



**UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

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**ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF NEGATIVE ETHNICITY ON  
NATIONAL POLITICS IN KENYA: A CASE STUDY OF MOLO SUB-  
COUNTY (1992-2016)**

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**DECLARATION**

I, the undersigned, declare that this project is my original work and that it has not been presented in any other institution for academic credit.

Lesasuiyan Richard

Sign ..... Date.....

This Research Project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the Supervisor.

Dr. Martin Ouma

Sign: ..... Date.....

## **DEDICATION**

This project is dedicated to my loving family for their enormous support and encouragement during my studies.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

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## ABREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
APTC	Administration Police Training College
CDN	Catholic Diocese of Nakuru
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence
CJPC	Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
DP	Democratic Party
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FASS	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
GAC	Genesis Art Creation
GEMA	Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association
GEN	Gender Equity Network
HIV	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus
IBEAC	Imperial British East African Company
IDIS	Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
KAMATUSA	Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, Samburu
KANU	Kenya African National Union

KCPE	Kenya Certificate of Primary Education
KLA	Kenya Land Alliance
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission of Human Rights
LSBE	Life Skills-Based Education
MP	Member of Parliament
NCCK	National Council of Churches in Kenya
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OFB	Order of Franciscan Brothers
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
PGIC	Pentecostal Gospel International Centre
PEV	Post-Election Violence
PNU	Party of National Unity
SDA	Seventh Day Adventist
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIP	United States International Peace

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>DECLARATION.....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>DEDICATION.....</b>	<b>ii</b>
<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....</b>	<b>iii</b>
<b>ABBREVIATIONS.....</b>	<b>iv</b>
<b>TABLE OF CONTENTS .....</b>	<b>vi</b>
<b>ABSTRACT.....</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>CHAPTER ONE .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.3 Problem Statement .....	4
1.4 Objectives of the Study.....	4
1.4.2 Specific Objectives .....	5
1.5 Justification of the Study .....	5
1.5.1 Policy Justification.....	5
1.5.2 Academic Justification.....	5
1.5.3 To the general public.....	6
1.6 Literature Review.....	6
1.6.1 History and origins of negative ethnicity in Africa .....	6
1.6.2 Negative ethnicity during pre-colonial times.....	6
1.6.3 Negative ethnicity during colonial time.....	7
1.6.4 Impacts of negative ethnicity on national politics .....	8
1.6.5 Socio-economic impacts of negative ethnicity .....	10
1.6.6 Ethnic demography of Kenya .....	13

1.7. Theoretical Framework .....	18
1.7.1 Human Needs Theory .....	18
1.7.2 Intercultural Miscommunication Theory .....	20
1.8 Conceptual Framework .....	22
1.9 Research Methodology .....	23
1.9.1 Research Design.....	23
1.9.2 Research Site.....	24
1.9.3 Target population .....	24
1.9.4 Sample Size.....	24
1.9.5 Sampling Procedures .....	25
1.9.6 Data collection methods.....	26
1.9.7 Instruments validity and reliability .....	29
1.9.8 Legal and ethical considerations .....	30
1.9.9 Methodological assumptions .....	30
1.10 Chapter summary .....	31
<b>CHAPTER TWO .....</b>	<b>32</b>
2.0 THE NATURE OF NEGATIVE ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN MOLO SUB-COUNTY .....	32
2.1 Introduction.....	32
2.2 Nature of negative ethnicity in Molo Sub-County.....	32
2.3 Negative ethnicity and competitive politics.....	35
2.5 Summary .....	40
<b>CHAPTER THREE .....</b>	<b>41</b>



### **3.0 THE CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC**

#### **VIOLENCE ..... 41**

3.1 Introduction..... 41

3.2 Economic implications of negative ethnicity..... 41

3.2.1 Destruction of property ..... 41

3.2.2 Interference with agriculture ..... 42

3.2.3 Disruption of trade ..... 43

3.2.4 Changes in land ownership ..... 44

3.2.5 Increases in crime rates ..... 45

3.3 Social implications of negative ethnicity..... 46

3.3.2 Deaths..... 46

3.3.3 Disruption of education..... 47

3.3.4 Social distance..... 48

3.3.5 Disruption of social activities ..... 48

3.4 Cultural implications of negative ethnicity..... 49

3.4.1 Renaming of places ..... 49

3.4.2 Erosion of patriarchal authority ..... 50

3.4.3 Culture of warfare ..... 51

3.4.4 Erosion of family values ..... 52

3.4.5 Rise of Mungiki ..... 52

#### **CHAPTER FOUR..... 54**

#### **4.0 PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES IN MOLO SUB-COUNTY, NAKURU COUNTY 54**

4.1 Introduction..... 54

4.2 State sponsored peace building initiatives ..... 54

4.2.1 Establishment of Police Posts .....	54
4.2.2 Operation Rudi Nyumbani, Tujenge Pamoja and Ujirani Mwema.....	55
4.2.3 Cash Incentives .....	56
4.2.4 The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC).....	57
4.3 Community Based Peace-building Initiatives.....	58
4.3.1 Religious Organizations .....	58
4.3.2 Educational Institutions .....	60
4.4 Strategies to promote lasting peace and eradicate negative ethnicity in Molo .....	61
4.4.1 Reconciliation .....	61
4.4.2 Restoration of Land Rights .....	62
4.4.3 Youth Employment.....	63
4.4.4 Compensation of Post-Election violence victims .....	64
4.4.5 Cultural Change .....	64
4.4.6 Community Dialogue.....	65
4.4.7 Chapter Summary .....	66
<b>CHAPTER FIVE .....</b>	<b>67</b>
<b>5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....</b>	<b>67</b>
5.2 Conclusion .....	69
5.3 Recommendations.....	70
<b>References.....</b>	<b>73</b>

## ABSTRACT

*Ethnicity is a phenomenon which has largely been misunderstood in political systems. It is the consciousness of belonging to an ethnic group where an ethnic group is a group of people who claim to share commonality in traditions, ancestry and language. It only becomes negative when a dichotomy is implied 'we versus them'. Politics of ethnicity are not only unique in Kenya but in many other places in Africa, it is still prevalent in many parts of Kenya. In the contemporary environment, Africa is confronted by numerous socio-political and economic maladies. Many of the negative forces operating in the continent have restructured people's lives, and the manner public and private institutions respond to their needs and interests. Since independence, violent ethnic conflicts have been witnessed in many African countries not limited to Nigeria, DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. In East Africa and in particular Kenya, Molo sub-county in Nakuru County has been hit hard by some of the most horrible forms of ethnic related violence with social, economic and cultural consequences. This has continuously been so because of mismanagement of ethnic diversity and abuse of democracy. This is largely the result of negative ethnicity that continues to shape the nature of competitive politics and land allocation and ownership issues. Even though the Government of Kenya has employed various strategies to address the implications of negative ethnicity in Molo sub-county, it is apparent that initiatives by non-governmental organizations such as religious and educational institutions have largely succeeded in restoring lasting peace and security in Molo. The equation of ethnic dominance has largely contributed to violence since the larger communities tend to fight for supremacy and at the same time dominated the minority groups. The minority are therefore ignored and neglected thereby rising aggravating mistrust and confidence. The needs for all the ethnic groups need to be addressed in order to create harmony among them.*

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

#### 1.1 Introduction

Africa is plagued by frequent socio-political and economic problems. Many of the negative forces operating in the continent have restructured people's lives, and the manner public and private institutions respond to their needs and interests. In the past, it was argued that the problems currently witnessed in the continent stemmed from excessive exploitation of its natural and human resources for more than four centuries by Imperial European nations. However, exploitation and domination still continues today, although in a subtle and refined manner, even after Africans gained independence in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This explains to the fact that the challenges and problems witnessed in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa may be self-inflicted. Consequently, right-minded activists and scholars are more cautious about attributing Africa's woes wholly to colonialism and neo-colonialism because a close analysis of its political, social and economic catastrophes reveals that one self-inflicted misery that explains its current situation is negative ethnicity. This chapter covers background to the study, problem statement, and objectives of the study, justification of the study, literature review and chapter review.

#### 1.2 Background to the Study

In recent years, Sub-Saharan's ethnic diversity has been floated to explain the continent's political, social and economic challenges.<sup>1</sup> Since independence, violent ethnic conflicts have been witnessed in many African countries not limited to Nigeria, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, but in contemporary society, East Africa, and in particular Kenya, has witnessed some of the most

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<sup>1</sup> Green, Elliot. Explaining African Ethnic Diversity. *International Political Science Review*. London: London School of economics, 2012, 2.

horrible forms of ethnic related violence. This is largely associated with competition, exclusiveness and conflicts in relations among the ethnic groups. This explains how in Kenya the curse of ethnocentrism sadly occurred during the 2007/8 General Elections when peaceful Kenyans beastly rose against each other. In ethnically polarized countries, scholars have argued that negative ethnicity has led to political instability and conflict, low economic growth and poor provision of public goods, poverty, and high inequality amongst other related factors. In contemporary political, social and economic discourses, it is Africa's volatile and unstable situation that stands out. Modern scholars insist their manner of speaking about Africa does not highlight rediscovery of the continent, but merely alludes to its political instability by exposing the prevalence of violent ethnic conflicts in the continent, especially in the 1990s when negative ethnicity was at its worst.<sup>2</sup>

National politics remains vital to the process of nation-building though African countries such as Kenya do not focus on eliminating ethnic and tribal loyalties, and underscoring the need to commit to one's nation.<sup>3</sup> People continue to identify with their ethnic group, kin group and religious group instead of the nation. The power and influence of sub-national identities may be considered a curse to the process of nation building in the developing world. Negative ethnicity is prevalent in national politics and heightens ethnic animosities and tensions as ethnic groups compete for political power and authority, and it is not surprising it remains a leading cause of ethnic conflicts and violence that threaten nation-building in African states.<sup>4</sup> Existing evidence supports this notion as violence, conflict and civil unrest is prevalent in developing nations that are more ethnically diverse than other nations of the world. Africa is ethnically diverse than any

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<sup>2</sup> Chua, Amy. *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (London: Heinemann, 2004), 174.

<sup>3</sup> Collier, Paul. *Implications of ethnic diversity*. The World Bank, 2012, 1.

<sup>4</sup> Collier, *Implications of ethnic diversity*, 3.

other societies in the developing world, and this explains why it has historically received its fair share of violent ethnic conflicts.

Existing literature remains divided on the impact of ethnic diversity on nation building as opponents of ethnic diversity use Africa as an example of the failure of ethnic diversity to foster national cohesion and integration. However, proponents of ethnic diversity who see it as an ingredient in promoting national cohesion and integration use Europe instead. Europe initiated a nation building process that sought to culturally harmonize and create nations from its ethnically diverse population. Based on its successes, many thought Europe set an example for post-colonial African leaders, but with the exception of Tanzania, many leaders failed miserably. Even though the case of Europe demonstrates the process of nation-building is possible in ethnically diverse states, negative ethnicity influence on national politics cause violent ethnic conflicts that pose the greatest threat to building politically, socially and economically viable societies.

Molo sub-county is located in Nakuru County in Kenya and it lies along a branch of the former Uganda Railway and Mau Forest in the Mau Escarpment. It was established by the government owing to its vast vegetation, temperature, and fertile lands in the region. Molo constituency is one of the 11 electoral constituencies in Nakuru County, and owing to the strategic location Molo sub-county, became a constituency of political intrigues since its formation in 1988. A constituency located in the Rift Valley region that predominantly belongs to the Kalenjin ethnic group, it has been controlled by the Kikuyu ethnic group since its formation. All Members of Parliament have been the Kikuyu, and political competition amongst the two dominant tribes explains the ethnic conflicts that have characterized this part of the Rift Valley region since 1992.

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

When Kenya gained independence from the British in 1963, its people were guaranteed a better and promising future. However, its ethnically diverse population posed a major problem to the process of nation-building, as the country's leadership allowed negative ethnicity to manifest in national politics. The Constitution of Kenya provides for the instruments and ways of ensuring that diversity is inculcated among the Kenyan Communities. The Constitution also provides for neither ways of ensuring that no discrimination is projected to any ethnic group nor manifestation of animosity between and among the ethnic groups. The establishment of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) was another step forward among many others that exist to help address ethnic acrimony.

Despite the presence of the law enforcement agencies and other bodies to address the ethnic tensions and reversals, there seems not to be any improvement in ethnic tensions since the country has witnessed a number of ethnic clashes between Pokots, Tugens and Marakwets among other groups. This study therefore seeks to look into ways that can address ethnic tensions among different groups so as to bring in an existence of a peaceful, harmonious and cohesive society that observes and appreciates ethnic diversity as a positive strength.

### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

This section covers the broad objectives and the specific objectives of the research.

#### **1.4.1 Broad Objective**

The main objective of this study determined the origins, history, and impact of negative ethnicity on national politics and ethnic communities in Kenya between 1992 and 2016.

### **1.4.2 Specific Objectives**

- i. To investigate the nature of negative ethnicity in Molo Sub-county in Nakuru County, Kenya.
- ii. To examine the cultural, economic, and social implications of negative ethnicity in Molo Sub-County in Nakuru County, Kenya
- iii. To evaluate the peace building strategies applied by various actors and advise on effective peace building strategies to promote long lasting peace and security in Molo, Kenya.

### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

This section covers the justification of the study. The research focussed on the policy and academic justifications. Moreover, the research also highlighted the importance of the research to the general public.

#### **1.5.1 Policy Justification**

The research study is important because it refined current policies on national integration employed by the Kenyan government in addressing negative ethnicity through insights obtained from research. Moreover, the research study offered insights to inform on new policy interventions to boost the process of national cohesion and integration in Kenya.

#### **1.5.2 Academic Justification**

The research will generate new academic literature on the impact of negative ethnicity and underscore the importance of fostering a cohesive society in Kenya.



### **1.5.3 To the general public**

The study will increase awareness on how to address negative ethnicity and foster a unified society, which will alleviate the challenges and problems that result from ethnic conflicts and violence. Moreover, the research study is an important tool for civic education and public participation. It will inform people about the country's cultural and ethnic diversity, and institutional frameworks that exist to promote co-existence and cultural inclusivity in national politics.

## **1.6 Literature Review**

This section covers the history and origins of negative ethnicity in Africa, negative ethnicity during the pre-colonial times and colonial times, impacts of negative ethnicity on national politics, and the socio-economic impacts of negative ethnicity,

### **1.6.1 History and origins of negative ethnicity in Africa**

The majority of political economy discourses on Africa takes ethnicity as a fixed concept and independent variable instead of a dependent variable. This phenomenon continues, though many scholars are moving away from this primordial thinking and embracing a more constructivist view of ethnicity. Moreover, contemporary scholars continue to underscore the dynamism of ethnicity, but it is important to trace the history and origins of African ethnicities to determine the school of thought that best explains African ethnicity.

### **1.6.2 Negative ethnicity during pre-colonial times**

There are numerous theories about the origins of pre-colonial ethnic diversity in Africa. Many hypotheses are rooted in geography. For instance, latitude and temperature are said to be inversely proportional to ethnic diversity, which implies warm tropical climates support farming.

Thus create little incentives for its inhabitants to migrate or trade with other ethnicities, an action that leads to the creation of new ethnic groups such as Darwin's finch species living in the Galapagos Islands.<sup>5</sup>

However, Nunn offers another hypothesis for Africa's ethnic diversity; slave trade.<sup>6</sup> Slave trade weakened relationships and associations between Africans thereby inhibiting the development of large ethnic groups. This illuminates a close relationship between contemporary ethnic fractionalization and slave exports per area. For instance, the names given to many African ethnicities such as the Dioula people of West Africa demonstrate this relationship. The name originates from a Manding word *gyo-la*, which means the land given to slaves captured during warfare, while the name of their close neighbour the Gio comes from a Bassa word *gii-o* meaning slave people.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, evidence of the relationship between ethnic diversity in Africa and the slave trade is not limited to West Africa. The Bantu ethnic group occupying southern Somalia arrived there as slaves from southern Africa through shipment via the East African coast by Zanzibar traders in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

### **1.6.3 Negative ethnicity during colonial time**

During the colonial period, Blanton, Mason and Athow argue colonists had a direct and phenomenal impact on African ethnic diversity through the application of divide and rule tactics.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, the colonists also influenced African diversity indirectly by appointment of tribal chiefs and white missionaries to uphold ethnic differences. Apart from direct and indirect colonial influences, colonial cost saving approaches to rule in Africa also influenced ethnic

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<sup>5</sup> Ahlerup P and Olsson O. *The Roots of Ethnic Diversity*. Department of Economics, Göteborg University. 2011, 22.

<sup>6</sup> Nunn N. The Long Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trade. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(1): 139-176. 2008, 160.

<sup>7</sup> Holsoe S and Lauer J. Who are the Kran/Guere and the Gio/Yacouba? Ethnic Identification along the Liberia-Ivory Coast Border. *African Studies Review* 19(1): 139-149., 1976, 142.

<sup>8</sup> Blanton R, Mason T and Athow, B. Colonial Style and Post-Colonial Ethnic Conflict in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research* 38(4): 473-492. 2001, 474.

diversity in three ways. First, Green argues that European attempts to maximize bureaucratic costs and create economies of scale encouraged the creation of large states.<sup>9</sup> For instance, a British Commissioner was charged with responsibilities over colonies the size of Wales while the French, intentionally created large colonies in underdeveloped regions of West and Central Africa.<sup>10</sup> As such, racial groups in America and caste groups in India are different from ethnic groups on the African continent because they are regionally less concentrated. This explains why smaller states like Burundi, Lesotho, and Djibouti are less ethnically diverse compared to Chad, Tanzania, or DRC.

Another impact of colonial cost saving approaches was the creation of colonial borders. The high costs of drawing colonial borders that were a reflection of local political economies prompted Europeans to split up ethnicities, an action that worsened tribal and linguistic diversity. As such, Europeans were experimenting with the arbitrary borders as they were drawn without considering pre-existing local political situations. Finally, Mamdani argues another consequence of colonial cost saving was the creation of homogenous rural tribal areas with tribal chiefs acting as decentralized despots.<sup>11</sup> This was realized through indirect rule policy employed by the British and led to the emergence of new ethnic groups as large ethnicities were split into distinct and separate tribal areas with tribal chiefdoms, an initiative that worsened ethnic differences and led to the separation of ethnic groups that formerly inhabited common areas.

#### **1.6.4 Impacts of negative ethnicity on national politics**

It is appreciated that various scholars have written about the multifaceted crisis of development that has plagued African countries for the last 30 years, as many demonstrate optimism for the

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<sup>9</sup> Green E. On the Size and Shape of African States. *International Studies Quarterly* 56. 2012, 8.

<sup>10</sup> Herbst J. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000, 88.

<sup>11</sup> Mamdani M. *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996, 123.

continent's growth prospects while many more expressing despair. Competing literature on the cause of the crisis in Africa's development points to the authoritarianism of post-colonial states, an occurrence that led to increased opposition to the state during the 1980s and 1990s. Increased opposition reaffirmed the need for African countries to design themselves better futures by embracing liberal politics and market economies, but this was not to be as subsequent electoral cycle demonstrated clientelism and patronage remained dominant practices in African politics.<sup>12</sup>

According to Berman, the relationship between democracy and ethnicity in Africa focus on public institutions as a mechanism for accommodating and protecting the rights and interests of ethnic diversities, but limited research on state bureaucracy has led to an imbalance on understanding this relationship.<sup>13</sup> The bureaucracy includes all levels of encounters and interactions with citizens and institutions of the state. The nature of such encounters influences the orientations of ordinary citizens in politics and the state, as well as the possibility of civic politics and collective organization in the pursuit of ideological principles and common interests. Bureaucracy in the West underwent a long and painful process of development that led to the emergence of honest civil services, which have played an important role nurturing and sustaining social trust that is evident in industrial capitalism and the nation state of the West but lacks in Africa's capitalism and the nation-state.<sup>14</sup>

In Africa, Berman argues that probity and disinterested competence are the last things citizens anticipate in their communications and interactions with public officials. State bureaucracy remains an area of ethnically biased distribution of patronage, nepotistic appropriation of state offices, extortion of bribes, and direct theft of public revenues. It is this bureaucratic culture that

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<sup>12</sup> Chua, Amy. *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (London: Heinemann, 2004), 157

<sup>13</sup> Berman, Bruce. Ethnicity, bureaucracy, & democracy: the politics of trust. "In *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, ed. by Bruce J. Berman, Dickson, Eyo, and Will Kymlicka. Boydell & Brewer Limited, 2004, 39.

<sup>14</sup> Berman, *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, 41.

leads to the emergence of a vicious cycle that depends on ethnic solidarity and patron-client relationships that dominate the bureaucratic process in African states.<sup>15</sup> This has led to the loss of trust, which is important for the functioning of a liberal democratic state in a capitalist society. It is not surprising that the adoption of liberal democracy and capitalism from the West has failed, as people have lost trust in public institutions owing to ethnic politics that has led to the control of a state bureaucracy by dominant ethnic groups at the expense of other ethnic groups.<sup>16</sup>

Berman, Eyoh, & Kymlicka also agree even the civil society was overtaken by communal divisions, especially ethnicity and religion.<sup>17</sup> As a result, they had no meaningful impact on party formation, and electoral competition showed little interest in promoting liberal democracy. According to the authors, African ethnicities were not the result of primordial and primitive cultures, but were the result of African encounters with capitalism and the nation state in the precolonial and post colonial era. As a result, they are unlikely to fade away because they continue to define an Africa's experience of modernity and have been constructed from indigenous and foreign cultural material and continue to be refined and defined in the present.

### **1.6.5 Socio-economic impacts of negative ethnicity**

The socio-economic impacts of negative ethnicity in Kenya are noticeable in the existence and persistence of wanton corruption. Corruption refers to the misuse of public office for personal gain.<sup>18</sup> It is like cheating and bribery, and in a democratic government, it is suppressing laws and regulations that guide public conduct and delivery of services fails to eradicate this vice. When laws are loose and give room for more discretion in the decision-making process, public officials

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, 39.

<sup>16</sup> Chua, Amy. *World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability* (London: Heinemann, 2004), 9.

<sup>17</sup> Berman, Bruce J., Eyoh, Dickson, and Kymlicka, Will. *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey, 2004, 6.

<sup>18</sup> Nyong'o, Peter Anyang'. *A Leap into the Future: A Vision for Kenya's Socio-Political and Economic Transformation*. Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2007, 79.

are likely to capitalize on this discretion for individual gain. For instance, too much discretion given to the Minister of Finance during the days of foreign exchange allocations and import licensing led to schemes such as the Goldenberg scandal. As a result, corruption led to the diversion of substantial amounts of public resources from the public sphere to private hands.

As such, corruption cripples government activities and undermines the delivery of service, and this worsens underdevelopment in the entire economy.<sup>19</sup> The economy is further affected because when people lose faith in government, tax revenues decline as corruption supports the flight of capital and a shadow economy. However, an ominous effect of corruption is the destruction of Kenya's productive capacity and subverting the process of development towards a capitalist economy.

Between 1991 and 1994, the government paid out billions of shillings following the Goldenberg scandal. The scandal involved a fictitious export of diamonds and gold, an action that made the Kenyan economy suffer severely.<sup>20</sup> The treasury was forced to borrow domestically through bills and bonds, an action that increased interest rates to approximately 76 percent. High-interest rates made it difficult for industrialists, manufacturers, and traders to service loans while banks were attracted to lend the government owing to high-interest rates. As a result, many businesses and industries were closed during this period, and until today, Kenya is yet to recover from the adverse shocks of the scandal of its economy.

According to Berman, social justice is elusive in Africa, as it is in continuous contention with particulars of ethnic nationalism and associations of personal trust that have characterized the political process for ages. As a result, the postcolonial state in Africa remains the conglomeration of offices and agencies to be manipulated and captured under the disguise of an official

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<sup>19</sup> Nyong'o, Peter Anyang'. *A Leap into the Future: A Vision for Kenya's Socio-Political and Economic Transformation*. Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2007, 81

<sup>20</sup> Nyong'o, *A Leap into the Future*, 81.

development ideology, for the personal and communal benefit.<sup>21</sup> This contradiction of the “politics of the belly” is that poor and rich, masses and elites share the common opportunistic and materialistic perspective of politics and the state.

In Kenya, corruption is not secondary to national politics, but remains the reason why people engage in politics. People seek political power to gain opportunities to acquire prestige and riches and be in a position to offer benefits in the form of contracts, jobs, and money to political allies and tribesmen.<sup>22</sup> As such, neither state power nor ruling Coalition are organized around transformational projects channelled towards capitalism or nation state. These projects threaten the existing basis of accumulating power and wealth, and for the patronage politicians that maintain elites and ethnic factions.

As a result, African countries fail to develop a trans-ethnic public arena that is rooted in universalistic norms and civic trust that governs both economic and political transactions.<sup>23</sup> The dilemma of political reform in Africa should focus on weakening the associations between the state, its agents, and ethnic communities of society as an essential condition for addressing political tribalism and realizing a broad collaborative trust that promotes the development of the state and market. It is important to offer open and free access to professional forces of the nation-state for members of all ethnic communities by eliminating discriminatory impacts of differentials of numbers, education access and wealth.

According to Berman, Eyoh, & Kymlicka, contemporary African ethnicities are larger in the social scale and population and remain distinct from other smaller ethnic groups, unlike the smaller communities that existed during the colonial era.<sup>24</sup> The social forces that shape ethnic

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid, 47.

<sup>22</sup> Nyong'o, Peter Anyang'. *A Leap into the Future: A Vision for Kenya's Socio-Political and Economic Transformation*. Nairobi: African Research and Resource Forum, 2007, 49.

<sup>23</sup> Nyong'o, *A Leap into the Future*, 50.

<sup>24</sup> Berman, Bruce, Eyoh, Dickson, and Kymlicka, Will. *Ethnicity and the Politics of Democratic*

development and identity, and therefore, ethnic politics are seen regarding moral ethnicity and political tribalism. Ethnic identity is not necessarily associated with irrational kind attachments, but moral ethnicity, which is a network of social obligations that define the rules and responsibilities of people, and most importantly, offer protection when they are threatened or alone. On the other hand, political tribalism deals with the relationships between ethnic groups or ethnic groups and the state and is primarily addressing the competition between ethnic competitors for material rewards of modernity through control of the state apparatus.<sup>25</sup> In this manner, ethnic success is defined through maximizing the power and resources available to one's ethnic group, regardless of the consequences of other ethnic groups. As a result, moral ethnicity and political tribalism have shaped the ethnic development and identity, as ethnic politics continuously uses cultural and historical resources in the present and past to control the future and define the terms of social change.

### **1.6.6 Ethnic demography of Kenya**

The demographics of Kenya demonstrate that the country has a population growth rate of 2.6 percent, one of the highest globally.<sup>26</sup> In 2017, the population was approximately more than 48 million inhabitants compared to only 6 million inhabitants in 1950. Kenya is an ethnically diverse state in East Africa and is mainly inhabited by Bantu, Nilotic, and Cushitic ethnic groups. Even though no ethnic group constitutes a majority of people, the Kikuyu, the largest ethnic group represents only 22 percent of the total population.<sup>27</sup> The five largest ethnic groups are

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Nation-building in Africa. "In *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, ed.by Bruce J. Berman, Dickson, Eyo, and Will Kymlicka. Boydell & Brewer Limited, 2004, 4.

<sup>25</sup> Berman, Bruce, Eyo, Dickson, and Kymlicka, Will. Ethnicity and the Politics of Democratic Nation-building in Africa. "In *Ethnicity & Democracy in Africa*, ed.by Bruce J. Berman, Dickson, Eyo, and Will Kymlicka. Boydell & Brewer Limited, 2004,5.

<sup>26</sup> World Atlas. Largest Ethnic Groups in Kenya. *World Atlas*.

<http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-groups-in-kenya.html> (Accessed May 3, 2017).

<sup>27</sup> World Atlas. Largest Ethnic Groups in Kenya. *World Atlas*.



Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kalenjin, and Kamba. The Kikuyus are excessively represented in government, public life, business, and professions. The Luo are majorly artisans and traders, Kamba is common in law enforcement and defence, while Kalenjin is mainly farmers. Even though Kenya's ethnic diversity is recognized as an invaluable asset, it is apparent ethnic diversity has caused conflicts and disputes, as ethnic hatred and rivalries over the dominance of Kikuyu over commerce and politics continues to hinder national integration.

The Kikuyus live around Mount Kenya and are believed to have migrated from the North East and East Africa during the 1500s.<sup>28</sup> They bordered Maasai, and though they fought for cattle, intermarriage and trade were common. For the Kikuyu, land ownership is the most essential social, political, economic, and religious factor. This is what brought them into conflict with white farmers and settlers who occupied traditional lands.

The Luo, on the other hand, lives around the Lake Victoria region and migrated into this region from the Nile area in Sudan around the 1400s.<sup>29</sup> Originally, they were pastoralists but turned to fishing and farming after the outbreak of animal diseases led to the death of their livestock. Another large ethnic group in Kenya is the Kalenjin. This is a name given by the British to several ethnic groups that spoke the same language, but several dialects. The Kalenjin consists of Kipsigis, Nandi, Tugen, Elgeyo and Marakwet. Kenya's second President, Daniel Arap Moi, was a Tugen, and as a result, the Kalenjin became politically powerful. The ethnic group lives in the Kenyan Rift Valley and entered the country around 200 years ago.<sup>30</sup> Even though the Kalenjin are majorly pastoralists, they have taken up agriculture and the production of honey.

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<sup>28</sup> Largest Ethnic Groups in Kenya. *World Atlas*.  
<http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-groups-in-kenya.html> (Accessed May 3, 2017).

<sup>29</sup> Largest Ethnic Groups in Kenya. *World Atlas*.  
<http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-groups-in-kenya.html> (Accessed May 3, 2017).

<sup>30</sup> Largest Ethnic Groups in Kenya. *World Atlas*.  
<http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-groups-in-kenya.html> (Accessed May 3, 2017).

The Kamba also settled in the eastern part of Kenya around 200 years ago.<sup>31</sup> This region was east of Nairobi towards the famous Tsavo National Park. They are exceptional traders and were historically involved in commerce from Lake Victoria to Lake Turkana. During the Colonial period, they were revered for their fighting skills and intelligence thus the British conscripted many Kamba people into the Army. Finally, the Luhya are an ethnic group in Kenya living around Kakamega in the western parts of the country. Currently, they are the second largest ethnic group in Kenya after the Kikuyu. A major issue in this region is population density, as it continues to hinder their farming economy as cultivation plots get smaller with every generation. During the colonial period, the Luhya were not increasingly involved in politics, but independence led to increased involvement by prominent Luhya leaders such as Masinde Muliro, Martin Shikuku, Moody Awori, Kijana Wamalwa amongst others.

### **1.6.7 Impact of negative ethnicity in Rift Valley Province**

It is important to trace the history and origins of ethnic settlements in this region. The arrival of British colonists in Kenya is often considered a blunder as the British discovered Kenya on their way to construct a railway to Uganda, to understand the impact of negative ethnicity and ethnic conflict in the Rift Valley Region. However, they eventually settled in the White Highlands after discovering Kenya was favourable for their settlement.<sup>32</sup> The initial stages of colonization were overseen by the Imperial British East African Company (IBEAC) and later the British East African Protectorate, leading to the emergence of land issues and questions amongst indigenous communities in the region, as the communities blamed the British for usurping their land by building the Uganda Railway line.

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<sup>31</sup> Largest Ethnic Groups in Kenya. *World Atlas*.

<http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/largest-ethnic-groups-in-kenya.html> (Accessed May 3, 2017).

<sup>32</sup> Nyawalo, Phoebe A et al. *The invincible violence in Kenya: A case study of Rift Valley and Western regions*. Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer, 2011, 125

The land question continued after independence as Kenyatta's regime continuously settled Kikuyus in the Rift Valley, and later, other ethnic groups bought land in various parts of the region through bank loans, savings, and land grabbing in the guise of public use only.<sup>33</sup> However, the locals declined to purchase land as they claimed they could not buy land that was ancestrally theirs and began to resist against ethnic groups in the Rift Valley region that were not entitled to land. As a result, the motivation behind conflicts and violence in the Rift Valley were driven by ancient hatreds during the pre-colonial and post-colonial eras.<sup>34</sup> Even though deep-seated animosities were kept in check by an authoritarian single party KANU regime, the introduction of multiparty politics in 1992, as put by American President Bill Clinton "*lifted the lid from a cauldron of long-simmering hatreds.*"<sup>35</sup>

An analysis of the underlying factors that make the Rift Valley prone to violent conflicts than other regions is manifold. First, the presence of many ethnic groups in the region led to resource-based competition in Uasin Gishu and Trans-Nzoia worsened ethnic rivalries between Kikuyu and Kalenjin.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, heightened negative ethnicity by political incitement in Burnt Forest and Eldoret also made ethnic conflicts inevitable in subsequent years. Border issues were also a major reason for heightened conflicts and violence as the Turkana and Pokot were affected by boundary issues with other neighbouring provinces, especially Central Province.<sup>37</sup>

Another underlying cause of conflicts and violence was historical grievances and injustices such as land tenure systems and resettlement schemes in Kitale and Cherangany. Historical injustices also included unjust distribution of public resources, especially in semi-arid areas of the Rift Valley that were increasingly sidelined by state and non-state actors. With increased settlement

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<sup>33</sup> Nyawalo et al. *The invincible violence in Kenya*, 125.

<sup>34</sup> Nyawalo, Phoebe A et al. *The invincible violence in Kenya: A case study of Rift Valley and Western regions*. Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer, 2011, 126.

<sup>35</sup> Nyawalo et al. *The invincible violence in Kenya*, 126.

<sup>36</sup> <sup>36</sup> Nyawalo, Phoebe A et al. *The invincible violence in Kenya: A case study of Rift Valley and Western regions*. Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer, 2011,127.

<sup>37</sup> Nyawalo et al. *The invincible violence in Kenya*, 127.

by ethnic groups, land degradation was another underlying cause of conflict and violence in this region. Lastly, the lack of a peace-building mechanism by state and non-state actors exacerbated the other underlying cause of conflicts, leading to eruption of violence in 1997 and 2007.

As a result, a major impact of conflicts and violence in the Rift Valley after 1992 worsened hatred and mistrust amongst ethnic communities in the region.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, conflicts in the region have also led to the loss of lives in situations when violence erupts, especially the 2007 violence that led to the death of more than 1133 people in the country. Since politics in Kenya is ethnically based, violent conflict worsened poverty and inequality amongst ethnic groups in the Rift Valley, especially the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, and other minorities.<sup>39</sup> The psychological effects of conflicts and violence also led to illnesses such as depression and other mental health problems as the devastation resulting from violence was unbearable to many inhabitants in the Rift Valley region.

### **1.6.8 Gaps in the literature**

From the first research objective, there are various gaps on the nature of negative ethnicity in Kenya, especially in Molo Sub-County. As a result, it will be difficult to establish whether negative ethnicity is the principle cause of ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley region. On the second objective, ethnic conflicts have had social, economic, and cultural impacts in Molo Sub-County, but limited research on the issue makes it difficult to relate politics and negative ethnicity in Kenya. Even though the Government of Kenya has established institutions to address negative ethnicity in the country, their efforts are yet to bear fruits as many areas in the country have suffered because of ethnic conflicts in 1992, 1997, and 2007. As a result, this study will

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid, 150.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 150.

investigate and add literature on the impacts of negative ethnicity and outline the challenges faced by institutions charged with integrating ethnic communities in Kenya.

## **1.7. Theoretical Framework**

The theoretical framework for this study has been derived from two theories, namely: Human Needs Theory and Intercultural Miscommunication theory.

### **1.7.1 Human Needs Theory**

Human Needs Theory was proposed by John Burton between 1979 and 1997. His main argument is that ethnic conflicts emerge when a particular ethnic group is denied both biological and psychological needs that are connected to growth and development.<sup>40</sup> Recently, scholars have proposed various approaches of conceptualizing ethnicity as many modern theories are failing to respond to changes in contemporary society. A failure to identify an appropriate theory to understand ethnicity implies ethnicity will persist and stability in African nations will be threatened not by ethnicity per se, but a failure of national institutions to acknowledge ethnic differences and interests because of negative ethnicity. As a result, many theories of ethnicity underscore the important role of the government in avoiding ethnic conflict. The government should not discriminate against ethnic groups in the country but ensure ethnic inclusivity, the human needs theory and intercultural miscommunication theory best help to conceive ethnicity and offer insights to avoid conflict in ethnically diverse populations.

Human beings need various essentials that go beyond food, shelter and water to survive. These include physical and non-physical elements needed for growth and development and all other things people are inherently driven to acquire in their lifespan. Burton perceives human needs in

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<sup>40</sup> Avruch, Kevin and Mitchell, Christopher. *Conflict Resolution and Human Need*. London: Routledge Publishers, 2013, 22.

a different way. Unlike Abraham Maslow, who pictured human needs as hierarchical in order, he saw human needs as an emergent collection of growth and development necessities that are sought simultaneously in a powerful and persistent manner.

First, people need safety and security. This is the need to be free from anxiety and fear, which is realized when there are structures, stability, and predictability of the human condition. Moreover, belongingness and love make people feel they are acknowledged by others and are able to establish personal relationships with friends, family, and identity groups. This is possible when people have self-esteem. People are satisfied when they know they have considerable influence on their environment, or are seen by others as capable, competent, and strong. This brings personal fulfilment that is an essential to human need because people feel they have the ability to reach their maximum potential in various areas of life.

Moreover, Burton agrees identity is another important human need that gives people a sense of connection to the physical world. When people have identity, they realize another important need, which is cultural security because others respect their cultural values, concepts, ideas, language, and traditions.<sup>41</sup> As a result, an ethnic or cultural group feels they have the freedom because they have no civil, political, or physical restraints and they can exercise freedom of choice in every aspect of life. If such a group is denied various opportunities and privileges in life, Burton argues they are denied an important human need, which he calls distributive justice. It occurs when national resources are not distributed fairly between all community members.<sup>42</sup> As a result, he agrees the group is prevented from participating in society and actively influencing it.

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<sup>41</sup> Avruch, Kevin and Mitchell, Christopher. *Conflict Resolution and Human Need*. London: Routledge Publishers, 2013, 23.

<sup>42</sup> Taylor, Antony James William. *Justice as a Basic Human Need*. New York: Nova Science Publ, 2006, 13.

Human needs theory insists that a primary cause of protracted conflicts is people's adamant desires to meet their utmost needs of the person, group, and societal level.<sup>43</sup> For instance, the violence witnessed in Kenya in 2007 involved the unmet needs of safety, freedom and distributive justice. As such, human needs theory offers a new perspective on conflict theory. It remains an important conceptual tool that addresses and connects human needs in all levels of life, and also acknowledges the existence of both negotiable and non-negotiable needs. That is, they understand human needs are analogous to emotions, thus cannot be bargained for, surprised, or traded, which helps in departing from traditional negotiation models that do not recognize non-negotiable needs.<sup>44</sup>

On the other hand, human needs theory is appropriate for this research because it supports collaborative and multidimensional models of addressing human conflicts and other related techniques. The incorporation of problem-solving workshops and processes, when addressing human conflicts, helps to acknowledge that human life is complicated while human needs are persistent. Moreover, problem-solving models also evaluate the main causes of conflict, while prioritizing the fulfilment of people's unmet needs. Finally, human needs theory accepts that though human needs cannot be conceded, it is possible to address human conflicts in a positive manner. This theory will be applied in this study to help explain that when human beings are denied of their needs they are likely to rebel and hence conflict.

### **1.7.2 Intercultural Miscommunication Theory**

Today, communication, which remains a basic element of life, is increasingly becoming intercultural. In an increasingly globalized world, people are not only transferring goods,

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<sup>43</sup> Sites, Paul. "Needs as Analogous of Emotions. In *Conflict: Human Needs Theory*. New York City: Springer Publishing, 1990, 7.

<sup>44</sup> Sites, *Needs as Analogous of Emotions* (New York City: Springer Publishing), 10.

services, and technology amongst nations, but also transporting cultures, ideas, and thoughts. However, intercultural problems abound as information flows become common leading to intercultural miscommunication. Intercultural miscommunication occurs when communication problems emerge between people from different cultures. According to Chick, there are five common sources of intercultural miscommunication namely sociolinguistic transfer, differences in the distribution of compliments amongst different cultures, differences in contextualizing cues, intonation, and differences in politeness strategies.<sup>45</sup>

Intercultural miscommunication theory is appropriate for this research because it strives to explain how poor intercultural communication causes conflicts and violence amongst cultural and ethnic groups. In the Kenyan context, conflicts may be as the result of communication incompatibilities between different cultural communication styles.<sup>46</sup> In Kenya, ethnic communities are poorly informed about other cultures. Negative ethnicity has led to contempt and disregard of other ethnic communities by a dominant ethnic or cultural group, which controls national politics in the country. Moreover, intercultural miscommunication also occurs when the negative cultural stereotypes and ethnic groups have of each other are exacerbated, especially by the state controlled by a dominant ethnic group or groups.<sup>47</sup> Lastly, miscommunication between ethnic cultures is also caused by lack of appropriate mechanism to promote and enhance effective intercultural communication. This theory will be applied in this study to help explain that when there is a misunderstanding between two cultures conflicts arises.

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<sup>45</sup> Chick, Jackline K. Intercultural communication. In S. L. McKay & N. H. Hornberger (Eds.), *Sociolinguistics and Language Teaching* Cambridge: CUP, 1996, 334.

<sup>46</sup> Fisher, Simon. *Working with Conflict: Skills and Strategies for Action*. London: Zed Books, 2000, 8.

<sup>47</sup> Fisher, *Working with Conflict* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 8.




## 1.8 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework refers to a researcher's synthesis of academic literature on how to explain a particular phenomenon. As a result, it maps out the needed actions in the course of research given the previous knowledge obtained from other researchers together with observations made on a research subject. As such, it demonstrates the researchers' understanding on how various variables in the research study associate with one another. As McGaghie puts it, it sets the stage for presenting a research question that puts in motion the investigation reported based on the problem statement. The independent variables are the state, negative ethnicity, and ethnic conflicts while the dependent variables are age, gender, region, power and authority, inequality, poverty, unemployment. The following model has been derived from the two theories to be applied in this study.

### Independent Variables

### Dependent Variables



<sup>48</sup> Martinez, Ruben and Dukes, Richard. The Effects of Ethnic Identity, Ethnicity, and Gender on Adolescent Well-Being. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*. 26(5) (1997), 503-516.

<sup>49</sup> Stewart, Frances. "Root causes of violent conflict in developing countries." *BMJ*, 324 (7333) 342-345.

## **1.9 Research Methodology**

Research methodology is a plan or strategy a researcher employs in investigating a particular phenomenon to obtain the important answers to a research problem or question.<sup>50</sup> It is an outline of research that includes what the researcher will carry out, from writing down the hypothesis and resulting operational implications, to the eventual analysis of data obtained from the research. As a result, a research methodology seeks to answer research questions and problems accurately, economically, objectively, and validly. As such, it arranges the conditions for collecting and analysing data in a way that reflects the importance of the research process. As a result, this section explains the methodology of the study, including research design, site of the study, target population, study sample and selection procedures, data collection techniques, and data analysis methods.

### **1.9.1 Research Design**

A research design is a procedural process employed in a research study and incorporates the various perspectives ranging from data collection to data analysis. The study employed a mixed method approach research design that included both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis procedures. Qualitative research was important in determining the attitudes, opinions, understandings, and motivations of communities living in Molo. Through qualitative research, it was possible to understand the underlying challenges and problems facing local communities in the study area. Quantitative research, on the other hand, made it possible to measure the challenges and problems amongst local communities living in Molo by producing numerical data for use in generating functional statistics and gauging various opinions and beliefs.

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<sup>50</sup> Kumar, Ranjit. *Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners*. 2011, 94.  
[https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc\\_100025410580.0x000001](https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100025410580.0x000001)

### **1.9.2 Research Site**

The study was restricted to Molo sub-county in Nakuru County, Kenya. The preferred unit of analysis was the local residents of the sub-county. The choice of Molo sub-county was informed by two major factors. First, it is located in the Rift Valley, a region that has experienced some of the worst forms of ethnic violent conflicts since 1992, through to 1997, and lately in 2007 where many Kenyans were victims of violence following the disputed General elections. Secondly, Molo sub-county comprises of an ethnically diverse population, including major ethnic groups in Kenya namely Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, Luhya, and other ethnic groups that together are hosted by the Kalenjin ethnic community. Therefore, it is possible to acquire insights on violent ethnic conflicts in the county.

### **1.9.3 Target population**

The participants in this research were residents of the Molo sub-county in Nakuru County. Under the 2010 constitution, Molo is amongst 11 constituencies in Nakuru County.

### **1.9.4 Sample Size**

The population of Molo is 107,806 people. In the study, the researcher's sample size was chosen using the sample size calculator for populations greater than 100,000 individuals, which resulted in a sample size of 383 respondents. 200 people were locals from Molo Sub-County, 120 were local living in the area that were most affected by the Post-Election Violence, 20 were local leaders, including chiefs and community elders, 23 were people from the County leadership, and 20 were civil servants from NCIC. Out of the 383 respondents in the study, 330 were included in the focus group discussions while 53 were administered interviews and sent questionnaires.

### Sample Size Derivation:

The sample size for this research was found by using the sample size determination formula below that was proposed by Krejcie and Morgan in 1970.

$$n = \frac{z^2 \times p(1-p)}{(E^2)}$$

Here, p is the population of Molo that can be reached realistically. However, since the researcher could not establish the exact proportion, the research applied 50%. Z is the confidence interval and the researcher employed a 95% confidence interval. As such, z was equal to 1.96. E is the margin of error. The margin of error used for this research was 5%. Substituting everything in the equation the researcher found:

$$n = \frac{1.96^2 \times 0.5(1-0.5)}{(0.05^2)} = 384.16$$

In order to find the true sample size, the researcher used the following formula.

$$\text{True Sample} = \frac{n \times \text{population}}{n + \text{population} - 1}$$

Where n = 384.16 and population is 107,806. Substitution in the equation, the researcher found the true sample:

$$\text{True Sample} = \frac{n \times \text{population}}{n + \text{population} - 1} = \frac{384.16 \times 107,806}{384.16 + 107,806 - 1} = 383$$

### 1.9.5 Sampling Procedures

Sampling is a process of choosing units such as people or organizations from a population of interest to enable a researcher to arrive at generalizations about the population under study.<sup>51</sup> In this research, the sample population comprised of Molo residents. From the sample, it was

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Thompson, Steven K. *Sampling*. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2013. <<http://www.myilibrary.com?id=362172>>.

important to derive the sample size, which is the action of selecting the number of observations to include in a statistical sample. The sample size was chosen using a stratified sampling technique which is a process of choosing a sample size by dividing a sample under study into homogenous characteristics of importance for the research process, followed by a random sampling of each sub-group.

As a result stratified sampling enabled the researcher to represent both the general population and its resulting sub-groups, especially minority groups.<sup>52</sup> This was appropriate for this research because it enabled sampling of the Ogiek ethnic group, which is a minority group in the region. Moreover, through stratified sampling, it was possible to use different sampling fractions within the given strata to sample a minority group. As such, the disproportionate stratified sampling strategy was applied because the research sought to use different sampling fractions in the sampling strata. Finally, stratified sampling is necessary when statistical precision is prioritized by a researcher, which is applicable in this research study as the sample size is less homogenous.

#### **1.9.6 Data collection methods**

To analyse the impacts of negative ethnicity on national politics in Molo, the researcher used a mixed-method approach in collecting data, which included quantitative and qualitative designs. A quantitative research design focuses on measuring amount or quantity, thus applied to phenomena that can be measured regarding quantity. On the other hand, qualitative research design is focused on phenomena related to kind or quality. Quantitative research could allow measuring and analysis of data to study the relationship between the dependent and independent variables into details. This allowed for objectivity in the research because it was possible to test hypotheses by measuring data through statistics.

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<sup>52</sup> Thompson, *Sampling*. (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2013), 141.

Qualitative research design, on the other hand, was essential during the early stages of the research study. It is a period when a researcher is unsure of what to study or prioritize in a research study. As a result, it does not require a strict research design plan before the research begins, because it is important for the researcher to allow a research study to unfold naturally. For the social sciences, qualitative research is indispensable because a researcher acquires detailed and rich data from detailed written descriptions of observed evidence. This allows a researcher to peek into the social meanings of research and how research will influence people in society.

Qualitative data was obtained through a literature review, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. Information obtained from the literature review was verified through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. Interviews were useful in obtaining data and information regarding a participant's experience. There are four main types of interviews namely formal, informal, open-ended, and closed-ended interview designs.<sup>53</sup> As such, this research employed a closed-ended interview approach where a yes or no answer offered a possible conclusion to an interview where no further information could be extracted. Using a closed-ended interview approach allowed the researcher to collect objective data from respondents.

An important part of an interview was the design of interview questions. The research used three sections of the interview, namely introductions, identification, and citation of the purpose of the research, and request for a short background on the experiences of interviewees during the 2007 post-election violence. Then, the research determined the opinion of the respondents in terms of how negative ethnicity has influenced people in Molo. However, the researcher also employed follow-up questions that deemed important in serving the purposes of realizing research

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<sup>53</sup> Tashakkori, Abbas, and Charles Teddlie. *Foundations of Mixed Methods Research: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Techniques in the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. London: SAGE, 2008, 229.

objectives. The formulated questions were designed in a manner that offered meaningful insights from participants in response to the research question.

Apart from the design of interview questions, it was important for the researcher to choose an ample setting where there was the least distraction to enable interviewees to express their concerns and opinions freely. In creating a free environment, the researcher explained the objectives of the interview, and subsequently, explained the background of the research. Moreover, it was important to address issues of confidentiality to gain the approval of participants, publish their opinions, and use their answers to produce data for purposes of the research. Moreover, the interview format was also discussed with the interviewees to determine the time needed for interviewing. The interviewees were allowed to clarify any doubts about the interviewing process to obtain qualitative data. Finally, the researcher availed the contact details for further clarifications if necessary.

Another method that was employed in collecting data was focus group discussions. A focus group is a small group consisting of at least 6-10 people who are led by a moderator through an open discussion.<sup>54</sup> A focus group needs to be large enough to provide rich discussions, but not that large to disregard some of the participants. The researcher included a minimum of ten participants per focus group discussion. Members comprised of people who were present in Molo during the post-election violence of 2007.

#### **1.9.6.1 Data collection procedures**

The data collected from interviews and focus group discussions offered responses to the key research question. The questions resembled those used in the questionnaire and the answers were given through face-to-face conversations and discussions with the respondents. The appropriate

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<sup>54</sup> Litosseliti, Lia. Using Focus Groups in Research. London: Continuum, 2003, 1.

amount of time for an interview and in-depth discussion was 45 minutes. The allocated time was sufficient to obtain information needed to produce viable data for analysis and the interviews were recorded using note taking and all responses from interviews recorded, summarized, and interpreted.

### **1.9.6.2 Data processing and analysis**

After carrying out interviews and project group discussions, the researcher reviewed the audio recorded and prepared a report of the individual focus group on a question by question format, which employed direct quotes from what participants said during the session. Just like in any research method, was important to evaluate and analyse discussions as systematically as possible. As a result, a researcher listened to inconsistent comments and investigated them further to understand the research problem better. It was important to clarify inconsistencies to avoid confusion during the process of data transcription and summary. Moreover, it was necessary to consider asking every participant a final question that would enable them to summarize and put together their perspectives.

### **1.9.7 Instruments validity and reliability**

This section will cover the validity and the reliability of the instruments used in data collection.

#### **1.9.7.1 Validity**

Validity refers to the extent that a given approach to data collection, analysis, and interpretation measures what is needed for the research. To ensure validity of instruments used for this research, the researcher ensured that the interview questions and focus group discussions related to the three main objectives of the topic under investigation. As a result, the researcher cross-checked to ensure the questions covered all conceptualizations of the study.



### **1.9.7.2 Reliability**

Reliability is the capability of a research instrument to produce similar results when employed under the same conditions, and most importantly, when measured at various points. The split half approach was employed to guarantee instrument validity. The interview and focus items were divided into various groups and each respondent's score was determined using each half of the scale.

### **1.9.8 Legal and ethical considerations**

Rivlin and Timpane posit that the increasing literature especially on social experiment explains the recurrent legal and ethical problems researchers face in research. This includes the risk of harming experimental subjects and the challenge in balancing the needs of ensuring scientific validity and dissemination against the need to safeguard the right of privacy and informing the subjects. To ensure legal and ethical compliance, Rivlin and Timpane advise on informing the necessary authorities before collecting and compiling data. Moreover, the researcher complied with voluntary informed consent requirement where participants for this research were allowed to voluntarily participate in the research process. On confidentiality, the participants were guaranteed the data compiled would not be shared to any third party before seeking their permission, and most importantly, anonymity was also guaranteed to guarantee security.<sup>55</sup>

### **1.9.9 Methodological assumptions**

The research study assumes that interviews in face-to-face discussions and focus groups are well informed about the experiences following the 2007 post-election violence. Apart from this, it is

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<sup>55</sup> Rivlin, Alice M., and P. Michael Timpane. *Ethical and Legal Issues of Social Experimentation*. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1975), 101.

also assumed that the participants chosen through stratified sampling will be responsive enough to get the most out of the discussions.

### **1.10 Chapter summary**

As seen above the researcher employed a mixed methods approach that is composed of qualitative and quantitative research designs. The qualitative design focused on analysing the responses from the respondents while the quantitative design focused on the demographic statistics of the respondents. The research was conducted in Molo sub-county as it has remained a major post-election violence hotspot since 1992. The data collected offered insight on the underlying causes, consequences, and remedies of violent ethnic conflicts in Molo sub-county in Kenya.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2.0 THE NATURE OF NEGATIVE ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN MOLO SUB-COUNTY**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

The chapter examines the nature of negative ethnicity in Molo, Kenya between 1992 and 2016. Existing research studies indicate that ethnic violence in this part of Kenya was caused by the manifestation of negative ethnicity in national politics and land allocation and ownership issues. It was endemic in competitive politics and allocation and ownership of national resources such as land in Molo. This chapter examines the nature of negative ethnicity in Molo Sub-county. Moreover, it evaluates the relationship between negative ethnicity and competitive politics, and land allocation and ownership to determine how it impacts national politics.

#### **2.2 Nature of negative ethnicity in Molo Sub-County**

The study established that negative ethnicity was the primary cause of violence in the aforementioned periods owing to its manifestation in national politics. The residents in Molo area agreed that they had co-existed in Molo without ever demonstrating ethnic hatred or tension towards one another. However, increased polarization from politicians had contributed to subtle ethnic disputes and conflicts amongst communities in Molo owing to issues about land boundaries and cattle theft. According to Kagwanja, ethnic disputes and conflicts were prevalent in Molo during the culmination for multipartyism. Owing to domestic and international pressure, former President Daniel Arap Moi was forced to end single party rule and embrace pluralism. However, pluralism posed a threat to his rule, Moi stoked existing ethnic hatred and employed

ethnic violence in 1991 and 1992 as a technique to disrupt multiparty politics and ensure his hold on to power.<sup>56</sup>

According to many respondents, the President was at the forefront in stirring ethnic animosities as he used his ruling party, Kenya African National Union (KANU), and other opponents of multipartyism to reignite calls for ethnic federalism or *majimboism* to pacify increased calls for pluralism. During the culmination to multipartism, many Molo residents especially Abagusii and Kikuyu ethnic communities fled the area as they foresaw the potential for the eruption of ethnic conflicts as the first multiparty elections came close. The call for *majimboism* was reignited by a motion in parliament that was moved by Noor Abdi Ogle, an MP from Wajir, in July 1991. The Member of Parliament argued that *majimboism* was central to the sustenance of KANU, and most importantly, a solution to calls for multiparty elections by the opposition.

According to respondents from Abagusii and Kikuyu communities, *majimboism* was a political arrangement where every ethnic community was supposed to return to their ancestral land. Moreover, the Akiwumi report attested that ethnic groups that were unwilling or reluctant to move back to their ancestral lands were to be forced to do so.<sup>57</sup> KANU was dominated by politicians from the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu (KAMATUSA) ethnic groups who were preoccupied with pushing for *majimbo* reforms. The politicians organized meetings throughout the Rift Valley with the intention of evicting all ethnic communities that failed to identify Rift Valley as the dominant political and ethnic group in Kenya.

As such, the study established that in Molo, KANU politicians successfully portrayed the Abagusii and Kikuyu as opponents of the KAMATUSA ethnic groups in their struggle to retain

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<sup>56</sup> Kagwanja, Peter, M. "Politics of Marionettes: Extra-Legal Violence and the 1997 Elections in Kenya" In Rutten, M and Mazrui, A. (Eds) *Out for the Count: The 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya*. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001), 72.

<sup>57</sup> Akiwumi, Augustus, M. *Report of The Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya*. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1999), 78.

political power.<sup>58</sup> According to the respondents, *Majimboism* was popular amongst indigenous ethnic communities who supported the KANU government, but they did not benefit from the arrangement as it was lopsided in favor of KANU politicians who would benefit from the eviction of all ethnic communities.

Majority of the respondents mentioned that the eruption of ethnic violence following elections in 1992 demonstrated that the plan to evict non-indigenous ethnic communities who were perceived as opponents of the KANU government and single party rule in the name of *majimbo* reforms was coming to a reality. According to Maupeu, the first wave of massacres began against Kikuyu peasants in Molo region.<sup>59</sup> Furthermore, the respondents blamed the political rallies organized by the KANU government politicians in 1991 at Kericho, Kapsabet, and Narok for amplifying ethnic tensions in Molo.<sup>60</sup> According to Mbembe, it is the resulting perception of federalism as portrayed by opponents of multipartyism that explains massive displacement of ethnic communities in various parts of Kenya since ethnic violence in 1992.<sup>61</sup> The *majimbo* debate was intense in Molo compared to other parts of the country owing to the creation of an indigenous-settler rivalry. The indigenous communities consisted of the Kalenjins and Ogiek while settlers were other ethnic communities that migrated to Molo from Central, Western, and Nyanza provinces.

Majority of research participants agreed that the rivalry between native ethnic communities and settler communities changed the settlement patterns in Molo, as the Kalenjins evicted a swathe of Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, and Abagusii communities when ethnic violence erupted in 1992, 1997, and 2007. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) noted in its 2008

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<sup>58</sup> Kagwanja, Peter and Roger Southall. Introduction: Kenya – A democracy in retreat? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 47, no.3 (2009), 264

<sup>59</sup> Maupeu, Herv. & Winnie, Mitullah et al. *The Moi Succession: The 2002 Election in Kenya*. (Nairobi: Trans Africa Press, 2005), 39.

<sup>60</sup> Akiwumi, Augustus, M. *Report of The Judicial Commission Appointed To Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya*. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1999), 49.

<sup>61</sup> Mbembe, Achille. *On the Postcolony*. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 28.

report Maasai and Kalenjin politicians have continued to refer to ethnic groups outside the KAMATUSA communities especially the Abagusii and Agikuyu as “*madoadoa*” meaning foreigners, settlers, or spots in the Rift Valley region.<sup>62</sup>

### 2.3 Negative ethnicity and competitive politics

According to majority of respondents from Mau forest, competition for land between the Ogiek and non-Ogiek communities worsened negative ethnicity though politics of ethnicity was the principal cause of violence in 1992 and 1997. KANU politicians employed negative ethnicity to mobilize massive support for the incumbent President Daniel Arap Moi amongst the Kalenjin, Nandi, and Kipsigis ethnic communities. Many residents from settler communities received threatening leaflets to vacate Molo region or face the consequences and even death. Owing to heightened ethnic politics, KAMATUSA politicians successfully dislodged *majimboism* as a strategy by the opposition to remove Kalenjins and KANU from political power, a strategy that stopped many Kalenjins from trooping to the increasingly popular FORD Asili party.<sup>63</sup>

The Akiwumi report into the ethnic violence in 1992 noted that it was a part of a larger scheme that was already underway in Nandi County throughout 1991. Many respondents lamented that Nandis had begun evicting Kikuyus, Kisii, Kamba, Luhya, and Luo.<sup>64</sup> The study established three main objectives of spreading negative ethnicity and causing ethnic violence in Molo. First, violence was used by President Daniel Arap Moi to demonstrate to Kenyans that as he had foreseen, multipartism was a recipe for ethnic hatred, tension, conflicts, and eventually violence.<sup>65</sup> As such, the KANU regime sponsored ethnic violence to discredit democracy that

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<sup>62</sup> Mbembe, Achille. *On the Postcolony*. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001), 41.

<sup>63</sup> Maupeu, Herv. & Winnie, Mitullah et al. *The Moi Succession: The 2002 Election in Kenya*. (Nairobi: Transafrica Press, 2005), 39.

<sup>64</sup> Akiwumi, Augustus, M. *Report of The Judicial Commission Appointed To Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya*. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1999), 59.

<sup>65</sup> Korwa, Adar, G and Isaac, Munyae, M. “Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under Daniel Arap Moi, 1978-2001.” *African Studies Quarterly*, vol.5, no. 1 (2001), 9.

would be the result of the introduction of multiparty politics. Second, the state funded ethnic violence in Molo to displace and scatter opposition sympathizers and make it difficult for them to register as voters and vote in the 1992 general elections.<sup>66</sup> It would ensure the opposition got negligible votes in Molo and other perceived opposition strongholds.

Many research participants agreed that increased Kikuyu and Abagusii control of Molo after the General Elections in 1992 would worsen ethnic animosity and hatred. However, the parliamentary and presidential election results in Molo Constituency in 1992 gave FORD Asili a strong lead. Kenneth Matiba garnered 55,000 votes against President Moi's 36,000 votes while at the parliamentary level, Njenga Mungai garnered 57,637 votes against Joseph Kebenei who got 33,016 votes.<sup>67</sup> Njenga Mungai won the parliamentary seat with a margin of 24,621 votes but considering that Kenneth Matiba lost the presidential tally with less than 600,000 votes, KANU could have suffered a massive defeat in the presidential polls if the state did not use negative ethnicity to mobilize ethnic support throughout the Rift Valley Province.

However, the study established that ethnic animosity and hatred leading to ethnic violence in 1997 was ignited by opposition leaders namely Charity Ngilu, Mwai Kibaki, and Raila Odinga, and in 2007 by Raila Odinga after refusing to accept the presidential results. Even though they demanded a repeat of the elections by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) within 21 days, Moi was eventually sworn in on January 6, 1998. Majority of respondents recalled that tensions began in the Njoro electoral zone after Mwai Kibaki challenged President Moi's re-election victory and filed a petition of the same in search for justice.

According to a respondent who attended a political rally in Narok Town on January 17, 1998, cabinet ministers from the Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu ethnic groups, including

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<sup>66</sup> Perlez, Jane. "Ethnic Violence Is Shaking Kenya." *The New York Times*. March 29, 1992.

<sup>67</sup> NCCK. *The Cursed Arrow: A Report of Organized Violence against Democracy in Kenya*. Nairobi. 1993, 49.

William Ole Ntimama and Kipkalya Kones warned ethnic communities living in the Rift Valley of possible violence if Mwai Kibaki declined to abandon his petition.<sup>68</sup> Henry Kosgey, another minister in Moi's regime, claimed Mwai Kibaki's petition was a blatant attack on the whole Kalenjin community and threatened bloodshed throughout the entire country. As a result, the study established that the political sentiments from KAMATUSA politicians after President Moi was sworn in led to the onset of ethnic violence in Njoro on January 26, 1998.

Majority of respondents reported that collaboration between the Ndorobo, a sub-tribe of the Ogieks, and Kipsigis ethnic groups began attacking Kikuyus living in Mutukanio farm, *Stoo Mbili*, and Kihingo centers along the Njoro-Mau Narok road. They mentioned that the attackers killed people, injured others, and torched houses.<sup>69</sup> As a retaliation, Kalenjin respondents living in Lare and Naishi reported the Kikuyu began attacking non-Kikuyus in the two areas.

The Daily Nation noted that revenge attacks by the Kikuyu were instigated by Kihika Kimani, a Kikuyu Member of Parliament-elect for Molo Constituency, who claimed his ethnic group had been pushed to the wall. Nevertheless, he claimed they would defend themselves to ensure no lives were lost and no further property damaged by raiders from the Ogiek and Kalenjin ethnic communities.<sup>70</sup> As a result, the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Ogieks, Abagusii, and other ethnic communities in Molo Constituency were embroiled in a protracted battle that made it important for the government to intervene.

The study also determined that negative ethnicity manifested in competitive politics heightened ethnic tensions and caused ethnic violence in Molo in 2007.<sup>71</sup> Many respondents who had

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<sup>68</sup> Rutten, Marcel. et al (Eds). *Out for the Count: The 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya*. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001), 537.

<sup>69</sup> Rutten, Marcel. et al (Eds). *Out for the Count: The 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya*. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001), 576.

<sup>70</sup> Rutten, Marcel. et al (Eds). *Out for the Count: The 1997 General Elections and Prospects for Democracy in Kenya*. (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2001), 537.

<sup>71</sup> Cowen, Michael. and Karuti, Kanyinga. "The 1997 Elections in Kenya: The Politics of Communitality and Locality" in Cowen, M. and Laakso, L. *Multi-party Elections in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey, 2002): 128 –171.



supported either the Party of National Unity (PNU) or Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) predicted their presidential candidate would assume power thus their ethnic communities would benefit from state appointments and resources. However, the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) noted that ethnic violence was likely in case the incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, a candidate from PNU, won the presidential elections in 2007. Just as anticipated by the intelligence agency, Mwai Kibaki was announced the winner under debatable circumstances, an action that led to confusion and eventually outbreak of election violence. Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) supporters refused to accept election results leading to violence in major towns across Kenya including Eldoret, Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa, and Nakuru, with Molo falling a major victim owing to its ethnic diversity.

#### **2.4 Negative ethnicity and land ownership/allocation**

The study established that apart from politics, dispute for the land in Molo Division especially Mau Forest was a major cause of ethnic violence in 1992 and 2007. The study established that the four main ethnic groups in the electoral zone including the Ogiek, Kipsigis, Agikuyu, and Abagusii saw Molo Division as their homeland. As such, it is their deep commitment to the land area and territorial boundaries that played a major role in the Post-Election Violence in 2007 and 2008. It was mentioned that mobilization by local leaders prepared them to be ready to die in defending and recovering their land as it was important in differentiating ethnic community from one another.

Moreover, it was observed that increased allocation of large tracts of Mau Forest to government cronies who immediately rented it to Agikuyu and Abagusii farmers worsened ethnic hatred and tensions as it altered land boundaries and demarcations. The government intruded into Ogiek land territories and allocated and sold their land to powerful and influential people. The study established that Abagusii and Agikuyu activities of clearing land using fire and burning of

charcoal led to increased concerns amongst the Ogiek community.<sup>72</sup> Many respondents observed that Ogieks were increasingly against the wanton dispossession and destruction of forest land that remained their main source of livelihood. Ogieks relied on Mau Forest for bee keeping and hunting and gathering and they blamed settler ethnic communities for depleting the forest and threatening their livelihood and survival. The study established dissent from the Ogiek community led to demonstrations in November 1995 where approximately 300 Ogieks staged a demonstration along the Nakuru-Njoro road, but the government refused to hear their plea as the Police were immediately deployed to disperse the protestors.<sup>73</sup>

Majority of respondents mentioned that after the Ogieks had realized the government did not support their mission to secure their ancestral land, they began attacking non-Ogieks in the Mau Forest, including Abagusii, Agikuyu, Kipsigis, Luo, and Luhya communities to ensure the invaders were kept off their territories. Before the arrival of other ethnic communities, it was observed that the Ogieks were in constant opposition to the Kipsigis on land issues in Molo region.<sup>74</sup> For many decades, President Moi made futile attempts to convince the Ogiek to merge with the larger Kalenjin communities.

The study established that to ensure Kalenjin dominance in Mau Forest, President Moi further resettled 40,000 Kalenjins from selected Kalenjin districts in Molo forests.<sup>75</sup> The Kalenjin sub-groups were needed to offer additional votes and reinforce KANU's political base in Molo Constituency and the Rift Valley region in general. It was becoming a trend in Molo as privileged politicians benefited from the state impunity. Through state allocations, the political class ensured that perpetrators of ethnic violence did not face justice, and worse, the ethnic

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<sup>72</sup> Kimaiyo, Towett, J. *Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices, 1902–2004*. (Nakuru: Ogiek Welfare Council., 2004), 44.

<sup>73</sup> Kimaiyo, Towett, J. *Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices, 1902–2004*. (Nakuru: Ogiek Welfare Council., 2004), 46.

<sup>74</sup> Koross, Kibiwot. How the government made Ogiek Landless. *The Star*. October 24, 2012, 1.

<sup>75</sup> Kimaiyo, Towett, J. *Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices, 1902–2004*. (Nakuru: Ogiek Welfare Council., 2004), 88.

communities that carried out widespread violence in Molo region were rewarded using huge tracts of land in Mau Forest.<sup>76</sup>

## **2.5 Summary**

This chapter examined the nature of negative ethnicity in Molo, Kenya. From primary and secondary sources, it is evident that negative ethnicity played a major role in the ethnic violence that occurred in Molo Division from 1992 to 2016. There were two areas where negative ethnicity remained widespread namely in competitive politics and allocation of land and other national resources. From the chapter discussion, it is apparent that the nature of negative ethnicity in Molo Sub-county is exhibited both socially and politically, but political organization of ethnic identities in Kenya has an unimaginable impact on the behaviors and practices of people from different ethnic communities. It is not surprising that intense competition for political power has led to use of ethnic violence as a tool by the Kenyan political elite to ascend to power, as they continued to guarantee political and economic opportunities and privileges to their ethnic communities.

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<sup>76</sup> Boone, Catherine. *Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 262

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 THE CULTURAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF ETHNIC VIOLENCE

#### 3.1 Introduction

The chapter examines the cultural, economic, and social implications of negative ethnicity in Molo Sub-county. It focuses on ethnic violence that occurred in 1992-1993, 1997-1998, and 2007-2008. The cultural impacts included renaming of places, culture of warfare, rise of *Mungiki*, erosion of patriarchal authority, and erosion of family values while the economic implications included destroyed property and increased crime, interference with agriculture, disruption of trade, and changes in patterns of land allocation and ownership. The social implications covered in this chapter include deaths, disruption of education and social distance, interference with social activities,

#### 3.2 Economic implications of negative ethnicity

This section addresses the economic impacts of negative ethnicity in Molo region.

##### 3.2.1 Destruction of property

It was mentioned that many Molo residents have lost property of unimaginable value during ethnic violence that has plagued the country since 1992.<sup>77</sup> One Abagusii woman farmer from Keringet lost her house and livestock after fleeing her home as the houses of non-Kalenjins were burnt, livestock and household items stolen, and the victims forced to evacuate Molo area. It was observed that ethnic communities that had invested heavily in businesses in the rural areas suffered massive losses as Kalenjin and Ogiek warriors burnt agricultural and trading centers that

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<sup>77</sup> Mwogera, Lawrence, G. Making Sense of Political-related Violence in Kenya. Open Democracy. (September 14, 2008), 1.

had numerous businesses. The study also established that the majority of people lost household and personal possessions not limited to school certificates, title deeds, birth certificates, sofa sets, radio sets, bicycles, clothing, and utensils.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, since farming is common in Molo, it was observed that many homesteads that had livestock such as cattle, sheep, goats, and poultry amongst others were forced to abandon them as the rapid pace of events following eruption of violence did not offer much time to move with them.

### **3.2.2 Interference with agriculture**

Majority of respondents mentioned that they were motivated to settle in the region owing to the presence of fertile soils and suitable climate for agriculture and farming. Their sentiments are reiterated by the Akiwumi Report, which reported that negative ethnicity and subsequent ethnic violence disrupted agriculture and farming because of abandonment of land previously used for cultivation and farming by their owners.<sup>79</sup> The study established that many land owners in Molo relocated to Kuresoi, Keringet, Nyandarua, Nakuru, and Uasin Gishu leaving behind fallow land that KAMATUSA ethnic communities used for grazing. Many respondents lamented that Kalenjins drove them away from Kuresoi, harvested their crops, and turned their rich agricultural lands into grazing lands for livestock. The study established that in some instances, farmers returned to their lands, but the violence had disrupted agriculture as the land area cultivated reduced significantly. As such, lack of family labor, loss of farm tools, and uncertainty about the future affected agricultural production and income.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 129.

<sup>79</sup> Pugliese, Jessica. The Impact of Conflict and Instability on Agriculture in Mali and Nigeria. Brookings.edu. (September 8, 2014), 1.

<sup>80</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 131.

They also recognized that the disruption of agriculture led to a decline in agricultural production and income, which eventually led to food shortages and starvation.<sup>81</sup> A report released by the Food and Agricultural Organization in 1993 noted that victims of ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley Province faced hunger and starvation, and the province alone needed 1080 tons of pulses, 7,200 tons of cereals, and other food items to overcome the emergency resulting from the eruption of ethnic violence in 1992<sup>82</sup>

### **3.2.3 Disruption of trade**

It was observed that agricultural production and farming in Molo had led to increased need for trade. Ethnic communities in the region cultivated crops like cabbages, carrots, kales, peas, and maize that they exchanged with other ethnic communities in trading centers.<sup>83</sup> As a result, agriculture and trade were a major source of income for Molo residents, but many respondents mentioned that the eruption of violence in the region disrupted all income earning activities. According to a respondent who went back to Molo area immediately after the violence in 2007, poor market and trade links affected supply of produce as trading centers like Mukinyai, Muchorwe, Keringet, and Turi that attracted large pools of customers and traders were closed. The study also established that lack of proper infrastructure such as road networks in areas like Toito hampered market networks and trade. Even though Toito was later renamed to Kuresoi as a strategy to attract development, ethnic violence in 2007 drove people away to live in towns, leaving their land fallow. As a result, lack of farming interfered with trade as farm products were major commodities traded in Molo region.

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<sup>81</sup> Muiru, The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008, 132.

<sup>82</sup> Odhiambo, O. "Moi pleads for food donations." Daily Nation, (1993, 13th May), 1.

<sup>83</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008, 134.

### 3.2.4 Changes in land ownership

It was mentioned that during the first wave of ethnic violence in Molo, Kalenjins moved to Keringet, Mau Summit, and Kamara areas while others from Sagaitim farm that was predominantly Agikuyu and Abagusii relocated and settled in Trans Nzoia and Uasin Gishu Counties.<sup>84</sup> It was also observed that Kikuyu and Abagusii were forced to flee to Dundori and Subukia in Nakuru County while others relocated to Central Province and mostly to Nyandarua District. The study established that the violence created an opportunity for changes in patterns of land ownership in the region as fleeing Kalenjin and Kikuyu sold their land at low prices especially to the Abagusii who faced land shortages back in Gusii land. As a result, Abagusii acquired huge tracts of land in Sagaitim farm.<sup>85</sup>

Majority of respondents mentioned that patterns of land ownership changed in Molo Division following occupation of empty lands by strangers. Some respondents indicated that parts of Molo such as Jogoo, Kapsita, Kamwaura, and Nyakinyua were occupied by strangers who arrived as herders and also harvested crops and acquired livestock left behind by fleeing families.<sup>86</sup> The respondents also reported that political elites also encouraged members of their ethnic communities to occupy lands left by displaced people. The study also established that ethnic violence in Molo also created new opportunities for land grabbing as powerful people in Moi and Kibaki governments unlawfully acquired huge tracts of land in areas where the government settled internally displaced people. As such, changes in land ownership patterns were also evident during the resettlement process as prominent people in government acquired land near

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<sup>84</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 134.

<sup>85</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008, 136.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, 137.

urban centers while genuinely displaced people acquired land in the interior of Mariashoni and Mau Forest.<sup>87</sup>

### **3.2.5 Increases in crime rates**

The study established that the three waves of ethnic violence in Molo Division increased crime levels in both rural areas and urban centers, but crime was worse in urban areas where people fleeing to towns turned to crime owing to lack of genuine ways of earning an income.<sup>88</sup> It was mentioned that deaths during Post-Election Violence led to increase in the number of orphans as deaths and separation of family members and families made orphans to engage petty and violent crime. Moreover, disruption of education and a growing number of school drop-outs also worsened crime in Molo region, as children and the youth resorted to crime as a source of income for their survival. The study also established that though the government created the Operation *Rudi Nyumbani* initiative to assist displaced people to return to their homes, insecurity made evictees remain in nearby towns and turn to crime to survive.

It was also observed that other forms of crime also emerged following ethnic conflicts and violence with girls and women becoming major victims. Many respondents mentioned that defilement and rape cases increased as marauding youth gangs found girls and women vulnerable during insecurity resulting from violence. Even though many rival families later offered their girls for early marriage as a strategy to create lasting peace, the study established it was against Kenyan law as children were required to marry after 18 years. Furthermore, the proliferation of breweries selling illicit liquor also contributed to crime in urban centers occupied by fleeing families.

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<sup>87</sup> Kimaiyo, Towett, J. Ogiek Land Cases and Historical Injustices, 1902–2004, (Nakuru: Ogiek Welfare Council, 2004), 95-97.

<sup>88</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 139.



### 3.3 Social implications of negative ethnicity

This section examines the social implications of negative ethnicity in Molo sub-county.

According to Barasa (1992), the social impacts of conflicts and violence are challenging to quantify, but it is apparent violent conflicts affect individuals, groups, and nations in numerous ways. According to Bartos (2002), units in society such as the individual, group, or organization present a force that stimulate numerous counterforces, which explain why violent conflicts produce entirely new relationships when these forces meet counterforces.<sup>89</sup> As a result, the chapter agrees ethnic violence in Molo led to the emergence of new social relationships amongst ethnic communities that contrasted previously existing ones.

#### 3.3.2 Deaths

Many respondents reported that the main social outcome of negative ethnicity in Molo Division was deaths resulting from injuries that warring communities sustained during attacks.<sup>90</sup> Many respondents lost family members, relatives, and friends in the hands of the attackers. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence also observed that though the majority of deaths were caused by ordinary citizens who attacked other citizens based on their ethnic community, other deaths were as a result of security forces attacking ordinary citizens.<sup>91</sup> Apart from deaths caused by the violence, the study also established that old people also succumbed following circumstances surrounding the violence, while others especially the youth committed suicide. Many respondents mentioned that the violent evacuation of people from places they considered home was the worst type of loss.<sup>92</sup> Rothbart and Korostelina state that individuals

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<sup>89</sup> Bartos, Jan and Wehr, Paul. *Using Conflict Theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 6.

<sup>90</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. *The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008*. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 88.

<sup>91</sup> Waki, Phillip. *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence*. (Nairobi, Government Printer, 2008), 90.

<sup>92</sup> Waki, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence*, 275.

who lose a lot of property in the event of violent conflicts become devastated as grief and shock consume them.<sup>93</sup>

### **3.3.3 Disruption of education**

Many respondents mentioned that negative ethnicity and ethnic violence in the aforementioned periods also made many children drop out of school. It was also observed that children from displaced families dropped out of school because they were unable to access their schools, as their families fled to urban areas. Moreover, many schools in the region were closed as the attackers raided schools in session, burnt and looted school resources, a scenario that made it difficult for schools to sustain their activities. As a result, the study established that Mutate in Kapsita, Mau Summit and Jogoo around Molo Town schools were victims of burning and looting, while others like Chandera School became refugee camps following the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence.<sup>94</sup>

A report by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) established that at least 55 primary schools in Molo failed to reopen after eruption of violence in 1992. As a result, more than 16,500 pupils did not attain education while others in standard eight failed to sit for their Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) that year. Furthermore, disruption of education especially primary education became a trend in subsequent elections in 1997 and 2008 with majority of respondents reporting that the disruption of education in primary schools made it difficult for children to transit from primary to secondary school.<sup>95</sup>

Apart from disruption of primary and secondary education, the study also established that ethnic clashes in Molo also prevented high school students from pursuing college education owing to

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<sup>93</sup> Rothbart, Daniel, and K. V. Korostelina, Karina, V. *Why They Die: Civilian Devastation in Violent Conflict*. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011), 43.

<sup>94</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. *The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008*. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 93.

<sup>95</sup> NCCCK. *The Cursed Arrow: A Report of Organized Violence against Democracy in Kenya*. Nairobi, 1993, 22.

financial constraints. Teaching was also a problem as Kalenjin teachers transferred from Elburgon, Molo, and Njoro to Bomet, Kericho, Uasin Gishu Districts while Kikuyu and other non-Kalenjin teachers transferred to Nakuru and Naivasha Districts.<sup>96</sup>

### **3.3.4 Social distance**

Many respondents mentioned that ethnic violence led to displacement and separation of families in Molo region. The violence destroyed farms that were the main source of income for families in the region. The study established that proliferation of breweries selling illicit alcohol was a major cause of social distance as men resorted to drunkenness and neglected their families. Moreover, many men who remained behind were also separated from family members while family disagreements as women assumed the role of men led to divorce.<sup>97</sup> A study conducted by Rutten found out that tensions were prevalent in Njoro and its environs as ethnic communities in these areas increasingly feared and distrusted one another. Rutten notes that Kalenjins and Kikuyus using the Njoro-Mau Narok road used separate means of transport following violence that erupted after the General Election in 1992.

### **3.3.5 Disruption of social activities**

The study established that the displacement of various ethnic communities in Molo and surrounding areas interfered with patterns of social relationships.<sup>98</sup> Majority of respondents mentioned that Kalenjin militia attacks on mosques and burning of churches strained ethnic relations as churches, schools, and mosques are important institutions of socialization. Social institutions are known to nurture a sense of trust amongst people and have a major impact on

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<sup>96</sup> Barasa, Kundu. "The Impact of Past and Potential Ethnic Conflicts in Kenya" A Paper Presented For The USAID Conference on Conflict Resolution in The Greater Horn Of Africa, June 1997, 1992.

<sup>97</sup> Barasa, "The Impact of Past and Potential Ethnic Conflicts in Kenya," 132.

<sup>98</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 110.

identity and a sense of self. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence also noted that burning and looting of religious institutions did not only separate religious faithfuls from various ethnic communities but also led to feelings of betrayal amongst them.<sup>99</sup> Majority of mentioned that Internally Displaced Persons were worst affected as settling in IDP camps with limited social amenities led to the breakdown of the traditional norms and values embraced in their former rural settings.

### **3.4 Cultural implications of negative ethnicity**

The section examines the cultural consequences of ethnic violence in Molo in the periods above. According to Ross, culture is a commonly shared and historically transmitted system of meaning that individuals, groups, or communities use to gain an understanding of the world around them. As a result, it plays a crucial role in identity formation.<sup>100</sup> In times of conflict, culture and conflict increasingly interact in various ways.

#### **3.4.1 Renaming of places**

The study established that ethnic violence experienced in Molo since 1992 led to changing of names in various villages. Majority of respondents claimed that between 1996 and 2001, Kapsita was renamed to *Witemere*, a Kikuyu name coined by the Kikuyu community living in Mukorombosi and Sagaitim farms.<sup>101</sup> However, the area reverted to its original name, Kapsita, a Kalenjin name though the Ogiek living in the scheme insisted it needed to revert to its native name Kapseita. Naming is a tool of control and domination, and most importantly, a powerful technique of expressing cultural homogeneity in a multicultural setting like Molo. However,

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<sup>99</sup> Otwera, Lucas. "The Impact of Politics on Churches in the Rift Valley" (2014). Project Documensts. Paper 263, 8.

<sup>100</sup> Ross, M. *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 18.

<sup>101</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 116.

renaming is also another influential tool of group resistance and establishment of a group identity.

Moreover, it was observed that during the 2007-2008 ethnic violence, *Chogocho* was renamed to *Seguton*. *Chogocho* is a Kikuyu name and reflected the minority Kikuyu ethnic community living in the area though it was later renamed to *Seguton* to reflect the dominant Kalenjin community inhabiting the area after the violence.<sup>102</sup> The study established that the adoption of new names for villages in Molo also resulted from changes in land ownership. For instance, ethnic violence experienced between 1992 and 2008 led to an exodus of Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities from *Sagaitim* farm and an influx of Abagusii. As the Abagusii increased in number in the farm, Kikuyus from neighboring *Ngwataniro* and *Mukorombosi* farms began referring to *Sagaitim* farm as *Keroka*, an Abagusii ancestral area located in Nyamira County.

### **3.4.2 Erosion of patriarchal authority**

Many respondents mentioned that negative ethnicity did not only lead to family discord and infidelity but also eroded the traditional authority of men in the family, as women were forced to assume numerous roles held in reserve for men.<sup>103</sup> Ethnic violence created new opportunities for the emergence of disagreements over gender roles in the family, an occurrence that necessitated adoption of new values to address emerging conflicts. As a result, it was observed that after violence separated men from their families, women living in town centers assumed authority and made unilateral decisions in the home such as engagement in small-scale businesses and selling livestock without consultation.

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<sup>102</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 117.

<sup>103</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008, 118.

It was also observed that in Kapsita, many communities in the location especially the Kikuyu from Njoro and Olenguruone suffered massive casualties during the violence.<sup>104</sup> There was only one road that connected Elburgon Town and Olenguruone though the two places were sixty kilometers apart. The militia was said to hide in the forest connecting the two towns. Many people who made it to Elburgon were mainly women while men who made it were forced to disguise themselves as women. Since many men were unable to make it to their homes, women enjoyed the privilege of making independent choices on how to acquire property, open new businesses, and direct labor even when their husbands preferred otherwise.

### **3.4.3 Culture of warfare**

The study also established that culture was central in defining and treating rival ethnic communities. Many respondents from Kuresoi argued that Kikuyus who escaped the violence were advised by Kalenjins on how to do so. They were told to put a handful of grass in their mouths, and when the Kalenjin warriors approached them ready to attack, they stopped singing their war songs and allowed groups of children, women, and reluctantly, men safe passage.<sup>105</sup> In another incident, many Kalenjin respondents insisted culture played an important role in the success of negotiations between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga. They mentioned that when the negotiations were almost collapsing, and the threat of renewed ethnic violence became apparent, non-Kalenjin communities living in Kapsita, Nyakinyua, and Sagaitim farms hanged a milk guard called *sotet* in front of their doors at night.<sup>106</sup> The respondents believed that the practice would deter clashes between communities in Molo and its environs.

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid, 119.

<sup>105</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 120.

<sup>106</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. 120.

### **3.4.4 Erosion of family values**

Many respondents reported that a traditional norm and practice that was mainly affected by the violence was the practice of initiation. For many ethnic communities in Molo, boys were sent to live in their huts after puberty, but the burning of houses and displacement forced members of a family to share rooms, a practice that was contrary to the tradition. The study also established that for the Ogiek community, agricultural activities by the Agikuyu and Abagusii communities changed their way of life in fundamental ways. The settling communities depleted the forests that were their main source of livelihood forcing the Ogiek to engage in farming and other activities.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, it was observed that separation and death of husbands led their women into prostitution as they engaged in commercial sex with neighboring Bantu communities. For instance, the prevalence of commercial sex workers and prostitution in Molo Town after the 2007-2008 ethnic violence was attributed to mushrooming of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in these areas.

### **3.4.5 Rise of *Mungiki***

According to many respondents *Mungiki* was formed after leaders such as Maina Njenga and Ndura Waruinge mobilized Kikuyu youth with the intention of protecting Kikuyu interests in the Rift Valley region.<sup>108</sup> *Mungiki* is a Kikuyu word meaning masses of people. The study established that Maina Njenga successfully formed the group in 1995 after claiming to have received a vision where *Ngai* (God) demanded him to free and restore Kikuyu culture as an important step towards liberating the community. In this manner, many respondents from the Kikuyu community saw *Mungiki* as a militia group set up to protect them from attackers during the clashes.

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<sup>107</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 123.

<sup>108</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008, 125.

It was mentioned that in isolated areas in Molo region such as Elburgon, Kapsita, Mukinyai, and Mukorombosi, Kikuyu men were compelled to join a warrior group called *Njama* to help in defending Kikuyu land from attacks by Kalenjin warriors.<sup>109</sup> As a result, the Mungiki offered hope to Kikuyus that religion and the state had failed to offer them, as the group saved many Kikuyu lives in areas hardest hit by ethnic violence.

### **3.4.6 Chapter Summary**

This chapter evaluated the economic, cultural, and social impacts of negative ethnicity in Molo region between 1992 and 2016 by examining the three cycles of ethnic violence namely 1992-1993, 1997-1998, and 2007-2008. The study established that the disruption of agriculture and trade was the worst economic impact of negative ethnicity in Molo region, as it destroyed the main sources of income. Since people lacked any form of income, it was difficult to purchase lost and destroyed land and property, and most important, led to increase in crime as displaced people resorted to crime for survival. Moreover, deaths from ethnic violence were the main impacts of negative ethnicity in Molo. It widened the social distance, crime, and disrupted social activities as men played an integral role in the family. Finally, culture played an integral role in fanning negative ethnicity amongst ethnic communities residing in Molo region. As such, its manifestation in national politics served to worsen ethnic suspicion and hatred that eventually led to violence.

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<sup>109</sup> Muiru, Paul, N. The Social, Cultural and Economic Impact of Ethnic Violence in Molo Division, 1969 –2008. Master Thesis, (Nairobi: Kenyatta University, 2012), 126.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4.0 PEACEBUILDING INITIATIVES IN MOLO SUB-COUNTY, NAKURU COUNTY**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

The chapter examines the peace initiatives that have been initiated between 1992-2016 to address ethnic conflicts and violence amongst ethnic communities in Molo Sub-County. Since the emergence of multiparty politics, Kenya has become a victim of periodic ethnic conflicts, and Molo presents an excellent case for illustrating the impacts of ethnic violence on ethnic communities in the country. However, various peace initiatives have been initiated to address the causes and consequences of ethnic violence and most importantly, deter further violence. Nonetheless, more peace building initiatives are needed. As a result, the chapter examined peace building initiatives offered by the government, community, religious institutions, and further recommended other alternative initiatives to address sporadic ethnic violence in Molo.

#### **4.2 State sponsored peace building initiatives**

The Government of Kenya was a key stakeholder in initiating and implementing peace-building initiatives in Molo region and other areas of the country affected by ethnic violence between 1992 and 2016.

##### **4.2.1 Establishment of Police Posts**

Many respondents observed that following waves of violence in Molo, the government increased security in several parts of Molo by establishing at least 20 police posts in the area. Police posts were concentrated in town centers, schools, and border points demarcating areas occupied by rivaling ethnic communities especially Kikuyu and Kalenjin territories. However, the study established that police posts across Molo had an inherent weakness as many victims of ethnic

violence were convinced that the state was a major accomplice in the violence. According to Ziesberg, the state plays a crucial role in maintaining domestic peace and security as it controls majority of agencies, institutions, and processes that bring about social change.<sup>110</sup> The victims did not trust the police to maintain peace and security in the region.<sup>111</sup> However, majority of respondents praised the introduction of community-based policing where each ethnic community chose members to assist the police in enhancing security in the affected areas within and around Molo.

It was also mentioned that the government did not understand that ethnic violence in the area was a culmination of other conditions such as unemployment especially for the youth. Many respondents agreed that, unemployed Kikuyu youths who moved to Molo, Elburgon and Njoro towns became easy targets for militia especially the *Mungiki* while Kalenjins displaced by the violence were quickly recruited to assist in the attacks. The study established that ethnic violence also led to deep feelings of resentment and hatred amongst warring communities, and it was likely they would engage in revenge attacks, as the government had failed to deliver justice to victims from various ethnic communities.<sup>112</sup>

#### **4.2.2 Operation Rudi Nyumbani, Tujenge Pamoja and Ujirani Mwema**

The study also established that other state sponsored peace building initiatives were Operation *Rudi Nyumbani* (Return Home), *Ujirani Mwema* (Good Neighborhood), and *Tujenge Pamoja* (Build Together), which were initiatives began by the coalition government after violence in 2007-2008.<sup>113</sup> Through the President's Office, the coalition government took over humanitarian

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<sup>110</sup> Zeisberg, Mariah. *War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 112.

<sup>111</sup> Akiwumi, Augustus, M. Report of The Judicial Commission Appointed To Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya. (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1999), 132.

<sup>112</sup> Waki, Phillip. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence. (Nairobi, Government Printer, 2008), 91.

<sup>113</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3, (2016), 9.

assistance and reconstruction programs offered by the Kenya Red Cross and other global agencies. The then Ministry of Special Programmes was launched and mandated to assist in resettling the Internally Displaced Persons.

However, many respondents did not participate in the initiatives because mandating the Provincial Administration that people distrusted to manage the resettlement of IDPs speeded their failure. It was established that the Provincial Administration was increasingly suspected to be an accomplice in the violence thus was unable to undertake the complex resettlement and peace building initiatives and address security concerns in Molo town.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, the three peace building initiatives by the Ministry of Special Programmes were executed with speed without considering important factors that influenced resettlement and peace building tasks. Many respondents agreed that the existence of numerous IDP camps throughout the Rift Valley exposed the dealings and activities of the political class and the state. The study established that dismantling refugee camps without preparing victims for reception and reintegration with existing communities served to set the stage for violence in subsequent electoral cycles as rival communities were not prepared to live together with each other.

#### **4.2.3 Cash Incentives**

Majority of respondents lauded the cash incentives offered by the government to assist victims of ethnic violence to rebuild their lives. According to the Land Survey Report released in 2009, the government offered Internally Displaced Persons ten thousand shillings each to assist in the resettlement and reconstruction process.<sup>115</sup> However, the study established that the process was marred by corruption, and even after concerted efforts, many IDPs did not receive the funds. The funds were misappropriated by government officials from the Ministry of Special Programmes

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<sup>114</sup> United States Institute of Peace. *Special report on internal displacement and local peace-building in Kenya*, 2010, 7.

<sup>115</sup> Kenya Land Alliance. *Land data survey report on internal displacement*, (Nairobi: Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, 2009), 9.

and Provincial Administration while other funds were given to other people who posed as IDPs. A survey carried out by the Kenya Land Alliance found out that out of the 2,746 people displaced during the 2007-2008 violence, only a few IDPs received the 10,000 and 25,000 Kenyan Shillings offered as start-up capital.<sup>116</sup> The survey also found out that in Kuresoi Constituency, a Chief had offered the start-up capital to his supporters, especially the youth who had engaged in the violence.

Apart from offering cash incentive to victims of ethnic violence in 1997-1998, many respondents praised the government's efforts of buying land and constructing houses to shelter fleeing families. In Turi Division, the study established that the government purchased a significant portion of land, allocated the land to displaced families, and assisted the families to construct houses as a way of rebuilding their lives. In Turi Division, it was mentioned that cattle theft was the principal cause of ethnic mistrust and suspicion amongst ethnic communities, especially Kipsigis and Ndorobo but settling other ethnic communities in the region led to a significant decline in cattle rustling and theft in the area.

#### **4.2.4 The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)**

The study established that following the 2007-2008 post-election violence, the state established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) to reconcile different ethnic communities in the country.<sup>117</sup> Majority of respondents saw it as independent commission, and as a result, the NCIC successfully gathered more than 100 Kalenjin and Kikuyu elders in Nakuru County to debate about the historical injustices against their communities since the colonial era. The study established that meetings between kikuyu and Kalenjin communities culminated to an

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<sup>116</sup> Kenya Land Alliance. *Land data survey report on internal displacement*, (Nairobi: Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, 2009), 9.

<sup>117</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3, (2016), 9.

eight-point peace plan that was signed in 2012. Through the NCIC, the peace plan promised to respect the culture, tradition, and freedoms of ethnic communities in the county as contained in the Constitution. Moreover, the elders promised to establish a dispute resolution mechanism to ensure ethnic communities did not intimidate each other, address spontaneous violence, and compel politicians to preach peace.<sup>118</sup>

However, majority of respondents faulted NCIC for its failure to include the youth in the peace-building process. According to United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the youths in the village were mobilized to engage in violence while village elders were charged with blessing them in preparation for war.<sup>119</sup> Consequently, the study established that since the youth were not involved at the grassroot level, peace building initiatives by the government failed to address ethnic violence in Molo and the larger Nakuru County.

### **4.3 Community Based Peace-building Initiatives**

On community based peace building initiatives, non-governmental organizations were at the forefront in reconciling warring ethnic communities in Molo region.

#### **4.3.1 Religious Organizations**

According to Zeisberg, state may be crucial in maintaining domestic peace, but its initiatives and programs are not sufficient to ensure peace and security. Majority of respondents observed that following ethnic violence in Molo, other players including non-governmental organizations, community workers, and religious organizations were involved in peace building initiatives.<sup>120</sup>

However, the study observed that efforts to nurture inter-ethnic harmony did not reach other villages in Molo, but Kuresoi and Likia were major beneficiaries of peace initiatives supported

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<sup>118</sup>Njoroge, K. "Survivors say state absconded its duty." *The Standard*, 22.

<sup>119</sup> United States Institute of Peace. *Special report on internal displacement and local peace-building in Kenya*, 2010, 7.

<sup>120</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3, (2016), 9.

by the Catholic Diocese of Nakuru (CDN) and National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK).<sup>121</sup> The Catholic Diocese of Nakuru, one of the several branches of the Kenya Catholic Church was notable in this regard.

In 1991, CDN created the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC) that was tasked with initiating programs for educating Kenyans towards justice. Moreover, CJPC was also charged with promoting peace to enable Kenyans assume control over their lives, nurture mutual understanding, protect and respect for human rights through advocacy and best practices, and resolution of conflicts through peace-building initiatives.<sup>122</sup> During the 2007-2008 violence, the CDN and other departments like Order of Franciscan Brothers (OFB) offered emergency relief and raised funds to fulfill the program.

The study established that in addressing poverty, unemployment, and unequal distribution of scarce resources, CDN started economic activities to encourage peace building in Molo. For instance, the diocese initiated the Lay Apostolate Department to coordinate all economic activities to guarantee capacity building and sustainability to minimize conflicts that resulted from competition over scarce national resources in the area. Apart from economic activities, CDN also started the *Makao* program that was focused on purchasing land and later reselling it to Molo residents in installments, and at affordable prices to empower the people economically, restore their dignity, and alleviate poverty.<sup>123</sup>

Catholic Diocese of Nakuru also identified youth idleness in Molo sub-county as another cause of conflicts in the area, and establishing it was necessary to empower the youth by involving them in productive activities. As a result, it introduced Life Skills-Based Education (LSBE) to

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<sup>121</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3, (2016), 94.

<sup>122</sup> Karori, James. Analysis of Interethnic Conflicts and Peace Building between 1992 And 2010 in Molo District, Kenya. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, vol. 19, issue 7 (2014): 95.

<sup>123</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3, (2016), 10.

realize this objective.<sup>124</sup> LSBE is an interactive process that enables the youth to develop positive attitudes and acquire knowledge and skills for healthy behavior. To combat the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases, CDN encouraged the youth to work with government agents and other adults to spread information about the importance of prevention. On its strategy of empowering the youth in Molo Sub-County, CDN prioritized gender equality and basic education. As a result, its responses were crucial for promotion and sustenance of both family and community care practices.

### **4.3.2 Educational Institutions**

The study established that a notable educational institution that played a major role in peace building in Molo Sub-County was the Carol Teachers College located in Nakuru County.<sup>125</sup> The college initiated an outreach program in 2008 to increase awareness about the significance of ethnic unity in Kenya. Both staff and students of the college decided to reach out to ethnic communities in the Rift Valley Province to quell political and ethnic animosities that followed the disputed election in 2007. It was mentioned that they toured violence hotspots in Kuresoi and Molo townships to preach peace amongst rival ethnic communities in an attempt to address the cycle of ethnic and land clashes in Molo since 1992.

Many respondents observed that the college organized a peace caravan that moved around violence hotspots in the Rift Valley such as Molo, Kuresoi, Kericho, Eldoret, Olenguruone, and Njoro amongst others.<sup>126</sup> According to Mr. Ongeta, a lecturer at the college noted idleness and unemployment amongst the youth was a major cause of violence in the Rift Valley as politicians exploited this weakness to engage the youth in violence. In order to arrest this situation,

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<sup>124</sup> Karori, James. Analysis of Interethnic Conflicts and Peace Building between 1992 And 2010 in Molo District, Kenya. *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, vol. 19, issue 7 (2014): 91-102.

<sup>125</sup> Njagi, Antony. "College choir fights to slay ethnicity dragon." *Daily Nation*. (January 30, 2012.), 3.

<sup>126</sup> Njagi, "College choir fights to slay ethnicity dragon," 3.

computer classes played an important role in ensuring the youth were busy and avoided trouble. The study established that the peace caravan went around churches, schools, marketplaces, and other public areas performing dances, songs, poems, and skits to the locals.<sup>127</sup> Moreover, they also educated the people on the significance of cultural, economic, and political co-existence. Their efforts in the region bore fruit, and this was acknowledged by Kinuthia Mbugua, the then Administration Police Commandant who lauded their role in promoting peace in the entire Rift Valley region. Peace building initiatives by Carol Teachers College also prompted similar initiatives.<sup>128</sup> For instance, ethnic communities in Burnt Forest began a similar initiative to harmonize the people from the area who suffered as a result of ethnic violence that ensued after the General Election in 2007.

#### **4.4 Strategies to promote lasting peace and eradicate negative ethnicity in Molo**

This section examines the strategies needed to promote lasting peace and address negative ethnicity in Molo.

##### **4.4.1 Reconciliation**

The study established reconciliation was crucial in fostering ethnic harmony and unity amongst communities living in Molo Sub-County following ethnic violence.<sup>129</sup> It was mentioned that local leaders and the church were central in the reconciliation process. Village elders and Chiefs organized *barazas* where warring communities especially Kikuyu and Kalenjin met to reconcile their differences as a step towards peace. The study established that in the *barazas*, truth telling was key as residents in the area offered full accounts of their past, especially the identification of perpetrators and victims of ethnic clashes. It is important for both people and institutions to

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<sup>127</sup> Njagi, "College choir fights to slay ethnicity dragon," 3.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>129</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3. (2016), 12.



acknowledge and understand their roles during ethnic conflicts in the past, and learn constructively from experiences during conflicts to ensure such instances are not repeated.<sup>130</sup>

However, it was observed that during the reconciliation process, religious leaders from Catholic, Seventh Day Adventist (SDA), Mosques, and Full Gospel Churches of Kenya (FGCK) should play a major role as churches and mosques are known to underscore the importance of accepting a new conscience amongst individuals and communities through confession, reflection, repentance, and rebirth. Moreover, if reconciliation is to succeed, Molo residents should be at the forefront in initiating the peace process. After the 2007-2008 Post Election Violence, Kofi Annan played an important role in initiating the peace process at the national level, but it is apparent efforts by Molo residents to peacefully co-exist with each other led to a meaningful reconciliation drive.

#### **4.4.2 Restoration of Land Rights**

The majority of victims of ethnic clashes in Molo lost parcels of land and important land documents such as title deeds after their houses were burnt down, while others misplaced their land documents as they fled the violence. As a result, it is important for the Kenyan Government to assist in their replacement to enable the victims recover and reinstitute their rights over land in Molo and its environs.<sup>131</sup> Molo is considered a violence hotspot and many residents who fled the area may be unable to recover their lost land. As a result, the government should compensate them accordingly, an action that will play a big role in helping the victims in reconstructing their lives.

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<sup>130</sup> Bloomfield, David and Barnes, Teresa. *Reconciliation after Violent Conflict: A Handbook*. United Nations, (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2003), 40.

<sup>131</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3, (2016), 12.

It was established that apart from the loss of land and rights over land, ethnic tensions in areas such as Kapsita and Mukinyai may remain high as victims of ethnic violence are yet to recover property they lost during the violence.<sup>132</sup> Living side by side with each other, they are saddened as they can see their property such as bicycles, cattle, iron sheets, and television sets in the homes of rival communities. Many respondents mentioned that Molo residents should initiate a program to encourage rival communities to surrender such property voluntarily as a step towards restoration of ethnic and personal relationships. A successful restitution process is dependent on successful reconciliation because restorative justice is crucial in nurturing sustainable peace in Molo Sub-County.

#### **4.4.3 Youth Employment**

The study established that unemployment amongst youth in Molo was unique as sporadic conflicts in the past 25 years worsened suffering amongst the largest age group in the country.<sup>133</sup> Many respondents mentioned that youth in Molo discontinued their education, while many who moved to towns hoping for better opportunities were left desperate and susceptible to politicians preoccupied with using violence as a tool to win elections. The study observed that unemployed youth remained prime targets for militias, and it is necessary for the Kenyan government to create various avenues to empower the youth economically.

Many respondents welcomed the *Uwezo Fund* as a commendable attempt to achieve this objective, as it organized the youth into productive groups, and offered finances to youth groups to initiate income generating activities. On the other hand, it was also observed that other initiatives such as planting of trees in forests depleted during conflicts or construction of roads

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<sup>132</sup> Muiru, and Muraya. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya, 12.

<sup>133</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3. (2016), 13.

through the *Kazi kwa Vijana* initiative was also important in keeping the youth busy. The study established that if the youth can earn incomes from various economic activities, then it would be difficult for politicians to use them for causing violence during elections.

#### **4.4.4 Compensation of Post-Election violence victims**

In Turi Division, many respondents supported the government's initiative of purchasing land and building homes to shelter victims of violence. Since 1992, ethnic clashes in Molo have led to the massive destruction of property. The study established that in many cases, victims have been forced to start afresh after losing property from household belongings to land. As such, compensating victims by helping them to build houses and resettling others in other areas is a crucial step towards peace building amongst ethnic communities in Molo Sub-County.

However, Sriram argues that compensation is vital for sustainable peace, but in Molo Sub-County, all victims of ethnic clashes since 1992 are yet to be compensated fully.<sup>134</sup> More than 14,000 victims of the violence in 2007-2008 are yet to be compensated. The IDPs now live in Kisii County though they resided in various parts of the Rift Valley before the violence. In early 2017, the government agreed the victims would be given the 200,000 shillings each as earlier promised, but it was actualized in June as the 2017 elections approached. As a result, lack of compensation may explain why various ethnic communities continued to harbor feelings of resentment against each other.

#### **4.4.5 Cultural Change**

Majority of respondents mentioned that since independence, a culture of mistrust, suspicion, and violence has thrived in Molo region, and the only way to break down these barriers was if Molo

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<sup>134</sup> Sriram, Chandra, L. *Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground*. (London: Routledge, 2013), 248.

residents lived in lasting peace. According to Couroucli, it is important to create multiple channels for people to express themselves.<sup>135</sup> Negative ethnicity is pervasive in the entire country, as the struggle for political power and competition over scarce resources has led to rivalry amongst ethnic communities. In Molo Sub-County, addressing negative ethnicity requires Molo residents to make significant changes in how they relate to each other.<sup>136</sup> In 2012, a joint initiation ceremony amongst the Abagusii, Kikuyu, and Kalenjin communities were organized by the National Council of Churches of Kenya, Genesis Art Creation, and Gender Equity Network, and it is important to sustain such initiatives because they are vital in peace building.

#### **4.4.6 Community Dialogue**

The study established that the Government of Kenya employed community dialogue as a strategy to promote peace and security in Molo. It was mentioned that the Provincial Administration was at the forefront in facilitating dialogue between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. The national government through the County Administrators have formed committees to forge peaceful co-existence between and among the diverse communities living in Molo. Majority of the respondents appreciated this approach by the government but urge that the same should never be allowed to lose momentum as witnessed before. They therefore call for commitment and sustenance of the same. As reported by the Daily Nation, the form of intervention would resemble one that occurred during ethnic violence in 1997-1998. Concerned senior politicians from Central Province such as Njenga Mungai, Njenga Karume, and Isaiah Mathenge led a delegation comprising at least 18 leaders from the GEMA community to State House on May 24, 1993, to meet with President Moi on the matter. The meeting at State House was also attended

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<sup>135</sup> Couroucli, Maria. *The Balkans - Ethnic and Cultural Crossroads: Sofia (Bulgaria), 27-30 May 1995 : Democracy, Human Rights, Minorities: Educational and Cultural Aspects*, (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publ, 1997), 45.

<sup>136</sup> Muiru, Paul, N and Muraya, Martha, W. Lost Opportunity: Peace Building Initiatives in Molo Division, Nakuru County, Kenya. *International journal of Arts and Humanities*, vol. 2, issue 3. (2016), 13.

by senior KAMATUSA leaders such as William Ole Ntimama, Kipkalya Kones, Francis Lotodo, and six Kalenjin elders. GEMA leaders were deeply concerned about continuous clashes and insisted they were running out of patience owing to the threat of insecurity that faced Kikuyus in Molo and the entire Rift Valley Province.

#### **4.4.7 Chapter Summary**

This chapter examined and evaluated the peace building strategies employed by various stakeholders to address the cultural, social, and economic impacts of negative ethnicity in Molo. It was established that the Government of Kenya was the primary stakeholder in the peace process. However, peace-building initiatives by non-governmental institutions such as religious organizations and education institutions were more effective in addressing the consequences of negative ethnicity in Molo. The Government of Kenya was seen as a major accomplice in the violence that rocked Molo since 1992 thus mistrust and suspicion from ethnic communities especially the Kikuyu led to failure of various state sponsored initiatives. However, community dialogue restored faith in the Provincial Administration as they successfully mediated between warring Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities. As a result, various community dialogues largely explained the success of other strategies employed by the government and non-governmental organizations in Molo.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Summary

The research study analyzed the impact of negative ethnicity in Molo Sub-County in the period 1992-2016. Since the period was characterized by intermittent ethnic conflicts and violence, it is that apparent negative ethnicity largely explains the recurrence of violence in Molo. As a result, Chapter Two continues by discussing the nature of negative ethnicity in Molo from 1992 to 2016 by examining its relationship with competitive politics and land allocation and ownership issues. Numerous literatures on the cause of ethnic violence in the periods above agree that ethnic violence was the result of a combination of various factors. However, negative ethnicity was identified as the main cause of ethnic violence. Moreover, land controversies, cultural factors, and ethnic politicization are also identified as other factors that explain the prevalence of ethnic violence in these periods. Since ethnic violence occurred following the repeal of Section 2A of the Kenyan Constitution that reintroduced multiparty politics, many scholars concluded that ethnic conflicts in Molo during these periods were politically motivated.

Furthermore, Chapter Three examines the economic, social, and cultural impacts of negative ethnicity in Molo. The immediate social consequences of ethnic violence in 1992-2016 were both direct and indirect deaths. Moreover, the violence also interfered with education and caused desperation amongst family members who lost spouses, children, and parents. Moreover, social distance also increased as marriages between warring ethnic communities broke while settlement patterns also demonstrated widening differences amongst communities. Indigenous communities like the Ogiek were affected by the violence in fundamental ways as the destruction of forest

cover by settler communities such as the Agikuyu and Abagusii led to scarcity of food and destruction of sacred places.

They were forced to flee their homes while Abagusii and Agikuyu communities had to change circumcision locations and sources of food. Moreover, it was difficult to adhere to cultural norms and traditions as violence forced communities to engage in various practices such as living with in-laws. On economic impacts, it is apparent that violence led to the destruction of homes and houses, businesses, increased dependency, diversion of scarce resources, and interference with agriculture and trading activities. Moreover, violence also led to significant decline in investments in Molo as an environment of uncertainty discouraged both local and foreign investors from investing. Victims were also forced to cater for medical treatments for injuries and mental illnesses associated with the violence. As a result, ethnic violence further impoverished families and communities in Molo, an action that led to the prevalence of crime as victims struggled to survive. The disruption of agriculture and farming amongst families in Molo led to significant decline in their incomes, and it is apparent that ethnic violence in Molo has led to a slowdown in economic growth in the area.

Chapter Four examines the peace building initiatives initiated by the government of Kenya and other non-governmental organizations and institutions. It also, evaluates the role of religious institutions and educational institutions that played major roles in peace building. Apart from examining the peace-building initiatives, the chapter also critiques various peace building initiatives with the intention of exposing their limitations and improving on them to ensure sustainable peace in Molo Sub-County. Since ethnic violence occurred in 1992, the failure of various peace building initiatives is associated with employment of a top-down approach by the Government. Sustainable peace building initiatives should begin at the grassroots level, and this explains why peace building initiatives by educational, religious, and non-governmental

institutions have fairly succeeded in bringing lasting peace in Molo. As a result, strategies to build lasting peace in Molo include reconciliation, restoration of land rights, cultural change, youth employment, and compensation of victims. Following intensive research into the cultural, economic, and social impact of ethnic violence in Molo, it is apparent that the causes and consequences of ethnic violence are numerous. They are not limited to the causes and consequences discussed in the research study alone. The study concludes by stating that politicians remain at the forefront in exploiting ethnicity to acquire and retain political power.

## **5.2 Conclusion**

It is evident that since 1992, ethnic conflicts and violence in Molo Sub-County have had massive consequences in various spheres of life. Ethnic communities residing in Molo were attracted by the fertile soils and ample climate to practice agriculture and carryout farming. This has historically contributed to the country's food production, but it is apparent, the prevalence of vicious ethnic conflicts threatened the country's food security and facilitating hunger situation facing various areas. Therefore, the government needs to embrace effective peace-building mechanisms to ensure agricultural production and farming is sustained to ensure food security for the people. However, it is noticeable that the government has failed in its attempt to secure lasting peace in Molo as its top-down approach to peace-building has continuously disregarded important stakeholders in the peace process such as the youth, women and the elderly. It is understandable that peace-building should begin at the village level to ensure all stakeholders are engaged in peace-building. It is clear that from the study that there is urgent need to de-ethnicize our politics so that the people should avoid running to their ethnic cocoons when something happens. There is therefore need for all and sundry to boldly accept that negative ethnicity is real and we cannot dream of a united country while maintaining social distance between our ethnic



communities. In order to preserve this country and ultimately pass it on to generations to come, there is need to inculcate the culture of embracing diversity and this need to start from the hard hit areas like Molo.

### **5.3 Recommendations**

The study has presented some very salient issues that require a framework to see it through the implementation process so as to address the vicious circle of electoral related violence which has for a long time been a setback to democracy particularly in Molo. For the government to assure Molo residents regardless of ethnic background live peacefully in a safe and secure environment, it is important to offer adequate compensation to victims of ethnic violence. The National Land Commission should also work with other stakeholders to address the issue of land rights of the local people. There is therefore need for them to collectively work together for the common good of all the residents living in Molo.

#### **5.3.1 Youth empowerment**

The study recommends for the youth empowerment which should be at the forefront in offering education, training, and employment opportunities which is crucial in safeguarding the future of the young generation. It is apparent that there is glaring mismatch between the aspirations of the youth and opportunities available to them. When large numbers of young people feel frustrated in their search for status and livelihood, they can be a destabilizing force. The youth must therefore be given ample space in local peace building initiatives.

#### **5.3.2 Empowering institutions**

The study also established that it is almost impossible to guarantee sustainable peace if politicians continue to capitalize on negative ethnicity as a tool to win elections or retain elective positions. As a result, it is important for the government to establish robust institutions that

ensure politicians desist from polarizing the country along ethnic lines. It is this deepening political and ethnic fault lines that are driving the local communities to rise up against one another. Currently, existing institutions such as National Land Commission and National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) do not have enough powers and authority to carry out their mandates and it is not surprising that politicians continue to exploit ethnicity to their advantage to ensure their hold on power. For that matter, empowering public institutions is crucial if the government is to address the causes of ethnic violence and mitigate the consequences of ethnic conflicts in volatile areas such as Molo. It is also imperative that NCIC to invest and continuously strengthen both their legal and investigations departments so that the cases they present to courts of law meet the evidential threshold because Judges cannot convict the suspects on evidence that fall way below. It is also important for NCIC to collaborate with institutions like Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) and Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) on evidential led investigations.

### **5.3.3 Strengthening of legal frame work**

The research has established that there is need for the government to enact laws that stringently deter the would-be perpetrators from spreading hatred between and among communities along ethnic lines. They also need to review the existing laws so as to amicably address the legal gaps that create room for mischief by perpetrators.

### **5.3.4 Political leadership and good governance**

Politics of exclusivity are largely the cause of poor democratic governance and this has for a long time been demonstrated in Molo. It is imperative that the political class must embrace the diversity so as the masses are not merely made as pawns in the political game. The political system should be responsive to the demands of the electorates but sadly Molo residents have experienced the three waves of violence because conversion chambers have been dysfunctional.

Failure to enact rules of governing multi-ethnic communities has a major setback in developing a cohesive society based on values and common belief. In order to address such shortcomings the political class should strive to nurture democratic systems that could mitigate negative ethnicity.

#### **5.3.5 Development of community policing programs**

The research established that community policing program has been developed apparently sustenance of the same has not been successful. It is therefore important that such programs should be projected as long-term projects in pursuit of peaceful co-existence among the diverse communities in Molo. Partnership should have a broad representation with a structured manner of sharing information. The Police and the local community leaders should develop strategies and programs that are well structured to facilitate continuous training and better equipping the actors with skills, knowledge and change attitude. Such an approach will motivate the Actors in building trust and confidence among the political players and the local communities.

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# Appendix i: NACOSTI Clearance Permit

## CONDITIONS

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2. Both the Licence and any rights thereunder are non-transferable.
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REPUBLIC OF KENYA



National Commission for Science,  
Technology and Innovation

## RESEARCH CLEARANCE PERMIT

Serial No.A 16182

CONDITIONS: see back page

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:**  
**MR. RICHARD LESASUIYAN**  
**of UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI, 19284-501**  
**NAIROBI, has been permitted to conduct**  
**research in Nakuru County**

**on the topic: ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT**  
**OF NEGATIVE ETHNICITY ON NATIONAL**  
**POLITICS IN KENYA: A CASE STUDY OF**  
**MOLO SUB-COUNTY (1992-2016)**

**for the period ending:**  
**13th October, 2018**

*Richard Lesasuiyan*

Applicant's  
Signature

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/17/63834/19627  
Date Of Issue : 13th October, 2017  
Fee Received : Ksh 1000



*Paluma*

Director General  
National Commission for Science,  
Technology & Innovation

**Appendix ii: Letter of introduction**

Date:...../...../2017

To Whom It May Concern

Dear/Madam

**RE: DATA COLLECTION**

My name is **Lesasuiyan Richard**, pursuing a Master's Degree in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, College of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Nairobi.

I am conducting a research on the analysis of the impact of negative ethnicity on national politics in Kenya: a case study of Molo Sub-county between 1992 - 2016.

I would like to enlist your assistance in filling in the questionnaire provided. Your responses will be treated with the utmost confidentiality and used for academic research purpose only.

Your assistance and cooperation is highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely

LESASUIYAN RICHARD

R50/82248/2015

**Appendix iii. Questionnaire**

**SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHICS**

- i. Name (optional): .....
- ii. Gender { } Male { } female
- iii. Age { } 20-25 { } 26-30 { } 31-35 { } 36-40 [ ] 41-45 { } 46-50 above 51
- iv. Name of organization: .....
- v. Occupation of Respondent: .....
- vi. Location of Respondent: .....
- vii. Respondent's Marital Status: .....
- viii. Highest level of education: .....

**SECTION B: MOLO RESIDENTS**

- 1. How long have you lived in Molo? .....
- 2. How did you interact and relate with people from other ethnic groups before multipartyism in 1991?.....  
.....
- 3. What do you think are the main causes of ethnic conflicts in Molo area since multipartyism was introduced in 1991?  
.....  
.....
- 4. Did ethnic violence in 1991-1992, 1997-1998, and 2007-2008 affect you individually?  
If yes how.  
.....  
.....  
.....

5. Do you think ethnic violence in the periods indicated above strained social relations among the various ethnic communities in Molo ?.....
6. Do you own any piece of land in Molo Sub-County?  
.....
7. Before ethnic violence erupted in 1992, how did you utilize your piece of land in Molo Sub-County? .....
8. Do you still own your piece of land? If so, how are you currently utilizing it?  
.....  
.....
9. Has ethnic violence affected your farming activities?  
If so, how, .....
10. What are the strategies that the government and other stakeholders have put in place to promote co-existence among the communities living in Molo?  
.....  
.....
11. What do you think can be done to have a lasting solution in conflict resolution?  
.....  
.....  
.....

**SECTION C: DISPLACED PERSONS**

1. Why did you move away from Molo Sub-County?

.....  
.....

2. What reasons informed your decision to move from Molo Sub-County?

.....  
.....

3. When residing in Molo Sub-County, did you live in your own house or did you rent a house? .....

4. After moving away from Molo Sub-County, do you currently live in your own house or do you live in a rented one? .....

5. If you currently own land in Molo Sub-County, how are you utilizing the piece of land?

.....  
.....

6. If your land is currently being utilized, what economic activity are you undertaking?

.....  
.....

7. Apart from farming, do you engage in any other economic activity in Molo Sub-County?

If so, is the economic activity still on? If no, what interfered with or stopped the economic activity?

.....  
.....  
.....

8. Have you experienced any losses from interference with your economic activity? If so, can you gauge your losses in Kenyan Shillings? .....



9. Has ethnic violence affected you personally or your family economically? .....

.....

10. Are you planning a return to Molo Sub-County? .....

.....

11. What do you think can be done to ensure that the communities living in Molo co-exist harmoniously.....

.....

12. What are the strategies that the government and other stakeholders have put in place to promote co-existence among the communities living in Molo?

.....

.....


13. What do you think can be done to have a lasting peace and harmony among the communities living in Molo

.....

.....

.....

**Appendix iv: Map of Molo Sub-County**



Source: <https://softkenya.com/kenya/molo-constituency/>