# MANAGERS' COMPENSATION PREFERENCES

# AND

# THE EXISTING COMPENSATION SCHEMES

(A CASE STUDY OF THE CO-OPERATIVE BANK OF KENYA)

BY

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# DECLARATION

This research project report is my original work and has not been presented for a degree in any other university.

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This research project report has been submitted for examination with my approval as university Supervisor.

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# DEDICATION

# TO MY PARENTS

# ANN NTHENYA AND TILUS KILIKA

For their love for education, concern, sacrifice and patience over my study period.

The crown for this work is a true realization of their long cherished dream.

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# ABSTRACT

In an attempt to determine managers' compensation preferences and the relevance of the existing compensation schemes in the Banking Industry of Kenya, this study was designed to take the nature of a survey and focussed on a case study of the Cooperative Bank of Kenya. The Secondary data that guided in the conceptual frame work took a motivation theory based approach to the broad view of compensation. This enabled the development of the research instrument by way of the items of compensation of both intrinsic and extrinsic nature categorized into either economic or non economic rewards and incentives. Out of the 40 questionnaires given out, only 33 of them were responded to by an equivalent number of managers from the Bank. They were required to respond to them by asserting their degree of importance of the items listed in a 5- point Likert scale as well as their opinions towards the items of compensation. The instrument was found to have high reliability and internal consistency of 0.77 measured by the Coefficient Alpha. The findings of the study were analyzed using both parametric and non- parametric techniques of Factor Analysis, Z- statistic and chi- square statistic respectively.

The results of the study showed that the managers have significant compensation preferences which are weakly associated with the demographic variables of occupation and seniority and relatively different across the items of compensation. Ten factors were extracted as the most critical issues of concern for compensating the managers in the Bank, some of which are highly correlated. Those non-economic items were relatively more preferred to the economic ones. It was also found that the current compensation scheme of compensation is irrelevant with an expected utility of zero with regard to the identified preferences of the managers. The irrelevance was theoretically explained as not to be emanating from the items of the scheme per se, but from reasons that touch on structural and administrative issues of these rewards that are incongruent with the postulates of motivation theory to compensation. However, the study concluded by noting that the sample size drawn was too small to generalize these findings across the entire Banking industry and the Kenyan Economy at large.

#### CHAPTER ONE:

# INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 BACKGROUND

The concept of compensation has drawn a lot of concern to scholars in Behavioural Science. The key issue that raises such concern is in the area of individual employee motivation. Scholars in this field have come to agree that motivation is built upon the issue of needs which form the basis for the goals that people as employees seek to satisfy in the work place (Schiffman and Kanuk, 1996; Chung, 1977). Motivation thus becomes important as a common denominator that links together the attainment of both individual and organization goals.

The theory so far developed has viewed compensation in its broad meaning to incorporate both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. The extrinsic rewards are handled through salary and wage administration while those of intrinsic nature are handled through aspects of organization structure, job content, recognition and opportunities for promotion (Belcher 1974; Carrel and Kuzmits, 1986). Suggestions have been made to the effect of translating the contents of this developed theory into usable programs in organizations. The programs so developed should aim at identifying the different needs of the employees in question, the incentives available for use by the organization and then matching these individual needs with the organizational incentives. And when the incentives are applied to arouse the goal-directed behaviour in organizations, they become rewards (Chung 1977). From such a match, the organization develops schemes for compensation, containing the program and systematic arrangement of the combination of elements that are connected with the rewards to the employees.

In the process of administration of the rewards, scholars have found differences in the values attached to different compensation items in the schemes under use. These have led to research into individual preferences which have been found prevalent among managers (Lewen and Lauser 1973; White 1973). It has thus been suggested that the issue of any employee compensation be treated as an art as much as it is a science (Carrel and Kuzmits, 1986; and White, 1973). The aspect of science is seen in its systematic and scientific treatment of the subject, while that of

art is seen in the differential treatment of employees with respect to their preferences for different items in the compensation scheme.

## 1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Research findings have shown that there are no average managers, and so no universal and uniform compensation strategies can be applied on them (Zedeck, 1977 and Byars and Rue, 1979). These have led to further research into the individual manager differences with regard to the compensation of managers and executives and have found that: there are variations in executives' motivations leading to variations in compensation preferences; the preferences for different compensation items differ; they desire some freedom of choice in reward selection; and advocate for a flexible/cafeteria system of administering rewards (White 1973; and Lewen and Lauser, 1973). Belcher (1974) pointed that these preferences should be integrated with the executives compensation. And Cascio and Award (1981) showed that they can be integrated through the Vroom's Expectancy Model. It has thus been pointed that the company should assess its managers needs, determine those compensation items truly demanded and those employment outcomes relevant (Carrel and Kuzmits, 1986; Belcher, 1974) which have led to the development of flexible compensation systems in organizations.

Whereas these observations have been well taken care of in the developed world (White, 1973; Lewen and Lauser, 1973; Slocombe and Bluedorn, 1999), the approaches that have been used in Kenya in guiding compensation decisions of Salary Surveys, Civil Service Reviews and Collective Bargaining Agreements seem to be very silent on most of the suggested issues. They have leaned more towards the financial aspects and thereby neglected the non-economic issues and those intrinsic aspects of compensation. Further, no study has been conducted on the compensation preferences of managers in Kenya. It thus remains unknown as to whether the schemes in place, being guided by the afore-mentioned approaches, give the managers what is relevant and of value to them.

This study looks at the compensation preferences of managers and those existing schemes in the Banking Sector. This sector is deemed relevant because of its

active participation in the preparation and a relatively stable consistency in the usage of the Salary Surveys coupled with its emergence as one of the best paying sectors in the economy in 1998 (Kenya Salary Survey, 1998). And even within this sector the Co-operative Bank of Kenya has been selected to facilitate for a case study of the research. This bank has its origin in the co-operative movement and over the years has actively participated in the promotion of the co-operative philosophy which has identified it with the Kenyan socio-cultural environment. It is this association which distinguishes it with an organization culture cultivated over time whose influence on the members of staff renders this study different from those done elsewhere in the developed economies.

## 1.3 OBJECTIVES

The study has two objectives:

- · To identify the managers compensation preferences; and
- To assess the extent of the preferences met by the existing compensation schemes.

## 1.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY

- The study will make a significant contribution to the Kenyan society in:
  - Filling the existing knowledge gap on managers' compensation preferences, and those schemes in place, a step which will guide the direction that future research in these areas will take.
  - Enhancing the development of strategic Human Resource policies that are individual manager based with regard to compensation.

#### CHAPTER 2:

# LITERATURE REVIEW

## 2.1 COMPENSATION

## 2.1.1 INTRODUCTION

Compensation and the principles that govern its administration in an employment situation are based upon the theory of motivation. Koontz and Weighrich (1988) defined motivation as a general term that applies to the entire class of drives, desires, needs and wishes and similar forces. Nadler et al (1979) postulated motivation as some internal state in a person which causes clusters or objects or outcomes to be sought by individuals. These two seem to concur with that of Chung (1977) who described motivation as a term that refers to goal directed behaviour. This goal directed behaviour is characterized by the process of selecting and directing certain actions among voluntary activities to achieve goals. As he noted, human behaviour can be classified into three major categories, namely: Motivated behaviour which is characterized by persistent goal orientation; Frustrated behaviour which is aroused when goal directed behaviour is interrupted; and Physiological reflexes which are automatic responses to external stimuli. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of defining the scope of motivational study. The concern of this study is the goal directed behaviour.

The study of motivation is therefore a complex task because it deals with many factors that influence goal-directed behaviour. That motivated behaviour is not only influenced by an individual's characteristics (e.g. needs, interests, attitudes and goals) but also by organizational conditions (e.g. tasks, managerial practices, and organizational climate). To be able to deal with this complexity, the need arises for a conceptual scheme concerning the effects of these individual and organization variables on work motivation.

#### 2.1.2 THE NATURE OF MOTIVATION

Schiffman and Kanuk (1996) noted that there is a general consensus among scholars as to the nature of motivation. They contended that motivation is built upon the issue of "NEED", and so they saw motivation as the driving force within

individuals that impels them to action. The driving force is produced by a state of tension which exists as the result of an unfulfilled need. Individuals strive both consciously and subconsciously to reduce this tension through behaviour(s) that they anticipate will fulfill their needs and thus relieve them of the stress they feel. The specific goals they select and the patterns of action they undertake to achieve their goals are the result of individual thinking and learning. This view is supported by Nadler et al (1979) who observed that people's needs can only be satisfied by their engaging in behaviours. They also asserted that people think about the future and make choices about how to behave and that they perceive their environment in terms of their past experiences and needs.

Koontz and Weighrich (1988) formulated the basic element of human behaviour as being some kind of human activity, whether physical or mental. They argued that human behaviour can be looked at as a series of activities. These activities are goal oriented, that is, people do things that lead them to accomplish something. The primary task of managers then becomes that of getting people to contribute activities that achieve the mission and goals of an enterprise.

Chung (1977) in summing up these thoughts showed that the first step in studying motivational behaviour is to understand how a person's needs are manifested into goal directed behaviour. He noted that each individual has a set of needs and satisfying needs becomes his goal. The term "NEED" is used here to mean an internal state of disequilibrium - physical as well as psychological which causes the individual to pursue certain courses of action in an effort to regain equilibrium. And as Koontz and Weighrich (1988) concluded, motivation is the result of the interaction of needs, incentives and perceptual patterns of an individual. An incentive is a stimulus existing in an organization which can influence the behaviour of its members. An incentive becomes a reward when given to workers. An organization has its various incentives that can be used to induce employees to contribute their energies to organizational endeavours. These incentives are classified into three categories:

- (i) Substantive (e.g. financial, job security and working conditions)
- (ii) Interactive (e.g. social workgroup, leadership, supervision and structural factors)
- (iii) Effectance (e.g. job content, growth opportunity and responsibility.)

The person's perceptual mechanism interprets the expectancy of his effort leading to task performance, the instrumental relationship between this performance and receiving incentive rewards and the intense value of these rewards for satisfying his needs. The person's level of ability influences his perception on these motivational contributions.

#### 2.1. 3 APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF MOTIVATION

As it was observed earlier, motivated behaviour is very complicated. To deal with this complicated behaviour, we then need a conceptual scheme concerning the effects of both the individual and organizational variables on work motivation. This theoretical frame work will then serve as a vehicle not only for explaining motivational behaviour but also for providing managers with a tool to promote productive behaviour in organizations. In view of these facts, many scholars have developed several theories to the study of the nature of motivation. Chung (1977) in review of these theories, noted that they are organized in such a manner to best describe and explain the motivational process in organizations and can be classified into three major categories as: (a) Need theories of motivation; (b) Incentive theories of motivation; and (c) Cognitive theories of motivation. He further pointed that these theories are highly complimentary for the relationships among motivational resultants (i.e. behaviour, reward, satisfaction and productivity) will all be examined so as to guide managers to formulate motivational programmes in their organizations.

## (a) Need Theories


These are referred to as content theories of motivation. They focus on explaining the internal behavioural causes. They explain this causative behaviour through the manifestation of human needs. And the scholars in this category of theories are Abraham Maslow, McGregor, David McClelland and Aldefer. They see a need as an internal state of disequilibrium - whether physical or psychological which causes the individual to pursue certain courses of action in an effort to regain the equilibrium. And this is premised upon the fact that each individual has a set of needs and the satisfaction of these becomes his goal.

The needs approach or study helps to explain and predict what, why and when certain goals or outcomes become important to a person. The assessment of variations in those needs (i.e. existence, affiliation and growth needs) and their relative strengths

at a given moment becomes the initial step towards understanding what determines a person's effort and performance.

This approach extends further to indicate that individuals are attracted to organizations because the organizations provide them with various means of satisfying their needs, for example: Existence needs are met with pay, physical working conditions and job security; Affiliative needs are met with opportunities for socialization and participation; and Growth needs are met by performing enriched jobs. These means are thus used by organizations as organizational properties to encourage people to join them and function within them. When this then occurs, the properties become incentives. The organization then has several incentives at its disposal which it can use to induce its employees to contribute their energies to achieve organizational endeavours. As was earlier shown, the incentives can be of three major types, to meet the needs as shown below:

Table 2.1.3: Matching incentives with their respective needs.



These incentives can be intrinsically and extrinsically mediated to satisfy the employee needs.

## b) Incentives Theories

Incentive theorists turn their attention to the external factors that influence behaviour as opposed to the behavioural causatives in the internal state of needs. They are interested in finding contingency relationships between behaviour and its consequences, rather than trying to explain why behaviour is energized and how it is directed once it is energized. They work on the axiom that behaviour is a function of its consequences (i.e. reward or punishment) and so people behave to receive rewards and avoid punishment. Thus according to these theories, by manipulating the potential consequences or incentives, one can control the behaviour of other people.

They define the term Incentive as an external stimuli that influences the behaviour of employees or the condition in jobs that are capable of influencing or altering behaviour. Organizations have a variety of incentives that induce and influence their employees' behaviour. Employees are induced to organizations for pay, job security and/or professional growth.

The major considerations in the Incentive theories are studied under the captions of theories of learning and reinforcement, principles and mechanisms of managing reinforcement systems, types of incentives/reinforcers and application of reinforcement in organizations.

# c) Cognitive Theories

The cognitive theories describe individual differences in responding to the external and internal behavioural determinants. This difference among individuals is acknowledged by Koontz and Weighrich (1988) who observed that there is no average person, and so differences in reaction to motivation incentives will occur dependent upon, individuality of people due to their personalities, different roles assumed by people, diversity of social systems, perceptual differences and human dignity. Of these theories, the one that has received the most widely accepted explanation is the expectancy theory, to which research evidence is also supportive of (Robbins, 1986).

# 2.1.4 The Expectancy Theory

The expectancy Theory was developed by scholars to explain individual differences in motivational responses and attempts to clarify the differences between individual and organizational goals. According to Steers and Porter (1979), it is a cognitive theory of motivation that attempts to identify relationships among variables in a dynamic state as they affect individual's behaviour. The theory departs from the

content theories in that it depicts a process of cognitive variables that effect individual differences in work motivation (Luthans, 1992).

This theory explains the cognitive process in which people select, organize and interpret sensory stimulation into meaningful picture of their own work environment and choose a set of behavioural alternatives instrumental to the attainment of their own goals. Thus it emphasizes the importance of perceptual variables moderating the relationship between stimulus and response and postulates motivation as a goal-directed behaviour involving an active process of evaluating the valence of outcomes and expectancy of , goal attainment. The valence refers to the attractiveness of an outcome or the strength of an individual preference for a particular outcome and includes such terms as value, incentive, attitude and expected utility. In order for the valence to be positive, the person must prefer attaining the outcome to not attaining it. A valence of zero occurs when the individual is indifferent and the expectancy refers to the likelihood that an action leads to an outcome (Luthans 1992). The theory extends to indicate that individuals should be viewed as thinking, reasoning beings who have beliefs and anticipations concerning future events in their life. It posits that human behavior to a considerable extent is a function of the interactive processes between the characteristics of an individual (such as personality traits, attitudes, needs and values) and his/her perceived environment (such as supervisors style, job or task requirements and organization climate) - steers and porter (1979). And thus as Bennett (1997) pointed, the individual's behavior will reflect self selected goals and what the person has learned or believes will help achieve them. And as Robbins (1986) observed, the theory includes three variables, namely:

- (i) Attractiveness which is the importance that the individual places on the potential outcome or reward that can be achieved on the job. This considers the unsatisfied needs of the individual.
- (ii) Performance reward linkage which is the degree to which the individual believes that performing at a particular level will lead to the attainment of a desired outcome.
- (iii) Effort performance linkage which is the perceived probability by the individual that exerting a given amount of effort will lead to performance.

Accordingly, the theory postulates several inherent steps, which are analyzed in the form of the following questions:

- i. What perceived outcomes does the job offer the employee? The outcomes may be positive as: pay, security, companionship, trust, fringe benefits, a chance to use talents/skills, congenial relationships. On the other hand employees may view the outcomes as negative as: fatigue, boredom, frustration, anxiety, harsh supervision, threat of dismissal. However the critical issue here is not reality which is irrelevant but what the individual employee perceives the outcome to be regardless of whether or not their perceptions are accurate.
- ii. How attractive do employees consider these outcomes? Are they valued positively, negatively or neutrally? This is an internal issue of the employee and thus considers their personal values, personality and needs.
- What kind of behaviour must the employee produce in order to achieve these outcomes? The outcomes are not likely to have any effect on the individual employee's performance unless the employees knows clearly and unambiguously what he/she must do in order to achieve them.
- iv. How does the employee view his/her chances of doing what is asked of her?

These observations thus present expectancy theory as a contingency model that holds to the view that there is no universal principle for explaining every ones motivation, and so leads to the need to understand the individual's goals with regard to:

- The linkage between effort and performance
- The linkage between performance and rewards and
- The linkage between the rewards and the individual goal satisfaction.

This theory brings out four premises, the most relevant one being that people have preferences (or valences) for various outcomes or incentives that are potentially available to them.

# 2.1.5 THE HUMAN RESOURCE PERSPECTIVE TO MOTIVATION

Many scholars in human resource management (for example, Tyson and York, 1997) have postulated an approach to the understanding of motivation that is premised upon the philosophy of the Behavioural Sciences. They approach the concept of motivation from the viewpoint of work and human activities. As Tyson and York (1997) have observed, work and its management are human activities, which are set in motion, carried out, continuously supervised, monitored and assessed by people who are constantly interacting with each. It is this perspective that suggests that human

factors are very crucially important for managers to be aware of as well as have a broad knowledge of human behaviour, including even their own.

This perspective extends further to include the aspects of human features and attributes and holds that human beings share certain common features such as physical and mental characteristics. These are the attributes that link all the members of the species thus producing common patterns of behaviour. It is on the basis of this that all human beings have physiological and basic needs commonly concerned with survivival (i.e. food, shelter, security, reproduction, affection, group membership, etc), and unlike animals also reveal a higher range of needs concerned with making sense of what might otherwise be a meaningless world. These needs show themselves in the form of exploratory, self-fulfilling activities of many and varied forms. In consequence a common feature of all human behaviour is that it is goal directed as the members of the species are driven to satisfy their needs.

While still emphasizing on the human similarity, the view also presents human beings as being dissimilar in many aspects that are accounted for by the unique combination of their genetic and environmental factors. Every human is physically distinctive from all other humans at birth. Thereafter everyone is subjected to a unique pattern of environmental influences produced by the accumulative and distinctive features of a particular family, sex, religion, role, education, race and epoch. This is also a constantly changing process with the result that all of us are being continuously shaped and modified by new experiences and relationships. These differing factors of heredity and environment produce an individual uniqueness which has important consequences.

Even as we grow physically and develop mentally, the general process of satisfying needs and making sense of the world, we are subjected to the socializing influences of other people with whom we have most contact. These produce individual differences and dissimilarities which Graham and Bennett (1998) have dealt with in three headings as:

# i. Physique

Which is defined as the attributes of the body, its size and shape, its speed and strength of movement, the efficiency of its senses. These are basically

determined by heredity though they can be developed or suppressed by upbringing and training.

## ii. Intelligence

It is the capacity to make effective use of the intellect which is the sum total of the mental functions of understanding, thinking, learning, observing, problem solving and perceptual relationships. It is sometimes called the mental ability.

## iii. Personality

It is the sum total of the various qualities that are shown in behaviours. Even though this definition taken literally includes intelligence and physique, the term is usually taken to include above all, emotions, motivation, interests and social qualities.

This condition of common human similarity and individual dissimlarity has a significance for the problems of interpersonal relationships and hence for personnel management. This comes in the area of perception which is affected by the individual's external environment and the person's background. These affect the information processing mechanisms of the individual, which is in turn used as basis for judgements, decisions and actions.

## 2.1.6 MOTIVATIONAL PROGRAMMES

Chung (1977) stands distinct in his work on motivation for pointing clearly that motivational theories cannot be put into practice until they are translated into workable programmes. He observed that understanding these theories helps to explain and predict motivational phenomena, but it does not prescribe how managers should behave in dealing with motivational programmes in their organizations. The fundamental difference between theory and a motivational programme is that a theory describes a phenomenon, while a motivational programme specifies a course of action; the former is based on a positivism while the latter takes a normative approach. The relationship between them is mutually inclusive in that an understanding of theories becomes a necessary initial step for developing sound action programmes. In developing workable motivational programmes, he postulated a guideline which should be considered. First, work motivation depends on the motivational commitment of an employee; a manager or an organization does not

have direct control over an individual's motivation. However the organization can influence the behaviour of its employees through organizational incentives, intrinsic as well as extrinsic, which involve the following strategies:

- (i) An effort should be made to match organizational incentives to the needs of employees. This will not only enhance the incentive value but also result in greater employee satisfaction.
- (ii) Organizational rewards should be related to task performance. Tying task performance to rewards individually or collectively, will not only increase the value of performing the task, but also insure the mutual dependency of achieving individual as well as organizational goals
- (iii) The corollary to this second strategy is that of probability of obtaining rewards should be challenging but attainable. If it is either too pessimistic or optimistic to attain, it will lose its incentive value.

The second guideline is the fact that there are a number of organizational properties that can be applied to generate organizational incentives. These organizational properties can be classified into three major categories:

- (i) Extrinsic or substantive to include pay, working conditions and job security.
- (ii) Social or Interactive to include group norms, trust and openness, risk taking behaviour and supervision.
- (iii) Tasks or jobs to include job enlargement, job enrichment, and flexible working hours

The application of these should aim at attaining a fit between the Individual characteristics and organizational properties, so as for the organization and its members to maintain mutually reinforcing relationships. Motivational problems will however arise when there is lack of fit between the individual needs/goals and the organizational characteristics. Consequently, a guideline has been developed in the form of a chart that combines the needs, incentives and programmes so as to match the individual needs and organization characteristics as:

Table 2.1.6: Theoretical match of the needs with the incentives and the appropriate motivational programs.

NEEDS	INCENTIVES	MOTIVATIONAL PROGRAMMES
GROWTH ORIENTED NEEDS:	EFFECTANCE INCENTIVE:	MOTIVATION THROUGH WORK SYSTEMS:
- Self Actualization	- Growth Opportunity	- Flexible Working Hours
- Achievement	- Challenge	- Job Enlargement
- Competence	- Job Content	- Job Enrichment - Management by objectives.
RELATION - ORIENTED	INTERACTIVE	MOTIVATION THROUGH
NEEDS:	INCENTIVE:	AFFECTIVE INTERACTION:
- Affiliative	- Social Reinforcers	
- Companionship	- Work Group	- Structural Design
- Competition	- Leadership	- Leadership process
<ul> <li>Power and Status</li> </ul>	- Supervision	- Group Process
	- Structural Influence	- Organizational Climate
EXISTENCE NEEDS:	SUBSTATIVE	MOTIVATION BY
	INCENTIVE:	FINANCIAL INCENTIVE:
- Security	The same of the same of the	STREET, M. M. M. S.
- Safety	- Job Security	- Incentive Pay
- Physiological	- Pay	- Salary
	- Fringe Benefits	- Bonus
	- Working Conditions	- Fringe Benefits
		- Stock Options

Source: Chung (1977) PP12

Even though other scholars have not followed the chart approach, yet it is discernible from the contributions of Steers and Porter (1979), Robbins (1986), Luthans (1992) and Bennett (1997) that they are supportive of this categorization of the various motivation elements by Chung (1977). Thus this chart has been adopted because of its relevance to this study in classifying needs into different categories and then matching each with the right incentives and programmes to administer the incentive. Further it has taken care of both the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of motivation (Herzberg 1959) as well as the economic and non-economic rewards as suggested by Belcher (1974) covered under the compensation section.

## 2.2.0 THE MEANING OF COMPENSATION

Compensation has been variously defined by different scholars. Belcher (1974) and Carrel and Kuzmits (1986) observed that compensation takes a broader scope to refer not only to extrinsic rewards such as salary and benefits but also to intrinsic rewards such as recognition, chance for a promotion and more challenging

job opportunity. Singh and Nzuve (1992) and Dessler (1994) focused on the wage and salary administration aspect of compensation to indicate that it covers both financial incentives and fringe benefits. This focus indicates that salary and wage administration has two components namely: Direct financial payments in the form of wages, salaries, incentives, commissions and bonuses; and Indirect payments in the form of financial benefits like Insurance, paid vacations, paid holidays, food services, credit unions and recreation.

Compensation in terms of pay is therefore given to employees, based on either time or an agreed piece rate. And this has to be guided by such basic considerations as Legal requirements, Union influences, compensation policies and equity and its impact on pay rates. As several authors have pointed, these pay rates are established in a systematic way through the following steps:

- (i) Conducting a salary survey
- (ii) Determining the worth of each job through job evaluation to identify the compensable job factors.
- (iii) Grouping similar jobs into grades
- (iv) Pricing each pay grade and
- (v) Fine tuning pay rates

Jeffrey (1998) observed that the kinds of questions that arise in compensation come to four decisions, namely:

- How much to pay employees
- · How much to place on financial compensation as a part of the total reward system.
- · How much emphasis to place on attempting to hold down the rate of pay, and
- Whether to implement a system of individual incentives to reward differences in performance and productivity and if so how much emphasis to place on these incentives.

These key decisions about pay make compensation very important for they help establish a company's culture by rewarding business activities, behaviours and values that senior managers hold dear.

## 2.2.1. COMPENSATION MODELS

As Belcher (1974) observed, compensation is interpreted in most occasions as involving an exchange between employees and organisations in which each is getting something in return for giving something. As such then, scholars from different streams of orientation ranging from economists, psychologists to sociologists have studied compensation from different vantage points thereby postulating different models of compensation. These models have been described as:

- a) The Economic transaction
- b) The psychological transaction
  - c) The sociological transaction
  - d) The political transaction, and
  - e) The ethical transaction

#### a. The Economic Transaction View

This view holds that compensation represents a transaction between man and organization involving the employment contract. In this regard then, pay becomes the price the organization pays for employing a factor of production. And in this sense, payment for employment serves as an economic transaction governed by the same logic as any other purchase in which the purchaser attempts to obtain the greatest quantity and the highest quality for his money. The worker is also selling his services to obtain income and he holds out for the highest price he is able to command. These transactions are supposed to set the price in terms of the demand of purchasers and the supplies of the sellers and to allocate the scarce economic resource (labour) to the employment where it has most value.

This view has been argued against along the following dysfunctional areas resulting from this perspective:

- It focuses on the organization and the economy rather than the individual employee, a view which places the organization as purchaser of labour thus being the active decision maker and the individual given a passive role.
- It limits compensation to economic rewards only, a view that ignores the noneconomic rewards thus making the transaction to be incompletely analyzed.
- It assumes that labour services are what organizations purchase and that individuals are passive instruments in the transaction.

These shortcomings have given way for the development of the other four mentioned models.

## b. The Psychological Transaction View

This view sees employment as representing a psychological transaction or contract between Man and the Organization in which the individual exchanges certain desired types of behaviours for pay and other sources of job satisfaction. Thus the situation faced by the employee, their needs, perceptions and attitudes determine the behaviour. The contract between the individual and the organization thus attains reality through the eye of the beholder. So rewards offered by an organization enter the contract only if the individual perceives them as relevant. These rewards should then be offered to individuals by organizations to promote certain types of behaviours. But which rewards motivate what kinds of behaviour and how they operate are functions of perception and attitudes.

# c. The Sociological Transaction View

This view posits that man lives in a universe of events and objects endued with meanings by man himself through social definitions couched in language. He learns these meanings along with language and solidifies them through associations in groups important to him. The individual derives his plans of actions from the roles he plays and the various statuses he occupies in the groups which he feels identified with as reference groups. Motivation is thus embedded in the attitudes, values and roles of individuals in various groups.

## d. The Political Transaction View

This view argues that compensation represents a political transaction involving the use of power and influence. Organizations, unions, groups and individual employees all exert power to influence or change the transaction. Union exerts influence at the time the contract is bargained and during the life of the contract through the grievance procedure. Organizations exert power in the same situation and in addition some choose to be wage leaders, and thus become major forces in the labour markets. And even within organizations, groups exert power to obtain a more favourable transaction for themselves. As they acquire more differentiated but interdependent units, more and more individuals acquire power to influence the employment transaction.

#### e. The Ethical Transaction View

This school holds that compensation represents an ethical transaction which is seen with the repeated appeals for fairness seen in such phrases as 'fair day's pay', 'the just wage' and 'gross iniquities'. The emphasis is justice, fairness and equity in matters of compensation. Equity is viewed from the eye of the beholder, and so it means that one party to a transaction cannot define what is equitable for the other. Each must decide for himself.

These five models give an implication of the diversity of compensation in that even though it can be variously viewed as an economic, psychological, sociological, political or ethical exchange, yet it is all these and more than any one of them. And this points at three issues of concern in compensation, namely: Employee contributions, Incentives and Organizational rewards.

#### 2.2.2 CONTRIBUTIONS

Contributions represent outputs from employees to the organisation in exchange for inputs from the organisation in the form of rewards. To the organisation, contributions represent inputs from employees in exchange for outputs to employees in the form of rewards. The employee contributions can be of different types as:

- (i) Job related contributions which relate to the nature of the job in terms of difficulty and importance. These are obtained from job evaluation efforts aimed at bringing out the compensable job factors. This gives the basis for equal pay for equal work.
- (ii) Performance contributions which measure contributions to the employment exchange in terms of performance in the job. It is these that give the basis for rate ranges and incentive plans that take into account differential performance matched with differential pay. These are reinforced by performance targets and performance appraisal schemes.
- (iii) Personal contributions which relate to personal traits not required by the organisation. But equity theory holds that a number of these potential contributions may be recognised and considered relevant to the employment exchange which might make it necessary to be considered as a determinant of equity. These contributions are: age and seniority; sex and place; personal appearance; lifestyle; adaptability, commitment, cooperation, creativity,

initiative, judgement and reliability; self improvement efforts; and acceptance of responsibility, effort expended, education, intelligence, job knowledge.

#### 2.2.3 INCENTIVES

Rajaram (1999) pointed that managers are concerned with enhancing the value of their human capital. This human capital is tied to the firm and industry - specific components of earnings variability. By exploiting the firm's unique set of competencies and resources to obtain a competitive advantage, managers improve the firm's performance and their own consequent standing and employment prospects in the external labour market. Managers also have to cater to a broader range of organizational stakeholders than the shareholders. They thus devote more attention to managing the firm - specific factors which are more closely linked to their welfare. It is this that creates a divergence of goals between top management and shareholders wherein lies one root cause of the agency problem. Corporate Boards of Directors hence have to try and resolve this agency problem through management contracts that link top management compensation to shareholder incentive.

The essential feature of any incentives issue thus lies in the differences in the aims of the people involved, for if people or parties are perfectly in agreement, there is no need for one to create incentives for the other. But in the real world, an ideal situation may not occur whereby the principal can find an agent whose aims are not in conflict with his. As McMillan (1992) pointed, several questions then have to be considered, and revolve around:

- How can you make it another person's interest to behave as you want?
- How can you create incentives?

In an attempt to answer these questions, the need arises for the designers of incentives to fully understand what the concept of incentives entails. McMillan (1992) has noted that the word "Incentive" comes from the Latin word "Incentiuus" which means "setting the tune". Since the whole question arises because of some divergence of interests, people must be rewarded if they are to be induced to do something they would prefer not to do. It is due to this that organizations result to appreciate the concept of motivation in an endeavour to change people's goals. They do this by fostering corporate cultures, beliefs in the organizations' goals and pride in teamwork

to reduce the differences between the objectives of the agents - the employees and the principal - the employer. This thus sees Management broaden the compensation perspective in terms of rewards to the employees to include not only money as the sole motivator but also other aspects as peer pressure, pride in craftsmanship and the work ethic.

It has thus been suggested that to get people to do things they would prefer not to do, you must offer some kind of reward. Within this is hidden some wildly controversial questions not only of economics but also of politics and philosophy, some of the fiercest debates being beliefs about the importance of incentives. The rewards have therefore to be structured in such a way that it is in the interest of the employees to do as you want them to do. McMillan (1992) has pointed that the shortest and best way to make your fortune is to let people see clearly that it is in their interests to promote yours. This is achieved by way of devising a payment scheme that perfectly aligns the agent's interest with the principal's by setting the agent's marginal payment rate at 100%. This marginal concept is based on the balance between extra payments to the employee for extra efforts by the employee.

# 2.2.4. REWARDS

Rewards for work include all those things that the employee receives as a consequence of the employment exchange. And in systems terms they represent inputs to employees from the organisation in exchange for outputs from employees in terms of contributions. To both the parties, the outputs must exceed inputs if the systems are to survive and achieve their goals. And in other words, employees must perceive their rewards as greater than their contributions and organisations must perceive contributions provided by employees as more than the rewards they give to them. The rewards may be classified in several ways as:

- a) Economic
- b) Non economic

# a) Economic rewards

They are of various types as:

 Economic job rewards whose primary reward for work is the salary or the wage.

- (ii) Economic performance Rewards or Incentive Plans which are offered to provide performance motivation. There is some empirical evidence that these incentive plans can increase productivity (Belcher 1974). The various types are: Individual Incentives Plans including standard hour plans, sharing plans, Halsey plans, the Rowan plan and Bedan plan; and Group Incentive plans which include the plant wide/company wide incentives and Scanlon plans (Chung 1977, Belcher 1974).
- (iii) Economic membership Rewards which are not designed to compensate for the specific job assigned to the employee but for their membership in the organisation. The organizations often do this to arouse sufficient organisational attachment on the part of the employees to enable it accomplish its purposes. These rewards include: Career progression rewards for years of experience since acquiring qualification, age and seniority; Profit sharing in cash plans, deferred payments and a combination of these; and Compensation security plans as guarantees of employment or income.
- (iv) Indirect compensation which are offered as fringe benefits representing payments to the employees not for their work but for their acceptance of the roles of employees. These include:
  - (a) Extra payments for time worked (e.g. Holiday premiums, overtime premiums, weekend premiums)
  - (b) Non production awards and bonuses (e.g. Anniversary awards, Christmas bonus, Quality bonus, Year end bonus, waste elimination bonus)
  - (c) Payments for time not worked (eg. family allowances, medical time, paid sick leave, religious holidays, severance pay)
  - (d) Payments for employee security (e.g. contributions towards insurance, employee stock purchase plans, employee loan association, home financing, pensions)
  - (e) payments for employee services (e.g. employee parties, educational assistance, company housing, Beauty parlor, paid club memberships, parking space operations, scholarships)

The Kenya Salary Survey (1998) showed prevalence of most of these items. However some of these benefits have been consolidated into the basic pay. Other benefits provided as part of standard terms and conditions of service are: Retirement (Pensions, Gratuity, Provident); Medical (In-house schemes, Insured schemes, a combination of the two); Life Assurance schemes; Funeral Assistance schemes; Car schemes; Loan entitlements; Education for children; and Conditions of employment covering annual leave, sick leave with full pay, maternity leave, compassionate leave, paternity leave and study leave.

#### b. Non financial Rewards

Many of this type of rewards issue from several sources as the organization, the supervisors, fellow employees, and the employee himself. These have been contributed to by scholars from different streams, notably psychology and sociology. They include those of Herzberg (1959) touching on recognition, achievement, growth, advancement, technical competence of supervision, responsibility, the work itself, status and job security. Those from sociologists include authority pay, power pay, status pay and privilege pay. The various categories of the non financial job rewards are:

- (i) Non financial job rewards which are provided by the organisation as a result of job design and include: work flow system, information flows, number of operations, complexity of work, skill and attention requirements, and status, importance or level of the job.
- (ii) Non financial performance rewards including: opportunity, status, recognition, power and influence, participation in problem solving, opportunity to set performance goals, job variety, responsibility, freedom, autonomy and independence, job (skill) challenge, feeling of self control and identification with organisation goals, self respect or self esteem.
- (iii) Non financial membership rewards which are designed to maintain the organisation. These arise from three sources as:
  - (a) Characteristics of the organization: organization size, prestige, visibility, importance, and level of profits.

- (b) The way the organisation is run in terms of: flexibility of the organization, policies and procedures, extent of decentralisation, extent of delegation of authority, clarity of authority symbols, the work flow system, the communication system, and conflict resolution methods.
- (c) Others such as security, predictability of life in the organization, adequacy of training programs (or quality of management development programs), and participative/consultative management decision making.

#### 2.2.5 COMPENSATION OF MANAGERS

Koontz and Weihrich (1988) observed that the compensation of managers must begin with first of all defining the managerial job. But as they have pointed, there doesn't seem to exist a complete agreement among scholars as to what exactly constitutes the job of a manager. Since the nature of several managerial tasks has been studied from several different perspectives, the major points of focus have been:

- From the Greatman School the behaviour and habits of successful managers.
- Economists the focus has been on their entrepreneurial aspects of managing. The
  main concern is that of profit maximization, innovation, risk taking and similar
  activities.
- Others focus on
  - Decision making especially on those that cannot be
    Programmed
  - Leadership with an emphasis on particular traits and managerial styles
  - Power and influence (i.e. the leader's control of the environment and subordinates)
  - Behaviour of leaders by examining the content of the manager's job
  - Work activities of managers

The second point of concern in the managerial compensation is that of the individual managers' differences exhibited through different needs, desires and motives. These differences are connected with:

- The managerial candidates wide differences in age, economic position and level of maturity which see the managers want many things usually including opportunity, income and power.
- The managers' different concern for the opportunity for a progressive career that provides depth and breadth of managerial experience. Related to this is also the challenge found in meaningful work. Even though many people especially managers want to feel that they make a significant contribution to the aims of the enterprise and even society, yet the degree of this varies among them.
- The managers different wants to be rewarded for their contributions.

The third consideration in the compensation of managers is that of the components of top management compensation. Rajaram (1999) has pointed that top management compensation can be examined from the dual perspectives of the amount as well as the mix of compensation. This mix varies along with the following variables.

- Fixed compensation which is independent of the firm's performance versus variable compensation, which is tied to a measure of the firm's performance, and
- Current compensation accruing at the end of the year versus deferred compensation accruing in latter years.

From a corporate governance perspective, these different components in the mix of executive compensation are different in their impacts on managerial motivation. Each predicates differing degrees of short term versus long term orientation in managerial decision making as well as differing degrees of risk sharing between the shareholders and managers. Cash compensation (i.e. Year-end salary and bonus) promotes primarily a shorter term orientation. The salary does not co-vary greatly with firm performance, or from year to year. It is intended to provide the means of livelihood and a guarantee of medium of financial stability of managers. In most instances it also adheres to industry norms that specify the amount ranges for each hierarchy position, functional area, company size and performance within particular industries or sectors. The year-end bonuses are normally tied to annual earnings - based performance and tend to fluctuate more. However, both these do not encourage managerial activities and decisions that generate longer term appreciation

in shareholder value. Thus the incentive contract for managerial cash compensation shifts most of the risks on to the shareholders.

Stock options on the other hand are intended to encourage a longer term orientation in managerial decision making (especially restricted to stock options) and necessitate more of an ownership perspective among managers. Stock options and grants thus more closely align managerial interests with the welfare of share-holders.

The management's cash compensation is adjusted to conform to the norms prevailing in the external managerial labour market. This conformity is ensured by personnel departments and compensation consultants who determine the appropriate levels of compensation based in the set criteria.

Crane (1982), Carrel and Kuzmits (1986) have pointed that due to the unique nature of managerial roles, organizations consider giving those in managerial and executive positions perquisites in addition to the direct and indirect payments. These perquisites represent a distinct area of generic compensation that involves certain privileges and special considerations that are granted in addition to pay and benefits (Hadad 1985). Such perquisites are normally associated with organizational rank and the most typical of these are: Company provided cars; First class travel accommodations; Chaffeur-driven limousines; Free or assigned parking privileges; Executive or special dining rooms; Club memberships; Membership to professional organizations; Paid travel for spouse; and Interest free loans.

#### 2.2.7 COMPENSATION SCHEME OF MANAGERS

Crane (1982), Belcher (1974) and Dessler (1994) observed that organizations consider the compensation of managers as unique and so different from those of other employee groups as to warrant separate treatment. These differences are associated with:

- The evaluation of their jobs that tends to emphasize non quantifiable factors like judgement and problem solving.
- (ii) Their job contributions which are different in that the managerial positions have significant effects on profits. So their job contributions represent an identity between the individual and the organisation such that what they contribute determines what the organisation is and does.

(iii) The management (especially top management) is assumed to be a partner of the owners and a trustee of the interests of the various organizational claimants including themselves. Their emphasis is on strategic and administrative decisions.

The executive and managerial work is defined as consisting of creating production and jobs, making decisions, providing leadership, allocating resources, reconciling claimant interests, introducing innovations, accumulating and using capital, and taking risks. The degree of responsibility of the managers on these roles varies with their level in the organization hierarchy (Belcher, 1974).

Because of the role that these managers play in determining divisional and corporate profitability, most employers pay their managers and executives some type of bonus or incentive. These take both short term and long term perspectives as:

- (i) Short term Annual bonus according to an agreed formula, which motivates the managers'/executives' short term performance.
- (ii) Long term To reward management for the long term growth and prosperity of the company. They include
  - (a) Capital Accumulation programs such as: stock options, stock appreciation, Performance achievement plans, Phantom stock plans, and Book value plans.
  - (b) Benefits vacations and holidays, Sick leave, Severence pay, Supplemental unemployment benefits, Insurance and Retirement.

Blunt and Popoola (1990) concluded that there is a great need to tie individual performance which is directed towards the accomplishment of organizational goals to desired rewards in Africa. And they pointed that some of the rewards valued most by African workers are money and other incentives such as status, prestige and power. And in terms of Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory of motivation, they observed that the greater part of the world's population is still motivated by lower level basic survival needs. At work, this translates into an overpowering concern for material rewards and security of tenure. And to Africa which is a third world continent, this revelation is much more true.

Thus a compensation scheme for managers will consist of the plan, programme, design and systematic arrangement of the combination of elements that are connected with the rewards to those persons in the managerial cadre. Such a scheme derives from the organization strategy and the policy on the management of its human resource element. Such a policy will detail on the operational procedures culminating in timely salary reviews, performance measurement and personnel management techniques of administering overall levels of salary and bonus, salary adjustments, promotion, transfers, demotions and training and development (Mcbeath and Rands, 1976). And as such it is likely to be influenced by the organization culture, economic conditions, other organizations, the size, structure, technology and climate of the organization (Belcher, 1974). These sources of influence suggest that such a scheme will heavily borrow from the contents of the available salary survey (Kenya Salary Survey, 1998). And for the purpose of this study, a compensation scheme for the managers in the Kenyan environment is assumed to reflect the following items in terms of economic rewards, non-financial rewards and perquisites (White 1973; Belcher, 1974; Hadad, 1985; Carrel and Kuzmits, 1986; and Kenya Salary Survey, 1998 and Heath, 1999).

# (a) Economic Rewards

- (i) The salary.
- (ii) Incentive Plans with the various types being:
  - (a) Individual Incentives
  - (b) Group Incentive plans
  - (c) Economic membership Rewards which include: Career progression rewards for years of experience since acquiring qualification, age and seniority; Profit sharing in cash plans, deferred payments and a combination of these; and Compensation security plans as guarantees of employment or income.

# (iii) Fringe benefits which include:

- (a) Extra payments for time worked (e.g. Holiday premiums, overtime premiums, weekend premiums)
- (b) Non production awards and bonuses (e.g. anniversary awards, christmas bonus, quality bonus, year end bonus, waste elimination bonus)

- (c) Payments for time not worked (e.g. family allowances, medical time, paid sick leave, religious holidays, severance pay)
- (d) Payments for employee security (e.g. contributions towards insurance employee stock purchase plans, employee loan association, home financing, pensions)
- (e) payments for employee services (e.g. employee parties, educational assistance, company housing, beauty parlor, paid club memberships, parking space operations, scholarships)
- (f) Retirement (pensions, gratuity, provident)
- (g) Medical in-house schemes, insured schemes, or a combination of the two)
- (h) Life Assurance Schemes
- (i) Funeral Assistance Schemes
- (i) Car Schemes
- (k) Loan Entitlements
- (1) Education for Children
- (m) Conditions of employment covering annual leave, sick leave with full pay, maternity leave, compassionate leave paternity leave and study leave.

# (b) Non financial Rewards.

These are in three categories as:

- (i) Non financial job rewards which include the workflow system, information flows, number of operations, complexity of work, skill and attention requirements and status, importance or level of the job.
- (ii) Non financial performance rewards including: opportunity, status, recognition; power and influence, participation in problem solving, opportunity to set performance goals, job variety, responsibility, freedom, autonomy and independence, job (skill) challenge; feeling of self control and identification with organization goals, and self respect or self esteem.
- (iii) Non financial membership rewards which emanate from three sources as:
  - (a) Characteristics of the organisation in terms of the organisation size, prestige, visibility, importance, and level of profits.

Thus a compensation scheme for managers will consist of the plan, programme, design and systematic arrangement of the combination of elements that are connected with the rewards to those persons in the managerial cadre. Such a scheme derives from the organization strategy and the policy on the management of its human resource element. Such a policy will detail on the operational procedures culminating in timely salary reviews, performance measurement and personnel management techniques of administering overall levels of salary and bonus, salary adjustments, promotion, transfers, demotions and training and development (Mcbeath and Rands, 1976). And as such it is likely to be influenced by the organization culture, economic conditions, other organizations, the size, structure, technology and climate of the organization (Belcher, 1974). These sources of influence suggest that such a scheme will heavily borrow from the contents of the available salary survey (Kenya Salary Survey, 1998). And for the purpose of this study, a compensation scheme for the managers in the Kenyan environment is assumed to reflect the following items in terms of economic rewards, non-financial rewards and perquisites (White 1973; Belcher, 1974; Hadad, 1985; Carrel and Kuzmits, 1986; and Kenya Salary Survey, 1998 and Heath, 1999).

# (a) Economic Rewards

- (i) The salary.
- (ii) Incentive Plans with the various types being:
  - (a) Individual Incentives
  - (b) Group Incentive plans
  - (c) Economic membership Rewards which include: Career progression rewards for years of experience since acquiring qualification, age and seniority; Profit sharing in cash plans, deferred payments and a combination of these; and Compensation security plans as guarantees of employment or income.

# (iii) Fringe benefits which include:

- (a) Extra payments for time worked (e.g. Holiday premiums, overtime premiums, weekend premiums)
- (b) Non production awards and bonuses (e.g. anniversary awards, christmas bonus, quality bonus, year end bonus, waste elimination bonus)

- (b) The way the organisation is run in terms of: flexibility of the organisation; policies and procedures; extent of decentralization; extent of delegation of authority; clarity of authority symbols; the workflow system; the communication system; and conflict resolution methods.
  - (c) Other factors as: security; predictability of life in the organisation; adequacy of training programs (or quality of management development programs); and participative/consultative management decision making.

# (C) Perquisites

- (i) Company provided car
- (ii) Car loan
- (iii) First Class Travel accommodations
- (iv) Free/Assigned parking privileges
- (v) Club memberships
- (vi) Membership to professional organizations
- (vii) Paid travel for spouse
- (viii) Interest free loans
- (ix) Chauffeur driven limousines
- (x) Executive/Special Dining rooms

## 2.3.0 COMPENSATION PREFERENCES

White (1973) spotted a weakness with the subject of motivation with respect to its general treatment of the principles and issues regarding the formulation of policies for use in guiding compensation in organizations. Zedeck (1977) supported this in his review of the attention given to the study of motivation since 1900, and pointed that no single approach either singly, or in combination seems to fit every one. This is so because of individual differences, which managerial strategies seem to have failed to account. And this has extended to the area of design of compensation packages that are meant to meet the needs of what are assumed to be an "average" executive (Byars and Rue, 1979). Koontz and Weighrich (1988) pointed that there is no average person and that the individual employee should be considered as a whole person other than looking at first separate and distinct characteristics such as knowledge, attitudes, skills and personality traits. Each person has all these to

different degrees and they also tend to interact with one another and their predominance in specific situations changes quickly and unpredictably.

The result of these observations is the existence of different preferences among executives and managers to different compensation items. Several scholars have indicated that managers will have different preferences for different compensation items. For example: Chung (1977) pointed that employees as people will have different preferences for different reward plans; Byars and Rue (1979) observed that executives' preferences differ as to compensation distribution; Cascio (1989) linked the existence of these different preferences to demographic factors; and Cascio and Award (1981) attempted to capture those preferences in compensation theory through the Vroom's Expectancy Model. Research by several scholars gives supporting evidence to this fact. Lewen and Lauser (1973) found different preferences for different compensation items and an explicit desire to obtain some freedom of choice; Mahoney, (1964); Hulme and Bavan, (1975); and Schwab and Wallace (1974) found that employees will have different preferences for different pay plans; and White (1973) found that executives under the study were in different categories according to the items of compensation they preferred. More recent research efforts have been given to the intrinsic aspects of compensation. As Slocombe and Bluedorn (1999) pointed, those efforts have focused on human preferences for time utilization in the work place and with a view to assigning employees to different positions in the organization thereby achieving some degree of congruity between the job characteristics and the job holder.

These preferences exhibited by the managers are rooted in their value orientations. As several scholars have shown, preferences are very closely linked to values, and this is clear from the following observations: Rogers (1969) saw the concept of values as the tendency to show preference; Coughlan (1969) perceived values as preferences, criteria, objects and possessions, personality and status characteristics' and states of mind that are absolute, inherent in objects, present in man, and/or identical with his behaviour; Inlow (1972) described values as determinants of ones choices in life that decide his behaviour; Rockeach (1973) and Robbins (1986) defined values as representing basic convictions that a specific mode of conduct or end state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite

or converse mode; and Kabanoff and Holt (1996) defined values as relatively enduring beliefs about what kinds of behaviours or end states are preferable to others.

It is due to this link that several scholars have advanced a strong case for the integration of the value-based preferences of employees into the managerial compensation strategies. This case has been advanced along several points: Robbins (1986) pointed, that values lay the foundation for the understanding of attitudes, motivation, perception and human behaviour in the organization which puts values at the centre of the managerial behaviour; Zedeck (1977) viewed motivation in an information processing way thus involving the concept of perception; Organ and Bateman (1991) linked managerial behaviour with perception; Lord and Mahan (1991) linked perception with leadership, information processing and performance; Organ and Bateman (1991) showed that perception is at the crux of all significant behaviour; and Ronen (1978) observed that the individual values affect not only perceptions of appropriate ends but also perception of the appropriate means to those ends. Seen this way, the individual values are part of the set with which employees approach their work environment and evaluate the organizational reward system.

### 2.3.1 THE GENERATION OF PREFERENCES

Moore (1999) pointed that people do not possess established global preference orderings. Instead people have mental procedures that allow them to generate preferences when called for. This preference generation procedure relies on the presence of actual or imagined alternatives to make it possible to judge an option within a relevant evaluative context.

According to this observation, it seems very unlikely that people are born with preferences for particular objects. Instead, preferences may become more well established with experience. And further to these is the fact that people do not have clear preferences for objects. It is far more common for these preferences to be weak, vague and undeveloped. So instead of referring to a stable set of extant preferences, one must construct ones preferences when they are called for. This process of online construction necessarily faces a number of competing motives and rationales, and this intrapersonal conflict can give rise to preference - reversal effects. Preferences are not simply revealed but are actually constructed in the process of elicitation.

The process of generation of preferences normally goes as follows: Each must identify his/her own standards for doing something or some behaviours, and if such are available in memory, they are likely to be used. If not then, one must imagine other possibilities and determine the action to take. The comparison process would clarify the standard by which people construct their preferences online.

This does not however say that people do not have preferences before they are asked about them. But it suggests that people have strategies they use for assembling preferences and that these strategies are unlikely to produce preferences that are invariant across elicitation methods. Thus this school of thought explores the strategy of generating preferences online by comparing within a context of imagined alternatives. As Moore (1999) reported, research on counter factual thinking has documented the power of comparisons and context in human judgement. These have found that perceived or imagined choices can influence preferences, satisfaction and the desirability of various alternatives. Research on asymmetric dominance has also shown that the inclusion of an irrelevant inferior alternatives can change preferences by changing the context of comparisons.

It thus becomes clear that options are preferred more when they dominate other alternatives than when they don't, even when the dominated alternative is normatively irrelevant. In other words, options that are accompanied by a downward comparison to an inferior option are thereby seen as more attractive. The converse of this pattern is the tendency for options to be less popular when they are dominated by other alternatives than when they are not, even if those alternatives are normatively irrelevant.

In a series of several experiments, Moore (1999) found that:

- Order of presentation has a significant impact on ratings of options previously shown to produce joint-versus -separate preference reversals.
- Availability of information and the order in which it is acquired affects the evaluability on preference generation.
- Without a global preference set for calculating value, preferences must be generated online by processes that are vulnerable to bias, they will be better and the expressed preferences will be more fully informed, the more information the decision maker has.

 Decisions more closely approach rationality to the extent that they occur in a rich context of other alternatives and standards by which to judge relevant options.

# 2.3.2 PREFERENCES FROM THE MOTIVATION VIEW POINT

Because of the link between preferences and motivation so postulated, certain scholars have taken interest into highlighting the manifestation of these preferences in the employment situation. White (1973) observed that the relationship between preferences and motivation (and so compensation) is mediated by the expectations of the employees. These expectations take into account the process by which people learn to expect the consequences of their actions and take cognisant of their feelings and thoughts. And these too are influenced by their training, experiences by which they learn that certain kinds of actions are likely to lead into their long term successes. In addition to these, contacts with other people, their encouragement and approval, acceptance of what they do to attain to the expectation also reinforce.

Cascio and Award (1981) supported this and fitted preferences within the theories of motivation as:

- (i) Universal theories to include those of Maslow, McGregor, Atkinson and McClleland Models
- (ii) Environmental theories to include those of Herzberg, Skinner's conditioning and Reinforcement theories
- (iii) A composite Theory which refers to Vroom's Expectancy Model. This was seen as a rational model of how individuals develop preferences and make choices. Byars and Rue (1979) saw this valence expectancy model as Preference Expectancy Model.

They then concluded that the individual employee faces a set of alternatives for which he must select choices on outcome. Faced with these he will make preferences based on the strength (Valence) of his desire to achieve the outcomes and those preferences are related to his perceptions of the strength of the outcomes.

Several factors will combine together to account for differences in the preferences among managers for different compensation packages. These factors are:

 The Individual uniqueness that gives rise to different needs, ambitions, attitudes and desires of responsibility and levels of knowledge in terms

- of skills and potentials (Chung, 1977; Robbins, 1986 and Koontz and Weirich, 1988)
- (ii) The multiplicity of roles of employees as members of a broad societal system as consumers of goods and services, members of a family, schools, churches, trade associations and even political parties (Nadler et al, 1979)
- (iii) The employees' different motivational stages. Tampoe (1993) hypothesized that an employee at any given point in time can be at one of the four motivational stages of fulfillment, transition, developmental and plateand.
- (iv) Differences in perception among different employees, by which the employment contract between the employee and the organization attains reality through the eye of the beholder. The rewards offered by the organization enter the contract only if the individual perceives them as relevant (Belcher; 1974, Luthans, 1992; Tang, 1992; and Organ and Bateman, 1991).
- (v) Differences in motivational value of the incentives offered by the organization. (Chung 1977;)

As Chung (1977) pointed, the differences among the executive preferences are influenced by two major factors namely internal and external to the individual. These are analyzed as:

- Internal influences as the individual's needs, ability, self concept that influences
  his perception, role perception that influences his threshold for evoking
  behaviour, personality factors that influence perceptions and their past
  experiences of success or failure.
- External influences as the size, novelty, movement, repetition and the familiarity
  of the incentive, and the social situation (i.e. the organization climate) in which
  the incentive is perceived.

# 2.3.3 INTEGRATING PREFERENCES WITH COMPENSATION DECISIONS

The above points suggest that employees will demonstrate different preferences to different compensation packages. Singh and Nzuve (1992) pointed that different employees will demonstrate different preferences to the rewards they want

due to certain acts of personal values and goals that they seek to fulfil in their work. This, plus the contributions of the expectancy theorists has given several implications to the design of compensation schemes. And as has been pointed out clearly by Chung (1977), Steers and Porter (1979), Robbins (1986), Luthans (1992) and Bennett (1997), the management of any organization should put into consideration the following facts:

- That Individuals possess different preferences for outcomes and different perceptions of the relation between effort and rewards and that they will be motivated differently. These differences should be incorporated in the salary and wage administration, job design through job enlargement, rotation, enrichment, goal setting and job engineering.
- Efforts to be made to determine what rewards each employee values.
- To analyze the total employment situation for any conflicting expectancies between the employee and the organization's offering as well as checking the system for equity.
- 4. To align the organization's offering with what the employee wants, and
- Creating organizational flexibility to accommodate the individual differences.

Several points have been advanced in favour of the need to integrate these preferences into compensation policies, which revolve around five considerations. The first is the fact that compensating employees for what they give the organization is to some extent as much an art as it is a science (Carrel and Kuzmits, 1986). White (1973) observed that the more systematically and scientifically the subject of compensation is treated, the more cold and inhuman it seems. And to avoid this problem it has to be accepted that there are two sides to it namely, the individual and the organization, and that unless the organization is open with the individual and gets his full support, the scheme so developed may be tainted with suspicion. Thus the organization has to provide what the individual values as relevant and important.

The Second is in the link between organizational compensation and the employee productivity and job satisfaction. Even though studies show very little correlation between productivity and satisfaction, yet Dunn and Stephens (1972) have used the Porter-Lawler model to show that rewards that are perceived as equitable can sometimes satisfy needs. High levels of productivity on the other hand can sometimes lead to both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.

Thirdly, the huge expenditures incurred by companies for salaries and benefits warrants the assessment of the employee needs and determining which of the compensation items are truly demanded (Carrel and Kuzmits, 1986).

The fourth one is on the need to recognize and consider those employment outcomes considered relevant by the employees. Evidence indicates that the more a reward is valued by the employees, the more weight it carries in motivating both membership and performance. Thus organizations should be aware of the range of rewards that may be provided to employees and the preferences that they have for those rewards. (Belcher, 1974).

The last consideration lies in the need to give the employees freedom of choice of rewards. Williams and Luthans (1992) pointed that research evidence in environmental, experimental and social psychology indicates that the freedom to choose from among courses of actions, outcomes or situations can have powerful effects on the way people feel, think and behave. For example, studies have found that the elderly in institutionalized setting experience improved health and lower mortality rates when they are encouraged to make a greater number of choices concerning day to day events affecting them. Other studies using both animal and human subjects have found that freedom of choice is motivational as well as desirable to recipients and choice leading to increased perceptions of control has reinforcing properties. And there is some agreement that choice occurs when individuals perceive control of the selection process from among options of similar value and outcome certainty. And this means that individuals experience choice when they perceive themselves as the agent who selects from options of similar attractiveness and indeterminacy exists as to which option will yield the optimal outcome. Pelmutter and Monty (1977) theorized that choice produces heightened perceptions of personal control which subsequently activates arousal and leads to a concomitant increase in task performance. And Tang (1992) found that individuals who experience choice tend to outperform no choice subjects. This is further reinforced by Swanack (1998) who pointed that the present generation of employees is better educated and informed than any other previous generation. It makes demands and has expectations, demonstrates an inherent need to be respected and at least in part to have a say in its destiny.

The consideration of these points has led to the prevalence of flexible compensation schemes in organizations. As Carrel and Kuzmits (1986) have observed, different employee needs and desires have formed the basis for different preferences. As a result, organizations have responded to these by developing flexible compensation plans called Cafeteria System approach. This approach has been supported by Byars and Rue (1979), Belcher (1974) and Zedeck (1977) who have pointed that these are necessary to satisfy the needs of different executives and help insure maximum return for their executive compensation systems. Belcher (1974) pointed that the above postulated integration can be reinforced and sustained by broadening the organization view of the employment equation, making greater variety of the employment exchanges, responding with different reward packages for separate employees groups which should vary by occupational and demographic factors, and offering employees more choices in determining their reward packages.

However, as some scholars have pointed, such an integration may not be easily realised in organizations. This may result from several inhibiting factors as:

- 1. As McBeath and Rands (1976) observed, compensation issues fall under the few critical decisions that are made and influenced by a small number of people in organizations. These are the same people who control the commercial destiny of the company and whose value may be of a different order from all those who are subordinate to them.
- Very closely related to the above point is the existence of lay theories of motivation among people (and so managers) that often cloud the extent of understanding of the managers making compensation deals on those deals target people. These are rampant in agency relationships thus bringing into the picture perceptual differences, conscious choices made and long term preferences. In a series of four experiments, Heath (1999) found a significant evidence of these lay theories existing among managers with regard to
  - Extrinsic incentives bias connected to perceptions and stereotypes.
  - Self serving biases due to différences in information processing among people.
  - c. Lay theories effects in the evaluation of incentive programs and framing of fixed incentive programs to others.

These findings are consistent with several earlier studies. Rosen and Jerdee (1976a, b, 1977) in a series of three studies established that older workers are perceived to be less motivated to remain up to date in their professions, lower in performance capacity and potential for development, more risk averse, more resistant to change, less creative and higher in stability and interpersonal skills. Craft et al (1976) characterized older workers as weaker, less ambitious and more opinionated. Doering et al (1983) observed that older workers were perceived to have different work values, needs and preferences, greater organizational commitment and lower internal motivation and greater overall job satisfaction. Saks and Waldman (1998) found the existence of age norms in professions which vary across jobs and affect performance.

Belcher (1974) postulated the possibility of the existence of a perceived discrepancy between the organization compensation policy and the employee. This discrepancy can emanate from three sources. The first is contrasts between comparisons made by organizations and those by the individuals, while the second is the predisposition of the parties to the interpretation of the employment exchange. The organization sees it as purely an economic exchange whereas the individual sees it in his own self concept. And the third arises from a discrepancy between (1) the amount of reward received and the amount the employees' desire and (2) the amount of the contribution recognized by the organization and the amount by which the employees wish to be recognized.

#### 2.4 PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN KENYA

Some isolated studies have been undertaken on motivation in general. Detho (1988) looked at the sufficiency of workmen's compensation amounts. Kimutai (1993) studied the managerial attitudes towards participative decision making in state-owned firms. Musomba (1993) studied those motivational factors that affect performance among employees of the Kenya Railways.

Even though the salary surveys, collective bargaining agreements and civil service salary reviews may not be treated as scientific studies, yet they deserve mention here because of their contribution in being more specific to compensation issues in the country. Generally, these have looked at the structure of salaries and terms of service as guided by legal considerations, Industry competitive trends and economic issues of cost of living and inflation. The reviews date back to pre-

independence period while the surveys date to as early as 1977 (Salary and fringe benefits survey, 1977; Civil Service Salary Review Report, 1990; Kenya Local Government Workers Union CBA, 1993; and Kenya Salary Survey, 1998).

It is thus clear from the above attempts that compensation based on motivation theory has been treated in general terms. The focus on the specific areas of motivation of Needs, Incentives and Programs has not been given attention (Chung 1977). And further to this is the fact that the emphasis has been on the Economic and Legal Considerations while neglecting the non-economic variables as suggested by Belcher (1974), and so by implication the intrinsic aspects (Herzberg, 1959). And since the behavioural aspects of the managers reflected through their compensation preferences have not been assessed, it still remains unknown as to whether the schemes in place are of any relevance to those beneficiary managers.

As Feldman (1983) observed, research in personnel and Human Resource Management should aim at improving the material and psychological well being of both employees and the fortunes of the organizations that employ them. It should further seek to bring improvements accomplished through innovative changes in the work place and interventions that aim at making jobs more rewarding and interesting. And in the final analysis it empowers the managers who make decisions so that those decisions are cooperatively made. In addition, the managers will be more adept at instilling commitment and motivation among the employees, reward systems more motivating and satisfying and organisation structures that are more responsive to their environments.

Miller et al (1998) reported of studies that showed the evidence of crosscultural differences in what is valued and what motivates workers. In addition, they warned that failure to recognize the values of this culture for which pay systems are designed could ultimately lead to employee resistance and ineffectiveness. These matters when assessed against the Kenyan situation leave unanswered questions regarding the totality of the motivation of the Kenyan population of workers.

The purpose of this study is therefore to focus on those specific aspects of motivation theory that underlie compensation with regard to the needs, incentives and schemes that are in place. As such then the study looks at both the intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of compensation by first analyzing the managers' compensation preferences and then secondly assess the extent of these preferences that is met by the current existing schemes.

#### CHAPTER THREE:

# STUDY METHODOLOGY

# 3.1 THE POPULATION

The population for this study comprised of all the low and middle managers of the Co-operative Bank of Kenya.

# 3.2 SAMPLING DESIGN

# 3.2.1 SAMPLE SIZE

The sample size was selected to be 40 managers from the 5 operational departments of the Bank. This size was selected to cushion against non-responses so that at least a minimum sample size justified by Daniel and Terrel (1975) rule of thumb of a sample size of 30 or more is representative would be obtained.

#### 3.2.2 SAMPLING METHOD

Stratified sampling method was applied to obtain respondents from all the operational departments in the bank. A disproportionate technique of this method was used to obtain equal number of respondents from each department.

### 3.3 DATA COLLECTION METHOD

The study relied on a communicational method of a questionnaire. The data was collected for the purpose of analysis of the relationship between managers' compensation preferences and the existing compensation schemes. It was conducted to obtain primary data which sought to obtain information on the respondents attitudes and opinions of the individual managers' preferences, inclinations, and feelings towards certain compensation items.

# 3.3.1 THE QUESTIONNAIRE

This data was obtained from the respondent managers by the use of a Likert 5-point scale questionnaire.

The items in the questionnaire covered areas that were operationalised as:

 Compensation Preferences: They were measured as the choices that one would make due to their expectations on the several items considered in their

- compensation. These choices would be made on the basis of the relative importance attached to the various types of rewards in both financial and non-financial categories
- Compensation Scheme: This has been taken to refer to the programme used by
  the Bank containing both economic and non-economic rewards to the employee
  managers' covering the basic salary, the fringe benefits, the perquisites and the
  characteristics of the organization management depicted in the organization
  structure and climate.
- Part 1 and 2 of the questionnaire relate to both the preferences and the scheme.

  Under each of these the questionnaire has been split into sub sections with each containing items that are specific to the sub-heading as:
  - (i) Economic rewards referring to those inputs by the organisation to the employee of financial or material nature for their outputs to the organisation and considered under:
  - Job rewards and incentives
  - Membership rewards
  - Fringe benefits
- (ii) Non-Economic rewards which referred to those inputs by the organisation to the employees which are not of a financial or material nature but mostly intangible, intrinsic and psychological or sociological and are associated with the organisation, fellow employees and the employee himself. The types that were then considered were:
- Job rewards
- Fringe benefits
- · Performance rewards
- Membership rewards
- Perquisites
  - The items under each were developed from instruments applied in other studies done by White (1973), Slocombe and Bluedorn (1999) and Heath (1999) in conjunction with those derived by Belcher (1974).

The questionnaire was self administered to the respondents through the office of the chief manager in charge of Human Resources to whom the purpose of the inquiry was explained. The respondents were then left alone to complete it and was collected later at an agreed date. This office of the chief manager human resource department was adopted to serve the purpose of the research assistance in the bank to the candidate.

Part one of the questionnaire was rated as

- Least important
- most important 5

while part two was rated as

- disagree strongly 1
- disagree 2
- neither 3
- agree 4
- agree strongly 5

# 3.4 DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

The data was analyzed by use of the following statistical tools of both parametric and non parametric statistics as:-

- · Descriptive statistics of the mean and standard deviation
- Factor Analysis
- Z- statistic
- · Chi-square test of difference
- · Chi- square test of association
- Chi-square test of independence
- Chi-square Goodness of Fit test

# DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents an analysis of the findings of this study. The study was conducted at the Co-operative Bank of Kenya. The respondents were drawn from a population of managers ranging from the lowest level to the level of Chief Managers. This population was far from being uniform due to their demographic differences of seniority in management, occupation and their stations. The geographical scope was limited to Nairobi area only due to time factor.

The data was obtained from the respondents by use of a predetermined questionnaire. The Reliability of this instrument was measured by the Coefficient Alpha calculated from the respondents scores and stood at 0.77. According to Malhotra (1996) coefficient Alpha varies from 0 to 1 and a value of 0.6 or less generally indicates unsatisfactory internal consistency reliability whereas those scores of 0.6 and above indicate high levels of internal consistency reliability of the instrument.

This computation was based on the 33 questionnaires out of 40 that were received back completely filled representing 82.5 percent response rate.

The data presented and analyzed in this chapter is therefore based on the responses of these 33 respondents.

# 4.2 DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS

TABLE 4.2.1: RESPONDENTS BY DEPARTMENTS

DEPARTMENT	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
MD's Office	8	24.2
Finance Division	5	15.2
Business Division	9	27.3
Development Division	6	18.2
Operations Division	5	15.2
TOTAL	33	100.0

TABLE 4.2.2: RESPONDENTS BY MANAGEMENT LEVEL

LEVEL	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE	
Manager	14	42.42	
Middle Manager	11 (11	33.33	
Senior Manger	4	12.1	
Chief Manager	4	12.1	
TOTAL	33	100.00	

Source: Field Data, 1999

# 4.3 RESPONDENTS' SCORES

TABLE 4.3.1: RESPONDENTS SCORES ON OPINIONS

RESPONDENT	MEAN SCORE	STANDARD
NUMBER	4.00	DEVIATION
1	3.58	0.0230.
2	3.70	0.0583
3	2.89	0.0408
4	2.93	0.0525
5	3.31	0.0175
6	4.12	0.035
7	3.14	0.0058
8	2.39	0.00166
9	3.63	0
10	2.85	0.029
11	4.47	0.064
12	3.66	0.099
13	3.81	0.0035
14	3.54	0.0016
15	3.20	0.0583
16	3.14	0.0408
17	3.25	0
18	2.66	0.0466
19	2.38	0
20	3.18	0.0525
21	3.88	0
22	2.81	0.0035
23	2.95	0.198
24	3.04	0.0116
25	2.68	0.0408
26	2.81	0.0175
27	3.70	0.058
28	4.12	0.035
29	2.85	0.00116
30	3.54	0.0016
31	2.66	0.0466
32	2.81	0
33	3.70	0.0583

TABLE 4.3.2.: RESPONDENTS SCORES ON PREFERENCES

RESPONDENT NUMBER	MEAN SCORE	ST D. DEVIATION
1 TANDAY ADDAYS	4.40	0.03123
2	4.37	0.0843
3 .,	4.14	0.01874
4	4.21	0.02811
5	3.54	0.04997
6	4.17	0.00437
7	4.61	0.0593
8	4.52	0.0249
9	4.73	0.05309
10	4.09	0.0343
11	4.42	0.0554
12	4.40	0.0312
13	4.5	0
14	4.07	0.00937
15	4.04	0.049975
16	3.64	0.01874
17	4.14	0.01874
18	3.26	0.01249
19	3.80	0.0624
20	4.52	0.0249
21	4.28	0.0374
22	5.0	0
23	4.47	0.04060
24	2.73	0.05309
25	3.11	0.05934
26	5.0	0
27	4.35	0.0468
28	4.21	0.02811
29	4.09	0.0343
30	4.14	0.049925
31	3.11	0.5934
32	5.0	
33	4.47	0.04060

# 4.4 STATEMENT SCORES

TABLE 4.4.1: PREFERENCE STATEMENT SCORES BY RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT	MEAN SCORE	STANDARD		
NUMBER	2.70	DEVIATION		
1	3.70	0.00557		
4	4.56	0.00441		
3	3.51	0.0300		
4	2.39	0.0229		
5	2.39	0.0424		
6	3.63	0.0371		
7	4.60	0.0353		
8	4.0	0		
9	3.79	0.005126		
10	4.15	0.003		
11	4.70	0.000176		
12	4.45	0.0265		
13	4.91	0.00053		
14	4.96	0.05656		
15	4.69	0.0406		
16	4.82	0.00106		
17	4.03	0.00176		
18	4.15	0.0030		
19	4.96	0.05656		
20	4.54	0.0318		
21	4.79	0.00512		
22	4.64	0.00212		
23	3.48	0.02828		
24	3.27	0.00424		
25	4.79	0.00512		
26	4.67	0.00388		
27	4.79	0.00512		
28	4.55	0.0318		
29	4.78	0.00512		
30	4.90	0.0530		
31	4.09	0.00530		
32	4.12	0.0000940		
	4.85	0.00282		
33	4.30	0.19445		
34		0.0265		
35	4.45	0.0247		
36	4.42			
37	3.30	0.000176		
38	3.0	0		
39	3.82	0.00106		
40	4.52	0.00088		
41	3.15	0.00883		
42	3.39	0.00229 Source: Field Data 1999		

TABLE 4.4.2: OPINION STATEMENT SCORES BY RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT NUMBER	MEAN SCORE	STANDARD DEVIATION
DUT 45 ROOM, NEWA	2.64	0.002
2	2.94	0.003
3	2.45	0.0032
4	2.09	0.005
5	3.48	0.005
6	2.55	0.003
7	2.97	0.004
8	2.64	0.002
9	3.0	0
10	3.24	0
11	3.27	0.004
12	3.09	0.005
13	4.24	0.0024
14	3.90	0.00005
15	3.54	0.0003
16	4.0	0
17	3.60	0.0003
18	3.76	0.0004
19	2.67	0.003
20	3.27	0.00018
21	3.76	0.0004
22	1.97	0.0005
23	2.85	0.000008
24	2.55	0.000007
25	3.76	0.0004
26	3.94	0.000005
27	4.0	0
28	3.70	0.00003
29	3.18	0.000010
30	3.97	0
31	4.15	0
32	4.0	0
33	3.64	0
	4.15	0
34		0.0003
35	3.55	0.0003
36	3.18	
37	2.94	One appear to in Table 4.5 Lo
38	3.0	0 000025
39	3.0	0.000025
40	3.06	0.00048
41	2.88	0.0000528
42	2.94	0
43	2.15	0
44	3.55	0.0003
45	3.58	0.00001
46	3.39	0
47	1.88	0.000021
48	1.97	0

#### 4.5 INITIAL FACTOR SCORES

TABLE 4.5.1 THE REWARDS: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

IT	EM	M	S.D.
1.	Economic Job Rewards	3.42	0.06
2.	Economic Membership Rewards	4.28	0.04
3.	Non-financial Job rewards	4.60	0.08
4.	Fringe Benefits	4.28	0.04
5.	Non financial Performance rewards	4.76	0.008
6.	Non financial membership rewards	4.38	0.01
7.	Perquisites	3.55	0.28

Source: Field Data, 1999

TABLE 4.5.2 THE OPINION TO THE REWARDS:
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

IT	EM	M	S.D.
1.	Economic Rewards	2.69	0.013
2.	Membership rewards	3.04	0.0005
	Job rewards	3.84	0.0006
4.	Fringe Benefits	2.84	0.0006
	Job characteristics	3.77	0.29
6.	Bank Administration	2.97	0.11
	Perquisites	2.75	0.04

Source: Field Data, 1999

# 4.6 FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE REWARD (COMPENSATION) ITEMS FOR THE SAMPLE.

Factor analysis followed several steps.

Step one- In the first step, the principal components approach of factor analysis produced a correlation matrix of the correlations among the 42 variables that were in the first part of the questionnaire. The correlation matrix appears as in Table 4.6.1 on appendix 1.

Step two-The second step of the process extracted the factors based on the Eigen value. This Eigen value represents the amount of variance associated with each factor. The extracted factors were loaded with the following variables as: (see table 4.6.2 and 4.6.3 on appendix 2 and 3 respectively)

### FACTOR 1:

- · Payments deferred to the future
- Employee stock option and ownership plans
- Executive bonus plans
- · Payments for employee insurance and stock purchase plans
- A job with the opportunity to lead others
- Retirement schemes
- Anniversary awards and bonus
- Overtime, holiday and weekend premiums
- · Responsibility, autonomy, freedom and independence
- Feeling of self control and identification with the bank goals
- Flexibility of the bank policies and procedures
- Extent of delegation and decentralization of authority
- Predictability of life in the Bank
- First class travel accommodations
- Paid travel for spouse

### FACTOR 2:

#### Variables

- Executive treatment
- Payments for employee loan associations, home financing and pensions.
- Working in a job with intellectual interest and professional prestige
- Opportunity for promotion
- Participation in problem solving
- Opportunity to set performance goals
- Self respect and esteem.
- Extent of delegation and decentralization of authority.
- Security in the bank.
- · Participative and consultative decision making
- Free / Assigned parking

# FACTOR 3

#### Variables

- Career progression rewards after qualification.
- A job with challenging tasks
- Membership to bank sponsored clubs and professional associations
- Paid travel for spouse

# FACTOR 4

# Variables

- Consolidated salary
- Payments for security and security related rewards
- Feeling of self control and identification with the bank goals
- Adequacy of management Development and training programs
- Interest free loans.

## FACTOR 5

## Variables

- The Basic Salary
- Profit sharing Plans
- Executive Bonus plans
- Working with congenial colleagues

# FACTOR 6

#### Variables

- Contributions for membership to professional and social organization
- Loan entitlements
- Participation in problem solving

### FACTOR 7

# Variables

- The consolidated salary
- Working with congenial colleagues

#### FACTOR 8

# Variables

· Life Assurance, Medical and funeral Assistance schemes.

#### FACTOR 9

# Variables

· Working in a Job with intellectual interest and professional prestige

# FACTOR 10

# Variables:

• Nil

Step three-involved rotation of the unrotated factor matrix. This rotation was deemed necessary to result in factors that can be interpreted. Through rotation, the factor matrix was transformed into a simpler one that was easier to interpret. Varimax procedure of factor analysis was applied to minimize the number of variables with high loading on each factor, thereby enhancing interpretability. The ten extracted factors have therefore been identified and renamed as: ( see table 4.6.4 on appendix 4)

### FACTOR 1: ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP REWARDS

Variables:

- Executive bonus plans
- Opportunity to lead others
- Retirement schemes
- Overtime, holiday and weekend premiums
- Responsibility, autonomy, freedom and independence
- Flexibility of bank policies and procedures
- Decentralization and delegation of authority
- Predictability of life in the bank
- First class travel accommodations
- Paid travel for spouse
  - Interest free loans

### FACTOR 2 : PER FORMANCE REWARDS

Variables

- Payments for employee loan associations, home financing and pensions
- Job with challenging tasks
- Job with intellectual interest and prestige
- Education assistance and scholarships
- Opportunity for promotion
- Participation in problem solving
- Opportunity to set performance goals
- Self respect and esteem
- Security in the bank

#### FACTOR 3: CAPITAL REWARDS

## Variables

- Deferred payments
- Stock option and ownership plans
- A job with intellectual interest and professional prestige
  - Educational Assistance and scholarship
- Anniversary award and bonus
- Over time holiday and weekend premiums
  - Decentralization and Delegation of Authority
  - Adequacy of management training programmes
    - Bank provided car

## FACTOR 4: STATUS REWARDS

#### Variable

- Payment for employee insurance and employee stock purchases plans
- First class travel accommodation
- Free assigned parking
- Membership to bank sponsored clubs and professional associations

# FACTOR 5 : VARIABLE JOB REWARDS

#### Variables

- Basic salary
- Profit sharing plans
- Executive bonus plans
- Working with congenial colleagues

# **FACTOR 6: CAREER REWARDS**

#### Variables

- Career progression rewards after qualification
- Working with challenging colleagues

### FACTOR 7: SECURITY REWARDS

#### Variables

- Loan entitlements
- Life assurance, medical and funeral assistance schemes
- Overtime, holiday and weekend premiums

#### FACTOR 8: PARTICIPATION REWARDS

Variables:

Participation in problem solving

Participative and consultative decision making

# FACTOR 9: SENIORITY REWARDS

Variables

Payments for seniority and seniority related rewards

#### FACTOR 10: FIXED JOB REWARDS

Variables

- Consolidated salary
- Job with challenging tasks
- Working with congenial colleagues

### 4.6.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXTRACTED FACTORS

The nature of relationship between these ten extracted factors is shown by the Factor Transformation Matrix in table 4.6.5 on appendix 5. The Matrix shows the intercorrelations between each factor with the other nine factors. Correlation ranges from 0 to 1. A correlation score of 0 indicates no correlation at all, where as between 0-0.5 in low correlation. A correlation of 0.5 - 1.0 is a high one. Accordingly then, from this matrix, it appears that the factors correlate highly as:

- Factor 1 with Factor 3
- Factor 3 with factor 4
- Factor 6 with factor 7
- Factor7 with factor 10
- Factor 9 with factor 6

The rest do not correlate with any of the factors.

# 4.7 CHI-SQUARE TESTS FOR RELATIONSHIPS

## Table 4.7.1 TESTING FOR THE RELATIONSHIP

# BETWEEN PREFERENCES AND OCCUPATION

DPT	ITEMS							
1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
A	3	6	8	7	8	7	5	44
В	4	5	5	5	5	5	2	31
C	5	7	8	5	9	6	4	44
D	4	6	6	6	6	6	3	37
E	3	5	5	5	5	5	4	32
TOTAL	19	29	32	28	33	29	18	188

Source: Field Data, 1999

# Key Key

# Departments A to E stand for

A = Managing Directors' Office

B = Financial Division

C = Business Division

D = Development Division

E = Operations Division

# Items 1 to 7 stand for

1 = Economic Job Rewards

2 = Economic Memberships Rewards

3 = Non-financial Job Rewards

4 = Fringe Benefits

5 = Job Characteristics

6 = Bank Administration

7 = Perquisites

H<sub>0</sub>: There is no Association between preference and occupation

 $H_A$ : There is an Association between preference and occupation of managers

To test for this hypothesis, the mean score by each respondent to each of the mentioned items were computed. Only those who scored a mean of 3.4 and above were considered to have significant preference for the items and so were included. (see appendix 6 for the computation of the sample Chi-square value)

$$X^2_{Sample} = 4.01545$$

$$X^2_{\text{critical}} 1 (0.05,30) = 18.49$$

Since  $X^2_{Sample} < X^2_{critical}$  we fail to reject the alternate hypothesis.

Conclusion: There appears to be an association between the managers' compensation preferences and their occupations. The contingency coefficient calculated using the X<sup>2</sup> of 4.01545 stood at 0.1446. This compared to the upper limit attainable score of 0.8280 indicates a low degree of association between the managers' compensations preferences and their occupations. The contingency coefficient will be zero for no association whereas for a perfect association the score will be equal to the maximum coefficient obtained at 0.8280 (Churchill, 1991).

# 4.7.2 TESTING FOR THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PREFERENCES AND SENIORITY

Each respondent's mean score for the items of compensation were computed and a mean score of 3.4 and above used to judge those who had significant preferences on the items from the different levels of managers.

Table 4.7.2

1.72	ITEM OF COMPENSATION							
MANAGEMENT	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	TOTAL
LEVEL Manager	9	14	14	13	14	13	8	85
Middle Manager	8	10	10	8	11	8	5	60
Senior Manager	1	3	4	3	4	4	3	22
Chief Manager	2	3	4	4	4	4	2	23
Total	20	30	32	28	33	29	18	190

Source: Field Data, 1999

$$X^2_{\text{Sample}} = 2.71525$$

$$X^2_{\text{critical}}(0.05,24) = 13.85$$

(see appendix 7 for the computation of the sample Chi-square value)

H0: There is no Association between the mangers preferences and their level in the management hierarchy.

H<sub>A</sub>: There is an Association between managers preferences and their seniority.

Since 
$$X^2$$
 Sample  $\leq X^2$  critical, we do not reject  $H_A$ 

Conclusion: There appears to be an association between the seniority of managers in the management hierarchy and the compensation items preferred. The contingency coefficient computed to measure the strength of this association stood at 0.1186. The upper limit coefficient score of 0.8280 for this category indicates that the association between seniority and managers' compensation preferences is low.

# 4.7.3 TESTING FOR THE DEPENDENCE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS OPINIONS AND THEIR OCCUPATION

The managers' mean score were computed for their opinions to each category of items of compensation. Once this was done, the following criteria was used to judge as to whether they agreed, disagreed or were indifferent.

Mean score of: 1 - 2.44 Disagree

2.45 - 3.44 Neither

3.45 - 5.0 Agree.

The same criteria was applied in testing for the dependence of the managers' opinions and management level in section 4.7.4., and the difference between the preferences and the schemes in 4.7.5.

**Table 4.7.3** 

RESPONSE						
DEPARTMENT	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	TOTAL		
MD'S Office	3	4	1	8		
Finance	2	3	0	5		
Business	1	8	0	9		
Development	4	1	0	5		
Operations	2	2	(luc) 1	5		
Total	12	18	2	32		

Source: field Data, 1999

$$X^2_{\text{sample}} = 9.26647$$

$$X^2_{\text{critical}(0.05,10)} = 3.94$$

(see appendix 8 for the computation of Chi-square value)

Ho: The managers opinions towards the existing scheme and their occupation are independent.

H<sub>A</sub>: The managers opinion towards the existing compensation scheme and their occupation are dependent.

Since  $X^2_{\text{sample}} > X^2_{\text{critical}}$  we fail to reject  $H_A$ .

Conclusion: The managers' opinion towards the dependent on their occupations. This degree of dependence is high as evidenced by the computed contingency coefficient which stood at 0.4738. The upper limit coefficient score for this category is 0.81649, for which 0.4738 is above its mid point.

# 4.7.4. TESTING FOR THE DEPENDENCE OF RESPONDENTS OPINIONS AND MANAGEMENT LEVEL

Table 4.7.4

MANAGEMENT LEVEL	RESPONSE							
	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	TOTAL				
Manager	5	9	0	14				
Middle Manager	5	7	0	12				
Senior Manager	2	1	1	4				
Chief Manager	2	0	0	2				
Total	14	17	1	32				

Source: field Data, 1999

 $X^2_{Sample} = 11.3119$ 

 $X^2_{\text{critical }(0.05.6)} = 1.64$ 

(see appendix 9 for the computation of Chi-square value)

H<sub>0</sub>: The managers opinions towards the existing scheme is independent of the level in the management hierarchy.

*H<sub>A</sub>*: The managers opinions towards the existing scheme is dependent on the level of management.

Since  $X^2_{Sample} > X^2_{critical}$  we fail to reject  $H_A$ .

Conclusion: The managers opinions towards the existing scheme of compensation is dependent on their seniority in the management. The contingency coefficient computed to measure the significance on the dependence was 0.51100. This is a high level of dependence when compared against the maximum score of 0.707.

# 4.7.5 TESTING FOR THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PREFERENCES AND THE SCHEMES

Table 4.7.5

ITEM of COMPENSATION	RESPONSE					
	AGREE	NEITHER	DISAGREE	TOTAL		
Economic Job rewards	7	12	14	33		
Economic membership rewards	17	8 2 101196	7	32		
Non financial job rewards	28	5	0	33		
Fringe benefits	10	11	0 210	33		
Job characteristics	50	15	12	65		
Bank Administration	9	11	148 11 5 8	31		
Perquisites	7	14	11	32		
Total	128	76	55	259		

 $X^2_{Sample} = 70.024$ 

 $X^2_{\text{critical }(0.05.6)} = 5.23$ 

(see appendix 10 for the computation of Chi-square value)

H<sub>O</sub>: There is no significant difference between the preferences of the managers and their opinions towards the existing scheme for compensation.

H<sub>A</sub>: There is a significant difference between the managers' and their opinions towards the existing scheme.

Since  $X^2_{Sample} > X^2_{critical}$ , we fail to reject  $H_A$ .

Conclusion: There is a difference between the managers compensation preferences and their opinions towards the current existing compensation scheme. The contingency coefficient computed using x<sup>2</sup> value of 70.024 was 0.4613. This is a significant level of difference when compared against the maximum score of 0.8164.

#### 4.8 Z -STATISTIC TESTS

To be able to answer adequately both objectives one and two, Z- statistic tests were carried out in several steps. The steps involved testing whether the preferences of the managers are normally distributed. This test relied upon the chi-square Goodness of fit.

# 4.8.1 THE CHI-SQUARE GOODNESS OF FIT TEST FOR NORMAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE MANAGERS PREFERENCES.

The Managers mean scores were computed for all the compensation items in part one of the questionnaire and the scores grouped into five categories (classes ) and their frequencies as shown below. The expected frequencies were then computed and enabled the further computation of the sample chi-square score as:-

Table 4.8.4. The Managers preference scores grouped and their frequencies and the expected scores

Class	Actual frequency (0)	probability	expected (E)	$(O-E)^2/E$
2.5-3.0	1	0.0047	0.0047	210.770
3.0-3.5	4	0.0884	0.3536	37.600
3.5-4.0	4	0.2537	1.0148	8.780
4.0-4.5	19	0.1043	1.9817	146.140
4.5-5	5	0.1908	0.954	17.150
			X <sup>2</sup> Sa	mple 420.460

H<sub>0</sub>: The Managers preferences are normally distributed

HA: The Managers preferences are not normally distributed

The critical value at the 95% confidence level is 1.15.

Since  $X^2$ <sub>Sample</sub> >  $X^2$  critical (5,0.05), we fail to reject  $H_A$ . We therefore conclude that the managers' preferences are not normally distributed. However Churchill (1991) and Webster (1992) justified the use of Z-statistic to test an hypothesis even if the variable being tested in the population is not normally distributed, provided that the sample size is large enough for the Central Limit Theorem to operate. Since the sample size in this study of 33 is large, z-statistic was applied to test the hypothesis for the existence of preferences and the extent of these that is met by the existing schemes.

## 4.8.2 TESTING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF PREFERENCES.

The mean score for all the respondent Managers was computed and used to test the hypothesis stated as:

H<sub>0</sub>: The Managers have significant compensation preferences.

HA: The Managers do not have any significant compensation preferences


Statistically stated

H<sub>o</sub> : ₹ ≥ 3.5

 $H_A: \bar{x} < 3.5$ 

At the 5% significant level the critical calculated as  $3.5 \pm 1.96$  (0.5303/ $\sqrt{33}$ ) is 3.68 The mean score for the Managers is 4.178.

This is a one tailed (left) test as



Since  $\overline{\times}$  critical  $<\overline{\times}$  sample ,we fail to reject H0, we conclude then that the managers have significant compensation preferences.

# 4.8.3 TESTING FOR THE UNIFORMITY OF THE PREFERENCES ACCROSS THE DIFFERENT COMPENSATION ITEMS

The Hypothesis was stated as:

H<sub>0</sub>: The Managers preferences are significantly different across the items of compensation.

H<sub>A</sub>: The Managers preferences are uniform across all the items of compensation.

It was statistically stated as:

$$H_0$$
:  $\bar{\times}_A \neq \bar{\times}_B \neq \bar{\times}_C \neq \bar{\times}_D \neq \bar{\times}_E \neq \bar{\times}_F \neq \bar{\times}_G$ 

$$H_A$$
:  $\overline{X}_A = \overline{X}_B = \overline{X}_C = \overline{X}_D = \overline{X}_E = \overline{X}_F = \overline{X}_G$ 

Where x̄<sub>A</sub> ..... x̄<sub>G</sub> represent mean scores for the items of compensation ranging from economic job rewards, economic membership rewards, non financial jobs rewards, fringe benefits, Non-financial performance rewards, Non-financial membership rewards to perquisites, respectively.

At the 95% confidence level, using the mean score of 3.5 as in the above hypothesis the \*critical value ranges from 3.31 to 3.68.

The computed Sample for the items from the sample were

$$\bar{x}_A = 3.42$$

$$\bar{x}_B = 4.28$$

$$\bar{x}_{\rm C} = 4.59$$

$$\bar{x}_D = 4.28$$

$$\bar{x}_E = 4.75$$

$$\bar{x}_F = 4.398$$

$$\bar{x}_G = 3.550$$

Since the \*\*sample values of some of the items (i.e. A, and G) fall within the critical range and others (i.e. B,C,D,E,F) fall outside this range, we fail to reject H0, and conclude that the Managers preferences for different compensation items are not uniform.

# 4.8.4 TESTING FOR THE EXTENT OF PREFERENCES MET BY THE EXISTING SCHEMES

The hypothesis was stated as

H<sub>0</sub>: There is a significant disagreement between the preferences and the Managers' opinions.

 $H_A$ : There is a significant agreement between the preferences and opinions of managers.


Hence

Ho: x ≤ 2.44

 $H_A$ :  $\bar{x} > 2.44$ 

At the 95% confidence level the  $\bar{x}_{critical}$  value computed is 2.427. That from the sample is 3.256.

As shown, this is a one tailed (Right hand) test. The  $\bar{x}_{sample}$  falls within the rejection area, so we fail to reject  $H_A$ .



#### CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study was to analyse managers' compensation preferences and the extent of these preferences that is met by the existing compensation schemes of the cooperative Bank of Kenya. Based on previous work, it was argued that organisations should assess the needs of their managers, the compensation items demanded by them and those employment outcomes relevant to them. These should guide in the development of motivational programs that match those needs of the managers with the incentives in use by the organisation. This contribution helped develop the instrument that was used to obtain the preferences of managers to various compensation items by both intrinsic and extrinsic nature. The responses obtained from those managers was detailed in the previous chapter. This chapter undertakes to discuss that data in the format in which the two objectives of the study follow one another, and give an implication of the findings to both scholars and practitioners in the field of Behavioral Science.

#### 5.2 THE MANAGERS PREFERENCES

The findings showed that the managers have several needs which form the basis for their preferences. The Z-statistic test gave the evidence of the existence of these preferences. This concurs with the conclusions arrived at by other previous studies done elsewhere by white (1973) and Heath (1999) that managers have preferences. The reality of the existence of compensation preferences becomes true of the case of the Managers of the Cooperative Bank of Kenya. The findings revealed that the preferences differ for different items of compensation and that the non economic rewards are relatively more preferred to the economic ones. There is however a weak association between these preferences and the demographic variables of seniority and occupation. This contrasts the observation of Cascio (1989) that linked the existence of preferences to demographic factors.

This weak association is attributable to the fact that the sample was drawn from only one organization, and further the geographical scope covered was only that of Nairobi.

There was no much diversity with respect to the demographic composition of the respondents. Other demographic variables as age, gender, ethnicity, education profession, political affiliation, club-membership and professional association, societal roles and consumption patterns were not looked at which if put into consideration perhaps might show a strong relationship. Factor Analysis of these preferences grouped them into ten categories. In terms of motivation theory, it can be said that the managers have ten varied dominant needs, some of which are interdependent with others, and others being independent. These needs among the managers form the basis for what they seek to be compensated for and that the critical issues to concern with in compensating the managers are to be linked with compensating them for:

- · Being members of the organization
- Their performance in contributing to the success of the organization goals.
- · Their capital developmental needs while in the organization
- · Their status in the organization
- · Their careers
- Security
- · Their participation
- Their seniority in the organization

The variables that are considered under each of the areas for compensation ( as shown by both the unrotated and rotated factor matrices) indicate that the managers have varied needs that go beyond the scope of that which is covered by the salary surveys. While the salary survey outlines only the economic rewards, the managers showed preferences to a greater variety of needs of non economic nature in addition to the economic ones that the surveys cover. This finding tends to compare favourably with those studies by white (1973)and Heath (1999)on compensation elsewhere, where preferences have been expressed for non-financial aspects of compensation. But contrary to those findings of white (1973) that grouped the managers preferences into six, the findings of this study categorized them into ten, a difference which might be attributed to such factors as changes with time that have an impact on the managers Demographics and psychographics, and environmental variations. And in addition, these variables also give an indication of the diversity of the needs of the managers that ranges from basic existence needs to higher order needs as was pointed by Maslow. Even though the study did not seek to compare the relative importance of the items by the respondents, yet the mean scores of the compensation items compares favourably with the findings of Blunt and Popoola (1990) with regard to some of the most valued rewards in Africa as being status, prestige and power.

It has also come out clearly that the variety of the needs behind the preferences lie within the broad categorization of the need approach used in the literature review that grouped the needs into three categories as Existence, Affiliation and Growth (Chung 1977). Consequently then, the theoretical chart that was developed in table 2.1.1.6 matching the needs to the incentives of the Substantive, Interactive and Effectance could guide in the development of programs for use in motivating the managers in the organization.

# 5.3 THE EXTENT OF THE PREFERENCES MET BY THE EXISTING COMPENSATION SCHEME.

The second objective of the study was related to the relevance of the existing schemes of compensation in view of the identified preferences of the managers. The chi-square test of difference between the managers' preferences and their opinion toward the existing scheme showed that there is a significant difference. The Z-statistic test also supported this for the mean score ranged within the zone in which the managers are indifferent. According to Luthans (1992), when the managers are indifferent, then the managers value and expected utility of the existing schemes is zero. This raises motivational concern when the managers neither support nor oppose the current scheme of compensation and points at attitude related behaviors such as job satisfaction and organizational commitment. It then leads to the implication that the scheme to begin with is irrelevant and inadequate because of several underlying reasons:

- The designers of the scheme are not aware of the range of the needs exhibited by those managers who are supposed to benefit from the contents of the scheme. Since no study has been contacted before on the preferences, the schemes have simply been done based on assumptions by the designers as to what they think is best for the target managers. This is of course subject to many biases linked to the existence of lay theories among the designers of the schemes as was suggested by Heath (1999).
- The schemes have depended upon external advice from consultants notably those
  who prepare salary surveys. These surveys are limited in their scope to cover only
  economic incentives and rewards. This perspective limits the scope of the
  compensation equation from its broad meaning to the narrow definition that covers
  salary and wage administration only. And as was pointed by Jeffrey (1998),this

narrow view often lands the designers leaning on it into one of the six dangerous myths about compensation, that people work for money. This study revealed that the managers prefer other non-economic items of compensation of intrinsic nature which the surveys have ignored over time.

- The possibility of a mismatch between the managers needs and characteristics and
  the incentives being used also exists. As was pointed by Chung (1977) such a
  mismatch can lead to motivational problems, the evidence of which is the nature of
  attitude the managers have towards the current existing schemes.
- The existence of certain inhibiting factors to the integration of the managers requirements (preferences) in the schemes for compensation may also explain.
   These range from the narrow view of the employment equation, through the small number of those who make the compensation decision to the exclusion of those beneficiary managers from participating in the compensation decision.
- The role that perceptions play in the generation of preferences and evaluation of the compensation equation cannot be ignored. There is no global preference set for judging the compensation scheme in whose absence these preferences are generated on line by processes that are vulnerable to bias. For them to be better, Moore (1999) pointed that more information has to be provided and in addition other alternatives and standards by which to judge relevant options. In the case of the population that was sampled, they don't have the options with which to compare the existing scheme and therefore such biases emanating from such a poor context of comparison could have contributed to the opinion score by the managers.

#### 5.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS

The findings as so far discussed raise several implications of concern to both the scholar of Behavioral Science and the practitioner of Human Resources in Kenya. The major concerns that the study indicates can be summed up in the following points as:

• That the managers have significant preferences to compensation items is clear indication that they have significant needs that form the basis for the goals they seek to satisfy in the employment situation. Organizations are then better placed to understand the behaviour of these managers. However, since the association of these preferences (and the needs) with the demographic variables used of occupation and seniority has not been adequately explained, future research efforts will have to seek to explain through other demographic variables on the nature of this association.

- That as it was strongly argued by the literature review, there are differences among the managers as to what they prefer for their compensation. As Jeffrey (1998) pointed, a system of individual incentives to reward the difference may have to be considered.
- That as was argued by the literature review, compensation has been understood through the narrow view that has leaned more towards the economic transaction view only, to neglect other valued non-financial incentives and rewards. This has raised the need to expand the compensation view not to think of money only.
- That there is the need to analyse the total employment situation for any conflicting expectancies between the managers and the organisations offering to check the whole system for equity. This will lead to an alignment of the organization's offering with what the employee wants. This of course calls for organizational flexibility to accommodate any differences. And the way might be towards flexible compensation systems that have worked elsewhere on the globe. However one critical concern is whether the situation is ripe in the country for this system of rewarding employees to be applied.
- That there is need to improve the attitudes of the managers towards the existing scheme. This could probably be enhanced by treating compensation as an art as much as it is a science, by resulting to a democratic approaches by designing the scheme, that way to give them a better perception of the higher degree of their control over their compensation as was suggested by Pelmutter and Monty (1977). This of course will result to a greater variety of alternatives against which to generate their preferences, in which event the preferences so generated will be more rational than when made in a less rich context (Moore, 1999).

#### 5.5 CONCLUSION

This study was designed to determine the compensation preferences of managers in the Kenyan Banking sector and the extent of the preferences that is met by the existing compensation schemes. Having conducted 33 managers of the cooperative Bank of Kenya, the study found that the managers have significant preferences to different compensation items of both financial and non financial nature. It came out clearly that these preferences are not uniform across all the items considered under the study, and that the non-financial incentives and rewards are relatively more preferred to the economic ones.

The results of the study on the opinions of the managers to the existing scheme of compensation in view of their preferences indicate that the managers are indifferent. This has led to the conclusion that the scheme is irrelevant on the basis that the perceived value and utility of this scheme is zero.

While the results might be that convincing for a case study, it is feared that the sample drawn is too small to warrant generalisation of these conclusions across the industry population of the managers in the Banking sector and the nation at large. Additional research is therefore required to ascertain whether these conclusions of the existence of preferences and the irrelevance of the existing schemes of compensation hold for the Banking industry and the nation as a whole.

#### 5.6 RECOMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future Research efforts by scholars might want to carry on with this work on preferences from the point reached by this study. Such research can look at

- The Behavioral variables that will capture demographic attributes of the managers to better explain the relationships of the preferences and the demographic variables.
   Among these are behavioral causatives of values, attitudes and perceptions.
- Assessment of the willingness of both employees and the managers to adopt flexible compensation systems.

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Table 4.6.1
Correlation Matrix:

	VAR00001	VAR00002	VAR00003	VAR00004	VAR00005	VAR00006	VAR00007
			0.000	1100			
VAR00001	1.00000						
VAR00002	.15886	1.00000					
VAR00003	.38223	25644	1.00000				
VAR00004	.17589	.16697	.52204	1.00000			
VAR00,005	.03688	27231	.37290	.48236	1.00000		
VAR00006	.53135	09187	.60663	.49260	.46747	1.00000	
VAR00007	03062	05201	.35564	.13886	.22971	.24814	1.00000
VAR00008	.31008	.24174	.18472	.23190	10100	.25767	.20498
VAR00009	.24345	.31677	40707	.12779	02039	05044	28327
VAR00010	13051	12954	.14751	00907	.14096	09984	.07493
VAR00011	07104	.13324	16705	.24779	.30266	.02075	.13324
VAR00012	.06518	.12380	19682	.09671	.04533	11940	08571
VAR00013	.02955	.38860	11206	.16442	.05285	.00663	.24611
VAR00014	.02831	.09927	28292	17405	21221	33270	36870
VAR00015	03000	16303	.14155	00534	.19550	.00807	
VAR00016	.11082	.17487	18055	.09207	.08515	.04309	.03238
VAR00017	.44433	.30739	.18519	.28489	.33264	.43743	.16844
VAR00018	.21989	04876	.42851	.42557	.46091	.70577	.46740
VAR00019	.37997	.37653	06265	.05147	11489	03705	10137
VAR00015	.03591	08184	.42967	.35800	.40955	.62821	.61067
VAR00020	.20089	.10323	13572	10329	.11700	05749	29755
VAR00021	.04476	.03062	.05796	.36928	.52149		.28327
VAR00022	.19272	23866	.40341	.37577		.59417	
VAR00023	.30728	29254	.44269	.52059	.60007	.61510	.24909
VAR00024	.36793	.17427	03375	08848	.10023	.03860	16907
VAR00025	.29244	.13021	22687	.16115	.06641	.23738	13835
VAR00026 VAR00027	.16748	.14430	11613	.12352	.18864	.15798	07718
VAR00027	.00080	13549	.34037	.30282	.37930	.58396	.69420
	.20089	.20343	.10507	.25282	.02615	.40397	.30363
VAR00029		.27112	.01235	.19707	.02976	.16795	10560
VAR00030 VAR00031	.42649			.29196	.35053	.57994	.53036
	.18628	02233	.26028			.53812	.56858
VAR00032	08840	18445	.43322	.31668	.41681		
VAR00033	.29244	.30925	18384	02066	01476	.05414	.13021
VAR00034	.01019	12801	.33910	.26450	.33739	.49661	.78888
VAR00035	23130	21321		.31839	.58184	.15403	
VAR00036	.07267	.12931	29064	.12551	.17500	.02433	18445
VAR00037	.19330	22898	.46224	.63246	.50658	.69368	.07327
VAR00038	.36583	19461	.46767	.54274	.40135	.56806	.16720
VAR00039	.46737	.07525	.01072	.28868	.14783	.15974	35396
		FA	CTOR	ANAT. Y	STS -		
			CIOR				
	VAR00001	VAR00002	VAR00003	VAR00004	VAR00005	VAR00006	VAR00007
VAR00040	05043	.22562	17145	.08978	13200	28161	17683
VAR00041	05083	01635	.18627	.51516	.31172	.32341	.06459
VAR00042	03175	.13689	.04880	.30855	05865	.16434	.11207
	*********	117700000	WADOOO10	UNDOGGIA	WADOO013	WARAAA 3	WARAAA
VARCASAS	VAR00008	VAR00009	VAR00010	VAR00011	VAR00012	VAR00013	VAR00014
VAR00008	1.00000						

# Appendix 1 continued Table 4.6.1 continued

VAR00009	. 45685	1.00000					
VAR00010		17390	1.00000				
VAR00011		.36510	.17586	1.00000			
VAR00012		.42369	02454	.53019	1.00000		
VAR00013		.02955	.08677	.30187	.58817	1.00000	
VAR00014	15382	.16177	01318	09792	.12977	.06703	1.00000
VAR00015		12898	.06594	.11802	.05970	.17593	.07665
VAR00016	00860	.31400	.10512	.24038	.52078	. 63333	.06088
VAR00017	27539	11048	01609	.21080	.16731	.46325	00590
VAR00018	.12584	14379	.08715	.26525	01828	.13496	42650
VAR00019	.31250	.24368	.05534	.30625	.10275	05590	.03060
VAR00020		14184	.05488	.30702	03871	.05670	53073
VAR00021		.31519	.11942	.46649	.49116	.09376	.08982
VAR00022		.36900	.17390	.50718	.35307	.29553	16721
VAR00022							
		.14224	.21117	.55549	.20801	00690	33880
VAR00024	.32308	.27094	01443	.37500	.08768	09690	31424
VAR00025		.36793	.10230	.17736	.50196	.30121	.07694
VAR00026		.59880	28305	.14751	.48502	.33508	.06878
VAR00027	.06461	.42013	.09308	.28095	.45236	.46631	.05672
VAR00028	.23185	13066	12763	.23027	.01586	.08627	50967
VAR00029	.25199	.08659	34523	.12055	07755	16408	34224
VAR00030		.53392	.10098	.27836	.38067	.37455	.06030
VAR00031		.23882	.00503	.46500	.22181	.17958	40901
				.17808	24555	12478	42598
VAR00032		17788	.13072				
VAR00033		.39456	.11671	.30205	.48502	.56545	.07650
VAR00034		17659	.08053	.28778	.04787	.26046	46828
VAR00035	07772	.34576	.20356	.62426	.44294	.27972	08833
VAR00036	.10732	.57376	34620	.25933	.49649	.27893	.11791
VAR00037	.11554	.13061	.01730	.37157	.05199	14142	28042
VAR00038		.24545	00306	.41875	.06482	19044	28839
VAR00039		.53731	.20847	.42098	.25311	.03586	.15311
VAR00040		.52344	.14283	.40395	.09085	15299	.08375
					.03480	15780	26498
VAR00041		.38007	.01952	.32885			
VAR00042	.36904	.18061	26869	02792	.00213	18000	25966
	VAR00015	VAR00016	VAR00017	VAR00018	VAR00019	VAR00020	VAR00021
VAR00015	1.00000						
		FA	CTOR	ANALY	SIS -		
	VAR00015	VAR00016	VAR00017	VAR00018	VAR00019	VAR00020	VAR00021
	VAROUUIS	VAROUUIO	VAROUULI			VIII.00020	***************************************
UNDOGOTO		1 00000					
VAR00016		1.00000					
VAR00017		.15035	1.00000				
VAR00018		.36936	.31462	1.00000			WARRESTS.
VAR00019		05590	.00909	.03177	1.00000		
VAR00020	.28612	.14581	.06320	.86652	.08151	1.00000	
VAR00021	19985	.22268	09906	.03829	.34069	01139	1.00000
VAR00022		.62061	.03122	.55943	.16520	.51708	.25631
VAR00023		.22082	.14301	.71024	.08101	.69258	.39791
VAR00024		.10808	.02908	.59085	.03750	.59954	.22538
VAR00024			08486	.17401	.29186	.09760	.70133
		. 63254			07024	.07125	.11782
VAR00026		.56545	.13276	.16958			
VAR00027		.82253	.12106	.33215	05793	.15109	.33095
VARO0028	.44218	.08627	.11130	.74297	08439	.91192	16430

# Appendix 1 continued Table 4.6.1 continued

VAR00029	.11420	03516	.02667	.53280	.34069	.61520	08791
VAR00030	03578	.73809	.01791	.26918	.34487	.16063	.33053
VAR00031	. 34705	.33761	.13135	72862	.14456	.85187	.03536
	.30695	16516	06502	.52973	.15593	.73135	16690
VAR00032							
VAR00033	.12754	.79582	.18893	.21867	.31610	.12723	.27982
VAR00034	.45409	.21833	.10833	.75582	.05139	.88986	08619
VAR00035	.24460	.39806	.06033	.28656	10825	.28236	.18157
VAR00036	05364	.44042	04534	05527	.15593	05351	.23056
VAR00037	.00000	.07071	.12643	.56254	.03953	.53269	.01657
VAR00038	.05155	.11991	.12554	.63729	.15378	.56050	.06944
VAR00039	14851	.35144	.23782	.15895	.24056	12898	.37322
VAR00.040	08123	.10592	13295	13375	.13158	15444	.11310
VAR00041	05125	.11993	27906	.44476	.14467	.51692	.13168
VAR00042	.06601	.04355	21472	.36542	.04220	.46424	14563
111100012	.00001	.0.000	169384				
	VAR00022	VAR00023	VAR00024	VAR00025	VAR00026	VAR00027	VAR00028
		,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,					
VAR00022	1.00000						
VAR00023	.68216	1.00000					
	.45596	.78540	1.00000				
VAR00024							
VAR00025	.51332	.34088	.14368	1.00000			
VAR00026	.47347	.13440	.23883	.37849	1.00000		
					.76499	1.00000	
VAR00027	. 68522	.29765	.16510	.62686			
VAR00028	.39356	.56255	.55217	06929	.18292	.07403	1.00000
VAR00029	.14201	.29116	.45600	07531	.11782	17003	.66982
VAR00030	. 64787	.25999	.23648	.72115	.62292	.82764	00950
VAR00031	. 63686	. 68852	.63928	.22069	. 42423	.42150	.82494
VAR00032	.39263	.58200	.51702	19161	15680	11885	.68229
VAR00033	.57559	.13440	01873	.65604	.42105	.67547	.03387
VAR00034	.43807	.52969	.50361	.02769	.00963	.09526	.87481
				.15554	.35148	.44315	.28190
VAR00035	.78212	.64811	.44745				
VAR00036	.39263	.13068	.21009	.39207	.45195	.35179	.00317
VAR00037	.48063	.73193	.71151	02840	.17770	.12823	.47275
1111000001	.40005			.02010			
		F A	CTOR	ANALY	SIS -		
	VAR00022	VAR00023	VAR00024	VAROOO25	VAR00026	VAR00027	VAR00028
	VARUUUZZ	VAROUUZJ	VAR00024	VAR00023	VAR00020	VAROUUZI	VAR00020
VAR00038	.39084	. 67753	.82172	.05949	.19942	.16446	.46548
VAR00039		.40535	.36405	.31973	.34247	.44593	26914
VAR00040	.05043	.14131	.16053	.01891	11091	00762	23097
VAR00041	.40478	.53052	.74239	.02915	.15070	.13327	.41315
VAR00042		.07573	.26357			.02858	.52720
*ANUUU42	.00000	.01313	.20331	04700	. 23331	.02030	.52/20
	VAR00029	VAR00030	VAR00031	VAR00032	VAR00033	VAR00034	VAR00035
	,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,						***************************************
****							
VAR00029	1.00000						
VAR00030	01033	1.00000					
		.44156	1.00000				
VAR00031	.53544						
VAR00032	. 45767	06631	.63589	1.00000			
VAR00033	04418	.77519	.37459	05534	1.00000		
						1 00000	
VAR00034		.10127			.27434	1.00000	
VAROCO35	06809	.25600	.44977	.38379	.27713	.28681	1.00000
VAR00036		.41402	.18349	03125	.45195	.00337	.38379
VAR00037	.41437	.17137	.53333	.59689	04443	.34126	.52490

# Appendix 1 continued Table 4.6.1 continued

VAR00038 VAR00039 VAR00040 VAR00041 VAR00042	.50593 12609 .02207 .52228 .66284	.30304 .52621 .17373 .23920 .04094	.62624 .12828 .03297 .51280 .39666	.39452 15794 11489 .51659 .16921	.00443 .24333 .05176 02379 10580	.40688 23241 21638 .40037 .35630	.28229 .34954 .16333 .36669 14243
	VAR00036	VAR00037	VAR00038	VAR00039	VAR00040	VAR00041	VAR00042
VAR00036 VAR00037 VAR00038	1.00000 .20761 .12115	1.00000	1.00000	1 0000			
VARO0039 VARO0040 VARO0041 VARO0042	.15478 .14167 .25668 .04262	.38036 .13315 .63378 .24224	.48565 .31129 .68384 .41406	1.00000 .54696 .26076 11869	1.00000 .34691 .02528	1.00000	1.00000

Table 4. 6.2 Communalities, Elgen values and extracted factors

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
VAR00001	1.00000	*	1	11.47644	27.3	27.3
VAR00002	1.00000		2	7.06769	16.8	44.2
VAR00003	1.00000		3	3.66357	8.7	52.9
VAR00004	1.00000	*	4	3.10428	7.4	60.3
VAR00005	1.00000	*	5	2.66918	6.4	66.6
VAR00006	1.00000	*	6	2.11666	5.0	71.7
VAR00007	1.00000	*	7	1.84967	4.4	76.1
VAR00008	1.00000	*	8	1.57009	3.7	79.8
VAR00009	1.00000	*	9	1.30257	3.1	82.9
VAR00010	1.00000	*	10	1.16044	2.8	85.7
VAR00011	1.00000	+	11	.93726	2.2	87.9
VAR00012	1.00000	*	12	.82259	2.0	89.9
VAR00013	1.00000	*	13	.71551	1.7	91.6
VAR00014	1.00000	*	14	.64700	1.5	93.1
VAR00015	1.00000	*	15	.54762	1.3	94.4
VAR00016	1.00000	*	16	.45303	1.1	95.5
VAR00017	1.00000	*	17	.37265	.9	96.4
VAR00018	1.00000	*	18	.32975	.8	97.2
VAR00019	1.00000	*	19	.26624	.6	97.8
VAR00020	1.00000	*	20	.24954	.6	98.4
VAR00021	1.00000	*	21	.17276	. 4	98.8
VAR00022	1.00000	*	22	.15344	. 4	99.2
VAR00023	1.00000	*	23	.12556	.3	99.5
VAR00024	1.00000	*	24	.09416	.2	99.7
VAR00025	1.00000	*	25	.07158	.2	99.9
VAR00026	1.00000	*	26	.04304	.1	100.0
VAR00027	1.00000	*	27	.01438	.0	100.0
VAR00028	1.00000	*	28	.00328	.0	100.0
VAR00029	1.00000	*	29	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00030	1.00000	*	30	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00031	1.00000	*	31	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00032	1.00000	*	32	.00000	.0	1.00.0
VAR00033	1.00000	*	33	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00034	1.00000	*	34	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00035	1.00000	*	35	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00036	1.00000	*	36	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00037	1.00000	*	37	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00038	1.00000	*	38	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00039	1.00000	*	39	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00040	1.00000	*	40	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00041	1.00000	*	41	.00000	.0	100.0
VAR00042	1.00000	*	42	.00000	.0	100.0

Table 4.6.3 The Ten Factor Loadings before rotation

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
VAR00001	.27389	.20468	.22486	.17841	.78587
VAR00002	03841	.35672	.01878	.50915	.16304
VAR00003	.38877	48180	.05007	20988	.51423
VAR00004	.56061	09778	.23197	12079	.22146
VAR00005	.57055	12961	07965	54492	.05773
VAR00006	.67972	29385	.05117	02743	.53542
VAR00007	.43881	45479	53980	.14040	10781
VAROCO08	.35469	01206	.32761	.51219	01773
VAR00009	.26411	.65829	.44839	.21490	22098
VAR00010	.05575	.03766	13094	45238	05697
VAR00011	.51573	.32811	.03692	27101	33459
VAR00012	.25542	.64527	20100	06396	14748
VAR00013	.19448	.45512	64104	.04902	.10867
VAR00014	39927	.39496	.04231	08833	.04862
VAR00015	.25951	18560	46907	.02615	18868
VAR00016	.41457	.67074	36954	.07842	.00204
VAR00017	.19034	.06182	29575	17037	.62413
VAR00018	.82268	23029	17039	.02623	.19720
VAR00019	.15800	.22231	.29291	.30367	.09817
VAR00020	.82494	40246	17823	.16727	06862
VAR00021	.17626	.52572	.16741	18564	03050
VAR00022	.76534	.36665	19143	14388	18644
VAR00023	.84695	04137	.08982	39236	03391
VAR00024	.80866	14152	.33864	17975	.00350
VAR00025	.30683	.68021	08827	.07989	.13679
VAR00026	.39003	.56125	06665	.23319	.07656
VAR00027	.45200	.69129	25504	00714	.07152
VAR00028	.74475	47079	27357	.24039	13245
VAR00029	.51666	34463	.22240	.54663	05128
VAR00030	.48231	.70851	.00489	.19519	.17962
VAR00031	.89379	05984	13464	.20891	10154
VAR00032	.62832	53830	03389	03013	18782
VAR00033	.36046	.67518	37420	.24068	.07525
VAR00034	.73387	37386	39607	.20947	12741
VAR00035	.58289	.27155	14558	50326	42503
VAR00036	.27716	.53636	.08244	.13130	21766
VAR00037	.73669	17919	.35173	29258	.05841
VAR00038	.76015	12634	.44673	09295	.10901
VAR00039	.31990	.54682	.46802	32956	.23600
VAR00040	.06616	.28650	. 54448	07775	31860
VAR00041	.66290	09375	.50201	.08360	32919
VAR00042	.36235	23098	.24766	.59148	18949

----- FACTOR ANALYSIS -----

	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10
VAR00001	.12325	01393	05587	.31674	.15979
VARO0002	.15099	.53190	.03505	24359	25174
VAR00003	.13734	14444	.15154	.03399	09181

# Appendix 3 continued Table 4.6.3 continued

JAR00004	22590	.31396	.24918	16759	34393
~	ALLOY MERCENIAL				
JAR00005	15427	.01353	08805	.11906	23250
VAR00006	17420	07939	03949	.05921	10880
VAR00007	.20783	.17558	.17451	.20497	.08361
VAR00008	.32670	13237	.38460	.21463	20458
VAR00009	12773	.08556	.13053	.22559	.00548
WAR00010	.59277	07315	.29953	27868	.01433
WAR00011	.18463	.47793	22469	05378	.14170
VAR00012	14469	.19603	29464	.02556	.10448
WAR00013	06189	.34172	.05652	13711	14344
VAR00014	06282	.07537	.14182	.32989	.08884
VAR00015	.09354	.12606	.24429	.50027	.32322
VAR00016	09133	13316	.16981	23401	.08585
VAR00017	14503	.58910	04529	01528	.09325
VAR00018	.03102	05224	05474	28078	.14145
VAR00019	.56505	.23061	29756	.16638	17856
VAR00020	.12447	07637	10658	14734	.02220
VAR00021	.33262	14923	57678	03527	.04966
VAR00022	.04154	11700	.07779	.00530	17851
VAR00023	.13891	07475	18431	.02891	.07383
VAR00024	08327	09088	05173	.14207	.07531
VAR00025	.26944	39680	26715	01288	02996
VAR00026	52984	16064	.07844	.07276	.12514
VAR00027	14600	28280	.17975	17019	.05792
VAR00028	12162	.00820	10682	.01781	.11889
VAR00029	08125	.18996	28173	03108	.11000
VAR00030	.14660	23016	.21227	04419	05352
VAR00031	.04150	02074	.02552	.06394	.14298
VAR00032	.19727	00978	.04347	.16657	30167
VAR00033	.23740	03283	.08473	.06272	08748
VAR00034	.17005	.01612	02610	.01274	.02170
VAR00035	15941	.09573	.08109	.12035	12931
VAR00036	33886	.03524	17466	.30145	33510
VAR00037	20578	.04065	.00431	01690	10485
VAR00038	05820	.04297	.04455	04052	.27098
VAR00039	.09211	.11464	.21277	02912	.25336
VAR00040	.23380	.33631	.32668	07813	.24331
VAR00041	04680	03598	.09781	16036	13239
VAR00042	25888	04949	.00976	28080	.17051
	. 20000		111111		

Table 4.6.4: The Ten Factors and their Loadings after rotation Rotated Factor Matrix:

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
VAR00001	00017	.18717	05670	.07339	.91065
VAR00002	.00511	.17444	28683	.13445	.01335
VAR00003	.30345	17825	.33991	17317	.57920
VAR00004	.29615	.03524	.58440	.19029	.24223
VAR00005	.18125	.05646	.80422	10138	.12618
VAROCO06	.50020	.05931	.44120	16937	.62937
VAR00007	.49039	04326	.09047	18738	00357
VAR00008	.25948	.11433	05292	.20051	.16272
VAR00009	13394	.43032	.09916	.56797	04188
VAR00010	07654	.11505	.13170	.14813	10109
VAR00011	.20799	.19870	.38562	.50230	20924
VAR00012	06192	.53906	.13467	.15238	14875
VAR00013	03947	.57891	.06165	17701	07506
VAR00014	62122	.09112	12834	.14174	.05379
VAR00015	.13221	.05417	.03387	.00991	.00764
VAR00016	.09539	.91438	.02066	.07441	05517
VAR00017	01115	.06699	.17045	02337	.53937
VAR00018	.79599	.25617	.26371	01488	.28007
VAR00019	.06898	02866	08344	.16046	.17507
VAR00020	.90020	.09933	.25818	09647	.06070
VAR00021	04610	.30774	.09152	.11706	.00083
VAR00022	.29638	.64780	.53287	.07480	10094
VAR00023	.49680	.19076	.64385	.19649	.17374
VAR00024	.51366	.06819	.57661	.28917	.27893
VAR00025	00476	.72950	02364	07768	.12914
VAR00026	.07500	.71991	.05954	.10465	.13528
VAR00027	.04585	.93948	.12268	.07004	.04571
VAR00028	.86203	.02779	.21011	13514	.02410
VAR00029	.77745	18041	06795	.12228	.11599
VAR00030	.04799	.84878	.04629	.18622	.21863
VAR00031	.72863	.36032	.26325	.13280	.11335
VAR00032	.57049	20804	.51256	13125	03230
VAR00033	00595	.80405	04020	03016	.04735
VAR00034	.77992	.12505	.19490	17199	00807
VAR00035	.05950	.37658	.75434	.21200	31446
VAR00036	11395	.41505	.33510	.02493	16722
-22/00026	11395	.41505	.55510	.02493	120121

----- FACTOR ANALYSIS -----

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
VAR00037	.44368	00558	.70147	.25224	.23662
VAR00038	.56285	.04588	.38199	.50419	.38051
VARO0039	17810	.35866	.25492	.69474	.38449
VARO0040	10124	01250	.00752	.86743	14492
VARO0041	.56231	.04668	.40556	.42272	13245
VARO0042	.70093	.01011	22928	.20053	08151

### Appendix 4 continued Table 4.6.4 continued

	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10
		10001	140001	140001	ractor ro
********	00654	22520	14007	11746	00000
VAR00001	.00654	.22538	.14087	.11746	.06216
VAR00002	14271	.11181	.11226	.14029	.80524
VAR00003	.01862	14994	33627	.13906	08019
VAR00004	18386	28228	.02899	.10972	.38423
VAR00005	.08416	.02032	06339	15274	07105
VAR00006	03808		.06514	.03843	.01029
VAR00007	.72228	11556	18234	.05640	.13583
VAR00008	.09862 06794	.02234		.82932 .30415	.07719
VAR00009 VAR00010			.47695		
	.06396	.08126	81994	.04093	02426
VAR00011	.18792	.44147	02251	28939	.23317
VAR00012	.08254	.33199	.27770	36226	.14936
VAR00013	.23766	03137	03475	28530	.56190
VAR00014	.11778	.00596	.16003	01544	02004
VAR00015	.86877	10305	00257	01337	09948
VAR00016	.02962	04007	03108	11934	.09810
VAR00017	.17599	08561	01603	51723	.54214
VAR00018	.06267	02601	18719	12908	.01546
VAR00019	01339	.68551	.03857	.35339	.34234
VAR00020	.19788	.05971	11480	.07645	01475
VAR00021	24039	.78940	03022	14292	13777
VAR00022	.14964	.14474	04971	.11174	.01150
VAR00023	.09900	.30678	15337	08657	21417
VAR00024	.02914	.09830	.12137	.09970	25906
VAR00025	14742	.54084	02997	.09078	11555
VAR00026	03565	17106	.51833	06863	06956
VAR00027	05713	04723	00278	05988	04958
VAR00028	.36453	08635	.13168	03174	04060
VAR00029	.02425	.12185	.39466	.10819	.13722
VAR00030	08046	.15660	01233	.29108	.07816
VAR00031	.34100	.07016	.08150	.11382	02307
VAR00032	.29417	.03948	12564	.35765	00164
VAR00033	.22133	.26334	02154	.14844	.27107
VAR00034	. 45700	.03714	10986	.08381	.07032
VAR00035	.24668	.03709	.01853	12913	05923
VAR00036	03555	.20646	.61688	.14969	.11271
VAR00037		05401	.07907	.03028	08304
		FACTOR	ANALYSIS		
		France 7	Factor 0	Factor 9	Factor 10
	Factor 6	Factor 7		Factor 9	
VAR00038	05311	.00867	.05482	.02062	16134
VAR00039	17646	.12885	10235	04336	02631
VARO0040	03009	.06722	09165	.15934	.08453
VAR00041	21354	00281	.12020	.35798	06780
VAR00042	17255	21610	.33885	.16292	02401

Table 4.6.5 Factor Transformation Matrix:

Table 4.0	. J ractor I	Lansiolmacio	II MACLIA.		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
Factor 1	.68642	.37810	.52068	.17499	.19790
Factor 2	44548	.75740	04855	.26528	05398
Factor 3	03478	34777	.09777	.59595	.18377
Factor 4	. 36695	.10831	64749	09337	.00813
Factor 5	10318	.05237	07005	24022	.90349
Factor 6	.01626	07298	19755	.09698	.03817
Factor 7	04001	29953	.09174	.37350	01820
factor 8	18442	.18049	.00814	.31261	.04151
Factor 9	35158	13891	.18530	07135	.25179
Factor 10	.15617	.03258	45932	.47509	.20218
	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10
actor 1	.16128	.09823	.03813	.08766	.01336
actor 2	14346	.28931	.15954	04912	.14178
actor 3	52346	.12701	.20868	.34269	16804
actor 4	.02971	01978	.42398	.41575	.26779
actor 5	19443	07007	11302	10738	.20170
actor 6	.19951	.57499	66699	.34393	.10460
actor 7	.24893	.02106	.11929	29544	.77234
Factor 8	.22164	71653	30488	.41749	.06417
Factor 9	.63339	.19979	.42893	.28338	22110
Factor 10	.29771	02882	03132	47740	42265
			LU TO		

# Computing for the sample Chi-square value for the relationship between preferences and occupation

0	E	(O – E)2	(O-E)2/E
3	4.44	2.0736	0.467
4	3.13	0.75569	0.2418
5	4.44	0.3136	0.0706
5 4	3.73	0.0729	0.0195
3	3.23	0.0529	0.0163
6	6.78	0.6084	0.0897
5	4.78	0.484	0.0101
7	6.78	0.484	0.0071
6	5.70	0.09	0.0157
5	4.93	0.0049	0.0009
8 5	7.48	2.2704	0.361
5	5.27	0.0729	0.0138
8	7.48	0.2704	0.0361
6	6.29	0.0841	0.0133
5	5.44	0.1936	0.0355
7	6.55	0.2025	0.0309
5	4.61	0.1521	0.0329
5	6.55	2.4025	0.3667
6	5.51	0.2401	0.0435
5	4.76	0.0576	0.0121
	7.72	0.0784	0.0101
5	5.44	0.1936	0.0355
9	7.72	1.6384	0.2122
	6.49	0.2401	0.0369
5	5.61	0.3721	0.0663
7	6.78	0.484	0.00713
5	4.78	0.0484	0.01012
7 5 6	6.78	0.6084	0.0897
6	5.7	0.09	0.0157
5	4.93	0.0049	0.0009
5	4.21	0.6241	0.1482
2	2.96	0.9216	0.3113
4	6.78	7.7284	1.1398
3	3.54	0.2916	0.0823
4	3.06	0.8836	0.2887
			$X^2 = 4.01545$

Computation for the sample Chi-square value of association between preferences and seniority

0	E	$(O-E)^2$	$(O-E)^2/E$
9	8.94	(0 - E)	0.0004
8	6.31		0.4526
1	2.31		0.7429
2	2.42		0.0728
14	13.42		0.02506
10	9.47		0.0296
3	3.47		0.0636
3	3.63		0.1093
14	14.76		0.0391
10	10.10		0.0009
4	3.70		0.0243
4	3.87		0.0043
13	12.52		0.0184
8	8.84		0.0798
3	3.24		0.0177
4	3.38		0.1137
14	14.76		0.0391
11	10.42		0.0322
4	2.83		0.00848
4	3.99		0.00002
13	12.94		0.00006
8	9.15		0.1445
4	3.35		0.1261
4	3.51		0.0684
8	8.05		0.00031
5	5.68		0.0814
3	2.08		4069
2	2.17		0.0133
			$X^2 = 2.71525$

Computation for the sample Chi-square value for the dependence of respondents opinions and occupations

. 0	E	$(O-E)^2$	$(O - E)^2/E$
3	3		0
2	1.875		0.0083
1	3.375		1.6712
4	1.875		2.4083
2	1.875		0.00083
4	4.5		0.0555
3	2.81		0.01284
8	5.06		1.7082
1	2.81		1.1658
2	2.81		0.2334
1	0.5		0.5
0	0.31		0.3203
0	0.56		0.56
0	0.31		0.31
0	0.31		0.31
			$X^2 = 9.26447$

Computation for the sample Chi-square value of the dependence between

respondents opinions and the	r management level
------------------------------	--------------------

0	E	(O-E) <sup>2</sup>	(O-E) <sup>2</sup> /E
5	6.125		0.2066
5	5.25		0.0119
2	1.75		0.0357
2	0.875		1.4465
9	7.43		0.3321
7	6.375		0.0612
1	2.125		0.5955
0	1.06		1.06
0	0.4375		0.4375
0	0.375		0.375
1	0.125		6.125
0	0.0625		0.625
	119		$X^2 = 11.3119$

Computation for the sample Chi-square value of the difference between preferences and the existing scheme.

0 .,	E	(O-E) <sup>2</sup>	(O-E) <sup>2</sup> /E
7	16.30		5.306
17	15.81		0.0895
28	16.30		8.3981
10	16.30		2.4349
50	32.12		9.9531
9	15.32		2.6072
7	15.81		4.909
12	9.68		0.556
8	9.38		0.2030
5	9.68		2.262
11	9.68		0.18
15	19.07		0.8686
11	9.09		0.4013
14	9.38		2.2755
14	7.00	ES Regularisation	7.000
7	6.79	The Lave Jan	0.0064
0.	7.00	HEAT IN FURNISH	7.00
0	7.00		7.00
12	13.80		0.2347
11	6.58		3.1186
11	6.79		2.6103
	iele jande if yo	allow him in miner	$X^2 = 70.024$



#### UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI FACULTY OF COMMERCE

MBA PROGRAMME - LOWER KEBTER CAMPUS

Telephone: 732160/5

P.O. Box 30197 Nairobi, Kenya

15 JUN 1999
Office of the Chief Man.
Human Resources
No. Development

May 18<sup>th</sup> 1999

Telegrams: "Varsity", Nairobi Telex: 22095 Varsity

The Managing Director Cooperative Bank of Kenya

Dear Sir, .

The bearer of this letter, KILIKA JAMES Registration No. D61/7145/97 is a Master of Business and Administration student of the University of Nairobi. He is required to submit as part of his course work assessment a research project report on some management problem.

The student is doing his research on "ANALYSIS OF MANAGERS' COMPENSATION PREFERENCES AND THE EXISTING COMPENSATION SCHEMES". He would like to use your organization for a case study of this research. We would therefore, appreciate if you allow him to collect data in your Bank for the research.

The data collected will be treated confidentially and used for academic purposes only. Your Bank can get a free copy of the final report upon request from the above office.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

DR. M. OGUTU

MBA Coordinator & Senior Lecturer

P. 3. A. OFFICE \*

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Chiversity Committees

JAMES KILIKA, C/O MBA COORDINATOR, FACULTY OF COMMERCE, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI, PO BOX 30197, NAIROBI. 6<sup>th</sup> JULY 1999.

#### Dear Sir / Madam,

I am conducting a management research project sponsored by the University of Nairobi in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in Business and Administration.

Upon request by the University of Nairobi administration, the top management of your Bank through the office of the Managing Director has consented to facilitate for a case study of this research. Your response and those of other management staff in the Cooperative Bank will therefore enable me complete this task. The answers you will give in response to the questions in the enclosed questionnaire are very important to the accuracy of my research.

I hope you will take the time to complete and return it to the Chief Manager, Human Resources at your earliest convenience. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

J.M. KILIKA

(Research Candidate)

S.N.M. NZUVE

(University Research Supervisor)

## RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

#### INTRODUCTION

You are kindly requested to answer the following questions in the three parts of the questionnaire.

#### PART ONE

The questions here are about the importance to you of the various items of financial rewards, fringe benefits and other non-economic incentives deemed suitable for a compensation scheme. Please read Section A and tick 1 for the **Least Important** and 5 for the **Most Important** item. Repeat the same procedure for Sections B, C, D, E, F and G.

# Section A: The Importance to you of the various economic job rewards and incentives.

1. The Basic Salary	1	2	3	4	5
2. The Consolidated Salary	1	2	3	4	5
3. Profit sharing plans	1	2	3	4	5
4. Payments deferred into the future	1	2	3	4	5
<ol><li>Employee stock option and ownership plans</li></ol>	1	2	3	4	5
<ol><li>Executive bonus plans</li></ol>	1	2	3	4	5

### Section B: The Importance to you of the various economic membership rewards

Career progression rewards     after qualification	1	2	3	4	5
<ol> <li>Payments for seniority and seniority-related rewards</li> </ol>	1	2	3	4	5
<ol> <li>Executive treatment in things like office space, parking lots, and furnishings</li> </ol>	1	2	3	4	5
<ol> <li>Contributions for membership         To professional and social         Organizations     </li> </ol>	1	2	3	4	5
<ol> <li>Payments for employee insurance and employee stock purchase plans.</li> </ol>	1	2	3	4	5
12. Payments for employee loan associations (saccos), home financing and pensions.	1	2	3	4	5

Sect	ion C: The importance to you of th	e var	ious	non-	financ	ial job	rewa	irds.	
13.		1		2	3	4			5
	tasks								
14.	A job with opportunity for	1		2	3	4			5
	growth								
15.	Working with challenging	1		2	3	4			5
	colleagues								
16.	Working in a job with	1		2	3	4			5
	intellectual interest and								
	professional prestige								
17.	Working with congenial	1		2	3	4			5
	colleagues								
18.	A job that gives me the	1		2	3	4			5
	opportunity to lead others.								
	A CONTRACTOR								
Secti	ion D: The importance to you of th	e var	ious	fring	ge bene	fits.		*	
	oan entitlements	1		2	3	4		5	
20. I	Retirement schemes	1		2	3	4		5	
21. I	ife assurance, Medical and	1		2	3	4		5	
	uneral assistance schemes								
22. I	Educational assistance and	1		2	3	4		5	
5	Scholarships								
	Anniversary awards and								
	onus like Christmas bonus					ŧ			
	nd year end bonus	1		2	3	4		5	
	Overtime, holiday and	1		2	3	4		5	
	veekend Premiums								
	and the state of t								
S	lection E: The importance to you of Rewards.	fthe	vari	ious p	erforn	iance i	ion-f	ine.n	cial
25. (	Opportunity for promotion		1		2	3	4		5
	Participation in problem Solving		1		2 2	, 3	4		5
	Opportunity to set Performance		1		2	3	4		5
g	oals								
	Responsibility, autonomy, Freedom		1		2	3	4		5
	nd independence		1		2	3	4		5
	eeling of self control and dentification with the Bank Goals		1		2	3	7		0
			1		2	3	4		5
30.	Self respect and esteem		1		2	3	4		9
Canti	on F: The importance to you of the	a war	ione	man	harchi	n non-	finar	cial	
Secti	Rewards.	e var	ous	men	Dersin	p non-	inui	citti	
	Rewaras.								
21 E	levibility of the Benk	1 -	- 1	2	3	4		5	
	lexibility of the Bank	1		2	,				
	olicies and procedures he extent of decentralization	1		2	3	4		5	
		1		2	3	4		0	
	nd delegation of authority	1		2	3	4		5	
33.3	ecurity in the bank	1		-	2			-	

1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
f the varie	ous perq	uisites		
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
1	2	3	4	5
	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2  1 2	1 2 3  1 2 3  f the various perquisites 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3	1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4  1 2 3 4

### PART TWO

The Questions in this part are about your opinions toward the various aspects of the Compensation Scheme of your employer. Please read Section A and tick (✓) for the appropriate response from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Repeat the same for Sections B to H.

Section A: Your opinion towards the Economic Rewards

		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1.	The amount of salary I am rewarded with is as adequate as I desire			□ □		
2.	The Scheme allows me to share in the annual profits made by the bank					
3.	The Scheme entitles me to the Stock Ownership of the Bank					
4.	The Scheme entitles me for Stock Option Plans					

	5.	The Scheme entitles me into some adequate share of the Bonus					
	6.	The Scheme entitles me into reward payments deferred into the future					
	Sec	ction B: Your opinion towards t	he Member	ship Rewar	ds		6
			Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
	7.	My Career progression after qualification has been					
	8.	adequately rewarded My Seniority in the Company has been adequately rewarded with Seniority payments	O Seems	0	A green to		
	9.	I have been given executive treatment in things like Office Space, Parking lots and Furnishings					
	10.	My membership to professional and social organizations has been supported with the relevant contributions					
	11.	My employee insurance and stock purchase plans have been adequately paid for	0				
	12.	My home financing and pension payments have been adequately met	-:				
					4 -		
	Sec	tion C: Your opinion towards t	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
	13.	My job has got very challenging tasks					
25 Ma	14.	My job gives me the desired opportunity for personal growth in the Bank					

15	. My colleagues at work are very challenging					
16	The job has very high level of intellectual interest and professional prestige				- t <sub>+1</sub>	
17.	My colleagues at work are very congenial					
18.	The job gives me the opportunity to lead others in the Bank					
Car	stian Dr. Vann animian tamanda	the fallowin	in Grinas ha	u aGto		
sec	ction D: Your opinion towards	ine jouowii	ig jringe bei	nejus		
		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor	Agree	Strongly Agree
19.	The Scheme allows me adequate loan entitlements			Disagree		
20.	The Scheme gives me sufficient retirement benefits					
21.	The Scheme gives me an adequate life assurance, Medical and the Funeral Assistance cover I need					
22.	The Scheme gives me an adequate Educational assistance for myself and for Children					
	Cilidren					
23.	The Scheme entitles me to sufficient professional					
	benefits.					
24.	The Scheme entitles me for anniversary awards, Christmas and Year end bonuses					
					13	
Seci	tion E: Your opinion towards t	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Agree nor	Agree	Strongly Agree
25.	The job itself gives me good opportunities for advancement			Disagree		

26	. The work I do gives me great job challenge and variety					
27	The Job gives me the opportunity to participate in					
28.	problem solving The job gives me the opportunity to set performance goals for my work				- (4)	
29.	The amount of freedom I have in my job is high.					
30.	The job gives me a strong feeling of self-control and identification with the bank goals					
	The job gives me a feeling of doing something meaningful.	he followin	g character	ristics of your jo	ob	0
32.	The job is very interesting.					
33.	The job enables me to earn alot of respect from the people I work with.	0				
34.	The job gives me the opportunity to learn new things.					
35.	My job gives me the opportunity to fully develop my skills and abilities					
36.	The job gives me the opportunity to influence the policy of the bank.					
Sec	tion G: Your opinion towards		eristics of the	he Bank Admir Neither		Strongly
		Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree nor	Agree	Strongly Agree
37.	The policies and procedures of the bank are very flexible			Disagree □		

38.	The extent of decentraliz and delegation of author the bank is very adequat	ity in					
39.	My life in the Bank is ve	ery					
40.	The Management Development and Traini programs are very adequ	-		0			
41.	The degree of participati and consultative decision making is very adequate	n					
42.	The Internal status I'm accorded by the bank ear me a lot of external press						
Sec	tion H: Your opinion tow		rious perqu		-i	C.	
		Stron	 Disagree	Neither Agree nor	Agree		agree
43.	I am entitled to a company provided car.			Disagree			
44.	I am entitled to and well accorded free or assigned parking privileges.						
45.	I am entitled to the Bank sponsored Club Membership.						
46.	I am entitled to the Bank sponsored Professional Organization.						
47.	I am entitled to a paid travel for my spouse.						
48.	I am adequately entitled to interest free loans.						

( 4)

## PART THREE

This part seeks to obtain some of your job-related information.

1.	Your Job Position in the Manager Middle Manager Senior Manager Chief Manager	Bank:		
2.	Your Department:			
Fin	ance/Accounts		Business Development	
Ma	rketing		Legal	
Hu	man Resources/Personnel		Public Relations	
Ope	erations		Information Technology	
Au			Other	

Thank you for your Cooperation!