#### **UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

# COLLEGE OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

# THE ROLE OF POLITICAL DIPLOMACY IN ADDRESSING AFRICA'S CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION:

A CASE OF THE EAC

 $\mathbf{BY}$ 

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A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN DIPLOMACY

# **DECLARATION**

# **DECLARATION BY STUDENT**

This project report is my original work and has not been pro-	esented for a degree award or any
other award in any other university.	
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# **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this report to the East African Community. May the letter and spirit of integration in the region endure



#### **ACKNOWLEGEMENT**

I thank the Almighty God for His grace, strength and good health which kept me in the track of completing this project report. I am also grateful to my Supervisor, Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo for her continuous academic guidance and support throughout my research and documentation of my report.

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Especially, I would like to thank all my interviewees for sparing much of their time to respond to my instruments of research even when they were not obligated to do so. I thank Ms. Meg Carr who out of goodwill volunteered to assist with my data analysis.

#### **ABSTRACT**

Political Diplomacy as used in the new EAC is proving to bear more fruits compared to when and how it was used in the initial EAC. But even with its little success and the potential of cutting across issues to effectively address the challenges of integration in the region, Political Diplomacy is not being sufficiently utilized. The main purpose of the study was to investigate and assess how the use of Political diplomacy can be enhanced in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC.

This study employed the use of cross-sectional surveys and purposive sampling to select the interviewees. The theories used are neo functionalism which puts emphasis on the role of institutions in the process of integration and intergovernmentalism which reiterates that the state is the key player in the integration process. The hypotheses formed were: The key challenges of Integration in the EAC are undermining the entire Integration process of the region: Political Diplomacy has the potential to effectively address the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC and Political Diplomacy has not effectively addressed the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC. They were used in the formation of the research instruments.

The study established that; the EAC remains a largely intergovernmental body rather than a neo functional institution. The study also found out that no degree of Political Diplomacy can bear fruits without the required political backing by all partner states in addition to partnership with other stakeholders. The study also found out that no degree of Political Diplomacy can bear fruits without the required political backing by all partner states. The invoking of the principle of variable geometry has been a commendable political diplomatic strategy to fast track integration.

The study recommends that the political elite need to give the Private Sector more investment opportunities to promote industrial growth which is a major focus of integration in the region. There is also a need to make integration in the EAC more of a citizen-centered process so as to create a sense of a community comprised of the citizens of all the partner states rather than largely relying on institutions to champion the course of integration

#### ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APEC- Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

AU- African Union

CFTA-Continental Free Trade Area

COMESA- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

COW-Coalition of the Willing

**EAC-East African Community** 

ECA-Economic Commission of Africa

ECCAS-Economic Community of Central African States

ECOWAS- Economic Community of West African States

FDLR- Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda

FTAs-Free Trade Areas

LPA-Lagos Plan of Action

OAU- Organisation of African Unity

PTAs-Preferential Trade Areas

**RECS-Regional Economic Communities** 

**RIAs-Regional Integration Arrangements** 

SADC-Southern African Development Community

UNECA-United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

# **UN-United Nations**

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#### CHAPTER ONE

#### INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 Background of the study

Regional Integration refers to collective governance and material interdependence between or among states.<sup>1</sup> It is an illustration of a geographical scope with a number of partner states involved in an arrangement which varies from simple coordination to deep cooperation.<sup>2</sup>The depth of this cooperation is measured in terms of the degree of sovereignty that an individual state is willing to surrender to the regime or institution created by the partner states. Cooperation can also be assessed in sectors such as those of trade, labour mobility, service delivery, harmonization of macro policies and most importantly, whether or not a sense of a security community has been realized within that geographical scope. Integration is a symbol of the unification of a number of hitherto independent Arrangements. In Africa, such arrangements comprise of but are not limited to: the EAC, ECOWAS, ECCAS,SADC and COMESA.

Adding to the mentioned agreements at a regional level, several efforts have as well been underway to forge economic cooperation (and deep economic integration at the end of it all) among states in Africa .³Hatzernberg says that "the aspiration of African leaders to integrate Africa, provided the rationale for the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA)."<sup>4</sup> It was a brainchild of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was adopted by African Heads

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Mitrany, D. The Progress of the International Government. (New Haven: Yale University Pess, 1933) p101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Abegunrin, O. *Africa in Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century : A Pan African Perspective* . New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Alemayehu and Haile, (2004).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Hatzernberg. T. Regional Integration in Africa. Stellenbosch: Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa, 2011.

of State in April, 1980. The plan aimed at increasing Africa's self-sufficiency and reducing dependency on the Western countries. The Abuja Treaty was signed in 1991and was the impetus for the African integration agenda. This treaty emphasized African solidarity, selfreliance and an endogenous development strategy through industrialisation. The treaty came into force in 1994 and envisaged the development of an African Economic Community by 2028.Leaders at the African Union (AU) Summit which took place in January 2012 under the theme 'Boosting intra-African trade' endorsed a plan to set up a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017. The proposed CFTA would be a key component of the African Union's approach to increase intra-regional trade within the region by a 25-30 percent minimum in the next decade. 5 Many serious efforts exist in Africa, directed towards the achievement of Regional Integration but inspite of that, RECs in Africa have not shown a high degree of success in fully achieving their intended objectives.<sup>6</sup> Such efforts are mainly with the intention of generating employment, poverty eradication, and improving per capita incomes and challenges as well as improving the overall living standards of African countries through enhancing intra African trade.

Diplomacy on the other hand is "the means by which states throughout the world conduct their affairs in ways to ensure peaceful relations". 7It is concerned with the management of relations between states and between states and other actors. Diplomacy has been used in Africa as an instrument of fostering cooperation among states. There are different forms of diplomacy which include; media diplomacy, environmental diplomacy, cultural diplomacy, economic diplomacy, sports diplomacy and political diplomacy to mention but a few. Of

<sup>5</sup>*International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,* (2012)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Opportunities for Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of SADC www.iosrjournals.org

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Nicolson, H. *Diplomacy*. London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.

particular interest to this research project is political diplomacy. This style of management largely embraces the calculated art of negotiation conducted by the political class.8 It is concerned with the allocation of power and resources and high politics decisions such as the decisions around ending wars or managing conflicts. Political Diplomacy has a cross cutting effect in that it addresses all the aspects of the forms of diplomacy mentioned earlier. It can be very instrumental in realizing the goals of Regional Integration.

#### 2. Problem Statement

Despite the fact that all African states have embraced Regional Integration by belonging to various Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the continental hope for Economic Integration, Development and ensuring Peace and Stability has not yet been realized. This is attributed to various challenges which vary in nature, scope and levels of complexity.9 Different forms of diplomacy such as Economic Diplomacy, Sports Diplomacy and Political Diplomacy have been used and continue to be used in an attempt to address these challenges.<sup>10</sup>

Political Diplomacy is not issue specific. It is strategic and cuts across the uniqueness of an issue in the sense that it can be employed to address problems of a political nature as well as those of social and economic nature.<sup>11</sup> Additionally, in the most complex cases in Africa, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Satow E. *Guide to Diplomatic Practice* . London: Longmans, 1932.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Elhiraika, Adam B. (et al) *Regional Integration and Policy Challenges in Africa*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Orji, Kingdom E. "Issues in Diplomacy and Regional Integration for Sustainable Development in Africa." *Reiko International Journal of Social and Economic Research vol* 4(2012) 4-6.

 $<sup>^{11}</sup>$  Dannreuther , R. and Peterson , J.(eds). Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations . London: Routledge, 2006.

power of Political Diplomacy over other forms of diplomacy has often played out. This power has manifested itself in form of the potential that Political negotiations have had in managing protracted conflicts, negotiating new trade partnerships, and establishing appropriate policies to enhance cooperation. <sup>12</sup>It is against this background that this study seeks to investigate why the powerful hand of Political Diplomacy is not being sufficiently utilized to provide a solution to the unending setbacks that Africa has been grappling with in the process of Regional Integration.

### 1.3 Research Questions

- i. What have been the main challenges of Regional Integration in the East African Community?
- ii. What has been the role and impact of Political Diplomacy in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the East African Community?
- iii. What have been the setbacks of using Political Diplomacy to address the challenges of Integration in the East African Community?

#### 1.4 Research Objectives

### 1.4.1 General Objective

i. "To investigate and assess how the use of Political Diplomacy can be enhanced in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in Africa."

<sup>12</sup> Ziwira E. "Exploring the Use of Power in Negotiataion." *The Herald* (2016)

### 1.4.2 Specific Objectives

- To investigate and analyze the main challenges of Regional Integration in the East African Community.
- ii. To identify and assess the role and impact of Political Diplomacy in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the East African Community.
- iii. To examine and assess the setbacks of using Political Diplomacy in addressing the challenges of Integration in the East African Community.

### 1.5 Literature Review and Research Gaps

#### 1.5.1 Introduction

In addition to elaborating the concepts of Regional Integration and Diplomacy, the Literature Review in this research focuses on Regional Integration in Africa and the Diplomacy of Regional Integration. This is with an effort to establish other scholars' perspectives on the role of political diplomacy in regional integration. The section also provides a special focus on East Africa's political negotiations in diplomatic relations in Regional Integration looking at trade, industry, investment, labor, education and training issues.

#### 1.5.2 What is Regional Integration?

Regional integration is premised on the assumption that the coming together of nations to attain a common goal though cooperation has more benefits to be attained. There is no agreed definition of the term Regional Integration and neither is there an agreement on its substantive context or form and in the same breath, the ideological perspectives which inform Regional Integration also differ. This lack of clarity on the guiding principles/ideologies on

Integration and how to articulate it could be contributing factor to the general slow and poor performance of some of the Regional Integration Arrangements which exist on the globe.

Regionalism in general is a policy which is intended for the reduction of trade barriers between or among countries, whether or not these countries are within the same geographical location. An interesting feature of international economic integration however is that most of the RECs involve countries which are geographically close to each other. The main exceptions from this categorization include (APEC), The group of Three (Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela). There are also various pluraliteral Free Trade Areas such as Mexico with Chile and South Africa with the European Union. Bilateral FTAs also exist and they include that between Canada and Chile, Mexico and Chile and Israeli and the United States of America. Mambara defines Regional Integration as the formation of close economic linkages among geographically close countries mostly by forming Preferential Trade Agreements.

#### 1.5.3 Neo-Functionalism

This theory of Regional Integration is associated with scholars such as Ernst Haas. It is a Break away theory from the theory of Functionalism where Functionalism puts more emphasis on the role of the state as the main actor in the process of Integration. Neo-Functionalism gives special attention to the role of Non –State Actors such as Interest Groups and the private sector in the Integration process . Following a comparison of the two related theories, neo- Functionalism is more appropriate in relation to the current EAC model where cooperation enjoys the support of the private sector. The existence of various Public Private Partnership Agreements is an attestment to this.

Neo-Functional Proponents are concerned about how and why states cease to be exclusively sovereign and why they voluntarily decide to merge and interact with their neighbors with an effort to find finding better and mutual ways of conflict resolution and in the long run they end up losing some attributes of sovereignty. The wider assumption of neo-functionalists is that; with economic cooperation ie increased economic activity among states, there will be an automatic generation of a spill over which will eventually lead to Political Integration. These two processes are likely to be accelerated by the creation of supranational structures (Regional Institutions).

Ernest Hass' assumption was that once the pressures for further integration begin to be felt after the launch of integration efforts, in a certain region, social and economic groups would definitely demand for additional economic integration. The Neo- Functionalist school has proposes four analytical variables which are crucial to the understanding of Regional Integration; Actors, Motives, Process and Context.

#### 1.5.3.1 Actors

Neo- Functionalists believe that the primary actors of integration are above and below the state. Those below the state include interest groups and Political Parties while those above the state are the supranational Institutions. These regional Supranational Institutions are capable of fostering further integration by promoting the development of interest groups and nurturing closer ties with them and their fellow technocrats in national structures. In the EAC, for instance, the private sector contributes atleast 80% to the economy of the region by way of wealth creation, production of goods and services as well as poverty reduction. Therefore, there is a need, within the requirements of the establishment of the community, to

have a framework for a continued structured dialogue between the East African Community, the Private Sector and other members of the civil society

#### **1.5.3.2 Motives**

This variable is about the process of Community formation, ideally dominated by nationally constituted groups with very specific goals with the willingness and the ability to turn to supranational means when in deems fit .

#### **1.5.3.3 Process**

This third variable involve functional Spill-Over. The upgrading of common interest according to Burley and Mattli, is the third element in the dynamics of Regional Integration. This occurs when the partner states begin to experience significant difficulties in arriving at a common policy in order to safeguard other aspects of interdependence among them. The nation states therefore take up joint efforts, sector by sector to upgrade their mutual interests. For example, the EAC negotiating structures include the National Development and Trade Policy Forum at the national level with representatives of Public and Private sector organizations within the trade sector. The mandate of the body is to prepare negotiating positions on all aspects of EPA negotiations.

#### 1.5.4 Intergovernmentalism

The theory of intergovernmentalism is associated with scholars such as XY. It conceptualizes the process of integration as that of a negotiation or bargaining between heads of governments of the states in a particular region. Ideally, it is the interest of the larger states to drive integration and in the process of integration, smaller states may end up being bought off

by the larger ones. Theorists of intergovernmentalism see small states as the believers of regional institutions. They see these institutions as their strategy to deal with the expansive and more complex issues which are an outcome of the process of integration.

These two theories are relevant to this study because in the EA the power of decision making rets with the main representatives of the state. These are the Council of Ministers as opposed to the members of the secretariat, regional legislators and members of the judiciary constituted by the judges of the East African Court of Justice. Therefore, this amounts to government to government relations as opposed to supranationalism. The current model of the EAC is more of intergovernmental in practice and remains Neo-Functional in theory since the individual partner states have a say at every level of decision making.

#### 1.5.5 Regional Integration in Africa

In Africa, the champion of R.I was the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) which, for the purposes of economic development, the proposed the division of the continent into regions. <sup>13</sup>The initial wave of R.I in post colonial Africa was rooted in the spirit of pan-Africanism whose vision was the creation of a politically unified Africa. This found its expression in the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It was established in 1963 at the height of decolonization in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia .

R.I Was and still is core to many economists, politicians and business people because it promised to increase the wealth and well-being of a number of countries at a rate greater than just the sums of the development of the participating countries' economies. History indicates

<sup>13</sup> Reikojournals.org: "Issues in Diplomacy and Regional Integration for Sustainable Development in Africa."

that such hopes often led to disappointment in Africa since the European approach to integration only succeeded culminated into the existence of the European Union, and has fulfilled its expectations. On the contrary, the African continent, despite the fact that it houses a large number of regional R.I Arrangements is failing.<sup>14</sup> This perceived failure could generally be attributed to: Political Instability; escalation of wars across national borders; Insecurity; Endemic corruption; Lack of harmonization of macro policies; Inter and Intraethnic conflicts among others.

Other Arrangements of R.I (often referred to as Regional Economic Communities; RECs or Regional Integration Agreements RIAs) were the East African Community (EAC) from 1967-1977, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), (COMESA) since 1975 and Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), which was established in 1982 under strong support of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) from 1980-1992. <sup>15</sup> Pan-Africanism, despite its illusiveness in practical politics, remains to the present day an important part of the identity of the African elites and an engine for continuous attempts to unite Africa. In 2002, the OAU was transformed into the African Union (AU)<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Ronge, Eric (2000) 'Trade within the COMESA and Between The East African Community and the European Union' the Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis (KIPPRA), Memo

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Alot, M. (2008). Communications and Marketing Strategy for the East African community/Federation. Head Information and Public Relations, East African Community.
Asante, S K B 1997. Regionalism and Africa's development. London: Macmillan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>East African Community Industrialization Policy 2012–2032 (2010), Structural Transformation of the Manufacturing Sector Through High Value Addition and Product Diversification Based On Comparative And Competitive Advantages of the Region

### 1.5.6 Regional Integration in the EAC

The first East African Community (EAC1), comprised of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya, and traces its roots in the 20th century. Britain, the colonial power, established a customs union which comprised of the three states which shared a common currency, and an institution for the management of shared resources and services in sectors of rail, road and air transport.<sup>17</sup> Due to perceived disparities in the distribution of the gains and losses of integration, the common bonds that were earlier established became loose. As Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were heading towards independence in the early 1960s, these suspicions kept growing.

In 1967, there was a major step in an attempt to reconcile these differences; a treaty was signed establishing the East African Community. Unfortunately, the ideologies of Kenya and Tanzania proved to be constantly clashing and there was high political tension between Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya was perceived as the greatest beneficiary. Beginning from 1971, the speed of the break up gathered. In 1977, the Community Treaty was formally terminated. Owing to this, the shared services and common institutions were also terminated. The momentum towards break up gathered speed starting in 1971, and the Community Treaty was formally terminated in 1977. Most of the joint organs and common services were dismantled.

However, in 1993, the three countries launched a process that led to the reconstitution of the secretariat. This led to the signing of a new treaty, re- establishing the East African Community (EAC2) which came into force in July 2000. There were provisions for the formation of a customs Union which was to be followed by a common market. The Customs

<sup>17</sup> Dinka.T and Walter Kennes. Africa's Regional Integration Arrangemets; History and Challenges. 2007.

Union became operational in 2005.Burundi and Rwanda were accepted as EAC2 members in 2007.Overally, the EAC seems to have been re-established on much better footing. Currently, the EAC is comprised of 6 Partner States: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda and South Sudan. Its headquarters are in Arusha, Tanzania.

### 1.5.7 What is Diplomacy?

The concept of diplomacy developed in the early medieval times with simple structures as sending messengers to negotiate in other states. This later developed to countries having embassies in other countries. Diplomacy is the conduct through representation organs and by peaceful means of the external relations of a given subject of international law.<sup>18</sup>It is a powerful political activity whose main purpose is to enable states achieve the objectives in their foreign policies through negotiation.<sup>19</sup>Different scholars have defined the term 'diplomacy' in various ways but there is a general agreement that diplomacy is a way or means of dialogue or negotiation which states us to conduct their relations within the international system, which could be political, cultural or economic in nature. Nicolson also sees diplomacy as a means of peace where two parties have come to a deadlock.<sup>20</sup> Therefore diplomacy is employed in situations where states or non-state actors are in disagreement. This is clearly indicated in Chapter 6 of the United Nations Charter on Peaceful means to solve disputes. Article 33.1 states that "the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall first of all seek a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Barston, R.P. *Modern Diplomacy*. London: Pearson Longman, 2006.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Berridge, G.R. *Diplomacy* (2nd Ed.). London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Nicolson, H. *Diplomacy*. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.

solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

#### 1.5.8 Origins of Diplomacy

The acts of diplomacy began in the very early times with Italian Peninsula in the late fifteenth century, spreading through Italy, France, Egypt, and America and later throughout the world. The first fully functional diplomatic method was developed by the French systems which went through modification with time to develop the current world diplomatic system. To sum it up two significant developments can be drawn from the whole process of evolution of diplomacy; one is that diplomacy has been changing with the changing nature of the global system.<sup>21</sup> It has also changed with the global increase of population. This has led to different needs of different states hence making diplomacy even more complicated. The state is being overtaken by private and humanitarian organizations and has ceased to be a main actor in international relations. This is because of the weak state structures in a world with large numbers of private organizations. Thus diplomacy is moving from bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to poly lateral diplomacy of private organizations and the state working together.

#### 1.5.9 Trends in Diplomacy

Poly lateralism emerged in Post-Cold War diplomacy whereby transnational actors and forces conduct international affairs; and the growth of a greater interaction between the state and non-state actions. Relationships in today's international relations range from international organizations, multinational corporations, special economic zones and even prominent

<sup>21</sup> Barston, R.P. *Modern Diplomacy*. London: Pearson Longman, 2006.

individuals. This new dimension calls for the need of corporation among the actors in their quest for global interests. The Post-Cold War era was characterized by four key factors: First, the rise of non-state actors, then the deregulating of international environment followed by a shift from inter-state to internal forms of conflict then lastly the impact of new information and communication technologies.

This has seen diplomacy taking a totally different direction with time, from first track and second track diplomacy to multi layered and poly lateral layered diplomacy thus the birth of other forms of diplomacy. With respect to regional integration, Economic diplomacy matters because scholars of regional integration agree that the process begins with economic integration as it advances to other forms of integration.

#### 1.5.9.1 Economic Diplomacy

Economic diplomacy developed in early 1400 BC in Egypt as countries traded products with each other, in those days Egypt was trading with West Asia .<sup>22</sup> Trade was the major reason for interstate interactions and this provided a platform for the development of economic diplomacy. In those days, there were external exchanges of products with each other with documentary records as signed agreements. The Amarna Archives of Egypt are evidence of trade relations between Egypt and Asia . More evidence of exchanges of the early people is the Silk Routes of India-China and China-Europe that indicate that people were involved in

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Cohen & Westbrook. *Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations*. (Amarna: JHU Press, 2000)p35.

exchange of goods, religious artifacts and manuscripts.<sup>23</sup> Finally, trade was the major driving force of explorers like Vasco Da Gama and Christopher Colombus.<sup>24</sup>

Economic diplomacy is the diplomacy that is used to acquire goals through trade and commerce. It focuses on trade relations as opposed to political or cultural relations. States send out economic diplomats to focus on economic matters in receiving countries and to realize their countries' economic goals through engaging in trade relations. In this case the states are not the only actors in this form of diplomacy as it involves non-state actors like NGO's, MNCs and Trade organizations. These diplomats are tasked with ways of promoting trade and investments in their country. Bayne & Woolcock define economic diplomacy as a decision making and negotiation process in international economic relations. It is carried out by various actors all geared towards economic development. In earlier diplomatic practice, ministries of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Finance conducted economic diplomacy but in recent time other institutions are also involved including and not limited to Multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and sub-central government departments. With the changing global patterns, economic and trade related issues have become important hence the growing nature of economic diplomacy. In today's multi polar world system the state has ceased being the core actor in international relations hence the need for more parties involved in trade negotiations. According to Rana, economic diplomacy is the process through which countries tackle the outside world to maximize national prosperity in all fields of activity which include trade, investment and economic exchanges. The foundations of economic diplomacy lie deeply in globalization. Globalization has greatly improved

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Rana, K.S., Charterjee B. *Economic Diplomacy*. Mumbai: CUTS International, 2011.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Ibid.

relationships among states especially economically and these economic relations are carried out using economic diplomacy. Rana continues to state that the main factors that lead to a successful economic diplomacy is that; it should involve all the business units of the country as opposed to only the ministry of foreign affairs. This is to mean that non-state actions should be actively involved.

Secondly, successful economic diplomacy depends on the structures of foreign affairs and external economic management. This will ensure that the external economic work is handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also ensures that countries engage easier in bilateral economic issues especially with World Trade Organization. It is also a better way for states to exploit their foreign trade and investments through development of a diplomatic network

Thirdly, successful economic diplomacy leads to promotion of export services and foreign investments. Economic diplomacy will enable a state market its internal enterprises to the foreign markets, carry out market studies and help traders participate in international trade fairs in anticipation of marketing their products. By this a country gains Foreign Direct Investments by attracting foreign investors to invest in the countries. Fourth, successful economic diplomacy should involve countries networking through their embassies and consulates with the support of ministries of Foreign Affairs and that of Trade. Rana, & Chatterjee have categorized economic diplomacy into three phases; the first being the economic salesmanship which involves building new economic connections, second phase is the economic networking and advocacy phase, that involves coordination with other entities which deal with international economic issues and the final phase is the regulatory

management and resource mobilization phase, which includes the negotiation process and requires high competency in order to advance economic interests. <sup>25</sup>

#### 1.6 Gaps in Literature Review

- i. From the literature reviewed under this topic, there is lack of a theory that sufficiently explains the role of the political elite in the process of Regional Integration. Many of those that exist agree that state representatives (political elites) but they play a minor role. Much focus is on the institutions created by the states out of the integration process.
- ii. There is insufficient academic research on the role that political Diplomacy plays in the efforts of African integration.

#### 1.7 Justification of the Study

This study hopes to contribute to efforts of various stakeholders including, policy makers and other practitioners in the field of academia. It seeks to enrich their knowledge base from the findings and recommendations of this study, leading to an in-depth understanding of the role of political diplomacy in Regional Integration.

### 1.7.1 Policy Justification

This research seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on the influence that political diplomacy has on policies in the process of regional integration. It also seeks to proffer various strategies to employ with regards to the best way of advancing political

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Rana, K.S., Charterjee B. *Economic Diplomacy*. Mumbai: CUTS International, 2011.

diplomacy without other countries appearing as being domineering than others in quest to enhancing regional integration.

Flexibility, which has always been the trademark of diplomacy, provides the hope that political diplomacy will not only benefit the political elite but will be of benefit to states and other new actors on the international scene, in their efforts to create a better world for the twenty-first century.

#### 1.7.2 Academic Justification

Academically, scholars can use the findings of this research to build on their knowledge of the role that political diplomacy plays in the process of regional integration. It can also be used as reference document for scholars of Diplomacy and International Relations.

#### 1.8 Theoretical Framework

#### 1.8.1 Introduction

Different theories of International Relations have been formulated by various scholars and they have been used as the basis of explanation of academic studies. This research uses an eclectic approach where two related theories; Neo- functionalism and Intergovernmentalism will be used as analytical tools.

#### 1.8.2 Neo-Functionalism

This theory is associated with the works of Ernst B. Haas, Leon LindBerg and Jean Monnet among others. It is an integration theory that views Regional Integration as a process where states remove all barriers to free trade. Neo- functionalism reformulates the functionalist principles in the context of regional institutions. According to functionalists, Regional

Integration is an unpreventable result of development which imposes more functions to the state and makes them cooperate with international functional institutions. The end result of the process is the creation of a separate institutional organization performing the functions of the state.

However, from the perspective of neo functionalists, the created institutions will drive the integration process further. In the end, neo-functionalists see everything being shifted to the center as the result of a new political community.26They envision that the importance of nationalism and that of the nation state will decline due to the creation of a central supranational state. The thinkers of this school present three mechanisms which are viewed as the driving force of the integration process; positive spill –over, transfer of domestic alliances and technocratic automaticity.<sup>27</sup>

#### 1.8.3 Intergovernmentalism

This is a criticism of the neo-functionalist approach to Regional Integration and is associated with scholars such as Michelle Cini, Wierer Diez and Perez -Solorzano Borrogan. It criticizes Neo-Functionalism for ignoring the continued dominance of the nation state and national interests and argue that the state still plays an important role in external policies. There is also criticism over spill over from economical to political integration, citing that there is too much focus on the internal dynamics of integration. <sup>28</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Haas, B.E. Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organisation. New York: PinterPub, 1964.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Wallace, H., Pollack, M. and Young, A. R. (eds.). *Policy-Making in the European Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Cini, M. and Perez-Solorzano Borrogan, N. (eds.) European Union Politics. Oxford :Oxford University Press, 2004.

#### 1.8.4 Relevance of theories to this study

With respect to this study, the relationship between neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism is; Neo-Functionalism represents Regional Integration and the positives of the process while intergovernmentalism alludes that there could be negative impacts of the spill over process which can be interpreted as the challenges that of the process of Regional Integration. Intergovernmentalism stresses the fact that the political elites, who are representatives of the state have an overarching role to play in the process of integration. Therefore, the negatives of integration can be corrected by more involvement of the political elites through government to government negotiations ie Political Diplomacy.

#### 1.9 Hypotheses

This study is informed by the following key research hypotheses:

- i. The key challenges of Integration in the East African Community are undermining the entire Integration process of the region.
- ii. Political Diplomacy has the potential to effectively address the challenges of Regional Integration in the East African Community.
- iii. Political Diplomacy has not effectively addressed the challenges of Regional Integration in the East African Community.

#### 1.10 Research Methodology

#### 1.10.1 Research Design

This study seeks to use both primary and secondary sources of data. Secondary sources will include books, Newspaper articles, various strategic reports, peer reviewed journals, relevant protocols and treaties. The primary sources intended for the study will include personal

interviews as well as responses from questionnaires. The research also hopes to use a mixed method approach where both qualitative and quantitative data will be collected to substantiate the study.

#### 1.10.2 Target Population

The target population for this study is Regional Integration experts most of whom are senior technical officers in the Kenyan Ministry of the East African Community, Labor and Social Services.

## 1.10.3 Population Sample

Purposive sampling will be used to select the sample of the population that will be used to assist in collecting first hand data for the purpose of this research. The size of the sample will be 10 respondents from various departments of the EAC ministry as well as other Integration and Diplomacy experts from the region.

#### 1.10.4 Data Collection Tools

The researcher seeks to incorporate the use of two data collection tools specifically designed to collect relevant data for this study. A questionnaire will be sent to the respondents via email while an interview guide will be used to conduct personal interviews either face to face or via phone call .

#### 1.10.5 Data Presentation and Analysis

The data collected from the field will be analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative methods of data analysis. Quantitative data will be analyzed using the Statistical Package for

Social Sciences (SPSS) while qualitative data will be analyzed using content analysis. The analyzed data will be presented by use of pie charts and bar graphs.

#### 1.11 Chapter Outline

#### 1.9.1 Chapter one: Introduction

This chapter seeks to include; Introduction and background of the study, Literature Review and Gaps, Theoretical Framework, research questions, objectives and hypotheses

## 1.9.2 Chapter Two: Key challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC

This chapter seeks to provide an in-depth analysis of the main challenges faced by the process of Regional Integration in the EAC

# 1.9.3 Chapter Three: The role of Political Diplomacy: The principle of variable geometry in the EAC

This chapter hopes to assess the impact of political diplomacy on its effort to address the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC.

# 1.9.4 Chapter Four: Setbacks of Political Diplomacy: The challenges of using variable geometry to alleviate the problems of the EAC

Chapter four seeks to decipher why Political Diplomatic Strategies have not been successful so far in addressing the challenges of Regional Integration within the EAC.

#### 1.9.5 Chapter Five: Data presentation and analysis

#### 1.9.6 Chapter Six: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations.



#### **CHAPTER TWO**

#### KEY CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE EAC

#### 2.1 Introduction

Despite being relatively successful in policy implementation compared to other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in Sub Saharan Africa, the integration process in the EAC has accomplished less than what has been anticipated.<sup>29</sup> An observable proof of this is the failure of living up to the timelines set to realize the pillars of the regional body. Although the Customs Union and the Common Market Protocols have already been signed and ratified, the full benefits of these two pillars are yet to be felt across the partner states. The foundation of the Monetary Union and the Political Federation is still struggling to find a solid ground. This underachievement and sluggish implementation of policies is attributed to the challenges of various natures that affect the integration process. However, there are outstanding issues which cut across these challenges and therefore pose as the main factors impeding integration efforts in the region. <sup>30</sup>They include; Lack of Political goodwill and the principle of Sovereignty as well as the overlapping membership of partner states to various Regional Economic Communities.

#### 2.2 The Principle of Sovereignty and Lack of Political goodwill

Good will is the friendliness or helpfulness that a person or group of people can give towards a certain course of action. Political goodwill therefore is the responsiveness of the political elites around particular issues. Within the EAC, Political goodwill has only been

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> AfDB. African Development Report 2014. Regional Integration for Inclusive Growth: 2014.

<sup>30</sup> Cirera, X. Regional Integration in EAC Countries: Lessons and the Way Forward. Trademark East Africa;
2013 .

witnessed in fragments and not as a continuous baseline from which support for the course of integration may be drawn from. When this happens, the protocols and other regional agreements that are signed by the heads of the EAC partner states remain as political declarations and nothing more. <sup>31</sup>For instance, the "Free Education Area" Policy recommendation was signed in 2005 but it has only been approved for implementation during the 17th Summit in May 2017. Without political goodwill, the implementation phase of policies and agreements is undermined, therefore slowing down the process of integration. <sup>32</sup>

**Table 1: EAC Scorecard 2014: Main Liberalisation Restrictions** 

Trade in Goods				Trade in Services	Movement of Capital
	Tariff	Reported NTBs	C E T Exemptions		
Burundi	10%	3	29	9	16
Kenya	15%	16	41	16	3
Rwanda	9%	5	56	11	5
Tanzania	34%	18	11	17	16
Uganda	28%	9	35	10	5
EAC		51		63	

Source: Adapted from the EAC Secretariat, 2014.33

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Mattli, W.; The *Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Cirera, X.; Regional Integration in EAC Countries: Lessons and the Way Forward. Trademark East Africa, 2013

<sup>33</sup> Percentage shows trends towards non-compliance in elimination of tariffs and equivalent measures within EAC: a higher percentage indicates higher worse score, 2008-2013; 2) Number of reported non-tariff barriers (NTBs), 2008-2013; 3) Numbers of granted requests for temporary exemptions (stays) of application of the Common External Tariff (CET), 2011-2013; 4) Number of measures inconsistent to commitments to liberalise services trade within EAC, out of over 500 sectoral laws reviewed; 5) Number of capital operations that are restricted, out of the 20 operations covered by the EAC Common Market Protocol (as at January 2014) .

In essence, state sovereignty creates institutionalization weaknesses which affect the delivery of most of the promises of Regional Integration. This leaves the EAC with many formal rules which have not been institutionalized, undermining the ability of the EAC to shape its Policy agenda. Examples of weak institutionalization areas within the EAC include:

- I. The Budgeting Processes and rules of EAC financing
- II. Formal rules of power relations among partner states

#### 2.3 Budgeting Processes rules of Financing

The oversight functions of the budget processes of the EAC are very weak. <sup>34</sup>This alarm has been raised by the General Purpose Committee and EALA whose recommendations to amend budgets rarely bear fruit. <sup>35</sup> This is attributed to the fact that these two bodies lack the independence that they require to achieve their goals. In comparison to the council, has considerable powers over the terms of service of the assembly and can take disciplinary actions against the members of the assembly. For instance, recommendations for allocations of the social sectors (2013,a) have not been implemented. The only budgetary recommendation that was approved over the past few years was in (2013/14) allowing EALA to hold more sessions. <sup>36</sup>Weak institutions within the budget process is an indication of a larger problem within the EAC where partner states strategically decline to show goodwill to certain integration projects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> Afrobarometer; *Status of the Economy, Constitutional Implementation, and the East African Community.* www.afrobarometer.org (29 June 2017)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> EALA. 2013a. *Report of the Committee on Revenue and Expenditure*. Arusha: East African Legislative Assembly,2013

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> EALA. 2013b. Strategic Plan 2013-2018. Arusha: East African Legislative Assembly, 2013

#### 2.4 | Power Relations among member states

Formally, power in the EAC should be distributed between the Summit, Council and EALA. In practice, however authority is vested in the Council and the Summit composed of national politicians, rather than the member state representatives found in the EALA. More specifically, the Council uses technicalities and informal practices to maximize its influence and constrain the legislative arm. An example of such a technicality is the practice of including implementation plans in Protocols, over-ruling the EALA's role for developing such plans by the council of ministers. The Council is constituted by a Minister from each member state with the power to pass Protocols which translate the general principles of the Treaty into specific policies. These principles are considered part of the Treaty and are therefore legally binding to partner states. Protocols are to be supplemented by implementation plans in the form of Acts which are to be voted on by the EALA. In contrast the Council gradually bypasses this by including prolonged Annexes in Protocols which lay out implementation plans for the policies in partner states.


In short, weak institutions within the budget process is indicative of a wider trend where formal systems and rules are overridden to ensure member states avoid relinquishing significant amounts of power to the EAC. Member states are not in agreement over proposed institutional arrangements which would provide more capacity but require member states to cede authority to the EAC. While it is clear that the EAC organs have low levels of institutional capacity, there is a lack of consensus on the structure and form that increased institutional capacity should take. In 2011 the Council of Ministers directed the Secretariat to commission an institutional review given the Secretariat's increased mandate since the Permanent Tripartite Commission was established in 1993. However, several years on the

review is not complete due to changing policy positions and a lack of member state agreement on the recommended institutional arrangements. East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) member has stated that key staffing positions remain vacant awaiting completion of the review, hindering Secretariat capacity even further It has been reported that the proposed institutional structures include a full-fledged department within the Secretariat for the Common Market Protocol, transferring the existing responsibility from the Planning Department . However, the most contentious institutional update is reported to be the replacement of the Secretariat with a more powerful Commission, which would have the power to enforce decisions over member states, overturning the current interstate dominance in decision-making. Proposals for the Commission would reportedly include the transfer of ministers in charge of EAC affairs from their respective member states to reside in Arusha to expedite decision making. It appears that member states have not committed to a clear position on the proposal to replace the Secretariat with a Commission. It would appear unlikely that member states would cede such large amounts of authority to the EAC, or commit substantially increased funding to the EAC .

#### 2.5 Overlapping membership to RECS

East African states are at the centre of an overlapping web of regional blocs and trade arrangements including membership in IGAD, COMESA, SADC and ECCAS and sets of bilateral and multi-lateral trade agreements with foreign states/RECs. EAC states hence face competing commitments and disjointed sets of rules and standards to comply with.

Figure 2.1: Overlapping membership to RECS



Source: AfDB 2010

There are also some significant differences between the political agendas of member states that relate to economic policy. This results in tensions and additional coordination costs for implementing regional policies and fragmented policy environments.<sup>37</sup> The effects of multiple REC membership are most prevalent in trade policy and barriers to the implementation of the common market.<sup>38</sup> Efforts to implement a common external tariff have suffered from a patchwork of exemptions, some of which due to that EAC member states belong to different FTAs. In particular, all EAC partners are members of COMESA, except

Muluvi A. and P. Odhiambo; East African Partner States Pulling in Different Directions: What Are the Implications for the East African Community ? "Africa in Focus". Brooking, 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Sandrey, R; *Intra-REC Trade and Overlapping Membership: Review of COMESA, EAC and SADC.* Tralac Working Paper S15WP11/2015 .

Tanzania that is a member of SADC. So, the EAC CET makes explicit exemptions to accommodate for these differences. In addition, Burundi is also a member of ECCAS, for which no formal exemption are recognised in the EAC Customs Union Protocol and related regulations, but which de facto derogate to the EAC CET when trading with its ECCAS partners. In terms of trade values, the trade flows thus derogating from EAC CET represents between 7% and 13.5% of the respecting external trade of EAC member states (EAC Secretariat, 2014c). This is a major systemic problem which both limits and complicates the implementation of the EAC integration. COMESA is also in the process of implementing its own customs union, and while the COMESA CET is in principle harmonised with EAC CET, discrepancies will remain, as long as Tanzania does not join COMESA and exclusion and exemptions differ. Since SADC also plans to become a custom union, the issue of coherence and harmonization of the different trade regimes will remain high.

The Tripartite FTA process, involving COMESA, EAC and SADC should in principle facilitate the alignment and compatibility of overlapping trade regimes, even more so if the Tripartite FTA turns into a Tripartite CU, as foreseen. But there is still a long way to go. This will also not address the issue of Burundi's membership to ECCAS. Besides, the EAC CU also allows for member states to request exemptions (temporary stays of application of the CET), although they arguably cover a small percentage of trade of the respective EAC countries (between 1% and 3.6% according to the Secretariat, 2014 report. The merit of exclusions and exemptions is that they allow accommodating for domestic political and economic interests which otherwise could have worked against or even prevented the pursuit of EAC integration process. But in doing so, they also reduce the coherence and integrity of that integration and further complicate its implementation. Overlapping memberships may

also limit the ability of the EAC to act as a fully coherent collective actor in the international arena. In the case of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU, for instance, Tanzania initially negotiated with a sub-group of SADC countries, before finally joining the group comprising all other EAC members. <sup>39</sup>

#### 2.6 Conclusion

From an interview with one of the directors at the Ministry of EAC in Kenya, the EAC has limited capacity and authority to address and monitor these implementation challenges as a result of its institutional challenges. EAC institutional capacity is low and EAC institutional arrangements have not been updated to take into consideration the increasing scope of the EAC goals. It appears that member states are not in agreement over proposed institutional arrangements that would provide more capacity but also would give the EAC more supranational authority, as well as carrying increased financial obligations. The EAC is and remains strongly an intergovernmental organisation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Bilal, S.; Asymmetric Trade Negotiations for Development: What Does the Experience from the ACPEU Economic Partnership Agreements Tell Us? In Bilal S., P. De Lombaerde and D. Tussie (eds). 2011. Asymmetric Trade Negotiations, The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series, Ashgate. pp.45-88.

#### CHAPTER THREE

# THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF POLITICAL DIPLOMACY: THE PRINCIPLE OF VARIABLE GEOMETRY IN THE EAC

#### 3.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapter, the progress of integration has been slow with certain factors posing the greatest challenge to a seamless integration. In 2013, the birth of the Coalition of the Willing (CoW) introduced a much needed -although controversial- incentive to the region's integration effort. Through the principle of variable geometry, the presidents of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have taken bold steps to demonstrate the significant strides that are possible with political support at the highest ranks. And against the odds, the move to exclude Tanzania and Burundi has brought the EAC closer together .

According to the treaty establishing the EAC , variable geometry is "flexibility which allows for progression in co-operation among a sub-group of members in a larger integration scheme in a variety of areas and at different speeds" Therefore, article 7(1)(e) of the Treaty, the principle of variable geometry allows Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda the rights to pursue cooperation and progress in areas of common interest, as long as it is done within the domain of the overall integration process in the bloc .

#### 3.2 The Tripartite Initiative

The "Coalition of the willing" goes by the official name; the Tripartite Initiative for Fast Tracking the East African Integration. This coalition excluded Burundi and Tanzania which were regarded by their partners as laggards in the integration effort, and held three summits in 2013. The three presidents; Uhuru Kenyatta, Yoweri Museveni and Paul Kagame of Kenya,

Uganda and Rwanda respectively, settled on a number of measures aimed at fast tracking integration efforts in the region. Their initial focus was on joint infrastructure projects and the abolition of Non-Tariff Barriers in the Northern Transport Corridor which covers Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan; an important trade link for landlocked countries in the region. Some of the Achievements of the "Coalition of the Willing" have included:

#### 3.2.1 Infrastructure

The three partner states signed a tripartite agreement for the development and operation of a standard gauge railway (SGR), initiating an infrastructural project with the potential to transform the region. According to this agreement, the SGR is intended to run from the port city of Mombasa through Nairobi to Malaba on to Kampala, Kigali, and Juba. It aims to supplement the present narrow gauge line built by the colonial British which is much slower and only runs from Kenya to Uganda. The first phase of the SGR running from Mombasa to Nairobi was launched on 31st May 2017 and is currently operational. Currently, close to 90 percent of cargo from the port of Mombasa is being transported by road across the region. The SGR is being presented as a necessary alternative to this.

#### 3.2.2 Non-Tariff Barriers

Following the discussions of the three countries, President Kenyatta, ordered for the streamlining of operations at the port of Mombasa which led to the decrease in the time taken for goods to be cleared. Additionally, the Kenyan President ordered that the number of roadblocks on goods in transit to Uganda to be reduced. Consequently, according to an EAC ministers' report from the 5th summit held in May 2014, the time for clearance of goods from Mombasa to Kampala dropped from 18 days to 14 days while that of goods from

Mombasa to Kigali from 21 days to 15 days. The cost of clearing goods was also significantly reduced with a container destined for Kampala costing 1,731 USD while that destined for Kigali costing 3,387 USD. These figures indicate a fall from 3,375 USD and 4,990 USD respectively.

#### 3.2.3 Freedom of movement

In as far as the movement of persons and labor is concerned, Rwanda led the way through abolishing work permit fees for all EAC citizens. Kenya followed suit and at the beginning of 2014, Uganda also abolished work permit fees for Kenyans and Rwandans. For Multinational Corporations running multiple offices in the three countries, cross-border operations will be greatly eased. Also, since February 2014, the citizens of Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda have been able to travel within these three countries with only their national identity cards, where in the past passports were a prerequisite. In June 2014, the East African Visa was launched which is valid for a period of 6 months for residents and non-residents within the 3 countries. The three heads of state also approved the establishment of a single tourist visa for their countries. These developments mark a substantial progresses to traveling for both business and leisure within the region .

#### 3.2.4 ICT

The "Coalition of the Willing announced a plan to establish a single area mobile network by the end of 2014. The single area network has resulted in the elimination of roaming charges in the region. Since August 2014, mobile phone users in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda have been enjoying a 20 per cent reduction in tariffs on cross-border calls. This was followed by the harmonization of taxes on mobile services by the three countries in April 2014, causing a reduction in charges for text messages, and voice and data services. Indications are that

Tanzania and Burundi will be invited to join the single area network. Successful implementation of this initiative will, albeit virtually, connect East Africans better than they have been at any point in history.

#### 3.2.5 Other areas of cooperation

Other significant agreements among the three partners have been on; fast-tracking implementation of the Single Customs Territory (SCT) ahead of their EAC counterparts. They have also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on defence, security and foreign affairs policy a clear foundation of a political federation (now confederation)

#### 3.3 Conclusion

Albeit the backlash from certain spheres, the coalition of the three partner states has improved levels of collaboration among all five member states and introduced exactly the kind of drive that is required for the goals of the EAC to be achieved. The 2016 scorecard launched by the EAC Secretariat, in conjunction with the World Bank, to monitor the implementation of the common market in the five member states still makes for sober reading. The report leaves no doubt as to the colossal task that awaits member states in order to achieve full common market status with initial target having been 2015. The report also highlights the challenge of ensuring that the message of integration and its implications is trickling down to the ordinary citizens. That notwithstanding, the region is already much more unified; a region in which business and personal interactions are becoming a lot easier. Companies with operations in the EAC will, for instance, increasingly draw greater benefits from the efforts being made to facilitate smooth movement of people, capital and goods within the region's boundaries.

#### **CHAPTER FOUR**

# SETBACKS OF POLITICAL DIPLOMACY: CHALLENGES OF USING VARIABLE GEOMETRY TO ALLEVIATE THE PROBLEMS OF EAC INTEGRATION

#### 4.1 Introduction

#### 4.2 Diplomatic tensions among partner states

The emergence of the CoW and exclusion of Tanzania and Burundi was not purely driven by economic interests. This partnership corresponded with a period of tense diplomatic relations in the region. In May 2013, the President of Tanzania Jakaya Kikwete, urged Rwanda to engage in peace talks with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group which Kigali holds responsible for atrocities during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. President Paul Kagame of Rwanda did not take Kikwete's sentiments positively. During that same period, the participation of Tanzania in a UN led intervention force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) also raised diplomatic tensions with Uganda, a country which has always been involved in the politics of Congo. Moreover, in July 2013, President Kikwete expelled 35,000 illegal immigrants from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. On the other hand, Kenya was committed to realigning its foreign policy to focus more on regional relations in the face of International Criminal Court (ICC) charges facing its president and deputy president.

When Tanzania signaled closer ties with Burundi and DRC, the probability of another collapse of the EAC was high. Initially, the actions of the CoW increased tensions: President Kikwete, in November 2013, in a fiery address to his country's parliament, strongly criticized CoW's interventions on issues that he felt were already under the various EAC protocols. He

specified the use of national IDs as a travel document, political federation, single tourist visa and Single Customs Territory. Kikwete strongly stated that discussions on the political federation and single customs territory should have included Tanzania, stating that he was comfortable with CoW fast tracking the rest .

#### 4.3 Exclusion of Burundi and Tanzania

In June of 2013, the presidents of Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda met in Entebbe; Uganda in show of the commitment to fast track the integration process. These three countries held a common belief that overtime, the negotiations of the EAC have been undermined by the fact that Tanzania belongs to SADC while the rest of members belong to COMESA. Tanzania pulled out of COMESA in 2001. Burundi and Tanzania never attended that summit, although Burundi had been invited. As stated earlier, the overriding feeling among the three member countries present was that Burundi and Tanzania have been "dragging their feet" on matters of integration. During the meeting, the three states agreed to fast-track the development of infrastructure in the region and some of the key projects discussed included the construction of an SGR from Mombasa to Kigali, the extension of an oil pipeline from Kenya through Uganda to Rwanda, the construction of a Ugandan oil refinery and an electricity interconnection plan between the three countries, among other initiatives. Also discussed, and a point that created a lot of "heat" was the plan of establishing a political federation .

The second meeting of the heads of state of the CoW was held in August 2013 in Mombasa, Kenya. In this meeting, a ministerial delegation was present to represent the Republic of Burundi. Similar to the initial meeting, Tanzania was not invited at all. During the third meeting which followed in October in Kigali, Rwanda, the absence of the other two

members was felt; Burundi and Tanzania did not attend. During these meetings, the leaders who were present recapped that the summit was an initiative to boost development through infrastructure growth, trade, and political and economic integration in the region .

#### 4.4 General Animosity among partner states

The fact that regional issues, including the establishment of a political federation, easing of restrictions on movement of people, the launch of a single tourist visa, and elimination of work permit fees among residents of the three countries, were discussed without all five EAC members was noticeable. Because of this, the other two countries have expressed concern that they are being sidelined in the discussion of key projects in the region. The then Tanzanian minister for East African Affairs pointed out that the three member countries were contravening Article 7(1) of EAC protocol, which says:

"Even though this Article allows member countries to enter bilateral or trilateral agreements, it is a must that issues under consideration for implementation under this arrangement are fully discussed and agreed upon by all member countries."

With the presence of this general animosity between partner states in the background, several initiatives meant for the full implementation of the integration are likely to be delayed;

- I. The first issue of concern is whether the targets set under the proposed EAMU protocol will be realized in time for the adoption of a single currency in 2023.
- II. The full implementation of a common market protocol, which provides for the free movement of people, services, labor and capital among the countries, has already taken longer than the scheduled date of 2015. Among other key the issues likely to be delayed include: the full adoption of a common visa for regional tourism and an EAC passport; the total elimination of work permits among the member countries; and the elimination of yellow fever certificates required by Tanzania.

III. The emerging divisions are likely to slow the implementation of the remaining phases of the establishment of the custom union. Key among them is the adoption of a Single Customs Territory, the adoption of the EAC Industrialization Policy and Strategy, and the adoption of EAC Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Protocol.

#### 4.5 Emerging Mistrust among partner states

Overally, the emerging mistrust was likely to affect trade among the member countries then and now, which is likely to impact on the economic growth and development in the region, especially bearing in mind that Tanzania is a key export destination for products for products from Uganda and Kenya. Similarly, to Tanzania, the East African Community is its second biggest trading partner after South Africa. In light of the major potential implications this mistrust could have, policymakers in the region should continue seeking a sustainable solution so as to prevent another major split in the EAC .

#### 4.6 Conclusion

Amidst the diplomatic row among some partner states, president Kikwete came out strongly to underlined that his country was in the EAC to stay.<sup>40</sup> Fortunately there was a de-escalation in rising tensions in January 2014 when the CoW summit scheduled to take place in Kampala was cancelled at the last minute. It was later held on 20th February, 2014 with the attendance of Tanzanian Vice President Dr. Mohamed Gharib Bilal and Burundi's Vice President Geravis Rufykiri in addition to CoW heads of state. During the summit, the heads of state resolved to allow Tanzania, Burundi and South Sudan to submit their preferred areas of cooperation by

 $<sup>^{40}</sup>$  Muluvi A. and P. Odhiambo, 2013. East African Partner States Pulling in Different Directions: What Are the Implications for the East African Community? Africa in Focus. Brooking. December .

the next summit.<sup>41</sup> At the 5th CoW Summit in May 2014, Tanzania was represented by Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda with Burundi's Vice President in attendance. Importantly, the two members are currently on board in the implementation of the SCT, though with some steps behind .<sup>42</sup>

#### **CHAPTER FIVE**

#### **DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS**

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the data presentation and analysis which was collected from the target audience. The data was acquired through the use of questionnaires and interview guides which were the main tools for data collection in the study and interviews. The interpretation of the data was on the basis of the research questions and objectives.

#### **5.2 Findings**

The majority of respondents (73%) said that regional integration in East Africa is struggling to achieve its intended objectives. One-hundred percent of respondents said there are politically initiated strategies put in place to address the challenges of integration in the East African Community. However, respondents were split on the nature of these strategies with 55% responding they are economic and 45% responding they are political. One-hundred percent of respondent agreed that these strategies are not effectively addressing the challenges of regional integration in the EAC.

42 Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Ibid.

The most common key challenge noted was diplomatic standoffs. Additionally, 100% percent of respondents did not think the strategies were effectively addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC. All respondents agree that diplomacy is often used in the integration effort of the EAC and all respondents said economic diplomacy is the most popular form of diplomacy used in integration efforts.

Respondents were split on whether they believed that political diplomacy has the potential to effectively address most of the problems of regional integration in the EAC with 64% agreeing and 36% disagreeing. Again, respondent were evenly split (45% yes, 55% no) on whether there has been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC. Sixty-four percent of respondents believe political diplomacy is being well utilized in the EAC and the same respondents agree that political diplomacy has been effective in putting up strategies to alleviate the problems of Regional Integration.


All respondents from the Ministry of EAC and the Center for Regional Integration agreed that political diplomacy has the potential to effectively address most of the problems of Regional Integration in the EAC while all respondent from CUEA disagreed with the statement. Respondents from the Center for Regional Integration had the same responses for all the questions. Respondents from CUEA were evenly split on whether there has been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC.

### 5.3 Response Rate




## **5.4** Regional Integration and its objectives

Figure 5.1: Is Regional Integration in East Africa Struggling to achieve its intended objectives?



A 73% majority of the respondents agreed that regional integration is facing major challenges which hinder the EAC from achieving its intended objectives. One of the directors at the ministry of EAC said that "integration is not at the place where we want it to be. Things are slowly taking shape but we cannot wish a way the fact that there are still major steps which need to be taken."


# 5.5 Political Strategies of addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC Figure 5.2: Are there Politically initiated diplomatic strategies put in place to address the challenges of integration in the East African Community?



All the responded agreed that there have been efforts of employing political diplomatic strategies to help alleviate the problem of integration in the EAC. While all were in agreement about the presence of political diplomacy in the region they were not in consensus with the manner in which political diplomacy is conducted. One of the directors at the centre for regional integration stated that "economic diplomacy is being used more to further political diplomatic efforts in the region." This is as indicated in figure 5.3 below


#### 5.5.1 Nature of strategies

Figure 5.3: Please give a brief description under the relevant nature of the strategies



5.6 Effectiveness of strategies of addressing challenges of Integration

Figure 5.4: Are these strategies effectively addressing the challenges of Regional Integration in the EAC?



All respondents agreed that political strategy put in place have not been effective in addressing the challenges of integration in the region. This means that in as much as there are political diplomatic methods they do not necessarily touch on solving the major problems of regional integration in the EAC. Those that have been employed are seen as methods of furthering new initiatives in the region rather than addressing the problems at hand.

## 5.7 Diplomacy in the efforts of EAC integration




Figure 5.5: Is Diplomacy often used in the integration efforts of the EAC?

All the respondents agreed that diplomacy has often been used in the integration of the efforts of EAC. The region has over time enjoyed fairly peaceful coexistence from the partner states and other countries neighbouring the region. Where problems have emerged or conflicts arisen diplomacy has always been the method by which the problems were addressed.





Figure 5.6: Which form of Diplomacy is the most popular in the EAC integration?

All the respondents agreed that economic diplomacy is more popular in the east African community as compared to other forms of diplomacy such as political diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy. This shows that the economic sector of the region is at the forefront of furthering the efforts of regional integration. On its own however, economic diplomacy lacks the power to address issues which emerge from other sectors such as political, cultural and public sectors.

# 5.9 The Potential of Political Diplomacy in addressing the Problems of Regional Integration in The EAC


Figure 5.7: Does Political Diplomacy have the potential to effectively address most of the problems of Regional Integration in the EAC?



64% majority of the respondents agreed that political diplomacy has the potential to effectively address most of the problems of regional integration in the region. This gives political diplomacy a cross cutting face meaning that it has the power to effectively cut across different divides i.e. political, cultural, economic and social and successfully address the problems of regional integration. On the other hand a 36% minority of the respondents think that other forms of diplomacy especially economic diplomacy, with the necessary political backing is solely able to address the problems of regional integration in a crosscutting manner.

#### 5.10 Goodwill by Political Elites in the EAC


Figure 5.8: Has there been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC?



A 55% majority of the respondents agreed that there has been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC in the journey of attempting to address the problems of regional integration. Most of these respondents were from the government agencies from the ministry of EAC. 45% of the respondents who were not constituted off of government employees thought that there has been no goodwill by political elites in the region whatsoever and that is why the process of integration in the region has been lagging behind.


## **5.11** Use of Political Diplomacy in the EAC

Figure 5.9: Is Political Diplomacy being well utilized in the EAC?



A similar reflection of the previous responses was also seen when the respondents were asked whether political diplomacy was being well utilized in the EAC. A 64% majority most of whom were government employees strongly agreed that political diplomacy has been and continues to be well utilised in addressing the problem of regional integration in the region. A 36% minority disagreed with varying degrees citing that political diplomacy has been and continues to be misused by individual states to further their own selfish national interest.

Figure 5.10: Has Political Diplomacy been effective in putting up strategies to alleviate the problems of Regional Integration?



When they were asked whether political diplomacy has been effective in putting up strategies to alleviate the problems of regional integration, a 64% majority most of whom were government employees strongly agreed that political diplomacy has been and continues to be well utilised in addressing the problem of regional integration in the region. A 36% minority disagreed with varying degrees citing that political diplomacy has been and continues to be misused by individual states to further their own selfish national interest.

#### **CHAPTER SIX**

#### SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## 6.1 Summary of Findings

This research project was intended to establish the role of Political Diplomacy in addressing the challenges of regional integration in the EAC. Upon completion of the research it was proven that Political Diplomacy carries the potential to effectively address the challenges of integration in the region. However, key impediments such as the principle of sovereignty, lack of political goodwill, the rules of financing, power relations and overlapping membership to RECs have a detrimental effect on the use of Political Diplomacy in regional integration.

The principle of variable geometry a product of Political Diplomacy has been a notable effort of enhancing regional integration in the EAC. However, more needs to be done for it to be more effective.

A 73% majority of respondents said that regional integration in East Africa is struggling to achieve its intended objectives. One-hundred percent of respondents said there are politically initiated strategies put in place to address the challenges of integration in the East African Community and they agree that the most notable of them has been the Principle of Variable Geometry. However, One-hundred percent of the respondents agreed that these strategies are not effectively addressing the challenges of regional integration in the EAC.

#### 6.2 Conclusions

The research concluded the following:

I. The principle of Variable Geometry in the EAC as manifested through the Coalition of the Willing is a commendable political diplomatic strategy to fast track integration.

- However, in as much as it has good intentions, it poses as a challenge by isolating some partner states from getting involved in the mainstream cooperation.
- II. With proper support from the political elite, once the economic structures of Common Market, Customs Union and Monetary Union are fully implemented, the ultimate goal of integration; a Political Federation will automatically fall into place.
- III. As the ultimate goal of integration, the legitimacy and the sustainability of the EAC Political Federation is largely dependent on the level of development achieved in the region. A successful political federation means a conducive environment with a strong political will, commitment and the presence of the required regional structures and institutions.
- IV. Even with the efforts of Political Diplomacy within the region , the problem of overlapping membership of partner states to various RECs largely undermines the binding commitments to different policy environments whose objectives and mandates are not always similar

#### **6.3 Recommendations**

The principle of variable geometry in the EAC being displayed under the Coalition of the Willing is a commendable Political Diplomatic Strategy to fast track integration. However, in as much as it has good intentions, it poses as a challenge by isolating some partner states from integrating into the mainstream cooperation. The approach which the coalition of the willing has used to roll out its plans, has been sending signals indicating that there is no room left for Tanzania and Burundi to be accommodated. The more that these states feel resented and isolated, the higher the likelihood of another fragmented EAC. Therefore, it is imperative that the governments of Rwanda, Kenya and Uganda involve Tanzania and Burundi more

openly on future joint projects and discuss their entry points when they are ready to team up with them. Fast tracking the integration process ought not to be seen as a competitive process but a process where some partners go ahead of the others and encourage and support them to follow in that direction.

Although Regional Integration is mostly seen as a political affair, the Private Sector needs to be more involved in a much deeper sense that how it currently is. As a bloc, the East African Community is rich in resources which have the potential to spur its course of economic integration. Most importantly, the presence of oil in South Sudan and the discovery of oil wells in Uganda and Kenya poses as an emergence of a new economic order within the region which is expected to reduce over dependence on Western States for oil and oil products. The Private Sector needs to be given more investment opportunities to promote industrial growth in the region.

There is also a need to make integration in the EAC to be more of a citizen-centered process so as to create a sense of a community comprised of the citizens of all the partner states. This can be improved through the elaboration of the East African Civic Education and Sensitization programs in order to promote a true sense of an East African Identity.

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# **APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE**

# THE ROLE OF POLITICAL DIPLOMACY IN ADDRESSING AFRICA'S CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA: A CASE OF THE EAC

#### **Part 1: GENERAL INFORMATION**

Name				
Organisation				
Designation				
Date				
PART 2: OBJEC	CTIVES			
1. a) Is Regional I	ntegration in Afric	a Struggling to achiev	e its intended objective	es?
No []				
Y	e	S	[	]
b)Explain				
2. a)Are there str	rategies put in pla	ice to address the cha	allenges of integration	in the East
African Communi	ity?			
No[] Yes[]				
h) If was inlance or	ive a brief descript	ion under the relevant	nature of the strategies	2

Economic [ ]					
Social [ ]					
Political [ ]					
		•••••			•••••
c) Are these strates	gies effectively a	ddressing the	challenges of	Regional Integ	ration in the
EAC?					
No [ ]					
Yes [ ]					
Please explain					

3.State any 3 key challenges encountered by these strategies in addressing the challenges o
Regional Integration
4. Is Diplomacy often used in the integration efforts of the EAC?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
5. Which form of Diplomacy is the most popular in the EAC integration? Explain.
Economic Diplomacy [ ]
Public Diplomacy [ ]
Tuone Dipionaey []
Cultural Diplomacy [ ]
Political Diplomacy [ ]

6. Does Political Diplomacy have the potential to effectively address most of the problems of
D : 11 ( ): (1 EACON 1:
Regional Integration in the EAC? Please explain
No
[]
Yes[]
7. Has there been a show of goodwill through negotiations by political elites in the EAC?
Yes [ ]
No [ ]
8. a)Is Political Diplomacy being well utilized in the EAC?
Yes [ ]
No[] b)Please explain
9. Has Political Diplomacy been effective in putting up strategies to alleviate the problems of Regional Integration?

Yes [ ]	
No[] b) Please explain	
10. Give any other relevant comments	