CHALLENGES FACING THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN AFRICA: A FOCUSED COMPARISON OF EASTERN AFRICA AND SAHEL REGIONS EXPERIENCES

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2018
DECLARATION

I understand that plagiarism is an offense and therefore affirm that this proposal is my original copy and has not submitted it to any other institute for any other reward.

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SUPERVISORS DECLARATION

This proposal of study has been presented for examination with our consent as University Supervisors.

Signature……………………………… Date……………………

DR. MUMO NZAU
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My sincere appreciation goes to my supervisor for his advices throughout this work. I greatly benefited from their vast knowledge and experience. I wish to thank the entire University department for their strong background information which enabled me to set the basis of my project.

Thanks too to all members of my family for support during this period. Much appreciation also goes to my friends for their encouragement during difficult times is highly appreciated. Above all, I give thanks to the almighty God for His grace and providence.
DEDICATION

To my course mates, my parents, siblings and all friends, their unwavering financial, moral and spiritual support has given me the strength and hope to carry on with my studies.
ABSTRACT

Violent extremism denotes to the behaviors and beliefs of individuals who support or apply the ideological inspired violence to accomplish radical political or religious perceptions. The view of violent extremism can be demonstrated along a variety of issues, comprising gender associations and politics. It has progressively become an international risk of security, which is undermining global security and peace. Some of the leading groups among them being Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, the Levant and the alleged Iraq Islamic State. This study intends to determine the reason behind the prevalence of violence extremism and terrorism in Sahel’s and East African refugee camps. Using the hypothesis that terrorism is a major security threat in East Africa, and that the countries involved have difficulty in combating the vice, the research uses interviews, observation, and questionnaire on a sample population of about 150-200 individuals in Dadaab Camp. The findings indicated that the reasons for the prevalence of violence in East Africa and Sahel region were financial challenges, insecurity, and political instability, weak border management, under-development, operational problems, fragile economies, security and the rule of law, and ethnic division.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study
Violent extremism denotes to the behaviors and beliefs of individuals who support or apply the ideological inspired violence to accomplish radical ideological, political, or religious perceptions\(^1\). Despite several attempts to make peace between communities, some countries from Eastern Africa and the Sahel keep still experience internal conflict. This situation is complicated by a range of issues affecting the whole region such as religious tensions, the increased impact of radicalization, as well as the prevalence of organized crime and trafficking. Border areas are particularly affected by this phenomenon.

Eastern Africa or East Africa is the eastern section of the continent of Africa, which is variably described by geography. In the Statistics Division Plan of geographical areas of the United States, twenty territories constitute Eastern Africa. Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, South Sudan and Uganda in central Eastern part of Africa are East African Community members\(^2\). The Sahel is the extent of territory between the higher West coasts (Atlantic Ocean) and Africa’s more top east, which is the Red Sea. Also, ‘Sahel’ is a term in Arabic that means the ‘coast,’ an allusion to the two surrounding seashores.

It is a combination of semi-arid, grassland and unoccupied region, specifically, the climate of the Sahara Desert. Pastoralists and nomads occupy the shore. The Sahel is historically rich, as confirmed by the past trade routes of Trans-Sahara, which intertwined th\(^3\)e Sahel,

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\(^1\) Azam (ed), Conflict Growth in Africa: The Sahel, organization for economic Co-operation and development (1999).
the civilization centers such as Djenne, Timbuktu, and Gao, and the emergence of influential realms like Sokoto Caliphate and the Songhai. The region covers approximately three million squares km and comprises sections of southern Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Niger, Sudan, Chad, Mali, Senegal, and Gambia. It is projected that roughly fifty million persons reside in the area of Sahel.

Over the last twenty-five years, the Sahel has significantly attracted policy investigation and global research, based on its environmental issues, usually connected to factors like drought, desertification, and famine. The second motive for Sahel’s concentration is the destitution outline of the area, deteriorated by the impacts of the modifications of the environment. The third motive is the rising scope and scale of safety challenges and issues to ethnic-nationalist philosophy and the increase of light weapons and small weapons. Besides, the growing planned illegal activities and network behaviors of criminals and the spread of radical equipped groups is also another cause.

Of highest priority in this paper is to focus on the challenges Eastern Africa countries are facing in attempt to encounter violent extremism in refugee Camps like Daadab in Kenya, Nyarugusu in Tanzania and BidiBidi in Uganda. In this study, we are going to settle our research on Dadaab refugee fields to represent the other camps since it is the largest camp in EA. The Dadaab refugee camp has a populace of 235,269 documented immigrants and those who seek refuge as at the close of Jan 2018. The sites Ifo, Dagahaley, and Hagadera were built in 1992. The latest camps Kambioos and Ifo II were inaugurated in 2011 after

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4 East Africa” Merriam-Websters Geographical Dictionary
5 Azam (ed), Conflict Growth in Africa
the arrival of 130,000 new immigrants from Somalia. The study also seeks to realize the social, political and economic factors that may hinder the effort to prevent violent extremism in these fields.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

Violent extremism has led to loss of lives, properties and insecurity. It is a global problem that has not been solved. Despite several studies on violent extremism and its prevention mechanisms in the refugee camps worldwide, the problem is still recurring. The investigator has explored majority of these associated materials and discovered that majority of them focused on militaristic PVE approaches of the government in the Eastern Africa and Sahel region of L. Chad, instead of approaches that comprise all pertinent stakeholders like the NSA (Non-state Actors).

The latest of these investigations were carried out in 2012 and these explorations aims at updating examiners in this field. Additionally, majority of the researches failed to dwell into the wider context of examining the challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism in view of addressing matter connected to socio-economic and governance. Approaches of military have not been successful in the battle. In the ongoing hunt for an effective grand approach to counter violent extremism, it is essential to widen research and exploration to comprise PVE and to comprehensively address the challenges facing prevention of violent extremism. It is also necessary to progress measures of prevention that

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are focused on human safety. Hence, this paper identifies challenges that affect the process of prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in Eastern Africa and Sahel regions by examining the political, social and economic aspects.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The aims of this research are as follows;

i. To examine challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism among migrant population in refugee camps.

ii. To discuss challenges facing PVE in refugee camps in Eastern Africa.

iii. To ascertain challenges facing PVE in Sahel region.

iv. Comparative examination of Eastern Africa and Sahel region experiences with PVE in refugee camps.

1.4 Research Questions

The investigation focuses on responding to the following questions;

i. What are the challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in EA countries?

ii. What are the challenges facing PVE in Refugee camps in Eastern Africa?

iii. What are the challenges facing PVE in the Sahel region?

iv. What are the similarities between EA states and Sahel region as far as violent extremism is concerned?
1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the review of earlier studies carried out by researchers revolving within this area of study. It is important to point out that many books and other materials have been written.

Payne asserts that most groups of nationalism make an effort of achieving non-violent change of politics but governments usually suppress them. This is seen in many states especially in the developing countries. Frequently, nationalist violence is escorted with nonviolent, lawful, political actions intended to accomplish autonomy, political liberty and parity or freedom. The role played by human rights groups that is not usually condoned by governments is an example of how interest groups of good will are often branded radical groups by the governments they go against. However, they are usually branded parties of national liberation or independence fighters by their followers, comprising other governments.

The war between Palestinian and Israeli is noted to be the most famous modern example of state terrorism. Payne brings out the fact that the battle between Palestinian and Israeli has pushed the Middle East into four key combats and notes that it continues to fuel ongoing violence in the region. He recommends early mitigation of such conflicts because failure to do so has international implications, mostly due to the reliance of the world on the imports

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12 Boko Haram purportedly pledges allegiance to ISIS.
of petroleum from the Middle East. It also affords an opportunity to other terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, to apply such battle to validate their actions and to hire members all through the world of Islam. From Payne’s point of view, governments should accept challenge by other actors within the state, as long as such challenge is for the good of the citizens.


1.5.2 The Different Faces of Terrorism

Radical groups have been among the most urgent political issues during the previous half century. Its most-sidedness, cheap lethality and randomness make it hard, expensive and unreliable for prevention and control. Domestic terrorism is another area that Payne dwells on and explores the April 19, 1995 case when Americans observed in disbelief as bodies

\(^{14}\) Quoted in: Welch Claude E. & Smith A.K, Military Role and Rule ; Duxbury Press, Wadsworth Belmont California ,1974, pp258-259
covered with blood were retrieved from the federal construction in the City of Oklahoma.\textsuperscript{16} The Americans were quick to lay the blame on Middle East terror groups but the reality was that the heinous act was committed by America’s own Gulf combat expert Timothy McVeigh.\textsuperscript{17} According to Hottman, terrorism owes its survival to an capability of adapting and adjusting to issues and counter-measures, to continue identifying and exploiting its opponent’s vulnerabilities.\textsuperscript{18} The burgeoning strategic arms race and the accelerating proliferation of the various means of organized violence continue to lend persuasive support to Lasswell’s view of coercion as a political currency. Indeed a competitive society and specifically one whose competitors are power hungry is a recipe for chaos. Such is explained in the study of Welch & Smith, Military Role and Rule; Duxbury Press, Wadsworth Belmont California, 1974, 258-259 Ibid east to west across Africa\textsuperscript{19}.

Regarding the international intervention on terrorism on the 11th September, 2001, the global community was presented with a new kind of terrorism, which was truly universal in its institute and its influence\textsuperscript{20}. The post September 11 period has confronted religious leaders, the government, the media, policy makers, and the public to play both vital and productive roles in the battle against international terrorism.\textsuperscript{21} The International Police Organization (Interpol) has had a significant impact in the fight against terrorism. According

\textsuperscript{16} Romaniuk, P (2015) \textit{lesson Learnt from Danish and Other International Efforts on Countering Violent Extremism} CVE in Development Contexts
\textsuperscript{17} Whittaker J. D., \textit{The Terrorism Reader}, London and New York; Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2003, Pg ii
\textsuperscript{18} Hottman, \textit{Rethinking Terrorism and Counter Terrorism}, P 314
\textsuperscript{19} Quoted in: Welch Claude E. & Smith A.K, \textit{Military Role and Rule} ; Duxbury Press, Wadsworth Belmont California ,1974, pp258-259
\textsuperscript{21} Stivachtis Y.A, \textit{International Order In a Globalizing World}, Virginia polytechnic institute and state university, USA ,2007, pp 161-181
to Dr. Todd Sandler a UT Dallas researcher, the International Police Organization re-described its task by entrusting a portion of its international resources to fighting radical groups and such measures appeared to be constructive. “Our calculations confirmed that, Interpol receives approximately $ 200 profit for each $ 1 it uses on the battle against radical groups” ‘and Sandler, the Vibhooti Shukla lecturer of economics and political economy in Dallas School of economics in UT, policy sciences and political, affirms that it is a big benefit.22

The resolution wanted states to stop the movement of radical groups through successful control of border and limits on the delivery of documents for traveling.23 The inspections of security we go through in the world of today like when boarding planes, when calling on public and private offices, churches and socials places is an obvious sign that governments have a costly accountability over the safety of its citizens. Radical groups may eventually cost democracy as Hobbes Thomas highlights that since individuals may look for safety from forces that they believe are powerful, it will compromise their freedoms and privileges of democracy.24 Furthermore governments defend defying the rights of people asserting that they are enforcing national safety.25

1.5.3 Theoretical Framework: Theory of Securitization
The method of securitization has been a valuable instrument to a psychoanalyst who wishes to test the concept of the aim of safety threat26. The theoretical narration is well-designed

26 Ibid
and has produced much attention of academy and sparked the amount of crucial arguments and reviews, focusing on broadening and further specifying the model to increase its descriptive impact and rationality.

The model of securitization is observed as challenging because of the inventive and noteworthy contribution of the understanding of security. The design of security is barely limited with the most attention on the language of key players like political kingpins. Such implies that security is comprehended and only takes place when interventions are addressed in support of a specific community, which is often a state.

Focus on styles of illustrations like pictures or material practices are included. (McDonald, 2008: 564). Therefore, the main focus considers the language and its impact to construct safety. Similarly, the abstract model of securitization emphasizes on what the spectators receive; thus, it becomes necessary in effective securitization method. Copenhagen school offers reasons why individuals are doubtless to accept some securitizing moves than others. These facilitating conditions facilitate or have an adverse effect on securitization. However they are not intellectualized and they constitute acts of speech, which disagree that security is made socially. The misunderstanding between securitization as a useful method by concentrating on control of performance of human action and procedures claims that security is established severally.

Such misunderstanding resulted to criticism by the alleged Second invention of securitization examiners who contend that it is impossible to understand securitization outside the framework of history and culture where safety discussion occurs.

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Hence, security means is conditional. Finally, the framework of securitization is restricted because the character of the act is distinct. This is because of the description of risks to safety. This assertion relies on an obligation to the impression that safety is set up in oppositional conditions: by declaring it wants preservation or protection.

Occasionally, it is more efficient if protection is perceived as a normal goal that should be achieved or expressed main principles that need protection, rather than articulation only regarding “from what and from whom it needs protection”. Hence, observing security as a negative thing fails to represent a rational necessity.

1.6 Justification of the Study

1.6.1 Academic Justification

There are numerous resources on the final conception of violent, which include the activities and the threats originating from violent assaults. Of highest priority in this paper is paying attention to violent groups’ body, which included the members of the radical groups. Most specifically, I will concentrate on the challenges facing EA states in violent ideology hindrance.

1.6.2 Policy Justification

This knowledge can assist in finding answers to the problem that EA is experiencing within the battle against coercion. It is necessary for the action of a nation at both individual and dogmas levels. Also, it is crucial for the willpower of the development and growth of a nation given the influence of instability on varied divisions of the economy. The

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examination might be a tool to be employed to direct the arrangements of the government on problems with instability originating from the behaviors of terrorists.

1.6.3 Hypotheses

i. EA states does not have adequate capacity to counter terrorism

ii. Terrorism is a major security threat to EA states and Sahel region.

1.7 Research Methodology

1.7.1 Introduction

This part aims at outlining the approaches the examiner intends to implement in conducting his study. It will investigate who comprises the populace to be investigated, who will be part of the sample gotten from the huge population and also clarify clearly the criteria to be employed in reaching the projected sample. Of greatest importance in this part are the details on the tools that the examiner will utilize to gather the pertinent data for the analysis.

1.7.2 Target Population

First-hand information will be collected from interviews, focused group discussions, questionnaire of different clusters and sampled population. The targeted population will include youths, Muslim elders, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), representatives of local community, madrasa teachers and other relevant stakeholders in Dadaab refugee camp. The study will also be centered on three key institutions that handle issues related to the subject under study. These institutions are the International Police Organization (Interpol), Kenya Police Anti-Terrorism Unit, and the Immigration Ministry and

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Registration of Individuals, Diplomats. The personnel (staff) under these ministries will therefore be the population under study.

The researcher will ascertain the number of employees in the above three institutions and draw a representative sample out of it. Given the researchers interest in generalizing the results of the study to the wider population, he will apply the probability sampling design by simple random sampling to select the representative sample.

1.7.3 Sample Size and Sample Procedure

In this study, the sample size will be between 150-200 respondents; 20 in-depth interviews with representatives of various institutions dealing with refugee affairs and five thorough interviews with security personnel within the Dadaab refugee camp. The use of these numbers of respondents in this survey is obtained from recommendations on the sampling process by two researchers. First, a recommendation by Francis\textsuperscript{31} that in all research with a qualitative component regardless of the design should make use of fifteen (15) interviews as the smallest acceptable sample and another recommendation by Emmel, \textsuperscript{32} that a sample ranging from 5 to 25 can be adequate in a study that uses in-depth interviews in data collection.

The reason for the above is because by the end of 20-25 thorough interviews, the researcher will have obtained an adequate saturation point, which will be used in data analysis. The sample needs to be big enough to serve sufficient depiction of the population regarding what

\textsuperscript{31}Francis, J. (2010). *What is an adequate sample size? Operationalising data saturation for theory-based interview studies.*

\textsuperscript{32}Emmel, N. (2013). *Sampling and choosing cases in qualitative research: A realist approach.* London: Sage
the study aims at generalizing the research findings, and small enough to be chosen economically regarding valuable subjects.

1.7.4 Sampling Methods

Stratified sampling

This will be done by dividing the target population into important subcategories and then selecting members in proportions that they occur in the population based on some characteristics.

Random Sampling

The study will give each population member an equal opportunity of being chosen to contribute to the investigation.

Volunteer Sampling

People who are self-selected into the survey will be given an opportunity. Often, those with strong interest are the main topic of this survey.

1.7.5 Data Collection Methods

To be able to carry out a successful research that will inform the general objective of the academic survey on ascertaining the challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in Africa, the researcher intends to use the following methods:

Secondary Data

The researcher aims at answering questions that address challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in Africa. Thus, he will examine the news-letters,
journals, and data available within different line ministries (e.g. immigration, and ministry of defense).

**Observations**

This will entail a systematic noting and documentation of occasions, artifacts (items), and conducts in the social context of Daadab refugee camp and the entire Garissa County. It is believed that using this method will generate first hand and tangible information that will help in confirming the actual resources available and possibly the extend of violent extremism. Careful and purposeful photography will be used to capture the actual situation on the ground and within the target area per selected population. This will help the research to raise pertinent discussion questions and inputs to help make the necessary recommendations.

**Focused Group Discussions**

This will be organized mainly by youths and leaders in charge of the security. Also, anti-terrorism Unit will be required to engage as a group to share their views and experiences on the violent extremism in the area of study.

**Interviews**

It is envisaged that the engagement of key informants will raise the security issues and matters of violent.

**Questionnaire**

This strategy will be implemented for the sampled groups or whole population. The researcher will use questionnaires to gather regular or rare routine information. The
information usually gotten through questionnaires comprises perceptions of stakeholder on security matters, general information on violent and policies as well as stakeholders involvement. It will require respondents to complete the form themselves.

The researcher will also go extra mile to use Skype in situation where transport to gather information in required area is costly, for example in scenario like Chad. The Skype interview will be recorded and stored for future reference.

1.7.6 Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics will be used by the researcher to analyze his data. This will involve tabulated percentages and proportions. It will also include graphical representation of information.

1.7.7 Scope and Limitations of the Study
This research will widely rely on the knowledge and experience of the researcher in the police service. The researcher’s intensive training on investigation of terrorist activities and knowledge on counter terrorism-crisis management will be useful in carrying out the research. The research will also look into earlier studies with the same bearing. Furthermore, the researcher will carry out his study in the Dada refugee camp given that the impact of terrorism is greater here and also considering the accessibility of relevant information.

The key institutions that the researcher will visit and collect relevant data are the Kenya Police Anti-terrorism Unit, the Kenya’s Immigration and Registration Ministry and the International Police Organization (Interpol) offices in the capital city Nairobi. The data collected in these three crucial institutions will be generalized and will reflect the true
situation in as far as the challenges facing Eastern Africa states in the fight against violent is concerned.

**1.6.7 Confidentiality of Information**

This is another challenge that the researcher foresees. The examiner will depend largely on data from the Police Unit of Anti-terrorism and other groups of government involved in fighting terrorism. Terrorism is seen as a threat of protection; hence, records that the government holds on this aspect are private.

**1.7.8 Chapter Outline**

Chapter one forms the researcher’s proposal. It introduces the topic of the study subject. It gives the historical data and the issue statement of the study. The chapter also outlines the objective of the study while reviewing previous literature. It gives the theoretical framework under which the researcher bases her study. Furthermore, the researcher provides the hypothesis, the research methodology and the scope of his study.

Chapter two of this research study will give an overview of the security history of Dada refugee camp prior to the era of terrorism. It will also shed light on the uncommon terrorist activities. Chapter three will highlight the state of affairs in Kenya and the East African region after the attack of terrorism on the trade centre of the world in the U. S.

Chapter four analyses the data collected by the researcher. It determines Kenya’s capacity in countering terrorism and comprehensively outlines the challenges the country has faced in the fight against terrorism. Chapter five will conclude and make recommendations from the results of the examination.
CHAPTER TWO
AN EXAMINATION OF CHALLENGES FACING THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AMONG MIGRANT POPULATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS: EASTERN AFRICAN EXPERIENCES

2.1 Introduction

The following are the challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism among migrant population in refugee camps in East Africa;

2.1.1 Deployment of New Method of and Levels of Brutality

Terrorists always use tricky strategies and levels of brutality and are extremely brutal and change constantly in several areas. Lines between “criminals,” “terrorists” “insurgents” are confusing in regions such as African nation, Kenya, Republic of Uganda and Burundi. teams as well as the supposed Muslim State (ISIS) which has a new duplication of the terrorism; one whose legality is postulated not only on the grounds it contends to defend, however conjointly its aptitude of implementing its governance principles, justice, as well as the allocation of resources.33

Tales of teenagers abandoning comfortable residences in Western nations to go to territories that are controlled by the ISIS baffle committees and lawmakers. However, they discuss such disaster among youths regarding identity and views of injustice and a difficulty of separatist, cultural, and social lines.34

2.1.2 Insult from Border Peace and Security Development

So far, the work of the UN on fighting terrorism has remained hugely insulated from its wider security and peace, development, and work of humanitarian groups. Such has been purposeful in certain cases, for comprehensible motives, but in other cases, it is a result of inactivity and an absence of collaboration across the government. Nevertheless, it is possible that future battles will require a stronger reaction of the UN in choices concerning actions of peace, assignments in fields, and involvement of politics.

2.1.3 Unfavorable Funding Opportunities

Regardless of the increasing interest in PVE, chances for funding seem to unreasonably favor those centric strategies of law enforcement. Also, the involvement public community has been challenging when commenced outside a justly procedure of consultation. The players of civil society have expressed distress regarding the stigmatization of specific societies and the “securitization” of their job. A possibility for abuse exists as invasive defensive and measures of responsiveness are implemented and temporary feedbacks are required to what is a lasting dispute. Nevertheless, instead of making the case for neglecting the efforts of PVE, such concerns underline the necessity of getting it right.

37 Richards, Alan,
38 Richards, Alan,
2.1.4 Lack of Clarity

The PVE effort has experienced an absence of clearness in its scope and description. Furthermore, most practitioners and policymakers have employed the words “PVE” and “counterterrorism” conversely, when in actual sense they signify different strategies. The stress on prevention, the rights of human, civil society, and improving the resilience of community has been a seal of the goals and policies of PVE—whose essence and ranges are similar to growth, avoidance of battles and efforts of mitigation.39

2.1.5 Lack of Support from Local Government

The biggest challenge facing peace keepers within East Africa countries is an absence of political determination, specifically in nations with developing democracies or non-democratic systems. Such is worsened by political wars and anxieties in the country. They go through a shortage of independence and the lack of lasting vision/development and/or dedication. In certain instances, tensions and struggles of power may happen between regional and central bureaucracies, particularly in circumstances of instability or battle.

An example of such a case can be found in Kenya where there is conflict between national government and county level40. Moreover, in countries with highly centralistic arrangement, it may be harder to establish a firm effort of politics for the prevention of violent extremism at a regional level.41 The absence of self-government and independence slows down the responsibility and the sense of accountability for the adoption of Violent Prevention

40 Branch, Daniel and NicCheeseman
methods. Federal policies and measures of structural amendments may usually obstruct the execution of violent extremism in regional bureaucracies.

2.1.6 Non-recognition of the Contributions and Roles from Civil Society

Often, the above goes together with an absence of comprehending violent extremism at the level of federal government. Inability to identify end partner with civil society limits efforts by regional bureaucracies of reaching communities that are marginalized.

2.1.7 Regional Imbalances

In East Africa, marginalisation is manifested in groups that have been denied access to economic and political resources to better their lot.\textsuperscript{42} These groups have come to be referred to as the marginalised that is youths, being discriminated they lack opportunity to get job hence the only option is to join the radicalise groups. This situation makes it very difficult to curb violent extremism within this marginalize areas.\textsuperscript{43}

2.1.8 Under-Development and Poverty

Under-development and impoverishment form desperation and grievances that can easily be used by terrorists, particularly when such aspects are united with ineffective governance and the shortage of basic delivery of service. The Kenyan media reports that there are several cases of young men engaging with radical organizations attracted entirely by wealth, promises of shelter and food, or provided wives by the group if they devoted themselves to


\textsuperscript{43} Economy Watch. Mali Economic Statistics and Indicators. Available at: http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/country/Mali/.
combating for them. Such young boys may not essentially share the rational assertions of these associations, but the benefits provided are sufficient to convince them that supporting radical organizations provide more chance than staying in destitution and tolerating the status. Curbing violent extremism in situation is very difficult.

2.1.9 Armed Islamism

Armed Islamism has always been seen as an apparent and serious threat of security. The behavior of equipped Islamists has risen since the start of 2000s and up to 2003, when three major groups operated in the region. The founding of such organizations can be connected to a custom of state overlook, continuous impoverishment and underdevelopment, absence of the control of state territorial, and tensions of ethnics.

2.1.10 High Corruption Level

Kakauma corruption has comprised at least five employees of the UN in an examination after a victim leaked information concerning the same before it developed. The five officials of the UN and two immigrant employees were relocated to Nairobi to be examined by the branch office of UNHCR for Kenya. The five officials of the UN originated from the unit of protection, community service and resettlement in Kakuma’s Sub office of the UNHCR. The two immigrant staffs were both translators who are involved with UNHCR on a payment of incentive. According to the policy of the UN, all services provided to

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44 Branch, Daniel and NicCheeseman
45 Economy Watch
46 UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)
immigrants are free, which comprises the provision of shelter, discrimination against the status of immigrant and resettlement abroad.

Nevertheless, such is not the case in each program managed by the UNHCR and other adopting associates in Kakuma. Inhabitants have complained regarding the rampant instances of fraud, bribes by police and robbery of refuge materials in nearly each zone of services issued in the camp\textsuperscript{47}. At least a dozen rumors and cases of fraud circulate around the people in the camp but no independent organization has courageously appeared to shame the terrible behaviors or inform the media about such actions.

2.1.11 Easy Access to Weapons by Youths

The huge quantities of arms transshipped through Kenya to regions of violent battle add considerably to the supply of arms in the area\textsuperscript{48}. Given the simplicity of flow of weaponry across borders, the purchases of weapons by local players that are facilitated by the government of Kenya lead to the issue of recycling or arms from battle. However, the regime of Moi has failed to recognize this connection, and, to the contrary, has talked of global flows of weapons to the area as if Kenya was not caught up in the business\textsuperscript{49}. For instance, President Moi voiced concern regarding armed combats in the horn of Africa and their broader influence of stability in the area. He noted that he would wish to record strong opposition of Kenya to the consignment of weapons to the different theaters of battles or

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid
any other forms of outside interventions in the area. He further asserts that these can only
fuel the battle and increase the anguish of people.

Furthermore, Kenya is susceptible to illicit transferring of arms through the same routes
employed for lawful shipment of weapons. The coastline of Kenya and specifically, the port
of Mombasa have been recognized as points of entry utilized by smugglers. Investigators of
the United Nations have reported doubtful flights of weapons that have been transferred to
Nairobi and recommended the arms aboard may have been meant for embargoed parties.
Miyumo, who is the former customs official and who also operated at an expert panel of the
U.N on small weapons, stated that the job of custom officers has been made harder by
dishonest weapon brokers and agents of shipping.

These people use fake documents, file fake plans of flight, falsely declare cargo, conceal
arms in secret sections in shipping containers and cars and finally plot to transfer arms
unnoticed. He demonstrated that customs authorities in Kenya take various steps to rein
in such conduct, but affirmed that better equipment and methods were needed to more
systematically stop undeclared shipment of weapons.

Nevertheless, in all instances, the choice to release or confiscate an unauthorized
consignment, and when to allow the shipment of weapons through the land of Kenya, finally
relies on political powers in Nairobi. Miyumo mentioned that he was conscious of two
instances where undeclared (and presumably unauthorized) cargo of arms detained by

50 Ibid
52 Copyright © Afrobarometer 2016 27 Cilliers, J. (2015). Violent Islamist extremism and terror in Africa
custom representatives was eventually claimed by a bordering nation, and on the order of Nairobi officials, the weapons were unconfined.

2.1.12 Growth of Unregulated Madrassas

Defenders of madrassas argued that government had demonstrated inability to run public. As long as such growth remains unplanned and unregulated. 54 No one is aware of what is taking place in these madrassas even security personnel, which gives them opportunity to plan for violence in the area.

CHAPTER THREE

A DISCUSSION ON CHALLENGES FACING PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM AMONG MIGRANT POPULATIONS IN REFUGEE CAMPS: THE SAHEL REGION EXPERIENCES

3.1 Introduction

Despite the effort to reduce or prevent violent extremism in Sahel region, peace keepers are faced with a lot of challenges. Among these challenges include;

3.3.1 Lack of Coordination

The risk of security in Sahel and their solutions are of an international nature, but vary in intensity from country to country. At times, the differing views of the risks and solutions by the three states of Sahel and the three neighbors of Maghreb (Morocco, Libya and Algeria), and the lack of a sub-local group encompassing all the states of Maghreb and Sahel, result in independent or poorly synchronized action and impede effective and reliable initiatives. At the global community level, comprising the EU (European Union), systematic and coherent action connecting political, development and security factors is also inadequate.

3.3.2 Challenges of Operation

There are various concrete challenges to conquer. The recommended cell of counterterrorism in Mali is yet to be instituted, while development on Mali’s Special Programme for Peace, security, and development in North (PSPSDN) has no impetus. In

Niger, the federal authority to battle against radical groups is yet to be formed. Regional authorities go through difficulties in sufficiently mobilizing and employing the divisions, which have been coached and the resources that have been offered by the supporters.

In Mali, the establishment of the poles of development and security in Northern Mali need to master powerful engagement of politics of the federal authorities while gaining from a greater level of discussion with the regional civil society. Such will ensure that they strengthen trust to evade the deployment of agencies of security in the North being deduced by traditional and regional leaders as ruining the efforts under the nationwide pact. The developmental safety and humanitarian aid employees in Northern Mali has become an important challenge. In addition, in Niger, the planning for a permanent approach to combat against radical groups, instigated under the international representatives, will have to be convinced by the next administration.

3.3.3 Insecurity and Instability in Politics

Instability in politics has plagued certain states of Sahel for years. In Mali, the March 2012 army coup brought an unexpected stop to twenty years of steady democracy. After the repercussion, radical groups that had taken majority of the northern areas begun to head to the south, with the aim of taking control of the entire nation. In January 2013, an intervention supported by Chad and led by the French stopped their progress. The battle compounded

the humanitarian and security threats, partly by disrupting routes of supply and causing shortages of food.

The calamity in adjacent Darfur, Sudan, and the existence of an equipped revolution in the east caused harm to the security of Chad, which will continue for several years\textsuperscript{61}. Also, during the fifty years of independence of Niger, as confirmed by the Global Crisis Group, the nation has witnessed two equipped revolutions, seven regimes, four coups, and eras of hopeful change of democracy and reversals. In an area with permeable boundaries, a security or political disaster in one nation is usually a serious risk to neighbors. Such boundaries have been of benefit to drug smugglers and criminal links. The UNODC (UN Office for Drugs and Crime) has approximated that most flows of illicit arms connected to illegal behaviors in Sahel comprised $3.8 billion every year.\textsuperscript{62}

3.3.4 State Authority vs. State Legitimacy

The other problem is the association between the nature of the strength and the instability features in that area. Since the previous year, Liptako Gourna, the area of border between Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, has gone though a rise in insecurity, with attacks against the forces of security, posts of border, and regional leaders. Various groups are functioning in this region. Along the border of Mali and Niger, the dangers comprises mostly of Ansar Dine and the State of Islam in the larger Sahara, while Malam Ibrahim Dicko’s Ansaru and

HamadouKouffa’s Katiba Macina Islam are active along the border of Burkina Faso and Mali\textsuperscript{63}.

Nevertheless, the existence of such groups fails to clarify the increasing insecurity in this area. Instability is the outcome of sedimentation of issues, of which violent radical groups are the latest layer. A significant problem here is the challenges to the authority of the country, due to the blunders of the forces of security and the apparent government agent’s corruption, which is contrary to the poor delivery of basic facilities. Violent rivalry also exists between crop growers and pastoralists, which often leads to confrontations in communities.

### 3.3.5 Mutual Interests in Enhancing the Situation and Development and Security Situation in the Sahel

There is an apparent and longstanding attention both for the districts and for the EU in alleviating and enhancing growth in the area of Sahel. Strengthening stability and governance within the states in Sahel through the rule of law promotion and rights of human along with socio-economic growth is crucial, specifically for the advantage of susceptible regional populace of such nations. A pressing and a latest priority is preventing the attacks of AQIM in the area of Sahel and its potential to conduct attacks on the land of the EU\textsuperscript{64}.

Such will help in reducing and containing drug and other illegal trafficking meant for Europe, recurring lawful business and communication networks (pipelines, roads) across East-West, North-South, Sahel, protecting prevailing economic interest and creating the

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\textsuperscript{63} Whittaker J. D., The Terrorism Reader, London and New York

\textsuperscript{64} International Crisis Group (2005). \textit{Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?}
foundation for business and investment of EU. Enhancing security and growth in Sahel has a clear and direct influence on protecting the interests and citizens of Europe as well as inner security state on the EU. Thus, it is significant to strengthen and guarantee complementarily and consistency between outside and inner factors of the security of the EU.65

3.3.6 Ethnic Division

In Somali and Nigeria, organizations of violent extremist started as culturally homogenous, movements with simply domestic issues, which is the overflow of their particular regimes.66 Such groups have progressed toward more motivated political objectives and set up a lively existence in bordering countries. Such organizations usually favor border areas because of reduced levels of security and presence of the government, which facilitated illegal links and susceptible border countries. This condition challenges not just the inner stability of most nations, but also the constancy of the area of border.

3.3.7 Governance, Development and Resolution of Conflict

The isolated and distant feature of this sensitive place and the hardships experienced by the Sahel states in offering protection, help, public facilities and development to regional populations, the inadequacy of decentralized making of choices and the unfair sharing of profits of capital-intensive financial actions create solemn challenges. Shortage of education and opportunities for employment for young individuals leads to anxieties and makes them inclined to collaborate with organized crime or AQIM for economic motives to be radicalized and hired by AQIM.67

Poor governance, specifically in the region of justice, social segregation and an inadequate development level, with the remaining inner battles and recurring revolutions in areas influence by insecurity, make the Sahel nations and their populace susceptible to AQM behaviors and planned networks of crime. The desert places of all three nations have a de facto independence history, which makes the control of government difficult to exert. Furthermore, corruption delays the successfulness in the battle against AQM and the growth of an efficient sector of security. Conducting development aid plans has also become riskier.68

3.3.8 Security and the Rule of Law

These countries have inadequate strategic and operational capabilities in the broader security, enforcement of law and sectors of judiciary (army, justice, customs, management of border, police) to control the land, to guarantee the safety of people, to stop and to react to the different threats of security, and for law enforcement (carry out examination, trials etc) regarding the rights of people. Such is particularly reflected in the inadequacy of lawful frameworks and capability of law enforcement at all degrees, inefficient management of border, absence of contemporary methods of investigation and gathering techniques, conveying and exchanging information, and inexistent or outdated infrastructure and equipment. The control of the desert of desert areas in Northern Niger and Mali is delicate. Accessible resources are inadequately employed to target unlawful actions and radical groups.69

68 Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), “Preventing Youth Radicalization in East Africa” Work Shop in Kigali, Rwanda 22-27 Jan 2012, Program Report
3.3.9 Financial Challenge

The PSC questioned the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) to pass the FC-G5S use, and to recognize the modalities of logistical and economic report. France, the engineer behind the resolution, required the approval of the UNS under Chapter VII of the Chapter of UN, which would have enabled the FC-G5S support. Nevertheless, eventually the UNSC only allowed the FC-G5S deployment rather than explicitly passing it\textsuperscript{70}. Furthermore, the council also remembered that it was the accountability of the G5 states of Sahel to offer the force with sufficient resources, while promoting for more support from multilateral and bilateral associates.

While the EU has reported that it will assign 50 million Euros to the military, the Sahel G5 will be forced to externally look for more support, as the introduction budget for a year is approximately 423 million Euros\textsuperscript{71}. The Report of the Security Council announced that the U.K. and the U.S. had argued against a recommended resolution that would have forced the UN to economically support the action. Apparently, the point that the FC-G5S comprises troops that will intervene in their lands failed to suit the lawful framework for actions of peacekeeping\textsuperscript{72}.

3.3.10 Fragile Economies

Agriculture in Sahel uses most of the work force of the district and contributes largely to its Gross Domestic Product, which comprises up to 45 percent in certain states of the area\textsuperscript{73}. It also plays a significant role in the security of food. However, it remains extremely

\textsuperscript{70} OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2013)
\textsuperscript{71} United Nations. Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.
\textsuperscript{72} UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2017a). Human Development Report
\textsuperscript{73} OECD
underdeveloped and is featured by a nearly complete reliance on three to four months of rainfall annually. It is also characterized by reduced application of external inputs like fertilizers and seeds, the lack of mechanization and weak connections to market.

The UNEP reports that the repeated 1970s and 1980s droughts brought enormous losses of livestock and agricultural produce, loss of people’s lives to malnutrition and illness, hunger, and huge displacement of individuals and devastated economies. The UNEP also affirms that the change of climate could also have adverse penalties on production of agriculture and security of food in Sahel. The Sahel states have a poor performance on Human Development Index of UNDP, a measurement of the social and financial welfare of a country.

### 3.3.11 Organized Crime

There are various reasons why the Sahel area and Mali attract international organized illegal activities. The first reason is the aspect of geography, where Northern Mali is sparsely occupied and covers a region around the size of France, the land is largely desert while the district shares long boundaries with Niger, Algeria and Mauritania. Hence, this, together with absence of materials, makes the control of the borders and land nearly impossible apart from the few city hubs of the region.

Traffickers of cocaine employ established trafficking channels and make use of the regional groups with huge experience of transversing the desert and exploiting technologies, like satellite phones and GPS to diversify and coordinate their channels. The chances that organized illegal actions provide attract the Northern Mali residents, partly because they offer rewards enormously outweighing the profits that lawful alternatives can provide, if

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75 Sandra Fullerton Joireman, *Institutional Change in the Horn of Africa*
those options are present. Moreover, the absence of operative judicial and enforcement of law institutions implies that the danger of consequences from the country is nearly non-existent.

3.3.12 Weak Border Management

Sahel States are inadequately armed to efficiently take control of the borders, guarantee the safety of human, as well as stop and react to the different risks of security. The recurring displacement of populations across the borders in the region also calls for strengthening the capacity of authorities in humanitarian border management to address sudden changes in cross-border movements.\textsuperscript{76} Points of border in the area usually have no fundamental confirmation tools of travel papers and are operated for the better part by inadequately experienced employees on passport examination procedures and latest trends of document forgeries. Border posts are also affected by limited communication systems and in urgent need of vehicles to ensure border patrolling.

Additionally, majority of points of border are detached from worldwide and nationwide illegal watch-list techniques. This creates a severe gap that wanted criminals could take advantage of when in need to move across this region.\textsuperscript{77} Moreover, the establishment of official crossing points is not always coordinated with other bordering countries, which contribute to the lack of effective border control mechanisms and further encourages irregular migrations across the border and promotes all forms of cross-border offenses, including trafficking of refugees and smuggling of people, in addition to all forms of illegal

smuggling of goods, arms and drugs, which is known to be among the main financial sources of international organized crime\textsuperscript{78}. Finally, the widespread flow of arms, drug trafficking, kidnapping and massive inflow of population (with the risk of infiltration of members of these criminal /terrorists groups) have enabled criminal and terrorist groups to maintain a strong presence in the region, effectively competing with national governments for territorial control.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{78} Sandra Fullerton Joireman, \textit{Institutional Change in the Horn of Africa}

CHAPTER FOUR
COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION OF THE EXPERIENCES WITH VIOLENT EXTREMISM AMONG MIGRANT POPULATION IN REFUGEE CAMPS:
EASTERN AFRICA AND SAHEL REGION

4.1 Introduction
Comparison between Eastern Africa countries and Sahel region as far as violent extremism is concern. There are a lot of similarities and differences between Sahel regions and the Eastern Africa state concerning violent extremism. Discussed below are some of the challenges and similarities they have.

4.2 Similarities between Challenges Facing Violent Extremism Prevention in Eastern Africa and Sahel regions

4.2.1 Financial Challenges
In both Sahel and Eastern Africa states for example in Kenya there is inadequate fund set aside to curb violent extremism in these regions this make it difficult.

4.2.2 Growth of Unregulated Madrassas
In Chad Iridimi camp there is growth of unregulated madrassas among Muslim youths, this has been a base foundation for organizing terror attack among youths. Same case applied to Daadab refugee camp in Kenya where government and security has no control over the madrassas\(^80\). No one is aware of what is taking place in these madrassas even security personnel hence they take advantage to plan for violent in the area 7.

\(^{80}\) Wabala, Dominic, *Fresh Conflict in Somalia Raises Terrorism Fears in the Region*, Daily Nation Wednesday May 27, 2009
4.2.3 Insecurity and Political Instability

Instability in politics has plagued certain states of Sahel for years. In Mali, the March 2012 army coup brought an unexpected stop to twenty years of steady democracy. After the repercussion, radical groups that had taken majority of the northern areas begun to head to the south, with the aim of taking control of the entire nation. In January 2013, an intervention supported by Chad and led by the French stopped their progress.

In the same case in Eastern Africa, the biggest challenge facing peace keepers within East Africa countries is the absence of determination in politics, specifically in states without systems of democracy or with developing democracies. Such is exacerbated by clashes and tensions of politics in the state. They experience an absence of independence and the lack of permanent vision/development and/or devotion.

4.2.4 Poor Management of Border

Sahel States are insufficiently armed to efficiently take control of their borders, guarantee the safety of people as well as stop and react to the various security risks. The recurring displacement of populations across the borders in the region also calls for strengthening the capacity of authorities in humanitarian border management to address sudden changes in cross-border movements in Eastern Africa there is also a weak border management between the countries that border Daadab refugee camp like Somalia and Kenya doesn’t have effective border management authority that can govern the camps and this makes it easy for youth who want to join terror attacks in refugee camp move easily without any restrictions.

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81 Romaniuk, Peter. *Lessons Learnt from Danish and Other International Efforts on Countering Violent Extremism*

82 Romaniuk, Peter. *Lessons Learnt from Danish and Other International Efforts on Countering Violent Extremism*
4.2.5 Under-Development and Poverty

Under-development and impoverishment form desperation and grievances that can easily be used by terrorists, particularly when such aspects are united with ineffective governance and the shortage of basic delivery of service. The Kenyan media reports that there are several cases of young men engaging in terrorism attracted entirely by riches, promises of shelter and food, or provided wives by the group if they devoted themselves to combating for them.

Such young boys may not essentially share the rational assertions of such associations, but the benefits provided are sufficient to convince them that supporting radical groups provide more chance than staying in destitution and tolerating the status quo. As there is a lot of similarities between Eastern Africa and Sahel regions as far as violent prevention challenges are concerned there is also some differences. Below are some of the discussed differences between challenges facing violent prevention in Sahel region and Eastern Africa Countries.

4.2.6 Operational Challenges

The challenge only applies to the area of Sahel where there are various concrete challenges to conquer. The recommended cell of counterterrorism in Mali is yet to be instituted, while development on Mali’s Special Programme for Peace, security, and development in North (PSPSDN) has no impetus. In Niger, the federal authority to battle against radical groups is yet to be formed. Regional authorities go through difficulties in sufficiently mobilizing

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83 Sandra Fullerton Joireman
84 Rice, Susan, “The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States
and employing the divisions, which have been coached and the resources that have been offered by the supporters.

4.3 Analysis of Data, Results and Discussion

Introduction
The analysis and results of the research as explained in study methodology is presented in this chapter. The findings were presented on the challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in Africa: A focused comparison of East Africa and Sahel regions experience. The study objectives were; to examine challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism among migrant population in East Africa, to ascertain challenges facing prevention of violent extremism in Sahel region and finally to compare examination of Eastern Africa and Sahel region experiences with prevention of violent extremism in refugee camp.

The study focused on 100 applicants where all the 96 applicants offered feedback and gave back their questionnaires, which contributed to a rate of response of 96%. This rate of feedback was enough and representative and agrees to the stipulation of Mugenda and Mugenda, which proved that a speed of feedback of 50 percent is sufficient for exploration and announcing; a 60 percent response speed is good while a 70 percent and over rate of response is excellent. Such laudable rate of feedback was because of additional efforts that were carried out through politeness calls made in an effort of reminding the contestants to complete and give back the questionnaires.

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85 Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) Response rate and analysis
4.4 Demographic Information

The investigation at first aimed at determining the general knowledge on the applicants who took part in the research in response to age, hold of section and gender. The information on demography points at the appropriateness of the respondent in responding the issues on the challenges facing violent prevention in Africa. The applicants were requested to specify their age group. The results of the investigation are demonstrated in Table 5.1 below.

Table 4.1: Age bracket

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(18-25)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(26-35)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40-75)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 96 96

Source: Field data

Figure 4.1: Age Bracket
As indicated in table 4.1, the sample of the analysis represented all the youths, old with the youths creating the highest part of the sample. The interviewees were also requested to specify their age group. The results of the investigation are shown in Table 5.2.

**Table 4.2: Distribution of respondent based on gender**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4.2: Distribution of respondents**

**Source: Field data**

From Table 5.2, the analysis documented a greater rate of response from males compared to females in their different groups of ages.
4.5 Challenges Facing the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Refugee Camps in Africa

The first aim of the research was to discuss issues facing prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in Eastern Africa. The study aimed at establishing whether the interviewees were conscious of violent extremism within their respective camps. Most of the interviewees (96%) confirmed being conscious of violent extremism. This illustrates that the violent extremism in refugee camp is a well-known phenomenon by population living there.

Table 4.3: Challenges they think hinder violent extremism in refugee camp base

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenge</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak border management</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of coordination</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic division</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and rule of law</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
<td><strong>96</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 4.3: Challenges they think hinders violent extremism in refugee camp base

Data source: Field

From the table 5.3 the study discovered that poverty is the biggest issue that affects the population leaving in the refugee camp followed by corruption and the least is political instability as many of the respondents didn’t know the meaning.
Table 4.4: Respective departments on the challenge they face in curbing violent extremism in the camp

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Challenge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Poverty, lack of support from government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Poverty, corruption, lack of support from national government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>Youth unemployment, poverty, inadequate fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-terrorism Unit</td>
<td>Lack of cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth leaders</td>
<td>Poverty, lack of support from government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers of madrassas</td>
<td>Harassment from government, lack of resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy of Chad</td>
<td>Lack of coordination with states, language barrier</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Data source: Field**

From the table 4.4 the study shows that poverty is a common challenge among all stakeholders involved in violent extremism prevention as it affects all the departments in curbing violent extremism in the refugee camp.

### 4.6 Discussion of Findings

The analysis confirmed that the challenges affecting prevention of violent extremism in Sahel and East African Countries are; poverty, lack of coordination, lack of support from government, inadequate funds, political instability and lack of resources. From the study we also discovered that poverty is the most rampant challenge as youths join the radicalization due to unemployment.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

Summary of results, conclusion and suggestions of the investigation in proportion to the aims of the research are presented in this chapter.

5.2 Summary of the Study

The exploration discovered that some challenges that hold back prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in East Africa States and Sahel regions are similar while others are different. Those that are similar include; financial challenges, insecurity, and political instability, weak border management, under-development, and operational problems, while those that are different include; fragile economies, security and the rule of law and ethnic division. A higher percentage indicated that under-development is the most challenge that affects almost all the sectors involved in the prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in Sahel and East African States.

5.3 Conclusion

The purpose of the analysis was to ascertain the challenges facing prevention of violent extremism in the refugee camps in East Africa and Sahel regions using a sample of Dabaab refugee camp for East Africa states and Chad for Sahel regions. After exploration of the results of the study, the analysis found that there are various similarities between challenges facing the prevention of violent extremism in refugee camps in East Africa and Sahel regions. It also found that under-development is the common problem because it makes youths get involved in radicalization and terrorism practices to get money and wealth. The study settled that there is a lack of government support from states, which results in the
weak management of border; thus, causing free flow of terrorist from one country to another.

5.4. Recommendations

The study established that there are numerous challenges facing violent prevention in refugee camps. Therefore, it made the following recommendations; Security concerned with border management should be tightened, government should create employment opportunities for youths joining the radicalization groups in order for them not to idle, and last but not least records of people entering or leaving the camp should be taken frequently. Such will ensure that there is no illegal person(s) in the refugee camp that may have the bad intention of training the youths on becoming terrorists.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION A -- BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Organization/Institution

2. Position/department

3. Age Group (yrs):  □ up to 18  □ 19 to 25  □ 26 to 40  □ 41 to 55  □ 55 +

4. Gender:  □ Male  □ Female

5. Level of education  □ primary  □ secondary  □ collage  □ university  □

SECTION B – CHALLENGES FACING PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN DAADAB

1. Which challenges do you think hinders prevention of violent extremism in this camp?

a) ..............................................

b) ..............................................

c) ..............................................

d) ..............................................

e) ..............................................

SECTION C – CHALLENGES FACING PREVENTION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SAHEL REGION (CHAD)

1. What are the challenges that affect prevention of violent extremism?

a) ..............................................
b) ..............................................

c) ..............................................

d) ..............................................

e) ..............................................

2. Who should be blame for the above challenges?

a) Government □  b) NGOs □

Reason for your selection.................................................................

3. Do you think youths are involved in decision making when it comes to security matters?

Yes □  No □

4. Why do youths join radicalization groups?

□ For fame

□ To get rich

□ No sure

5. What should government do to ensure that they don’t join these groups?

...........................................................................................................

...........................................................................................................

...........................................................................................................

...........................................................................................................

...........................................................................................................
6 Do you think Government has the capability to curb these challenges hindering violent extremism?

Yes ☐  No ☐

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Statements on challenges affecting prevention of violent extremism</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
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<td>Poverty</td>
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<td>Lack of coordination</td>
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<td>Lack of involvement of all stakeholders</td>
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<td>Organized crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weak border management</td>
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SAHEL REGIONS
Dhafur Refugee camp in Chad
Photos of Daadab Refugee camp in Kenya