

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK

**CRIMINAL GANGS AND THEIR SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON MICRO AND
SMALL ENTERPRISES (MSES) IN KENYA: A CASE OF MUNGIKI GANG IN
KIRINYAGA COUNTY, CENTRAL KENYA**

BY

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DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for examination in any other institution or university.

Stephen Munyagia Mbiru

Sign _____

Date _____

This research project is submitted for examination with my approval as the university supervisor.

Prof Edward K. Mburugu

Sign _____

Date _____

DEDICATION

I dedicate this research work to my late dad, Johnson Mbiri a man who cherished hard work and made massive sacrifices to lay a foundation for my education and that of my siblings.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	v
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	x
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xi
ABSTRACT.....	xii
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 Background.....	1
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	4
1.3 Research Questions.....	6
1.4 Objectives of the Study.....	7
1.4.1 General Objective	7
1.4.2 Specific Objectives	7
1.5 Importance of the Study.....	7
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	12
2.0 Introduction.....	12
2.1 Literature Review.....	12
2.1.1 MSEs and Development	12
2.1.2 Constraints against MSEs	14
2.1.3 Organized crime and economic development.....	16

2.1.4 Organized Criminal Gangs in Kenya.....	21
2.1.5 Mungiki movement in Kenya	22
2.1.6 Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga	25
2.2 Theoretical framework.....	26
2.2.1 Durkheim’s theory of Anomie.....	27
2.2.2 Merton’s Social Strain theory (1968)	29
2.2.3 Fluid Theory.....	30
2.3 Conceptual Framework.....	33
2.3.1 Political Activities.....	34
2.3.2 Economic Activities.....	35
2.3.3 Social Activities	35
2.3.4 Mitigation Efforts or strategies to neutralize Mungiki menace	35
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	36
3.0 Introduction.....	36
3.1 Research Site Description.....	36
3.2 Research Design.....	41
3.3 Units of Analysis and Unit of Observation.....	41
3.4 Target Population.....	42
3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure	42
3.5.1 Sample Size.....	43
3.5.2 Sampling Procedure	43
3.5.3 Research Instruments	45
3.6 Methods of Data Collection	45

3.6.1 Collection of Quantitative Data	47
3.6.2 Collection of Qualitative Data	47
3.7 Ethical Considerations	48
3.8 Data Analysis	49
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION ...	50
4.0 Introduction.....	50
4.1 Response rate	50
4.2 Social and demographic background of the respondents.....	52
4.2.1 Gender of the respondents.	52
4.2.2 Educational Attainment.	53
4.2.3 Distribution of respondents by their religious affiliation.....	53
4.2.4 Distribution of respondents by age.	54
4.2.5 Marital status.....	55
4.3 MSEs in Kirinyaga County.....	55
4.3.1 Sectorial classification of enterprises in Kirinyaga County.....	55
4.3.2 Classification of enterprises based on type of business activity.....	56
4.3.3 Distribution of enterprises based on size.	57
4.3.4 Distribution of business in each town.....	58
4.4 Existence of Mungiki in Kirinyaga County.....	59
4.4.1 Emergence of Mungiki in the study area.	59
4.4.2 Gender composition of Mungiki.....	60
4.4.3 Owners of local enterprises and Mungiki.	61
4.4.4 How politicians and MSEs owners’ support Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga.	62
4.4.5 Why enterprise owners join or support Mungiki.	65
4.4.6 Enterprise owners’ awareness on Mungiki criminal activities in Kirinyaga.	66
4.4.7 Economic activities of Mungiki in Kirinyaga County.....	67
4.4.8 Mungiki Socio-Cultural activities.....	76
4.4.9 Political Activities of Mungiki in Kirinyaga	80
4.4.10 Implications of Mungiki activities on MSE development	83
4.5 Socio-economic effects of Mungiki activities on MSEs in Kirinyaga County.....	89

4.5.1 Introduction.....	89
4.5.2 Effects of Mungiki activities on MSEs.....	90
4.5.3 Economic effects of Mungiki activities on MSEs in Kirinyaga.....	94
4.5.3.1 Case 1: “Justice in the hands of a killer gang”.....	101
4.5.3.2 Case two: “in the hands of vigilante group killers’.....	102
4.6 MSE Owners’ Mitigation Measures against Mungiki.....	110
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	116
REFERENCES	128
APPENDICES	142
Appendix 1: Introductory Letter	142
Appendix 2: Consent Form.....	143
Appendix 3: Questionnaire-MSEs Owners.....	144
Appendix 4: Interview Guide Questions for Key Informants.....	154
Appendix 5: List of Key Informats.....	156

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1 Sampling Frame -MSE types, size and sample size in Kirinyaga County

Table 4.1: Response rate of respondents

Table 4.2: Distribution of respondents by age

Table 4.3: Distribution of enterprises based on business activity

Table 4.4: Respondents knowledge of the existence of Mungiki

Table 4.5: Knowledge as to when Mungiki emerged in the area

Table 4.6: Respondents awareness on Mungiki implications on enterprises

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 2.1: Schematic Representation of the Conceptual Framework

Figure 3.1: A Map of Kenya showing location of Kirinyaga County

Figure 3.2 Map of Kirinyaga showing the study Towns

Figure 4.1: Distribution of enterprise ownership according to gender

Figure 4.2: Educational attainment among the respondents

Figure 4.3: Distribution by religious affiliation

Figure 4.4: Marital status of the respondents

Figure 4.5: Sectorial classification of enterprises in Kirinyaga County

Figure 4.6: Size of business in terms number of employees

Figure 4.7: Distribution of business in each town

Figure 4.8: Owners of local enterprises and Mungiki

Figure 4.9: Types of support

Figure 4.10: Why enterprise owners support Mungiki

Figure 4.11: Awareness of respondents about Mungiki activities

Figure 4.12: Effects of Mungiki activities

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Police Office
G.O.K	Government of Kenya
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ILO	International Labour Organization
KCC	Kenya Cooperative Creameries
KNHRC	Kenya National Human Rights Commission
KPCU	Kenya Planters Cooperative Union
KTDA	Kenya Tea Development Authority
M.S.E.	Micro and Small Enterprise
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MSEA	Micro and Small Enterprises Authority
MSMEs	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
NCRC	National Crime Research Centre in Kenya
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PSV	Public Service Vehicle
SACCO	Savings and Credit Cooperative
SDLF	Sabaot Defense Land Forum
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime Convention
UN	United Nations

ABSTRACT

Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE) sector plays a major role towards economic development of Kenya. However, despite the vast research related to this sector, little has been done to evaluate how activities of organized criminal gangs impact on its growth. This study aims to establish how Mungiki's criminal activities in Kirinyaga County has affected Micro and Small Enterprises. The researcher uses several theories to discuss the origin of Mungiki as an organized criminal gang. These theories help to explain the factors and conditions that compel people to join the outlawed sect. A key theory used in this study is fluid theory of militias by Gani Yorom. It attributes emergence of criminal groups to an unattended socio-economic conditions of an area or country. The researcher applied stratified and purposive sampling to come up with a sample for study. Primary data was obtained from respondents by use of questionnaires and notes taken during interviews conducted among key informants. The data generated was analyzed using descriptive statistics and presented in tables, graphs, pie-charts, narratives and discussions. Secondary data was obtained from books, articles in journals, newspaper extracts, and internet sources. An analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data was done. Findings from the study showed that the local socio-economic and political environment is to blame for the emergence, growth and spread of Mungiki in the area. The study further revealed that Mungiki was engaged in activities that had serious negative implications on enterprise development in the county. It also showed that the local population together with state agencies such as police and judiciary haven't been able to combat Mungiki criminal activities in the area. The study also established various measures taken by enterprise owners and other agencies in dealing to Mungiki menace. Finally, the study recommends adoption of preventive, interventional and suppressive measures to combat Mungiki and other criminal gangs that negatively affect MSEs.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Kenya has witnessed an upsurge of organized criminal gangs. A report released by National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) late in 2014 noted that criminal gangs in Kenya had increased from 36 in 2010 to 46 in 2013 (NCRC report, 2014). By the end of 2016, this number had doubled. This led to the gazette notice of 30th November 2016 in which the then Kenyan Interior Cabinet Secretary the late, Joseph Nkaissery outlawed 89 criminal groupings operating in various parts of the country under the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act, 2010 (The Daily Nation, Saturday December 31 2016). This upsurge extends to both rural and urban areas where it has greatly impaired socio-economic development. Most of the affected sectors in the rural and urban economies are the small and micro enterprises. These enterprises are important; and their contribution towards achievement of micro and macro-economic goals of any given nation, especially in developing nations is enormous (Shelley, 2004).

A report by the International Labor Office's (ILO) acknowledges that micro and small businesses in Kenya are an important sector that provided livelihoods to many Kenyans. According to the report incomes earned from this sector were 16 times higher than those received by wage laborers or farmers on small plots (ILO, 1972). Opportunities for income earning in this sector were also seen as a pull factor in rural-urban migration (ILO, 1972).

National baseline surveys carried in 1995 and 1999 did ascertain the magnitude of MSE sector in Kenya. The surveys revealed that there were 708,000 MSEs employing 1.2 million people and that the sector provided more employment than the formal sector (Daniels et. al, 1995).

By 1999, about 1.3 million MSEs in the country provided jobs to about 2.4 million of people equivalent on average, 18.8% of the country's GDP second to agriculture having increased from 13.8 in 1993 (CBS et. al, 1999).

In Kenya, about 25% of households are involved in some kind of business activity with the most of them relying on such entities for their income (GoK, 2007). The MSE sector is a key contributor to job creation in Kenya's economy. The sector contributed about 80% of the country's employment. The sector is thus a significant contributor to the Kenya's GDP, as was evidenced in 2011 when it contributed about 20% to the country's GDP (GoK, 2012).

Sectorial distribution of MSEs shows that 64% of all the enterprises are in the trade sector (CBS et. al, 1999). Services and manufacturing sectors have 15% and 13% respectively whereas construction sector accounts for less than 2% of the total (CBS et. al, 1999). Regional distribution of MSEs is not specified even though the 1999 survey covered most parts of the country. It only mentions that majority of these MSEs are in rural areas i.e. 74% of manufacturing, 70% of construction and 67% of trade (CBS et. al, 1999).

The government; aware of the role small businesses play in the economy, developed a strategy to guide the activities of MSEs in Kenya through the drafting of Sessional Paper No.2 of 2005 titled the Development of Micro and Small Businesses for the Creation of Employment and Wealth with an Aim of Reducing Poverty (Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2005).

This culminated into creation of a Micro and Small Enterprises Authority (MSEA) following enactment of the MSE Act that gives direction to among others, key issues such as: the legal and regulatory environment, markets and marketing, business linkages, the tax regime, skills and technology and financial services.

For the MSE sector to thrive, a good political and socio-economic environment is necessary. A key component of this environment is security whose importance was implicitly echoed through a government report which emphasized that in order for economic development to be attained, matters of safety, insecurity and rule of law must be addressed (GoK, June 2003).

This assertion emanated from an increasing concern over rising cases of insecurity and criminal incidences minted against Kenyans and their businesses mostly by organized criminal gangs. As earlier stated, an upsurge of these groups' activities had been noted. This upsurge has had a negative impact on the country's economic development.

According to the National Crime Research Centre report (NCRC, 2014), criminal gangs such as Mungiki, Taliban, Kamjesh, Sungusungu, Mombasa Republican Council, Angola Msumbiji, 42 brothers and Al Sabaab are a major threat to the economic development in Kenya. Out of these groups, Mungiki is the most spread, feared and violent organized armed groups in Kenya (Landinfo, 2010). The Mugiki group has mafia-like operations earning itself the title 'the millennial sect', (Henningsen and Jones, 2013; UNODC, 2009).

Mungiki is a Kikuyu word drawn from the etymological root word *Muingi* which literally means masses of people (Wamue, 2001). The term also derived from another Kikuyu word '*nguki*' which means crowds; '*nguki*' reflects a belief in a people's entitlement to a place of their own in the ontological order. Adherents of the group are mainly drawn from the Agikuyu community whose main goal is reverse the Kikuyu community back to its traditional cultural roots.

The history of Mungiki formation is not clear courtesy of the secrecy of the sect, and the fear of retribution to any potential informant (Landinfo, 2010). The group draws some motivation from the Mau Mau insurgence of 1950's against the white colonial rule in Kenya.

With time, the group mutated into an elaborate criminal gang spreading its activities in Nairobi especially within the slums, central Kenya and Rift Valley. In these areas the group has been engaged in illegal activities such as unlawful recruitment of members, oathing, extortion, drug trafficking, kidnappings and murder. Due to these atrocities, the group among 18 others were outlawed by the Kenyan government on March 15 2002 through legal notice number 42 in the Kenya Gazette.

For a time now, the group has clandestinely been conducting its activities in Kirinyaga County. These activities have had a far reaching effect on development. This study explored these activities and shows how they have affected the Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) in the area. The group's horror was at its peak from 2007 to 2009 but has clandestinely continued to operate in many areas up to date.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Kenya has witnessed an increase in the number of organized criminal gangs. In March 2002 the then Kenyan Police Commissioner outlawed 18 criminal gangs operating in various parts of the country. This number rose to 33 by 2010 (The Standard October 20th 2010) and had grown to 46 by 2013 (NCRC, 2014). By the end of 2016, the number of outlawed gangs had grown to 89 (Kenya Gazette No 10689, December 2016 pg. 4998). In banning these gangs, the government accused them of being 'the perpetrators of lawlessness and insecurity in the country'. They were accused of kidnappings, piracy, illicit drugs, carjacking, money laundering, illegal arms, extortion, and oathing witnessed in the country (Daily Nation, March 9th, 2002, Standard, October 20th 2010). The question that begs answers is; how has the criminal activities by members of these gangs impacted on the economic development of the country?

This study therefore attempted to establish existence of criminal gang activities in Kenya and show how they have affected the performance of Micro and Small Enterprises. The focus was on Mungiki sect; an outlawed criminal gang in Kenya. The gang is the largest, most dreaded and widely spread criminal gang in the country. Its members are accused of terrorizing people with extortion rackets and gruesome punishments' (Los Angeles Times, November 27th 2011).

The rationale behind this study is there exists minimal research on criminal gang activities and their effect on enterprises in Kenya. Available studies among them; the National Crime Research Centre report on criminal gangs only discusses evolvement of gangs, their activities and their emerging trends. Studies by Becker (1968), Bowen and Morara (2009) only identify crime as a fundamental factor of analysis in economics. They present statistics that shows insecurity as the second most pressing challenge facing SMEs in Kenya at about 68% prevalence.

Other studies have extensively focused on constraints such as inadequate finances, poor managerial skills, poor location, economic climate, lack of infrastructure, exploitation by authorities, lack of market and poverty, local governments' regulations, inadequate raw materials, increased inflation, fluctuating exchange rates, increased taxes and regulation, corruption, judiciary and anticompetitive practices as key constraints towards MSEs growth in Kenya (Kibera and Kibera, 1997; Thembe et al, 1997; Alila and McCormick, 1994). Not much has been said on criminal gangs in these studies a gap that this study intends to bridge.

Same time, studies touching on insecurity and development in Kenya mainly focus on urban organized crime with very little mention of what happens in the rural areas (Bowen and Morara, 2009, Okombo and Sana 2010, Wanjohi, 2012, Masoud and Mwirigi, 2013,). But some of these groups among them Mungiki have also extended their operations into the rural areas.

It is therefore necessary to extend our focus and find out how the gang's activities have impacted on rural economies and in particular the MSE sector. Much of crime analysis in economics tend to focus on individual offenders with a dearth research relating to the analysis of organized crime and its subsequent effect on business. In the surveys of Freeman (1999), Dills et al. (2008) and Ehrlich (2010), criminal organizations are not even mentioned.

Reliable and valid data in respect to Mungiki and its activities has not been available due the group's secretive nature. Findings of this study shall come in handy to supplement what is currently available. Such a data will be crucial as far as the MSE sector is concerned considering its significance in combating rural poverty. The state has a duty to provide security to the citizens and their businesses. The state exercises this responsibility through the police in a modern state system. This is done in partnership with the judiciary, prison among other agencies. In the event that the state is unable to provide security, then alternative sources of security takes effect (Masese G., 2007). Therefore, this study attempts to find out the mitigation measures that are being put in place by MSE owners and other organs to address the Mungiki menace as a supplement to government intervention measures.

1.3 Research Questions

- i. What is the nature of Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga County?
- ii. Are MSE owners aware of Mungiki activities and their implications on enterprises development?
- iii. What are the socio-economic effects of Mungiki activities on MSEs in Kirinyaga County?
- iv. What measures have the MSE owners put in place to address the Mungiki menace?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 General Objective

The general objective of this study is to establish the nature of Mungiki activities and their socio-economic effects on MSEs in Kirinyaga County.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

- i. To determine the nature of Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga County.
- ii. To establish MSEs owners' awareness of Mungiki activities and their implications on enterprises development
- iii. To establish the socio-economic impacts of Mungiki activities on MSEs in Kirinyaga County.
- iv. To identify the mitigation measures put in place by MSE owners to address the Mungiki menace.

1.5 Importance of the Study

Kenya has witnessed an increase in the number of criminal gangs. Their activities have spread beyond the urban areas with some of the gangs extending their activities into the rural areas. Similarly micro and small business sector has grown tremendously mainly due to the shrinking of national economies in the world. However this growth faces major challenges as most of the MSEs rarely survive long as confirmed by Sessional paper No 2 of 2005 (GoK Sessional paper No 2, 2005).

This study will therefore help the sector in several ways. First, its findings will benefit the government, development agencies and entrepreneurs.

They will guide them in making well informed decisions in respect to development and investment strategies within MSE sector. For example, based on the recommendations made here, the government will be able to develop concrete policies that inspire the growth of enterprises both in urban and rural parts of Kenya. Similarly the government's agencies that deal with issues of insecurity will greatly benefit from the study.

Secondly, the study will provide better understanding of organized criminal groups and establish the challenge they pose on economic development in the rural areas. Investors always seek information on security environment of an area before investing. In this case the study will offer crucial insights to investors that will assist them in making well thought investment decisions.

Thirdly, the country's devolved units of governments (counties) will benefit from the findings of this study. They will be able come up with sound development policies and mitigation measures to counter proliferation of criminal gangs at the county level.

Fourthly this study will also offer a clear research agenda to further enhance the effectiveness of any suggested interventions. This means, further research based on empirical evidence will further enhance the case for MSE support and test on the effectiveness of definite interferences.

Fifth, the study will also pave way for further research on the overall impact of security and judicial interventions to combat organized criminal gangs and establish helpful strategies aimed at promoting MSEs growth. Research on the most favorable structural interferences that help and increase socio-financial sustainability of MSEs' intervention.

Sixth government agencies responsible for fighting organized crime especially the police will benefit from the study in that they will get insights on the formation and how such groups operate.

Seventh, the study help interrogate various mitigation strategies adopted by the business owners to cushion their businesses against criminal gangs.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The geographical location of this study is limited to Kirinyaga County. It's specifically, restricted to the four major rural market centres; Kagumo, Kerugoya, Kagio and Ngurubani and their environs. These areas were only researched at the local level, to determine the impact of organized crime on Micro and Small Enterprises.

The area was selected as the primary site to conduct this investigation based on a pre-assessment endeavor that demonstrated that the county exhibited peculiar trends in respect to criminal gang activities. For example it's only in this county where Mungiki activities triggered emergence of a local vigilante formed to counter gang's insurgence. In regards to data gathering, only 30% of the total MSE owners in each town formed part of the study sample of respondents. The sensitivity of the study limited the researcher's key informants to ten for one on one interviews. Fear of reprisals from Mungiki adherents thwarted the researcher attempts to get more information through focus group discussions.

Mungiki is a difficult gang to study. The researcher believes that, a lot of information must have been withheld as a result of the creed or ethical code of the gang and fear of self-incrimination. This information may never be known, unless one is part of the group. At the initial stages of the study, the researchers had at times to rely on second-hand information and rumors.

Mungiki operational areas can at times be very dangerous. Whenever one is talking to either Mungiki members or members of the community on issues relating to the gang or any criminal underworld related to the sect he/she must be extremely cautious.

This was even aggravated by the fact that in Kirinyaga, Mungiki triggered emergence of Kenda Kenda; a local rival vigilante. Falling in either of them at the knowledge of the other, could amount into a serious mistake.

Questions on validity and reliability of the information provided by either respondents or informants couldn't be ignored considering previous reprisals against those who shared secrets about the gang. This explains why the researcher incorporated secondary data sources among them newspaper features to enhance accuracy and minimize errors and biases. It guaranteed reliability of the findings and conclusions.

The study obtained information from respondents by use of questionnaires. Data from key informants was obtained using one on one interviews. Through this triangulation technique, the researcher was able to produce recurring themes, which were later analyzed. A mixture of the two, enhanced the validity and reliability level of the research. This design was deliberate, as some respondents didn't want to respond to specific questions, and in some cases different answers were provided to the same question. Where it occurred, it was in itself a valuable research finding that indicated the different opinions of the respondents and informants on the research topic.

To access to Mungiki members and establish a mutual relationship of trust, a significant amount of time was spent in the field. This was compounded by a cloud of fear that is ever manifested among the locals thus for some informants participation had to be negotiated. Some even set specific rules or just guidelines under which the interview was granted.

A key aspect of crucial importance during data collection is safety and ethical considerations. Any topic involving Mungiki members and their interaction with either local government or even the community is a sensitive topic.

Extra measures had to be taken in order to protect the identity of and information provided by respondents and to make sure that the research accords with ethical guidelines.

Lack of previous published work on Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga posed another limitation. It restricted the study's depth and breadth, denying the researcher a comparison opportunity and this made it difficult to compare and confirm the results generated here.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.0 Introduction

Literature review helps in grounding the researcher in a given topic area; it shades light on what has been studied, methodologies employed in those studies, and the emerging issues. It also helps in synthesizing the main theories and how the theories have been applied in the previous studies together with the criticisms to the theories (Hart 1998:1).

This chapter will highlight on the importance of MSEs, the activities of organized criminal gangs, how they affect business enterprises, a theoretical explanation of emergence of gangs and a conceptual framework of the main variables.

2.1 Literature Review

2.1.1 MSEs and Development

All over the world, scholars and decision-makers have had a keen interest in the development of MSEs due to the recognition of their financial and economic contribution towards the Gross Domestic Product and development. According to the International Labour Organization (1986), MSEs result in economic and industrial development and are the means through which poverty can be eliminated.

Many of the big companies started small just like the present day SMEs, by extension, there is need to nurture today's SMEs if they are to become big companies in future. SMEs are the breeding grounds for indigenous entrepreneurship from where small investments that would otherwise never emerged are generated (Aryeetey & Ahene, 2004).

In a nut shell, MSEs are significant to the development of both an individual and a country. At an individual level, they offer employment opportunities and this raises the quality of life for both the business owners and the staff. According to Bwisa (2011), at the national level, they create a balance between big businesses, maximize farm production and unprocessed materials which would otherwise be left unused, they make it possible for small scale producers to sell their products, they utilize and mobilize resources that are disregarded by the available conventional mobilization networks and provide opportunities for many ordinary Kenyans to be a part of the large scale production.

According to Scheers (2011 pp.5048-5056), MSEs offer employment opportunities to many people both in developed and developing nations. Over 90% of African enterprises are SMEs and their input in African employment and GDP is over 50%. According to Hatega (2007) and Kauffmann (2005); SMEs make up over 95% of businesses in Sub-saharan African and their significance can't just be underestimated. Kauffmann (2006) argues that MSEs are widely acknowledged for their input in the political, social and economic advancement. Their significance is mainly seen in their capability to offer affordable goods and services, they are a source of income and offer employment opportunities to many people. This explains why globally, both bilateral and multilateral institutions, governments and Non-Governmental Organizations have been coming up with policies that assist entrepreneurship development (Robertson, Collins, Medeira and Slater, 2003).

In Kenya, MSEs play an important role. The first MSE baseline study conducted in 1993 showed that there were just about 910,000 MSEs offering employment to around 2 million people. The second MSE baseline study conducted two years later in 1995 showed that there were around 708,000 businesses offering employment to around 1.2 million people.

In comparison to the other sectors of the economy, it is clear from Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2005 that MSEs contribution to the nation's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from 13.8% to over 18% in 1999 and to over 25% in 2012 according to the Economic Survey of 2012. Kithae (2012) postulates that MSEs are a source of employment to 80% of the working population in Kenya.

2.1.2 Constraints against MSEs

Despite its rapid growth, the MSE sector, is extremely unstable thus experiences high levels of business closer and decline (Baard and Van Den Berg, 2004, Eriksson and Kuhn, 2003). Arinaitwe (2002) states that recent studies prove that developing nations have a higher number of MSEs failure than the developed nations.

Three out of five business startups fail within three months (KNBS, 2007). In retrospect, the ability of SMEs to sustain themselves in the long run is limited and as such account for a higher percentage of wealth and job losses (Ahwireng-Obeng, 2003).

Many researchers have tried to analyze and uncover primary determinants of MSEs' success or failure (Perks and Struwig, 2005, Baron 2004b, Pretorius et al, 2005a).Some arguments suggests that the development of SMEs is a black box (Dockel and Ligthelm, 2005), while others see it as an interplay between internal and external factors is a key function to the success of SMEs (Markman and Baron, 2003).

In Kenya, the major hindrances to SMEs growth include poor infrastructure, inaccessibility to finance, lack of management skills and insufficient business information (Baseline, 1999).

Besides these, the other hindering factors include high cost of energy, insecurity, corruption, bureaucracy, weak institutions and lack of transparency in government departments (APRM 2007).

According to Monk (2000) insufficient working capital, poor market selection and swiftly changing market conditions militate against MSEs. According to Moya K. & Mason (2009), over 50% of new enterprises fall within the first five years of operation owing to poor methods of operations, deprived managerial skills and inadequate finances.

Inability to access credit facilities influences the type of technology being used in businesses by restricting the number of alternatives that can be considered. A large number of MSEs use technology which is not suitable for their needs reason being it is affordable to them. Sometimes even when credit is accessible, the businessperson may lack the ability to choose freely the kind of technology they want because lending conditions may demand for purchase of heavy and immobile equipment to act as security for the loan. Wanjohi and Mugure (2008) sum it up by stating that inability to access finances and credit facilities continue to be a great challenge that MSEs in Kenya face.

The growth and profitability of a firm is highly influenced by entrepreneurial orientation (Brown, Davidson & Wiklund, 2001), Mahmood and Hanafi (2013) contend that entrepreneurial orientation yields superior performance while Soininen (2013) see it as a factor of longevity of a firm. Other factors that contribute to the success of a firm include innovativeness, pro-activeness and risk-taking ability (Frank, Kessler & Fink, 2010).

Many MSEs lack this capacity. According to Ntakobajira (2013), small and micro enterprises face competition not just from other SMEs but also from large firms which are now participating in the available markets which was initially viewed as strictly for small-sized enterprises.

Amyx (2005) opines that the biggest hurdle faced by MSEs is the poor perception that clients have towards them. Possible clients often doubt their ability to provide quality services and view them as being unable to complete more than one major task concurrently.

Larger businesses have the upper hand due to their name recognition and their seeming dominance over smaller businesses (Bowen, Morara & Mureithi, 2009). The MSE sector in Kenya often operates domestically, on small-scale and produces just enough to sustain it.

World Bank affirms that majority of enterprises in Kenya employ very few employees,, operate seasonally and rarely do they have access to water and electricity and most of them are operated from the owner's homes (World Bank, 2006).

A large number of MSEs are mostly operated for survival purposes and they opt for economic activities that rarely attract competition both in the urban and rural areas (Kihonge, 2014).

From the ongoing review it is clear that little has been done to explore insecurity and more importantly insecurity by organized criminal groups and how it has impacted on economic development of the country especially MSE sector.

2.1.3 Organized crime and economic development

Increased insecurity through criminal and terror incidences, has increasingly posed a major threat to economic development both in the urban and rural areas with all sectors of the economy affected. According to KNHCR report (2005), “the threat to peace and insecurity in the 21st century is not limited to global war and conflict only but also wars among tribes, organized crime and terrorist activities. Within ‘non-conflict’ situations, obstacles to development are mainly criminal activities and lack of security (Ayeres 1994, Mollwaine 1999, Rogers 2003b).

Criminal activities disrupt the development of nations, destabilize the spiritual and physical well-being, lack respect for human life and breeds an environment of violence and terror. This results in lack of personal security and poor quality of life. The United Nations report (1992:6) states that a rise in occurrence of criminal activities results in the disruption of security and incites a state of insecurity.

Organized criminal gangs are a phenomenon present in many countries; however, the groups vary in terms of activities and ideologies. While there is a variance in activities, the consequences of their actions are more often than not similar (UNODC, 2002). But whichever way you look at them, such groups are usually a threat to peace, stability and development wherever they exist.

Organized crimes are self-perpetuating associations of individuals and/or groups that come together with a sole aim of procuring gains (commercial or monetary) by unlawful means while covering their actions through corrupt means. Similarly; the Transnational Organized Crime Convention (TOC) delineates an organized criminal group as well planned group of people that is in existence for a stipulated period of time and they act in harmony with an objective of committing serious criminal activities so as to obtain financial or material benefits (UNODC, 2002:9).

Studies have identified various types of criminal gangs from both developed and developing countries. Most of them are organized within ethnic groups or across ethnic lines and this is no exception to Kenyan groups. They are engaged in a range of serious criminal activities among them violence and drug dealing, as well as minor crimes and status offenses, over short or long periods of time (Irving A. Spergel, 2003).

These activities have had a devastating effect; whereby they threaten national security and negatively impact on socio-political and economic stability (Grennan, Britz, Rush, Barker 2000; Klein 1995).

Italy has had modern organized criminal gangs for decades, a fact that has led to sprouting of a variety of groupings with their own traditions and subculture. These groups have in effect spread in all parts of the Italian society. Among these gangs is the Italian Mafia; a group often thought of as being the archetype for organized crime worldwide (Roberto Saviano, 2006).

The Sicilian Mafia together with Sicilian La Cosa Nostra have accumulated massive wealth and are today involved in international crime (Dickie John, 2004). The Sicilian Mafia specializes in drug trafficking, political corruption and military arms trafficking apart from being involved in arson, frauds, counterfeiting and racketeering crimes (Filippo Spadafora 2010).

Escalation and spread of gang activities in United States culminated to the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 whose purpose was to eradicate their criminal activities. In the 2011 the National Gangs Intelligence Center of the Federal Bureau of Investigation asserted that there are approximately 1.4 million active gangs (of all types) with more than 33,500 gangs in United States (FBI, 2011, Carter F. Smith, Jeff Rush & Catherine E. Burton, 2013)

While alluding to the fact that militia groups can play an important role in local communities in the absence of government security agencies; in Southeast Asia, they have been accused of criminal behavior and human rights violations (Jeremy K and Kari T, 2012). They operate like enterprises and have commercialized their criminal activities which range from small family run operations to large corporations.

Organized groups have been able to expand their networks across borders courtesy of globalization (UN.GIFT, 2008). Among the European countries cross-border crime has been on the rise in an enlarging European Union. Criminals, especially organized gangs, are now exploiting the lowering of national barriers to EU trade; travelling to commit crimes, increasing their illegitimate profits and escaping punishment (Luchtman M, 2013).

The threat of these gangs to the economies of EU members is quite extensive and has forced their leaders to create a special police force 'Europol' to handle criminal intelligence and support investigations conducted by law enforcement officers in EU countries when they have a cross-border element (Europol, 2016). In these countries business and general economic development has been laden by insecurity posed by these gangs with the MSE sector suffering the blunt most.

From 1980's Russians, underwent transition from communism to capitalism. According to Ruth J (2010) this transition has not been painless and has created an impetus of many distressing problems among them the problem of organized criminal groups. He adds that the "existence of organized criminal gangs disables successful economic reforms by influencing important issues such as competition, entrepreneurship, capital flight, the shadow economy, and violence". It has been argued that, by 1991, organized crime had expanded to form over 700 gangs in Russian republic alone (Anderson, 1995, 353).

The militias, vigilante groups and gangs in Africa fall under the category of organized criminal gangs. They fit this description because they operate under a self-organized model, they operate on the basis of a criminal corporation offering illicit products, invest in legal economic sectors, use violence to have monopoly in the market among other factors (Ribeiro, Jorge & Oliveira Rosane, 2010: 14).

The assertions that organized crime is a business activity are echoed by Antônio José Campos Moreira who argues that militia configures the crime of conspiracy. He further asserts that organized crimes cannot operate without representation in the legal system (police, government and judiciary) of a country (Ribeiro, Jorge & Oliveira Rosane, 2010: 14).

Since 1980 organized criminal gangs have ravaged many African countries such as Somalia, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Uganda and Kenya. In Northern Nigeria, Boko Haram an illegal Muslim group; has been involved in attacks against both government and private entities including businesses. Their emergence has been associated with globalization, great advances in communication technology and the unstable political and socio-economic conditions.

Just like in the Asian case; gangs operating in Africa often have a Janus faced nature and slide between roles as legitimate providers of social services and oppressors of communities. While the groups are illegal, disenfranchised groups find them useful for the articulation of their grievances. The military nature of these groups disqualifies its members from participation in formal political arenas (Erik Henningsen and Peris Jones, 2013). Activities by criminal groups' poses insecurity both in the urban and the rural areas and this extensively affect the performance of micro and small enterprises hence retarding development in the affected areas.

In examining gangs in Russia, Friedman revealed that enterprises have no option but must comply with rules set by organized gangs to continue operating (Friedman, 2000). The findings are echoed by Anderson who observes that the rules may include such things as payment of unofficial taxes (Anderson, 1995, 354). The net effect of such criminal acts is they hamper economic growth as businesses would have to comply with unlawful demands that eats into the amount they would otherwise pay to the legitimate tax regime as well as eat into their profits (Williams, 1997, 25).

As a remedy, businesses would opt to increase commodities prices and in turn; this affect sales. The actions of organized criminal gangs thus have negative effects on the emergence and growth of SMEs.

2.1.4 Organized Criminal Gangs in Kenya

Trends of organized criminal gang activities in East Africa, specifically Kenya, are frequently evolving. According to the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC, 2012), unlawful criminal gangs have steadily increased in Kenya, a trend that raises concern. The report attributed emergence of sophisticated crimes proliferation to well veiled outlawed groupings. It adds that, majority of these groups at 50.2 per cent engage in illicit drug trafficking while 34.4 percent engage in extortion of money related activities. About 33.2 per cent engage in kidnapping for ransom while 12.7 per cent engage in environmental crimes (NCRC report, 2012). The late Interior Cabinet Secretary, Joseph Nkaissery outlawed 89 criminal gangs running activities in different parts of the country. Major outlawed gangs are Mungiki, Taliban, Kamjesh, Sungusungu, Mombasa Republican Council, Angola Msumbiji, 42 brothers, Al Sabaab, Mafuguli Gogo, Team Acrobatic, Marachi Republican Council, Akapulo, Masaa soo, Akili za Usiku, Masenari, American marines, Matakwei, Mawaiyo, Baragoi Boys, Mayakuza, Nzoia Railway Gang, Chap Ilale, Quick Response Group, Chifu Kali among others (Kenya Gazette No 10689, 26 December 2016, NCRC, 2012).

Organized criminal gangs in Kenya have been associated with their native communities and this gives them protection making it difficult to deal with them. For example the Mombasa Republican Council is associated with coastal communities, Mungiki with Kikuyu, Embu and Meru, the SDLF with the Sabaot and the Al-shabaab with the Somali. Their operations also tend to be limited within some geographical areas of the country.

For example the Mombasa Republican Council operates at the coastal areas while the Mungiki are within central, parts of Rift valley, parts of Eastern and Nairobi. Some of these gangs have spread their operations in both urban and rural areas and this has far reaching effects on development. The MSE sector has borne the greatest blunt of organized crime and insecurity caused by these gangs.

Within the Kenyan context, the significance of crime and security is mirrored by the opinions voiced by ordinary citizens. The major source of poverty is said to be insecurity. The Kenya Economic Recovery Strategy for Employment report asserts that economic development can only be attained if matters of safety, insecurity and rule of law are tackled. Other additional factors highlighted include well-organized and competent law enforcement agencies, prioritizing the safety of the public and ensuring adherence to law and order which is paramount to the development of the economy and improvement of life (GoK, 2003-2007).

2.1.5 Mungiki movement in Kenya

Mungiki is one of the most organized criminal gangs in Kenya. The details of gangs' formation are not clear partly because of the secretive nature of the sect (Norway 29 Jan. 2010, 6; The New York Times 21 Apr. 2009). During its over twenty years of existence group has been labeled variously as a 'millennial sect' or 'youth gang', 'youth militia' or 'vigilante group' or 'Kenyan mafia'. (Henningsen and Jones, 2013).

It's referred to as Kenya's Cosa Nostra, Yakuza or Kenyan Mafia due to its elaborate organization. Jane's Intelligence Reviews describes Mungiki as 'Kenya's largest criminal organization, specializing in extortion' (Jane's Intelligence Review, 2 Feb. 2010). Mungiki was among the first 18 organizations outlawed through a special issue of Kenya Gazette supplement number 20 of March 15, 2002 upon being accused of being dangerous to the government of Kenya.

The name Mungiki is derived from the Kikuyu word Muingi- ki, which means masses, multitude or large gathering (Daily Nation, May 27th 2014). Wamue (2001) asserts that *Mungiki* is a Kikuyu word drawn from the etymological root word *Muingi* which literally means masses of people. The term is derived from another Kikuyu word ‘*nguki*’ which means crowds; ‘*nguki*’ that infers a belief in a people’s entitlement to a place of their own in the ontological order. Adherents of the group are mainly drawn from the Agikuyu community whose main goal is revert back to their cultural and political roots.

The group apparently bears some similarity to a mystery religion and is associated with the Kikuyu community (Henningsen and Jones 28 May 2013, 373). The group is "a religious movement clothed with diverse aspirations ranging from political to religio-cultural and socio-economic liberation" (Norway 29Jan. 2010, 6).

Its formation and development is associated with one Kamunya Njoroge as the founder, his son Maina Njenga; who became the group’s spiritual leader and Ndura Waruinge who acted as the national coordinator and spokesperson until he abandoned the movement 2014.

Initial details claim that the group started as a local militia in the Kenyan highlands to protect Kikuyu farmers in disputes over land with the Maasai and the Kalenjin. The two tribes were seen to dominate the government late in 1980s and 1990s.

It has also been argued that Kikuyu youth; dissatisfied by rising levels of poverty, landlessness and alarming levels of unemployment joined the group which seemed to offer them a sense of purpose, cultural and political identity as well as income (IHS Jane's 2 Feb. 2010; Norway 29 Jan. 2010).

The group is opposed to westernization and advocates for the return to indigenous African traditions. Their ideology rejects Christianity and is in favor to traditional practices such as forced female genital mutilation (Henningsen and Jones 28 May 2013, 374; Afrik.com 19 Oct. 2010; Norway 29 Jan.2010, 5, 6). While some of the ideologies promoted by the group are progressive (refusal of corruption), some of the ideals it pushes are extreme and a disdain to Kenyan modernization. Ritual performances are also associated with the group during recruitment and are done in secrecy.

In the areas where Mungiki operates it has been accused of cold blood murders, kidnapping, admission of oath, administration of illegal taxes and acting as a vigilante group where they keep out rival gangs and ordinary criminals. The group is accused of use of violent ways to achieve their goals (Afrik.com 19 Oct. 2010; Norway 29 Jan. 2010, 10). Its followers also act as cultural police by enforcing prime Mungiki dress codes on women marital ethos based on Kikuyu traditions.

Mungiki members have also been accused of extortion where they collect monthly fees from residents and business owners and operate a parallel judiciary. They are involved in arbitrating family disputes and renter versus landlord conflicts and hiring out their gangs to politicians and business people as well.

The findings of Wamue (2001) reveal that the group does charge the public for access of public utilities i.e. toilets, illegal electricity, water and sewerage connections particularly in the urban areas. Whenever the group are under threat from the authorities, they react by means of instilling fear through acts such as beheading and display of mutilated corpses. Therefore, by use of terror, the group intimidates any form of opposition.

Wamue further points that while the group condemns vices such as ethnicity, corruption among others, they invalidate their stand by themselves being a purely Gikuyu group that promotes the cultures and traditions of the Agikuyu only (Wamue, 2001).

2.1.6 Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga

While the sect set out its operations in the central Kenya, it has managed to expand beyond this region to other parts of the country, notably, the informal settlements in Nairobi, and Rift Valley areas such as Nakuru, Nyahururu, Laikipia, Naivasha and Eldoret (Wamue, 2001). The sect's expansion was mostly in the 1990s when Kenya was under severe turbulence in the clamor for multiparty. The need to expand was majorly fueled by the group to expand its illegal operations to facilitate the sustenance of the livelihood of its members. The group came to the public limelight in the early 2000 when it unleashed terror on the public mostly in Rift Valley and parts of Central Kenya.

In the year 2002, the sect was outlawed by the Kenyan government (Norway, 2010) due to its stand of championing ideals that contravene what the mainstream society postulates. The sect run protection rackets especially in the public transport sector; at the same time, harassed and intimidated residents in the areas the operated (US State Department's Country Reports, 2010, 21).

The government responded with increased crackdown of its members especially in Nairobi, Kiambu and Muranga. Many of them fled and sought refuge in Nyeri and Kirinyaga where they regrouped and began establishing similar operation networks. It is in these areas especially Kirinyaga where the locals resisted and waged war against the sect followers.

The residents; who are mainly small scale farmers and business people didn't take the group invasion lightly and resisted. In retaliation, the sect's adherents countered the resistance with extreme vigor and brutality.

The conflict persisted for a while with the residents of these areas forming a local militia or a vigilante group to deal with the group's menace. This later degenerated into intense sporadic battles pitting the vigilante and the security agencies on one hand and the Mungiki on the other.

2.2 Theoretical framework

The activities of organized criminal gangs in Kenya cannot be explained using one theoretical approach because they are as diverse as the groups themselves. Further, for each organized gang, there tend to exist a correlation between its criminal activities and the factors that precipitated its emergence. Groups with a religious background tend to have religious connotations in their act; a similar case with those with cultural or even political origins.

It is also important to note that a criminal gang may not necessarily be a product of one factor but could have a variety of causes and Mungiki is no exception. The sect is a complex entity considering that it incorporates religious and cultural aspect but political and economic aspects as well (Wamue, 2001). Kagwanja (2003) concurs with Wamue's assertions but further adds that together with the complexity, the sect is also heir to a long tradition of religio-political revivalism that dates back to the early stages of anti-colonial resistance. Kisiangani (2002) echoes the positions of both Kagwanja and Wamue and explains that the complexity in the sects' formation is occasioned by the deteriorating economic situation in Kenya. For the purpose of this research, three theories have been used to explain the emergence and activities of Mungiki in Kenya. They include, Durkheim's theory of Anomie, Merton's Social Strain theory (1968) and Fluid Theory.

2.2.1 Durkheim's theory of Anomie

In Durkheim's usage, anomie referred to a situation in which cultural norms break down because of rapid change. Durkheim contend that inequality is a natural and inevitable human condition that is explained by social maladies such as crime lest for social norms breakdowns which results in anomie (Simpson, 1965). In the absence anomies persons live a normal life with common values and do regular routines. Commonness of persons in a society reflects social solidarity. The social solidarity is a function of the diversity of the roles of the society. Durkheim holds that crime is part of the social solidarity and as such is normal, he adds that a society that lack crime would be pathologically over controlled. Anomie becomes real resulting in a number of social ills including crime in the organic form of the society. In the maintenance of the social solidarity, criminals play a significant function as they form a segment of the society that's seen as inferior while the other parts remain superior. The society's solidarity is further enhanced by the punishment of criminals, failure to punish crime undermines the sector of the society that sacrifices for the good of all.

The theory of anomie thus explains deviance and crime. Durkheim contends that, in an organic society, high crime rate is a function of normalness, or rapid changes occasioned by modernization. He further adds that the acceptance of urbanization and modernization even by rural societies has led to the breakdown of the mechanical society and giving way to the organic frame. The theory therefore extensively explains the emergence organized criminal gangs. For example, the first and second World wars which were followed by the economic depression in Europe disturbed the socio fabric leading to emergence of many organized criminals that negated from the expected norms. Criminal activities of such groups brought businesses into their knees. Similarly, Kenya has experienced deep socio-economic changes which have eroded the traditionally cherished norms.

Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) implemented in late 80s and early 90s had numerous effects on the economy, such as over the roof increase of commodity prices, the relegation of the underprivileged in the dissemination of fundamental benefits such as education and health and a high number of unemployed people (Ikiara 1990, Mwega and Ndulu 1994, World Bank-UNDP1993, Swamy1994).

Institution sanctions aimed at reducing government debt and expenditure resulted in government freeze on employment in the 1990's in the civil service and teaching fields. Market liberalization a pre-condition of the SAP exposed Kenya's developing economy to a more competitive and established world market. The exposure of an already fragile economy only led to more job losses and economic stagnation, a factor that only added to poverty levels. Data on income expenditure distribution for 1994 (Central Bureau of Statistics 1999) indicated that urban poverty had increased to 59.6% and rural poverty increased from 46.8% to 51.5% in between 1994 to 2000. The decline in economic growth in the subsequent years from 2.4% in 1997 to 1.2% in 2002 and the marginal participation of Kenyans in the formal economy meant that many individuals had to derive their livelihoods from the informal sector, agricultural self-employment and others turning to criminal activities. As at 1997, Kenya was ranked number 22nd from below on human development with averagely 80 USD per capita income. In the same year, the gap between the rich and the poor grew bigger with the richest 10% earning a total of about 47.7% of the total income. Kenya was ranked second to Brazil where the rich earned a total of 51.3 per cent of the income (UNDP Report, 1997). All this created an abnormal social and economic fabric that provided a base for emergence of criminal gangs such as Mungiki. The group's membership was ready to engage in activities such as extortion, blackmail; maiming and even murder to survive yet these had retrogressive effect on economic development in Kenya.

2.2.2 Merton's Social Strain theory (1968)

The social strain theory propagates that the social conditions individuals are subjected to compel them to engage in criminal activities as it hinders their abilities to fully satisfy their needs legitimately (Merton, 1968). In the face of social limitations, crime becomes a normal response. The theory is in support of the claims of Durkheim's anomic theory explanation of delinquency.

According to Merton, high crime rates in America could be explained by certain prevailing social conditions in American society particularly in the lower social classes. In his argument, he claimed that the social structure of America hinders the abilities of certain sections of the American society to satisfy their appetite. As a result, those subjected to such limitations are forced to engage in non-conformist conduct. He further asserts that the value and worth of an individual in all cultures is equated with wealth, a fact that necessitates the need by each person to acquire some.

In explaining the America's case, Merton demonstrated that opportunities were highly concentrated in the high class sections of the society relative to the lower class. Those in higher class as culture demands aspire to accumulate more while those in lower class who are structurally disadvantaged also strive to acquire irrespective of the means used. Merton's assertion are echoed by Cloward and Ohlin (1960) whose argument confirm that desire for economic condition is the key driver of delinquency in boys. Unavailability of sincere opportunities for improvement of one's economic status, heightens individual's discontent forcing him/her to seize illegitimate opportunities that exist. Left with no option, these individuals may be pushed to formation of organized gangs to express their frustration.

The grounds justified by the theory befits the Kenyan society, just like America, material gain in Kenya define the worthiness of an individual.

With poverty and high unemployment rate, societies that feel socio-economically and politically disenfranchised seek for opportunities by any available means including those that are illegitimate. The Mungiki sect members are one such group that use illegitimate means to get money that they then invest in ventures that are valued by the society. In the meantime, legitimate businesses suffer the consequences of the sect's actions. However its worth to note that Mungiki is also involved in activities that aims at solving the social problems among the poor by means of illegal provision of public utilities such as illegal water and electricity connections (Mathai, 2011). At a small fee five shillings, the gang sells water to people from the illegal connections they have made from the main water supply lines. They also connect individuals to power supply lines at a fee inversely proportional to the sizes of their households. Disconnection of such illegal connections by concerned government agencies leads to violence as the gang attempts to chase away officials tasked to dismantle the illegal connections (Mutahi, 2011). Illegal power and water connections are not done by experts. This leads to occasional power blackouts and water contamination in the affected areas hurting enterprises.

2.2.3 Fluid Theory

The theory is an advancement of Rousseau's social contract position (Zartman, 1995; and Genes Jones Yoroms, 2005). Zartman, opines that when the state cannot perform its basic functions anymore and its ability to authoritatively make decisions and provision of welfare to the society is paralyzed, then that state is considered collapsed. When this happens, the state loses political legitimacy and have no socio-economic apparatus. Societal fragmentation crops in with the inability to instill law and order and the consequent loss of power over political and economic space.

He therefore affirms that state collapse is neither an event nor a mere crisis but a lasting degenerative malady (Zartman, 1995, pp.5-8).

The Fluid theory holds that when there are social and economic problems in a state, militias emerge. On the same vein, absence of social justice, rule of law and democracy is recipe for the emergence of militias. The proponent of the theory further argues that in social conflicts, the state is not always impartial and as such the unrepresented social forces call to question the legitimacy of authority.

It is only the failure of the state to provide full security to the populace that prompts the very citizens to dissolve their security contract with the state and resort to other forms of security at their disposal. Militias thus emerge when the legitimacy of the state is put to question. The Minute men in America are a good example for the aforementioned illustration. The group constituted a group of colonies that felt that their interests were not taken into consideration by the British prompting the group to revolt and thus informed the genesis of the American Revolution (Miller, 1945).

The Mungiki's case is not any different, the binding cord in their case just like other militias elsewhere is a sense of injustice to the living conditions tolerated (Henningsen-and-Jones, 2010). Henningsen further add that among the members, there is a common awareness of historical injustices that the Kenyan population has been subjected to. It is alleged that the Mungiki was originally constituted to defend the rights of Agikuyu farmers in dispute with the Maasai and the Kalenjin believed to be favored by the government of the day then, the Mungiki support base is mostly persons displaced by ethnic clashes (Kagwanja, 2003, p. 29).

As the Kikuyu felt more and more disenfranchised by the then Kenya's second president; Daniel Arap Moi, the Mungiki membership grew (Landinfo, 2010). In the case of Kenya, these factors border political and economic factors that may yield criminal behavior. The Kenya's politics revolves around ethnicity, and so it is understandable for the Kikuyu community to have felt excluded in the government of the time. This exclusion is to serve the interest of elites and by extension ethnic community that forms government.

The marginalization, prompted the formation of the Mungiki and the subsequent insecurity witnessed in the areas they operate. Kenya has had a history of violence and as such have a bearing in insecurity. Starting from 1992, 1997 and the 2007 elections, violence was reported with 2007 bearing the highest incidences of violence as confirmed by reports by Amnesty International.

Law enforcement and justice administration, have been undermined by weak laws and institutional structures. Executive influence have been accused to have a hand in undermining the justice system in Kenya mainly because of systemic hindrances to the independence of the legislature and the judiciary. In many cases individuals feel like they have no channels for redress which contributes to the cycle of violence as aggrieved parties take the law into their own hands. These injustices are seen as direct causes of the difficulties Mungiki members had experienced growing up in slums in Nairobi or in rural areas in Central Kenya in particular. This therefore can explain why the group emerged as well as the criminal activities they are engaged in.

In Kenya, organized gangs are engaged in a wide range of activities (Wamue, 2003) such as extortion, blackmail, gambling, loan sharking, political corruption and this stifles development activities in the rural areas.

Extortion in particular is a time-tested aspect of an organized gang and it involves the acquisition of property through the use of threats or force. For example, Mungiki charge "protection fees" to slum residents and demand money for basic services such as water, electricity (Reuters 5 June 2007, UN 7 June 2007), and access to public toilets (Safer Access July 2007). The sect has targeted businesses for extortion as well (NPR 17 July 2007; Africa Research Bulletin, 1-30 June 2007, 17125). Those who refuse to pay may be killed (BBC 9 Oct. 2007). Many syndicates use blackmail, violence, murder, torture and assault to keep themselves powerful and profitable. Their constant threat of violence keeps victims and witnesses silent. The criminals demand money from farmers, shopkeepers and housewives and this has negatively affected development in the areas of the group operations.


2.3 Conceptual Framework

A concept is defined by Nachmias and Nichamias (1996) as an abstraction, symbol, a representation of an object or one of its properties, or of a behavioral phenomenon. The conceptual model is an illustration of key variables and their interconnection or relationship.

A model therefore is an abstraction from reality that orders and simplifies our view of reality by representing its essential characteristics.

The conceptual framework below shows the relationship between dependent variable (socio-economic effect) and sets of independent and intervening variables. It shows that Mungiki members are engaged in political, social and economic criminal activities that unless mitigated have a serious impact on the Micro and Small Enterprises.

Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework



2.3.1 Political Activities

According to figure 2.1, Mungiki is engaged in political activities such as political violence, riots and demonstrations, rival political groupings, infighting and corruption. These activities have had serious implications on businesses and other economic activities in the affected areas.

2.3.2 Economic Activities

The figure also conceptualizes that Mungiki is engaged in economic activities that impact negatively on the growth and performance of MSEs. Among Mungiki's economic activities are extortion from business people, taxation and levies on businesses, charging farmers produce, participation in illegal businesses and sale of contraband goods.

2.3.3 Social Activities

Mungiki as an organized criminal gang is also engaged in social activities ranging from beheadings, threatening & instilling fear, torture of reformed sect members, forced female circumcision, kidnapping, robbery with violence, murder and forced recruitment and oathing.

2.3.4 Mitigation Efforts or strategies to neutralize Mungiki menace

The study conceptualizes that various agencies; government and other organizations as well as the owners of the businesses are engaged in various mitigation strategies or activities aimed at neutralizing Mungiki activities that negatively affect businesses. For example, government agencies are engaged in crackdowns, arrests and imprisonment of Mungiki adherents to weaken the movement.

Other actors such as the church and the civil societies are actively engaged in activities such as educating the public and more importantly the youth against criminal activities. The owners of enterprises also initiate measures aimed at securing their businesses.

These efforts are at times jointly undertaken whereby the security agencies, faith based organizations and other organs together with business owners forge a united forum to eradicate crime.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter comprehensively covers the research methods used in this study in its endeavors to answer obvious but fundamental question: “how was the research conducted?” The elements discussed are: research site description, research design, unit of analysis and units of observation, target population, sample size and sampling procedure, research instruments, data collection procedures, ethical considerations and data analysis techniques.

3.1 Research Site Description

The study site for this research paper is Kirinyaga County. It is one of the 7 counties in central Kenya. The county is bordered by Embu in its South and Eastern sides, Muranga in the West and Nyeri in its northern side. It's composed of four sub-counties Kirinyaga East, Kirinyaga Central, Kirinyaga South and Kirinyaga West. The four also form the county's four legislative units (constituencies).

The mainstream religion is Christianity with Catholic, Anglican and Presbyterian churches being the mainstream churches. Others include; IPCA, AIC, Methodist, Seventh day Adventist, There are a few Muslim concentrated in Mwea, Sagana and Kutus each with one Mosque. The people practice both traditional and modern cultures. The national government is based in Kerugoya town where the police and other government officers located. The county government's offices are based at Kutus. There are other small towns in the county with sub administrative functions i.e. Kianyaga, Baricho, and Mwea. The rest are market centres i.e. Ngurubani, Sagana, and Kagio. The inhabitants of this county are 98% Gikuyu and 2% others.

Until 2016, the total rural self-employment is 49,200 persons and sectorial contribution to household income from self-employment is 10%. Urban self-employment is 39,365 persons and has a sectorial contribution to household income of 8 percent (Kirinyaga County website, 2016).

The county is endowed with a good climate and fertile volcanic soils. Like most of neighboring counties, agriculture is the backbone of the county's economy with a mix of agro and livestock farming.

Farmers in the county grow tea and coffee as the main cash crops while rice, maize and beans are the main food crops. Horticulture production is a major activity in the county with fruits such as tomatoes, bananas, oranges and many others being grown. Vegetables such as French beans, kales, carrots and cabbages are also grown in plenty.

There are several industries located in Kirinyaga County specializing mostly in agricultural based products and alcohol. Among them, are 4 tea factories; Thumaita, Kimunye, Kangaita and Mununga. The fifth; Ndima tea factory; is shared with Nyeri County. There is 1 coffee miller (KPCU), 2 maize millers (Joymax millers and Centur millers), 2 rice millers (Mwea Rice Mills and Nice rice millers) and 4 alcohol producing industries (Rokin agencies, Muniyiri agencies, Wambo wines industries and Wise born industries). There are several jua kali associations in the county and over 1,200 jua kali artisans.

There is high industry potential especially on value addition, agro-processing and tinning industries considering the high production of tomatoes, sugarcane, mangoes, watermelons, bananas and green grams (Kirinyaga County First County Integrated Plan 2013 – 2017, May 2014). There are many coffee pulp processing factories dotted in areas where coffee is grown.

Rice is grown Mwea, the lower part of the county. Mwea is currently the biggest irrigation scheme in the country run by the National Irrigation board of Kenya (NIB). Farmers in Kirinyaga are also engaged in dairy production with milk being supplied to such process such KCC (Kenya Cooperative Creameries), Brookside and a local farmers cooperative (Kirinyaga Dairy Cooperative Society).

Many farm products among them tea, coffee and fresh beans are exported through farmers' cooperative Saccos and agencies such as Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA) while the rest are sold in Nairobi and other towns such as Mombasa.

Mount Kenya Forest and National reserve covers a large part of the county and is home to a large variety of flora and fauna. It is also a major tourist attraction. The county is well linked with tarmacked roads with most of the other links being all weather roads. Consequently, the county is advantaged due to its proximity to the city of Nairobi served by both Nairobi-Thika-Sagana-Karatina and Nairobi-Thika-Mwea-Embu highways.

Statistics show that as of 2009, the county had a 528,054 people in an area of 1,205.4 km² that forms large labor force that makes the county highly productive and a major contributor to the national economy.


A number of financial institutions have set up in the county to take advantage of the growing agro-business, trade, commercial and services sector. Among them are Kenya Commercial Bank, Equity, Barclays, Cooperative, Family and Sidian Banks. There are several farmers and teachers' micro finance Saccos that offer various financial services to the locals.

Figure 3.1: Location of Kirinyaga County



(Source: Karte: NordNordWest, Lizenz:<https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index>.)

Figure 3.2: A Map of Kirinyaga County showing Towns under Study



(Source: <http://www.kirinyaga.go.ke/map.html>)

3.2 Research Design

Research design is the plan and structure of investigation that enables the researcher to obtain answers to the research question (Kerlinger, 1986). The choice of a research design is guided by the purpose of the study, type of investigation, extent of researcher involvement, stage of knowledge in the field, time period over which the data is to be collected and the type of analysis to be carried out, that is, whether quantitative or qualitative (Sekaran, 2003).

Based upon the nature of the research problem and the research questions, descriptive study design is considered appropriate for this study. Kothari (2014) opines that the descriptive design of research aims at defining the current status of a phenomenon, demarcating the nature of the main state of affairs, way of life, opinions and finding out precise explanations. This allows use of both qualitative and quantitative methods when investigating and gathering both primary and secondary data.

3.3 Units of Analysis and Unit of Observation

Unit of analysis is who or what is studied during research while unit of observation is what is described by research data that one analyzes. The unit of observation is at the level at which you collect the data while the unit of analysis is at the level at which you pitch the conclusions.

Babbie (2012) describes a unit of analysis as an element about which information is collected and analyzed. The units of analysis in this study are the micro and small enterprises in Kirinyaga County affected by Mungiki activities and the business owners/managers are the targeted respondents.

3.4 Target Population

According to Kothari (2014), all items in any inquiry constitute a ‘universe’ or ‘populace’. Mugenda (2003) describes a populace as whole groupings of people, occurrences, things which share physical characteristics which are apparent. In this context, a population means the complete census of the sampling frames.

A sampling frame in this case is a list of all units in a population, from which research on population commonly referred to as census are more illustrative of the whole population due to the fact that all the people in a population have an equivalent probability of being a part of the last sample that is picked according to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003). Best and Khan (2007), define the target population as a small portion of the population sampled for observation and analysis. It is also considered as the population to which the researcher wants to generate the results of a study. This definition is appropriate as it ensures that the population of interest is homogeneous.

MSEs based in Mungiki targeted areas of Kirinyaga County, shall form the target population for this study. These are enterprises employing 1-50 persons. They cut across all the economic sectors as provided in the MSE act of 2012 i.e. farm, manufacturing, industry, service, and trade (GoK, 2012).

3.5 Sample Size and Sampling Procedure

Social researchers are frequently faced with the fact that they cannot collect data from everyone who is in the category being researched. As a result, they rely on getting evidence from a portion (sample) of the whole in the expectation and hope that what is found in that portion applies equally to the rest of the ‘population’ (Denscombe, 2006).

3.5.1 Sample Size

Denscombe (2006) argues that for the results of a study to be indiscriminate, that, in order to be generalized from the findings of a research, the sample must not only be carefully selected to be representative of the population; it also needs to include a sufficient number. The absolute size of the sample will depend on the complexity of the population and the research questions being investigated.

Sample size according to Mugenda (2008) determines the precision with which population values can be estimated. The total number of MSE's in the Mungiki affected areas will be established through a census meaning that respondents shall be approached through census method. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) states that when the census is small there is no point of sampling if time and resources allow and this increases reliability. The term Census implies that each individual and each set of individual characters are enumerated separately and that the characteristics thereof separately recorded (Vijayaraj & Dinesh Kumar, 2010). Kothari (2004) also describes census as a complete enumeration of all the items in a population.

3.5.2 Sampling Procedure

Both stratified and purposive samplings were used to come up with a sample for the study. Through stratified sampling, the entire target population of MSEs in areas earmarked for this study were put in into different subgroups, or strata, and then randomly selected for the final subjects proportionally from different strata. The criterion for stratification was based on the business type to ensure businesses of the same type forms a different stratum for data collection purposes. This helped the researcher to achieve greater precision, reduce costs and guarantee better coverage of the population (Castilo J.J, 2009).

Table 3.1: MSE types, size and sample size targeted for study in earmarked towns of Kirinyaga County

Town	Number of MSEs in each Mungiki affected town	30% of the MSEs targeted for sampling	Declined & Spoilt	Actual No of Respondents
Kagumo	200	60	5	55
Kerugoya	250	75	12	63
Kagio	100	30	1	29
Ngurubani	300	90	27	63
Total	850	255	45	210

Purposive sampling or judgmental sampling was used to select 10 key informants for in-depth information in this study. According to Babbie and Mouton, (2001), purposive sampling entails selecting a sample based on the knowledge of the population and the purpose of the study.

The technique was appropriate as it did cut costs and enabled the researcher reach the targeted sample quickly thus saving time. It also enabled the researcher to get crucial information about Mungiki activities since many business owners exhibited a lot of fear in discussing the gang's activities less they are accused of betrayal and harassed.

Out of the 10 informants, were two local government officials; a chief and a sub-chief serving in the County's Mungiki affected areas. The other eight own and run businesses in either of the four towns under study.

Of the eight, three are former Mungiki members of whom one is a former Mungiki official in the County. Two of the remaining six are members of a vigilante group that emerged to fight Mungiki out of Kirinyaga. The last four are local traders who also engage in farming within the county are victims of Mungiki operations.

3.5.3 Research Instruments

The key research instruments in this study are questionnaires for respondents and interview guided questions for key informants. Questionnaires were used to gather data from owners of enterprises (respondents) who were not willing to go through interview due to time limitations or other reservations. The questionnaires consisted of open and closed ended questions. According to Chandran (2004) a questionnaire is appropriate because it translates research objectives into precise field questions and brings an association between research questions and research results by becoming the means of obtaining evidence related to the research questions. They also help in the collection of data from large group respondents.

Key informants interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a participant's experiences. Further, an interviewer was able to pursue in-depth information around the topic. It enabled probing and corroboration of issues which came out during data collection using questions. Interviews are useful as follow-up to certain respondents to questionnaires, e.g., to further investigate their responses (McNamara, 1999). To ease the exercise, the interview guide was developed from the questionnaire to enable the discussions to revolve around the matters relevant to the topic of study. The researcher used newspaper extracts/features to further supplement information given by respondents and informants.

3.6 Methods of Data Collection

Data collection follows the formulation of the problem, identification of the data requirements and selection of the research design as the next logical step in the research process. Data collection is gathering empirical evidence in order to gain new insights about a situation and answer questions that prompted the undertaking of the research.

It involves operationalizing the research design into instruments of data collection with a view to collecting data in order to meet the research objectives (Chandran, 2004)

For the purpose of this study, both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods were used. They provided a tradeoff between breadth and depth and between generalizability and targeting to specific (sometimes very limited) populations (NSF USA, 2002)). This mixed method of research involved collecting, analyzing and integrating quantitative (e.g., experiments, surveys) and qualitative (e.g. interviews) research. It provided a better understanding of the research problem than either of each alone.

Qualitative methods were used to provide a broad approach in understanding and giving in-depth explanations on social phenomena in a natural setting (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). They provided a better understanding and possibly enabled better and more insightful interpretation of the results from the quantitative study.

Quantitative methodology was employed to help the researcher provide and analyze raw data. The survey approach was used in data collection as its wide and inclusive in coverage, specific in time and empirical in nature. Among the survey forms of data collection used are face to face interviews, documents and questionnaire (Denscombe, 2006). Both primary and secondary data were used.

Primary data was acquired through questionnaires that were physically given to 210 respondents. They were expected to respond to the questions and return them back to the researcher for coding and analysis. Key informants oral interviews were conducted by use of un-structured questionnaire. Information was captured by use of note taking analyzed qualitatively and presented through narratives and discussions.

Secondary data was be obtained from books, articles in journals, internet sources, Kenya Bureau of Statistics and Kenya police crime report statistics retrieved from the Police. The gaps found in secondary data were filled with archival data from Kenya National Archives, newspapers extracts and other sources.

3.6.1 Collection of Quantitative Data

Data collected through quantitative methods is often believed to yield more objective and accurate information because it's collected using standardized methods, can be replicated, and, unlike qualitative data, can be analyzed using sophisticated statistical techniques (NSF USA, 2002). For the purpose of this research quantitative data was collected through questionnaires

3.6.2 Collection of Qualitative Data

Creswell, (2014) places qualitative data-collecting procedures into four categories: observations, interviews, documents, and audiovisual materials. He provides a concise table of the four methods, the options within each type, the advantages of each type, and the limitations of each. For this study, one on one interview with informants and documentary procedures of data collection were widely used. This is because interviews are more open ended and less structured (Merriam, 2001).

In this study data was collected from primary and secondary sources. Primary data were obtained directly from the sample population. The researcher first got a permit from the University authorities to allow collection of data. The researcher then contacted the County Commissioner's office where he explained the background of the study and requested to be allowed to collect data from the county. From here the researcher proceeded to carry out data collection processes.

Interviews were administered via face to face, using an interview guide to the sampled informants. This assisted the researcher to get in-depth understanding of the Mungiki activities.

It helped to find out how these activities impacted on enterprises and hear what measures have been put in place to mitigate the groups menace. The researcher adapted the questions as much as necessary, clarified doubts and ensured that the responses were properly understood by repeating or rephrasing the questions. Through this, the researcher was able to pick non-verbal cues from the respondent. Open ended questions were applicable to this study since they allowed the respondent to answer questions in their own known words than read through a long list options.

3.7 Ethical Considerations

A social researcher is ethical, in the collection of their data, in the process of analyzing the data and in the dissemination of findings (Denscombe, 2003). In this case, the researcher assured subjects their privacy; maintained confidentiality and assured them of an informed consent. A systematic process to collect data was used without interfering or harming subjects.

The researcher ensured that there was no breach of research subject's privacy or even gets engaged in misrepresentation. Potential conflicts of interest were not hidden; neither did the researcher mislead subjects as to the nature of the research. The researcher ensured that there was no harm or distress; physical or psychological to both respondents and informants (research subjects). Throughout the research process all steps were taken necessary to ensure that personal biases or preconceptions do not influence the conduct or findings of the research. The researchers did ensure that he didn't put the subjects in a compromising position where there is potential danger. Where internet was used, "netiquette", or rules of thumb, politeness, civility, and enhanced understanding was applied (Jones, 1998).

3.8 Data Analysis

Data analysis is an important stage in the research process. It involves the organization and processing of data with an aim of extracting useful information to answer the research questions and help in accomplishing the research objectives. The process began with cleaning of the data in the questionnaires every day after fieldwork. This ensured that all information is captured and coded. As is required, after fieldwork; open ended questions were coded based on similar responses.

Data obtained from both the primary and secondary sources was analyzed using content analysis. This approach is readily understood, inexpensive and is suitable in objectively and systematically measuring the thematic content of responses received. The researcher reviewed the contents collected from the interviews, put them into context and wrote the study findings. No software was used in the analysis instead; the researcher compiled the data and presented it in tables, graphs, pie-charts and the rest in prose form.

CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION

4.0 Introduction.

This chapter presented the findings of the study along the four objectives. These are;

- i. To determine the nature of Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga County
- ii. To establish MSE owners' awareness of Mungiki activities and their implications on enterprises development
- iii. To establish the socio-economic impacts of Mungiki activities on MSEs in Kirinyaga County
- iv. To identify the mitigation measures put in place by MSE owners to address the Mungiki menace.

The responses from the subjects were compiled into frequencies and converted into percentages and presented in tables, charts and graphs. This was to facilitate easy analysis and understanding of the study.

4.1 Response rate

The researcher had two sets of study instruments; 255 respondents who own enterprises in the study area and ten key informants conversant with Mungiki sect and its activities in the area. As shown in table 4.1, out of the 255 targeted MSE owners, 210 responded equivalent to 82.3%. A total of 15 indicated that their questionnaires got spoilt 5.9% while 11.8% respondents declined to return their questionnaires citing among others; fear of Mungiki reprisal.

Key informants attributed this to the respondents discomfort in disclosing their association with the dreaded criminal gang, fear of being arrested by police and perhaps fear of punishment mutable by a local militia group formed to eradicate the criminal gang.

When asked why they declined to participate, one of respondent who declined to participate in the study confided to the researcher that he had been threatened by a member of the gang.

“Umwe wa-anake-aya riria aranyonirena maratathi maya maku; aranyitire guoko arandwara keherini arajira atiri; geria kuiuria maratathi maya utuendie, nawe umenye kuria ugu-thamira” (Translation-“when one of Mungiki members saw me with your papers (questionnaire); he held my hand and called me aside with a warning, try to fill those papers so that you sell us out (i.e. betray us), and then better know where to relocate to”).

This fear and silence from respondents in regards to Mungiki was unequivocally explained in Kenya’s parliament in May 2009. In his response on circumstances under which 43 people were killed in Kirinyaga, the then Minister for Internal Security at the time the late Prof. George Saitoti observed that;

“In Kirinyaga there is a serious code of silence in those areas. Members of or of public cannot easily open up. So taking evidence from members of public is not an easy task because nobody is willing to open up (Kenya National Assembly Official Record-Hansard, 28 May 2009)

Out of the 55 respondents who declined or had their questionnaires spoilt, 27 owned business in Ngurubani, 12 in Kerugoya, 5 in Kagumo and 1 in Kagio. All the 10 key informants fully participated during the interview and thus there was 100% response. All of them gave crucial insights on Mungiki criminal activities in the County. This response rate is satisfactory to make conclusions for this study as it was quite representative. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), a response rate of 50% is adequate for analysis and reporting; a rate of 60% is good while a 70% response rate and over is excellent. The response rate in this study is 82% thus is excellent.

Table 4.1: Response rate of respondents (N=255)

Response Rate	Frequency	Percentage
Successfully responded	210	82.3
Spoilt questionnaires	15	5.9
Non-respondents	30	11.8
Total	255	100.0


4.2 Social and demographic background of the respondents.

The study sought to establish relevant demographic characteristics of the respondents. As specified earlier, 210 respondents (owners of enterprises) accepted to participate and thus returned their questionnaires after responding to various questions. They differed in age, gender and household status. There were also variances in terms business activity they engaged in. The quantitative information hereunder is about this group of respondents.

4.2.1 Gender of the respondents.

The study sought to determine the gender of the respondents. Majority of MSEs in the county are owned and run by men. As can be observed from figure 4.1, out of 210 enterprises 65.7% are male owned compared to 34.3% that are female owned. However it's important to note that most women operate as assistants in these businesses, especially those that are family owned.


Figure 4.1: Distribution of MSE ownership according to gender (N=210)



4.2.2 Educational Attainment.

The study sought to determine the highest academic qualification of the respondents. Based on figure 4.2; out of 210 respondents, 10% hadn't any formal education, 21.4% had primary education, 34.3% had attained secondary level, 24.3% had college training while and 10% had university education. It's therefore clear that 90% of MSEs owners in Kirinyaga have some formal qualification. This explains why a number of businesses especially wholesale, micro finance entities, PSV Saccos and small food processing industries thrives in the county


Figure 4.2: Educational attainment among the respondents (N=210)



4.2.3 Distribution of respondents by their religious affiliation.

Figure 4.3 show that 87.2% of the respondents are Christians, 10.4% are Muslims while 2.4% are traditionalists. Majority of respondents are Christians. Though over 97% of the respondents are of a religious orientation little was said on the role of the church in regards to Mungiki menace in the county. But local church leaders are said to condemn the sect activities.

Figure 4.3: Distribution by religious affiliation (N=210)



4.2.4 Distribution of respondents by age.

Table 4.2 reveals that the age of the respondents varied between of 20 and 65 years. But it's clear that majority of enterprises 83.3% are owned by people aged between 25–55 years. This can therefore explain why extreme opposition exhibited against Mungiki members emanated from youthful enterprise owners and other members of the local community. This also explains why majority of those who lost property or died in the fights pitying Mungiki extortionists and a local vigilante gang are the productive lot of community.


Table 4.2: Distribution of respondents by age (N=210)

Age bracket in years	Frequency	Percentage
20-25	16	7.6
25-35	43	20.5
35-45	67	31.9
45-55	49	23.3
55-65	26	12.4
Over 65	9	4.3
Total	210	100.0

4.2.5 Marital status

Figure 4.4 shows that more than a half of the MSEs; 53% in the area are owned by married respondents while 31.9% are owned by single respondents while the rest are owned by the separated and divorced owners'. Therefore, majority of MSEs are family owned and any negative effect on them directly increases poverty at both at family and community level.

Figure 4.4: Marital status of the respondents (N=210)



4.3 MSEs in Kirinyaga County.


The researcher classified enterprises in Kirinyaga County on the bases of sector, size and type.

4.3.1 Sectorial classification of enterprises in Kirinyaga County.

The study sought to know under which sector each enterprise studied falls. This was aimed at establishing the sectorial orientation of businesses in Kirinyaga County.

Figure 4.5 shows that; 61.4% of MSEs falls under the service sector while 24.3% are agriculture related. MSEs within manufacturing sector are 7.6% while 6.7% are in construction sector. But Kirinyaga has a prominently agrarian economy thus all sectorial businesses are agro related.

Figure 4.5: Sectorial classification of enterprises in Kirinyaga County (N=210)



4.3.2 Classification of enterprises based on type of business activity.

Table 4.3 shows that out of the 210 enterprises owners, 24.78% are crop and livestock farmers, 20.95% are wholesale and retail traders, 7.69% are wood and metal fabricators, 8.57% are milk and vegetable vendors, 13.33% are new and second hand clothes (Mitumba) sellers, 17.14% are PSV, taxis and other transport operators, 6.67% are Artisan/craftsmen while 10% are rental house owners. It is these businesses, both formal and informal that are negatively affected by Mungiki activities impoverishing the local communities in the county.

Table 4.3: Distribution of enterprises based on business activity (N=210)

Sector	Type of Enterprise	Frequency	Percentage
Agricultural Related	1. Crop & livestock farmers	33	15.7
	2. Milk, fruits & vegetable vendors	18	8.6
Service Related	3. Wholesale/retail traders	44	21.0
	4. Psv/taxis/other transport	36	17.1
	5. Rental house owners	21	10.0
	6. New cloths & Mitumba sellers	28	13.3
Manufacturing sector	7. Wood/metal fabrication	16	7.6
Construction sector	8. Artisan/craftsmen	14	6.7
TOTAL		210	100.0%

4.3.3 Distribution of enterprises based on size.


Micro enterprises are businesses that employ one to ten employees while small enterprises employ more than ten and up to fifty employees. These can either be informal or formal. (CBS et al 1999) defines informal enterprises to as semi-organized and unregulated activities undertaken by self-employed persons in open markets, in market stalls, in undeveloped plots or street pavements within urban centers (CBS/Ministry of Planning and National Development, 1989). In Kirinyaga 79.5% of enterprises are micro enterprises while 20.5% are small businesses. They spread across all the study towns.

Figure 4.6 shows that 56.2.0% of enterprises Kirinyaga are owner managed, 39.5% have 1 to 5 employees, and 3.3% have 6 to 10 employees with the remaining 1% of business entities being manned by more than 10 employees. Enterprises with more than one employee are mainly tea plantation farms, wholesale shops and supermarkets, eating joints and PSV Matatu Saccos.

The rest, are small, mostly family owned and more often family members assist in selling or offering the required service to customers. As such, the quality of services and ability to cater for the needs of enterprises is wanting. Most enterprises rely on casual labour whose demand was dictated by seasons. Apart from those that are county licensed (and only few are licensed) majority of these enterprises are informal.

In a nut shell most of the enterprises in Kirinyaga are micro and small in size; and have limited capitiation. This explains why many of them are very vulnerable to survive Mungiki onslaught. Excess extortion by Mungiki and in some cases murder or maiming of their owners and staff alike led to their poor performance and ultimate collapse.


Figure 4.6: Size of Business in terms number of employees (N=210)



4.3.4 Distribution of business in each town.

Kirinyaga has several urban centres. Figure 4.7 shows distribution of businesses in each town covered in this study. These towns were the most affected by Mungiki menace. Since each town has a variety of enterprises, the researcher picked respondents based on different types businesses proportionate to the total number of businesses in each town.

Figure 4.7: Distribution of business in each town (N=210)



4.4 Existence of Mungiki in Kirinyaga County.

Table 4.4 shows that out of 210 respondents 55.2% were aware of the existence of Mungiki within their areas. Another 37.2% were aware of the gang's existence in other areas. A total of 7.6% declined to comment. To them, Mungiki is a very sensitive issue to discuss thus they chose not to respond for fear of being accused of divulging secrets of the gang.

Findings of this study confirmed that Mungiki exist in many areas of the county and many local residents are aware of its operations. Those who were not aware of the gang within their locality are aware of its existence elsewhere. Areas where respondents had a high knowledge of Mungiki existence happen to be the same areas with heightened Mungiki activities and consequently a high enterprise mortality rate.

Table 4.4: Respondents knowledge of the existence of Mungiki (N=210)

Response on knowledge of the existence of Mungiki	Count	Percentage
Know Mungiki exist in their areas and other areas too	116	55.2
Don't know Mungiki exist in their areas but exist in other areas	78	37.2
No comment	16	7.6
Total	210	100.0

4.4.1 Emergence of Mungiki in the study area.

As shown in table 4.5, respondents were not able to give a specific time or period when Mungiki emerged in their areas. The researcher attributes this to the clandestine nature of Mungiki which the gang seems to have perfected over time. But both respondents and key informants agreed that they started noticing some sect members in their localities from mid 1990s.

According to informant 1 who is a local administrator; Mungiki has been active in Kirinyaga from mid-1990s.

“These boys have operated for a while in my location. We started noticing a few from mid to late 1990s but they got extremely aggressive from 2001 onwards. The public outcry over the group’s criminal activities increased from around 2004 but attracted a lot of public and media attention from 2007”, he revealed during the interview.

Table 4.5: Knowledge as to when Mungiki emerged in the area (N=210)

Period	Frequency	Percentage
Before 1996	11	52.0
1996-2000	126	60.0
2001-2010	47	22.4
2011-2016	19	9.1
I don’t Know	7	3.3
Total	210	100.0

4.4.2 Gender composition of Mungiki

Majority of the respondents confirmed that the male gender at 71.0% dominates Mungiki membership while 26.7% indicated that Mungiki has mixed membership. Only 2.3% commented nothing on this.

Therefore, Mungiki is presented or manifested as a largely male problem where major roles are executed by male members. But still, Mungiki has women members whose roles are mainly limited to support. Once a female member joins the sect, she can’t opt out and if she does, she is killed.


Informant 3 and 6 explained the unique way of how females joins Mungiki;

“In Kirinyaga, most girls fell into the trap of Mungiki membership by marrying the sect’s male members unknowingly. But some wilfully accepted to join the gang. Women who joined the gang had to first convert into Mungiki by going through the necessary rites. Among these rites is female circumcision. A Mungiki man cannot marry or stay with a *‘kiirigu’* (uncircumcised woman).Mungiki wives are expected to follow their husbands’ orders and guard the sect’s secrets”.

4.4.3 Owners of local enterprises and Mungiki.

Figure 4.9 shows that the majority of the respondents at 68% indicated that the local population including businessmen do join Mungiki. Only 22% said that locals do not join Mungiki. Ten per cent of the respondents didn’t comment. Many enterprise owners join the sect to avoid paying illegal charges administered by the gang to non-member businessmen. Further they join to make extra money that they receive after sharing the sect’s daily collection gotten from non-member businessmen. Such businessmen use the money to expand their businesses.

Figure 4.8: Owners of local enterprises and Mungiki (N=210)



4.4.4 How politicians and MSEs owners' support Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga.

The study revealed that out of 210 respondents, 70.5% said that they knew of business people and politicians in their areas who support and finance Mungiki activities. While 10% said that they were not aware of any business person or politician who either support or finance Mungiki. The rest; 19.5% didn't comment at all.

Owners of enterprises and politicians supports Mungiki financially, protect them against arrest by security agencies and assist members with services among them transport. They also bail out those accused of various crimes and offer legal advice when necessary. They do procure and supply Mungiki members with weapons, support them morally and at times give material support. In return, Mungiki provides them with security against ordinary criminals, keep competitors away and business rivals at bay and supply them with illicit and contraband goods at low prices. Some are beneficiaries of the group's criminal activities especially extortion.

For politicians, the benefits extend further whereby they engage Mungiki members in their political campaigns against rivals. The gang is used to disrupt rallies of opponent politicians. It is this kind of support that put politicians and businessmen in a dilemma since they cannot publicly condemn Mungiki. A report on Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga by Kenya's parliamentary Committee on Administration and National security tabled on 27th August 2009 observed that, "there appears to be a profound code of silence by politicians and leaders from central Kenya in their condemnation of activities of these outlawed militias". Having been compromised, local politicians lack any moral authority to condemn Mungiki. Similarly at the height of Matatu wars over control of various routes in Kirinyaga, Mungiki members helped a local Matatu operators Sacco; Kukena, to keep out Matatus from rival Saccos such as Neno and 2NK that also operated a fleet of PSV vehicles in the area.

By so doing, Kukena Matatus operators enjoyed monopoly on these routes. It was therefore difficult for Kukena Sacco operators to condemn Mungiki even when the gang members' harass people including the Sacco's own customers. Surprisingly at the time of collecting data for this study, local politicians kept blaming each other over Mungiki resurgence and use of its members in their local political wars. For example, the then Kirinyaga governor; Joseph Ndathi accused his opponents of bankrolling Mungiki against him.

“Mungiki has re-emerged in the county through Saccos and boda boda networks. This is with support from well-known people among them businessmen operating in Nairobi (Daily Nation, January 9, 2017)”.


This confirms that politicians and business people are the foundation on which Mungiki thrives. But it is important to note that any support given to Mungiki certainly comes with a cost especially on enterprises in the area. Increased gang activities increases costs and erodes the profits margins of any business. It ultimately leads to enterprise stagnation or even total collapse. According to informant 5, local traders who refuse to support Mungiki are harassed and have their businesses destroyed by the gang members. He narrated his experience with the gang;

I owned four motorbikes that helped me run a groceries and a bodaboda business (Motorbike business) in Kangaita. Initially, Mungiki used to collect from us fifty shillings per motorbike daily. But two months later, the group imposed on us a daily fee of one hundred shillings per motorbike for offering security. We refused to pay. One evening the group broke into my store where I retire the motorbikes after a day's work. They splashed petrol on them and then set them ablaze. I lost all of them,” he explained.

A female informant 2, who operates a small rice mill and a groceries stand in Kagio market lamented of the same.

“A lot of stealing was going on in this market especially at night. They (Mungiki) came here and demanded to secure our businesses. We agreed to pay them 50 shillings per stand a week which seemed to work at first. But then, two months later they coerced us to start paying them Ksh 300 per week! Worse still, every time a member of this gang is arrested and taken to court; we were forced to give 500 shillings each to secure bail. Those of us who refuse to pay are publically whipped and their merchandise confiscated. Further, its only members of this gang that can load or off load vehicles picking or dropping produce at our market, yet they set exorbitant fee for the service. Those who refuse are warned not to open their businesses! Where these boys are, you either cooperate with them or close your business”.

Figure 4.9: Types of support (N=210)



4.4.5 Why enterprise owners join or support Mungiki.

The study sought to determine the reasons why MSE owners either join or support Mungiki. Most respondents 66.2% identified protection and security as the drive behind MSE owners joining or supporting Mungiki. A total 23.8% said Mungiki adherents' forces MSE owners to join sect. Another 10.0% indicated that traders join Mungiki to win favours that comes with such membership.


Others are attracted by the sect's ideals and objectives while a good number join to survive in business. Threat was also cited as a factor for people joining Mungiki. Informant 4 who is also a businessman and farmer near Kagumo narrated his friend's experience,

“My friend lived with his family behind his wholesale shop here in Kagumo shopping centre. He was approached to join the sect but refused. One day he got some young unexpected Mungiki visitors.

They had warned him of dire consequences for refusing to join or support the gang activities. They also claimed to have reliably learnt that he had been speaking ill about their gang. He was reminded that he hadn't paid them their toll for months.

He was asked to cleanse himself by paying a sum Ksh 10,000 failure to which they would cut into pieces each of his family members and pack the bodies into sacks and throw them deep in Rundu River. Scared to death, he paid the fine the next day. Later in the evening, he and his family packed few of their personal effects and left to join his brother living in Rwanda rather than continue suffering in the hands of the gang.”

Figure 4.10: Why enterprise owners support Mungiki (N=210)



4.4.6 Enterprise owners’ awareness on Mungiki criminal activities in Kirinyaga.

The study wanted to ascertain respondents’ awareness of Mungiki criminal activities in their areas. It was observed that most respondents 62.4% have heard and witnessed Mungiki activities in their area. A total of 32.3% confirmed to have heard about Mungiki activities in the area but have never witnessed them. The rest, 5.3% didn’t comment.

Figure 4.11: Awareness of respondents about Mungiki activities (N=210)




Figure 4.12 clearly shows that most of the people are aware of Mungiki activities in their areas. Informants cited Kagumo, Kerugoya, Ngurubani and Kagio as the areas with the highest number of Mungiki operatives. It also happens that most enterprises are based in these towns and this offered Mungiki great opportunities to make money through protection and extortion rackets. Initially, enterprise owners in these areas embraced Mungiki as the gang purported to have come as a liberator against frequent robberies and other crimes witnessed in their areas. But the gang later turned enemy when its members started harassing enterprise owners and levying exorbitant fee against their businesses.

4.4.7 Economic activities of Mungiki in Kirinyaga County.

Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga are a function of the area's socio-economic environment though politics also play a role especially during the electioneering period. The sect's activities in the area are primarily for its economic enhancement and survival. According to informant 1; Mungiki will indulge in any activity as long as it gives them money. The gang members are involved in protection rackets; extort money from traders, farmers and households. Mungiki also targets social matters like arbitration of domestic conflicts for a fee.

Informant 8 who is a victim of the sect's Kangaroo court narrated;

“In one incidence, I had a serious quarrel with my wife. On 12th December 2010, I came home drunk after having a good time with my in-laws at a local pub to cerebrate Jamuhuri day. On arrival home at Ngurubani where I also run an Agrochemical shop, I had an argument with my wife. The argument degenerated into a fight where she accidentally tripped and fell injuring her hand. She fled home that evening but returned late in the night accompanied by three young men whom I could not recognize because it was dark.

They introduced themselves as the '*njama*' (sect member at times refer themselves to as Njama). They asked me to accompany them as I was being summoned by '*kiama gia-athuri*' (the council of elders) following accusations brought into their attention by my wife. I was led into a dark room where I could only hear voices but couldn't see. I was sentenced to receive 3 strokes of cane and pay Kenya shillings 5,000 as '*mburi-ya-kiama gia-athuri guikarira iti*' (an elders goat for sitting down to listen to my case). I was also forced to strip naked, lie on a table by my stomach where I was whipped. I was also warned not to fight my wife and escorted home. Since that day; I've never fought my wife again".

Mungiki demands payment for security services offered on businesses. Similarly, every household is asked to pay a certain amount depending on the financial status of the individuals in that household. The Matatu industry is the hardest hit by this kind of extortion. PSV vehicles playing various routes within Kirinyaga have to part with some fee. Those that doesn't comply with this requirement are barred from operating in various county routes. At times their crew is harassed and vehicles stoned or even burnt. An informant who is a Matatu operator in the area said,

“It is a rule; each Matatu has to part with Kenya shillings 200 per day otherwise it wouldn't be allowed to pick passengers. Those who fail to pay face the wrath of the gang. Any Matatu that defy is forced to withdraw operation from the routes and has its crew punished. In some routes, like Muranga-Sagana-Kagio-Kutus and Makutano-Ngurubani-Embu; Matatus that fail to comply are ejected from routes by Mungiki adherents. Afterwards the sect installs Matatus owned by its members or those owned by operators who support the gang. For any new Matatu to operate in Mungiki controlled routes, the owner has to pay a fee of forty thousand Kenyan shillings”.

Small scale farmers in Kirinyaga are not spared either. In tea growing areas such as Kangaita, Kagumo, Gatwe Gathuthuma and Mununga; the gang targets tea growers. Whenever they are paid what is called tea bonus, Mungiki visit individual homes asking for 'their' share. According to informant 4 Mungiki members are very lazy thus harvest where they have not planted.

“Imagine they even wait for your chicken to lay eggs and then they come for them, you milk your cow and they want to carry all of your milk!”

Rice and horticulture farmers suffer similar consequences in the hands of Mungiki. Informant 2 who hails from Kagio and has interests in agribusiness had this to say,

“They have taken over the distribution of agricultural produce and levy 'taxes' on any agricultural product passing through 'their roads' to the market. Even women carrying bananas, oxen carts, bicycles and vehicles transporting farm produce to the market are levied too. Even the boys that load and offload agricultural products in these vehicles at the markets such as Kagio, Kutus and Ngurubani have to pay a certain fee to the gang”.

Informant 5 added,

“Early one morning in October 2013, we woke up to find carelessly written leaflets believed to emanate from adherents of the outlawed Mungiki sect. They were dropped in various places with some pinned on the doors of our businesses.

They warned us to start paying taxes for our businesses failure to which we would be killed. The leaflets were also dropped in strategic places such as Kangaita area demanding Sh10,000 from each trader as protection fee.

Five traders named in the leaflets handed them over to the administration police in the area and criminal investigations officers in Kerugoya. Following the circulation of the leaflets, some written in Kikuyu, the traders have been living in fear and can hardly sleep. Mungiki do not issue empty threats”.

Hawkers and mobile traders are not spared either. Majority who are of Somali origin and sell wares such as shoes and clothes from house to house have to pay Mungiki some fee. Informant 4 narrated of Ahmed’s (a hawker) experience.

“The boy sells shoes. While returning into his rental house located at Kibingo, a market centre along Kerugoya-Kagumo-Karatina road; he met some sect members. They had previously asked him to start paying fifty shillings per day or stop hawking in Kirinyaga. One evening, the gang confiscated his wares for failing to clear some two week arrears. His merchandise was only returned after he paid up what he supposedly owed them.

Extortion by Mungiki is not been limited to economic activities. It extends to social activities that have a potential of bringing some income. In some cases Mungiki would demand a percentage payment from income received during socio-cultural events such as bride price payment.

Informant 6 narrates how they used force locals to pay an amount from what families receive as bride price and other social monies.

“We targeted ruracio or the kikuyu payment of bride price where we demanded a part of what was given to the girl’s family. We kept a schedule of homes where such events would take place. Later in the evening, we would visit the homes after *ruracio* is paid and demand our share. Sometimes we would ask to be given the entire amount.

We also taxed funds raised through funds drive events. Every time we got wind of a fundraiser, the organizers must set a certain amount aside for us. Otherwise we would appear from nowhere and collect our share by force. Any resistance was met with extreme ruthlessness towards the family members. We would later invest such funds in our illicit businesses that rivalled genuine business activities in our local markets”.

As alluded earlier, Mungiki imposes illegal changes in accordance with one’s social class. Land buyers for instance are considered rich thus are made to part with a high 'tax'.

Informant 8 talked of locals who confided to them on how illegal payments are made to the outlawed sect leaders.

"Households are taxed according to the type house they live in. Those who own permanent houses pay Ksh.600 while those living in timber houses pay Ksh.300. Dwellers in mud houses part with Ksh.150 per month. Those who own permanent rental/commercial houses in trading centres such as Kagio, Ngurubani, Kerugoya and Kagumo pay as high as 5,000 shillings per month. The amount is determined by size and value. If you intend to construct a house, you must pay some construction fee. If you do not, your construction materials will be spirited away. You have no one to report to".

Apart from protection rackets and extortion of social and economic activities, the sect members are involved in other criminal activities among them killings. For example the gang is quick to kill or maim anyone who opposes their extortion practices.

Informant 3 narrated of an incidence on the night 20th April 2009.

“I was one of those who escaped death with a whisker in Nyeri. We were alerted over an eminent attack by Mungiki in Gathaiti village, Nyeri. A home where two of our members from Kirinyaga served as farmhands had been touched by Mungiki adherents. As a former Mungiki member (now a member of a vigilante fighting Mungiki), I was tasked to lead the Kagio team to Gathaiti. Unaware that Mungiki had fooled us; over 600 of us from different towns of Kirinyaga rushed there on motorbikes to rescue our colleagues. The touching of the house was just a trick. It was aimed at attracting as many of us as possible to the scene so that we can be butchered. In that night only; Mungiki killed 28 of us”. The sect was retaliating the killing of 14 of its members by our colleague vigilantes in Kirinyaga. This massacre aimed at passing a warning to us to stop harassing and blocking the gang members from carrying out their activities in in the County.

This dark night was also captured by Patrick Nzioka and John Njagi (The Daily Nation, Tuesday April 21 2009).

The two narrated how, residents of Gathaiti village in Nyeri East Central Kenya woke up to find a scene from hell, with bodies strewn on the ground, with cuts all over, some with throats slit. Many of these bodies had deep cuts with some having limbs completely severed. This was after the Mungiki sect adherents attacked their village in the wee hours of night armed with crude weapons. The revenge attack followed death of 14 sect's members killed by a local vigilante group in the neighbouring Kirinyaga County. During the Nyeri attack, several villagers were killed in cold blood.

Speaking to the press, the then area police boss, John M'Mbijiwe explained how the gang torched a house to lure their victims and then lay in wait for those responding to the cries of distress. They then attacked and killed them one after the other.

Two people who were in the house perished in the inferno. According to the police boss, 18 people were bludgeoned to death on the spot with axes and machetes while seven others were abducted and murdered at the nearby Kiaruhiu trading centre. Before the attack police had intensified patrols following rumours that the sect was regrouping to avenge killing of their members by the well organised vigilante group in the neighbouring Kirinyaga County. It's said that Mungiki men cunningly used the vigilantes own identification code name—Bantu – to attract victims from their hideout and that's how the outlawed gang managed to kill so many of them.

In the morning distraught villagers numb with fear and horror, watched silently as the police picked the victim's bodies and later transferred them to Karatina Hospital Mortuary. The macabre killings left villagers speechless. One of the recovered bodies had been consumed by the flames in the burnt house while another was partially burnt and had deep cuts on the head. According to the police the victim was possibly killed as he tried to escape the fire. Narrating the ordeal, the 70-year-old house owner, said the two victims were her farmhands and hailed from neighbouring Kirinyaga County, where some Mungiki members had in the recent past been lynched. Police recovered seven bodies at Kiaruhiu trading centre, all male, while at Gathaiti, scene of the massacre, there were 18 bodies, some of them hidden in tea bushes. The killings took place on both sides of River Wamuthambi, which divides Nyeri East and Kirinyaga West. The Mungiki had been extorting a toll on households, traders and Matatu owners in the area.

From this extract, it's clear that individuals who are perceived as hindrance to Mungiki economic empowerment 'deserve' to be eliminated. Those targeted include rival groups opposed to Mungiki, business people, farmers, Matatu drivers and conductors. Individuals in certain households and businesses who refuse to pay protection fees or 'house taxes' are also targeted. Murders by Mungiki are systematically executed to send a message of fear to those who oppose the group.

Informant 9 says

“Mungiki adherents do not just kill; they kill viciously to send a message of fear and terror. For example, in Kirinyaga, those who have opposed the activities of Mungiki have met their deaths through skinning, chopping off of their private parts and beheading. Later Mungiki places the victim's head on a pole at a strategic place where passers-by can get a clear view. Using such methods, the Mungiki group manages to instil fear to the people forcing them to obey their 'rules' and pay taxes.”

Several high profile killings have taken place in Kirinyaga. Among the victims of such cold murders are errant prominent business people and civil servants who fail cooperate with the gang. Others are those who betray the sect's course. Such murders are committed by a professionally trained squad within Mungiki ranks. In her feature Evelyn Kwamboka (East African Standard," March 08, 2004) affirmed existence of such a killer unit nicknamed 'bagation'.

According to a police source, the word bagation is corrupted from the expression "no bargain over death". To be recruited in the bagation, young people mostly in their 20s pay between Sh1,200 and Sh1,800. Those who join Mungiki's "School for Killing" or "death squad" are indoctrinated to murder or execute the group's adversaries. It remains a puzzle to the police on why young people pay such an amount to be recruited into a killer unit.

Police believe that the members of the 'bagation' unit are behind most of Mungiki's murders or execution of their adversaries. The members of the killer unit strictly obey orders from their superiors without question as the oath they take during their graduation bind them to do so.

Mungiki adherents are also involved in robberies. They carjack people and later rob them their wares and valuables. An informant narrated of an incidence where a Matatu was hijacked along Kutus/Kagio/Makutano route.

“Both the driver and conductor were dragged into a bush and murdered. Ironically, the passengers were also forced into a nearby field, stripped naked and robbed off their valuables.”

Recruitment of new members is a major activity of Mungiki. This is aimed at strengthening its membership and raise the sect's income in form of subscription fees and monthly membership renewal fee. Increased membership means increased incomes as more members would now be carrying out extortion activities hence increasing the sect's kitty. Recruiters take advantage of unemployment among school leavers and school dropouts. According to informant 1, Mungiki group has tried recruiting at a very high rate to survive and remain viable.

For every two new member one recruit, he/she receive a commission of 2,000 shillings. This gives the recruiters the impetus to hunt for new recruits. The aim is to expand their extortion base through recruitment of a large force. The gang has therefore been approaching villages using threats and forcing school children to join them.

4.4.8 Mungiki Socio-Cultural activities

Traditional Kikuyu religion is the foundation of Mungiki as a sect. The sect's religious activities are mainly practiced to induct new members and mobilise the existing ones. Mungiki argue that traditional religion is aimed at uniting and mobilising the Kikuyu population to rise against the bondage of cultural and mental servitude, supposedly brought about by Christianity and Whiteman's rule. To achieve this, new Mungiki recruits are taught indigenous kikuyu values or '*Kirira*'. The entire process culminates into a socio-religious cleansing ritual referred to as '*guthera*'.

The ritual entails traditional rites in which one denounce alien cultures, traditions and beliefs. Mungiki promotes what members consider to be sincere and practical belief. To achieve this, Mungiki campaign for a thorough turn around to original kikuyu ways of life.

The ceremony of reversing to traditions is referred to as '*kigongoona*' or a ceremony of sanctity that according to the sect members was destroyed with coming of modern western culture and Christianity. According to an informant this loss of the African religion has led to many political and socio-economic problems. Mungiki blame Christian faith for causing severe divisions amongst the Kikuyu and this has infuriated *Mwene-Nyaga* or Ngai (God among the Kikuyu). In this case, Mungiki calls the Kikuyu to re-adopt kikuyu traditional religion.

Even though religion is perceived to be a platform for recruitment of new members it's also used to enhance bonding among existing ones. It also serves as a tool of the sect's attaining acceptance in the society. It also camouflages Mungiki's push for the gang's economic and political objectives. The importance of religion to Mungiki has over time been disregarded unlike the sect's political and economic ventures that have proven to be more rewarding to the group.

Religion is therefore only seen to be used as a tool of political empowerment and a means to escape arrests by the government.

Informant 6, who is a former Mungiki member gives insights of the gang's socio-cultural activities.

“Immediately one accept to join the group; either by force or otherwise, he/she has to undergo an elaborate ceremony. To join Mungiki both men and women must be circumcised or be ready to undergo the rite. Initiates must also pledge secrecy after going through a mandatory oath of secrecy in which they promise not to reveal the sects' secrets and activities at all time. It is made clear to the initiates that the ultimate end of those who fail to keep the sect's secrets is death. Oathing is an elaborate process, held at night in a shrine. The process entails slaughter of a black sheep and goat and their blood mixed with some blended extract from roots gotten from wild bushes. It's an intricate long process that goes all the night until dawn. Its climax is the drinking of Kikuyu traditional beer, *Muratina*, made of honey as the initiates engage in singing and incantations in praise of Ngai or *Mwene-Nyaga*.

Stuffs such as walking sticks that are painted red, green, black and white, gourds and small tobacco bottles are handed around to each member as they chat; "*Thaai thathaiya Ngai! Thaai thathaia Ngai!*" A flag in colours similar to those of other paraphernalia is normally hosted outside the shrine. Meanwhile initiates continue chatting as they drink the bloody mixture. They later sing and dance kikuyu traditional songs as they enjoy roast meat which is passed from one person to the other. Initiates and the rest of the sect members are only allowed to bite the roast goat meat after the sect leaders have had their bite. They also sniff tobacco, from small bottles that are passed around those present.

Another ex-Mungiki member; informant 3 add;

“The objective and purpose of the entire ritual and oathing ceremony is to unite the group members and ensure that the initiates abide to the doctrines of coming together as a society that respects the Kikuyu culture and its traditions. In the wee hours of the morning, the new initiates are baptised at a stream, river or a dam that is near the shrine. This is where the initiates are dipped in muddy waters before crossing over a goatskin spread on the ground where the sect’s spiritual leader stands. As a norm, those forced to join the sect after being coerced can’t turn back or exit the sect upon taking this oath. Successful initiates are now allowed to know all the sects’ secrets and sources of finances, group’s operations and other internal matters. Those who betray the gang are executed once they denounce the sect. This explains why sect members disappear from the public limelight immediately they opt out as members”.

Key informants narrated many incidences of Mungiki initiation ritual ceremonies during the study with others having been captured by both print and electronic media. For example, George Munene (Daily Nation, November 01, 2009) reported of an incidence in which;

“Police arrested eight Mungiki members during a night oathing ceremony at Ng’othi village in Mwea division Kirinyaga County. During the operation, more than thirty Mungiki suspects managed to escape arrest. Those arrested during operation were locked up at Sagana police station. Among the items impounded by the police during operation; were two goats, five machetes, herbs, tobacco, Bibles, hymn books, sufurias (cooking pots), and two motorcycles used to transport the ritual items. Many of those arrested spotted dreadlocks and wore long jackets.

The police later raided a sect leader's house and rescued young men of between 22 and 28 years taking oath. The Mungiki leader fled before the security forces could arrest him. According to the locals the sect members are believed to have planning to launch murder killings after this oathing ceremony”.

In regards to recruitment of Mungiki female members, informant 2 was explicit;

‘To join Mungiki, girls must undergo Female Genital Mutilation or FGM; a traditional African cultural practice that is illegal in Kenya. This process is executed by old Mungiki women who either forcefully or voluntarily circumcise captured young girls. The initiates are taken to a special place in the forest where they are taught on the Kikuyu culture. They are also taught on how to be faithful and dedicated to their husbands. But the local administration and security agencies have been keen to stop Mungiki carrying out such social activities in Kirinyaga.

Whereas many socio-cultural practices are a catalyst of enterprise growth; Mungiki's socio-cultural practices have had negative affect on businesses in Kirinyaga. Their prevalence has made the business community fearful forcing many to close or relocate their businesses to other areas. The culture of extortion and liking of free things associated with Mungiki has made business expensive to operate in Kirinyaga.

These practices are said to kill entrepreneurship, innovation and the spirit of handwork which are key tenets of enterprise of growth. The youth is abandoning education and skills acquisition programmes to venture in extortion. Female entrepreneurs and youthful girls are fleeing to escape FGM yet they have a role in promoting enterprise development.

Majority of those girls who go through the rite assume that they are now mature thus abandon school without any usable skills. In a nutshell, Mungiki's activities and cultural teachings have led to collapse of enterprise.

4.4.9 Political Activities of Mungiki in Kirinyaga

Mungiki members were found to align themselves to either political side that protects the group's interests. An informant spoke of some local politicians and traders who finance operations of the group and shield its members from arrest and lynching by a local vigilante group. Another informant, added:

"It's a well-known fact that some politicians and local business people finance Mungiki activities. We have been warning them to desist from aiding the sect otherwise we shall catch up with them. We have information that the gang has taken control of various businesses in order to generate income to sustain its networks. We wouldn't allow them to continue with their activities while those who benefit from them harass us."

Incidences, warnings and utterances made by local political leaders and government officials confirm political engagement of Mungiki in the county. For example, towards the end of 2016, the Kenya's Interior Permanent Secretary Karanja Kibicho warned Kirinyaga's local leaders against hiring goons to intimidate opponents ahead of 2017 general elections. He accused local politicians of reviving criminal gangs among them Mungiki ahead of the general elections saying that the goons were out to cause chaos. Several weeks later Kenya's Interior Cabinet Secretary the late Joseph Nkaissery issued a gazette notice as per Section 22 (1) of the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act, 2010 on 30th December 2016 banning 89 organized criminal gangs operating in various parts of the country (Daily Nation, 30th December 2016).

Local politicians have in various occasions blamed each other over Mungiki menace in the county. They point fingers at each other for enlisting Mungiki followers to unleash terror on each other for political mileage. “The gang members are hired to heckle opponents during political rallies in the area”, an informant says. The immediate county governor (Joseph Ndathi) warned in late 2016;

“Once again we face a threat posed by the Mungiki sect which we have to confront. If action is not taken to deal with this ruthless gang, our growing agro-economy stands to lose immensely. The illegal sect has re-emerged through Saccos and bodaboda networks with support from prominent people, among them are rich business operators based in Nairobi”.

But for Narc-Kenya leader Martha Karua, the blame over the Mungiki menace lies on parents, teachers and the local clergy for failing to nurture the youth into responsible citizens. Ms Karua roots for consultation between leaders, the youth and parents in finding a lasting solution to unemployment, one of the factors that have aided the spread of the sect in the region. The Narc-Kenya leader calls on the government to create business and job opportunities to discourage the youth from joining criminal gangs.

Her remarks are echoed by former Devolution Cabinet Secretary and the current Kirinyaga Governor, Anne Waiguru, who also comes from the area. For Waiguru, the government should come up with a well thought-out youth policy to address problems facing young people in the country. “Unemployment acts as a catalyst for the youth to join illegal groups such as Mungiki. We therefore need to create opportunities for the youth of this county in order for them to start enterprises”, she concludes. Findings of this study show that Mungiki participation in Kirinyaga politics is mainly a means of gaining income. Mungiki members are hired by the political elite to extend their political dominance.

But respondents expressed fear that increased political activities by Mungiki affects their businesses. They identified harassing of political opponents, murders, riots and demonstrations and fights between rival groups as some of the political maladies associated with Mungiki that are detrimental to economic wellbeing of enterprises in the county.

Informants were quick to express their fears and those of businessmen,

“Heightened political temperatures in the county affect us so much. They create an environment of fear and insecurity. For example, during electioneering period we suffer. As traders, we are forced to close businesses early and open late. As we talk now, some of us traders are busy looking for alternative places to relocate our businesses. These Mungiki boys act with impunity. They extort us more; carry out murders, destroy businesses and maim as they engage in rival political confrontations, riots and demonstrations. Our leaders and security agencies usually turn a blind eye towards the gang’s criminal activities for political expediency. We are a very worried lot. In the last elections we lost a lot. Shops were burnt others broken into and looted. We had to start from the scratch. PSV vans belonging to our business colleagues in transport were burnt in the ensuing mayhem. Milk got wasted as there was no way to deliver it to the dairies around. Signs are on the wall. Many of us are yet to recover and investors within Mungiki hotspot areas have started fleeing the county and the trend is worrying”.

At the national level, Mungiki vocally criticise political intolerance and exclusion, poverty and violence minted on Kenyans by oppressive state operators and those accused for accumulating affluence by exploiting the poor.

But this is just a political gimmick used by Mungiki as an excuse to justify their criminal acts such as extortion and levying of illegal fee against those they consider to have colluded to exploit the majority i.e. owners of enterprises.

To conclude, Mungiki's involvement in politics is a give-take affair where they give support to a particular party or individual politician in anticipation of gaining economically. The gang's political loyalty shifts from one political side to another, as dictated by economic gain and survival. To Mungiki, politics is an avenue of enhancing their survival and development as well as gaining economically. Its participation in politics has brought about political violence. This is mainly because the gang's members are used by the political elite to further their political aspirations and at the same time safeguard the already acquired political power.

4.4.10 Implications of Mungiki activities on MSE development

In this section the study sought to know whether enterprise owners are aware of the implications of Mungiki activities on growth and development of MSEs in their area. Majority of the respondents 72.4% were aware of the implications while 20.5% of the respondents indicated not to be aware. Out of the total, 7.1% of the respondents didn't comment.

Table 4.6: Respondents awareness of Mungiki implications for enterprises (N=210)

Respondents awareness (Responses)	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	152	72.4
No	43	20.5
No comment	15	7.1
Total	210	100.0

Respondents were asked whether activities of Mungiki benefited or hurt enterprise. Majority expressed serious concerns regarding the gang. A total of 81.4% respondents believed that Mungiki's activities have had serious negative implications on MSEs.

Of the remaining respondents 14.3% believed that Mungiki activities have mixed implications whereby some businesses have benefited while others have suffered. Only 4.3% were of the opinion that Mungiki's activities spur enterprises growth in their areas.

According to informant 7, those who argue in favour of the sect are either its members or beneficiaries of its spoils.

“Leave those ones alone. They must be either Mungiki members or those seller outs who have benefited from the sect over time. You see, a few Mungiki leaders in the area have infiltrated the PSV Matatu businesses in the area. They have purchased own Matatus using the ill-gotten money. They occasionally create situations that favour their Matatus on the road. For example, they collude with the traffic police manning the routes urging them to carry out impromptu crackdown on other PSV vehicles so that theirs can be left to continue operating. This means that they make profits while the rest are grounded”.

In a nutshell, Mungiki activities have had a negative effect on enterprises and other economic activities in Kirinyaga County. Informant 8 had this to say;

“What can you expect from a batch of criminals like Mungiki? You know, incidences of insecurity caused by acts of crime have serious negative socio-economic effects on our society's social and cultural fabric. Incidences of crime militate against investments raise business operational costs apart from inflicting pain due to unexpected deaths and destruction of property. Criminal acts also deny MSE owners liberty which is a critical ingredient for business to thrive”.

According to most respondents, Mungiki activities create an insecure environment; create unfair competition while extortion and illegal taxation drastically reduces MSEs profits. They fear that this will ultimately throw them out of business. Others fear for their lives, those of loved ones and their staff.

Asked whether they are knew of people including businessmen who have been executed or incapacitated by Mungiki in the area, 70% indicated that they are aware. Another 16.7% were not aware while 13.3% of respondents opted not to comment on the matter.

Out of the sampled 210 respondents, 40% indicated that those killed or injured are traders, 34.8% cited farmers, and 17.6% indicated artisans, 3% mentioned crafts people while 3.3% filled nothing. It is therefore clear that Mungiki killings and injuries affected all types of businesses in the county leaving a serious implication on their development.

According to key informants, the main and most devastating implication has been loss of lives and displacement of people who flee occasional skirmishes in areas affected by the sect's activities. As indicated earlier, majority of businesses in Kirinyaga are one owner or family entities. Death or injury of owner or those who man the business marks its slow down or even its ultimate death.

Many respondents felt that high crime incidences and sense of insecurity have led to the mushrooming of private security firms which are filling the void. Individuals are also acquiring firearms to protect themselves but this has the negative effect of fuelling trade in illicit arms. In local towns high crime rates have created fear and urban fragmentation, reducing trust between community members. The resultant effect has been an extra expense in enhancing security within residential areas.

According to informant 2 many enterprise owners have opted to close businesses located in insecure rural areas. Many have even moved residences into urban areas either to live in gated estates or close to security agencies. An informant had this to say;

“My brother owned a butchery and a hotel in a market centre called Mutitu. In 2007 he got tired of Mungiki harassment. He terminated his 7 employees after several months of extortion by Mungiki; sold the businesses and moved to Nairobi”

During Mungiki fights, riots and demonstrations; properties such as business premises, granaries and residential homes are destroyed or burnt. This has affected residents and business owners alike. Skirmishes in towns, markets and farms leads to destruction of properties and merchandise owned by MSE owners. Destruction of business infrastructure and disruption of agricultural activities has led to increased rural and urban poverty as a result of job losses and dwindling opportunities to earn income in the county. New investors are also shying away from county for fear of losing their businesses. Violent skirmishes pitting Mungiki on one hand and security agencies supported by local vigilante groups on the other, has killed local tourism as visitors shy away from visiting tourist destinations such as Mt Kenya forest. A trader who deals with curio ware along Sagana-Karatina-Nyeri road complains of low business.

“My customers have reduced by more than a half since the Mungiki story began in this area. Other curio owners along this road complain of the same. If things don't improve soon, we will soon close down”

A sense of anomie is clearly evident and businesses in towns and market centers such as Kangaita, Kagumo, Kerugoya, Kagio and Ngurubani report huge losses. This is a result of massive looting and destruction of property.

In Kagumo thousands worth of investment have been lost through destruction and looting. Key services that ease and facilitate both retail and wholesale businesses, farming, transport, banking and other development initiatives have negatively been affected. Informant 5 had this to say,

“Look at this town now. It’s a ghost town today. The economy of this town has for many years relied on agriculture and immigrant population comprising of teachers in local schools and staff who work in our local tea factories; Mununga and Kangaita. With the emergence of Mungiki, majority of these people relocated to Kerugoya which enjoys some level of security leaving landlords with vacant houses while traders had no one to sell to. Many shops, butcheries, hotels and market stands have closed. Farmers have nowhere to take their produce especially fresh milk and vegetables.”

Insecurity has also affected food production as farmers struggle to deliver their farm produce to the markets; a situation that is likely to create a food crisis. According to this study many areas of Kirinyaga County are likely to face starvation, a factor that has been attributed to the criminal unrest and poor rainfall in some parts of the county. Food prices are speculated to rise sharply as the impact of the shortage is felt in the county. The violence has hampered food storage, many granaries have been burnt making grain storage a challenge and this may lead to low of food reserve storage in the area. Furthermore, access of cereal products in crime prone epicentres such as rice growing areas of Mwea is difficult as many farmers have been presented with security risk.

School enrolment has been affected since Mungiki has infiltrated local learning institutions especially primary and secondary schools. According to one informant, enrolment rates have dropped considerably in the county especially in those areas with high presence of Mungiki.

In Kirinyaga, insecurity is now undoubtedly embedded in the minds of the local communities, something that has created distrust and destroyed community relations among residents who once shared residences as neighbours. Research findings pointed at high levels of scepticism and mistrust among neighbours in areas such as Mutitu and Kamuiru. Such mistrust and scepticism hasn't been healthy for enterprise development. In these areas bloody clashes pitting Mungiki members and a local vigilante gang were witnessed.

A writer with East African Standard explicitly narrated how those accused of being Mungiki or sympathetic to the gang have been shunned;

“Those who fled cannot come back dead or alive and their families and businesses are avoided by neighbours. In Mutitu alone, he wrote; elders say up to 30 young men accused of being Mungiki members were banished in 2009. They have never returned after the vigilantes vowed to kill them if they did. Scores of other people were dragged from their houses and hacked to death with machetes or forced to commit suicide. Combined with nearby villages where the vigilantes roamed and hunted down Mungiki suspects, an estimated 100 men were forced to flee their homes. At Mzee Stephen Githinji's home, three of his sons “Joshua Muthee, Peterson Wanjohi and Josphat Kithaka“, were forced to leave the area. Githinji died a few months after the vigilantes stormed his home and set his sons houses ablaze. Villagers believe he died from stress (Fri, 04/18/2014, East African Standard).

What is clear is that a tense environment exists in the areas affected by Mungiki menace with families seen to as ‘anti-Mungiki’ sceptically living with those tagged to as ‘pro-Mungiki’. Such an environment derails development of enterprise.

These divisions' boils down to business whereby both sides avoid transacting with each other. Further; occasional confrontations are witnessed leading to massive destruction of property and businesses. Food crops are also destroyed leaving many destitute. Many of the attacks have been reported to be revenge attacks but police raids have occasionally been mounted to calm underlying tension.

Business owned by Mungiki exiles remain closed and the few that are still operational are shunned by the locals. Movement of individuals has also been curtailed with many residents from both rural and urban areas limiting travel to areas of safety, in some areas; visitors are forced to travel with convoys of security agents. Prosperity in an agrarian economy has much to do with co-existence between neighbours. They buy and sell among themselves thus any mistrust between them has a serious negative implication on enterprise growth as witnessed in Mungiki areas of Kirinyaga.

4.5 Socio-economic effects of Mungiki activities on MSEs in Kirinyaga County


4.5.1 Introduction.

In an earlier section, respondents were able to identify the activities of Mungiki in their areas and Kirinyaga County as a whole and what they consider to be the implications of these activities on enterprise development. In this section, the focus is on the actual socio-economic impacts of Mungiki activities on enterprise growth in Kirinyaga County. It explains both short and long term effects of Mungiki activities on enterprise. This is important as it offers a great contribution to scholarship as it expounds upon the aftermath of rural organized criminal gangs activities in a rural setting.

4.5.2 Effects of Mungiki activities on MSEs

In its endeavour to remain economically relevant, Mungiki targets businesses and other commercial activities within the areas its followers operate. Majority of the respondents, 70% agreed that Mungiki activities negatively affected enterprises in their areas. Only 15.7% believed that Mungiki had positively impacted on enterprises. The rest, 14.3% declined to comment on this.

Figure 4.12: Effects of Mungiki Activities (N=210)



Informant 6 said,

“Force, violence and threats work effectively well for Mungiki especially when they extort, levy taxes and recruit new of members in our area. One afternoon, I was monitoring commuters as they boarded my 14 seater Matatu at Kerugoya bus terminus. A few minutes later five other Nissan Matatus zoomed into the terminus hooting and with their lights blazing.

Immediately, over 70 mean faced boys with dreadlocks; sniffing snuff disembarked from the vehicles brandishing whips and clubs. They announced take-over of the terminus and declared a Ksh. 200 fee per day for every PSV vehicle ferrying passengers from the terminus to any given destination. For two weeks, my crew parted with Ksh. 200 and it pained me. How do you feed an adult, who doesn't work but is quick to threaten or violently grab what you have worked so hard to earn?"

It should be noted that the impact is not limited to the non-actors (those who are not Mungiki members), but it cuts across even to the adherents of the Mungiki group. The security of the area has been affected thus affecting the economic activities, education, society unity and day to day activities of the general public. The government structures have also been impacted upon yet they are expected to ensure an enabling environment necessary for businesses to thrive. Majority of the respondents accused Mungiki of engaging in activities that negatively affected their businesses. Use of violence, threats, extortion and illegal levies on businesses were cited to have had a major impact on enterprises in the county.

"Many of us have not recovered and may never recover as long as members of this gang roam around. Today you may think that all is well but I can confirm to you that they only changed tack to avoid arrest and evade our vigilante boys. They have come up with very clandestine ways of extorting and taxing us. We are helpless in this because no one wants to face their rath. Their threats and violence are real. They can disappear with your head any time if they get wind or suspect that you have betrayed them", said Informant 7

Informant 1 produced newspapers of varying dates and leaflets brought to his office with writings that show how the gang uses violence and threats to attain its goals.

He was quick to say,

“Residents especially those who own businesses in various towns and market centres in this county are living in fear. For instance, in one case, residents woke up only to find the leaflets, which were distributed at village centres and on roads, warning them to brace for a strike anytime. The leaflets read in part:

"Ithui andu a Mungiki Kirinyaga o handu yaruma, nitwihitite ati, kwirihiria no nginya twirihirie maunduini maria twikitwo ni andu a Kirinyaga (We members of Mungiki from every corner of Kirinyaga have vowed that we must revenge on the ills that have been meted on us by people from the area).

The notes were addressed to the residents of such areas like Kagumo market, Karaini, Kangaita, Ndiriti, Kiamaina, Gatwe and Kerugoya town. Others were residents of Kibingo, Mukinduri, Kiawaruguru, Kianjege, Kagio, Baricho, Kiburu, Kiania, Kabonge, Kamuiru and Gathiti. Other leaflets warned that Mungiki will get several heads from these villages as a statement that they had received their leader, Maina Njenga, back from Kamiti maximum prison.

In another story (The Daily Nation on September 5, 2002) George Munene wrote on how Mungiki followers caused road chaos along Embu-Makutano road in Kirinyaga. The incidence led to the arrest of four Mungiki suspects who were part of over a 60 member gang that barricaded road as they tried to take control of a local bus terminus in Ngurubani. Scores of other sect's members managed to escape the police swoop. Mungiki only allowed vehicles from Kukuena Sacco to pass through while those of rival companies such as Neno Sacco were blocked.

The drivers of the vehicles that were blocked from playing the route resisted the move, resulting to a clash between them and the Mungiki members.

Munene again wrote in (September 11th Daily Nation, 2002).

He reported of more chaos between Mungiki and police as the sect members attempted to control public transport in Kirinyaga. The chaos brought business at Ngurumbani town into a standstill as the police battled suspected members of the outlawed sect. During the confrontation, police arrested scores of the sect's adherents while others were injured. The Mungiki adherents had taken control of the bus terminus forcing armed police to move in to restore order. The police clobbered the sect's members who were armed with crude weapons. Hawkers at the market abandoned their goods and fled as police battled the rowdy group. The sect's leader who is a son of a local tycoon managed to flee during the confrontation.

According informant 4 who is a trader from Kamuiru, such incidences are common and they do actually hurt enterprises as traders are forced to close business for many hours and in many occasions, businesses are burnt, looted or destroyed.

“My friend had an auto repair shop in Kagumo. He lost a canter lorry during one of the confrontations pitying the police and traders on one hand against the Mungiki insurgents who had sworn to take a daily of Ksh. 300 per shop in Kagumo. He recently told me that business has not been doing well since these boys pitched tent in our area. Customers and patrons have gotten scared. They seem to shy away from either buying goods or procuring services in this environment where security is not guaranteed.”

From the above incidence, it is clear that Mungiki activities do affect MSEs in the county. Riots, blockades, confrontations orchestrated by Mungiki lead to lows sales and in other incidences, the merchandise get destroyed whenever there are chaos in the area.

4.5.3 Economic effects of Mungiki activities on MSEs in Kirinyaga.

Mungiki activities have had a serious economic effect on lives of Kirinyaga residents. Key economic sectors among them the MSE sector have suffered the blunt of Mungiki harassment. The extortion and illegal charges make enterprise owners in the County not achieve the full potential of their investment. They have deteriorated Kirinyaga's economy by chasing away investors and potential investors while enriching certain individuals who are mainly Mungiki members and their supporters.

In areas affected by Mungiki, traders' incur massive loses. Some close their businesses, while others opt to relocate and invest in safer areas away from Mungiki interference. This has eventually impoverished the county's population with many people losing employment.

The transport industry has been most affected. Matatu owners have either to comply with the extortion thus hampering their economic growth; others have opted to completely exit the transport industry that has for years offered them income.

This has led to more job losses and has complicated the issue of idle youth forcing many of them to join the gang itself to make a living. Informants who are former Matatu operators narrated how they quit transport business after the sect increased renewal fee from Ksh. 50,000 to Ksh.200,000.

Others lamented of Mungiki's extortion threats;

“In Mwea, we, traders are extremely scared following the circulation of leaflets by Mungiki that demands that we pay Ksh.10,000 for wholesale outlets while timber operators must part with Ksh.200. Mungiki demanded that horticulture producers pay the sect Ksh.5,000, and rice farmers part with two sacks of rice. Those who own stone houses are expected to give Ksh.500. When we reported to the Police, they claimed they were pursuing the thugs but the sect members have continued to circulate the leaflets. The police have asked us not to pay any money to the illegal group but they are doing nothing to stop the gang members. We are just at the mercy of God.”

Many businesses in Mungiki hot spot areas are destroyed every time Mungiki members engages in raids, fights, riots and rooting spree causing massive enterprise losses. According to informant 4 who hails from Kamuiru, Mungiki extortionists destroy businesses;

“Anake aya a Mungiki nioru muno. Matu chemaga me gakundi ka-anake eri kana atatu riria mokite guitia igoti ka-huwaini. Ungimaima, machokaga magoka me-gikundi makathukangia indo ciaku. Rimwe matumaga mikora ikunyaririre biathara yaku. Akorwo ninduka winayo matumaga mikora ikahunja naikaia kana igathukangia indo iria wendagia. Mungiki utiganaganawe oriria okahingia wendi wao kana uhinge biathara uthame. Munginyitana muri taenebiashara murege kuriha, mokaga me mbutunene makamuhura na magathukangia indo iria murendia kana magacitaha. Rimwe marutaga mikana muhinge thuguri. Ringi na ringi nitukuhinga ona thiku mugwanja kana makiriatwahithitio wikaro ni Mungiki! Mahinda tamacio tuhingite tuthiaga athara itariyoneka”

(These Mungiki young men are bad. They secretly come in groups of two to three demanding illegal taxes from our shops in the evenings. If you refuse to give, they later come back in a bigger group and might destroy your merchandise if you hold on not paying them. They can even send thugs to destroy your stock. If you operate a shop, the thugs will break in; steal or destroy your goods. Mungiki will never give up on you not unless you pay what they want, close the business or move it elsewhere. If you gang up as business people and refuse to pay, they will also come together and attack your businesses or force you as traders to close them down. Sometimes we close businesses for a whole week due to Mungiki's harassment causing us massive losses".

The extortion exercise by Mungiki adherents has led to the economic development of certain individuals in the group and the entire group in general. Many businesses in the local centres are now run by the Mungiki adherents and their supporters.

The sect has taken over some Matatu routes and brought in their own Matatus and those of their sympathizers. This has in turn enriched the gang members who now boast of being economically liberated. Even private vehicles using the so called 'Mungiki routes' have to pay protection fee in some areas of Kirinyaga. Apart from the sect members enriching themselves with the ill-gotten wealth, part of it is used to buy illicit weapons and pay court fines for the gang's arrested members.

At the same time Mungiki related skirmishes have often hampered the transport industry forcing investors to pull-out their vehicles which leads to business losses and reduce job opportunities.

The gang target Matatu terminus and routes to raise funds for their survival. Any resistance by public service operators and their crew leads to bloody fights and riots pitting them against Mungiki. Such confrontations contribute to destruction of property causing massive losses.

Disruption of public transport is common as this is the softest target used by Mungiki to raise money. Many incidences of Mungiki's attempts to control the sector were narrated during this study and were also reported in the print media. Here is an extract from the print media;

“At least one person was injured and property damaged when suspected Mungiki members in their attempt to control a route clashed with boda boda operators in Kibingoti area in Kirinyaga. The violent incident that started early in the day left a trail of destruction reminiscent of the 2009 Mungiki-vigilante wars. Boda Boda operators engaged suspected Mungiki members for the better part of the day along Sagana-Karatina road. Police officers from several stations in Kirinyaga and Karatina patrolled the tense area to keep peace. The officers had to fire in the air to disperse the rowdy and heavily armed boda boda operators who were baying for the blood of the Mungiki sect members. During the violent altercation, several motorcycles were burnt down. Eyewitnesses claim four to five motorcycles had been torched. Speaking to the Standard, the then Central police boss; Mr Francis Munyambu and Kirinyaga Central OCPD Patrick Oduma confirmed that four motorcycles were destroyed. “They burnt down four motorcycles but we were able to intervene and separate the groups. We also managed to arrest one person believed to have created enmity between the two youth groups,” said Munyambu (East African Standard on Fri, October 19th).

This destruction is not limited to enterprises owned by ordinary people. Even businesses owned by Mungiki members, and their sympathizers suffer the same fate at times. Such businesses have been targeted during retaliatory attacks mounted by a local's vigilante gang established to deal with Mungiki attacks. Informants' narrations in this study confirmed this and are substantiated by print media reports.

For example the Daily Nation of 21st April 2009 reported how

‘a local vigilante group raided Kagio town at night and destroyed property worth thousands of shillings belonging to suspected Mungiki members. Tension mounted as more than 300 villagers, who have been cracking down Mungiki criminals, raided rental rooms and business premises of the suspects, damaging assorted items. Thirty suspects fled when word went round that the villagers were about to raid the town. Armed with pangas, axes, petrol bombs, bows and arrows, the raiders combed the area and searched the buildings for the sect members. The 7.30pm raid brought business in the usually busy town to a standstill as traders hurriedly closed their businesses and locked themselves up fearing that they might be mistaken for Mungiki suspects and be attacked. A trader who did not wish to be named said the villagers knew the suspects and headed straight to where they operated their businesses or lived. “Although we panicked, they didn’t attack us. They were interested with the criminals,” he said. The villagers have been on the hunt of the suspected Mungiki members since April. They accuse the suspects of unleashing terror on them and stealing their property. They also accuse the suspects of extorting money from Matatu operators, cyclists, traders and planning to introduce a Ksh.100 illegal levy per household. So far villagers have killed 14 criminals in Kirinyaga alone, and burnt 20 houses. (Daily Nation, Tuesday April 21 2009)

Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga have led to loss of life. The deaths are either by Mungiki adherents, by anti Mungiki forces and at times by police. Majority of those killed are the young people; a big loss to the local economy.

Key informants narrated chilling incidences of how young men lost their lives through Mungiki activities in the county. Informant 1 painfully narrated how his brother; local Matatu driver was killed by Mungiki.

“They accused him of betraying the group. Prior to his murder, he had confided to me that some sect members were after his life for refusing to work with them. I asked him to make a formal report at Wanguru police station. On the eve of his death he phoned and told me that he had been threatened three times that day. I regret for not acting immediately. That evening his wife called me at midnight worried that her husband hadn’t come home yet. This was unusual of him thus I suspected something must have gone wrong. Ours fears would come true in the morning when we later learnt that both his vehicle and the conductor were missing. We spend the best part of the day searching for them. At around 6 pm we received information of a Nissan Matatu that had been cited abandoned near a river; a short distance from Ngothi village in Mwea. We rushed there. On arrival, I was shocked to see my brother; brutally murdered and a pool of blood next to his Matatu. His mutilated body had some missing parts a hallmark of Mungiki style of murder. In his mouth the tongue was missing but there was a poorly written note; ‘hii ni onyo kwa wote wanaotusaliti’. Two days later, his conductor was traced lying unconscious in a local health facility with deep cuts on his head. When he woke up after two days, he was able to tell us what happened. According him, they were returning the Matatu to its parking lot in Mutithi after the day’s work. As my brother opened the driver’s door, four men with their faces covered emerged out of the darkness. They dragged the two out of the driver’s cabin and pushed them into the passengers’ area.

One took control of the vehicle while the other three held them inside the van. They tied their hands and legs before blindfolding them. As they drove with them away, they accused them of refusing to pay route fee and reporting the gang members to the local security agencies. They were beaten badly as they were being driven into the bush. After some distance the conductor said that he was thrown out of the moving van. Those who took him to hospital say they found him hurt and unconscious on a track that leads through the rice fields. As for my brother, he appeared to have died a very painful death. According to the autopsy report, my brother died of torture. His hands, head and legs had deep cuts while his tongue and private parts were missing.

But it's not only Mungiki who killed their victims. Those accused of being Mungiki members or perceived to sympathize with them went through painful deaths in the hands of a local vigilante gang, Kenda Kenda.

The vigilante team comprising of young men was mobilized to protect the locals against Mungiki atrocities. They pursue Mungiki followers and their supporters like animals killing them in cold blood. Regardless of who is attacked; what is clear is that businesses suffer. Majority of those killed by the vigilantes go through untold torture before they die. "If you listen to relatives of the victims or read stories detailing their murder in the local dailies; you would understand what I mean", explained a key informant.

Case narratives by victims' relatives gave a vivid picture of how the local vigilante gang dealt with those accused of being Mungiki followers or supporters. The study took note of two cases given by victim's close family members.

4.5.3.1 Case 1: “Justice in the hands of a killer gang”

When a son confided to his father that his life was in danger, little did the father know that an action he opted to take to save his son would ultimately lead to the boy’s brutal murder. The man, like other villagers in Kirinyaga County, was aware of Mungiki’s terror in his locality, but little did he know that his son had secretly joined the banned sect. What shocked him most was that his son was planning to flee the village, not for the fear of Mungiki, but the local vigilante group that was purporting to protect the residents by torturing and killing suspected Mungiki sect members and their supporters.

Having lived with the vigilante group members, and indeed knowing majority of them, the old man was confident that they would not harm his son. His son who was due to sit his KCSE had recently confided in him that a schoolmate had tricked him together with another boy into joining the sect. His son had gone to borrow a book from the said boy who took them to another house where they found the sect’s members carrying out an oathing procedure.

The two boys were forced to take the oath, and warned of dire consequences should they reveal the sect’s secrets to anyone, including their parents. But months later, his son decided to dissociate himself with the sect, and confided in his father that he had been forced to join the banned group.

The father persuaded his son not to run away from the village but to instead confess to the vigilante group that he had been forced to join the sect. He was confident and optimistic that his son would be pardoned by the vigilantes. But he was dead wrong.

On the material day, he confidently took his son to the vigilantes meeting where his son was to confess his 'sins.' He was accompanied by the other boy who had equally taken the oath. At the meeting the two boys explained how they had been forcibly recruited. But as soon as they were done, with their confession at a place the vigilante had named 'The Hague', (a spot near Kagumo town) the vigilante group leaders passed a death sentence on the duo for their crimes. The pleas by the boys for their lives to be spared fell on deaf ears. The man's plea for the lives of the two boys to be spared equally fell on deaf ears. Some of the villagers at the scene pleaded with the gang leaders to either spare the lives of the boys or carry out their executions elsewhere.

The gang leaders heeded the call to change the execution venue and frog-marched the two boys to a different venue. Brandishing pangas and axes, the vigilante members killed the two boys as villagers silently watched, hoping for a miracle. The boy's dad run away from the site to the arms of his wife, to break the sad news that their son was no more.

4.5.3.2 Case two: "in the hands of vigilante group killers"

When a young man aged 22 years was seized by the local vigilante group; over suspected ties with the proscribed Mungiki sect, he knew his fate was sealed. He had to die at the hands of the merciless gang that purported to serve justice to members of the illegal sect.

He was ferried in a convoy of motorbikes from his Karinga village home to Kamuiru (near Kagumo) the site where the group was operating a Kangaroo court, famously called 'The Hague'. His hands were tied with ropes to make sure he did not attempt to free for freedom. The judgment declaring guilty was delivered in a record three minutes.

But before he died, he had to suffer in the hands of the merciless gang as he was made to stand on the ashes of other suspects who had been burned alive before him. The ruthless vigilante group had devised a new strategy of killing suspected Mungiki members. The victim was asked to decide whether he preferred being hacked, set ablaze or hanged. He opted to be hanged, hoping it would be less painful. But some villagers who had gathered at the scene urged the vigilante group to carry-out the killing elsewhere. The kangaroo jury heeded the call and it took the scared boy to a roadside where he selected a tree and was given a rope with the noose ready so that he could easily hang himself. According to the narrator, the gang cheered as the boy climbed up the tree at around midday, pleading for his live. His pleas fell on deaf ears as the gang had already smelt blood. "He delayed to release the rope, and someone slashed his hand so he could let go," his mother, interjected during the interview amid tears. The family was in more shock after the police covered up the brutal murder by indicting in the post-mortem report that the boy was lynched by the public, who they had had identified as a dangerous robber.

According to the informant, the vigilante group had also issued a stern warning to the villagers not to participate in the burial of those they killed, including digging graves. He also added that the activities of this gang are not isolated. Its members have rampaged through villages in Kirinyaga and have so far executed about 20 Mungiki suspects in similar blood-chilling fashion. He also said that, many atrocities have been committed by this vigilante gang which the Government has failed to stop despite pledges to do so. He adds;

“The Police, have failed to dismantle Mungiki and other emerging gangs. They appear to be spectators in the violence that some officers secretly admit to be supporting, despite the glaring abuse of suspects rights.

As residents plead with the police to stop vigilantes who have mutated into execution squads, there are claims that they are operating with the full support of the government and local police. The gangs are headed by "chairmen" who serve as judges at the trials. They are the ones who order the executions once suspects are found guilty, residents confided in us. These chairmen are well known people, but none of them has been arrested or prosecuted. The Government is an accomplice in the murders. "I called our MP to ask him to call an end to the violence, but he told me a senior Government official had advised him to keep off the issue. We are asking ourselves why police had not visited our homes to carry out investigations. We are also questioning why the gangs are allowed to operate in broad daylight without police intervention. We know four of the killers but we doubt anything will be done to them even if we report them", the victim's father concluded.

Mungiki activities have affected school completion. Most of the recruits are young people who are schooling. In most cases, the recruits of Mungiki drop out of school in the pursuit of lucrative 'extortion business'. In this case, most of the productive members of society become an economic burden to the same society and this has had long term negative effect on enterprise development.

Manifestations of fear and mistrust among business owners and their families has since become common. Enterprise owners who once supported each other have become extremely sceptical of each other thanks to Mungiki. According to informant 8,

"Days are gone when we used to help one another as business people. We had a kitty where we made contributions from our daily sales. From this kitty one could access a soft loan either to boost his/her business or address issues of illness, funerals and school fee for his/her children. That trust is no longer there.

Instead, we accuse each of either being a Mungiki or a supporter of the gang” Since the group emerged in area there has been increased unhealthy competition and rivalry among business owners. Similarly there has been increased sale of illicit goods in the market that have negatively affected enterprise development in the affected areas.

Mungiki has killed or maimed/hurt many people in the county. Among Mungiki victims are enterprise owners, close relatives or persons personally known to them. Injuries and murders among the business community have been reported and recorded in the County. Deaths have a great impact on those who are left behind. When the only bread winner in a family dies, the family members who are left are bound to suffer. Not only does death bring in sorrow and suffering but it also creates a security void especially when husbands and fathers leave their families without somebody to protect them. Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga have led to deaths of those opposed to their activities. This has brought economic hardships to the families of the deceased. The killing of Matatu operators by the Mungiki adherents along various routes in Kirinyaga left an economic gap in their families.

The loss of life caused by shooting down of Mungiki followers has caused loss of the young generation and able manpower in Kirinyaga. Most of those gunned down are the productive human resources of the society-the youth. When such youths die, it is not only a loss to the deceased families but also a loss to the society. Some young people have also fled their homes in fear of being gunned down by the police. This is still a big loss to the local community.

One informant said that even at the market most of the business people are old people. Young people are no longer interested with business especially. This has been blamed on Mungiki and has negatively impacted on the County’s enterprise development.

Prevalence of Mungiki in the towns studied has made enterprise owners insecure and restless forcing many of them change their normal ways of life. Some have even been forced to change residence while others have forced you to change your usual traveling arrangements. Some have been forced not to go to certain places. Mungiki menace has made business expensive to run. For example, many enterprise owners have invested on self-protection and defence. They are spending more on security either through purchase of a weapon for self-defence or by deploying private security in the affected areas.

The fleeing of people from Kirinyaga is not restricted to those running away from Mungiki atrocities, even Mungiki adherents flee from police arrests. Many of them have fled after the government intensified the hunt for the gang members in recent years. Many youths who were not followers of Mungiki have also fled police arrests after being branded to as the group's members. As a result, you witness that in many homes; only old and sickly parents have left. They are unable to perform chores like tilling of land, planting and harvesting and this has slowed farming. Others have been forced to rely on hired labour which has further strained their economic wellbeing.

The families of those who exit Mungiki and flee Kirinyaga County have been left in trouble. When a member of a certain family withdraws his/her Mungiki membership, the family is harassed through beatings in an attempt to force it reveal the whereabouts of their child. Mungiki argue that such a family must have influenced their child to leave the group or even helped him/her to flee. Some families have even been forced to pay a certain monthly fine to compensate the loss of such a member who was considered resourceful to the gang. An informant talked of a family in Mukinduri, which lives under threat. Mungiki members have kept fining them for they supposedly allowed their son to flee after exiting the gang. Such expenses have depleted the family's income leaving little for a worthwhile investment.

The wars pitting vigilante gangs against Mungiki sect members have left many hot spot areas in a state of desperation and misery. Mungiki members who survived vigilante onslaught and fled haven't been able to return back to their home. In this extract a writer expresses a desperate state of affairs in Mungiki hot spot areas among them Mutitu in Kirinyaga County.

“Mutitu village, though blessed with rich agricultural soil and adequate rains, is one of the most insecure places to live in. The greenery shrouds the hate and anger that boils in the hearts of residents five years since a bloody war between a vigilante group and Mungiki split once good neighbours down the middle. In Mutitu alone, elders say up to 30 young men accused of being Mungiki members were banished in 2009. They have never returned after the vigilantes vowed to kill them if they did. Scores of other people were dragged from their houses and hacked to death with machetes or forced to commit suicide. Combined with nearby villages where the vigilantes roamed and hunted down Mungiki suspects, an estimated 100 men were forced to flee their homes. The violence against the suspects precipitated a revenge attack in Gathaiti-Kiangumara village in neighbouring Nyeri where 28 people were slaughtered on April 21, 2009. About 100 people were killed as the fighting between the two gangs escalated. In Mutitu, we walked on rain-soaked paths to a homestead of one of the victim's, where a cow nibbled lazily at the spot where her son's house once stood. The house was razed by a marauding gang that alleged that his son was a Mungiki member. “He can't come back home. If he did and they learnt about it, I'd have to start preparing to bury him,” said an old mama, in reference to her son who fled.

“Even if I died, he wouldn't attend my funeral. If I was admitted in hospital, he wouldn't come to see me.” This mama's fear captures those of many other parents and their children.

Another young man was a carpenter who made furniture for residents at a fee and also built houses. Residents say after the vigilantes took control of the area with the support of the police, many people used them to fight personal wars. Family members tussling over land found a way to deal with their opponents. One of the vigilante leaders took advantage of the mayhem to grab the man's wife after eliminating him. In the ensuing lawlessness, many innocent people were killed or banished. It created enmity as brother turned against brother and neighbour against neighbour.

"Let's tell the truth. My son was a good person," said the mama. "That's what I told them," interjected a local elder. "He was a good man and a carpenter." However, he declined to discuss how the boy became a target of the gangs. But he said following accusations that Mungiki members were raping women and collecting illegal taxes, locals resolved to form vigilante groups to flush them out. The old man is one of the village elders recognised by the government and issued with identification cards to reconcile parties separated by Mungiki wars. "They slaughtered my goat," he said. "I demanded to know why and I was told it had been eaten by wazee." He said locals were fed up with Mungiki and planned to stop their operations. The government supported the vigilantes in a bid to end runaway insecurity. But people were targeted without any formal investigations.

"We knew them. They were from this area and they used to sniff tobacco. That's how we identified them." At the time, the vigilantes would be escorted by police as they waved axes and machetes. Unable to deal with the outlawed Mungiki sect, the local administration and the police allowed the vigilantes to take the law into their own hands.

Residents said the police kept vigil as houses were torched and sometimes shot in the air to scare anyone who tried to rescue the suspects. But this backfired on April 23, 2009, when a Mungiki squad waylaid vigilantes in Gathaiti-Kiangumara village, killing 29 in a gory fashion. Many were beheaded and others burnt to death as they slept.

At Mzee Githinji's home, three of his sons – Joshua Muthee, Peterson Wanjohi and Josphat Kithaka – were forced to leave the area. Githinji died a few months after the vigilantes stormed his home and set his sons' houses ablaze. Villagers believe he died from stress. Later, Muthee's wife, Anne Kagendo, and Wanjohi's wife Beatrice Wambui also passed on.

“We keep asking ourselves, how will all this end? Is this our life?” said John Njoka, a neighbour whose son, Githinji, was exiled. Nderi, another man whose son is in hiding, said people can only reconcile when parents of both aggressors and victims come together. They would then invite vigilante officials for peace talks. But a major problem, according to residents, is that the vigilantes appear to have been embraced by the new administration after they were identified as community policing groups to help fight cases of kidnappings.

However, the then Kirinyaga County Police Commander Christine Mutua denies this and argues that; “there is no government in the whole world that can sit around a table for talks or negotiations with members of outlawed criminal gangs as is being suggested in the Kirinyaga case.”

Mungiki adherents have earned income by setting up Kangaroo courts to 'solve' family disagreements for a fee. There are cases where women have hired Mungiki members to discipline their husbands if they beat them or if they are having affairs outside the marriage.

Men who find themselves before Kangaroo courts are harshly sentenced and fined. The main aim of Mungiki in the establishment of Kangaroo courts is to gain economically. They do not have the interest in maintaining family values. As a result of these courts, many families have broken up. In some families, the spouse that is affiliated to Mungiki usually has taken control of the family; the spouse has 'colonised' their partners to an extent that they even beat them up (East African Standard, 26th Saturday April, 2014).

From this extract, it is clear that criminal activities by organized gangs has serious negative effects on people's lives. Mungiki has left a trail of damage on the economy of the affected areas. Both agro and ordinary enterprises have negatively affected living local communities' poor. The lesson learnt here is that gang activities have a negative impact on economic development.

4.6 MSE Owners' Mitigation Measures against Mungiki.

Respondents and key informants do concur that insecurity perpetuated by Mungiki had grown out of hand. A similar observation was made by the Kenya's Parliamentary Committee on Administration and National Security in its report presented to parliament on 27th August 2009. According to this committee Mungiki menace in Nyeri and Kirinyaga is something that has grown into a hydra and unless action is taken, the nation's security particularly in the affected areas will be extremely compromised (Kenya National Assembly Official Record 'Hansard', 27th August 2009). Two informants, 1 and 9 explains,

“Our offices and the local police stations continue receiving reports on crime daily supposedly by Mungiki. The crimes range from extortions, threats, murders, kidnappings, rapes, house breaking and muggings. Cases of hit men and women hired to silence potential enemies, business rivals, feuding parties on property especially land are on increase.

Our intelligence reports points at Mungiki as the perpetrator of these atrocities yet the police are unable to contain them. Residents are growing impatient and us as local administrators are also getting frustrated. The gang doesn't spare the police either. Informant 1 narrated of how an administration police constable was attacked. He said: "The Mungiki members waylaid the constable, as he was returning to his work station at Kandongu chief's camp from the nearby market. They hit him on the head using a wooden piece which saw his lose control of the motorbike he was riding, plunging into a ditch. They robbed him of the motorbike, Ksh. 2000 in cash and his cell phone. The officer was rescued by a motorist who rushed him to Mwea Mission Hospital in critical condition. According to the officer, his pleas to the sect's members to spare his life fell on deaf ears.

To survive Mungiki's onslaught MSEs owners employed several strategies. Some have opted to cooperate with the gang by agreeing to pay protection fee and other taxes. Many others have relocated to safer area. Some have abandoned their good homes in rural areas for rental houses in more secure suburbs of Kerugoya town. Some reported Mungiki criminals to security agencies while some opted to pay ransom for the release of their kidnapped relatives. But reporting Mungiki is risky according to informant 8,

"Reporting these boys to the police is dangerous. If they come to find out that you reported them; you are dead! A number of us are 6 feet under for this. Some businessmen joined the gang as members. Others supported Mungiki out of fear of losing everything. But others supported the gang to benefit from its activities. But there are those who relocated their businesses away from Mungiki while others closed theirs and fled. Can you imagine being issued with a threat that someone will come for your head; would you wait?" he asked.

He produced a badly scribbled paper written in Kikuyu addressed to his late brother for the researcher to see.

Nituhetwo uhoro ati wee niwe uratu-kunyanira gwi chifu na thigari ciake. Nitwagukania! Nitukugira mutwe waku otauria anake aitu merigite kugira wa mukurinu. Waku tukawiga machemanio majira haria Kiania. (We are privy to information that you are the one reporting us to the local chief and his police. Be warned! We will come for your head just the same way our men went for that of Mukurino after he betrayed us. We will place it at the road junction of Kiania (Kiania is a market centre in Kirinyaga West).

“My brother couldn’t sleep neither we of his family. We quickly met as a family and agreed that he must leave the area immediately. He quickly disposed all the merchandise in his shop and moved to Mombasa. He died last year of stress.

Residents especially traders and farmers demands for action against the gang didn’t seem to yield much. They held demonstrations pleading with the local security agencies especially the police to pursue and flush out gang members. With the security agencies unable to deal with the gang, residents decided to confront the gang head on. A trader based in Kagio was quick to say;

“We decided enough was enough. This gang’s violence must be met with violence. You don’t negotiate or dialogue with criminals. We had to confront the gang with an equal measure of violence if we are to vanquish it. Even the police had to employ crudeness and violence to stop its members from committing more atrocities”.

The desperation of Kirinyaga residents against Mungiki is captured in report by Administration and National Security tabled in parliament on 27th August 2009 following the Gathaiti massacre. According to this report,

“According to this report, political leaders from Central Kenya have not been very vocal in condemning Mungiki activities. The community policing has similarly been taken over by frustrated mobs that have been using unorthodox means to flush out Mungiki sect members. Some of the vigilante groups have been killing suspected Mungiki members, and thus soiling the reputation of the community policing initiative to an extent that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the two groups.”

Tired of Mungiki criminal activities and little or no action at all from the local security agencies; the residents decided to protect themselves and their property. Supported by residents; particularly enterprise owners and with blessings from local elders, young men from Mungiki affected areas ganged up against Mungiki criminals. They rampage across the county smoking out Mungiki members and their sympathizers. The amorphous vigilante group is mainly facilitated mainly by businessmen to offer surveillance against Mungiki in the county. They use motorbikes to crisscross the county to flush out Mungiki suspect wherever they have been sighted. This has occasionally led to violent confrontations between Mungiki and the vigilante group. In an article ‘Two more Mungiki suspects killed in Kirinyaga’ Bernard Momanyi wrote;

Residents of Kirinyaga district on Monday killed two more people suspected to be Mungiki sect members, bringing the number of those killed to six since Saturday. Angry residents stoned the two suspects to death and threw one of the bodies in a river and another in a coffee plantation.

“One of the bodies which was badly mutilated was recovered in Rundu River while another was found in a tea farm in Kangware village,” a police officer said. One of the suspects hails from Kagumo village where high tension was reported on Monday. Police have warned residents not to take the law into their hands by lynching suspects and instead present them to the authorities.

But residents of Kirinyaga district have maintained that they will not surrender the suspects to the police because whenever they are arrested, they pay their way out and continue harassing them. Three other suspects were lynched on Saturday in the area and another one on Sunday. The three bodies were found dumped at Kiawaruguru, Kiamaina and Muragara villages. The fourth man was killed on Sunday. According to police, traders were mainly involved in the killings. “They are the most affected because they often complain of being extorted by the illegal sect members,” the then area deputy police Chief Patrick Oduma said. On Monday, a house belonging to a suspected Mungiki sect member was set ablaze after residents failed to trace the owner who was said to be a notorious extortionist. “We understand the suspect was not at home, when the angry mob descended on the house and burnt it,” he added.

The then Kirinyaga OCPD Herbert Khaemba said he has intensified security patrols in the area to avert more incidents of that nature. “We have told residents here not to panic, because we are out to protect them. They should not fear coming to us to report whenever they are harassed by Mungiki members. But then we still don’t want them to burn suspects,” he said. (Daily Nation, April 13, 2009)

In response to the merciless killing of 28 young men from Kirinyaga who had gone hunting for Mungiki sect members in Nyeri, the government sent a special force from the GSU to round up Mungiki criminals. This was captured by John Njagi and George Munene in a feature 'Police hunt down Mungiki in Kirinyaga'.

Police have been deployed to Kirinyaga to hunt down members of the proscribed Mungiki sect who have killed 29 people. The officers drawn from the dreaded General Service Unit arrived in the area on Friday and are camping at the Kerugoya and Karatina police stations. They are patrolling Kerugoya town, neighbouring villages and the Mt. Kenya Forest to flush out the sect's members suspected of having killed 29 people in Gathaithi village in Nyeri East, which neighbours Kirinyaga. The officers are also expected to try to halt the wave of revenge killings in Kirinyaga West district where a vigilante group hacked to death a widow, Jane Nyaruia, and burnt down her house, accusing her of funding Mungiki activities. (Daily Nation, " April 25, 2009).

The local judicial system has failed according to the locals. As a result, the anti Mungiki militia established a Kangaroo court nicknamed The Hague. 'The Hague' is the place where the vigilante group staged mock trials before mercilessly killing suspected Mungiki members. According to the locals; particularly owners of businesses, The Hague was established to punish Mungiki criminals.

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations based on the specific objectives of the study.

5.2 Summary

The study sought to establish existence of criminal gang activities and their socio-economic effects on MSEs in Kenya a case study of Mungiki in Kirinyaga County.

5.2.1 Nature of Mungiki criminal activities in Kirinyaga County

Findings of this study show that Mungiki's criminal activities in Kirinyaga are determined by the prevailing political and socio-economic circumstances in the county. Consequently, factors such as increased levels of poverty, unemployment, and high numbers of school dropouts, scarcity of arable land due to increased population and cash crop failures in the 1990s are to blame for increased Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga County. Other factors include; breakdown of social values, lack of parental guidance, Mungiki propaganda and peer pressure, search for self-esteem, idleness and laziness among the youth. According to this study, the gang's criminal activities in the county are mainly socio-economic and are geared towards the gang members' wellbeing. This explains why running of extortion rackets is a major activity of the gang. The rackets are run by well-coordinated cartels who extorts money from MSE owners. They target farmers, small scale traders, public service vehicles and Jua kali crafts persons.

Mungiki also demands fee from social events such as 'ruracio' or payment of bride price, merry-go-rounds, fundraising events and 'kamweretho'; a women's activity where they visit their parents and offer them presents.

Mungiki members operate legal and illegal businesses. However, even when doing legal business, Mungiki businessmen are engaged in unethical practices that give them undue advantage over non Mungiki businesses. They use threats and at times and create insecure situations that scare away competitors from operation. Among the gang's illegal businesses includes; sale of contraband goods, illegal drugs and guns.

The gang is involved in rituals such as oathing and female genital mutilation. Oathing is aimed at creating a binding covenant between gang members that can't be broken. This explains the silence and secrecy often witnessed among gang members as noted during this study. It emanates from a strict induction process one undergoes to qualify to be member of the gang. Mungiki is also involved in murder of real and perceived enemies, abductions for ransom and armed robberies. The gang runs ad hoc Kangaroo courts to arbitrate on marriages and other domestic conflicts at a fee. The gang members engage in politics too. During political confrontations pitying Mungiki supported camps against other political rivals' leads to massive destruction of property, injuries and even death. The proceeds realized from Mungiki's legal and illegal activities are used to further enrich the gang members through investments in sectors such as PSV transport, real estate and farming. Part of the proceeds is used to bribe police, court prosecutors, judicial and correctional officials to bail and secure freedom for arrested colleagues. It also used to bribe other government personnel to allow gang members to continue with their illegal activities unabated. The money is also used to pay membership recruitment teams and those who administer oath.

5.2.2 MSE owners' awareness about Mungiki activities and their implication on enterprise

The study found that MSE owners are aware of Mungiki's criminal activities and their implication on enterprise development. Findings of this study show that the response of enterprise owners towards the gang's insurgence in their areas was based on individual's knowledge and perception towards the gang and its activities. Some confirmed to have joined and participated in Mungiki activities willfully as it offered them an opportunity to benefit financially. Others indicated that they had been forced to join the gang and support its course. Some were just attracted by the sect's ideals and objectives. Many indicated that they were victims of the gang's atrocities in one way or another. Fear due to frequent Mungiki threats, need for protection were identified as the main factors behind enterprise owners support to Mungiki.

5.2.3 Socio-economic impacts of Mungiki activities on MSEs in Kirinyaga County.

Mungiki's criminal activities have profound social and economic impact on enterprises. The study noted that membership to the gang is basically a means to earn a living and socialize. And this explains the link between the gang's increased criminal activities and the deteriorating state of MSEs in Kirinyaga. MSEs forms majority of enterprises in the county and are therefore a major target of Mungiki extortion and illegal tax cartels.

The most affected MSE sector is the public transport service where Mungiki target control of Matatu terminus and routes to raise funds. Any resistance by public service operators and their crew is met with bloody fights and riots. This has forced many PSV operators to abandon public transport due to increased harassment by Mungiki extortionists. This has led to job losses and complicated the problem of idleness among the youth forcing many of them to join the gang hopefully to make a living through extortion.

The study reveals that other businesses including agribusiness are targeted by the gang too. Those in Mungiki hot spot areas are destroyed whenever the gang members engages in raids, fights, riots and rooting spree causing massive losses. Similarly, businesses owned by Mungiki members and their sympathizers suffer the same fate during retaliatory attacks moulded by local vigilante gangs established to fight Mungiki.

From this study, it's important to note that the success or failure of any business especially in the rural areas is a function of the prevailing socio-cultural linkages. Strong social ties guarantee enterprise success. However Mungiki has created divisions that have negatively affected MSEs both at family and community level. At family level, Mungiki is accused of fueling serious conflicts that ultimately destroy many family run businesses in the county. Similarly, partnerships have suffered a similar fate due to Mungiki related conflicts. At the community level, businesses associated with those perceived to be Mungiki are shunned by non-Mungiki and vice-versa.

According to this study; Mungiki is a dreaded gang. Its insurgency in Kirinyaga created fear among MSE owners forcing some to close or relocate their businesses to other areas. Further, it was noted that Mungiki criminal activities have eroded both human capital and social capital development. For example, in Kirinyaga the gang has led to migration of people as fear of crime has significantly reduced quality of life the area. Similarly, violence muted by the gang on the local population has been blamed for slowing down the rate of return of locals who would otherwise boost enterprise development in the county. Mungiki criminals have forced the productive individuals to occasionally exit the labor force because of violent injuries and social unrest among the locals. The operations of the gang have negatively affected the investment climate of Kirinyaga as they deters or delay local and investments from elsewhere

The study noted that the gang's culture of extortion has made business expensive to operate in Kirinyaga. It's blamed for prevailing laziness and lack of entrepreneurial spirit among the youth in the county.

The study shows that Mungiki activities have affected school completion. Mungiki members have been luring students to abandon school and become gang members. Those who join the gang; but continue schooling are in disciplined and unable to concentrate in class. Mungiki recruits, who drop out of school without skills or education, can't secure employment or even manage businesses. In most cases, they pursue the lucrative 'extortion business'. They are used by senior Mungiki members to run extortion cartels that choke enterprises. They simply become an economic burden to the same society and this has had long term negative effect on enterprise development. Female entrepreneurs and youthful girls end up terminating their businesses and flee to escape FGM. Girls who have gone through the rite assume that they are now mature thus abandon school without any usable skills.

The study reveals how threats and violence orchestrated by Mungiki has created mistrust, fear and suspicion among MSE owners. This has manifested itself among enterprise owners and their families. Enterprise owners who once supported each other are now extremely skeptical of each other. They no longer assist each other while rifts between them and their customers have led to weakening of formerly strong ties in business. Violent confrontations between Mungiki and police or other gangs within business areas have led to destruction of merchandise. The fear of Mungiki has forced some enterprises to close while others have been moved elsewhere.

Findings of this research show how Mungiki criminal activities led to injuries and loss of life. Deaths were either by Mungiki adherents, anti Mungiki forces and police.

The study note chilling incidences of how Mungiki killed its victims. Majority of those killed are the young people; a big loss to the local economy.

But it's not only Mungiki who killed their victims. Those accused of being Mungiki members or perceived to sympathize with them goes through similar painful deaths in the hands of a local vigilante gang; Kenda kenda. The group comprised of young men is occasionally mobilized to protect the locals against Mungiki atrocities. The gang pursues Mungiki and their supporters killing them in cold blood. Regardless of who is attacked or killed; what is clear is that MSEs suffer under such a hostile environment.

Deaths have a great impact on those who are left behind. When the only bread winner in a family dies, the family members who are left are bound to suffer. Not only does death bring sorrow and suffering but it also creates a security void especially when husbands and fathers leave their families without somebody to protect them. For example killing of Matatu operators by the Mungiki adherents along various routes in Kirinyaga left an economic gap in their families.

Mungiki activities in Kirinyaga have led to deaths of those who oppose their activities. This has brought not only sorrow and pain but also economic hardships to the families of the deceased. The loss of life caused by shooting down of Mungiki followers has caused loss of the young generation and able manpower in Kirinyaga. Most of those gunned down are the productive force of the society mainly the youth. When such youths die, it is not only a loss to the deceased families but also a loss to the society.

Some young people have also fled their homes in fear of being gunned down by the police. These are people who would have produced the much needed manpower to help the society die hence the loss of such required services.

Prevalence of Mungiki in the towns studied has made enterprise owners insecure and restless forcing many of them change their normal ways of life. Some have even been forced to change residence while others have forced you to change your normal travel patterns. Some have been forced not to go to certain places. Mungiki menace has made many businesses expensive to run. For example, many enterprise owners have invested on self-protection and defence by; spending more on security either through purchase of a weapon in the house for self-defence or increased deployment of security in affected areas

Mungiki has killed or maimed/hurt many people in the county. Among Mungiki victims are enterprise owners, their close relatives or persons personally known to them. The fleeing of people from Kirinyaga is not restricted to those running away from Mungiki atrocities, even Mungiki adherents flee from police arrests. Many of them fled after the government intensified the hunt for Mungiki members in recent years.

Most youths who were not followers of the Mungiki group also fled police arrests because most of them were branded as the group's members. In many homes, old and sickly parents who depended on their children's help were left to suffer alone. They are unable to perform the chores like tilling land, planting and harvesting. In this case, farming has been affected.

The families of those who exit Mungiki and flee the area have been left in trouble. They are harassed through beatings to reveal the whereabouts of their child. Mungiki argue that the family must have influenced their son to leave the group and helped him to flee. The family is forced to pay certain monthly payments to repay the loss of a member who had been resourceful to the group. Such expenses depletes the family's incomes. The wars pitying vigilante gangs against Mungiki sect members have left Mungiki hot spot areas in a state desperation and misery.

5.2.4 Mitigation measures instituted by MSE owners to combat Mungiki menace.

The study results identify several strategies that enterprise owners apply to survive Mungiki's onslaught. Some opted to cooperate with the gang by agreeing to pay protection fee and other taxes. Others among them traders and farmers opted to report Mungiki criminals to security agencies demanding action against the gang. When this failed to yield much, they held demonstrations pleading with the local security agencies especially the police to pursue and flush out gang members. Some abandoned their good homes in rural areas for rental houses in more secure suburbs relocated in towns such as Kerugoya. Some opted to pay ransom for the release of their kidnapped relatives.

Tired of Mungiki criminal activities and little or no action at all from the local security agencies; residents decided to confront the gang head on to protect themselves and their property. This involved use of unorthodox means to flush out Mungiki sect members and kill them. With blessings from local elders, young men from Mungiki affected areas ganged up against Mungiki criminals. These mobs mutated into vigilante groups such as Kenda kenda that ended up soiling the community policing initiative to the extent that it now become very difficult to distinguish in those areas who was in community policing, a Mungiki or a vigilante. The amorphous vigilante group is facilitated mainly by businessmen to offer surveillance against Mungiki in the county.

Its members use motorbike to criss-cross the county flushing out Mungiki suspect wherever they have been sighted. This has occasionally led to violent confrontations between Mungiki and the group. The local judicial system has failed according to the locals. To address this, the anti Mungiki militia established a Kangaroo court nicknamed The Hague; an area where vigilante groups would hold mock trial before mercilessly killing those suspected to be members of Mungiki. The study shows that The Hague was simply established to punish Mungiki criminals.

5.3 Conclusion

In conclusion the study examined the nature of Mungiki criminal activities in Kirinyaga, entrepreneurs' awareness of these activities, and their socio-economic effects on enterprises. It also examined the mitigation measures put in place by entrepreneurs to address the Mungiki problem in Kirinyaga County.

The study established that Mungiki members are involved in political violence, riots and demonstrations. The study also established social activities of Mungiki among them; forced female circumcision, kidnapping, Robberies, Murders and forced recruitment & oathing. Extortion, illegal taxes and levies on businesses, participation in illegal businesses and sale of contraband goods; were some of the economic activities identified in this study. From this discussion, majority of Mungiki activities are criminal and have a negative effect on enterprises.

Findings of the study show that enterprise owners are aware of gang's activities and their implications on businesses. This explains why they have attempted to put in place mechanisms aimed at protecting their enterprises from the gang members. The study established various socio-economic impacts of Mungiki activities on micro and small enterprises.

Mungiki activities increased costs of doing business due to an increased need to employ different forms of security thus diverting investment away from business expansion and productivity improvement, and this led to a less than optimal operating strategy.

They also lead to business losses, arising from looting, arson, theft, extortion and fraud. They contributed to loss of output because of reduced hours of operation as businessmen from operating late or loss of workdays arising from outbreaks of violence, and avoidance of some types of economic activity.

Mungiki activities reduces output because of the temporary (from injury) or permanent (from murder) exit of individuals from their businesses. In the latter case, the loss is not just current output, but the output in the remaining years of the individual's working life. They also cause a permanent shut-down of firms or relocation to less crime-prone countries. They negatively impact on the investment climate thus can deter or delay investment, and hence growth.

Findings of this study shows that Mungiki criminal activities have adverse repercussions on enterprises. Mungiki criminal activities erodes the development of human capital as well as social capital and thus constrains the potential for growth. The crime situation in Kirinyaga (created by Mungiki) seems to be an important reason for migration of traders, since the fear of crime significantly reduces the quality of life. Crime and violence have also been blamed for slowing down the rate of return of migrants back to Kirinyaga. Also, crime forces otherwise productive individuals to occasionally exit the labor force because of violent injury to themselves or close associates, or because of social unrest in the community. Mungiki violence would occasionally cause student's absenteeism from lessons and schools to close periodically. This would deny learners an opportunity to acquire the much needed skills to steer MSE sector.

The study identified a number of strategies and measures adopted by entrepreneurs to address Mungiki menace. Among them were demonstrations against the gang, engaging a local vigilante gang to fight Mungiki criminals. Others opted to close down businesses or scale them down while others relocated their investments in areas free of Mungiki. The government & other organs are also involved in attempts to weaken the gang. The government outlawed the sect and police mounted crackdowns on Mungiki criminals; prosecuted and imprisonment many Mungiki criminals. Government agencies together with civic educators' community leaders, churches and CBOs, and NGOs have focused on moral & spiritual guidance especially among the youth.

5.4 Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions of this study; the country must adopt a multi-dimensional approach that aims at dismantling Mungiki's financial strength and networks, eradicate corruption within security and judicial agencies strengthen rule of law and enhance judicial systems that ensures justice in every front. By so doing, the gang's negative effects on MSEs will be mitigated.

This study recommends the following;

1. The major actors in terms of fighting organized crime ought to adopt preventive measures that entail services, programs or activities designed to prevent people especially the youth from joining gangs ought to be put in place.
2. They must tackle the deep-seated state of unemployment and poverty that attract the youth to join Mungiki and other criminal gangs. Urgent and deliberate policies ought to be implemented to reduce poverty, eradicate idleness; boost economic competitiveness through the county's trade networks, avail reliable and affordable energy and increase the county's labor force. Tertiary training can come in handy to equip the youth with technical and vocational skills that make them employable and be able to create and manage their own businesses.
3. The government, local leaders, religious bodies and educational institutions ought to roll out a community awareness education program that sensitizes the society on proliferation of gangs and the dangers of associated with them. This will help parents and other groups in offering guidance and discourage the youth from joining criminal gangs i.e. Mungiki that negates societal norms and values.
4. Interventional measures that draw gang members and close associates away from the gang lifestyle ought to be implemented. These entails offer for education, job training and community service opportunities as incentives to quit the gang while still holding those receiving services accountable for continued delinquent or criminal activity.

5. Security agencies should adopt a gang crime enforcement strategy that entails a wide range of criminal justice activities in which law enforcement, prosecution, probation and conditional release of prisoners direct their efforts to curtail and ensure accountability for the criminal activity of gangs and gang members. Crime enforcement strategies include, sharing intelligence about gangs, targeting and jailing dangerous and persistent offenders and using gang embargos to prevent association among known gang members. Effective prosecution of gang offenders coupled with enhanced sentencing will deter other gang members from engaging in criminal activities.
6. The government should implement relevant laws and policies i.e. witness protection programme that secure witnesses from intimidation. Witnesses and the public will readily give evidence and relevant information required to punish gang members engaging in criminal activities. By so doing those sect members caught or accused of extortion and other illegal actions that hurt enterprises will get a fair hearing and be punished.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Introductory Letter

Dear Respondent (s)

My name is Stephen M. Mbiri a student of university of Nairobi, Kenya. I am carrying out a research on the **Existence of Criminal Gang’s Activities and their Socio-Economic Effects on Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) in Kenya**. This research is purely academic, carried out in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Award of Degree of Master of Arts in Sociology.

I request you to provide the relevant information that would help make this research successful.

Confidentiality and/or complete anonymity would strictly be observed if requested by the informant (s).

Thank you in anticipation.

.....

Appendix 2: Consent Form

I agree to take part in this study, as explained to me. My participation is fully out of my own free will and not due to any benefits, direct or indirect; I may or may not gain from the study.

Tick to mark consent _____ **Date** _____

Respondent willingly accept the interview _____

Respondent declined interview _____

I, the researcher, have explained fully to the participant/participants relative about the study, its benefits and side effects, and have not withheld any information regarding the study. I have assured the participant of his or her confidentiality during the study, and in case he or she withdraws from the study

Researcher's signature _____ **Date** _____

Appendix 3: Questionnaire-MSEs Owners

Answer the questions with honesty by filling blank spaces or ticking (↔)

But please do not write your name in this questionnaire. The information you will give will be confidential and is for research purposes only

Part 1: Social and Demographic Characteristics

1.0 Name: _____

1.2 Gender: Male () Female ()

1.3 Town/Village _____

1.4 Sub-County/District _____

1.5 County _____

1.6 Age: Below 25 years () 25-35 yrs () 36-45 yrs () 46-55 yrs () 56-65yrs () over 65yrs

1.7 Educational attainment

Primary () Secondary () College () University ()

1.8 Type of business: Farmer () Artisan/crafts person () Wholesale/Retail () Greengrocer ()
Hotel/Butcheries () Matatu Operators () *other (specify)

1.9 Size of Business in terms number of employees: Owner only () 1 to 5 employees' () 6 to 10 employees () More than 10 employees ()

Part 2: Mungiki Activities in Kirinyaga County

2.0 Do you know of the existence Mungiki as an organized criminal group in this area/town?
Yes () No ()

2.1 If yes, when did the group emerge in this area? Before 1996 () 1996-2000 () 2001-2010 ()
2011-2016 ()

2.2 Why do you think Mungiki as an organized criminal group emerged in your area? (tick any that apply according to you)

Reasons why Mungiki emerged in Kirinyaga	Tick
1. Poverty	
2. Low levels of Education	
3. Easy access to fire arms	
4. Drugs and alcohol	
5. Peer influence	
6. Ruthless crackdown of Mungiki adherent in Nairobi and other areas	
7. There existed a local Mungiki cell that kept recruiting new membership	
8. Were brought in by owners of local businesses to keep competitors away	
9. Urbanization	
10. Child abuse	
11. Love for easy quick money among the youth	
12. I don't know	

2.3 What is the gender composition of Mungiki membership in your area? Male only () Female only () both Male & female ()

2.4 Are there locals including your colleague businessmen who have joined Mungiki? Yes () No ()

2.5 Business people support to Mungiki in your area. Do you agree? Agree () Disagree ()

2.6 If yes, what reasons do they give for joining the group (you can tick more than one reasons among those listed below)

Reasons why some locals and businessmen joined Mungiki	Tick
1. They were forced to join sect by other Mungiki members	
2. Ideals and objectives of Mungiki attracted them to join the group	
3. They joined to get/win favours that the group members seemed to enjoy	
4. To be able to survive in business	
5. They were threatened by other Mungiki members less they be labeled traitors	
6. I don't know	

2.7 Any other reasons why some locals and businessmen joined Mungiki?

2.8 Mungiki members are said to engage in social, economic and political activities in areas they exist. Are you aware of any such activities in your area? Yes () No ()

2.9 Among the economic activities listed below tick those associated with Mungiki in your area that you are aware of.

Economic Activity	Tick
1. Drug Trafficking	
2. Computer crime, including internet fraud	
3. Trafficking in women and children for sex industry	
4. Kidnapping to get ransom	
5. Extortion, including protection money from business people	
6. Charging farmers produce	
7. Participation in Illegal businesses	
8. Taxation & levies on businesses	
9. Carjacking	
10. Armed robbery	
11. Gun running activities	
12. Collection of protection money	
13. Illegal connections of water and electricity supply	
14. Bribery	
15. Inter-regional conflicts (fights)	
16. Inter-business conflicts	
17. Offering security services	
18. Running public service vehicles (Matatus)	
19. Distribution of agriculture produce	
20. Loading and off-loading of goods	
21. Assassination of targeted individuals	

2.10 Any other economic activity by Mungiki you know about? _____

2.11 Have you witnessed Mungiki carry out any of the economic activities you have ticked above in your area? Yes () No ()

2.12 If yes, briefly explain how the group engages in economic activities in your area

2.13 Which of the socio-cultural activities listed below are associated with Mungiki in your area?

Socio-Cultural Activities by Mungiki	Tick
Killing victims to extract organs for rituals	
Beheadings as a way of revenging	
Threatening & instilling fear	
Torture of reformed sect members	
Forced female circumcision	
Oathing	
Recruitment of new members	
Arbitration of domestic conflicts	

- 2.14 Any other socio-Cultural activity by Mungiki you know about
- 2.15 Have you witnessed or heard Mungiki carry out any of the above socio-cultural activities in your area? Yes () No ()
- 2.16 If yes, briefly explain how the group engages in socio-cultural activities in your area
- 2.17 Among political activities listed below tick those associated with Mungiki in your area?

Political Activities by Mungiki	Tick
Political violence	
Riots and demonstrations	
Involvement in fights with rival groups	
Supporting of rival politicians	
Others (specify)	

- 2.18 Any other political activity by Mungiki you know about
- 2.19 Have you witnessed or heard of Mungiki carry out any of the above political activities you have ticked in your area? Yes () No ()
- 2.20 If yes, briefly explain how the group engages in political activities in your area

Part 3: MSE Owners Awareness of Mungiki Activities and their Implications on Enterprise Development

- 3.0 As business owners are you aware of the implication of Mungiki activities on enterprises development in your area? Yes () No ()
- 3.1 If yes, are you and the other business owners concerned about those implications? Yes () No ()
- 3.2 If yes, why are you concerned? (tick those that you agree with)

Why we are concerned	Tick
1. Because activities such as Mungiki members participating in business lead to unfair competition compelling closure of our businesses	
2. Mungiki extortion and illegal taxation tendencies drastically cut on our profits	
3. The group's criminal activities creates insecurity in our area; ultimately killing our enterprises	
4. Any other (specify)	
5. I don't know of any implication	

3.3 If No, why are you not concerned?

Why you are not concerned	Tick
1. Believe that the group's activities won't affect our businesses at all	
2. We have strategies to mitigate any of the group's criminal activities	
3. Believe that the police would manage to contain the Mungiki menace	
4. Believed that Mungiki was of no effect or harm to the business community	
5. I don't know	

3.4 Do you think businesses in this area are affected by Mungiki activities? Yes () No ()

3.5 If yes, how are your enterprises affected? Positively () Negatively () Both negatively and Positively ()

3.6 To some people, Mungiki activities have benefited enterprise in your area (tick the various ways cited as benefiting enterprise among the ones listed below)

Positive effects of Mungiki activities	Tick
1. Mungiki kept competitors away thus increased profits for existing enterprises	
2. Ordinary crime went down in areas under Mungiki due to sect's ruthless ways of punishing criminals	
3. Number of enterprises grew thanks to Mungiki	
4. Businesses grew in terms of size	
5. Optimism among the owners of enterprises increased	
6. I don't know	

3.7 Others argue that the sect activities have negatively affected enterprise in your area (tick the various ways cited as damaging enterprise among the ones listed below)

Negative effects of Mungiki activities	Tick
1. Extortion and illegal taxes led to the collapse and ultimate closer of many businesses	
2. Fear of Mungiki reprisals led many entrepreneurs to close their businesses	
3. Unethical business practices perpetuated by the sect killed many businesses in the area	
4. Increased murders, kidnappings and occasional threats drastically killed entrepreneurial spirit with many business owners closing their businesses or moving them elsewhere	
5. I don't know	

3.8 Are you aware of people who have been killed or injured by Mungiki in your area? Yes () No ()

3.9 What was the livelihood occupation of those killed/injured? Farmers/livestock keepers () Artisan/crafts people () Businesspeople () Employed by GK () Employed by private ()

3.10 What has been the implication of these killings/injuries on enterprises development in your area? (Tick those that applies)

Implication of Mungiki killings/injuries	Tick
1. Pain and suffering among entrepreneurs' families	
2. Closure of businesses previously owned by the victims and dependents	
3. Fear and panic among entrepreneurs leading occasional closer of businesses	
4. Any other (specify)	

3.11 Does the Mungiki own any businesses that you are aware of within the area? Yes ()
No ()

3.12 If yes, give examples of businesses owned by Mungiki

3.13 Where does a Mungiki member obtain the money to start such businesses?

Sources of Mungiki money to start businesses	Tick
Mungiki members borrow from banks	
Own savings from Mungiki members	
Extortions and illegal fee from business owners i.e. matatus, retailers etc	
Corruption and bribery deals	
Funds gotten from Robberies, kidnap ransom	
Contributions from Mungiki members	
Any other source (specify)	
I don't know	

3.14 What do you consider to be the implications of these Mungiki businesses on enterprises development in your area?

3.15 Do you think business people in your area support or channel funds to members of Mungiki for support activities? Yes () No () Don't know ()

3.16 Does the group extort money from business people? Yes () No () Don't know ()

3.17 What have been the implications of businesses people supporting or channeling funds to members of Mungiki on enterprises development in your area?

3.18 Is it true that the police collude with the members of criminal organized groups? Yes () No () Don't know ()

3.19 Is it true that the police ignore useful information about Mungiki as an organized criminal Group? Yes () No () Don't know ()

3.20 Have you ever seen the police and known members of organized criminal groups together in friendly interactions? Yes () No () Don't know ()

3.21 What have been the implications of this association between Mungiki, police and other security agencies on enterprises development in your area?

Part 4: Socio-Economic Effects of Mungiki Activities on Enterprises

4.0 Mungiki is accused of engaging in activities that affect businesses in your area. Do you agree? Yes () No ()

4.1 Mungiki are said to use violence and threats of violence against business people in areas they operate. How far do you agree with this statement? Strongly agree () Agree () Disagree () Strongly Disagree ()

4.2 If you agree or strongly agree, how has violence and threats of violence impacted on businesses in your area?

4.3 Mungiki has been accused of engaging in corruption and bribery. Do you agree? Yes () No ()

4.4 If yes, who do Mungiki members corrupt or bribe? Security Agencies i.e. police () Administrative officials () officials of county government () others ()

4.5 Briefly explain why?

4.6 Have there been arrests of members of Mungiki in your area? Yes () No ()

4.7 If yes, why were they arrested?

Reasons why Mungiki members were arrested	Tick
1. Bribery	
2. Extortion	
3. Charging illegal fee and taxes from then public and businesses	
4. Abductions & Murders	
5. Robberies	
6. Threats & Blackmail	
7. Others (specify).....	

4.8 Could you be aware if the arrested members were taken to court? Yes () No ()

4.9 If Yes, what happened to them after the court appearance? Returned to their homes () Were imprisoned () Not seen/heard of them () Not sure ()

4.10 If No, could you know why they were not taken to court? Yes () No ()

4.11 Briefly explain why?

4.12 Are you aware of any convictions of Mungiki suspect members? Yes () No ()

4.13 What are the possible reasons why Mungiki suspects' members may not be convicted? (Tick those that apply)

Reasons why Mungiki members may not be arrested	Tick
1 Bribe security agencies i.e. the police for them not to be arrested	
2 Security agencies fear arresting Mungiki members	
3 Security agencies work in partnership with Mungiki members	
4 Victims fail to report them for fear of reprisals	
5 Any other reason (specify).....	

4.14 What are the likely reasons why members of organized criminal groups are not prosecuted?

Reasons why Mungiki members may not be prosecuted	Tick
1 Bribe security agencies i.e. the police for them not to be arrested	
2 Security agencies fear arresting Mungiki members	
3 Security agencies work in partnership with Mungiki members	
4 Victims fail to report them for fear of reprisals	
5 Any other reason (specify).....	

4.15 How has the failure to convict or prosecute Mungiki members this impacted on individual business owners and their enterprises in your area?

4.16 Mungiki activities cause suffering to business owners at their individual, family and businesses level. How far do you agree with this statement based on experiences in your area Strongly agree () Agree () Disagree () Strongly disagree () Don't know ()

4.17 If you strongly agree or agree, then briefly explain how business owners suffer at individual, family and business levels

4.18 Many business owners closed their businesses; others moved them to other towns or even scaled them down due to Mungiki activities? Do you agree with this? Yes () No ()

4.19 If yes, explain briefly (you can give vivid incidences of what happened)

4.20 Tick any effect on enterprise that is due to Mungiki activities in your area from those provided in the list below.

Implications	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't Know
1. Reduced profits margins due extortion and illegal charges			
2. Destruction of businesses/property			
3. Fear among business owners and their families			
4. Closure of businesses			
5. Increased competition and rivalry among business owners			
6. Increased illicit goods in the market			
7. Injuries and murders among the business communities			
8. Forced you to change your normal ways of life			
9. Made you feel more secure and restless			
10. Forced you to change residence			
11. Has killed your close relative or persons personally known to you			
12. Forced to ensure you have a weapon for self-defense in the house			
13. Has maimed/hurt a person I know			
14. Forced you to change your normal travel patterns			
15. Forced you not to go to certain places			
16. Demands money from new migrants to the area			
17. Resolves domestic disputes			
18. Has forced me to spend more on security			
19. Controls public transport in our area			
20. Deploys security in your area			

Part 5: Mitigation Measures put in Place by MSE Owners to Address the Mungiki Menace

5.0 How far do you agree with the argument that owners of enterprises invited and encouraged Mungiki in your area? Strongly agree () Agree () Disagree () Strongly disagree () Don't Know ()

5.1 If you strongly agree or agree with this argument briefly say why? And if you strongly disagree or disagree with this argument briefly say why?

5.2 Do you agree that Mungiki violence has been met with violence in your area? Strongly agree () Agree () Disagree () Strongly disagree () Don't Know ()

5.3 If you agree or strongly agree with the assertion above, briefly explain your position

5.4 If you disagree or strongly disagree with the assertion above, briefly explain your position

Below are ways in which various groups have been trying to mitigate Mungiki menace. Please tick those that apply to how businessmen in your area responded

Action	Response		
	Yes	No	Don't Know
1. Cooperating by payment for protection & other taxes to Mungiki			
2. Reporting them to the police			
3. Paying ransom for the release of a kidnapped relative			
4. Engaging rival groups to neutralize Mungiki			
5. Becoming a member of the group			
6. Moving the business to areas devoid of Mungiki activities			
7. Closing the business			

5.5 Briefly narrate any incidences of how owners of enterprise have mitigated/or responded to Mungiki in your area.

Appendix 4: Interview Guide Questions for Key Informants

Section A: Social and Demographic Characteristics

1 Name: _____

Gender: Male () Female ()

2 Location _____

3 Town/Village _____

4 Sub-County/District _____

5 County _____

6 Age of Respondent _____

7 Educational attainment No education () Primary () Secondary () College () University

8 Designation of Informant

a. Local Administrator ()

b. Leader Representing Business Community()

c. Ex-Mungiki Member/Leader()

d. Leader/Member of vigilante group formed to counter Mungiki ()

Date of Interview _____

Section B

- 9 Do you know of any the existence of Mungiki in this area?
- 10 Why and when did organized criminal groups emerge in this area?
- 11 What activities both negative and positive is the gang involved in, in your area?
- 12 Do they make any demands on business people and if so what are these demands? How have they affected business?
- 13 Tell me of any personal experience especially that has to do with the interaction between Mungiki and enterprise owners: narration of episodes/experiences
- 14 How has business people responded towards Mungiki both at individual and group level?
- 15 How do Mungiki as an organized criminal group relate with the police, chiefs (Government)?
- 16 What strategies has enterprise owners put in place in response to Mungiki menace in this area
- 17 What would you suggest should be done about Mungiki as an organized criminal group?

Appendix 5: List of Key Informants

Name	Age	Interview at	Date
Informant 1	43	Chief's office	18/11/2016
Informant 2	22	Kagio	26/09/2016
Informant 3	28	Kagio	29/09/2016
Informant 4	50	Kagumo/Kamuiru	25/11/2016
Informant 5	51	Kangaita Area	03/10/2016
Informant 6	42	Kerugoya	15/12/2016
Informant 7	47	Ngurubani	15/09/2016
Informant 8	32	Ngurubani	30/11/2016
Informant 9	39	Sub chief's office	06/12/2016
Informant 10	27	Sagana/Kagio	12/01/2017