UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN MANDERA AND MOMBASA COUNTIES

MOHAMED AHMED HASSAN

REG NO: R50/82823/2015

A RESEARCH PROJECT PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER IN ARTS INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEC 2017

DECLARATION

This thesis project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree award in any other University.

Signature..   Date..

MOHAMED AHMED HASSAN

REG NO: R50/82823/2015

Supervisors Approval

This project has been submitted with our approval as the University Supervisors

Signature...   Date..

Dr. Mumo Nzau

DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis project to my late dad Ahmed Hassan and my loving Mum Bishara Shobay and my siblings who have been my sources of inspiration and strength throughout the study period.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Allah for the gift of life and wisdom. All my accomplishment I owe unto the creator. I am greatly indebted to my supervisor Dr. Mumo Nzau who has really scrutinized this work and directed me on various areas that needed improvement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and Background to the Study

In recent times violent extremism has become a topic for frequent topics by political affiliates, nongovernmental organizations,[1] inter-faith gatherings through workshops and conferences[2] as well as by the general community.[3] Violent groups are in many instances motivated by self-interest, quest for power and/or wealth, narrow grievances and at times the desire to advance political agenda.[4] Extremists in many cases are brought together by their shared dedication to certain vision of how a community should be structured, as well as being inquisitive of the present fundamentals governing the society.[5] As the issue has become a matter of grave concern in the current world to both civil authorities and religious communities and institutions, it has become necessary to discuss ways of countering such extremism. According to the US Policy[6] the perceived presence of a convincing moral obligation often is required for people to justify violent activities towards others.

Religion is an influential part of cultural norms and values, intensely implicated in people and social notion of peace, since it tackles some of the most intense existential concerns of human

---

[1] Golan, G. D. (2016). *Countering violent extremism: A whole community approach to prevention and intervention*.4 (1), 105-107

[2] Bosco, R. M. (2016). *Securing the sacred: Religion, national security, and the western state*. pp. 23-55

[3] Van, M. L., & United States Institute of Peace,. (2016). *Community resilience to violent extremism in Kenya*. pp.96-145

[4] Ibid pp.102

[5] Great Britain., & Great Britain. (2010). *Preventing violent extremism: Sixth report of session 7(10)* pp.33-87

[6] USAID Policy. (2011). The Development response to violent extremism and insurgency. *Putting principles into practice*. USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism. 104(3), pp. 12-29

life for example right/wrong, freedom/ inevitability, sacred/profane and fear/security.[7] In addition all religions have come up with rituals, laws and ideas and symbols of civilization with cultural obligation to significant peace related values, among them an openness and even love for strangers, the restraint of ego, value for human rights, forgiveness and humility, repentance and acceptance of liability of past mistakes.[8] Basically, religious institutions exert a lot of influence which can be used for peacemaking, reconciliation or prevention of vices.[9]

In a global perspective, religious institutions have played a vital role towards pursuit of peace and social justice well documented. In Europe, the growth of Protestantism marked in a new era of vast social-political transformation and illumination in place of the domineering feudal system. It rejected the catholic predestined canon which wholly supported feudal structures and their exploitative dynamics.[10] In Poland, the church remained the leading voice against the extremely dictatorial communist system as all other avenues for political mobilization had been prohibited.[11] In Latin America, the Catholic Church being the most dominant acted a fundamental position in fighting injustices during leftist/rightist regimes and throughout the Cold War fighting against guerillas.[12]

The attacks by ISIS on northern Iraq and Syria prompted prominent Imam Sheikh Abdullah bin Bayyah and more than 100 other Muslim leaders to act, drafting a condemnation of the insurgent group's actions with an appeal to Islamic jurisprudence. As Muslims faced persecution from

---

[7] Gopin, M. (2000). *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking*. New York: Oxford University Press, , p.1-126

[8] Ibid, P.13

[9] Gopin op. cit., 56

[10] Spitz, Lewis W. (1980). *The Reformation*. St. Louis: Concordia Pub. House, pp. 45-56

[11] Ramet, Sabrina P., (1992). *Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia: The Communist and Post Communist Eras*. Durham u.a: Duke Univ. Press, *104(3),pp. 817-828.*

[12] Kan, E.M. (1993) 'Religious Transformation and Social Change in Latin America', Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, pp.1-220

Buddhist extremists in Burma (Myanmar), some Buddhist monks offer shelter in their monasteries. Notable increase in Buddhist extremist violence Sri Lanka called for religious community to examine itself before working with others.[13] Following the 9/11, US-funded religious interventionism has increased thus assuming new forms with government-led programs and projects intending to support moderate religion. These efforts include support for interfaith dialogue, religious freedom and religious rights protection.[14]

In Africa, the involvement of religious organizations in the fight for justice, humanitarian assistance and peacemaking has been prominent.[15] Other than playing part in peace building process, the religious groups constitute the largest number of actors involved in providing humanitarian relief in disasters and conflict zones.[16] Notably, they are active peacemakers. World Conference of Churches (WCC) and All African Conference of Churches (AACC) for instance commenced and arbitrated Sudan peace process in 1972 and an agreement was made. They actually remained the only convincing and genuine mediators in a extremely polarized identity based conflict.[17] A little known Catholic order known as the *Community of Sant'Egidio* played a fundamental role in helping the mediation process during the Mozambican peace process.[18] In Nigeria, the kidnapping of hundreds of schoolgirls by Boko Haram in 2015[19]

---

[13] Nozell M and Hayward S. (October 2014). Religious Leaders Countering Extremist Violence: How Policy Changes Can Help. 40(1), 101-123.

[14] Green, S. N., Proctor, K., & Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.). (2016). *Turning point: A new comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism*. *94* pp. 95-120.

[15] Mawere, M., & Marongwe, N. (2016). *Violence, politics and conflict management in Africa: Envisioning transformation, peace and unity in the twenty-first century*. Mankon, Bamenda: Langaa Research & Publishing3(8), pp. 1-171.

[16] Ploch, L., Library of Congress., & Federation of American Scientists. (2010). *Countering terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. response*. Washington, D.C.?: Congressional Research Service. 99, 29(3), 1-27.

[17] Ibid 29(3), 1-27.

[18] Ploch *op. cit*., p.20

[19] Marc, A., Verjee, N., Mogaka, S., & World Bank. (2015). *The challenge of stability and security in West Africa*. pp. 49-112

prompted Muslim and Christian leaders to organize peaceful demonstrations to resist extremist violence. The Islamic spiritual leader for Nigerians also condemned Boko Haram.[20] The religious leaders in this country joined hands with faith groups to come with ways of resisting extremism.[21]

Kenya, which has in many years been viewed as one of the most stable countries in East Africa has in recent years been faced with internal conflicts and the spillover effects of regional instability.[22] Their effects are however hardly felt in many regions of the country as the government has many response mechanisms among them religious leaders. The use of religious leaders and organizations in peace building process was mostly felt after the post election violence in which ended start of year 2008.[23] Religious actors are a vital part of the peace sector in Kenya with deep roots and experience merging relief, development, and peace building.[24] They were among the first responders during the ethnic clashes 1990s, adapting from immediate needs to long-term solutions. As other drivers of conflict have emerged, religious actors of various types continue to be involved, including collaborating across religious traditions and addressing inter-religious tension.[25]

---

[20] Nozell op. Cit., pp 11

[21] Best, S. G., & Rakodi, C. (2011). *Violent conflict and its aftermath in Jos and Kano, Nigeria: what is the role of religion?*. Religions and Development Working Paper pp.69-72

[22] Ploch, L., Library of Congress., & Federation of American Scientists. (2010). *Countering terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. response*. Washington, D.C.?: Congressional Research Service. 99, 29(3), 1-27.

[23] Mawere, M., & Marongwe, N. (2016). *Violence, politics and conflict management in Africa: Envisioning transformation, peace and unity in the twenty-first century*. Mankon, Bamenda: Langaa Research & Publishing3(8), pp. 1-171.

[24] Bercovitch, J. & Ayse S. K (2009). 'Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith- Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution', *International Negotiation* 14 (2009), pp. 175-204.

[25] Ibid op. cit., 180

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Based on the existence of the memories of past conflicts, and coupled by other historical injustices such as displacement of persons, land grabbing and inequitable distribution of resources, it is more likely that the cycle of violence and conflict could continue. Religious actors have a wide reach and long history in Kenya, often in providing services in remote areas. Religious actors also exist within a society that functions largely along ethnic lines and using client/patron systems. They are part and parcel of these social systems. The credibility of religious leaders was however tarnished surrounding the 2007–08 elections and violence, when they were seen as partisan and even exacerbating ethnic divides. Most successful efforts at reconciliation have been led by teams of local politicians mostly in the affected areas. The one exception to this rule is the role that church can play in peace building.

Violence in Mombasa County is an issue that elicited a lot of concern as it is seen to spread to other counties in the country. Land related violence as well as terrorist attacks have been witnesses in the recent past in these two counties. Many youths in these counties are considered radicalized owing to the recent return of more than 700 youths who served in Al-Shabaab and an unknown number about those still in Somalia or working with Al-Shabaab.[26].In trying to curb this menace, the Kenya government has exerted forceful security measures which have killed other Muslim youths. Though some NGO's such as HAKI Africa, Manyatta Youth Entertainment (MAYE) and Act Change Transform Kenya (ACT) the GoK still continues with its extreme measures where the youths especially men are kidnapped never to be found again. The only active religions group has been Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI) which is still not very active.

---

[26] Mohamed, H. (2015) 'Rescue Garissa town from the bloody clutches of AlShabaab', The Daily Nation Kenya pp.25

Studies on counter violent measures have concentrated on political measure, community policing and media avenues. Mogire and Agade[27], for example, did a research on Counter-terrorism in Kenya paying attention to effectiveness of the terrorism control measures by the government of kenya. Aronson[28] on the other hand only concentrated on the participation of the Muslim community in countering terrorism in Kenya. The futility of these efforts to counter violent extremism and forge peaceful coexistence within communities calls for other avenues to be implemented. This study will therefore examine the role of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The purpose of this study was to examine the role of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County. The study was guided by the following specific objectives:

i.   To explore the causes of violent extremism in Mombasa county.

ii.   To examine the measures used by religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa county.

iii. To find out the effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa county

iv.   To determine challenges facing religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa county

---

[27] Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 35(1), 33-56.

[28] Aronson, S. L. (2013). Kenya and the Global War on Terror: Negelcting Histroy and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism . *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS, Vol. 17 (2): pp.* 24-84.

1.4 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions:

i. What are the causes of violent extremism in Mombasa County?

ii. Which measures are used by religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County?

iii. How effective are religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County?

iv. What are the challenges facing religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County?

1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justification.

Academically, this study will be useful in determining the extent of violent extremism in the two counties. There lack systematic study of the role of religious leaders in countering violence extremism. Importantly there is absence of concrete studies on the role of both Christian and Muslim organization in Kenya and more so in Mombasa County. Though the churches participated in the peace building process as a result of the 2007-08 post election violence (PEV) they have not actively shown their presence in other measures of countering violence in Kenya. The studies have also focused on Muslim religion as a key contributor toward violence extremism such as youth radicalization and terrorism but failed to see the positive side of it as a key body in countering violence extremism in Kenya.

1.5.2 Policy Justification.

There have been several reported conflicts all over Kenya and it's becoming expensive as properties are destroyed, lives lost thus slowing down the economy as subsequent low tourism levels are witnessed. Results of the study will help the government in coming up with means of thwarting the activities of the violent extremists before they occur, and therefore help prevent loss of life and property that is associated with activities of the extremists.

There are various NGOs in Kenya that have been in the ground trying to find mitigating measures of curbing occurrence of violence in Kenya as was witnessed in the PEV, cattle rastling and terrorism. These groups have mainly considered community policing which so far bears little fruits on preventing the vice from occurring. They would therefore find the findings very important and learn how to include religious leaders and one of the measures towards countering violence in Kenya and more so Mombasa County.

The study will also be an eye opener to various religious leaders particularly the organizations they are under National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK) for Christians and Muslim groups in understanding the key roles they can and should play in countering violent extremism in Kenya.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

The study will use constructivist peace research theory which is founded on peace research paradigm of conflict analysis and management. Among the major approaches to conflict management, religious actors fit to a large extent with the peace research paradigm. The strategist approach is rooted in the realist traditions assumes that states are the only main actors in conflict management and other actors are considered of little consequence since ultimately

they are controllable by state. Also it privileges strategy as the key to order and envisions no alternative order apart from the one maintained by power. Essentially, it assumes that 'peace in any sense other than absence of violence is a chimera'.[29] The key problem with the approach is that the power based nature can only deliver a settlement reflecting power balances among the parties in conflict. Once the power equilibrium is disturbed the settlement unravels.[30]

Though the society acknowledges other actors apart from the state is more concerned with legitimization of relationships, without focusing on conflict generating structures, as the solution to conflict management.[31] Therefore, it treats actors as equal and the role of conflict manager is to provide a supportive framework where actors can legitimize their relationships.[32] In case of non-state actors using this approach, the preferred mode of supportive framework is the problem solving workshop incorporating key actors in conflict. The problem is that, the outcomes of problem solving workshop rarely trickles down to the grass root levels and are not easily translatable in the real life situations of all actors and constituencies. Nonetheless, its insistence on the provision of human needs as a key to resolving conflict is important, for it points out to the need to address both values and interests if conflicts are to be resolved.[33]

The theory conceptualize peace as more than absence of violence since there are societies with no overt violence but are characterized by structural violence which hinders individual potential to realize their capabilities.[34] Thus, there is a need to address not only violent conflict but also

[29] Groom, Op cit, pp.96.

[30] Repstad, Pål. (2004). "The power of the faithful: Powerful Actors with Clear Intentions or Power Everywhere?" Oslo: Novus Press. pp. 1-143

[31] Mwakimako, H. & Willis, J. 2014. Islam , Politics and Violence on the Kenyan coast. 31(1): pp 1–23

[32] Ibid

[33] Repstad op. cit., pp 35

[34] Nozell M and Hayward S. (October 2014). Religious Leaders Countering Extremist Violence: How Policy Changes Can Help. 40(1), 101-123.

the structures which generates injustices.[35] To do so there is a need to move from a 'no war no peace society' to one characterized by positive peace. This is only achieved through addressing the physical, structural and cultural forms of violence. However there exist differences on how to achieve these goals. On one hand critical peace research theory advocates for revolutionary changes even if this is to be achieved through the use of force. On the other hand constructivist peace research theory advocates for social transformation through a peaceful process capable of addressing the structures that generate oppression whether physical, structural or cultural.[36]

According to the theory, to effectively address conflicts, there is a need for multi-level participation from all levels involved, that is, from top decision makers to middle range opinion leaders to grass root constituents. [37]Also, there is a need to approach peacemaking as a long term commitment which focuses not only with immediate issues, but also addresses long standing issues such as exploitative or exclusive governance and institutional arrangements, memories and narratives of dehumanizing the others, deep-rooted sense of historical injustices.[38] Importantly the end goal is justice, since the persistence of injustice can only deliver negative peace.

The theory will be applied in this study to help focus on multi-level roles of religious actors in countering violent extremism. Religious leaders have infrastructures at all levels of the society meaning that they have the capacity to address both the local and national generators of

---

[35] Ibid pp. 35

[36] Mohammed Abu-Nimer, (2003). *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice,* Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, pp. 183.

[37] Wesley J. W. (2011). The Religious Violence Project. *A Report to the 2010-2011 Edition of the Boston University Religion Fellows Program. pp. 21-43*

[38] Ibid pp. 183.

Wesley op. cit., *pp. 27*

conflict.[39] Also the peace researcher paradigm concern with long term commitment reflects the behaviour of religious actors who prior to the conflict are often deeply embedded in the community carrying other tasks; hence they understand the needs of the community and do not leave once the immediate conflict is resolved.[40] Further, the approach focus on addressing the cultural and structural violence reflects the mission of religious actors. Religious leaders' goal is to foster social, political and economic justice, acts of kindness, tolerance, love, embracing of strangers, reciprocity and self and others forgiveness.

1.7 Research Methodology

Research methodology discusses the procedures and strategies that were used to conduct the study. It describes the study design, the location of the study, the target population and the procedure for selecting sample for the study. It also describes the research instruments that were used in the study and finally scrutinizes the data analysis before closing the chapter with a summary.

1.7.1 Research Design

Research design can be considered as the rationale or end-all strategy of a research that tosses light on how the study is to be done.[41] It demonstrates how the greater part of the real part of the research study– the specimens or gatherings, measures or projects, etc.–work together trying to address the research questions.[42] The research design can either be contextual, descriptive, exploratory, non-experimental or qualitative.

In contextual research the environment and conditions in which the study takes place as well as the culture of the participants and location while in descriptive research it is designed to provide

---

[39] Vallacher, R., Coleman, P., Nowak, A., & Bui-Wrzosinska, L. (2010). *Rethinking intractable conflict: The perspective of dynamical systems*, American Psychologist, 65 (4), 262-278

[40] Ibid pp. 267

[41] Cooper, D. R., & Schindler, P. S. (2008). *Business research methods*. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin.

[42] Kothari, C. (2006). *Research methodology, methods and techniques.*New York: Willey Eastern Ltd.

a picture of a situation as it naturally happens.[43] Explorative studies are undertaken when a new area is being investigated or when little is known about an area of interest. Non-experimental research is used in studies whose purpose is description and where it is unethical to manipulate the independent variable.[44] Qualitative research focuses on the experiences of people as well as stressing uniqueness of the individual.[45]

The study adopted descriptive research design by use of a survey. Descriptive design is a design used to obtain information concerning the current status of the phenomena and to describe "what exists" with respect to variables or conditions in a situation. [46]This study design was selected because it helps the researcher describe data and characteristics about the population and phenomenon under study. Using the design, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected.

1.7.2 Population
The population of a study refers to the whole group of people or objects to which researchers are interested in generalizing the conclusions.[47] This study was based in Mombasa County. The location will be selected because of the rampant violent extremism cases.

The study mainly targeted religious leaders and the youths in the region. The study population comprised of all main religious leaders in Mombasa County. The study estimated the leaders to be around 55 people.

1.7.3 Sample Size
Sample size is a means of determining the number of elements of the population to be included in the sample.[48] The study used Krejcie and Morgan formula to come up with the sample size which is 48 religious leaders. This study adopted simple random sampling to select the sample

[43] Creswell, J.W., & Plano Clark, V.L. (2007). Designing and conducting mixed methods research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications

[44] Creswell, J. W. (2013). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches*. Sage Publications, Incorporated.

[45] Ibid

[46] Creswell op. cit.,pp.48

[47] Cooper, D. R., & Schindler, P. S. (2008). *Business research methods*. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin.

[48] Creswell op. cit., 23

for the study. Simple random sample was used to sample religious leaders from Mombasa County.

1.7.4 Data Collection Method

Data collection is the way of getting data on focused factors in a set up efficient form, which then empowers one to answer significant questions and assess results.[49] There are two common methods of data collection; primary and secondary. Primary data collection method involves collecting first-hand information from the participants. The study utilized both primary and secondary data methods in collecting data. Primary data was used to collect data using questionnaires, interviews and focused group discussions. The religious leaders participated in the study through filling out questionnaires and interview guides. The questionnaires were structured into both open-ended and closed-ended questions. The youths in the area were involved through focused group discussions.

1.7.5 Research Procedures

The first step entailed preparation of structured questionnaire with both closed ended and open ended questions. The next step involved pre-testing the instruments to ensure they are free from errors through the guidance from the supervisor. Pretesting involved use of five respondents from each of the supermarket under the study. The researcher sought a letter of introduction from the university before securing a permit from the National Council for Science and Technology. The researcher visited selected mosques and churches in Mombasa and made arrangements with the leaderships in the areas for him to collect the data.

---

[49] Cochran, W. G. 1963. *Sampling Techniques*, 2nd Ed., New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.pp. 1-240

1.7.6 Data Analysis

After data collection, questionnaires were checked for completeness to ensure they were ready for analysis. With the help of SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) version 20, quantitative data collected using questionnaires were analysed using percentages, frequencies, means and standard deviation in form of tables and graphs. Qualitative data analysis is usually based on an interpretative philosophy that is aims at examining meaningful and symbolic content of qualitative data (Nieuwenhuis, 2007).[50] Percentages were used conjointly with frequencies to express the proportion ranging from 0- 100, on the same responses. Mean score and standard deviation were used in Likert scale data. In this case, Likert scale questions allowed the respondents to indicate their levels of agreement with statements referring to the factors affecting customer retention. The mean ranged from 1-5 based on the Likert scale. Qualitative data was analyzed using thematic analysis. Thematic analysis involved analyzing the main themes in the study.

1.8 Chapter Outline

This study is organized into six chapters. Chapter One covers the introduction to the study. This chapter contains the background to the study, problem statement, the study objectives, research questions, justification of the study, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses, research methodology and finally the chapter outline. Chapter two focuses on extent of violent extremism in the Kenya. This chapter captures an overview of violent extremism in Kenya. Thereafter, it discusses the mechanisms used to counter violent extremism. Chapter three covers measures used by religious leaders in countering violent extremism. The chapter introduces the role of religious leaders. It will then look at the current mechanisms that are employed by religious leaders uses especially those targeting on the youths. Chapter four presents effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violent extremism. The chapter looks at the applicability of the measures used by religious leaders by analysing the existence of violent

---

[50] Kothari, C. (2006). *Research methodology, methods and techniques.*New York: Willey Eastern Ltd.

extremism. Chapter five presents data presentation and analysis. This chapter focuses on data analysis and presentation of data collected from both primary and secondary sources. Chapter six contains the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA

2.1 Introduction

Violence is on the rise across the globe and it manifests differently everywhere. Globalization has made it easier for both creative and destructive ideas to spread globally.[51] The violence is however widespread in many African countries and Kenya is not left behind. Kenya has struggled to craft a response to tackling violent extremism, especially since militarist groups have been quick to adjust their recruitment methods to adapt to such responses. Widespread narratives seem to suggest that violent extremism has international origins and is inherently a non-Kenyan problem.[52]

Kenya is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multicultural society that is predominantly African. The Muslim community that accounts for roughly thirty percent of the population is drawn from the whole spectrum of Kenyan society but mainly constitutes communities of Somali and Arabic Descent found primarily in the North Eastern and Coastal areas respectively.[53] The larger part of the Muslim population is young with sixty five percent of its members being between the ages of 18 and 35. The coastal youth also form 9 percent of the total youth population in Kenya.[54]

The Islamic radicalization that is seen in many Muslim societies has its roots in the revivalists' movements that emerged in the 1950s.[55] Kenyan Muslims are no exception as due to

---

[51] Van, M. L., & United States Institute of Peace,. (2016). *Community resilience to violent extremism in Kenya*. pp.96-145

[52] Mwakimako, H. & Willis, J. 2014. Islam , Politics and Violence on the Kenyan coast. 31(1): pp 1–23

[53] Mwakimako op. cit. pp12

[54] Njonjo, K. S. (2010). *Kenya Youth Fact Book.* Nairobi: Institute of Economic Affairs and Fredrich-Ebert Stiffung. pp1-43

[55] ICG (2012). *Kenyan Somali Islamimist Radicalization.* Africa Briefing No. 85. Brusells: International Crisis Group. (3) pp. 389-392

globalization and ease of communication they have become more observant and a portion has become radicalized. According to the 2009 census, the Kenyan Muslim community is about 3.3 million of the country's population of 38.6 million.[56] Some sections of it have been exposed to various strains of radical Islamism in the last four decades, much of it based on an amalgam of Salafi theologies, the most popular being Wahhabism.[57] Salafi radicalization was gradual and unfolded in three distinct phases, each complementing the one before.[58]

The first wave occurred in the late 1970s and coincided with Saudi Arabia's emergence as an oil power keen to export its brand of Islam. It was essentially theological and driven by an unstated proselytising agenda. The aim was to subvert the traditional Shaf 'i *mazhab* (sect) and related Sufi orders and convert their adherents to Wahhabism.[59] The dissemination of Salafi ideas and values had a lasting impact on the community. Since the conservative Muslims resent the dominance of Western-style entertainment and consumerism, the Salafi quest for doctrinal purity and authenticity ended up fomenting discontent with modernity and the secular state.[60] As such, the Muslim community grew more insular, puritanical and conservative. Sectarian animosities escalated and traditional support for moderation and coexistence waned.[61]

---

[56] Minhas M. Khan, (October 29, 2015) "Understanding and Identifying Violent Extremism," *ISSI Issue Brief. Pp 23-36*

[57] Botha, A. (2013). *Assesing Vulnerability of Kenyan Youth to Radicalization and Extremism.* Johannesburg : Institute for Security Studies (245) p. 156-171

[58] Ibid pp.158

[59] ICG op. cit., p 389-392

[60] Botha, A. (2013). *Assesing Vulnerability of Kenyan Youth to Radicalization and Extremism.* Johannesburg : Institute for Security Studies (245) p. 156-171

[61] ICG (2012). *Kenyan Somali Islamimist Radicalization.* Africa Briefing No. 85. Brusells: International Crisis Group. (3) pp. 389-392

2.2 Violent Extremism

Violence refers to the infliction of pain, shedding of blood, use of physical force, violent language, fury and forcible interference with personal freedom.[62] Violent extremism, is the beliefs and actions of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals.[63] All forms of violent extremism include terrorism, communal violence and other forms of politically motivated violence. Many researchers and policy makers have underestimated the power of ideologies and deeply felt convictions as the main motivations behind numerous forms of violent extremism.[64] Extremism, on the other hand, is the ideological beliefs and behaviours well beyond the boundaries of the "normal" in a political, cultural, religious, or moral context.[65] One of the factors that drive violent extremists is culture and culture specific perceptions of what is fair and unfair, just and unjust. [66]Their motivations are usually derived from basic social contracts between the state and citizens.[67]

Violent extremism is often seen and cast by the media and general public as having deep links to religion. This is usually because many violent extremists use religious rhetoric and ideology, and pervert interpretations of religious scriptures to justify their savagery and divide people.[68] Though the history and growth of violent extremism is very old, today we see radical narratives in the form of Salafi jihadi movements, ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra, al-Qaeda, al–Shabaab, Boko–

---

[62] *Ralph E.S. Tanner (2007). Violence and religion: cross-cultural opinions and consequences. Concept Publishing Company. pp. 5–6.*

[63] U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. Public Intelligence. (2009). *Public Intelligence*. Pp. 241-294

[64] USAID Policy. (2011). The Development response to violent extremism and insurgency. *Putting principles into practice.* USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism. pp. 12-29

[65] Wesley J. W. (2011). The Religious Violence Project. *A Report to the 2010-2011 Edition of the Boston University Religion Fellows Program. pp. 21-43*

[66] USAID Policy. Op.cit. pp. 12-29

[67] Ibid

[68] Minhas op. cit. *pp 28*

Religion makes it easier for extremists to demonize the enemy by portraying them as evil. Additionally, in many cases, common perceptions of and moral justifications for regulating a society bring violent extremists together, for example Salafi jihadists,[69] with national and global agenda of ridding the world of evil. Esposito has also validated this point that terrorist groups' primary grievances and goals are political for which they use religion.[70] Frustrations with the local and global political environment, and most of the times ideologically motivated thoughts are also behind violent actions.[71]

Most studies by Western scholars suggest that economic disparity and illiteracy are the driving forces behind violent extremism in the Muslim world, which may be true in some cases. However, many acts of violence after 9/11 in various counties contradict the assumption of socioeconomic and educational setting as the factors contributing to violent extremism. Piketty, however, argues that the high concentration of wealth in few hands (countries with less population and more wealth), and the wars waged by the West in the Middle East have led to frustration and justification for jihad. Economic deprivation and wars have benefited only the "few" in the region; therefore, economic inequality is the major driver of terrorism.[72]

The attacks in Paris and San Bernardino precipitated distrust of Muslims, which led to a sharp increase in hate crimes and prejudices, making Muslim immigrants the victim of Islamophobic harassment in Europe and the US. Against this backdrop, President Obama in his speech, at the United Nations General Assembly, stressed on the need to eradicate violence extremism as a

---

[69] Guilain Denoeux & Lynn Carter, (February 2009). "Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism," *USAID. pp*. 5

[70] Esposito, John L. (November 30, 2015), "Does Islamophobia Feeds Radicalization," pp 28-31

[71] Minhas M. Khan, (October 29, 2015) "Understanding and Identifying Violent Extremism," *ISSI Issue Brief. Pp 23-36*

[72] Tankersley, J. (November 30, 2015), "This might be the most controversial theory for what's behind the rise of ISIS," *Washington Post, pp. 34*

common mission of all nations. He asked for breaking the cycles of conflicts and grievances, and noted that Islamophobia feeds into extremist narratives.[73] The US National Strategy (2011) for Empowering Local Partners defines violent extremists as "individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals." It defines the root causes of violent extremism as "radicalization that leads to violent extremism includes the diffusion of ideologies and narrative that feed on grievances, assign blame, and legitimize the use of violence against those deemed responsible."[74]

2.3 Geneology of Violence in Mombasa County

At independence, Kenya adopted the British system of government by which the country had been subdivided into provinces led by what were considered tribal kings/chiefs. However, this was not a smooth transition as two groups opposed the supposedly new civic order at independence.[75] These included the Mwambao Separatist Movement (MSM) which was contesting the allocation of the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip to Kenya by the colonial administration and the Somali secessionist movement called *Shifta.* Of interest is the fact that the Mwambao United Front, the military wing of MSM, acceded to the demands of a unitary state at independence and subsequently fizzled from the limelight and became inactive. However, its members continued to exist with their ideology and has re-emerged as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) with its clarion call of *Pwani si Kenya* which literally means 'the Coast is not part of Kenya'.

---

[73]UN. (February 19, 2015), "Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. pp.3-9

[74] *The White House* (August, 2011) "Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States," pp 21

[75] Ngunyi, M. and Katumanga, M. (2012). *From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence.* Nairobi: The Consulting House and Office of the GLR. Pp45-65

The alienation of Muslims continued long after independence and into the entry of multiparty politics. In 1992, the Muslims did attempt to form a party, the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) which was popular among young Muslims in the Coastal region. However, the party was accused by the regime at the time of promoting Islamic fundamentalism and was declared an illegal entity.[76] Of note is the fact that the activities of the IPK and Islam were considered a threat to Kenya's national security.[77] While the party fizzled out due to government crackdown, it created fertile ground for radicalization and extremism among the Muslim community. This also fostered cohesiveness of the group as the members continued to dialogue among themselves on the issues facing them due to discrimination and marginalization.[78]

There is a history of marginalization of minority communities in Kenya and it happens that the majority of minority communities are actually Muslims. The big share of arid and semiarid lands in Kenya is where you find Muslims. The upper eastern Kenya moving downwards to the coast—all that area is dominated by Muslims. These are also areas that have never realized development.[79] The presence of government there is very small. The imbalances in these areas was created by the 1965 sessional paper under the title "African Socialism and its application in Kenya" which gave priorities for government development on what they call "high productivity areas" that is where there is rain and agriculture.[80] The low potential areas are areas where pastoralists live with their cattle, camels, goats, and everything else. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund also invest in high potential areas. The result of this strategy in this

---

[76] Prestholdt, J. (2011). Kenya, the United States and Counterterrorism. *Africa Today 57(4): pp.* 3-27 .

[77] Aronson op. cit., pp 100.

[78] Ibid

[79] Maina S. (2017). Muslim leaders are trying to change the way Kenya fights terrorism. pp. 32-90

[80] Ibid

session paper was a skewed approach that destroyed certain communities while giving opportunities to others.[81]

Marginalization happened mainly in terms of socio-economic development. Relative economic deprivation has long been the subject of local dissent, dissatisfaction and opposition to the national government.[82] The average incidence of poverty in the Coastal region is estimated at 62% with the national average at 38% as at 2007.[83] Further, poverty in some pockets of the cities at the Coast such as Mombasa average 70%. The level of economic disparity is perceived as being particularly acute among the regions with a large concentration of Muslims who feel increasingly marginalized by broken promises of government commitment to equitable development in the region.[84]

Such grievances have led to formation of armed militia groups at the Coast such as *Mulungunipa* and its political wing the MRC, and the Kaya Bombo Raiders. These are the most prominent in the coastal region but there exist others such as the Coast Housing Land Network more known for its land rights lobbying activities than armed activity.[85] The most notable is MUHURI which is an acronym for Muslims for Human Rights. The existence of such groups and grievances have a direct link to crime and insecurity in the sense that there exists a large young population at the Coast that is idle and socio-economically frustrated. Such individuals and groups have a greater propensity to engage in behavior that is likely to create insecurity. Njonjo argues that crime is

---

[81] Lederach, op cit. pp 34

[82] Mghanga, M. (2010). *Usipoziba Ufa Utajenga Ukuta: Land, Elections and Conflicts in Kenya's Coast Province.* Nairobi: Henrich Boll Stifung. Pp. 12-45

[83] KNBS (2007). *Basic Report on Well-Being in Kenya.* Nairobi : Governement Printer. pp. 1-55

[84] Ibid

[85] Ibid

strongly associated with young people as 53% of crime incidences in Kenya have been committed by persons between the ages of 16-24 years of which 89% are by males.[86]

Further, radical organizations have taken it upon themselves to understand and prey upon a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors and individual characteristics that render the youth vulnerable to recruitment into violent extremist organizations.[87] Al-Shabaab maintains strong relations with religious institutions and charitable organizations that pay those willing to be recruited into jihadsim. By extension, this has also led to an increase in international crimes such as piracy, drug trafficking and wildlife poaching to enable funding for youth radicalization and terrorism activities. Since the 1970s, extremist Islamic groups have been suspected of funding the communities at the Coast region through madrasas, health clinics, children's orphanages, and vocational training institutes. For instance, the youth would study for free from primary through to secondary and stand a chance of receiving university scholarship to study in Saudi or Pakistani Islamic universities.[88] Many of the recipients of this education were from cash-strapped families who would have dropped out of the mainstream state-run schools. The brighter ones would be sent to Wahhabi institutions of higher learning such as the Kisauni Islamic Center in Mombasa. To such a group of the youth, this provided a route to gainful jobs and respectability, something which the state had ostensibly failed to do.

2.4 Violent Extremism in Mombasa County

The coastal region, though being a predominantly Muslim society have been marginalized from the national resource and the landlessness among the populace injected historical grievances. The

---

[86] Njonjo op. cit., pp11

[87] Berman, E. (2009). *Radical, Religoius and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism* . Massachusetts : MIT Press. *73, pp* 1036-1044.

[88] ICG (2012). *Kenyan Somali Islamimist Radicalization.* Africa Briefing No. 85. Brusells: International Crisis Group. (3) pp. 389-392

2010 constitution bought devolution which projects the distribution of functions, duties and resource allocation to the counties. This, however, has seen a slow move with the government trying to slow down devolution and projecting centralization. This slow realization of devolution created the re-birth of a secessionists political organization MRC121 claiming *Pwani si Kenya*.[89]

On October 31st, 2011, one suspect linked to Al-Shabaab was arrested in Mtwapa, Mombasa.[90] On July 7th, 2013, seventeen people were killed and six injured after an explosion at a religious public rally in Likoni, Mombasa.[91] On June 10th, 2014, Sheikh Mohammed Idris, the head of Imams and Preachers of Kenya was shot dead in a Mombasa mosque by groups who opposed his championing of anti-radicalization campaigns. Since then, many similar killings have been carried out by groups that are pro-radicalization, against factions considered to be informants and loyal to the police. By the end of July 2014, more than twenty-one clerics, among other Muslims, had been killed by suspected actions of law enforcement agencies.[92]

In June 2015, an Imam in Mombasa was charged convicted for radicalization of young men into Al-Shabaab, being sentenced to 20 years in jail.[93] On September 4th, 2016, in Majengo, Mombasa, Mohamed Soshi was shot dead, and weapons recovered from the apartment he was residing. Soshi was linked to Harun Fazul; an Al-Qaeda member who was killed in 2011 and Jaysh Ayman militant group in Lamu. Soshi coordinated other significant attacks like the

---

[89] Mwakimako, H. & Willis, J. 2014. Islam , Politics and Violence on the Kenyan coast. 31(1): pp 1–23
[90] Standard, The. 2017. "Terror Suspect Arrested in Kilifi." *The Standard*. Accessed February 8, 2017. Pp 13
[91] 2013. *Daily Nation*. Accessed February 8, 2017. 16 Injured in Likoni Church Terror Attack". Pp 7
[92] IRIN. (July 28, 2014). "Kenya: Gunned down in Mombasa: the clerics that have died." pp 3
[93] Bwana, Joachim. 2015. "Imam in Mombasa Court For 'Luring Boys into Al Shabaab." The Standard. Pp23

February 2nd, 2015 Bondeni attack, September 18th, 2015 assassination of a police officer, and other killings recorded on July 3rd, 2015, and March 26th, 2015 in Mombasa.[94]

2.5 Causes of Violent Extremism

Violent extremism comes as a result of direct and indirect socio-economic, political and operational factors that inhibit access to security services and pose a challenge to the threat's response to existing and emerging threats to security. KNCHR has established that drivers of insecurity oftentimes revolve around perceptions and/or realities of marginalization and/or exclusion, by certain regions or groups of people in the country. These drivers are also given impetus by the country's political architecture which has since independence favoured a policing structure that leans towards the protection of the regime and/ or maintenance of the status quo.[95]

2.5.1 Youth Unemployment

Overall, Kenya experiences high levels of unemployment, 40% as at December 2012).[96] Youth unemployment at the coastal region stands at 70% of the total youth population. This high rate of unemployment is attributed to the fact that the minimal activities the youth carry out are not sufficient to afford them a decent life or provide for the utilization of their full potential.[97] Moreover, there has been animosity arising from the influx of migrant communities (*wabara)* who ventured into the coastal regions in the 1960s and 70s to capitalize on the economic opportunities available especially land resettlement schemes.[98]

---

[94] Ombati, Willis. 2016. "Fugitive Terror Suspect Ismail Mohamed Soshi Killed In Police Raid On Mombasa House." Pp 15-34

[95] Ombati op. cit., pp17

[96] World Bank (2012). *African Economic Outlook, Kenya 2012*. Washington DC.: World Bank . pp 1-23

[97] Njonjo op cit., pp 23

[98] Ngunyi, M. and Katumanga, M. (2012). *From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence*. Nairobi: The Consulting House and Office of the GLR. pp45-65

According to the 2009 Census, the youth (age 15 to 34) constituted 35.39% of the country's population translating to around 13,665,378 million individuals. Of this number, 51% were male while 49% were female. The population between age 0 to 14 accounts for 42.92% of the country's population. Thus bringing the total number of individuals below age 34 to 78.31% of the total population.[99] Out of this number, slightly over 50% of the youth make up the country's labour force. This number is estimated to have increased by 10% by the 2009 census bringing the number to 60%. Despite accounting for a significant proportion of the country's workforce, youth unemployment is at a record high confirming the marginalization and peripheralization of more than half the population of the country. Unemployment among the youth stands at 70%.[100]

There is an established link between youth unemployment and crime. In the period under review, the KNCHR also conducted research that concurred with the foregoing assertion. For example, KNCHR's work on conflict management in Mombasa County in 2013/1416, found out that unemployment served as a strong push factor for youth radicalization. Through its one-year engagement with young people in the County, the Commission established the fact that youth unemployment, coupled with perceptions of real or imagined systematic marginalization, contributed to their vulnerability and easy proclivity to terrorist activities, which promised them an "easier and quicker path" to wealth.[101]

Additionally, interviews with respondents and research undertaken in 26 counties on the matter of security from 2010 to 2014 confirmed that there were high levels of unemployment among the

[99] World Bank *Op cit., 22*
[100] Mwakimako, H. & Willis, J. 2014. Islam , Politics and Violence on the Kenyan coast. 31(1): pp 1–23
[101] Bwana, op cit., 23

youth in all the counties under review.[102] Further, KNCHR established that many of the unemployed youth were actively involved in a plethora of criminal activities. These were manifested through the operations of well-established extortionist gangs and militias; youths being used as guns for hire by powerful political personalities and business people; as well as impressionable and malleable recruits into extreme religious ideologies.[103]

Research conducted on the subject of youth unemployment found that economic challenges such as inadequate job creation by governments, coupled with inadequate skills set among young people as well as lack of knowledge of government policy among youth played a key role in the systematic exclusion of young people from the country's socio-economic fabric. The foregoing reasons, the research found, were fertile grounds that contributed to the birth and legitimization of the Mungiki, a violent criminal extortionist gang.[104]

2.5.2 Corruption

Corruption within the security sector has been found to be the greatest impediment to the government's effort to both address and redress the rising levels of insecurity in the country. Available evidence shows that there are an increasing number of cases of collusion between law enforcement officers and criminals. For example in the course of its field work, KNCHR interviewed both State and non-State actors who admitted that indeed there were some "rogue security enforcement officers" who were working in concert with criminals to defeat efforts to address and redress insecurity.[105] The culture of corruption among the security agents has significantly eroded the confidence between law enforcement officers and members of the public

---

[102] Botha, A. (2013). *Assesing Vulnerability of Kenyan Youth to Radicalization and Extremism.* Johannesburg : Institute for Security Studies (245) p. 156-171
[103] Ibid pp. 898
[104] Botha, op cit., pp. 158
[105] Atta-Asamoah, A. 2015a. East Africa Report; The Nature and Drivers of Insecurity in Kenya. Institute for Security Studies. 27(1): pp 91-102.

who may genuinely want to cooperate with the officers to combat crime. As a result of the foregoing, a security vacuum has emerged which has fueled the rise of a subaltern culture of security protection around criminal gangs and militias.[106]

Oftentimes, though they may start out with "benevolent" intentions, most criminal gangs and militia groups end up being some of the worst purveyors of insecurity due to the extra-legal nature of their operations.[107] During the period under review, the Commission documented a number of cases related to gang and militia violence. Available data fortifies the Commission's findings. For example, it is important to note that though militia groups and gangs remain proscribed under the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act, No. 6 of 2010, research carried out by the National Crimes Research Centre indicates that gangs and militia groups are well and alive and thriving in various parts of the country.[108] Another consequence of the endemic corruption within the security sector has been the creation of a safe operating environment for real and potential terrorist elements. For example, some of the acts of terrorism experienced during the period under review can be linked to the fact that some criminal elements have been able to buy their way back into the country through illegal border passages facilitated by security and immigration officials.[109]

2.5.3 Technology

While affecting Kenya as a whole, modernization in the context of radicalisation and extremist violence should be given due consideration when it comes to transport and information, communication and technology (ICT) sectors. Infrastructure in this sector has improved over the

---

[106] Atta op. cit pp.99

[107] CAK. (2014). *Quarterly Sector Statistics Report: Fourth Quarter of the Financial Year 2013/2014.* Nairobi : Communication Authority of Kenya . *43,* pp. 1-58.

[108] Atta op. cit., pp 95

[109] Botha, A. (2013). *Assesing Vulnerability of Kenyan Youth to Radicalization and Extremism.* Johannesburg : Institute for Security Studies (245) p. 156-171

years thereby reducing the cost of doing business. The most notable growth has been reported in the new ICT (internet, mobile phone, computers) compared with traditional (television, radio, newspapers) sector. This is evidenced in the low internet and phone calling rates per minute as well as increased penetration. As at December 2013, internet penetration in Kenya as a percentage of total population stood at 47.3 percent, way above Africa's average of 21.3 percent.[110]

Internet access is also fairly widespread in all cities and towns. The number of Facebook users, the most common social medium, is at 4.8 percent of the total population. Mobile phone penetration stood at 80 percent as at June 2014.[111] It is also worth noting that most of the phones are internet-enabled meaning that internet penetration can be assumed to be a high as the number of phone subscribers in Kenya. In modern societies, this is a good sign as it means accessibility to information and contact among individuals has increased thereby easing the modalities of working.[112]

Alongside this is the fact that the youth are more agile and adaptable in the use of ICT. As such, they are the main users of the new ICT mainly for the purpose of entertainment through games, movies, music downloads as well as knowledge seeking and socializing.[113] According to Njonjo[114], the use of internet for information access ranks 57%, followed by communication through email and social networks such as Facebook at 39%, and entertainment especially games and music downloads at 2%. While this points to good progress, it aso portends a danger as there

---

[110] CAK. op. cit., pp 15
[111] Ibid
[112] Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 35(1), 33-56.
[113] Njonjo op. cit., 41
[114] Ibid pp. 27

lurks cyber crime and terrorism targeting especially vulnerable groups such as children and young people. Internet connectivity is widespread and it is difficult to effectively police cyber-space thus leaving the young to have access to all kinds of information.[115]

2.6 Conclusion

The limitation of local communities' involvement in security, fake promises to the public and uncoordinated government security initiation; lead to the mistrust between the populace and government. Findings show that unemployment, corruption and technology also a contribution to violent extremism across the country. Individuals joining extremism are highly motivated by ideologies and not necessarily the economic factor. This study aimed at finding solutions to such extremism by looking at the role of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County in Kenya.

---

[115] Botha, op. cit pp.160

CHAPTER THREE

RELIGIOUS LEADERS IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

3.1 Introduction

Countering violent extremism entails the prevention of the conflict from becoming violent or expanding to other arenas.[116] It includes the enforcement of existing treaties and peace accords. Appleby[117] points out that the development of effective measures to prevent or contain deadly conflict begins with the articulation of the problems generating the conflict and it requires the mobilization of social forces desirous of addressing those problems. Countering violent extremism also involves enforcement and peacekeeping operations. It is the principle that all conflicts cannot necessarily be resolved, but learning how to manage conflict can decrease the odds of non-productive escalation. It involves acquiring skills related to conflict resolution, self-awareness about conflict modes, conflict communication skills and establishing a structure for management of conflict in our environment. [118]

Religious conflict resolution began to emerge in the 1990s with an increasing awareness that if religious tradition and teaching could encourage violence and conflict so the same traditions could be appealed to bring about resolution of conflict.[119] This is enabled by their religious traditions such as scriptures, teaching and historical memory of peace-building, peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict resolution. In a very real sense religious leaders have always been

---

[116] Coward, H. and Smith, G. S (2004). *Religion and peace-building*. U.S.A: State University of New York Press. 108: pp. 189-206.

[117] Appleby, R.S. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp.1-298

[118] Smock op. cit., pp 21-28

[119] Fox, J. and Sandler, S. (2006). Bringing Religion into International Relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Volume 32, Issue 8, pp. 11–20

involved in resolving conflicts.[120] Appleby[121] argued convincingly that religious leaders were essential to peace processes and deserved greater international support. Religious figures have been exceptionally active in this arena as social critics. An example of such effort was the annual Buddhist peace marches across Cambodia.[122]

Coward and Smith write "religious actors are underutilized in these roles, to the detriment of peace processes and several authors in this volume lament the missed opportunities of this kind".[123] For example in Northern Ireland, most experts agree that the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 would not be effective on the structural-political level until and unless grassroots and cross-community peace practitioners are involved. A significant percentage of the latter are religiously motivated to build new local Catholic-Protestant institutions and networks and to strengthen the ones put in place since the troubles began in the 1960s.

3.2 Religious Leaders in countering violent extremism

Religious leaders can and should indeed promote the prevention of violent extremism. Religious actors are important in countering violent extremism because of their unique positions of authority, credibility, institutional resources and ties with communities. Not all violent extremism is encased in religious terms, and not all extremism is violent. But the rhetoric and media discussion of violent extremism often masks the positive role that religious actors can and do play.[124] Recognizing the role of religious leaders in preventing violent extremism (PVE) and promoting the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue, the United Nations Secretary

---

[120] Bercovitch, J. and Kadayifci-Orellana, S.A. (2009). Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution. *International Negotiation* (14), 175–204.
[121] Appleby, R.S. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp.1-298
[122] Appleby op cit., pp 213-214
[123] Coward op cit., pp. 188
[124] Nozell op. Cit., pp. 113

General enshrined in its Plan of Action on preventing violent extremism the importance for faith and community leaders to mentor "vulnerable followers so as to enable them to reject violent ideologies" and promote "tolerance, understanding and reconciliation between communities".[125]

The UN Plan of Action on PVE noted that a number of those who succumb to recruitment by terrorists are radicalized and recruited in prison. Therefore, safeguards need to be put in place to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies to other prisoners, and religious leaders from all faiths must be involved in these efforts. As much as religion has been used to instigate violence, it can also be used as a means to peace building. The fact that religious leaders can communicate with each other much faster than before due to the improved methods of communication can be one way of building peace among people of different religions. International religious organizations like Catholic Relief Services have peace building as one of its missions. Buddhism encourages Buddhists to try to make the world a better place through, among other things, peace building.[126] Many religions promote values like selflessness, discipline, compassion, empathy and forgiveness. The belief in these values implies that a religious person will be motivated to work towards peace.[127]

Many religions have similar traditions, values and practices. The adaptability of many of the religious traditions, beliefs and values can be used by religious leaders positively to choose myths and symbols and create interpretations which encourage reconciliation.[128]Through these, they can encourage peace building. Religious leaders usually know the myths, symbols and

---

[125] Baku, A. (2016). Breakout Session "Religious Leaders and Violent Extremism: The Challenges of Prevention". 7th Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. Vol. 25, No. 3, 292-298

[126] Appleby Op cit., pp. 196

[127] Silberman, I. E., Tory H. and Dweck, C. S. (2005). Religion and World Change: Violence and Terrorism versus Peace', *Journal of Social Issues* 61 pp 137-144

[128] Bercovitch, op cit., pp. 177

traditions of the religion they profess, as well as a linkage with other religious leaders in the same or different religions. They can use these linkages and knowledge of the prevailing myths and traditions to create bridges between warring parties. Religious leaders are usually trusted by their followers, who comprise members of the local community. Because of this trust, their advice and stand point is easier to follow compared to the views of ordinary members of the community. This trust can be exploited to create harmony between discordant communities.

Their position as religious leaders gives them moral legitimacy and moral leverage to bring about an agreement between parties involved in a conflict, thereby acting like intermediaries.[129] The authors further points out that religious peace building is more effective when religion still plays an important role in that society, when the disputants respect the religious authority of the peace builders and when religion plays some part in the conflict.

According to Mohammed,[130] every religion can foster either violence or nonviolence. It is the responsibility of those who follow a particular faith to cull these resources for nonviolence from their religious scriptures. He extracts these resources and in the case of Islam, comes up with a list of virtues or attributes, valued within Islam, which can contribute towards peace. These include unity and equality of mankind, all as God's creations; justice and forgiveness, showing mercy, regarded more highly than demanding retribution; seeking peace; avoidance of violence; and reconciliation with the enemy. There are other attributes that are not directly linked to peace, but can be useful in the peace building process.[131] These include patience, valorisation of collaborative processes above authoritarian ones, and the concept of the Ummah or Muslim

---

[129] Ibid pp. 187

[130] Mohammed Abu-Nimer, 2003 *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice,* Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, pp. 183.

[131] Ibid

community which emphasises collective action that can be utilised for peaceful goals. Besides these values despite the reputation that Islam has in the West for being inherently violent, Denny[132] asserts that overwhelming majority of Muslims sincerely want peaceful international as well as domestic religious and political relations and the institutions and agreements that can make them secure and stable.

The Bible explicitly discusses peace, through the figure of Jesus who promoted non-violence and forgiveness. Most Christian traditions value love and compassion, elements that propagate peace. In a similar fashion, Gandhi (2004) explains that Hindu religious texts tend to emphasise war, especially the epics, but that peace and reconciliation are also represented as worthwhile goals. The Ramayana also emphasises the importance of treating the enemy honourably, and Rama's chariot is described as having "self restraint as one of its horses, and cords of forgiveness and compassion to harness it. The Quakers and the Mennonites have been devoting their time and money towards conflict resolution and peace building.[133]

Most research studies suggest that Christianity has taken the greater initiative when to peace building, especially when compared to Islam and Hinduism. A case in point is The Henry Martyn School of Islamic Studies (HMI) in Hyderabad, which was started with the goal of studying Islam in order to facilitate missionary efforts among Muslims and enable them to "commend Christ acceptably to Muslims".[134] This role was changed to include that of encouraging interreligious dialogue, reconciliation and in building peace between

---

[132] Denny, F. M. (2004). Islam and Peace building: Continuities and Transitions', State University of New York Press, pp. 129-146.

[133] Bartoli, A. (2004). Christianity and Peace building, in: Coward, Harold and Gordon S. Smith (eds.), *Religion and Peace building,* State University of New York Press. pp. 147-157.

[134] Diane d'Souza (1998). *Evangelism, Dialogue, Reconciliation: The Transformative Journey of the Henry Martyn Institute,* Hyderabad: Henry Martyn Institute, pp 7-35

communities.[135] The institute has lately established three community development projects in the Old City of Hyderabad where Muslims and Hindus are brought together to learn skills to support their livelihood, to be schooled, to receive health care etc. the aim of this is to bring members of the different communities together to solve common problems, thereby developing strong links that cannot be easily separated. This would also increase the participants' awareness of the commonalities between the two communities, thereby encouraging them to actively work towards preventing violence in times of tension.

3.3 Religious Measures to countering violent extremism

Debates have elevated the importance of religion as a key factor in increasing understanding and reconciling differences in international relations and security.[136] The religious approach explicitly emphasises on spirituality and/or religious identity; use of religious texts, use of religious values and vocabulary, utilization of religious or spiritual rituals during the process and involvement off faith-based actors as third parties.[137] Religious interventions rely on religious actors being perceived as legitimate by all parties involved in conflict.[138] The appeal to shared religious values and sense of a higher calling based on the desire for peace and reconciliation manifest in religious texts and tradition enables as will be seen in subsequent chapters has been effective in leading to successful conflict resolution.[139]

---

[135] Ibid

[136] , D. and Cox, B. 2003. *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*. New York: Oxford University Press. Vol 2 Issue 8; pp. 340-47.

[137] Bercovitch, J. and Kadayifci-Orellana, S.A. (2009). Religion and Mediation: The Role of Faith-Based Actors in International Conflict Resolution. *International Negotiation* (14), 175–204.

[138] Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (2010). *Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy.* Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 6 (1) 4-10.

[139] Gopin, M. (2000). *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking*. New York: Oxford University Press, p.1-126

Religious leaders have become more active in peace work in recent years; they can play a dynamic role in all stages of a conflict and contribute to prevention, mediation, conflict management and transformation as well as post-conflict reconstruction, reconciliation and advocacy for socio-political change.[140] Appleby[141] calls for wider acknowledgement of the potentially effective and influential role religious actors can take not only in preventing and managing violent conflicts, but also in promoting human rights and more participatory forms of government.

The advantage of utilizing the peace and reconciliation capacities of religious leaders includes the ability to appeal to the peaceful tenets of religions.[142] The ability to access strong ethical norms inherent in religions and appeal to these in order to influence the actions of followers is a valuable resource. The extensive local, national and international networks and communications developed by religious organizations can be used to help with the logistics of conflict resolution.[143] Religious actors tend to be firmly entrenched within civil society and as such can lead the way in countries emerging from conflict being able to transform into sustainable, peaceful democracies.[144] Religious leaders can take up a number of measures in countering violent extremism: educators; advocates; intermediaries; mediators; they can help to change

---

[140] Sampson, C. (2007). "Religion and Peacebuilding." In *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. pp. 273-326.

[141] Appleby, R.S. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp.1-298

[142] Smock, op cit., pp.27

[143] Ibid pp. 23

[144] Shore, M. (2009). *Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.* Farnham: Ashgate. 142, pp. 250–353.

behaviours; provide peacebuilding education, health or relief services; disseminate ideas such as democracy and human rights; or encourage disarmament.[145]

3.3.1 Advocacy

Sterland and Beauclerk[146] suggest that the key to the usefulness of institutions within the faith communities lies in the degree to which they are *of* the religious community, without *being* the religious community. Being part of the community means they are trusted by the community, but by not being the community itself, they can retain autonomy, allowing them to explore new peacebuilding areas. Religious leaders have a unique position in being able to access and mobilise faith communities.[147] Through sermons and preaching they can reach out to a large number of people with relative ease.[148] They may have access to both grassroots communities and high-level leaders. Additionally, religious actor may be able to mobilize sister communities both locally and internationally, lending a conflict resolution movement more momentum.[149]

Religious actors are more likely to be seen as trustworthy, just, and to have a moral and spiritual motivation for peace, with fewer ulterior motives. There is some suggestion in the literature that Muslim actors tend to operate as individuals rather than in formal NGO structures.[150] Christian actors are often formed into organizations, and often have an ability to draw on international

---

[145] Bercovitch, J., & Kadayifci-Orellana, A. S. (2009). Religion and mediation: The role of faith-based actors in international conflict resolution. *International Negotiation, 14(*1), 175-204.

[146] Mohammed Abu-Nimer, (2003). *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice,* Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, pp. 183.

[147] Bercovitch op. cit., pp. 179

[148] Ibid pp. 178

[149] Ibid pp. 182

[150] Abu-Nimer, M., & Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A. (2008). Muslim Peace-Building Actors in Africa and the Balkan Context: Challenges and Needs. *Peace & Change, 33(*4), 549-581.

networks with rich Christian countries, giving them a solid financial base.[151] Accordingly, religious authorities are in a unique position to reach out to the wide network constituted by their adherents. Churchly and denominational organizations, with their member masses, are here in a particular position to communicate and reach through to an extended audience.[152]

Most official religions are to some extent part of *intra*-confessional and *inter*-religious networks of religious organizations. These networks are based on cooperation and dialogue among religions, and among various groups within the same overall religion. Inter-religious networks may serve as a strong basis for dialogue in conflict contexts where the parties hold different religious identities. Intra-confessional networks are based on cooperation within groups of the same faith, and commonly transcend state borders.[153] In such intra-confessional, international networks, the very element of 'being religious' is as a common feature that for many unites across borders. In practice, drawing upon these intra-confessional or inter-religious *networks* can give more force to an initiative, combining influence across multiple levels.[154] In Angola in 1998, the Catholic Church used a combination of direct contact and public protest in order to put pressure on the parties not to resume violence. The church engaged its grassroots followership as well as its international networks, but also had critical support both locally, among the country's traditional local leadership (the *sobas*) and internationally, via non-governmental organizations and donor governments.[155]

---

[151] Owen, M. & King, A. (2013). *Religious Peace-building and Development in Nepal*. Winchester Centre of Religions for Reconciliation and Peace. 72(2):pp. 221-231.

[152] Johnston, D. (2003). *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4(1):pp. 1-270.

[153] Ibid pp. 14

[154] Johnston, D. (2003). *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4(1):pp. 1-270.

[155] Cain, A. (2001). "Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?" *Review of African Political Economy* 28:577-586.

Religious leaders are able to pursue activism and lobbying of governments to push for peace. The Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka, founded on Buddhist principles, is a strong actor in peace advocacy and lobbying for government social and economic reform.[156] In Kano, Nigeria, the radical Islamic movement Jama'atu Izalatil Bid'ah Wa'ikamatis Sunnah (JIBWIS) used lobbied the government for fairness in distribution of relief items and for justice for victims.[157] In Kenya, the Muslim FBO Wajir persuaded the government to begin including peace education in schools. In Nepal, larger-scale interfaith organisations have lobbied on disarmament, youth issues, and space for faith-specific burial grounds.[158]

3.3.2 Education and Teaching

Religious actors can play a role as educators and in bringing people together for conflict transformation. They have a legitimate position from which to teach, including educating about others' religious beliefs and in preaching tolerance and understanding.[159] Some FBOs have experienced success in their peacebuilding efforts because they are rooted in faith teachings. Basing development work on a specific religious doctrine can have intrinsic value to members of that community.[160]

In Mindanao, Philippines, military officers have been sent to peace-building workshops facilitated by FBOs.[161] Peace-building training provided by Catholic Relief Services has helped the military understand the different positions in the conflict, and has also helped other actors see

---

[156] Ibid pp. 580

[157] Best, S. G., & Rakodi, C. (2011). *Violent conflict and its aftermath in Jos and Kano, Nigeria: what is the role of religion?*. Religions and Development Working Paper pp.69-72

[158] Owen op. cit., pp. 225

[159] Hayward, S. (2012). *Religion and Peacebuilding. Reflections on Current Challenges and Future Prospects.* United States Institute of Peace. 9(1): pp. 26-48.

[160] Clark, J. N. (2011). Religious Peace-building in South Africa: From Potential to Practice. *Ethnopolitics,* 10(3 4), pp. 345-365

[161] Berkley Center for Religion Peace and World Affairs. (2011). *The Philippines: Religious Conflict Resolution on Mindanao.* Berkley Center for Religion Peace and World Affairs: Washington DC. pp 33-44

the military as colleagues rather than opposition.[162] This educational initiative has trained peace-builders who have gone on to establish bridges between communities, and changed attitudes within the military. This has been significant in reforming the military's reputation and enabling them to build relationships with communities.

In South Africa, the Damietta Peace Initiative, a Franciscan Christian organization, focuses on empowering individuals as a route to peace. It trains community groups to address community conflicts in a non-violent way, teaching peace and tolerance. It aims to help poor and black communities value themselves, leading to reconciliation through empowerment.[163]

Schools or educational institutions can play a role in promoting peace through their position as conduit of values, behaviour and attitudes.[164] Education develops child wellbeing and can be used to promote tolerance, which both contribute to the longer-term processes of peace-building.[165] Faith-based education can additionally offer mental resilience, a source of hope, and a specific social structure.[166] The Dutch Christian organizations ICCO and KIRK in Actie partner with southern educational FBOs which promote ideals of peace, tolerance, coexistence, inclusion, and non-violence. One partner organization is ZOA in Sub-Saharan Africa, which promotes conflict transformation in its school programmes through interreligious and interethnic cooperation, equal access to services, and accountable governance, amongst others. Caritas Southern Africa is carrying out peacebuilding in schools throughout South Africa.[167] Its

---

[162] Ibid pp. 37
[163] Clark op cit., pp. 347
[164] Van Ommering, E. (2009). *The Roles of Faith‑Based Educational Institutions in Conflict Transformation in Fragile States.* ICCO Alliance Working Group Religion and Education. 30(4): 450–461
[165] Ibid pp. 453
[166] Van Ommering op. cit., pp450
[167] Clark, J. N. (2011). Religious Peace-building in South Africa: From Potential to Practice. *Ethnopolitics,* 10(3 4), pp. 345-365

programme aims to help children deal with feelings of anger and frustration in a constructive manner, to help prevent turning to violence.[168] World Vision in Nepal has offered similar workshops to children, aiming to help build positive attitudes.[169]

3.3.3 Convening dialogues

Interfaith dialogue has been embraced by governments and organisations as a key tool for facilitating peacebuilding in situations where conflict has some inter-religious element.[170] In some academic work, fostering relations between different communities is also referred to as building social capital.[171] There are very many examples of this kind of work, which is a key focus of many FBOs. Some examples follow. The Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel brings together FBOs and facilitates dialogue and study groups, including studying each other's sacred texts, which can promote greater understanding.[172] Similarly, Caritas Southern Africa brings black people together in South Africa to work on community projects, with the aim of increasing understanding and tolerance between violent groups.[173]

Caritas Nepal carried out inter-faith reconciliation through community projects, including providing the building materials for Hindus and Muslims to construct houses together.[174] In Jos, Nigeria, after violence in 2001, many organizations participated in or established seminars for peacebuilding and dialogue. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) organised meetings between Christians and Muslims, participated in inter-faith seminars and built dialogue with

---

[168] Clark op cit., pp 346

[169] Owen op. cit., pp. 226

[170] Hayward op. cit., pp 33

[171] Van Ommering op. cit., pp455

[172] Flanigan, S.T. (2013). Religion, conflict and peacebuilding in development. Edward Elgar Publishing. Pp.252-267.

[173] Clark op cit., pp. 450

[174] Owen, op cit., pp. 222

Muslim counterparts.[175] The Islamic organisation Jamatul Nasril Islam led Christian-Muslim dialogue and participated in all the peace committees organised by government.[176] Religiously mixed workshops appeared to have helped build trust between participants. Other strategies included mixed- faith sports matches, workshops on non-violence, targeting different sectors such as students and indigenous peoples, and radio messages of peace.[177]

Gopin[178] suggests that activities such as interfaith dialogue should be combined with other approaches to achieve substantial results. Furthermore, what many agree on is that in order to enable and strengthen the influence of religious leaders and other faith-based actors, co-operation between religious and secular actors, and between local religious leaders and political authorities, is crucial.[179]

3.3.4 Mediation

Folberg and Taylor[180] define mediation to be the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons; systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs. Mediation is a process that emphasized the participant's own responsibility for making decisions that affect their lives. It is, therefore, a selfempowering process. It is a goal-directed and problem-solving intervention.[181] The objectives of mediation, they argue, are production of a plan (agreement) for the future that the participants can accept and comply;

---

[175] Best op cit., pp. 70
[176] Haynes op cit., pp.52-75.
[177] Ibid
[178] Gopin, M. (2000). *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking*. New York: Oxford University Press, p.1-126
[179] Appleby op. cit.,, 212
[180] Flanigan, S.T. (2013). Religion, conflict and peace-building in development. Edward Elgar Publishing. Pp.252-267.
[181] Ibid

presentation of the participants to accept the consequences of their own decisions; and reduction of the anxiety and other negative effects of the conflict by helping the participants device a consensual resolution.[182]

Mediation studies have consistently shown that the identity of the mediator plays a role in the success of the intervention.[183] Religious actors have often acted as mediators in conflicts. Quite often, participants in the conflict request faith-based mediators rather than secular ones. Religious actors often have long-term commitment to their communities, and their social position as cultural insiders gives them credibility and authority.[184] Some mediation processes highly value the neutrality and impartiality of the mediator; processes involving religious actors tend to fall at the other end of the spectrum. FBOs which know the dispute, are engaged with the parties, and who will not leave the area after the resolution, are considered cultural insiders who have a vested interest in reaching a resolution for peace, without favouring either side.[185] This helps them motivate communities for peace.

Whether or not they belong to the same religious community as the parties in conflict, religious actors are likely to be able to win trust from both sides. This is because they are seen as having a primary commitment to doing God's work and the lack of vested interests in the outcome other than peace.[186] The Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone was made up of mixed-faith people from the communities in conflict, which allowed them to discuss with leaders from all warring parties. In other cases, actors from outside the community, or from other faiths, have been

---

[182] Flanigan op. cit., pp.257.
[183] Bercovitch op. cit., pp. 186
[184] Bercovitch op. cit., pp. 193
[185] Clark op. cit., pp. 465
[186] Ibid

successful.[187] FBOs may use religious mediation strategies to help parties reach an agreement. These could include prayers, meditation, religious rituals, religious vocabulary, values and myths.[188] Within Muslim communities, FBOs have successfully used traditional conflict resolution methods (*suluh1*), which are familiar and therefore legitimate.[189]

According to Scott, the most direct and decisive involvement in conflict resolution came when religious actors provided good offices and served effectively as mediators.[190] For example, the Catholic Church was deeply involved in this area in the beginning of 1968 in Bolivia, helping to resolve every major clash between the miners and the national government and the many impasses that were produced by the elections for the presidency. In Northern Ireland, para-church organizations such as Corrymeela provided peace and expertise for conversation among politicians as well as ordinary citizens from the Protestant and Catholic communities, and behind the scenes mediators prepared the way for meetings between leaders of the opposing militias. Also in India, the Gandhi Peace Foundation from its headquarters in Delhi and in 33 field centres across India, conducted research and training programs in nonviolent conflict resolution.[191]

3.3.5 Commitment
Resting on normative systems, religions depend upon its adherents experiencing a certain level of dependence on their normative systems; of feeling a certain degree of commitment. This implies a direct relationship between the *willingness* of the members to contribute to maintaining the religion, and their sensed *dependence* upon it, and is illustrated by the simple fact that if the

---

[187] Flanigan op. cit., pp. 254
[188] Bercovitch, op. cit. pp.175-204.
[189] James, R., with CABUNGO. (2009). *Faith-Based Organisational Development (OD) with Churches in Malawi.* INTRAC Praxis Note pp. 47.
[190] Ibid
[191] Appleby, R.S. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp.1-298

religious adherents lack faith in the normative system, the religion will eventually cease to exist.[192] A peacemaking effort is in need of similar mechanisms; the parties in conflict must be *willing* to resolve the conflict: Without a certain level of dependence and commitment from the parties to achieve peace, peacemaking will not succeed. As with all aspects of religion, also the religious normative system is fundamentally ambiguous, with a *con*structive as well as a *de*structive potential. Possibilities and potentials for engagement in a peacemaking process, is subsequently related to the form of the normative systems.[193]

Additionally, peace brokering founded on a sincere normative commitment may increase the broker's capacities as well as credibility among the parties. In Mozambique, the Catholic community Sant'Egidio became a key mediator in the conflict in the mid-1970s. The successful involvement of Sant'Egidio is commonly considered as, on the one hand, a consequence of the community's neutrality in the conflict, while on the other hand, as a result of the shared normative ground the community's ethos offered to the parties.[194] This illustrates nicely the peacemaking potential of religious normative systems, both as a key quality of the potential broker, and as a common ground for the parties to the conflict.

Religious organizations are well positioned to serve as agents of conflict transformation, with a potential for communication with their own grassroots and with the broader public. Leaders of religious organizations are in a position to negotiate with reference to the normative system of the religious group, and may at the same time be in a position to issue altered theological

---

[192] Repstad op. cit., pp. 17
[193] Stålsett, Sturla J., Oddbjørn Leirvik, and with Peter Beyer (Eds.). 2004. *The Power of Faiths in Global Politics*. Oslo: Norwegian Church Aid. Pp. 607-610
[194] Appleby, R.S. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp.1-298

interpretations of the normative system.[195] To the extent that religious leaders are not closely connected to any of the conflict parties, their credibility as well as their freedom of action may be great. This is one reason why religious leaders who do their utmost not to be linked to any of the conflict parties may be at grave risk. Furthermore, with the capacity of the state weakening as a result of war, people may be drawn towards alternative networks, such as religious ones, which further strengthens the relevance of religious organization.

3.4 Effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violent extremism

Religious leaders have actively made attempts to end conflicts and foster reconciliation and rehabilitations among conflicting groups in different parts of the word.[196] This is a high-profile approach where religion has been represented by faith-based organizations in demonstrating its capacities in resolving conflicts. Haynes[197] clears a skeptical mind with illustrations of faith-based organizations which have carried out peace dialogues and immensely contributed to peace-building both in conflicting and post-conflicting communities. The Quakers financed by the Ford foundation in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–70; the work of the World Council of Churches and the All Africa Conference of Churches in mediating a cessation to the Sudan conflict in 1972.[198]

[195] Gopin, M. (2000). *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking.* New York: Oxford University Press, p.1-126

[196] Smock, D. R. (2001). "Faith-Based Non-Governmental Organizations and International Peace-building." Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. pp 21-28

[197] Haynes, J. (2009). Conflict, conflict resolution and peace-building: The role of religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 47(*1), 52-75.

[198]Vallacher, R., Coleman, P., Nowak, A., & Bui-Wrzosinska, L. (2010); *Rethinking intractable conflict: The perspective of dynamical systems*, American Psychologist, 65 (4), 262-278

3.4.1 Enhancing Cultural identity

Svensson[199] states that religion can take the form of cultural identity, which has to do with the traditional sphere of a religious group, or that of convictional identity, which entails active religious ideology. Said and Funk[200] note that religion is particularly effective in shaping the norms and values of a group in a conflict situation, as it makes claims about what is right and what is wrong and provides explanations for the most fundamental existential issues of life. Indeed, Gopin[201] suggests that it is in times of conflict that groups tend to be the most defensive of and attached to their own religion.

Religion has been proven to be a powerful tool for mobilisation. Political leaders often use religion to manipulate group identities; religious narratives, myths and symbols are often highly effective in dehumanising and building enemy images of *the Other*.[202] Gopin[203] finds that antagonistic identities of religious communities can be built around experienced trauma and fear of things not yet experienced. Furthermore, "manufactured injury" can be manipulated by leaders to mobilise groups for political causes.[204] Lederach[205] points out that strong enemy images and deep polarisation in turn increase uncritical support for group leaders and cohesion inside the group.

---

[199] Svensson, I..(2013). *Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars*. Queensland: University of Queensland Press. pp1-250

[200] Said, A., and Funk, N.C (2002). "The Role of Faith in Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution." *Peace and Conflict Studies* 9(1): 36-50.

[201] Gopin op. cit. pp.12

[202] Repstad op. cit.,97

[203] Gopin, M. (2000). *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking*. New York: Oxford University Press, p.1-126

[204] Ibid., pp. 96-98

[205] Lederach, J. P. (2010). *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.1-284.

Many scholars emphasize that academics and practitioners should therefore recognise the common religious values that encourage peace and harmony and apply them in facilitating reconciliation and interreligious dialogue.[206][207] It has also been suggested that because of the central part it plays in the construction of group identity and intercultural frictions, religion should be incorporated into conflict resolution theory and frameworks.[208] However, Gopin[209] notes that taking religion into account in conflict resolution does not entail naiveté about the violent potential of religion or blind support to any religious institutions, but rather sophisticated cooperation between secular and religious actors. Others see the issue from a different perspective. Svensson[210] for example, takes the view that while it is not religious identities per se that make conflicts difficult to resolve, significant religious *incompatibilities* between parties must be minimized by "desacralisation" to allow for the more positive use of religion in peacemaking.

3.4.2 Peace building

According to Lederach, peace-building depends on the contributions of leaderships at three major levels, namely; the top level, the middle range and the grassroots levels.[211] Firstly, the top level includes the key political and military leaders in the conflict. Few in number, they are somewhat removed, in social location and sensibility, from their constituencies. Highly visible, they are more likely to be influenced than other actors by media pressure and personal career

---

[206] Kadayifci-Orellana, S. Ayse. 2008. "Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution." In *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, edited by Jacob. 143, pp. 36–44.

[207] Smock op. cit., pp.17

[208] Svensson, I..(2013). *Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars*. Queensland: University of Queensland Press. pp1-250

[209] Gopin, op. cit.,. 20.

[210] Svensson, op. cit., 13.

[211] Lederach, J. P. (2010). *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.1-284.

ambition, especially as the latter is affected by the prosecution and outcome of the conflict. The public's perception that these are the players with real power and influence raises the stakes for them, and the inflexibility for fear of being perceived as losing ground to a stronger opponent can be the result. At the post-conflict level in which structural transformation ought to take place, these leaders often are concerned with consolidating their power and preserving stability by whatever means possible; they allow real structural reform, if at all, with these considerations primarily in mind. Secondly, the middle range level which are the top level national officials such as Patriarchs, Bishops, Chief Rabbis and Ayatollahs.

Various scholars[212][213] have discussed the part religious leaders play in peace-building and peacemaking. Several other scholars have also brought attention to the particular capabilities religious leaders have in fostering peace in their communities. [214][215][216] One of the most widely recognized areas in which religious leaders can make important contributions is that of reconciliation. Johnston and Cox[217] add that the reputation of religious leaders as apolitical actors with respectable values as well as their ability to mobilise support from local to international levels can aid peacemaking. Lederach[218] calls for a paradigm shift that moves away from a focus on resolution and instead turns the attention to rebuilding and restoring relationships.

---

[212] Appleby, R.S. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp.1-298

[213] Smock op. cit., pp. 25

[214] Barnett, Michael, and Janice Gross Stein. (2012). "Introduction: The Secularization and Sanctification of Humanitarianism." New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 3-36.

[215] James, op. cit., pp.19

[216] Omer, Atalia. 2015. "Religious Peacebuilding: The Exotic, the Good, and the Theatrical." In *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peacebuilding*, pp. 183-211

[217] Johnston op. cit. pp. 14

[218] Lederach op. cit., 24

According to Sampson[219], there is also a wider trend of interreligious councils, networks and other bodies becoming active in the peacebuilding arena. These types of religious bodies, councils formed by religious leaders and NGOs could have a lot to contribute to preventing conflicts with religious dimensions.[220] Bouta, et al[221] finds that FBOs have been able to positively contribute to mediation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding in numerous ways in war-affected communities.

For Lederach[222] the midrange leaders are best positioned to lead long-term peacebuilding efforts. This is because, they have greater flexibility of movement and are more numerous than top level leaders. Also they are connected to a wide range of individuals in the conflict settings through their networks and professional associations. Within the religious community the midlevel leaders are the highly respected monks, priests, ministers, rabbis and others who serve as heads of the regional religious bodies such as dioceses' representatives to ecumenical, inter-religious, or civic bodies, or as pastors of prominent local congregations.[223]

3.4.3 Restoration

Religion can play an important role in restoring the social fabric and rebuilding trust in communities; in order to do this, religious authorities can encourage values such as forgiveness, empathy, mercy, repentance and compassion.[224] Johnston and Cox[225] underline the ability of

---

[219] Sampson op. cit., pp. 273-326.

[220] Johnston, D. (2003). *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4(1):pp. 1-270.

[221] Botha, A. (2013). *Assesing Vulnerability of Kenyan Youth to Radicalization and Extremism.* Johannesburg : Institute for Security Studies (245) p. 156-171

[222] Lederach, J. P. (2010). *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.1-284.

[223] Lederach op. cit., 42-43

[224] Johnston op. cit., pp.14-15

[225] Johnston op. cit., pp.14

religious leaders to rehumanise opposing parties, while Kadayifci-Orellana[226] note their ability to facilitate the healing of trauma, for example through rituals and ceremonies. Many conclude that their leverage over conflict parties is largely rooted in the respect, legitimacy and trust they often enjoy within their communities.[227] They also tend to know their own communities well and understand their needs.[228]

Engaging moderate religious leaders may be a useful means of curbing violence and more extremist religious beliefs.[229] Sampson[230] emphasizes that new approaches to mediation, reconciliation and reconstruction of societies are particularly important in the kind of intrastate conflicts in which the parties live close to each other and their everyday lives continue to collide. For these and other reasons, the peaceful potential of religion is increasingly employed by various religious actors from faith-based NGOs to individuals in their peace efforts.[231] They now more and more often play a peace-building role in various conflicts, not limited to those perceived as religious.[232]

Appleby[233] emphasizes that religious actors contribute to the processes of structural reform that is necessary for the restoration of conflict and human rights abuses. For him, nations recovering from oppressive regimes and civil wars, as in South Africa and Nicaragua, called on religious leaders to help determine and implement appropriate instruments of transitional justice.[234] For

---

[226] Kadayifci op. cit., pp. 274
[227] Bercovitch op 29
[228] Kadayifci op. cit., pp. 278
[229] Zartman, I. W, and Maha K.. (2011). "Growing Up in Groups." In *Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy*, pp. 27-56.
[230] Sampson, C. (2007). "Religion and Peacebuilding." In *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. pp. 273-326.
[231] Ibid pp. 277
[232] Smock op. cit., pp 21-28
[233] Appleby op. cit., pp.228
[234] Ibid pp.220

him, religious actors were prepared to assume leadership of key dimensions of social reconstruction after a deadly conflict because they had been intimately involved in the attempt to end the violence from the beginning whether as social critic, prophetic voice, humanitarian relief agency, or advocate for the poor and defenseless.[235] For example in the 1960's and 1970's when the military seized power in most Latin American countries, leaving only Colombia and Venezuela with democratic politics, the Catholic Church which was the dominant religious body on the continent, stepped up its public denunciations of the abuses of power. The bishops of Brazil, Chile and Argentina issued pastoral letters condemning state sponsored murder, torture, and the denial of fair trial.[236]

The external religious mediators have played the critical role in getting talks off the ground or in overcoming an impasse. For example, conflict resolution efforts of *Sant' Egidio* in Mozambique, Algeria, Uganda and Kosovo; and Mennonite consultation in the negotiations between the Sandinista government and the Miskito Indians on the east coast of Nicaragua in 1988. Also the United Nations and its various agencies, secular and humanitarian NGO's, local secular actors and interested states have often taken the leading parts.[237] For example the United Nations peace-keeping to avoid wars in Democratic Republic of Congo, south and north Sudan, Somalia and so on. Also in March 2003, the Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum in Nigeria and the United States Institute of Peace jointly promoted a five day dialogue workshop in Kaduna which is one of the most conflict-ridden states in Nigeria.

---

[235] Ibid
[236] Bouta op. cit., pp. 172.
[237] Appleby op. cit., pp.239

Lederach [238] demonstrate how negotiation and humanitarian aid improved the harsh economic conditions that civil war Mozambique was ravaged with. The mayhem between the independence movements named FRELIMO (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) and RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance).[239] The larger Mozambican religious community was divided with Muslims hostile towards FRELIMO. Evangelical and Pentecostal organizations supported RENAMO. The Protestant ecumenical association and United Methodist Church supported FRELIMO.[240] The Catholic bishops issued personal letters condemning atrocities committed by both sides and calling for negotiations. The government could no longer deny that the churches were providing essential social services – such as the distribution of food and clothing, education and health care – which the state itself was unable to supply during the war with RENAMO.

3.5 Conclusion

Chapter three focused on the counter violence extremism strategies employed particularly by religious leaders. The chapter looked at various strategies that are mainly used such as advocacy, dialogue, education and teaching, mediation and commitment. From the findings, much literature indicates that such strategies were mainly used and applied by Christian leaders in solving conflicts in various regions around the globe. This study however focused on strategies used by both Muslim and Christian leaders in Mombasa County. It was expected that in these counties, majority of the members are of Muslim origin and thus the Muslim leaders are better placed in identifying and solving violence cases in these regions.

---

[238] Lederach, J. P. (2010). *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.1-284.
[239] Lederach op. cit., pp. 57.
[240] Ibid

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focused on the role the religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County played in the management of the violence. To achieve this, the study was guided by the following objectives to examine the measures used by religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County, to find out the effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County and to determine how to empower religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County. The Chapter integrates both primary and secondary data. Primary data was collected by use of questionnaires and interview guide (Appendix I) targeting religious leaders in Mombasa County while secondary data was from newspapers, magazines articles and books.

4.2 Response Rate

It was noted from the data collected, out of the 48 questionnaires administered to religious leaders in Mombasa County, 37 were fully filled and returned. This represented a77.1% response rate which as per Mugenda and Mugenda[241] it is considered excellent.

Table 4.1: Response Rate

Response rate	Frequency	Percentage
Returned	37	77.1
Unreturned	11	22.9
Total	48	100

---

[241] Mugenda, O.M., & Mugenda, A.G. (2003). *Research Methods; Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches.* Nairobi

4.2 Background Information

The study hoped to get respondents information particulary on gender, age bracket, highest level of education and their religion.

4.2.1 Gender

The respondents were asked to indicate their gender. Their response is as shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Gender of the Respondents

The study found out that 71.4% of the respondents were male while 28.6% were female. This shows that majority of religious leaders in Mombasa County are male.

4.2.2 Age Bracket

The respondents were also asked to indicate their age bracket. Their response is as shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.2: Age bracket

As shown in figure 4.2, majority of religious leaders were between 41-50 years followed by 32.4% between 31-40 years. An additional 18.9% were above 50 years while the remaining 10.8% were below 30 years. This shows that the religious leaders were evenly distributed in all age groups and thus varied responses were expected.

4.2.3 Highest Level of Education

The respondents were further needed to indicate their highest level of education. Their response is as shown in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.3: Highest level of education

Many respondents as indicated in figure 4.3 had diploma level education followed by 28.6% with

degree level of education while 14.3% had secondary level education. This shows that the

respondents were well educated.

4.2.4 Religion

The study further needed the respondents to show their religion. They indicated as represented in

Figure 4.4.

Figure 4.4: Religion

Many respondents were Muslim leaders (70.3%). Christian leaders were 24.3% while Hindu

leaders were 5.4%. The high number of Muslim leaders was expected since the two regions are

mainly dominated by Muslims.

4.3 Causes of Violence

The study required the respondents to indicate their opinion on the extent to which the given

statements contributed to violence in their area. They were to indicate using a scale of 1-5 where

1=no extent, 2= little extent, 3= moderate extent, 4=great extent and 5= very great extent.

Table 4.2: Causes of violence

	Mean	**Std. Deviation**
Poverty	4.857	.3779
Low level of education	4.428	.7868
Political discrimination	2.714	1.6035
Economic marginalization	3.857	1.3451

Discriminative law enforcement practices	3.000	1.7320
Lack of employment	4.428	1.1338
Religious fanatism	1.142	.3779
Search for self identification	1.714	1.1127
Poor parenting	2.000	1.4142

The respondents indicated that poverty contributed to violence in their area to a very great extent (mean=4.857, SD=0.3779). Low level of education (mean=4.428, SD=0. 7868), lack of employment (mean=4.428, SD=1.1338) and economic marginalization (mean=3.857, SD=1.3451) contributed to a great extent towards violence in their area. The respondents further indicated that discriminative law enforcement policies (mean=3.000, SD=1.7320) and political discrimination (mean=2.714, SD=1.6035) contributed to a moderate extent to violence in their area. Further, poor parenting (mean=2.000, SD=1.4142) and search for self identification (mean=1.714, SD=1.1127) contributed violence in their area to a less extent while religious fanatism (mean=1.142, SD=0.3779) did not contribute violence in their area.

The respondents through an interview pointed out that lack of employment was the major cause of violent extremism in their region. Lack of employment contributed significantly to youth radicalization and involvement in violent extremism. The respondents suggested that creation of employment opportunities would play a significant role towards countering violent extremism. One religious leader from said "many youths are radicalized due to lack of employment. The central and county government should come up with means to engage the youth properly." Another respondent supported this idea when he said "The government of the day should reduce

unemployment level since idleness renders the public always available in such negative activities."

4.4 Measures by religious leaders in countering violence extremism

The study required the respondents to indicate their opinion on the extent to which the given statements on measures by religious leaders in countering violence extremism. They were to indicate using a scale of 1-5 where 1=no extent, 2= little extent, 3= moderate extent, 4=great extent and 5= very great extent.

Table 4.3: Measures by religious leaders in countering violence extremism

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Advocacy	4.142	.8997
Education and training	4.714	.4879
Convening dialogues	3.571	1.3972
Mediation	3.285	1.7043
Reconciliation	4.285	1.1127
Forum with government agents	3.285	1.3801

The respondents indicated that one of the measures used by religious leaders in CVE to a very great extent was education and training (mean=4.714, SD=.4879). Measures used to a great extent were advocacy (mean=4.142, SD=.8997) reconciliation (mean=4.285, SD1.1127) and convening dialogues (mean=3.571, SD=1.3972). Other measures such as mediation (mean=3.285, SD=1.7043) and forum with government agents (mean=3.285, SD=1.3801) were

used to a moderate extent by religious leaders in CVE. The findings agree with Van et al.[242] that religious leaders' peace and security work spans advocacy, dialogue, and direct engagement with Muslim youth at the local level. Religious leaders should also engaged with Muslim youth to empower them to stay in school, find employment, start a business, and participate in civic activities and decision making. In Mombasa, Religious leaders should collaborate on a youth employment action research initiative to assess opportunities for growth in youth employment and enterprise, as well as barriers for youth.

The study also carried out an interview by asking the religious leaders measures of countering violent extremism in their region. Some of the measures suggested were as follows;

Community involvement

The respondents were of the opinion that involving the community holistically would prevent violence. One respondent said that violent extremism can be countered best if the communities affected and those accused of committed the violence are involved holistically. The communities brought together to chat the way forward and their grievances solved properly. Another respondent said that the county government should organize frequent forum to dialogue with the public on issues affecting them and not only leave it at that but also ensure implementation of the proposed solutions. Yet another respondent indicated that;

> "To initiate community based practice that would be able to look into the root cause of the problem and come up with a proactive measure and programs entailed to minimize or restrict the said problem. Secondly, there is need for collective responsibility between the community, other stakeholders and the government to work hand in hand to put such menace to rest."[243]

Parental involvement

---

[242] Van, M. L., & United States Institute of Peace,. (2016). *Community resilience to violent extremism in Kenya.* pp.96-145

[243] Mohamed interview with respondent 1 Deriye Ahmed 10th sept 2017

The respondents were of the opinion that parents should be allowed to play a part in countering violence in the community. One respondent said that every parent should know where their children were at any given time. He added that there should be no school going children who were not in school. "Parent sensitization program should be conducted regularly aimed at creating awareness on the dangers of violent extremism. Children should be given engaging extra curricula activities during their leisure time" He added.[244]

Training

The respondents advocated for training of youths and young children through creating seminars and vocational centres to make them busy. Another respondent was for the idea of training so as to improve their orientation towards alternative dispute resolution mechanism like having dialogues, mediation and arbitration. "Since Africa is religious continent, religious leaders should be on the front line bridging the gap between the public and the relevant institutions expected to address the issues the public is demanding, to avoid them from expressing themselves through violent extremism" was an opinion of yet another respondent.[245]

Sheikh Hassan Omari said;

> "Muslim leaders have done a lot in countering violent extremism through various programs. We have started teaching Muslims interfaith dialogue and effects of terrorism. We organize group activities that allow participants to explore all value positions on issues central to extremist discourse and relevant to events in Kenya, free from criticism or social pressure,"

He further added that they held forums that allowed participants to propose interventions to solve terrorism-related topics according to a broad array of their own values. He also said that they

---

[244] Mohamed interview with respondent 2 Sheikh Abdirahman Alasow 15th sept 2017
[245] Mohamed interview with respondent 5 Imam Alinur Ibrahim Baricha 15th sept 2017

traveled to different parts of the country preaching counter-narratives and mainly during Friday *khutbahs*.

Religious leaders need energy about history and each contention has a history. Without a past filled with the contention, it is close difficult to draw up a dream without bounds. Also, religious performers have now and again received track one peace making techniques, however they do not have the assets and status that track one referees do.[246]

Johnston[247] indicates that religious leaders give convincing answers in little social gatherings and groups by outfitting individuals with a feeling of personality and course in life. In religious exercises, individuals rediscover their characters and good duties.

4.5 Effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violence extremism

The study required the respondents to indicate their opinion on the extent to which the given statements on effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violence extremism. They were to indicate using a scale of 1-5 where 1=no extent, 2= little extent, 3= moderate extent, 4=great extent and 5= very great extent.

Table 4.4: Effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violence extremism

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Enhancing cultural identity	2.857	1.5735
Peace-building	4.571	.5345
Restoration	3.428	1.2724
Community cohesion	4.000	1.1547

---

[246] Mwagiru, M., (2008). *The Water's Edge: Mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya*. Nairobi: IDIS. . 35(1), 33-56.

[247] Johnston, D., (2003). *Faith Based Diplomacy: Trumping Real Politik*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Intercultural interaction	3.285	1.3801

The respondents indicated that religious leaders were effective in peace-building to a very great extent (mean=4.571, SD=.5345). They were effective in community cohesion to a great extent (mean=4.000, SD=1.1547). They were effective to a moderate extent in restoration (mean=3.428, SD=1.2724), intercultural interaction (mean=3.285, SD=1.3801) and enhancing cultural identity (mean=2.857, SD=.1.5735).

The respondents through an interview were asked to indicate the effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violence extremism in their region. Religious leaders were depicted as contributing to unity in their respective communities. One respondent said that by working with others in faith groups they strengthen the ability of local communities to fight extremism by addressing community needs through collaboration with all the religious groups and the political groups.

> "Religious leaders hold a special place in the society by educating and propagating the importance of our social norms and values which is the basis of the understanding and practicing what is required of us in Islam. This therefore enables them to interact with communities they operate in and advice accordingly. This has been proven and approved by all"[248]

Another respondent said that religious leaders were best placed to counter violent extremism with enough support from the relevant authorities. He however added that proper monitoring and evaluation of the work of the religious leaders was also important[249]. There is need for the religious leaders to encourage the government to have employment programmes for the

---

[248]Respondent 1 Deriye Ahmed 10th sept 2017
[249] Respondent 2 Sheikh Abdirahman Alasow 15th sept 2017

65

youths.[250] Religious leaders know how to persuade their way into the community hence their effectiveness authority. Religious leaders can reach the maximum number of people in mosques, madrassa and other religious gatherings[251].

They are effective because they are considered to be opinion leaders in religious setup. Their presence within the society makes them more of genuine moderators than other leaders and the communities they operate in trust them better. This enables them to engage better with the people they are tasked to help.[252] The religious leaders have knowledge on the changing dynamics of terrorism and there is the will from these leaders to fight radicalization and promote coexistences amongst their communities and bordering neighbours.[253]

Some youths through focused group discussion indicated that most of religious leaders only say a word once the issues of concern have escalated into violent extremism, when they could have intervened during the initial stages before emotions of complainants are high.

> "Religious leaders' task should be a continuous role of not only preaching but also engaging the societies around them and trying to find solutions to their issues and also call in government and nongovernmental organizations whenever they need assistance or legal redress. Most of them wait for believers during their sacred days of the week but during the other days do not engage them. This is because a formality exercise and why intervening once it's turned violent to me proves no effectiveness. They should have done something before" they added[254]

4.6 Challenges faced by religious leaders in countering violence extremism

The study required the respondents to indicate their opinion on the extent to which the given statements on challenges faced by religious leaders in countering violence extremism. They were

---

[250] Respondent 6 Pastor Gilbert Kariuki 10th oct 2017
[251] Respondent 3Faith Oduya 01st oct 2017
[252] Rechyler, L., 'Religion and Conflict' *International Journal of Peace Studies*, vol 20, No.1.
[253] Respondent 4 Asha Adan 05th oct 2017
[254] Focused group discussion response

to indicate using a scale of 1-5 where 1=no extent, 2= little extent, 3= moderate extent, 4=great extent and 5= very great extent.

Table 4.5: Challenges faced by religious leaders in countering violence extremism

	Mean	Std. Deviation
Mistrust in sharing intelligence on sensitive information which exposes other partners to a certain degree of vulnerability	4.428	.7868
Lack of well-equipped anti- violent extremism force and facilities	4.428	1.1338
Lack of international/national laws	2.142	1.6761
Lack motivation to the religious leaders	3.714	1.3801
Lack of professional preparedness	3.571	1.8126

The challenges that faced religious leaders to a great extent in CVE were mistrust in sharing intelligence on sensitive information which exposes other partners to a certain degree of vulnerability (mean=4.428, SD=.7868) and lack of well-equipped anti- violent extremism force and facilities (mean=4.428, SD=1.1338). Challenges that faced them to a great extent were lack motivation to the religious leaders (mean=3.714, SD=1.3801) and lack of professional preparedness (mean=3.571, SD=1.8126). Lack of international/national laws was indicated to face religious leaders to a little extent (mean=2.142, SD=1.6761).

The respondents through an interview were asked to indicate the challenges faced by religious leaders in countering violence extremism. some of the challenges they specified were as follows;

Financial shortages

One major challenge noted by the respondents was financial issues. One respondent said that religious leaders lack the necessary financial ability required in undertaking their activities for instance moving from place to place in convening community and other stakeholder meetings.[255] Another topped by saying that religious leaders lack funds to carry out their duties. Therefore they don't have means to move across the count. He further added that they need funding so that the leaders preach the positive aspects of our religion Islam.[256]

Lack of cooperation

Lack of cooperation between the government agencies and religious leaders was also noted as a challenge. "There is lack of trust and cooperation between the security apparatus and society hence hindering any possible undertaking of such initiative by the religious leaders" Said one respondent. In Mombasa county, violent extremism is rampant and this is due to several factors like; marginalization, unemployment and radicalization. Religious leaders are accused of being part of the violence experienced in the coastal region which makes it hard for them to convince the law enforcers that they are not guilty.[257] "There is lack of Government intervention in offering skills and knowledge training to religious leaders, this will help them to understand the work on countering violent extremism and to put it in culturally and religiously relevant frames" indicated yet another respondent.[258]

Fear of victimization

 Religious leaders feared being victimized and seen as siding with a particular group of persons. One respondent said that religious leaders feared for their life in that if they come out to

---

[255] Respondent 1 Deriye Ahmed 10th sept 2017
[256] Respondent 4 Asha Adan 05th oct 2017
[257] Respondent 5 Imam Alinur Ibrahim Baricha15th sept 2017
[258] Respondent 6 Pastor Gilbert Kariuki 10th oct 2017

intervene, they feared they might be arrested and implicated on terror activities that they are not aware/part of. Terrorist struck homes of such clerics who preach against them in the cover of the nights to instil fear amongst others who will 'interfere with their work'.[259] Security enforcers have been accused of extrajudicial killings of top religious leaders at the coastal region, thus most of them fear to communicate with the youth that they might be accused of propagating jihadism.[260]

> "Religious leaders are not recognized better by the administration they work under, because the administration feels the religious leaders are part of the problem itself. The lack of recognition and participation in the issues is the biggest obstacles to the religious leaders.[261]

Muslim leaders have often times called on the Kenyan government to stop victimizing innocent Muslims as part of anti-terror efforts and instead engage with the Muslim community to address extremism.[262]

---

[259] Respondent 4 Asha Adan 05th oct 2017
[260] Respondent 5 Imam Alinur Ibrahim Baricha 15th oct 2017
[261] Respondent 7 Farida Athamn Mbarak 20th oct 2017
[262] Ibid

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

The study aimed at examining the role of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County. The study was guided by the following objectives to explore the causes of violent extremism, to examine the measures used by religious leaders in countering violent extremism, to determine the effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violent extremism and to assess the challenges facing religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County.

5.2 Summary of Findings

Findings show that the main causes of violence in Mombasa County are poverty, Low level of education, lack of employment, economic marginalization. Other challenges were discriminative law enforcement policies and political discrimination. From the findings, lack of employment contributed significantly to youth radicalization and involvement in violent extremism.

Findings also show that some of the measures used by religious leaders in CVE are education and training, advocacy, reconciliation and convening dialogues. Other measures are mediation and forum with government agents. The findings agree with Van et al.[263] that religious leaders' peace and security work spans advocacy, dialogue, and direct engagement with Muslim youth at the local level.

From the findings, religious leaders were effective in peace-building, community cohesion, restoration, intercultural interaction and enhancing cultural identity. Religious leaders unify

---

[263] Van, M. L., & United States Institute of Peace,. (2016). *Community resilience to violent extremism in Kenya*. pp.96-145

people as they work with others in faith groups they strengthen the ability of local communities to fight extremism by addressing community needs through collaboration with all the religious groups and the political groups. They hold a special place in the society by educating and propagating the importance of our social norms and values thus interaction within the community.

From the findings of the study majority of the respondents indicated, mistrust in sharing intelligence on sensitive information which exposes other partners to a certain degree of vulnerability. They further added lack of well-equipped anti- violent extremism force and facilities, different counter violent extremism priorities and different legal systems are also challenges faced by counter violent extremism partnership. The findings revealed that lack of human resources, international/national laws, contrasts involved with states from which fanatics develop, lawful and arrangement issues with data sharing, contrasts in way to deal with counter-violent operations, observing and surveying progress, mechanical and operational contrasts, social contrasts/absence of trust, and responsibility.

5.2 Conclusions

The first objective was to explore the causes of violent extremism in Mombasa County. The study concludes that the main causes of violence in Mombasa County are poverty, low level of education, lack of employment, economic marginalization, discriminative law enforcement policies and political discrimination. From the findings, lack of employment contributed significantly to youth radicalization and involvement in violent extremism. This has been propagated by the historical injustices in the country which seem to favour the productive areas such as the rift valley and the central regions. Political as well as economic factors do not favour these regions compared to other counties and it was only after devolution that developments are

71

being experienced. The regions are also highly populated by Muslims against the larger populations of the country which are christens.[264]

The second objective was to examine examine the measures used by religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County. The study concludes that some of the measures used by religious leaders in CVE are education and training, advocacy, reconciliation, convening dialogues, mediation and forum with government agents. The findings agree with Van et al.[265] that religious leaders' peace and security work spans advocacy, dialogue, and direct engagement with Muslim youth at the local level. Appelby[266] indicates that religious leaders role in peace promotion is now and again 'inchoate and delicate, clumsy, and needing more prominent number of sufficiently prepared professionals, more examination and testing and hypothetical elaboration. Religious leaders across the globe, employ several measures to counter violent extremism which at times in proliferated by certain regions. In Mombasa County both the Christian and Muslim leaders have played a role in countering violent extremism. The study however established that Muslim leaders are in a better position of countering violence owing to the fact that majority of the people shares similar beliefs. The findings are in line with Wallensteen[267] that religious leaders have keen interest in and capacity for reconciliation, healing, and justice.

The third objective was to find out the effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County. The study concludes that religious leaders are effective in peace-building, community cohesion, restoration, intercultural interaction and enhancing cultural

---

[264] Mwakimako, H. & Willis, J. 2014. Islam , Politics and Violence on the Kenyan coast. 31(1): pp 1–23

[265] Van, M. L., & United States Institute of Peace,. (2016). *Community resilience to violent extremism in Kenya*. pp.96-145

[266] Appleby, op. cit., p p.7

[267] Wallensteen, P. (2002). *Understanding Conflict Resolution*. London: Sage Publishers, pp 1-133

identity. Religious leaders unify people as they work with others in faith groups they strengthen the ability of local communities to fight extremism by addressing community needs through collaboration with all the religious groups and the political groups. According to Mwagiru[268] that religious leaders get involved in the business of conflict management as a vocation. Religious leaders hold a special place in the society by educating and propagating the importance of our social norms and values thus interaction within the community. According to Appleby and Little[269] religious leaders' have inclination to convert, which mistakes peacemaking for preacher work. He advocates that they must adjust a dialect of second requests that is they must have the capacity to talk a second order dialect that rises above religious or ethnic limits and cultivate cooperation with mainstream and legislative offices and delegates.

The fourth objective was to find out the challenges facing religious leaders in countering violent extremism in Mombasa County. The study concludes that study majority of the respondents indicated, mistrust in sharing intelligence on sensitive information which exposes other partners to a certain degree of vulnerability. They further added lack of well-equipped anti-violent extremism force and facilities, different counter violent extremism priorities and different legal systems are also challenges faced by counter violent extremism partnership. The findings revealed that lack of human resources, international/national laws, contrasts involved with states from which fanatics develop, lawful and arrangement issues with data sharing, contrasts in way to deal with counter-violent operations, observing and surveying progress, mechanical and operational contrasts, social contrasts/absence of trust, and responsibility. The findings agree

---

[268] Mwagiru, M., (2008). *The Water's Edge: Mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya*. Nairobi: IDIS. . 35(1), 33-56.
[269] Little, D, and Appleby. R. Scott (2004). "A Moment of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious Peace building in an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict." pp. 1-266

with OAU[270] that one of the real difficulties experienced by the religious leaders in actualizing its counter- violence plan is the absence of satisfactory human and monetary resources.

5.3 Recommendations

Based on the study findings, the study makes the following recommendations;

i. Religious leaders ought to cleanse their name against being involved with any terrorist groups and violent extremism by being in the forefront condemning the same. This should be done in open as opposed to conducting meeting in undisclosed locations so as to regain the trust from the community.

ii. The government should assure religious leaders of protection as they carry out their peace building messages from place to place. Past deaths and threats to religious leaders from both the government and the terrorist groups have victimized the leaders from being proactive on the issue of violent extremism in Mombasa County.

iii. Both the central and the county government should offer necessary funds to the religious leaders in preaching and training on violent extremism. More funds should particularly be given to the sheiks since the majority of coastal people are Muslims and attend mosques.

iv. The county government should look for ways of creating job opportunities to the youths in the region. The research has found out that more youths are likely to engage to violent extremism due to idleness which makes them prone to being lured to terrorist groups. When the youths are made busy they will have no time to engage in such activities.

---

[270] See, the 1999 OAU Convention and the Plan of Action

v.   The non-governmental groups should join hand with the religious leaders in carrying out campaigns on the dangers of being involved in violent activities. By teaching the community, the information is likely to trickle down to the youths who will be warned against involving themselves with terrorist groups.

vi.   The government should work with religious organizations which are involved in campaigns to try to address the push and pull factors of violent extremism. These organizations lobby and advocate for policy change in different levels of government because there are also genuine grievances. These are very appealing to communities where there are practical issues that we need to service.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abu-Nimer, M., & Kadayifci-Orellana, S. A. (2008). Muslim Peace-Building Actors in Africa and the Balkan Context: Challenges and Needs. *Peace & Change, 33(*4), 549-581.

Appleby, R.S. (2000). *The Ambivalence of the Sacred*. Lanham, MA: Rowman and Littlefield. Vol. 25, No. 3, pp.1-298

Aronson, S. L. (2013). Kenya and the Global War on Terror: Neglecting History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism . *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS, Vol. 17 (2): pp.* 24-84.

Atta-Asamoah, A. (2015a). East Africa Report; The Nature and Drivers of Insecurity in Kenya. Institute for Security Studies. 27(1): pp 91-102.

Baku, A. (2016). Breakout Session "Religious Leaders and Violent Extremism: The Challenges of Prevention". 7th Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. Vol. 25, No. 3, 292-298

Barnett, Michael, and Janice Gross Stein. (2012). "Introduction: The Secularization and Sanctification of Humanitarianism." New York: Oxford University Press. Pp. 3-36.

Bartoli, A. (2004). Christianity and Peace building, in: Coward, Harold and Gordon S. Smith (eds.), *Religion and Peace building,* State University of New York Press. pp. 147-157.

Bercovitch, J., & Kadayifci-Orellana, A. S. (2009). Religion and mediation: The role of faith-based actors in international conflict resolution. *International Negotiation, 14(*1), 175-204.

Berkley Center for Religion Peace and World Affairs. (2011). *The Philippines: Religious Conflict Resolution on Mindanao.* Berkley Center for Religion Peace and World Affairs: Washington DC. pp 33-44

Berman, E. (2009). *Radical, Religoius and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism.* Massachusetts : MIT Press. *73, pp* 1036-1044.

Best, S. G., & Rakodi, C. (2011). *Violent conflict and its aftermath in Jos and Kano, Nigeria: what is the role of religion?.* Religions and Development Working Paper pp.69-72

Bosco, R. M. (2016). *Securing the sacred: Religion, national security, and the western state*. pp. 23-55

Botha, A. (2013). *Assesing Vulnerability of Kenyan Youth to Radicalization and Extremism.* Johannesburg : Institute for Security Studies (245) p. 156-171

Bouta, Tsjeard, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana and Mohammed Abu-Nimer. 2005. *Faith-Based Peace-Building: Mapping and Analysis of Christian, Muslim and Multi-Faith Actors*. Salam Institute for Peace and Justice. Vol. 27(1): pp. 91-102.

Bwana, J.. (2015). "Imam in Mombasa Court For 'Luring Boys into Al Shabaab." The Standard. pp23

Cain, A. (2001). "Humanitarian & Development Actors as Peacebuilders?" *Review of African Political Economy* 28:577-586.

CAK. (2014). *Quarterly Sector Statistics Report: Fourth Quarter of the Financial Year 2013/2014.* Nairobi: Communication Authority of Kenya . *43,* pp. 1-58.

Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (2010). *Engaging Religious Communities Abroad: A New Imperative for U.S. Foreign Policy.* Chicago: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs. 6 (1) 4-10.

Clark, J. N. (2011). Religious Peace-building in South Africa: From Potential to Practice. *Ethnopolitics,* 10(3 4), pp. 345-365

Coward, H. and Smith, G. S (2004). *Religion and peace-building*. U.S.A: State University of New York Press. 108: pp. 189-206.

Denny, F. M. (2004). Islam and Peace building: Continuities and Transitions', *Religion and Peacebuilding,* State University of New York Press, pp. 129-146.

Diane d'Souza (1998). *Evangelism, Dialogue, Reconciliation: The Transformative Journey of the Henry Martyn Institute,* Hyderabad: Henry Martyn Institute, pp 7-35

Esposito, John L. (November 30, 2015), "Does Islamophobia Feeds Radicalization," pp 28-31

Flanigan, S.T. (2013). Religion, conflict and peace-building in development. Edward Elgar Publishing. Pp.252-267.

Fox, J. and Sandler, S. (2006). Bringing Religion into International Relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Volume 32, Issue 8, pp. 11–20

Golan, G. D. (2016). *Countering violent extremism: A whole community approach to prevention and intervention*.4 (1), 105-107

Gopin, M. (2000). *Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of World Religions, Violence and Peacemaking*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.1-126

Great Britain., & Great Britain. (2010). *Preventing violent extremism: Sixth report of session 7(10)* pp.33-87

Green, S. N., Proctor, K., & Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, D.C.). (2016). *Turning point: A new comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism*. *94* pp. 95-120.

Guilain Denoeux & Lynn Carter, (February 2009). "Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism," *USAID. pp*. 5

Hayward, S. (2012). *Religion and Peace-building. Reflections on Current Challenges and Future Prospects.* United States Institute of Peace. 9(1): pp. 26-48.

ICG (2012). *Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalization.* Africa Briefing No. 85. Brusells: International Crisis Group. (3) pp. 389-392

IRIN. (July 28, 2014). "Kenya: Gunned down in Mombasa: the clerics that have died." pp 3

James, R., with CABUNGO. (2009). *Faith-Based Organizational Development (OD) with Churches in Malawi.* INTRAC Praxis Note pp. 47.

Johnson, D. and Cox, B. (2003). *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*. New York: Oxford University Press. Vol 2 Issue 8; pp. 340-47.

Johnston, D. (2003). *Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4(1):pp. 1-270.

Kadayifci-Orellana, S. Ayse. (2008). "Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution." In *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, edited by Jacob. 143, pp. 36–44.

Kan, E.M. (1993) 'Religious Transformation and Social Change in Latin America', Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, pp.1-220

KNBS (2007). *Basic Report on Well-Being in Kenya.* Nairobi : Government Printer. pp. 1-55

Lederach, J. P. (2010). *The moral imagination: The art and soul of building peace*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.1-284.

Little, D, and Appleby. R. Scott (2004). "A Moment of Opportunity? The Promise of Religious Peace building in an Era of Religious and Ethnic Conflict." pp. 1-266

Maina S. (2017). Muslim leaders are trying to change the way Kenya fights terrorism. pp. 32-90

Marc, A., Verjee, N., Mogaka, S., & World Bank. (2015). *The challenge of stability and security in West Africa*. pp. 49-112

Mawere, M., & Marongwe, N. (2016). *Violence, politics and conflict management in Africa: Envisioning transformation, peace and unity in the twenty-first century*. Mankon, Bamenda: Langaa Research & Publishing3(8), pp. 1-171.

Mghanga, M. (2010). *Usipoziba Ufa Utajenga Ukuta: Land, Elections and Conflicts in Kenya's Coast Province.* Nairobi: Henrich Boll Stifung. Pp. 12-45

Minhas M. Khan, (October 29, 2015) "Understanding and Identifying Violent Extremism," *ISSI Issue Brief. Pp 23-36*

Mogire, E., & Agade, K. M. (2011). Counter-terrorism in Kenya. Journal of Contemporary African Studies. 35(1), 33-56.

Mohamed, H. (2015) 'Rescue Garissa town from the bloody clutches of AlShabaab', The Daily Nation Kenya pp.25

Mohammed Abu-Nimer, (2003). *Nonviolence and Peace Building in Islam: Theory and Practice,* Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, pp. 183.

Mugenda, O.M., & Mugenda, A.G. (2003). *Research Methods; Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches.* Nairobi

Mwagiru, M., (2008). *The Water's Edge: Mediation of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya*. Nairobi: IDIS. . 35(1), 33-56.

Mwakimako, H. & Willis, J. 2014. Islam , Politics and Violence on the Kenyan coast. 31(1): pp 1–23

Ngunyi, M. and Katumanga, M. (2012). *From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence.* Nairobi: The Consulting House and Office of the GLR. pp45-65

Njonjo, K. S. (2010). *Kenya Youth Fact Book.* Nairobi: Institute of Economic Affairs and Fredrich-Ebert Stiffung. pp1-43

Njonjo, K. S. (2010). *Kenya Youth Fact Book.* Nairobi: Institute of Economic Affairs and Fredrich-Ebert Stiffung. 40 (2), 247-262

Nozell M and Hayward S. (October 2014). Religious Leaders Countering Extremist Violence: How Policy Changes Can Help. 40(1), 101-123.

Ombati, W. (2016). "Fugitive Terror Suspect Ismail Mohamed Soshi Killed In Police Raid On Mombasa House." Pp 15-34

Omer, A. (2015). "Religious Peace-building: The Exotic, the Good, and the Theatrical." In *The Oxford Handbook of Religion, Conflict, and Peace-building*, pp. 183-211

Owen, M. & King, A. (2013). *Religious Peacebuilding and Development in Nepal*. Winchester Centre of Religions for Reconciliation and Peace. 72(2):pp. 221-231.

Ploch, L., Library of Congress., & Federation of American Scientists. (2010). *Countering terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. response*. Washington, D.C.?: Congressional Research Service. 99, 29(3), 1-27.

Prestholdt, J. (2011). Kenya, the United States and Counterterrorism. *Africa Today 57(4): pp.* 3-27 .

Ralph E.S. Tanner (2007). <u>Violence and religion: cross-cultural opinions and consequences.</u> Concept Publishing Company. pp. 5–6.

Ramet, Sabrina P., (1992). *Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia: The Communist and Post Communist Eras*. Durham u.a: Duke Univ. Press, *104(3),pp. 817-828.*

Repstad, Pål. (2004). "The power of the faithful: Powerful Actors with Clear Intentions or Power Everywhere?" Oslo: Novus Press. pp. 1-143

Said, A., and Funk, N.C (2002). "The Role of Faith in Cross-Cultural Conflict Resolution." *Peace and Conflict Studies* 9(1): 36-50.

Sampson, C. (2007). "Religion and Peacebuilding." In *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Pp. 273-326.

Shore, M. (2009). *Religion and Conflict Resolution: Christianity and South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.* Farnham: Ashgate. 142, pp. 250–353.

Silberman, I. E., Tory H. and Dweck, C. S. (2005). Religion and World Change: Violence and Terrorism versus Peace', *Journal of Social Issues* 61 pp 137-144

Smock, D. R. (2001). "Faith-Based Non-Governmental Organizations and International Peace-building." Special Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. pp 21-28

Spitz, Lewis W. (1980). *The Reformation*. St. Louis: Concordia Pub. House, pp. 45-56

Stålsett, Sturla J., Oddbjørn Leirvik, and Peter Beyer (Eds.). (2004). *The Power of Faiths in Global Politics*. Oslo: Norwegian Church Aid. Pp. 1-130

Standard, The. 2017. "Terror Suspect Arrested in Kilifi." *The Standard*. Accessed February 8, 2017. Pp 13

Svensson, I. (2013). *Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars*. Queensland: University of Queensland Press. pp 1-250

Tankersley, J. (November 30, 2015), "This might be the most controversial theory for what's behind the rise of ISIS," *Washington Post, pp. 34*

The White House (August, 2011) "Empowering Local Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The United States," pp 21

U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide. (2009). Public Intelligence. *Public Intelligence*. pp. 241-294

UN. (February 19, 2015), "Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. pp.3-9

USAID Policy. (2011). The Development response to violent extremism and insurgency. *Putting principles into practice.* USAID Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism. 104(3), pp. 12-29

Vallacher, R., Coleman, P., Nowak, A., & Bui-Wrzosinska, L. (2010). *Rethinking intractable conflict: The perspective of dynamical systems*, American Psychologist, 65 (4), 262-278

Van Ommering, E. (2009). *The Roles of Faith-Based Educational Institutions in Conflict Transformation in Fragile States.* ICCO Alliance Working Group Religion and Education. 30(4): 450–461

Van, M. L., & United States Institute of Peace,. (2016). *Community resilience to violent extremism in Kenya.* pp.96-145

Wallensteen, P. (2002). *Understanding Conflict Resolution.* London: Sage Publishers, pp 1-133

Wesley J. W. (2011).   The Religious Violence Project. *A Report to the 2010-2011 Edition of the Boston University Religion Fellows Program. pp. 21-43*

World Bank (2012). *African Economic Outlook, Kenya 2012.* Washington DC.: World Bank . pp 1-23

Zartman, I. W, and Maha K.. (2011). "Growing Up in Groups." In *Engaging Extremists: Trade-Offs, Timing, and Diplomacy*, pp. 27-56.

Appendix I: Questionnaire for Religious Leaders

Section A: Background information

1. Indicate your gender

    Male   [ ]

    Female   [ ]

2. What is your age bracket?

    Less than 30 years   [ ]

    30-40 years   [ ]

    40-50 years   [ ]

    Above 50 years   [ ]

3. What is your highest education level?

    Secondary level   [ ]

    Diploma level   [ ]

    Degree level   [ ]

    Post graduate level   [ ]

4. What is your religion?

    Christian   [ ]

    Muslim   [ ]

    Hindu   [ ]

    Others   [ ]

5. In your opinion, to what extent do the following factors drive violence within your area? Use a scale of 1=5 where 1=no extent, 2=little extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent and 5=very great extent.

	1	2	3	4	5
Poverty					
Low level of education					
Political discrimination					
Economic marginalization					
Discriminative law enforcement practices					

Lack of employment					
Religious fanatism					
Search for self identification					
Poor parenting					

Measures by religious leaders of CVE

6. To what extent do you use the following measures in countering violence extremism in your county?

	1	2	3	4	5
Advocacy					
Education and training					
Convening dialogues					
Mediation					
Reconciliation					
Forum with government agents					

7. Please explain on your best measures of countering violence extremism in your county.

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

Effectiveness of religious leaders in CVE

8. How would you rate the achievement of each of the following as a result of involvement of religious leaders in countering violence extremism?

	1	2	3	4	5
Enhancing cultural identity					
Peace-building					
Restoration					
Community cohesion					
Intercultural interaction					

9. In your own opinion what is the effectiveness of religious leaders in countering violence extremism in your county?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………….

Challenges faced by religious leaders in CVE

10. To what extent do the following challenges face religious leaders in countering violent extremism in your counties? Use a scale of 1=5 where 1=no extent, 2=little extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent and 5=very great extent.

	1	2	3	4	5
Mistrust in sharing intelligence on sensitive information which exposes other partners to a certain degree of vulnerability					
Lack of well-equipped anti- violent extremism force and facilities					
Lack of international/national laws					
Lack motivation to the religious leaders					
Lack of professional preparedness					

11. In your own opinion are the main challenges facing religious leaders in countering violence extremism in your county?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………

Appendix II: Interview Guide for religious leaders

1. What is the current role of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in the county?

2. Are religious leaders involved in effective measures to counter terrorism?

3. What kind of action programs could be implemented in collaboration with religious leaders to avoid the spread of violent extremism?

4. What are the various strategies put in place to counter violent extremism in your county?

5. Describe the effectiveness of the strategies used in countering violent extremism in your county?

6. What are the challenges faced in combating violent extremism in Mombasa County

7. What recommendations can be made in improving the counter-violence extremism measures/strategies applied in the county?

Appendix III: Focused Group Discussion for the Youth

1. What is the current role of religious leaders in countering violent extremism in the county?

2. Are religious leaders involved in effective measures to counter terrorism?

3. What kind of action programs could be implemented in collaboration with religious leaders to avoid the spread of violent extremism?

4. How do they correct unfair and inaccurate perceptions of religion and encourage critical understanding?

5. What are the various strategies put in place to counter violent extremism in your county?

6. Describe the effectiveness of the strategies used in countering violent extremism in your county?

7. What are the challenges faced in combating violent extremism in Mombasa County

8. What recommendations can be made in improving the counter-violence extremism measures/strategies applied in the county?