

KENYA-US COOPERATION IN COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

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DECLARATION

This research study is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in this University or any other Institution of higher learning for examination.

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Signature.....

Date.....

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

I hereby dedicate this research project to my family, colleagues and friends who have continuously been a source of encouragement and offered their endless support during the entire time I was writing this research project and even when at times I felt defeated and all hope seemed lost.

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I would like to first and foremost acknowledge and appreciate my supervisor Prof. Maria Nzomo for all the advice and guidance given unto me as I was writing this project. I would also like to acknowledge my dear family, friends and colleagues who all participated and offered their much valued input into this project. This research project would not have been a success if it had not been for you.

ABSTRACT

Over the past two decades or so, acts of international and localized terrorism in Africa and elsewhere in the world have not only caused wanton human suffering but also constituted a direct threat to state survival. Terrorism continues to pose serious challenges to states in Africa and the world at large. Mutating and elusive repertoires around the vice have proven difficult to muster for many a government in the region. Yet while regional governments - either singly or collectively- have continued to enhance their counterterrorism strategies and capabilities; from time to time, serious qualms have emerged concerning the extent to which these processes have contravened and/or fell short of international human rights commitments and expectations upon the states. The United Nations General Assembly defines terrorism as a global security threat which requires collaborative approach. Kenya has witnessed several terrorist attacks ranging from the US Embassy bombing in 1998 to the recent Garissa University attacks. It is also worthwhile to mention that it is not only Kenya that has suffered from terrorism, but countries like Tanzania, Nigeria and Uganda have not been left behind. Terrorist groups including the al-Shabaab of Somalia, Boko Haram of Nigeria, Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM) and the al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) not only tear into the social fabric of a society, but also radicalize and recruit youths to join their terror groups. These groups main aim is to denounce western ideologies and radicalize the youths against teachings which go with Islam. A collaborative approach is required to counter such groups. The study sought to examine the status of terrorist phenomenon globally and the various global partnerships which exist with a view to assessing their level of efficiency. The research site was Nairobi. The study found that lack of democracy, failed or weak states, the emergence of modernization heralded by high economic growth has equally been found to correlate strongly with the emergence of ideological terrorism, historical antecedents of political violence, civil wars, and extremist ideologies revolutions, dictatorships or occupation may lower the threshold for acceptance of political violence and terrorism, and impede the development of non-violent norms among all segments of society as some of the factors that have been sustaining terrorism in the world today. The study concludes global terrorism has been on the rise, as the respondents explained that last year, 2015, marked the biggest rise in deaths caused by terrorist attacks, with more than 32,000 people killed in by the attacks worldwide. Based on this finding the study recommends an expansion on cooperation between national and regional terrorism practitioners and centers outside the Kenya-US partnership and the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership to working with restorative justice alternatives and organizations exploring methods of dealing with terrorists and radicals.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program
ACSRT	African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
AQAP	Al Qaida in the Arab Peninsula
AQIM	Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
ATA	Antiterrorism Assistance
AU	Africa Union
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
CTITF	Counter terrorism Implementation Task Force
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Forum
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ICPAT	International Conference on Plasma Assisted Technologies
ICU	Islamic Court Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham
JATF	Joint Antiterrorism Task Force
JTB	Joint Terrorism Branch
PREACT	Partnerships for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
SWAPO	South West Africa Peoples Organization
TSCTI	Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative Partnerships
UNSC	UN Security Council
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe Africa Union Patriotic Front

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

Over the past two decades or so, acts of international and localized terrorism in Africa and elsewhere in the world have not only caused wanton human suffering but also constituted a direct threat to state survival. Terrorism continues to pose serious challenges to states in Africa and the world at large. Mutating and elusive repertoires around the vice have proven difficult to muster for many a government in the region. Yet while regional governments - either singly or collectively- have continued to enhance their counterterrorism strategies and capabilities; from time to time, serious qualms have emerged concerning the extent to which these processes have contravened and/or fell short of international human rights commitments and expectations on the part of states¹.

The United Nations General Assembly defines terrorism as a global security threat which requires collaborative approach. Kenya has witnessed several terrorist attacks ranging from the US Embassy bombing in 1998 to the recent Garissa University attacks. It is also worthwhile to mention that it is not only Kenya that has suffered from terrorism, but countries like Tanzania, Nigeria and Uganda have not been left behind. “The terror groups such as al-Shabaab, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, and Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM) not only tear into the social fabric of a society, but recruit youths to join in this groups”². These groups main aim is to denounce western ideologies and radicalize the

¹ Boer 2008

² www.globalct.org

youths against teachings which go with Islam. A collaborative approach is required to counter such groups.

On its part, the US has also faced the challenges of terrorism; the most decisive one being the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Centre. This state of affair has made both the US and Kenya to think of collaborative efforts to combat terrorism.

Counter-terrorism may be defined broadly as “those state actions that aim to suppress terrorist violence, utilizing any or all tools of statecraft including the use of military force, criminal law measures, intelligence operations, regulatory controls, and diplomacy.” Thus, it can be seen as a preventive and responsive mechanism to terrorists’ activities.³ The United States’ Department of Defense (DOD) has defined counterterrorism as “actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable to terrorist networks.”⁴ The struggle against terrorism, however, is never-ending. Terrorism owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and exploit its opponent’s vulnerabilities. For success against terrorism, efforts must be as tireless, innovative, and dynamic as that of the opponent.⁵

The United Nations Global Counter-terrorism strategy which was adopted by General Assembly resolution 60/288 in 2006, and states that terrorism, constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. As a multilateral response, the UN has

³ Norton. Bensahel, N. (2006). “A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29: 35-49.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterterrorism*, Joint Publication 3-26, November 13, 2009.

⁵ Martin G (2009), *Understanding Terrorism, Challenges, Perspectives and Issues*, 3rd Ed, Sage Publications.

continued with efforts of combating emergent threats and challenges on the basis of international law. Actions adopted in response to the terrorist attacks in the US, has seen the undertaking of three major security council resolutions (1368, 1373 and 1377) that aim to addressing terrorism respectively: readiness to take “all necessary steps” to respond to the attacks and to combat all forms of terrorism, including the deterrence and clampdown of the financing of terrorism; and other procedures to eliminate international terrorism.

In an attempt to counter terrorism, both Kenya and the US have initiated a number of counterterrorism activities. For instance, Kenya has so benefitted from Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program which is aimed at providing capacity building in border security, surveillance, crisis response among other measures. The Homeland Security’s Department of Customs and Border Patrol are aimed at providing border patrols and this has worked for the Kenya police and Kenya wildlife service. This study looks specifically at the US-Kenya counter terrorism collaborative initiatives with a view to evaluate their effectiveness in countering terrorism in both Kenya and threats to US interests in the Horn of Africa region.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The development of counter-terrorism policies around the world reflects domestic political processes and different national approaches by states around the world. As a multilateral response, the United Nations has called to proceed with the endeavors fighting new threats and difficulties on the premise of international law. The activity taken in light to the terrorist attacks in the United States has seen the appropriation of three major Security Council Resolutions (1368, 1373 and 1377) tending to terrorism in several ways respectively. In

particular, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in 2006, and states that terrorism continues to one of the most serious threats to international peace and security.

Global partnerships in the fight against terrorism occupy a key position in Kenya's relations with other countries especially the US. Kenya and the US have enjoyed warm and cordial relations over the years; ranging from tourist visits from the US; to the recent signed bilateral agreements between President Uhuru Kenyatta and barrack Obama in 2015. Despite this, the two countries are at two different levels of economic development. While US is the world's super power and suffered the 9/11 attacks, Kenya has had to repeatedly deal with the negative consequences of terrorism. Consequently, Kenya requires assistance from US to provide it with intelligence gathering and surveillance equipments as part of the counter terrorism collaboration.

This study examines the global situation in respect to terrorism and in particular the role of global partnerships in countering terrorism and the challenges that Kenya faces in its fight against terrorism. In addition, it also examines counter-terrorism measures against US interests in the Horn of Africa region.

Research Questions: The study is guided by three key questions: a) what are the various global counter terrorism partnerships that exist? b) What role do global counter terrorism partnerships play in countering global terrorism? And, c) in what ways does the US assist

Kenya within the US-Kenya Cooperation in the fight against terrorism and what is the subsequent development for the two countries.

1.3 Study Objectives

The general objective is to examine the global status of terrorist phenomenon and the various global partnerships which exist with a view to assessing their level of efficiency.

1.3.1 Specific objectives

1. To assess the global situation in respect to terrorism.
2. To examine and determine the role of global partnerships in countering terrorism.
3. To analyze the various ways by which the US cooperates with Kenya in countering terrorism

1.4 Literature Review

Terrorism around the world has continued to occur with increasing frequency and magnitude and with new modes of attack. This has provoked debates and raised questions among scholars, policymakers and other stakeholders, as to the efficacy of the mechanisms and strategies in place for responding to terrorism. Indeed, the high occurrence and global spread of terrorism and the seeming inability of the World Community to combat it despite legislative and other counter-terrorism measures, has not only brought into question the viability of the strategies in place for responding to terrorism, but also the underlying conceptual, ideological and institutional frameworks underpinning action⁶. The 35th OAU Summit in Algiers, Algeria, in July 1999, saw the adoption of The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, by African states, to provide the regional

⁶ Maria Nzomo (2013) the gender dimension of international terrorism

architecture necessary for thwarting and countering acts of terrorism within the African region⁷.

In Kenya's case, The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012⁸ is the main legal framework concerned with counterterrorism efforts. The Act employs supposedly "gender neutral" language. The Act describes terrorist action as one which involves the use of violence against a person; endangers the life of a person other than the one committing the action; creates a serious risk to the health, safety of the public or a section of the public or results in serious damage of property through the use of firearms or explosives⁹. Neighboring states to Kenya like Tanzania and Uganda also have their own counter-terrorism legislations in place. Just like Kenya's Suppression of Terrorism Act 2012¹⁰, Uganda's Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002¹¹ and Tanzania's Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002¹²

1.4.1 The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy

The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy which was adopted by Member States on 8 September 2006¹³ consists of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288)¹⁴. This strategy was tailored to enrich national, regional and international efforts to strategically counter the threat of terrorism. Some of the practical steps outlined in

⁷ Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism (1999): OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999 <https://treaties.un.org/doc/db/Terrorism/OAU-english.pdf> accessed on November 3, 2014

⁸ <http://frc.go.ke/legislation/download/18> accessed on November 3, 2014

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ <http://frc.go.ke/legislation/download/18> accessed on November 3, 2014

¹¹ <https://www.unodc.org/tldb/showDocument.do?documentUid=6589> accessed on November 3, 2014

¹² http://www.immigration.go.tz/downloads/Tanzania_Prevention%20of%20Terrorism%20Act%202002%20.pdf accessed on November 3, 2014

¹³ <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml#poa4> accessed on November 3, 2015

¹⁴ Ibid

the resolution range from strengthening state capacity through the involvement of non-state actors to promote and protect human rights within the context of counter-terrorism efforts and to counter terrorist threats, to better coordinating United Nations system's counter-terrorism activities. The strategy recognizes the role of non- state actors and the need for them to collaborate with the state to counter terrorism. In addition, the United Nations has also come up with a number of anti-terrorism resolutions which are designed to consistently, unambiguously and strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, as it constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. In line with this the UN promises to take urgent action to prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and, in particular.

The UN also requires that all state parties implement all the General Assembly resolutions on measures to eliminate international terrorism, and also other relevant General Assembly resolutions on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terror acts. States are also required to implement the Security Council's resolutions related to international terrorism and to fully cooperate with the counter-terrorism subsidiary bodies of the Security Council in the fulfillment of their tasks, recognizing that many States continue to require assistance in implementing these resolutions¹⁵. Of most significance in this UN counter terrorism strategy is the recognition that international cooperation and other counter terror measures that are undertaken, comply with obligations under international law,

¹⁵ ibid

including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law¹⁶.

1.4.2 Counterterrorism partnerships

A number of countries have forged various cooperative initiatives to counter terrorism. For instance, to improve its counterterrorism competence, Ethiopia takes part in Regional Strategic Initiative and Antiterrorism Assistance program (ATA), to develop capacity on leadership and management, investigative skill, and border security. Ethiopia is an active member of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. The country participates in regional and multilateral forums for counterterrorism, including the IGAD Security Sector Program trainings, which build the capacity of IGAD member states to mitigate, detect, and dissuade acts of terrorism.

Nigeria enjoys cordial relations with the U.S. on counterterrorism cooperation. The Nigerian Government, through help of the US, has an intelligence infusion cell, tasked with streamlining coordination and information sharing on counterterrorism matters among key agencies, which includes the State Security Service (SSS), the intelligence agencies, the national police, and the military. The Nigerian government participates in U.S. counterterrorism capacity programs under the U.S. Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program, including the training of Nigerian Police Force members in the awareness and capacity to protect and preserve evidence from the crime scene of a suspected terrorist act. Through the ATA program, Nigerian Police, customs officials, and immigration

¹⁶ <http://www.un.org/en/terrorism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml#poa4> accessed on November 3, 2015

officers also participated in an interagency rural border patrol training to build the law enforcement sector's ability to effectively utilize all agencies in tackling rural border security challenges.

With the assistance from the US, the government established an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (later disbanded), a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a National Security Advisory Committee. Senegal has been working to improving its law enforcement capability by engaging in multilateral training events organized by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), AU, and the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS). The U.S. Department of Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program provided training and enabling equipment to build their investigative and border security capacities. Through the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), ATA helped establish a Cyber Crime Investigative Unit with the Senegalese National Police, Criminal Investigative Unit.

The Nigeria is employing a more effective strategy to address the Boko Haram terror group, which combines security efforts with political and development efforts to reduce appeal by the group to the local communities, whereby they have been able to address the concerns of the people of northern Nigeria, and protect the rights of all its citizens. Nigeria continues to engage with national and local leaders through US-funded projects that expand vocational skills training for youth at risk of extremist radicalization. Counter terrorism measures deduced include poverty levels alleviation programmes, economic development, education and social reforms. The Nigerian government is also aggressively addressing poverty challenges through its youth empowerment programmes like You Win, and investing massively on infrastructure to promote economic development.

Similarly, Tunisia is making concerted efforts to improving its socio-economic conditions through economic development and educational programs in order to counter radicalization and violence. It is working closely with the US aid agency (USAID)'s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) on programs that have been designed to counter violent extremism. The programs, which include awareness campaigns, youth centres, and educational activities, seek to engage youth who are at risk of being recruited by violent extremist organizations. On its part, Egypt has earmarked \$1.3 billion for development and counter-terrorism efforts in the restive Sinai Peninsula, to contain Islamist insurgency.

1.4.3 Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Africa

For a long time, terror attacks in the African region were few and far between right from the early post-independence time in the 1960s through to the 1980s. Nonetheless, African governments and international security agencies in those olden days begun to be concerned about terrorism especially after the Munich Attack in September 1972 and the Entebbe hostage incident in June 1976 as well as the Norfolk Bombing in Nairobi on December 31st 1980- all of which were directed against Israeli nationals. This was the context of terrorism and counterterrorism in the immediate post-independence Africa. The vice seemed to have been localized to the Middle East in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict; but also in the context of the Northern Ireland conflict in which terror methods were employed by the Irish Republican Army against the United Kingdom especially on the decade of the 1980s.

It is noteworthy however that in the ‘strict sense of the word,’ internally directed (what would be termed *domestic terrorism*) forms of terrorism in Africa have been in existence for a long time, though perhaps not publicized due to their localized nature. National liberation movements in Africa like the Mau Mau in Kenya, the Algerian Liberation Movement, the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the South Western Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia and Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe (then, Southern Rhodesia) were all classified at one time or another as terrorist organizations. The 1960s through to the 1990s, were characterized by numerous civil wars on the African scene- Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC) Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi just to mention but a few. These conflicts were characterized by what would, in many respects, pass to be acts of terror against civilian populations.

Nonetheless, the kind of terrorism that emerged in the immediate post-Cold War period was one which seemed to pit the Arab and/or Muslim world on one hand against the United States and the West on the other- it had assumed a global character. In fact, it was not until the August 7th 1998 attack on the US Embassies and Dar-es-Salaam that counterterrorism operations in region were stepped up. Today’s context of terrorism in Eastern Africa seems to be centered on Al-Qaeda-related extremist group- Al-Shabaab, in Somalia. This outfit has been quite active and increasingly working in cahoots with other militant groups’ cells that are dotted all over the northern region especially in Libya, Nigeria (Boko Haram), Mali, Algeria, Morocco and Egypt (and by extension Yemen, Oman, Comoros and Afghanistan).

Over this period, Eastern Africa has been a major focal point as far as the activities of international terror groups is concerned.

According to the Global Terrorism Index Report for 2014, out of a total of 162 states, the top-20 most affected by terrorism, 6 are in Africa namely Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, Egypt, Libya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Republic of South Sudan and Sudan. A cursory glance at these statistics reveals in fact, that at least three of these fall within the Eastern Africa cluster. Hence, it is clear that the Eastern Africa region is at the core of the African counterterrorism agenda. But how did this come to be? Over this period, regional governments- *either singly or collectively*- have been keen to counter the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, Al Hijra, and Al-Shabaab (among others) and their sympathizers. By late 2006, it was clear to the international community that terrorism and terror networks had pitched camp in Somalia. Security agencies in the region were also aware that there was a growing number of active as well as terror sleeper cells in many parts of the region more so in Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The unilateral undertaking by Ethiopian forces in Somalia, in December 2006, marked the first move in the direction of rooting-out these organizations, with Somalia as the main point of focus¹⁷.

This Operation somewhat set the pace for similar counterterrorism undertakings by other regional states¹⁸. The Ethiopian campaign was on several instances bolstered by concurrent stealth surgical strikes by the United States in early January 2007 targeting suspected

¹⁷ Siefert 2008

¹⁸ Derso 2009

extremists belonging to several fundamentalist off-shoots of the ICU¹⁹. These groups included the Al-Ittihad Islamiya, Hizbul Islam, Ahlu Sunna Waljama'a, Ras Kamboni Brigades, Jama Islamiya and (the then emerging) Mujahideen Youth Movement among others, were believed to be enjoying the support of international terror networks including Al-Qaeda²⁰. Halting their growth and influence was deemed urgent and necessary for the then Transitional Federal Government to gain full control in the war-torn state. Since then, the regional counterterrorism strategy has since had Somalia as its focal point. With the blessing of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) commenced its mission in Somalia in March 2007, with a force consisting mainly of Ugandan troops but later joined by Burundian troops²¹.

It seemed that the Al-Shabaab activities were confined to Somalia in bid to oust the then Transitional Federal Government (TFG) through both conventional and unconventional warfare to meet their desired goals. It was therefore no surprise when Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the Kampala 11th July terror attacks. A week later, on 23rd July 2010, the eve of African Union's Summit in Kampala; AU Commission chairperson Jean Ping announced that he had asked countries, including South Africa to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Although many African Heads of State strongly condemned that Kampala terror attacks, they seemed unable to provide a final and lasting solution to the 'Somalia Question'. Al-Shabaab appeared untamable and it continued with its terror operations on land and at sea with sheer impunity.

¹⁹Nzau 2010, 165

²⁰ Sabala 2011, 109-110

²¹ Sabala 2011, 99; Wakengela 2011, 383-384

It was on this grounds that in mid-October 2011, The Kenya Defence Forces were ordered into action to stop Somalia's Al-Shabaab militia from further threatening the country's security and economy. Kenya then declared war on the terrorist organization operating from Somalia and said Kenyan security forces will pursue the aggressors across the border. Kenyan authorities argued that Kenya had a right to self defence, adding that the Constitution and the UN charter were clear on the defence of borders. They invoked Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which pronounces self defence as an inherent right- meaning the country can do whatever is necessary to keep its borders secure²².

Kenya had little options but to go after Al Shabaab militants who abducted aid workers from Dadaab refugee camp. In retaliation, Al Shabaab made several terror incursions into Kenya. Al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage threatened to launch terror attacks in Kenyan cities if Kenya did not withdraw its troops. Since the on set of *Operation Linda Nchi* in Mid-October 2011, Nairobi and various part of the North Eastern Province came under terrorist attacks by Al Shabaab operatives and their local sympathizers. Today, Al Shabaab remains the greatest threat to Kenya's national security and even the wider Eastern African region²³.

Kenya's *Operation Linda Nchi*- OLN lasted between October 2011 and June 2012, when Kenya officially joined AMISOM in 2014. OLN's main strategic end-objective was to crush the military capabilities of *Al-Shabaab* and diminish their direct influence especially in

²² Nzau 2013

²³ Nzau and Mwanzia 2014

border regions with Kenya²⁴. These direct preemptive actions did succeed, but only partially so, for armed opposition to the TFG has since persisted. On the whole, the situation in Somalia has remained volatile but relatively stable but the threat of terror inside Somalia has been significantly reduced. Be it as it may however, Al-Shabaab managed to carryout several devastating attacks on soft targets especially in Kenya. The first major one of this kind was the Westgate Attack of September 2013, followed by the Mpeketoni, Lamu Attacks of June 2014 and the Garissa Attack of April 2015. Other smaller but deadly attacks have also taken place mainly on Kenyan soil including the September 2014 laying of 28 passengers and the December 2014 attack on a quarry in Mandera that left 36 dead among many others (of smaller magnitudes mainly involving the use of grenades and improvised explosive devices) that numbered at least 80 by December 2014. Meanwhile, dozens of suicide bombings have taken place inside Somalia with the latest one involving a suicide attack on a UN vehicle in April 2015, leaving six UNICEF personnel dead.

1.4.4 Building Global Support

A number of collaborative measures have been undertaken to build global support for counter terrorism. The UN for instance has committed both financial and technical resources to Africa to mitigate African states' inability to counter terrorism. There are concerted efforts to institutionalize the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism signed in 1999. Similarly, efforts to address the mutually agreed anti-terrorism priorities of the UN system and the AU peace and security agenda in the areas of vulnerability and deficiencies require broad cooperation and

²⁴ International Crisis Group 2012

collaboration between the UN system and the AU institutions to prevent African States from falling further behind.²⁵

The UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (UNOSAA), through a “Framework for Consultations” with relevant African intergovernmental organizations and private institutions, and in collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and its components have developed an Action Plan which provides a path to implementation of UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and counterterrorism mandates in Africa.

This UN-AU cooperation structure has a potential role in strengthening Africa’s counter-terrorism architecture” by working closely with African institutions to increase their communication capacities and strategies, as well to foster institutionalizing civil society participation in the process. After 9/11, U.S. focus on terrorism in Africa became much more pronounced. Counterterrorism efforts have become even more pronounced in U.S. Africa policy in form of military, diplomacy, financial action, intelligence, law enforcement as well as development processes. United States deployed a sizeable contingent of American troops on the continent, with the establishment in late 2002 of the Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti. In 2011 the United States co-founded the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), which includes participation from African countries. The

²⁵United Nations. (2010) Africa and International Counterterrorism Imperatives, United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Africa. <http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/new-reports/OSAA-TerrorismPaper-12Nov2010.pdf>
Accessed on 27th April 2015.

GCTF focuses on identifying critical civilian counterterrorism needs, mobilizing the necessary expertise and resources to address such needs, and enhancing global cooperation²⁶.

1.5 Theoretical framework

This study uses the complex interdependent theory. Complex interdependence has three main characteristics: a) Multiple channel connects societies: These include informal ties between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements; informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face to face and through telecommunications), and transnational organizations (such as multinational banks or corporations). These channel lead to interstate, trans-governmental and transnational reactions proving that state are not the only actors in the international political system. b) The agenda for interstate relations consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among issue means that military security does not always dominate other foreign policy agendas. In fact, today many issues arise from domestic policy making the distinction between domestic and foreign issues blurred. C) Military force is not used by governments towards other governments within the region or on the foreign when complex interdependence prevails. It may however be important in these governments' relations with other governments outside that region or on other issues. For instance, military force could be irrelevant in resolving disagreements on economic issue among members of an alliance, yet at the same it can be very important for those alliances relations with a rival bloc.

The three conditions have been fulfilled on certain global issues of economic and ecological interdependence. There exist multiple channels of contact among peoples of different

²⁶ ibid

countries. For instance, bureaucrats from different countries deal directly at meetings and on telephone as well as in acting. Also non-governmental elites frequently get together in normal course of business and in conferences sponsored by private foundations. In addition, multinational forms (Coca-Cola) and banks affect both domestic and interstate reactions. Thus the participation of large and dynamic organizations not controlled entirely by governments has become normal part of foreign as well as domestic relations. These actors are important because they act as transmission belts making government policies in various countries more sensitive to one another. Parcelled developments in issues of environmental regulation and caution over technology reinforce this trend.

Foreign affairs agendas – that is sets of issues relevant to foreign policy with governments are concerned - have become larger and more diverse. All issues can no longer be subordinated to military security. As Henry Kissinger (US Secretary of State) noted in 1975 “progress in dealing with traditional agenda is no longer enough. New and unprecedented kinds of issue have emerged. The problem of energy, resources, environment, population, use of space and seas now rank (equally) with questions of military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.’ The extensive consultative arrangements developed by OECD, GATT (WTO) IMC, EO, AU indicate how domestic and foreign policy issues overlap among states. When there are multiple issues on the agenda which threaten the interest of domestic groups but do not threaten the nation as a whole, the problem of formulating a coherent foreign policy increases.

1.6 Justification of the study

The purpose of this study aims to examine the key motivating factors behind the Global partnership as a Counter Terrorism Strategy. The fact that Kenya is still a developing country means Kenya has to rely heavily on the US to provide it with the much needed assistance required in terms of security support. On the flip side of the coin, Kenya has become the new frontier for business having hosted the global entrepreneurship summit recently highlighting the interdependence of Kenya's national security and international security.

Academically, the study will add to the existing body of knowledge that examines global counter terrorism measures and more specifically the US Kenya counter terrorism cooperation. It will also enrich the existing on global partnerships some counter terrorism strategies. It will be of use to students of international studies, international relations and other related disciplines. On the policy side this study will help make a contribution to Kenya's counter terrorism security initiatives aimed towards building a more secure and peaceful country.

1.7 Hypotheses

1. Global counter terrorism strategies enhances states' counter terrorism capabilities
2. Kenya's terrorist threats have declined following the new global counter partnership strategies signed with the US.
3. The Kenya-US Cooperation agreement on counter terrorism is more of a political agreement than a technical agreement

1.8 Methodology

1.8.1 Introduction

This section focuses on the scientific methodology of research. Chava and David Nachimias (1996) define scientific methodology as a system of explicit rules and procedures upon which research is based and against which claims for knowledge are evaluated. This section therefore discusses the research design, the research site, population sample, the sampling procedure, the data collection instruments, the methods of data collection and data analysis. This research used both qualitative and quantitative methodology. It also discusses the ethical issues that arose during the research.

1.8.2 Research Design

The research design used was a case study which aimed at giving as much detail as possible on the phenomenon of study. This case study further enabled the researcher to bring out the underlying factors of global partnership as a counter terrorism strategy. According to Kombo and Tromp (2006), the aim of a case study design is to study a unit in detail. This design brought out examples of global partnership as a counter terrorism strategy in the world. In order to achieve the objectives this study both primary and secondary sources of data were used to examine how global partnership as a counter terrorism strategy has assisted to boost the efforts of Kenya and US cooperation.

1.8.3 Research Site

The research site was Nairobi. The researcher chose Nairobi because most of the government officials believed to be experts on global partnership as a counter terrorism strategy can be

found there. It is also a city where most of the policies, key decisions and business activities taking place between Kenya and the United States.

1.8.4 Population and Sample

The target population comprised government officials, members of the civil society, men and women from Kenyan Defence Forces, the anti-terrorism officer in Kenya, professionals working in both Kenya and United States (all aged between 25 and 55 years old). A sample size of 45 respondents was chosen as this size was representative and easy to tabulate.

1.8.5 Sampling Procedure

This study used purposive sampling where the researcher targeted specific groups of people believed to be experts on global terrorism. According to Kombo and Tromp (2006) the power of purposive sampling lies in selecting the information rich cases for in-depth analysis related to the central issues under study such as the motivating factors of terrorists, any existing policies on terrorism and the challenges that might hinder Kenya from prospering further. Therefore, this procedure assisted in getting more information about the issue at hand and also bringing out varied views on it.

1.8.6 Data Collection and Research Instruments

This is a significant step before data analysis because of the methods and instruments involved in the data collection. The researcher used a self-administered questionnaire and questionnaire interviews. Both of these questionnaires provided the researcher with quantitative and qualitative data. The research also used both open-ended and close-ended questionnaires.

1.8.7 Procedure for Data Collection

As a requirement, when carrying out research in Kenya the researcher acquired a research permit. This allowed for the distribution of questionnaires in Kenya. The questionnaires were administered to people working in government agencies and the Embassy of United States in Nairobi.

1.8.8 Data Analysis

The researcher used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to study the links between variables. The data was then coded into the database. Frequency distribution and correlation tables were used to analyze the links between variables.

1.9 Scope and Limitation of the study

The study was restricted to the Global partnership as a Counter Terrorism Strategy: A case study of Kenya –Us Cooperation. In Kenya the research targeted Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of United States in Nairobi, and the United Nations in Nairobi. The major limitation to this study would be that of gatekeepers. This may happen when going to administer a questionnaire the gate keeper may ask all sorts of questions before your let into the compound. This makes also waste a lot of time. Another limitation maybe the scope of answers, a respondent may feel not obliged to give as much information regarding sensitive security details. On that note, also not all respondents may be available to answer the questionnaire hence time-wasting again. It may also be a problem accessing all relevant government policy documents for literature review. Another limitation to this study would be that of security. It was not possible to visit all areas in Kenya because of insecurity.

1.10 Chapter Outline

This study has five chapters. Chapter one which is the introductory chapter is composed of the statement of the problem, the objectives, literature review, theoretical framework and methodology. Chapter two is an assessment of the global situation in respect to terrorism and provides a general overview of global terrorism situation. Chapter three looks at the role of global partnerships in countering terrorism. Chapter four is on US-Kenya Cooperation on Counter terrorism and analyses the research findings. Lastly, chapter five provides the research conclusion and recommendation.

CHAPTER TWO

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE GLOBAL SITUATION IN RESPECT TO TERRORISM

2.1 Introduction

This chapter gives an assessment of the global situation in respect to terrorism before narrowing it down to regional and local. It further gives specific examples of where terrorism has occurred. It is now well established that terrorism is no longer a problem for specific countries but an internationally global issue. Terrorist organizations may perpetrate attacks in a variety of countries; the victims of attacks can be of different nationalities; the offices, headquarters, and training camps of terrorist organizations function in various countries; terrorist organizations receive direct and indirect assistance from different states, enlist support from different ethnic communities, and secure financial help throughout the world²⁷.

Modern terrorism is increasingly dependent on the support of nations. Some states sponsor terrorism or use terror groups as a means to their own ends, while these organizations depend on the assistance they receive from such countries at the economic, military, and operational levels. Some organizations are so closely dependent on the assistance of states that they become “puppets” functioning at the initiative, direction, and with the complete support of these states²⁸. States perpetrating terrorist acts abroad through their own official bodies—members of its security forces or its intelligence services, or their direct agents. In other words, states intentionally attacking civilians in other countries in order to achieve political aims without declaring war. Another aspect of the global situation in respect to terrorism

²⁷ Alex P. Schmidt and Albert I. Jongman et al., *Political Terrorism* (SWIDOC, Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 1988), p. 5

²⁸ Alex P. Schmidt and Albert I. Jongman et al., *Political Terrorism* (SWIDOC, Amsterdam and Transaction Books, 1988)

involved the sponsoring of terrorism activities, like in the case of Iran where it carried out training of Hezbollah. Iran has been notorious in this that at one time it was it was also implicated in the assassination of fellow Iranians for example in Berlin four murders of Kurdish dissidents took place and the German court in 1997 found Iranian leadership responsible.

2.2 The Global Dimension of Terrorism

The changing nature and understanding of terrorism is not only an important issue but also divisive. Threats of International are made more serious by the interdependence nature and the network operations of International terrorist groups. The theory of complex interdependence argues that actors in the international system collaborate in common objectives and this is also applicable among the different terrorist groups.

Over time Terrorism has changed in in concepts, locations, techniques, incidence, scale and the organizational structures²⁹. Laqueur (1999) argue that terrorism is different in this generation; as there has been a revolution, in the countenance of terrorism³⁰. Such a dramatic change in the nature of terrorism from that which occurred historically, and the assertion of the existence of a new form of terrorism would aid to contextualize the status of global terrorism³¹. Postmodern terrorism as called by Laqueur beyond the traditional terrorism we have known, has become one of the greatest security threats as terrorists' motivations, strategies and weapons have changed in the last 30 years compared to traditional

²⁹ Whittaker, (2007)

³⁰ Laqueur, (1999)

³¹ Tucker, (2001)

terrorism. According to Medd and Goldstein³², the terrorist motivations in the 1970's were political, but in the 1980's besides politically motivated terrorism, religiously and economically motivated terrorism is observed, and this situation has continued during the 1990's. Also, Chalk, Kartha and Kronin emphasize the religious terrorism in the 1990's.

According to Laqueur, extreme right groups have replaced the terrorism of leftist and anarchic groups. In addition, ethnically motivated terrorism has increased. Today, the global terrorists might be very small groups or even individuals. Terrorism has wrecked havoc almost everywhere in the world we live today, but just to narrow it down I will first look at it globally beginning with the Lockerbie bombing. Although the incident fell under transnational terrorism it was termed as a terror act. The Pan American flight 103 was downed over Scotland in the year 1988. It was reported that the bomb was transferred in London from a flight which had originated in Malta. The terror incident left about 276 people dead.

Arguably, terrorism became internationalized with the establishment of the Al Qaida – an extremist group whose origin dates back to the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1989. Led by the world's most wanted terrorist at the time, Usama bin Laden the Al Qaida Leader, claiming that all the chaos and instability in the Islamic region are caused by the west countries. Several terror affiliated groups emerged during the Arab Spring in different parts of the world. For instance, there is Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was formed by a merger of Saudi Arabian and Yemeni Islamist extremists; Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); Al Shabaab in Somalia; Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Boko

³² Medd and Goldstein

Haram in Nigeria. All these Al Qaida groups use explosives, detonated by suicide bombers, to cause indiscriminate destruction and mass civilian casualties. Although some have even carried attacks overseas, the 11 September 2001 attack on the world trade center in the United States was Al Qaida's most "high impact" attack that has been seen around the world³³.

On September 11, 2001, 19 militants associated with the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda coordinately hijacked four airliners and carried out suicide attacks against specific strategic targets in the United States. Two of the airliners were flown into the twin-towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third airliner was flown to the Pentagon just outside Washington, D.C., and the fourth airliner crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. All 45 people aboard were killed³⁴. These attacks were associated with Islamic fundamentalism and they caused a lot of deaths and untold destruction. In response to this, the United Nations called for continued efforts in combating new threats and challenges on the basis of international law. The action undertaken in response to the terrorist attacks in the United States saw the adoption of three major Security Council Resolutions (1368, 1373 and 1377) addressing terrorism in several ways respectively: readiness to take 'all necessary steps' to respond to the attacks and to combat all forms of terrorism; the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorism; and the measures to eliminate international terrorism³⁵.

³³ <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international-terr>

³⁴ <http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks>

³⁵ *ibid*

The event, dubbed 9/11, awakened the European states. After 9/11, European Union member states made the fight against terrorism a priority. The key threats were perceived as ‘terrorism committed to maximum violence’, the proliferation and availability of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, regional conflicts, the weakening of the state system (state failure), privatization of force and organized crime³⁶. Thus, it is considered that global terrorism poses a growing strategic threat to whole Europe. The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction³⁷. These states are jointly committed to combating terrorism. Consequently, they have decided on wide range of measures such as judicial cooperation, cooperation between police and intelligence services, prevention of financing of terrorism, strengthen the control at external borders and to improve cooperation with the United States for effective combating³⁸. Thus the EU supports the key role of the UN and full implementation of UN conventions on terrorism and has taken steps to have a common legislation to combat terrorism, exchange information between member states, freezing the assets of terrorists’ activities and financing of terrorism. In addition, the European Council adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism on March 2004, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in Madrid in order to build the plan that they have decided after 9/11. The Madrid train bombings of March 11, 2004, which were attributed to ETA, a Basque separatist organization killed 191 and injured more than 1,800 people.

³⁶ Schmid, P. Alex and Jongman, J. Albert (1984): *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Bata Bases, Theories, And Literature*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

³⁷ Friedman, L. Thomas (1999): *The Lexus and Olive Tree – Understanding Globalization*, Anchor Books, New York.

³⁸ Soros, George (2006): *The Age of Fallibility: Consequences of the War on Terror*, Public Affairs, New York.

Occurring just three days before Spain's general elections, the attacks had major political consequences.

In recent years Britain has suffered a number of terrorist attacks starting with 2005 London Subway bombing which left 52 dead. A number of terrorist plots have also been foiled in Britain including the 2010 London Stock Exchange plot, the 2011 Birmingham rucksack bomb plot and the 2013 plot against Territorial Army base³⁹. France which for a long time has held the reputation of being the bastion of citizen safety had this shatter by the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack which left 12 people dead. Four more people were killed two days later by a friend of the Charlie Hebdo attackers who held them hostage.

2.2.1 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant/ the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)

In June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, established the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a caliphate. Although no nation recognizes ISIL as a state, the group has received allegiance from terror groups in Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia⁴⁰. ISIL has claimed terrorist attacks in Canada, the US and France. In August 2011, al-Baghdadi began sending experienced militants to Syria where they later established in January 2012 the Jabhat al-Nusra, or the al-Nusra Front (ANF) that opposes President Assad's regime. In 2013, ISI changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) to reflect its growing influence in Syria, and announced the merging of ISIL and ANF. ANF disputed the merger and appealed to Al Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. When al-Zawahiri instructed

³⁹ <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international-terr>

⁴⁰ <https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-do/the-threats/terrorism/international-terr>

ISIL to restrict its activities to Iraq, the group took control of many of ANF's foreign fighters. Tensions continue between ISIL and ANF, and in February 2014 Al Qaida dissociated itself from ISIL, reaffirming ANF as Al Qaida's official branch in Syria. The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), has supplanted al Qaeda as the jihadist threat becomes a great concern.

ISIS' rhetoric ideology, and long-term goals are similar to al Qaeda's, as the two groups were once formally allies. But ISIS is not al Qaeda. It is not an outgrowth or a part of the older radical Islamist organization, nor does it represent the next phase in its expansion. In effect ISIS is the successor to al Qaeda and it represents the post-al Qaeda jihadist threat. In effect ISIS came into being following the U.S invasion of Iraq in 2003. At that time, it was called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and under the leadership of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi but in 2011, when the revolt against the Assad regime in Syria grew into a full-blown civil war, at which point the group took advantage of the chaos. It seized territory in northeast Syria where it established a base of operations. It then rebranded itself as ISIS. Today ISIS boasts of over 30,000 fighters, holds state territories in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in sophisticated military well organized operations⁴¹.

The Middle East as well as South East Asia has seen its fair share of terrorist attacks. It is believed that the attackers were Muslims aimed at carrying out retaliatory attacks at the US because the US was supporting Israel, the US was also involved in the gulf war at the time and it had heavy presence in the Middle East. This just shows one how the Islamic terrorist

⁴¹ <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2015-02-16/isis-not-terrorist-group>

were against anything western from the US. It is sad to note that they were financed by Osama bin Laden's terrorist organization. It is interesting to note how the terrorist gained entry into the US. It was noted that the terrorists easily smuggled box-cutters and knives through security at three East Coast airports and boarded four flights bound for California, because the planes were loaded with fuel for the long transcontinental journey. In a similar tone, the PKK, a Kurdish separatist group, continues to commit terrorist acts against Turkey. In Latin America, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army in Colombia. There were also the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) extremists who held hostages in the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima, Peru, for 125 days.

2.3 Terrorism in Africa

Over recent years' terrorist groups in Africa have been exploiting structural state weaknesses in African states, including the porous borders and socioeconomic discontent. It seems that the smuggling of fire-arms, drugs and contraband, widespread corruption, poor governance and a history of clan clashes and hostage taking for ransom in parts of Africa, have provided a gap for the establishment of terrorist organizations with operatives, and the lines between Islamic militancy and organized crime becoming blurred. The absence of government and a lack of medical care and economic opportunity are driving people toward extremist ideology in Africa. Northern Mali is a particular challenge due to lack of effective government control in two-thirds of the country, turning the area into a safe haven for al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.

2.3.1 Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

AQIM is one of the most well-known and verifiable terrorist group whose operation consistently continue to affect West Africa. AQIM is a terrorist organisation with its origins in Algeria. On October 17, 2013 32 AQIM terrorists succeeded in attacking an Algerian natural gas facility at Amenas. Since that time the group has spread its operations to Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It seems AQIM operatives have adapted techniques from Iraq, as well as Afghanistan, and AQIM is gaining a foothold in lawless parts of regions in that part of the Sahara, with nomadic tribes, where local loyalties take precedence over other allegiances. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb is among the best-financed affiliates of the terrorist group, drawing its money from kidnapping for ransom, drug-running and illicit trafficking of tobacco and fuel. Violent extremists and affiliates of al-Qaida were involved in the September. 11 2012 attacks on a U.S. diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, that claimed the lives of Ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans⁴².

2.3.2 Boko Haram

Boko Haram is an Islamic sect that believes politics in northern Nigeria has been seized by a group of corrupt, false Muslims. It wants to wage a war against them, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria generally, to create a “pure” Islamic state ruled by Sharia law. Boko Haram receives financial support, some training, probably some explosives from al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, in a relationship that goes both ways. Since August 2011 Boko Haram has executed bombing attacks in public places including churches in Nigeria's northeast. The group has also broadened its targets to include setting fire to schools, in March 2012, some

⁴² <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/24/world/europe/europe-ponders-terror-threat-to-soft-ta>

twelve public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night, forcing close to 10,000 pupils out of education. To counter the attacks by Boko Haram the government of Jonathan Good Luck announced a state of emergency in 2013 where Boko Haram had its stronghold. These three states included: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa⁴³. The Boko Haram in Nigeria have proved to be very dangerous not only to the Nigerian people, but to the security system of the entire West African region. They appear to be a disgruntled lot expressing their anger at anyone and at anything and have proven to be resilient. The terrorist group has over a thousand recruits who are experts in bombing.

2.3.3 Al-Shabaab

Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for many bombings in Mogadishu and in central and northern Somalia, typically targeting Somali government officials, AMISOM, and perceived allies of the TFG. Al-Shabaab also claimed responsibility for the twin suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, on 11 July 2010 that killed more than 70 people. Al-Shabaab is responsible for the assassination of Somali peace activists, international aid workers, numerous civil society figures, and journalists. The group gained additional notoriety by blocking the delivery of aid from some Western relief agencies during the 2011 famine that killed tens of thousands of Somalis. Kenya has been hard hit by terrorists. Hundreds of lives were lost in the Westgate attacks, the recent Garissa and Wajir attacks. Other places hit include: Mombasa, Madera, Kilifi and Lamu counties. Kenya has put comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that includes vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalization policies.

⁴³ Princeton N. Lyman and J. Stephene Morrison; the terrorist threat in Africa; available at <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles59534>

Since the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in July 1998, Tanzania has not experienced any other major terrorist attacks. However, on May 5, an explosion outside of a Catholic church near Arusha killed three and injured over 40 gathered for the church's consecration. In Uganda when the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRM) came into power in 1986, many insurgent groups emerged to fight it, including the Holy Spirit Movement. Uganda has used several counterterrorism strategies to deal with the terrorism issue. Some of the strategies include: preventive actions and deliberate, disruptive interventions, it has set up the Joint Anti-Terrorism (JAT) Task Force and also the Ugandan military have combed the hideouts of terrorists in the country. Other measures include: offering a resettlement packages to those who were ready to denounce their evil acts and it also introduced amnesty.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed global situation of terrorism in line with objective one of the study. In this respect it examined the activities of various groups that operate in different parts of the world. Specifically, the activities of terrorist groups such as: Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Al-Qaida in the Arab Penisular, Boko Haram, and Al-Shabaab among others were examined. In conclusion one thing remains for a fact that it is big, global problem worldwide and effective and efficient counterterrorism measures are required to defeat this monster. When we look at the assessment of the terrorism at a regional level, we see that almost of countries in the world have borne the brunt of terrorism. One way to counter this form of terrorism is to institute structures for both the Muslims and Christians and for the government to be committed at reducing the high level of poverty and corruption that exist in the country and which hamper growth and investment to come to fruition. There is sufficient evidence

from this chapter to affirm our first hypothesis that global counter terrorism activities enhance states' counter terrorism capabilities.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

3.1 Introduction

This chapter is based on our objective number two a focuses on different counter terrorism partnerships put in place at bilateral, regional and global level to eliminate terrorism activities in the entire world thus promoting peace and security for all. The chapter focuses on the role played African Union, Kenya-United States security partnership, IGAD, US-African joint security operation in eliminating terrorism. It is very clear that terrorism is a world problem and not specific to any particular country and it is in this spirit that to win war on terrorism, then all countries must partner and fight as a team. The logic of global counter terrorism partnerships is to a great extent informed by the theory of complex interdependence especially in its argument that multiple channels connect society. These channels include informal ties between governmental elites making it possible for them to initiate cooperative counter terrorism strategies.

3.2 Kenya-US Counter terrorism partnerships

The U.S. government sees Kenya as a key accomplice and grapple state in the East African region, and as basic to counterterrorism endeavors in the region. Kenya has more than once been a target of terrorist attacks, and, as the September 2013 attack on the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi underscores, terror threats against international and domestic targets in Kenya remain a genuine concern. Kenya's military assumes a key part in regional operations against the Al-Shabaab militias of Somalia. The Al-Qaida-subsiidiary Somali extremists

group has asserted responsibility for the Westgate Mall attack as a retaliatory response to Kenya's military offensive against the group across the Somali outskirts.

In time memorial, the diplomatic relationship between Kenya and US has existed that even in the late 1970s, for instance, at the climax of the Cold War, security cooperation of with c Horn of Africa countries took on increased strategic priority in cognizant of contingency planning for possible military intervention of US in the Persian Gulf as well as

Mombasa port in Kenya was seen as a robust alternative to options in Somalia. Kenya was accorded enormous military aid, which continued under the Reagan Administration's policy to "contain "Soviet influence in the region as result of base-access. By the end of cold war in early 1990s, the United States became increasingly sensitive to political and human rights abuses orchestrated by former president Daniel Moi's government, even although strategic location and comparative stability of Kenya ensured that cordial relationship was maintained, aided by Kenya's pivotal role as a regional hub for international humanitarian relief operations in Sudan and Somalia. Ties ameliorated as the aforementioned two countries heightened their cooperation on counterterrorism measures. The elections held in 2002 and the subsequent political transition were a vital event in the creating a warm relationship, which Robert Godec, current U.S. Ambassador to Kenya has described as friendship ties as "historically deep and broad"

Kenya is one of the main five global recipients of United States' Department Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) subsidies, which supports border and marine security and law implementation programs. ATA funds support counterterrorism training for the Kenyan

Police, and have averaged \$8 million annually in recent years. Expression by US congress regarding Kenyan security forces in recent appropriations legislation, and has forced on the requirement of stringent vetting of all units that are beneficiary of U.S. aid. This concern is approved by the State Department reports of police corruption and exemption, and of heinous abuses by multiple security agencies.

Kenya is ranked as the largest beneficiary of U.S. security assistance within the African substance. Military support Aid has in the previous 20 years progressively centered around enhancing Kenya's abilities to control its land and sea borders and to counter terrorism. Notwithstanding U.S. help, Kenyan buys through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program are sizable by regional standards, and have included fighter aircraft, helicopters, and Air Force computer systems. The Kenyan Navy has received U.S. assistance to upgrade its capacity to encounter the piracy within the Indian ocean which exude from Somalia. Kenya receives aid through a regional State Department program, the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT), with related counterterrorism funding totaling over \$10 million in FY2012. Kenya is a major African recipient of Department of Defense (DOD) aid, totaling almost \$80 million to date, as authorized under Section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), as amended, and Section 1207(n) of the FY2012 NDAA, as amended, the latter applying to its role in AMISOM. U.S. Africa Command's Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), based in Djibouti, maintains a small contingent hosted at a Kenyan naval base that conducts civil affairs projects and other security cooperation activities in Kenya.

The joining of more than 4,000 Kenyan troops into AMISOM has budget implications for the US State Department, which has given generally \$700 million in coordination's support, equipment, and training for AMISOM troop contributors since 2007. This aid has been given through the Department's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, and includes U.N. assessed contributions to the U.N. logistics mission that supports AMISOM. DOD has provided more than \$100 million in funding for training and equipping AMISOM troop contributors since FY2011, some of which, as noted, has been committed for Kenya.⁴⁴

3.3 African Union Role in fight against terrorism

Terrorism has in time been a menace and threat to the African security, but recently with the involvement of intergovernmental organisations in efforts to address the threat has seen some improvements.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) was active in combating mercenaries and other problems of subversion on the continent, but it was not until the beginning of the 1990s that terrorism was actually addressed in the OAU agenda.

The twin bombing of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the inhumane terrorist attacks of the 9/11 in America, were vicious manifestations of the magnitude of the threat that the Africa continent and by extension the world must cope up with in the 21st century. The anti-terrorism campaign on international scale mushroomed in response to 9/11, and specifically the unprecedented international solidarity that surfaced, brought to the fore the significant role that regional and international organizations had, as key stakeholders of

⁴⁴ DOD provided \$140 million under Section 1206 to date, and almost \$40 million under Section 1207(n) authority.

interstate regional counter-terrorism activities. The change of the OAU into the AU in the wake of the Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) as declared by President George W Bush was never timely. At that moment the world was in need of unity and solidarity to defend against terrorist attacks and extremism.

Terrorism represented the first global challenge to the newly formed African Union, whose foremost objectives include the promotion of collective security and common values in Africa countries, as enshrined in its Constitutive Act.⁴⁵ As President Denis Sassou N’Guesso of Congo (Brazzaville) rightly puts it: “Faced with terrorism, we are all in the same boat and under the same threat,”⁴⁶ The AU was by virtue of its Constitutive Act, tasked to promote a prominent and leadership role in the fight against terrorism on the African continent.

Viewed systematically, the fight against terrorism can be classified in four levels: international, continental, regional as well as national level. The thrust of the state remains unchallenged and, indeed, central in fighting terrorism at all four levels. Therefore, whatever functions intergovernmental organizations play combating terrorism, it is what has been relegated to them by states in cognizant of sum of comparative advantage. Any intergovernmental organization participating in the fight against terrorism in Africa must have to confront, at the practical level, the debate which emerged after 9/11 as to whether terrorism, in its modern state and manifestations, poses a dangerous threat to the continent on the same magnitude as conflicts of internal nature, abject poverty as well as health crisis.

⁴⁵ See, for example, Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU.

⁴⁶ A Soussan, faced with terrorism, we are all in the same boat, an interview with Denis Sassou N’Guesso, *African Geopolitics*, 3–4, Summer–Fall 2001. See electronic version: <www.africangeopolitics.org/show.aspx?articleid=3081> p 1 (8 March 2004).

AU has a mandate to avert and fight terrorism in Africa, in order to fill the gaps where its member states or regional mechanisms are not there. In such manner, the AU part ought to be reciprocal and serve as an interface between the continent and the international community, including the United Nations (UN). For the AU to play out this assignment effectively, it must first conquer some of its internal shortcomings and build its own financial and human resource capacities. The AU's battle against terrorism in Africa ought not be seen in confinement from the new strategic orientation taking place on the continent. The Constitutive Act of the AU gives rules for preventing and combating terrorism within the continent. Article 4(o) calls for "respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities", which is underscored in the preamble as the need to bring security, stability and peace as a prerequisite for the implementation of Africa's development agenda. Other aspects of an emerging peace and security architecture on the continent, particularly the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU, including the AU Non-Aggression and Common Defense Pact and the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP), have distinguished terrorism as one of the common threats facing the African continent.⁴⁷

In the period before 9/11 the OAU role in preventing and fighting terrorism was not a major priority. It served basically as a political platform for communicating collective will of member states. While the OAU could embrace a typical legal framework for combating terrorism as embodied in the 1999 OAU Convention, it was unable to implement its

⁴⁷ See paragraph 9(d) of the Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy, adopted by the 2nd Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU held in Sirte, Libya, in February 2004.

decisions and instruments. It lacked a follow-up mechanism and its secretariat in Addis Ababa was given no specific role or mandate to coordinate exercises of member states identifying to counter-terrorism.

After the 9/11 terror attack on the US Trade Center, the AU has mainly been an instrument that is obligated to strengthening its member states' power and RECs in meeting their obligations under continental and international counter-terrorism instruments laws, as well statues. The systemic arrangement of actors and the circulation of obligations in the GWOT constrained the AU to rethink its part and arrange its exercises inside the global and continental realities in Africa. Subsequently, the Union has progressively observed its part as a clearinghouse for standards and gauges setting for the battle against terrorism in Africa, and also the interface between Africa and the global community. The selection of the Plan of Action, the Protocol to the 1999 OAU Convention and various counterterrorism choices including continuous endeavors to set up a Comprehensive African Anti-Terrorism Model Law, affirm the part of the Union as a standard setter.

Since its birth in July 2002, the AU's mandates as far as terrorism is concerned have been to coordinate and harmonize the activities of states and of the RECs, as well as to promote interstate cooperation within the continent in areas of counter-terrorism. By doing this, the Union has been organizing forum of intergovernmental experts and senior government officials, such as the serialized High-Level Intergovernmental Meeting⁴⁸. The Commission's

⁴⁸ Began in 2002 and the last one was held in Algiers, Algeria, in October 2004. The purpose is to bring senior government officials and experts from the 53 AU member states to share experiences, best practices and challenges, as well as chart the way forward toward the implementation of the AU counter-terrorism instruments.

Chairperson used their consistent reports to the policy organs of the AU to illuminate on the status of terrorism on the planet and in Africa specifically, and to look for arrangement bearings for the AU counter terrorism program.

One of the major achievements by the AU is the establishment of the ACSRT with respect to the concrete implementation of its counter-terrorism regimes. The ACSRT gives the AU a technical capacity to implement its regimes. With its research capacity, the ACSRT can be proactive in preventing terrorism in Africa. Enhancement cooperation and information-sharing at all levels has been enabled by the establishment of a committee for intelligence and security in Africa (CISSA) within the Commission to coordinate intelligence activities of member states.

The AU also facilitates technical assistance delivery to its member states through its advocacy role, by acting as an interface or a go-between for African states and technical assistance providers such as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and other international institutions. In this regard, almost all member states of the AU were, either directly or indirectly, part of a technical assistance delivery program offered by these institutions between September 2001 and December 2004. Ongoing efforts within the commission to draft a Comprehensive African Anti-Terrorism Model Law will further contribute to efforts to consolidate and harmonize national legislations relating to terrorism.

3.3.1 Challenges of AU in combating terrorism

The AU experience in preventing and combating terrorism in Africa has shown some limitations in its effectiveness and capacity. To start with, the AU is yet to defeat a legacy of the OAU, in particular an inclination to receive point of interest choices and make professions without guaranteeing powerful and suitable development. In this way, the primary test remains the full operation of the counter-terrorism instruments and applicable choices of the AU policy organs. The AU still does not have the ability to build up a rundown of culprits of terrorism, goes about as stated in the Plan of Action. This is exacerbated by the absence of a local or mainland capture warrant which could allow the AU to research capture and keep people blamed or suspected terrorist acts. The AU is additionally not able to confirm which part states are conforming to or really actualising the AU and worldwide counter-terrorist administrations and which ones are most certainly not. In spite of the fact that part states are required to answer to the administrator of the commission on their exercises, many are still hesitant to do as such, whining of reporting weakness.⁴⁹

The AU has yet to adapt suitable measures to deal with issues of human rights that arise from states counter terrorism activities. Although there are some human rights provisions in the AU regimes, action is yet to be taken against those who have abused human rights in order to ensure compliance. This problem is also due to the lack of coordination between the AU Commission in Addis Ababa and the African Commission on Human and People's Rights

⁴⁹ There is a growing concern among member states about reporting fatigue as a result of increasing demand for states to submit written reports to regional, continental and international organizations on various activities at the national level.

based in Banjul, Gambia.⁵⁰ Though not explicitly concerned or mandated, the latter could contribute significantly to the prevention and combating of terrorism, particularly with respect to the protection of human rights in states' activities. One of the major challenges encountered by the AU in implementing its counterterrorism agenda is the lack of adequate human and financial resources.⁵¹ While this problem is not peculiar to counter-terrorism, it is, however, a severe stumbling-block to fully and timely realizing the AU's counter-terrorism objectives, especially if the Union is to be proactive in its response to terrorism.

3.4 Trans-Saharan counterterrorism Initiative partnership (TSCTI)

The TSCTI is a Department of State-led interagency program established in 2005 between the U.S. and nine nations in Africa: Chad, Niger, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Nigeria.⁵² In October 2006, arrangements to add Libya to this program were declared, however as of this written work had not yet been settled. It is "multi-faceted, multi-year technique aimed at defeating terrorist organisations by fortifying provincial counter terrorism capacities, improving and systematising participation among the locale's security strengths, advancing majority rule administration, defaming psychological oppressor philosophy, and strengthening reciprocal military ties with the United States." The program is estimated to be a \$500 million venture, in augmentations of \$100 million every year, if fully financed. Take note of that in late 2006, the Department of State changed the name of

⁵⁰ The legal responsibilities between the two commissions as far as terrorism is concerned are not clear. The Protocol and the Plan of Action confer the responsibilities for implementation on the AU Commission in Addis Ababa.

⁵¹ See, for example, the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Implementation of the 1999 OAU Convention and the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa, AU document Mtg/HLIG/Conv Terror/ 2(II), Original:

⁵² *The U.S. European Command Home Page*, "Operations and Initiatives," available from <http://www.eucom.mil/english/Operations/main.asp>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2016

this program from an "Initiative" to an "Partnership" – the "Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership.

The African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) was made to fill a hole in African peacekeeping capacity, and provide peace keeping operations training and non-lethal equipment to 14 nations, including three TSCTI participants (Nigeria, Senegal and Mali). These peacekeepers can be utilized as a component of a United Nations mission, or for operations initiated and led by the African Union or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Amid the Clinton Administration, former US president, ACOTA was known as the African Crisis Response Initiative. ACOTA is the Africa portion of a larger, global program known as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which was modeled after the success of ACOTA, and which exports the peacekeeper training program to other different countries around the globe.⁵³

Since 1983, the Department of State's Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program has synergized government, state and local civilian law enforcement organisations in a program that gives training, equipment and innovations to nations around the globe with a specific end goal to enhance their counter terrorism capacities. TSCTI accomplice nations, and in addition other global hotspots, for example, Colombia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, have used this program, getting an extensive variety of training including cyber terrorism, airport terminal security, hostage negotiations, emergency administration and

⁵³ *The Stimson Center Home Page*, "U.S. Support to African Capacity for Peace Operations: The ACOTA Program," available from <http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=255>; Internet; accessed 14 March 2016.

reaction, countering terrorist organizations. The kind of training offered is custom fitted to the accomplice nation's needs and conditions.⁵⁴

The topography of the region contributes enormously to its security issues. The sheer size of the extent of the Sahel and Mahgreb districts, a generally ungracious landscape, and governments who are essentially not capable on checking their massively long borders result in permeable borders that permit unhampered development and movements of people, money and weapons. The GSPC's capacity to make due in the unfriendly environment of southern Algeria and northern Mali is not exclusively because of self-reliance. It requires "some level of quiet submission from the locals, yet it additionally requires financing. This originates from both the hostage ransoms they got and from GSPC connections to smuggling." Cigarette smuggling has turned out to be a standout amongst the most lucrative pirating venture in the region. Cigarettes from Zerouate in Mauritania are moved to Kidal, Mali. There they are split into smaller parcels and taken into Algeria in Toyota Land Cruiser pick-ups. "As indicated by one estimate, a pack of Marlboro cigarettes (the fundamental brand in the trans-Saharan trade) sells for 250 CFA francs in Burkina Faso, 650 in Mali, and what might as well be 850 in Algeria."⁵⁵

3.5 Counter-Terrorism Strategy in East Africa through IGAD

While creative collective endeavors among East African states, external donors, and civil society through the foundation of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) are making noteworthy steps

⁵⁴ William P. Pope, "Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Role of Security Assistance," 10 March 2005, *The Department of State Home Page*, available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/43702.htm>; Internet; accessed 12 March 2016

⁵⁵ Ibid.

toward the improvement of a reasonable approach to counterterrorism capacity building in the region, there remain significant challenges to effective cooperative action in East Africa. These include severe intra- and interstate conflict, increasing radicalization, lack of state capacity, competing priorities, and political sensitivity surrounding the very notion of counterterrorism. To date, most counterterrorism endeavors have concentrated on short-term security and law enforcement measures to the near exclusion, even at times to the detriment, of longer-term efforts to address underlying conditions conducive to the expansion of terrorism.

The Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) recently noticed that due to its geographical location, assurance of dispute, absence of state structures, loss of hope from the loss of trust and the development of radicalism, the IGAD locale is thought to be the most helpless against psychological warfare of all areas in sub-Saharan Africa." All nations in East Africa have been victims of terrorist acts, whether executed by and against a nation's nationals for domestic cause or concentrated on "extra-national or extra-regional targets, for instance, Western targets situated in [East Africa]." Most misfortunes from terrorism in East Africa are not connected to global terrorism but rather to local rebellions in the sub region. Truth be told, most episodes of global terrorism, which has been the concentration of the United Nations' counter terrorism agenda, have focused on Westerners or Western-related assets, and this has led to the recognition that terrorism is a predominantly Western concern.

Notwithstanding the kind of terrorism, nonetheless, neighboring groups in Africa have borne the brunt of the death toll and property loss and other economic damages from attackers; yet from numerous points of view, significantly more consideration has been paid to the moderately few of Western casualties of terrorism in the sub region. This has convoluted efforts by a few governments in East Africa to bolster global counterterrorism endeavors without being viewed as pushing external interests. The sub region has encountered drawn out and serious intra-and interstate conflicts, prompting to insecurity, destitution, and political seclusion that make it defenseless against terrorist exploitation. For instance, the progressing strife amongst Ethiopia and Eritrea—which fixates on a border issues, in which Ethiopia charges that Eritrea is giving religious radicals support which have connections to al-Qaida to further Asmara's military targets has prompted to the passing's of thousands, the suppression of restriction developments, huge quantities of reported human rights violations, and Eritrea's withdrawal from IGAD.⁵⁶

Guerrilla aggregates in Uganda, for example, the Lords Resistance Army and the Alliance of Democratic Forces, have utilised ruthless strategies, which have apparently prompted to the deaths of more than 5,000 people over that nation and thus expanded open resilience of measures against others under doubt. The circumstance in Somalia, which has been without a fully functioning national government since 1991 notwithstanding more than dozen attempts at national political reconciliation, is an especially essential element energizing the spread of radicalism and terrorism in East Africa today. Thomas Dempsey, an Africa expert at the US

⁵⁶ For a discussion of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, see, e.g., Jason Mc Lure, "Dueling Dictators," *Newsweek*, 28 November 2007, www.newsweek.com/id/72707; "Ethiopia and Eritrea: Stopping the Slide to War," *International Crisis Group*, Africa Briefing No. 48, 5

Army War College, takes note of that, different terrorist groups have worked in Somalia since it encountered state collapse in the mid-1990s.

The most prominent of these include Al-Ittihad al-Ialamiyyaa (AIAI), Al-Qaeda itself, and a small, recently emerged, extremely violent jihadist cell led by Aden Hashi ‘Ayro. AIAI seems to have acted as a terrorist hub for other groups active in Ethiopia, while the ‘Ayro group has operated as a terrorist node in the evolved two-cell network model. Al-Qaeda has demonstrated and suspected links to AIAI and ‘Ayro, and appears to have developed Somalia as a key hub for attacks throughout East Africa.⁵⁷ In the last couple of years, the situation in Somalia has deteriorated even further with the growth of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a group believed to have terrorist ties, which defeated a coalition of US-backed warlords in 2006. The subsequent US-backed Ethiopian invasion and occupation of Somalia briefly dislodged the UIC, but fostering insurgency has complicated efforts by Ethiopia, the Transitional Federal Government, and the African Union (AU) to bring stability to the country and may have in some ways strengthened the hand of hard-line Islamists fighting for control of the country.⁵⁸

Countries in the sub region are in critical need of support in terms of equipment; training for police, judges, and prosecutors; improving border control and monitoring of unpatrolled coastlines; strengthening interdepartmental cooperation; upgrading communications equipment and facilities; combating terrorist financing; detecting document forgery; and combating arms trafficking. Some countries would benefit from assistance in drafting and

⁵⁷ Thomas Dempsey, “Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions,” *Strategic Studies Institute*, US Pa. Army War College, Carlisle, 2006, p. 8.

⁵⁸ Steve Bloomfield, “Somalia: The World’s Forgotten Catastrophe,” *The Independent*, 9 February 2008.

adopting counterterrorism legislation, while others require assistance in refining existing legislation. Support is also needed to address more fundamental capacity issues, such as strengthening democratic institutions and the judicial system, combating corruption, improving governance, dealing with internal and external conflicts, and targeting vulnerable communities.

In some countries, even help in building roads and railway connections are required not just to enhance the prospects for development and regional integration, but to help improve and enhance the lives of vulnerable and marginalized communities and incorporate them into a more extensive society. In Somalia, outside support is basic to enabling the Transitional Federal Government to give essential government services, in particular education, so that it can act as an effective alternative to extremist groups and ideologies.⁵⁹ The four-year ICPAT program was launched in June 2006 in Addis Ababa, where the program is based.⁶⁰ It is funded by European and other donors, administered by an African NGO with research and networking experience in the security area (the Institute for Security Studies), and overseen by a steering committee made up of the member states of IGAD and including nonvoting representatives from the countries that provide direct support to ICPAT, thus utilizing an innovative approach to develop an effective sub regional counterterrorism mechanism. It has additionally prevailed with regards to conquering human and financial resource limitations that other parts of IGAD as well as other numerous African-based multilateral organizations suffer from and the lack of political support for deepening sub regional participation among

⁵⁹ ICPAT Meeting Report, “Implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in the IGAD Region and Building National Capacities,” Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4-5 March 2008. [On file with the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation].

⁶⁰ ICPAT was launched some three years following the development of the IGAD “Draft Implementation Plan to Combat Terrorism in the IGAD Region” and a subsequent vulnerability assessment of terrorism in the IGAD region. IGAD’s “Draft Implementation Plan to Combat Terrorism in the IGAD Region

its members in the security field. The program concentrates on capacity and confidence-building measures in the IGAD region, working intimately with partners at the regional and worldwide level.

ICPAT's work focuses on five areas: (1) enhancing judicial measures; (2) working to promote greater interagency coordination on counterterrorism within individual IGAD member states; (3) enhancing border control; (4) providing training, sharing information and best practices; and (5) promoting strategic cooperation. ICPAT, at times in partnership with UNODC's TPB and EAPCCO, and with the contributions of such institutions as the International Organization for Migration, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and high-level experts from the region, has carried out country-specific capacity-building initiatives in each of these areas.⁶¹

Highlighting this approach, in September 2007, ICPAT, with the support of UNODC's TPB, organized the first-ever IGAD ministerial-level meeting on countering terrorism in Kampala to which six IGAD member states sent high-level delegations. The motivation behind the meeting was to give a stage to the reviewing progress on strengthening legal cooperation against terrorism and to establish a more compelling system future cooperation in the legal field. The Kampala Statement calls on IGAD members, inter alia, to take the necessary legal, authoritative, and administrative measures, including establishing inter-ministerial counterterrorism coordination mechanisms in each country; regard human rights while countering terrorism; and exchange information and experiences related to combating

⁶¹ Examples of the capacity-building training and other assistance ICPAT has delivered since its establishment include a one-month counterterrorism training course designed in conjunction with EAPCCO for law enforcement officials in each IGAD member-state. The training has already been provided to 25 Ugandan and 25 Somali police officers.

terrorism, including through the establishment of a forum of counterterrorism experts. Fundamentally, the announcement also observes and asks the member states to implement the UN Strategy and requests the continuation of UNODC/ICPAT capacity-building training⁶².

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter analysed in detail the role of global partnerships in countering terrorism. From the analysis it is clear a number of partnerships have been forged to mitigate terrorist threats over the world. For instance, the Africa Union has made great effort to counter terrorism at continental level. Such efforts include the preparation of the Comprehensive African Anti-Terrorism Model Law as well as the establishment of the ACSRT. On her part Kenya has entered into a counter terrorism strategy with the US as well as IGAD states.

In line with our second hypothesis it is clear that the above efforts and counterterrorism strategies and partnerships employed by regional, continental and other International community have brought about improved security across Kenya, Africa and the world as a whole. Terrorism is a global problem which requires mutual partnership and effort in order to eradicate this vice across the globe. Be that as it may, going forward, Congress may face difficult decisions in balancing U.S. human rights concerns against other priorities in the U.S.-Kenya relationship. These incorporates a common longing to counter terrorism, ongoing development and humanitarian priorities, and other foreign policy goals in the region. The United States has made huge interests in Kenya and the size of the U.S. government presence

⁶² Kampala Statement: Meeting of Ministers of Justice of IGAD Member States on Legal Cooperation against Terrorism,” 20-21 September 2007, Kampala, Uganda, www.igad.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=70&Itemid=65.

in the country underscores its significance in the region. Kenya's commitment and capacity to respond to transnational threats in ways that support U.S. Kenya remains a strategic security partner to the United States in East and central Africa hence there is need for more partnership in order to fight terrorism threats posed in the region and the world as a whole.

CHAPTER FOUR

US-KENYA COOPERATION ON COUNTER TERRORISM:

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the findings of the study which analyzed US-Kenya cooperation to counter terrorism. The main thrust of the study was to assess Kenya-US cooperation in countering terrorism internationally. Data collected was collated and reports were generated. Findings from open-ended questions were also presented in prose. The researcher used frequency tables, figures and qualitative analysis to present data.


4.2 Demographic data

This section discusses data on sex, age, education level, professional affiliations and nationality of the respondents.

4.2.1 Sex

The study sought to establish the sex of the respondents. The findings are shown in figure 4.1 below.

Figure 4.1: Respondents Sex



Based on the findings in figure 4.1, it was determined that majority of the respondents were males 65%, while 35% were females. The importance of these statistics was to get gender balanced view terrorism across the board. The substantive representation of the female gender gives this study high credibility as many studies ignore the valuable contribution of women to the understanding the terrorist menace.

4.2.2 Age

The study sought to determine the age of the respondents. The findings are shown in table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 Age

	Frequency	Percent (%)
25-30	2	8.9
31-35	2	4.4
36-40	7	28.9
41-45	8	20
46-50	13	15.7
51-55	9	17.7
60 and above	4	4.4
Total	45	100.0


According to the findings showed above, majority (28.9%) of the respondents were in the age bracket of 36-50. 20% were of an age of 41-45 years while 17.7% were of an age of 51-55 years, 15.7% were of an age of 46-50. On the flip side, 8.9%, 4.4% and 4.4% were of an

age of 25-30 years, 31-35 years and 60 and above years respectively. This age bracket is in the working cadre and was able to provide credible and reliable information based on well informed interpretations of the situation on the ground or personal experiences. The information gathered from this data enabled the study to confirm the first and second hypotheses.

4.2.3 Level of Education

The study also sought to establish the respondents' level of education. This was very vital due to the sophisticated nature of terrorism. Larger percentage of those interviewed had university level education and hence were able to comprehend the questions well and interpret the circumstance correctly. The findings are shown in figure 3.2 below

Figure 3.2 Level of Education



From the illustrated figure above, most of the respondents 44% had attained university degree as the highest level of education, 33% had college diplomas, 20% had secondary school education while 3% had primary education. This strongly suggest that majority of the respondents had university degree as their highest level of education.

4.2.4 Respondents Professional Affiliation

The study used stratified sampling method and sought to determine the Professional affiliation of the respondents. This was of considerable importance since counter terrorism is a technical activity and it was worth to obtain data from the most relevant agencies dealing with my issue of concern. Since partnerships involving counter terrorism are mostly created by governments, the study was biased in interviewing majority of this group. Nonetheless, in order to obtain an equilibrium in international opinion on cooperation between Kenya and Us to counter terrorism, the study included other key stakeholders in the subject. The findings are shown in table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 Professional affiliation


	Frequency	Percent (%)
Government Agencies	18	40
NGOs	10 11	24.4
The diplomatic Corp in Nairobi	6	13.4
The united Nations Office in Nairobi	10	22.2
Total	45	100.0

From the table above, majority of the respondents 40% were from the government agencies, 22.4% were from NGOs, 22.2% were from the United Nations Office in Nairobi while 13.4% were from diplomatic Corp in Nairobi.

4.2.5 Respondents Nationality

The study aimed at understanding the effects of Kenya-US cooperation to counter terrorism and attempted to cover respondents from the two countries. The study could not equal number of Kenyans and American since it was conducted in Nairobi Kenya. Albeit, tremendous efforts were made to cover both Nationalities. The findings are shown in the below.

Figure 4.3 Respondents Nationality



From the study findings, most of the respondents in the study (77.8%) were Kenyans while 22.2% were American.

4.4 Global Situation of Terrorism

4.4.1 Factors Sustaining Terrorism Worldwide

The study sought to determine the factors that have been perpetuating terrorism worldwide. From the results of the study, majority of the respondents pinpointed lack of democracy, Failed or fragile states, quick modernization as sky rocketing financial growth has also been found to be in tandem with the proliferation of fanatical philosophies, radical ideologies and archrival antecedents of civil wars, tyrannies, political violence, dictatorships or occupation may diminish the edge for acknowledgment of political violence and terrorism, and impede the amelioration of peaceful standards among fragments of the society. Further the respondents indicated hegemony and imbalance of power. When local or international powers have mind-boggling power contrasted with adversarial groups.

One of the respondents (D7) was of the opinion that *“Illegitimate or corrupt governments frequently give rise to opposition that may turn to terrorist means if other avenues are not seen as realistic options for replacing these regimes with a more credible and legitimate government”*.

4.4.2 Main Forms of Modern Terrorism

The study sought to establish the main forms of terrorism in the world today. From the findings, majority of the respondents indicated religious terrorism, right wing terrorism, left wing terrorism and narco-terrorism. Respondents further elucidated that religious terrorism is one motivated by religious ideologies and grievances. This permeated religious teachings used to justify and even exhilarate this kind of self-sacrifice. Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab are examples of religious terrorism.

Respondents further postulated rightwing terrorism is the form that aims to combat liberal governments and preserve traditional social orders. While as narco-terrorism according to some respondents refers to organizations that gain funds through the sale of drugs. Such as cartels in Mexico that have carried out beheadings, mass burials, and other severe acts of violence.

Another respondents (D20) stated “*Other forms of modern terrorism under rightwing terrorism are Kul Klux Klan and Neo-Fascists, many such groups are present not only in the U.S. but also in Germany, Russia, and others*”.⁶³

4.4.3 Rise of Global Terrorism

The respondents were requested to indicate whether global terrorism was on the rise. The findings are as shown below.

Table 4.3 Rise of global terrorism

	Frequency	Percent (%)
Yes	37	82.2
No	8	17.8
Total	45	100

From the findings, majority 82.2% of the respondents indicated that global terrorism was on the rise while 17.8% indicated it was not on the rise. This implies that global terrorism was on the rise.

⁶³ Interview questionnaire for D20

Among the respondents who stated yes, they explained that last year marked the biggest annual increment in deaths caused by terrorism, with more than 32,000 people killed in attacks around the world. Additionally, one of the respondents stated the Institute for Economics and Peace had compiled its annual Global Terrorism Index and looked at the figures from 2000 to the end of 2014. It found terrorism was on dramatic rise and foreign citizens were exponentially the targets.

4.4.4 Measures Put In Place to Combat Terrorism Internationally

The respondents were asked to explicate the measures that have been put in place, to combat terrorism. From the findings, majority of the respondents indicated the following as the measures that have been put in place; fortified coordination and cooperation among states in combating crimes that might be connected with terrorism, including all aspect of drug trafficking, prohibited arms trade, especially the small arms and light weapons. Secondly, apprehension and prosecution or extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts, in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, heightened collaboration, as fitting, in trading credible and precise information concerning the prevention and embattling of terrorism,

According to respondent (D39) *“United Nations Counter Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate have been encouraged to work with states, at their request, to facilitate the adoption of legislation and administrative measures to implement the terrorist travel-related obligations. Further countries have been encouraged to set up all efforts to*

*improve the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets such as infrastructure and public places, as well as the response to terrorist attacks.”*⁶⁴

4.4.5 Root Causes of Terrorism in the World

The study also sought to find out the root causes of terrorism in the contemporary world. From the findings of the study, majority of the respondents indicated weakened social orders with disenfranchised state structures. These are more vulnerable to civil wars than wealthier and developed states, and subsequently the fear of terrorism increase, inadequacy of education where terror cell groups recruit young individuals who were not able to finish their education. Because they are ignorant and lack of opportunity they are with ease manipulated, abject poverty which is a global problem that threatens world security, hampers international efforts to end violent conflict and terrorism, states transiting democratically, rather than just or autocratic administrations. Levels of boundary-crossing terrorism are noteworthy in semi-authoritarian states.

Respondent (D10) indicated *“a lack of political legitimacy and continuity, as well as a lack of integration for the political fringes encourages ideological terrorism and societal changes brought through modernization. Thus, creating the conditions for terrorism through mobility, communication, widespread targets and audience.”*⁶⁵

4.4.6 Effects of Terrorism

The respondents were requested to indicate the impact of terrorism. The respondents revealed Both immediate and prolonged effects which included mental injury of the prompt casualties injuries, deaths and; short- and long-term effects on the economic development of the

⁶⁴ Interview questionnaire for D39

⁶⁵ Interview questionnaire for D10


attacked country and it also often widens publicity for the groups or individuals planning the attacks, which is often their goal. In addition, the economy not only flops because of building and infrastructure damage, but it also suffers sustained effects from trauma to impaired financial markets, high budgets on security and safety, and the influence on supply chains of upgraded security at land, sea and air border crossings.

D10 adds “*Besides the injuries and deaths immediately brought about by terrorist attacks, survivors often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and major depression.*”⁶⁶

4.4.7 Means by Which Modern Terrorism Is Being Perpetuated

The study sought to pinpoint the respondents’ priority in ranking means by which modern terrorism is being perpetuated. The findings are as shown below;

Figure 4.4 Means by which modern terrorism is being perpetuated



From the study findings, a larger percentage of respondents in the study (52%) indicated ranked religion as the first means by which modern international terrorism is being

⁶⁶ Ibid

perpetuated today, 22% ranked the internet as the second, 16% ranked the phones as the third and 10% indicated weapons of mass destruction. This depicts majority of the respondents' ranked religion as the highest means by which modern international terrorism is being perpetuated today.

Respondent D24 argued, *'religious extremism has become the main driver of terrorism in recent years, according to this year's Global Terrorism Index. The report recorded 18,000 deaths in 2013, a rise of 60% on the previous year. The majority (66%) of these were attributable to just four groups: Islamic State (Isis) in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaida.'*⁶⁷

4.4 Role of Global Partnerships in Countering Terrorism

4.4.1 Global Partnerships Forged In Countering Terrorism

The study asked the respondents to state the global partnerships which have been forged in countering terrorism. In light of this, the respondents revealed global partnerships formed to counter terrorism are US-African joint security operation, IGAD, NATO, Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative partnership (TSCTI) and AMISOM.

According to respondent (D5) *"NATO's work on counter-terrorism focuses on improving awareness of the threat, developing capabilities to prepare and respond, and enhancing engagement with partner countries and other international actors."*⁶⁸


⁶⁷ Interview questionnaire for D24

⁶⁸ Interview questionnaire for D5

4.4.2 Effectiveness of global counter terrorism partnerships in countering terrorism

The study requested the respondents to state whether global counter terrorism partnerships are effective. The findings are as shown below

Figure 4.5 Effectiveness of global counter terrorism partnerships in countering terrorism



From the study findings, majority of the respondents (85%) stated that global counter terrorism partnerships were not effective while 15% agreed that it been effective. This implies that global counter terrorism partnerships were not effective.

Among the respondents who said yes, the respondents noted that it has not been effective due to lack of proper enacted legislation and capacity building and lack of full commitments among partnerships for instance lack of joint trained forces or boards to fight terrorism.

Respondent (D5) adds that “*the global counter terrorism partnerships have not been effective due to lack of co-operation among states.*”⁶⁹

4.4.3 Challenges Faced By Counter Terrorism Partnerships

The study sought to establish challenges faced by counter terrorism partnerships. From the findings of the study majority of the respondents indicated, mistrust in sharing intelligence on sensitive information which exposes other partners to a certain degree of vulnerability, lack of shared intelligence reports.

Respondent (D3) pointed out that “*lack of well equipped anti-terrorism force and facilities, different counter terrorism priorities and different legal systems are also challenges faced by counter terrorism partnership.*”⁷⁰

4.4.4 Challenges encountered by Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership

The study further probed the respondents on the challenges encountered by Kenya-US terrorism partnership. The discoveries uncovered that absence of human resources, international/national laws, contrasts in relationships with states from which extremists emerge, legal and policy issues with information sharing, differences in approach to counterterrorism operations, monitoring and assessing progress, innovative and operational differences (i.e., incompatibility in: systems to share information), cultural differences/lack of trust, and accountability.

Respondent (D15) says “*there is increased corruption within the Kenyan government and the Kenyan military lack motivation hence impeding the Kenya-US counter terrorism strategies.*”

⁶⁹ ibid

⁷⁰ Interview questionnaire for D3

he also adds that “*Tense armed raids based on poor intelligence may only increase cycles of radicalization and violence.*”⁷¹

4.5 Ways in Which the US Cooperates With Kenya in Countering Terrorism

4.5.1 Main aspects of Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership

The review looked to build up primary parts of Kenya-US counter terrorism warfare partnership. From the discoveries of the review, dominant part of the respondents demonstrated the United States is putting the vast majority of its support behind the Kenya military for the battle against Al-Shabaab through financial aid and military aid. They additionally expressed that, lion's share of U.S. military aid to Kenya this year intends to upgrade Kenya Armed Forces investment in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and military operations against Al-Shabaab through the Defense Department's Counter Terrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF).

Respondent D12 pointed out that “*U.S. military aid to Kenya under the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program for FY 2015 has been largely focused on training the Kenyan military on key aspects to combating terrorism. Some of the proposed course titles include: comprehensive security responses to terrorism; advance special operations combating terrorism alumni course; program on cyber security studies and strategic level small craft combating terrorism.*”⁷²

⁷¹ Interview questionnaire for D15

⁷² Interview Questionnaire for respondent D12

4.5.2 Role played by Kenyan government in counter terrorism partnership

In regard to the role played by the Kenyan government in counter terrorism partnership. The respondents showed an accumulation of information from all sources on the terrorist foundations, activities, and plans in the nation, analysis of the information to produce insight, producing reports for action, policy and sharing with accomplices, coordination of counter terrorism efforts with other government stakeholders and partners and monitoring the situation locally and all round in regard to terrorism.

With regard to measures to curb terrorism respondent D7 argued “*in monitoring the situation locally, the Kenyan government has carried out the following measures such as anti-terror police unit deployment to the northern region, construction of a perimeter security wall that will separate the two countries Somali-Kenya, defence budgetary allocations have been increased to help equip the security agencies and asset freeze of Al Shabaab sympathizers and financiers and Hawalas closure that launder money for the jihadists decapitating their finances.*”⁷³

4.5.3 Role of US government in counter terrorism partnership

The respondents were asked to explain the role of the US government in the counter terrorism partnership. From the discoveries, most respondents demonstrated, that the US government through the department of counterterrorism, facilitates all U.S. Government endeavors to enhance counter terrorism warfare collaboration with remote governments and takes part in the improvement, coordination, and usage of American counter terrorism approach. At the point when the respondents were examined further, they showed, the US

⁷³ Interview Questionnaire for respondent D7

government additionally portrays endeavors to counter terrorism financing and prepare law enforcement authorities of the U.S. and, Kenya, and also the innovative work of counterterrorism innovation.

Commenting on the role of the US government's role in counter terrorism partnerships, respondent D2 said, *“US examines current and developing federal-state government counterterrorism working relations with other states such as Kenya and explores terrorism legislation and the Congressional role in the budget and oversight process.”*⁷⁴

4.5.4 Effectiveness of the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership

The study sought to establish how effective the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership had been in countering terrorism in Kenya. In light of these the respondents indicated, the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership has not been very effective due to the nature and unpredictable ways in which the terror groups operate and increase in number of casualties.

4.5.5 Main agencies involved in the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership

The respondents were requested to indicate the main agencies involved in the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership. According to the findings, majority of the respondents indicated the national counter terrorism centre (NCTC), antiterrorism police unit (ATPU), National security intelligence service, a joint terrorism task force (JTTF), National security advisory committee (NSAC).

Commending on agencies involved in counter terrorism, respondent D3 said *“altogether these agencies aim at improve Kenyan capacity to improve Kenyan capacity to investigate*

⁷⁴ Interview Questionnaire for respondent D2

incidents identify operatives and coordinate relevant work across other agencies involved in counterterrorism.”⁷⁵

4.5.6 Ways in which Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership can be made more effective

As to routes in which Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership can be made more viable, respondents were of the assessment it's through; compelling utilization of existing technologies, innovative work exercises and arrangement of new ways to deal with alleviating the country's vulnerabilities. Furthermore, plan counterterrorism support programs to incorporate huge support for rule of law institutions, establishments in partner nations and human rights prepare rations for military and police force.

According to one of the respondent D41 “*the United States should work with allied countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia, which have significant counterterrorism experience, to develop counterterrorism strategies and assistance programs that leverage relationships with these nations for our mutual benefit.*”⁷⁶

4.5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has elaborately analyzed important aspects of Kenya-US cooperation to counter international terrorism. Key primary data was presented analysed and discussed that enables the study to make important academic as well as policy recommendations. Data presented indicate that there is a rise in the terrorist activities which can be attributed to the synergies forged by different terrorist groups. The chapter also established that a number of counter

⁷⁵ Interview questionnaire for respondent D3

⁷⁶ Interview Questionnaire for respondent D41

terrorism measures have been put in place. These include apprehension, prosecution and even extradition of perpetrators of terrorist acts. Among the means by which modern terrorism is being perpetuated include use of internet, phones, religion as well as possibility of employing weapons of mass destruction.

Global counter terrorism partnerships have born fruits in this struggle; however, they face a number of handles. These include mistrust in sharing intelligence, lack of proper equipment as well as a certain degree of increased vulnerability once a country is known to belong to counter terrorism cooperation. This chapter therefore discounts our third hypothesis which argues that the Kenya-US cooperation agreement on counter terrorism is more of a political agreement than a technical agreement.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This study examined three objectives: an assessment of the global situation of terrorism, an examination and determination of the role of Global partnerships in countering terrorism and lastly, an analysis of the various ways by which the US cooperates with Kenya in countering terrorism. In this chapter the study analysis the study objectives and makes conclusions based on each objective and then recommendations drawn from the research findings.

5.1.1 Assessment of the Global Situation of Terrorism

The review found that absence of a majority rule government, failed states, rapid modernization as high financial related advancements has likewise been found to associate immovably with the rise of terrorism, radicalization and historical predecessors of political violence, civil wars, unrest, autocracies or occupation may restrain the edge for acknowledgement of political violence and terrorism, and obstruct the improvement of peaceful standards among all sections of society as a portion of the variables that have been managing terrorists on the planet today. At whatever point where local and global forces have a stunning power contrasted with opposition bunches. Degenerate administrations and organizations every now and then give ascent to resistance that may turn to terrorism if different roads are not seen as functional decisions for replacing these administrations with a sounder and honest government.

The main forms of modern terrorism were found to be religious terrorism, right wing terrorism and narco-terrorism. Further respondents explained that religious terrorism is one motivated by religious ideologies and grievances. This is made possible by religious teachings used to justify and even encourage this kind of self-sacrifice. Examples of religious terrorism are such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. Respondents' defined rightwing terrorism as the form that aims to combat liberal governments and preserve traditional social orders. Kul Klux Klan and Neo-Fascists, many such groups are present not only in the U.S. but also in Germany, Russia, and others. While as narco-terrorism referred to organizations that gain funds through the sale of drugs. Such as cartels in Mexico that have carried out beheadings, mass burials, and other severe acts of violence.

The review further revealed that worldwide terrorism was on the ascent. In support of these they expressed, that last year denoted the greatest yearly rise in deaths brought on by terrorism, with more than 32,000 individuals murdered in assaults attacks around the globe. Also, they expressed the Institute for Economics and Peace had assembled its yearly Global Terrorism Index and took a toll at the figures from 2000 to the end of 2014. It discovered that terrorism was rising significantly and foreign citizens were progressively the targets. As to measures set up to battle terrorism, the respondents uncovered diverse measures had been set up, for example, trepidation and arraignment or extradition of culprits of terrorism, increasing collaboration, as appropriate, in trading convenient and timely information concerning the prevention and fighting of terrorism, reinforced coordination and participation among states in battling crimes that may be associated with terrorism, incorporating drug

trafficking in every one of its viewpoints, unlawful arms exchange, specifically of smaller arms and light weapons.

The study also found the root causes of terrorism in the world today as being; poor societies with weak state structures. These are more exposed to civil wars than wealthier countries, and therefore the risk of terrorism increase, lack of education where terrorist groups recruit young individuals who were not able to finish their education. Because they are ignorant and they lack opportunity there easily manipulated, poverty too which is a global problem that threatens world security, jeopardizes international efforts to end violent conflict and terrorism, states engaged in democratic transition rather than democratic or authoritarian regimes. Levels of transnational terrorism are highest in semi-authoritarian states. In addition, lack of political legitimacy and continuity, as well as a lack of integration for the political fringes encourages ideological terrorism and societal changes brought through modernization. This creates fertile grounds for nurturing terrorism through mobility, communication and widespread targets and audience.

Further the study found the following as the effects of terrorism injuries, deaths and psychological trauma of the immediate victims; short- and long-term impact on the economy of the attacked country and it also often creates publicity for the groups or individuals initiating the attacks, which is often their objective. Besides the injuries and deaths immediately brought about by terrorist attacks, survivors often suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety and major depression. The economy suffers an immediate impact due to building and infrastructure damage, but it also suffers long-term effects from trauma to

financial markets, a rise in spending on security and defense, and the impact on supply chains of enhanced security at land, sea and air border crossings. In regard to means by which modern terrorism is being perpetuated today, majority of the respondents' ranked religion as the first means by which modern international terrorism is being perpetuated today. Further the respondents stated religious extremism as the key driver for terrorism in recent years, according to this year's Global Terrorism Index which reported a record of 18,000 deaths in 2013, a rise of 60% on the previous year. The majority (66%) of these were attributable to just four groups: Islamic State (Isis) in Iraq and Syria, Boko Haram in Nigeria, the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qaida⁷⁷.

5.1.2 Examination and determination of the role of Global partnerships in countering terrorism

The study found that some of the global partnerships formed to counter terrorism are US-African joint security operation, IGAD, NATO, Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative partnership (TSCTI) and AMISOM. In regard to effectiveness of global counter terrorism partnerships in countering terrorism, the study found that it has not been very effective due to lack of proper enacted legislation and capacity building and lack of full commitments among partnerships for instance lack of joint trained forces or boards to fight terrorism. Further other respondents stated, the global counter terrorism partnerships had not been effective due to lack of trust and co-operation among states.

⁷⁷ Report from Institute for Economics and Peace, Published 17 Nov 2015

The study also found that challenges faced by counter terrorism partnerships, as revealed by the respondents are such as; mistrust in sharing intelligence on sensitive information which exposes other partners to a certain degree of vulnerability, lack of shared intelligence reports, lack of well equipped anti-terrorism force and facilities, different counter terrorism priorities and different legal systems.

The study additionally found the difficulties experienced by Kenya-US terrorism partnerships are absence of HR, global/national laws, contrasts in relations with states from where radicals surfaces, legal and policy issues which hamper valuable sharing of information, distinctive ways to deal with counter terrorism operations, advance checking and evaluation and operational differences (i.e., contradiction in: frameworks to share information), social-cultural contrasts/absence of trust, and responsibility. Further the respondents additionally showed there was expanded corruption inside the Kenyan government and the Kenyan military lacked inspiration.

5.1.3 Various ways by which the US cooperates with Kenya in countering terrorism

The study established main aspects of Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership were financial aid and military aid. The respondents revealed the US was rallying its support behind the Kenyan military in the fight against the Al-Shabaab through offering financial and military aid. They further stated that, majority of U.S. military aid to Kenya this year aims to enhance Kenya Armed Forces participation in the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) and military operations against Al-Shabaab militias through the Defense Department's Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF). Further the U.S. military aid to Kenya under the

Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program for FY 2015 was largely focused on training the Kenyan military on key aspects to combating terrorism. Some of the proposed course titles include: Comprehensive Security responses to terrorism; advance special operations combating terrorism alumni Course; program on cyber security studies; and strategic level small craft combating terrorism.⁷⁸

In regard to the role played from the Kenyan government in partnership towards countering terrorism, the study revealed the importance of collating information from different sources on the terrorist network, plans and activities locally, analysis of the information to produce intelligence, producing reports for action, policy and sharing with partners, coordination of counter terrorism efforts with other government stakeholders and partners and monitoring the situation locally and globally in regard to terrorism. Additionally the respondents indicated in monitoring the situation locally, the Kenyan government has carried out the following measures such as anti-terror police unit deployment to the northern region, ongoing construction of a perimeter security wall between the two countries Somali-Kenya, defence budgetary allocations has been increased to help equip the security agencies and freezing asset of Al Shabaab sympathizers and financiers and the closure of “Hawalas” that launder money for the jihadists thus decapitating their finances.

The study also established the role of the US government in the counter terrorism partnership through the bureau of counterterrorism, coordination of U.S. Government efforts to improve counter-terrorism cooperation with foreign governments. The respondents further indicated, the US government efforts to counter finances towards terrorism, the training of law enforcement officials of both the U.S. and Kenya, as well as intelligence gathering. In

⁷⁸ <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/> accessed on 15/10/2016

addition, it examined current and developing US government counterterrorism working relations with other states such as Kenya and explored legislation against terrorism and the role of Congress in the budget and oversight process.

Further the study established the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership had not been very effective due to the nature and unpredictable ways in which the terror groups operated. In regard to the main agencies involved in the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership, the respondents indicated the national counter terrorism centre (NCTC), antiterrorism police unit (ATPU), National security intelligence service, a joint terrorism task force (JTTF), National security advisory committee (NSAC). Respondents further stated altogether these agencies aim at improving Kenya's capacity to investigate incidents, identify operatives and coordinate relevant work across other agencies involved in counterterrorism. In regard to ways in which Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership can be made more effective, the respondents opined it's through; effective use of existing technology, research and development and positioning new tactics to mitigating the vulnerable nation's.

In addition, there was the identified need to model programs for counterterrorism support to include substantial support for legal institutions in partner states and human rights training for police and military. Respondents further stated the US needs to work with allied countries including the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia, who have developed substantial counterterrorism strategies that can be of assistance to their Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership.

5.2 Conclusion

Assessment of the Global Situation of Terrorism

The study concludes lack of democracy, failed or weak states, swift modernization occasioned by high economic growth, rendering extremist ideologies and historic pasts of civil wars, political violence, violent revolutions, may lower the acceptance of political violence and terrorism, and impede the development of non-violent norms among all segments of society are some of the factors sustaining terrorism worldwide. Moreover, the study concludes the main forms of modern terrorism are religious terrorism, right wing terrorism and narco-terrorism.

The study also concludes global terrorism has been on the rise, as the respondents explained that the recent past marked the biggest annual rise in deaths caused by terrorism, with thousands of people killed in attacks around the world. In addition, various measures have been put in place to combat terrorism such as arrests of committers of terrorism, intensifying cooperation in exchanging accurate intelligence concerning the deterrence and battling terrorism, heightened harmonization and cooperation among states in combating crimes likely connected with terrorism, including trafficking in narcotics. Further the study concludes weak state structures, lack of education and poverty as some of the root causes terrorism worldwide.

Examination and determination of the role of Global partnerships in countering terrorism

The study concludes NATO, AMISOM, US-African joint security operation, IGAD, NATO, Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative partnership (TSCTI) are the various global partnerships forged in countering terrorism. In addition, the global counter terrorism partnerships of countering terrorism have not been very effective due to lack of proper enacted legislation and capacity building and lack of full commitments among partnerships for instance lack of joint trained forces or boards to fight terrorism. Further other respondents stated, the global counter terrorism partnerships have not been effective due to lack of co-operation among states.

The study also concludes challenges faced by counter terrorism partnerships are such as mistrust in sharing intelligence on sensitive information which exposes other partners to a certain degree of vulnerability, lack of shared intelligence reports, lack of well equipped anti-terrorism force and facilities, different counter terrorism priorities and different legal systems. On the other hand, challenges encountered by Kenya –US counter terrorism partnership are dissimilarities in how they relate with states which harbor extremists, hindrances and legal policy in information sharing, different approach to counterterrorism operations, monitoring and progress assessment, operational and technological differences, lack of trust and accountability and increased levels of corruption within the Kenyan government and the Kenyan military lacks motivation.

Various ways by which the US cooperates with Kenya in countering terrorism

The study further concludes the United States Department of Defence highly supports the Kenya military for the fight against Al-Shabaab through financial and military assistance. These are the main aspects of the Kenya-US counter terrorism approach. Further, the study concludes the Kenyan government plays the following roles in the counter terrorism approach: assemblage of evidence from different sources on the terrorist's organization, actions, and intelligence in the country, analysis of the gathered information for intelligence, producing actionable reports, policy and sharing with partners, coordination of counter terrorism efforts with other stakeholders and monitoring local and global trends in terrorism.

The study also concludes the US government through the bureau of counterterrorism, manages all U.S. Government's efforts to improve counter-terrorism cooperation with foreign governments and participates in the development, coordination, and implementation of American counterterrorism policy⁷⁹. Nevertheless the US government also describes efforts to counter terrorism finance and train law enforcement agents of the U.S. and Kenya, by also conducting research and development of counterterrorism technology⁸⁰. Further the Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership has not been very effective due to the nature and unpredictable ways in which the terror groups operate.

Finally, the study concludes national counter terrorism centre (NCTC), antiterrorism police unit (ATPU), National security intelligence service, a joint terrorism task force (JTTF), National security advisory committee (NSAC) are the main agencies involved in the Kenya-

⁷⁹ <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/> Accessed on 10th November, 2016

⁸⁰ Ibid

US counter terrorism partnership. Moreover, current use of prevailing technology, research and development, deployment of alternative approaches to alleviating the nation's involved susceptibilities remain some of the ways in which Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership can be made more effective. In addition, counterterrorism assistance programs are designed to inculcate support for law enforcement institutions in partner countries and human rights training for military and police forces.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on these findings, the study recommends the following: -

- I. Expand the existing collaboration with other terrorism analysis machinery outside the Kenya-US partnership
- II. The Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership needs to work with organizations exploring alternative restorative justice in dealing with radicalization and terrorism.
- III. The Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership should develop a resilient operational and tactical intelligence mechanism. It for working with partner countries to develop linkages between terrorism analysis bodies and share analysis of risks and countermeasures. All these actions should be supported by the development of international standards for security measures firmly devoted to principles of democracy.
- IV. The Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership should search for ways to endow organizations understand the root causes of radicalization and of terrorism. The partnership is expected to pay attention of such studies' findings.

- V. The Kenya-US partnership needs to engage more to inspire affirmative US approach, and develop new ways of influencing other Government and in particular the Israelis.

5.4 Academic Recommendations

There is need to carry out similar research in the effectiveness of other counter terrorism partnerships. The descriptive analysis that was used was insufficient to draw conclusions on the phenomenon and to afford satisfactory facts that can be used for policy development. This research proposes that further research centering on the implications of Kenya-US counter terrorism partnership should be carried out.

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