

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI
INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**THE AFRICA EUROPEAN COOPERATION IN MAINTAINING PEACE,
SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA:**
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

PRESENTED BY

NAME: ELIZABETH A. AKINYI

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SUPERVISOR:

Mr. Martin Nguru

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DECLARATION

I, Elizabeth Akinyi Aywak, do hereby declare that this research project is my own original work and that it has not been presented for the award of a degree in any other University.

Signed.....

Date.....

ELIZABETH A. AKINYI

This project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor;

Signed.....

Date.....

Mr. Martin Nguru

University Supervisor

Institute Of Diplomacy and International Studies

University Of Nairobi

DEDICATION

Micheal Radido Aywak, Redempta Aywak, Gladys, Dorothy, Friday, Mary, Mercy and Godfrey, my greatest friends. Look at how far we have come. God is has been Great.

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ABSTRACT

This research sought to examine the Africa-EU cooperation in maintaining peace security and stability in Africa. It narrowed down to the Assessment of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy Framework as an instrument adopted by the two continental bodies in ensuring that their mandate is achieved. To bring to question the effectiveness of the strategy, various factors were looked into; these included a closer look at the structural and functional nature of the JAES strategy and areas where the cooperation between the AU and EU has been witnessed through interventions. Finally, the major drawbacks that the strategy has had in its implementations; especially outward facing effects such as the influence of emerging powers that have shown a lot of interest in Africa. China's interests and influence are discussed at length in that respect.

The study applies Structural Realism theory to mirror the need for cooperation and the popularity of the intensive integration processes. The assumptions of the Structural Realism theory that states are anarchic, offensive, and unpredictable in intentions advances for a look into International Relations through structures and systems rather than the Units of the systems (States) to work together for a common good in a bid to survive in the system.

The study found out that some of that although there have been success in some areas in the AU-EU cooperation in maintaining peace and security, the challenges in the implementation of the strategy lie in the institutional framework capacity, ideological differences between the AU and the EU, state-centric hegemonic interests also hamper the mandate of the strategy. It is the view of this study that there is need to embrace the Africa diversity conflict resolutions approaches, that the unequivocal role played by the regional blocs in maintaining peace and security in their respective regions be recognised . The study also recommends the need for African countries to finance the strategy for efficiency and ownership

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACP...	Africa, Caribbean Pacific (States)
AFISMA...	African led International Support Mission to Mali
AMISOM.....	African Union Mission to Somalia
APF.....	Africa Peace Fund
APSA.....	Africa Peace and Security Architecture
ASF.....	Africa Standby Force
AU.....	African Union
BINUCA.....	Bureau Intégré de l'organisation des nations unies en centrafrique
C2C.....	College to College
CAR.....	Central African Republic
DDRR.....	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation program
ECOWAS.....	Economic Community of West African States
ENP.....	European Neighbourhood Policy
ERM...	Emergency Response Mechanisms
EU.....	European Union
EUCAP.....	European Union Maritime Capacity Building Mission to Somalia
EUFOR RCA...	European Forces Republic of Central Africa
EUGS.....	European Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy
EUMAM.....	European Union Military Advising Mission
EUNAVFOR.....	European Union Naval Force Somalia
EUTM.....	European Union Military Training Mission
FOCAC.....	Forum on China- Africa Cooperation
JAES.....	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
MINUSCA...	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African Republic
MINUSMA...	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

NEPAD.....New Partnership for Africa's Development
REC..... Regional Economic Communities
SADC.....South African Development Community
TDCA.....Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement
TFG..... Transitional Government
UfM..... Union of the Mediterranean
UN.....United Nations

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

This chapter looks into a brief background of the study; this is then followed by statement of the research problem, the research objective is stated and a further breakdown of the objective of the study is done to come up with the specific objectives, relevant research questions are formulated also formulated in this chapter. The study is justified and literature review around the topic covered. Finally, 1.10 highlights the chapter review.

1.1 Background to the Study

The cooperation between the European and Africa dates back to arrangements forming the foreign policies that the states in Europe had with their former colonies. Through different agreements, conventions and partnerships, the cooperation has undergone reforms to include a wider range of thematic involvements that go beyond the trade agreements¹. For the purpose of this research the ‘frameworks’ will be looked at as a term the equivalent to the foreign policy in place that defines the kind and terms of the relationship that the African and European countries have under the AU and EU.

The EU and the African countries cooperation is done through multiple frameworks that include; The Cotonou agreement of 2000 that came into enforcement in 2003. This agreement holds the capacity as the legal framework for the EU-African relationship, 79 countries are covered herein, 48 of which are in the Sub-Saharan Africa thus forming the Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific states (ACP). A formal channel for the defined relationship between Africa

¹ Renard Thomas, *The Treachery of Strategies: A call for The EU Strategic Partnerships* (Egmond Papers, 2011)

and Europe was established culminating in the adoption of the Joint Africa-EU strategy in 2007 under the African Union.²

In addition to the ACP and JAES strategy frameworks, and for strategic reasons, the European Union council adopted three further frameworks as discussed below.

The Horn of Africa Strategy, this strategy takes into account the challenges that have affected the region over time, they include radicalization, forced internal displacement, migration in the region and the effect that actions in the area has had on the region around it as a whole through piracy and terrorism activities. The action plan of the strategy looks into assisting and ensuring that the Horn of Africa achieves peace, security and stability, and a democratic accountable government.³

The Gulf of Guinea Strategy: to protect the Gulf of Guinea countries from the consistent maritime related crimes along its coastal line. This strategy was established in 2014 to counter the activities of the pirates at sea, instances of illegal fishing, drugs, human, diamonds, waste and arms trafficking.⁴ With a mandate to have well governed, stable and prosperous countries that are able to create employment through organized maritime activities, increase and cooperate in trade and respect for the rule of law, an action plan 2015-2020 was adopted in 2015.⁵

Thirdly, the Sahel- EU stand out as the very first regional strategy that the European Union established, it formed basis for the two former strategies discussed above. Discussion towards the establishment of the Sahel-EU strategy began in 2008⁶ following a request from the member states for intervention on the increased highly organized criminal activities,

²The JAES framework forms the basis of this study.

³ Soliman A, A. Vines et al, *'The Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa: A critical Assessment of the Impacts and Opportunities'* (Chatham House 2012)

⁴ EU- Africa relations: 'How do Countries and the EU Cooperate?'(European Council)

⁵ Conclusion on the Gulf of Guinea Action plan 2015-2020, (Council , Brussels 16 March 2015)

⁶ Ibid 4

instances of kidnappings and radicalization of the youth, mobility across the region and migration, and border and land demarcation disputes. The effect of the 2011 Libyan crises on the larger Sahel region had been underestimated.⁷ The Sahel Strategy was established and endorsed for implementation in 2011, its Action plan 2015-2020 was adopted in 2015.⁸ The areas pointed out for the action plan would be good governance and internal conflict management in the Sahel, developmental agenda of the area, countering the violent extremism that was spreading in the region and finally, the quest for upholding of respect the rule of law across the region along with political and diplomatic security.⁹

Africa-European relations and developments interactions are not restrictive to the frameworks, at the helm, the African and the EU heads of state hold summits after every three years, the troikas or the ministerial meetings with both the African Union and the EU representatives are held more regularly depending on needs that arise, there are also commission to commission formal dialogues that take place.¹⁰

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The establishment adoption as a foreign relations policy of the JAES Framework (Lisbon 2007) was viewed as a redefinition and the beginning of a new 'era' on how Africa and Europe related. The forged ambitious partnership was meant to ensure that there was a global context of ensuring that the common challenges and interests affecting the actors (Africa and Europe) involved are solved for the mutual benefit of all. The major thematic areas of partnerships included climate change, environmental protection, peace and security, trade and regional integration migration and mobility of the citizens in the countries, youth

⁷ Ibid 3 pg (47-48)

⁸ Conclusion on the 2015 to 2020 Sahel Regional Action plan, (Brussels, April 2015)

⁹ Ibid 4

¹⁰ Ibid 8

employment, governance and human rights, and science and technology.¹¹ The November 2017 Abidjan summit marked 10 years since the adoption of the JAES framework, the recurrent areas of discussion were still peace and security, migration and trade. Clearly, against the expectations, not much has been achieved over the period of time. A retrospective assessment of Africa and Europe in the last 10 years indicate that despite all the effort, the complementary strategies and summits, meetings held in addition to the finances committed into the Joint Africa-EU strategy framework there has been actually a sharp rise in cases of insecurity, illegal immigrations, trade conflicts, humanitarian crises, challenges in governance and absolute disregard of human rights among other challenges.¹²

This research therefore seeks to bring to question the effectiveness of the strategies employed in the cooperation, commitment of the parties involved and more so the relevance of this sort of cooperation in solving not only African and European instability issues but to a large extent how it has been employed to achieve global stability and relations by analyzing its successes and failures over the last 10 years in maintaining the peace and security of the African continent.¹³

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study aims to critically analyze the effectiveness of the Joint African-European Strategy framework in maintaining Peace, Security and Stability in Africa.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

- 1) To establish the extent to which the Joint Africa-EU Strategy framework has been instrumental in maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa.

¹¹ Pirozzi N, N. Sartori, B.Venturi, '*The Joint Africa-EU Strategy.*' Think Tank online debate

¹² The 5th EU/Africa Summit, *A new impetus of the Africa/EU partnership.* UCLG Africa, November 2017

¹³ Ibid

- 2) To evaluate the effectiveness of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy framework Africa-EU strategy framework cooperation in maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa through interventions.
- 3) To examine changing relationship between Africa and EU and the influence of the interests of emerging powers such as China in Africa.

1.3.2 Research Questions

- 1) To what extent has the Joint Africa-EU Strategy framework has been successful in maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa?
- 2) How effective has the Joint Africa-EU strategy framework in maintaining Peace and Security and Stability in Africa in comparison to other bilateral and multilateral agreements between African and The European States?
- 3) What is the nexus between the changing strategy in the Africa-EU relation and the interests of China in Africa?

1.4 Literature Review

1.4.1 JAES Strategy and the ACP-Framework

In a bid to restructure operations of the OAU and the subsequent creation of the African Union in 2003, the political leaders in Africa at the time had rationalized that it was also important to restructure the framework within which the African continent would carry out its relations with the other continents such as Europe. With the E.U, The ACP- Framework for the African, Caribbean and the Pacific states,¹⁴ and other bilateral arrangements between the countries had been in place to define how the countries in these zones related to the EU. The political views however were that under the ACP framework, African countries were highly stratified and that the EU had not adapted to the new political outfit that the AU had

¹⁴ International cooperation and Development , ACP-The Cotonou Agreement

become.¹⁵ The relations between the two continents needed to be redefined and a shift was necessary from the EU-country to Continent-Continent; that is the AU to EU partnership as the new political partnership.¹⁶

The efforts towards restructuring the framework of operation involved a series of meetings and two AU-EU summits. The Lisbon Summit of 2007(second) led to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adoption by the EU and Africa's leaders.¹⁷ This framework, though not legally binding as a policy, is primarily used to augment the strategic and political cooperation for the European Union and Africa as a continent;¹⁸ this was in a bid to expand their relational cooperation scope. It was also a clear indication that African politicians and policy makers were ready to take up ownership of the future of the African Continent.¹⁹

The African political leaders pushed for apolitical relationship on an equal footing not only at the continent to continent bilateral level but also on the global scene. It was also for recognition of the new direction that Africa was taking as an actor in the global politics as well as on the global economic front as an emerging economy.²⁰ For Europeans, this kind of partnership would allow for discussions on governance and democracy in Africa, issues to do with enhanced observation of human rights and upholding of the rule of law which were prior on resisted and opposed by the states as going beyond the trade and aid discussions under the ACP Agreement, such was considered as interfering with states' sovereignty.²¹ The JAES puts in place periodical action plans to guide and ensure that the specific set goals are

¹⁵ Ibid 11

¹⁶ Jean Pierre Elong Mbassi, UCLG Africa Note – 7th Africa/EU Summit, Rabat, (June 2017)

¹⁷ Ibid 15

¹⁸ Ibid

¹⁹ Carbone, Maurizio “*The EU and Africa: making sense of a special relationship*” (University of Glasgow).

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Ibid 19

achieved within a particular period of time. Currently, the roadmap for 2017-2020 is in operation.²²

The first JAES Strategy (2008-2010) Action plan preamble,²³ which gave the strategy its operational framework, the major objective was to have a more overtly political relationship between the AUC and the EU through the establishment of an overarching framework where Africa would be treated 'as one'. That continent to continent partnership would be enhanced and that the EU- Africa relation would be reinforced and elevated to a level of ensuring that common concerns are addressed, the institutional ties are strengthened that common challenges would also be tackled.²⁴

The JAES's other objective would be to open the space and expand discussions from aid and development to other areas that were previously met with resistance from ACP countries (Under the Lome Agreement)up until the late 1990s. These areas included; promotion of continental security and peace, fundamental freedoms and rights, gender equality, democratic governance and sustainable economic development.²⁵

1.4.2The Joint Africa-EU Strategy Criticism

Maurizio Carbone, '*The EU and Africa: making sense of a special relationship*', argues that The Joint Africa European Strategy showed significant changes of the time on the African Continent, a manifestation that Africa and its leaders were more prepared to take up ownership of the continents future and at the same diversifying the African interest beyond. This was realized through the formation of the African Union. On the Other hand, The JAES reflected on the European Union's Concern over the fast and potentially declining influence

²² Ibid 4

²³ Ibid

²⁴ The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, '*A joint Africa-EU Strategy*',(Lisbon, 9 December 2007)

²⁵ Ibid 24

and relevance of Europe on the African Continent on the backdrop of a notable change of the increasingly influential emerging powers such as China on the African soil.²⁶

In critiquing the inability of JAES taking effect in tackling the objectives that it was set up for, Carbone takes note of the differences in priorities of Europe and Africa where the latter's priority lies in its interest in aid and trade, the former is more concerned with security and migrations to Europe. These conflicting priorities have given rise to pertinent questions on the relevance of the strategy. While EU attempts to assert a form of normative power on the African continent promoting good governance and security, there has been criticism on the same member states choosing silence on crucial governance and humanitarian crisis in countries where they do have some commercial and strategic interests. Many African Countries look at the issue of immigration as a factor that contributes heavily to development in terms of foreign remittance and brain gain for the European members coming to Africa, the EU partners use incentives and repressive measures to control immigration into Europe and categorize the same as a security threat adding to the issue and country differentiation in dealing with challenges thus causing constant tension between the partners on normative powers presented by the EU and material interests.²⁷

A closer look into of the EU's involvement in Africa on matters of poverty eradication and the developmental agenda is interpreted as a reflection of the bigger picture which in real sense, is driven by resistance to Immigration of Africans, hardnosed trade and the European an overly sensational securitization of the EU development policy in Africa. This is viewed as coercive and often meets resistance from African politicians.²⁸ The African leaders on the other hand are depicted as always avoiding, resisting and configuring EU policies to benefit

²⁶ Ibid 19

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ Olivier Ubananeza , *African Union, A valuable Partner for the EU? The fight against Irregular Immigration* (2017)

from the uncoordinated EU policies. The question of equity and partnership is put to test by these differences in approach as well.²⁹

On the European side, there seems to be an agreement in observation that coherence of the EU policies in Africa has been achieved, Carbone establishes that the EU, up towards the January 2017 EU-Africa Summit, there had been progress in making the EU policies in Africa Coherent enough in spite of the tensions that have rocked the EU constituent States amidst the United Kingdom Brexit challenges as well as the declining financial prowess thus ultimately posing a challenge to the Union as the international champion of the developing world's interests. On the other hand, the fact that Africa has become more and more assertive in taking up major roles and becoming an actor in the international policy space has also seen it widen its scope in negotiating and relating with other external actors.³⁰ This position poses a challenge to the would be asymmetrical EU-Africa. In spite of the apparent competition from other emerging powers, The European union has comprehensive approach in Africa that goes beyond material interests covering various fields and strategically engaging certain Africa countries does not only give EU a privilege but has also solidified its position as a major actor in Africa compared to other counterparts.³¹

The existence of different agreements that define the foreign policy of the EU in Africa the differ as per regions, TDCA (Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement) and the Strategic Partnership (2006) tie the EU to South Africa, North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt) is bound by two coexisting agreements, that is, the Euro-Med partnership currently referred to as ENP-Policy (the European Neighbourhood), as well as the Union of the Mediterranean (UfM).³² The ACP- Cotonou agreement covers the Caribbean

²⁹ Ibid 24

³⁰ Ibid 19

³¹ Carbone ,M

³² ACP-Cotonou Agreement

and the Pacific states alongside the rest of the sub-Saharan.³³ The JAES sought to address this kind of fragmentation of Africa at its adoption in Lisbon and stressed the importance of applying the principle of partnership of equals in the intensive dialogues. The EU however continues to define the relationship along the same lines and remains accused of piecemeal Africa resulting in lack of synergy. Prior to the EU/AU Abidjan summit, the Foreign Affairs ministerial meeting in Brussels, where both the African Union chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, and the EU HR/VP of the EU commission Federica Mogherini,³⁴ were present, the call to ‘*A renewed impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership*’³⁵ was welcomed by both parties, however, The EU maintained ambiguity on any long term political framework for a renewed partnership, discussions on key issues of peace and security, migration (compact) and investment facility were taken totally out of the ACP context and not the Joint Africa-EU Strategy framework.³⁶

1.4.3 The Joint Africa-EU Strategy and Regional Blocs

Conrad Rein points out that there are numerous challenges in the AU-EU cooperation in their quest and objective of maintaining peace and security in Africa Union (AU) and that these challenges have great some pre-eminence out of the African context. The challenges of terrorism, migration for instance have brought the western forces to Africa in a bid to forge a counter-dependence sort of cooperation to aid in solving the global challenges example, in recent decades.³⁷ By 2014, The African continent was still ranked as the most conflict-prone.³⁸ The long standing legacy of the European Union in maintaining the longest peace and stability in Europe, especially in the Western Europe, inspired and led the African leaders

³³ Ibid 14

³⁴ The HR/VP is the EU commission’s High Representative and Vice President

³⁵ Ibid 12

³⁶ Foreign Affairs Council, Brussels (May 2017)

³⁷ Conrad Rein, ‘*EU-AU Interregional Relations and the Role of the EU*’ (Volume 1)

³⁸ Conflict Barometer (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014)

through the AU to draw upon the same structure and facilitate the regional blocks in establishing and maintaining peace in Africa.³⁹ This is however hampered a lack of a balance between readiness and establishment of the peace support facilities across the sub regional blocs in Africa. The African Standby Force-(ASF) was established to bridge the gap on the lack of preparedness in terms of a peace keeping force. Structurally, the AU African Standby Force is pyramidal in nature for achieving continental consensus; it is divided into military, police and civilian components with standby brigades of about 15,000 troops administered in five regions in the continent⁴⁰. The African Union African Standby Force's operation in maintaining peace and security in Africa has not been without challenges; the deep continental cultural differences and paying allegiance to stances taken by former colonial masters have greatly affected the acceptance and operation of the ASF, the states are pit the African states and regions against each other in either support of or not in support of the African Standby Force for being either Anglophones, Francophone or Lusophone states. While the Anglophone states were supportive of the Facility, the Francophone and the Lusophone states opposed the idea especially backed by France's rejectionist attitude towards Nigeria as the leading force causing rifts among the Regional Economic Communities.⁴¹

Lack of resources and unwillingness to take up hegemonic roles has greatly hampered the operations of the ASF, with the exception of South Africa and Nigeria, who have backed the ASF forces through SADC and ECOWAS respectfully. A major issue connected especially with the scarcity of resources is the lack of ability and thus reluctance by countries to take up major roles as that brings with it the responsibility to step in and provide resources⁴². The frequency of the political and humanitarian conflicts and crises especially in the West and

³⁹Ibid

⁴⁰ Emmanuel Fanta, *The Capacity of the Regional Organizations in Peace and Security*, (Florence, 2009)

⁴¹Kinzel Wolf, *The African Standby Force of the African Union, Ambitious Plans, Big Regional Disparities: An Interim Balance*, (Berlin: SWP, July 2008)

⁴²Atuobi Samuel, *Implementing the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework: Prospects and Challenges* (Accra: Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre,2010)

Horn of Africa have put a huge financial strain on both the African Union and the Economic blocs in their quest find solutions to the sporadic happenings.⁴³ The Arab spring and the political, social and economic challenges that destabilized the Northern states of Libya and Egypt who were major contributors put a huge strain on the AU's operational budget and the novel APSA. For many years, only South Africa and Nigeria, and sometimes, though to a very small degree the Northern country of Algeria have been left to play the role of financing the African Peace and Security Architecture as an institution and dealing with its challenges.⁴⁴

With so many institutions such as the UN, AU, EU, and the African Regional Economic Commissions involved in keeping peace in Africa, it emerges that the biggest challenge for peacekeeping, security and stability in Africa is the obvious vagueness and even greater misunderstanding on who is directly responsible for the various activities on the ground and the particular role that each of the bodies is supposed to play.⁴⁵ The resulting effect has been cases overlapping roles, uncoordinated actions and lack of harmony among the organizations as they all not only have the capacity as institutions to legally deploy peacekeeping forces but also to engage in Diplomatic negotiations. States are also bound by the “the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention” which pose legal constraints on interventions of any sort at early stages of conflicts.⁴⁶ Based on these challenges, efforts have been in place to call for harmonization in maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa more so for the AU-RECs cooperation.⁴⁷ The AU Commissions under different leaderships for the last 10 years have

⁴³ Apuuli Kasaija Philip, *'The African Union (AU)' The Libyan Crisis and the Notion of 'African Solutions to African Problems'* (African Contemporary Studies, 2012)

⁴⁴ Ibid

⁴⁵ Conrad Rein, *Enhancing Peace and Security through Institutional Cooperation*, (Contemporary Security Studies; 2015 pg 267-295)

<http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fcsp20>

⁴⁶ Ibid

⁴⁷ Ulf Angel, *Peace, Security and Democracy- What about the AU?*(GIGA, December 2012)

been focusing attention on ensuring that there are legally binding agreed upon policies that will ensure that AU and the regional blocs have a harmonious working relationship on the ground.

1.4.4 The JAES, 2018 and Beyond

The African and European policy makers are expected to renegotiate the ACP-EU partnership Agreement, a first one since the signing of the JAES framework in 2007 in September 2018. A conflict of interest comes to play as the Cotonou Agreement has the financial and legal weight yet it is the Joint Africa-EU strategy that offers the strategic, formal framework for dialogues on security and politics between Africa and Europe.

In the memorandum released by the European Commission on proposals for negotiations of the Cotonou Agreement for September 2018, the EU proposes that the basis of the cooperation would be as stated, that the integrative compact of the EU and African partnerships goes beyond the JAES and that there was need to have a new document with a broader legal mandate but that would see to it that the agreements with the North African countries stay as they are⁴⁸ The proposal is to have three Compact the documents to replace or upgrade some pre-existing agreements including the JAES.⁴⁹

The demands in the proposal go contrary to the demand that Africa should be treated ‘as one’, and that the JAES strategy is the overarching agreement, the EU places more weight and emphasises on the Cotonou agreement, due to be renegotiated before the 2020 time frame elapses. The North-South Agreements on the other continue to communicate, albeit in a subtle way, an underhand insinuation that there is still exists the donor-recipient relationship

⁴⁸Ibid 14

⁴⁹ Ibid

between Africa and EU against the equal partners principle upon which the JAES was formed.⁵⁰

The treatment of the JAES as an ad hoc framework with no long term political, legal and financial capacity makes the adoption of action plans agreed upon difficult to implement. For the first action plan implementation, the EU decided to form purely ad hoc task forces around the various thematic areas; this turned the tasks into bureaucratic, heavy and inefficient processes that achieved little and with no sense of ownership. The financing of the JAES is meant to be done through the pre-existing ACP framework in a cumbersome set up that has been criticized by many, including H.E. Mr. Konare O. Apha the AU Commission's then president at the Lisbon Summit. The framework has over the time proved to be unable to respond to sensitive emerging issues such as Economic Partnerships Agreements, terrorism and migration issues⁵¹. Political dialogues have therefore not been fruitful through the JAES as a show sense of ownership has been poor on both ends.

On 13th June 2018, The EU HR/VPF, Mogherini, through a statement proposed the formation of a European Peace Facility (EPF) through which the Sahel region would be financed militarily to fight the criminal activities in the Sahel region.⁵² Though left out of the EU budget so as to get around the EU rules on funding military projects,⁵³ it is a very sensitive matter to the neighbouring states. The African Union, as a bloc, has been had very minimal contribution on The EU –Sahel peace and stability discussions.

⁵⁰ Willy Kololo, *'The Role of the EU in the African Peace and Security Architecture'* (The J. Monnet Papers on Political Economy 2015)

⁵¹ Ibid 14

⁵² The New EU 'Peace Fund' could buy weapons for Africa. (Euractive.com, June 2018)

⁵³ Athena- Financing Security and defence military operations (Council of the European Commission, March 2018)

Arguments have been put forward that The EU has an interest of ensuring that Africa's problems are 'kept' in Africa. The EU is also presumed to cooperate and help African countries as a moral obligation owing to its position as a continent that is ranked the wealthiest. In spite of the propensity by some elites in Africa to play down the role of EU in Africa, it can be said to go beyond the simple benevolence due to the diversity of the sectors that it engages in comparison to Africa's engagement with other partners such as China. Nevertheless, the strategic geopolitical pursuit of Africa by Europe for global relevance and influence cannot be ignored in looking at the continental and state centric interests of the European Countries.⁵⁴

1.5 Justification of the Study

This study is essential to weigh in into the effectiveness of the JAES Strategy Framework, the content and implementation of its mechanisms as a foreign policy of both the African and The European Union member states. Not much seem to have been done in the area of researching on, understanding and thus holding the policy makers accountable on the decisions and implementation of strategies passed with regards to the same document owing to the fact that JAES is the major framework through which the African and European nations interact and forge relationships upon. The prominence of this framework calls for the need to understand, analyse and factor out issues as raised bilaterally by the two continents for the mutual benefit of each party especially on the near emotive recurrent issues of peace and security and stability in Africa. This paper will therefore benefit the different sectors as highlighted below.

⁵⁴ Andrea Rugger, G. Theodora et al, *Managing Mistrust: An Analysis of the Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping in Africa* (Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1,22 June 2013)
C. Rein "EU-AU Interregional Relations and the Role of the EU?" Volume 1, Number 4, 22 June 2015.

1.5.1 Policy Justification

- ✓ This research will be beneficial in enabling policy makers to make sound decisions regarding partnerships and involvement in the continental emerging and recurring issues at the international level.
- ✓ At the regional level, the role of the African states as units in the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU strategy will be re-evaluated.
- ✓ This research will also benefit the Kenyan government of Kenya through the Ministry of foreign affairs in Kenya to look into its foreign policy with regards to extent to which it will be involved in the bilateral engagement with the European Union and the African Union

1.5.2 Academic justification

The academia, and especially International Relations and Political Science scholars will benefit from this research to enhance knowledge on The Joint Africa-EU strategy framework, add insight the existing literature on matter of Peace, security and stability that have continued to rock the African Continent and the extent to which the joint interventions have been instrumental in curbing the challenges.

1.5.3 General Public justification

To sensitize and educate the general public on content of the information on The Joint Africa-EU strategy that may not be in the public domain be it by design or negligence, and how this arrangement affects the daily running of not only the African Union but also the individual citizens in the various states in Africa directly or indirectly affected by the happenings on the continent on matters of security.

1.6 Theoretical Framework

This study embraces the Structural realism theoretical perspectives in trying to critically analyse the effectiveness of The Joint Africa-EU Strategy as an African European cooperation framework in maintaining Peace, Security and Stability in Africa. The following is a discussion of the theory and its relevance to the study.

1.6.1 Structural Realism

Although the realism school of thought ideologies of anarchy, self help in the system and power balancing may have been considered as more appropriate for a long-gone period, it is evident that conditions of the International system have changed; there is a change of system rather than in the system.⁵⁵ Classical realist such as Hans Morgenthau believed that states wanted power simply because it was human nature and an intrinsic desire of states through individual leaders to dominate other states by acquiring power⁵⁶. The common interests and need for cooperation seem to contradict, to some extent, this view especially in the multi-polar system that the world is in. Competition in a characteristically multi-polar system is more convoluted than in a typical bipolar system. Realism can thus not be absolute in a world that is pulling more and more towards democracy. This explains why the intensity of integration has gained popularity and more bloc to bloc partnerships such as the European Union and African Union have been embraced in the international system.

Structural realism would therefore be a more elaborate theory to explain the relations that are extended by the regional blocs in a bid to work together, on equal footing, for the common good of the actors involved. Advanced by an American Political Scientist Kenneth Waltz in

⁵⁵ Kenneth Waltz, Structural Realism in The Post Cold War,

⁵⁶ John Mearsheimer (2001)

his book *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz put an end to the Great Debates on International Relations with his neorealism approach. The central approach of the Structural Realism theory lies in the fact that analysis of the International politics is done through the systems and structures and not the units or states which make up the structures.⁵⁷

By definition, a system would generally be said to be a regularly interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole. In International Relations, the political actors are thus the states which form the elements of the system, they are strongly connected entities and their behaviour influences actions, influencing a counter-reaction. This prompts the thought that Waltz puts forward that the actors in the International system are not motivated by a hunger for power as advanced by the classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes and Morgenthau; rather they are motivated by security considerations.

The structural realism theory bases its argument on some assumptions that;

- ✓ The International system is characteristically anarchic in nature and there is no plausible power above the states that together form that system
- ✓ That there are some states that have the offensive capabilities
- ✓ That states are not in a position to tell the intentions of the other states
- ✓ That states have certain inclinations that they are in pursuit of and that the ability to survive is a prerequisite for achieving what is being pursued.

Structural realists ignore cultural dissimilarity that exist amongst states as well as the regime system, be it democratic or autocratic. While this concept would be necessary in ensuring that the principle of equality applies to all the actors, realistically; the North-South partnership is affected by the perpetual dependency of one group on the other thus creating possible hegemonic tendencies. The African continent as a whole depends on EU and the union's

⁵⁷ Kenneth Waltz (1976)

member states funding to the tune of EUR 20 billion per year, this makes the EU the biggest donor to Africa's official development assistance;⁵⁸ the partnership between the two continents thus remain donor-recipient as opposed to equal partners. On the backdrop of the assumptions of structural realism, it is possible to clearly deduce the short comings in the operational framework of The JAES Strategy; the suspicion with which some the thematic areas such democratic regimes and the upholding of the rule of law are treated with, continuous and consistent signing of proxy agreements and forging of other bilateral partnerships despite the fact that the strategy in question is meant to be the overarching partnership above all the other complementary agreements. There are other several structural weaknesses that the strategy harbours.

While structural realism would largely be considered defensive realism owing to the fact that the actors in the system are driven more by security considerations and are against excessive pursuit of power, there is a noteworthy split among the structural realists where by offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer are of the opinion that it is a great move strategically for state to attain as much power. The argument is not solely in support or glorifying of conquering and dominating other states rather that, it is a much better strategy to gain excessive power to be certain of own survival.⁵⁹ It is however important to realize that in this case of discussing offensive realism, that war or offense is not basically the ultimate way through which states have the possibility to achieve significant power, it is possible to gain it differently through substantial increase in population and wealth as china has done over the decades.⁶⁰ To balance power, some structural realists learn towards an Offence-defence realism approach. this approach, in one way or another, suggest that if a state attempts to gain more power then it ends up fighting many losing battles and that it will be easy for states to

⁵⁸Africa-EU partnership, financing partnerships


⁵⁹ John Mearsheimer (2001)

⁶⁰ Ibid

outweigh the benefits of offence and eventually concentrate on defense. It is within this theoretical framework that the European states through the European Union are seen to increasingly ensure that there is cooperation with the African states through the Joint Africa-EU strategy and other bilateral agreements to counter the effort of the Chinese activities in the continent which are viewed as offensive in nature.

1.7 Hypotheses

The Africa-EU Cooperation in maintaining Peace, Security and Stability in Africa



1.8 Research Methodology

1.8.1 Research Design

Research design involves the procedure of economically gathering, compilation and organization of analysis conditions of data with the intention of gaining relevance to the

research study.⁶¹ This study will take a cross-sectional survey perspective . A mixed method approach will be employed utilizing both the quantitative and qualitative aspect.

This will include data collection.

- ❑ Primary data gathered from the survey
- ❑ Key informant qualitative interviews will be conducted as a way of collecting data from policy making institutions, Ministry of foreign affairs, The African Union policy docket, Embassies and The European Union Commission.
- ❑ Secondary information will be collected from recent relevant literature from policy documents to address the scope of the project needs

1.8.2 Sample and Sampling Technique

A sample in research is basically a sub-group taken from a particular target population with relevant traits. As much as it is not always feasible to study an entire group, a sample drawn from the population can be used in a study to represent the whole target population.⁶² The procedure of drawing these individuals for a study is what is referred to as sampling.⁶³

Sample size calculation N=153

Using Fishers formula to calculate the size of the sample

$$SS = \frac{Z^2 * (p) * (1-p)}{C^2}$$

Where: Z= Z value (for example 1.96 for 95% confidence level)

⁶¹Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques.2006

⁶² Ibid

⁶³ Mugenda, Social Science Research: Theory and Principles, 2008.

P=% of picking a given choice expressed as a decimal

(.5 used for Sample size)

C=Confidence interval expressed as a decimal

1.8.3 Target Population

The target group or population for the study consists of all the persons that can be practically generalized by the findings of a researcher. The conclusions that are drawn from a sample represent the general traits of the target population. The target population for this research will include political officers at the European Union, delegation to the republic of Kenya, officers at the African Union offices in Nairobi and Addis Ababa, officers at the Ministry of foreign affairs, Kenya, students and Lecturers at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies; University of Nairobi and/or Institute of Peace and Security Studies in Addis Ababa, selected members of the public will also contribute as respondents in this study.

Various relevant policy documents will also be carefully scrutinized to collect secondary data for the research.

1.8.4 Data collection Methods and Instruments

This study will primarily centre on both the quantitative and qualitative data collection methods. Collection of Quantitative data will be attained by administering questionnaires with structured closed-ended and open-ended questions. Structured questions will be have a by a list of probable options that will allow the respondents choose a response or answer that depicts their situation or view. Qualitative data will be collected using in-depth interviews.

1.8.5 In-depth Interviews

An interview guide will be used to get a detailed insight on the actual areas where the African European cooperation the knowledge of areas of cooperation, expectations, successes, challenges and way forward.

1.8.6 Data Analysis and Presentation

As soon as the filled in questionnaires are received back, they will be carefully scrutinized for legibility and accuracy. All the sections will be checked to ascertain that they are complete, that the important questions have.⁶⁴ To organize the data, a numerical coding system will be used; the coded data will then be entered in a computer and the SPSS Version 12 software used for the analyses of the coded data. The results will be described through percentages, the means and deviations.

The interview responses will be categorized thematically in line with the objective of the study and conclusions drawn from the narrative analysis using. Narrative analysis seeks to form the key debates in and around the study as per the responses.⁶⁵ With this as the most appropriate method of analysing the data from the in-depth interviews and the secondary data collected from various policy documents, the findings will be presented in terms of narratives, bar graphs and charts Presentations will be in narratives and themes.

1.9 Scope and Limitation of the study

This research will focus on the African European cooperation in maintaining of peace, security and stability in Africa, a critical analysis of the Joint Africa-European Strategy framework .The target population will be those directly involved in policy formulation and implementation in various institutions. Various relevant Foreign policy documents, interviews, resolutions passed from summits and meetings will also form part of the secondary data of the research. The research will take place between June-October 2018.

Possible limitations to the study would be financial capacity to cater for the research process, commitment of the interviewees to complete the questionnaires and interview schedules and

⁶⁴ Tromp, Proposal and Thesis Writing, an Introduction, 2006

⁶⁵ Ibid

tight time frame within which the data is to be collected. Financial constraints also pose a challenge in reaching the various respondents.

1.10 Chapter Outline

Chapter one introduces the concept of cooperation and formulation of foreign policy framework that defines the relationship that exists between Africa and Europe, an overview of the historic connections between these two continents and the efforts towards maintaining the relationship through various formal agreements is highlighted. As the research is around the area of cooperation, a detailed discussion on the Formation of The JAES strategy framework is done to get an understanding of its objective and purpose in maintain peace and security. The researcher also expounds on the main objective of the study, the specific objective and the research questions that are raised in order achieve the stated objective. For justification of the research, three key areas are pointed out that stand to benefit from the research; these include the academia, policy and the general public. For the literature review, an analysis of different scholarly work written on the Joint Africa EU Strategy Framework, its formation, organization structure an its effectiveness as a tool for ensuring that Africa enjoys peace, security is put forward backed by various policy documents, publications, journals and communications. The researcher discusses structural realism as the relevant theory for an analysis of the efficiency of the JAES framework. A hypothesis is also formulated to explain the outcomes of the Joint Africa-EU strategy framework. Lastly, the researcher sets out the research methodology that ought to be used, explains the target population and the tools to be used in the research.

Chapter two entails an examination into the extent to which the framework under discussion has actually been instrumental in bringing about peace and stability on the African continent.

This has been achieved by keenly looking into the historical background on the cooperation frameworks that have been in place prior to the Joint Africa-EU Strategy for Africa and the EU in exploring avenues of keeping peace, its eventual establishment, adoption, operational structure, objectives and mandate and its implementation on the ground. Chapter 2 is concluded by a discussion on how the JAES strategy relates and compare to other regional and international organizations that have the same or nearly the same objective in Africa.

Chapter Three of the research revolves around an Evaluation of the effectiveness of the JAES strategy in maintaining Peace, Security and stability in Africa against other Foreign policies between Africa and Europe. This has been achieved by detailing the specific areas of interventions. The conflict areas discussed are the Central African Republic, The Crises in Mali and finally Somalia. For each case, a historical background is given, a discussion of the conflict and finally the success and failures of the missions and operations in the intervention.

Chapter Four is on examining the changing relationship between Africa and EU and the influence of the emerging powers such as China interests in Africa. This chapter elucidates the effect that activities of China in Africa have had on the execution of the JAES Strategy, the changes in the Foreign Policy of the European Union for Africa as a reactionary policy emanating from the influence that China has had in Africa. As such, The EU's 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS) is put in perspective to bring to fore the changing tone and strategy of the EU in Africa. The chapter is concluded by a discussion of a possible tripartite cooperation of Europe Africa and China for an effective strategy for peace keeping and stability of Africa and further, the chapter details the Chinese interests in Africa

Chapter five provides the summary of the details from all the above chapters the findings of the study, conclusion and recommendations of the research study. It also puts forward the gaps and areas for further studies.

CHAPTER 2: JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY FRAMEWORK AS AN INSTRUMENT OF MAINTAINING PEACE, SECURITY, AND GENERAL STABILITY OF THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

2.0 Introduction

Chapter two captures a discussion on the extent to which the Joint Africa-EU Strategy framework has been instrumental in maintaining Peace, and keeping Africa Secure and Stable. This will be done through a brief discussion on the Historical background of the various initiatives and formation of institutions that had the mandate to carry out Peace keeping initiatives in Africa as it is crucial information in analysing the role that each play and how the various units interact. A brief discussion around the Africa Peace Facility as the legal framework through which the European Union cooperates with Africa on matters of security is also a vital area in this section. The events at AU leading to the establishment of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy Framework will also be discussed as they mirror directly into The JAES Organizational Structure. A keen analysis of the relations that come to play amidst the African Peace Facility (EU side) and African Peace and Security Architecture (AU side) will be put forward, the institutional structure of the two and the strengths and weakness of this sought of arrangement. This section will also cover discussions on the specific key areas of cooperation that include; enhanced dialogue on efforts to ensure that the APSA is operational, and modalities of Strengthening the much needed coordination and collaboration of the EU, AU, REC's and the United Nations.

2.1 A historical background on Cooperation of the EU and Africa in Maintaining Peace and Security on the African Continent

2.1.1 The African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP) and the African Peace Fund

According to Scheipers and Sicurelli⁶⁶ African Policy makers have a very positive perception of the responsibility of The EU keeping Africa secure and peaceful. This is however not a clear cut conclusion that the cooperation between the two continents has always been tranquil when it comes to interventions in conflict and crisis management in Africa considering the historical colonial relations that they share. Prior to the establishment of The JAES Framework, the European Union, related to and still does sometimes relate to Africa, (as discussed in Chapter 4 of this paper) through a multiple of Frameworks. The existence of different agreements that define the foreign policy by the EU for Africa differ as per regions among other bilateral agreements, some of the frameworks include; The TDCA-Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement and the Strategic Partnership of 2006 that define the relations of Europe and South Africa, the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union of the Mediterranean (ENP and UfM respectfully) tie the EU to the North Africa states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. The other parts of sub-Saharan Africa making up 48 states are under the ACP-(African, Caribbean and Pacific states), also known as the Cotonou Agreement of 2000. The ACP came to enforcement in 2003 and it is the overarching Framework that defines the working relations of Africa and the EU. For the purpose of this research, the ACP will be more prevalent as an area of interest and concern on for the AU and the EU. The Africa Peace Facility was established in 2004 under the legal foundation of the Cotonou Agreement of 2000 and funded through the European Development Fund; this was a rejoinder to an appeal put forward by the African political leaders at the time. APF would not only have the strategic objective of ensuring that there is a

⁶⁶ Scheipers, S and Sicurelli, D. 'Empowering Africa: Normative Power in EU-Africa Relations'(2008)

peaceful, safe and secure Africa but also fostering of political stability, efficiency in governance, and creation of an environment that has potential for inclusive and sustainable development and growth.⁶⁷

2.1.2 Formation of the A.U and the APS Architecture

The onset of the new millennium ignited waves of the so-called 'African renaissance'. It is during this period that Africa established NEPAD and saw the initiative that led to the formation of the Conference on Security, Stability, and Development and cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). Independent and as different as these Continental Initiatives may be seen, it can be deduced that there seemed to be an urgent need to restructure the operations of the OAU as well as, thus the subsequent creation of the African Union in 2003. The leaders believed that success of the initiatives in one area would influence success in the others, and thus work together to quicken the African Renaissance that would therefore make the much talked about African Century turn into a reality.⁶⁸

The AU was seen to prioritize the issue of peace and sustainable security and stability on the continent. Under the Principle of 'African Solutions to African Problems', The African policy makers showed willingness to ensure that there was peace and security on the continent⁶⁹ hence in 2002 in Durban setting up of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The APSA was enforced in December 2003 and its legal basis rests in the Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) and the AU's Peace and Security Council Protocol.⁷⁰ It is the AU's blue-print reference point on promotion of a peaceful,

⁶⁷ *Building partnerships for change in developing countries* (European Commission)

⁶⁸ Online source- International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa,(October 2001)

⁶⁹ Maurizio Carbone, ' An Uneasy Nexus: Development , Security and the EU'S African Facility'(2013)

⁷⁰ Engel and Porto, 2011, p. 16

secure and Stable Africa.⁷¹ The APSA gives the African Union the power to be in charge of African security and in the process leaving out other external factors such as the EU initially. The inability of the APSA to be fully operational led to the need for external support from the EU, though changing in nature, so that, rather than the EU's direct intervention in African conflicts, it would provide financial and technical support.⁷²

2.1.3 Road towards the Formation of the Joint African-EU Framework

After the formation of the African Union, the political leaders rationalized the importance of Africa redefining how it related to other continental organizations. With regard to the European Union, the political views were that the African countries were highly stratified under numerous frameworks and Agreements thus undermining the efforts of the African Union to view 'Africa as one'. According to the policy makers, the EU had not adjusted to the 'new' political outfit that the African Union had become to a level of carrying out its foreign policy at a Continent to Continent level as opposed to the bilateral Continent (EU) to State and Continent, still the EU, to regional Agreements.⁷³

The Cotonou agreement of 2000 which cover 48 of the African states in the sub-Saharan region came into enforcement in 2003. The ACP- Agreement is still operational in spite of it covering only the sub-Saharan Africa yet, the AU, as an organization constituted of all the African states except Morocco as at the time.

The new millennium triggered conversations around need for more political relationship on equal footing, democracy, governance and human rights. In the early 2000s five elements drove the African and EU leaders to develop this ambitious partnership. First, There was a realization that the two continents needed to have an equal partners political partnership and

⁷¹ African Union Peace and Security Architecture (October 2012)

⁷² Vines and Middleton, 2008, p. 16

⁷³ Jean Pierre Elong Mbassi, UCLG Africa Note – 7th Africa/EU Summit, Rabat, (June 2017)

away from the donor-recipient that had existed for long, this meant that the EU would have the leverage to discuss issues beyond trade and aid which the ACP countries previously opposed as interference in their sovereignty, these were matters regarding human rights, governance and governance. On the other hand, Africa would have a say on global politics and Africa taking up a position on the global scene as an emerging and transforming economic powerhouse.⁷⁴ Secondly, Africa was already attracting the attention of other players that included India, Brazil and at a very high speed and increased involvement, China. The 2006 Beijing Forum on China- Africa Cooperation, (FOCA), was widely attended by African heads of States. Thirdly, there seemed to be a sense of urgency in the international scene for Africa pushed by the MDGs agenda, creation of NEPAD in 2001, establishment of other Pan African Initiatives. In 2005, the narrative of Africa as a continent in need was transformed to land of opportunities after the UK's Commission for Africa and the 'Year of Africa' was established. The fourth indicator is attributed to the fact that Portugal's presidency of the EU was more enthusiastic in having deliverables for the 2007 Africa-EU Lisbon summit and thus this provided the political drive for the consultations. Finally, and as a major driver, the fact that OAU had been transformed to AU a provided a ground fertile enough for continent to continent relations.⁷⁵ The effort towards the formation of The Joint Africa-EU framework involved a series of meeting and two summits.⁷⁶ The Joint Africa –EU Framework Strategy was adopted at the 2007 second Lisbon Summit by the EU and their African counterpart leaders.⁷⁷

The adoption of the JAES framework strategy established it as the official channel through which the African countries could effectively relate with the European Union under The

⁷⁴ The African Union and the European Commission (2007a)

⁷⁵ Maurizio Carbone, *One Europe, One Africa – Changing Dynamics in EU-Africa relations*

⁷⁶ Cairo Summit, 2005 and Lisbon Summits, 2007

⁷⁷ Ibid

African Union Umbrella. This framework, though not legally binding as a policy,⁷⁸ is primarily used to augment the strategic and political partnership between the EU and Africa as a continent in a bid to expand their relational cooperation scope.⁷⁹ The JAES also sought to address the kind of fragmentation of Africa that had been done by the EU. At its adoption in Lisbon, it stressed the value of having dialogue with emphasis on equality of partners and the need for the EU to discontinue piece-mealing Africa through preferential treatment resulting in lack of synergy.

2.2 The JAES: Objectives and Operational Structure

Now that the formation of the important frameworks has been explained, this section will put to perspective the objectives of the JAES, the structure within which it operates and areas of priority, and how these areas have evolved over time. These areas are of importance to this research as they all reflect insight on the commitment level of the partners involved, AU and EU, in the main area of this research, which is the Cooperation of AU and EU through the JAES in maintaining a peaceful, secure and stable Africa.

The JAES, Framework, based on the principle of partnerships of equals', represented the first mutually agreed upon framework for Africa as a whole and the EU. This strategy offered the signal that for the first time, Africa would have to be given the treatment of one continent in negotiations. This was also be an opportunity to expand the areas of discussion and partnership from the aid and development spheres into broader themes such as democracy, governance, peace and security, Migration, mobility and employment, regional integration and trade, Climate change Science and technology and Energy. There would also be jointly agreed Action Plans attached to the partnerships. In the first JAES Framework action plan of

⁷⁸ The Cotonou Agreement stands as the legally binding policy framework

⁷⁹ Jean Pierre Elong Mbassi, UCLG Africa Note – 7th Africa/EU Summit, Rabat, (June 2017)

2008-2010⁸⁰ preamble, which gave the strategy its operational framework, the major objective was to have a more overtly political relationship between the AUC and the EU through the establishment of an overarching framework where Africa would be treated ‘as one’ and that continent to continent partnership would be enhanced, the EU- Africa relation would be reinforced and elevated to a level of ensuring that common concerns are addressed, the institutional ties are strengthened and that common challenges affecting both the EU and Africa would be addressed.⁸¹ The second action plan (2011-2013), focused more on the eight main areas with major emphasis on political dialogue. The long term and possibility of ensuring that the APSA is operational were covered on the adoption of this road map; the document also stipulated the importance of coordinating the operations of the regional blocs and those of the African Union Commission to have a regional, continental and global outlook on security matters.⁸² For the Road map that covered the years between 2014 and 2017, a deliberate priority was given to Peace and security, democratic governance, human rights and inclusive and sustainable continental and growth and development.⁸³ Currently, the roadmap for 2017-2020 is in operation.⁸⁴ Peace and Security has been top of Agenda for all action plans except the 2017-2020 Whereby it is placed after Education, science technology and Skills development.⁸⁵

The prescribed action plans are tailor made to ensure that plans in place are achieved with tangible results. The partnership is highly structured to ensure that there is adequate engagement of various stakeholders including non-state actors on matters of governance and implementation of the action plans. It was also designed to ensure that both Africa and the Europe adopt common positions on some issues that take a global perspective.

⁸⁰ The First action plan (2008-2011) endorsed by the Ministerial Troika(Accra, October 2008)

⁸¹ The Partnership guidelines for the Joint expert Groups, endorsed by the Ministerial Troika (November 2008)

⁸² The JAES Strategy(2011-2013) Action plan, EU-Africa Summit, (Tripoli, November 2010)

⁸³ The EU-Africa Partnership the JAES roadmap (2014-2017)

⁸⁴ Ibid 4(EU-Africa Relations)

⁸⁵ Refer to figure 1 on evolution of the JAES priorities figure

The JAES framework not only complements other existing frameworks and partnerships in Africa-Europe cooperation but it also overarches all the other frameworks at the regional, national and local level. Within the last 10 years of its existence, the framework has had a total of 5 Summits, several high level commission to commission annual meetings, and the EU- Africa Ministerial Troika's meet two times every to ensure that the implementation of the given areas of priority are on track ⁸⁶. More recently, in a commission to commission delegation meeting that took place in Addis Ababa in April 2016, the HR/VP of the EU Commission Federica Mogherini, reiterated the fact that Africa and EU shared long standing and close partners and that they also had common priorities and challenges. Top of the agenda was security, terrorism, migration challenges, social development and integration issues.⁸⁷

2.3 Evolution of the JAES Framework

From the time that the JAES Framework was adopted in 2007 in Lisbon, there have been various strategies adopted to ensure that its role is fully realized to improve the cooperation and relations for Africa and Europe. This has seen the JAES priority areas evolve over time (Refer to image 1) and thus importance of certain areas shifting. With three successive action plans up until 2017, it is a demonstration on the effort vested in the JAES to support priority areas and ensure that the Strategy is a success⁸⁸. The Abidjan 5th AU-EU Summit in November 2017 resulted into the adoption of a joint declaration for 2018 and onward, this outlined four joint priority areas for action that included; First human resource through education, promotion of science and technology and development of skills. Second, the need

⁸⁶ Resetting the Africa-EU- Africa Relations- High level Group meeting, (October 2018), Africa Union, EU Africa Partnerships

⁸⁷ Ibid

⁸⁸ Africa-EU partnerships

to ensure that resilience is strengthened and peace and security and governance are also established. Third, mobilizing investments for African sustainable transformation and finally Migration and Mobility.

The evolution of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy's priority areas




Figure 1: Evolution of the JAES priorities

While peace and security were given prominence in the first and second action plan (2008-2013) and roadmap (2014-2017), the Abidjan declaration restructured the same for a second priority as Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance. This raises pertinent questions on the reason for the shift in the priority, Peace and Security was not given prominence as the case before. Does it suggest that there are success stories from the strategy or are there other means that have been favoured to deal with maintaining of peace, security and stability in Africa?

2.4 Implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy on Peace and security

2.4.1 Enhancing Political Dialogues

Peace and security remains the main priority of the cooperation between the European Union and Africa. The strategic objective of the JAES is to guarantee peaceful and secure environment that is also safe for humanity, reduce conflicts and foster sustainable growth and development and enhancement of democratic governance that contribute to political stability of. The actions identified to ensure that the objective is achieved include, the need to strengthen political dialogue among the African leaders, the funding of the APSA to keep it operational and increased collaboration and coordination with Regional Economic Communities and the United Nations.

The JAES framework, in all its action plans over the years has emphasized the special place for political dialogue for discussions, to reach common positions and implement mutual approaches to solve the issues of peace and security on the African continent. Achieving unity of intention between the EU and AU still remains a challenge. The unity of purpose has lately also been compromised further by the perceived one way dialogue by the EU that seem to impose conditionalities on Africa in their tendency of the EU to securitize the migration agenda. Policy based dialogue on matters of security both at the technical and political level of the AU and EU has not been enhanced in spite of the existence of the AU PSC and EU PSC that is meant to reinforce coordination since the adoption of the JAES framework in 2008.⁸⁹ Though the impact of the forums may not have been felt in terms of coordination, there have been various consultative meeting on counter-terrorism, violent extremism, migration and radicalization among other security crisis that continue to grip the African continent.

⁸⁹ African Union Co-chairs Conclusions of the Joint AUPSC/EUPSC retreat(October 2016)

The political dialogues have also set out the AU and EU on extreme ends and against each other in the recent past. Matters of universal jurisdiction and the international criminal justice remain unsolved. While EU fully believes and supports the ICC as the body to dispense justice of criminal and of humanitarian nature and by extension a solution to impunity, security and stability in Africa, African leaders remain sceptical and view the ICC as unfairly targeting leaders in sub-Saharan Africa.⁹⁰

2.4.2 Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The Africa- EU main partnership tool for implementing peace and security is the African Peace Facility which was essentially set up in 2003 to support the regional mechanisms. The APF has three components, these are, the African Peace Support Operations, the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the operations of the ERM, (The early response Mechanisms) A big portion of the APF funds is allocated to the Peace Support operations, that is 89.5% of the total or EUR 1.76 billion between 2004 and 2016⁹¹ 8.31% or EUR 164 million went to capacity-building while the remaining 1.52% (EUR 30 million) covered the ERM. Giving support to the African Standby Force remains the priority of the Africa-EU cooperation on peace and security. To achieve this, it is thus imperative that the APSA is operationalised. The APSA has not been fully operationalised as envisioned that it would be by 2010 hence still challenged in carrying out peace missions in Africa.⁹²

The APF still has weak element in its capacity-building. With a budget that is funded almost entirely by the EU, it raises issues of ownership, decision making capacity. In a bid to address pertinent concerns on accountability, reporting and transparency in the utilization of the funds on implementing activities by the African Union and the RECs, The European Commission

⁹⁰ Amould Valarie, *‘A Court in Crisis? The ICC in Africa and Beyond’* (Egmont Paper, May 2017)

⁹¹ Africa Peace Facility Annual Report, (2016) pg 5(European Commission)

⁹² Africa Peace Facility Annual Report ,(2016) pg 15 (European Commission)

further amplified its control over the APF funds.⁹³ The African Union is however on a path of ownership of APF; a decision taken in the AU Assembly of 2015 was that the AU assembly would take up financial accountability for 25% of peace activities by 2020. Although the January 2017 launch of the Peace Fund as stipulated in The Kaberuka report of August 2016 did not take place,⁹⁴ there are ongoing discussions towards the course.

2.4.3 Strengthening the relationship between the AU, EU, RECs and the UN

The need to coordinate and strengthen the relationship that is created between and among the African Union, The European Union, Regional Economic Communities and the United Nations interactions is of paramount importance in the process of implementing structures for maintaining peace, security and stability on the continental level in terms of leadership responsibility and funding. The challenges in hierarchy, who to act first, when and what role each of the organizations should take have emerged now and then in cases where intervention is called for leading to in some cases disastrous results, mismanagement of situations and funds, suspicion and at times overlapping of roles, this situations arm or often than not attributed to gaps in communication, coordination and harmonisation, liaison officers have been appointed, partially improving the gaps. Hierarchical division between the AU and the RECs is now generally accepted although sometimes done with reluctance.⁹⁵

⁹³ Commission Decisions on the Fourth and fifth amendments, 4735 (26 July 2016 and 72589 17 November 2016) respectfully on a fourth (4907- 15 July 2014) for the 2014-2016 Action Programme of the APF in favour of the AU commission

⁹⁴ AU Peace Fund, Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing

⁹⁵ Ibid 11, Pirrozi (ed), *How to engage Regional Organizations and Civil Society*, (Pg 260

2.5 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter on the extent to which the Joint Africa-EU Strategy Framework has been instrumental in maintaining Peace, Security and Stability in Africa delves into various policy documents that directly affect the Joint Africa- IU Strategy framework. By discussing the contents of the policies such as the Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) framework the position of the Africa Peace Fund, the contents of the JAES Framework itself and the Africa peace and security Architecture, it is possible draw conclusions on the strengths and the bottlenecks that the Framework has to determine its ability to effectively be used as a policy in maintaining peace and security in Africa.

**CHAPTER 3: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY
FRAMEWORK IN MAINTAINING PEACE, SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA
THROUGH INTERVENTIONS**

3.0 Introduction

This chapter covers the various specific interventions that have been carried out as a measure to maintain Peace, security and stability in Africa. It covers discussions on the specifics of the kind of conflict, the genesis of the conflict and by extension the effort that has been put in to normalize the situation. While some interventions take unilateral decisions of either of the organizations or the effort of the regional blocks in the area in collaboration with the specific governments, some have taken the collaborative effort of the states, regional blocs, coordination of the African Union and the EU and the involvement of the United Nation as a global arbitrator of conflict. The choice of country of discussion was dependent on the diversity and nature of the conflicts and the intervening partners, the duration of the conflict and the intervention period. The case of each country selected requires a deep analysis of the underlying issues; however for the purpose of discussing the Joint Africa-EU Strategy Framework role in peace and security, priority is given to the joint effort and the success and failure parameters of the intervention strategy. The conflicts under discussion in this chapter include, The Central African Republic, The Mali Crisis, and the Somalia Crisis.

3.1 Central African Republic Crises

3.1.1 Background and Causes of conflicts in the Central African Republic

The CAR has experienced a violent political history of coups, dictatorial regimes and complete disregard of the rule of law by incumbent presidents. The history of violence has continued to be the face of CAR's political scene to the effect that most civilians are armed

and in perpetual readiness for a war. Since its independence from France in 1960, the perennial weak governments in CAR have not been in a position to provide stability to the people in CAR against the shadowy rebel and bandit groups who operate freely and often prey on the civilian population⁹⁶. The economic and social disparity between the North and South CAR, lack of basic amenities and general severe poverty in the country have also been viewed as factors that have continuously caused rife in the Central African Republic. The CAR is categorized as one of the least developed countries and the poorest in the world as it stands; this is in spite of the rich natural resources that the country is endowed with⁹⁷. The geographical location of CAR puts the country at crossroads and susceptible to violence; the landlocked CAR, with its fluid and porous borders have exposed it to extreme influence by its neighbours such as Chad, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Cameroon, who in their own times of conflict have not only been using the remote areas of CAR to harbour and train their militia and insurgent troops but also directly involved themselves in the political mêlée of the country⁹⁸. Within the CAR, to the North are the pastoralists and merchant, majorly Muslim Sahel communities, to the south, former animists, predominantly Christian Savannah communities.

The French Military, Economic and Political influence on the CAR Conflict

France continues to openly play a principal and highly dominant role in making the decision on the preferred political ruler in the CAR. It can be argued that France has not really positively influenced the Economy of CAR in comparison to its other former colonies; it has however over the years maintained a strong and military presence amidst the conflicts that the

⁹⁶ Brown, 2001: 214-218.

⁹⁷ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

⁹⁸ Darfur crisis had significant implications on the security of the CAR

country undergoes.⁹⁹ The strategic and central position of CAR makes it an important location for France as in the past, France was not only able to pay close attention and contain the Russian Influence in Libya but the Country was also strategic enough to facilitate the French military response and surge capacity in the neighbouring African states.¹⁰⁰ France has always shown her keen interest to maintain influence in the Central African State. On the security of the CAR, France has been instrumental in supporting, training and reformation the CAR forces, there are instances where France has had to intervene directly in the political space of the state by either supporting a ruling regime or facilitating coups against incumbent presidents.¹⁰¹ The former colony's has also made attempts through technical assistance and support in ensuring that the CAR is under the rule of law, and strive towards fight for democracy and good governance.¹⁰²

The blurry line between outright political interference and diplomatic cooperation has also entangled France's interests in the elusive economic and security dynamics. French companies Total and AREVA made an attempt at exploring CAR's resources on an industrial scale; this however staled when the investors ran into trouble with the CAR government and militia attacks in the North.¹⁰³

Several attempts in the past to have a functional, democratically elected government in the CAR have previously failed as there continues to be coup after coup causing instability. For many years, the southern community took charge of the leadership of the country, this would

⁹⁹Lombard,Louisa, *Understanding Conflict in Central African Republic*

<https://news.yale.edu/2017/03/23/understanding-conflict-central-african-republic-qa-anthropologist-louisa-lombard>

¹⁰⁰ Lombard Louisa

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² McFarlane and Marlan, 'Crisis in the Central African Republic

¹⁰³ Ibid

dramatically reverse the political order when in 2013, for the first time since its independence, the Northern and partly eastern Seleka group grabbed power through a coup that saw the CAR president Francois Bozize ousted plunging the country into chaos¹⁰⁴. Clashes and tensions ensued between the Islamic Seleka and the anti- Balaka forces generated into adverse inter communal and religious conflicts that would see destructions and thousands internally displaced¹⁰⁵. Efforts at intervention that included the disarmament process of both the Seleka and Balaka groups saw the forces disintegrated into splinter groups, further deepening the crisis at the local level. In 2015 the Seleka group agreed to a temporary cease fire this did not yield any reprieve for the country as violence erupted once again as the government rejected the anti- Balaka and Seleka agreement.

Conflicts in CAR have presented different fronts from coups, civil unrest, ethnic and religious conflicts, to neighbouring countries, such as Chad and Southern Sudan, interference in the political scenes in CAR. The military, economic and political involvement of France in the internal affairs of the CAR has also been attributed to the instability in the country.¹⁰⁶ Close to half a million people have been rendered refugees in the neighbouring countries and close to a million have been internally displaced in the CAR since 2013 an estimated 3000-6000 people have been killed in the clashes. The prolonged fighting had dire consequences in the north, civilians were raped, widespread killings, looting by the warring parties, torching of villages and the limited infrastructure absolutely destroyed. These conflicts continue to erupt sporadically with grave human rights violations committed right in the presence of a contingent of Peace Keeping missions and the Non-Governmental humanitarian bodies. The humanitarian crises in the CAR have escalated over time prompting intervention attempts to bring the country to order and ensure that there is peace and stability.

¹⁰⁴ Central African Republic: *The Roots of Violence*, (Crisis Group Africa Report, 21 September 2015)

¹⁰⁵ Ibid 76

¹⁰⁶ CAR disarmament drive fails to capture militia leader(Crisis Group)

3.1.2 Interventions in the Central African Republic Crises

The Central African Republic has had several interventions to restore peace and stability over the long period that the country has been in a state of instability. The African Union, Economic Commission of Central Africa, UN, France and the EU have all been involved in intervention missions to the CAR.

Peace Keeping Missions in the CAR, Beyond 2013

The CAR has seen the transition of several peace keeping missions that have ranged from states led such as France , Libya, and Chad , to regional, the African Union, the EU and the United Nations led missions

The UN led BINUCA mission had its mandate extended and expanded severally amidst the conflicts and working alongside other ongoing missions.¹⁰⁷ The mission was in operation when violent attacks escalated in 2013. The United Nations continue (d) to support other missions in the CAR and work collaboratively by authorizing the mandate and operations of peace missions from the AU and the EU through its security council.

Following the March 2013 Coup that saw the then President ousted from power plunging the country into fresh violent attacks, the African Union Security Council suspended the Central African Republic from its activities and imposed Sanctions on CAR . The AU Security Council Authorized by the AU International Support Mission in CAR (AFISM-CAR) was established to consolidate peace taking over from the Economic Community of Central African States Mission, AFISM-CAR would later be followed by another African led mission MISCA¹⁰⁸ with the mandate to offer protection to the civilians and also creating conditions for humanitarian assistance. BINUCA was given the mandate under resolution 2134 of the

¹⁰⁷ United Nations Security Council, Sixty-eighth year, 7042nd Meeting, (New York, 10 October 2013)

¹⁰⁸ Ibid 79

UN council to assist in the transitional process in the CAR, discussions to transform MISCA into a UN peace Keeping Mission were however not conclusive. The United Nation adopted a resolution that led to the institution of (MINUSCA).¹⁰⁹ The mission had an initial deployment of up to 10,000 military personnel and a 1,800 police force MINUSCA was to take over operations from the AU led MISCA Mission.¹¹⁰ The MISCA troops were re-hatted¹¹¹ and adopted into the MINUSCA mission. The MINUSCA mission continues its operations in CAR since its establishment in April 2014.

EUFOR RCA and EUTM RCA

The violence in CAR continued to attract a global attention prompting the EU to unanimously endorse the decision to deploy a peace keeping mission, European Forces Republic of Central Africa (EUFOR RCA) to the country with an objective of contributing to a safe environment and provision of humanitarian aid to the people of CAR.¹¹² As much as it was in the interest of the French government, this was a symbolic gesture as it signified and repositioned the EU as the global actor on matters of peace and security. During the planning, it became however clear that the EU member states were unwilling to fully contribute in terms of troops towards the mission. It took the Union six months to gather enough forces, an aspect that led to its criticism over dragging its feet in making decisions over such a small operation. EUFOR RCA was given a very limited mandate of protecting the population that was most at risk and crating conditions that would favour provision of humanitarian aid. With authorization from the United Nations Security Council, the mission was established on February 10 2014. Given the narrow mandate that the mission had, it fulfilled its mission and was thus terminated on March 15 2015. The mission was viewed as not being ambitious,

¹⁰⁹ Ibid

¹¹⁰(S/PV.7153

¹¹¹ This refers to redeploying the same troop under a different mission

¹¹² Tardy, Terry, EUFOR RCA Bangui: “ Defence matters” (2014), (European Union Institute for Security Studies)

lacking genuine interest in the humanitarian crises and the suffering, and that it failed to improve the situation in CAR.¹¹³

The European Union Military Advising Mission (EUMAM RCA) 2015-2016 was constituted and later, from 2016 to present, the ongoing EU Military Training Mission (EUTM RCA) that has been training the CAR security forces to empower and facilitate them to provide security to its population.

The EU trust Fund in support of CAR is also an initiative towards stabilizing CAR from donor humanitarian dependency to transit to restoration and re-establishing of CAR in development and long term sustainable programs provision of basic infrastructure and reclaiming of local administration. The package also caters for budgetary allocation for elections to be channelled through the UN as a route towards democratization of the country.

3.1.3 Assessment of the success of the CAR Interventions

The EUFOR RCA was considered a partial success. The missions operational mandate objectives were met. The security condition in the CAR improved and violence constrained. The local community that was under the mandate of the EUFOR RCA perceived the mission as more efficient and reliable compared to the United Nations peace keepers.

The EUTM RCA mission has successfully provided strategic advice in the restructuring of the military. This is from the National defence planning, to military deployment and procurement documents. This has seen its mandate extended to September 2020 and mandate expanded to the training of all military staff, the president's cabinet and the Gendarmerie.¹¹⁴

The mission has trained 3 battalions for deployment into the forces. This has enabled the CAR government to provide both the internal and external security to its citizens. The

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Common Security and Defence Policy, European Union Training Mission in Central African Republic (EUTMRCA)

validation of the specialized intelligence forces after training and educating them in leadership, tact, prevention of sexual abuse, International humanitarian law, human rights among others brings discipline and professionalism in the forces.

About 232 former rebels have been reintegrated into the FACA through the Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation (DDRR) program. The program is aimed at reducing the arms in the hands of the civilians and reconciliation of the warring communities to maintain stability and ensure that there are minimal possibilities of breakout of conflicts.¹¹⁵

The EU donor Trust fund for the CAR, working in conjunction with the IMF and World Bank are directing funds to the CAR for specific intentional projects that have been lauded as a trajectory towards the transforming of the CAR from aid dependency to self sufficiency.

3.1.4 The gaps and failures in the CAR

The instability in the neighbouring countries continue to cause turmoil in the CAR, the CAR does not fall into either of the European Union's regional strategies , this put to test and hampered the implementation of the comprehensive approach¹¹⁶ question means that the EU had to work. The evident lack of political will by the EU member states to provide troops and refusal to use a battle group for the mission was an indication that the EU either missed the mark on the extent of the conflict or was simply not willing to get really involved in the conflict resolution. The delay of the mission by six months saw intensity and spread of the conflict thus causing more humanitarian crisis. The EU strategy seems to have given emphasis to the time of exit rather than to the state that the CAR was in before exiting.

The focus on the election process by the international partners in isolation to other pertinent issues in the country has been treated with suspicion and critiqued as a catalyst to fuelling ethnic based violence. The rushed elections have not increased the democratic space in CAR

¹¹⁵ Ibid 111

¹¹⁶ Discussed further in detail under Somalia crisis

but only worked to deepen the divisions in the CAR. The violent historical past of the CAR still causes cycles of conflict and violence in the country. The continued presence of the rebels, the French forces and the various Peace keeping missions has militarized the country to high levels and thus causing continuous tension among the civilians.

Poverty, lack of basic infrastructural facilities and gross human rights violations continue to hamper the efforts towards restoring peace and security and maintain stability in the CAR. The income inequality and a dropping GDP per capita provides the CAR's young population little to engage in and avoid fuelling and joining conflicts¹¹⁷ approaches by peace missions have not been as instrumental as expected in ensuring that the situation changes.

Recent attacks on humanitarian aid agencies workers and reported killings of peace keepers and journalists in CAR have given the CAR conflict interventions a new challenging front that may likely cause withdrawal of forces and the international humanitarian organizations from the country. The humanitarian aid has also been denied access to some areas such as Bangassou to provide basic needs such as water to the Muslim IDPs.¹¹⁸

The Archange Touadera has been deemed weak, corrupt and unstable, it has also has little to encourage integration and affirmation. After his election in 2016, the presidents' insistence on disarmament as a condition for mediation and reconciliation has frustrated the efforts of the International community to continue with the mediation process. The Muslims rights in the country have been seen as still infringed upon and in the lack of diversity in the public service that is inconsiderate to the North east population has been fronted as inhibiting future conflicts.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Dani Belo, Asha Siad, Micah Sienna(2/8/2017), The Norway Paterson School of International Studies

¹¹⁸ Namie Di Razza, *How Can the UN Curb CAR's Spiral of Violence and Ethnic Cleansing?* (Relief web Report)

¹¹⁹ Ibid 88

¹¹⁹ Dr Vines Alex, OBE, Mali Crisis: Intervention Strategy .

3.2 The Mali Crises

3.2.1 Background and Causes of Conflicts in Mali

The Mali crisis represents a complex linkage of a series of events that resulted in periods of lack of peace, security and stability in the country. The unexpected *coup de tat* in March 2012 caused chaos and left Mali not only vulnerable politically but also gave time to the Islamist extremists and the minority Tuareg group in the North to consolidate and form a jihadist state in Northern Mali. The radical groups in Mali and the larger Sahel had initially been subdued by Colonel Gaddafi of Libya a situation that suddenly changed after the NATO 2011 intervention in the Libya Crisis and the subsequent fall of the Gaddafi regime.¹²⁰ Chaos erupted in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu regions; this was after the Tuareg of Malian origin soldiers who had been recruited to serve in the Libyan Jamahiriya army had returned¹²¹. The defeated Libyan defenders formed alliances with the Northern Islamist group, the adequately armed group proved to be a challenge to be handled by the then weak Malian government. The state of insecurity spread quickly to central with banditry on the rise, various competing militia groups taking up the readily available arms to control trade and migration routes, marginalized communities armed to challenge the urban elite aristocracies, for instance the 2016 violent attacks between the Bambara and the Fulani,¹²² radical groups such as the Macina Liberation Front causing deadly attacks on security forces Mali as the group occupied more territory. With all the security challenges, it became clear that the Mali crisis would needed not just a regional or continental but an international intervention.

¹²¹ Naffet Keita, *Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali resulting from the Algiers Process. Between Euphoria and scepticism: Traces of Peace.*

¹²² Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making? (Crisis Group Africa)

3.2.2 Interventions in the Mali Crises

The first regional intervention was by ECOWAS urging the neighbouring countries to close borders apply trade and travel sanctions and freeze asset and bank accounts of the Juntas that had taken over power after the coup. This was to force the Juntas to relinquish power and return Mali to a constitutional order. The Juntas signed an agreement to factor in a restoration of constitutionalism in exchange for amnesty.¹²³ The quest by ECOWAS to send in military force was however met with resistance from not only Bamako, but also the neighbouring Algiers and Mauritania. A mission to Mali (MICEMA) by ECOWAS was opposed by Algiers from its conception stage and thus did not take off prompting the African Union to take over the coordination.¹²⁴

The African Union sought to make the Mali Intervention framework a continental affair. By seeking the United Nations' Financial support through the AU Peace and Security Council, it overcame the prior reluctance of Algeria to support the ECOWAS led mission. The African-Led support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was thus deployed to Mali in July, 2012 to Mali. An attack and takeover of a strategic town, Konna, by the Islamic extremists on 10th January 2013 impelled the Malian government to seek a military backing from France. The French 'Serval' was deployed and immediately managed to 'push back' the Islamic extremists and secured Konna.¹²⁵ The French Serval did not leave immediately as was expected and would eventually to work along AFISMA. Despite the AFISMA cooperation with the France led Serval, France put a suggestion to the UN to have AFISMA replaced,¹²⁶ UN Security council therefore authorized the replacement of AFISMA by MINUSMA ignoring the African Unions suggestions.

¹²³ Mali Sanctions lifted: ECOWAS, (Times Live Online, 8 October 2012)

¹²⁴ Lacher, ' Northern Mali'

¹²⁵ Lacher

¹²⁶ Communiqué of the 358th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the AU on the situation in Mali (7 March 2017)

3.2.3 Assessment of the success of the Mali Crises Intervention

The integrated stabilization efforts by AFISMA, Malian Army, the French forces and MINUSMA was instrumental in providing an enabling environment for the first round of elections in August 2013. The reconciliation process led by Algeria resulted to integration and supporting of cease fire in Mali.

The operation by the French government to dislodge the radical extremist group was considered highly successful. The UN peace keeper, MINUSMA, however continue to elicit mixed reactions, apart from the fact that Malians are at a loss on the reason for the UN involvement, as they are looked at as biased for supporting the government, there are accusations that the MINUSMA is intervening for profit.

Unlike the individualized training of forces approach that was used by the US, the IU has managed to forge forces from scratch thus crating cohesion for their future operations

The auditing and training on the chain of command has been emphasized to avoid the happenings that led to the staging of a coup by disgruntled junior officers

Given the limited mandate of the MINUSMA and the lack of capacity by the AFSIMA, the EUTM Mali has been instrumental in responding to the security related issues in Mali and providing financial aid.

3.2.4 The Gaps and failures in the Mali Crises Intervention

While relative peace has been achieved as MINUSA operate alongside the French in Mali, the country continues to languish in extreme poverty, human trafficking, illegal trade, banditry ,smuggling, and hostage taking for ransom continue to flourish in the Northern

state. Jihadism is also seen to continue affecting the Maghreb state fundamentally driven by poverty and lack of viable sources of income as argued by regional experts.¹²⁷

The issues of resources; human, financial and technical knowhow constraints exposes the African Union and the African regional blocs to challenges and unequal grounding in a expedition to actively take part in maintaining, peace, security and stability on the African continent. This can be deduced from the roles that both AU and the regional blocs are forced to play in the peace missions and crucial consultative meetings concerning African states. The decisions or actions taken by either the European Union or the United Nations rarely put the African perspective and contribution in consideration. This raises questions on the matter of mutual interests, equal partners, sovereignty and ownership in cooperation on peace, security and stability in Africa.

Malian insistence to have AFISMA transition to MINUSMA proved a big disappointment. The Malians did not know that MINUSMA had no mandate to deal with terrorism and counter insurgency.¹²⁸ MINUSMA has also suffered several military attacks by the terrorists in spite of the mission not being for counter insurgency.

The multiple and complex nature of the Mali Crises has continued to challenge to the peace keepers as the crisis emanate from different quarters and for different reasons.

The perceived lack of foreign interest in Mali and the Sahel region in gnarl by the IU Member states has resulted in insufficiency and lack of coordination and cooperation in solving the problems of Mali.

¹²⁷ Stephen Harmon, ' *From GSPC to AQIM: The Evolution of an Algerian Islamist Terrorist Group into Al-Quida Affiliate and the implications for the Sahara- Sahel Region .*' (Concerned Africa Scholars, Spring 2010,Pg 24)

¹²⁸ MINUSMA's authorized strength intervention (29 June 2015-30 June 2016)

3.3 The Somalia Crises

3.3.1 Background and Causes of the Somalia Crises

Somali's lack of capacity to enhance the rule of law has culminated to the country being termed as a failed state in the international scene. After the over throwing of the dictatorial regime of President Siad Barre in 1991, the power vacuum in the country led to a series of clan-based power struggles that turned the country into chaotic destruction spanning over twenty years¹²⁹. The country fragmented with Somaliland declaring its independence from the mainland and the Coastal Puntland declaring its autonomy in 1998.¹³⁰ Intervention attempts by the United States of America and The United Nations failed to bring order to the country in the mid 1990s and came to a halt with numerous casualties among the international troops that had been in the country for peace keeping mission. The disregard of the rule of law and the strategic position of Somalia in the Horn of Africa plunged the county into a hub of high level corruption, piracy in the high sea, terrorism and violence. Frequent Droughts and famine would add to the increasing problems causing a humanitarian crisis that called for exiling of about 1.5 Million people and another category of the same number internally displaced.

3.3.2 Interventions in the Somalia Crises

International and Regional Effort in Somalia Intervention

The geographical location of Somalia makes it a vital and relevant for global stability. The cycle of insecurity intensified by the presence of the Al-Qaeda linked Jihadist group Al-Shabaab and the piracy made it the more challenging to have a stable government. These happenings caught the attention of the International Community to try and salvage the

¹²⁹ Ibid

¹³⁰ Alison K. Eggers, “*When is a state a state? The case for Recognition of Somaliland*”(Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, December 2007, pg 211-222)

humanitarian crises. Different international institutions and organizations responded and thus started to contribute towards the development, securitisation and stabilization of Somalia. The European Union also took the centre stage in a bid to intervene through the Somalia Crisis. The Transitional Federal Government formed in 2004 made an attempt at preparing the ground for a Federal Somalia government by drafting a new constitution. The TFG did not succeed at this as it had close to no support internally, thus making very little progress in restoring peace and stabilizing Somalia. The Islamic Courts Union would later gain control of the Capital Mogadishu and making an attempt at restoring some order in the country in 2006, this lasted for a short while as the Islamic Court Union was also ousted by the Ethiopian forces with the backing of the United States fearing that the ICU would lead to a spread in militant Islamists. In 2007, the African Union deployed AMISOM Peace keeping mission to Somalia to restore order. The UN launched the Djibouti Peace process to spearhead reconciliation between the TFG and the moderate ICU members, this would also prove challenging as the radical ICU members linked to the Al Qaeda group did not cooperate and held onto the ambition of forming an Islamist state in Somalia.¹³¹ The EU on the other side deployed the EUNAVFOR Somalia, a first ever maritime operation by the EU to assist the TFG in fighting Piracy.

¹³¹Axadle International Monitoring, *Somali Government has decided to postpone national elections until 2012*(April 2011)

The EU'S Comprehensive Approach Intervention in Somalia

In observing the 'comprehensive approach' that the EU applies in the development aid, it creates a nexus between security and development, respect for rule of Law and human rights and observation of the international Law as a prerequisite for development aid. These conditionalities could not be fulfilled by Somalia at the time of the decision by the commission to intervene in the Somalia case. For this reason, the first EU Intervention in Somalia favoured a tailor made approach that called for a regional approach. Through a 2006 communication, the strategy became operational.¹³² The comprehensive approach would later be signed in the 2009, 'An EU policy on the Horn of Africa – towards a comprehensive its main goals as peace, security and stability in Somalia. Theoretically, all the three intervention strategies made an attempt at encompassing the Comprehensive approach of strategy.¹³³ This strategy attempted to coordinate the EU instruments in the region prioritizing development and venturing into joint action with other international actors working towards the stability of Somalia. In 2011, yet another strategy was adopted; 'Strategy for the Horn of Africa', this strategy prioritized linking security to development.

The EU intensified its presence in Somalia on different fronts. The EU launched the EUTM training mission to train and assist the TFG army in ensuring that the Somali citizens are provided with basic security and thus curb or discourage involvement in the Piracy business. The EUTM is part of the EU's comprehensive approach to peace and security and development.¹³⁴ The presence of AMISOM in Somalia is dependent upon EU's financial support that goes towards the salaries of the peace keepers, housing, medication and technical

¹³² Ibid

¹³³ European Commission Development and Cooperation, EuropeAid, EC Assistance to Somalia, (January 2009)

¹³⁴ Ibid ,EuropeAid, AMISOM (December 2010)

support.¹³⁵ This pits the EU as the largest donor to Somalia's peace keeping and stabilization support programmes. With the African Union as the main EU partner, both have been involved in training the TFG forces and AMISOM holds the responsibility of reintegrating the EUTM Somalia, Bihanga Camp (Uganda) trained security forces into the Somali Defence forces after few months of reintegration in Jazira, Mogadishu.¹³⁶

3.3.3 Assessment of the success in the Somali Crises Intervention

The naval operation Atalanta has been considered a big success in safeguarding the high waters of Somalia from an operational perspective. There is a significant drop in the number of piracy related vessel attacks with a considerably great response to the few that occurred in the period between 2008 and 2013. The later years have seen almost non existence piracy activities on the Somali off shore. The combined effort of the operation Atalanta and the EUCAP Nestor of 2013 spread its operation from Seychelles, Djibouti and extended into Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland creating maritime safety surveillance and improving the capacity building of the locals on matters security across the region.

AMISOM has effectively fought off the Islamic Jihadist group such as Al- Shabaab and recovered the major cities in Somalia that had been under their control for many years.¹³⁷ This has seen a relative decrease in the number of terrorism attacks within Somalia and the ripple effect extended in the neighbouring countries of Kenya and Uganda that had become susceptible and vulnerable to the instability in Somalia. The safety of the major commercial and operational cities has also made it easier for the Somali Government to provide security and rebuild the country's economy. It has also attracted more international organizations to get involved in the relatively safe Somalia.

¹³⁵ Ibid

¹³⁶ The Transitional Government on Life support (International Crisis Group)

¹³⁷ Ibid

The cooperation between the AU and the EU in maintaining peace, security and stability in the Horn of Africa has been lauded as a success. The African Union led AMISOM and the EUTM Somalia missions have also played a significant role in not only aiding the Somalia Government to maintain peace and security but also done a tremendous job in capacity building by training and reintegrating the Somalia National Army. One third of Somali's defence forces have been successfully trained since 2010. This is a reflection of the success of the Comprehensive approach that Brussels favours in intervention operations.

On the democratic front, the AMISOM and EUTM Somalia mission have enabled Somalia to hand over power from the TFG to the Federal Government of Somalia. The historic success of the elections held in early 2017 that saw Somalia carry out not only the national Assembly election but the presidential as well is an indicator that Somalia is experiencing relative calm after the 10 years of cooperation between African Union and the EU in stabilizing the country.

It is worth noting that besides the cooperation with the African Union, the EU has decisively offered solutions to the Somali crises ranging from the humanitarian challenges, piracy, gender training, youth support and heavy funding of peace and stabilization missions. There are undeniable changes in Somalia which have facilitated reconciliation, general outlook and stability of the country.

3.3.4 The Gaps and Failures in the Somali Crisis Intervention

Some scholars argue that the achievements highlighted on the peace, security and stabilization of Somalia are fragile and less self sustaining in the long term. The country is not safe enough for programs that would take the citizens out of the destruction, poverty and vulnerability to fully take off. The extremist groups are still in existence and instances of more being recruited are common place.

The resilience of the pirate groups has also not gone unnoticed as there have been cases of the pirates operating from the Coast of India where some mother ships have been sent by the pirates¹³⁸. A point to take note of is that the international community has had no capacity to prosecute the arrested pirates, the EU member states have shown unwillingness to carry out the prosecution thus leading the unconditional releasing of pirates. It is also believed that the reduction in vessel attacks is momentary due to the current international pressure on safe guarding of the maritime and that this could change at any particular moment.

The training of the SNA and reintegration of the same into the Somali forces bring to book the intrinsic challenge of lack of intermediate commands and the possible collision of the new troops with the soviet trained army generals. The Federal Somali Government is also not in a strong financial position to pay its forces. The FSG budgetary allocation for the SNA can cater for only the few SNA who protect Mogadishu. As for the other four sectors, the payment have been done by the local chiefs in some cases or government allied warlords thus creating a sense of loyalty to the individuals rather than to the service and the Federal Government. All the efforts of the EUTM Somalia and AMISOM will be of no use if in the long run the FSG is unable to pay the trained troops.¹³⁹ The Financial burden of the long stay and over dependence of AMISOM for security and the EU for financing in Somalia puts questions on the real stability of the country; this is a big point of concern that jeopardizes the future of the operations and the missions.

Challenges in coordination in working with different regional and local partners, the FSG and the Somali Army made operations in Somalia difficult and complicated. The EU has been accused of poor coordination; the humanitarian programmes of Somalia are still run from

¹³⁸ J. Ferro Rodríguez

¹³⁹ Ibid

Nairobi creating collision and unwillingness of the Somali people to fully cooperate¹⁴⁰. The kind of aid given in Somalia has also been critiqued for not being long term in sustenance; the World Food Program brings in food from outside rather than investing in Somalia to benefit the citizens economically.¹⁴¹ Mission Atalanta's financing seemed to protect the economic activities in the high seas and not directly benefiting the Somali people.

3.4 Chapter Conclusion

This chapter on An Evaluation of the effectiveness of the Joint Africa-EU strategy framework in maintaining Peace, Security and stability in Africa against other Foreign policies between Africa and Europe looks into the practicality of the JAES framework in real-time conflict affected area. The Choice of Mali, Central Republic of Africa and Somalia helps to spread the affected area in different zones as a way of determining the different causes of conflict in Africa basing on the ideology of African diversity culturally, geographically, politically and socially. The cooperation in this respect is looked at from a perspective of the strategy and policy of the different institutions that intervene in the conflicts in Africa and how successful they are deemed to be.

¹⁴⁰ H-G Ehrhart; K. Petretto(pg 184)

¹⁴¹Hagström Frisell et al. 2012, 4

CHAPTER 4: CHANGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFRICA AND THE EU, AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE EMERGING POWERS' INTERESTS IN AFRICA

4.0 Introduction

With the dynamics and an equally changing diplomatic space, states and regions are changing the manner in which they interact between and among themselves. This chapter seeks to examine the shifting relationship that the EU and the African Union has developed in the recent times in a bid to support peace, security and Stability on the African continent, the driving force behind the change in strategy, success parameters of the new impetus and a deeper look into the interests of the States in this regard. An assessment of the influence of emerging powers especially China, and its activities on the African continent will also be looked into as it seem to have some push and pull effect on the EU foreign policy strategy of in Africa. To discuss the emerging trends, the European Global Strategy of 2017 will be discussed and analysed. Although the European Global Strategy covers and goes beyond wider scopes on the diplomatic fronts, this chapter will majorly point out on the areas of peace and security and the translation of the same on the relationship between Africa and Europe. The chapter will also look into the influence that China has had on the implementation of the JAES framework, its own African policy and how the state interests of the EU member states and China are impacting on peace, security and stability in Africa.

4.1 The Joint Africa- EU Strategy Framework (JAES) and the European Union Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)

An analysis on the success of the Joint Africa –EU strategy presents a mixed track record, the major area on the importance and uniqueness of the JAES Strategy was the promise to deliver

on improved political dialogue between the African Union and the EU member States, a deliberate and unilateral voice on the issues of global concern, more so, issues that affected both Europe and Africa, involvement of non state actors and stronger support for African integration process by the European Union. While the political leaders praise, amplify the deemed success and claim progress of the JAES framework in public, it takes a nose dive in private, there are hashed undertones on the failure of the JAES as the main framework to aid in the maintaining of peace, security and stability in Africa. The failure of the strategy in addressing the issues of security in Africa is attributed to different fronts, some scholars argue that the gap between the discourse of the framework and the reality has actually widened over time, the differences between the two partners on fundamental issues such as human rights records, the contentious and differing position on the International Criminal Court, democracy and regime change¹⁴². There is also the perception that the strategy lacks the pledged support from the EU to enable it to successfully carry out the necessary interventions especially in the areas of peace and security.

With the increasing security challenges such as the terrorism and cyber attacks, human trafficking and piracy that are affecting both in Africa and Europe, the echoed admission is that the strategies employed to ensure that there is Peace and security in the two continents have not been as successful. The EU thus deliberately moved further to re-examine its stand not only as the lead partner in the global agenda of maintaining peace and security but also as the continental neighbour to Africa, keeping in mind that instability in Africa, especially the North Africa, directly impacts on the neighbouring EU states. Conversations around escalating security challenges, new diplomatic ties in the changing times, including Britain's exit discussions from the Union brought in the need for the EU to have a different strategy to define its relationship with other partners .

¹⁴² Rachel Hart, ' *Changing the relationship Between Europe and Africa* ' (July 2011)

4.1.1 The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS)

The EU, under the leadership of the High Representative Federica Mogherini in June 2016 presented the European Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) under the titled ‘*Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe*’¹⁴³ to the European Council as the agreed upon Foreign Policy and guide on how to deal with the diplomatic undertakings of the Union as well as how to tackle issues of security within and without its European borders for formal adoption.¹⁴⁴ The Global strategy not only represents a blueprint for a rule of law based Europe’s pursuit of a liberal world but also a document that contains agreed upon overarching principles of the EU foreign policy to the rest of the world in the long run.¹⁴⁵ The emphasis of the EUGS (as it is referred) is on a stronger and more unified Europe. It is underpinned by the vision of and the need and an aspiration for a stronger and unified Union, willingness and ability to make a impact and difference in the world. The EUGS intends to present to the members what is termed as a true Union that promotes shared interests through responsible partnership engagement amidst the Brexit conversations.¹⁴⁶

The principles in the document are broadly categorized under; Shared Interests and Principles, Priorities to External Action, and Vision to Action. On the Union’s shared Interests and Principles, the emphasis of the EU is on promotion of peace, guarantee the EU citizens security and advance prosperity of its citizens, and foster resilience as a model of democracy that Europe has been and promote a global order that is rules-based with a multilateral mind set and while putting the United Nations at the core. The EUGS puts emphasis on a united Europe that has potential to effectively deliver on the security,

¹⁴³ EUGS launching mission statement

¹⁴⁴ (EUGS, June 2016)

¹⁴⁵ Implementing the EU Global Strategy, the EU delivers on Security and Defence (Brussels, 2017)

¹⁴⁶ Joris Larik ‘*The EU’s Global Strategy in the Age of ‘Brexit’ and ‘America First’*’ (Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, December 2017)

democracy and prosperity of its own citizens and engage with others to deliver the same to the world at large to make a difference.

On priorities on external action, the EU sets out five priority areas that include; The security of the Union as the major priority; the EU expected to step up in and contribute to collective security of the member states and work closely with partners such as NATO to ensure that security is guaranteed, State and Societal Resilience to the East and South of Europe is the second priority area for external action, the regions stretching from Central Asia all through Central Africa are of interest as they are close neighbours to Europe. It is in the Interest of EU to build closer relations under the European Neighbourhood Policy to transform the countries within and beyond the ENP.¹⁴⁷ An Integrated approach is the third aspect on the priority; this is embraced to go beyond the comprehensive approach in tackling conflicts within and beyond the European Union member states' borders. The EU is to tackle conflict at all stages, act at different level of governance and seek measures of stabilization by ensuring that there is no disengagement at a premature stage in the event of a crisis erupting. Most importantly to the Integrated Approach, to ensure that there is adequate involvement of partners in conflict management. The EUGS also recognizes the importance of regional cooperation orders as a means to manage economic and security concerns while at the same time ensuring that globalization embraces the uniqueness of identities and cultures in the 21st century. Finally the EU aims to be transforming the existing system in the global order under the international law ensuring that there is respect to human rights, sustainable development and a drive towards common global interests.

The Vision to Action embraces and puts further emphasis on a stronger and credible European Union with sovereignty of the members, an aspiration for a responsive Union with

¹⁴⁷ Ibid113

its diplomatic activities enshrined in the Lisbon treaty¹⁴⁸ and exploring all its potential and the developmental agenda of the members be more aligned to the EU's Strategic priorities . There is also the aspect of members being joined up particularly on the aspects of implementation of the policies on migration, Sustainable development goals, security and counter terrorism.

With the clearly changed context in engagement, the EU Global Strategy puts to question all the other existing agreements that the EU has been pursuing in various capacities and with the different regions. With The EUGS main priority still in the area of peace and security, the focus on the European neighbourhood in the 'principled pragmatism' that prioritizes Europe in the External Action on matters of security creates a conflict of interest, an ambitious document with a regional outlook with the need to offer its citizens tangible solutions on the present immediate challenges, it has been viewed by many as self preservationist as migration and asylum seeking from the neighbouring African States is highly securitized.¹⁴⁹The EUGs has also been criticised as yet another non consultative document on the African end thus considered a one way dialogue of Europe talking down at Africa to solve the African peace and security challenges. The divergent opinions on the issues of migration, human rights and the international criminal court still stand and seem to have further deepened with the European Global strategy.¹⁵⁰ As some EU members down play the political , economic and strategic importance of Africa to their own long term agenda , it is clear that there are some state centric interests that push the EU involvement in African affairs especially the interest in the peace and security sphere. There appears to be

¹⁴⁸ <http://www.lisbon-treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty.html>

¹⁴⁹ Larik (2017)

¹⁵⁰ Ibid

an urgency of The EU to link its African Policy with the EUGS hence an adoption of a joint communication on the Africa EU partnership in May 2017.¹⁵¹

4.2. The Effect of China on the Joint EU-Africa Strategy Framework Cooperation

4.2.1 China's influence on EU Foreign Policy

The global influence of the emergence of China as a major Economic power plays out through the European Global Strategy on foreign affairs and security Policy albeit in a subtle way. The Union's insistence on the observation of both domestic and International Law, more so the Law of the Sea by the EU, the rules-based global order with the UN as the core, seem to directly reprimand and reference China's activities. Southern China sea disputes¹⁵², the Chinese Influence on the global scene on trade, its development aid activities and human rights record track are reflected in the principles put down in the EUGs. This thus points to particular interests that the EU has and seeks to curtail and by extension, a show that the EU intends to redeem its seemingly dipping grip as a transformative global power.¹⁵³ This sought of competition for influence has seen Africa and African leaders provide the play field for the supremacy battles and thus grounds for compromise on the genuine implementation of the strategies and agreements in place that in the long run affect the direction on maintaining peace, security and stability.

4.2.2 The JAES Framework and China's Africa Policy

In 2006, just one year before the adoption of the JAES Strategy framework, China launched its 'Africa Policy', as a means to a strategic approach on how China would relate to Africa. It is therefore worth noting that the two documents, Africa Policy and The JAES are interlinked

¹⁵¹ Ibid

¹⁵² The South China Arbitration Case(The Republic of Philippines Vs The Peoples Republic of China(12 July 2016 ruling)

¹⁵³ Ibid

in terms of the interest of China and Europe respectively in the African continent.¹⁵⁴ With the clear intention to work with Africa and the subsequent increased presence of China in Africa, the need for the EU to develop a working relationship as opposed to the viewed competition and the perceived negative contribution of China to climate change arose. In 2008, the EU commission held a trilateral dialogue that would see China, Africa and European collaborate and cooperate in Africa in four major areas to avoid unnecessary overlap, these include areas of peace and security, infrastructural support, Agriculture and food security, environmental and natural resources sustainability management.¹⁵⁵ The proposal was endorsed immediately by the European council. The prioritization of security in this regard was for the specific nexus that security has with development hence need for a more multilateral approach to promote the areas of Peace and security in Africa and sustain economic and social development on the continent¹⁵⁶. With these proposals on how to manage the African conflicts at a tripartite level communicated through the European commission, it is considered as an effort to not only undermine tenets of the JAES on equality but also the African voice and right to choice on who to engage at the consultative level as a third party, in this case, China, on matters regarding peace, security and development in Africa.¹⁵⁷ It is also considered a contradiction to use the existing bilateral agreement (JAES), that is the overarching framework that defines how the AU engages diplomatically with the EU to engage at a tripartite level with a third partner without adequate consultation from both ends. The prescriptive nature of the communication and proposal by commission on how Africa

¹⁵⁴ Jing Men, B. Benjamin 'China and the European Union in Africa : Partners or competitors' (Farnham: Ashgate 2011, pg 269)

¹⁵⁵ Ibid

¹⁵⁶ Council of the EU, ' Conclusions on Trilateral Dialogue and Cooperation between the European Union , China and Africa(Brussels, 10 November 2008)

¹⁵⁷ Anna Katharina Stahl, ' Hic Sunt Dracones: Exploring Unchartered Territory of EU-China-Africa Trilateral Relations, (PHD diss, Vrije Universiteit, Brussels, 2014. pg 251)

should 'behave' towards China has been met with resistance and in its place, a consideration for mechanism that is trilateral suggested.¹⁵⁸

4.2.3 EU- Africa-China: Tripartite Partnership; Different Approaches

There is an imbalance in looking at a possible cooperation of China and Europe on their respective involvement Security on one side and development on the other in Africa. While the EU engages Africa at a regional level under different frameworks such as the JAES and The Economic Partnership Agreements negotiation, the Chinese engagement with the African countries is very much state specific. The EU's interest in African peace and security takes a fourfold front, first is the increasing focus on the internal security and the defence of the EU, the now established nexus between security and development, the launch of the African Peace and Security Architecture and finally, the strong emergence of Africa in the global scene.¹⁵⁹ The pre-existing agreements would set ground for deeper negotiations with the African states, this has however not been the case as disagreements on the different frameworks applied to African regions and the shift in interests of other Africa states to China have necessitated a need for change in strategy for different conflict prone regions in Africa. It can be argued that it is against this backdrop that the EU has been making an attempt to 'custom make' its policies in different region in Africa such as the EU policy on the Horn of Africa and the EU's Strategy for Security and development in the Sahel.¹⁶⁰ The EU's effort in tackling security threats in Africa has seen it emphasise security as it has combined the development aid with the EU common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

¹⁵⁸ Bernardo Mariani, *Challenges and Opportunities for Peace and Security Cooperation, Europe, China and Africa: New thinking for a secure century.* (Brussels: Friends of Europe 2016 Pg 67.70)

¹⁵⁹ Bromley, Mark, 'The European Union' in *The Security Activities of External Actors in Africa*(ed Elisabeth Sk Sköns and Olawale Ismael (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) pg 132.

¹⁶⁰ The Council of the EU, ' Council Conclusions on a Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels: 14 November 2011)

thus ensuring that security is placed as a precondition of a country's development. This is also echoed in the European Global strategy.

4.3 China's Interests in Africa

China has in the recent past shown wider ambitions assertiveness to take a leading role in the geopolitics and in establishing herself in global trade while moving towards establishing herself as an important global actor through the United Nations.¹⁶¹ The 2016 launch and construction of China's military base in Djibouti, a first one overseas, is a positive indicator of China's willingness to be more involved in the maintaining of peace and security in Africa. In cooperating with the African states, China started following up its Africa Policy by creating a post of special Representative for the African Affairs in 2009, in 2015, the China permanent Mission to the AU was opened and as it stands at the moment,¹⁶² China has already acquired an observer status at the African Union. These are clear and strategic steps towards China's intentional interest in cooperation with Africa.¹⁶³ The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has been the conduit through which China has been financially supporting and investing in Africa. The FOCAC has action plans are adopted through Ministerial conferences. The current Action plan was adopted in 2015 In Johannesburg where China planned to invest in Africa USD 100 billion by 2020. This is an indicator of China's strong presence in Africa on investment and trade relations. The Chinese investment approach embraces what it refers to as economic cooperation which differs from EU's development ad that has often been critiqued for its conditionality.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶¹ Rudolf Du Plessis, 'Trump and Africa: Making China Great Again (South African Institute of International Affairs, February 2017)

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³ Wheeler, ' *Tackling the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons* ', Dittgen et al. ' *On Becoming a Responsible Great Power*' (109)

¹⁶⁴ Manrique Gil, 'Something *New out of Africa?*

Enshrined in the 2006 'Africa Policy', China argues that it has gone through similar developmental part as Africa and therefore shares more common valued compared to Africa's other partners . China in its cooperation holds onto the aspect of non-interference in the internal affairs of its development partners and respect to state sovereignty. On multilateralism, China commits its cooperation with the African Union and the UN by making its contribution toward peace keeping missions, ad that it would provide assistance in its own capacity in conflict resolution.

China has increased its involvement in African Peace and security though with a great difference in perception with the EU. China does not necessary push for democratic spaces in the states that it partners with a policy that augur well with the African Doctrine of 'African solutions for African Problem'.¹⁶⁵ Scholar Bund and Makocki point out to the fact that the involvement of China in Africa might be posing a threat to the peace and security in Africa as its economic involvement has been linked to conflicts that have erupted in some countries on account of their employment policies, reported cases of corruption and environmental degradations and alleged firearms supply in countries where they operate. There are calls for China to depart from the hands off attitude and get more involved while still keeping mind the non-indifference and non-interference principles in maintaining world peace and security.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁵ China's involvement in Africa's Security, Chung Zhang.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid

4.4 Chapter Conclusion

Chapter 4 covers the concept of; examining the changing relationship between Africa and EU and the influence of the emerging powers such as China interests in Africa. This is a partly a determination into the emerging trends and the future that the EU and the AU are looking into. With a clear change of tone in how the EU intends to cooperate with Africa as deduced from The EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) of 2016, it is highly likely that some policies including the JAES Strategy framework has not stood the test time. Africa has also been seen to ‘Face the East’, this in a nut shell indicates that China is and will be a determiner on the trajectory of EU Foreign policies in Africa.

CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS, KEY DEBATES, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

5.0 Introduction

This chapter will cover an introductory discussion on the specific area of the Africa EU cooperation through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy as the focus of the study. A summary the key areas of debates, the summary of the finding of the study, the conclusion and finally, the recommendations for further studies around the thematic concerns.

From a broad perspective, this study aimed at examining the African-European cooperation in maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa through a critical analysis of the effectiveness of the Joint Africa EU Strategy Framework. This Strategy Framework is important in its own right as it is the formal channel that forms the basis of the foreign Policy of the European Union in Africa. As such it holds the superiority and lays the ground for equality in engagement on matters of global concern, and terms of interaction between The African Union and The European Union. The Continent to Continent cooperation was an agreement reached to avoid and break away from stratification and fragmentation of African countries by the European Union through multiple bilateral, tripartite and multilateral agreements, conventions and partnerships that not only caused overlaps in tackling challenges in Africa but also seemed to undermine the concept of Africa being under one Umbrella of the African Union. With a recognition that Africa has and is still considered a continent prone to instances insecurity and instability, the effects of the same spills over considering that Europe is the closest neighbour to Africa to the North. Against this backdrop, a working relationship between the two continents has to be forged on policy fronts to ensure that a mutual understanding and a common ground is reached.

As an important foreign policy framework, the study divulges into the details of the JAES Strategy Framework, its structure, content, areas of emphasis, and a discussion on its strengths and weaknesses as a framework dependent on to deliver results as Africa and Europe cooperate to maintain peace, security and stability on the African continent. The debates on delivery cannot be successful without looking at other operational frameworks that form base to the Africa-EU partnership. These include the Cotonou Agreement of 2000, which, legally speaking remains the overarching framework, and regional strategies such as those that cover the Horn of Africa, The Sahel, The Gulf of Guinea, European Neighbourhood among others. Of even greater concern is the 2016 European Union Global Strategy on Security and Foreign Policy,¹⁶⁷ this brings to book questions on the change in strategy, the conditions and questions the position of the Joint-Africa EU Strategy framework amidst all the Changes. Could it an admission that the JAES framework, as a policy instrument has not been effective enough as a framework within which Africa and the EU works to maintain peace, security and Stability in Africa?

5.1 Empirical data and Findings

Empirical data on the effectiveness of the Africa-EU cooperation in maintaining Peace, Security and stability in Africa

To clearly put to perspective the effectiveness of the Africa-EU cooperation in maintaining Peace, Security and stability in Africa, particularly analyzing The Joint African-European Strategy framework. The researchers, administered questionnaires to respondents at EU delegation to Kenya, political office, The African Union, Kenya and Addis Ababa, Institute of Peace and Security Studies, Addis Ababa, at the Institute of Diplomacy and International

¹⁶⁷ Ibid 11

studies, University of Nairobi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya, the Kenyan Embassy in Addis Ababa, IGAD- Addis Ababa, the United Nations, Somalia Mission and 4 respondents from the Kenya Defence Force. Two focus groups were conducted at the IPSS, Addis Ababa, and IDIS, University of Nairobi, physical and phone interviews were also conducted in the collection of data.

Being a study on policy, several policy documents and formal communiqués were also analyzed to form a basis for secondary data in places where, due to financial and logistical constraints, the researcher could not access.

Of the 157 questionnaires that were administered over the period of time, only 125 were either received back, and/or correctly or fully filled as shown in the table below. This represents 79.6% return rate. The findings from the questionnaires, interviews and the resulting responses from the focus group discussions form the basis of the summary of the findings in this section.


Table 1: The Administered and Received Back Questionnaires

PLACE ADMINISTRED	Number of Administered Questionnaires	Number of the Received Back Questionnaires
EU Delegation to Kenya	15	12
African Union- Addis Ababa	25	15
African Union- Nairobi	10	10
IDIS- Nairobi	30	25
IPSS-Addis Ababa	25	18
Kenya Defense Force	07	07
IGAD- Addis Ababa	15	13
UN Support of in Somalia(Nairobi)	10	07
Citizens in Nairobi	20	18

Table 2: Age Distribution of the Respondents


Respondents Age Bracket in Years	18-39	30-39	40-49	50-59	Above 60
Number	31	43	35	14	2

Chart 1: Age Distribution of the Respondents



On age distribution majority of the respondents were below the age 50. This gives 86% of the total number of respondents. Those in their 50's made up 12% and the above 60 age bracket were only 2 thus the least with just slightly above 1% of the respondents.

Chart 2: Level of Education




The highest number of respondents were holders of Masters Degree at 37%, followed closely by the Degree holders at 25%; this could be attributed to the target population of the study that aimed at mostly those in policy making docket or a studying toward the same.

Table 3: Gender distribution

GENDER	NUMBER
Female	43
Male	82
Total	125

Chart 3: Gender distribution




66% represents the number of male respondents while the female formed 34%.

Table 5: Years of Service

YEARS OF SERVICE	Less than 5	5-10	11-15	Over 15
NUMBER	23	38	49	16

Chart 4: Years of Service



5.2 Summary of Key debates

In analysing the extent to which the Joint Africa- EU strategy has been instrumental in maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa, it can be noted that right from its structural composition, right from its establishment and adoption, there seem to have been hurried effort to adopt the strategy as a deliverable on both the EU and AU quarters with no capacity or political will to actually implement it in its full capacity especially on cooperating on matters of peace and security. The dawn of the millennium saw a keen and intentional interest of other emerging economic powers such as India, Brazil and majorly China in Africa as the continent began getting a voice in the global arena as a place of opportunity. This meant that Europe needed to move fast and secure her position as the main global actor in Africa

Framework Capacity

As a framework, the JAES has formal capacity as the augmenting policy, it is well constituted with fair representation in all its operational areas, the framework does however lack the legal capacity to stand as the overarching framework that define the foreign policy of African Union and the European Union, the Cotonou Agreement that gave rise to the ACP agreement still holds both the legal and financial muscle. The ACP is also more recognizable in terms of the number of people who know about its mandate. This therefore leaves the JAES Strategy framework to be considered as less superior and continues to operate as an ad hoc policy.

State of the AU- EU Cooperation under JAES Framework

The enthusiasm about the framework is fizzling out, Africa on one side has been critiqued for making the success of the Framework challenging with her inability to financially support the various peace keeping missions, the African leaders on the other hand point figures back to the EU claiming that the Union is quick in promising funding but does not deliver. The relationship and conversations between Africa and Europe remains largely Donor-Recipient.

Effectiveness of the different Policy Approaches

Those in support of the importance of using diverse strategies and tailor made frameworks for different states and regions put forward the arguments that Africa is too diverse with deep cultural, social, political and geographical differences that result to different forms and causes of conflicts that cannot have homogenous approaches in resolving. The strong affiliation to former colonial masters has also been a factor in ensuring that Africa is treated as one.

Ideological differences between The AU and EU

The changing priorities and agenda pose challenges to the JAES framework; issues of the influx of migrants and asylum seekers into Europe have set Africa and Europe on the opposite fronts. The political leaders in Africa have been resistant and insist on aid and trade negotiations in some troikas while the EU side put priority on immigration, the perceived high securitization of immigration and asylum seeking by Europe has been a contentious issue for the Unions. The comprehensive approach applied by the EU in the conflict prone zones, especially North Africa, has been interpreted as an attempt by Europe 'to keep Africa's Problems in Africa' and not developmentally motivated.

The political leaders in Africa have also been critiqued for not being very keen on implementing agreed upon strategies, it has been urged that they avoid, resist and reconstruct

some policies to benefit from the lack of coordination. On the democratic front and rule of law, collision occurs on AU and EU's stand on their positions on International Justice and the role of International Criminal Court in conflict resolution, Europe is viewed as being in support of the court for prosecution of offenders of crimes against humanity, African Union and some ordinary citizens in Africa on the other hand, hold on the perception that the ICC is a biased institution that targets precisely African leaders, a position that escalated the 'African solutions to African problems' debate.

Financial support and Capacity

The overreliance on the EU for financial support in dealing with security related issues puts Africa at a disadvantage on the negotiation table. The funds from the EU are also in most cases unpredictable and conditional. The ACP agreement is not open to funding military related missions. Regional affiliations play out where hegemonies in the regional organizations direct their funds to enable the trading blocs as opposed to enabling or directing funds to the AU for the African standby Force and this hampered African Union from consolidating funds from members. The missions are also too expensive in terms of the technical and operational costs.

The JAES framework and other institutional policies

The European Union has shown cooperation with the AU, UN and the regional blocs in efforts of intervention. The synergy in intervention has been considered successful in most instances. The financial and technical support in terms of training have been instrumental in bringing peace in the countries that intervention under the EU has been involved and cooperated with the African Union. The EU involvement in supporting the AMISOM mission stands out, majority are aware of the support 22% say it is an AU undertaking while less than 10% responded that they do not know of how the three interconnect. In the coordination,

there are however instances where there have been overlapping in roles and mandate during interventions by the EU, AU and the regional blocs. Lack of consultation and poor strategy in handling of conflicts in Libya, Mali, CAR and The Gambia has been pointed out as close to disastrous on humanitarian scale.

Interventions in conflict areas

There are claims of preference and discrimination when it comes to countries that interventions are directed to. This is mostly driven by vested interests that the intervening parties have in the countries. While atrocities are committed in some countries such as Burundi, there is very little to show that the international community and the peace keepers have done to salvage the situation. Perennial conflicts in some African states are claimed to be fuelled by the west as a measure to illegally exploit the natural resources under the disguise of intervention. Some of the countries cited include The CAR, DRC, Libya and Sierra Leone among others.

Institutional Challenges of the JAES framework

Lack of public participation has hampered chances of ownership of the framework's mandate, the ordinary citizens and the civil society are not involved and some do not understand the role of the framework, the processes and decisions are left entirely to the officials and expert groups. This has rendered the framework too state-centric and wanting in consultation.

The European Union Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) is yet to gain prominence, momentum and acceptance among the African policy makers, a surprising 63% of the respondents were not very familiar with it. It is however prominent among the diplomatic groups, the common view of those who have gone through it is that it is still non consultative, too ambitious and still 'talks down at Africa'. The emphasis on putting Europe

first, it is argued, makes the framework lack a global appeal .Most EU policy makers from are receptive to the framework, they are of the opinion that it is decisive and relevant n the prevailing times where security has been challenged and decisive in nature to tackle security challenges not only in Africa but across Europe and the global.

State interests in Africa

The EU continues to downplay Africa's importance this is an opportunity that is impulsively being taken by china as a leading developmental partner. There are however reservations on china's capacity to genuinely involve herself in peace, security and conflict resolution in Africa, a position that the European Union is still held high on.

5.3 Conclusion

This research has established that cooperation in maintaining peace and security in Africa is a prerequisite to claim any form of success. It is however challenging when tied to a particular framework. The Joint Africa- EU Strategy Framework has been instrumental in governing the relationship between Africa and Europe on predominant areas of such as peace and security, Human rights and Rule of law, democracy and governance, Trade and Regional integration, Climate change, technology and information. All these remain to be ambitious, long shopping lists of deliverables and non deliverables. When it comes to the sensitive matter of peace, security and stability in African States, the policies raise political temperatures through Political Interference, State-centric interests, and hegemonic collisions.

In centralizing Africa, the African Union plays a vital role; it can however not work on its own owing to the frequency of conflicts on the continent. The lack of financial capacity by the organization disadvantages it in cooperation with other organizations and Financial and technical capacity goes hand in hand with political for the success of a given policy.

5.4 Policy Recommendations

In order to have effective policies that encourage and affirm the cooperation between Europe and Africa in ensuring that Africa has peace, security and it stable,

1. Policy makers should recognize that many regional organizations have a strong basis and thus need go beyond the trade negotiations and involved and support them more as important components in security matters in on the continent.
2. African countries should adequately fund the African Standby Force to avoid ad hoc and ill equipped missions
3. Recognize the unique diversity in Africa while still recognizing the important role that the African Union plays in uniting the continent
4. In this information era, policy makers have to be intentional in educating the public for ownership

5.5 Suggestions on Areas for Further research.

A lot seem to have been done in areas of maintaining peace and security in Africa. There are however gaps in areas of inclusivity when it comes to policy management in relation to conflict management. The effect of 'Brexit' and the choice of 'silence' and non-acknowledgment in the recent EU Global strategy for foreign and Security Policy is also a matter than needs further discussions.

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Appendix I: Questionnaire

C/O University of Nairobi,

Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies

P.O. Box 30197,

Nairobi.

Date:

Dear Sir/Madam

QUESTIONNAIRE ON AFRICA-EU COOPERATION IN MAINTAINING PEACE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE JAES STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

The above subject refers; I do hereby request your assistance in getting responses as a fulfilment to the study in the mentioned area. I am a Masters of Arts student at the University of Nairobi pursuing research information on *Africa-EU cooperation in maintaining peace, Security and Stability in Africa, A critical analysis of the JAES Strategy Framework*. To be able to do this study, I am required to get information from
.....for assistance in data collection, this will only be possible through responding to the questions attached herein in the questionnaire .I have tried to make the questions short and so as to take a relatively short time to respond to. Your response to each one of the questions will be of invaluable contribution to this study. I do assure you of my utmost confidentiality and that the information so collected will be used precisely for this academic purpose. Any publication of these findings will be purely for statistical purposes and with formal authorization of the University of Nairobi.

Your assistance will be greatly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,

Elizabeth A. Akinyi

PART A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. What age bracket are you in?

- a. 18-29 []
- b. 30-39 []
- c. 40-49[]
- d. 50-59[]
- e. Over 60 years[]

2. What is your highest qualification academically?

- a. Certificate []
- b. Diploma[]
- c. Bachelor[]
- d. Masters[]
- e. Other (Kindly specify.....)

3. What is your Gender?

- a. Male
- b. Female
- c. other

4. Nationality.....

5. Employer.....

6. Precise job title.....

7. How many years of professional service have you served?

- a. Less than 5 years
- b. 5 – 10 years
- c. 11-15 years

d. Over 15 years

8. In your opinion, which top 5 countries or continents would you say are relating more with Africa on different fronts?

.....

.....

.....

.....

9. What is the state of the relationship of the following countries/ Continents on with Africa?

	Very well	Well	Fairly Well	Poor	Don't know
USA/AFRICA					
EUROPE/AFRICA					
CHINA /AFRICA					
AFRICA TO AFRICA					
OTHERS /AFRICA					

10. On a scale of 1-5, where 5 is the highest value that represents Most and one last, which areas do the following countries / Continents cooperate most with Africa?

a) EUROPE AND AFRICA

COOPERATION LEVEL SECTOR	1	2	3	4	5
TRADE					
DEVELOPMENT/AID					
SECURITY					
SCIENCE AND INNOVATION					
IMMIGRATION					
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE					
CLIMATE CHANGE AND RESILIANCE					

b) USA AND AFRICA

COOPERATION LEVEL SECTOR	1	2	3	4	5
TRADE					
DEVELOPMENT/AID					
SECURITY					
SCIENCE AND INNOVATION					
IMMIGRATION					
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE					
CLIMATE CHANGE AND RESILIANCE					

c) CHINA AND AFRICA

COOPERATION LEVEL SECTOR	1	2	3	4	5
TRADE					
DEVELOPMENT/AID					
SECURITY					
SCIENCE AND INNOVATION					
IMMIGRATION					
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE					
CLIMATE CHANGE AND RESILIANCE					

d) AFRICAN COUNTRIES AMONG THEMSELVES

COOPERATION LEVEL SECTOR	1	2	3	4	5
TRADE					
DEVELOPMENT/AID					
SECURITY					
SCIENCE AND INNOVATION					

IMMIGRATION					
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE					
CLIMATE CHANGE AND RESILIANCE					

AFRICA AND OTHERS (Please specify...)

COOPERATION LEVEL SECTOR	1	2	3	4	5
TRADE					
DEVELOPMENT/AID					
SECURITY					
SCIENCE AND INNOVATION					
IMMIGRATION					
DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE					
CLIMATE CHANGE AND RESILIANCE					

11. Do Africa and Europe have formal way or policy that defines how they relate?

YES NO NOT SURE

12. a) Have you seen, heard or read about the following?

Framework/ Policy	YES	NO
a)The Joint Africa-EU strategy Frame (JAES Framework)		
b)The European Global Strategy for Foreign Affairs and security (EUGS)		
c)The Cotonou treaty – (ACP agreement)		

(b) If yes for any of the Framework in 12. a) above, on a scale of 1-5, where 5 represents very well and 1 not at all, how well do you understand the contents of the framework?

	1	2	3	4	5
The JAES Framework					
The EUGS					
The ACP					

c) If 12. b), above is 3 and above in score, what are;

i) The strengths of the framework(s)

ii) The weakness of the framework(s)

13. In your opinion, how is the security situation in Africa at the moment?

.....

14. Which countries in Africa have been affected most by conflicts?

.....

15. What are some of the major reasons for the conflicts and instability in the countries that you have mentioned above?

.....

16. If we singled out migration and immigration as an effect of conflict and instability in the countries mentioned, who is most affected or bearing the highest burden/ weight?

.....

17. Who bears the chief responsibility of ensuring that Africa is peaceful, secure and stable?

.....

18. a) Do you support interventions?

YES

NO

b) If yes in 18. a) above, which organization would you rather should intervene in Africa, select in order of preference and priority, 1 representing first preference and 5 least preferred

Institution

Any willing Country	United Nations	African Union	Regional Blocs	European Union
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Order of Preference
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

19. Which countries do you know where intervention has taken place?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

20. If we selected the countries listed below, how would you rate the level of effectiveness/success of the missions? (Mark appropriately within the box for each organization. Kindly name the other if any)

THE CAR		Very Effective	Effective	Fair	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
	UN					
	AU					
	EU					
	CEMAC					
	OTHERS					

MALI		Very Effective	Effective	Fair	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
	UN					
	AU					
	EU					
	ECOWAS					
	OTHERS					

SOMALIA		Very Effective	Effective	Fair	Ineffective	Very Ineffective
	UN					
	AU					
	EU					
	IGAD					

	OTHERS					
--	--------	--	--	--	--	--

21. Has the AU done enough to keep Africa safe?

YES

NO

NOT SURE

22. Which areas can the AU improve and emphasis on to be adequately equipped for crises in Africa?

.....

23. What are your views on China's activities in Africa?

.....

THANK YOU

Appendix II: Interview Guide

C/O University of Nairobi,
Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies
P.O. Box 30197,
Nairobi.
Date:
Dear Sir/Madam

INTERVIEW GUIDE ON AFRICA-EU COOPERATION IN MAINTAINING PEACE SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFRICA-A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE JAES STRATEGY FRAMEWORK

The above subject refers; I do hereby request your assistance in getting responses as a fulfilment to the study in the mentioned area. I am a Masters of Arts student at the University of Nairobi pursuing research information on *Africa-EU cooperation in maintaining peace, Security and Stability in Africa, A critical analysis of the JAES Strategy Framework*. To do this study, I am required to get information fromfor assistance in data collection, this will only be possible through responding to the suggested questions contained in the interview guide. I have tried to make the questions short and so as to take a relatively short time to respond to. Your response to each one of the questions will be of invaluable contribution to this study. I do assure you of my utmost confidentiality and that the information so collected will be used precisely for this academic purpose. Any publication of these findings will be purely for statistical purposes and with formal authorization of the University of Nairobi. I would also request your consent to record the conversation for purposes of crosschecking during data analysis.

Your assistance will be greatly appreciated.

Yours faithfully,
Elizabeth A. Akinyi

Interview Guide

Foreign Policy

1. In your opinion, which top 5 countries or continents would you say are relating more with Africa on different fronts?
2. What is the state of the relationship of Africa with,
 - a) US,
 - b) EU
 - c) China
 - d) Among themselves
3. What about the African States? How are they relating?
4. Have you seen, heard or read about,
 - a) The Joint Africa EU framework
 - b) The Contonou Agreement?..... ACP
 - c) The European Global Strategy framework of 2016?
5. What is your take on these strategies?

Security

1. In your opinion, how is the security situation in Africa at the moment?
2. Which countries in Africa have been affected most by conflicts?
3. What are some of the major reasons for the conflicts and instability in those the countries that you have mentioned above?
4. If we singled out migration and immigration as an effect of conflict and instability in
5. Who bares the chief responsibility of ensuring that Africa is peaceful, secure and stable?

Interventions

1. Do you support interventions?
2. Which organization would you rather should intervene in Africa,
3. Which countries do you know where intervention has taken place?
4. Which missions would you say have been successful?
5. If we selected Mali Car and Somalia, how would you rate the intervention strategy
6. Has the AU done enough to keep Africa safe?
7. Which areas can the AU improve and emphasis on to be adequately equipped for crises in Africa?
8. What are your views on China's activities in Africa?

Appendix III : A Map showing the EU Supported, AU-led and AU-endorsed Peacekeeping Missions

