

**POLICE AND POST CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING IN  
KENYA: A CASE STUDY OF MOLO REGION, NAKURU  
COUNTY  
1990-2012**

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**DECLARATION**

I declare that this research is my original work and has not been submitted in any other university or college for any academic award.

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This work has been submitted with my approval as a University supervisor.

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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this project to soldiers who have lost their lives to bullets and I.E.Ds while in service.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I thank the Almighty God for giving me life and bringing me this far. I also wish to appreciate the support given by different people to make this study possible.

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To anyone who played any role during my study, may God bless you.

## **ABSTRACT**

Post conflicts peace building is big challenge facing Africa and the whole world today. It comprises various processes, roles and sequential activities proceeding from cessation of hostilities to economic reconstruction. This study evaluates the role of police in peace building in Kenya and specifically in Molo. It looks at how involving the police, in collaboration with all other stake holders would ensure success of peace building in the region. It includes responses to many agencies of peace building including religious organization, youths, women, civil society, business community, IDPs and police themselves towards police participation in peace building.

Three main objectives guided the study. The first was to identify the various stake holders of peace building in Molo. These were programs, activities and efforts towards peace by the government and other non-state actors. The second objective was to examine why peace building efforts had failed in Molo. The third objective of the study was to assess how involving the police would help ensure success of peace building in the region.

The study tested three main hypotheses. First it was that Peace building efforts in Molo have been ineffective. Second, many stakeholders have attempted to ensure successful peace building in Molo but their efforts have not led to permanent peace. And thirdly, fully involving the police in managing peace in Molo may help reduce recurrence of conflicts and ensure peace building is successful.

The main theory in the study is positive and negative peace theory, by Johan Galtung. Galtung expanded the concept of peace and violence to include indirect or structural violence. According him peace is not merely the absence of violence and war but would include integration, justice and peace by peaceful means. The study thus examined the deep rooted causes of conflicts in Molo which unless resolved will result to the region experiencing negative peace.

The study found out that indeed many stake holders are taking part in peace building in Molo. However, their efforts have not borne much fruits as seen in the recurrent conflicts. The study also found out police participation in peace building was minimal, much of their response were unplanned and reactive. Fully involving the police in peace building in Molo will bear fruits and make peace building successive.

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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

UN – United Nations  
UNDP – United Nations Development Program  
IDP - Internally Displaced Persons  
GOK - Government of Kenya  
PC – Provincial Commissioner  
IED- Improvised Explosive Device  
DC- District Commissioner  
AP –Administration Police  
KP –Kenya Police  
DO- Divisional Officer  
OCS- Officer Commanding Station  
OCPD- Officer Commanding Police Division  
DAPC- District Administration Police Commander  
SDA - Seventh Day Adventists  
IPOA Independent Policing Oversight Authority  
NPS-National Police Service Commission  
IAU-Internal Affairs Unit  
MOD - Ministry of Defense  
KANU-Kenya Africa National Union  
FORD- Forum for Restoration of Democracy  
GBV- Gender Based Violence  
GSU - General Service Unit  
RDU - Rapid Deployment Unit  
PEV-Post Election Violence  
NGO – Non Governmental Organization

## DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Conflict** A term derived from the Latin word ‘confligere’ meaning to be antagonistic, incompatible, contradictory or in opposition. Thus a conflict arises when two or more parties have incompatible goals about something. <sup>1</sup>

**Police;** A civil force granted the legal authority to enforce the law and maintain public order.<sup>2</sup> For the purpose of this project, a policeman/woman is a person appointed to serve either in the Administration Police Service or in the Kenya Police Service;<sup>3</sup>

**Peace;** A set of values, customs and behavior that reject violence and attempts to prevent conflict by addressing all root causes of conflict while promoting peace through dialogue. Peace is not the mere absence of war but includes the presence of justice and social development. <sup>4</sup>

**Peace building;** Local or structural efforts that foster or support social, political and institutional structures and processes which strengthen the prospects for peaceful co-existence to decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, re-occurrence or continuation of violence.<sup>5</sup>

**Active Peace:** Term developed from Gray Cox, a consortium of theorists, who posit that, peace is a part of a triad, which also includes justice and wholeness. The consortium later integrated the terms peacemaking, peace keeping and peace building to fit in to the triad.<sup>6</sup>

**Negative peace;** the term was introduced by Johan Galtung in the 1960s in his research on peace to mean absence of violence or absence of war. It is characterized by absence of violence, pessimistic, curative and peace is not always by peaceful means. Positive peace on the other hand is characterized by structural integration, optimistic, preventive, justice and peace is always by peaceful means.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Mitchel C.R, *The structure of International Conflict* (London:Macmillan,1998),pp.15-25

<sup>2</sup> Jeong Ho-Won, *Peace Building in Post Conflict Societies ; Strategies and Processes : USA* ,Lynne Rienner, 2013

<sup>3</sup> The National Police Service Act, 2011, GOK

<sup>4</sup> Gray Cox, *The Ways of Peace: a Philosophy of Peace as Action*. New York: Paulist Press, 1986.

<sup>5</sup> Jonathan Goodhand, *Aiding Violence or Building Peace? The Role of International Aid* Taylor & Francis, Ltd.UK 2002

<sup>6</sup> Galtung, J: *Peace by Peaceful Means; Peace and Conflict, Development and civilization*, Sage Publication, 1964

<sup>7</sup> ibid

**Peace Making;** Political, diplomatic and sometimes military interventions directed at bringing warring parties to an agreement.<sup>8</sup>

**Peace keeping ;** Normally a third-party intervention (often, but not always done by military forces) to assist parties in transitioning from violent conflict to peace by separating the fighting parties. These peacekeeping operations not only provide security, but also facilitate other non-military initiatives.<sup>9</sup>

**Reconstruction;** Providing and enhancing governance, rule of law, justice and security when conflict and violence have subsided and peace agreements have been implemented. It also entails rebuilding infrastructure, buildings, agriculture, industries, hospitals etc.<sup>10</sup>

**Conflict Early Warning;** The systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crisis for the purpose of anticipating violent conflict, attaching meaning to indicators, formulating best response action and communicating to policy makers for the purpose of decision making and action.<sup>11</sup>

**Internally Displaced Person(s) (IDP)** a person or groups of persons who have been forced to flee from their homes or places of habitual residence as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflicts, generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human made disasters and who have not crossed internationally recognized state borders.<sup>12</sup>

**Community Based Policing,** an approach to policing that recognize voluntary participation of the local community in the maintenance of peace and which recognizes that the police need to be responsive to the communities and their needs. Its key element is joint problem identification and

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<sup>8</sup> Jeong Ho-Won, 2005

<sup>9</sup> *ibid*

<sup>10</sup> Michael Cranna (ed) *The True Cost of Conflict* London, Earthscan Publications Ltd , 1994

<sup>11</sup> Taiser M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews, eds. *Durable Peace: Challenges for Peace Building in Africa*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004.


<sup>12</sup> United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* , New York; United Nations. February 1998. Available at , [http:// www.brookings.edu/project/idp/gp\\_page.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/project/idp/gp_page.aspx) 21<sup>st</sup> February 2013

problem solving, while respecting the different responsibilities the police and the public have in the field of crime prevention and maintaining order;<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Maiese, Michelle. "Peace Building." *Beyond Intractability*. Eds. Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess. Conflict Information Consortium, University of Colorado, Boulder. 2003

# MAP OF THE AREA OF STUDY



©J.M Salee Aug.2008

**Figure 1. Map of the study area**

Source; Ministry of Planning: Rift Valley

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Since independence, Kenya has witnessed ethnic violence that has produced large numbers of victims including hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Perpetrators come from the highest levels of government, international meddlers, politicians and even ordinary people<sup>14</sup>. This violence has sometimes torn apart Kenya's social fabric and generated deep trauma. It also has contributed to economic downturns, hunger, environmental degradation, stresses on health care systems, surges in crime, and growing insecurity. Conflicts in Uganda, Sudan and Somalia have spilled over into Kenya and made arms more readily available in both rural and urban areas. This makes Kenya dangerously divided and some citizens have acquired arms supposedly to defend themselves in case of attack while others have acquired the arms for crime and violence.

After the 2007 national elections, in an attempt to stop future violence, Kenya embarked on a National Dialogue and reconciliation process, which led to a power-sharing arrangement and a national accord.<sup>15</sup> The accord's four key agenda areas provided a road map for necessary short- and longer-term changes to prevent future violence. These proposed changes aimed not only at dealing with immediate humanitarian issues, but also to reduce impunity and promote broader institutional change. In this sense the accord represented a consensus on a national strategy for building peace.

All over the world, the role of the police has been seen as to protect life and property, provide safety and maintain order<sup>16</sup>. Where there is a conflict the police, military and paramilitary are expected to maintain order and ensure calmness after which they are withdrawn. The conflicting parties are left to solve the existing difference on their own. Other relevant institutions like religious organizations and civil society come on board to try to permanently solve the existing difference.

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<sup>14</sup> See Waki Report , "Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) 2008

<sup>15</sup> The full set of the text of the accord and related documents are available at <http://www.dialoguekenya.org/> (accessed march 25, 2012

<sup>16</sup> Kenya Police Act Cap 84 LOK and Administration Police Act Cap 85 LOK( also the National Police Service Act, 2011)



In Kenya, as elsewhere, IDPs have been killed or maimed when they have attempted to return to former homes in areas lacking adequate peace and order. Persistent insecurity linked to mobilized youth, local impunity, and the incompetence of the police and legal system makes resettlement and reintegration of the displaced dangerous. The return of the displaced to their former land challenges those who had occupied them after displacement. This can trigger further violence unless there is careful mediation of property disputes in a reconciliation processes.

This study explored the role of police in ensuring success of peace building. In Molo, as elsewhere, post conflict peace building has tended to ignore the crucial role the police can play to ensure success of peace building. Molo was chosen since it has experienced post-election violence since the introduction of multi-party democracy in Kenya. In particular, the 2007/08 elections led to deaths and displacement of many civilians leading to the question whether previous peace building efforts have been successful in the area.

Molo is located in the Rift Valley North West of Nairobi about 200km from the capital city.<sup>17</sup> The area has experienced substantial displacement of civilian populations as a result of ethnic clashes and election-related violence since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1990s. The highest magnitude of displacement was experienced in association with the December 2007 General Elections.

An assessment done in 2008<sup>18</sup> showed that by September 2007, more than 65,000 people had already been displaced to 22 camps in Molo District, with many more staying with host communities in areas surrounding Molo and elsewhere in the country. The assessment results further showed that, by June 2008 many IDPs had not returned to their farms or houses, but were staying in the transit sites. The population of the IDPs residing in transit sites (where population figures were available) was found to be 37,971, nearly 90% of the 42,277 IDPs reported by the PC's Office to have returned to Molo.

Peace building activities continued from the signing of the national accord. The scale of return and success of integration of the displaced are two of the most tangible indicators of progress of

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<sup>17</sup> See attached map

<sup>18</sup> Red Cross Narrative Report, "Interagency Assessment of Transit Sites; Molo District", 11<sup>th</sup> June 2008

peace building process.<sup>19</sup> Using this criterion, peace building in Molo can be termed to have been unsuccessful. According to the 1998 Red Cross report, among the fraction of IDPs who can be considered returned or settled, many do not have adequate security and livelihoods or access to compensation, restitution, or improved relations with neighbors.<sup>20</sup>

It is therefore very important to bring security providers on board if peace agreements are to be successfully implemented and peace building made effective and efficient. After the 2007 PEV, many peace meetings have been held in Molo. Some have been chaired by senior government officers. Of particular note is the SDA Camp in Molo. The returning IDPs were ‘welcomed’ back to their former homes by the local Kalenjji leaders at the meetings. But they still received vocal threats from members of the host community. The police were notable absentees from the process and this absence complicated the process of resettling the IDPs back into their former homes. Consequently, IDPs lived in great fear of violence, especially in integrated communities. Most of the returnees were either one or two individuals representing households otherwise left behind either in IDP camps or in integrated families due to insecurity. There were insufficient security personnel in the resettlement sites and environs. IDP returnees expressed fears about leaving the sites, unprotected, to tend to their farms or visit markets or health facilities. The absence of security made them prone to attack<sup>21</sup>.

Historical roots of conflicts had to be addressed in order to ensure peace in the Rift Valley and Kenya at large. These hatreds had been there for some time and were related to land and divisions of the past. It required an enormous effort to bring the elders of different communities together to admit that everybody loses when there is conflict<sup>22</sup>. The police should lead this and although it may be a long-term process, it should not be termed impossible. The role of the police in peace building needs to be greatly emphasized since they understand the situation and through their investigations they should know the best solutions.

In Kenya, the urgency accorded to police reform under ‘Agenda Item FOUR’ was reinforced by recommendations made by the Waki Commission of Inquiry into 2007/2008 Post Election

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<sup>19</sup> Jeong Ho-Won

<sup>20</sup> *ibid*

<sup>21</sup> Jacqueline Klopp, “Kenya Unfinished Agendas”, *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Summer Vol.62, No. 2, Washington, 2009, Pg 149

<sup>22</sup> Red Cross Narrative Report, Molo, 2008

Violence (PEV). The Commission, in its report dated 16<sup>th</sup> October 2008, recommended that the government should initiate urgent and comprehensive reform of the Kenya Police and the Administration Police, and that such reforms be undertaken by a panel of policing experts.<sup>23</sup> The overall goal of Police reforms was to transform the Kenya Police and Administration Police Forces into efficient, effective, professional and accountable security agencies that Kenyans could trust. Reforms, in the past had largely focused on operational and administrative aspects such as salaries and equipment but did not target institutional, legal and policy areas that are necessary for transformation of the police. Amongst the mandates of the commission was to review the tooling, logistical and technological capacity of the police. Thereafter it was to recommend changes necessary to sustain modern security management, disaster management, conflicts and early warning/rapid response systems and joint operational preparedness strategy for the police. The reforms aimed to make police service more professional, better prepared and well serviced. If this happened, the police would be better placed to aid in peace building in post conflict communities.

## **1.2 Statement of the Research Problem**

Since the introduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya in the 1990s, Molo District has been prone to, and adversely affected by ethnic clashes. The conflicts among the communities may be attributed to differences in their ethnic backgrounds, colonial land alienation and post-independence re-distribution of land which favored one ethnic community more than others.<sup>24</sup>

Nonetheless, the growing literature on post conflict peace building and internal displacement in Molo fails to emphasize a number of important factors. First, without successful local peace building, resettlement and reintegration of the displaced to their former homes become a potentially dangerous and an unattractive option for IDPs. In addition, extant literature fails to point out who the stakeholders of peace building are and the relationships between such stakeholders. Furthermore, in order to completely settle in to their former homes and integrate with the local communities, IDPs must be assured of their security and future peace.

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<sup>23</sup> See the "Report of the National Task Force on Police Reforms (2009)" Chaired by Philip Ransley

<sup>24</sup> Amisi Bertha, "Conflict in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya: Towards an Early Warning Indicator Identification" in Nnoli O. (ed). *Ethnic Conflict in Africa* .Dakar: CODESRIA Book Series, 1998

Many initiatives have been put into place in Molo to end ethnic conflicts and ensure sustainability of peace. The local communities, provincial administration, the religious organizations, NGOs both local and international and many other institutions have attempted to build permanent peace but with little success. Indeed, according to a Kenya Red Cross report of 2008, Molo District already had approximately 65,000 IDPs (3830 households) before December 2007. In this report, the Red Cross blamed the local police and Provincial Administration for doing little to collect intelligence for organizing an early warning system.<sup>25</sup>

Where police interventions have taken place, positive outcomes have been registered. For example, when violence erupted in January 2008, many police officers were deployed in Molo to restore calm. This, however, was a temporary deployment and by March 2008, they had been withdrawn and gone back to their former stations across the country. The same happened in 2010, after the referendum results were announced. Again as in 2008, most of the police officers who had been deployed in the area to provide security were withdrawn. The local police who were few and lacked important skills to manage post conflict peace building were left to respond to any criminal incidents.

The problem that this study contends with therefore is anchored on the argument that, the role of police during peace management, peace building and reconciliation is paramount, and its exclusion might help us understand what led to the failure of peace building in Molo.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

To guide this research the following research questions were used;

1. Which individuals, organizations and institutions were involved in peace building in Molo in the period under study?
2. What role did the police play in peace management initiatives in the region?
3. How could these roles have been enhanced to help better manage peace in Molo?

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<sup>25</sup> Kenya Red Cross Society, "Displacement in Rift Valley Report" , 2008

## 1.4 Objectives of the study

The research was guided by the following research objectives

1. Identify the various stake holders of peace building in Molo.
2. Examine the reasons why previous peace building efforts failed.
3. Assess the extent of police involvement in peace building in Molo.

## 1.5 Justification of the Study

Despite the growing literature on peace building, there is a noticeable gap. This is a systematic analysis of the stakeholders of peace building and the specific roles each plays to ensure successful peace building. There has been little effort to study security and its impact on peace building. Very few studies have been undertaken to look at the specific roles of police in peace building.

Non-governmental peace building organizations usually focus on sporadic small projects, youth exchanges, and workshops. They rarely tap into the informal or formal networks of local people and institutions. Consequently, little monitoring of conflict and reporting on previous hot spots of violence occur in an institutionalized and continuous manner. Political and military interventions should address tensions not only at the national and international level, but also at the local level – the level of the family, the clan, the village, or the district.<sup>26</sup>

Many researchers have tried to answer the question why lasting peace and security cannot be achieved despite intense peace building efforts in Molo and more generally, why peace builders are often unsuccessful in addressing the local failures of peace processes.

Cranna have argued that, the solution to many conflicts in the world mainly lies in the local mechanisms which are usually neglected at the expense of international peace-keeping<sup>27</sup>. He argues further that, a collaborative process which incorporates all players without excluding even the local ones should be put in place and that there should be efforts to identify the local perpetrators as well as the victims of conflict. The question therefore becomes who identifies the

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<sup>26</sup> Burgess .G and Stephen. F : ‘Durable Peace :Challenges for Peace Building in Africa’ African Studies Review - Volume 48, Number 3, December 2005, pp. 208-211

<sup>27</sup> Michael Cranna (ed) *The True Cost of Conflict* London, Earthscan Publications Ltd , 1994.

local perpetrators and the victims. The police are naturally ideal for this role through investigation and prosecution.

Without a successful local based peace building initiative, the resettlement and reintegration of the displaced to former homes becomes a potentially dangerous and unattractive option<sup>28</sup>. The return can produce more violence if proper peace building mechanisms are not put in place. This can be partly done through a strong and effective presence of police who would ensure security to the returnees.

In Molo, a strong police presence would ensure that IDPs are not killed or maimed when they attempt to return to their former homes. The police would also deal with the persistent insecurity linked to mobilized youth, local impunity, and the failure of the legal system which makes resettlement and reintegration of the displaced dangerous.

Where the return of those displaced to their former homes triggers further violence from those living on the appropriated or vacated land, the police could play a role in identifying those areas and ensure the land is returned to the original owners. Peace building processes would begin with the police being at the center to ensure all parties are safe and secure in the future.

The practical role security agents in Molo played during and after conflict have not been keenly looked at. This research using the case study of Molo aimed at creating a better appreciation of the role the police play to ensure success of peace building after conflict.

### **1.6 Scope and Limitations of the study**

The research covered all the administrative and geographical regions of Molo in Nakuru County. This includes parts of Kuresoi sub -county, Njoro sub-county and Olenguruone. The area was chosen due to the re-current of conflicts since the introduction of multiparty democracy in the 1990s. The study involved an in-depth analysis of the peace building in the region with a focus on police participation. This provided a better understanding of how police would play a direct role to ensure the success of peace building both at the regional and national levels. Peace building efforts since 1992 was studied with the main focus being the December 2007 post-election violence and the ensuing post conflict peace efforts.

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<sup>28</sup> Michael Cranna, 1994

Certain factors negatively affected the results of this research. First, the public perceived the police negatively. This made them biased when reporting on the assistance they received from the police. Most respondents described the police as brutal, corrupt, and uneducated amongst many other negative attributes. Police in Kenya are reportedly most corrupt and are known to demand bribes before offering any lawful service. Civilians who had previously been mishandled by the police or who had at one time given a bribe to the police also viewed the police negatively. The researcher explained to them about the new laws that had attempted to make the police a service which must be public friendly and responsive.

The confidential nature of the police work made members of the service hesitate to give information; junior police officers could only give information after the consent of their seniors. Only gazetted officers are permitted to disclose any information about the police.<sup>29</sup> This limited information obtained. To counter this, the researcher first collected information from station commanders and other senior officers. For the junior officers, the researcher promised them that he would be confidential with any information obtained from them.

Another challenge was the confusion in administrative boundaries. The larger Molo was divided into many sub-counties. These are Molo Central, Kuresoi, Njoro and Olenguruone. The administrative boundaries created confusion to the respondents who had not been clearly oriented on the new boundaries. The researcher worked very closely with the local leaders and provincial administration especially chiefs and assistant chiefs who identified respondents and explained boundaries to them.

## **1.7 Literature Review**

### **1.7.1 Peace Building; meaning and approaches**

The term "peace building" came into widespread use after 1992 when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then United Nations Secretary-General, announced his *Agenda for Peace*<sup>30</sup>. Since then, "peace building" has become a broadly used but often ill-defined term connoting activities that go beyond crisis intervention such as longer-term development, and the building of governance structures and institutions. Peace building should also include building the capacity of non-

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<sup>29</sup> National Police Service Standing orders, GOK, 2013

<sup>30</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* Document. 1992

governmental organizations (including religious institutions) for peacemaking and peace building.

Burgess and Stephen<sup>31</sup> trace the origin of the term to the 1970s work of a Norwegian Sociologist Johan Galtung who first created the term 'peace building' through the promotion of systems that would create sustainable peace. Such systems in their view, needed to address the root causes of conflicts and to support local capacity for peace management and conflict resolutions. Their work emphasized bottom-up approaches that decentralize social and economic structures.

According to them, post conflict peace building takes three dimensions; these are stabilizing the post conflict zone, restoring state institutions and dealing with social economic issues.

It is therefore clear that to end conflict and build post conflict societies; both state and non-state agencies play a very important role. It is thus important to develop clear linkages and coordination amongst all stakeholders. As a critical component of successful peace building, security in former conflict areas should be consolidated with all other measures to control violence. This work emphasizes the importance of integrating security agencies in peace building. Bringing the police on board would ensure sustenance of cease fire among belligerent communities and that all the people uphold the rule of law.

Michael Cranna defines peace building as interventions that are designed to prevent the start or resumption of violent conflict within a nation by creating a sustainable peace.<sup>32</sup> The activities address the root causes or potential causes of violence, create a societal expectation for peaceful conflict resolution and stabilize society politically and socioeconomically. Peace building efforts, he argues, include demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration processes, increasing the role of women, security sector reform, technical assistance for democratic development, or promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation efforts<sup>33</sup>. The writer notes that United Nations effort

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<sup>31</sup> Burgess .G and F. Stephen. 'Durable Peace :Challenges for Peace Building in Africa' African Studies Review - Volume 48, Number 3, December 2005, pp. 208-211

<sup>32</sup> Graham Day, 'Peace keeping: *Challenges of Law and Order in Peace Operations*', presentation given at the US Institute of Peace, Washington DC, 29 March 2001

<sup>33</sup> Michael Cranna (ed) *The True Cost of Conflict* London, Earthscan Publications Ltd , 1994.



towards peace building is usually hampered by troop shortfalls and the unwillingness of the local parties, especially rebels to engage actively in peace implementation.

The writer however does not bring out clearly the role local mechanisms plays following the withdrawal of troops after cessation of hostilities. In Molo, the police have been left out in most peace programs only to react to crime incidents. Their large deployment during 2007/08 General election and 2010 referendum was temporary and most were withdrawn afterwards. The study at hand will investigate the role the police play to ensure enforcement of peace agreements, investigation of criminal cases, prosecution offenders and provision the much needed post conflict security which would discourage renewed fighting.

### **1.7.3 Police and Peace Building**

While looking at the failure of peace building, Graham Day points out that in most if not all war-torn societies, resulting from intra-state conflicts, security agencies are, prior to and/or during the conflict period, politically biased, militarized, corrupt, ethnically (or group) divided, disrespectful of human rights and inefficient at ensuring the security of all citizens. He further says that, the promotion of good governance, lasting peace and development depends, to a large extent, on breaking this history of security bias, intimidation and brutality<sup>34</sup>.

This confirms what is indicated in the Waki report of 2007/2008 PEV, that the police in Molo as elsewhere were incompetent and poor in handling of the general elections. They were blamed for taking sides and in some cases perpetrating the violence against civilians. It also corroborates a 1992 National Council of Churches of Kenya report<sup>35</sup>. The report notes that, the colonial masters used their security apparatus, to subdue political movements in Africa. The apparatus included security native officers who were fanatics for the white rule, poorly trained but heavily armed. The commission further noted that the trend was carried on to independent African states where the security agencies are governments' mechanism for subduing any revolt. This was further confirmed by both Philip Waki and Kreigler commissions who blamed the local police for failure to monitor and actively prevent violence prior to and after the December 2007 elections. The Police were politically manipulated and lacked the will to protect innocent people. They were

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<sup>34</sup> Graham Day, 2001

<sup>35</sup> Task Force Report of NCCCK, " Kenya Conflicts, Politics and Elections" :Daily Nation March 11, 12, 29: 1992

also blamed for arresting, harassing and sentencing innocent civilians who volunteered information to them.

This research noted that, reforming the police service would delink them from political manipulation and make them competent custodians of order and tranquility to ensure people coexist with peace. It would also make them responsible and competent to contribute to conflict management, peace building, early warning and general development of the country and Molo in particular.

In his book, *Peace Building in Post Conflict Societies*, Ho-Won Jeong<sup>36</sup> argues that peace building includes, providing technical assistance for democratic development, promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation, re-integrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law, improving the standards of living and protecting human rights and finally security sector reforms.

This work portrays that a single party cannot play all these roles of peace builders. A joint effort from both the local and international players would ensure success of peace building. In Molo for instance, many organizations had tried without success to bring to an end conflicts between existing communities. Existing peace committee, representatives of political organization, religious organization, business groups and many others have attempted ensuring sustenance of peace in Molo. Most of these programs were reactive in nature and excluded the police leading to resurgence of violence after some times.

On importance of security during peace building, Stephen Stedman, Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual note that in countries recovering from civil war, the lack of basic security and infrastructure invariably leads to the failure of peace agreements<sup>37</sup>. These agreements are formal and aim at ending violent conflicts and creating conditions for durable peace. Rarely is it the problem that the parties cannot strike a bargain. Often, they reach an agreement, but are unable to enforce it.

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<sup>36</sup> Jeong Ho-Won, 2005

<sup>37</sup> <sup>37</sup> Stephen Stedman, Bruce Jones and Carlos Pascual, *Power and Responsibility: Creating International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2009).

In Molo, many peace agreements have been signed between communities. The disputants agree to live together but this becomes only a start. Sustaining this peace becomes a long-term process that must incorporate all parties and stake holders. As noted, re-lapse in to violence between the communities has led to failure of the agreements. This can be attributed to local spoilers who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threaten their power and interest. There must be a way to deal with these spoilers. The police have the power to limit the effectiveness of spoilers through better training, equipping and deployment. Police will be in a position to guarantee physical security which is a foundation of successful reconciliation. They will offer a dispute resolution system and enforce all laws and rules including all terms of the peace agreement.

Barbara Walter argues that, one common problem in enforcing a peace agreement is the presence of spoiler parties that have an interest in maintaining the status quo or who profit more from the conflict than the peace<sup>38</sup>. He further notes that these parties can limit the effectiveness of agreements leading to recurrence of conflict. Mechanism should therefore be put in place to limit the influence of spoilers.

This study identified the spoilers who were behind the post-election violence. It also focused on the role of the police in Molo to bring to book the spoilers and thereby ensuring sustainable peace in the region. The locals reported their willingness to positively identify all spoilers of peace in their locality and then report to the police and other relevant authority. The police would be suitable for controlling Conflict entrepreneurs and other spoilers since they are trained to use a minimum level of force to restore public order and enforcing local rules. Building good community relations would enable the police to access confidential information on spoilers

James Cotton notes that peace building is a complex task which requires engagement across all of the institutions of order and governance as well as with the wider society<sup>39</sup>. The writer notes that, in undertaking peace building, military forces are required to disarm warring groups,

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<sup>38</sup> Walter Barbara, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization*, Vol. 51, No. 3, (Summer, 1997), pp. 335

<sup>39</sup> James Cotton, 'Peace building in the Pacific: the Australian military experience' in *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, Issue 14, July 2009 (Available at [www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk](http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk) 1

destroy the arms and reintegrate former combatants in to the society. The writer also points out that they should also promote rehabilitation and development of societies.

The writer fails to point out that, disarmament and reintegration does not necessarily bring about stability and peace. This work will demonstrate that even after disarmament, rebuilding relations, monitoring this peace, security reforms, TJRC among others, may be important tools towards permanent peace. It is necessary also to restore public order and offer post conflict support. The military role then can shift to the police who become ultimate guarantors for civilian agencies of order, as well as to perform such technical tasks as weapons disposal, the monitoring of cantonment or other peace arrangements or the supervision or retraining of former combatants.

Ludovic Hood notes that, in order to root out corruption in Solomon Islands which involved senior members of the small political elite, police were empowered to prosecute senior officers and politicians involved in conflict<sup>40</sup>. The writer notes that, a former prime minister was charged with robbery, larceny and intimidation. The author also points that, in Timor-Leste it was the finding of the United Nations inquiry into the events of 2006 that it was the Minister of the Interior who bore the ultimate responsibility for the misuse of the police and police weapons hence the urgent need of police reforms.

Political manipulation of police in Molo was identified as one of their shortcomings. In the area, as elsewhere, peaceful coexistence has been disrupted by political leaders' pursuit of self-interest and power struggles. These politicians have in the past incited their tribesmen to take arms against those they term as invaders and this have created animosity between different communities in Molo. Such politicians and other inciters enjoy the protection of corrupt police officers who they bribe to avoid prosecution. A reformed police should identify historical crimes and those who committed them regardless of their political class and conduct trials. Prosecution of political leaders and expression of remorse are some of the principles of successful peace building.

In his study on democratic policing, Barley David notes that, it is now an accepted idea and policy goal – within the international community – that the post-conflict reconstruction and

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<sup>40</sup> Ludovic Hood, 'Security Sector Reform in East Timor, 1999-2004', *International Peacekeeping* 13(2006), no. 1, pp. 60-77

rehabilitation of war-torn societies must entail from an early stage the reform and restructuring, or even the complete re-establishment, of local police forces according to the norm of 'democratic policing'. The concept of democratic policing represents the idea that the police are a service, not a force, with the primary focus on the security of the individual rather than the state. Its defining characteristics are 'responsiveness' to the needs of individuals, and 'accountability' for its actions to the public it serves<sup>41</sup>. He notes that, the end result for democratic policing would be that police officers of different ethnicities would work side by side and, in doing so, would learn to treat all citizens equally.

However, the writer did not look at a situation where the police might be tempted to take sides and protect their tribesmen. In Molo, prior to the 2007/08 post-election violence, Police officers from different tribes were not working in cohesiveness. This created an impression of tribal division which the local communities would tend to emulate. The successive peace enforcements, relies on the credibility of the security providers and their willingness to intervene. In both Kreigler and Waki Reports, the Police were blamed for lack of any serious intervention to prevent conflict and crime and few cases were reported where police protected members of their community while shooting those belonging to a different ethnic tribe<sup>42</sup>. This research suggested viable solutions which would make the police neutral and partisan.

Amisi Bertha differentiates between peace keepers and peace builders<sup>43</sup>. The author argues that, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment, while peace builders work to make that environment self-sustaining. There is a need for a collaborative intervention where external peace keepers ensure cessation of hostilities while local peace builders work towards creating an environment that promotes peace and interdependence. Even after the international peace keepers are withdrawn, local mechanisms which have been put in place should ensure continuity and success of peace building.

This research focused on this sustainability of peace building. The research notes that although there was a cease fire after the National Accord was signed due to 2007/08 PEV, tension

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<sup>41</sup> Bayley.D , *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It*, Washington DC: US Department of Justice, 2001, pp.11–5, at [www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/188742.pdf](http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/188742.pdf). (20/4/13)

<sup>42</sup> Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (Waki Report)*, 2008

<sup>43</sup> Amisi Bertha, 1998

between communities in Molo remained high long after the 2007 elections. My study intends to bring out that, police should enforce and monitor relationships between different communities and should do this in collaboration with all other peace building stakeholders. Where there are signs of conflict, the police through their early warning system should deal with such signs before they develop in to tribal conflicts.

While looking at the conflicts in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya, Amisi Berther notes that, the major challenge of peace-building is mobilization of sustained political will and resources on the part of the national and international community<sup>44</sup>. The writer also notes that many local organizations have contributed to peace building but are always limited by resources. The writer calls for the international community to support, finance and ensure the success of local peace building other than just providing military troops to enforce peace.

This study will point out clearly that police reforms require adequate funding in order to ensure logistical and welfare improvements. Perhaps the international community can provide funding for training, equipping, financing, monitoring among others which the police as part of local peace builders can benefit from. The funds would also support community participation as well as building police stations and camps in areas prone to conflict in Molo.

Korir Singoei<sup>45</sup>, the Executive Director of the Centre for Minority Rights puts it clearly that, the incompetence of the police in Kenya has resulted in segregation and impartiality at all levels. He notes that, the police have to be reminded of the professional ethics and be re-armed to avoid being over powered by bandits and thugs. The writer also notes that, the police and civilians must pursue same objectives both tactical and strategic levels.

During this research, many respondents indicated their willingness to partner with the police to ensure peaceful coexistence. Due to their interdependencies, the local communities and security agencies should be complimentary to each other and should work in harmony. Police can only be successful with a reaffirmation of respect oh human rights, professionalism and rule of law. They

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<sup>44</sup> Amisi Bertha, 1998

<sup>45</sup> Songoei K. In the site [http://www.The-Eoser.The\\_unending\\_Kenya's\\_clashes](http://www.The-Eoser.The_unending_Kenya's_clashes), October 2008,(accessed 13<sup>th</sup> April 2012)

should shift from their traditional settings which sometimes limit them to making arrests, prosecution and use of force.

In Molo, a Kenya Red Cross report <sup>46</sup> noted that, even after the National accord was signed, many schools and business remained closed, vital installations were vandalized and food distribution centers were attacked. Even humanitarian activities were hampered by lack of security. Some NGOs withdrew due to highly organized armed groups which were still patrolling some parts of Molo. After ceasefire was declared in Nairobi, the police lacked the capacity to disarm and prevent aggressive action on the ground. They were either excluded in most post conflict programs or lacked the will to act. Police response was reactive in Molo and problem oriented. The police in Molo should have had adequate programs to understand their roles in crime control, order maintenance and the provision of wide range of services to the local communities as well as all people working or living in Molo.

## **1.8 Theoretical Framework**

Three theories formed the basis for this research

1. The Positive and Negative Peace theory.
2. Theory of active peace;
3. Integrative conflict resolution theory

### **1.8.1 The Positive and Negative Peace theory**

The theory of positive and negative peace stems from the 1950's when peace research was still heavily focused on direct violence, as in assault and warfare. These terms were first introduced by one of the founders and main figures in peace research, Johan Galtung, in the founding edition of the *Journal of Peace Research* in 1964. In the 1960's Galtung expanded the concepts of peace and violence to include indirect or structural violence. Thus, negative peace was defined as "the absence of violence, absence of war", and positive peace as "the integration of human society". Negative Peace is characterized by, absence of violence, is pessimistic, curative and peace is not always achieved by peaceful means. Positive Peace is characterized by structural integration. It is optimistic, preventive, just and peace is always by peaceful means.

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<sup>46</sup> ibid

The theory was very useful in the study. While cessation of violence has been achieved in Molo, there are many unresolved issues. Thus people can be said to be enjoying negative peace. Many IDPs have not settled back on their lands; those who lost property still require compensation; perpetrators need to be investigated and insecurity is still rampant. Disarmament requires to be done and truth justice and reconciliation commissions need to be constituted to ensure success of peace. It is only when all the stakeholders are brought together to address all these odds that the community can enjoy positive peace.

### **1.8.2 The theory of Active Peace;**

Gray Cox and Johan Galtung were the first to develop the concept of active peace. Gray Cox in his book *The Ways of Peace* (1886) proposes to discard the noun "peace," and to replace it with a verb, "peace-ing." "Peace-ing" is the cultivation of agreements.

Johan Galtung, (1964) in his work refining the development of the *triadic theory* – (peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building) points out that conflict and peace follow a stages with distinct features. He defined as existence of harmony, justice, well being and the absence of hostility.

The theory purports that there are five developmental stages toward Active Peace. One aspect of the five-stage theory is that one stage only becomes visible or understandable once the one before has been attained. In this way, each stage represents a 'perspective', both individual and social. Social 'organisms' can be said to progress through the stages as well as individual ones. The first stage is *Acquiescence*, where one knows there is something wrong, but takes no action. The second stage is *Pacifism* where people are no longer quiet within themselves. Their discomfiture with violence and oppression begins to affect how they live. Then the third stage is *Passive Nonviolent Resistance*. People make changes in their behavior by reasons of conscience but are not necessarily social about it. It is also akin to the concept of standing aside or not 'taking part in a vote'. The fourth stage is *Active Nonviolent Resistance* where they take social leadership in attempting to thwart the forces of violence, oppression, and subjugation. The final stage is the triad of Peace making, peace keeping, and peace building making up Active peace.



### **1.8.3 The Integrative Conflict Resolution Theory**

In 1940, Follett was the first to refer to the search of peace after conflict as search for *integrative solutions*, that is, solutions which meet the interests and needs of all parties. She offered a personal anecdote where she and another woman disagreed about whether to open or close a window. The compromise solution, that is, having it half open, would satisfy neither of them. Eventually they discovered that one wanted the window open to increase the fresh air, while the other wanted it closed to prevent a draught, which led to the cooperative, integrative or “win-win” solution of opening a window in an adjoining room.

This notion was later elaborated as integrative bargaining by Walton and McKersie (1965) as the process by which parties attempt to explore options to increase the size of the joint gain without respect to the division of payoffs. Integrative bargaining most commonly occurs either as a direct *negotiation* between the parties in conflict, or through *mediation* where a neutral third party is brought in to facilitate the process. This process eliminates a solution where one party “wins” and the other party “loses” (win-lose, zero sum, or distributive negotiations), but the goal is an integrative (or win-win) solution.

Various post conflict peace building efforts have been adopted in Molo but social and political tensions accompany population displacements, destruction of property and violence every time there is an election. This has been attributed to the long history of animosity and mutual accusations amongst different ethnic communities in Molo.

This theory was useful in the study since it proposes that, to get a permanent peace solution in Molo, a system had to be formed which would reduce deep and expanding social disparities. This system would also address the development potentials of different ethnic groups and ultimately produce benefits to all the groups. This requires peace builders who understand the internal systems of the people and have the capacity to ensure social justice, peace and reconciliation. If brought on board, the transformed police in Molo will ensure peace agreements are adhered to. They will also control violence and ensure the rule of law. The police will not only control violence but will also solidify positive peace which centers on integration and peace through peaceful means hence a win-win solution.

## **1.9 Research Hypothesis.**

In order to achieve the goals and objectives of this research, the following hypothesis guided the investigations.

1. There were several stakeholders of peace building in Molo.
2. Some critical stakeholders were left out in peace building efforts in Molo.
3. Fully involving the police in managing peace in Molo would have yielded better results towards peace building.

## **1.10 Research Design and Methodology**

### **1.10.1 Research Design**

This study was conducted in the larger Molo region which comprised parts of Kuresoi, Olenguruone, Keringet and Njoro. These areas experienced conflicts which could be tracked back to introduction of multiparty party democracy in the country. It was done through a descriptive survey research design. The study involved establishing the roles of police in ensuring success of peace building in Molo. Both qualitative and quantitative data was obtained from the field using various techniques. Target participants were the local communities, former IDPs, the police, Deputy County Commissioners (DC), Assistant County Commissioners (DO), chiefs and Assistant chiefs), NGOs operating in the area and any other organization whose mandate included peace building in Molo. Senior police commanders (the OCPDs, OCSs, DAPCs) and junior police officers were interviewed.

After identification of the participants, sampling of the respondents was done in order to ensure uniform participation. Simple random sampling was used in police stations, IDP Camps where all the study objects had equal chances of being included in the samples. Systematic, stratified and cluster sampling was also used where possible to increase efficiency and provide adequate data for analysis.

### **1.10.2 Data collection**

Both primary and secondary data was collected from different sources in the region. The aim was to assess the roles played by the police in peace building and reconstruction in Molo. Also examined were reports that had previously been prepared on conflict in Molo and other places in Kenya and outside the country. Secondary data was obtained from articles, journals, periodicals

and other scholarly materials. Archival holdings for primary data as well as photographs and newspapers with information on conflict and peace building in general were examined.

Personal interviews were conducted to obtain information from the respondents. This was done after identifying relevant respondents through sampling. Those to be interviewed were identified to avail information on police and peace building in Molo. Research assistance was used where there were language barriers.

Questionnaires were administered both on a one-on-one basis and through focus group discussions targeting IDPs, returnees and the police. Both open ended and close ended questions were used in order to get as much information as possible.

General observation contributed to the findings of the research. Where the respondents were not physically met, telephone numbers were obtained and direct calls made (telephone interviews) whereby the responses were recorded down on notebooks or tape recorded.

### **1.10.3 Population and sampling**

For primary sources, both police officers and civilians were engaged through administering questionnaires and also conducting interviews. The civilians would give a clear picture of how the public perceived the police. The police were interviewed in order to check on their skills and how much they understood their roles in peace building. A total of 30 of police officers (54%) and 25 civilians (46%) were sampled. The police sampled comprised 5 females (17 %) and 25 males (83%) while the civilians comprised 17 males (68%) and 8 females (32%).

Out of the 30 police officers 8 officers (27%) were above 50 years, 10 officers (33%) were between 31-40 years while 12 officers (40%) were between 21-30 years. The mix of the young and old would help to capture the changing syllabus in police training colleges.

Out of the 25 civilians, six were members of the provincial administration and 19 from general public. The sample comprised of 17 males (68%) and 8 females (32%). Out of these 5 (20%) were above 50 years, 10 (40%) were between 31-40 years and 10 (40%) were between 21-30 years. Those from provincial administration were selected since they understand the roles of police and directly interacted with the members of public.

#### **1.10.4 Focus group**

During this research, individuals were engaged independently for interviews and questionnaires. Afterwards, respondents were engaged in focus groups where discussions were recorded. Agencies and organizations involved in peace building were also engaged and responses recorded.

#### **1.11 Data Analysis and Interpretation**

After collecting the data, attention then focused on analyzing the data. Analyses were useful in order to reduce accumulated data to manageable size and to develop summaries.

First, data was edited whereby errors from the raw data were eliminated. This ensured that analysis took place with minimum errors or mistakes. Tabulation was then done by counting the number of responses that fit in each category. Finally, the data was analyzed then interpreted to enable making of conclusions.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2.0 MOLO CONFLICT; HISTORY, CAUSES AND IMPACT**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

Since the introduction of multi-party democracy in 1991, there has been a growing tendency for proliferation of violence in Kenya with many regions experiencing armed violence especially before and after major elections. These conflicts are rooted in various factors including resource scarcity and inequitable distribution, negative ethnicity, political competition and perceived historical injustices. This chapter deals with the conflicts in Molo. It starts by a general description of the area of study giving its geographical position in the country and county. The chapter further looks at the colonial factor and its impact in population distribution, the genesis and history of Molo conflicts and causes and impacts.

#### **2.2 Molo Region in General**

Molo is in Nakuru County which is part of the former Rift Valley Province. At the time of study it was a home to two major communities namely Kalenjin (45%) and Kikuyu (40%). Other ethnic communities found included Kisii, Luhya, Luo and minority communities mainly Ogiek. Previously the area had two constituencies, Molo and Kuresoi. After 2010 constitution review, they were later subdivided into four, namely Molo, Njoro, Kuresoi North and Kuresoi South. Each constituency has one major ethnic group, with a sizeable number of other communities. In Molo constituency, the Kikuyu are the majority, Kuresoi has the Kalenjin as the majority while

The region has also been divided into a number of sub counties namely, Molo, Olenguruone, Keringet, Njoro, Kuresoi North and Kuresoi South. It borders Baringo to the North, Kericho to the North west, Nakuru sub-county to the East, Bomet County to the south West and Narok County to the South. (See the map provided)

Since the introduction of multi-party democracy, the region has experienced post-election violence mainly among the main ethnic communities the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Kisii.

Njoro has the Kikuyu as the majority. However all the constituencies have sizeable minorities of Ogiek, Luo, Luhya and Gusii.

### 2.3 The Colonial Administrations and its Impacts

Over many millennia the many communities in Kenya adjusted themselves to their ecological niches. As a consequence communities such as the Kikuyu and the Miji-Kenda developed agricultural economies. Others, including the Maasai and the Samburu practiced pastoralist forms of production. Others such as the Luo and the Abagusii adapted themselves to a mixture of crop cultivation and livestock keeping. There were others like the Ogiek who thrived on hunting and gathering. Production was more for collective subsistence rather than individual accumulation.<sup>47</sup>

The ethnic boundaries among pre-colonial Kenyan communities were fluid. Inter-ethnic interactions were characterized by trade, intermarriages and limited and intermittent warfare. The histories of migrations and settlement were about continuous waning and waxing of the various ethnicities. But this all ended with the arrival of Europeans. Colonialism developed from imperialism, referred to by Lenin as the highest stage of capitalism. Capitalism, imperialism and colonialism share the following characteristics: political and cultural domination and economic exploitation.

In Kenya's case, as with the rest of Africa, the starting point was the 1884/85 Berlin Conference, which set the rules of colonial occupation. Together with the 1886 Anglo-German Agreement and other inter-European territorial arrangements, the conference was instrumental in not only erecting artificial boundaries around Kenya but also in wresting diplomatic initiative and economic control from Kenyan peoples. In 1894 and 1895 Britain declared protectorate over Uganda and Kenya, respectively. Kenya's boundaries were demarcated without the consultation of Kenyan peoples. The colonial boundaries led to the establishment of a large territorial entity which arbitrarily brought together over forty previously independent communities into one territorial entity<sup>48</sup>. The independent state, would find it a daunting task wielding these communities into one nation-state.

These administrative and ethnic boundaries created artificial shortage of land and other resources. It also severely curtailed traditional migration methods of dealing with diminishing

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<sup>47</sup> John K. Akokpari, *The State, Refugees and Migration in Sub-Sahara Africa*, Blackwell publishers , 1998

<sup>48</sup> Walter Oyugi, 'Politicized Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon.' Widner (1971)

recourses. Inter-ethnic competition would characterize the post-independent Kenya which would lead to increased intercommunity conflicts.

#### **2.4 Molo and the Post-Independence Settlement Schemes**

After independence, Kenyatta's government formed the Settlement Transfer Fund Schemes (STFS) and asked the British for a loan to buy off land from colonial settlers wishing to return to Britain. Britain, having been reassured by Kenyatta that those settlers wishing to stay on in Kenya would not have their land repossessed, advanced the money. This money was used to buy former settler land through the Kenyatta initiated STFSs. President Kenyatta encouraged the locals to form land buying companies which benefited from attractive loans advanced by politically correct bank institutions.<sup>49</sup>

Through the Million Acre Resettlement Scheme, the locals formed land-buying companies. At the height of this process, most of the power brokers acquired very large chunks of land in Nakuru Molo and Mau Narok at the expense of the landless. These companies, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, facilitated the settlement of hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu from Murang'a and Kiambu in the Rift Valley.<sup>50</sup> More than 60% large-scale farms around Nakuru and 40% of small scale settler farms, were ultimately acquired by the Kikuyu. Local communities mainly the Kalenjin did not fare so well since land could not be acquired by the landless who had no money.

From 1971 onwards, large tracks of land were sub-divided into smaller pieces which the African farmers could afford. By 1973, over a million acres of land had been settled by about 50,000 families. This meant that lands which had been lost to white and other settlers was not entirely repossessed and redistributed to the original owners. The new owners were mainly members of other communities who had the political connections and acquired financial assistance from public funds.<sup>51</sup>

In November 1991, Western donor governments and the World Bank made it clear to the Kenya Government that aid disbursements would be dependent on major economic and political

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<sup>49</sup> Gatheru, Mugo R. *Kenya from Colonization to Independence, 1888-1970*. Jefferson: McFarland & Co, 2005

<sup>50</sup> Walter Oyugi, 'Politicized Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon.' Widner (1971)

<sup>51</sup> Republic of Kenya, *The National Land Policy in Kenya; Addressing Historical Injustices; issues paper no. 2/2004* Kenya Land Alliance; 2004

reforms<sup>52</sup>. Even before that, the then Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi had repeatedly warned that multiparty politics was not compatible with a multi-ethnic Kenya and would lead to war and chaos, similar to what was happening in neighboring countries like Rwanda and Burundi at the time. But with pressure from the international community and local politicians Moi yielded to the demands and allowed multiparty democracy. Many political parties were registered and campaigns for the 1992 general elections started.

In October 1991, gangs of young men supposedly belonging to the Kalenjin ethnic group, armed with spears and machetes, attacked settlements belonging to members of other communities. Meitei farm in South Nandi was the first place to be attacked in October 1991. In this and following attacks, hundreds were forced to flee their homes, houses were burned down and shops looted. Ultimately, three people were reportedly killed, thirty houses were burned and about four thousand people were left homeless. In addition, sugar cane plantations were destroyed by fire in the Miwani, Chemase and Kaptweta areas. Luo men were mobilized by their political leaders to retaliate and after 11 days the fighting spilled over into the neighboring Kisumu district, home to the Luo.<sup>53</sup>

By May 1992 as many as 2,000 people were reported killed and 50,000 rendered homeless in various parts of the country. The victims of the attacks now included members of the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya and other ethnic groups who had settled in Molo, Kericho and Nandi areas of the Rift Valley. The attackers claimed that these other ethnic groups had encroached on traditional Kalenjin lands. The political leadership at the time whipped up emotions against non-Kalenjin land title holders thereby instigating the clashes.<sup>54</sup>

Soon after the multi-party elections in December, 1992, fighting erupted once again in the Molo especially in Kuresoi, Kamara and Elburgon. The aggressors during this post-election phase of the conflict were the Kaenjins. Their main targets were the Kikuyus, the main ethnic group settled in the area. But they also attacked other ethnic communities. A common factor in all the areas affected by the violence was that they were inhabited by large numbers of "migrant" ethnic

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<sup>52</sup> Gatheru and Mugo, 2005

<sup>53</sup> Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Tribal Clashes in Kenya, (The Akiwumi Report) Nairobi*, Government Printers, 1999

<sup>54</sup> Ibid



groups (Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Kisii), who formed the major support base of the opposition parties (DP and FORD) in the country during the 1992 elections.

A few days after the first outbreak in October 1991, the General Service Unit (GSU), a paramilitary force, together with some Administration Police (AP) were deployed to quell the fighting but were apparently unable to do so. Eyewitness claimed that the armed police watched as people were attacked and homes burned down in Kuresoi and Keringet<sup>55</sup>. Local residents reported that police were either unable or unwilling to stop the aggressors. In some cases the police were within several meters from the scenes of violence but did not seem bothered. In September, 1993, and after two years of continued ethnic fighting in various parts of the country, Moi invoked the Preservation of Public Securities Act and declared the hardest hit areas, Molo, Londiani, and Burnt Forest, "security zones." Consequently, a ban was imposed on possession of weapons, holding of gatherings, movement of livestock at night and publication of information on conflict in the "security zones" without government consent. Opposition Members of Parliament, human rights activists and journalists were prevented from entering these areas. Security personnel were given wide ranging powers which included authorization to shoot to kill, requisition of private vehicles, search and arrest.

Such election related conflict was repeated in 1997, 2002 and 2007. The 2007 election was held on 27<sup>th</sup> December 2007. The ECK declared Kibaki's re-election three days later. The Opposition loss was met with furious accusation of rigging and Kibaki being sworn in without all the results country. Fifteen minutes after Kibaki was announced president, violent attacks were reported in Kibira slums. The following day, hundreds of homes were burnt in Rift Valley, Nyanza and other parts of the country. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced from their homes and more than 1,000 people died from post-election violence.<sup>56</sup>

The wave of inter-conflict in Molo in 2007/2008 went down in Kenya history as the worst since independence. Prior to the December 2007 elections, there were increased political incitements where the Kalenjin who were reportedly supporters of ODMs threatened to evict the Kikuyu who were said to be supporters of PNU.

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<sup>55</sup> Republic of Kenya, Report of the judicial commission appointed to inquire into the Tribal Clashes in Kenya (The Akiwumi Report), Nairobi, Government Printers, 1999

<sup>56</sup> Ibid

In July 19, 2007, leaflets were distributed in Likia which partly read “ *Onyo! Onyo! Warning has been issued to the people who are not from this region. This is our land..... time has come for you to leave and return to your land. The Rift Valley Land Owners and Protectors Army is ready to fight for their land till the last drop of blood is shed...*” This was reported to the authorities including District Commissioner Molo, and the OCPD and they promised to carry out immediate investigation.

In August 2007, over 150 homesteads were displaced in Kuresoi, after five people including two children were killed, over 65 homesteads were burnt down.<sup>57</sup> The violence escalated at first targeting the Kikuyus but later non Kalenjin communities. Eventually the Kikuyus armed themselves in order to defend their life and property.

The announcement of Kibaki as the newly elected president led to violent reactions by the opposition supporters who went on a violent rampage and engaging in mass protests. The former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan arrived in the country and successfully brought the two sides on a negotiation table. On 28<sup>th</sup> February, 2008, Kibaki and Odinga signed the a power sharing agreement; The National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008 which brought back normalcy. Over 1,000 people died during the 2007/08 PEV and 1million people were displaced.

The 2012 elections were the first held under the new constitution which was passed during the 2010 referendum. The elections were relatively peaceful although some unrest was reported in several parts of the country notably Nairobi central and Nyanza. Major credit was given to security organs that were deployed in areas where the government anticipated chaos<sup>58</sup>.

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<sup>57</sup> Mcgoye C. (1965) *Coming to Birth*. Nairobi: Longman Nic Cheeseman, (2008), “The Kenya Elections of 2007: An Introduction,” *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, Vol 2 No. 2.

<sup>58</sup> The Standard Newspaper 24<sup>th</sup> January 2013

## 2.5 Causes of Molo conflict

**Table 2.1 Causes of conflicts in Molo**

Causes	Frequency	Percent
Land	10	18
political competition	11	20
Economic inequalities	9	16
Negative ethnicity	5	9
Cultural difference	4	7
Poverty and unemployment	5	9
Cattle raids	3	5
Failure by security agencies	8	15
Total	55	100.0

(Source: Field Data 2014)

### 2.5.1 Political Competition

Since 1992 multi-party elections, Political competition and incitements had characterized politics in Molo where different communities wanted to dominate political power. This led tribal loyalties with each tribe wanting to either remain in power or regain it from the others. Politicians identified themselves with their ethnic groups instead of a united common goal for the region. During the study, 20% of the respondents identified politics as the major cause of conflicts in the region. They reported that communities lived in harmony and peace until electioneering periods when politicians divided them in to ethnic groups as voting blocks. This created animosity between the local Kalenjini community and the others who migrated to the region. Politicians fanned tribal conflict when they capitalized on highly sensitive issues like land, businesses, Mau forest among other issues. During any major election, rival political groups based on ethnic alignments used displacement of eligible voters as a tool to reduce votes cast. The politician in the region organized young men and women into groups and used the group to silence their rivals

### 2.5.2 Competition over land

During the study 18% of the respondent identified land as a cause of conflict in the Region. The Kalenjins believed that, Kikuyus were given their land by former governments who acquired it from white settlers. These grudges could be traced back to period after independence. British transferred land to the Kenyan government; the Kenyatta regime did not give it back to the

rightful owners. Instead land was taken by others through the government supported land buying companies.

After the 1997 post-election violence, a judicial commission was appointed to inquire in to the violence. The so called Akiwumi Commission pointed out some of the underlying reasons for the clashes in Molo. First were the ambitions of Kalenjin people to recover what they lost when the Europeans forcibly acquired what they described as their ancestral land. Secondly was the desire to remove foreigners from their midst. The reference was towards the Kikuyu, Kisii, Luo and other communities who had found permanent residence in the Rift Valley.<sup>59</sup>

The Waki commission of 2008 also identified the main cause of conflicts in Molo as competition for resources especially land between the major communities in the region namely the Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Kisii<sup>60</sup>. The Kalenjin viewed themselves as the original land owners and viewed the others as foreigners. However, the Kikuyu, Kisii and Luhya also viewed themselves as the rightful owners of lands acquired legally by buying from government and large land holders who had decided to subdivide their lands after independence.

A former resident of Keringet had this to say, “I was born in Keringet where by father bought two acres of land after retiring from a government job. I schooled in Keringet and have never known any other place. After every election, we are targeted by our neighbors who complain of us being foreigners and voting for their rivals.”<sup>61</sup> According to him, their neighbors chased them from the rightfully owned land due to the misconception that former governments have given them the land for free.

According to a 2008 report by an NGO called The IDP Network, during the 2007/08 campaigns, Kalenjin politicians reminded the people of their past ownership of land. Fearing defeat, the Kalenjin armed youths started burning houses and grabbing land in Likia, Kuresoi, Keringet and elsewhere. The kikuyu were forced to flee to areas they had not registered as voters Among the Kalenjin candidates, the one with the harshest speech was likely to be given the votes. The electorate had vowed never to vote for someone who was promoting dialogue with the Kikuyu.

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<sup>59</sup> Akiwumi Commission, G.O.K. 1999

<sup>60</sup> Republic of Kenya, *Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence (Waki Report)*, 2008

<sup>61</sup> Oral interview , James 12<sup>th</sup> April

### **2.5.3 Cultural difference**

Cultural difference between different communities in the region could also be blamed for creating animosity amongst them. 7% of the respondents believed that cultural differences could have led to the conflicts in the region. The communities in the region had cultures that differed from those of others. Kikuyus and Kisii for instance loved cultivating their land while the Kalenjins practiced daily farming. This created tension especially during dry seasons due to scarcity of water. After the Kikuyus acquired and established large farms, Kalenjins experienced shortage of grazing lands especially during dry seasons. Kalenjins during initiation ceremonies trained their youths to be warriors and encouraged them to steal cattle from other communities in the region. In December 2007, Kalenjins youths held illegal meetings in the forests. It was reported to be a traditional initiation ceremony for boys but it emerged later that the youths were planning for attacks.<sup>62</sup>

### **2.5.5 Negative Ethnicity**

According to Mullojanov and Parviz, ethnic conflicts in societies are not about natural resources and boundaries. To him, ethnicity and ethnic conflicts are caused by ethnic grudges<sup>63</sup>. He therefore proposes that, for those conflicts to be solved, solutions that aim at solving the underlying root problems must be sought. In Molo, there exist historical grudges on settlements and divisions of land, political dominance and distribution of wealth among others. The kikuyu expansionism which had seen them acquire large pieces of land caused mistrust between them and the Kalenjins.

During the study, 9% of the respondents identified Negative ethnicity as a major cause of conflicts in the region. Molo was a home to Kikuyu, Luhyas, Kalenjins, Luos, Maasai, Ogieks and other minor tribes. This diversity had been used by politicians as a dividing tool to pit communities against each other. Violence in the region had been organized along these ethnic lines. Politics in the region was based on competition among ethnic communities which caused conflicts every time there was an election.

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<sup>62</sup> Oral interview, Patrick Manthi, ACC, Elburgon 16<sup>th</sup> April, 2014

<sup>63</sup> Mullojanov and Parviz. 2001

**Table 2.2 Ethnic background of the police officers**

Tribes of the officer	Frequency	Percent
Kikuyu	12	34.3
Kalenjin	14	40.0
Others	9	25.7
Total	35	100.0

(Source: Field Data 2014)

During the study, police were blamed for protecting their tribesmen and in some cases committing atrocities against civilians. It was found out that 74.2 % of all police officers were from Kikuyu and the Kalenjin communities. This explained why most respondents complained of police biases in responding to distress calls. Some victims of the violence responded that police when responding to incidents spoke the language of the attackers and took no action against them.

### **2.5.6 Poverty and unemployment**

During the study, 9% of the respondents identified this as a major cause of conflicts in Molo. Just like most regions in Kenya, most people in Molo lived below the poverty line. Youths therefore engaged in conflicts as a way of obtaining illegal wealth. Political leaders in the region took advantage of these poor electorates and gave them handouts to buy their political loyalty. The region also lacked higher institutions of learning and youth polytechnics. Due to the lack of training opportunities, many youths spent time idling in shopping centers.

There was an evidence of economic gap between the poor and the rich in the region. For instance, in Molo town, the poor lived in informal settlements with simple structures, lacked piped water, with poor roads and poverty. The same was noted in Elburgon with slums like Kito and Kasarani lacking most amenities. The rich lived in developed estates enjoying good roads, water and houses.

### **2.5.7 Failure by government agents**

Failure or reluctance of security agents and other government agencies to act had also been blamed for the conflict in Molo. For instance, the Akiwumi Commission came to the conclusion that the security forces and the Provincial Administration were negligent and unwilling to take firm and drastic action to prevent the clashes from erupting or once these erupted, to bring a

quick end to them. This according to the report can be attributed to their connections, ethnically politically or economically to the local communities.

In Molo, police were blamed for doing very little to prevent conflict and assist victim of violence. They were termed as corrupt; they lacked tools, skills and in many cases joined their fellow communities in committing atrocities.

**Table 2.3 Problems inhibiting police performance in peace building**

Problem	Frequency	Percent
Vehicles and fuel	8	26.7
Enough security officers	9	30.0
Lack of skills	6	20.0
Poor housing	6	20.0
Equipment and tools	1	3.3
Total	30	100.0

(Source: Field Data 2014)

Majority of Police in Molo blamed lack of enough vehicles and inadequate numbers of officers as affecting their efforts to peace building.

### **2.5.8 Stealing of livestock**

A series of livestock raids in Kuresoi and Olenguruone elicited retaliatory response by the affected groups. The group frequently raided would argue that, they could not wait for Government intervention or elders to organize recoveries of stolen livestock. In some cases elders were pushed by the youths to sanction retaliatory raids targeting farms and houses.

In Sirikwa, cattle owners especially from the Kisii and Kikuyu communities were forced to acquire arrows and other weapons to guard their livestock from being raided. According to area chief, frequent raids of cattle at Sirikwa and Moto villages have created tensions between Kalenjins on one hand and Kikuyus who claimed that their stolen livestock were driven to neighboring Kalenjin dominated regions<sup>64</sup>. This created tension among the communities in the region leading to increased animosity and acquisition of illegal fire arms.

<sup>64</sup> Oral interview, Timothy Ominde, Chief Kuresoi, 26<sup>th</sup> April. 2013

## **2.6 Impact of the Conflict**

### **2.6.1 Political dominion**

Recurrent tribal conflicts in Molo affected the region's political distribution. Being cosmopolitan, major communities continued to rely on ethnicity to dominate political power suppressing others leading a cycle of political conflicts any time there is elections. During elections, some voters were forcefully displaced to ensure they did not vote and therefore reducing political competition. This led to a situation where certain communities dominated politics in regions where they are the majority. In Molo and Njoro constituencies where the Kikuyus were the majority, they dominated political positions while in Kuresoi North and South, Kalenjins who were the majority held most political positions. As a results, minorities communities in the regions remained with grievances since they could not produce the numbers during voting.

### **2.6.2 Displacement of people**

Election violence in Kenya has led to massive displacement of people. Just before, during and after 1992 multi-party elections, many land owners considered non indigenous were evicted from the lands in Molo. By 1998, the IDP population in the Molo stood at 30,000 people.<sup>65</sup>

The Nakuru Branch of Red Cross Society also prepared a report in February 2008 about the IDPs conditions in Molo. According to the report, there were over 30,000 displaced households with Kuresoi Division halving over 5,000 IDPs.

In December 2008, the Ministry of State for Special Programs in conjunction with UNHCR and the Kenya National Bureau of Statists', released a report which indicated that the 2007/08 PEV produced 663,921 IDPs<sup>66</sup>. The report indicated that Molo district had approximately 22,000 IDPs in December 2007. According to the report, the IDPs consisted of over 90% Kikuyus and the rest were either Luhyas, Luos and in some places Kalenjins.

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<sup>65</sup> Nowrojee,B, '*Human Rights Protection; Looking at the Experience of UNDP in Kenya*' *The Mustard Seed* Washington DC, Jesuit Refugee Service, 1998, pp 12-17

<sup>66</sup> The National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project, Report on Implementation of Agenda Item 2 January 2009, Report found at [http://www.south.co.ke/Downloads/Peports/Agenda\\_2.pdf](http://www.south.co.ke/Downloads/Peports/Agenda_2.pdf), Accessed on 18<sup>th</sup> January 2014.



### **2.6.3 Loss of life**

According to the Report of the National Accord Implementation Committee of March 2008, the 2007/08 post-election violence caused an estimated loss of 1,200 lives and displacement of 350,000 people in the country. Molo region had a total of 99 deaths during the 2007/2008 PEV. After every election, police records indicated increase in cases of unreported deaths, unclaimed bodies and people reporting disappearance of relatives.

In Molo, as elsewhere, other incidents like isolated case of murder of an individual over land, pasture or business or political campaigns easily led to breach a peaceful co-existence and eventually to a protracted violence.

### **2.6.4 Economic impacts**

Conflicts in the region led to forceful displacements, loss of production, destruction of infrastructure, closure of business and more economic losses. The 2007/2008 PEV in Kenya resulted to a massive destruction of property estimated at 90 billion shillings country wide and general destruction of social and economic life.<sup>67</sup>

During the study, majority of the respondents in business (90%) observed that, conflicts caused closure of business leading to loss of stock and income. When there was violence or threats of violence shops remained closed and criminals took advantage of conflicts to break and steal from business people. All trades were disrupted including those operating open airs, small shops, hotels, private hospitals and many other businesses.

Conflicts in the region combined with other factors to compound the problem of unemployment in Molo. Conflicts effected farming which was a major employer in the area. With little investments in the region, there were few new job opportunities and economic opportunities.

These conflicts also led to loss of domestic animals and harvests. There was loss of market for agricultural products since farmers abandoned their farms during conflicts. Continued disruption of farming also caused loss of income for farmers due to poor yields and lack of market. It also resulted to interruption of learning for children, breakdown of relationships and families and general increase in poverty.

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<sup>67</sup> Waki Report, 2008

The increased insecurity during conflicts made markets and shops inaccessible, public service vehicles were withdrawn from roads leading to further losses.

### **2.6.5 Human right abuses**

It is during conflicts that most abuses were committed in Molo. Women and children globally are affected by conflicts more than other members of the society. Conflicts in Molo spurred sexual violence against women. Police records indicated increased reports of rape during conflicts. For instance, there was a 85% increase in abuse against women in December 2007. Conflicts also rendered women and children more vulnerable to hunger, loss of income and loss of maternal health care. Survivors of abuse and other atrocities lived with terrifying memories seeking justice that was not forthcoming.

### **2.5.6 Increased crime incidents**

Police records in Molo showed an increase in crime during and after conflicts. There were increases in murders, incitements, assaults, house breakings, arsons and other conflict related crimes. The repeated conflicts in Molo left people with more sophisticated weapons mainly guns. After the 2007/08 post-election violence, there was a higher demand for guns in Molo. There was an increase in application for licensed fire arms holders. More illegal firearms have found their way in to Molo; this could be in preparation for future conflicts<sup>68</sup>.

### **2.7 Conclusion**

As noted in the study, Molo conflicts can be traced back to the 1990s after the introduction of multiparty democracy in Kenya. These conflicts affected the people of Molo in many aspects of their lives. The impacts were political, social, economic and environmental. Although the main conflicting parties were Kikuyus and Kalenjins who were the majority, even the minor ethnic communities in the region including Kisii, Luhya and Ogieks were affected either directly or indirectly.

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<sup>68</sup> Oral Interview , OCPD Molo, Molo Police Station 10/04,2014

As seen in the study, land and politics were the main causes of conflicts in the region. Issues of ownership of land where huge tracks of land are owned by few members of a certain community needed to be addressed, politics had worsened this problem of land with it becoming the major tool for political campaigns. Difference in cultures, negative ethnicity, poverty and failure by the government agencies was also blamed for worsening conflicts in the region.

In the region, displacement was a major impact of the continued conflicts. The study found out majority of those displaced takes time before resettling back to their land. Even the returnee were faced by problems of insecurity and integrating of returning IDPs with other members of societies takes time due to previous abuses and crimes that needed to be addressed.

## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 PEACE BUILDING IN MOLO

#### 3.1 Introduction

Peace-building measures involve all levels of society and target all aspects of the state structure. They therefore require a wide variety of agents for their implementation. These agents advance peace-building efforts by addressing functional and emotional dimensions in specified target areas, including civil society and legal institutions.<sup>69</sup>

Peace building requires public-private partnerships in addressing conflict and great coordination among the various actors. International governmental organizations, national governments, bilateral donors, and international and local NGOs need to coordinate their efforts to ensure that every dollar invested in peace building is spent wisely. While external agents can facilitate and support peace building, ultimately it must be driven by internal forces since it cannot be imposed from the outside.<sup>70</sup>

Peace building in Molo can be termed unsuccessful as seen in repeated post-election violence. Violence was experienced in 1992, 1997, 2002 and the worst of all in 2007. Every election has resulted to violent inter-clan clashes in Molo resulting to loss of life, destruction of property and displacement of persons. Many interventions have failed to solve this problem permanently. Many stakeholders have put their efforts in building permanent peace in Molo but this has not permanently brought this peace. Numerous resolutions or peace management strategies have been put in place but none of them seem sustainable in creating an atmosphere of peace, security and coexistence. This chapter looked at the peace building processes in Molo with emphasis on agents of peace building, and their interface or lack of it with the police and their consequences.

#### 3.2 Entrepreneurs (Business People) in Peace Building

One of the key actors in post-conflict economies are indigenous entrepreneurs, or local actors who either through necessity or opportunity undertake new financial ventures, often creating and applying innovations in the process. Capital flight during conflict results in an economy that has

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<sup>69</sup> Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. "Building Peace: Challenges and Strategies After Civil War," The World Bank Group (2001). [available at: <http://www.chs.ubc.ca/srilanka/.pdf> 13<sup>th</sup> January 2014

<sup>70</sup> Jeong Ho-Won , Peace Building in Post Conflict Societies ; Strategies and Processes : USA ,Lynne Rienner, 2005

been lacking in investments over a long period of time. Not surprisingly, most private economic agents are unwilling to invest in politically uncertain times that are often accompanied by continued physical insecurities in parts of the state, macro-economic instability, pervasive corruption and weak governance and regulatory environments. The degradation of human capital during conflict, due to the lack of investment in education and inability to deliver education services, poor health resulting from a lack of health services, inadequate nutrition and physical and mental trauma sustained from violent conflict, present further challenges to economic growth.<sup>71</sup>

In Molo, entrepreneurs were able to overcome many of the post-conflict challenges that other businesses and foreign investors found insurmountable. While investment during conflict and in the period following were low due to the high-level of risk, local entrepreneurs typically had highly liquid investments and assets, and, often due to the nature and smaller scale of operations, tended to be flexible enough to respond to both the volatility and the rapidly changing needs that are characteristic of the period after the end of violent conflict. Small business people and shop keepers ensured adequate supply of food stuffs such as maize flour, sugar, rice and other necessities in IDP camps and other areas.

This flexibility and responsiveness allowed entrepreneurs to play a critical role in the delivery of public goods and services essential in the post-conflict period. Driven by both necessity and opportunity, local business people were found filling the gap left by weak government institutions during conflict, for example in the delivery of basic goods and services such as clothing and medicine. A chemist attendant who also operated a clinic reported. “After the 1997 conflict, I almost closed my chemists after being out of business for four months; a lot of my stock expired and had to throw it away after the conflicts. However, during the 2007/2008 post-election violence, I continued selling my drugs in refugee camps and other public place. I operated mobile chemist using a motor bike.”<sup>72</sup>

The chemist reported that, many IDPs called him using mobile phones and he delivered drugs and bandages. Through his movements he was able to supply not only medicines but also vital

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid

<sup>72</sup> Oral Interview ; Chemist Attendant Alfred Kinyua 11<sup>th</sup> April 2014

intelligence to the police leading to arrests of armed men. At one time in Michigwi, he reported to have treated two young men who had gun wounds, he informed the DC and the group was arrested and several guns, kerosene, bows and arrows were recovered from the group.

On whether police played their roles to protect their businesses and ensure peace, he pointed out several cases he was arrested while delivering drugs to IDP camps and could only be released after bribing the police. He also blamed the reactive nature of the police where they came in after shops and businesses were burned down and made no arrest.

Safaricom mobile money (M-pesa) entrepreneurs generated creative solutions which made money available to the people in conflict areas. During the conflict periods, most banks in Molo closed down. Equity, Family and Cooperative banks closed down between December 20<sup>th</sup>, 2007 and Mid-January 2008. With closure of these banks, customers were not able to access money from the banks. Safaricom M-pesa offered a quick solution to this. Even in IDP camps, it was easy to get an M-pesa agent who had escaped from their shops and living in Camps.

However, most business people in Molo blamed the police for doing little to protect them. They reported to have incurred huge losses due to this insecurity. The business that suffered most were the consumer good dealers. At one time, there was a police imposed curfew in Molo meaning people did not go out to buy things leading to loss of profits.

The police benefited by charging protection fee in order to secure some business premises. Small scale could not afford the expensive police hire services while the large scale businesses operated through the period.

### **3.3 Women and Peace Building in Molo.**

In light of the growing number of armed conflicts and their differential impact on women, the international community has reached consensus on the need to include women in all aspects of decision-making related to peace. The Beijing Platform for Action adopted by 189 governments at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, clearly defined – under Strategic Objective E.1 – the need to ‘increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making

levels' including conflict prevention and resolution, post-conflict reconstruction, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building'.<sup>73</sup>

In Molo, women regardless of tribe joined hands to help each other during and after conflict. One of the victims of 2007/08 PEV pointed out in this in the interview "The war came without our knowledge. Unlike my husband who ran to the forest after our house was burnt, I could not leave our three children. After looking for places to hide, I went in to my neighbor's home. Although, a Kalenjin who were purported to be our enemies, they hosted me and my children for nine days"<sup>74</sup>

She blamed the police for doing little to protect them. Although notified of impending attacks, the police according to her did very little to protect them from being attacked. After their houses were burnt down, she gave the police the name of the suspects who were arrested the following day only to be released the following day after some politicians demanded they be released. To make them better, she suggested all police officers who were in Molo during 2007/2008 PEV should be investigated. New officers should be posted to the area and more stations be built.

Women also maintained their families in camps. They solicited for food, either relief or from other sources. In IDP camps women operated small shops and which made food stuffs and other important items available in the camps. Those women sold among others items batteries, soap, salt, skin lotion, sugar, medicine and detergent. Traders would come from Molo and other towns with these products and sold them to the women who would repackage and sell at a profit to fellow IDPs depending on how much money they had. They also operated small farms near the camps which were sources of food.<sup>75</sup>

Madam Chief of Turi reported that, after war, women have been able to bring families and tribes together to engage in peace building. The administrator reported that, women were able to proactively bring fellow women together to resist political incitement. Women leaders were

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<sup>73</sup> Klot, Jeniffer ."UNDP/BCPR Gender Mainstreaming in Crisis prevention and Recovery", A Froward Looking Review. (Februeary 2006)

<sup>74</sup> Oral Interview; Mrs. Jane Kiori 12<sup>th</sup> April 2014

<sup>75</sup> Oral Interview Former IDP Jecinta Wangari 12<sup>th</sup> April 2014

deployed in every political meeting who are able to monitor speech by aspirants during campaigns.<sup>76</sup>

Police in Molo according to the lady chief worked tirelessly to respond to crime during conflict. Together with AP officers, the chief visited villages preaching peace, distributing relief and in many cases accompanying other stake holders to offer assistance. However, she blamed the police commanders for disclosing to the criminals the source of intelligence information. She was at one time threatened with death when she informed the police of a man who was in possession of stolen livestock. She also blamed poor police preparedness, lack of equipment and corruption as a major drawback to police peace building efforts.

According to Molo OCPD, the 2007/08 post-election violence had a high proportion of women who experienced multiple rapes and associated injuries and infections.

**Table 3.1; Comparison between sexual violence cases reported between December/January 2007/08 and December/January 2012/13**

Station	December 2007 and January 2008	December 2012 and January 2013
Molo	4	Nil
Keringet	5	1
Elburgon	3	1
Kuresoi	4	1
Total	16	3

(Source: Molo Police division record, 2014 )

The results shows rape cases were more (84%) during 2007/08 period than the same time 2013/14 when there is general peace.

According to the Molo OCPD, sexual violence during conflicts periods could be more than those reported. Victims were either busy searching for safety and the suspect were rarely known. Victims referred to hospital did not report back to the station. He noted that, in many cases the victims had no one particular suspect leading to collapse of cases and failure in the investigations. Health facilities in Molo which could have dealt with the effects of rape, and

<sup>76</sup> Oral Interview assistant Chief Mrs Peris Mwangi; Turi ,Mona . 11<sup>th</sup> April 2014



specialist support for such mothers and children, consistently gave low priority to women since they were dealing with so many conflict related injuries, and specialists were rarely available.<sup>77</sup>

This showed a police service either limited with investigation skill or not willing to prosecute sexual offenders. There were no skilled officers to investigate and handle sexual related offences in any police station in Molo. Police in Molo therefore failed to protect women against tribal and political violence. In some cases, police committed atrocities against women, several women who were community leaders and activist were reportedly arrested and harassed by police. Both police and civilians who perpetrated abuses against were therefore left uninvestigated which represents a total miscarriage of justice and longer lasting pain to women.

### **3.4 Religious Organizations**

Over 90% of the respondent agreed that the Molo conflicts were not religious in nature; religious differences were not the cause of conflict and religious leaders played no part in the conduct of the wars. However, owing to the identification of religion with national identity and the hatred stirred up by the ethno-religious rhetoric of nationalist leaders, there was tension in churches where members came from different ethnic communities as reported by most respondents.

Many religious leaders were said to have done very little to condemn those who started the conflicts and they signally failed to expose or denounce atrocities done by their own followers. A pastor with Full Gospel Churches of Kenya reported that, in seeking to identify with their own tribes, religious leaders forgave their followers who burned other people's houses and seemed to justify such actions. They did not preach peace during 2007/08 PEV. Many churches were burned and unlike elsewhere the churches didn't offer refuge to victims. After the 2007/08 PEV the pastors formed an association Molo Pastors and Preachers Association (MPPA) which have carried out massive peace building in the region<sup>78</sup>.

On police and peace building, the religious leader reported that the police in Molo patrolled conflicts areas. They arrested and shot dead many armed criminals which reduced tension. However, they were limited by corruption, lawlessness, and lack of training. According to the pastor, most of the police officers in Molo were biased and always took sides during conflicts.

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<sup>77</sup> Oral Interview OCPD Molo 16<sup>th</sup> April 2013

<sup>78</sup> Oral Interview Religious leader in Molo. 16<sup>th</sup> April 2014

They therefore required to be moved elsewhere and properly trained officers deployed in Molo comprising less Kikuyu and Kalenjin officers.

The National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK) operated a mobile office in Molo. The council offered relief food for IDPs as well as carrying out frequent medical services in IDP camps. The council among other things also carried out frequent Joint Police and Public Security Forums in Molo. An official in Molo office praised some police for their effort to protect NCCCK staff and their supplies. However, she suggested deployment of more police officers, skills enhancement as well transferring those who had overstayed in Molo in order to improve their peace building efforts.

The Catholic Diocese of Nakuru (CDN) was active in peace building. The diocese among other things was involved in relief funding, victim identification and assistance, peace monitoring among another tasks. The Dioceses organized public meetings in Kuresoi and Olenguruone for the purpose of reconciliation and reconstruction. Through such Barazas, speakers were allowed to express themselves on what led to conflicts and suggested solutions for future peace. Many perpetrators came forward to express their regrets and seek forgiveness. The Dioceses then asked the youths to compose poems and plays with peace messages and winners were awarded motorbikes.<sup>79</sup> Their reports pointed out areas where the Diocese staff could not access due to armed insecurity. According to the report, the areas had many illegal weapons and there were no police officers on the ground.

### **3.5 Civil Society**

Non-combatant civilians are the main targets of violence and civilian deaths are the vast majority of all casualties. Conflicts cause Forcible displacement, massacres, women and children abductions, recruitment of children as soldiers, environmental destruction and economic collapse. It also creates profound impoverishment, the legacies of crippling bitterness, fear and division. These are some of the many reasons why civil society actors feel compelled to use their

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<sup>79</sup> Alumina Report, 1996-2006). Catholic Diocese of Nakuru. Nakuru; Nakuru Press

energy and creativity to find alternatives to violence, to end wars, and prevent them from starting or reoccurring.<sup>80</sup>

An NGO, Centre for Conflict Resolution Kenya, made enormous strides in peace building. This organization organized many workshops and trainings in Molo to among other things strengthen the capacity of the local communities on various ways of conflict management, peace building, early warning and civic education. Together with other organizations, the NGO have annually organized road shows and other programs especially during the International Day of Peace which is observed on 21<sup>st</sup> September.

Youths on Human Rights, an NGO based in Nakuru was able to identify the central agenda of issues that needed to be addressed in responding to conflicts in Molo and dealt with peace and security issues more widely. One of its officials in Molo had this to report, “We organized forums and provided awareness on importance of human rights and peace. We also strengthened police and citizen peace committees, supported peace tournaments and been seeking engagement of local leaders for peace.”<sup>81</sup>

He blamed the police for not doing enough to enforce and maintain peace in Molo. According to the official, politicians and individual who directly or indirectly financed conflicts in the region were profiled. This report was shared with the police and a confidential detailed report availed to them. The report included names of police officers who were directly involved in the Molo conflict. The police did not arrest any of those criminals nor did they take action against their fellow officers who participated in the conflicts.

To boost police role in peace building, he suggested skills enhancement, additional officers, better remuneration and more importantly disciplinary action to the officers who failed in their duties.

The civil society also played a role in early warning of emerging crises; monitoring, analysis, and communication strategies to raise awareness and generate attention. The National Council for Churches in Kenya (NCCCK), Nakuru region have been involved in this in view of preventing

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<sup>80</sup> Mullojanov, Parviz. 2001. “Civil Society and Peacebuilding “ *Politics of compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process*, ACCOR. No. 10 March

<sup>81</sup> Oral Interview, Mr Osiemo Patrick, Official Youths On Human Right 11<sup>th</sup> April 2014.

future conflicts. They have trained independent peace monitors and deployed them across the region with a view of collecting information and reporting to relevant authorities any sign of conflict. They have also trained government officers and other stakeholders on conflict and peace building. After the 2007/08 PEV, they helped establishment of safe IDP camps, gave them food and other amenities and provided a mobile clinic for all camps. During the ‘*Operation Rundi Nyumbani*’ (government initiative to return IDPs back to their homes) the group worked very closely with the government to identify genuine IDPs for compensation and support.

Many NGOs were very instrumental during resettlement of IDPs following the 2007/08 disputed elections. Catholic Justice and Peace which operates an office in Nakuru and a mobile office in Molo provided building materials and construction experts to the returnees. They also provided cloths, medicine and beddings among other humanitarian assistance.

Civil society activists were able to accomplish what the government could not do: to create sufficient pressure to bring together former warriors in to a table. On 21<sup>st</sup> September 2008, with the support of Catholic Diocese of Nakuru, Egerton University, Kenya Red Cross Society; Nakuru and other partners, a group of university students mobilized many of the former combatants into a peace walk and a football match at Molo stadium. They relied on road shows and elaborate tactics to engage the different communities and break through the fear of the former combatants. After the walk which was flagged off by the then provincial Commissioner, many youths came up to be prayed for by a group of senior pastors from Molo. Two homemade guns were surrendered by a group of youths from Kuresoi amongst many bows and arrows. In the competition, Kikuyu, Kalenjin and Kisii youths joined together in a football march not for a winner but as a sign of reconciliation. A group of combined women from various Churches in Molo performed joined songs that promoted peace and reconciliation. The youths spray-painted humorous and eye catching graffiti, disseminated T-shirts and badges, and self-organized written peace poems to the amusements of the attendants. In attendance were senior police officers who held lengthy talks and promised amnesty to the former combatants who surrendered to the police.

### **3.6 Youths and Peace Building**

As of today almost half of the world’s population (48%) is under the age of 24 and of these 18% or more than one billion people are defined as youths. Strengthening international mechanisms

that specifically address youth needs is not only a demographic and democratic imperative, but also crucial in preventing conflicts from escalating.<sup>82</sup>

According to the Assistant county Commissioner of Elburgon, youths in Molo repeatedly contributed to over 70% of conflicts. They were used for a variety of reasons by politicians in the area. The young people, many of whom were unemployed, were used as tools for electioneering by unscrupulous politicians who often encourage and pay them to use violence to achieve their ends. They were given drugs and money to disrupt rival political meetings and there were cases of use of violence leading to injuries.<sup>83</sup>

He reported that the government had been focusing on empowering young people through education since education was a priority and the key to successful peace building. To him, the Administration Police adequately provided peace and were willing to take part in all peace activities. However, he blamed the KPS for not taking their duties with seriousness. He also noted poor sharing of information amongst security agencies with each operating independently. The ACC therefore suggested a more coordinated security operations with central command to carry out disarmament and enforce peace in Molo. Frequent transfers were affecting their operations and he suggested posting specially trained police officers with better understanding of peace and conflict management.

Chairperson of Kuresoi Youths Forum reported that, youths in Kuresoi felt neglected in decision making and were not used as agents in peace building. According to him, many NGOs in this region had been unable to utilize the youths. They target both aged men and women leading to failure of peace building. He pointed out that it was the youths that burnt houses and fight since they had the energy and were easily manipulated.<sup>84</sup>

The respondent further reported that, these young people often face the additional barriers of lack of trust with the police. The police he said were biased and usually arrest innocent youths which have worsened police and youths relationships. On community policing, the respondent said the police preferred working with the aged men and women therefore neglecting the youths in crime management. Police also were blamed for corruption during recruitment leading to incompetent

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<sup>82</sup> United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 50/81 of 13 March 1996.

<sup>83</sup> Oral Interview; Mr. Patrick Manthi; Assistant County Commissioner Elburgon . 11<sup>th</sup> April 2014.

<sup>84</sup> Oral Interview, Nicholas; Chairperson, Kuresoi Youths Forum 12<sup>th</sup> April 2014.

youths being recruited in the region. To make them effective peace managers, the police according to him should be retrained, better paid and only those with sufficient education should be recruited.

Youths have also used Art as a tool for peace building. The chairperson for Molo Na Fanaka a group consisting of 35 members aged between 16 and 35 years of different tribal backgrounds was interviewed. According to him, there can never be peace in Molo unless youths are actively involved.<sup>85</sup> The group was formed to promote a healthy image of youth participation in public policy discussion in the region, and dispel the notion of youth and crime.

The respondent blamed the police for killing many youths and physically injuring them during the 2007/08 conflict. The police according to him took advantage of the curfews to arrest and collect money from innocent youths. Unlawful fines were paid by the youths in police stations and even chief camps. For those who were not able to pay the money, they were taken to court and jailed for allegedly committing criminal offences. He called authorities to thoroughly investigate the police who were in Molo for extra judicial killing even before entrusting them with peace building.

Youths in Molo have been trained on poverty eradication as a way to empower them against misuse by politicians. The Deputy Commissioner, Molo praised the youths in their efforts for peace building. The Programs on poverty eradication had been organized to pass the message to youth to avoid taking money, and other things from leaders, who in turn would be used by the leaders to create conflict in their community in particular and their country in general. They have been trained on cattle rearing, proper farming techniques, poultry and fish farming, bee keeping etc. the commissioner reported to have invited financial institutions to give loans to youth groups.<sup>86</sup>

Youths in Molo have together with the Police jointly organized sporting activities with a theme of promoting peace and coexistence. On 18<sup>th</sup> April 2009, there was a major football and volleyball tournament organized by Molo District Youth Officer. The teams comprised of youths drawn from various divisions and a condition was that, each team had to have at least

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<sup>85</sup> Oral Interview James Korir; chairperson Molo Na Fanaka 12<sup>th</sup> April 2014

<sup>86</sup> Oral interview; Mr Kavita Deputy county commissioner Molo. 11<sup>th</sup> April 2014

representatives of two tribes. The tournament was attended by many government officers, politicians, civil society representatives and prominent business people. The winning team; Keringet Youths later played with a team comprising police officers drawn from Administration police, Kenya police and Anti-Stock police Unit. During the game there were entertainments by groups drawn from Molo region. The Molo District AP Commander Mr. Kanyeki gave out trophies and other gifts to the teams. He also had a projector displaying photos and videos with peace messages.

### **3.7 Conclusion**

Peace building is therefore an umbrella concept that encompasses not only long-term transformative efforts, but also peacemaking and peace keeping. It encompasses early warning and responsive efforts, violence prevention, ceasefire agreements, establishment of peace zones, advocacy work, civilian and military peace work, humanitarian assistance and much more which has social, economic, and political foundations that serve the needs of the population. All these cannot be done by few players but all stakeholders' roles must be put into proper use. Most peace building agents in Molo had a consensus that the police had not done enough to ensure success of peace. They pointed out why the police were not successful and also suggested solutions to such shortcomings.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4.0 POLICE AND PEACE BUILDING**

#### **4.1 ROLES OF POLICE IN PEACE BUILDING**

##### **4.1.1 Introduction**

Post conflict peace building requires integrated efforts where all stakeholders are brought on board. Its proper management is an important task in transforming adversarial relationships. In a time when the world is divided in its approach to promoting security, the UN has championed a more holistic approach, as embodied in the former UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan's observation that: "The world must advance the causes of security, development and human rights together, otherwise none will succeed. Humanity will not enjoy security without development, it will not enjoy development without security, and it will not enjoy either without respect for human rights."<sup>87</sup>

In general, this chapter seeks to give an insight on the role of police in post conflict peace building. It seeks to find out if these roles were adopted in the Molo case and the consequences to peace building in the region.

The roles range from the primary duties of police officers like protection of life and property to more complex duties such as peace education, peace monitoring and their roles in Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commissions.

This chapter also gives an analysis of data collected from both police officers and civilians on their views on police participation in peace building.

##### **4.1.2 Preventing Resurgence of conflict**

One of the most urgent tasks in initial stages of peace building is to prevent a resurgence of violence and provide public security so that basic societal functions can be protected. This

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<sup>87</sup> Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General UN. 21 March 2005. A/59/2005. <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm>. accessed in 14th April 2014



maintenance of cessation of all violent conflict is the foundation for a peaceful transition and social reconstruction.<sup>88</sup>

As a critical early step, security in former conflict areas should be put in place to prevent recurrence of violence. The police play a direct role in reducing tension and suspicion before they engage on further actions including prosecution and disarmament by collecting illegal firearms from the public.

In Molo there were few preventive measures to ensure the areas formerly affected with the fighting were safe before other general elections. There was little police presence in areas like Kuresoi, Kapsita, Michigwi and Kamwaura all vast areas served with very few police if any. These were conflict hotspots which have suffered resurgence of conflict after every election. The exemption was that before the 2012 election, many police were deployed in these area and the results were positive. Any attempt to disrupt peace was met with arrests and prosecution. But after the peaceful elections, the police were withdrawn therefore exposing these areas to future conflicts.<sup>89</sup>

**Table 4.1 Police Detection on Conflict Early Warning Signs**

		Frequency	Percent
Do you have any training on conflict early warning systems t	Yes	5	16
	No	25	84
	N	30	100

(Source: Field Data, 2014)

All the police officers interviewed responded to have experienced conflicts while in service. However only five (16%) had received some training on peace and conflict. This left the majority 84% without formal skill on peace building only to relay on their police training skills.

On response to conflicts, Police in Molo responded violence after it occurred. There were little preventive measures. Police did not engage on Intelligence collection. They resorted to arrests,

<sup>88</sup> Ibid

<sup>89</sup> Oral Interview Chief Inspector of Police Peter Kuta, 18<sup>th</sup> January 2014

warnings and prosecution. Years after 2007/2008 violence, there were no new stations in hot spot areas and no major plan to sustain the existing peace.

### 4.1.3 Maintaining Law and Order

In most post conflict setting, the police role in provision of public security is considered in the context of protection of group and individual wellbeing and to put an end to human rights violations by both the state and none state agents. This security is both for the victims as well as the perpetrators of conflicts and violence. Public safety and order cannot be assured without suppressing murder, violent assault and other criminal offences. Law and order as well as international human right law must be observed. This can be done by the local police and where the police force is insufficient or missing soldiers can serve as a public security force.<sup>90</sup>

Molo tribal conflict was characterized by general lawlessness, revenge attacks, looting, theft and organized crime. This could be prevented through building local capabilities to ensure internal security. Security could not be guaranteed until criminal structures which operated during conflicts were destroyed. The local police could have tackled unorganized mob violence, protect property and basic human rights as well as reinstate basic public order in post conflict societies. Most respondent 85% believed the police did not do enough to prevent conflict in areas of their deployment. They blamed this on numbers, skills, and lack equipment among other reasons.

**Table 4.2 How the police responded to conflicts in Molo**

Police response to conflict	No	%
Maintaining law and order	15	50
Providing security to stake holders	6	20
Investigation of violence	3	10
Peace Education	3	10
Enforcement of curfew	Nil	Nil
Disarmament	1	3
Total	30	100

(Source: Field Data 2014)

<sup>90</sup> Jeong Ho-Won, 2005

The former Molo Sub county AP Commander praised the police for their ensuring peace and order before and after the 2012 elections. This was due to their pre-planning and proactive nature of their deployment. He noted that with police presence, few people were willing to disrupt peace, law and order. Previously, the politicians took advantage of police ineffectiveness to incite their tribesmen during campaigns. In 2012, there was adequate police presence in every political gathering, any politicians who tried to incite others was summoned in the station and warned with arrest. The politicians committed themselves before the police to observe peace with even their rivals. According to him, several arrests were made and an aspiring MP was held up in police custody for a day for incitement. He promised to observe peace during the campaigns which he did.<sup>91</sup>

#### **4.1.4 Enforcing Cease Fire.**

A ceasefire (or truce) is a temporary stoppage of a war whereby each side agrees to suspend aggressive actions. Ceasefires may be declared as part of a formal treaty, but they have also been called as part of an informal understanding between opposing forces. Third parties are able to enforce the terms of a peace agreement that the combatant parties would agree to.<sup>92</sup> Once Cease fire has been obtained, aid agencies can finally access areas where children and families have been suffering due to the conflict.

In Molo, there were cases where some agencies feared being attacked. Police should have offered armed escort to ensure this aid is accessed by all those in need. A former Red Cross volunteer reported that during the 2007/08 violence, armed police escorted them whenever they went to distribute food and other supplies. Many times, the police had to fire in the air to penetrate some barricaded routes. In Tamiota, police had to threaten to shoot young men who attempted to burn their vehicle claiming it was supplying votes. They were taking drugs to Kuresoi dispensary. If the police were not there they could have burned the car and even killed the Red Cross staff.<sup>93</sup>

A small contingents of local security apparatus in Salvador and Nicaragua for example deployed before the UN peace keepers made it easier and provided the logistical support making it easier

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<sup>91</sup> Oral Interview; Mr Muriithi ;Molo Sub County AP Commander; 12<sup>th</sup> April 2014

<sup>92</sup> Ludovic Hood, 2006

<sup>93</sup> Oral Interview, Jane Wigwa , Former Red Cross Official 16<sup>th</sup> April 2014

for these UN peace keepers operations.<sup>94</sup> The local security personnel created confidence to the UN Mission, a stronger force deployed to disarm the illegal local illegally armed functions.

In enforcing cease fire, the security personnel in Molo could have applied rules of engagement to reduce violence by controlling any group that reneged on its commitments to a cease fire. Police could have applied violence control methods to ensure that both parties respected cease-fire and surrendered all illegal weapons. They were required to create trust and confidence building measures in order to induce cooperation from the parties. In order to recover all the illegal firearms and enforce cease fire, the police could have combined flexible rules of engagement and lawful coercive capabilities. This is because with their investigation, intelligence policing and proactive measures, aggressors and victims could have been easily identified.

#### **4.1.5 Prevention of Ethnically Motivated Crime.**

There are three types of crimes in a post-conflict situation: crimes against the person ( assault, rape, murder); crimes against property (looting, burning houses); and crimes against culture ( attacks against historical sites, religious symbols).Crimes against culture, are the type of crime that involves not physical but rather psychological damage and conveys the implicit message that minorities are not welcome, leading to the latter living in fear and, thus, jeopardizing the reconciliation process.<sup>95</sup>

An elder in Elburgon reported that Prior to the 2007 Elections, they were called *madoadoa* (specks). There was a common ground that Rift Valley was an ODM region and that they belonged to central province. Their houses were burned and their property was taken away including cattle. The police didn't help, they concurred with their attackers that they belonged elsewhere. The elder reported that, most of the police talked the language of the attackers and joined in the attacks.<sup>96</sup>

The police were blamed of being ignorant when a certain community was attacked and sometimes taking sides. A former political aspirant said that the Kalenjin were referred to *Rubwa* by the kikuyus. In political meetings, they were called bad names by aspirants who insisted Molo

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid

<sup>95</sup> Borgeryd, A. J. (2006). *Managing Intercollective Conflict: Prevailing Structures and Global Challenge*. Umea University, Sweden: Umea University.

<sup>96</sup> Oral Interview with elder Mr Kaniaru Elbergon, 16<sup>th</sup> April 2014

is a Kikuyu region and only kikuyu leaders can lead. He was attacked any time he campaigned in areas with Kikuyus as the majority inhabitants. The Police didn't help and where they were present, they responded with excessive force, while in other areas they failed to intervene.<sup>97</sup>

**Table 4.3 Police taking sides in conflicts**

		Frequency	Percent
Did the police took part in the conflicts	Yes	17	68
	No	8	32
	N	25	100.0

(Source: Field Data, 2014)

Police were also blamed for releasing arrested suspects without taking them to court even where there was enough evidence. A chief in Mariashoni reported that, during the 2007/08 PEV, many cases were reported to police with sufficient eyewitness accounts of who the attackers were. In all the cases, police either just did not bother to respond, or arrested a suspect and then released the suspect either the same day or the next day. No statements were recorded and no suspect was arraigned in court. According to Him, the police either took money or else they were protecting their communities.”<sup>98</sup>

#### **4.1.6 Provision of Security and Ensuring Rule of Law**

In post conflict societies, it is crucial to establish and maintain rule of law, and to implement rules and procedures that constrain the powers of all parties and hold them accountable for their actions.<sup>99</sup> The writer notes that can help to ease tension, create stability, and lessen the likelihood of further conflict. Civilians have confidence in an independent police service that can serve as a forum for the peaceful resolution of disputes and post-war grievances. In addition, societies need a police service that deters and punishes banditry and acts of violence.

As Ho-Won Jeong puts it, some components of peace building may be considered more importantly than others in determining success. In measuring the short term success of peace building, security can be weighed more heavily that such components as political transition, economic rehabilitation and others. Police will play these important short term components of

<sup>97</sup> Oral Interview a former political spirant and currently a Youth Leader at Molo 14<sup>th</sup> April 2014

<sup>98</sup> Oral Interview , Mr Samson Salim ;chief Mariashoni Location 14<sup>th</sup> April 2014

<sup>99</sup> Michael Doyle, 2001

peace building and contribute to the long term components such a peace education, investigations and truth justice and reconciliation.

In Molo, during conflicts, there were areas where humanitarian assistance could not be provided. This is because roads were blocked and volunteers were threatened which prevented free and open passage of supplies. In Kuresoi for instance, after conflict broke in 2007/2008, Red Cross had to withdraw its staff because of violence. There was no sufficient security and armed criminals had attacked their staff claiming they were supplying weapons to their rivals. Delivery of aid and assistance to the besieged population living in IDP camps was hampered by a lack of adequate security presence.

Police maintained security for important facilities critical to all people during and after conflict. These included schools, hospitals, banks, food storage facilities and other major and vital installations. These critical facilities were state owned or private ventures that were unrelated to the conflict's core issues and centered on shared interests. The deputy Commissioner confirmed this. According to him, few if any attacks on vital installations occurred in the region. The Police commanders had mapped and ensured adequate police were deployed to such facilities. Keringet Water, the saw mills, Highlands industries, TimSales, Egerton University; Kiptagich Tea factory and many other were all protected by the police. Even the hospitals were under threat and police saved them from the angry mobs who wanted to destroy them. Only two schools were slightly burned Kapsita Primary and one in Kuresoi<sup>100</sup>

#### **4.1.7 Investigation, Judicial Trials and Prosecution**

Unearthing the truth of what happened during conflict is a precondition for socially acknowledging the significance of the injury to the victims. This is because; victims will have an avenue for their statements to be heard as a legitimate source of truth. Indeed, a crucial part of peace building is addressing past wrongdoing while at the same time promoting healing and rule of law.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> Oral interview , Mr Kavita Deputy County Commissioner, Molo Sub-County 23/4/2014

<sup>101</sup> Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. "*Building Peace: Challenges and Strategies After Civil War*," The World Bank Group (2001). [available at: <http://www.chs.ubc.ca/srilanka/.pdf> 13<sup>th</sup> January 2014

The police had a crucial role in attempting to deal with the past criminalities and human rights abuses therefore ensuring that justice was served. It is commonly thought that past injustice must be recognized, and the perpetrators punished if parties wish to achieve reconciliation.

A former IDP who lived in a rented house in Elburgon stated, “I had five acres of tea in Olenguruone, I was chased and resettled in Kapsita in 1997. I know the person who took my land. He belonged to a different tribe and claims that he was given my land and livestock by the government. In Kapsita, I was given three acres of bare land. I put a house which was burned completely in January 2008. I want my land back, the Police should arrest the person who burned my house, they should also give me back my Olenguruone land.”<sup>102</sup>

According to him, the police did not do enough to protect them. They supported their rivals and even supplied guns and funds to the warriors. He therefore suggested having new police officers who will offer genuine security services without taking sides. Those who took part in committing crime according to him should have been punished for that.

Police in Molo could have helped Justice seeking victims by investigating evils of the past. This would also include naming criminals and taking them through trial. Criminal courts are essential parts of peace building and acts as good means for preventing future abuses. Court rulings could have been used to support the rights of the victims to seek repair for the damage both materially and psychologically. Most crimes such as rape, abduction, destruction of property, murder and arson committed during post-election violence were criminal offences punishable by law but they were not investigated nor punished.

#### **4.1.8 Identification and Selection of victims.**

According to Jeong Ho-Won (2005), a new society cannot be built as long as the fate of victims remains shrouded in lies or hidden in sealed records. The police in Molo had a role of identifying prosecution witnesses who were willing to substantiate victims account in a court of law or in a formal public hearing. These could have been relatives of the victims, members of civil societies or any persons who were well represented or present during the violence.

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<sup>102</sup> Oral Interview, Mr. Duncan Mathenge; former IDP Molo; 9<sup>th</sup> April 2014

As reported by the OCPD, victims such as those who were sexually assaulted were not willing to come forward due to shame associated with the acts. The police could have carried out in depth inquiry and identified all women who were sexually assaulted. .

During the operation *Rudi Nyumbani* and other IDP support programs, police in Molo provided vital information which helped identify genuine cases for assistance. Police had records of those who died during PEV, those assaulted, houses and property burnt, sexually assaulted victims and many more victims of conflict related crimes. Such information was important not only for the government and aid agencies but it could also be useful to all peace building stakeholders.

#### **4.1.9 Peace Education**

Many believe that the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture. Parties should strive to understand the cultural dimension of conflict, and identify the mechanisms for handling conflict that exist within that cultural setting<sup>103</sup>. The writer further notes that, Peace building is a process that needs trust and confidence.

The police in Molo needed to work towards redeeming this confidence through peace education programs. The police could have promoted peace education by utilizing local mechanisms for handling disputes which were effective in resolving conflicts and transforming relationships. These initiatives includes those that incorporate citizen-based peace building including police-community peace projects in schools and villages, local peace commissions and problem-solving workshops, and a variety of other grassroots initiatives which police can be part of.

In 2008, a program was started in Nakuru where the civilians were to be trained by the police and deployed to voluntarily monitor peace in their areas. Those peace monitors were supposed to work closely with the local police in all aspects of security and peace. However, the program later collapsed due to lack of funding and follow-up programs. Through such programs, the police can educate the public on peace, security and other important skills. Long-term plans should be put in place to sustain community- police partnership programs.

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<sup>103</sup> Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. 2001



Former Molo AP Commander initiated a youth program where he Visited schools and churches and identified interested youths for leadership programs. The youths who participated in the program and interested in joining the police service and had obtained a good grade in secondary school would be assured a vacancy during recruitment. Through this program, thirteen youths, (9 males and 4 females) joined the police between 2008 and 2011.<sup>104</sup>

**Table 4.4 Police training civilians on peace and security**

		Frequency	Percent
Have you received training on peace and security by police	Yes	9	36
	No	16	64
	N	25	100

(Source: Field Data, 2014)

Police in Molo could have carried out peace education through local radio stations, seminars, workshops, lectures roundtables, classrooms, through community associations and others. Through these channels police could have engage members of the Public through discussions touching on peace and security. They could also utilize chiefs and village elders as channels of communication between communities

#### **4.1.10 Disarmament**

Demilitarization and disarmament are critical steps after fighting parties have agreed to peaceful negotiations. They should seek to eliminate both heavy weapons and small arms from combatants. There cannot be positive peace so long as groups in a conflict are still armed out as originally scheduled. This is because parties may hide arms to facilitate their return to fighting in case a cease fire does not work<sup>105</sup>.

In Molo, there had never been any disarmament. A chief reported that many people illegally obtained fire arms after 1997 election violence. Those with arms were asked to voluntarily surrender the arms to the authority. However, only one person returned a homemade gun to Molo police station in December 1998. Since the parties have refused to cooperate, force may be necessary to get such arms. Police can apply minimum force in order to collect these weapons

<sup>104</sup> Oral Interview; Mr Gitahi Kanyeki ;former AP Commander; 16<sup>th</sup> June 2014

<sup>105</sup> Magnard, Kimberly, Healing Communities in Confclitl; International Assiatance in Complex Emergencies. New York . Columbia University Press, 1999

and ammunitions after they carry out a survey to know who owns illegal firearms. This can be facilitated by Police-Community committees formed through community policing. Police will also ensure security for all parties since disarmament and demilitarization may be unsuccessful until the worrying parties are guaranteed on their security.

Disarmament has been very successful where there is an agreed upon plan to integrate combatants in to the national army or in the security forces.<sup>106</sup> The police in Molo as elsewhere could have recruited the qualified youths who voluntarily surrender their arms. This would be a motivating factor for youths to surrender small arms in Molo.

In Molo, the OCPD blamed the post conflict armed crime to the proliferation of small arms in to the region which had been acquired during and after 2007/08 post-election violence. After the violence, many people in the region in anticipation of future conflicts embarked on acquiring fire arms. However, these same firearms have found their way in to criminal hands leading to an increased rate of armed robbery. Although the police are making every efforts to recovers such firearms, their efforts could have been integrated with other peace building programs using other stakeholders to make it more effective.

After a successful disarmament, police could have minimized chances of rearmament. Strict screening of residents, sharing of information, police community participation, crime detection and investigations could be adopted to ensure no illegal firearms were obtained after successful disarmaments. By ensuring all parties adequate and quality security, the community would see no need of taking firearms to secure themselves.

#### **4.1.11 Early Warning**

Conflict Early Warning consists of data collection, risk analysis and transmission of information with recommendation to targeted recipients. The receiving agencies has role to receive and share information concerning potential conflict, undertake analysis of the information and develop case scenarios and formulate options for response.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid

<sup>107</sup> Brown, S., Doe, S. G., Nyheism, D & Rosenbhn, K. (2005). *Early Warning Early Response, Conflict Prevention and Post-conflict Reconstruction Network*. Retrieved from Governance , Social Development and Human Conflicts: [www.gsdr.org/index.cfm?objected](http://www.gsdr.org/index.cfm?objected) 14<sup>th</sup> May 2014

There have been recurring violent inter-ethnic conflicts in Molo every five years since the dawn of multiparty democracy in Kenya in 1990s. Whereas the major of all conflicts was that of 2007/2008 PEV, Waki commission noted that, long before the 2007 elections there were every indication of repeated conflicts in the region. This was consisted to the KNCHR report on Kenya 2007 election violence. For example, on 9<sup>th</sup> November 2006, attackers from Ogilge burnt houses in Mwaragania Molo District and killed a businessman in the area. Police did nothing to stop the attack although they had received the information one week before. Further the reports noted that leading politicians in the area including aspiring Members of Parliaments and MCAs incited their communities against others.<sup>108</sup> Police would be required to monitoring these indicators of rising tensions and then take measures to erase them.

Before the 2010 constitutional referendum, police commanders in Molo were able to map the region and deployed the officers in advance. Extra officers had been deployed since tensions had risen following the referendum campaigns. By being prepared in advance, the police were able to avert any violence. There was adequate preparedness and any sign of violence was dealt with before it escalated to conflict. However, most of those police officers were withdrawn after the referendum only to be redeployed before the 2013 to again prevent violence. The police require a systematic understanding of how conflict develops so that early warning could be noticed and analyzed to prevent conflict escalation. This police intervention should could include a wide set of actions, including community policing and deployment of national Intelligence officers, additional police stations among others.

There are concerns about the quality and reliability of the information collected, and a possible trade-off between speed and accuracy.<sup>109</sup> In Molo, the negative public perception of the police affected their relationship and communications. The respondent reported instances where they provided confidential information but the police ended disclosing and thereby exposing the reporter to danger. There was a need therefore to monitor and vet officers before deploying them to conflict prone areas in Molo.

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<sup>108</sup> Oral Interview Retired Police Michael Kigwe 14<sup>th</sup> April, 2014

<sup>109</sup> Pham, P.N., & Vinck, P. (2012). Technology, conflict early warning systems, public health, and human rights. *Health and Human Rights Journal*, 14(2), 106-117

**Table 4.5: Police Detection on Conflict Early Warning Signs**

		Frequency	Percent
Did you detect conflict early warning signs?	Yes	5	16.66
	No	25	83.33
	N	30	100

(Source: Field Data, 2014)

Effective conflict early warning and early response by police also required special skills and training. Only 25% the police respondents utilized conflict early warning systems. The rests only depended on their basic police skills to prevent and respond to conflicts. It trained the police would have ability to effectively monitor the changing conflict dynamics on multiple different levels. They could involve other local actors with good local knowledge leading to timely, sensitive and adequate responses to incidents. Molo people would have trust and confidence with the police in the region which would be a major step to permanent peace in the region.

#### **4.1.12 Protection of Human Rights**

Protection of human rights is an essential component of peace building. After cessation of hostilities, police must ensure civilian security is adequate. They must ensure political, economic and civil rights of members of public are upheld and they take action against anyone illegally limiting these rights.

Police in Molo as elsewhere were blamed for causing gross misconduct and violation of human rights. Many respondents reported of cases where they were detained unlawfully or cases where police subjected them to unlawful force to obtain information or force them in to confessions.

**Table 4.6: Police skills on Gender based violence and children rights**

		Frequency	Percent
Did you have any training on GBV and children rights	Yes	7	23.3
	No	23	76.7
	N	30	100

(Source: Field Data, 2014)

Over 75% of the Police had received no training on gender based violence and children right. The stations also lacked gender desks to deal with cases of women and children. Proper deployment, security patrols, proactive planning, timely responses and community partnership will prevent abuses to human rights and other ethnically motivated crimes in Molo. Police commanders should ensure adequate supervisions of officers mainly in out posts and police stations to ensure suspects are treated with dignity, women and child have separate cells and all the rights of arrested persons are observed at report offices and police cells.

#### **4.1.13 Role of police in truth seeking**

Truth telling and restorative or criminal justice is important components Peace building. It is often suggested that, knowing the truth heals the society and sets the victims free. For societies or communities recovering from violence and conflicts, justice for past criminal activities brings healing to victims. In Molo, women told horror stories of the kind of abuses they went through during conflicts. Former IDPs were eagerly too looking for legitimate avenues of sharing their statements. Most of the victims in Molo pointed out that they knew the people who committed these atrocities and were willing to forgive them if opportunity of true seeking was provided. Police through their records could have created these public hearings with the support of other stake holders. . Criminal prosecution would act as deterrent against future abuses and the police as investigator together with the judicial officers would help unearth the truth of tribal conflicts in Molo.

#### **4.2 Conclusion**

As discussed in this chapter, the police played an important role during peace building efforts. The objective was comparing what police did in Molo with what was required of them to ensure success of peace building. Police participation required them to perform various functions, responsibilities and roles ranging from their primary duty of protecting life and property to more complex ones like disarmament.

To ensure success of peace building in Molo, both short term police plans and long-term ones had to be incorporated. Short terms roles included patrols, provision of security, prosecution, timely response to incidents, curfews among others. Long term responsibilities included peace education, early warning systems, victims identification, disarmament among others. There are roles that required only police presence to prevent crimes while others required advanced skills, planning and proactive planning.

## CHAPTER 5

### 5.0 CONCLUSION

This study sought to assess the role of police in peace building in Molo. It also sought to determine whether failure to involve the police in peace management programs in the area could be blamed for the resurgence of conflicts.

The data of the study was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources entailed use of questionnaire, and interview schedules. Similarly, the study collected data from secondary sources by reviewing documented information from journals, books and newspapers. The data was later analyzed in order to draw conclusions and summary.

The study had three objectives. One of the objectives was to find out the various stake holders taking part in peace building in Molo. It was found out that many peace programs have been put in place by various stakeholders but have not resulted to permanent peace. The youth, women, religious organizations and the civil society were all present on the ground. However, all their efforts were affected due to high level of insecurity, political incitements and poor coordination amongst the stakeholders.

The second objective was assessing the reasons why peace building efforts had failed in the region. In most of these programs, police were not fully involved and were called upon only when there was violence or related incidents. Areas without the police showed a pattern where the absence of police led to deterioration in law and order with dramatic increase in crime. During the 2007/08 PEV violence, police were deployed in large numbers. The same was repeated during the 2010 constitution referendum. This temporal deployment of officers was able to prevent election related violence and ensure calmness.

The police were blamed for not doing enough during conflicts in Molo. Most respondent blamed the police for not only doing very little but also taking part in the conflicts. Some of the police spoke the language of the local communities and some respondents claimed that the police were beneficiaries of conflicts. It was also noted that, in some places in Molo, Police were responsible for organizing abuses during and after the conflicts. Some respondents pointed out cases where the police took part in raping women, burning houses and other atrocities.

Skills on conflicts and peace building were contributing factor on how police played this role. The study established that the majority of police officers lacked skills and training to monitor security effectively in the study area. Moreover, their presence in the conflict hotspots was limited to providing general police services and therefore they lacked the capacity to monitor ethnic conflicts continuously. The police doctrines and practices did not ensure the police serving in the region incorporates the diverse cultures and concepts. Most police could not understand the local communities' cultures. The police were not in a position to differentiate between unlawful local practices and those that are culturally correct. For instance, when the Kalenjin youths started forming groups and arming themselves long before 2007 elections, the police were informed. But it was said that these were preparation for circumcisions<sup>110</sup>. However, it was later to be known these groups were politically sponsored to cause mayhem and burn houses.

The police were reported to be encountering various obstacles in the efforts to be effective peace builders. These institutional and logistical obstacles ranged from lack of training and skills on peace building, poor equipment and salaries to poor organizational support. In the training colleges, the police were not trained on peace management since it was not part of their syllabus. Only ten officers (30%) mostly those in the ranks of inspector and above reported to have undertaken training on peace building. Even the junior police officers require such training to be able to effectively participate in peace building

The study established that, involving the police in peace building in Molo would lead to its success. Their roles ranged from preventive strategies to responding to incidents. The police would ensure public safety and order which would create a conducive environment for other stake holders. Their presence would ensure all conflicts related offences such as murder, assaults and arson were prevented. Suspects of such criminal offences would also be arrested, prosecuted and if guilty punished in accordance with the law. This would increase public confidence with the police which is an important component of police and peace building.

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<sup>110</sup> Oral Interview Assistant county Commissioner, Elburgon, 11<sup>th</sup> February 2014.



In Molo, community policing has not been effective as reported by most of the respondents. They blamed this on lack of confidentiality and trust where the police could not be trusted with confidential reports. Police needed to be fully involved in peace building efforts in Molo in order to make it successful and ensure permanent peace. However, few things needed to be done to ensure they fully participated in peace building in the region.

Corruption and brutality of the police needed to be dealt with. All the civilian respondents termed the police in Molo as corrupt. Most of these police would demand a bribe before offering any assistance during conflicts.. Laws needed to be put in place and strict punishment be granted to any officers who solicited for bribe while offering primary services to the public. All police officers associated with abuses should have been questioned and investigated. Those found guilty should have been prosecuted or retrenched depending on the abuses they were proved to have committed.

There was a need for additional police officers in the area. As per the 2009 National Census, the then Molo District had a population of 124,438. The total number of police officers serving the district was 216, making the citizen police ratio to 576:1. One police officer for 576 citizens was far below the agreed UN ration of one police officer for 450 citizens. Other than temporally deploying officers during elections and later withdrawing them, additional officers should have deployed and additional stations be put up in conflict hotspots.

In order to support stability and democratization within Molo, the police should have been organized, trained and equipped with the ability to provide public security. The police needed to be sufficiently prepared to protect democratic rights of citizens in the area which was dominated by conflicts. In the past, the police had been dominated by personnel who were blamed for being inhuman and frequent oppressors of human rights. The police reforms if properly implemented would come came up with a new organizational structure, independent commands, commissions and new training syllabus. All those would make the police more effective and professional in service delivery.

In Molo, Community Policing had not been effective as reported by most of the respondents. They blamed this on lack of confidentiality and trust where the police could not be trusted with confidential reports. To improve the cooperation between the police and communities, there

could have been an establishment of Police Public Relation committees which would be responsible for community policing in the area. Response to complaints or questions from the community could have improved by ensuring that Police commanders participated in all meetings called by any other stakeholder.

Police in Molo should have trained and deployed peace monitors for conflict monitoring and early warning. The program although present lacked support and proper planning. The monitors should have been equipped to monitor incidences of conflict and keep records as per the division, location, sub-location and the villages. Once the timely reports are received by the police and stake holders, planning would be done to avert conflicts and ensure success of peace building.

In Guatemala for instance, Police reforms in 1998 moved towards establishing a more indigenous police, locally trained and deployed. Local police academies were developed to train a police force which was more sensitive to community needs and the community was able to realize communal justice<sup>111</sup>.

There was a need to deploy officers who understood local culture in Molo. However, such officers should have been well vetted to ensure they served all communities without favoring any ethnic community in the region. By ensuring ethnic balance, the police would be less tempted to take sides as each community would be represented. The police would also understand the culture and history of the people which would be a boost in addressing underlying and historical injustices

Out of the 35 officers interviewed 12 (35%) belonged to Kikuyu and 14 belonged to Kalenjin communities (40%). The police must have felt the pressure of supporting their fellow tribes-men as reported by majority of the respondents. To prevent tribal alignment within the police deployed in Molo and elsewhere, the posting of officers should have reflected national diversity.

The police were reported to be encountering various obstacles in the efforts to be effective peace builders. These institutional and logistical obstacles ranged from lack of training and skills on peace building, poor equipment and salaries to poor organizational support. In the training colleges, the police were not trained on peace management since it was not part of their syllabus.

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<sup>111</sup> Mollojanov and Palviz, 2001

Very few officers mostly those in the ranks of inspector and above reported to have undertaken training on peace building. Most respondents including those from the civil society reported previously viewing police officers negatively. According to them, most of the police officers had been previously involved in organized banditry and other corruption. The police were said to love bribes and rarely gave services for free. Prevention of an ethnic conflict required that, police officers should have had adequate capacity in terms of tools and equipment and other logistics. These would have enabled them to carry out adequate preventive patrols and early deployment while tools included adequate transport facilities, fuel and weapons.

The success of police involvement in peace building therefore lay in both the recognition that they were vital stakeholders and had a role to manage peace. This called for the development of an effective mechanism for internal control and police accountability which intern would boost public confidence. There was a need for establishment of a special peace management police unit which would professionalize peace building by the police.

The corruption in the police, human right abuses and general incompetence by the police should have been dealt with by the relevant authorities. The police required independent commanders at the county and national level whose appointment and deployment should have been competitively done to ensure only the competent ones occupied such positions. If all these are done, there would be effective police officers who could be deployed to ensure success of peace building in Molo, in Nakuru County and the country at large.

### **5.1 Areas for Further Research**

This study was conducted with an objective of examining the role of police in peace building in Molo. From the findings, the study makes the following recommendation for further research.

This study was limited to police intervention strategies to peace building and conflict prevention and management. There is need to conduct further research on how police can intervene in other forms of conflicts such as domestic violence, in Molo district.

In addition, more research should be done to examine the extent, and effects of police corruption that has over the years tainted the National Police and hurt the police in many ways. Additional

Additionally as noted in this study, there is a clear relationship between recurrent conflicts and crime in Molo. This linkage requires further study.

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3. Mrs. Jane Kiori; PEV Victim ( 12<sup>th</sup> April 2014, Molo)
4. Mrs. Jane Waigwa; former Red Cross Official (16<sup>th</sup> April 2014; Keringet)
5. Mr. John Wachira (Religious Leader) 16<sup>th</sup> April 2014;Molo
6. Mr. Kaniaru; Village Elder, Elburgon (16<sup>th</sup> April 2014; Elburgon)
7. Mr. Patrick Manthi Assistant County Commissioner Elburgon
8. Mr. Kavita ; Deputy County Commissioner (11<sup>th</sup> April 2014;Molo)
9. Mrs. Kulgert; Chairperson, Keringet Women Action. (16<sup>th</sup> April 2014; Keringet)
10. Mr. Muriithi ; 12<sup>th</sup> April 2014; Mau Summit
11. Mrs. Naomi Kigathi , Molo Women for Peace (12<sup>th</sup> April 2014, Elburgon)
12. Mr. Nicholas; Youth Leader (12<sup>th</sup> April 2014, Kuresoi)
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# APPENDIX I: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR POLICE OFFICERS

**TOPIC: POLICE AND POST CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING: A Case Study of Molo Region, Nakuru County: 1990-2012**

My name is **Ephraim Karani**; I am currently undertaking studies at **The University of Nairobi**, Faculty of Arts leading to a **Masters of Arts degree in Armed Conflict and Peace Studies**.

## Instructions:

This is an academic research on police and peace building in Molo. The questionnaire doesn't require you to state your names. The information obtained will be treated confidentially and will be used only for this study. Thank you for taking part in this study.

## Section A: Demographic data

Gender: male  female

Name service KP ( ) AP ( )

Age: Below 20  21-30  31-40  Above 40

Tribe .....

1. Station/ Post .....

2. Rank .....

3. How long have you been in this station/post

- 0 – 1 year ( )
- 2 – 3 years ( )
- 4 – 5 years ( )
- More please specify

**Section B**

4. Have you experienced any conflict while in service? Yes ( ) No ( )

5. What is the main cause of conflict in Molo

*(Tick where appropriate)*

- a) Competition over land ( )
- b) Political incitements/competition ( )
- c) Economic inequalities ( )
- d) Negative ethnicity ( )
- e) Cultural difference ( )
- f) Poverty and unemployment ( )
- g) Cattle raids ( )
- h) Failure by security agencies ( )
- i) Any other .....
- .....

6. How did you respond to the conflict

- a) Arrests
- b) Ambushes
- c) prosecution
- d) Patrols of hotspots
- Others
- Specify please .....
- .....

7. Do police have any role to play to ensure success of peace building

- a. Yes ( )
- b. NO ( )

8. As a police officer, do other stakeholders involve you in their peace efforts

- a. Yes ( )

b. NO ( )

9. In your capacity as a police officer how did you help to restore peace after the conflict

- a. Maintaining law and order
- b. Providing security to other stake holders
- c. Investigation of violence and abuses
- d. Peace education
- e. Enforcement of curfews
- f. Disarmament

Others specify .....

.....

10. Which challenges/limitations have you faced while making efforts to end conflict?

- a. Poor coordination
- b. Poor remuneration
- c. Lack of enough police officers
- d. Lack of skills
- e. Lack of equipment facilities and

11. Do you have any training on peace building?

- a. Yes ( )
- b. No ( )

12. How can police participation in peace building be improved

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## APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CIVILIANS

**TOPIC: POLICE AND POST CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING: A Case Study of Molo Region, Nakuru County: 1990-2012**

My name is **Ephraim Karani**; I am currently undertaking studies at **The University of Nairobi**, Faculty of Arts leading to a **Masters of Arts degree in Armed Conflict and Peace Studies**.

Please note that your responses and views will be used in compiling my research on Police and peace building in Molo

### Instructions:

This is an academic research on police and peace building in Molo. The questionnaire doesn't require you to state your names. The information obtained will be treated confidentially and will be used only for this study. Thank you for taking part in this study.

### Section A

Gender: male  female

Age: Below 20  21-30  31-40  Above 40

Tribe .....

Professional: .....

1. For how long have you been in Molo

0– 2 year ( )      2 – 5 years ( )      over 5 years ( )

2. Have you witnessed any violence/conflict

a. Yes ( )

b. No ( )

Explain

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.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

3. Why in your views has it been hard for police to ensure peace in Molo?

- i).....
- ii).....
- iii).....
- iv).....
- v).....

4. How do you rate police officers in Molo in terms of their response to build peace?

- Very poor ( )
- Poor ( )
- Average ( )
- Good( )
- Very Good ( )

Explain

.....  
.....  
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.....  
.....

5. Did the police take part in the conflicts/ have you seen them taking sides

- Yes ( )
- No ( )

Explain

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6. Do the police have the capacity to ensure success of peace building in Molo?

- Yes ( )
- No ( )

Explain

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7. During the 2007/2008 post-election violence did the police assist you in any way?

- Yes ( )
- No ( )

Explain

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.....

8. How do the police relate with the community in Molo

- Best ( )
- Good ( )
- Fair ( )
- Poor ( )
- Very poor ( )

Explain

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

9. Have you received any training on peace and security by police?

- Yes
- No

10. What changes would you wish to see in the Police to make them efficient in ensuring peace in Molo?

i).....

ii).....

iii).....