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DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH  
RADICALIZATION IN THE EASTLEIGH AREA OF NAIROBI COUNTY.

ALEX NDILI

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## DECLARATION

This Research Project is my original work and has not been presented for the award of a degree in any other university.

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This Research Project has been submitted for examination with my approval as a University supervisor

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## **DEDICATION**

This Research Project is dedicated to my wife, Ms. Mutindi Munyao and children; Waka, Kinyili and Mbithe.

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My sincere regards goes to Dr. Mike Chepkonga, my supervisor, who assiduously guided and advised me the whole time of developing this Project Paper. I further register my appreciation to the entire Department of Sociology and Social Order of the University of Nairobi for all the assistance extended to me throughout the research period. Finally, I thank my family, workmates and the Kenya Police fraternity for having supported me morally and financially throughout the research process.

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>APS</b>	Administration Police Service
<b>ASP</b>	Assistant Superintendent of Police
<b>ATPU:</b>	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit.
<b>CI</b>	Chief Inspector of Police
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organizations
<b>CVE</b>	Countering Violent Extremism
<b>DAPC:</b>	Divisional Administration Police Commander
<b>DCI</b>	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
<b>DCI:</b>	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
<b>EIJ</b>	Eritrean Islamic Jihad
<b>HoA</b>	Horn of Africa
<b>IEDS</b>	Improvised Explosive Devices
<b>IP</b>	Inspector of Police
<b>IPOA</b>	Independent Policing Authority
<b>KPS</b>	Kenya Police Service
<b>NCO</b>	Non-Commissioned officer
<b>NCTC</b>	National Counter Terrorism Centre
<b>NIF</b>	National Islamic Front
<b>NPS</b>	National Police Service
<b>OCD</b>	Organized crime Division
<b>OCPD</b>	Officer Commanding Police Division
<b>PSV</b>	Public Service Vehicles
<b>PUI</b>	Pending Under Investigations
<b>S/SGT</b>	Senior sergeant of Police
<b>SMT</b>	Social Movement Theory
<b>SP</b>	Superintendent of Police
<b>SSO</b>	Service Standing Orders
<b>SSP</b>	Senior Superintendent of Police
<b>SSP</b>	Senior Superintendent of Police

<b>SWAT</b>	Specialized Weapon and Tactics
<b>TOC</b>	Transnational Organized Crime
<b>VERLT</b>	Violent extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism.

## ABSTRACT

Community policing approaches have been used successfully to prevent crime, reduce fear of crime, and improve public safety. A raging debate however is emerging as to whether this approach can be used with equal effectiveness in the prevention of terrorism. Like other Horn of Africa Countries, Kenya has over the last sixteen years tried several approaches on “the war against terrorism”. However, none of the approaches have succeeded in stamping out terrorism. The purpose of this study therefore was to find out ways in which the philosophy of community policing could be modeled to fit a citizen based-counter terrorism strategy in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi County. The study was based on four objectives; to identify risk factors that drive youth to radicalization, to establish the typical characteristics, features and behavioral patterns of radicalized youth and related activities; to establish how principles of community policing can assist in the identification of radicalized youth and to elicit suggestions on how to solve the problem of youth radicalization within Eastleigh area. This was done by exploring the role of police-community partnership in the prevention of youth radicalization to violent extremism. The study adopted a descriptive survey design. Questionnaires with both closed and open ended items were used to collect quantitative data from eighteen community-based entities which included religious groups, local business groups, welfare groups and *Nyumba Kumi* clusters. Interview schedules were used to collect qualitative data from five religious leaders and twelve police commanders. Systematic random sampling was used to pick respondents from various community groups and junior Police Commanders. Snowball and Purposive sampling were used in respect of religious leaders and senior police commanders respectively. Data was analyzed using descriptive statistics and themes. Analyzed data were presented in charts and tables. The study revealed that the current government’s response to the threat of terrorism was largely based on ‘hard’ policing techniques. However, such approaches were found to breed mistrust and hostility by residents towards law enforcement agencies. The study further established that community policing principles can be used to create sustainable partnerships between law enforcement agencies and local residents, thus facilitating the identification of root causes of youth radicalization. It was therefore recommended that an interagency approach should be employed to counter the threat of youth radicalization in addition to strengthening of critical governance structures; equitable distribution of national resources and the formation of a community based National Counter Terrorism Strategy. Training of police officers on community policing principles and trends in youth radicalization was strongly recommended. Further, police officers should invest more on trust building initiatives in establishing joint early warning system with the local communities they serve. The study further recommends an intensive public awareness campaign on the nature, indicators and symptoms of youth radicalization within Eastleigh in particular and the Country at large.

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background of the Study.

Among the defining characteristics of the twenty-first century's first decade is the specter of terrorism that threatens world stability and security. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the United States in September 2001; London in July 2005, as well as subsequent attacks in Bali in October 2005 are criminal events that have attracted major security attention and investigation. Undoubtedly, the war against terror by the United States (U.S) and its allies has claimed many billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives, the majority being innocent civilians. Bélanger and Kruglanski (2012) observed that no matter how many terrorists are killed or captured; scores of others, mostly young people seem willing and ready to take up their place. At this point, many feel that the real challenge is to prevent and/or reverse youth radicalization from violent extremism.

Africa is not spared. High profile attacks such as the abduction of 276 girls in Chibok Nigeria in April 2014, the beheading of 21 Coptic Christian migrant workers in Libya in February 2015, the murder of 147 students at Garissa University in Kenya in April 2015 and recent Boko Haram attacks in northern Cameroon are just a few examples of the atrocities committed by radicalized groups in Africa.

Radicalization is a process by which an individual or a group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or reject or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of

choice (Ali ,2008). More recently, radicalization of youth has become a major threat to peace and security. Many pathways into and through radicalization to violent extremism exist. This is because terrorists are adaptive adversaries who use a variety of tools and tactics to particularly reach the youth as potential recruits. Thus, youth Radicalization is a key theme in terrorism discourses that is well documented in recent literature on violent extremism.

Scholars have figured radicalization as a psycho-social phenomenon that unfolds from context, thought and finally action (Kruglanski and Orehek, 2011). According to Kruger (2007), the stereotype of a terrorist as a foreigner from a disadvantaged or marginalized country, striking at unpopular values from abroad, is slowly fading away. This is because legitimate threats from both within and without national boundaries exist along a continuum of conflictual context.

Since 2009, U.S. authorities have witnessed a remarkable surge in the number of Americans engaged in terrorist activities. Dozens of cases have been identified nationwide involving militants of diverse backgrounds. The latest increase in the number of Canadian and British citizens joining the ranks of terrorist organizations, the Algerian gas plant attack on January 20, 2013 and Boston Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013 are cases in point. In the Algerian attack, 32 terrorists were involved, three of them Algerian while the rest were made up of eight nationalities, including 11 Tunisians, 2 Canadians, plus an Egyptian, a Malian, Nigerian, and Mauritians (Chikhi, 2013).

In Eastern Africa radicalization is increasingly gaining international attention. This is evidenced by rampant occurrence of terrorist activities mainly by youths of Somali

origin. Somalia has made international headlines for almost two decades now; first as a place of civil war characterized by clan warfare and humanitarian catastrophe, then as a failed state, and finally as a potential safe haven for Islamist terrorists( Marchal and Roland, 2009). Unfortunately, the Islamic radicalization in Somalia has spilled over into Kenya. This is evidenced by cross-border presence of terrorists and its clandestine support network mainly among youths in Nairobi, North-eastern and the Coast region. Besides, since the invasion of South Somalia by the Kenya Defence Forces in 2011, militants have executed a number of terrorist attacks in the Kenyan territory, notably the Westgate and Garissa University attacks in 2013 and 2015 respectively. (Reuters, 2015). Instructively, all four of the known assailants in the Westgate attack lived in the Nairobi suburb of Eastleigh, a suburb known for its large Somali population. To date, four other Somalis have been charged with helping to plan the operation, two of whom have Kenyan citizenship and identification cards (Reuters, 2015). Apparently, although Kenyan authorities blame al-Shabab for much of the violence, it is now evident that Kenya has a domestic radicalization problem of its own. And as reported by the United Nations Monitoring Group (UNMG) on Somalia and Eritrea in 2014, Kenyan nationals are to blame for a number of recent terrorist attacks within the Country, the majority of them having received military training from al-Shabaab cells in neighbouring Somalia (UNMG, 2014).

According to Sageman (2008), counter terrorism approaches have been categorized into either “hard” or “soft” strategies. Hard strategies comprise a doctrine of law enforcement, military and police operations. Conversely, soft interventions are designed to address risk factors that subject individuals and groups to violent extremism. Within the regime of soft policing platforms is the philosophy of community policing.

Community policing is an approach that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime. On the fight against terrorism, the initiative seeks to counter the threat of violent extremism without antagonizing citizens while respecting international standards of fundamental freedoms and human rights. This philosophy consists of three key components namely: partnerships with the community, problem solving and police transformation (Maguire and Wells, 2009).

Trusting partnerships between the police and local citizens are the cornerstone of community policing. Whenever they are based on trust and mutual understanding, partnerships can foster community vigilance on any form of criminal activities. Consequently, such partnerships could be designed and adopted to monitor activities aimed at recruitment and subsequent radicalization of youth within a local context such as Eastleigh. The engagement of various community groups within Eastleigh on a broad array of public safety is likely to motivate the local communities to address their own security concerns. Assured of improved quality-of-life, the residents are likely to be encouraged to own a local process that focuses on the factual causes of radicalization. In addition, community policing initiatives are likely to take cognizance of the various subsets of the population that form a community, with emphasis on the different security needs that each of them values most. The purpose of this study therefore was to explore the role of community policing in countering radicalization within the Eastleigh area in Nairobi County.



## **1.2 Statement of the Problem.**

In much of the modern World, Kenya included, the task of countering terrorism is largely the domain of security agencies. Commanders of various Security Services and Forces seek to achieve this object mainly through ‘hard power’ tools which includes selective use of Special military squads and police operations (Brons, 2001). These tactics, supported by the current anti-terrorism legislation have allegedly led to a variety of human rights violations particularly through arbitrarily arrests and torture of terrorism suspects (Ronczkowski, 2007). In fact, Rosand et al (2009) observe that counterterrorism efforts in Kenya largely focus on short-term security and law-enforcement efforts, thus ignoring longer-term measures which could focus on primary conditions that promote terrorism.

A case in point is the aftermath of September 2013 Westgate terror attack in Nairobi, Kenya, where the police launched Operation “Sanitization of Eastleigh” in an effort to flush out suspected al-shabaab operatives from the Eastleigh suburb. However, residents and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) protested that the operation was characterized by ethnic profiling, unlawful detention and deportations, infringement of the residents’ fundamental human rights, brutality and wide-spread bribery (IPOA, 2014). At the close of the operation, all suspects were released by the court for lack of evidence (IPOA, 2014). Rosand et al (2009) opine that individuals, particularly young people who find themselves a subject of police brutality under the guise of ‘war on terrorism’ are likely to fall victims to radicalization. Indeed, Sageman, (2004) notes that disenfranchised young people who harbor the feeling that the society has the least to offer them, are most likely to be targeted for radicalization to violent extremism.

Radicalization is social processes that could easily occur within basic community set-ups (Schmid, (2013). Subsequently, it would be prudent to consider radicalization prevention strategies that seek to incorporate the support of the citizen in analyzing and responding to the threat. Instructively, counter-radicalization approaches could be most effective if policies that seek the active engagement of local communities were comprehensively pursued.

Subsequently, community policing efforts that are based the principles of police-public partnerships, joint problem solving and community intelligence are likely to address the root cause youth radicalization. Such a strategy would most likely facilitate unveil opportunities for various stakeholders to examine the local conditions under which youth radicalization occurs. In addition, such principles would draw relevant actors to a wider context of socio-economic and political factors that form the basic values and practices of local communities (Speckhard, 2012). By partnering with statutory parties, the police, who are the main custodians of criminal law are likely to work closely with local government, education officials and appropriate community leaders to identify individuals at risk of being influenced into violent radicalization that lead to terrorism.

While numerous research findings on the effects of ‘hard’ strategies on counter-terrorism exist, there is very little literature on the involvement of local communities in addressing the threat of youth radicalization. For instance, Mogire and Agade (2011), researched on Counter-terrorism in Kenya with specific regard to the effectiveness of the terrorism control measures the government had put in place. Further, Aronson (2012) only concentrated on the participation of the Muslim community in countering terrorism across the country in general.

An article by Dominic Pkalya titled “Government needs to rein in police if plans to halt extremism is to succeed” (Sunday Nation, September 13, 2015), emphasized on trust building between the law enforcement agencies and the local communities in prevention of terrorism. On the contrally, Police in Eastleigh appear to operate on rigid regulations that seem to be in conflict with the interests and values of the local security consumers. The bureaucratic nature of command within the NPS limit officers’ prowess to creativity and outreach to local communities. Effectively, the development of a community oriented anti-radicalization strategy may not be realized in the near future.

This study therefore sought to establish the feasibility of police-public partnerships in addressing risk factors that predispose youth to radicalization within Eastleigh area. Premised on mutual interest and trust, such partnerships are likely to promote a common understanding of the causes and drivers of youth radicalization within Eastleigh area. Effectively, the police could move away from militarized operations that more often than not raise human rights questions and prevent effective communication between the police and the local populace. This study therefore aims at exploring the role of community policing in countering radicalization in Eastleigh area of Nairobi County.

### **1.2.1 Research Questions**

- i. What risk factors promote youth radicalization?
- ii. What are the typical characteristics, features and patterns of radicalized youth?
- iii. In what ways will the principles of community policing help in the identification of radicalized youth and related activities?
- iv. How can the problem of Youth Radicalization be solved?

### **1.3 Study Objectives.**

#### **1.3.1 General Objective**

The general objective of this study was to establish the role of Community policing in the prevention of youth radicalization in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi County.

#### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives.**

The specific objectives of the study were as follows:

- i. To identify risk factors that drive youth to radicalization.
- ii. To establish the typical characteristics, features and behavioral patterns of radicalized youth and related activities.
- iii. To establish how principles of community policing can assist in the identification of radicalized youth.
- iv. To elicit suggestions on how to solve the problem of youth radicalization within Eastleigh area.

### **1.4 Justification of the Study.**

Radicalization to violent extremism can happen at any age. However, young people in search of a sense of belonging, purpose, and identity are more vulnerable to violent radicalization that lead to terrorism. This is often compounded by negative perceptions of state authorities, especially law enforcement officers, whom are perceived to be brutal and partisan towards the ruling class.

In Africa and particularly the Eastern Africa region, young people's ingenuity, energy and resilience can be harnessed to generate real and positive change through constructive engagements (UNDP 2006). Thus, extrication of the youth from the fangs of violent

extremism is therefore likely to allow them to realize their full potential and make meaningful contribution to the society.

Kenya being a developing state, the youth remain at the forefront of social and political developments. Far from being passive victims subject to manipulation, the youth can be molded to constantly recreate their societies through their participation in family, work, culture and ritual and in finding new ways of coping with economic situations. The Kenyan youth exist as a kind of meeting point for local, traditional and digital knowledge, and crafting new forms of versatility in positive thinking. With the increasing evidence that terrorist organizations are targeting youth into their ranks for replenishment, the future of many Kenyan youth remains precarious and uncertain. Eastleigh area within Nairobi County has been identified by security agencies as a prime base for youth recruitment into radicalization (Rabasa 2009b). Al-shabaab recruiters in particular are systematically preying upon the vulnerabilities of Eastleigh youth in various contexts by offering a range of incentives. In addition, the government's response to the threat of youth radicalization in Eastleigh through police operations seems to greatly give counter-productive outcomes. The purpose of this study therefore is to establish the viability of community policing as long lasting response strategy to the risk of youth radicalization in Eastleigh.

The study findings provide valuable insights on the role that various stakeholders may play in reducing the vulnerability of the youth to violent extremism. Initiatives such as objective police operations are expected to facilitate lasting partnership between local residents and law enforcement agencies within Eastleigh area. Such partnerships will most likely help to improve police accountability in the eyes of the public. The overall outcome would be increased quality of local intelligence that would expand the circle of guardianship for a safer Eastleigh community. The study further recommends various

interventions that the government may initiate to alleviate feelings of marginalization and frustration amongst various sections of the local population targeted by the al-shabaab operatives.

Instructively, recommendations ensuing from the study will inform the principles upon which to anchor a National Counter-Terrorism Strategy. In addition, the counter terrorism legislation adopted in 2012 has been significantly contentious for supposedly containing sections that substantially violate fundamental freedoms and rights of the person. This study therefore is expected to raise community concerns and potentials that would interest policy makers in the security sector at large and prevention of terrorism in particular. Indeed, the general practice of community policing ideals has been shown to create stable environments for socio-economic development both locally and internationally. Furthermore, the areas for further research as suggested at the end of this paper are likely to provoke the academic and scholarly world into probing more on community based CVE approaches.

### **1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study**

Botha (2013) identifies Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa, Wajir, Mandera and Eastleigh as key spots in the Country where Kenyan youth are joining the al-shabaab in large numbers. However, this study is limited to the Eastleigh area, a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious suburb within Nairobi County, whose strategic positioning has attracted youth from within and without. Although Countering radicalization is a broad area in the field of terrorism, this study only focused on a community based approach that specifically target the youth of Eastleigh area. The study was confined within four key principles of community policing: Police-community partnership; joint problem solving, intelligence management and police reforms. The target population included family heads, religious

and administrative leaders, leaders of various community groups and police officers serving within Eastleigh area.

Radicalization to violent extremism is both a sensitive and emotive field of research and does not easily lend itself to reliable, valid and systematic exploration in the field. The study used a descriptive survey approach to collect data from respondents and informants in order to overcome the limitations of a single design. The key informant interview, which is purely a qualitative approach, is one that allows collection of information from a wide range of people. It was anticipated that not many key informants would be available for interviews due to the sensitive nature of the research subject. Consequently, the findings may not be generalizable beyond the research population. To surmount the sensitivity challenge, the researcher took steps to initiate a favorable impression and rapport in order to earn trust of the target population.

## 1.6 Definition of Key Terms and Concepts

<b>Al Qaeda:</b>	A global militant organization founded by Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1988.
<b>Al-shabaab:</b>	Somalia based cell militant Islamist group linked to the al-qaeda.
<b>Community policing:</b>	Policing philosophy that promotes organizational strategies which support the systematic use of partnerships between communities and law enforcement agencies, and problem solving techniques, to pro-actively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime.
<b>De-radicalization;</b>	The process of abandoning an extremist worldview and concluding that it is not acceptable to use ideologically motivated violence to effect social, religious, political change.
<b>Ideologies:</b>	Systems of belief derived from worldviews that frame human social and political conditions.
<b>Islamic Extremism:</b>	Vocal or active opposition to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.



<b>Prima-facie</b>	in common law jurisdictions denotes evidence that, unless rebutted, would be sufficient to prove a particular proposition or fact.
<b>Radicalization:</b>	A process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice.
<b>Terrorism:</b>	The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
<b>Violent extremists:</b>	Individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political, social, or religious goals.
<b>Youth:</b>	Any human being aged between 12 and 35 years.

## **CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter reviews literature that is relevant to the study and pin-points the knowledge gaps in line with the study objectives. Literature reviewed includes the possible causes, process and indicators of youth radicalization; current response to terror threats in Kenya and the possible role of community policing in the prevention of youth radicalization. A theoretical frame work that comprises The Frustration-Aggression Theory, Rational Choice Theory and Routine Activities Theory is also covered under this chapter. The conceptual framework of the study is presented at the end of the chapter.

### **2.2 From Radicalization to violent Extremism.**

The United States National Counter Terrorism Centre (US-NCTC, 2003) defines radicalization as a process by which an individual or a group adopts increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or reject and undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice. Theories about radicalization abound. Some focus on structural factors such as political tensions and cultural cleavages, sometimes referred to as the root causes of radicalization; others emphasize on personal factors, such as the shock of a life-changing event or the influence of a mentor (Wright, 2007).

Wiktorowicz and Quintan (2007) observe that the term *radicalization* became more prevalent after the 2005 terrorist bombings in London that targeted a bus and the subway

system. The attacks were led by two young men who had grown up in the United Kingdom and did not fit the profile of past terrorist perpetrators. One of the four bombers of the 7 July 2005 train attack was a model student. He had never been in trouble with the police, was the son of a well-established family and was employed and integrated into society (ibid). Ever since, a significant body of research, by among others, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) has been undertaken with the aim of getting a better understanding of why some people are vulnerable to radicalization and the processes through which radicalization occurs. The Directorate of General Justice of the European Commission (2008), for instance carried out a study on beliefs, ideologies and narratives of radicalization. The underpinning concern of the study was whether existing forms of radicalization are exclusively targeted at particular sets of the society.

The US-NCTC identified four broad categories of describing the way in which young persons are recruited or became radicals. These are; born into a radical environment (born of radical parents) forced into radicalism (recruited forcefully), persuaded (enticed through some motivation) and self-radicalization (driven by individual curiosity). These are not inclusive of all the ways in which young persons are recruited, and are likely to occur in various combinations.

The causes of radicalization are as diverse as they are abundant (Mandel 2009). Youth recruitment is based on a combination of reasons. These can be categorized as a compendium of "push" and "pull" factors, Community and personal factors. Push factors include alienation from prevailing norms and opportunities; pull factors are preferred ideologies and opportunities; community aspects of radicalization include social and

cultural milieu while the individual factors are mainly personality and disposition (Mandel 2009).

Alexander et al. (2001) observe that terrorist radicalization does not follow a linear path and the conditions conducive to it vary from one individual to another: It is often the result of a combination of contextual and personal factors, which can include feelings of alienation, exclusion, deprivation, insecurity or victimization. According to Alexander et al. (2001), the challenge is that violent extremists draw on ideas and grievances that resonate with various needs of the youth, in order to recruit and exploit them by offering a false sense of purpose, belonging and identity.

Kruglanski and Orehek (2011) break the benefits of youth recruitment into two categories: those that benefit the terrorist group, and, those that benefit the recruit. For the groups studied, the primary benefit of recruiting youth is that it enables the militant cells to replenish their ranks, which is crucial for their continued existence (Wright, 2007). The use of young persons is likely to help some groups evade detection by security forces, something that would enable them to carry out terrorist attacks effectively. For the recruit, the group offers to meet personal, welfare, and social needs that might not already be met by their social or familial networks (Alexander et al., 2001).

### **2.3 Youth Radicalization in the Greater Horn of Africa (HoA)**

The Greater Horn of Africa (HoA) is made up of Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, Yemen, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan and Southern Sudan. Radicalization in this region is increasingly gaining attention. The process is fuelled by the Somali based-al-Qaida-affiliated al-Shabaab and the ongoing global war on terrorism (Kruglanski and Orehek, 2011). Various reasons have been advanced for the growth of al-shabaab in Somalia

including the absence of a functioning government since the overthrow of President Mohamed Siyad Barre in 1991 (Rabasa, 2009b). Violent extremism in Somalia fuels inter-community tensions, inhibits socio-economic development and fosters regional and international insecurity.

The Greater HoA is a region with strategic global significance and a major route of international marine transport. This is also a place where diverse cultures, faiths and peoples of different nationalities are meshed up into a dynamic community (Ali 2008). The rise of youth radicalization and violent extremism in the HoA is one of today's most pressing threats to peace, stability and development (Alexander et al, 2001). The region faces a range of challenges that fuel youth radicalization, including the presence of transnational terrorists and other violent groups. These security challenges are exacerbated by an array of chronic problems, ranging from underdevelopment and weak governance to high unemployment. Such challenges potentially make the youth more vulnerable to empty promises of a better life and financial incentives offered by terrorist organizations (Fink et al, 2013).

According to Silber and Bhatt (2007), this region has been heavily affected by destructive cross-border communal conflicts often triggered by resource scarcity due to rapid population growth and porous borders. Disproportionate military and other repressive reactions to security threats such as terrorism often end up delegitimizing local authorities and undermining efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism through community engagements (Rabasa 2009b). Moreover, the underdevelopment and fragility that characterizes the region has given rise to a range of youth grievances that foster an enabling environment for terrorist groups to spread their message and recruit support (Rabasa, 2009b).

Ali, (2008b) observe that terrorist groups operating in the region have capitalized on economic weaknesses, governance deficits, violent conflicts, and the lack of effective services delivered by governments to recruit from politically and economically marginalized youth populations. These structural “push” factors, accompanied by “pull” factors such as charismatic recruiters, appealing ideologies, and material and social incentives, have fueled youth radicalization into violent extremism within the Greater HoA and adjacent Countries (Ali, 2008b). The spread of youth radicalization has led national governments in the Greater HoA and their regional and international partners to increasingly focus on measures aimed at controlling youth extremism in the region (The United Kingdom’s Counter Terrorism Strategy, 2006). These measures include military peace keeping operations; crackdown on suspected terrorist organizations and sympathizers, and ethnic and religious based profiling. The force and discrimination that characterize these tactics are likely to drive more youth into radicalization and add to the threat of terrorism within the Greater HoA.

Youth recruitment into violent conflict is not a new phenomenon in the Eastern Africa region in General. Pirio (2005) indicates that there were revolutionary movements in Sudan in early 1990s where the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan was accused of harboring and abetting youth recruitment for purposes of expanding violent extremism (Pirio, 2005). The NIF was further accused of associating with al-Qaeda to undermine the governments of its neighbors with the sole aim of bringing about an Islamist state (Pirio GA, 2005).

In Eritrea, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) has been the main focus of Islamic extremism. The EIJ advocates the establishment of an Islamic State in Eritrea and has engaged in youth recruitment to fortify its base. Under the name of the Islamic Salvation Front, the EIJ is currently a member of the Eritrean National Alliance, an umbrella organization that opposes the Eritrean government (Kepel 2007).

Due to its geostrategic position; relations with the U.S, the United Kingdom (UK) and Israel; proximity to Somalia and its role in the war against terrorism, Kenya is at cross roads, as far as countering youth radicalization is concerned. The country has variously been referred to as a base for terrorist activities (Ali 2008b; Pirio 2005). Weak governance on security and criminal justice system is highly believed to discourage local communities from participating in addressing the root causes of youth radicalization in the Country (Rabasa, 2009b). Further, studies indicate that although most of terror activities go on in Somalia, some of the perpetrators are recruited from Kenya (Pirio GA, 2005). The recruiters concentrate on the Kenya-Somali border and in Eastleigh estate in Nairobi, both of which are predominantly inhabited ethnic Somalis (Ali, 2008b)

## **2.4 Violent Extremism in Kenya**

A significant manifestation of the growing threat of extremism in post-independence East Africa is the 7 August, 1998, attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, which were attributed to al-Qaeda. Rakodi (2000) observes that although a number of political officials in Kenya and Tanzania claimed that their respective countries had merely been used as a battleground to target the U.S and its

interests, it was to be later discovered that individuals involved in the attacks included both foreigners and locals.

Since then, violent extremism has gradually lost its exclusively foreign character as national and regional extremism expand. The success of al-Qaeda's cell in Kenya was emphasized on 28 November 2002 when two suicide bombers targeted the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa. Unlike in the case of the bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi in 1998, all of the suspects involved in the Paradise bombing were Kenyan nationals, with the exception of Abu Talha al-Sudani, a Sudanese national (Rakodi, 2000)

Evidently, Al-Shabaab has deliberately targeted Kenya's religious and ethnic fault lines, using social and economic grievances to ensnare youth to join their ranks (Rakodi, 2000). The first cases of Kenyan youth radicalization, recruitment and trafficking for militia and al-Shabaab fighting in Somalia were reported in 2006 by the civil society (Rabasa, 2009). Particular spots in Nairobi and Mombasa were identified as forming the foci of these activities. With time these radicalization activities took root in the country. However, for quite some time, the government of Kenya took a dim view of the reports and dismissed them as mere propaganda and alarmist. There were vehement denials across the country over allegations of such recruitment. However, according to Rabasa, (2009), four years later, the government acknowledged the fact that youth were actually being recruited for terrorist activities. Kenyan Nationals have been directly involved in recruiting their fellow nationals to join al-shabaab ranks. Initially, after being radicalised, these individuals would leave the Country to fight in Somalia. This trend also gradually changed in that locally marginalised, radicalised and recruited individuals started being used to execute attacks on their own soil (Botha, 2014).



On September 21, 2013, a massacre of 67 innocent civilians took place at the Westgate Mall, Nairobi. And on April 02, 2015, gunmen stormed the Garissa University College, Kenya, killing 149 people, injuring over 79. Both attacks were claimed by the al-Qaeda linked group al-Shabaab (Reuters, 2015). In the case of the of the Westgate massacre one of the gunmen was a Norwegian citizen of Somali descent. In the Garissa attack, one of the four gunmen was a Kenyan National who was variously described as a "high-flying, grade-A student" with a promising law career ahead. Both men were in their early 20s (Reuters, 2015).

## **2.5 Youth radicalization in Eastleigh.**

Nicknamed "Little Mogadishu," the Eastleigh Suburb of Nairobi has bloomed in the past decade into one of East Africa's most vibrant commercial centers, built mostly by citizens of Somalia who sought refuge in Kenya after the country collapsed in the 1990s (Aronson,2012). But as Eastleigh boomed, a parallel growth emerged. Business with the Arab Gulf brought increased investment from that region in fundamentalist madrasas, making the neighborhood fertile ground for Youth radicalization and militancy (Botha, 2014).

Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) suggests that the main cause of homegrown radicalization in Kenya is the inability of young people to undergo the acculturation and assimilation process successfully; a process that would enable them to become fully productive members of the society. This vacuity leaves them vulnerable and susceptible to the influences of radicalizing forces. According to Mogire and Agade (2011), the advanced Kenya's economy and infrastructure, relative to her neighbors, allows for

freedom of movement and abundance of targets of recruitment. Weak governance in key areas such as security, criminal justice system, and rule of law, which is seemingly applied in a selective manner, probably serves as push factors for disenfranchised youth in joining terrorism ranks. Additionally, Kenya's Proximity to unstable states, porous borders, political stability and relatively stronger cosmopolitan economy attracts abundance of al-shabaab sympathizers into the Country.

On the other hand, Muhula (2007) observe that Kenyan youth are bedeviled with various grievances arising from poverty, unemployment, limited education opportunities and poor socialization. These vulnerabilities coupled with an extreme interpretation of Islam, are likely to therefore employ a variety of ideological tools and radical Islamic teachings to galvanize the youth towards violence.

## **2.6 Response to Radicalization.**

Counter terrorism approaches the world over have been categorized into "hard" and "soft" strategies. The hard power approach is an enemy-centric doctrine consisting primarily of offensive, hard power tactics such as Predator and Reaper drone strikes, increased Special Forces and police operations (Schmid and Rashmil, 2013). This position is supported by the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2007), which captures two main elements of countering terrorism: prevention and disruption. The underlying assumption here is that, by denying terrorists entry into the United States and disrupting terrorist operations, it is possible to deter homegrown terrorism (National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2007). Neumann (2009) notes that any effort towards prevention of youth radicalization should not be disconnected from their social and political context.

Law enforcement agencies, particularly New York Police Department (NYPD), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the Los Angeles (LA) Police office, as well as other agencies in Europe, have attempted to address youth radicalization through building true partnership with the local populations (Neumann, 2009). This is based on the assumption that building resilience against violent extremism begins at the local level. The guiding supposition in this context is that effective counter-radicalization strategies are likely to be best achieved through the engagement and empowerment of individuals and groups primary levels of the society.

In Kenya, the government relies mainly on a combination “hard” tools that include anti-terrorism legislation and security operations, to deal with the country’s radicalization threat. Key pieces of legislation that the government is currently enforcing are: Prevention of Terrorism Act; the Penal Code; the National Police Service Act; The Proceeds of the Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Prevention of Organized crime Act and the Security Laws Amendment Act. A common denominator in these laws is the sweeping powers bestowed upon the Police to arrest, detain and prosecute suspects of radicalization on the least suspicious grounds. The security forces focus on impromptu operations and profiling of groups that are considered ethnically, religiously or culturally distinct (Kithure, 2014). Numerous sections of these laws are deemed discriminative and targeting members of certain religious and ethnic communities. Consequently, as they enforce these laws, the Police are viewed as a central part of the conflict, rather than a response to that conflict.

However, a community policing plan that relies upon organizational decentralization and a reorientation of police commitment is likely to facilitate a dual communication between the police and the public. Since community policing assumes a commitment that is broadly focused on problem-oriented policing, the police are expected to be responsive to

citizens' demands by prioritizing local concerns. It also implies a commitment to helping neighborhoods solve crime problems on their own, through community organizations and crime prevention programs (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997)

### **2.6.1 Joint Police operations**

The NPS Act (2011) empowers The Inspector General of the National Police Service (IGP) to conduct operations from time to time in respect of any threat facing National security (NPS Act 2011). Pursuant to these powers, following the September 2013 Westgate terror attack, the IGP ordered a joint operation comprising the Kenya Police Service (KPS), the Administration Police Service (APS) and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) in Eastleigh. The object of the operation was to flush out al-shabaab operatives, capture radicalized youth and neutralize terror threats in Eastleigh. However, in the aftermath of the operation, the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) released a report which read in part;

*“....on 5th April 2014, the government launched a security operation dubbed OPERATION SANITIZATION OF EASTLEIGH, which was to be carried out under the aegis of the NPS. This Operation was largely designed to be carried out around Eastleigh Estate to flush out Al-Shabaab adherents/aliens and, search for weapons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs)/explosives and other arms so as to detect, disrupt and deter terrorism and other organized criminal activities. As the Operation got underway, there emerged widespread media reports of alleged ethnic profiling of certain ethnic groups, as well as unlawful detentions and deportations by the Police. In addition, there was criticism from a section of the public who were concerned that the operation had infringed on their fundamental human rights and that, to a larger extent, it was skewed towards specific segments of the society. The Operation was further marred by widespread allegations of corruption where some residents*

*were allegedly forced to part with bribes to avoid being arrested and/ or detained in unclear circumstances. Allegations of arbitrary arrests, harassment, assault, unlawful detentions and deportation of individuals were also made” (IPOA 2014).*

The IPOA further opined that the operation created avenues for rogue Police Officers to engage in extortion activities (IPOA, 2014). There were allegations of people with valid documents being arrested, acts that amounted to violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of the locals. Some detainees alleged that police officers engaged in corruption during their arrest and transportation to Police Stations. It was further claimed that some detainees secured their release along the way and at Police Stations after allegedly bribing the officers. Others alleged that in some estates, the Police openly asked for bribes so as not to search some buildings. Some detainees alleged the practice of releasing detainees along the way or at the Stations resulted into some of them being arrested twice. A police operation of this nature is likely to reduce police legitimacy in the eyes of residents. Similarly, public trust that would have effectively persuaded the locals to share information with the police was lost in the antagonism.

The IPOA team therefore concluded that the operation was poorly conceived and executed. A case in point here is the practice of searching residential areas, where a building would be searched severally by different groups of Police Officers in the course of the day or at night. Junior officers seemed to lack close supervision and guidance. As a consequence, there were several allegations of human rights violations. For instance, suspects were held beyond the constitutional 24-hour rule only to be released without charge (IPOA 2014).

Civil Society Organizations, particularly The KCHR and MUHURI view this conduct as reflecting a dangerous readiness by the country's security services to pursue initiatives that subverts the rule of law and indiscriminately targets specific minority communities. This, MUHURI (2014) argued, damages the government's reputation, the legitimacy and effectiveness of police action, by violating the same law they are employed to preserve. Hence, all counter terrorism activities should be subject to the rule of law and respect of human rights (Speckhard, 2012)

### **2.6.2 The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU).**

The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), a unit within the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI), was established in February 2003 to combat terrorism. Since then, it has responded to numerous attacks. The unit has a mandate to "Prevent, detect, disrupt and interdict imminent terrorist activities within the country; exhaustively investigate all terrorism and terrorism related cases; take control, secure, and cordon all scenes of terrorist incidents; create profiles for suspected terrorists and establish a databank; share intelligence with other security related agencies operating within the country; and review and monitor security of foreign missions accredited to Kenya(ATPU Strategic Plan, 2013-2018). However, according to (MUHURI, 2014) the unit allegedly operates discreetly rounding up, detaining and sometimes executing suspects of terrorist activities. The allegation is that youth from certain community groups are known to flee their homes to escape the fangs of ATPU. This certainly creates a fertile ground for al-shabaab operatives to recruit the desperate youths into their ranks (UN Reporteu, 2012).

According to Kenya Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission report (KTJRC, 2013), ATPU has reportedly committed a wide array of human rights abuses that violate international, regional, and domestic law. These abuses are not only unlawful but also counterproductive. Violent extremists use such abuses to justify violence and to recruit others. In addition, counterterrorism-related human rights abuses erode community trust in government. This extinguishes opportunities for authorities to enter into dialogues with the same communities that can be instrumental in reducing extremist violence.

ATPU allegedly violated various principles and provisions of domestic, regional, and international human rights standards, in particular the prohibitions on extrajudicial killings; torture and other ill-treatment; excessive use of force; disappearances; and other forms of arbitrary detention, renditions, and other serious human rights violations. In addition, there are no documentary independent, impartial, and transparent investigations of allegations human rights violations carried out by the ATPU ((MUHURI 2014)

Thus, community policing could be best positioned to achieve the dual goals of protecting communities from attacks and protecting civil rights and liberties .The moral example set by the freedoms in the Constitution must never be outshined by suspicion, or the desire to silence ideologies that are not considered mainstream. Similarly, the freedoms of speech, press, religion, and assembly should never be repressed because they are perceived to be violent or offensive. Since Law Enforcement obligations includes the commitment to “always uphold the Constitution,” regardless of the circumstances.

## **2.7 Community Policing and Youth Radicalization**

The Office of Community-Oriented Policing in the US describes Community Policing as a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies which support the systematic use of partnerships between communities and law enforcement agencies, and problem solving techniques, to pro-actively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime (US Department of Justice, 2003). This is because Community policing is a “soft” tool that thrives on building of trust with local communities and engaging with them as partners to develop information-driven solutions to local issues. This soft power approach to prevention of radicalization consists of population-centric methods, and contains features such as information sharing, capacity building and trust building (Otiso, 2009). Such engagement is meant to promote community awareness about the threat of violent extremism. The rationale here is that more aware communities are of potential threats to their security, the more empowered they are to be resilient against it, and the better prepared they are to counter the threats themselves. Community policing’s broad approach encompasses greater emphasis on proactive and preventive policing. Building partnerships with public and private community stakeholders, interacting with residents and community leaders, sharing information, and investigating reports of suspicious or unusual behavior are all components of community policing that are easily transferable to the prevention of radicalization (Rosand et al 2009). Community members are an important force multiplier. They can help identify, prevent, and eliminate radical ideologies and behaviors at the normative stages.



However, community based approaches need to be designed and implemented in ways that work to maintain legitimacy, reduce exclusion and enhance social cohesion. For a full integration of community policing principles in the prevention of radicalization, four thematic features were examined; police-community partnerships, identification of radicalization factors, management of intelligence and police reforms.

### **2.7.1 Police-Community Partnerships**

Under the community policing philosophy, all members of the community are viewed as partners who share responsibility for developing and implementing solutions to public safety priorities. Inherent in this is the notion that individuals who live or work in a specific community are better situated to identify immediate social concerns and disorders. Thus, trusting partnerships are the cornerstone of community policing. In order for these partnerships to be successful, they must be based on transparency, communication, and respect (Scheider, Chapman and Seelman, 2004)

Through communication and collaboration, law enforcement agencies and the people they serve can tailor initiatives to address specific, agreed-upon needs and help foster a common purpose in keeping communities safer. In countering violent extremism, lasting partnerships are necessary for law enforcement to achieve the appropriate balance between delivering traditional police services and working to prevent radicalization.

Maguire and Wells (2009) opine that fostering trusting partnerships begins with being aware of community concerns and being sensitive to the norms and practices of diverse groups within the community. Taking into account specific ethnic, religious, and social practices is essential for law enforcement when interacting and communicating with

members of the community. Important to note here is the possibility that even within a specific group, there could be different practices and beliefs that necessitate unique responses from law enforcement. Although Mogire and Agade (2011) did an investigation on Counter terrorism in Kenya, their article generally describes control measures, the rationale and motivations behind terror attacks in Kenya. Consequently, there is need to establish the role that a community-oriented approach may play in the prevention of terrorism in the Country and beyond.

The Kenya Police Strategic Plan 2010-2014 identified community Policing as one of key strategies to be implemented within the strategic period with the aim of preventing terrorism in the Country, particularly within Eastleigh, Mombasa and North Eastern region. Further, the Government in 2013 rolled out a community based programme christened *Nyumba Kumi* (ten households) with the aim of anchoring Community Policing at the house level(Kenya gazette Notice No. 14485). Consequently, several community policing clusters were rolled out in 2013, in radicalization hotspots, Eastleigh among them.

The rationale of the roll out was to facilitate law enforcement agencies within Eastleigh to engage various actors in countering terrorism. Community policing clusters and religious leaders should therefore create a common platform to counter ideologies and narratives that legitimize violence, by standing for justice and equity as well as affirming the ideals of inclusiveness and opportunity. The study therefore sought to investigate the extent to which the Police had partnered with various community groups to identify

factors that breed radicalization among the youth within Eastleigh, and suggest possible points of convergence that could support lasting partnerships.

### **2.7.2 Identification of Radicalization Factors**

Countering radicalization to violent extremism can be best achieved by engaging and empowering individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience against it Bartlett and Birdwell (2010). Radicalization usually occurs within loose social networks of relatives, friends and peers. The most vulnerable potential recruits are those who are at a stage of life where they are seeking an identity and livelihood, while looking for approval and validation (Baker et. 2007). According to a report released by International Crisis Group (2012), there are four main factors that have contributed to the country's vulnerability to radicalization and terrorism: structural and institutional factors, grievances, foreign and military policy, and jihadist ideology.

Further, The UK Strategy for countering International Terrorism (2013) recognizes that radicalization is fundamentally an individual process, and countering it requires adopting strategies with an individual touch. Hence, local individuals, who interact with the youth such as parents, teachers, coaches, mentors, and religious leaders, as well as peers, are critical in identifying strange activities or behaviors among the youth. That groups that operate at the grassroots level are capable of detecting radicalization in its nascent stages and intervening before it metastasizes into acts of violent extremism (Speckhard and Paz, 2012).

In the East Africa Region, youth struggle to access employment, education, housing, health services, and other necessities. However, they become frustrated with their

inability to achieve culturally recognized adulthood status and seek validation by joining violent extremist groups, which give them an adult-like status through responsibility, purpose, and often financial compensation. Mogire and Agade (2011) observes that in Kenya, impunity among politically connected elites causes young people to lose confidence in their legal institutions. This development could be attributed to the seemingly discriminative approach by the criminal justice system. Youth, for instance, claim to receive harsh punishments for seemingly small offenses, such as lack of National identification cards and loitering.

On their part, politicians commonly stoke youth frustrations and promise sweeping reforms aimed at improving their lives. After elections, however, they are abandoned leaving them to conclude that solutions to their problems can only be achieved outside of mainstream politics, perhaps through violent extremism. Kenyan youth and in particular those in Eastleigh area of Nairobi, face unequal or inconsistent application of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) (IPOA, 2014). Police operations in the name of “fight against radicalization” seem to aggravate their feeling of disenfranchisement and neglect.

Conventionally, young people seek a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives, a longing for adventure, glory, heroic or iconic status, and through a search for outlets that enable them to break from convention (Speckhard and Paz, 2012). Eastleigh youth are no different; they are exposed to ostentatious insistence of extreme Islamic ideologies which exploit their withdrawal from social interaction, sudden obsession with physical fitness and limited contact with siblings. Faced with these, the youths are therefore more likely to look for a meaning and construct worldviews that satisfy their desires for self-

actualization and fulfillment. In fact, Bartlett and Birdwell (2010) found out that local groups and individuals are capable of watching out for new behaviors and ideas that the youths pick during and after radicalization. The current study aims at finding out the role of local community groups such as *Nyumba Kumi*, peace committees and religious leaders in the identification of indicators of radical behavior and subsequent commitment to share such intelligence with the local police within Eastleigh.

### **2.7.3 Intelligence on Youth Radicalization**

Collection and processing of intelligence on youth radicalization remains a key concept in successful counter-terrorism measures at the local police level (Schmid, 2013). For members of local communities to effectively contribute to the local intelligence system, they must be able to understand how and what to observe, how to and what to report. To maximize on the quality and quantity of information provided by the community, law enforcement must provide a framework of knowledge. The more that law enforcement can educate the community, the more robust the feedback from the community (Scheider, 2004).

Schmid (2011) observe that by use of intelligence analysis, the police are able to identify threats within the community and be more specific about defining suspicious behavior. When the patrol officer receives specific information from the intelligence unit, he/she, should be able to synthesize and release it to citizens in a form and content that they will readily comprehend. Armed with more detailed information concerning what actions may constitute “suspicious” behavior, the public can be more empowered. With this greater awareness, citizens will not only know what to look for, but also what to report to the law enforcement agency (Scheider, 2004).

Nevertheless, these studies disclose little to link intelligence to decision making in the prevention of radicalization according to the prevailing laws of the land. As Schmid (2011) argues, for intelligence on radicalization to be lawful, it has to be gathered, stored, processed, disseminated and used in strict compliance with national laws and international human rights standards. Further, it is important to note that the majority of radicalization intelligence is not obtained by covert means, but is developed from open-source information, basically the local residents (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2010). In Eastleigh area however, the police appear to handle terrorism intelligence so unobtrusively as to nurture extreme mistrust between the locals and law enforcement agencies.

As pointed out elsewhere, Eastleigh has become an important centre of Diaspora and a hub for a trust-based trading community that operates across East Africa, Asia and the Middle East. This has attracted people and groups of various ethnic, economic and religious backgrounds. Thus, establishing communication channels between each of these sections of Eastleigh and the police can provide a formidable intelligence network system. Threats to, or opportunities of youth radicalization can be specifically defined and reported to police for timely action. However, confidentiality and commitment on both the Police and the residents is a critical element of the intelligence management process. This study therefore seeks to explore ways in which officers can objectively process intelligence obtained from the locals on youth radicalization trends while maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the Police command.

#### **2.7.4 Necessity of Police Reforms**

A community-based approach to prevention of radicalization emphasizes both reforming the police and refurbishing their public image. Speckhard and Paz (2012) identifies two elements upon which such reforms rests: changing the methods and practice of the police and taking steps to establish a relationship between the police and the public. In order to find solutions to community problems, the police and the public must move beyond a narrow focus on individual crimes or incidents, and instead consider innovative ways of addressing immediate community concerns that give rise to crime and disorder (Horowitz, 2012). The end goal is the creation of a professional, representative, responsive, and accountable institution that works in partnership with the public.

Findlay (2004) observes that in order for the Police to respond to the challenge of domestic terrorism, there is an urgent need for extensive restructuring of police organizations in order to embed a ‘community-based’ approach in their counter terrorism strategy. Opaque and confused management structures should be made more transparent; promotion and recruitment within the agency should be based on standardized merit-based procedures rather than cronyism. Strong control systems should be put in place in an effort to stamp out corruption. Officers should be made more accountable as a result of new procedures through which the public may launch their complaints (Cole, 2003).

The Police should aspire to reach out to communities that have long been alienated from attention. The process should begin with raising awareness about people’s rights, the role of the police, and the methods the police can use to support community safety and

security. Special concentration need to be placed on the vulnerable youths and those who have disproportionately suffered in the hands of the police before (Spalek, 2012)

In a radicalization prevention context, goals should be clearly defined, and prudently include all key stakeholders, balancing both interest and influence. Cole, (2003) found out that developing a professional and accountable police service practicing a new style of policing that is responsive to the needs of local communities is increasingly recognized as important in the prevention of radicalization. The design, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the intended engagement should be as wide and consultative as possible, so as to ensure that all stakeholders have ownership to the programme.

However, there exists little empirical evidence on the requisite police reforms intended to accommodate a community policing strategy in prevention of radicalization. Aronson (2012) used a purely quantitative approach to explore the role of the Muslim community in the prevention of terrorism in Kenya. Conversely, this study sought to find out ways of engaging the participation of all available communities in the prevention of radicalization in the Eastleigh area of Nairobi County. Key considerations were the capacity building for officers on professionalism, human rights, resource management, rule of law and emerging trends in radicalization to violent extremism. New responsibilities for patrol officers and organizational flexibility should permit officers to explore new dimensions of crimes and community problems that traditionally have not been part of a patrol officer's responsibilities. Indeed, Baker et al. (2007) opines that if officers are to embrace community policing principles in the prevention of radicalization, they have to be more



aware of what's happening around the world and how it impacts on the local communities.

## **2.8 Theoretical Framework**

Frustration-Aggression Theory and Social Movement Theory were used to explain motivation to radicalization while Routine Activities Theory was chosen to describe specific ways in which certain principles of community policing could be adopted to prevent and disrupt the radicalization cycle.

### **2.8.1 Frustration-Aggression Theory**

The theory of aggression was proposed by Dollard and Miller (1939) to explain frustration that arises as a result of blocking or frustrating a person's efforts to attain a goal or an objective. The theory has it that frustration causes aggression and may therefore be used to explain riots and revolutions by deprived sections of society, who may express their bottled up frustration and anger through violence. The link between frustration and aggression has been discussed in psychology for more than half a century now. Frustration is the condition which exists when a goal-response suffers interference, while aggression is defined as an act whose goal-response is injury to an organism or organism surrogate.

The theory therefore suggests that terrorist behavior arises because of the frustration related to political and economic situations. The political and economic climates that foster such frustration are actually years of alienation and marginalization, a condition that invokes the need to initiate and drive change in a radical way. Gurr (1970) emphasizes the notion that, for deprived individuals, stress and hassles build up until they

reach a point that "breaks the camel's back" and the displacement of released energy provides some benefit in terms of catharsis or ventilation. This explains feelings of alienation that discriminated youths may experience leading them to view radicalization as viable option in life.

This study therefore uses the Frustration-Aggression theory as a tool to explain how individuals mutate from potential terrorists to actual terrorists. Thus, potential radicalism of Eastleigh youth is aggravated by established social-structural systems that limit job opportunities for the marginalized youth and offer few alternatives, yet societal expectations remain high. Further, the discriminative application of the law by the police in the war against radicalization probably pushes the youth further into frustration. In fact, Police operations in Eastleigh target jobless and idle youth, sometimes locking them up in police cells on flimsy grounds such as being idle and disorderly. Such crackdowns are usually subjective and more often than not, the youth are locked up several times without any charge being preferred against them. In addition, alienation from mainstream economic structures, lack of engagement in political discourse and feeble family ties leave the youth with little hope in pursuing legitimate goals of life. Unfortunately for society, extremism functionaries exploit these gaps by promising a false sense of material satisfaction and rewards; "offers" religious or temporal that on the face value appear irresistible to the youth.

However, one of the limitations of the theory is that it cannot explain the whole spectrum of the drivers of recruitment. For instance, those who join radical groups in search of identity, recognition and belonging. Another limitation is that this theory suggests that frustrated, prejudiced individuals should act more aggressively towards out-groups they

are prejudiced against, but studies have shown that they are more aggressive towards everyone.

### **2.8.2. Social Movement Theory**

One of the most promising theoretical frameworks applied to understanding radicalization processes and violent extremism is Social Movement Theory (SMT). According to Zald and McCarthy(1987), Social Movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population, which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society. Social movement theory began in the 1940s with the idea that the movements arose from irrational processes of collective behavior occurring under strained environmental conditions producing a mass sentiment of discontent.

Thus, SMT can be used to explain why members of a movement look to recruit others. These insights from SMT are known to generate an attractive framework for systematically studying the processes of radicalization and influence within militant extremist movements. Wiktorowicz (2005) proposed a four-component developmental model for radicalization; Those who came to be radicalized and are open to new worldviews (cognitive opening); those who view religion as a path to find meaning (religious seeking); those who find the group's narrative and ethos to "make sense" (frame alignment); and ultimately, through a process of socialization, those who become fully indoctrinated into a movement.

Viewing contemporary al-shabaab as a social movement, SMT provides potential insights for understanding the process of youth radicalization in Eastleigh. The al-shabaab

requires fresh and energetic blood to replenish its ranks. Thus, operatives have identified Eastleigh as a reservoir of desolate youth who are more likely to seek new worldviews with minimal or no persuasion at all. The al-shabaab recruiters misrepresent Islam principles and promise the youth heavenly pleasures should they die in the name of Allah. In addition, the operatives use their logical frame work to “make sense” of their existence. Hence, youths, within Eastleigh who feel alienated and disconnected find reprieve in realizing that they can be “appreciated” through selfless service to the al-shabaab. This false recognition can easily motivate them to an extent of overlooking the attendant consequences until it is too late. Through the process of socialization, the youth are gradually exposed to the process of radicalization with those displaying a high sense of commitment gaining higher status and recognition.

### **2.8.3 Routine Activities Theory**

This theory derives from Amos Hawley’s (1950) theory of human ecology, which explores the temporal aspects of human behavior in community environments. Hawley (1950), identifies three key aspects of collective human activities: rhythm (the normal recurrence of events), tempo (the number of events in a certain period of time), and timing (the coordination and intersection of behaviors in the environment). Cohen and Felson (1979) Subsequently adapted these principles and introduced Routine Activities Theory as an ecological perspective on criminal behaviour. Their theory emphasizes three elements conducive to a crime event: a motivated offender who intends to commit a crime, a suitable target for the offender, and the absence of capable guardians who might otherwise prevent the crime from taking place. When these conditions converge in space and time, crime is likely to occur.

Conversely, the absence of any of the three conditions may be sufficient to discourage a crime from happening. It is important to note that Routine Activities Theory offers suggestions about the probability of criminal behavior rather making definite claims about when crime will occur. Routine Activities Theory can therefore successfully explain the application of community policing principles in the prevention of radicalization. Thus, the “capable guardian” element appositely represents the partnership component of a community oriented surveillance that reduces the chances of a crime in given environment or space.

Recruitment and radicalization of youth commonly occurs within the local neighborhoods. Routine Activities Theory is commonly used to explain why and how youth are at a heightened risk of being involved in offending behavior and of being victimized. Since an individual’s demographics influence their daily activities, they are predictive of their risk of victimization. Guardianship to the targeted youths could be stretched by creation of active partnerships between the Police and the local populace through community policing. By creating mutual trust between the police and the public, parents, guardians, relatives, friends and neighbors are likely to be empowered to keep vigil on vulnerable children, relatives, friends and neighbors. This is expected to curtail the liberty and motivation of the extremists through sharing information on suspicious individuals and groups with the Law enforcement agencies.

Conventionally, Police are used to thinking about a problem in terms of the offenders involved, indeed, their usual focus is almost exclusively on how to identify and arrest them. Community policing, however, requires that a broader range of solutions is

explored and this requires information about the victims and the places involved. Community policing strategies require Police officers to be more than just crime-fighters. They should be out in the community expanding the scale of guardianship through dialogue, constructive patrols and timely response to emerging community concerns.

The theory advocates a set of precautions against crimes arising from opportunities provided by the local environment which is determined by design and restriction of access to premises. In order for law enforcement to assist in the creation of an effective counter-narrative, the police need to understand the demographics of their community, the specific threats facing community members, and potential targets for extremists. The theory suggests that the police should be aware of the different populations and groups in their area and of domestic conditions that may give rise to and sustain the processes of youth radicalization. Routine Activities Theory as a situational crime prevention model, may help to focus efforts on specific situations in which radicalization occurs and prevents those situations gravitating or escalating to the point where violent extremism is more likely.

## **2.9 Conceptual Framework**


Motivation factors and traits of radicalization are the independent and intermediate variables of the study respectively. According to Asal et al (2007), the interplay between grievance, capability and political opportunity structure can persuade youth to join groups that advocate hostility towards the society. The skewed nature of economic and political conditions in Eastleigh can easily drive the youth into violent extremism. This is because disenfranchised youth remain predisposed to religious and ideological machinations that

likely to turn them against community norms and the ruling authority. The need for identity has been a theme that has resonated in much radicalization work; vulnerable individuals appear to be those who are struggling in some way to find an identity, to feel meaningful or significant, to merge the secular and religious, or to feel connected to others.

Systematic harassment of the youth by the police in Eastleigh may brand fear and feeling of intimidation arising from discriminative application of the anti-terrorism law. However, establishing trust between police officers and community members is expected to reduce the impacts upon communities of 'hard' policing strategies. Innes et al. (2007) argue that low trust in the police can inhibit the willingness of individuals to pass community intelligence about a range of problems and issues, and a report by Demos (2007) highlights the importance of high trust relationships between communities and the police for effective national security in the age of 'home-grown terrorism'.

The indicators for suspecting terror activities such as emotive personality, change in association and sudden disconnect from ordinary norms may be subtle and not known to any one individual. Therefore, active police-public partnership may accelerate the diffusion of information coming from different individuals through ties developed between police and community (Innes, 2006). Consequently, empowering local communities, increasing social resilience and facilitating constructive dialogue between communities of Eastleigh and the law enforcement agents may constitute a lasting solution to the problem of violent extremism in Eastleigh in particular and Kenya at large.

**Fig. 2.1: Conceptual Framework**



**Source:** Author, 2016



## **CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1 Introduction**

This Chapter highlights the study site; the Research Design, Target Population, Sources of data and data collection instruments. The sample design, sampling techniques used and the criteria of determining the sample size is covered. Methods of data collection and data presentation are summarised at the end.

### **3.2 Site Selection and Description**

The study site is Eastleigh area of Nairobi County. As the capital city of the Country, Nairobi is booming in various dimensions and is the seat of the National Government with various international agencies' headquarters. Eastleigh area has a population of 174,349 spread over four divisions- Eastleigh North, Eastleigh South, Airbase, and Kiambio slum area (census estimates, 2009). The influx of refugees into Eastleigh dates back to the early 1990s triggered by insecurity in Somalia, Ethiopia and the Great Lakes region. According to Refugees International (March, 2012), Asylum seekers and refugees from Somalia are the most populous followed by a sizeable Ethiopian Oromo community and a minority from the Great Lakes, Eritrea and South Sudan. Eastleigh is therefore the preferred location for Somalis migrating to Nairobi, where the substantial indigenous Somali Kenyan population eases integration into the social and economic life. Ethiopian Oromo's are drawn to Eastleigh by social ties with Somalis, and a good proportion of them are Muslims sharing a religious identity with the Somalis.

According to International Crisis Group (2012), youth population in Eastleigh and surrounding communities (Majengo, Mathare and Kiamumbi) is close to 60 percent of the resident communities. Marginalization and brutal law enforcement has weakened youth resilience and increased their susceptibility to extremist ideologies. Coupled with the highly radicalized environment, youth in Eastleigh remain exposed to fanatical dogmas and are vulnerable to recruitment by groups such as Al-Shabaab.

A study conducted by Gastrow, P (2011) of the International Peace Institute (IPI) examined six categories of crimes in Eastleigh: drug trafficking, illicit trade in counterfeit goods, smuggling and trafficking of humans, trafficking in wildlife products, small arms trade and money laundering. These constitute crimes that do not happen in isolation, but form networks of Transnational Organized Crime(TOC) that have been described as predicate offences to violent extremism. According to the US Organized Crimes Division (OCD, 2012), in the first nine months of 2010 at least ten arms seizures were reported in Eastleigh. Arguably, arms traffickers have a sophisticated smuggling system that links Somalia with the United Nations refugee camp at Dadaab and Eastleigh, offering ready market for disposal.

A report by the US State Department (2014) on money laundering started with a short and simple sentence: “Kenya is developing into a major money laundering country”. Funds laundered from Somalia end up in Eastleigh, Kenya. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia (2012) observed that Kenya’s large Somali community, its proximity to Somalia and the notoriously porous border between the two countries all contribute to Kenya’s emergence as a major base for radicalization. Reportedly, members of Shabaab and Hizbul travel with relative freedom to and from Eastleigh, where they translate

proceeds of piracy and corruption to legitimate business. A key pillar of this support network is a community of wealthy clerics-cum-businessmen, linked to a small number of religious centers notorious for their links to radicalism in Eastleigh suburb. Accordingly it is reasonable to assume that Eastleigh provides a safe haven for factors that support youth radicalization, notably the presence of free flow of small arms, expertise and financing. This proposition can be used to explain why in 2013, in the wake of al-Shabaab attacks, the Government targeted Eastleigh in a massive security sweep.

The remarkable entrepreneurial energy that has transformed Eastleigh from a rundown shantytown into a vibrant commercial hub within two decades has its origins in the remittance boom of the early 1990s (Sara 2010). It is also partly driven by a close-knit community of Wahabi entrepreneurs, linked to similar networks in Mogadishu, Dubai and the Gulf. The 2014 Annual police statistics indicate that planning and assembly of terrorism arsenal has been traced to Eastleigh suburb (Annual Police CrimeStat, 2014)

According to Sara (2010), the Somali population of Eastleigh, originally an Asian neighbourhood is now estimated at over 100,000. No place has as many madrasas per square kilometre in Kenya as Eastleigh. These madrasas are popularly associated with disseminating radical teachings to youths. Eastleigh therefore, presents an uncommon opportunity for launching a study to explore the applicability of Community Policing in addressing the threat of radicalization. In addition, the area comprises various ethnic and religious groups from within and without the Country. Therefore nurturing a collective policing strategy is likely to offer each group a forum to express their specific priorities and concerns. Such approach may present opportunities to address underlying causes of

radicalization and double up as a valuable force multiplier for the law enforcers within Eastleigh area. Furthermore, the reported indiscriminate repression of the area residents by the law enforcement agencies in the name of ‘war against terrorism’ today is incompatible with the liberal values of liberty, equality, humanity and justice as espoused in the constitution.

**Figure 3.1: Map of Eastleigh**



### **3.3 Research Design.**

The study adopted a descriptive survey design, an approach that helps to describe characteristics of a population or phenomenon (Kombo and Tromp, 2010). This allowed for the collection, analyzing and integrating of quantitative data with qualitative themes thereby providing a better understanding of the research problem. According to Creswell (2010), this design has the ability to pursue in detail the key objective of study. The study was designed to accommodate the collection and analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data from local leaders and police commanders. Quantitative data was gathered through survey design, while interviews were used in respect of qualitative data.

### **3.4 Unit of Analysis and Observation**

According to Kothari (2004) the unit of analysis is the major entity that is being analyzed in a study. It is the 'what' or 'who' that is being studied. The units of analysis in this study were principles of community policing that include police-community partnerships, problem solving, police reforms and community intelligence. On the other hand, the unit of observation is the entity which measures the characteristics or obtained data required in the research study (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). It also refers to the unit upon which one collects or analyzes data. The unit of observation were individual police officers and existing local community groups within the Eastleigh area. In respect of this study, information was obtained from an individual person but the results obtained from the analysis relate to a compound unit.

### **3.5 Target Population**

The target population comprised both Police officers and the local communities residing or doing business in Eastleigh. The police population included junior and senior police

commanders under whose jurisdiction Eastleigh area falls. Junior commanders ranged from the rank of a corporal to that of a Chief Inspector while Senior Police Commanders were of the ranks of Assistant Superintendent, Superintendent and Senior Superintendent commanding Starehe Police Division, where Eastleigh area falls. Members of public targeted in this study were organized groups that are officially recognized, whether formal or informal. Key of these were Religious groups, Welfare groups, entrepreneurship groups, *nyumba kumi clusters*, Community Policing Committees, recreation groups, Security and peace committees.

### **3.6 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure**

Kombo and Tromp (2010) define sampling as a procedure used to gather people, places or things for study. The aim of sampling is to select a number of individuals in such a way that the individual selected is representative of the larger group from which they are selected. Primary respondents were picked through systematic random sampling. Due to the heterogeneous nature of the community population, a 30% sample size was considered appropriate. This is according to Njenga and Kabiru (2009) who suggest that, in order to cater for differences within a target population, a sample of 30% is an appropriate sample. Subsequently, the study identified a sample frame of twenty - two (22) community groups, each with an average of twenty five (25). 30% of 25 gave an average eight (8) respondents per group. These were picked through systematic random sampling due to the heterogeneity nature of the community groups. Eight (8) respondents from each of the twenty-two (22) groups gave a total 176 primary respondents.

Police respondents included three senior police commanders drawn from the Divisional police command. The commanders were the Officer Commanding Starehe Police Division (OCPD); Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) commander and the Sub-county Administration Police (AP) Commander. These were purposively sampled due to their specific role of organizing divisional operations, deployment and investigations.

There were eighty-eight (88) junior commanders drawn from the Kenya Police, the Administration police and the Directorate of criminal investigations. These officers form the supervisory cadre of officers who directly oversee operational, patrol and investigation functions within Eastleigh area. Interviewees from this cadre were picked through simple random sampling since all perform related activities in response to the threat of radicalization and violent extremism. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), A sample size of 10% is an appropriate sample for an homogeneous population. A sample size of 10% from a sampling frame of eighty-eight(88) junior commanders gave nine(9) interviewees from the junior command since they are performed similar supervisory duties. Religious and opinion leaders were purposively sampled.

### **3.7 Sources of Data**

Both primary and secondary data were gathered for the study. Primary data refers to those data that are collected afresh for the first time (Kothari, 2011). Primary data were collected from persons who were members of active community groups within Eastleigh. From the police population, primary data was obtained from both junior and senior police commanders at station and Divisional levels respectively.

Secondary sources of data consisted of police records particularly the Occurrence Book (O.B) and the cells register. Although such data may have been collected for other purposes, the information offered valuable insights into possible causes, drivers, indicators, current response strategies and possible solutions to youth radicalization in Eastleigh. This data was however modified to reduce inaccuracies and assumptions as these are the common limitations of secondary data.

### **3.8 Data Collection Methods and Tools**

Both quantitative and qualitative data was collected for the study. Quantitative data was collected by use questionnaires with both closed and open ended questions. A questionnaire is a data collection tool consisting of a series of questions asked to respondents and designed to extract specific information on a stated problem. Closed ended questions are defined by their need to have explicit options for a respondent to select from. This helps reduce chances of evaluator bias since the same questions are posed to all respondents and the data can be quantified and be used to compare and contrast other research findings. Open-ended questions are exploratory in nature. This allows the respondents to give honest opinions in their own words on certain aspects (Mugenda & Mugenda 2003). Questionnaires were administered to one hundred and seventy- six (176) community group members through drop-and-later-pick method.

Qualitative data was collected through interview schedules. Basically, this involves qualitative in-depth interviews with people who know what is going on in the community. An interview schedule is a plan or a guide for investigation into a particular subject matter. This may include a set of questions asked and filled by the interviewer in face to face meeting with the interviewee. This method was used to collect data from



group leaders, Police commanders and residents who had firsthand knowledge and history of youth radicalization in the area. This provided insights on the nature of challenges that bedevil the youth and helped to capture the context against which radicalization of youth into violent extremism occurs.

### **3.9 Pre-testing of Data Collection Tools**

Pre-testing of questionnaires and interview schedules was done within Majengo at Pumwani, a Division adjacent to the study site. This was done by distributing ten questionnaires and conducting five interviews. The aim of pretesting was to establish the reliability and validity of the research instruments. The reliability of a research instrument is concerned with consistency, accuracy, precision, stability, equivalence and homogeneity. A research instrument can be considered to be valid when it accurately measures what it is supposed to measure. Pre-testing of the questionnaire and interview schedule helped to identify problems in the design of questions, sequencing of questions or procedures for recording responses. The main focus was to; identify any weakness(es) in the organisation and administration of the research instrument; enable the researcher to make improvements and corrections before embarking on the actual data collection procedure; ascertain the clarity of instrument items, and correct ambiguities in the questions; and establish the content validity of the instruments.

### **3.10 Ethical Considerations**

Terrorism remains both an emotive and a sensitive matter in the Society. Thus, appropriate steps were taken to ensure protection and safety of all respondents and all other persons who in one way or another gave information for this study. All questionnaires were accompanied with a cover letter explaining the nature and scope of

the research. This included a certificate of confidentiality and informed consent for all information provided by the respondents. Institutions and individual's names or any other details that could disclose the identity of the respondents were avoided. Interviews were preceded by a similar narrative. Respondents were given the freedom to choose whether to participate in the study or not. Gate keepers were consulted in respect of those respondents who did not have the capacity and freedom to make independent choices. The data was strictly handled by the researcher and trained research assistants, and only for the stated purpose.

### **3.11 Data Analysis**

The study generated large volumes of raw data, both qualitative and quantitative. This data were subjected to thorough editing and summarizing before the actual analysis. Classification and tabulation was augmented by statistics, both descriptive and inferential. Measures of central tendency and dispersion were used to summarize the survey data by use of SPSS and version 21 Premium statistical computer program. The data is presented in tables and narrative forms. Analysis of qualitative data was based on themes, which allowed for the creation of quantifiable characteristics. Further, the researcher attended three community meetings during their ordinary course of business and made hand-written notes. The focus was on issues that participants were discussing, the number of times the subject of radicalization was mentioned and the body language of the participants. These notes were later typed up and used as further data in addition to the interviews. This assisted in shedding further light on the dynamics of radicalization and possible interventions within Eastleigh area. The data was summarized and reduced into specific categories to enable the identification and linking of similar themes.

### **3.12 Problems Encountered in the Field**

Due to the sensitive nature of Terrorism, all senior police commanders had expressed a lot of reservations to engage in a candid discussion on radicalization. The claim was that the data sought fell in the classified category of information within the police communication circles. However, the challenge was surmounted by a disclosure that the researcher was an insider and that the information required was purely for academic purposes. A similar problem was encountered with some community groups and individuals who were afraid of victimization. To counter this trepidation, a honest declaration of privacy and confidentiality was made, discussed and affirmed.

It was evidently noted that junior police officers were discussing the questionnaire items before responding to them. This was evinced by a pattern of a similar choice of options in closed-ended questions and common statements in the open-ended questions. This, however turned out to be an informative finding as such officers appeared to be receiving and executing analogous orders from their bosses in the execution of their duties. Consequently, it was decided that the police constables be excluded from the study and instead, all junior commanders were sampled and interviewed separately.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION**

### **4.1 Introduction**

In this chapter, results of data analysis and interpretation of the study findings are presented. Objectives of the study were; to identify risk factors that drive youth to radicalization, to establish the typical characteristics and behavioral patterns of radicalized youth and related activities, to establish how community policing principles can assist in the identification of radicalized youth and activities and to elicit suggestions on how to solve the problem of youth radicalization in the area of study. Data was collected from local community groups and police officers whose jurisdiction falls within the Eastleigh area.

### **4.2 Response Rate**

A total of one hundred and seventy six (176) questionnaires were distributed to the community respondents during the data collection phase. Out of these, 150 were returned. This represented 85.2% of the total questionnaires distributed to primary respondents. However, 3 questionnaires were discarded due to incompleteness and other inconsistencies. Therefore 147 questionnaires, which is 83.5%, were available for analysis. According to Mugenda and Mugenda(2003), a response rate of 70% and above is sufficient enough for analysis.

In respect of qualitative data, all the key informants from community and police respondents respectively, were available for interviews.

### **4.3 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

Age, level of education, period of residence and religion of respondents were found to be relevant demographic factors insofar as knowledge on youth radicalization is concerned.

#### **4.3.1 Age of Community respondents**

As shown in table 4.2, about 48% of the community-group membership is aged 41 years to 50 years. No single community group had members aged below 18 years. Those aged over 60 years were a paltry 5%. The implication here is that Eastleigh residents who join community groups are mainly those aged between 31 and 60 years. An interview with a retired chief disclosed that one would never be considered for the position of a unit head unless they were aged at least 25 years and were married with at least one child. In addition, a *Nyumba Kumi* chairperson pointed out that only ‘grown ups’ were elected to hold positions in the said *Nyunba Kumi* clusters.

An interview with the chairman of a Catholic Men Association (CMA) revealed that only married men were allowed membership to the Association. According to him,

*“It is in our regulations that only married men qualify to join CMA. In fact, the youngest we ever admitted in our group was a 23 year-old, newly married young man”.*

In the view of the forgoing therefore, persons below the age of 18 years were considered children. Effectively, such persons do not qualify as members of local community groups. Aronson (2012) opines that elderly members of society are more likely to discern the social processes and agents by which individual learns or acquire radical attitudinal dispositions. Accordingly, it can be argued that the study sufficiently interrogated persons who had adequately interacted with various social institutions within Eastleigh such as the family, peer groups, schools, adult organizations and religious institutions.

**Table 4.1 Age Distribution of Community Respondents**

Age (Years)	No. of respondents	Percentage
18-30	12	8.2
31-40	33	22.4
41-50	71	48.3
51-60	23	15.6
Over 60	8	5.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>100</b>

Source; Field Survey 2016

#### 4.3.2 Education level of Respondents

Education levels of respondents was categorized into four; Primary, Secondary, College or University and ‘other’, to capture the education status of those respondents who did not fall into any of the first three categories.

**Table 4.2 Education Level of Community Respondents**

Primary	Secondary	College/University	Other	Total
32 (21.8%)	78(53%)	7 (4.8%)	30(20.4%)	<b>147(100%)</b>

Source; Field Survey 2016

According to Rakodi (2000), the quality of education that one receives by and large determines their competencies and the kind of opportunities or career options the person has in life. Although informal education of the respondents was found quite invaluable

during interviews, it was not easy to gauge the extent to which one was informed in field of radicalization and terrorism. Formal education was therefore quantified as an estimation of respondents' cognitive skills as far as knowledge on radicalization is concerned in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are concerned.

#### **4.3.3 Period of Residence in Eastleigh**

The period that respondents had resided within Eastleigh area was considered a crucial dimension of the study. Table 4.4 presents period brackets in years within which one had been a resident at the research site.

**Table 4.3 Period of Residence in Years**

Below 1 year	1-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	25-30	Over 30 years	Total
3(2%)	4(2.7%)	10(6.8%)	10(6.8%)	13(8.8%)	41(27.9%)	48(32.7%)	18(12.2%)	<b>147(100%)</b>

**Source; Field Survey 2016**

Over 95% of the respondents had resided in Eastleigh for a period exceeding five years. Indeed, there was a notable 12.2% who had been Eastleigh habitants for over thirty consecutive years. Interview with Key Community informants revealed that most of residents who had stayed for over thirty years had Eastleigh as their permanent homes. In the view of the foregoing, it is highly probable that the target population has had an interaction with Eastleigh environment that may qualify them to make reasonable observations with regard to youth proselytization to violent extremism.

#### **4.3.4 Religion of the Respondents**

Data presented in table 4.5 shows that majority of residents interviewed are Christians.

**Table 4.4 Religion of Respondents**

Christian	Muslim	Hindu	Other	Total
101(68.7%)	41(27.9%)	2(1.3%)	3(2.1%)	<b>147(100%)</b>

**Source; Field Survey 2016**

According to Vittori and Bremer (2009), Muslims comprise a little more than 11 percent of the of all people living in Kenya. The United Nations Population Estimates (2016) places Kenya Population at slightly above 46 million. Large concentrations of Kenyan Muslims live in Coast and North Regions, and the capital city of Nairobi, and Eastleigh in particular. (Møller, B 2006). Previously a quiet residential zone, the arrival of vast numbers of Somali –Muslim refugees in the last two decades catalyzed transformation of Eastleigh into ‘Little Mogadishu’, a global hub for Somali business. Effectively, this may explain the relatively higher number of Muslim concentration (27%) within Eastleigh comparative to countrywide distribution of 11%.

The demographic feature of religion was considered a key aspect of the unit of observation for this study. This reasoning is supported by Cronin, (2003) who opine that some religious dogma have anti-modern goals of returning society to an idealized version of the past and are therefore necessarily anti-democratic and anti-progressive. Further, the purported marginalization of Muslims in Kenya, though not the only source of radicalization to extremism, has been cited to elicit National and international conflicts that are violent in nature (Cronin, 2003).

#### **4.3.5 Rank, Duties and Length of Service of Police Officers**

There were two rank categories of officers ranging from the rank of a senior sergeant(S/SGT) to Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP). According to the Service



Standing Orders (2016), Police deployment is guided by job descriptions, length of Service and rank of officers. However, an interview with one of the commanders at divisional levels indicated that there is no requisite competency for one to be deployed at jurisdictions characterized by radicalization and terrorism. The officer responded thus,

*“We have standard operating procedures and any officer can be deployed to command any police division as long as he or she is of the rank of Superintendent of Police (SP) or Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP)”.*

Hence, a deduction can be drawn to the effect that some or all officers deployed with Eastleigh may have no particular competencies and knowledge on nature of terrorism and radicalization.

The station and ward commanders were of the ranks of Chief Inspectors (CI) of Police all with deputies holding the ranks of Inspectors of police (IP). All posts and units were found to be under the command of Inspectors. There was, however one post that was under the command of a Chief inspector and deputized by a senior Sergeant. The implication here is that a technical conflict may arise in terms of the chain of command because the in-charge of the post is required to take orders from and report back to the Station commander. In this particular case, both officers were of the same rank and this is likely to affect operations, particularly those targeting suspects of radicalization and terrorism. No reference to educational or other professional qualification was made with regard to deployment of officers within terrorism prone areas such as Eastleigh. It was revealed that none of the officers within Eastleigh had received specialized training on Countering Violent Extremism or related fields. Nevertheless none of the interviewed officers had a service of less than ten (10) years in the police. Effectively, all the

commanders had reasonable experience in police work ranging from operations, investigations and patrols.

#### **4.4 Youth Radicalization Risk Factors**

This section covers an in-depth analysis of various factors that may directly or indirectly prompt youth into radicalization. These factors were Poverty, Low level of education, Religious Fanatism, Political discrimination, Lack of employment, Breakdown of social values, Historical injustices, Economic marginalization, Search for self identification and Discriminative law enforcement practices. Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought these factors risked youth to radicalization within Eastleigh area. As tabulated in table 4.6, it can be shown that other than historical injustices and search for identification, all other factors had a significant influence on youth radicalization as discussed below;

##### **4.4.1 Poverty, Education Levels and lack of Employment**

More than half of the respondents felt that Poverty (66.7%), low education levels (76.9%), lack of employment (68.7%) and economic marginalization (60%) were key causes of youth radicalization in Eastleigh. This finding is consistent with Fearon and Laitin (2003) who identified poverty, economic deprivation and lack of employment as conditions conducive for delinquency. In addition, violent extremist groups tend to target populations afflicted by economic deficiencies and high levels of illiteracy. Further, Allan et al.(2015) opine that the emergence of Islamist violent extremism in Kenya is consistent with the economic situation of the country in general and the youth in particular. Indeed, an interview with a *Nyumba Kumi* chairperson who is a retired teacher noted that

*“Our young people who have not obtained standard formal education are easily targeted by the al-shabaab for radicalization. My understanding is that while it is evident that illiterates do not manufacture the explosives, most of the real terrorist attackers are drawn from illiterate, disadvantaged and stranded youth population”*

However, one of the divisional police commanders had quite a contrally view,

*“Youth radicalization should be disconnected from illiteracy and poverty. Unemployment as well should be no contributing factor. In any case, there are many other youths out there, both educated and uneducated but have not turned to crime as an option for a living. Radicalization is a crime like any other and should be dealt with as such. Nowhere does the law cite poverty as a defense to deviance and crime.”*

Contrally to this view, studies in Africa have shown that extremist groups often thrive in areas where education is poorest with youth population characterized by poverty and unemployment, particularly North-east Nigeria, northern Kenya and southern Somalia (Botha 2012).

This finding creates the impression that illiterate people can be more easily manipulated because their state of social deprivation denies them the capacity and knowledge to critically question the narratives and doctrines of extremist groups. On the other hand, over 23% of the respondents felt that poverty and unemployment did not contribute to youth radicalization. However, this view is contradicted by Botha (2012) who established that Kenyan youth were attracted by higher wages offered by al-shabaab recruiters.

Consequently, it may be suggested here that those youths within Eastleigh who are not able to secure employment opportunities consistent with their levels of skill and education may easily fall victims of radicalization to violent extremism by the al-shabaab. Further, it has been adduced as a factor in violent extremism that a proportion of

terrorists were relatively well educated but either unemployed or employed in fairly menial roles (Botha, 2012).

#### **4.4.2 Religious Fanatism and Breakdown of Social values**

As presented in table 4.6, over 96% of the respondents were of an extreme opinion that religious fanaticism was a key driver of youth radicalization within Eastleigh. This view was shared by Ansari et al (2006) who found that religious identity had a major impact on attitudes and that those youths who held Islam as their primary identity exhibited more positive views towards Jihad and martyrdom. Indeed, a key informant who was a Muslim cleric within Eastleigh disclosed that some Islam preachers were misinterpreting Islamic doctrines to justify recruitment and indoctrination of youth into violent extremism.

Further, over 80 % (10 out of 12) of the police interviewees held the view that religion, and especially Islam was the key cause and driver of radicalization. Indeed, one of the police post commanders stated,

*“Islam is terrorism and terrorism is Islam. The problem of radicalization in Eastleigh is embedded on these Somali Muslims. They couch their preaching to violence along pre-existing and well-regarded religious discourse. The radicalization process currently going on in Eastleigh cannot be detached from Islam. The process is spearheaded by religious scholars and clergy who are well versed in Islamic doctrines”*

These findings suggest that both the police and the residents of Eastleigh strongly associate religion and particularly Islam with radicalization to violent extremism. Subsequently, this position limits the focus of youth radicalization to Islam, a perception that is likely to lead to religious conflict between communities living in Eastleigh. In an equal measure, the police are likely to adopt counter radicalization measures that

specifically target those professing Islam faith. Such an approach is likely to play a counter-productive function in the war against radicalization within Eastleigh. In fact, such views are in conflict with a wide range of scholarly and research work in the terrorism domain. According to Allan et al (2015), radicalization, and indeed terrorism is a multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be reduced to religion as the single causal factor. Terrorism results from a complex array of economic, political, psychological and social forces the precise mix of which varies from place to place and person to person. The fact that some individuals and groups wrap their justifications in a Islamic rhetoric does not qualify Islam as the sole cause and driver of violent radicalization. (Allan H. et al 2015).

**Table 4.5 Youth Radicalization Factors**

Risk Factors	Extremely		Some How		Never		Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%		
Poverty	98	66.7	14	9.5	35	23.8	147	100%
Low level of education	113	76.9	21	14.3	13	8.8	147	100%
Religious Fanatism	142	96.6	3	2	2	1.4	147	100%
Political discrimination	72	49	15	10.2	60	40.8	147	100%
Lack of employment	101	68.7	14	9.5	32	21.8	147	100%
Breakdown of social values	88	59.9	43	29.2	16	10.9	147	100%
Historical injustices	44	29.9	58	39.5	45	30.6	147	100%
Economic marginalization	88	60	50	34	9	6	147	100%
Search for self identification	42	28.6	422	8.6	63	42.8	147	100%
Discriminative law enforcement practices	133	90.5	14	9.5	0	0.0	147	100%

**Source; Field Survey 2016**

#### 4.4.3 Discriminative Politics and Law Enforcement

Discriminative enforcement of law by the police as well stood out as a key factor driving youth into violent extremism. 90.5% of the respondents felt that youths were unfairly targeted during police swoops and operations. An interview with a chairman of a small business community within Eastleigh Section Three narrated in part,

*“The police are targeting youth who are either Somalis or Muslims or both, the chief has men who spy on our children and on several occasions, the youth are rounded and locked up in police cells for several days. Following the attack on Garissa University, the police would come in their numbers any time during the day or at night. They conducted raids on apartments, brandishing their firearms, banging on doors, and demanding to see national identification cards. Several youths were arrested with many of them being released after their parents parted with some cash. Some of those taken away by the police have never been heard of again...”*

This statement may pertinently support the argument that aggrieved youth, whether Somalis or not, may despair and fall prey to the prying al-shabaab sympathizers and recruiters.

A similar position was held by a renowned business man within Eastleigh who felt that the tough actions by Kenya’s law enforcement and security officials have straining the hitherto brotherly co-existence of ethnic Somalis, Kenyan-Somalis, and indigenous Kenyans. He further stated that the strict measures adopted and implemented by Kenyan authorities, were based on ethnicity which eventually culminate into ethnic profiling.

*“Such police actions may compel some members of the affected communities to take risky and desperate decisions by actually joining the al-shabaab”*,

concluded the interviewee.

Indeed, extracts from two police records, that is the Occurrence Book and the Cells Register in one of the police posts revealed that on the eighth day of February 2014, during the Eastleigh sanitization swoop, 48 suspects of terrorism between the ages of 21 and 33 years were booked in the police cells. Out of these, 44 were released the following day without charge while the other four had their cases Pending Under Investigations (PUI)

However, the police command within Eastleigh had different views. One of the commanders at the divisional level emotively asserted that the police always acted within the law, He stated thus,

*“our operations are covered by the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Security Laws Amendment Act 2014 and the Prevention of Organized crime among other laws. We have to collect circumstantial and situational evidence when prima-facie facts are not available. It’s true that most suspects of radicalization and terrorism are Islams, particularly those of Somali origin. It’s the law that catches up with them, no discrimination”.*

Despite the position held by the police, it appears highly likely that the more alienated some groups feel, the greater the likelihood that some of their members will sympathize with extremist organizations.

Over 50% of the respondents felt that political marginalization had an impact on Eastleigh youth who join the al-shabaab or other violent groupings. Indeed, one interviewee, who is human rights activist in Eastleigh, noted that,

*“As long as Kenyan domestic politics remain divisive, corruption, inequality and lack of political voice continue, the youth of all ethnic groups will be vulnerable and susceptible to believing the promises made by al-shabaab recruiters. Again, the youth have learned not to believe the promises made by politicians to their supporters during the elections because they are promptly ignored thereafter”.*

This may effectively be interpreted to suggest that blocked or minimal political participation by the youth within Eastleigh may create alienation which can be harnessed to promote violent extremism. This inference is in fact in line with observations made by Schmid (2011), who opine that, Politicians commonly stoke youth frustrations and promise sweeping reforms aimed at improving their lives. After winning their elections, they may ignore or abandon youth supporters, leaving a semi-organized and politically charged youth cohort idle. Politicians who lose their elections may similarly exploit their youth followers by inciting them to violent protests or armed resistance. In both cases, political manipulation leads young people to feel disillusioned with politicians and electoral politics. This feeling may contribute to the conclusion that solutions to youth problems must be achieved outside of mainstream politics, perhaps through violent extremism.

#### **4.5 Behavioral Patterns and Features of Radicalized Youth**

Respondents were presented with a list of observable characteristics that are likely to signify that one is at one stage or another in the cycle of radicalization to violent extremism. The respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with these patterns/characteristics. The responses are summarized in table 4.6.



**Table 4.6 Features of Radicalized Youth**

<b>Behavioral Pattern</b>	<b>Agree</b>		<b>Neutral</b>		<b>Disagree</b>			
	n	%	n	%	n	%	<b>Total</b>	%
Concentration on self-image	84	57.1	13	8.8	50	34	147	100
Newfound patriotism	127	86.4	10	6.8	10	6.8	147	100
Adverse expression	100	68	3	2	44	30	147	100
Expressed feelings of disconnection	75	51	17	11.6	55	37.4	147	100
Disconnect from associates	133	90.5	11	7.5	3	2	147	100
Aggressive demeanor	87	59.2	23	15.6	37	25.2	147	100
Sudden travels	111	75.5	14	9.5	22	15	147	100
Viewing society as enemy	130	88.4	8	5.4	9	6.2	147	100
Change in physical appearance/attire	29	19.7	38	25.9	80	54.4	147	100
Acquisition of new religious ideologies	142	6.6	0	0	5	3.4	147	100

**Source; Field Survey 2016**

#### **4.5.1 Religion and Social Disconnect**

Out of the 147 respondents, 142(96.6%) strongly felt that acquisition of new religious ideologies was a key indicator of youth under the process of radicalization within Eastleigh area. Indeed, research has shown that religion is pretty a big motivation element

and those extremist actions which make for the name of religion are a fundamental danger for societies (Guiro, 2009). According to Ali (2008), religious creeds, though not the only significant indicator of radicalization is becoming one of predominant models for extremism in the modern world. Consequently, there appears to be a causal connection between belief and behavior. This is because interviewees from Islam and Christian faiths, including those who did not subscribe to any faith were pointing at some Islamic practices as indicators of radicalization. This position is supported by the view of over 40% of respondents who indicated that those exposed to the process of radicalization adopted Islamic dress code. An interviewee who was a Muslim scholar stated,

*“Islamic radicalization is purely religious. It is intended to restore to the universe a moral order that had been corrupted by the enemies of Islam. It is neither political nor strategic but an act of redemption meant to humiliate and slaughter those who defy the hegemony of Allah”*

Further, it is imperative to note that radicalization is associated with overt and observable behavioral changes linked to the Islamic ideology. The individual may change their appearance, their health may suffer (including mental health) and they may become isolated from family, friends, peers or social groups (Guiro, 2009). Accordingly, an inference can duly be drawn to the effect that violent extremists may articulate and justify their agendas using religious language. However, a closer look at the foregoing strongly suggests that religion is not an inherent source of violence, but rather, a channel through which youth radicalization may most effectively be sustained.

Similarly, over 90% of the respondents felt that social disconnect was an observable phenomenon amongst youth being exposed to radicalism. According Diani and McAdam(2003) youth radicalization is directly linked to its social context. Such factors as a perceived moral outrage that affects an individual’s sensibility, overt demonstrations

of discrimination and exclusion could easily point to targets and victims of radicalization. Over 90% of the respondents indicated that those youth who had been exposed to radicalization would express their dissatisfaction by disconnecting from family members, friends, colleagues and even spouses. This may suggest that such youth may avoid public areas, family gatherings and participation in other social activities.

Conversely, interviews with the police strongly indicated that religion and ethnicity were primary causes and drivers of radicalization in Eastleigh.

*“We have specially trained units for tracking radical suspects. We send undercover officers to religious institutions and monitor movement of Somali immigrants, refugees and some business men. In addition, our officers are constantly in patrol. We are interested in those youth who suddenly convert to Islam, those dropping out of school and idlers. Individuals who out rightly condemn the authorities are highly likely to be followers of al-shabaab”*,

recounted one key police informant at the Divisional command. Therefore an informed deduction can be drawn to the effect that police focus on indicators of radicalization is limited to religion, race and ethnicity.

#### **4.5.2 Anti – Authority, Aggression and New found Patriotism**

Over 60% of the respondents agreed that hostility towards the authorities and aggressive demeanor to the society at large could be a sign that a young person was being radicalized. This corroborates with an observation made by one key informant;

*“It is not uncommon to hear disgruntled youth make adverse expressions against the government. A regular complaint is that of blanket crackdown on Kenyan Somalis, or Kenyan Muslims in general. Many youths too are hostile to the authorities for what they term as “systemic discrimination”. In my view, individuals exhibiting such characteristics are likely to be at one stage or another towards radicalization to violent extremism”*

The implication here is that the recruiters may present themselves as the pseudo-government, providing social services and other support mechanisms, personal, welfare,

and social – that might not already be met by their social or familial networks. One of the key informants to the study disclosed that, parts of the youth population who are living in poverty, lack shelter and food, and have limited access to education are meant to believe that the society is deliberately unfair to them. This ideology can therefore easily create aggressive feeling among the unfortunate youth towards the local community in general.

Over, 127(86.4%) of the respondents were of the view that youth exposed to radicalism were most likely to pronounce a new found patriotism. This is irrespective of whether one hails from rich or poor backgrounds. Indeed, a chairperson of a local peace and security committee supposed that even young persons from relatively wealthy background were not spared either. The interviewee added that those recruited from such backgrounds are likely to adopt antagonistic and hostile demeanors towards their old friends and at the same time exhibit a new sense of identity, prestige or pride. However, over 54% of the respondents felt that change in physical appearance or acquisition of a new dress code was not necessarily indicative of young persons under the process of radicalization. Undoubtedly, this was supported by a member of peace and security committee who emphasized that the al-shabaab recruiters had devised shrewd techniques of disguising young people that they recruit into extremism.

A key informant who was a teacher and the discipline master of a local secondary school disclosed that a school had to expel three boys in as many months for displaying conduct that went contrally to school regulations. She recounted thus;

*“One of the boys, a Muslim, who was a dormitory captain, had threatened two of his colleagues with death for questioning his discriminatory action between Muslims and Non-Muslims. Another boy illegally brought a*

*smart phone to school and would spent most of the night surfing the net. He was found to have been following the war in Syria through the internet. That one too, we had to expel him”,*

She further observed that the threat of radicalization was assuming new trends;

*“My recent observation is that the al-shabaab recruiters are casting their net wider. In a neighboring school, the principal had to call the police to the school to arrest three girls who had suddenly converted to Islam. They had become overtly hostile towards the school administration. In fact, the lead girl had on two occasions referred to their Christian counter parts as kafiri. Surprisingly none of the girls was a Somali as we would expect. Indeed, only the ring leader was from the coast. The other two were born and brought up in Kisii County”*

This finding revealed that not only male youth are targeted by the terrorist operatives. There is a high possibility therefore that the terrorist organizations are disguising in Islam to recruit youth irrespective of their race, sex, ethnic or religious back grounds. The target of female youth by terrorist operatives appears to be an emerging dimension as observed on September 2016 attack of Mombasa central police station by three female youth (Daily Nation, September 2, 2016).

An inference can therefore be drawn to the effect that revealed there is no particular objective way of determining factors that could undoubtedly be cited as indicators of radicalization. It was further revealed that there did not exist active links between community groups, local institutions and law enforcement agencies that could be used to monitor the movement of youth suspected of being radicalized.

#### **4.6 Role of Community Policing in Identification of Youth Radicalization Activities**

Respondents were provided with some community based suggestions that were thought as activities capable of identifying youth radicalization. They were asked to indicate the

extent to which they felt such activities could enhance the identification of youth radicalization within Eastleigh.

#### **4.6.1 Information sharing, Early warnings and Police Feedback**

As presented on table 4.7, 93.2%, that is 137 of the total 147 respondents available for the study felt that information sharing between the government authorities and the members of public would be extremely effective in identifying youth radicalization activities within Eastleigh. The same position is held by Botha (2013) who observe that the police have a critical role of engaging with local communities to increase their ability to identify individuals at risk of falling to violent extremism. A respondent who was university lecture had this to say,

*“The, authorities, and particularly the police should work out ways to solicit timely feedback from the residents and business people within this area. They can work to adopt this responsibility through neighborhood mapping, support for those individuals in the community most at risk of becoming involved in violent extremism, schools liaison and community intelligence. When the police engage with the community, the intention should be to uncover community concerns about crime and security and to build public confidence. As a consequence, community policing holds the potential to generate useful yet voluntarily provided intelligence from those communities”*

However, 90% of the police commanders that were interviewed felt that terrorism is such a sensitive crime that any information in respect radicalization to extremism should only be handled within the National intelligence model. Six of commanders at the station and post level emphasized that communication and indeed information management was clearly captured in the Service regulations. Concern was placed on the credibility of information that the local residents are likely to offer. A station commander pointed out that they could not act on information that has not been sanctioned by the Divisional bosses.

Although about 15% of the respondents were of the opinion that early warning platform would have no effect on vulnerable youth, majority of them (68%) felt that such system would be extremely effective.

Over 90% of the respondents felt that timely police-public feedback is a crucial factor in prevention of youth radicalization. These finding corroborates Otiso(2009) who opine that some communities may experience discrimination or alienation based on popular stereotypes about the kinds of people responsible for terrorism, or communities that may perceive themselves as being unfairly targeted by law enforcement. Appropriate feedback on police operations to the local communities is highly likely to lessen the burden of suspicion and mistrust associated with the police. A respondent who was student at a local university opined thus,

*“For community policing to be effective in counter radicalization, police officers should endeavor to keep residents informed on action taken on all suspects of terrorism arrested or confined at the police station. This may help to address concerns of citizens who are resentful and disrespectful of the state security apparatus. This way, the gap between the public and the government could be narrowed and help to initiate contacts and connections with more stakeholders. Effective police-public communication will reduce prejudices against the state in the minds of citizens; and citizens are likely to change their biases if they see positive behaviors from the police. Such approach can even help eliminate propaganda tools used by terrorist organizations to justify their violent activities. If community policing programs reach all segments of society, the problem of youth radicalization in Eastleigh can be alleviated or even resolved”.*

The foregoing expressions reveal that an information sharing platform may place both residents and the law enforcement authorities at a vantage point of appreciating factors that support youth radicalization within Eastleigh. Timely feedback may help to develop holistic and sustainable police-public partnerships. Such approach is likely to go beyond verbal condemnation to action on how to address structural issues that make it possible to

recruit the youth. Early warning systems will seemingly create intra and intergroup opportunities to identify risks and threats that initiate and accompany the process of youth radicalization within Eastleigh.

**Table 4.7 Community Policing and Radicalization Activities**

Activity	Extremely Effective		Slightly effective		No effect			
	n	%	n	%	n	%	Total	%
Public –police information sharing	137	93.2	8	5.4	2	1.4	147	100
Common early warning platform	100	68	24	16.3	23	15.6	147	100
Monitoring of religious institutions	141	95.9	6	4.1	0	0.0	147	100
Scrutiny on the nature of training	96	65.3	44	29.9	7	4.8	147	100
Identification of strangers	102	69.4	14	9.5	31	21.1	147	100
Reporting youth drug activities	14	9.5	15	10.2	118	80.3	147	100
Timely public-police feedback	133	90.5	13	8.8	1	0.7	147	100
Recurring youth problems	123	83.7	13	8.8	11	7.5	147	100
Disclosing structures	95	64.6	41	27.9	11	7.5	147	100
Police transparency	144	98	3	2.0	0	0.0	147	100
Joint rehabilitation programmes	140	95.2	7	4.8	0	0.0	147	100

**Source; Field Survey 2016**



#### **4.6.2 Rehabilitation of ex-convicts, illegal drugs and identification of strangers**

As shown on table 4.6, about 95%, that is 140 of the total respondents felt that Joint rehabilitation of ex-convicts of radicalism and returnees from terror groups was an effective approach to interdicting youth radicalization in Eastleigh area. As noted by Rosand(2007), a rehabilitation strategy that comprise counseling programs is likely to re-educate violent extremists and extremist sympathizers through intensive objective debates, religious guidance and psychological counseling. An interviewee who was a Muslim cleric observed that a joint re-habilitation program may dissuade the state from exacting revenge on returnees and is further likely to reinforce a whole range of counter narratives and positive messages. These may include the concept that extremists only use their recruits to advance their own cause and that those who fall in with militants have misunderstood the basic tenets of Islam. He added that he had observed local youths who been incarcerated for six months seeking to re-join the al-shabaab because those who knew them had already labeled the ‘terrorists’. The implication here is that a program that is based not on punishment or retribution but on a presumption of benevolence is likely to encourage acceptance of ex-convicts and returnees and develop notions of inclusion.

However, over 80% of the respondents were of the opinion that identifying and reporting youth involvement in illegal drug activities was not a factor in taming youth radicalization. This realization could be interpreted to mean that illegal drug activities are either not prevalent within Eastleigh area or that this may not have a co-relational effect to radicalization. A further 21% of the respondents felt that identifying strangers may have no effect towards the same end. However, over 69% of the respondents indicated

that community vigilance may help expose strangers suspected of luring youth into violent extremism.

#### **4.6.3 Monitoring Religious Activities and Physical Structures**

About 95% of the respondents felt that monitoring religious activities within Eastleigh was an extremely effective approach to reduce youth radicalization. In all interviews contacted during this study, there was unanimity that initial ignorance of religious teaching is a leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views, especially among youth. One respondent felt that lack of deep knowledge of true religious teaching is partly related to some observable dangerous trends in the recent practice of religion in Eastleigh. The respondent further stated,

*“Some religions are characterized by proliferation of sects and independent preachers in Islam, and increasing reliance on preachers rather than on the holy books themselves; as a result, young people are very vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization by independent and roaming preachers, extremist groups, and religious ideologues, who often distort religious injunctions. It is therefore the responsibility of all persons living in Kenya, and Eastleigh in particular to scrutinize religious around us”*

Scanning for recurring youth problems such as rampant school dropout was cited by over 83% of the respondents as a very effective way of identifying and stopping youth from joining radicalized groups. An interview with a principal of a high school within Eastleigh area indicated that low educational standards in Eastleigh contribute to young people becoming more easily susceptible to manipulation and recruitment into extremist groups, he added,

*“Although the right to education is one of the basic rights in the country, access to this right is hardly attained. The issue of free and compulsory primary and secondary education should transcend mere statement to practical delivery of this basic entitlement to Eastleigh children. The*

*curriculum should be overhauled. This way, the education system will inculcate skills and knowledge to make young people more competitive in the modern economy because most of the youth idling out there are school drop outs and unemployable graduates. County and state governments should design programmes to constructively engage the youth, the parents and the society at large must augment the government in instilling national values and nationhood to young people. The security sector should partner with the local people to make the environment safe and secure for the youth to realize expected social goals through morally accepted means. This way, the al-shabaab will find it hard to lure the youth in to terrorism”*

Over 92% of the respondents were of the view that disclosing clandestine occupation of structures, apartments, housing units would by and large be an effective way through which the residents could help the authorities to check youth radicalization. Indeed, interviews with three care takers and one landlord disclosed that no much attention is given to apartment and guest house occupiers as long as they pay their rents and dues in time. Further, a key informant working with directorate of criminal investigations described a scenario where al-shabaab recruiters had rented a whole housing unit and turned it to a makeshift ‘vocational youth training centre’. The Key informant added that the proprietor had offered to train young people on various skills and help them acquire employment in various countries within the Arab Peninsula. The training centre would recruit over 46 youth before within three months before a cub operator reported to the matter to the police. The cub driver had been engaged to transport some youth to Lamu.

Interviews with three pastors of the different protestant churches suggested situations where law enforcement officers would join them during gospel crusades and vigil nights, either in uniform or in plain clothes depending on prevailing conditions. This was thought of as a way to establish mutual engagements where parents, guardians, teachers

and religious leaders would comfortably identify indicators of youth radicalization at the pre-formative stages. This would also create a opportunities to engage vulnerable youth particularly those targeted for radicalization through extreme religious and ideological narratives.

Therefore an inference can be drawn from the above findings to suggest that a strategy designed to engage the local communities in addressing recurring youth challenges and monitor religious activities could be an effective way of curbing youth radicalization within Eastleigh. Similarly, recruiters and terrorism sympathizers living among or occupying local premises would be easily identified.

#### **4.7 Solutions to Youth Radicalization in Eastleigh.**

Under this section, Junior and Senior Police Commanders, Selected members of local community, group and religious leaders were presented with the question; “What in your opinion would be the best solution to youth radicalization in Eastleigh?” This question statement attracted lengthy discussions from the community respondents. responses were summarized to four themes; police operations, police-community partnerships, youth empowerment and community intelligence.

##### **4.7.1 Police Operations**

Over 90% of the interviewees expressed wide reservations with police operations as strategy of countering youth radicalization within Eastleigh. The general feeling was that police operations exacerbate the radicalization processes. Indeed, a senior Muslim cleric observed thus,

*“The youth have the perception that they are the target of politically motivated and ethnically-biased security practices and unjust judicial*

*systems. Police operations are, therefore, often seen as part of the problem and tend to create further divisions between the state and citizens”*

However, all senior police commanders interviewed expressed a contrarily view on police operations. One the commanders emphatically stated that the threat of terrorism requires a high presence of police patrols and operations to disrupt terrorist networks. Further, a commander at the station level narrated thus,

*“We have to continue to maintain a strong sense of police and intelligence presence throughout Eastleigh. This helps to monitor individuals with suspected ties to radical groups. Actually, undercover agents should be funded more to carry out professional profiling of the troublesome individuals and communities around this area”.*

This position however is seemingly in conflict with numerous findings arising from empirical data on countering violent extremism. Mythen & Walklate, (2006) for instance found out that ‘hard’ policing strategies can erode trust within those communities that are targeted. The construction of themes such as Muslim youth as the key suspect requiring state surveillance and control is misleading. Young Muslim men in particular have been viewed as constituting a ‘problem group’ and a ‘fifth column, the enemy within’ by media, politicians, the security services and criminal justice agencies (Birdwell, 2010)

An inference can there be drawn with some reasonable degree of certainty that ‘hard’ policing tactics can significantly undermine any attempts that police make to engage with the youth in Eastleigh. Indeed, from the literature review, previous research has it that trust and confidence in the police can be seriously undermined in situations where communities feel that they are being over-policed (Bowling and Phillips, 2007).

#### 4.7.2 Police-Community Partnerships

Over 80% of the interviewees identified police-community partnership as a solution to the threat of radicalization within Eastleigh area. However, they appeared apprehensive that such partnership may only work if the threat of power differentials is adequately addressed. The main concern here was that community groups may not feel that they are actual partners in the policy process due to power imbalances between them and other partners such as the police and other government agencies. A quote from a Muslim youth who is a student at a local university illustrated this;

*“In cases where there is power imbalance between partners it is important for those in positions of relative power to create spaces within which all partners are equals, included and respected. This is especially important in the context of police-community engagement as police officers are in positions of relative power over community members. Within a counter-terrorism context that is based upon the involvement of communities, it is important to stress that partnership work is characterized by the absence of coercion – all parties are free to stop interacting as and when they choose”*

This finding closely collaborates observations by Reiner, (2007) who opines that partnership in counter terrorism is more enhanced in situations where police respect the individuals they partner with. Such partnerships may be particularly difficult given that research exploring ‘cop culture’ has highlighted the often inward-looking nature of police culture (Reiner,2007).

Therefore, it may be that in the context of counter-terrorism, it is the role of police to make the first move and to seek and act to bring about a relationship of trust. This may involve ground-breaking police officers taking a policing leap into uncertainty in

initiating a process of trust-building, particularly when the context of counter-terrorism is embedded in a system of distrust rather than trust.

#### **4.7.3 Counter narratives and youth empowerment**

Religious and community leaders were recognized by both the law enforcement officials and residents as being capable of providing legitimate counter narratives and counseling to the target individuals and groups. Interviews with two sheiks and an imam indicated that that Muslim voices are best positioned to counter radical narratives within an authentic Islamic framework, while intelligently exerting pressure from within Muslim communities to moderate radical individuals and institution. *Nyumba Kumi* and local peace committees leaders were mentioned as having the prowess to leverage religious, state and non-state actors in developing community-led interventions with a view to address social alienation. An interviewee who was Muslim Imam was quoted;

*“We should go the Saudi Arabian way where the government pursues a community and family-level approach that focuses on radicalized individuals who have not yet taken violent actions. Once an individual is apprehended there, imams and religious clerics are involved in providing religious re-education”*

The impression created here is that local leadership, especially religious and administrative officials should mobilize and engage both public and private foundations to initiate and facilitate community based capacity building community centers for the youth. Such programmes were seen as being capable of fostering a sense of belonging and economic empowerment. In addition, the youth could be engaged in such activities as sporting and creative arts above providing them access to mentors who preach socially responsible definitions of what it means to be a *good Muslim* based on local values. An

emphasis was put to the effect that counter narrative activities and programmes should extend to institutions of learning, law enforcement agencies, the private sector, peace and security committees, *nyumba kumi* clusters and the media.

#### **4.7.4 Community Intelligence**

Both police and community interviewees' opinion on the importance of information sharing was evident. However, there appeared to be a sharp difference in the management of information arising from community intelligence networks because police chiefs unanimously indicated that information on terrorism and radicalization was classified for national security purposes and as such, feedback on police action concerning information originating from the locals remains limited or non-existent. On the other hand, local community leaders noted that community intelligence could only be considered as an ample counter-radicalization approach if the police were willing enough to offer adequate and timely feedback while maintaining the principles confidentiality and trust.

Indeed, a number of research studies highlight the importance of trust in obtaining community intelligence. For example, Virta (2008: 30) views trust and confidence towards the police as a precondition to community intelligence, thus, she argues that,

*'Trust and confidence towards the police is a precondition to community intelligence.... It would be very difficult for the police to get community intelligence if people do not trust the police'.*

Innes et al. (2007) argue that low trust in the police can inhibit the willingness of individuals to pass community intelligence about a range of problems and issues, and a report by Demos (2007) highlights the importance of high trust relationships between



communities and the police for effective national security in the age of 'home-grown terrorism'. According to Hillyard (1993; 2005), a breakdown of police-community relations can have serious consequences for policing, and in the context of counter-terrorism can halt the flow of vital information from communities (Hillyard, 1993; Hillyard, 2005).

It follows therefore that, in order to consider community intelligence as radicalization prevention technique, the police have to build close and productive relationships with the citizens they serve. This way, officers are highly likely to have immediate and unfettered access to local, neighborhood information as it develops. Meaningful dialogue may require police officers endeavoring to answer queries that communities have in relation to the scope of counter-terror powers and investigations and possible impacts on the local communities of Eastleigh.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter provides a summary of the study findings, conclusions, recommendations and areas for further research.

### **5.2 Summary of Findings**

This section captures the key findings of the study. The summary is based on the study objectives.

#### **5.2.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents**

Key demographic factors of the respondents examined were age, education, and period of residence, religion and rank in respect of police of officers currently serving within Eastleigh. Age was found to be a prerequisite for one to qualify to be a member of certain local community groups, which may ultimately lead discrimination on that basis. There is therefore high likely hood of under or misrepresentation of some sections of the population in issues that concern the entire society such as radicalization to violent extremism. Nevertheless, the study can be said to have captured a reasonable experience and concerns of the Eastleigh communities as far as radicalization is concerned. Religion, particularly Islam was found to be key cause and driver of radicalization within Eastleigh.

Rank, length of service and duties of police officers were found to form strict criteria that determine police deployment procedures. Any police officer can be deployed to command a police division as long as they have attained the rank of an SSP. However, requirements for appointment to various police ranks were beyond the scope of this

study. The study revealed that none of the commanders within Eastleigh had received specialized training on CVE or related disciplines.

### **5.2.2 Risk Factors that drive Youth Radicalization**

The study established that Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) tailor their recruitment strategies to exploit youth vulnerabilities. In Eastleigh, These vulnerabilities were found to be occasioned by various risk factors. These factors were summarized to five categories namely; Discriminative law enforcement practices, individual factors, socio-economic conditions, religious and political factors.

It was established that the youth, particularly those professing Islam and of Somali origin were being unfairly targeted during police swoops and operations. Literature review and key informant interviews however indicated that there is need to look beyond a narrow focus on religion as the key driver of radicalization in Eastleigh. This perspective was prompted by the realization that it is not clear how one could filter out other ideological motivators such as ethnicity and personal motivations.

### **5.2.3 Behavioral Patterns and Characteristics of Radicalized Youth**

The study found that there are certain factors, observable at the community level, which might indicate an individual youth or a group of youth was under the process of radicalization. Key of these indicators included disconnect from former associates, aggressive demeanor, change in physical appearance/attire, acquisition of new religious ideologies and concentration on self image. The study established that radicalization is associated with overt and observable behavioral changes linked to the Islamic ideology. The individual may change their appearance, their health may suffer (including mental health) and they may become isolated from family, friends, peers or social groups. it was

further revealed that exhibit excessive secrecy regarding what sites they are visiting online, where they are going, who they are meeting. It was further discovered that the police base their operations on profiling informed by factors and attributes associated with Islam and race. This perspective was found to have the ability of limiting the focus of youth radicalization to Islam, a perception that is highly likely to lead to religious conflict between communities living in Eastleigh.

#### **5.2.4 The Role of Community Policing in the Identification of Radicalization Activities**

The study revealed that building sustainable police-community partnerships, interacting with residents and community leaders, and investigating reports of suspicious or unusual behavior are components of community policing that are easily transferable to countering violent extremism. It was discovered that information sharing could be designed to a tool capable of keeping an eye on youth activities and movements both in and out of school, monitoring the activities of suspected al-shabaab operatives and scrutinizing programmes that are taught in religious and other institutions within Eastleigh.

The study found out that the police have a critical role of engaging with local communities to increase their ability to identify individuals at risk of falling to violent extremism. Information sharing between law enforcement agencies and the local communities was cited as having the propensity to enhance community intelligence on youth radicalization and other crimes.

### **5.2.5 Best Solution to Youth Radicalization in Eastleigh**

Police operations, police-community partnerships, counter-narratives, youth empowerment and community intelligence were identified by both police and community interviewees as key possible solutions to the threat of youth radicalization in Eastleigh. The study ascertained that the manner in which operations were designed and executed amounts to 'hard' policing strategies. The study concluded that the police operations could lead to disconnect and distrust between the State and the local population, a condition that is likely to hamper community based anti-radicalization interventions.

Partnership was identified by both police and the community as one of the best approaches to reduce chances of youth radicalization in Eastleigh. The residents however insisted that such partnerships should be founded on transparency and two-way communication. The study found that counter-narrative initiatives would be vital in halting the radicalization process by presenting the orthodox interpretations of the scriptures. In addition, community intelligence was found to help establish rapid and layered response strategies.

### **5.3 Conclusions**

In conclusion, an informed inference can be drawn to the effect that political, socioeconomic and individual factors are key drivers of youth in to violent extremism within Eastleigh. The diversity and dynamic nature of these factors presents a situation whereby no single counter-radicalization approach can be said to adequately address the threat of youth radicalization in Eastleigh. It can further be stated that while it is true that the police are the most visible keepers of the law, they may not singlehandedly address

the myriad upstream factors that drive youth to violent extremism. Indeed, the study established that engaging local communities in the prevention of radicalization within Eastleigh could be a key point of departure in the ‘war against terrorism’. This was informed by the realization that prevention of youth radicalization may greatly require local knowledge of the recruitment procedure and context-specific understanding of the radicalization processes.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

Drawing from the above findings and conclusions, the study arrived at the following recommendations:

1. **Interagency cooperation:** The government should initiate and promote an interagency cooperation to address the threat of radicalization within Eastleigh and other radicalization hotspots within the Country.
2. **Governance:** There is need to leverage the government to partner with CBOs, Civil society groups and the private sector associations so as to help fill gaps in the provision of basic social services and equitable opportunities to empower young people. This will greatly insulate the youth against recruitment to violent extremist groups.
3. **Training:** Law enforcement officers and in particular the police should be thoroughly trained on principles of community policing and the nature and trends of radicalization to violent of extremism. This will equip officers with requisite

knowledge on the root causes of youth radicalization and the subsequent role of the local communities in counter-radicalization.

4. **Building state trust:** Community based initiatives for trust building between law enforcement agencies and Eastleigh communities should be urgently mooted to boost legitimacy of the agencies in the eyes of the public. This will improve the quality of local intelligence which is crucial tool in countering youth radicalization.
5. **Early Warning Systems:** Joint Early warning mechanisms should be put in place for the purpose of picking signals of radicalization early enough for appropriate action.
6. **Public awareness and Education:** Programmes that further peaceful co-existence, intra- and inter-faith dialogues should be initiated with a view to foster greater resilience against radicalization forces. A resident who is aware of the possible indicators of radicalization is an asset in the prevention of the same
7. A national counter terrorism strategy should be designed in manner that promotes police-community partnership with a view to address the root causes of youth radicalization.

### **5.5 Areas for Further Research**

Further study is proposed on the following areas;

1. Establish the role of community policing in the prevention of radicalization in all terror hot spots particularly Mombasa, Mandera and Turkana Counties.

2. Assess the extent to which the National Counter Terrorism Centre has mitigated against the threat of radicalization within Eastleigh with a view to anchor the activities of the centre on community-based strategies
3. Establish the effect of the closure of Dadaab refugee camp on radicalization of the youth in Eastleigh area and other hotspots.
4. Establish the effect of increased deployment of police personnel on counter radicalization within radicalization hot spots in the Country.



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## APPENDICES

### Appendix I: Questionnaire for Local Community Groups

#### Letter of introduction

Alex Ndili

University of Nairobi

Department of Sociology and Social

Work

Cell phone 0722537477

I am a Student at the University of Nairobi pursuing a Masters degree of Arts in Criminology and Social order. As a requirement of the programme, I have embarked on a field research that aims at ESTABLISHING THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH RADICALIZATION IN THE EASTLEIGH AREA OF NAIROBI COUNTY. Kindly note that you have been selected to participate in this study because as a community leader, you may have information that will greatly enrich the outcome of this study. All responses will be treated with strict confidence and will not be used for purpose(s) other than that stated.

It is expected that the study findings will not only inform the development of a National Counter Terrorism Policy but also propose strategies that the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) may pursue in order to arrest the problem of youth radicalization in the Country. Results of the study are available on request at no cost. Kindly complete on or before 30<sup>th</sup> May 2016. Feel free to communicate to me via my mobile phone.

NDILI ALEX

Thank you.

**Section A: Personal Information** (Tick as appropriate)

1. Sex: 1-Male.....2-Female.....

2. Age.....

Below 18	18-30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 60
1	2	3	4	5	6

3. What is your highest level of education

Primary	Secondary	College/University	Other
1	2	3	4

4. Period of residence in Eastleigh in years.....

5. Religion.

Christian	Muslim	Hindu	Other(Specify)
1	2	3	4

**Section B: Youth Radicalization Risk Factors.**

In your opinion, to what extent do the following factors drive Youth into Radicalization within Eastleigh area?

1. **Extremely;**      2. **Greatly;**      3. **Some how;**      4. **Hardly**      5. **Never**

		1	2	3	4	5
1	Poverty					
2	Low level of education					
3	Religious Fanatism					
4	Political discrimination					
5	Lack of employment					
6	Breakdown of social values					
7	Historical injustices					
8	Economic marginalization					
9	Poor parenting					
10	Search for self identification					
11	Discriminative law enforcement practices					

Are there other factors that in your opinion drive youth into radicalization within Eastleigh?

If yes, Kindly explain

.....  
.....  
.....

**Section C: Behavioral Patterns and Characteristics of radicalized youth or youth in the process of radicalization.**

Indicate the extent to which you agree with the following as patterns/characteristics of a radicalized youth (or one who is under the process of radicalization)

- 1. Strongly Agree;    2. Agree;    3. Neutral    4. Disagree    5. Strongly Disagree**

		1	2	3	4	5
1	Concentration on Self-image					
2	Newfound Patriotism					
3	Adverse expression against the Government					
4	Expressed Feelings of Disconnection					
5	Change in Personal Narrative					
6	Disconnect from former associates					
7	Aggressive Demeanor					
8	Association with known sympathizers of terrorism					
9	Sudden travels					

10	Viewing Society as enemy					
11	Change in physical appearance/attire					
12	Expression of particular emotions					
13	Acquisition of new religious ideologies					

Explain any other characteristic, conduct or behavior that in your opinion may be a pointer that a youth is either radicalized or is in the process of being radicalized.....

.....

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.....

**Section E. The role of Community Policing in the identification of youth**

**Radicalization activities.**

Indicate the extent to which you think the following police-community practices will enhance the identification of youth radicalization activities within Eastleigh.

**1. Extremely;      2. Greatly      3. Neutral      4. Slightly      5. No effect**

		1	2	3	4	5
1	Sharing information on the basic traits of youth radicalization process					
2	Developing a common early warning platform for youth radicalization					
3	Monitoring of religious institutions within Eastleigh					
4	Scrutiny on nature of training offered in learning institutions					
5	Reporting strangers who are unable/unwilling to explain their intention					
6	Reporting youth involvement in illegal drug activities					
7	Timely feedback on reports and claims					
8	Scanning for recurring problems e.g. rampant school dropout.					
9	Identification and reporting of clandestine occupation of structures and apartments					

10	Police transparency on arrests, prosecution and release of suspects of radicalization and terrorism					
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Are there any other approaches that the Law enforcement Agencies and the community can jointly engage in to assist in the identification of youth radicalization activities within Eastleigh?.....

If yes, state and explain.....

.....  
 .....  
 .....

**Section F: Best Solution to Youth Radicalization in Eastleigh**

What in your opinion, what do you think should be done, and by whom in order to arrest the problem of youth radicalization in Eastleigh?

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**Appendix II: Interview Schedule for Community Group Leaders.**

I am a Student at the University of Nairobi pursuing a Masters degree of Arts in Criminology and Social order. As a requirement of the programme, I am embarking on a field research that aims at ESTABLISHING THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH RADICALIZATION IN THE EASTLEIGH AREA OF NAIROBI COUNTY. Kindly note that you have been selected to participate in this study because as a community leader, you may have information that will greatly enrich the outcome of this study. All responses will be treated with strict confidence and will not be used for purpose(s) other than that stated. It is expected that the study findings will go a long way in informing the government on the most appropriate strategies of arresting the problem of youth radicalization not only in Eastleigh but in the country at large.

- I. What factors in your opinion drive Eastleigh youth into radicalization? Kindly explain.
- II. What behavioral patterns characterize radicalized youths within Eastleigh?
- III. Do you think Police-community partnership can help in identification of the activities of radicalized youth? Elaborate your opinion.

IV. What would you suggest as the best approach to finding a lasting solution to the challenge of youth radicalization within Eastleigh and indeed across the Country?  
What action(s) should be taken and by whom?

### **Appendix III: Questionnaire for Police respondents.**

Letter of Introduction

Alex Ndili

University of Nairobi

Department of Sociology and Social  
Work

Cell Phone 0722537477

I am a Student at the University of Nairobi pursuing a Masters degree of Arts in Criminology and Social order. As a requirement of the programme, I have embarked on a field research that aims at ESTABLISHING THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH RADICALIZATION IN THE EASTLEIGH AREA OF NAIROBI COUNTY. Kindly note that you have been selected to participate in this study because as a police officer, you may have information that will greatly enrich the outcome of this study. All responses will be treated with strict confidence and will not be used for purpose(s) other than that stated.

It is expected that the study findings will not only inform the development of a National Counter Terrorism Policy but also propose strategies that Law Enforcement Agencies may pursue in order to arrest the problem of youth radicalization in the Country. All information obtained will be treated with utmost confidentiality and results of the study are available on request at no cost. Kindly complete on or before 30<sup>th</sup> May, 2016. Feel free to communicate to me via my mobile phone.

NDILI ALEX

Thank you.

**Section A: Demographic information.**

Fill/Tick as appropriate.

1. What is your rank in the National Police Service?

Rank	PC	CPL	SGT	S/SGT	I.P	C.I	ASP	SP	SSP
Please tick (✓)									

2. What are your current duties \_\_\_\_\_

Beats/patrols	investigations	Crime records	Cells Sentry	Report office	Other(Specify)
1	2	3	4	5	6

3. For how long have you served within Eastleigh Police jurisdiction?

Years of Service	below 5	5 - 15	16 - 25	26-35	Over 35
Please tick (✓)	1	2	3	4	5

**Section B. Police Response to Youth radicalization in Eastleigh.**

Indicate the degree to which you think the following police practices have been effective in the prevention of youth radicalization within Eastleigh

**1. Extremely effective;      2. Slightly Effective      3. No effect**

		1	2	3
1	Arrest and prosecution of al-shabaab suspects			
2	Use of special police units e.g. the ATPU			
3	spontaneous Police operations e.g. operation sanitization of Eastleigh			
4	House to house searches			
5	Impromptu raids of suspected institutions of radicalization e.g. Mosques			
6	Closure of suspected institutions of radicalization e.g. Mosques			
7	Apprehension of idle youths			
8	Night Curfews			
9	Profiling of sections of the Eastleigh communities			
10	Crackdown on Drug abuse			
11	Increased police patrols			

What other youth radicalization prevention tactics do police use in Eastleigh?

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In your opinion, how effective are these tactics

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**Section C. Police-Community Partnerships**

How often do you engage with the members of local community groups to identify factors that drive youth into radicalization within Eastleigh?

- 1. Always; 2. Very often; 3. Often; 4. Hardly; 5. Never.**

		1	2	3	4	5
1	Joint environmental scan for conditions that support activities of terrorism					
2	Regular meetings of beat officers with community members to analyze and prioritize on areas of general notoriety and disorder.					
3	Police openness to the opinions of group members on youths suspected of radical activities					
4	Gender mainstreaming in the deployment of officers in the community					

5	Facilitate the accessibility of police reports on Police performance at the station level to community group members.					
6	Involvement local community leaders in Police crackdown on grounds of terrorism and radicalization.					
7	Engaging with local groups for creation of community awareness on impact of terrorism and radicalization.					
8	Consulting with members of local community groups in profiling sections of Eastleigh communities.					

Do you think police engagement with the members of local community groups may assist in the prevention of youth radicalization in Eastleigh?.....

If yes, give a brief discussion on the best way that you think such engagements should be structured.....  
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**Section E: Best Solution for Youth Radicalization in Eastleigh**

What in your opinion would be the best solution for youth radicalization in Eastleigh?  
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**Appendix IV: Interview Schedule for Key Police Informants.**

I am a Student at the University of Nairobi pursuing a Masters degree of Arts in Criminology and Social order. As a requirement of the programme, I have embarked on a field research that aims at ESTABLISHING THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY POLICING IN THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH RADICALIZATION IN THE EASTLEIGH AREA OF NAIROBI COUNTY. Kindly note that you have been selected to participate in this study because as a police commander, you may have information that will greatly enrich the outcome of this study. All responses will be treated with strict confidence and will not be used for purpose(s) other than that stated.

It is expected that the findings of this study will inform the National Police Service and the Government at large to develop and pursue strategies that will best address the problem of radicalization not only in Eastleigh but the Country at large.

1. For how long have you been a commander within Eastleigh Police Jurisdiction?
2. What are your core duties within your station area?



3. What, in your opinion, are the key risk factors to radicalization factors within Eastleigh?
4. Briefly explain the main behavioral patterns and characteristics that could be associated with a radicalized youth, or a youth who is undergoing the radicalization process
5. In your opinion, in what ways may Community Policing Principles be used in identifying youth faced with threat of radicalization?
6. What do you think should be done, when and by whom in order to arrest the problem of youth radicalization within Eastleigh?