

**INFLUENCE OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS ON
HUMAN SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF DADAAB, KENYA**

**BY
SIGEI EVE CHEBET
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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for another Degree in any other University.

Signature.....Date.....

Sigei Eve Chebet

R52/82926/2015

This research project has been submitted for examination with my permission as the University Supervisor.

Signature.....Date.....

Dr. Martin Ouma

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my parents Mr. and Mrs. Sigei who encourage and inspire me to be a better version of myself and who remind of life's endless possibilities. I am extremely loved and immensely grateful. My sisters Faith and Nelly Sigei, aunt Margaret and cousin Nicole Cherotich for their prayers and support. To Andrew Kamau Njenga, for selflessly and unconditionally loving and encouraging me even on my worst days. Lastly this thesis is dedicated to the men, women and children both known and unknown who have suffered, from the effects of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and to all my colleagues who strive to have a lasting impact on the lives of refugees in Dadaab.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
CAAFAG	Children Associated with armed forces and groups
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Framework
EA	East Africa
GLR	Great Lakes Region
HDR	Human Development Report
HoA	Horn of Africa
HS	Human Security
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
RECs/RMs	Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms
SA	Small Arms
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS

Definition of Terms

Diverse terms carry diverse meaning, depending on the location covered by a study. Therefore, it is important to give the operationalization of key terms.

Ammunition

Defined to include not only a complete round, but also its components as well such as casing or gunpowder. A broad definition of ammunition is necessary because of the ease of manufacturing ammunition with minimal, low technology equipment from prepared components.

Human Security

Human security is the safeguard of the vital core of all human lives from grave and inescapable environmental, economic, food, and health, personal and political threats.

Illicit Trafficking

According to article 3(e) of the Firearms Protocol, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts and components, and ammunition from or across territory of one state party, to that of another state party if the state parties concerned does not authorize it, in accordance with the terms of the protocol.

Small Arms and Light Weapons

This concept has been used in this study to refer to Small Arms which according the small arms survey are; revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns and light machine guns.

Light weapons are; Heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS); and mortars of calibres of less than 100 mm.

ABSTRACT

Today proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons is a major challenge facing almost all of the war split regions of the world especially Africa claiming the lives of many soldiers as well as innocent civilians. Therefore, this study will majorly give focus on the influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Human Security and particularly on Kenya's Dadaab refugee camp. Despite the Government of Kenya efforts to control and curtail its spread, there is continued use and spread of SALW, the issue has become recurrent than it was before. Some adverse political, economic and social situations can be linked to the proliferation of small arms. The study observed that there is indeed a connection between Human Security and SALW and can be explained by 3 interconnected factors 1) Weak governance structures 2) Unhealthy clan competition between the refugees 3) Underdevelopment. Kenya enacted the Firearms Act (CAP. 114) as an Act of Parliament for regulating, licensing and controlling the manufacture, importation, exportation, transportation, sale, repair, storage, possession and use of firearms, ammunition, air guns and destructive devices and for connected purposes. This Act commenced in 1st January 1954 and has been the backbone of arms control in Kenya. However, its key tenets require better coordination by government agencies to curtail the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Dadaab and in Kenya at large. Civil wars in the Horn of Africa, over the years have led to the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons. The wide availability of arms apart from being devastating in terms of human loss has altered the cultural foundations of many communities. Given the livelihood insecurity of communities in border areas, and inability of police to provide security, the study noted that the availability of arms has provided the means for communities to seek alternative livelihoods (inevitably violent ones) such as banditry, and acquire the arms in order to not only protect themselves, but their families as well. The study applies Regional Security Complex theory to test its reliability. Chapter one provides the background of topic of study by first setting the broad context of the research study, the statement of the problem, justification, theoretical framework, literature review, hypotheses and the methodology of the study. Chapter Two assesses factors influencing proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Dadaab. Chapter Three examines control measures used by the Government of Kenya to curb the influence of SALW on human security in Dadaab; Chapter Four determines the influence of SALW on Human security in Dadaab and Chapter Five provides conclusions of the study, gives recommendations and provides suggestions on areas for further study.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction and Background to the Study

Today multiplication of SALW is a noteworthy test confronting the greater part of the conflict divided regions of the world plus the Middle East and additionally quite a bit of Africa killing many soldiers and additionally innocent civilians. Along these lines, this investigation will meaningfully provide emphasis on Kenya's Dadaab Refugee camp. Be that as it may, this can be questioned since there was visit multiplication of SALW in the North-Eastern region of the nation flanking Somalia. The locale has emitted into ethnic conflicts every once in a while asserting predominantly the lives of ladies and kids.¹

The first chapter delivers the foundation of the examination by fundamentally setting the thorough setting of the examination study, the issue articulation, avocation, theoretical framework, literature review, gaps in the literature and the strategy of the investigation.

1.2 Background to the Study

Drive of SA over the globe is progressively hard to follow and consumes long-lasting impacts on human security. Frequently SA end up noticeably accessible in an area for legitimate and lawful reasons identified with national security, peacekeeping or law enforcement. Truth be told, a noteworthy portion of the exchange weaponries, is honest and known about. It is definitely an deep-rooted and flourishing business. As a result of globalization, armaments have now traversed fringes and remain to be progressively

¹ Grimmett, R.F & Kerr, P.K. (2012), *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011*, Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2012

widespread. Most weaponries are currently amassed from constituents obtained from many nations.

Small arms alter the stream of contention in a brief instant. SA are dangerous; and are proposed to exterminate. These weaponries change a fundamental contention to a disaster, and used against noncombatants hoping to secure their families. In a couple of nations thought to find a sense of contentment, the height of SA viciousness can be elevated as in battle areas, and also quality is a perceived way by which abusive behavior at home happens. SALW are accountable for a lion's offer in regards to fight related conflict passing—an expected 60–90 percent of all immediate clash casualties will be murdered with guns. Arms cause strife. Conflict powers insecurity and destitution. Violence does not by any means begin with a weapon, yet rather it augments altogether when weapons are accessible, particularly in adequately unpredictable circumstances flooding with injustice, destitution and mistrust.²

The expansion in SA continues to be predominantly upsetting in Africa, where rifles, explosives, armaments and different SA continue to be utilized to slay and relocate many individuals worldwide. Weaponries have been utilized as an amount of perilous conflicts in the Horn, East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and different African countries. At the point when weapons enter a zone, they can remain there for quite a while. Weapons particularly consume a valuable epoch of various decades. These SA routinely reused

² Wepundi, M., Nthiga, E., Kabuu, E., Murray, R., & Alvazzi del Frate, A. (2012). *Availability of small arms and perceptions of security in Kenya: an assessment*. Geneva: Small Arms Survey.

from republic to republic, and possession is operated amongst warriors, security powers and war swindlers.³

In Africa, many have passed on over clashes and its connected repercussions. The sporadic fighting continues to be customary in late eras and is especially aided by these classes of armaments, which are effectively accessible and occasionally taken a toll not as much as sustenance substances. In 1994, an intraethnic battle in Rwanda led to approximately more than eight hundred thousand people killed, generally with SA, including axes. A normal three hundred thousand civilians have in like manner passed on a comparative course in Burundi.⁴

Outfitted viciousness devises social and economic effects that are felt by women in many courses rather than men. Ladies are too much hurt by the damage to health, schooling and additional communal administrations. For sure, notwithstanding amid amity, ladies endure matter to ferocity and intimidating, regularly in their households. Ladies are significantly slanted to be gunshot with an actually apprehended weapon by some individual they identify well with rather than by a baffling attacker. A weapon extends the shot of death by 12 times diverged from various techniques for brutality.⁵

A particular summary of light weapons could in like manner contain; significant programmed rifles, hand-held under-barrel and mounted explosive launchers, man-flexible air barrier framework, (for instance, shoulder fired aircraft firearms and rockets),; hostile to tank weapons and recoilless rifles, minimized hostile to tank and

³ Boutwell, J., & Klare, M. T. (2010). *A scourge of small arms*. Scientific American, 282(6), 48-53.

⁴ Pinto, A. D., Olupot-Olupot, P., & Neufeld, V. R. (2006). *Health implications of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Eastern Uganda*. *Medicine, conflict and survival*, 22(3), 207-219.

⁵ Kirui, P., & Mwaruvie, J. (2012). The dilemma of hosting refugees: a focus on the insecurity in northeastern Kenya. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 3(8).

rocket launcher frameworks, and mortars of point of confinement underneath 100mm. Light weapons fall just underneath the seven classes of expansive weapons offered an explanation to the UN enlist of customary arms, and are in this way a middle classification between "small arms" and "major weapons."⁶

The explanation of SALW in the UNROCA procedures nearly counterparts the meaning of SALW imitated in the ITI – the main significant UN instrument that includes a definition. However, vital contrasts imply that had the UN enlist been made the foundation of a description and would have essentially limited the extent of the weapons secured. These incorporate the expression, putting at the top of the priority list its attention on armed weapons in connection to reason for the record. The position to 'armament made at changed in accordance with military depiction for usage as unsafe tools of conflict; and the particular orientations to SA for usage by particular subsidiaries of equipped armies and light weapons for consumption by a few individuals from military filling in as a team.⁷

1.3 The Problem Statement

This scholarship is introduced by the way that the undertaking of small arms crosswise over EA and Kenya specifically is progressively hard to follow and its enduring impacts on HS. The Oxfam International, article titled "Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Next Steps for the UN Program of Action" contended that SALW have been reprehensible for the main part of the battling and guarantee going in a significant part of lawbreaking and public viciousness. The no matter how you look at it openness of SALW push toward

⁶ An electronic Journal of the US Department Of State (2001), Small Arms and Light Weapons: US policy, and Views; Washington DC: USA, US Foreign Policy Agenda, p. 9

⁷ Maslen, S., Gracca, G., Parker, S. (2016). *The Arms Trade Treaty: A Commentary*, UK: Oxford University Press p. 105.

getting to be tools of various sorts of brutality. For instance, criminal movement, ethnic and political disputes, and impedance with attempts to pass on sustenance, pharmaceutical, and supplies to people in urgent need of alleviation.

Refugees are regularly on the less than desirable finish as they are faulted for the convergence of the armaments as a result of some of their ex-combatant positions; consolidating relationship with nearby possess, warlords, local armies and in like the instance of Kenya sheltering Al-Shabaab dread gathering. Regardless of the GoK endeavors to regulate and diminish its spread, there is sustained use and extent of SALW, the matter has turned out to be more intermittent than it was some time recently. The course of SALW particularly in refugee camps in Kenya requires improved organization by administration bureaus to decrease the use and spread.

1.4 Research Questions

- i) To what extent does SALW influence Human Security in Dadaab refugee camp?
- ii) What factors influence the proliferation of SALW in Dadaab refugee camp?
- iii) To what level do control measures by the government assist in curbing the influence of SALW on human security in Dadaab Refugee Camp?

1.5 Objectives of the Study

Objectives:

Broad Objective:

- i) To examine, the influence of Small Arms Light Weapons to Human security in Kenya

Specific Objectives:

- i) To assess the factors influencing the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Dadaab Refugee Camp
- ii) To examine control measures used by the Government of Kenya to curb the influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on human security in Dadaab Refugee Camp.
- iii) To determine the influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Human Security in Dadaab Refugee camp

1.6 Literature Review

There are various particular consequences for human lives, coming about specifically or by implication, from the conflict, struggle and outfitted viciousness that includes the spread and utilization of SALW. From killings and decimation to weak healthcare and absence of schooling chances, conflict and struggle essentially influence human lives.

1.6.1 Concept of Human Security

Human security is known to have two main aspects. Firstly, it means, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. Secondly, it refers to the protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in daily life – whether in homes, work or community. These threats can exist at all levels of national income and development.”

There are 7 principles of human security. They comprise environmental, economic, food, health, personal, community and political security.

Economic retreat for instance, incorporates guaranteed essential pay and furthermore access to fundamental needs. Food security is depicted as the capacity to get to essential

nutrition and food supply. Well being security covers various issues, for example, the access to clean water, admission to health facilities, and to have indispensable info to carry on with a solid life⁸

Environmental security then again covers issues as deterrent of water pollution, air contamination, deforestation, counteractive action of natural events, for example, starvation, surges, violent winds and seismic tremors. Community security is worried about the protection of convention and convictions, dialects and shared esteems. It moreover integrates getting rid of ethnic segregation, stoppage of tribal disputes, and safety of native persons. In conclusion, political security is worried about the shield of human rights and prosperity of the community. The getting rid of political abuses, detainment, systematic vile conduct, and disappearing are held under political security⁹.

The idea of HS created as a feature of the comprehensive worldview of human advancement developed in the UNDP by Mahbub ul Haq, with solid help from Amartya Sen. The UNDP's 1994 HDR was the chief main overall text to clarify HS in applied positions with approvals for procedure and accomplishment also. The origination of HS additionally had the backing of Oscar Arias, previous President of Costa Rica and victor of the Nobel Peace Prize, who connected HS with recommendations for a "Worldwide Demilitarization Fund". Intended to give sponsorship to incapacitating and demobilizing military, re-incorporating military work force into people and different activities to embrace weapons control and public schooling for uniformity, this exertion would turn into an essential component for developing HS in many states.

⁸ Wood, Brian. 2006. *Strengthening compliance with EU arms embargoes: key challenges for monitoring and verification*. In United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (ed). DDA Occasional Papers, no. 10.

⁹ Ibid pg 1

Prior, the idea of safety was greater, signifying to commonly the nation and person. For Greeks, the city-state conveyed the request and assurance precondition for individual endeavors and security. For the Romans, it meant an inward condition of quietness and autonomy of mind. Different obvious reactions relate especially to its theoretical vulnerability and absence of an exact definition. Paris¹⁰ has contended that HS can be compared to other correspondingly indistinct notions like “sustainable development” – “everybody is for it, but a small number of people have a clear inkling of what it means.” Similarly, Newman¹¹ denotes to it as outstanding but disapprovingly weak.” Even Lakhdar Brahimi,¹² previous exceptional representative to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti, and chairperson of the UN Panel on Peacekeeping, is well known as saying: “I don’t use the term human security because I don’t know exactly what I mean, and I worry that someone will come up and contradict me.”

1.6.2 Control Measures

1.6.2.1 The United National Programme of Action (UNPoA)

The fundamental agenda for battling unlawful transferring and multiplication of SA is the UNPoA embraced in 2001, which is governmentally program of action received in 2001, which is governmentally obligatory and generally concurred. It functions, as a device for construction of purposeful universally activity, including the improvement of associated multifaceted mechanisms issues, for example, weapons handling and checking and

¹⁰ Paris, Roland (2001) ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’, *International Security*, 26(2), pp. 87-102.

¹¹ Newman, Edward (2010) ‘Critical Human Security Studies’, *Review of International Studies*, 36(S1), pp. 77–94.

¹² Lakhdar Brahimi, quoted in Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, ‘The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience’, *International Affairs*, 86(1), (2010), pp. 211–224, 215-216.

following a few of the UNPoAs arrangements are less commanding than the EU and its part states contended for.¹³

1.6.2.2 The Firearms Protocol

Nation parties to the firearms protocol are essential to outlaw inside their state lawful provisions illegal transferring in firearms, their parts, components and ammunition.¹⁴

The above normally eliminates from its submission national to national transfers of firearms.¹⁵ The travaux arrangements of the protocol do, however designate that it relates to profitable transfers of firearms amongst units possessed or functioned by administrations, such as government kept weapons producers.¹⁶

The protocol relates to SA and to a partial course of light weapons.¹⁷ It also relates to certain shares of constituents of weapons and to communiqué.¹⁸ State gatherings are obligatory to create and uphold an operative organization of export and import consenting or approval as well as of procedures on global transit, for the transmission of weapons, their portions and constituents and ammo.¹⁹

Keeping in mind the end goal to encourage following, the guns, convention forces commitments on nation parties to need unmistakable and recognizable markings to be connected to guns made in brought into their domain.²⁰

¹³ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War, Final Report (United States, United Nations, p. 15.

¹⁴ Art 5 of the Firearms Protocol

¹⁵ Art 4 of the Firearms Protocol

¹⁶ UNODC, Travaux Préparatoires of the Negotiations for the Elaboration of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, (2006),. New York, p. 637.

¹⁷ Art 3 of the Firearms Protocol

¹⁸ Arts 3(b) and (c) and 4(1) of the Firearms Protocol

¹⁹ Art 10 of the Firearms Protocol

²⁰ Art 8 of the Firearms, Protocol

1.6.2.3 The Arms Trade Treaty

The treaty specifically talks about the duties obligatory on countries by Security Council resolutions²¹ by treaties (for instance, overwhelming illegal transferring of traditional arms²² and by pertinent guidelines of customary international law.

The declaration of ideologies in the inaugural segment of the ATT covertly covers customary responsibilities to confine arms transmissions.²³

1.6.2.4 The Nairobi Declaration

It is equipped at the GLR and the HoA, also identifies the prominence of satisfactory state rule to device the ownership, and transmission of SALW, makers, dealers, agents and trailers and meaningfully investors.²⁴

1.6.3 Factors influencing Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons

In a conference Paper for the UN Periodic Meeting called *SA and Human Rights: The Need for Global Action*²⁵ by Human Rights Watch states that the over the top advancement and in all cases ill utilization of small arms voices to an overall human rights emergency by promising endless human rights misuse and rupture of International Humanitarian law. These ruptures incorporate the mindful focusing of standard natives, and unselective assaults responsible to excessively hurt normal nationals and distress also.

²¹ Art 6(1) and (2) of the Arms Trade Treaty

²² Such Treaty Obligations would also include the Duty to Prevent Genocide Set out in art. 1 of the Genocide Convention.

²³ Boister N., Currie, R. (2015). *Routledge Handbook of Transnational Criminal Law*, New York, Routledge p. 252,253.

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Small Arms and Human Rights: *The Need for Global Action A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper for the U.N. Biennial Meeting on Small Arms* 7th Jul 2003 pg 2, 4

Edward Mogire²⁶ perceives that the extreme upsurge and storing up of SALW at some point as of late, among and following severe crushes has incited various districts being astonished with SA with destroying results on individual, national and worldwide security. SALW are the fundamental tools of ferocity, have drawn out or angered battles, designed enormous streams of immigrants, destabilized the rule of law and created an ethos of ruthlessness and exclusion. It is in this setting the influence on human security, can be contemplated.

Because of penetrable and tremendous fringes, frail administrations, and unimpressive state security frameworks, SALW are hard to regulate or record for as they pass inside the locale starting with one clash area then onto the next. They channel a long ways past armed forces and police forces to criminal gatherings, private security powers, vigilante squads, and specific nationals.

1.6.4 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Political Security

Muggah and Bearman²⁷ discoursed management of a state not only forms the economic development of a nation, nonetheless is as well accountable of giving humanity inordinate of safety to its kinfolks. "High amounts of equipped viciousness and unlawful SALW increase in both clash influenced and non-conflict social orders are frequently indications of powerless or unaccountable security division." Despite the fact that the proximity of weak administrations is a bit of the reason for the proliferation of SALW increase within a country, the extended openness of SALW influences the administration

²⁶ The Article, "The Humanitarian Impact of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the Threat to Security" Available on line at http://www.desarme.org/publique/media/In%20The%20Line%20Of%20Fire_ing.pdf.

²⁷ Muggah, R., & Berman, E. (2012). *Humanitarianism under threat: the humanitarian impacts of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Small Arms Survey.

of the country by additionally crippling safety ranges as more weapons are available to gangsters and felonious affiliations.

Kirui and Mwaruvie,²⁸ noticed that with weakened safety partitions and extending flimsiness, safety within countries of dispute may incite to the denationalization of the security division. "Private security organizations, when approved by the state, increment interest for legitimate SALW, yet can likewise build the supply of the unlawful market if stockpile administration is feeble or there is inner debasement. Inadequately prepared private security gatekeepers can likewise be in charge of SALW abuse and now and again have been ensnared in criminal movement and human rights abuses." Because of the increasing doubt, the denationalization of security sources which in this way can't be acceptably watched in view of delicate organization, a country's money related change is antagonistically affected as the cost of cooperating additions. In like manner, human rights infringement continue happening as illegal development in such areas increases.

1.6.5 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Environmental Security

Muggah and Batchelor²⁹ recognized a portion of the new security terrors to incorporate environmental deterioration; outsized measure displaced person developments and movements; broad dangerous spates, plus HIV/AIDs and of late, malaria; developing of religious radicalization; opened up instances of savagery within states, outfitted clashes and aggregate regular wars, with consequent occurrences of state destruction. Others are, mounting joblessness; extending neediness; net human rights infringement and intensified instances of massacre and ethnic purging; monstrous exchange and removal of

²⁸ *ibid*

²⁹ Muggah, R., & Batchelor, P. (2013). *Development Held Hostage: Assessing the effects of small arms on human development*. UNDP, April.

unlawful additional weaponries. Their cross-outskirt suggestions; globalization and its following dissatisfactions; terrorism; trades of drugs and people crosswise over fringes (drug trafficking and human trafficking); monetary and money related unfortunate activities and antagonistic expenses on good governance; among numerous others.

1.6.6 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Health Security

Weiss³⁰ uncovered that civic goods, for example, health and education as well are essential to the monetary development of a nation. With agreeable health administrations, the general public can maintain a lesser passing rate and reduce the length and spread of diseases among its people groups. This enhanced health in the populace shields relentless monetary development a trademark that isn't partaken in nations with clashes. In regions of contention inside Sub-Saharan Africa, health facilities are not as energetically realistic as laborers are unwilling or unfit to labor in zones of uncertainty. The equivalent relates to other civic services that assistance bear monetary advancement, for example, schooling. Subsequently, the contention limits the state's ability to financially develop in both the broad and here and now.

1.6.7 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Economic Security

The spread of SALW obnoxiously influences financial improvement by crippling venture, divestment, and misallocation of assets to security rather than advancement, and influences the operation or beginning of advancement plans. Health and schooling conveyance is unfortunately influenced when breadwinners work in a perilous situation. Teachers and doctors are problematic to lure to labor in territories where they are at

³⁰ Weiss, T. (2014). *Guns in the borderlands. Reducing the demand for small arms. Institute for Security Studies Monographs, 2004(95)*, p.116.

bigger danger of being assaulted. The spread of weaponries will keep expansion goals from being gotten. It is in acknowledgment of this that the UNDP has perceived an uncommon association under the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR) to manage the SALW issue. The UNDP acknowledges;

Where guns rule, growth suffers, schools close, shops close, commerce halts, and the local economy slogs to a halt. Buildings are demolished, bridges are propelled up, and whatever development there has been, is absent. Private investment dried up and development organizations can't function. Even after the shootings halts, there is no refuge. People cannot yield to their homes or a standard life.³¹

1.6.8 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Community Security

Kumssa et al.,³² are on the view that in instances of contradiction, mature men are normally a large portion of the immediate fatalities of prepared conflict. Regardless of the way that women and children are besides direct subjective by the sustained conflict, they along these lines go up against a substitute plan of infringement and dangers against them. By virtue of women, combatants test them with confinement, threatening, torment, prostitution, and attack. This ignores their constitutional rights and it proceeds away their chances, makes bothersome gravidities, and is purpose behind the spread of HIV/AIDS in Northern Kenya. Adolescents are likewise tried with different issues as a repercussion of conflicts. The most enormous issue is maybe the taken after with utilization of adolescents as warriors

³¹ Statement by a UNDP Participant to the preparatory committee for march 2001 a UN Meeting

³² Kumssa, A., Jones, J. F., & Herbert Williams, J. (2009). *Conflict and human security in the North Rift and North Eastern Kenya. International Journal of social economics*, 36(10), pp.1008-1020.

According to Bradbury and Kleinman³³, the distribution of SALW of various types has made incredible dependency a large number of children held up in furnished clash all through the contention as well as for a considerable length of time decades after. The presence, expansion and abuse of (SALW) overwhelmingly affects children in struggle and post-strife social orders. Shabby, simple to utilize and broadly reachable, these weapons fuel numerous present clashes and broaden, banquet and grow the expenses of contention. The nearness of small arms upsurges the threats to kids both specifically, through misfortune and damage, mishandle and uprooting, and furthermore by implication, through psychosomatic injury, weakness and the loss of chances.

1.6.9 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Personal Security

According to Mkutu³⁴, where SALW are employed to upsurge doing combating in areas of difference, it is typical for also states that have savored the experience of long extends of amity to see the effect of the SALW increment inside Northern Kenya. As said some time recently, as people escape scopes of debate, SALW transferring on a diminutive scale occurs as they travel. When in doubt, these arms tumble in the hands of criminals who in this manner apply them to advance misuse the human opportunities of occupants. "Fierceness in north-western Kenya (particularly, the extents west of Lake Turkana along the Ugandan edge) has drawn out, disturbed by the readied accommodation of firearms and run-off from neighborhood conflicts." In such events the SALW are utilized to manhandle the human flexibilities of normal people in adjoining countries. "Also, the closeness of SALW in refugee and inside unstuck individuals (IDP) camps has been

³³ Bradbury, M., & Kleinman, M. (2010). *Winning Hearts and Minds?: Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in Kenya*. Medford, Mass.: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.

³⁴ Mkutu, K. A. (2012). *Small Arms and Light Weapons among pastoral groups in the Kenya-Uganda border area*. *African Affairs*, 106(422), pp.47-70.

connected with drawn out threatening and militarization, on occasion unquestionably aligned with exercises to use such camps for confirmation and detailing domains for prepared social occasions." In illustrations where SALW are utilized to force standard individuals to adequately share in battle, are their human rights disregarded and also conflicts are additionally strengthened and connected as said some time recently³⁵.

Small arms are recognized as a main cause that can disrupt the safety of persons.³⁶ It is likewise realized that the unlawful generation, exchange and development of SALW and their unnecessary development and unrestrained distribution in numerous areas of the world, have a far reaching assortment of philanthropic and financial impacts and signify a grave peril to amity, bargain, wellbeing, security, permanency and maintainable progression at the individual, group, nationwide, provincial and universal levels. As the Statement of the African Specialists on Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SA expresses, spread and illegal exchange SALW adversely affect human security, specifically on ladies, kids and other susceptible gatherings, and on foundation. Besides, the misappropriation of weaponries energizes an ethos of viciousness and undermines social orders by making a good setting for unlawful and illicit imports doings. Brutality caused by small arms debilitates great administration, dangers vital human rights, and postpones financial advancement. It irritates furnished clashes, the development of innocent peoples and hides international humanitarian law.

³⁵ Laurance, E. J., & Stohl, R. (2012). *Making global public policy: the case of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. Graduate Institute of International Studies-Small Arms Survey.

³⁶ Capie, D. (2008). Localization as resistance: The contested diffusion of small arms norms in Southeast Asia. *Security Dialogue*, 39(6), pp.637-658.

1.6.10 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Food Security

Dhanapala³⁷ opines that most likely, household rights and the access of people to essential needs comes up short when individuals are compelled to escape. Food security is additionally harmed by the doings of outfitted gatherings. For instance, the danger and provocation of regular folks by outfitted groups limits versatility (e.g. of cultivators to their farms or merchants to business sectors) and aid laborers have recognized unyielding food uncertainty amongst families in armament-soaked ranges. Even where those spots are 'profiting' from impressive agronomic and foodstuff help – decisive of an association between outfitted ferocity and admission to fundamental benefits. In Kenya, for instance, conveniences like teaching and human services have declined or crumpled in zones where SA attainable quality and utilize are high. Proficiency and school acknowledgment rates in armament influenced areas are well underneath the countrywide regular.

1.7 Gaps in the Literature

As per the above discourse, the investigation has built up almost nothing has been undertaken to analyze the effect of SALW to HS in Kenya, the methodologies utilized by the GoK to restrict the deluge of unlawful SALW into Dadaab and to inspect the effect of SALW on HS in Dadaab. In spite of the advance made in endeavoring to whelp unlawful SALW in Kenya, the writing investigated has rooted a gap in on progress to the effect against illegal SALW campaigns; all things considered, the examination looks to analyze the Influence of SALW on human security in Dadaab, Kenya.

³⁷ ibid

1.8 Justification of the Study

Policy Justification

The issues of illegal SALW around the Horn of Africa is thought little of as a straightforward social exercise, hitherto for a timeframe; there has arose innovative patterns, inclinations and flow creating it extra modern, rough and damaging. A comprehension of the flow of their effects to HS in Kenya and even so in refugee camps is essential in deciding the most fitting methods for preparing early reactions to human security impacts in the nation. Data from this examination will be helpful to performers in peace building in outlining suitable mediation components to safe guarding Human secure environments'.

Also, stream of unlawful arms inside refugee camps imperils the security of all Kenyans and means that uncontrolled convergence of weapons and unreliable outskirts with neighboring states. This outcomes in expanded levels of brutal wrongdoing; expansion of prepared state armies; invasion of cross-outskirt political/radical groupings, for example, Al-Shabaab dissenters, which may give ready ground to flimsiness in the nation. This investigation looks for methods for tending to the apparent multiplication of SALW in Dadaab Refugee Camp with an opinion to enhancing the suggested peace constructing and conflict managing, administration arrangement in assigned refugee camps in the nation.

Academic Justification

Various examinations around SALW and HS have been carried each backing comprehensively to the scholastic arenas; this investigation initially will improve

discussion around SALW, Human Security with the expectation of firming conflict deterrence, humanitarian and security studies;

Furthermore, administration of SALW in displaced person camps is a noteworthy segment for guaranteeing maintainable HS. Peace and security is relevant in empowering interest in any given range, as well as permits local people take part in monetary exercises that can enhance their expectations for everyday comforts. All things considered, the examination looks to include learning the insufficient premise of info for instruction consciousness campaigns, which amity actors characters in aid ranges use in reacting to the threat of unlawful SALW. These actors are the GoK, civil society associations and UN organizations, particularly the refugee agency –UNHCR

General Justification

In regards of an all-inclusive approach in matters concerning SALW, the study purposes at speaking on the distribution of unlawful SALW as a worldwide danger to HS and human rights with position with its pervasiveness in Dadaab Kenya.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

The Regional security complex as was progressed in the mid 1980's by Barry Buzan, and cultured by him and different equals at the finish of the Cold war will demonstrate this research. It is an arrangement of countries whose significant security discernments and worries are interwoven to the point that their national security issues can't be endeavored independently. Its individuals have interconnected security relations, and every members activity has costs for the others.³⁸

³⁸ Buzan and Waever 2003

Accumulations of Small Arms and Light Weapons without anyone else's input don't cause the contentions, yet the attainable quality of these weapons gives towards exasperating clashes, by expanding the destructiveness and time of violence.³⁹ SALW unlawful multiplication in the GLR, the HoA, West Africa and flanking nations is adding to the expansion in social violence, the elevation of exploitation, and other illegal conduct that make dangers to amity, advancement, security and after-strife reconstructing.⁴⁰

This theory is appropriate in light of the fact that it directs the examiner in seeing in what way countries tangle up in an arrangement of interconnection (the anarchic setting) which amass locally in what is characterized as security multiplexes. The complexes seized by collective risk acuities and security distresses however with no assurance of having made an unfaltering and broad enduring tranquil administration. The theory connects the national, regional and global levels of security. They work in a mix of realist (thought of limited of territoriality dispersal of power) and constructivist (securitization theory) thoughts creating a base up perception which security complexes get up from the statement of security needs by the conceivable basic units.⁴¹

1.10 Research Methodology

This part identifies the organizational measures employed in information collection and analyses. They comprise of the research design, location of the study, population of the study, sampling procedure and sample size, instrumentation, information collection and information analysis.

³⁹ General Assembly Resolution A/52/298, *Small Arm* 27 August 1997

⁴⁰ *African Union Strategy to Control of Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Member States Experts*, held on 26-29 September 2011, Lomé, Togo.

⁴¹ Baert, F., Scaramagli T., Soderbaum F (2014) *Intersecting Inter regionalism: Regions, Global Governance and the EU*, New York, Springer Book p.79,80

The research methodology instrumentalizes the research into understanding the relationship between SALW and human security.

1.10.1 Research Design

This is an descriptive overview and utilized both qualitative and quantitative strategies. It incorporated the determination of an example of persons upon who partook in sorted out Focused Group Discussions centered towards understanding the influence of SALW on human security. Information was assembled from pre-determined respondents about their encounters and assessments so as to sum up the discoveries to the populace that the sample was proposed to represent. This outline was the most reasonable for this examination since it expected to acquire clear, truthful, attitudinal data, opinions, qualities and present or past practices; including giving the researcher to open the respondents to an arrangement of inquiries for a chance that permitted correlation. The plan expected that all the imminent respondents had information or experience that bore on the issue being explored.

1.10.2 Study Area

Dadaab includes five camps that is Dagahaley, Ifo Main, Ifo 2, Kambioos and Hagadera. Notwithstanding, since the GoK choice to shut down Dadaab Refugee camp, Kambioos camp shut on the fifteenth of February 2017 leaving just four camps. Masses of the camp contains fundamentally of those of Somali origin, and a constrained number being from South Sudan and Ethiopia. The reason the researcher chose Hagadera Camp in Dadaab as the study area is because of the government's stand that Dadaab is the hub of criminal elements that pose insecurity threats for the country and where misuse of SALW is on the rise.

1.10.3 Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis was preselected key informant respondents that included the police, humanitarian workers and refugees. This unit of analysis was preselected because they interact with information regarding SALW in Dadaab Refugee Camp. In-depth interviews from pre-selected opinion leaders and refugees in Dadaab provided material on likely association between SALW and HS.

Table 1: Sample Size

Category of Respondent	Desired Sample Size	Sampling Technique
Police (Regular and AP)	15	Key Informant
Refugees in Hagadera Camp	90	Simple Random Sampling
Humanitarian workers	100	Simple Random Sampling
University of Nairobi	5	Purposive Selection

Sample size (Source, Researcher 2017)

For the purposes of this study, the number of respondents was determined using the formula adopted.⁴²

1.10.4 Sampling Procedure

Purposive sampling was used to hand-pick and categorize the aid workers working in Hagadera refugee camp; they formed the key informants. A total of 20 key informants were reached. Out of the 20, 10 were police and 10 were humanitarian workers. The study also adopted random sampling procedure whereby every fifth refugee with the card was sampled for the survey.

⁴² Mugenda, O. M., & Mugenda, A. G. (1999). *Research Methods: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*. Nairobi: Acts Press.

1.10.5 Research Instruments

Research Instruments are dimension tools intended to get data on a topic of importance from research subjects.

1.10.6 Data Collection Methods

The examination was basically descriptive in nature, in that capacity connected both qualitative and quantitative information gathering strategies to extensively capture the vital information. The utilization of qualitative and quantitative information was credited to the way that the SALW and Human security are phenomena that can't be adequately discussed by one strategy as it were. The two strategies allowed for triangulation of data gathered and thusly, supplemented each other in increasing more perception into the subject and at the same time assemble numeric data to create quantitative indicators

Information was gathered utilizing interview guides with respondents. A key informants' guide was utilized to get aid workers and police knowledge on influence of SALW on human security in Dadaab Refugee camp. The questionnaire was directed to the key informants with help of one research aide. The utilization of a questionnaire enabled each respondent to get a comparable assessing tool to finish which occasioned in standardized responses.

1.10.7 Data Analysis and Presentation

Finished questionnaires were abridged for completeness; at that point the data was examined through thematic content analysis. Other Descriptive statistics would incorporate frequencies, percentages and means exhibited in tables, charts which were utilized to condense, compose and break down information, depicted the characteristics

of the sample. After information examination, the outcomes were synchronized, interpreted and talked about.

1.10.8 Pilot Testing of the Instruments

Pre-testing of the instruments was done at University of Nairobi with students of Diplomacy and International studies.

1.10.9 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

Unwavering quality and authenticity was developed for institutionalization of the research instruments to be used as a piece of the examination. Content authenticity of the examination instruments was furthermore settled in order to guarantee that they reflected the substance of the thoughts being alluded to. In the first place, the instruments were constructed differently in relation to the set goals to ensure that they address the targets. Second, authorities (my supervisor Dr. Martin Ouma) from the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies was counselled to look at the essentialness of the survey things against the set objectives of the examination. The instruments were then taken for managing on a people that had close similar qualities as the goal masses. The objective of steering was to take out any unclear things, set up if there are issues in controlling the instruments, test information accumulation directions, develop the possibility of the investigation, expect and change any legitimate and procedural troubles concerning the examination, and allow preparatory information examination; including testing the unfaltering nature of the instrument.

1.10.10 Data Collection Procedure and Ethical Considerations

The collection of data needed to be endorsed at all levels including by the academic supervisor. At the state level, a license to accumulate info was gotten from the National Council for Science and Technology (Nacosti). Dadaab Refugee camps committees moreover gave authorization. Respondents were requested to take an interest deliberate after intensive clarification that there would be no physical, mental or social hazard related with participation in the study. The clarifications were verbal and in writing. The secrecy of data was ensured such that the member info would not be presented to general society. Every respondent dealt with his/her questionnaire secretly. There was no individual identity mark on the questionnaire.

1.11 Chapter Outline

Chapter One is the presentation and incorporates foundation of the investigation, articulation of the issue, targets, look into questions, hypothetical structure and the writing survey, procedure and section layout. The second chapter evaluates the components affecting the multiplication of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Dadaab Refugee Camp. Chapter three investigates SALW control measures set by the administration of Kenya to check the influence of SALW in Dadaab Refugee Camp. The fourth section explores the influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Human Security. The last chapter gives a synopsis of the fundamental discoveries, dialog of the outcomes, conclusion, proposals and recommendations for regions of further research.

CHAPTER TWO

FACTORS INFLUENCING PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN DADAAB

2.0 Introduction

Small arms abuse influences everybody from the individual to the international community. Human rights abusers utilize them to confer additional legal executions and constrained vanishings and for torment. Women and girls persevere assault, viciousness, kidnappings, subjection and constrained prostitution at the barrel of weapons, while young men die from firearm wounds in disturbing numbers. Indeed, even those that are not straightforwardly focused on can be casualties, enduring the psychosocial injury related with living through war and watching brutality.⁴³

Conflicts waged with small arms force millions of people from their homes every year. In December 2005, an estimated twenty-four million people in at least fifty countries were on the move due to armed violence. Populations are often affected by small arms even when a conflict has ended as refugees fear returning home because of small arms-wielding criminals in their communities or on their travel routes. The multiplying and abuse of small arms also affect social structures indirectly because family or families are weakened and support for children is disrupted when parents are killed by small arms, or when small arms violence fixes children to flee alone.⁴⁴

⁴³ Stohl, R. Schroeder, M, Smith D, *The Small Arms Trade: A Beginner's Guide* (England, OneWorld Publications, 2012) p. 8

⁴⁴ Ibid

2.1 Crime

It can be characterized as a demonstration of power or extortion embraced in quest for self-intrigue. This incorporates burglary (which gives "cash without work"), assault (sex without courtship) for instance.

A standout amongst the most significant issues related with many camps is the disappointment of local authorities to give full protection to displaced people especially since camps are frequently situated in or near, clash zones. In the long haul, camps can wind up noticeably risky, wrongdoing-ridden places assailed by arms and drug smuggling. Refugees in these camps frequently endure domestic abuse and physical intimidation.⁴⁵

People that have been the casualties of wrongdoing can be especially dreadful of its prostration, can live in consistent dread of this and may never again move around and act in the sort of flexibility to which they were acclimated. Even non-victims can respond to their perception of possible victimhood similarly. Living with relative levels of anxiety or fear that impact on duty life and behaviour, perhaps leading to social isolation and withdrawal is thus an important aspect of how crime potentially affects society more widely than any crime event itself.⁴⁶

The study observed that crime was prevalent in the camp. Most of it being committed by youth in different sections within Hagadera camp. Most of them using knives and pistols

⁴⁵ United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR): *Fifty years of humanitarian action* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) P. 108.

⁴⁶ Coomber, R. Donnermeyer, J. McElrath, K. Scott, J, *Key Concepts in Crime and Society* (London, Sage Publications, 2014) p. 56

to attack civilians. Some of those who are attack steal things like money, alien cards, non-food items that have been distributed by agencies and also electronics in households.⁴⁷

A hundred percent of the respondents agree that SALW holders live within them as they use the same to steal property and kill people in the camps. They also mention that crime in the camp has to an extent reduced since a curfew has been placed in Hagadera camp⁴⁸

The study observed that majority of the respondents are familiar with small arms like AK-47, pistols, knives, machetes and axes.⁴⁹ A small percentage of the respondents who are well vast with the weapons mentioned that they are aware of other weapons like light machine guns, G3, grenades, IEDs and carabines being readily available and misused in the camp by bandits, militias and other criminal elements.⁵⁰ It was noted that most of those who commit crimes in the camps are part of the youth bulge in Hagadera camp, who are unemployed and are trying to make a living by stealing property, and also being incited and brainwashed by militia groups for personal gain. Some of those who commit these crimes are not only refugees, but also those from the host community, who reside in Fafi constituency.⁵¹

⁴⁷ FGD Discussion held on 7th September 2017 in Hagadera, Block J9 (Views by Galbay Issack Kulow)

⁴⁸ FGD Discussion held on 7th September 2017 in Hagadera, Block J9

⁴⁹ FGD Discussion held on the 8th September 2017 in Hagadera Transit Area

⁵⁰ Individual Interview held on 23rd September 2017 in Dadaab Police Station (Tango 2 station)

⁵¹ FGD held on 23rd August 2017 in Hagadera, Block D3

2.2. Porous Borders

Porous borders still remain a critical problem. Many scholars assert the issue of porous borders has always been problematic in the region particularly as a result of weak governments that were unable to exercise authority throughout the state.⁵²

Outskirts are permeable and groups on either side keep up close ties base on ethnicity, dialect, culture and exchange. Shared grievances, for example, natural or socio-economic elements, or underestimation in view of a typical distinguish, find ideological help crosswise over outskirts. Permeable fringes and normal ties additionally encourages the movement of individuals state armies, laborers and refugees and arms, drugs and stash.⁵³

State nearness in fringe ranges is marginal all through EA, mirroring an over-all letdown of the legislatures to forces the external scopes of their regions. Kenya's outskirt with Somalia for example, is permeable and in vast part parched and meagerly inhabited, to a great extent by ethnic Somalis. In spite of the fact that there are ostensible traditions checkpoints of the principle Kenyan section focuses, whatever is left of the fringe is once in a while watched and there are many smuggling routes.⁵⁴

The focus group discussions⁵⁵ observed that most respondents agree that the security situation in Dadaab is very unpredictable. At times, it is very calm and at times program activities by aid agencies have to stall because of insecurity in the camps.

⁵² Davis, J Bangura A, *Terrorism in Africa: The Evolving Front in War on Terror* (UK, Lexington Books, 2010) p. 136

⁵³ Mogaka, S. Verjee N, Marc A, *The Challenge of Stability and Security in West Africa* (USA, The World Bank, 2015) p. 18

⁵⁴ Rabasa, A, *Radical Islam in East Africa* (USA, RAND, 2009) p. 20

⁵⁵ FGD discussion held with aid workers, in DMO,Dadaab on August 24th 2017

In the month of May 2017 for example, the number of undocumented persons and new arrivals in the camp skyrocketed, all of who crossed the border as they headed for the camps. Some of these undocumented persons as referred to by UNHCR have been blamed for the smuggling of these weapons. Not only do they carry the arms, but also the labour force and the skills to assemble the same weapons used to commit crimes in the camp.⁵⁶ The situation according to those who have been mandated to ensure border security state that the situation in the camp is under control and that the authority is taking all the necessary steps to ensure that those who are crossing the border are properly screened in regards, to documentation and other belongings or property.⁵⁷

The respondents⁵⁸ noted that there is still much to be done at the border points as border patrols are not enough to guarantee the security of civilians and those who reside in Dadaab refugee camps. There is need for more officers and more security equipment to be deployed at the border, and reliance on unconventional security like intelligence gathering.

One respondent notes that the border is vast and stretches to more than 700 kms and therefore border patrols becomes redundant because Kenya does not have the capacity to ensure regular patrols along the border. Therefore it makes it easy for bandits, HSM militants and other criminal elements to cross the border. Herders in Abaratilo and Kotile forests, Dagelena and other outskirts of Dadaab have spotted these elements most times.

⁵⁶ Individual Interview held in INSO, Dadaab with Yusuf Omar on 14th September 2017

⁵⁷ Individual Interview held on 24th September 2017 with OCPD, Dadaab

⁵⁸ Interview held with Kevin Kithela, UNMAS (Kismayo, Somalia) and former KDF Soldier who served for 13 years (Held on, 5th September 2017)

They sometimes use and abandon vehicles in the areas that they operate in, as they head for the camps or plan attacks to attack security forces based at the border.⁵⁹

2.3 Refugees

Similarly, an association has been drawn between the existence of refugees and the flow of SA into Kenya, where the accessibility of such weapons has expanded significantly, helping to deepen lethal bandit assaults and clan rivalries in the nation's north east. Because of the expanded insecurity, more individuals are arming themselves, in this manner filling the winding of viciousness, which has now spread into Kenya's capital. The flow of small arms into Kenya is encouraged by the absence of a functional government in Somalia, not just basically by the refugees. In the general visibility, nonetheless, everybody crossing the outskirts from Somalia is a displaced person. It is on the premise of this affiliation, and the way that terrorism in the locale and SA multiplication do have roots; in Somalia that Somali refugees are really seen as immediate security dangers by the government.⁶⁰

Before 1991, the Kenyan government used an adhoc organizational refugee status system to identify refugees. Generally, refugees were allowed to integrate locally and enjoy the rights to work, to an education and to freedom of movement. However, with the increase of regional conflicts and the massive influx of refugees beginning in 1991, the Kenyan government surrendered its role in refugee status determination (RSD) to UNHCR. Managing with the excessive entry of Somali refugees and the associated dread of

⁵⁹ FGD discussion held with Safety and Security humanitarian workers on 14th September 2017, at INSO offices, Dadaab.

⁶⁰ Loescher, G.Milner J, *Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and International Security Implications* (New York: Routledge Books, 2005) p. 42

amplified insecurity, the Government of Kenya, approved a common encampment policy, and thus Dadaab was formed in 1993.⁶¹

It was noted that refugees are not to blame for the proliferation of SALW. First, because the porous border is so long and vast, and this therefore means that it is open for all sorts of criminal elements to come through. Ideally, because these incidents happen in Daadab or outskirts of Dadaab, it would only be logical to put the blame on refugees.⁶² These SALW are not only in the hands of refugees but are also found in Mandera, Wajir and El-Wak, Lafey and Liboi and therefore, through porous borders and criminal elements, they then find themselves in the camps.

The study observed that it is true that some of the refugees have been found to directly commit these crimes and that some of them have gone ahead to even harbor these criminals, and not share information with the authorities about their presence in the camps.⁶³ It was noted that between the months of January 2017 and April 2017 there were 15,378 returnees and 9183 new arrivals who fled from Somalia to the camp. The respondents interviewed gave varied reasons, some sighted that they fled back because of the drought, security, lack of quality healthcare and to access quality education in the camp. In one of the sessions, one respondent said that:

“Al Shabaab has a habit of arresting those who are intending to cross into Kenya. In most cases, those on flight usually get killed and arrested. I met two girls who are new arrivals. Al Shabaab had arrested and killed their families. The two girls are now

⁶¹ Hollenbach D. *Refugee Rights: Ethics, Advocacy and Africa* (USA. Georgetown University Press, 2008) p 92

⁶² FGD Discussion held with humanitarian workers at UNHCR Offices, Dadaab on the 28th August 2017

⁶³ Individual interview with police held on 23rd September 2017

*pregnant in the camp,” says one respondent. In some cases, children return on their own, while leaving their family members behind.*⁶⁴

Table 2: Data on Undocumented Persons

Months	Description of Persons identified to be on the move/crossed the border into Kenya	
	Returnees	New Arrivals
January 2017	2,190	2,833
February 2017	7,888	2,235
March 2017	0	2,225
April 2017	5,300	1,900
Total	15,378	9,183

(Source: Field data from Refugee Consortium of Kenya-RCK)

The study also observed that among the new arrivals and returnees, that there are other criminal elements as much as there are others with genuine concerns. Militias and other criminal elements in search for better standards of living also cross the border, in the form of new arrivals and returnees. The month of June 2017, soon after the influx of the undocumented persons witnessed a lot of insecurity in the form of IED attacks placed on the Dadaab-Liboi road and this may be attributed to the influx.⁶⁵

2.4 Corruption

The term corruption is defined as deceitful or unlawful conduct, particularly by influential persons such as government administrators or police officers. A portion of the real reasons for corruption incorporate individual covetousness, decay of individual

⁶⁴ FGD Discussion held on 4th June 2017 in Hagadera Camp, Section I2(Views by Hawo Ali Aden)

⁶⁵ Individual interview held on 23rd September 2017 with the OCPD, Dadaab Police Station (Tango 2 Station)

moral sensitivity, absence of straightforwardness particularly at the institutional level and furthermore moderate legal procedures.⁶⁶

It is a standout amongst the most worldwide marvel that practically every nation is battling with to tackle. It is spreading speedier than an endemic; corruption rates and wrongdoing rates have soar in the course of recent decades. Corruption levels have reached alarming proportions in African countries. Driven by rapacity and neediness numerous government authorities are among experts of corruption which thus powers the local people to swing to wrongdoing as their last choice. Corruption hampers advancement in Africa.⁶⁷

Police corruption and inadequacy in Kenya has made the nation all the additionally engaging for al Qaeda associates. Indeed, even with changes which are accepted to have decreased corruption in the Kenyan police, Kenya's security sector battles to screen considerably higher, rates of global transactions all through Kenya than do neighboring nations.⁶⁸

In Kenya, and different nations not at conflict, the set obtainability of these weaponries weakens security (counting with connection to crime) dissolves forecasts for improvement; adds to social deterioration and influences the fall back on brutality more to likely and all the more lethal. Kenya is defenseless against weapons trafficking in light of its terrestrial area in a conflict-ridden locale. The weaponries circling in Kenya originated from, dwellings as far as China and the United States, yet the vast majority of

⁶⁶ Ugono, E, *The Impact of Corruption in Africa* (Nigeria, Xlibris Corporation, 2015) p. 1,2

⁶⁷ Chinuda, E. *Grappling with change in Africa: The Dream of Prosperity using African Wisdom* (USA, Author House, 2014) p. 122

⁶⁸ Innes, A. M. *Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens* (USA, P.S.I, 2007) p. 77

them went through battle areas in neighboring nations previously advancing toward Kenya's illegal firearm markets.⁶⁹

Majority of the respondents agree that the reasons there is presence, and an increase of these weapons in the camp is because of corruption from the side of the Government of Kenya. Even those who are arrested are released when they offer bribes to police officers.⁷⁰

The lack of accountability and transparency is also a contributing factor to the proliferation of these arms in Dadaab. One respondent makes reference to the events of June 2017, where some militia men who had planted IEDs along Dadaab-Hagadera road. Photos of the men who had committed these crimes surfaced online and had been booked in Hagadera police station for further questioning, and yet no word was given to the civilians.⁷¹

2.5 Personal Protection

One of the most important ways in which societies are transformed by war is the diffusion of weapons throughout communities. The term diffusion recommends the scattering of arms in social orders, stretching out to governments and state-claimed entities as well as to private armed forces and civilian armies, guerilla gatherings, criminal associations and other non-state actors. Weapons are diffused into war-torn and post -conflict societies via a variety of mechanisms.

⁶⁹ Human rights Watch, *Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya* (USA, HRC, 2002) p. 1

⁷⁰ FGD Discussions with humanitarian workers on 19th July 2017 in Dadaab, DMO

⁷¹ *ibid*

This includes; deliberate arming of militias and paramilitaries, combatants retaining weapons, trafficking networks used to supply combatants, corrupt sale by uniformed personnel, authorized purchase from firearm retailers and loss or theft of weapons. Amid a furnished clash, non-soldiers are seriously suspicious and law implementation won't not work fittingly. In such conditions, people will much of the time get arms for individual security, notwithstanding meeting up to ensure their communities are protected.⁷²

As aforementioned, ownership of an assortment of small arms is broad in numerous nations, separating a long ways past armed forces and police powers to resistance gatherings, criminal associations, private security forces, vigilante squads and individual citizens. In spite of the fact that weapons are regularly obtained to give a feeling that all is well with the world, the result might be the correct inverse. It is in this manner not astonishing, that a few nations bear what might as well be called an arms race. In any case, the all the more intensely equipped a general public is, the more insecure it may come to feel with good examples such as the United States of America, and South Africa.⁷³

The study established that most of the respondents do not have faith in the police and their ability to protect them within Hagadera camp. Some of the measures that have been put by the Government of Kenya have by a very small extent ensured that the community is safe from criminal elements. Personal protection involves the fact the community is in

⁷² Greene O, Marsh N, *Small Arms, Crime and Conflict: Global governance and the threat of armed violence* (U.S.A, Routledge Books, 2012) p. 73

⁷³ Renner M. *Small Arms, Big Impact: The Next Challenge of Disarmament* (USA, Diane Publishing, 1997) p.7

possession of some of this SALW, in order for them to protect themselves and their families.⁷⁴

Majority of the Somali men carry with them a small knife that resembles a dagger. It is referred to as ‘*Toorey*’ in the Somali language. The nomadic lifestyle of the Somali of the community has made it a norm for them to carry it.⁷⁵ Some of the respondents mentioned that they own guns in order to protect their cattle as they graze in the outskirts of the camp. They mentioned that it helps protect them from bandits who they often encounter along the roads.⁷⁶

2.6 Clannism

The Somali people share a solid people custom, in view of the legend of a typical predecessor. According to one Somali scholar, “clannism is the Somali version of the generic problem of ethnicity or tribalism” it signifies aboriginal cleavages and cultural disintegration within Somali society, and clannism, lies at the root of the country’s collapse.⁷⁷ The violent conflicts between Somali refugees in Dadaab were also chiefly fought along clan lines.

Clannism forms is a very important component in the community in Dadaab Refugee Camp. It is a form of identity, and a way of life of the majority Somali community in the camp. According to one of the respondent.

The Somali clan system breaks down to sub-clans and other sub-clans still underneath. One of the respondent helps me to understand it better. At the very top are the 2 main

⁷⁴ FGD Discussion held in Hagadera Camp, Block J10 on 3rd August 2017

⁷⁵ *ibid*

⁷⁶ *ibid*

⁷⁷ Rotberg R, *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (U.S.A, B.I.P, 2003) P. 132.

ones, Samaal and Sa'ab, then just below that is Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Rahanweyne, and many other sub-clans underneath. When an incident happens within the community, for example: when one kills, commits rape, fraud and even steal it is not the individual who is responsible that will be answerable but rather it is the collective responsibility of the clan to handle the issue. The clan relationships are based on traditional relationships better known as *Xeer* (Customary Law). Most times feuds carry on until formally resolved by agreement also known as *Maslaha*. The price paid after the settlement are in form of money and sometimes in the form of cattle most times camels. The price of one came varies between 50,000-80,000 Kenya shillings. Most of the criminal elements and militia men are hosted by clan members who remain faithful them and don't report to authorities.⁷⁸

The only common thing that is reported is the fact that the men have been spotted by community members but never exactly, where they reside. Weeks later, after the militia men have committed crimes, it is observed that community members were aware of where they resided including the section and block, to finer details to when they arrived in the camp.⁷⁹

It was observed that clannism where different clans feel the need to arm themselves because of the threat they face from the other clans. One such sub-clan is that of the Somali Bantu that mainly resides in Hagadera, sections J8,J9,J10 and spread out in other sections to include L,M and N. For a very long time the Somali Bantu has faced discrimination from other Somali clan members. They are considered to not be a pure

⁷⁸ Individual interview held with Hassan Noor, Safety and Security Officer, UNDSS on 29th August 2017 at UNHCR Office, Ban Ki Moon 2 Conference Room, Dadaab

⁷⁹ FGD Discussion held with humanitarian workers on 30th July 2017 in Dadaab

breed of Somalis, because of their physical appearances that don't resemble that of the Somalis. The women get abused at the tap stands and the children bullied in school.

Some of the respondents of Somali Bantu origin mentioned that they are called names like '*Sanweyne*' meaning someone with a big nose, and others to include '*Oji*', which is associated to mean that of not belonging to the Somali community. ⁸⁰This has caused most of them to arm themselves in order to defend themselves and their families, and this in turn, contributes to the increase of SALW in the camp.

2.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed the factors influencing proliferation of SALW in Dadaab. It was observed that there are different factors that influence the proliferation of these arms to include clannism is a way of life for the Somali community and also how plays a big role in how the community harbors some of these militiamen and criminal elements, who are holders of these weapons. The other factors to include porous borders, which has been a menace for the government of Kenya and security forces and: corruption, which still plagues the security sector, mandated to protect the civilians. In addition, refugees, who cross borders unchecked and personal protection, go to show that there is much that still needs to be done to deconstruct the notion that owning these arms makes one feel more protected or safe.

⁸⁰ FGD Discussion held in Hagadera Section J8 on 29th July 2017 and led with the Hagadera Somali Bantu Chairman Abdi Daud Ahmed.

CHAPTER THREE
CONTROL MEASURES ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN
DADAAB

3.0 Introduction

Most arms control endeavors since World War II have been given to atomic and particular weapons of mass annihilation to overwhelming general weapons. Since the United Nations Secretary-General issued a supplement to his 1995 Agenda for peace regarding the issue (January 1995), stretching out idea has been given to the weapons that are really making the loathings found in Africa, the Balkans, and unmistakable parts of the world.

These weapons are SALW, for example, land mines, strike rifles (the AK-47), and programmed weapons. Extensively, SALW join a wide blend of dangerous instruments from handguns to man-portable air defense systems. The all-around perceived significance of small arms is typically seen, as disguising man-versatile guns and their ammo essentially made arrangements for specific use by military powers as deadly weapons. Light weapons are generally heavier and more prominent than little arms and intended to be utilized by a humbler assembling or gathering of infantry work urge.⁸¹

3.1 Disarmament

Disarmament is thought to be the best methods for averting war and ensuring peace. It is ordinarily trusted that unless there is disarmament, war and annihilation can't be checked. The main direct reason for war as per disarmament approach is the presence of weapons.⁸²

⁸¹ U.S Foreign Policy Agenda, *Small Arms and Light Weapons. Can they be Controlled? Small Arms and Light Weapons: US Policy and View*, Volume 6, No. 2 (June 2001) pp 7-8

⁸² Joshi S, *International Relations: From 1914 to Present Day* (India, Goel Publishing House, 2005) p. 88

Overall and whole disarmament under stern and viable worldwide control remains a definitive objective of all endeavors applied in the field of disarmament. The primary duties regarding demobilization lie with Member states. The United Nations according to its charter has a central role, and crucial responsibility in helping party states in the capacity.⁸³

Proponents of disarmament argue that, disarmament helps in the lessening of devastation by forestalling deaths and wounds to people, and animals that would have happened because of ownership of weapons; decreases the penchant of criminality in urban ranges because of development of weapons from peaceful zones to urban focuses. It additionally helps in elevating arranged resolutions to the contention, rather than the utilization of arms, makes a situation for infrastructural and financial improvement among pastoralists and takes out odds of dangers of neighboring groups who generally would be armed.⁸⁴

The study observed that disarmament as a control measure that has been used in Dadaab camp. The police officers and the military have used it a way to curb the proliferation of SALW. It was noted that most of the weapons that have been found and surrendered by militia men and other criminal elements include those between 2.2-60 millimeters.⁸⁵

They include the FN conversion, G3 (7.62×51mm), AK47, FN, L1A1, Carabine, Kalbooster, Pistols, Cesca 75, Cesca 85 and Cesca 100.⁸⁶ There have been times when some have surrendered their weapons to authorities after awareness and sensitizations in the community. This has worked to some extent but what has worked even better is the

⁸³ United States General Assembly, *Strategic Framework for the Period 2010 – 2011*, Supplement no 6, 63rd Session (New York, 2009) P. 65

⁸⁴ Kimani N, *Youth and Peaceful Elections in Kenya* (Kenya, Twaweza Communications Ltd, 2013) P. 156.

⁸⁵ Individual interview held on 24th September 2017 with police in Dadaab Police Station (Tango 2 station)

⁸⁶ Individual Interview held on 23rd September 2017 with police in Dadaab Police Station (Tango 2 Station)

fact that police have used forced disarmament. The use of forced disarmament involves sporadic swoops that have been carried out by police within the camps. In the process of these swoops and patrols, many of the weapons that have been aforementioned have been recovered.⁸⁷

The reason that most of these militiamen and other criminal elements have refused to surrender these weapons is that they fear the authorities and they also the consequence that come with the surrender of these weapons. Therefore, most of the surrender has happened during the sessions with the community leaders including religious and elders in the community.⁸⁸

The use of forced disarmament as a control measure has worked well in the area according to one of the respondent because of the continued buildup and the fact that disarmament has taken so long to work, notwithstanding the fact that SALW continues. This according to majority of the respondents has worked well.⁸⁹

The study observed that the used of forced disarmament is very hectic, but very successful in ensuring that the camp is safe for refugees to live, for businesses to open and for humanitarian workers to continue operating as well, to provide the much needed assistance as well.⁹⁰ All the vehicles that are used by the police for example in Dadaab refugee camp are provided for the United Nation High Commission for Refugees.

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ FGD discussion held on July 26th 2017 with CPPT members in Hagadera Refugee Camp, Section F

⁸⁹ Individual Interview held on 23rd September 2017 with OCPD, Dadaab in Dadaab Police Station (Tango 2 station)

⁹⁰ ibid

3.2 Amnesty

The word amnesty originates from the Greek stem *amnestia* which means to overlook. An amnesty is a lawful mechanism that adequately destroys a past deed, in the meantime lifting the likelihood of discipline for the individual responsible for the deed.

Demonstrations of amnesty are one-time-just occasions, every now and again ordered after the change in an administration. For example, after majority rule came to South Africa; a type of amnesty was presented for the individuals who had committed human rights violations during the apartheid era.⁹¹ In addition, weapons collections programs organized by Gun Free South Africa, for example, were followed by the South African Government announcement of a twenty. Four-hour gun amnesty in late 1994.

In 1996, Gun Free Zones were established in South Africa's rural areas, such as the village of Mapela where 'no gun signs, resembling 'No Smoking' signs, were displayed in prominent areas where gun possession was no longer tolerated.⁹²

At the national level, Kenya likewise has over and over utilized temporary gun amnesties to urge citizens to hand over unlawful weapons in return for a guarantee they won't confront arraignment. These accordingly met with little achievement, as they do not address the uncertainty and different issues fundamental the interest for weapons.⁹³ In 2015, Kenya declared amnesty and rehabilitation to youth who joined Al-Shabaab, and requesting that they enlist with the government in ten days. Following the enactment of

⁹¹ Horvitz , Catherwood C, *Encyclopedia of War Crimes and Genocide* (USA, Infobase Publishing, 2006) P. 17.

⁹² Rogers P, *Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security* (England, Ashgate, 2009) p. 175

⁹³ Human Rights Watch, *Playing with Fire: Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights In Kenya* (USA, HRW, 2002) P. 19.

the security laws amendment Act 2014, the government would rehabilitate youth who had been radicalized and those who were vulnerable to radicalization as well.⁹⁴

The respondents noted that there are those that have heeded to the calls by the leaders, elders and the government of Kenya to surrender their weapons without consequences. Authorities have used this control measure in order to curb the misuse of illicit SALW.⁹⁵

To an extent, the study noted that this measure has worked with little success when the government has called for the holders of these weapons to release them so that they may be granted amnesty. Majority of the respondents noted that they don't have faith in the government including the police and military. One of the respondents noted that swoops that have been conducted in the camps before have used excessive force and therefore most of them fear the wrath that comes with surrendering their weapons. The preference to surrender to community is obvious because some of the criminal elements feel that they will not be targeted if they surrender to community leaders and elders.⁹⁶

3.3 Sensitization Campaigns

Sensitization and awareness raising were stated as significant channels in notifying persons about the hazards of SA and equipped ferocity.

The major clarification behind civilians to pass on armaments is to guarantee themselves their relatives and their own particular property without a practical and put stock in security system. Moreover, a fragile economy and expeditiously open small arms bolster the climb of guiltiness; bracing the impression among the masses, that possession a

⁹⁴ Ombati, C, *Kenya announces amnesty and Reintegration to Youth who denounce Al-Shabaab*, The Standard, Nairobi, 14th April, 2015, p.3

⁹⁵ FGD discussion held on 01 August 2017 in Hagadera Camp, Section F3

⁹⁶ *ibid*

weapon builds individual security. Civil society organization have been dynamic since way back in securitization campaigns and accumulation of weapons in war torn nations.⁹⁷

During the focus group, discussion respondents noted that the awareness sessions in the community are increasingly are, bringing change to the community. It was also evident that the sessions are ensuring that the youth in the community are engaging themselves in many constructive activities.

Parents and caregivers have also been taught on good parenting skills. One respondent notes that aid agencies especially the ones that deal with child protection have taught them on positive parenting and proper child rearing practices. They know see more than ever the importance of ensuring that their children and other children, who are not their own are engaged in activities that do not expose them to militia men who may want to radicalize them.⁹⁸

Agencies like The UNHCR and LWF continue to train and impart skills on Community Peace and Protection Teams (CPPT) who presently monitor, answer to and account security occurrences at community equal in the camp. They are also trained in disaster preparedness and management. Majority of the respondents said that they prefer community structures to handle matters security, because they have better approaches on the same. The Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) also works with the authorities to ensure that the sessions are thorough and seamless.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Bryden A. Scherrer V, *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform: Insights from UN Experience in Afghanistan, Burundi, The Central African Republic and the Democratic of the Congo* (Germany, DCAF.2012) p. 97

⁹⁸ FGD discussion held on 24th August 2017 in Hagadera Camp, Section M1

⁹⁹ Individual interview held with Saleh Tembo, of UNDSS, held on 28th August 2017 in Dadaab, DMO

3.4 Border Patrols

The border amongst Kenya and Somalia is just about 700km long and in spite of the stronghold and patrol endeavors once the fringe was closed, refugees keep on crossing, rushing to gauntlet between the outskirt and one of the refugee camps they have to reach so as to enlist with UNHCR and dodge extradition.¹⁰⁰

After the Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia in 2006, Kenya closed its border to Somalia, and stepped up border patrols with international counterterrorism assistance. In 2009, and 2010, the Somali Al-Shabaab militia repeatedly threatened to launch attacks on Kenyan territory and minor incursions into Kenya by Somali militias have become regular.¹⁰¹

Perceiving the genuine danger postured by SALW, the Government of Kenya has just propelled a variety of endeavors intended to shore up the nation's capacity to anticipate trafficking. For example, the Kenya Ports Authority has influenced noteworthy walks in executing the Global Maritime Organizations to ship and port office safety efforts.¹⁰²

The study observed that adequate border patrol police that have helped to decrease the presence of SALW in the camp to a very small percentage because the border is very vast and runs almost 700 kilometers, therefore making it hard to control who and what happening along the Kenya-Somalia border. The respondents however, mention that the government is aware of that and is working to ensure that security at the border is never compromised.

¹⁰⁰ Pickering S, *Women, Borders and Violence: Comment Issues in Asylum, Forced Migration and Trafficking* (Australia, Springer books, 2011) p. 26

¹⁰¹ Amar P, *Global South to the Rescue: Emerging Humanitarian Superpowers and Globalizing Rescue Industries* (USA, Rutledge Books, 2013) p. 133

¹⁰² Finlay B, Bergenas, J, Tesser V, *Beyond Boundaries in Eastern Africa: Bridging the Security Development Divide with International Security Assistance* (New York, DIANE Publishing , 2011) p. 32

One of the respondent mentioned that at the moment all security agents and military forces have been deployed at the border even as the elections on the 26th of October 2016 is fast approaching. The reason for this is because Al-Shabaab has threatened to take advantage of national events that attract large crowds, and numbers of people. Not only have the respondents threatened but have also attacked, injured and killed security agents at the border and there has been need to deploy even more of the security agents at the border.¹⁰³

There are plans that are also underway to construct a wall along the border and also put security cameras. The government is also aware that there are other alternative routes that the militiamen and other criminal elements use in order to access the camps, but that much still needs to be done on the same. It was also noted that there is need to have more specialized forces along the border like bomb experts.¹⁰⁴

3.5 Camp Patrols

The Dadaab camps are located in a part of the country that faces the threat of banditry, armed in that case, robberies, sexual violence and even terrorism.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees, UNHCR presented fencing around the outcast camps and collaborated with the Kenyan police to advance more prominent physical security. The Kenyan government enlarged police nearness in the camps,

¹⁰³ Individual interview with the OCS, Hagadera Camp Dadaab on 13th September 2017 in Hagadera Police Station (Tango 5 station)

¹⁰⁴ Individual Interview held on 23rd September 2017 with OCPD, Dadaab in Dadaab Police Station (Tango 2 station)

requested more regular police watches (counting bi-month to month helicopter watches).¹⁰⁵

Since late 2011, known individuals accepted to be sympathizers of al-Shabaab the outfitted Islamist assemble battling the Somali government and associated powers in Somalia carried out terrorist assaults on regular citizen targets and security forces in North Eastern Province, circumscribing Somalia, Nairobi and Mombasa too. Police posts, patrols and vehicles having a place with government organizations including the armed force were assaulted with landmines and improvised explosive gadgets crosswise over North Eastern province.¹⁰⁶

The study observed that there has been a constant camp patrol in Hagadera to ensure that security is maintained within the camps. The government has ensured that patrols are happening not only at night but also during the day.

The respondents mentioned that a curfew has been put in Hagadera and that refugees cannot walk around the camp at certain times in the night. Aid agencies have ensured that there are sufficient vehicles that can do camp controls through UNHCR that has provided the same to the police.¹⁰⁷

Even despite the efforts by the police to patrol the camp, and ensure security, militiamen and other criminal elements still creep in the camp. One of the respondent said that

¹⁰⁵ Kumar A, *Human Rights: Global Perspectives* (New Delhi Sarup and Sons, 2002) P. 171

¹⁰⁶ Human Rights Watch: *World Report 2013: Events of 2012* (USA, HRC, 2013) p. 106

¹⁰⁷ Individual interview held with police on 27th June 2017 in Hagadera Police Station (Tango 5 station)

suspected bandits attacked and stole mobile phones from a household in Gethuthe, which is Section G, H and I, in the first week of September.¹⁰⁸

Another respondent states that, camp controls have really helped in mitigating threats when they happen because police officers are able to respond faster and ensure that the situation is controlled faster.¹⁰⁹

3.6 Implementation of the Nairobi Protocol

The Nairobi Protocol entered into force in 2006 with 12 states being signatories. The protocol commits states to concrete actions for example, obligatory gun registering and prohibition on civilian possession of military assault rifles to control SA in the HoA and the African GLR .¹¹⁰

The Nairobi protocol is the most recently negotiated treaty providing a framework for domestic regulatory regimes controlling small arms. Like the SADC firearms protocol, it is sub-regional in scope focusing on the Great Lakes, region and the Horn of Africa a sub-region, notable for its recent conflicts.¹¹¹ The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the GLR and the HoA (2004) was the creation of discussions amongst 11 states.¹¹²

The Nairobi convention was marked in April 2004 by the board of ministers from the ten part nations (Burundi, DRC, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan,

¹⁰⁸ Individual interview held with Yusuf Omar, Deputy North Advisor, INSO (31st August 2017)

¹⁰⁹ *ibid*

¹¹⁰ Anderton C, Carter J, *Principles of Conflict Economics: A Primer for Social Scientists* (UK, CUP, 2009) p. 198

¹¹¹ Rogers D, *Postinternationalism and Small Arms Control: Theory, Politics, Security* (U.S.A Routledge Books, 2016) P. 67

¹¹² Lachemann F, Wolfrum R, *The Law of Armed Conflict and The use of Force: The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (UK, OUP, 2017) P. 91

Tanzania and Uganda) Later on, Seychelles, Somalia, Central Africa Republic, Republic of Congo and South Sudan concurred to the Nairobi Protocol somewhat later, expanding the participation to fifteen nations. Part states marked the Nairobi Protocol, following affirmation that the issue of multiplying of illicit SALW in the locale had been crumbled by inside political clash, terrorist activities and perilous destitution.¹¹³

Kenya has submitted to the arrangements of the Nairobi Protocol and the Best Practice Guidelines too. Article I of the Nairobi Protocol and Cap 1, 1.3 of the best practice Guidelines, require that; states in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa' check all the SALW, in state proprietorship at the time of generation with an unmistakable stamping, giving the name of the maker, the nation or place of creation and the serial number. Kenya has ensured that weapons are checked and has additionally proceeded to prepare cops to take the necessary steps.

The respondent mentioned that over 20,000 weapons have been marked in line with the requirements of the protocol and so the country has fully complied with the same. The respondent also agree that they have played their part in regards to the best practice guidelines on public awareness raising and education, where it has worked in changing the behaviours and attitudes of the community and they also see the importance of peaceful coexistence.¹¹⁴

¹¹³ Sang, F, *A Noble but Onerous Duty: An Autobiography by Former Director of Criminal Investigation Department* (Bloomington, Author House, 2013) P. 76

¹¹⁴ Individual Interview held on 23rd September 2017 with OCPD, Dadaab in Dadaab Police Station (Tango 2 station)

3.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter discusses some of the control measures that have been placed in Dadaab. It focuses on the measures that have worked in ensuring that the region is safer and free from SALW. The control measures put by the Government of Kenya have shown progress although slow in ensuring curbing of these illegal SALW. Much is still being done to also ensure that the best practices to the treaties and protocols that Kenya is signatory to are being implemented. It is also evident that effective governance is an vital feature absent in safeguarding the control of SALW in Dadaab.

CHAPTER FOUR
INFLUENCE OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS ON HUMAN
SECURITY IN DADAAB

4.0 Introduction

Human security implies ensuring and protecting freedoms. It implies shielding individuals from basic and inescapable dangers and circumstances, expanding on their qualities and goals. It likewise implies making frameworks that give individuals the building pieces of survival, poise and work. HS supplements national security, advances human improvement and improves human rights. It supplements state security by being individuals focused and tending to weaknesses that have not been considered as state security dangers¹¹⁵.

Small arms expansion over the globe prompts the more quick spread of brutality and amplifies the staggering impacts of violence, contributing altogether in ranges of outfitted conflict to human rights abuse and encroachment of international humanitarian law. In Kenya, and particular nations not at war, the prepared accessibility of these weapons undermines security (counting with relationship with wrongdoing) separates prospects, for progress adds to social breaking down and impacts the fall back on brutality more to likely and all the more deadly.

Kenya is defenseless against weapons trafficking, as a result of its topographical area in a contention ridden locale. The weapons circling in Kenya, begin from regions as far away as China and the United States, however the vast majority of them went through battle

¹¹⁵ P. Bilgin, Williams P.D, Seguchi M, Galbraith J.K, Inayatullah S, Weiner J, Schrine A, Murphy L, *Global Security and International Political Economy*, (UK Eloss Publishers Co. Ltd, 2010)p.335

areas in neighboring nations previously advancing toward Kenya's unlawful firearm markets.¹¹⁶

4.1 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Environmental Security in Dadaab

The capacity of war to cause extensive long term and grave damage to the natural setting constitutes a menace that is historically novel¹¹⁷. The concern of analysts and policy makers is growing, including those in the pentagon, that the environment will play a role in conflicts as climate changes progresses. Singer and Keating noted that standing armies may dump materials such as shells and chemicals into the environment. The buildup of army camps may destroy arable land and vegetation and increase logging and training armies may degrade arable land and cause pollution. Another indirect channel involves war refugees. As observed by Allan in 1987, for Afghani refugees, the temporary settlement of many refugees in hastily made –up camps may create mountains of waste and destroy the surrounding vegetation and forestry.

The existence of SALW may lead to war, and this turn can destroy the environment. The warring parties may destroy the environment of each other as part of their strategies to win the war.¹¹⁸ For example, armies may set forests on fire or dump defoliates on them to deny the enemy timber or hiding places as well as set oil wells on fire, destroy fresh water resources, crops, grazing fields and vegetation and domesticated animals to prevent their uses by the enemy.

¹¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Playing with fire; Weapons Proliferation, Political Violence and Human Rights in Kenya* (USA, Human Rights Watch, 2002) p. 1

¹¹⁷ Westing. A *Cultural Norms, War and the Environment* (USA, Oxford University, press, UNEP, 1988)p.18

¹¹⁸ Li. Q, Reuveny R. *Democracy and Economic Openness in an Interconnected system; Complex Transformations* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) P. 267

Armies may also flood large areas by destroying dams or opening floodgates to destroy other natural resources, to slow down or prevent enemy movements. Alternatively, the warring parties may intensify the exploitation of natural resources to sell them and finance their war efforts.¹¹⁹

The clearest confirmation of unfriendly natural results of war, in light of SALW, originates from the effect of huge quantities of refugees and returnees. Refugees escape either to urban communities or to provincial ranges, inside or outside their condition of inception. Urban communities turn out to be much more stuffed than they as of now are prompting natural anxieties, regularly interceded by means of lacking water, sewage and waste transfer facilities, and to debasement in the quick region that for the most part influences human instead of wildlife.¹²⁰

The former assistant minister for Environment, Prof. Wangari Maathai, particularly raised concern over environmental degradation in areas where refugee camps are located in Kenya. She continued to add that, although the government has left the responsibility of providing firewood, to the refugee camps to some non- governmental organizations (NGOs), and other bodies the country does not have equivalent programs for re- afforestation in those areas. Therefore, the refugees, have destroyed the environment. This is something; she continued to say the government should be careful about. The government should ensure that the environment, in the areas where refugees are hosted, is not destroyed. Professor Wangari Maaathai welcomed the idea that once refugees have

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.269

¹²⁰ Brauer, J. *War and Nature: The Environmental Consequences of War in a Globalized World* (UK, Altamira Press, 2009)p.161

relevant documentation, they should be moved to other areas so that they are not concentrated in one area, where they could cause environmental havoc¹²¹

The respondents noted that SA might not have a straight effect on the environment but affects indirectly. It was noted that chemical weapons are not used by elements in the camp. In the event that they were, they would then have a larger impact on the environment.¹²² Most of the respondents however agree that because of the illicit use small arms groups escaping war and other conflict stricken zones, may settle and overcrowd in areas and this may lead to deforestation, as is with Hagadera that holds five times its intended population. Individuals are forced to look for firewood, and this in turn leads to deforestation as resources are stretched, and this in turn leads to environmental degradation.

The issue of clean water is also compromised when individuals are overcrowded in a particular area. The chances of water contamination and the spread of water borne diseases remaining very high.¹²³ A good case study, on an area known as Shantabaq on your way to Garissa where vegetation had receded to more than a radius of 2 Kilometers because of people, and their cattle overcrowding in one area, and the fact the issue of plastic bags as well being disposed off as well.¹²⁴ Other issues such as air pollution came up throughout the interview sessions.

¹²¹ Kenya National Assembly, Official Record (Hansard), (Kenya National Assembly Official Report, 25 November 2003)p.4041

¹²² Individual interview held with Yussuf Omar, Deputy North Advisor, INSO (31st August 2017)

¹²³ FGD held in Hagadera camp on 4th September 2017

¹²⁴ Interview held with Kevin Kithela, UNMAS (Kismayo, Somalia) and former KDF Soldier who served for 13 years (Held on, 5th September 2017)

4.2 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Food Security in Dadaab

Food security aim is to protect individuals from the dangers of famine and starvation. It looks to guarantee that all people groups constantly have both physical and monetary access to fundamental sustenance.¹²⁵

Small arms accessibility and abuse are only two of the progressions confronting the international community. At the UN meeting on the unlawful exchange of SALW in all its features, held in New York in 2001, taking part states perceived that the exorbitant amassing and unrestrained distribution of (small arms), in numerous areas of the globe, represent a danger to wellbeing, security, strength and practical advancement at the individual, national, local and worldwide levels. Small arms accessibility and abuse oblige the decisions accessible to individuals including well being from criminal brutality, access to fundamental administrations and food insecurity, monetary open doors and shared trust.¹²⁶

The population in Dadaab, specifically Hagadera camp specifically is highly dependent on food that is distributed by the World Food Programme. The food is distributed in the first week of every month. One of the respondents said that they used to distribute nutritious food in the 1990s. They distributed sugar, dates, rice and pasta as well. In early 2000s, the food that was being distributed was not as nutritious as they started receiving sorghum, wheat flour, and cooking oil. The respondent compares it to dog food.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Samiul, H, *Human Security and Philanthropy; Islamic Perspectives and Muslim Majority Country Practices* (UAE, Springer Books, 2015) p.32

¹²⁶ A Project of the Graduate Institute of International Studies. *Small Arms Survey 2003: Development Denied* (New York, Oxford University Press., 2003)p. 156

¹²⁷ FGD held in Hagadera Camp 01 September 2017 (Views by Moulid Aden Sabtow,L10)

When there is illicit use of small arms, even NGOs that are tasked to distribute food in the camps will not be able to do so. Attacks on the way by bandits and other elements will prevent them from doing so. In addition, food that is transported from Garissa to the Dadaab will be delayed, as traders are afraid of using the roads. This in turn leads to inflation of food prices in the camp due to scarcity.¹²⁸ This may also lead to health security as children end up being malnourished when families are not able to access wholesome food.¹²⁹

4.3 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Political Security in Dadaab

One noteworthy worldwide source from the UN framework, the HDR (UNDP) utilizes political security as one of the seven principle classes of dangers to HS.¹³⁰ The UNDP definition constrained the degree to transcendently watching the sub orders of human rights and the limitation of subjects by military administrations.

Utilizing information from AI, UNDP called attention to that "political constraint, systematic torment, abuse or vanishing (of people) was as yet polished in 110 nations. The report likewise pointed out broad political turmoil in nations that brought about confinement or detainment by authorities

.¹³¹ One of the more significant effects excess and widespread availability and misuse of SALW has on human lives is the brutal treatment and abuse human may suffer at the hands of authorities, officials and security forces. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have described for years, and to what

¹²⁸ Individual interview held in DMO with Collins Ng'etich (Humanitarian worker, Terre des hommes)

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰ The Seven categories of human Security are: economic food, health, environment, personal, community and political, UNDP (1994:22-40)

¹³¹ Brauch H, Oswald U, Mesjaz C, Grin J., Dunay P, *Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing security in the 21st century* (Germany, springer books, 2008)p. 561

extent the unchecked spread and misuse of weapons lead to human rights abuses in nations everywhere in the world. Moreover, specific categories of weapons have been targeted as particularly inhumane in the use in combat for example, cluster munition and landmines, have most recently been categorized as inhumane weapons.¹³²

It is the responsibility of a country to safeguard its own citizens. Almost all the respondents agree that if the state fails to do so then there will be mass violations of human rights. When one is not ensured protection by the government, then human rights then becomes a challenge.

One of the respondents mentioned that in the aftermath of the kidnapping of two teachers in Hagadera, Section J2, police committed mass violations as they went from house to another to conduct swoops. One of the respondent continued to say during the aforementioned swoop, he left his house to help an old woman who was being confronted by police. In the middle of all that, he was slapped and thoroughly beaten by police.¹³³

According to the views given by the respondents the use of small arms continues to not only allow for the abuse of human rights, the government according to them has been silent on the excessive force used on the refugees who reside in the camps. The misuse of these small arms has led to a stereotype being formed by the Government of Kenya that militia and other armed elements reside in the camps and therefore the innocent in the community suffer as a result of the same notion.¹³⁴

¹³² Cox M, Shawki N, *Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human Rights Politics* (England, Ashgate, 2009)p. 221

¹³³ Interview with Hassan Aden, held on 11th September 2017, Section K5

¹³⁴ Interview held on sAugust 28, 2017 with Abdi Ali, Humanitarian Worker, Alijugur.

Some female respondents mentioned that they have encountered sexual assault in the hands of the police that has often led them with the feelings of shame and guilt. They continued to mention that the people that have been mandated to protect them are the perpetrators, and they can only rely on the aid agencies and other national legal agencies, to support and defend them. Reporting to them means being targeted by the authorities, something that they are afraid of.¹³⁵

4.4 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Community Security in Dadaab

The concise review of how community security has been characterized focuses to no less than three key highlights in comprehension and tending to the difficulties of community security through a Human Security lens. Initially, community security is about the opportunity from dread and flexibility from need of specific gatherings.

The most examined of these gatherings are ethnic minorities and indigenous groups by guaranteeing that these communities are free from dread and need, and their identity(ies) is secured. Besides, dangers to a community security can originate from different powers, including the state. Finally, the scope of threats to group security implies that ways to deal with group security would fundamentally must be multifaceted underscoring the close linkages between human security and human improvement, peace and democracy.¹³⁶

Some of human security pointers concerning community security incorporate; dread of multiregional clashes, fear of multiregional wars, dread of inward clashes, barrier from

¹³⁵ FGD held on 8th September 2017, Hagadera Section C1

¹³⁶ Caballero, A, *An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies: A Transnational Approach* (UK, Sage Publication, 2016)p. 70

cruel customary practices, abolishment of ethnic separation and regard for essential human rights.¹³⁷

Generally, the Somali community makes up the majority of the population in Dadaab and specifically in Hagadera camp. According to most of the respondents interviewed, the community is a way of life. The traditions, customs and the beliefs of the people is something the Somali community hold dear to them.

When there is illicit use of SALW, it then destroys the social structures that are in the community. Children have been seen in the camp to be bearers of these small arms and they have been recruited into armed groups. These groups are known as CAAFAG.¹³⁸ Some of these children join even as a result of seeing some of their family members killed either in Somalia or in the camp. School going children drop out because of being lured monetarily by armed groups and other elements as well.¹³⁹

These small arms also erode the community's beliefs. According to the community beliefs and religion, it is justified to kill someone who has killed another person, but it is considered *haram* or not justified when an innocent individual is killed. One of the respondents makes reference to the Holy Quran Chapter Alma'idah 75:23 which says, On that explanation we intended for the children that if anybody slew a person; unless it be a murder or for spreading harm in the land-it would be as if he slew the whole people: and

¹³⁷ Chalamwong Y, Thalohumpon N, Chantavanich S, *Temporary Shelters and Surrounding Communities: Livelihood Opportunities, the Labour Market, Social Welfare and Social Security* (Thailand, Springer Books, 2014)pp. 67

¹³⁸ Individual interview held with Henrietta Namusonge on 11th September 2017 at Terre des hommes, Dadaab

¹³⁹ Individual Interview held with Irene Mwangi, Psychosocial Counsellor on 11th September 2017, at Section D5, Hagadera Camp

on the off chance that anybody spared an existence, it would be as though he spared the life of the all humanity.¹⁴⁰

The other issue that comes out strongly is that of clannism, and the fact that other communities view themselves superior to others. It goes so deep to not only the sub-clan level but also the family level. The different clans may be business rivals or political rivals, for example and to protect their status, they may arm themselves. This will lead to the erosion of the way of life of the community and threatens it as well.¹⁴¹

4.5 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Economic Security in Dadaab

Economic security is defined as having a source of income you can count on, that is enough to cover food, clean water, adequate clothing and shelter (housing and utilities), plus necessary transportation, health care and education costs, with enough left over to save as a cushion in case of an emergency licenses and services, and other miscellaneous expenses necessary for life and well-being.¹⁴²

Misuse of SALW affect the economy, and its growth in many ways. Firstly, resources that could and should be used to aid economic growth are often diverted away from economic activities, toward military spending and weapon purchases.¹⁴³

Second, damaged infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, makes trade and commerce more costly and less feasible.¹⁴⁴ Third, armed gangs and bandits steal products and decrease the likelihood of trade transactions. All of these factors have an ultimate impact

¹⁴⁰ Individual interview held with Fardosa Ibrahim Shale on 15th September 2017 at UNHCR Compound, Dadaab

¹⁴¹ Individual interview with Mohamed Noor, Safety and Security Officer, Windle Trust Kenya; 4th September 2017

¹⁴² Yoshida O, Wajjwalku S, Chong Ho K, *Advancing the Regional Commons in the New East Asia* (New Routledge Books, 2016)p.44

¹⁴³ Control Arms Campaign , 2004

¹⁴⁴ Small Arms Survey , 2003 b)p 143

on prices, consumption and economic livelihood. External actors are far less likely to direct investment to insecure and unstable areas, and tourists are not likely to travel to and spend their financial resources in localities plagued by excess weapons availability and misuse.

Ultimately, economic development is connected to stability and security. Where small arms are widely available and lead to instability and insecure, poor economic growth and investment are likely to follow¹⁴⁵

The proliferation of small arms has a direct effect on development because they make conflict and banditry, more feasible and enduring, the costs of which are incredible high. Transit routes are blocked, national industries cannot function, business screech to a halt and foreign investors leave. Schools cannot operate, basic services for example water projects and health care cannot be provided, food cannot be harvested and people are displaced.¹⁴⁶

Majority of the respondents note that the illicit misuse of SALW directly affect the economic security of Hagadera camp. The respondents were of the idea that the presence of SALW encourage robbery and affects businesses. The government of Kenya sets curfews when there is misuse of these illicit use of small arms, and therefore this affects businesses as shops and the market closes early. One of the respondent commented on

¹⁴⁵ Cox M, Shawki N, *Negotiating Sovereignty and Human Rights: Actors and Issues in Contemporary Human Rights Politics* (England, Asghate Publications, 2009)p.221

¹⁴⁶ Ezrow, N, Frantz E, Taylor A, *Development and the State in the 21st century: Tackling the Challenges facing the Developing World* (UK, Plagrave, 2016)p.120

Alhuda Primary and Secondary School in Section J2, when two teachers were kidnapped.

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The curfew that was set by the government in March of 2017, from 6pm to 6am affected businesses, as traders had to close very early, and so profits were not as much. There is also inflation because roads are impassable because of the illicit use of the small arms, and there is close to no movement of goods from one place to another. As a result also, the development of the area has also been affected as it highly discourages development and investment in Dadaab as well. A good example is given where a respondent notes that the Somali people are naturally entrepreneurs, and if businesses were to be open until 10 pm, there would be so much productivity and success the camp. However, because of the insecurity, it is impossible to run businesses at night. In fact, it is illegal to walk around the camp at night.¹⁴⁸ The respondent goes ahead to note that the economy of the area would flourish if the opportunity to open businesses at night was presented given that aid agencies continue to impart financial literacy to the refugees.¹⁴⁹

4.6 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Personal Security in Dadaab

Personal security purposes to shield individuals from external viciousness, be it from the state or ostensibly actuated hostility of contentious people and actors from household misuse or from predacious grown-ups. For some individuals, the most extreme reason for concern is wrongdoing, basically brutal criminal behavior.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ FGD held on 28th August 2017 (Views by Hassan Ahmed Aden)

¹⁴⁸ FGD held on 11th September 2017 in Hagadera Camp, Section D5

¹⁴⁹ Individual interview with Mohamed Noor, Safety and Security Officer, Windle Trust Kenya; 4th September 2017

¹⁵⁰ Akpeninor J, *Modern Concepts of Security* (Bloomington, Author House, 2013) p.73

In regards to women for example, evidence is developing that firearms have a huge influence in the execution of violence against women. Armed sexual brutality is terribly far reaching in intensely armed conditions. Weapons can be utilized to encourage assault: women and their daughters are assaulted using these arms while far from households gathering kindling and water, for instance or when doing other every day errands. They are additionally helpless in prison or in exile camps, where there is no place for them to stow away.¹⁵¹

In extremely poor social orders (or gatherings in the public eye), a weapon would speak to one of the biggest, if not the single biggest, capital merchandise controlled by a family unit. Even inexpensive but functioning weapons still cost more than US\$100. Not surprisingly, such an inefficient (in productive terms) capital assets is not attractive to the very poor. Once other assets are acquired, however, (say cattle, agricultural implements, a small shop or other capital goods), the need for protection becomes important and a firearm is both affordable in household capital term) and more efficient (in providing protection). Certainly, such a pattern can be seen in weapons holding among shopkeepers in inner cities, or in pastoralist communities in East Africa. The presence of a gun in a household for example, increases almost threefold the risk of women becoming homicide victims, regardless of why the weapon was in the household in the first place.¹⁵²

Personal security in Dadaab has greatly been threatened because of the misuse of SALW. Majority of the respondents feel that they are not safe as result of the small arms that are in the arms of some elements who use them for personal gains.¹⁵³ For this reason, many

¹⁵¹ Amnesty International IANSA, Oxfam, *Control Arms Campaign* (US, Oxfam , 2004)p. 28

¹⁵² Burgess J. *The Routledge Handbook of New Security Studies* (USA, Routledge, Books, 290)p. 151

¹⁵³ FGD held on 17 August 2017 in Hagadera Camp, Section D5

of the respondents feel that they need to arm themselves in order to protect themselves and their families as well.

When one's personal security is threatened, you live in fear, children are not able school, and head of households are not able to make available for their families and may lose their jobs as a result.¹⁵⁴ These arms through confrontations at the family level also threaten personal security. One respondent gives an example where a man killed his brother-in-law as a result of domestic abuse, in the first week of September 2017. He stabbed the man several times in section M4. The man unfortunately passed on.¹⁵⁵

There is also threats that have been faced by pastoralists who have been threatened by militia group like Al Shabaab who ask them to pay '*fungu la kumi*' (This represents ten percent of the total income that it paid to an authority and in this case, Al Shaabab) and therefore pastoralists feel threatened by some of the elements they encounter as they leave the camp to go and graze their cattle in the wild.¹⁵⁶

As a result, when the personal security of individuals is threatened it in turn destroys the social fabric as wives lose their husbands and vice versa, and children are left without parents.

¹⁵⁴ Individual interview with Nuh Dagane, Humanitarian worker, World Food Programme, 16th August 2017

¹⁵⁵ Group Interview held on 28th September 2017 with Moulid Aden and Hassan Ahmed in Hagadera Camp.

¹⁵⁶ Individual interview with Mohamed Noor, Safety and Security Officer, Windle Trust Kenya; 4th September 2017

4.7 Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapon on Health Security in Dadaab

Health security aims at to ensuring least protection from sicknesses and unfortunate ways of life in third world nations, the chief reasons for death are communicable and parasitic infections, which exterminate millions of individuals every year. In developed nations, the real slayers are illnesses of the cardiovascular system slaying millions yearly.¹⁵⁷

Arms availability and misuse, and the resulting impact on social services such as health care, are diminished during times of conflict and in areas where the post conflict environment is wrought with volatility and uncertainty. Large numbers of gunshot wound injuries overburden local hospitals and weaken their ability to effectively treat not only firearms victims, but other ill and injured patients as well.¹⁵⁸

In many conflicts, arms-related violence puts increased weight on well-being frameworks by overpowering hospitals with wounds upsetting the conveyance of life sparing and malady avoiding inoculation and prescriptions. Healthy citizens might be not able access preventive care over treatable conditions or communicable infections, as assets might be diverted from immunization projects to managing firearm wounds or expanded insecurity.

Moreover, health facilities, might be wrecked by bombing and other violence and simply cannot operate. Amid the common war in Mozambique for instance, experts trust that 34 percent of the medical system there was influenced through the demolition of almost 200

¹⁵⁷ *ibid*

¹⁵⁸ Small Arms Survey (2003b) p.140-141

health centers and in addition the damaging of about 300 increasingly that were compelled to close.¹⁵⁹

Substantial numbers of conflict refugees and IDPs confront extra hardships from weapons proliferation. Regularly much required food aid cannot get to needy populaces because of continued outfitted brutality. Sometimes, the subsequent absence of food contributes, to hunger, which influences the defenseless individuals from a populace, especially children.¹⁶⁰

According to majority of the respondents, Small Arms and Light Weapons may directly affect health security. One of the respondents recounts the kidnapping of two humanitarian workers working with Doctors without borders better known as MSF. The two aid workers Catalan Motserrat Serra and Blanca Thiebaut who were captured in IF02 refugee camp, on 13th October 2011. This had a direct effect on health security as it stalled the services being offered to refugees by aid agencies.¹⁶¹

Other ways that health security may be threatened because of SALW is when health practitioners feel unsafe to access certain areas of the camp because of insecurity, and misuse of these small arms. This in turn lead to high mortality rates as health services are not timely.¹⁶² Health security is extremely important in the Dadaab Context, as the large population and overcrowding leads to poor health environment either through issues of sanitation.

¹⁵⁹ Stohl R, Grillot S., *The International Arms Trade* (USA, John Wiley & Sons, 2013)p.102

¹⁶⁰ *ibid*

¹⁶¹ Individual interview with Marion Mwebi held on 29th August 2017 in DMO, Dadaab.

¹⁶² FGD held on 4th September 2017 in Hagadera Camp

During one of the session, one respondent commented on how these small arms have these weapons have been used to commit atrocities such as rape. One incident that was given by one of the interviewee was of a girl who was raped in IFO camp. When the biological father of the child tried to rescue her, he was shot and killed on the spot. As a result, also, the girl was infected with HIV/AIDS.¹⁶³ Another threat that may face the Dadaab region is theft of medical supplies that is distributed by either the government or aid agencies, because of the misuse of these small arms.

4.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed the influence of these arms on human security in Dadaab. More specifically Hagadera camp where most of the incidents happen, and that have threatened human security. It is observed that the community in Hagadera camp is faced with different forms of insecurity to include food, health, personal, political, environmental and community. Chapter Four, therefore concludes that SALW affects human security, directly and indirectly. However, with effective administration, and a governance system, threats to human security brought about by SALW will be greatly reduced.

¹⁶³ FGD held on 7th September in Hagadera Camp (Transit Area)

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.0 Introduction

This study set out to interrogate the influence of SALW on Human security. Using Dadaab region as a case study; it assessed the factors influencing the proliferation of these weapons in Dadaab, examined the regulatory measures used by the GoK to curb the influence of SALW on human security in Dadaab, and also lastly, assessed the influence of the same weapons on human security in Dadaab.

The chapter summarizes and also concludes, the main issues emerging from the study and recommends on areas of further research. Furthermore, the chapter elaborates in depth lessons learned, on understanding influence of SALW in the region.

5.1 Summary

The study established that there is indeed a link between SALW and human security within the setting of the community residing in Dadaab Kenya.

The rising insecurity in the camps is directly linked to the proliferation of SALW. Not only does it affect human security, but has also caused untold misery, and suffering to those who reside in the region. Crime for example in Hagadera Empire, has increased the number of adolescent boys, who drop out of school, and has ripped the society of future leaders, who were looked up to rebuild, their country of origin, Somalia.¹⁶⁴

The community is aware that these SALW, are readily available in the camp, and also know the holders of these weapons. The efforts to control, or reduce the proliferation of

¹⁶⁴ FGD Discussion held on 7th September 2017 in Hagadera, Section J, Block 9.

SALW, is made difficult by the issue of porous borders. These borders have not only facilitated the movement of people, but have also highly contributed to the movement of these arms into Dadaab camps.

The inability by the GoK, to control the same has been made difficult by the many smuggling routes available, and the fact that despite the presence of checkpoints, the border is rarely patrolled.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, the government of Kenya has explored the need to look for unconventional ways to deal with the issue of porous borders, although at a very slow pace.

The high rate of corruption has also enabled the perpetrators and made it easy for them to smuggle small arms and use these same weapons in the camps. This has in turn increased insecurity and caused anxiety to those living and working in Dadaab. It has threatened not only the personal security of the refugees but also of aid workers providing the much needed assistance to the most vulnerable persons in the community.¹⁶⁶

The study notes that clannism has directly also contributed to not only the proliferation of SALW but has threatened human security in Dadaab as well. The community in Dadaab is divided into clans and a threat to one clan member is considered a threat to the whole clan. Not only do clan representatives resolve disputes, but also conflicts arise between different clans. This stems from the fact that different clans feel superior to others, the Somali Bantus being the most inferior.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Individual Interview with Police Officer in Dadaab on 28th September 2017 (Tango 2 Station)

¹⁶⁶ FGD Discussion with Humanitarian Workers Held on 22nd September 2017, DMO Dadaab

¹⁶⁷ Telephone Interview with Small Bantu Chairman Abdi Daud Ahmed, on 29th September 2017

On control measures, the approaches used have to a small extent helped in ensuring that SALW misuse is a thing of the past. The use of amnesty for example, has failed terribly as, the community has little faith in the police. Furthermore, the community has armed itself to ensure that they not only protect themselves but their families as well. Forced disarmament that is being used, and continues to be used by the military and police continue to stir ill feelings, as human rights abuses have been reported.

The influence of SALW on human security is undeniably visible as overcrowding of refugees has caused a strain on the already existing resources, and individuals feel the need to arm themselves as they walk for miles to look for natural resources such firewood, and grazing land for their cattle. It has threatened food security as traders are unable to access markets, due to the high insecurity of the routes, and this in turn has led to the inflation of food prices. The community is constantly living in fear, and anxiety as well as a result of the presence of SALW, and businesses have been forced to close down as well.

5.2 Conclusion

The study concludes that there is a connection between HS and SALW. The nature of the link is that small arms misuse affects everyone from the individual. It is however, of essence to recognize causes that may influence the multiplying of these SALW, because of the existence of many interrelated factors, and to identify measures put in by the government, considering the rapid rate of globalization.

The study refutes the notion that refugees in Dadaab are mainly the reason why there is a rapid increase and misuse of these arms in the camp. The study acknowledges a

combination of different factors behind insecurity in Dadaab Refugee camps. This study concludes that the influence and misuse of SALW, and its threat to human security will continue to be felt, and this can be explained by 3 interconnected factors .1)Weak governance structures2)Unhealthy clan competition between the refugees3) Underdevelopment

Furthermore, the study notes that the state has failed to formulate and implement appropriate control measures to mitigate the misuse of these arms in Dadaab. The failure of the security forces to control the movement of arms at border checkpoints continues to threaten human security in Dadaab camp. This has pushed the community not only the refugees but also the host community to arm themselves in order to feel protected and has consequently led to the increase and misuse of SALW. This places governance at the center of security problems in Dadaab.

5.3 Recommendation

5.3.1 Policy

The study acknowledges the presence of security forces, not only at the border doing patrols but also in the camps. Despite the aforementioned being available, insecurity in the camp and at the border is alarming, the study recommends for more military personnel to be deployed on border points, and utilization of not only police to do camp control, but also intelligence gathering from the Community Peace and Protection Teams (CPPT).

Furthermore, the study notes that there are many illegal and alternative routes that are used by smugglers who find themselves within the camps together with not only the

arms, but also the skills to use and assemble. It is also recommended for the government to consider employing new strategies to combat the issues of smuggling and proliferation of SALW as opposed to efforts of before like the construction of a border fence with Somalia, or installation of security cameras.

The study identified that community mobilization and awareness raising in Dadaab refugee camps could help in addressing the root causes of why there is proliferation and misuse of SALW, but also help greatly to reduce the demand for these arms, and the false perception that ownership of these arms increases one's personal security. This will also enhance the information shared by the community in Dadaab for effective management and reporting of criminal activity within the camps.

The study acknowledged that one of the reasons that there is alarming proliferation of SALW and its threat to human security is because of the youth bulge in the Hagadera camp. Militiamen and other criminal elements have taken advantage of this, and managed to recruit some of these youths into militia groups. It is recommended that the government of Kenya together with aid agencies should take it up to involve youth into constructive activities, such as livelihoods to impart life skills onto them, that they can apply even upon repatriation, to their country of origin. Efforts have been made by some aid agencies, but loopholes and gaps still exist. This is because of donors pulling out, and only funding voluntary repatriation related activities.

5.3.2 Academic Areas for Further Research

5.3.2.1 Threats Posed by the Influx of Undocumented Persons into Dadaab

Somalia in the last one year has been affected by failed rains in much of the country. Consequently, this has resulted to drought, food insecurity and unprecedented hunger. The majority of those affected fled into Kenya.

Following the tripartite agreement, the government position to close the camp is sustained. All the undocumented persons (i.e. new arrivals and returnees) are not being recognized and registered by UNHCR. They however, are being profited and are able to access food, education and health facilities or services. It will therefore be interesting to interrogate whether these undocumented persons to a large extent are to blame for the insecurity in Dadaab and the continued spread of these weapons in the region. How is the state going to trace undocumented persons if at all they are responsible for criminal activities or terrorist networks within the camp? What are the likely challenges to be experienced in future with the increasing number of undocumented persons in the camp?

5.3.2.2 Reconceptualization of Border Security

The government of Kenya stand on fencing of the Kenya – Somalia border is final. The Ministry of Interior initiated the project in 2015. The plan is for the wall to run along the 800km border. In this regard, a study on the possibilities of exploring more advanced alternatives, preferably with other countries on how to operate the Kenya-Somalia border would be desirable. The importance of realizing that national security problems cannot be handled individually in this era of globalization and interconnectedness will help on the formulation of better ways of dealing with border security.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Oral Interview Schedules

Section 1: On Introduction

My name is Eve Chebet Sigei an M.A in International Conflict Management student at the University of Nairobi. I am carrying out a study entitled: Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Human Security: A Case Study of Dadaab, Kenya. The information provided will be treated with confidentiality.

Instructions: Please tick in the bracket [] in front of the most appropriate response. Where explanation is required, use the space provided.

SECTION 1: Demographics

1. What is your gender?

Male	
Female	

2. What is your age?

18 – 25 years		
26 – 30 years		
31 – 35 years		
36 – 40 years		
41 years or more		

3. What is your Occupation in the camps?

--	--

4. Which camp in Daadab do you live in?

In an urban area	
In a rural area	

5. What is your country of Origin?

--

6. What is your Religion?

Islam	
Christian	

Section II: On Factors Influencing Proliferation of SALW in Dadaab

- 1) What small arms are you familiar with?
- 2) Kindly give a brief on the security, situation of Dadaab?
- 3) What are the most common illicit small arms in this area?
- 4) Do you think refugees are to blame for illicit proliferation of small arms in Dadaab?
- 5) In your opinion, why do people own small arms in this area?

Section III: On Control Measures

- 1) What are some of the control measures you are aware of to deal with issues of illicit SALW?
 - a) Internationally
 - b) Regionally
 - c) Nationally
- 2) What measures do you think have and have not worked in controlling the influence of small arms?
- 3) What are some of the challenges encountered in a bid to control the entry of small arms?

Section IV: On influence of small arms on Human Security in Dadaab Camp

- 1) In what ways or to what extent do small arms affect each of the below aspects of human security?
 - a) Political security
 - b) Economic security
 - c) Food security
 - d) Environmental security
 - e) Personal security
 - f) Health security
 - g) Community security
- 2) What do you think is being done to improve the effect of small arms on human security?

Appendix II: Questionnaire

Questionnaire for Individual Participants

My name is Eve Chebet Sigei an M.A in International Conflict Management student at the University of Nairobi. I am carrying out a study entitled: Influence of Small Arms and Light Weapons on Human Security: A Case Study of Dadaab, Kenya. Kindly fill in this questionnaire as honestly as possible. The information provided will be treated with confidentiality.

Instructions: Please tick in the bracket [] in front of the most appropriate response. Where explanation is required, use the space provided. If you need more space to write, use a separate paper. You are free to use extra paper if you so wish.

SECTION 1: Demographics

7. What is your gender?

Male	
Female	

8. What is your age?

18 – 25 years		
26 – 30 years		
31 – 35 years		
36 – 40 years		
41 years or more		

9. What is your Occupation in the camps?

--	--

10. Which camp in Daadab do you live in?

In an urban area	
In a rural area	

11. What is your country of Origin?

--

12. What is your Religion?

Islam	
Christian	

SECTION 2:

This subsection seeks to assess the factors influencing proliferation of SALW in Dadaab Refugee Camp. Please respond as appropriate

13. What Small arms are you familiar with?

Pistols

AK-47

Grenades

If others please specify;

14. How often do you see the weapon mentioned above?

Everyday

Once a week

Every fortnight

Every month

15. What challenges do you encounter in a bid to control entry of SALW?

SECTION 3:

This subsection is concerned with examining control measures used by the Government of Kenya

Please respond as appropriate.

16. What control measures have been effected by GoK to curb influence of SALW in Dadaab?

17. What challenges do you encounter, despite the existence of control measures on Small Arms and Light Weapons?

18. Dadaab is a conflict stricken area, how do you ensure you feel safe?

19. How prepared are you in the event of an ambush?

Highly prepared

Prepared

Unprepared

20. What measures do you think have worked in controlling the influence of SALW in Dadaab?

21. Please mark (x) in the box which best describes your agreement or disagreement.

No	Statement	Strongly disagree 1	Disagree 2	Neutral 3	Agree 4	Strongly agree 5
1	The availability of control measures on SALW has a positive impact in Dadaab camps					
2	The availability of SALW has a positive impact on Human Security in Dadaab camps					

SECTION 4:

This subsection is concerned with the conventional security aspect of Human security.

Please respond as appropriate.

22. Does SALW affect the security of refugees in Dadaab?

Yes

No

Not sure

23. Rank the impact of SALW on the security of refugees in Dadaab refugee camp by using the following criteria

High rank (3) moderate rank (2) low rank (1)

	High Rank (3)	Moderate Rank (2)	Low Rank (1)
CONVENTIONAL SECURITY			

24. Please mark (x) in the box which best describes your agreement or disagreement.

No	Statement	Strongly disagree 1	Disagree 2	Neutral 3	Agree 4	Strongly agree 5
1	The availability of SALW has a positive impact on policing activities in Dadaab camps					
2	The availability of SALW has a positive impact on community policing in Dadaab camps					
3	The availability of SALW has a positive impact on crime prevention in Dadaab Camps					

Thank you for your feedback!!

Appendix III: Research Permit



NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,
2241349, 3310571, 2219420
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

9th Floor, Utalii House
Uhuru Highway
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/17/62150/18863**

Date **7th September, 2017**

Eve Chebet Sigei
University of Nairobi
P.O. Box 30197-00100
NAIROBI.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on “*Influence of small arms and light weapons on human security: A case study of Dadaab, Kenya,*” I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Garissa County** for the period ending **5th September, 2018.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Garissa County** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit **a copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

**GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The County Commissioner
Garissa County.

The County Director of Education
Garissa County.

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MISS. EVE CHEBET SIGEI
of UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI, 14208-100
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct
research in Garissa County**


**Permit No : NACOSTI/P/17/62150/18863
Date Of Issue : 7th September, 2017
Fee Received :Ksh 1000**

**on the topic: INFLUENCE OF SMALL
ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS ON HUMAN
SECURITY: A CASE STUDY OF DADAAB,
KENYA**

**for the period ending:
5th September, 2018**



.....
**Applicant's
Signature**


.....
**Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation**

CONDITIONS

- 1. The License is valid for the proposed research, research site specified period.**
- 2. Both the Licence and any rights thereunder are non-transferable.**
- 3. Upon request of the Commission, the Licensee shall submit a progress report.**
- 4. The Licensee shall report to the County Director of Education and County Governor in the area of research before commencement of the research.**
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