

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (IDIS)

**REGIONAL POWERS AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF
KENYA AND ETHIOPIA'S INTEREST IN SOMALIA**

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**A Research Project submitted in partial fulfilment for the award of the Degree in
Masters of Arts in International Conflict Management, Institute of Diplomacy and
International Studies, University of Nairobi.**

2017

DECLARATION

This project is my original work and has not been submitted for another Degree in any other University

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This project has been submitted for examination with my permission as the University supervisor

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DEDICATION

To my wife, Halima Ibrahim for her encouragement and financial support

ABSTRACT

This study explored regional powers and conflict management with a special focus to the interest of Kenya and Ethiopia's in Somalia and how the interest has affected the Somalia situations. The main objective of this Research Paper was to establish the factors that have hampered resolution of Somalia conflict; to establish the effect of the interest of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Somalia conflict; and to identify strategies that can lead to peace in Somalia considering the interest of Kenya and Ethiopia. The study employed qualitative approach and sought to cover the exploratory and descriptive elements of the research process. The first part of the study gives a background of conflict management efforts in Somalia. The second part provides details of the challenges in the management of Somali conflict, it covers the factors that hamper conflict resolution in Somalia. In the third part, the paper delves in the analysis of the interest of Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia, it highlights the history of the modern Somali conflict, the justification of Kenya's involvement in the Somali conflict, a multi-faceted approach in addressing national interest and the contemporary intervention in Somalia. Lastly, the fourth part of the paper presents a critical analysis of the involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia in the management of Somalia Conflict. The findings of the study reveal that conflicts in one country spreads and, thus affects other nations in one way or another. It was also revealed that resolution of Somali conflict requires a multi-faceted approach with the involvement of external actors. The involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia was also revealed to be marred with certain interest that may hinder conflict resolution in Somalia. The study recommends that there is need for the involvement of external actors with no other interest other that regional stability in the quest to resolving the conflict in Somalia.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background to the study

1.0 Background to the study

After the Second World War and the fall of the Berlin wall, the global political system has undergone a change from a United States (US) led unipolar world order to an uprising or the rise of many contenders.¹ The global weight on the US had mutually enthused the advent of a diversity of players: regional middle powers including China, Brazil, Russia, and India; regional alliances like the European Union (EU); and regional supremacies like Iran, Argentina, South Africa and Nigeria. The alteration of the world perspective has led to an ongoing interest in (and focussing more on research) regions, regional order and regional supremacies in terms of the part they have to play (with other regional/state players) in the international system.²

For regional stability to be a reality, regional powers are charged with the responsibility of ensuring the right leadership and direction which will in turn spur growth and development in their respective regions. The pressure on the regional actors' in the realisation of this stability in their regions has been heightened by the unwillingness of Western countries to get involved in civil and political strife mostly in the underdeveloped world and especially Africa. To put it differently, regional supremacies are now taking the responsibility of addressing clashes, economic deficiency and political instabilities in their regions.³ Regional powers are now under

¹ Prys, M. (2009b). Regional hegemon or regional bystander? South Africa's Zimbabwe policy, 2000-2005. *Politikon*, 36(2).

² Fleges, D. (2009). Regional power, South Africa: Co-operative hegemony constrained by historical legacy. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27(2), 135-157;

³ Prys, M. (2010, September). The variability of regional powers. Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR, Stockholm.

more pressure and high expectations has been put on them to deal with the political strife, difficulties brought by low economic growth and political uncertainty taking place in their backyards. Time and again the Western world has been calling upon countries like Brazil, India, South Africa, Nigeria and Australia to intervene and salvage their regions from total downfall.⁴

Research has been carried out on regional supremacies as both implementers⁵ and stumbling blocks to regional amalgamation.⁶ Regional players have also been looked into by researchers in reference to the rise and to maintenance of regional safekeeping multiple units under the regulation or administration of a single government.⁷ Additional research on regional leadership puts emphasis on the part played by a regional supremacy as a rising power in worldwide domination.⁸ Nevertheless, it appears there is a shortage of data on a sub-national leadership, especially in Africa occasioning a deficiency of scientifically verifiable inferences.

Conflict in Somalia can be drawn back into the colonial period. Somali was partitioned into five parts by the colonial rulers (Britain, France and Italy). The British Somaliland, and Northern territory of Kenya were allotted to Britain, The Italian Somaliland was colonised by Italy, The Northern coastline presently the republic of Djibouti was colonised by France while Ogaden area was colonised by Ethiopia.⁹

⁴ Adebajo, A., & Landsberg, C. (1996). Trading places: Nigeria and South Africa. *Indicator*, 3(13), 64-68.

⁵ Hurrell, A. (2007). One world? Many worlds? The place of regions in the study of international society. *International Affairs*, 83(1), 127-46; Alao, A. (2011). Nigeria and the global powers: Continuity and change in policy and perceptions (Occasional Paper No. 96). South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme. SAIIA.

⁶ Pedersen, T. (2002). Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and institutions in regional integration. *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), 677-696.

⁷ Buzan, B. (1993). From international system to international society: Structural realism and regime theory meet the English school. *International Organization* 47(3), 327-352.

⁸ Pedersen, T. (2002). Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and institutions in regional integration. *Review of International Studies*, 28(4), 677-696.

⁹ Mulugetta, 2009: 9

Somali conflict involves other states in the region who play a vital role in it. Involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia have undoubtedly influenced peace and war.¹⁰ Other than these two countries, other players have also contributed to the Somalia conflict, for example, in the bid to neutralise Ethiopia's action in Somalia, Eritrea has influenced the Somalia conflict.¹¹ Nonetheless, it is not true to state that the immense regional intervention in Somalia is as a result of national interest or delegation issues, there are other factors involved such as military and political power supremacy in the region. Uganda is seen to have abundant influence in the region and wants to preserve the status quo but Kenya and Ethiopia have become obstacles in the case of Somalia. Resolution of Somali's conflict is almost impossible to achieve without the common consent of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia.¹²

1.1 Statement of research problem

Somalia has lacked an operational central government for about three successive decades. The lack of a central government has been attributed to a number of factors. Scholars have had a consensus that the root cause of instability is conflict. Other factors such as poor governance, high illiteracy, clan based power struggle and extreme poverty have been proposed as propagators of conflict in Somalia.¹³ Somalia has been mocked as one of the most anarchic states after the fall of her central government. However, there are parts of Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland) have enjoyed comparative stability after reconciliation processes led by local leaders.¹⁴ External players such as Kenya and Ethiopia are involved in the Somalia conflict. Kenya and Ethiopia intervene in the conflict by working together with a number of local players to ensure their interests are well catered for which has had a negative bearing on the conflict in

¹⁰ Eriksson, 2013: 5

¹¹ **Ibid**

¹² **Ibid**

¹³ Lewis, I.M. (2002). A modern history of the Somali. Nation and state in the Horn of Africa. Fourth Edition. Published by James Currey, Btec Books and Ohio University Press

¹⁴ Afyare and Barise, 2006: 33

Somalia.¹⁵ Past studies have put emphasis on the activities of domestic players, their obstinacy and stubbornness and the clannish heterogeneity of Somali society as the sum of the factors that have affected the conflict. However, this study seeks to fill the gap by focusing on the role which external actors play in the Somalia conflict management with a predisposition to Kenya and Ethiopia. The study will be guided by the following objectives.

1.2 General objective

The general objective of the study is to explore the role of regional powers in peace and conflict in Somalia.

1.2.1 Specific objectives

- i. To establish the influence of the behaviour of Kenya and Ethiopia in the conflict situation in Somalia
- ii. To determine the interests of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Somali conflict
- iii. To explore prospects of stability in Somalia considering the interest of Kenya and Ethiopia

1.2.2 Research questions

- i. What is the interests of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Somali conflict?
- ii. What is the interests of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Somali conflict?
- iii. What are the prospects of stability in Somalia considering the interest of Kenya and Ethiopia?

¹⁵ Eriksson, 2013: 6

1.1 Significance of the study

A considerable amount of empirical study has been conducted within the country to determine the relationship between foreign interference on Somali conflict. It has been perceived from the available literature, that most research works view foreign interference as a hindrance to Somali unity. As far as we can tell, the influence of foreign interference of Somali conflict has not been empirically verified in the literature, especially in Mogadishu-Somalia. Most scholars in the Country have also not been keen to document the nature, interference involved in Somali conflict. Therefore, this study is imperative in filling this observed gap by examining the impact of Ethiopia and Kenya on Somali conflict. The study further makes an addition to the literature available on foreign and regional interference on Somali conflict.

1.5 Literature review

1.5.1 Regional power

A nation that is dominant in relation to its measurable resources and capabilities e.g. military) in a given geographical area and which seeks to control other nations in that geographical area is said to be a regional supremacy.¹⁶The European Consortium for political research state that dominant states in the region create an environment which joins together international institutions that deal with political and economic incorporation among nations and which can be used as a way out for preventive war¹⁷. A large number of models of incorporation propose that nations come together or join forces so as to come up with solutions to their inability to access adequate facts and figures; lessen operational expenditures among others for the advancement of the welfare of their members. As a result, coming together aids in creation of

¹⁶ Nolte, Detlef (2010): How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics, in: Review of International Studies, vol. 36.

¹⁷ European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2005 SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 11(1): 99–135 [DOI: 10.1177/1354066105050138]

a dependable obligation that eliminates the risk of impending conflicts among nations of unequal influence.

Integration offers a substitute to war that is meant to defend a state against a rising power challenging the status quo and deterring it from creating a regional hegemony. European incorporation established in the 1950s had a role of compelling a momentarily weak West Germany so that she cannot use her power in future to control Europe, thus preventing a defensive war against her.

Superiority in economic and military capabilities, and in geographical size is often referred to as material resources. Military superiority is imperative to the identification of a nation as a regional power. Having adequate military resources for instance, a big number of military force, a constant adequate budgetary allocation to the military, exceptional practical knowledge in combat in addition to a satisfactory internal ability to manufacture conservative artilleries make up the key contributing factors of a nation's defence forces competencies.¹⁸

Demonstrating economic power as shown by their Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Gross National Product (GNP), and procurement abilities, technological advancements, and industrialization is similarly vital for a nation to be categorized as a regional supremacy.¹⁹ States that have both military and economic strengths are able to successfully govern and have an impact in regional security issues. Even so, states with military strengths only may establish a momentary region of influence and governance.²⁰ When a state has a strong military,

¹⁸ Lemke, Douglas (2008): Dimensions of Hard Power: Regional Leadership and Material Capabilities. Paper Prepared for the First Regional Powers Network Conference at the German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg, Germany; Vayrynen, Raimo (1979): Economic and Military Position of the Regional Power Centers, in: Journal of Peace Research, vol. 4, no. 15.

¹⁹ Vayrynen, Raimo (1979): Economic and Military Position of the Regional Power Centers, in: Journal of Peace Research, vol. 4, no. 15; Prys, Miriam (2010): The Variability of Regional Powers. Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on International Relations. Stockholm, Sweden.

²⁰ Vayrynen, Raimo (1979): Economic and Military Position of the Regional Power Centers, in: Journal of Peace Research, vol. 4, no. 15

adequate economic resources, good population structure and diplomatic efficiency further works towards strengthening a nations candidature to making it a regional supremacy.²¹

Nations that take on a regional power position have the motivation to lead, exercise power, and take a role of a stabilizer in matters of regional security by being involved in peacekeeping and peace-making activities. They also impact regional security matters by making use of prevailing regional governance structures.²² However, there is need for internal political stability in order to exercise regional leadership.

In order for a state to be determined as a regional supremacy, it is critical for other states in the region to jointly approve the potential candidate's power and position. Nonetheless, the growth and control of regional supremacies is often begrudged by other regional states. Triepel contends that dominant states in the region are time and again faced with misgivings and sometimes antagonism, and verbal confrontation.²³ These kinds of reactions maybe brought about by anxiety, defencelessness, protectiveness, differences, or past events. Therefore, a regional supremacy can only be welcomed by other states after they make a cost-benefit analysis of the new state of affairs, it is based upon usefulness or necessity but most importantly when a state realizes it is helpless in the situation.²⁴ Acknowledgement by other regional actors such as the intergovernmental organizations and more importantly, by states which have been internationally acknowledged as global supremacies such as the United States of America, Russia etc. is imperative for power projection.

²¹ Iyob, Ruth (1993): Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa, in: Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 31, no. 2.

²² Iyob, Ruth (1993): Regional Hegemony: Domination and Resistance in the Horn of Africa, in: Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 31, no. 2; Flandes, Daniel (2007): Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case. German Institute of Global and Area Studies Working Paper no. 53.

²³ Prys, Miriam (2010): The Variability of Regional Powers. Paper presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on International Relations. Stockholm, Sweden.

²⁴ Ibid

By and large, a dominance in material resources, a prerogative to take control and acknowledgement remain imperative for a nation's recognition as a regional power. In this respect, comparative in lieu of total dominance when one considers measurable resources is crucial owing to the big variations between measurable strengths of regional powers all over the world. Additionally, it is only the comparative dominance over neighbouring nations that is of importance in regional associations.²⁵ As much as some states are viewed as regional supremacies in the geographical areas where they are located, their influence may be limited or irrelevant at the global level.²⁶

1.5.2 Regional powers and conflict management

Conflict is a natural occurrence among human beings that has been in existence since time immemorial. It is commonly alleged that where there are people, there will be disagreements and hence conflict. Moreover, subject to the way it is resolved, conflict may intensify and lead to destruction or if beneficially resolved it may result to quality final products. Consequently, being able to cope with conflict is vital to a fully functioning people or for peace to reign among people. There are instances where some people go out and start war most of the times conflict maybe caused by poor communication between people in relation to their needs, ideas, beliefs, goals or values. These issues make conflict resolution, management and transformation skills and institutions significant and nonpareil.

The act of being in a position to identify and take control of conflict rationally, impartially and resourcefully is referred to as conflict management. It involves the reduction of the undesirable and disparaging characteristics associated with war using a set of procedures as well as working jointly with the conflicting groups. Conflict management is sometimes used to refer to conflict

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Wight, Martin (1978): *Power Politics*. Hedley Bull et al. (eds.). Revised and expanded edition. Leicester: Leicester University Press. First published in 1946 by Royal Institute of International Affairs.

regulation. It involves all actions involved in controlling conflict satisfactorily at different phases, comprising all efforts put to assist in averting conflict, by being pre-emptive. Conflict management incorporates conflict restraint, suppression and all legal action. Its objective is to develop group learning and results, including efficiency and output in an organizational situation.²⁷

Conflict Resolution has a purpose of ending conflicts with the use of practical resolving of problems, separate from the administration. It is anticipated that the use of conflict resolution will ensure that the core causes of conflict are addressed and resolved, which result in nonviolent behaviour and agreeable and hospitable attitudes, and a transformation in the structure of the conflict.²⁸

Additionally, conflict prevention is practical approach of handling conflict before it intensifies. It denotes all tactics involved in the pre-violent stage, at the beginning conflict curvature. These tactics are use with an aim of preventing clashes from intensifying into violence. Despite the fact that diplomatic talks occur after a war, preventive diplomacy aids in addressing and handling intensifying tension. The notion that wars yet to come can be stopped beforehand has been in existence for many generations. Conflict prevention is used in susceptible areas and periods with an aim of evading risk associated with the usage of the millitary and other methods of intimidation by states and groups to resolve the political differences that may brought about by weakening aftermaths of economic, social, political, and international transformation.²⁹

The United Nations (UN) and regional organizations and global and regional powers have a common acceptance and goodwill towards preventive negotiations due to the discovery that it is costly to manage conflict. Preventive negotiation activities are executed by the UN, regional

²⁷ Rahim, 2002

²⁸ Mayer, Bernard, 2012

²⁹ Lund, 1996

organizations, NGO networks and individual states. Preventive actions include: prior notice, fact-finding missions, prompt deployment, demilitarized zone, confidence building measures.

Conflict Transformation requires a lot of effort and encompasses all actors in healing the conflict. Building of sustainable relationships through a process of transforming views and attitudes of groups goes beyond conflict resolution. The notion of conflict transformation emerge from: the acknowledgement of the dialectical component of conflict about the inescapability of transformation; the acknowledgement of the impartiality of conflict, and that conflict can be either negative or positive, but then groups involved can change it into positive to capitalize on the opportunities.³⁰

Peace-building is a phase in conflict transformation process. It is intended to avert the beginning or continuation of violent conflict by building long-standing peace. Peace building undertakings tackle the core causes or possible causes of violence, form a general acceptance and belief in peaceful conflict resolution and make the society steady both politically and socioeconomically.

Operational and successful peace-building undertakings form an atmosphere which encourages self-sustenance, long-lasting peace; bring together antagonists; avert conflict from reviving; assimilate civil society; generate rule of law apparatuses; and tackle principal organizational and societal matters. Scholars and experts continue to find that peace-building is at its peak in effectiveness and durability when it depends on indigenous notions of peace and the principal underlying forces which nurture or facilitate conflict.³¹

³⁰ Hugh Miall, 2004

³¹ Coning, C, 2013

1.5.3 Role of external actors in Somalia conflict

This segment offers a description of the roles and drives of diverse players in Somali's conflict. The magnitude to which these external players can shape and/ or elucidate the multifaceted basic features of conflict in the war-ravaged state of Somalia are also highlighted.

1.5.3.1 The role of Ethiopia in Managing the Somali Conflict

Ethiopia is one of the main neighbours to Somalia in many reverences. As a result, she has good reason to be involved in Somalia's politics. In Ethiopia's view one important reason that justifies her involvement in Somalia's conflict is their lengthy and historical relationship characterised with violence between the two countries ever since the late 1970s. In 1978 the two countries went to war because of the violent behaviour of Somalia towards Ethiopia. The latter has for a long time remained unreceptive to a possible future with a potentially antagonistic neighbour in an instance where a secure, capable Somali state comes into existence. As long as there is still assertions by Somalia's political forces over Ogaden (Ethiopia's Somali region) which seems not to be uninhibited, Ethiopia will always have her reservations.³²

Secondly Ethiopia is apprehensive that Somalia will probably agitate turbulence amongst indigenous Somalis in Ethiopia due to her ethnic-based federalism and a constitutional provision of secessionist self-determination which can lead to instability in the country. Experts contend that the area commonly referred to as the Somali region due to the large number of Somalis living there remains ostracized from Ethiopian politics and the government has been criticized for long for severely suppressing and controlling the people. This situation creates a good atmosphere for any Somali effort to set off conflict inside that region and most probably

³² Zartman, I. W. (1985). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York, Oxford University Press.

by calling for a revolution to ensure Muslim rights are respected or perchance even by declaring Jihad the Holy war just like the UIC did.³³

Thirdly, flow of refugees from Somalia to Ethiopia has a high possibility of causing a disturbance in the ethnic equilibriums due to the long border shared which means more refugees are able to get into the country. Ethiopia is concerned over the commonness of a risky state of anarchy in Somalia which has a possibility of posing a challenge to institutions put in place to enforce the rule of law in Ethiopia. In normal circumstances, having a strong and hostile Somali state as a neighbour would be an atrocious choice as compared to a strong and friendly Somali, however, the Ethiopian government will for the most part opt for the second option which is a weak Somali state reliant on her sustenance.³⁴

It is argued that the leading motive for the intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia's conflict is to secure its national interest. Ethiopia has on no occasion been for a secure and a stable government in Somalia because she may give demands for the return of the Ogaden province just as the Islamists had begun to do. Despite disapproval of Ethiopian troops in Somalia, President Yusuf is not in a position to have Ethiopians withdraw. He is well aware of the fact that their withdrawal would spell doom for his government which largely depends on Ethiopia to protect it from terrorists since his paramilitaries are incapable of dealing with the insurgent groups on their own, what's more the new national army is still under training provided by Ethiopia.³⁵

³³ Walraven, K. V. (1999). *Dreams of Power: The role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993*. Leiden, African Studies Centre.

³⁴ Moller, B. (2009). *The Somali Conflict. The Role of External Actors*. Copenhagen, Danish Institute For International Studies.

³⁵ Kinfte, A. (2002). *Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace*. Addis Ababa, Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development.

It is purported to be true that with this intention in mind, the Ethiopian government set up measures to ensure TFG was in power by explicitly influencing the election process so as to ensure the candidate she preferred, Abdullahi Yusuf, came into power. Ethiopia is alleged to have assisted TFG via military assistance to enable it transfer its base from Nairobi to Somalia. The ill-fated US attempt to establish the APRCT, this action triggered the upsurge and ensuing victory of the UIC. Ethiopia fought the UIC because of its verbal support for secessionist movements (mainly by ONLF and OLF) and also by the rise to eminence of Sheikh Aways, a former forerunner of AIAI, which Ethiopia saw as a possible risk.³⁶

It is debated that the consequent involvement by Ethiopia ended up being counterproductive in that it fortified the dangerous armies in the Islamist crusade both by sanctioning aggressive local militias like the Al-Shabaab to become more stable and by supporting more Salafist descriptions of the Sharia Law over the more apolitical and judicious Sufism. Due to the fact that Ethiopia is viewed as an ancient enemy and for the most part a Christian country, it becomes easy for the Islamists to describe the involvement as a fresh campaign by the infidels. Additionally, when Ethiopia recognized it lacked validity in the eyes of the Somali people she was keen to withdraw as soon as possible. Ethiopian government's reason to pull out of Somalia was not clear and also her determinations to convince the AU to take over seem to be an effort in futility.³⁷

The Ethiopian government has constantly accused the Islamists for importunately proclaiming a Jihad or holy war against Ethiopia. Ethiopia uses this as justification to its role as a legitimate intervention against the extreme Islamist local militias in Mogadishu. However, critics claim that the presence of Ethiopian military in Somalia is nothing but a political scheme used

³⁶ Moller, B. (2009). *The Somali Conflict. The Role of External Actors*. Copenhagen, Danish Institute For International Studies

³⁷ Ibid

as a cover up to make certain that the AU and the international community would believe in there being a presence of security risks that may jeopardize Ethiopia's national interest and political stability in the Horn of Africa.³⁸

Opinion may be positive or negative. There is a substantial variety of opinion among the world community on Ethiopia's part in Somalia, conveyed in diverse and argumentative ways. Ethiopian government justifies its activities in Somalia maintaining that there are well-known and extensional threats to her security brought about by extremist groups that are accumulated along the border owing to the lack of an operational central government in Somalia. What is more, Ethiopia further alleges that she is requested by the Somalian Transitional Government to protect the Somali people from extremist groups.³⁹

Groups and sympathizers who are for Ethiopia contend that the national security of Ethiopia drove her to intervene so as not to wait for Somalia's instability to come to her.⁴⁰ Ethiopia does not have to wait for the terrorists attack her; she goes into Somalia and works to destroy them before they can advance their capacity to attack her; she ensures she renders them helpless so as not to give them an opportunity to be a menace in future. Involvement in Somalia is an venture that Ethiopia has been making to its long term National Security Objectives.⁴¹ Ethiopia needs a firm Somalia, due to the fact that the security of Somalia and Ethiopia is mutually dependent. In order to achieve this, from 1991 Ethiopia has been taking a number of actions by different steps: in regional meetings, in the AU level, and even at the international

³⁸ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6204695.stm>

³⁹ Abdulahi A. Osman. 2007. Cultural Diversity and the Somali Conflict: Myth or Reality? The University of Georgia, Athens Georgia.

⁴⁰ Berouk Mesfin. 2012. Ethiopia's Role and Foreign Policy in the Horn of Africa; the International Journal of Ethiopian Studies. Tsehai Publishers.

⁴¹ The Ethiopian Herald. 2016. Ethiopia: Becoming a magnet of peace, economic integration.

community. She has aided peace initiatives by forming agreements and good relationships with various bilateral and multilateral organizations.⁴²

The Federal Government of Somalia is in support of Ethiopia's hands-on actions she takes and also appreciates the efficiency of the Ethiopian Military. On the other hand, the Somalia government condemns Ethiopia's working with clan leaders and lack of accountability when it comes to request for information for instance, the probe on ENDF for the death of Somali citizens.⁴³

Critiques of Ethiopia's intervention are mainly Ethiopians. These are predominantly the opposition groups such as the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the ONLF, Diasporas, the Islamic Front for Liberation of Oromia, the Patriotic Ginbot (or the Movement for Unity and Democracy) and others.⁴⁴

Additionally, different segments of Somalia community have diverse opinions on the role of Ethiopia in Somalia. The senior citizens and the youth have varying sentiments towards Ethiopia's involvement. Some extremist groups and individuals view Ethiopia as an intruder and a historic opponent to Somalis. For instance, the Ethiopian military intervention of 2006 in Somalia was said to be a raid.⁴⁵ They perceive Ethiopia as meddling force in the Somalia's in-house matters. Ethiopia's efforts in Somalia are viewed from a negative perspective, there are complaints that Ethiopia is bringing destruction to Somalia, massacring many Somali citizens and many insurgent group members.⁴⁶

⁴² Eriksson, Mikael. 2013. External Intervention in Somalia's civil war; Security promotion and national interests? Literary and Artistic Works, Stockholm.

⁴³ Godliet, Joshua S. and Jon C. Pevehouse. 2009. International Relations; 8th edition. New York: Pearson Longma.

⁴⁴ Hassan Abdi Aden. 2010. The success and failure of Somali peace process since the conflict of 1991. Addis Ababa University: Institute for Peace and Security Studies.

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Frankel, Benjamin. 1996. Realism: Restatements and Renewal. Psychology Press; London, Portland.

Fundamental Jihadists and other armed insurgent groups of Somalia similarly believe in the fact that Ethiopia is their actual foe. These predominantly include Al-Shabab, al-Ithaad al-Islamiya, Ahlu Sunna WalJama'a, Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia, Hizbul Islam, Jabhatul Islamiya/Islamic Courts Union, Mu'askar Anole, Ras Kamboni Brigades, and Somali National Front.⁴⁷ These groups are unhappy with the Ethiopia's general contribution in Somalia. They believe that Ethiopia is in Somalia simply to back a specific group and that the group is not prevalent all over the Country. Due to these reasons, there have been a number of attempts by Somali Islamists to attack the AU headquarter structures and other main buildings in Addis Ababa.

Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia's internal affairs since 1991 has been extremely detested by many Somalis, who have an understanding that Somaliland and Puntland are Ethiopian formations whose intention is to divide Somalia. Ethiopia's donation of aid to local militias in order to combat Al-Shabaab armies and its sporadic military invasions have fortified this image.⁴⁸ Despite any positive outcomes that may result from Ethiopia's actions in Somalia, majority of Somalis will take it to mean an effort to create a rift and weaken the country. The leading assumption in Ethiopian decision-making levels is that the majority of Somalis will continuously be apprehensive of any action taken by Ethiopia even when the latter is acting in good faith.

Some countries and groups justify Ethiopia's activities in Somalia. They understand the fact that Ethiopia is a strong state that is working towards containing and defeating the terrorist groups who are a threat to its stability. The advocates of this viewpoint urged the international community such as, IGAD countries, AU and UN to back Ethiopia in all ways.

⁴⁷ Hassan Abdi Aden. 2010. The success and failure of Somali peace process since the conflict of 1991. Addis Ababa University: Institute for Peace and Security Studies.

⁴⁸ Ibid

Countries which are against Ethiopian involvement in Somalia perceive Ethiopia's actions as motivated by her own national interest that may in the future aggravate war within Somalia and make way for the presence of many terror groups. Some UN member states made use of the UN forum to condemn Ethiopia's activities in Somalia.⁴⁹ For instance, the League of Arab States like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, mostly the Gulf States like Qatar, United Arab Emirates and several Muslim nations and the neighbouring Eritrea too are major critics of Ethiopia. They are determined to destabilize the control Ethiopia has in Somalia. On the other hand, there are countries that certainly appreciate Ethiopia like the US understandably.

Italy which is the former colonial power of Somalia is quite apprehensive of Ethiopia's motives. There are moments when Ethiopia has disagreements with Kenya and Uganda on her activities in Somalia. In addition, the Federal orientation of recent Somali administrations is perceived as Ethiopia's tactic to further deteriorate the Somali state. These opinions were further aggravated by the destabilisation role played by states of Arab countries, Islamic nations and Eritrea, which have repeatedly acted as stumbling blocks Ethiopia's productive efforts to bring sustainable peace and stability to Somalia.

1.5.3.2 The role of Kenya in managing the Somali Conflict

Economic survival, protection of her territory and security are the vital matters that make Kenya have an interest in Somalia. In reference to Kenya and Somalia relations in the past especially considering Somali's intent to reclaim her territory (Greater Somalia), it is paramount for Kenya to have a welcoming government in Somalia. This type of government should seek to uphold peace and stability for the greater good of the whole region. Kenya has seeks to be the dominant state in the region and hence it is vital for her to have a strong base in

⁴⁹ Eriksson, Mikael. 2013. External Intervention in Somalia's civil war; Security promotion and national interests? Literary and Artistic Works, Stockholm.

Somalia's political state of affairs after the conflict. Kenya is one of the countries in the region that has felt the strongest impact of the conflict and insecurity in Somalia. Kenya's deteriorating insecurity has been contributed to by the large influx of illegal firearms and refugees from Somalia. This situation has obliged the Kenyan government to spend substantial amount of resources in defending her people. In this regard, Kenya has a duty to needs to eradicate any environment which makes it easier for terrorists and Islamic extremist groups to flourish. Kenya's effort to combat organized and cross-border criminal activities depends largely on a diplomatic and stable Somalia.

A methodical consideration of the interactions amongst the Somali urban refugees and the populations that they reside within necessitates theoretical elucidation of what can be considered as the refugee-host correlation with respect to the lack of security triggered by the inflow of the refugees. There is need for creation of an explicit empirical method for examining the case of Somali urban refugees⁵⁰. A measure to categorize the Somali urban refugees and what it entails to be hosted by the more established populaces of Nairobi city calls for a grander theoretical precision⁵¹.

The UN policy which was meant to revive interest in urban areas led to the discovery of many hidden Somali refugees living self-settled or undocumented lives in the margins of Nairobi city. Although they were not document5ed as refugees, their reasons for migrating from their country of origin were similar i.e. they migrated due conflicts and ended up in Dadaab refugee camp and under the wings of humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations.⁵²

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Crawley, M. "Somali Banking Under Scrutiny." *Christian Science Monitor*, November 28, 2001

⁵² Campbell, E. Somali refugees and Migrant Trade Networks in Nairobi, in *Global Migration Perspectives*, No. 47, Geneva: Binghamton University, State University of New York, 2005.

According to the Kenyan government, Somali refugees are persons recognized as refugees by the UN Convention on the rights of refugees, the presence of Kenyan Somalis make it difficult to simply identify a Somali urban refugee by simply looking at their physical appearance.⁵³ A large number of Somalis have acquired Kenya's legal identification documents such as Identity Cards, passports etc. in order to avoid police aggravation and to enable them to conduct businesses and take part in political activities in Eastleigh. Moreover, the question of who a Somali urban refugee is continues to be a hard bone to chew considering the fact that there are some Kenyan Somalis who take advantage of the refugee situation and they go ahead and register themselves as refugees at the refugee camps in order to profit from refugee relief programs and even access opportunities to travel abroad⁵⁴.

Nairobi is a vast city both geographically and demographically, this makes it possible for there to be many places where people can interact and hence it is quite easy to mix up the host community and the urban refugee⁵⁵. For instance, even though Eastleigh is an area where the majority of the residents are Somalis this does not confine them here, many Somali refugees live in deprived areas, work for employers that live in middle class areas and the wealthy ones even interact with the local businesspeople in Nairobi. These kinds of interactions essentially reflect on the kinds of attitudes people have towards refugees and also the kinds of dealings they have with the refugees⁵⁶.

⁵³ Horst, C. "Vital Links in Social Security: Somali Refugees in the Dadaab Camps, Kenya." UNHCR Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit, New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No. 38. 2001, www.unhcr.ch

⁵⁴ Prendergast, John (1997). *Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia*. London: Pluto Press

⁵⁵ Menkhaus, Ken (1998). "Somalia: Political order in a stateless Society." *Current History*, 97: 32-220-224

⁵⁶ Small, Melvin and J. David Singer. 1996. "Correlates of war project; International and Civil war Data: 1816-1992." "technical report, Inter-University consortium for Political and Social research.

The problem of separating a typical host community in Nairobi is manifest. Freedom of movement and a right to work require that refugees resided, participated in economic activities, pursued services such as medical services, education and intermingled socially in a manner that comprised dealings with a non-socially homogenous population. The refugees' survival in Nairobi is dependent on social experience gained from the day to day interactions with the host community in the residential neighborhoods hence separation would be devastating to them⁵⁷.

Residential communities have been critical in formation of local ties between the Somali refugees and hosts and in cementing their position in the urban setting. Legal restrictions and overly reliance on relief aid from the UNHCR results in Somali refugees poor performance at workplaces, they do not compete for jobs and lack access to resources for fear of fueling conflict with host community. From this perspective relations between the host and refugees were designed by social and cultural differences and not proximity and familiarity per se⁵⁸.

In 1991, Somalia went into a state of civil war after the fall of Siad Barre's regime. The civil war which started in the early 1991 and continued into the mid 1993 resulted in thousands of Somalis being killed and close to a million displaced from their homes and forced to flee across borders to neighbouring countries especially Kenya. Local militias and clan based armies fought to take over the country mostly the capital city Mogadishu but none seemed to have the capability of controlling the whole country. By the year 1995, generals of various armed groups split up the countries on the basis of hatred and hostility into small economic reserves and war zones. The state of anarchy which continued for a long period of time led to the upsurge of

⁵⁷ Gurr, Ted and Barbara Harff. 1997. "Internal wars and failures of Governance, 1954-1996." Technical report, state Failure Task Force

⁵⁸ Fischer, Stanley. 1993. "The Role of Macroeconomic Factors in growth." *Journal of Monetary economics* 32 (3): 485-512.

radical Islamism and fanaticisms which gave rise to in well thought out criminal activities such as piracy that was the beginning of Somalia War Economics⁵⁹.

The panel of experts for Somalia contend that the absence of an operational central government in Somalia to protect property rights calls for armed action by individuals or groups as an only resort to bring stability in the country⁶⁰. The AU and AMISOM have been working to bring together the clans to end the conflict. A treaty was signed in Kenya in the year 2004 to reconcile the belligerent parties and to establish a new government. As a result, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was set up and it consisted of elders and senior representatives. Unfortunately, the expectations on TFG to end the conflict and extremisms were not fulfilled⁶¹.

Reconciling warring clans was a very challenging task that the new government had to tackle. The government had to also deal with risk of terrorism by the Islamic Court Union (ICU) who had taken over the Southern region and the capital of Mogadishu in 2006 but to the relief of the Somali government, the Ethiopian troops were able to overcome them. In 2008 Al-shabaab retaliated against the government and took control of southern Somalia. Furthermore, after Ethiopia withdrew her troops from Somalia in 2009, Al-shabaab took control of Baidoa.⁶²

Small arms and Light weapons (SALW) production is a great risk to public is a serious threat to the well-being of people all over the world⁶³. in a recent report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary General acknowledged the threat brought about by SALW and pointed out that small arms create an adequate environment for violations of human rights including massacre

⁵⁹ UN development Program (UNDP). 1998. *Human Development Report Somalia*. Nairobi: UNDP.

⁶⁰ Schneider, Friedrich with dominikEnste. 2002. *Hiding in the Shadows: the Growth of the Underground Economy, Economic Issues* 30, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund.

⁶¹ Little, Peter, 2003. *Somalia: Economy without State*. Oxford: James Curr

⁶² Gebrekal, M. (2002) *The Horn of Africa: The Changing Nature of Security in the Aftermath of the Cold War* (PHD thesis, University of London).

⁶³ Maritime Piracy and anti-piracy measures by: Hermann, Wilfried. *Naval forces*, 2004 Volume 25 issue Ikken, MassipFarid (July 1 2009) New African Publication, soma

and mutilating, rape and other forms of sexual violence, imposed disappearance, torture and involuntary enrollment of minors by armed groups or militaries which have been instrumental in the rise in insecurity. A large percentage of the human rights abuses are perpetrated by them than with any known weapon⁶⁴.

The element of being low-cost, light and easy to use, easy to move secretly has contributed to their increase in number and worldwide accessibility which has had an impact of intensifying conflicts by increasing the capacity of the violence to cause death and serious damage and its duration and further increases the sense of vulnerability which leads to a greater demand for weapons. Small arms are dangerous when parties make use of them in both conflict and non-conflict conditions. The Small Arms Working Group (SAWG) estimate that the small arms are answerable for probably 60-90 per cent of deaths in the case of armed conflicts and upwards of 200,000 non-conflict deaths each year, this phenomenon is true to many regions in the world and not just Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia.⁶⁵

Every minute a person dies as a result of the use of small arms and the number of firearm injuries is even higher. The International Committee of the Red Cross (1999) backs this reasoning and state that it is the children who are most vulnerable with many being murdered, incapacitated and psychologically traumatized during violent conflicts. The committee further gives statistical proof to the effect that more than twenty million children have been forced to migrate from their homes, two million murdered and one million left without parents, six million extremely incapacitated or disabled and twelve million have been left homeless due to war for the duration of the last ten years⁶⁶.

⁶⁴ *United States of America v Mohamed Ali Said aka Maxamad Ali Saciid et,al* (Case 2: 10-cr-00057) USA 2010.

⁶⁵ Kamenju J., Okoth P. (Eds) (2006) *Power Play and Policy in Kenya; An Interdisciplinary Discourse*, Nairobi, Oaklands books, Nairobi

⁶⁶ Browin M M (2003) *Small Arms Survey*, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Editorial Geneva

The evidence of availability of numerous illegal Small arms in the wrong hands can be seen in the large number of armed conflict within the pastoralist zones, armed crimes in the cities and the rise in acts of terror. The increase of small arms in the country is a significant challenge to the government as it seeks to redress insecurity. Kenya sent its Defense forces into Somalia to help combat Al-Shabaab militia group who are terrorizing the stability of Somalia and also are accused of sustaining a series of erratic terrorists' attacks in the republic of Kenya. However, since the deployment of the Kenya Defense Forces into Somalia, the country's level of fear and anxiety have escalated⁶⁷.

The reemergence of piracy cases off the coast of Somalia impelled Kenya to be involved in the legal trials and bringing to book of alleged pirates. By the year 2008, Kenya opened her law courts for legal trials of suspects netted by naval forces off the coast of Somalia. There was establishment of agreements bestowing to Kenya a legal authority to conduct the trials due to there being a need of a link between Kenya and the suspects⁶⁸. In order to complement international law, the USA and certain EU arresting states with the support of the UNODC and the IMO established treaties with the non-arresting states like Kenya and Seychelles for the receipt and the legal trial of suspects⁶⁹.

The treaties between Kenya and Seychelles, the EU, the USA, Denmark and the UK were proposed to rectify the lack of jurisdictional connections. These treaties provided a clear framework for the conditions of transfer of alleged pirates, armed robbers and seized property

Oxford University Press IV.

⁶⁷ the EU- Kenya agreement on the transfer of persons suspected of having committed acts of piracy led to prosecution of a number of cases of suspects arrested and handed over to Kenya by the EU NAVFOR. The agreement has since been terminated

⁶⁸ Constitution of Kenya 2010.

⁶⁹ Article 2(1) Constitution of Kenya 2010

as a result authorizing arresting nations to bring the accused and property to Kenya and Seychelles for investigations and trials⁷⁰.

1.6 Theoretical framework

1.6.1 The New Wars Theory

The New Wars Theory was proposed by Mary Kaldor and it explicates the facets of the conflicts in the new era.⁷¹ Kaldor argues that the contexts of conflicts in the new era are new and that they involve many transnational factions both at global and local level all of who fight for specific political reasons by any means including terrorism, and criminalised economies. The dynamics in the new wars, makes the distinction between global and local as well as between local repressors and aggressors difficult.⁷² She contends that tracing the evolution of new wars may be a daunting task but opines that it may have started in the 20th century. She further opines that these wars are characterised by its different nature of that of the old wars that had elements blurring of private and public, state and non-state among other elements. She contends that such characterisation make the new wars difficult to understand by the international community and treating them as the old wars is wrong.⁷³ In her view, globalisation processes influence the new wars and as such are characterised by global modernity. She further argues that the new wars apply modern techniques and war materials and thereby allow the conflicting parties to minimise casualties. While the new wars employ these modern techniques, employing the modern techniques in intervention does not necessarily yield similar results. She gives an example of use of drones in a conflict and concludes that such application may yield either positive or negative impacts.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Cap 10 Laws of Kenya

⁷¹ Kaldor, Mary. 2012. *New and Old Wars*. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California

⁷² Ibid

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Ibid

Kaldor contends that in the characterisation of the new wars, the present days error conflicts overrate international actors. She opines that the new wars have varied actors including reporters, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), mercenary troops and military advisors. Interventions on the other hand do not only comprise of the actors in the war, the new wars equally have elements of regional organisations and states.⁷⁵ She further elucidates that the new wars are driven by illegal plunders such as black market and hostage taking or through assistance from outside such as diaspora remittances, neighbour state support. The actors heavily depend on external assistance from organisations and states of similar agenda.⁷⁶

1.8 Methodology

1.8.1 Introduction

The study used conflict mapping design because of its ability to create a broader view of the dynamics, actors, issues and the structure of the Somalia conflict. The design helped to increase knowledge about this conflict and simplifies the interveners' to choose decisions for a suitable conflict resolution scheme. Realism has been employed in this study. In the model the first step in managing a particular conflict is "conflict mapping. The model provides a clearer understanding of the nature, origin and all the dynamics in a conflict to all the actors. Application of this model responds to all potential questions on the particular conflict resolution technique employed. The method is therefore suitable for the current study because it informs the facets considered by the intervener that are specific to the nature of conflict under consideration.⁷⁷ The method is an essential tool for intervening conflicts in which interventions and peace processes fail due to incorporate conflict mapping. Therefore, the method was

⁷⁵ Ibid

⁷⁶ Ibid

⁷⁷ Wehr, Paul. 2005. *Conflict Mapping*. Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado. Colorado (<http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/cmap.htm>)

suitable for Somalia's conflict since interventions and peace processes have so far not produced a holistic resolution to the conflict.⁷⁸ By doing so, the study explains the issues and interests of Kenya and Ethiopia within the conflict. It will as well describe how the actors in the conflict interact within the conflict and in which context.

1.8.2 Research design

A research design specifies the methods and procedures for collecting and analysing the needed information. It highlights a blue print for the research as well as the chosen research method to determine the information needed.⁷⁹ The study employed case study design because of its ability to give historical analysis of a situation and emphasis to accuracy through minimised biases. Qualitative approach was employed in the present study because of the sensitivity of the issues that were examined.

1.8.3 Population of the study

A population is the set of individuals, objects or data from where a statistical sample can be drawn.⁸⁰ The study population for this study included government officials, military personnel, and non-governmental organisations. The target population were officials in the departments of defence and organisations that have been directly involved in the Somalia peace process.

1.8.4 Sampling Frame

The sampling plan describes how the sampling unit, sampling frame, sampling procedures and the sample size for the study. The sampling frame describes the list of all population units from which the sample will be selected. The sampling design involved interviewing the population

⁷⁸ Ramsbotham, O, Woodhouse, T, and Mial, H. 2012. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. 3rd edition. Polity Press: Cambridge

⁷⁹ Bailey D.K (1978:176) *Methods of Social Research*, 4th Edition, New York, the Free Press.

⁸⁰ Ibid

that has been involved and affected by the Somali conflict. This means the target was the academia and policy making and leadership arena in public and private sector.

1.8.5 Research instruments

The study employed qualitative approach with the aid of interview guides and desk review of published material on the subject matter. Interview guide is a data collection method involving questioning of individuals and documentation of the responses done during the process.⁸¹ Review of published material is a way of data collection where secondary data are used in a study. It is usually a good starting point as it paints a picture of the situation has opined by other authors.

1.8.6 Research Procedures

The interview questions were designed by the researcher based on the research questions were pre-tested to ascertain the suitability of the tool before the actual administration. Pre-testing was done by interviewing respondents were selected randomly from the target population. This enabled the researcher to fine tune the questions for objectivity and efficiency of the process. The questions were estimated to take fifteen to thirty minutes to complete.

1.8.7 Data analysis

Content analysis has been employed in this study; content analysis allows capturing of in-depth perspectives of the respondents as noted during the interviews. Emerging themes have then been summarised and presented to facilitate interpretation.

⁸¹ Ibid

1.9 Chapter outline

The first chapter provides the background to the study, the problem statement and the objectives of the study together with a brief literature review. The second chapter highlights the effect of foreign intervention in the Somali conflict; the third chapter delves in the interests of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Somali conflict; the fourth chapter will be a critical analysis of the involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia in the management of Somalia's conflict; and the last chapter will cover conclusion and recommendations for further studies.

CHAPTER TWO: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE IN SOMALIA: FACTORS HAMPERING RESOLUTION OF THE SOMALIA CONFLICT

2.0 Introduction

Methods for overseeing organizational conflict are as shifted as its causes, roots and settings. The motivation behind conflict management, regardless of whether attempted by the parties involved in conflict or in the case of including the intercession of an outside party, is to influence the whole structure of the circumstance of conflict in order to contain the dangerous segments in the conflict procedure including antagonistic vibe, viciousness among others that can help those involved to have inconsistent objectives to discover ways of dealing with their conflict. Successful conflict management prevails with regards to limiting disturbance brought about by conflict, and coming up with ways to solve the conflict that is attractive and satisfactory.⁸²

Somalia is regularly viewed as unstable state.⁸³ It is undeniable that the methods to fabricate and maintain a present day state, with internal and external sway as its characterizing qualities has flopped in Somalia. Although, the ongoing surrounding of Somalia as an instance of state disappointment is an expository technique that must have distinct breaking points. It must be noted that there exist two peaceful and working localities of Somaliland and Puntland in the North and North-eastern districts. Due to the fact that Southern Somalia has been in war for a long time, has rendered the entire nation to be considered a failed state due to lack of a balanced governing system. Today the bigger piece of Southern Somalia is affected by starvation and

⁸² J. P. Folger, *Working Through Conflict* (New York: Educational Publishers Inc, 2007)

⁸³ David A Lake and Donald Rothchild (Eds.) (1998).

common war.⁸⁴ As of recently, much consideration has been given to Somali family relations and Islamic radicalism as the main driver of the issue.

While drought, Islam and families are topics discussed repeatedly in Somali history, famine and turmoil as has described the South are most certainly not. Actually a conjunction of external powers alongside the external arms and the internal interruption of the family framework have added to the outrageous state of Southern Somalia as it is today. This section approaches the investigation of Somalia from a whole different face. Rather than taking the current sovereign state as an all-inclusive standard for political associations and accepting that it is the main conceivable option, the section approaches Somalia as a socio-political order. Doing as such involves an examination of the structures and rationales that maintain the present request and also those that may transform it. This section is an adventure through time in the mission for a doable suggestion to the present impasse in Somalia and the progression of a united Somalia Republic with three self-ruling areas.

2.1 The interplaying factors

In 1991, Mohammed Siad Barre, President of Somalia since supposition of power in a military overthrow in 1969, a previous partner of both the Soviet Union and the United States and the Marehan family, ran away from the capital city of Mogadishu with the armed forces of the United Somali Congress (USC).⁸⁵ He had been removed from the government the USC, the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Front (SPF). At the appropriate time and after the statement of Siad Barre, the three radical parties which had met up just in the last phases of the defiance, couldn't concur upon new governance for Somalia.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Ibid

⁸⁵ Somalia: Country Profile, p. 16. Africa Watch, "Somalia: A Fight To The Death?" (New York: The Africa Watch Committee, 13 February 1992), Vol. 4, No. 2., p. 5.

⁸⁶ Ibid

The Northern based SNM with the Isaak family as its base of power was the first to be founded in 1981. The SNM were not informed about the structure of the new government by the Southern USC and SPF. With their knowledge that a unified Somalia would in all probability be ruled by the Southern groups, the North withdrew and announced freedom as the Republic of Somaliland on May eighteenth 1991. Following this activity, by November seventeenth the current common war in the South had started.

Even though the patriot or Somali trappings of every group's name, they have each been kept to at least one geographic district and have dominantly included at least one of their families. The Hawiye who possess Southern and Central Somalia including the territory around Mogadishu made up the biggest piece of the USC. The Ogaden occupying South-western Somalia and Ethiopia, shaped most of the SPF. The Isaak family occupying the northern Somaliland territory formed the SNM.⁸⁷ The greater part of the investigations of the Somali structure have credited the "group" as the foundation of today's detestations. Although, groups are not really the reason for contemporary savagery but rather one of many elements that are and have been having an effect on everything. The current situation with Somalia comes about because of a perplexing cooperation of the family factor, colonial history, the part of Islam superpower impedance and fizzled governance.

2.2 Clan, as a Factor in the Somali Conflict

The Somali people are considerably among the most standardised in Africa, both ethnically and religiously with Islam being the pervasive religion of decisions.⁸⁸ Although, they are entirely separated by an old family or fraction framework that created because of the necessities of survival in the moderately desolate horn of Africa. Around 85% of the people are ethnically

⁸⁷ "Siad's Somalia," Horn of Africa Report, June 1990.

⁸⁸ Lee V Cassanelli.

Somali (the rest of Bantu and Arab). The Somalis can generally be isolated into six notable families in particular, the Dir, Isaaq, Daarood, Hawiye, Digil and the Rahanwiin.⁸⁹ There are further divisions among the Daarood into Majerteen, Ogaden, Marehan, Dulbahante and Warsengeli. These structures remain to date as the establishment of political and social life. In a society of nomads in which people kept up no settled address and in which limits were by nature liquid, group loyalty was and stays to date the main type of recognizable proof outside of one's name. It was the way to decide an individual social ways, their district of origin and who their family and companions were.

The family structure has a general history that is peaceful exhibiting that the framework is not innately given to intra-tribe battling and particularly anarchic viciousness. In this unique situation, latest family fighting can be viewed as irregular due to the nearness of intra-group battling (between sub-clans). Before the current reign of Al Shaabab in the great parts of Mogadishu, the common war in the area was between Mohammed Farrah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed who are both from the Hawiye family tie.

2.3 The Colonial Factor

In the colonial time of the nineteenth century, the territory in which ethnic Somalis occupy was shared between Britain, Italy, Ethiopia and France.⁹⁰ As European powers grew their trade nearness in East Asia, ports in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean ended up plainly imperative refuelling stations. In 1839, the British built up a military army and coaling station at Aden on the Al-Yemen shore of the Arabian Peninsula. France built up its own particular fuelling station at Obock in northern Djibouti in 1862 and later included the port of Djibouti, while in 1869 Italy started a department and exchange office in the port of Aseb on the Eritrean coast.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Lewis I M (1993).

⁹⁰ Lyons, Terrence and Ahmed I Samatar (1995) Somalia. The Brookings Institution, p.11.

⁹¹ Ibid

In the late 1800s, Britain marked protectorate arrangements with Somali and, in 1888, consented to an arrangement with France in regards to the limits between the two nations' cases.

⁹²As British Somaliland turned into a protectorate of Britain, bad habit diplomats were sent to keep up request and control trade. The principal years saw uprisings drove by Mohammed "Frantic Mullah" Abdullah that finished with the 1920 besieging of Abdullah's base. ⁹³

Additionally prior belongings along the Red Sea increased through the Treaty of Wichale, Italy obtained parts of Southern Somalia on an agreement from Zanzibar. Italian Somaliland stretched out south to the Juba River and east to Ethiopia. In 1897, Italy and Ethiopia conceded to the eastern outskirts of Italian Somaliland. Italy and Britain, which held the land south of Juba in British East Africa, achieved a concession to the limits of their possessions in 1908.

⁹⁴Part of the land, east of Juba River, combined with the Italian Somalia in 1925.

In 1936, the recently delegated legislative leader of Italian Somaliland added Abyssinia (Ethiopia), shaping Italian East Africa, which encompassed French and British Somaliland. ⁹⁵

The strains between the partners and pivot powers that prompted to the World War II significantly affected the Horn of Africa. Italy proclaimed war on the United Kingdom and seized British Somaliland by constraint in 1940. ⁹⁶ Though, in 1941, the British recovered British Somaliland and Italian Abyssinia (Ethiopia/Eritrea), increasing a lot of Italian Somaliland. In that season of British control from 1941 to 1948, Somalia was prepared to acquire self-governance. Italy formally denied its claim to regional ownership in Somalia in 1947. In 1949, the entire region of Italian Somaliland went under global trusteeship. The UN

⁹² Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Somalia. Competition among European Powers and Ethiopia." 2007.

⁹³ Bureau of African Affairs. U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Somalia." December 2007.

⁹⁴ Bureau of East African Affairs. U.S. Department of State. December 2007.

⁹⁵ History World. "History of Somalia.

⁹⁶ Ibid

guided Italy to enable the Somalis to move in the direction of freedom in the ten-year time frame from 1950 to 1960.⁹⁷

A self-governed Somalia began in 1960 with British Somaliland picking up self-governance on 26th June and Italian Somaliland sticking to this same pattern on first July. The two parts of the nation joined to form the Somali Republic. A legitimate meeting held in April of that year built up that Mogadishu would be the capital city of the recently founded nation. On the other hand, the arrangement of the capital in the South expanded the quantity of southern Somalis involved in government positions, resulting to a Southern-ruled focal government.⁹⁸

After one year, the general population of Somalia embraced the primary constitution in light of European models. The possibility of a co-joint Somalia that consolidated all groups of Somalis commanded the administration's first years. This sentiment of a dished Somali existed in Somalia itself as well as in French Somaliland (which is Djibouti today), Northern Kenya, and Somali people in Ethiopia. Skillet Somalism was strong to the point that when the Somali people in Kenya were not given self-assurance in 1963, guerrilla fighting seethed in the territory for the following five years. In 1967, the Prime Minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, urged the government to repudiate its cases on Somali people out of the nation, consequently fortifying relationships with its neighbours. Nonetheless, most of the Somalis did not concur with the agreement made by Somalia and its long-term foe, Ethiopia.⁹⁹

A mix of national and civil elections held in March of 1969 was led by the Somalia Youth League (SYL), the nation's first political party and an outgrowth of the British development, was the Somalia Youth Club, of 1943. It was a prevalently communist front that brought together the tribes of the nation and had broad connections to groups in Somali, Kenya and

⁹⁷ Bureau of African Affairs. U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Somalia." December 2007.

⁹⁸ Bureau of African Affairs. U.S. Department of State. "Background Note: Somalia." December 2007.

⁹⁹ Country Studies. Library of Congress.

Ethiopia. Lack of content over the results of early national elections and affirmations of government decision extortion is believed to be the fundamental driver of the coup d'état on 21 October, 1969.

The armed forces, reinforced by the police, detained top government authorities and framed another overseeing body, the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). General Mohamed Siad Barre, an early supporter of African communism, was elected as the president by the SRC. Additionally, the SRC did away with the constitution, restricted every political group, destroyed the National Assembly, and changed the states name to the Somali Democratic Republic.¹⁰⁰

2.4 The Islamic Factor

In a drought season in 1912, Mohammed Abdille Hassan referred to by the British as the "mad Mullah" was driving a religious group of rebellion to remote intercession: British, Italian and Ethiopian.¹⁰¹ During a journey to Mecca in the 1890s, Sheik Mohammed Abdille Hassan met with Sayyid Mohammed Salih, who is the organizer of the aggressor Islamic Salihya Order. Hassan who was an intense devotee, embraced the Salihya lessons. He changed his name to Sayyid Mohammed and came back to Somalia to lecture Islamic change.¹⁰²

At Berbera, where Sayyid Mohammed settled fast and for a short period, he started to passionately instruct the new Salihya Order reprimanding his kindred compatriots to move in the opposite direction of their delicate living and take after a strict way of Muslim dedication. He censured smoking, chewing of Khat and for the most part denounced libertine practices. Throughout his educating, Sayyid Mohammed came into contact with European, Christian

¹⁰⁰ Ibid

¹⁰¹ Peter Schraeder.

¹⁰² Ibid

colonizers and he turned out to be bit by bit persuaded that they were keen on devastating the Muslim confidence in Somalia.

He attested that Somalia was in peril of external impact and admonished his compatriots to dispose of the English men and preachers. His aggressor adaptation of Islam and declaration of Somali patriotism met restriction from a significant number of the general population he needed to lead. He experienced a lot of protection from disciples of the founded Qadiriya Order-the overwhelming strain of Islam in Somalia which started from the eleventh century. They despised the messianism of Sayyid Mohammed's lecturing and feedback certain in it; that Qadiriya rehearses were stodgy and stale.¹⁰³

By a similar token, the North drift where Sayyid had started his educating was encountering the advantages of contact with the British for instance extended markets and presently couldn't seem to encounter a great part of the negative parts of that contact in particular colonization and misuse since the British existence was moderate. In this line, couple of Somalis who profited from this new success minded to tune in to Sayyid's message of starkness and devotion. In 1898, he moved from the drift into the inside to settle with the Dulbahante, his maternal family.

Essentially, the district he moved to an altogether ethnical Somali, is a piece of current Ethiopia. Not at all like the seaside staying Isaak and Dir groups, the Dulbahante had not marked an arrangement with the British. In such manner, he could go generally lecturing peaceful nomads against the Christian preacher endeavours. He misused the outer risk of Christianity to empower peace between warring groups. Wherever on the way he upgraded his picture. He obtained a notoriety for being a talented writer and assembled an identity faction around him. His endeavours brought forth the twenty year jihad of the "Dervishes" directed against every

¹⁰³ Ahmed, Ali Jimale (Ed) 2005.

single Christian colonizer ("dervish was utilized to allude to any disciple of the Salihya Order and in this manner connected to Sayyid's supporters) between 1900-1920. The effective consequences of Sayyid's battle managed an overwhelming hit to British Protectorate Administration. By 1908, having spent subsidizes thoroughly out of extent to Somaliland's Protectorate's key and colonial significance as hamburger provider to the port of Aden.

The British chose to forsake their settlements and operations in the inside and pull back altogether to the drift. The Administration additionally outfitted the Isaak family and left them to secure themselves against the Dervishes. This withdrawal was met with Italian dissents as it exited the Sayyid Mohammed issue exclusively in their grasp. Italy and Ethiopia were additionally worried about the emission of uncontrolled group fighting with such withdrawal. The British had misjudged the Sayyid development.

They considered him to be a conventional family pioneer acting inside the arrangement between tribe battles. They accepted that with the approaching Dervish risk, the Protectorate tribes would join together, just like the standard groups among the Somalis and a pioneer would rise to direct them. Although, the reality of the situation was that Sayyid's development had risen above the convention group structures. Religion, specifically Islam furnished the development with the dish Somali interest.

This is not to make light of the significance of the tribe factor – Sayyid's help was restricted essentially to the Ogaden locale and the reality of the matter is that sure between family

competitions threatened the weak solidarity he had set up among the Dervishes; and his adherents were of an unexpected religious request in comparison to most Somalis – all things considered, the individuals from the Salihya Order were Muslims. With the British withdrawal together with their granting of an enormous supply of arms, the families were sans left to seek after old tribe quarrels thus they did. Amid this period, any sort of social association deteriorated decreasing a great part of the populace to starvation. Sayyid's jihad proceeded until its sudden end in 1920 with is death.

An impartial investigation can be drawn between the time of 1900 through to 1900 to recently that is by contrasting the radical Dervish Islamic development with the plenty of Islamic developments that have in the most recent decade and over jarred for control of Mogadishu and Somalia at large. These are the Union of Islamic Courts, Hizbul Islam and the Al Shaabab who are at presently responsible for the bigger piece of Mogadishu. Similarly that the Dervish development was against external intercession in Somali undertakings, these parties have made use of a similar contention against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the endeavours by the African Union to ensure a similar government and secure its governance over Mogadishu.

2.5 Super Power Rivalry

Appropriately, just from his initial time as head of state Barre delighted in Soviet Union help. Actually, one of his initially activities was to present the idea of "Logical Socialism" in the management of Somalia's undertakings. As per Barre, this joined Islam, communism in light of Marxist standards, and the possibility of group improvement through independence.¹⁰⁴ Siad Barre helped built up the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) in 1976 which was intended to fill in as an ideological vehicle for his approach. In the meantime, Siad Barre started

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

the nationalization of Somalia's therapeutic administrations, schools, banks, power, and transportation and the legislature took full control of all the nation's fares and imports. In 1975, land was nationalized with ranchers got on 50 year sustainable leases from the government.

In the Siad Barre administration, the Somalia's military reliance on Soviet Union hardware and teachings incredibly grew Soviet impact in Somalia. The Soviet Union gained an assortment of military offices, eminently at the northern port of Berbera. By this time, in 1974 to be exact, Siad Barre drove Somalia to join the Arab League.

One of the essential objectives of Siad Barre was to set up a "larger Somalia" one whose limits would have originated before those of the colonial segments this would incorporate the Ogaden, some of Kenya and the entire of Djibouti and would have included an all ethnically Somali region. All the same, these endeavours were coldly respected by other African nations the lion's share of which are multi-ethnic combinations.

An acknowledgment of Somali cases would have verifiably prompted the acknowledgment of the privilege of each minority ethnic party to announce its autonomy in quest for an ethnically homogeneous substance presentations that would enormously and tragically destabilize Africa. Without a doubt Siad Barre's desire the Somalia's disastrous Ogaden war of 1977-1978 which cost Siad Barre his neighbourly association with the Soviet Union. In quest for his objective of joining all Somalis, Barre attacked the Ogaden locale of Ethiopia between 1976-1978 using Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). In as much as the Soviet Union bolstered Barre's "Logical Socialist" government, similarly it supported Mengistu's Ethiopian Marxist government.

The Soviets started providing the Ethiopian powers with weapons to vanquish the Somali attack and in November 1977, Somalia revoked its arrangement of fellowship with the Soviet Union

and ousted 6,000 Soviet guides and specialists. On account of this activity Somalia essentially lost the majority of its monetary and military help. By March of 1978, a Soviet and Cuban-drove counter assault had re-built up Ethiopian control in the principle territories of the Ogaden and the Somali government reported the withdrawal of its powers.

The defeat in the Ogaden War and the break with the Soviet Union was trailed by a continuous growth in combination with the United States. This was essentially owing to the United States procedure in the Gulf, following the Soviet intercession in Afghanistan in late 1979. Somalia consented to a protection arrangement with the United States in 1980, which allowed the utilization by the last's military work force of the air and maritime offices at Berbera. The United States furnished Somalia with generous measures of help amid the 1980's the point at which the nation needed to manage the gigantic flood of outcasts from the Ogaden area however stayed reluctant about giving the military guide that was frequently asked by the Siad Barre administration. An inundation of an expected 80,000 evacuees from Ethiopian Ogaden toward the finish of 1978 prompted a regional ethnic irregularity in the North of Somalia.

Endeavours by the focal government in Mogadishu to suppress the agitation achieved more prominent regional turmoil.¹⁰⁵ Common distress in the long run prompted common war. The passing's of thousands of regular citizens incited a United States drove mediation in 1992– 93. Operation Restore Hope included more than 34,000 United States troops sent to help re-establish request and end starvation.¹⁰⁶ This mission and its achievements were brief, in any case, when the sudden passing's of 18 United States officers was flashed crosswise over universal media in appalling style in October 1993, the United States and other European countries were compelled to contrarily re-evaluate their organizations. Remote troops were pulled back by the spring of the next year.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

¹⁰⁶ Osman Abdulahi et al (Eds) 2007.

2.6 Failed Leadership

Through the span of his governance, Siad Barre had assembled a religion of identity owing himself as the father of Somalia. Radio reports and appearances would start with a melody committed to "Our Father, the Father of Knowledge." Initially, Barre had built a multi-family structure that endeavoured to create Somali national awareness and end tribe significance. In any case, as his energy wound down later in his govern, he came to depend vigorously on the family bolster, and he oppressed certain groups and played recreations of gap and lead with the others.

In October 1970, on the principal commemoration of the military overthrow that conveyed Siad Barre to control, he declared the presentation of Scientific Socialism as talked about above. This was combined with a reprobation of tribalism. Barre banned group IDs – in itself a pivotal assault on migrant Somali culture. Somalis taking part in customary group exercises were liable to fine or potentially detainment. The administration additionally assumed control public exercises, for example, funerals and relational unions compelling Somalis to hold these services at state introduction focuses.

The significance of the faction and a comparing irresoluteness towards patriotism might be shown purchase the technique utilized towards the finish of the colonial time frame and amid the initial nine years of freedom (1960=1969) to build up family connections. It had turned out to be chic decorum among the European instructed Somali first class not to uncover one's family for the generally useful moniker "Somali" alluding to faction loyalties in the previous tense. While it was sufficiently basic to dismiss the apparently primitive, pre-colonial recognizable proof framework, this dismissal at that point represented the issue of another technique for distinguishing proof. As opposed to make or find a completely new framework,

Somali's undeniably acknowledged the expression "exclan" as a method for respectfully asking into or answering about family steadfastness.

Notwithstanding, Siad Barre's resulting activity in particular engaging his own Marehan family to the detriment of different families and abusing group contentions would appear to control his pessimistic control of communist talk to keep sectional conflicts from meddling with his run the show. In spite of the fact that it was unlawful to specify tribe affiliations openly, Siad Barre's energy base was a tripartite family devotion known by the code name M.O.D. It comprised of the Marehan, the Ogaden and the Dulbahante factions. The M.O.D was slyly built to keep up a tight hold upon sectional pressures that could isolate the Somali state. The Ogaden possess western Somalia and Ethiopia. Through his family ties, he could control Somali relations with Ethiopia. Since the Dulbahante possess the two sides of the limit between previous British and Italian Somalilands, his child in-law could limit rubbing amongst north and south and the Italian and British colonial conventions.

In May 1986, a close lethal auto collision including Siad Barre smashed the longstanding deception of strength of the "Incomparable Leader" persona he had so carefully developed. Reliable with the Somali Constitution, Senior Vice President General Mohammed Ali Samatar ventured forward to be between time pioneers and proclaimed a highly sensitive situation. In as much as Samatar did not endeavour to undermine Siad Barre's position amid this time, the harm had just been done to the President's power. Without precedent for his rule, there was open theory about who might succeed him. Besides, the rashly de-hospitalised Siad Barre was still physically feeble and helpless against his own family who were wildly endeavouring to shore up their own particular positions on the off chance that Barre lost power. In September 1986, the Central Committee of the Party proposed an additional seven years for Siad Barre as President.

He won 99% of the vote in national decisions on December 23rd. After the decision, Siad Barre advanced various Marehan to the senior positions of the armed force and reshuffled the bureau to give the Marehan more grounded control of the Ministry of resistance. In February 1987, General Samatar was delegated First Minister in the new government. Since the imperative services of Foreign Affairs and Defence announced specifically to the President rather than the recently made First Minister, Samatar was adequately expelled from the hierarchy of leadership. Truth be told his office and authority living arrangement were immediately assumed control by the new Minister of Defence.

Siad Barre had built two governments, one formally constituted around General Samatar and the other led around the last specialist, the President himself. Barre's expanding dependence upon the Marehan wrecked the delicate poly-group structure he had in the past built, abandoning him open to restriction from each faction other than his own. This distance prompted ruthless constraint of restriction which joined with the loss of key an incentive after the icy war as of now examined above, left Siad Barre without a partner and prompted his snappy destruction. Various resistance bunches multiplied.

Armed force officers, despondent with the legislature, framed the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), while the Isaaq faction shaped SNM. One extra gathering that weighed into the shred was the USC comprised of individuals from the Hawiye tribe. The battling between these gatherings and the Barre government intensified a financial emergency and brought about the division of Somalis along group lines.¹⁰⁷ As Somalia disturbed into more noteworthy turmoil, Barre withdrew to Mogadishu. Somali resistance comprising of USC and SNM powers, situated in neighbouring Ethiopia, constrained Barre from control on 26 January 1991. As Barre went into oust, the focal government in Mogadishu fallen and the SNM took control of

¹⁰⁷ Ahmed, Ali Jimale (Ed) 2005.

Northern Somalia. Mogadishu and quite a bit of southern Somalia stayed under control of the USC.¹⁰⁸

2.7 The Transitional Federal Government

Throughout five years that followed, a few endeavours to determine the conflict and start reunification were put to practice. Djibouti facilitated a noticeable regional meeting in 2000. Therefore, a three-year transitional national government was made.¹⁰⁹This legislature was going by Abdulqasim Salad Hassan. Its objective was to make a changeless national government joining all of Somalia. Somali Peace talks, held in 2002 in neighbouring Kenya, endeavoured to fashion a compromise between the administration and 20 warlords.

After two years a break compromise occurred. On 28 January 2004, Somali pioneers concurred on a sanction that would build up another, five-year transitional parliament with 275 individuals.¹¹⁰In October of that same year, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was chosen President of the new Transitional Federal Government.¹¹¹ Regardless of the formation of a transitional government, Mogadishu was still keep running by warlords in the primary years of this century. In any case, those warlords were ousted in June 2006 by the Supreme Council of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). This gathering, made up of priests, business pioneers and composed local army, overwhelmed quite a bit of southern Somalia. As they developed in control, they looked to topple the TFG however were driven from control by joint Ethiopian– TFG powers.¹¹²

Following the thrashing of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (UIC), the TFG transferred to Mogadishu with the help of Ethiopian powers in January 2007. Material help from its one-time antagonistic neighbour kept on filling Mogadishu as Ethiopia sent troops all through 2007.

¹⁰⁸ Osman Abdulahi et al (Eds) 2007.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid*

¹¹⁰ *Ibid*

¹¹¹ *Ibid*

¹¹² Marchal Roland, 2007.

These powers, alongside African Union (AU) peacekeeping troops, have gained ground in fighting the agitators looking to topple the commonplace Somali government. In any case, ceaseless battling has incurred significant injury on the TFG and on regular people.¹¹³ The UN reports that 60% of Mogadishu's inhabitants have fled the city because of the battling, adding to the assessed 1 million dislodged Somalis. As indicated by the executive of security at Somalia's National Security Ministry, the TFG controls just 20% of the nation, making it simple for the Islamic dissidents to regroup and develop.¹¹⁴ Currently, the battle focuses on the TFG in its push to re-build up a perpetual focal government, with global help predominantly from the AU to make a bound together Somalia.

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Ibid

CHAPTER THREE: KENYA AND ETHIOPIA INTEREST IN SOMALIA

3.0 Introduction

In order to understand the interest of Kenya and Ethiopia in Somalia, it is critical to determine why the two countries intervened in Somalia in 2011. Besides, it is imperative to identify link between the deployment of Ethiopian and Kenyan forces to Somalia. In order to comprehensively address the issues raised above, this chapter is organized into different subsections. Instead of the theoretical approach, this research uses the existential concept to explore the case of Somalia. As such, Kenya and Ethiopia as well as other group of soldiers are used to articulate the background of Somali's current threats in Somalia.

This presentation explores the military intervention of Kenya and Somalia, particularly, since 2011. The rise and threats posed by al-Shabaab to foreign policymakers of Kenya and Ethiopia is addressed in the subsections. The subsequent subsection articulates how the impact of Somali's history on the contemporary world. In particular, this subsection examines the initial deployment of over eight-thousand soldiers by Ethiopia and Kenya and the intricate landscape they encountered based on the structure of clans, customs and religious beliefs in Somalia. Equally, the chapter focuses the objectives of self-interested security. The chapter also deals with the secularization theory, which is particularly used to provide a unifying theme throughout the chapter.

The concluding subsection of the chapter deals with the PGT (Public-Goods-Theory). Through the theory, the chapter determines the connection between the entrance of US forces in Somalia in the 20th century and the current deployment of Ethiopian and Kenyan forces in Somalia. ¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Bobrow D and Boyer M (1997).

3.1 Existential, not theoretical: the history behind modern Somali threats

In order to comprehend why soldiers from Kenya and Ethiopia were deployed in Somalia in 2011, it is essential to understand the evolution of Somalia and the country's current status as one of the most failed states. Somalia, which is located on the north-eastern horn of Africa with its shape similar to number seven, is an idea that has been contested for long, even among the Somali's themselves. For instance, in 1960, the republic of Somalia was formed following the union of British and Italian Somaliland. However, some Somalis advocated for a larger Somalia which should have included the current eastern Ethiopia, Djibouti and northern Kenya. In fact, the invasion of the Ethiopian Ogaden by General Mohamed Siyaad Barre in 1977-9178 was to expand the boundaries of the country. However, after losing the war and experiencing a casualty of 25,000 in under one year, numerous opposition forces arose in Somalia with the air of toppling Barre's government.

After a bloody decade, Barre's regime fell in 1991. Consequently, the country witnessed chaos and a humanitarian crisis, which in turn, necessitated the US's intervention in 1992. The Humpty Dumpty principle,¹¹⁶ which is elucidated as part of the FSI (Fund for Peace's annual 'Fragile States Index' just) just like Ethiopia's and Kenya's case, can best be used to explain America's intervention. Somalia's case shows a critical recovery aspect from conflict and development. Based on the Humpty Dumpty principle political metaphor, the significant fall of countries is usually fast and catastrophic and, often, takes sizeable resources during the reconstruction process.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Messner JJ (2013).

¹¹⁷ Ibid

In the long-term, Kenya and Ethiopia will benefit immensely in case tranquillity is restored in Somalia. Meanwhile, Kenya and Ethiopia have to face the consequences of the current status in Somalia, including failed institutions and high levels of insecurity.

Dadaab camp in Kenya, which is the largest refugee camp globally, is one example of insecurity and state failure in Somalia. The camp, which was established in 1992 hosts 336,495 registered refugees from Somalia and other unregistered refugees.¹¹⁸ In order to reestablish governance in Somalia, and facilitate repatriation of Somali refugees residing in the country, a two year reconciliation process was hosted in Kenya.

In turn, through the reconciliation process, the TFG (Somali-Transitional-Federal-Government) was formed in 2004 to restore Somalia's central government. The 2004 TFG was the 15th attempt since 1991. The negotiations resulted in Kenya accepting to accommodate the complex realities in Somalia. The 4.5 formulae was negotiated with reflections based on the clans' influence. As such, the four main clans –Hawiye, Darod, Dir and Digle-Mirifle, were equally represented in the proto-parliament. The five minority constituencies focused other members including non-ethnic Somali groups, persons from the Somalia diaspora, various Islamist groups and other citizen groups. The TFG meeting was hosted in Kenya in 2006. Subsequently, in February 2006, the first TFG parliament was held in Somalia, in the Western city of Baiodia. Kenyan Policymakers expressed hope that their efforts could lead to a period of stability in Somalia. However, the Al-Shabaab, which is radical Islamist group has been the major stumbling block in realizing stability in Somalia. Based on reports from the UN, half of the group's foreign fighters have been recruited from Kenya.¹¹⁹ Consequently, following massive recruitment of Kenyans into the group, the Kenya-Somalia border was closed after

¹¹⁸ UHCR (2014) Kenya.

¹¹⁹ UN Monitoring Group on Somalia (2012).

Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006. The Kenyan government was worried its nationals could return with radical ideologies and lethal skills acquired in Somalia.

The irredentist and existential approaches can be used to elucidate the 2006 Somalia invasion by Ethiopia and the subsequent occupation until January 2009. Between January and June 2006, the UIC (Union of Islamic Courts) which consists a group of moderate to fundamentalist Islamists and Somali nationalists were racking up military victories over ARPCT (The Alliance-for-the-Restoration-of-Peace-and-Counter-Terrorism) which was practically a coalition of clan militia backed by the US. Consequently, an appearance of stability and peace was restored in the country. Notably, after 16 years, the seaport and airport of Mogadishu was opened. Equally, commerce surged in Mogadishu, large swathes of Southern and central Somalia fell under a unified administration and members of the Somali diaspora returned. However, the TFG officials operating from Baidoa claimed the right of governance.

Ethiopia, together with other regional players, sought to reconcile the TFG and UIC elements through talks based in Khartoum with the intention of creating a unity government. However, when the talks delayed, the UIC attempted to enforce a victor's peace. UIC forces moved towards Baidoa in the West and, thus, came into contact with Ethiopian forces that were officially training the nascent TFG national army in the country. The intensification of the war resulted in some of radical UIC radical leaders demanding for a Jihad against Christian Ethiopia.¹²⁰ In turn, the Ethiopian leaders enunciated their own radical stance by claiming that UIC had extensive connections with al-Qaeda, thereby, creating likely hood of Taliban like regime emerging in the Horn of Africa.¹²¹

Furthermore, policymakers in Ethiopian were aware of a UN's report noting that other forces were operating in Somalia with the aim of destabilizing the state of Ethiopian. Notably, based

¹²⁰ Agence France-Presse (2007).

¹²¹ Ibid

on Resolution #1676 of the UN's Monitoring Group on Somalia, Eritrea, which is the avowed enemy of Ethiopia, was hosting, training and arming to the OLF (Oromo-Liberation-Front) as well as the ONLF (Ogaden-National-Liberation-Front) which are the main opposition forces in Ethiopian.¹²² The report alluded to the probability that Eritrean proxies could use UIC-controlled territories in Somalia to launch attacks into Ethiopia.

When a full Ethiopian military invasion came, the UIC was pushed out of power. Consequently, a way was created in January 2007, for the TFG to get into Mogadishu for the first time since its inception. However, over 8000 Ethiopian forces were required to protect the TFG as they gained entry into the capital city. Subsequently, Ethiopian soldiers withdrew towards the west and the first remnants of the UN- and AU-blessed African Union force, AMISOM, stepped into the breach.

Since the arrival of AMISON in Somalia, al-Shabaab has been the main opponent. Originally the militia for the UIC, al-Shabaab has now transformed into a force of its own. The leaders of the group have been continuously advocating for the incorporation of some parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti where some Somali ethnic groups reside into the greater Somalia (109th Congress, 2014). Besides the group has sanctioned global Jihad;¹²³ vouchsafed loyalty to al-Qaeda;¹²⁴ and praised terrorist attacks both inside Somalia and beyond. Some of the high profile terror attacks by the group include coordinated suicide-bombings in Hargeisa, Somaliland and Bosaso, Puntland in October 2008. In this attack, which targeted offices of the local government, the Ethiopian consulate and the UN compound, around forty persons were killed.¹²⁵ Equally, in December 2009, a suicide bomber from al-Shabaab attacked a graduation ceremony in Mogadishu where around nineteen people were. The main targets of this

¹²² United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia (2006).

¹²³ Ibid

¹²⁴ Lister T (2013).

¹²⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2008).

university graduation attack was Somali's TFG officials attending the event.¹²⁶ Moreover, in 2010, suicide bombers attacked Kampala, Uganda where over seventy-four people were killed.¹²⁷ The aim of this attack in Uganda was to avenge the massacre of women, children and the elderly conducted by Uganda soldiers operating under AMISON as explained in English-language video. In September 2013, the West Gate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya was attacked by al-Shabaab and 67 people succumbed while 175 others were wounded.¹²⁸ As pointed out through a tweet from the group's media arm's account, the purpose of the West Gate attack was to avenge the lives of innocent Muslims killed by Kenyan Jets in Somali's Lower Jubba.¹²⁹ All of the above speak to al-Shabaab's aspirations and abilities and are a significant source of regional concern.

3.2 Justification of Kenya's involvement in Somalia

The Operation Linda Nchi was initiated by the When KDF (Kenyan-Defence-Forces) in October 2011 when forces from Kenya crossed into Somalia. As such, Kenya capitalized on UN's Charter Article #51 to invoke the country's right to defend herself.¹³⁰ The invocation had its resonations from the 1992 US foreign policymakers' statements when, as pointed out above, the regime of George Bush senior resolved that it was not irrational to think threats can come from middle and small powers, yet alone the world's most-failed state. Definitely, such concerns from the past proved perceptive – as shown when, in an October 2011 letter sent to the Security Council. Based on the letter which was written by Kenya's Ambassador to the UN, the country, in agreement with Somali's TFG, had been coerced to undertake vigorous, targeted measures to preserve and protect Kenya's integrity and the national economy's

¹²⁶ Pflanz M (2009) Al-Shabaab Blamed for Somalia Bombing.

¹²⁷ BBC News (2010).

¹²⁸ Lister T (2013).

¹²⁹ Anzalone C (2013).

¹³⁰ Article 51 of the UN Charter states.

efficacy and restore security and peace in the face of terrorist attacks perpetuated by the al-Shabaab from Somalia. Equally, as pointed out in the letter, in the past 20 years, Kenya has experienced numerous challenges following the collapse of the Somalia government in 1991. While some of the incursions were quelled by the police and military, others resulted in the loss of lives; particularly, along border towns due al-Shabaab Militants' activities.¹³¹

KDF's ability to engage in their first-ever foreign military venture came after a period of diverging trends. Between the end of the cold war and the mid-2000s, Kenya was among the top ten countries in terms of contributing peace keeping troops to the UN.¹³² On average around two-thousand personnel from Kenya were deployed worldwide at any given time.¹³³ However, since 2005, Kenya's contributions to UN peacekeeping missions have steadily declined.¹³⁴ Concurrently, Kenya, like other countries such as Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, Iraq and Afghanistan, has become one of the major beneficiary hard security anti-terrorism recipients from the US.¹³⁵ Resultantly, with unmatched military capability, forces associated with Operation Linda Nchi moved towards the East and North into Kismayo, which is one of the major port city in Somalia. The aim of moving into Kismayo was to deprive al-Shabaab tax income emanating from port commerce and, equally, cut off weapon access through the port. Moreover, entry into Kismayo enabled KDF to create a buffer zone in Southern Somalia in the stretches between the Kenyan border and Kismayo. The buffer zone which covered around 200 kilometres protected Kenya from refugee influx, entry of contraband and potential terrorists Kenya. Furthermore, the buffer zone could create economical gains to the country including protecting the \$24.7 billion LAPSEET (Lamu-Port-Southern-Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport) corridor, which connects Lamu town in Kenya to South Sudan oilfields and to

¹³¹ UNSC (2011).

¹³² United Nations Peacekeeping Data Dashboard (2014).

¹³³ Ibid

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ USAID/US Department of State (2009).

provide Ethiopia, with its 80-plus million citizens, access to the Indian Ocean's maritime trading lanes.¹³⁶

After the 2006-2009 Somali invasion, Ethiopia invaded the country again in November 2011 alongside Kenya's invasion in October. Although Ethiopia's motivation were similar to the previous invasions, the number of troops involved were reduced from thousands to hundreds.¹³⁷ Besides, the troops from Ethiopia were determined to work through proxies. Strategically, al-Shabaab leaders could not claim that Somalis were under a Christian invasion organised by Ethiopia.¹³⁸ Moreover, proxies enabled Ethiopia deal with al-Shabaab and, simultaneously, minimize contentions with complexities in Somali including religious, cultural practices to clan dynamics.

In terms of clan dynamics and cultural practices intersections, Somalis have historically organized themselves into diya-groups (diya implying blood payment) which are social insurance cooperatives. Diya-groups can consist of clans, subclans and/or sub-subclans, but members are always contractually bound to pay or receive damages collectively. Within this framework there is no concept of individuality. Consequently, in case of murder, the killer's diya-group is required to provide just compensation to the victim's diya-group. In case the killer's diya-group fails to compensate the victim, then, the victim's family can exact blood revenge to the perpetrators as well as members of the killers kin – which usually involves more claims and counterclaims for diya payments or revenge.

During the 2006–2009 Ethiopia invasion of Somalia, forces from Ethiopian regularly responded arbitrarily to attacks. For instance, Human Rights Watch, recorded numerous situations where troops from Ethiopia counter-attacked with retaliatory bombardments of highly-populated

¹³⁶ Kabukuru W (2012).

¹³⁷ Gettleman J (2011).

¹³⁸ Agence France-Presse (2007).

areas.¹³⁹ Such responses from Ethiopian forces resulted in Somali casualties and, definitely, lead to a diya response against the Ethiopian troops. Consequently, Ethiopia worked through proxies in the second invasion to avoid such spirals of violence. One proxy Ethiopia opted to partner with in its 2011 re-invasion was ASWJ (Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a).

ASWJ, just like al-Shabaab, is an Islamic based organization. As such, the group which partners with TFG, plays a critical role in Somalia's religious and clan environment. However, the group is different from al-Shabaab in the sense that it does not operate under the radical Salafist Islam philosophy based in Saudi Arabia, rather, it relies on the less radical Sufi Islam approach. Moreover, fighters affiliated to ASWJ's in central Somalia are largely members of the Hawiye clan (the first and last two clans).

On the contrary, al-Shabaab's fighters in central Somalia are mostly an alliance of all Hawiye sub-clans. Besides the religious differences, the clans linked to al-Shabaab and ASWJ have had historical disputes over agriculture and grazing rights around the Shabelle River. In turn, this has resulted in the diya cycles of cross-clan fighting and shifting alliances. Based on the social complexities and history, it is probably clear why forces from Ethiopia, used a different tactical approach in the 2011 invasion contrary to the 2006 invasion, despite having the same strategic goals in both invasions: to defeat the perceived threat al-Shabaab posed to the security of the Ethiopian state.

3.3 Multi-faceted approach in addressing national interest

According to Benjamin Buzan and Ole Waever,¹⁴⁰ and Benjamin Miller¹⁴¹, most countries are concerned about the threat posed by their immediate neighbours instead of their distant ones. Since most states are not superpowers, the power that such states are able to project usually

¹³⁹ Albin-Lackey C (2008).

¹⁴⁰ Buzan B and Waever O (2003).

¹⁴¹ Ibid

losses its strength with an increase in distance. As one scholar argues, great powers have the luxury of power projection. However, failing or failed nations can have various mechanisms of projecting their powers including suicide bombers or through refugee movements. Nonetheless, such mechanisms also from the principle of loss of strength gradient. Notably, instead of being located in South Africa, the Dadaab refugee camp is located along the Kenyan-Somalia border for a particular reason. Equally, instead of attacking the US, al-Shabaab attacks Kenya and Uganda for a particular reason. Based on this approach, Somalia has presented a particular 'security externality' to Kenya and Ethiopia since both physically adjoin Somalia.¹⁴²

Based on David Lake, a regional security system occurs when local externality occurs in specific geographic area and causes threats to the existence of states or individuals.¹⁴³ The 1964 defence pact between Kenya and Ethiopia is a good illustration of David Lake's approach. Equally, the current renewal of the defence pact as well as the coordination on display when Kenyan troops entered Somalia in October 2011, followed by troops from Ethiopian mere weeks later. Consequently, Lake's hypothesis is verified by association with AMISOM.

The military operation of AMISOM was a relatively-robust at the beginning of 2014 in comparison to March 2007 when team arrived in Somalia. The entire UN and AU sanctioned force comprised of peacekeepers from Uganda who were approximately 1700 troops.¹⁴⁴ The troops from Ugandan maintained a lonely vigil until December 2007. After December 2007, other peacekeepers arrived from Burundi and, therefore, increased the AMISOM troops to around 6000 personnel (AU Mission in Somalia, 2014a). Since then, peacekeepers in Somalia have increased drastically. As of June 2014, 21,564 personnel from 6 countries in African were operating under the AMISOM forces in Somalia.¹⁴⁵ Their main duty, as elucidated in the

¹⁴² Albin-Lackey C (2008).

¹⁴³ Lake D (1997) Regional Security Complexes.

¹⁴⁴ BBC News (2007).

¹⁴⁵ AMISOM, 2014b

UNSCR (United-Nations-Security-Council-Resolutions), is to undertake every possible measure that enhances reconciliation and dialogue in Somalia (UN SCR #1772, from 2007) (Department of Public Information, 2007), and to minimize the threat posed by armed opposition groups in the country and, thereby, create a conducive environment for legitimate and effective governance across Somalia.¹⁴⁶

Two of the six states that contributed troops to Somalia as referenced above are Ethiopia and Kenya. Kenya on its part has seventeen percent of all military personnel in AMASOM which amounts to 3664 soldiers. On the other hand, twenty percent of AMISOM troops operating in Somalia which is around 4395 originate from Ethiopia. Soldiers from Kenya were re-hated by their leaders under the June 2012 AMISOM command structure. It was not until January 2014 when forces from Ethiopian were re-hated. Ethiopian and Kenyan leaders, at least initially, thought joining AMISOM would stand in the way of our command control, and of course it would stand in the way of our operational freedom.¹⁴⁷ Ultimately, though, leaders in Addis Ababa, realised various benefits from joining AMISON. Notably, some material and financial intervention costs were transferred to the AU, UN and donors. Besides, operating within AMISOM provided UN Security Council and AU legal cover for their forces' operations.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, the security system of AMISOM is set to meet the security considerations of Ethiopia and Kenya with regard to Somalia.

AMISOM exists because of a set of interacting, interdependent components that receive legal justifications from the UN and AU Security Council. Bureaucrats and policymakers in the UN, the AU and individual nations provide material, financial, moral and logistical support. Together with other 4 African nations whose troops are operating in Somalia, Ethiopia's and

¹⁴⁶ Department of Public Information, 2012

¹⁴⁷ eNCA (2013).

¹⁴⁸ Joselow G (2014).

Kenya's loss of strength gradient has been mitigated. Notably, most of Ethiopian and Kenyan troops were deployed in the areas they operated before joining AMISOM. Kenyan forces were dispatched in Kismayo (sector 2) while Ethiopian forces were deployed in Baidoa (sector 3) (AMISOM, 2014b). Other AMISON troops operating in Somalia were responsible for their own sectors. Consequently, by operating under AMISOM, Ethiopia and Kenya have united and broadened their efforts against each potential threats from Somalia. emanating from Somalia.

3.4 Another generation, another intervention

Based on the 1993 letter written by the then UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN had obtained authority from the council's 1992 3rd December Resolution 794 to undertake relief operations in Somalia and create a secure environment for such activities.¹⁴⁹ Equally, Somalia's special representative from the AU commission for Somalia notes that the AU's mission in Somalia that consists of various stakeholders from Africa is facilitating the peace and stability restoration process in Somalia.¹⁵⁰

Such statements concur with the English school international relations approach that humanitarian intervention efforts associated with norms and ideals are as important as self-serving calculations.¹⁵¹ However, based on this article, interventions conducted by the US, Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia demonstrate a high level of realist and neo-realist scholars.¹⁵² The two realities are not necessarily contradictory, especially when placed in a public goods framework.¹⁵³

Air is frequently used as the critical example of a public good because, in the economists' vocabulary, it is impossible to prevent other persons from consuming it once it is produced.

¹⁴⁹ Boutros-Ghali, 1993: 7-8

¹⁵⁰ Annadif, 2013: 2

¹⁵¹ Finnemore, 1996, 2003; Wheeler, 2000, 2001

¹⁵² Gilpin, 1981; Keohane and Nye, 1971, 1977; Morgenthau, 1978; Waltz, 1979, 1995

¹⁵³ Holcombe, 1997

Likewise, imposed or maintained security can equally be considered as a public good. Basically, an absence of armed conflict – a public good produced, say, in the wake of a military intervention – provides equal opportunity for all not to suffer an attendant violent death or wound from ongoing hostilities.

Based on the public goods theory which dates back to the 1970's, the pursuit of self-interest (such as the American, Kenyan and Ethiopian foreign policymakers each seeking the security objectives of their countries) is not necessarily at odds with the pursuit of idealistic or collective outcomes (e.g. those ideals noted above in the two respective quotes from Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and Ambassador Annadif).¹⁵⁴

Accordingly, in case foreign policymakers decide to arbitrate in the ongoing tragedy in Somalia because they hope to realize private gains for their respective countries (i.e. in the public goods theory jargon, to be able to consume a produced good at the exclusion of others), then this should not detract from the fact that, quite plausibly, higher amounts of public benefit can be realized in Somalia than otherwise might have been the case. Such public gains might be accrued through the delivery of some humanitarian relief, the return of some displaced persons and refugees, the defeat of some militants, and/or the creation of a conducive environment that promotes security and enables some popular governance to take over, even if its only in some limited areas.

In other words, public good could be realized through a military intervention, even if an impure one – since not all persons will have an opportunity to 'consume' the public good, and not necessarily in equal measure.¹⁵⁵ And herein is the major connection between the 1992 US involvement in Somalia and the 2011 Somalia intervention by Ethiopia and Kenya. The

¹⁵⁴ Russett, 1970

¹⁵⁵ Sabala, Kizito, 2011.

intention of both interventions was to produce a type of ‘public good’ through the imposition of conditions conducive for security.

A classic take on public goods theory, as put forward by, say, Paul Samuelson¹⁵⁶ and Mancur Olson¹⁵⁷ classic approach on the public good theory, nations that follow personal self-interest in terms of military operations that are presumably peacekeeping in nature usually fail to produce the desired public good (e.g. choose not to engage in an operation), or ‘under produce the amount desired of the public good’ (i.e. fail to find or dedicate enough time, treasure and/or blood to make peace a reality) since ‘self-interest works against the interests of the collective’.¹⁵⁸

According, it is explicit that the US’s intervention in Somalia, though it realized some good, did not remedy the concerns and circumstances which created the supposed need for Ethiopian and Kenyan forces to intervene in Somalia a generation later. Unfortunately for Ethiopian and Kenyan troops, their current efforts in Somalia will probably be hampered by both the dictates of the public goods theory as well as the internal political realities in Somalia.

In August 2012, Somalia’s first formal parliament after almost 20 years was inaugurated. Just before the swearing in of parliamentarians the UN Monitoring Group for Eritrea and Somalia produced a report for the UNSC noting that fully 70 per cent of all money which had made its way to Somalia’s TFG between 2009 and 2010 had either been embezzled, wasted or stolen. Moreover, the report highlighted that that total government expenditure in 2011 was, in the euphemistic language of the report, ‘absorbed’ by the offices of the president, prime minister

¹⁵⁶ Ibid

¹⁵⁷ Goodhan, 2003.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

and speaker, a sum nearly equal to what ‘the government spend on security in a time of conflict’.¹⁵⁹

Accordingly, the Monitoring Group recommended that the UN Security Council endorse relevant government officials from Somali. Instead, almost a third of those officials who had been part of the TFG occupied positions in the 2012 parliament. Some of these individuals, as it was reported later, purportedly paid around US\$25,000 for the honour.¹⁶⁰

Based on more recent reports, Mogadishu is still a hotbed of incompetence and corruption. No less than 80 per cent of withdrawals from Somalia’s Central Bank are made for ‘private purposes’ consisting of a ‘patronage system and a set of social relations that defy the institutionalization of the state’.¹⁶¹ Besides, funds are usually diverted before they reach the Central Bank. For instance, until 2013, finances from taxes and fees associated with issuance of Somalia passports failed to reach the Central Bank.¹⁶²

In the first quarter of 2013, though, after foreign donors began asking questions, some deposits related to passports were made. However, besides lacking relevant documentation, only 4% of the deposits were made from passport issuance.¹⁶³ Likewise, the Mogadishu port, which is the main source of internal revenue for Somalia, revenue of around \$3.8 million was projected every month. However, for eight months only \$2.7 million was deposited in the central bank. Equally, despite an general in the Central Bank’s port revenue deposits, the increase was not proportional to the reported increase in number of Ship activities in the port of Mogadishu.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁹ Sabahi Online, 2012

¹⁶⁰ The Economist, 2012

¹⁶¹ United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2012: 24

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³ Ibid

¹⁶⁴ Barnes, C., & Hassan, H. 2007. The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 1(2), 151-160

In case self-interest always opposes the interest of collective¹⁶⁵ in terms of the interventions of the military, then the same case applies to the political process and politicians in Somalia. Despite the success of forces from Kenya and Ethiopia as well as other AMISOM members in Somalia, the country's solution in the long-term relies on the exercise of legitimate and effective governance by Somalia's politician. However, based on the level of corruption and public waste demonstrated by Somalia's politicians, the solution to the country's long-term challenges are still in the horizon. Consequently, the second generation of soldiers to intervene in Somalia – this generation of Kenyan and Ethiopian soldiers – might realize little more than their American predecessors in one of the world's most-failed states.

¹⁶⁵ Harper, M. *Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith, War and Hope in a Shattered State*. Zed Books, London, 2012.

CHAPTER FOUR: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF KENYA AND ETHIOPIA IN THE MANAGEMENT OF SOMALIA'S CONFLICT

4.0 Introduction

As seen in the previous chapters, war-torn societies are host to windows of misfortunes as well as opportunities that can open up to building peace. In Somalia's case, most of the previous peace building endeavours and endeavours at building an incorporated national government have fizzled. The conditions and dangers that have supported the conflict for a considerable length of time keep on existing: the fall of the focal state and disorder in a few regions; a failed society ridden by family governmental issues; far reaching destitution, natural annihilation and youth joblessness; a blasting war economy that advantages an intense world class; the rise of radical translation of Islam, as the al-Shabaab revolt; and a divided global group which has sought after contending targets.

In order to explain the role and effect of external actors in Somalia's conflict, this chapter will map the conflict and the involvement of Ethiopia and Kenya in the management of the conflict as well as their issues and interest. As indicated in the aim of the thesis, the study focuses on two of the external actors in the conflict (Ethiopia and Kenya). This does not mean that the rest of the external actors in the conflict are not important. But, due to the limitations of the scope of the study and the fact that these two countries are neighbors to Somalia and the extensiveness of their involvement in the conflict, compared to other external actors, this study focuses mainly on these two the courtiers.

4.1 Ethiopia's involvement

The study uncovers that Ethiopia is a compelling outer character in the Somali conflict. The nation has since demarcated fringe with Somalia in the east. There is a long unfriendly history

over the Somali occupied Ogaden area of eastern Ethiopia which has brought about interstate wars between the two nations.¹⁶⁶ While the threatening vibe between the two nations is uncertain formally in an interstate procedure, the common war softened up Somalia 1991. This made another security worry for Ethiopia. Parties of various character in Somalia undermined and attacked Ethiopia.¹⁶⁷

Ethiopia has been engaged with the Somalia conflict which proceeds more than two decades. The antagonistic history between the two nations took after by the idea of conflicts to "overflow" in adjacent nations and influence them in various ways inspired the Ethiopian association in the Somali conflict.¹⁶⁸ This is a case conflicts spread rapidly and making precariousness in the neighbouring states in an assortment of ways including exchange, both the European Union and the African Union has sent delegations to discuss the international recognition of Somaliland. So far, Ethiopia is the first State to officially recognize Somaliland as a Sovereign State.¹⁶⁹

Al-Itihad had their army installations in Gedo area of southern Somalia, however had solid prominence and supporters all through Somalia. The gathering, whose political rationale was to set up an Islamic state in Somalia, likewise, strived to spread Islamic radicalism in the horn of Africa. In addition, the conflict in Somalia made a stage for Ethiopian revolutionary gatherings that make shakiness in Ethiopia. The Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), revolt assemble that battles with Ethiopia in the Ogaden locale has got sympathizers and concealing spots in Somalia to take up arms against Ethiopia. This sort of participations between various gatherings of enthusiasm for the district is in accordance with Kaldor's contention that the greater part of new the time conflicts draw in and give shelter to transitional

¹⁶⁶ Afyare and Barise, 2006: 8

¹⁶⁷ Abbink, Jon. 2006.

¹⁶⁸ Brown, Michael E. 1996.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid

gatherings that may have an indistinguishable motivation from the nearby ones in the conflict or else misuse the conflict setting to accomplish their thought processes. This situation in the Somali conflict made a genuine worry to the neighboring states, essentially to Ethiopia.

In spite of the fact that this has existed since the ruin of Somalia's state, it expanded when the ICU caught regions near the TFG's (Transitional Federal Government) bases in Baidoa and undermined its reality. The Islamists, whose intention is to force strict Sharia administer in Somalia, has additionally more than once debilitated Ethiopia and promised to force their govern to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital city. This has exasperated the circumstance and Ethiopia subsequently chose to intercede in Somalia militarily. The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) attacked Somalia and expelled the ICU in SCS. As per Brown's contention with respect to the effect of inside conflict in neighboring states, the Ethiopian government clarified its military activity because of the dangers postured against it.

In spite of the fact that this has existed since the defeat of Somalia's state, it expanded when the ICU caught regions near the TFG's (Transitional Federal Government) bases in Baidoa and debilitated its reality. The Islamists, whose thought process is to force strict Sharia control in Somalia, has likewise over and again undermined Ethiopia and promised to force their manage to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital city. This has disturbed the circumstance and Ethiopia subsequently chose to mediate in Somalia militarily. The Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF) attacked Somalia and removed the ICU in SCS. As per Brown's contention with respect to the effect of inward conflict in neighboring states, the Ethiopian government clarified its military activity because of the dangers postured against it.

The ENDF effectively removed the Islamists and encouraged the TFG to set out on its manage in bigger regions in SCS, including the capital city, Mogadishu, yet as the case may be in many conflicts where outside powers intercede interior conflict, the Islamists began a revolt battling

against Ethiopia and the TFG, they began to regroup their powers in the far southern areas of Jubaland where they made preparing and enrolling camps for their warriors. At the same time, they likewise increased solid help inside the neighborhood populaces who saw the Ethiopian powers as intruders. This made another measurement in the conflict. Numerous different gatherings, including jihadists from different parts of the world and Ethiopian dissident gatherings have additionally joined the revolt against Ethiopian powers in Somalia. This is in accordance with Kaldor's clarification of how interior conflicts can change into transnational one.

While insurrection powers were growing new strategies, for example, present day unstable devises, roadside bombs, suicide assaults and other new time war systems. The Eritrean government is additionally answered to have included the conflict by offering help to the radical gatherings. Joined Nations authorities announced Eritrea's association in the Somali conflict. The UN sources likewise revealed that more than 2000 Eritrean warriors were in Somalia. Eritrea and Ethiopia have an uncertain outskirts conflict and went to an interstate war. In a discourse to disclose the ENDF creation to Somalia, the Ethiopian head administrator, Meles Zenawi, said "Ethiopian safeguard powers were compelled to go into war to secure the sway of the country". This changed the wonder of Somalia's conflict into "another war" setting recommended by Mary Kaldor. This is a result of the assortment of the performing artists including in it, changing measurements and war methods/materials utilized as a part of the conflict. As indicated by Kaldor inside conflicts are revered for regional and global performing artists with variable characters and targets to include.

This expanded the dangers that the conflict postures against neighboring states, the district and past. Subsequently, the US government has begun to help and work together with the TFG and Ethiopia keeping in mind the end goal to keep the potential frailty "overflow" against its advantage and the district. A few other neighborly states and associations likewise gave

assistance to Ethiopia in the battling against the Islamists. In opposite, other outer performing artists, including Al-Qaeda offered help to the interior gatherings, essentially, the Islamists who battled against Ethiopia. The inclusion of such outer performing artists in the Somalia conflict affirms Kaldor's thought that inside conflict is conceivably alluring to outside on-screen characters.

In light of Ethiopia's proximate and basic security worries in the Somalia conflict, it applies different ways to deal with increment its national security and intrigue; those methodologies incorporate production of two-sided coordinated efforts with powerful elements and people in the conflict. For instance, Ethiopia underpins and works together with the experts in Puntland and Somaliland in the security and political angles. Ethiopia has a fringe with the two substances and this abatements its security worry over the conflict in Somalia. It likewise enables its powers to manage its national security dangers in the regions controlled by those substances. So also, Ethiopia has a decent association with a portion of the powerful warlords in Somalia and gives them military help to battle against the Islamists. In this circumstance, Ethiopia's techniques to build its national security through reciprocal relations with singular elements in the conflict could be seen as negative effect towards an all encompassing determination to Somalia's conflict. This could likewise be translated as Brown's clarification that neighboring states are regularly dynamic supporters of savagery, heightening and regional precariousness.

Concerning compromise and conflict resolutions to Somalia's conflict, Ethiopia assumed parts in numerous peace activities. Nonetheless, Ethiopia undermined a portion of the endeavors to which its advantage was in question; for instance, it tested the Cairo peace process by enlisting and inducing two fundamental Somalia group pioneers to blacklist the procedure. General Aden Gabyow and Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf pulled back the procedure in Cairo and traveled to Addis Abba. The way that Egypt has unsteady relations and debate now and again with

Ethiopia over the Nile River water sharing, Ethiopia was troubled with the procedure, which was encouraged by Egypt, for the previous idea it was probably not going to create well disposed Somali foundations to Ethiopia.

Ethiopia intercedes in Somalia's conflict not exclusively to shield its national security from dangers postured by on-screen characters in Somalia, yet in addition needs to avert different states, for example, Eritrea that purportedly bolstered Somali groups and additionally Ethiopian restriction in Somalia as intermediary. Brown calls such intercessions "pioneering mediation". States intercede in interior conflicts by exploiting inner shortcomings and turmoil. Such inward shortcomings can possibly make windows of chances for different states that more often than not bolster benevolent inner performing artists and neighbour agitator gatherings to take part in an intermediary wars with their adversary states. This sort of intercession incorporates sending of the formal powers into inner conflicts with regards to peace mediation. This is the thing that precisely Ethiopia did when it trusted its security was in question by match Eritrea and Somali Islamists.

In addition, the Ethiopian military innovation and the war amongst ENDF and radical gatherings in Somalia in 2006-2009 made mass regular citizen relocation and compassionate emergencies. A large number of individuals have left their homes in fear.

4.2 Kenya's Involvement

The same as Ethiopia, Kenya imparts authentic variables to Somalia with respect to ethnic and land angles. The north eastern territory of Kenya is overwhelmingly occupied by a Somali ethnic population, and not like Ethiopia, Kenya had no interstate wars with Somalia. Nonetheless, strains between the two nations over the Somali possessed district happened directly after the autonomy of Somalia. The principal Somali Free State pronounced its goal to bring together the Somalia possessed localities in the horn of Africa under one state in which

north eastern area of Kenya incorporates. Northern Frontier Liberation Army (NFLA), an ethnic Somalia secessionist development, was built up in the mid-1960s to battle against Kenyan power in the area.¹⁷⁰

The Somali government at the time moved down this development and gave them good and material help. Despite history, Kenya has dependably been well disposed with the people of Somali since the war softened up Somalia in 1991. Kenya hosted the biggest number of Somali exiles who fled the war in Somalia. As indicated by UNHCR Kenya has a large portion of a million Somali displaced people according to this year's report, while the conflict in Somalia still proceeds.¹⁷¹ The way that all conflicts influence regional nations in a few ways, the size of Somali exiles in Kenya could tremendously influence this nation in factor viewpoints. Despite the fact that Kenya has the biggest number of Somali displaced people on the planet, Kenya's part in the Somali conflict remained very impartial for a long time. It has been associated with intercession forms between inner performing artists and facilitated a few peace forms intended to accommodate conflicting parts in Somalia. The way that all conflicts influence regional nations in a few ways, the size of Somali exiles in Kenya could immensely influence this nation in factor perspectives. This represents Brown's idea on regional measurements in inner conflict. He clarifies that displaced person is a consequence of interior conflict and it generally influences the neighbouring nations.¹⁷²

Despite the fact that Kenya has the biggest number of Somali displaced people on the planet, Kenya's part in the Somali conflict remained very impartial for a long time. It has been engaged with intercession forms between external characters and facilitated a few peace forms intended to accommodate conflicting regions in Somalia. This was also comprised of the one held 2002-

¹⁷⁰ Møller, Bjørn.

¹⁷¹ UNHCR. 2012.

¹⁷² Brown, Michael E. 1996.

2004 in under the support of IGAD states and global group delivering the TFG.¹⁷³ Despite its obligation in the conflict, Kenya constantly experienced frailty episodes postured by this conflict since it softened out up 1991. This identifies with Brown's clarification about provocative activities of inward conflicts against neighbouring states contending that issues of exile and uncertainty "overflow" are among factors that can lead regional states to include in nearby conflicts.¹⁷⁴

Because of the changing measurements of Somalia's conflict, the dangers it postures against Kenya expanded when Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, who controlled bigger ranges in SCS undermined, to destabilize Kenya. The fear monger association did a few assaults inside Kenya focusing on tourism and other financial wellsprings of the nation. In addition, the gathering began to enroll adolescents of Kenya, Somalis in Kenya and other Muslim nationals inside Kenya to go along with them. The Kenyan governments saw this as genuine security issue against its national security and intrigue. Enrollment of youths could give the fear based oppressor association an ability to destabilize Kenya through "home developed" components. Therefore, the Kenyan government changed its conduct towards the Somali conflict by sending the Kenyan protection powers (KDF) into Somalia to battle Al-Shabbab and keep their assaults against Kenya.¹⁷⁵ In connection to its measurements and the conduct of the performing artists in it, Somalia's conflict can be named what Kaldor disclosed to be "new wars". Enrollment of young fellows of various nationality by Al-Shabaab and contribution of Al-Qaeda, shows another war character in this conflict.¹⁷⁶ As per Kaldor, performers in the new conflict period teach contenders through character or philosophy, for example, religion, political and faction

¹⁷³ Møller, Bjørn.

¹⁷⁴ Brown, Michael E. 1996.

¹⁷⁵ ICG. 2012. The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia. International Crises Group. African Report. Feb. 15-2012. No.184.

¹⁷⁶ Kaldor, Mary. 2012.

personality. Consequently, Al-Shabaab's conduct in Kenya is a conspicuous normal for "new wars".

Moreover, Brown¹⁷⁷ clarified that nearby conflicts can possibly "overflow" and make military issues for neighboring states. He contends that inner conflict produces precariousness in neighboring states, making political and monetary unsteadiness. On account of Somalia, Al-Shabaab kidnapped help laborers and visitors in Kenya making security and monetary shakiness in that nation. The gathering hijacked two Spanish guide laborers in northern Kenya and injured a few others. This made an emergency for help associations to help evacuees and other guide subordinate individuals in Kenya.¹⁷⁸

In a different episode, assailants from Somalia seized a French national visitor lady in the waterfront shoreline of Lamu.¹⁷⁹ Because of fear based oppression and frailty made by Al-Shabaab in Kenya, numerous western and different nations cautioned their nationals against go to Kenya. Moreover, Kenya experienced issues from the theft in Somalia. This has added to the effectively poor security circumstance, influencing the nation in both socially and monetarily. The Somalia privateers assaulted payload boats and traveller vessels making a beeline for Kenyan in Indian sea and the Gulf of Aden. This incapacitated the exercises in the main seaport of Kenya, Mombasa and debilitated it to conclusion.¹⁸⁰ Snatching of help specialists and voyagers in present day period conflicts are persuaded by financial purposes to nourish the war. As per Kaldor,¹⁸¹ the new fighting is generally determined by unlawful economy including prisoner taking and loots.

¹⁷⁷ Brown, Michael E. 1996.

¹⁷⁸ Mark Bowden.2011.

¹⁷⁹ Theguardian. 2011.

¹⁸⁰ XINHUA. 2013.

¹⁸¹ Kaldor, Mary. 2012. New and Old Wars. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California

In endeavours to handle robbery exercises and ensure the national intrigue, Kenyan security and law authorization offices spend huge assets in hostile to theft operations, making a further weight to the nation.¹⁸² Nonetheless, Kenya additionally trusts this is a universal issue made by the wilderness in Somalia. Kenya, as well as impending dangers to global peace and security. The UNSC has in a determination 1851 depicted theft and furnished burglary in the Somali and universal waters a hindrance to peace and security in that district.¹⁸³ Although, the variable difficulties made by this conflict against Kenya are in accordance with Brown's idea inward conflict outcomes against regional and universal peace. Brown¹⁸⁴ clarifies interior conflicts spread and make issues in neighbouring nations.

Despite the fact that the Kenyan troops mediated in Somalia and occupied with battling with Al-Shabaab, the fear based oppressor association still remains a dynamic and vital to Kenyan inside security. The instability exercises by Al-Shabaab much of the time happen in Kenya.¹⁸⁵The group completed an assault in Westgate, a vast and exceptionally famous shopping centre in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, murdering not less than 72 innocents Kenyan and travellers in September 2013. Comparable assaults were focused with Mombasa, the beach front traveller and the port city of Kenya.¹⁸⁶

In light of the difficulties influencing the national security and intrigue, Kenya chose to build the contribution in Somalia by incorporating the Kenyan powers in Somalia with the AMISOM peacekeeping powers working under the order of the AU and UNSC. The Kenyan powers working in Somalia at first attacked Somalia with an individual self-preservation choice by the Kenyan government. The AU and UNSC formally enabled KDF to join AMISOM peacekeeping powers through in UNSC determination 2036 of February 2012. The

¹⁸² XINHUA. 2013.

¹⁸³ UNSC. 2008.

¹⁸⁴ Brown, Michael E. 1996.

¹⁸⁵ Eriksson, Mikael. 2013.

¹⁸⁶ Aljazeera. 2013.

determination gives lawful structure, commands and assets to the Kenyan powers to battle Al-Shabaab in Somalia.¹⁸⁷

With regards to security dangers originating from battling bunches in Somalia, Kenya's interventionist activity in Somalia shows what Brown called a "Guarded intercession"; Brown brings up that states take such mediations in inside conflicts when their national security and intrigue are undermined by performing artists in adjacent conflicts.¹⁸⁸ Nevertheless, the thought process in this sort of mediation is not to end the conflict in the main point, however to prevent it from spreading into Kenyan fringes. States do this in various methodologies, yet the centre focus is safeguarding own national security.

In this unique situation, keeping in mind the end goal to ensure its own national security, Kenya takes a stab settled and strength in Somalia, especially in the close-by areas. In this manner, so as to get security in her regions, a dynamic Somali regional state in the close-by districts is a possibility for Kenya. This makes a security cushion zone to ensure Kenyan national security and intrigue. In addition, Kenya contends that such a specialist can make a sheltered and secure condition for Somali exiles living in Kenya to return and resettle in their nation.¹⁸⁹

Production of a neighborhood expert activity is likewise part of a government Somalia objective, a framework that Kenya pushes for. With an end goal to understand a regional specialist in Jubba land and government Somalia in the long haul, Kenya held a compromise procedure for nearby senior citizens and legislators from Jubba land districts in 2010 and upheld them to shape a regional state in that piece of Somalia. Kenya likewise prepared nearby volunteer armies selected from groups of those areas to battle Al-Shabaab in Jubba land, this gives Kenya a safe neighboring condition. In any case, the Somali government in Mogadishu

¹⁸⁷ African Union Mission in Somalia. 2014.

¹⁸⁸ Brown, Michael E. 1996.

¹⁸⁹ Eriksson, Mikael. 2013.

is miserable with Kenya's conduct in making and managing neighborhood organizations in Somalia. The FGS sees this more to undermine its part as a focal government in Somalia.¹⁹⁰ The FGS postured worries about its disappointment with respect to the Kenyan activity to Kenya and IGAD and other IGAD part states, yet Kenya demands the procedure was significant for its national security and in addition the regional one. In any case, Somalia trusts this would baffle endeavours to restore peace.¹⁹¹

As Brown clarified, it is a general character of states to act for their national enthusiasm for others' contentions. For this situation Kenya organizes assurance of her national security over endeavouring to determine Somalia's contention comprehensively. Despite the fact that it is difficult to dispose of contention overflow while neighbouring with a nation living with strife for quite a long time, Kenya is endeavouring efforts to make a secured adjacent area in the contention. This is the thing that Brown arranges as "defensive intercession". In accordance with Kenya's way to deal with Jubbaland, Brown brings up that states help ethnic gatherings in adjacent clashes in light of a legitimate concern for their national security.¹⁹²

Instead of FGS, the Jubbaland organization was established and a president was chosen for Jubbaland leaving a genuine worry on FGS. Ahmed Madobe, the chosen pioneer contends that, the Somalia government needs to take after the temporary elected constitution of Somalia under which they are chosen. In an exhibit to the FGSs dismissal to acknowledge with Madobe's organization, the recently established Jubbaland specialist situated in Kismayo where they to a great extent rely upon the Kenyan powers declined to consult with FGS to determine the gridlock.¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ BBC NEWS. 2011.

¹⁹¹ Eriksson, Mikael. 2013.

¹⁹² Brown, Michael E. 1996.

¹⁹³ Uhuru, Kenyatta. 2013

Despite the fact that Somalia's contention has delayed and gone through various measurements and different characters, the intercession by neighboring states, for example, Kenya and Ethiopia can lead the contention to another measurement with new personalities in light of provincial states. The conduct of Kenya in this contention is probably not going to create a comprehensive answer for Somalia's contention; it rather concentrates on a halfway arrangement in which its national intrigue is limited. Despite the fact that, Kenya clarified this as an activity of cautious intercession which Brown discloses to be when states intercede others' contentions with the destinations of self-protection and focus "to bring cross-fringe issues, (for example, exile streams or military attacks) to an end, to shield wars from spreading or all the more aggressively, to convey wars to an end".¹⁹⁴

Although, Kenya's activity in manoeuvring up particular groups in a nearby clash looks like what Brown clarified as "defensive intercession". Brown, clarifies such an intercession is "intended to ensure or help ethnic brethren engaged with dangers somewhere else".¹⁹⁵ Despite the fact that Kenya's activity in this contention is required by national security dangers, its conduct to move down Jubbaland can be seen as "defensive mediation". In accordance with this, the FGS censured the Kenyan legislature of helping particular groups in Somalia; The Ogaden tribe who prevalently possesses Jubbaland has likewise a solid impact in Kenya.¹⁹⁶

Kenya's contribution incorporate the one held 2002-2004 under the support of IGAD part states and worldwide group delivering the TFG.¹⁹⁷ Despite its part in the contention, Kenya constantly experienced uncertainty occurrences postured by this contention since it softened out up 1991. Because of the changing measurements of Somalia's contention, the dangers it postures against Kenya expanded when Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda, who controlled bigger

¹⁹⁴ Brown, Michael E. 1996.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid

¹⁹⁶ Eriksson, Mikael. 2013.

¹⁹⁷ Møller, Bjørn. 2009.

zones in South-Central Somalia undermined, to destabilize Kenya. The psychological militant association completed a few assaults inside Kenya focusing on tourism and other financial wellsprings of the nation. Additionally, the gathering began to select youths of Kenya, Somalis in Kenya and other Muslim nationals inside Kenya to go along with them. The Kenyan governments saw this as genuine security issue against its national security and intrigue.¹⁹⁸

Therefore, the Kenyan government changed its conduct towards the Somali clash by sending the Kenyan barrier powers (KDF) into Somalia to battle Al-Shabaab and keep their assaults against Kenya. In connection to its measurements and the conduct of the performers in it, Somalia's contention can be named what Kaldor disclosed to be "new wars". Enlistment of young fellows of various nationality by Al-Shabaab and association of Al-Qaeda shows another war character in this contention. Besides, nearby clashes can possibly "overflow" and make military issues for neighboring states. On account of Somalia, Al Shabaab stole help specialists and voyagers in Kenya making security and financial shakiness in that nation. The gathering hijacked two Spanish guide specialists in northern Kenya and injured a few others. This made an emergency for help associations to help exiles and other guide subordinate individuals in Kenya.¹⁹⁹

Despite the fact that the Kenyan troops mediated in Somalia and occupied with battling with Al Shabaab, the psychological oppressor association still remains a dynamic and essential risk to Kenyan inner security. In light of the difficulties influencing the national security and intrigue, Kenya chose to build the contribution in Somalia by coordinating the Kenyan powers in Somalia with the AMISOM peacekeeping powers working under the command of the AU and UNSC. The Kenyan powers working in Somalia at first attacked Somalia with an

¹⁹⁸ Miyandazi, Luckystar. 2012.

¹⁹⁹ ICG. 2012.

individual self-protection choice by the Kenyan government. The AU and UNSC formally enabled KDF to join AMISOM.²⁰⁰

In spite of the fact that the Kenyan powers now work in Somalia under the order of the AU and UNSC, they are intrigued and basically engaged with the settlement of Jubaland. The Kenyan troops work in the Jubaland area and assume an unmistakable part in the foundation of this provincial self-sufficiency. Kenya clarifies this as a major aspect of her endeavours to guarantee her own national security. In this manner, it gives a hand to the Somali people group living the close-by fringe locales to get an organization that promises them peace and security.

²⁰¹ Although, Somalia's government in Mogadishu declined to perceive the result of the group arrangements to make the Kenya upheld Jubaland organization.

²⁰⁰ Eriksson, Mikael. 2013.

²⁰¹ Uhuru, Kenyatta. 2013.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

5.0 Summary of findings

Peace, security and stability in Somalia is necessary to the region in general and the neighboring states in particular. Insecurity and Conflicts in one country spreads and, thus affects other nations in one way or another. As discussed throughout this thesis, the Somali conflict is characterized in this study as the new wars, i.e. that wars and conflicts involve numerous transnational connections of local and international players who fight for specific political goals at times using terror tactics and destabilization as well as criminalized economy.²⁰² Consequently, security agencies from the US, for example, raised concerns regarding their citizens travelling to Somalia to join al-Shabaab.²⁰³ Likewise, other western countries have raised concerns on how their citizens travel to Somalia and, thus, join and fight for al-Shabaab as well as other radical groups participating in the conflict.

The Somali conflict involves various external factors including transitional radical elements that destabilize security in Somalia, the East African region as well as other areas in Africa and beyond. Consequently, the conflict has a worldwide impact. In turn, the conflict can only be resolved through multifaceted efforts because it affects global security and peace. Without a unified global involvement, sustainable peace cannot be realised in Somalia. Furthermore, it is essential for all peace efforts to include all actors from Somalia and the regional states, especially, those affected by the conflict directly.

The fact that the conflict in Somalia is complex and involve various players, this research endorses the recommendation of Brown regarding global action to internal problems.

²⁰² Kaldor, Mary. 2012. *New and Old Wars*. 3rd edition, Stanford University Press: Stanford, California

²⁰³ U.S State Department. 213. Rewards for Justice - Reward Offers for Information on Omar Hammami and Jihad Mostafa. U.S. Department of State. March. 20-2013. (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/206565.htm>)

According to Brown,²⁰⁴ peace can be realized in conflicts such as the one in Somalia through an accumulated global, which in turn, will probably produce sustainable peace in internal conflicts. Since the Somalia conflict has global implications in security and peace, Brown's recommendations of concentrated global community action is appropriate for the underlying problem.

As such, institutions in Somalia can be supported by the global community in the war against terrorist movements and state building. Brown also emphasizes the importance of local communities in terms of engagement and willingness for openness and peace for support from the global community.²⁰⁵ These are the two critical focal principles required to secure common approach towards final resolution to this conflict. As Nicholas Kay points out, the head of the UN assistance mission in Somalia, the Somali government is making progress in the political and economic aspects. However, Kay emphasizes the need for global help to secure a stable and peaceful Somalia.²⁰⁶ The UN envoy's statement confirms the preparedness of leaders from Somalia in terms of bringing peace in their country.

Based on this two critical focal principles, this research promotes the two track strategy recommended by Brown for global and local actors to resolve such conflicts. In fact, the strategies are designed for conflicts where most people are determined to create peace in their country, while a minority militant groups want to perpetuate the conflict. This is relevant for Somalia, since Al-Shabaab is a global terrorist organization and does not receive support from from the ordinary Somalis. The government of Somali recognizes Al-Shabaab as the enemy of security and peace in the country and is involved in direct war with the terrorist group. The Somali president, Hassan Sheikh, said "Al-Shabaab is an enemy of peace, they are not Somalis,

²⁰⁴ Brown, Michael E. 1996. *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Center for Science and International Affairs. John F. Canady School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge. Massachusetts

²⁰⁵ Ibid

²⁰⁶ Kay, Nicholas. 2014. Despite progress, Somalia is nearing 'danger zone' in critical areas, warns UN envoy. UN News Centre. May.22-214. (<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47863#.U4HIXii230>)

they are international criminals and their relation with Somalia is only that they take advantage of lawlessness in Somalia”^{.207} Furthermore, the UNSC endorsed and recognized the group as an obstacle to security and peace in Somalia and the entire world based on resolution 1853.²⁰⁸

Accordingly, Brown’s two track strategies becomes the most pertinent channel for long-term peace in Somalia. Co-optation, which is the first strategy, navigates measures in neutralizing al-Shabaab’s influence and dealing with the militant group. For instance, to minimise the groups popular support, economic and political reforms must be implemented in the country to deal with the broad-based societal problems, marginalizing al-Shabaab by bringing more and more frontier elements into the economic and political mainstream. Providing economic and political opportunities to al-Shabaab members undermines and finally brings more into the peace process.

Neutralization, which is more relevant to the Somalia scenario, is the second strategy. According to Brown, neutralization is a belligerent campaign against militants, it deals with them cutting off logistics and arms support from neighbouring countries and search-and-capture or search-and-destroy missions”^{.209} While, neutralization is majorly the responsibility of the Somali government and people, it is critical for Somalia to obtain assistance from global community so as to realize a stable and peaceful Somalia. Besides the two focal strategies in the research, other four critical actions are also recommended. Among the four, humanitarian assistance is the first approach to the needy people. Humanitarian assistance, in Somalia, is critical in order to enable the affected civilian communities to access human needs in their livelihood. Mediation mission and fact finding is the second strategy. Since the war in Somalia has been on for the past twenty years now involving numerous players, such a mission will

²⁰⁷ Omar, Chrispinus, Mgidu, Chris, and Kaburo, Njoroge. 2014.

²⁰⁸ UNSC. 2008.

²⁰⁹ Brown, Michael E. 1996.

likely create an avenue for peace in the country. Traditional peacekeeping forces is the third strategy. This mission is significant for Somalia because the country is at war with militants and has no strong security institutions. As such, through traditional peacekeeping forces, Somalia will manage to build its own strong security forces to be able to defend as well as neutralize anti-peace forces. Multifunctional peacekeeping operation is the fourth element. This operation helps with the reconstruction of infrastructure, economic and political system building and law and judicial enforcement. By doing so, the prospect to achieve peace and security in Somalia and the region is possible.

5.1 Conclusion

The Somali conflict has been in existence for at least, the past two decades. The main external players, in terms of restoring peace and stability in the country are Ethiopia and Kenya. Notably, the intervention process of the two countries has played a critical role in the restoration of peace since the year 2000. Kenya and Ethiopia have been involved in restoration of peace and stability in Somalia because of the threats caused by the Somalia conflict to their national security. The conflict has particularly created a safe sanctuary for rebel groups from neighboring countries, radical groups that perpetuate supply of arms and refugees in the sector and international terrorists. Equally, the conflict has become a regional concern because of its ability to cross national boundaries, thereby, threatening the peace and security of neighbouring countries, especially, in the East Africa region. Furthermore, the international community has been affected by the spill over effect of Somalia's conflict. For instance, the piracy challenge in the Indian ocean affects ships operating in the international waters along the East African region and, particularly, near the Somali shoreline. As such, the spill over effect verifies Brown's hypothesis that in case an internal conflict becomes global issue once it spills over its borders and creates a threat to peace and security of the international community.

However, despite Ethiopia's critical role in the restoration of peace and stability in Ethiopia, some of the Ethiopia's behaviour and activities have undermined the peace process in Somalia. The intervention by Ethiopian and Kenyan military, for instance, particularly the war between Somalia's insurgent groups and ENDF in 2006-2009 has created a mass of internal displacement (IDPs) and refugees fleeing to neighboring countries, including Ethiopia and Kenya. Consequently, Somalia's humanitarian crisis has worsened. This is how the behavior of these external actors affected Somalia.

Based on the internal conflict approach by Brown, this research contends that peace in Somalia can be realized by designated resolution scheme. Therefore, an international commitment to restore peace, rule of law and ensure long-term stability in Somalia. The global actors, including the neighbouring and regional states need to map out the Somali conflict and generate a single approach targeting a holistic resolution to the conflict.

Finally, the thesis admits that the study does not cover and elucidate every issue and aspect of the Somali conflict; hence suggests further field research on this topic from a broader perspective which investigates the cooperation and contradistinctions among the many local and external actors and oversee the potential for peace within Somalia as well as in the region. More importantly, further study would help to understand how both the Somali conflict and the interventions of external actors, affect the livelihoods of the ordinary people on the ground.

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Appendix 1: Interview guide

1. How do you consider Kenya's neutrality in addressing the Somalia conflict?
2. Has the involvement of Kenya in the Somalia conflict been fruitful?
3. Does Kenya have the capacity to deal with the complex and endless civil war in Somalia?
4. Does Ethiopia have the capacity to deal with the complex and endless civil war in Somalia?
5. Has Ethiopia been perceived by conflicting parties as neutral actor?
6. Has Kenya been perceived by conflicting parties as neutral actor?
7. Do you consider the peace path proposed by Kenya to be an effective path?

8. With the interest of Kenya, do you think the dream of attaining peace in Kenya will be realised?
9. Please describe the kind of project(s) Kenya and/or Ethiopia has been involved in the past in the management of conflict in Somalia.
10. How would you rate Kenya and/or Ethiopia's work on Somalia peace and security?
11. Is the involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Somalia peace process effective?
12. Has the involvement of Kenya and Ethiopia in the Somalia peace process helped to achieve peace or has it exacerbated the situation?
13. What do you feel has or has not worked in the Kenya/Ethiopia Somalia peace approach?
14. What areas in the approach do you think needs strengthening?
15. In your opinion, what have been the major achievement and challenge that Kenya and Ethiopia have faced in the Somalia peace process?

