

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE
MECHANISMS IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF IGAD AND ECOWAS, (2005 –
2015)

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Declaration

TheResearch is my original work which has not been submitted for a degree/diploma works in any other university.

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This Research project has been submitted for examination with the approval of **DrPatrickMaluki** as the university supervisor.

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Dedication

To my parents and siblings, I am grateful to you for laying the strong foundations on which most of what I do is built. Thank you for the values of integrity and discipline that you instilled in me.

Thank you all for making this study a success.

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This work began with a concept and a burning inner desire to turn it into reality. This has only been possible through immense support from a number of great people around me.

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Abstract

The statement of problem of the study is that with increased conflict situation across the globe with weak mechanism to warn and respond despite such attempts. At the UN and AU level such moves to strengthen national capacity for conflict prevention and creating closer collaborative structures with both international and regional agencies, such mechanisms have not been optimal. Instead the threat to human security through armed conflicts, gross human rights abuses and genocide continue unabated. Research shows that the mechanisms were put in place to prevent and respond to conflicts are effective. Even where the warning is effective there is gap on response mechanism. The objective of the study is to analyse the effectiveness of the mechanisms in Africa with a focus on the two regional bodies IGAD and ECOWAS, during the ten-year period of 2005 to 2015. The study seeks to provide an overview of how the two regional bodies have responded to conflicts, compare and contrast their conflict prevention strategies worked, and finally identify academic as well as policy gaps in early warning and response mechanisms in Africa. The study adopted Boutros Ghali's 'preventive diplomacy' as a theoretical framework for analysis and the it deals with conflict early warning systems and mechanisms at the sub-regional level and in a comparative nature. The prevention theory lays the basis for analytical approach to conduct to the research. The mechanisms today popular in the arena of conflict avoidance and management. However, devastating human atrocities continue to be experienced in Africa and elsewhere. An effective early warning system should therefore be established on the basis of support by the highest political authorities, and also has to rely will of grassroots organizations. The research used both primary and secondary sources of data. Due to budgetary constraints, however, one may challenge was access to data at regional bodies. Methodologically, mixed robust approaches tend to yield better results. The research findings have shown that CEWARN's relies on its network of monitors and responders. while, ECOWARN system takes advantage of its access to both government and civil society organizations. Further, ECOWARN is arguably a beneficiary of institutional link to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security. The study, therefore, recommends that early warning systems clearly identify their clients to be relevant. Additionally, these mechanisms must endeavor to bridge the policy gaps between strategies and clients.

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List of Abbreviations

APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APSA	African peace and Security Architectures
AU	African Union
AUCM	African Union Continental Mechanism
CEWARN	IGAD Conflict Early Warning Mechanism
CEWERUs	Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit
CEWS	Continental Early Warning Systems
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPRM	Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Mechanism
COMWARN	COMESA Conflict Early Warning System
CSSDCA	Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
EACWARN	East African Community Conflict Warning System
EASBRIG	East African Standby Brigade
ECOWAS	Economic Commission of West African States
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
GWoT	Global War on Terror
HoA	Horn of Africa
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development

NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PIF	Pacific Island Forum
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UEMOA	West African Economic and Monetary Union
UN	United Nations
UNOCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USA/US	United States of America
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1. Background

According to Hyogo framework for action 2005—15, early warning involves a meticulous gathering and analysis of information in order to forecast emerging, worsening or recurring crises. Early warning thus should enable pre-emptive action where conflict is eminent.¹ Response on the other hand is conceptualized as those initiatives made at the phase when any conflict is still latent and which target aversion, transformation or resolution. Throughout this study, the term “mechanism” will be used in reference to the specific units or entities that a particular EWER System employs. This includes collection, collation and analysis with the assumption of a clear nexus between how methods and how the systems actually work.

EWER (Early Warning and Early Response) is today prominent as a norm in universal attempts to manage conflicts and research institutions.² Despite such prominence of EWER, post-independence African states have not achieved security from within. The continent has witnessed devastating human atrocities; therefore, there has been a rethinking of Africa’s security in the construct of the Early Warning Systems.³ After the cold war period, threats to peace started to increase in scale and intensity.⁴ In situations whereby incompatible objectives or values of opposing forces occur, a conflict is foreseeable. The most common types of conflicts in Africa

¹ISDR, Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), 2005-15, Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, 2005, Hyogo, Japan, Chapter, 2005

²Mbugua J., *Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa: Do they work?* IPSTC Peace and Security Research Department, International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya, 2014

³Njenga F., *International Law and World Order Problems*, Eldoret: Moi University Press, 2001

⁴Irobi E. *Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Study of Nigeria and South Africa*, Conflict Research Consortium, University of Colorado, 2005.

include civil wars, secessions, internal crises and regional conflicts⁵. These mechanisms are devised and created to forewarn various stakeholders of potential conflicts so that proactive measures are taken to prevent them from escalating into actual violence.⁶

Africa is home to many conflicts; many African states have experienced a conflict, albeit at varying levels. A rivalry occurring among several opposing persons, ideas, groups, or interests because of goals incompatibility is referred to as conflict⁷. In an effort to prevent these conflicts that have characterized Africa, Conflict Early Warning and Early Response mechanisms are today widely accepted. Williams (2007) contends that these approaches are based on the argument that it is much cheaper and less bloody to prevent eruption of violence than to stop it after it has begun or escalated.

One of the extremes of these conflicts was the genocide in Rwanda where approximately one million people were killed.⁸ Williams observes that during the genocide, the international community failed Rwanda probably after the bad experience in Somalia, Rwanda's strategic unimportance or reluctance to consider the violence as Genocide, thereby the responsibility to intervene.⁹ Franke (2007) observes that there three reasons orchestrated the desire for the continent to establish mechanism—African Peace and Security Architectures (APSA). These are, unwillingness by global powers to intervene, surge in conflicts within states as well as the

⁵Ikejiaku Brian, *The Relationship Between Poverty, Conflict and Development*, Canadian Journal of Sustainable Development, 2009

⁶Austin, A. "Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?" Berghof Research Centre. 2004

⁷Mwagiru, M. *Conflict: Theory, Processes and Institutions of Management*, (Nairobi: Watermark), 2006

⁸Williams, Paul D. 2011. "The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities." International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) Program Working Paper." New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, October. Last accessed December 6, 2012.

⁹ See Article one of the 1948 *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* which creates a responsibility on the parties to intervene to stop acts of genocide.

emerging conversation that Africans strive to solve their own issues internally. The OAU Secretary general in a report of 1992 sparked the creation of a relatively enduring Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution Mechanism (CPRM) phasing out earlier ad hoc mechanisms.

1.1.1. Early Warning and Response Mechanisms

Early warning entails a methodical gathering and synthesis of information so as to anticipate and identify emerging, deteriorating or recurring humanitarian issues.¹⁰ According to the HFA 2005-2015, early warning enables pre-emptive protective action where a conflict is eminent. Early warning system is only as effective as it supplies reliable and actionable information to authorities beforehand. As such, such efforts become an instrument of preventive diplomacy.¹¹

According to Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller, an effective early warning system requires the highest political authorities as well as the cooperation from local organizations.¹² Its relevance is determined by the ability not only to collect data on possible conflict, but to do so using proper indicators, methodologies, analyzing the data, making good enough predictions and generate a roadmap for response.

Campbell and Meier contend that the linkage between early warning and response is optimally effective with a people-driven approach as the approach involves people who are actually at the grassroots.¹³ In Africa, there are five Conflict Early Warning Mechanisms established under a Regional Economic Community (REC) in Africa. These include the Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS) East African Community (EACWARN) in Eastern Africa, Conflict

¹⁰ISDR, Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), 2005-15, Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, 2005, Hyogo, Japan, Chapter, 2005

¹¹See 'Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters 2005-2015', Hyogo Framework for Action.

¹²Keyserlingk, N. and Kopfmüller, S. *Conflict Early Warning Systems: Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa*. GTZ Report, October 2006,

¹³Campbell, S. and Meier P, *deciding to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decision making within the United Nations*, The Fletcher School, 2007

Early Warning System of IGAD (CEWARN) in the region referred to as the Horn of Africa, COMESA Conflict Early Warning System (COMWARN) in the Eastern and Southern Region and ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Mechanism (ECOWARN) in the Economic West African economic community Region.¹⁴

However, Mireille contends that as a tool, conflict early warning system only creates the conditions needed to advance peace but does not in itself create peace (Ibid). Mireille observes that a mechanism's reliability is dependent on the much it is supported by the highest political authorities through multifaceted efforts of local structures at the grassroots. Therefore, this research seeks to do a comparative study of IGAD's CEWARN and ECOWAS' ECOWARN to determine how effective early conflict warning and response systems have been in the prevention of these situations in the African continent.

The History of Early Warning and Response Mechanisms

The term early warning system was first used in predicting natural disasters and behaviour of stock markets.¹⁵ The concept of early warning first entered into the conflict discourse in 1980s as attempts to forecast on famine and flow of refugees and displaced people. Such 'early warning' primarily forewarned humanitarian agencies, allowing them to put adequate measures in place beforehand. However, recently, the practice has aided empirically oriented policy decisions which in effect have immensely curtailed devastating implications of conflict.

¹⁴Mireille, A. 'Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response', *International Peace Institute*, Vienna, Austria, August 2012

¹⁵Adelman, H. 'Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn and West Africa', conference paper at *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention*, Hilton Chicago, February 28. 2007. Retrieved from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p178869_index.html

Austin views such systems as those enterprises that focus on organized data collection, analysis and/or designing of attendant policy strategies.¹⁶ This also entails risk assessment and information sharing. Austin's conceptualization thus focuses more on methodological component of early warning. The definition is further strengthened by Nyeihmwho views these systems as a practice that yields processed, actionable data that enables policy-makers at various phases in conflict management have a deeper appreciation of causes and nature of conflicts.

Woocher argues that an Early warning system therefore promotes a clear appreciation of the minutiae of conflict dynamics and its impacts; forecasts on possible trajectories of a conflict; aids humanitarian decision-making and communicates information and analysis to decision-makers.

Meier and Bond contend that the practice of conflict early warning aims at to forecasting the outbreak of armed conflict. At minimum, it attempts to detect the early intensification of violence, to prevent the outbreak of violence.¹⁷

The United Nations has been at the forefront of peaceful resolution of armed conflict around the world since inception in 1945 especially in the post-Cold War period. It still does much conflict prevention work through its agencies and with other regional organizations (Meier and Bond, 2007). In Africa, the practice of conflict prevention is relatively novel and in need of more empirical studies to establish effectiveness of such efforts. At the moment, regional organizations are coordinating with states and non-state actors on conflict early warning. For instance, In 2002 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on

¹⁶Austin, A. 'Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?' *Berghof Research Centre*. 2004

¹⁷Meier, P. and Bond, D. 'Environmental influences on pastoral conflict in the Horn of Africa', *Political Geography*. Vol. 26 (6):2007

Development) developed a Conflict Early Warning and Response machinery (CEWARN).¹⁸ For west Africa, ECOWARN came into existence in 2000 with the objective of institutionalizing a culture of preventing conflict through building a community's capacity and Civil Society Organizations in early exposure of aggressive conflicts.¹⁹

According to Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller, early warning efforts do not aim at suppressing conflicts, instead, they seek to respond to a conflict as it develops.²⁰ As such, the functions of early warning are: continuous monitoring of violent conflicts; provide neutral information; analyze situations and its future trends; and to change the trajectory of conflicts and prevent or de-escalate violence.²¹

Matveeva argues that an effective early warning and response system collects and analyses data, assesses warning and provides various scenarios, develops proposals for action, and assesses early response.²² Through this, it should be able to detect conflicts, map their trajectories and alleviate such conflicts through provision of requisite policy guidance to the relevant actors.²³

In the context of Africa therefore, Conflict Early Warning Mechanisms have been institutionalized with an aim of coming up with lasting security and peace in the African continent. There are several functions that Conflict Early Warning Systems play within the continent. Such functions include the collection and analysis of information concerning impending conflicts; formulation of case scenarios, strategizing a response to an impending

¹⁸ The 2002 Protocol establishing IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism.

¹⁹ Ibid

²⁰ Ibid. p.3

²¹ Keyserlingk, N. and Kopfmüller, S. Conflict Early Warning Systems

²² Matveeva A. *Early Warning and Early response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemma*. Den Haag: European Centre for Conflict Prevention, 2006.

²³ Keyserlingk, N. and Kopfmüller, S. Conflict Early Warning Systems

conflict, sharing information and giving policy advice to decision makers like heads of states and government among other functions.²⁴

1.2.Statement of the Problem

Whereas there are UN level and African level early warning mechanisms that seek to strengthen national capacity for conflict prevention and creating closer collaborative structures with both international and regional agencies, such mechanisms have not been optimal. Research shows that the mechanisms have not been able to prevent conflicts that it would be able to prevent because of a lack of expertise, material and technical equipment.²⁵ This research broadly seeks to critically analyze the effectiveness of these mechanisms across Africa in the context of what is already available.

It begins from the standpoint that these mechanisms were initiated to address the plethora of conflicts in the post-World War II period, with huge resources allocated yet the yield has not been commensurate. It argues that because of the origins and trajectory of the many conflicts in Africa, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms.

Stedman and Ottaway observe that most African states engaged in political instability and internal wars soon after they attained independence or soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall largely due to lack of adequate institutions of governance or leaders with inadequate standards of governance to effectively take control over the established territory.²⁶ Ottaway further argues that

²⁴Mireille, A. 'Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response', *International Peace Institute*. Vienna, Austria, 2012:1-9

²⁵*Preventing Conflicts in Africa: The Role of Early Warning and Response Systems*, International Peace Institute 2012

²⁶ Stedman, S. and Lyons, T. 'Conflict in Africa' in Gyimah-Boadi E. (Ed), *Democratic Reform in Africa: The Quality of Progress*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2004. See also M. Ottaway, 'Africa', *Foreign Policy*. no. 144, Spring 1999.

the ability of most of African states to self-govern effectively has been hindered by economic decline and decay of administrative structures, making these states more susceptible to conflict.

According to Sawyer, the intricate nature of African conflicts could also be a function of incompatibility of interests, values and objectives.²⁷ However, Sawyer argues that whereas conflict is inevitable in society, however, proper management and transformation may yield peace and progress in human society and this is where Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms come into play.

This research takes cognizance of the intricacies of African conflicts in the context of institutional decay and massive efforts at preventive measures by regional bodies. It therefore hopes that the findings of this study should fix the gaps in the mechanisms in the continent. The study addresses three (3) research questions;

- i. How has IGAD responded to conflict
- ii. What are the differences between IGAD and Ecowas conflict prevention strategies?
- iii. What successes has IGAD achieved in its early warning and response efforts

1.3.Objectives of the study

The overall objective of the study is to critically analyses the efficacy of Conflict Early Warning and responses mechanisms across Africa

More specifically, the study seeks to:

- 1) Analyse how the IGAD and ECOWAS regions have responded to conflicts within their territories;
- 2) Compare and contrast how IGAD's and ECOWAS have been in conflict prevention in Africa;

²⁷Sawyer, Amos. 'Violent Conflicts and Governance Challenges In West Africa: The Case of The Mano River Basin Area', *Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis* Indiana University.

- 3) Examine reasons for failures and success of efforts by IGAD and ECOWAS mechanisms.

1.4. Justification of the Study

Scholars and policy makers in governments to see Africa move from a situation of chaos to an orderable. African intellectuals have been accused of indiscriminately serving regimes and the opposition without considering merit.²⁸ The most adverse indictment is the failure of these intellectuals to generate useful knowledge for the consumption of their people and in pursuit of solutions to perennial challenges bedeviling them. This is precisely because what may be applicable in the west may not necessarily be applicable in Africa.

When analysis on Conflict Early Warning Systems in Africa is done, it is often done by consultancy institutions hired by governments, making one to question the objectivity of outcomes. Little scholarly effort has been made to critically analyze the Conflict Early Warning Systems in Africa. This is the gap that this study endeavors to bridge.

The findings of this study is hoped to have both theoretical and practical contributions. Theoretically, the findings of this study will inform other scholars, researchers and make material available for students with an interest Conflict mechanism in Africa. It as well hoped to make a contribution to the available knowledge on Conflict Early Warning Systems. Practically, the findings of this study will inform policy makers concerned with conflict prevention.

1.5. Literature Review

Deriving from both theoretical and empirical basis, this section will examine secondary literature that illustrates the effectiveness of these mechanisms in the continent. Its first section will examine the existing conflict within the Horn of Africa and the West African regions. The

²⁸John, Markakis. 'The Horn of Conflict', *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 30, 2003. See also A.B. Bozeman, *Conflict in Africa: Concepts & Realities*. Princeton University Press, 1971.

second part will review the history of these systems in Africa. In the final part, this study assesses the effectiveness of these mechanisms in Africa.

Goldstein outlines three tangible types of international conflicts; territorial disputes, disputes, control of governments and economic conflicts.²⁹ Olaosebikan has observed that territorial disputes can either be over interstate borders, secession, and airspace or over territorial waters.³⁰ Africa is susceptible to intra and state versus state conflicts since independence when a number of wars began across many states. Goldstein observes that twenty-four countries in Sub-Saharan Africa countries at one point or another had war, the rest have been lucky not to experience. In recent years however, these conflicts have significantly reduced. Some conflicts have occurred in contexts more and more internationalized and trans-nationalized.³¹

Grasa and Mateos further contend that war in Africa has inflicted humanitarian and socio-economic damage. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, such conflict may have claimed over five million people directly or otherwise. Elsewhere in Sierra Leone, almost half the population was displaced due to armed clashes, while in Darfur more than 300,000 people have died since 2003.

1.5.1. Conflicts in the Horn and West Africa Regions

Conflict management is hinged on the premise that when indicators of conflict are detected early enough, it becomes much easier to stop the conflict altogether and that efforts that begin when

²⁹ Goldstein J.S., *International Relations chapter 5: International Conflict*, (Pearson Education Inc, 2006)

³⁰ Olaosebikan A.J., *Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution*, African Research Review Vol. 4 (4), Serial No. 17, October, 2010

³¹ Grasa and Mateos 2010

the conflict has already begun are not only costly but are also dangerous³². This, according to Bercovitch is because the more a conflict advances towards violence the more do positions become entrenched and conflict acquires its own logic. Conflict resolution and limitations of conflicts are then less likely to be effective. As such, Hamburg (2002) argues that early prevention is the best option.

Africa's ongoing conflicts, instability and humanitarian crises are attributed to state fragility. Such situations often create power vacuum which can be filled by warlords, Islamist extremists, local gangs, or organized criminal syndicates. Hamburg adds that this can make the already insecure environment an extremely complex one with both domestic and international negative consequences.

Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller therefore argue that taking cognizance of this reality, conflict early warning systems are aimed at timely generating information on latent conflicts and broad threats to peace. They observe that the information is then processed to establish scenarios, forecast probability of certain developments and to suggest relevant options to preclude and/or limit violent conflicts. However, it is vital to point that early warning systems do not necessarily have response component.

The understanding of conflict and its root causes is a recipe for constructing preventive measures to avoid unnecessary conflicts. There are various reasons that can lead into a conflict. For instance, communal groups may engage in a disagreement over basic needs such as their protection, space, access to institutions that influence the political economy as was seen in of the

³²Bercovitch J., *Preventing Deadly Conflicts: The Contribution of International Mediation* In Wallenstein P (ed) *Preventing Violent Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges*. Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, 1998

Sudan.³³ Some can be brought about by what Galtung calls internationalization of culture whereby people are dissocialized from their own culture while get re-socialized into another culture. This brings about domination of one group by another. According to Jeong liberation wars in parts of Africa just like in Asia represent a struggle against domination, exclusion and repression. The war like the one witnessed in the Sudan is a liberation war with characteristics of a civil war which are derived from inter-ethnic rivalry (Ibid).

The Horn of Africa is full of conflicts making it the most complex region. Every country within the region has experienced long-drawn-out conflicts that are attributable to ethnicity, politics and interstate rivalries. It is also a theater for Global War on Terror (GWOt); this can be attributed to instability in Somalia and neighboring countries such as Congo, the Central Africa Republic and Burundi (Jeong, 2000). Intra-state conflicts are the most common conflicts within the Horn of Africa region. External mediation has contributed to insecurities and tensions in the horn of Africa Region because it is driven by geostrategic interests.

Conflicts in West Africa are linked to economic, political, historical and cultural factors. These include elites in weak states driven by greed, ethnic, religious, social divisions traceable to pre-colonial times. These factors have been used to fuel resentments by the leaders amongst the population. While West Africa's oil and other resources are used by the ruling elite to enrich themselves on one hand, they are used as a means of financing for rebel groups on the other hand (Kuerschner, 2016). Kuerschner further observes that West African countries continue to experience prolonged civil wars.

³³ See works of Johan Galtung on the matter

1.5.2. Early Warning and Response Mechanisms in Africa

In the VII chapter of the UN Charter, it is highlighted that the importance of regional blocs in security matters across the world. Security issues cannot be fully resolved by single countries on their own; since most security issues are trans-boundary in nature. Further, it mandates regional organizations do all within their powers and bring peace to regional disputes and only take them to the United Nations Security Council as the last resort.³⁴

Regional arrangements in the African continent include: Organization of African Unity (OAU), as well as, sub-regional organizations like the, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) in the horn of Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), nonetheless, unless the security council approve, actions involving regional arrangements futile.³⁵

1.5.3. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

In 2001, NEPAD (New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development) OAU (Organization of The African Union's member states' assembly initiated APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism). It was envisioned to be a useful tool in prevention of conflicts across the continent. The APRM was set in such a way that it would self-monitor and seek to harmonize standards of governance across the states.³⁶ By 2012, 33 countries had signed to be parties to the APRM,

³⁴ Coning C., *The Role of the OAU in Conflict Management in Africa*, Published in Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peace Building, 1997

³⁵ Cilliers J. and Malan, M. *South Africa and Regional Peacekeeping*, (CSIS Africa Notes, 1996), p 187

³⁶ NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, "African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)," available at www.nepad.org/economicandcorporategovernance/african-peer-review-mechanism/about 09/07/2015

sixteen of them have conducted a review.³⁷ The implementation of APRM's recommendations remains a challenge despite its voluntary nature.

The African Union Continental Mechanism (AUCM)

The AU Early Warning System (CEWS) is a creation from the 2002 procedure that initiated the Peace and Security Council. Primarily, it was to curb anticipated threats and conflicts to security and peace in Africa.³⁸ The CEWS has a monitoring and observation Centre situated at the headquarters of African Union and similar units of the RECs (Regional Economic Communities' early-warning mechanisms. The units at RECs are structured in such a manner that they are directly linked to the situation room.

1.4.6. IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)

IGAD is a regional supranational organization mandated to among other things foster regional peace in the African horn. However, it has been severely hindered by conflicts among its members. The Horn of Africa region is riddled with wars and conflicts among them collapsed state in Somalia, the insurgency of by Lords Resistance Army in Uganda, South-Sudanese internal conflicts and constant tension between Ethiopia and Eritrea.³⁹

In its approach, CEWARN initially followed an incremental philosophy to conflicts by focusing entirely on two pastoralist conflicts. This aimed at reporting on all violent conflicts not just in the interest of national or state security but also conflicts that are broadly within the

³⁷ *Communiqué Issued at the End of the Sixteenth Summit of the Committee of Heads of State and Government Participating in the African Peer Review Mechanism*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia January 28, 2012. Retrieved from <http://aprm.org/sites/default/files/16TH%20APR%20FORUM%20%20FINAL%20COMMUNIQUE.pdf> accessed on 09/07/2015

³⁸ African Union Community, *Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System*, paper presented at the Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, Kempton Park, South Africa, December 17–19, 2006, available at www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PSC/CD/5_Framework.pdf retrieved 15/07/2015

³⁹ Adelman, Howard. 'Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn and West Africa', Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, February 28., 2007. Retrieved from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p178869_index.html (accessed January 8, 2009)

sphere of human security. To achieve the same, CEWARN created a linkage with officers in the field, national coordinators, research centers and national Early Warning and Response components. It then piloted in conflicts related to grazing rights especially as witnessed in Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia.

Methodologically, CEWARN has listed a mix of fifty-two indicators around social and political issues under violent occurrence Reports. Here the pointers encompass raids, armed clashes, and protests, demonstrations among other similar issues.⁴⁰ It also lists indicators for reports on the existence and state of broad social relationship issues.⁴¹

For six years of existence, CEWARN has not been very successful.⁴² In monitoring and assessment of its successes, CEWARN appreciates operational gaps in implementation as a central variable to its current underperformance. It has also been hindered by limited funding from IGAD thus a thin staff incapable of implementing its wide mandate. Thus IGAD is still undecided on an optimal scope of work that CEWARN should do meaningfully.⁴³

1.4.7. ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Mechanism (ECOWARN)

The status of Treaty of ECOWAS shows that all ECOWAS states have ratified all the protocols inter-state conflict. Important to this research is the 1999 Protocol on machinery for Conflict deterrence, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. This protocol was dovetailed with an comprehensive strategy for managing conflict and is arguably the advent of conflict early

⁴⁰Boshoff, Henri. 'Early Warning: Some Techniques and Other Thoughts', Speaker, Workshop on the Establishment of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Addis Ababa, October 30-31.2003 http://www.africaunion.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/PSC/CD/11_BACKGROUND%20paper%20No.%201.pdf (accessed March 8, 2016).

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² CEWARN Unit. 2006. CEWARN Strategy 2007 – 2011. <http://www.gtz.de/de/dokumente/en-CEWARN-Strategy-2006.pdf> (accessed April 8, 2016)

⁴³ ECOWAS. 1993. Treaty of ECOWAS. <http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=treaty&lang=en> (accessed March 13, 2016)

warning in the region. ECOWAS also established a unique agency to manage crises and guard democracy and constitutionalism.⁴⁴

ECOWAS has a Mediation and Security Council comprising nine members and has been in existence since 2001. The Council was a creation of the discomfort with Nigeria's hegemony in the situation seen in some countries in West Africa in the last decade of 20th century. The Council has a number of provisions on when and when not to intervene. The protocol in the 10th article allows each and every form of intervention while the 25th Article sanctions the council to act on actual conflicts, humanitarian threats, destabilization of the sub-region compelling human rights violations where democratic regimes are toppled.

In August 2008, a study on the ECOWAS early warning system pointed out that the system was on the right track since it established that EWR utilizes data collected both by non-state entities and government.⁴⁵

Literature Gap

The literature review examined secondary literature that illustrated the effectiveness of these systems in Africa; with emphasis on existing models already in operation both in the Horn and West Africa sub-regions. From the above review, however, it is clear that there is so much academic work on these mechanisms and no specific works detailing and/or examining the effectiveness of these mechanisms in general and on the specific sub-regions under study; hence the gap this study is supposed to fill in.

⁴⁴ ECOWARN. 2008. Mid-year evaluation and update of ECOWARN.
http://www.wanep.org/ecowarn_update_08.htm (accessed March 13, 2016).

⁴⁵ Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), 1999. Conflict and Peace Analysis and Response Manual. <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/studman2.pdf> (accessed January 8, 2009).

1.6.Theoretical Framework

The term ‘preventive diplomacy’ was put forth by Dag Hammarskjold, the former UN Secretary-General in the 1950s and thereafter renewed in the 1990s by Boutros BoutrosGhali⁴⁶ Preventive diplomacy covers all those actions by a state or a non-state actor to avert conflict, de-escalate existing disputes and curtail spread of conflicts.⁴⁷

Preventative diplomacy encompasses restrictions on demilitarized zones amongst or within states as a statement of the international community’s interest in conflict prevention. Ideally, when conflicts have been predicted, the United Nations ought to deploy troops.⁴⁸ However, evidence shows that the most effective way to preventing conflicts is safeguarding and advancing of human rights and democracy.⁴⁹ This is because violations of human rights will often cause tensions within states and sometimes to disagreements between states.⁵⁰ Conflict prevention therefore necessitates the paying of attention to a broad and even exogenous factors not directly linkable to conflicts.⁵¹

Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are the key elements of ‘infrastructures for peace’ or peace architectures.⁵² Such an infrastructure is often designed from the bottom-up and linked with informal and formal groups at the grassroots level. Grassroots networks, think-tanks, church-related entities and political and social

⁴⁶Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. New York: United Nations, 1992, p. 5

⁴⁷Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy*, Op cit, pp. 11-12 See also: International Alert, *Resource Pack for Conflict Transformation*. London, IA, 1996 (Parts, I-V)

⁴⁸Karatoprak, A. and Tamsen B. *An Agenda for Peace: Spearheading of Reform Culture at the United Nations*. ” <http://centerforunreform.org/?q=node/242> Retrieved 16/07/15 1822h. accessed 08/06/2015

⁴⁹ Helsinki Summit Declaration, 1992

⁵⁰van der Stoep M. *Preventing conflict and building peace: a challenge for the CSCE*, NATO Review. August 1994, n° 4; Vol. 42. Brussels: NATO.

⁵¹Karatoprak A., and Tamsen B., *An Agenda for Peace: Spearheading of Reform Culture at the United Nations*. ” <http://centerforunreform.org/?q=node/242> Retrieved 16/07/15 1822h. accessed 08/06/2015

⁵²Ganson, B. and Wenmann, A. *Operationalizing Conflict Prevention as Strong, Resilient Systems: Approaches, Evidence, Action Points*, (Platform Paper 3, 2012. Geneva: Geneva Peace building Platform).

outfits engage in activities at various levels and stages of conflict that are in sum useful to preventive diplomacy. Thus an effective preventive mechanism relies on the dynamics of these these multiple actors.⁵³

Early warning mechanisms aim at predicting the emergence of armed conflict, to forecast forecast early intensification of violence in order to prevent the outbreak or the deterioration of deterioration of violence. Although such efforts were seen as early as from the 1970s, it is in the in the 20th century that more structured early warning efforts emerged. For example, in 2002 2002 IGAD devised the CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism) to handle tensions and active conflict in the countries along the Horn of Africa.

1.7 Hypotheses

This study tested the following hypothesis:

- i. Weak Early Warning and response mechanism contributes to intractable conflict in Africa;
- ii. CEWARN and ECOWARN have not effectively responded to managing sub-regional conflicts in their areas of operation;
- iii. CEWARN and ECOWARN's shortcomings are due to political and other external factors.

1.7. Research Methodology

This section describes the steps that the researcher followed in data collection and how that data was analyzed and presented. This section is composed of the following parts: sampling, sources and types of data; methods and tools of data collection, data analysis, validity and reliability.

⁵³Zyck, S. A. and Muggah, R. *Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention: Obstacles and Opportunities. Stability*, (2012)

The research's target population was all the embassies and high commissioner's of IGAD and ECOWAS member states in Nairobi, the capital of Kenya. There are 6 IGAD diplomatic missions and 10 ECOWAS diplomatic missions in Nairobi. All these diplomatic missions have a number of staff with varied expertise, including those working directly on conflict early warning and response. This study worked with a sample of 5 members of staff from the missions 16 missions, 2 from IGAD and 3 from ECOWAS. The five respondents represent 31 percent of the missions. Whereas this is above the 10 percent recommended for representative sampling, it was necessary since the entire target population is narrow and a lower sample size would not yield representative and generalizable findings.

This study utilized purposive sampling to identify the sample population of the main informants—diplomats or staff at the diplomatic missions who were considered to have the information that is relevant to the objectives of this study. These respondents were then engaged in interviews lasting between 1-2 hours with questions covering the three objectives of the study. In addition, the study interviewed 3 people working for institutions dealing with conflict within the IGAD and ECOWAS in Addis Ababa and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kenya but not as diplomats or working for the diplomatic missions. This sample was also supplemented by theoretical insights from scholars of International Studies, International Conflict Management, Diplomacy and Political Science.⁵⁴

The researcher collected primary data through face-to-face interviews, methodologically using a Main Informant guide instead of questionnaires. The Main Informant Guide is preferred over questionnaires to enable the researcher to probe the informants; allow the informants clarify issues that they may find difficult to understand. Moreover, Main informant guides are

⁵⁴Frankfort, N. and D. Nachimias, *Research Methods in the Social Sciences* (5thed). London: St. Martin's Press, 1996.

suitable in studies with practically a small sample. This required the searcher to hire Field Assistants to take notes as the researcher administer interviews. For standardization and ease of reading, field officers engaged in the study were required to type the information they gathered. The study also utilized Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) of 3-4 technocrats in order to gather information from the key informants using a Focused Group Discussion guide.

Secondary data collection entailed reading and analyzing relevant existing literature from published works in the form of books, articles and journals. All these methods and tools were supplemented by intellectual observations of the researcher. Published and unpublished secondary data such as texts, journals, newspapers, magazines, policy material, research papers, conference reports and internet sources were subjected to qualitative analysis and interpretation. The data was then presented in a thematic form that incorporated any presentations means to clearly depict the study's findings. The author is confident that given the width and breadth in sampling as well as nature of questions asked and secondary sources of data the work relies on, its inferences pass the test of validity and reliability.

Several constraints were bound to hamper this study; for instance the time factorsthis study in 2 ways: 1, the study took only 3 months. This time was inadequate for the researcher to collect sufficient data. Consequently, secondary, unpublished, as well as, primary data was employed instead. 2. The limitedtime hindered the scope of the study. Therefore, it was impossible to decisivelygather primary data.

1.8.Chapter Outline

The study is structured around the following five (5) chapters: -

- Chapter One: Introduction to the Study
- Chapter Two: Conflict Early Warning & Response Mechanisms: An Overview

- Chapter Three: A Comparative study of IGAD and ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning Mechanisms
- Chapter Four: Conflict Early Warning & Response Mechanisms A Critical Analysis
- Chapter Five: Conclusions

CHAPTER TWO

EARLY CONFLICT WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

2.1. Introduction

The first Chapter of this study which forms the foundation of this study introduces the study. It systematically presented the objectives of the study, statement of the problem of the study, the literature review, the study's methodology, as well as, the theoretical framework from governing the study's hypotheses. This chapter will then attempt an overview of causes and consequences of conflicts in Africa. It will examine Early Conflict Warning and Response Mechanisms in Africa and focus on the Horn of Africa and West Africa. It will conclude by comparing and contrasting the mechanisms adopted in West Africa to those adopted in the Horn of Africa.

2.2. Conflicts in Africa: An Overview

Kofi Anan describes Africa as a vast and varied continent where every country has different history and ecological settings, phases of growth and policy development. Annan argues that the conflicts in Africa are a function of the continent's diverse cultures and complex societies. According to Shah, Africa has seen more than 30 wars since 1970, mostly intra-state in nature, comparatively the highest number of conflicts by continent. Numerous conflicts still exist.⁵⁵

Conflicts remain a challenge to Africa's security. Goldstein divides international conflicts into three types, namely: territorial disputes, control of governments and economic conflicts. Territorial disputes can either be over interstate borders, secession, and airspace or over territorial waters.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ 'The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa' *Report of the Secretary-General*. 1998

⁵⁶ Goldstein, J.S. *International Relations*. Pearson Education Inc. 2006.

Similarly, Collier and Binswanger classify conflicts into those that are motivated by the desire to loot and those that seek justice. This classification however is limited due to the value judgment it portends. Other scholars categorize conflicts based on actors involved.⁵⁷ From the diversity and complexity as espoused by Anan, Africa is therefore predisposed to conflicts within states and between states.⁵⁸ Similarly, Africa has also witnessed numerous protracted internal and cross state conflicts. These include: the Bakassi dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon which has spanned four decades⁵⁹; the dispute between Algeria and Morocco over a part of the Atlas Mountains that has spanned a half a century, the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia since 1960s, the disagreement between Somalia and Ethiopia that lasted about fifteen years from 1964, the problem between Chad and Libya that lasted two years from 1980, the territorial boundary dispute between Kenya and Somalia border immediately at Kenya's independence which lasted about four years and the dispute between Tanzania and Uganda in the late 70s.⁶⁰

However, there is no one overarching cause of conflicts in Africa. The conflicts are born out of a myriad of factors as in the examples stated and therefore there can be no single solution to these conflicts. Most of them are multifaceted and protracted as exemplified by the conflict in Somalia in the Horn of Africa region and civil wars in Angola. Additionally, most of them are internationalized in nature - the effects of conflicts in one country are felt across the borders - and are further complicated by regional and international factors. In the event that these factors

⁵⁷ Muhabie, M. M. 'The Root Causes of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa.' *American Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 4(2):28-34.

⁵⁸ Olaosebikan, A.J. 'Conflicts in Africa: Meaning, Causes, Impact and Solution.' *African Research Review* Vol. 4 (4) no. 17 of 2010.

⁵⁹ Olaosebikan, A.J. 'Kwame Nkrumah and the proposed African common government.' *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* Vol. 5(4):218-228, 2011.

⁶⁰ Cook, C. *African political facts since 1945*. Publication: New York 1983.

intertwine and are combined, conflicts are exacerbated and further intensify each other's effects.⁶¹

It is estimated that the United Nations Security council has committed at least 75% of its time and money towards management of conflicts in Africa.⁶² The practice of conflict management in the continent is relatively nascent and has not attracted adequate inferable studies. It is no longer the sole responsibility of the UN to ensure global peace; regional organizations have taken on the important role of developing networks with non-state actors such as citizen activist groups and state actors in the up-coming practice of conflict deterrence by African actors.⁶³

2.3. Conflicts in the Horn of Africa and West Africa

2.3.1. The Horn of Africa Region

The greater HoA (Horn of Africa), comprising 8 Nations: Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan, is at constant risk of conflict despite its strategic importance to the rest of the world. Lyons argues that these states have some extent of socio-culturally shared values and deep economic linkages which also intertwines them politically. Consequently, all the states in this region have not been spared from the effects of conflicts in neighboring irrespective of whether they share boundaries.⁶⁴

Additionally, the Horn of Africa provides the inter-religious nexus between Muslim, Christian and Animist cultures. There are about 44% Muslims and 43 % are Christians, a near

⁶¹ McGraw, B. *Root Causes of Conflict in Africa*. Humboldt State University, 2012.

⁶² Ajibogun, O. *Causes of Conflicts in 21st Century Africa*, 2009

⁶³ Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism for IGAD Member States 2002

⁶⁴ Terrence, L. 'Critique of Berouk Mesfin' s avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy Toward Ethiopia and Eritrea' *ISS Africa* 2011.

even dispersion in population. The rest of the cultures and religions take up the remaining 13%. It is also one of the poorest regions in Africa; according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) the bulk of the population here lacks the most basic necessities. The Horn of Africa also has relatively lower per capita income, life expectancy and literacy levels in the world. The region is also characterized by droughts that affect both agricultural products and livestock, thereby food insecurity.⁶⁵

The region is comparatively the most conflict-riddled areas in the world.⁶⁶ According to Adeleye (2012), these conflicts are ethnic, religious, border conflicts and internal civil war which have shored up military allocations, led to migration and internal displacements, starvation and the fractionalization of states. It is estimated that genocides, political conflicts, civil strife, inter and intra conflicts have claimed approximately 7.8 to 19.6 million lives since 1945. Pervasive violations of human rights, systemic inequality and broad injustice are the main causes of the conflicts.⁶⁷

Mengitseb characterizes reasons for conflict in the HoA region into three contextual factors. First, colonial socio-economic structures and institutions have contributed to the present day conflict in the HoA region. The conflict-fostering structural and institutional mechanisms established by the colonial state resulted into the ethnic fractionalization and formation of new states on the basis of such ethnic identities. This is largely because colonial boundaries were not demarcated with no regard to such identities.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Horn of Africa crisis report, December 2008.

⁶⁶ Muhabie, M. M. 'The Root Causes of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa', *American Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 4 (2) 2015.

⁶⁷ Conflict Prevention: A Guide, *Costs and Causes of Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa*.

⁶⁸ Mengitseb Kidane, *Critical Factors In The Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts*, Discussion Paper 67, Nordiska Afrika Institutet, Uppsala, 2011

Foreign colonialism according to Elmore created boundaries elicited perennial ethnic conflicts which have led to human rights violations, conscription of children into militia and in some extreme instances, the collapse of the state. This situation was exacerbated by Cold War superpower rivalries that funded opposing sides of these conflicts (Elmore, 2010). In this case, Elmore argues that conflicts such as the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war occurred. It has also contributed to the South Sudan's secession from the Sudan and on the ongoing conflict on over whether Abyei region should be part of Sudan or South Sudan.

Secondly, conflicts in the region could be attributed to the current international order—whose influence surrounds economic, political and military spheres. For instance, the structural adjustment programmes imposed on the Third World by the Bretton Wood institutions have been accused of aggravating inequality, creating conflicts between modernity and traditional practices hence conflict. Similarly, the external support to the regions' regimes under "War on Terror" have stirred religious differences hence conflict.⁶⁹

The attendant religious extremism emanating from terrorism and war on terror have shaken the stability of most states with terrorist organizations such as Al-Shabab, constantly engaging the state in violent attacks. The region is today demarcated both as fertile for terrorist networks and also terrorists' refuge. The resulting ethnic fragmentation have also made violent participation by ethnic groups a viable path to state power, for example, the Ogaden National Liberation Front located in the eastern part of Ethiopia. Additionally, existing ethnic tensions and animosities make these countries susceptible to disputes⁷⁰ (Muhabie, 2015). The Horn of Africa

⁶⁹Mengitseab, K. 'Critical Factors in The Horn of Africa's Raging Conflicts', Discussion Paper 67, *Nordic African Institute*, Uppsala, 2011

⁷⁰Muhabie Mekonnen Mengistu, *The Root Causes of Conflicts in the Horn of Africa*, American Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2015

is therefore constantly under the radar in the war against terror.⁷¹ As a result, mass surveillance of entire populations, suppression of political dissent have complicated the security problem especially in states where terrorist networks are rife.⁷²

Lastly, conflict in the region has also been intensified by the adverse effects of climate change at the same time when population growth has been exponential. As already pointed, a large chunk of the region experiences frequent drought, as a result resource conflicts are also indelible in the region.⁷³

2.3.2. *The West African Region*

The ECOWAS defines conflict as ‘contradictions within power relations seen through complex individual and group relationships and nature in the quest for scarce resources or opportunities.’⁷⁴ Violent conflicts and civil strifes have been existence in the region for decades, however, between 1980-1990, the conflicts adopted a new pattern with protracted conflicts which immensely destabilized the region’s political and economic development.⁷⁵

Most states in this region have gone through coups d’états such as Gambia and Niger; civil wars such as in Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ivory Coast; as well as religious and ethnic clashes such as in Nigeria, Mali and Benin since independence.⁷⁶ Moreover, Adebajo argues that the conflicts of the region have also been intensified by such factors as autocratic regimes,

⁷¹ Usama, A. ‘Security across the Somalia-Lamu interface’, *Chonjo* 6: 25–26, 2009.

⁷² Healy, S. ‘Lost Opportunities in The Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect And Peace Agreements Unravel’, *Chatham House Horn of Africa Group* report, 2008.

⁷³ Mengitseab, K. ‘Critical Factors In The Horn of Africa’s Raging Conflicts’, Discussion Paper 67, Nordic African Institute, Uppsala, 2011.

⁷⁴ Abbink, J. ‘Ethiopia-Eritrea: proxy wars and prospects for peace in the Horn of Africa’, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 21(3): 407, 2003.

⁷⁵ Aning, K. E., Birikorang, E. and Jaye, T. ‘Compendium of ECOWAS Peace and Security Decisions’, Accra: KAIPTC, 2010.

⁷⁶ Kuerscschner, M. ‘Conflict in West African States’, *E-International Relations*, 2013.

poverty, foreign interference, poverty and corruption.⁷⁷ Obiconcurs that the causal mechanisms of the conflicts in west Africa are complex, generally emanating from history, socio-economic dynamics, authoritarianism and its enduring implications, political exclusion, international powers and local struggles.⁷⁸

The net effect of the intra-state conflicts in West Africa has been devastation surrounding humanitarian crises, economic collapse for example in many states across west Africa. According to Annan (2014), there has been a decline in violent conflicts in the region however, the Sahel region is currently facing the challenge of insurgencies and low intensity conflicts. For example Boko Haram insurgency in northern Nigeria and a terrorist organization operating in swathes of Mali pose security threat in the region.⁷⁹

2.4. Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms in Africa

The Arab Spring witnessed in North Africa in 2011, the military coup in Mali in 2012, the crisis in Guinea-Bissau challenged the ability of African Union and the rest of the world to handle such kinds of crises.⁸⁰ In the high politics of conflict resolution, the early warning as a norm is new. The UN Office for Research and Data gathering first constituted an official early warning facility for the UN under Boutros-Ghali. Boutros envisioned a system of preventative diplomacy that focused on confidence building, early warning systems and preventative deployment of troops where conflicts were eminent.

⁷⁷ Adebajo, A. *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau*, Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2002 p39

⁷⁸ Obi, C. *Conflict and peace in West Africa*, Uppsala, Sweden: The Nordic Africa Institute, 2012.

⁷⁹ Walker, A. 'What is Boko Haram? Special Report 308', Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

⁸⁰ Mireille, A. *Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response*. International Peace Institute, Vienna, 2012.

Boutros recommended that Security Council or the General Assembly should be able to initiate formal fact finding on pre-conflict situations.⁸¹ The Secretary General also invoked the 65th Article of the Charter on those social and economic advancements on efforts that could be put in place to mitigate conflicts and ensure world peace. Such preventive deployment would be guided by existing rules and laws.⁸²

Conflict prevention, therefore, pays of attention to a wide range of components of member states.⁸³ Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter emphasizes the role of blocks as actors in the global management of conflict. It further mandates that regional arrangements, through their states, attempt peace where there are conflicts prior to escalating them to the UN Security Council.⁸⁴

Regional arrangements in Africa include; the OAU and sub-region organizations like ECOWAS, IGADD in the Horn of Africa, as well as SADC the (Southern African Development Community) in Southern Africa.⁸⁵ However, the UN Security Council always has to authorize any enforcement being implemented by the regional arrangements.

In 2000, the AU adopted the *Solemn Declaration* of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa which placed a renewed emphasis on conflict prevention.⁸⁶ The emphasis identified civil society and member states actors as integral actors in conflict-deterrence. This process was lent credence by the CSSDCA

⁸¹ See Secretary General's report named *An Agenda for Peace*

⁸² Karatoprak, A. and Tamsen, B. *An Agenda for Peace: Spearheading of Reform Culture at the United Nations.*"

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Coning, C. 'The Role of the OAU in Conflict Management in Africa.' in monograph no. 10, *Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peace Building*, 1997

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, AU Doc. AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI), 2000.

(Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa) which has the formal mandate to coordinate peace, stability, security, development, and cooperation in the AU.⁸⁷

Similarly, the AU panel of the wise in 2002 to advise the council of Peace and Security, as well as the chairperson of the AU Commission on conflict prevention. This panel has been accused of inflexibility, inaction and lethargy.⁸⁸

2.4.1. The African Peer Review Mechanism

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), modeled around a voluntary self-monitoring entity came into existence in 2001. It focuses on harmonization of governance standards across Africa including matters of conflict prevention and resolution.⁸⁹ Even as a voluntary mechanism, members states still find it difficult to implement recommendations made by APRM. For example, a 2005 review in Kenya outlined the historical underpinnings of potential conflict, which later emerged as the drivers of conflict after the disputed 2007 presidential elections. The review was not acted upon by states, regional agencies and international organizations. Such a failure was the case in south Africa where a review identified the threat posed by xenophobia but no action was taken.⁹⁰

2.4.2. The AU Continental Early Warning System

The AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) through the 2002 protocol established the AU's Peace and Security Council. Its main mandate was to nub latent conflicts and security

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ See Article 2 of the *Protocol on Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, adopted by the first ordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union. Durban, 2002.

⁸⁹ NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, "African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM),"

⁹⁰ IPI, op. cit. p3

threats in order to facilitate appropriate response.⁹¹ A framework of operating the CEWS came into action beginning 2006. The framework identified three key roles as collection and analysis of conflict data; generation of reports, coordination and collaboration with stakeholders in implementation.⁹² It depends on analytical and news sources for collection of conflict data.⁹³ Mireille observes that a Memorandum of Understanding that took effect in 2008 significantly strengthened the operational functions of CEWS. However, whereas CEWS has since made noticeable strides, it is still inhibited by lack of technical expertise and support (Ibid.).

ECOWARN

ECOWARN was created in 1999 to monitor and report signs of potential conflict in the region, in effect, an appreciation that early warning is critical to early response.⁹⁴ ECOWARN is based in Abuja, Nigeria with offices across the region and has an observation and monitoring. Its work is supported by the work done by the press and grassroot organizations on collection of information relating to potential conflict-prevention.⁹⁵ Its work broadly focuses on good governance, gender equality and empowerment of the youth as critical pillars of conflict prevention. The failure of ECOWARN to put in place effective early response mechanisms has

⁹¹AU Commission, *Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System*, paper presented at the Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, Kempton Park, South Africa, December 17–19, 2006.

⁹²AU Commission, *Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System*, paper presented at the Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning and Conflict Prevention, Kempton Park, South Africa, December 17–19, 2006.

⁹³Mireille, A. 'Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response', *International Peace Institute*, Vienna, 2012.

⁹⁴Opoku, John. *West African Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System: The Role of Civil Society Organizations*, KAIPTC Paper, no. 19, 2007

⁹⁵OECD, 'The ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network' interview with Mr. Augustin Sagna, May 2009.

been cited as one of its key weaknesses. It has also been unable to institute effective coordination with other agencies that do similar work within ECOWAS.⁹⁶

The criticism leveled against ECOWARN prompted it to initiate partnership with governments and civil society actors. For example, WANEP (the West Africa Network for Peace-building) has in the recent past coordinated its civil society partnership component. Its early warning efforts have broadly dealt with traditional armed conflict. However, there is pressure for the entity to extend focus to emerging conflicts and threats to conflict. WANEP has since developed a set of indicators for contemporary threats such as violent extremism and religious fundamentalism in West Africa and the Sahel.⁹⁷

2.4.3. CEWARN

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) developed community-led peace initiatives to mitigate violence and promote peace among communities living together.⁹⁸ Conflict Early Warning System of IGAD (CEWARN) was the first conflict early warning system to be created by IGAD over a decade ago and was the first of its kind in the continent. It has made significant contributions in the formulation and operation of sub-regional mechanisms in Africa and the world.⁹⁹

As a first of its kind in the continent, CEWARN is the benchmark these mechanisms for state and non-governmental institutions. It works with local communities, civil society

⁹⁶ John, M.K. *Regional Approaches to Peace-building: The ECOWAS Peace And Security Architecture*, Paper presented at the BISA-Africa and International Studies ESRC seminar series: African Agency in International Politics, The Tim Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace, Warrington, Cheshire, 2002

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ CEWARN, "CEWARN Convenes Peace Gathering for Neighboring Communities of Ethiopia and Kenya,"

⁹⁹ Austin, A. "Early Warning and the Field: A Cargo Cult Science?" *Berghof Research Centre*. 2004.

organizations and government policy-makers. CEWARN thus has provided the AU with technical assistance on the best practices in the nascent field of conflict management.¹⁰⁰

To juggle a delicate balance between working with civil society and government agencies, CEWARN is modeled around three lines of authority. IGAD makes its political decisions through a Permanent Secretaries' committee from Member state' Foreign Affairs Ministries who reports to Council of Ministers in the IGAD. Its Executive Secretary handles information on potential conflict and escalates the same to the Committee of Permanent Secretaries which then makes recommendations.

2.5. Conclusions

It is clear from literature that Africa is home to many conflicts. Both the ECOWAS and the HOA regions are volatile, fragile and vulnerable to both inter and intra state disputes/conflicts. Conflicts are attributable to colonial border demarcations that impose countries to clash over, ethnicity, religious extremism, political and ideological differences, civil discord and other internal conflicts. In an effort to move from this sort of narrative, scholars working on these mechanisms and policy makers alike began embracing the norm on the basis of the argument that it's much cheaper and less bloody to prevent eruption of violence than to stop it after it has begun or escalated.

Almore argues that in theory, early-warning systems ought to be futuristic in their outlook. Currently, mediation is considered zero-sum to both the ECOWAS and the HoA nations; where erroneously, effective conflict resolution is associated with military interventions. These notions ought to shift to positive-sum end games in the interest of early-warning systems.

¹⁰⁰CEWARN, "CEWARN Convenes Peace Gathering for Neighboring Communities of Ethiopia and Kenya,"

Additionally, it is important to appreciate that resolution of conflicts is only possible after until a conducive political space is established. As such, the requisite dialogue between parties starts. Therefore, a successful conflict resolution occurs, where mediators have a political space and accountability mechanisms.

CHAPTER THREE

IGAD AND ECOWAS CONFLICT EARLY WARNING MECHANISMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2005-2015)

3.1. Introduction

Chapter two provided an overview of causes and consequences of conflicts in Africa. It examines the mechanisms in Africa and focused on the Horn of Africa and West Africa. This chapter will compare Early Conflict Warning and Response Mechanisms for both the Horn of Africa region and the West African region. It will look at the background of these mechanisms, compare CEWARN and ECOWARN, analyse the effectiveness of IGAD's early warning and response machinery and ECOWAS regions, also analyse the challenges and draw lessons for both organizations.

3.2. Background

The increase in intra-state conflicts across Africa is best illustrated by the surging statistics of internally displaced persons and refugees on the continent. According to the International Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), there were over internally 11.4 million IDPs in Sub-Saharan Africa, accounting for 30 percent of 38 million IDPs globally displaced by wars and

conflicts as of 2014.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the distinction between conflicts within states and those involving a state and the other is rather indeterminate given the intertwined nature of conflicts within and across nation-states boundaries.

Major conflict zones across the region are; the Maghreb, Central Africa, Southern Africa, Western Africa, and the HoA(Mwagiru, 2006).The zoning process is important in understanding African conflicts due to the vast nature of the continent, as well as the fact that each region has a specific set of issues that have tended to trigger conflicts. Although the causes of conflict are varied and contextual in nature, across Africa,Bowd and Barbra argue that the underlying proximate and trigger issues to a conflict can be attributed to four general causes which includes; domestic battles with an aim of controlling the state, secessionist movements, “failed state” syndrome which leads to power vacuum, and general acute poverty.

In reference to the horn of Africa, the causations of conflicts can be attributed to all the four general patterns. It is critical to bear in mind the fact that all the horn of African states have either experienced or are currently experiencing inter-state or intra state conflicts. These conflicts range from; the conflict witnessed in Kenya in 2007-2008 after its presidential elections, to the current debilitating conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia. However, like across the rest of the continent, the prevalent forms of conflict in the region have mostly taken the form of intra-state conflicts, but with regional and international ramifications¹⁰².

Tejpar and Albuquerque observe that West Africa was comparatively a rapidly growing regional economic organization in Africa but which continues to experience armed conflicts, as

¹⁰¹International Displacement Monitoring Center, ‘*Global Overview: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence*,’*Norwegian Refugee Council*, Geneva, 2015.

¹⁰²WuhibegezerFeredeBezabih, “Fundamental Consequences of the Ethio-Eritrean- War, 1998-2000”, *Journal of Conflict logy*, Vol. 5, Issue2, 2004

leaders seize power through unconstitutional means. These armed conflicts, unconstitutional changes in power and transnational crime continue to have negative ramifications for human insecurity in West Africa. Tejpar and Albuquerque further argue that the region's security dealing with national security are incessantly weak, making some parts conducive as refuges for transnational crimes.

Conflict Early Warning and Response (EWR) mechanisms are much more recent efforts that are geared towards fixing the disconnect between early warning and implementation to avert conflicts. These conflicts and gaps in prevention are well illustrated by the humanitarian emergencies in Africa. Currently, all sub-regional and regional organizations in Africa have either developed, or are in the process of putting in place an EWR mechanism. However, efforts towards establishing EWRs dates can be traced back to 1950s and has been hinged on intelligence and military thinking. More recently, early warning systems have been prompted by natural calamities, massive human rights violations, diseases and economic crises. To an extent, they have been able to prevent the occurrence of conflicts within both the Horn of Africa and the West African region¹⁰³.

3.2.1. ECOWAS Peace and Security Strategy

In response to the issue of terrorism, Tejpar and Albuquerque observe that ECOWAS' counter-terrorism strategy embraces military response alongside prevention of such areas as radicalization, good governance, unemployment, and social and/or ethnic discrimination, transnational trafficking, drugs, small arms and light weapons (SALW) as security challenges.

¹⁰³Wulf, Herbert, and Tobias Debiel. "Systemic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms." *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 16 (4) (October–December): , 2010

ECOWAS principle that emphasises free trade on some instances complicates security efforts. Non the less, the organization has made a number of strides in laying down its security architecture. ECOWAS adopted a Convention on SALW in 2006. This agency, based in Bamako, Mali assists member states and civil society organizations in tackling proliferation of SALW (Wulf and Debiel, 2009). The Interpol and the European Union (EU) endorsed the formation of a West African Police Information System (WAPIS). Through WAPIS, the region is able to share information on transnational crime including Mauritania. WAPIS shares information through maintaining of police databases of ECOWAS member states.

West Africa is also riddled with piracy as a security challenge. This problem, according to Wulf and Debiel (2009) has posed a major threat to commerce thus to growth in the area. To this front, ECOWAS formed an *Integrated Maritime Strategy* has established three maritime zones in the region. However, the effectiveness of such maritime zones is significantly hindered by weak naval defense systems even though the US, EU and Japan have provided massive technical aid.

Wulf and Debiel also observe that ECOWAS has also sought to promote democracy as an indirect benefactor of the region's peace architecture. In 2001, the Democracy and Good Governance protocol was adopted by the ECOWAS with the aim of inhibiting unconstitutional regime change. It is through the Protocol that the region managed Burkina Faso after president Compaoré was forced out of office in 2014. In addition, Tejpar and Albuquerque argue that through the protocol, ECOWAS oversaw a smooth transition in Nigeria. ECOWAS also has ECOWARN, an entity that monitors pandemics and social factors associated with to social unrest and armed conflict as well as emerging security threats¹⁰⁴.

¹⁰⁴Ibid

From the foregoing portrait of the ECOWAS, one may conclude that the West African regional body has made significant progress in terms of mitigating conflicts. Experts widely agree that ECOWAS has accomplished some work in so far as conflict prevention is concerned.

However, a number of shortcomings in ECOWAS efforts have also been identified. Tejpar and Albuquerque contend that ECOWAS lacks funds and logistical support to deploy stand by troops in conflict-prone countries¹⁰⁵. Second, the strained relations between the AU, the UN and the ECOWAS are further exacerbating the conflict prevention capabilities of the region.

3.2.2. IGAD Peace and Security Strategy

According to Mahboub, IGAD is a major pillar of the AU security system which is critical to AU Commission decision making process (Mahboub, 2013). The policies that IGAD implement are usually stem from decisions made by heads of states. As such, IGAD's working mechanism is unique to other regional organs as it works on priority policies with the backing of heads of states through the AU Commission.

According to CEWARN Strategy document covering the period 2007-2011, IGAD deliberately established its Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) under its Division of Peace and Security as a statement of emphasis on its focus on peace. The decision underpins IGAD's philosophy that timely intervention before a conflict is better than handling an actual conflict. IGAD's early warning mechanism was also designed to support the Regional Economic Communities (REC's) efforts on peace.¹⁰⁶

However, IGAD member countries face an array of security risks such as environmental and technological challenges that have a bearing on peace. The uniqueness of security challenges

¹⁰⁵Tejpar J and Lins de Albuquerque A., *Challenges to Peace and Security in West Africa: The Role of ECOWAS*, Studies in African Security, 2015

¹⁰⁶ CEWARN Unit, *Final Draft CEWARN Strategy, 2007-2011*, Addis Ababa, 2006.

within member countries also mean that more often, these states pursue security strategies that are discordant. It is therefore imperative that a deeper analysis into the similarities and differences in region's security challenges are understood and harmonized under IGAD.¹⁰⁷

Mahboub further argues that IGAD's peace and security approach is bottom-up. It is currently working with grassroots agencies and government structures to resolve conflicts in the region—South Sudan; in addition to cases of Islamic insurgency and terrorism especially emanating from Somalia. IGAD continues to mediate a number of regional disputes with its notable success having been the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Sudan. The organization has also made numerous attempts to return Somalia to a functioning state. IGAD has also consistently deployed troops in member states facing internal conflicts in order to deter foreign military intervention.

According to Mahboub, IGAD's work also extends to investigating emerging crimes across member states. These crimes, such as, money laundering, terrorism, cyber -crime, organized crime and piracy the agency perceives as possible long term threats to the greater good of the region's peace. It therefore does the investigations while also building members states' capacity to deal with these threats. Similarly, IGAD has also taken the path of democratization and promotion of good governance as tacit benefactors of peace in the long term¹⁰⁸.

3.3. The Structures of IGAD and ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning Mechanisms

¹⁰⁷ See IGAD's 'Disaster Risk Reduction' paper.

¹⁰⁸ Mahboub M., *IGAD's Role in Stability and Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa*, Chatham House, London, 2013

Matveeva identifies three generation systems of in the evolution of these mechanisms. The first generation of early warning systems were largely established in 1990s and largely focused on evidence based analysis of conflicts and prevention. To the disadvantage of this generation of early warning mechanisms, they were largely based outside the places of active conflict, for example the International Crisis Group. The second generation systems came from 2000s and strategically shifted to combine analysis and advocacy in conflict early warning and prevention. Here, field monitors worked with policy advocacy specialists to persuade governments and influential actors outside the state to act on indicators of conflict. The third generation conflict early warning systems which were established from 2003 adopted a multipronged strategy. These mechanisms combined response to threats and ongoing violent conflicts while pursuing evidence-based responses.

In a nutshell, most of the first generation systems were generally headquarter-based, while second and third generation systems shifted to efforts that place institutions close to where conflicts were on going or projected.

3.3.1. The structure of ECOWAS' ECOWARN

ECOWAS protocols and conventions provide a viable framework for addressing conflict and security issues; however, it is still unclear whether ECOWAS can translate these regional conflict prevention mechanisms into tangible results on the ground, especially considering the type of security concerns presently faced by the region. It has been effective in working with and harnessing the extended resources and skills of its civil society counterparts to assist it in achieving its objective and should be held up as an example of good practice; however, the

mechanism as a whole still suffers from limited technical and human capacity and its available resources are not commensurate with its extensive mandate.¹⁰⁹

The ECOWAS Parliament has shown a willingness to engage on peace and security issues despite the fact the parliament does not possess formal power to do so. Irrespective of whether the ECOWAS Parliament chooses to play a more pronounced role in regional crisis prevention mechanisms through using soft power, explicitly through amendment of the Mechanism to give the parliament a defined role or through using the greater legitimacy it would exercise if directly elected, the ECOWAS Parliament should adopt a whole-of-parliament approach when dealing with crisis issues. The parliament needs to develop strategies or participate in mechanisms that will allow it, as an institution, to: help manage crises when they arise; and as a medium-term conflict prevention strategy, address the structural conditions that make the region more prone to conflict.¹¹⁰

The CEWARN Strategy document outlines ECOWARN activities as monitoring and data collection and situational reports. The situational reports are developed from quantitative and qualitative analysis of indicators. The work of ECOWARN system is bolstered by its access to numerous sources of information both government and civil society in addition to the benefits that accrue from its institutional link to the ECOWAS strategy for Conflict deterrence, Management, Resolution, security and Peace-keeping, also known as “the Mechanism”. From this link, ECOARN is able to broaden its work in the region.

3.3.2. The Structure of IGAD’S CEWARN

At the regional level, CEWARN has a Committee of Permanent Secretaries (CPS), anchored on in Art9 (2) and 10 of the Protocol. The CPS comprises the director of political affairs, the

¹⁰⁹See *Regional Crisis Prevention And Recovery Mechanisms, West Africa: Regional And National Parliaments Employing Crisis Prevention And Conflict Management Techniques*

¹¹⁰ CEWARN. CEWARN Strategy: 2007-2011. Addis Ababa: CEWARN Unit, 2006.

executive secretary and CEWARN as ex-officio members and the Permanent Secretaries from the ministries of Foreign Affairs. The CPS convenes two times every year to exchange information on conflict and early warning thereafter advises the IGAD Council.¹¹¹

CEWARN also has a Technical Committee on Early Warning (TCEW) which coordinates its functions. TCEW was founded under articles 9 (6) of the Protocol and comprises heads of National Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (CEWERUs) with also a representation from civil society, research institutions and CEWARN. TCEW oversees cooperation between all the entities forming it and reviews CEWARN's reports.¹¹²

At the national level there are two main mechanisms; the CEWERUs and the National Research Institutes (NRI). The CEWERU always anchored in relevant ministries are run by steering committees, a focal point and local committees. It collects information, reviews and analyzes early warning and responses; liaises with the entities at grassroots and prepares requisite reports. NRIs often are NGOs contracted by CEWARN to manage databases.¹¹³

The local committees designed in such a manner that they should improve action within Member States. These local committees are required to design modalities for information gathering, resources and creation of strategic partnerships. CEWARN 2012–19 Strategic aims at Utilization of CEWARN's decision-support tools in policy formulation and development, entrenching of the practice in local, national and regional governance. Communities, citizens, private enterprises, and officials in CEWARN's areas of operation are collectively engaged in upholding human security, Sustaining preventive response initiatives – particularly cross-border

¹¹¹Open internet sources.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid.

ones – that combine local and national ownership, and utilizing them to influence scaling and best practices.¹¹⁴

3.4. CEWARN and ECOWARN: A Comparative Analysis

The Comparative analysis of early warning mechanisms in this study is based on the following approaches: type and/or organization of the system; geographical and operational area; major and early warning behaviors/activities and their institutional design; methodology; and relations with response approaches.

3.4.1. Types of Early Warning Models and Organization of the System

CEWARN's has both predictive and risk assessment as well as an early response component. Its work utilizes political and economic indicators to forecast on situations. As such, CEWARN early warning model is viewed as a Capacity and risk Assessments with components of Early Response¹¹⁵.

ECOWARN's early warning module can be categorized both as a risk assessment effort and investigative research. This is because its mechanism of work emphasizes a strong work relation with civil society organizations. Both CEWARN and ECOWARN are also viewed as inter-governmental early warning arrangements since it has anticipatory role on conflicts. At the same time, CEWARN and ECOWARN may also be viewed as part of third Generation of Early Warning Systems as they collect, analyze and develop linkages.¹¹⁶

3.4.2. Objectives and Focus

Under objective and focus, both CEWARN and ECOWARN are arguably analogous as each of them pursue informing decision-makers albeit at different levels. At the moment, CEWARN currently narrowly deals with cross-border pastoral conflicts and organized cattle theft which

¹¹⁴ *Saferworld: Towards a more effective early warning system in the Horn of Africa Learning lessons and seizing opportunities*, July 2015.

¹¹⁵ *ibid*

¹¹⁶ WANEP is an implementing partner for ECOWARN

provided it with an easy entry point to the region's conflicts.¹¹⁷ ECOWARN focuses on all aspects—economic, social, security and environmental that impact on peace in the West African¹¹⁸.

3.4.3. Early warning Activities and Methodology

In this aspect, both CEWARN and ECOWARN are arguably similar in as far as monitoring and reporting of conflicts happens. Their monitoring follows a systematical approach with collection and analysis of data where they work. CEWARN and ECOWARN rely on open source collection of data in their monitoring mechanisms. Conversely, the two vary in the nature of indicators for respective sub-regions.

Additionally, just like ECOWARN, CEWARN provides a rich database of information and analysis to IGAD member states, NGOs and donors. CEWARN's network of monitors and responders is viewed as its main strength. Through its office in Addis Ababa and partners, CEWARN manages an efficient system of early warning.¹¹⁹

CEWARN depends heavily on non media reports and its Field Monitors who collect data. The data, both qualitative and quantitative are uniquely tailored to predict conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. It relies on civil liaison officers, CSOs and government representatives for collection. Moreover, WANEP serves as its key implementing partner, providing a strong technical presence in analysis of early warning data.

¹¹⁷ Fanta, E. "The Capacity of African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security." paper presented at European Development Workshop: Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions.

¹¹⁸ Kasujja, ZamZam Nagujja. "Expectations and Reality in Conflict Prevention." In Walter Feichtinger and Predraj Jureković (eds.), *Konfliktprävention zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit*. Wien: Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2007

¹¹⁹ Abdelrahim, A. K. "Africa's Peace and Security Architecture(s): The African Union and the Regional Economic Communities; the Case of CEWARN/IGAD", Paper Presented for the Conference "Beyond the Year of Africa: Partnerships for Peace and Development in Africa- the International Community and African Agencies", March 28-29 2006, Bradford, West Yorkshire, England.

3.4.4. Early Warning Products

On one hand, CEWARN is arguably more advanced than the ECOWARN due to six types of early warning reports, namely: Alerts, Country Updates, Regional Cluster Reports, Situation Briefs, Country Baseline Studies and Annual Risk Assessment.¹²⁰ On the other hand, ECOWARN is still evolving towards producing these reports, with their products currently under trial.¹²¹ In the near future, ECOWAS will come up with daily highlights, policy briefs, incident and situation reports, country profiles, as well as, monthly and quarterly reports.¹²²

3.4.5. Institutional Capacity

CEWARN's institutional capacity could be described as an elaborate one since its structure extends from local to sub-regional levels. ECOWARN on the other hand is strictly working through its Abuja Based Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) and four regional offices. Comparatively, it is yet to attain the heights of institutional maturity of CEWARN. A 2009 United Nations Capacity Assessment concluded that the Zonal Bureaus of ECOWARN are still dormant with less than optimal technical expertise.¹²³

3.4.6. Challenges facing ECOWARN and CEWARN

According to Mahboub, ECOWARN and CEWARN are currently the most developed early warning and response systems in Africa. Globally, Africa is also considered to be the continent with most elaborate early warning/response system. The two systems support the continent through robust evidence for decision making on early warning. However, Mahboub opines that despite the comparatively good job by the two mechanisms, there are specific challenges.

¹²⁰ CEWARN. "African Union Commission, Regional Economic Communities discuss progress on Continental Early Warning System Initiative." CEWARN Monthly, No. 17(2009).

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. "Interview with Mr. Augustine Sagna." The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) News Letter, No. 4-5 (2009).

¹²³ Fanta, E. "The Capacity of African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security." Paper presented to the European Report on Development Workshop: Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanisms, Florence, April 16-17, 2009.

ECOWARN is seen as having a vast coverage but limited depth. CEWARN on the other hand has deep coverage but limited breadth. Secondly, the current methodologies adopted by the systems are incapable of analyzing nuanced conflicts and pre-conflict situations. Third, which is related to the second, the systems are still largely reactive in nature without the capacity to tackle root causes of conflicts.

Therefore, Mahboub's paints a portrait of systems that are uneven and weak with inability to navigate political sensitivity in Africa which tends to fuel or exacerbate conflicts.

3.4.7. Linkage and Response

Kasujja and Nagujja argue that for a system to be considered suitable, it must achieve a workable relationship with the end at which action on warning is taken¹²⁴. This is because the end game is not predicating but rather preventing conflicts. As such, at all levels, these systems must develop a workable strong link between early warning reports and decision-making, which CEWARN currently lacks. The strong workable linkage between reporting and decision-making is however slightly better under ECOWARN.

3.5 Conclusion

The Chapter compared early conflict warning and response mechanisms for the Horn and West Africa sub-regions. It looked at the background of CEWARN and ECOWARN as mechanisms, examined their effectiveness both in terms of early warning and response. The Chapter also looked at the challenges faced by the two and lessons they can learn from each other. The Chapter concludes that while SADC is by far the best in the continental level of these mechanisms, CEWARN is ahead and has many lessons for ECOWARN.

¹²⁴ibid

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONFLICT EARLY WARNING AND RESPONSE MECHANISMS IN AFRICA: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

4.1. Introduction

Chapter three compared the conflict mechanisms in both West African region and that of the HoA. It looked at the background of these systems, analyzed the effectiveness of the IGAD's and ECOWAS's early warning and response machinery. It also analyses the challenges and draw lessons for both organizations. Chapter four will look at emerging issues within the arena of prevention of conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, the study will attempt to draw lessons from best practices elsewhere and give the way forward.

4.2. Emerging Issues

This section will assess how effective mechanisms have been in the resolution of conflict against emerging trends in the same field.

4.2.1. The status of Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms in Africa

In 1992 at an OAU Assembly meeting in Dakar, discussion on establishment of an Africa-wide conflict early warning entity began¹²⁵ (Cilliers, 2005). Thus, the machinery for Conflict deterrence, Management and Resolution was born. A year later, through what was christened the 'Cairo Declaration' the decision was effected. The broad mandate of the Mechanism were forecasting and inhibition of armed conflict, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. For operational purposes, The Mechanism created what was named the Central Organ which initially consisted of nine member states (later 14) and convened annually. These members and the state chairing the OAU formed the Bureau of the Assembly (Ibid.). Cilliers further observe that these early warning and response mechanisms primarily served human security and not national or state interests. As such, their operations are informed by the philosophical notion that the state and its leaders ought to protect citizens. Thus the various EWRs within Africa are at different stages of development to embrace state and human security perspectives. Currently, most early warning work in Africa is dependent on desk officers for collection of informational and analysis.¹²⁶

According to Article 3 of the CEWARN Protocol, CEWARN's opted to focus on cross-border pastoral conflict and full systems after five years. IGAD also works with research institutions or civil society organizations and coordinators.¹²⁷ The pastoral conflicts also tend to be associated with prevalence of small arms that then fuel other conflicts. This is also the case in West Africa.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Cilliers J., and Malan M., *South Africa and Regional Peacekeeping*, (CSIS Africa Notes, 1996), pg. 11

¹²⁶ Cilliers J., *Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa*, Occasional Paper 102, 2005

¹²⁷ Addendum to the CEWARN Protocol, Part 1: Mandate, Article 3

¹²⁸ See Cilliers

In terms of technical capacity, Cornwell posits that the CEWARN system is still struggling to bridge the gap between analysis of information on early warning and actual actions taken by states to avert conflicts.¹²⁹ As such, Cornwell proposes that the system should seriously consider one location for CEWARN and IGAD which are currently separately located in Addis Ababa and Djibouti City. In addition to co-location, a more integrated approach to conflict deterrence, management and response machinery as is in West Africa as well as Southern Africa. Cornwell also opines that a strong political goodwill from IGAD member states would be necessary to realize effectiveness of the system.

CEWARN has also to contend with the deficits in its US\$600,000 annual budget that hinders optimum performance.¹³⁰ Cornwell however argues that the expansion of CEWARN would depend on the extent to which its work can convince the donor community, a feat the system can only achieve with a holistic mechanism. The mechanism has also to contend with transparency and accountability queries often raised by member states and donors.¹³¹

However, ECOWAS' well developed regional system happens to be in a region equally facing a daunting challenge with multiple conflicts—religious or ethnic (Cornwell, 2001). In the Southern African region, a narrower interpretation of security has tended to anchor early warning systems to state intelligence agencies.

4.2.2. Challenges and opportunities for Africa

The foregoing discussion hints at a continent determined to put in place early warning and response systems but which is faced by numerous challenges. First of these challenges is the

¹²⁹ Cornwell, R. *Early Warning: Some Techniques and other Thoughts*, unpublished paper, *Institute for Security Studies*, 2001.

¹³⁰ Cornwell, R. 'Early Warning: Some techniques and other thoughts', unpublished paper, *Institute for Security Studies*, 2001

¹³¹ *Relaunching Africa's Economic and Social Development: The Cairo Agenda for Action*, AHG/Res.236 Assembly of Heads of State and Government, 31st Ordinary Session, 26-28 June 1995, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

plethora of similar regional structures which then creates overlaps and hence confusion.¹³² The already complicated arena was recently worsened when the EAC (East African Community) entered the AU as its 6th pillar. The attendant entities that EAC will develop are likely to further complicate the early warning and response work as the 23rd Chapter of the Treaty founding the EAC clearly permits the Community to deal with security issues.¹³³

West Africa is however less complicated according to an AU report of 2003. The regional mechanisms acknowledge the eminence of ECOWAS in conflict prevention and management systems. This is however not the case in the CEMAC (Central Africa region whereby the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa) members and the CEPGL (Economic Community of the Great Lakes States) members are the same¹³⁴ and ECCAS Member States. This complicates the region's early warning architecture yet this region has some of the most protracted conflicts with a constant potential of new conflicts.¹³⁵

Furthermore, the Protocol establishing CEWS under Africa Union's Peace and Security Council lists a number of challenges. First, the constrained human resources, training and funding environment inhibits early warning work. Second, the haphazard manner in which RECs coordinate and share information poses an operational challenge. Third, there has also been insufficient synergy between other AU peace and security agencies. Fourth, there is always the gap of translating early warning into preventive action across the continent. Finally, Africa has limited capacity and political will. As such, the early-response component of the African Union's APSA (Africa Peace and Security Architecture) will remain constrained.

¹³² African Union, *Report of the Workshop on the Establishment of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)*, 30-31st October 2003, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

¹³³ African Union, *Report of the Workshop on the Establishment of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)*, 30-31st October 2003, Addis Ababa.

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ African Union. 2002. "Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union."

Positively, where early warning mechanisms overlap, this could actually be an advantage rather than a weakness as already discussed. For instance, the CEWS may benefit from reports on Tanzania through SADC and EAC. This would end up providing the continent's situation room with more rather than less to base action on. What then needs harmonization is regional action and not Africa-wide action¹³⁶

Therefore, whereas the challenges may appear unsurmountable now, the future of the continent's early warning systems appear promising. The continent need to be inspired by the maxim that forestalling a conflict is a relatively less costly and more prudent approach than intervention.¹³⁷

4.2.3. Challenges and opportunities for IGAD and ECOWAS Regions

ECOWAS' and IGAD's mechanisms continue to face numerous challenges as outlined by Zenko and Friedman (2011). The ECOWAS study cited earlier pointed a number of limitations to the ECOWAS mechanism. First, ECOWAS is still unclear on the model of its early warning system—Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC). Second, the OMC has not made the tough decision of conflicts to focus on, between humanitarian and political dimensions. Third, the Observation and Monitoring Centre does not have strong technical staff, a proper communication infrastructure and some level of automation.

Third, Zenko and Friedman have also identified five shortcomings of forecasting models; First, early warning models only work best in stable countries and which are also the least in need. They contend that the situation in moderately stable and unstable countries are difficult to predict and the most likely to degenerate into conflict yet the actual events that act as indicators could be vastly different. Zenko and Friedman argue that early warning systems are unable to predict up

¹³⁶ibid

¹³⁷Addendum to the CEWARN Protocol, Part III: Verification and Analysis, Article 1

to twenty percent of conflicts that erupt, especially in unstable states, which is in absolute terms significant. Relatedly, Barton and von Hippel contends that research on impact of small but incremental events on conflict is still lacking.

Similarly, the causal link between indicators of conflict and actual eruption of conflict is complex. Research has shown that the existing causal links on early warning mechanisms tend to favour short-term correlations, ignoring long standing structural issues such as demographics, education, human rights, poverty, displacement and health. This criticism therefore means that early warning mechanisms are suitable in cases of short-term crises.

Fourth, there is also the question regarding the extent to which early warning mechanisms accommodate what is referred to as the local spaces. Local spaces mean local civil societies engaged and existing dispute resolution efforts that determine how events, including those likely to degenerate into conflict unfold. Fifth, there is also the concern of ability for systems to replicate elsewhere. The existing models have not clearly spelt out the conditions under which the efforts are considered effective. Such clarity would enable ease of replication from one context to the other.

4.2.4. Conflicts in the Sudan

The HoA has numerous developments that are potential triggers of conflict. Those events that are more likely to trigger conflict have generally been identified as directly or indirectly related to armed-resource competition. In Sudan, with the current relative peace, CEWARN work now focuses on the boundary related tensions and conflicts. Once this is adequately addressed, IGAD will shift focus to national and regional level as ECOWAS is currently doing.¹³⁸

¹³⁸Williams, Paul D. "The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities." *International Institutions and Global Governance* (IIGG) Program Working Paper." New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations.

For CEWARN to effectively work in Sudan, Wulf and Debiel observe that there was a need to change the legal protocol under IGAD to accommodate the negotiating parties under Government of National Unity in Sudan. The scholars also argued that CEWARN also needed an expansion beyond its original entry point—pastoral conflicts. Similarly, Mbugua posits that the work of CEWARN was seriously hindered by the fact that the conflict constrained flow of information needed for indicators, hence affecting even the cost of early warning work¹³⁹

4.2.5. Low Uptake of Technology in Africa

Conflict early warning and response is heavily dependent on technology—from gathering, analysis and modeling of interventions. The technology according to Mbugua is deployed on GIS (Global Information System), and GPS (Global Positioning) and have worked perfectly to systems that have employed them. The uptake of technology in Eastern Africa, although improving, has generally been slow to be effective the uptake of technology must be concurrent from grassroots to desk officers analyzing early warning data, as it has worked in the case of EWER.

4.2.7. Sovereignty and Political Interests

Wulf and Debiel contend that for regional systems to be effective, significant amount of goodwill and cooperation from states is necessary. However, states are constantly in a delicate balance between such cooperation and political considerations, with political considerations often taking precedence. For example, in the case of CEWARN, poor relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea poses a real challenge in as far as the two states would want to work under IGAD.

¹³⁹Mbugua J. *Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa: Do they work?* IPSTC Peace and Security Research Department, International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya, 2014

4.2.8. Technological Advances

On the positive note, Ettang argues that technological advances are a boon to early warning and response efforts.¹⁴⁰ Although the uptake is slightly lower than advancement, there are indications that the future/potential of early warning and response would be far better with the technological capabilities even as small as through cellphone applications. Today, instant transmission of incidences is possible. For example, in the recent past, CEWARN's ICT (Information Communications Technology) for Peace project has been successfully used to transmit timely and reliable data in Uganda. The challenge however remains ability to verify transmitted data as fast as it comes.

4.2.9. Other Issues

Lack of a Global Conflict Prevention Framework

Chapter six and seven of the United Nations Charter 1945 recognizes conflict prevention as a central theme. The two chapters allow the UN Secretary General, security council and the General Assembly to peacefully resolve any conflicts and to avert wars.¹⁴¹ Chapter VI outline measures for conflict prevention such as: fact finding, conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, negotiation and mediation. As indicated earlier, Boutros Boutros-Ghali advancement of preventive diplomacy is arguably viewed as efforts towards early warning and response.

In spite of global, regional and national efforts towards these systems, these systems are still facing a myriad challenges. First, many systems still yield inaccurate predictions stemming from methodologically flawed analysis. Second, these systems have sometimes failed to foresee important events, thereby eruption of conflicts despite the efforts. Third, early warning systems have also been at times faced with the challenge of lethargy when it comes to linking action

¹⁴⁰Ettang, D. 'Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms in Africa: Gaps and Prospects', Consultancy Africa Intelligence, 2015

¹⁴¹See Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter 1945

with warnings. This in essence has tended to lead to uncoordinated and contradictory action as well as poor decision making (Nyheim, 2009). At the global front, despite the efforts already in place, the future of these systems will largely depend on extent to which the framework for global conflict prevention strategically feeds early warning and response. To aid this endeavor, the UN is yet to put in place standards for universal conflict EWER systems.¹⁴²

4.3. Lessons from Other Mechanisms outside Africa

4.3.1. Lessons from Minorities at Risk (MAR) and Global News Monitor

Recently, academic research has been interested in settings that cause states with ethnically divided identities to opt for conflict. Thus, a project dubbed ‘Minorities at Risk’ was conceptualized and implemented. Findings from this project suggest plausible linkages between grievances, mobilization, rebellion and repression of minorities. thus, the research on minorities has to a large extent fed into the work of early warning and response.¹⁴³

4.3.2. The Crisis Watch: International Crisis Group (ICG)

The International Crisis Group (ICG) focuses on the most significant crises situations in the world, producing monthly reports covering over 70 situations. the reports capture escalation and de-escalation of the conflicts. It relies on collection and indices developed by media, policy makers, business community and the general public.¹⁴⁴ ICG is headquartered in Brussels based with centers in Africa, Asia and Europe. ICG work thus is viewed as working in tandem with the broad philosophies underpinning early warning systems.

4.3.3. The Global Peace Index (GPI)

The GPI (Global Peace Index) is essentially an information system which categorizes nations according to their peace degree. GPI utilizes one hundred and twenty-two (122) qualitative and

¹⁴² International Peace Institute (IPI), Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Early Warning and Response, Conference Report, New York, 2012

¹⁴³ Maryland University, through the directorship of Ted Gurr began “The Minorities at Risk Project” in 1994

¹⁴⁴ The Crisis Watch; International Crisis Group. Retrieved from www.fundforpeace.org/en/publication-type/crisis.aspx on 10/05/2016

quantitative indicators over one hundred and sixty-two (162) countries in the world. In addition to the global index, GPI also does select individual countries over a seven-year period on conflict. GPI has become a popular yardstick for conflict vulnerability which is thoroughly contextualized.¹⁴⁵ Thus, GPI, just like ICG is arguably a friend to early warning efforts.

4.3.4. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Just like ECOWAS, ASEAN was founded in 1967 to advance economic prosperity of its member states, a mission that is intractably intertwined with peace. Through various treaties, ASEAN is able to advance a holistic development model cognizant of conflict prevention. For instance, in 1994, ASEAN established Regional Forum (ARF), a region-wide security forum. ARF focuses on dialogue on security and diplomacy.¹⁴⁶ IGAD could borrow from ARF's structure that follows non-interference, sovereignty, non-alignment and territorial integrity. IGAD can borrow from the operations of ASEAN. Sridharan argues that the incremental, consultative and consensus-based philosophy preferred by the ASEAN model has tended to create a relative stability in the region.¹⁴⁷

4.3.4. The Pacific Island Forum (PIF)

The Pacific Island Forum (PIF) was earlier on known as South Pacific Forum. This forum comprising 16 independent states of the Pacific was founded in 1971. It is the Pacific's foremost political and economic policy organization. In 2002, leaders of the PIF established a security program which deals with domestic security and transnational crime. The Biketawa Declaration, upon which PIF's security Framework was founded entails a tool to advise and confer with its respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs to initiate measures that are geared towards promoting peace and security. In 2000, it helped establish the Regional Assistance

¹⁴⁵ The Global Peace Index. Retrieved from www.globalpeaceindex.org/globalpeaceindex/2014 on 10/05/2016

¹⁴⁶ The Minorities at Risk project was established by Ted Gurr in Maryland University, Gurr, 1994

¹⁴⁷ Sridharan, K. *Regional Organizations and Conflict Management: Comparing the ASEAN and SAARC, Crisis States*, Working Paper Series 2, London, London School of Economics, 2008.

Mission to the Solomon Islands, Nauru and three successful election observer missions to Nauru, Solomon Islands and Fiji.¹⁴⁸

The organization relies on the cooperation of the local communities. These local communities are viewed as central to supply of safety measures and the contemporary nation-state institutions as seen in the developed world. Pacific human security includes gender equality, youth participation, persons with disabilities and other marginalized groups, concern for traditional culture and governance structures. IGAD should also include all these groups in its operations with CEWARN.¹⁴⁹

4.4. Conclusion

Research on early warning generally suggests that the degree of efficacy of an early warning and response mechanism is determined by how strong its field monitors and how strong its presence is on the ground. According to Mbugua, the use of numerous sources of information, be they quantitative or qualitative methods, Information Technology, feeds updates to key state-level and global organizations. Such approaches also heavily contribute to the link between responders and mechanisms.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, as new indicators are identified, there is need to adapt to different systems so that the resultant models are better. In this case therefore, for a model to be effective, it should be adaptable, elastic and strong.

¹⁴⁸ The Human Security Framework for the Pacific 2012-2015, Islands Forum Secretariat

¹⁴⁹ Ibid

¹⁵⁰ Mbugua J. *Conflict Early Warning and Response Systems in Eastern Africa: Do they work?* IPSTC Peace and Security Research Department, International Peace Support Training Centre Nairobi, Kenya, 2014

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Summary

Early warning products are a function of a lengthy process that begins with collection of data, analysis and brief summaries—reports. Throughout this work, it has come out that early warning is essential to conflict. It emanates from the link between and functional response mechanisms. As stated earlier, CEWARN is currently doing a variety of six reports. These reports serve different levels and are done at different intervals.

This work has also argued that conflict prevention is anchored in the old maxim that encourages prevention and not waiting for a problem to arise so as to deal with it. However, in the context of conflict prevention, the precision relied upon from indicators heavily influence extent to which the cure is arrived at. Once conflicts break out, the cost and effort in de-escalating and eventually resolving are enormous. This is particularly more so in Africa, a continent bedeviled by state fragility.

As the study has demonstrated, in West Africa, conflicts stem from economic, political, historical and cultural factors. Elites, motivated by sheer pursuit of greed, ethnic interests, religion, social fragmentations are triggers of conflicts. In the Horn of Africa region, almost all the countries have experienced protracted conflicts caused by the same reasons for which West African conflicts emerged¹⁵¹. Most of the Horn of Africa region conflicts have largely been intra-

¹⁵¹ibid

state in nature. In addition, Kasujja argues that external intervention has also caused a number of conflicts as Western countries pursue their interests in the region.

These mechanisms have become prominent in transnational conflict prevention. However, devastating human atrocities continue to be experienced in Africa and elsewhere. For instance, in the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) over five million people may have been casualties of conflict. To change the situation, the mechanisms have been embraced on the basis it is much cheaper and less bloody to prevent eruption of violence than to stop it after it has begun or escalated. An effective early warning system relies on support of the highest political authorities as well as coordination by local government structures and community based entities.

Existing research has shown that conflicts in the HoA are dynamic. The region however requires a strong regional actor and less involvement or direction from the international community. Therefore, early warning should to be effective, early warning efforts must underscore timeliness and accuracy. Currently, mediation is considered zero-sum to both the ECOWAS and the HoA nations with military success defining the overall success of conflict resolution.

Additionally, it has been argued that conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa cannot work unless a clear political will, cooperation with non-state actors working in the grassroots as well as international community is forged. This will however rely on the extent to which accountability mechanisms and efficacy is realized.

As the research has argued, because Africa is the home of the most protracted conflicts emanating from multiple source, ECOWARN and CEWARN are arguably the most advanced early warning and response systems globally. Host states can only make the mechanisms better

going forward. The two supra-national organizations, IGAD and ECOWAS provide strong building blocks for robust and effective early warning mechanisms.

The research has also shown that CEWARN's relies on its network of monitors and responders through the CEWERUs. This has enhanced the systems reliability and general efficacy. On the other hand, ECOWARN system takes advantage of its access to multiple sources of information—both government and civil society organizations. Further, ECOWARN is arguably a beneficiary of institutional link to the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security.

This research cannot over emphasize the fact that the extent to which a system is effective is as good as the level to which its field monitors and analyst understand and executive their job. Mbugua has illustrated that through reliance on manifold sources of data both solid qualitative and quantitative methods, use of ICT, regularity of accurate updates and cooperation with international agencies, systems work. Additionally, as new indicators are identified, there is need to adapt to different systems so that the resultant models are better. In this case therefore, for a model to be effective, it should be adaptable, elastic and strong.

5.2. Conclusion

IGAD's strategy on peace and security that acknowledges that peace and security are integral to development. Thus its emphasis on a comprehensive regional peace and security strategy. To succeed, such a strategy needs to balance ambition, reality and objectivity. It therefore must embrace a holistic approach to human security including conflict prevention.

As the analysis has demonstrated, CEWARN and ECOWARN have played key roles in stabilizing projects within the Horn of Africa and the West African Regions. CEWARN protects

its decision to initially narrow down its approach to conflicts emanating from grazing rights as a key to the early warning work from which then such systems would flourish.

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The research has also argued that despite the challenges facing EWR systems, these models have registered an impressive track record. However, the overlaps in data collections, conflict predictions and assessments could be significantly reduced through restructuring of the systems within and across regions.¹⁵³

Therefore, one could argue that ECOWARN and CEWARN have become continental benchmarks for data-based mechanisms. They also show the audacity in pioneering region-wide mechanisms that entail a whole spectrum of state and nongovernmental agencies. There is urgent need to expand the types of conflicts that these organizations cover. To this endeavor, the CEWARN mechanism has crafted a visionary, innovative strategy for expansion, increased relevance to decision making and implementation.

5.3. Recommendations

This study therefore makes the following recommendations. First, that these mechanisms have to clearly delineate their clients, their assumptions and when they expect action from multi-level governance. Secondly, CEWARN must rethink the gaps that organizations create at regional, continental, and global levels and realistic solutions. Thirdly, early warning systems could

¹⁵² Daniel Yifru, Director of IGAD's Peace and Security Division, in Fanta E., *The Capacity of African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security*". 2009

¹⁵³ Wulf, Herbert. and Tobias Debiel. "Systemic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms." *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations* 16 (4) (October–December), 2010

immensely benefit from mutual support and deep cooperation among conflict-prevention actors, regionally and globally.

Fourth, early warning frameworks and implementation mechanismsought to develop practical policies for operations. Fifth, the ECOWARN and the CEWARN mechanisms should enhance their data collection systems with emphasis on qualitative, quantitative and use of technology. Lastly, IGAD could realize a more comprehensive strategy through initiation of conversation on unsettled disputes.

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