A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF ELIJAH WASIKE MWANGALE:
1939-1992

By

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MASTER OF ARTS DEGREE IN HISTORY

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DECLARATION
I declare that this research work is my original work and has not been submitted for examination in any other university.

Signature…………………………… Date……………………………………...

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C50/66451/2013

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor

Signature…………………………… Date………………………………………

DR. HEBERT AMATSIMBI MISIGO
DEDICATION
This research project is dedicated to Prof. Milcah Amolo Achola who was one of my supervisors. May the Lord rest her soul in eternal peace.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work came to fruition as a result of determined efforts by several individuals. I wish to very sincerely thank all of those individuals who put in varying efforts to see to it that this work is accomplished. I wish to particularly thank the Department of History and Archeology of the University of Nairobi for its help in walking me through the project writing process. Thanks go both to the late Prof. Milcah Amolo Acholo and Dr. Hebert Amatsimbi Misigo for their professional guidance. This work would not have been possible without their guidance. I am also grateful to Basombi clan elders who approached the interview with unrivalled dedication that made the research richer. I also wish to thank my two sons, Jefferson Nambakha and Victor Nabibia and daughter Sheila Wafula, for their help in typing the work and my wife Grace Wasike for helping in financing and encouragement. I wish to register my sincere gratitude to Mr Pius Mulati, Mr Shapan Kwalia and Mrs Lindah Nasike for accepting to proofread the document. Without their combined efforts, this work would not have been completed on time. Finally, I wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to the Teachers Service Commission for extending a paid study leave to me. The study leave accorded me ample time and the resources necessary to successfully complete this course.
ABSTRACT

The project set out to construct a biography of Elijah Wasike Mwangale. It was guided by three objectives; To examine Elijah Mwangale’s early life, education and social cultural experience which helped shape his career (1939 – 1966); To examine Elijah Mwangale’s role and contribution in public service (1966 – 1978); To examine Elijah Mwangale’s role as a cabinet minister; To examine Elijah Mwangale’s role and contributions in KANU (1976-1993).

The study made use of both secondary and primary sources. Primary information from the Kenya National Archive and Kenya’s Parliament, was gathered and used. Interviews were also conducted in Bungoma, Nairobi, and Trans-Nzoia, which yielded very important information. Secondary sources included a review of books, journals, articles and magazines. All the information from both the primary and secondary sources was pieced together to construct the biography of Elijah Mwangale.

The research established that various occurrence and experiences in Elijah Mwangale’s early life left life-long imprints in his minds that helped guide and shape his political life. The research also demonstrated that as a member of parliament, Elijah Mwangale established himself as a great debator. The issues he tackled included education, health, trade unionism and the state of economy. He rose to the national limelight when he chaired the J.M Kariuki murder Probe Committee which delivered a damning report to President Kenyatta.

During the reign of president Moi, Elijah Mwangale was, for the first time, appointed to the cabinet. As a cabinet minister he served in the Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Agriculture.

Mwangale replaced Fredrick Khaoya as chairman of KANU Bungoma Branch in 1976. In that capacity, he did a lot to strengthen the party at the grassroots and at the branch level. At the beginning, he guided the branch to peace and tranquility. However with time, he made many enemies who ganged up against him to make Bungoma Branch a troubled branch.
Source: The Passing of a Political Giant (Eulogy).
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CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

A biography is a detailed description of a person’s life. It presents a subject’s life story, highlighting various aspects of his or her life, including intimate details of his/her experiences. Once upon a time historical biographies were written by men and were mostly about great men. However, overtime the historical frontier has swung away from the traditional study of kings and conquerors to incorporate the study of ordinary people.

There have been debates as to whether biographies can be a serious contribution to history. In this regard it can be pointed out that there has been reservation sometimes voiced in the academic community that by focusing on the life of an individual, the writer can hardly embrace the wider historical picture. There is also a danger that biographers may develop an emotional relationship with the subject of their research in away a bonafide historian should not.

However, biographies are important as they answer a real need within us to understand each other better, as human nature is complex. Pursuing the life of another may offer inspiration and encouragement in times of diversity. The study of man may also be important in order to evaluate history. Knowledge of biography therefore, allows us a healthy corrective to pure subjectivism. It is in this regard that the story of Mwangale is important.

The story of Elijah Mwangale details an individual’s journey and his interactions in various contexts and within diverse spaces that were turning points in Kenya’s history. Born just at the beginning of the World War II, Elijah Mwangale grew up and attended school during the war and the post war period. The period was important in the history of Kenya as it witnessed increased forces of nationalism and marked a march towards independence. There was a new awakening among the African populace which saw an escalation in the hopes, expectations and dreams among the the people of African origin. Elijah Mwanagale’s generation became an embodiment of those dreams and expectations.
With the fast approaching independence, many Kenyan nationalists such as Tom Mboya, Gikonyo Kiano, and Kariuki Njiru, became involved in active preparation of young men and women who would take up jobs in independent Kenya. Here again, Elijah Mwangale was part of a group of youngsters taken to United States of America (USA) as part of a grand plan to prepare leaders for independent Kenya. However, Elijah Mwangale was not part of the pioneer group taken to the USA. Elijah Mwangale was taken to the USA in 1963, following two groups that had proceeded him.

Elijah Mwangale returned to Kenya in 1966, from the United States of America (USA), in another very critical moment in the Kenyan history. The period 1969 to 1975 was an important period as it witnessed the killing of Tom Mboya, the systematic sidelining of Odinga Oginga and increased GEMA activities. The period, therefore, witnessed a vacuum created in the political space (opposition politics) which Elijah Mwangale, fresh from college and full of youthful energies and ideals, strove to occupy. The happenings would create challenges and opportunities which Mwangale and other like-minded politicians would grapple with.

The killing of J.M. Kariuki in 1975 would thrust the nation into unprecedented confusion and dilemma. This would in turn thrust Mwangale’s career to great heights as he would be settled upon to chair the Parliamentary Probe Committee into the assassination. This would in a way be a turning point of sorts in his political life. Following the crack down that followed the findings of the Probe Committee, Mwangale seems to have toned down his political rhetoric.

The passing on of the founding father of the nation, President Jomo Kenyatta in 1978 and the ascendancy to the throne by his, long serving and loyal, vice-president, Daniel arap Moi, would in turn usher a new era in Kenyan history- the Nyayo Era. The period witnessed the refurbishment and perfection of a one-party system that would dominate the psyche of many Kenyans and by extension their political life for the two decades that would follow. President Moi began to use KANU as an alternate instrument of rule. As a result, in Kenya’s history, the party became a true focus of authority. It relegated parliament, the provincial administration, and the judiciary to subordinate positions. This would have great ramifications on many political careers,
including that of Elijah Mwangale. It would also witness Elijah Mwangale’s metamorphosis of sorts, as Elijah would completely change his style of politics. As much as the period would witness increased agitation for democracy and anti-Moi struggles of the 1980s and 1990s, the period would also see Elijah Mwangale transformed from a progressive politician to a staunch KANU hawk.

The biography examines Elijah Mwangale’s early life, as well as his work as a Member of Parliament, Cabinet Minister and a KANU hawk. It also examines his private work as an entrepreneur. Consequently, documenting Mwangale’s story provides a platform to narrate the transformational dynamics of the change that Kenya underwent in the post-world war II period, the post-independence history of Kenya and how Mwangale fitted in it.

This work is solely mine and I will take full responsibility of any mistakes or errors that may manifest themselves in the text.

1.1 Historical Background
In constructing Mwangale’s biography, this work sought to situate his life in historical, social, economic and political context and how each impacted him.

1.1.1 The Social Historical Background.
Christianity played an important role in the introduction and spread of education in Kenya, during the colonial period, which in turn shaped leaders like Elijah Mwangale. Initially, some of the Abaluhya, like the Tiriki, resisted education, but eventually, all of them came to perceive education as a tool for innovation of their social structures and roles.¹ Since the initial providers of education were the Christian Missionaries, it required students to belong to the denomination of the school, giving rise to another idea namely – the sponsorship of a school by a given religious denomination. These denominations gave rise to many educated young men and women that were later to take lead in post-independence Kenya. In the case of Elijah Mwangale, the Friends Church played an important role both directly and indirectly. Through the influence of

the Friends Church, his father emerged as one of the Commercial Elites in Western Kenya. He in turn passed over the benefits to his son, by ensuring that his son received a good education.

As the country moved close to independence, there were preparations that were carried out for post-independence African Civil Service. Hornsby C. points out that as independence approached, major expansions were taking place in the future elite class. This was driven by the cold war between the communists and capitalists. Between 1956 and 1960, Tom Mboya, Julius Kigonyo Kiano and Kariuki Njiri, built tight relations between the United States of America (USA) and African nationalists leading to mass airlift of O-level African students to the USA universities on scholarship programmes. According to him, the American Student Airlift produced most of the second generation elites of the 1970s and 1980s, including politicians, academics and journalists like George Saitoti, Elijah Mwangale, Josepah Karanja, Zachary Onyanka, Joseph Kamotho, Wangari Maathai, Jonathan Ng’eno and Hillary Ng’weno.

1.1.2 Kenya, from Multparty to One party State

Kenya attained her independence as a multiparty democracy. However, the multiparty democracy lasted less than a year. Hornsby contends that opposition parties were collapsing all over Africa, with both scholars and politicians arguing that they were shallow, ethnically based, unnecessary or uneconomically efficient. Contemporary assessments of the challenges to the nationhood viewed national identity and stability as key and these were seen to be threatened by the divisiveness that a multi-party electoral contest would create. Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) soon merged with Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 1964, leaving KANU as the only political party in Kenya.

KANU soon degenerated, with the national officials abandoning or ignoring their party jobs and accountabilities and rather focusing on their state roles. In 1964, radical KANU national organizing secretary, John Keen and assistant executive, John Owashika, wrote to Kenyatta, cataloguing the decline of the party and calling for its

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governing council to meet, but nothing happened. Unable to continue from within, Oginga Odinga and his allies decamped to the new union, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) in 1966, reverting the country to multi-party democracy. This return to multi-party democracy lasted till 1969 when KPU was banned. Kenya remained a de facto one party state, until 1982 when it became a de jure one party state.4

The decay of KANU continued after it became the only party. Hornsby argues that KANU’s purpose was to serve as a weak basis for legitimacy, a venue for factorial competition, a platform for publicity and a means of rewarding and punishing local dignitaries.5 According to him, it organized nothing and did nothing. Its sole operational role came in regulating electoral competition, where it could filter out a few undesirables. An example was when the party machinery was mobilized against Charles Njonjo for being a traitor and ejected him from the party.

With the Njonjo inquiry out of the way, Moi and his allies sought new ways to assert their authority and tighten their control. Moi now turned to KANU as an alternative instrument of rule. For the first time in Kenyan history, during the 1984-1989 periods, the party became a true focus of authority, relegating Members of Parliament to subordinate position. The emphasis on the party was not however based on ideology. Smith Hempston would later note that Kenya was not a one-party, but one-man state. Earlier in 1976, Elijah Mwangale had been elected to the position of KANU Chairman Bungoma Branch, a position he held for nearly three decades.6

1.1.3 The Degeration of Parliament
The independence constitution, hammered by the Lancaster house conference of 1962, transferred much of the model of the West Minister system of parliamentary government to the soon to be independent state. However, after independence, there developed what can be described as guided democracy. Though Parliament remained the center of debate and public attention, the assembly never asserted its power to legislate government programs and policies.7 Efforts were made to prevent it from

6 Ibid.
passing private members motions. The Parliament struggled to hold the government accountable during Kenyatta’s regime. Between the period 1975 and 1978, opposition became open in Parliament when Seroney was elected deputy speaker. Elijah Mwangale, having entered parliament in 1969, was thrown in the public limelight when he was elected to chair the Parliamentary Select Committee after the assassination of J.M Kariuki in 1975. During the reign of Moi, he was appointed first as the Minister for Labour, then as Minister for Tourism and Wildlife, then Foreign Affairs and finally Agriculture. He remained firm and strong behind Moi and was only wiped aside by the multiparty waves in the 1992 general election. The focus of this study will be on Elijah Mwangale’s early life and his role and contribution in public space.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
Available information indicates that Elijah Mwangale acted in various public spaces. He entered elective politics in 1969 as a member of parliament for Bungoma East Constituency. During his tenure as Member of Parliament, he chaired the Parliamentary Select Committee that probed the assassination of J.M Kariuki in 1975. When President Moi took over the throne, he appointed Elijah Mwangale to serve as a minister in different ministries, first in the Ministry of Labour, then Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and lastly in the Ministry of Agriculture. As one of the KANU point men in Western Province, he served as KANU chairman for Bungoma KANU Branch for nearly two decades. Hilary Ng’weno identifies him as one of the prominent men and women who made major contribution to Kenya’s history in his biographical TV documentaries, Makers of a Nation.

However, these are snippets of Mwangale’s story as much of his contribution to the modern history of Kenya still remains underexplored. Little is known about him personally as well as his role in public space. The position of KANU branch chairman evolved unregulated to become instrumental in shaping Kenya’s history, to a large extent, yet little has been written about it. Mwangale’s famous quote as chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee, that investigated the Assassination of J.M Kariuki, has been made reference of many times, yet his engagement in such an important episode remains largely undocumented.
This raises certain questions that have not been fully addressed. What factors influenced his early life? What qualified Mwangale to be appointed as chairman of the Parliamentary Select Probe Committee into the murder of J. M. Kariuki? What was his role as a KANU chairman of Bungoma KANU branch? What were his legacies in parliament and cabinet? How did he go about carrying out his duties in his varying capacities? Was the Njonjo traitor issue a fact or mere conspiracy? Did Mwangale know more than he let out on the Robert Ouko murder? These questions and others were investigated in this project work.

1.3 Objectives
The overall objective of the study was to construct a Biography of Elijah Mwangale.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives
i. To examine Elijah Mwangale’s early life, education and socio-cultural experiences which helped shape his public life (1939-1965).
ii. To examine Elijah Mwangale’s Role and Contribution in his early Public Service (1966-1978).
iii. To examine Elijah Mwangale’s Role and Contribution as a Cabinet Minister (1979-1992).
iv. To examine Elijah Mwangale’s role and Contribution as chair of Bungoma KANU Branch (1976-1993).

1.4 Literature Review
David Mendell’s, Obama, From Promise to Power, is a political biography of Barack Obama, from his childhood to the time of announcement of his candidancy for the presidency of the United States America. The author focuses on Obama’s fast rise to power from obscurity to the national stage. Starting as a student in Hawaii, he moved on to community activism in Chicago, to the president of the Harvard Law Magazine, to State Senate of Illinois, and finally to the National Senate. The author attributes this meteoric rise to a carefully crafted and calculated plan by an ambitious man. The author, besides providing a critique of Dreams from My father, also examines Obama’s work as a Senator of Illinois State Senate, as well as a Senator in the

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national government. The author points out that Obama’s greatest moment came when he was invited to deliver a key note speech at the Democratic National Convention in 2004. The author also demonstrates that throughout his work, Obama came to represent the promise of unity among groups of all types – blacks and whites, Democrats, Republicans and Moderates, the young and the old, the upper middle class and the lower class. The review of this book was important as it was useful in providing the style used in biography writing. This was particularly so in areas of convergence of the two politicians, especially representative politics, and party politics.

Walter Isaacson, in *Kissinger, a Biography*, looks at Henry Kissinger from his childhood as a persecuted Jew in Nazi Germany, through his family’s migration to America, his education and his rise in public space to security advisor and secretary of state during the reign of Nixon. He also examines Kissinger’s role as a globe-trotting business consultant. Isaacson shows that Kissinger never embraced European liberalism, republicanism and idealism. He shows that, instead, Kissinger was attracted to conservatism with its emphasis on national interest and balance of power. He argues that Kissinger turned to Metternich, Castlereagh and Otto Von Bismarck, the prime practitioners of power politics, to whom he dedicated his doctoral dissertation, *A World Restored*. He avers that in his foreign policy Kissinger would always see any struggle in the world in the East-West context and therefore, the need for real politick (Realism). According to Isaacson, the policy was reflected in Kissinger’s dealing with Vietnam, Cambodia, China and the Soviet Union as well as Africa especially in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The review of Kissinger’s biography was important as it helped in shedding light on the styles used in biography writing. This was especially important as Mwangale’s work as Minister for Foreign Affairs provided appoint of convergence with Kissinger’s work as Secretary of State.

Hornsby Charles in, *Kenya, A History Since Independence*, seeks to explain what has happened in Kenya since independence and to align academic understanding of post-colonial development with the experiences and perception of Kenyans about their country. He also pays close attention to the political, social and economic history, and international affairs, as well as the political philosophy and shows that intrigue,

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ethnic patronage and corruption have characterized Kenyan politics. Hornsby mentions Mwangale in relation to various occurrences. These references have been vital in providing building blocks in the construction of the story of Mwangale.

There is considerable literature on some Kenyan leaders that have played a role in public space. However, no such literature, has been written about Elijah Mwangale, and hence the reason for writing this biography. Babafemi A. Badejo, has put together a book on Raila Odinga.\textsuperscript{11} He says his intention in this work was to tell as briefly as possible the story of politics in Kenya and Raila’s role in them. In effect, it was an attempt to write two biographies in one. Andrew Morton wrote, What Babafemi A. B. has referred to as a public relation account on Moi.\textsuperscript{12} The book traces Moi from his humble background, through his vice presidency, to leadership of the nation as the second president of the republic of Kenya. David Goldsworthy’s book on Tom Mboya, has established that Tom Mboya made a mark in Labour organization, party politics, constitution draftsmanship, international diplomacy, Pan-Africanism, economic planning and authorship\textsuperscript{13}. Wandibba has contributed to a biography of J.M Kariuki, in the series of Makers of Kenya’s history.\textsuperscript{14} This particular volume focuses on the life of one of independent Kenya’s most flamboyant politicians. He shows that Kariuki’s was a life full of nationalist agitation, fight for the rights of the poor and landless and the determination to fight colonialism.

These biographies were important in two ways. There are those like \textit{Raila, An Enigma in Kenyan Politics} and Wandiba’s \textit{biography of J. M. Kariuki} that mention Mwangale. Such references were important in the writing of Mwangale’s biography as they were sources of information. There were those like \textit{Moi, the making of an African Statesman} and \textit{Tom Mboya, the Man Kenya wanted to forget}, that do not mention Mwangale at all. Such books, were handy as they, pointed to the gaps that necessitated this study.

Maina wa Kinyathi examines the violent confrontation with the British invaders, their social and political struggle against the British imperialist occupier, the transformation of the constitution, Mau Mau armed resistance, the class struggle and revolutionary movement against Kenyatta, and Moi’s neo-colonial regime and their imperialist bakers. In his work, the author mentions such contemporary leaders and civil servants of President Daniel arap Moi such as Mwangale, Charles Njonjo, J.M Kariuki, Ben Gethi, Patrick Shaw, Pius Kibathi Thuo, Peter Giceru Njau, Peter Kimani, and Kihika Kimani. Other leaders mentioned include Oginga Odinga, Ochieng’ Oneko, Paul Ngei, Taita Towett, Robert Matano, Okiki Amayo, Nathan Munoko, Nyamweya, Kibaki, Kiano and Nyaga. The author does not mention Elijah Mwangale, even though Mwangale was the Chairman of the select committee that Maina discusses. This book was important as it pointed to the gaps in existing literature that necessitated the study.

Marcel Rutten, Alamin Mazrui and Francois Grignon in their book, *Out for Counts*, provide an avenue for specialists on Kenyan politics to discuss both the local and national level politics of the country. In this book, Musambayi Katumanga wrote an article in which he mentions Mwangale, while arguing that the formation of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) by Martin Shikuku, Oginga Odinga and Philip Gachoka not only elicited opposition excitement in Luhya land, but it also helped to undermine the KANU hawks in the province, who were led by Elijah Mwangale and Burudi Nabwera. The article does not accord Mwangale a detailed coverage of his political life, his early life, his career and his role as KANU leader. However, it served as reference material in the writing of Mwangale’s biography.

Waruhiu S.M. in his book, *From Autocracy to Democracy in Kenya*, seeks to give an analysis of government of Kenya between the granting of internal self-governement in June 1963 and the multiparty general elections in December 1992, in order to reveal how the government fell short of achieving the democratic ideals to which the people

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of Kenya aspired at independence. While the book mentions many of Mwangale’s contemporaries, it fails to mention Mwangale. The book was important as it pointed to the gaps that necessitated the writing of a biography on Elijah Mwangale.

Kichamu Akivaga in his article, *Towards a National Movement for Democratic Change in Kenya*, mentions Mwangale in his article concerning the confrontation between the pro-democracy and pro-establishment forces, in which he shows that Elijah Mwangale threatened Njoha with detention or elimination. He points out that Elijah Mwangale was originally a progressive member of parliament and that he only turned to become an anti-democracy crusader on becoming minister. The article does not give details on Mwangale’s political life, his childhood nor his career. However, it served as reference material in the writing of Elijah Mwangale’s biography, especially on his metamorphosis from a progressive politician to a pro-establishment leader.

Daniel Branch, in his book, *Kenya between Hope and Despair*, seeks to show how Kenya’s leaders have encouraged political debate to center on recognition rather than on redistribution. He argues that tribes have encouraged Kenyans to think and act politically in a manner informed first and foremost by ethnicity, in order to crush demands for redistribution of scarce resources. While writing on the murder of J.M Kariuki, Branch mentions Mwangale. The book was, therefore, an important resource in the construction of Mwangale’s biography.

Musambayi mentions Mwangale in his article on constructing Abaluhya unity. In this article, he mentions Mwangale in relation with the division of Bungoma East constituency into Kimilili Constituency and Webuye Constituency. The book was an important source of information in the construction of the story of Elijah Mwangale, as the constituency was curved out to suit Mwangale, since he was left with the most loyal part of his constituency.

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Wanyiri Kihoro in his book, *The Price of Freedom*, gives a record of the resistance of Kenyans to colonial and post-colonial oppression and dictatorship.\(^{21}\) The objective of the book is to try to bring together all the serious cases of colonial and post-colonial repression across Kenya. It is clear from the book that Kenyans have resisted the excesses of colonialism and human rights abuse and violation, especially under the post-colonial one-party state. He mentions Elijah Mwangale in relation with J. M. Kariuki assassination. The book served as an important source in the building of Mwangale’s story.

G.G Kariuki, in his book, *Illusion of Power*, recounts his experiences of half a century politics.\(^{22}\) The author gives a clear description of the entire political landscape right from pre-independence armed struggle, the constitution conferences and the post-independence power struggles, through to the excesses of the one-party regime and the intrigues of the political reforms at the close of the 20\(^{th}\) century. These reflections effectively capture the images that have flashed across the country’s political history. The author mentions Mwangale twice, first in relation with the advent of the issue of the traitor, in which Mwangale’s role is described and secondly he mentions Mwangale in relation to the Njonjo commission of inquiry in which Fred Gumo, then an assistant minister made a claim touching on Mwangale. These references provided the requisite information in the writing Elijah Mwangale’s biography.

Kate Currie and Larry Ray, in their article, State and Class in Kenya, set out to situate power struggle between President Daniel arap Moi and the ex-Minister for constitutional affairs, Charles Njonjo, in context of class antagonism in the Kenyan state.\(^{23}\) The article examines the class context for conflict with the figure most closely associated with conservative, capitalist and pro-British tendency in Kenyan nationalism. This article mentions Mwangale in his relationship with the issue of traitor and the subsequent fall of Charles Njonjo, in which Mwangale and a group of Bungoma M.Ps alleged at a press conference that some cabinet Ministers were


dissatisfied with Moi. The article was an important source in writing of Mwangale’s story.

Vincent Khapoya in his article, Moi and Beyond, attempts to explain Kenya’s successful transition experience after the death of the founding president, Jomo Kenyatta. He explores the factors underlying the then unease in the country, which had led to the detention of political activists, and to charges abroad of human rights violations. He goes on to speculate on prospects of a peaceful transition after the incumbent presidency of Daniel arap Moi. This article mentions Mwangale while arguing that the alliance between Moi and the western groups showed no signs of fraying at the national level. He argues that Mr. Mwangale, a westerner, continued to enjoy the confidence of the president and ventured into Kibaki’s territory for rallies and fundraising to show that he was not merely an ethnic or regional leader who happens to be in the cabinet, but a national leader who spoke for all Kenyans from all parts of the country. This essay is important as a source of information as it throws light on the relationship between Elijah Mwangale and other leaders.

Galia Sabar-Friedman, in his article, “The Mau Mau myth”, focuses on several issues concerning the invocation of the Mau Mau myth and its performance in Kenyan political discourse since independence. The main section of the article addressed the contest over the past, which was limited to the KANU ruling party and the formal and informal opposition. The analysis centres on the concept of the Mau Mau as both the stage and the language of the political debate in the 1990s. The article mentions Mwangale in relationship with Mau Mau. It points out in 1985, the Mau Mau myth was once again invoked in the inner Kikuyu struggles inflamed by the president and his allies, in a campaign to secure the nomination of Elijah Mwangale’s vice-presidency and strengthen ex-Mau Mau allies own power in central province. The legitimacy of Mwangale was explained to Kikuyu politicians on the basis of his allies’ role within the Mau Mau and it stood in contrast to Kibaki’s distance from this important part of their past. Here again, he argues, that the ties with ex-Mau Mau

were used as a stage to legitimize a current political act. The article was an important source in the construction of Mwangale’s.

David Throup, in his article, Election and Political Legitimacy, traces the political developments during the Kenyatta and Moi regime.\(^{26}\) He argues that by the time President Jomo Kenyatta’s death, in August 1978, Kenya had acquired the reputation of being one of the most open polities in Africa. He adds that since the accession of President Daniel arap Moi, in August 1978, Kenyans freedom diminished. The article mentions Mwangale, when it argues that, apart from the Abaluhya ally, Elijah Mwangale in western province, and former Vice President Mwai Kibaki, who remained in the cabinet as Minister for health from 1988 to December 1991, Moi favoured relatively inexperienced individuals, whose political position depended almost entirely on his patronage. However, the article is important as it throws light on Mwangale’s political life.

Walter O. Oyugi, in his article, Ethnicity in the Electoral Process, sets out to explain the nature of transaction between electoral politics and tribalism especially with reference to the multiparty politics in Kenya.\(^ {27} \) He argues that the politics of the 1992 general elections shows how ethnicity continues to be the major force influencing the behavior of politicians and voters. The author argues that where powers and wealth were at stake, ethnic relation became conflicting. Mwangale is mentioned in relation with the new coalitions which were built prior to the 1992 elections. The author points out that former cabinet ministers Elijah Mwangale and Burudi Nabwera from Luhya land, in numerous rallies, stressed the need for Luhya’s support of KANU and Moi, as the surest way to be rewarded. This article is important as it highlights Elijah Mwangale’s Transactional style of leadership.

Misigo H. Amatsimbi and Wambui Kiai in their article on the Friends church, assess the correlation between the Friends African Mission (FAM) and the nurturing of

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Christian commercial agricultural elites in western Kenya.\textsuperscript{28} The authors point out that the FAM’s agricultural policy provided an important platform for nurturing the development of commercial agricultural elite. The authors mention Elijah Mwangale’s father, Philip Mwangale, as having been one of those agricultural elites, who used their resources to provide better education to their children. The article is important in as far as it provides the inside on Elijah Mwangale’s religious and commercial background.

1.5 Justification
The literature reviewed above established that most of the literature written on Kenya only provides sketchy glimpse into Mwangale’s work and contribution. The downside of this is that not much on Elijah Mwangale’s work has been covered. Much of Elijah Mwangale’s early life, his performance as a Member of Parliament, his role as KANU Bungoma District Branch chairman and his role as a Minister during Moi’s reign have not been fully captured. What is established from the review is scattered pieces of information about his political life that do not construct the whole story about him. This study has therefore weaved together the various pieces of information provided both by primary and secondary sources to construct some coherence in the story of Mwangale’s early life and how it later played out in his political life. The information provided shall contribute a great deal to modern history of Kenya.

1.6 Theoretical Framework
Transaction Leadership Theory
In this study, the researcher applied one theory of leadership, the transactional leadership theory. This theory was first identified by James McGregor Burns, in his book, \textit{leadership}. According to him, transactional leadership occurs when one person takes the initiative in making contact with others for the purpose of an exchange of something valued: that is leaders approach followers with an eye towards exchanging.\textsuperscript{29}

According to Peter G. Northouse, politicians who win votes by promising “no new taxes” are demonstrating transactional leadership.\(^ {30}\) Similarly, managers who offer promotions to employees who surpass their goals are exhibiting transactional leadership. In a classroom, teachers are being transactional when they give students a grade for work completed. The exchange dimension of transactional leadership is very common and can be observed at many levels throughout all types of organizations.

Bass applied Burns’ ideas to organizational management. He argued that transactional leaders mostly consider how to marginally improve, how to maintain the quantity and quality of performance, how to substitute one goal for another, how to reduce resistance to particular actions and how to implement decisions.\(^ {31}\)

Transactional leadership represents exchanges in which both the superior and the subordinates reciprocate each other so that each derives something of value. Simply stated, transactional leaders give followers something they want in exchange for something the leaders want. Transactional leaders engage their followers in a relationship of mutual dependence in which the contribution by both sides are acknowledged and rewarded. Though transactional leadership can be described as the exchange of valued outcomes, closer examination of the literature suggests that all exchanges are not equivalent. It appears that two levels of transactions can be distinguished. Employees who engaged in relationship that involved support and the exchange of emotional resources (high quality) were less likely to leave an organization than employees who engaged in relationship that involved contractually agreed upon elements such as eight hours of work for eight hours of pay.\(^ {32}\)

A less common form of transactional leadership involves promises or commitments that are rooted in exchangeable values such as respect and trust. Burns referred to these values as modal values. Modal values bond leaders and followers in an attempt to actualize the needs of both parties. Thus, a lower order transaction depends upon a leader’s control of resources (pay increase, special benefits), that are desired by the followers. If such rewards are not under the leader’s direct control, their bargaining


\(^{31}\) P. G. Northouse, Op cit

\(^{32}\) Ibid, p.649.
power is diminished. Higher order transactional leadership, on the other hand, relies on the exchange of non-concrete rewards to maintain the followers’ performance. In this relationship, the leaders directly control such exchanges since they rely upon no tangible rewards and values.33

This work applied the transactional leadership theory in the examination of Elijah Mwangale’s leadership style, by scrutinizing his actions, utterances, and his relationship with his constituents, as well as those in power then. In his dealing with his constituents, Elijah Mwangale employed a lot of resources in exchange for their support. According to him, leadership was synonymous with wealth and vice versa. At Bungoma KANU Branch, he sustained his relationship with KANU delegates by dishing out a lot of money to them. In the process, he was able to attract both high order and low order followers. In his dealing with Moi, he expected to be rewarded with a higher office in exchange for his support. When this did not come his way, he complained loudly and this might have contributed greatly to the decline in his fortunes after the 1992 general elections.

1.7 Research Hypothesis
This study employed the following hypotheses in order to facilitate data collection and interpretation:

i. Elijah Mwangale’s early life greatly influenced his political life.

ii. Elijah Mwangale’s performance in his public work was characterised by a metamorphosis from a progressive parliamentarian to a reactionary KANU hawk.

iii. Elijah Mwangale’s performance as KANU Bungoma chairman was driven by loyalty and desire for reward from the Moi regime.

1.8 Scope, Problems and Limitation of the Study
The study covered Mwangale’s childhood which included his education and training starting from 1939. The study also covered his career and his political life as KANU leader, MP and Cabinet Minister, up to his ouster as MP in 1992. A brief history of his life in the post 1992 period has also been included.

33 Op cit.
In carrying out the study, the researcher faced various constraining factors. The most outstanding was the rule that documents that have stayed in the archives for less than 30 years old from the date when they were written cannot be availed for public scrutiny. As a result, a lot of information about his work in government was not availed to the researcher. To some extent, this shortcoming was overcome by visits to the Kenyan parliament and carrying out interviews with some of those who worked with him.

There were other factors that also combined to affect the effectiveness of the researcher. One important area that impacted on the research was Elijah Mwangale’s family feuds and secrets. Mwangale’s siblings seemed to harbour serious secrets on events surrounding the death of Elijah Mwangale. Because of this, the researcher was viewed with a lot of suspicion during the research. For security and legal reasons, the information has not been included. However, some family members like David Mwangale, Rosemary Mwangale, and Wycliffe Basa were able to to share a lot of information with the researcher, thereby, ameliorating the situation.

There was, in some cases, serious attachment to family documents. One of the sisters had a document which the researcher considered very useful but she completely refused to allow it to be photocopied. The researcher had to approach other family members, with similar documents, for assistance after a long period of searching. Some family members were not available for interview as they stay in the USA. These were Elijah Mwangale’s first wife Janet and his son Andrew Sarai, together with others of Elijah Mwangale’s children. Their contribution was very much missed. Text messages sent to them went unanswered.

Other family members who could have provided information, accepted in the initial stage but when later approached, they refused to pick up the phone or even return phone calls. However, the shortcoming was overcome when a group of elders accepted to provide key information, in a focused group interview. The interview yielded very vital information.

Time lapse affected the quality and accuracy of information received. The research was carried out twenty four years after Elijah Mwangale exited the public service.
People only remembered the generalities, but rarely the specific events and acts. Some of those who worked with Elijah Mwangale had died. With them the important information they carried also disappeared. The accuracy of the information collected was established through crosschecking the information against published information in books, newspapers, magazines and journals.

Certain ministries became no go zones during the period of research, especially with increasing acts of terrorism. Parliament and the Ministry of foreign affairs became nearly impossible to access. Access only became possible after the intervention by the Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Nairobi.

Time constrain was also an additional hurdle as the researcher was supposed to conduct the research within strict timelines. The researcher had a study leave of two years within which to cover the course work and carry out the research. The study leave came to an end with the completion of the proposal, before the completion of the whole project. To complete the project, the researcher had to continue seeing the supervisor when time allowed.

1.9 Methodology
The study employed both primary and secondary sources in this study. The beginning point was an examination of secondary sources. The study analyzed books, scholarly journals, published articles and newspapers that were relevant to the subject of study. These sources helped to capture information on Elijah Mwangale that had already been written.

The second stage involved collection of information using primary sources. This included capturing archival information such as official parliamentary reports, government files and annual reports and minutes of various bodies with which Mwangale worked closely. The researcher also visited the Kenyan Parliament where the Hansards were observed. The Hansards were particularly handy in throwing light on Mwangale’s role as a member of parliament.

As part of collection of primary data, the researcher also carried out interviews. The questions that were used were unstructured. Here, the researcher had a plan for the
topic to be discussed, but did not follow a fixed order of questions or word these questions in a specific way. Interviewees were allowed a great deal of latitude in the way they answered, the length of answer and even the topic of their discussion. The aim was to allow them to speak in their own words in order to obtain a first person account. The information was captured as notes as well as audio-recorded. Prior permission was obtained before recording was carried out.

The sampling technique that was applied was purposive sampling. In this case, choosing of a sample, depended on the judgment of the researcher. Snowballing was also used to arrive at some interviewees. Those chosen in the above categories led the researcher to other interviewees that were viewed as possessing vital information. In fact, many of the valuable respondents were suggested to the researcher by those who knew them as having been close to the late minister. In total thirty five respondents were interviewed.

Focused group discussion was also employed as a method of data collection. A group of six elders comprising the chairman of the Basombi clan, the organizing secretary, and the secretary, organized for a day and together provided information on Basombi as well as on Elijah Mwangale. During the interview the secretary could respond first then the other elders could with addition information if they felt compelled to do so.

The information gathered in both secondary and primary sources was analyzed qualitatively. This method provided ways of discerning, examining, comparing, contrasting and interpreting meaningful patterns or themes on which conclusions were drawn.
CHAPTER TWO

ELIJAH’S MWANGALE’S EARLY LIFE, 1939-1966

“In the life of everyone, there comes a point when he realizes that of all the seemingly limitless possibilities of his youth, he has actually become one actuality,” - Kissinger\(^{34}\)

2.1 Introduction

This chapter examines Elijah Mwangale early life from the time of his birth in 1939 up to the time he completed college life in 1966. In order to achieve that goal, the chapter, particularly examines his birth, his traditional as well as his Christian heritage. In addition, the chapter considers his primary education, initiation, secondary school education, and finally his college education. The chapter ends with an examination of his marriage to his first wife Janet Allen. It also examines his marriage to his second wife, Salome, later in his life. Particularly important, is the chapter’s examination of how various aspects of his early life impacted on his career as a Member of Parliament and Cabinet Minister.

2.2 Birth

Elijah Wasike Mwangale was born in 1939, at Matili village, in today’s Kimilili-Bungoma District, to a Quaker (Friends) couple, Philipo Mwangale and Zipporah Muboka Mwangale.\(^{35}\) He was the fourth born in a family of 17 children all born and raised by one Mother.\(^{36}\) This family was a large one by any standards. Philipo Mwangale being a staunch Christian lived by the church’s teaching that a good Christian should not marry more than one wife. However, in keeping with the African tradition, he needed to raise a large family. He married Zipporah Muboka after the death of his first wife, Musieni Naliaka. With Zipporah Muboka he was able to live the two dreams: the Christian dream of marrying only one wife at a time and the Traditional African one of raising a large family.

Elijah Mwangale was baptized Elijah as the Quaker church demanded. He was also named Wasike following the happening at the time he was born. The period 1930-

\(^{36}\) Ibid. P.14.
1939 witnessed serious invasion of the western region of Kenya by locust, which destroyed anything on their way in form of crops and plants, leaving behind famine and poverty. The Bukusu name for locust is “chisike” and therefore, many people born in 1930s were named Wasike in cases of males and Nasike in cases of females. It was therefore in respect to this that Elijah acquired his second name, Wasike.

The third name Mwangale was a family name which he inherited from his father and which had been passed down from generation to generation. Mwangale’s father was the fifth in the genealogy of the Basombi clan to carry the name Mwangale. The name is first traced to Mwangale wa Sikenye who lived in Butumba in Uganda. The second Mwangale was Mwangale wa Kubende who also lived in Butamba in Uganda. It was from this second Mwangale that Basombi broke and moved into Kenya. The third Mwangale lived in Kenya and gave rise to four boys: Masibo, Matakho, Wamalwa, and Makokha, who in turn gave rise to various Basombi houses in Bungoma today. Matakho gave birth to Lusweti, Makhapila and Wekhomba and it was Lusweti who gave birth to Philip Mwangale (Elijah’s father) from whom Elijah inherited the name Mwangale.

2.2.1 Elijah Mwangale’s Traditional African Heritage.

The Basombi clan, from which Elijah hailed, is a closely knit community, proud of its heritage and success at present and in the past. Basombi belong to a cluster of “Banabayi” who claim the oath of “Nabayi wa Banyole”. Basombi are the leaders of Banabayi, a cluster that comprises six subclans and are said to have been entrusted with the function of looking after the welfare of the Bukusu. This function was at play during the migration and settlement of the Bukusu, in Western Kenya, during which period, Basombi formed the advance group which pioneered new places that the Bukusu intended to settle. Their role, in this respect, was to cleanse the new places and to plant “Chisokho” (traditional herbs) which had the effect of pushing the enemies away from the area for settlement. The area, that is today referred to as Bungoma and part of Busia county was initially settled by such groups as the Kalenjin.

37 Oral Interview, Focused group discussion, Council of Basombi Elders, Interview, June 6th, 2015.
38 Oral Interview, Council of Elders, focused group discussion, June 6th, 2015, Matili.
39 Ibid.
and the Masai and it was through the use of “Chisokho” and warfare that the original settlers were eventually displaced.\(^{40}\)

Basombi also acted as judges through threat to unleash hailstones. In the event that one had committed a crime one was brought before Basombi who in turn threatened to unleash hailstones on his homestead.\(^{41}\) Such threats, more often than not, led to confessions and compensation by the culprit to avoid punishment. As proof that Basombi could unleash hailstone, the elders gave an example of Lukowa Titi who was arrested, and taken to the Provincial Commissioner in Kakamega during the colonial times on charges of practicing witchcraft. However, he denied the charge and pointed out that he only had powers to control hailstones. To demonstrate his powers he requested for permission, wondered into Kakamega forest and after a short while, clouds gathered and hailstones dropped to the ground in large amounts without the accompaniment of rain.

Basombi were also priests who prayed for the Bukusu during the period of migration and settlement. They were professional singers and musicians as well as great architects. They built Forts which still stand up to today. One such Fort is said to be at Ebunyala, built by Basombi when they stayed briefly at that part of western. So strong is the belief in this traditional grafts that they claim that even today those Basombi students that pursue related courses in architecture and medicine in universities are never referred.\(^{42}\)

To a casual observer this rich heritage in Basombi tradition had very little bearing on Elijah Mwangale career and public life since he was brought up in a strict Christian family. However, a closer scrutiny of Mwangale’s life and work, go along way in showing that traditional life had rubbed up on him. Elijah underwent traditional circumcision like any other Bukusu boy. As a leader, Elijah employed clever use of proverbs, sayings and stories to drive home his argument with great ease. Finally,

\(^{40}\) Ibid.
\(^{41}\) Ibid.
\(^{42}\) Council of Elders, Op cit.
many of the members of his Basombi clan believed that he was a prophet and a reincarnation, from the past, of their great worrior, Lusweti.43

2.2.2 Elijah Mwangale’s Christian Heritage
The biggest influence in Elijah Mwangale’s life was the Quaker Church. Basombi elders pointed out that the father of Philip Mwangale, Lusweti, died when Philip and his siblings were still very young.44 According to them, Lusweti had been chosen chief by the colonial government during the period of colonial establishment. He was in charge of Webuye area. He died early not long before his first born child was circumcised. It was then that, Lusweti’s brother, Makhapila took over the raising of his brother’s children. Makhapila, a disciplinarian and one who had taken to the Quaker church, along with other Basombi families, took his children, as well as Philip Mwangale, to school in Lugulu. He also helped them to acquire a lot of land by pushing other people away using “Chisokho” before he died in 1949.

The above version given by Basombi elders differs from the view presented by Rosemary Mwangale who pointed out that her father was adopted by the Quaker Church when he was about five years and was brought up by the Church45. This version seems to tally with the version presented by Misigo Amatsimbi in his Ph.D thesis in which he analyzed various ways in which the Friends Church acquired early converts.46 In his thesis, Misigo points out three ways through which the Church acquired its early converts. He argues that initially, despite repeated efforts, the missionaries could not induce non-employees to attend classes. He adds that the missionaries’ response to this indifference was to encourage workers to settle their families at the station in return for the use of the station’s farm land. In this way, he argues, the Friends hoped to collect a group of children for classes and make the youngsters the nucleus of a new Christian community. Besides, he also points out that the Vihiga station experimented with orphans as another means of obtaining an active audience to work with and that at first, 15 orphans were enrolled in the station’s

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Oral interview, Rosemary Mwangale, May 14th 2015.
The idea of recruiting orphans seems to have been true at the Lugulu station as well. According to Rosemary Mwangale, Philip Mwangale who was an orphan was adopted by the Church at a tender age and was trained first at Lugulu and later at Kaimos.48

According to Misigo Amatsimbi, the Friends African Mission (FAM) missionaries also made a major contribution to the African education by their insistence that girls, as well as boys should have the same privilege of classroom instruction.49 He points out that in the Luhyia tradition set up, women and children were always considered as objects and not subjects. However, he says the FAM missionaries viewed women as subjects. He points out that this new thinking espoused that women should be given access to many privileges previously denied them, for example, the right to choose a husband.50 It was in this respect that Ziporah Muboka had the opportunity to attend classes in the Lugulu Friends Mission. Ziporah was from a Vangachi clan of the Tachoni. Her father was Sarai from the larger Murumba family. Philip Mwangale and Ziporah Muboka met while in Lugulu and the two married through a wedding in 1928.51

How then did The Friends African Mission (FAM) come to play such a very important role in evangelization in Western Kenya? M. Amatsimbi and W. Kiai have given a vivid description of how this came to be. They have pointed out that The FAM was the first Christian mission to establish a station in western Kenya, at Kaimosi, in 1902, among the Tiriki.52 They add that there was dramatic outburst of mission energies as the Uganda Railway and the newly established colonial administration, opened up the previously inaccessible interior of Kenya. FAM was one of the missionary bodies that followed the railway to the interior. The pioneer FAM missionaries in Kenya were Willis Hotchkiss, Arthur Chilson and Elisha. The


48 Oral Interview, Rosemary Mwangale, May 14th, 2016, Kiminini.

49 H. M. Amatsimbi, Op cit. p. 94.


51 Oral interview, Rosemary Mwangale, May 14th, 2015. (see photograph at the end of chapter one)

pioneer Missionaries selected Kaimosi as a possible location for their mission for various reasons including potential water power which would operate a water mill, adequate supply of timber and ample land for farming. Finally, the local people were termed as friendly and receptive people. With these practical consideration in mind, the missionaries chose Kaimosi to become the centre of FAM and the future East African yearly Meeting of Friends (EAYM). After the establishment of the above industrial mission, the Friends Missionaries began to expand through the establishment of new stations in western Kenya. By 1918, FAM had established stations at Vihiga among the Maragoli, Lihanda among the Isukha and Idakho, Lugulu among the Bukusu and Tachoni and Malava among the Kabras. 53

In 1913, Lugulu was preferred for opening of a mission station because it is located on a higher ground. 54 The settlement at Lugulu bore fruits because after the first few months, the natives who were Bukusu and Tachoni, were beginning to benefit from the work of the missionaries. In a few months, a total of one hundred and fifteen people had been treated of different diseases and the missionaries had had twelve church services with about sixty followers at the last of their meetings. These activities gave a very good impression to the communities around Lugulu. In September 1914, Rev. Jefferson W. Ford and his wife arrived in Kaimosi. He was to move to Lugulu to expand missionary work among the Bukusu, Tachoni and in the area of the settlers as far as Kabuyefwe. Jefferson Ford moved to Lugulu to carry out all the wonderful work he did in 1915. There were many converts that were trained in Lugulu including Andrew Wanami, Samson Wekesa, Jacob Sukura, Ayub Lukorito, Simon Marango, Andrew Chemiati, Benjamin Chesongali Muundi, Philip Siambi, Zakayo Wasike and Agusta Mecca. Jefferson Ford opened other stations in Bokoli, Teremi and Chwele to train old people just like in Lugulu.

Philip Mwangale and many other converts from the Bukusu, Tachoni, and Sabaot were among those trained in Lugulu Mission station under Jefferson Ford. 55 He

55 Oral Interview, Basombi Council of Elders, Focused Group Discussions, 7/06/2015, Kimilili.
attended the first two classes in Lugulu but later proceeded to Kaimosi mission for five years where he trained as a teacher and a priest. After the training, he was first posted to Matili Village School as a teacher and priest. He later went to the settlement schemes where he worked as a “Nyabara” or supervisor on a firm owned by Captain Armlice in present day Saboti. He also served as teacher and a priest at the same time. Returning from the settlement scheme, he continued serving as a priest in the Friends Church under Ford. The Quaker Church therefore played an important role in training Philip Mwangale as a teacher, a priest as well as an entrepreneur through the Industrial Education scheme. These skills propelled Philip Mwangale into, not only, the leadership of the Quaker Church but also into the leadership of the Land Tribunal, as well as helping him to emerge as an economic elite as early as in the 1930s.

Philip Mwangale, besides his religious works also served the colonial government as vice-chairman of the African Land Tribunal Court. He started his work at Kamtiong and was later transferred to Kimilili and then to Kabuchai where he served as the Vice-President of the court. The colonial government operated two legal systems. Africans who had land disputes would go before the African Court for arbitration. The position of the court date back to, as early as, 1920s. This position was given to him by virtue of his position in the church. The colonial government wanted somebody incorruptible and trustworthy and his religious background placed him above many others who lacked such background.

H.M. Amatsimbi and W. Kiai have pointed out that Philip Mwangale and other friends converts used their knowledge gained from the settlement schemes and from Industrial Education offered in the church to start their own semi-mechanized farming that they had learned on the European farms. They were among the first to plant the new maize seeds and adopted the techniques impressed upon them by the administrative and agricultural officers. They consciously aimed at expanding their production for sale in order to purchase new consumer goods, to improve their homes.

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56 Council of Basombi Elders, Op cit.
57 B. Wekesa, The Road Not Taken, A biography of Wamalwa Kijana Nairobi, Oakland Media Services Ltd, 2004, P.41
and meet new expenses, such as school fees and church dues. Consequently theirs became a location of large-scale and commercial maize farming in 1930s.

H.M. Amatsimbi and W. Kiai also argue that Philip Mwangale and other friend’s converts used their church contacts to develop various opportunities. Together with others like Peter Wanyama, Zakayo Wasike, Peter Makari, Aarone Wakhungu, Yohana Masambu and Andrea Chemiati, they became the first African Friends to mechanize their farms, through the use of animal-pulled iron plough. According to the two the Bukusu, Tachoni and Kabras farmers, led by friends such as Philip Mwangale and Zacharia Makhalang’ang’a, respectively, also acted on their own initiative to develop an effective bulk-marketing system and campaigned for better prices for their produce. At the time, Africans were not allowed to sell maize directly to Europeans or to the government. They were, therefore, forced to sell their produce through Asian middlemen, who were often unscrupulous in their business methods, underpricing African goods.

The government, anxious to encourage African maize production, in order to offset the deficiencies caused by the slump (due to the depression of 1930s) in settler production of Maize, agreed to increase the price of maize per bag to African farmers from 90 cents to Kshs2.50 in 1930, after the deduction of the cost of bags and transportation. The government also allowed Africans to sell their maize directly to the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA), a settler organization. Consequently, many large scale African farmers joined KFA, at a fee of Sh.200. In addition, the district reports of 1937 indicated that “there are now three Local Natives Councils (LNCs) go-downs in the district at Luanda, Butere and Broderiek falls (webuye). All are now leased to KFA for Shs.700 per annum. The last named was handed over to a native Company of 80 members who are themselves members of KFA.” The native Company, mentioned was formed in 1936 under the leadership of Philip Mwangale. Through Mwangale’s advice, the company pledged to sell its maize solely to the KFA. According to Amatsimbi and Kiai, such developments brought considerable

59 Ibid.
60 H. M. Amasimbi and W. Kiai, Op cit.
61 H.M Amatsimbi and W.Kiai, quoting KNA, DC/NN/1/9,1937:5
prosperity to the new crop of Bukusu, Tachoni and Kabras Christian farmers of the 1930s.

Coming as he did from such a background, it can be argued that, Elijah Mwangale’s background was a privileged one. With that kind of wealth, Elijah, unlike his peers, would not need anything. He would pursue education to any level and would enjoy a headstart in the career of his choice. It was no wonder, therefore that he joined politics so early in his career.

The Friends Church, theretofore, played an outstanding role in the provision of education in western Kenya during the colonial period. The attitude of the Society of Friends towards education was determined by their belief in inner light. Holding as they did that there was something of God in every man, they regarded education (in the broadest sense) as the developing of that divine seed or the fanning into flame of that divine spark. To the friends, therefore education was an intensely religious thing. It meant the training and development of the spiritual life, the liberating of the divine that is within us. The Quakers having had an advantage over the ordinary peasants ensured that the benefits were passed to their children. The elite’s wealth and education ensured that their children would receive a high level of training, which was increasingly becoming necessary if the African were to secure a well-paying job.

It was in this respect that Philip Mwangale, ensured that his children enjoyed a good education. Church membership, not only provided the elite and their children with access to higher education, but also provided them with practical experience in public speaking, administration procedures and behaviour according to new social norms—important skills for holding responsible positions in local governments. For instance in many locations, administrative leaders were recruited from men who had regularly attended mission schools for several years, and since primary education was exclusively in the hands of FAM, education and Christianity became linked.

63 J. M. Neyole, Op cit, P19
2.3 Philip Mwangale’s Family

Philip Mwangale had and raised a large family. The first wife, the late Musieni Naliaka, gave birth to Esther Musamia, Racheal Masasabi and Absolom Wekhomba. However, she died early because of plague which was an incurable disease then. It was then that Philip Mwangale married Zipporah Muboka in 1928. Ziporah was a Tachoni who belonged to a Bangachi clan of the Tachoni. The two had met at the Lugulu Mission and had a church wedding in Lugulu. She gave birth to 17 children which were a large number by any standards. As already pointed out Philip Mwangale wished to live according to the Church’s monogamous tradition by marrying only one wife at a time. However, in keeping with the African tradition of raising large families, he had very many children with Zipporah Muboga. In traditional African society large families were considered a sign of wealth as well as a sort of insurance against bad omen. This was, particularly, so in a world in which there were many incurable diseases at the time.

The first born was Peter Wekhomba who grew to become a magistrate and later joined the National Cereals and Produce Board, finally settling down as a farmer. The second child was Susan Namwacha who married in Kabras but latter settled in Naitiri as a farmer. John Lusweti was the third child. He worked as a District Officer (DO), farmer and preacher with the Elgon religious yearly meetings. Elijah Wasike was the fourth born. Gladys Lumonya was the fifth born and worked with Richardson pharmaceuticals and Consolidated Chemicals before retiring to farming. Mary Nasimiyu was the sixth born and served as, a teacher before retiring to farming in Naitiri. Rosemary Naliaka, the seventh born also served as a teacher. She later worked with Bata Shoe Company, before retiring to her farm at Kiminini.

Richard Makhapila was the eighth born and trained as a chemical engineer. He worked with the Kenya Airport, before retiring to his dairy farm. Wycliffe Basa Mwangale was the nineth born and was a veterinary doctor, who worked with various companies before retiring to his father’s Kikwameti farm, where he runs a successful large scale poultry farm. The tenth born, Alice Were, worked with Panpaper. She later

64 Oral Interview, Rosemary Mwangale, May 14th, 2015.
65 Oral Interview, op cit.
66 Ibid.
worked with Kenya Re-Insurance Company before joining teaching. Rosa Obura, the eleventh born worked as an accountant. She later worked with tourist hotels, but now runs her own private business. Joyce Nekesa, who passed on in the year 2000, worked at Siba Chemicals. She later opened her own computer firm in Westland. The late Joseph Murumba was a businessman who owned his own company that supplied Jomo Kenyatta Airports with lamps. The late James Sinya worked with Kenya breweries, at its Webuye Distribution Centre but later joined Mwangale’s firms. Edwin the last born is an Architect, but is now settled in farming at Mwangale’s Chetambe farm.

That Philip Mwangale’s family was large is something that is not in dispute. What is debatable is the implication of such large family on the growth and development of Elijah Mwangale, in his formative years. Growing up in such a large family might have had far reaching effect on the young Elijah. Surrounded with many other children, it meant that, Elijah Mwangale did not automatically enjoy preferential treatment and that he had to struggle and compete for attention. This was important as it was a good training ground for competition in the public space in days to come. It can also be pointed out that this was a perfect training ground in leadership. This is because, in a large family, one had to exercise leadership at every turn and every occasion- an experience that would come in handy as he climbed the ladder in the public space.

**2.4 Elijah Mwangale’s Early Education.**

Elijah’s Mwangale’s education can be considered in two categories; formal as was provided in the school system and informal as was provided in the homestead setting during occasions such as initiation. Formal education in the larger Bungoma region, was a product, to a larger extend, of the efforts of the Quaker Church. The three primary schools attended by Elijah Mwangale were the product of sustained efforts by the Frends Mission at Lugulu.

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67 Oral interview, Rosemary Mwangale, May, 14th, 2015, Kiminini.

Elijah Mwangale was educated at Matili and Kaptola Primary schools for his lower primary education. The establishment of Matili Primary School had been part of the efforts made by the Lugulu Mission to expand education opportunities to the increasing number of children eager to learn. The effect of the outbreak of the First World War had been to bring many young people to the Mission Station at Lugulu, as learners. The Mission Station became crowded and Jefferson Ford quickly opened other stations for training those who were willing to learn Christianity. It was in this regard that Matili was opened in 1915 as a village school under Stephen Ndong’a. Other schools opened in the same way were, Bokoli under Simon Marango in 1917, Malinda under Matayo Onyakha in 1919, Ndivisi under Yohana Wandabwa in 1922, Chwele under Yohana Wafula in 1918, Chesamisi under Zackayo Wasike in 1922 and Kimilili under Daniel Amudabi in 1922.

During the time that Elijah attended Matili primary school, it was an elementary school providing instruction for lower primary, up to standard four. Today, it has given birth to Matili Technical College and Matili Secondary School.

Elijah Mwangale, therefore, schooled and mingled with other children of his age at this level. This was an important introductory lesson since he was able to share experiences with children from all walks of life, especially those from poor families. This was significant as it would eventually help create a loyal constituency for him that he would rely on in future when he finally entered politics. He would also learn their needs and expectation that he would attempt to serve once in politics.

Schooling at this level involved routine walking to and from school, both in the morning and during lunch hour when the school would break till the following day. For the remainder of the day Elijah Mwangale would help with chores at home, play or at times roam around. This was important as it afforded him enough time away from school to socialize and grow.

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69 Oral Interview, Op cit.
70 J. M. Neyole, Op cit.
72 Oral Interview, P. Amutalla, former chief and schoolmate, May, 9th, 2015, Kimilili.
He attended class one to class four at Matili Friends (FYM), from where, at the end of a four year period, he sat for the Common Entrance Exam (CEE) in 1950, but since he did not fair on well, he repeated the class at Kaptola Primary School in 1951. From Kaptola, he eventually secured a place at Chesamisi Intermediate School in 1952. He had wanted to join Lugulu Intermediate School but he did not make it.\footnote{Oral Interview, Daughter to Accosta Mecca, May 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 2015, Kimilili North.}

Chesamisi Intermediate School was the equivalent of upper primary school today. The school had been established in 1922 as a village school under Zackayo Wasike. As has already been noted, this was part of Jefferson Ford’s effort to expand education opportunity from Lugulu Mission Station, to as many youths as was possible at the time. In late 1940s the school underwent a major renovation under the headship of Mackenzie Ndalira, who had trained as a teacher in Maseno. Mark Barasa who had been posted to the school as untrained teacher, remembered the period very vividly.\footnote{Oral Interview, Mark Barasa, Teacher & MP, July, 5\textsuperscript{th} 2015, Chesamisi.} He said that the school which was then mud walled and grass thatched leaked very badly. He therefore, wrote a letter to a white settler, by the name Ruid Ganz, for assistance in renovating the school. He added that Ganz had distinguished himself as a very generous person who sponsored many needy students in the school. All he needed was a letter from the school indicating that a student was penurious. Mark Barasa was not disappointed in his request as Ganz was only too willing to help.

However, a new problem soon cropped up. In 1946, Chief Amtalla in whose area the school lay, convened a “Baraza” in which the whole idea of the renovation of the school was attacked as an evil plan aimed at extending the colonial boundary into the Bukusu Reserve.\footnote{Oral Interview, Op cit.} To avoid conflict with the chief, Mark and Ganz sought permission from Ford, at Lugulu Mission. Ford readily granted it and since the Bukusu trusted him so much, opposition to the planned renovation was suddenly brought to an end. Construction of modern buildings in the school began with Ganz bringing in contractors from Uganda. He also brought in Zaplon Mulati, who had trained in masonry in Kaimosi, to help in building of the school. Cement and tiles were brought in from Tororo in Uganda and bricks were made locally. The ultra-modern building, by the standards of the time, was completed in July 1948 and was officially opened in
September of the same year. These renovations and the excellent performance in the Common Entrance Exam in 1951, led to elevation of Chesamisi to an intermediate status in 1952. It was the first school to attain the intermediate status. Students joined it from both the immediate and distant places such as Chwele, Milo, Bokoli, and Ndivisi. It was a boarding school, but when it started there were no dormitories to house the students and therefore, most of them were housed by neighbours, in the neighbourhood of the school.76

Elijah Mwangale was one of the pioneer students and was housed by Acosta Meka, one of those who had been trained earlier at Lugulu mission and was a teacher at Chesamisi at the time. Accosta Meka, also housed several other students. It was while in Chesamisi Intermediate School that Elijah Mwangale distinguished himself as a great debater. He was a regular participant in school debates. He was also very active at music and games.77 This prowess in school debates might have been the result of several factors. Key among them was Elijah’s Mwangale’s upbringing in a large family. The implication of such upbringing was that a child growing up in such a family was always debating various issues with siblings, hence improving on his debating skills in the process. The second factor could be attributed to the role played by the Quaker Church. The church was instrumental in training its followers, especially the youth, in leadership roles. Such youths grew up confident in their ability to express themselves satisfactorily. Last, Philp Mwangale himself served as a good role model, being a leader both in the church and the Local Native Court.

This ability to debate served as good preparation for his political career where the power of speech was a highly valued asset. As a politician, Elijah came to distinguish himself as a brilliant and dazzling public speaker. He demonstrated his prowess in debate both in parliament and in defence of KANU.

While at Chesamisi, Elijah also distinguished himself as a ring leader who defended the interest of all the other students.78 He would on many occasion be found in the wrong, along with other students that he associated with. During such occasions he

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76 Ibid.
77 Oral Interview, Rose Masinde, Daughter of Acosta Meka, May, 23rd 2015, Kimilili North.
78 Rose Masinde, Op cit.
would be the one to speak on behalf of the other members of the group. He, therefore, gained notoriety as the voice of those found in the wrong with him but who could not defend themselves effectively. This ability was also to prove important in his later career as a Member of Parliament. He also spent most of time as a member of Moi’s Cabinet defending the KANU government. In carrying out his duties, Elijah Mwangale was known for his bravery and unwavering approach to issues that were dear to him. This attitude appears to have taken root during his formative days as a student, particularly during his days at Chesamisi Intermediate School.

However, it was also while at Chesamisi that Elijah Mwangale’s lack of interest in academic work would manifest itself. Elijah Mwangale, according to Rose Masinde, daughter of Acosta Meka who housed Elijah Mwangale, was stubborn. He could not adhere to school rules and many were the times when he could not attend classes. He and other students indulged in leisure activities and could sing such songs like “Simweme” and “Buno Buyansi” as well as play guitar. As a student, Elijah preferred to cross to his mother’s childhood home and to Mzee Petero Wanyama at Lugulu Mission. Petero had joined the mission in 1913 and after finishing his classes as a full convert, had married Esther Namaemba in 1919. He remained at Lugulu Mission hospital as a teacher and priest. He used to stay with most of the young converts that were taking lessons at Lugulu and treated them like they were his own children. Elijah liked to escape school to go and stay with him. On one such occasion his father could not stand it anymore. He went for him, tied him to his bicycle and dragged him, all the way, to school.

Mark Barasa, the headmaster of Chesamisi Intermediate School between 1951 and 1953, did not mince words about Elijah’s conduct at the school. He said that Elijah was a hooligan who could not stay tranquilly in school. According to him, Elijah was never in school during weekends. He could move out with a band and guitars to such far off places such as Kituni, for local dances. On one such occasion, Philip Mwangale traced Elijah Mwangale in Lugulu and dragged him to school. Mark

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79 Ibid.
80 Rose Masinde, Op cit.
81 Oral Interview, Mark Barasa, Teacher, MP, July 5th, 2015.
Barasa, as head master of the school, decided not to punish Elijah himself, but allowed the father to whip him instead.

This incident goes to show that had Philip Mwangale been one to give in to Elijah’s whims, Elijah Mwangale would not have gone far with his education. It was, therefore, through his father’s determined efforts that Elijah Mwangale was finally able to change his negative attitude to education. When he eventually grew fond of education no one would stand in his way in his quest to farther his education. He would eventually, in a remarkable twist of fate, return from America to oust his mentor and teacher, Mark Barasa, from his seat as Member of Parliament for Bungoma East Constituency.

There were occasions when Elijah Mwangale could himself ride a bicycle to school. Former Chief Pwoka Amutalla, related an occasion while returning to school when Elijah gave him a lift, on his bicycle.\(^82\) It is important to note that a bicycle was not something common at the time and the fact that Elijah could ride one to school attests to his social-economic background and status. This shows that Elijah as a young man grew up in relative comfort unlike other children of his time who lived in absolute poverty. As already observed, his father having been among the pioneer convert to the Quaker Church, took full advantage of his position in the church and the community to emerge as one of the early commercial elite. This was important in propelling Elijah and his siblings up the education ladder as well as according them a life of comfort.

### 2.5 Initiation of Elijah Mwangale

Initiation was and still is, a very important rite of passage among the Bukusu. As Elijah became of age he had to be initiated into manhood according to the Bukusu traditions. However, in carrying out this important rite Philip Mwangale would face the dilemma of having to choose between the Bukusu traditions and the Christian one. Among the Bukusu, one cannot transit to manhood unless one had faced a cut.\(^83\) It was therefore a very important period in one’s lifetime. Circumcision especially the

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\(^{82}\) Oral interview, Pwoka amutalla, Former Senior Chief, School Mate, May, 9\(^{th}\) 2015.

\(^{83}\) B.Wekesa, *The Road Not Taken, A biography of Michael Wamalwa Kijana*, Nairobi, Oakland Media services Ltd, 2004, P.49
traditional type was a fairly serious affair among the Bukusu then as it is now. It consisted of a series of rituals that tests the candidate’s capacity for endurance. Among other things the activity involved running around through village with jingle bells to invite friends and relatives to witness the cut. He did that while wearing a slab of freshly slaughtered meat from the uncle and his body was smeared with gut. He then danced overnight while jingling to songs, usually by ecstatic crowds while at the same time wearing extremely smelly offal of a cow and finally being taken to the river the following morning to be smeared all over the body with mud. He is then brought to the homestead early in the morning for the circumcision knife.

Elijah Mwangale was circumcised in 1950 according to the Bukusu traditions. The crowd sang the whole night and early the following morning he was taken to Khamulati River where he was smeared with mud before being brought home for circumcision. The Basombi elders reminisced the whole exercise very vividly. According to them, his father being an elder in the Friends Church had never circumcised any of his children at his own homestead or courtyard. He had always arranged to have them circumcised along with those of the relatives, elsewhere, to avoid condemnation from the church. However, as fate would have it, this time round, the relatives declined and asked him to have his fourth born son circumcised at his own home. He arranged the whole exercise to be carried out at his mother’s courtyard. He provided for everything that was needed and Elijah Mwangale proceeded to invite relatives and danced throughout the night to the day of circumcision. However, in the morning while returning from the river, the crowd became rowdy and decided that they should circumcise the young Elijah Mwangale at his father’s courtyard. Philip Mwangale’s protests that that would tarnish his name in church went unheard. So it came to pass that Elijah Mwangale became the only son of Philip Mwangale to be circumcised at his father’s homestead. The father had always escaped that kind of responsibility hiding under the umbrella of the church.

Why Philip Mwangale chose to circumcise his children at home, albeit at the homes of his relatives, according to Bukusu tradition, when he had the option of taking them to the hospital, as expected of a church elder, is still open to debate. The Church

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84 Oral Interview, Council of Elders, Focused Group Discussion, June, 7th, 2015, Kimilili.
condemned such traditions as ways through which heathen traditions were passed down from generation to generation. In allowing such traditions Philip Mwangale was clearly going against the church’s teachings. However, it can be argued that in allowing his children to undergo the traditional circumcision, Philip Mwangale had found a clever way of seeking acceptance for his children, in a society that valued and treasured the practice. Had he failed to do that, his children would have been vilified and ostracized from the other members of the society. The implication of this would have been that the probability of Elijah Mwangale rising to a position of leadership in the Bukusu society would have been nearly impossible.

2.6 Secondary School Education

Elijah Mwangale sat for his Kenya African Examination in 1955. His lack of interest was reflected in the result that he attained as he did not perform well. Most of his time had been spent on leisure activities. Those students that performed well in the examination at time joined secondary schools such as Maseno, Kakamega, St. Mary’s Yala, or Kaimosi (later Friends School Kamusinga). This was not the case for him. Since he could not secure a secondary school in Kenya, he joined his cousin, Aggrey Kolole in a private school in Uganda, called Kasubi High School. The new school did not have boarding facilities, while Elijah Mwangale had travelled over thinking it offered boarding services. He stayed in the same room, sharing both bedding and utensils, with his cousin Aggrey Sitati till the end of the term.

Kasubi high school did not have many qualified teachers but being so close to Makerere University it had the advantage of attracting Makerere University students to come over and teach them. In addition to being a private high school and without boarding services, it meant that Elijah Mwangale again lived unrestricted lifestyle. He remained in Uganda until he sat for his Junior Secondary Examination (J.S.E) at the end of his form two class. However, he was not happy with his stay in Uganda and with the quality of education offered there. He started looking around for another school in Kenya.

85 Oral Interview, P. Amutalla, former senior Chief, May, 9th, 2015, Kimilili.
86 Oral Interview, A.S.Kolole, cousin and classmate, May, 10th, 2015, Kilili.
While on holiday in Kenya he applied and was admitted to Oswald secondary School in Mombasa.\textsuperscript{87} It was a private school owned by Asians who had started admitting African students at the time. He later invited his cousin Aggrey Sitati to join him in Mombasa. In Oswald secondary school, learning was properly organized with regular Indian teachers. It was in Mombasa that Elijah Mwangale started attending science classes and immediately developed a liking for them. This would turn out as an excellent preparation for his career in Agriculture which required sciences as a foundation. However, students in this new school still faced the problem of housing as the school did not offer boarding services to students. Elijah Mwangale started by staying with relatives, but later moved to the diocese of the Church Mission society. The church eventually helped him and others to get better houses. Elijah Mwangale’s classmates in Mombasa included Barasa B. Cheloti who later worked with the department of lands and a young brother to former minister Burudi Nabwera. Elijah sat for his Cambridge School Certificate Examination in 1961 and attained a division three. He particularly performed well in sciences and this was a big achievement, given that he had started attending science classes in form two. He also did very well in languages. There were nine African students, but he emerged the best amongst them in sciences.\textsuperscript{88}

Elijah’s secondary school education did not come easy. It had taken the father’s intervention for Elijah to remain in Chesamisi Intermediate School to the end. However, since he did not secure a place in any of the then established secondary schools in Kenya, it then took the deep pockets of his father to find him a private school, first in Uganda and later in Mombasa. Since private schools were very expensive, it was only those from privileged background that would manage that kind of fees. This goes to show how Elijah’s privileged background played an important role in his education.

After completion of his fourth form, his father took him to Kaimosi Teachers College to train as a teacher, but Elijah Mwangale was not satisfied. Had he continued along that line he would, probably, have ended up as a school headmaster or as a chief as most of his classmates ended up becoming. He wrote a letter to the government

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{88} A. Kolole, Op cit.
requesting for a different opportunity, arguing that he did not want to become a primary school teacher. He followed it up with inquiries about other institutions but he was discouraged that he did not have the right qualification to join those other institutions. However, he was eventually released from Kaimosi and moved to Egerton Agricultural College for a diploma in agriculture.

2.7 College Education.

Elijah was finally admitted at the Egerton Agricultural College in 1961, to pursue a diploma in agriculture. A colonial institution, Egerton College was founded in 1939 by an English baron, Lord Maurice Egerton of Talton who lived between 1874 and 1958. The Agricultural School was intended to train British soldiers who came to Kenya to practice agriculture. Sir Michael Blundell, then a young man, saw to the success of the project. The ex-soldiers spent some time at the Agricultural school in Njoro, before they were allotted farms on which they practiced commercial farming. For many years, the Agricultural School was exclusively for white male only. Although Lord Egerton was philanthropic and had many programmes for the youth in Krutsford, his hometown in Manchester, England, he was something of a misogynist (a woman hater). He therefore, ensured that married men who were admitted to his school left their wives in Nakuru. Initially, no African was admitted to the school. The Agricultural School later became a diploma awarding agricultural college but the practice of keeping women out of college was scrapped off by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta when he officiated at the first graduation ceremony in 1963. Among the male only-graduands was Elijah Wasike Mwangale, a student leader and one of three pioneering African students admitted there in 1961. Not only did Kenyatta open the college to women students, he also appointed William Odongo Omamo as the first African principal of Egerton Agricultural College.

Egerton College played an important role in the transformation of Elijah Mwangale. His stay at Egerton witnessed a complete change in his attitude about education as he now fully embraced education. This metamorphosis would see him improve drastically in his academic performance that at the end of his training he emerged among three

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\text{\^{99} Ibid.}\]
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\text{\^{100} C. Wanjala and V. Musebe, } The passing of a political Giant, Unpublished funeral eulogy, P.15.\]
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\text{\^{101} C. Wanjala and V. Musebe, Op cit.}\]
top students, securing himself a scholarship in the staff development programme. In addition, his training in Egerton was fully in line with what he would later do as Minister for Agriculture. This training was also in line with the Friends Church’s training in Agriculture under the Industrial Education Programme aimed at making the recipient self employed. Besides, Elijah also served as a student leader while in Egerton Agricultural College. This was important as it served as a training ground for his future role in leadership, both as a Member of Parliament and Minister.

**2.8 Virginia State University**

In the mid 1960s, Omamo arranged for three of his African students from Egerton to be trained in the United States of America (USA) in order to return to Njoro and teach at his College.\(^92\) He picked Elijah Mwangale, Olumbe Ongoma, who was till his death a leading plant pathologist and Wilson Karua who has been a Professor at Egerton University. In USA, Mwangale studied at Virginia State University. He obtained a Bachelor of Science (BSC) and a Master of Science (MSC) Degrees in Agronomy in the same university. The University College in which he trained specialized in Agriculture, Forestry and Home Economics. He completed his studies in July 1966. “Professor after professor commended my brother” said Wekhomba his elder brother who attended his brother’s graduation ceremony at the Virginia State University.\(^93\)

By successfully completing his bachelors and a master’s degree, Elijah had achieved a task that even the talented and well endowed students at his time only dreamed about. His was therefore no mean achievement. To what then can we attribute this great achievement? His achievement can partly be explained by his background that was greatly influenced by the Quaker Church belief in the inner light. According to the writing of Gerald K. H. there is something of God in every man. They regarded education as the developing of that Divine Spark.\(^94\) It was this high regard for education that escalated a rush for education by the sons of the Quaker Agricultural Elites. It is enlightening to note that most of them trained in agricultural related courses.

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\(^92\) Ibid.

\(^93\) C. Wanjala and V. Musebe, Op cit.

The second explanation of his high achievement may be found in the many opportunities that were abound around the period leading to Kenya’s independence. Many young people were taken to foreign colleges abroad to help in their preparation in order to serve the newly independent nation. Those who were lucky included, Baraka Hussein Obama, Joseph Kamotho, Wangari Mathai, George Saitoti, to mention but a few.  

The third explanation could be found in the excellent example provided by Masinde Muliro. Muliro was an orphan whose parents passed on when he was very young and was literally adopted by the Bukusu Union. His fees was paid by the Catholic Church and the Bukusu community upto Capetown University in South Africa, which he joined in 1949. This was a very high achievement, no wonder it inspired many from the Bungoma district, no less, Elijah Mwangale, who hailed from the same village of Matili, in Kimilili district.

2.9 Marriage and Family Life

It was while in USA that Elijah met and married his first wife Janet Allen of West Virginia in 1966. They were blessed with a son who he named Andrew Sarai (named after his maternal grandfather). Early photographs show that Elijah Mwangale was a caring and loving husband, flanked by his wife and carrying his son on his shoulders. He was diligent and mindful of the health and well-being of his family. The bond between him and his immediate family can be traced during his lifetime. His challenge as a family man came early in his life when he was appointed lecturer at the Egerton College. The government only sent him a lone air ticket for himself. He could not leave his family -wife and young son, behind in the USA. He decided not to travel until he arranged and secured a loan from the British Government to enable him to travel to Kenya with them.

Before her divorce with Elijah Mwangale, Janet seemed to have worked her way into the hearts of Elijah’s siblings and relatives. Many of them spoke very highly of her as

a person who brought the family together. During her stay with Elijah, she urged Elijah to help his siblings. Subsequently, Elijah Mwangale helped to train and fix his siblings in various jobs or in his vast business empire. Rosemary says they really loved Janet as much as she also loved them. During that period Elijah Mwangale is said to have loved her greatly. He gave her a job in his shop in Kitale as a manager and when she retired he bought her ninety two acres of land in Kiminini where she resides today.  

2.9.1 His Second Marriage

In 1986 Elijah Mwangale met and befriended Salome Naliaka and the two got married in 1989. Solome Naliaka is daughter to Lodrick Musaba and Racheal Nekesa both of Webuye. The father came from Babichachi clan of the Bukusu. Their relationship started in 1986 and blossomed through her studies at the University of Nairobi, Faculty of Law, culminating in their marriage in 1989. They were subsequently blessed with three girls: Racheal Busanju in 1990, Angela Muboka in 1993 and finally Eleanor Nelima in 1997.

Despite his busy schedule and problem of the electorate which demanded his attention, one would see him involved in the homework of his children. Salome said that their relationship started while she was still a student at the University of Nairobi, pursuing a degree in law. She said that whenever she wanted to see him, she would move to one of the university telephone booths to call him and he would come or a date would be set. She added that Mwangale was one never to shun controversy and never feared being seen with her. On one occasion he walked into the halls of residence accompanied by his bodyguards, causing some of her roommates to scamper, not knowing what to do. The roommates assumed that Mwanagale was a good member of parliament who cared for his constituents to the extent that he visited them in their halls of residence. However, they were all amused when they later discovered that the two had a serious relationship.

98 Oral Interview, Rosemary Mwangale, May, 14th 2015.
99 Oral Interview, Salome Mwangale, Wife, June 16th 2015, Webuye
100 Oral Interview, Opct.
Concerning the harambee spirit, Solome said that her husband was serious convert. She added that he participated in all manner of fund raising. According to her, because of the amount he donated Elijah did not use wallets to carry money. Instead he carried a briefcase full of money. She also participated in harambees where represented Mwangale. She carried lots of money which she dished out to the harambees that she attended. She helped fund raise for schools, women groups and churches in Webuye.\textsuperscript{101}

She also narrated of a time when Mwangale took her abroad while she was still a student. She said he took her first to United Kingdom and later to the USA. Of the marriage, she said he was a good father and husband.\textsuperscript{102} However close family members were not happy with her as they were used to Janet. Rosemary Mwangale said that Salome was responsible for the divorce between Janet (first wife) and Elijah Mwangale. She was opposed to the Marriage from the beginning leading to her relationship with Mwangale suffering.\textsuperscript{103} Wycliffe Mwangale said that their new sister in-law was not one to bring Mwangale close to relatives. They, therefore, decided to keep off and continued to do so even after their brother past on.

Elijah Mwangale’s second marriage might have come as a surprise to many. Elijah Mwangale coming from such strict religious background, as he did, many expected him to remain monogamous. However, coming partly from a traditional African background, where large families were cherished, sticking to a monogamous marriage was a tall order, and was not assured. Having worked tirelessly to amass a lot wealth, the question of who would inherit it once he was gone must have bothered him greatly. It was no wonder, then that he surprised both friends and foe by marrying again, when he was well into his fifties.

Elijah Mwangale had only one child, Andrew Sarai, with his first wife, Janet Allen. Solome gave birth to three children, Racheal Busanju in 1990, Angela Muboka in 1993, and finally Eleanor Nelima in 1997. However, during Mwangale’s funeral additional nine children were presented as Mwangale’s children. The family in turn

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{103} Oral Interview, Rosemary Mwangale, May, 14\textsuperscript{th}, 2015, Kiminini.
recognized them, but as to whether they had a share of his fortune is not clear, as only Sarai and the second wife are mentioned as beneficiaries.\footnote{104 Oral Interview, Basombi Council of Elders, Focused group discussion, June 2015, Matili.}

\textbf{2.10 Conclusion}

The chapter set out to examine Elijah’s Mwangale’s early life and how it impacted on his later career. It established a very close correlation between some aspects Elijah’s Mwangale’s early life and his career as Member of Parliament and Minister. The chapter, particularly, established that various occurrences and experiences in Elijah’s early life left lifelong imprints in his mind that would help, guide and shape his future life. The Friends Church was such a factor that had far reaching influence on Elijah’s later life. Elijah’s father had been converted and brought up in the church mission at Lugulu and Kaimosi. He later served the church raising to the position of leadership. Following the church’s teaching on protestant ethics, the father was able to emerge as one of the earliest agricultural elites. With such a background the father ensured that his children, Elijah included, would acquire a good education, something that was not available to many African children of his time. Elijah’s taste for business was also, probably, inculcated into him partly from the Quakers teaching and partly inherited from his father’s early hand in business.

Some of his talents and oratory were dveloped and honed during his schooling. He was said to have been a great debater while a student at Chesamisi Intermediate School. These early attempts informed his later prewess in parliamentary debates.

While in school and later at Egerton College, he was said to have developed an interest in advocating for the rights of others. He also acted as a student leader. This background informed his early involvement in radical parliamentary debates, joining as he did, such populist of the time as J.M Kariuki and Martin Shikuku.

In his early days as a student he schooled in Indian schools, especially Oswald Secondary School in Mombasa. This might have influenced his later relationship with Asian families with whom he later ventured in business. He was, particularly, very close to the Asian founders of Pan African Paper Mill.
His American education greatly affected his attitudes, debates and work in parliament. In arguing that, the A-level classes were useless, a waste of money and unnecessary hurdle to University education, he was probably influenced by his American background which did not have A-level classes. In addition, while chairing the Parliamentary Probe Committee on the assassination of J. M Kariuki, Mwangale was strongly influenced by the happenings in America at the time. The american educated Mwangale viewed the probe committee, which he chaired in 1975, in similar vein as the congressional committees that were set up in the early 1970s to probe the scandals such as the watergate scandal that ruined president Richard Nixon second term and reinforced the theory of the second term curse for American presidents.

Though Elijah Mwangale was not brought up strictly in the traditional African style, a few practices might have rubbed on him and influenced his future career. The fact that he was initiated in the Bukusu traditional style and allowed to interact freely with those others of his clan and community, both in school and at home, helped him understand and appreciate those he was later to lead. The language, the proverbs and stories that he would later use in his political life were probably acquired this way. In addition, the Basombi clan is said to have produced outstanding leaders and warriors, that led the Bukusu at one time or another. Such leaders included Sikenye wa Mwangale, Basa, Mwangale wa Khane, and the great warrior Lusweti. During the colonial times Basombi are said to have produced chiefs such as Wekhomba, Mutoro, Kolole and Kere. The elders believed and felt that Mwangale’s leadership was part of a continuation from the past. In fact they argued that there was a prophecy about Elijah Mwangale to the effect that he would grow into a great leader.
Wedding photograph of Philip Mwangale and Zipporah Muboka taken in 1928. 
Source: Bassa Mwangale’s Family album.

Elijah and wife with daughters Rachael, Angela, and Eleanor. Source: The Passing of a Political Giant, Funeral Eulogy, P.17.

Andrew Sarai, Elijah’s son. Source: Bassa Mwangale Family Album.
Elijah addresses students at Friends School Kamusinga. Source: Former Chief Amtalla Family Album.

Previous: Elijah and founders of Panpaper. Source: Bassa Mwangale's Family Album.
Mama Zipporah Muboka and grandchildren. Source: Bassa Mwangale’s Family Album.

Andrew Sarai, Moi and Sarai’s Wife. Source: Bassa Mwangale’s Family Album.
“I believe firmly that substituting Kamau for Smith, Odongo for Jones and Kiplangat for Keith, does not solve what the gallant fighters of our uhuru considered an imposed and undesirable social injustice.” - J.M Kariuki.\(^{105}\)

**INTRODUCTION**

This chapter set out to examine Elijah Mwangale’s early public life. The Chapter examines Elijah Mwangale’s work as lecturer at Egerton Agricultural College as well as his work as Member of Parliament for Bungoma East Constituency. The period covered in this chapter spans from 1966 to 1978. Besides, the chapter also examines Mwangale’s private life as an entrepreneur. It shows the various businesses that were established by him.

3.1 Elijah Mwangale’s Appointment as a Lecturer in Egerton

Elijah Mwangale returned to Kenya from his studies in the USA in 1966. He had been offered a job in Egerton while still in the USA. On his arrival therefore, he was appointed lecturer at Egerton College on 24\(^{th}\) November 1966. He initially joined the department of Economics but later switched to Chemistry. He was confirmed as a lecturer at the Egerton Agriculture College on the 1\(^{st}\) of July 1967. He later returned to Virginia State University in his later life to receive his honorary doctorate (Honoris Causa). The late Sir Michael Blundell, who was the chairman of the Board of Governors for Egerton Agricultural College during Mwangale’s time as lecturer, described him as a trouble-shooter. He said that Elijah Mwangale always wanted to lead his lecturers into striking.\(^{106}\) Elijah’s problem with those in leadership seems to have been carried over from his early days as a student at Chesamisi Intermediate School. He remained in Egerton until 1969 when he was persuaded to join politics.

3.2 Mwangale in Parliament

In 1969, Elijah Mwangale resigned his job as a lecturer at Egerton College to contest for the Bungoma East Parliamentary Seat, which was then occupied by Mark Barasa.

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Mark Barasa was Elijah Mwangale’s teacher at Chesamisi Intermediate School. Mark Barasa had been the representative of Bungoma East Constituency in the first Parliament from 1963-1969 on a KANU ticket. The first Parliament was extended to give time to the Members of the Senate, who had been merged with the Lower House, to acclimatize. Mark Barasa was said not to have been articulate on issues facing the people of Bungoma East Constituency and therefore, rarely spoke in Parliament. On one occasion when President Kenyatta visited the Constituency, the President is said to have failed to acknowledge him as one among members of parliament accompanying him. Barasa could not give a welcoming speech to the president on that occasion.

The above position was dismissed by Mark Barasa himself. He argued that he effectively represented the people of Bungoma East Constituency, adding that most of the development projects in the constituency were initiated by him because of his association with KANU, at a time when Western region was predominantly KADU. He sited the introduction of Chesamisi High School in 1964 and Pan African Paper Mill in 1969 as some of the projects introduced during his time. However, his argument was not shared by many people in the constituency.

After one term of Mark Barasa’s representation, Masinde Muliro, the defacto leader of the region, started searching for a suitable replacement and eventually settled on Elijah Mwangale. Elijah Mwangale provided the promise of a young, well-educated and energetic leader. Muliro worked with him and introduced him in the campaigns as a helper and one who could do many things for the people of Bungoma East Constituency.

According to Chris Wanjala and Vitalis Musebe, in their unpublished funeral eulogy entitled, *The Passing of a Political Giant*, Elijah Mwangale tendered his resignation, as a lecturer at Egerton College, on 31st October 1969, to contest the Bungoma East Constituency. According to them, Wekhomba, Elijah Mwangale’s elder brother,

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108 Oral Interview, F.M.Munyakho, May, 9th, 2015, Kimiliili.
109 Oral Interview, Mark Barasa, Teacher, MP, July 5th, 2015.
110 Ibid.
claims credit for leading the way into politics for his youngest sibling by encouraging him to leave his post at the college to come and join politics. “Some “wazees” had approached me and wanted me to go into parliamentary politics, but I was not keen myself and looked around and saw no one else suitable but my brother. I called him from Egerton and urged him to join politics. He was not proficient in Kiswahili. But I can assure you that by the time of his death, my brother was one of the most fluent Kiswahili speakers among the Kenyan politicians,” he observed.111

Elijah Wasike Mwangale made his political debut in a style of his own.112 They argue that tall, charismatic, and forceful, Mwangale literally forced his way to the August house in 1969 at a tender age of 29 years. Wearing a neat burgeoning beard, Mwangale’s entry in Kimilili, then called Bungoma East Constituency of Bungoma District, caused a political stampede. Smoking from an elegant and dummy pipe and carrying a heavy decorated and glittering walking stick, Mwangale became an instant hit on the campaign platform. Within days of arrival on the campaign trail, he had already earned himself his first nickname. He became Bwana” Kiko” (Pipe Smoker). He assaulted the imagination of the electorate with the words, “Mpende msipende, Kiko atainingia bunge.”113 Take it or leave it, Kiko will go to parliament, the statement reads in English.

Elijah mesmerized the Bungoma East voters with his oratory. From Webuye to Yalusi, from Brigadier to Kamukuywa River, Mwangale excited the voters as he hunted for his first votes. He was a real contrast to the then incumbent Mark Barasa Katenya whose academic credentials and mastery of the art of persuasion could not match those of the maverick from Egerton College. For a long time the electorate did not know Elijah Mwangale’s real name. They simply referred to him as “Kiko” and memorized his electorate symbol as “Simba.” His robust voice that burst the seams of the microphones, his sophistication, urbaneness and ability to combine Lubukusu, Kiswahili and English on the platform were unmatched.114

112 Ibid, P.20
113 Ibid, P.20
114 C. Wanjala and V. Musebe, Op cit.
Those who still remember that campaign say he came determined not to just win but to do so convincingly and so he did.\textsuperscript{115} Circumstances prevailing in the constituency played a great deal in Mwangale’s overwhelming victory of that year. He came at the time when the voters were still smarting from the exit of the legendary Luhya political titan, in the person of the late Henry Pius Masinde Muliro, who had shifted his political base to Kitale East in Trans Nzoia district of the Rift Valley province. But stepping into Muliro’s shoes turned out to be monumental task for Mark Barasa such that, by the end of of his single and lackluster term in 1969, the constituency was already disillusioned with his performance and were subsequently scouting out for an alternative for Barasa. Among those approached to contest the seat happened to be Mwangale’s elder brother, Peter Wekhomba who had already made for himself a name as being among few African rally drivers. But Wekhomba did not have the urge for politics and he together with two of Mwangale’s cousins, Jackson Musombi and John Mafunga, prevailed upon young Mwangale to run. Their choice was not a disappointment as Mwangale turned out to offer that alternative voters were looking for and they were soon dancing to his youthful and more attractive political tune. From the word go, Mwangale made it known that he was going for nothing short of victory.\textsuperscript{116}

During the ensuing election which was held in 1969, Elijah Mwangale easily won on his first attempt. He polled 9,907 votes as opposed to the runners-up, Peter N. Sifuma who polled 4,018 votes. Barasa came in fourth in a seven-man fight with a paltry 2,885 votes. This victory earned Mwangale a slot as one of the members of the second parliament of Kenya running from 1969 to 1974.\textsuperscript{117}

In electing Mwangale to parliament the people of Kimilili East got more than they had bargained for. Whereas Mark Barasa had been diminutive, Elijah Mwangale was flamboyant, whereas Mark Barasa had been inarticulate, Elijah Mwangale would emerge as fluent and a great debator, whereas Mark Barasa had been lowly educated, Mwangale had all the advantages of high education with a Masters of Science to boost, and finally, whereas Mark Barasa had been an introvert, Mwangale emerged as

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, P.22.

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.

daring and could take any bull by its horns. These qualities would catapult Mwangale not only into regional politics but also into national politics, where he would loom high and tread like a colossus for the next three decades. During his stint in the second parliament, though he remained a backbencher, Mwangale established himself as a fearless legislator, who never shied away from treading on the toes of powerful front benchers.\textsuperscript{118}

In carrying out his function as a legislator, Mwangale was brave and spoke his mind above being a tactician. His contribution was well researched as at times it was arrived at through consensus with other senior politicians from Western Province. Such politicians included Masinde Muliro, Burudi Nabwera, Peter Kibisu and Martin Shikuku. Together they agreed on which position to take in the subsequent debates in parliament. Such debates, therefore, reflected regional interest. Mwangale also joined other fiery politicians from other parts of the country and together they championed for issues that were of national importance. Such debates, more often than not, were mature and did not dwell on petty issues as is the case at present. Other nationalists with whom Mwangale joined hands in national debates included Grace Onyongo, George Anyona, Juma Boy, J.M Kariuki, Dr. Muriuki, Martin Shikuku, and Seroney.\textsuperscript{119} In parliament Mwangale tackled wide ranging issues, which can be collectively grouped into economic, social and political issues.

\textbf{3.3 Articulation of Social Issues.}

Social issues formed part of the issues at the heart of Mwangale’s contribution in parliament. Foremost were the issues on education, which Mwangale sought to tackle both at national level and at the constituency.

\textbf{3.3.1 Basic Education}

Elijah Mwangale was critical about the structure of the old system of education, the 7-4-2-3 system. The system meant that a student had to spend seven years in primary school, four years in secondary school, two years in high school and finally three years in the university. According to the assistant Minister of Education at the time, higher school certificate classes in some of the Kenya’s secondary schools were necessary as a source of high level manpower and the government would not at that


\textsuperscript{119} Oral Interview, Hon. B.Nabwera, MP, Minister, KANU Secretary General, May, 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2015, Kiminini.
time accept suggestions that the two classes be abolished.\textsuperscript{120} Arguing on the same subject, Mwangale said that he had come to the conclusion that the two classes were unnecessary and a time wasting exercise. According to him, the classes were nothing, but screening camps where selection for university entry was coupled with a lot of nepotism and brotherisation. He argued that the £600,000 that was spent on the two classes would comfortably go along way in helping destitute children.\textsuperscript{121} While moving a motion on reforms at the University of Nairobi, Mwangale also pointed out that there was no point in having Higher School Certificate. He argued that if Kenya could get rid of Higher School Certificate, it could have a lot of students going to the university.\textsuperscript{122}

These were some of the debates that characterized the dialogue on the structure of education in Kenya prior to the changes that would come in 1980s. During the 1980s two major changes occurred in the education system. The government replaced the 7-4-2-3 school system with the 8-4-4 education system. Although the scholars took time out to investigate the backlash of the change, one effect that was observed immediately was the worrying drop in the quality of Education.\textsuperscript{123} The extent to which the introduction of the new education system and the over-stretching of available education resources may have adversely influenced education quality would not be established immediately. However, among the first of the 8-4-4 education system first casualties were 75 percent of the second year engineering students at the University of Nairobi, who, during the 1992/93 academic year, failed their examinations and were discontinued, forced to repeat or made to sit supplementary examinations. A select committee set up to probe the faculty’s poor results reported that there was little communication between the students and their lecturers. In class, the report noted, most students were found to be passive listeners, they neither asked nor answered questions posed by lecturers, and had a poor background in Mathematics, which was an essential prerequisite in solving engineering problems.

\textsuperscript{120} Nation Reporter, \textit{Saturday Nation}, Government Opposes Abolition of Forms v and vi, February 27, 1971, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} The National Assembly Official Report, 5\textsuperscript{th} March, 1971, P.476.
Under the terminal theory, dropouts of a particular level were expected to use knowledge and skills learnt from the school system to earn a living. Primary school leavers were expected to acquire skills in carpentry, metal work and entrepreneurship as tools for self-reliance. In other levels of schooling as well, the objective was to provide less academic, more practical education, which would be more appropriate in the lives of the students and their communities. But the result of the system bore significantly different results from the projects as many graduates of primary and secondary schools lacked the real skills to use outside of the classroom environment. Unlike their predecessors who underwent a curriculum targeted at acquiring knowledge, the 8-4-4 lot, neither received enough of the practical skills nor the despised remembering-of-facts education.

3.3.2 University Education

Regarding University education, Mwangale gave it his best efforts, probably because he had worked in one such institution as a lecturer. He personally moved a motion to reform the administration of the University of Nairobi in order to eradicate inefficiency and poor administration. He particularly, moved a motion to dissolve the then University Council and to appoint a new one with membership from all provinces. He wanted a commission formed to inquire into the affairs of the university with a view of making recommendations for its smooth and efficient running. He also moved to have more consistuent colleges which would be geographically dispersed throughout the republic. He argued that from his experience of having been in a University, he knew that the University of Nairobi at that time was young. Having been curved out of a technical institution, its physical as well as academic development was still in a youthful stage and could not qualify as a university as such. He pointed out that the university suffered from various angles. It had no campuses and could not develop as a monolithic institution. According to him, the institution contained all the faculties and all the departments in one whole unit; as a result of which the university was scattered all over the place.

Mwangale also suggested that the Minister of Education and the President should form an arbitration committee or commission to look into how Kenyans would like to

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have their universities to develop and to look into the character of the university. He pointed out that such an undertaking had already taken place in Uganda and that Obote and the President of Tanzania had looked into the whole objectives of the university education.\(^\text{126}\)

He also explored the question of tribalism at the University of Nairobi. He argued that it was difficult to divorce any type of activity, be it administration or anything in Kenya, or perhaps in most African countries, without considering the tribal aspect. He pointed out that though it was usually said that tribalism did not exist in academic institutions, a look at the establishment of the University of Nairobi, revealed that only ten or less out of twenty eight top officers came from other parts of the country. He added that if one looked at the appointment committee, whether it was at the faculty level or administration level, there was an anomaly created deliberately, not by mistake, such that if the choice was to be made, it could easily fall into the trap of tribal emotions.\(^\text{127}\)

Regarding the University of Nairobi Council, he pointed out that he had a list of members as nominated by the President. He revealed that the Chairman of the University Council was appointed on a permanent basis which was inappropriate. The Chairman served the previous college and had been retained to serve the University. He argued that the composition of the council was such that the tribal emotions would easily be introduced in the running of the University affairs. According to him, the Chairman of the Council and the Vice Chancellor of the University of Nairobi should never come from the same community. He advocated for equal representation of people from all parts of the country.\(^\text{128}\)

He pointed out that a look at the methods and the conditions laid down by the various faculties, revealed that the admission policy was fair. However, he argued, that the devil lay in the details. He pointed out that when Dr. Kiano was Minister for Education, many good high schools were established around Nairobi and Central Province and were well equipped. That resulted in unequal performance which in turn

\(^{126}\text{The National Assembly Official Report, Op cit. P.473.}\)

\(^{127}\text{Ibid}\)

\(^{128}\text{Ibid P.474.}\)
impacted negatively on the admission. Finally, still on the University of Nairobi, Mwangale moved a motion to establish the offices and terms of the vice chancellor, the deputy vice chancellor and the Council. This restructuring was meant to check the then escalating problem of tribulation at the university. The growing tribalism seemed to mirror what was happening elsewhere in the Cabinet, civil service and even the military. However, Kenyatta was never repentant over accusations of nepotism and tribalism made against his government. Instead, he defended the Kikuyu priviledges: “Some want to tell us that Kenya belongs to all the people. Granted, I know that much. But I have a question to ask; when we were shedding blood, some languished in prison and some suffering in the forest fighting for Uhuru, where were the bloody others...If you want honey, bear the stings of the bee…”129, he said.

Looking at Mwangale’s argument on the old system of education and his motion to restructure the University of Nairobi, there is no doubt that Mwangale was a major player in the foundation of the education system that Kenya enjoys today. Today, the old system is no more, having been abolished in 1985 and replaced with the 8-4-4 system. The University of Nairobi established various campuses away from the main campus following Mwangale’s argument, and the administration is structured along his argument. The University Act 2012, requires that the top managers of public universities be appointed from different areas to reflect the face of Kenya. This, to a larger extend, reflects Mwangale’s stand on university education. However, the University Act, goes against the expectation of many communities in whose areas universities have been established, who in their narrow and tribal thinking, expect universities to be headed by one of their own.

Mwangale also contributed a lot on academic freedom at the university. He concurred with the minister who had introduced an amendment which provided for academic freedom. However, he cautioned the university administration, professors and students. He pointed out that no rights were given to any organization, institution or individuals without corresponding duties. He said that academic freedom meant that the professors, the students and the administration would take into account the faith of

the parliament in their proper judgments which they made concerning national interests and the integrity of the state.\textsuperscript{130}

However, this pretense and posturing with the academic freedom would not last long. Time would come in the 1980s when the academic staff and students would be harassed, spied on and thrown into jail, exiled or sent underground. According to the system, they had become a pain in the neck that had to be gotten rid of.

Mwangale argued for the establishment of a second university away from the University of Nairobi. According to him, Kenya needed a second university as the University of Nairobi was full. While contributing to the debate on the ministry of education vote, he suggested that Egerton College be expanded and made part of the University of Nairobi because, according to him, it had the necessary facilities.\textsuperscript{131}

It should be pointed out here that university expansion in Kenya has since taken place in three phases resulting into the number of universities increasing to unprecedented levels. According to John Mugon Boit and Lydia Cheruto Kipkoech of Moi University, the first phase fell in the period 1956-1984.\textsuperscript{132} They point out that this was an era of planned and controlled expansion in university education. During this period one institution, the University of Nairobi, dominated the higher education scene in Kenya. According to them, this was the period when the government pursued a policy of Africanizing the civil service by investing in the training of high level skilled manpower. High education was of critical importance in that regard. The fundamental role of the university during that period was seen as the production of educated elite to take up jobs in the civil service including those that were being left by departing expatriate staff following Kenya’s independence in 1963.

According to Boit M. J. and Kipkoech C. L., the second phase of university development took place in the period between 1985 and 1990.\textsuperscript{133} This was the period

\textsuperscript{130}The National Assembly Official Report, University of Nairobi Bill, 29\textsuperscript{th}, July, 1970. P.3161.
\textsuperscript{131}R. Irungu, E. Omori and D. Kariuki, Join Egerton to Nairobi Call, Daily Nation, Wednesday, 11\textsuperscript{th} October, 1978, P.4.
\textsuperscript{133}J. M. Boit and L. C. Kipkoech, Op cit.
when there was unparalleled growth in public university education. In a span of five years (between 1985 and 1990), two universities and two consistent colleges were established. Student enrollment consequently rose to levels far in excess of numbers projected in the University expansion plans in the early 1980s. This growth was unplanned. This second phase, according to them, took place during a critical and challenging period in the evolution of the university system in Kenya. They point out that in early 1986, for example, the universities were closed following a students’ strike and were not reopened until 1987. Consequently, there were no university admissions in the intervening period. When the universities reopened in 1987, they were confronted by unprecedented admission problems. There were two counts of Kenya Certificate of Secondary Examination (KCSE) candidates to be admitted. Mounting public pressure over the long period of closure forced the administration to “bite off more than they could chew”. They argue that two groups of university applicants, the 1986 and 1987 cohorts, who were admitted together in 1987 brought a virtual explosion in admission numbers from 3500 students in 1986 to 8500 students in 1987.

In 1990, another ‘double intake’ occurred following the admission of candidates from the 7-4-2-3 system of education and the new 8-4-4 system. They argue that altogether, the universities admitted 21,450 students bringing total enrollment in the public universities to 41,000 students, comprising of 39,000 undergraduates and 2,000 postgraduates.\(^\text{134}\)

According to Boit and Kipkoech, the universities did not seem to be adequately prepared to handle such a large number of students within the existing infrastructure. It was, therefore, imperative that the government had to provide additional physical facilities to enable the universities to cope with the large number of students already on their footsteps. The victims of the accommodation and teaching space crisis in the public universities were the middle level colleges. The government phased out some of the middle level personal training institutions and turned their facilities over to universities. This decision, they point out, was in a way legitimizing the views of the

\(^{134}\)Ibid.
working party on education and manpower for the next decade and beyond (1988), under the chairmanship of Kamunge.\textsuperscript{135}

The working party had pointed out that the future expansion of university education could be done through the utilization of training and research institutions being allowed to develop as university institutions.\textsuperscript{136} The report argued that some of them had facilities, equipment and personnel capable of offering high quality university education. As a result Moi University took over the former Moi Science Teachers’ College, Siriba Diploma Teachers Training College and Government Training Institute became Maseno University and Egerton University acquired the former Laikipia Teachers Training College. Kenyatta University made use of the facilities of Kasarani International Sports Complex for students’ accommodation and lectures. The University of Nairobi took over physical facilities belonging to a number of government institutions in Nairobi including the Government Secretariat College at Parklands, The Kenya Institute of Administration at Lower Kabete and the Institute of Adult Education at Kikuyu. However, even the additional facilities were unable to accommodate all the students at once. The second double intake admission of 1990 exacerbated the problem of staff shortage facing public universities. This forced universities to recruit staff with lower academic qualifications and part-time lecturers from neighbouring universities.

The third phase of university development, according to them, began in 1991 when the government founded the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University College.\textsuperscript{137} It also introduced a number of policy measures to stabilize, rationalize and control university development. One of the policy measures’ initiatives was that of the introduction, in 1991, of cost-sharing as a measure of cost-recovery in all public universities. The universities were also, for the first time, required to formulate ten-year development plans to guide their physical, academic and staff development programmes.

\textsuperscript{135}J. M. Boit and L. C. Kipkoech, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid, P33-36.
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
3.3.3 Expansion of Education in the Former Western Province.

Mwangale’s impact on education can be traced in things he said, did, opposed or even outrightly omitted to do in his backyard of the former Western Province. Three issues: The Western Institute of Science and Technology, Sang’alo Institute of Science and Technology and Kibabii Teachers College, stand out.

3.3.3.1 Western Institute of Science and Technology College (WECO)

Mwangale’s contribution to education in the larger former Western Province comes to light when one examines the establishment of the Western Institute of Science and Technology (WECO). According to Professor Vincent Simiyu, the college was the brain child of Masinde Muliro who supported it for two main reasons. According to him Muliro saw the project as a Luhyia one and one which served as a focus for Luhyia unity. This was why it was located in Kakamega which was then the headquarters of Western Province.138

Mwangale on the other hand opposed the idea of the college being located in Kakamega. He did this inspite of the fact that Muliro had always supported him. Mwangale wanted the college located in today’s Bungoma County, at Sang’alo. Mwangale argued that Sang’alo had a lot of government land and urged the people of Bungoma to forget about WECO. The debate became personal and even acrimonious, especially between their followers. The side of Muliro eventually won. WECO was established between 1974 and 1975. The college eventually became Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology.139

According to prof. Simiyu there were those who wanted the college located, not in Kakamega but, in Kaimos among the Maragoli. They would later use the same position to oppose the name Masinde Muliro as being ideal for the university. One person who had opposed the location of WECO in Kakamega was the late Joseph Khaoya. During the naming of the university he pointed out that because Muliro had fought hard to mobilize funds for the college, it was only appropriate for the university to be named after him.140

138 Oral Interview, Prof. Vincent Simiyu, University of Nairobi, Nov. 15th, 2016, Nairobi.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
3.3.3.2 Sang’alo College of Science and Technology

Back in Bungoma, Mwangale was in the foreground in pushing for improvement and establishment of more schools and colleges. He specifically pushed for the establishment of Sang’alo institute of Science and Technology.¹⁴¹ He was part of the District Leaders Conference at the Bungoma County Council where the council donated 1000 acres of land for establishment of the college. The meeting was attended by among others, the MP for Bungoma East Elijah Mwangale and MP for Bungoma South J.W Khaoya who was also the Chairman of Bungoma District KANU branch. Addressing the conference, Mwangale warned people to refrain from unnecessary squabbles and join hands for development of the entire province. The conference urged the planning committee to start utilizing the available land.

In 1986 Mwangale invited President Moi to a very successful fund raising which was held at the college. This was to improve and modernize the college. A total of 3.6 million was collected.¹⁴² This was a large some of money considering the living standards of the time. However, today there is very little on the ground to reflect this amount. This raises a moral and economic question as to the value for the money raised in harambees during the Moi era.

It has to be pointed out here that by 1970s, a secondary school level qualification no longer guaranteed employment. Partly in response to this, the early 1970s saw a new education phenomenon; the Harambee Institute of Science and Technology.¹⁴³ Communities across the country decided that, given the increasing need for technical skills and the shortage of places for such study, they should establish vocational institutes of science and technology. In the end, fifteen such Harambee institutes were established, each funded through house-to-house collections, harambees and donations from cooperative societies, trade unions and abroad. Most achieved little, being primarily prestige projects, and only eleven survived into the 1980. As well as doubts over whether local communities could fund such complex projects, the institutes had implication for material identity. They were

¹⁴² Oral Interview, Prof. Vincent Simiyu, Nov. 15th, 2016.
political tools and were restructured on an ethno-regional basis in an open competition between communities for resources. Kenyatta presided over the first fundraising of Murang’a Institute in 1971 and laid the foundation stone for Kiambu Institute in 1974. Kibaki led the fund raising for the Kimathi Institute in Nyeri, while Moi did the same for Rift Valley Institute of Science and Technology. Ramogi Institute of Science and Technology was founded in 1971 and was linked to Luo Union and chaired by politicians. It experienced massive misappropriation of funds.

3.3.3.3 Kibabii Teachers College

According to Prof. Vincent Simiyu, plans to establish a teachers College at Kibabii goes back to 1958. He argues that Kibabii was the earliest catholic institute in the area going back to 1931. By 1950 it was a complex, composed of the lower primary, the intermediate school and the church. He points out that around the same time, Mumias had also established itself including the establishment of ST Peters Teachers College. In 1958 the Catholic Church decided to face out the TTC in Mumias and in its place establish a secondary school. ST Peters College admitted its first form one class in 1959. The TTC was then moved to Kibabii. However, in 1962 Kibabii also became a secondary school and the college became dormant.

He points out that much later the government decided to restart the TTC at Kibabii. However, Mwangale was opposed to this project, arguing that the college should instead be established at Moi Girls Secondary School Kamusinga, where his cousin was the then headmistress. Prof. Simiyu points out that Mwangale did not leave matters at that. He approached the Bishop of the Anglican Church of Kenya (ACK), Bishop Mundia, for support. However, Bishop Mundia declined to intervene, arguing that the idea of a TTC had long been associated with the Catholic Church and that he did not see the reason for interference. All these occurrences do not paint a rosey picture about Mwangale. They depict him as one who embraced regionalism, and marginalization of some areas back at home.

144 Oral Interview, Prof Vincent Simiyu, Nov. 15th, 2016, Nairobi.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
3.3.3.4 Other Projects Associated with Mwangale.

Mwangale was also key in establishment of Harambee Schools in his Kimilili East Constituency.\(^{147}\) Nearly every secondary school in the constituency received donations from Mwangale towards their infrastructural development. Maeni Secondary School had been riddled with many debts. When an Asian businessman was about to auction its property, Mwangale stepped in and cleared the whole debt. However, the school remained on a week footing with very few students until the Kibaki administration introduced the free day secondary school education. The Constituency Development Fund has also done a lot to revive the school. However, part of the problem with the school, in the past, could be attributed to ‘Dini ya Musambwa’ followers, who were anti-western education and fought very much to discourage students from joining it.

Mwangale was instrumental in the development of Moi Girls’ High School.\(^{148}\) His closeness to the senior government officials in the Moi regime was very beneficial to the schools as he could invite them to fundraisings. The procurement of the first school bus was done courtesy of his good relationship with Moi, who donated the bus to the school. Besides Moi, later, Biwott was invited to fundraise for the school’s expansion. However, because of endemic corruption during the reign of Moi, projects started with good intentions failed to reach the intended goals. Much of the money that was raised did not benefit the people who were displaced during the expansion exercise of the school, as many of them have not been compensated up to the present, a period of two and a half decades on.

Other projects in the education sector which Mwangale initiated in the constituency included the refurbishment of Friends’ School Kamusinga, initiation of Matili Village Polytechnic (now technical institute) and Sitabicha Rehabilitation Center for the disabled. All these projects meant that Mwangale left a mark in the education sector in Kimilili Constituency.\(^{149}\)

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\(^{147}\) Oral Interview, Patrick Chaka, Kimilili Constituency KANU Chairman, 4th, June, 2015.

\(^{148}\) Oral Interview, F. Wesonga, Worker Moi Girls Kamusinga, May 9\(^{th}\), 2015, Kimilili.

\(^{149}\) Oral Interview, Oral Interview, P. Amtalla, Former Class Mate and Chief, May 9\(^{th}\), Kimilili.
3.4.0 Health Issues
Elijah Mwangale raised many issues in the health sector that directly affected the common man. The issues he raised touched on Harambee Health Centers, Medical supplies to hospitals, and remuneration to doctors.

3.4.1 Harambee Health Centers
One issue that Mwangale dealt with, in the health sector, was the question of the status of Harambee health centers. Harambee hospitals and health centers had been started by Kenyans with the intention of reducing pressure on government health centers and hospitals. During the construction, the government had assured the people that when the said centers were completed, it was going to provide medicine and other equipment, plus staff. However, on completion, the problem of lack of enough trained medical personnel in the country was not addressed. Health centers which had been built at a very great expense were yet to be utilized since the ministry had not provided staff as required. Mwangale called for a crash programme to train medical personnel to man those harambee health centers which had been built by ‘wananchi’. He clarified that a crash programme did not mean producing people who were not fully trained or were half-baked. A crash programme according to him meant much more intensive course of work involving all areas that were covered by normal medical trainees and because it was intensive, the time period was reduced.

A related issue that Mwangale tackled was one in which the government was taking over the Harambee health centers. He attacked the system where the minister was taking over the Harambee Institutions, purely on some type of consideration, such as through the influence of a good friend of his. He called for change of the system so that things could be done like in the Ministry of Education. According to him, the minister of education had announced that some Harambee Secondary Schools will be taken over each year and there were specific ones for each province. He argued that he would like to have something similar in the Ministry of health; to make sure that Harambee Health Centers were taken over by the government. He was of the view

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151 Ibid, P.188.
that it was unfair to take over all Harambee centers in one particular area just because one happened to be influenced by certain big fellows.

Mwangale, specifically, called for recruitment of young people who had completed their High School Certificate and obtained either Division II or III, many of whom were still on streets.\textsuperscript{152} He added that there were many others who had completed High School Certificate and were still on the streets. According to him, there was still a great deal of wastage of manpower in the country because such people could be utilized in the crash programme or other programmes for that matter. This argument was very noble as it could have partly solved the problem of unemployment for school leavers as well as the problem of inadequate medical personnel. However, the situation has continued to face the health sector to today.

Mwangale brought to the attention of the house the way money was distributed to harambee projects, especially by the charity sweepstake.\textsuperscript{153} He argued that he was saying this because there was a minister in the house who was the chairman of the sweepstake. He was of the opinion that money from the charity sweepstake was pouring to only certain places and he wondered why that was the case.

\textbf{3.4.2 Inadequacy of Medical Supplies in Hospitals.}

Mwangale was up in arms against the inadequacy of medical supplies to hospitals.\textsuperscript{154} He pointed out that an Honorable Member had suggested that there were health centers and hospitals that went without medical supplies because of laziness in the department which supplied these areas; the central supplying office. He revealed that a few months earlier, some people had died in Bungoma Hospital because of lack of blood transfusion equipment. He was of the opinion that it was the job of the Minister, as a politician, to get work done officially in the ministry.

Finally, he raised the issue of the quality of drugs being administered to patients.\textsuperscript{155} He said that there were drugs that were being brought into the market that were injurious to the patients. He wondered whether the country had laboratories where the

\textsuperscript{152} The National Assembly Official Report, Op cit, P.189.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, P.190.
\textsuperscript{154} The National Assembly Official Report, 29\textsuperscript{th} September, 1971.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, P.663.
efficiency of those drugs could be tested medically or chemically. He pointed out that it was wrong for Kenyans to be used as an experimental grounds by foreign firms that brought in all types of tablets in all types of colours. He called for a specialized laboratory to test some of the drugs which were becoming popular in the country.

3.4.3 Renumeration for Doctors.
He addressed himself to the issue of the salaries for doctors.\textsuperscript{156} He said that a doctor was a person that he respected and that he respected even more, his brains because it was not a joke to be one. He believed that many people did not perhaps appreciate what doctors went through to become doctors. He argued that not even half of all the members of parliament could qualify as doctors because, he believed, they did not have the brains to do so. He argued that it was unfair to say that a doctor’s work is a mere service and therefore his salary should not compare with others. According to him, Permanent Secretaries and university lecturers should not earn more than doctors. He called for a salary structure that would incline the country’s doctors to work hard and feel they were serving and they were appreciated. He proposed that a medical doctor in Kenya should earn not less than an undersecretary.

The issue of salaries to the medical staff has remained a thorny issue up to today, with many of the medical staff leaving the country to seek greener pastures elsewhere. However, had these proposals been taken seriously, the country would have been saved from this haemorrhage. Things did not seem to be running properly during the 1960s and 1970s and into the 1980s. This scenario provided a fertile ground for members of parliament to debate on a wide range of issues. It is these debates that laid the foundation for the Kenya of today.

\textsuperscript{156} National Assembly Official Report, OP cit.
3.4.4 Development of Health care in Bungoma District.

Back in Bungoma, there were those like the former senior chief Pwoka Amtala who credit him with improving the local dispensaries through renovation. He is also said to have been responsible for the initiation of the Nyayo District Hospital in Webuye.\textsuperscript{157} However, this is contrary to the view held by those in the know. Catherine Wasike, a long serving medical officer at Kimilili Sub-District Hospital pointed out that the renovations carried out in the hospitals in the 1980s and 1990s were the result of Kenya Finland and not personal efforts. According to her, the project was under one William Walukana and covered the whole of Western Province and not confined to Kimilili. Under the Kenya Finland initiative sub-district hospitals like Webuye, Kimilili, Bokoli and Naitiri were renovated.\textsuperscript{158}

3.5 Trade Unionism.

Elijah Mwangale was very critical of trade unions. He pointed out that many of them had one major characteristic; big mouths, and completely unqualified to negotiate on behalf of those unions.\textsuperscript{159} He added that they were basically nocturnal activists, meaning that all their jobs were done at night by backdoor negotiations in order to throw out their, perhaps, more qualified leaders and that to a large extent, they were financed by groups that tended to sabotage the interests of the workers. He agreed with Hon. Shikuku’s contention that it was time they shaved off their beards, as they were a complete nuisance. He was of the opinion that for the previous three years, an organization called the Central Organization of Trade Unions which claimed to represent affiliated unions, had become a battle ground for tribal pro-west. The union was split between the Pro-Muhanji followers and Pro-Juma followers. According to him, if he had powers, he would have liked to scrap the organization and in the place of warring groups get people with a bit of ‘substance upstairs’, people who could think of labour unions and the services they could provide.

In an environment in which trade unions enjoy democratic space, this utterance by Mwangale would have been interpreted as serious interference in the rights of unions to form and represent their workers. However, such stance and debate would soon

\textsuperscript{157}Oral Interview, P. Amtalla, Former school mate, & Senior Chief, 9\textsuperscript{th} May 2015, Kimilili.
\textsuperscript{158}Oral Interview, C. Wasike, Agricultural Officer, 12\textsuperscript{th} May 2015.
\textsuperscript{159}Official National Assembly Report, Protection of unscrupulous Employers, 21\textsuperscript{st} April, 1972
become part of the norm in Kenya until some would eventually suggest that COTU
should be an affiliate of KANU. This was only the beginning of state interference.
However, the methodology advocated by Mwangale not standing, it can be argued
that Mwangale was right in one respect. COTU had not been very effective over the
years as a result of tribal rivalries and other internal problems.\textsuperscript{160} Most of the trade
unions did not consider COTU as an effective source of assistance, particularly in
areas of collective bargaining and dispute settlement. Each of the thirty national
unions was organized on an industrial basis. As a result, there were very few
jurisdictional or other problems between the national unions. The basic function and
activities of all unions was to organize workers, bargain collectively and handle
workers’ disputes and grievances. To accomplish this, all unions relied upon shop
stewards and branch secretaries to organize and recruit members as well as to, initially
at least, handle workers’ grievances. The powers were highly centralized in their
general secretaries. This arrangement meant COTU had a minimal role to play in
trade disputes.

3.5.1 Refugee Problem.
The question of refugees residing in Kenya was discussed by Mwangale in his
contribution in parliament. He pointed out that most refugees came from independent
African countries and called on the Kenyan government to condemn the system that
created conditions which forced people from certain areas to flee.\textsuperscript{161} He said that
Kenya should not differentiate white dominated governments and African ones.
According to him, it had been found out that African independent countries were
perhaps the worst oppressors. Accordingly, he said, Kenya had to condemn them
because they had created a political system whereby their own people could not
tolerate them at all and were forced to run to other countries for protection.
He was of the opinion that the question of environment that was being discussed at a
conference in Stockholm should be placed under problems arising from oppression
which resulted in people moving from their environment and pushed to other
environments where they could not fit.\textsuperscript{162} He raised another issue where certain

\textsuperscript{160} J. Douglas Muir and J.L. Brown, \textit{Trade Union Power and Process of Economic Development, The

\textsuperscript{161} The \textit{National Assembly Official Report}, Immigration (Amendment) Bill, 13\textsuperscript{th} June, 1972, P.53.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
refugees had to move in cars from Tom Mboya Street to Uhuru Highway because they feared being gunned down by certain characters from their countries. According to him Kenya was considered a heaven by every refugee in the world today because it had been preaching peace and tribal unity. He argued that simply because Kenya was a paradise should not be the reason to be the main ground for refugees from all over the world. He added that Kenya should not take refugees from Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi to enjoy its fruits. He added that Kenya had very few fruits to begin with, as it had its own problems.

However, the problem of refugees residing in Kenya continues to vex the Kenyan government up to today. In the wake of the Garissa University College terrorist attack, there were calls to the effect that the refugees in North Eastern parts of Kenya should be repatriated to Somalia. Local leaders in North Eastern region seemed to be of similar opinion. However, the law is clear on the issue of return of refugees.

It states, “no person shall be refused entry into Kenya, expelled, extradited from Kenya or returned to any other country or be subjected to any similar measures if, as a result of such refusal, expulsion, return or other measure, such person is compelled to return or remain in a country where the person may be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social.”163

The law clearly states occasions when one can cease to be a refugee in Kenya.164 Such occasions may include when one voluntarily re-avails himself of the protection of the country of his nationality. Another case may be where a person that had lost his nationality voluntarily re-acquires it. In case one acquires the nationality of another country or eventually enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality, he may lose the refugee status. The same may happen when one voluntarily re-establishes himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution. Similarly, one’s refugee status may cease when the circumstances in connection with his status as a refugee cease to exist and he refuses to avail himself to the protection of the country of his nationality. In cases where one committed a serious offense outside Kenya before being admitted as a refugee in

164 Ibid.
Kenya, one’s refugee status may cease. The same is true if one has lost his nationality and continues to refuse to return to the country of his former residence.

3.6 Articulation of Issues in the Economic Sector.
Mwangale left an inscription on matters that concern the economy. He was interested in Infrastructure, Agriculture, Industry, Land and even exploration of petroleum.

3.6.1 Infrastructural Development.
Mwangale fought for infrastructural development in his Bungoma East Constituency.\textsuperscript{165} For instance, he suggested in parliament that the Kimilili and Malakisi Rural Electricity project should be extended immediately so that it could cover Tongareni, which was then a divisional center, as well as the outlying areas within the neighbouring divisions. He argued that he was concerned because in the past, transmission lines would pass through areas without electricity being provided to those areas. He gave an example of a line passing through one town to another without serving adjacent areas or the areas between the two towns. He called upon the minister for power and communication to realize that parliament would like to see more action but not more contracts being signed between the government and international firms in respect of big projects, and forgetting the real areas which were important in terms of economic development in the efforts to alleviate poverty in rural areas.

Once again, he appealed to the minister to extend the power lines to cover Misikhu as a market, Kimilili as a center and the outlying secondary schools like Kimilili Secondary School, Kamusinga and Chesamisi Secondary Schools.\textsuperscript{166} After that, he argued that electricity should be extended to cover other markets like Kamukuywa, Chwele and Malakisi. He pointed out that that was the only way the area he represented, which was well endowed with rich soils and water, could develop. With electricity, he reasoned that the people in the area could put up small industries such as the timber industry or jaggery. He appealed to the minister to make sure that the application of rural electrification programmes was done as a matter of priority.

\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
instead of signing big contracts to supply electricity to areas like Tana River and other areas and forgetting rural areas.

It can be pointed out that most of the areas that Mwangale, served such as Webuye, Misikhu, and Kimilili were provided with electricity in the early 1980s. However, the other parts like Kamukuywa and Tongaren, which he mentioned in the debate, remained unconnected till the NARC government of Mwai Kibaki started mass rural electrification programme. Areas which hitherto would only dream of electricity were now made accessible to electricity. There are those like Joseph Munyakho Makokha who failed to see anything positive in what Mwangale was doing. He argued that Mwangale failed to help construct the Kimilili-Misikhu road that passed through Mwangale’s Matilili home. He pointed out that even those roads that were constructed were watered down.

3.6.2 Agricultural issues.
Mwangale came out strongly in support of the Agricultural Sector. This sector was dear to him not merely because it was area of his professional speciality, but also because as already already mentioned in chapter two, he hailed from an agricultural background as his father had been a progressive farmer. It was, therefore, one area that he knew only too well and was one that he tackled with passion.

3.6.2.1 Issues in the Maize Sector
Mwangale came out strongly in support of production of maize which he argued was produced by many of his voters. He asked the Minister to recognize the fact that the source of food in the country was Western Province. He joked that the people of Western Province were the only ones who had not quarreled with God; while other areas were suffering from drought, Western Kenya was having a great deal of rain. He said that as a result, the area produced all kinds of food. However, the areas had some difficulties in that it was difficult to transport some of the foodstuffs to the market because of the poor roads. He said that Ministers made promises about plans to develop roads in the area but did not carry the plans out. He revealed that in 1970, a Minister who was visiting the area promised to tarmac Webuye-Kitale Road but this

was not done. According to him the road had broken down so much that he did not see how the farmers were going to move the bumper crop of maize to the market.

The problem of roads in Bungoma East has greatly been improved with many tarmac roads radiating from Kimilili town to the surrounding areas. However, roads joining Kimilili to Tongaren area remain poor, loose surface roads, though they have been improved to all weather roads. The question that Mwangale argued so much about – that of marketing of maize – remains a vexing issue. The government is yet to come up with a solution to solve the problem of marketing excess or surplus maize in case of a bumper harvest. During such an occasion, when the area experiences a bumper harvest, middlemen have always had a field day to the frustration of farmers. Maybe devolution may provide an answer to the perennial problem as the county government is closer to the people and may feel their problems. Already, plans are underway to construct a maize mill in Tongaren District to process the maize and look for market for the finished product.

Mwangale argued for providing of a maize subsidy for maize producers while contributing to a motion on replacement of members of the Maize and Produce Marketing Board.¹⁶⁸ He said that 90 percent of Kenya was made up of people who grew maize to feed the whole nation. According to him historically, prices of agricultural produce have always been subsidized. In Kenya, he pointed out, maize was subsidized fifty years before, during the colonial time and it was only after independence that the country started to reduce the prices or rather, go back to the so-called world parity of maize price which was then Sh17. He gave the example of the United States of America where the government went as far as paying a farmer not to produce a particular crop. In France, he said, the government subsidized a milk producer because it wanted to keep his milk production but at the same time have the farmer earning an income. In Kenya which was a developing nation, he said, the government policy was that of bringing the maize price down. He said that what amused him was that the Minister was one of the people who promoted the subsidy policy before, during the colonial times. However, after the attainment of independence, the same minister embarked on the policy of bringing down the price

of maize to world parity of Sh17. The result of this was reduction of maize production and increased importation of the crop.

His contribution also included a debate on seed production.\textsuperscript{169} He was of the opinion that production of seeds was running into some problems because of the large nucleus of farms which the ministry had promised to be available to organizations like Kenya Seed Company before there could be the same level of production. Most of those farms were owned by the Agricultural Development Corporation although they were being taken over by individuals, cooperatives or groups of people. He wanted the minister to tell the house how he proposed to maintain the same level of seed production especially when the only available nucleus farms were being depleted by policies of the ministry. He therefore wanted the minister to tell the house whether the bill covered all seeds. He also called on the minister to put up a research station to backup all seeds which were then not being properly supported by the government. The research unit should be related to maize and wheat stations such as Kitale, Njoro and Thika Sisal Research Station. The stations were vital if the house was to consider the bill important.

The government of Kenya has always encouraged the exports of certified seeds from Kenya Seed Company to neighbouring countries such as Uganda and Tanzania. This has always left the country in a precarious situation as such seeds are known to run out during the planting season. Such occasions have always led to farmers resorting to desperate measures. Such measures have always included, and not limited to, buying seeds from agents who produce seeds which are not certified with the end result being poor harvest, increase in maize diseases and famine.

Concerning payment of farmers after they had harvested, he was of the opinion that there were unexplained delays.\textsuperscript{170} He pointed out that in the past after a farmer had harvested his crop and it was on the crib, the Agricultural Finance Corporation used to visit the farmer, looked at the crop and paid him/her 80 percent. This policy had changed, according to him, and at the time the Kenya Farmers’ Association did not

\textsuperscript{169} National Assembly Official Report, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{170} The national Assembly official Report, Cereals and Sugar Finance Corporation indebtedness, 6\textsuperscript{th} July, 1972, P.765
pay farmers on time. Payment to farmers was delayed for as long as three to four months. He appealed to the government to consider cereal advance of up to 80 percent.

The question of payment of farmers still remains a thorny one. Payment to farmers has always been delayed for as long as six months. This has not only impacted negatively on finances of such families who rely on farming as the sole source of income. It has also impacted negatively on preparation and farming for the next planting season. In a nutshell, the government has been a participant in impoverishing of farmers instead of increasing their wealth. Putting money in the pockets of such farmers could easily spark rapid economic growth as it may lead to increased purchasing power.

3.6.2.2 Issues in the Livestock Sector

According to Elijah Mwangale, there was a growing demand for cattle in the world and that there was a diminishing availability of meat and livestock in other countries which gave Kenya as a country, an opportunity to develop her livestock industry in order to meet the export.\(^\text{171}\) He was also of the opinion that the population of Kenya in the next ten years would increase from 11 Million to 16 Million people and that by the year 2000 it would be in the region of about 25 Million people. Therefore, he argued that with proper planning and substantial changes in the institution and programme of livestock development, the beef industry could turn out to be the best and most important as Kenya’s foreign exchange. He argued that the government had not devised proper programmes and institutions to enable the country to realize the great potential in the beef industry. He pointed out that the beef industry suffered some major setbacks. The first one was that the outset rates of the beef industry was just about half as high as they should be and that the structure and level of the producer and consumer prices did not compare well with economic forces. The processing facilities were inadequate and that diseases had always been a threat. He commended the government for having instituted the development of a beef research station in Nakuru with a view of encouraging specialization in production of cattle.

Mwangale suggested that one way of doing that was to divide the ranch into three or two major zones. The first, he suggested, was to produce the immature animals to be fattened later in areas which had more grass. He suggested that the North Eastern and Eastern areas and the semi-arid areas such as Laikipia, Kajiado, Narok and Nakuru, with a total of 95 million acres of land, could be used to provide calves for fattening in the more productive areas with a higher rainfall range so that by the year 1980, Kenya could be producing anywhere around one million calves for the slaughter houses. The second part was to increase the slaughtering capacity by considering producing areas and establishing meat factories such as the Kenya Meat Commission at the sources of supply.

The question of keeping cattle for beef farming continue to vex the government. Up to date, the government has not managed to come up with a workable solutions. Farmers from pastoral areas have continued to incur enormous losses especially when drought hit the areas. The government has always come out looking helpless in the face of adversity with the Kenya Meat Commission failing to absorb the number of animals during such periods. Mwangale himself would later rise to head the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock for many years. However, he could not come up with such beautiful measures as outlined above.

Mwangale was at home with the question of dairy farming in the country. He was of the opinion that Kenya had a system where milk was becoming one of the major earners of income in rural areas. He appealed to the government to ensure that grade cattle or hybrid cattle were imported in the country so that they could be distributed to farmers in order to produce more milk. He revealed that statistics in the past three years had shown that milk had been declining instead of increasing due to certain diseases caused by non-application of proper chemicals. According to him, there was need to increase milk production. In order to do so, he said, we must ensure that Kenya not only used normal artificial insemination system, but also continue to improve some of the best hybrid animals and sent them to rural areas so that Kenyan farmers could buy them and put them in their farms. He said that he had noted that all the grade animals in the settlement schemes had died. He pointed out Tongaren which

173 Ibid
was in his constituency was one good example. According to him the animals had died because there were no veterinary officers in the areas. In some cases, the cattle dips were not always used fully because the dip attendants, who were government employees, were not doing a proper job.

The issues raised by Mwangale on dairy farming and milk production were pertinent then and are equally valid today. The government has never been an active participant in this regard which has seen the sector dominated by those farmers who have the money to invest in the technical know-how and milk coolers as well as the grade animals. The veterinary services have never been improved as the government eventually declined to employ veterinary doctors arguing that they should privatize their services. Small scale farmers cannot afford to hire such services. Milk marketing has also had to be privatized with the Kenya Cooperative Creameries taking a beating. However, in some areas, private players have moved in to claim a stake in an area that had been dominated by K.C.C before. Such players include Tuzo, Molo, Fresha, Ilara and Brookside.

3.6.3 Agricultural Parastatals.
According to Mwangale Agricultural parastatals formed because they were supposed to carry out trade and make money. However, he was of the opinion that they had become spenders of government money without any tangible returns. He called upon the vice president to look for ways to see to it that parastatals became independent and commercially viable. He argued that if Kinyanjui could run the East African Industries to profitability, then Lugonzo and Gecar could run the East African Power and Lighting to profitability. He said that most of the boards of parastatals were given money, but none of them was run profitably. He pointed out that even if there was theft in the tea factory, no one has ever said that the tea factories were losing money and were not profitable. He added that coffee was sold directly abroad and Kenya made money.

However, he said things were different concerning Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) and Kenya Meat commission.\textsuperscript{175} When marketing, those in charge pocketed a large commission, then claimed that the Kenyan meat or butter was of poor quality. He called upon Ministers to help the government in firing those who did not toe the line. He also argued that the question of an executive chairman of parastatals was not a well thought out idea. According to him Kenya could not have an Executive Chairman in addition to a Managing Director and General Managers. He said such an arrangement only fueled the milking of money from parastatals and did not add value.

Parastatals were constituted to run business on behalf of government in areas where the people of Kenya could not raise capital to participate. They were supposed to make economic sense. However, over time, most of them were turned into cash cows and instead of putting money to the ex-chequer, they always drained it. They have also gone a long way into enriching the pockets of those who managed them. Therefore, instead of propelling the economy to high heights, they have plunged the country into one financial crisis after another. In a nutshell, they became an unnecessary burden to the tax payer.

\textbf{3.6.4 Industrial Development.}

Mwangale was passionate on the issue of manufacturing and location of industries. The development plan of 1970-1974 had stated that the government was determined to widen the geographical dispersal of the benefits of industrialization as part of the rural development strategy.\textsuperscript{176} Mwangale argued that it was not clear on how the government was going to achieve that and that had been the mistake committed in the previous development plans of 1966/68 and the 1964/66. According to him, if the government was committed to an equitable distribution of industries throughout the country, the first step was for the government to provide elaborate incentives that would induce foreign or local investors to invest in the country. He argued that talking in the house that they would like an industry to go to Kisumu or an industry go to Kajiado when the conditions of Kajiado compared to Nairobi or Thika or Nakuru or Kisumu were not the same, was not useful. He proposed that the country should

\textsuperscript{175} The National Assembly Report, Op cit.

\textsuperscript{176} The National Assembly Report, Adoption of Development Plan, 1970-1974, 24\textsuperscript{th} April 1970, p 52.
introduce elaborate incentive schemes and if possible top them up with some kind of law forcing investors, local or foreign to go and invest in the countryside.

He mentioned a few incentives which he considered as necessary to achieve the objective. The first incentive he pointed out was the government extending the tax relief period of at least five years to all pioneer industries going into rural areas.\textsuperscript{177} The tax relief, he argued, would encourage anybody who comes to Kenya, instead of going to Nairobi, to go to Kisumu, go to Kericho or Kakamega or Broderick falls to invest there because he knew he was going to make much money, if not similar profits as he would if he had invested in Nairobi.

The second incentive which he suggested to the house was that the government, through the inspectorate financial institutions such as the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation of Kenya, should be prepared to take majority shareholding on a joint basis with private or foreign investors in industrial projects which were going into the rural areas.\textsuperscript{178} This was to demonstrate that they were confident in those projects being viable in the areas where they were going. Municipal property tax should be lowered as an incentive, he argued. He pointed out that Thika had 2.5 percent Municipal property tax, Nakuru had 3.5 and Nairobi had 5 percent in which case Thika became more attractive to an investor.

Mwangale urged the government to introduce clearer and greater measures to protect local as well as new industries.\textsuperscript{179} He proposed an Industrial Registration and Licensing Act in order to control the method of investment of foreign and local companies. He gave an example of the industrial Estate which was producing small skilled materials such as chips, pins and so forth, but was not protected in any way. He said the Industrial Registration and Licensing Act would protect the local industries and regulate where the investment will go. He also urged the government to streamline the conditions of customs refund to products manufactured locally and exported from raw materials originally imported into this country in order to enable the manufacturers to compete effectively in International markets. He was of the

\textsuperscript{177} The National Assembly Official Report, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid.
opinion that the government should introduce, as a matter of priority, an Act of Parliament to force investors to locate industries in the rural areas as a topping up factor on the elaborate and attractive incentives already mentioned.

Finally, he argued that industries should be located where raw materials were found, say in Western Province, Nyanza or Coast. According to him there was no reason why an industry should be located in Nakuru to process fish from Kisumu or from Mombasa. He pointed out that the textile industries that were coming up in Eldoret should instead be located in Western and Nyanza where the materials were found.\(^\text{180}\)

The issues raised by Mwangale have beset the country since Independence. Whether to protect young industries or not has been a valid question ever since. After independence Kenya concentrated on putting up import substitution industries. Such factories were meant to manufacture goods to substitute the goods that were being imported, in order to save on foreign exchange. There was need to provide some form of safeguards in order that such industries did not face competition from goods manufactured from outside the country. Such safeguards came in the form of import duties. Protected from competition, such industries never evolved into efficient industries that could produce high quality goods that could compete at the International level. Hence, when such safeguards came down in the face of liberation programmes that were initiated by the international financial institutions and donors, the industries tumbled down.

Mwangale advocated for tax holidays as a way of spurring industrial growth in rural areas. However, it is doubtful whether they would have been useful in promoting industrialization in rural areas. The Kenyan government introduced a 150 percent tax deduction for capital investment of KShs200 Million or more spent on industrial building and machinery outside Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu in 1991.\(^\text{181}\) The move was informed by the fact that most industries were concentrated in major towns that were attractive due to their proximity to major markets and relatively better transport, communication and utilities. This concentration had in turn led to massive rural-urban


migration, further expanding the economic gap between towns and rural Kenya. However, Treasury Secretary, Henry Rotich terminated the policy through the Finance Bill 2015 that proposed the deletion of the tax incentive provided for in the second schedule of the Income Tax Act. There was no evidence that investors had invested in rural areas. In addition there were challenges in defining what constitutes areas outside these municipalities. It was estimated that the cumulative annual loss for the 24-year-old incentives was at more than KShs 50 million, with the annual loss running at over KShs 4 billion each year. The import of this is that investors attach a premium to good infrastructure, availability of skilled manpower and access to markets as opposed to periodic tax weaves.

3.6.5 Foreign Domination of Kenya’s Economy.

Mwangale left an imprint on matters concerning Kenya’s economy and foreign domination. According to him the commercial and the industrial sector of Kenya were still controlled by foreigners. He argued that more than 70 percent of the profit derived from the industrial and commercial sector still went to the foreigners. He added that Kenya still depended mainly on foreign investment that were indirectly channeled back through, either profits, royalties or salaries to expatriates and so on. Besides, he argued that there were foreigners still holding large estates of coffee and tea. He wondered why Kenya still allowed vast tea estates in Kericho where an African was the one who was processing it at the factory. According to him, the road from Nairobi to Naivasha had large ranches owned by foreigners, like that owned by Lord Delamere. He argued that at the time, the economy of the country was not in the hands of the Africans.

He pointed out that the International Labour Organization report pointed to two things. First, that though the economy had been developing at a rate which was supposed to be fast, in effect, it was only a few people who were getting the fruits. There were vast areas in the country which were very poor. These were the areas that were poorer before independence.

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He was of the opinion that there were imbalances which were introduced in the country by a few people that simply grabbed a lot of property. He also argued that if they wanted to develop the country, they should do what Amin did for his country. He said that there was no need of saying he would fail because no other person would be able to do what he had done. According to him, the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation would not help this because Africans did not own the shops. The buildings were owned by somebody who lived elsewhere. Secondly, the loans given carried large interests of up to 10 percent. As a solution, he argued that Kenya should get rid of some of those fellows and have Africans owning some factories. He added that if it was up to him, he would have nationalized some of the factories.

These arguments were extremely radical coming from Mwangale. Kenya up to today still relies heavily on foreign investment and is looking out for more. Expatriates are increasingly involved in the economic development of the country. Amin’s displacement of Asians failed miserably with a reverse in economic growth. Today, they have been recalled. Tanzania tried nationalization of foreign investment but failed.

3.7 Legislation or Development

Traditionally, a member of parliament was supposed to represent his people in parliament as a legislature. His core function was to make laws. Besides legislation, he was supposed to represent his people by presenting their views in motions and budget making. Besides, parliament was supposed to play an oversight role to see to it that monies which were allocated to various ministries were used accordingly. These were roles bestowed to the legislature as one of the three arms of government. The other arm of government – the executive – was charged with the responsibility of executing government policies and development programmes. However, over time, the line separating the function of executive and that of the legislature has become blurred. The legislative arm has increasingly encroached on roles reserved for the executive, raising the question of conflict of interest, as is the question with the Constituency Development Fund (CDF).

As a legislator, Mwangale was in his own class. He appeared to have thoroughly done his homework, providing depth and seriousness to the motions that he discussed. He also came up with various motions of his own including, and not limited to that of, the University of Nairobi Amendment Bill. However, followers also expected him, as a member of parliament, to carry out development projects in the constituency. There are those who argue that he initiated various development projects which went far in transforming the lives of his people in Bungoma East Constituency.

According to Joseph Kivunde, Mwanga le was a development conscious Member of Parliament who initiated various development projects. He encouraged both men and women to form development associations. One such group, he remembers, was ‘Yibalaye’ Development Group which was an all gender development group. Through it, the group members could buy animals for the member’s farms and pay school fees for their children. Members were visited by other members of the group who identified peculiar problems facing such members and then helped to solve them. Regarding farming, members could not borrow loans from banks which had high interest rates. Small loans were processed and given to the members by the association. This helped members to produce enough to take to the Cereals Board for sale.

According to Kivunde, when there was rush for land in the settlement schemes, Elijah Mwangale, encouraged his people to acquire land there. To those who refused to move to the settlement schemes, he told them that they would be ruled as was the case in the colonial period. A case in point was when he helped launch Matili Technical College, then a Village Polytechnic. He told neighbours of the college such as Sirengo, Temteo Meji and Jakton Walekhwa to abandon the small portions of land which they held on, for the expansion of the polytechnic, so that they could be helped to secure 200 acres of land each, in Trans-Nzoia but they refused. Sirengo told him off during one of the meetings, arguing that those old men were the pioneers of Matili village and that they would never move away from there. Many people fought the

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185 Oral Interview, J. Kivunde, Kimilili Location KANU Chairman, 26th May 2015, Matili.
186 Oral Interview, J. Kivunde, Op cit.
idea of moving to Trans-Nzoia settlement scheme. He, eventually, personally donated land to the polytechnic which he said he had, initially, given to his elder son, Sarai.

Mwangale used the harambee spirit to touch every aspect of the social and economic lifestyle of his people. He participated in the establishment of cattle dips in his constituency. He was a friend to Maina Wanjiki who was Minister for Agriculture and Livestock. Wanjiki helped him to establish cattle dips throughout the constituency. Mwangale made sure that every location had a cattle dip. The project was government initiated but his closeness to the Minister meant that more were established in his constituency. He participated actively in helping the disadvantaged through the Harambe spirit. He helped many but one case stood out; that of Kasili, who was an orphan. He found him a scholarship to Sweden and organized for his plane ticket and on return after studies, he was found employment in Kakamega. He later resigned to found his own private business. Mwangale was also instrumental in establishment of Coffee factories in his constituency. Coffee factories like Makhanga and Kamusinde were a direct result of Mwangale’s intervention. He actively participated in the establishment of Kitinda Dairy Factory. However, the factory later went down as a result of mismanagement.

Mwangale helped in the establishment of many harambee secondary schools during his period. Schools such as Maeni Girls’ Secondary School, Kamusinde Secondary School, Sipala Secondary School, Sosio Girls’ Secondary School, Maliki Secondary School, Kimilili Secondary School and Moi Girls’ Kamusinga Secondary School, were conceived during his time as a Member of Parliament. He also served as Chairman of the Board of Governors of Friends’ School Kamusinga for a long time.

Mwangale was involved in the expansion of Moi Girls’ Kamusinga. The school had remained underdeveloped with small semi-permanent structures, confined in a small compound. Stories were rife at one time that the situation was so ominous that some girls were forced to share beddings. Mwangale played an important role in the

187 Oral Interview, Patrick Chaka, Kimilili Constituency KANU Chairman, 4th June 2015, Kimilili.
188 Oral Interview, Rose Masinde, Bungoma KANU Branch Official, 23rd May 2015, Kimilili North.
modernization of the school. His closeness to Moi and Biwott saw to the two being invited to the school to conduct very successful harambees. The harambees led to the expansion of the compound by displacing people and securing them land elsewhere. The school bus was also secured with the help of President Moi who donated it to the school. Some structures, like the school dining hall were also built during his time. The school officially attained the name Moi Girls’ during the period. However, everything good is never without a downside. Some of the people who were displaced to give way to the expansion of the school are yet to be compensated even when money was availed for the same.

In parliament, Mwangale pushed for the establishment of roads in his constituency in order to open up the area’s economic potential. It was during this period that the Bungoma-Chwele-Kimilili Road was built. He also pushed for the building of the Webuye-Kiminini-Kitale Road. However, his critics argue that he failed to extend the Bungoma-Chwele-Kimilili road to Misikhu.190

There are also those who did not see much in Mwangale’s leadership. Francis Makokha Munyakho, a resident of Bungoma East Constituency, did not see anything progressive in the leadership of Mwangale. He pointed out that Mwangale was opposed to young people making it in life because he feared opposition. According to him, what annoyed people was the fact that Mwangale boasted openly that he did not see anybody that could pose a threat to his leadership for the next thirty years. However, according to him, when Mukhisa Kituyi came up, the people changed their mind and not even Mwangale’s money could help. He poured a lot of money and even used such slogans as ‘Bubwami kimiandu’ which translates to mean ‘leadership is wealth’ and ‘quid pro quo’ meaning ‘scratch my back, I scratch yours’ but the people refused to be swayed.191

Wilberforce Kisiero says that Mwangale was so powerful. He was very close to those who mattered in government. Through the connections he could get a lot of money from State House. He says, “We used to have a saying that Mwangale walked erect when going to the State House, but walked with a stoop when coming out of the State

190 Oral Interview, P. Amtalla, Former Senior Chief, 19th May 2015, Kimilili.
191 Oral Interview, F.M. Munyakho, Former Teacher, 9th May 2015, Kimilili.
House, on account of the amount of money he carried in the briefcase.” However, according to Kisiero, such money could not last because Mwangale gave too much to his constituents. He argued that Mwangale also made a lot of money from his businesses as he was a born and gifted businessman. However, the money from the businesses also disappeared through donations to the people. Kisiero was of the opinion that Mwangale would have done much better as a businessman rather than as a politician. He said that politics is dirty and joining politics means you have to lie low and behave like a sycophant. He argued that Mwangale’s belief that people could be controlled by giving them too much money was built on wrong premises. According to him people get money and forget about it and that Mwangale should have invested the money in developing and empowering his people so that they could look for it themselves.

What Wilberforce Kisielo was saying carries some weight to a point. Among the Bukusu there is a wise saying which says “Oonia we likonjo okhaonia we enjala tawe”. Translated, the saying means “heal a person with a wound but not one who is starving”. This is because the person with a wound will always look at the scar and remember how bad the situation had been. The starving person, on the other hand, will forget as soon as he/she is satisfied. It may also be pointed out that the heavy spending in campaigns was the operating paradigm of the time. People believed that a good politician was one who brought development to them through harambees and giving them handouts. It would take time before a different paradigm could be developed. This change in paradigm came with the initiation of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) which relieved MPs from spending their own money on development projects.

3.8 Probe Committee into Assassination of J.M. Kariuki.

Although he remained at the backbench, Mwangale established himself as a fearless legislator who never shied away from treading on the toes of powerful frontbenchers. The electorate appeared to have approved of Mwangale’s brand of politics for when the 1974 elections came; they gave him an overwhelming majority of 25,465 votes, a figure which no politician had polled in the country before. As had been the case, in

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192 Oral Interview, W. Kisiero, MP, Assistant Minister, KANU Treasurer, May, 20th 201, Kitale.
1969, Sifuma turned up runners-up for the second time and polled 5,829 votes with Mark Barasa making his last bid and getting a mere 965 votes. It was during his second term as a member of parliament that Mwangale shot into the national limelight where he remained till his defeat in 1992. Mwangale’s opportunity came in 1975 when the populist maverick MP for Nyandarua North, the late Josiah Mwangi Kariuki (J.M.) was assassinated under mysterious circumstances and his body was dumped in the Ngong Forest.194

David Branch has given a vivid background history of events that led to the assassination of J.M Kariuki. According to him in the early 1970’s J.M. Kariuki had emerged as the most prominent voice of criticism of the malaise into which Kenya had fallen.195 He points out that the assassination of Mboya and the detention of Odinga left a vacuum and Kariuki was best placed to fill it. According to him, Kariuki’s supporters were the indebted and poor, landless and land hungry who were dismayed at the rapid accumulation of land and wealth by elites. He argues that of all the problems facing the country at the time, his favoured issue of corruption and land policy were those that exercised Kenyans most. In addition he says, as a Kikuyu with great credibility among Mau Mau veterans and the landless, he was able to point out Kenyatta’s hypocrisy to great effect. He enjoyed almost total support in his constituency and was returned to parliament in the 1969 elections with the largest majority in the country.196 Buoyed by the success, Kariuki stepped up his criticism of the government’s land policy. He urged it, on repeated occasions, to cease both repaying the loan made to it by the British to compensate departing European farmers and to cancel the debts owed by Kenyan farmers who had been resettled.

According to Branch, Kariuki’s most severe censure of the government was reserved for its land policy.197 Recalling the determination with which the freedom fighters fought and the death of many people in Kenya during the struggle, he argued that independence had not been about a mere change-over or substitution in ownership of

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197 Ibid.
land. He argued that it was wrong to substitute Kamau for Smith, Odongo for Jones and Kiplagat for Keith as that did not solve what the gallant fighters considered as imposed and undesirable social injustice. Kariuki thus gave a public voice to a question that many Kenyans were asking themselves privately after a decade of independence; whether this was actually what they had fought for.

Branch adds that just a month after the 1974 election, there was a series of public revelations about the extent of corruption within the upper echelons of government and Kenyatta’s immediate family. According to Branch revelation centered on the illegal trade in ivory, but similar stories could still be told of less networthy commodities such as charcoal and maize. Illegal trading in ivory was proving to be a very profitable activity for the ruling elite. Private poaching had been banned in 1974 in an effort to protect the country’s 120,000 elephants which were being killed at the rate of 20,000 per year. Despite banning of private trading, those participating in the illegal selling of ivory had a turnover of $10Million a year. The new Scientist Magazine alleged that those profiting from the trade were closely linked to Kenyatta, his wife Mama Ngina and his daughter Margaret. A devastating report was prepared by the anti-poaching lobby. It named Mungai, the Kenyatta family, Paul Ngei and Njonjo as participants in the illegal ivory trade.

Branch argues that Kariuki was probably involved in the revelation about poaching and ivory smuggling. According to him, until the election of October 1974 he had been an assistant minister for tourism and wild life and had close personal ties with Jack Block, a prominent figure in the anti-poaching lobby, who was concerned about the effect of poaching on tourism. According to branch his stinging criticism of the Kenyatta government made him a lot of enemies. Branch argues that, rumours of an imminent assassination were widely circulated in political circles in early February 1975. The rumours reached Kariuki and subsequent events convinced him that this was not a hoax or mere warning. Aided by friends in government and security forces, he came to a conclusion that the bomb explosion in Nairobi during February, one at the Starlight Nightclub and the other at the Bureau de Change at the Hilton Hotel

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198 D.Branch, Burudi Nabwera, Kisiero, Op cit.
199 Ibid.P.112.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
were part of efforts by figures within the Kenyatta’s inner circle to silence him once and for all.

Branch points out that throughout the month of February, Kariuki and his friends were under police surveillance.\textsuperscript{202} Kariuki recognized that at the very least, his days as a political force were numbered. According to Branch, Victor Riitho, a close friend, who talked to Kariuki on 17\textsuperscript{th} February, said that Kariuki had spoken like a man on his death bed, saying how important it was to fight for the truth whatever might happen. On the evening of 1\textsuperscript{st} March, 1975 an overnight bus to Mombasa leaving Nairobi Race Course Road was loaded and ready to depart when a bomb exploded on board. Seventeen people were killed outright, eight died before they could receive attention at the city’s Kenyatta Hospital, and another died overnight at the hospital.\textsuperscript{203} Nearly seventy more were seriously injured in the blast. At the time of the explosion, Kariuki was celebrating a friend’s engagement at a party in the suburb of Karen. Driving back, he heard an explosion and drove to the scene, saw the damage and bloodshed and then drove to a casino where he had been a frequent visitor. He had a few drinks with Geth the commander of the General Service Unit of the police (GSU).

C. Hornsby shows that the following day, a concerted effort began to link Kariuki to the bus bombing.\textsuperscript{204} A decision was taken by senior police officers to interrogate him. That evening, Kariuki met again with Geth at the Hilton, from where he was escorted by non-uniformed police officers for questioning. He was not seen alive in public again. According to Branch, it is believed that later that evening, Kariuki was taken to a remote spot in the Ngong Hills outside the city of Nairobi and shot. His body was left for the animals to dispose of it, but his remains were found by a herd’s boy the following morning. After being recovered by local policemen, his body was taken to Nairobi Mortuary. Efforts were made to conceal his identity and to allow the authorities to bury it in an anonymous grave. A false nametag was attached and moved around the building. An official announcement that the mortuary was holding an identified corpse was made public only on the morning of 11\textsuperscript{th} March, nine days after Kariuki’s death and shortly before the time limit for claiming the body was due

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\textsuperscript{202} D. Branch, Op cit. P.113.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid. Also Oral Interview, Burudi Nabwera, member of Parliamentary Select Committee, May 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2015, Kiminini.
\end{flushright}
to expire. On the same day Kariuki’s wife identified his body in the mortuary, after which armed policemen sealed off the building. On 12th March, police commissioner Bernard Hinga finally confirmed that Kariuki was dead, killed by two bullet wounds.

The result was mass outbreak of popular anger. As soon as Kariuki’s death became public, angry students demonstrated but were dispersed by the GSU. Large crowds gathered and police cordoned off roads into Nairobi. Most shops and schools closed. Several ministers removed the flags of office from their cars and fled in fear.

Kariuki’s death aroused the national assembly to open hostility. MPs immediately demanded an investigation into the murder. On 14th March, parliament appointed a select committee to investigate the killing. Its chair was backbencher, Elijah Mwangale. Besides Mwangale, other members included MPs G. Onyango, J.M. Shikuku, H.C. Wariithi, J.M. Seroney, B. Nabwera, C.W. Rubia, R.S. Mwavumo, J.K. Mulwa, M.W. Mwithaga, J. Muriuki, J.M. Gachago, D.M. Amin, J. Kitonga and J. Nyamweya. The parliamentary select committee came to be known as ‘The Select Committee on the Death of Hon. J.M. Kariuki. It held a total of 46 meetings and interviewed 123 witnesses, some of them more than once. At every turn, attempts were made to block its investigation. For instance, the police refused to allow the MPs to view documents related to the inquiries into Kariuki’s murder or the bombings. Witnesses who appeared before the committee had in some cases been tortured by the police first, while others were threatened and intimidated. Police officers who gave evidence to the select committee were fired shortly afterwards. Despite such obstacles being placed in the path, the committee reached findings that have subsequently been corroborated by investigations by journalists and the contemporary archival records.

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205 D. Branch, Op cit, P.114.
206 D. Branch, Op cit.
207 Ibid.
The committee made various conclusions and recommendations. It implicated Ben Geth, Commander of the GSU who was known to have been the last person seen by witnesses in company of Mr. Kariuki when they left the Hilton Hotel together, about two hours before the murder. He was regarded as a person who must have taken an active part in the murder himself, or as an accomplice of the actual murderers. It recommended that Geth be suspended from duty pending fresh investigation.\textsuperscript{210}

Other recommendations included the conclusion that the persistent refusal by Hinga who was commissioner of police, Nderi, the director of criminal investigation, the Chief Investigation Officer, Senior Superintendent of police, Sokhi and Mungai, Senior Assistant Commissioner of police, Rift Valley Province, to cooperate with the committee led to the conclusion that no satisfactory investigation had been carried out by the police or was likely to be carried out unless the above named police officers were replaced in the police force.\textsuperscript{211}

The senior police officers stationed at Ngong Police Station were accused for gross negligence in the performance of their duties after discovery of the body of Kariuki to a degree which would have destroyed the possibility of identification of the body and that it did indeed delay the identification. Each officer was to be subjected to disciplinary action.\textsuperscript{212}

George Geth of the Daily Nation was guilty of irresponsible statements in that Newspaper in relation to the murder of Kariuki. He had misled Parliament and the Nation and delayed early investigation by publishing on 8\textsuperscript{th} March, 1975 a specific statement that Kariuki was in Zambia. In so doing, he did not take any reasonable steps to ascertain the truth or otherwise of such a statement which was in fact not true. Consequently he was to be severely censured for irresponsible journalism.\textsuperscript{213}

The report also recommended that three policemen, Pius Kibathi Thuo, Peter Gicheru Njau and Peter Kimani, be regarded as suspects in the murder, a matter which

\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
required thorough investigation. In addition, because of his suspicious movement on the material day, Patrick Shaw of the Kenya Police Reserve was also to be investigated. The committee also recommended that the movements and activities of Mayor of Nakuru, Councillor Silas Mburu Gichuhi, Nyandarua District Commissioner Stanley Thuo, Deputy Director of National Youth Service Waruhiu Itote (General China), Evans Ngugi and Karanja, body guard of Mbiyu Koinange, be investigated.\textsuperscript{214}

C. Wanjala and V. Musebe, the American educated Mwangale viewed the probe committee in singular vein as the congressional committee that were set up in the early 1970s to probe scandals such as Watergate scandal that ruined president Richard Nixon’s second term and reinforced the theory of second term curses for American presidents.\textsuperscript{215}

The two point out that Mwangale was thrust into the centre of a truly volatile situation. Luckily for him, there was little doubt as to his and by extension the select committee’s ability to do the work despite the circumstances. The Weekly Review, which was just a month old and had already become an authoritative political magazine had this to say of Mwangale’s ability to steer the select committee, “All eyes in Kenya and many hopes are now turned to the 15 member select committee to investigate the murder of J.M Kariuki and there is no doubt that the committee is chaired by one of the best minds in Kenya’s National Assembly”- Elijah Mwangale.\textsuperscript{216} According to them, Parliamentary Committee was to confirm those attributes when it delivered a damning report to the President Kenyatta besides strong resistance from powerful figures around the presidency. Mwangale emerged from the chairmanship of the committee a more popular politician with an established natural stature of his own. From his handling of the selected committee, Mwangale also earned himself revered title of “Chairman Mwangale.” It was perhaps the highest political rating Mwangale was to enjoy in 25 years. His soaring popularity was to become a source of discomfort and disquiet from the political powers of the day that

\textsuperscript{214} Report of the Select Committee, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{216} Ibid, Oral Interview, Burudi Nabwera, MP, May 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2015, Kiminini, Also Oral Interview, Lunani James, Campaign Manager, May 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2015, Kimilili.
began viewing him with considerable suspicion. It was said at the time that Kenyatta was quite concerned about Mwangale that he reportedly passed a message to him to slow down and to be more circumspect in his political dealings.

The tabling of the motion had itself already precipitated a limited flow of political blood when one cabinet minister and two assistant ministers were swiftly sacked after they opposed a government sponsored amendment that sought to only note the report rather than adopting it. The amendment had been brought to the house by Attorney general, Charles Mugane Njonjo. Muliro who was minister for Public Works and two Assistant Ministers, John Keen and Peter Kibisu found themselves out of office a day after voting against the Njonjo amendment. The sacking further reinforced the risky business that J. M. issue entailed courtesy of Mwangale. Muliro and Kibisu, both Luhya like Mwangale, were never to return to the government. The sensitivity of the J.M matter was best brought home by the comments of the then powerful GEMA secretary, Dickson Kihika Kimani who charged that Mwangale and members of his committee were out to sow the seeds of discord and wreck President Kenyatta’s Government.217

The J.M issue also saw Mwangale add a new entry to the list of his treasured and memorable quotes when he narrated the story of a hyena and a stone. As he concluded the tabling of the J.M report to the hushed house, Mwangale veered of the text and told his colleagues,

“Once upon a time, a hyena came across a stone. The hyena stopped by and hailed the stone but the stone did not respond. As it passed the stone, the hyena turned around and said, “Even if you have not responded, you have heard” and with those few remarks, I beg to move.”218

To those schooled in the metaphor and innuendo, the message was unmistakable. He was telling the government of President Kenyatta and those who may have

217 Ibid P24 and Oral Interview, Burudi Nabwera, Member of the Parliamentary Committee, May 22nd 2015, Kiminini.
218 C. Wanjala and V. Musebe, Op cit.
participated in the J.M murder that even if they remained silent in the face of the devastating evidence against them, they had heard.219

The committee was equally clear that Kibathi had not acted alone, but rather had carried out the murder on the orders of senior officials within the security forces and government. Their attention was firmly fixed on Koinange. When the MPs visited Kenyatta to present a copy of the final report to him on 3rd June, the president ordered that Koinange’s name and that of presidential bodyguard, Arthur Wanyoike Thungu, be removed from the list of individuals who deserved more thorough investigation. “When you beat the son, you beat the father”, the president told the committee members.220 Reluctantly, the MPs did as they were told and the final draft of the report appeared without the mention of Koinange or Thungu. However, earlier versions of the report with their names included had already been released to certain journalists and diplomats.

For his role in the committee, Mwangale earned himself national admiration as a courageous man and for a long time he was referred to as ‘Chairman’ as a mark of appreciation for his role in the J.M. probe. When the 1979 elections came around Mwangale once more proved difficult to beat when he pulled 24,617 votes. A new entrant, David Nasokho, who thereafter made a point of opposing Mwangale in subsequent elections, trailed far behind him with 10,064 votes. Sifuma also contested again and managed 6,549 votes, with another new entrant, Christopher Kisaka polling 761 votes. By then, a new era had dawned on the Kenyan political scene following the death of Kenya’s first president, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. Mwangale was appointed to cabinet for the first time by President Moi, initially as minister for labour.

3.9 Mwangale as an Entrepreneur
Many have agreed that Mwangale was a shrewd businessman and strategist who had an eye for any business opportunity. Wilberforce Kisiero who was at one time Member of Parliament for Mt. Elgon constituency and who worked closely with Mwangale said that Mwangale was a born businessman. He added that Elijah would

219 Ibid.
have done better in business, than he did in politics, if he had stuck with business. According to him, Politics only messed him up as in politics one was expected to toe certain lines while at the same time helping very many dependants.  

David Simiyu Mwangale, his Nephew who managed most of his companies said Elijah was a strategist who during his lifetime ran a complex empire of businesses. In 1969 to early 1970s, he founded consolidated chemicals. The company was based in both Nairobi and Mombasa but it eventually developed a national distribution network.

He had a clearing and forwarding company by the name Vista Ltd. This company was based in Mombasa. However, he did not put all his efforts in clearing and forwarding companies. He also invested in casinos in both Mombasa and Malindi towns. The casino was referred to as No. 1 casino. Besides he also ran an entertainment outlet in Malindi called Star-dust. In addition he had shares in Inter-continental casino in Nairobi.

With his knowledge in Agriculture, Elijah also invested heavily in farming. His father Philip Mwangale was an accomplished farmer. The father together with other prominent Bukusu businessmen like Musumba, Mukopi, Musamia, Milimo, Agosta Mecca, and William Kisaka, had organized themselves to acquire farms in the settlement schemes. They first acquired Kikwameti farm with each getting 310 acres. They then acquired Kananachi farm from which each secured 45 acres. Philip Mwangale established his Kikwameti farm which he continued to run until his death in 1983 at the age of 86 years.

With such background Elijah was not to be left behind. He established a one thousand eight hundred acre farm at Chetambe near Saboti in Kitale, dealing in dairy farming and crop production. He also had another farm called Quintin farm which was also under maize production. The Quintin farm was later invaded by squatters at the

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221 Oral Interview, Wilberforce Kisielo, Former MP Mt. Elgon, May, 2015, Kitale.
222 Oral Interview, David Simiyu Mwangale, May, 12th 2015, Webuye.
223 Oral Interview, D. Mwangale, Op cit.
224 Ibid.
instigation of the provincial administration, when he finally fell out with KANU. Elijah Mwagale also tried his hand at the distribution of Products for companies like Bata and Kenya Breweries. He established a Bata Shoe Shop for distribution of Bata Shoes in Kitale. He was also a beer distributor with Kenya Breweries and distributed Kenya Breweries products in Bungoma and Mt. Elgon Districts.

His flagship company was the East African Heavy Chemicals in Webuye town. The company dealt with the manufacture of water treatment chemicals. The company is still in existence, though it is under the management of Kenyans of Asian origin. In Malakisi, he owned a ginnery which separated seed from lint. He also helped in the establishment of Webuye’s Pan Paper Factory. The factory had been planned for Thika town but he worked to have it relocated to Webuye. He continued to have a very close relationship with the founders of the company and would be seen posing with some of them in photographs. However, Mark Barasa differed with this argument. He argued that the plan to set up the Company begun earlier, during his stint as Member of Parliament.

Mwangale was also instrumental in the expansion programme of Nzoia Sugar Company. However, this expansion was not successful as the Company was left with machinery that it could not use and an expansive debt that it is still servicing up to today.

3.10 Conclusion
This chapter set out to examine Mwangale’s early public life. This included his role as a lecture, work as a Member of Parliament, and his private work as an entrepreneur. The Chapter established that Elijah Mwangale first joined Egerton Agricultural College upon his return from the USA, as a Lecturer in 1966. He worked and rose through ranks to the position of a full lecturer before leaving in 1969 to join politics.

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225 Oral Interview, OP cit.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 Oral Interview, Mark Barasa, Teacher, MP, July, 5th 2015, Chesamisi.
229 Oral Interview, Op cit.
As a Member of Parliament, Mwangale spoke out his mind without fear and his debates were well informed and thoroughly researched. On matters touching on education Mwangale opposed the old system of education, commonly referred to as the 7-4-2-3 system of education. Still on matters education he moved a motion to reform the administration of the University of Nairobi as well as raising issues in opposition to tribalism that was then rampant at the University. Back in Bungoma District Mwangale pushed for the establishment of Harambee Schools as well as Sang’alo Institute of Science and Technology.

In matters concerning health Mwangale pushed the agenda of Harambee Health Centres. Besides, he also decried the inadequacy of medical supplies to hospitals and called for improvement in that area. Finally, he raised the issue of the quality of drugs administered to patients in Kenyan hospitals.

Mwangale raised questions on the quality of trade union leaders who he accused of being big mouths, but completely unqualified to negotiate on behalf of those unions. Mwangale strongly condemned those governments in Africa which created conditions that forced people to flee.

Mwangale tackled issues related to the state of the economy with equal zeal. He called for improvement in Agriculture, Industry, and Land policies, and suggested ways in which the economic sector could be helped to improve. In addition the the assassination of J. M. Kariuki in 1975, propelled Mwangale into the national limelight and the assignment is seen as having been an important turning point in his career. How he handled the issue would advance or break his political career. The J. M. Kariuki probe Committee delivered a damning report to President Kenyatta despite of strong resistance from powerful figures around the presidency.

Mwangale, besides having been an astute politician, he was also a shrewed businessman and strategist who had far reaching influence in the world of business. He tried his hand on many businesses including but not limited to, Vista Ltd, Commercial farming, Distribution of products for Bata and Kenya Breweries as well as the East African Specter.
CHAPTER FOUR


“If I have to choose between justice and disorder, on one hand and injustice and order on the other, I would choose the later” - Kissinger

INTRODUCTION

This chapter set out to examine Mwangale’s work as a Cabinet Minister. The period covered span from 1979 when he was first appointed as a Member of the Cabinet to 1992 when he finally lost his seat as Member of Parliament for Kimilili Constituency. The period saw Mwangale appointed to serve in various capacities. The positions he served included Minister for Labour, from 1979 to 1981, Minister for Tourism and Wildlife from 1981 to 1983, Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1983 to 1987, Minister for Livestock Development, 1987 to 1988, and Minister for Agriculture, from 1988 to 1992. Besides the above, the Chapter also examined Mwangale’s leadership of the KANU Bungoma Branch, which he served from 1976 to 1993.

4.1 Mwangale Appointed Minister

In 1978 following the passing on of the first president and founder of the nation-President Kenyatta- President Moi succeeded him as the second president of the republic of Kenya. Before being chosen to succeed Kenyatta, support had flooded in from all walks of life. KANU Party chairmen in different districts had competed in pledging loyalty to the incoming President. They argued that he should be declared the sole party presidential candidate. Cabinet Ministers had already proclaimed their loyalty to Moi as the head of state.

From Bungoma, the District KANU Chairman, Elijah Mwangale said that his branch supported the cabinet’s wise and timely decision to back president Moi to succeed the late President; Kenyatta. He pointed out that president Moi was highly respected and admired throughout the country for his devotion to duty and enormous


contribution to harambee projects. He added that it was necessary to rally behind his leadership to avoid unnecessary and destructive petty politics.

This was democracy the KANU style. While the constitution called for a vice-president to hold office in an acting capacity for ninety days, then go for an election, it came to pass that Moi succeeded Kenyatta through automatic nomination to the presidency of KANU and the nation without any opposition. The choruses of support could also be seen as the precursor for the psychophancy that would come to typify the Moi era.

President Daniel arap Moi appointed Mwangale as Minister, for the first time in his career, to the Ministry of Labour in 1979. The death of President Kenyatta and the rise to power of President Daniel Arap Moi, therefore became an important turning point in Mwangale’s political direction. With Moi at the helm, Mwangale quickly warmed up to the new president and Moi in turn embraced Mwangale as one of the strongest and most colourful leaders from the Luhya community who he could rely on to provide the necessary support in his leadership. While his fellow parliamentary colleagues from Western province were still not quite comfortable supporting Moi’s presidency in the open, Mwangale already made it known that he was a true Nyayo follower and that Moi was not a “passing cloud” as many, of Moi’s early critics of his presidency, had thought he would be. His support for president Moi saw Mwangale make a remarkable shift in his political style. He shed his radical approach and adopted a more conformist approach that saw him move rapidly close to the President and the ruling party’s top echelons.

By the time of the 1979 elections, Mwangale was already ripe for cabinet appointment. The only hurdle standing in his way was re-election to the National Assembly. When the elections came, Mwangale easily retained the seat with the usual comfortable majority that had become his specialty. On returning to parliament, Mwangale moved straight to the front bench as Minister of Labour. Mwangale threw up a homecoming party at Matili Village, Eastern Bungoma District. During the

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occasion Mwangale pledged to work tirelessly to bring about love, peace and unity among all Bungoma leaders without which he said, progress among the people could not come about. Addressing the mammoth rally at his Matili home in Kimilili location, Bungoma District, Mwangale strongly castigated divisive elements and trouble makers, saying that Kenya’s Nyayo leadership had no room whatsoever for acts that could disrupt peace and development. He called on all Bungoma residents to work as a team and forget tribal differences. All Kenyans, he said, were equal before the government. He added that the supply of water to every home was on the government’s priority list and urged people to start using water to rear grade cattle.

One aspect about the fourth parliament which stood out was that the majority of the new MPs were well-educated and professionals of high regard in various trades. It also had an advantage of the easy adaptability of the young generation, which now constituted a majority vote since lowering of voting age from 21 years to 18 years. President Moi appointed many of the young and highly educated MPs to the cabinet and made others assistant Ministers. Professionals leading Ministries included Prof. Jonathan Ng’eno (Water Development), Arthur Magugu (Health), Joseph Kamotho (High Education), Elijah Mwangale (Labour) and Andrew Omanga (Natural Resources and Environment), Henry Kosgey (Transport and Communication), Robert Ouko (Foreign Affairs) and Daniel Mutinda (Information and Broadcasting). Also in cabinet was a wealth of talent in business, political and administration matters. Both the professionals and non-professionals in the cabinet were expected to trade skills under the dynamic leadership of President Moi, who also endorsed each ministry with highly skilled and trained Assistant Ministers and Permanent Secretaries.

Of the parliament, Kibaki, who was the leader of government business, said that he expected deliberations to be more meaningful to the country than they used to be. He added that it was fortunate that they were dealing with an enlightened parliament. The parliament was a reservoir of people from all walks of life, ranging from businessmen, herdsmen, to lawyers and trade unionists.

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235 C. Nyamboki, *Daily Nation*, parliament of professionals, Wednesday December 12, 1979, P XXXVI.
236 Ibid.
4.1.1 Issues at the Ministry of Labour.

Mwangale wrestled with various issues that faced the Ministry Labour then. Like many Ministers after him, Mwangale tried to fix the minimum wage of workers.\textsuperscript{237} Asked on whether he was considering a wage increase given the then escalating cost of living, he pointed out that the Ministry was aware about increases in the cost of living in various sectors of the economy. According to him the ministry had taken action, after receiving proposals from trade unions and from COTU and that those proposals were being processed by the General Wages Advisory Board. He pointed out that as soon as the process was over, which he hoped was in the next few weeks, a new legal notice to replace what had been there since 1977 would be made and it would reflect the sentiments of the Government.

The minimum wage is dealt with by the Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act. In Kenya a tradition has been established according to which the Minister of Labour, in exercise of his or her powers conferred to him by section II of the Regulation of Wages and Conduction of Employment Act, orders the increment of minimum wages to come into effect on May 1\textsuperscript{st} of every year. In this order he or she follows the recommendation of two bodies, the General Wages Council and the Agricultural Wages Council.\textsuperscript{238}

In 1980, Mwangale being in charge of the Ministry of Labour moved the Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1980 on Economic Prospects and Policies.\textsuperscript{239} The paper sought to review the position of Kenya’s economic conditions and to forecast the future trends as well as to offer an economic package which would enable the ministry to deal with the reality of the situation on the ground then. He argued that devising appropriate economic policies was a dynamic process. Policies must be reviewed regularly and revised in the light of the changed conditions. According to him, in March 1979 the government had published the 4\textsuperscript{th} National Development Plan which chartered the course the Ministry expected to follow during the period through to 1983. He pointed out that the theme of the plan was the alleviation of poverty through creation of jobs and improved access to services and facilities that satisfy basic needs. Special

\textsuperscript{237} The National Assembly Official Report, General wage increase for workers, 12\textsuperscript{th} March 1980.
\textsuperscript{238} The Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act, Section II.
\textsuperscript{239} The National Assembly Official Report, Approval of the sessional papers No. 4 of 1980, 27\textsuperscript{th} May 1980, P.1285.
attention, he said was given in the plan to a more equitable distribution of income and the needs of the under-privileged in the society, including the small farmers, the pastoralists, the landless, the poor and the hand-capped. According to him the Ministry remained committed to the improvement of the welfare of the people of Kenya and that remained the basic aim of development in Kenya. He also pointed out that the emphasis remained on the less privileged members of the society.\footnote{240}{Official Nation Assembly Report, OP cit.}

Mwangale was also faced with various industrial actions during his period at the Ministry. One such involved 3,000 Kenya Carrier’s employees in Thika.\footnote{241}{Nation Reporter, Daily Nation, October Friday 13th 1980, P.8.} How the strike was handled reflected the governments respect for Trade Union Movement. The workers had staged a walk out for some time in total defiance of a return-to-work order by the Labour Ministry and their Trade Union leaders. The employees were demanding the removal of senior staff members in the company’s plantation section. When the workers first staged their walk-out, the Thika Branch Secretary of the Kenya Union of Commercial Food and Allied workers, the Labour Ministry officers in Thika and the factory manager, E.W Pries had asked them to go back to work but they had refused. Labour officers from Nairobi and Nyeri arrived and tried to sort out the problem but no avail.

At nearly the same time, Mwangale said that the government had firm machinery that enabled frank discussion between workers, employees and unions, as a result of which the country had escaped serious strikes and lockouts.\footnote{242}{Ibid.} He made the remarks when he received an eight-man delegation of the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees of the United States, who paid a courtesy call on him at his office. Praising the role of the Kenya’s industrial court he had said, the government could intervene in a dispute directly if necessary for the benefit of the two sides. It should be noted that as Mwangale was praising the labour relations in the country things were not that rosy, as there was an on going strike in Thika.

In early 1980s employment situation continued to worsen. Manufacturing employment had barely doubled since independence and only constituted 2 percent of
the labour force of nearly six million people. Probably 10 percent of the labour force was formally employed, most in the urban areas; many others were in informal or temporary low income jobs. There was massive underemployment amongst farm workers. Regarding trade unions, despite the nominal power of 33 registered Trade Unions and of COTU, the laws requiring compulsory mediation and cool-down periods made striking legally very difficult. Once exception came in 1981 when new rules demanding that the state doctors give up private practice caused a national-wide doctors strike in May of that year; Unions were banned and strikes were broken up.243

4.2 Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife
Mwangale did not last in the Ministry of Labour for long. In 1981 he was transferred to the ministry of Tourism and Wildlife and remained at the Ministry till 1983 when he was moved to the ministry of Foreign Affairs in another reshuffle. While at the Ministry of Tourism he was able to establish the Kenya Tourism Board and contributed significantly to the promotion of tourism in the country.244

Between 1972 and 1982, roughly 35,000 tourists visited the country in a year, mainly from Britain and West Germany. However, there was a downturn in the number of tourists visiting the country during the period coinciding with Mwangale’s tenure at the ministry- between 1981 and 1983. The downturn was attributed to two factors, one being the coup attempt in 1982 and the other being a decline in the foreign exchange earnings. The two factors combined to scare the tourist’s way from the country.245

4.2.1 Attempts to Revamp the Tourist Sector
Mwangale as Minister for Tourism made various attempts to improve the performance of the ministry and increase earnings from it, which were on the downturn. He engaged with the tourist agents who collected funds from tourists and paid for their services. He argued that it was these agencies that the ministry was vigorously addressing itself to in a bid to ensure that every penny which rightly belonged to Kenya was remitted and accounted for. According to him the government

had strengthened the exchange control investigation section of the Central Bank of Kenya, which was busy detecting possible violation of its Exchange Control Regulation. He, in addition, said that the ministry was also in the process of establishing its own investigation unit to co-operate with Central Bank in pursuit of the same goal. The ministry was also co-operating with the Civil Aviation Board and Central Bank as well as utilizing its foreign offices fully, to monitor the travel agencies overseas, in order to ensure that money came to the country. The ministry had advised all tour and travel agents, including those who owned houses at the coast and who had the practice of not paying their dues to do so.246

In an effort to revamp tourism in Kenya, Mwangale convened a high powered seminar on the importance of tourism to Kenya in Nairobi, in April 1981. The seminar was opened by the then Vice President Mwai Kibaki to try and work out a new policy on tourism. Papers were read, points debated and when the seminar ended, the Ministry gave the impression that at last a cohesive policy was about to be drawn up for the country’s tourism industry. A better guess was that, either the new policy had been worked out by the government and the seminar was nothing but a public relations exercise to give the private sector a sense of contribution or being consulted, or that there had been no cohesive thinking by the government on tourism and this seminar had introduced more confusion as to the goals of the industry than existed before.247

Kibaki had tried to set the tone of discussion by asking the participants to ask themselves the rather embarrassing question, was tourism worth it? Did Kenya get a fair return on the money it invested in tourism? Were Kenyans getting all that they should have been getting out of tourism as a foreign exchange earner? In the age of scarce foreign exchange reserves, could tourism justify the foreign exchange the country spent to bring tourists to the country and made them comfortable during their stay? He dismissed the general view that the benefits of tourism were well known and called on the participants to provide hard statistics.248

248 Ibid.
The Ministry appeared to be at a great disadvantage during the seminar.\textsuperscript{249} Whilst the private sector and some of the invited consultants had done their homework, the government presentation at the seminar appeared long on generalization and short of data, with the result that what appeared to come through from the presentation at the seminar was a strong case for the government to give in most, if not all the, demands of the private sector regarding ways and means of going about to improve the tourism industry. As was expected the private sector wanted the government to spent more on tourism promotion, wanted concessions by way of fewer and cheaper licenses, tax rebates, wavering of fees by the government, a drastic de-regulation of the industry by the government. The private hoteliers, promoters and tax operators appeared to have prepared their argument for over a year for some of the papers presented at the seminar dated a year earlier. The papers from the private sector were full of statistics to prove the general thesis that the tourist industry in the country was in shambles, due to mainly mismanagement by the government bodies which affected the industry.

Though the statistics and the papers had been available to the government for a long time, no consistent counter statement appeared to emerge from the government side during the discussion and at the end of the day, Kibaki’s searching questions, which pointed the way for the government to put the private sector on the defense, would take some time before finding convincing answers. In the meantime, two views continued to be associated with tourism in Kenya: the average Kenyan continued to think that tourism was just one of those many loopholes through which foreign based operations siphoned money out of Kenya. While the hoteliers and tour operators continued to insist that Kenya’s foreign exchange problems would virtually disappear if only the private sector could be given the necessary tools and freedom to compete with Caribbean Islands, Singapore, Hongkong and North Africa.\textsuperscript{250}

\section*{4.2.2 Tourist Facilities in Kenya}

During the preparation for the conference of the Heads of States and Governments held in Kenya in 1981 (the organization Of Africa Unity, OAU), Mwangale told parliament that the preparation took to account the facilities that Kenya had. He pointed out that the impression was given out that facilities found in the country were

\textsuperscript{249} The Weekly Review, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{250} Ibid.
foreign owned. According to him, during preparation for such an important summit, other countries usually built villas, special conference halls and special facilities in order to host a conference of the size. He argued that Kenya had done it by utilizing the institutions already found in the country. According to him the government had made a very important decision nearly ten years earlier when it decided to construct the Kenyatta International Conference Centre. He said that the value of the conference then, was ten times the cost with which the government had used to put it up.  

Mwangale pointed out that the hotels in which the head of states and other important dignitaries stayed were almost 70 percent owned by Kenyans or by the Kenyan Government. According to him, the chains of Serena Hotels were owned up to the tune of 72 percent by the Kenyan government, Institutions or Kenyan themselves, Hilton Hotel and the Hotel Inter-continental in Nairobi were owned up to 40 percent by the government through the appropriate corporation in the Ministry of Tourism. He said Kenyans also owned other hotels upcountry in locations like Nakuru, Nyeri, Thika and Kisumu. He argued that the route taken by Kenya towards the participation in the economy was the best approach. It was not through nationalization, but through participation. According to him, that participation had enabled Kenyans to take a very large part of what was then in the country as means of production.

Finally, it can be pointed out that the Kenya Tourism Industry was sailing through doldrums and there were fears that the situation was worsening during the period that Mwangale was at its helm. According to informed sources, returns within the industry had plummeted to such an extent that some hotels and tour operator, particularly along the coast were weighing the wisdom of being in the industry at all. Some thought it was time that they jumped from the sinking ship. Already a modern hotel built two years earlier with a capacity of 172 beds was under receivership and some more were reported to be on the firing line. Plaza hotel, on the North Coast, which had opened its doors to the public in December 1980 was reported to have faced an uphill struggle for survival and was then facing receivership. The plight of the industry, according to the government and industry sources, was mainly attributed to

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252 H. Ng’weno, Op cit.
five factors. The factors included the greatest global recession, poor marketing in the tourist reservoirs of Europe, bad relation between the government and the industry, retention of the earnings of the industry abroad, and black market exchange operation along the Kenyan Coast.\textsuperscript{253}

The crux of the matter, according to both the government and the industry, was centred squarely on the Industry’s earnings in real terms. Over the years, Kenyans had been made to believe that tourism was a major foreign exchange earner, taking second place after coffee. However recently, they had to swallow a bitter pill of reality that, to a large extent, most of the revenue had remained in foreign coffers and was unlikely to find its way to Kenya. In an Interview, Elijah Mwangale minced no words in contending that an international conspiracy did exist, through which some foreign investors in the hotel industry and tour operators retained the largest share of tourism revenue. The said investors remitted to Kenya sums, only enough, to ensure that their Kenyan operations were sufficiently run. Sources at the coast indicated that well-coordinated rackets existed through which tourist were able to exchange foreign exchange on the “black market” at rates higher than the official ones. The foreign money was later smuggled out through international syndicates.\textsuperscript{254}

\subsection*{4.2.3 The Traitor Issue}

One of the most outstanding roles that Mwangale is remembered for, while at the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife, was his conspicuous role in the Njonjo saga. Hardly had Kenyans recovered from the shock of the coup attempts of 1982, than the country was faced with a new and more complicated challenge- the traitor issue. While addressing a public rally in Kisii in May 1983, President Moi revealed that a powerful politician in his cabinet was plotting to overthrow his government, with the assistance of some foreign governments. Mwangale was to actively participate in the revelation of Charles Njonjo as the traitor was.\textsuperscript{255}

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item ibid.
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Njonjo, known to both friends and foes as “Sir Charles” or the “Duke of Kabeteshire”, and Kenya’s first Attorney-General was born from the home of a colonial chief and had his education in South Africa and Britain. He rose from a State Counsel to the post of Attorney-General when Kenya became a sovereign state. He was a personal advisor to President Jomo Kenyatta and a close confidant of President Daniel arap Moi. But behind the façade of loyalty lurked intense ambitions for presidency of the Republic of Kenya.

Moi’s campaigns against Njonjo began in such a way that it appeared the president was only acting as a result of irresistible pressure from people. For a long time Njonjo was not referred to by name, but at the beginning of April 1983 the press acknowledged that he had adopted a low profile and that gone were the days of frequent warning to dissidents and radicals. Later in April, Shikuku captured the headlines with a speech that must have had Moi’s approval, in which he claimed that the leadership of Kenya was full of thieves and hyenas. Speaking at Maringo in Nairobi, he said that there were rich business politicians and civil servants who, four years before, thought that the government headed by president Moi was a passing cloud, and that they were now using money to ruin the country. It was then that Elijah Mwangale, then Minister for Tourism, and a group of Bungoma MPs alleged at a press conference that some cabinet ministers were dissatisfied with Moi. Other leaders from other parts also took to the same chorus.256

Thus far, Njonjo’s name had not been mentioned, though early in May 1983, while the press was speculating about basic division within the Kenyan political leader, Tipis, Shikuku and Mwangale were accused of inciting the public to revolt against the cabinet. The allegation by an ex-mayor of Nairobi, Andrew Ngumba, was supported by a politician close to Njonjo, C.G Kariuki. He said that the trio were confusing the public for their own selfishness and blamed the press for highlighting these issues. Moi himself in a Labour Day speech ordered ministers to stop continuing with conflicts in public, presumably a reference to those criticizing Shikuku’s group, since

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he had earlier claimed in Nyanza that foreign powers were grooming an unnamed person to take over the presidency.257

On 12th June 1983, Njonjo attended a Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) service in his constituency, where the preacher’s sermon had been agreed with him in advance. The sermon in Kikuyu referred to a “limping sheep” that could not lead the flock and the need to find a new leader. The Nation headlined the sermon resulting into a torrent of abuse in the National Assembly. The association between the limping sheep and Moi was denounced and finally Mwangale named Njonjo in parliament as the traitor.258

After that, Njonjo’s fall was rapid. On 1st July 1983, Martin Shikuku explicitly denounced Njonjo. After his fall the press published a full transcript of the parliamentary proceedings in which Shikuku had made four main allegations which included, that Njonjo had always sided with Europeans during the struggle for independence, that he had exercised influence on the judiciary to gain protection from investigation, that over Kshs.1 million from Chase Manhattan Bank and Ksh.340,000 from a London Bank had been deposited in Njonjo’s account and was withdrawn in cash after the attempted coup and finally that in violation of Kenyan law, Njonjo was the owner of an engineering works in Pietersburg South Africa. The implication was that Njonjo had been involved in August 1982 coup and that he was receiving funding from overseas to destabilize the Government.259

Following Shikuku’s denunciation, Moi suspended Njonjo from the cabinet and announced that a judicial inquiry would be made into the serious irregularities. Njonjo resigned both his parliamentary seat and the chairmanship of the Kikuyu Branch of KANU. A Judicial Commission of Inquiry consisting of three judges-Justices C.H.E Miller (Chairman), Justice Chronicle E. Madan, Queen Council (QC) and Justice Mrs. Effie Owour- was appointed on July 1983 to enquire into the allegation made within and outside parliament, involving Njonjo. The commission found that all the allegations against Njonjo, except the crucial one of treason had been proved. In his

speech following the Inquiry Report, president Moi announced his pardon of Njonjo, giving Njonjo’s age and past service to the government as among the reasons for the clemency.260

Joseph Kamotho in a post traitor issue interview, denied their having existed any plan to oust Moi. Of the infamous traitor issue, he said that it was merely a power struggle, and that he never understood why Moi turned against former bosom buddies. According to Kamotho, Moi was a very humble man when he took over the presidency. However, people from other tribes felt that there were too many Agikuyu in government and that a way had to be found to reduce their numbers. He argued that some like Mwangale, Masinde Muliro and Burudi Nabwera believed that one of their own should have taken the number two slot in the government. He swore that neither he, nor Njonjo, nor Oloitiptip planned to overthrow the government. According to him Njonjo was not planning anything against Moi, but that there were personality differences between him and his peers. He said Oloitiptip was a down-to-earth man who might have misread Njonjo’s association with Moi and became close to the former. He adored Njonjo unreservedly because he believed Njonjo was the best friend of Moi and this cost him dearly both in the political and personal front. Kamotho added that the inquiry into the conduct of Njonjo was a waste of public funds as all that was said about him was untrue. He argued that the matter was complicated by the leadership style of the former president. According to him, President Moi listened to too many and got wrong signals which made decision making difficult.261

Njonjo himself had something to share in the post “traitor issue” period. He said that the claim that he had direct support of the Americans and the British with the express mission of forcibly installing him as the president was not true. He added that he was very sad that Moi was misled by some people and instead of checking out the fact, he accepted what he was told to be the gospel truth. He argued that if you are told something and you do not investigate to find out the truth, you can make a very serious mistake. According to him, what Moi did was contrary to what Mzee Kenyatta

261 N. Kiharo, Sunday Nation, Reflection of a fallen insider, June 15, 2008, P.3
would have done. He said that if you told Mzee Kenyatta about one of your colleagues, he would listen to what you said, and then confront you with it in the presence of the person you had accused.  

4.3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mwangale was transferred to the ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1983 and remained in that portfolio until 1987 when he was transferred to the ministry of Livestock and later to the Ministry of Agriculture in subsequent reshuffles. His appointment came on the back of his successful campaign in the 1983 election in which he retained his Kimilili seat. In these elections, Mwangale whose stature was high having worked hard to protect the institution and person of the president, made a mincemeat of the four opponents in the Bungoma East Constituency by amassing 25,666 votes. Sifuma got 5,728 votes with Kisaka and two entrants Wanyonyi Mbita and Raymond Wasike getting less than 5,000 votes between them.

4.3.1 Kenya’s Foreign Relations under Mwangale

A brief examination of Kenya’s foreign policy since independence is helpful in assessing Mwangale’s performance as Minister of foreign Affairs. Since independence Kenya’s foreign policy has shifted through quiet diplomacy, the period of uncertainty and reassessment, and finally Kenya’s involvement in the new cold war politics. To understand Kenya’s quiet diplomacy, Makinda contends that, one has to understand her dependence, the fact that her policies were to a large degree, circumscribed by the dominance of foreign capital. Quiet diplomacy, according to Makinda, was dictated by the circumstances under which Kenya found herself after independence. He argues that Kenya’s foreign policy was shaped by the need to attract more foreign capital, to maintain commercial links with neighbouring states, to ensure security of her boarders and to consolidate political power base. He argues that in pursuit of these goals, Kenya manifested her dependence in three different ways. First, there was the dependence on foreign investments and aid, which ultimately

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meant the predominance of western, particularly British capital and influence. Second, he adds that there was a dependence on the wide East African Market, which meant Kenya’s continued domination of the East African Market. Third, he argues that there was a security dependence manifested in a defense agreement with Ethiopia in 1964 and a number of defense agreements with Britain. He points out that the British government entered into a number of agreements with the Kenyan government immediately after independence. For instance, in 1964, the two governments signed an agreement for the Royal Air Force to establish the Kenya Air Force.  

This was the situation when Mwangale was appointed minister of Foreign Affairs in 1983. During his period as minister of Foreign Affairs, Mwangale had to grapple with issues related to human rights, Kenya’s relation with the USA and the UK, Kenya’s relations with South Africa, and relations with other East African countries.

4.3.2 Kenyan’s Relations with the USA and Britain

By 1986-7, Kenya’s position as Africa’s darling of the west was under threat. Western governments were being pressed to cut aid and admonish the Kenyan government about its actions. Amnesty International was amongst several human rights organizations that publicized the state’s abuses and campaigned for an end to the western support. In 1985-6, Amnesty adopted more Kenyan detainees as possible prisoners of conscience. By 1986, concerned comments were surfacing in the European press. Amnesty coordinated a letter-writing campaign to Moi and Kenya’s high commissioner to Britain, Sally kosgei. Moi, always sensitive on issues of sovereignty was infuriated by the idea that foreign Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) could challenge his actions, and on Jamhuri day, December, 12th 1987, he declared that the so called Amnesty International could go to hell. However, he released more determines at the time.  

In the period 1983 to 1987 the official Kenya-USA relations kept on changing. The relations were of relative friendliness in 1983 but became increasingly hostile as time passed on. According to Macharia Munene three factors can explain this change. First

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265 S.M. Makinda, Op cit.
according to him the United States began to manifest signs of sensitivity to both economic mismanagement and political repression among its client states. Second the Kenyan government was virtually eliminating political freedoms and appeared to condone official corruption and economic mismanagement. Finally, he argues that the activities of American ambassadors to Kenya became more public thereby affecting the practice of diplomacy.\
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Ambassador Gerald Thomas, who served from 1983 to 1986, seemingly got on with Moi and his government. According to Munene, in 1886 ambassador Gerald hosted a commemoration party for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the students’ airlift in which the Kennedy administration had played a part. Gerald pointed to the airlift as an inspired example of historically excellent relations between the two nations. Munene contends that in a July message Gerald added that Kenya was a model for neighbourly relations on African continent. According to Munene this confidence in Kenya’s economic and political stability began to be eroded. He points out that the USA media began to highlight corruption and political repression in Kenya.

According to Munene, Edward Girardit of the Christian Science Monitor wrote in March 1986 that Western business men and donor countries shared blame for the deteriorating situation because they play along or shut their eyes to the abuses because Kenya is a strategic ally, a friend of the West. Gwyme Dyer of the Washington Times wrote that President Moi had devoted his attention to becoming by far the richest man in the country. According to the report Moi’s property holding were conservatively estimated at $100 million and that he had a share in half of most lucrative businesses in Kenya. Munene also contends that there were reports in foreign media that Moi was increasingly becoming dyranical, a development that attracted unfavourable publicity. He gives the example of Richard Reeves of the Baltimore Son who in July 1988 wrote that Kenya was on the edge of disaster. That its democracy was a one-party police state run by a megalomaniac named Daniel arap

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268 Ibid.P.160.
269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
Moi, who seems determined to eliminate free speech and simplify map making by naming everything in the country after himself.\(^{271}\)

Macharia contends that more publicity followed the closure of the University of Nairobi after students protested the expulsion of their leaders. According to him Sheila Rule of the New York Times, wrote that the Students were were charged with holding an illegal meeting and failing to obey the the police. She argued that the clamping down of the students was part of a well orchestrated campaign to silence dissent.\(^{272}\) The arresting of the Mwakenya dissidents provided more fodder to the press. Those arrested, it was reported, were denied legal representation, tortured, and then sent to jail. Among those arrested was Maina wa Kinyati, a history lecturer at Kenyatta University, married to an American.\(^{273}\)

It was under such state of affairs that the ministry of foreign affairs, then headed by Elijah Mwangale, was supposed to provide direction. According to Macharia Munene the government had several responses to such adverse publicity. Ambassador, Wafula Wabuge, in December 1985, wrote that press censorship was unheard of in Kenya, and appealed for sympathy and support instead of abuse. Moi, Wabuge wrote was an internationally acclaimed as a humble, peace loving, wise and astute statesman, whom nineteen million Kenyans trusted and regarded as a father. However, Munene contends that despite Wabuge’s assertion, publications that were critical of Moi were intercepted, local and foreign journalists were warned not to publish negative stories and in June 1986, Moi accused foreign embassies of being rumour factories and breaching diplomatic protocol. The Kenya-American relations were clearly worsening in the period that Mwangale served as minister of foreign affairs.\(^{274}\)

During the period that ambassador Elinor Greer Constable served as the USA ambassador to Kenya from Nov. 1986, relations between Kenya and the USA did not seem to improve. According to Macharia Munene, in January 1987, Secretary of State George Schutz and Congressman Horward Wolpe separately visted Kenya and in both instances the issue of human rights came up. Munene points out that Shutz was well

\(^{271}\) Macharia Munene, Op cit.
\(^{272}\) Ibid.
\(^{273}\) Ibid, P. 161.
\(^{274}\) Ibid.
treated by the Moi regime because he sidestepped rights issues. However, Wolpe, chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Africa was not because he showed great interest in human rights such as detention without trial, treatment of Maina wa Kinyatti, queue voting and the removal of tenure of office for the Attorney-General. Munene points out that Wolpe's meetings were cancelled at the government’s behest. In a press conference that Wolpe gave he denounced what he called repression in Kenya as well as the American passiveness in the face of deteriorating human rights situation in Kenya.\textsuperscript{275}

In response, Elijah Mwangale called Wolpe's remarks scandalous and unfounded as he denied that the government had interfered with wolpe’s meetings. The hostility to Wolpe, Munene argues, helped to focus more attention to human rights issues in Kenya, which as Wolpe had pointed out jeopardised USA aid to Kenya. According to Macharia, this warning became particularly pertinent when in February and March of 1987, Gibson Kamau, a prominent human rights activists was arrested and then detained as he prepared to sue the government over alleged torture inflicted on detainees.\textsuperscript{276} At around the same time Moi accompanied with Mwangale went on an aid-soliciting trip to Washington, where in his meeting with President Reagan and Secretary Schutz, he was questioned about human rights in Kenya. According to Munene, since Moi had questioned about human rights abuses in S. Africa, the Washington post advised that Moi clean up his house first. The state department demanded that Moi investigate and make public charges of the alleged human rights abuses. Moi cancelled his appointments in Newyork and left the USA disappointed and without the promise of increase in aid.\textsuperscript{277}

Mwangale as minister for foreign affairs came face to face with the issue of human rights abuses. How the Ministry of Foreign Affairs handled the issue of human rights and the activities of the exiled dissidents became an important exercise in the eyes of the donors who were increasingly becoming restless and agitated. This can be seen in the way he dealt Salim Lone. According to George Gona, Lone was about to be arrested in June 1982 for participating in political activities, which the state was dead

\textsuperscript{275} Macharia Munene, Op cit, P.162.  
\textsuperscript{276} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{277} Ibid.
set against, but were legal. Gona points out that later in 1986, When Salim Lone was asked by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Elijah Mwangale, he returned, but he was arrested and taken to Nyayo House torture chambers. This incident does not exactly throw light on which side of the divide Mwangale stood, but it does show that he was in the mix, especially as he went about his business as minister of Foreign Affairs.

Back in 1984, Mwangale was in the limelight concerning his handling of Ngugi wa Thiong who was then in exile. Knowing what damage Ngugi wa Thiong’s activities in London and USA could do to Kenyans relations with the donor community, Mwangale went for Ngugi’s jugular, depicting him as a communist extremist not worth listening to. Ngugi wa Thiong’s updated version of the Trial of Dedan Kimathi was dismissed as a communist propaganda by Mwangale. The script of the play had been considerably changed to incorporate references concerning the neo-colonialist exploitation of African peasant and workers. Nairobi felt that the activities of the exiles and their local supporters were damaging to the race relations in Britain, apart from damaging the British foreign policy. It was also felt that more damage was being done by the ripple effect in Kenya of the group’s propaganda.

On October 19, 1984, Elijah Mwangale pointed out that Kenyan dissidents in London were being funded by a bunch of Marxist Communists, who were hostile to Kenya. Mwangale told the dissidents to cleanse themselves of their sins before writing anything on Kenya. He assured Ngugi wa Thiongo, Micere Mugo, and Kihoro that their activities in London were well known. He accused the London group of exploiting Kimath’s name by collecting huge sums of money from some communist embassies for their selfish ends.

Following the hullabaloo, Ngugi’s play was banned by the Commonwealth Institute in London. The Institute was concerned not so much by the play itself as by its controversial presentation at the Africa Centre, where it had been, deliberately, used

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as a vehicle to attack the Kenyan, British, and American Governments by Kenyan exiles and local extremist elements.  

4.3.3 Kenya’s Relations within the East African Region

Mwangale tackled issues related to the situation in the East African region. In the immediate post-Njonjo period, relations with Kenya’s ex-EAC neighbours had improved, but this did not last. Tanzania was looking south for its economic links, and relations remained distant.

Kenya tried to improve her relations with Uganda during the tenure of Mwangale as Minister of Foreign Affairs. On June 20, 1985, Mwangale delivered a special message from President arap Moi to Ugandan President, Milton Obote. Mwangale expressed satisfaction with the results of the then just concluded bilateral meeting between Kenya and Uganda in Nairobi on transport and communication. He pointed out that on matters relating to the East African Community, there still existed a few snags which could be solved.

President Obote in turn expressed willingness to buy Kenya’s transport and communication services. He said that there were a number of items Uganda would like to buy from Kenya in settlement of debts Kenya owed her. Overtime the situation in Uganda worsened sharply, with hundreds of thousands murdered during a brutal civil war, and relations with Kenya became poor. Kenya provided sanctuary to Milton Obote when he was ousted for a second time by the military in July 1985.

Another intervention worthy noting was the 1985 Uganda peace talks in Nairobi facilitated by Mwangale. The Talks brought together the Uganda Military Council, under General Tito Okello and the National Resistance Army under Yoweri Museveni. The talks were concluded on December 17th with the signing of the peace accord. Under the accord, the Military Council was to be reconstructed. The Ugandan head of state would remain its chairman and head of state while the head of the National Resistance Movement would become its vice-chairman.

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However, Museveni declined to return to Kampala to form a new government. Uhuru, a publication of Tanzania’s ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi, quoted Museveni as saying that the peace pact would not be implemented while soldiers of the National Liberation Army (the official government army), continued committing atrocities.\textsuperscript{285} Eventually, the National Resistance Army (NRM), on Sunday, January 27, 1987, seized Kampala and its leader, Yoweri Museveni announced he had dissolved Uganda’s Military Council and that he would constitute a new one in due course.\textsuperscript{286}

However, relations between Kenya and Uganda would remain lukewarm and full of suspicion for most of Mwangale’s tenure in office. A border clash in December 1987 led to deaths on both sides, and Uganda continued to provide a safe haven for Kenyan dissidents. The Kenyans were also fearful of Uganda relations with Libya and Cuba and this was a feature of several Mwakenya cases.\textsuperscript{287}

4.3.4 Kenya’s Relations with South Africa
One of the most important foreign relations issue in the 1980s was the dilemma on how to deal with the racist regime of South Africa and her allies. The issue then was weather or not the Kenyan Government would actively support the stated objective of the Organization of African Union (OAU); that of ridding the African continent of colonialism and apartheid. George Ondeny in his article on the Colonial Roots of Post-Colonial Kenya’s Foreign Policy Behaviour, argues that in 1964 the O.A.U. member states resolved that no African state was to have diplomatic relations with the Republic of S. Africa.\textsuperscript{288} Most African Countries supported sanctions against South Africa. It is therefore important to examine Kenya’s stand on the issue during Mwangale’s tenure at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mwangale’s public utterances during his stint as Kenya’s minister for foreign affairs were, clearly anti-apartheid. In September, 1986, Mwangale argued that Africa faced a greater threat to its political stability, than ever before, from the racist regime in South Africa.\footnote{News Reporter, The Standard, S. Africa is a Security Risk, Nairobi, Saturday, September 27, 1986, P.5.} He said that South Africa had intensified brutality against those seeking freedom and justice within her borders and Namibia and perpetrated acts of aggression, murder, and destruction of her neighbours. He said this while delivering Kenya’s statement at the 41\textsuperscript{st} regular session of the United General Assembly. He added that the rest of Africa could not remain indifferent when their brothers and sisters continued to be subjected to vicious assaults for uncommitted crimes. He demanded for unconditional and immediate release of Nelson Mandela, all other prisoners, and detainees so that they could participate fully in the political process in S. Africa. He also called for immediate lifting of the state of emergency as well as an immediate and complete dismantling of apartheid, among other measures.\footnote{Ibid.}

In July, 1986, Elijah Mwangale told the British High Commissioner to Kenya, John R. Johnson that Kenya and other African countries were disatisfied with the manner in which the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was handling the sanction issue against South Africa.\footnote{KNA, The Standard, Kenya-UK Relations Reviewed, Nairobi, Saturday, July 19, 1986, P. 20.} He added that if the British Government did not change its stand on sanctions against South Africa, more African countries were likely to withdraw from the then forthcoming Commonwealth Games to be staged in Edenburg, UK.

Following tough stands like those of Mwangale, the South African “ghost” that had always haunted the Olympic Games, inevitably caught up with the Commonwealth Games. Top African sporting countries, Kenya included, that had in the past provided fireworks that gave the games the deserved spark, pulled out of the Games and disbanded the camps.\footnote{Omulo Okoth, The Standard, Commonwealth Games, Thatcher Stand on South Africa Triggers off Mass Boycott. Nairobi, Monday, July 21, 1986.} The Asian and Caribbean nations were also poised to make their move.
The withdrawal of many African countries from the Commonwealth Games was reported to have widened a rift between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Queen Elizabeth. The Sunday Times went farther and quoted unnamed advisors of the Queen as saying that the Queen was not only critical of Thatcher’s stand against sanctions, but was also dismayed at the Prime Minister uncaring and socially divisive approach to domestic politics.

On June 16, 1986 while commemorating the 10th anniversary of Soweto Day, Mwangale pointed out that Soweto Day was a day filled with bitter memories. He pointed out that this was a day when the racist regime in S. Africa brutally murdered school children who were demonstrating against the kind of education they were getting in Soweto. He argued that the increased demonstrations by the oppressed people of South Africa should be a warning to the racist regime that no amount of violence will intimidate the people. Mwangale called on those powers that supported the racist regime to heed the call for adoption of compressive sanctions against South Africa. He said that the government of Kenya believed that the existence of apartheid was not only an insult to all Africans but also a threat to peace and stability in the world.

That was a very strong argument coming from Kenya’s chief diplomat at the time. Whether or not Kenya was committed to this stated position is open to debate. There are those who would say that Kenya’s dependency on foreign capital placed her in a precarious position from which she was too vulnerable to make a bold and independent stand on the South African issue. George Otieno Odeny, points out that in 1964 the OAU member states resolved that no African states was to have diplomatic and commercial relations with South Africa because of her policy of apartheid. According to him Kenya did not live up to that resolution and continued to permit airlines flying to and from S. Africa to refuel in Nairobi. Besides, during the

Njonjo saga, Shikuku revealed that Njonjo was the owner of an engineering works in Pietersburg, South Africa, in violation of Kenya’s foreign policy.296

Elsewhere in Africa the situation was not any better. The relations between Kenya and Sudan remained that of hostility in the period when Mwangale was Minister of Foreign Affairs.297 The discovery of oil in Sudan, Sudan’s Islamic revolution of 1983 and the fall of the Numeri regime in 1985 initiated a period of instability and the growing North-South tension. In turn Kenya provided support to Colonel John Garang’s Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Garang lived in Kenya at the Kenyan Government expense from where he led his campaign for secularism and South Sudan’s autonomy. He was well connected with Kenyan elite. As conditions worsened in Southern Sudan, 250,000 Southern Sudanese died from hunger and diseases. In response foreign aid agencies established a major relief operation in Lokichoggio in Turkana, Kenya.

4.3.5 A Political Tourist

Elijah Mwangale’s closeness to the president was again subjected to serious test in 1985 when he was linked to forces out to torpedo the political career of the then Vice President Mwai Kibaki. It all began when Kibaki accused some unnamed politician of visiting his home district in Nyeri, and holding night meetings in big hotels. In what was to become the “political tourist” affair Mwangale found himself denying the claims that he was actually the political tourist Kibaki was referring to. In his usual style, Mwangale used the opportunity of the denial to make some unflattering remarks about some leaders who, according to him, were operating below expectation of the high position they held and the public trust and responsibilities they carried.298

The foray Mwangale was making in Kibaki’s backyard could be put in its proper context by examining what was happening in Kikuyuland then. Having humbled Njonjo, Moi shifted his alliances amongst the Kikuyu for a second time. Now

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296 See also Traitor Issue.
seeking to limit the influence of Kibaki and his allies, Moi briefly co-opted two groups for which he had little time in the past; the Kenyatta era Kiambu elites and the ex-Mau Mau veterans of Nakuru and Nyeri.\footnote{C. Hornsby, \textit{Kenya, A History Since Independence}, London, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012. P. 403.}

Moi tried to use Kikuyu ex-Mau-Mau to win the support of poorer Kikuyu. In Nyeri it was Waruru Kanja who re-emerged from political wilderness to help take on Kibaki.\footnote{C. Hornsby, Op cit.} Kibaki and allies, therefore, saw Mwangale’s visits as Moi’s efforts to undermine him politically. It was alleged that Mwangale had gone to the district to strategize with Kanja on how Mwangale could wrest the vice presidency of KANU from Kibaki in the next national KANU elections to be held in July that year. In a rather uncharacteristically vigorous manner Kibaki reacted to Mwangale’s visit by declaring that Nyeri did not need a political tourist.\footnote{H. Ng’weno, \textit{Makers of the Nation}, Nairobi, Ntv, KHB, Co-production (DVD).}

Mwangale in turn denied any political motive for his visit and criticized Kibaki for being preoccupied with trivial issues beneath his stature.\footnote{Ibid.} The two would remain at loggerheads from then on. As it turned out Mwangale did not take Kibaki on for the post of the national Kanu Vice President in the elections held in July1988. Indeed he did not contest any national post in KANU, contenting himself with helping Moi strengthen his control of the ruling party’s executive council. In the 1988 elections Kibaki retained his position as Vice President of the party.

\subsection*{4.4 Ministry of Livestock Development}

In 1987, Mwangale was transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Livestock. He held the portfolio for one year till 1988 when he was appointed to the Ministry of Agriculture. A background examination of the livestock industry shows that milk and meat products have remained key components of Kenya’s Agricultural Sector. Roughly half of Kenya’s cows were kept by pastoralists: the other half by commercial farmers and smallholders. Privatization came early to the meat processing, as the upland Bacon Factory and the Kenya Meat Commission, the state-owned processors, both collapsed in 1985. Both had suffered from private sector competition, they had no monopoly in processing, but could not vary their
prices or off take on commercial grounds. Both had been in financial problems since 1976-7 which became self-reinforcing once farmers realized they could not trust them to pay on time. The 1960s and 1970s had seen little growth in milk production. In contrast 1985-9, a period coinciding with Mwangale’s presence at the Ministry saw a boom, with huge increases recorded year on year. Production marketed through the KCC’s production factory doubled between 1982 and 1989, a result of greater production and replacement of home consumption and local sales with cash sales.303

4.4.1 Shortage of Animal Feeds
While at the Ministry, Mwangale addressed a serious shortage of dairy, poultry and pig feeds in 1989. According to him the shortage had risen due a number of factors. The first one was that the manufacturers of animal feeds were not supplying adequate quantities to the farmers. Apart from meat, bone and blood meal which were on short supply due to the closure of the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) and the Uplands Bacon Factory, the other raw materials were available in sufficient quantities. As a remedy, he said the prices of animal feeds were to be gazetted at the factory gates only, while prices for whole-sellers and farmers were not gazetted. Therefore, he said the government planned to gazette prices for all animal feeds from the manufacturer to the consumer level. He argued that that would streamline the pricing structure of animal feeds.

Secondly, he pointed out that the government was now encouraging farmers to grow more oil seed crops which would provide both oil for human consumption and industry and also oil seed cakes to be used for the production of animal feeds. He added that this was being done by the extension service unit of the Ministry. In addition he said, the importation of the raw materials which were not locally available, especially vitamins and antibiotics was now being done rapidly. He also said that plans were underway to reopen the Uplands Bacon Factories.304

4.4.2 Exploitation of the Pontential in Arid and Semi-Arid Areas.
Given the potential that existed in arid and semi-arid areas, Mwangale emphasized the importance of exploiting such areas in the country. According to him the

304 The national Assembly Hanscord, Question by Private Notice, Wednesday, 12 July, 1989.
government’s attitude in the past was to emphasize what he called the ‘greenbelt’ movement of the country. He argued that Kenya had about 21 to 28 districts that were fortunate enough to have a lot of rain water and therefore they constituted a ‘greenbelt’. He added that the country had forgotten to ensure that the other 21 districts which ran from Turkana, Baringo, Pokot, Wajir, Marsabit all the way to Isiolo, Garissa, Tana River, Kajiado and so on, had water. According to him, there was need to change the attitude of the people and that Kenya had to consider the fact that the only area of expansion for the country was the 80 percent of the total area of the country which was arid. One major source of income for people in the arid and semi-arid areas was livestock which could not survive without water. According to him, the government should plan properly to make sure that a substantial amount of money was provided to enable the areas develop dams and water pans for the animals. He added that his ministry should not be given KShs23 million but KShs200 to KShs300 million or even KShs1 billion in order to expand the economy. He agreed fully with the plan of pumping water from Lake Victoria to the highest point in the country like Timboroa. He said that he had been recently in China with the president and that the Chinese had undertaken a study to determine the type of funds and resources required for such a project.305

Such pronouncement which would have transformed the country remained just that – pronouncement. No serious undertaking were carried out to implement them. As a result, the North Eastern part of the country has remained exposed to vagaries of nature and poverty.306 The potential that Mwangale pointed out has remained unexploited up to today. Kenya, out of incompetence, corruption, and negligence, has completely failed to take advantage of the noble ideas generated over time to transform herself.

Mwangale also pointed out that decontrolling the price of meat and other incentives given to the livestock farmers, had made them enjoy the highest average income than any other sector at the time. He added that this had been brought about by the fact that the government had increased the prices of milk. He enumerated various benefits

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305 The National Assembly Official Report, the Minister of Livestock Development, Tuesday, 3rd October, 1989.
enjoyed by livestock farmers. According to him farmers were happy that the government had put up a major research infrastructure: the veterinary services. The majority of vaccines in the livestock industry were produced in Kenya, by Kenya and for Kenyans. He added that out of the veterinary laboratories, Kenya was able to export the vaccines which were now being used, not only within East Africa, but also in many other parts of the world. He added that there was no other country in Africa that had a bigger disease control programme than Kenya. Kenya had a problem because of movement of stock of animals from the neighbouring countries such as Somalia and Ethiopia which had diseases. Such countries, according to him, did not have disease control programmes as was the case in Kenya.  

Concerning the Kenya Meat Commission, Mwangale pointed out that the entire meat processing programme in the country was being reorganized, and he hoped that in the near future the ministry would be able to provide slaughter houses in Isiolo so that the animals could be slaughtered there before they were brought into the market. He added that plans were underway to provide a slaughter house in Garissa as well. More slaughter houses were to be established at Tana and Marigat or Kerio Valley so that the animals were slaughtered at the source rather than being transported to Kenya Meat Commission.

Such plans were noble and had they been implemented they would have gone along way into solving some of the problems facing the people of the North Eastern Region. However, they remained unimplemented until the onset of devolution which is now opening up the area afresh. At a local level Elijah Mwangale is credited with the construction of a modern slaughter house in Kimilili town.

4.5 Ministry of Agriculture.

In 1988, Mwangale was moved to the expanded Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, after the 1988, elections which he won through queue-voting. Mwangale made it at the nomination stage by garnering over 70 percent of the vote. His popularity remained high and it was not until 1992 that Mwangale was shaken from

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308 Ibid.
309 Oral Interview, Chaka Patrick, KANU chairman, Kimilili Constituency, June 4th, 2015, Maeni, Also Amtalla Pwoka, Schoolmate, Former senior chief, May 9th, 2015, Kimilili.
his seat by a new entrant, Mukhisa Kituyi, assisted by a strong opposition wave, ushered in by multiparty politics.\textsuperscript{310}

Elijah Mwangale’s appointment to the Ministry of Agriculture was important in many ways. Elijah Mwangale’s father had established himself as an agricultural elite and therefore, Elijah Mwangale had had first hand experience as he grew up. The Quaker church had insisted on inculcating life skills among its followers, agriculture being one of them. His training had also prepared him in this area. He majored in agriculture at Egerton and West Virginia University and later joined large scale farming. Mwangale’s transfer to the Ministry of Agriculture was, therefore, to him a home coming of sorts.

4.5.1 The Grain Politics

During the period that Mwangale was at the helm of the Ministry of Agriculture, Maize remained Kenya’s staple crop and was produced by both the small farmers and large commercial producers in the former white highlands. Wheat was increasingly popular and was grown mainly in the Rift valley. The government, through the National Cereal and Produce Board (NCPB), controlled the pricing, movement and sale of both crops, although in practice, large volumes of maize were still consumed or traded privately. Production which had dropped recovered and stabilized at around 2.5 million tons a year during 1985-92, reflecting good rains and relatively high producer prices. But Kenya’s per capita food production continued to decline by more than 2 percent a year between 1980 and 1987, increasing the country’s need to import food and becoming a serious concern to policy makers.\textsuperscript{311}

In the second half of the 1980s, partly in response to the 1984 famine, rather than liberalizing, Kenya tightened controls. Proposal to give maize millers the freedom to purchase their requirements direct from farmers without going through maize and produce boards had been planned since 1970s but were never implemented. The key issue during Mwangale’s stint at the Minstry, was how to produce enough domestic

\textsuperscript{310} H. Ng’weno, \textit{The Weekly Review}, (Ed) Kimilili, October 30\textsuperscript{th} 1987.

maize to avoid shortages and keep the prices low for urban consumers without liberalizing imports, which would hurt the grain barons of the Rift Valley.\textsuperscript{312}

According to Mwangale, in a report to Parliament in 1992, the government was aware that Kenya was importing maize and that Kenya imported wheat and rice every year, as well. He pointed out that Kenya had good soils and ecological zones which could allow it to grow all the food that it required. If Kenya utilized the potential of seed with the research work that had been done in areas concerned with food and livestock production, Kenya could produce enough food. He gave a survey of various limiting factors. He pointed out that the inputs a farmer required were imported; the fertilizers, chemicals and machinery were all imported. However, he also pointed out that the government had given incentives or subsidies to agriculture as all agricultural inputs imported in the country, came in duty free. He added that there were also other incentives that included the removal of a fee that was being charged on spares and other items that came into the country.\textsuperscript{313}

Mwangale argued that Kenya was looking at the possibility of decontrolling the price of maize, but that would be done only at the right time. He was of the opinion that Kenya would only do that when it had sufficient maize being produced. The government had also established massive storage facilities throughout the country and according to him the country was now able to store as many as 16 million to 17 million bags of maize in the stores. He added that that was a tremendous achievement, which was being maintained at a very high cost to the government in the support of the marketing of the crop.\textsuperscript{314} Locally the maize silos in Bungoma town were put up during Mwangale’s stint as Minister of Agriculture.\textsuperscript{315}

However, during Mwangale’s stint, the World Bank called for privatization of the National Cereals and Produce Board. The World Bank’s regional vice president for Africa, Edward Jaycox, said that the monopoly of state marketing bodies in the purchase and distribution of agricultural produce should be reduced to facilitate free marketing through private sector participation. He wondered why it was necessary for

\textsuperscript{312} C. Hornsby, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{313} The National Assembly Official Report, the Minister for Agriculture, Tuesday, 5\textsuperscript{th} May 1992.
\textsuperscript{314} National Assembly Official Report, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{315} Oral Interview, Amtalla Pwoka, Former Senior Chief, May 9\textsuperscript{th}, 2015.
the NCPB to handle the marketing of cereals. He described the board as overstaffed and a burden to the farmers. However, Mwangale maintained that the NCPB should remain a buyer of the last resort.316

4.5.2 The Coffee Sector

The 1980s saw instability in the coffee industry, although it remained the country’s largest foreign exchange earner until 1989. Two thirds of Kenya’s coffee now came from its 360,000 small holders. Production per hectare was among the highest in the world. The The Kenya Planters and Cooperative Union (KPCU) was still the sole processor and main miller and regulator. The country’s production was rewarded during 1984-6 by a second spike in world coffee prices in which prices exceeded the 1976-7 boom. However, 1986 was the last year of real coffee profitability. World prices fell and farmers became increasingly dissatisfied as payment was eaten by a chain of coffee organizations, including County Councils, Local Co-operatives, the KCPU and Coffee Board of Kenya.317

Mwangale tackled the various issues that were facing the coffee sector at the time. He could at times ban planned Coffee Board meetings. On December 2, 1990, he cancelled a Coffee Board of Kenya meeting which was scheduled to discuss strategies for a series of pre-coffee conference meetings in the districts.318 He also directed that there will be only one item in the agenda at the district pre-conference meetings to elect the delegates for the January 11 conference. During the district pre-conference meetings, farmers would speak their minds about the industry and suggest ways to improve it. The implication of the cancellation was that the annual report and account for the coffee board for years 1986/87, 1987/88, 1988/89 which had never been presented to the farmers, would not be given. The last coffee conference had been held in 1987. Mwangale also gave new orders on the way the pre-coffee conference meetings would be conducted and supervised. He said that the elections of the delegates to the coffee conference will be supervised by District Agricultural Officers and witnessed by District Co-operative Officers.

However, according to observers of the coffee industry, the action was contrary to the coffee Act which clearly stipulated that the Coffee Board was supposed to conduct the pre-conference meetings and the coffee conference. According to Section 12 (1) of the Coffee Act, cap 333, the Board should at least once in every year convene a conference of delegates for planters. The Act further states that the members of the Board appointed by the minister shall be appointed from the panel of names submitted by a conference and hold office for a period not exceeding three years as the minister may specify and may be eligible for reappoint. During his stint as Minister of Agriculture, it can be argued that, Mwangale improperly influenced the Coffee Board and never allowed it to work freely, as provided for by the law.319 At local level, in his Kimilili constituency, there were those who pointed out that Mwangale helped to establish coffee factories. Such factories, according to them, included Kibisi Coffee Factory, Kaptola Coffee Factory and Khamulati Coffee Factory.

4.5.3 The Tea Industry

The government’s interest in expanding tea production was evident and the industry prospered. Production doubled between 1980 and 1989 to the point where Kenya produced more than 10 percent of the world exports. Small holders’ production had increased especially mainly around Mt. Kenya, with the development of local factories and planting programmes supported by foreign donors. By 1985, small holders controlled 43 percent of the marketed tea, with most of the remainder coming from big plantations in Kericho. The Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) remained a regulatory and producing body, one of the most successful agricultural parastatals since the 1960s in delivering services and containing costs. It had few politicians on its board.320

In 1986, in a change of direction, the government established a new parastatal; the Nyayo Tea Zone Corporation, to produce tea from farmers inside forest reserves. The goal of the Tea Zones were to create a natural ecological barrier, between peasant producers and forests, producing tea, reducing encroachment on the remaining forests and providing jobs. The KTDA was not consulted regarding the decision. The new parastatal developed 17 boundary tea estates throughout the highlands over the next

few years from Mt. Kenya to Uganda border. Tea production rose but there were protests that the zones were undermining the prices and that there were too few KTDA factories to process the new tea. The tea zones project was heavily politicized, managed directly by the Office of the President (OP) and its head was kalenjin ex-PC and Moi loyalist, Isaiah Chelaget. Anti-government activists claimed that its covert aims included weakening of control of the tea industry by (mainly Kikuyu) small holders. The tea zones’ mixed mandate of agricultural production and ecological protection proved difficult to maintain but remained self-financing.321

Mwangale’s stint at the Ministry of Agriculture was also laced with what came close to a fertilizer scandal. There were reports that linked Mwangale to a controversial transaction between a company in which his brother was a director and the state owned Kenya Tea Development Authority. However, the reports carried a titanic of unproven claims. What was not in dispute was that the East African Heavy Chemicals Ltd – the company in which Mwangale’s brother, Richard Mwangale was a director, applied for a license to import fertilizers for the crop year 1988/89. The application was vetted by the fertilizer coordinating committee, a body composed of representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture, Finance, the Office of the President and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development and which had a secretariat at the Ministry of Agriculture. The company was allocated a quota of 7000 metric tons of fertilizer type 25.5.5+55. The country’s total fertilizer requirement that year was 270,000 metric tons and the largest quota went to the Kenya Grain Growers Union (KGGU), the Mwanga Cooperative Union and the MEA Ltd.322

East Africa Heavy Chemicals proceeded to make arrangements for the imports and a consignment of the fertilizer arrived in Mombasa in October 1988. Mwangale insisted that there was nothing irregular in the transaction, telling a press conference the previous week that East Africa Heavy Chemicals was only one of the many companies importing fertilizers and that it was KTDA who approached the company to supply it with fertilizer after the former realized that it could not meet its fertilizer needs from its regular suppliers in time. However, preliminary observation could suggest that that the minister’s assertion gave only part of the story. There was

evidence that it was the company that approached the KTDA with an offer to sell them fertilizer. The offer was apparently made in a letter dated July 1st from the company to the KTDA.\textsuperscript{323}

According to correspondence between the company and the KTDA, a letter written by C. M. Irungu of the KTDA referred to “your letter of offer to supply to us 7000 metric tons of fertilizer”. The letter proceeded to give Heavy Chemicals the terms under which the KTDA would accept to be supplied with the fertilizer. It is noteworthy that the question of who initiated the transaction was pertinent to the whole saga because an allegation had been made to the effect that the KTDA did not need the fertilizer it was supplied with and that the state corporation was compelled to buy fertilizer that it did not require. The dates on which the transactions took place were telling.\textsuperscript{324}

According to correspondence, the offer by Heavy Chemicals was made on July 1\textsuperscript{st} 1988. The KTDA accepted the offer three days later in a letter dated July 4\textsuperscript{th} and signed by Irungu. The application for an input license was also made on July 1\textsuperscript{st} and approved on July 6\textsuperscript{th}. It is also noteworthy that KTDA had insisted on an exact time for delivery. It had insisted that it was a fundamental condition to that contract that Heavy Chemicals delivered the fertilizers at Kilindini by August 15, 1988 without fail, failing in which the contract would lapse, at the company’s own cost.\textsuperscript{325}

Whether or not the KTDA saga raised questions of conflict of interest was an open-ended question. According to Mwangale, the deal was done above board and therefore the matter of conflict of interest did not arise. He denied that he exerted pressure on KTDA which at the time came within the armpit of his ministry, to buy the fertilizers from Heavy Chemicals. Mwangale insisted that there was nothing fishy, shady or dubious in the transaction. Mwangale also denied that fertilizer amounting to some 30000 tonnes was dumped in a warehouse belonging to a sugar factory in Western province. He said that the company had made a loss on the fertilizer deal, arguing that they had hoped to make money negotiating easy interest rates on the finance of the

\textsuperscript{323} The Weekly Review, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{325} Ibid.
exports but they delayed in the delivery of the fertilizer and had wiped out the interest concession his company had negotiated.\footnote{The Weekly Review, Op cit.}

In a sense, the KTDA saga illustrates the problems the country experienced with the management of import licensing for fertilizers which began in 1979 as a measure to conserve foreign exchange at a time when reserves were low and fertilizer costs had risen. Licensing was also seen as a means of increasing the number of firms marketing fertilizers in Kenya and to stabilize the market in the face of fertilizer mountains resulting from aid donors. All firms importing fertilizer had to have an import license. Applications were reviewed by the Fertilizer Coordinating Committee. In theory, the committee gave weight to companies that had prior experience in importing fertilizer. However, the policy had the effect over the years, of driving the more experienced importers out of the market, leaving it to KGGCU and many new firms, most of which had neither marketing outlets nor distribution systems, nor the experience and capital to ensure timely imports.\footnote{H. Ng’weno, The Weekly review, More Questions than Answers, June 16, 1989, P.22.}

4.5.4 The Sugar Sector

During Mwangale’s stint at the Ministry of Agriculture, Kenya’s sugar production was growing and peaked in 1989. Mumias Sugar, once considered marginal, had proved a success and was now producing nearly half of Kenya’s sugar. The sector faced many difficulties though. In 1988, the Ramisi factory in Kwale collapsed as did Miwani in Kisumu. Nzoia Sugar embarked on a series of expensive expansion, which left it saddled with large loans and under-utilized equipment. Kenya’s production was inefficient and returns to farmers were low, despite the fact that retail prices remained well above the world market prices. This was in part because the European Economic Community (EEC) quotas and American Preferential Trade System depressed world prices and some producers exported sugar at below cost. Kenya’s demand exceeded supply and from 1985 onwards, despite two decades of investment, Kenya became a sugar importer once more. With the wide gap between local and import prices, domestic shortages and corrupt administrative environment, the consequence was sugar imports were organized by insiders.\footnote{C. Hornsby, Kenya, A History Since Independence, London, I. B. Tauris, 2012. P. 436}
In 1986, Muliro publicized a scandal whereby companies associated with civil servants and ministers had been licensed to import 26,000 Lorries of sugar during shortages. By 1987, such imports were of increasing concern to western donors. There were allegations that Moi and Abraham Kiptanui imported so much sugar during 1987 that the KNTC, the sole distributor, could not buy it all and was unable to pay the factories for their deliveries for months. It was also alleged that shortages were being artificially created, to allowed pre-planned imports. In one case in 1990, critics alleged, 75000 tones of sugar were imported and sold at prices more than double the gate-controlled price. To ensure this happened, KSh3 million were allegedly placed in a minister’s account, KSh500000 into an official’s and KSH1 million delivered to the Office of the President.\textsuperscript{329}

There was a growing tension between policy and elite interests which appeared ready to risk the survival of the industry for personal gains. Over the next three years, cane production fell from its peak of 5 million metric tones in 1989 to 4 million tones in 1992, leading to more imports. The worst problems with the sugar mills appeared at period that sugar imports were landing at the docks. In 1992, bizarrely, Kenya was simultaneously exporting and importing large quantities of sugar.\textsuperscript{330}

In 1988, Mwangale was pressurized in parliament to explain the state of Miwani and Ramisi Sugar Factories, and explain when the Busia factory would be built. According to Mwangale, Miwani and Ramisi sugar factories had ceased production and were then under receivership. He added that the impact of the two factories closure was on overall sugar production in the country was negligible. The two factories, he said, produced about 24,500 tons of sugar which accounted for about 5 percent of the total sugar supply in the previous year. He said that deficits would be minimal during the years in question and would easily be accommodated through the carry-on stocks from 1987. He therefore, concluded that there was likely to be no shortage that should be bridged during the year 1988. However, due to foreseen shortfalls in the sugar production in the next five years, he said, the government had decided to establish two new factories, one in Busia and the other one in Yala. The

\textsuperscript{329} C. Hornsby, Op cit.
construction of the factories would commence as soon as investors had finalized the packages for their establishment.\textsuperscript{331}

Pressurized more that it was only the previous week that he had said that Kenya was not importing any sugar through Kilindini port, he said there were two types of sugar used in the country. There was the refined sugar which was used by the bottling plants and food industry. Then, there was the ordinary sugar that was used in drinks. He added that the refined sugar in the past had been partially obtained from the Miwani Sugar Factory production. This, he said, was because the milled sugar from Miwani had been converted into refined sugar. He added that since Miwani Sugar Factory closed, Kenya had been forced to import refined sugar used in industries. He said that it was only the previous day Coca Cola Plant in Kisumu had been threatening to close down because of that problem, but that the problem was being addressed. Regarding ordinary sugar that was used in drinks like tea, there was enough.\textsuperscript{332}

The sugar industry seemed to be on a growth trajectory and had a lot of potential, during the period that Mwangale was Minister for Agriculture. However, combined actions of individuals who seemed to be interested in lining up their own pockets at the expense of sugar millers, mismanagement and unexplained expensive attempts to expand some factories, eventually brought down the once vibrant industry. The same machinations seem to be on the increase as seen in the case of Mumias Sugar Company that has brought the company to its knees.

4.5.5 Agricultural State Corporation

For decades, state regulation of agriculture had limited waste and maintained quality standards. However, many marketing boards were inefficient and some were being used as tools for a re-distinctive social policy.\textsuperscript{333} Liquidity was becoming a chronic problem with knock-on effects in late payments to farmers. Most agricultural parastatals had begun to lose money, some never fully recovered. Like the government itself, they financed their losses by borrowing, but interest payment became an increasing component of their costs. The major factor in their performance

\textsuperscript{331} The National Assembly Report, Ministry of Agriculture, 6\textsuperscript{th}, July, 1988. Also Oral Interview, Burudi Nabwera, May 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2015, Kiminini.
\textsuperscript{332} The National Assembly Official Report, Minister of Agriculture, 6\textsuperscript{th} July, 1988.
was inflexible pricing, under-capitalization (especially in sugar factories), high levels of borrowing and poor operational management, itself a product of politicization, corruption and inefficiency.

4.5.5.1 The Agricultural Finance Corporation

The AFC was also facing liquidity problems because of unpaid debts. It was financed by the treasury and by cheap foreign loans to offer seasonal finance to farmers. Although the terms were generous, many loans were never repaid. By 1988, loan defaulters were estimated at KSh2.3 billion out of a loan portfolio of KSh3.6 billion. Most of the AFC’s loans by value went to larger farmers and it too was suspected of exhibiting political and ethnic biases. Officials came under pressure from above and below to write off the loans, ignore defaults or charge interest rates below commercial terms, another example of how administrative practices could be used to subsidize certain communities and became a source of ethno-regional tension.334

Mwangale tried to make the Agricultural Finance Corporation a viable institution. Ever since it was established as the primary agricultural lending institution in Kenya, it had operated exclusively as a lender. This had prevented the institution from tapping funds from the mass of Kenya’s small savers and farmers, thus limiting its growth and ability to serve farmers effectively. The fact that AFC had operated only on one side of the credit market, lending, had also prevented it from access to the larger financial market in Kenya, thus inhibiting the channeling of liquidity from other sectors of the economy to the agricultural sector. In 1989, Mwangale, the Minister for Agriculture, announced that AFC was soon to become a deposit-taking institution. He said that it was one of the measures to be taken by the government to improve the AFC’s revenue base.335

However, making the AFC a deposit-making institution would not be the recipe for increasing the corporation’s effectiveness. There was evidence that the AFC’s inability to raise funds to lend had been due to lack of loan discipline. The organization’s schemes had been marred by massive loan defaults, partly as a result of the fact that the AFC had not been vigorous in serving foreclosure notices to

334 C. Hornsby, Op cit.
defaulters. Mwangale said that the AFC would in future institute very strict lending terms that would call for stringent credit discipline on the part of the borrowers. He added that the decision by the government to write off loans owed by some of the AFC borrowers should not be interpreted to mean that loans would be written off whenever farmers failed to pay. “The money lent to you is borrowed money which must be paid”.

One of the pitfalls in performance of the agricultural credit system still left much to be desired. First, the government had realized that a disproportionate scheme of resources both from the private and public sector had gone to financing transfers rather than the creation of new assets. Indeed, much of the money lent to the sector had gone into financing land transfer programmes in settlement schemes and in subdivision of large scale farms. Secondly, although commercial banks devoted a significant proportion of their lending to agriculture, there was evidence that a great deal of money was diverted by borrowers to non-agricultural activities.

4.5.5.2 Nzoia Sugar Company

Burudi Nabweri, in an interview, said that parastatals were formed by the government at independence, to provide investment capital where indigenous capital was limited. Those in the agricultural sector were supposed to oversee development in that sector. However, he pointed out that many have remained a problem because of corruption and mismanagement. As a result of which most have turned out to be a big burden to the tax payer. However, he pointed out that that should not have been the case. According to him, if a parastatal has a good chairman and a good board, it should be able to make money and be profitable.

He argued that during Mwangale’s period as Minister for Agriculture, the leadership at Nzoia was not purposefully structured to deliver results. Mwangale, a Bukusu, was Minister for Agriculture. Fred Wafula, Chairman of the Company, was also a Bukusu from Matili village. The managing director was also a Bukusu. Such an arrangement, he argued, was bad because there were no proper checks. He said Mwangale should have appointed anyone from elsewhere in the country, as long as the person was a

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336 H. Ng’weno, Op cit.
337 Ibid.
performer. He added that it was during Mwangale’s stint as Minister for Agriculture that Nzoia Sugar Factory embarked on very expensive expansion, eventually landing the company into a huge debts which saw the company became an unprofitable. The company sourcesd spares from the USA which were meant for a very huge factory, not a small one like Nzoia. The spares were abandoned at the miller’s yard where they have remained in disuse up to today. The company was unable to pay the debt and therefore, the treasury stepped in to service the debt on its behalf.\textsuperscript{338}

According to Burudi, Nzoia Sugar Company is located in an area which has very rich soils for sugarcane growing. According to him, Nzoia was recovering 20 bags of sugar from one ton of sugarcane while in the Nyanza region, the recovery rate was 15 bags per ton. When he was appointed chairman of the board of directors Nzoia Sugar Company, he was also given a good team to work with. He also enjoyed good will from local politicians, as well as President Mwai Kibaki whose government gave them 300 Million with which to pay farmers. As a result of their efforts, Nzoia Sugar Company began making money and farmers were able to earn good money from the sugarcane deliveries. After six years at the helm, the company’s accounts were healthy and by the time they left in 2007, the Company had billions in its account. He added that Nzoia Sugar Company can perform given proper management. However, for it to perform, the Bukusu should stop championing for one of their own to be at the helm of the company.\textsuperscript{339}

\textbf{4.5.6 Mwangale and Corruption}

Corruption reached frightening levels during the period that Mwangale served as Minister of Agriculture. According to Hornsby, politicians and civil servants were players in the game they were refereeing without effective scrutiny.\textsuperscript{340} According to him, senior figures would own or be sleeping partners in businesses they were regulating and ensure they received contracts, licences, credit, and information. He argues that the 10 per cent of Kenyatta era became 25-50 per cent, sinking some projects, while others appeared constructed primarily for rent-seeking opportunities they gave. He adds that Moi Elites needed to extract more, more rapidly, because of

\textsuperscript{338} Oral Interview, B. Nabwere, MP, Minister, KANU General Secretary, 22\textsuperscript{nd} May 2015, Kiminini.

\textsuperscript{339} Oral Interview, Op Cit.

their fragile political and economic position. They did not have the economic base that the Kikuyu had created (with assistance of the government).\textsuperscript{341}

Elijah Mwangale, as part of the Moi Elites, was mentioned severally in relation with corruption.\textsuperscript{342} He was also mentioned by the New Scotland Yard Report on the disappearance and death of Robert Ouko, in relation with corruption. According to the report Mwangale, Biwott, Saitoti and Kiptanui were some of the politicians frustrating efforts by Robert Ouko to revive and complete the construction of the Kisumu Molasses Plant. According to the report, Briner Matten, who had been conducted by Robert Ouko, to revive the company, had ran into problems. For her company to carry on with the project she was supposed to pay a commission on the total amount of the contract to the following; Biwott 15%, Saitoti 10%, Mwangale 10%, Kiptanui 5-15%, and Aslam 5-10%\textsuperscript{343}.

The effect of such acts was that contracts were given to companies whose profits were so affected by the size of the commission that they were incapable of doing a satisfactory job even if that had been their intention. This could have indirectly affected the performance of Kenya’s economy in the long run.

It is equally important to note that Elijah Mwangale was mentioned in the Troon Report for a totally different but equally serious reason. The report mentions Mwangale in relation with a statement that Mwangale made concerning the activities of two KANU expellees, Matiba and Rubia, both Kikuyus. He is quoted as having said, “If they (Matiba and Rubia) did not stop their activities the government had the machinery to destroy them. The decision of the two to press for dissolution of parliament and creation of more parties shows that they have no respect for the constituency of the presidency and I would like to tell them to be warned since there will be no second warning. Pruning of disgruntled elements in the country began after independence and it would continue until trouble makers were weeded out. All those who were playing with the founding father of the Nation were destroyed and

\textsuperscript{341} C. Hornsby, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{342} See also the Fertiliser and the Nzoia Sugar Company expansion scandals mentioned above.
those trying to play with President Moi will also face similar consequences”. Troon drew attention to the fact that Mwangale had been part of the delegation that had accompanied Robert Ouko to Washington and his statement could have carried more meaning than was accorded.

The statement coming from Elijah Mwangale was unfortunate. Mwangale had, in 1975, chaired the Probe Committee into the Murder of J. M. Kariuki, which ushered Mwangale into public limelight and impacted greatly on his future career. His statement appeared to be a complete turn around from the ideals for which he had stood for earlier in his career. This was a reborn Mwangale. A stranger to everyone including himself. Mwangale had undergone a complete metamorphosis from the Mwangale of yesteryears. It is true what they say, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. To what then did Mwangale owe this transformation? Was it the power that he thought he wielded, or his ambition to eventually rise to replace Moi, or was it because of the need to protect his business empire. Whichever the reasons, Mwangale had changed for worse and he would pay for it, in full, come the 1992 multiparty elections.

4.6 KANU POLITICS

In the 1980s, Moi began to use KANU as an alternate instrument of rule. For the first time in Kenya’s history, during 1984 – 9 the party became a true focus of authority, relegating members of parliament and even the provincial administration to a subordinate position. Long the enemy of socialism, Moi briefly reinvigorated KANU to create a mass movement of East European lines. The new stress on the party had little ideological content, apart from the obedience to the president. This was encapsulated in Moi’s Nyayo philosophy, which had gradually changed meaning from Moi’s following in Jomo Kenyatta’s footsteps, to that of everyone else following in Moi’s. KANU was supreme, but this was because the president wanted it that way. Although Kenya took on the appearance of the party state, time would show that it was an alternative expression of personal and elite rule. As US Ambassador Smith

Hempstone later noted, Kenya was not a one–part state: it was a “one man state”.\textsuperscript{345} It was in such arrangement of things that Kanu branches played an increasingly important role.

### 4.6.1 Bungoma Kanu Branch

Elijah Wasike Mwangale was elected the chairman of Bungoma KANU Branch in 1976, replacing J. W. Khaoya. He served in that capacity until 1993 when he was voted out. During that period, Bungoma district earned the reputation of being one of the most politically united districts in Kenya. Unlike its sister districts, Kakamega and Busia, Bungoma steered clear of internal feuds and political battles that had gone on in Kakamega and to a lesser extent, in Busia. The measure of Bungoma’s political tranquility was the fact that it was one of the few districts in the country which did not take any disciplinary action against any of its leaders: none of its leaders were suspended or expelled from KANU.\textsuperscript{346}

Bungoma, under Mwangale, preferred the path of non-interference in the political leadership of the district and its leaders traditionally refrained from joining Kakamega’s long standing political battles. In fact, Bungoma leaders ignored claims of supremacy over the other districts by neighbouring politicians, behaving as if they did not care about anyone’s claim of being the spokesman of the province. In the 1985 KANU grassroots, election which provided a fairly accurate show of the measure of political stability in the district, KANU sub-branches and local party members rallied behind their elected MPs and ensured that the three got posts in the branch. Mwangale, was returned unopposed as the branch chairman and in the manner of KANU elections, where voting was by blocs, Mwangale’s group, which included all parliamentary representatives, swept the board many of them unopposed. The Bungoma central MP, Peter Kisuya, went in as branch secretary. The only incumbent who did not have a seat in the branch was the Mt. Elgon MP and an assistant minister, Wilberforce Kisiero.\textsuperscript{347} However, it should be pointed out here that Kisielo, coming from a minority tribe in the district- the Sabaot, this was poor arithmetic as it did not show the inclusiveness expected of a senior politician of Mwangale’s caliber.\textsuperscript{348}

\textsuperscript{347} H. Ng’weno, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{348} Ibid. p. 16. Also Oral Interview, Kisiero W. Former Mt Elgon MP, Assistant Minster, Bungoma KANU Branch Treasurer, May 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2015, Kitale.
As a branch chairman, Mwangale exercised remarkable influence on the activities of the branch. He was a key figure in Bungoma district since he was first elected to the party branch in 1976 and was also key in shaping the local party politics over the years. His stature as the undisputed spokesman of the district was given a boost when he was appointed to the Cabinet as Minister for labour by President Daniel arap Moi, who had assumed the presidency the previous year, following the death of Kenya’s first President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. As an aggressive politician who had been endowed with substantial wealth, Mwangale went around the district generously distributing large amounts of money, at various fundraising meetings in the district and other parts of the country.349

What the Bungoma leaders eschewed at the district level, they compensated for at the national level. Mwangale, Sifuna and Kisuya all featured prominently in the national limelight because of their controversial statements. Mwangale featured prominently in Parliamentary Select Committee that investigated the mystery of the assassination of the popular Nyandarua North MP J.M Kariuki. He also featured prominently in the Njonjo traitor issue.350

Mwangale’s firm grip on Bungoma’s political affairs appeared to have continued unabated well into late 1980s. Most of his political opponents bid their time and waited for the right opportunity in order to strike. That opportunity was provided with the fall of Josephat Karanja from the position of vice president, on 1st May 1989 when he resigned, following the passing of a vote of no confidence in him by parliament. By way of precedent, setting vote of no confidence, parliamentarians then turned their missiles towards so-called Karanja men. The hunt was in top gear and was widening as politicians threatened to name prominent politicians who had dealings with Karanja either in politics or in business.351 The Jigger (burrowing flee) had been removed, but many little eggs remained in the wound and had to be killed.352

349 The weekly Review, Op cit.
Mwangale must have been an anguished man when he rose in parliament to go on record disowning the disgraced former vice-president. Mwangale then went on to paint a picture of himself as a senior and long-serving Minister responding to a great deal of pressure in coming out to publicly distance himself from a long time personal friend and a major business associate, who had been pressured to resign. Mwangale’s emotional pitch before an attentive parliament must have been personally agonizing, but his turnaround over his relationship with Karanja may have been designed to ensure his own survival in the event of a continuing fall-out after the former vice-president’s speedy exit from the center stage and perhaps indicated that he faced much more severe pressure than other senior politicians who were happy to associate with Karanja when he was in a position of relative influence.\(^{353}\)

The performance in parliament only succeeded in presenting Mwangale’s opponents in Bungoma district where he was KANU chairman and preponderant political force, with an opening to go for his political jugular, with the MP for Kanduyi, Maurice Makhanu, coming out with a statement the following day calling on the Minister to resign his cabinet and party position. Makhanu swiftly likened the Minister to the apostle Simon Peter who disowned Jesus when the going got tough. He argued that this was not the kind of leader this country wants because nothing can prevent him from disowning his country and the head of state in times of trouble. Makhanu charged that Mwangale had earlier watered down a call by the Bungoma KANU branch for Karanja’s resignation and that he had even gone to the extent of trying to defend the former vice-president at a branch meeting the previous month by suggesting that Karanja was the right person for the job.\(^{354}\) It was evident from Makhanu’s challenge that the Kanduyi MP was after Mwangale’s political blood from the very beginning of Karanja’s debacle.\(^{355}\)

With the matter now making headlines in the press, national attention focused on Mwangale and he came out the following day to deny all that Makhanu had accused him of. Mwangale took his turn to accuse Makhanu of deliberate attempts to tarnish his image and wondered why Makhanu, who had attended the party branch meeting,

\(^{353}\) The Weekly, Op cit.


\(^{355}\) Ibid.
had not come out earlier to make his complaints. It was after Mwangale’s response that president Moi brought the debate to an end during an impromptu meet-the-people tour of Alliance High School. In a brief directive, the president told politicians to end matters that had been dealt with in parliament regarding some individuals. The president, however, left the affair open-ended with the rider that if similar issues arose, they should be dealt with by KANU branches in accordance with the law. But coming from the president, the pronouncement pre-empted further moves that could have been in store for Mwangale and effectively shifted the burden to Makhanu who was then summoned by the Bungoma branch to substantiate his allegations. What would have happened to Mwagale had the president not spoken is now debateable. However, the intervention itself was significant in the sense that it was, in a way, a warning to Mwangale’s detractors that the Minister was still on the right side of the president.

On the home front, five hundred KANU delegates from the district were reported to have passed a vote of confidence in the minister at the Kanduyi meeting. In addition, Mwangale’s victory seemed sealed when the Bungoma KANU executive met and reprimanded Makhanu for his allegation, even placing him on a three month probation which was a novel and intriguing party disciplinary measure. Makhanu also apologized to the Bungoma KANU branch for any statements he had made that might have embarrassed the branch chairman, Mwangale. The following day, Mwangale followed it up with KANU branch delegates meeting, where it was reported that the branch passed a vote of confidence in his leadership.

Though Mwangale might have come out of Kanduyi meeting feeling somewhat victorious, he was to suffer a rude shock after an event that turned the whole affair into something of a farce. The Daily Nation cartoonist, Madd, used the occasion of Makhanu’s apology to come out with a caricature depicting a kneeling Makhanu apologizing before a stern faced Mwangale for associating Mwangale with the “kneel-before-me-politician”. That was a label Karanja was tagged with at the outset of the two-month assault that culminated in his downfall when Kiambu leaders accused him

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356 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
of demanding that they acknowledge his pre-eminence. Makhanu later denied that he ever knelt before Mwangale suggesting that the allegation was prompted by widespread rumours in Bungoma district. He was then joined by the then assistant minister for foreign affairs and MP for Sirisia, Joseph Muliro in denying that the branch executive committee had passed a vote of confidence in Mwangale with both arguing that such a proposal, made by the minister himself in chairing the executive committee meeting, would have been highly irregular.359

Makhanu and Muliro, by then, established as Mwangale’s principal foes in Bungoma, kept up the pressure the following weekend at a Harambee rally in Malakisi location, in Muliro’s constituency, where they charged that Mwangale had boasted that he was their spokesman and the only politician in Bungoma district with the access to the president. They also again rejected the supposed vote of confidence in Mwangale charging that the minister had imposed the resolution on Bungoma KANU branch. Makhanu later followed it with a charge that a politician (interpreted to mean Mwangale) had poured millions of shillings into Bungoma in order to buy support. He also pointed out that the politician was trying to cover up past mistakes by coming out with allegations of plots to destroy him and other senior politicians.360

Mwangale must have been troubled by the manner by which the two freshmen MPs had taken him on. Sources close to him suggested that they could have done so only with encouragement from other more powerful political personalities.361

After years of political calm, Bungoma district now appeared set on a troubled course. The much vaunted unity it had enjoyed and taken pride in appeared to have been dissolved into thin air. The local political leadership appeared polarized into hostile camps. Joseph Muliro, MP for Sirisia, and Maurice Makhanu, MP for Kanduyi, broke ranks with the rest of the leaders led by Elijah Mwangale. The rift began when in the wake of the fall of Josephat Karanja Makhanu challenged Mwangale to quit his ministerial and party post on account of his past business association with Karanja.

359 H. Ng’ewono, Ibid. p.6.
360 H. Ng’weno, Op cit.
361 Ibid.
Makhanu who had humbled himself before the executive branch meeting, going as far as signing a written apology and promising to rally behind Mwangale, changed his mind and carried on with widened attacks on Mwangale. The two persisted in their attacks even when Mwangale maintained a studied silence. Makhanu and Muliro made it clear that they wanted to see Mwangale shunted to the side in the district’s politics. This desire had been demonstrated the previous year when the two joined forces to oppose Mwangale in the party elections held later in the year.  

The challenge mounted by Muliro and Makhanu angered and embarrassed Mwangale in equal measure. He is said to have literally cried before the delegates as often happened when he was annoyed. He is said to have retorted that he did not understand how his secretary (reference to Muliro) could challenge him for the party post. As often happened when angered, he was only soothed and calmed by women delegates singing Christian hymns to him.  

Mwangale, being in the cabinet and the Bungoma KANU branch chairman, there was plenty at stake. There was no doubt that if he were to fall the MPs would stand a good chance of benefitting. When Makhanu and Muliro entered Bungoma politics, they represented a new force which, ironically arose from the previous order of things, where Mwangale was comfortably dictating political events with the rest of the MPs behind him. The district had four constituencies then; Bungoma East (Kimilili) represented by Mwangale, Bungoma South (Kanduyi) represented by Lawrence Sifuna, Bungoma Central (Sirisia) represented by Peter Kisuya and Mt. Elgon by Wilberforce Kisiero. The electoral boundaries commission carved out of Bungoma East a new constituency and named it Webuye. Mwangale won the Kimilili seat without much fight through nomination by queueing, garnering over 70 percent of the vote. Kisiero also easily won the Mt. Elgon seat. Candidates for Kanduyi, Sirisia and Webuye went on to the secret ballot.  

It was during the campaign rallies that Makhanu and Muliro began the anti-Mwangale crusade in Bungoma. At their campaign rallies, the two accused the minister of  

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363 Oral Interview, Pwoka Amtalla, Former Senior Chief, May 9th, 2015.  
364 H. Ng’eno, Op cit.
supporting their opponents - Sifuna and Kisuya. Mwangale never denied the allegation and the two went on to win the Sirisia and Kanduyi seats. They remained opposed to Mwangale. This opposition was to be manifested more openly six months later when Muliro leading the challengers’ camp vied for the post of branch chairman. Mwangale thrashed them effortlessly and they were never able to capture any seat.365

Another bone of contention was the resentment of other parts of the domination of the eastern part in the areas’ leadership. Since Mwangale assumed party leadership in 1977, he had retained a decisive grip on local party affairs. With his elevation to the cabinet in 1979, he became the district’s senior most politician and for many years steered clear of political infighting. Makhanu’s and Muliro’s efforts to chip away at Mwangale’s power base in an apparent bid to reduce his clout in Bungoma politics had little success, mainly because of the party structure which was solidly behind Mwangale. That explains why in his attacks on Mwangale, Muliro called on the entire grassroot machinery to vote out Mwangale. Makhanu on his part claimed that Mwangale had bought the entire party leadership.366

4.6.2 Ousted but Saved by Moi

In February 1992, Elijah Mwangale was ousted from the Bungoma district KANU chairmanship but regained his seat a day later thanks to President Daniel arap Moi’s intervention. His ouster and subsequent reinstatement to the Bungoma district KANU chairmanship was a story of ironies. As a KANU hawk that had been projected as the party’s greatest asset in Western province, Mwangale was hardly a candidate for such an ignominious fall from the KANU post. If there were people on which KANU had relied to shoot unrestrained salvos at the opposition, Mwangale was one of them. His hawkish posturing made him so unpopular with the opposition that the vice-chairman of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), Masinde Muliro, had vowed to abandon his traditional Cherengani stronghold, in the next elections, to contest in the Kimilili constituency just to ensure mwangale’s defeat. It was ironical therefore, that it was not the opposition, but KANU itself that delivered Mwangale a quick

365Ibid. Oral Interview, Hon Kisiero, Former Mt Elgon MP, Bungoma Kanu Branch Official, May 10th, 2015, Kitale.
366H. Ng’weno, Op cit.
knockdown that week before he beat the count to resume the district’s KANU chairmanship. The next day, after Mwangale’s ouster President Moi nullified it.\textsuperscript{367}

The President told a public rally in Kitale town on the following Tuesday that Mwangale’s ouster was illegal, as the officials had not consulted party headquarters as required. Among the things that appear to have irked the President were remarks attributed to sambu soon after the branch coup, when he said that he would seek to bring Muliro back to KANU. “Who sent them to look for Muliro?” Asked the then President.\textsuperscript{368}

The reasons given for Mwangale’s ouster were that he was a liability to KANU and the government, and that he had caused many people in the district to defect to FORD. According to Makhanu, KANU’s image had been seriously tarnished by dictatorial party stalwarts such as Mwangale, who were responsible for the problems that the nation was facing then. However, observers were not particularly impressed with the reasons and wondered why it had taken the branch officials so long to realize that Mwangale was a liability. According to them, Mwangale’s problems were more likely to be related to the role he had been playing in Western province ever since the country’s return to multi-partyism. It had been an extremely busy time for Mwangale who, together with his cabinet colleague, Burudi Nabwera, had emerged as KANU’s pointman in Western province. During the previous two month, Mwangale had been campaigning strongly for KANU, with the overriding theme in most of his political speeches and actions being that he was out to deliver the Luhya community to KANU during the 1992 general elections.\textsuperscript{369}

Observers believed that Mwangale’s problems might have arisen from his own overzealousness in seeking to be seen as KANU’s most effective man in the area. Mwangale’s message to the Luhya was that they were the 2\textsuperscript{nd} largest tribe in the

\textsuperscript{367} H. Ng’weno, \textit{The weekly Review}, (Ed) Beating the count, February 28 1992, p.3.
\textsuperscript{368} Ibid. Also Oral Interview, Hon Kisiero, MP, Bungoma KANU Official, May 10\textsuperscript{th}, 2015.
country and could not therefore be ignored. Yet, he pointed out; the Luhya had held neither the country’s presidency nor his its vice-presidency.\textsuperscript{370}

Unfortunately for Mwangale, some of his colleagues in KANU began to view his stance as somewhat mischievous, suspecting that he was directing his words to KANU as much as to FORD, and that he was indirectly telling President Moi to consider a Luhya for the KANU vice-presidency if he wanted to win the Luhya support. Others believed that the Luhya who Mwangale wanted to be vice-president was none other than himself and that his remarks were motivated more by ambition than anything else. But if the KANU leadership had let that pass, it did not ignore Mwangale’s subsequent suggestion that the presidency be rotated among the country’s various tribes. Addressing a public rally, Mwangale had been on his regular theme about how the Kikuyu and the Luo have already had a go at the presidency through the late Mzee Jomo Kenyatta for many years and the vice-presidency through Odinga and Mwai kibaki, when he suggested that other tribes should also have a chance at the two posts. He then went on to suggest that the presidency should be rotated in order to ensure fair play in the distribution of the country’s top seats among various tribes.

The suggestion was subjected to various interpretations, the most prevalent in the KANU circles being that Mwangale was, in effect, also calling into question President Moi’s continued occupancy of the seat. If Mwangale’s argument were taken to its logical conclusion, it would also exclude Kalenjins from the presidency, and Mwangale was immediately accused of going against KANU’s support for President Moi as president and, by extension, seeking the presidency himself. This view was publicly expressed by an assistant Minister for Wildlife, Moody Awori, who asked Mwangale to curb his unbridled ambition to be the 1\textsuperscript{st} Luhya president. The matter was raised again by the KANU delegates who ousted the Minister from the party’s branch chairmanship, claiming that he had embarrassed the Luhya community.\textsuperscript{371}

Mwangale’s gaffe played into the hands of his rivals in Bungoma and it appeared as if they had convinced KANU headquarters that he had become a liability and needed to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[370]\textit{The Weekly}, Ibid.
\item[371]\textit{The Weekly Review}, Op cit.
\end{footnotes}
be removed. While it was highly unlikely that Sambu and his group could have moved against Mwangale without the tacit approval of KANU headquarters, observers were not agreed on the extent to which Mwangale had indeed, become a liability to KANU. While some of his careless and hawkish statements had hurt the party’s image at the national level, there persisted a strong view that Mwangale remained the strongest political force on the ground in Bungoma district, and that his removal might not necessarily be in KANU’s best interests. This might explain president Moi’s decision to reverse the situation. Mwangale had dominated Bungoma district politics ever since he became its KANU chairman in 1976 and it must have occurred to KANU that, in the multi-party era, Mwangale was likely to deliver more votes for KANU than the new team led by Sambu.\footnote{Ibid.}

Wilberforce Kisiero, a former MP for Mt. Elgon constituency remembers the events that preceded the ouster vividly. He says they got word from above, in a highly placed position that they should remove Mwangale since according to the source, “Amemena pembe sana.”\footnote{Oral Interview, Hon.W. Kisiero, MP, Fomer Assistant Minister, May, 20th, 2015, Kitale.} They got hold of the district committee and went to Eldoret where they met and plotted the ouster. They spent the night in Eldoret and the following morning they held a meeting in Bungoma where they announced the ouster. He added that unfortunately the president was coming to kitale and he(Kisiero) went to meet him at Moi’s Bridge. When the president saw him, he fired him (Kisiero) and wondered who had told them to remove Mwangale. He accused them of being followers of Muliro and that they were out to undermine the party’s position in Western Kenya. He added that it was then that he realized that the said source had not sought Moi’s views on Mwangale’s ouster. Inside information later confided in Kisielo that Mwangale had gone to the State House and told Moi that those who had ousted him were Muliro’s followers and crooks that did not have the party’s interests at heart.\footnote{Oral Interview, Op cit.}

On the issue of Mwangale’s ouster, Burudi Nabwera said that it was clear someone up in the KANU hierarchy wanted Mwangale out of the way. He, however, wondered whether they achieved anything by it as all those who replaced Mwangale fell way
below him in rating and performance. He said that Mwangale’s ouster marked the beginning of an end of KANU’s reign in western.\textsuperscript{375}

4.6.3 Elusive National Kanu Post

Mwangale, a forceful minister during Moi’s one party reign had always been an ambitious man with very big dreams and they remained just that – big dreams. He never succeeded in rising at the national KANU post. He first showed interest in a national seat in 1978 when he vied for position of national chairman. During the campaign he took the unprecedented step of placing front page advertisement to trumpet his candidature. His catch line at the time was “Remember Chairman Mwangale”. This was seen as an attempt to capitalize on his chairmanship of the J.M Kariuki assassination probe committee a few years earlier. Although, Mwangale did not win the seat, he emerged in a respectable second position which sadly could not take him anywhere in the party hierarchy.\textsuperscript{376}

He remained without a serious national office until 1979 when president Moi appointed him to the cabinet. Mwangale soon emerged as a forceful personality willing to wage battle on behalf of the president whenever required. This was particularly evident in 1983 when he became the first person to name Njonjo in parliament as then widely talked about, then unnamed, traitor being groomed by foreign governments to usurp power. That is a role that he would remain proud about right up to his exit from politics.\textsuperscript{377} In him the KANU establishment found a friend that could be used to get rid of any enemy from within or without.

Mwangale was also in the news in 1985 when he was identified as the leading operative behind a plan to destabilize the then vice-president, Mwai Kibaki, in his Nyeri district. That culminated in the celebrated political tourism issue when Mwangale was accused of making secret visits to Nyeri hosted by the then minister for information and broadcasting, Waruru Kanja, to plot ways and means of removing Kibaki at the 1983 party election. Kibaki went on to retain his seat without opposition putting to rest speculation to the effect that Mwangale was all set to offer a challenge.

\textsuperscript{375}Oral Interview, Hon. B. Nabwera, MP, Minister, KANU Secretary General, May, 22nd, 2015.
\textsuperscript{376}H. Ng’weno, \textit{The Weekly Review}, (Ed) Beating the counts, Feb. 28\textsuperscript{th}, 1992
However, Mwangale continued snipping at Kibaki whenever the opportunity presented itself, especially in the two years preceding the 1988 general election, when Kibaki was under a general onslaught both in Nyeri and on the national political stage. However, by the time of the election, when it was clear that Kibaki was headed for the chop, Mwangale had also dropped out of contention to succeed him.\textsuperscript{378}

Mwangale is also said to have had a keen interest in the post of KANU General Secretary which was then held by Burudi Nabwera, who after serving for three years was edged out. It was said that at the time, Nabwera’s colleagues at the national level were not particularly impressed by his performance and during the countdown to the party polls, it was widely speculated that the person most likely to take over from Nabwera was the then Minister for Agriculture, who was also the Bungoma KANU Chairman, Elijah Mwangale. Mudavadi was undergoing medical treatment in Britain at the time, but as soon as he came back he indicated that he wanted to be secretary-general. Mudavadi and Mwangale had not been Seeing eye to eye for many years apparently over provincial supremacy and it appeared as though Mudavadi’s main reason for contesting the post was a means of ensuring that Mwangale did not end up with too many titles and attendant clout. Mwangale was not prepared to tangle with Mudavadi and promptly dropped his plans for the post and settled for a position in national executive as one of western province’s representatives.

The National KANU elections that followed were orchestrated and every candidate was elected unopposed. Moi remained President and Karanja replaced Kibaki. The other seats were allocated on ethno-regional basis. Oloo Aringo a Luo replaced Omolo–Okero as chairman. Mudavadi a Luhyia, replaced Nabwera as secretary-general. Similarly, Ntimama, a Maasai, replaced Tipis as treasurer and Kalonzo Musyoka and Davidson Kunguru were also allocated seats based on regional consideration.\textsuperscript{379}

Mwangale stood a good chance at going for the post after the death of Mudavadi. Given Mwangale’s earlier interest in the post and the fact that he was gracious enough to step aside and allow the ailing Mudavadi to take it, he now stood as a leading

\textsuperscript{378} The Weekly Review, Ibid.
contender for the post. As it were, only new developments could change the situation for Mwangale. That is what happened when a vice-president was chosen from the Rift valley, meaning that Central province which had been deprived of the same, had to be compensated with the post of the secretary-general of the party.  

Mwangale who had had close shaves in the past had one major other close shave in 1987. In this one he survived without any major public show of strength. In 1987 as a minister for foreign affairs, he told a press conference in Europe that he would defy any summons issued to him by the KANU disciplinary committee on the subject of anything he had said in parliament. Mwangale was at the time responding to suggestions by the western press that the growing strength of the party had neutered parliament, with summons issued against the minister for labour, Peter Okondo, for having criticized the committee in parliament being a case in point. Mwangale got a rude shock on his return when the KANU disciplinary committee summoned him based on the response, accusing him of belittling the party. However, the move which could have proved an embarrassment to the government was quietly dropped. The committee was not long afterwards disbanded for what Moi accused its members for having let power get into their heads.

4.6.4 The Dawn of Multiparty Politics

Even as he became aware of the consequences of his political decisions, under the changed political realities, Mwangale stuck with KANU and President Moi to the very end, even as his political survival was threatened in the process. Mwangale continued to soldier on trying to fight off the strong opposition blowing in Western Province and in his Kimilili Constituency at the time. In 1990, in reaction to Smith Hempstone’s remark that congress would give aid to countries that nourished democratic institution, defended human rights and practiced multiparty politics, Mwangale accused Hempstone and the American Embassy of being the conduit through which dissidents in the United States poured money in the country for the purpose of disrupting Kenya. He added that Kenya would not tolerate treasonable activities by Americans living in Kenya. Hempstone dismissed Mwangale’s

\[\text{380} \quad \text{Weekly Review, Op cit.} \]

\[\text{381} \quad \text{Weekly Review, Op cit.} \]
arguments as ‘arid nonsense’ and pointed out that “it is well known that if anyone
knows about illegal money, he knows it”. 382

In response to the New Year message delivered by Rev. Timothy Njoya, at St.
Andrew’s packed congregation, drawing a parallel line between the falling
dictatorship of Eastern Europe and the situation in Africa, and by extension Kenya,
Mwangale weighed in very strongly. Mwangale, who was then Minister for
Agriculture and Livestock Development, demanded that those who made statements
such as Njoya’s, even if from the pulpit, should be detained without trial. According
to Njoya’s argument, the one-party system in Africa had completely failed to be
democratic and should therefore be replaced with multiparty systems which, in his
view, were more consistent with democracy. He contended that the one-party political
idea had been manufactured and imported into Africa from Eastern Europe by such
pioneer African nationalists as the late Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania and the late Modipu Keita of Mali. What had been most irksome in the view
of many of Njoya’s critics was his contention that the one-party political system in
Kenya was ‘imported’ from of all places, Eastern Europe. He had said that Africa
could not convert the one party political system that they had adopted from Eastern
Europe into a democracy by baptizing it with local names. 383

In August of 1990 following the demise of Alexander Muge in a gristy road accident,
Mwangale, speaking in Kajiado, he termed the death as part of a “passing
cloud”. 384 However, to many observers the remark was curious given the circumstances
surrounding Muge’s death. It raised question as to whether or not Mwangale new
more than he was leading out.

Mwangale’s non-compromise stance saw him demand the detention of multi-party
advocates when the debate on the issue began in the early 1990, claiming those
advocates were out to remove President arap Moi from power. He called for the
crushing of multi-party advocates the same way Mzee Jomo Kenyatta destroyed

382 G. P. Okoth, Africa at the Beginning of the Twenty First Century, Nairobi University Press, 2000,
P.170.
383 H. Ng’weno, The Weekly Review, (edit) Njoya at It Again, January, 12th, 1990, P.3, See also C.
enemies of his government. There were those who argued that over time Mwangale joined the group of politicians whose careless statements armed critics with ammunitions to whip the government.385

In defense of KANU, Mwangale seemed to take his war against his fellow politicians from Western Kenya. In what was billed as a great showdown to determine the undisputed champion of Western Province, Mwangale challenged Martin Shikuku and Masinde Muliro to a duel at Kakamega Bukhungu Stadium. However, Muliro and Shikuku cried off, saying that Mwangale, who was the meeting’s promoter and convener, was fiddling with rules. What had been a popularity contest had turned into both a loyalty contest and a KANU recruitment drive. However, Shikuku argued that he was going to take over as the convener and promoter and set a new agenda to include critical national issues such as the state of the economy, inflation and unemployment, frequent price increases, shortages of medicines at government hospitals, the fate of the Turkwel Dam and many other issues.386

Prior to the first multiparty general election, President Moi seemed to place a lot of effort on Western Province. Moi seemed keen on winning over the province. Western Province was one of the areas in the country that were expected to provide the vote that would determine the presidential race, thanks to the constitutional amendment that stipulated that a winning presidential candidate must garner at least 25 percent of the vote in at least five of the country’s eight provinces. KANU leaders had been struggling to counter the opposition movement in the area before the President finally joined them. Before the president left for Western Province, KANU stalwarts led by Mwangale, then the Minister for Agriculture and Bururi Nabwere, then Minister for Information and Broadcasting, had been preaching the need for the Luhyas to remain in KANU if the community expected any benefits in the multiparty era. Mwangale had started on the mission even earlier telling the Luhyas that, as the second largest tribe in the country, they deserved greater recognition by supporting KANU while warning them against fragmenting their interest by joining different political parties. He repeatedly told them that the Luhyas would at the time be expecting to get the vice

presidency and eventually the presidency after President Moi retired. His argument was that the opposition especially FORD, which had provided the greatest challenge to KANU in the province, was basically a Luo-Kikuyu affair from which the Luhya would be sidelined. In fact, Mwangale and other KANU leaders in the area seemed to have believed that multiparty politics was about favours and rewards, with communities at the centre of things benefiting while those on the periphery were shunned.\textsuperscript{387}

Mwangale had not yet through with Mwai Kibaki and during the first multiparty campaigns, he did not spare him. Mwangale blasted Kibaki over his calls for the president’s resignation, claiming that the Democratic Party was fronted largely by prominent Kikuyus who were also leaders of \textit{Mwakenya}, the underground dissident movement that grew into prominence in the mid- eighties. Mwangale also suggested that in calling for President Moi’s resignation, Kibaki was sheltering behind a similar call a week earlier by the Roman Catholic bishop, who had argued that if the government was responsible for or could not contain the tribal/political violence, then it ought to relinquish office. In response to Mwangale, Kibaki denied the \textit{Mwakenya} claims and went ahead to call for a boycott of the Madaraka Day celebrations. That was hardly Kibaki’s initiative, as a cleric at the Ngong Road Baptist Church; Pastor Mutava Musyimi had called for such a boycott in protest against political violence a fortnight earlier.\textsuperscript{388}

As the 1992 elections drew near, a day for reckoning was certainly high for Mwangale. Accustomed to easy victories since his debut in parliamentary politics in 1969, Mwangale would this time be fighting tooth and nail to retain his political seat in the face of determined challenges posed by 34 year-old deputy executive director of FORD-Kenya, Mukhisa Kituyi, and a former managing director of Nzoia Sugar Company, Francis Wabuge. The race would prove a tough one with the main issue being whether Mwangale, who ranked among the remaining few powerful men in President Moi’s KANU government, would survive the onslaught. Despite being regarded as a no pushover, Mwangale who had been battling the growing opposition influence in Kimilili, with his chances of re-election getting dimmer due to KANU’s

\textsuperscript{387} H. Ng’weno, \textit{The Weekly Review}, (Ed) A Changing Political Scenario, October 30th, 1992, P.12
\textsuperscript{388} H. Ng’weno, \textit{The Weekly Review}, Changing Tactics, June, 5\textsuperscript{th}, 1992, P.4
unpopularity in the constituency, which held the party responsible for many ills, among them the ethnic clashes that left more than 100 people dead and hundreds displaced.\textsuperscript{389}

Another factor that was contributing towards the diminishing luck of Mwangale was the campaigns launched by the Bungoma Professionals Group (BPG) which was founded by the late James Kokonya, the late Prof. Edward Kasili and the late retired Major Sirengo. It played an important role in defeating Mwangale in the December 12, 1992 election. Their preferred candidate was Mukhisa Kituyi.\textsuperscript{390} Prof. Simiyu adds that Mwangale was always slippery with regard to Bungoma intellectuals and Professionals. He could never hold serious discussion with them. He could only order them drinks and leave without any serious discussion.\textsuperscript{391}

When elections were finally called in 1992, Mwangale lost his seat to Mukhisa Kituyi by a landslide. His had been a war well fought on all fronts. But the odds had been against him from the beginning. As the foremost political leader in Bungoma district, Mwangale became the opposition target, with FORD making him the single campaign issue in the district. They say what goes around comes around; this fight reminds one of the fights of the legendary Basombi leader known as Lusweti wa Mwangale, who was reputed to have been a great warrior who won many fights that the Basombi got involved in. Legends have it that he was once invited to help in defending the Bakhwami against their enemies. On joining them, they all retreated to the protective walls of their respective forts, leaving him exposed to the enemies. He soldiered on until late in the evening when tired, surrounded and overwhelmed; he was finally killed. Mwangale had been involved in the fight for KANU’s survival. However, in the end, while KANU survived the first multiparty elections of 1992, Mwangale did not. He was vanquished by the strong wind of opposition that blew over Bungoma District.\textsuperscript{392}

Running on KANU meant he could not make it in Bungoma district because of the strong wave of opposition in the district. Tribal clashes that were instigated by KANU

\textsuperscript{389} H. Ng’weno, The Weekly Review, Mwangale Vs Kituyi, November 13th, 1992
\textsuperscript{390} Telephone Interview, Vincent Simiyu, 14\textsuperscript{th} May 2015
\textsuperscript{391} Oral Interview, Prof. Vincent Simiyu, Nov. 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2016.
\textsuperscript{392} Oral Interview, Focused Group Interview of Basombi Council of Elders, 7\textsuperscript{th} June 2015.
as a way of showing that multi-party politics could not work in Kenya had greatly affected the Bukusu in Bungoma district. Trouble began on 29 October 1991 in Nandi district, a few weeks after the majimbo rallies and before Moi’s decision to reintroduce multi-party politics. Over the first few months of 1992, the clashes in Bungoma and Trans-Nzoia worsened and some of the highest death tolls occurred in this small region. The sabaot were aggressors, armed with bows and arrows and occasionally guns. The area had also experienced sabaot violence against Bukusu immigrants in 1963 and 1968. The underlying origins were the same. The Sabaot and Pokot, deported from Trans-Nzoia in the first years of colonial rule remained determined to recover their so called stolen lands.393

However, when Moi visited the area in company of Mwangale, it is said that Mwangale denied that any member of the Bukusu had been killed. He is said to have remarked that they were all okay and that only one member of the Teso community had been killed. Close friends and advisers of Mwangale, sensing danger and signs of the changing fortunes, had advised Mwangale to stand down and resign because of the clashes. However, during his speech he did not do as advised. Had he heeded this plea, may be, events in Bungoma district might have taken a different course.394 This did not go down well with the people. They argued that they needed a leader who could stand with them. Masinde Muliro, at that time the leading Luhyia leader, is said to have called on the bukus to replace him. He even had threatened to stand in Kimilili Constituency on a FORD ticket, if there was nobody else that could challenge Mwangale. Though by the time of election Muliro had died, all those opposed to Mwangale needed to do was mention the call by Muliro to remove Mwangale.395

The other problem was that which faced the sugarcane production with the non-payment for the sugarcane delivered to the factory by the Nzoia Sugar Factory as was the case with all the other constituencies in Bungoma district. When finally the elections were called in 1992, Mukhisa Kituyi running on a FORD-Kenya ticket, beat KANU’s Elijah Mwangale with 27,235 votes which were 86.2 percent of the total

394 Oral Interview, Patrick Chaka, Kimilili Constituency KANU Chairman, June, 4th, 2015.
395 Ibid.
votes cast. Mwangale came a distant second with 4,351 votes which were 13.78 percent of the total votes cast.\textsuperscript{396}

Alfred Sambu did not wait long to put his cards on the table after defection from the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) back to KANU. He soon announced the ouster of former cabinet minister and long-serving Bungoma KANU chairman, Elijah Mwangale, from the branch chairmanship. This was a position which Sambu had coveted for a long time.\textsuperscript{397}

\textbf{4.6.5 Finally in the Political Cold}

Out in the political cold for almost six months since losing the Kimilili Parliamentary Seat, Mwangale had passed through a traumatic experience of the magnitude, unimaginable during his peak as a KANU insider. He had passed through a series of embarrassing episodes that would hardly have been associated with him during his heydays. The episodes began with him being implicated in the abortive May 3 workers strike called by the Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) secretary-general, Joseph Mugalla, who was a fellow Luhyia.\textsuperscript{398}

Mwangale had also been put through other humiliating experiences. He had had to undergo interrogation by the special branch over the failed strike. He also faced two attempts to oust him from the party position – his only semblance of power he still had – in both Kimilili sub-branch and Bungoma branch levels. He had also been blocked from attending KANU’s National Governing Council and the National Executive Committee meetings. As Mwangale pondered the implication of his apparent political isolation, his 700-acre Quintin farm in Trans-Nzoia district, 250 acres of which was already planted with maize, was invaded by sabaot tribesmen, whose action was promptly supported by the district administration and later endorsed by the government which termed Mwangale as a land cheat. In between, Mwangale’s property was raided by auctioneers out to seize it for alleged failure to repay a sh. 1.5 million debt.\textsuperscript{399}

\textsuperscript{397} H. Ng’weno, \textit{The weekly Review}, (Ed) Embattled Old Guards, June, 11th, 1993, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{398} H. Ng’eno, Op cit.
\textsuperscript{399} Ibid.
In July 1993, the KANU party headquarters gave the Bungoma branch a go ahead for the Executive Committee to effect a change of leadership in the branch under the supervision of the neighbouring Busia district party chairman and an assistant minister in the office of the president, Moody Awori. The exercise took place behind closed doors at the Mabanga farmers training centre, some two kilometres from the KANU district office in Bungoma. This was clearly aimed at getting Elijah Mwangale from the centre stage of the party branch leadership. After two abortive attempts to remove him from both the branch and the Kimilili sub-branch chairmanships, Mwangale gave in announcing that he had given up both positions in order to prepare himself to take on Vice-president George Saitoti for the party’s number two slot. The announcement seemed only to accelerate Mwangale’s fall from grace. Within days, KANU headquarters had instructed Awori to effect Mwangale’s removal.

Awori told angry pro-Mwangale delegates who had camped outside the venue that he had the mandate to effect the changes to ensure that the branch was functioning as the country prepared for KANU grassroots elections. Mwangale, who was present, stormed out of the meeting in protest and joined his supporters in declaring the exercise illegal and accusing party headquarters of interference. Despite the protest, the branch executive went ahead and replaced Mwangale with former Sirisia MP, Joseph Muliro, but weeks later, following the creation of Mt. Elgon district, the branch executive removed all members sympathetic to Mwangale, beginning with a former MP for Webuye, Joash Wa Mang’oli, who lost his post of branch vice-chairman and was replaced by another Mwangale foe, Maurice Makhanu. Alfred Sambu became branch secretary while Suleiman Murunga, a new-comer in the district’s politics became the new branch treasurer. A nominated MP and Nairobi lawyer, Moses Wetangula took over as organizing secretary. The party headquarters promptly recognized the new officials.

What confounded many was the fact that at the time when Mwangale seemed to have hit political rock bottom, after falling foul of his former political patrons, he announced that he would expend his considerable energies vying for a national KANU seat. He mentioned the vice-presidency, the national chairmanship and the

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401 H. Ng’weno, Op cit.
post of secretary general. He announced that he would vie for one of those seats come the KANU elections that were due by the end of September 1993 once the five-year mandate of the then office had expired.\textsuperscript{402}

Mwangale in an interview with the Economic Review correspondent was able to candidly shed light on some issues that faced KANU as a party. Asked on whether in relinquishing his KANU branch post and declaring that he was aiming for a national position, he was only looking for a graceful way out after sensing that he was about to be ousted. He said that that was not the reason because according to him, attempts to remove him from branch politics had been on for a long time. He said he simply felt time had come for him to move a ladder higher. He added that in single party system, vertical movement up the party was the arrangement and that was displayed in teamwork, party discipline and loyalty and when the president felt such arrangement would strengthen the party, he abided by it and supported those elected to lead the party. He argued that in multi-party structure, it was impossible to retain such arrangements. The multi-party arrangement generation of voters wanted transparency, openness and freedom of choice in electing their leaders. He added that the party hierarchy from top down to the sub-location level would like leaders who were true representatives of the people. Anything else such as the old arrangement would weaken the party.\textsuperscript{403}

On the question that he had been under pressure in Bungoma, in maneuvers seen to be closely linked to the tribulations he had faced at the national level, he pointed out that the answer lay in the history of the country. He argued that the political history of Kenya showed that leaders who had grown to seniority tend to create fear in leadership circles and attempts are always made to weed them out. This was part of the culture that prevailed during the single-party system. It rises out of self-preservation instinct of some individuals. It cannot continue in a multi-party system, he argued. The constitution is specific on limitation of the presidential tenure to not more than two five-year terms. Leaders must be allowed to grow and emerge out of experience and wisdom. This weeding out of potential leaders cannot work in the present political situation. He added that unless all in KANU could develop a new

\textsuperscript{403} Obura, Op cit p.6.
vision of what works for the party, they would find it difficult to win back the confidence among the Kenyan voters they had lost to the opposition.404

On the question of who wanted him out, he said he had been at the centre of politics for a long time. If there was anything like being an insider he had been there and that he knew the system very well, enough to know that when such games are being played against him, they had been orchestrated from the top levels of the party officialdom. He argued that it might have been the result of constitutional changes limiting presidential tenure having the effect of accelerating power struggles both within the party and within the government. He added that it was possible that he was perceived by some colleagues as representing some threat to their own ambitions. However, he said that at the end of the day, it was the people who would determine who takes over after president Moi finished his term.405

Asked whether it was conventional wisdom that when a politician of his stature was subjected to what he had gone through, president Moi was pulling the strings or could at least have given the nod, he pointed out that he did not know that. However, he added that he had known the president for a long time. He entrusted him with a cabinet position in 1979 and retained him till he lost his parliamentary seat in 1992. He argued that if he had lost confidence in him or had a bone to pick with him, he had all the powers to dismiss him during that time. He pointed out that that is why he believed it could not be coming from the president, for such about-turn would represent a tremendous metamorphosis.406

Finally, on the very important question that statements to the effect that KANU used and discarded people like toilet paper had gained currency and whether he felt like a toilet paper, he had a short and sharp retort: “If it were anybody’s intention to misuse me thus, it would be a miscalculation of the highest order.”407

Burudi Nabwera said in an Oral interview that there were those up in the KANU hierarchy who were not comfortable with Mwangale and wanted him out. They

404 K. F Obura, Op cit, p.6-7.
405 Ibid., p.7.
407 Ibid.
therefore employed never ending machinations to see Mwangale out. However, he wondered if those who fought him strengthened or weakened the party. According to him, Mwangale was a very powerful politician, whose stature was such that when he spoke everyone listened. However, he argued that he was replaced by lightweights who could never be felt at the national level. He further pointed out that Bungoma’s participation in national politics had taken a beating. He argued that some of the politicians elected to the national assembly had not even made maiden speeches.408

4.7 End of an Era

When Mwangale lost battle for his political seat, he left the winners to have the field day. However, he still reminded them that he was still around and he could bounce back and take them on. He never ran for his Kimilili seat again. One of his major assignment, after retiring from parliament parliamentary politics was the chairing of the Somali peace talks that eventually resulted in the historic election of that’s country’s President in Nairobi. He also acted as an executive and as a non-executive chairman of many parastatals and private business companies.409

His sudden demise in November, 2004 stunned many Kenyans of all walks of life and left them mourning and reflecting on the life and times of this great Kenyan.410 Elijah had for a long time suffered a heart problem. According to his brother Wycliffe Basa, Elijah Mwangale had had about 25-35 percent of his heart operated on. He therefore, required very special attention including special foodstuffs. However according to Basa this was not always the case as he could at times eat junk food in hotels. He also needed special care so that he could not over exert himself. However, Basa pointed out that his brother on one occasion drove himself to a funeral in Western and back to Nairobi. He had also been advised not to fly because of the same heart condition. On the day he was found dead on a sofa set, he had on the previous day met with the staff of one of his companies. He had told the staff that the following day they were going to have a get-together lunch and appeared in good form. However, that was to be the last time they could see him alive. He collapsed at home and was rushed to the MP

408 Hon. B. Nabwera, Interview, May, 9th, 2015.
410 Ibid.
Shah Hospital where he was announced dead on arrival. However, the immediate cause of his death was not ascertained as no postmortem was carried out.411

4.8 CONCLUSION

During the reign of President Daniel Arap Moi, Mwangale was chosen to cabinet as a Minister in 1979 and remained in the position until 1992 when he lost his Kimilili parliamentary seat. He served as Minister for Labour, Minister for Tourism and Wildlife, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Livestock and lastly as the Minister for Agriculture. While at the Ministry of Labour, he tried to fix the issue of minimum wage. He also presented the Session Paper No. 4 of 1980 on economic prospects and policies. In addition, Mwangale also tried to address the industrial actions.

In 1981, Mwangale was transferred to the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. While at the ministry, he was able to establish the Kenya Tourism Board and did a lot to promote tourism in the country. He engaged with tourist agents who collected funds from tourist and paid for their services. This was in an attempt to improve earnings from tourism and revive its dwindling fortunes.

In 1983, the issue of the traitor surfaced. Mwangale again was in the foreground in exposing Charles Njonjo as the the traitor. Howwever, the chapter provides a balanced examination of the traitor issue by considering the position of both the Mwangale side and the Njonjo side. It does this by examining the interviews of Njonjo and Kamotho, carried out by Magazines, in the post traitor issue period.

In 1983, Mwangale was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign affairs and remained in the portfolio until 1987. During the period that Mwangale was at the Ministry he addressed issues related to human rights, Kenya’s relations with the USA and the UK, Kenya’s relations with S. Africa, relations between Kenya and other East African countries as well as Kenya’s relations with Somalia.

411Oral Interview, Wycliffe Basa Mwangale, May 14th 2014.
In 1988 he was moved to the expanded ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. He remained in this ministry till 1992. The performance of Kenya’s economy in 1980s depended on agricultural performance and shows how Mwangale dealt with issues in the cereal, tea, and sugar sectors, as well as in the Agricultural State Corporation.

Concerning the Agricultural State Corporation, state regulation continued during Mwangale’s stint at the Ministry. However, many marketing boards were inefficient and some were being used as tools for a re-distributive social policy. The major factors in there poor performance were inflexible pricing, under-capitalisation (especially in sugar factories), high levels of borrowing, and poor operational management, itself a product of corruption and inefficiency.

Corruption reached frightening levels during the period that Mwangale served as minister. Politicians and civil servants were players in the game they were refereeing without proper scrutiny. There were reports that linked Mwangale to controversial transactions between a company in which his brother was a director (The East African Heavy Chemicals) and the State owned KTDA, over fertilizer imports. Elijah Mwangale was also mentioned by the New Scotland Yard Report on the disappearance and death of Robert Ouko in relations to corruption. The sourcing of spares for upgrading and expanding Nzoia Sugar Company was also seen as having been compromised, as the spares were not suited for a small company such as Nzoia Sugar Company.

Mwangale replaced Fredrick Khaoya as Chairman of the Bungoma KANU Branch in 1977. In that capacity he did a lot to strengthen the party at the grassroot. During the period that he was chairman of the Branch, he led it through two sharply contrasting periods, each with contrasting fortunes. From the beginning, the branch experienced peace unequally by its neighbours. But as time passed, Mwangale would make enemies both locally and nationally, who would combine forces against him and whose drama would be played out both in public and behind doors, eventually making Bungoma branch one of the most troubled branches in the country.
One finger KANU salute. Source: Family Album.
Below: Moi’s Cabinet. Source: Family Album.
To Elijah Mwangle
with best wishes.

Ronald Reagan

"REST IN PEACE"

MAY GOD BLESS ALL WHO TEAMED UP WITH US IN THEIR SUPPORT
FOR THIS BEFITTING SEND-OFF TO

Our Beloved, Hon. Elijah Wasike Mwangi, EGH, MP.

Text by Jotًا othi Shekula, PhD, and Mi Vitale Mwaihe, a veteran Journalist
Designed and run by Philip Nisoka, Creative Direction
Mwangale’s final moments. Source: Family Album
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
The project set out to construct a biography of Elijah Wasike Mwangale. The study was guided by three objectives namely; to examine Elijah Mwangale’s early life, his education and social-cultural experiences which helped shape his career (1939-1966); to examine his role and contributions in public service (1966-1992); to examine his role and contribution as a cabinet minister (1979-1992), and finally, to examine his role and contribution as chairman of Bungoma KANU Branch (1976-1993).

The methodology applied involved the use of both secondary and primary sources. Primary information from the Kenya National Archives and the Kenyan Parliament were gathered and used in the construction of the biography. Field interviews were conducted in Bungoma, Nairobi and Trans-Nzoia counties. Secondary information was gathered through review of books, journals, articles and Magazines. All the information from both the primary and secondary sources was pieced together to construct a biography of Elijah Mwangale.

The study embraced transactional leadership theory. In his dealings as a politician, both in his Kimilili constituency and at the national level, Elijah Mwangale exhibited Transactional Leadership Style. At the constituency, it is said he was perhaps the best convert to the Harambee gospel. In his long and eventful political career, Mwangale attended and presided over many fundraising rallies for all manners of development efforts, thus helping many young people to learn. To the common man, Mwangale was that generous politician to whom they turned to at the time of need. Regardless of age, they all came knocking at his door for financial support. Mwangale’s waiting room, when he was a cabinet secretary was perhaps the only one which was always overflowing with people seeking to see him. He popularized such sayings as “Bubwami Kimiando” translated to mean power is wealth. Another commonly used saying was “Guid pro Quo”. Translated, it means scratch my back and I will scratch yours or favour for favour.

Elijah Mwangale’s transactional leadership style could also be traced in the type of followers that he attracted. He attracted tenacious loyalty and devoted followers among the young and the old, who never abandoned him. Yet even as he interacted
with rank and file, Elijah retained a dignified detachment that set him above the crowds that he interacted with on a daily basis. In fact, Elijah set standards of his own against which he was to be measured.

At a personal level, Mwangale stood out in the crowd, another evidence of Transactional Leadership. He chose what to wear to match the occasion. For him, it was “Omuntu Chingubo” (We are judged by what we wear). He was one of the best dressed Kenyans and was highly conscious of how he dressed, how he walked and where he ate and stayed. He lived in exclusive neighbourhoods. In his heydays as a young MP, he lived in the upmarket suburbs in Muthangari. When he arrived in Bungoma from the USA, he knew where to stay. In Webuye, the only place where Mwangale was known to stay, if he was not at his rural home, was at a guest house, the resort for top brass for the Webuye Pan Paper mills. In Bungoma, he only stayed at Bungoma Tourist Hotel and at the Golf Hotel when in kakmiga. Appearances are very important to a leader that displays Transactional leadership Style. He has to always convince his followers that he is able to keep his part of the bargain all the time.

Mwangale’s attitude towards leadership in the run up to the 1992 elections, is another evidence of Mwangale’s Transactional leadership Style. Mwangale viewed the country’s leadership as a system of reward. Mwangale and Burudi campaigned in Western province while arguing that the region had continued to support KANU and it was about time the province was rewarded with the position of the Vice presidency.

His opponents in the Bungoma District KANU politics best described his Transactional leadership style. In the KANU delegate’s elections, his opponents could be heard complaining that Mwangale had poured money in the district and that he had in effect literally bought the delegates and they stood no chance in campaigning against him.

The research yielded various findings. It established a very close correlation between some aspects Elijah’s Mwangale’s early life and his career as Member of Parliament and Minister. The project particularly established that various occurrences and experiences in Elijah’s early life left lifelong imprints in his mind that would help,
guide and shape his future life. The Friends Church was such a factor that had far reaching influence on Elijah’s later life. Elijah’s father had been converted and brought up in the church mission at Lugulu and Kaimosi. He later served the church rising to the position of leadership. Following the church’s teaching on protestant ethics, the father was able to emerge as one of the earliest agricultural elites. With such a background, the father ensured that his children, Elijah included, would acquire a good education, something that was not available to many African children of his time. Elijah’s taste for business was also probably inculcated into him partly from the Quakers teaching and partly inherited from his father’s early hand in business.

Some of his talents and oratory skills were developed and honed during his schooling. He was said to have been a great debater while a student at Chesamisi Intermediate School. These early attempts informed his later prowess in parliamentary debates. While in school and later at Egerton College, he was said to have developed an interest in advocating for the rights of others. He also acted as a student leader. This background informed his early involvement in radical parliamentary debates, joining such populist of the time as J.M Kariuki and Martin Shikuku.

In his early days as a student, he schooled in Indian schools, especially Oswald Secondary School in Mombasa. This might have influenced his later relationship with Asian families with whom he ventured into business. He was, particularly, very close to the Asian founders of Pan African Paper Mill.

His American education greatly affected his attitudes, debates and work in parliament. In arguing that the A-level classes were useless, a waste of money and unnecessary hurdle to University education, he had probably been influenced by his American background which did not have A-level classes. In addition, while chairing the Parliamentary Probe Committee on the assassination of J. M Kariuki, Mwangale was strongly influenced by the happenings in America at the time. The american educated Mwangale viewed the probe committee which he chaired in 1975 in similar vein as the congressional committees that were set up in the early 1970s to probe the scandals such as the watergate scandal that ruined president Richard Nixon second term and reinforced the theory of the second term curse for American presidents.
Though Elijah Mwangale was not brought up strictly in the traditional African style, a few practices might have rubbed up on him and influenced his future career. The fact that he was initiated in the Bukusu traditional style and was allowed to interact freely with others of his clan and community, both in school and at home, helped him understand and appreciate those he was later to lead. The language, the proverbs and stories that he would later use in his political life were probably acquired this way. In addition, the Basombi clan is said to have produced outstanding leaders and warriors, that led the Bukusu at one time or another. Such leaders included Sikenye wa Mwangale, Basa, Mwangale wa Khane, and the great warrior Lusweti. During the colonial times Basombi are said to have produced chiefs such as Wekhomba, Mutoro, Kolole and Kere. The Basombi elders believed and felt that Mwangale’s leadership was part of a continuation from the past. In fact, they argued that there was a prophecy about Elijah Mwangale to the effect that he would grow into a great leader.

Elijah Mwangale first joined Egerton University upon his return from the USA, as a Lecturer in 1966. He worked and rose through ranks to the position of a full lecturer before leaving in 1969 to join politics. As a Member of Parliament, before he was appointed minister, Mwangale spoke out his mind without fear and his debates were well informed and thoroughly researched. Elijah Mwangale contributed alot towards Kenya’s education Policy. For instance he advocated for the introduction of the 8-4-4 system of education. Concerning high education, Mwangale moved a motion to reform the administration of the Univerity of Nairobi as well as raising issues in opposition to tribalism that was then rampant at the University. Back in Bungoma District, Mwangale pushed for the establishment of Harambee Schools as well as the Sang’alo Institute of Science and Technology.

In matters concerning health, Mwangale pushed the agenda of Harambee Health Centres. Besides, he also decried the inadequacy of medical supplies to hospitals and called for improvement in that area. Finally, he raised the issue of the quality of drugs administered to patients in Kenyan hospitals.

Mwangale also raised questions on the quality of trade union leaders, who he accused of being big mouths, but completely unqualified to negotiate on behalf of those unions. Mwangale strongly condemned those governments in Africa which created
conditions that forced people to flee into refugee camps. Mwangale tackled issues related to the state of the economy with equal zeal. He called for improvement in Agriculture, Industry, and Land policies, and suggested ways in which the economic sector could be helped to improve.

The assassination of J. M. Kariuki in 1975, propelled Mwangale into the national limelight and the assignment is seen as having been an important turning point in his career. How he handled the issue would advance or break his political career. The J. M. Kariuki probe Committee delivered a damning report to President Kenyatta, inspite of strong resistance from powerful figures around the presidency. Mwangale, besides having been an astute politician, he was also a shrewed businessman and strategist who had far reaching influence in the world of business. He tried his hand on many businesses including but not limited to, Vista Ltd, Commercial farming, Distribution of products for Bata and Kenya Breweries as well as the East African Specter.

During the reign of President Daniel Arap Moi, Mwangale was chosen to cabinet as a Minister in 1979 and remained in the position until 1992 when he lost his Kimilili parliamentary seat. He served as Minister for Labour, Minister for Tourism and Wildlife, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister for Livestock and lastly as the Minister for Agriculture. In the Ministry of Labour, he tried to fix the issue of minimum wage. He also presented the Session Paper No. 4 of 1980 on economic prospects and policies. While at the Ministry, Mwangale also tried to address industrial actions.

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A biography of Mwangale is an important contribution to the history of modern Kenya. It throws light on the intrigues and the macheavelian style of leadership that characterized both the Kenyatta and Moi era. It shows the back stabbing, the use and dump tactics, all forms of conspiracy and betrayal that characterized the period in question.

This research has, therefore, unearthed important historical data. This data can be used to gauge Mwangale as a politician, cabinet minister, and KANU Bugoma Branch chairman, alongside his contemporaries. The study also serves as a point of departure for more research on Elijah Mwangale and other leading figures in Kenya.
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