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**Countering Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: The Role of Public
Diplomacy**

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Master of Arts in Diplomacy, at the Institute of Diplomacy and International
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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this research project is my original work and has not been submitted to this or any other institution.

Signature _____ Date ____/____/2017

FRANK MWITI KIRIMI

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the University Supervisor.

Signature _____ Date ____/____/2017

PROF. AMB. MARIA NZOMO

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my mother, Mrs. Winfred Guantai, who has been a great source of inspiration throughout my life. My Late grandfather Mr. Erastus Kirimi you were a great educator, thank you for all the support you gave me. Rest with the angels.

I also dedicate this thesis to my Uncles, Stanely Mbae, Timothy Mugambi, Benson Kinoti, and the late Evasio Mbae, and Aunts the Late Lucy Kirimi and Purity Mbae, whose words of encouragement and push for tenacity has brought me this far.

I dedicate this thesis to my siblings, Koome, Kirimi, Murimi and Mukami who have been supportive all through and have never left my side.

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is indeed a transnational security conundrum as evidenced by the death and destruction it causes. Furthermore, more and more 'vulnerable' people are being recruited to the 'dark side', particularly in the Horn of Africa sub-region. Therefore, this research sought answers to three pertinent questions: Are the strategies and mechanisms of counterterrorism in place effective? If not, are 'traditional' diplomatic strategies in place better placed to tackle terrorism? If yes, are public diplomacy counterterrorism strategies more suited to counter terrorism? To assess these questions, the research sought to employ the liberal theoretical approach in analyzing public diplomacy as a counterterrorism strategy. This research further sought the insight of 23 respondents, using a mixed method data collection and analysis to obtain the relevant data that led to the inference that public diplomacy strategies are both sustainable and effective in counterterrorism. For this reason, the research recommended that further research ought to be carried out by the academia to establish a link between corruption and terrorism. Furthermore, it recommended that policy makers, adopt strategies that are not only responsive to terrorist threats, but also preventive ones. Indeed, strategies that are aimed at safeguarding human security, aimed at eradicating vulnerability that leads normal human beings to become terrorists. Moreover, this research revealed that a collaborative effort between both state and non-state actors is apt in addressing these underlying enablers of terrorism. Making a conclusion that a public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy is most appropriate in preventing terrorism and dealing with the root enablers of terrorism.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AG	Attorney General
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
C-TED	Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Counter Terrorism
CTITF	Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force
DANIDA	Danish International Cooperation Agency
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EAC	East African Community
HoA	Horn of Africa
HR	Human Rights
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Agency for Development
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IH	International Humanitarian
IT	Information and Technology
MNC	Multinational Corporation
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Service
NSA	Non-State Actor
OAU	Organization of African Union
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PREACT	Partnership for Regional East African Counter Terrorism
PM	Prime Minister
PNU	Party of National Unity

SG	Secretary General
SAVE	Strengthening Resilience to Violence & Extremism
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNGC-T	United Nations Global Counter Terrorism
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	Weapon of Mass Destruction

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Background

Events of September 11th 2001, brought attention to the world the magnitude and destruction of international terrorism, making it a key security concern of this era. This tragic event served as a wakeup call to the world that no one is safe from international terrorism in the rapidly globalizing universe. The Global Terrorism Database, estimates that there have been more than 150,000 terror attacks globally from 1970 to 2015.¹ Accordingly, the war on terror is expensive, in fact, the Institute for Economic and Peace estimates the global security expenditure in 2015 at \$117 billion.² In addition, the death toll (2000-2014) caused by terrorism was estimated at over 140,000 civilians.³

Various mechanisms and strategies have been formulated in an attempt to counter terrorism, the most significant one being, the 2006 United Nations Counterterrorism strategy- an instrument which is reviewed every 2 years by the General Assembly. It aims at augmenting international, regional and national counterterrorism efforts by strengthening states' capacity to counter terror threats whenever they emerge. Secondly, it aims at strengthening the United Nations by equipping it to deal with terror threats, and further lays foundation for safeguarding civil liberties and the law as they are key to fighting terrorism.⁴ Furthermore, there are several other regional multilateral initiatives in place. An example is the OAU Convention on Preventing and Combatting Extremism whose ratification stood at 41 of the 54 African countries by March 2016.⁵

¹ *Global Terrorism Index*, Institute for Economic and Peace. 2015. Pp. 3

² *ibid*

³ *ibid*

⁴United Nations, 'UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.'

<https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy> (accessed 24/4/2017 at 5.20 p.m.)

⁵ African Union, 'List of Countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism,' 1/4/2016

<https://www.au.int/web/sites/default/files/treaties/7779-sl->

Indeed, diplomacy is a resource in counterterrorism. It involves social contacts between informal institutions such as non-state actors, academia and the elite mass. It encompasses public dialogue of convincing the mass to shun terrorism and the killing of innocent lives in the guise of ideology. Conflict prevention is in the realm of diplomacy as it seeks to solve disputes amicably, and is done either bilaterally or multilaterally.⁶ Accordingly, diplomacy uses carrot and stick of military and economic might, to coerce the population or states to turn away from terrorism.⁷ In this context, carrots are inducements such as; reduction of trade barriers, offer of military protection and/or economic aid. While, sticks simply imply the threat of military intervention or economic sanctions (coercive diplomacy). All this is intended to apply diplomatic pressure to states that harbor terrorists or are sympathetic to their cause.

Accordingly, public diplomacy is underrated in countering the threat posed by terrorism. It encompasses reaching out to the public both domestic and foreign, using state media, dialogue, speeches aimed at creating an understanding of a state's policy goals, ideas, ideals, culture and institutions; all geared at winning hearts and minds. It would however, require shifting from a public diplomacy strategy that is centered on public relations to one that institutes projects that directly shape the thinking of the public and directly improve their lives. This involves incorporating a range of public diplomacy activities such as; digital engagement programs, social media engagement, education, and poverty eradication. These initiatives should target specific needs such as employment, access to basic needs, environmental conservation, civil liberties and the law.

[protocol to the oau convention on the prevention and combating of terrorism 14.pdf](#) (accessed 15/4/2017)

⁶ Pesto, Haris, 'The Role of Diplomacy in the Fight Against Terrorism' Connections: *The Quarterly Journal* 10, no. 1, 2010. Pp. 64-81.

⁷ Nye, Joseph. 'Propaganda isn't the way: Soft Power.' *International Herald Tribune*, January 2003.

In conclusion, terrorism, a security menace in the modern era, must be nipped in the bud if the world is to meet its global development agenda. However, the wanton destruction and threat it poses threatens to derail this goal. It is therefore prudent that new strategies and mechanism of counterterrorism are carefully designed to include dialogue, the law, respect for civil liberties and overall freedoms.

1.1 STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

Terrorism is on the rise, in fact, statistics show that there was an 84% increase of terrorist related deaths in 2014 alone, claiming 13, 486 lives.⁸ In addition, there has been more than 150,000 terror attacks recorded globally from 1970 to 2015.⁹ Similarly, the global economic impact of terror related violence hit \$13.6 trillion in 2015,¹⁰ and has caused extensive environmental degradation.

In countering the terrorist threat, public diplomacy can be a resource. It is a preventive measure and can as well be used during military intervention. The value of public diplomacy in this endeavor is found in its appeal to the hearts and minds of individuals. The rapid advancement in Information Technology, has provided states with tools to influence these ‘hearts and minds’ of the public in an unprecedented way, and this ought to be explored further in countering the terrorist threat that we face.

This research aims at enriching the existing knowledge base by providing a detailed analysis on whether the counterterrorism strategies and mechanism used by states, particularly in the Horn of Africa region, have had any impact in deterring terrorist groups, while making a case for public diplomacy in counterterrorism.

⁸ *Op. Cit*, Global Terrorism Index. Pp. 14

⁹ *Ibid*, Global Terrorism Index. Pp. 4

¹⁰ *Ibid*, Global Terrorism Index. Pp. 3.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- a) What are the counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in place and what has been their impact in the Horn of Africa?
- b) What has been the role and impact of various diplomatic strategies of counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa region?
- c) What impact has public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy had in the HoA region?

1.3 OBJECTIVES

1.3.1 Broad Objective

Examine the role and impact of public diplomacy in countering terrorism.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

- a) To examine and assess the counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in place and their impact in the Horn of Africa.
- b) To examine and analyze the various diplomatic strategies and the place of public diplomacy in countering terrorism in the Horn region of Africa.
- c) To assess the impact of public diplomacy as a counterterrorism measure in the Horn of Africa.

1.4 LITERATURE REVIEW

1.4.1 Introduction

The concept of terrorism is indeed a complicated concept for the common folk to grasp especially when trying to link the objectives and methods used to propagate it, with International Law, the Geneva Convention and the UN Charter on one hand, as well as the specific definitions offered by various governments and their agencies on the other.

There has not been a unanimous description of terrorism despite decade's long research and literature on this subject.¹¹ Perhaps this is the reason why effective coordinated counterterrorism mechanisms and strategies have not been yet formulated. Walter Laqueur notes that several hundreds of definitions of terrorism have been propagated so far, observing that the aspect of violence or a threat to instigate violence on a weaker target as common in all the definitions.¹² Jeffrey Simon further notes the existence of about 212 definitions of terrorism globally.¹³ A factor that makes it hard to come up with a comprehensive description of terrorism is the motivation of the so called terrorists; whether political, nationalist, or ideological, makes it difficult to determine. Secondly, stakeholders have failed in reaching a consensus on what constitutes terrorism. Perhaps this is what led to social scientists Schmidt and Jongman in 1988 to analyze the wordings of hundreds of definitions. In their analysis, violence emerged at 83.5%, politics at 65%, propagating fear at 51% while indiscriminate targets emerged at 21%.¹⁴

Laqueur describes terrorism as using violence to meet certain objectives, with an aim to instill fear on the intended victims, relies on publicity and its conduct is inhumane.¹⁵ Yohana Alexander, concurs that terrorism is fear inducing. He defines it as a propagation of violence against civilians aimed at intimidation in order to achieve political goals.¹⁶ The League of Nations Convention on Terrorism goes ahead to include

¹¹ Drummond, J. 'Northwest Imperative to Global Jihad: Social Psychological Aspect of the Construction of the Enemy, Political Violence, and Terror. In C. Stout (Ed.), *The psychology of terrorism: A public understanding (psychological dimension to war and peace)* (Vol. III). Connecticut: Praeger, 2002.

¹² Walter Laqueur, '*The New Terrorism Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction*' Oxford University Press, (2000) pp.5

¹³ Simon, Jeffrey D. '*The Terrorist Trap*' Blomington; Indiana University Press. 1994

¹⁴ Schmidt, Alex. Jongman, Albert '*Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Databases, Theories and Literature.*' Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books. 1988

¹⁵ Walter, Laqueur. '*The Age of Terrorism* (2nd Ed) New York, Columbia University Press, 1987pp. 44

¹⁶ Alexander, Yonah '*International Terrorism; National, Regional and Global Perspectives*, New York. Praeger. (1976) Pp xiv

the state and its government as targets of terrorist attacks.¹⁷ Terrorism can be perpetrated in the hunt for political, or ideological objectives. The definition offered by the US Department of Defense perhaps exemplifies this point. It is using illicit violence or a threat of the same, to cause distress while pursuing political, ideological or religious goals.¹⁸ Alex Schmidt and Albert Jongman perhaps offer the most all-inclusive definition. They describe terrorism as violence that rouses anxiety which is instigated by individuals or groups for ideological or political reasons where the victim is not the main intended target but as a message directed to a larger audience.¹⁹ I will use this definition for the purposes of this research. On the other hand, there are individuals who justify the use of terrorism to meet their objectives arguing that the motive is justifiable. One definition is that of the former PLO Chairman the late Yasser Arafat, in his 1974 address to UNGA where he coined the ill-famed quote, ‘One man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.’ Jonah Goldberg in his book ‘The Tyranny of clichés’ criticized this statement by stating that it is possible to differentiate a freedom fighter from a terrorist by just analyzing at the tactics they used.²⁰

1.4.2 Components of Terrorism

According to Cindy Comb, terrorism has five main characteristics; wanton violence, intimidation, a motive, weaker victims and an audience.²¹ In short, terrorists have an intention to make a point or seek publicity through intimidating or perpetrating violence upon innocent victims.

¹⁷ League Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. 1937 Article 1 (2)

¹⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff DOD, 2008 ‘*Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*’ Washington, D.C; DOD.

¹⁹ *Op Cit.*, Schmidt, Alex. Jongman, Albert. Pp. 28

²⁰ Goldberg, J. ‘How Liberals Cheat in the War of Ideas,’ Sentinel. 2012

²¹ Cindy, Comb. C, ‘*Terrorism in the 21st Century*’ (2nd Ed), Prentice Hall, 2000. Pp. 7.

Terrorism is not a new concept and can be traced to the period of the ‘*Reign of Terror*’ during the French Revolt of 1793, when the government branded the revolutionaries as terrorists.²² Since then terrorist attacks have morphed into more brutal and less humane. According to the Financial Action task Force, terror organizations nowadays tend to engage in income generating activities to fund their insurgency, consequently enabling them to wage a global war.²³ For instance ISIL has installed moles as bank managers all over Iraq’s major financial center, Mosul, with an intention of looting to finance their operations,²⁴ in addition to capturing the oil reservoirs and managing them for income generation.

According to Conte, the modern day definition of a terrorist is politically motivated. He notes, that some UN member states, Such as Libya and Iran, have all lobbied to have actions by freedom fighters excluded as acts of terrorism. He further notes that, Nelson Mandela was on the terror watch list for his role as commander of *Umkhonto We Sizwe*, which was considered a terror group in South Africa in the 60s, was only removed from the terror watch list in 2008, yet he was bestowed the Nobel in 1993.²⁵

1.4.3 Counterterrorism

Combating terrorism was first recorded in the ancient Roman Empire (1st Century AD.) when the Rome administration embarked on stopping assassinations in the Province of Judea by Sicarii Zealots, on civilians who collaborated with the Romans.²⁶ Omelicheva, defines counterterrorism as a blend of external and domestic strategies, which are

²² Burke, Edmond. ‘*Reflections on the Revolution in France*’ (1970) Ed. C.C. O’Brien, London; Penguin Books. 1969

²³ FATF, *Financing of the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)*, FATF, (2015) www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/methodsandtrends/documents/financing-of-terrorist-organisation-isil.html

²⁴ Di Giovannu. J *et. al.* ‘*How Does ISIS Fund its Reign of Terror?*’ Newsweek. 2014

²⁵ Conte, Alex. ‘*Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism: Commonwealth Approaches; The United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand.*’ Heidelberg; Springer, 2010.

²⁶ Pillar, Paul. R. ‘*Counter terrorism Security Studies: An Introduction*’ (Ed) Williams, Paul D: Routledge. 2008

intended to curtail activities of terrorists while protecting citizens from injury culminating in their actions.²⁷ Counterterrorism thus prevents and reacts to any terrorism threat aimed at a state, its citizens and in most cases its resources. These initiatives, range from financial restrictions, membership and party to international and regional treaties on counterterrorism, intelligence sharing and other forms of co-operation on terrorism related matters.

Rodgers further proposes these counter terrorism measures:

- a) Intelligence gathering, vigilance and bolstering of the security apparatus.
- b) Deterrence and military interventions.
- c) Mitigating underlying issues that motivate potential terrorists and cutting off their support base.²⁸

These measures, accordingly, represent both defensive and offensive approaches to counter terrorism. However, Lansford, et al propose a more radical military solution to dealing with terrorism.²⁹ Nevertheless, the Quaker council for European Affairs propose more diplomatic measures the like of good governance, aid assistance, democratization, equality and human rights, and international and regional regimes and organizations as a more effective counter terrorism measure.³⁰

Sageman, further suggests, for these counter terrorism initiatives to be effective, they ought to be harmonized across the international community, international and regional

²⁷ Omelicheva. M., 'Counterterrorism: The State of Scholarship, Directions for Future Data Collection and Analysis,' *Perspectives on Terrorism*. Vol. 1, No. 2, 2007

²⁸ Rodgers, 'Terrorism Security Studies: An Introduction' (Ed) Williams, Paul D: Routledge, 2008

²⁹ Lansford, et al (Ed) 'America's War on Terror' (2nd Ed): Ashgate, Surrey, 2009.

³⁰ Quaker Council for European Affairs, 'Effective Counter Terrorism: A Critical Assessment of European Union Responses.' Brussels. (2007)

bodies, civil society, faith based organizations *inter alia*.³¹ In this sense, collaboration ensures that the international community is able to benefit from collective intelligence to fight the scourge of terrorism, as Mattie Stepanek once said ‘unity is strength...’

Moreover, the United Nations Counter Terrorism Strategy of 2006, stresses that any counterterrorism measures adopted by states, should uphold fundamental freedoms and liberties as well as the law for them to be effective.³² In fact, Chenoweth *et al*, studying the connection between counterterrorism measures that result in subjugation of rights and terrorism, concluded that terrorist activities increased within a month.³³ Nonetheless, Young, concludes that repression directed at members of a terrorist outfit, led to short term de-escalation, but cautioned against future backlash.³⁴ While refuting, Gary *et al*, see minimal impact in torturing suspected terrorist on reduction of terrorism and in fact, link such torture to exacerbation of terrorism.³⁵

1.4.4 Strategies and Mechanisms of Counterterrorism

Yohan Alexander proposes co-operation between states as an efficient counterterrorism strategy. He argues that forging global consensus, training of law enforcement officers, collaborating on intelligence matters and economics would help in countering the terrorist threat.³⁶ George Joffe concurs, he asserts regional co-operation can be an effective counterterrorism strategy. His focus is based on the Euro-Mediterranean

³¹ Sageman. M., ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,’ *Terrorism and Political Violence*. Vol.26, 2014. Pp. 573

³² General Assembly Resolution 60/288, ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.’ A/RES/60/288 (8th Sep 2006)

³³ Chenoweth *et al.*, ‘Does Repression Decrease Terrorist Attacks? Evidence from Israel,’ Presented at the Annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Quebec: Montreal in March 2011

³⁴ Young. J., ‘*Repression, Dissent and the Onset of Civil War.*’, PhD Thesis, Florida State University, 2008.

³⁵ LaFree. G., ‘The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political Violence in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models,’ *Criminology*, Vol. 47, 2009. Pp. 26

³⁶ Alexander. Yohan, ‘*Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of six Nations.*’, Washington, D.C: Potomac Books, 2006. Pp. 4.

partnership of political and economic development, an effort aimed at countering terrorism in the Northern Africa region.³⁷

However, Lum Kennedy *et al*, are of the opinion that quality scientific data on counterterrorism strategies is lacking in the existing research. They further cite a lack of consistency in the available empirical data supporting the notion that the counterterrorism strategies employed, have actually led to a reduction of terror attacks. They assert that some may have even led to retaliatory attacks. In addition, they point out the US defense spending increase from \$9 billion in 2000, to \$30 billion in 2005 did not have a significant impact on global terrorist activity. Hence, they argue that there is insufficient empirical data to prove that the strategies in place have effectively countered the terrorist threat and how a state's failure to fully implement has impacted on counterterrorism.³⁸

1.4.5 Theoretical Perspectives on Terrorism

1.4.5.1 Psychological factors theory

Crenshaw, ponders why a reasonable man would choose to voluntarily join a terrorist organization and remain there.³⁹ Kegley, on the other hand, believes that terrorists have special personality traits that make them so.⁴⁰ While concurring, Schmidt & Jongman added that these special personalities included: irrational, violent, cold, conniving, disturbed and narcissistic.⁴¹ However, Jerrold Post critiqued the idea of personality disorders and noted that terrorists are inspired to do what they do by the physical

³⁷ Joffe. George, 'The European Union, Democracy and Counter terrorism in the Maghreb,' *JCMS*, University of Cambridge, Vol. 46, No1, 2008. Pp. 147-171.

³⁸ Lum, C., Kennedy, L.W. & Sherley, A. J Exp Criminol. 'Are counter-terrorism strategies effective? The results of the Campbell systematic review on counter-terrorism evaluation research' *Journal of Experimental Criminology*. 2006 Vol. 2: Pp. 489.

³⁹ Crenshaw, M. 'Explaining Terrorism: Causes Processes and Consequences,' London & Newyork: Routledge. 2011 Chapter 7.

⁴⁰ Kegley. W. Charles, 'International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls.' St. Martin's, 1990.

⁴¹ *Op Cit*, Schmidt & Jongman

environment around them.⁴² Crenshaw concurs that psychological factors coupled with environmental factors could lead to terrorism.⁴³ Indeed, Corrado asserts that political terrorists are seldom viewed as mentally disturbed.⁴⁴ The intention here was to highlight that terrorists are normal people without mental disorders. Spirinzak warns against completely ruling out psychological factors.⁴⁵

1.4.5.2 The Deprivation theory

This theory shows the correlation between human frustrations and his violent tendencies. Aristotle (384-322 B.C) pointed out when humans are frustrated about their lives, they tend to be violent.⁴⁶ Wiberg, links human aggression to political, economic and social frustration.⁴⁷ Gatlung echoes the fact that inequalities in socio-economic and political status leads to aggressive tendencies in human beings.⁴⁸ Indeed, Dollard, *et al*, a group of Yale psychologists, concur that violent tendencies tend to be triggered by frustrations.⁴⁹ This is the case in the Horn of Africa where terror groups the likes of The Oromo Liberation Front in Ethiopia and the Justice and Equality Movement in Sudan claim to seek equality.

⁴² Post, Jerrord. M, Walter (Ed) 'Origins of Terrorism: Psychology, ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind,' New York: Cambridge University Press, Washington D.C. 1990 Pp. 25-40

⁴³ Crenshaw, M. 'The Causes of Terrorism, Charles, W. Kegley, Jr. (Ed). *International Terrorism, Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, New York: St Martin's Press, 1990 Pp. 113-126.

⁴⁴ Corrado Raymond. R, 'A Critique of the Mental Disorder Perspective of Political Terrorism' *International Journal of Law and Psychiatry* Vol 4(3-4), 1981, Pp 156.

⁴⁵ Spirinzak, Ehud, 'Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization', in Tore Bjørge (ed.) *Terror from the Extreme Right*, London: Frank Cass, 1995, pp. 17-43.

⁴⁶ Aristotle (350 B.C), '*The Nicomachean Ethics*' (W.D, Ross & Lesley Brown. *Trans*) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2009

⁴⁷Wiberg, Håkan, '*Conflict Theory and Peace Research*' (Almqvist & Wiksell. *Trans*) (2nd Ed), 1990.

⁴⁸ Johan, Galtung 'A Structural Theory of Aggression', *Journal of Peace Research* 1 (2). 1964, pp. 95-116.

⁴⁹ James, Dollard et.al, '*Frustration and Aggression*' New Haven: Yale University, 1939.

1.4.5.3 Contagion Theory

Redlick asserts the fact that terror attacks happens in a periodic manner.⁵⁰ Brosius & Weiman add that periodic attacks imply an intention to seize the attention of the globe through the media and that this proves that terror attacks are timed to elicit maximum attention.⁵¹ Crenshaw goes ahead to allege that modern mass media is responsible for encouraging these periodic attacks by highlighting them in their news articles.⁵²

1.4.6 Diplomacy as a counter terrorism tool

Diplomacy is essential in peace negotiations according to perhaps one of the earliest proponent of the diplomatic theory, De Callieres.⁵³ Later theorists of diplomacy, have come up with unique ways of describing it. Diplomacy can be symbolized by the method by which it is conducted. For instance, Morgenthau describes it as upholding a state's national interests in a peaceful way.⁵⁴ This view is further reinforced by Freeman who points out that it is essentially nonviolent while acknowledging its coercive capability.⁵⁵ Likewise, diplomacy can be denoted using an activity. As Harold Nicholson put it, diplomacy is organizing international relations through negotiation.⁵⁶ In essence, he saw negotiations as central to achieving a diplomatic goal rather than using force.

⁵⁰ Redlick, Amy Sands, 'The Transnational Flow of Information as a Cause of Terrorism', in Yonah Alexander, et. al (Ed) *Terrorism: Theory and Practice* Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979, Pp. 73-89.

⁵¹ Weimann, Gabriel and Hans-Bernd Brosius, 'The Predictability of International Terrorism: A Time-Series Analysis', *Journal of Terrorism* 11 (6) 1988, Pp. 500

⁵² Crenshaw, Martha, '*Terrorism in Context*' University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1995. Pp.115.

⁵³ Francois. C., '*On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes*,' Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963

⁵⁴ Morgenthau. H., '*Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*,' 3rd Ed New York: AA. Knopf, 1964. Pp. 569.

⁵⁵ Chas. F. W., 'The Incapacitation of US Statecraft and Diplomacy,' *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Vol. 6, 2011. Pp 413-433

⁵⁶ Nicholson. H., '*Diplomacy*,' (3rd Ed) New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. Pp. 6

Moreover, diplomacy can be described using the format it takes. E.g. Bilateral and Multilateral diplomacy. Indeed, Keohane, labels multilateral diplomacy as involving more than two states, who synchronize and promote their national interests.⁵⁷ This is to say that states with similar interests and agendas can merge their various individual interests as one, and promote such interests in the international arena. While Krieman's description of bilateral diplomacy inculcates a shared recognition of two states' interests.⁵⁸

Furthermore, Diplomacy can be described according to the agents who carry it out. The Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations of 1961⁵⁹, recognizes official agents of states and international organizations. Accordingly, Krieman views track 1 diplomacy as one done through official channels of the state through its appointed bureaucrats.⁶⁰ However, owing to the development of diplomacy as an art, non-state actors have since been recognized as agents of diplomacy. For instance, track 2 diplomacy according to Dr. Diamond and Amb. McDonald, in addition to states bureaucrats, includes influential and skilled individuals with the capacity to influence public opinion to resolve a conflict.⁶¹ In addition, they view track 3 diplomacy as involving private groups working on relationship building between adversaries, who work to improve relationship and facilitate communication between them.⁶²

⁵⁷ Keohane. R., 'Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research,' *International Journal*, Vol. 45, No. 4, 1990. Pp. 732

⁵⁸ Krieman. Y., '*The Israeli Diplomatic efforts-and successes- in the Czech Republic, through Various Tracks*,' Master Thesis, Masaryk University, 2016. Pp. 4

⁵⁹ *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes*, Vienna, April 18, 1961. Washington. 1973.

⁶⁰ *Op Cit*. Krieman. 2016

⁶¹ Louise Diamond & John McDonald, '*Multi Track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*,' Washington, DC: Kumarian Press, 1997. Pp. 2

⁶² *Ibid*. Louise Diamond & John McDonald. Pp. 53

Accordingly, Paul Pillar views diplomacy as a resource in modern day counterterrorism efforts.⁶³ He asserts that diplomacy is a bond that binds various states' counterterrorism efforts into a single cohesive one, and that it is too critical to be left to states diplomatic agents alone, and should include non-state actors.⁶⁴ In addition, Haris Pesto views modern terrorism as a war that requires diplomatic discourse. He emphasizes the fact that the skill and tact of diplomacy has quelled many intractable conflicts, terrorism should not be an exception. He believes that the tact and skill used by diplomatic agents would be essential in counterterrorism.⁶⁵ Wilkinson adds that terrorism is best countered through military action, but warns that states should not overreact through military action.⁶⁶ Erbay, on the contrary posits, military incursion may lead to revenge attacks. He illustrates using the Israeli Defense Forces activity within Palestinian territory, has ensued in reprisal suicide bombings by youthful Palestinians.⁶⁷ Ally adds that any counterterrorism measure deployed should be designed carefully to be strict, but reasonable, not politically motivated and should treat all parties equally.⁶⁸ In fact, Chapter 6 of the Charter of United Nations strongly recommends that any dispute that threatens global peace, should be resolved peacefully, and that force ought only to be as a last recourse once the diplomatic remedies have been exhausted.⁶⁹

However, soft power diplomacy proponents such as Nacos, while critiquing hard power, say that the use of coercion does not guarantee effective counterterrorism, while

⁶³ Paul, P., '*Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*,' Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. Pp. 12

⁶⁴ *Ibid*

⁶⁵ *Op. Cit.* Pesto, Haris, 2010. Pp. 64-81.

⁶⁶ Wilkinson, Paul. '*Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*.' London: Frank Class Publishers, 2001.

⁶⁷ Erbay, T., '*The role of the Military in Counterterrorism: Unintended Consequences*,' Postgraduate Thesis, (Monterey: California) Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. Pp. 52

⁶⁸ Aly, Anne. *et al.* 'Making Noise online: An Analysis of the Say No to Terror Online Campaign.' *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. viii, Issue 5, October 2014.

⁶⁹ Charter of the United Nations, Article 33, Sec 1. Pp. 24

stressing, that it may fuel more violence and retaliatory attacks.⁷⁰ He further asserts that mobilizing the locals and carefully crafted diplomacy is very useful in countering the threat of terror. He adds, controlling the media narrative, negotiations, offering relief aid and economic development aid, counters terrorist propaganda and reduces the possibility of radicalizing frustrated people.⁷¹ Li and Shaub add that Foreign Direct Investment and economic stability promote development thus reducing chances of individuals getting radicalized.⁷² Klitgaard *et al* lay emphasis on the democratic peace perspective. They assert that democratic states are less likely to harbor terrorists as compared to authoritarian regimes and dictatorships.⁷³ On the contrary, they warn that terrorism is not discriminatory it cuts across the rich and the poor, the weak and the strong, the educated and the illiterate equally.⁷⁴ In contrast, Peter Neumann argues against negotiating with terrorists citing that such negotiations would be perceived as giving legitimacy to terrorists, but suggests regimes could do it only to result in stopping wanton violence.⁷⁵

Lastly, Jergen, asserts diplomacy on its own is not a sufficient counterterrorism tool, it ought to be backed up by public diplomacy strategies and mechanism to have a bigger impact.⁷⁶ Accordingly, diplomacy alone in the real sense does not sufficiently counter terrorism, and needs to be fortified by public diplomacy which focusses mainly on the citizens themselves, to be effective.

⁷⁰ Nacos, *et al.* (Eds.). 'Debating terrorism and counterterrorism: *Conflicting perspectives on causes, contexts, and responses.*' Washington, D.C: CQ Press 2010

⁷¹ *ibid*

⁷² Quan, Li & Shaub, Drew. 'Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorism: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis,' *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(2). 2004. Pp 230.

⁷³ Klitgaard, P., *et al.* 'The political economy of freedom, democracy, and transnational terrorism.' *Public Choice: The Political Economy of Terrorism*, 128(1&2), 2006 Pp. 290

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Peter R. Neumann., 'Negotiating with Terrorists,' *Foreign Affairs*, 2007.

⁷⁶ Juergen. K., 'The Inertia of Diplomacy,' *Diplomacy & State Craft*, Vol. 19, Issue 2. 2008. Pp. 333

1.4.7 Public Diplomacy as a counter terrorism tool

Hans Tuch, describes public diplomacy as state's communication to the public, to educate them on its foreign policy, principles, and socio-cultural institutions.⁷⁷ For instance, American principles encompass democracy, fundamental freedoms, tolerance, development and the rule of law. Similarly, the agency mandated to oversee the Integration of USIA functions into the State Department in 1997 defined public diplomacy as mechanisms through which states use in understanding, informing and influencing domestic and foreign audiences.⁷⁸ In a nutshell, public diplomacy is the winning over of 'hearts and minds' of the public on a state's ideals, principles and culture, in an effort to promote cohesion, tolerance and peaceful co-existence. Additionally, Tuch relates public diplomacy to propaganda and the use of IT and the internet to set agenda and shape the opinions of the public.⁷⁹

Philip Seib, a proponent of the use of public diplomacy to counter terrorism insists that it is an underrated resource. He further notes that terror groups are setting the agenda through the media; social media, and such messages should be countered immediately.⁸⁰ Hillary Clinton concurs suggesting smart power should be used to counter the terrorist threat. She further notes that a streamlined and contemporary public diplomacy would be the ideal tool to fight terrorism. She goes ahead to assert that having direct engagement with the public is critical in this fight against terrorism.⁸¹ Accordingly, smart power implies use of both soft power and moderate hard power

⁷⁷ Tuch, H. N., *Communicating with the World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan (1sted) 1990. Pp. 3

⁷⁸ <http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm> <accessed on the 10th of March 2017.

⁷⁹ *Op. Cit.* Tuch, 1990.

⁸⁰ Seib, Philip. 'Public Diplomacy: New Media and Counterterrorism.' *CPP Perspectives on Public Diplomacy*. 2011

⁸¹ Rodham, Clinton, 'Leading through Civilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and Development' *Foreign Affairs*: Council on Foreign Relations. Vol. 89. No.6 2010. Pp 13-24.

approaches in counterterrorism; a shift from the standard military response. James Forest singles out Al-Qaeda as the group with the highest social media outreach that it uses to indoctrinate and radicalize youth. He says that this must be countered using well planned public diplomacy.⁸² This involves a calculated counter al Qaida propaganda strategy. In addition, Friz Machlup, categorizes public diplomacy into education, research, developmental initiatives and financial assistance.⁸³ Accordingly, Stephen Emerson alludes to the phrase ‘*Not every security problem has a military solution*’ citing hardships especially in African states could lead one to be radicalized. He further asserts that efforts to eliminate these challenges would be a sensible preventive measure.⁸⁴ John & Colin root for peaceful conflict resolution and good governance mechanisms as effective counterterrorism measures especially in the Horn of Africa region.⁸⁵

1.4.8 Gaps in Literature Review

After reviewing the available literature in this area, I conclude that there lacks sufficient evidence to link the de-escalation or exacerbation of terror attacks to the strategies and mechanisms of counterterrorism employed. Similarly, the use of public diplomacy to counter terrorism has not been adequately addressed by the academia particularly on its use and its impact in the Horn of Africa region. Therefore, this research aims at linking the reduction or exacerbation of terror attacks to mechanisms and strategies formulated

⁸² Forest, J. ‘Influence Warfare and Modern Terrorism,’ *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*: Georgetown University Press. Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008.

⁸³ Machlup, F., ‘*The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*,’ Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962

⁸⁴ Emerson, Stephen, ‘The Battle for Africa’s Hearts and Minds,’ *World Policy Journal*: Duke University Press, Vol. 25. No. 4, 2009. Pp. 53-62.

⁸⁵ Colin, Thomas- Jensen, ‘Blowing the Horn,’ *Foreign Affairs*: Council on Foreign Relations. Vol. 86. No.2, 2007. Pp. 59.

by policy makers, while making a case for public diplomacy as the most effective tool of countering the terror threat in the Horn region.

1.5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

Currently there is a scarcity of data that links the reduction or increase of terror attacks to the counterterrorism mechanisms and strategies in place, more so the greater Horn of Africa region, particularly in Kenya and Ethiopia. In fact, policies are increasingly being made based on unverifiable data, such as media reports which are prone to manipulation. This may slow down the process of eradicating terrorism once and for all. This research intends to collect and collate verifiable data to be able to come up with accurate conclusions and actionable recommendations. I intend to conduct my research on both Kenya and Ethiopia as they have well-organized public diplomacy strategies in place.

1.5.1 Academic justification

This research seeks to add value to the existing academic work in the realm of the use of public diplomacy to counter terrorism. This will be done by introducing new empirical data and highlighting the best public diplomacy strategies used to counter the terrorism threat, based on case studies of Kenya and Ethiopia.

This research also intends to bring in new knowledge that will aid the academia in theory building and validation of the existing theories and ensure new hybrid theories are formulated.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

To the policy makers, this research will be evidence based and will link the reduction of terror attacks and the strategies and mechanisms that have been formulated. This will aid policy makers make better policies that will effectively counter the terrorist threat.

Secondly, this research will bring clarity to the policy makers on the significance of public diplomacy in the fight against terrorism aiding them to come up with better public diplomacy strategies of countering terrorism.

1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In a world of rapid globalization, amplified international interdependence, advancement in IT and the emergence of NSAs as major players in international relations, a liberal approach to countering the terrorist threat is the most practicable one.⁸⁶ The liberal theory perhaps more suitably exemplifies the role diplomacy has to play in countering the terrorist threat, in this case public diplomacy. This is owing to the fact that it acknowledges the multiplicity of actors in international relations, for instance, States as well as NGOs, MNCs, INGOs, the media etc., as opposed to realism which is state centric.

Accordingly, deprivation of fundamental rights and freedoms, socio-economic and political inequality enable terrorism to flourish.⁸⁷ These deprivations cause frustration which in turn may lead the masses to embrace violence such as joining terror groups. In fact, liberalists such as Aristotle, argue that there is correlation between human frustration and their violent tendencies.⁸⁸ This was reaffirmed in 2001, when 40 heads of government while addressing the United Nations General Assembly, alluded that issues of terrorism be addressed alongside inequality, poverty and underdevelopment.⁸⁹ In fact, the Secretary General Kofi Annan in his speech, emphasized that universal

⁸⁶ Buris, L. 'Realism v Liberalism in the Development of Counterterrorism Strategy.' *Small Wars Journal*, October 2011, Pp. 2.

⁸⁷ Ross, I, Jeffrey, 'Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Casual Model,' *Journal of Peace Research*, Sage Publications. Vol. 30, No. 3, 1993. Pp 317-329.

⁸⁸ *Op Cit*, 36.

⁸⁹ United Nations. 'Terrorism must be addressed in parallel with poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, general assembly told.' 2001. [Online] Available at: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2001/ga9971.doc.htm> [Accessed 29 May 2017].

peace and security could only be tackled by addressing issues of human suffering and deprivations.⁹⁰ Hence, frustrations caused by this inequality, economic hardships and underdevelopment lead to violent mindsets an environment where terrorism best thrives.⁹¹

Secondly, the liberal theory presupposes that weaknesses in liberal institutions and legal frameworks especially those tasked with conflict resolution, justice and equality, breeds anarchy which in turn leads to terrorism. These institutions are the glue that holds the society together, they ensure order is maintained, adjudicate where differences emerge and amicably resolve issues. Therefore, if the institutions are unable to dispense their functions, anarchy blossoms leading to violence in form of terror attacks. Therefore, failed states are a major breeding ground for terrorist organizations, the likes of Al Shabaab in Somalia, and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. They provide an environment in which international terrorist organizations thrive as they lack law and order.⁹²

Indeed, one Ancient Liberal, Immanuel Kant, in his thesis *Perpetual Peace*, advances the notion that there is a connection between political freedom and peace,⁹³ proving that individual freedoms and security are interlinked.⁹⁴ Therefore, bestowing fundamental rights and freedoms would ensure the masses are content reducing the chances of them being radicalized. Besides, public diplomacy thrives best where free speech and free press are stomached.

⁹⁰ GA/9971 of 2001.

⁹¹ *Op Cit*, 39.

⁹² Piazza A.James, 'Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failinf States Promote Transnational Terrorism?' *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52, Issue 3, September 2008. Pp. 469-458.

⁹³ Williams. B. 'From Freedom to Liberty: The Construction of a Political Value.' *Philosophy of Public Affairs*, 2001. Pp. 25.

⁹⁴ T, Dunne. 'The Rules of the Game are changing; Human Rights in Crisis Post 9/11,' *International Politics*, 2007. Pp 270.

Empowering institutions that reinforce the fundamental liberties of individuals such as the judiciary, would be an effective measure to counter the terrorist threat⁹⁵ indeed, the United Nation Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 legally imposes responsibility to states to protect its citizens from terror attacks by enacting laws and establishing institutions that mete out justice to terrorists and their financiers. These institutions also ensure economic order within a state hence minimizing chances of economic exploitation of the poor by the elite class. This in turn encourages equal economic prosperity, reducing the chances of radicalization.⁹⁶

However, this theory although it prescribes freedoms and liberties, fails to prescribe how these freedoms can be guaranteed equally to all. In a capitalist world it is almost impossible to guarantee equality as ‘capitalism is not an equalizer.’⁹⁷ Without a doubt, this theory does not solve the gender parity conundrum which has been an issue for decades now. Secondly, liberals fail to agree on the type of institutions appropriate to deliver liberal standards in a multiethnic setting.⁹⁸

Therefore, in countering terrorism, a liberal analysis can be both efficient and effective in understanding the link between terrorism and the deprivation of fundamental rights and freedoms, inequalities, and weak institutional frameworks. For terrorism to be effectively countered, liberal tools that directly impact on the lives of people and improve their status must be adopted to ensure that frustration does not lead individuals to a terrorism mindset.

⁹⁵ *Op Cit*, Doyle. W. M. Pp.213.

⁹⁶ Knight, Jack ‘*Institutions and Social Conflict*’ Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp 17.

⁹⁷ Berg. M., ‘*An Ecological Critique of Capitalism*,’ Undergraduate Thesis, University of San Diego, 2016.

⁹⁸ *Dunne, T. 'Liberalism'* in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), *The Globalization of World politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. 108-123

1.7 HYPOTHESES

The study seeks to test the following hypotheses;

- a) The strategies and mechanisms of counterterrorism in place are not efficient in thwarting terrorism in the HoA.
- b) The ‘traditional diplomatic’ counterterrorism strategies currently in use are not effective to counter the threat posed by terrorism in the HoA.
- c) If public diplomacy counterterrorism strategies are used, then the threat posed by terror in the HoA will be effectively thwarted.

1.8 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

1.8.1 Research Design

This research used a mixed method approach, systematically advancing both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. In pursuit of quantitative data, it relied on Semi structured questionnaires. While, in pursuit of qualitative data, the researcher made field visits and observations, guided by a checklist. Key informant interviews and focus group discussions were guided by an interview and discussion guides respectively.

1.8.2 Research Setting

Field visits to the ministry of External Affairs, the Embassy of Ethiopia in Kenya including the National Counter Terrorism Center, were made, to collect Primary data. While visits to the American Reference Center at the US Embassy in Kenya, the Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library, and the National Defense College Library provided secondary data.

1.8.3 Population

The population for this research comprised of registered, adult urban refugees from Ethiopia aged between 18 and 60 years. The criteria used was that they had to have lived in Ethiopia when they were 17 years of age or older, this ensured that the respondents had an understanding of the subject matter in question. Respondents also comprised of experts in the field of counterterrorism.

1.8.4 Sample

The study utilized a convenience sampling. Semi structured questionnaires were issued to willing registered, and easily accessible urban refugee adults, dividing them into focus groups for discussions. The sample population was drawn randomly while ensuring gender equality.

1.8.5 Data Collection

The study relied on semi-structured questionnaires and interviews to obtain data relevant to the questions and objectives of this research. Every registered adult urban refugee, who was willing to participate received a letter giving information about the research and a consent form in addition to the questionnaire.

1.8.6 Ethical Considerations

Permit to conduct the research was sought from The National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation pursuant to the Science and Technology Act, Chapter 250 Laws of Kenya. Secondly, the respondents had the right decide independently without coercion whether to respond or ignore any question they were uncomfortable with in the questionnaire. In addition, all respondents' fundamental rights and privacy were strictly observed by ensuring no names and phone numbers were attached to the questionnaires. Thirdly, there was full disclosure of the nature and scope of the research

and the respondents were made aware of their discretion to participate in the research. Lastly, each respondent was presented with a consent form that they signed prior to the completion of the questionnaire.

1.8.7 Data Analysis

Quantitative data was analyzed using the computer research analysis software IBM's Statistical Package for Social Sciences. While **Qualitative data** was analyzed by constructing the various interviews questions into topics and coding them. Then, grouping the responses with recurring themes together.

1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE

- 1) Chapter One: Introduction and background. Lays the framework upon which the research will be conducted, identifies literature gaps and shows the methodology that will be used in the research.
- 2) Chapter Two: Counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in the Horn of Africa. Investigates the counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in place, and their impact in Kenya and Ethiopia.
- 3) Chapter Three: The role and impact of diplomatic strategies and the place of public diplomacy in counterterrorism. Analyzes the role and impact of diplomatic approaches in counterterrorism.
- 4) Chapter Four: The impact of public diplomacy as a counterterrorism tool. Critically assesses public diplomacy strategies in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa.
- 5) Chapter Five: Presentation of quantitative data and analysis. Presents and analyzes quantitative data collected, and collated during the course of the research.
- 6) Chapter Six: Conclusion and recommendations. Demonstrates how this research has contributed to existing knowledge, while giving actionable recommendations to policy makers. It also justifies why the study had to be done.

CHAPTER TWO

STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS OF COUNTERTERRORISM; KENYA AND ETHIOPIA

Introduction

The first step in answering my research question, ‘what are the strategies and mechanisms of counterterrorism in place and their impact in the Horn of Africa?’ was to analyze the international and regional counterterrorism strategies, and their importance in setting up the counterterrorism regime in place. This was essential in understanding the role both regional and international organizations have played in setting counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms, and their influence in the domestic strategies of Kenya and Ethiopia.

In addition, I examined the CT strategy culminating in International and regional instruments and regimes emanating from the International and regional organizations. This is essential in evaluating their impact in the designing various strategies and mechanisms of counterterrorism in both Kenya and Ethiopia.

Accordingly, I begun by examining the role of international law in counterterrorism, then, the part of the UN and related organizations in influencing the global counterterrorism agenda, followed by the enablers of extremism in Africa, and the role of the AU in scheming the African counterterrorism agenda and lastly examined the individual strategies and mechanisms of both Kenya and Ethiopia that have culminated from the International and regional efforts, and their impact in countering the terrorist threat, finally I employed the liberal theoretical approach in analyzing and justifying the strategies and mechanisms in place in the Horn of Africa sub-region.

2.1. INTERNATIONAL LEVEL COUNTERTERRORISM

2.1.1. International Law and Counterterrorism

In the 21st century terrorism no longer contains itself within national borders, largely due to the rampant globalization and the advancement in Information Technology. This is manifest the terrorist attack in 9/11. The significance of these attacks was the death toll almost equaled the casualties of terrorism in preceding two decades⁹⁹, and that they were committed by non US citizens. International law, is not only the foundation upon which domestic and international counterterrorism law of states is based upon, but also sets rules of states' and non-states actors' collaboration on issues of counterterrorism. Terrorism has global implications that can only be mitigated through global regulation,¹⁰⁰ which international law offers.

Strategies and mechanism of counterterrorism ought to be based upon aspects of human rights, democratic rule and social equity.¹⁰¹ A fact that was further re-emphasized in the General Assembly that, counterterrorism mechanisms and strategies and human liberties work in tandem with each other.¹⁰² This is the reason international law exists within the realm of IH, HR, and the refugee laws, *inter alia*. This was alluded to in the Security Council resolution 1456 of 2003 that obliges states to take counterterrorism measures within the framework of international law specifically placing emphasis upon human rights, refugee and humanitarian laws.¹⁰³ In doing so, international law imposes duties and obligation to states and non-state organizations when dealing with each

⁹⁹ Mahd. M., 'From Old to New Terrorism: The Changing Nature of International Security.' *Global Studies Journal*

¹⁰⁰ Vinay. B., '*Global Issues for Global Citizens: An Introduction to Key Development Challenges.*' Washington DC: World Bank, 2006. Pp. 2.

¹⁰¹ United Nations, '*Human Rights and Criminal Justice Responses to Terrorism.*' Vienna: UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014. Pp. 5.

¹⁰² General Assembly Resolution 60/288, 'The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.' A/RES/60/288 (8th Sep 2006)

¹⁰³ Security Council, *Security Council resolution 1456 (2003) [on combating terrorism]*, 20 January 2003, S/RES/1456 (2003)

other. Sources of International law are; international conventions and protocols, customs and practice, ‘principles of law recognized by civilized states’.¹⁰⁴

However, states, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council blatantly disregard International Human Rights Laws in the guise of counterterrorism mechanisms, which habitually comprise blatant abuse of fundamental human rights as prescribed by the Bill of Rights, violations of rights to free speech and privacy, that may lead to frustration of the citizenry in turn leading to unrest; ultimately manifest as terrorism. For instance the ‘International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights’ (ICCPR) proscribes torture and other inhumane treatment,¹⁰⁵ and mandates that suspects of any international law violation are promptly brought before the judiciary to be tried before a court of appropriate jurisdiction, without prejudice and undue delay.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, the US has habitually detained suspects of terrorism at the Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, who are often deprived of these rights. In fact, since its inception, 780 suspects have been detained as of March 2017, in addition to 9 deaths in detention.¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, 17.6% of former detainees have reverted back to terrorism.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, excessive counterterrorism measures, including overly obstructive legislature, is increasingly being adopted against vulnerable groups such as migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. This is often as a result of erroneously linking acts of terrorism to refugees and people who profess allegiance to certain faiths, contrary to Art. 14(1) of the UDHR, 1948 that guarantees a right to seek asylum from

¹⁰⁴ United Nations, ‘*Statute of the International Court of Justice*’, New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information. Print. 1945, Article 38. Pp. 51.

¹⁰⁵ UNGA, ‘*International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*,’ 23rd March, 1976. Art 7. In United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 999. Pp. 171

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* Art 26

¹⁰⁷ Human Rights First, ‘*Guantanamo By The Numbers; Fact Sheet*,’ Washington. D.C: Human Rights first, March 2017. Pp.2

¹⁰⁸ The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ‘*Reengagement of Detainees Formerly Held at the Guantanamo Bay, Cuba*,’ Washington, D.C: ODNI. 2016

persecution.¹⁰⁹ For instance, the US' president executive order 13769 of January 2017 dubbed 'protecting the nation from foreign terrorist entry into the US' aimed at regulating entry into the US of citizens of 7 Muslim speaking states.¹¹⁰

2.1.2. United Nations Strategies and Mechanism of Counterterrorism

The UN was formed in 1945. Its membership currently stands at 193 states.¹¹¹ The Charter is an instrument of international law as it creates conditions under which commitments by states arising from international law are maintained,¹¹² making it the supreme law where international law obligations are concerned.¹¹³ Furthermore, the United Nations is tasked with subduing acts that threaten international peace and security.¹¹⁴

Accordingly, terrorist extremism threatens global peace, a fact which was reiterated by the Security Council in 2011.¹¹⁵ In 2014 alone, 93 states experienced terror attacks resulting to 32,765 deaths.¹¹⁶ Consequently, the United Nations uses its various organs and specialized agencies, each with a unique mandate, to devise strategies and mechanisms of counterterrorism.

Indeed, the UN is a platform where states convene to deliberate solutions to any emerging threat to global peace and seek solutions to fighting it. In fact, with a global

¹⁰⁹ UNGA, 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' New York: United Nations General Assembly. 1948, Art 14(1)

¹¹⁰ The White House, 'Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,' whitehouse.gov (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/06/executive-order-protecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-united-states>) <accessed 12th October 2017

¹¹¹ United Nations, un.org, (<http://www.un.org/en/member-states/>) >accessed 5 June 2017.

¹¹² United Nations, 'Charter of the United Nations', New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information. Print. 1945 (preamble-3rd Paragraph)

¹¹³ *Ibid*, Article 103. Pp. 63.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid*, Article 1, Sec 1. Pp. 5

¹¹⁵ Security Council, *Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) [on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts]*, 28 September 2001, S/RES/1373 (2001).

¹¹⁶ Global terrorism Index. (2016). 3rd Ed. [ebook] Institute for economics & peace, pp. 4. Available at: <http://www.economicsandpeace.org> [Accessed 24th May 2017].

membership, states can converge and set out agendas and strategies where they can unite and tackle any perceived threat.

The UN has the ability to sanction rogue belligerent states that harbor terrorists or aids them in any way. Through the Security Council it can impose economic sanctions or even authorize using force to ensure that global peace and security is maintained.

UN specialized agencies have a role to play in countering terrorism. They deal with various specific mandates that are all aimed at the general human security. For instance the WHO works to eradicate rare tropical diseases, while UNDP works to ensure global sustainable development. These functions in turn eradicate the perceived root enablers of terrorism by reducing the vulnerabilities that may lead people to choose a violent path of terrorism. In addition their far reaching networks makes the UN more reliable to deal with a threat that has a global impact such as terrorism.

2.1.2.1. The United Nations General Assembly

UNGA is the cream in the hierarchy of all the principal organs of the United Nations, perhaps owing to its worldwide membership, making it the key platform for members to deliberate international issues. In fact, all the 193 member states have an equal vote on the floor of the General Assembly,¹¹⁷ with recommendations on significant matters as international peace and security requiring a 2/3 majority vote of members in attendance.¹¹⁸

Accordingly, it may discuss issues that relate to global peace, raised by a member, unless it is under deliberation by the Security Council.¹¹⁹ A significant milestone was reached in 1994 when it adopted resolution 49/60 of 1994, which reiterated the

¹¹⁷ *Op Cit*, Charter of the United Nations, Article 18(1).

¹¹⁸ *Ibid*, Article 18(2)

¹¹⁹ *Ibid*, Article 35(1)

inexcusable and criminal nature of terrorist attacks.¹²⁰ In discharging its functions, it may form subsidiary organs that would aid it.¹²¹ Thus, 3 committees have been established to date to deal with the terrorism problem.

a) The 3rd Committee

Otherwise referred to as the humanitarian, social and cultural committee, is tasked with analyzing human rights, equality, humanitarian and developmental issues around the world, working closely with states to ensure their counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms encompass the growth and protection of all humans alike. Likewise, it harmonizes efforts of other UN agencies such as the task force in charge of implementing the counterterrorism strategy, regional and national organizations to ensure that the strategies of counterterrorism are ethical in that they contain aspects of socio-cultural equality and are non-discriminatory in nature. Fulfilling the requirement of Article 13(b) of the Charter.¹²²

Lastly, it negotiates resolutions and conventions which are subsequently tabled at the General Assembly for adoption. In fact, during the 71st General Assembly meeting, 3 resolutions on alternative development agendas, learning and preventing crime, tabled by the 3rd committee were approved.¹²³ In brief, the 3rd committee is essential in counterterrorism as it tackles issues considered conducive for the emergence, growth and spread of terrorism.

¹²⁰ General Assembly resolution, 'Declaration on measures to eliminate International Terrorism' : A/RES/49/60 (9 December 1994)

¹²¹ *Op Cit*, Charter of the United Nations, Article 22.

¹²² 'Promotion of international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, educational and health fields, and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms based on equality.'

¹²³ United Nations, 'Meetings Coverage' un.org (<http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/gashc4184.doc.htm>), 3 November 2016> accessed 5th June 2017. (GA/SHC/4184)

b) The 6th Committee

Otherwise known as the legal committee, deals with legal matters that are posed in the General Assembly, and is represented by all the member states, and even observer states can join in the discussions.¹²⁴ It is constituted in pursuance to Article 13 of the Charter which mandates the UNGA to ‘...make recommendations for the purpose of...encouraging the progressive development of international law...’ It therefore makes commendations to the General Assembly on matters of international law. For instance, it negotiates and deliberates proposals such as actions to be taken to suppress international terrorism.¹²⁵ It then tables the proposals on the floor of the General Assembly for adoption. Decisions culminating are arrived at through a vote or informal consensus.¹²⁶

Consequently, the legal committee’s most notable achievement counterterrorism initiative was the negotiation of the ‘Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism,’ that was adopted by UNGA in 1994.¹²⁷ This resolution denounced terrorism and placed an obligation to members to cooperate to fight it.

c) Ad Hoc Committee

It was established pursuant to Article 13-(1)a of the UN Charter,¹²⁸ by the 1996 UNGA resolution 51/210,¹²⁹ tasked with expounding on the ‘International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings’ along with the ‘International Convention for the

¹²⁴ United Nations, ‘Sixth Committee-Legal’ un.org (<http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/>) >accessed 5th June 2017.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Panigua. D. C.F, ‘The *Negotiation Dynamics of Four UN Counter-terrorism Treaties, 1997-2005.*’ New York: City University of New York, 2008. Pp. 38.

¹²⁷ *Op Cit*, General Assembly resolution A/RES/49/60.

¹²⁸ Mandates the General Assembly to ‘initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of...encouraging the development of International Law and its codification.’

¹²⁹ General Assembly resolution, ‘Measures to eliminate International Terrorism’: A/RES/51/210 (17 December 1996) Paragraph 9.

Suppression of Financing of Terrorism’ and the ‘International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,’ intending to complement the framework that existed at the time, while further attempting to develop an extensive structure on international terrorism.¹³⁰ Membership is open to members, UN agencies and the IAEA.¹³¹ Voting is done by a ‘single undertaking’ where every item in the negotiation is part of the whole document and cannot be separately agreed upon.

Indeed, its mandate culminated in the adoption of UN General Assembly resolutions, 52/164 of 1997, 54/109 of 1999 and 59/290 of 2005.¹³² All counterterrorism conventions. Conversely, the Ad Hoc Committee last met in 2013 pursuant to GA resolution 67/99¹³³ to update the General Assembly on its progress towards a comprehensive counterterrorism convention, stating it needed time to deliberate on the unresolved contentious issues.

2.1.2.2. The UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy (UNGC-T strategy)

The UNGC-T strategy was a determined attempt by the UN to come up with a single strategy that pieces together the various conventions, protocols and resolutions relating to terrorism. Accordingly, in September 2006, the UNGC-T strategy was unanimously adopted by UNGA. It is a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that is tasked with dealing with; the principal circumstances that favor the spread of terrorism, preventive counterterrorism, enhancing the capacity of states to counter extremism, while underpinning an obligation by states to upholding civil liberties and the law, are the basis of its four pillars. It aims at eliminating factors that make states vulnerable to

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (A/RES/52/164), The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (A/RES/54/109), and The International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism (A/RES/59/290) respectively.

¹³³ General Assembly, ‘Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism.’ A/RES/67/99 (December 14 2012.)

exploitation by terror cells, such as; poverty, socio-economic inequality, weak institutional frameworks, subjugation of civil liberties and lack of autocracy and upholding the law, seen by scholars of countering violent extremism as triggers of terrorism.¹³⁴

The HoA sub-region¹³⁵ is predisposed to terrorism as compared to the rest of the sub-Saharan Africa, due perhaps to its geo-location, states' weak institutional frameworks, poor economies, conflicts both inter-state and intra-state, the uncontrolled movement of persons across borders and the socio-economic inequality.¹³⁶ Indeed, according to the 2016 corruption index by Transparency International, Ethiopia is ranked 108th, Kenya 145th while Somalia came last at number 176,¹³⁷ proving that corruption is still rife in the region. In addition, the report explicates a link between corruption and inequality in distribution of both power and wealth, by highlighting the fact that the lower ranked states have a weak institutional framework and low transparency.

Secondly, states in the region lack sufficient resources to effectively implement their counterterrorism measures. This was the case in 2009 when Ethiopia recalled its 3000 man army from Somalia citing lack of resources to sustain a containment counterterrorism.¹³⁸ Thirdly, the HoA region has experienced both inter and intra state conflicts particularly border disputes. The most significant being the Ogaden war of 1977, when Somalia invaded Ethiopia aiming to annex the Ogaden region.¹³⁹ The

¹³⁴ Forest, James J. F. *'The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training, and root causes.'* Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006. Pp. 2.

¹³⁵ For the purpose of this project Horn of Africa sub region refers to Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia.

¹³⁶ Shin, D.S. 'Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn: An Overview', *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, 2009 Pp.79-91

¹³⁷ 'Corruption Perception Index 2016.' Transparency International, January 25, 2017 <Accessed 27th May 2017. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.

¹³⁸ Moller, B. (2017). *'Somalia after Ethiopian Withdrawal'*. DIIS Brief. [online] Danish Institute for International Studies, Pp.2-4. Available at: <https://goo.gl/OjMni5> <Accessed 4 Jun. 2017.

¹³⁹ Nkaisserry, J. *'The Ogaden War: An Analysis of its Causes and its Impact on Regional Peace in the Horn of Africa'*. Pennsylvania: US Army War College, 1997. Pp. 5-8.

failure of which perhaps led to the emergence of a separatist terrorist cell, the Ogaden National Liberation Front.

To further complicate matters, there is uncontrolled movement of people across borders. In fact, the 2015 terror attacks on Kenya exposed its porous borders and a weakness in border security, particularly the attack on Garrissa University that claimed approximately 150 lives. In view of the foregoing, the Horn of Africa sub region is vulnerable to indoctrination and terror attacks. An effective UNGC-T strategy ought not only provide mechanisms to respond to terror attacks, but provide early warning tools and prevent indoctrination of the locals.

2.1.2.3. The United Nations Security Council

The UNSC is perhaps the most prominent organ of the UN as it has power to compel compliance in instances where global peace and security is threatened.¹⁴⁰ Hence, it is primarily tasked with upholding global peace and security and reinstating peace.¹⁴¹ It comprises of 15 members, 5 of whom are permanent members (USA, China, UK, Russia, and France) and 10 non-permanent members who are elected to serve biennially.¹⁴² Each member is entitled to a single vote. However, non-members are allowed to participate in discussions where the issues in contention affect their interests,¹⁴³ whereas resolutions passed by the Security Council are binding.¹⁴⁴ In addition, in discharging its duty, the Charter allows it to institute subordinate organs that aid in performing its duties.¹⁴⁵ Accordingly it has set up committees for this function.

¹⁴⁰ *Op Cit.* Charter of the United Nations, Articles 41 & 42.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.* Article 24(1).

¹⁴² *Ibid.* Article 23.

¹⁴³ *Ibid.* Article 31.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* Article 25.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.* Article 29.

a) Counter-Terrorism Committee

Following the September 11th attack on the US soil, the UNSC adopted resolution 1373 which reiterated the threat to global peace and security postured by terrorism. It further, imposed an obligation to members to outlaw incitement and financing of terrorism and further mete out justice to perpetrators and abettors of terrorist acts.¹⁴⁶ It among others acknowledged that discrimination of any kind, conflicts and development issues are a stumbling block in counterterrorism efforts.¹⁴⁷

Accordingly, UNSC resolution 1373 of 2001 tasked the Counter-Terrorism Committee tasked with monitoring its implementation by member states by periodically appraising their reports on the implementation status and to aid in international collaboration on the counterterrorism issues raised in the resolution.¹⁴⁸ The Committee was later reinforced when the UNSC approved resolution 1535 of 2004 that formed the ‘Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate’ (C-TCED) that was tasked with complementing its work in monitoring and ensuring states co-operate in counterterrorism efforts.¹⁴⁹

b) The 1540 Committee

In 2004, the Security Council adopted resolution 1540 whose main aim was to thwart the possibility of terrorists and individuals acquiring WMDs. It required states outlaw the making, possession and transport of WMDs and mete justice to those who aid and

¹⁴⁶ *Op Cit.* S/RES/1373 (2001), paragraph 3.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.* Paragraph 10

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.* Paragraph 4

¹⁴⁹ Security Council, *Security Council resolution 1535 (2004) [on combating terrorism]*, 26 March 2004, S/RES/1535 (2004)

abet the terrorists or potential terrorists.¹⁵⁰ It further encouraged assistance of states who lacked the capacity to implement this resolution.¹⁵¹

Accordingly, the resolution created the 1540 Committee, assigned the task of monitoring the enactment of the resolution, then report back to the Security Council.¹⁵² The Committee mandate was to last 2 years and states were to send reports just 6 months after the resolution was adopted.¹⁵³

2.1.2.4. The Secretariat

The Secretariat is comprised of the SG appointed by UNGA following approval of the UNSC, and other United Nations staff required to dispense the functions of the United Nations.¹⁵⁴ The SG is the chief executive officer of the UN. Accordingly, the SG may alert the UNSC on any issue that in his view is a potential threat to global peace.¹⁵⁵ The SG chairs the ‘Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.’ In fact, it was set up by Koffi Annan in 2005.¹⁵⁶

Implementation of the UNGC-T strategy is done under the patronage of the CTITF. The task force, although a creation of the UN Secretary General in 2005, was endorsed in 2006 by UNGA to implement the UNGC-T strategy. It brings together 24 entities; specialized agencies, funds and programs within the UN, which include; UNESCO, UNDP, World Bank, WHO, ‘The Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection

¹⁵⁰ Security Council, *Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) [concerning weapons of massive destruction]*, 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004) Pp. 2.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid.* Paragraph 7.

¹⁵² *Ibid.* Paragraph 4.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁴ *Op Cit.* Charter of the United Nations. Article 97.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Article 99.

¹⁵⁶ United Nations, ‘The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (<https://goo.gl/jVGtGH>)<accessed 7th June 2017.

of Human Rights’, ‘Department of Political Affairs’, ‘Department of Public Information’, *inter alia*.¹⁵⁷

The CTITF, serves to compliment and provide support to the counterterrorism efforts of states by forging alliances with other regional and international bodies dealing with counterterrorism and availing necessary resources needed for capacity building within member states.¹⁵⁸ Further, it provides a forum to addresses issues of political and economic discrimination and other aspects of human rights. This is facilitated by the CTITF working group ‘Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism.’ The task force identifies strengths and weaknesses of human rights legislation of member states while encouraging information exchange among member states.¹⁵⁹

Additionally, the CTITF dealing with ‘countering the financing of terrorism’, is tasked with identifying methods terrorist cells use to source financing, devises means to stop this financing while identifying the emerging challenges related to curbing financing of terrorism.¹⁶⁰ Similarly, it offers assistance to member states to formulate laws that outlaw financing of terrorism, provide training on asset freezing while facilitating domestic and international cooperation on the matter.¹⁶¹ This is in line with the 2001 UNSC resolution 1373 that states would ensure passage of laws that outlaw funding of terror activities and freeze assets of terrorists and their sympathizers.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁷ *Op Cit*, Eric Rosand, *et al.* 2008. Pp. 8.

¹⁵⁸ General Assembly Resolution 70/291, ‘The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Review’: A/RES/70/291 (1 July 2016).

¹⁵⁹ UN CTITF Protecting Human Rights while Countering Terrorism Working Group, ‘*The Impact of Terrorism and Counterterrorism measures on the enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*’. Expert Seminar Report, Geneva, 7th November 2008.

¹⁶⁰ United Nations, ‘*CTITF Working Group Report on Tackling the Financing of Terrorism*’. New York: Department of Political Affairs. 2009. Pp. 3-8.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.* Pp. 9.

¹⁶² *Op Cit*, S/RES/1373/2001.

SUMMARY

As argued above, the UN through the Counterterrorism Committee, since 2006, has aided states and regional organizations to implement coordination in CT efforts regionally and internationally, boosting their Counterterrorism ability. As a result some states have even created their own counterterrorism units. For instance, Germany, Israel *et al* all have specialized counterterrorism units.

In addition, it has been ascertained that the UN, through counterterrorism reporting by member states and regional organizations. For instance, pursuant to UNSC resolutions 1373(2001) and 1624(2005), members are mandated to report to the CTC on matters regarding the implementation of the resolutions.¹⁶³¹⁶⁴ Accordingly, it has been successful in information collection, making it one of the largest if not the largest repository of global counterterrorism activity. In fact, by 2004 all member states had filed initial reports on counterterrorism with the CTC.¹⁶⁵

However, one major obstacle faced by the UN is the lack of a universally accepted definition of the crime of terrorism. This poses a challenge when the various definitions propagated by the various scholars and experts, can be challenged by states whenever they don't suit their political and national interests.

Similarly, the United Nations lacks an implementation enforcement mechanism, in that it has no ability to intervene and coerce states to comply with mandates bestowed upon them by a counterterrorism resolution. This is indeed, an obstacle to the UN in its quest to implement its resolutions. In addition, courts within the jurisdiction of the implementing state can review measures adopted to be implemented that give effect to

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* Article 6

¹⁶⁴ Security Council, *Security Council Resolution 1624(2005)* [On Threats to International Peace and Security], 14th September, 2005. S/RES/1624(2005) Article 5

¹⁶⁵ De jonge. C., 'The United Nations and the Campaign against Terrorism,' *The Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 26, No.4, 2003. Pp.168

UN Resolutions. For instance, this was the case in *Kadi v EU Council and Commission* of 2008, where the European Court of Justice annulled EU regulation 881/2002 pursuant to UN Security Council Regulations 1267(1999) and 1989(2011) that aimed at imposing restrictions upon individuals deemed to have been associated with the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden, citing it to be in blatant breach of fundamental rights.¹⁶⁶

Lastly, the second pillar, ‘preventing and combatting terrorism’ of the UNGC-T strategy is particularly hard to quantify, when trying to gauge whether the UN Global strategy has been successful or not. For instance, a state like Ethiopia may have had the pre-requisite conditions in place that support occurrence of a terror attack, yet it did not materialize, while a country like the US might not, yet it happens. Besides, no two states have identical circumstances when it comes to measuring the successes or failures of a counterterrorism strategy. In fact, Kenya and Ethiopia have diverse socio-politico-cultural dynamics. Still, examining specific states prone to terrorism, where the UN played a major role in capacity building and support may perhaps give a better insight of the UNGC-T strategy. Specific analysis of Counterterrorism efforts in both Kenya and Ethiopia, then identifying similarities in strategy and execution may provide an insight on what elements of UNGC-T strategy are successful and the reason behind its success.

2.2. REGIONAL LEVEL COUNTERTERRORISM

2.2.1. Perceived causes of terrorism in Africa

In analyzing the counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in Africa, it is appropriate to look at the perceived causes of terrorism in the continent, seeing that the region obviously has unique challenges, therefore unique causes of terrorism. The challenges

¹⁶⁶ *Kadi v Council of the EU & Commission of the European Communities*, C-415/05. P, European Union: ECJ, 3rd September, 2008

range from socio-economic deprivations, weak political and institutional frameworks, religious and cultural marginalization and most notably under development.

a) Ethnic and religious marginalization

Ethnic and religious diversity is not by itself a direct cause of violent extremism, but when a religious or ethnic group perceives itself as marginalized, they may express their frustration through violence.¹⁶⁷ So, groups, whether religious, political or ethnic that feel sidelined by the ruling class, are bound to feel insignificant and discriminated that would lead them to be frustrated and angry thus leading them to seek importance and resolve. These create a fertile radicalization ground for terrorists.¹⁶⁸ However, as mentioned earlier, terrorism is in no way restricted to actions of a particular religion or ethnicity. Nevertheless, a number of violent conflicts have been instigated by religious and ethnic exclusion, sometimes manifest as terror attacks.¹⁶⁹

Groups have been marginalized in Africa, as a result of corruption, weak institutional frameworks and bad regimes. For instance, the rise of Boko Haram in West Africa has been attributed to marginalization of Muslims in political, and socio-economic participation, which have led to violent extremism, and the continuance, of the deprivations is a factor that enhances youth to be sympathetic to their cause.¹⁷⁰ In addition, terrorism in the North Eastern Kenya and the rampant youth radicalization, is perhaps due to decades of marginalization and socio economic inequality. For instance, in 2004, the doctor to patient ratio in the region was 1:120,000 as compared to Central

¹⁶⁷ Fearon. J, Laitin. D., 'Ethnicity, Insurgence and Civil War,' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97 2003. Pp. 75-90.

¹⁶⁸ Mahmood. M., 'When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda,' Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2001.

¹⁶⁹ Annan. N., 'Violent Conflicts and Civil Strife in West Africa: Causes, Challenges and Prospects. Stability,' *International Journal of Security and Development*. Vol 3, No.1, 2014.

¹⁷⁰ Casimir. A *et al.*, 'Religion, Violence, Poverty and Underdevelopment in West Africa: Issues and Challenges of Boko Haram Phenomenon in Nigeria,' *Open Journal of Philosophy*. Vol.4. No.1, 2014. Pp. 63.

Kenya region which had 1:20,000.¹⁷¹ This shows that inequality and marginalization are root enablers of terrorism and radicalization of youth by terror groups, such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram.

b) Socio-economic deprivations

The African Union anti-terrorism plan of Action of 2002, acknowledges the role that socio-economic deprivations plays as enablers of terrorism.¹⁷² Accordingly, it imposes a duty to member states to co-operate in counterterrorism measures. This has further been echoed by scholars of countering violent extremism, who assert that poverty and socio-economic deprivations often lead to human frustrations that more often than not lead to violence responses which in turn create conditions favoring the spread and emergence of terrorism.¹⁷³ In fact, a blend of these deprivations, inequalities and human rights violations work in tandem as enablers of terrorism. Accordingly, prioritizing socio-economic development is an ideal counterterrorism strategy.¹⁷⁴

However, there are antagonists of the socio-economic deprivation theory as a cause of terrorism and indoctrination. In their arguments they contend that most terrorists are neither poor nor illiterate. They point to figures such as Bin Laden who came from a wealthy Saudi family. Hence, they maintain that terrorism should be strictly considered a security threat that has no links to deprivations whatsoever.¹⁷⁵ This was evident from a study that was conducted on Palestinian terrorist groups, where it was determined that

¹⁷¹ Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and Society for International Development, *‘Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: Pulling Apart or pooling together?’* Nairobi: KNBS, 2013.

¹⁷² The African Union Anti-terrorism Plan of Action, 14.09.2002. Mtg/HLIG/Conv.Terror/Plan(1)

¹⁷³ Tore. B., *‘Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward,’* London: Routledge, 2005. Pp. 3

¹⁷⁴ Omer. T., ‘Fighting Radicalization, not Terrorism: Root Causes of an International Actor,’ *SAIS Review of International Affairs*, Vol. XXIX, No.2. 2009. Pp.76

¹⁷⁵ Kruger *et.al* ‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is there a Casual Connection?’ *Journal of Economic Perspective*. American Economic Association, 2003.

there was no association between terrorism and poverty or illiteracy.¹⁷⁶ The majority of terrorists interviewed showed some degree of literacy and had middle class backgrounds.¹⁷⁷ Despite the variation in philosophy of both set of scholars, they both concur that socio-economic deprivations may be enablers of terrorism and radicalization. In conclusion, while associating socio-economic deprivations and poverty, it is worthy to note different states have unique circumstances and thus, sweeping generalizations may not be accurate when trying to explore a connection.

c) Political aspects

A weak political institutional framework in Africa is a cause of conflict. This is because the weak institutions, are incapable of resolving a conflict when it emerges, meting out justice to perpetrators, accommodating political participation and corruption which is synonymous with unequal distribution of resources. In fact, the 2002 African Union plan of action acknowledged the important role that institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, security, and financial have to play in countering terrorism in Africa.¹⁷⁸ These institutions are the glue that holds society together through; conflict resolution, adjudication and inter-communal dialogue whenever any sort of conflict emerges or threatens to emerge, in addition to being agents of equity.

2.2.2. The African Union and Counterterrorism

The AU emerged from the Durban summit of 2002, in South Africa,¹⁷⁹ to replace the OAU. Terrorism in Africa goes all the way back from the struggle against colonialism, where activities by some of the liberation combatants were perceived as terrorist acts.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Op Cit.* African Union Anti-terrorism Plan of Action, Paragraph 10(c).

¹⁷⁹ NTL, 'African Union,' Nuclear Threat Initiative (<http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/african-union-au/>) June 6 2015< Accessed on 6. 6. 2017.

¹⁸⁰ Ewi. M, & Anning. K., 'Assessing the Role of the African Union in Preventing and Combating Terrorism in Africa,' *African Security Review*, Vol.15, No.3. 2006. Pp. 35.

For instance, in 1980, an *Umkhonto we Sizwe* member Renfrew Christie, was sentenced under the Terrorism Act.¹⁸¹

Accordingly, in an attempt to counter terrorism, OAU (later AU) adopted various counterterrorism measures; in 1992, a resolution on ‘strengthening cooperation and coordination among African states to combat the phenomenon of extremism in all its forms and manifestation,’ was approved where all the member states pledged to fight violent extremism of all kinds.¹⁸²

In June of 1994, a ‘Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations,’ was adopted requiring states to abstain from any form of state terrorism and aiding and abetting any terrorist organization, and bringing to justice any such perpetrators.¹⁸³ And an affirmation that a breach in the spirit of Charter of the UN as a gross violation of international law.¹⁸⁴

Following the attacks on the US missions in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the OAU adopted a binding resolution dubbed the ‘convention on prevention and combating terrorism’ of 1999. Indeed, it sought to define the term terrorism as an act or conspiracy to create fear or coerce an action through terror against the government, the people or any government installations.¹⁸⁵ Then again, it excludes actions aimed at attaining liberation as acts of terrorism so long as they in line with international law principles.¹⁸⁶ It further, imposes member state obligation to co-operate in areas such as extradition

¹⁸¹ Perumal. D., ‘*Umkhonto We Sizwe timeline 1961-1990*,’ South African History Online (<http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-wesizwe-mk-timeline-1961-1990>) >Accessed 6.06. 2017.

¹⁸² OAU. ‘Strengthening Co-operation and Co-ordination among African States to Combat extremism in all its forms and Manifestation,’ 1992. [AHG/Res.213 (xxviii)]

¹⁸³ OAU. ‘Declaration on a Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations,’ Assembly of Heads of States and Government, June 1994. [AHG/Decl.2 (xxx)] Paragraph 15.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.* Paragraph 7.

¹⁸⁵ Organization of African Unity, *OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, 14 June 1999. Article 1(3).

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.* Article 3(1).

and establishing jurisdiction over terrorist acts.¹⁸⁷ However, it lacked a mechanism of enforcing and implementing it.¹⁸⁸

Accordingly, perhaps with these defects in mind, in 2004, the AU enacted a protocol to the 1999 ‘Convention on preventing and combatting terrorism’ that obliged the Peace and Security council, among others, to take charge of monitoring, evaluating and offering assistance to member states in implementation¹⁸⁹, which was lacking in the earlier document.

In the 2002, Durban Summit marked the new dawn as the African Union replaced OAU. However, the new AU retained the legal instruments that were ratified under the OAU. In September, African heads of states met to reiterate Africa’s commitment to tackling the terrorist threat following the 9/11 attacks a year earlier. Consequently, they approved the ‘Algiers plan of action on the prevention and combating of terrorism,’¹⁹⁰ which called for a more hi-tech immigration controls and the installation of anti-forgery security features on identification documents in member states.¹⁹¹ This plan of action aimed at fortifying the capacity of member states to combat terrorism, using modern equipment that was at par with international standards.¹⁹² It further oversaw the formation of the ‘Center for Study and Terrorism Research’ that is obliged to conduct research and train on counterterrorism issues, and further analyze counterterrorism data.¹⁹³ Thus proving resourceful to academia and policy makers.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* Articles 4-7.

¹⁸⁸ *Op Cit.* Ewi. M, & Anning. K., 2006. Pp. 8.

¹⁸⁹ Organization of African Unity, *Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism*, 2004. Article 4.

¹⁹⁰ African Union. ‘Algiers *Plan of Action of the African Union on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa*,’ Algiers: AU, 2002.

¹⁹¹ Kathryn. S., ‘AU Plan on Terrorism: Joining the Global War or Leading the African Battle,’ *African Security Review*, Vol.11, No.4, 2002. Pp. 105

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

¹⁹³ *Op Cit.* Algiers *Plan of Action of the African Union on Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa*. Article 20.

In 2011, the AU adopted the African Model counterterrorism law, which is template model law aimed at ensuring member states synchronize their counterterrorism law, ensuring uniform strategies are adopted for effective counterterrorism throughout Africa.¹⁹⁴

In September 2014, the Peace and Security Council met in Nairobi, which culminated into a proposal for a counter terrorism fund, harmonized African counter terrorism efforts and the instituting of a dedicated African Union counter terrorism unit.¹⁹⁵ However, this is yet to come to fruition.

2.2.3. The OAU Convention

The OAU Convention is the primary counterterrorism mechanism of the AU which has been fortified using the 2004 protocol to the Convention. It defines terrorism as a criminal law violation in a state that interferes with a person's dignity, liberty or is intended to kill, injure destroy property with an aim to coerce the government into doing something.¹⁹⁶ However, this definition is vague and too wide and may be open to misinterpretation by states to violate freedoms and liberties of non-violent protestors.¹⁹⁷ Accordingly, I will address the main provisions and obligations as postulated by the Convention.

a) Acts not establishing the crime of terrorism

The Convention seeks to distinguish between acts of terrorism and freedom fights, by asserting that actions taken to gain independence, following the principles of international law against annexation of sovereign territory, occupation and hostility by

¹⁹⁴ United Nations Office to the African union, '*Counter Terrorism*,' unoau.org (<https://unoau.unmissions.org/counter-terrorism>) <accessed 6.6.2017.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ *Op Cit.* OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. Article 1(3)

¹⁹⁷ Vijoer. F., '*International Human Rights Law in Africa*,' Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. 280.

a foreign army do not constitute an act of terrorism.¹⁹⁸ However, pursuant to the first Protocol to the Geneva Convention of 1949, acts of terror can be committed even in times of occupation and colonialization.¹⁹⁹

b) Duties imposed on member states

First and foremost, the Convention imposes a responsibility on members to ratify, assent or sign international counterterrorism instruments with utmost urgency.²⁰⁰ In response to this, Kenya signed the ‘International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’ in November 2001²⁰¹, while Ethiopia ratified in April 2003.

Secondly, member states are under obligation to reassess their domestic laws, review them and establish relevant offenses of acts of terrorism and recommend appropriate penalties in line with international counterterrorism instruments.²⁰² Ethiopia then embarked, through the Ethiopia, Justice and Legal System research Institute to revise the Penal Code to criminalize terrorism.²⁰³

Thirdly, member states are under obligation to enact regulations that outlaw acts of terrorism using their various law making bodies that comply with the various counterterrorism instruments and international law.²⁰⁴ Accordingly, the Kenyan parliament adopted a ‘Proceeds of Crime and Anti-money Laundering Act,’ and the

¹⁹⁸ *Op Cit.* OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. Article 3(1).

¹⁹⁹ International Committee of the Red Cross, *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, (Protocol I)*, 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3. Article 51.

²⁰⁰ *Op Cit.* OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. Article 2(b)

²⁰¹ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘*Ratification Status*,’ unodc.org (<https://goo.gl/FkL1v7>) <Accessed 7.06. 2017.

²⁰² *Op Cit.* OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. Article 2(a)

²⁰³ Andre. S (ed). ‘*African Counterterrorism Co-operation: Assessing Regional and Sub regional Initiatives.*’ Washington D.C: Potomac Books, 2007. Pp. 67.

²⁰⁴ *Op Cit.* OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. Article 2(c)

‘Prevention of the Organized Crime Act’ that outlawed membership and support of outlawed criminal enterprises, e.g. al Shabaab.²⁰⁵

Finally, member states are obliged under the Convention to co-operate in counterterrorism measures with other member states in; intelligence sharing, and information exchange.²⁰⁶

c) Authority over terrorist acts

The Convention allows member states to establish exclusive state jurisdiction over acts of terror committed within its borders, regardless of where the assailant was apprehended.²⁰⁷ Indeed, AU member states can establish extraterritorial jurisdiction on a terrorist who is apprehended outside its borders and request for rendition if suspected to have committed an act of terror within its borders.

Similarly, under the Convention, member states can establish jurisdiction over an act of terror committed against its citizen, and/or against a government facility, including embassies or consulates.²⁰⁸ Its significance is that, states could establish such extraterritorial jurisdiction albeit the act of terror being committed outside its borders, on condition it has been perpetrated against its citizen in the diaspora, or a government facility. In addition, states can establish jurisdiction on a stateless person so long as they are domiciled in that state.

²⁰⁵ Center on Global Counterterrorism Co-operation, ‘*Fighting Terror Through Justice: Implementing the IGAD Framework for Legal Counterterrorism Co-operation.*’ Task Force Report, May 2012. Pp. 8

²⁰⁶ *Op Cit.* OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. Article 5(1)

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.* Article 6(1)(a)

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.* Article 6(2)

Lastly, once members have ratified the Convention, states have an obligation to notify the SG of the AU regarding the jurisdiction under its domestic regulations, also when it changes.²⁰⁹

d) Repatriation of Suspected terrorists

The Convention imposes an obligation to member states to make terrorism an extraditable offense in the various bilateral extradition treaties they are party to.²¹⁰ In addition, repatriation of a suspected perpetrator of a terrorist act, will occur when a suspect alleged to have committed an act of terror within another state's territory, has requested extradition. On condition that it is within the parameters of the Convention and the various bi-lateral treaties between the states.²¹¹

However, an extradition may be denied on the ground that the extradition proceeding before a competent court, has been dismissed or denied.²¹² The proceedings must then be conducted without undue delay and without prejudice.²¹³

e) Protection of Human Rights and counterterrorism

The 1999 OAU Convention in its preamble acknowledges the effect that terrorism has in derogating basic human rights such as: rights to life, security and socio-economic development.²¹⁴ Hence, terrorism a security problem for Africa that greatly threatens the basic human existence and human development and should be prioritized.

Similarly, Article 22 'interpretation clause', provides that the interpretation of the Convention should be one that is based upon international law, Humanitarian, and

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.* Article 6(3)

²¹⁰ *Ibid.* Article 9

²¹¹ *Ibid.* Article 8(1)

²¹² *Ibid.* Article 8(3)

²¹³ *Ibid.* Article 8(4)

²¹⁴ *Ibid.* Preamble, Par 9.

values of HR, and the ‘African Charter on Human and people’s Rights.’²¹⁵ In essence, any counterterrorism strategy and mechanisms adopted by member states ought to respect and promote human rights.

SUMMARY

As earlier discussed, regional counterterrorism initiatives are coordinated within the African Union framework. However, mechanisms and strategies devised by the African Union have faced several challenges that have barred them from being efficient in the fight against terrorism;

First and foremost, the African Union lacks the ability to intervene and coerce member states to fully implement mandates postulated in its conventions and resolutions. For instance, the Algiers Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism of 2002, and the resulting protocol of 2004, both came into force a decade after their inception. Not only that, by the start of 2016, only 15 members had ratified the Algiers convention, including Kenya, Nigeria and Somalia some of the member states hardly hit by the threat of terrorism.²¹⁶ Accordingly, foot-dragging by AU member states to ratify a counterterrorism policy has proved disastrous to its successful implementation hence making it less effective.

Secondly, the AU lacks sufficient support in the areas of human resource, expertise and funding to effectively implement its counterterrorism policy. Governed by predictable and sustainable financing, the commitments by member states have not always been honored. For instance, an audit in 2007, established that only 6% of the regular AU budget is assigned to the Peace Fund against an estimate of 25% that is needed.²¹⁷ This

²¹⁵ *Ibid.* Article 22

²¹⁶ Allison. S., ‘26th AU Summit: Why Isn’t the AU’s Counterterrorism Strategy Working?’ Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 29th January, 2016

²¹⁷ *Ibid.* Allison. S

impairs its quest to carry out counterterrorism operations under the fund. In addition, the African Union is unable to finance its own peace and security initiatives including counterterrorism measures. For instance, the AMISOM operation in Somalia is bankrolled by the European Union, the United Nations and states such as the UK, USA, Italy, *inter alia*.

This leads to the conclusion that these challenges pose a great risk at the effective implementation of the counterterrorism measures formulated by the African Union. This ultimately renders them ineffective in countering the terrorist threat in the region.

2.3. STATE LEVEL COUNTERTERRORISM

2.3.1. Kenya

Historical background of terrorism

Since the 70s, Kenya has experienced terror attacks that have resulted in death, injury and destruction of property. The earliest terror attacks can be traced back from the bombing at the OTC bus station in 1975 that left 27 people dead.²¹⁸ This was followed by an attack at the Norfolk hotel by a Palestine group, the PFLP leaving 15 people dead majority being Kenyans. This attack was ascribed as a retaliatory attack for Kenya's role in the 'Entebbe Hostage Crisis'.²¹⁹ This was followed by the bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi's CBD attributed to an al Qaeda affiliated group, which left over 200 people dead, and over 4000 injured, majority being Kenyans. This brought to the world the reality of international terrorism and the need to devise strategies of counterterrorism for even small states like Kenya. This incident, forced the hand of

²¹⁸ Government of Kenya, '*National Policy for Disaster Management in Kenya*,' Nairobi: Ministry of State for Special Programs, 2009. Pp. 13.

²¹⁹ Mogire. E & Mkutu. A., 'Counter-terrorism in Kenya,' *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, Vol. 29, Issue.4, 2011. Pp. 477.

Kenyan bureaucrats to start designing, albeit slowly, a counterterrorism strategy.²²⁰ In 2002, an al Qaeda affiliate group bombed an Israeli owned hotel in Kikambala that left 13 people dead.²²¹

In the recent past, al Shabaab a terrorist group situate in Somalia has carried out attacks within the Kenyan territory. In 2013, an al Shabaab affiliate, attacked the West Gate shopping mall and killed 67 people of diverse nationalities. This particular attack was attributed as a retaliatory attack in response to the *Operation Linda Nchi*, a Kenya Defense Forces incursion into Somalia aimed at securing the Kenyan border.²²² This was followed by the 2015 terrorist attack on Garissa University, which left 150 students dead. This attack was also deemed a retaliatory attack attributed to the role of Kenyan troops in Somalia.²²³

These terrorist attacks on Kenya project a nation where terror attacks are rife, and only effective strategies and mechanisms can mitigate the issue of terrorism. It is clear that the current military based strategies have resulted in retaliatory attacks instead of countering the terror threat. The issues deemed to be the enablers of terrorism in Kenya are, but not limited to; long stretches of unmanned borders and lax border controls, an uncontrolled influx of refugees, youth radicalization, weak institutional frameworks and corruption, marginalization of some parts, and proximity to belligerent neighbor states. In essence, any effective counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms adopted by Kenya ought to address this underlying enablers of terrorism.

²²⁰ Aronson. S., 'Kenya and the Global War on Terror: Neglecting History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism,' *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*, Vol. 7, 2013. Pp. 2

²²¹ Adan. H., '*Combating Transnational Terrorism in Kenya*,' Defense Technical Information Center, 2005.

²²² *Op Cit.* Aronson. S., 2013.

²²³ Simon. M., 'The April 2015 Attack in Garissa by al Shabaab: A basic Human Needs and Structural-Cultural-Direct Violence Analysis,' *Foreign policy Journal*, 2015. Pp.2

2.3.1.1. Strategies and Mechanisms

Accordingly, Kenya has formulated counterterrorism strategies and mechanism in an effort to counter the terror threat. In 2014, the Kenyan Legislature approved the ‘Security Law (amendment) Act’, which was meant to reinforce the existing terrorism legislation. It also created the National Counter Terrorism Center which is mandated to harmonize counterterrorism efforts, aimed at identifying, dissuading, and neutralizing terrorist threats within Kenya.²²⁴ Accordingly, NCTC is a multi-agency body that comprises of; A director, the National Intelligence Service, the AG, the Director of Immigration and Registration and the National Police Service.²²⁵ It is tasked with creating a terrorism database that would aid law enforcement to identify, prevent and neutralize a terror threat.²²⁶

Terrorism has been defined by the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, as an ‘act or threat to use violence to intimidate or coerce’ a decision from the government or citizens.²²⁷ It attracts a jail term not beyond 30 years, however, when it results to death, it attracts a life sentence.²²⁸ However, the Act was subject to opposition from human rights groups, civil society and the media on grounds that some clauses were unconstitutional. The High Court in 2015, threw out 4 clauses, Section 16 that dealt with disclosure of evidence, section 26 that concerned silence of an accused, section 48 that limited the number of refugees to be hosted in Kenya to 150,000, and finally section 12 that concerned media freedom.²²⁹

²²⁴ Government of Kenya, ‘*Security Laws (Amendment) Act*’ Nairobi: Government Printers, No. 19, 2014. Section 40A. Pp. 351.

²²⁵ *Ibid.* Section 40A(2)

²²⁶ *Ibid.* Section 40B. Pp. 351

²²⁷ Government of Kenya, ‘*Prevention of Terrorism Act*,’ Nairobi: Government Printers, No. 30, 2012. Section 2.

²²⁸ *Ibid.* Section 3.

²²⁹ Kagwanja. P., ‘Ruling on Anti-terrorism Law a Triumph for Kenya’s Judiciary,’ *Daily Nation*, (Nairobi), 28 February 2015

In an attempt to end criminal financing, including terrorist financing, in 2009 the Kenyan legislature passed the ‘Proceeds of crime and anti-money laundering Act’.²³⁰ However, it has since been amended by the proceeds of crime and money laundering (amendment) Act of 2017 which came into force in March 2017.²³¹ Accordingly, money laundering is the introduction of illegal financial proceeds to the economy while obscuring its source to make it look authentic.²³² Therefore, Kenya’s closeness to Somalia and its well developed money transfer systems, makes it exposed to money laundering proceeds from illegal charcoal trade, ransom, illegal poaching and piracy from the terrorist organization al Shabaab.²³³

Moreover, in an effort to share information concerning transnational crimes the like of terrorism, and in compliance of international and regional instruments, UN Security Council Resolution 1373, 2001 and the IGAD ‘Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition Convention’, the Kenyan legislature enacted the Mutual Legal Assistance Act of 2011, that offers joint assistance to other states in investigating, prosecuting and trying transnational crimes.²³⁴ For instance, in 2007, Kenyan authorities arrested over 150 suspects of terrorism who had disguised themselves as refugees trying to cross the border, who were then flown to Ethiopia and Somalia.²³⁵

²³⁰ The Republic of Kenya, ‘*Proceeds of Crime and Anti-money Laundering Act*,’ Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting. No. 9, 2009.

²³¹ Republic of Kenya, ‘*Proceed of Crime and Money Laundering (amendment) Act*’ Nairobi: Government Printers, 2017.

²³² United Nations Office for Drugs control, ‘*Model Legislation on Money laundering and Terrorism*,’ Report: UNODC, 2005. Pp.9

²³³ US Department of State, ‘*2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*,’ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(<https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol2/239088.htm>) <Accessed 10.6.2017

²³⁴ Mwanzighe. L., ‘*Legal Responses to Terrorism: A Case Study of The Republic of Kenya*,’ Master Thesis. California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012.

²³⁵ Mogire. E., ‘*Victims as Security Threats: Refugee Impact on Host State Security in Africa*,’ ASHGATE: Kingston University. 2011. Pp. 141.

In addition, Kenya is engaged in police collaboration initiatives with INTERPOL and the East African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization (EAPCCO) which aims at apprehending transnational criminals such as terrorists, and providing cooperation on such matters.²³⁶ Similarly, the Peace and Security Protocol of the EAC, which Kenya is party to, builds the capacity of states to tackle terrorism and is a platform for counterterrorism information sharing among members.²³⁷

2.3.2. Ethiopia

Historical background of terrorism

Ethiopia, a landlocked country is one of the most populated state in Africa boasting a population of around 99 million, only second to Nigeria in Africa, and the largest in the HoA region.²³⁸ The terrorist threat in the region has been attributed to the end of the Afghan war in 1989, where about 20,000 jihad fighters returned to their home countries, subsequently promoting extremism back home, including Somalia,²³⁹ and the unrelenting civil war in the region.

Accordingly, Its Location in the HoA, makes it susceptible to terrorist attacks. It is encircled by belligerent and politically unstable states with weak institutional frameworks, marred by civil conflicts, the likes of South Sudan, Somalia and Eritrea, who have at one time or another sheltered or supported a terror group that carried out attacks in Ethiopia, or even directly engaged Ethiopia in war, posing cross border insecurity. For instance, Somalia invaded it in 1977, intending to annex the Ogaden

²³⁶ *Op Cit.* Center on Global Counterterrorism Co-operation-Taskforce Report, 2012. Pp.19

²³⁷ East African Community, '*Protocol on Peace and Security*,' Arusha: East African Community, 2013.

²³⁸ World Bank, '*Investing in Ethiopia's Future*,' Washington DC: World Bank. 2015.

²³⁹ Sageman. M., '*Understanding Terror Networks*,' Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Pp. 36

region which it claimed to be part of the larger territory.²⁴⁰ However, with support from USSR and Cuba, Ethiopia was able to repel Somalia in 1978, perhaps signaling the beginning of a thorny relationship between the two states. Indeed, Somalia poses a significant threat to Ethiopian national security, by regularly backing militia they believed to be anti-Ethiopian, such as the ONLF who in 2007 attacked the Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau in Ethiopia, killing around 70 employees, of Ethiopian and Chinese descent.²⁴¹

Similarly, Eritrean support for anti-Ethiopian militia is believed to stem from their war between 1998 and 2000. Indeed, in 1995 Al Itihad Al Islamiya an Eritrean backed terrorist outfit, attempted to assassinate the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak who had attended an OAU summit in Addis Ababa.²⁴² In addition, in 2006, the Islamic Court Union, believed to be backed by Eritrea avowed a jihad against Ethiopia. Consequently, the Security Council in 2012 adopted a resolution imposing sanctions against Eritrea for its role in arming militia in Somalia.²⁴³

Accordingly, in 2006, Ethiopia deployed troops in Somalia in response of the growing aggression by the Islamic Court Union and for humanitarian assistance that was indicated by the number of refugee immigration as a result of the conflict in a bid to prevent the conflict spilling over, all in a bid to enhance its national security.²⁴⁴ Nevertheless, in 2008, a suicide attack by al Shabaab on Ethiopia's trade mission in

²⁴⁰ Tareke. G., 'The Ethiopia-Somali War of 1977 Revisited,' *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3. 2000. Pp. 636

²⁴¹ Col. Farus. B., 'A Review of Ethiopia's Security Challenges in the Horn of Africa,' Master Thesis, US Army War College, 2013.

²⁴² Rotberg. I., 'Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa,' Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. Pp 93.

²⁴³ Security Council, *Security Council resolution 412 (2012) [Report of the Secretary-General on Eritrea]*, 8 June 2012, S/RES/412

²⁴⁴ Bamfo. N., 'Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia in 2006: Motives and Lessons Learned,' *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol.4 No.2 2010. Pp. 55-60.

Somalia left approximately 20 people dead.²⁴⁵ Therefore, Ethiopia has formulated counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms to effectively counter the terrorist threat, despite facing few terrorist attacks in the recent past as compared to Kenya.

2.3.2.1. Strategies and Mechanisms

A significant anti-terrorism legislation was passed in 2009, dubbed the ‘Anti-terrorism Proclamation of 2009. This was in line with the requirement of the UNGC-T strategy that required states to criminalize acts of terror through law. The proclamation acknowledges that terrorism is not only threaten national security but also human security.²⁴⁶ However, it has attracted widespread condemnation citing that it seeks to suppress fundamental liberties such as those of expression as stipulated in the bill of rights.²⁴⁷ For instance, ‘...disruption of any public service’ is an act of terror that could attract a death penalty, life imprisonment or a jail term of up to 15 years.²⁴⁸ Basically, a peaceful demonstration that ends up disrupting the flow of traffic would be deemed an act of terror.

Moreover, in an attempt to curtail the financing of terrorism, the house of people’s representatives enacted the ‘anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism proclamation’ of 2009, which was later replaced by the ‘anti-money laundering and financing of terrorism proclamation 780’ of 2013. Accordingly, Ethiopia has been marred by illegal cross-border smuggling of goods, people and ivory, which has led to loss of revenue and development opportunity. In fact, it is estimated that around \$5

²⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch, ‘*Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Anti-terrorism Law,*’ [hrw.org\(https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/30/analysis-ethiopia-draft-anti-terrorism-law\)](https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/06/30/analysis-ethiopia-draft-anti-terrorism-law) 30 June 2009<Accessed 11 June 2017

²⁴⁶ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. ‘*A Proclamation on Anti- Terrorism Proclamation*’ Federal Negarit Gazeta No. 652/2009. August, 2009. Preamble

²⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, ‘*Human Rights Watch Submission on Ethiopia,*’ Report. 2012

²⁴⁸ *Op Cit.* Anti-terrorism Proclamation No. 652/2009. Article 3(6)

billion was lost in 2010 alone.²⁴⁹ Thus the proclamation paved way for international cooperation by Ethiopia in suppressing money laundering. It created the Financial Intelligence Center a government organ that is responsible for outward reporting, and implementing the requirements of the Financial Action Task force. Additionally, banks are required to report any suspicious cash transactions for investigation.²⁵⁰ Thus, this proclamation criminalizes any financial support for terrorist acts, thus denying terrorist organization resources to carry out an attack.

Similarly, the Ethiopian Task Force for Counter Terrorism, a national committee, coordinates counterterrorism initiatives.²⁵¹ Thus, it comprises of Ethiopian law enforcement (Federal Police and the NISS) and the defense forces. The NISS is tasked with gathering counterterrorism intelligence, maintaining border security and conducting criminal investigations on terrorism related cases.²⁵² Likewise, it is tasked with managing of counterterrorism strategy in collaboration with the Federal Police and the Defense Forces and facilitates counterterrorism efforts with other states like the USA.²⁵³

Externally, by 2014, Ethiopia has ratified 7 global (UN), regional (AU) and sub-regional (IGAD) counterterrorism instruments.²⁵⁴ Notably, it has formulated harmonization mechanisms for these instruments for instance, the IGAD anti-money laundering treaty and various bilateral extradition treaties.²⁵⁵

²⁴⁹ Lakew. A., 'Anti-money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Regime: Practices by the Ethiopian Financial Intelligence Center,' Master Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2016.

²⁵⁰ Lelissa. B., 'Impact of Promulgation and Enactment of AML/CFT Rules on Resource Mobilization: Case of Ethiopian Banks,' *Journal of Poverty, Investment and Development*, Vol. 17. 2015

²⁵¹ US Department of State, 'Country Reports: An African Overview,' state.gov (<https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257514.htm>) 2015<accessed 13 June 2015.

²⁵² *Ibid.*

²⁵³ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁴ *Op Cit.* Andre. S (ed). Pp. 66

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.* Pp. 67.

In addition, Ethiopia is a member of various global and regional police bodies such as; INTERPOL, The East African Police Chief Co-operation and the African Mechanism for Police Co-operation, in an effort to co-ordinate and co-operate and intelligence sharing on transnational crimes such as terrorism.²⁵⁶

Finally, Ethiopia has formed alliances with developed states the like of USA in counterterrorism efforts, who provide technical and financial support, which in turn facilitates it to build a strong counterterrorism infrastructure to counter violent extremism not only in Ethiopia but also in the Horn of Africa region.²⁵⁷ For instance, in 2007 with the support of US forces, Ethiopia captured Ahmed Madobe, who was the deputy Amir of al Shabaab.

2.4. IMPACT OF STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS OF COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The lack of a universal consensus of what constitutes an act of terror, is perhaps the reason why there lacks a global consensus on the strategies that could effectively counter the terrorist threat.²⁵⁸ Accordingly, each state has devised its own strategies and mechanisms dictated by its own unique set of conditions that it perceives to cause terrorism, and the manner in which the terrorist carry out their attacks. Indeed, domesticating the global counterterrorism initiatives in place, is vital to the formulation and implementation of effective counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms.²⁵⁹

²⁵⁶ Dessu.M., ‘*Policing in Diplomacy: The Opportunities to Ethiopia*,’ Master Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2016

²⁵⁷ Matfess. H., ‘Ethiopia: Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Sub-Saharan Africa,’ *SMALL WARS Journal*, 2017 Available at: <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrn/art/ethiopia-counter-terrorism-legislation-in-sub-saharan-africa>

²⁵⁸ Bensahel. N., ‘A Coalition of Coalitions: International Co-operation against Terrorism,’ *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. Vol. 29, No.1, 2006. Pp. 38

²⁵⁹ Kimunguyi. P., ‘*Terrorism and Counterterrorism in East Africa*,’ Melbourne: Monash University, 2005. Pp.12

However, at the 2005 Madrid summit, UN Secretary General in his keynote speech proposed a rounded counterterrorism strategy involving what he termed as the ‘5Ds’;²⁶⁰

- a) Dissuasion of citizens from joining the terrorist cause,
- b) Denying the terrorist organizations avenues to attack,
- c) Deterring states from aiding a terrorist organization or engaging in terrorism,
- d) Developing state capability to effectively counter terrorism,
- e) Defending human rights while countering terrorism.

Thus, Kielsingard suggests, 3 counterterrorism strategies to encompass the 5Ds.²⁶¹ Firstly, the military strategy²⁶² which is enshrined in the Charter of the UN in instances of self-defense. It encompasses military and humanitarian interventions. Secondly, the law enforcement strategy²⁶³ that involves nonmilitary security apparatus such as the police, who treat an act of terrorism as a crime. They seek to deny terrorists a means to carry out an attack, through intelligence gathering, investigating and apprehending terrorism suspects. Lastly, the human rights strategy²⁶⁴ which is largely preventive strategies in that they address the underlying causes of terrorism, and seeks to address issues that lead people to become radicalized. Similarly it seeks to regulate the other two strategies by incorporating human rights approaches into them.

2.4.1. Kenya

Kenya’s incursion into Somalia in October 2011, in pursuit of al Shabaab militants that had carried attacks within the Kenyan borders marked a new era in the Kenyan

²⁶⁰ United Nations, ‘Secretary General’s Global Strategy for fighting Terrorism, keynote speech to Madrid Summit,’ SG/SM/9757, Press release, Spain: Madrid, March 10 2005.

²⁶¹ Mark. D., ‘A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism,’ *California Western International Law Journal*. Vol.36, No.2, 2006. Pp. 252S

²⁶² *Op Cit.* Charter of the United Nations, Article 51

²⁶³ *Ibid*

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*

counterterrorism strategy.²⁶⁵ However, this has not effectively thwarted the al Shabaab terror attacks within the country. For instance, in 2015, al Shabaab operatives conducted one of the largest terror attack at Garrissa University that led to 150 civilian casualties.²⁶⁶ As alluded to earlier this was termed as a retaliatory attack to the Kenyan military operation in Somalia.²⁶⁷ In fact, several subsequent terrorist attacks have been attributed to al Shabaab. Hence, it is evident that a military strategy in counterterrorism is not effective in curbing the threat posed by al Shabaab, as it is attributed to reprisal attacks in response to the Kenyan military presence in Somalia.²⁶⁸

Additionally, inter-agency coordination to a terrorist attack is not well organized. This was witnessed during the response to the Westgate mall attack by al Shabaab militants in 2013, where an inter-agency rivalry between the army and law enforcement resulted in a member of the law enforcement officers being gunned down in a friendly fire.²⁶⁹ In fact, a command control post was missing perhaps leading to the inter-agency confusion during the rescue operation at the Westgate shopping mall.²⁷⁰ Accordingly, although the NCTC is mandated to coordinate inter-agency counterterrorism initiatives, more effort has to be put in actual coordination of the first responder agencies in terrorist attacks.

A legal anti-terrorism regime was finally adopted by the Kenyan legislature in the form of the Prevention of Terrorist act of 2012.²⁷¹ This was in an attempt to domesticate counterterrorism measures into law pursuant to the various international and regional

²⁶⁵ Kenya Literature Bureau, *Operation Linda Nchi: An Insight into the Art of Modern Warfare*, Nairobi: KLB, 2014

²⁶⁶ *Op Cit.* Aronson. S., 2013

²⁶⁷ *Op Cit.* Simon. M, 2015. Pp.2

²⁶⁸ A point reiterated by Muendo, CFE, ACAMS, Security and Research consultant

²⁶⁹ Okari. D., 'Kenya's Westgate Attack: Unanswered Questions one Year on,' [bbc.com \(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29282045\)](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29282045) 22nd September, 2014< Accessed 13th October, 2017

²⁷⁰ Key Informant interview with a member of the Recce Squad.

²⁷¹ *Op Cit.* Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012

conventions that Kenya is party to. However, the Act was not collectively accepted and was subject to opposition by human rights groups and civil society on the ground that it was unconstitutional, then consequently challenged it at the High Court. As a result, 4 clauses were deemed unconstitutional and were invalidated.²⁷² Accordingly, this poses a challenge in effective implementation of this Act as a counterterrorism measure. In addition, the anti-terrorism legal regime lacks a witness protection mechanisms that encourages witnesses to come forward to report suspected terrorist activity. This in turn discourages witnesses from testifying against suspected terrorists as they fear for their lives.²⁷³

In an attempt to curb terrorist financing, the Kenyan legislature passed the ‘proceeds of crime and anti-money laundering Act’ of 2009. However, the financial reporting center lacks adequate structures aimed at identifying, tracing, freezing and repatriation of proceeds of crime, hence the law hasn’t been fully operationalized as a result. For instance, according to the department of state, informal financial structures such as the ‘hawalas’ are common money laundering avenues that have remained unregulated.²⁷⁴ These informal financial regulations coupled by unregulated money transfers present a challenge to implementing an anti-money laundering counterterrorism policy.²⁷⁵

2.4.2. Ethiopia

Ethiopia has been touted as the front runner in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in the Horn of Africa. This was attributed to Obama’s remarks in appreciation of

²⁷² *Op Cit.* Kagwanja. P., 2015

²⁷³ Interview with Guantai a legal consultant with Crowne court consult

²⁷⁴ Department of State, ‘*International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*,’ Vol.II, 2017 <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm> <accessed 13th October 2017

²⁷⁵ Interview with Mburugu from the Central Bank of Kenya

Ethiopia's efforts,²⁷⁶ perhaps evidenced by the lack of recent terror attacks within the Ethiopian soil.

In 2006, Ethiopia launched a military incursion into Somalia, touted as a self-defense strategy against the rapidly advancing Islamic Courts Union based in Somalia, in an attempt to bolster its own national security and protect its borders against the external threat that was imminent.²⁷⁷ However, this preemptive military strategy failed to prevent subsequent terrorist attacks within the Ethiopian borders. For instance, in 2013 a terrorist bomb went off in Bole district of Addis Ababa, leading to 2 deaths. The attack was attributed to al Shabaab, a terrorist group based in Somalia, and was attributed as a reprisal attack on Ethiopia's military role in Somalia. In fact, it is believed that the bomb was meant to be detonated at the Addis Ababa stadium where the Ethiopian football team was due to play Nigeria. Consequently, Ethiopia's military incursion into Somalia caused feeling of resentment by al Shabaab sympathizers within Ethiopia who staged the reprisal attacks.²⁷⁸

Additionally, in 2009, the Ethiopian legislature adopted the Anti-terrorism Proclamation pursuant to international and regional mechanisms that oblige member states to criminalize terrorist acts.²⁷⁹ However, this piece of legislation, although paved with good intentions, was subject to widespread criticism among human rights lobby groups, the civil society, the media, *inter alia*. Alluding that it contained fundamental clauses that were repugnant to justice and in contravention of basic human rights and

²⁷⁶ Dr. Maru. T.M., 'On President Obama's Appreciation of Ethiopian CT and COIN Doctrine,' LinkedIn (<https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/president-obamas-appreciation-ethiopian-ct-coin-taddele-maru>) August 7 2015 < Accessed June 15 2017

²⁷⁷ Gettleman. J., 'Ethiopia Hits Somali Targets Declaring War,' nytimes.com (<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/25/world/africa/25somalia.html>) 25th December, 2006 < Accessed 13th October 2017

²⁷⁸ Key Informant interview with an Ethiopian expat working in Kenya

²⁷⁹ *Op Cit*. A Proclamation on Anti-terrorism. 2009

international law.²⁸⁰ In fact, the Human Rights Watch noted that it contained fundamental flaws regarding protection of fundamental rights protected by the Ethiopian constitution.²⁸¹ Indeed, it was viewed as potentially depriving citizens and suspects of the right to be presumed innocent and that of a fair trial.²⁸²

Moreover, in 2009, Ethiopia operationalized its own anti-money laundering regime dubbed ‘the Anti-money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Proclamation 780,’ of 2013 which subsequently, established a Financial Intelligence Center that was mandated to handle money laundering and terrorist financing issues.²⁸³ All intended to curb the flow of illicit finances aimed at funding terrorist activity from the unstable state of Somalia. However, its efficiency has been marred by a lack of sufficient technical and technological capability of the staff hence hasn’t been effective in sealing the money laundering loopholes. For instance, the Global Finance Intelligence, in 2016 estimated that approximately \$2b is still being laundered within Ethiopia annually.²⁸⁴ This is evidence that the anti-money laundering and terrorist financing legal strategy has not been effective to fully deal with illicit funds flowing into and out of Ethiopia.

2.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Expanding the liberal school of thought, it would seem that, an anarchic global system, needs rules and regulations to deter competition and induce cooperation among actors. These are in the form of international law and other legal instruments which regulate behavior of the multiplicity of actors in international relations. The use of force is forbidden under Article 2(4) of the UN, bar in instances of self-defense and collective

²⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch, ‘*Analysis of Ethiopia’s Draft Anti-terrorism Law*,’ New York: HRW. 30th June, 2009

²⁸¹ *Ibid*

²⁸² From a group discussion with urban Ethiopian refugees domiciled in Hurlingham area of Nairobi

²⁸³ *Op Cit*. Lakew. A., 2016

²⁸⁴ Global Financial Intelligence, ‘*Illicit Financial Flows and Development Indices Report*,’ GFI, 2016

security action sanctioned by the Security Council.²⁸⁵ This provision essentially regulates the use of force by international relations actors with one another. However, these rules and regulations merely infer obligations to actors in IR and are not essentially enforceable.²⁸⁶ This is evident from the lack of any sort of action against the Coalition of the willing for invading Iraq, which was neither in self-defense nor sanctioned by the UNSC. Consequently, it is evident that rules and regulations not only fail to deter actors in IR but also are unenforceable.

In addition, liberalism presumes that diplomatic engagements and strategies are best suited to effectively tackle common security conundrums such as terrorism as opposed to military force. For instance, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) finally declared a ceasefire in 1998 as a result of diplomatic negotiations moderated by Britain.²⁸⁷ While, since Kenyan forces entered Somalia in pursuit of al Shabaab, terrorism attributed to them hasn't relented. In fact, in 2015, attacks perpetrated by al Shabaab accounted for 90% of deaths in Somalia.²⁸⁸ This is evident that diplomatic counterterrorism strategies are effective in countering the terrorist threat as opposed to the use of force. Hence, a counterterrorism strategy that advances democratic values, equality and individual liberties would be more pragmatic. Public diplomacy would for that matter be a more effective counterterrorism strategy.

Furthermore, liberalism advances the notion that, terrorism is an international blunder resulting in lack of viable institutional frameworks. Therefore, multilateral institutions such as the UN and AU are platforms where actors in IR converge and cooperate to

²⁸⁵ *Op Cit.* Charter of the UN, Article 2(4) Pp.6

²⁸⁶ Gareth. E., *'The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes once and for All,'* Washington. D.C: Brookings Institute Press. 2008

²⁸⁷ Edwards. A., 'When Terrorism as a Strategy Fails: Dissident Irish Republicans and the Threat to British Security,' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol.34, No. 4. 2011

²⁸⁸ *Op Cit.* GTI, 2016. Pp.32

overcome such security conundrums as terrorism, by way of mutually agreed anti-terrorism conventions, such as the ‘Declaration of measures to eradicate terrorism’ A/RES/49/60, and the OAU convention on the ‘Prevention and combatting of Terrorism.’ However, these multilateral institutions lack enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance by members. Accordingly, actors in IR seek grander rational outcomes that serve their long-term interest, perhaps the reason some fail to ratify anti-terrorism conventions that do not serve their interests. Nevertheless, public diplomacy could be used to influence the opinion of the public who in turn influence their state’s action to ratify such conventions.

Lastly, liberalism posits that within the state lies a multiplicity of actors with varying interests, each of whom seeking to influence state actions in the international system. Hence, states guarantee a level playing ground for each of them to ensure societal cohesion. However, when the state adopts policies that potentially marginalize a single actor, then they are bound to dissent, sometimes violently manifest as terrorism. For instance, a study conducted by Botha reveals that the extrajudicial killing of terrorism recruiters adopted by security agents along the Coastal region of Kenya, as a cause of youth joining al Shabaab.²⁸⁹ However, policy makers are considered rational and capable of foregoing individual interests to further the common good. Despite the fact that the strategies and mechanisms of counterterrorism in place in Kenya and Ethiopia are not effective, policy makers are capable of making policies that promote societal cohesiveness, one of the best indicators of resilience to terrorism, essentially in the realm of public diplomacy.

²⁸⁹ Botha. A & Abdile. M, ‘Radicalization and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia,’ *ISS, Paper*, Vol.266, No. 11. 2014

To sum up, cooperation and coordination reduce conflict.²⁹⁰ This was evident when the Kenyan law enforcement agencies lacked coordination while responding to the terror attack at Westgate shopping mall, resulting in one officer being gunned down. Signifying that the counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in place are not only ineffective, but require fortifying using more diplomatic strategies, in fact, public diplomacy would be better suited.

2.6. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, at the beginning of this chapter, this study sought to establish whether the counterterrorism mechanisms and strategies in place are sufficient to efficiently counter the threat that terrorism poses. To that end, it was established that the domestic legal regime in both Ethiopia and Kenya, first and foremost, lacks mechanisms to protect witnesses who come forward to report terrorist threats. Similarly inter agency coordination is not well organized thus needs to be reviewed to avoid the calamity of friendly fire as was witnessed during the Westgate siege. In the regional and international scene, more robust mechanisms ought to be put in place to ensure state compliance to the counterterrorism obligations imposed upon them as well as the need to place strict punitive measures to states that fail to comply.

Accordingly, the research concludes that the counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in place are indeed not effective on their own to counter the threat posed by terrorism. It is prudent that new, modern and innovative public diplomacy strategies are adopted to fortify the current mechanisms and strategies in place, for them to be efficient in countering the threat posed by terrorism. Hence, confirming the hypothesis

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.* Pp.88

that the mechanisms and strategies of counterterrorism in place are not efficient to offset the threat of terror.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF DIPLOMATIC STRATEGIES AND THE PLACE OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN COUNTERTERRORISM

3.1. DIPLOMACY: AN OVERVIEW

Various scholars of diplomacy have formulated definitions of the term diplomacy. However, in this chapter, I used Morgenthau's definition as promotion of a state's interests by peaceful means,²⁹¹ as well as management of relations by negotiation. As a result, diplomacy uses the dexterity of persuasion and compromise in equal measures to succeed. This is consistent with '*Politics among Nations,*' a *magnus opus* by him, which alludes that while conducting diplomacy, states should use a cost-benefit rubric that exploits compromise and persuasion, to proficiently achieve its policy goals.²⁹² This is further embodied in chapter six of the UN Charter that imposes an obligation to states in settling disputes that negate global peace, peacefully through; negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. For instance, the protracted Eritrean conflict, has been subject to various mediation efforts in a bid to resolve it once and for all since late 90's.²⁹³ This is in line with chapter VI of the Charter that imposes an obligation to states to resolve domestic or international conflicts diplomatically first before pursuing other options.

Indeed, diplomatic approaches could be useful strategies for resolving conflicts both domestic and those that transcend borders, symbolized by wanton violence such as international terrorism, when tactfully negotiated. A well conducted negotiations, ensures that the parties to the conflict, improve and cement their relationship with each

²⁹¹ *Op Cit.* Morgenthau. H, 1964. Pp. 569

²⁹² *Ibid.* Morgenthau. J. H, 1948

²⁹³ Jooireman. S. F, 'Ethiopia and Eritrea: Border War,' in *History behind the Headlines: The Origin of conflicts Worldwide*, (eds) Sonia. G. B, *et al.* Vol. 1, Nos 1-11, Detroit: Gale Group, 2001.

other, minimizing the risks of a retaliatory conflict. This is because communication (verbal and non-verbal) is a resource to negotiations and if tactful, and efficiency is the result.²⁹⁴ This was the case with the 2008 mediation of the Kenyan post-election crisis that culminated in a unity coalition between PNU and ODM who were adversaries to the conflict, which left approximately 1500 dead.²⁹⁵ Hence, communication safeguards the efficiency of diplomatic approaches in resolving violent conflicts transcending borders such as terrorism, as well as making it a useful resource in domestic counterterrorism strategies such as community dialogue.

Moreover, diplomacy is a multi-stakeholder endeavor that emphasizes upon multilateral and bilateral relations between nations and NSAs in international relations. This is by way of international and regional agreements such as treaties and conventions of counterterrorism, where parties cooperate in areas of mutual interests such as security.²⁹⁶ Here, states seek to fuse the various counterterrorism strategies into a single one which is more compact, and comprehensive.²⁹⁷ Accordingly, the 2006 UNGC-T strategy, was negotiated and passed in the General Assembly as a holistic strategy to counter the threat of terrorism. Hence co-operation in global counterterrorism measures efficiently tackles issues of common concern like security, whereby terrorism threatens global peace and security and the basic survival of states.

In order to formulate efficient diplomatic strategies for the long term, it is prudent to examine the motive behind terrorist groups as terrorism is in itself a form of non-verbal signaling aimed at intimidating, manipulating and provoking a greater audience.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁴ Tran. V. D, '*Communication and Diplomacy in a changing World*,' Norwood: Abex, 1978. Pp 8

²⁹⁵ Maupeu, H, 'Revisiting post-election violence.' Lafargue, J. (Ed.). *The General Elections in Kenya: 2007*. Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers Ltd, 2008. Pp. 187-223.

²⁹⁶ *Op Cit.* Nicholson. H, 1968. Pp. 6

²⁹⁷ *Op Cit.* Pesto. H, 2010. Pp. 73.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid*

Hence, manipulation aims at coercing the intended target to abandon a policy direction that the terrorist disapprove, while intimidation causes fear among a group so that they act according to the terrorist demands, and finally provoking a target to respond indiscriminately in a way that would victimize the citizens, who in turn dissent and join the terrorist cause.²⁹⁹ Hence, policy makers while formulating these diplomatic strategies of counterterrorism, ought to consider the underlying enablers of terrorism and make policies that improve a state's capacity to counterterrorism that embrace cooperation, conflict management both locally and globally, economic diplomacy and sustainability all these while upholding fundamental liberties and freedoms. These strategies should accommodate actors, both state and non-state to be fully efficient.

3.2. ACTORS IN DIPLOMATIC COUNTERTERRORISM

Actors of a diplomatic discourse are defined as entities of global legal nature which are bound by international law or have influence in global affairs through their wide financial base.³⁰⁰ These actors have a global clout on the diplomatic process that enables them engage. They include: State, Non-state and Quasi actors.³⁰¹

State actors are the principal actors of diplomacy, since they are the chief subjects of international law. Each pursuing its own personal interests in the global arena, all geared at the basic survival and prosperity of the state and its citizens. It is for that reason that states are at the primacy of counterterrorism policy based on cooperation, coordination in counterterrorism activities, and negotiations with other states in the

²⁹⁹ Andrew. H & Barbara. F, 'The Strategies of Terrorism,' *International Security*, Vol. 31 No. 1, 2006. Pp 59

³⁰⁰ Mwangiru. M., '*DIPLOMACY: Documents, Methods and Practice*,' Nairobi: Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, 2004. Pp. 45

³⁰¹ *Ibid*

global and regional arena, with the intention to contain the terror threat that has become a global conundrum.

Furthermore, owing to rapid globalization, non-state actors have emerged as actors in international relations challenging the traditional primacy of states.³⁰² Moreover, the traditional liberal institutions are increasingly being influenced by non-state actors such as the civil society. Whereas they are private entities, they have a prominent role in the diplomatic process. A good example is the clout exhibited by religious organizations the likes of the Roman Catholic Church and Islam in modern diplomatic relations, even establishing diplomatic relations as is the case with the Vatican.³⁰³ Therefore, non-state actors are essential to the diplomatic dispensation in the liberal international environment owing to their clout, wide reach and expertise in global affairs.

Accordingly, the role of non-state actors has increasingly become of paramount prominence in counterterrorism, this is because terrorism is in fact being regarded by scholars in the area of countering violent extremism, as a social issue rather than just a security conundrum,³⁰⁴ hence the need to shift counterterrorism approaches from state centric to include non-state actors, whose expertise and already established networks, would be essential in implementing public diplomacy based policies. In fact, counterterrorism initiatives increasingly being addressed using holistic approaches, such as public diplomacy, to mitigate the complex issues emerging from purely social aspects that enable the emergence and spread of terrorism such as deprivations, inequality and marginalization and desecration of civil liberties. Indeed, addressing aspects such as community resilience and aspects such as terrorist propaganda that are

³⁰² *Op Cit.* Simmons. P., 1998. Pp. 82

³⁰³ *Ibid.* Mwangiru. M., 2004. Pp. 46

³⁰⁴ Balsi. A-M., 'The Influence of Non-State Actors on Global Politics,' Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2016

credited to the rapid radicalization of youths, is in the realm of NSAs the likes of NGOs and the civil society.³⁰⁵ Moreover, NSAs can help the state legitimize and even criticize counterterrorism policy emanating from the state or international organizations and are better suited to initiate grass root agendas that help curb the spread of terrorism such as education, development projects and inter-communal dialogue in addition to restoring public trust in liberal institutions that have come under severe threat from terrorism. Hence, these strategies of counterterrorism aimed at ‘winning hearts and minds’ are more efficient when they involve non-state actors especially where they transcend jurisdictions which are inviolable by state actors.

Finally, Makumi Mwangi, describes quasi actors as private entities who lack transnational legal standing, although not bound by international law, derive clout from their wide reach and their vast resource base that could even surpass those of states.³⁰⁶ For instance, terrorism and the threat it poses is bad for business of multinational corporations (MNCs) and may assist either by availing resources to counter the threat or coercing states into adopting a viable counterterrorism policy in addition to the foreign direct investment they inject into the economy to improve the lives of citizens that goes a long way to reduce economic and social frustrations that may lead to violence.

3.2.1. Case Studies

3.2.1.1 Kenya

The Kenya foreign policy document articulates actors pertinent in the apprehension of its policy objectives as the institution of the presidency, the ministry of external affairs

³⁰⁵ *Ibid*

³⁰⁶ *Op Cit.* Mwangi, M., 2004. Pp. 47

and trade, the legislature and any other relevant institutions.³⁰⁷ Accordingly, the office of the presidency epitomizes the state's chief diplomat, since it represents the state in international and regional summits. For instance, the Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, was among the few African heads of states invited in May 2017, to attend the Group of 7 (G7) summit in Sicily, Italy, where he highlighted Africa's plight in counterterrorism, and called upon member states to partner with African states in areas of intelligence sharing and sustainable development to effectively defeat terrorism.³⁰⁸ In addition, the head of state accredits diplomatic envoys and signs their credentials.³⁰⁹ Moreover, they are mandated to delegate authority to initiate, negotiate and sign treaties on their behest. This is in line with Section 4(2) of the Treaty making and Ratification Act of 2012 which permits the president to delegate initiation, negotiation and ratifying powers to any relevant department of the state.³¹⁰ Which includes counterterrorism treaties. Indeed, the head of state appoints ambassadors who represent him in other states, collect information about threats and opportunities for counterterrorism cooperation in their host states, and directly report to him. This is in line with Article 132 (2) (d) of the Constitution of Kenya.³¹¹ Therefore, it is evident that the making and execution of a foreign policy such as counterterrorism policy, originates and ends with the head of state making him the utmost principal figure in Kenya's diplomatic engagement.

³⁰⁷ Republic of Kenya, '*Kenya Foreign Policy*,' Nairobi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. 2014. Chapter 3. Pp. 32

³⁰⁸ Namunane. B., 'G7 Member States to cooperate with Africa in Solving Woes,' *Daily Nation*, (Nairobi), Saturday May 27 2017

³⁰⁹ Government of Kenya, '*The Constitution of Kenya*,' Nairobi: Government Printers, 2010. Article 132 4(b)

³¹⁰ Government of Kenya, '*Treaty making and Ratification Act*,' Nairobi: Government Printers, No. 45, 2012. S.4(2) Pp. 7

³¹¹ *Op Cit.* The Constitution of Kenya. Article 132 (2) (e) Pp. 77

The second actor of Kenyan diplomacy is the legislature consisting of the senate and parliament, whose are representative of the Kenyan people³¹² and whose mandate is to propose, deliberate and decide the Kenyan domestic policy. Notably, foreign policy of a state springs from its own domestic policy,³¹³ hence, domestic policy and foreign policy are discerned by territory only. This deliberation power stems from Article 95 (2) of the Kenyan Constitution.³¹⁴ Parliament through the foreign relations committee, administers the enactment of foreign policy, which includes counterterrorism policy. In addition ratification of essential treaties of counterterrorism may be approved with or without reservation to specific provision, by parliament.³¹⁵ Hence, the legislature is an important actor in Kenyan diplomatic dispensation on matters of counterterrorism.

The Judiciary interprets agreements that Kenya has entered into with other states, thus advising policy makers on how to domesticate the specific policies from treaties or conventions and their implication on domestic law, which in turn aids them in making informed policy decisions. This mandate is conferred by Chapter 10 of the Constitution of Kenya. In addition, it offers an advisory role to the government on how to domesticate certain conventions into domestic law without contravening provisions of the constitution.³¹⁶ This was the case with the government's attempted implementation of the prevention of terrorism Act, of 2012, in line with Security Council Resolution 1456 of 2003, but the High Court held 4 clauses in contravention of civil liberties as encompassed in the Bill of Rights. Hence it is evident that the judiciary is an important

³¹² *Ibid.* Article 94 (1)

³¹³ Fearon. J. D., 'Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations' *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1998. Pp. 294

³¹⁴ *Op Cit.* The Constitution of Kenya. Article 95(2)

³¹⁵ *Op Cit.* Treaty making and Ratification Act, S. 8 (4)

³¹⁶ Kameri. P. M., & Akech. M., '*Kenya: Justice Sector and the Rule of Law,*' International Environmental Law Research Centre, Johannesburg: Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa. 2011. Pp. 4

actor of diplomatic counterterrorism dispensation through its advisory and interpretation role.

The cabinet secretary ministry of external affairs and trade is the spokesperson of the state on matter pertaining foreign affairs. The ministry is therefore tasked with the responsibility of trailing Kenya's foreign policy and international trade undertakings in line with the provisions of the Constitution, aimed at defending and illuminating Kenya's interest in the global environment. Predominantly the socio-economic and political interests.³¹⁷ This includes counterterrorism measures that Kenya undertakes. This is evident from the cabinet secretary Ambassador Amina Mohammed's meeting with the US secretary of state during his visit to Kenya in 2006 where she highlighted Kenya's strides in counterterrorism initiatives by way of conflict management of its neighbors Somalia and Sudan in the HoA region.³¹⁸ In addition, the ministry coordinates the work of ambassadors which includes information gathering and reporting on issues that are threat and opportunities for counterterrorism cooperation, which in turn provides information for counterterrorism policy decision making.

In conclusion, these actors ensure that Kenya leads by example in diplomatic counterterrorism policy formulation and implementation while coordinating and cooperating with other states in the region and globally to ensure a lasting solution to the terrorist threat within the country and the HoA region as a whole.

³¹⁷ *Op Cit.* Kenya Foreign Policy. 2014. Pp. 7

³¹⁸ US Department of State, 'Remarks with Kenyan Foreign Minister Amina Mohamed,' state.gov(<https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/08/261188.htm>) August 22, 2016

3.2.1.2. Ethiopia

Ethiopia's diplomacy is dominated by the executive (the president & the PM) and the foreign minister.³¹⁹ In fact, the president, the head of state, is tasked with the mandate of accrediting and receiving diplomatic agents.³²⁰ Similarly, the president has powers to negotiate and ratify international agreements subject to legislative approval articulated in Article 55(2) of the Constitution³²¹ including counterterrorism treaties and conventions. Additionally, upon recommendation by the prime minister, the president appoints ambassadors and envoys to represent the country abroad.³²² These ambassadors report of the opportunities of counterterrorism cooperation from their host states and threats of terrorism posed from within their host states to Ethiopia.

The PM, who is the commander-in-chief of the army is tasked with negotiating and signing agreements with foreign states. This is evident from the meeting in Valetta, Malta in May 2016 between PM Hailemariam Desalegn and the EU President Juncker, where an agreement dubbed 'Towards an EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement,' was signed projecting EU's cooperation with Ethiopia, in areas of counterterrorism and refugee migration. Furthermore, The Prime Minister is tasked with following up and ensuring that these policies culminating in these international agreements, and adopted by the House of Peoples' Representatives, are implemented into law.³²³ This is manifest from a follow up to the meeting with the EU president when PM Hailemariam, pledged to personally oversee the implementation of the agreement to the European

³¹⁹ Gebeyehu. Y., 'Ethiopia: Making Diplomacy Effective in Ethiopia's Foreign Policy,' *Addis Fortune*: Addis Ababa, 2016

³²⁰ The Federal Republic of Ethiopia. 'The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia,' Article 71(4)

³²¹ Yihdego. Z., *et al.*, (Eds.) 'Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law 2016,' (1st ed) New York: Springer, 2017. Pp. 72

³²² *Op Cit.* The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Article 71(3)

³²³ *Ibid.* Article 74(3)

Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, Christos Stylianides.³²⁴

Similarly, the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service, tasked with protecting national security through intelligence gathering, reports directly to the prime minister.³²⁵

Indeed, the legislature, particularly, the House of Peoples' Representatives, the law making house in a bicameral legislature is mandated to deliberate and approve an international agreement, treaty or convention inclusive of counterterrorism ones, before they are domesticated into law, in accordance with Article 9(4) of the Ethiopian constitution.³²⁶ This makes them important actors of diplomatic counterterrorism in Ethiopia based on their approval status as obligated by the constitution of Ethiopia.

3.3. THE DIPLOMACY OF COOPERATION

Owing to challenges posed by globalization and advancement in information technology, states are no longer unitary actors in dealing with cross border security threats such as terrorism, making cooperation essential in countering the terrorism threat.³²⁷ This is because of the liberalized flow of goods and people across borders, has made it easy for terrorist groups to launch attacks in any state of their choosing, making it necessary for states to cooperate and coordinate in their strategy to thwart them. There is consensus in the global community of the danger that sophisticated weapons in the hands of the terrorist poses. Hence the need to adopt cooperative counterterrorism strategies against the threat.

³²⁴ European Union, '*HR/VP Federica Moghaini met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn*,' Europa.eu (https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_fr/4984/) 15.06.2016

³²⁵ Erwin Van Veen, '*Perpetuating Power: Ethiopia's Political Settlement and the Organization of Security*,' CRU Report, 2016. Chapter 2

³²⁶ *Op Cit.* Yihdego. Z, *et al.*, (Eds.) 'Ethiopian Yearbook of International Law 2016' Pp. 73

³²⁷ Moodie, M., '*Cooperative Security: Implications for National Security and International Relations*,' Cooperation Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 14, 2000

Indeed cooperation in counterterrorism strategy is seen to have taken a foothold particularly in the wake of the 9/11 terror attack on the US soil, when the global community realized that no state is safe from international terrorism, big or small.³²⁸ None of the terrorists were US citizens, and the international community for the first time witnessed not only their wide reach, but also their advanced methods of attack, which resulted in casualties of an unprecedented magnitude. Hence the realization that terrorism can effectively be fought when there is a centralized system where the international community in its entirety is involved.

Counterterrorism cooperation in this sense, involves states with common interests, such as the realization that terrorism is not just a threat to peace but an impediment to economic advancement.³²⁹ This is because tranquility creates a conducive environment for states to focus on economic development which is essential in their national interest. This in turn creates the need for them to form coalitions within mutually agreed parameters, either bilaterally or multilaterally guided by norms that regulate their behavior in the fight against terrorism, and impose punitive measures to those who are a threat to global peace.³³⁰ Cooperation in counterterrorism is enhanced through confidence building, conflict management and transparency that boost their relationships,³³¹ which in turn averts future conflict amongst them which would create an enabling environment for terrorism to thrive.

In addition, the global community has realized that countering the terror threat can be averted in the long term by addressing the root causes of terrorism rather than using a

³²⁸ Javier. A. *et al.*, 'A Decade of EU-Counterterrorism and Intelligence: A Critical Assessment,' *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 30, Nos. 2-3, 2015. Pp. 191-206

³²⁹ Perl. R., '*International Terrorism: Threat, Policy and Response- A CRS Report for Congress*,' Washington D.C: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006

³³⁰ *Ibid*

³³¹ Florick. D., 'Remapping US-China Relations: A Holistic Approach to Building Long term Confidence and Transparency,' *International Affairs Review*, 2015

military response. There is a consensus that human insecurity caused by deprivations, environmental degradation, abuse of civil liberties and the inability to meet the basic needs of citizens is a threat to global peace as they act as enablers of terrorism. Hence the need to cooperate and improve the capacity of states to tackle these challenges.

Cooperation in counterterrorism is perhaps key in a situation where liberal institutions of a state have been eroded or weakened resulting in the state's lack of the ability to counter terrorism, and provide basic amenities for their own citizens.³³² This is the case with failed states such as Somalia in the Horn of Africa region, which are more susceptible to terrorism as the lawlessness affords a conducive environment for terrorist cells to set up base. Thus the necessity for the global community to collaborate and intervene as this may pose a threat to global peace in the long term. However, in my opinion regional cooperation would be the most appropriate in dealing with a situation like Somalia. This is because the regional actors are particularly well versed with the dynamics and challenges faced by a state like Somalia and would directly pose a threat to regional peace in the immediate future. This would encompass restoring domestic stability through restoring the institutional frameworks, strengthening their capacity to rebuild their political and socio-economic structures.

3.3.1. Case Study

3.3.1.1. Kenya

As alluded to in the previous section, terrorism, a crime that transcends borders in a globalizing world, poses fundamental challenges to peace, safety and the rule of law, making it an arduous task for a single state to effectively tackle it unilaterally and Kenya is no exception. Therefore, owing to the magnitude of the challenges it poses, Kenya

³³² Dempsey, T., '*Counterterrorism in African failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions*,' Carlisle, PA: Strategic Strategies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006

adopts a well-coordinated response in the form of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and international collaboration in, border security, repatriation, ‘mutual legal assistance’ in criminal, law enforcement, intelligence, military support and training as well as development assistance in an attempt to effectively prevent, contain and respond to terrorist threats.

Pursuant to the international principle of comity, Kenya enacted the Mutual Legal Assistance Act of 2011, which paved way for Kenya to enter into bilateral MLA treaties with other states around the world. This Act provides for reciprocation in gathering of evidence, investigation and judicial action.³³³ For instance in April 2016, Kenya signed an MLA treaty with both the USA and China covering transnational crimes such as crimes of terrorism and corruption.³³⁴ ³³⁵ In the regional and the international setup, Kenya is a signatory of the IGAD Convention on ‘Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition’, in addition to the ‘United Nations Convention against Transnational crimes’ of 2000.³³⁶ These MLA agreements have enabled Kenya cooperate with states in the global community in apprehending, investigating and charging criminals within their jurisdiction suspected of funding, aiding and abetting or carrying out terrorist attacks within the borders of the concerned states.

Furthermore, Kenya cooperates with other states in the repatriation of fugitives suspected of having orchestrated, financed or conspired to commit terrorist attacks to states that have submitted formal extradition requests in accordance to the specific

³³³ Government of Kenya, ‘*The Mutual Legal Assistance Act*,’ Nairobi: Government Printers, No. 36, 2011. Part 1, Clause 3

³³⁴ ‘*USA Government Pledge Mutual Legal Aid to Kenya*,’ statelaw.go.ke (<http://www.statelaw.go.ke/usa-government-pledge-mutual-legal-aid-to-kenya/>) 14.04 2016

³³⁵ ‘*China and Kenya Successfully conclude Negotiations on Treaty and Sign Draft Texts*,’ gov.cn (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1426223.shtml)

³³⁶ UN General Assembly, ‘*United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*’, 8 January 2001, A/RES/55/25

treaties between them. In fact, extradition in Kenya is governed by three main legal regimes in the form of the Extradition (Commonwealth countries) Act (Cap 77), which governs the extradition of fugitives, suspected to have committed a terrorism crime within Commonwealth member states,³³⁷ the Extradition (Contiguous and Foreign Countries) Act (Cap 76), which governs the extradition of suspected fugitives of terrorism to non-Commonwealth states, based upon reciprocal bilateral treaties between the states and Kenya, and the Fugitives offenders Pursuit Act (Cap 87), based upon the principle of comity, permits law enforcement of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania to pursue a fugitive outside their jurisdiction subject to an extradition order by a magistrate.³³⁸

At regional level, Kenya is party to the OAU Pact on the ‘Prevention and combating of Terrorism’ of 1999, which establishes terrorism crimes as extraditable offenses and obligates states to cooperate in extradition.³³⁹ Finally, in the international sphere, Kenya has ratified the ‘Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’, 1999, which obliges members to cooperate in extraditing financiers and enablers of terrorism to states that establish valid jurisdiction while safeguarding their civil liberties and rights of asylum.³⁴⁰

Indeed, the cross border nature of terrorism puts border security cooperation at the forefront of Kenya’s security policy. For instance Kenyan and Somali officials in 2006 resolved to conduct joint border patrols in the border point between Mandera and Bula Hawo and put up common exit and entry border points, in an aim to curb the free

³³⁷ Government of Kenya, ‘*The Extradition (Commonwealth countries) Act*,’ Nairobi: Government Printers, Cap 77, [Rev. 2012]

³³⁸ Government of Kenya, ‘*Fugitive Offenders Pursuit Act*,’ Nairobi: Government Printers, Cap 87, 1982 [Rev. 2012]

³³⁹ *Op Cit.* OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999. Article 9

³⁴⁰ *Op Cit.* International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999

movement of al Shabaab operatives between the two countries.³⁴¹ In addition, the USA in 2015 gave Kenya counterterrorism aid of up to 100 million USD earmarked for counterterrorism measures such as border security initiatives targeted at detecting, deterring, and disrupting cross-border activities of al Shabaab operatives.³⁴² In addition, Kenya and Ethiopia share a joint border and security commission that addresses issues of border security.³⁴³

3.3.1.2. Ethiopia

As aforementioned, terrorism is indeed a trans-border threat to peace and security. Hence, cooperation in unifying their counterterrorism efforts into a coordinated effort to ensure efficiency. Ethiopia is no exception.

First and foremost, there is a domestic effort to coordinate domestic inter agency efforts into a single collaborative strategy to ensure its domestic efforts are coordinated under one institutional body, consequently, in 2006, security, immigration, refugees affairs counterterrorism strategies were transferred under one umbrella body; the Ethiopian Task Force for Counter Terrorism.³⁴⁴ The ETF-CT is tasked with prevention, reacting and long-term counterterrorism planning and implementation in the area of intelligence, border security, and criminal investigating and coordinating, other agencies that are tasked to carry out each of these initiatives. Indeed, it is tasked with thwarting all perceived threats to Ethiopian national security.³⁴⁵

³⁴¹ Goldberg, 'Kenya, Somalia in Joint efforts to curtail Cross-border Terrorism (Al Shabaab) at Mandera Border,' intelligencebriefs.com (<http://intelligencebriefs.com/kenya-somalia-in-joint-efforts-to-curtail-cross-border-terrorism-al-shabaab-at-mandera-border-area/>) 15th March 2006

³⁴² Security Assistance Monitor, 'U.S. Counterterrorism AID to Kenya,' securityassistance.org (http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/us-counterterrorism-aid-kenya) 21.7.2015

³⁴³ *Op Cit.* Mwagiru. M., 2004. Pp. 68

³⁴⁴ Woldemichael. W., 'Terrorism in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa: Threat, Impact and Response,' Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Press, 2010. Pp. 290

³⁴⁵ *Ibid*

Similarly, Ethiopia has entered into bilateral counterterrorism cooperation initiatives. The most significant one being the counterterrorism multilateral agreements with the USA. This was necessitated by the fact that the US was in need of a strategic partner to bolster its counterterrorism efforts around the HoA region and the Middle East owing to Ethiopia's strategic geo-location. Ethiopia-USA are key allies in the areas of military support and training, intelligence sharing, extradition treaties and mutual legal assistance alliances in transnational crimes such as terrorism and corruption, which is credited to be the cause of the underlying enablers of terrorism.³⁴⁶ Indeed, there is cooperation in military intelligence as well as in counterterrorism initiatives semi regional efforts such as the Partnership for regional East African Counter Terrorism (PRACT) as well as the 'Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa' (CJTF_HOA) all of which derive their funding from the US.³⁴⁷ Accordingly, PRACT was established in 2009 to assist states in the Horn of Africa region build capacities to individually counter terrorist threats and enable them do short and long-term counterterrorism design and action.³⁴⁸ While, the CJTF_HOA, together with Djibouti, is more of counterterrorism defense, conflict management, and eradicating root enablers of terrorism.³⁴⁹

Ethiopia, alongside Kenya supported the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia in 2004, including hosting them during the mediation efforts to hand over power.³⁵⁰

Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya have cross-border security arrangements aimed at

³⁴⁶ Aremo. D., '*Global Terrorism and Ethiopia's Foreign Policy Dynamics: A Narrative Analysis*,' Master's Thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2014

³⁴⁷ Lauren. P., '*Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The US Response*,' Washington, D.C: Congressional Research Service, 2010

³⁴⁸ Department of State., '*Country Reports on Terrorism-2010*,' Washington, D.C: Bureau on Counterterrorism. 2010. Pp.6

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.* Pp.8

³⁵⁰ Donovan. C., '*US Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Understanding Cost, Cultures and Conflicts*,' Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2008

screening people going across their borders in an effort to avert terrorist groups and smuggled arms from crossing over, particularly from Somalia.³⁵¹

Regionally, and internationally Ethiopia has ratified and assented to over 8 regional, sub regional and international counterterrorism instrument that oblige them to cooperate with other member states in counterterrorism measures. Particularly in Mutual Legal and Extradition Agreements.³⁵² Besides, the Ethiopian Police cooperate with INTERPOL and are members of The East African Police Chief Cooperation to cooperate against cross border crime such as terrorism.³⁵³ Hence, Ethiopia is aggressively involved in counterterrorism cooperation in an effort to thwart the terrorist threat emanating from and beyond its borders.

SUMMARY

Despite strides made by the HoA states to cooperate in counterterrorism measures, several challenges are posed thus making it less effective;

First and foremost, these extradition laws are outdated and sometimes do not safeguard fundamental liberties and the right to asylum. For instance, in 2006 a British citizen, Reza Afsharzagaden on holiday in Mogadishu, while fleeing the conflict ensuing from Ethiopia's troops incursion into Somalia, was arrested in Kenya and immediately handed over to Ethiopian officials who then handed him over to Americans who arbitrarily detained him without regard to due process, and was only freed through diplomatic intervention by the UK.³⁵⁴

³⁵¹ Department of State., 'Country Reports on Terrorism-2013,' Washington, D.C: Bureau on Counterterrorism. 2013. Pp.25

³⁵² *Op Cit.* US Department of State Country Reports-2015

³⁵³ *Op Cit.* Dessu. M., 2016

³⁵⁴ Spiegel Online, 'US Interrogates Terror Suspects in Ethiopian Jails' Spiegel.de (<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/extraordinary-renditions-in-africa-us-interrogates-terror-suspects-in-ethiopian-jails-a-487893.html>) 11th June, 2007 < accessed 13th October, 2017

Moreover, joint border patrols are not efficient enough to prevent the infiltration of terrorists. This is because the HoA states have long unmanned borders owing to lack of sufficient human resource, technological capability and finances to efficiently patrol the borders. Additionally, globalization and advancement in information technology has disinterested the traditional borders thus enabling cross border crimes such as terrorism and terrorist financing to be committed within the cyberspace. This in turn making it tough to combat these crimes that transcend borders.

In light of the foregoing, diplomatic cooperation although a solid counterterrorism strategy, is faced by challenges that make it less efficient to effectively tackle terrorism within the HoA region.

3.4. THE DIPLOMACY OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Expending the liberal lens, terrorism is as a result of weak and redundant legal and institutional framework that are geared to conflict resolution. Accordingly, failed states create a favorable environment for terrorism to thrive, as terror groups seek to establish domain within the jurisdiction of these states, away from scrutiny, interference and need for accountability.³⁵⁵ This in turn creates a security threat to neighboring states, as well as a long-term threat to global peace. The aptitude of Al Shabaab, a terrorist group in the HoA, is an example how failed states are conducive for terrorist groups, not to mention the security threat it has posed in the wider Horn of Africa region.

Therefore, it is prudent for neighboring states to mitigate internal conflicts of these states which are evidentially unable to manage internally. Mitigation is more effective when diplomatic conflict resolution mechanisms are used, as they are party centered in that the third party acts more as a moderator, nonetheless the solutions transpire from

³⁵⁵ Reilly. D., '*Failing State Violence*,' PhD Thesis, University of Colorado, 2011

the parties themselves, making it easier to enforce and implement.³⁵⁶ Perhaps with this in mind, the Kenyan foreign policy document accentuates the need for a ‘peace diplomatic pillar’ in the security stabilization of the H.O.A sub-region.³⁵⁷ In addition, internal state conflict are a source of discontention among the citizens. Internal conflicts may lead to a state of lawlessness, which creates an enabling atmosphere for terrorism to grow. For instance, according to the small arms survey report in 2012, there were more than half a million small arms in circulation in Kenya alone.³⁵⁸ The impact of these internal wars is that they lead to a humanitarian crisis which in turn causes disenfranchisement among the affected who may seek to dissent in the form of terrorist attacks.

3.4.1. Case Study

3.4.1.1. Kenya

Indeed, as mentioned above, the Kenya Foreign Policy document of 2015, accentuates the need for Kenya to cooperate with neighboring states in the form of conflict resolution using the diplomatic peace pillar, in order to stabilize the H.O.A. region. This averts conflict in Somalia, which is deemed as an enabler of terrorism. For instance in 2004, Kenya took leadership in the IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority for Development) facilitated mediation, between the 2000 Transitional National Government of Somalia, with the newly elected transitional government based on a power sharing formula.³⁵⁹ In addition, Kenya has been heavily involved in mediating a

³⁵⁶ Sikander. T., ‘Conflict and Conflict Resolution,’ in Lt. Col. Rehman. S, *et al.* (eds.) ‘*Margalla Papers*,’ Islamabad: National Defense University, 2011. Pp. 155

³⁵⁷ *Op. Cit.* Kenya Foreign Policy, 2014. Pp. 22

³⁵⁸ Small Arms Survery-Special Report, June 2012

³⁵⁹ Menkhaus. K., ‘Mediation Efforts in Somalia,’ *AfricaMediatorsRetreat*, 2007. Pp.38

peaceful resolution of the power based conflicts in Sudan, from mid 90s, which culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005.³⁶⁰

Similarly, Kenya, has sought regional and international leadership in the form of regional conflict management, prevention and resolution, with the aim to secure the globe which in turn eradicates conditions necessary for terrorism to thrive. This has been achieved through direct mediation facilitation and also through supporting regional and international organizations in finding long-term counterterrorism solutions.³⁶¹ Therefore, Kenya makes monetary besides personnel contribution to regional and international institutions such as the UN, AU, IGAD and EAC *Inter alia*.to fund and aid peace and security initiatives which includes terrorism measures. For instance Kenya's annual obligation to these organizations is in the tune of 679 million KSH,³⁶² which funds security initiatives of: the UN peacekeeping force, the African Standby Force and the Eastern Africa Standby Force.

In addition, in an effort to end internal conflicts in Kenya particularly among the pastoral communities, the Government has initialized grass root mobilization and mediation initiatives aimed at reconciliation among the warring parties.³⁶³ Similarly, civil society and think tanks have taken up the role of shaping and formulating problem solving policy and resettlement plans that are aimed at solving the issues at hand in the long term.

³⁶⁰ Juma. W., '*Kenya's Mediation in the Sudan Peace Process*,' Master Thesis, University of Nairobi, 2013

³⁶¹ *Op. Cit.* Kenya Foreign Policy, 2014. Pp. 5

³⁶² Omondi. G., 'Kenya sets up Fund for International Bodies annual fees,' *Business Daily*, 12.2.2017

³⁶³ Adan. M., & Pkalya. R., '*Conflict Management in Kenya: Towards Policy and Strategy Formulation*,' Nairobi: Practical Action, 2006

3.4.1.2. Ethiopia

Conflict management is one of the areas Ethiopia had to engage into perhaps for the reason of necessity and the fact that it is sandwiched by belligerent and unstable neighboring states such as Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia, who pose the biggest threat to their peace and security. Hence Ethiopia seeks to protect its national borders as they pose a significant terrorist threat to Ethiopia. In fact, Ethiopia in its foreign security policy document has proscribed various methods of engagement with each of these states.³⁶⁴

Ethiopia has a population of 99 million people consisting a multiethnic society.³⁶⁵ For instance, according to the US Department of State, 63% of the population comprises Christians, while just 34% consists of Muslims.³⁶⁶ Accordingly, in an effort to protect the individual rights and ensure they live in harmony, the Constitution, bestows every citizen, the fundamental rights and freedoms of association and worship as proscribed in the Bill of Rights.³⁶⁷ Therefore, ethnic groups that may feel marginalized develop a feeling of resentment, which may lead them to dissent against authority in violence manifest as terrorism; as OLF has time and time again done. For this reason Ethiopia has been in negotiation with the Oromo political organization, the Oromo Federalist Democratic Movement (OFDM) aimed at building political consensus, and inclusion in an area they have felt excluded for ages. This has led to a truce as their political inclusion has given them hope for the future.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁴ Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, '*Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy & Strategy*,' Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information & Audiovisual Department, 2002. Pp. 56-80

³⁶⁵ *Op Cit.* World Bank. 2013

³⁶⁶ US Department of State., '*International Religious Freedom Report-2003*,' Washington. D.C: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights & Labor.' 2013

³⁶⁷ Harff. B, & Gurr. R. '*Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*,' Cambridge: Westview Press. 2004

³⁶⁸ Abbink. J., '*A Decade of Ethiopia: Politics, Economy & Society. 2004-2016*,' Addis Ababa: BRILL. 2017

Correspondingly, Ethiopia has been involved in regional and sub-regional efforts in area of conflict management as the security policy document realizes that stability within neighboring states is prudent in their internal peace and security.³⁶⁹ In fact, Eritrea, and Somalia pose a direct terrorism threat as groups emanating from the two states have time and time again conducted terrorist attacks within Ethiopia, particularly the terrorist attack by Eritrean backed ONLF attack on a petroleum exploration bureau in 2007.³⁷⁰ Eritrea has additionally been sanctioned by the UNSC for backing al Shabaab; a major terrorist group in the Horn of Africa.³⁷¹ For that reason in an attempt to quell these external threats Ethiopia has been involved in mediation efforts within the region to promote stability within these states. For instance, in the late 90s it was involved heavily and even facilitated mediation efforts between the Transitional Government of Somalia and the various clan representative in an aim to agree a viable power sharing agreement aimed at stabilizing Somalia.³⁷² In addition, Ethiopia hosts, the East African Standby Force headquarters in Addis Ababa, who are tasked with regional peace making and conflict management.

Lastly, Ethiopia has an obligation to the United Nations in the form of personnel and monetary support. For instance, Ethiopia had by 2016 contributed over 70,000 personnel to over 9 UN peacekeeping missions.³⁷³ This has given them a leveraging position in their campaign for non-permanent representation in the Security Council for the year 2017-2018.

³⁶⁹ *Op Cit.* Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy & Strategy. 2002

³⁷⁰ *Op Cit.* Farus. B. 2013

³⁷¹ *Op Cit.* Amahazion. F., 2016

³⁷² *Ibid*

³⁷³ African Union, ‘*Address of Ethiopian Foreign Minister Tedros Adhomom to the 26th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments,*’ Addis Ababa, 2015

Hence, Ethiopia has been a leader in regional and international conflict management initiatives and is seen as a leader in the area. This has hence shaped its diplomatic strategy in the aim of securing its borders from the threat of terrorism emanating externally, in addition to quelling domestic threats posed by disgruntled members of groups that are deemed marginalized as they are vulnerable to terrorist indoctrination.

SUMMARY

Conflict is rife in the HoA region, this in turn frustrates attempts at efforts at conflict management in the region. For instance, Somalia and South Sudan are engaged in an unending cycle of internal conflicts that habitually tend to spill over to other surrounding states. This has made any attempt at engaging in the diplomacy of conflict resolution an uphill task for both Kenya and Ethiopia making it a less effective strategy of counterterrorism.³⁷⁴

Secondly, the absence of an accepted HoA sub-regional hegemon further complicates the diplomacy of conflict management within the region,³⁷⁵ as both Kenya and Ethiopia lack real legitimacy and regional respect to manage conflict within the region. On the contrary, other sub regions the likes of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) revere South Africa as a hegemon, thus according it the respect it deserves to lead the way on similar matters.

Lastly, the financial constraints experienced by sub regional institutions in the HoA region the likes of IGAD and EAC as a result of member states unable to meet their commitments has left them with a deficit in human resource and expertise. For instance,

³⁷⁴ Fentaw. A., 'A Nascent Peace & Security Architecture in the Horn of Africa,' *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, 2010

³⁷⁵ Alex. DW., 'In Search of a Peace and Security Framework for the HoA,' in Medhane. T., '*Turning Conflicts to Cooperation: Towards and Energy led Integration in the HoA*,' Addis Ababa: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004

IGAD has a meagre staff of only 222 at their disposal.³⁷⁶ Accordingly, IGAD and EAC where Kenya and Ethiopia have taken leadership roles is unable to carry out conflict management initiatives in the HoA.

Therefore, it is clear from the above, that the diplomacy of conflict management although a counterterrorism strategy, is not effective enough to completely counter the threat terrorism poses.

3.5. ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Economic diplomacy is the utilization of economic statecraft of a country to attain its policy goals.³⁷⁷ In the modern setting NSAs are also included as actors of this diplomacy.³⁷⁸ Essentially, it is the use of economic tools of import, export, trade agreements, and aid *inter alia*, to avert conflicts such as terrorism. In essence, increase in economic diplomacy boosts the economy of a state, enhancing quality of life for citizens therefore reducing socio-economic frustrations that may lead them to violence in the form of terrorism. Indeed, increasing economic ties between a state increases trust between the states, as well as enhancing economic development which reduces the enablers of terrorism such as: poverty, drought, unemployment and economic inequality *inter alia*, all linked to human frustration and eventually averting violence.³⁷⁹

Conversely, development is the positive growth of all facets of the human life including; socio-economic, civil, fundamental freedoms and liberties and the rule of law.³⁸⁰ Therefore, ‘sustainable development’ is, development that caters for the present

³⁷⁶ Elowson. C & Adriana. L., ‘Challenges to Peace & Security in Eastern Africa: The Role of IGAD, EAC and EASF,’ *Studies in African Security*, 2016

³⁷⁷ Bergeijk. P & Selwyn. M., ‘Economic Diplomacy and Economic Security,’ in Costa. C (ed.) ‘*New Frontiers for Economic Diplomacy.*’ Instituto Superior de Ciencias Sociais e Politicas, 2009. Pp. 37-54

³⁷⁸ *Ibid*

³⁷⁹ *Op Cit.* Dollard. J. *et al.*, 1939

³⁸⁰ Cornbridge. S. (ed.) ‘*Development Studies: A Reader,*’ London: Edward Arnold, 1995

needs of humans, while taking into consideration the needs of future generations.³⁸¹ Development, thus addresses the root causes of terrorism by removing the underlying conditions by improving the quality of life and reducing frustrations that may lead to violence in the form of terrorism. Certainly, the connection between terrorism, economic diplomacy and sustainable development is that economic advancement realized from economic diplomacy, spurns development which in turn extinguishes the root enablers of terrorism.

Development spurned by economic diplomacy policy such as export and import trade, improves quality of life in communities that have previously supported terror groups, giving them an alternative to violence. For instance, according to the institute for economics and peace, terrorism is likely to occur in under developed states.³⁸² In fact, terrorism in states with low income and underdevelopment has increased twofold since 2002 according to their 2016 report.³⁸³ This is apparent from the fact that Northern Kenya has been hardly hit by terrorism perhaps due to decades of marginalization, and socio-political exclusion that has made youth in the region prone to terrorist radicalization.³⁸⁴ In fact, the terrorist attack on Garrissa University was credited to Mohamed Mohamud, a former teacher from the area.³⁸⁵ Therefore, diplomatic policies of counterterrorism ought to enhance development that improve quality of life of the locals thus inhibiting their support for terror groups.

³⁸¹ United Nations 'Our Common Future.' Brundtland Report, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. 43.

³⁸² Fearon, J., 'Governance and Civil War Onset.' Background Paper for the World Development Report 2011.

³⁸³ *Op Cit*, Global Terrorism Index, 2016

³⁸⁴ Menkhaus. K., 'Conflict Assessment: Northern Kenya and Somaliland', Copenhagen: Danish Demining Group, 2015. Pp. 18.

³⁸⁵ Boyle. D. *et al.*, 'Kenya's most wanted: Police Hunt Teacher Islamist Terrorist Mastermind behind Attack that Killed 147, putting £145,000 bounty on his head,' Mailonline (<https://goo.gl/yzwSHT>) 3.4.2017

Socio-economic development based diplomatic policies discourage the radicalization of aggrieved groups, where marginalization has left them frustrated and vulnerable.³⁸⁶ Terrorists tend offer such vulnerable parties financial enticement to join their cause. Hence, development based policies aid in draining the pool of potential recruits by reducing their gripe and providing them with alternatives to violence. For instance, as per the 2009 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics report, unemployment of youth in Kenya aged 20-24 stood at 13.1% which is higher than the 8.9% national unemployment rate.³⁸⁷ Consequently, new recruits by al Shabaab under the age of 24 account for 57% of their total recruits.³⁸⁸ Hence, it is clear that al Shabaab recruiter recruit from the marginalized and vulnerable youth who are frustrated at the prospects of the future.

Likewise, soft power diplomacy tools of economic sanctions and trade embargos can be deployed to discourage state sponsored terrorism. Accordingly, economic diplomacy can be used as both as carrot and stick to discourage state sponsored terrorism. Indeed, states can withhold aid or trading activity until it withdraws its support. For instance, in 2009, the UN Security Council by way of Resolution 1907, slapped Eritrea with sanctions for their support for al Shabaab.³⁸⁹ Hence, economic diplomacy tools are essential in counterterrorism deterrence when properly used and can coerce states to withdraw their support to a terrorist group.

³⁸⁶ Cragin. K. & Chalk. P., *'Terrorism & Development: Using Social and Economic Development to inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism,'* Pittsburgh: Rand, 2003. Pp.x

³⁸⁷ KNBS. *'Kenya Population and Housing Census,'* Nairobi: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2009. Vol. 1 A

³⁸⁸ Botha. A., 'Radicalization in Kenya: Recruitment to al Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council, *ISS Paper*, Vol. 265, 2014

³⁸⁹ Amahazion. F., 'Examining International Sanctions: The Case of Eritrea,' *Foreign Policy Journal*, 2016

Lastly, economic diplomacy strategies such as development aid, aimed at capacity building targeting justice, governance, development through rebuilding institutional framework and the rule of law, can be effective terrorism deterrence. Weak legal and institutional framework in a state, may lead to anarchy. Therefore, economic aid to a failed state earmarked at rebuilding this institutions, could be an appropriate terrorism deterrence. In fact the UNGC-T strategy of 2006 emphasizes on the need for states to adopt strategies that deal with underlying conditions that are conducive for terrorism, such as enhancing socio-economic conditions, ensuring equal distribution of resources and upholding civil liberties, in addition to increasing the capacity of weaker states to fight terrorism.³⁹⁰ Hence, strengthening the liberal institutional and legal framework ensures conflicts are resolved when they occur and justice is meted to those deserving thus deterring terrorist behavior.

3.5.1. Case Study

3.5.1.1. Kenya

Poverty eradication programs in Kenya can be traced back to sessional paper number 10 of 1965, which aimed at eliminating disease, illiteracy and poverty.³⁹¹ Since then, various development initiatives have been formulated, the most significant one being the vision 2030 for sustainable socio-economic development that aims at propelling Kenya into a global economic powerhouse by the year 2030.³⁹² In fact, the Kenya Policy document acknowledges a link between socio-economic development and fortune to peace and security within and outside its jurisdiction.³⁹³

³⁹⁰ *Op Cit.* United Nations Global counterterrorism Strategy, 2006

³⁹¹ Ministry of Economic Planning and Community Affairs., '*African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya*,' Nairobi: Government Printers, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965

³⁹² Government of Kenya, '*Kenya Vision 2030: The Popular Version*,' Nairobi: Government Printers, 2007 [Print]

³⁹³ *Op Cit.* Kenya Foreign Policy, 2014. Pp. 23

Consequently, the government of Kenya has devised various mechanisms based upon vision 2030 intending to alleviate the vulnerability that the region faces. For instance, in 2011, the ‘Vision 2030 Development Strategy for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands’ which aims at fast-tracking development of the previously marginalized region, for that reason decreasing vulnerability to al Shabaab enticements.³⁹⁴ This was critically exemplified by the formation of a unique ‘ministry of Development for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands’, tasked with the mandate of coordinating and implementing development projects in the area.

Similarly, pursuant to the provision of the 2010 Constitution, devolution has played a major role in equitable sharing of revenue and resources which has helped mitigate underdevelopment in the region. This has ensured that frustrations leading youth to join al Shabaab are minimized. In addition, youth unemployment was addressed by the 2009 *Kazi kwa Vijana* initiative that aimed at affording vulnerable unemployed youth with work in government projects.³⁹⁵ However, due to mismanagement and corruption this project was discontinued.

Finally, the government has partnered with religious and civil societies to build community resilience and initiate counterterrorism dialogue in addition to community policing initiatives such as *Nyumba Kumi*.³⁹⁶

However, owing to years of long marginalization, the northern part of Kenya formally the North Eastern province, has become vulnerable to terrorism owing to the widespread poverty and underdevelopment, which has deepened socio-economic

³⁹⁴ Government of Kenya, ‘*Vision 2030 Development Strategy for Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands*,’ Nairobi: Government Printers, 2011

³⁹⁵ Hope, K, R., ‘Engaging the Youth in Kenya: Empowerment, Education and Employment,’ *International Journal of Adolescence and Youth*, Vol. 17, No. 4 2012. Pp. 221-236

³⁹⁶ Ortiz, M., ‘Partnering with East Africa to Counter Violent Extremism,’ medium.com (<https://medium.com/foggy-bottom/partnering-with-east-africa-to-counter-violent-extremism-81987ca61e51>) 21.10.2016< Accessed 6.8. 2017

grievances of the communities. These have been exploited by al Shabaab who have further compounded political respite in the region. Therefore, prevalent unemployment of youth for instance, has been a major area of manipulation, with new recruits of the terrorist organization earning an estimated monthly income of up to \$150.³⁹⁷

Unemployment of youth is rampant. For instance, 39.1% of Kenyans of working age are unemployed,³⁹⁸ and evidently youth in the northern region of Kenya bear most of this brunt. Not only that, lack of education is an aspect that is exploited by al Shabaab recruiters as it brings uncertainty to future prospects among the youth who may seek to pursue a 'grand' cause away from poverty. In fact, the region is attributed to only 9% of primary school going children, in addition to 50% truancy among school going children.³⁹⁹ Unemployment and lack of education is for that matter a recruiting theme for terrorist groups.

Moreover, social factors are a factor in influencing vulnerable youth into radicalization by al Shabaab, for instance, orphans are more vulnerable to recruitment as they seek father figures among the al Shabaab leadership.⁴⁰⁰ Additionally, lack of basic amenities such as health and housing lead to frustration making them in danger of being radicalized. Religion, perhaps due to victimization of Somali Muslims in Kenya by authorities, is a vital element influencing radicalization. This has been alluded to by

³⁹⁷ Muhsin. H., 'Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al Shabaab and Somali youth,' *CTC Sentinel*, Vol.5, No.8. 2012

³⁹⁸ 'United Nations Development Report'. New York: United Nations Development Program, 2017. [Print]

³⁹⁹ Watkins. K. & Alemayehu. 'Financing for a Fairer, more Prosperous Kenya: A Review of the Public Spending Challenges & Option for Selected Arid and Semi-arid Counties,' Washington D.C: The Brookings Institute, 2012

⁴⁰⁰ Ferguson. J., 'The World's Most Dangerous Place: Inside the Outlaw State of Somalia,' London: Bantam Press, 2013

Botha as over 80% of his respondents termed religion as a primary factor for them joining al Shabaab, and that they saw al Shabaab as defender of their religion.⁴⁰¹

Lastly, endemic corruption is a cause of unequitable resource and wealth distribution in Kenya that has led to poor standards of living among the poor while enriching corrupt officials. For instance, transparency international lists Kenya at number 145 out of 176 states globally.⁴⁰² This has led to an emergence of vulnerable and desperate people who show dissent in the form of violent acts such as terrorism.

3.5.1.2. Ethiopia

Economic diplomacy as aforementioned, is prudent in ensuring economic development of as state in turn eliminating frustrations caused by deteriorated human security issues that are drivers of terrorism. Ethiopia is well aware of economic development's role in maintaining peace, security and ultimately, stability of its borders,⁴⁰³ particularly from terrorism. By ridding of the underlying enablers of terrorism, then the threat it poses can be effectively countered. Accordingly, Ethiopia is a rapid budding economy in Africa. In fact, the economy has been experiencing a double digit growth since 2013, with agriculture contributing to 80% of its GDP hence is the biggest contributor of its GDP.⁴⁰⁴ This is expected to catapult it to a middle income state by the year 2025.⁴⁰⁵ However, its long years of market isolationist policies have kept its per capita income at just below 600 USD, which is significantly lower than the regional mean.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰¹ *Op Cit.* Botha. A & Abdile. M. 2014

⁴⁰² Transparency International, '*Corruption Perception Index-2016*,' T-I, 2017

⁴⁰³ *Op Cit.* Introduction-Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy & Strategy. 2002

⁴⁰⁴ World Bank., '*Ethiopia's Great Run: The Growth Acceleration and How to Pace it*,' Washington, D.C: World Bank Group, 2016

⁴⁰⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁰⁶ World Bank., '*Overview-Ethiopia*,' worldbank.org

(<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ethiopia/overview>) April 24, 2017.< Accessed 10.8.2017

Accordingly, the Ethiopian government has tapped on its agricultural resource, and through the Agricultural Development led Industrialization Strategy, provided employment opportunities for unemployed vulnerable youth through subsidizing agricultural inputs thus making them affordable.⁴⁰⁷ This was an effort to poverty reduction as well as employment of vulnerable youth in an effort to curb potential terrorist radicalization.

Additionally, the Ethiopian government devised the ‘Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication’ and ‘Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty’ programs, aimed at poverty eradication and accelerating development projects in areas that have been left marginalized by previous regimes.⁴⁰⁸ This is aimed at reducing the pool of vulnerable youth who are receptive to terrorist indoctrination.

Lastly, in tackling climate change issues that cause degradation that may result in conflict, Ethiopia first and foremost hosts the UN Environmental office that does liaison with the African Union on matter of sustainable environmental issues. Secondly, the Ethiopian Panel on Climate Change, a scientific organization within Ethiopia, analyzes environmental data from around the world and forwards their findings and recommendations to policy makers to enable them formulate policies that are accurate and efficient in environmental conservation.⁴⁰⁹ These efforts are essential for Ethiopia to eradicate the root enablers that lead to terrorism.

However, due to the rampant unemployment of the educated, frustration brought about by a lack of prospect for future advancement has made them a vulnerable group when

⁴⁰⁷ Gebremeden. Y., ‘Ethiopia: The ADLI still Mobilizing Ethiopia’s Economy,’ *The Ethiopian Herald*, 14th February, 2016

⁴⁰⁸ *Op Cit.* Gebremeden. Y. 2016

⁴⁰⁹ ‘Ethiopian Panel on Climate Change (EPCC) [epcc-et.org](http://www.epcc-et.org/)(<http://www.epcc-et.org/>) < Accessed 10.8.2017

it comes to terrorist radicalization.⁴¹⁰ For instance unemployment in Ethiopia lies at 5.7% and 8.1% of the youth,⁴¹¹ in fact, according to the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, income is a strong foundation of identity for most Ethiopian youth in the modern times.⁴¹²

Accordingly, terrorism could be used as a political tool by people who are long aggrieved by exclusion and marginalization, and manifests itself as dissensions arising from groups that have long been marginalized.⁴¹³ Violent suppression of protests in the Ogaden area of Ethiopia and press gagging has made the region prone to terrorism.⁴¹⁴ Even though poverty and underdevelopment are not the sole factors that lead to violent extremism, it has been verified that economic deprivation and terrorism are linked especially among the unemployed youth.⁴¹⁵

Terrorism plays a key role in the environmental degradation. This can be explained in two ways; one is that a terror attack causes environmental pollution, and that terrorist organizations engage in environmental crime, e.g. illegal poaching and illegal logging to fund their acts of terror. In fact, it is estimated that \$258 billion worth of resources are annually illicitly harnessed by criminal organizations including terrorist groups,⁴¹⁶ to fund their criminal activity which causes environmental degradation leading to drought. For instance, in 2013 alone, Al-Shabaab, a terror group in the Horn of Africa made \$56 million from illicit charcoal trade to fund their operations.⁴¹⁷ This Illegal logging lead to deforestation, destruction of the natural habitat of wildlife, and increase

⁴¹⁰ Ghanam. H, & Bhatia. K., 'How do Education and Unemployment affect the Support for Violent Extremism?: Evidence from 8 Arab Countries,' Washington, D.C: Brookings

⁴¹¹ *Op Cit.* World Bank. 2017

⁴¹² Interview conducted on the 1st of August, 2017

⁴¹³ Rodger. P., 'Al Qaida, and a World in Balance,' OpenDemocracy, 2011. 06/06/112.

⁴¹⁴ Harbeson, J (Eds.) 'Africa in World Politics: Engaging a Changing Global Order'. Boulder: Westview Press, 2013.

⁴¹⁵ Raul. C, Friedrich. S., 'The Socio-Economic Determinants of Terrorism and Political Violence in Western Europe-1994-2007' *European Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 28, 2011.

⁴¹⁶ Nellesmann. C, et al., 'The Rise of Environmental Crime-A Growing Threat to Natural Resources, Peace, Development and Security.' A UNEP-INTERPOL Rapid Response Assessment, 2014. Pp.7

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid.* Pp. 11.

of green-house gases in the atmosphere as trees are natural filters. In turn this negatively impacts on development which in turn leads to a frustrated population who are prone to violence manifest as terrorism.

Terrorism and drought in Somalia brought about by logging, has forced Somalis to flee to neighboring states of Kenya and Ethiopia as refugees.⁴¹⁸ For instance, the Dollo Odo refugee camp in Ethiopia, is only second to Dadaab, and according to the UNHCR spokesman in 2012, was refuge to over 150,000 refugees.⁴¹⁹ This number is massive and can lead to a negative socio-economic impact to the host country. It also impacts hugely on the environment as over reliance of resources such as; food water and fuel would lead to their depletion.⁴²⁰ In addition, these refugee camps are seen by Al Shabaab recruiters as fertile ground to recruit frustrated youth, who are wooed by promise of employment and monetary consideration.⁴²¹

SUMMARY

In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that ‘traditional’ diplomatic approaches to counterterrorism although notably helpful are not effective in countering the threat posed by terrorism and need an infusion of public diplomacy strategy.

For instance, long marginalization and socio-economic exclusion of some communities in both Kenya and Ethiopia has made citizens vulnerable to the terrorist cause in the

⁴¹⁸ Momodu. S., ‘*Refugees Turn to Ethiopia for Safety and Asylum*’. AfricaRenewal Online magazine, April 2015.

⁴¹⁹ UNHCR. Andrej Mahecic. [online] Available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2012/10/508142086/somali-refugee-population-still-rising-ethiopia-new-camp-planned.html>. 2012.>Accessed 5 Jun. 2017.

⁴²⁰ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘*Economic and Social Impacts of Massive Refugee Populations on the Host Developing Country as well as Other Countries*’, Standing Committee. UNHCR, 1998. (EC/47/SC CRP. 40)

⁴²¹ Hellensten. S, ‘*Radicalization and Terrorist Recruitment among Kenya’s Youth*’, Nordic Africa Institute, Policy Note No.1: 2016.

form of dissent against the regime. Therefore, ‘traditional’ diplomatic strategies by themselves here might not be effective to counter terrorism.

Similarly, rampant unemployment of the educated and youth has made them lack prospects for the future, making them seek alternative source of wealth to fend for their families. In addition, environmental degradation caused by terrorist over reliance of natural resources to fund their activities has created vulnerable groups that are prone to the terrorist cause. This has compounded diplomatic efforts of counterterrorism, making less effective in thwarting the threat that terrorism poses.

Therefore, it is evident that ‘traditional’ diplomatic strategies ought to be fortified by public diplomacy strategies to efficiently fight terrorism within the HoA region.

3.6. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: AN OVERVIEW

Public diplomacy entails predominantly using ‘soft power’ resources available to a state to achieve its policy goals. As Nye posits, ‘soft power is the use of non-military and non-economic tools of statecraft to help the state meet its policy goals’.⁴²² It entails the use of carrots and sticks, whereby carrots imply incentives and enticements while sticks imply coercion and threats.⁴²³ Media, literature, culture, sports, education, economics, institutions *inter alia*, are tools used to achieve soft power. It embraces democratic values of universality, civil liberties and the law and liberal markets. Hence, public diplomacy is only a platform to exercise soft power. The word public diplomacy was devised by E. Gullion in the 60s, as influencing of public opinion in the creation and implementation of foreign policy that goes beyond traditional diplomacy.⁴²⁴ Public diplomacy essentially indicates an activity by states and NSAs to foster understanding

⁴²² Nye. J., ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power,’ *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 616, 2008. Pp.94-109

⁴²³ *Ibid.* Pp.95

⁴²⁴ Nicholas. C., ‘*Public Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past*,’ Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2009. Pp. 12

to the public of ideals, ideas, institutions and policies, in order to achieve policy goals. For states, broadcasting foreign affairs to the public sets the agenda which has positive impact on their policy goals and may exert pressure on foreign states to act. As Nicholas Cull puts it, 'it is an attempt to exert a state's influence in global politics through public communication.'⁴²⁵

Accordingly, it is evident that there is no universally agreed definition of public policy.

Thus while doing a content analysis of the various descriptions, a theme emerges:

- a) Multi-stakeholder communication with the public intended to accomplish policy goals.
- b) Transnational public to public cultural interaction and communication.
- c) Aimed at impelling public opinion.
- d) The messages relayed are candid, transparent, factual and well-reasoned out.
- e) Credibility is of utmost importance if the policy objectives are to be met.
- f) It is a state's branding strategy.
- g) It involves a two way communiqué.

Therefore, public diplomacy is a two way communication strategy by both state and NSAs, based upon facts, to the public aiming to sway their opinion about a policy goal. This also builds long-term relationships and the reputation of the actor relaying the message.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*

3.6.1. Goals of Public Diplomacy

a) Nation Branding

Nation branding is a fairly new conception that was hypothesized by Simon Anholt in 1996.⁴²⁶ It presupposes a state's national identity incorporating political, cultural and sociological aspects of the state. Accordingly, owing to globalization and the threat of cultural and historical attrition that comes with it, states in the global environment, now have increased a sense of national pride and unique identity to distinguish themselves from others.⁴²⁷ Therefore, nation branding can be ascribed as the promotion of a state's political, historical and cultural image in the global arena, using the techniques of communication, marketing and advertising.⁴²⁸ A state's image abroad is vital to its political and socio-economic interest and is essential to how it relates in the global arena.

Similarly, nation branding embraces elements that distinguish its unique elements such as culture and rich history to make it charm its target market.⁴²⁹ Branding has to be done in a well-planned manner so as to appeal and enhance its reputation, both to its citizens and abroad. Accordingly, it is more appealing to its target audience when the citizens themselves showcase their own culture, history and identity, as opposed to government agencies.⁴³⁰ For instance, the Maasai culture is now a global brand and is used by to market both Kenya and Tanzania as ideal tourist destinations.

⁴²⁶ Szondi. G., 'Public Diplomacy and Nation Branding: Conceptual Similarities and Differences,' Netherlands: Netherlands Institute of International relations, 2008

⁴²⁷ Dinnie. K., '*Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues and Practice*,' Oxford: Butterworth Publishers, 2008

⁴²⁸ Fan. Y., 'Nation Branding: What is being Branded?' *Journal of Vacation Marketing*, Vol.12, No.1, 2006. Pp. 6-13

⁴²⁹ *Op Cit.* Szondi. G. 2008

⁴³⁰ Anholt. S., '*Brand New Justice: The Upside of Global Branding*,' Oxford: Butterworth Publishers, 2003

Global relations are not only a strife for power but also derive a sense of meaning to the states.⁴³¹ Parallels can thus be drawn between public diplomacy and nation branding in that a state's public diplomacy mechanisms are used for nation branding to both domestic and foreign targets. A successful branding campaign is as a result of a well planned and executed public diplomacy initiative, with an aim to enhance a state's reputation in the global arena. Domestic citizens enhance both public diplomacy and nation branding in that they serve as ambassadors to a collective purpose and national pride.⁴³² Public diplomacy therefore can be ascribed as a state's branding technique to a larger target audience.⁴³³

b) Influencing Public Opinion

Public diplomacy strategy aimed at communicating with the society is intended to influence the public opinion of its target audience. Actors of public diplomacy in the contemporary globalized world can now directly communicate to their target audiences without having to go through an intermediary.⁴³⁴ In addition, issues such as environmental conservation, upholding of fundamental rights the like of LGBT rights, and peace and security have formed the public diplomacy agenda of many states in the global forum. States have therefore embarked on ways in which to influence public opinion on these issues perhaps with an aim to encourage them to persuade their governments to adopt policies around these issues. One major forum that has gained prominence is the social media.

⁴³¹ Beer, F., *'Meanings of War and Peace,'* Texas: A&M University Press, 2001

⁴³² Anholt, S., 'Foreword' *Journal of Brand Management,* Vol.9, Nos. 4-5, 2002. Pp.230-238

⁴³³ Lewis, E., 'Branding war & Peace,' *Brand Strategy,* 2003. Pp.27

⁴³⁴ Castells, M., 'The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global governance,' *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* Vol.616, No.1. 2008

Thus, public opinion can be influenced through agenda setting around an issue.⁴³⁵ This is by focusing on issues extensively, so as to direct the public to ponder on them, hence asserting pressure to their governments to adopt policies around them. For instance, by relying on opinion polls and extensive news on the threat al Shabaab posed on the internal security of Kenya, framed the issue as the most vital Kenyan interest at the time and perhaps was the foundation upon which *Operation Linda Nchi* policy of 2011 was drafted. Secondly, issue priming could be used to lead the public audience on issues around which to evaluate their leaders.⁴³⁶ For instance, in 2007, the main news agenda was the free primary education policy by the Pres (Rt) Kibaki's regime, thus the public was primed to judge Kibaki on how well his administration implemented the policy, perhaps a precursor to his re-election in 2007. Lastly, public opinion can be swayed through framing issues according to events while leaving out the negative parts, intended to impel how people perceive a policy.⁴³⁷ For instance, by focusing on the free primary education and leaving out the part that a good number of qualified students were not going to garner placement into secondary school framed the policy in a positive light.

c) Clarifying Miscomprehension and Misinformation

In the modern era of advanced information technology, and the ability to directly communicate to the public using social media, terrorist groups and rogue individuals have devised sophisticated propaganda mechanisms aimed at dirtying a state's policy. For instance, during the Westgate siege in Kenya, al Shabaab used twitter all throughout

⁴³⁵ McCombs. M, & Shaw. D., 'The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media,' *Public Opinion Quarterly*. Vol. 36. 1972. Pp. 175-187

⁴³⁶ Shanto. L, & Kinder. D., '*News That Matter*,' Chicago: Chicago University Press. 1987

⁴³⁷ Entman. R., '*Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion and US foreign Policy*,' Chicago: University of Chicago press. 2004

the incident, to misinform the public on the events during the rescue operation.⁴³⁸ Indeed, misinformation in the modern world spreads faster than genuine news.

In light of the foregoing, an effective public diplomacy strategy that does a content analysis of messages being propagated, and tactically and transparently debunks the myths being propagated using information that is easily processed by the target audience is of extreme significance. For example, in the hotly contested Kenyan presidential election of 2017, the election body, Independent Elections and Boarder Commission, was always on toes to respond to rumors and misrepresentations, mainly intended to shape Kenyan voters' perception of the various aspects of the polls. At one instance they tweeted: 'Fake News Alert: We have not announced any plans to declare the winner of the presidential elections tonight. Ignore the circulating SMS.'⁴³⁹ This was in response to a rumor that they had intended to announce the presidential election in the dead of the night while Kenyans slept. Hence, a public diplomacy strategy well-articulated and swiftly dispensed can be used to effectively quell misinformation.

3.7. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY VERSUS THE TRADITIONAL DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES

First and foremost, traditional diplomacy is fixated mainly on official efforts by state officers to persuade officials of the targets state to take an action while public diplomacy on the other hand, is fixated on shaping public opinion of the public in the target state so that they can exert pressure on their government to take action that is acceptable to them. The difference here is public diplomacy is able to permeate the traditional sovereign borders as it is conducted by even non-state actors who carry their tasks both

⁴³⁸ Mair. D, '#Westgate: A Case Study: How al Shabaab Used Twitter during an Ongoing Attack,' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 40, No.1, 2007

⁴³⁹ IEBC. Twitter Post. August 9, 2017. 5.38 P.M.
(<https://twitter.com/IEBCKenya/status/895293298839105536>)

domestically and internationally. For instance, student exchange programs between Kenya and Ethiopia through the University of Nairobi and the University of Addis Ababa is an example of non-state actor driven public diplomacy.

Secondly, owing to the nature of traditional diplomacy, in that it seeks to fulfill a regime's objectives, is short term. For instance, a regime's objective might be regional peace, but its predecessor might choose international peace objectives instead. Hence traditional diplomacy might have short term objectives, while public diplomacy focuses on both short and long-term goals that are geared towards edifying a positive image of the state abroad and domestically, in turn influencing a positive public opinion. This is because public diplomacy objectives effected by non-state actors who have long-standing networks tends to have long-term objectives as opposed to regime executed diplomacy. For instance non-state actors work with the public on socio-economic empowerment, advocacy, *inter alia*, which are long-term in nature.

Conversely, for traditional diplomacy to effectively meet its objectives realistically it needs to be backed up with public diplomacy strategies. As argued above, since traditional diplomacy is focused on short term objectives, as they are essential to government-to-government interactions. However, the most pragmatic diplomatic efforts must be futuristic not just short term. Hence, a pragmatic diplomacy policy must impart public diplomacy strategies in its efforts to meet its short term goals while sustaining a longstanding approach for posterity.

3.8. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Public diplomacy as stated in previous chapters is a relatively new notion. However, diplomacy itself is as old as history itself and some aspects similar to the concept of public diplomacy have been recorded. Here, I analyzed the evolution of public

diplomacy in three distinct stages: Before the cold war, during the cold war and after the cold war, to the currently used public diplomacy. This is aimed at showing the strides public diplomacy has taken during the period. Cold war period is a significant yardstick as it symbolizes the period when public diplomacy was extensively used to wage psychological warfare and spread propaganda during the era of bi-polarity.

Accordingly, the practice of public diplomacy is as old as history itself. Harold Nicholson theorizes that even in pre-history, our cromagnon practiced the art of diplomacy, albeit not as sophisticated as it is today.⁴⁴⁰ For instance, in the 700 B.C. the Greeks were thought to practice public diplomacy in the form of sports diplomacy when they held interstate Olympics games.⁴⁴¹ In fact, early literature indicates that Greek and Persians had some form of cultural exchanges in the 5th Century B.C,⁴⁴² with evidence showing that both Greeks and Persian cultures had some similarities owing to their interactions.⁴⁴³

3.8.1. Pre-Cold War Public Diplomacy

One early show of winning ‘hearts and minds’ was illustrated by Napoleon on his way to invade Egypt, before he set foot into Egypt’s shores, he asked his speech writer to inscribe a honest and candid note to the Muslims in Egypt clarifying to them that the invasion was not aimed at destroying their religion but freeing them from the shackles of their oppressors.⁴⁴⁴ He further stressed on the virtue of equality among men in the

⁴⁴⁰ *Op Cit.* Nicholson. H. 1968

⁴⁴¹ Frank. A, & Mosley. D., ‘Diplomacy in Ancient Greece,’ *Review of New Books*, Vol.4, No.3, 1976. Pp.287

⁴⁴² Miller. M., ‘*A Study in cultural Receptivity*,’ Cambridge, 1997

⁴⁴³ *Ibid*

⁴⁴⁴ Kramer. M., ‘Déjà vu: ‘*The ABCs of Public Diplomacy in the Middle East*,’ Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2004. Pp. 1-9

‘eyes of God’ an instance of promotion of the concept of democracy to a foreign audience using public diplomacy.⁴⁴⁵

Similarly, during WW1 the allies (France, Britain and Russia) found themselves in need of backup and reached out to the Muslim nations for help. However, the Ottoman Sultan, with influence from Germany, issued a ‘fatwa’ against any Muslim joining them in the war as they intended to oppress them. In response, the Allies sent a counter response insisting that they valued freedom of religion as well as the fact that the ‘fatwa’ may have been issued under instructions of the Germans. This was an illustration of use of public diplomacy to counter misinformation and propaganda.⁴⁴⁶

In America, President Woodrow Wilson, in 1917 by way of executive order 2594, established a committee on Public Information that was tasked with informing foreign and domestic audiences about the policies that his administration implemented, and consequently selling the policy intentions to them.⁴⁴⁷ This was an instance of influencing the public in the making and implementation of American policy.

The 20s coincided with the invention of the radio, which signified a breakthrough in the conduct of public diplomacy by way of international broadcasts. For instance, in 1927, the Dutch Philips Corporation first began broadcasting to its foreign workers in the Dutch East Indies.⁴⁴⁸ This was to keep them informed of the policy developments in the home nation. This was an instance of state to public interaction aiming to create harmony within its colonies.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid*

⁴⁴⁶ *Op Cit.* Kramer. M. 2004

⁴⁴⁷ Woodrow W., ‘Creating Committee on Public Information,’ Executive Order 2594. 13.4.1917

⁴⁴⁸ Pengine. W., ‘International Broadcasting in the Social Network Era: New Allegiances in Deterrorized Space, calls for Public Diplomacy,’ *Public Diplomacy Magazine*, 22.6.2011

In 1929, the Soviet Union went one ahead when they initiated broadcasts to public targets abroad using their local dialects, through Radio Moskva.⁴⁴⁹ It initially aired in 4 languages, but grew to 11 by 1933. This proved to be resourceful in promoting the communist ideology by persuading its audiences to join the great cause. In fact, in the 30s the British foreign office come across a transmission in English.⁴⁵⁰

In 1931, the United Kingdom followed suit when they launched the British Broadcasting Corporation which was intended to promote British policy agenda in addition to advancing the accomplishments back home.⁴⁵¹ Later in 1938, BBC introduced an Arabic broadcasting service that was intended at countering the anti-Crown uprisings that had sprung, and quell the already rampant German propaganda.⁴⁵² Evidentially, the crown used BBC as an anti-propaganda tool as well as build relations with its subjects abroad. Similarly,

The Nazi Germans were masters of propaganda, in 1933 a ministry of propaganda was formed to persuade and exert influence the public to join their cause. They used speeches books, pamphlets and radio to disseminate their messages primarily addressing hatred and war.⁴⁵³

3.8.2. Cold War Public Diplomacy

The Cold War period is signified by the period immediately after WWII and the downfall of the Soviet Union in the early 90s. Global politics was ideological symbolized by the iron curtain dividing the Eastern and Western blocs, each of whom

⁴⁴⁹ West. J., '*Truth Betrayed*,' London: Duckworth Overlook, 1987

⁴⁵⁰ *Ibid*

⁴⁵¹ *Colonial Administration Records* (Migrated Archives), United Kingdom: The National Archives, 2013. Pp.11

⁴⁵² *Ibid*

⁴⁵³ Merkl. P., '*German Unification in the European Context*,' PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010. Pp. 35

was trying to recruit other states into their philosophy; capitalism on one side and communism on the other. Public diplomacy strategy gained prominence at the time when both sides tried to win ‘hearts and minds’ of other states to join their creed.

The 40s symbolized a period when America used its film industry to spread capitalist ideals of democracy and civil rights, and spread anti-communism propaganda around the world. In fact Selznick, a Hollywood producer at the time described film as the best American ambassador.⁴⁵⁴ Similarly, in 1948, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office established an Information and Research Department that was mandated to fight communist propaganda against the Western bloc. It aimed at accumulating material against the Soviets in the developing world, and their colonies then furnishing BBC with the data, meant to furnish the state media with counter propaganda content.⁴⁵⁵

In 1949, USA fashioned information organizations such as the USIA, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, at the forefront of its public diplomacy efforts of battling against the communist propaganda that was spreading rapidly around the globe.⁴⁵⁶ This was the first instance that information organizations were involved in spearheading US foreign policy goals.

However, it was not until the election of President Eisenhower in 1953, when America started relying fully on information and ideological warfare to spread its ideals as well as fighting the rapidly growing communism. Thus a comprehensive and aggressive strategy was devised to this effect, with communication departments at the forefront of

⁴⁵⁴ Shaw. T, & Youngblood. D., ‘*Cinematic Cold War*,’ Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2010.

Pp.11

⁴⁵⁵ Taylor. P., ‘*Propaganda in the 20th Century: Selling Democracy*,’ Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999. Pp.227

⁴⁵⁶ Dizard. W., ‘*Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the United States Information Agency*,’ Colorado: Boulder Publications, 2004

this effort.⁴⁵⁷ At the same time, the demise of Joseph Stalin, made America slacken on its overly aggressive public diplomacy initiatives, well, that and the fact that Soviets had acquired new sophisticated military capability and did not want to trigger a nuclear warfare by way of an overly aggressive policy.

Additionally, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was a milestone in the American public diplomacy, Radio Free Europe conveying messages in local dialect, encouraged violent opposition against the Soviets.⁴⁵⁸ At the same time, America adopted a strategy of selling American Capitalism to the world in the place of the overly hostile propaganda strategy.⁴⁵⁹

At the same time, the 50s symbolized a time when America and the Soviets had citizen-cultural exchange programs in the form of students, scientists, engineers, athletes, *inter alia*. In fact, it is estimated that over 40,000 citizens, during the period between the years, 1958-88 were beneficiaries of this program. This was intended to give them a broader view of the world beyond the iron curtain and an experience a diverse socio-cultural set up.⁴⁶⁰

Moreover, the 60s was a period when student exchange programs took a foothold especially in the developing countries who were beginning to secure independence, and they needed skilled manpower for their young economies. For instance, African-USSR student exchanges were particularly popular.⁴⁶¹ This was of significance because, USSR used this opportunity to challenge the West's claim that the Soviets were racists

⁴⁵⁷ Mitrovich. G., '*Undermining the Kremlin: America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947-1956*,' New York: Cornell University Press, 2000

⁴⁵⁸ Hearings., '*Winning the Cold War: USA's Ideological Offensive*,' House of Representatives: Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 1963

⁴⁵⁹ *Ibid*

⁴⁶⁰ Richmond. Y., '*Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: How the West Won*,' typepad.com (<http://whirledview.typepad.com/whirledview/cultural.html>) <accessed 8.8.2017

⁴⁶¹ Matusevich. M., '*Journey of Hope: African Diaspora and the Soviet Society*,' *African Diaspora*, Vol.1. 2008. Pp. 53-85

and this was an opportunity to open up to the rest of the world beyond the iron curtain that the Soviets are no less different from the Capitalist as was propagated at the time. This was also an opportunity to spread communist ideals to African students who would promote them back home.

In the late 70s President Jimmy Carter, initiated a human rights style to the American public diplomacy. This was a deviation from the previous radical propaganda and psychological warfare against the Soviets. It accentuated a global call for upholding fundamental rights and freedoms around the world.⁴⁶² For instance, America focused its attention to anti-Apartheid in South Africa and the need to oust autocratic regimes around the world.

In the 80s American president Ronald Reagan, who had a background as an actor was well versed with the efficiency of words and ideas in persuading the masses. Accordingly, American public diplomacy entered a new phase, where it used words, ideas and ideals were used to challenge the very basis of communism, here more resources were dedicated to pursuing public diplomacy initiatives.⁴⁶³ Therefore, perhaps this efforts are the ones that finally led to the demolishing of the Berlin Wall that signified end of the cold war period.

3.8.3. Post-Cold War Public Diplomacy

During the period immediately preceding the cold war, public diplomacy seemed to have taken a backseat in international relations, with states even moving information departments from foreign policy oriented areas. For instance, in 1999 the USIA was

⁴⁶² Carter. J., '*Inaugural Speech*,' at the University of Notre Dame, January, 1977

⁴⁶³ Lord. C., 'The Past and Future of Public Diplomacy,' *ORBIS*, Vol.42, No.1, 1998. Pp.49-72

disbanded and its roles transferred to the Department of State, specifically office of undersecretary in charge of public diplomacy.⁴⁶⁴

However, the attacks on 9/11 prompted the need for public diplomacy and national branding in the international system particularly, evidenced by the importance of national branding in maintenance of international peace and security. Nevertheless, public diplomacy has been a practice long before the September 2011 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, albeit was a reactionary tactic rather than a regular practice. States therefore have sought to refine their public diplomacy approaches based upon the American practice and experience.

Owing to globalization, the world has become a global village and there is a great acceptance by states of the need for transparency and accountability in both their internal and external affairs. Besides the emergence of non-state actors in international relations, who serve as watchdogs of state policy, has forced states to adopt public diplomacy as a way of broadcasting their policy in a transparent manner to their allies and international partners.

Accordingly, public diplomacy is used as a public relations exercise especially when a state's policies has made them unpopular in the global environment. For instance, the Dutch adopted public diplomacy to defend their overly liberal policies of drugs, prostitution, *inter alia*. Similarly, Qatar's have been forced to initiate an aggressive public diplomacy to defend their 'open' policy to groups termed as 'terrorist

⁴⁶⁴ U.S. Foreign Affairs Reform and Reconstructing Act, 1998. Pub. L. 105-279

organizations' in the wake of accusations labelled against them as sympathizers and funders of terrorism.⁴⁶⁵

Public diplomacy is used by states who are in the quest of backing their vital interests, such as security, stability and economic.⁴⁶⁶ These states use public diplomacy to campaign for membership in regional organizations, to convince other members that their interests align with the aims of the organization. For instance, Turkey embarked on a rigorous campaign to have them granted membership to the European Union.⁴⁶⁷ Membership has band wagoning and economic advantages.

In addition, public diplomacy is used by developing and states in transition with big economic ambitions. This is done through rigorous nation branding campaigns, such as promoting it as a tourism destination.⁴⁶⁸ In addition, it can be used where a terrorist incident has portrayed as an unsafe destination. For instance, in the wake of the Westgate shopping mall in Kenya, and facing several travel advisories against it, embarked on a vigorous nation branding campaign, using Brand Kenya board under the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives, in addition to a rigorous social media campaign on twitter using the hashtag #SomeoneTellCnn, in response to a CNN story branding Kenya as 'a hotbed of terror.'⁴⁶⁹ Compelling CNN to retract and issue and apology.

⁴⁶⁵ Hassan. H., 'There's No Space for Qatar to Save Face,' foreignpolicy.com (<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/29/theres-no-space-for-qatar-to-save-face/>) June 29, 2017< Accessed 8.8.2017

⁴⁶⁶ Melissen. J., 'The New public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice,' in Melissen. J., 'The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations,' Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. 2005. Pp. 10

⁴⁶⁷ Hug. A., 'Turkey in Europe: The Economic Case for Turkey Membership of the European Union,' London: Foreign Policy Center, 2008

⁴⁶⁸ Anholt. S., 'Brand New Justice: How Branding Places and Products can Help in the Developing World,' Amsterdam: Butterworth-Heinemann. 2005

⁴⁶⁹ Dearden. L., 'Kenyan Ridicule U.S. Network CNN on Twitter for 'Hotbed of Terror' Report,' *The Independent Online* (<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/someonetellcnn-kenyans-ridicule-us-network-on-twitter-for-hotbed-of-terror-report-10410337.html>) 23 July, 2015<accessed 8.8.2017

Even states considered as belligerent, have adopted public diplomacy strategies in an attempt to save face to the international audience, at the backdrop of negative images portrayed against them, if not spread propaganda about powerful states' policies towards them.⁴⁷⁰ For instance North Korea, has embarked on various image building campaigns, including on twitter using the handle @DPRK News to give updates and information/propaganda to its 233 thousand followers.⁴⁷¹

In light of the foregoing, it is evident that states utilize public diplomacy strategies based on their own unique circumstances, post-cold war and 9/11. It is prudent that a public diplomacy strategy is matched by actions that are consistent with the message it intends to portray. This is because, owing to the advanced information technology communications tools, such as the social media news travels round the world in seconds, and any action that contradicts a policy would make the target audience skeptic.⁴⁷² For instance, a public diplomacy policy that advocates for equality and fundamental human rights, may be ineffective when the state closes down borders for asylum seekers and refugees.

3.9. Non-State Actors and Public Diplomacy

Globalization in the contemporary world has brought the need for transparency in a policy making and implementation. For this reason, public opinion and attitude is a defining factor if a policy is to be effective. Accordingly, it is of utmost importance to factor in the public in policy formulation. Factoring in the public has also brought with it the need to feature non-states actors in a globalized international relations. Hence, public diplomacy can be described as a mechanism utilized by both state and NSAs

⁴⁷⁰ Metzi. J., 'Popular Diplomacy,' *Daedalus*, Vol. 128, No.2, 1999. Pp. 177-79

⁴⁷¹ DPRK News Service, @DPRK_News.< Retrieved 8.8.2017

⁴⁷² *Ibid.* Melissen. J. 2005. Pp.9

aimed at, comprehending values, behavior, relationship building, and swaying the public in order to advance their policy goals.⁴⁷³ The resource of NSAs in public diplomacy is derived from their long standing relationships, wide and inter-personal networks and collaborative capabilities with the public.⁴⁷⁴ These include but are not limited to; Non-governmental organizations, Multinational Corporations, Inter-governmental Organizations *inter alia*. In addition they are seen to operate at both the international and domestic level.

Non-state actors are relevant in public diplomacy strategy dispensation in that their objectives may line up with those of public diplomacy albeit inadvertently. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that states incorporate NSAs in the formulation and implementation of public diplomacy strategy if they are to be effective.⁴⁷⁵ For instance, non-state actors work with the public on issues of socio-economic empowerment, promotion of fundamental and civil liberties and advocacy, which are in the domain of public diplomacy strategy.⁴⁷⁶ Hence effectively inadvertently contribute to public diplomacy goals.

Additionally, in contrast to states, who are seen to conduct public diplomacy to achieve their own self-interests, the association of a non-state actor increases the trustworthiness of a message to the target public. This is because they derive their neutrality in their promotion of universal values and have a diverse funding base.⁴⁷⁷ Hence they are seen

⁴⁷³ Gregory. B., 'American Public Diplomacy: Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,' *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Vol.6, No.3. Pp.353

⁴⁷⁴ Zaharna. R, *et al.*, 'Relational, Networked and Collaborative Approaches to Public Diplomacy: The Connective Mindshift,' New York: Routledge, 2013

⁴⁷⁵ Attias. S., 'Israel's New Peer-to-peer Diplomacy,' *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Vol.7, No.4. 2002. Pp.474-81

⁴⁷⁶ La Porte. T., 'The Impact of 'Inter-mestic' Non-State Actors on the Conceptual Framework of Public Diplomacy,' *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy*, Vol. 7, No.4, 2012. Pp.442-57

⁴⁷⁷ Lee. G, & Ayhan. K., 'Why do we Need Non-State Actors in Public Diplomacy?: Theoretical Discussion of Relational, Networked and Collaborative Public Diplomacy,' *Journal of International and Area Studies*, Vol.22, No.1. Pp.57-79

as not working for their own self-interests hence public a diplomacy strategy promoted by them has more believability and is therefore effective. In addition, they derive their long experience in a field and array of expert human resource, grants them credibility, coupled with their already established networks.⁴⁷⁸ Hence, they are efficiently setup to carry out a public diplomacy campaign and sustain it in the long-term.

Building relationships within a diverse public is the long-term goal of public diplomacy and require actors that have an enduring presence and goals. States lack this capacity as policies are made to advance a certain regime's goals.⁴⁷⁹ Relationship building with the public requires patience and long presence, in order to build trust and understanding, hence requires a long-term strategy that states cannot guarantee, hence non-state actors are better suited.

Accordingly, for a public diplomacy strategy to be effective, the communication must be dualistic in nature, in that the aim must not only to listen but also factor in the public's interests and needs.⁴⁸⁰ In fact, Nye posits, 'an effectively executed public diplomacy campaign is a 2-way communication, where it does not just affirm but listen.'⁴⁸¹ Castells further asserts, 'effective public diplomacy policy does not only persuade, but also connect; not only affirm but also heed.' Hence, owing to the bureaucracy in government, it is almost impossible to guarantee a two-way communication with the public, hence non-state actors are best suited to dispense an effective public diplomacy policy in this context.

⁴⁷⁸ Grunig. J., 'Image and Substance: From Symbolic to Behavioral Relationships,' *Public Relations Review*, Vol.19, No.2, 1993. Pp.122-38

⁴⁷⁹ Wilson. J., 'Strategic Cooperative Communities: A Synthesis of Strategic, Issue-Management, and Relationship-Building Approaches in Public Relations,' In Culbertson. H, & N. Chen (eds.) *'International Public Relations: A Comparative Analysis,'* 1996. Pp.78

⁴⁸⁰ Grunig. E., & Hunt, T., *'Managing Public Relations,'* New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. 1984

⁴⁸¹ *Op Cit.* Nye. J. 2008. Pp.104

Additionally, when a society's issues have been as a cause of state deprivation, through corruption or other issues, they are likely to be skeptic of a state led public diplomacy strategy. Therefore, non-state actors may be the only credible actor to dispense a public diplomacy strategy effectively. Also, when issues relate to specialized issues such as environmental degradation, non-state actors may be better placed as they have expertise and long experience in dealing with such issues. Hence, they are better suited to implement an effective public diplomacy strategy.

3.10. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND TERRORISM

3.10.1. Causes of Terrorism

It is prudent to examine the root enablers of terrorism in order to sufficiently analyze how public diplomacy policies can be integrated into counterterrorism measures. Therefore, the rudimentary causes or rather enablers of terrorism, are divided into structural and facilitator causes.⁴⁸² Structural causes include the deprivations that make people lose hope in future prospects of advancement, while structural causes are weaknesses in basic liberal structures that glue the society together in harmony leading to anarchy; and terrorism thrives in anarchy.

Violence expressed as terrorism is as a result of dissent against the ruling elite or regime by a section of the minority that may feel discriminated and excluded from fundamental rights in that they see a dim prospect of future change.⁴⁸³

Indeed, inequality in the distribution of national resources and revenue may lead people to frustration in their ruling class, this may be expressed through violent responses in

⁴⁸² Paul. W., '*Political Terrorism*,' London: Macmillan. 1974

⁴⁸³ *Ibid*

the form of terrorist attacks.⁴⁸⁴ This perhaps explains why Northern Kenya a region that has been neglected by successive government regimes, is a source of al Shabaab recruitment.

Socio-economic and political exclusion of a minority group coupled with the failure to recognize any prospect of advancing in the long-term may cause frustration that may lead a section of the society to choose a terrorist cause.⁴⁸⁵ For instance, ISIL are particularly successful at recruiting youths in Belgium who feel excluded from the socio-economic and political activities of the state.⁴⁸⁶

Additionally, unemployment coupled with a dim view of prospect of future advancement within a society is an enabler of terrorism in that an unemployed person may seek to join a terrorist cause to support their families economically.⁴⁸⁷ For instance, the Bomu state of Nigeria, deemed to have 83% illiteracy rate has the most Boko Haram activity in the whole of Nigeria.⁴⁸⁸

Similarly, institutional weaknesses can contribute as a structural enabler of terrorism. Liberal institutions such as the judiciary, the legislature, law enforcement, *inter alia*, are the glue that holds the society together in harmony. This is because they provide mechanisms for conflict resolution, justice and reconciliation, on one hand, policy formulation and the rule of law on the other. Any perceived weakness of these functions breeds anarchy within the society as ‘man eats man.’ This anarchy creates a conducive environment for terrorists to set up base and operate without any fear of being held

⁴⁸⁴ BOIX, C. ‘Political violence: Conflict and Violence,’- Yale Conference paper. April 30th May 1st 2004

⁴⁸⁵ O’Neill. W., ‘In Responding to Terrorism: What Role for the United Nations?’- Report. New York: International Peace Academy. 2002

⁴⁸⁶ Blatmann. C., ‘Exclusion, not Unemployment explains ISIS Recruitment?’ 1st December, 2015

⁴⁸⁷ Paul. E, & Jianguo. L, ‘Some Roots of Terrorism,’ *Population and Environment*’ Vol.24, No.2. Pp.186

⁴⁸⁸ Agbiboa. E, ‘The Nigerian Burden: Religious Identity, Conflict and the Current Terrorism of Boko Haram,’ *Conflict, Security and Development*. 2013

accountable.⁴⁸⁹ For instance this is the case with failed states like Somalia and Afghanistan where al Shabaab and al Qaida respectively, have set up base.

3.10.2. Public Diplomacy Counterterrorism Strategy

Public diplomacy is a resource in counterterrorism. This is because unlike the military strategy it is a long-term solution that when effectively executed, addresses the underlying issues that cause terrorism. Accordingly, underlying enablers of terrorism are deprivations and weakness in a state's institutional frameworks. Public diplomacy for that matter entails open and transparent two way communication and persuasion, aimed at the target audience, that terrorist derive their pool of recruits, with an aim of finding a common ground that unites them, creating harmony and eradicating the factors.

Consequently, public diplomacy in this context seeks to deter, disassemble terrorist organizations, curtail source of terrorist funding, sideline terrorists, and diminish their ability to radicalize and recruit members of the society. This is achieved through candid and open dialogue with the target audience. Tackling these, defines an effective public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy.

Hence, effective public diplomacy counterterrorism strategies require a collaborative effort with a multiplicity of actors in international relations and is enforced through soft power and not by coercion.⁴⁹⁰ However that collaboration has to balance the needs of the target population as well as that of the state that aims to cooperate for it to be effective. For instance, the U.S. cooperation with Kenya was not fully embraced by

⁴⁸⁹ Brown. G, & Stewart. F., 'Economic and Political Causes of Conflict: An Overview and some Policy Implications,' *CRISE WORKING PAPER*, No.81. 2015

⁴⁹⁰ Riordan. S., 'Dialogue-Based Public Diplomacy: A New Foreign Policy paradigm?' in Melissen. J., *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan. 2005. Pp. 194

everyone as Kenyans including the policy makers were cautious of overly promoting U.S. interests, while compromising their own freedoms.⁴⁹¹ A collaborative effort ought to be readily acceptable to all people concerned and not forced down their throats for a public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy to be effective.

Indeed, radicalization, and financing, considered as abettors of terrorism are in the purview of public diplomacy. For instance, radicalization of people into terrorist organization is caused by the perception of the recruits on the state perhaps of the overly discriminative policies, while the ability of terrorist groups to fundraise within the society may be as a result of a section of society perceiving them as liberators from a state's inadequacies. For instance, the ability of al Shabaab to recruit youth from Mombasa, Kenya unfettered has to do with how the youth perceive themselves as deprived by the regime.⁴⁹² Hence, public diplomacy strategies aim at changing the way the society perceives the government and the society around them that encourages them to choose the path of terrorism. Hence an effective public diplomacy strategy aims at changing their way of thinking by persuading such potential recruits that the state is not the enemy but the terrorists themselves are.

Additionally, where a society is too divided that a group feels victimized against, by reason of their culture or religion, as it is with youth who join based on their Islamic faith, a well-orchestrated public diplomacy strategy may persuade them that there is no state religion and everyone can live in harmony by finding a common ground. For instance, a study by Botha found that 80% of his respondent youths had joined al Shabaab purely based on the fact that they felt that government policy victimized them

⁴⁹¹ Whitaker. E., 'Reluctant Partners: Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Democracy in Kenya,' *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol. 9, 2008. Pp. 254-71

⁴⁹² *Op Cit.* Botha. A. 2004

based on them being Muslim and of Somali origin.⁴⁹³ An effective public diplomacy policy would aim to persuade such potential recruits that the state's policies treats all Kenyans as equals and that Christians and Muslims can coexist without disrupting their way of life or changing their beliefs.

Terrorists can convince their targets that state ideology based upon democracy and equality are Western neo-colonialism ideals and against their cultural and moral beliefs leading them to dissent against a state in the form of terrorist attacks. Therefore, an effective public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy would be one that persuades them that democracy and equality are compatible with their beliefs and have no impact on their culture and beliefs. Thus, it is of utmost importance that policy makers device public diplomacy strategy tools that engage them candidly on the values of equality and democracy while incorporating their beliefs and culture. For instance, convincing such members of the society that democracy is compatible with the Islamic faith and beliefs. For instance, studies show that a significant number of Muslims favor the ideals of democracy.⁴⁹⁴ Hence an effective public diplomacy policy is based upon credible and candid dialogue that caters for diversity in culture, history and beliefs, in that democracy is not stone wall and can be negotiated to suit everyone's needs. For example, the Somali elections in 2017 were done *via* an electoral college who represented their clan, instead of the one person one vote style.⁴⁹⁵ Hence, a public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy ought not instill beliefs upon the target audience but incorporate them into it.

⁴⁹³ ⁴⁹³ Botha. A & Abdile. M. 2004

⁴⁹⁴ Nye. J., '*Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*,' New York: Perseus Books Group. 2004

⁴⁹⁵ Burke. J., 'Somalis greet 'New Dawn' as U.S. Dual National wins Presidency,' [theguardian.com \(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/somali-presidential-election-won-mohamed-abdullahi-mohamed\)](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/somali-presidential-election-won-mohamed-abdullahi-mohamed) 8 February, 2017< accessed 8.8.2017

3.11. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Using the liberal theory approach, it would be apparent that if a state is to effectively counter the threat posed by terrorism then, it should harness the tool of cooperation with its allies, multilateral institutions and non-state actors. Therefore a unified approach to a security threat such as terrorism, could be a valuable resource if it is to be defeated once and for all. In fact, liberalism lays emphasis on bilateral and multilateral cooperation as the most effective modes of interaction in global relations and the upholding of fundamental liberties, human rights and equality.

In addition, it is evident that failed states are fertile grounds for terrorist organizations to set base and operate freely without scrutiny and fear. This is because these states lack viable institutions which mete out justice and resolve conflicts when they emerge. Therefore conflict management within these states is essential to ensure that such conflicts do not spill over beyond their borders in the form of violent terror attacks. Accordingly, world politics is as a result of a complex system of bargaining between the multiplicity of actors hence national interest may not only be determined in military terms, but also in trade and industry, environmental, technical, *inter alia*. Therefore, a pragmatic conflict resolution strategy ought to be diplomatic in nature specifically incorporating long-term goals of public diplomacy.

Indeed, terrorism is an international relations gaffe which can be mended by vibrant legal and institutional frameworks. Therefore, liberal multilateral institutions are useful platforms for states to converge to solve common security conundrums that transcend international borders such as terrorism. Strengthening such institutions and building their capacity to counter the threat would ensure that terrorism is defeated once and for all. Therefore, a pragmatic diplomatic approach would build capacity for such

institutions to be able to fight terrorism in its entirety. More so, by infusing the long-term strategies of public diplomacy.

Lastly, liberalism is entrenched in the concept of optimism and hope for future prospect. Through education of the public, coupled with provision of employment opportunity and reciprocal trade between states ensures economic advancement which eradicates factors such as abject poverty reduces frustrations among citizens by giving them a prospect for the future hence reducing vulnerabilities that are responsible for violence in the form of terrorism. This is thus a long-term strategy that is in the realm of public diplomacy.

3.12. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, at the beginning of this chapter the study sought to investigate whether the ‘traditional’ diplomatic strategies have an impact in countering the threat posed by terrorism. To that end, it was determined that although these strategies have an impact, it is marginal as they are short-term in nature. It is evident that the majority of the diplomatic counterterrorism strategies are implemented by the state. This poses a problem in that state run strategies lack longevity as regimes have a restricted period in which to implement policy based on the constitutional time limit upon which they operate. In addition, challenges such as marginalization and corruption are caused by the same state hence it lacks credibility to implement such policies. Therefore, it is prudent that states collaborate with non-state actors who are more credible in implementing diplomatic strategies of counterterrorism. Similarly, it was realized that resource constraint is a pertinent issue in implementing diplomatic counterterrorism strategies, especially in the developing states in the HoA. It is therefore prudent for developed states to chip in more in order to build their capacity to effectively implement.

Accordingly, the research concludes that the diplomatic counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in place are indeed not sufficient to counter terrorism and need to be backed up with more community led, communication based strategies that are as a result of government and non-state actors collaboration, in the form of public diplomacy strategy. Hence, confirming the hypothesis that diplomatic counterterrorism strategies are not sufficient to counter the terrorist threat.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AS A COUNTERTERRORISM TOOL IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

4.1. INTRODUCTION

In answering my research question, ‘what impact has public diplomacy strategy had in the Horn of Africa?’ I assessed the public diplomacy strategies of both Kenya and Ethiopia, as they have well organized public diplomacy strategy in the Horn of Africa sub-region. I further explored the forms in which public diplomacy counterterrorism strategies take, evaluating the opportunities available for further exploration by policy makers based on the best practices internationally.

4.2. Public Diplomacy Counterterrorism Strategy in Kenya

Kenya, as alluded to earlier, is prone to terrorist attacks particularly emanating from al Shabaab. For this reason the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in 2015 launched a National Counter Violent Extremism Strategy. This is a comprehensive counterterrorism action plan that is aimed at tackling the root enablers of terrorism and the various unique and diverse Kenyan community desires. In addition, he appointed Dr. Ambassador. Martin Kimani to head the counterterrorism coordination efforts of the NCTC.⁴⁹⁶ This was a direction in the right direction for the Kenyan long-term efforts to counter the terrorist threat. He emphasizes on community led efforts to thwart this threat this is evident from his submission at the Chicago Forum on Global Affairs

⁴⁹⁶ ‘Kimani, Martin (Amb. Dr.)’ ict.org.il(<https://www.ict.org.il/Worker.aspx?ID=731>) < Accessed 11.8.2017

Forum, where he submitted that a community led collaboration with law enforcement is the most effective counterterrorism tool for Kenya.⁴⁹⁷

Similarly, an effective public diplomacy strategy involves the government partnering with non-state actors, especially religious leaders, and distinguished people within society with clout to initiate community dialogue that is candid and two-way. This is in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1624 that calls upon states in collaboration with the various communal actors, including the media to address intolerance, discrimination based on religion and values and causes of disharmony within their diverse society. For instance, non-state actors; the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM), Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism initiative (BRAVE) and Center for Ihsan & Educational Development, have collaborated to initiate programs that initiate dialogue to the youth in an effort to equip them with the right mentality to resist terrorist indoctrination.⁴⁹⁸ In addition, BRAVE involves itself in counterterrorism media campaign tailored to persuade the youth to ditch counterterrorism rhetoric perpetrated by extremist groups and engage in meaningful development projects. They also run social media campaigns and workshop forums aimed at youth awareness on how to avoid indoctrination from terrorists. For instance in July, they hosted a forum dubbed '*Lenga Ugaidi na Talanta,*' that attracted over 300 youths from diverse cultures and religions to discuss on innovative ways to use their talents to create self-employment and resist terrorist propaganda.⁴⁹⁹ This are instances

⁴⁹⁷ Muraya, J., 'Community the Best Ally in War on Terror, NCTC Director Submits at Chicago [Forum,' capitalfm.co.ke (<http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2017/06/community-the-best-ally-in-war-on-terror-nctc-director-submits-at-chicago-forum/>) June 19, 2017

⁴⁹⁸ Interview with Ali. M held on the 12th August, 2017

⁴⁹⁹ The Peace Center, Twitter Post. July 11, 2017, 12.29 pm (<https://twitter.com/PeaceCenter/status/884706103837249537>)

of government partnership with non-state actors to create inter-faith dialogue between vulnerable youth in an effort to persuade them to desist terrorist propaganda.

Likewise, an effective public diplomacy counterterrorism policy ought to devise a comprehensive community based action plan to address root enablers of terrorism and address the diverse community wants as well as equipping them to counter the terrorist threat. For instance, in early 2017, the Kwale County in collaboration with USAID and DANIDA, in line with the National Counter Violent Extremism Strategy launched the county plan for combatting terrorism, which lay emphasis on an economic development policy aimed at deterring youth radicalization into al Shabaab and the MRC⁵⁰⁰ This action plan epitomizes the role devolved county government are playing in collaboration with NSAs, to implement effective public diplomacy strategies to counter the threat of terror in the long-term.

Equally, an effective public diplomacy strategy would involve funding judiciary counterterrorism initiatives to enable it mete out terrorism criminal justice and develop community collaborative and resilience building projects. For instance, in June 2017, the US Department of State availed an \$800,000 grant to fund research projects dubbed at supporting the Kenyan Judiciary in areas of criminal counterterrorism prosecution and community collaboration efforts with the judiciary to build resilience and counterterrorism.⁵⁰¹ This is an example of state to state cooperation to ensure that the private sector aids in devising effective public diplomacy strategies that equip the judiciary with the relevant tool it needs to counter terrorism.

⁵⁰⁰ Republic of Kenya, '*Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism*,' Nairobi: Government Printers, 2017

⁵⁰¹ Duke University, 'Kenya Counterterrorism Criminal justice Sector Support,' duke.edu (<https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=293031>) < Accessed 11.8.2017

Accordingly, an effective public diplomacy strategy ought to advance community-law enforcement collaboration in the form of community policing. For instance, Kenya devised a community based strategy way back in 2008.⁵⁰² This was implemented in 2008 by way of a ‘*Nyumba Kumi*’ community based vigilance crime prevention strategy that includes terrorism in collaboration with Kenyan law enforcement to provide early warning and terrorism prevention alerts emanating from the community where the terrorist themselves reside.⁵⁰³ In fact, Leting, hypothesizes that it is an effective strategy that could actually impede terrorism activity in Kenya.⁵⁰⁴ Thus, empowering a community led policing strategy in collaboration with law enforcement is in the realm of an effective public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy in that deals with terrorist that façade themselves within the society as upright citizens.

Finally, empowering institutions of higher learning and individuals with clout such as university dons, to build counterterrorism awareness, inform and equip youth and other community members with tools to resist radicalization and violence related with terrorism, is evidence of an efficient public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy. For instance, the ‘University of Nairobi through the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies’, held a stakeholder’s dialogue forum, intended to initiate conversation on how to best well tackle the terrorist threat in the Kenyan context.⁵⁰⁵ Additionally, Sheikh Omari of SUPKEM who teaches Islamic religion at the University of Nairobi, spends his time in organizing inter-faith sensitization and awareness

⁵⁰² Government of Kenya, ‘*Implementing Community Based Policing*,’ Nairobi: Government Printers, 2008

⁵⁰³ Leting, M., ‘Nyumba Kumi Strategy of Community Policing and its Impact on Curbing Crime: Empirical Assessment from Kenya,’ *IOSR journal of Humanities and Social Science*, Vol.22, No.1, 2017. Pp. 32-6

⁵⁰⁴ *Ibid.* Pp. 34

⁵⁰⁵ University of Nairobi, ‘*The University of Nairobi today, engaged stakeholders in the search for strategies that will counter terrorism in Africa*,’ uonbi.ac.ke (<http://www.uonbi.ac.ke/content/uon-holds-discourse-strategies-counter-terrorism>) May 7, 2017< Accessed 11.8.2017

building workshops to foster tolerance among communities, hence curtailing religious or culturally motivated incidents of terrorism. Hence, this is an example of how non-state actors can implement effective public diplomacy strategies aimed at awareness creation and dialogue initiation aimed at efficiently addressing the root causes of terrorism.

4.3. Public Diplomacy Counterterrorism Strategy in Ethiopia

The Ethiopian Foreign Policy and National Security Strategy, reaffirmed its national security priorities citing economic development, dialogue and poverty eradication, based policies as vital to peace and security.⁵⁰⁶ Accordingly, it has pursued its national interests through negotiations, dialogue, and community empowerment initiatives aimed at preventing violent conflicts including those attributed by acts of terror.⁵⁰⁷ This is a deviation from its initial use of hard power policy.

Indeed, the government of Ethiopia, devised a strategy that coordinates with and empowers local religious actors to enhance community resilience and expedite a candid two-way dialogue between the community and the state.⁵⁰⁸ For instance, in 2012, the Federal Affairs ministry collaborating with the Islamic Affairs Supreme Council of Ethiopia, trained an array of religious leaders on counterterrorism measures that emphasize on dialogue and the structuring of community resilience when faced with terror.⁵⁰⁹ This is an illustration of an effective public diplomacy strategy aimed at creating harmony within a diverse society and countering terrorism efficiently while at it.

⁵⁰⁶ *Op Cit.* Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy & Strategy. 2002

⁵⁰⁷ Abebe. T., 'Public Diplomacy as a Method of Conflict Prevention on the Nile Basin,' *International Journal of Political Science and Development*, Vol.3, No.11, 2005. Pp. 432-39

⁵⁰⁸ *Op Cit.* Arerero. K. 2014

⁵⁰⁹ *Op Cit.* U.S. Department of State, 2012. Pp.21

Accordingly, an effective and efficient public diplomacy counterterrorism policy is aimed at facilitating a community led policing strategy while coordinating with law enforcement. Certainly, the Amhara region, has a longstanding community vigilance program that encourages communities to report any perceived threats to the law enforcement.⁵¹⁰ This policy helps build trust between the community and law enforcement and how the community perceives them.

Indeed, an effective long-term public diplomacy approach is aimed at solidifying the societal resilience to terrorism and radicalization. This is illustrated by the SAVE project, in conjunction with the European Union, Ethiopian non state actors and the media, help in educating the youth on cultural harmony, and education that creates awareness to issues of radicalization and terrorism. In addition, peer-to-peer education activities and interfaith dialogue is pursued in order to mitigate the spread of terrorism and change the perception of youth away from violent tendencies.⁵¹¹

Finally, an effective public diplomacy strategy aims at analyzing the root enablers of terrorism and radicalization such as promoting economic development and eradicating poverty within the community. Accordingly, this can be used to pull resources to fund the initiatives then, implement viable targeted strategies. For instance, Ethiopia in collaboration with USAID implemented a strategy for economic development and community resiliency in countryside Ethiopia⁵¹² that is aimed at poverty eradication and economic development, tackling the perceived issues that lead to vulnerability that leads people to choose the terrorist path.

⁵¹⁰ Denney. L, & Kassage. D., ‘Securing Communities for Development: Community Policing in Ethiopia’s Amhara National Regional State,’ *Shaping Policy for Development*. 2013

⁵¹¹ Global Counter Terrorism Forum, gctf.org (<https://toolkit.thegctf.org/document-sets/abu-dhabi-plan-action-education-and-counter-terror-extremism/good-practices/iii>)

⁵¹² USAID, ‘Country Development Cooperation Strategy: Accelerating the Transformation Towards Prosperity,’ Washington, D.C: USAID, 2012

4.4. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Using the liberal theory approach, it would seem that the contemporary international relations involves a multiplicity of actors, all with competing interests seeking to influence state action. Accordingly, it entails both state and NSAs working in tandem to unravel global conundrums such as terrorism. Therefore, for a public diplomacy strategy to effectively counter the threat posed by terrorism, ought to be as a result of a collaborative effort between both state and non-state actors, as they both have different roles to play. For instance, the state plays a funding role, while NSAs use their well-established networks to effectively implement a public diplomacy strategy.

In addition, liberalism dictates that shared democratic norms and culture is the most pragmatic approach to constrain belligerent tendencies. Accordingly, open democratic negotiations are a resource to a public diplomacy strategy. These should be based upon candid two-way communication which involves also listening to societal concerns, and not just dictating policy direction. Essentially, this fosters good relationships between the state and the society leading them to build much needed resilience towards terrorist agenda hence effective in counterterrorism.

The core ideology of the liberal theoretical approach, lies in safeguards on fundamental liberties, democratic dispensation and the upholding of human rights. Accordingly, these safeguards are of essence to the society as they foster hope of future prospect, which ensures harmony and tolerance which are precursors for averting violence which may be manifest in the form of terrorism. This is why any pragmatic public diplomacy strategy ought to infuse these aspects into it for it to effectively counter terrorism.

Essentially, national interests are in the contemporary world not defined by military might only but by economic, environmental and technological might. Accordingly, a

pragmatic public diplomacy approach ought to endeavor to advance these aspects, in turn creating prosperity for the citizen. As a result, societal cohesion and resilience against terrorism is enhanced.

4.5.CONCLUSION

In conclusion, at the onset of the chapter the study sought to establish the impact of public diplomacy counterterrorism strategy in Kenya and Ethiopia, and whether they are effective in countering the threat posed by terrorism. It was established that in fact, a collaborative effort between the state, non-state actors and the society, based on candid and honest two-way dialogue, is effective in managing the root enablers of terrorism, hence nipping terrorism in the bud as opposed to the current measures that are reactive in nature. This is evident from the practice of public diplomacy to counter terrorism in Ethiopia, which hasn't experienced any significant terrorist attack in the last decade. In essence Ethiopia has a well-developed public diplomacy machinery that has proved a success story in the Horn of Africa.

Accordingly, the research comes to a conclusion that public diplomacy counterterrorism initiatives are most efficient in dealing with terrorism. Therefore, confirming the hypothesis that policies founded upon public diplomacy, are capable of effectively countering terrorism.

CHAPTER FIVE

PRESENTATION OF QUANTITATIVE DATA AND ANALYSIS

5.1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents and analyzes quantitative data collected during the research period. The data was collected from 23 respondents of both Kenyan and Ethiopian nationalities. This research used a mixed method approach, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. Quantitative data was obtained by way of semi-structured questionnaires, while qualitative data was obtained by way of interviewing key informants.

The data collected in this research was collected from urban Ethiopian refugees residing around Hurlingham area, a few Kenyan citizens residing in Nairobi particularly Eastleigh and the CBD. Interviews were conducted at religious establishments such as Jumiya Mosque, Nairobi Chapel and the Hare Krishna Temple, as well as Non state organizations such as the Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism where staff members were interviewed. Ethiopian and Kenyan embassy staff were also interviewed. Additionally, data was collected at the American Reference Center at the US Embassy in Kenya, the Jomo Kenyatta Memorial Library and the National Defense College Library.

Lastly, quantitative data collected was analyzed using IBM's Statistical Package for Social Sciences, while the qualitative data was themed and content derived from recurring themes.

5.2. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Majority of the respondents interviewed were of Kenyan nationality, however the researcher managed to interview a good number of Ethiopian urban refugees residing particularly in the Hurlingham area of Nairobi. These respondents were randomly selected owing to the fact that he was not privy to a pre-prepared list of respondents.

A refugee for the purpose of this research is as propagated in the 1951 UN ‘Convention on the status of refugees’ read together with its 1967 protocol, as a person residing outside their state of domicile as a result of a justifiable fear of torment based on their ideals, race, religion, political affiliation, *inter alia*, hence are reluctant to return as a result of this fear.⁵¹³

5.2.1. Bio Data

This section aimed at collecting data relating to age, gender, religion, education and nationality. The purpose of this section was to enable the researcher determine what data is relevant in terms of ideals, values and historical political knowhow of their respective states. For instance, a respondent below the age of 18 may not be particularly interested in the political climate around them as well as they may not be privy to certain historical events.

⁵¹³ UNHCR. ‘*Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*,’ 2010 (<http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10>) <Accessed 12 Aug, 2017




Chart 5.1: Age of Respondents

52% of the respondents to this research were aged 18-30 years. This perhaps is owing to the fact, as Awiti & Scot postulated, 80% of the Kenyan population is below 35 years of age.⁵¹⁴ Hence, a random convenient sample is likely to pick out this age group. While, the age groups of 30-40, 40-50 stood at 26% and 22% respectively. The reason the majority of data collected (52%) came from the age group of 18-30 years is that the youth are targets of terrorist recruiters hence terrorist propaganda is mainly tailor-made for them, with the aim of indoctrinating them to their cause. Similarly, they are the main consumers of the worldwide web where this propaganda is often spread.

⁵¹⁴ Awiti. A, & Scott. B., ‘Kenya Youth Survey Report,’ Nairobi: The Agha Khan University. 2016. Pp.1




Chart 5.2: Gender of Respondents

More women were interviewed for the purpose of this research, at 56.5% perhaps due to the fact that women, according to the 2009 Kenya population census, exceed men by 0.2%.⁵¹⁵ Thus, a random sample would likely pick out more women than men. The reason that majority of the data collected came from women, is that more women have now taken initiative to familiarize themselves with the dangers that terrorism poses in the region as terrorists do not distinguish based on gender when it comes to recruitment, radicalization or even during terror attacks.

⁵¹⁵ *Op Cit.* Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and Society for International Development. 2013




Chart 5.3: Religion of Respondents

Majority of respondents were Christians at 44% while Muslims and Indians stood at 39% and 17% respectively, this perhaps demonstrating the findings by the 2009 Kenyan census.⁵¹⁶ Hence, a random sample would pick more people of the Christianity faith, followed by those that profess Islam and Hindu respectively. The reason that the majority of the data collected came from respondents who profess the Christian faith symbolizes the unfounded and deep rooted belief that Christians are the main target of terrorist attacks. Similarly, Muslims had a significant number of respondents interviewed as they see themselves as targets of unfair socio-cultural stereotyping by the authorities and the society as a whole.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid*




Chart 5.4: Education Level of Respondent

Majority of the respondents willing to be interviewed for the purpose of this research had attained the tertiary education level or more at 74%, this perhaps is indicative of the group of people who are knowledgeable of the contextual issues of this research. In addition, this signifies that the debate on terrorism is more prevalent in the post-secondary education set-up, hence the need to introduce the debate early on perhaps in primary school to equip the younger generations with the tools to develop resilience towards radicalization and indoctrination by terrorist propaganda.




Chart 5.5: Nationality of Respondents

Majority of the respondents to this research were Kenyans, reason being the research was conducted within Kenya, and the fact that Kenyans were more willing to be interviewed on matters pertaining this research. Additionally, Ethiopian urban refugees based on their customs, ideals and fear of being victimized, were less unwilling to be interviewed. In addition, this majority group of respondents coming from Kenya signifies that terrorism is more endemic in Kenya as compared to Ethiopia and that Kenya has to adopt more effective policies if the war on terror is to be won.

5.2.2. Strategies and Mechanisms of Counterterrorism

5.2.2.1. The Anti-Terrorism Law efficiency in Deterring Terrorism and Radicalization

Majority of the respondents interviewed, 56.5%, where (34.8% disagreed and 21.7% strongly disagree) disagreed that anti-terrorism law is efficient in deterring terrorism and radicalization. In fact, the mean, as calculated according to Dr. Rensis Rikert, ($m = \frac{fx}{\div f}$), as shown in **Table 5.1**, amounts to 3 signifying that most respondents disagree

that an anti-terror law in both Ethiopia and Kenya is an efficient counterterrorism strategy.

Table 5.1: The Anti-Terrorism Law efficient in Deterring Terrorism and Radicalization

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	4	1	4	17.4
2.Concur	3	2	6	13.1
3.Disagree	8	3	24	34.8
4.Strongly Disagree	5	4	20	21.6
5.I don't Know	3	5	15	13.1
Total	23		69	100

This signifies the fact that a majority of citizens are not confident that the anti-terrorism law as currently set up is effective to counter the threat posed by terrorism and that it requires to be reviewed and subsequently amended encompassing public participation in the process.

5.2.2.2. Security Checks in Public Institutions Effective Curbing Terrorist

Attacks

Majority, 73.9%, (with 43.5% strongly concurring and 30.4% concurring) of respondents interviewed concur that security checks in public institutions (Both in Kenya and Ethiopia) are effective in deterring terrorist attacks, as indicated in **Table 5.2** below. Additionally, the mean ($m = fx \div f$) is 1.91 indicating that majority of the respondents concur that security checks are an effective strategy to curtail a terror attack.

Table 5.2: Security Checks in Public Institutions in Effective in Curbing Terrorist Attacks

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	10	1	10	43.5
2.Concur	7	2	14	30.4
3.Disagree	4	3	12	17.4
4.Strongly Disagree	2	4	8	8.7
5.I don't Know	0	5	0	0
Total	23		44	100

This signifies that the majority of people have confidence in security checks in public institutions as a way to counter a terrorist attack. Therefore, more resources should be dedicated in training of security personnel who conduct the checks and on modern screening equipment to make it more effective to counter a terrorist threat.

5.2.2.3. Police well Equipped to Fight Terrorism

Majority of the respondents, 69.5%, (with 47.8% disagreeing and 21.6% strongly disagreeing), disagree that the police (both in Kenya and Ethiopia) are sufficiently equipped to fight terrorism, as indicated by **Table 5.3**. In addition, the mean ($m = fx \div f$) is 3 indicating that the popular stance among the respondents was that the police are not equipped sufficiently to effectively counter the threat posed by terrorism.

Table 5.3: Police well Equipped to Fight Terrorism

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	2	1	2	8.7
2.Concur	4	2	8	17.4
3.Disagree	11	3	33	47.8
4.Strongly Disagree	5	4	20	21.6
5.I don't Know	1	5	5	4.5
Total	23		68	100

This signifies that a majority of people are less confident that the police are well equipped to respond to incidents of terrorism and that more resources should be set aside for police counterterrorism training and equipment to enable them effectively prevent and respond to terrorism attacks when they occur. Similarly, law enforcement should engage in public relations exercise to build confidence among the population.

5.2.2.4. Military Operation Somalia including (AMISOM) Deterred Terrorists

Majority of the respondents, 56.5%, (52% disagree and 4.5% strongly disagree) disagree that the military intervention in Somalia has not deterred terrorists (In Kenya and Ethiopia) in any way, as shown by **Table 5.4** below. Moreover, the mean ($m = \frac{fx}{f}$) is 2.4 demonstrating that a majority of people interviewed do not think that a military intervention is an effective counterterrorism measure.

Table 5.4: Military Operation Somalia including (AMISOM) Deterred Terrorists

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	4	1	4	17.4
2.Concur	6	2	12	26.1
3.Disagree	12	3	36	52
4.Strongly Disagree	1	4	4	4.5
5.I don't Know	0	5	0	0
Total	23		56	100

This symbolizes that the citizens are not confident that a military strategy of counterterrorism is effective in dealing with terrorism and in fact leads to reprisal attacks. Indicating that a diplomatic strategy ought to be adopted to effectively counter the threat that terrorism poses.

5.2.3. Diplomatic Counterterrorism Strategies in the Horn of Africa

5.2.3.1. Cooperation in Counterterrorism measure is effective in thwarting terrorism

Majority of those interviewed 73.9%, (21.6% concur and 52% strongly concur) concur that cooperation in areas such as border security are helpful in thwarting the terrorist threat, as shown by **Table 5.5** below. In addition, the mean ($m = \frac{fx}{f}$) is 1.9 indicating that a large portion of respondents agree cooperation in counterterrorism measures helps curb terrorism.

Table 5.5: Cooperation in Counterterrorism measures is effective in thwarting terrorism

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	12	1	12	52
2.Concur	5	2	10	21.6
3.Disagree	3	3	9	13.1
4.Strongly Disagree	2	4	8	8.7
5.I don't Know	1	5	5	4.6
Total	23		44	100

This symbolizes that a majority of citizens are confident that state-to-state cooperation in counterterrorism is an effective strategy to deal with the threat that it poses and that the government should set aside more resources geared towards this strategy. In addition, policy makers should formulate policies that are geared towards cooperation in counterterrorism to effectively fight terrorism.

5.2.3.2. Poverty and Marginalization makes one vulnerable to Radicalization

A large proposition of respondents 86.9 %, (with 39.2% strongly concurring and 47.8% concurring) concur that poverty and marginalization are factors that make an individual vulnerable to terrorist radicalization, as indicated in **Table 5.6** below. Moreover, the

mean ($m = \frac{fx}{f}$) is 2 indicating that a majority of people agree that for counterterrorism strategies to be effective they must strive to eradicate these factors.

Table 5.6: Poverty and Marginalization makes one vulnerable to Radicalization

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	9	1	9	39.2
2.Concur	11	2	22	47.8
3.Disagree	2	3	6	8.7
4.Strongly Disagree	1	4	8	8.7
5.I don't Know	0	5	0	0
Total	23		45	100

This symbolizes that a majority of people view poverty and marginalization as causes of vulnerability that leads one to join a terrorist cause. Therefore, the government should formulate policies that eradicate poverty and ensure equitable distribution of the national cake by exterminating factors that cause inequitable distribution of resources such as corruption, to effectively thwart the threat of terrorism.

5.2.3.3. Internal conflicts in Somalia contributing to the spread of terrorism in the region

A majority of the respondents 91.3% (26.1 strongly concur and 64.9 concur) were of the opinion that the internal strife in Somalia is contributing to the spread of terrorism in the HoA Region as indicated by **Table 5.7** below. In fact, the mean ($m = \frac{fx}{f}$) is 1.9 indicating that a large majority concur with the fact that Somalia's internal conflict makes it a conducive environment for terrorist activity.

Table 5.7: Internal conflicts in Somalia contributing to the spread of terrorism in the region

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	6	1	6	26.1
2.Concur	15	2	30	64.9
3.Disagree	1	3	3	4.5
4.Strongly Disagree	0	4	0	0
5.I don't Know	1	5	5	4.5
Total	23		44	100

This symbolizes that a majority of people view internal conflicts in Somalia as spilling over beyond its borders in the form of terrorism. Therefore, the government should ensure that conflict management strategies are prioritized to ensure that the conflicts in Somalia do not spill over beyond its borders, as a peaceful and stable Somalia is the key to countering the terrorist threat in the HoA region.

5.2.4. Public Diplomacy Counterterrorism Strategies in the Horn of Africa

5.2.4.1. Community dialogue and resilience building initiatives effective in countering terrorism

Majority of the respondent interviewed, 78%, (30.4% strongly concur while 47.8% concur) concur that strategies that initiate community dialogue and resilience building initiatives are effective in countering the terrorist threat, as indicated in **Table 5.8** below. In fact, the mean ($m = fx \div f$) is 2 indicating that majority concur that strategies of dialogue and resilience building should be used when deterring terrorism.

Table 5.8: Community dialogue and resilience building initiatives effective in countering terrorism

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	7	1	7	30.4
2.Concur	11	2	22	47.8
3.Disagree	3	3	9	13.1
4.Strongly Disagree	2	4	8	8.7
5.I don't Know	0	5	0	0
Total	23		46	100

This symbolizes that more and more people are confident in public diplomacy strategy of dialogue and building community resilience as key to effectively fighting terrorism within the region. Hence, the government should formulate policies geared towards dialogue and building of community resilience if they are to effectively counter the terrorist threat.

5.2.4.2. Poverty Eradication based initiatives effective in countering terrorism

Majority of the respondents interviewed for this research, 91.3% (with 52% strongly concurring and 39.2% concurring) agree that poverty is an enabler of terrorist activity, as indicated in table 5.9 below. In fact, the mean ($m = fx \div f$) 2, indicates that most of the respondents were of the opinion that in countering terrorism, the government ought to initiate development geared policies if they are to effectively counter terrorism.

Table 5.9: Poverty Eradication based initiatives effective to counter terrorism

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	12	1	12	52
2.Concur	9	2	18	39.2
3.Disagree	1	3	3	13.1
4.Strongly Disagree	0	4	0	0
5.I don't Know	1	5	5	4.5
Total	23		38	100

This symbolizes that more people are confident that government policies geared towards eradicating poverty are effective to counter the terrorist threat. In addition, the government should involve non state actors in these initiatives geared towards poverty eradication to effectively counter terrorism once and for all.

5.2.4.3. Community policing in collaboration with police is effective in countering terrorism

Most of the respondents interviewed for the purpose of this research, 91.3% (with 34.8% strongly concurring and 56.5% concurring) agree that community policing projects in collaboration with police are effective in prevention of terrorist attacks, as indicated in **Table 5.10** below. Meanwhile the mean ($m = \frac{fx}{\div f}$) is 2 indicating that most respondents were confident that community based vigilance is a great preventative measure when it comes to terrorism.

Table 5.10: Community policing in collaboration with police is effective in countering terrorism

Response (x:1-5)	Frequency (f)	x	fx	%
1.Strongly Concur	8	1	8	34.8
2.Concur	13	2	26	56.5
3.Disagree	2	3	6	8.7
4.Strongly Disagree	0	4	0	0
5.I don't Know	0	5	0	0
Total	23		40	100

This symbolizes that more people are confident that community led policing in collaboration with law enforcement is essential in deterring terrorism. Therefore, the state should set aside more resources geared towards enabling this policy, while law enforcement should create better relations with the community to ensure they cooperate in this endeavor. Similarly, policy makers should formulate laws that protect whistle

blowers from reprisals from the suspects and their accomplices to ensure that this strategy effectively works in countering terrorism.

5.3. Key Findings

1. The Anti-terrorism laws in both Kenya and Ethiopia, the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act,⁵¹⁷ and the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation, 2009 respectively, according to respondents, have had minimal effect in countering the terrorist threat. The consensus seemed to be that they have been used by law enforcement as an avenue to victimize and eventually stereotype innocent citizens. Tesfa an Ethiopian living in Kenya, claimed that citizens of Somali origin were most victimized by law enforcement.⁵¹⁸
2. Most respondents were of the opinion that security checks in public institutions have minimized the risk of terrorist attacks within these institutions. These checks instill confidence in the citizenry while deterring potential attacks by terrorists.
3. Most respondents interviewed for the purpose of this research felt that the police are under equipped to deal with terrorists. They were of the opinion that terrorists are getting more sophisticated and modernized, hence the government ought to spend more on equipping the police to empower them to effectively deal with the terrorists.⁵¹⁹
4. Most of the respondents were of the opinion that the military interventions (of both Ethiopia and Kenya) have made them more susceptible to reprisal attacks by al Shabaab.

⁵¹⁷ *Op Cit.* Prevention of Terrorism Act. 2012

⁵¹⁸ Interview with Tesfa Teka, on the 13th July, 2017

⁵¹⁹ Interview with Key Police informant, on the 13th of June, 2017

5. Majority of the respondents opined that terrorism is best dealt with through state to state cooperation. They termed border security and intelligence as key cooperation areas that would effectively counter the threat of terror that Kenya and Ethiopia faces.⁵²⁰
6. Most respondents felt that the internal strife particularly in Somalia, is to blame for the increased terrorist attacks in Kenya. They also felt that the internal conflict poses a threat to Ethiopia and resolving the conflict would create law and order and enable the state of Somalia to deal with the terrorist organizations in the country.
7. Finally, most respondents were of the idea that community based approaches to counter the terrorist threat are more effective. One particularly cited the *nyumba kumi* community vigilance initiative as having made strides in exposing potential terror threats to the police.⁵²¹

5.4. CONCLUSION

At the onset of this chapter this research sought to gather quantitative proof that counterterrorism policies founded upon the practice of public diplomacy are indeed the most effective of counterterrorism strategies when countering the threat posed by terrorism. Accordingly, this chapter found evidence that an effective way of tackling terrorism is indeed through public diplomacy strategies. Therefore confirming the hypothesis that public diplomacy counterterrorism strategies ought to be embraced in the fight against terrorism and the threat it poses.

⁵²⁰ Interview with Mutua, a security consultant, on the 10th of May, 2017

⁵²¹ Interview with Kamande, Chairman Ngina road, community policing group. On the 10th of August, 2017

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it is evident from the study that terrorism is no longer a threat that states can handle unilaterally. Terrorism has become a big threat to global peace, therefore, states have to involve non-state actors as well as the society itself in the formulation and execution of counterterrorism policy. Hence, a counterterrorism policy should be a collaborative effort between not only states and non-state actors, but also the society themselves.

In addition, it is clear that the current strategies and mechanisms are not effective enough there is need to win over the ‘hearts and minds’ of the society whom terrorists recruit from. Therefore a counterterrorism strategy that influence the opinion of the public that terrorists are the enemy. It should be based upon candid communication with the public. Hence, an effective counterterrorism policy should engage the community it is centered upon.

Accordingly, there is need to build harmony and tolerance within the society if the threat of terrorism is to be countered effectively. To achieve this, there is need to safeguard human security. This can be done by ensuring any counterterrorism policy is based upon sustainable development and uphold civil liberties and freedoms. This ensures that vulnerability that makes ordinary members of the society to choose the path of terrorism is eradicated. Hence, an effective counterterrorism strategy should eliminate frustration within the society and restore hope and prospect for the future. This then will create tolerance and harmony within the society, making them resilient to terrorist propaganda.

In conclusion, it is thus clear that strategies and mechanisms of counterterrorism should be based upon the liberal theoretical approach, and should be based upon cooperation between not only with states and non-states but also with the community whom it targets. This is to say that such policies should be community led if they are to be effectively fight terrorism once and for all. Evidentially, public diplomacy strategies are most effective in fighting the menace that is terrorism.

6.2. RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, this research has not only established that the counterterrorism strategies and mechanisms in place are not only ineffective in countering terrorism but may exacerbate it. Therefore, a more pragmatic approach should be adopted to effectively thwart the threat of terrorism. It is essential to use tact and skill in coming up with new innovative measures aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the society. With the advancement of information technology, terrorist to are coming up with new innovative techniques to carry out attacks. Thus, counterterrorism policies should keep up with the times if they are to be effective. Hence, a public diplomacy approach is best suited.

6.2.1. Academic Recommendations

- More research out to be done to establish the link between corruption and terrorism. Corruption leads to unequal distribution of the national cake, thus leaving some members of the society feeling not only marginalized but also deprived, leaving them vulnerable and susceptible to the terrorist cause. For this reason more research ought to be carried out to explore corruption as a root enabler of terrorism to make recommendation to policy makers to make more stringent policies to fight corruption.
- There is need for researchers to explore more innovative ways to monitor and evaluate public diplomacy counterterrorism policies. Indeed, researchers need

to explore how to measure the redundancy of a policy or the success of a policy to enable policy makers amend or improve a policy to ensure maximum impact.

- There is need for scholars to develop a school based curriculum that is comprehensive and relevant for pupils at the very early age that facilitates their ability to develop tools of building resilience against terrorism at an early age.

6.2.2. Policy Recommendations

- Anti-terrorism law in Kenya and Ethiopia does not provide safeguards aimed at protecting whistle blowers and witnesses. Enacting a witness and whistle blower protection policy would ensure that more people report cases and testify against potential terrorist before they commit an act of terror, without fear of any reprisals. This is not only a preventative measure but also a deterrent measure.
- It is essential that any counterterrorism strategy counters terrorist rhetoric by discrediting their messages to the vulnerable members of the society. It is therefore prudent that this communication aimed at countering terrorist propaganda, must be credible and well thought out. Hence, a department of public diplomacy should lead such efforts. For instance, a department of public diplomacy should be set up at the National Counter Terrorism Center to spearhead such communication.
- In addition, terrorist organizations like al Shabaab still secure funding for their operations despite the stringent anti-money laundering law in Kenya. It is evident that there is need seal all loopholes that the terrorist groups use. This means the proceeds of crime and money laundering Act needs to be reviewed to target new modern and informal cashless money transfers and digital payment systems such as the internet based Bitcoin and hawalas. Ensuring terrorist

organization is deprived of monetary facilitation to carry out attacks would be effective in countering terrorism.

- Community policing initiatives such as the *nyumba kumi* community vigilance initiative would be more effective if it adopted new innovative ways to report to law enforcement fast. Therefore, a mobile based app where people would report suspected terrorist anonymously without fear of being victimized by these criminals should be adopted. This will definitely encourage more members of the society to report any suspicious activity without fear of any kind.
- More resources should be set aside for counterterrorism research. There is need to keep up with the new innovative ways that terrorist organizations are using to radicalize the youth and vulnerable groups. This will enable policy makers to come up with relevant policies to effectively counter terrorism.
- There is need to build support, and collaborate with civil society to effectively counter terrorism. From this research it is evident that strategies aimed at the community are more credible when delivered by non-state actors rather than state officials. Hence, there is need to avail more resources to non-state actors and build their capacity to effectively counter terrorism.
- There is need to rehabilitate defectors from terrorist groups. Indeed, government rehabilitation centers should be established to help defectors from terrorism reintegrate into the society. This would make them a beacon of hope for would be defectors and attract more who would want to leave the violent ways.

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APPENDICES

1. QUESTIONNAIRE

A. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION (Tick where applicable)

1. What is your age?

a) 18- 30

b) 30-50

c) 50-60

2. What is your gender?

a) Male

b) Female

c) I prefer not to say

3. What is your religion?

a) Christianity

b) Islam

c) Hinduism

d) Other

4. What is the highest level of education you have attained?

a) Primary

b) Secondary

c) Tertiary

d) Undergraduate

e) Postgraduate

5. What is your nationality

a) Kenyan

b) Ethiopian

B. STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS OF COUNTERTERRORISM. (Tick

where appropriate)

6. In your opinion is the Anti-Terrorism law in your country efficient in preventing terrorist attacks and radicalization of youth?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree
- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

If you disagree, what do you think is the reason?

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7. In your opinion, do you think security checks at public institutions are effective in preventing a terrorist attack?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree
- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

8. In your opinion are police in your country well equipped to deal with terrorists?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree

- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

If you disagree, why do you think so?

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9. Do you think the military operation (by both Kenya and Ethiopia) has deterred terrorists from attacking your country?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree
- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

Kindly explain

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C. DIPLOMATIC COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (Tick where appropriate)

10. Do you think cooperation by states in counterterrorism initiatives is effective in foiling terror attacks?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree

- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

What areas in your opinion should state cooperate in order to effectively prevent terror attacks?

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11. In your opinion does poverty caused by marginalization make people vulnerable to radicalization into terrorism?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree
- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

Kindly explain your answer above

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12. In your opinion do the internal domestic conflicts in Somalia make the region more susceptible to terrorism?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree
- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

Do you think states (both Kenya and Ethiopia) should intervene to ensure their safety?

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D. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA (Tick where appropriate)

13. Do you think dialogue with the most vulnerable people to terrorist radicalization within the community and community resilience initiatives are effective in countering terrorism?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree
- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

Kindly explain your answer above

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14. Are economic development and poverty eradication initiatives effective in countering terrorism?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree
- d) I strongly disagree

e) I don't know

Kindly explain your answer above

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15. In your opinion are community led policing initiatives in coordination with the police effective in preventing terrorism?

- a) I strongly concur
- b) I concur
- c) I disagree
- d) I strongly disagree
- e) I don't know

Kindly explain your answer above

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2. INTERVIEW GUIDE.

- A. Are Counterterrorism Laws in your country efficiently curbing the threat terrorism poses? If not, what in your opinion needs to be amended to ensure they are efficient?
- B. Are community policing initiatives efficient in curbing terrorism in the HoA region? Is there room for improvement in the area of community-law enforcement collaboration?
- C. What impact does state-to-state and state-to-non-state cooperation have in counterterrorism measures? Is cooperation efficient in counterterrorism measures?
- D. Are military strategies of counterterrorism more or less effective when compared with the peaceful diplomatic approaches vis-à-vis countering the threat of terror?
- E. Are public diplomacy based initiatives such as community policing really effective in eliminating the threat of terror and countering radicalization of youths in the HoA region?
- F. What is the impact of public diplomacy initiatives in relation to the counterterrorism initiatives that are already in place within the HoA region?

3. RESEARCH INTERVIEW PARTICIPATION CONSENT FORM

I consent to be interviewed in this research conducted by Mr. Frank Mwiti Kirimi from the University of Nairobi's Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, and comprehend that the project is designed to gather information about the role of public diplomacy in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa. I will be one of approximately 25 people to be interviewed for the purpose of this research.

1. My participation in this project is voluntary, and that no monetary consideration will be advanced for my participation. I may withdraw my participation at any time I feel like.
2. If, for any reason, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to withdraw my participation in the interview.
3. Notes will be taken during the interview. An audio tape of the interview may be made, and if I feel uncomfortable in any way, may request the interviewer to cease recording.
4. It is my understanding that the interviewer will not identify me by name in the research ensuing from this interview without my express consent, and that my confidentiality as an interviewee will be upheld.
5. It is my understanding that the conduct of this research has been appraised and subsequently approved by the 'National Commission for *Science, Technology and Innovation*' pursuant to the Science and Technology Act, Chapter 250 Laws of Kenya.
6. I have read and comprehended the details provided hereby, and had all concerns addressed to my fulfilment, and voluntarily consent to partake in this research.
7. I have thereby been furnished with a copy of this consent form.

Signature

Frank Mwiti Kirimi

Interviewer

Date

Signature

For More Information, Please Contact my Supervisor:

Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo,

Director, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies,

Email: director-idis@uonbi.ac.ke

Tel: 318262 Ext. 28087/28380

4. PERMIT



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

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NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/17/78078/17708**

Date: **10th July, 2017**

Frank Mwiti Kirimi
University of Nairobi
P.O. Box 30197-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“Countering terrorism in the horn of Africa: The role of Public Diplomacy,”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **7th July, 2018.**

You are advised to report to **the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chief Executive Officers of selected government agencies, the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.

**GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The Principal Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Chief Executive Officers
Selected government agencies.