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COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN AFRICA:

A CASE STUDY OF THE MEDIA IN KENYA

BY

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this is my original research project and has not been submitted for any award in any other University.

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This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

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DEDICATION

This research project is devoted to my lovely wife, Lilian

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

This study assesses the efficacy of counterterrorism strategies in Africa utilizing the role of media in counter-terrorism in Kenya as case study. The study investigates the efficacy of the counter-terrorism strategies in place and suggests a feasible approach that includes pertinent stakeholders, especially bringing the media on board as a fundamental stakeholder. This research uses Media-Oxygen of Publicity thesis as a tool to explain and understand the dynamics of international terrorism. The research agrees with the hypotheses that: Counter terrorism strategies in Africa have ignored the media's potency on combating terrorism. Apparently, there is a positive correlation between increasing terrorism activities in Kenya and the media coverage of terrorism, hence incorporation of the media in counter terrorism strategies could greatly contribute to reducing international terrorism. The findings indicate that Kenya's counterterrorism strategy remain inadequate in addressing preventive terrorism measures, especially in strengthening collaborations between the government and the media to counter extremism and radicalization as well as underlying root causes of terrorism. The analysis points out that State centric counterterrorism measures in Africa is counter-productive. The study recommends counterterrorism strategies which incorporate the media. This is informed by the fact that the primary objective of terrorism is to publicize their cause and the media is the medium used, meaning that for terrorists to succeed in reaching a wider society, they require the media. The media, which incorporates the mass media and social media, has powerful influence on the impact of terror activities. Given that publicity is pivotal for terrorists to advance their cause, working with the media in the counter terrorism campaign is apparently the most plausible approach.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AIG	Armed Islamic Group
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CT	Counter Terrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
EU	European Union
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front
GCTF	Global Counterterrorism Forum
GWoT	Global War on Terror
HOA	Horn of Africa
ICPAT	Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ISIL	Islamic State in Syria and the Levant
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KTN	Kenya Television Network
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MCK	Media Council of Kenya
NTV	Nation Television
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogadeni National Liberation Front
PLO	Palestinians Liberation Organization
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1   Background of the Study

The definition of the term terrorism remains elusive and ambiguous with no universally acceptable understanding of the terminology. The struggle of defining terrorism is as difficult as the struggle against terrorism itself. The notion that when one is considered a terrorist, others perceive him as freedom fighter, helps to complicate efforts of attaining a more amenable meaning of terrorism. Indeed, there are as many definitions as there are terror attacks worldwide. Terrorism has different meanings not only to different people but also it means different things in different time periods. For example, the following categories of people perceive terrorism differently: for those in authority who are responsible for peace, order and security; for academia; for journalists; for onlookers and spectators; for those who are victims or relatives of victims; and for the terrorists themselves.

To differentiate terrorism from other forms of crime, Bruce Hoffman (1998) identifies the following characteristics associated with terrorism: aims and motives are political, using violence or threats to use violence, perpetrated by subnational groups who have distinct chain of command, intended to create fear on a broader targeted audiences that go over and above the direct victims. From the foregoing, Hoffman defines terrorism as deliberate action of generating and exploiting fear and anxiety by using threats of violence or actual violence in order to attain a desired political change.

Gerd Nonneman (2010) stresses that what is important to know is that terrorism is not an '-ism' which refers to ideology. It is a tactic which can be used by an individual, groups

or a state for any ideological or other motives. He defines terrorism as "the act or threat of violence targeting non-combatant population and/or institutions, often but not always in arbitrary fashion, in order to create fear and/or to damage the institutions that are being challenged." For him, the aim of threatening or using violence ranges from destabilizing the target, demonstrating the movement's strength, forcing policy change or extracting financial gain. Gerd identifies four main categories of terrorism: one, revolutionary or ideological which aims to replace the existing order using a clearly new order, two, Nihilist or anarchist which aims to destroy the existing order without any clear roadmap of preferred alternative, three, nationalist which aims at liberating people or territory and fourthly, criminal type which entail creation of or maintaining an environment conducive to the interests of organized crime.[1]

For the purpose of this study, terrorism examined excludes state terrorism and is limited to that which is employed by non-state actors and directed against non-combatant civilian populations and organizations. In this respect, the operational definition of terrorism adopted for this study is that terrorism entails deliberate use or threat to use violence against non-combatants to purposefully create fear for political, ideological or religious reasons. This underlies the fundamentality and functionality of the media as the medium of publicity in the terrorists' calculus when executing attacks.

Three major theories namely; Libertarian theory, the social responsibility theory and the Soviet communist theory better explain the function of the media. Under the liberal systems of government, the functions of the media are enshrined in the countries constitutions or fundamental laws. Basically, the media is free from government controls

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[1] Gerd Nonneman, 'Terrorism and Political Violence in the Middle East and North Africa: Drivers and Limitations, in Asaf Siniver (Ed.), International Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, Routledge Publishers, 2010, New York, pp.12-13

and has the key function of keeping the government in check. Besides, the media mandate is to inform, entertain and provide a basis of economic support through advertising. In other words, the media under liberal systems have a central role in social interaction, political and economic discourses and the formation of "public opinion" without undue hindrance from the government. However, the social responsibility theory emphasizes responsibility of the media to the society it serves as opposed to freedom per se. The media assumes not only legal responsibilities but also moral obligations for all that they broadcast for the general good of the people. The Soviet Communist theory, posits that the media is state owned, under tight controls and the virtues of individual liberty are subordinate to those of the party and the state. The media therefore, operates as a tool of the ruling power. These theoretical interpretations of the roles and functions of the media raise fundamental questions on the extent to which the roles and functions of the media are determined and the political system and the government in power.[2]

From the foregoing, the cardinal aim is to achieve maximum publicity for the group/individual or cause.[3] From the definition of terrorism, it is discernible that the media, though it may not be fully responsible for terrorism occurrences, nevertheless it plays a critical role in publicizing the terrorist groups' agenda. The media provides the medium of drawing attention and diffusing the message of the group. Essentially, the key objective of terrorism is to disseminate terror and uncertainty among the targeted audience as well as spreading of the group's message through the violent acts.[4] Terrorist attacks are in most cases deftly designed to attract and allure the media.

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[2] Ochilo Polycarp J., Press Freedom and the Role of the Media in Kenya, 1993, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/32b0/b1ef28942de9f72f632b8afb684862875055.pdf, accessed on 15/07/18
[3] Matusitz, J.A., Terrorism and Communication: A Critical Introduction, (Sage Publications Inc., 2013), pp.4
[4] Alexander Spencer, *Lessons Learnt: Media and Terrorism*, Arts and Humanities Research Council, AHRC Public Policy Series, No.4, 2012

Though contested, symbiotic relationship exists between the media and terrorism whereby terrorists use the media to articulate and advance their cause to the intended audience whereas the media needs the terrorist theatre for newsworthy items to increase audience base and as a strategy to maximize profits. Media – terrorism oxygen thesis advocated by former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher postulates that the media is basically the oxygen of publicity for terrorists, without which, their activities and influence can be greatly curtailed. The terrorists constantly seek to exploit free media and even manipulate it to achieve their objectives.

Apparently, to a larger extent, the media is critical player in setting the agenda for the public by filtering and shaping issues. In this respect, the media coverage on security issues, particularly on terrorism shapes opinion of the public and impact of media coverage is immense. In this respect, the Agenda-setting theory sheds light on the pervasive role of the media in counter terrorism policies and strategies.[5] Apparently, the media, among other factors, plays a critical role in influencing trends in terrorists' tactics, targets and tradecraft. Terrorism cannot exist without recruiting new adherents besides creating a notion that they are powerful than what they really are.

In general terms, international terrorism landscapes continue to evolve throughout the globe with escalating challenges to international and regional peace and security. According to the Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (JTIC) Global Attack Index, the number of terror attacks continues to rise. In 2016, the Centre recorded 24,202 attacks by non-state actors and individuals, representing 27.5% increase as compared to cases recorded in 2015.[6]

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[5] Daniel Karell, The Agenda-Setting Theory in Mass Communication, 2018, https://online.alvernia.edu/agenda-setting-theory/, accessed on 20/07/18
[6] Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Centre, https://www.ihs.com/products/janes-terrorism-insurgency-intelligence-centre.html, accessed on 20-08-17

Unlike in the past, the world is faced with a unique type of terrorism which exhibit not only a non-hierarchical network comprising family members but also the individual involved are homegrown. Recruitment of the current crop of terrorism is also becoming more unstructured where potential members are attracted to terrorism through exposure to social media; some individuals acting alone due a feeling of dissatisfaction. Use of micro-cell system to avoid detection is the norm in the current dispensation of terror organizations.[7]

It is apparent that the globe has and continues to experience terror related attacks and threats with varying levels of impact. International Terrorism transcends territories in its operations, and involves actors of varied nationalities. For instance, the 9/11 Al-Qaeda-sponsored attack in the US was planned and executed by individuals of diverse nationalities. The unrestricted movement of terrorists across different territories is evident in the contemporary world as individuals from different countries travel to join terrorist groups in other parts of the world such as the ISIL and AQAP in Yemen. Likewise, the 1998 terrorist attacks in Nairobi was authorized by Al-Qaeda coordinated and executed by individuals from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Comoros and local cells in Kenya.

Apparently, the 9/11 attack was a turning point when focus on terrorism in Africa became much more pronounced and counter terrorism strategies by states and non-state players intensifies. The event created widespread fears, uncertainty and seriously undermining global and regional security. It is instructive to note that before the 9/1, the known ideology of the terrorist was not so much seeing many people dead but many people watching as a strategy to publicize their cause. However, in the new age of terrorism, the

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[7] Khalid I., Deconstructing Terrorism: A Holistic Approach,
http://www.academia.edu/12613946/Deconstructing_Terrorism_A_Holistic_Approach, accessed on
22/08/17

terrorist aims at inflicting mass killings and cause mass casualties to elicit and amplify their cause.[8] In the information age, terrorists are able to adapt by exploiting new technologies. They have also demonstrated that they can not only adapt to counter terrorism measures in place but can also develop new capabilities using the new technologies. It is the expectations of the citizens that the media ought to inform and apprise them of information as much as possible without exaggerating or dramatizing. In the contemporary environment, governments and the media are in most cases at loggerheads or work at cross purposes. Whereas the governments call for restraint on the part of the media because excessive coverage can undermine the integrity of operations, the media often operate overdrive to cover the unfolding terrorist situation on the basis that the citizens have a right to the information and the media has the responsibility to inform, educate and entertain the public.

In its efforts to contain international terrorism, the UN has put in place legal structures and frameworks through adoption of several terrorism related treaties and resolutions through the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council.[9] Instrumentally, the UN adopted Global Counter Terrorism Strategy in 2006 that employs a four pronged pillars, constituting: addressing factor that are conducive to spread of terrorism; prevention and combating of terrorism; capacity building for member states; and measures for ensuring human rights forms the basis for the fight against terrorism.[10] Apparently, these efforts have not prominently focused on media as a formidable strategy to combat terrorism. In any case, the UN has been faced with numerous limitations in combating international which range from proliferation of UN Committees and duplication of roles to bureaucracy within the UN system.

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[8] Ibid
[9] Alistair Millar, Eric Rosand, Allied Against Terrorism: What's Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment, The Century Foundation Press, 2006, New York, pp 9-24
[10] UN Office of Counter Terrorism, UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2006, accessed 18/9/17

Discernibly, the post 9/11 counter terrorism measures devised by the international community have not been effective in reducing the terrorism phenomenon. Some of the counter terrorism measures have been considered to be selective and discriminatory in their approach, thus discrediting the international efforts to counter terrorism. It is from this background and the state of affairs, that this research is necessary to inform alternate comprehensive and pragmatic approaches in anti-terrorism and counter terrorism measures which incorporate the media as a key stakeholder.

1.2   Statement of the Research Problem

World over, many states have employed wide-ranging state-centric strategies and measures in response to the challenges posed by international terrorism, ranging from the use of force (military), law enforcement measures, to international collaboration among others. Some of these measures have largely been ineffective in countering the threat poses by terrorism. However, it is increasingly being acknowledged that the media can play a crucial role in mitigating the threats that state institutions per se may not address. Terrorists acts are usually intended for a wider audience than the targeted the victims and it is truism that the wider audience cannot be reached without making use of the numerous media avenues and platforms to publicize their cause. This means that for terrorists to succeed in reaching a wider society, they require the media. Borrowing from Margret Thatcher's metaphor, the media is basically the "oxygen" of publicity for the terrorists.

In Kenya, as much as the cardinal role of the mass media is to inform the world as it happened, it sometimes broadcasts exaggerated or unverified information to the public about terror activities. In Kenya, the media is regulated by the Media Council Act of 2013

that requires all players in the industry to adhere to protection of national security and also the code of conduct for journalists which provides that the media has to desist and shun from giving presenting acts of terrorism in a way that glorify such activities. Nonetheless, the media continues to give the terrorist the much-needed publicity to advance their cause.

Although, several studies and researches have been conducted regarding the media and terrorism nexus, there has not been a comprehensive study on what role the media can play in countering terrorism. Apparently, there is disconnect between the governments' counter terrorism strategy and the synergy the media can bring on board in preventing international terrorism. Given that publicity is pivotal for terrorists to advance their cause, working with the media may be one of the plausible counter terrorism mechanisms. The focus then should be exploring on how the media can work closely with the government in this cause. This study therefore endeavors to carry out a research on the identified knowledge gap.

This study will be guided by the following research questions: (i) what is the trend of international terrorism in Africa and how effectiveness are counter terrorism measures? (ii) how effective are Counter Terrorism strategies in Kenya? and (iii) what is the role the media in International Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in Kenya?

1.3   Objectives

The general objective for this research is to evaluate role of the media in counter terrorism efforts in Kenya. More precisely, the study seeks to:

i.   Analyse the international terrorism dynamics and counter terrorism measures in Africa

ii.   Assess the status of international terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya

iii.   Analyse the role of the media in promoting terrorists agenda and counter terrorism terror in Kenya

1.4   Justification of the study

The study is informed by global terrorism trends which indicate that international terrorism persists and the trend is not likely to change, thus presenting serious ramifications on peace and security not only on the international and regional scene but also at the local arena. Disparate counter terrorism measures and strategies have been applied in the Kenyan with varying degrees of success. However, terror attacks continue to be witnessed.

The choice of the media in Kenya as case study is inspired and enlightened by the fact that Kenya has witnessed devastating effects of international terrorism and continues to face terror threats from Al-Shabaab, an off-shoot of Al-Qaeda. Kenya has put in place several counter terrorism measures but the country continues to grapple with terror threats. The Kenyan mass media is very vibrant and its role in international terrorism cannot be gainsaid.

1.4.1 Academic

Academic research in Kenya universities and other research institutions on the counter terrorism phenomenon has been growing steadily, particularly since the 9/11 attacks in the USA. This study sought to contribute to this emerging researches with a view to developing broader perspectives into the phenomenon. The study will precisely examine the media in Kenya and its relations with terrorism with a view to contributing to the

body of knowledge on counter terrorism strategies by Kenyan research institutions, having recognized from the existing literature that it has not focused much on how the Media can play a potent role in combating international terrorism in Kenya and the region. Specifically, academicians, Kenyan universities and other research institutions can gain from this research, in terms of how the media can be incorporated in CT strategies.

1.4.2 Policy

This study endeavors to contribute on how mass media counter terrorism strategy can effectively contribute to combating international terrorism and provide recommendations that future approaches in counter terrorism could consider. This research would therefore provide invaluable insights for government policy decision makers and other relevant stakeholders by offering pragmatic policy options and strategies to consider when formulating and implementing policies geared towards combating international terrorism challenges in Africa and Kenya in particular.

1.5 Literature Review

1.5.1 Introduction

The literature review for this study is generally categorized into theoretical and empirical literature. The media-terrorism theoretical debates explored range from the media-terrorism symbiosis, media agenda setting theory, oxygen of publicity thesis to contagion theory. The empirical literature is examined in the following broad areas: The literature on international terrorism in Africa, capturing the status, manifestations and trends; The literature on the effectiveness of counter terrorism strategies in Africa; The literature on the nature and extent of international terrorism in Kenya, encompassing the history and manifestations of the phenomena in Kenya and the response to it; and finally, literature on the role of the media in international terrorism and combating terrorism in Kenya.

Media encompasses technologies that disseminates information to various audiences in different parts of the world. Essentially, media entails all means of mass communication regarded collectively. The mass media especially not only encompasses print and electronic media but also includes other significant types of communications such as music, books and films. The contemporary world has witnessed globalization of media culture, with the embrace of the social media through tweeter, WhatsApp, Instagram, Face book, etc.

1.5.2 Theoretical Debates

1.5.2.1 Media-terrorism symbiosis thesis

Terrorism is indisputably one of the principal security challenges in the contemporary world environment and this has been compounded by globalization. It is undeniable that the terrorists need a medium of conveying their message to the intended audience – the media, in line with Bruce Hoffman (2006) who argues that the terrorists and the media are

interdependent. In view of this argument, the media is used by terrorists to articulate and advance their cause to the intended audience whereas the media needs the terrorist theatre for newsworthy items to increase audience base and as a strategy to maximize profits. The Game-Theoretic Model advanced by Rohner and Frey emphasizes the symbiosis between terrorism and the media, in the sense that the two parties not only benefit from one another but also modify their actions depending on the actions of the other party.[11]

Plenty of literature exists emphasizing that terrorism has a reciprocal beneficial relationship with the media. For instance, the Palestinian terrorists' hostage taking during the Munich Olympics in 1972, the Lebanese terrorists who skyjacked TWA aircraft in1985, and the 9/11terrorist attack where terrorists purposefully wanted the attention of the public, are manifestations of these relationships where at the same time the media exploited the incidents to make windfall gains through sales.[12] The media on the other hand gains from the society's eagerness and passion to get information about terror attacks. Melodramatic print and electronic media take advantage of the anxiety, distress and attraction engendered by terrorist activities to advance their business.[13] Peresin (2007) opines that there exists an interactive liaison between terrorism and the media from the perspective that terrorists constantly seek to exploit free media and even manipulate it to achieve their objectives. In this respect, the media affords the terrorists with a platform for global reach to shape public perception about terrorism and the associated dangers.[14] The real concern to governments is not the symbiotic relationship between the media and terrorism, rather the influence on public opinion and governmental decision making that would be in favour of terrorists(Peresin 2007:19).

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[11] Rohner, et al, Blood and Ink, The Common-Interest-Game between Terrorists and the Media. Public Choice 133, no. 1/2 (2007), pp.142, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27698175 accessed on 29/07/18
[12] Ibid.,
[13] Ibid., pp.130
[14] Anita Perešin, Mass Media and Terrorism, Medij. istraž. (god. 13, br. 1), 2007, pp.5-22, file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Peresin%20(4).pdf, accessed on 28/07/18

However, the terrorists are ready and willing to kill journalists if they actively collaborate with their enemies, either by spying, being accomplices or misrepresenting their cause.[15]

Wieviorka (1988), contends that there is no mutual interdependence between Terrorism and mass media, in the sense that the media and terrorists make or show connection in any of following disparate means, ranging from pure indifference to the media, relative indifference, a media-oriented strategy, to coercion of the media. According to this argument, the Media does not solely depend on terrorism news for survival, it can exploit other forms/streams of news for its survival. Nonetheless, it appears that the media and terrorist group need each other for their survival. Apparently terrorist groups use horror and fear as a communication strategy, and that they intentionally select their targets purposely to maximise the attention of the media. These developments show that the media is exploited as an amphitheatre for accessing a wider latitude for disseminating ideology for terrorists. In the same vein, the media also benefits from terrorism, since cases of terrorism incidents proliferate sales for newspapers and even the number of people who view television news increases.[16] In other words, terrorist organizations and lone wolves strategically exploit the multiplier effect of the media to create fear and attract attention in order to realize their objectives.

There is intensified migration to new media on online platforms such as Facebook, twitter, Instagram, especially after 9/11, ostensibly to evade government crackdown on the mainstream media. This is more so because the social media offers more interactive platform and it is target specific. Furthermore, the new media has technical advantages for terrorists such as the ease in sharing, uploading and downloading files and videos

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[15] Lopez, François. "If Publicity Is the Oxygen of Terrorism – Why Do Terrorists Kill Journalists?" Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 1 (2016): pp.72, http://www.jstor.org/stable/26297520 accessed on 28/07/18

[16] Rohner et al (2007) Op cit., 142

from mobile phones. Apparently the jihadists are keen to strategically demonstrate their dexterity in exploiting the advantages and minimising disadvantages of the media. Basically, there are four main objects as to why the terrorists use mass media: to convey the propaganda of the deed with the aim of creating extreme panic and anxiety amongst their targets; mobilize wider backing for their desired convictions and ideals; upset and disorganize government reaction; to rally and enhance support base ostensibly to grow enlistment, raise more financial resources and inspire further terror attacks (Peresin, 2007: 9)

1.5.2.2 Media -Agenda setting theory

The theory postulates that the media is a key player in shaping political reality whereby the public come to not only know about a particular event or issue, but also the degree of significance to attach to it from the amount of information from the media. This theory was originated by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw 1972 during their seminal study of the role of the media in the 1968 USA Presidential campaigns. In their argument, the media has the capacity and ability to bring issues to the attention of the public and shape public opinion.[17] In this line of argument, the media therefore coverage on security issues, particularly on terrorism shapes opinion of the public and is therefore relevant in informing policy and policy reforms.

Agenda setting theory rests on two main assumptions. The first one states that the media filters and shape issues instead of reflecting as they are. Secondly one is the assumption that when media focuses on just a few issues and subjects, the public tends to perceive those issues as more important, "agenda setting doesn't necessarily tell people how they should think or feel about certain issues, but rather what issues they should think about."

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[17] McCombs, et al, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, The Public Opinion Quarterly 36, no. 2 (1972): pp.176-87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2747787.accessed on 15/07/18

Agenda-setting theory seems quite appropriate to help us understand the pervasive role of the media in counter terrorism policies and strategies.[18]

The challenge with this theory is that it is not easy to measure the extent to which the media influences people's attitudes and emotions. It remains contested as to what extent mass media influences. Lines of reasoning range from those who postulate that the media is a dominant deceptive and disinformation instrument that moulds susceptible publics to those who contend that mass media has little influence. Generally, findings have demonstrated that media documentation of violence and brutality engenders feelings of fear and anxiety among the publics who have not been directly affected by such violence. The government of the other hand that is charged with national security gets on a warpath with the media when coverage of terrorism activity, actively creates anxiety and fear among the publics. In this respect, the Media and governments, though both designed for a common goal of to serving the people, they many a times are at loggerheads with one another. The media wants all the freedom to criticize the government with the aim of improving government function, and government feels uncomfortable for being criticized unfairly and desires to take control over private media so that they can share their sides of the story.

1.5.2.3 Media-terrorism Oxygen of publicity thesis

Oxygen of publicity thesis postulates that the media gives life to the terrorists cause through publicity. In 1985, the former British, Margaret Thatcher while addressing the American Bar Association said that hijackers and terrorists thrive on publicity, without which, their activities and influence would be sharply curtailed. She noted that in the face of print and electronic media, acts of terrorism inescapably make a persuasive viewing.

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[18] Daniel Karell, The Agenda-Setting Theory in Mass Communication, 2018, https://online.alvernia.edu/agenda-setting-theory/, accessed on 20/07/18

She further said there is dire need not to play into the hands of terrorists given that coverage of acts of violence and horror creates a natural wave of compassion and empathy for the victims. This is compounded by advanced technology that has made the terrorists job easier and that of the security agencies more challenging.[19] Without constraining and censoring the media, the PM believes that ways must be sought to famish terror groups of the oxygen which they rely on to publicize their cause, urging the media to create a voluntary code of conduct, binding them not say or show anything that would help the terrorists to achieve their ends.[20] The former PM's comments did not in any way suggest that the media should be prevented from reporting on terrorist movements, rather the media needs to forego some freedom ostensibly to constrict avenues the terrorists actions can be reported.[21]

1.5.2.4 Rational Choice Model

The Model posits that individuals always make prudent and logical decisions. The Model is premised on the notion that human beings base their decisions on rational calculations, makes rational choices and purposely aim at maximizing own benefits. Rational Choice Theory also postulates that complex social phenomena are influenced by individual human behaviour.[22] In this respect, the Rational Choice Theory of terrorism adopts the idea that all actions terrorists take are based on rationality, calculated and centred on conscious decisions. Terrorist behaviour is rational and terrorist organizations possess internally consistent set of believes and values, meaning that terrorism is a logical means of advancing their desired goals and objectives. Basically, terrorist organizations are

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[19] Margret Thatcher, Speech to American Bar Association, London, 1985
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096 accessed on 22/07/18
[20] Ibid.,
[21] Aly, A, Macdonald, S, Jarvis, L, Chen, T., Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet. 2016, New York and London: Routledge.
[22] Rational Choice Theory, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/rational-choice-theory.asp, accessed on 19/09/17

rational actors who use violence to achieve their goals be they political, religious or ideological in nature. The theory posits the following: terrorists are rational actors and their actions are strategic; terrorists aim to manipulate the behaviour of opponents through violence; and terrorists want to communicate a specific message to a particular audience through violence engineered publicity. Caplan agrees that the rational choice model is relevant for terrorism and remains a valuable analytical tool for evaluating terrorist behaviour.[23]

1.5.3 Empirical Literature

1.5.3.1 International Terrorism Trends in Africa

The history of terrorism in Africa dates back to millennia of ancient Egyptians who committed atrocities that would today be interpreted as terrorist acts. However, the term 'terrorism' did not feature often in Africa's political lexicon. When it did, it meant very different things to different people, meaning that there is no collectively acceptable explanation of what terrorism is.[24] However, this study assumes the definition of terrorism to connote a premeditated use of violence or threat to use violence against non-combatants to purposefully create fear with the objective of achieving political, ideological or religious aims.

Discernibly, the number terror groups have increased and terror activities in Africa have also risen exponentially. Some jihad groups are focusing on forcing people to strictly adhere to Islamic law, which advocates for non-believers to be whipped, stoned and executed. Terrorism activities by non-state terror groups continue to soar,[25] with the

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[23] Bryan Caplan, Terrorism: The relevance of the rational choice model, *Springer Science*, 2006, http://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/pdfs/terrorism.pdf accessed on 10/09/17
[24] Simon Allison, "Good talk, not enough action: The AU's counter-terrorism architecture, and why it matters", *Institute for Security Studies*, Policy Brief 66, March 2015 (accessed on 28/08/17)
[25] See Appendix I, the AON 2015 Terrorism Map, indicating the trend international terrorism in the world in 2015

attendant challenges to peace and security in Africa. According to data collected by the Centre on Religion and Geopolitics' Global Extremism Monitor, Africa continent witnessed a dramatic increase of terror-related attacks from 738 attacks in 2015 to 1,426 terror incidents between January and September 2016.[26]

The ambiguous nature of the term terrorism has partially contributed to complicating counter terrorism strategies that government and international community employ. However, the overall counter terrorism approaches countries have adopted ranging from the use of military, security agencies to international collaboration have not been able to eliminate the threat since terrorism activities continue to be witnessed. This calls for a rethink of the current strategies.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram continues to target civilians and government installations. The group came into focus in 2009 and have so far killed over 20,000 people and displacing over three million in northern Nigeria. The group has spread its wings to Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Additionally, the militant group has the potency to attack internally displaced camps and relief agencies operating in the northern area of Nigeria.[27] The role of the media in Nigeria has been brought into scrutiny for making the work of the terrorist group easy. Some newspapers stream headlines that are eye-catching, which create fear and anxiety on the populace thus, making the group to succeed in their aims and objectives.[28]

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[26] Ryan Cumming, "Africa's 2017 Terrorism Outlook", Centre on Religion and Geopolitics, http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/sub-saharan-africa/africas-2017-terrorism-outlook, accessed on 20/08/17
[27] Cummings Ryan, What can the continent expect from Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and ISIS – and efforts to counter them – over the coming year?, http://www.religionandgeopolitics.org/sub-saharan-africa/africas-2017-terrorism-outlook, accessed on 10/09/17
[28] Omego Christie, PhD, "The Role of the Mass Media in the Fight against Terrorism and the Instrumental Use of Women in Boko Haram Insurgence in Nigeria", *An International Journal of Language, Literature and Gender Studies (LALIGENS),* Ethiopia Vol. 4 (2), Serial No 10, May, 2015, file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/119151-328932-1-SM.pdf accessed on 10-09-2017

Additionally, there is resurgence of terror activities in the Sahel region precipitated by AQIM, a network of insurrectionaries in the Sahel area. AQIM, Aqum, Makhtar, Ansar Dine and Macina Liberation Front merged into one group and calls itself Jama'at Nusrat al- islam Wal Muslimean, which means a group for supporting of Islam and Muslims. The group is responsible for recurrent instability in Mali and neighbouring countries; Niger, Burkina Faso and Cote de'voire.[29] Sahelian region welcomed the assistance by the USA to manage the ungoverned areas but still faces unrests by the inhabitants of those areas.

The Horn of Africa (HOA), comprising Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia is considered as one of the major areas where terrorism is prevalent in Africa.[30] The region is the most militarized US response to counter terrorism efforts in Africa. The USA has a military base in Djibouti which primarily patrols the Red Sea and collects information about terror activities in the region.[31] Although there have been long-standing disputes in other places in Africa such as like Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo, the HOA has had many conflicts over a long span of time. The underlying causes are many and sometimes multifaceted even within a single dispute, including ethnic, cultural differences, arbitrary boundaries, religion, ideology, competition for scarce resources, inequitable sharing of resources, and the sheer desire for power. There are underlying conditions that directly contribute to conflicts and resorting to use of terrorist schemes. For instance, Poverty and social injustice are widespread; Borders are porous where Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Eritrea have long and poorly patrolled coasts on the Red Sea or Indian Ocean; illegal arms are freely available and

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[29] Beri Ruchita, "Rise of Terrorism in Africa" Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/rise-of-terrorism-in-africa_rberi_130417 accessed on 09/09/17
[30] Docking Tim, "Terrorism in the Horn of Africa" *United States Institute of Peace*, Special Report 2004, https://www.usip.org/publications/2004/01/terrorism-horn-africa
[31] Op Cit., Lyman et al, pp.77

accessible in the region; shortage of financial resources and trained personnel to counter the activities of terrorist elements; and endemic Corruption coupled with low pay for security personnel that leave officials susceptible to accepting money from terror groups in return for assistance to facilitate their schemes.

In Somalia, Al-Shabaab continues to launch offensive against AMISOM, Somalia government and target in the neighbouring country Kenya. With the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and announcement that AMISOM intends to reduce troop presence has given the terror group the impetus to assert itself in the eastern Africa region. Somalia is the centerpiece of terrorism and counter terrorism activities in the Horn of Africa. Peace has never prevailed in Somalia after Siad Barre's administration was toppled in 1991.

Since 2014, there have been pro-ISIS terror groups active in the north Africa, particularly Tunisia and Libya, producing fertile ground for expansion of ISIS. The group is also recruiting from Eastern and Southern Africa to fight Syria. Islamic terror groups continue to operate in Algeria since 1990s with the Islamic State being the latest to gain visibility in the country. In 2017, the country witnessed terror incidents range from attack on security agencies to thwarted suicide bombing in the city of Constantine. The most active Islamist groups operating within Algeria are AQIM, GIA, the Mali-based Organization MUJAO, the radical offshoot of FIS and al-Murabitoun. Additionally, there are several small groups spread across the southern and eastern borders of Algeria, which have varying levels of loyalty to the ISIS. The groups pose a threat to the general security of the country, region and beyond.

1.5.4   Assessing the effectiveness of counter terrorism strategies in Africa

Measuring effectiveness of counter terrorism measures is often challenging given that the

way one perceives and measures progress is crucial to the formulation and implementation of strategy. Perception plays a key role in influencing the way states strategize and apportion resources for fighting terrorism. Measurement of infectiveness or futility of counter terrorism strategies may be looked at in terms of incidents/events which focus on number of terror attacks in a given period of time. Equally, attitude and trends are key determinants on international terrorism and responses to it.

By and large, strategies to counter terrorism have largely not been effective in the continent. The fact that terrorism has increased in scope is a clear indication that counter terrorism strategies employed are not working. The over-reliance on the use of military and security led responses of using force and disregard for rule of law and human rights contribute to hardening of terrorism and breeds radicalization. More often than not, African states have allowed global narratives of terrorism to dictate the local responses. For example, the USA, as the main country funding AMISOM operations in Somalia, emphasizes on military-led responses in suppressing al-Shabaab rather than focusing on stable, peaceful and all-inclusive Somalia. At the continental level, African Union (AU) agreed that, as a sustainable strategy to combat international terrorism, member states adopt a comprehensive framework that embraces regional cooperation and commitment to uphold human rights, however, very few countries are observing such reformist strategies.

In Kenya for instance, the government published a bill on Suppression on Terrorism in 2003 but did not succeed as it was vigorously opposed by politicians, civil society and Muslim fraternity, arguing that it contained parameters which can be misused by state functionaries. The second attempt was made in 2006 through the Prevention of terrorism bill, which would allow security agencies to apprehend and search property without court

warrants and security agencies to detain terror suspects for three days. The bill was tenaciously contested, leading to protests in the streets for fear that it threatened to dismember the very fabric of the Nation and could provide a palatable ground for inter-religious hostilities and mistrust. The third attempt was in 2012 that finally led to the passing of the Prevention of Terrorist bill 2012 into law, making it Kenya's first legislation on acts of terrorism after the two previous unsuccessful attempts. The Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA) 2012 broadly defines terrorism as an act or threat of action that involves endangering a person's life, causing death, serious bodily harm, destruction of property, creating severe threat to the safety and wellbeing of the public.[32]

1.5.5 Assessment of the role of the media in International Terrorism and Counter Terrorism

Journalists by nature of their training, are ingrained with the belief that objectivity is Spitulnik, christens the media as "notoriously polyvalent," meaning that the media has a number of different forms, purposes, meanings and aspects. The media, whose singular form is medium, is generally regarded as a form of conveyor belt of some kind, where communication takes place such as print media, electronic media, televisual media, oral media, social media, multi-media and audio-visual.[33] The mass media generally encompasses the mainstream media (fourth estate), new media, and social media collectively. New media connotes new digital-based electronic using mass communication media such as the Internet,[34] while social media emphasizes on the applications that facilitate consumers to generate content that can be shared in social networks. According to Josipovic, mass media, in the broadest sense, entails transmission

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[32] Laws of Kenya, The Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012

[33] Spitulnik, Debra. "Media." Journal of Linguistic Anthropology 9, no. 1/2 (1999): pp.148-151. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43102451, accessed on 24/09/17

[34] Pitulnik, Op. cit.,

of messages from one source to a limitless number of people.[35] For the purpose of this study, mainstream media will be focused and critically examined though the social media, as an important component of the contemporary media will also be highlighted. Basically, mainstream media in this sense denotes to the conventional forms of mass communication, like the print and electronic versions of major media outlets.

Journalists by nature of their training, are ingrained with the belief that objectivity is fundamental when releasing information to the public and presenting facts as they are. Journalistic norms dictate that the public should access the widest possible range of information and the consumers make a decision which information is useful. The challenge is how to balance the right for the public to know vis-à-vis the obligation and responsibility of the media to broadcast information, knowing that publicity works in favour of the terrorists. Media censorship in this era of democracy will not work. Freedom of expression and information in the media is one of the vital pillars of a democratic society. This therefore calls for self-restraint whereby the media has to make a rational choice as to whether or what to release, delay or withhold for the national good.[36]

Media also finds challenged to decide what description to use on a political act or violence. For instance, Reagan administration calling contras in Nicaragua as 'freedom fighters' and accepts Israel version of Palestine effort as 'terrorist', depict states using the terrorist label to project foreign policy and serve other interests. The other reality is that the Media is in business and to a large extent is driven by commercial consideration.[37]

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[35] Josipović, Ivo. "The Mass Media and Musical Culture." International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music 15, no. 1 (1984): pp.39-51.
[36] Ibid
[37] Held, Virginia, The Media and Political Violence, The Journal of Ethics 1, no. 2, 1997, pp.187-202. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25115544 , accessed on 15/09/17

Terrorism can hardly achieve their objectives without the media. Publicity is the weapon terror organizations use to reach their targeted audience, other than the victims. This explains why their attacks are in most cases spectacularly brutal. "Without the world's attention, these acts of viciousness are pointless. Furthermore, unless the terrorist can attach his political message to the headlines he has caused, he has failed."[38] In a nutshell, although the intentions of different groups of terrorists may differ from one another, the common denominator remain maximization of publicity through the media to advance their cause. This is compounded by citizen journalism, who lack professional training in journalism but are able to exploit advanced technology to create content and distribute them globally (Syallow 2017). However, the Media does not have to be a tool of aiding terrorists achieve their agenda, rather can be turned to be a weapon for combating terror. This means that national governments can incorporate national and international media in their counter terrorism strategy. The media can be useful in combating terrorism by: accurately reporting on incidents; transmitting warnings issued by security agencies to the public; offering important information regarding foreigners; exposing and revealing connections between various persons and terror groups; and acting as a forum for quality discussions on social and political implications of terrorism (Peresin 2007:13-14).

1.6   Theoretical Framework

The study is guided by the Media-Terrorism "Oxygen" thesis which best explains the role of the media in international terrorism. The thesis postulates that media is the "oxygen" of publicity terrorists depend on to project and promote their cause. In 1995, the former British PM, Margaret Thatcher during the her address to American Bar Association said that hijackers and terrorists thrive on publicity, without which, their activities and

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[38] Anderson, Terry, Terrorism and Censorship: The Media in Chains, *Journal of International Affairs* 47, no. 1, 1993, pp.127-36. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357089 , accessed on 15/09/17

influence are sharply curtailed. In her observation, in the face of print and electronic media, terrorists acts make a compelling viewing to targeted audience. The former PM, further said that there is dire need not to play into the hands of terrorists given that coverage of acts of violence and horror creates a natural wave of compassion and empathy for the victims. This is compounded by advanced technology that has made the terrorists job easier and that of the security agencies more challenging.[39] The speech was made shortly after the hijacking of TWA flight 847 and the murder of a navy SEAL and at that time there was widespread condemnation of the media for providing a platform for terrorists' actions. Without constraining and censoring the media, the PM believes that ways must be sought to deny terrorists the oxygen that they rely on to publicize their cause, urging the media create a voluntary binding code of conduct that require the journalists and the media fraternity in general not say or show anything which could assist the terrorists to achieve their ends.[40] The former PM's comments did not suggest that the media should be prevented from reporting on terrorist movements, rather the media needs to forego some freedom ostensibly to constrict avenues the terrorists actions can be reported.[41]

The media indisputably provides terrorism with the mode of to achieve their cause, the goal being to exploiting media houses to cause fear and uncertainty among the masses.[42] Gender or religion notwithstanding, images of political violence, create anxiety and despondency among the publics, with the aim of increasing public awareness of the terrorists cause (Slone Michelle 2000:44). Most democracies regard reporting of terrorism as an essential component of life in a free society, particularly when such incidents are a

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[39] Op. cit., Margret Thatcher,1985 https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096 accessed on 22/07/18
[40] Ibid.,
[41] Aly, A, Macdonald, S, Jarvis, L, Chen, T., Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet. 2016, New York and London: Routledge.
[42] Op.cit., Nacos Brigitte,2007, pp. 6

danger to society, in any case, such events will be reported on social media.[43] Indeed, some terrorist organizations have, instead of relying on mainstream media, resorted to providing their own oxygen of publicity by using their own broadcasts, websites and social media accounts. However, the mainstream media still remains relevant and pertinent in the terrorists' game plan of publicizing their cause.

1.7   Hypotheses

   i.   Professional media coverage would de-escalate terror attacks in Kenya

   ii.   Irresponsible media coverage is responsible for the increasing incidents of terror attacks in Kenya

  iii.   Incorporation of the media in counter terrorism strategies could greatly contribute to reducing international terrorism

1.8   Methodology of Research

This section of the study covered the research design, study sites, population of the study, data collection methods, validity of the instruments used to collect data, reliability of the instruments, data presentation and analysis, ethical consideration as well as the breadth and constraints of the research.

1.8.1 Research Design

The study applied both qualitative and quantitative research approaches in the research process of data collection and data analysis. The research focused on the media's role in counter terrorism strategies in Kenya. Both primary and secondary data were used.

1.8.2 Study Site

The study for this research is Nairobi city. My choice is informed by the fact that Nairobi

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[43] Ibid

is the capital city of Kenya where mainstream media houses are located and all government security agencies are headquartered. More so, a number of major terrorist attacks have happened in the city over the past few years, with heavy causalities.

1.8.3 Population and sampling

The population for the study was senior media practitioners such as journalists, editors and experts working with mainstream media houses based in Nairobi, Kenya. Senior government officials in Kenya's Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, especially the Anti-Terrorist Police Unit and National Intelligence Service and National Counter terrorism Centre, also formed part of the study population. The targeted population was chosen because of expertise on media-terrorism issues and are key stakeholders in the media industry and National Security sector.

The sampling technique used was purposive sampling technique. This is due to the fact that the researcher targeted senior security and media experts involved in counter terrorism strategies as well as media practitioners who are well versed and conversant with the media-terrorism interplays.

1.8.4 Sample Size

The researcher interviewed heads and senior media practitioners (journalists) managers from each of the following electronic and print media: Nation Television (NTV); Citizen TV; Kenya Television (KTN); Kenya Broadcasting Corporation; Daily Nation; East Africa Standard; and the people daily. From the security sector, the researcher interviewed heads, senior departmental heads and section heads, fifteen (15) from NCTC, ten (10) from ATPU and ten (10) from the NIS. The entire sample size was sixty five (65) questionnaires which were administered. The duly filled questionnaires received from the respondents were fifty-two (52), representing eighty percent (80%) of the sample size.

The representative numbers were arrived at by looking at the organizational structure and focusing on senior management who are experts in the research area from each of those organizations. Generalizing the opinions of the senior management in those organization gives a good representation of the entire study population.

1.8.5 Methods of Data Collection

The method of collection of data entailed both through primary data and secondary data.

Primary data

This was carried out through collection using structured questionnaire interviews, targeting officers with knowledge and expertise in both pertinent Kenya government departments and media practitioners such as journalists and editors from major media houses in Nairobi. The key government departments comprised, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). The mainstream media houses targeted were the Nation Media Group, Citizen Royal Media Services, Kenya Television Network and Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC).

 Secondary data

This was assembled by assessing literature from various books, academic journals articles, policy papers, periodical publications, newspapers, magazines and Television documentaries. This helped to appreciate what has already been done on the research area and tease out the inherent knowledge gaps.

1.8.6 Data collection Instrument

The collection instrument used was open ended and closed questionnaires to collect data from respondents. The questionnaires were systematically developed to ensure its validity and reliability. First and foremost, the tenacity, aims, study questions, and proposition of

the proposed research were scrutinized. The background of the audience was determined, especially by looking at their professional standards and the level of access to the targeted information. In this respect purposeful sampling was used, targeting the professional respondents from among the population. Secondly, questions and statements were generated in line with the content of the literature review and the theoretical framework. The questionnaires were delivered by hand and used email where hand delivery was not convenient.

1.8.6 Data Analysis and Presentation

The data collected was sorted out as per the objectives of the study, coded and analyzed. The findings have been presented qualitatively through narration and quantitatively using graphs where applicable.

1.8.7 Ethical Considerations

Before embarking on the field work, field research approval was obtained from the University of Nairobi and the permit for field research was also obtained from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation. The correspondence with the respondents was on a voluntary basis and the data collected used for the sole purpose of the study and remained confidential.

1.8.8 Scope and Limitations

The scope of this study was confined to the post September 11, 2001 to December 2017 (2001 to 2017). This is due to the inherent developments that the bombing of the twin towers and the Pentagon in the USA reawakened the world and thus redefined how combating of the war on terrorism in conducted. The research was narrowed to Nairobi region, due to limited time of the research and the fact that Nairobi has witnessed many

terror attacks of varying proportions. The challenges faced included limited time of the research and respondents who were not be willing to participate. In terms of limited time, email system was employed more than hand deliveries and for unwilling respondents, they were assured of the ethical considerations of the research.

1.9   Chapter Outline

The Research was structured into five (5) chapters as indicated below:

Chapter One (I) is on the **background**. This chapter examines the background information on the global trends on international terrorism. The chapter also identifies the research problem, literature review, theoretical framework, hypotheses, justifies reasons for the study, its objectives and methodologies used in carrying out the research, scope, limitations, and chapter outline. Chapter two (II) is on the **International terrorism and counter terrorism measures in Africa**. This focuses on the foundations of international terrorism in the continent, status and counter terrorism and strategies in Africa. Specifically, it assesses AU, AFRICOM and AMISOM role in combating terrorism in Africa. The chapter also assesses **the media's contribution to counter terrorism in the African continent.** Chapter three (III) is on the status of international terrorism and strategies for combating terrorism in Kenya. The chapter starts with an overview of terrorism in Kenya. It also explores the nature, foundations and extent of international terrorism and effectiveness of measures employed to combat terrorism in Kenya. Additionally, the chapter looks at the legal and regulatory frameworks for the mass and social media. Chapter four (IV) is on **evaluating the role of the media in counter terrorism in Kenya**. This chapter also focuses on data presentation and Analysis.

Chapter five (V) dwells on the **summary, conclusion and recommendations**. The summary section summarizes the counter terrorism mechanisms used in Africa,

effectiveness of such mechanisms and role of the media in counter terrorism strategies in Kenya Specifically, the section evaluates the role of media in promoting terrorists' agenda and combating terrorism in Kenya. The conclusion section concludes that Kenya continues to bear the brunt of terror activities by terror groups, despite the several CT mechanisms and strategies. The section also concludes that the media remains a critical component in agenda setting and medium of communication for terrorism, thus the criticality of the role of the media in combating terrorism cannot be gainsaid. Recommendation section gives a raft of recommendations on how the government can work closely with the media in combating international terrorism. Some of the measures suggested include the following; the government appreciating the critical role the media in society, furnishing the media with the accurate information, the government to readily respond as appropriate to media enquiries, providing the media with regular updates on the terrorism threat situation, giving the media opportunities to visit the theatres of counter terrorism operations, getting the media involved more in civic education and sensitization on the terror threat and tactics, and conducting of joint seminars and training programs involving media practitioners and government officials essentially to not only revitalize the responses and reactions by the government but also to promote media coverage of terror activities. This is likely to build trust and reduce suspicion between the government and the media.

By and large, chapter I is the proposal section of the study that gives the background information on international terrorism, reviews existing literature both on relevant theoretical and empirical debates on terrorism and the media, and explores the rationale of how and why the study is to be conducted, among other preliminary requirements. This is proceeded by chapter II which essentially dwells on the international terrorism in Africa,

counter terrorism strategies employed to combat terrorism on the continent as well as the place of the media in the international terrorism phenomenon.

CHAPTER II

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES

IN AFRICA

2.1   International Terrorism in Africa

Cases of transnational terrorist organizations have not been prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa until two decades ago, although there have been several rebel movements across the continent who were basically domestic dissident or insurgent groups. Over the last few years, the continent has witnessed intensification of terrorism activities especially in Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Chad, Cameroun, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Kenya.[44] There is no universally acceptable definition of terrorism. This leaves the meaning and utility of the term terrorism to remain debatable and contested. Although the event of the September 11, 2001, changed the landscape and perception of terrorism at the world stage, terror activities persist not only in Africa but throughout the world and terrorism remains a challenge for national governments and international players.[45] Escalation of terror activities in Africa manifests themselves in several areas in Africa. The intensification of conflict in West Africa revolving around terrorism cannot be gainsaid as witnessed by the intensification of the conflict in the Niger Delta and the rise of Boko Haram activities. In the East African region, the rural Somalia is ungoverned and is being commanded by Al Shabaab that is largely responsible for terror activities in Somalia and the neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Uganda.[46]

In a bid for terrorists to achieve their targeted objectives, the terrorists execute planned

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[44] Kweku Ortsin, Nana Amissah Mensah-Dadziebo, Terrorism In Sub-Saharan Africa: Causes and Possible Solutions, Ghana Growth and Development Platform Current Issue Note 11, August 25, 2015, http://ghanagdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/GGDP_CIN11_Growing-Terrorism-In-Africa_-Final.pdf, accessed on 20/02/18

[45] Elu, Juliet U. "Terrorism in Africa and South Asia: Economic or Existential Good?" The Journal of Developing Areas 46, no. 1 (2012): pp.345-57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23215438., accessed on 15/10/17

[46] Ruchita Beri, Rise of Terrorism in Africa, *Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis,* 2017, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/rise-of-terrorism-in-africa_rberi_130417 , accessed on 11/11/17

attacks which have serious consequences not only on the people but the economy of the targeted country. In this respect many targeted states have witnessed civilian fatal causalities and destruction of critical national infrastructure such as airports, bus stations, bridges, train stations, water supply points, telecommunication equipment, financial services facilities and electricity generation services. This development not only creates disquiet and nervousness in the targeted viewers, but also unsettles economic activity. The Terrorists believe that economic costs associated with a combination of loss of human lives and massive destruction of property will compel the government to accede to their political demands.[47]Basically, the terror attacks have the potential of engendering uncertainty, a development that undermines investment and diverts foreign direct investment, furthermore that increases the cost of doing business through high insurance premiums and security agents.[48]

In the last two decades, the African terrain has transformed from conflicts between States to largely intra conflicts dominated by non-State actors such as rebel groups and terror groups who exploit the weaknesses of the state to wage attack against their targets be it in the domestic scene or in international arena. This means that efforts to defeat such groups call for collaborative effort both locally and internationally.

It is also instrumental to note that the media environment has also evolved exponentially where improved Information Communication Technologies have enabled faster communication and greater access to internet and mobile communication. This has not only worked to the advantage of States to combat terror activities, but it is also beneficial to the terrorist to execute their objectives with dexterity. As much as Africa relies on Information and communication technology (ICT) to promote development and improve

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[47] Gaibulloev, Khusrav, and Todd Sandler, The Adverse Effect of Transnational and Domestic Terrorism on Growth in Africa, Journal of Peace Research 48, no. 3 (2011): pp.355-356.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23035432. Accessed on 13/02/18
[48] Ibid.,

international security in the continent, it is a double-edged sword in the sense that it also increases opportunities for radicalization. The media equips terrorists provides an exceptional platform for enlisting, training, coordinating and communicating with followers and potential recruits. Twitter and other social media channels are increasingly becoming a weapon of choice used by terror groups in African continent to broadcast their messages, motivate admirers, and enlist more members.[49] This underscores the notion that the media is the 'oxygen' of publicity for the terrorists.

The contemporary trend in terrorism in Africa, and the world over has tremendously mutated towards loosely organized, self-financed, international networks of terrorists with inclination to religious and ideological motivation. The new terrorism in not only increasingly using communication technology but also extensive networks that prefer to attack soft targets which are lightly or undefended civilian. Furthermore, suicide bombing has become a weapon of choice because it is inexpensive and effective and less complicated and compromising than other kinds of terrorist methods.

Though African governments are grappling with international terrorism, Giroux and Forest argue that at macro level, challenges such as prevalent poverty, endemic starvation, deprivation and diseases remain the major problems which undermine human security. Nonetheless many African states continue to be faced with domestic and transnational terror organizations who are using the 'favourable' African soil to launch attacks against their domestic and international targets.[50] Moreover some domestic terror organizations have transformed to transnational status as exemplified by groups such as Algeria's Salafist Group which merged with Al-Qaeda in 2007, resulting in the formation

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[49] Giacomo Persi Paoli, et al, Social Media in Africa: A Double-edged Sword for Security and Development, https://www.rand.org/randeurope/research/projects/social-media-in-africa.html, accessed on 09/07/18
[50] Ibid., pp.10-11

of AQIM.[51] Before analyzing the counter terrorism measures to international terrorism in Africa, it is important to appreciate what causes terrorism.

2.2   Foundations of terrorism in Africa

The media is intricately linked to terrorism and it remains one of the main drivers of terrorism. Given that terrorists seek recognition and publicity is its highest goal, terrorism cannot therefore exist without publicity by the media. Essentially, the conception of contemporary terrorism arose after the emergence of mass media following the progressive technology that supported broader dissemination of information. The new media through the internet and social media is a game changer that is propagating terrorism, whose coverage assist in recruiting new supporters. Increased media coverage of terrorist activities help to heighten terrorist threat, causing more fear that damage itself. For instance, in 2015 Gallup carried out a poll in the USA showing that 51% of Americans were worried that they and their families will become victims of terrorism. However, the chances that an American will die in a terrorist attack is far much lower, of about 1 in 29 million. This means that perception of terrorism remains far greater than the threat it actually poses. [52]

Martha Crenshaw asserts that there is no general theoretical inquiry of the causes of terrorism because: for one, in most cases terrorism is approached from historical perspectives which takes into account many causes; two, there are judgments which are centred on social factors; and three, there are also political explanations which blame revolutionary ideologies. However, basically terrorism is a form of political behavior emanating from the considered and thoughtful choice of rational actor, who is the terrorist organization in this case (Crenshaw Martha 1981:379-381).

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[51] Ibid.,
[52] Gonzalez Susana, What Drives Terrorism Part 5: The Media, On Security, Stratfor Worldview, 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-drives-terrorism-part-5-media [accessed on 29/07/18]

Generally, the underlying causes of terrorism can be analysed from four different levels of explanation: Individual, societal, state and transnational. At the individual level, individuals engage in terrorism not only due the desire to revenge and for personal gratification but also on behalf of a terror group they identify with. Some individuals can get radicalized after identifying with the sufferings of others. In this respect, terrorists see themselves as philanthropists who are not self-centered, they see themselves working valiantly for the sake of others and morally distinguishable from criminals who are out there for personal aggrandizements and gains (Louise Richardson 2006:43). For example, Boko Haram exists because some sections of the society who feel relatively deprived want to revenge against authorities. Relative deprivation occurs where individuals (or groups of people) instinctively perceive themselves as deceitfully deprived over others they perceived as having similar attributes and deserving similar rewards. The dissatisfied individuals get frustrated and eventually resort to violence in revenging against the source (real or imagined) of their frustration. Violence therefore thrives where there are persistent grievances and accusations caused by relative deprivation. In Nigeria, political violence is witnessed in areas of the country that is socio-economically deprived. In Northern Nigeria where there is high levels of unemployment and abject poverty, Islamic groups have been challenging the state authority to address the underlying causes. Also, in the South East, particularly the oil rich Niger Delta, the locals feel they are not benefiting from the oil and environmental degradation due to irresponsible oil multinational companies causing deprivation of indigenous people of their livelihood. This has resulted into militant groups comprising unemployed youth to engage in violent attacks such as vandalism of the oil pipes, car bombings, kidnappings and extortions. It is therefore discernible that Nigeria's counter terrorism strategies to contain Boko Haram and other rebellious groups have to consider the pervasive realities of poverty and

economic deprivation. Though the causal link between poverty and terrorism is indistinct with quantitative researches showing that people living in poverty are less likely to engage in terrorism and that those likely to engage in terrorism are educated and come from affluent families, Poverty and lack of job opportunities for the youth can be a motivating factor for the youth to join terrorist groups.[53]

At the state level, a State can sponsor terrorism as a tool to achieve foreign policy objectives. States use this strategy since it has high payoffs with relatively low costs. It is not ease to identify State terrorism and such States can easily deny. Weaker States find it palatable to resort supporting terrorists against stronger enemy states. On the flipside, powerful States can engage proxy wars against terrorist organizations or enemy states since it is cheaper and can easily deny its involvement in cases where backlash may be high. Louise Richardson asserts that in pursuit of foreign policy, some States engage in sponsoring terrorism to project and promote national interest. Additionally, some states support or back terrorism to advance certain domestic interests.[54] For instance, the US considers Iran, Sudan and Syria as State sponsors of terrorism.[55] The objectivity of Iran government to sponsor terrorism as a strategy of exporting revolution, while at the same time it acts as a tactic meant to avert breeding of revolutions emanating from abroad.

At the societal level, States undergoing rapid modernization and urbanization are more likely to be prone to terrorism due to development challenges such as unemployment and poverty. Though it is contested that inequality and poverty cause terrorism, they are nevertheless risk factors which increases the likelihood of triggering terrorism. At the transnational level, globalization is offered as a remedy and cause of terrorism. Globalized States are prone to terrorism since their borders are permeable and advanced

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[53] Richard Jackson, et al., The Causes of Terrorism, Deconstructing the Myth in Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Spotlight on Strategies and Approaches, Arches Quarterly Vol.5 9th Ed. Spring 2012,
[54] Op Cit., Louise Richardson, pp.52
[55] US Department of State Website, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm , accessed on 15/11/17

technology can easily be exploited by terrorists. On the other hand, States with low globalization index such as India and Egypt have experienced low levels of terrorism.

Though there have been increasing cases of terror groups with religious motivations, religion is not inextricably linked to terrorism. Religion plays the role of mobilizing and legitimizing terror activities. Religiously motivated terrorists tend to be more fanatical and are willing to cause mass causalities. The religion is a cause to the extent it combines with other socio-political factors making terrorism more transnational.[56]

The media, 'dubbed' as the 'oxygen' of publicity for terrorists, remains intricately linked to terrorism and it is one of the main drivers of terrorism, besides ideology, technological advancement, backlash from counter terrorism strategies, as well as political and economic developments. Given that terrorists seek recognition and publicity is its highest goal, terrorism cannot therefore exist without publicity by the media. Essentially, the conception of terrorism arose after the emergence of mass media following advancing technology that empowered wider propagation of information. The new media through the internet and social media is a game changer that is propagating terrorism, whose coverage assist in recruiting new supporters. Increased media coverage of terrorist activities help to heighten terrorist threat, causing more fear that damage itself. For instance, in 2015 Gallup carried out a poll in the USA showing that 51% of Americans were apprehensive that they will become victims of terrorism. Nevertheless, in reality, the chances of an American dying as a result of a terror attack is far much lower, meaning that perception of terrorism is far much greater than the actual danger posed by the terror threats, courtesy of the media.[57]

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[56] Ibid., pp.38-70
[57] Gonzalez Susana, What Drives Terrorism Part 5: The Media, On Security, Stratfor Worldview, 2017, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/what-drives-terrorism-part-5-media , accessed on 29/07/18

2.3   Counter terrorism strategies in Africa

Counter-terrorism refers to practices, techniques and strategies that governments and other stakeholders adopt in responding to terror activities, be they real or perceived. This is in tandem with free Dictionary definition which defines counter-terrorism as activities that are intended to prevent terrorist acts or to eradicate terrorist groups.[58] Basically, counter terrorism entails proactive measures, policies and strategies which seek to eliminate terrorist environments and groups. As the definition suggests, and as observed by Nzau (2017), counterterrorism is a highly state-centric activity since the state is the main actor and guarantor of national security, a development that beckons realist thinking of the anarchical world. Traditionally, this is a militaristic affair that entails technical, political, economic and human intelligence to forestall terror attacks.[59]

African countries can choose to exploit soft power and/or hard power strategies to counter terrorism. Hard power which refers to the use of military strength to influence the behaviour of other actors is defined by Joseph Nye describes as the "ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might" to compel others to adhere to your wishes (Nye: 2004). Essentially, as far as counter terrorism is concerned, hard power entails use of coercive military force as a strategy to combat terrorism. Soft power on the other hand focuses on use of, diplomacy, persuasion, capacity building, *inter alia*, rather than using force or coercion. Nye considers smart power, a combination of hard and soft power, with the right mix, as an effective strategy to combat terror. He further notes that national security pivots around winning hearts and minds as well as winning wars.[60]

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[58] The Free Dictionary, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/counterterrorism , accessed on 19/11/17
[59] Nzau Mumo, Civil Society and Eastern Africa Counterterrorism Agenda: A Critical Account, Africa Amani Journal, Vol.1 Issue.4, pp.41-51, http://mail.mumonzau.net/images/dr_mumo_nzau_aaj2017.pdf, accessed on 19/11/17
[60] Nye Joseph, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, *Foreign Affairs Journal*, 2004

Maluki identifies some of the counter terrorism strategies which have been utilized by Africa governments as explained below.[61]

Firstly, one of the strategies governments have commonly used is military deployment of the military. For instance, Kenya deployed her military in Somalia in 2011, teaming up with the Ethiopian forces to stabilize the country against the al Qaeda offshoot, al-Shabaab. They have since been joined by Uganda, Djibouti and Burundi as part of the AMISOM. In January 2013, Nigeria provided troops and gave logistical support to the ECOWAS effort in Mali.

Secondly, initiatives on Anti-money Laundering to curb financing of terror activities have been explored by some African countries. For instance, Ethiopia, Kenya and South Africa are members of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), an associate member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which aim at curtailing terrorists in accessing financial support.

Thirdly, many African countries engage in regional collaborations as a strategy to improve its counterterrorism capacity. For instance, Ethiopia is a member of IGAD and Partnership for Regional East Africa Counter-terrorism. Kenya on the other hand remains one of Africa's largest beneficiaries of the US government's Anti-terrorism Assistance program which aims at creating capacity for law enforcement in border security, investigations, crisis response, as well as prevention and timely response to terror activities.

Fourthly, legislating Anti-terrorism mechanisms remains one of the major endeavors of many African countries in combating terror. Ethiopia's Anti-terrorism Proclamation

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[61] Maluki Patrick, Learning From Country Best Practice In Africa: In Search of A Grand Counter Terrorism Strategy, http://idis.uonbi.ac.ke/sites/default/files/chss/idis/idis/Maluki-LEARNING%20FROM%20COUNTRY%20BEST%20PRACTICE%20IN%20AFRICA-2.pdf, accessed on 16/07/18

(ATP) legislation enacted in 2011 has been instrumental in prosecuting and convicting individuals associated with terrorist activity. The Kenya Prevention of Terrorism Act together with the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act offer a robust legal framework for prosecuting terrorists.

Fifthly, training and capacity building is also one of the measures used to improve counterterrorism capacity. Ethiopia is a beneficiary of the United States' Regional Strategic Initiative and Anti-terrorism Assistance program meant to develop capacity on leadership and management, border security, and skills on developing investigative capacity. Nigerian as well enjoys cordial relations with the US on counterterrorism cooperation. With US training and assistance, the Kenya government established an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, a National Counter-Terrorism Centre, and a National Security Advisory Committee.

Sixthly, Economic empowerment and development initiatives form part of the soft power some countries are using to mitigate terrorism phenomenon. For instance, Nigeria has developed an all-inclusive strategy to resolve Boko Haram grievances, focusing on development efforts aimed at reducing appeal by the group to the local communities, whereby they have been able to tackle genuine concerns of the people of northern Nigeria, and safeguard the human rights for all the residents. At the same time, Nigeria continues to engage with national and local leaders through US-funded projects which aim to train the youth on vocational skills, as a strategy to prevent them from engaging in violent extremist. Counter terrorism measures deduced include poverty alleviation programmes, economic development, education and social reforms.

Seventhly, many African government are now modernizing their forensic Science and Surveillance initiatives as a strategy to combat terror. For instance, Tunisia has acquired

an Automated Fingerprint Identification System and keeps fingerprint records for identification cards, criminal records, and latent prints.

2.3.1 Status of Counter Terrorism in Africa

The fight against terrorism has increasingly become a great concern not only to African countries but also the world at large, thus making counter terrorism efforts and attainment of international peace and security an enormous challenge. International terrorism does not only undermine peace and tranquility but also make the countries lose development prospects. The counter terrorism choices range from use of force to operations other than war such as repression, conciliatory and legal options. Use of force encompasses use of military strikes against terrorist targets and the attendant covert operations. Non-military options entail use of intelligence, applying economic sanctions, diplomacy and concessionary means. Legal responses promote rule of law using law enforcement and legislating counter terrorism laws to criminalize terrorist activities Gus Martin: 208-209).

The landscape for countering domestic and international terrorism in Africa has changed in the recent times with many African governments being impaired in terms of capacity to fight terrorism. For instance, in Somalia, large swathes of the area are ungoverned and acts as a fertile ground for Al-Shabaab breeding. In the post 9/11, Africa has witnessed the US and other western countries becoming more willing to collaborate with Africa to counter terrorism in terms of training and funding of counter terrorism initiatives. The United Nations has also endeavored to assist African countries to institute the necessary legal structures and build capacity for relevant institutions ostensibly to respond to key aspects related to counter terrorism such as terrorist financing and money laundering.[62]

Despite considerable efforts in responding to terror threats, Africa is still plagued with many security challenges ranging from intra/inter-state conflicts, rising radicalization, to

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[62] James J.F. Forest and Jennifer Giroux, Terrorism and Political Violence in Africa: Contemporary Trends in a Shifting Terrain, Perspectives of Terrorism, Vol.5, Issue 3-4, pp.12-13,

competing priorities to political sensitivity of the concept of counter terrorism. Consequently, vulnerability of the region to terrorism is attributable to, *inter alia*, weak governance, porous borders which facilitate relocation of undesirable persons and illicit arms, radical religious ideologies, indoctrination of sections of the society that is vulnerable as well as harsh socio-economic conditions which provide a fertile infrastructure for thriving of terrorism.[63]

In some countries, the counter terrorism strategies and measures employed have assisted in bringing some semblance of peace and security in the international system. For instance, in Ethiopia, it can be observed that the counter terrorism strategies have succeeded and one cannot conjecture any cases of terrorism against its people despite having its troops in Somalia. This is different with the Kenya situation where the al Shabab has been targeting Kenyan interests, citing the presence of Kenyan troops in Somalia soil. So, the question is, what has Ethiopia done differently as far as counter terrorism strategies are concerned?

Maru[64] asserts that the Ethiopian Doctrine on Counter terrorism (CT) and Counterinsurgency (COIN) differs from other countries strategies in many ways: in Ethiopia politics is supremacy over the military components of the CT and COIN strategies. In other words, politics precedes the military and criminal justice systems as far as CT strategies are concerned, where the Ethiopian Doctrine focuses on liberating areas for local communities, thus enabling them to fight back against terrorists. This approach focuses on the government building trust, understanding fears, and sharing a common vision with the local communities. This strategy "helps to build close-knit neighbor-hood watch associations that provide community-based peace and security with

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[63] Patrick Kimunguyi, Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in East Africa, ResearchGate, 2015,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267265383_Terrorism_and_Counter_terrorism_in_East_Africa
[64] Mehari Taddele Maru is a specialist in international human rights and humanitarian law, an international consultant on African Union affairs, and an expert in public administration and management.

effective oversight by the state." This strategy makes it very difficult for both foreign and domestic terror groups to establish themselves and operate discreetly amongst communities. Above all, a single agency acting singly cannot manage to effectively fight terrorism, rather it requires teamwork and involvement and participation from a wide range of national and international organisations, key to success being Organization, Cooperation and Coordination.

2.3.2   Role of African Union (AU) in Counter Terrorism efforts in Africa

The AU framework for counter-terrorism basically comprises the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999, the AU Action Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, and the appointment of AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Co-operation in 2010 to coordinate continental efforts geared towards effective implementation of the relevant AU instruments in the prevention and combating of terrorism.[65]

As a sign of commitment to combat terrorism in the African region, African Heads of State meeting held in Dakar in 2001 adopted the Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism protocol which recognized the growing threat of terrorism in the continent and its nexus with other organized crimes such as money laundering, drug trafficking, transnational crimes and proliferation of small and light weapons. The Declaration called for firm strengthening of coordination and cooperation among states in efforts to combat all manifestations of international terror activities in Africa. The Heads of State further appealed to all African countries to urgently ratify the AU Agreement on the Prevention

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[65] AU Peace and Security Website, The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework, http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct, accessed on 04/08/18

and Combating of Terrorism and related United Nations instruments which will provide legal structures for combating international terrorism.[66]

The AU also held a high level Inter-Governmental meeting on prevention and fighting of international terrorism in the African continent in Algiers in 2002 that adopted the AU Plan of Action on preventing and combating terrorism which stipulated measures including legislative, border control, judicial, exchange of information and financing of terrorism. In the same vein, the African Centre for Study and Research of Terrorism was created in 2004 as an implementation strategy of the 2002 Plan of Action on Preventing and Combating terrorism in Africa. The ACSRT is not only mandated to research on terrorism and develop strategies for capacity building on combating of terrorism but also forum for coordination of counter terrorism efforts among member states (MS) and in partnership with regional and international stakeholders.[67] The 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union held in Kampala in 2010, underscored the need to intensify efforts to combat the increasing scourge of terrorism in the continent vide the Assembly/AU/Dec.311 (XV), which stressed the need for Member States (MS) to renew efforts to combat increasing threat of terrorism, increase mobilization, work closely together to fight terror in the continent that is posing serious threat to security, peace and stability in Africa.[68] The African Model Law on Counter Terrorism adopted during 17th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union, held in Malabo, in 2011 vide the Union decision, Assembly/AU/Dec.369 (XVII),[69] urged Member States use the Model Law not only to improve their national legislations but also use the Model to implement provisions contained in the various continental and international counter-terrorism instruments.

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[66] Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, 17th October 2001, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3db22b14.html, accessed 04/8/18
[67] African Union Peace and Security Website, The African Union Counter Terrorism Framework http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/64-counter-terrorism-ct
[68] Assembly/AU/Dec.311(XV), Decision on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/assembly-au-dec-311-xv-e.pdf, accessed on 02/8/18
[69] Ibid.

However, the AU counter terrorism initiatives and strategies have not been effective in mitigating against the threat of terrorism as manifested by increasing terror incidents in Africa such as: 2013 al-Shabaab terror attacks in Kenya at the Westgate Mall, killing 70 people and 2015 Garissa University killing that resulted in death of 148 people; Massacre of thousands of people by Boko Haram in Baga village in Nigeria in 2015; the siege at Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali; the mass shooting in Sousse, Tunisia; the suicide bomber in Mogadishu, Somalia; the attack in Burkina Faso leaving 29 people dead in 2015. The arguments advanced that controlling terrorism takes time, which is not a short time phenomenon and also that Africa is not immune to international terrorism are neither here nor there. Africa has not effectively implemented raft of initiatives and strategies by the AU. For instance, the 2002 Algiers Plan of Action which offers comprehensive counter terrorism strategies is yet to be ratified by key players such as Kenya, Somalia and Nigeria.[70].

Fundamentally, the main challenge to the implementation of the 1999 OAU Convention of the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which deals with strategies to combat terrorism at the national level and the need for international collaboration on terrorism, remains non-ratification of the Convention by member states. In spite of the AU Commission charged with the responsibility of monitoring compliance by using formal and informal diplomatic channels to implore member states to ratify the Convention, many member states had neither signed nor ratified the treaty by 2007.[71] The non-commitment by member states was informed by states preferring to pursue national interest at the expense of continental interest. Member states are quick to invoke

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[70] Allison Simon, 26th AU Summit: Why isn't the AU's counter-terrorism strategy working?, Institute for Security Studies, 2016, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/26th-au-summit-why-isnt-the-aus-counter-terrorism-strategy-working

[71] Sam Moki, The Role of the AU: Integration, Leadership and Opportunity, in John Davis (Ed.), Africa and the War on Terrorism, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2007, pp.123-4

preservation of sovereignty and independence. However, as by June 2017, there was renewed commitment with 50 countries having signed and 43 ratified. For the AU member states to succeed in combating international terror, they have to embrace international cooperation and set aside their national interests in favour of the continental interests. Additionally, it is discernible that a small fraction of the African Union's budget is contributed by member states, whereas pledges by member states to support AU operations are unpredictable, accentuated by the fact that African Standby Force does not have its own resources to fund operations. These developments speak volumes in terms of the level of interest African states have in the AU as a vehicle to combat terror in the continent.[72] From the international perspective, the assistance from the West and the international community to the AU has been slow, the efforts by the UN and other western countries who dominate in the fight against terrorism are largely unappreciated, and the AU's plea for technical assistance and capacity building has also been sluggish.[73]

2.3.3   Role of the Africa Command (AFRICOM)

In 2007, the US announced its intention to establish a single command to consolidate all its security programs, especially counter terrorism in the African continent. The AFRICOM became a new, autonomous and fully operational command in October, 2008. Prior, U.S. defense operations for Africa were divided among European Command, which covered West, Central, and Southern Africa; the Central Command, which covered the Horn; and Pacific Command, which covered the island base at Diego Garcia and maritime programs related to the Middle East. President Bush said that the new command will strengthen the US security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities

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[72] Hennie Strydom, The African Union lacks a coherent plan to fight terrorism, *The Conversation*, 2015, http://theconversation.com/the-african-union-lacks-a-coherent-plan-to-fight-terrorism-41394 , accessed on 12-11-2017
[73] Op. Cit., Sam Moki, pp.122-3

to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa, besides enhancing peace and fostering common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth.[74]

The plans by the US to station the AFRICOM headquarters in Africa did not augur well with many African states over ambiguities regarding AFRICOM mandate and objectives. The mounting misunderstanding and misgivings by African countries made the US to change her mind and locate it in Stuttgart, Germany and run bases in Africa. Presently, AFRICOM operates from two bases in Africa, one at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti and the other one in the Ascension Island off the West Coast of Africa that serves as hubs for carrying out military and non-military operations across the African continent.

It is apparent that the US is capitalizing on the Command to pursue its strategic national interests in Africa. The Command's main objective revolves around combating the al-Shabaab in Somalia, neutralizing violent extremist group across northwest Africa, fighting Boko Haram and countering piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, among other functions. With these developments, it is envisaged that the US military presence in Africa are inevitably bound to remain and is expected to sprout and intensify as the US unrelentingly continues to pursue her national interests.

William Miles (2012:33-34) believes that creation of the regional military Command for Africa was primarily tied to the pursuance of the US strategic national interest in Africa which include access to oil supplies and combating terrorism, aroused by 9/11 terrorist attack.[75] This view is shared by Daniel Volman (2007: 734-44) who posits that the creation of AFRICOM is for the US to not only expand security assistance to Africa

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[74] Theresa Whelan, Why AFRICOM? 2007,
https://blackboard.angelo.edu/bbcswebdav/institution/LFA/CSS/Course%20Material/CCSS2323/Readings/Whelam.pdf
[75] Miles, William F. S. "Deploying Development to Counter Terrorism: Post-9/11 Transformation of U.S. Foreign Aid to Africa." African Studies Review 55, no. 3 (2012): p.33-34.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43904847.

regimes willing to act as 'surrogates,' particularly for African states with oil and natural gas but also as a grand strategy to contain China's growing influence in Africa. Nonetheless, the US continues to militarize Africa under AFRICOM as a strategy by the US to combat terrorism.

The military bases spread throughout Africa are used for counter terrorism operations, to host US troops deployed for counter terrorist operations and also use the bases for counter terrorism missions and air/drone strikes.[76] Under AFRICOM, the US initiated Trans-Sahara Counter terrorism partnership program whose objectives was to defeat terrorism in the Pan-Sahel region by strengthening regional counter terrorism capabilities through training and military assistance. Again, the CJTF-HOA, now under AFRICOM, focuses on detecting and disrupting terror activates in the HOA. For instance, in 2008, the past leaders of al-Shabaab, Ahmad Abdi Godane and Aden Hashi Ayro were killed in a US air strike in their hideouts in Somalia. It is anticipated that the US strategy and future engagements in Africa will continue owing to increasing of its strategic significance of Africa as far as counter terrorism and other. The future interactions will be "based on reactive, selective strategic interests, and moral impulses around issues of poverty, humanitarian disasters, wars, governance and human rights, with AFRICOM as the main structural framework for achieving these priorities."[77]

2.3.4 Africa Mission in Somalia

The Africa Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a peacekeeping mission that was formed in 2007 by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. The UN Security Council Resolution 2372(2017) mandates AMISOM to counter the threat brought about

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[76] Besteman and Savell, Where in the World Is the U.S. Military? Everywhere, 2018, usnews.com, https://www.usnews.com/ accessed on 19/08/18
[77] David J. Francis, AFRICOM and the future of the United States – Africa Relations, in David J, Francis (Ed.) US Strategy in Africa: AFRICOM, Terrorism and Security Challenges, Routledge publishers, 2010, New York, pp.175-8

by Al-Shabaab and other terror groups among other functions. To achieve this, AMISOM conducts targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed terror groups, including jointly with the Somali Security Forces.[78]

AMISOM has both military and civilian components. Currently, the military constitute soldiers drawn from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Djibouti.[79] The troops have been able to carry out several offensive operations against al-Shabaab in conjunction with the US Special Forces, killing many of them, including top leadership. The US, as part of the international community supports operations of AMISOM in conducting special offensive operations against Al Shabaab.

From a counter terrorism perspective, the US makes significant contributions in terms of logistics and training to AMISOM. It is observable that since September 9/11 attack, the USA has prominently focused on Africa as a strategy to safeguard homeland security.[80] The US counter terrorism initiative in Africa has seen resources mobilized by the USA to modernize the police and judiciary capability in the continent, ostensibly to bolster counter terrorism efforts. For instance, in 2015, AMISOM and the UN Mission in Somalia, facilitated construction of police training facility in Kismayo in an effort to modernize and equip the Somali Police Force.[81] The greater engagement of the USA has created a new unique opportunity for Africa states that the continent can capitalize on the new attention to promote the continent's stability, prosperity and renaissance. [82]

Though firm imprints of the US in combating terrorism in Africa were observable after the 9/11 attacks, the USA had however embarked on combating terror from in 1998, the

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[78] AMISOM Website, AMISOM Mandate, http://amisom-au.org/ accessed on 17/8/18
[79] Ibid.,
[80] Greg Mills, Africa's New Significance, in John Davis (Ed), Africa and the War on Terrorism, Ashgate Publishers Ltd., 2007, pp.17-20
[81] Goldberg, Somali Police Force Open AMISOM/UNSOM Constructed Police Training Facility, Strategic Intelligence, 2015, https://intelligencebriefs.com/somali-police-force-open-amisomunsom-constructed-police-training-facility/, accessed on 20/8/18
[82] Op. Cit., Greg Mills, pp.24-5

time when the US Missions were attacked in Kenya and Tanzania. Contending perspectives indicate that the real intention for the USA intervention in Africa is not combating terrorism, rather terrorism is used as a strategy to access Africa's natural resources, especially oil.[83]

The USA formed the Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at camp Lomonier in Djibouti to primarily stage raids in Somalia to root out al Qaeda and its associates in Somali and Yemen. Additionally, Djibouti not to act as a launch pad for the US to project its power around the geographical area but also is a perfect gateway to the Middle East. Allowing the USA on her soils has enabled to Djibouti with 'goodies' in return. The US pays Djibouti USD 1,131 Million in a year and also benefits from US such as foreign aid and construction of water projects and medical facilities. The Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) has also been established in Djibouti.[84] Good relationship between USA and Djibouti notwithstanding, the government has taken advantage of the war on terrorism to entrench human rights abuses and crack down on opposition leaders.[85]

2.4 Challenges of Counter terrorism in Africa

Some of the counter terrorism strategies employed by some countries in Africa have not been effective due to the fact that they are not homegrown solutions but have been imposed on them by powerful states such as the USA. Some countries have strategically embraced the anti-terrorism rhetoric meant to serve different interest, some partners have been hesitant, while some repelled against foisting of such counter terrorism measures

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[83] Ibid,
[84] Ibid
[85] Ibid, pp.40

which they perceive to be discordant with their national interests.[86] For instance Uganda joined the US war on terror so that it can secure international assistance for its struggle to contain rebels domiciled in the north of the country. For the case of Tanzania, domestic counter-terrorism laws were passed to honour international obligations, but appears reluctant to implement those provisions.[87] A government may be more willing to comply with the international counterterrorism regime if their leaders believe that the country is a possible target or has been a victim of terrorist attacks and believe that it can be attacked again. However, some leaders may want exaggerate the threat of terrorism to either justify their efforts to maintain power or validate external funding.

2.5 Nexus between the Media and Terrorism in Africa

Mass media is basically the technology which is intended and anticipated to reach large audiences. Essentially, mass media connotes the means of communication used to reach huge majority of the people though electronic and print media as well as the Internet. There exists constant tension between the media and African governments. The media has a professional duty to report news objectively and keep the public informed whereas the terrorists want to promote their cause by using the media as a medium of communicating their schema.[88] Apparently there is a thin line between the media providing news and promoting terrorist agenda. Some media outlets deliberately sympathize with one party at the expense of the other. For authoritarian states, the government greatly regulates the media and therefore the government calls the shots as far as media coverage is concerned. However for democracies, the media has the freedom to use whatever media spin it believes is desirable in their reporting practices, in which case, some media houses

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[86] Whitaker, B. E., Compliance among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-terrorism Regime, *Review of International Studies* 36, no. 3 (2010): pp.639-62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40783289. Accessed on 17/02/18

[87] Ibid.,

[88] Martin Gus, Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies, Sage Publications Inc., Los Angeles, 3rd Ed. 2014 pp.68-83

intentionally use inflammatory language and pictures to appeal, fascinate and interest an audience.[89] More often than not, the media is owned and controlled by multinational organizations which are largely motivated by the market share and the profits they make, meaning that investment returns is a key consideration on what to report as opposed to objective reporting. This therefore means that unless the media adhere to ethical standards when reporting terrorist incidents, this will lead to contagion effect where the media news reports of terror activities and incidents may influence the future behaviour of like-minded terrorists.[90] With the advent of the new media, numerous challenges exist as far as counter terrorism is concerned. The need for the governments in Africa to adjust "counter terrorism strategies to the new arena, applying new types of online warfare, intelligence gathering and training cyber warriors" cannot be gainsaid.[91] Online campaigns need to be enhanced in engaging counter terrorism narratives. This development calls for new strategic thinking as far as counter terrorism is concerned. Rather than reacting to terrorism incidents, there is need to engage in anticipatory and pre-emptive measures, enhance Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in combating terrorism as well as anticipating emerging social media resources that can be abused by the terrorists.[92]

2.6   Conclusion

The key purpose of terrorism is to attraction public attention, to create mass hysteria and fear, an objective that media coverage squarely fit in promoting the terrorists' agenda. From the terrorists' perspective, media coverage therefore is significant measure of the accomplishment of a terrorist act. Apparently, the media remain powerful forces for influencing public opinion, with the resultant impact on both the governments and terrorist organizations.

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[89] Ibid, pp.69
[90] Ibid, pp.76
[91] Weimann Gabriel, Counter Terrorism in Social Media, in Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet, Ann Aly, et al., (Ed), Routledge Publishers, 2016, New York. pp. 59-61
[92] Ibid.

Terrorism remains a major challenge to world peace, and it is also evident that international terrorism continues to mutate and is proving difficult to mitigate. The counter terrorism measures put in place by many governments in Africa have tended to worsen the situation rather than ameliorating it. Indeed, the manner in which the Counter Terrorism (CT) measures have been executed by most government have tended to be counterproductive, save for a few governments where such measures have succeeded. This calls for a critical re-evaluation of the CT strategies employed with a view of coming up with palatable strategies which will positively contribute to international peace and security. Simply put, unless pragmatic approaches are not employed to root out international terrorism, it is likely that the world will continue to experience terrorism, otherwise States should consider consigning themselves to learn how to live in the contemporary complex world (Louise Richardson 2006: 237).

In nutshell, this chapter has explored the status and role of the media in International terrorism in Africa and counter terrorism strategies employed by AU, AFRICOM and AMISOM in the fight against terrorism in Africa. The next chapter narrows down to the evaluation of international terrorism and counter terrorism strategies in Kenya, with the emphasis on the role the media plays in promoting and combating international terrorism.

CHAPTER III

STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

STRATEGIES IN KENYA

3.1   International Terrorism in Kenya

Chapter II delved on the International terrorism and counter-terrorism measures in Africa, focusing on the foundations of international terrorism in the continent, status and counter terrorism and strategies in Africa. Specifically, it assessed the role of the AU, AFRICOM and AMISOM in the fight against Terrorism in Africa. The chapter also assessed the role of the media in combating terrorism in the African continent. This Chapter III examines the status of international terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya. It also explores the nature, foundations and extent of international terrorism and efficacy of measures Kenya has put in place to contain terrorism. Additionally, the chapter looks at the legal and regulatory frameworks for the media, highlighting the criticality of the media in combating international terrorism.

Kenya has witnessed several terror attacks in the recent times. In retrospective, Terrorism is not new in Kenya and can be traced back to the colonial period where the British colonial rulers described the Mau Mau peasant uprising (1952 - 1958) as terrorism. To Kenya scholars and some historians, the Mau Mau were freedom fighters trying to free the country from the colonial rulers, whom they christened as terrorists.[93] This is in tandem with the aphorism that a perceived terrorist can be considered as a freedom fighter by others. Indeed, it is demonstrable that today's terrorist can be tomorrow's statesman.

Contemporary terrorism in Kenya started in 1980s when the Popular Front for the

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[93] Otenyo, E.E., "New Terrorism: Toward an Explanation of Cases in Kenya", in, Africa Security Review13(3) (2004) pp.77

Liberation of Palestine bombed Norfolk hotel, an Israel investment, in relation to Kenya's acceptance to give Israel logistical support during Entebbe rescue operation. Again in 1998, al Qaeda masterminded the attacks at the US Missions in Kenya and Tanzania, leading to the commencement of war on terrorism by the USA. In 2002, the attack on Kikambala Hotel, at the coast of Mombasa together with the attempted downing of Israel aircraft, Arkia airlines en-route to Tel Aviv from Mombasa with al- Qaeda signature firmly placed Kenya at the heart of terrorist activities in the region.[94] Much of the threat Kenya is facing comes from al-Shabaab from Somalia. The long-drawn-out conflict in Somalia characterized by the absence of a central government and dysfunctional institutions have occasioned existence of vast ungoverned spaces that have become fodder for Al-Qaeda and its offshoots such as Al-Shabaab to blossom. Al-Shabaab was initially concentrated its activities in Somalia, but it afterwards established extensive networks in Kenya for recruitment, fundraising and conducting training activities inside Kenya. Al Shabaab, who initially focused on gaining support from the ethnic Somali community in Kenya, has extended its tentacles and influence to non-Somalis and by 2009, Kenyans nationals constituted a substantial number with influence within Al Shabaab.[95]

The Al Shabaab terror group is essentially domiciled in Somalia and is famous for conducting terror attacks inside Somalia. It is also acknowledged that the group also carries out attacks in the countries bordering Somalia, with Kenya bearing the most brunt. Ahmad Umar, also known as Ahmed Diriye is the emir and current leader of the terror group who took over from Ahmed Abdi Godane. Gadane died in 2014 through US air strikes. By end of 2015, the group had an estimated membership of between 7,000 and

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[94] Raymond Muhula, Kenya and the Global War on Terrorism: Searching for a New Role in a New War, in John Davis (Ed.), Africa and the War on Terrorism, Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2007, pp.43-57
[95] UNSC, Report on Eritrea and Somalia by the UN Monitoring Group, 2010, pp.24

9,000 combatants. Al Shabaab obtains funding from a wide range of sources which include Al Qaida and sympathetic Somalis in the diaspora. Eritrea is also suspected to be supporting the group with financial resources and arms. The UN has also claimed that other countries such as Djibouti, Iran, Syria, Egypt, provide funds, weapons and training to Al Shabaab.[96]

Apparently, there are distinct connections between the disbanded Al Ittihad Al Islamiya (AIAI) and Al Shabaab membership. Aden Hashi Ayro, who perished in May 2008 through a US air strike was an erstwhile commander of al-Shabaab joined the Islamic Court Union, to establish the militant wing following the successful capture and control of a large swathe of Somalia. Ayro received consecrations from Aweys, the al Shabaab spiritual leader before taking over the leadership. A sustained assault by AMISOM, Ethiopian and Somalia military managed to recapture control of the capital and reinstated the TFG, forcing the ICU membership to flee to the bordering states, whereas Al Shabaab withdrew and fled to the south where it continued to conduct guerilla attacks.[97]

Kenya sent troops to Somalia in 2011 to pursue terrorists and create a buffer zone against insecurity from Somalia following a series of raids on coastal resorts by Somali criminals and the kidnapping of two Spanish aid workers from Dadaab refugees camp and taken into Somalia. The Al-Shabaab embarked on a series of attacks through improvised explosive devices (IED), grenades and firearms in Nairobi, the Coast and the North Eastern regions, demanding that Kenya withdraws its troops from Somalia. The attacks targeted public gatherings, entertainment establishments, churches and security personnel.[98] The terror attack at Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September 2013 left 67

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[96] Terrorism Profiles: Al Shabaab, The Mackenzie Institute, Security Matters, 2015, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/al-shabaab-2/, accessed on 29/04/18
[97] Ibid
[98] International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No.102, 25 September 2014, pp.4

people dead and several injured. Again, in April 2015, Al-Shabaab stormed Garissa University in Kenya killing 147 people. Garissa town is 120km from the border with Somalia. The attack casted doubts on the ability of the Kenyan government to protect her people. The end results and effects have been declining tourism, waning direct foreign investments and loss of employment. Al Shabaab which commands much of the southern-central region of Somalia, uses guerilla warfare and terror tactics to pursue and advance their cause. In 2012, Ahmed Abdi Godane established ties with Al-Qaeda thus focusing more on transnational agenda. This development has been the bone of contention and disharmony among members since some are keener in concentrating on domestic agenda as opposed to international goals.[99]

3.2   Structure of terrorism networks

Though planning and execution of terror activities are by nature secretive, it is not easy to differentiate terrorists from other normal people since those persons engaged in the vice do conduct normal and sometimes legal activities. Terrorists' organizations usually scattered throughout the globe and have connections and relations. They are organized through international networks and keep in touch, by taking advantage of advanced technologies to communicate, conduct their operations and enlist new adherents by widely using online networks and telephony.[100] However, in some instances, some individual terrorists act alone (lone wolves), perhaps because they are just sympathetic to a cause and are not controlled from any quarters. The case of lone wolves is apparently the most challenging given that it is not easy to identify and track down such lone wolves. In most cases, such lone wolves are known after committing atrocities or when their plans are at advanced stage.

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[99] Mellgard Emily, Terrorism in Africa: An Inside Look At the 3 Most Dangerous African Terrorist Groups, 2013, https://mic.com/articles/66127/terrorism-in-africa-an-inside-look-at-the-3-most-dangerous-african-terrorist-groups#.NeFznd6EW accessed on 12/02/18
[100] Lelo, Mamosi, Terrorism in Africa: Challenges and perspective, 2012

As a strategy to sustain and fund terror activities, terrorist outfits engage themselves in criminal activities such as money laundering, Narco-trade, including drugs, arms and human trafficking and smuggling of counterfeits. Some of these criminal activities involve killing, destroying, damaging and threatening by using different kinds of means such as firearms, bombs, chemical and biological materials. The complex nature of these organizations make it hard and challenging to combat international terrorism. For sustainable success, countering terrorism should entail by starting to examine the underlying reasons of terrorism and then try to resolve them rather that extensively using military force.

3.3   Motivations and causes of terrorism in Kenya

Understanding the motivations and causes of terrorism is critical in formulating an all-inclusive strategy to combat terrorism, owing to the fact that terror groups are diverse and functionally dissimilar. It is therefore not easy to explain the causes of terrorism from a singular causal factor. This notwithstanding, ideology remains a key reason and cause of individuals engaging in terrorism. Basically, ideology shapes the psychological deportment of an individual and provides moral justification of the consequences. This means that terrorists are rational actors who choose their targets rationally by pursuing targets with optimal benefits. Though sometimes many socio-political and economic factors related to terrorism such as weak institutions, poverty, porous borders and statelessness are considered to be causal factors, they only provide the necessary environment in which terrorism thrives.[101] There are several underlying or root causes for individuals getting involved in terrorism. Factors such as poverty, unemployment, backwardness, ignorance and unresolved grievances as well as poor political governance lead to despair and frustration among the affected members of the society, which in turn

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[101] Op. Cit., Raymond Muhula, pp.44-45

may cause tendency to engage in terror activities.

In spite of the counter terrorism measures put in place, Kenya continues to witness terrorism activities of huge magnitude. This begs the question as to why Kenya remains a target of international terrorists, especially the al – Shabaab, an off-shoot organization of al – Qaeda. As much as it is true that Kenya has porous borders which makes it easier for terrorists to enter the country, this argument needs further re-evaluation since Ethiopia-Somalia is much lengthier (1600km) in comparison to Kenya's (682km) and yet it does not experience such attacks. So geographical proximity alone may not be able to explain why Kenya is targeted and all other neighbours are hardly attacked. Even in terms of the Muslim population, Ethiopia has a proportionately higher Muslim population, at 34% vis-à-vis Kenya's Muslim population which stands at about 11% and yet Ethiopia is rarely attacked by al-Shabaab.

According to Otenyo (2007), Kenya is an easy target of terrorism is attributable to what he calls "geopolitical curse" meaning that Kenya's close association with the West and the good relations it enjoys with terrorists' nemesis (Israel and the west) offers a good rationale to target the country.[102] Terrorists are also attracted to Kenya by the good infrastructural facilities such as airports, roads, and railways which makes movement very easy within the region. The country's porous borders and ineffective policing of the borders lead to easy entry of extremists and weapons into the Kenya. Furthermore, the substantial restive Muslim population of Somali descent in Kenya makes it difficult to identify genuine Kenya Somalis. Raymond Muhula says that Kenya is a gateway to the Horn of Africa for terrorism and the US pursuit of terrorists owing to its close association with the West and Israeli, making Kenya suffer collateral damages. He however

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[102] Otenyo quoted in Raymond Muhula, pp.48

succinctly observes that this development has changed over time where not only western interests are targeted but Kenya is being targeted for being an ally, among other reasons.[103] Al-Shabaab asserts that it targets Kenya in revenge to the alleged atrocities committed by the Kenyan military deployed in Somalia (now part of the African Union peace-support operation AMISOM). I find this argument more of an excuse and not a reason for the attacks. The Kenyan military entered Somalia in pursuit of the Somalia-based Islamist militant group, al Shabaab who had kidnapped tourists at the coastal town of Lamu and aid workers in Mandera in 2011. The narrative about liberating Muslims is calculated to prompt heavy handedness responses from the government that would further entrench the narrative of an anti-Islamic Christian government and gain more recruits. In any case, most of the victims al-Shabaab has killed in Somalia are Muslims, thus negating the notion of fighting for Muslims interests.

The Kenyan Constitution affords the Kenyan media utmost level of freedom whereas the media in the neighbouring states such as Ethiopia the media is suppressed. In Kenya, the international media operate freely as opposed to in neighbouring countries where their independence of the international media is greatly reduced. In fact the international media such as China's Xinhua are based in Nairobi whereas other media outlets such as BBC and Al-Jazeera have reporters/journalists in Nairobi and other major towns.

Kenya Tourism sector is one of the major sources of foreign exchange earner for the country, directly contributing Kshs 294.6 billion to the GDP in 2017 and supporting direct employment of 429,000 jobs.[104] The recurrent threat from al-Shabaab has seen tourists cancelling their travels with a cumulative result of these attacks resulting in job

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[103] Op. Cit., Raymond Muhula, pp.43-47

[104] The Economic Impact of Travel & Tourism, March 2018, https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/countries-2018/kenya2018.pdf, accessed on 20/8/18

losses and shutting down of hotels. Al-Shabaab use the media has 'oxygen' of publicity to show that nobody is safe in Kenya with that aim of bringing Kenya's economy down and try compel Kenya military to exit from Somalia. It is also compelling to believe that the other reason al-Shabaab attack Kenya's tourism sites is because the tourist hub has ample targets, whose coverage of the media accords al-Shabaab regional and global relevance.

Al-Shabaab has managed to create homegrown terror networks in Kenya which are responsible for many terrorist attacks in the country. This is manifested by the fact that some of the individuals who attacked Garissa University College and Westgate Mall in Kenya were Somalia Somalis who have been dwelling in the country.

3.4   Kenya's responses to terrorism

Kenya's responses to terrorism constitute use of a mixture of soft and hard power strategies, which revolve around military, legal and diplomatic approaches. The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) was created in 2014 as multi-agency instrument primarily of security agencies, charged with an advisory role and is also mandated to coordinate counter terrorism effort in Kenya.[105] The Centre is specifically mandated to coordinate national efforts to combat terrorism, carry out public awareness regarding terrorism dangers, come up with strategies to counter radicalization and stimulate de-radicalization, build capacity in counter terrorism and prevention, as well as coordinating in the provision security certifications for aviation schools, in conjunction with other relevant Ministries Departments Agencies (MDAs). At policy level, the Centre is charged with the responsibility of initiating, developing and constantly reviewing counter terrorism strategies and policies, engaging the public to participate in counter radicalization, coordinate and manage the execution of the Strategy on Counter Violent

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[105] National Counter Terrorism Centre website, https://www.counterterrorism.go.ke/, accessed on 16/07/18

Extremism (CVE), designing strategies to delegitimize violent extremist ideology and also serve as focal point through which the government engages other stakeholders on issues dealing with CT and CVE initiatives at local, national or international levels.[106] In this respect Kenya's counter terrorism policies and strategies can be viewed from three lenses; Legislative, Policy and Diplomatic.[107]

3.4.1   Legislative Initiatives

The government published a bill on Suppression on Terrorism in 2003 but did not succeed as it was vigorously opposed by politicians, civil society and Muslim fraternity, arguing that it contained parameters which can be misused by state functionaries. The second attempt was made in 2006 through the Prevention of terrorism bill, which allowed the police to arrest and search property without authority from the courts and allowing investigators to detain suspected terrorists for 36 hours. The bill was also contested leading to protests in the streets for fear that it threatened to dismember the very fabric of the Nation and could provide a palatable ground for inter-religious hostilities and mistrust. The third attempt was made in 2012 that finally led to the passing of the Prevention of Terrorist bill 2012 into law, making it Kenya's first legislation on acts of terrorism after the two previous unsuccessful attempts. The Prevention of Terrorist Act (POTA) 2012 broadly defines terrorism as violence or threat of violence which encompasses death, severe physical injuries, destruction of property, threat to a person's life, undermines security and public wellbeing, and involves usage of weapons or explosives.[108] The Act criminalizes anyone who campaigns for, idolizes or facilitates the commissioning terror activities.

As a booster in the fight against terrorism, the Kenya government also legislated the

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[106] Ibid.,
[107] Op Cit., Raymond Muhula, 2007,
[108] Laws of Kenya, The Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012

Security Laws (Amendment) Act No. 19 of 2014 (SLAA). The Coalition of Reforms and Democracy (CORD petitioned the High Court challenging the constitutionality of the SLAA. The Court declared some controversial terrorism laws unconstitutional and therefore invalid. Some of the clauses relate to media freedom, refugees' status as well as bond and bail procedures for criminal suspects. The fight against terrorism in Kenya remains a challenge and terror attacks persist.

The Official Secrets Act provides that any person who obtains, collects, records, publishes or communicates in whatever manner any code word, plan, article, document or information that is calculated to be useful to a foreign power commits an offence.

The Kenyan Code of Conduct for the Practice of Journalism provides that the media should avoid presenting acts of violence, armed robberies, banditry and terrorist activities in a manner that glorifies such antisocial conduct. Also, newspapers should not allow their columns to be used for writings that tend to encourage or glorify social evils, warlike activities, ethnic, racial or religious hostilities.

Though governments try to constrict terrorists of the oxygen of publicity by use of relevant legislations to censor and limit the output of news media sources, terrorists can still successfully get media attention in western democracies due to market competitive nature of media business and the fundamental freedoms and civil liberties enshrined in their constitutions.[109]

3.4.2 Diplomatic Initiatives

The government has made diplomatic efforts by initiating several multilateral and bilateral initiatives to build partnerships. Use of diplomacy helps to create a global anti-

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[109] Majoran Andrew, Terrorism & the Oxygen of Publicity, The Mackenzie Institute Security Matters, 2014, http://mackenzieinstitute.com/terrorism-oxygen-publicity/, accessed on 20/8/18

terror coalition that is a central component of response to terrorist events. Kenya has also participated in several platforms such as IGAD, AU, UN, and the Commonwealth.[110]

3.4.3 Military initiatives

Kenya has used the military and other security agencies to pursue terrorism within the country and outside. The military has been actively involved in tracking down terrorists in the country and in Somalia. The military is currently engagement in Somalia as part of the AMISOM trying to bring normalcy in the war ton country. Bilaterally, Kenya and the USA have been involved in joint counter terrorism operations. The USA has also been able to assist in provision of military hardware and capacity building in counter terrorism training. Kenya and CJTF-HOA forces have also been conducting counter terrorism operation in the Indian Ocean international waters. Additionally, Kenya is a key partner in the East Africa Counter Terrorism initiative (EACTI), created by the USA to build capacity in fighting terrorism in the East African region.

Military, diplomatic and legislative solutions cannot be effective in combating terrorism when explored singly but requires a combination or a mix of several strategies, including the media. Apparently, the media has not been reconnoitered and pursued as an effective counter terrorism strategy.

3.5 Is it time to negotiate with the terrorists?

Toying with the idea of making peace with the terrorists as a counter terrorism strategy look attractive and brilliant idea but appears a mirage. Many countries including Kenya have declared a blanket policy of not negotiating with the terrorists, borne out of the conviction that the terrorists must learn that there are no rewards in engaging in terror

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[110] Op. Cit., Raymond Muhula, pp.54-55

activities since doing so will open up political legitimization of their actions. Negotiating

with terrorists for an amicable settlement on not to engage in terror activities may send

signals that government condones criminality and encourage future terror attacks.[111] On

the flipside, depending on the nature of terrorism, refusal to negotiate may lead to loss of

lives and property. Other writers argue that negotiating with terrorists offers an

opportunity to collect information on the nature and root causes of terrorism depending

on the nature of terrorism such as separatist groups, negotiation has been successful and

effective in taming terrorism by agreeing to concessions, with others turning to be

political parties such as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Euskadi Ta

Astakasuna (ETA) in Spain, and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri

Lanka.[112]

3.6   The Nexus between the Media and Terrorism in Kenya

Publicity remains the primary goal and weapon of terrorists to advance political causes or

to simply cause chaos. The reporting of a political kidnapping, an assassination or a

deadly bombing is usually a first victory for the terrorist and it is pointless if these acts of

viciousness do not attract world's attention, are pointless. Indeed "The media carry

messages to anyone from anyone with the knowledge, skill or importance to make use of

them. It may be propaganda or it may be truth, but either way, the media carry powerful

influence."[113] Terry warns journalists about what they reports where a human life is at

risk. They must understand that what they report might well kill the person. This does not

mean that journalists abandon or even tone down their reporting.[114] This calls for

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[111] Wilkinson, Terrorism-Media, in Marie-Helen Maras, Counter Terrorism, (1st Ed.) Jones & Bartlett
Learning publishers, 2013, pp. 317-27
[112] Ibid, pp. 317-27
[113] Anderson, Terry, Terrorism and Censorship: The Media in Chains, *Journal of International Affairs*
Vol.47, no. 1, 1993, pp.127-136. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357089. pp. 128-129 Accessed on 30/04/18
[114] Ibid., pp.135

responsible reporting in the interest of the common/public good. Basically, terrorists largely depend on the media to get attention, attract recognition and seek legitimacy for their activities as well as their cause.

Prior to the advent of the internet age the media relied on the mainstream print and electronic media to publicize their cause. However, in the contemporary world of advancing technology, terrorists also spread propaganda online through social media platforms such as YouTube, blogs, Instagram, LinkedIn groups, twitter, Facebook, Myspace, videos, as well as online magazines and publications.[115] As Maras (2013) further puts it, internet is not only an enabler and an incubator of terrorism but online environment also serves as a virtual meeting place for individuals to discuss extremist ideologies. Furthermore, the internet provides a platform for extremists to justify their engagement in terror activities and a forum for individuals to access extremist propaganda.[116]

Social media is essentially interactive and relies on communication technologies such as internet networks to establish a massively interactive platform for individuals or groups to not only discuss and share content and but also modify user generated content. This is because the social media is relatively inexpensive and easily accessible. Furthermore, the channels are not only popular with the intended audience but also friendly. For instance, Harakat al-Shabaab al-mujahideen, commonly known as al-Shabaab, a jihadist fundamentalist group based in Somalia responsible for causing most of terror activities in East Africa, is not new to social media. It operates a quasi-official and unofficial twitter accounts. In 2013 during the Westgate attack in Nairobi, Kenya, al-Shabaab tweeted in their twitter account taking responsibility of the attack. The tweets were coming from

[115] Marie-Helen Maras, Counter Terrorism, (1st Ed.) Jones & Bartlett Learning publishers, 2013, pp. 290-91
[116] Marie-Helen Maras, Ibid.,

sources inside the mall as the attack was going on, targeting the Kenya government and the Kenyan people. According to David Mair, the best way to combat this type of threat is to focus on counter terrorist narratives addressing them to the recipients of the terrorist twitter accounts rather than engaging with the terrorist actors (David Mair 2006:83-84).

Terrorism is a psychological weapon which relies on the mass media to communicate threats to a wider society, meaning that terrorists aim at maximizing publicity of their activities by making many people watching and lots more listening. Ideally, "the terrorist attacks are designed to elicit a specific response from the civilians, the government, followers and other members of the terrorist group. If an act of terrorism is not seen or acknowledged by anyone, then it serves no purpose. A terrorist group would not be able to sustain itself without the media because it not only helps to bring attention to the terrorists' cause but also assists them in gaining new followers and recruits."[117] This explicates the centrality of the media in combating terrorism since the more publicity the terrorists get, the more lethal they become. Conversely, the less the oxygen of publicity, the less attractive it will be to terrorists. It is suffice to say that in this era of expanded technological development both the terrorists and counter terrorists practitioners alike are operating in an environment that is both complex and chaotic, in the sense that they have no control of messages they send over the internet.[118]

Censoring the media as a counter terrorism strategy may not work in the contemporary world this is due to the fact that "even if all television news media were to agree not to cover terrorism, terrorist attacks would still be covered online by private networks and

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[117] Wilkinson, Terrorism-Media, in Marie-Helen Maras, Counter Terrorism, (1st Ed.) Jones & Bartlett Learning publishers, 2013, pp. 292
[118] Anne Aly et al, Introduction in Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet, Ann Aly, et al., (Ed), Routledge Publishers, 2016, New York.

social networks such as twitter, Facebook, Myspace."[119] Basically, internet surpasses censorship. Even in the face of the media trying to promote self-restraint in publicizing the terrorist related activities, internet remains a hindrance to the effective enforcement of limiting coverage of such activities. As to whether terrorism will fully continue to thrive without the mainstream media is an area which requires further research. To paraphrase the issue, the critical question is whether the mainstream media will be completely irrelevant as oxygen of publicity for the terrorists in favour of internet platforms. My predisposition is that the terrorists will need both mainstream media and new media, as a strategy to cast the net of publicity wider, covering both those who are still glued to the mainstream media and those publics who have migrated to social media. This then call for prudent and effective ways and strategies of reducing inherent dichotomy between the media and the government as far as combating of terrorism is concerned. The security agencies and the media need to understand the significance of and benefits of joint counter terrorism actions working together between the media and government where both parties agreeing on the best practices in combating terrorism without compromising the missions of their organizations.[120]

The terrorists' narratives can also be countered through the media by using counter narratives. Counter narratives is a form of counter terrorism which involves deconstructing, demystifying and discrediting messaging of terrorists. Logan argues that the most effective way of responding to Islamic extremism is to "depoliticize Islam through a metanarrative of political secularism of Islamic extremist – radicalization in the name of, and usually informed by an interpretation of, Islam"[121] Halverson augments that

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[119] Wilkinson ….in Marie-Helen Maras, Counter Terrorism, (1st Ed.) Jones & Bartlett Learning publishers, 2013, pp. 292
[120] Wilkinson, Op. Cit., pp.294-5
[121] Sarah Logan, in Violent Extremism Online: New Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet, Ann Aly, et al., (Ed), Routledge Publishers, 2016, New York. pp. 167-83

there are five strategic principles for countering narratives of Islamic extremism: avoiding reinforcement by prevention of mistakes that give fodder to terrorists to affirm their narratives; countering analogies by invalidating the analogy or providing a new one; decompressing time which involves disrupting the links Islamist extremists attempt to construct with an idealist past; deconstructing binaries by countering perceptions of 'us against them' and 'good against evil; and recasting archetypes by focusing on the credentials, actions and consequences of terrorist leaders by questioning whether they are qualified to make religious declarations.[122]

Terrorism remains a national concern to the national security of the country. The main focus of Kenya in combating terrorism should be what makes Kenya vulnerable and attractive to terrorist. The government needs to soul search and address the attendant factors. As part of a long-lasting strategy of effectively countering terrorism in Kenya, the media must also be brought on board, given that the media remains the 'oxygen' of publicity for the terrorist. Kenya enjoys a vibrant media that has largely contributed to widespread coverage of terrorism activities, which has taken toll on war against terror. This state of affairs has purposefully or inadvertently, made would-be recruits to identify themselves with the Al Shabaab cause. There are several mediums though which terrorist use to communicate, some of which are enumerated below:

3.7   Mass media

Mass media refers to impersonal avenues of disseminating and diffusing information to the citizenry, principally through the use of print and electronic means.[123] Basically, Mass media, usually referred to as mainstream media, is about varied set of technologies that

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[122] Halverson et al., quoted in Sarah Logan, grasping at this Air: Contending Terrorists Narratives Online, pp. 174-5

[123] Business Dictionary, Mass Media, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/mass-media.html, accessed on 01/05/18

aim to reach a very large audience. The communication channels are impersonal in the sense that they put the audience in a passive position/mode. The influence of the mass media in promoting and countering terrorist agendas cannot be gainsaid.

3.7.1 Print media

The print media, due to its referential nature, renders itself very amenable to the spread of the terrorist agenda. The Kenya print media has intuitively or deliberately advanced the al- Shabaab cause through terrorist stories they select, thus providing the terrorism phenomena with much hyped consciousness and recognition. As much as such stories are intended to inform the citizens on the dangers that al-Shabaab pose, they also provide a good platform that the terrorists exploit for publicity purposes. These media reports have also have been used to create fear among potential tourists. Consequently, the government's capacity to hit back against the terrorists, rally public support or even convince citizens who are rendered jobless by low tourist visits has been seriously compromised.

3.7.2 Electronic Media

Terrorists' intention is to have their activities amplified and electronic media, especially television, which have wittingly or inadvertently used to advance the al-Shabaab agenda Television has also aided the cause of al-Shabaab by airing violent scenes of security operations, thus creating sympathizers for those affected during security operations, even when some may be innocent, have kin who become bitter when they watch graphic images of these security operations. The Masjid Musa mosque operation in February 2014 where NTV showed graphic images of the operation in the mosque is a case in point. Again, even when such scenes are broadcast, angling of stories and interviews for the same are often biased against the state.

3.8 Social media

Social media is basically a technology that rides on the internet to facilitate the sharing of ideas, thoughts and information as well as creating virtual networks.[124] Over the past one decade, social media has increasingly become a virtually critical asset for all the people where they creating content, interacting with one another, and collaborate with one another. The "State of Internet in Kenya 2017 Report," indicates that, as of September 2017, a total of twelve million Kenyans were on WhatsApp with seven million of them being on Facebook. Eight million Kenyans are active on YouTube and with four million taking on Instagram. At the same time one million Kenyan were active on twitter and also one million on LinkedIn.[125]

Most Kenyans, especially the youth, are very active in social media, a forum that has proved to be a favourite weapon of choice for the Al-Shabaab to recruit new member and propagate their ideology. Apparently, this development manifested itself during the Westgate terror attack where Al Shabaab used twitter accounts to transmit their messages for claiming responsibility which the Kenyan media exploited to file their media reports and publish in the newspapers, thus wittingly or unwittingly aiding the terrorists to achieve their cause.

Weimann notes that al-Shabaab recognizes the power of the mass media in its operations and al Shabaab has used it very effectively. It justifies its use of violence using three rhetorical structures: 1) portraying themselves as underdogs; hunted and persecuted by state operatives; 2) demonizing and delegitimizing their perceived enemies shifting the responsibility for violence from themselves to their victims; 3) portraying themselves as a

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[124] Investopedia, Social Media, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/social-media.asp, accessed on 01/04/18
[125] Bloggers Association of Kenya, State of Internet in Kenya 2017 Report, 2018, https://www.ifree.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/State-of-the-Internet-in-Kenya-report-2017.pdf, accessed on 01/05/18

non-violent organization that only seeks negotiations to achieve what is denied from them (Weimann:2004). These are functional competences that terror attacks, including those mounted by al-Shabaab, cannot do without. Social media by virtue of it being a mass media that can be used anonymously and has proved to be the ultimate tool for terrorist groups like al Shabaab.

3.9   Legal and Regulatory Frameworks for the Media in Kenya

There exists clear legal and constitutional freedoms, liberties and limitations as regards to the media and the public dispositions. Under the Constitution, the media and other Kenyans have a right to information, especially when it is of national importance. This is due to the fact that the media has a duty to apprise and enlighten the citizens on matters that impact on their lives. In this regard, there are numerous legal, administrative pronouncements and policy statements which exist providing for media coverage of issues of national security such as Proceeds of Crime Act, the National Intelligence Service Act (2012), Anti-Money Laundering Act and Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012).

The Constitution has a number of relevant provisions on freedom of expression and the relevant limitations. Specifically, article 34 of the Constitution of Kenya stipulates that the State will not control or hamper any person engaged in broadcasting, the production or circulation of any publication.[126] It therefore apparent that the 2010 Constitution provides for the right to information for the media who has the responsibility to inform the public on matters that affect their lives.

The Official Secrets Act, which provides how state secrets and state security are

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[126] The Kenya Constitution, 2010, http://www.kenyalaw.org/lex/actview.xql?actid=Const2010, accessed on 26-11-2017

conserved and preserved, postulates that any person who acquires, gathers, records, publishes or communicates in whatever manner any coded words, strategies, document or information that is designed or intended to be useful to a foreign power commits an offence.[127] Additionally, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2012) proscribes anyone who advocates and venerates, counsels, provokes commission of terror activities.[128]

The Media Council of Kenya (MCK) also plays a critical role in setting out media standards and ensures compliance with those standards. Essentially, MCK not only prescribes ethics for media practitioners but also ensures that their rights and privileges are safeguarded during the conduct of their duties and responsibilities. Additionally, the MCK promotes professional standards amongst media practitioners as well as setting the standards of education and training for journalists, among others.[129]

The Code of Conduct for the Practice of Journalism prohibits the media from presenting acts of violence which glorifies anti-social conduct.[130] Print media is also prohibited from writing in their columns messages which are inclined to boost or adore deeds which may create disharmony. Discernably, the code of conduct for practice of journalism does not explicitly provide on how terrorism issues must be handled, thus giving leeway for the media fraternity to use discretion in handling terrorism matters. The Handbook of Reporting Terrorism, published by the International Media Support and the Media

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[127] Laws of Kenya, The Official Secrets Act, http://kenyalaw.org/lex//actview.xql?actid=CAP.%20187, accessed 20/8/18
[128] Laws of Kenya, Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 30 Of 2012
 file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/PreventionofTerrorismAct30of2012%20(1).pdf, accessed on 20/8/18
[129] Media Council of Kenya Website, http://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/en/mck/index.php , accessed on 26-11-2017
[130] Kenya Media Council, Code of Conduct for Journalists,
http://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/en/mck/index.php/code-of-conduct-for-the-practice-of-journalism, accessed on 20/8/18

Council of Kenya in 2016[131] provides for the responsibilities of the media, how journalism should be dealing with victims, survivors and families of terror victims and also on how to interacting with security agencies. The challenge is that the handbook is just a guide that is not legally enforceable.

In spite of all these existing laws and regulations, still antagonism exists between the government and the media regarding increased media coverage of security issues, especially on matters relating to terrorism, stating that this is likely to promote the cause of terrorism by giving exposure to the terrorism acts, spreading fear and inadvertently underwriting public legitimacy of their intended objectives and goals.

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[131] Terrorism Reporting Handbook,
http://www.mediacouncil.or.ke/en/mck/index.php/publications/terrorism-reporting-handbook, accessed on 26-11-2017

CHAPTER IV

EVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND COUNTER TERRORISM IN KENYA

4.1   Introduction

Chapter III explored on the status of international terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya with specifics on the nature, foundations and extent of international terrorism and effectiveness of counter terrorism measures in Kenya. The chapter also looked at the legal and regulatory frameworks for the media, highlighting the criticality of the media in combating international terrorism. Chapter IV critically assesses the research data collected from the field regarding the role Kenyan media plays in promoting terrorists' agenda and how it can be utilized to complement government efforts to combat terrorism.

Media practitioners and journalists from the mainstream electronic and print media houses (specifically the NTV, KBC, KTN, Daily Nation, East Africa Standard and People Daily) were interviewed. To examine the government perception about the role the media plays in either promoting or combating terrorism, senior government officers who are experts in international terrorism and counter terrorism matters from the National Counter Terrorism Centre, Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and National Intelligence Service were also interviewed. The interviewing tool (questionnaire) was designed such that the respondents were confined to addressing themselves in the following areas: why international terrorism is on the increase in the African continent and the mechanisms in place to address the same at the continental level; drivers/causes of terrorism in Kenya; vulnerability of Kenya to terror attacks and attendant impacts; Government of Kenya's

strategies to combat terrorism, effectiveness of such measures and challenges in fighting terrorism; the media/government relations as far as countering terrorism is concerned; the extent to which the media not only contributes to promoting terrorists' agenda but also in combating terrorism; existence and effectiveness of government mechanisms which incorporate the media in countering terrorism; what the government of Kenya is doing to improve its relations with the media; and how the media can effectively be incorporated in counter terrorism.

Generally, international terrorism continues to rise in Africa with attendant loss of lives, destruction of property and far reaching ramifications on the continental peace and security. Respondents opine that the prevalence of conflicts in the region such as Somalia provide opportunities for training and safe havens for terrorists. High rate of poverty and unemployment in the continent offers a palatable environment for radicalization and enlistment of the youth into terrorism. Africa's proximity to unstable zones in which international terrorism thrive such as Syria and Yemen makes it easy for terrorists to relocate to the continent in pursuit of their cause. The continental mechanisms put in place to combat international terrorism including joint military responses, diplomatic efforts and coordination by the AU Peace and Security Commission, have largely been ineffective.

Kenya is not an exception as it continues to fight terrorism which appears to be on an upward trajectory. The impact of terror activities has been immense, ranging from physical impact in terms of deaths and injuries, economic impact through destruction of property and diminishing foreign investments and tourism, social impact by creating mistrust among Kenyans on religious and ethnic basis, psychological impact in terms of

creating fear and despondency and uncertainty, to political impact where the government is compelled to respond in a way that infringe on human rights and the law.

4.2   Why Kenya is vulnerable to terror attacks

Respondents argued that the presence of western interest in Kenya as well as Kenya's perceived closeness to the West have contributed to persistent terror attacks in the Kenyan soil. Counter terrorism measures which are perceived has thus fueling revenge as well as involvement of the military campaigns against the Al-Shabaab which are sometimes indiscriminate, has bolstered the Al-Shabaab to intensify attacks on Kenya, with the view of creating an Islamic caliphate in the region. Respondent G1 was categorical that "perceived marginalization and historical injustices, unemployment and poverty are some of the other underlying forces that drive the Kenyan youth to radicalization and violent extremism." For Respondent G10, Kenya "has international visibility with guaranteed international media coverage," among other factors, that expose Kenya to terrorists who cause terror with the aim of attracting international media coverage to publicize their cause. The Respondent observed that many international media organization such as CNN, Al-Jazeera and Xinhua operate freely and have resident reporters in Nairobi. The media coverage of Al Shabaab activities provides the much needed "oxygen" of publicist the terror group needs to subsist and, potentially, blossom. Some respondents also opined that some of the other equally critical reasons that leave Kenya exposed to terrorism include; Kenya's proximity to Somalia, the porous borders and weak controls, numerous targets that are not well secured, sympathetic and restive communities, trust deficit by local communities towards security agencies/government, corruption, as well as, unregulated social media that facilitate recruitment and planning by the terrorists.

Many of the respondents felt that al-Shabaab terrorist attacks were actually directed at Christians and if any Muslim had died of a terrorist attack then they were collateral damage. Christians have been targeted in many of the attacks in Kenya, be it in Garissa, Westgate, Quarry miners in Mandera. Some of the terrorist attacks survivors, manages to escape death through their ability to recite verses from the Koran. Notably, the attacks have targeted churches and no mosque has been targeted. Respondent G2 opined that the intention of the terrorists is to exploit the media, which provides the platform of publicity to create a divide, tensions and mistrust, a strategy by al-Shabaab to rally support among the Muslims and also foment Christian – Muslim hatred.

4.3   Counter Terrorism Mechanisms/Strategies in Kenya

Kenya has employed several mechanisms and strategies regarding the war on terrorism. Respondent G1 said that they range from military operations, intelligence and law enforcement measures, legislation, border securitization/control, financial controls, information campaign, diplomacy by building coalitions with other regional states, engaging communities for support, to amnesty, rehabilitation and reintegration of the surrendering terrorists. Respondent M1 says that the government has not only introduced sensitization seminars on threats associated with radicalization but also has empowered and well-resourced the security agencies, especially the National Intelligence Service to detect and deal with attendant terrorist activities.

The respondents argue that a combination of these aforementioned measures have assisted in reducing the capability of al Shabaab and other groups; identified and disrupted numerous planned attacks; successful prosecution and conviction of terrorists; checked movement of terrorists from other countries; stifled financial flows; created greater public awareness on terrorism and elicited community participation in countering

terrorism. The interviewee acknowledges that the measures have however not managed to completely eliminate terrorism in Kenya. some respondents said that some of the major challenges the government faces in counter terrorism include the following: the perception that some communities or members of certain communities are particularly targeted; legislation enacted has often been challenged on the basis that it violates the constitution; existence of numerous unregulated financial remittance systems that cannot be controlled; suspicions by communities towards security agencies; quick adaptation by terrorists to changes; and unregulated media platforms.

4.4   Media's role in promoting terrorists' agenda

Kenya government has endeavoured to work closely with the mainstream media with a view to enhancing public awareness on the threat of international terrorism and articulating government measures to counter the threat. Consequently, mainstream media has regularly highlighted the nature and the extent of the threat posed by international terrorism; disrupted discreet operations by both the security agencies and also terrorists' plots at varying degrees. Nevertheless, the media has continued to report on the excesses of the security agencies during counter terrorism operations, which has many a times engenders rift between the government and the media.

A senior government officer Respondent G3 said that sensationalized reporting of terrorist activities acts as a catalyst to terrorism, it instils fear to its viewers and targeted audience. He further said that "extensive media attention on Al Shabaab spreads their ideologies, creates fear and also enhances recruitment of more followers." One of the senior Respondents journalist, M7, placed media editors in control of the terrorist agenda because "they have the final say on where to place reporters' stories, the tone and even story sizes, meaning it is the editors in Kenya who give al-Shabaab the space and voice."

However, one of the media practitioners brought in the business aspect where editors act depending on what they thought would sell through sensationalizing reports.

Respondent M8 was categorical that the media is a contributory factor in escalation of terror activities in Kenya. Sometimes the media, through reporting, tend to idolize terrorist actors/actions, making them appear 'super human' thus drawing potential recruits. Furthermore, through media criticism of counter terrorism laws and measures, fuels the perception that certain faiths or communities are being targeted. If properly harnessed, the media can be instrumental in creating awareness about the threats of terrorism, highlighting the destructive consequences of terrorism. Additionally, the media provides a platform to forewarn about planned terror attacks and disseminate information about possible targets and individuals involved.

On whether they consider Kenyan media a good partner in combating terrorism, one media respondent was positive that the media has helped by strengthening resistance by showing that there is no way out of the al Shabaab menace apart from fighting them. She also felt the media has awakened the resolve of potential recruits by showing the terrorist agenda as a game that will not be won any time soon. The other media respondent felt that media may inadvertently be advancing the al-Shabaab agenda, but not deliberate.

One media practitioner, Respondent M6, said that the media has been objective, asserting that "journalists are experts in their own field who thoroughly questions sources and collaborate evidence before airing their reports." Conversely, Respondent M9 acknowledged that the media has not been whole objective, given that sometime media reports are sensationalized. This interviewee felt that the media has inadequately handled al Shabaab issues as far as coverage of counter-terrorism is concerned. Indeed, as per the

Media Council Monitoring Report on coverage of Westgate Mall terror attack in 2013, the media was faulted for sensationalizing the coverage and airing some unverified information that lacked accuracy and reliability. The report recommends that the media ought to desist from filing sensational reporting, showing bloody pictures, frightening headlines, using inciting and inflammatory catchwords in their quest for news.[132]

4.5   Kenya Government - Media relations and the way forward

Many respondents observed that the relationship between the media and government is weak and in most of the time characterized by suspicion and mistrust. Respondent G3 says that social media such as Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp propagate narratives terror groups and there has been little effort to remove terrorist content from these platforms. The respondent further opines that the mainstream media has not considered training journalists in countering hate content, ideologies and propaganda. For Respondent G2, live airing and coverage of terror incidents and case files exposure create agony to bereaved families and give mileage to terrorists to carry out more operations.

For Respondent G10, Government mechanism to involve the media in combating terror exists. For instance, the military campaign against al Shabaab in Somalia has always involved the media who on several occasions have been taken to the operational field. Intelligence and law enforcement operations have also involved the media for the purpose of awareness creation. He adds that Government's proactive strategy to involve the media in counter terrorism campaign has helped the media to gain better understanding of the threat posed by terrorism, putting them in good stead to act as vehicles/platforms for public awareness. He acknowledges these efforts notwithstanding, there remains a strong

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[132] Ibid.,

suspicion arising from the fear that the government is intent on limiting media freedom. The Respondent proposes that perhaps, the government should do more to reduce the tension and mistrust so that the media can play a greater role in counter terrorism. This can be done through the following suggestions: appreciating the critical role of the media in society; furnishing the media with the accurate information that the media requires without compromising counter terrorism operations; being available to respond as appropriate to media enquiries; providing the media with regular updates on the terrorism threat situation; and according the media opportunities to visit the theatres of counter terrorism operations e.g. Somalia.

Respondent G12 says that there is no need not to promote terrorist agenda but can be effective tool in combating international terrorism. The Respondent says that the media needs to be more involved in civic education and sensitization on the terror threat and tactics to ameliorate the appeal for youth recruitment into terrorists' organizations. The need to also aggressively involve Non-Governmental Organizations, private sector religious groups, affected societies, affected families and rehabilitated victims in the government counter terrorism approaches cannot be gainsaid.

4.6   Conclusion

From the findings, it is discernible that international terrorism continues to rise in Africa with attendant loss of lives, destruction of property and far reaching ramifications on the continental peace and security. The continental mechanisms put in place to combat international terrorism including joint military responses, diplomatic efforts and coordination by the AU Peace and Security Commission, have largely been ineffective. Specifically, Kenya has endured the brunt of terror activities by al Shabaab and other terror groups, with the impact taking toll on the physical, psychological, economic, social

and political dimensions. Causes of terror resonates around issues related to economics, social and political factors.

Kenya has employed several mechanisms and strategies regarding the war on terrorism and a mix of these measure have to some extent assisted in reducing the capability of al Shabaab and other groups. However, the threat persists and al Shabaab remains one of the major national security challenges facing Kenya today. The realization of an all-inclusive Counter Terrorism strategy includes not only the military approaches but also employing softer and diplomatic methods in addressing the underlying root causes of terrorism. The media occupies an important place in terms of agenda setting and medium of communication for terrorism. A CT strategy that leaves out the role of the media is bound to fail. The Government needs to mend fences with the Media to eliminate the mistrust and tension that exists between the two.

The proceeding chapter provides a summary of the mechanisms used in Africa to counter terrorism. It also not only explores how effective such mechanisms but also looks at the role of media in countering terrorism strategies in the country.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1   Introduction

This chapter summarizes the counter terrorism mechanisms used in Africa, effectiveness of such mechanisms and role of the media in counter terrorism strategies in Kenya Specifically, this study was geared towards evaluating the role of media in promoting terrorists' agenda and combating terrorism in Kenya. The chapter further outlines the conclusion of the research and suggests recommendations.

5.2   Summary

Chapter one introduced the study by examining the background information on the global trends on international terrorism, by pointing out that international terrorism continues to rise thus threatening international security. The chapter also reviewed literature, which incorporated literature on the general aspects of international terrorism, taking into account theoretical foundations, manifestations and trends. Second, literature on the effectiveness of counter terrorism strategies in Africa and more specifically the nature and extent of international terrorism in Kenya. Ultimately, the literature on the role of media in international terrorism and combating terrorism in Kenya was examined. Rational Choice theory was adopted as the theoretical framework to guide the research. Chapter two highlighted trends in international terrorism as well as counter-terrorism measures in Africa, focusing on the foundations, status and counter terrorism strategies of international terrorism in the continent. Specifically, it assessed the role of AU, AFRICOM and AMISOM in the fight against Terrorism in Africa. The chapter also assessed the role of media in combating terrorism in the African continent. It was

established that many of the counter terrorism strategies in Africa have not been largely effective in eliminating international terrorism. It was also recognized that the media remains a powerful tool used by the terrorists to publicize their agenda and this has created tension between African governments and the media for being sympathetic to the terrorists' cause. Chapter three looked at the nature, foundations and extent of international terrorism and effectiveness of counter terrorism measures in Kenya. Additionally, the chapter explored the legal and regulatory frameworks for the media. Chapter four concentrated on assessment and analysis of data from the field. From the assessment, it became quite clear that the media, both mass media and social media play a key role in promoting terrorist agenda. It also emerged that for a comprehensive CT strategy to be effective, the media must be incorporated.

5.3   Objectives and Hypotheses in relation to findings

The central objective of the research was to evaluate the role of media in promoting terrorists' agenda and counter terrorism efforts in Kenya. The first objective was analyse the international terrorism dynamics and counter terrorism measures in Africa, which was addressed in chapter two. The second objective was to assess the status of international terrorism and counter-terrorism strategies in Kenya, which was addressed in chapter three. The final objective was to analyse the role of the media in promoting terrorists' agenda and role it plays in counter terrorism in Kenya, which is constituted in chapter four and also which the suggested recommendations in this chapter fives seeks to address.

The research established that international terrorism continues to present tremendous challenges to not only to Kenya's national security but also regional and international peace and security. The study also established that whereas the various counter terrorism

policies and strategies adopted have to some extent managed to disrupt terror attacks, the strategies have not been sufficient in eliminating the threat, given the fact that the terrorism phenomenon persists. The research finally established that the role of the media is crucial for any counter terrorism strategies to be successful.

On the strength of the findings of this study, an assessment of the hypotheses proposed is necessary. The first hypothesis that counter terrorism strategies in Africa have ignored the media's potency on combating terrorism. Indeed, as per this study, there is tension and confrontation between the media and government agencies. The mistrust and suspicion pitting governments and the media has dampened the media's role in the fight against terrorism. The second hypothesis that there is a positive correlation between increasing incidents of terrorism in Kenya the media coverage of terrorism was not whole confirmed but it was established the media plays a big role in promoting terrorists' agenda. Finally, the third hypothesis posited that incorporation of the media in counter terrorism strategies could greatly contribute to reducing international terrorism is validated given that terrorists cannot succeed in publicizing their cause without the media.

5.4   Conclusion

Kenya continues to bear the brunt of terror activities by terror groups, despite the several CT mechanisms and strategies. The media remains a key player in agenda setting and medium of communication for terror organizations, thus media's participation in combating terrorism is crucial. The Government needs to mend fences with the Media by reduce the mistrust and tension that exists between the two, so that the media is meaningfully incorporated in fighting terror.

5.5   Recommendations

This study proposes the following measures in order to enhance and enrich the media's participation in combating international terrorism in Kenya:

a) The government to be in the fore front in appreciating the critical role the media in society. The appreciation will go a long way in improving relations between the media and the government;

b) The government to be continually furnishing the media with the accurate information that the media requires without compromising counter terrorism operations;

c) The government to be readily available to respond as appropriate to media enquiries. This will ensure that the media has access to the information they require to avoid speculation;

d) Providing the media with regular updates on the terrorism threat situation;

e) According the media opportunities to visit the theatres of counter terrorism operations e.g. Somalia;

f) The media getting more involved in civic education and sensitization on the terror threat and tactics to ameliorate the appeal for youth recruitment into terrorists' organizations; and

g) Conducting joint seminars and training programs bringing together officer from security agencies and media fraternity. This will help to build trust and reduce suspicion between the government and the media. The resultant effect will therefore be improving of government response to terror activities and also lead to informed media reporting of terror occurrences.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I – AON Terrorism Map

AON 2015 Terrorist Map

Appendix II - Letter of Introduction

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN   Date…….…....

Dear Sir/Madam

REQUEST FOR DATA COLLECTION

MR. VINCENT ANYEGA ONGERE

I am the above name student currently pursuing Masters of Arts degree in International

Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, University of Nairobi.

I am carrying out a research on **"COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN**

AFRICA: A CASE STUDY OF THE MEDIA IN KENYA."

The basic objective of terrorists is to publicize their cause and media is the medium of

communication. It is on this premise that media is poised to play a substantial role in

combating terrorism.

You have been identified as a crucial person to assist in this research.

Kindly assist in filling in the attached interview guide to the best of your knowledge. The

information you share will be treated with utmost confidence and will purely be used for

academic purposes.

Your assistance, support and cooperation will be highly cherished.

Yours Sincerely,

Vincent Anyega Ongere

Appendix III - Consent Form

Title…. "Countering Terrorism Strategies in Africa: A Case Study of the Media in Kenya."

I_____ (respondent) give permission to the researcher to utilize the information that I will provide him as part of his research and that the nature of the study has been explained to me by the (Researcher/Research Assistant)…………..

Signature_____ Date_____

I _____ (Researcher/Research Assistant) confirm that I have explained the nature and effect of the study.

Signature_____ Date_____

Appendix IV – Structured Interview Guide for Government Personnel

Date _____

QUESTIONS:

Please fill as appropriate

SECTION A: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM DYNAMICS AND COUNTER TERRORISM IN AFRICA

1) Why is international terrorism on the increase in Africa?

----

2) What mechanisms are in place to combat international terrorism at the continental level?

SECTION B: COUNTER TERRORISM IN KENYA

3) What are the drivers/causes of terrorism in Kenya?

----

4) What makes Kenya vulnerable to terror attacks?

----

5) What is the impact terror activities in Kenya?

----

6) List the strategies that the government of Kenya applies to counter terrorism?

   ----

7) How effective are these Counter Terrorism strategies?

   ----

8) What do you consider to be the challenges of the GoK's counter terrorism mechanisms
   ----

SECTION C: ROLE OF MEDIA IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN KENYA

9) How do you rate the Media and Government relationship as far as combating international terrorism is concerned in Kenya?
   Very good [   ],   Good [   ],   Weak [   ],   Very Weak [   ]
   Please explain

   ----

10) To what extent can the media be said to be a contributory factor in escalation of terror activities in the country?

    ----

11) Does the media play a role in combating terrorism in Kenya?
    YES [   ]
    NO [   ]
    Explain:

    ----

12) Are there Government mechanisms that involve the Media in combating terror?
    YES [   ]
    NO   [   ]
    Explain:

    ----

13) How effective are these mechanisms in counter terrorism?

    ----

14) How is the relationship between the Government security agencies and the Media?------
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    ----

15) Is there anything the government is doing to improve its relationship with the Media?

    ----

16) How effectively can the media be incorporated or involved in counter terrorism?

Appendix V – Structured Interview Guide for Media Practitioners

Date _____

QUESTIONS:

Please fill as appropriate

SECTION A: COUNTER TERRORISM IN KENYA

1) What are the drivers/causes of terrorism in Kenya?

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2) What makes Kenya vulnerable to terror attacks?

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3) What is the impact terror activities in Kenya?

   ----

4) List the strategies that the government of Kenya applies to counter terrorism?

   ----

5) How effective are these Counter Terrorism strategies?

   ----

6) What do you consider to be the challenges of the GoK's counter terrorism mechanisms?

SECTION C: ROLE OF MEDIA IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN KENYA

7) How do you rate the Media and Government relationship as far as combating international terrorism is concerned in Kenya?

Very good [   ],   Good [   ],   Weak [   ],   Very Weak [   ]

Please explain

----

8) To what extent can the media be said to be a contributory factor in escalation of terror activities in the country?

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9) Does the media play any role in combating terrorism in Kenya?

YES [   ]

NO   [   ]

Explain:

----

10) Are there Government mechanisms that involve the Media in combating terror?

YES [   ]

NO   [   ]

Explain:

----

11) How effective are these mechanisms in counter terrorism?

----

12) Is there anything the government is doing to improve its relationship with the Media?

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13) Are there any efforts the Media has put in place to improve its relationship with the government?

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14) What are the challenges the media encounters when endeavouring to cooperate with the government in combating terrorism

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15) What programmes/strategies has the media put in place to counter violent extremism and radicalization

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16) How effectively can the media be incorporated or involved in counter terrorism?