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DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND RE-INTEGRATION (DDR) AS
A TOOL FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN POST-
CONFLICT SOCIETIES: A CASE OF SOUTH SUDAN

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DECLARATION

I Kimotho Salim Kinyua hereby declare that this project is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other University.

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This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

To the love of my life Hannah, sons Raymond and Caleb, mum Wamichonjo, brothers and sisters all of whom have been incredible pillars in this life. I wouldn't have asked for great family than you.

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My sincere gratitude's are to the Almighty God who has remained a constant source of hope and inspiration against all odds. At the lowest point in life and when challenges came knocking his grace remained sufficient. My immediate family more so the love of my life Hannah, sons Ray and Caleb for being so kind, patient and understanding when the bug and thirst for higher education came calling. You have been my cheering squad, number one fans and support systems in this journey. Saying that I love you is an understatement.

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ABSTRACT

Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) remains a strategic component for Post-Conflict Peace-building and Reconstruction and has proved to be an efficient tool to guarantee any society emerging from conflict an ideal environment for peace, security and development to thrive. Within the African region for instance, DDR has been tried in a couple of countries among them Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo and more recently South Sudan with remarkable success being recorded in a number of them. The cases of Sierra Leone and Rwanda remains classic examples for the successes achieved within considerably short period and under difficult circumstances. However, the South Sudan scenario is invariably different challenging the DDR model under implementation. In trying to find answers on why the exercise never achieved intended objectives, it is important to appreciate the historical background of the conflict and the Post conflict framework available. Subsequently, perspectives' beginning with United Nations approach to DDR, African Union perspective and finally the East African perspective and how each of them influenced DDR implementation in the country has been canvassed. The paper also seeks to investigate and answer why DDR failed in South Sudan and depends on both Primary data collected on location in South Sudan as well as Secondary data from various sources. Interview guided forms were administered to various players among them beneficiaries, government officials involved in the exercise as well as UNDP/UNMISS officials whose role was critical in the process. Data was analyzed and presented in charts and tables to enable the researcher achieve the objectives of the study. The study focused on the key actors whose role was important during implementation among them Government of South Sudan, Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) as well as the United Nations systems being United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) as well as the United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Gaps were identified and factors that led to the collapse of DDR in the country enumerated with a couple of issues emerging out of the exercise. Additionally, the lessons drawn from the entire process are highlighted in the study which concludes with summary and recommendations that could help invigorate DDR in South Sudan.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
CCM	Centre for Conflict Management
CNLG	National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Demobilization Disarmament and Reintegration
EA	East Africa
EAC	East Africa Community
GoK	Government of Kenya
GOSS	Government of South Sudan
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IGAD	Inter-Government Agency on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRPD	Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
OAU	Organization of African Unity
R.D.F	Rwanda Defense Forces

RDB	Rwanda Development Board
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
REC	Regional Economic Communities
RSS	Republic of South Sudan
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SPLA	Sudan People Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan People Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO	Sudan People Liberation Movement-In Opposition
SRG	Southern Regional Government
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMISS	United Nation Mission in South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
WAAF	Women Associated with Armed Forces
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

This chapter will delve in the introduction part of the study, its background as well as the statement of the problem. Consequently, the general and specific objectives of the study will also be unveiled and reason (justification) of the study. The last part of the study deals with literature review, theoretical underpinnings and ultimately the research methodology of the study.

1.1 Background of the Study

Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is a common practice in post-conflict peace building and reconstruction. It plays an integral role in stabilizing societies dealing with effects of protracted internal strifes. However, for these endeavors to realize any accolades, the style and manner of implementation must be well coordinated, must be driven by the needs of the ex-combatants and most importantly they should be sustainable. As such, societies and countries emerging from civil wars must take cognizance of the need to deal with the high number of their ex-fighters, how to rehabilitate them back to their normal lives as well as providing some means of livelihoods. While, implementing this programme, it is important to consider a number of factors such as; - age, gender, physical health, education level as well as psychological and social situations of the ex-combatants. This will ensure a smooth rehabilitation programme.

Any effective DDR strategy must begin with identifying ex-fighters and extending un-conditional amnesty for them to come out of their camps, registering them while noting individual needs and finally providing a time-table through which the

programme will take. The success or failure of this social-economic venture is dependent upon the commitment of the government, availability of funds as it is a capital-intensive endeavor, the level of involvement of international actors and finally the ability of the affected society to embrace and own the process as clearly outlined in a UNDP evaluation report on DDR in Sudan by Bhattacharjee and Gadkarim in 2012¹.

The study focused on what has come to be referred as Africa longest civil war between the Sudan and South Sudan. The research tried to uncover the manner in which DDR programmes was implemented in post 2005 CPA period and whether or not this may have contributed to a relapse to war in 2013. Ultimately, the paper also examined the gaps in the implementation of DDR programmes in South Sudan, failure to ensure a stable nation leading to war almost immediately after gaining independence from the Sudan.

1.1.1 United Nations Perspective of DDR

DDR doctrine became popular within UN peace keeping operations around 1980s². However, it was not until March of 1990 when the first DDR endeavor was established in Nicaragua South America to demobilize anti-government forces that were threatening the newly formed government³.

¹Bhattacharjee A, Gadkarim H, Evaluation of Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme: United Nations Development Programme Sudan Final Report, November 2012

²<http://www.unddr.org/uploads/documents/IDDRS%202.10%20The%20UN%20Approach%20to%20DDR.pdf>

³ United Nations DDR Resource Centre <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs-framework.aspx>

Since then, DDR has become synonymous with UN supported Peace building activities in both peace keeping and non-peacekeeping contexts. In the following years, the UN has supported and or carried out DDR activities in a number of countries across the world such as Sierra Leone in 1997⁴. On the same breath, it is the United Nation Peace Operations report famously known as Brahimi report that was the game changer, transformed and shaped UN peace operations in the years to come.

More importantly, the Lakhdar Brahimi led commission captured the importance of DDR in peace building operations and went further to propose for a UN budgetary allocation to support such operations⁵. It is the DDR programmes in the Great Lakes Region of Rwanda (1997), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2008 and Burundi in 2007⁶ that has gained prominence with the former UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon acknowledging that since its inception, DDR activities have proven to be an important element in enhancing sustainable peace, recovery and development for societies emerging from conflict⁷.

DDR is an integral undertaking in Post conflict peace-building and reconstruction and need to be dealt with as such because of the dynamics and complexities involved in trying to win the confidence of the ex-combatants. A UN report on 2nd generation DDR practices in peace operations enumerates the pre-conditions before any of such

⁴ Good Finding infobrief, Africa Region No.81 of October 2002 accessed on April 14 2017

⁵ Durch W,J, Holt V,K, Earle C, R, Shanahan M,K. The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations (2003) The Henry L Stimson Centre

⁶Edmonds, M, Mills, G & McNamee, T. (2009). *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo*, African Security, 2:1, 29-58, DOI: 10.1080/19362200902766383 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19362200902766383> accessed on 25 January 2017

⁷ Ibid

endeavor could begin which includes but not limited to a signed peace agreement that would provide a legal background for DDR, minimum level of trust between the warring parties, willingness of the parties to engage in DDR activities and finally an undertaking for guaranteed security of the ex-combatants⁸. Consequently, the United Nations in pushing the DDR agenda prescribes about five major principles and approaches that should always guide the process. The five are that:-the process must be locally owned, s it must be ex-combatants oriented, thirdly, it should be open, verifiable and accountable, must encompass all the needs of the ex-combatants all under one roof and finally it must be well thought, well planned and well executed⁹.

Implementation of DDR has changed over time and this has led to emergence of two distinct approaches namely; the traditional approach and 2nd generation approach to DDR¹⁰. Traditional approach to DDR continued to influence the activities up and until June of 2010 when the study of second generation DDR was commissioned to address the gaps that the traditional approaches could not help especially in fragile environments where a peace agreement is yet to be signed. In this regard, the latter is essential in building trust among the parties so as to foster linkages between them and whose end goals are immediate political and security objectives. More often

⁸ UN Report on 2nd Generation Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations: A contribution to the new horizon discussion on challenges and opportunities for UN peace keeping January 18 2010

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Ibid

than not, 2nd generation approaches are used to set the ground for traditional DDR approaches which are more effective, long term and sustainable¹¹.

Over time, the fragmented nature of DDR approaches led to the development of Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) which among other things gives a clear guidance on how all UN backed DDR activities are planned, coordinated and executed. On the other hand, IDDRS enumerates how the UN system supports the various agencies, departments, funds and programmes into laying ground for effective DDR activities. However, there is a general acknowledgement that DDR is an important yet complex process that has security, military, political, humanitarian as well as social economic aspects and thus calls for a well-coordinated, meticulous and well thought plans if ex-combatants have to become partakers in the elusive peace efforts.¹²

1.1.2 African Union Perspective on DDR

The African Union (AU) addressed itself expressly on DDR when the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that came into effect in 2005 was developed and adopted by member states and later on reinforced by a couple of other supportive documents, work reports and guidelines that have been developed over time¹³. Through the AU agenda for peace and security, APSA outlines four key elements and among them is peacemaking, peace support operations, peace building and post-conflict reconstruction and development under which DDR has been cited as central and important.

¹¹ Ibid

¹² Ibid

¹³ African Union APSA (2005) <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/african-peace-and-security-architecture-apsa-final.pdf> accessed on June 21 2017

Further, AU acknowledges that DDR is a complex endeavor with political, humanitarian and socio-economic elements that must be addressed if peace, security and sustainable development are to be achieved in any society emerging from conflict¹⁴. In the subsequent years, AU has gone further to develop APSA implementation road map for 2016/2020 whose strategic priority three (3) digs deeper into post-conflict reconstruction and peace building with an overall objective to ensure an effective and coordinated post-conflict support to members states and any other community within the African continent emerging from conflict¹⁵. The AU DDR guidelines are tailored to address specific gaps and needs in the continent and draw their experiences from DDR activities that have been conducted in the continent previously¹⁶.

1.1.3 East African Community Perspective on DDR

At the same time, AU in its wisdom has gone further to note that due to the intricate nature, cost involved and ever rising need for DDR within the continent which is underlined by inadequate capacity across the board, Regional Economic Communities (REC) such as the East African Community (EAC) be the first point of contact and thus mandated to coordinate and develop own protocols borrowing so much from the APSA road map and guidelines¹⁷. Towards this end, member states among them Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and more recently South Sudan are yet to come up with a common protocol for post-conflict peace building, reconstruction and development and to a large extent a DDR strategy for the region.

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ African Union-APSA Roadmap (2016/2020)

¹⁶ African Union DDR bulletin (2014) vol.1 Edition II

¹⁷ Ibid

However, African union Commission has a liaison's offices within EAC specifically to coordinate post-conflict peace building and reconstruction, DDR and SSR activities in the region¹⁸

1.1.4 History of DDR in South Sudan

The South Sudan conflict has been unique in the sense that South Sudanese were seeking to secede and have a right to self-determination from the Northerners. This struggle is recorded as the longest civil war/insurgency in Africa ending in 2005 when the Collective Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in Nairobi Kenya after lengthy negotiations under the stewardship of the Inter-Governmental Agency on Development (IGAD)¹⁹. The extent of this insurgency meant that a good number of the citizens were involved and more so the youths who could be easily lured into the battle front and or continue hampering the government efforts to stabilize the country. In this regard, there was an urgent need to carry out DDR across the country so as her a little governable.

The first disarmament effort in the country therefore can be traced in late 2005 when there was a commitment to disarm loosely organized militias mainly young men at village and local levels commonly known as white militias in states of Jonglei and Upper Nile²⁰. Shastry Njeru posits that the youths are the mainstay of the fighting personnel in any conflict underpinning that a child as old as nine years can be

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹Ylonen,A, Security, Regionalism and flaws of the externally forged peace in Sudan: The IGAD peace process and its aftermath accessed from www.ajol.info on April 15, 2016

²⁰ Mathew, B.A, Chris, A, "This Gun is our food": Demilitarizing the White Army Militias of South Sudan. Norwegian Institute of International affairs No.722 of 2007

considered old enough to fight²¹ and South Sudan was no exception and this robbed these young minds an opportunity to realize their full potential in life. Further she regrets that the youth crisis in Africa is characterized by an excessively youthful population and limited socio-economic opportunities and therefore can easily be lured into a militia or by the government to perpetrate violence²². She is also quick to point that by the end of the Civil War in 2005, over one hundred thousand young soldiers had been recruited to fight within the ranks of the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) as well as other splinter fighting units and this presented a serious challenge to deal with if a relapse to war was to be avoided²³.

Further, it has been authoritatively noted that of the challenges facing transition from conflict to peace in the world and more so Africa, is the role of local armed groups/rebels commonly referred to as Other Armed Groups (OAG)²⁴. Consequently, it has been argued that just as the burden of war is borne by youths, the burden of peace as well must weigh heavily on the same group if sustainable peace and development is to be realized and hence the need for effective DDR programmes in any post-war society.

However, before engaging in this noble activity in South Sudan, there was need to first understand the structural factors underlying the Southerners so as to develop a strategy on dealing with the matter effectively. Two, there was need to cultivate the locals' support and ultimately be sustainable to the government and other actors.

²¹Njeru,S, Dealing with the past: The youths and the post-war recovery in South Sudan. Accessed from www.ajol.info/ajcr accessed on April 15, 2016

²² Ibid

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Ibid

The reasons for these ragtag militias to exist are threefold; one, the prolonged civil strife in the country and the inability of the newly established government to build coherent governance structures, two, the political economy and vested commercial interests and the need for self-protection and finally the high level of desolation amongst the youths²⁵. Therefore, any effort that could not address these three pertinent issues would be hell bent for failure.

The experience of this disarmament exercise was not entirely pleasant as it was marred with resistance and violence and the government had to use force and at one point suffering heavy casualties with about three hundred (300) SPLA soldiers succumbing in one of the incidences. Nevertheless, the exercise continued in the two states as planned under the stewardship of United Nations, UNDP, UNMISS and SPLA and at the end of the exercise about one thousand (1000) weapons were collected. A simple compensation policy had been mooted and for every one gun returned, a gift in form of a fishing or mosquito net was given in return²⁶. However, this was not sufficient as it failed to address the motivation factors and or provide an alternative to the youths that would divert their attention from engaging in conflicts to nation building.

During the more than two decades conflict in South Sudan, the political, economic and social values, bonds and structures were tested to the core. Normal lives of combatants were destroyed and hence the need for effective DDR programs so as to bring the post-conflict societies back to sanity. Njeru views DDR as a long-term

²⁵ Ibid

²⁶ Ibid

measure that external actors can use to induce spoilers of peace into the peace process, reduce the possibilities of the players to revert to armed struggle and bring out the best of their creative mind into action as an alternative

1.2 Statement of the Problem

DDR programmes in post conflict peace building and reconstruction are essential components to lasting and sustainable peace. Towards this end, analysts, scholars and policy makers have had discourses over and over again and ultimately coming to an agreement that insecurity persisting in any society emerging from conflict inhibits any meaningful development to take place. Consequently, it blocks chances for sustainable peace and has the potential of leading the society back to conflict. Development partners have gone further to underline that the prevalence of small arms and the ex-combatants that possess them have a negative impact on the economic and social conditions of countries/societies emerging from conflict given that at the end of the conflict, a number of ex-combatants entering the highly competitive labour market have inadequate or poor skills, assets, and social capital to support sustainable livelihoods.

This therefore may be exploited by opportunists leading to a return to war or may result to rise in criminal gangs and or banditry if not disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated effectively. In essence, this jeopardizes the elusive peace process. DDR programmes are thus carried out with sole goals of ensuring a stable and secure environment for peace to thrive, build trust and confidence amongst the population, forestall future conflict, promote national reconciliation and most important ameliorate human and capital resources for sustainable development to take route.

Therefore, any other endeavor carried out in post-conflict situation that does not take cognizant of the above goals is an exercise in futility. Over time; DDR has proven to be a critical ingredient in bringing peace, sanity and development in conflicted societies and has played a key role in stabilizing them and setting them for development. In Africa where the exercise has been executed in several countries, Rwanda leads the perk for developing and implementing activities that has won accolades from all and sundry for the ability to hold the country together and set it on a different socio-economic course that is unprecedented. DDR in Sierra Leone has also been cited on several fronts as satisfactorily given the dark patch that the country went through and the magnanimity of the Sierra Leoneans in dealing with the past amicably and forging the future in confidence. Ever since the two countries travelled the DDR path, peace and tranquility have been experienced with the economy of the two growing exponentially. Subsequent and most important is that a relapse to war is unheard of.

However, the South Sudan context juxtaposes the two and offers vital lessons of the route any society emerging from conflict ought not to travel. Firstly, delayed implementation of DDR in the country, corruption during the process coupled with selective disarming and inadequate funding only served to set the country on a negative peace building and reconstruction trajectory. This study therefore aims at analyzing the South Sudan post 2005 conflict situation, the missed opportunities and finally the circumstances that pushed the country at the tip of falling into anarchy for ignoring such an important post-conflict peace building and reconstruction strategy.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The study aims at analyzing DDR as a tool for sustainable peace and development in post-conflict societies with specific emphasis to South Sudan. More specifically, the study will:-

- i. Endeavour to find out the nature, extent of roles played by key actors in the implementation of DDR and in South Sudan
- ii. Identify the gaps and emerging issues during the implementation of DDR in South Sudan.
- iii. Analyze account for the collapse of DDR in South Sudan
- iv. Explore the lessons learnt in implementing DDR programmes in South Sudan

1.4 Literature Review

The literature review will focus on selected post-conflict peace building situations where DDR programmes have been applied, tried and tested and draw a parallel between them and what was implemented in South Sudan. Further, this review will examine the nature and actors in the South Sudan context and the highlights-both challenges and successes will be given emphasis with a view to draw vital lessons for the purpose of implementing future programmes in other jurisdictions. The review will focus on several aspects of DDR among them:-Definition of DDR, the United Nations approach to DDR and major actors in the exercise. Consequently, a brief history of the South Sudan Conflict will be laid down followed by nature and overview of DDR that was implemented, the successes and failures of the exercise in

South Sudan and finally model case studies at hand for comparative purposes where vital lessons from Rwanda, Sierra Leone and South Sudan will be enumerated.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) is defined by the UN separately as concepts because each performs a different role in the whole process. Accordingly, Disarmament is defined as the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population it also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes. Demobilization on the other hand is defined as the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. Consequently, Reintegration is defined as the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. This socio-economic programme has specific timelines is multi-faceted, and ought to be carried out at the lowest level of the affected communities if it is to be effective and transformative.²⁷ It is guided by three pertinent instruments that has been widely used across disarmament exercises across the world; coercion, influence and incentives²⁸.

1.4.1 United Nations Approach to DDR

The UN has developed elaborate prescriptions, guidelines and approaches to inform DDR exercises across the world. However, these guides are not specific to any situation and it is therefore incumbent upon the implementers dealing with a case at hand to come up with approaches that are ideal to their situation but not out of sync

²⁷ DDR in peace operations, a retrospective http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/DDR_retrospective.pdf accessed on January 27 2016
²⁸ Ibid

with the broader guidelines²⁹. To a large extent, two distinct approaches to DDR has emerged namely: -1st Generation DDR or traditional approach and the 2nd Generation DDR approach³⁰. Whilst it is difficult to draw a line and separate the two as they are implemented almost concurrently, it is important to appreciate the difference in situation and context in which they are applied and or implemented³¹. Second generation DDR approach as it were is implemented as a way of stabilizing the already fluid peace situation and in most instances than not it targets youth as well as militia gangs that can compromise peace and security during transition period. Ultimately, second generation precede traditional approaches which are more comprehensive, well planned and coordinated and are aimed at offering ex-fighters life-long alternative to arms and war³².

First and foremost, there must be an existing legal framework to support the process, two there must be minimum level of trust between and among the key actors, thirdly and most important the unconditional commitment and willingness of the parties to DDR activities and finally a secure and safe environment that would facilitate the process to begin³³.

1.4.2 Major Actors in DDR

The key actors in the process must be mapped and identified and their roles properly defined to avoid overlap and or mistrust that can interfere with smooth implementation, compromise the already fragile peace and prematurely halt the

²⁹ Ibid

³⁰ DDR in peace operations: a retrospective http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/ddr/ddr_062010.pdf accessed on 15 August 2017

³¹ Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration practices in Peace operations

³² Ibid

³³ Ibid

process altogether. The most notable actors in DDR implementation are:- Governments, Military, Other Armed Groups (OAG), Civil Society, Media, United Nation Systems, Regional governmental organizations, Financial Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and finally Research and policy organizations³⁴. However, it is prudent to note that even if the above are listed as actors, more often than not, a few of them would be active at once in any given situation. Over and above the actors, other players and more specifically the beneficiaries must also be mapped and identified while their specific needs and requirements are noted to pave way for a comprehensive and result oriented DDR exercise.

1.4.3 Brief History of Sudan Conflict

The Sudan conflict is arguably one of the Africa's most complex one, having lasted about fifty years to resolve. The signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi-Kenya between John Garang on behalf of SPLA/M and Ali Osman Taha on behalf of the Government of the Sudan and witnessed by a host of Heads of States and Government among them President Mwai Kibaki of the Republic of Kenya was momentous³⁵. In its own ways, the CPA exemplified the aspirations and the long-standing desires for the Southerners to determine their own destiny. The event marked the first step towards the birth of the world youngest nation; the Republic of South Sudan which came to be on 9 July

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Sudan and The Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army (2005)

2011. However, prior to the granting of a republic, a referendum was conducted with about 98% of Southerners voting to secede from United the Sudan³⁶.

It is worth noting that the desire for change, self-determination and or secession by the Southerners did not begin in 1983, rather it started immediately after independence of the larger Sudan in 1956 after what the Southerners termed as exclusion in forming the independence government. It is recorded that power was centered in Khartoum and was held by a small elitist group of Arab autocrats. From the onset, dissent, exclusion and grievance was apparent amongst the Southerners given that when decolonization/indigenization started majority of the slots within the Public service went to the North with the Southern region getting only eight (8) of the nine hundred (900) available slots and this according to LeRiche and Arnold was the first catalyst for dissent³⁷.

Early traces of violence between Khartoum and South region dates as early as 1960s when Joseph Lagu a young military officer within Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) rebelled and formed a movement known as Anya-Anyanya loosely translated to mean Snake Venom to fight against harassment and forced converting to Islam by the Arabs and demanded for creation of a different State of Southern Sudan from the Unified Sudan³⁸.

³⁶ Mathew, L and Mathew ,A, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013) pp 3

³⁷ Ibid pp 11

³⁸ Ibid pp 25

The Anya-Anya rebellion ended on February 27, 1972 after the signing of the infamous Addis Ababa Agreement which among other things recognized Southern Regional Government (SRG). However, it was not until 1983 when Khartoum re-introduced Islamic Laws (Sharia) as the basis for governance thus prompting the emergence of a new revolution momentum under the leadership of John Garang with majority Southerners coalescing within SPLA/M- this culminated with the CPA in 2005 but not without myriad of challenges key among them constant fallouts and bickering compounded by sharp ethnic divisions within the ranks and files of SPLA/M³⁹.

The unfortunate demise of Garang in July 2005 barely six months after the historic signing of the CPA in Nairobi dealt a big blow to the revolution agenda. Pundits have described him as a strong revolutionary although a domineering personality, who had messianic character⁴⁰. His understanding and command of SPLA/M amidst strong opposition from within and as far as Khartoum gave him the proverbial title of the glue that held everything together. LeRiche and Arnold observes that Garang's death left a big gap in the movement which was already struggling to remain afloat while maintaining coherence in pursuit of Southern interests⁴¹.

After the successful July 2011 referendum that went in favour of a new Republic of South Sudan, rebuilding the new nation was to start in earnest and with virtually every sector from social, economic and infrastructures having been ravaged by decades of war resulting to outrageous poverty levels, the work of the new

³⁹ Ibid pp 32

⁴⁰ Ibid pp 39-41

⁴¹ Ibid pp 42-43

government was clearly cut out. A rare wind of hope was blowing across the nation, refugees were returning home in their thousands and international partners were keen to keep to their promises of assisting the new baby to at least stand on her own albeit under difficult circumstances. LeRiche and Arnold quips that there was one main challenge that continued to hamper these efforts-the political arena and governance structures were overly militarized and this spelled doom for the newly found nationhood⁴².

It is important to note that in the period preceding the July 2011 independence, South Sudan was already showing signs of returning to war albeit not with the North but with itself. Several of the former SPLM/A stalwarts who felt marginalized in the scramble for power ended up taking arms and rebelling against the iron fisted Salva Kiir who was leaving nothing to chance in trying to consolidate power and entrench himself using all means necessary including the constitutional making process that would result to a powerful president with an overbearing authority. Most notable of the dissenting voices was Dr. Riek Machar his Vice-President who is described as a serial and perennial rebel for having a history of rebelling- his first altercation being the 1991 revolt against Garang. In view of the above, Le Riche and Arnold laments that the situation of South Sudan at independence was already volatile and full of suspense⁴³.

Incidentally, open rebellion coupled with Kiir obsession to remain in control resulted into an even more complex situation where dissenting voices would take-up arms and in return, amnesty, incentives and buy-offs could be offered by the government

⁴² Ibid pp 44

⁴³ Ibid pp 150-157

to the top leadership making rebellion a lucrative affair. However, this left a trail of disfranchised followers with nothing to show for it.

1.4.4 Nature and Overview of DDR in South Sudan

The cyclic state of affairs would later prove too expensive to deal with for the new republic. Kiir's led government blatantly ignored to improve tools of governance to be more people centered and boost Security Sector Reforms (SSR) through internationally acclaimed programmes such as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) with a long-term goal of building bridges and trust amongst different groups and individuals. As mentioned earlier, majority of South Sudanese knew nothing else other than arming themselves as a way of expressing alternative view; this remains a daunting task for the founding father of the nation to date.

It is worth acknowledging that although comprehensive DDR had been envisioned in the CPA, the GoSS made several attempts to disarm civilians as early as 2006, an exercise that aimed at not only collecting weapons but was also meant to enhance government control of the otherwise non-governable areas where law and order hardly existed. However, the exercise ended being a shun as even the very basic objectives of a simple DDR exercise were never achieved. Regrettably, the exercise was marred with mistrust between the government and the locals targeted for disarming and have been taunted to have been ill motivated. The fact that members of a certain community (Nuer) were targeted was misconstrued to mean that it was meant to make them vulnerable hence more governable prompting their resistance. Moreover, the timing, execution and planning was poor to guarantee any peace

dividend.⁴⁴ As a result there were as many casualties amongst SPLA and the white army alike.

1.4.5 Success and Failures of the DDR Exercise

While some level of success was noted at the end of the exercise in 2008 with collection of about three thousand (3000) weapons, conflict experts have been struggling to establish impact of the exercise if any since the GoSS failed to address the structural and systemic factors that continues to disenfranchise the youths⁴⁵ which could have been addressed through a more comprehensive exercise that were more friendly, community centered and devoid of political and military undertone as had been earlier witnessed⁴⁶. O'Brien in his analysis of this civilian disarmament campaign has poked holes into the manner in which it was carried out and has raised genuine concerns that compounded an already existing social challenge. He has apportioned blame to GoSS and other key actors for carrying out a disorganized exercise and expecting coherent outcomes. Of particular interest was the lack of a clear legal framework in which the exercise was to be grounded on which has been widely seen as a shot in the arm and coercive in nature instead of promoting a voluntary call, this coupled with a top-bottom approach instead of vice-versa in execution denied the much need confidence that is expected of such a delicate exercise⁴⁷.

⁴⁴ O'Brien A, Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Campaign (2009). Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ibid

In a different context of DDR in South Sudan, Jairo Munive further regrets the slow process of comprehensive DDR implementation pointing out that although envisioned in the 2005 CPA, actual work started in 2009 and by the end of 2011 only a handful of combatants about 12,000 mainly women had been demobilized this falling short of the nearly 200,000 targeted combatants⁴⁸.

Consequently, failure of the international community and partners to recognize and appreciate the unique nature of South Sudan and allow for the local solution in transformation of the country's fragile security sector coupled with over reliance of donor funding to steer the transformational agenda cast doubts for any successful DDR undertaking. To begin with, there was no way the SPLA could begin operating as a contemporary military as was being pushed by Britain and America and two, there was need to understand the underlying issues such as how to deal with other militants' groups that were not part of SPLA during the struggle but had now been collapsed into South Sudan after independence.

Notably among them were remnants of SAF who were fighting alongside Khartoum during the civil war yet they were mainly Southerners and SSDF which was a breakaway of SPLA both of which commanded a sizeable following and posed the greatest risk if not well assimilated. On the other hand, the new nation was running the risk of having a bloated military amidst dwindling economic fortunes. Rightly so, as Rolandsen laments that failed security sector reforms led to increased

⁴⁸Munive, J. (2004). Invisible Labour: The Political Economy of Reintegration in South Sudan, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 8:4, 334-356, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2014.964451 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2014.964451> accessed on 26 January 2017

insecurity and were indicators of a struggling government-all these were evident prior to December 15 2013 when new round of hostilities began in South Sudan⁴⁹.

However, if South Sudan people have to enjoy social, political and economic development like other nations and which are as a result of peace and security, a sustainable way of dealing with this quagmire is necessary, a way that will not disenfranchise the militants even more and one that will ensure a professional military was intact⁵⁰. Had this challenge will be navigated carefully and meticulously without undue pressure from external actors the situation could probably be different today.

From the overview above, it can be deduced that DDR implementation in South Sudan was two folds; one, the civilian disarmament that took place immediately after the CPA was signed in 2005 and aimed at taking away weapons from the civilians so as to enable the newly formed government to entrench itself within its boundaries and two, the comprehensive DDR targeting ex-combatants that began in 2009. However, in both instances the GoSS appear clueless and often rushed into execution without proper policy guidelines and in the end both exercise ended prematurely with little or no impacts at all to the targeted societies. This is in sharp contrast with DDR exercises carried out in other jurisdiction within Africa which achieved laudable successes. The cases of Rwanda and Sierra Leone for example remain a model due to the gains made within a very short time and sneak peak review would

⁴⁹Rolandsen, H. (2015.) Another civil war in South Sudan: the failure of Guerrilla Government?, *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 9:1, 163-174, DOI: 10.1080/17531055.2014.993210 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2014.993210> accessed on 26 January 2017

⁵⁰ Ibid pp 162-165

be of utmost importance in drawing a parallel between the two successful cases and the one under study.

1.4.6 Model Case Studies of DDR

DDR in Rwanda was precipitated by decades of internal conflicts leading to a dichotomy of the two dominant communities as Tutsi or Hutu culminating in the worst form of crime against humanity-the Rwanda Genocide against Tutsi where in just a hundred days, about a million Tutsi and moderate Hutus were brutally maimed⁵¹. Consequently, the end of genocide marked the beginning of another treacherous journey for this tiny East African nation and with so many young men and women militarized; a new strategy to de-militarize and put them on a recovery path and enhance their economic standing had to be formed. This is the beginning of DDR in Rwanda. Three years after genocide, Rwanda established a commission to entirely implement the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration programs for the ex-combatants⁵².

The commission has so far assisted over sixty thousand (60,000) ex-combatants from the Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) and various returnees from armed groups involved in the genocide who had fled to neighboring countries⁵³. Rwanda's successful DDR programme has been exemplified by the manner in which it has been implemented. Most notably is the embrace and support by the people of Rwanda and the absolute commitment by the government to fund the programmes albeit with limited economic resources.

⁵¹Mamdani M, (2001), when victims become killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda. Princeton University Press

⁵²www.demobrwananda.gov.rw/home accessed on 31 January 2017

⁵³ Ibid

DDR in Rwanda remains a towering example in the world. It is premised on a philosophy that seeks to create a national identity that is devoid of ethnic/racial/political balkanization and a military that is progressive and not slaves of the its past. RDF is at the centre of these programmes. Among values cultivated to achieve the dream of a united, progressive and successful country is the spirit of Ingando as pointed out by Edmonds, Greg and McNamee who asserted that this sort of military encampment prior to an operation creates a selfless individual whose aim is to serve others and the nation.⁵⁴

The nation of Rwanda has made great strides towards institutionalizing governance tools and in all this, Unity, Reconciliation and peace building is as important as development. The creation of bodies such as Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) to deal with issues pertaining governance, National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), National Commission for the Fight Against Genocide (CNLG), Institute of Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRPD), Centre for Conflict Management (CCM) and Rwanda Demobilization and Re-integration Commission (RDRC) is a testament towards the commitment that never again should they slide back to 1961-1994 national shame that led to genocide.

Sierra Leone on the other hand, has also been applauded for achieving remarkable success by the time the programme came to a close in 2005 whereabout seventy-five thousand (75,000) ex-combatants were demobilized in collaborative efforts between the government of Sierra Leone, donors such as the World Bank and implementing agencies key among them UNDP and the United Nation Mission in Sierra Leon

⁵⁴ Ibid

(UNAMSIL)⁵⁵. Of particular interest in Sierra Leone is the manner in which the implementing agencies executed the disarmament role and the support they received from the government with over forty-two thousand (42,000) weapons as well as about one million two hundred thousand (1,200,000) rounds of ammunition collected and destroyed.

Consequently, availability of funds, meticulous planning at the reintegration level and the attitude of the ex-combatants towards the programme as pointed out by Jonah Leff when examining the nexus between social capital and reintegration of ex-combatants which are key ingredients for a successful DDR venture⁵⁶. As a matter of fact, DDR happens within a context of a community whose needs varies from the other and it is therefore incumbent upon the implementing agencies to try as much as possible to understand the particular needs of the people they seek to serve⁵⁷.

The strategy to target a community in the long run ensures that at the end of the reintegration process the impact is not only at the individual level but within the entire group or community. This rare strategy among other things appears to have had tremendous effects in Sierra Leone. However, it is the reintegration of ex-fighters mainly children and girls in the context of Sierra Leone that has received accolades and remain a reference point for DDR all over the world. It has been pointed out that of the 75,000 ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, slightly over seven thousand were children both boys and girls majority of whom were integrated and

⁵⁵UNAMIS Peace and security section United Nations Department of Public information DPI/2142B December 2005 <http://www.un.org/Dpts/dpko/missions/unamis/> accessed on April 14 2017

⁵⁶Leff J, (2007), *the nexus between social capital and reintegration of ex-combatants* accessed from <https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/viewFile/57308/45692> on April 14 2017

⁵⁷ Ibid

reunited with their families while the rest joined community schools ready to continue with education⁵⁸.

1.4.7 Vital Lessons from Rwanda, Sierra Leone and South Sudan

While it is critical to appreciate the different contexts and situations in the three aforementioned cases, it is also important to note that some aspects applied in one or two could also have made a difference if applied in the other. Key among them is that DDR is an expensive venture that requires the commitment of funds from international finance groups and more so the support of the local national treasury. In South Sudan for example, the input and support of the government in providing funds for DDR programme is almost negligible leaving the burden to other actors. This is in sharp contrast of the support the governments of Rwanda and Sierra Leone gave to their respective DDR exercises. The high number of ex-combatants demobilized and reintegrated in various parts of the country, 60,000 and 75,000 in Rwanda and Sierra Leone respectively is a testament of this commitment by respective governments⁵⁹.

On the other hand, failure of the newly formed GoSS to deal effectively with high number of the critical mass-the youths; who are a potential risk to peace and security is evident while the opposite happened in Rwanda and Sierra Leone where the reintegration of youths and children was given utmost attention with as many children in Sierra Leone being reunited with their families while many youths were absorbed in formal schools whose doors were open for them⁶⁰. In Rwanda, the

⁵⁸ Ibid

⁵⁹ Ibid

⁶⁰Ibid

RDRC has come up with innovative methods to attract the youths to embrace DDR with as many joining different demobilization centers to pursue their talents such as football and music⁶¹.

The involvement of the community targeted in any form of DDR is critical so as to bridge and build confidence and to win their hearts and minds as they finally embrace the exercise. This aspect is particularly important as it determines how the targeted group and or individuals will respond to the exercise when it sets off. In South Sudan, earlier attempts to disarm the communities in Jonglei were met by resistance a testament that the community was either not aware of the exercise or the government was forcefully doing the exercise which turned out to be true⁶². The opposite is evident in the case of Rwanda and Sierra Leone where the exercise has been lauded for its emphasis on the larger community as espoused by Jonah Leff in his analysis of Sierra Leone and the trio of Edmonds, Mills and McNamee whose study on DDR and Local ownership in the Great Lakes region and particularly Rwanda has been extremely captivating⁶³.

Finally, the importance of promoting and institutionalizing tools of good governance as a guarantee to the continuous management of public affairs with a view to spurring public confidence cannot be over emphasized⁶⁴. This goes hand in hand with enhancing and supporting SSR efforts with a long-term goal to have a lean but professional and proactive security sector that can guarantee peace and security and

⁶¹DemobRwanda, Issue 13 June 2015

⁶² Ibid

⁶³Edmonds, M, Mills, G & McNamee, T.,(2009). Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, *African Security*, 2:1, 29-58, DOI:10.1080/19362200902766383 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19362200902766383> accessed on 25 January 2017

⁶⁴ Ibid

thus spur growth and development. This is the missing link in South Sudan. Rwanda and Sierra Leone have made great strides in their efforts to promote good governance and the dividends are evident. On the flipside, corruption is rampant in South Sudan while efforts to draft a new constitution have met hurdles after hurdles which are driven by selfish interests of individuals who are not keen to have a progressive nation.

The post-conflict contexts in the three countries are both interesting and eye-opening due to the manner in which individual countries despite being within the same continent have tackled them. Rwanda and Sierra Leone have achieved so much while the other- South Sudan angling between civil war and anarchy. From the onset, it is clear that the element of planning long before the starting of DDR is paramount and this coupled with availability of funds would have contributed to success in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. As has been found out, Rwanda has been at the forefront of funding its own DDR programmes even after the international community recanted on their earlier commitment to provide the finances while in Sierra Leone, the World Bank, UNDP and a host of other donors worked closely with the government in planning, funding and implementing DDR programmes.

This has clearly not been seen in the case of South Sudan where the country's economic standing due to long history of war and segregation from the North puts it at a disadvantage. This has been worsened by the fact that the need and numbers of those that needed to be demobilized is too high and the international community becoming aloof in meeting their commitments. At the same time, DDR seems to work effectively if community approaches are embraced and if the ex-combatants

themselves welcome and own the process. This is made possible if DDR programmes address the central needs of the ex-combatants.

The striking difference between the three contexts in the Post-War period is strikingly evident. Whereas in South Sudan the end goal was to attain independence from the Sudan and which was achieved in July 2011, in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, the period after the conflict has been to build institutions and governance structures that would ensure trust is built between warring communities thus ensuring that a return to war is out of question. On the other hand, the government of Rwanda has taken it upon herself to support peace building initiatives particularly DDR and SSR programmes by providing funds from the exchequer⁶⁵ a situation that is completely different in South Sudan where such initiatives depend on donor funding which is at times conditional, delayed and inadequate or even not forthcoming⁶⁶.

The element of local ownership of such initiatives is brought into sharp focus in the three cases and that is where Rwanda exemplifies the African Union (AU) philosophy of Africans solutions to African Problems as it has steered away from the contemporary drawn methods of peace building initiatives in favour of locally acceptable means of building peace, unity and reconciliation. This has seen the country take an economic recovery path and a sustainable development trajectory and is currently being lauded for being the only African country to have achieved Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ Ibid pp 162-165

1.5 Justification of the Study

Africa has for a long time been associated with endless conflict and negative economic growth. Most often than not, African nations emerging from conflict with exceptions from a few have had to struggle with emerging rebellion even before the dust settles. South Sudan crisis remain a big headache in the region due to the fact that the internal civil crisis which started immediately after attaining internal self-determination from Sudan threatens the very core of its existence. The paper examined various post-conflict peace building and reconstruction strategies employed in South Sudan with emphasis on DDR and drew up lessons that in return can inform policy makers, international actors, researchers and academics to have a better understanding and appreciation of DDR as a means of stabilizing post-conflict societies.

The findings of this research is of more interest to IGAD which has been the lead organization in mediating the South Sudan conflict as well as members of the East African Community in which South Sudan is affiliated to in their efforts to understand how to deal with post-conflict situations within their block. Ultimately, GoSS will find this research useful in their quest to finding a lasting solution to their challenges particularly in building lasting peace and ensuring sustainable development that can only be realized through addressing the needs of the South Sudanese people majority of whom know nothing but guns and other weapons of war.

The researcher therefore posits that the solution to South Sudan upheaval lies not only in drafting a peace agreement between SPLM and SPLM-IO but also in drawing up proper DDR strategies to address the Psycho-social, health and economic needs of her people upholding the African Union philosophy of ‘African Solution to African problems’. On the other hand, students of conflicts particularly those interested in post-conflict peace building and reconstruction will find this study insightful as it seeks to uncover the complexities of this Africa longest conflict that has mutated from a revolution to secession and now a near internal crisis.

1.6 Hypotheses

- i. Effective DDR programmes are tools for sustainable peace and development
- ii. Ineffective DDR programmes or lack of such in post-war society can lead to relapse
- iii. Societies recovering from war can customize DDR affairs to suit their needs leading to lasting peace and economic progress

1.7 Conceptual Framework

The post-conflict situation in South Sudan can best be explained and understood using several lenses. However, the most ideal one is the conflict transformation lens that was coined by John Paul Lenderach in 1980s. However, it is his work titled *Beyond Intractability* that demystified the studies of post-conflict peace building and reconstruction and the issue of conflict transformation as opposed to conflict resolution became more pronounced and acceptable⁶⁷. Lenderach in his arguments noted that the impacts of conflict is felt at the personal level then to the family and

⁶⁷Lenderach J.P, Maiese M, (2003) *Conflict Transformation*

finally to the community level and therefore any solution to the same situation must address the needs, emotions and feelings of the affected individuals, their families and the larger community. He affirms that whilst conflict is endemic in society, the ability to navigate its intricacies and finding a sustainable solution would impact the society more positively and put it on a peace and development path and this ultimately is the conflict transformation perspective⁶⁸.

Conflict transformation according to Lenderach is underpinned on four key pillars that are pertinent in any conflict situation; the personal, relational, structural and cultural pillars. These aspects form the basis through which conflict is perceived and experienced and how also it should be resolved. The personal pillars deal with the emotional and psycho-social effects of the conflict and ultimately how these effects must be dealt with during attempts to make the best out of the situation. The relational dimensions attempt to look at the impacts of the conflict to the larger community as well as how it influences relationships between individual and group interactions.

This in essence dictates that during transition from conflict to peace, the communal needs must be looked at holistically. Structural aspects, according to Lenderach attempts to interrogate the underlying causes of conflict and how political, social as well as economic structures and institutions are built. They also seek to answers on how the structures and institutions respond to human needs knowing too well that conflicts are fueled and maintained by competition and challenges of fulfillment of human needs. Finally, the cultural dimensions focus on ways in which conflict can

⁶⁸ Ibid

affect, change or influence the way of life of a community or a group of people linked to a certain violent situation⁶⁹.

Lenderach's work influenced in a special way the application of DDR in post-conflict situation given that it aims at dealing with effects of conflict from the basic societal unit that is the individual, family and ultimately the community level. Wendy Lamboune in her work on post-whole set of chances that if well harnessed can propel it to greater social-economic and political levels or sink it to oblivion if mishandled⁷⁰. DDR therefore is the link between conflict and peace in a society transitioning from a turbulent civil strife struggling to keep tab with her people and the many opportunities that are in the future if well harnessed.

1.8 Research Methodology

In testing the hypothesis, the researcher used mixed methods and also depended on primary and secondary data. Interviews guided forms were administered on location to various players in the South Sudan Post-conflict players among them DDR beneficiaries/ ex-combatants; UNMISS staff and GoSS officials involved in DDR. *See Appendices*. Interview excerpts from an expert in the field of post conflict peace building and reconstruction is also used in the study. Consequently, a desktop analysis and evaluation of available secondary data from sources such as journals, books, newspapers, review and reports was also be carried out. The researcher also reviewed the DDR programmes in Africa and specifically those within the Great Lakes Conflict system on top of using data from published papers, policy documents

⁶⁹ Ibid

⁷⁰Lambourne W, (2004), Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Meeting needs for justice and Reconciliation. Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development No. 4 of 2004

and reports from various countries and conflict zones where successful DDR programs have been implemented. A couple of selected experts were interviewed to find out the current position.

1.9 Limitations of the Research

Research work was done under very difficult circumstances due to on-going conflict in South Sudan that broke in 2013. The country is largely insecure and therefore movement to and around the country to carry out interview was highly limited. Taking of photographs to enhance the study is also outlawed. Administration of research tools such as the Interview guided form was a challenge as majority of the South Sudanese are illiterates and semi-illiterates. At the same time, there is deep rooted suspicion between GoSS machinery and international workers in the country challenging free interaction and ultimately responses and interviewing of key respondents. It was also difficult for the researcher to travel in person to South Sudan to have a firsthand experience of DDR implementation due to cost and logistical implications involved.

CHAPTER TWO

NATURE AND ROLES OF FACTORS OF DDR IN SOUTH SUDAN

2.0 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the nature and extent of roles played by actors involved in the DDR programmes in South Sudan and also give a brief descriptive summary of the geographical and demographic arrangements in the country, the nature of DDR that was implemented in South Sudan, challenges that rocked implementation and key actors involved in the exercise who includes The Government of South Sudan, SPLA/M as well as the United Nations agencies. The chapter will conclude with a brief summation.

2.1 Geographical and Demographic Status of South Sudan

South Sudan is located within East Africa and measures approximately six hundred and nineteen thousand (619,000) Kilometers square. The country borders Sudan to the North, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the South, Kenya and Uganda to the South East and Central African Republic to the West. Consequently, it is divided into ten administrative units known as States for the purpose of governance. These states are as follows;- Western Bahr Ghazal, Northern Bahr Ghazal, Warrap, Lakes, Western Bahr Ghazal, Western Equatorial, Central Equatorial, Eastern Equatorial, Jonglei and Upper Nile. On the other hand, the seat of government is in Juba from where the national policies are made and directed from⁷¹.

⁷¹ United Nations Department of Field Support, Geospatial Information Centre, June 2017

By the year 2005 when the CPA was signed, South Sudan population was estimated to be about eight million (8,000,000) people who were spread across the country while another close to one million (1,000,000) were living as refugees in the neighboring countries of Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia⁷². At the same time, another one hundred and eighty thousand (180,000) people were living as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) while close to half a million (500,000) people had suffered casualties during the over two decades of civil war, a clear indication of the negative impacts that the protracted conflict had to the general population growth and development. There are about four hundred ethnic groupings in South Sudan with the Dinka and Nuer being the most dominant ethnic groups.

The Dinka constitute slightly above thirty five percent (35%) of the population while the Nuer are the second most populous ethnic group making about fifteen percent (15%) of the population. The remaining half of the population is made up of by the smaller ethnic composition among them the Shilluk, Azande and Bari⁷³. However, the official language in South Sudan is English. Majority of the South Sudanese are Christians but there is also a sizeable number of Muslims in the country due to the close ties and traditional attachments with Arabs from the North. The current political, socioeconomic and military crisis in South Sudan is interwoven and closely related to the two dominant ethnic groupings with Dinka on one side and the Nuer on the other with each trying to gain competitive advantage over the other.

⁷² Mathew, L and Mathew ,A, South Sudan: From Revolution to Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013

⁷³ Ibid

2.2 The Nature of DDR in South Sudan

DDR in South Sudan was envisioned and entrenched in the CPA document under Annexure 1 on the permanent ceasefire and security arrangements, implementation modalities and appendices that had been agreed upon at Naivasha earlier before the signing of the historic document by representatives from the Sudan and Southern Sudan. The annexure as it were had three components namely;- ceasefire arrangements, the armed forces and thirdly and most important the DDR part⁷⁴. Further, the same was reinforced by a United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996 of July 8, 2011 that among other things recognized the new Republic and also stressed the need for concerted efforts to ensure sustainable peace and security as well as strategies for post conflict peace building and reconstruction⁷⁵. Consequently, the resolution also acknowledged the important role the United Nations and other international partners were to play in supporting societies emerging from conflict in upholding and guarding peace with a view to dissuade any threat to peace and prevent a return to war in the country⁷⁶.

The drafters of the CPA had envisioned two key objectives of the ambitious DDR programmes, one, they acknowledged that the situation was still volatile and hence the need for DDR so as to continue creating a conducive and secure environment for the people and to help in peace building as well as stabilize the nation that had been ravaged by decades of war and secondly, that DDR was to be carried out throughout the country as part of the healing process and with sole goals of building confidence

⁷⁴ Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), 2005 pp 99-109

⁷⁵ United Nations Security Council 1996 (2011)

⁷⁶ Ibid

and repairing broken societal bonds⁷⁷. It is estimated that about one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) South Sudanese were actively involved in the civil war either as fighters while others especially women and children played a complimentary role in assisting the combatants.

This is over and above the unofficial numbers of youth militias aligned to other armed groups and spread across the country and needed to be disarmed as well. This therefore could see the number soar even higher. It is prudent to note that SPLA/M did not shy away from recruiting everyone into its ranks regardless of their age or gender and this explains the reason why the number of children ex-combatants and Women Associated with Armed Forces (WAAF) kept on soaring during post conflict peace building activities and this therefore called for an elaborate post-conflict strategy before it degenerated into a crisis.⁷⁸

Whereas DDR concept is viewed in general terms, its application differs from time to time and depends on the nature of the post-conflict situation. In the case of South Sudan, DDR would apply in its entirety and would run full circle. Disarmament as applied in South Sudan targeted members of the ragtag groups in the country and aimed at helping the newly formed government affect some level of control and ensure a safe and secure environment. The main players in this exercise were the GoSS and SPLA and targeted areas of Jonglei and Upper Nile where cattle rustling and general security was deteriorating. Disarmament can either be voluntary or forceful depending on the situation at hand.

⁷⁷ Ibid pp 119

⁷⁸ Ibid

Demobilization on the other hand targeted to release active duty officers mainly from SPLA and other organized national forces with a long term of having a lean but efficient force. The estimated number of active duty officers to be demobilized stood at 150,000. Reintegration in the context of South Sudan targeted to give sustainable means of livelihoods to all disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants as well as other category of individuals affected by the conflict in one way or another such category includes but not limited to women, children and the disabled. Reintegration as it were, was the most expensive part of the entire DDR exercise as it begins with training, compensation and settling the affected candidates within the community of their choice. GoSS, SPLA, NGOs and the donor community were the key drivers of Reintegration.

The nature of DDR programme to be implemented is determined by the nature of the post-conflict environment.⁷⁹ As a basic requirement for DDR to be implemented is a safe, secure and supportive environment for any meaningful exercise to thrive. As a matter of fact, the signing of a peace pact does not always guarantee a secure environment and the South Sudan case was not exceptional. The protracted infighting between warring parties in the South Sudan conflict in post-CPA period weighed heavily on the ability of the newly established government to guarantee safety and security to the citizenry as well as critical players involved in DDR in the country. Turyamureeba observes that the unresolved CPA issues, external interferences from Khartoum as well as internal civil unrests precipitated by ethnic

⁷⁹ Ibid

dispositions presented serious challenges to an ideal environment that could support meaningful peace-building activities⁸⁰.

On the other hand, the existence of several armed groups across the country under the command of politicians coupled by proliferation of small arms and light weapons was also a major setback in the implementation of DDR with the government constantly fighting to survive rather than concentrate on building capacity for peace-building or other development projects that could guarantee opportunity for all.

2.3 Challenges of DDR Implementation

After the signing of the CPA in 2005, the journey to post conflict peace building and reconstruction began in earnest with the implementation of DDR strategies topping the agenda. Consequently, it had been proposed that each of the ten states would have at least one DDR centre to coordinate and spearhead the activities and further cascade them down to the grassroots so as to reach as many people as possible.

Unfortunately, myriad of challenges some internal while others were natural threatened the already fragile situation. However, in some instances, the new government was entirely to blame, for instance those borne out of perennial conflict in the country. Others were external and informed by aggression from their jittery former partner namely the Sudan. However, it is the demise of the South Sudan revolutionary John Garang Demabior in a plane crash in August of 2005 that also dealt a big blow to the newly formed government that was struggling to remain afloat and this was a major setback to the interpretation, understanding as well as implementation of the CPA which captured the dreams and aspirations of the new

⁸⁰ Ibid

nation. It is recorded that Garang's death had so much impact to the CPA that long after he was gone with pundits to acknowledging that his stewardship and understanding of the South. Garang by all means was the sole and the only silent voice that held the strong desire for South Sudan secession while bringing everyone one on board for the sake of common good: his desire to see a united and prosperous South could not be compromised⁸¹.

The signing of the CPA ushered in a new dawn in South Sudan, a new hope was also born and considering that the country was still dealing with shackles of conflict that had lasted almost a life time of the nation, there was an urgent and pressing need to deal with the high number of fighters who needed an escape out of militancy as well as the high number of small arms and light weapons that were in their hands, needless to say that failure to deal effectively with these two intertwined challenges would prove too expensive for the new nation in the long run. This therefore called for the need to craft an elaborate, workable; sustainable as well as cost effective DDR strategy. The new leadership had the opportunity at hand to craft and develop one at the onset.

However, lack of political will and the different set of priorities seemed to stand in between. Consequently, the stated objectives were also to be supported by a raft of guiding principles that were to steer the process taking into account the needs of combatants, age and most important timelines within which specific aspects were to be achieved. It is worth noting that the CPA had set a maximum of six months within which the process of registration of all ex-fighters was to be carried out and

⁸¹ Ibid

more importantly the demobilization and reintegration of all child soldiers within the same period. The document also recognized the need for institutionalizing DDR activities so as to give room for accountability, transparency, progress tracking and institutional memory given the high number of cases at hand. With all this in mind, an effective and elaborate DDR strategy had to be crafted and implemented in Post 2005 CPA period.

However, this was not to be. An African Leadership Centre report took a swipe in the manner in which DDR in totality was ignored right after the signing of the CPA. The report notes that during negotiation and development of Protocols that made up the CPA, both government and the rebels in this case SPLA never prioritized DDR as an important agenda that warranted any attention. Instead, top in their agenda list included issues pertaining to inclusion in government, sharing of oil resources amongst others and this put the rehabilitation of the targeted 180,000 ex-fighters in jeopardy.

The report therefore laments that from the onset, the Southerners never gave DDR the attention and support it deserved hence its failure before it even started and ultimately this failure came with a hefty cost as many of the ex-fighters never got a chance to transition from rebels to civilian life and this provided a fertile ground for recruitment in the subsequent conflicts by opportunists.⁸²Munive further links the failure of DDR in South Sudan to lack of goodwill from key actors involved in

⁸²Turyamureeba, R (2014) The CPA-DDR program in South Sudan: What went wrong? ALC Research Report No.7 , October 2014

supporting downsizing of active fighters as well as their inability to design and implement an effective DDR strategy under such peculiar circumstances⁸³.

2.4 Key Actors in South Sudan's DDR

The most visible actors in the implementation of DDR in South Sudan were the Government of South Sudan, Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA), United Nations Agencies among them United Nation Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).

2.4.1 The Government of South Sudan and SPLA

The GoSS was the principal partner being the midwife government that transitioned the nation from revolution to civility. In the Post CPA period, the South Sudanese government was under intense obligation to help its citizenly settle down after many years of civil war. By and large, the SPLM/A under which the new nation was born and delivered held the keys to stability and the first steps towards this was through peace-building and reconstruction and therefore DDR should have been close to their heart. In that regard, the GoSS developed a national DDR policy document that was adopted in September of 2011.

The document spelt out the road map and specific deliverables and objectives that were to be achieved by carrying out DDR in the country. These objectives according to Munive were as follows:- Need to downsize the number of Organized National Forces (ONF) to a manageable figure so as to reduce their wage bill, to reintegrate ex-fighters in their original communities, Promoting the use of non-military means in boosting the livelihoods of ex-combatants and finally to demobilize all the underage

⁸³ Ibid

soldiers and facilitate the revert to civilian life. With the policy document done and ready, the ground was set.

In the implementation of long term and sustainable peace and development programmes, GoSS was expected to play a vital role beginning with laying the foundation through which all the ex-combatants would transition to civilian life in dignity and at least engage in nation building as responsible citizens. However, this had a false start in South Sudan as a section of senior SPLA members saw it as waste of time and resources. On the other hand, the existence of several armed groups especially those that were aligned to the North (Sudan), yet Southerners and were fighting against SPLA would only complicate matters further for the new government.

A classic example was about fifteen thousand (15,000) former fighters of Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) who were predominantly Southerners and therefore in the post CPA period they would not head to the North. This led to the formation of the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) a body that was charged with the responsibility of spearheading demobilization and integration efforts of all the ex-combatants from across all groups⁸⁴. As a matter of fact, the GoSS embarked on an ambitious plan to reform and modernize its security sector in post CPA period so as to make it capable to deal with the imminent threats emanating from the North.

In that regard, about forty percent of total government expenditure went to the security sector ignoring other critical sectors of the economy such as education, health, infrastructure development and agriculture whose multiplier effects would

⁸⁴ Ibid

have been felt more across the population unlike the security sectors whose beneficiaries were insignificant in comparison to the entire population. In any case, the money went only into paying salaries of a bloated military and essentially led to an emergence of social and economic classes within South Sudan as pointed out by Le Riche and Mathew. Over and above the stated challenges, the new GoSS administration also had to contend with other emerging challenges among them poor returns from the oils due to the falling prices at the international market, endemic poverty as a result of decades of war and worse still the fact that South Sudan is a landlocked country lead to skyrocketing of commodity prices.

This coupled with low literacy levels and over reliance on imports as opposed to developing own manufacturing industries which would have created job opportunities for the masses only aggravated the situation⁸⁵. The creation of South Sudan DDR Commission to steer the programmes did not make things better either as its operations were constantly affected by cash-flow crisis and hence beating the logic of its formation in the first place.

Turyamureeba notes that the crisis at one point was so severe that the Commission's office had to be closed as it could not afford to meet its recurrent bills as well as procure simple logistical requirements.⁸⁶ Consequently, the GoSS consistently failed to honor its part of the deal of the economic individual reintegration kitty of 250 US Dollars as had been agreed, with donors and other partners honoring their pledge of 1500 US Dollars sending the DDR programs into further disarray and by the end of

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ Ibid

the set period (2012) only a handful of the targeted ex-fighters were managed⁸⁷. The table below paints a grim picture of the results of a DDR program carried out in one of the centers within South Sudan.

Table 1: Declining No. of Ex-fighters in one DDR Centre

Services rendered	No. of Ex-fighters	% of those demobilized
Demobilized	12525	100
Received Referral Services	12336	98
Registered for Integration	12020	96
Completed training	10866	87
Provided with startup kits	10750	86
Received One follow-up	10646	85
Received two follow-ups	8512	69

Source: JairoMunive (2014)

From the above table, it is evident that the number of ex-fighters that were demobilized continued to decline from 12525 ex-fighters who were demobilized to 8512 ex-fighters who completed the entire exercise. This significance fall shows a demoralized lot that were either disinterested or non-committed.

On the other hand, constant bickering between the GoSS and partners who included UNDP, World Bank and UNMISS over accountability did not make the situation any better as pointed out by the Human Security Baseline Survey (HSBA) Small Arms Survey, this frosty relationship lead to serious underfunding of DDR activities

⁸⁷ Ibid

bringing the entire process into a near halt and in the end, only a handful of those targeted were rehabilitated⁸⁸. It is worth noting that DDR is a capital-intensive venture that GoSS economy would not have supported due to dwindling economic fortunes brought about by a couple of factors key among them closure of some oil fields due to continued tension between GoSS and the Sudan as well as increased militancy leading to rebels controlling some areas. These among others led to a near collapse of the economy that was struggling to stay afloat.

Since 2005, a number of efforts have been made all attempting to come up with an effective DDR strategy in South Sudan. Unfortunately, most of the efforts have not given pleasant results leaving the lives of ex-militants miserable, the situation remains volatile and the promise of peace and development as envisioned in the CPA has remained a pipe dream.

A report on a pilot reintegration project carried in 2013/2014 noted that forty percent of South Sudan revenue went to meeting the recurrent expenditure of the National Organized Forces (NOF) which was not only untenable but also unsustainable in the long run and for the country to realize any economic progress, they had to be reduced to manageable numbers a process that could only be realized through downsizing of active duty officers. At the same time, there was a blatant lack of goodwill between partners and GoSS and on several fronts, they differed openly on the direction DDR programmes were taking and this affected the progress. Particularly, the ALC report cited lack of political will from within SPLA and

⁸⁸Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) report
<http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/ddr/HSBA-DDR-in-South-Sudan.pdf> small arms survey accessed on 17May 2017

government technocrats and the disinterests of the primary stakeholders such as the police who perceived DDR as a waste of time and resources and therefore had no place in the new era.⁸⁹

In the end, observers have lamented that the continued efforts by Kiir led government to politicize and patronize SPLA activities by rewarding and buying loyalty from would be rebels was a ticking time bomb waiting to explode and will continue hampering demobilization efforts in the troubled country over and above being big burden to the economy. Munive points that with a membership of about two hundred thousand (200,000) strong men and women majority of whom are neither active nor accounted for due to disjointed structures, SPLA posed serious challenges to the future prospects of the World's youngest nation.

It is prudent to note that GoSS as the principal actor in the DDR programming and implementation had a critical role to play if the intended purpose of the activities were to be effective and successful. However, from the onset, it is apparent that the new government and or its officials were not keen and never took this seriously-from failed pledges in supporting reintegration kitty to poor arms collection and controls after disarming of the ex-combatants, this coupled with harsh economic realities facing the country. It was evident that implementing successful DDR programs in South Sudan would be a toll order.

On the other hand, the attitude of the ex-combatants themselves and the general public towards DDR was wanting with majority placing their premiums on opportunities that will come their way after completion of this training only to be

⁸⁹ Ibid

disappointed. Munive observes that peace and stability in South Sudan currently and in future would largely be affected by rising tension between Khartoum and Juba, uncontrolled militancy, and a heavily armed civilian population. He therefore posits that any meaningful DDR must not only deal with the above but must also build confidence and bridge community bonds and at the same time be able to transform ex-combatants into active and economically responsible civilians and without which it will be an exercise in futility⁹⁰.

With this in mind, GoSS ought to have been on the steering wheel in driving the DDR agenda for the benefits and opportunities instead of being the greatest impediment to the implementation of DDR in post 2005 CPA period. Another downside of DDR in South Sudan was the patronage and influence of the SPLA stalwarts in determining who would be enlisted in the programme and who would not. Even though DDR is a military process just like it is a political and or socio-economic process, the role of the SPLA was chokingly too much to an extent that senior military officials drew up a master list of the would be beneficiaries whereas some of those enlisted were undeserving leading to inflated numbers and misuse resulting to what is now being referred to as the political economy of disarmament demobilization and reintegration in South Sudan as demonstrated by Munive.

'One ex-combatant male for instance had his four wives enrolled in the reintegration programme, one was a WAAF and the rest had lived in Kakuma Refugee camp in Kenya during the war and only recently returned'.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹Munive J, (2014) Invisible Labour: The Political Economy of Reintegration in South Sudan, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 8:4, 334-356, DOI: 10.1080/17502977.2014.964451 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502977.2014.964451> accessed on 26 January 2017

2.4.2 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

The UN through its implementing agencies United Nation Development Program (UNDP and United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) have been key players in South Sudan DDR activities. UNMISS role was espoused in a UN resolution 1996 of 2011 whose mandate in this regard was to stabilize the country and ensure that civilians were safe with a sole end goal of setting the ground for development to take root in the newly birthed nation⁹². However, prior to this, the UN had extensively engaged the GoSS from as early as 2005 when a UNMISS was established under United Nation Security Council Resolution 1590 of 2005 when about nine thousand (9000) peace keepers, seven hundred (700) police as well as a couple of civilians were deployed to help in stabilizing the country during the interim period with a core mandate of helping to deal with emerging humanitarian issues, DDR as well as governance and development of basic infrastructure to facilitate growth. The current UNMISS military strength in South Sudan stands at twelve thousand two hundred and eighty-eight (12,288) officers drawn from various countries. This is complimented by one thousand two hundred and forty four (1,244) UNMISS police and another two thousand five hundred and sixty three (2563) civilian personnel⁹³.

Consequently, due to the fragile and volatile nature of peace and security situation in the country and the fact that warring parties have shown little efforts to end the current crisis that continue to endanger lives of civilians majority being women and

⁹² United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996 of 8 July 2011

⁹³United Nations Security Council Report of the Secretary General on South Sudan of 13 April 2016

children, UNMISS role and mandate has continued to be extended by the Security Council with the latest being in November 2016 for further one year.⁹⁴ The mandate is subject to more review and possible extension until such a time when parties will show commitment to end hostilities and return to dialogue. This is certainly informed by the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine of the United Nations which is vested and executed by the Security Council on behalf of the United Nations⁹⁵.

However, it is worth noting that the United Nations in itself did not have any active role in South Sudan other than periodical monitoring and evaluation as well as reporting that set deadlines were not being met and at the same time Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) which has been touted as one of the most effective monitoring and evaluation organ of the UN during the interim period⁹⁶. On the other hand, it is also important to appreciate the fact that the UN-GoSS relationship has not always been rosy but continue to be marred with a lot of suspicion with Salvar Kiir led government accusing UN of supporting SPLM-IO side led by Riek Machar by transporting cache of arms to them an accusation that has been advertently denied by the UN Secretary General⁹⁷.

The joint efforts of UNMISS and UNDP as implementing agencies of the UN was to deal with the Reintegration component of DDR in both the Sudan and South Sudan with UNDP providing technical support for effective implementation of the programs and UNMISS carrying out the hands-on part that would see ex-combatants

⁹⁴ United Nations Security Council Special Report of the Secretary general on the review of the mandate of the UNMISS on 10 November 2016

⁹⁵ Ibid

⁹⁶ Ibid

⁹⁷Mugo J, An analysis of mediation as a tool for conflict resolution in Africa: A case study of mediation process in South Sudan between December 2013 and March 2015. Master’s Thesis , University of Nairobi, 2016

finally settled at their place of preference a process known as reinsertion⁹⁸. However, it is noteworthy that UNDP does not necessarily implement the programme parse but it contracts organization with expertise to carry out such activities through a competitive bidding process. Most notable organizations that have been contracted by UNDP include International Organization for Migration (IOM), Bangladeshi Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) amongst others⁹⁹.

It is also prudent to mention that UNDP has been involved in DDR activities in several other jurisdictions across the world since 1991¹⁰⁰ and therefore has adequate capacity and experience to handle the South Sudan DDR. While UNDP points out that DDR is central in addressing the post-conflict security challenges that arise from lack of skills and livelihoods by the ex-fighters, they have also acknowledged that the same calls for relentless commitment and unequivocal political will from all the interested parties as well as a supportive international and donor community¹⁰¹ and consequently, the success or failure of any DDR endeavor depends on two main factors; the level and state of peace keeping operations in place and governance issues in that particular society or country. The central role of UNDP in any DDR

⁹⁸Bhattacharjee A, Gadkarim H, Evaluation of Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme: United Nations Development Programme SudanFinal Report, November 2012 <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/fileadmin/docs/facts-figures/ddr/UNDP-Sudan-DDR-Evaluation-Nov-2012.pdf> accessed on May 17 2017

⁹⁹Munive J, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in South Sudan: The limits of conventional peace and security templates, DIIS Report 2013:07 https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/rp2013-07-jairo-disarmament-southsudan_web.jpg_1.pdf accessed on May 17 2017

¹⁰⁰UNDP-DDR practice Note accessed on June 21 2017

¹⁰¹ Ibid

endeavor includes but not limited to capacity building, resource mobilization, prevention of community based violence and finally arms/weapons control¹⁰².

2.5 Chapter Summary

In summation, the GoSS, UNDP, UNMISS and by extension SPLA role in DDR implementation cannot therefore be downplayed as each of the aforementioned institutions played a role that has contributed in one way or the other of the current status of reintegration. However, it started on a low key following the inability of the key parties to fully commit to the words and letter of the CPA that called for downsizing of active soldiers leading to a delay until 2009 when the first bunch of ex-combatants were demobilized and the fact that resources were not adequate or available from some key donors which also contributed to the delay in the beginning of DDR activities.

However, contrary to the expected position that GoSS should have prioritized DDR programmes in the country, the reality was that in most instances the government lagged behind in meeting its obligations in so far as implementation was concerned. For instance, failure of GoSS to meet part of the commitment to fund the pilot DDR programme of two hundred and fifty US Dollars (USD250) yet a greater percentage of national revenue were going into meeting security expenditure.

On the other hand, SPLA stalwarts continued to hamper smooth implementation of DDR activities and if not providing master lists that contained their undeserving relatives to be included, they were busy sabotaging the process claiming that it was a total waste of time and resources. Over and above this, failure of the government to

¹⁰² Ibid

streamline the military so as to be responsive, professional and devoid of ethnic patronage dealt a big blow to the smooth implementation of DDR implementation.

UNDP and UNMISS continued to play an integral role albeit amidst myriad of challenges key among them the elusive peace and volatile security situation precipitated by heavily armed civilians and a Kiir led government that is not in control. On the other hand, their inability to carry out comprehensive disarmament demobilization and reintegration activities have been brought to sharp focus with some observers noting that the approach and programmes being carried out do not match with the reality of the South Sudanese situation and expectations of the ex-combatants and therefore would have little impact if any. This coupled with inadequate funding and big numbers of ex-fighters to be demobilized have not made their efforts worth writing about. The actors would be more impactful if they played their role independently and if the international community was to be more responsive to the needs of South Sudan.

CHAPTER THREE

GAPS AND EMERGING ISSUES DURING DDR IMPLEMENTATION


3.0 Introduction

The chapter will have two sections with the first section focusing on the gaps and emerging issues during implementation of DDR programmes in South Sudan between 2005 and 2013 and the second section will delve into the factors that contributed to the collapse of DDR activities in the country.

3.1 Gaps During DDR Implementation

DDR in South Sudan as envisioned in the CPA and other enabling policy documents was to address several key issues at the onset among them; Women, children and the disabled ex-combatants as they had been greatly affected by war. Of the about one hundred and fifty thousand targeted ex-fighters, ninety thousand (90,000) were men, thirty thousand (30,000) women and thirty thousand (30,000) under age fighters. The chart in the next page shows the distribution of ex-combatants depending on age and gender.

Figure 1: Distribution of Ex-combatants according to gender and age



The official number of disabled ex-combatants who formed an integral part of the process could not be established. The establishment of the South Sudan Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) in late 2005 was meant to ensure that proper measures were in place before the process began with the sole aim of boosting the ex-combatants means of livelihoods before they return to their normal lives as well as help in identifying and reintegrating children and women associated with armed forces.

Children and Women formed a critical mass in the struggle and their role could not be underestimated. Prior to carrying out comprehensive DDR programmes in South Sudan, a pilot programme had to be carried out targeting about four thousand five hundred (4500) ex-combatants and was to be executed in three (3) phases, this was to be done by 2012 so that the lessons learnt and cost implications would be used as points of reference while implementing the comprehensive DDR programmes that was to cover the entire group of ex-fighters.

Further, SSDDRC had long-term strategy of applying DDR programmes as tools for Security Sector Reforms (SSR) in South Sudan through downsizing and rightsizing of the national organized forces that had become more of a welfare force than a professional responsive outfit that is required of a national security force. Therefore, of the 150,000 ex-fighters targeted, about eighty thousand (80,000) were from the SPLA and South Sudan Armed Forces (SSAF) while the rest were to be drawn from the national, Prison, Wildlife and Fire brigade services as shown in the table below.

Table 2: Targeted ex-combatants depending on their formation

Force Formation	Numbers targeted
SPLA/SSAF	80,000
Police, Prison, Wildlife and Fire Brigade Service	70,000

The three (3) month process of integration would begin with a voluntary call for the ex-fighters to come out and register with the implementing agencies. However, the national Demobilization Commission and the Ministry of Defense and Veteran Affairs would play a key role in identifying and developing a list of those that would be included in the pilot project. The first step included DDR candidates profiling where Bio-data on individual candidates would be noted. This would have Names, Education and skills, health and disability. Further, disability categorization would be carried out to establish the nature, extent or severity of the disabled ex-combatants. The form below is a template used to register ex-combatants at the beginning of DDR.

Table 3: Form (Template) used to register Ex-Combatants at the Rehabilitation Centre

Ex-Combatant Registration Form						
(Tick as Appropriate)						
Name:					Date of	
Registration:						
Gender: Male Female						
Registration Centre:						
State of Origin:						
Age: 5-12 20-30						
13-19 31 and above						
Level of Education						
None Basic Secondary Tertiary Others (Specify)						
Formation of engagement						
SPLA SSAF Others (specify)						
Physical Disability if any and its extent						
Health Status						
Skills possessed						
Driving Plumbing Farming Mechanic Welding fishing Any other (Specify)						
Place of Settlement						

The above template would be used to profile and identify individual ex-combatants and their specific needs so as to come up with an appropriate and responsive programme to address their needs. This would ensure that ex-combatants that were literate would be separated from the illiterate ones at the same time women and men were dealt with differently as their needs and approaches may from time to time differ. Consequently, children and under age ex-fighters would be separated from their adult counterparts as their ability to absorb as well as reintegration needs are different. While the adult ex-fighters would prefer acquiring a skill to improve their livelihoods that will enable them meet the day to day needs of their families, children and underage ex-combatants would highly likely prefer going back to school to continue with education and therefore profiling becomes an integral part of DDR programmes more so at the initial stages.

The adult ex-combatants were expected to choose from a wide range of available vocational skills available such as carpentry, plumbing, driving amongst others that were being offered at the transitional facilities in order to enable them deal with vagaries of poverty that bedeviled the country due to persistent conflict while fighting for freedom. There was need for a paradigm shift on the part of the ex-combatants to adopt a more proactive approach as the success of these endeavors were dependent on their ability and willingness to change from militancy to economically empowered civilians.

Disability categorization and health status of the ex-combatants was also an important consideration before putting the ex-fighters into a Transitional facility. Most often than not, the physically challenged ex-fighters have special needs that

cannot be addressed like those of ably-bodied ex-fighters. It is also prudent to factor in the status of health of ex-fighters at the initial stages as some could be nursing terminal illness or conditions such as non-communicable diseases or HIV/AIDS that would definitely call for special handling and treatment. In particular, HIV/AIDS remain a key issue amongst the ex-fighters which could be attributed to inadequate awareness due to prolonged conflict in South Sudan.

On the other hand, the psycho-social needs of different categories of ex-combatants vary in different degrees and therefore require an elaborate, workable and sustainable process that responds to these needs. Ultimately, the success of any DDR endeavor is gauged at the reintegration phase and the ability to improve security and stability in any post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction situation as has been constantly espoused by different players in South Sudan DDR activities. The 6th edition (July/August 2012) of Inside DDR a publication of South Sudan Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) captured this reality noting that a robust DDR programme is critical to security and stability as a tool for laying ground for recovery and development¹⁰³. Consequently, reintegration as an end result should enable ex-combatants cultivates meaningful economic livelihoods within the communities that they are resettled and reinserted.

3.2 Emerging Issues During DDR Implementation

During the implementation of the DDR programmes in South Sudan that began in 2012 with a pilot project of one thousand five hundred (1500) ex-combatants, a number of cross-cutting issues emerged that are worth delving into, these issues in

¹⁰³Inside DDR, SSDDRC. 6th Edition July/August 2012

one way or another affected the smooth implementation of the programme to an extent that the ultimate collapse of the entire DDR activities and the break out of civil war can be attributed to this. These issues are:-

3.2.1 Lack of Political Will

At the point of crafting the CPA document that ended the civil strife and laid ground for the new nation of South Sudan, there was blatant lack of political will to carry out DDR amongst the many fighters in South Sudan with a section of SPLA/M senior leaders terming the exercise as a complete waste of time and resources¹⁰⁴. This sluggish attitude towards the exercise coming from within government quarters dealt a big blow to the overall objectives of this internationally acclaimed strategy of peace building and reconstruction.

At the policy level, the formation of the national DDR Commission to coordinate this activity was not enough; there was a recommendation to establish a national DDR Council an advisory outfit bringing together the membership of the commission and Ministry of Defense and Veteran Affairs in order to direct policy and develop guidelines that would inform policy decisions on the matter. The delayed formation of the council meant that issues that needed to be addressed remain unresolved leaving the exercising struggling¹⁰⁵.

Further, GoSS did not prioritize DDR activities and in most cases, the government failed to meet its own commitments towards the programme with the most prominent being failing to avail part of the funds approximately two hundred and fifty dollars

¹⁰⁴ Ibid

¹⁰⁵ Ibid

(USD 250) per person that was to be used for paying the ex-combatants during the pilot phase¹⁰⁶. This in essence meant that the piloting was headed to a false start and if providing funds at the pilot stage was a challenge, then dealing with an entire 150,000 ex-combatants would be an even more complex and challenging endeavor for the South Sudanese government. On the other hand, failure of the government machinery to protect and safeguard the property and facilities of the main actors key among them UNDP leading to theft and loss of equipment such as laptops showed a system less concerned with the efforts by such organization in implementing DDR in their own soil¹⁰⁷

It is important to put this lack of political will into perspective; firstly, South Sudan found itself in a catchy situation given that during the twenty-one (21) years civil war, Khartoum had managed to recruit so many Southerners to fight alongside Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as proxies and in essence fighting against SPLA. Therefore, the choice of independence during referendum meant that these proxy fighters remained in South Sudan as they could not go back to the North. This in essence remained the greatest security threat and headache for Juba. This is rightly so because, SPLA was already struggling with high numbers of non-productive soldiers who needed to be demobilized so as to create a more efficient, responsive but lean national army, with the international community already raising the red flag, and at the same time being confronted with an extra fifteen thousand (15,000) more soldiers from the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) from the North but mainly Southerners.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid

¹⁰⁷ Ibid

The GoSS was damned whether demobilizing or reintegrating into SPLA¹⁰⁸. Demobilizing and or discharging these soldiers meant that they could continue fighting as rebels or militants due to disaffection while at the same time, reintegrating them into SPLA meant that the GoSS continued to maintain and pay more non-productive military officers than it actually needed. Whichever way Juba chose, there were bound to be consequences and this could explain the lack of will power to carry out DDR as earlier envisioned.

3.2.2 Creating Dependence Syndrome vis-à-vis Building an Economically

Thriving Community of Ex-fighters

DDR as a strategy in post-conflict peace building and reconstruction should on the very least enable the ex-combatants be in a position to thrive economically, support their dependants and most importantly build and grow the economy of the nation. The basic rationale is that if massive mobilization during the crisis was as a result of economic pull factors i.e. if the reason for the fighters to join the revolutionary movement was a way of economically sustaining themselves, then, sustainable peace efforts must address this by creating alternative and attractive economic incentives¹⁰⁹. Therefore, in a nutshell, DDR in South Sudan had to achieve the following key objectives; build conditions for conflict prevention, promote human security and on the very least build sustainable peace and lay ground for socio-economic development in the country¹¹⁰. All these objectives are important and each one of them must be achieved.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰ Ibid

However, when preparing ex-combatants for eventual reintegration and reinsertion into the communities of their choice, it is paramount to ensure that a dependence attitude is not embalmed into their mindset as un-learning would be more catastrophic. The South Sudan should not have been exceptional. Quite a good number of ex-fighters harbored the feeling that the government owed them a favour and had to reciprocate by either giving them a job or opportunity within government and this essentially blocking their creative mind. The fact that everyone one wanted to remain in the ranks of SPLA that seemed more lucrative than any other sub-sector of the economy in itself was too loud. Consequently, there was growing concerns of the emerging economic class division between those working within government forces and the rest of the population an issue that could be attributed to the overdependence on government in providing means of livelihoods than engage in other economic activities that could open up the economy even more.

On the other hand, there was very little growth recorded in the informal micro enterprise sub-sectors of the economy in 2011/2012, a clear indication of the disinterests of the locals in building the economy oblivious of the impacts the same would have in the economy if exploited. On the downside, around the same time, SPLA spending increased by over thirty percent (30%) with most of the resources going into meeting the welfare needs of a bloated and ineffective national army. The inability of the ex-combatants to challenge their creative mind is as a result of the initial engagement which instills some sense of entitlement in future and hence the need to look at the entire approach and infrastructure of DDR implementation in South Sudan.

3.2.3 Funding and Relevance of Skills to the Needs of the Locals

The issue of funding and implementation of DDR activities in South Sudan remains a controversial discourse with several voices recommending the need to examine and possibly come-up with a different approach that suits a post-conflict situation at hand since these situations are different and peculiar. The almost certain prescription of vocational training as first step towards improving the livelihoods of ex-combatants being sharply contrasted due to the efficacy and two because of the emphasis given yet results tell a different story all together. At the same time, the level of training offered to ex-fighters was so basic in addition to the fact that the skills given to the ex-fighters such as tailoring, masonry, driving and others are already saturated in the market and therefore may never help in transforming the lives of those intended.

More often than not, the nature of skills transfer in a post-conflict situation is closely linked to the donors, international communities, financiers and implementing actors and this is the beginning of the disconnect. To the financiers and donors, the risk and cost involved in vocational training is low while to the implementing actors, this is the only thing they know and have capacity to do¹¹¹. This leaves the would-be beneficiaries in this case South Sudan between a rock and a hard stone and with very few choices if any. In this one, the international community and financiers have not been spared; one their approach towards DDR in South Sudan was not only lackluster but also lacked a clear vision while ignoring the peculiar nature and special needs of the country.

¹¹¹ Ibid

3.2.4 Corruption and Nepotism in Identifying Beneficiaries

The journey of DDR activities in South Sudan was long and a treacherous one with the 1st phase beginning in 2009 about four (4) years after the signing of the revered CPA document a major drawback for the entire exercise. This meant that when the process began, quite a good number of legitimate ex-combatants did not turn up at the Transitional facility while at the same time it presented a serious challenge amongst the actors to differentiate with certainty a genuine ex-combatant from a dubious one, as so much had passed under the bridge. This gave room for patronage from within SPLA/M quarters and opened a whole can of worms with genuine cases being ignored at the expense of fake ones giving a section of influential government and military officials an opportunity to nominate their kin who posed as ex-combatants yet they were not.

Constant meddling and interference from sector SPLA commanders in charge of the exercise was the new norm as they gave to implementers' master lists containing names of those they wanted included in the DDR exercise. In this regard, failing to address the needs of the genuine ex-combatants at the level of identification and profiling meant that those that were eventually enlisted for demobilization reintegration and or reinsertion were never a security threat and thus the impact of the entire exercise was inconsequential to say the least¹¹². The real characters who posed the greatest threat to peace, stability and economic advancement of the new nation were still out there and it was just a matter of time before they unleashed their ugly side of their face.

¹¹² Ibid

A case in Torit within Eastern Equatorial State where a senior SPLA stalwart influenced the enlistment of four (4) of his wives into the DDR programme in the area epitomizes the ugly picture and the extent that corruption and nepotism were deep rooted within the South Sudanese DDR programmes and it was just a matter of time that this backfired right on the face of the South Sudanese, more so leaders. The break out of the violence in December 2013 that has rocked the country since then remains a testament that there was blatant mishandling of the entire process.

3.2.5 Affirmative Action Issues in DDR

The above aspects deal with issues of gender, youth, children and disability that are cardinal issues in the context of DDR in South Sudan because of the centrality of each one of them and the need to address needs of each group while implementing the programme. Gender issues becomes pertinent because of the fact that women were heavily involved in the South Sudan armed conflict as fighters and therefore any attempt to disarm, demobilize or even integrate ex-fighters that does not capture their needs becomes an exercise in futility.

On the other hand, just like they were involved in the conflict, efforts to build peace must also involve them. However, part of the challenge bedeviling women in DDR implementation was the shallow definition of who an ex-combatant is with the pre-assumption of an ex-combatant being a man taking centre stage. But, a United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 of October 2010 recognizes the role of women in armed conflict as well as peace building and equally identifies and enumerates the needs for either a female or male ex-combatants. In this case an elaborate criterion has been developed so as to capture those that needed to be

included in DDR activities taking into consideration the wider roles of women in the conflict. The three broad categories developed took into account the following:-

- i) Female dependants. This category encompasses women who directly depended on either a male or female combatant as a spouse or daughter.
- ii) Female supporters. These are mainly women who played a supportive role in the conflict but at the background. Their roles included but not limited to nursing, cooking while others were used as sex slaves or objects while others worked as office managers.
- iii) Female armed combatants. These are women who were directly involved in the conflict as fighters, weapons and went into the battle front. This is the category of women fighters that DDR activities in South Sudan revolved around, ignoring the other two categories yet they were not only important, but also key actors in the conflict that warranted the attention of implementers.

On the other hand, youth issues in South Sudan conflict cannot be over emphasized given that in any conflict, the young and energetic fighters are the ones between fifteen (15) to twenty-four (24) years of age. Most often than not, they form the most critical unit of fighters or the infantry Division whose main source of power are armed soldiers on foot. Consequently, this is the group that bears the greatest responsibility of any armed conflict; both casualties and fatalities thus when addressing peace building, this category must also bear the same level of responsibility. The push and pull factors into the conflict must be adequately addressed as well as put elaborate and long-term measures that will continue

addressing their concerns, disadvantages and vulnerabilities with a view of boosting their economic independence. In dealing with the youths in DDR, the need for integration must be packaged in such a way that it is appealing and excites them than the need to continue waging war against real or perceived enemies. At the same time, there must be continued engagement to ensure that the youths are not enticed back to the conflict.

The issue of children and DDR in South Sudan cannot go unnoticed. However, the UN has addressed itself in the matter and outlawed the use of children in armed conflict. Therefore, there has been no official record to show the number of children soldiers in the South Sudan conflict. Consequently, DDR activities targeting children must prioritize among other things family tracing and reunification of the child ex-fighter with his or her family or relatives and most importantly deal with psychosocial needs of the child and emphasize on education and training of such minors with a long-term goal to bring up a responsible citizen.

Finally, the issue of disabled ex-combatants and how to deal with their needs was at the forefront of DDR implementation in South Sudan with the Ministry of Defense and Veteran Affairs tasked to deal with their financial, physical as well as psychosocial needs which are not only special but vital as they are already disadvantaged. Although there was no outright discrimination against disabled ex-combatants, the insistence that DDR was for able-bodied ex-combatants and not for so severely wounded ex-combatants put them to a disadvantage as the country lacked proper policy guidelines on the matter on how their long-term needs will be

mainstreamed. In a nutshell, the above four issues needed the attention of DDR managers and implementers if a smooth process was to be achieved.

3.2.6 Negative Ethnicity in South Sudan Politics and Military Affairs

Negative ethnicity within South Sudan politics and military is a key issue that will continue to furnace conflict in the new republic now and in future. The Dinka-Nuer divisions in the country have found their place right at the centre of South Sudanese politics and military as well, resulting to mistrust and fear that is unprecedented. This has resulted to breakup of the army to SPLA and SPLA-IO and generally into a government that is diametrically divided. On one side is Salva Kiir the current President an ethnic Dinka while in the opposition is Riek Machar a Nuer.

The December 2013 crisis exposed the underbelly of the sharp divisions within South Sudan with Kiir led government accusing Machar of attempting to a coup d'état. This was followed by a series of attacks against the Nuer both civilians and the ones serving in the military. In fact, the onslaught turned not against Kiir and his legitimate expectations but against his ethnic backyard. Worth noting is that these two leaders (Kiir and Machar) have managed to rally their kinsmen behind them and against each other and thus holding the country into a ransom given that they are the majority in the country and the effect have been devastating.

3.3 Accounting for the Collapse of DDR in South Sudan

This section will attempt to unearth some of the factors that may have contributed to the collapse of DDR in South Sudan. Turyamureeba in his analysis of factors that determine a successful DDR exercise has enumerated two broad aspects as critical

factors; one, the will of political leaders and guidance and participation of ex-combatants and has gone further to note that DDR is a function of political will, transparency and accountability of participating institutions and above all should be guided by the needs of ex-combatants.¹¹³Based on the above therefore, any other exercise that deviates will experience challenges and massive failure. In the case of South Sudan, the following challenges were experienced and led to the collapse of DDR:- lack of local ownership and participation, weak accountability and governance systems within Government to spur confidence amongst the citizens, disjointed approach and constant bickering between GoSS and implementing partners and finally a highly militarized civilian society. This part is informed by data collected on location in South Sudan and interview excerpt from a former SPLA soldier turned conflict scholar currently living in Nairobi Kenya.

3.3.1 Insufficient Involvement of the Locals

For DDR to be effective and achieve maximum effect, the role of the locals in this case communities' living in South Sudan was paramount at the design as well as implementation stages. It is at this stage that the locals are rallied to own the entire process and are given an opportunity to suggest what they think would transform their lives and activities that will be carried out at each and every stage. Rallying the locals behind the entire process helps in quelling tensions brought about by politics of exclusion which can easily scuttle the entire process should the locals feel excluded and are incited against DDR by their leaders. Munive in a DIIS report on DDR in South Sudan notes that a critical evaluation of the exercise hinted to an

¹¹³ Ibid

exercise not meeting the specific objectives and needs of South Sudanese ex-combatants and called for a redesign of the entire programme.

He further regretted that despite the fact that there was widespread agreement on the importance of DDR in the country, there was little awareness and support from the locals and specifically on the impact the same would likely have to the general security situation at the local and nation spheres¹¹⁴. Consequently, the traditional template of DDR implementation has been brought into sharp focus as it failed to make any impact in the lives of ex-combatants with several leaders calling for departure from this classical approach and adopting a more specific approach that was realistic to the needs of the locals¹¹⁵. All this pointing to a disjointed strategy that never involved the locals from the onset

Ordinarily, for the locals to embrace DDR, it should be responsive to their needs, should be open, fair and most importantly inclusive at all cost which tended to lack in the South Sudan Case. In the first place, DDR implementing agencies did not bother to line up the locals behind their activities and their entry point to the community was also wanting due to the fact that there were poor structures to link up the government agencies spearheading the activities, implementing organizations and the local communities. Particularly, the absence of strong localized administrative structures in the entire country dealt a big blow to the entire process as the ability to create awareness way ahead of the beginning was not possible.

¹¹⁴ Ibid

3.3.2 Weak Governance Tools to Spur Public Confidence

Following a successful referendum that led to the birth of a new republic, there was an urgent need to build and strengthen public institutions across the country to respond to the needs of the South Sudanese. The newly formed government led by Kiir and his Deputy Machar had a responsibility to form and lead a transparent government so as to spur public confidence and promote economic growth. But this was not to be, corruption, nepotism and embezzlement of public resources was evident leading to accusations and counter-accusations and with that the good will that the public had in their government continued to be eroded. Corruption was life within government quarters with some cabinet Ministers accused of diverting the ministerial allocations into personal accounts.

The height of corruption and impunity in the country was exemplified when it became apparent clear that two cabinet ministers Deng Alor and Kosti Manibe were to be dismissed and charged in Court of Law for engaging in misconduct while another one Pagan Amum was to be investigated over gross mismanagement. However, attempts to sack the three has been taunted as politically motivated, President Salvar Kiir lamented that his entire cabinet was not only a bunch of ineffective lot but was also incurably corrupt hence their dismissal¹¹⁶. There was open bias to accountability amongst public officials leading to a disenfranchised citizenry. The very freedom that they so thirstily yearned for from the North had come to haunt them.

¹¹⁶ Ibid

From the onset, the very basic tenets of governance were missing in South Sudan with SPLA patronage and influence at the regional and national levels leading the pact.

The amount of influence that some SPLA stalwarts wielded in the management of public affairs often attracted criticism with the issue of listing of DDR beneficiaries exposing the underbelly of corruption. State governors were accused of presiding rot within their states while. Issues of corruption and nepotism within government were evident. However, it is the issue of dispossession and grabbing of land belonging to returnees and public land that caused uproar amongst South Sudanese who felt that the government was unfair to them and was not doing enough to protect the common citizens.

Poverty levels were increasing at alarming levels and economic freedom that they so yearned for were not forthcoming. It is at this point that Machar announced his intentions to challenge his boss- President Kiir as the Party leader of Sudan People Liberation Movement (SPLM) and consequently challenge him in the Presidential elections later when hell broke loose and South Sudan was blown into a serious civil crisis that continues to date. All the gains that had been made since 2005 when the CPA was signed have been eroded and DDR activities have also faded away with growing tension and constant attacks. The country is at the verge of total collapse and until the South Sudanese people makes deliberate decision to change and embrace their differences; stability and economic growth that the country so needs will remain just a pipe dream.

This therefore calls for a transparency and prudent management of public affairs in the country if the gains of freedom and independence are to be felt at the lowest level in the country. The new class of elites emerging in South Sudan has a link in SPLA and GoSS and accused of siphoning public resources to the detriment of millions poverty stricken citizens.

3.3.3 Disjointed Approach Between GoSS and Partners

DDR is an important exercise that calls for coordinated and concerted efforts between the parties involved. The most important aspect of the exercise is to ameliorate and uplift the living standards of the ex-combatants. On the other hand, the national or transitional government for that matter plays an important role to steer the programmes ahead in terms of policy and other interventions while implementing partners by the virtue of their support whether in cash or in kind have the ability to influence the success or failure of the programme. It is imperative to note that the South Sudan context experienced its fair share of challenges and the relationship between GoSS and key partners especially UNDP was not always rosy and in several instances the two differed openly to the detriment of DDR.

A case in point as demonstrated by Turyamureeba is SPLA application of double standards by demobilizing ex-combatants while they continued to recruit youthful soldiers particularly from other armed groups¹¹⁷. Under normal circumstances, what SPLA required was downsizing rather than continuous recruitment into its ranks. This coupled with a weak economy that solely depended on oil export as well as

¹¹⁷ Ibid

protracted differences on the oil pipeline between Juba and Khartoum could only worsen the situation¹¹⁸.

On the other hand, frosty relationship between UNDP and GoSS particularly the DDR Commission continued to hamper a smooth implementation process. Turyamureeba notes that the cause of poor relationship centered on procedures for resource allocation, priority and accountability and the fact that South Sudan was weak economically; the government was at a disadvantage and could hardly determine the direction of DDR giving external partners an upper hand in determining the projects to be carried out, how they shall be handled and when funds would be released. Turyamureeba regrets that these constant bickering, undercutting, corruption and apathy did more harm than good to the DDR agenda in South Sudan.

3.3.4 Highly Militarized Civilian Society

One of the greatest effects of South Sudanese civil war has been the emergence of different militia groups and factions and the political economy that has emerged out of it. This has continued to thrive because of the fact that there exists a large pool of disempowered youths ready and waiting to join these factions to earn a living. Moreover, almost half of the South Sudanese eight million people are below eighteen years of age is an indication of an underlying social and economic challenge that requires a leadership to awaken and harness their ability and strength for the good of the nation. At the same time, there lack a policy for control and movement of arms and other weapons in the country an indication of the urgent need for an effective

¹¹⁸Ibid

government supported DDR exercise. The obsession with guns amongst civilian population as tools for self-defense is an issue that warrants urgent intervention as it is a recipe for disaster.

Further, the levels of militancy are compounded by the fact that some of the militias are ragtag in nature, are fragmented and do not serve as SPLA members and are basically involved in banditry and cattle rustling as a way of life. Their presence at the local levels has led to ineffective control by the national government in some areas. Attempts by GoSS to disarm them have also been met with resistance and on several occasions challenging the firepower of SPLA during attempts to forcefully disarm them as it happened in Jonglei, and Upper Nile States.

On the other hand, SPLA has remained an amorphous organization that continues to rake in billions of public resources with little to show for it and rather than focus at the strategic need for carrying out DDR and let go the huge baggage of its non-productive men, the army continues to recruit young soldiers into their rank and file so as to deny other armed groups an opportunity to get suitable candidates for recruitment. This knee jerk reaction has only served to compound and complicate the situation further for South Sudan. The ripple effects of this move are far and wide; firstly, this has continued to add to numbers of unproductive national army and further increased the cost of welfare, two denied the youths an opportunity to engage in alternative economic activities that could spur growth, thirdly it has further increased the candidates for possible recruitment by other militia groups when they are disenfranchised and demoralized.

These continued militarized activities among the civilian population continue to undermine the course of pacifying the nation with proper post-conflict peace building and reconstruction mechanisms such as DDR. For any effective DDR mechanism to take root in South Sudan, the government will have to take an active role not only in providing the much-needed funds for a comprehensive exercise but also in ensuring that its deeds and actions do not undermine the very efforts that will bring about sustainable peace and development¹¹⁹.

3.4 Chapter Summary

In summation, this chapter delved into the nature of DDR implementation in South Sudan and issues that kept coming up during the process until the collapse in 2013 due to increased civil strife precipitated by political misunderstanding between President Salva Kiir and his sworn rival Dr. Riek Machar. The fact that DDR implementation was delayed and never began on time after 2005 CPA signing until 2012 meant that the rightful beneficiaries had moved on with their life and by the time the government renewed the need to carry out the activity, those that were registered for the programme were either cronies of senior government and military officers and thus ignoring the deserving and needy beneficiaries.

The nature of DDR implementation is a costly endeavor and demands a systemic process that calls for meticulous planning from designing, identification of beneficiaries, training and reinsertion and it is evident that the GoSS was neither ready nor committed to implement the CPA chapter on DDR as signed in 2005 given

¹¹⁹ Interview excerpt from Garang Deng-former SPLA fighter currently a conflict Scholar carried out on May 31 2017 at Nairobi Kenya

the many deliberate blockades the government kept on laying on the path of smooth implementation.

On the other hand, so long as the government continued recruiting more youths into the SPLA rank and files in the guise of building a strong army in the face of imminent threat from the Sudan was in itself insincere given that SPLA was already overburdening the country by its huge appetite and budgetary allocations at the expense of other key sectors of the economy. Consequently, there was need to look at the DDR in South Sudan more comprehensively and inclusively to respond to the needs of various categories of ex-combatants such as Women, the youth, children and the disabled as their needs are different and needs a special approach.

Therefore, the GoSS being the custodian of the process had an extra duty to ensure that issues of governance were given a priority so as to spur public goodwill and confidence and ultimately support in all its endeavors an important mix that constantly lacked in Kiir led government. There was obvious ignorance of building strong public institution to strengthen governance that continued to hamper service delivery eroding the much-needed public confidence that was much needed for the new nation to move along the path of peace and awaken its economic prowess. Finally, the government continued to abscond its own duty of crafting a way to deal with increased militancy amongst its civilian population and more so the youths who needed urgent direction by leveraging in their strength and creativity to spur growth across all sectors.

CHAPTER FOUR

LESSONS LEARNT ABOUT DDR IN SOUTH SUDAN

4.0 Introduction

This chapter will explore the lessons learnt during DDR implementation in South Sudan. Among the lessons that will be explored deeply are;- Armed groups are a major stakeholders in building sustainable peace. Consequent and most important is how to deal with the youths not as threat to peace but as untapped economic resource. Thirdly, the chapter will underline the importance of the local community in designing and planning of DDR. At the same time, the chapter seeks to note that success or failure the exercise depends on the integral role that the government plays and this would ultimately determine the direction the exercise would take. Another major lesson learned is the role of donors and other international partners with recommendation that they should be limited to certain parameters. Finally, the chapter will examine the lessons drawn from Political instability and its impact to the exercise and will conclude with a brief summary.

4.1 Role of Armed Groups in Peace-Building

From the onset, the nation of South Sudan was grappling with a challenge of highly militarized society that was precipitated by decades of civil war. Right from the signing of the CPA there was a section of the armed groups that were opposed to this negotiated agreement while the other faction was Khartoum sponsored and vehemently opposed the idea of secession and for obvious reasons. On the other hand, SPLA/M had disintegrated into several other factions among them SPLM-DC led by Lam Akol as well as the Paulino Matip led South Sudan Defense Forces

(SSDF) to mention but a few whose history of changing loyalty remained a matter of concern¹²⁰. However, it is the constant change of loyalty of the current leader of SPLA-IO Riek Machar that has continued to have serious ripple effects on the achievement of peace and stability in the country. Machar and Akol first onslaught against Garang was in 1991, but it did not take long before the two went separate ways over who was to lead the SPLA/M-Nasir and generally due to lack of strategy to advance their agenda against a more experienced and strong leader John Garang¹²¹.

Over and above these organized armed groups that could play at the national scene, there were so many other armed groups at local and village levels that continued to rein terror and could be often be absorbed into a more mainstream faction for a pay. A United Nation's report on South Sudan indicated that by the year 2006, there were over thirty thousand (30,000) loosely organized militias at village levels thus challenging effective government control and ultimately making any disarmament attempt a hard nut to crack¹²². The report went further to note that these militias tend to be more active during the dry season where they are mostly engaged in cattle rustling¹²³. The manner in which the GoSS have also handled the armed groups is also telling and of particular interest is President Kiir infamous 'Large tent strategy' that aimed at collapsing all the armed groups into SPLA to give him more clout in governing the country.

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Ibid

¹²² Ibid

¹²³ Ibid

The strategy has been critiqued for attempting to solve a rather complex challenge politically in a simplistic manner and only succeeded in expanding and creating ineffective SPLA and further sinking the economy due to increased salaries and allowances for the newly absorbed loyalists. With such a glaring history defections and counter-defections that continued long after the signing of the CPA as well as the birth of the nation, it is apparent that militancy in South Sudan remained a lucrative affair that could easily guarantee the founder member a place at the national table. This and other reasons have contributed heavily to emergence and growth of rebel movements across the country and these calls for a coordinated and concerted approach in bringing these entities on the table where efforts to carry out DDR activities are being discussed if the challenges posed by armed groups and other militarized entities during a transition from war to peace are to be surmounted¹²⁴.

On the other hand, it is important to understand the motivation of the armed groups collectively and individually so as to develop disarmament strategies that are not only effective but also responsive to the needs of individual members as well as their collective desires. Most importantly is to have a clear picture of existing structures and hierarchy of the existing armed groups given that the very survival of an entity is centered on a personality who is able to capture the mind and aspirations of a group those that he leads. It is prudent to contextualize post-conflict building and reconstruction strategies based on the realities of each and every situation if success is to be achieved in the long-run. In the case of South Sudan, any successful DDR

¹²⁴ Ibid

endeavor had to encompass the needs and wishes of other armed groups or else be doomed to fail.

4.2 Appreciating Youths' Resource Not a Threat to Peace

The role played by the youth in the South Sudanese conflict can neither be ignored nor over emphasized. It is common knowledge that the youths are the mainstay of any violent conflict as they form a critical fighting and infantry wing¹²⁵. At the same time, it is the same group that can easily be lured into fighting by the conflict opportunistic merchants who stand to benefit from any protracted violence. Munive has expressly asserted that the youths are regarded as potential candidates for recruitment of fighters in any civil crisis and since they have no alternative, engaging in conflict is a way of earning a living and thus this form of marginalization puts them at a disadvantage of misuse and exploitation¹²⁶.

Bearing this in mind then, any strategy to bring sustainable peace and development into South Sudan ought to take into considerations the need of this category and probably inform a paradigm shift from the GoSS and policy makers to have a different outlook at the youths and long-term achievements that stand to be realized by focusing on this group. It has been argued that DDR can only be effective if it succeeds in transforming ex-combatants into economically and empowered citizens who do not necessarily depend on the state for welfare and support. DDR must offer to the ex-combatants a livelihood, sense of purpose and belonging, dignity, respect and ultimately a feeling of contentment quips Munive¹²⁷. This sort of philosophical

¹²⁵ Ibid

¹²⁶ Ibid

¹²⁷ Ibid

understanding was required in dealing with the youths and thus called for a departure from traditional DDR approaches that give most emphasis to training.

Whereas training of ex-combatants is emphasized and critical, in the context of South Sudan, it does not guarantee the ex-combatants jobs, neither is the sort of training offered congruent to the needs in the labor market. Thus, there is need for a total paradigm shift in South Sudan which acknowledges the centrality of the youths in the socio-economic development of the country. This should bear in mind the current economic realities which is largely culturally centered and informal and therefore requires the creativity and energy of the youths to unlock its potential.

4.3 Involvement of the Local Community in Designing and Planning DDR

Cultivation of good relationship with the locals should be the entry point of any DDR player in a post-conflict peace building and reconstruction situation. To begin with, the locals must be well appraised in advance of the intentions and the extent that DDR will be carried out amongst them so that they can embrace and own the process. The locals need to know the parameters so that in return, the implementing agencies get to understand their fear, concerns and expectations from where a joint working plan is agreed lastly and most important, the collective /communal benefits of the exercise must be clearly outlined which will be used to galvanize support for the intended programme. One of the pitfalls of DDR in South Sudan as highlighted by Jairo Munive was the dwindling level of support that the exercise received from

the public and SPLA alike due to its continued failure to meet the needs of the South Sudanese and continuously agitated for its redesigning¹²⁸.

On the other hand, initial disarmament of early 2006 in Jonglei as earlier discussed provided a complex matrix in that the targeted community resisted for fear of being unfairly targeted by the government. Secondly, there was growing concerns amongst the Lou Nuer community over uncontrolled arms in the area in the hands of youth militias which constantly kept them at loggerhead with the government security agencies more so SPLA resulting to countless deaths¹²⁹.

This sort of quagmire required a serious balancing act which could only be achieved first by rallying the targeted community behind the exercise by guaranteeing them security, secondly explaining to them the need for voluntary disarmament and finally the communal benefits that would accrue after disarmament exercise. Arnold Mathew and Chris Alden in their work on South Sudan underscored the importance of a community driven approach in DDR exercise noting that in the Jonglei experience key actors specifically the GoSS and UN agencies were able to hold the entire community to account over any atrocities committed by their militias and in return this empowered the community to discipline their errant youths that could easily put them into spotlight.¹³⁰

The issue of land and land tenure in South Sudan is as emotive as it is in other jurisdictions in the region and needed to be looked at from the community perspective. Like in many places, there is a culture denying women and children

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰ Ibid

from owning land. In that regard, failure of DDR implementers in South Sudan to engage a section of their DDR candidates on some basic requirements like availability of land for settlement and at the same time enquire from the communities if they would welcome some of the ex-combatants to live amongst them. In some instances, as noted by Turyamuureba, the community rejected any attempts to settle some ex-combatants amongst them due to their past atrocities while in other instances land was not available as the intended parcels had either been grabbed or reallocated to influential members in the society¹³¹. These are some of the issues that would have come out if there was effective participation in designing, planning and execution of the programmes in South Sudan. DDR is implemented amongst individuals and communities and regardless of the approach; the end goal should be geared towards building a community that is economically thriving where peace and security for all is guaranteed quips Turyamureeba.

4.4 Government's Role is Critical in DDR Implementation

Government plays a monumental role in driving the DDR agenda in as far as developing policy and guidelines are concerned. A UN IDDRS paper acknowledges that national and or transitional governments play a lead role in the establishment of critical institutions such as commissions that are paramount in steering DDR programmes forward¹³². The government also acts as a link between the international community and donors whose role in the entire exercise cannot be ignored. On the hand, DDR is an expensive venture that requires coordinated efforts from across all government quarters so as to ensure support and funding without interruption. In the

¹³¹ Ibid

¹³² Ibid

case of South Sudan, the Salvar Kiir led government had the sole responsibility of galvanizing support for DDR as it would have been the magic bullet that could help in ensuring the country settled down after decades of war.

However, this was not to be as highlighted in the DIIS report on DDR in South Sudan which blamed GoSS for being the greatest impediment to the successful implementation of DDR by failing to own and develop policy and guidelines that were in line with the requirements of the CPA¹³³. Consequently, the delayed implementation of DDR as agreed before the end of the transitional period between 2005 and 2011 when the CPA expired has been cited as one of the downside of DDR implementation effort in South Sudan.

Another important element that requires the support of the government is in the provision of funding that is equally important if any DDR endeavor is to run smoothly. There is a direct correlation between successful DDR programmes and supportive national governments. However, GoSS consistently failed to honor its financial commitments despite drawing one of the most ambitious DDR programmes in the world prompting other donors to develop cold feet on their level of funding. GOSS has also come under fire for failing to rally her top leadership behind this important national exercise and on several instances dismissing it as a waste of time and resources.

¹³³ Ibid

4.5 The Role of Donors in DDR

The role and importance of the donor community and other international partners has been put into perspective with the value that they added in the context of South Sudan being questioned. This is so because many evaluation reports noted a wide gap in the efficacy of the training being given to ex-combatants and the ability to boost their chances of gaining sustainable skills that could help them unlock their potential and have an economically productive life. In several instances donors have been accused of engaging in low-level risk activities in DDR despite the fact that they add too little or no value at all since that is what they know and can afford beating the logic of having been involved in the first place. Jairo Munive notes that the type, quality and length of training given to ex-combatants is vital to the success of DDR. However, he laments that in the context of South Sudan the offered training was poorly structured in content and time and was out of sync with the needs of the labour market¹³⁴.

On the other hand, the international community should not be given too much role and space to operate as they could easily jeopardize the entire exercise as they are driven by partisan interests. This is clearly demonstrated in South Sudan where Reintegration component of DDR was left to UNDP and despite the fact that millions of dollars had been channeled to the same between 2005/2011, the results were not convincing. At the same time, there were serious management and accountability questions raised over UNDP given that about 450,000 US Dollars could not be accounted for. Turyamureeba further laments that to the extent that UN

¹³⁴ Ibid

and its implementing agencies could delay the release of funds as well as determine who to contract to implement what they felt was important without consulting GoSS is enough evidence that their role should have been limited to certain parameters.

DDR is a capital-intensive venture that requires the host government to be able to carry out and finance its operations if need be and this was the main undoing of South Sudan. The end result of this situation was constant misunderstanding between GoSS and these partners, Lack of accountability on the financiers and partners, unnecessary red tapes and apathy among key players. The above reasons are attributed to be the main factors that led to the collapse and failure of DDR in South Sudan. Needless to say, that the success of DDR is dependent upon the political goodwill, transparency and accountability of key implementing institutions and the relationship that they build with each other. This relationship is cemented by consultations and driven by the needs of the ex-combatants concludes Turyamureeba.¹³⁵

4.6 Political Instability Affects DDR

The period after the CPA signing was largely peaceful in South Sudan, perhaps due to the fact that Kiir led government was able to galvanize support from across the armed groups through incentives and appointments of leaders to the government. This temporary peace provided an ideal environment for peace and security to take root. However, little was achieved in terms of DDR due to constant differences between GoSS and implementing agencies and the attitude of some government officials towards DDR. On the other hand, the continued mistrust and interference

¹³⁵Ibid

from Khartoum was eminent especially in disputed areas such as Abyei region due to its vast endowment in Oil resources. Consequently, the period after the referendum was characterized with renewed clamor for greater political and democratic spaces by the citizens and leaders alike. The very strategy used by the government had turned against it quite literally.

Some of the armed groups previously incorporated in government reneged on their earlier position, leading to disruption of all the gains made. By 2013 the country was gearing for the worst civil crisis. This did not only affect the macro and micro economic standpoints of the country but it did also affect any post conflict peace-building and reconstruction strategies already put in place¹³⁶.

4.7 Chapter Summary

DDR is an important endeavor in any post-conflict situation and needs to be understood as such by all the players. The South Sudan context in particular offers peculiar lessons that we need to appreciate. The above lessons amongst many others could be used to draw comparisons between South Sudan and other contexts around the world for the sake of improving and promoting DDR. The fact is that armed groups are an important stakeholder in peace building and cannot be wished away. However, their multiplicity as in the case of South Sudan leads to complexity and may ultimately lead to exploitation by the leaders who thrive and benefits from protracted conflict. On the other hand, the youths' issue needs to be relooked and addressed on a different perspective where young people in the conflict are seen as a resource for socio-economic growth other than a threat to peace. In this regard,

¹³⁶Ibid

leveraging on their creativity, energy and skills could be the master stroke that would put the country on a path of Socio-economic recovery and growth.

At the same time, involvement and participation of the locals in designing and planning of DDR programme is an important ingredient that should not be disregarded. It gives the targeted community an opportunity to examine and own the process from where a degree of success is assured. On the other hand, the role of the government is critical in directing policy and guidelines that are geared towards sustainability of the programmes. Another lesson drawn from DDR in South Sudan is the importance and value of donors and the international partners and the view that some of their activities do not add any value while others are driven by partisan and parochial interest coming to the fore. Finally, political stability in any post-conflict situation should be guaranteed as it ensures a safe and secure environment for the implementing agencies and community to engage without undue pressure.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The chapter will focus on summary of the study, conclusion and recommendations.

5.1 Summary

The study focused on the nature and extent of roles played by key actors in the implementation of DDR in South Sudan. Consequently, a number of issues were looked at among them, the demographic and geographical status of the country which is key in trying to understand the tribal composition of the country given that tribe plays an important role in South Sudan politics and military affairs and to that extent peace and security architecture in the country. The country lies in the Eastern part of Africa and shares common border with Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) all of which have been impacted by the conflict in South Sudan in one way or another. Consequently, the population of the country is about eight million people who constitute over four hundred ethnic groupings. However, the Dinka is the most dominant ethnic group constituting about thirty five percent, followed closely by the Nuer with about fifteen percent. In this regard, the Dinka and Nuer dominate South Sudan political, social, economic and military spheres and in most instances turning against each other resulting instability in the country.

Consequently, the nature of DDR implementation was clearly examined. Whilst, DDR is considered as a whole and complete process, each of the specific aspects is implemented on its own and collectively they result to sustainable peace and development in post conflict peace building and reconstruction. The study noted that there was both voluntary and compulsory Disarmament in South Sudan in some instances the latter resulting to fatalities of the armed groups and SPLA alike. It is in record that Disarmament exercise in South Sudan can be traced back as early as 2006 when SPLA made attempts to forcefully disarm a number of armed groups in Jonglei States with a view of reducing the number of weapons in the hands of civilians. Although, the exercise was opposed by the locals resulting to violent confrontations and fatalities between the militias and SPLA, the experience laid ground for future disarmament exercise in the country with vital lessons being drawn. Key among the lessons being to rally the local community behind the exercise and making them own and embrace the process.

On the other hand, Demobilization of active duty soldiers was to be carried out immediately after the signing of the CPA with a view of reducing the number of SPLA to a manageable and sustainable figure that will lead to reduced military spending and ultimately transform SPLA from a welfare force to a lean, professional and responsive military. However, the same did not materialize owing to different factors until about 2009 when the first demobilization exercise was carried out. Among the factors attributable to failure of the exercise include;- imminent threats from Khartoum over border and commercial disputes, protracted militancy within the

borders of South Sudan and unavailability of funds to jump-start the exercise as it is an expansive venture.

Reintegration of ex-combatants is also an important aspect of post-conflict peace building as it seeks to give them a new lease of life away from the guns and battle fronts in an environment of their choice. It is the most expensive part of DDR as it must address the specific needs of the ex-combatants and should cover their emotional, socio-economic, psychological as well as physical needs of the ex-fighters right from the day they are disarmed or demobilized to a period not less than a year. The exercise was also to go hand in hand with the other two but also fell into a false start as it was primarily left to the donors to deal with it and who at different times felt disappointed as the entire comprehensive exercise was not achieving desirable results.

Key actors during DDR implementation in South Sudan are also highlighted in the paper. While the actors in any such exercise can be broad depending on the interests, the study focused on the two most prominent ones being the Government of South Sudan and by extension the SPLA which are more interlinked and related as well as the United Nations system in this regard United Nation Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and United Nation Development Programme (UNDP). The GoSS would play an integral role in the overall DDR exercise being the primary actor under the leadership of President Salvar Kiir. The signing of the CPA in 2005 came up with a semi-autonomous government that was to operate for a six-year transitional period up to July of 2011 when a referendum on whether South Sudan was to secede or remain as part of the larger Sudan was carried out.

The decision to secede was affirmed by about 98% of the South Sudanese during a national referendum. Therefore, the responsibility of carrying out comprehensive DDR programmes was bestowed upon the transitional government between 2005/2011 as well as the GoSS that came into effect after the referendum. As the lead actors GoSS was to develop and drive the DDR policy and agenda to ensure that desired results are achieved. However, this was not always the case. Dwindling economic fortunes precipitated by fall of oil prices in the world market as well as heightened tension between Juba and Khartoum over sharing of oil resources affected the much-needed financial flow to support the exercise.

On the other hand, SPLA that would ordinarily be playing a complimentary role to the GoSS in supporting DDR was also caught up in the middle. To begin with, SPLA spending was much higher than any other sector in the economy yet their input and productivity was minimal with some of the top military leaders disregarding the exercise as a waste of time. At the same time, SPLA patronage and influence in the exercise was rife in some instances top military commanders drawing a master list that included their relatives and or friends throwing the entire exercise into disarray as the ones included were not necessarily the most deserving cases. In a nutshell, GoSS and SPLA showed minimal interest in creating a conducive, peaceful and secure environment for DDR to thrive.

The UN system primary responsibility in any post-conflict peace building and reconstruction situation is to ensure that there is stability in the country; civilians are safe and that there is an ideal environment for development to take root, a role played by UNMISS in the context of South Sudan and two capacity building,

resource mobilization, prevention of community based violence as well as arms/weapons control which is a preserve of the UNDP. The mandate of UNMISS have been extended on several occasions and its capacity boosted by the United Nation Security Council owing to fragile nature of the security situation in the country. More so, UNDP which has been the lead partner in charge of the Reintegration component has constantly failed to achieve its mandate due to constant bickering between them and GoSS over accountability issues. In several instances, the quality of training offered to ex-combatants as part of their integration being put into perspective for being out of sync with their needs and being irreverent in their future life of Ex-fighters.

During implementation of DDR in South Sudan, several disconnects were noted, first and foremost DDR implementation was delayed and never began on time after 2005 CPA signing until 2012 meaning that the rightful beneficiaries had moved on with their life and by the time the government renewed the need to carry out the activity, those that were registered for the programme were either cronies of senior government and military officers and thus ignoring the deserving and needy beneficiaries. Secondly, DDR is an expensive exercise that calls for a systemic process as well as meticulous planning from designing, identification of beneficiaries, training and reinsertion and it is evident that the GoSS was never ready or committed to implement DDR.

The continued recruiting of youths into the SPLA rank and files in the guise of building a strong army in the face of imminent threat from the Sudan was in itself insincere given that SPLA was already overburdening the country by its huge

appetite and budgetary allocations at the expense of other key sectors of the economy. At the same time, there was need to look at the DDR in South Sudan more comprehensively and inclusively to respond to the needs of various categories of ex-combatants such as Women, the youth, children and the disabled as their needs are different and needs a special approach. The above stated issues have emerged as pertinent in South Sudan and calls for further examination as they would ultimately shape post-conflict peace building and reconstruction in the country

Consequently, GoSS as the custodian of the process had an extra duty to ensure that issues of governance were given a priority so as to spur public goodwill and confidence and ultimately support in all its endeavors an important mix that constantly lacked in Kiir led government. There was obvious ignorance of building strong public institution to strengthen governance that continued to hamper service delivery eroding the much-needed public confidence that was much needed for the new nation to move along the path of peace and awaken its economic prowess. Moreover, little participation by the locals meant that they had little appreciation of the programmes. Worse still, continued bickering between the government and implementing agencies precipitated a disjointed approach. Failure of GoSS to deal with increased militancy amongst its civilian population and more so the youths further compounded the problem leading to collapse of DDR implementation in the country.

The South Sudan Post conflict peace building and reconstruction context is peculiar and affords critical lessons. Key among them is that armed groups are an important stakeholder in peace building and cannot be ignored and particularly if bulks of the

armed groups are the young men and women. To address the issue one for all, the perspective needs to change from that of threat to partners.

Involvement and participation of the locals in DDR design and planning is key and should never be ignored as it offers the locals an opportunity to examine and appreciate the process from where a degree of success is assured. Governments' role is critical in directing policy and guidelines that are geared towards sustainability of the programmes. Donors and the international partners are also valuable players although their role should be limited to specific elements of DDR and not leaving an entire component as was the case of Reintegration in South Sudan. Finally, political stability in any post-conflict situation is an important catalyst that can guarantee as a safe and secure environment for the implementing agencies and community to engage in boosting sustainable post conflict peace building strategies.

5.2 Conclusion

DDR is an internationally acclaimed strategy for post conflict peace building and reconstruction that has the ability of transforming a war-ravaged society characterized by poverty and despair into an economically thriving nation of proactive ex-fighters where peace, security and economic growth are the standpoint and South Sudan context could not be exceptional. However, for it to achieve desired results, deliberate measures must be taken by key actors among them the government whether transitional or otherwise, the military and most important the international partners with each role clearly cut out to avoid constant disagreements and blame game. Consequently, the government which is the primary stakeholder must realize that the success of the exercise largely depends on its ability to draw and direct DDR

policies and guidelines that are specific, realistic and achievable and above all provide for a funding that will see that the programmes continue even when donors withhold theirs for one reason or the other.

On the other hand, proper mechanisms ought to be in place prior to the beginning of the exercise and should be informed by appreciating that every post-conflict situation is different from the other and that the DDR template should be customized to suit the particular area under implementation. More often than not, there is the tendency by the implementing agencies to replicate what has been used elsewhere with a view that it would work and deliver results. An example of this blanket assumption in South Sudan is the quality of vocational training offered to ex-combatants by the implementing agencies that has been put into perspective casting doubts on the value if any of such skill transfer in a DDR context if at all they do not have any social-economic impact into the lives of an ex-combatant once they are on their own. Analysts portend that such skills must improve the employability of an individual or boost his/her self-reliance ability and thus the opposite of it can only prompt a rethinking.

An ideal DDR environment must be stable, peaceful and secure to allow for development to take root as well as afford the implementing agencies an opportunity to do that which they desire to as to improve the livelihoods of the ex-combatants which should be at the epicenter of any DDR endeavor. It is noteworthy that implementing agencies, government and or institutions tasked with DDR executes their mandate upholding the principle of mutual cooperation and respect devoid of sideshows.

Ultimately, the overarching interests of DDR are to promote sustainable peace and security, spur economic growth in a post-conflict society and improve quality of life of ex-combatants. These very broad objectives can only be achieved if there are deliberate, concerted and consistent efforts by all the players. In the end, it is the centrality of an ex-combatant in the exercise as well as his/her needs and the quest for sustainable peace and security that should be the centre of focus in any DDR exercise.

5.3 Recommendations

The study makes three elaborate recommendations on the way forward for DDR in South Sudan to be effective and provide much needed peace and security dividends in the troubled nation. One; the Government of South Sudan must take full control of the exercise in terms of designing, implementation and funding. Secondly, tools of governance in the country must be improved to build confidence amongst the citizens and finally, there is a pressing need to deal with civilian militancy in the country.

Right from the signing of the CPA in 2005, the GoSS has consistently shown disinterest in promoting DDR to help in rebuilding the society ravaged by protracted conflict. Needless to say, that there could be no better way of dealing with about 150,000 people deeply involved in the conflict other than through a process that would transition them to be economically productive. A critical look at both the interim government of South Sudan between 2005 and 2011 and the newly formed government of the Republic of South Sudan after the referendum reveals trails of missed opportunities precipitated by lack of commitment from a primary actor.

Despite DDR having been recommended in the CPA, the government continued to ignore its importance other than applying it for self-preservation like the case of forceful disarmament of the Nuer community in Jonglei State as they were considered a threat to the establishment and continued recruitment of armed groups into SPLA whereas they ought to have demobilized so many of the active duty soldiers was the highest form of self-preservation and insincerity.

At the same time, GoSS failed to take an active role at the initial stages of the programmes design and the vacuum gave an opportunity to the implementing agencies and international partners to take advantage by designing what was cheap and affordable rather than what would eventually transform the lives of the ex-combatants. Most important of all is that the GoSS must take full financial responsibility of DDR. By absconding this role and delegating Reintegration component of DDR to the international partners shows a government completely out of touch with the needs of her people.

Over and above promoting DDR to boost peace, security and development, there is need for upholding good governance in all public spheres so as to spur confidence amongst the citizens. Corruption, mismanagement of public funds, patronage by senior government officials and SPLA leaders erodes confidence and acts as catalyst for dissent. Above all, there is a dire need to deal with civilian militancy in South Sudan; this coupled with proliferation of weapons in the country threatens the very basic existence of the young nation. This can be achieved by involving the locals in drawing voluntary disarmament exercise, engaging the youths in alternative occupation, opening up the rural areas for development through development of

basic infrastructure such as roads and schools. Consequently, the culture of conflict merchants who thrive and take advantage of the disenfranchised youths for their own political and economic should be dealt with and highly discouraged.

The government of South Sudan should move with speed to ensure that SPLA becomes a responsive and professional military other than a tribal and welfare outfit as it is currently as this is the only way of minimizing the urge of every young citizen to join. This will go a long way in reducing military spending that is already bulging and thus eating into funds that should be directed to other key sectors of the economy such as education and health that are critical in promoting economic growth.

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APPENDICES

Interview Form for DDR Beneficiaries/ Ex-Combatants

Dear respondent,

I am a Post Graduate Student of International Conflict Management (ICM) at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) University of Nairobi, Kenya currently writing my thesis. My topic is “*DDR as a tool for Sustainable Peace and Development in Post-conflict Societies: A Case of South Sudan*”. I would appreciate your response in helping me achieve objectives of this paper. Any data provided will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will not be used in any other way, other than for academic work.

Please take your time to respond to every question.

Kind regards,

Salim Kimotho

Reg. No R52/76289/2014

Interviewer.....(Name)

Interviewee.....(Name)

Translator (If any).....

Date.....Time.....

Name..... (Optional) Age.....

Telephone Number.....(optional) Email address.....

Occupation..... Station.....Period..... in years/months/weeks days

- i. When and which Rehabilitation centre did you join?
- ii. Approximately how many were you in the camp?

- iii. How long did the rehabilitation process take?
- iv. Briefly explain the skills that you were introduced to during rehabilitation
- v. What start-up kit and or resources were given to you?
- vi. In your opinion was that kit and resources enough/adequate to enable you live a decent life as a civilian?
- vii. What role did the GoSS play during rehabilitation?
- viii. What are some of the social-economic activities that ex-fighters are introduced to during rehabilitation?
- ix. Are there projects that were initiated by ex-fighters and are thriving to date?. List them, what they do and when they were established?
- x. In your opinion, had the DDR activities been implemented differently between 2005/2013 and more people demobilized and or rehabilitated, to what extent would that have helped to stabilize the country?
- xi. What is the status of DDR in South Sudan at the moment?
- xii. To what extent in your opinion can proper DDR activities help in stabilizing a society emerging from conflict, restore peace and put it on a positive economic trajectory?
- xiii. How can (xii) above be achieved in South Sudan?
- xiv. Any other information in regard to DDR implementation in South Sudan that can add value to this Research.

Thank you very much.

You can send your feedback to me via kimotho9@gmail.com

Interview Form for Other Partners Involved in DDR

Dear respondent,

I am a Post Graduate Student of International Conflict Management (ICM) at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) University of Nairobi, Kenya currently writing my thesis. My topic is “*DDR as a tool for Sustainable Peace and Development in Post-conflict Societies: A Case of South Sudan*”. I would appreciate your response in helping me achieve objectives of this paper. Any data provided will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will not be used in any other way, other than for academic work.

Please take your time to respond to every question.

Kind regards,

Salim Kimotho

Reg. No R52/76289/2014

Interviewer.....(Name).....

Date.....Time.....

Name..... (Optional) Age.....

Telephone Number.....(optional)

Email address.....

Occupation..... Station.....Period..... in

years/months/weeks days

- i. What is DDR within the context of South Sudan?
- ii. Give a brief history of DDR in South Sudan

- iii. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, how many ex-combatants have been demobilized. How many were men, women and children?
- iv. How many ex-fighters were targeted to be demobilized by 2011 and by 2016?
- v. In your opinion are the numbers in your answer above adequate?
- vi. Is there a functioning DDR body established and supported by the Government of South Sudan and when was it established?
- vii. List other players/partners with GoSS in DDR activities
- viii. How many Rehabilitation Centers are available across the entire country, are they adequate and how many would be enough?
- ix. What are some of the social-economic activities that ex-fighters are introduced to during rehabilitation?
- x. Are there projects that were initiated by ex-fighters and are thriving to date?. List them, what they do and when they were established?
- xi. What is the reception of rehabilitation efforts by the ex-fighters?
- xii. What support material or otherwise has GoSS given to DDR activities in the country? Is this support adequate?
- xiii. In your opinion, had the DDR activities been implemented differently between 2005/2013 and more people demobilized and or rehabilitated, to what extent would that have helped to stabilize the country?
- xiv. What is the status of DDR in South Sudan at the moment?

- xv. To what extent in your opinion can proper DDR activities help in stabilizing a society emerging from conflict, restore peace and put it on a positive economic trajectory?
- xvi. How can (xiv) above be achieved in South Sudan?
- xvii. Any other information in regard to DDR implementation in South Sudan that can add value to this Research.

Thank you very much.

You can send your feedback to me via kimotho9@gmail.com

Interview Form for Senior GoSS Officials Involved in DDR

Dear respondent,

I am a Post Graduate Student of International Conflict Management (ICM) at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS) University of Nairobi, Kenya currently writing my thesis. My topic is “*DDR as a tool for Sustainable Peace and Development in Post-conflict Societies: A Case of South Sudan*”. I would appreciate your response in helping me achieve objectives of this paper. Any data provided will be treated with utmost confidentiality and will not be used in any other way, other than for academic work.

Please take your time to respond to every question.

Kind regards,

Salim Kimotho

Reg. No R52/76289/2014

Interviewer:.....Interviewee:.....Age:.....

Telephone Number.....(optional)

Email address.....

Occupation:.....Station.....Period..... in
years/months/weeks days

- i. What is DDR within the context of South Sudan?
- ii. Give a brief history of DDR in South Sudan
- iii. Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, how many ex-combatants have been demobilized. How many were men, women and children?
- iv. How many ex-fighters were targeted to be demobilized by 2011 and by 2016?
- v. In your opinion are the numbers in your answer above adequate?
- vi. Is there a functioning DDR body established and supported by the Government of South Sudan and when was it established?
- vii. List other players/partners with GoSS in DDR activities
- viii. How many Rehabilitation Centers are available across the entire country, are they adequate and how many would be enough?
- ix. What are some of the social-economic activities that ex-fighters are introduced to during rehabilitation?
- x. Are there projects that were initiated by ex-fighters and are thriving to date?. List them, what they do and when they were established?
- xi. What is the reception of rehabilitation efforts by the ex-fighters?
- xii. What support material or otherwise has GoSS given to DDR activities in the country? Is this support adequate?
- xiii. In your opinion, had the DDR activities been implemented differently between 2005/2013 and more people demobilized and or rehabilitated, to what extent would that have helped to stabilize the country?

- xiv. What is the status of DDR in South Sudan at the moment?
- xv. To what extent in your opinion can proper DDR activities help in stabilizing a society emerging from conflict, restore peace and put it on a positive economic trajectory?
- xvi. How can (xiv) above be achieved in South Sudan?
- xvii. Any other information in regard to DDR implementation in South Sudan that can add value to this Research.

Thank you very much.

You can send your feedback to me via kimotho9@gmail.com