MANAGING CONFLICTS IN AFRICA THROUGH REGIONALISM: CASE STUDY OF EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY

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A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MASTERS OF ARTS DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

NOVEMBER 2017
DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work, and has not been submitted for award of a Degree in any other University.

Signature………………………………………………. Date………………………………..

Adan K Mulata

The thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor.

Signature………………………………………………. Date………………………………..

Prof. Maria Nzomo

Supervisor
DEDICATION

This project paper reflects a journey where its success was predicated on the dedication of two key players in my life and work environment. The dedication is therefore made firstly to my family for their inspirational love, care and patience while the second is made to my superiors and colleagues at work who gave me an unparalleled support and encouragement during the entire period of my studies.
I would like to acknowledge and thank particular individuals who have contributed to the successful completion of this project paper. First are my wife and family for their invaluable support and encouragement during the entire period of the study. Second is my supervisor Prof. Maria Nzomo for her articulate guidance in shaping my academic development at the college and supervision of this project. I wish to further acknowledge the support provided by my supervisor for their genuine concern, mentorship and encouragement throughout my time at University of Nairobi. Lastly, I wish to thank the almighty God for giving me the strength to accomplish all the assigned tasks and to enable me achieve success of this magnitude. Despite the role played by the various actors above, I alone bear the entire responsibility for whatever shortcoming this work may have.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ACIRC - African Crisis Immediate Response to Conflicts
AEC - African Economic Community
AFTA - A Free Trade Area
AGA - African Governance Architecture
AIDS - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMIB - African Union Mission to Burundi
AMIS - African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISEC - African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros
AMISOM - African Union Mission in Somalia
AMU - Arab Maghreb Union
ANZERTA - Australia, New Zealand Closer Economic Relation Trade Agreement
APF - African Peace Fund
APRM - African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture
ASEAN - Asia the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASF - African Standby Force
AU PSOD - African Union Peace Support Operations Division
AU - African Union
CAR - Central African Republic
CEN-SAD - Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CEWARN - Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CEWS - Continental Early-Warning System
CIS - Communications and Information Services
COMESA - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPMR - Conflicts Prevention, Management and Resolution
CPRM - Conflicts Prevention, Resolution and Mechanism
DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC - East African Community
EAC - East African Community
EAPCCO - East African Police Chiefs Cooperative Organization
EASBRIG - Eastern Africa Standby Brigade
EASF - Eastern African Standby Force
ECA - Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African States
ECCAS - Economic Community of Central African Status
ECGLR - Economic Community of Great Lakes Region
ECOMOG - Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
EU - European Union
FTA - Free Trade Area
GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GPI - Global Peace Index
HIV - Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IDTFCP - Inter-Departmental Task Force on Conflict Prevention
IGAD - Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IGO - Inter-Governmental Organizations
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IOR - Indian Ocean Rim
LPA - Lagos Plan of Action
MARAC - Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conference
MoU - Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement
NARC - North African Regional Capability
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD - New Partnership for African Development
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization
OAU - Organization of African Unity
OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
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<td>Panel of Economic Persons</td>
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<td>PTA</td>
<td>Preferential Trade Area</td>
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<td>USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>VSAT</td>
<td>Very Small Aperture Terminal</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
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Abstract

This research project sought to investigate whether regionalism in Africa using RECs as an entry point can provide adequate frameworks for conflict management. Specific focus was on the linkages of the institutional frameworks for conflict management from the national, RECs and continental levels, their resourcing and coordination of the mechanisms. The general objective of the study was to determine how regionalism in Africa can be used as an instrument for conflict management within the RECs with the EAC as a Case Study. Specifically, the study sought among other things to determine the trends in Regional Integration in Africa, assessed African Union’s institutions and strategies for conflict management, established the experiences and capacities of the East African Community in conflict management and analysed the gaps in capacity and the strategies needed to be employed for effective conflict management by Regional Economic Communities in Africa, and the EAC in particular. The study was anchored in the Neo-functionalism theory which offers a good framework for analysis from the socio-economic and political benefits of regional integration which enabled overcome the causal factors of conflict in the continent. In the findings, identification of gaps in current practices of conflict management at the level of RECs and existing continental structures was made to provide a way of addressing specific strategies of managing conflicts in Africa using regionalism. The research design for this study was based on a combination of survey design that utilised mixed approach of qualitative and quantitative techniques. The sample technique used was purposive. Data collection was by way of questionnaires administered physically to key informants, sent by emails and telephone interviews. The study found that the African Peace and Security Architecture institutions are actively involved in the regional conflict management. The RECs have too been instrumental in the management of conflicts in their respective sub regions, despite various challenges they faced. The research concludes that with proper resourcing, political good will, capacity building and well oriented framework, these institutions can deal with the current and emerging conflicts in the sub-regions. Finally, the study recommends the need to accelerate and advance regional integration in Africa, seek African owned and resourced sustainable mechanisms and the need to develop long term strategy to defeat threats to states in Africa in the internal and external dimensions. In the academic arena, there is need for further research on how states can surrender some of their sovereignties to a supranational institution and inculcate political good will to spur regionalism to spur regionalism across Africa.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background

Africa has a total of 54 states, land mass of about 30.3 million km² and a population of around 1.166 billion people which are estimates for 2015\(^1\). Africa has great potential such as a large productive land mass, a large population, strong cultural ties; and abundant resources. The contemporary challenges faced by states in Africa include; the lack of human security in all its aspects, unfulfilled nation building which concerns lack of national unity and cohesion, political instability, ethnic conflicts and poor governance. Critical contributors to the current state of the continent are inequality, nepotism and unequal distribution of resources which tend to lead to hatred between communities. Further, the citizens in several states of Africa, still experience suppression of their freedoms, violation of human rights and their dignity.

The current situation for the countries in Africa is rooted mainly in the continent’s past where it had suffered political, societal, institutional and economic disruptions for several hundred years. The past events which could have led to the present set of challenges include; slave trade, colonialism, post independence oppressive regimes, effects of the cold war and negative effects of globalization among others. In slave trade alone, for over four centuries of its

existence since 1510, Africa lost an estimated 11 million people which bled the continent of a large population of the young labour force\(^2\). The process of acquiring slaves was violent and pitted diverse African societies against each other which led to the degeneration of societal relationships.

Another classic example of events which had a negative effect on the people of Africa is colonialism which began with the 1884-85 Berlin Conference\(^3\) where the partitioning of the continent by the European powers was accomplished. The Berlin Conference was attended by thirteen states\(^4\). John Reader observes that African leaders were not invited nor were they consulted as the partitioning was done. In the process of partitioning the continent for the colonial power and individual property, King Leopold II of Belgium acquired for himself an area of 2.5 Million Km\(^2\) christened as ‘Congo Free State’. During colonial occupation, extreme atrocities were conducted against the people of Africa. For example, the Congo had a population of about 20 million people at occupation by the Belgium in 1884 yet in 1911 only 8.5 million people remained which meant that entire regions were de-populated\(^5\). At the same time, extensive exploitation of resources was done to enrich the colonial power thereby impoverishing the African people.

The partitioning of the continent also led to the drawing of artificial boundaries thereby creating countries that were not viable states. Furthermore, most recent internal instability and inter-state conflicts experienced in Africa including those over borders are associated with such colonial creations. Despite the above historic concerns, it needs to be acknowledged that the

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\(^4\) Ibid, p 541, The 13 nations include; Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and USA.
\(^5\) Ibid, p 547.
people of Africa and their leadership today have greater responsibility for the current condition of the people in the continent. The choices made by leadership in Africa and the direction they take including the state of their populace impacts directly on the situation in each country of Africa. Regional integration and regionalism among other approaches can be useful catalyst in reversing those negative effects and place the continent on the path towards progress.

The nature of conflicts experienced by states in Africa has tended to evolve over time. First there were the wars associated with the struggle for independence from colonialism of mainly the 1950s and 1960s. The transition from colonial rule in some cases like that of Congo which went into civil war soon after independence was violent. Second are the proxy and interstate wars experienced during the latter half of the cold war era. Interstate conflicts were short and mostly over borders such as the Ethiopia-Eritrea War 1998-2000. Third are the numerous internal conflicts which are inter-communal in nature that affected several countries of the continent in the post cold war era. Indeed Marshall observes that there was a surge in societal conflicts particularly in the 1990s which also led to large scale displacement of populations.

More recently, the continent of Africa continues to have challenges of failed states, ungoverned spaces, corruption and instability associated with terrorism, civil wars and political violence among others. Experiences over the last decade highlight the internationalization of modern conflicts. An international armed conflict is defined as conflict between two or more of the high contracting parties or conflicts in which one or more states contributed troops to one or

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both warring sides. However, equally significant is the fact that the effect of such conflicts impact widely across various regions of the world in terms of refugee flows or terrorist acts emanating from such conflicts. For example, the wars in Iraq, Syria and Somalia have among others demonstrated this notion of internationalization of conflict. This means that conflicts in various regions of the world can only be addressed as a regional or global phenomenon using institutional frameworks rather than at the national level. The combination of these concerns has offered opportunity for Africa to use regionalism as a tool for conflict management, socio-economic and peaceful coexistence. This is necessitated by the fact that ineffective conflict management strategies will usually have drastic consequences where people will suffer death and destruction.

The wider Eastern Africa region covers about 13 countries in the Horn, East and Great Lakes Region of Africa. According to Bereketeab, the nature of conflicts which affect the countries in the region falls into three main categories of state-society, state-state and society-society. Several countries in the Eastern Africa region have suffered complex intra or inter-state conflicts since their independence which have impacted greatly on the region. Three examples are briefly engaged to show magnitude and effects of the conflict in the region. Firstly, countries such as Sudan and South Sudan have not had a period of durable peace in their existence as independent states. Secondly other conflicts in the region such as the Ethiopia – Eritrea war (1998-2000) and the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region continues to have simmering tension which is becoming protracted in nature. In the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, the most recent fighting broke out between the two on 13 June 2016 in the Tsonora area.

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According to BBC, ever since a peace deal in 2000 ended the countries' two-year war border war, the countries have been in a state of "neither war nor peace" \textsuperscript{14}.

Similarly, the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region have been protracted in nature \textsuperscript{15} with several countries in that region experiencing conflicts periodically and in a cyclic manner. The conflict epicenter has shifted overtime from one country to another in the region. Thirdly is the 1994 genocide in Rwanda where close to a million Tutsi were killed in less than 100 days due to what was perceived as a strong ethnic based division \textsuperscript{16}. Fourthly, a classic example is the conflict in the collapsed state of Somalia which has been ongoing for two and half decades with spillover effect in the entire region. The greater Eastern Africa region has therefore undergone long period of conflict and insecurity which requires management at all levels.

Beyond the above, the conflict in Somalia has been associated with piracy, terrorism and large scale movement of refugees among other ills all on a global scale. The region also experiences other acts of insecurity such as cattle rustling, “trafficking of small arms and light weapons, wildlife poaching and other transnational organized crimes. Thus this part of Africa is a turbulent area where most of the conflicts are both national and transnational in nature and therefore tend to be cross-border. The approach to resolving such threats require collective action in terms of conflict management strategies by the countries of the region for an effective approach in addressing the problems. Similar scenarios which are characterized by conflicts, insecurities and violence are experienced in other parts of the continent particularly the West Central and North Africa including the Sahel region.

Despite the above challenges, Africa has immense geostrategic significance for the international community. Africa is divided into distinct regions, large youthful population, rich mineral resource base and large tracts of unexploited arable land. In Africa, there are also areas of overlap and commonalities such as the people and culture which connects the entire continent. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of the regions in the continent have transformed into Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Examples include; African Union which is the continental body, East African Community, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, Economic Community of West African States, Southern Africa Development Cooperation, Economic Community of Central African States and Arab Maghreb Union among several others as RECs. Indeed most countries have dual or more membership to the various regional integration efforts across the continent. Further, as earlier stated, there is the internationalization of conflicts where several countries of the continent are affected which makes the security of states interdependent. Based on the combination of these factors and to harness the continents’ full potential, it would be prudent for the continental and sub-regional organs in Africa to seek integration in functional areas but also have a significant role in addressing the challenges faced by the continent.

1.1 Problem Statement

The states in Africa continues to experience numerous problems as signified by its poor performance in several indicators globally particularly on violence. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) shows that there are important regional variations in violent conflict trends. During the period 1989-2014, Africa was the most violent region in the world and had the

highest number of deaths in interstate conflict of 419,078 people excluding the Rwanda genocide.  

The Global Peace Index (GPI) has been ranking 163 countries globally and covers 99.7% of the world’s population according to their level of peacefulness every year since 2004. The GPI 2016 findings on the state of peace index for countries in Africa have nine countries with high, twenty nine in medium, five in low and seven in very low. Of the seven that have a very low state of peace index, Somalia, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan are in the wider East African Region which directly impacts on the states of East African Community. In the index, EAC partner states of Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi have deteriorated marginally while countries neighboring the region such as Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and DRC have equally deteriorated in their state of peace Index. This situation denotes the existence of protracted conflicts and potential for tension which should concern actors in the region of Eastern Africa and at the continental level. 

Given the above scenario when coupled with other challenges faced by states in Africa and other social ills described in the earlier section, one can conclude that Africa is indeed, a troubled continent. Such a situation necessitates the need for continental organs and RECs to have a crucial role in conflict management to ensure progress and prosperity for their respective citizens. The increase in the complex web of challenges including conflict in Africa as cited above means that existing strategies for conflict management in the continent have failed or

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20 The Index gauges global peace using three broad themes; “the level of safety and security in society, the extent of domestic or international conflict and the degree of militarization”.
22 Ibid, p 16.
require review. The study proposes that regionalism in Africa can enable overcome such challenges and allow the continent to reclaim its place in the international community.

Due to the above concerns, this research project seeks to investigate whether regionalism in Africa using RECs as an entry point can provide adequate frameworks for conflict management. The outcome of this research and the success of this approach is likely to contribute to peace and socio-economic progress for states in the continent. Though the subject of regionalism is widely published, there are opportunities for making further original contribution to some gaps identified through this research. Specific focus is made on the linkages of the institutional frameworks for conflict management from the national, RECs and continental levels, its resourcing and coordination of the mechanisms. The study suggests ways of bridging the gaps and in the process enrich the existing body of knowledge.

1.2 Research Questions

The overall research question is how can regionalism in Africa be used effectively for conflict management? The specific research questions to guide the study are as follows:

a. What are the trends in regional integration in Africa?

b. What are African Union’s institutions and strategies for conflict management?

c. What are the experiences and capacities of the East African Community in conflict management?

d. What are the gaps in capacity and what strategies should be employed for effective conflict management by Regional Economic Communities in Africa, and the EAC in particular?
1.3 Objectives

1.3.1 Overall Objective

The general objective of the study is to determine how regionalism in Africa can be used as an instrument for conflict management within the RECs using the EAC as a Case Study.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study are as follows:

a. Determine the trends in Regional Integration in Africa.

b. Discuss and assess African Union’s institutions and strategies for conflict management.

c. Establish the experiences and capacities of the East African Community in conflict management.

d. Analyze the gaps in capacity and what strategies should be employed for effective conflict management by Regional Economic Communities in Africa, and the EAC in particular.

1.4 Hypotheses

The hypotheses which will be tested in the study are as follows:

a. Increase in membership to RECs and rise in number of states meeting their full financial obligations to AU and RECs coupled with deepening of Regional Integration in Africa can lead to closer and peaceful relations between states in the continent.
b. An effective institutional framework for conflict management in RECs which can make timely response to conflicts in their backyard using successful strategies leads to reduced conflicts in the continent.

c. Disparity in the level of advancement of institutions for conflict management and early warning in RECs can lead to difficulties of coordination and response to conflicts in the continent.

d. Inadequate capacities, structures, skills and resourcing for conflict management including the lack of ‘political will’ in RECs such as the East African Community will negatively affect conflict management initiatives in the region.

1.5 Literature Review

The review of literature is done in four stages. First is the definition of conflict followed by the conceptualization of regional integration and regionalism. The latter two terms are key in guiding the required parameters for RECs in specified functional areas. Second is a brief engagement with the major challenges faced by states in Africa to underscore the need for strong institutional structures within the RECs for conflict management. Thirdly a brief engagement is made with the trends in regional integration and regionalism globally. Finally, a similar engagement is done for the trends in regional integration and regionalism in Africa.

1.5.1 Definition of Terms

Conflict & Conflict Management

The term conflict is complex and it has been defined differently by various scholars. Coser defines conflict as a “struggle over values and claims to status, power and scarce resources
in which the aim of the opponent is to neutralize, injure or eliminate the rival.” Miall et al define the term conflict as “the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups.” According to Miall et al, conflict is “an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change…..as an expression of the heterogeneity of interests, values and beliefs.” Burton & Duke acknowledges that conflict, rivalry and competition are a form of opposition which translates to disservice of a social entity whereas cooperation allows such social entities to function in service of one another. The key terms that emerge from the above definitions of conflict include; goal incompatibility, struggle, rivalry, scarcity and competition by individuals or groups.

The above terms coupled with the expression of interests, values and beliefs by groups or individuals inform the conflict situations that are likely to emerge. Also based on the above definitions, conflict can be perceived as endemic in society and affects each and every individual in diverse ways. On the other hand, the term conflict management is defined as the regulation of conflict which involves the limitation, mitigation and containment of violent conflicts. From the above discussion, it is evident that conflicts are part of everyday life in society and impacts them in diverse ways and various levels from the communal, national, regional and international levels. Such a complex phenomenon which affects society widely requires effective institutional management structures to enable regulate conflicts and related emerging challenges.

1.5.2 Conceptualization of Regional Integration and Regionalism

26 Burton John and Frank Dukes eds (1990), Conflict; Readings in management and resolution, Macmillan Press Ltd, Hound Mills, Basingstoke, p 19.
Maruping M, states that “regional integration entails the coming together of two or more states, normally through reciprocal preferential agreements”\(^\text{28}\). The process can be based on one or more of the following integrating cooperation arrangements\(^\text{29}\). First is the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) or Agreement, where member states charge lower tariffs to imports produced by fellow member countries than they do for non-members. Second is the Free Trade Area (FTA) which is a PTA without any tariffs on fellow members’ goods. Third is the Customs Union, an FTA using the same or common tariffs on imports from non-members. Fourth is the Common Market which is a customs union with free movement of the factors of production. Finally is the Economic Community which has a single-currency, common market or monetary union in which fiscal and monetary policies are unified. According to Maruping, if political sovereignty is given up, an economic community becomes a federation or political union with common legislation and political structures. Such a federation then becomes an amalgamated regional organization as opposed to a functional one.

Ernst Haas a prominent scholar on integration in the 1950s and 60s defines “integration as the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre”\(^\text{30}\). Haas anticipates that such institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. He then proposes that the end result of a process of political integration is a new political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones. To get to this level of integration as suggested by both Maruping and Haas, the challenge will be how to overcome sovereignty, nationalism and loyalty.


associated with independent states. Therefore this study will be more based on the neo-functional approach.

Breslin and Higgott, define regionalism as those state led projects of cooperation that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and treaties. They also define "regionalization as representing the processes of integration which albeit seldom unaffected by state policies, derive their driving force from markets, from private trade and investment flows, and from the policies and decisions of companies rather than predetermined government plans." Of interest to this study is regionalism where the projects for cooperation are state driven but other actors are equally involved as envisaged by neo-functionalism approach.

Regional Integration agreements have been around for many centuries. Regional integration is a complex multi-dimensional and multi-faceted phenomenon which occurs in diverse areas or sectors and at different levels. The goal of regional integration varies in terms of span and scope. Schiff M and Winters A, give various examples of regional integration which dates back to the 1664 Customs Union of the provinces of France. They also observed that Customs Union were precursors to the creation of new states such as Italy, Germany and United States of America (USA). Post WWII developments led to the creation of Free Trade Areas and Customs Union with examples such as the Benelux Customs Union and European Coal and Steel which was formally established in 1951. The experiences of the 1960s and 70s showed that regional integration underwent a period of protectionism and interventionism. However, the

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1980s to the present particularly in the post-cold war era, the world witnessed giant leaps in the growth of regionalism\textsuperscript{35}.

Schiff and Winters give factors which led to recent increase in regionalism such as governments wish for better policies, the need to obtain secure access to markets, pressures of globalization and the desire to maintain sovereignty\textsuperscript{36}. In practice regionalism is about trade, investment, development, democracy and human rights, deep integration, regional cooperation and coordination\textsuperscript{37}. In essence regionalism does contribute to the survival of the state. The above focus of regionalism is significant for conflict management as positive developments in the combined effects of the above factors are expected to contribute to the reduction of conflicts. Regionalism also enables the effective coordination and response at all levels when conflicts occur in the internal and external dimension of the state.

Regional integration is an effective way of dealing with antagonistic neighbours as it fosters trade, builds trust and confidence which promote peace between countries\textsuperscript{38}. The integration in functional areas allows for the interaction between communities to reduce the likelihood of violent conflicts. For example, the creation of European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957 were meant to reduce potential for conflict particularly between France and Germany\textsuperscript{39}. Additionally, regional integration has a role in strengthening democracy and political institutions which are both necessary for peace. Equally significant will be the structures for coordination and response to conflict using stronger conflict management institutional frameworks at the continental and regional levels.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid, p 5. \\
\textsuperscript{36}Ibid, p 6. \\
\textsuperscript{37}Maurice Schiff and L Allan Winters, 2003, Regional Integration and Development, Oxford University Press and World Bank, Washington, pp 7-9. \\
\textsuperscript{38}Maurice Schiff and L Allan Winters, 2003, Op Cit, p 187. \\
\textsuperscript{39}Maurince Schiff and Allan Winters,2003, Opcit, p 192.
1.5.3 Challenges facing States in Africa

The majority of countries in Africa have been independent for over half a century. However, despite this relatively long period of their existence, the reality in most of the states shows that there has been minimal socio-economic progress. Large clusters of the population of countries in Africa lack basic needs compared to other regions of the world. Therefore most states in Africa have not had meaningful experiences of peaceful co-existence in the internal and external dimensions of the state nor prosperity for its people. The reverse is true in other regions of the world such as Europe and North America. Some specific issues which underlie the current poor state of countries in Africa are briefly engaged in this section.40

Firstly, states in Africa have the highest levels of poverty compared with other regions of the world. As at 2012, about 500 million (42.7%) people in sub-Saharan Africa live on $1.90 a day.41 There are 34 countries of the 50 least developed countries globally which are located in Africa.42 This translates to 63% of the 54 states in Africa belonging to the category of least developed countries. Africa’s population can be an asset or liability based on how they are developed, resourced and utilized in states. According to the UN Population Fund, 2009 the population of Africa could double in size over the next course of 27 years thus by 2036.43 The key concern is whether states in Africa are capable of providing the basic needs and human rights for its people today particularly if the population will double by 2036 as anticipated. The above situation prevails despite the majority of countries in the continent being rich in natural resources and there is greater potential for other sectors like agriculture and industry to flourish.

40Some of the issues in this section were used in the author’s earlier work on: Managing Peace and Conflict Issues in Africa, Africa Scotland Forum, 2016.
Indeed the immense resources abundantly found in Africa have been substantial contributor to prosperity in some of the developed countries elsewhere in the world. For example one can question how countries such as France or Belgium would be like without the sustained extraction of resources from its former colonies in Africa. A more peaceful Africa with effective conflict management structures particularly in the RECs will enable the continent to overcome the poor state of people and allow for socio-economic progress.

Secondly is the fragility of states in Africa where the majority of countries in the continent are either weak or failed states. The Fund for Peace Fragile index ranking, 2014 has 49 of the 54 countries of Africa between warning and very high alert with none in stable, very stable and sustainable categories. The fragility of states in Africa has its roots in the continents disruptive past and the challenges from both internal and external dimensions. Such state fragility should concern all actors in Africa due to the possibility that a state can make progress overtime but easily slide back into crisis. There are several examples such as Libya, Ivory Coast, Central African Republic and Egypt among many others which despite several decades of development and progress have regressed critically to near or failed state category in a matter of days.

Thirdly Africa continues to experience political instability, conflicts, war and violent extremism which has tended to spread across various regions of Africa. Political instability has become a constant problem for many states in Africa since decolonization in 1960s with up to 61% of states in Africa having experienced instability at one point or another between 1960 and 2014.

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During the cold war, proxy wars were fought on the continent by the two world powers. In the post-cold war era, autocracies in Africa have declined while there has been an increase in the number of democratic regimes. This has brought the challenge of democratic transitions for many countries in Africa which has been a cause of conflicts. Evidently, the clamour for power and resources including dynamics of democratization has led to an upsurge in conflicts for many states in Africa. There is need to address governance, leadership and service delivery challenges in Africa to overcome the fragility of states.

Fourth are the numerous conflicts affecting the various regions of the continent. According to Project Plough Shares armed conflicts report 2014, in 2013 alone there were a total of 28 armed conflicts in 25 countries across the world. Twelve of the armed conflicts were in the continent of Africa which translates to 43% of conflicts in the world. Put differently, 24% of countries in the continent of Africa are identified as being in a state of armed conflict. Indeed a scrutiny of most states in Africa today indicates that there are serious threats to the survival of the states from both the internal or external environment. The violent conflicts have had devastating effects such as death, genocide, injury, violations of human rights and destruction of property including deprivation of means of livelihood for affected communities. Appropriate conflict management structures are essential in contributing to transition towards achieving peace in the continent.

Fifth are asymmetric threats such as terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization which are global phenomenon and have been the cause of concern to many states in Africa. Data from Global Terrorism Index 2014 shows the top 50 countries of the world according to their

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terrorist activities has 18 of the countries from Africa\(^{48}\). Terrorist attacks by groups such as Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab and their offshoots in countries across various regions of Africa have been a serious source of insecurity, destruction and death which is an impediment for socio-economic development of the states in the affected regions. More recently, the Islamic State terror group continues to cause havoc across numerous regions of the world with many states in Africa suffering its brunt directly or indirectly through its affiliates. Related to the issue of terrorism are the radicalization of the youth and some segment of the population in some states towards violent extremism. To minimize this, there is need to engage in anti-radicalization measures, educate and create employment for the youth.

Besides the above, states in Africa face other crises such as those of violent democratic transitions, corruption, transnational organized crimes, bad governance, youth bulge coupled with unemployment, insecurity (food, terrorism, disasters, health, and environment) and the overall safety for its people. The notion of human security still eludes majority of the people in Africa. Ethnicity including the issues of identity has been a major source of conflict and wars across Africa. There is need to identify such threats to the survival of states in the continent to enable draw comprehensive long-term plans with countries acting individually or collectively in RECs.

Based on the issues cited in this section, Africa needs to have strong institutions particularly in the field of conflict management at continental and regional levels to overcome plethora of challenges. Failure to achieve this will mean the continent’s people will remain equally poor, divided and in conflict into the near and distant future. This study among others

intends to contribute to such debates to enable Africa emerge from the current challenges which impedes its progress.

1.5.4 Regional Integration

The international system is anarchic as there is lack of a powerful entity which is placed above the state. However, various scholars are of the view that despite the anarchy, order can still be maintained in the international system. For example, Gehring observes that the establishment of International Organizations and development of International Law can help overcome the anarchy in the international system. This position has been proven with the establishment of global institutions such as United Nations in 1945, European Union (EU), African Union (AU), ASEAN, OAS and international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights among numerous others. Such international, regional and sub-regional organizations are meant to provide a platform which can dilute the excesses associated with the anarchic world.

A key purpose of Regional Integration in Africa is to serve as an empowering instrument for international economic bargaining against the threat of marginalization in the process of globalization. Thus a key reason for forming RECs to a great extent is in response to the negative effects of globalization. In sub-Saharan Africa the various Regional Economic Communities are at different stages of progression in the integration process. Early attempts for African Unity and the promotion of Pan-African ideals were advocated for by independence leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. Nkrumah’s propositions for pan-Africanism such as national independence

and trans-nationalism among others were articulated at all African Peoples’ Conference in Accra in 1958. As a result of such efforts, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was established in Addis Ababa, 25 May 1963 by leaders from 31 countries of Africa.

The creation of OAU in 1963 was preceded by a period of intense division among the then independent states in Africa. The three main political divisions of independent states in Africa which were aligned in groups at the time were the Brazzaville group which comprised 12 French speaking states, Casablanca group with 8 countries and the Monrovia group which had 20 states. The Monrovia group carried the day as its five principles informed the OAU Charter following its establishment in 1963. The focus of OAU in the 1960s was primarily to end colonization and to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the member states.

Makinda and Okumu observed that from the onset, the pursuit of OAU’s agenda was impeded by power struggles and fear of political uncertainty both at the state level and in the continental organ the OAU. Due to paralysis associated with uncertainty, the OAU adopted the doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of states while in the institution itself the power struggles between states came to the fore. However, the OAU remained instrumental in shaping Africa’s unity through the establishment of Regional Economic Communities.

The push for RECs as building block for Africa’s followed the economic decline of the 1970s and the challenges associated with the implementation and failure of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAPs) in the 1980s. The OAU existed for 39 years alongside its sub-regional organizations like EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD and UN Economic Commission for

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51 Ibid, p 11.
53 Ibid, p 11.
Africa (ECA)\textsuperscript{54}. Some of the significant developments under OAU are the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action which charted the path to the continent’s unity and the 1993 Cairo Declaration which established the OAU’s mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The RECs in Africa are intended to achieve African Unity.\textsuperscript{55}

Due to the mixed legacy of the OAU over its 39 years of existence, leaders in Africa established the African Union (AU)\textsuperscript{56} which in their view should have stronger responsibilities for stewardship of the continental agenda in security, development and governance. The AU constitutive Act was signed in 2000 while its formal launch was done in 2002. Factors which led to the emergence of AU included the end of the cold war, the need to cope with the dynamics of globalization, pre-eminence of neo-liberal economics, increasing demands for human rights, liberal democratic principles and transparency among others\textsuperscript{57}.

The RECs in Africa have developed individually and have differing roles and structures. Their primary purpose is to facilitate economic integration among members in regions and eventually African Economic Community (AEC), which was established under the Abuja Treaty (1991)\textsuperscript{58}. The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for the Development of Africa and the Abuja Treaty proposed the creation of RECs as the basis for wider African integration, with a view to regional and eventual continental integration\textsuperscript{59}. The relationship between the AU and the RECs is mandated by the Abuja Treaty and the AU Constitutive Act, and guided by the: 2008 Protocol on Relations between the RECs and the AU; and the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on

\textsuperscript{56}Makinda M & Okumu, 2008, Op Cit, p 29.
\textsuperscript{57}Ibid, p 31.
\textsuperscript{59}The African Union, Regional Economic Communities, Op Cit, p 1.
Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa. The RECS are increasingly involved in coordinating AU Member States’ interests in wider areas such as peace and security, development and governance.

The above trend in the establishment of RECs across Africa which will be discussed in greater depth in chapters two and three are positive developments in enabling overcome the numerous challenges faced by the continent. Using the ideas of Karl Deutsch based on his study of 1957 on Security Communities, where states are pluralistic in nature and integrated to the extent they can settle their difference peacefully. Deutsch was of the view that states in such a security community are headed on a path towards stable peace. This notion is anchored on the basis that as states integrate, they develop common values, norms and symbols which enables them to develop social identity and interact in various spheres of long term common interests. Deutsch observes that the sense of community is measured in terms of quantified transaction flows between and within nations. Regional organizations currently established in Africa are a starting point of establishing an African security community which is essential in having peaceful societies in the continent.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework chosen to guide this study is the neo-functionalism theory which is one of the primary models used to analyze regional integration. The theory is anchored

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60 Ibid, p 1.
on the classic functionalist approach to world order by David Mitrany in the 1940s\textsuperscript{63}. The functionalism theory assumes that states can create a world society which is peaceful through cooperation with one another in technical and economic sectors of activity. Mitrany proposed three categories of international organizations namely; those of loose association like the UN, a federal system such as USA and functional arrangements\textsuperscript{64}. In Mitrany’s views, functionalism offers an alternative model of international order to the power politics approach to international relations which is characteristic of realism\textsuperscript{65}. Classic functionalism is based on idea of pooling the sovereignty of members of an international organization to move towards working together on a common task. It is anticipated that individual will shift loyalties to a higher authority where economic and technical cooperation would "spill-over" into the political world.

Functionalism theory also posits that such a process towards supra-national authority would result in a working peace system which needs to be built gradually and incrementally\textsuperscript{66}. However, it placed emphasis on economics as the driver of the integration process. It also ignored the significance of both sovereignty and political will of states in the integration process. Further the theory did not anticipate the implications of linkage between economics, power politics and national sovereignty which are important factors in regional integration as states seek their national interests. This theory needed enrichment to be of better value in explaining regional integration and how to enable them to be effective in addressing the collective challenges.

\textsuperscript{63} Mitrany D, 1943, a Working Peace System: an Arrangement for the Functional Development of International Organizations, Royal Institute of International Affairs.


\textsuperscript{65} Mitrany D, 1943, Op Cit.p351.

\textsuperscript{66} Mitrany D, 1943, Op Cit.p351.
The Neo-functionalism theory which is the main approach used in this study emerged in the 1950’s to challenge the two dominant theories of international relations of classical realism and idealism. The establishment of European Economic Community and its eventual inauguration in 1958 and Haas publication ‘the Uniting of Europe’ contributed to the growth of Neo-functionalism theory. Neo-functionalism is used to explain regional integration efforts in various regions of the world as it leads to growth of multi-level governance from national to international. Unlike classical functionalism, neo-functionalism recognizes the importance of the political factor in determining what states can agree to surrender their sovereignty to a supranational institution. Modern experiences such as the European Union confirm that this is largely possible.

The two key tenets of the Neo-functionalism theory include loyalty in the integration process and the concept of spillover. First for spillover it is envisaged there will be flow from a functionally specific economic area to less technical but controversial political arena. Neo–functionalists envisage the cooperatives functions by government to continue broadening to other areas in a gradual manner to an eventual integration. Second for loyalty they anticipate the citizens to rise above nationalism associated with the state and shift it to the supra-national institution which will have been politically integrated. The spillover in functional sectors has been witnessed from economic to politics, governance, human rights, democracy and security among others. However, one must acknowledge that having loyalty move from the national to supranational institution is difficult to achieve.

Neo-functionalism theory envisages that states, rather than the struggle for power will defend their national interests through cooperation with each other. Neo functionalism envisages that national interest can be achieved through regional.\textsuperscript{69} As regional integration occurs society is expected to pursue their interest through the supranational institutions rather than their own governments. Thus the integration process reaches a point where the functional activities between society themselves drive the agenda for cooperation with minimal involvement of the states. On such a basis, Neo-functionalism theory acknowledges that the integration process would proceed quasi-automatically driven by societal needs which are found at the supranational level. At that level, the supranational institutions would enjoy increasing authority and legitimacy as they became the sources of policies meeting the demands of social actors. Thus, activities associated with sectors integrated initially would "spill over" into neighbouring other functional area. Such an approach is used by various RECs globally through the concept of widening and deepening integration as states forge closer ties and builds trust and confidence. The core concepts are institution and institutionalization which leads "to the emergence of a dense network of rules and organizations binding member governments, interest groups, bureaucracies, and politicians in ever-tighter interdependencies"\textsuperscript{70}.

The neo-functionalism theory explains the development of pluralistic security communities which comprises relationship between sovereign states from which there is no possibility for recourse to the use of force between them. At this stage, the regional organization develops into a supra-national institution which influences and limits actions of independent

\textsuperscript{69} Ludger Kühnhardt, Region building (Vol I), The Global Proliferation of Regional Integration, 2010, Berghahn Books, New York, p 33.
\textsuperscript{70} Haas, Ernst B, 2004, the Uniting of Europe; Political, Social & Economic Forces, 1950-1957. Notre Dame press, Notre Dame, Indiana, p xx.
member states. According to Haas, interest groups, government and political parties are necessary in forging the advancement to supra-national level\textsuperscript{71}.

Gehring observes that neo-functionalism is interested in the process of increasing integration rather than the interaction of actors in a fairly stable environment\textsuperscript{72}. Emphasis is on the role of supra-national and transnational actors in the integration process. Neo functionalism places emphasis on spill-over effects and also acknowledges the role of sub-national actors. The difficulty associated with neo-functionalism theory is how to overcome nationalism thus the challenge of how to shift loyalty from the national to the supranational institutions.

The REC needs to play a greater role in the management of their backyard for better chance for success. The UN Charter in Chapter VIII envisages such roles for regional organizations.

Article 52 (1) states that;

\begin{quote}
“Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations”\textsuperscript{73}.
\end{quote}

The neo-functionalists theory therefore offers a good framework for analysis of this study from the socio-economic and political benefits of regional integration which will enable overcome the causal factors of conflict in the continent. This can be achieved through spillover effect and building of stronger institutions including those for conflict management. The various

\textsuperscript{71}Haas E, 2004, Op Cit, p 10.
\textsuperscript{72} Gehring T, Integrating Integration Theory, Neo-functionalism and International regimes, Global Society Vol.10, No3, 1996, p 226.
\textsuperscript{73} United Nations, Charter of the United Nations & Statutes of ICJ, 1945, p 11.
tenets of the theory allow for broad understanding of the sectors of cooperation, strengthening of institutions and overcome the numerous challenges. This is the starting point for getting African states back on track. However, it is noteworthy that this theory to an extent underestimates the significance of sovereignty in the integration process.

1.7 Justification

The two main areas of justification of the study are as follows:

1.7.1 Policy

The findings of the study will enable identification of gaps in current practices of conflict management at the level of RECs and the existing continental structures. Thus the study is envisaged to assist in policy formulation in the management of conflicts in Africa and further contribute to the broadening of the continent’s agenda for regional integration. It should also enable states to engage the diverse challenges emanating from a globalized world which then translate to peaceful coexistence and socio-economic development for countries in Africa.

1.7.2 Academic

The study will apply the existing theory for regional integration as a framework for analysis with specific focus on regionalism as a tool of conflict management in the African context. Evidently, since there are several active conflicts in Africa, it means that there are equally challenges in the field of conflict management at the regional level which this study can engage. The study could address specific strategies or approaches in the literature to enable development of managing conflicts in Africa using regionalism. It is therefore anticipated that a combination of such engagement will contribute to academia in the complex field of conflict studies.
1.8 Methodology

The main objective of the study is to determine how regionalism in Africa can be used as a tool for conflict management within the RECs using the EAC as a Case Study. The emphasis is on the role of RECs can play in enhancing peace and security of states in Africa to allow for socio-economic progress. The research methodology and instruments used in this study enabled the researcher to address all the three specific objectives and the research questions outlined earlier in this chapter.

The research design for this study was based on a combination of survey design. The survey research involves the collection of information from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions. The target group for the survey selected included senior officers from the EAC Secretariat, Ministry of EAC or equivalent, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AU and other key senior individuals in sub-regional institutions such as the East African Standby Force. The sample technique used was purposive as only those individuals considered to have requisite information were targeted. In addition, key informants were identified and provided useful insight to the study. Some questionnaires were administered physically to the respondents, while others were sent by emails. In some instances, telephone interviews were conducted.

Data collection was also done from various secondary sources including books, journals and even using online journals which have so far informed the literature review and subsequent engagement with the study. The combination of the above sources enabled to generate both qualitative and quantitative data on the way forward in having stronger RECs able to manage conflicts better.
To attain validity, the researcher ensured that the content of the instruments used are focused on the research objectives and questions of the study. Secondly, data collection tools and the format of the instruments developed to ensure clarity of direction for the respondent. Though piloting of instruments was not done an attempt was made to maximize both the internal and external validity of the research outcome through neutral and unbiased positions to develop knowledge which can be generalized to wider society.

1.9 Scope and Limitation of the Study

The area and subject of this study are broad in nature in terms of conceptualization of integration itself and the expanse of issues associated with the concept. Attempt therefore made to focus the scope of the discussion to the functional organizations of similar kinds to those being developed in Africa. The areas of regional integration are usually in numerous functional areas. The study has narrowed discussions to those closely related to conflict management, peace and security. The study further limited to the continent of Africa and its emerging RECs with specific attention given to the EAC which is the case of this study. However, lessons drawn from established regional integration experiences like that of the European Union.

1.10 Conclusion

States in Africa despite over half a century of their independence continue to experience diverse challenges which greatly undermine the security of the people and the state itself. Africa’s immense resources and rich potential is unlikely to benefit its people if steps at the continental level and RECs are not taken to ensure effective institution based conflict management strategies. This will require deeper integration of states in the continent ate the regional level to
ensure economic progress and development which in turn will improve the livelihoods of the citizens of Africa. There is need for political will to achieve the required progress by ceding some sovereignty to the regional body to have supra-national capabilities to check the excesses of the state.

The neo-functionalism theory chosen to explain the study is appropriate as it will address the manner of the integration process, what is required to strengthen the institutions and the path towards having a supra-national institution. Acceptably there will be challenges associated with applying the theory such as nationalism and sovereignty where appropriate experiences from elsewhere will enable mitigation of conflict. A concerted effort needs to be put in place by state, international organizations, civil society and the corporate world to ensure the successful integration of states in Africa and strengthen its institutions particularly those associated with conflict management.

1.11 Chapter Outline

The study will be undertaken in five chapters as follows:

a. **Chapter One** covers the introduction including the background of the study, the research objectives, literature review and theoretical framework among other contents on the chapter.

b. **Chapter Two** analyzes the trends in regional integration in Africa. The chapter discusses how regional integration has evolved in the continent and identifies the current dynamics and implications for Africa.

c. **Chapter Three** examines the African Union’s institutions and strategies for conflict management. A critical look is made of existing institutional frameworks that exist at
all levels. The study will enable identify gaps and disparities across Africa in existing capacities for conflict management.

d. **Chapter Four** focuses on experiences and capacities of the East African Community in conflict management. A deeper discussion on the EAC which is the case study on this research to show both the gaps but also the potential for such regional bodies in the continent.

e. **Chapter Five** analyses the gaps in capacity and strategies for effective conflict management in Regional Economic Communities in Africa, and the EAC in particular. Most of the primary data is used here to explain the integration process in the continent, the complexities and where Africa is headed in managing its own affairs for the continent’s peace and security.

f. **Chapter Six** makes recommendations, conclusions and identify the areas of gap for future research.
CHAPTER TWO: ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA

2.0 Introduction

The chapter addresses the trends, determine levels of integration and challenges of regional integration in Africa. The discussion in this section begins with the justification for Africa to integrate and attempt is made to link regionalism and conflict management. Understanding these two areas is necessary to see the opportunities offered by regionalism to states or a group of states in any region of the world. A brief engagement is made with the global view of the trends in regional integration elsewhere in the world. This is then followed by a comprehensive look at the trends in regional integration in Africa which is the core discussion of this chapter. The integration process in Africa is explained from the historic overview of the pre-independence ideals, including the developments in 1960s to 1980s. Some emphasis is made on the post cold war era with specific focus on the current trends of integration in the continent and the significance of the integration process. At each stage, the factors which inform the continent’s push for the regional and continental integration will be identified.

The discussion on trends in regional integration globally also shows how different approaches and motivations were envisaged in the various stages of the process. Despite the varying approaches and anticipated end-states, in all the attempts to integrate Africa, a supra-national entity functioning at the continental level was envisaged to ‘unify the continent’. A powerful supra-national organization acting above the states and RECs is line with the neo-functionalism theory which is used to guide this research. Finally, challenges of regionalism in Africa are discussed followed by a brief conclusion. The study reveals that regional integration globally has been on the rise since WWII with remarkable growth experienced after the cold war
ended. In the context of Africa, there is a more pressing justification for continental unity based on threats challenges and opportunities in the global arena.

2.1 Justification for Regional and Continental Integration in Africa

There are a variety of reasons why Africa needs to integrate both at the continental and regional levels. Five major justifications for regional and continental integration are discussed in this section, though acceptably there could be other wider reasons which justify Africa’s integration. Firstly, the continent of Africa has numerous challenges such as the fragility of states, conflicts and wars, transnational organized crimes, limited economic power and the negative effects of globalization. The nature of security threats faced by states in Africa in both the internal and external dimensions was comprehensively covered in chapter one. However, suffice to note that issues of peace, security and stability including the institutional arrangement for conflict management cannot be sufficiently handled by a single country. The need to overcome these concerns is the key push factors for states in Africa to move towards regional integration. Most significantly, Africa needs to have a mechanism for overcoming both conventional and non-conventional security threats facing the continent now and to remain relevant in the future in a highly competitive world.74

Secondly there is need to overcome marginalization of Africa through socio-economic transformation. Rwengabo argues that for Africa to succeed in remaining relevant; there is need for interventions in having a united effort in socio-economic transformation, unity of purpose in politico-security strategic planning and united effort in ideological and pan-African

conscientization of its people\textsuperscript{75}. Rwengabo’s suggestions for the total integration of Africa in every functional aspect based on his concern for the continent’s relevance and also its survival in the complex global environment. The integration approach which focuses on unity in Africa offers prosperity for states, improved livelihood for the people and ensures their security. Unifying the continent in such a manner can therefore lead to the achievement of the ideals of pan-Africanism as envisaged by the continent’s founding fathers in the pre-independence and early post-independence era.

Thirdly is the need to broaden the narrow base of Africa in its socio-economic status in the world. According to Ludger, the African continent has not benefited from the immense socio-economic progress experienced by the rest of the world since 1950\textsuperscript{76}. As at 2010, the combined Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of all the countries of Africa was US$1.5 trillion compared to that of the European Union of US$ 456 trillion\textsuperscript{77} which translates to per capita income of US$1,842 against US$ 24,249 for Africa and EU respectively. Ludger observes that sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is economically the slowest growing region of the world and contributes only 2.3% of world trade. States in Africa are therefore collectively weak in socio-economic terms and will have difficulty surviving in a globalized world as single states. Regional and continental integration can offer states in Africa leverage and give them better chances for progress.

Fourthly and related to the above is the fragmentation and the small size of economies of states in Africa. Lolette observes that one of the most compelling arguments for regional integration in SSA is usually made on the basis of the fragmentation of sub-Saharan Africa,

\textsuperscript{75} Rwengabo-Rutashoboroka, 2012, Op Cit, p 1.
which now has 54 small economies, with an average GDP of US$4 billion, and a combined GDP
equal to that of Belgium or 50% of the GDP of Spain \(^{78}\). According to UNECA, over the decade
from 2000 to 2010, the African continent as a whole registered annual economic growth rates in
excess of 4 per cent. Over the long term, however, Africa’s growth has been far below that
recorded by the developing countries in Asia which are also termed as the Asian Tigers.
Moreover, Africa’s recent growth spurt has had virtually no impact on the underlying structural
configuration of its national economies \(^{79}\). Evidently, the continent’s growth needs to holistically
address structural issues affecting states and the people in Africa; otherwise the opportunity for
peace and security will remain elusive.

Due to such concerns, leaders in Africa have established various institutional
arrangements with the hope of anticipating the continent’s turn-round through regional and
continental integration. The main purpose is for Africa to achieve a united effort in socio-
economic transformation, peace and security through regional integration in the continent. The
integration process also brings together the otherwise small economies of states in Africa for
them to be viable entities as markets for their trade and interaction with the rest of the world.

Finally, the continent’s integration is necessitated by the historic reality of states in Africa
which are themselves a creation of colonial partitioning the continent \(^{80}\). The nature of colonial
rule itself by the various European powers moved some countries in East and Southern Africa
towards regional integration. Regional integration in some organization such as Southern Africa
Customs Union (SACU) agreement of 1910 and first EAC with its origin in 1919 were based on

such colonial practices. In essence the dynamics of colonialism shaped the political, economic and social cultural relationship between the states in Africa. To this day, colonial legacy continues to impact negatively on many states in the continent and contributes to their weak nature and continued fragmentation. The historic connection of colonial occupation experienced by states in the continent forms the basis for states in Africa to seek regional and continental integration. It is therefore necessary to overcome challenges associated with the historic injustices of colonialism through regional integration to strengthen and unify the continent. The justifications for regional and continental integration in the continent as outlined above and the achievement of the same are expected to be indicators of what the process means for Africa. As Africa proceeds with the process it is useful to consider the alternative approaches to regional integration that are available for the states in the continent.

2.2 Alternative Approaches to Regional Integration

A Regional Organization “is a segment of the world bound together by a common set of objectives based on geographical, social, cultural, economic or political ties and possessing a formal structure provided for in intergovernmental agreements”81. Regionalism is provided for in the UN charter Articles 52-54 Chapter VIII82. Regional arrangements may exist for dealing with issues of international peace and security and may take appropriate action as long as their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. States can settle local disputes through such regional agencies and the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) can mandate such agencies.

81 Oliver & Bennett, op cit, 2002, p 237.
Oliver & Bennett classify varieties of regionalism into four categories. First are the multi-purpose organizations such as OAS, ASEAC, AU, CIS and OSCE which have broad functions, aims and objectives. Second are security organizations or alliances such as NATO whose military and political orientation is about collective security of its members. Third are the functional organizations such as APEC, ECOWAS, SADC and EU which promote economic, cultural, social, or political collaborations. Lastly, UN Regional Commission such as Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) meant to promote universal goals within a geographic region. Africa needs to pursue a mix of all the four options which can bring successful integration and eventual unity swiftly. The continents integration has to go beyond the multi-purpose setting to include collective security and functional responsibilities. Africa therefore needs to develop Supra National Organization similar to EU which addresses the entire spectrum of threats and opportunities collectively. Such progression is in line as the neo-functionalism approach. As one considers the push factors for regional integration in Africa and the options available, it would useful to draw linkage between regionalism and conflict management.

2.3 Relationship between Regionalism and Conflict Management

This section addresses the motivation of why regions integrate and implications for development, security and conflict management. The discussion is mainly anchored on the ideas of scholars such as Ludger, Keohane & Nye, Miall et al and Kritzinger. Ludger defines regions to constitute geographical realities or a mental construct “conceived and shaped by notions of

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83 Oliver & Bennett, 2002, pp 243 - 244.
culture, identity and material interests. The regions are also shaped by their people, history, economics, politics and nature of the relations among states.

Acceptably, there are some regional groupings such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which goes beyond a geographic region. Ludger notes that regions discover region-ness and build up communities to serve their interests, pool resources and journey for mutual gain and benefit through co-operation and integration. According to Ludger, the motivation for region building includes; development tool, political recognition and sovereignty, means of empowerment of state actors and regional groupings as building blocks of world order in the era of globalization. Such motivation for integration is crucial for Africa as they are lacking or are weak in these attributes which are key motivators for region-building.

The next area of interests is how the integration process forges closer relationship between states leading to their inter-dependence. Keohane & Nye are of the view that interdependence has a role in transforming relations between states to the extent bargaining becomes the main instrument for resolving conflicts. The neo-functionalist approach which envisages regional integration under a supra-national organization can enable create a regime associated with preventing interstate conflicts to the extent that tensions are eased between states. The reduced tension, interdependence and an integrated region allows for the citizens to easily interact and trade in a specific region. This process also strengthens the internal dimension of the state. On the whole interdependence allows for the replacement of military rivalry and

85 Ibid, p 1.
86 Ibid, p 1.
competition over power, resources and territory with economic integration\textsuperscript{89}. States in Africa can reduce expenditure on defence equipment and channel the same resources to socio-economic wellbeing of their citizens which is necessary for peace and management of conflicts.

Miall et al are of similar view as they recognize that regional organizations and regionalism are ‘preventers of conflict’ where the countries of the region depend on each other for a variety of issues such as trade or security\textsuperscript{90}. During the period after 1990, several wars particularly those in Africa have had spillover effect in a region with a classic example being the protracted conflicts in DRC and neighbouring countries which affected the entire region. Miall et al recognize that regional security arrangements and regional integration contribute to the containment and limitation of conflicts\textsuperscript{91}. Thus the existence of a regional mechanism itself is a key contributor to the prevention and management of conflicts in a region’s neighbourhood or in their member states.

Kritzinger identifies security as one of the non-traditional gains from regional integration. Entering regional trade agreements (RTAs) may increase intra-regional trade and investment which will also link countries in a web of positive interactions and interdependency\textsuperscript{92}. This is likely to build trust, raise the opportunity cost of war, and hence reduce the risk of conflicts between countries. For example, on such considerations, there is no likelihood for Kenya going to war with Uganda which is until recently its biggest trading partner.

To attain such a level of peace between states requires developing a culture of cooperation and mechanisms to address issues of common interest. Regional integration is then

\textsuperscript{89}Miall et al, 2005, Op Cit, p 107.
\textsuperscript{90}Miall et al, Ibid, p 82.
\textsuperscript{91}Miall et al, 2005, Op Cit, p 82.
\textsuperscript{92}Lolette Kritzinger-van Nierkerk, Regional Integration: Concepts, Advantages, Disadvantages and Lessons of Experience World Bank Country Office in SA , p 3
likely to improve inter and intra-regional security which is what Africa needs at present to overcome its numerous challenges. Cooperation in a particular regional bloc may even extend to “common defence” or mutual military assistance, hence increasing global security. As evidenced in the specific areas of cooperation by RECs, there has been spill-over from economics into political and security issues including institutional capacity for management conflict as anticipated in the neo-functionalism theory.

There are immense benefits offered by regionalism in improving livelihoods, development and security as explained above. The interdependence of states in Africa within themselves is likely to reduce their dependence on traditional colonial western powers as has previously been the case. States in Africa therefore need to seek peace and security coupled with having an effective conflict management structures for their success and survival. This necessitates the need for the states to pursue regional integration across the continent. The reasons why Africa needs to integrate and the link between integration and security explained above signifies the importance of the process for Africa. It is therefore instructive to engage in the next section the global trends in regional integration to show its relevance for the continent.

2.4 Global Trends in Regional Integration

This section briefly engages global trends in regional integration to show that the process is actually being practiced world-wide. States form alliances and coalitions due to the nature of complex relations and possible threats that emanates from the international system. Major international organizations such as the League of Nations founded on 10 January 1920 and the United Nations (UN) 1945 have their primary mandate of dealing with issues of international

93 Ibid, p 3.
peace and security. Though in the case of the UN, its responsibilities have widened overtime to include other functional areas of democracy, good governance, environment, health, education, human rights & freedoms and development among many others. International organizations where each acts in different ways are important actors in international relations as their actions can have real consequences for states and the international community.\textsuperscript{95}

Jeanette observes that the regional cooperation schemes initiated in the 1950s and 1960s reflect three major trends. First, there was movement from bilateral and sectoral cooperation to broad economic agreements. Second, institutional links became tighter tending towards supranational capacity or entities to run the regional mechanism. Finally, in Europe the European Community and European Free Trade Area slowly moved towards a single European Economic Area. The integrated core region then becomes an attractive market for non-members and is able to enhance trade within themselves but also with other regional blocs. This scheme of cooperation has guided the development of regional blocs globally including those in Africa.

A reduction in the activities of regional integration was witnessed in the 1970s; however, there was some resurgence of regionalism in the 1980s. Some developments across the globe then included the Americas Initiative where FTAs were initiated with Israel (1989) and Canada (1985), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in Middle East established in 1981, the Southern African Development Consultative Conference formed in 1980 and Australia and New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{96} Jeanette Edblad, The Political economy of regional integration, working paper no 3 – 1996, Centre for regional science, CERUM
also signed the Australia, New Zealand Closer Economic Relation Trade Agreement (ANZERTA) in 1983\(^97\).

Evidently, there has been a general push for regional integration blocs and particularly FTAs in the post-cold war era mainly in the 1990s to the present. Jeanette notes that the internal European market was largely implemented by Europe, in 1993, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 and Latin American countries revived the integration schemes of the 1950s and 1960s while in Asia the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formed in 1967 launched a free trade area (AFTA) in 2007\(^98\). Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) in South America launched a Customs Union in January 1995 and the first step toward a trade bloc around the Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) was taken in April 1995.

Regional integration process in after1990s reveals three new trends\(^99\). First, the number of regional agreements and the number of countries that belong to a regional grouping have both risen. Second, is the case of the European Community where integration advanced to the stage of implementing a European Union which involves the free movement of factors of production, institutional harmonization and joint formulation of industrial, trade and competition policies among others. Thirdly, regionalism is beginning to produce its own dynamics which has made them stronger players in the internal and external dimension of the state. Such rise in the power of regional institutions is envisaged by the functionalism theory as supra-national entity which acts above the states in the majority of instances.

\(^97\) Jeanette Edblad, The Political economy of regional integration, working paper no 3 – 1996, Centre for regional science, CERUM
\(^98\) Ibid, p 12.
\(^99\) Ibid, p 12.
Overall, one can conclude that there has been remarkable growth of regional integration in the world from WWII to the present. According to the yearbook of international organizations, as at 2013, there are about 5,000 Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs). The growth in regional integration coupled with the dynamics of globalization with the spread of multinational companies, indicates that there is a world-wide move towards regionalization. Regional integration is a common phenomenon in all regions of the world including the African continent. What differs is the level of their integration, purpose, scope & nature of integration. Based on the developments above it would be useful to discuss the trends of regional integration in Africa.

2.5 Trends in Regional Integration in Africa

The Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has had a fairly long history of regional integration in diverse spheres. Regional integration initiatives in Africa dates back to the establishment of the South African Customs Union (SACU) in 1910 and the East African Community (EAC) in 1919. The ideals of pan-Africanism which begun in the early 20th Century in USA and Caribbean was inspired by scholars like Marcus Garvey & WEB Du Bois among others. As a result, Africa’s new leaders shared a passionate belief in the power of African-ness” with independence leaders such as Senghor of Senegal and Nyerere of Tanzania contrasting the Africans’ sense of shared identity with the individualism of Europeans. It is therefore not surprising that in 1963, president Nyerere of Tanzania declared that for the sake of all African

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states whether large or small, the goal must be a United States of Africa\textsuperscript{105}. Nyerere was of the view that through unity, Africa can be stronger to overcome effects of economic uncertainty, social oppression and the negative effect of the boundaries arbitrarily drawn by the colonialists\textsuperscript{106}. These and the three pre-independence efforts which constituted the Casablanca, Monrovia and Brazzaville groups were the driving force behind the creation of OAU\textsuperscript{107}.

The ideals of a united Africa “represents the aggregation of the historical, cultural, spiritual, artistic, scientific and philosophical leagues of Africans from past times to the present”.\textsuperscript{108} The pan-African agenda informed the efforts of regional integration under the OAU and more recently the AU. The first generations of regional integration schemes were motivated partly by the political vision of African unity which was high on the agenda at the inception of the OAU in 1963. Additionally, integration in the continent was in response to the negative effects of import substitution industrialization policies on the 1960s and 70s\textsuperscript{109}.

The dreams of having a unified Africa was shattered by military coups where 70 such coups occurred between the murder of Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in 1963 to the overthrow of President Mobutu of Zaire in 1997\textsuperscript{110}. This included the killing of Kwame Nkurumah of Ghana who was Africa’s leading light for unity in 1966\textsuperscript{111}. Despite the initial enthusiasm for integration in the continent at the eve of independence of many states in Africa, there was evident regression in the process in the 1960s and 70s. The reason for the regression was struggle over political power and survival of the leaders. The situation was further made complex by the numerous

\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, p 666.
\textsuperscript{107} Ludger, Op Cit, p 230.
\textsuperscript{109} Lolette Kritzinger-van Niekerk, Op Cit, p 1.
\textsuperscript{110} Reader, Op Cit, p 667.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, p 667.
coup experienced in Africa, conflicts and the dynamics of the cold war which disadvantaged several countries of the continent including its leadership. The combination of such factors led to the slowdown in the integration process in Africa.

However, there was turnaround for Africa in the 1980s where several key developments were witnessed. These developments included; the Monrovia Declaration 1979, Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) - 1980 and the final act of Lagos - 1981. The intense activities over those three years were efforts aimed at reshaping Africa to cope with its internal challenges and also external pressures. The 1980s also saw discussions aimed at the renewal of regional integration in the continent such as the first EAC which had collapsed in 1977. Though the LPA was not implemented due to the lack of funds, the Abuja treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) was signed in 1991.

The goals of AEC include: creation of FTAs, Customs Union, Single Markets, Economic and Monetary Union. The Abuja Treaty emphasized African solidarity, self-reliance and an endogenous development strategy, through industrialization. The proposed framework for African integration and continental industrialization was the use of regional economic communities to have a united African economy. In the case of AEC, political federation was not mentioned in the integration process but there was focus being on specific functional areas led by economics as envisaged by the neo-functionalism in theory. As a result, there was need to establish strong institutions which can serve as a supra-national level to facilitate and moderate interactions between the member states. Abuja Treaty therefore envisaged RECs to play greater

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112 Rukato, Op Cit, p 2.
113 Ibid, p4
role in unifying Africa and forge closer cooperation and harmonization of their activities in achieving the objectives of the Community.\textsuperscript{116}

To achieve the aspiration of closer cooperation and harmonization towards AEC, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) initially supported three regional integration arrangements. These were the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for West Africa, which was established in 1975, predating the LPA; the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) covering East and Southern Africa, the precursor of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) for Central Africa. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was established in 1989, completing continental coverage by RECs. Other regional groupings that emerged are the SADC and EAC which will discuss in the subsequent paragraphs.

The Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) was established in 1980, by the front line states with the specific aim of reducing economic dependence on apartheid South Africa. However, following South Africa’s democratic transition in 1994, SADCC became the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. The World Bank identified SADC as a clear example of the linear model of integration in Africa.\textsuperscript{117}

The EAC was founded in 1999 when the presidents of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda signed the EAC Treaty. The Burundi and Rwanda have acceded to the EAC later in 2008. A Customs Union protocol for the EAC was signed in March 2004, formally launched in 2005 and a common market protocol in June 2010. The current EAC is a revival of an earlier East African Community, which had its roots in 1919 but its formal establishment being in 1967. The first

\textsuperscript{116} Abuja Treaty, 1991
\textsuperscript{117} UN Economic Commission for Africa, 2015, Op Cit, p 5.
EAC collapsed in 1977 due to factors such as socio-political differences, disparity in levels of development between partner states, ideological differences, state interests, leadership wrangles and cold war divide among others. The East African Community today has five member states, a collective size of 1.82 million km², population of over 143.5 million people and GDP of US$110 billion\textsuperscript{118}. It should be noted that there is the evident admission of South Sudan as the 6\textsuperscript{th} partner state.

The present EAC partner states interact substantially and are thus interdependent to the extent that any situation between them can be resolved through peaceful means and not through war. A combination of such factors reduces tension between states and minimizes likelihood for war or conflicts while giving opportunity for peace. However, as the RECs consider forming federations such as that of EAC, there is need to have strong institutions at all levels which can impact beyond matters of trade or economics but also in other functional areas.

In explaining the tenet on membership of states in RECs there is evident rise in the regional integration process in Africa. The data on regional agreements in the post cold war era confirms these rise of states belonging to RECs where 5 countries belonged to one regional agreement, 27 being members of two and 18 were members of 3 or more regional integration organizations by 2005\textsuperscript{119}. A quick scan of existing regional economic communities shows that there are over 10 which can advance the goal of an African Economic Community. These include; AMU, ECOWAS, ECCAS, COMESA, SADC, IGAD, CENSAD, SACU, & Economic Community of Great Lakes Region (CEPGL) & UDEAC and EAC. The entire continent is covered by such RECs in an overlapping manner to allow for the integration of the continent. As De Mello and Tsikata observe “the RECs were and continue to be the glue that will cement

\begin{footnotes}
\item[119] Ludger, Op Cit, p 231.
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African unity. In the current geopolitical dynamics at the global level, the future of Africa lies in ensuring the success of its continental agenda for regionalism.

In the field of conflict Management and specifically, issues of peace, security and stability, further progress was made in 1995 by OAU adopted the Cairo Agenda for action which expanded the scope under LPA to include; democracy, governance, peace, security, stability & sustainable development, food security and capacity building among others. Such widening of responsibilities of the supra-national continental body confirms the spillover effects to issues of politics into other functional areas as anticipated by the neo-functionalism theory. The transition of OAU to AU in 2000 and the eventual establishment in 2002 of APSA as the continent’s main instrument for ensuring its security are all significant progress. Evidently, there has been growth in regional integration in Africa after the 1990s with significant development being the transition from OAU to AU.

2.6 OAU Transition to AU

Several factors formed the key turning point for Africa in the shift from the traditional principles of OAU. First is the fall of Berlin Wall which ushered a new era, freedom self determination in Namibia (1990) and South Africa (1994). These developments led to a renewed engagement to have a conflict free Africa which is ripe for integration and prosperity. Building democratic institution coupled with good governance was the primary concern of the shift from OAU to AU. Second was the need for states in Africa to survive in the era of a globalized and competitive world. Third was the need to free Africa from dependency and exploitation by powerful external actors. Additional to such concerns, the threats and challenges

120 De Mello and Tsikata, Op Cit, 2014, p4
121 Rukato, Op Cit, p 5.
122 AU, Agenda 2063, p 6.
faced by countries in Africa in the 1990s, and the inadequacies of OAU in addressing them led to new ideas being muted for Africa’s future.

President Wade of Senegal, Obasanjo of Nigeria, Mbeki of South Africa and Bouteflika of Algeria developed plans on the future of Africa such as the OMEGA Plan, New African Initiative and Millennium Africa Programme whose merger led to the development of NEPAD in 2001. NEPAD was meant to overcome the negative effects of IMF/WB Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) with its main objective being promoting peace and security in the continent. A combination of these factors resulted in the adoption NEPAD and the transformation of the OAU into the African Union.

To achieve the objective of NEPAD African leaders made joint commitment to strengthen mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at the sub-regional and continental levels among others. NEPAD is expected to work closely with the RECS and the AU in implementing its programmes. The RECs recognized under NEPAD include the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), COMESA, EAC, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC and Arab Maghreb Union. The above developments and the current trends in regional integration in Africa demonstrates further growth in regionalism in the continent as had been witnessed over the one and half decade.

2.7 Current Trends of Regionalism in Africa

This section covers the period after the turn of millennia which saw more ‘inter-regional’ integration through tripartite arrangements in the continent and AU’s push for unifying Africa

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124 AU, Agenda 2063, p 6.
126 Rukato, p 18.
through to 2063. The year 2063 signifies a century after the establishment of OAU in 1963. The focus on Africa’s integration in the future can best be seen through, the AU’s vision of “building an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, an Africa driven and managed by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the international arena as their overarching guide for the future of the continent”\textsuperscript{127}. It is meant to deepen integration between the partner states in various regional blocs and within RECs for continental unity. In the current practice, the first area of growth is the move towards integrating regions of Africa through tripartite arrangements.

There are several good examples of such tripartite arrangements or deepening of integration in Africa. First is the COMESA, SADC and EAC where the Summit approved the expeditious establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) encompassing the member states of the three RIAs\textsuperscript{128}. COMESA, SADC and EAC signed a Tripartite Free Trade Area Agreement in June 2015. The move towards African free trade zone or tripartite is encouraging. For example, the FTA among COMESA, EAC, and SADC can help solve the overlapping membership dilemma by bringing free trade among the 26 members by removing tariffs, applying the subsidiarity principle to infrastructure to improve the transport network and foster industrial development.

Secondly ECOWAS launched a Customs Union in January 2015 in West Africa and its members have already begun to implement the common external tariff. Thirdly, the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) member states have signed three out of the four protocols needed for the Union’s own free trade area\textsuperscript{129}. Integrating the regional communities is seen as an important

\textsuperscript{127} Agenda, 2063, p 10.
\textsuperscript{128} UN Economic Commission for Africa, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa, E/ECA/CRCI/9/9, 22 October 2015, p 2.
\textsuperscript{129} UN Economic Commission for Africa, Ibid, p 2.
step in building the African Economic Community envisaged in the Abuja Treaty but is also perceived to enhance deeper integration of the partner states of the respective regions.

The current trend in the integration process in Africa can best be seen through the AU Agenda 2063 which was launched in 2013. It takes account of past achievements, challenges in the continental and global context in which the continent’s transformation is to be implemented. The agenda offers opportunity for the continuity of the pan-African ideals and OAU’s visions against the backdrop for Africa’s renaissance, transformation and integration. The agenda has seven aspirations which are outlined in African Union, Agenda 2063.130 First is to have ‘a prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development’. Second is for “an integrated continent, politically united and based on ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s renaissance”. Third is “an Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law”. Fourth is a “peaceful and secure Africa”. Fifth is “an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics”. Sixth is “an Africa where development is people-driven, unleashing the potential of women and youth.” Lastly, “Africa as a strong, united and influential global player and partner.”131

The above aspirations that shows a broad road-map of achieving ‘the Africa we want’ by 2063. The seven aspirations confirm that the leadership in Africa are for deeper integration of the continent over the next five decades. Agenda 2063 also re-dedicates itself to the pan-African vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and represents

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a dynamic force in the global arena. States of Africa pledge to act together towards achieving the seven aspirations which are outlined in agenda 2063.

It would be useful to expound on the fourth aspiration of having a peaceful and secure Africa as it concerns matters of peace and security. This aspiration targets that by 2020 all guns will be silent, mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflicts will be functional at all levels and by 2063 Africa will have the capacity to secure peace and protect its citizens. In this aspiration, by the year 2063, the continent of Africa is expected to emerge as a peaceful and secure continent, a conflict-free with harmony among communities at the lowest level. It points to an Africa where inter-state and intra-state wars will have been eliminated and mechanisms put in place to prevent and or immediately resolve any kind of conflicts. Such ambitious and bold steps require strong institutional framework for conflict management across the RECs and AU itself.

Agenda 2063 is significant to this study as it demonstrates the continental intention and commitment to deepen integration of the continent. The aspirations in the agenda are futuristic and it serves as the focal point which draws the states in Africa towards the integration process. The agenda anticipates Africa having an integrated continent which is politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism. Africa would be united and strong to enable realize full economic and political integration and emerge as a sovereign, independent and self-reliant continent by 2063. Such strong sentiments towards the continent’s integration can only suggest that deeper integration is in progress in the continent.

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133 Ibid, p 2.
134 Agenda 2063, pp 6-7
135 Ibid, p 7
136 AU Agenda 2063, p 15.
The planned next steps for forging Africa’s integration process includes; Africa Free Trade Areas (2017), Customs Union 2019, Common Market (2025) and Monetary Union (2030)\textsuperscript{137}. The institutions will form part of governance structure of United States of Africa. The AU path towards integration focuses initially in a functional area thus economics as envisaged by the functionalism theory. However, the progression towards a politically integrated united states of Africa may turn out to be a pipe dream considering the current experiences of the European Union.

The AU Agenda 2063 envisages an increase in intra-Africa trade to about 50% from the current 12% which will be on better terms as opposed to trade elsewhere in a globalized world. Such an anticipated growth will require interaction between states in Africa, allows for contact between groups across the continent, build relationships and creates connectedness among the people of Africa. Such anticipation by Agenda 2063 ties well with the pan-African vision which was particularly focused on liberation, political and economic independence and development based on self-reliance of African people with democratic governance playing a fundamental role to facilitate continental unity\textsuperscript{138}.

Despite the above seemingly utopian ideals stipulated in the continents Agenda 2063 it gives hope and path towards prosperity. Africa is highly integrated and the trend as demonstrated above envisages deepening of the same. Some of the RECs such as COMESA have introduced the common investment area and SADC has the investment and finance protocol. For such a path to succeed, the first step requires overcoming the many ills affecting states in Africa in both internal and external dimensions including the challenges to regional integration in the continent.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid p 16.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid, p 15.
2.8 Challenges of Regional Integration

The regional integration process in Africa has experienced a variety of challenges which needs to be resolved to ensure positive growth for the states in the continent\textsuperscript{139}. First is the challenge of dependence on funding by external actors for Africa’s integration programmes. For example, NEPAD programmes are mainly funded under G8 sponsorships. Such donors will probably propagate their national and institutional interests through such programmes rather than allow a purely African agenda. The AU approved $426 million for 2014, but relies heavily on donors. Only 33\% of the budget is expected to be raised from member states and the rest is to be sourced from international and development partners. At the top of the list of AU’s development partners are countries such as Canada, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, the United Kingdom, Spain, China and Turkey, as well as organizations such as the World Bank and European Union. Africa needs to identify sources to adequately fund its programmes using its own resources in an independent manner to pursue the continent’s agenda.

Second is dual membership where states in Africa belong to two or more regional groupings which also overlap. For example Tanzania is in both SADC & EAC while Kenya is in EAC and IGAD among others. Ndomo, 2009, observes that of the 54 countries, 26 retain dual membership; 20 are members of three RECs; the DRC belongs to four RECs; and only 6 countries maintain singular membership\textsuperscript{140}. Rukato is also of the view that such dual memberships are costly, there will be conflict of interests in pursuit of the regional agenda and the RECs are likely to be ineffective\textsuperscript{141}. There is also the lack of harmony and difficulty in coordination of the RECs affairs. However, an alternative views is to look at the broader gain of

\textsuperscript{139} Alemayehu Geda, 2002, Regional Economic Integration in Africa: A review of problems and prospects with a case study of COMESA
\textsuperscript{140} Ndomo, Regional Economic Communities in Africa: A Progress Report, Nairobi, 2009, p 7.
\textsuperscript{141} Rukato, 2010, Op Cit.
such dual membership which is useful in entrenching the notion of continent wide integration in line with Abuja Treaty and eventually the African Economic Community.

Third is weak institutional capacity for effective conflict early warning and response mechanism in both the RECS and at the continental level. Evident in the process is the need for national focal points in all the AU member states to ensure proper implementation of regional and continental programmes. The key to achieving such capacities is establishing a framework for conflict management at AU and RECs which can coordinate matters of peace and security.

2.9 Significance of the Trends in Regional Integration in Africa

Despite the challenges cited above, there are several indicators that demonstrate the significance of the deepening trends in integration in Africa. First is the evident deepening of integration in Africa showing the leadership’s commitment to the pan-African ideals of unified continent. Most significant as demonstrated by the aspirations of Agenda 2063, states in the continent are beginning to look towards each other rather than outside Africa. Second issue stems from such closer cooperation on trade economic development. The intra-continent’s trade remains low at 12% of total exports within Africa, compared with 25% in ASEAN and over 60% in the European Union\textsuperscript{142}.

\textbf{Figure 1: Value and share of African intra-regional trade 1990-2014}

\textsuperscript{142}Caroline Ko, The GlobalCompetitiveness and Benchmarking Network, 2013.
The figure above indicates that despite the low percentage in intra-regional trade in Africa, there is evident increase over the last 25 years while the share has increased from 2% in 1990 to about 12% in the same period. Though the share of trade is low, the value has doubled from about $90bn in 1990 to about $135bn. It is therefore evident that there is a significant source of potential growth for intra-Africa trade which is yet to be exploited.

**Figure 2: Total intra-EAC Trade**
Figure 2 above shows similar trends in the EAC where both the imports and exports have grown fivefold over 13 years between 2000 and 2013. Deepening of integration and enhanced intra-African trade will lead to socio-economic progress, development and peaceful relationships between states. Such a development needs to be coupled with progress in the institutional capacity for conflict management and response.

Thirdly is the importance of regional integration in Africa which can play a vital role in diversifying economies from dependence on the export of just a few mineral products; in delivering food and energy security; in generating jobs for the increasing number of young people; and in alleviating poverty and delivering shared prosperity\textsuperscript{143}. Fostering regional integration in Africa can create regional value chains and thus become more efficient.

Fourth regional integration has so far allowed albeit with some challenges the flow of goods, services and people across borders to reduce costs and to help firms become competitive.

\textsuperscript{143} http://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/why-regional-integration-so-important-resource-driven-diversification-africa"
enough to link to these value chains. This when coupled with the large hard infrastructure projects such as roads, highways, rails, pipeline and ports for across the continent contributes to defragmenting Africa by reducing transport costs directly\(^{144}\) can offer wider opportunity for states in Africa. The deeper integration of regional markets can be done by eliminating non-tariff barriers to reduce trade and operating costs.

Though the continent has had a slow pace towards integration, the gains associated with the process as cited above and the potential therein are immense. An accelerated integration can be achieved by overcoming challenges such as inadequate financial resources, macro-economic instability, poor governance, conflicts and war, the prevalence of HIV and AIDS, and numerous sub-groupings\(^{145}\). Africa can then be able to utilize its resources for the benefit of its people and most significantly secure them using strong institutional frameworks acting at continental and RECs level.

2.10 Conclusion

The above discussion which is meant to engage objective one of this study has demonstrated that regional integration is world-wide phenomenon which has gained prominence in the post cold war era. The literature above also stated the motivation for regional integration and the benefits which are mainly economic gains but also in security. It was further argued that the economies of states in Africa are small, isolated and weak to survive and prosper individually. The need for meaningful development and security for the people of the continent can therefore be realized through the continent’s regional integration agenda rather than by


purely individual states. The approach to integration in Africa is in line with the neofunctionalism theory which begins with economic cooperation. However as anticipated in the theory, spillover into political, cultural and security aspects has been witnessed in the continent.

In Africa, the pre-independence movement, establishment of OAU and its transition to AU with the, establishment of institutions such as NEPAD, APRM and APSA among others are motivated by the need for Africa to ‘rise’ and take its place in the global community. Whether we are getting the process right in addressing the path towards Africa’s rise into the future is a key concern to this study. However, from the onset one can anticipate that the successful regional integration in Africa can enable dilute the negative effects of some of the challenges faced by the countries in the continent. Successful integration also impact positively on the relations between states and reduce tension over the rigid colonial boundaries, nationalism and sovereignty associated with the traditional Westphalia states.

The dynamics of integration in Africa shows that states in Africa cooperating in functional areas which spill over into other sectors like political, social & security enables them look inwards into Africa. This process conforms to the expected path to the integration process. However, the variance in the level of integration among RECs shows that the process does not have to be linear as anticipated in the theory. There will be able to trade among themselves and forge for their security which will be a good beginning point for their independence. The success of the entire effort in regionalism, prosperity and security for Africa requires the development of strong institutional frameworks in each of the functional areas of the supra-national organization. Of interest to this study is a scrutiny of AU’s institutional framework for conflict management which is engaged in the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE: INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA

3.0 Introduction

States in the continent of Africa as earlier discussed in chapter two, have had various forms multilateral institutions at the AU and RECS level to address challenges and opportunities in specific functional areas. Trends, prospects and challenges of regional integration discussed early clearly articulated the justification for integration including appropriate approaches to the process. In the discussion, it was evident that there is a positive link between regionalism and effective conflict management. Trends in regional integration at the global and regional levels have been on the rise as demonstrated earlier. A key area of regional integration as is common elsewhere in the world are in functional areas of peace and security as anticipated in the neo-functionalism theory.

The focus of this chapter is therefore to discuss and assess the institutions and strategies for conflict management in Africa. Specifically an in depth discussion will be made of the AU, African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and its five pillars including the appropriate conflict management mechanisms applied in each of the institutions. Emphasis is made on the existing Regional Economic Community’s (RECs), related institutions which deal with matters of peace and security to draw parallels and lessons for the future. It is intended that this approach to Africa’s capacity for conflict management is meant to develop an understanding of the various institutions and their practice in driving the continental agenda for peace and security.

3.1 Threats to Peace and Security in Africa
Chapter one engaged myriads of threats to security concerns across many regions and states in Africa. Further, Said and Adebayo deeply engaged the security challenges faced by States in Africa with focus on the post-Cold War era\textsuperscript{146}. Based on the situation in Africa, the majority of states have not known peace and progress as they are faced with various forms of tensions, violence and conflicts coupled with several social ills. This situation is further compounded by poor leadership, poor governance, inadequate, greed for power, unemployment, gender issues and ethnic divisions all of which have negative consequences for the people of states in Africa. Further, the continent has been a theatre of numerous inter-state and intra-state conflicts particularly over the last 3 decades. The conflicts are complex due to factors such as ethnicity, struggle for power and competition over resources which impacts on the security of states and various regions in the continent. Acceptably, Africa has not made much progress towards achieving good governance and a secure environment for their citizenry to have socio economic progress.

Over the last two decades, several states in Africa have experienced instability due to democratic transitions which has mainly been violent. At the same time, other states have increasing threat of terrorism; a complex combination which continues to define the direction for the majority of states in Africa. Such a scenario does not augur well for the necessary conditions for peace and security but rather it tends to sustain the spiral of conflict and violence for states and regions of the continent. This being detrimental to the well-being of the citizens of Africa and therefore requires conflict management.

At the continental level, the OAU and more recently the African Union (AU) which was established in 2000 have among others the primary responsibility of responding to conflicts in the African continent. The primary purpose of OAU/AU is therefore to determine the threats to peace and security while developing necessary institutions and instruments to address them. Over the last 17 years, the AU has made strides in defining those threats which impact on the security of states in the continent including what is required to have an independent and self-reliant Africa. The threats to peace and security in Africa are clearly articulated in the AU Solemn Declaration on Common Defence and Security Policy.

At the time of transiting from the OAU to AU, the African leaders acknowledged that the conflicts in Africa were a major impediment to the development of the continent and there was need to promote peace and security, and stability through it\textsuperscript{147}. The objectives of AU include; the establishment of a Common Defense Policy for the African continent and the peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states. There is also; the prohibition of the use of force among member states of the Union, peaceful co-existence of member states and the right of member states to request intervention from the Union with the aim of restoring peace and security\textsuperscript{148}. On such a basis, it is then anticipated that states in Africa will overcome its security challenges and enjoy a secure environment.

The Heads of State and Government of Member States of the African Union, meeting in the Second Extra-ordinary Session, in Sirte, Libya, on 28 February 2004, made the Solemn Declaration guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and UN Charter, and their common vision of a united and strong Africa based on the respect for

\textsuperscript{147}Nsongurua, The Institutional structures of the AU: A Legal analysis, California Western international law journal, Vol 33, No 1, 2002

\textsuperscript{148}Ceuppens, 2006
human rights, peaceful coexistence, non-aggression, non-interference in the internal matters of Member States, mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State.\textsuperscript{149} The AU solemn declaration on a common Africa defence and security policy identifies security threats to the continent which undermines the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability.

The threats identified in the policy document were from both the internal and external dimensions.\textsuperscript{150} In the internal dimension, common threats to Africa were identified as inter-state conflicts and tensions, intra-state conflicts; unstable post-conflict situations; grave humanitarian situations, as well as other circumstances such as refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and transnational organized crimes among others.\textsuperscript{151} The common external threats include; those that challenge Africa’s continental security from the external environment which may endanger either directly or indirectly, to constrain individual and collective efforts to achieve continental security goals. Such common external threats to continental security in Africa include external aggression, international conflicts and crises with adverse effects on African regional security, international terrorism and terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{152} Despite clearly identifying the threats faced by the continent in the internal and external dimensions as cited above, the security situation has remained volatile over the last six decades of the existence of the majority of states in Africa.

The individual and collective efforts by states towards managing conflicts in Africa translates to saving of the limited resources necessary for development needs to improve the livelihoods of the people in the continent. For example, states in Africa have perennially

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} AU Solemn Declaration, p 1
\item \textsuperscript{150} Solemn declaration on a common African defence and security policy signed by the Heads of State and Government of Member States of the African Union, Second Extraordinary Session, Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 28 February, 2004, pp 3-5.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Solemn declaration on a common African defence and security policy, 2004, pp 3-5.
\item \textsuperscript{152} AU CD&SP, 2004, p 5.
\end{itemize}
dedicated resources required for socio-economic development to fight wars and thereafter spend immense effort in the management of conflicts and recovery.\textsuperscript{153} A scrutiny of the existing institutional framework for conflict management in the AU will be necessary in the process of rethinking Africa’s future prospects for peace and security.

3.2 Institutional Framework for Conflict Management in AU

In earlier chapters, the trends in regional integration, their primary purposes and historic efforts in developing institutional capacity for conflict management were discussed substantially. This section therefore focuses on the more recent efforts which inform the existing vertical and horizontal continental structures for the management of conflicts. The current continental vision of conflict management is anchored on the AU’s Constitutive Act, which entered into force in May 2001\textsuperscript{154}. The act commits AU members to “accelerate political and economic integration of the continent, including the development of a Common African Security and Defense Policy; to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its member states; to promote peace, security, and stability throughout Africa; and to encourage democratic principles of good governance, human rights, and sustainable development. As a result of these efforts, there are a number of defence and security frameworks that have been developed to constitute the organs for implementing the Common Defence and Security Policy.

\textsuperscript{153} AU, Agenda 2063, 2013, p 41.
The AU constitutive Act recognizes that the scourge of conflicts is a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent. The act particularly focuses on the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of the continent’s development and integration agenda. Article 3 of the constitutive act of the AU states six objectives of the Africa Union which are all relevant to this study. First is to achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa. Second is to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States. Third is to accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent. Fourth is to promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples. Fifth is to encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Lastly is to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. Article 4 proposes the establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent, which is inherent in the six objectives of the Constitutive Act.

The building blocks of a common African defence and security policy or the continental instruments and mechanisms include; existing intergovernmental defence and security instruments, including treaties, charters, conventions, agreements, and declarations, which could inform on-going efforts to formulate and implement a Common African Defence and Security Policy. Core to these instruments are the Constitutive Act of the AU, the protocol of AU peace and Security Council and the African Standby Force. Expressed in these instruments are the continents-wide institutions for conflict management and socio-economic progress which are briefly discussed.

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156 IPSTC, Issue Brief No 7, p 5.
3.2.1 The Assembly

The Assembly of the Union is the supreme Organ which deals with threats to Africa’s collective defence and Security. Article 9 of the Constitutive Act which outlines the powers and functions of the Assembly”, endows it with the power to monitor the implementation of policies and decisions of the Union. At the same time the Assembly has the power to ensure compliance by all its Member States. In addition, the Assembly may delegate any of its powers and functions to any Organ of the Union with the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) being the most appropriate for powers relating to defence and security.

3.2.2 The Commission of the African Union

The AU Commission (AUC) is the equivalent of a Secretariat which administers and coordinates the Organs of the Union. A key component of the functions of the AUC is to deploy efforts and take initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and support post-conflict and rehabilitation activities. In general terms, the Chairperson of the Union is therefore entrusted with significant powers to deploy a variety of measures towards peace, security and collective efforts to progress the continent in all spheres.

3.2.3 Regional Economic Communities

The AU recognizes eight RECs, which include; Community of Sahel-Saharan States(CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Union du Maghreb Arabe
These RECs are also key drivers of African economic and political integration as envisaged by the 1991 Abuja Treaty.

The regional economic communities in Africa are seen as critical components for the conflict management within their backyard. The RECs are recognized as key actors for implementing conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms and strategies and are anchored on the various regional economic communities. Some existing regional institutions established in Africa for a variety of reasons in the continent include; ECOWAS, ECCAS, IGAD, SADC, EAC among others as outlined in appendix 3. Several of the RECs have mechanism for conflict management which have been trained, exercised and resourced. Most RECs have also deployed its forces and mechanism in a conflict area such as ECOWAS deploying ECOMOG Forces in West Africa.

The relationship between the AU and the RECs is hierarchical but mutually reinforcing while upholding the key principle of subsidiarity in undertaking continental agenda for peace and security. The AU harmonizes and coordinates the activities of the RECs in the peace and security realm, through the strategic leadership offered by the Assembly of Heads of State and government, the AUC and AU PSC. Further there are liaison officers from the RECs embedded in the AU Commission in Addis Ababa to ensure linkage and coordination.

### 3.3 African Peace and Security Architecture

The AU’s supreme organ is the Assembly of Heads of State and Government composed of all fifty four AU members states. Since the assembly convenes only twice a year, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (PSC) which comprise fifteen members manages
strategic and operational decisions about where, when, and how to manage conflict. At the continental level, a variety of institutions coordinated by the AU’s Peace and Security Council constitutes APSA\textsuperscript{159} which is shown in Figure 3 below.

\textbf{Figure 3: AU Structure for Peace and Security}

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the AU’s primary document for the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. APSA comprises a complex set of

\textsuperscript{159}Williams Paul D., October 2011, Op Cit, p 6
interrelated institutions and mechanisms that function at all levels in the continent. The AU has since 2002 successfully put in place APSA which is intended to address Africa’s peace and security challenges; by the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Of equal interest is post-conflict reconstruction and development which is a central component of the stabilization process in the return to normalcy in any past conflict scenario.

The African Heads of State and Government, adopted at the meeting of the AU Assembly on 25 May 2013, the “APSA Roadmap 2016-2020” which is a strategic document to achieve the goals of the AU on “Silencing of the Guns as pre-requisites for realizing a conflict-free Africa by the year 2020”. The current strategy is based on the achievements and challenges resulting from the implementation of the previous APSA Roadmap, 2011-2013 and a product of an inclusive and participatory process involving different departments at the AUC and RECs or Regional Mechanism (RMs).\(^\text{160}\)

The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 provides a shared understanding of the results to be achieved by all APSA stakeholders, articulates the roles and functions each stakeholder is expected to play. The document also highlights a shared understanding of the need to increased collaboration and coordination among all stakeholders and serves as the appropriate tool to communicate the project plans and expected results to Member States, partners and other external actors.\(^\text{161}\) The APSA Roadmap 2016-2020 details the joint aims in five strategic priority areas of conflict prevention, crisis/conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, strategic security issues and coordination and partnerships. In addition, there are crosscutting issues identified in the APSA roadmap such as gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations and climate change.

\(^{160}\)AUC, APSA Road Map, 2010, p 7.
\(^{161}\)Ibid, p7.
APSA embraces “a comprehensive agenda for peace and security in Africa that includes; early warning and conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations, peace-building and post-conflict, reconstruction and development, promotion of democratic practices, good governance and respect for human rights and Humanitarian action and disaster management.”

In the pursuit of achieving its mandate, APSA operates under the following five key pillars which are briefly discussed in the following sections.

3.3.1 The Peace and Security Council

The Peace and Security Council is created by the Protocol relating to its establishment, adopted in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002 and entered into force in December 2003. The PSC is a "standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict which can be termed as a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa". The PSC has the power to authorize peace support missions, to impose sanctions in case of unconstitutional change of government, and to "take initiatives and action it deems appropriate" in response to potential or actual conflicts. Under, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, the Union has the right to intervene in a member state in "circumstances of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity" with the mandate of the Assembly and on recommendation by PSC. Such a decision is binding to all AU member states.

The PSC over the last decade has made decisions on several conflicts in Africa such as Darfur, Comoros, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire and other

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162 AUC, APSA, Roadmap p7.
164 Ibid.
165 Ibid.
countries. Equally, the PSC has adopted resolutions creating the AU peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Darfur, and imposing sanctions against persons undermining peace and security such as travel bans and asset freezes against the leaders of the rebellion in Comoros. The Council is overseeing the establishment of a "standby forces" to serve as a permanent African peacekeeping force.  

Substantial progress has been made by the various pillars of APSA particularly the ASF and CEWS. In the 2010 assessment of APSA, “Moving Forward Africa” it was observed that there is need for vertical integration of APSA between the AU and the RECs/RMs. At the same time there were limited levels of coordination between other pillars and the lack of horizontal coordination within the AU itself. APSA framework needs to embrace the principles of sustainability and subsidiarity which are critical for force generation and sustainment while recognizing the hierarchy of the actors in APSA. Such a hierarchy should reflect AU, RECs/RMs and TCCs with effective linkages to ensure successful engagement in Regional Missions.

3.3.2 Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)

The AU developed the concept of early warning in 2006 and its framework for the operationalization of CEWS was subsequently endorsed in January 2007. At its inception, the need was realized to resource CEWS by mobilizing funds, technical resources and recruitment of personnel within three years for them to be operational by 2009. The intent was to have an Early Warning Systems (EWS) established at Union level and regionally. Some existing regional CEWs include; the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD: CEWARN), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS: ECOWARN), the East African Community (EAC: EACWARN), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

COMESA: COMWARN), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS: MARAC). The primary purpose of the early warning systems is to provide decision makers in the continent with timely information, analysis and response options in response to conflicts.

The establishment of a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is entrenched in Article 12 of the PSC Protocol which provides for the anticipation and prevention of conflicts in Africa. The observation and monitoring units at RECs are to collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room at the AU. To perform such tasks, the CEWS have put in place necessary infrastructure, methodology and systems to continuously monitor and gather information through their Situation Room. CEWS have therefore produced various reports, including early warning reports, situation updates, flash reports and weekly updates. Further coordination with AUC Peace and Security Department and the RECs are being enhanced. Despite this comprehensive and ambitious approach, most CEWs are yet to be fully operational at the two levels as anticipated.

3.3.3 Panel of the Wise

The AU created the Panel of the Wise (PoW) in December 2007 and it constitutes a five-person panel of highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. The PoW is seen as critical Pillar of APSA with the primary task being to support the efforts of the PSC, the Chairperson of the Commission, and the Assembly in the area of conflict prevention. PoW, at the request of the PSC or its own initiative “shall undertake such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the
Commission for the prevention of conflicts”. The Panel which meets at least three times annually organizes annual workshops, offers advice to both the Commission and the PSC, uses its good offices to carry out conflict mediation and assist AUC in mapping out threats to peace and security.

Despite its critical advisory role, the relationship between members of the panel and the PSC is very limited according to an internal assessment in 2010.”

The Panel has challenges of low staffing and lack of resources; however, despite the shortcomings it has been involved in several political crises, including those in Zimbabwe, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi and Madagascar among others.

3.3.4 African Standby Force (ASF)

The establishment of the ASF is informed by failures in attempts at peacekeeping operations and conflict management practices in Africa. Events such as the abandonment of Somalia in 1993 and in Rwanda after the genocide of 1994 led to a rethink of continental security. The international community and other powerful nations were reluctant or indecisiveness in approaching conflicts in Africa. As a result, African leaders then realized the need for Africa to seek own solutions to conflicts and wars in the continent. The African Standby Force (ASF) formations are expected to respond to crisis, manage conflicts and the consolidation of peace in the continent.

169 Ibid, para 68.
The AU key objectives are to ensure the development of an ASF capacity that is able to deploy rapidly, with sustainable administrative and logistics support as well as management capabilities. However, the challenge of an inadequate structure, framework and system to support the planning, deployment, management and sustenance of AU PSOs on a round-the-clock basis remains. At the national level, states have their own inherent capabilities for responding to a variety of crisis including conflict management while at the regional level, APSA relies on the five regional standby forces in the continent’s RECs. The standby forces comprise of the East Africa Central African, West African and South African standby force while the North African Region is termed as ‘Capability’. Three of the regional standby forces are based on existing RECs while two have regional mechanisms in areas where there are no specific REC covering the region or there is an overlap of RECs.

ASF has witnessed good progress which includes; achievement of a multi-component staffing, common policy documents, annual training plan and harmonized training standards. Good progress has also been made towards developing the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) for the regional standby forces. The ASF has grown in terms of capacity for peace support operations as there has been evident increase in the number of troops availed and desired capability. Implementation of the ASF Action plan 2014/2015 to ensure Full Operational Capability for the ASF by the end of 2015 has generally been successful.

3.3.5 African Peace Fund (APF)

The Peace Fund is established under Art 21 of the protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU to finance the AU’s peace and security operations. The Peace fund

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\[171\] AUC APSA pp13-23
covers operational activities such as mediation and preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity and peace support operations. The July 2016 Assembly decided that the Peace Fund would be endowed with $325m in 2017, rising to a total of $400m by 2020 from 0.2% levy on all imports. It is anticipated that through the endowment fund, AU can fully finance mediation and preventive diplomacy activities, institutional readiness and capacity to maintain a crisis reserve facility and meet its commitment to finance 25% of its peace operations budget. The rest of the 75% funding is expected from the UN and other partners.

3.4 Scenarios for Capability of African Standby Force

The process of building capacity of ASF’s regional forces to full operational capability and to allow the engagement of the appropriate tool for conflict management has taken place over time and in a hierarchical manner. This is coupled with the fact that AU has several intervention instruments to employ in the pursuit of continental peace and security. Such conflict management instruments include; early warning and response mechanism, mediation, sanctions and peacekeeping operations. The Maputo Report and the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF of May 2003 mentions six scenarios for the deployment of the regional contingents of the Standby Forces in Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

The scenarios are ascending in their complexity of structures, required management efforts and resources for deployment and sustainment. They comprise; observation and monitoring missions, preventive deployments in the case of rising political tensions, humanitarian assistance missions, traditional peacekeeping operations, peace support in a non-permissive environment and forceful intervention in a member state in grave

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circumstances\textsuperscript{173}. The six scenarios for executing the response to conflicts in the continent using the ASF elements are outlined below:

**Table 1: Scenarios for response to conflicts by ASF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Deployment requirement (from mandate resolution)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>AU/regional military advice to a political mission.</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission.</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission.</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions.</td>
<td>Thirty days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions</td>
<td>Ninety days with the military component being able to deploy in thirty days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>AU intervention, e.g., in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly.</td>
<td>Fourteen days with robust military force\textsuperscript{*}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite the existence of the above mechanisms, Williams observes that the AU faced three major challenges in its first decade\textsuperscript{174}. First, the AU attempted to re-fashion the continent’s peace and security architecture at a time when crises and armed conflicts engulfed much of Africa. Second, the AU took on formidable conflict management challenges without possessing any substantial military enforcement capability. The AU also lacked sources of leverage crucial for resolving armed conflicts. Third, AU reform efforts became entangled in broader debates about the appropriate relationships between the United Nations and regional organizations. Even

\textsuperscript{173} Olaf Bachmann, 2011, Op Cit p 12.
\textsuperscript{174} Williams Paul D., October 2011, Op Cit, p 1.
in current AU Mission – AMISOM, three inadequacies cited in this paragraph tends to undermine the achievement of the mission mandate and success of the operation.

3.5 APSA Roadmap 2016-2020

According to Said and Adebayo, despite progress in the normative instruments, it is yet to translate to real change on the ground. This signifies the need for a roadmap to ensure all APSA pillars evolve to their full operational potential. The APSA Roadmap outlines the results to be achieved, roles and functions which APSA stakeholders are expected to play. The roadmap also highlights a shared understanding of the need for increased collaboration and coordination among all stakeholders involved in APSA. The roadmap is the most relevant tool to communicate APSA project, plans and expected results to Member States, partners and other external actors. The roadmap details how AUC and RECs/RMs joint aims converges in five strategic priority areas of conflict prevention, crisis and conflict management, post-conflict reconstruction and peace building, strategic security issues and coordination and partnerships.

The 2014 APSA Assessment mapped out key priorities that are being addressed in the current APSA Roadmap and addresses the main APSA pillars, namely the PSC, the Panel, the ASF, CEWS and the Peace Fund. The report also covers AU’s strategic partnerships on peace and security with the RECs/RMs, with the UN and with the European Union (EU), mediation and preventive diplomacy; gender, peace and security; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); maritime safety and security; counter-terrorism; climate change and security; the AU Border Programme; Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD); the AU Liaison Offices in conflict and post-conflict countries; engagement with Civil Society Organizations (CSOs); donor assistance to APSA; the

\[175\] Said & Adebayo, Op Cit, pp 352-353.
RECs/RMs’ capacity-building needs for the operationalization of APSA; and the APSA Roadmap. The assessments noted that progress has been made with regard to the five APSA pillars and some other important policy fields.

The Roadmap is built on five thematic priorities with clear broad objectives defined for each thematic priority area with accompanying framework. The priority areas include Conflict Prevention, Crisis/Conflict Management, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Peace-building, Strategic Security Issues and Coordination and Partnerships. According to Rita, AU’s security architecture with its institutional frame work for conflict resolution and collective security needs to be seen as a trajectory for Nkurumah & Pax Africana.

The road map for the operationalization of the components of APSA is clear on how such humanitarian intervention will take place as regards AU action and UN. It also confirms Article 53, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter where the AU is expected to seek UNSC authorization for its peace enforcement actions. The RECs are in turn expected to seek authorization from the AU and eventually the UN for interventions in their respective regions. The current roadmap has been enriched to address diverse continental challenges. It recognizes wider strategic concerns surrounding the human security paradigm, terrorism and transnational organized crimes (TOC) which impacts significantly on security of states in Africa.

3.6 Complexity of the African Peace and Security Architecture

176 AUC APSA, pp13-23
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is expected to enable the AU to play a much greater role in conflict management\textsuperscript{178}. The AU initiative compared to that of OAU, demonstrates a paradigm shift in AU’s ambition, in undertaking peace operations and conflict management. The AU embraced new and controversial political values to enable it cope with the complex global and internal dynamics faced by the continent.

In 2010, AU commissioned a study which identified gaps, needs and priorities with a particular focus on the key components of the APSA; Peace and Security Council (PSC), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF), Panel of the Wise and Peace Fund\textsuperscript{179}. The report of the AU acknowledged that there has been varying degree of progress in achieving operational readiness by APSA at the AU and RECs/RMs. The study confirmed that there is no direct linkage and limited coordination between the other APSA components\textsuperscript{180}. Interestingly, there has not been much progress in enhancing coordination between the components of APSA.

According to Williams, the complexities inherent in APSA are diverse\textsuperscript{181}. First the PSCs procedural preference for consensus based decision making. Second is underfunding and understaffing of peace and security operation and supporting departments. There is the lack of real time diplomatic and intelligence reporting for analysis at CEWs. Thirdly is the overlapping of membership of states in the RECs which poses challenge in the harmonization of response and decision making at RECs which play intermediary role between the states and AU. The fourth is interoperability challenge due to differences in doctrine and equipment and ASF readiness levels.

\textsuperscript{179} Jean Ping, AU Chairperson, 2010, p8
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid, p8
\textsuperscript{181} Williams, Op Cit, 2015, 6-13
in respect of the scenarios 1-6. Fifth is what is perceived as traditional and narrow approach to security. Any future roadmap for APSA needs to take into focus the implications of the above complexities for AU to undertake its peace and security obligations for the continent.

APSA in close coordination with the RECs forms an important step in enabling the continent to manage conflicts. Similar initiatives such as the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism are meant to address problems of governance, leadership and corruption. NEPAD is also geared to improving governance in states, the living conditions and reduce poverty for the people of Africa. The success of such home grown interventions with the concept of ‘Africa by Africa’ if credibly sustained will be central in the search for peace and prosperity for states in Africa. Though several aspects of APSA are yet to be fully implemented, it forms a critical component of the African Governance Architecture (AGA) structures with their combined effect meant to entrench well governed, secure and peaceful African states\textsuperscript{182}.

3.7 OAU and AU Experiences in Conflict Management and Peace Operations

The OAU, AU and its sub-regional organizations have been involved in peacekeeping across the continent. In West Africa, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed peacekeeping operations in Liberia (1990-1998 and 2003), Sierra Leone (1997-2000), Guinea Bissau (1998-1999) and Cote D’Ivoire (2003-2004). ECOMOG was instrumental in providing conflict resolutions in both Sierra Leone and Liberia. IGAD and SADC have also actively brokered peace in their respective regions. Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1998) and Lesotho (1998); the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) in the Central African Republic (2002-2008);

\textsuperscript{182}AU, Agenda 2063, p 43.
the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) similarly in the Central African Republic (2008). In addition, the AU was involved in peacekeeping in Burundi (2003-2004 and 2007), Sudan (2004-2007), Somalia (since 2007), and Comoros (2006 and 2008).

The AU has deployed troops in more complex situations of conflict since 2003. Some of the current major undertakings by the AU which can form the basis of a test case for the continent’s conflict management institutions include; the hybrid AU/UN mission in DAFUR and AMISOM. The United Nations Force Intervention Brigade based in Goma made up of African TCCs comprising South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi meant to augment the UN mission in the DRC has been unique and effective in achieving the missions’ mandate. The AU deployed 7,000 peacekeepers from Rwanda and Nigeria in Darfur, 2005-2007 and an AU joint force successfully intervened to ensure sovereignty of Comoros when Anjouan attempted to secede.

An increase in the engagement through various forms of intervention by AU and other continental actors has been witnessed over the last two decades in Africa. A major departure from the OAU in the approach to conflict management is having the Assembly of the AU at the recommendation of PSC to undertake humanitarian intervention in a member state183. There has also been a dramatic traditional shift from the doctrine of non-interference, hence all intervention can be undertaken in respect of grave circumstances such as war crime, genocide and crimes against humanity184.

The experiences of ECOWAS operations by ECOMOG in both Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrated that RECs in Africa can undertake with support from partners limited peace

184 Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act, 2000
operations in the continent\textsuperscript{185}. Specifically the sub-regions of Africa could address problems in their back yard. Despite positive expectations the two missions had challenges of management and coordination, poor logistics, lack of funding, breakdowns of conduct and discipline, and occasional political quarrels about their legitimacy\textsuperscript{186}. This is an indication that the AU and REC\'s are far from undertaking fully fledged missions in the continent.

3.8 Case Study-AMISOM

3.8.1 The Deployment

Somalia has been in conflict with no formal structures of governance, peace and security since the collapse of Barre regime in 1991. After a decade and a half of inaction, the AU launched AMISOM on 19 January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate in 2007. Soon after, the UNSC approved the mission’s mandate in February 2007 under Chapter VIII of its Charter on regional arrangements\textsuperscript{187}. AMISOM was meant to be a precursor to a follow-up UN Mission which over a decade later is yet to materialize as the UN perceives the conditions in Somalia being unsuitable for peacekeeping. Despite the UN’s failure to take over the mission, AMISOM remains an active regional peacekeeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations.

3.8.2 AMISOM Mandate and Tasks

AMISOM is mandated to support the transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid\(^{188}\). As part of its duties, AMISOM also supports the Federal Government of Somalia's forces in their battle against Al-Shabaab militants. The mission is a Peace Enforcement mission due to the level of insecurity and volatility of the situation in Somalia. The force level in AMISOM has risen since the mission’s inception to about 22,000 troops currently drawn from Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti. Over the years, there has been regular extensions of AMISOM mandate with the latest being UNSCR 2372 of 30 August 2017\(^{189}\).

AMISOM is a unique mission as it is the first major peacekeeping mission primarily managed by AU but supported by UN and other partners. The missions is complex based of the consideration that Somalia has been majorly a failed state since 1991 a period which now spans about 26 years. This scenario is further complicated by the asymmetric nature of the threat but also the intense activities of the Al Shabaab terrorist group who use deadly modes of suicidal raids and combat engagement with the AMISOM forces.

### 3.8.3 AMISOM Challenges

As a result, AMISOM has faced myriads of challenges. First is the uncertain political situation in Somalia which can be characterized as local, fragmented, violent, heterogenic and based on hybrid structures of formal and informal institutions controlled by clans or militias. This tends to divide rather than unify the country while at the same time difficult for the force to build trust, consent and confidence as they interact with the community. Second AMISOM

\(^{188}\) UNSCR 1744, 2007  
\(^{189}\) UNSCR 2372, 2017
mandate has broadly lacked clarity as it is a product of influences by partners and intense negotiations. The driving factors most of which are beyond the AU and the Somali government itself are funding of the mission and issues of force sustenance. For example the last AU-UN Joint review of AMISOM which informed the latest UNSCR 2372 on the mission ignored all the views of TCCs and largely that of the AU. Thirdly is a low force level to defeat Al-Shabaab threat.

Fourth is the lack of sustainable funding for AMISOM which is the most serious challenge the mission is facing to the extent that the AU is seen as toothless. In the last one year alone EU has reduced funding by 20% while the UN has withdrawn several support system from the mission yet AU has done nothing to mitigate the gap. Such lack of capacity in critical aspects particularly in terms of continuity of its operations and force sustenance is a serious impediment. Lastly the Somali people though homogenous both ethnically and religiously are deeply anchored on clan loyalties which makes it complex to wage war in such a theatre.

Further there are wider concerns which impacted negatively on AMISOM. As with similar peacekeeping missions, the complexities associated with AU PSO usually arises from the environment in which the conflict management mechanism is applied. First, AMISOM forces are operating in highly dangerous environment with a large number of civilian, police and military personnel in the mission operating with significant levels of ongoing violence. Second, AMISOM is a mission against a terrorist group hence it is difficult to advance national reconciliation and dialogue. Third, is the inadequate coordination between the actors who drive AMISOM to defeat the terrorist threat and related transnational organized crime and terrorism which compounds the problems of Somalia. Fourth, the Security Council and AU PSC continue to generate mandates for AMISOM which are not in synchronization with the realities on
ground. This mismatch between the mission’s mandate and the realities on ground in Somalia is evident even in the latest UNSCR2372.

3.8.4 AMISOM Way Forward

Despite the complexities cited above, AMISOM has demonstrated that the AUs peace and security apparatus, though weak has brought a semblance of peace to the conflict in Somalia\textsuperscript{190}. The security situation in Somalia has improved remarkably since the deployment of AMISOM, however, the country is yet to be fully liberated and insecurity prevails in many regions of Somalia. The improved security situation has enabled a large part of the country including major centres to stabilize. At the same time there has been two successful democratic transitions successfully undertaken in Somalia. However, the basis to establish durable peace and security which are meant to augment the efforts and gains of AMISOM are yet to take effect.

AMISOM’s has had substantial operational successes which need to be sustained by political engagement within Somalia to enhance its legitimacy and credibility among ordinary people. This would best be done through support by governance institutions and investing in stabilization efforts using the internal structures of government. Second enhanced political-diplomatic efforts by the AU, partners in the region and beyond could have augmented the successes enjoyed by AMISOM in undertaking its mission. Third the AUC needed to develop and undertake a concerted force generation strategy, as well as for resourcing the Mission with key enablers and force multipliers. There must be clear and coordinated political commitment and consensus from the AU, its partners, and the FGS to deliver the resources required to implement AMISOM’s mandated tasks.

Beyond the above concerns, recent developments indicate that the future of AMISOM is quickly becoming uncertain and bleak at a critical moment where Somalia is on a positive trajectory of self rule. There are some key concerns which are likely to lead to the closure of the mission. First is the lack of sufficient and predictable funding which has been a challenge since the inception of the mission. If there is no alternative source of funding, there is real possibility of an accelerated withdrawal of troops from the Mission area by 2018. It is therefore prudent for the UNSC to consider authorizing Assessed Contributions for the mission to avoid the risk of premature withdrawal which could reverse gains made over the past decade. Second is the matching of AMISOM mandate to the level of the threat in which the troops operate and the nature of tasks they are to undertake to achieve the mission’s objectives. The security situation in Somalia remains of serious concern, urgent measures must be put in place to reduce security threats to manageable levels particularly in view of the AMISOM draw-down. AMISOM is still a war-fighting capability where military effort is required and not a police force for stabilization. The situation on ground requires more troops yet the direction by both UN and AU is to replace the military with the police.

3.9 Conclusion

The African Union and sub-regional mechanisms across Africa have the core responsibility to respond to threats of insecurity, violation of human rights and humanitarian operations in the region. The need for continued substantial engagement in this area cannot be over-emphasized particularly against the backdrop that the majority of states in Africa are faced with conflicts of one form or another. Under the AU immense progress has been made in shaping the continent’s institutions for conflict management albeit with some challenges.
Acceptably, the AU and several of its RECs have made several attempts and are actually engaged in a variety of conflict management forms including peacekeeping. A critical component that can allow independence and security for the continent of Africa is its capacity to resolve its own problem using own resources rather than dependency on external donors both state and non-state. Leadership in Africa have recognized this fact and established an important conflict management tool, APSA which remains a core instrument in addressing the continents peace and security agenda.

The establishment of institutions for conflict management is meant to enable states in Africa to overcome the myriads of problems using their own resources. According to Olaf, the drive for an ‘African renaissance’, which was spearheaded by a small group of African leaders, was significant in the search for solutions to the challenges facing the continent. Olaf acknowledges that such a push is particularly true in the field of peace and security where several institutional frameworks were developed at various levels across the continent. Despite such a spirited effort, there is concern that the AU’s founding documents including its latest major policy direction the ‘Agenda 2063’ are highly ambitious and full of rhetoric.

The neo-functionalism approach advocates for incremental integration, what President Nyerere also referred to as ‘steps by step’ integration. It is anticipated that as the integration process progress interest of member states will converge over time. Whether or not the same could work in an African environment will need to be debated. In the neo-functionalism framework, it has a key element of having common decision making among states. In the African continent, nationalism poses a great challenge. In the integration process a similar

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experience is seen elsewhere as an event in EU with dynamic of ‘Brexit’ and rises in the right wing parties across Europe. There is need to have supranational institution at regional blocks bonding continental levels are able to make decisions that bind the member states.
CHAPTER FOUR: EXPERIENCES AND CAPACITY OF EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

6.0 Introduction

The initial three EAC partner states have had a long history of co-operation in specified functional areas which dates back to early colonial period. The EAC approach to integration began with the functional area of economic but it was later expanded into political, social and cultural integration. The basis of this is to improve the quality of life for the people through peace, stability and security in the region. Efforts by states to integrate based on functional areas of common interests while retaining their sovereignty in line with neo-functionalism theory and is relevant to the path chosen by EAC member states to guide their process. This chapter focuses on experiences and capacities of the East African Community in conflict management. A deeper discussion is made on EAC efforts towards the region’s integration and the security environment followed by an assessment of EAC institutions and experiences in conflict management to show both the gaps and potential for such regional organizations in the continent.

4.1 Efforts of Integration in East Africa

The three countries of East Africa; Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have had several historic attempts to integrate since the colonial era and in the early post independence period. The first such attempt of their integration was the Customs Union between Kenya and Uganda in 1917, which was later joined by the then Tanganyika in 1927\textsuperscript{193}. Second is the East African High Commission (1948-1961). Third is the East African Common Services Organisation (1961-1967). Indeed, the EAC has historically had a fully fledged Customs Union

and a Common Market. This means that the EAC has a notable foundation in regional cooperation among its initial partner states.

In the early post-independence period; Kenya Uganda and Tanzania continued to work towards integrating the three countries of East Africa. In the 10 years of its existence, the first East African Community 1967-1977, made major strides while integrating rapidly before it was dissolved in 1977\textsuperscript{194}. The EAC member states then shared railways and harbours, airlines, civil aviation, inland waterways, road transport systems, post and telecommunications, power and lighting, customs and tax management, health and medical research, aviation training and pesticides research among others. At the same time, the EAC had a well established structure comprising the East African Court of Justice, East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat. While the initial attempt to integrate the three countries was serving mostly the colonial administrative agenda, their post independence cooperation was driven by the people of East Africa.

According to Mwapachu, at the time of the collapse of EAC, regional integration in East Africa had reached the highest level experienced in the world\textsuperscript{195}. Mwapachu cited diverse reasons for the collapse of the first EAC in 1977. First is the ideological difference between its member states whereby Kenya practiced capitalism while Tanzania practised socialism. The integration of the EAC was taking place at the height of the cold war era between USA and USSR and their respective allies. Second was the perception that Kenya as the major economy of the region would benefit more from the integration process and dominate the other member states. Third is the dynamics in Uganda which was then led by Idi Amin who was both

\textsuperscript{194} Kipkoech J, Challenges and Prospects of East African Community Regional Integration process (2001 – 2009), 2010
\textsuperscript{195} Mwapachu J, EAC: Past, present and future, p 10.
unpredictable but also failed to pay the country’s financial obligation to the EAC. Fourth is the complex web of personal differences between Kenyatta and Nyerere on the one hand and Nyerere and Idi Amin on the other. The individual differences between the latter two contributed markedly to the 1979 war between Tanzania and Uganda which saw the removal of the Idi Amin Regime.

The first EAC collapsed in 1977 due to irreconcilable differences between the EAC Partner states and individual leaders cited above and the environment in which the integration process was taking place. The collapse of the community triggered the nationalization of the organization’s assets within the borders of the respective countries coupled with the closure of borders to ensure minimal interaction between the states. This was followed by a period of cold relations and lull between the three countries. However, the situation changed following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the collapse of USSR in 1990 and the subsequent end of the cold war. These developments coupled with integration efforts in the region led to the resurgence of talks between the three countries of East Africa.

Some notable developments which led to the re-establishment of the second EAC took place between 1990 and 1999\textsuperscript{196}. Firstly, the three Heads of State of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda agreed to the signing of the Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation on 30 November 1993. Secondly, the full East African Co-operation activities began on 14 March 1996 when the Secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission was launched at the headquarters of the EAC in Arusha, Tanzania. Thirdly, driven by the need to consolidate regional co-operation, the East African Heads of State, at their 2\textsuperscript{nd} Summit in Arusha on 29 April 1997, directed the Permanent Tripartite Commission to

start the process of upgrading the Agreement for East African Co-operation into a Treaty. The Treaty-making process, which involved negotiations among the Member States which also involved wide participation of the public, was successfully concluded within three years. As a result of the sustained efforts, the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community was signed in Arusha on 30 November 1999.

The EAC Treaty entered into force on 7 July 2000 when the instruments of ratification were deposited by all the three Partner States of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The ratification of the treaty marked a rebirth of the new East African Community which has made an equally tremendous progress to those of the first EAC in the 18 years of its existence. The Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of Burundi acceded to the EAC Treaty on 18th June 2007 and became full Members of the Community effective 1st July 2007. The Republic of South Sudan joined the community in 2016, with the hope of having the country recover faster from the perennial civil wars. However, South Sudan has been pre-occupied with their national security concerns hence it has not been an active member the EAC.

The EAC aims at widening and deepening co-operation among the Partner States. Policies and Programmes have been developed with the aim of broadening and deepening cooperation among the partner states in political, economic, social and cultural fields, defence, research and technology, security and legal and judicial affairs for their mutual benefits. It was on this basis that the EAC countries established a Customs Union in 2005, a Common Market 2013, subsequently a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation of the East African States.

\[197\] Article 5 (1), EAC Treaty, 1999
The EAC process is anchored on the principles of sovereignty, equality and political independence with good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-aggression and non-interference which are essential for partner states to allow closer ties and faster integration. However, the envisaged progression of the EAC has not been smooth as anticipated due to a combination of internal and external concerns which have contributed to the slowing down of the integration of the EAC. The process has been characterized by the pursuit of national interests, use of non-tariff barriers, mistrust and insecurity in the region. The EAC partner states also belong to two or more regional arrangements which tends to be costly, leads to duplication of effort and at times pull them apart in situations where they belong to different regional block.

4.2 Conflict Dynamics and Insecurity in the East African Region

Several countries in the greater Eastern Africa region continue to experience conflicts which are complex and involve a mix of regional and international actors. Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda have enjoyed relative peace and stability in the recent past. Kenya has recovered fully from the spontaneous inter-communal violence experienced during the 2007/8 Post Election period. The country is currently stable but is engaged in the war against Al-Shabaab in Juba land, Somalia in support of AMISOM. Uganda was relatively turbulent in the initial two and a half decade of its independence. Though stable, the country has been engaged in the now diminishing fight against the Lords’ Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Front (ADF) while projecting its military force into South Sudan, Central African Republic and DRC for a variety of reasons. Burundi is still recovering from the ongoing internal political tensions which are characterized by occasional violence. Equally, there is tension between Burundi and Rwanda which has further polarized the country and its leadership. Finally, Rwanda has had a period of
calm in the recent past however; it has concerns of some rebel elements operating in Eastern DRC.

South Sudan which is the youngest EAC partner state has been in turmoil following the flare up of civil wars in 2013 and 2016 between the Dinka of President Salva Kiir and Nuer of his former Vice President Riek Machar. The security situation in the country continues to remain volatile and there has been the emergence of new rebel factions in the recent past. Today one can consider South Sudan as a weak or virtually a failed state and is therefore unable to progress effectively the EAC agenda of integration. South Sudan is the only EAC country with a marked internal security threat which can lead to the collapse of the state or negatively impact on the survival of the state. However, the security concerns for the EAC partner states emanates mostly from the external dimension where the region is wedged at the intersection of two major conflict systems of the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions which tend to overlap at the Sudan – South Sudan region. On the whole, the East African Community (EAC) has been facing new challenges towards peace, security and good governance in recent years. Terrorist attacks, religious tensions, piracy along the coast, disputes and battles over scarce natural resources, human and drug trafficking as well as an increase in organized crime have been troubling the region.

Beyond the issues raised above, there are a myriad of concerns which are transnational in nature and continues to affect most of the EAC Member States. In the EAC region there are conflict causal factors such as ethnicity, diverse forms of transnational organized crimes, corruption, bad governance and leadership related challenges which compounds the problems

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198 Miriam Heidtmann, Promotion of Peace and Security in the East African Community, GIZ, p 1
faced by the states in the region. Further, the long porous and insecure borders which are common to the majority of the states in the region make it easy for terrorist and other negative forces to infiltrate and cause harm to the citizens. The above concerns are compounded by the trafficking of SALW which is also linked to complex issues such as piracy and illegal migration and human trafficking. The existence of the myriads of security concerns in the EAC region requires a robust mechanism for conflict management, hence the need to review briefly the institution’s capacity to manage conflicts in the region.

4.3 Existing Structures for Conflict Management in the East African Community

EAC partner states anticipated the need for mechanisms for conflict management to address peace and security concerns in the region from both the internal and external dimensions. Indeed the EAC partner states recognized security as a pre-requisite for the success of the regional integration processes. Articles 5 of the Treaty establishing the EAC states\textsuperscript{199} that “the promotion of peace, security and stability within and good neighbourliness among partner states provides the institutional mandate for engagement in peace and security.” Further, the fundamental principles of the EAC as outlined in Article 6 of the Treaty establishing the EAC gives emphasis on peaceful co-existence, good neighbourliness, and peaceful settlements of disputes.

Under Article 124 of the EAC Treaty, partner states agreed that peace and security are prerequisites to social and economic development within the Community and vital to the achievement of the objectives of the Community\textsuperscript{200}. As a result, a Peace and Security Strategy

\textsuperscript{199} EAC Treaty, 1999

was adopted in November 2006\textsuperscript{201}. Subsequently, the EAC adopted the Protocol on Peace and Security as well as the EAC Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism in 2013 at the EAC joint meeting of the Sectoral Councils on Cooperation in Defence, Inter-state Security and Foreign Policy Coordination.

The EAC Peace and Security Protocol has its primary purpose of promoting peace, security and stability within the region. The protocol further identifies ten objectives for fostering regional peace and security, these include, combating terrorism and piracy; peace support operations; prevention of genocide; disaster management and crisis response; management of refugees; control of proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and combating transnational and cross-border crimes\textsuperscript{202}. With regards to conflict prevention, management and resolution Partner States agreed to use peaceful means to resolve any dispute or conflict between them. The EAC Partner states recognise the need for consultation with UNSC and AU PSC to mediate disputes in the region.

The EAC on the whole envisages undertaking all forms of interventions through the full spectrum of conflict in accordance with the UN charter and the Constitutive Act of the AU. A quick analysis of the Articles in the EAC Protocol on Peace and Security will show the ambitious nature of the document which makes it difficult or impossible to implement. The EAC Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism also include initiatives for the prevention of conflicts where early warning systems are an integral part of the peace and security architecture of EAC. Moreover, EAC has together with the European Union, Intergovernmental Authority on


\textsuperscript{202} “Others include addressing and combating cattle rustling, training programmes for security personnel, dispute settlement and regional and international cooperation in peace and security matters.”
Development (IGAD), COMESA and the Indian Ocean Commission, established a regional action plan against piracy to ensure regional maritime security\textsuperscript{203}.

The significance and emphasis placed on matters peace and security necessitates the need for EAC to develop a mechanism for the management of conflicts. However, despite the EAC being in existence for close to two decades, the majority of attempts to develop mechanisms and protocols actualizing its peace and security mandate has been signed recently awaiting implementation or are still at the draft stage. EAC is yet to develop proper and adequate structures and institutions for the management of conflicts.

The EAC peace and security legal agenda is based on the EAC Treaty, the Regional Strategy on Peace and Security, the Protocol on Defence Cooperation, the instrument on the Panel of Eminent Persons (PEP) and the EAC Mechanism on Conflicts Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR). Key EAC documents such as the Protocol on Peace and Security which contains a Conflict Prevention and Resolution Mechanism (CPRM) are meant to give policy direction to engagement in conflict management in the region. The two documents are critical to operationalize and provide a legal framework to coordinate the regional Peace and Security strategy\textsuperscript{204}.

The second most important document after the EAC Protocol for peace and security earlier discussed is the EAC Protocol of Cooperation in Defence. The EAC has an elaborate level of cooperation in the defence sector which has been a major pillar in protecting democratic gains and promoting good practices. The EAC Protocol on Cooperation in Defence Affairs, 2014

\textsuperscript{203} EAC Peace, Security and Governance\url{http://federation.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1...} (accessed 6 May 2016).

provides an elaborate programme of activities, largely aimed at confidence building among the EAC defence forces. It mainly focuses on four areas of cooperation namely: joint military training, joint operations, technical assistance, visits and exchange information. The strengthening of Cooperation in the Defence Sector through joint military activities will enhance trust and cooperation among the Partner States.

The institutional organs for coordination of EAC Armed Forces include; Sectoral Council, Ministers of Defence, Consultative Committee – Chiefs of Staff/Defence, Sectoral Committee at Directors level and Defence Experts Working Group. Partner states further undertook to negotiate and conclude a mutual Defence Pact. The idea of a mutual Defence pact for EAC is expected to advance the level of cooperation and the nature of interaction between the regional militaries however, it remains in draft stage.

Indeed, the EAC overall strategic security goal is to improve the capabilities of the EAC Partner States’ Security Forces to swiftly and effectively respond to complex security challenges. The current trend seeks to harmonize the working relationships and military co-ordination between the security forces of EAC Region, foster co-operation among the Partner States as well as enhance collaboration between civil authorities in the EAC. Military cooperation also contributes to further strengthening the cause of East African unity, regional security, peace and development. Such cooperation is essential for EAC to progress initiatives aimed at managing cross border criminal trends that have become common with the sub-region of Africa.

The third is the regional institution which brings together the National Police from the partner states to address diverse issues of cross border crime and security. The East African Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) meets regularly under guided by a MoU. EAPCCO is expected to fight jointly the full spectrum of transnational organized crimes including terrorism. EAPCCO is the main coordinating body and central in steering the sub-regional action programme Nairobi Declaration on SALW on the proliferation of small arms.

The EAC working with other regional organizations and partners has assumed a lead role in policy and strategy development for controlling SALW. The aim is to undertake empirical, policy and oriented research in order to promote peace and security and further EAC integration and development.\(^{207}\) Lastly, the Panel of Eminent Persons which is similar to AU Panel of the Wise was established in 2015 to promote preventive mediation efforts in the region. Similarly, the Summit of the Heads of the State has been involved in resolving conflicts in the EAC region. The Summit of the Heads of State did to an extent intervene in both the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi.

Additional to the above mechanisms, EAC with support from GIZ has developed structures and mechanisms for early detection of conflicts, their prevention, management and resolution. The structures includes the set-up of a regional Early Warning Centre, with a “situation room” for anticipating, monitoring and analyzing conflicts within the region as well in the surrounding countries. The EAC Secretariat is also developing capacities for conflict

analysis, data collection and management, policy formulations and for political mediation in regional conflicts.

The EAC has entered into Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with five regional and international organizations to ensure transparent coordination of cross-border security matters to augment its peace and security agenda. EAC has MoUs with Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group; African Union cooperating on peace and security; Regional Centre on Control of Small Arms (RECSA); Interpol cooperating on the fight against transnational crimes and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) promoting peace and security, democracy and good governance.  

4.4 Experiences of the East African Community in Conflict Management

The discussion above clearly demonstrates that the institutions for conflict management are yet to be transformed to functional and effective mechanisms. The EAC has not adequately developed and practiced its conflict management mechanism; however, the organization is currently undertaking several peace and security activities, both at the organizational level and jointly with other sub-regional organizations. Firstly, EAC is currently supporting an exercise for the disarmament and collection of small arms that is being implemented nationally by member states. The EAC focal point persons, located in each of the five member states work towards collection, transportation and the eventual destruction of the collected weapons. Secondly, EAC is also supporting a DDR programme in Burundi as part of its post-conflict reconstruction support for the country. Thirdly, at the inter-organizational level, EAC has signed partnership agreements with various regional bodies including IGAD, Regional Centre on Small Arms

(RECSA), ICGLR, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). These agreements are intended to guide their joint actions towards peace and security in the region. The EAC is also working on a small arms programme with RECSA, where it is providing funds to RECSA in support of RECSA’s work in small arms reduction in the region.

From the discussion above, it is evident that the existing structures for conflict management have limited capacity and in some instances, it is just beginning. The EAC lacks necessary staff and resources such as a fully fledged peace and security directorate with both military and civilian staff to plan for peace operations and manage the same. Further it seems that there are tensions between the partner states such as Kenya and Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi and Uganda and Rwanda which is likely to slow down the momentum of integration. A comparative look at the progress in other RECs, EAC is seemingly behind several others in having the correct structures for conflict management. What is encouraging is that all EAC peace and security activities are carried out in close coordination with the African Union’s framework of the continental African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which emphasizes on vertical coordination between continental, regional and national levels and horizontal collaboration between Regional Economic Communities (RECs) within Africa.\textsuperscript{209}

4.5 Conclusion

The EAC lacks capacity and political will to develop comprehensive policies which guides its engagements in matters of regional peace and security. For example, in the 2008 violence that followed the disputed general elections in Kenya, the EAC could not intervene. During the 2016 crisis in Burundi, the regional body also failed to respond. The consensus based

\textsuperscript{209} EAC Peace & Security and Legal Framework, Op Cit, p 2.
decision making process of the EAC where all the five member states must agree leads to delays and occasional paralysis on issues affecting the community\textsuperscript{210}. Though the EAC has had a favourable period where the integration process progressed rapidly it is evident that there has been some slow down over the last few years. The EAC is currently facing some challenges at a time when several of its states are either in conflict or having internal strife, a situation which requires a strong EAC regional mechanism for conflict management.

As a result of the above discussion, the EAC has not made much progress in the recent past in the integration process with mistrust and tensions between member states on the increase. The region is facing an uncertain future in its integration process despite being in a conflict prone region of Africa. At the same time EAC lacks adequate structures and instruments for conflict management which then translates to inadequate implementation of regional strategies. EAC militaries lack the requisite training, equipment and logistic capability to effectively undertake and sustain such operations either alone or as part of multinational missions. While the AU, ECOWAS and sub-regional groups are trying to develop more capacity, though still nascent\textsuperscript{211}. Despite such a situation, the EAC as a REC is on the threshold of uniting partner states towards achieving peace and security.

Beyond the building of institutional capacity for conflict management in EAC, it is significant to strengthen the community against the dynamics which caused the failure of the first EAC in 1977. Acceptably, the global environment is suitable for progression of EAC integration, however, there is need to safeguard the community from some of the other pitfalls which led to

\textsuperscript{210} ACCORD African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2011, pp 12-14
its premature collapse. Recent events in terms of mistrust, tension between individual countries within the community and overall lack of drive in the integration process are likely to impeded efforts to secure the region for socio-economic wellbeing of the citizenry.
CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA

5.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on analyzing institutional framework and capacity for conflict management. The chapter provides primary data and compares this with secondary data in order to corroborate the findings of the research. The different mechanisms for conflict management of regions are assessed on the basis of effectiveness. This chapter’s emphasis therefore will be in terms of analyzing gaps in capacity, strategies and institutional frameworks of RECs across the continent. An assessment is also made of how disparities in the levels of advancement in institutions for conflict management in RECs can lead to difficulties in the coordination and response to conflicts. Further, the fact that there are overlaps in membership of RECs and their institutions for conflict management pose numerous challenges particularly on functionality. The analysis in this section also explains the complexities and the way forward for Africa in managing its own affairs in the agenda for the continent’s peace and security rather than depend mainly on extra-continental support. There are diverse reasons for the inadequacies in the institutions for conflict management which are outlined in subsequent sections.

5.1 Analysis of Institutional Frameworks

Chapter discussed details the AU institutional frameworks which are well laid out and layered. These include; The Assembly of African Union and APSA with its five pillars of PSC, ASF, PoW, PF and CEWs among others. Equally the eight RECs as recognized by Abuja Treaty 1991 have different approaches and mechanisms for conflict management. In chapter four a discussed in details those institutional frameworks for conflict management in EAC. From the
literature EAC is among the least developed in addressing peace and security issues, however, it is well developed in matters regarding socio-economic integration. Among the five institutional frameworks of APSA; most respondents were familiar with the ASF while the least familiar was the Peace Fund. Of the 30 respondents, 65% replied in the affirmative which means they are familiar with ASF, PSC 16%, PoW 9% while 5% were familiar with Peace Fund and an equal 5% for CEWs.

Figure 4: APSA Instruments

Source: Field Research, 2017

The implication for this derives from the fact that the CEWs is still in its infancy while the ASF particularly EASF which has achieved full operational capability. This means that with political and other factors, the deployment of ASF would take place, however, funding and capability gap remains.

5.2 Gaps in Capacity for Conflict Management

The inadequacies and gaps which exist in the management of conflicts at regional and continental levels in Africa has been substantially engaged in earlier chapters. At the same time,
countries in Africa are currently experiencing cases of political instability and conflicts which is an indicator that the current institutional capacities of the AU and RECs in conflict management within the framework of APSA are still inadequate. From the literature review, it is apparent that the five RECs/RMs and their respective regional standby forces have limited capability to undertake basic peacekeeping operations let alone intervention in crisis affecting the member states. The regional standby forces are at varying stages of building their operational capabilities which necessitates the need for a continent wide effective military and conflict management institutional capacity.

The data collected on this aspect indeed illustrates this fact. Out of the 30 respondents on this issue, 25 or 83% of the respondents said that the security institutions of the RECs were underdeveloped to handle conflicts in their respective regions while 10% said it was developed while 7% had no specific comment on the issue.

**Figure 5: Levels of RECs Institutional Development**

![Levels of RECs Institutional Development](image)

**Source: Field Research, 2017**

On the issue of operation readiness, 25% were of the view that EASF had attained full operation capability, while 50% disputed this fact and the rest 25% were not sure of the level of preparedness. On the WASF 10% stated that it had attained full operational capability. The rest 90% disputed this fact and amongst these 20% held the view that the institution was a non-starter.
Among the key reasons given by the respondents for marginal performance in conflict management by the RECs are portrayed in the table below:

**Table 2: Challenges of RECs Institutional Mechanism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/No</th>
<th>Challenges and Issues</th>
<th>Nos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Overlapping membership</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lack of political good will</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Insufficient funding</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Lack of common understanding and perception of threats among states</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Frequent changes in leadership of key or lead institutions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Sovereignty and national interests considerations</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Outsider interference</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Poor Coordination and Lack of Harmonization</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Inadequate expertise</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Research 2017

Among the key reasons given were issues of sovereignty and national interest considerations, insufficient funding and inadequate expertise. The least significant issues identified included frequent changes in leadership of key or lead institutions, overlapping membership and poor coordination and lack of harmonization. Whereas the first three factors were felt to be critical can easily be associated with the fact that the respondents considered them as both key to national sentiments and donor fatigue. The latter clearly has affected many RECs in recent years. The least three factors can be attributed to technicalities and general lack of awareness among the respondents. These views are in line with the explanations in the various literature on challenges of RECs in Chapter four of the thesis. The above discussions in a nutshell reflects that the continental structures for conflict management lack political will, have weak and inefficient structures, inadequate expertise and lack resources required to respond to conflicts timely.

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212 See Chapter four, pp 83 – 96
5.3 Duplication and Overlap of Continental Conflict Management Structures

In various regions in Africa, there are several institutions that deal with conflict management where there are overlap of memberships and duplication of roles. Such situations burden the AU member states and create confusion in addressing potential conflicts. There are countries in Africa which have membership to three or more regional organizations which is costly in membership fees, assessed funding of regional programmes and regular participation in the activities of the region. Literature in chapter two affirms that only six out of the 54 countries in Africa which translates to 11% belong to singular membership while 89% belong to two or more regional institutions. Tanzania belongs to SADC and EAC and Kenya to COMESA, EAC and IGAD among others. This means that there are commitments and participation within these institutions are highly affected in terms their interest and contributions. This implies that experts and policy makers are constantly shuttling between meetings at great expense to the state. Further, staffing and funding the Secretariats of the many mechanisms is equally costly but also creates challenges of coordination.

Duplication relates to a parallel establishment to APSA framework which already has a layered structure with regional standby force arrangements covering the entire continent. Instead of reinforcing APSA, 13 AU member states recently established the African Crisis Immediate Response to Conflicts (ACIRC) which was passed by the Assembly in 2013\textsuperscript{213}. ACIRC is a reaction force which was operationalized in 2015 and comprises 13 Volunteer Nations which

\textsuperscript{213} AU Dec 489 (XXI) on the establishment of ACIRC.
funds the mechanism jointly with the AU. The Assembly of the AU is the same organ which established APSA which then creates ACIRC to duplicate its functions. According to AU consultant\textsuperscript{214}, ACIRC was meant to be an interim arrangement which continues to linger on and is now transforming into a duplication of ASF.

The concept of ACIRC is based on similar mechanism as the Force Intervention Brigade which is currently operating in Eastern DRC. ACIRC is expected to deliver a Peace Enforcement Capability which operates under AU Scenario 6 of APSA to intervene and contain violence/crisis and conduct operations of limited objectives and duration and hand over to UN/AU Mission within 90 days. In essence the ASF is meant to deliver similar response capability under APSA to respond to conflicts in Africa. The only key difference being that ASF Rapid Deployment Capability which is based on region across the continent in response to scenario 6 is 14 days while that of ACIRC is 7 days.

One can easily see that ACIRC duplicates the layered structures of ASF at the AU and RECs with staff which requires resourcing. Further the two rapid deployment capabilities share the same mandating authority which is the AU and UN while their dual employment will create confusion, competition and cause challenges of mandate, command and control in operations. A simple approach of adjusting the ASF response timelines could have sufficed rather than create a completely new outfit with the same mandate. There is also need to rationalize membership to RECs across the continent to ensure objective and cost effective relationships in Africa.

5.4 Renewed Commitment to the Integration Process

\textsuperscript{214}Brig Rtd D J Baburam, Former staff and AU consultant, interview 25 July 2017, Nairobi
A scrutiny of the dynamics in various RECs demonstrated that states pursue national interests at the peril of regional integration. There is evident lack of political will in RECs which has continued to integrate process and the opportunity it offers for conflict management. The discussion in chapter one on the nature of conflicts in Africa, showed the complexity of both causal factors, actors and required response to resolve the conflicts. Conflict management institutions in Africa needs therefore to address the causes such as resources, land security, elite struggles for political power coupled with bungled democratic transitions, religion and identity among others. This needs to be done while ensuring the people of Africa post conflict rebuilding of the states, their relations and wellbeing of the people.

Conflicts occur and flourish in fragile and weak states where national institutions are weak and there are ungoverned spaces where there is lack of state authority. In most situations in Africa, both the state and regional institutions are weak which constraints the capacity to manage conflicts. It is therefore prudent for states in Africa and the continent at large to pursue governance and developmental goals envisaged in UN and AU documents such as AU Agenda 2063 to ensure growth and prosperity to have strong states which can govern itself while observing human rights and freedoms for all its people. Such a scenario is necessary to have peaceable societies which are able to exploit their full potential across the states in Africa.

States in Africa are highly susceptible to both intra and inter-state wars and conflicts. The multiplicity of causal factors of conflicts and wars in Africa outlined in Chapter 2 and 3 are still prevalent. This means States in Africa will have conflicts and wars of various kinds and typologies. Such a scenario requires robust continental and regional mechanism for conflict
management. Unfortunately, despite sustained efforts over the last five decades, Institutions for conflict management in Africa are weak and unable to deliver on the set objectives\textsuperscript{215}.

In other regions of the world there are credible regional security arrangements. For example, in the case of Europe and USA, they rely on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)\textsuperscript{216} which was an instrument to defend allies against USSR, but has remained valid in the post-cold war era. In Africa, there is need for a layered conflict management strategy which begins with national, regional and continental institutional frameworks. Once developed, there is need for an effective coordination and harmonization mechanism to respond to conflict situations timely and in a mutually reinforcing manner. This will further require the development of an efficient and well-coordinated conflict early warning and early response capability in addressing conflicts flare-up.

5.5 Poor Coordination and Lack of Harmonization at the Regional and Continental level

The existence of various instruments at the regional and continental levels require proper coordination and harmonization of the existing mechanisms of RECs with those of the AU. Further the coordination and harmonization of procedures for implementing the Common African Defence and Security Policy between the Peace and Security Council, relevant Continental Mechanisms and other instruments is crucial for the success of the organization. The need for such coordination is explicitly stated in Section II (e) of the CSSDCA Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation, which provides for a commitment to establish a framework for security between the RECs, AU and United Nations

\textsuperscript{216} Rwengabo R, 2012, Op Cit, p 5.
which is critical for mission success. For example in the case of AMISOM, the coordination between AU, UN and Troop Contributing Countries has been inadequate leading to inefficiencies in the pursuit of mission’s mandate.

5.6 Mechanism for Conflict Management

There are various mechanism for conflict management which are used to respond to conflict situations. Among them are the use of good offices, mediation, negotiations, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication and early warning mechanism. In terms of priority, the respondents list them as tabulated below:

Table 3: Conflict Management Mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial Number</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Good Offices</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Adjudication</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Conciliation</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Arbitration</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Early Warning</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field Results, 2017

From the respondents, as indicated in the table above, the most frequently used conflict management mechanism in Africa is mediation and negotiation, while the least preferred mechanism are adjudication and arbitration. Mediation and negotiations are frequently used they are the mechanisms that are also supported by many donors and stakeholders which is also engrained in African conflict resolution approaches. The outcomes of such process are not zero sum hence is acceptable to all parties. Adjudication and arbitration are mechanisms that result in
zero sum outcomes that are not preferred by many actors. In addition, they are legalistic and therefore coercive, expensive, time consuming and resolve conflicts temporarily.

5.7 Inadequate Capacity for Early Warning

The AU has a Continental Early-Warning System (CEWS) which is central for ensuring conflicts from flaring up and in the event it does respond timely. However, the thirteen AU’s political liaison officers in the field are not enough to effectively monitor and analyze conflict dynamics across the entire continent. CEWS require more and better-trained analysts in addition to a proper information-technology infrastructure. At the same time a mechanism for data gathering and real-time reporting needs to be established to have the CEWs be effective in pre-emptying potential conflict. This will also allow the timely deployment of the appropriate mechanism for conflict management. The linkage and interoperability including harmonization of method and procedures between CEWS at AU with those in RECs down to national level is essential in the prevention of conflicts and their better management. Finally States are required to overcome sovereignty concerns and allow CEWs to report conflict dynamics in any particular country.²¹⁷ To have an effective early warning mechanism, there is need to overcome the information gathering problems for states to share intelligence, in a reliable and timely manner. According to Nganda, states are reluctant to share information or divulge information in a timely which hinders timely and appropriate response mechanism…this weakens the EW mechanisms.²¹⁸ There is need to have quality personnel with adequate surveillance and analytical

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²¹⁸ Maj Rtd Nganda, KDF, Intelligence Officer, IGAD during interview, 20 September 2017
competencies but also the right technologies to access space-based information\textsuperscript{219}. This requires a strong national EW structures which can interface with that of REC.

The EW mechanism needs to have measures which enhance the capacity and effectiveness of timely conflict prevention, peace building, and resolution such as closer coordination and cooperation and mechanisms for crisis management. At the same time political, diplomatic and military instrument meant to address the conflict situation needs to be capable and deployed timely. The APSA concept of EW mechanisms within RECs coupled with the regional standby forces are meant to achieve such a strategy. It is therefore a priority for states in Africa to fully operationalize the mechanisms of APSA.

5.8 Lack of Capacity and Capability

The Assembly has the powers to authorize military action and intervene in the territory of any member state, by invoking Article 4 (h). However, AU’s reluctance can be explained by its lack of practical military capacity for humanitarian intervention. In the event AU was to invoke Article 4(h) it would have challenges in deploying speedily the necessary military capabilities. AU and RECs/RMs lack the capacity in terms of human resource/expertise as there are challenges of low manning levels and staffing who cannot plan and manage adequately a conflict situation or crisis. Equally critical is the lack of capability in terms of troops in adequate numbers which has the required force multipliers and enablers to defeat asymmetric threat such as terrorist.

There are disparities in the progression of the regional stand by forces. African Standby Force was to achieve full operational capacity by 30 June 2010, however, despite delay spanning over 4 years, some regions have attained the capacity for all scenarios envisaged in APSA. For example EASF attained full operational capacity in 2014 and intends to hold its first major field training exercise of all its components and staff in November 2017 at Port Sudan. There are other regions of the standby forces which are yet to gain full operational capability.

The African Standby Force faces challenges of interoperability, complexities of command and control, strategic lift capabilities and lack of mechanism between the AU Peace and Security Directorate and the ASF brigades. For example, AMISOM requires a robust fighting capability which has remained inadequate for mission needs. AMISOM continues to lack critical mission components in land, air and maritime assets required to defeat the Al-shabaab. Equally there is the lack of adequate force multipliers and enablers which continue to negatively impact on the effective delivery of the mission’s mandate.

5.9 Inadequate Funding

Funding for the routine running of regional standby forces is usually done through assessed contribution and partners. The ASF depends mainly on donors to fund operations under all its scenarios; however, there are recent efforts to generate startup funds through the AU peace fund. In the case of AMISOM, the key concern is the lack of sufficient and predictable funding. There is frequent reduction of budget such as the reduction by 20% EU funding in Jan 16 while a similar reduction is expected in the next few months into 2018. Unless an alternative source of funding is found, there is real possibility of the closure of AMISOM by 31 May 2018 jeopardizing a flagship mission of the AU.

**220** For example, George A & Hall J, Op Cit, p 7 and 15.
The AU and the majority of its RECs have inadequate capacity which contributes to weaknesses in the continental mechanisms for conflict management. The AU Commission aims to facilitate, coordinate and monitor the Union’s advancement toward its primary vision of peace and security. To achieve this, the commission employs two objectives of reducing conflicts and achieving security and stability. The AU allocated a budget of $144 million for peace and security issues out of the expected overall expenditure of $784 million\(^{221}\) which makes it impossible to achieve the objectives resulting in understaffing and poor support for programs.

The Peace Fund (PF) was established in June 1993 as the principal financing instrument for the peace and security activities of the Organization of African Unity. As one of the five pillars of APSA, the PF’s legal basis is set out in Article 21 of the PSC Protocol. The PF is to be replenished through financial appropriations from the regular AU budget including voluntary contributions from Member States and arrears on assessed contributions. The Fund is also able to accept contributions from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society, donations from individuals, and through appropriate fundraising activities. During the Special Summit held in Tripoli in August 2009, AU Member States agreed to increase their contributions to the Peace Fund from 6% to 12% of the AU regular budget. The July 2016 Assembly decided that the Peace Fund would be endowed with $325m in 2017, rising to a total of $400m by 2020 from the 0.2% levy. The endowment represents a maximum amount that will be replenished annually as needed. The Peace Fund covers more than just the peace support operations. This endowment will enable the AU to fully finance mediation and preventive diplomacy activities, institutional readiness and capacity, maintain a crisis reserve facility as well as meet its

commitment to finance 25% of its peace operations budget\textsuperscript{222}. This situation still leaves 75% gap in funding peace and security related activities in the continent which will create dependency on traditional partners.

The AU Peace Fund needs to grow not only to fund the cost of peacekeeping but also cover post-conflict reconstruction activities. In fact, the organization's efforts are mainly focused on providing protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees, and internal displaced persons. There is virtual inattention to post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction in conflict affected countries. Having a strong partnership involving UN, AU, RECs, International Partner states and the civil society is crucial in overcoming funding challenges in post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation challenges.

5.10 Conclusion

Some challenges remain to be vigorously addressed, including the weak linkage between early warning and early response by decision-makers; the gathering of non-adequate data due to the ever-changing conflict dynamics; the low connectivity between the CEWS and the EWS of the RECs; the lack of connectivity between national EWS and REC EWS; and the variation of levels of operationalization of various EWS at the level of the RECs.

The AU Mechanism for conflict Management needs to have vertical and horizontal coordination, establish linkages while developing necessary partnerships to achieve common security goals of the continent. The AU lacks both capacity and capability to effectively undertake Peace operations. First are concerns of inadequate staffing of institutional Mechanism for conflict management at continental and regional levels; poor training standards and

challenges of interoperability. Second is the lack of combat capability which can be sustained for both conventional and asymmetric warfare\textsuperscript{223}.

The management of conflicts is a long-term process which requires long-term strategies and policies whose impact prevents the emergency of conditions that give rise to conflict. Most significant is the strengthening of institutional structures for conflict management to manage the process and implement the strategies. Individual States in Africa needs to cultivate political goodwill and have the commitment to coexist as good neighbours as envisaged by the various instruments of AU and RECs. To achieve this, there is need to build trust and confidence between states to the extent that challenges of sovereignty is minimized.

\textsuperscript{223} Juma Mwapachu, EAC: Past, present and future, p 10.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.0 Concluding Discussions

The last five chapters engaged extensively the topic of managing conflicts in Africa through regionalism using Case Study of the East African Community. This chapter makes conclusions by linking some of the key discussions and to answer the hypothesis of the study. A few recommendations will be made and suggest areas for future research. The main objective of the research was to determine how regionalism in Africa can be used as an instrument to overcome the numerous challenges faced by people and in particular the management of conflicts. Earlier discussion on the topic clearly showed how the majority of states in Africa despite having immense potential has myriads of problems such as conflicts, civil wars, poverty and political instability among many others. It also emerged from this research that Africa’s historic past of the slave trade, colonial oppression, and post-independence dynamics such as the cold war, poor leadership and oppressive regimes contributed to the ills affecting the continent.

The numerous attempts which were made since pre-independence era to the present of having a united, peaceful and progressive Africa which is a strong player in the international arena have not succeeded. There is need then to explore how regionalism using Ernst Haas neo-functionalism theory to foster regional integration and contribute to peace and socio-economic progress in the continent. The theory envisages that states are expected to defend their preferences through cooperation rather than the struggle over power with national interest being achieved through regional integration. Analysis was made of the trends in regional integration from the global to regional levels, institutional strategies for conflict management at the AU and RECs with focus on the EAC as a Case Study. The study clearly demonstrated that despite
ambitious plans and strategies, the AU and RECs institutions for conflict management in their present set-up are unable to deliver the continents aspirations.

The majority of previous attempts in the African continent to resolve conflicts have failed such as in the Republic of South Sudan and Somalia; in DRC it has helped reduce the magnitude of violence while in other cases the conflicts have remained dormant awaiting flare up such as Eritrea - Ethiopia. Indeed the demand for conflict management institutions is likely to be on the rise due to the continued impact of globalization and Africa being in a competitive global environment. It is therefore necessary for institutions in Africa to review their current capacities, structures and approaches to conflict management. In this regard, the proposals made in chapter five to strengthen institutional structures for conflict management are critical in ensuring RECs and continental conflict management institutions to effectively address conflicts affecting states and regions of Africa. Central to such a progression is to have regionalism whereby the various RECs integrate and become the focal point for the management of conflicts in the continent.

The first question to be addressed was whether an increase in membership to RECs coupled with deepening integration in Africa could lead to closer and peaceful relations between states in Africa. The EAC is focused on widening and deepening integration to the extent there is close coordination between the partner states in several functional areas such as customs union, cooperation in defence and security and education among many others. The people of East Africa are integrating fast and are behaving like one interdependent community. Other regions in Africa are pursuing ways of deepening their integration with ECOWAS and SADC being at an advanced stage of integration and building capacity. There is a similar approach at the continental level where the AU and its key document Agenda 2063 is dedicated to the pan
African vision of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa driven by its own citizens and represents a dynamic force in the global arena.

In response to whether increase in membership to RECs and deepening of regional integration in Africa, one can conclude that this is where the future of Africa is anchored. There is adequate justification for regional integration in Africa such as challenges and fragility of states, marginalization of the continent, its narrow economic base with fragmented small economies and the continents historic reality. Such a situation confirms that an increasing level of integration will enable Africa take control of its future for socio-economic progress and strengthen its institutions for peace and security. At the global level regionalism is still key driver of regional and global agenda despite some setbacks experienced in the recent past such as Brexit and other national interest driven agenda like Donald Trump’s ‘America first’ policy.

The next questions concerns whether an effective institutional framework for conflict management in RECs capable of timely response could lead to reduced conflicts. The notion of having a strong Africa with its own mechanisms in various functional areas was at the core of discussions in the pre-independence era. The different approaches by the Monrovia, Casablanca and Brazzaville in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the eventual establishment of OAU in 1963 was to develop such mechanisms which could address Africa’s problems including conflict management. Despite maneuvering Africa in an environment of mutating challenges, the progress made under OAU, Lagos Plan of Action 1980, Abuja Treaty 1991 and the Cairo declaration of 1994 are all meant to develop the continents capacity to manage its affairs including conflict management. In the post cold war era, Africa has seen an increase in the regional integration effort with the transition from OAU to AU in 2000 being the climax of such
progression. On the whole a key ambition is to have effective institutional mechanism for conflict management.

The most significant development towards this is the establishment of the AU APSA with its five pillars of Peace and Security Council, ASF, Continental Early Warning, Panel of the Wise and Peace Fund. RECs have also made progress in actualizing their synchronization to act within the principal of subsidiarity and compliment APSA efforts. Despite such remarkable efforts, Africa’s institutions for conflict management are still inadequate to address the continents peace and security needs. They lack of human capacity in every respect and are challenged by poor coordination, lack of funds and desired military and police capability among many others which continues to undermine Africa’s institutions capacity for conflict management. Ideas which can strengthen the institutional capacity for conflict management in Africa including through regionalism is addressed substantially in chapter five.

Based on the current events in Africa, the continent is likely to witness increase in the number of conflict affecting its various regions and states. Conflicts in Africa have complex web of causal factors in both conventional and asymmetric setting with numerous actors hence it will require strong regional and continental conflict management institutions which can deliver a complex mix of approaches in their resolution. The prevalence of major international terrorist groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Boko-Haram, Al-Shabaab among others and their affiliates operating in Africa and the complex web of transnational organized crimes will require states to come together in regions to address effectively the regions problem.

At the same time there is need to use non-traditional approaches to resolve the complex web of issues which leads to the radicalization of people including youths to join terror groups. This requires linkage and cooperation between regional and continental structures for conflict
management and national institutions to have complementary effort to defeat such vice. To augment this approach the peaceful coexistence, cooperation and harmony between states in Africa forging a united approach is required to anchor the process.

6.2 **Recommendations**

Regional integration is significant for States in Africa as it promotes economic growth, attract investment and through cohesion lead to regional peace and security. The level of integration for the relatively new State in Africa should not be ambitious. There is need for caution on several pertinent issues such as sovereignty, process of state building and levels of development. Institutional mechanism for conflict management should not be anchored on overlapping membership for better coordination and harmonization at clear stated levels. Same state belonging to several continental mechanisms as is the case of ACIRC and ASF creates confusion, duplication of effort and waste of the limited resources. Critical is for the AU and RECs to pursue policies of good participatory governance, gender good leadership and observe human rights which promote peace, security and stability in the continent. Recommendations are as follows:

a. Accelerate the integration process for AU member states to reap the benefits of regionalism through renewed commitment by states in Africa.

b. Seek African resourced approach to strengthening the institutions for conflict management in the desired hierarchical manner at RECs and AU.

c. Develop a comprehensive long term plan to defeat the threats to EAC region in both the internal and external dimension in a prioritized to ensure prosperity and secure community.
6.3 Areas for Future Research

The magnitude of difficulties faced by the integration process in Africa is immense hence there are many areas for further research; however, the following can be an area for priority consideration:

a. Identify the factors required to unlock the challenges sovereignty poses to integration process to allow for shift in loyalty to RECs and unity of Africa.

b. Develop a mechanism for African owned and resourced approach to build the desired capability and capacity in Africa to effectively manage conflicts in the continent to ultimately offer ‘African Solutions to African Problems’.
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List of Respondents

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2. Brig Ahmed Mohamed, former Chief of Staff, UNDPKO – NYC
3. Brig Alex Kendagor – Head of Peace Operations Dept – Nairobi
4. Brig Alphaxard Kiugu, former DA UN NY
5. Brig D J Baburam, AU Expert & 5 years work experience on AU Mission Planning
6. Brig J Mrashui – Chief EASF & ACIRC Desk, MOD - Nairobi
7. Brig Patrick Nderitu, Director IPSTC, Nairobi
9. Col A Wamwayi, EAC Desk Officer – MOD Kenya
10. Col Ben Oluoch, EAC Secretariat Staff – Arusha
11. Col Dr Stephen Handa, Head of CSS, NDC Kenya
13. Col Mor Mbow, Head AU Missions Security Unit – Addis Ababa
14. Lt Col Charles Imbiakha, Researcher CSS, NDC
15. Lt Col John Kiso Kirui, Former Ops Officers, UNAMID, Sudan
16. Lt Col Rugendo, Defence Advisor UN – NYC
17. Maj Gen Rtd S N Karanja, Former Deputy Force Commander, AMISOM, Nairobi
18. Maj Rtd Nganda, Intelligence officer IGAD, 2014-15
19. Col Njuguna Paul, Public Affairs Officer AMISOM, Mogadishu
21. Mr Peter Chege Kamau, Assistant Director EAC Ministry – Kenya
22. Mr Kilonzi, Director Peace and Security Directorate – MFA
23. Amb Dr Mohammed Guyo, IGAD Special Envoy to Somalia
24. Maj Nganda, Former Intelligence Staff Officer – IGAD
25. Col Chris Orina, Staff Mission Support for Peace Operations.
27. Mr. Ikumange Appolaire, Head Mission Support, AU
28. Mrs. Alice Kiarie – Head Strategy and Policy Department, MOD – Kenya
29. Mr. Barrack Ndegwa, Head EAC Integration, State Department of EAC, Nairobi
MAP OF EAC COUNTRIES

Member States - Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda

Source: Google Maps
MAP SHOWING REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA

Source: Google Maps

- Overlap of RECs to 2 or more Regional Mechanism prevalent
AFRICAN STANDBY FORCES

Sources: Wikipedia
This questionnaire is to assist in the research to determine how regional integration in Africa can be used as a tool for conflict management and insecurity.

Some questions require that you tick, others require explanation in spaces provided. The information volunteered here will be treated with highermost confidentiality and is purely for academic purposes. You are therefore requested to be as objective as possible.

**Section I: General Information**

1. Your Name................................................................. (Optional)
2. Male ( ) Female ( )
3. What is your level of education? High School [ ] Diploma [ ] Undergraduate Degree [ ] Post Graduate University [ ] *Tick one*
4. Your Nationality: ............................................................... (Please fill in)
5. Have you served under any Regional Organization? a. Yes b. No
6. Which Regional Organization do you represent? .................. (Please fill in)
7. Briefly explain your role or relationship in the organization? .......... (Please fill in)
8. How long have you worked in this organization? ......................... (Please fill in)

**Section II: Trends in regional integration in Africa**

9. What is your assessment of in growth of Regional Integration in Africa?
   a. Increasing fast b. Increasing slowly C. Constant D. Declining
10. What area/issue of integration is/was your organisation concerned with?
11. How has the organization you worked with participated in the integration process?
    ...............................................................................................................................
    ...............................................................................................................................
12. Is regional integration important for Africa? Briefly explain
    .................................................................................................................................
    .................................................................................................................................
13. What are the challenges of regional integration in Africa?

Section III: Institutional capacities and framework for conflict management in your organization


15. How can regional integration help in conflict management?

16. Are there any existing frameworks for conflict management in the organization(s) you have worked with? Briefly explain.

17. What are the capability and capacity gaps in the institution in its attempts towards conflict management represent?

Section IV: Experiences in Conflict Management of AU, RECs and RMs


19. What mechanisms of conflict management are/were used?
   a. Good offices
   b. Mediation
   c. Negotiation
   d. Conciliation
   e. Adjudication
   f. Arbitration
   g. Early warning Mechanism
20. What African Peace and Security Architecture do you consider most significant in Conflict Management
   a. Peace Fund
   b. ASF
   c. PoW
   d. PSC
   e. CEWS

21. What assessment would you give to the involvement in conflict management?
   a. Very successful
   b. Successful
   c. Moderately successful
   d. Unsuccessful

22. State the experiences of your organization in conflict management?

23. Does the structure for conflict management address the full spectrum of conflict from EW to Post Conflict Reconstruction? Explain

24. What major challenges have faced the Organization you have worked with in management of conflicts?
   a. Overlapping membership
   b. Lack of political good will
   c. Insufficient funding
   d. Lack of common understanding and perception of threats among states
   e. Frequent changes in leadership of key or lead institutions
   f. Sovereignty and national interests considerations
   g. Outsider interference
   h. Poor Coordination and Lack of Harmonization
   i. Inadequate expertise

25. Would you advocate for strengthening of RECs as tools for management of conflicts in Africa? a. Yes b. No

Thank you for contributing to peace and security in Africa.