

**EVALUATING PEACE MAKING PROCESSES, THE CASE OF IGAD IN  
SOMALIA CONFLICT**

**BY**

**ALI NOOR ABDI**

**REG NO: C50/80805/2012**

**SUPERVISOR:**

**DR FRED JONYO**

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## **DECLARATION**

### **DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE**

This is to declare that this thesis is my original work and to the best of my knowledge has not been presented for examination for any degree in any other Institution or University.

Sign..... Date.....

**Ali Noor Abdi**

**Registration No: C50/80805/2012**

### **APPROVAL**

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as the official University Supervisor.

Sign..... Date.....

**Dr. Fred Jonyo**

**University of Nairobi**

**Department of Political Science and Public Administration**

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## **DEDICATION**

I wish to dedicate this work to Allah, the Almighty for giving me the determination to complete this programme. I also wish to dedicate this work to my wife and children.

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# POLITICAL MAP OF SOMALIA



## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<b>AMISOM</b>	-	African Mission in Somalia
<b>AU</b>	-	African Union
<b>ECOWAS</b>	-	Economic community of West African States
<b>EU</b>	-	European Union
<b>IGAD</b>	-	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
<b>IPF</b>	-	IGAD Partner Forum
<b>ICG</b>	-	International Crisis Group
<b>SDM</b>	-	Somali Democratic Movement
<b>SADC</b>	-	Southern Africa Development Community
<b>SALW</b>	-	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>SNA</b>	-	Somali National Alliance
<b>SNM</b>	-	Somali National Movement
<b>SPM</b>	-	Somalia Patriotic Movement
<b>SRRC</b>	-	Somali Reconciliation and Restore Council
<b>SSDF</b>	-	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
<b>TFG</b>	-	Transitional Federal Government
<b>TFG II</b>	-	Transitional Federal Government II
<b>TNA</b>	-	Transitional National Assembly
<b>TNC</b>	-	Transitional National Council
<b>TNG</b>	-	Transitional National Government
<b>OAU</b>	-	Organization of African Unity
<b>OSAA</b>	-	Office of the Special Adviser on Africa
<b>UIC</b>	-	Union of Islamic Courts
<b>UN</b>	-	United Nations
<b>UNDP</b>	-	United Nations Development Program
<b>UNITAF</b>	-	Unified Task Force
<b>UNSC</b>	-	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNOSOM</b>	-	United Nations Operation in Somalia
<b>US</b>	-	United States
<b>USC</b>	-	United Somali Congress

## ABSTRACT

This study evaluates the extent to which IGAD policies, strategies and implementation practices have since supported peace processes in Somalia. The study contributes to the ongoing discussion on conflict and conflict resolution in Somalia by analyzing the impact of IGAD's peace building initiatives in the Somali conflict and recommends ways of enhancing sustainable long term peace in Somalia. The main objective of the study was to determine the extent to which IGAD has contributed to peace building activities in Somalia; the specific objectives were to examine the challenges faced by IGAD in its approach to peace building in Somalia and to recommend ways of enhancing sustainable long term peace building mechanisms in Somalia. The central question of this study was to what extent has the activities of IGAD promoted peace and stability in Somalia. The study assumed that IGAD's role in Somalia has not enhanced Peace building in Somalia hence the instability in Somalia is still a threat to regional stability and international peace. Therefore, new approaches are required towards peace building in Somalia. Theoretical perspective that guided the study is the problem solving approach which argues that conflict is part of human experience and attempts to find ways to minimize the impact of conflict. The data for the study was collected through interviews. The interviews included: questionnaires for the diplomats and officials from Intergovernmental Authority on Development and focused group discussion with Somali analysts and community elders. Secondary data was obtained from both published and unpublished literature. The study found out that IGADs contribution to the Somali peace process is affected by rivalry among states, lack of enough resources, member states national interests as well as weak secretariat of IGAD. The study therefore recommends that unilateral third party intervention cannot build peace alone and that the primary responsibility for peace building in Somalia lies with the Somali people to be given the lead role and approaches that nurture inclusion and participation among Somali identities be the guiding factor in finding a lasting solution to the Somali Conflict. This is in addition to strengthening the institutions of IGAD so as to have enough capacity to enforce IGADs decisions, also IGAD should look for alternative sources of funding so that its activities can be implemented without delays.

## CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### 1.0 Background of the Study

Boutros Boutros Ghali a former Secretary General of the (UN) defined peace building as an act of identifying and establishing supporting structures that aims at strengthening, solidifying peace in order to prevent the reoccurrence of conflicts. This definition was largely seen in relation to peace-building (UN Report 1995). These structures included the demilitarization of combatants and subsequent re-integration of the same fighters or military combatants back to society, resettling of refugees, provision of relief food, medical relief, economic reconstruction and improvement of national infrastructure. To a greater extent, this included activities like re-training of the national police, and tackling the root causes of the conflict as well as focusing on the reduction of war-related negative effects Doyle & Sambani (1999). The major aim of peace-building initiative is to ensure that society's progress and that wars do not re-occur again Doyle & Sambani (1999). The two writers further observe that peace-building may not necessarily eliminate all conflicts in society, but it may increase capabilities of institutional development, like the trade unions, civil society organizations fair judiciary and electoral bodies all of which enables the same society to prosper and provide internal mechanisms for conflict resolution within its jurisdiction hence prevention of the re-occurrence of war Doyle & Sambani (1999).

Contemporary definition of the UN peace building commission focuses more on capacity building measures that aims at risk reduction of conflicts, strengthening of national capabilities of state institutions from the grass-roots to the highest levels of governance which are a necessary condition for sustainable development in any society (Sriram 2009). This view is shared by Tolentino (2004) in which he argues that peace building is not only limited to rebuilding and reforming the conflict-stricken societies but by creating alternative conditions which will deter the recurrence of future conflicts. The author further observes that the observance of positive norms that are synonymous with political and economic progress will transform both national and international security. This will ensure both state and human security; finally Tolentino concludes that proper handling of

local affairs at the grass-roots will improve national security hence ensuring good governance Tolentino (2004).

Orguela (2004) observes that in the post-cold war era, global environment became a bit challenging to states in which there was a considerable shift of wars form that of inter-state to intra-state, this was influenced by the end of super-power competition, this exposed the state-weaknesses in its ability to cope with its aim internal-security challenges, many states especially in the south that were generally weak started experiencing new legitimacy challenges that made them unable to protect their own borders, and restrain internal conflicts, this led to the emergence of shadow states within the same states.

The Horn of Africa region is known in its volatility nature and it's the most conflict-ridden part of Africa, it's always referred by some quarters as the hot –bed of the world's conflicts. It has persistently been a venue of many inter-state and intra-state conflicts in Africa Kinde (2006). The most common source of the conflicts in this area is the issue of lack of democratic political institutions that allow public participation in the affairs of governance; it has been the main trigger –factor of civil wars Markakis (2003). In addition to this is the issue of its geographical proximity to the Middle East and its strategic advantage to the African continent, both USA and USSR as super-powers in the cold war era-participated in arming nation-states in the horn of Africa region as a way of counter-checking each other. This contributed to the rise of chaos and political instabilities in the region after the end of the cold war. (Kinde 2006).

The republic of Somalia became independent in 1960 from its former colony Italy, and British Somali-land (Memar 2012), it's an homogenous nation that harbors the Somali people who speak the Somali language and subscribes to one religion which is the Islamic religion, but this homogenous language, religion and culture has never stopped the civil war and human suffering in the republic of Somalia, this said conflict has existed for the last two decades. Apart from human suffering and civil war, there has also been the challenge of dictatorial and authoritarian leadership in the subsequent leadership after

the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre. Memor continues to observe that Siad Barre came into power in 1969 through a military coup that put to an end the attempts for post-colonial democratic state and he introduced socialism that led to dictatorship and culminated into the collapse of Somalia in 1991 (Memor 2012).

The republic of Somalia has been singled out as a state which has survived without a functioning government for more than twenty years. (Ldebre 1996). The northern part of Somalia which includes the states of Somaliland and Punt land have always enjoyed some level of stability, but the southern part of Somalia has always been rocked by inter-clan violence, the rise of war-lords and radical Islamic groups that have the main at the center stage of competition for power, resources and creation of a Caliphate. This instability in Somalia has continued to be a major concern in the African continent and to a larger extent the global world. (Lefebute 1996).

The citizens of Somalia according to Memor (2012) have undergone through a lot of challenges for the last twenty years namely violence, death, displacements, hunger, the rise of refugees camps in the neighboring states, the negative effects of the Somalia instability has not only been felt in Somalia alone, but it has had a spillover effects in the entire East –Africa region and the horn of Africa and to some extent the international community (Memor 2012). This through the problems such as terrorism, radicalization of the youth, increase of refugees, smuggling of arms and dangerous weapons. All the problems emerge from Somalia and since all the IGAD member states are affected in one way or another; IGAD has taken the lead in the attempt to resolve the twenty year old crisis (IGAD Report 2007).

IGAD which stands for intergovernmental authority on Development has been at the forefront in resolving the Somalia conflict, not only have the member states forming IGAD contributed their resources time and energy in dealing with the conflict head-on, but they have also send their troops in Somalia under the famous IGASOM troops, however IGAD has not received adequate support from the international community (IGAD Report 2007). The peace initiative by IGAD has not yielded positive results,



because of the various obstacles that mostly are within the Somalia territory among the obstacles include disputes in power sharing, resource allocation, land and property disputes. This has deepened the existing inter-clan divisions, which has constantly been manipulated by the political elites as they pursue their own selfish interests at the expense of national good, it should be noted that there are groups of political elites and power brokers that benefit from the instability of Somalia hence contributing to the failures of the numerous peace initiatives (IGAD Report 2007).

IGAD's effort towards peace building in the Horn of Africa is in line with the international consensus of adopting the use of regional integration bodies as a strategy of conflict management and resolution. According to UN's Agenda for peace in 1992. It sets out the issue of global peace and security as one of its key vision and emphasized the role of regional organizations in conflict resolution and peace making initiatives. It elaborated that the United Nations Organizations will always work hand in hand with regional organizations in preventing, managing and resolving all the global crises and conflicts. This resolution is now an established international norm and practice (UNSC report 1997).

### **1.1 Statement of the Problem**

Militarization of Africa's politics began in the 1970's, however for Somalia's case it began with Mohammed Siad Barres regime when military weapons were in the hands of the civilians and not the military men (Memor 2012), National institutions under Siad Barres regime relied on military power and might to keep law and order as well as safeguarding the legitimacy of the regime. The culture of impunity was the end result when proliferation of arms and absence of accountability of state officials took root. This eventually led to the breaking down of state authority and total collapse of the Somalia National army (ICG Report 2006), militia commanders lost control of their members, the same thing happened to clan elders who had no control of their clansmen. This made the existing traditional power structures to be irrelevant. Therefore a state of anarchy took root in Somalia as militia used the weapons to kill, loot, rape and commit crimes against humanity in Somalia (ICG Report 2006).

Somalia is facing a myriad of problems since the collapse of Siad Barres regime in 1991. This includes poverty, environmental degradation, and high rates of unemployment, black market, and radicalization of the youth, terrorism and a fragmented society among other challenges (ICG report 2006).

IGAD a body which got established in 1986 had an objective of addressing the environmental problem of degradation in the horn of Africa; it was however reformed in 1996 and expanded its mandate of resolving the emerging conflicts in its area of jurisdiction. This included the Somalia conflict (IGAD report 2007). IGAD has organized a number of peace initiatives in Somalia since 1991 even though the TFG (Transition Federal Government) was weak; it marked one of the successes of IGAD peace initiative in 2004. The TFG enjoyed the international support and IGAD is trying to build on it for further reconciliation (IGAD report 2007).

However, IGAD has faced a number of challenges in its efforts to restore peace in Somalia. These challenges are both internal and external, they include lack of political will from the Somalia clan elders to resolve the conflicts, financial constraints, weak armies and little logistical support from donors, wider spread inter stand and intra-state conflicts in the horn of African region as well as high poverty levels, all these factors increases the high rates of volatility of the region (IGAD report 2007). This study therefore examined the efforts adopted by IGAD in peace building in Somalia. The challenges faced by IGAD in its approach to peace building in Somalia and its recommended ways of enhancing long term peace building mechanism in Somalia. The central question in this study was to find out the extent to which IGAD's peace building approaches used in managing the Somalia conflict promoted regional stability and international peace and security.

## **1.2 Research Questions**

- (i) What are the measures adopted by IGAD in the peace processes in Somalia?
- (ii) What are the challenges faced by IGAD in its approach to peace building in Somalia?

3. What are the recommended ways of enhancing sustainable long term peace building mechanisms in Somalia?

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

#### **1.3.1 Main Objective**

(i) To determine the extent to which IGAD has influenced the Somalia Peace processes.

#### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

(i) To evaluate the efforts adopted by IGAD to restore peace in Somalia.

(ii) To examine the challenges faced by IGAD in its approach to peace building in Somalia.

(iii) To recommend ways and means that IGAD can adopt to ensure lasting peace is restored in Somalia.

### **1.4 Justification of the Study**

This study was justified at two levels, the academic level and the policy level. At the policy level, the study appreciated the fact that the Somalia conflict has affected both the Somalia people and it has also had ripple effects in the horn of Africa region as well as on the global scene. This has been reflected in the occurrence of issues like increase of the refugees, smuggling of small arms and light weapons in many states, the rise and spread of terrorism groups, radicalization of the youth, among others. The study was justified to re-look at the policies which IGAD and the international community has been relying on the delivery results. The study discovered that there were policy loopholes that needed to be filled up so as to ensure the success of IGAD in restoring peace in Somalia after 20 years of trying. At the same time, the study looked at the policy gaps of other players in the Somalia peace initiative like the NGO's, international donors, governments and international financial institutions, it also identified loopholes in their policies and suggested alternative measures in sealing those policy loopholes.

At the academic level, a lot of research has focused on the causes of the Somalia conflicts and the solutions, many scholars have written about IGAD's role in the Somalia conflict

and the issues of regional stability, but there exists scarcity of knowledge concerning the challenges that IGAD face in resolving the Somalia conflict. It is upon this background that this study seeks to fill the existing knowledge Gap as far as IGAD's capacity to resolve conflicts in its area of jurisdiction is concerned. Therefore the study on how IGAD is involved in peace building in Somalia will offer concerned states and non-state actors with insights on peace building approaches to manage the Somali conflict. The findings of the study will contribute to policy improvements by sensitizing policy makers on the strategies that enhance sustainable long term peace building mechanisms in the Somali conflict and the inherent challenges findings from this study will also contribute to the Academic discussions by building upon the existing literature on the peace-building mechanisms in the Somali conflict.

### **1.5 Scope and Limitations**

The study focused on IGAD's involvement in building peace in Somalia. This is the period in which the exit of Siad Barre in 1991 sparked off the Somali conflict. It is also the period in which various international peace-building initiatives were undertaken until the launch of the African mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the intervention by Kenya in 2011.

The major limitation that the study faced was that of security constraints, hence the study largely depended on secondary sources of information and limited primary sources such as officials from international bodies and a few Somalia intellectual and community elders. Other limitations of the study included the locality and the limited literature material on the various peace-building approaches used by different international players in managing the Somalia conflict. Attempts were made to get alternative materials such as progress reports developed by United Nations, AU, AMISOM and IGAD.

### **1.6 Definition of Key Concepts**

**Peacekeeping:** According to peace operations working group 2009, it involves military force operations of the invitation of parties to a conflict to supervise a ceasefire between

conflicting parties. The parties to a conflict in turn stop all violent... against each other and they recognize each other's existence.

**Peace enforcement:** According to (Coleman 2007) refers to forceful military intervention by one or more countries in a conflicting country with an aim of restoring order, and ending the violent conflict.

**Peace –making:** According to Coleman 2007 refers to the art of resolving conflicts through a diplomatic process, the major aim is to establish a cease fire between warring groups.

**Peace building:** According to Paris 2002 refers to the actions that happen after conflicts that aim at creating structures which solidifies peace. These structures aim at dealing with the root causes of the conflict. It targets behaviors of the people, their attitudes and institutions of governance.

**War-tone societies:** Refers to countries or societies that are characterized by warfare, violence and lawlessness (Paris 2002).

**Conflict management:** According to the UN Security council 2009, refers to the efforts that aim at containing the existing violence from escalating. It involves prevailing upon parties to a conflict to stop being violent and sorting out their disputes amicably. In this study, international conflict management will be used to refer to diverse efforts to bring conflicting parties together.

**Third Party Interventions:** refers to any of the situations where a third party becomes engaged in a conflict either in a capacity of a court, an arbitrator, a mediator; intervention leads to manipulation and leverage, which causes parties to agree on settlement, which they would not otherwise have agreed to.

**Track one diplomacy:** This is an officials, formal and governmental diplomacy channel which is usually conducted by properly and empowered diplomats who meet openly at properly appointed venues, for example, in the Ministry of foreign affairs or at conferences, and interact with each other according to established practices and properly adopted rules of procedures (Kappeler, 1998).

## **1.7 Literature Review**

This section deals with different issues that are associated with matters to do with peace building; many conflicts that usually turn to be violent are the main cause of deaths in the Sub-Saharan Africa. This has resulted into low levels of human security alongside the state of anarchy and hopelessness in Africa. Most of the African countries in the Sub-Saharan region are associated with negative things such as high poverty levels, poor provision of basic services, political instabilities, and slow economic growth and under – development. All these in one way or the other lower the standards of human security, hence making African continent to remain behind in terms of prosperity in the future. It should be noted that most of the post –conflict reconstruction activities in this affected countries have faced so many obstacles hence making matters to do with conflict resolution to be a herculean task in the sub-Saharan region.

Good hand, Jonathan and Hume (1999) observes that peace building is a new concept and they trace back the activities of peace building in the post-world War II era in the European continent whereby American Marshall plan was put in place to reconstruct the European Economy as well as Japanese economy in a bid to reconstruct their economies after severe destruction by the effects of World War II that were disastrous. Cousens and Kumar 2001 argue that traditionally states world intervene in matters of other states in the process of executing their own foreign policies. They claim that in situations where real politik supported the actions, the meddling of other countries affairs was in disguise and forceful and where real-politik did not support the action, the UN and other international organizations could not act collectively.

Good hand (1999) explains that in the cold war era, peace building matters has been supporting the idea that the international community must intervene in conflict prone areas as a third party because international community is usually neutral, however this new thinking cautions the same international community against meddling in other states affairs by pursuing very narrow selfish interests of some individual states. The United Nations in the 1990s bought this idea and it gave the need and the principles of post conflict activities that aimed at peace building.

Good hand (1999) continues to observe that the Agenda for peace as explained by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali has been relied upon so much by the United Nations in what he calls preventive diplomacy. The tool is used mostly for peace making, peace keeping operations and it has made the whole difference. However the initiative of Agenda for peace will do better if it identify and construct the support structures that will help to consolidate peace and promote the well-being and prosperity of ordinary people. Good hand (1999) adds that in a post conflict situations, various agreements are signed and they mostly aim at disarming the combatants, restoring law and order, destruction and mapping up of weapons, repatriation of refugees, advisory as well as training services to the security officers, monitoring and observation of elections, protection of human rights, reformation of state institutions, promotion of public participation. These agreements aim at restoring lasting peace and ensuring that war does not reoccur again.

Another scholar Pronk (1996) note that the post conflict activities are valuable in conflict prevention and it helps in the healing process of the affected communities, who suffered from negative effects of conflicts. He further proposes that peace building initiative can be very complicated and it requires an integrated system of actions and United Nations must partner with the conflicting parties so that a comprehensive peace-building effort can be successful and be sustainable. It refers to the idea of integrating all the activities such as judicial reforms, electoral reforms, control of arms, institutional reforms, social and economic development among others.

Fisher (1997) claims that in most cases, the way the international community approaches peace building is through the liberal peace idea. These ideas emanated from the western liberal theory and practice. The theory proposes political and economic liberalization as effective strategies of violent conflicts. The theory also subscribes to the promotion of concepts such as democracy, constitutionalism, rule of law, property rights, elections, human rights. Fisher observes that liberal internationalism is naturally interventionist and goes beyond stopping war. This is rather a normative agenda and it contradicts the

opinion that peace building has to be accompanied by non-violent political authority that will ensure a conflicting state recovers in its own way.

It should be noted that most intra-state and civil conflicts usually have a lot of difficulties in regaining law and order and therefore peace building initiatives are very key. This means that getting a legitimate government and avoidance of the reoccurrence of war requires long turn socioeconomic and political reconstruction activities, activities at the local level are relevant and supportive of peace building but they are incapable of substituting a political method for peace building on the side of external actors (UNDP report 1994).

Paris (2002) narrates that the major aim of peace building is to avoid reoccurrence of war, and it aims at dealing with the root causes of conflict in a structural way that targets both the state and non-state institutions, peoples and attitudes and behaviors of warring factions. The belief here is that all peace efforts must be non-violent, and must be anchored on institutions both in the political real and also to a greater extent in the social real, and the greatest in all these is the idea that peace building efforts must be home grown.

Various theories that aims at ensuring successful peace building efforts have emerged, for instance Causens and Kumar (2001) explains that political factors are key and necessary condition for any peace building efforts to succeed. Roth child (1996) on the other hand mentions military, political, cultural as well as economic security as salient features for peace building to succeed. They also hope in the idea of confidence building of the local society and the involvement of the international community. The two writers acknowledge that both the ideas of state building as well as good governance are central for peace building to take place. Schwarz (2005) summarizes it all and says that the security, welfare as well as people representation and public participation are core issues that peace building efforts must factor in if it wants to be successful.



Reychlers (2006) notes that there are five key features for any peace building to be sustainable, they include effective system of communication, consultation as well as negotiation, peace enhancing political, economic together with security structures and institutions, an integrative political – psychological approach and lastly a critical mass of peace building leadership as well as a supportive local, regional as well as international environment. Once all these five features are in place, it will make things easier for the idea of effective coordination and planning.

Other scholars such as Doyle and Sambanis (2006) puts across seven steps to be followed in order for peace building efforts to be successful, they include national security, regional security quick wins, rule of law and constitutional consent, right to property, democracy or wider participation, genuine and psychological reconciliation. The peace process must be based on the context of particular culture and conflict situation of the conflict in question. Participation of civil society would be better if the scholar's world have added it on their steps.

Elmi and Barise (2006) explains that a proper peace building efforts should address the following issues which are believed to be the main root causes of the conflict. They are as follows, creation of a peaceful environment between regions, stopping the activities of the militias. With the support of local security, business communities, elders, law courts, disarmament of warring factors, and people such as warlords, arms merchants, secondly there must be acceptable forms of power sharing formula for various conflicting groups. This is because the leaders of the conflicting factions play a key role in ensuring peace and stability of the conflicting nation. The writers cite the example of Puntland and Somaliland that adopted this strategy and it made them to be so stable.

Elmi and Barise (2006) also talks about matters to do with pursuit of justice, matters justice should either be dealt with through administration of punishments or giving amnesty to the criminals. The international community should come in to assist in the areas of reconstruction of state institutions, disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of fighting groups back to the society, also returning of the refugees will

require Donor support. Elmi and Barrise further propose that the role of Islam can be used to support peace through education. In relation to Somalia, this Islam peace education will help to deal with clan stereotypes and prejudices between clans. This education will make Somalis to see each other as brothers and subscribe to the Islamic lessons on peace which greatly abhors oppression and aggression or “Thulma.”

Perris (2002) claims that the involvement of third parties is crucial but they should be very careful that peace is home grown and not imported, the third parties mostly the international community should limit themselves to giving aid, advice or security umbrella or supporting reforms. This is necessary because in Perris view, the third parties from the international community cannot have any control to national attitudes or behaviors.

Doyle and Sambani’s (2006) notes that most of the international community actors are not fully committed to the peace building efforts. They offer military support while at the same time planning to exit the stage early instead of supporting the conflicting nation up to the end. They suggest that the international community actors should develop their capacities so that they divide their focus into two areas, part one will be to deal with the root causes of war, and part two will deal with peace building efforts. In other words, part one deals with the past issues, while part two deals with the future issues. They should give their support in a manner which supports all the warring parties. Peace building should aim at ensuring the sovereignty of the state in question is restored.

Sriram (2009) writes that in most cases challenges that affect peace building efforts are the same challenges that caused the outbreak of the war. In his opinion, the greatest new challenge of peace building is the pursuit of transitional justice, for instance, Elmi and Barise (2006) cites Ethiopia’s involvement in Somalia war is the biggest challenge to the realization of peace in Somalia. This is because in their view Ethiopia gives arms to fighting groups. It supports the spoilers, among others.

Manning (2003) claims that local challenges are partly responsible for the failures of peace-building efforts, local actors have no capacity to challenge the international actors who may want to influence matters indirectly. There is also a tragedy in Manning's view of the local actors pursuing their own selfish interest without those consulting those at the national level, however, the peace-builders should be careful with the prevailing circumstances of the environment and be flexible in the process of executing on their important mandates.

Rupesinghe (1995) argues that most of the successful international peace builders have been successful because of employing right strategies, for instance, building designated units, new policy instruments and creation of a special fund to support the peace – building initiative, although the strategy is important but it has not caused any changes in policies, reformed any institutions and provided funding for any activity. As much as the international bodies and the UN have been involved in peace building matters, they have been performing the same duties that are overlapping and counter-productive.

### **1.7.1 Theoretical Framework**

This study utilized the Problem Solving Theory which adopts a functionalist approach to the problems of conflict by accepting that conflict is part of human experience and attempts to find ways to minimize the impact of conflict on life (McGinty, 2013). It seeks to develop systems and institutions that will mitigate the impact of conflict and help divided communities cooperate.

The problem solving-approach to conflict analysis rejects the introduction of power in conflict management and denies its emphasis in the analysis of international relations. It postulates that the power path to conflict management, indeed resolution, lies in the parties to the conflict re-perceiving their conflictual relationships and in so doing mutually building bridges that lead to a self-sustaining post-conflict relationship (Weis-Wik, (1983). The problem solving approach could ideally be applicable to the Somali conflict since most actors have resorted to track one methodology (Keelman, 1992). Keelman (1992) also argues that the problem solving approach is the most effective

strategy to be used during the pre-negotiation phase of the conflict as it prepares parties in conflict for formal track-one mediation.

One major contribution of track-two diplomacy has been the use of problem-solving workshops, which are a creation of the world society paradigm (Burton and Vayrynen, 1994). Track two diplomacy is suggested as most effective during the pre-negotiation phase of a conflict, or as supplementary players during formal talks since problem-solving workshops help in highlighting conflictual differences and aim to reframe the dialogue (Burton and Vayrynen, 1994).

Mwagiru (1994) argues that track two diplomacy has a special meaning, particularly in the context of conflict management. It represents a different view of international relations, which is not state-centric but emphasizes the fact that in the final analysis individuals are at the center of all international interactions. Problem-solving workshops try to contribute to the creation of a political environment conducive to conflict resolution and transformation of the relationship between the conflicting parties both in the short-term and in the long-term. They create conditions that would enable the parties to move towards negotiations (Mwagiru, 1998).

Mwagiru (2004) notes that the problem-solving workshops have been suggested as a form of conflict management that look into deep seated and protracted conflicts. It aims at the resolution of a conflict, and it is participatory because it must primarily involve the people in conflict, as they must participate mutually in working out a resolution to their conflict. He further argues that a problem-solving workshop is an approach to conflict resolution as it tries to bring out the deep-seated feelings of the parties.

Mwagiru (2004) mentions four important issues a problem-solving workshop encourages parties to do. A problem-solving workshop encourages parties to talk about the history of their conflict; it encourages them to accept responsibility for any harm they have caused each other; it encourages them to mourn about the losses they have suffered from the conflict; and it encourages them to agree on what their future relationship will be. These

things are necessary before the process of resolution can begin as they prepare the ground for the healing process to start, and provide the atmosphere in which parties can meet without accusing each other. Varynen (1995) argues that the problem-solving workshop is seen as an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties in conflict for the purposes at hand without causing a further breakdown of social order. In this case, unlike official negotiations, problem-solving workshops provide for the parties a means to engage in dialogue.

According to Mwangi (1998), the strength of the problem-solving approach is that, it is an attempt to find a shared reality between the parties in conflict for the purposes at hand without causing a further breakdown of social order. The approach provides for the parties a means to engage in dialogue unlike official negotiations. It prepares for the process of resolution to begin by laying out the ground for the healing process to start and provide the atmosphere for parties to meet without accusing each other. The approach achieves this by encouraging parties to talk about the history of their conflict, to accept responsibility for any harm they have caused each other, to mourn about the losses they have suffered from the conflict, and to agree on what their future relationship will be (Mwangi, 1998).


However, the problem-solving approach has one major weakness as it rejects the introduction of power in conflict management and denies its emphasis in the analysis of international relations (Mwangi, 1998). The approach postulates that the power path to conflict management, indeed resolution, lies in the parties to the conflict re-perceiving their conflictual relationships and in so doing mutually building bridges that lead to a self-sustaining post-conflict relationship. These are assumptions which might not hold true in the Somalia case. The approach is thus weakened by rejecting the introduction of power in conflict management and denying emphasis in international relations. It also leaves track-one diplomacy for the future despite its importance and subsequent use (Mwangi, 1998).

The problem solving approach is relevant to this study since most actors in the Somalia case have resorted to track-one diplomacy. The approach looks into deep seated and protracted conflicts such as the one in Somalia and tries to bring out the deep-seated feelings of the parties with the aim of resolving the conflict.

### 1.7.2 Empirical Framework

The central question in the study was to find out the extent to which IGAD’s peace building approaches used in managing the Somali conflict promoted regional stability and international peace. This study examined the efforts adopted by IGAD in peace building in Somalia; the challenges faced by IGAD in its approach to peace building in Somalia and recommended ways of enhancing sustainable long term peace building mechanisms in Somalia. The conceptual model below illustrates the main variables of the study.

**Figure 1.1: Extent to which IGAD’s peace building approaches used in managing the Somali conflict promote regional stability and international peace**



### 1.7.3 Summary of the Literature

Various circumstances forces third parties to be part of any conflict, Pearson (1998) for instance explains factors such as geography, geopolitical issues, and the extent of the

conflict. Pearson claims that in most cases states intervene in conflicts that have gone to higher levels, or the said conflicts have started to cut across national boundaries, or they may have an ethnic influence within their territories. Pearson 1998 observes that sometimes states meddle in other states affairs when they have an interest in that conflicting country. It can be an economic interest, political, security educational or military interest.

Hans Morgenthau observes that interventions happen when a country's national interests are held to Ransom (Reagan (1998)). In brief conflicts have a direct impact on international security and the neighboring states are likely to feel more heat than others. All these may trigger external meddling. The international community through the UN has intervened in many conflicts citing them to be a threat to international peace and security. The UN also strives to promote humanitarian support at all times.

There is no doubt that the Somalia conflict had a spillover effect in the neighboring states and this explains why IGAD had to intervene. This is because the vacuum left by the fall of Siad Barres government led into the emergence of many militia groups and the rise of terrorist activities in the entire horn of African region. The spillover effects is now an and progress of the horn of Africa region, Mulugeta (2009) observes that Al-Shabaab is now a militant wing of the Al-Qaeda wing and they have a strong base in Somalia and their recruits come from all states in the horn of African region. This therefore must concern the international community.

## **1.7.4 The Concept of Peace-Building and Conflict Resolution**

### **1.7.4.1 Peace Building**

Peace building as a concept emanated from Johan Galtung's writings in 1975; he explained the term to mean all the three approaches to peace namely, peacemaking, peace keeping and peace building. He distinguishes between negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace-meaning end of violence but presence of root causes of violence and trigger factors, while positive mean means a peaceful society with absence of all root causes of the violence and elimination of trigger factors. (Galtung 1975). He argues that

negative peace succeeds in eliminating physical violence through peace keeping, but positive peace requires both peace making and peace building efforts because it eliminates all structural causes of violence.

Johan Galtung (1975) writes that peace making aims at eliminating tensions between warring factions while peace building creates structures and institutions that promote sustainable, peace. The key issues here are justice, equity and co-operation. This means that all root causes of violence will be eliminated.

Peace building as an idea became fashionable in 1992 when the UN secretary general Boutros Boutros Ghali wrote a report “An Agenda for peace. Many researchers trace the beginning of peace building from this document. (Heathershow 2008). This document outlined an important framework in managing international armed and violent conflicts. The secretary general proposed that the UN will play a pro-active role and increase its efforts in peace keeping operations with an aim of helping conflicting countries to stabilize after war. This means that post conflict activities is the hall mark of peace building.

Paffenholz and Spurk 2006 notes that peace-building aims at stabilizing negative peace, in that it prevents the reoccurrence of war and help the country in question to make progress. The major activities in spurks view are as follows.

Disarming, destroying weapons, repatriation of refugees, retraining of security officers, monitoring and observation of elections as well as promotion of human rights. These activities are short term measures while others may be medium term but they are geared towards achieving positive peace, however they are only a path towards positive peace but they do not necessarily cause positive peace. This means that the Agenda for peace document which is frequently sighted has got some gaps that need to be filled up (Haugerudbraaten 1998).



An agenda for peace document would do better in the historical conflicts like that of Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador and Cambodia. This is because all these conflicts were influenced by the cold war politics, however the current wars in Somalia, Yugoslavia, 1994 Rwandan genocide has proven almost impossible for the Agenda for peace principles to apply. This is because of the complexities of the newer conflicts. It calls for the reconceptualization of the idea of peace building, peace building may include preventive measures according to Boutros Ghali but they are not related necessarily to peace keeping operations, hence making peace building to be expanded to have wider explanations.

The universal view of peace building has been two fold, liberal peace building looks at the concept as short term and medium term goals to reform institutions, and national reconstruction of states, as well as creation of liberal democracies to establish positive peace (Galtung 1975).

#### **1.7.4.2 Conflict Resolution**

Wallenstein (2007) defines the concept of conflict resolution as a situation where warring parties agrees to solve their incompatible goals, accept each other's existence and stopping all the violent actions on one another. He proposed major issues that are key in ensuring conflict resolution succeed. One is the incompatibility of the fighting groups. This needs a third party to help the groups agree. This will resolve the incompatibility affecting the parties and it will offer a neutral ground of signing an agreement. Tarekegn (2005) observes that the aim of conflict resolution is to stop the war and getting a clear understanding of the root causes of conflict and find ways of eliminating them. The other key features are the pursuit of different goals and recognition of each other as parties.

Boulding 1976 and Burton 1990 elevates conflict resolution matters towards new concepts of conflict transformation and peace reconstruction. The major idea of conflict resolution according to the two writers is to cause a mental shift of peoples perceptions, attitudes as well as contradictions of the fighting groups. They finally stated that controlled information can cause long lasting peace and elimination of all forms of

violence. Currently conflict resolution relies on psychological skills and focuses more on positive peace than negative peace.

### **1.7.5 Approaches in Conflict Resolution and Peace Building**

Murthi (2009) claims that after the end of the cold war, many western countries started with drawing from participating in conflict resolution matters in Africa. This is because they needed to go back to the drawing board and reorganize themselves back at home after so many years of engaging themselves in the cold war activities. This is when new approaches and theories of peace and conflict started developing, and to a greater extent buy guided peace building efforts in Africa.

### **1.7.6 Phases in Successful Conflict Resolution Approach**

#### **1.7.6.1 Peace Agreement**

In Wallenstein (2007) view, signing of peace agreement marks the start of the conflict resolution exercise. This is where by conflicting parties accept each other's existence and they agree to stop all manner of hostilities towards each other Zartman (1991) acknowledges that stopping of violence is the most important step that conflicting factions can take and this is where the public begins to have a big say. When negotiation starts Zartman argues that is when matters to do with battle field ends. However this is not a sure way of ensuring lasting peace. This is because peace agreements are signed at the end of any negotiation process. Tarekegn (2008) notes that a mediator helps the conflicting parties to sign a peace agreement. This will incorporate issues such as disarmament, demobilization of the militia groups and further re-integrating the fighting groups back to the society. Other ideas such as political stipulation and military provisions may also be part of peace agreement.

Tarekegn (2005) goes ahead and argue that the most important item in peace agreement part of conflict resolution is the participation of key actors and the representation of secondary parties in the signing of the peace accord. Secondary parties are important because they may be involved in the ongoing conflict in one way or another, for instance

they may be supplying material support, psychological support or moral support to the conflicting parties during the conflict period.

### **1.7.7 Implementation**

Vayrynen (1991) observes that it is not enough to come up with a peace deal, but that peace deal must be carefully implemented by ensuring the participation of everybody concerned. By the mere fact that parties to a conflict have come up with an acceptable solution that is effective in terms of its implementation will shorten the period in which a conflict exists. In his view he asserts that both peace agreement and implementation of various stages of a conflict includes the following ideas, demilitarized zones, demobilization of fighters, setting up of dispute resolution commission, peace keeping initiatives and provision of effective power sharing formulae (Boultrous Ghali 1992). However Hempt (2007) cautions that conflict may reverse itself, and goes back to violence doubling its previous form, what may lead to these reversal is the failure to incorporate all the conflicting parties in a conflict.

### **1.7.8 Consolidation / Integration**

This is the final and most delicate state in the process of ensuring conflict resolution. If it succeeds it will completely change the mindset of the actors. This is because it would have resolved the central incompatibilities of the actors. Consolidation in his view refers to acceptance of agreement by all parties of all the provisions of the accord and support their implementation with an aim of causing long term co-operation and harmonious existence by this time it is believed that warring factions must have accessed economic and political resources. This will be an easier situation to change the bad relations between warring factions and ensure proper bonding.

## **CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICTS AND PEACE BUILDING PROCESSES IN SOMALIA**

### **2.0 Introduction**

The entire section will deal with among other things background to the Somali conflict, various peace processes which have been put in place, obstacles and opportunities for lasting peace in Somalia as well as presentation of the research findings.

### **2.1 Background of the Somalia Conflict**

The roots of Somali conflict can be traced in 1897 and later 1948 when Somalia was divided among three colonial powers namely Britain, Italy and French governments. After the portioning of Somalia, British colonial masters transferred Ogadens independence to Ethiopia, Mohamed Siad Barre came into power in 1969 through a military coup. He was a member of Marchan sub clan of the Somalis. Mohamed Farah Idid was the main competitor to Siad Barre and he came from the Hawiye group (Lewis 2005).

Since the collapse of the state and government in 1991, Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia though it was not recognized by the UN. The major source of the Somalia conflict is clanism. This has seriously divided the Somalis, and prolonged the clash ethnic clashes and competition over power as well as resources. This has resulted into mobilization of the militia as well as dampening the hopes of realizing a broad based reconciliation.

Somalia fell into the trap of war in 1991 when Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown by armed rebel groups. The sources of these conflicts are largely structural and they heavily contribute to the current civil war (UNDP 2004). The tactics used by the fighting groups are considered to be guerrilla tactics and the use of small arms as well as light weapons is also very common, this has resulted to a coups and increased violence in Somalia (Kalder 2012).

Coleman (2006) claims that conflict results from struggle of power imbalances between groups whereby one group exploits the other in all spheres of the life. While Ehrunger (2006) asserts that rivalry among groups is the major cause of intractable violence. Deaustch (2006) observes that oppression is the major cause of any conflict, for instance, Siad Barres clan the Darrod exploited that of Major Farah Aidid. D'Estree (2009) asserts that conflicts are as a result of the mixture of socio-ethnic as well as interstate ideas which challenges the existing practices.

Although the above scholars have different ideas on what cause intractable conflicts, they make a convergent idea that social, political as well as economic exclusion are the major factors that contributes to the emergence of conflicts. Also inequality together with exclusion can be considered as a serious cause. All these observations can be compared with the existing divisions among the ruling clan's vs. the nomads and outsiders against sedentary clans on the other hand (Suman 2007).

### **2.1.1 Clanism as a Major Cause of Somalia Conflict**

Although at the national level Somalia presents a picture of a one homogenous black group of people, Somali people are divided along the clanal lines, Somalis pledge loyalty more to their clans as opposed to their state. The four major clans include the Samaale and Sab, the Samaales compose of the three major clans which include Hawiye, Darood and Dir or Issaq, the Sab clans has two sub-clans that are the Digil as well as the mirittle (Rahanuregn). These are the major ones, however they are further sub-divided into more units (making the divisions to be more complicated (Zartman 1995).

Inter-clan wars are what define all these clans and sub-clans. These divisions go to the extent of influencing land settlements, accessing of natural resources as well as resource allocation. They quarrel a lot over water and pasture; other reasons for their fights include trade as well as land (Somali Transitional Federal Charter, 2003).

Other reasons for conflicts between the sub clans and that of Samaale include issues such as pasture and watering points, land encroachment. This is because each of the clan

interprets land ownership differently. Samaales looks at land as something which is owned communally, the Samales favor the individual style of land ownership community land provides for unrestricted movement as well as land usage, on the other hand individual land ownership demands restrictions in movements. These contradictory views causes incompatible goals over access, control and usage of land, this breeds unending wars among the warring groups (Dagne 2010).

The existing discontent has been caused by various factors in Somalia since they acquired their independence. These include massive competition over state power and fewer resources, economic mismanagement, corruption and poor service delivery. These increased poverty levels hence more discontentment (Dagne 2010).

### **2.1.2 Colonial Legacy as a Cause of Somalia Conflict**

Mulugeta (2009) observes that European colonialism had a negative impact in Africa hence it resulted into several conflicts. Britain, Italy, France divided Somalia into 5 major states, the Britons took British Somaliland and northern frontier District of Kenya, Italy occupied Italian. Somaliland- and France occupied Djibouti and Ethiopia. King Menelik of Somalia demanded his share and this led to wars between all the states and hence the disintegration of Somalia (Mulugeta 2009).

Colonialism adopted the culture of isolationism between states and these became a challenge to national cohesion and integration of Somalia. As a result of colonial experiences this sets tribes against each other. This brought in a lot of problems to Somalia which has made them to be unable to unite up to date.

### **2.1.3 The Ogaden War**

Historically, Somalia and Ethiopians have had frosty relations. Not only are they ethnically different but they are also religiously different. Somalia's view Ethiopia as one of the powers which divided Somalia into 5 parts, and these differences have never gone away. (Mulugeta 2009).

The Ogaden war which took place between 1977 – 1978 was started by Somalia's in a bid to re-integrate Ogaden region into the Somalia republic so as to ensure a one United Nation Ethiopia defeated the Somalis in this war. Ethiopia was supported by the Soviet Union as well as the republic of Cuba. This defeat of Mohamed Siad Bare affected him so much politically. This made him to start experiencing internal opposition (Mulugeta 2001). He faced many rebel groups who made military attacks against his government; the rebel groups enjoyed the support from Ethiopian. This led to his overthrow, this has seriously perpetuated the ongoing civil war (Erickson and Mikad, 2013).

#### **2.1.4 Regional and International Politics**

The horn of African region is forced with many kinds of conflicts both inter-state and intra-state conflicts. These include Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Sudan and Uganda as well as other African states like Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Italy, USA and China (Mwagiru 2000). The scramble for and partition of Africa exercised splited the Somalis into Djibouti, North –Eastern Kenya, Ethiopia as well as in the Republic of Somalia. These divisions led into strong linkages. Somalis in the three frontline states which affected the foreign policy making process of the three states.

Ethiopia and Djibouti have actively participated in Somalia conflict for a long time. These states have been accused by some quarters of supplying arms to different factions in the ongoing conflict in order to ensure a friendly government is put in place. This has greatly escalated the Somalia conflict, (UN Report 2003), Djibouti's interest in Somalia is to appease the Somali population which forms part of its nationality. It sympathizes with the Somali community within its territory. These wars have had a spillover effect in the entire African continent (Lake & Rothschild 1997).

At the beginning, Kenya had two approaches to the Somalia conflict, between 1963 – 1978 during Kenyatta's administration, Kenya was not friendly to Somalia, president Moi on the other hand 1978 – 2002) was more friendly to Mohamed Siad Barre and Moi tried to arm him twice to recapture the Somalia capital of Mogadishu as well as the presidency. Since the above strategy failed, Kenyan government quickly changed tact and started the

mediation process. Moi intended to ensure there is a new government in Somalia. Kenya put in place opportunities for dialogue and provided asylum to warring factions. Also the Somalis on the Kenyan territory supplied food stuffs, money and medical services to the displaced people in Somalia, therefore Kenya became a big player in the Somalia conflict (Kamudhayi 2004).

Regional politics has also influenced Somalia conflict in a great way, for instance, in a bid to settle personal scores with Ethiopia over border dispute, Eritrea combined forces with Djibouti to stop or curtail Ethiopia's interests in Somalia (World Bank Report 2005). At the same time, Uganda's aim of participating in the Somalia conflict was to counter the regional supremacy that Kenya enjoyed for long. This complicated matters for Somalia and made conflict resolution to be somehow tricky. The Somali conflict according to some quarters is believed to be field by some neighboring states because they derive direct benefits from the war (World Bank report 2008).

Other countries outside the horn of Africa region like Egypt, Libya, Yemen and the Arab league, have keenly watched the conflict as they see it as a Muslim problem (UN, 2003). Their major interest is to support an Islamic based solution, and the ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state. Yemen was identified as one of the states supplying arms to radical gaps, Egypt wants to safeguard her river Nile interests, Egypt believes that by the continuation of war, they will have succeeded in ensuring that Ethiopia does not diver the Nile waters for their own irrigation (UN Report 2003).

At the international level, Italy, France, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, USA as well as Britain have various interests in Somalia, Britain and Italy have a colonial history with Somalia, Italy colonized southern part of Somalia, Britain colonized the north western parts of Somalia, while France colonized Djibouti. Southern and central Somalia which was colonized by Italy and North western by Britain. Italy which was colonized by Britain signed an agreement to form the republic of Somalia in 1960, however after the civil war broke out, the south declared its own independence and it has been peaceful throughout, its currently called Somaliland (Lewis 2009).



Adam (2002) observes that the US has had mixed reactions towards Somalia. At the beginning US foreign policy was based on humanitarianism. The aim was to restore calm and order after the defeat of the Soviet Union, the US led to multi-lateral force into Somalia in early 1990s and they got defeated, he is then changed tact and withdraw its troops from Somalia. It therefore participates in the Somalia conflict through proxies or indirectly. Since the September 9/11 attacks and the recent acts of piracy, the US has been keen on the happenings in Somalia. The USA has been supporting the return of the TFG in Mogadishu.

## **2.2 The Consequences of the Somali Conflict**

Somalia has experienced conflicts since 1991 to date and it has suffered lawlessness due to failure of state institutions and the rise of rebel groups and radicalization of the youth groups, massive external intervention has also been a consequence (Mulugeta 2009).

### **2.2.1 Consequences within Somalia**

The ongoing Somalia conflict has affected Somalia in three major ways, first and foremost is Somalia's economic system Somalia experiences unregulated market that benefits a few people while it oppresses the majority. Many Somalis have no jobs, despite being active and able to engage in the production process. In fact many famous relies on the remittances and support from their relatives who are in other countries, besides high rates of unemployment the health services are so poor and enrolment in school by young children is very low, this creates a favorable environment for conflict to escalate (Dagne 2009).

The second consequence of Somalia conflict in Somalia is the aggravation of the humanitarian crisis, this is brought about by various factors which include high inflationary rate, piracy activities, drought, unending violence as well as humanitarian staff of the UN and other NGO's working in Somalia being targeted. All these increases the sufferings of the Somalia people (Dagne 2009).

The third effect of the war in Somalia is the subject of political consequences. For instance, the republic of Somalia before 1991 was one sovereign state, but now the country has disintegrated further, for instance the proclamation of the Somaliland as an independent state (but it hasn't been recognized by the United Nations). The emergence of clan-based substantive administration of Punt land in the North Eastern parts of Somalia, even though the said independent states are peaceful, but it can be abit difficult for Somalia to go back in its original status. It's only the southern and central parts of Somalia that are still experiencing war. The major issue there is that many clans are struggling in a big tussle with a sole aim of capturing power. This has resulted to loss of lives, entrenching anarchy, as well as emergence of the radical Islamic groups like the Al Shabaab (Mulugeta 2009).

### **2.2.2 Consequences for the Region and International Community**

The ongoing war in Somalia has caused some spill-over consequences to its neighboring states as well as to the wider international community. This is in ways such as the rise of terrorism, increase of refugees, piracy activities, smuggling of goods, as well as circulation of small arms and right weapons. This has been a great concern of the international community for the past twenty five years.

According to the UNHCR report 2008, Somalia was rated as the third largest state with many refugees coming slighting after Iraq and Afghanistan. Neighboring and frontline states such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Yemen have felt the impact of Somalia refugees on their territories (Mulugeta 2009). It should be noted that whenever a country hosts refugees, it must be prepared for some consequences on various sectors like security, political and economic areas. For instance the Al-Shabaab has been reported to recruit its members from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya; also Kenya has suffered economically by using its substantial little resources to cater for refugees. These resources could have gone to other useful things that benefit Kenyan citizens. (Mulugeta 2009).

Since the collapse of the state of Somalia in 1991, there has been no central authority to ensure law and order is kept, this has resulted to the use of international criminal groups in Somalia which has extended its unlawful and criminal activities in other parts of the world. The world states have been reported to be monitoring the Somalia situation closely to ensure its own security (Mulugeta 2009).

The rise and spread of piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean was very rampant in 2008 – 2009. This has negatively affected the international trade, for instance, the premiums that cargo ships pay as their insurance has significantly increased, this means that transportation costs of the cargo has increased, maritime security is impossible to be achieved because of the prolonged stage of instability (Mulugeta 2009).

The influx of small arms and right weapons in the region is also another effect; most of these weapons were acquired during the cold war era. This has seriously affected the security region in the horn of Africa as it has been listed as one of the factors that have fueled, sustained and contributed to increasing acts of criminality in the region. In summary, the increase of refugees, proliferation of small arms and right weapons, as well as rise of piracy and terrorist activities are the major consequences of the conflict in Somalia both to the region and to the international community.

## **2.3 Attempted Conflict Resolution Initiatives**

### **2.3.1 International Efforts**

The worsening of the humanitarian crisis as well as civil war in Somali made the United Nations to intervene in Somalia through its operations famously known as (UNOSOM I). The security council of the UN authorized this operation. This was resolution 1 of April 24 1992 (Dagne 2009). UNOSOM was mandated to provide security in Somalia, and the UN personnel, deliver humanitarian assistance as well as oversee the ceasefire of violence in Mogadishu. However the ceasefire failed to UNOSOM I could not function due to looting and the state of lawlessness in Somalia. The United States of America joined the UNOSOM in what was unified to be called the unified task force (UNITAF).

The idea and main priority of UNITAF was to assist UNOSOM I in providing the much needed security (Mulugeta 2009).

In May 1993 UNITAF's mandate was expanded to be UNOSOM 2 which included ensuring the establishment of the transitional government, and creation of governance institutions and adherence of basic principles in establishing democratic institutions that are representative of the Somali people (UNSC report 2006). However UNOSOM 2 forces suffered a severe attack which broke their morale a month later, more than 18 American troops decided to pull out of Somalia. This dampened the spirits of the UN Troops who also decided to pull out of Somalia in March 1995 after completing their mission although half way (Mulugeta 2009).

### **2.3.2 The Regional Quest for a Stable Somalia**

According to the IGAD report of (2007), its major function is to ensure regional peace and stability to the horn of Africa as a salient requirement for it to realize its vision. Therefore its involvement in the Somalia crisis is without doubt encouraged and necessary.

It should be noted that the horn of Africa region is to a larger extent homogenous as it shares a common history, geography, ethnic groups, however all these groups are in constant competition for meager resources. It's only the European colonization that divided these people into various states, this explains why the problem in one country has got a significant impact in neighboring states, and therefore the Somalia conflict has got a bigger impact within the entire IGAD's area of focus (Mulugeta 2009).

Ethiopia borders Somalia in a 200Km borderline. This is a very big security concern for Ethiopia, also, Ethiopia has ever engaged with Somalia in a Tussle over the Orgaden region. Therefore that grudge has refused to go away. Also the late Ethiopian prime minister took refuge in the Somalia territory for a very long time, during his stay in Somalia, he created a lot of contacts there who are now in faction readers in today's Somalia, he may be tempted to favor these friends to rise to leadership in Somalia,

therefore Ethiopia has to be very keen in balancing its interests in Somalia (Othieno 2007).

Kenya shares a borderline with Somalia of between 100km; Kenya also hosts a large number of refugees from Somalia. This has affected Kenya greatly both financially and environmentally. Kenya has also experienced the infiltration of small arms and light weapons within its territory as a heart of the Somalia conflict. Kenya in a great way wanted to ensure its own security as well as appear to be a leading peace maker in the region (World Bank report 2008).

Djibouti also shares a borderline within Somalia and therefore it has got security concerns, Djibouti strives to prevent at all costs the entry of illegal arms as well as Somali refugees within its territory. Djibouti also a member of the Somali national reconciliation conference admitted that keeping president Abdi Kassim in office was good for Djibouti in the Economic sense (Othieno 2007).

Eritrea joined and meddled in the Somalia affairs principally to settle scores with its neighbor Ethiopia, the two states have had a long standing dispute over their boarder line. Eritrea has been reported to be supporting multiple groups in order to countercheck Ethiopia (Othieno 2007).

For Uganda's case, it was reported that since Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are landlocked countries with weak economies, Kenya naturally emerged as the regional strongest part. Therefore president Museveni joined in the Somalia crisis with an intention of counter-checking Kenya as a regional grant. All these regional contradictions have made it difficult for a successful conflict management initiative (Garowe 2004).

### **2.3.3 Reconciliation and Peace Conferences to Resolve the Somalia Conflict**

According to Kamudhayi (2004) there have been a lot of efforts to reconcile the warring factions in Somali. This is because in 2001, the Somali conflict degenerated into a regional conflict the belligerent fighting groups were alleged to be receiving support from

a number of states namely, Eritrea, Egypt, Kenya as well and Djibouti. This is because each state had got its own interests in the Somalia conflict.

Menkaus (2007) observes that a number of peace conferences have been held either between few people or involving multi-sectorial groups but the said conferences have never yielded to any meaningful outcomes. Also it has been noted that the number of factions participating in the successive peace talks has been increasing. This hasn't realized any positive impact because the clan system is what defines the relationships between the Somalia people. Mekhaus further notes that IGAD gave member states the go ahead in dealing with the Somalia problem on its behalf from 1991- 2022.

#### **2.3.4 Djibouti initiative in 1991**

Djibouti hosted the first international attempt in reconciling the Somalis between June and July of 1991 and six organizations took part, these organizations represented clans as well as sub clans. In that meeting the clan was noted to be a basis of furthering ambitions of their leaders. These leaders at that time enjoyed influential government positions. They competed for fewer positions in the new government. As a result of these meeting, an agreement was reached to enclose Ali Mahdi as the new Somali president, but it was disputed by General Aideed who came from a different sub-clan known as Hawiye. This disagreement led to the outbreak of the bloody civil war in Mogadishu and the Southern parts of Somalia (Menkhas 2007).

#### **2.3.5 Ethiopias Efforts**

The second meeting was organized by the United Nations in Addis Ababa Ethiopia in March 1993. Several groups attended the second conference. These conferences brought on board new clan organizations and minority groups who were left out in the first meeting in Djibouti. However it was noted that many of the new groups were splinter groups who either supported Ali Mahdi or General Aideed. In Afyares view (2010), these splinter groups made the peace process to be a hard nut to crack.

The third attempt to make peace in Somalia is when IGAD asked Ethiopia to organize for another reconciliation conference. Ethiopia organized the ceremony in Sodere from November 1996 – January 1997, some 27 members attended. This conference was boycotted by General Hussein Aideed and some four factions that allied to him. This conference established a provisional central government of Somalia (UNSC 1997), even before this conference was concluded, Egypt convened a new reconciliation conference in Cairo in late 1997. This Egyptian conference invited both Ali Mahdi's group and that of General Aideed, however the groups allied to Ethiopia withdrew from the talks, and they considered the Egyptian meeting to be hostile to the Ethiopian led sodere peace process. They also claimed that the Egyptian meeting and the attendees were close to Al-Itihad an Islamist radical group engaged in violence with punt land as well as Ethiopia (Theodore 2002).

IGAD members expressed their shock over the Egyptian role in complicating matters. They urged all the states that had an interest in Somalia to collaborate with IGAD and its machinery to assist Somalia instead of working at cross purposes. (Mulugeta 2009). Ethiopia through the support of IGAD organized a number of conferences this time round involving most of the factions and representatives of IGAD as well as those of the international community. This meeting succeeded in establishing the Somalia standing committee together with a fact finding mission in 1998 that visited Somalia, Kind 2006, notes that since Ethiopia was involved in a border tussle with Eritrea between 1998 – 2000, Djibouti was asked to take the lead in the peace process in 2000.

### **2.3.6 Djibouti's Arta Conference**

This conference was organized in May 2000 in Arta in the republic of Djibouti. It was widely viewed as a new phase of the Somali peace initiative, unlike in the past. This conference took the civil society groups as their target. The negotiations lasted for about four months and it ended in August 2000. This resulted into the Arta Declaration where the transitional national government (TNG) was formed, it was led by Abdul Qasim Salat Hassan, and besides this the Arta meeting included the wider participation of various

groups among them civil leaders, intellectuals, clans as well as business community and the religious leaders (Elmi 2010).

This conference that was believed to be interactive and open received a lot of international backing and domestic support from the Somali people. It was also noted that the UN, USA as well as the European Union openly and publicly supported the Arta conference; more than 3,000 Somalis some of whom were warlords also took part. This conference had a surprising outcome whereby a national caretaker government was formed which enjoyed a lot of good will from the Somali people since it was widely accepted as well as welcomed. It's only the breakaway state of Somali land which did not celebrate because it still had some issues that contradicted with those of the rest of Somali (Elmi 2010).

This new government (TNG) secured international recognition. This enabled Somali to occupy a seat in the UN as well as other regional groups. Mulugeta (2009) notes that even though IGAD member states supported the peace process formally, their commitment zeal to the outcome was mixed. This is because Ethiopia became hostile to the TNG while Djibouti and Eritrea supported the TNG. Kenya and Uganda on the other hand feared that the TNG was like a puppet government used by enemies to launch hostile operations. This therefore means that the TNG did not enjoy full support from IGAD member states.

Elmi (2010) observes that the above situation made IGAD member states to support their proxies by channeling arms into Somalia. Eventually the TNG lost the little support that it enjoyed from the people. It was regarded as favoring the Aideed group. It further led to deepened inter-clan rivalries. This made Abdulahi Yusuf together with 17 other clans to make an alliance in Ethiopia in March 2001, in this place the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) was formed to challenge the just concluded Arta peace process as well as TNG in general. They also hold a wider agenda of promoting and forming the federal Somali state (Elmi 2010).



This means that the Arta Peace Conference did not succeed as it had been intended. The continued infighting within Somalia worked against it. Also internal wrangles between IGAD member states, since each state was pursuing its own selfish interests. It is reported that Ethiopia was working with SRRC as its proxy to check on the TNG. This contrasted with Djibouti which aimed at strengthening its bran child (TNG). Eritrea on the other hand supported TNG in order to hit back at Ethiopia (Elmi 2010).

Initially Ethiopia had supported the conference. This can be strengthened by the fact that Ethiopia's prime minister attended the inauguration ceremony; however Ethiopia became reluctant in accepting the outcome of this conference, and Ethiopia scuttled the TNG by convincing some of the participants to abandon the entire government which they did. They had to listen to what Ethiopia says because it is the same Ethiopia that was supporting them militarily, Ethiopia claimed that the Arta conference was incomplete. It therefore succeeded in organizing all the factions and groups that had opposed the Arta conference. Ethiopia also brought on board Arta participants who were dissatisfied by what they were given in Arta conference. Ethiopia helped them to create the SRRC. This action by Ethiopia portrayed it as a major player in the Somalia conflict. The SRRC waged a war against the Mogadishu government. It should be noted that part of the Ethiopia's population based in the Orgaden region is composed of the Somali's ethnic group and therefore it is worried of the radical Islamic groups invading the Orgaden region and causing problems in its territory. In addition to these, Ethiopian government supported those factions opposed to TNG by supplying to them landmines, ammunition and weapons in Mogadishu lower Jubba, Bay as well as Bakaal, Gedo and Hiran. The Ethiopia went to a further extent of strengthening punt land as a key state in order to countercheck the TNG.

The actions of Ethiopia brought in the attention of the UN, the UN Security council made a pronouncement in which condemned all those states who were sabotaging the peace process. The UN demanded for an immediate stop of such activities that were sabotaging the peace process. The UN's claims was supported by the security council's expert panel

on Somalia, in their report they acknowledged that indeed Ethiopia was indeed sabotaging the TNG.

Since the September 11 attacks in 2001 on America, Ethiopia labeled the TNG leaders as supporters of Osama Bin Laden and this brought a lot of differences between the US and the TNG, Ethiopia also attacked TNG on corruption, internal fighting as well as lack of resources to run its own government. All these sustained fight and blackmail of the TNG by Ethiopia led to its sudden demise. Whether Ethiopia's actions were right or wrong, one thing became clear, that no peace process can ignore the important role Ethiopia plays in the Somalia peace process. Ethiopia as an actor is capable of either blocking or ensuring the success of any peace process in Somalia. However, IGAD has always provided multiple forums for dialogue among its member states with a view of re-uniting TNG and their arch rivals the SRRC. This includes organizing the elections of a new government.

### **2.3.7 Kenyas Eldoret Peace Process**

Otieno (2007) in his writings acknowledged the fact that the rivalries between IGAD member states made it difficult for the Somalia crisis to be resolved. IGAD therefore started a new peace process which comprised of a technical committee because of unresolved rivalries between Djibouti and Ethiopia; Kenya was designated to lead the peace process this time round.

Kenya started a major reconciliation meeting (The National Reconciliation Conference) which took place in Eldoret in October 2002. This brought in a ceasefire agreement signed by 24 faction groups. They agreed to set up a federal structure. This was a complete reversal of the unitary governance structure established by the Arta conference among the participants included the TNG representatives as well as those of the SRRC. Powerful warlords, the Peace process were attended by 300 representatives of various groups for over two years. This led to the signing of an agreement which created the transitional federal charter as well as the selection of a national assembly which consisted

of 275 members. This parliament elected Abdullahi Yusuf as the president of the TFG in October 2004.

As Otieno writes, the Eldoret conference adopted the “4.5” power sharing principle which divided the Somali clans into four major clans as well as condensing all other clans into the remaining share. In this formulae 400 seats were divided into a four major clans, and minority groups collectively received half of the seats that major clans took for instance 84 seats for major clans and 42 for minorities (Otieno 2007). This system of power sharing led to divergent interpretations and it caused bitter divisions among the TNG and SRRC supporters. However the transition parliament got established using the same formula after a lot of appeal by the Technical Committee (Otieno 2007). After the swearing in of the new parliament, it ratified a charter that created institutions and their roles, obligations and responsibilities. Among the terms of these signed charter included the election of new president by the National Assembly, election of members of parliament by traditional readers in consultation with political leaders, the national assembly will compose of states and regional administrations, the term of parliament to be 5 years. This parliament therefore elected Abdullahi Yussuf the former president of Puntland as the new TFG president October 2004.

However due to volatility of security and the emergence of the union of Islamic courts (UIC), TFG could not move into Somalia. The UIC was very popular among the Hawiye clan members who direct in central as well as southern Somalia. This proved to be a bigger challenge to TFG to make any progress. President Abdullahi Yusuf lacked legitimacy because of this opposition. He also lacked legitimacy because of this opposition. He also lacked a strong security force to move to Mogadishu as well as be enabled to consolidate power (Mulugeta 2009).

The differences between the TFG and UIC were so deep in that the UIC refused to accept the TFG charter while the TFG viewed the UIC as a terrorist group, however, the two groups both participated in another dialogue organized by the Arab League, there was nothing good that came out of this dialogue. UIC leaders wanted to establish an Islamic

state that brought on board all Somalis who are all over the horn of Africa including the Orgaden area in Ethiopia (Mulugeta 2000).

Kidist 2008 observes that the UIC had its own militia who were financed by the business community in private contributions as they offered protection among the members of the Hawiye clan. This militia group collected taxes from people. The UIC became very strong in that it was able to fight and defeat warlords that controlled Mogadishu. In August 2006, the UIC succeeded in taking over cities as well as ports such as Baladwen, as well as Hoby in Central and Southern Somalia.

#### **2.3.7.1 TFG moves into Mogadishu**

It reached a point where the UIC had to declare the Jihad (holy war) on Ethiopian government with claims that Ethiopia was aiding TFG. In retaliation Ethiopia invaded Somalia in late 2006 with reasons being that UIC was becoming a national security threat, claiming that UIC was linked to terrorist groups, and it also supported the enemies of Ethiopia like the OLF as well as ONL. Ethiopia defeated UIC in a short span of time and the TFG were able to move to Mogadishu (Mulugeta 2009). This invasion was fully supported by IGAD and all its member states except Eritrea, IGAD also called for the Deployment of peacekeeping troops in Somalia by the African Union.

#### **2.3.7.2 Insurgency against the TFG**

Immediately TFG came to Mogadishu, it started experiencing opposition from the Al-Shabaab, Al –Shabaab enjoyed wider support as it had projected itself as a nationalist group, it adjusted itself into clan dynamics in its area of operation. It made a serious of attacks that included suicide bombings, leading to the increase of humanitarian crisis. They applied the hit and run tactics, up to date the Al-Shabaab control much of the South and central parts of Somalia. (Kidst 2008). IGAD stood with the TFG during the whole time; it has ensured the deployment AMISOM troops to Somalia by African Union. AMISOM has greatly received much support from the international community since March 2007.

### **2.3.8 Amisom in Somalia**

Previously both the AU and its predecessor OAU saw no need of meddling in Somalia affairs, however since March 2007. When AU decided to send its troops. This is after Ethiopia had threatened to pull its troops out of Somalia, and the USA supporting many African countries to contribute their troops to be part of AMISOM (Kidst 2008).

AMISOM's mandate was drawn from the AU peace and Security Council. The troops of AMISOM here support to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with different stakeholders, provide protection to TFG and its institutions, and monitor the security situation in Somalia. Support the implementation of stabilization policies on national security, re-establishment of Somali security forces that was all inclusive; carry out humanitarian activities like the repatriation of refugees as well as resettling the IDPs, landless, refugees, protect its personnel as well as installing various in hospitals and factories. (AU committee report 2007).

Several African states pledged to contribute troops to AMISOM but its only Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Ethiopia that took their troops to AMISOM for peace keeping. Most countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi refused to contribute their troops to AMISOM citing the security situation in Somalia, financial and logistical costs related to the exercise, also the states that contributed troops to Amisom lacked full commitment to the peace process (Kidst 2008).

In Kidst view Amisom suffers from a number of challenges that makes it unable to realize its goal, for instance, it lacks strong popular support, it was considered neutral at the beginning but after a few operations and exercises in dealing with Al-Shabaab, they were accused of indiscriminate killings of non-combatants, hence credibility crisis (Mulugeta 2009). Despite the challenges, AMISOM has provided training to the 7<sup>th</sup> troops and police provided medians and first aid services to the wounded civilians and 17<sup>th</sup> combatants (Kidst 2008).

### **2.3.9 Establishment of the TFG II**

Since President Abdullahi Yusuf came from the Darood clan, he was unable to reach to their main opponents, the Hawiye clan. He therefore appointed Mohamed Ali Gedi – a Hawiye to be his prime minister. The two clans have historical competition between them. The two could not sustain their working relationships and they failed to run the TFG as a united government, Ali –Gedi, the prime minister was forced to resign, a new Prime Minister Ahmed Nur, a Hawiye was appointed but he also forced a lot of opposition from the president and his people. The new prime minister was keen to work with the Al –Shabaab and their struggles greatly weakened the TFG ability to function properly.

Due to the persistent challenges TFG was constantly facing, and the continuation of the Somalia conflict and the worsening of the humanitarian crisis. IGAD and the international community resolved to organize a new peace process in Djibouti union president Yusuf opposed, because he was unable to challenge IGAD leaders, he was forced to resign (Mulugeta 2009). The results of the Djibouti conference was the creation of the unity government, in this government, there was an increase I parliamentary membership to accommodate the moderate insurgents. Sheikh Sharif who was the former leader of UIC was elected as the president. This new government was referred to as the TFG II, despite all these, insecurity state still continued to persist in Somalia (Mulugeta 2009).

### **2.4 Nationalism and the Prospects of Peace in Somalia**

According to Doge (2005), he argues that absence of all inclusive state institutions is the biggest challenge in realizing nationalism in Somalia. The degree of inclusivity of people in social, political and economic matters determines a lot whether the society can flourish or not. In his view he argues that stable institutions are necessary pre-requisite for any national cohesion and integration initiative. That if a state can fall to provide the very basic services such as security, judicial system, infrastructure as well as health care. This will tempt the citizens to look for alternative means of getting these services like joining the militias or armed rebel groups. This will eventually lead to further divisions along

political states and ethnic identities, the clans and ethnic groups will become the new basis of political mobilization and organization. Dodge (2005) continues to observe that religious or clan based organizations can temporarily offer the said services, but they lack the capacity of fostering national cohesion integration as well as national building, instead power struggles between ethnic communities will be the end result. Therefore sustainable development cannot be achieved and worsening of the humanitarian crisis will be the end result.

Mekhaus (2010) argues that separatist movements are not able to provide any security and development because they lack legitimacy, legitimacy gives any state or government a sense of civil identity and the chances of that government fostering a shared vision for the future is likely to gain support from the wider public. Mekhaus explains that the republic of Somalia has got a high chance of prospering if and only if the inclusion and integration of various traditional Somali identities happens, he dispels the notion that separatist groups can foster unity in Somalia, since those groups promote a single identity at the expense of others, others try to subsume and assimilate other groups. This has always resulted into further conflicts and widening the social and economic inequalities among the Somali people.

Mekhaus (2010) proposes that the best way that Somalia can get out of these quagmire is to first address the issue of opposing identities, in place of that, common goals should be established, also the inclusion of all clans and the Islamic religion will be the best way forward because they are the most representative and they are well entrenched forms of identity in Somali. This will be a step forward in fostering national cohesion as well as are the sources of conflict in a bigger way. Therefore mediators and all peace negotiators are urged to factor in the sold structures; this will add a lot of value to the ongoing peace processes.

Elmi (2010) notes that public participation is very necessary in resolving the Somalia conflict, he emphasizes on the need of creating a viable state and institutions that people will use as a vehicle to participate in matters of building Somalia. These institutions such

as the civil society, political parties, and pressure groups will try to cut across various identities. In turn these bodies or institutions will come up with long term goals that will ensure the development of Somalia. In short public participation will redefine the existing identities and relationships. This is because all the participants and peace builders at the local level will strive to ensure a shared national identity is put in place. This will go a long way in weakening and doing away with exclusive identities like those established around clans.

#### **2.4.1 Clan Kinship, Islam and Peace-building in Somalia**

Clan kinship and Islamic religion are the two most recognized identities that are stalling the peace process in Somalia. This is because these clans are hostile to each other and they are always engaged in power struggles among the elites, the end result of these have been disruption of peace initiatives, increase of violent clashes, unnecessary competition among clans, and unequal distribution of political, social as well as economic resources. Islamic movements on the other hand have rejected one national identity of Somalia; instead they want to create a single Islamic identity which will be based on the sharia laws. These in turn clashes with many domestic clan structures, again this is in sharp contrast with the neighboring states and western countries who fear that it will form a basis for the growth and spread of Islamic extremism (Dagne 2010).

Lederach (2005) noted that religion, as well as clan's identities are the basis of different aspects of life among the Somalis. This goes to an extent of including dispute resolution and reconciliation mechanisms. This means that any peace process must factor in this strategy, otherwise it will not go far, in Lederach's view, sustainable peace building initiatives must pay special attention in building state institutions that factors in multiple Somali identities in place, from the local level, regional level up to national level (vertical integration). This will be more effective if it is done alongside contribution of the long term goals of a national identity that will bridge all the existing societal divisions (horizontal integration).



The biggest challenge that most peace initiatives have had is to integrate various clans into state structures since the clan kinship provides a basis for social functions in which people's daily lives and relations are carried out. It is also a basic characteristic in which the Somali people recognize each other. These clans provide a sense of identity as well as belongingness, and they can be used to establish mutual support systems. These clans also give political leaders a basis for rallying support and are used to determine political representation, although this is a positive function, it gives peace-negotiators an obstacle in realizing national integration (Roland 2009).

Roland (2009) goes ahead to point out that in most cases oppressive regimes have been using multiple identities in targeting particular sections of the population for political reasons that may include segregations and assassinations, he also notes that the militia groups that are struggling for power and resources are also established along the clan lines. Ronald explains that a sense of belonging to a particular clan by an individual involves feelings of antagonism and hostility towards other social clans and groups in relation to matters inheritance as well as long standing rivalries. These clans are also a basis for providing collective needs such as water for livestock, digging wells, support in weddings as well as in funerals, supporting poor members. These support systems ensure life insurance and retribution through the Diya – paying groups.

Lederach (2005) explains that the clan in Somalia has been used for collective punishment. This is because if a member of one clan is killed by a person from another clan for whatever reason, the victim's clan retaliates by murdering someone from the suspect's clan irrespective of whether they are guilty or not. This establishment of Guilt in relation to a person's membership of a clan has promoted anarchy in Somalia, in addition to this; the political class has abused the clan identities by manipulating both the perceived and real complaints of the clan in the pursuit of their narrow selfish and personal gains as they pursue their political agendas.

These abuses and destructive nature of the clan identities has been a huge obstacle in realizing peace since they have weakened the state institutions. Inter clan violence

whether executed by militia groups or the diya – paying groups, often rival the states con.. in ensuring that law and order prevails. (Elimi 2016) observes that long standing issues such as political exploitation between clans and historical injustices are the biggest obstacle in ensuring peace in Somalia. For instance the issue of territorial ownership, most citizens accept the fact that they have a right to vote, vie for any elective seat, move across the country but these rights are curtailed by clans in their perceived territories. This perception slows down the idea of national cohesion.

Elmi (2010) summarizes it all by claiming that the said obstacles do not just affect immediate issues such as freedom of movement alone but long term issues such as national integration and cohesion, although there is an overlap between immediate and long term obstacles, unfair political exploitation of one clan against others erodes the initiatives of national unity. If peace negotiators can separate immediate challenges from long term challenges, it will help in dealing with Somalia problems easily. This is because some problems are solved immediately while others gradually. Nationalism can only be built when the state is functioning. Therefore much emphasis must be put by the peace negotiators in building state institutions. Then once that is done is when long term issues such like inclusion, reconciliation as well as forming one national identity will begin to take shape.

#### **2.4.2 Strategies to Confront the Challenges Posed by Clan and Islam Identities**

A number of strategies have been proposed to deal with the problems of clan's identities. Some of the proposed strategies are viable others are not in the Somali context. For instance the idea of complete destruction of communal identity was employed in the early 70's by the Somalia government. This was done through employment of "clan blind" policies. This was a good strategy for fostering nationalism and promoting individual rights as well as citizenship. This is because the use of clan identities in public places was banned. Also people were asked by their government to abandon the clans as their social interactions, however this strategy failed to bear any fruits because the political leaders themselves were going against that clan blind policies, they practiced clanal favourism in

their worst forms. This also increased the levels of corruption in government as well as social hypocrisy (Talentino 2004).

Another suggested measure is to partition Somalia into clan lines, but Elmi (2010) notes that since the clans are so many and they run into their hundreds, and because said clans are in competition of over natural resources which are fewer, this strategy is less effective, in place of that he advocates for power sharing where all clans are included. That's why the current formula of 4.5 is being used in power sharing where more parliamentary seats are allocated to the four major clans while the remaining half are shared among the smaller clans. The idea is to make the government of Somalia to be as representative as possible; however this idea is vehemently opposed by the Islamist groups and intellectuals who claim that it is inaccurate and alleges that it's a way of empowering the so called clanal warlords and elites.

Elmi (2010) goes further to advocate for power sharing between clans, this is because it will assist the mediators and peace builders in early stages of state building, this will bring about the notion of acceptability in the new state because all the Somali clans are represented, he goes further to suggest a two-tier system of government, whereby the upper house will represent the clans while the lower house will represent the wider population that will be elected based on geographical fame, to be an alternative of the existing 4.5 formulae.

Yusuf (2010) proposes a second strategy that deals with the idea of identity reconstruction. This will entail the consolidation of one and all inclusive identity. This means collapsing all the current identity groups and creating one large group, he suggests the identity options, one Islam and the other Somali nationalism. Although making Somalis to be under one Islamic identity is good, but it will create animosity with neighbouring states like Kenya, Ethiopia and the US that are Christian dominated. These states have well founded fears of Islamic extremism. The growth and spread of Al shabaab movement have reinforced these fears. Alshabaab have recruited their members

in all the Somali clans and are using violence to pursue their agenda. This has increased political instabilities and human suffering.

Richmond (2016) on the other hand rejects the idea of Islamic identity by pointing out that many Muslims reject both clan and Somali national identity, this favour a dominant religious identity as well as a universal Islamic nation. This means that all other traditional identities in Somalia will be rejected. This will cause further divisions, instead Richmonds advocates for a collective identity that integrates both Islamic religion and clan structures, which is nationalism. This will be an alternative to the single dominant identity.

Elmi (2010) summarizes that, power distribution as well as identity reconstruction is the most immediate issues that will build the Somali state and ensure the success of a long term goal of building a one single national Somali identity. That first the institutional structures should be put in place, this institutions will help to nurture national cohesion, secondly that a strong administration should be put in place and it should have the capacity of providing basic things such as law and order as well as security, education, health, judiciary that will solve disputes among the clans and individuals, all these will serve to weaken the aspects of clan identities, the institutions such as the police, courts, prisons will help to replace the punitive and unfair systems such as Diya- paying groups. He further advocates for the inclusion of local leaders, civil society groups, clan elders, to the new structures of the state, this will ensure a vertical national interaction and promote fair and proper decision making. This will ensure that Somali people are fully involved in ownership of economic, social as well as political decision making, hence strengthening the state.

## **CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

### **3.1 Research Design**

The study used the case study approach in order to understand the dynamics present generally in the peace building approaches used in managing the Somali conflict and specifically in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The design enabled the researcher to collect mainly qualitative data from community elders who reside in Kenya. This was supplemented by quantitative approach through descriptive design which was utilized to obtain quantitative data from a sample of diplomats from Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Somali analysts who reside in Kenya.

### **3.2 Sample of the Study**

The sample of the study comprised of diplomats and officials from Intergovernmental Authority on Development and Somali analysts and community elders. This sample possesses knowledge on the developing trends and the various peace building approaches used by IGAD in managing the Somali conflict.

### **3.3 Sampling Technique**

In this study, the study sample was drawn by means of non-probability sampling or purposive sampling for the collection of primary data. Purposive sampling was favored due to the difficulty faced in identifying individuals who were willing to participate in the study, that is, diplomats and officials from Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Somali analysts and community elders. These respondents were few and because of their importance, all of them were included in the sample. Though arranging for appointment for the interview was a challenge, the diplomats and officials from Intergovernmental Authority on Development were favored because of their knowledge on the developing trends and the various peace building approaches used by different players in managing the Somali conflict. The same could be said of the Somali analysts and community elders. In this study, 5 officials from Intergovernmental Authority on Development, 10 Somali analysts and 5 community elders were selected.

**Table 3.1: Sampling of Respondents**

<b>Respondents</b>	<b>Sample</b>
IGAD Officials	5
Somali Analysts	10
Somali Community Elders	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>30</b>

### **3.4 Sources of Data**

Data for the study was obtained from primary and secondary sources. Primary data was collected from interviews with diplomats and officials from Intergovernmental Authority on Development and from Somali intellectuals and community elders. The researcher visited and delivered introduction letters to the headquarters of IGAD and also used personal contacts to assist in introduction to Somali intellectuals and community elders. Secondary data was obtained from both published and unpublished literature. The publications included reports, books and journals. In addition, previous but relevant literature by other researchers was also used.

### **3.5 Methods of Data Collection and Research Instruments**

The methods of data collection that were used in the study include survey, focus group discussions (FGDs) and document review. In the survey method, primary data was collected through the use of questionnaires from 5 officials of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and 10 Somali intellectuals. The study used interview guides to collect data through focus group discussions held with the 5 Somali community elders. Secondary data was obtained through document review of publications including reports, books, journals and relevant literature by other researchers.

### **3.6 Data Analysis and Presentation**

The collected data in form of the completed questionnaires underwent editing to detect and correct errors and omissions. The qualitative data from the completed questionnaires and the interview schedules used in the focused group discussion was then put in categories, themes or patterns for coding purposes then analyzed by contextual (thematic)

analysis or content analysis. Analysis of the qualitative data helped to identify the developing trends and assisted in understanding the various peace building approaches used by different International players in managing the Somali conflict. It also assisted to trace the process and establish a causal relationship between the variables.

The quantitative data from the completed questionnaires was also put in categories or classes through coding, then tabulated and counted. The researcher then used SPSS computer package to organize and present the data. Descriptive statistical tools such as percentages and frequency distributions were used to analyze the data which was presented in tabular form. The researcher then interpreted both the qualitative and quantitative data and presented the research findings.

## **CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS AND STUDY FINDINGS**

### **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter will purposefully deal with the data analysis and the presentation of the findings made by this study.

### **4.1 Obstacles to Peace**

The reasons as to why various peace processes in Somalia have failed continues to puzzle many people, is it that the peace deals are poorly done, or is it that they are not implemented, Harper and Mary 2(12) put across eight reasons that May affect any Peace processes. They are as follows, first is the number of warring parties, secondly is the lack of other peace agreement before intervention or a forced peace agreement, third is the likelihood or the existence of spoilers, fourth is the subject of a collapsed state, fifth is the number of soldiers involved, sixth is the presence of the disposable natural resources. The seventh is the presence of a hostile neighboring states or networks and finally is the existence of the demands for succession for the purposes of the Somalia conflict all the eight factors apply. This study will specifically deal with the external factors and the two internal factors, they are as follows, first is the Ethiopian Meddling factor, secondly is the absence of a major power interest, third is the issue of warlords determination to maintain the current situation and lastly lack of enough resources to support ongoing peace process.

#### **4.1.1 The Ethiopian Factor**

Various political analysts have pointed out the fact that Ethiopia's meddling has posed as the biggest stumbling block in resolving the Somali conflict. This is because this meddling by Ethiopia has greatly aided the spoilers by supplying them with arms and weapons. This peace accords namely the ... Accord of 1997 as well as the Arta accord of 2006) have been undermined by Ethiopia. Ethiopia has also to a greater extent manipulated the peace process that has been held in Kenya as well as the transitional federal government that was put in place in 2005. Since Ethiopia is a powerful state and geographically well positioned has been a hostile state to Somalia, and it feels secure by ensuring that Somalia remains weak and divided.



Some analysts allege that Ethiopia has been hosting several Somalia factions one after the other in a bid to scuttle the peace process, Ethiopia made General Hussein Aideed to lose the city of Baidoa. General Aidid became a friend of Ethiopia later on and he took part in destroying the Arta peace agreement. Ethiopia at the same time destabilized Ali Mahdi's government by financing his arch-rival General Hussein Aideed. At the time General Aideed took over power in 1994, Ethiopia worked with Ali Mahdi to destabilize General Aideed. Likewise, when the Cairo accord was signed by all factions in Somalia. Ethiopia supported Abdullahi Yusuf and Adan Abdullahi. When Abdullahi Yusuf took power; Ethiopia organized the Somali restoration and reconciliation committee to subvert Abdullahi Yusuf's Transitional federal government.

Concerning the peace conference in Arta, Ethiopia together with Djibouti facilitated this conference, the end result of this conference was signing in of a charter that created a national assembly together with an interim government. However, Ethiopia went ahead and disregarded the Arta process citing it as incomplete and convinced other IGAD members hence the formation of the Kenyan peace process. In the Kenyan peace conference, Ethiopia took on active role of controlling the Agenda and the forum hence manipulating the peace process, Ethiopia managed to hand over power to warlords that they had a soft spot for they marginalized the traditional leaders as well as civil society organizations and religious leaders.

All these manipulations that are carried out by Ethiopia are meant to make Somalia be more divided and remain weak, Ethiopia believes that a weak and divided Somalia will pose no threat to it, this is because Ethiopia wants to continue colonizing Somalia territories that it occupies, also to retain the Somali ports through signing of agreements with various Somali clan chiefs under unequal terms.

#### **4.1.2 Warlords: Determined Spoilers**

Most of the Somali factions are led by warlords who benefit from the existing confusion. These warlords have committed many crimes and they feel so insecure about the future. They thrive on violence, intimidation to scuttle the various peace accords that have been

signed for example a general attacked Kisimayo in 2001 after refusing to take his parliamentary seat, while Gen Hussein Aideed and Osman adopted violent tactics in undermining the TNG. The same case applies to Abdullahi Yusuf and Colonel Shatigudud. Very many warlords have used violence, attacks in order to undermine the Somalia governments others who are in government sabotage the very government they serve and they attempt to create a parallel administration to that in Mogadishu. Other spoilers include General Aideed who sabotaged the United Nations efforts to bring back peace in Somalia in 1993. He wanted to get power through the backdoor. These spoilers have made peace making to be impossible.

#### **4.1.3 Lack of Resources**

Mekhaus (1998) claims that lack of enough resources and enough capacity has helped to prolong the conflict since Somalia for a very long time has lacked an effective and selfish government, it has been unable to finance its own main programs. This means that most of the Somalia's state resources emanate from foreign aid, either through bilateral or multi-lateral support. Domestic sources of revenue in Somalia have been destroyed by the prolonged war hence making the entire country to be dependent on foreign assistance. This factor of lack of enough resources was experienced during the Cairo and Arta peace conference. This means that the resolutions of the conferences like the creation of state institutions, could not be done due to insufficient funds, Somalia needs to be stable so as to generate enough resources like through taxes, fees, also it should be noted that a huge part of the Somalia population are refugees. In neighboring states others are internally displaced persons. Therefore it means that Somali loses a lot of revenue as a result of having many refugees outside its territory and many IDPs who remain unproductive within the Somalia territory.

#### **4.1.4 Absence of Major Power Interest**

Winston Tubman, one of the UN Secretary Generals representable to the Somali peace conference in Kenya narrated how the region lacked a hegemony hence continuation of conflict that if one the UN security council member was part of the horn of Africa region, then war in Somalia could have been dealt with long time ago, most scholars have

acknowledged the fact that African union has really supported Somalia, the same case with the European union, but was misses is the driving force (a hegemon ) to complete the whole process. They claim that Somalia lacks friends globally. The scholars have narrated how the US had strategic interests in Somalia during the cold war period but ignored its human rights needs or situation cold war period but ignored its human rights needs or situation. The US supported Mohamed Siad Barres government that led Somalia into the current turmoil (Lyons and Samatar 2002).

Since the US eighteen soldiers were killed, in 1992, the US withdrew from Somalia and since the it adopted a wrath and see attitude, however since the September II attacks in 2001 within America's territory. The US started monitoring the situation in Somalia more closely. The US has taken a number of measures to ensure order is restored in Somalia, for instance. It stopped the transfer of large money and Telecommunications Company in Somalia (Al –Barakaal). The US also listed twenty Somali companies and individuals as aiding terrorist groups. According to the US, unstable Somalia will serve as the bleeding grounds for terrorist groupings. In short America has not done enough to restore a stable regime in Somalia.

Ethiopia one of the likely hegemon in the horn of Africa region has been scuttling the peace processes instead of supporting them, if the United States had committed itself fully, Somalia would have been stable by now. This is because many Somalis are tired of war; secondly faction leaders and warlords have miserably failed to restore peace in Somalia. Also Ethiopia which enjoys the US backing has been sabotaging the peace process, hence if the US would have ordered Ethiopia to keep off Somalia issues the problem would have been solved long ago.

#### **4.2 IGAD's Role in Reconciliation and Peace Making**

(IGAD) the intergovernmental authority on drought and desertification was established in 1986 to deal with the efforts of various states from the horn of Africa region to eliminate chronic drought and famine in the region since it was almost impossible for one state deal with the problem individually (Ahmed 1992). Later on in 1996 IGADD member states

unanimously decided to expand the mandate of IGADD to deal with other issues such as conflict prevention, conflict management as well as conflict resolution matters. Therefore IGADD was enabled to start efforts of building peace and mediated in various conflicts. For instance IGADD played a mediator in conflicts between Ethiopia and Somalia governments in 1977 / 78 over boarder conflict.

In 1996, IGADD changed its name to IGAD, meaning intergovernmental authority on development. Its new principles included maintained regional peace, stability as well as security, promotion and protection of people's rights, one of the major objectives was to promote peace and stability in the horn of Africa, it also attempted to create mechanisms for prevention, management as well as resolutions of both inter-state and intra -state conflicts. This was done through dialogue (Art 7 of IGAD document 1996).

In addition to the above, IGAD member states agreed to ensure effective collective measures in eliminating threats to regional peace, cooperation as well as stability. Also to establish an effective mechanism of carrying out consultations. And as well as co-operate in peaceful settlements of disputes both inter-state and inter-state before being forwarded to other regional organizations and international community (Article 18 of IGAD charter).

The restructuring of IGAD secretariat also took shape and the new roles and mandate were factored in, however IGAD did not resolve any differences between its member states. This is because Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as Uganda claimed that sedan is the biggest threat to the security of the region, they therefore supported the south-Sudan rebels against the Sudan government.

These made IGAD to excel in conflict resolution. This was during the signing in of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) between Sudan government and the rebels. IGAD played an institutional crucial role in establishing where the problem was between north Sudan and south-Sudan; it also maintained the idea of continuity in the Sudan peace

access. This was very key in brokering the CPA deal, because of IGADs sustained involvement in the Sudan peace process.

#### **4.2.1 IGAD's Contribution to Peace and Security**

By the fact that IGAD officiated the signing in of the agreements in 2005 and 2005 proved that it was a reliable body in ensuring peace and security in the horn of Africa. For instance the Sudan peace agreement of 2005 and the Somali peace agreement of 2004. IGAD excelled in dealing with complex matters and defied all odds in ensuring a secure horn of Africa region, however Khadiagala (2007) notes that the existing circumstances under which the two agreements were signed exposed IGADs institutional role, for instance Khadiagala explains that IGAD peace initiative was politically motivated and it's the regional mediators who were drawn from member states, the secretariat of IGAD never contributed anything. This is because it had no capacity or authority to lead and manage any peace process on its own, when the Sudan peace process began in 1993 IGAD had no secretariat and the necessary bureaucracy to resolve any conflict.

The organization lacked organizational as well as logistical effort and the Djibouti based secretariat was far from achieving that, Khadiagala asserts that both Sudan and Somalia peace initiative relied on Kenyan diplomatic capacity, for instance, Kenya gave General Lazarus Sumbeiywo as the chief negotiator in the Sudan peace conference, while Ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat dealt with the Somalia conference.

Kenya tried in all ways by providing diplomatic and organizational support; also it tried so hard to maintain political neutrality. This neutrality was very key for the two peace deals to be brokered; Kenya also gave neutral ranks for different Somali factions that were backed by Ethiopia as well as Djibouti, Kenya also managed to put pressure on the Khartoum government to sign the peace deal.

Despite its inability to have strong institutions as well as the necessary authority over member states, IGAD managed to institutionalize do not funding through the IPF. This

external support was critical in ensuring the success of the peace deal however these support questioned the ownership of the peace process. The external financiers such as the US, UK, Norway gave deadlines for the peace process and this led to so many frictions and opposition from the warring groups. Therefore this two peace deals was seen as adopting a top down approach.

Although the US funded the Somalia peace process, but its involvement with western powers was very minimal since they had no interests in Somalia at that time, however these funding to foot the bills managed to ensure IGAD was able to do without the involvement of Egypt, Libya and Yemen who had direct interests in Somalia and the horn of Africa region. They were completely excluded which was a setback for the peace process. IGAD managed to establish a monopoly in the entire process, (Young 2012).

The success of IGAD in the two peace processes made it to earn legitimately and wider acceptance as the appropriate forum for tackling conflict in the horn of African region (Francis 2006). However Francis notes that on its own IGAD cannot achieve all that, instead he recommends that IGAD must divorce itself from external funding and ally itself with any hegemon in order to push through its Agenda (Francis 2006).

In the overall sense, IGAD is abit far from influencing conflict resolution, because it has got weak institutions because of its continued challenge the horn of African region continues to experience many conflicts, despite the signing of Sudan and Somalia peace deals in 2004 and 2008, IGAD has been unable to stop the Ethiopia Eritrea war of 1996-2000 or to prevent the Darfur conflict not to reach at the levels where it reached. There are also conflicts in northern Uganda by the LRA and conflicts in eastern Ethiopia, it should also be noted that at the time of the signing of Sudan and Somalia peace agreements. IGAD member states were not reading the same page.

For Sudan's case the divisions among the IGAD member states in 1996 / 97 peace process witnessed a hostile scenario where some of the member states supported the south Sudan rebel group to fight the Sudan government. This was through military action

taken by Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. This made the north to negotiate with the South; IGAD members can mostly agree there is an external pressure particularly from the United States. For instance the UN's military sanctions on the Somali arms embargo confirmed that Ethiopia was supplying arms to some rebel groups in Somalia throughout the 2003 / 2004, when the Somalia National peace conference was ongoing). The report also noted that Eritrea was assisting Islamic opponents of the TFG after the inauguration of that new government, when Ethiopia intervened; this made the TFG government to collapse.

It is a deep rooted culture in the horn of Africa whereby military peace processes are common. It should be noted that many of the IGAD leaders came to power through the barrel of the gun and most governments are military governments. This explains why boarder disputes are common between states because of these expansionist ideals of the military men. It becomes very difficult environment for peace processes to succeed.in such situations experts suggest that member states have to agree to cede some degree of sovereignty by being bound by regional laws and decisions of allowing the secretariat of IGAD to be independent.

It has been observed for some time that IGAD leaders have not been remitting their annual subscriptions to IGAD. Also disregarding IGADs legal framework in favor of unofficial means outside their mandate in dealing with the existing regional issues. Examples of such incidents include launch of the Sudan peace process in 1993 as well as the authorization of intervention military troops to aid the TFG in 1995 in the South and Central parts of Somalia.

The culture of dictatorial leadership in the horn of African states has greatly affected IGAD secretariat in doing its work. IGAD has been reduced into playing a reactive role rather than a pro-active role in fostering regional peace. Its IGAD member states that are directing IGADs activities instead of the other way round. This affects IGADs image and its neutrality in dealing with conflicts as it is required of any mediation body. IGAD also lacks a hegemon to support its work. A hegemon rises up by virtue of its superiority in

terms of economy, military, political as well as diplomatic strength. South Africa is the regional hegemon in the south while Nigeria is the hegemon of the West African states (Mwaura and Schemed 2022). Ethiopia's efforts to become a regional ground have been counterproductive and it has worsened things in the horn of Africa region.

Apuuli (2004) observes that at the technical level, IGAD secretariat has done its best by developing the necessary infrastructure like the early warning systems, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) that monitors areas of likely conflict. Apulli also points out another program me of IGAD known as the IGAD capacity building programme against terrorism (ICP). This programme is mandated to build national capacity to deal with terrorism as well as promoting regional security border controls as well as tightening the judicial sentences against terrorist activities. However the value of these programs is not seen or felt in detecting and containing many conflicts in the horn of African region. For instance Darfur conflict, Orgaden conflict, conflicts in Kenyan 2007 / 2008 post-election violence, the ongoing south Sudan conflict, of that conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti, or the Mogadishu conflict.

#### **4.2.2 IGAD and the Somali Peace Process**

The kind of conflict that existed in Somalia was one of the unique conflicts of our times; it was characterized by the total collapse of the state and its institutions. This happened when Mohamed Stud Barren was toppled in `99`, various groups fought to take the control of the Somalia capital of Mogadishu. This conflict in the city degenerated into war based on clan factions against each other. As soon as the notion of Islamism emerged, it became a political force in Somalia. As a result of these, the Somalia conflict became a regional problem because of its effects that were harshly felt in Ethiopia and Kenya in whose territories horsts a number of the Somali communities. The Somali war roped in the United States and major western powers that showed same concern and interests in Somalia because of the fear of widespread of terrorism activities.

Somalia could not become a member of IGAD because it lacked a government which was legitimate. This means that Somalia could not be a member of any other international



organization. IGAD therefore had a big challenge in dealing with the Somalia problem as a result of the said problem, OAU assigned Ethiopia in 1993 the leading role in restoring peace and reconciliation of Somalia, however the UN was firmly dealing with the Somalia problem through (UNHAF, UNOSOM 1&2) in a bid to create an environment whereby humanitarian operations as well as restoration of law and order were the main objectives, however by 1995 the two initiatives collapsed hence the continuation of war.

The main reason as to why Ethiopia was eager to participate in the Somalia peace process is because of its concerns of the activities of radical islamist groups that had emerged in most parts of Somalia after the overthrow of Siad Barre, some of this groupings included the Al Ijtihad, Al Islamic who wanted its followers to set aside their interclan divisions and embrace Islam as their ultimate political goal. Their major aim was to establish Somalia as an Islamic state which was guided by the Sharia laws. Their ultimate vision was to unite all Somalis in the entire horn of Africa region. This included Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti. It should be remembered that Ethiopia had both domestic and regional interests in Somalia peace process.

In Tadesses (2002) view Deep inside IGAD, Ethiopia was widely believed to enjoy a strong diplomatic leadership in Somalia affairs. For instance, in 1996/ 1997 Ethiopia adopted a twin-track policy where in the first instance, Ethiopia took a military action in dealing and destruction of Al-Ijtihad camps in Gedo towns in Somalia, Ethiopia claimed that the two groups were hosting Arab and Afghan mujahidin and terrorist groups which were widely suspected to be linked to the Al-Qaida group. These activities of Ethiopia were never opposed by IGAD, OAU nor the international community. This made the Ethiopia troops to be in control of border towns of Dolo in 1997, this were Somalia towns. At the same time, former Ethiopian prime minister the late meles zenawi warned UN officials that Somalia was housing terrorist groups hence a big headache to the horn of Africa region.

Politically, Ethiopia organized a peace talks of all Somalia factions in its Sodere town in 1997 January, Abdullahi – Yusuf and his group attended the conference and their major task was to convene a 465 member national reconciliation conference later in 1997, however, this peace process was boycotted by General Aideed and his group who were now controlling Mogadishu. This was now sabotaging the sodere peace process. As if this was not enough in March 1996. The Arab League together with Egypt organized Somali reconciliation talks in Cairo Egypt whereby General Aideed and his group attended. These two peace processes undermined each other and this made IGAD to stop all the peace processes that were working at cross purposes.

Another challenge to the IGADs peace process in Somalia was the apparent infighting between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998 over boarder dispute, Eritrea was accused of arming General Aidid and his faction while Ethiopia was allegedly assisting some factions inside Somalia. This worsened the Somalia war. The two countries were fighting using the proxies. At the end of this war in early 2002, Djibouti's new president launched a new Somali peace process.

The new approach that the new Djibouti president Ismael Omar Guelleh used was that of involving traditional and civil Somali leaders, and he avoided the warlords as well as faction leaders. This process concluded in August 2000 and it created the transitional national government (TNG) that was led by Abdukasim Salat Hassan. It enjoyed strong backing from the business community in Mogadishu and Islamist groups. It also got support from IGAD, AU, UN and Djibouti government.

However the TNG did not receive any support from Somaliland or Abdullahi Yusuf of Puntland. Also the warlords in Somalia opposed Abdulkasim, after Ethiopia concluded its war with Eritrea in December 2000, Ethiopia came back to Somalia and they started opposing the TNG claiming it was supporting radical Islamic groups and the Arab world. As a result of these opposition (the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) headed by Abdullahi Yusuf was formed to oppose the TNG. The SRRC got the support of Ethiopia in a bid to undermine the TNG.

Up to the year 2001, IGAD was a fence-sitter and it had no institutional capacity to deal with the Somalia issue, it relied so much on Ethiopia and Djibouti. After the Arta process, it was discovered that both Ethiopia and Djibouti were supporting opposing factions within Somalia, therefore IGAD in January 2002 decided to ask president Moi of Kenya to take charge of the peace process in Somalia. It was a case where Kenya was mediating between Ethiopia and SSRC on one hand and Djibouti with TNG on the other hand in this Kenyan peace process. The US and other western countries did not get involved hence there was no external pressure. The Somali warring groups had enough time to engage with each other (Nyuo Yah 2003). These negotiations began in Eldoret Kenya in 2002 and decided to stop all forms of violence in Somalia. The negotiations went on smoothly until Djibouti withdrew however Djibouti came back to the negotiation table after Uganda and Eritrea joined it. At the end of this conference, a new parliament that represented all clans was set up and by October 2004. The same parliament elected new president Abdullahi Yusuf to be the head of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). He then formed a new government that was headed by a new Prime Minister Gedi.

Despite all the above efforts by Kenya and other IGAD member states, wrangling persisted; credit goes to Kenya which availed its resources to ensure the success of the Somalia peace process. These wrangling made the TFG to be unable to put its two feet down in Somalia, there existed many factions that emerged to challenge its authority. IGAD had no choice but to live with all these conflicting views from its own member states, IGAD was considering taking on its force to enter Somalia and ensure its own stability.

#### **4.2.3 IGAD'S Achievements Case Study of the Establishment of the Juba Administration**

According to the views of many Somali elders, IGAD did the Somalis proud by establishing the Juba Administration in the South east area of Somalia. This was after a fact finding mission of IGAD officials in Mogadishu and Kismayo. The officials collected views from various people on Juba areas administration. They succeeded in striking a deal between the Federal government of Somalia and the leadership of the

interim Juba Administration. This agreement was famously known as Addis Ababa agreement of 3<sup>rd</sup> May 2013.

Inside the Adis Ababa agreement, there lies the establishment of an interim government in Juba, the total management of security forces, militia integration, federal institutions as well as structures, in addition to these the reconciliation of the citizens and confidence building among all the Somalis in Jubaland. These articles were implemented through constant negotiation, president Mohamed Ahmed Islam was re-elected on 15<sup>th</sup> August 2015 as part of the implementation of the agreement.

In all these negotiations, IGAD was represented by Amb Mohamed Affey, Ethiopia sent its foreign affairs minister Tedros and the Majority leader in the Kenyan parliament Aden Duale represented Kenya. Somalia leadership was represented by president Hassan as well as prime minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmake other attendees included leaders from punt land, among others. The outcome of these long meeting resulting in a deal where leaders agreed on the modalities of forming a national consultative forum on the election process. This was going to help in a great way to help Somalia realized its vision of having a federal government by 2016. This was a positive move in making Somalia to progress despite the usual life in Mogadishu.

Among the achievements of the Addis Ababa agreement was the reconciliation of the communities that were residing in Juba land, promulgation of the Jubaland new constitution, inauguration of parliament in Jubaland, amalgamation of militia groups into the great national army of Somalia, the ascending of Jubaland to a permanent state, funding of all these activities were facilitated by the EU, Italy, UK and the UN, IGAD only facilitates the exercise as the mediator, Ethiopia chaired and Kenya was a Rapporteur. This was a milestone in Somalia and the entire horn of African region. This is because stability of Somalia will have a ripple effect in the entire horn of African region. This conference succeeded because of commitment as well as ownership of all leaders in the entire process.

The federal government of Somalia and the interim Juba government after signing of agreement embarked on implementing all the articles of agreement. As a result of this implementation, parliament was inaugurated, jubaland government officials became members of the executive council, as well as the peace was restored. The new government was guided by the principles of one United government, all inclusive government, IGAD to offer a supportive role, and joint fighting of the Al-Shabaab as the key role of the federal government, Amisom as well as the international community. A 75 member national parliament was put in place and two speakers were elected.

#### **4.2.4 The Challenges Faced by IGAD in Its Approach to Peace Building in Somalia**

For the last eighteen years of peace activities, Somalia is still undergoing an ugly turmoil. This has had severe damage in Somalia in terms of loss of lives and property, prevention of humanitarian services and supply of relief foods. There are many insurgent groups in Somalia, for instance the Al-Shabaab- the Arabic word meaning the youth. This militant group has captured large swath of land and has rejected the UN's idea of sharing power with the TFG. The Al shabab group has carried out illegal activities such as a piracy in the Indian Ocean; this has caused insecurity in the Gulf of Aden area. The following are the major reasons why peace processes in Somalia are not making any major headway.

#### **4.2.5 The Complexity of the Somali Conflict**

According to the UN report (2013), Somalia has remained the unique case in the world to broker any peace deal. This is because of state disintegration; there has been a lot of difficulty in many issues such as representation, power, resource sharing, reconciliation just to mention but a few. Secondly IGAD as a body lacks committed and genuine partners, in helping Somalia to stabilize, in addition to this; clan loyalty by Somalis is the biggest obstacle. This kind of contest in Somalia among its clans is a zero sum game. This has continued to deepen the crisis and hence realization of peace becoming impossible. The existence of warlords who are mostly opportunistic is another hindrance to peace, most of these people are beneficiaries of the war and they act as spoilers. They pay special allegiance to their clans and not the Somalia nation. They have a habit of signing deals and disowning it.

In Mekhows view (2016), the Somalia people embraced Islam since it was introduced in East Africa; however they practice the tolerant version of Islam as opposed to the radical Islam. This tolerant Islamic version is facing a lot of pressure from the radical Islam that is always violent since it's manned by the extremist groups who want to create a caliphate (Taliban like regime) by uniting all Somalis in Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia and Djibouti, and then create a one Islamic state. They rely on Jihad to advance their agendas; they are one of the serious obstacles in the realization of peace in Somalia hence complicating the conflict in Somalia. Their activities have caused anxieties in the neighboring states as well as making the Somali conflict to have a regional as well as a global dimension.

Since the collapse of the Somalia state in 1991, Somalia became flooded with small arms and light weapons. This was in addition to the escalation of the civil war, rise of poverty levels, increased state of lawlessness and the ugly militarization of the civilians, because of the long continuous and unending state of insecurity, most Somalis people cannot agree to be disarmed. This explains why most interim governments in Somalia cannot put their two feet on the ground. The state is no longer the monopoly of force or violence. Mekhaus (2016) notes that any attempts to disarm people by the existing governments have led to more bloat shed. He therefore proposes that since the integration of the militia groups to the national army of Somalia cannot bear any fruit, the effective disarmament of Somalis require a special deployment of the international forces.

Land is another complex issue in the Somalia.. This has been worsened by a number of key eruptions namely the colonial legacy, clan wrangles, ownership of land and the ever changing palters of settlement among the Somali people since they are pastoralists. There is an increase in both land and property disputes. In order to deal with this problem, there must be a wide societal consensus and a proper functioning government to be put in place. Since Somalia is a third world development country and it relies on Donor aid to and the little revenues Somalia collects is stolen by the warlord. These has made it difficult for any government to survive since 1991. These governments that could not

survive included the TNG, TFGI, and TFG II, most of the budgets of all these governments have been funded by donors (Mekhaus 2010).

## **4.2.6 Regional Factors**

### **4.2.6.1 Rivalry among the States**

IGAD has had a long standing historical rivalry between its member states; in fact all the states have got boarder disputes among themselves. These are a serious challenge and IGAD therefore suffers from the credibility. The strength of IGAD depends on relationship of its member states. These rivalries are reflected in unnecessary competition in resolving the Somalia crisis, for instance Ethiopia and Eritrea have extended their own differences into Somalia by supporting different factions as a way of countering each other this complicating the conflict in Somalia since 1998. While Eritrea supported the TNG, Ethiopia and Djibouti claiming the process was not properly done. These internal differences made IGAD not to succeed in restoring peace in Somalia despite all its efforts.

### **4.2.6.2 Regional Instability**

IGAD is faced with a number of conflicts apart from the Somalia conflict, IGAD member states are experiencing either inter-state conflict or the intra-state conflict, for example the Sudan conflict, the South Sudan crisis, in short the horn of Africa region is troublesome, most of the governments are military governments that come to power by the Burrell of the gun and therefore they are characterized by despotic tendencies like bad governance, human rights violations, undemocratic institutions and the culture of impunity by state officials. Despite all these the states have been meddling in each of others affairs by supporting rebel groups. It has therefore been hard for IGAD to work out on a common security strategy and general policies that are binding to all member states; this is because of the high levels of mistrust, and acts of sabotage of some member states. Therefore IGAD lacks a common and executive strategy of dealing with the Somalia issue.

Another challenge that IGAD states face is drought, desertification as well as high levels of poverty. Therefore all these make IGAD to have a divided attention and cannot attend to all these problems with all the focus. Arab states are also alleged to be funding the Al-Shabaab group especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia states, Egypt and Libya to some extent are also accused of meddling in the conflict. All these countries have undermined IGAD's efforts greatly and they have gone to an extent of causing more instability in the horn of African region.

#### **4.2.6.3 Lack of a Regional Hegemony**

The existence of a regional power on any region is very key in ensuring a stabilization factor of the region, for instance Nigeria is the Hegemon in West African region while South Africa is the hegemon in the South African region, Nigeria heads ECOWAS while south Africa commands power in SADC, however for the case of IGAD, no state has reached that level of commanding power. In other words all the powers of all the IGAD member states can be challenged by other states. Ethiopia enjoys a large army and huge population but it lacks necessary economic capacity to be a hegemon in IGAD, Kenya lacks a strong military capability to push through as Agenda. Sudan as oil wealth and geographical advantage but it is constrained by internal challenges.

When the 15 respondents from IGAD and the Somali analysts were required to indicate how they perceived the peace building efforts by IGAD in managing the Somali conflict, a large number were of the view that the approaches had moderate success (32%). The rest of the respondents indicated that they achieved very low success (26%), they had high success (14%) and very high success (14%) as indicated in Figure 4.1.

It can be deduced that the peace building efforts by IGAD in managing the Somali conflict had moderate success. IGAD member states have continued their efforts in dealing with the Somalia conflict through a series of peace processes such as the two extraordinary summits and five extraordinary council of ministers meetings. IGAD members are also sustaining the government in Somalia by sending troops under AMISOM while the Juba administration was established in South Eastern Somalia.



However, failure in managing the Somali conflict can be attributed to economic interests, proliferation of weapons and traditional power structures rendered irrelevant. Opposing identities or hostile factions, divergent goals in terms of clans and the subsequent low affinity for national identity and presence of spoilers undermining peace processes or preventing implementation of peace accords also played a significant role in failure in managing the Somali conflict.

**Table 4.1: Respondents’ Perceptions on Efforts adopted by IGAD in Peace Building in Somalia**

<b>Reasons for Lack of Success</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Moderate success	7	47
Very low success	4	27
High success	2	13
Very high success	2	13
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>100</b>

### **4.3 Different Approaches in Addressing the Somali Conflict**

#### **4.3.1 The Structure of the State**

There is a sharp contrasting view among the IGAD member states on how to resolve the Somalia war, whereas some countries like Kenya, Eritrea and Djibouti are in favor of the unitary structure approach, some countries like Ethiopia and Uganda favor the federal approach. The arguments by the unitary approach supporting states are that the approach will promote national unity and protect the territorial integrity of Somali while federalism will Balkanize Somalia further. They fear that if federalism takes root in Somalia, it may cause some negative effects in their own territories as some marginalized ethnic communities may start demanding for federalism. The proponents of federalism like Ethiopia are of the view that federalism will promote proper peaceful settlements of disputes with special regard to the current state of Somalia where it has got break away states like punt land and Somaliland. It should be noted that Ethiopia is a federal state, and it may wish to extend its structure of governance to its neighboring states.

These differences in the structural approach of issues played out in the Arta peace process where Djibouti was the horst and it influenced the outcome whereby a unitary structure of governance was adopted. This is in sharp contrast with the Eldoret peace process where Ethiopia pressurized for the federal structure to be adopted and it was actually endorsed, however most participants claimed that they signed the deal to support the federal system of governance under duress, Ethiopia was mentioned as the culprit in this. In short, there has never been any form of consensus between the federal structure and the unitary structure of governance that is suitable for Somalia.

#### **4.3.2 Representation**

The subject of people's representation has been another source of bitter differences in resolving the Somalia war. This was because whereas some peace initiatives took the warlords to represent their factions, IGAD in other peace processes employed the approach of building blocks whereby autonomous state such as punt land and Somaliland acted as a base of putting in place a working federal government. Some other peace processes such as the Arta employed the civil society groups and clan elders as the people's representatives, while the Eldoret peace process IGAD relied on warlords and the clan elders to lead the negotiation process, in Djibouti conference; it's the moderate Islamic leadership that represented the people.

This kind of scenario whereby each group claims legitimacy of representing the people has made IGAD to experience the challenge of being all inclusive. As much as IGAD may claim to be all inclusive in its peace processes, the happenings on the ground suggests otherwise. There is no way all the actors can be included in the peace process because they are so many, for example. Warlords, civil society members, business community, Islamic groups as well as clan elders. It should be noted that before 2008, these groups were not recognized as important actors in the Somalia peace process despite their active participation in the Somalia conflict.

### **4.3.3 The Limited Capacity of IGAD Secretariat**

Despite IGADs revitalization in 1996 whereby its mandate was expanded, IGAD never received financial support in line with its expanded mandate (nearly 2009). IGAD lacks resources, technical capacity as well as political will and commitment from the member states in fulfilling on its mandate. Besides these IGAD secretariat has few professionals and administrative, it also lacks sufficient systems that can aid it in discharging on its mandate.

### **4.3.4 Insufficient Political Will**

In most of the cases, IGAD has been relegated to play a peripheral role in making decisions. This is because the secretariat does not attend any council of ministers meetings or the Assembly of heads of states, IGAD only is given what to implement on what the ministers have decided. For instance in the Eldoret peace conference, there is no role that IGAD secretariat played the management of all these peace processes is done by the frontline cases in most cases. It has been alleged that member state are afraid of a stronger IGAD, they fear it may challenge their authority. Another challenge that IGAD experienced is the problem of dual membership by its member states. The said states belong to other regional organizations and therefore they have a divided attention.

### **4.3.5 Financial Constraints**

It has been observed for a long time that IGAD has no financial capacity to meet its own budget. It therefore relies on donor support and the member states annual subscriptions. It has been noted time and again that most IGAD member states do not pay up their annual subscriptions to IGAD; therefore they are faced with huge arrears. This has led IGAD to be in a big financial problem, this case can also be explained to be as a result of high levels of poverty in most member states. the existing conflicts both intrastate and interstate as some of the reasons that may explain the accumulation of financial debts by member states except Ethiopia and Kenya, what brakes the Carmel's back is the fact that all member states with in IGAD are dependent on foreign aid in financing their own national budgets.

#### **4.3.6 Weaknesses of IGAD Secretariat**

It has been observed for a number of years that IGAD secretariat is not well prepared to handle any heavy task before it, for example the Eldoret process was looking upon IGAD to provide proper conference services to the peace process but to the surprise of many it was unable. Also in the entire conference, IGAD never documented or managed any information that came in as a result of that conference. This almost forestalled the continuation of the peace process until the intervention of the Kenyan government. It has been noted that many of the IGAD members of staff pay much allegiance to their home governments than to the IGAD body itself hence undermining the organization.

#### **4.3.7 The Neutrality and Enforcement Capacity of IGAD –IGADS Enforcement Capacity**

From the closer look of IGADs activities, one concludes that IGAD to a greater extent lacks enough capacity to implement on its decisions. After IGAD has issued its communiqués member states do not take that communiqué seriously, assuming they are taken it seriously they lack financial capacity to enforce those decisions. When IGAD members decide to enforce a decision, they only enforce those that are in line with their interests, issues such as on those of the environment, health and education but they avoid sensitive issues such as political and security matters. This scenario is worsened by internal divisions among the IGAD member states, and some member states undermining IGADs efforts in ensuring law and order is restored back to Somalia, for instance, Somali politicians, academics, and Somali's in diaspora have never endorsed the decisions made by IGAD hence undermining it.

#### **4.3.8 Lack of Regional Policy on Peace and Security**

Throughout the various peace process that has never spearheaded by IGAD, IGAD has been exposed a body that lacks comprehensive policy of peace and security. This policy would have addressed the various causes of insecurity in the region there has been a draft strategy but it was never been adopted because IGAD only focuses on short term and immediate issues as opposed to long term plans, for instance IGAD member state focus more on its revitalization and avoid matters to do with security policies. Medhane (2013)

observes that since IGAD member states lack democratic ideals such as respect for human rights, public party's patron and tolerance to divergent views. They fear to adopt a common policy because it will greatly affect the way they run their governments back at home. Also most IGAD members are still in the process of transition in state formation, because of these matters to do with intra-state conflicts, interstate conflicts will always be the case. Similarly lack of a hegemon in IGAD has also slowed down the culture of adopting common stand on policy issues, and what breaks the Carmel's back is the fact that IGAD member states are unwilling to adopt a common policy on matters to do with peace and security.

#### **4.4 Ways of Enhancing Sustainable Long-term Peace building Mechanisms in Somalia**

The success of restoration of peace and security in Somalia will require a comprehensive approach by all the peace builders in Somalia as opposed to the current firefighting approach by the international community and IGAD member states. The international community should strive to play a pro-active role as opposed to being reactive. They should realize that the deployment of naval forces to deal with sea pirates and providing humanitarian assistance won't stop the conflicts. Instead approaches that stabilizes Somalia and those strategies that will aim at resolving the root causes of the Somalia conflict will greatly help. A number of Somalia intellectuals have argued that part of the reason as to why the number of warlords has increased is because of the involvement of the international community in the affairs of Somalia and this international community has not taken any decisive actions against these warlords. The warlords are walking free and they carryout heinous actions with impunity as they get away with it Scott free.

It has been noted that the clan system holds sway in the lives of the Somali people because the Somalis' pay special allegiances to the clans as opposed to the state. This has resulted to inter-clan conflicts, rising cases of nepotism and high levels of inequalities among the clans. Therefore in order to resolve the Somalia conflict special attention should be given to the clan membership and inter-clan differences. This is where lies part of the solution, clan membership should be a basis to access resources power and basic services.

The previous peace processes have dealt with warlords and clan elders and sidelined the civil society members, who actively participate in the affairs of Somalia. This has made peace in Somalia to remain a pipe dream. Besides these most peace processes like that of the Arta focused on institutions rather than on the root causes of the problem. Therefore inclusivity of all groups is key if Somalia peace processes are to be successful.

Proper co-ordination and strong international engagement in the Somalia peace process is also very important, that is during negotiations and the implementation of all the signed agreements. Since peace building and state reconstruction go hand in hand, they should be done in a concurrent approach and not one thing at a time. Also the culture of imposing the solutions from western countries into the Somalia war should stop. The Somali people should be given a good political space so that they can own the process themselves.

Another way forward is to adopt a holistic approach to ensure the prosperity of the Somali people and not just a matter of bringing war to an end, in other words what can work best to the Somali's is positive peace as opposed to negative peace. This is because positive peace will address all the historical injustices and deal with the root causes of the Somalia conflict. This means that both military, diplomatic, and peace building strategies should be adopted in order to create a lasting peace in Somalia.

The inclusion of the Somalis people in the Diaspora, clan elders, religious leaders and opinion shapers is also a fundamental issue. They carry a wealth of experience which may help their relative back at home, besides these, some space or avenues should be created for them so that they can make their input. Warlords also need to be advised on the need to ensure peace in Somalia. This is because peace is a necessary tool for the prosperity of any nation and all the people.

Another measure that may be adopted in continuing the Somalia war is the idea of the international community to enforce the international human rights law and the norms of the responsibility to protect as their basis for international action.

They should invoke these laws so that they protect lives, property and the people of Somalia. So far the actions of the international community do not rhyme with these principles. The African union on the other hand should strengthen its African standby force so that it may cause an impact in Somali.

Another measure that can be adopted is that of making peace making missions to be able to make peace before attempting to keep it. For example ECOMOG succeeded in Liberia, but Amisom and the African standby force has failed miserably in finding peace in Somalia. Therefore Amisom needs to up its game and raise the sufficient member of troops from its game and raise the sufficient number of troops from its African member states. It should also streamline its finding methods and management issues as well as logistical matters. This will go hand in hand with implementing peace-building initiatives in a concurrent manner.

Another proper measure to be adopted is the question of carrying a proper survey and background check of the mission before embarking on intervention measures. This will enable the peace-builders to fully understand the historical issues of the mission both of the political angle, social angle and economic angle a proper assessment of the force needed to realize positive results is very key. For instance UNOSOM I failed because it did not have an appropriate force to deal with the Somalia problem. The same thing to UNOSOM II and UNITAF, they failed because of failure to address the root causes of the Somalia conflict. The said forces had a restricted itinerary. Therefore all the interventions in Somalia must be integrated into one system so that they realize a positive effect of restoring peace and security in Somalia. Otherwise hurried deployment and unplanned attacks won't help matters either.

IGAD is recommended to have a permanent structure and the capacity for mission management that will be able to work hand in hand with those of the African union and the United Nations Department of peace keeping operations (DPLO). This will ensure proper planning, coordination and integrate style of deployment of peace keeping operations. This will go further and assist IGAD in dealing with the problem of

circulation of small arms and light weapons, mobilization of the militia groups, and their subsequent reintegration back to the society, also disarmament will be made easier. Not only will these restore confidence of the Somali people's confidence, but the community will be willing to demilitarize and embrace peace IGAD should strive to do further research on the Somalia conflict and find out why the opposition usually emerges after signing of the peace deals, and what can be done to deal with such reasons.

According to the respondents, the challenges facing IGAD peace building initiatives in Somalia include complexity of the Somali conflict (49%). IGAD lacks genuine internal partners of peace from within due to zero-sum clan contest coupled with protracted conflict by warlords who deepened divisions to make reconciliation and power-sharing difficult. Due to the prevailing sense of insecurity; most Somalis are unwilling to disarm while dependence on international humanitarian assistance contributes to instability. Second was poor diplomacy methodology applied (14%). Diplomacy contributed to the failure through use of inappropriate strategies aimed at speeding up the revival of the state system that was originally to blame for the chaos.

The respondents identified three main ways of enhancing sustainable long term peace building mechanisms in Somalia. These included encourage peaceful co-existence and inclusivity (40%). This entails involving clans, elders and religious leaders and including civil society organizations. Secondly, international peace engagements should focus on institutional processes while supporting peace talks and making agreements more inclusive (33%). The international engagement in the peace process should be coordinated and strong, both during the negotiation stage and during the implementation stage. Third is to enhance capacity of peace building mechanisms and force requirements in international peace engagements (27%).



**Table 4.2: Respondents’ Perspectives of Enhancing Peace Building Mechanisms in Somalia**

<b>Mechanisms of Peace Building</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
International peace engagements to focus on institutional processes	6	40
Encourage peaceful co-existence and inclusivity	5	33
Enhance capacity of peace building mechanisms and force requirements	4	27
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>100</b>

## **CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Summary**

Somalia as a state is currently facing a myriad of challenges namely conflict, famine, poverty, refugees, terrorist activities, sea piracy, Jihadism as well as the existence of warlords. Although the people of Somalia have in the recent past attempted to craft better systems of governance in order to deal with the existing conflict and maintain law, order and justice. The problem of the nature of the state still remains, since the collapse of Said Barres regime, there has been a power vacuum and clans together with political elites have attempted to play the leadership role. At the same time the international community has tried to use the diplomatic methods to build the small state by attempting to restore a democratic elected government. This has been alongside the initiatives by the Somali people to re-establish a new system of governance.

There is no single explanation that can explain the causes of the perennial Somalia conflict, and no single idea can resolve that said conflict. It should be noted that there has been a lot of efforts in attempting to re-solve the crisis; however this has been undermined by a myriad of challenges both domestic and international. The challenge of Islamic militancy has complicated the problem and therefore becoming a major concern to the international community. As much as the Somalia's themselves are trying their best to resolve the said crisis, its high time that the international community need to come together, sit down and re-think their strategies, and see to it that they adopt more effective way to resolve the Somalia conflict and restore peace and security. They should employ strategies that are responsive to the realities of Somalia.

The Somalia conflict to a greater extent has made the issue of power sharing, property ownership, resource allocation and the place of women in society to be very complicated. This is besides deepening inter-clan divisions that has always experienced manipulation by politicians as they pursue their selfish interests. This has increased the number of political elites, and people benefiting as a result of the escalation of the said conflict in turn all the attempted peace initiatives have failed.

This study has established the fact that the Somalia conflict is so complex and characterized by competing personal as well as inter-clan interests, several conferences have been held in an attempt to resolve people's grievances but they have ended up furthering the inter-clan interests and those of the political elites. Instead of consolidating the gains that those conferences made since the 1990s, the said conferences have been turned into a money making ventures, some individuals who are so vocal are seen as clan elders and representatives of the clans which is not necessarily reflective of the realities on the ground. Some people cause divisions deliberately in those conferences so as to generate support from their clans hence increasing the number of participants and hence prolong the negotiations, other groups have also participated in the peace processes with the main agenda of blocking the rival groups from advancing their goals. These people have been invoking clan solidarity so as to access power and use it to achieve private gains. Despite the increase of the number of participants there has never been any lasting peace found as a result of these conferences. Peace agreements have always been challenged by the infamous expression by warlord general Mohamed Farah Aideed "Looma dhamma" meaning not inclusive, hence causing a continuation of conflicts and this looma dhama thing has not always been used in order to advance people's interests but rather individual interests (Ted 2016).

One advantage that IGAD enjoys is the ability to convene meetings at short notice for instance in 2011, IGAD held 12 heads of state meetings, 28 executive council meetings, IGAD also enjoys strong networking among its member states that makes it easier to do business and compare notes between member states. Also different ethnic groups cut across member states borders hence making strong regional ties that enhance regional stability and harmonization of various policies of IGAD. However on the flipside, the conflicting interests of member states that makes up IGAD has slowed down the Somalia peace process through difficulties in adopting a common position on policy issues.

External actors have also played a role in inflaming the Somalia conflict. These external actors include both the state and non-state actors, they have provided weapons and finance to various warring factions in Somalia, both the Arab states and western countries

have been engaged in the conflict because of one reason or the other, some may include terrorism others because of security of the international community concerns.

Since 1996, IGAD has been involved in the Somalia crisis in a number of ways, all these ways have been having An aim of installing a transition government that will usher in lasting peace, however these attempts have failed in numerous times, but IGAD has remained steadfast.

## **5.2 The Conclusion**

Since the Somalia conflict began in 1991, the complexity of the issue made the collapse of more than fifteen peace processes. This has negatively affected the horn of African region and the entire universe, IGAD has been at the forefront in attempting to resolve this crisis. IGAD mandate Ethiopia and Djibouti to deal with the issue as frontline states, IGAD has taken similar positions through endorsements of individual states initiatives in trying to resolve the conflict.

However, member states that form IGAD have engaged in rivalry amongst themselves through their contradicting approaches of dealing with the Somalia problem, this has slowed down IGADs process of restoring order in Somalia. These has been occasioned by individual states selfish interests that has questioned the neutrality of IGAD as far as the Somalia problem is concerned since IGAD reflects the behavior of its member states, IGADs efforts have been negatively affected by competition between member states.

The member states forming IGAD have also had a number of challenges that include, intra-state conflicts, inter-state conflicts, invasion of other states, supporting rebels in neighboring states, poverty, environmental degradation, refugees, etc., all these factors have in one way or another affected IGAD's capacity to restore lasting peace in the Somalia conflict.

The African union has made its own contribution in the Somalia conflict through AMISOM troops that has been protecting TFG II as well as providing humanitarian support to the Somali's. The AMISOM has faced a number of challenges that include

lack of enough staff, financial and logistical shortages, and lack of enough support from the international community. The United Nations organization on its part withdrew from Somalia since UNISOM failed, however it supports the African union through sponsoring peace initiatives and granting monetary assistance to TFGI and TFG II governments, however all the burden has been left to AMISOM and IGAD on the subject of peace keeping.

Despite all these initiatives both by IGAD, and other international bodies, the Somalia conflict is still escalating. This is reflected in the lack of a proper – functioning government which is well capacitated to provide law and order as well as offer basic services to its citizens. The TFG is not only weak but unable to tame the radical Islamic groups. Al-Shabaab continues to threaten the TFG through attacks and acts of insurgency in the southern parts of Somalia. This means that the Somalia issue requires a well-coordinated effort by both the regional and international organizations.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

First and foremost IGAD should consider developing and enhancing the capacity of its secretariat to ensure that only professionals are part of their staff members. This will greatly help IGAD to provide proper negotiations and mediation support to the conflicting parties. This will go a long way in fostering strategic partnership with the international community, and the international civil society organizations. At the same time IGAD is encouraged to put its emphasis on human security over the state interests, however this will be an uphill task for IGAD since it's a body that bring together state actors, but IGAD should find solace and encouragement from the UN whose primary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security. At the same time IGAD should be aware that global interests are not necessarily always coinciding with African interests, it should be very careful when making choices, but one fact remains that IGAD or rather sub-regional organizations are very necessary in helping to restore peace.

Secondly going by what IGAD has done in the Sudan crisis, south Sudan crisis and Somalia, it is very clear that IGAD means well for the horn of Africa and has therefore

set a good example for other sub-regional organizations. Since IGAD is undergoing institutional reforms, IGAD needs to factor in its past experiences in order to get strengthened so that it avoids making the same mistakes that it committed in the past. It should strictly adhere to its norms and principles that are contained in the treaty establishing it.

Thirdly, it has been observed that IGAD is weak politically, financially and institutionally. This means that IGAD lacks enough capacity to deal and contain the Somalia conflict, in addition to this, since there are so many intra-state and inter-state conflicts in the horn of Africa, this complicates matters for IGAD. Therefore member states are urged to urgently resolve their own internal differences so that IGAD can get strengthened. They should adhere to the international best practices of resolving inter-state conflicts, IGAD secretariat should consider setting up a forum where conflicting states can come together and iron out their differences. They can go further and invite other regional actors to come and mediate in those forums. If member states that form IGAD can relate in a mutually respectable manner that states trust one another, and co-exist in a peaceful way, this will give IGAD an ample time and best opportunity to deal with regional conflicts such as that of Somalia.

Another recommendation that this study makes is that since IGAD activities have been slowed down due to financial constraints. In addition to this, the many conflicts and endemic poverty in the horn of Africa. The study recommends that this should not be an excuse for IGAD members not to meet their financial obligations to IGAD. This means that member states should make prompt contributions to IGAD; also the international community is encouraged to also support IGAD by increasing their financial contributions, both financial and technical so that IGAD is able to play its rightful role in resolving the Somalia conflict.

The other observation this study has made is that not only is the Somalia conflict so complex but it is a very hard not to crack because there are so many actors involved. These include the radical Islamist group the Al Shabaab, clan militias, a warlord, who

enjoys external support from outside forces. These actors continue to compete for power and they control major towns, airports, ports, among others, in addition to these, land issues, justice as well as clan conflicts makes a major obstacle for peace to prevail in Somalia. This makes IGAD unable to sort out the Somalia issue easily. The study therefore recommends the strengthening of IGAD, through enhancement of its institutional capacity. Then other multi-lateral actors should come in and jointly help IGAD to resolve the Somalia conflict, IGAD should find a way of talking to the AU and the UN so that they create a working relationship with an aim of getting a viable solution to the Somalia conflict, creating a sense of ownership, and dealing with the problem of suspicion as well as to solicit for financial support easily.

The study has also noted with great concern that lack of a well institutional capacitated secretariat makes IGAD unable to deal with the Somalia conflict, there are very few professionals who work in the facilitators office, the study therefore recommends that IGAD tries to create links with academicians and researchers so that they are able not only to fill the gap but also to boost IGADs institutional capacity to come up with proper and viable decisions and workable initiatives.

The study has also discovered that one sided militaristic approach does not solve the Somalia crisis, instead it escalates the crisis. IGAD would do better if it engages all the actors in the Somalia conflict. This means that all clans should be given a chance for exclusivity purpose. This will help to solve the many inter-clan conflicts. Even the militant groups Al-Shabaab should be talked to and see whether they can embrace negotiations. This strategy will adopt what the EU is doing in the Middle East by talking to moderate Taliban's.

In Afghanistan, therefore the same strategy can be tried in the Somalia case and see whether it can yield results. The study has also noted with deep concern that most of the outcomes of security initiatives that arises from IGAD meetings has not always been acceptable to all members, therefore member states forming IGAD are urged to adopt

common agenda and common policies that will effectively deal with all conflicts in the region.

The study would also wish to recommend that all negotiators and mediators should be aware that there are so many factors that inspire the Somalia conflict namely historical, economic, political as well as social factors; other factors are both geo-political and geo-strategic. Therefore the mediators and the peace processes must factor in these issues, in addition to this they should be aware that the homogenous nature of the Somalia state has not helped them to have stability, therefore an alternative ideology that embraces peace, and foster unity should be administered the Somali people so that they stop their violent activities.



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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION

Ali Noor Abdi  
University of Nairobi,  
P. O. Box 30197-00100,  
NAIROBI.

Dear Sir/ Madam,

#### **REF: PERMISSION TO CONDUCT RESEARCH IN YOUR ORGANIZATION**

I am a post-graduate student pursuing a Master of Arts (M.A.) degree in International Relations at the University of Nairobi. I am conducting a research on “evaluating peace making processes, the case of IGAD in Somalia conflict”

I request you to kindly spare time to fill this questionnaire. The information obtained will be purely for academic purposes. I would like to assure you that your views will be used solely for research purposes. I assure you that, your identity will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thank you in advance.

Yours faithfully,

Ali Noor Abdi  
Reg No: C50/80805/2012

**APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SOMALI INTELLECTUALS AND OFFICIALS OF UN, AU, AMISOM AND IGAD**

**I: Background Information**

- 1. Sex:
  - Male
  - Female
  
- 2. Age.....
  
- 3. What is your highest educational qualification?
  - O' Level
  - A' Level
  - Diploma
  - Degree
  - Master/PhD
  - Other (specify).....
  
- 4. Organization/Status (tick one)
  - Intergovernmental Authority on Development
  - Somali intellectuals
  - Other (Specify).....
  
- 5. Which year did you join the Organization/Came to Kenya? .....
  
- 6. Which year were you posted to your current station? .....
  
- 7. What is your designation? .....
  
- 8. What are your duties at your Station/ Occupation...

**II: IGAD Peace Building efforts in Somalia**

- 9. What role has IGAD played in reconstructing peace in Somalia?  
.....  
.....
  
- 10. Mention some of the successes that IGAD has achieved through peace-building in Somalia.....  
.....

11. Does IGAD include all actors in its conflict resolution endeavors in Somalia? (How much does IGAD follow and implement the principle of inclusivity?).....  
.....
12. How do you assess the decision enforcement capacity of IGAD? Are its Decisions taken seriously? .....
13. How far has the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) been supportive in alleviating resource constraints? To what extent do they influence IGAD’s decisions?  
.....
14. How does IGAD coordinate its activities with other actors such as the AU and UN?  
.....  
.....

**III: Challenges faced by IGAD in Peace Building in Somalia**

15. How far does IGAD utilize the existing local traditional conflict resolution mechanism?  
.....  
.....
16. How do you assess the reputation of IGAD as a neutral facilitator? Which actors take the leading initiatives in IGAD’s decisions regarding Somalia?  
.....
17. Does IGAD have the institutional, financial and political capacity to address the Somali conflict?  
.....
18. Mention some of the challenges facing IGAD peace-building initiatives in Somalia.....
19. How do you assess the lack of durable security architecture at regional level?  
.....

20. Does IGAD have a comprehensive regional peace and security framework that addresses the fundamental roots of the regional conflicts?

.....

**IV: Ways of Enhancing Peace Building Mechanisms in Somalia**

21. Mention some of the ways of enhancing sustainable long term peace building apparatuses in Somalia.....

22. What should be done to strengthen the Peace and Structure of IGAD?

23. What should be done to actively involve IGAD in post-conflict reconstruction activities now and in future?

24. What measures should be taken to enable IGAD to play an important role in Somalia conflict resolution in future? (In terms of policy reform, institutional capacity building, policy harmonization and coordination).

.....

25. What lessons can be taken from other African Regional Organizations?

.....



**APPENDIX III: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COLLECTING DATA FROM THE  
SOMALI COMMUNITY ELDERS**

1. How far does IGAD utilize existing local traditional conflict resolution mechanism?
2. Indicate whether IGAD has the institutional, financial and political capacity to address the Somali conflict.
3. Comment on whether IGAD has a comprehensive regional peace and security framework that addresses the fundamental roots of the regional conflicts.
4. Mention some of the challenges facing peace-building initiatives in Somalia.
5. Does IGAD include all actors in its conflict resolution endeavors in Somalia?
6. Is IGAD a neutral facilitator?
7. Mention some of the ways of enhancing sustainable long term peace building apparatuses in Somalia.
8. Indicate any measures that should be taken to enable IGAD to play an important role in Somalia conflict resolution in future.

#### APPENDIX IV: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

List of Informants	Time and Date of Interview
IGAD Official one	April 7, 2016. 9:00 am–11:00 pm, Nairobi
IGAD Official two	April 7, 2016. 11:00 am–12:30 pm, Nairobi
IGAD Official three	April 7, 2016. 2:30 pm–3:45 pm, Nairobi
IGAD Official four	April 25, 2016. 10:00 am–12:10 pm, Nairobi
IGAD Official five	April 25, 2016. 3:00 pm–4:20 pm, Nairobi
Somali analyst one	June14, 2016.11 :00am–1:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali analyst two	June14, 2016. 2:15 pm– 4:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali analyst three	June15, 2016. 9:00am–11:00 am, Nairobi
Somali analyst four	June15, 2016. 11:15 am–1:15 pm, Nairobi
Somali analyst five	June15, 2016. 2:30 pm–4:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali analyst six	June16, 2016.10:00am–11:40 am, Nairobi
Somali analyst seven	June16, 2016.12:05 pm–1:30 pm, Nairobi
Somali analyst eight	June16, 2016. 2:15 pm–4:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali analyst nine	June17, 2016.10:05 pm–12:30 pm, Nairobi
Somali analyst ten	June17, 2016. 2:05 pm– 4:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali Community elder one	July 9, 2016. 11:00am–1:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali Community elder two	July9, 2016. 2:00 pm– 4:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali Community elder three	July 10, 2016. 11:00am–1:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali Community elder four	July 10, 2016. 2:00 pm– 4:00 pm, Nairobi
Somali Community elder five	July 11, 2016. 11:00am–1:00 pm, Nairobi

## APPENDIX V: CLAN GROUPS IN SOMALIA

