UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

SECURING PEACE IN EAST AFRICA: CURBING THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN KENYA

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A RESEARCH PROPOSAL PRESENTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTERS DEGREE OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

NOVEMBER 2017
DECLARATION

This research project is my original work and has not been submitted anywhere for examination in any other university or institute of higher learning.

Signature ……………………… Date ………………………

MARGARET WAIRIMU GATHAGA

R50/82073/2015

This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as the university supervisor.

Signature ……………………… Date ………………………

PROF. Amb. Maria Nzomo

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

University of Nairobi
DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my beloved parents, Mr. David Gathaga, and Mrs. Wintrizer Wambui, not forgetting my sisters Mary, Mercy, Mwihaki and Muthoni for their love, care, encouragement and support which inspired me to achieve this goal.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research is a symbolic testimony of the hard work, dedication, and undying support of a great network of friends too numerous to count. Am forever grateful for the incalculable assistance they rendered me through the entire process of research and writing.

I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor Prof. Amb. Maria Nzomo for her time, guidance and support throughout this research. Secondly, I wish to thank my entire family for standing with me at every step of my education, and particularly supporting me with the required resources during this research.

Finally, but no less importantly, I am grateful to all those involved in the data collection exercise; respondents from households, civil society organizations, and law enforcement agencies; and key informants and focus group participants. It is through their freely given participation that this precious base of data has become available.
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# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASTU</td>
<td>Anti Stock Theft Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFJN</td>
<td>Africa Faith and Justice Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European nation</td>
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<td>CASA</td>
<td>Coordinating Action on Small Arms</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal investigation department</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
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<td>DDA</td>
<td>Department for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Western African States</td>
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<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus group discussion</td>
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<td>HH</td>
<td>House hold</td>
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<td>IANSA</td>
<td>International Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>IGOs</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Organizations</td>
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<td>KANSA</td>
<td>Kenyan Action Network on Small Arms</td>
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<td>KFS</td>
<td>Kenya Forest Service</td>
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<td>KNFP</td>
<td>Kenya National Focal Point</td>
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<td>KPR</td>
<td>Kenya Police Reserve</td>
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<td>KPRs</td>
<td>Members of the KPR</td>
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<td>KWS</td>
<td>Kenya Wildlife Service</td>
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<td>NAP</td>
<td>National Action Plan</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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RECSA: Regional Centre on Small Arms
SADC: Southern African Development Community
SALW: Small Arms and Light Weapons
SPLA: Sudanese People’s Liberation Party
UAC: United African Company
UN: United Nations
ABSTRACT

Small arms and light weapons proliferation is a term used by organizations such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), United Nations (UN) and individuals advocating the control of small arms and their trade. Some organizations use the term particularly in arguing for weapons restriction of small arms sales to private citizens in conflict zones. To secure peace in the East Africa region by furthering the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapon agenda; to investigate how small arms and light weapons end up in the hands of unauthorized actors. To examine the control measure suitable for non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons in East Africa; to analyze the challenges that arise in the process of curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the East Africa region. Geographical positions of these areas, economic activity of the area and politics were said to be the main factors influencing the proliferation of small arms in the northern Kenya. It was revealed that weapons were locally made by the indigenous people in Kenya and some of them were imported from other countries. Also, it was discovered weapons stolen from security personnel have been one of the major factors of arms proliferation in Kenya. Notwithstanding, it was made known in the study that weapons that were reportedly got from war torn neighbors such as Sudan, Ethiopia contributed to arms increase. In furtherance, the study discovered that most customers range from local politicians in high circles of northern Kenya politics to prominent community elders and security officials procuring arms for crime markets in other parts of Kenya especially Nairobi areas, Coastal towns and other crime prone areas. Based on the outcomes, it was recommended that government through local leadership should further embark on awareness creation on the importance of peaceful co-existence amongst communities thereby reducing the influx of arms proliferation. This can be made possible by initiating peace programmes and campaigns in the prone areas.
CHAPTER ONE

1.1 Background to the Study

The rapid transfer of arms and light weapons over the world is progressively hard to follow and has durable consequences for\textsuperscript{1} human security. Frequently little arms end up noticeably accessible in an area for legitimate and lawful reasons identified with the security of the nation, keeping of peace or law implementation. Truth be told, a significant part of the exchange arms is authentic and represented.

Just like all other businesses, it has increased globally. Most of the countries now assemble weapons and their components. The main reason of this is the fact that weapons and their parts and ammunitions are easy to divert from the expected destinations. They mostly end up in countries that have no knowledge of their handling and control. The countries that have poor handling and storage of the weapons and arms, mostly end up with non-state armed groups and terrorists.

When weapons are brought in a specific area, they can stay there for a very long time. Their functional lifetime can be many decades. The dynamics of a conflict can be changed instantly by small arms. The main purpose they serve is to kill as they are lethal. They can be used against common citizens and can change a simple argument to a total tragedy. Majority of conflict deaths are due to small arms and weapons. Conflicts on the economy, bad health, diseases and hunger are the main causes of death. Another cause of conflict is displacement of people from their homes, severe injuries and assault. The small arms and weapons often fuel conflicts that lead to

\textsuperscript{1}Small Arms and Light Weapons, a collaborative project of United Nations University (Tokyo, Japan), Swiss peace (Bern, Switzerland), and Small Arms Survey (Geneva, Switzerland).
instability and eventually to poverty. The main causes of violence are not mainly weapons but weapons contribute to the growth of violence.

All inclusive, the marvel of the expansion of unlawful SALW has as of late risen as a noteworthy worry to the world, representing an intricate test that includes security, humanitarian and improvement measurements. The finish of the cold war prompted a decrease responsible for these weapons in many parts of the world, bringing about a critical increment in their dissemination around the world. The quickened pace of globalization in a similar period encouraged both legitimate and illicit cross-border exchanges of these weapons.

It is assessed that there are around 640 million small arms on the planet today, about 60 percent of which are legitimately held by regular people. Nonetheless, the conveyance of these weapons is to a great degree uneven geologically, demographically and institutionally. Taking all things together, 55 to 60% of the universe’s SALW are in the hands of regular citizens, with 35 to 38% in the hands of the military, 3 to 5% held by police and other state powers, and one for each penny in the hands of Non State military. These arms fuel, escalate and add to the prolongation of conflicts. As a conflict is drawn out, the requirement for more arms and ammo develops, in this way propagating an endless loop.

Seventeen years ago, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 on the importance of women’s participation in all areas of peace and security, including conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building. This milestone was a

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2W Cukier, “Small Arms and Light Weapons Presented to Perspectives on Disarmament”, United Nations, New York, March 14th 2001, Ryerson Polytechnic University, Toronto Canada. P. 357
3http://www.research.ryerson.ca/SAFER-Net, p.2
result of decades of activism culminating in the revolutionary idea that peace is inextricably linked with equality between men and women.

The spread of unlawful SALW is a threat to the world and to human security and human rights. No less than 500,000 individuals die consistently because of the use of small arms and light weapons. It is assessed that, out of the four million war-related deaths in the 1990s, 90% of those executed\textsuperscript{4} were regular people, a consequence of abuse of small arms and light weapons. What's more, several millions more individuals have lost their vocation, homes and families in view of the aimless and inescapable use of these weapons. Different measurements of the abuse of arms are the development of the marvel of children, assault as weapons of war (and its specialist sexually transmitted infections including HIV/AIDS) and the assistance of general crimes, psychological warfare, drugs and exchange of narcotics.

The research of "Africa's Missing Billions", led by Oxfam International, International Action Network on small (IANSA) and secure world demonstrates that the cost of conflict in Africa's advancement was around $300 billion in the vicinity of 1990 and 2005. This is equivalent to the measure of cash Africa got for International Aid from significant givers in a similar period. The exploration also shows that the continent loses an average of around $18 billion a year due to armed conflict. However, the global, continental and regional dimension of the negative effects of SALW can be controlled through various measures as will be discussed later in the text.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The proliferation of SALW is a serious problem globally, regionally and even nationally. For instance, Kenya is characterized by an extensive coast line, weak border and regional cooperation, under resourced police forces, corruption and lack of political will to address crime in a sustainable way. This has created an environment in which crime can flourish. The preponderance of SALW has particularly fueled multiple conflicts. Existing literature indicate that few studies have addressed the question of curbing SALW as a tool of securing peace in Kenya.

Does the effort applied towards non – proliferation of arms really enhance peace and sec in the EA region? The focus of this study is therefore securing peace in EA region, by the measure that needs to be taken against the proliferation of SALW in order to achieve peace and securing in EA and Kenya at the nation level.

1.3 Research Questions

i. How do Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferate in Kenya?

ii. What are the control measures suitable for non – proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kenya?

iii. What are the challenges of curbing the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kenya?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of this study is to contribute to secure peace In the EA region and Kenya at nation level by furthering the nonproliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons agenda.
1.5 Specific Objectives

i. To investigate how Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferate in Kenya

ii. To examine and analyze the control measures suitable for non-proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kenya

iii. To investigate the challenges of curbing Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferation in Kenya.

1.6 Literature Review

The illicit and indiscriminate proliferation of small arms and light weapons is one of the many challenges that states and governments globally are currently fighting to manage. The arguably irreconcilable conflict in Rwanda between the Hutu and the Tutsi; Burundi, the crisis in Sudan, the conflict in Mali, the crisis in Uganda and Ethiopia and the 2007 post elections violence in Kenya conflict are some of the conflicts that have occurred in the recent history. These conflicts experiences have badly weakened the institutions and governments in Africa, making them easily prone to conflict.

Expansion of small arms and light weapons is one of the real security dangers in African states. This test has turned into a feared beast and has stayed profound situated in spite of the mounting support from the universal, local and even neighborhood endeavors to relieve it, bringing about the loss of many lives and obliteration of physical foundation inside a few states in the continent. The

multiplication of SALW is primarily an outcome of conflicts at whatever levels and in whatever extent.

Warring groups expect arms to shield themselves from the opponent, moreover revolts and other criminal components expect arms to secure their interests while doing their exercises. Therefore, it is sheltered to present that conflicts are a noteworthy vehicle for both legitimate and unlawful exchange of small arms and light weapons. In a 2004 Human Rights Watch report watched that human right infringement are a noteworthy cause of interior furnished conflict in asset rich nations around the globe, and that covetousness as opposed to grievance alone incites individuals towards inside equipped conflicts.

Larger part of African nations ended up plainly autonomous in the vicinity of 1960 and 1963, when the association of African Unity, which is currently African Union was framed in Addis Ababa. At autonomy in the mid-1960s, SALW was not a major issue. Aside from Portuguese states of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, where Portugal likewise transported in a huge number of SALW to battle African patriots and flexibility contenders; and Angola, where France additionally foreign made huge amounts of a similar sort of weapons to seek after its pioneer motivation. Whatever is left of the continent pretty much were free from the 'devices of death'.

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The end of cold war prompted a decrease responsible for these weapons in many parts of the world, bringing about a huge increment in their flow around the world. The quickened pace of globalization in a similar period encouraged both legitimate and illicit cross border exchanges of these weapons, while a sudden upsurge in intra state conflicts in Africa made stunning interest for them which pushed for more supply. It is evaluated that there are 640 million small arms on the planet today, of which 7 million are in the West African district. Without a doubt, the SALW issue is a worldwide one which requires worldwide consideration and the production of arrangements at all levels of political and social associations keeping in mind the end goal to join the two sexual orientations in this battle similarly. Therefore, numerous Governments have consented to various arrangements at worldwide and provincial levels to stop the illicit spread of SALW crosswise over borders.

There are two sorts of worldwide and local concessions to SALW: 11 Legal and political. The most imperative distinction these two sorts of agreements is that the legitimate understanding is lawfully official. By consenting to the arrangement, states submit themselves to follow its prerequisites. A political concurrence on the other hand is an outflow of will and purpose to carry on as per certain standards and standards.

11 Small Arms Survey 2001
There exists an International agreement that deals with the illicit proliferation and trade of SALW. For example, the UN protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking of firearms, their parts, components and ammunitions. (UN Firearms Protocol). The UN Programme of action to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects (UN PoA). At the sub-regional level, the ECOWAS Convention on small arms an light weapons, Their Ammunitions and Related Materials was adopted in 2006. It succeeded the ECOWAS Moratorium of 1998, the first political agreement on SALW in the Sub-region that bans the importation and manufacturing of illegal weapons. It is legally binding to its members.

Work on limitation by means of the United Nations falls into two primary categories: The office for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), which acts at the point of convergence for the inner UN component known as CASA (Coordinating Action on Small Arms), and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. (UNIDIR), which does inquire about in arms control undertakings. Numerous other related legislative and non-administrative associations (NGOs), additionally chip away at SALW arms control. The media tends to often report deaths, injuries and displacements, and this is a result of the possession of illegal arms by individuals and organized criminal group.

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12 United Nations, “Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its aspects” New York, 2002.


14Michael Renner. “Curbing the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons: The World Watch Institute Homepage”. www.worldwatch.org/node/3738
The widespread availability of SALW has fuelled conflicts, resulting to destruction of immeasurable amount of property, gross violation of Human Rights, facilitation of the practice of bad governance, subversion of constitutions, coup d’état, creating general state of fear, insecurity and instability.

The proliferation of firearms in the East African Region is particularly a major concern and a grave threat to peace in the region. Most of the unregistered weapons in Kenya are smuggled into the country from neighboring countries. Realizing the need to end the destruction and mayhem that these deadly weapons cause in the country as well as in the region is therefore very vital.

The theory of Small Arms Demand helps to explain the proliferation of small arms and light weapons agenda. According to Meek and Scott’s theory, ‘demand’ is defined as a function of motivation and means variables, both of which can serve as inhibitors (lack of motivation, lack of means) or as stimulators. Motivations and means can be substituted as willingness and ability. In general, motivations include social, political and culturally constituted dynamic preferences for firearms.

Motivation can be assessed both qualitatively (motivation to be safe, to take revenge, etc.) and quantitatively (a weak versus strong drive), therefore, for the purpose of this study, both qualitative and quantitative data is collected. A similar flexible approach is applied to the ‘means’ dimension, which includes the prices, which can be assessed quantitatively.\textsuperscript{15} Resources include monetary items. The monetary sources could be credits, grants, earned income from work and other financial assets.

Though prices influence individual’s purchasing power, it should not be envisioned as a limited factor, since practices of lending and borrowing arms is common. The non-monetary sources refer to the availability and accessibility of arms and acquisition.

In consequence, the expression of ‘civilian demand’ of arms is governed by the interlay of ‘motivation’ and ‘means’ variables. However, in terms of weapons acquisition, proportionate requirement of both variables is not a necessary requirement. For instance, where the motive for purchase is prestige, which is often in the case of legal markets, price is a secondary consideration. This is because in such circumstances, arms bought for display might be a luxury type of good and the high price is itself a source of pride. In other case, a stronger motivation level would lead to a higher demand for the weapon, ‘but the same is not true for resources: if one’s resources are high, this may displace the demand of guns towards other, more onerous, means to fulfil the preference that has been expressed’.

Oosthugsmen’s approach to analyze demand is useful as it best suits an epistemological type of study where the emphasis lies at the local micro level, focusing on the individual. In the context of this study, the motivation and means variables were applied in novel fashion diagnose civilian perceptions and trigger factors which led to a demand of arms. The theory analytical logic of analyzing demand was utilized in the interview guide and applied in the fieldwork undertaken. It is essential to first further problematized demand in itself, before applying it to the case study, Kenya.
1.6.1 The Proliferation of Guns and Rustling in Karamoja and Turkana Regions: A Case of Appropriate Disarmament Strategies

The International Society heads to treat gun running by organized cartels as drug trafficking. Modern weapons have increased the opportunity and means for inter-conflict reciprocal raids, cross border warfare have more devastating and militarization has influenced the nature of political relationship between the Karamojong of Uganda and the Turkana community of Kenya, and their pastoral neighbouring.

The easy availability of quality firearms poses a threat to regional security and tests the survivability of fragile democracies of Africa. Application of appropriate disarmament strategies is therefore key. The strategy should be people focused, include long term economic development of the neglected regions and involve all communities within each country and across International boundaries. Most important, each state should strive to connect with the periphery, cultivate mutual trust, and consider all sub-tribes inalienable elements of Nation State. If those steps are to be taken, disarmament will be resisted for being punitive and confrontational, unilateral and short-term.

It is argued that before the Turkana and Karamojong and other pastoral communities lay down their arms, there must be an International effort to limit the freedom enjoyed by arms and ammunition to the herders. Since livestock rustling is the main

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17 Ibid P. 180-185
motive for arming, disarming must go hand in hand with altruistic policies that could provide alternative livelihoods.

Small Arms nonproliferation policies such as the Arms Trade Treaty, ECOWAS Moratorium on importation, exportation and manufacture of weapons, ECOWAS Small Arms Control Program, (ECOSAP), Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa (SATCRA) among other policies have been re-examined to ascertain that these policies are specific, measurable, attainable and time bound, and would prove useful in controlling to a large extent the level of proliferation of SALW.

1.6.2 Research Gap

Small arms and light weapons are plentiful, cheap, and easy to operate. These weapons are a highly desired and profitable commodity and are often sold with little domestic and international regulation by numerous weapons producers, from surplus military stockpiles, and by private arms dealers. Some states even give away huge numbers of small arms to shore up or undermine foreign regimes. A huge number of weapons are in public and private hands. According to the Small Arms Survey there are at least 875 million firearms in the world.1 Of these, 200 million or more belong to state militaries and 26 million or more to law enforcement agencies. The majority of global firearms, however—roughly two-thirds of the estimated total—are in the hands of nonstate actors and civilians.2 And many more are being produced.3 The legal trade in small arms was worth approximately $1.58 billion in 2006, but this does not include unreported and illegal sales. The Small
Arms Survey estimates that the total trade in small arms and light weapons, along with spare parts, accessories, and ammunition, almost certainly exceeds $4 billion.

1.7 Justification of the Study

1.7.1 Academic Justification

The research will serve as a starting point for further research by other scholars who will be interested in this area of study. Furthermore, it will not only add to the body of the existing literature, but it will also explore fresh options wherein containing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, in the East African Region, particularly Kenya, and also identify the gaps in the field of study.

1.7.2 Policy Justification

Small arms and Light weapons are capable of aggravating conflict in the region. This study shall therefore provide a framework that will address the non-proliferation of SALW mechanisms or measures that needs to be applied in order to secure peace in the region. Similarly, this study will also serve as a good source of information by Kenyan policy makers, constitutional lawyers, students of IDIS and sociology including politicians and professionals in crises and conflict management. In addition, it could also be used to identify loopholes and adopt strategies that could help prevent the proliferation of arms in Kenya.
1.8 Theoretical Framework

1.8.1 Securitization Theory

Security contemplates speak profoundly of global relations, prevalently managing the issues of war and peace. In the years following the Second World War, security ponderers have turned into an equivalent word for key examinations with an unmistakable concentrate on military division. However, with the developing complexities of worldwide relations motivation, in particular with the ascent of financial and ecological difficulties check, rise of another security difficulties, dangers and dangers, rise of new global relations on-screen characters, the customary view on the sole idea of security, that is, its quintessence, has turned out to be excessively tight.

Tremendous commitment to the contemporary security considers was made by Copenhagen School of security contemplates, which offered a unique range of security issues, seeing obviously that security progression could never again be diminished just to the military-political motivation.\textsuperscript{18} Buzan Barry, one of the delegates of the Copenhagen School, gets the idea of enlarging, extending and expanding security by concentrating on the conventional military power as well as by consolidating non-military divisions, for example, financial, societal and natural parts as columns to security.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{18}Buzan, B. (1991) \textit{People, States and Fear: An Agenda for Security Analysis in the Post Cold War Era}. Brighton: Weatsheaf
At last, it can be contended that the extent of security research and concern has definitely changed. There appears to have been a principal move in the worldview of security worries since the finish of icy war in 1990. The customary issues and worries of security before the icy war time frame remains at a separation; on one side of the continuum from the issues that portray the contemporary worries of security on the other. The regular or conventional security issues to a great extent bordered on regional sway of the state, between state relations, war and peace, adjust of energy, the approach and routine with regards to discouragement, including procedures for accomplishing and boosting the destinations and interests of the state, among others. Then again the new and contemporary worries of security border on significantly more unique issues.  

The UNDP (1994) Human Development Index Report on Human Security recognized a portion of the new security worries to incorporate natural debasement; extensive scale outcast developments and movement, across the board damaging pandemic, including HIV/AIDS and much more as of late, Malaria; development of religious fundamentalism, expanded instances of intra-state violence, furnished conflicts and expanded common wars, with resultant occurrences of state crumple.

Still others are, rising joblessness; extending destitution; net human rights infringement and expanded instances of genocide and ethnic purging; monstrous exchange and exchange of unlawful surplus arms and their cross border suggestions; globalization and its resultant discontents; fear based oppression; offers of

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21 Ibid, 56.
medications and people crosswise over borders,(drug and human trafficking); monetary and money related wrongdoings and unfavorable outcomes on great administration; among numerous others.

The significance of this hypothesis in the investigation is to standard the significance of expanding the comprehension of security by joining different issues that influence peace in a roundabout way. To facilitate non-multiplication of small arms and light weapons motivation, we may not accomplish this objective by concentrating on the conventional significance of security which just focuses power and weapons, yet rather grasp the contemporary and more unique issues, with a specific end goal to secure peace in the East African district. 23

1.9 Hypotheses

H₁₁: Small Arms and Light Weapons proliferate in Kenya

H₀₁: Small Arms and Light Weapons do not proliferate in Kenya

H₁₂: There are control measures suitable for controlling SALW in Kenya

H₀₂: There are no control measures laid for controlling SALW in Kenya

H₁₃: There are laid practices as well as challenges faced in curbing the prolife of SALW in Kenya

H₀₃: There are no laid practices as well as challenges faced in curbing the proliferations of SALW in Kenya.

23 UNDP. Human Development Index Report on Human Security, 1994
1.10 Research Methodology

This study seeks to investigate how peace can be secured in the East African region, by curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Kenya.

1.11 Research Design

The research design will be descriptive survey. This is a method of data collection by interviewing or administering questionnaires to a sample of individuals. In this research, information will be collected from respondents and their opinion regarding the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Kenya. The researcher will use empirical method to meet the objectives and make conclusions. Data will be obtained using primary sources such as questionnaires and interviews, and secondary sources such as reviewing academic books, reports, periodical journals, newspapers, relevant internet websites and articles.

The study will be carried out in West Pokot region, the host communities being the Pokot communities and the neighbouring communities of Trans-Nzoia region that happens to be a metropolitan community. The respondents will be both men and women mostly ranging from 18 to 70 years of age.

1.12 Target Population

The target population will be about 300,000 people. The respondents will include 10 village elders, 10 young adults, 10 middle aged people and 5 religion ministers. The respondents will be selected by use of purposive sampling. This sampling technique will allow the researcher to handpick cases that have the required information with respect to the objectives of the study. A visit to the Office of Disarmament Affairs will be done, and an interview carried out to a sample of individuals.
1.13 Sampling Procedure

The respondents will be drawn from West-Pokot and Trans- Nzoia regions of Kenya. These locations are in Kenya’s Rift Valley region. The respondents will be sampled from the villages and rural areas. Preference will be given to the members who will be willing to complete the questionnaires. The sampling methods will include; simple random, cluster snow ball and purposive where appropriate. Gender balance of both male and female will be taken into consideration.

1.14 Data Analysis Procedure

The data for this study will be obtained from primary sources. Empirical data will be both statistical and descriptive, and will contain duly completed questionnaires. This method of analysis will be simplified by the coding system of the questionnaires. Explanatory statistic will be the main method of analysis that will explain the proliferation of SALW in the region. Descriptive statistics will also be used so as to seek to understand the opinion of the host community. The methods are recommended for both qualitative and quantitative data.

Statistical methods that will be used will include frequencies, tabulations and percentages. Pie charts will be used in presenting analysis. The data will be interpreted, discussed with reference to the premises. After the interpretation and discussion of the data, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations of the study findings will be given.
1.15 Chapter Outline

Chapter one provides an introduction and background of the study. The following section of the work are discussed; statement of the problem, objectives, hypotheses, lit rev, justification of the study theoretical framework and methodology

Chapter two provides a discussion of ways in which SALW proliferate in Kenya.

SALW tend to proliferate due to reasons such as proliferation national laws cost and wide availability of arms, social and cultural factors, portability and durability characteristic of this arms, economical and political factors, porous, borders and globalization among others.

Chapter three devotes to find out the control measures suitable for nonproliferation of SALW in Kenya. Under this topic control measures such as disbarment, awareness creation on small arms arrest and prosecution of illicit arm possession, setting up of specialized police unit such as anti – stock theft and establishment of international norms and reducing surplus weapons is clearly discussed.

Chapter four discusses the challenges faced in the process of curably the profile of SALW in Kenya. In this chapter, challenges such as bureaucratic challenges, competing national priorities and limited political support, limited institutions in human capacity, limited resources coordination problems, among others are clearly stated.

Chapter five presents a sum may of the main finally, conclusions, and recommendations.
CHAPTER TWO

WAYS IN WHICH SALW PROLIFERATE IN KENYA

2.1 Introduction

The significant threat in the world for peace and security is the unchecked flow of small arms and light weapons. Despite the fact that the weapons are not the main cause of conflict, the fact that they are easily available and are cheap to purchase makes it easy for belligerents to initiate and maintain conflicts.

Intra-state conflict generally involves the parties at war, conflict between blurred lines, the involvement of common citizens, conflict in the local communities; and the society at a whole. There is also presence of untrained forces that at most times violate the rule of war. Most of the times, children and teenagers recruited in the untrained forces to ill and rampage.

2.2 Samples of Small Arms

Pictures 2.2.1: Samples of small arms
2.3 Sources of Small Arms

The main borders that are greatly affected by conflict are the Horn of Africa, the Easters region and the Northern Uganda. Those who traffic guns mostly find their customers in Nairobi City and in the Northern Kenya from pastoralists that defend their livestock and community (Rukia, 2002).

The main sources of weapons are the states that are unstable in the Horn of Africa. Southern Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia are the countries that bring crossroads to the Northern part of Kenya. These countries have been involved in unending civil wars due to political ambitions that result from government changes and the distribution of weapons in the society (Mbugua, 2007).

According to Wepundi el at. (2012), a Small Arms Survey in Mandera-Kenya in 2011, shows that firearms are mostly transported by the use of animals such as donkeys. Another way of transporting weapons is hiding them in the cargo like charcoal, sand and cooking oil for sale in the urban centers. According to the respondents Garrissa, Mandera and Somalia residents were mainly used as connections by the gunrunners. Table 1 below were some of the trafficking routes and means of transportation of small arms according to Wepundi el at. (2012).

Respondents reported that their main sources of firearms were from the neighboring countries although they were so unanimous in the reporting. Arms traffickers are said to use animals such as donkeys to transport firearms. The transportation of firearms

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are mostly transported by the use of animals such as donkeys to the urban centers for sale.

Pictures 2.2.2 Samples of small arms

![Image of small arms]

### 2.4 Trafficking Routes and Means of Transportation

**Table 2.1: Trafficking Routes and Means of Transportation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Main source</th>
<th>Means</th>
<th>Root</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Road, people, animals</td>
<td>Somalia–Mandera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia–Garissa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mandera–Wajir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia–Mandera–Wajir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Eastern</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Road, animals, traders, government vehicles</td>
<td>Moyale–Marsabit–Isiolo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Garissa–Isiolo–Marsabit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Rift/Western</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia,</td>
<td>Road, traders, community to community</td>
<td>Sudan–Lokichoggio–Lodwar–Kapenguria–Eldoret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan, Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ethiopia–Maralal–Nyahururu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kapenguria–Tot–Kapodo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda–Lodwar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Uganda–Kapenguria–Kitale–Bungoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Rift</td>
<td>Somalia, Ethiopia,</td>
<td>Road, traders, community to community</td>
<td>Kitale–Eldoret–Nakuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan, Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nairobi–Naivasha–Nakuru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nyahururu–Nakuru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Field work, (2017)*
2.5 Respondents’ perceptions of the frequency of firearms-related deaths or injuries (LEAs and CSOs)

Table: 2.2: Respondents’ Perceptions of The Frequency of Firearms-Related Deaths or Injuries (LEAs and CSOs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LEAs</th>
<th>CSOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1–5 victims per month</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No deaths or injuries</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–10 victims per month</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Field work, (2017)*

2.6 Small Arms Impact

According to 30.7% of the HH respondents, firearms are greatly responsible for the increase of human insecurity. An arms race is known to be fed by the rate of insecurity in most parts of the country. For example, due to the loss of livestock in the Northern part of Kenya in 2011, the communities were forced to restock their herds through raids.

As indicated by the Kenyan Police, the small arms and perceptions of security in Kenya lads to the increase in crime (Kenya Police, 2008). The use of peace-building and security management systems in the communities can be used to deal with small arms and light weapons. For example, in Samburu, during the FGD, the morans go to an extent of using guns in case of a disagreement over girlfriends. If young
robbers in Marakwet suspect one of having money or incase one just sells their cattle, they use weapons which makes insecurity in the area high\textsuperscript{25}.

Human insecurity is determined by use of armed violence which leads to death and severe injuries, loss of property, food insecurity, and lack of employment, sexual assaults and displacement of people from their homes. It has been observed that armed violence and cattle raids have reduced.

**Table 2.3: Perceived HH Safety Levels (Various Times and Places)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of day or night</th>
<th>Unsafe</th>
<th>Safe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Safety in home at night/in darkness</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety outside home at night/in darkness</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety walking around the marketplace during the day</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety outside home during the day, less than a 1-minute walk from home</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety inside home, during the day/in daylight</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>91.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety walking around the marketplace during the day</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety in home at night/in darkness</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>62.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety outside home during the day, during festivities</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety outside home during the day, at harvest time</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>75.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety outside home during the day, during the rain season</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety outside home during the day, during the dry season</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)*

The ready availability of small arms through legal and illegal channels only serves to aggravate the problem in sub-Saharan Africa (AEFJN, 2013). These weapons fuel

instability, conflict and pose a threat to sustainable development besides security of the nation (Small Arms Survey, 2012).\textsuperscript{26} The widespread proliferation of small arms is contributing to alarming levels of armed crime, in marginalized rural and urban areas. It has also exacerbated the ever-existent armed cattle rustling and tribal conflicts in pastoralist areas (Mbugua, 2007).

Several ways have been documented in which small arms and light weapons proliferate. Key to note are through transfers from a benefactor to a recipient, leakages from state and civilian stocks, acquisitions of recycled weapons from previous transfers, homemade weapons and ammunition, and battle captures (AEFJN, 2013). Approximately 20 per cent of households in Kenya are victims of a crime or an act of violence every year. Worse enough, 40 per cent feel that there is a likelihood of being victims of armed violence and/or crime. The government of Kenya embarked on voluntary disarmament among the warring communities in the Rift Valley, Eastern and North-Eastern provinces in which a number of firearms were confiscated (Wepundi et al., 2012).

As illustrated above, the trade in illicit small and light weapons has many negative impacts to Kenya and its neighbours. However, Kenya alone cannot mitigate the proliferation of these arms and this calls for concerted efforts of all other nations, more so, the neighbours. Further, small and light weapons are not a simple problem to tackle. Unlike heavy weapons, they have a legitimate military, police, and civilian

\textsuperscript{26} International Journal of Thesis Projects and Dissertations (IJTPD) Vol. 4, Issue 2, pp: (176-195), Month: April - June 2016, Available at: www.researchpublish.com
use\textsuperscript{27}. As a result of the changing nature of the trade in small arms and the complexity of the problem, strategies to address the problem are mainly national, regional and international initiatives. For example, the unprecedented post-election violence which took place after the elections held in December 2007 whereby the reduction of small arms reduction was a higher issue to the national agenda. In this line a Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms and Light Weapons (KNFP) initiative was formed. The initiative was to control the proliferation of small arms. However, all the noted three initiatives mentioned above face significant challenges whereby civilians hold between 530,000 and 680,000 firearms countrywide. Despite the fact that a reduction of firearms has been noted in the country, areas like the Mt Elgon and the Rift Valley continue to hold a large record of gun possession since 2003 (Arms Survey, 2012). Therefore, the strategies have remained inadequate to address the problem of small arms proliferation.

In the previous year, about 21.1\% of the respondents had been victims of crimes and violence. 53.2\% had experienced two or more encounters of crime and violence while 46.8\% had experienced once. Figure 2.12 demonstrates that security is increasing and there are fewer incidents; HH members indicated that they had been victims whereby the volatility rate was high. This data was contradicted by the Kenya Police which showed that it was lower in the North-Eastern parts of Kenya (Kenya Police, 2010, p. 2).

Low-volatility areas were found to experience crimes at home. Areas with high volatility were found to experience crimes all over the location whereby a third was at home, a third at the streets, 18% on private lands. Areas with moderate volatility experienced crimes on the roads. Private lands experienced crimes in the high-volatility areas. The medium and low volatility areas were prone to crime due to urbanization.

**Figure 2.1: Location of Climes Experienced by HH Respondents by County Volatility**

The HH respondents experienced robbery/theft as shown by 61.2%, 20.9% were faced by threat/intimidation, 14% experienced assault, beating, shooting, or fighting, 15.5% were serious cases that led to death, 7.1% were revenge killings whereas 5% faced unintentional killings as shown by Table 2.10).  

---

Table 2.4: Type of Crime or Violence Experienced (Multiple Responses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of incident</th>
<th>Cases expressed as percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robbery/theft</td>
<td>61.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat/intimidation</td>
<td>20.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault/beating/shooting/fighting</td>
<td>14.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gang violence</td>
<td>8.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intentional killing</td>
<td>7.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenge killing</td>
<td>5.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-clan fighting</td>
<td>3.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unintentional killing</td>
<td>3.5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape/sexual assault</td>
<td>3.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>2.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug dealing</td>
<td>1.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping</td>
<td>0.7 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field work, (2017)

According to Table 1.4, more than a third of the victims were confronted by the attacker with a firearm. Most of the firearms used were Small Arms Survey Special Report (16.8%), then handguns at 14.5%. Use of traditional and bladed weapons was at a quarter and 19% used no weapon.²⁹

2.7 Reporting of the Cases

According to the respondents, 64% of the cases were mostly taken to the police, 21.5% were taken to the provincial administration, 4.6% were reported to family members while 4% to traditional leaders (see Table 1.5).

Table 2.5: To Whom Crime/Violence Incidents Were Reported

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>% of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial administration</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbours</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leaders</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigilantes</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private security providers</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the total of the right-hand column may not correspond to 100 per cent due to rounding.

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)
2.7.1 Factors Influencing Proliferation of Small Arms

General Lack of Awareness

As a rule, it could be contended that there is a general absence of familiarity with the issue of small arms elements in the area. A case can be found in Kenya: in light of expanding violence against the Mukogodo Maasai pastoralists by furnished gatherings, the administration of Kenya took the choice to arm home watchmen for the assurance of the groups. A long way from being an answer for the issue, the choice prompted the expansion of small arms in the hands of untrained men and claims that the home gatekeepers are really engaged with the attacks. 30.

Porous National Laws on Possession of Arms

Another central issue is that national laws are either non-existent or feeble and unblended. Take the Kenyan case over: The issue now is the legitimate control of home watchmen and of private security firms; the laws expected to completely direct both are not set up. In addition, there is an absence of police limit in the area. Another critical factor supporting illegal trafficking is the poor cross-border participation between police powers and other government authorities. Cows stirring, or attacking, has turned into a noteworthy conflict hazard for the pastoralist groups in Kenya and Uganda. 31 Attacking has suggestions for relations with neighboring states, as "warriors" cross national borders looking for dairy cattle and weapons. The poor instruments for cross-border collaboration between the Kenyan and Ugandan

30 ECOWAS Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED), March 1999. © Center for Promoting Ideas, USA www.ijhssnet.com

31 Che, Kevin Ngang (2007), “Small Arms and Light Weapons, Africa’s True WMDs: The Role of SALW in Conflict and Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa”. A thesis from European University Center for Peace Studies
governments imply that they are seriously obliged in controlling the developments of furnished gatherings and weapons. Joint activity is the main powerful reaction.

**Low Cost and Wide Availability**

Technology is required in the production of small arms and light weapons as they are mainly manufactured for the military, police and civilian uses and therefore there are many suppliers all over the world.

Dealers think that it’s beneficial to carry weapons into Kenya because they order a significantly higher cost there. For instance, in 1999 Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) defectors allegedly could offer an ambush rifle to pastoralist Karamojong merchants on the Sudan/Uganda border for 30,000 Ugandan shillings (around $20), the Karamojong dealers would thus pitch the weapons to Pokot brokers living on the Uganda/Kenya border, who could offer it in Kenya for Ksh. 10,000 (roughly $135). That same firearm could then be sold in Nairobi for as much as Ksh.40,000 (around $530). What's more, it isn't strange in Kenya for weapons to be dealt for different items. On the Kenyan border weapons can be traded, contingent upon the present supply, for two goats or a cow.

There is a flourishing business sector for firearms in the border zones, with interest for such weapons energized by nearby and cross-border steers assaults, and additionally equipped border invasions. Furthermore, huge numbers of the weapons that dealers sneak into Kenya are transported to the inside of the nation. They are

here and there pirated by pontoon, however regularly conveyed on board business vehicles used to transport domesticated animals or other stock. One basic goal is Lokichokio close to the borders with Sudan and Uganda, rumored to be a focal point of the illicit exchange guns and ammo in northwest Kenya.

**Simplicity and Durability**

Small arms are simple to use and maintain they need very little maintenance and have a tendency to remain in operation for many decades. They also need very little training on their use thus effective in training of children and combatants.

**Portability and Conceal Ability**

It is very easy to carry small arms and light weapons by any individual or even vehicles, they can easily be moved in any area and can be hidden inside of other cargo shipments.

**Economic Factors**

Pastoralist communities often trade cattle for weapons. The main economic activity of the northern region of Kenya communities is animal husbandry __livestock keeping. Due to this there is widely use of small arms to protect their livestock from cattle raids, as these arms are cheaper and easy to handle and therefore children can be trained easily on how to use them.

**Social and Cultural Factors**

It is a fact that northern region of Kenya suffers from small arms proliferation. Their cultures are of violence and gun-ownership as a symbol of power and pride, even objects of affection. It is so due to communal security, inter-ethnic rivalries, and
struggles over scarce resources and the requirements of warrior cultures.\textsuperscript{34} Solutions to these problems require a fresh commitment of resources, new education programs and community participation (Kizito and Sabala, 2002). The culture of pastoralism makes them to find it necessary to defend their communities thus their traditions include the carrying of weapons.

**Political Factors**

Political instability in Kenya creates a great demand for the firearms. Political instabilities are often linked with weapons and therefore the manufactures link it to it to take advantage of the markets for the weapons (Mbugua, 2005).

In light of a Toposa (Sudan) strike on the Turkana amid the keep running up to last year’s general race in Kenya, the two groups went into a standard consent to stop cows’ assaults. The understanding was fixed at Kapota, Sudan and saw by communities’ senior citizens, lawmakers and government authorities (Mohahoud, 2004).

The agreement authorized the Toposa to restore the stolen creatures. No particular date or time allotment was given for the arrival of the domesticated animals. To add salt to damage, the Toposa people group again struck the Turkana toward the beginning of May, inciting their casualties to strike back. The Turkana contended that the Toposa had not regarded the Kapota revelation. Retribution was the best way to look for equity, or so they thought (Wairagu and Ndung’u, 2013). Also the case of

\textsuperscript{34} Decision A/DEC13/12/99 “Establishing of National Commissions for the Control of the Proliferation and Illicit Circulation of Light Weapons,” Lome, Togo, 10 December 1999
2007 post-election violence where thousands of Kenyans were killed and others armed by the use of small arms (Mkutu, 2008).

Geographical Factors

The African continent has different kinds of histories, geographical conditions, and development of economies, public policies and patterns of global interactions. Locations of conflicts in Africa reflect its diversity and the causes of conflicts. The natural resources in Kenya, historical heritage, farmers and agriculturists problems are all related to the main causes of conflict to humanitarian aid. The Turkana community has borne much of the brunt due to her geographical location.

The group of people is in conflict with practically every one of her neighbors: Merille, Dong’iro, Toposa and Dinka toward the north, Karamojong toward the west, Pokot and Samburu toward the south. Of the considerable number of locales, the northern outskirts conflicts have been most extreme and successive (Kizito, 2002). Geology factors, for example, the territory and populace appropriation similarly assumes a critical part. Accordingly, uprisings all the more consistently happen in these groups because of frail government power and one whose topographical powers does not warrant the administration power to ensure its aggregate domain.

Military, Police and Civilian Uses

The use of small arms and light weapons often do not strengthen the line between civilians and the police officers unlike the conventional weapons. Most of the countries have increased the purchasing of weapons due to counterinsurgency against ethnic and political groups and for domestic uses which depends on the laws of law control as citizens have been permitted to own weapons\textsuperscript{37}.

Issues of Governance

The disappointment in governance to give the required security was a factor that constrained natives to search for an option. Studies shows that, need trust in security powers, understaffing or some of the time basically the failure of security offices to complete their obligation successfully in numerous African nations educated the solid need by subjects to procure arms keeping in mind the end goal to shield themselves and their property from outfitted violence.

Corruption

The endless loop of low compensations and corruption makes reproducing justification for the expansion of small arms and light weapons among the nonmilitary personnel populace. Traditions officers are paid off by weapons merchants, troopers, cops and security powers are known to have sold government weapons to offenders.

\textsuperscript{37} Source: Tool Kit on Small Arms and Light Weapons, produced by The Regional Ecumenical Working Group on Small Arms for East Africa, Nairobi (2004).
Porous Borders

Because of permeable and broad borders, frail governments, and incapable national security frameworks, SALW are hard to control or record for as they move inside the locale starting with one conflict zone then onto the next. They channel a long ways past armed forces and police powers to criminal associations, private security powers, vigilante squads, and individual subjects. For instance, among cross-border pastoralist groups arms are procured clearly for security purposes however progress toward becoming encouraging instruments in conventional practices of animals assaulting. The use of such present day weapons has transformed such conventional practices into deadly fighting. Likewise, as peaceful territories get immersed with arms, pastoralists themselves move toward becoming providers of arms to non-peaceful rustic ranges and urban focuses. Deficient policing makes it simple for these illicit arms to flow without being distinguished by law authorization experts. As an outcome furnished guiltiness in urban, rustic, and border zones is on the expansion.

Globalization

The powers of globalization carry with it openings and difficulties, the disposal of state authorized confinements on trades crosswise over borders and the inexorably incorporated and complex worldwide arrangement of creation and trade that has risen thus additionally confuse the test of containing SALWs expansion. The possibility of globalization and its promoter with the expectation of complimentary market powers with least monetary obstructions and open exchange for world advancement gives ground to illegal exchange arms by limiting custom directions

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38 E.A. Mworozi, and A. Ntende, (2010). Livestock rustling, small arms and ethnic conflict in Improving human security through the control and management of small arms (APFO/IRG, Nairobi).
and border control, trafficking of small arms ends up plainly less demanding. Malhotra, (2011), focused on that, a miniscule percent of holder ships have load checks, subsequently influencing the arms development to smooth. Faking reports paying off authorities and covering arms as philanthropic guides are normal practices.

Malhotra (2011) recognized globalization factors that encourage expansion of illegal exchange arms:

a) Political and financial coordination are combined with lesser confinements in relocation and human development. This causes the arms merchants to brace their present business associations and tap new ones. Merchants relocate to different locales, roused by business extension or lessened operational dangers.

b) Banking changes and capital versatility have supported the underground market to spread its exchange globally, using each edge of the very much connected monetary market. This additionally offers ascend to seaward markets and assessment covers. A representation of managing an account advancement is E-cash. Banks have presented cards bearing microchips, which can store vast aggregates of cash. These cards are compact outside customary channels or can be effectively traded among people.

c) The linkage of keeps money with the web has represented another test in battling ill-conceived exercises in the monetary part. E-managing an account has digitized cash making it inclined to culpability. Despite the fact that, it
has various advantages for the world everywhere, it is misused for illegal tax avoidance, Visa tricks and registration. Adding to this, monetary reconciliation among areas favors arm dealers with more chances to shield their cash, by putting resources into various stock trades. Various other illicit practices are a result of a deregulated monetary area, however tax evasion is at the summit. Illegal tax avoidance or 'purging of cash' is an unlawful routine with regards to hiding the purpose of starting point, personality or goal of the assets, when playing out a specific money related exchange. The hoodlums move cash crosswise over borders picking up from banks in nations with careless hostile to washing approaches.

d) Profound extension of business carrier and cargo industry (making transport less expensive and less demanding) are instrumental in expanded entrance of arms in conflict zones. Worldwide merger of carrier organizations, supply chains, shipping firms make it extreme to regulate unlawful practices in air and water.

e) The development of worldwide correspondence in the previous two decades has been unbelievable. This has improved the capacity of arms merchants to convey universally through the web at a modest rate.

**Blaming Refugees**

In spite of the fact that weapons course in Kenya is entangled and for the most part includes numerous performing artists, the administration ordinarily traits weapons trafficking, alongside different violations, to displaced people living in Kenya and unpredictably accuses evacuees of being the significant wellspring of weakness. For
instance, the senior authority in charge of guns authorizing expressed: "Numerous outcasts moving from neighboring war-torn nations convey with them all way of guns" and distinguished the "larger part" of evacuees as previous warriors who "cross the borders with the weapons and offer them for subsistence."

President Moi himself has contended that exiles are to a great extent to fault for bringing weapons and wrongdoing into Kenya, and the best authority in North Eastern Province has faulted arms trafficking for the outcast group living in camps. More than 200,000 outcasts have looked for shelter in Kenya from neighboring nations. The successive xenophobic or against evacuee explanations, police provocation, self-assertive captures and coercion by government authorities have made an inexorably antagonistic condition for a large number of displaced people not ensnared in arms trafficking.

For the sake of security, the administration has kept most exiles to camps in immature regions. While national and border security issues are plainly a need for any legislature, no administration can, for the sake of security, stomp on the privileges of exiles. The duties of an administration to guarantee national security and to maintain its commitment to regard displaced person rights are not opposing. In actuality, long haul security interests are best served through the execution of instruments that maintain the run of law. At last, mishandling the human privileges of displaced people and unpredictably punishing outcasts without due process or individual responsibility is neither a satisfactory choice under global law nor does it give the best and practical local security approach.
The Kenyan government can take other, all the more just strides to address security and forestall secretive agitator movement, for example, expanded police watches and knowledge reconnaissance along the border or among groups with high quantities of displaced people, the migration of the exile camps and settlements with evacuees advance far from the borders with Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, and the unbiased examination and arraignment of those people in charge of criminal action, be they Kenyans or non-nationals. Each of these recommendations is less prohibitive than the uncertain imprisonment of thousands of individuals who have not verifiably risked Kenya's wellbeing, and would take into account a more supportable and rights-regarding security arrangement over the long haul.

2.8 Research and Information

2.8.1 Introduction

The presentation, analysis and interpretation of data collected in the study using descriptive statistics, Percentages and graphs and pie charts were used to explain the responses to the questionnaires. Conclusions and recommendations were made based on the analyzed data. This survey was carried out in three counties from northern region of Kenya. The tribes involved included Pokot, Turkana, Samburu, Rendille, Somali, and other communities living in the Northern part of Kenya. A total of a hundred and twenty (N=110) respondents participated in this study.

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2.8.2 Effects of Proliferation of Small Arms

The respondents were further asked to state the extent, which they think proliferation of small arms in the region has led to effects such as insecurity, conflicts in the society, underdevelopment, armed crime, and human rights violation. The extent was measured on a Likert scale of 1-5 (where one= very large and 5= not at all). Indeed, most of them ascertained that abundance of these arms largely led to human rights violation, armed crime, and insecurity in these areas. On the same note, a relatively large number of the respondents further indicated that these small arms led to underdevelopment in north Rift region. Nonetheless, it was reported that much as the small arms in region caused conflicts; they did not however do this largely (See the table below).

Table 2.6: Effects of Proliferation of Small Arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very large (%)</th>
<th>Large (%)</th>
<th>Fair (%)</th>
<th>Less (%)</th>
<th>Not at all (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflicts</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed crime</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human right violation</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underdevelopment</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field work 2017
It was also reported that proliferation of small arms in these communities led to looting and massive loss of property, and had led to increase in theft cases in region. It was argued that cattle rustling, which is so common in the region, is usually instigated by the increased use of weapons. Majority of the bandits/rustlers arm themselves with these weapons that aid them to intimidate and threaten the herdsmen from whom they steal the livestock. Moreover, the study was informed that these weapons have led to an increase in murder cases/mass killings in the area. The above findings confirms Wepundi el at. (2012) argued that, innocent people were majority of the victims in the East African Communities. The table below displays some of the effects of small arms proliferation according to Wepundi el at. (2012).

Table 2.7: Effects of Small Arms Misuse on Human Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects</th>
<th>Impact on development</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Direct effect                | Fatal and non-fatal injuries | Lost productivity<br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&n

| Indirect effects | Economic activity | • Increase in transport and shipping costs  
• Destruction of physical infrastructure  
• Increase in price of local goods, and local terms of Trade |
|------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
| Indirect effects | Social capital     | • Increase in numbers of child soldiers recruited and in action  
• Rise of membership of armed gangs and organized crime  
• Incidence of domestic violence involving firearms or the threat of weapons |
| Indirect effects | Development interventions | • Incidence of security threats  
• Costs of logistics and transportation  
• Costs of security management  
• Opportunity costs associated with insecure environments and/or damaged investments |

*Source: Wepundi et al. (2012)*

### 2.9 Factors Influencing Proliferation of Small Arms

Geographical positions of these areas and politics were said to be the main factors influencing the proliferation of small arms in the northern Kenya. This assertion was made by 45% and 38.3% of the respondents respectively. In addition, social-cultural and economic factors were also found to play a major role in the increase of small arms.
Figure 2.3: Factors Influencing Proliferation of Small Arms

Table 2.8: Factors Influencing Proliferation of Small Arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very large</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economical</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cultural</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Field work, (2017)*
2.10 Other Factors

Similarly, it also was brought to light that most of the people in these areas have weapons (guns) barely to protect their properties such as land, animals and other resources. The porous borders of the neighbouring communities and countries contribute immensely to the availability of the small arms. The war-like cultures of the neighbouring countries such as Sudan and Ethiopia too have a hand in the increase of the small arms and other weapons in the region.

Table 2.9: Other Factors Influencing Proliferation of Small Arms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Porous bonders</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of properties (land, animals)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War-like cultural of the community</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field work, (2017)

Practice of Small Arms in the Northern Region of Kenya

Cumulatively, more than 80% of the respondents reported that small arms are to a large extent traded and practiced in the northern regions of Kenya. However, it was only a minimal 2.6% of these respondents that indicated that the proliferation of small arms is practiced in these areas in a small extent.

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Sources of Small Arms

When the respondents were further asked to give the sources of the small arms used in the region, 38.18% of the respondents reported that the weapons were locally made by the local people. Another 28.18% indicated that the arms come from the foreign countries. The study was further informed that some of the arms are stolen from security personnel as this was reported by a massive 26.3% of the respondents. There were those weapons that were reportedly got from war torn neighbours such as Sudan, Ethiopia. 7.27%.

---

Table 2.10: Sources of Small Arms found and Used in Northern Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War torn neighbour (Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign countries</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some stolen from security personnel</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some are made by the local people</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field work, (2017)

2.11 Summary of Finding

According to the findings the interplay of motivations and means govern the acquisition of arms for small and ultimate expression. Jurgen Brauer and Robert Muggah (2006) argued that a person acquires a weapon on his own will or because of being pushed by others. This is because of a person’s own beliefs and attitudes that are generally the social relations of a person. This is motivated by resources and prices. Resources are credit, grants, earned, income from work, and income drawn from the investment in, or depletion of financial or physical assets while Non-monetary resources include, but are not limited to, a person or group’s drive, inventiveness, organizational and social capacity, and networks that make arms acquisition possible or impossible. The prices are comprised of how low or high a resources is worth.

According to Azar (1990), in the PSC theory, the main features of the conflict represents prolonged and violent struggles by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition, acceptance, access to political institutions, and economic participation just as proven in the North Rift by the above executed study. He identified four clusters of variables that act as preconditions for potential conflicts’ transformation to high levels of intensity that is communal content, deprivation of needs, state and governance issues, and international linkages (Hans J. Morgenthau, 1954).

**Conclusion**

There are multiple ways in which SALW proliferate in Kenya as discussed in this chapter. Having gathered both secondary and primary data from the field work, it is clear that SALW do proliferate due to reason such as availability and affordability and affordability of arms in the black market, proliferation border points, corruption, bad governance among others such as cultural and economic factors. As for the securitization theory, the need to articulate no militaristic means such as education the population, providing alternative means of livelihood such as farming other than pastoralism is important in preventing the proliferation of SALW.

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CHAPTER THREE

CONTROL MEASURES FOR NON-PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN KENYA

3.1 Introduction

To avoid access of those firearms to the criminal, the States which are member of UN should commence on implementing the declaration of United Nations Programme of Action about handling of Small Arms and Light Weapons. This is the only document declaration that discusses policies about small arm and light weapon trafficking. However, the intended objective of this declaration has not been much met and its implementation effort remains low. The declaration also supports any approach proposed by any country, which is member state of UN, with an intention of mitigating effect of careless handling of small arm and light weapons. These precautions consist of supervising of hawker activities, limiting pirates’ production and other measure that the country may feel friendly to control small arms and light weapons.

Even though these measures have never been presented in the Council Resolution meeting that was established, this was based on the fact that Russian Federation would not be able to honor it in the current form. This agreement did not consider Russian proposals which lead the agreement to lack full support of the member states. The draft agreement entailed some contents that infringed the sovereign of the state members, particularly the draft pointed that the United Nation should have control on any measures taken by the member state on small arm and light weapons. The responsibility of controlling small arm and light weapons bestows on individual
countries. In its current statements, the draft agreements do not have a firm foundation on UN responsibility and thus have an implication in future.

The manner in which these weapons are accessed through an illegal means continues to accelerate prolong armed conflicts and post-conflict situations. The access of these illegal arms such as small arm and light arms encourage recruitment of the children in crime activities. The author suggests to the council on addressing these behavior and comprehensive deal with it and more so in instances where children are introduced on the use of these weapons. Even though controlling illegal small arms and light weapons is a major challenge to many countries, he pointed that more empowerment was needed, especially on physical security and stockpile management, there is need to enhance facilitation of innovation transfer to developed countries.

Decisive policies are required to cope with the increasing global trade and relevant policies for implementation process. Boundary security must be enhanced. Though the matter is a global challenge, her country has been discussing the issues. Displacement of the people, widespread death and suffering were some of the experiences that those country where access to small arms and light weapons is rampant. It would be important to come-up with global and national approaches that intend to address the challenges and counter access of fire arms. Proper adoption, administration and management of security must be maintained.

There is need to establish a council that with responsibility of investigating illegally acquired arms through the boundary and increase awareness campaign and through investigation of what is traded in the boundary with the help of the neighboring
countries security organs. Strict approaches must be taken to mitigate the access and availability of the illegal arms in the black market. To safeguard the sovereign of any nation, transfer of the arms must be condemned in all manners possible. States must deal with non-state actor who abuse arms and end the flow of illicit access of these arms and the accused must be punished within the laws set.

A strict and more punishable approach must be adopted to discourage the flow of the illicit fire arms to the criminals. In Africa, comprehensive and accurate measure is required to cope with the challenges of access to small arm and light weapons. The establishment of the various SALW control structures can therefore be seen as an offshoot of various international and regional initiatives that emerged around the world in the late 1990s as the lethality of SALW became more appreciated. SALW proliferation was initially given attention by the United Nations through the Secretary General’s 1995 Agenda for Peace, with a focus on ‘micro-disarmament’. Subsequently, SALW initiatives were initiated by the United Nations, individual governments, regional and sub-regional organizations and non-governmental organizations.

In Africa, an African Union heads of government meeting adopted a decision concerning co-operation in the search for solutions to the problems posed by the proliferation of SALW in Africa. At the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Governments held in Algiers, from 12–14 July 1999, the Summit endorsed the holding of a Continental Conference of African Experts on Small Arms in 2000.
The signing of the Nairobi Declaration on 15 March 2000 was followed nine months later by that of the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (‘Bamako Declaration’). The Bamako conference (and Declaration) in 2000 developed an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of SALW in preparation for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in SALW in All its Aspects from 9–20 July 2001 in New York.

The above initiatives all underscore the importance of establishing regional and national bodies to co-ordinate action against illicit SALW proliferation5 and provide the mandate for NFPs. They include the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPOA)6, the Nairobi Declaration, the Nairobi Protocol7 and the Bamako Declaration8. The Nairobi Declaration in turn urges member states to support sub-regional co-operation among police, intelligence, customs and border control officials in combating the illicit circulation and trafficking in SALW and suppressing criminal activities related to the use of weapons.

Bound by the Nairobi Declaration, the signatories agreed in 2001 to the Coordinated Agenda for Action and an Implementation Plan. NFPs are mandated to monitor the ratification, implementation, execution and evaluation of the Nairobi Protocol at the national level in liaison with law enforcement agencies. They are also to ensure adherence to the standards set out in the document and inform the RECSA Secretariat on a regular basis of progress made. This mandate was reaffirmed during the 2\textsuperscript{nd} RECSA Ministerial Review Conference of 2004 and continues to guide action on SALW by NFPs at national level.
Under the UNPOA every country has committed itself to establish or designate national co-ordination agencies or bodies and institutional infrastructure responsible for policy guidance, research and monitoring of efforts to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects. States are also committed to establish or designate a point of contact within sub-regional and regional organisations to liaise on matters relating to the implementation of the Programme of Action. Article 4(d) of the Nairobi Protocol requires member states to establish or enhance inter-agency groups, involving police, military, customs, home affairs and other relevant bodies, to improve policy co-ordination, information sharing and analysis at national level. This provision is reiterated in the Bamako Declaration, which was largely influenced by the Nairobi Protocol. RECSA has also organized regular Ministerial Review Conferences and Governmental Expert Meetings. This has ensured that SALW discussions maintain relevance at the top levels of government in the member states. (However, considering the challenges related to lack of political will among member states to honour their commitments, the utility of these meetings is frequently questioned by sceptics.)

Facilitating and coordinating establishment of NFPs by member states is perhaps RECSA’s most significant achievement under this theme. The challenge is however, that the structures in most countries are not functioning as effectively as hoped due to a myriad of institutional and political problems (see below). The organisation has also provided technical support to states on the review of SALW legislation in a number of countries linked to the development of Best Practice Guidelines. However, even where progress has been made to review legislation, the application
of the best practice guidelines has been minimal. Apparently, most countries have not proactively sought assistance from RECSA to assist in the process. Further, despite the progress highlighted above, the pace of harmonization of laws and policies across the region (considered by many to be an ‘easy win’) has been slow. There seems to be consensus that this is one area where RECSA needs to redouble its efforts.

3.2 Mitigating the Challenge of Illicit Small Arms

The survey sought the opinion of respondents on several measures that have been applied in addressing the challenges of illicit small arms. Common approaches include disarmament, awareness raising, arrest and prosecution, and the possible establishment of a specialized police unit to deal with small arms.

3.2.1 Disarmament

A probative analysis of the responses demonstrates a trend of more knowledge of disarmament operations among respondents in hotspots than is the case in medium- and low-volatility areas. In fact, a significantly greater percentage of LEAs reported awareness of a local disarmament campaign in high-volatility areas than both CSO and HH respondents. Similarly, a significant greater percentage of CSO interviewees were more conscious of disarmament in their areas than were HH respondents.

It is also imperative to underscore the fact that mere arms recovery should not be the aim of disarmament operations. Instead, there should be attendant gains in a reduction of supply and demand factors feeding arms proliferation - including, but not limited to, boosting security in affected areas. In this regard there were mixed
feelings on the effect of disarmament on security, with the majority of HH respondents (54.7 per cent) indicating that security has increased due to disarmament; 19.1 per cent felt that security dynamics have remained the same as a result, while 26.2 per cent felt that security has decreased (Table 3.1). However, FGD respondents expressed support for comprehensive disarmament exercises.

**Figure 3.1: Percentage of Respondents Who Agreed with Selected Statements About the Outcome of Local Disarmament Campaigns, By Groups (LEAs and CSOs)**
Those involved in the disarmament exercise are usually community leaders and some members of civil society who work closely with the provincial administration in persuading and identifying those with arms. In all cases the Kenya Police and the Administration Police are involved, except in areas where the security dynamic is complex. Where there are armed groups, such as Mt Elgon’s SLDF, the army intervenes. In many cases, the Kenya Army is equally mobilized in some areas for the purposes of cordoning target areas while the police and provincial administration move in. In most cases, the bigger a disarmament operation, the more the number of security agencies involved, including the military. The Kenya Forest Service (KFS) and Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) have also been involved and often recover arms and hand them over to the police (KNFP, 2006, p. 34).

Some of the licit arms that are abused are those issued to KPRs. Hence, there are concerns about KPRs’ accountability and professionalism in the management of arms and ammunition. Some KPRs allegedly use their arms for carrying out criminal activities or hire them to those involved in banditry or raiding neighbouring communities. For instance, in Marsabit such suspicions were rife. It is also not clear whether KPRs’ arms are given back to the government. It is generally known that the saying ‘KPRs never die’ means that there is no record even of those who die and their arms are never surrendered to the government. Some are inherited or taken over by a member of the Small Arms Survey Special Report community, raising the question of the efficacy of the administration and control of arms given to KPRs.

However, in some areas like the greater Samburu and Turkana, KPRs are appreciated. Some respondents observed that the low numbers of regular security
officers do not provide adequate security for them. But to compound the politics around KPRs, whereas the Samburu have them, their neighbouring Pokot community does not. This reinforces perceptions that KPRs are biased, ethnic, and politicized.

3.2.2 Awareness Creation on Small Arms

Upon asking the respondent whether they had witnessed any awareness-raising initiatives on issues pertaining to small arms; 60.5 per cent of CSO respondents and 40.5 per cent of LEAs, respectively, said they had not attended, been involved in, or seen any awareness-raising efforts (see Figure 3.8). There have been some awareness-raising efforts by the provincial administrations, the KNFP, and civil society actors (especially under the Kenya Action Network on Small Arms) to advance education on issues of small arms and light weapons. Among the means of communicating and creating awareness on these issues, chiefs’ barazas (public meetings) and workshops were cited as having been used most frequently (see Figure 3.9) and rated as effective (see Figure 3.10). Barazas were rated as effective by LEAs and CSO respondents (96.1 per cent and 94.4 per cent, respectively). Workshops ranked as the second-most-effective method. Documentaries, brochures, and newspapers were generally rated as less effective.
Figure 3.2: Percentage of Respondents Who Have Attended/Been Involved In/Seen Any Materials Creating Awareness on Small Arms and Light Weapons, By Groups (LEAs and CSOs)

![Bar Chart](chart1.png)

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)

Figure 3.3: Percentage of Respondents Who Referred to Various Means of Awareness Raising, By Groups (LEAs and CSOs)

![Bar Chart](chart2.png)

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)
Analysis

Understanding the impact on human suffering caused by widespread availability of small arms and light weapons, is a matter of national and international concern on effective. Respondents were asked to specify which categories were to be considered as most important groups to target for campaigns against small arms. The youth and criminal gangs were given high priority, followed by CSOs— who can disseminate information using various means—elders, and *morans* management of such deadly materials through national action, implementation of treaties and strengthening international cooperation.

3.2.3 Arrest and Prosecution

The draft National Policy on SALW prepared by the KNFP provides for illegal firearms possession to be treated as a crime. Article 4(3) of the Firearms Act has provisions which prescribe a penalty of between 7 and 15 years’ imprisonment for illegal firearm and/or ammunition possession (Kenya, 1954). But although there are
laws to punish illicit arms possession, the prosecution of arms-related cases is sometimes hampered by ineffective investigations, which contribute to failure to convict.

Successfully prosecuting cases involving arms-related crimes and violence is central to resolving the impunity around illegal arms possession. One FGD participant provided an example of a deep-rooted gun culture in Lokichoggio. In one chief’s *baraza* attended by the DC [district commissioner], some community members came with their guns and gestured to indicate to the DC that what they needed were bullets for their guns and not the security and development issues he was talking about.

Most of those who had confidence in the government’s competence in prosecuting arms-related crimes were from hotspots, constituting 28.7 per cent of HH respondents, 32.8 per cent of LEAs, and 29.2 per cent of CSO respondents. Findings indicate that CSO respondents from Wepundi et al. Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya. Considering that most courts are found in medium- and low-volatility areas, their pessimism about prosecutorial competence—historically one of the roles of the Kenya Police—points to the need for strengthening of cases brought before the courts. This can be achieved only by conducting thorough investigations, knowledge of relevant laws, and skills in building watertight cases.
A large proportion of HH respondents than LEAs and CSO respondents agreed on the need to invest more resources in boosting prosecutorial efficiency and competence. The successful prosecution of small arms-related cases is an underpinning solution to injustices perpetrated with the gun. Demonstrable retributive and/or punitive measures against convicted perpetrators of small arms-related cases are a key approach to reducing arms demand. It is therefore urgent to have in place both the competency and adequate resources necessary for the successful prosecution of these cases. On average, 44.9 per cent of CSO respondents, 36.1 per cent of HH respondents, 80 Small Arms Survey Special Report and 25.1 per cent of law enforcers interviewed thought there is lack of competence in the prosecution of small arms-related cases.
Further, the fact that some unprincipled security/policing agents are suspected of collusion with criminal groups means that members of the public are not entirely confident of the abilities of law enforcement agencies.

**Figure 3.6:** Percentage of Respondents Believing That the Problem with the Prosecution of Arms-Related Crimes Lies in Lack of Resources Rather Than Competence, By County Volatility and Groups (HHs, LEAs, and CSOs)

Source: KNFP and Small Arms Survey (2011)
Asked if they were aware of any arrests relating to illicit arms, 34.4 per cent of LEAs and 43.8 per cent of CSO respondents confirmed knowledge of arrests. But 63.8 per cent of LEAs and 54 per cent of CSO respondents were not aware of such arrests.

3.2.4 Specialized Police Unit

Respondents were asked if the formation of a specialized police unit could improve small arms reduction efforts (Figure 3.6). A total of 74.6 per cent of LEAs and 82.4 per cent of CSO respondents supported this view, while only 23.9 per cent and 17 per cent disagreed, respectively.

The study sought to measure views on improving police training in arms control issues: 88 per cent of LEAs and 82.4 per cent of CSO respondents were positive on this. Beyond holding KNFP-facilitated awareness-training exercises at the Kenya Institute of Administration and the Administration Police Training School Embakasi, there is a need for more specialized training activities on border control mechanisms, stockpile management, best practice approaches to disarmament, and international and national arms control instruments, among other measures. Such initiatives should target all law enforcement agencies, even though institutions such as the Kenya Police College, CID Training School, Police Academy, and Administration Police Colleges. But the failure of law enforcers in arms control efforts is partly blamed on their lack of collaboration with the community.
Figure 3.8 Percentage of Respondents Indicating There Is a Need for A Specialized Police Unit on Small Arms, By Groups (LEAs and CSOs)

Figure 3.9: Percentage of Respondents Who Believe That There Is Good Cooperation Between Law Enforcement Agencies and the Community, By Groups (LEAs and CSO)
3.2.5 Early Warning System

Based on respondents’ views, it is essential that the existing early warning infrastructure be strengthened. This should be by, for instance, having a cooperative arrangement between the NSC and KNFP on the former’s national early warning and early response platform. In such an arrangement, the KNFP would bring its expertise on small arms and light weapons issues, and monitors would have to undergo appropriate training. It is important to have a foolproof system that does not compromise the security of monitors, law enforcers, and any other actor. But there would have to be confidence building efforts to encourage members of the public to be more forthcoming with early warning information.

Unfortunately, many respondents complained about the failure of law enforcement agencies to respond to information given to them. Tip-offs on imminent raids and/or crimes are also ignored. However, in some cases, the warnings are given, but the government lacks adequate resources to prevent or pre-empt the crimes. In other cases, government responses are reactive rather than proactive.

The public should be involved in providing information on firearms to the government or law enforcement agencies, the use of telephone facilities was viewed as effective (Figure 3.16). The sending of SMSs (text messages via cellular/mobile phones), the establishment of monitors to collect and disseminate information, and the use of DTFs rank equally highly in preference. E-mails are the most ineffective due to limited Internet availability, especially in rural areas.
3.2.6 What Is to Be Done

From all that has been learned about the international trade in small arms and light weapons, it is evident that no single set of policy initiatives will suffice to deal with this problem. Unlike the relative simplicity of the landmines issue—where the international community could focus on one particular weapon (anti-personnel landmines) and seek its elimination as a weapon of war—the effort to control the diffusion of light weapons will demand a host of initiatives, extending from the international arena to regional, national and local levels. National governments especially will have to go beyond their support for cracking down on the illegal trade in light weapons and examine their own role in the current legal weapons trade. The following initiatives represent a rough menu of the sort of steps that will be needed to subject light weapons transfers to greater international scrutiny and to reduce the flow of such munitions to areas of conflict.

Establish International Norms

The first, and perhaps most important, step is to adopt international norms against the uncontrolled and destabilizing transfer of small arms and light weapons to areas of tension and conflict. Although deference must be made to the traditional right of sovereign states to arm themselves, it must be made clear that this right has natural limits and does not extend to the acquisition of arms for the purpose of engaging in genocide or the suppression of opposition political or religious movements. It must become axiomatic, moreover, that the right to acquire arms for self-defense entails an obligation to maintain such weapons under effective government control at all times and to preclude their diversion to illicit purposes.
While it may take some time to clarify and win support for such norms, the basic groundwork has been provided by the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. In its 1997 report, the panel concludes: "The excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of small arms and light weapons is closely related to the increased incidence of internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence," and is, therefore, "an issue of legitimate concern for the international community." With this in mind, the report calls on UN member-states to "exercise restraint" with respect to the transfer of such weapons and to take all necessary steps to prevent the diversion of government arms supplies into illegitimate hands.

Clearly, much work is needed to strengthen these norms and to promote their acceptance by governments. As in the worldwide campaign against landmines, the media can focus public attention on the dangers posed by such weapons, especially to civilians and children. The issue is admittedly complicated by the fact that, unlike anti-personnel landmines, national governments and military and police forces can demonstrate a far greater legitimate need for light weapons for purposes of self-defense and national security. Nonetheless, the frequency with which such weapons are used against civilians and children points to a humanitarian aspect of small arms that is quite similar to that of landmines.

International norms could also be developed along the lines of the Geneva Conventions, where states-parties would be prohibited from supplying light weapons to any government, group or entity that does not have the resources to treat its wounded or those of the enemy, or has not trained its own personnel in the laws of war. In addition, public sentiment could be mobilized to support constraints on the
inhumane or indiscriminate effects of light weapons, in the same way that blinding laser weapons have been banned by the recently adopted protocol to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

**Increase International Transparency**

Enhanced international transparency is also necessary to curb the illicit trade in light weapons. In the absence of an effective transparency regime, it is relatively easy for illicit dealers to conceal their operations; as information on legal trade becomes more widely available, it will become more difficult to do this. Increased transparency will also facilitate joint efforts by law enforcement agencies to identify, track and apprehend black-market dealers.

At present, efforts to monitor and control the diffusion of small arms and light weapons are hampered by a lack of detailed information on the production, sale and transfer of such munitions. Few governments provide detailed data on imports and exports of light weapons, and the UN Conventional Arms Register covers major weapons only. To ensure effective international oversight of the legal trade in light weapons, efforts at increased transparency must be made at the national, regional and international level. National governments should be required to publish detailed annual tallies of weapons imports and exports, while regional arms registers covering light weapons should also be encouraged. Finally, at the international level, the UN arms register should be gradually extended to cover all types of munitions, including small arms and light weapons.
Increase State Accountability

Increased governmental accountability is needed in two key areas: first, the establishment of effective oversight over all military-type firearms found within the national territory, so as to prevent their diversion to criminal elements and black-market dealers; and second, strict controls over the import and export of such weapons, so as to preclude their use for any purpose other than legitimate self-defense as sanctioned by the UN Charter.

Efforts to accomplish the first of these objectives should be guided by the draft proposals of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. Particularly effective measures would include a licensing system for manufacturers and gun owners, more effective identification systems to track firearms, more effective record keeping of firearms, and safe-storage measures. An additional measure called for is the promotion of amnesty and weapons turn-in programs that encourage citizens to surrender illegal, unsafe, unwanted and excess weapons. (An Australian buy-back effort, for example, took in more than 600,000 firearms, Governments around the world should be encouraged to incorporate such measures into their national laws and regulations; those states that fail to do so should be barred from receiving arms from those states that do adopt such legislation.

Similarly, efforts to better control the import and export of small arms and light weapons should be guided by the recommendations found in the report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. These include the collection and destruction of weapons once conflict has ended; the destruction of surplus weapons no longer needed by a country's military or police forces (as opposed to selling or
States should also be encouraged to adopt a code of conduct for arms transfers such as those being considered at the regional (EU) and international levels. Such codes would bar the sale or transfer of small arms and light weapons to any state that is ruled by a military dictatorship, that fails to respect the human rights of its citizens, that violates UN arms embargoes, or that cannot ensure the security of the weapons already in its possession.

**Regional and International Efforts**

While priority should be given to the development of effective controls at the national level, efforts should also be made to establish systems of oversight and control at the regional and international levels. Action at the regional level is particularly important because light weapons are often circulated by regional networks of illicit dealers, insurgents and permissive government agencies. Moreover, experience suggests that it may be easier to mobilize political support for control systems at the regional level than at the international level.

At the regional level, policy initiatives could include agreements for the strengthening of import and export regulations, tougher enforcement of laws against illicit trafficking and joint operations against black-market dealers. The OAS effort is one means of fostering increased cooperation between national customs services and law enforcement agencies on a regional basis. Other such efforts could be greatly facilitated by countries like the United States and Japan, which could provide the requisite technologies for computer databases of suspected illicit weapons
traffickers. In southern Africa, national governments and intelligence agencies are sharing information and mounting joint operations to uncover and destroy large caches of weapons left over from previous conflicts.

The Mali moratorium on the manufacture, sale and import of small arms and light weapons is another initiative that can begin to reduce the easy availability of such weapons. As one of the more successful multilateral attempts to control the flow of light weapons both prior to and following periods of civil tension, the Mali initiative might provide a model for other regions. In West Africa, for example, the experiences of Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrated how even relatively modest numbers of light weapons inflicted horrific casualties on civilians caught in sectarian strife.

Other regional approaches include the establishment of regional codes of conduct on arms exports similar to that of the EU. Given the particularly troublesome black-market weapons activity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the OECD or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should consider adopting codes of conduct. Additionally, economic incentive plans could be devised that would facilitate the closure of excess production capacity in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For example, Western countries could buy surplus small arms and light weapons from these states and destroy them, much as the United States is purchasing excess Russian nuclear weapons material.

At the international level, emphasis should be placed on the adoption of measures needed to strengthen the implementation of weapons embargoes agreed to by the United Nations and associated bodies. While such embargoes may never be entirely
leakproof, evidence has shown that even a modest number of international observers at airfields, seaports and other points of entry for weapons to an area of conflict can make a difference. When supplemented by stricter national export controls, embargoes can make it far more difficult to deliver significant quantities of modern weapons to areas of conflict.

The major arms-supplying countries should also establish a mechanism (possibly as part of the Wassenaar Arrangement for conventional arms control) for consultation on arms flows to areas of current and potential conflict, along with provisions for the imposition of a moratorium on weapons transfers to any state or region deemed to be at risk of ethnic slaughter, state failure or genocide. International inspectors should be sent to the region to ensure compliance with these measures and to suggest any other actions that might be taken to reduce the flow of arms.

**Reducing Surplus Weapons**

Tending to the issue of surplus weaponry created by many years of Cold War rivalry is particularly essential because many states—especially previous Eastern alliance nations—are anxious to offer arms for hard money with few or no inquiries inquired. Because send out controls on surplus arms are for the most part less strict than those for recently fabricated weapons, bootleg market merchants think that its less demanding to acquire and offer surplus arms than recently made weapons. The issue of surplus arms is particularly intense in zones simply recouping from furnished conflict, where devastated ex-warriors may attempt to offer their weapons for money as opposed to turn them over to UN peace-attendants or other assigned specialists.
Measures to diminish worldwide stores of surplus weapons—a basic segment of any universal push to compel the stream of light weapons—can take a few structures. States that can stand to do as such should consent to obliterate the surplus arms and ammo in their ownership and to find a way to keep the spillage of weaponry from government terminals and warehouses. An early point of reference was set by the Dutch Ministry of Defense, which declared in January 1998 that it would obliterate the greater part of its surplus small arms, including 115,000 Uzi submachine firearms, FAL ambush rifles, Garand rifles, Browning guns and M-1 carbines.

For their parts, the United States and Russia should consent to participate in finding and recovering (or purchasing back) weapons given by them to guerilla bunches amid the Cold War. In numerous locales, these weapons are presently being used to fuel inside power battles and criminal violence. Removing these weapons from flow would close a standout amongst the most savage sections of the Cold War and help advance worldwide peace and security in the present time.

**Post-Conflict Measures**

A high need ought to be put on endeavors to expel the expansive amounts of small arms and light weapons that regularly stay in-nation once a specific conflict has finished. Again and again, the accessibility of such weapons encourages either a restoration of the conflict (as in Angola) or a destabilization of endeavors to manufacture a serene common society (as in South Africa). The constrained accomplishment of demobilization programs in nations like El Salvador, where the nation experiences a horrifying rate of criminal violence in spite of the gathering of a huge number of weapons, focuses up the multifaceted nature and trouble of such
endeavors. Most importantly, choices to incapacitate warring groups and expel light weapons from regions of conflict must be actualized consistently and thoroughly.

In addition, in numerous nations around the globe the ownership of arms is profoundly installed in the public arena, with the goal that arms gathering endeavors may demonstrate useless or not be politically attainable. In such cases, and all the more for the most part too, the essential accentuation ought to be on financial improvement and social recreation with the goal that ex-warriors and non-soldiers have reasonable alternatives in the non military personnel economy.

Late activities with respect to the World Bank and various improvement and compassionate NGOs to better incorporate monetary help programs with grounding, annihilation of weapons and conflict counteractive action systems are a useful advance toward this path.

**International Capacity-Building**

At last, any administration to control worldwide trafficking in small arms and light weapons may be as viable as the weakest connections in the framework. For whatever length of time that bootleg market merchants appreciate places of refuge in which they can work with exemption, it will be troublesome or difficult to uphold harder universal guidelines on the light weapons exchange. It is hence basic that the more grounded members in the framework help the weaker components to set up successful and dependable systems for the oversight of the arms advertise.

As a component of such endeavors, innovation ought to be created and sent universally to help track the stream of small arms and light weapons, distinguish
unlawful wellsprings of supply, and enhance law implementation and traditions arraignment of illicit providers and brokers. Notwithstanding creating PC databases and correspondences frameworks that can encourage worldwide participation on the light weapons exchange, a few other specialized activities have been proposed for expanding the straightforwardness of light weapons streams. One such activity being produced by OAS individuals is more viable checking and enrollment of weapons, both at the purpose of make and when such weapons are legitimately sent out. Such stamping will make it less demanding for law authorization and insight authorities to follow the supply courses of weapons initially gained legitimately which at that point entered the underground market.

Different proposition exist for the labeling of ammo and explosives, and concentrates on their attainability are being done by the Canadian government and the United Nations. While some of these specialized arrangements may demonstrate troublesome and costly to execute, the universal group has at any rate started the procedure of altogether.

**Regional Harmonization of SALW Control Legislation**

RECSA has used discretionary channels to secure individuals' duties regarding harmonization of their laws on SALW (e.g. through the Nairobi Declaration, Nairobi Protocol and the Best Practice Guidelines). As noted above in any case, advance on harmonization has been moderate. It is suspicious that RECSA's engagement with the governing bodies in the locale has been powerful. All things considered, the pace of harmonization of these laws has been moderate.
**Improved Border Management**

RECSA is yet to adequately assemble territorial help for substantial between state endeavors went for securing borders and fighting fold border arms trafficking. Border control instruments are frequently asset concentrated and RECSA itself under-resourced. For example, there is a need to enhance human and specialized limit at border focuses, enhance arms discovery apparatus and strategies, put resources into observation frameworks and scanners and improve policing and watches at key border focuses. RECSA should now start to organize this zone, supporting and empowering part states in their own endeavors.

**Kenya National Focal Point strategy**

Crafted by the KNFP is guided by the Kenya National Action Plan for Arms Control and Management (NAP), which was affirmed in June 2004.23 The Kenya NAP gives an action structure intended to completely address the SALW issue in Kenya. It was at first intended to cover a time of five years, beginning on 1 July 2004, after which it was imagined that a further evaluation would occur to gage the status of execution and advise the advancement of a take after on plan.24 The NAP has ten key columns that should be actualized by the KNFP. These pillars are: institutional framework, policy and legislation, stockpile management, public education and awareness, international and regional co-operation and information exchange, border control and refugees, human development, training and capacity building, research, critical areas support.
Summary

Despite the fact that the aggregate number of SALW circling the world over isn’t known, appraises in *The Small Arms Survey 2001* put the figure at near 100 million in Africa alone. It might be protected to expect that the heft of that number has discovered its way in east Africa district. These current weapons, in addition to those that are delivered through neighborhood house businesses, could fuel conflicts in the district for quite a long time to come. Every one of these variables confound endeavors to lighten human enduring and acquire security to the general population of this area.

Small and light weapons do not only threaten the livelihood of humans but it also affects by a great deal the economical structures and systems as well as political growth and functionalities in a nation. In recent conflicts, more people have been killed by small arms and light weapons than by major weapons systems. Mr. Ban, presented his most recent issue (archive S/2015/289) which said that the broad accessibility of weapons was a central point in the more than 250 conflicts of the previous decade, prompting more than 50,000 deaths every year and records levels of removal.
Conclusion

There are ways of preventing weapons from reaching the black market, though it is a difficult task due to the portability affordability of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Kenya. However, control measures such as disarmament, awareness creation arrest and prosecution of illicit arms possession, establishment of international norms, increasing state accountability reduction of surplus weapons improving border management among other efforts have at a greater extent helped in controlling true proliferation of SALW proliferation not only in the East Africa region but also in Kenya.
CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES OF CURBING A SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS PROLIFERATION IN KENYA

4.1 National Level Challenges

A number of challenges facing Kenya and Uganda at the national level can be identified:

Limited Resources

The sources to develop and implement NAPs in Kenya and Uganda has not been successful. Between the years 2004 and 2008 for example, €1,832,205 was required for the implementation of Uganda’s NAP. Support was required externally even from non-governmental organizations as their governments committing to little and others to nothing at all.

Limited Institutional and Human Capacity

The NFPs always face problems with the staff. Most of the staff are over-stretched and also have few resources as they try to play their roles effectively both nationally and locally and also controlling the 16 small arms and light weapons in Kenya and Uganda.

Bureaucratic Challenges

SALW structures are often hampered by Bureaucratic processes. Like in Kenya, KNFPs is delayed as their finances are channelled through the national treasury.
Competing National Priorities and Limited Political Support

There has been little support from the government for the control of SALW through NFPs that leads to it being a national security issue both in Kenya and Uganda.

Superficial Ownership by Governments

Despite the fact that the arrangement and improvement of NFPs was driven by the legislatures of the locale, the procedure was additionally remotely determined in some sense in the wake of numerous worldwide activities for SALW control. Maybe subsequently the Kenyan and Ugandan governments appear to depend more on outside help instead of specifically conferring assets and abnormal state political help to national activities.

Politicization of SALW Issues

The KNFP and UNFP have surprisingly created confirm based NAPs which, if completely executed, would yield huge advantages in both national and human security terms. Tragically, demobilization operations and arms decrease activities are here and there political, a reality that is past NFPs given their status in government. Political pioneers some of the time approach SALW issues in a subjective manner, looking to secure voting public interests (e.g. through demilitarization of political opponents). The required adjusting of local and ethnic worries in law authorization is essentially past the NFPs’ orders and limits. Such cases can be seen in both Kenya and Uganda. On account of the demobilization forms in Karamoja the NFP was minimized as the UPDF assumed control what was a prominent operation politically, despite the fact that the KIDDP was a more productive approach to direct the
procedure. Local level difficulties at the provincial level RECSA faces its own difficulties.

**Resource Mobilization**

Resource has been an ongoing problem until recently when EU secured international support.

**Keeping Pace with Regional Developments**

The development of RECSA has been a challenge as the capacity of has been shifted to others which makes capacity a major test. The development and increase of regional cooperation and harmonization lead to a safer world.

**Functionality of NFPs**

The effectiveness and operations of NFPs are greatly depended upon on SALW by RECSA in all the states. They are determined greatly by political, economic and social factors. Support of the government to NFPs has been said to be ineffective as it is treated as an ‘add on’. RECSA at times goes to the extent beyond coordination at the national level to catalyze action.

**Coordination**

Obviously, while RECSA keeps on issuing general rules to NFPs, the last have evidently not proactively looked for the help from the provincial body to guarantee that usage of their work is in accordance with the best practice.
4.2 Regional level challenges

At the regional level RECSA faces its own challenges:

**Resource mobilization**

Resource has been an ongoing problem until recently when EU secured international support.

**Keeping Pace with Regional Developments**

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4.3 Emerging Issues from the Study

The study was informed that Alshabaab’s terror activities were supported by the use of the two markets that sells them firearms worth millions of dollar. The arms were also used to recruit teenagers and children into the group so as to cause death, destruction, displacement and conflict that lead to poor development and lack of peace.

According to one County Commissioner, they used to check for fire arms from those that crossed the border as terrorists always check on how security people operate at the borders and also consulted the neighbouring communities on the security of the area especially in the night. He indicated that most of the customers were from Nairobi, Coastal and other areas where crime is prone.

Less International and Local NGO’s work in Small arms and Light weapons Program in Kenya and incorporate, Oxfam, Safer World, Danish Demining Group and Northern Kenya Caucus (NORKENYA) among others. Notwithstanding the above reactions from the examination (by Murithi Mutiga, 2015), Xinhua News Agency (in China) on October 24, 2013 distributed that, the illegal arms go through some security checkpoints where they appreciate security support and further taken through undesignated courses to different travel focuses in northern Kenya and different territories in Nairobi. The two markets that provisions arms to Kenyan and local markets are situated in two towns of Bualle and Bardera in southern Somalia that are under control of Al-Shabaab dread gatherings and Kismayu port city going about as the principle entryway of arms from different unlawful arms exporters like Yemen, previous Soviet satellite states, Libya, Egypt and Eritrea.
Conclusion

From the study, it is clear that there are multiple challenges faces in the process of curbing the proliferation of SALW in Kenya. These challenges are faced both at the national level, regional level and international level. A number of challenges facing Kenya at the national level include limited resources, limited institutional and human capacity, bureaucratic challenges, competing national priorities and limited political support and politicization of SALW issues.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of the Main Findings

In Kenya, historic conflicts between competing cattle herders have escalated to deadly warfare due to proliferation of small and light weapons. Weapons meant for war are now used by criminals to fuel crime waves and wage turf battles in communities. Millions of assault rifles and similar military weapons are in the hands of civilians, criminal elements, and irregular armed forces, hence responsible for most of the killings. Further, the problem subverts the rule of law, threatening social stability and economic progress not only in Kenya but also in the East African region.

In spite of the fact that the uncontrolled cross-border expansion of small arms is to a great extent encouraged by unlawful exercises, for all intents and purposes all illegal small arms were initially lawfully delivered or gained yet later fell under the control of unintended beneficiaries. Direction would hence require the detachment of unlawful from licit arms exchanges to create conventions for trades between states or non-state performing artists that control the circulation of small arms without obliging the honest to goodness advertise (Khadiagala 2003).

The tribes who are largely involved in proliferation of small arms includes Samburu, Pokot, Turkana, Borana, Rendille, Somali and Gabbra, who are basically pastoralists and mainly keep cattle, camels, goats, sheep and donkeys. Other tribes in these areas
include Teso, Njemps, Marakwet, El Molo, Tugen, Elkony, Kiprign, and Orma (Mkutu, 2008).

It is due to the proliferation of small and light weapons that northern Kenya is underdeveloped, human rights and international laws are violated regularly and governance is persistently poor. On human rights violation, the effects of proliferation of small and light weapons take the form of heightening and augmentation of conflict, reinforcing of lawbreakers and criminal associations and expanded wrongdoings against ladies and kids. The consequences for improvement appear as immediate costs, backhanded expenses and hindrance of conveyance and access to open merchandise and enterprises. In conclusion, impacts on administration appear as expanding weakness, the privatization of security sources, which thus can't be satisfactorily checked because of frail administration. It is in light of this that the research is geared towards establishing the effects of proliferation of small arms into the Northern region of Kenya.

5.2 Conclusion

It was clear that there was rampant proliferation of these weapons as most of the respondents ascertained that abundance of the arms largely led to human rights violation, armed crime and insecurity in these areas. A good number of the respondents further indicated that these small arms led to underdevelopment in northern Kenya. The increase of these weapons in the said regions has led to looting and massive loss of property, and has seen the increase in theft cases in these areas. It was argued that cattle rustling, which is so common in the region, is usually
instigated by the increase of these weapons as they (the small arms) have led to an increase in murder cases/mass killings in the region.

It was, further, argued that geographical positions of these areas, politics, social-cultural and economic factors were the main factors influencing the proliferation of small arms. This was also as a result of the locals needed to protect their properties such as land, animals and other resources. The porous borders of these communities and the neighboring countries contributed immensely in availability of the small arms in the region. Regarding the sources of these weapons, it was said that most of them were locally made/manufactured by the local people. Surprisingly, some of the arms are stolen from security personnel, while others were got from war torn neighbors such as Sudan, Ethiopia.

In a locale of far reaching conflict, permeable and now and then questioned borders, and social conditions that produce the interest for SALW, no single state will have any distinguishable effect on the issue independent from anyone else. A successful reaction to the issue of SALW requires broad provincial collaboration, and participation in a district of long-standing between state competitions and doubts won't be managed without a fitting institutional foundation. An expanded responsibility by the worldwide group is important to give specialized help to reinforce such a structure.

Raising open mindfulness about SALW is one procedure that must keep being sought after. Discussions with applicable government offices the issue can be raised and we can urge our own legislature the need to keep up and increment their responsibility regarding settling the issue of small arms and light weapons.
The Eastern Africa, similar to such a large number of different districts far and wide, requires synergistic methodologies including common society associations, organizations with benefactors and the universal common society, and a dedication from national governments if the locale is to maintain and execute existing Declarations and Protocols. Luckily, affable society associations now appear to be better put to add to endeavors that propel these peace and demobilization goals.

Perusing from the over, the difficulties are tremendous, exertion at alleviating those difficulties are without a doubt exceptionally requesting, past duties of the part countries and the ECOWAS body yet in addition common society associations, people, and the private hands, imperatively, an immense walk is required from national, local and the global association all in all. Numerous nations don't go past the marking of a settlement or understanding. The approaches, assentions endure absence of execution either because of absence of limit or assets, political will or both; others loathe the small arms motivation or consider it to be not top need. The incapacitating economy, disappointment of state to convey the fundamental necessities of life, security, and rising rate of joblessness, or more all corruption are a portion of the major inner variables that are obstructions to any important exertion at battling multiplication of small arms in the locale.

National governments need to show duties not just in approach detailing, support of assertions and codification, yet in addition down to earth exertion at execution require be set up, and to likewise, meet their essential duty to give social and monetary security and improvement for their residents. It is the bases to tending to arms exchange, by handling the roots causes of outfitted violence specifically,
underdevelopment, instability, disparity and corruption. Others involve avoiding arms exchanges to administrations that disregard UN arms embargoes and cause human rights infringement and in addition giving guide programs that enhance the security of arms stockpiling facilities.

States should lead the improvement of a legitimately restricting arms exchange arrangement that would build up normal global measures at the most elevated amount on the fare of ordinary weapons, including small arms. The creation and usage of an unmistakable and rational national arrangement on SALW expansion control ought to be done through the association of national meetings uniting every single diverse level of society, for example, legislative agents, group based associations, NGOs and leaders. A wide investment would empower the improvement of incorporated and far reaching arrangements in handling SALW multiplication at different levels and through different methodologies.

Common Society are at the cutting edge of advancing limited peace building activities, starting compromise forms, supporting for adherence to peace assertions and building limits in peace training. There is along these lines need to increase their contribution in battling small arms. Particularly, thoughtful society should be reinforced in teaching and illuminating open on ECOWAS tradition, the UNPoA, and the UN Firearms Protocol as their pivotal part in the control of SALW. This can be accomplished through the arrangement of essential assets, going from gear, fund and preparing, to fortify their exercises particularly in promotion systems. Likewise, there is have to enlarge the extent of existing NGOs chipping away at other topical issues –, for example, human rights, youngsters and youth, law authorization, sexual
orientation – to incorporate unlawful SALW, and to find the marvel of illegal SALW expansion inside the more extensive administration motivation in West Africa.

Ultimately, and vitally stricter measures require be gone up against issues of corruption, corruption render unproductive the greater part of the endeavors set up to battle small arms particularly in West Africa. Workable arrangement must be looked for at the universal level so it would propel adherence at the provincial and national levels similarly as it was the situation with majority rule framework and military autocracy.

5.3 Recommendations

In view of the challenges: Recommendations to the governments of East Africa The government of Kenya needs to ensure that the porous borders between communities living in the northern Kenya are manned to avoid smuggling of the illegal fire arms and also embark on a serious disarmament programme to recover these weapons. By so doing, it will be hard for the bandits and rustlers to access and raid the communities of their livestock and therefore the menace of cattle rustling that makes, or sometimes coerces people to have the guns will be over.

Awareness can be made possible by initiating peace programmes and campaigns in the prone areas in Africa. Moreover, traditional leaders from different communities in Northern part of Kenya should take part in peace processes and reconciliations.

More police officers especially from the Anti-Stock theft department to be deployed in these areas to curb the menace of cattle rustling which is rampant in the region.
Moreover, security needs to be beefed up in these areas to avert the many forms of crimes such as theft, rape, murder and other social injustices.

Government ought to empower people in these communities through education so that they can take up/adopt other income generating activities other than pastoralism and livestock keeping.

**Ownership**

Partners can only feel confident with the governments support if they own their national SALW control initiatives by being committed to the resources and NFPs programs.

**Institutional Strengthening**

The government of Uganda and Kenya need to recruit trained staff and with required skills to run the NFPs so as ensure effectiveness of the NFPs.

**Managing for Results**

While numerous SALW intercessions are process-based and may in some cases set aside a long opportunity to hold up under natural product, capable services and organizations inside governments should demonstrate enthusiasm for these procedures and accelerate their consummation.

**Closer Monitoring and Reporting on NFPs’ work:**

In spite of the fact that RECSA's part is fundamentally to co-ordinate provincial activity, close checking of NFPs' work will be useful in guaranteeing that usage is going on as per the built up best practice rules.
Implementing the Recommendations of the Functional Analysis of NFPs

The utilitarian investigation of NFPs completed by RECSA distinguished key difficulties to compelling execution of NFPs. RECSA should ask part states to address those difficulties at the national level in order to revive NFPs as ahead of schedule as could be allowed.

Assessing the Progress of NFPs

Associations working or expecting to work with NFPs ought to deliberately survey the record of NFPs and additionally the difficulties they look with a view to recognizing potential zones of help.

Supporting Action Plans with Clear Commitments

Contributors should bolster NFPs which have clear activity designs dependent upon conveying responsibilities made. This ought to be finished by recognizing ranges of help that can possibly add to the lessening of equipped violence.

Capacity-building

The decentralization of the NFP structures to locales and areas accompanies limit challenges. Common society performing artists can team up with the focal SALW structures in building the limits of these neighborhood units.

Monitoring the Effectiveness of Regional Initiatives

Common society on-screen characters can assume a part in following cross-border coordinated effort, their qualities, shortcomings and advance as a major aspect of a co-agent dare to enhance regionalization of SALW activities.
Research and Advocacy

A standout amongst the most essential parts that common society can play is that of leading examination that advises the plans and activities of NFPs and conceivably illuminate backing endeavors intended to open extra help and assets for them.

Harmonization of Policies and Legislation

Despite numerous, and some of the time covering strategy and administrative systems locally and territorially, SALW structures can work together among themselves and with common society performers to blend endeavors.
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United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects of July 2001.
To whom it may Concern

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST TO UNDERTAKE RESEARCH

I am a postgraduate student currently pursuing a Master’s Degree in diplomacy and international studies at University of Nairobi. I have obtained permission from the University Management to carry out research as part of the requirements for the award of the degree. As part of my study, it requires me to administer a questionnaire designed to generate some insights and equally offer support to my research proposal on the study topic, to secure peace in the East African region by furthering the non-proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons agenda.

I kindly request you to authorize me conduct interviews in your area or establishment to gather the required information. I assure you that the information provided will be treated with total confidentiality and will not be used for any other purpose other than the objectives of this study.

Your assistance in providing the required information will be highly appreciated.

Thank you.

Yours faithfully,

MARGARET WAIRIMU GATHAGA
APPENDIX II: QUESTIONNARE

SURVEY ON SECURING PEACE IN EAST AFRICA: CURBING THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS KENYA

General instructions

The main objective of the study is to secure peace in the East African region by furthering the non-proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons agenda.

Section A: General Information

(Please tick one answer only)

1. What is your age?

18-34 years (  ) 35-44 years (  ) 45-54 years (  ) 55 years and above (  )

2. What is your highest education qualification?

0-Level (  ) College Diploma (  ) Undergraduate Degree (  ) Postgraduate (  )
PhD (  )

Others (specify)……………………………………………………………………………………………………

3. What is the main economical activity in the region?

Pastoralist (  ) business (  ) farming (  ) transport (  )

4. Kindly indicate the main source of threat to human security in the region

Petty thieves (  ) armed gun men (  ) inter community conflicts (  ) bandits (  )

5. What is the frequency rate of attacks or crimes in the region?
1 week ( )  1 month ( )  2 months  11-15 years ( ) once a year ( ) others

Section B: Growth Strategies

1. Is there any security threat in the area?

Yes ( )  No ( )

What form of security threat frequently found in the area (you can tick more than one)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Threat</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External intrusion by other community</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intra community attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms and light weapon crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle rustling</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism from al-shabaab</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Other (specify) ...........................................................................................................

To what extent do you think growth the threat influence the peace of the? Mark one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extent</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very great extent</td>
<td>( )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Great extent</td>
<td>( )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moderate extent</td>
<td>( )</td>
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<tr>
<td>Little extent</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No extent at all</td>
<td>( )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. In your own opinion, to what extent do you think the government security agency has helped control the human security threat?

Very great extent ( )
Great extent ( )
Moderate extent ( )
Little extent ( )
No extent at all ( )

3. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements relating to source of small arms and light weapons. Use a scale of 1-5, where (1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= moderately agree, 4= Agree and 5= strongly Agree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of small arms and light weapons</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War torn neighbor (Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some stolen from security personnel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some are made by the local people</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In what other ways do small arms get to the hands of civil community in the region? Explain? ..................................................................................................................................................
3. Indicate your level of agreement with the following statements relating to transport and movement of small arms and light weapon in the community. Use a scale of 1-5, where (1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= moderately agree, 4= Agree and 5= strongly Agree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport and movement of small arms and light weapon</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public transport by road</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hiding firearms in cargo and/or livestock to urban centers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use of animals such as donkeys</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter community traders</td>
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</table>

In what other ways does arms and light weapon get in the hands of unauthorized actors in the society?

........................................................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................................................

4. In your own opinion, to what extent do you think supply of small arms and light weapon has infiltrated the society?

    Very great extent  (  )
    Great extent      (  )
    Moderate extent   (  )
    Little extent     (  )
    No extent at all  (  )
Indicate your level of agreement with factors influencing proliferation of small arms in Kenya. Use a scale of 1-5, where (1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= moderately agree, 4= Agree and 5= strongly Agree)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors influencing proliferation of small arms</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social cultural</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political factors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Geographical factors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Porous bounders</td>
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<tr>
<td>Protection of properties such as land and livestock</td>
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<tr>
<td>War- like cultural of the community</td>
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</table>