

**THE EFFECT OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING ON
HEALTHCARE SERVICES IN MAKUENI SUB COUNTY**

**BY
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T50/80710/2015**

**A Research Project Submitted to the Institute for Development
Studies, University of Nairobi in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for the Award of Master of Arts in Development
Studies**

**Institute for Development Studies
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI**

2018

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DEDICATION

To my 'best bird' and 'bud of a feather'. Here's to doing life together!

ABSTRACT

Participatory Budgeting experiments in municipalities across the world have yielded as varied results as there are municipalities. The Kenyan experience of participatory experiments has not fared any better. These have so far registered mixed result in promoting citizen-centred development. The objective of this study was to investigate the effect of Participatory Budgeting on healthcare service delivery in Makueni Sub-County. This study sought to examine both Makueni's participatory budgeting process and the level of citizen engagement in the said process. The study grounded itself in participatory democratic theory to achieve its set objective.

The study employed a case study design to investigate the Participatory Budgeting process in Makueni Sub County. Sampling was done purposively and through snowballing for semi-structured and unstructured interviews of Makueni citizens and key informants. The study, in response to its theoretical propositions, used pattern matching, explanation building, content analysis and descriptive statistics as data analysis techniques.

The study found that Makueni's formal participatory framework has encouraged the involvement of citizens in budget making allowing citizens, to some degree, influence spending at the Ward level in line with their priorities. The study concludes that PB has promoted healthcare services delivery in Makueni. But this is insofar as the construction of healthcare facilities is seen as a sufficient proxy indicator for delivery of healthcare services. There is, however, no evidence suggesting that Makueni's PB has directed any resources to the operationalization of these facilities, which entails such concerns as equipping, staffing and running of medical programmes.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors for their tireless support and encouragement, kindness and guidance in the entire course of my research. Only medical doctors could possibly have more patience than these three remarkable mentors: Prof Mitullah, Dr. Michuki and Mr. Manga! I would like to also register my gratitude to the IDS faculty and commend them for their excellence. I am, because you all are!

I would also wish to acknowledge the camaraderie and friendship I have found in my IDS classmates. Thank you for being reliable sounding boards in and out of class. It has counted for much.

Many thanks to the team at the Directorate of Public Participation in Makueni County for all their assistance especially in facilitating access to study sites and respondents.

I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to Dr. Jason Lakin and Dr. Abraham Rugo of IBP Kenya for their insights into my study in regards to public budgets and for giving me a platform to share my findings during the 2017 Equity Week conference. I would also like to appreciate Dr. Joost Fontein and Dr. Steve Kerr of BIEA for their helpful insights on my project proposal. I would like to especially thank Eliza Meriabe of Fahamu Africa for allowing me to pick her brain from time to time on her work on Participatory Budgeting in Makueni County. Many thanks to Stella Rop too for helping proofread my work. I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge French Kiwi Juice and Masego for affording me a conducive and creative atmosphere as I was writing up my dissertation. Thank you to you both.

I must also express my very utmost gratitude to my Wife, Cianjo Kibui, for her steadfast support and encouragement in the course of my studentship at IDS. It is no hyperbole when I say all this would not have been possible without her.

Finally, I would like to thank my Lord and God Jesus Christ; my strength for today and bright hope for tomorrow – great has been His faithfulness.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Annual Development Plan
AG	Auditor General
BIEA	British Institute in Eastern Africa
Bn	Billion
BQ	Bills of Quantities
CBEF	County Budget and Economic Forum
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CBROP	County Budget Review and Outlook paper
CEC	County Executive Committee
CFSP	County Fiscal Strategy Paper
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
DC	Development Committee
DDT	Deliberative Democracy Theory
DFRD	District Focus for Rural Development
DPP	Directorate of Public Participation
ECDE	Early Childhood Development Education
FES	Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung
FY	Financial Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GoMC	Government of Makueni County
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IBP	International Budget Partnership
IDS	Institute for Development Studies
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
IRI	International Republican Institute
KADP	Kenya Accountable Devolution Program
KANU	Kenya African National Union
Ksh	Kenya Shillings
KII	Key Informant Interview
LASDAP	Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan
MAPACA	Makueni Paralegal Community Association

MAVC	Making All Voices Count
MCA	Member of County Assembly
Mn	Million
MoDPS	Ministry of Devolution and Public Services
MoFSEP	Ministry of Finance and Social Economic Planning
NACOSTI	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
PB	Participatory Budgeting
PDT	Participatory Democratic Theory
PFMA	Public Finance Management Act, 2012
PMC	Project Management Committee
PPC	Public Participation Coordinator
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RoK	Republic of Kenya
SRDP	Special Rural Development Programme
TISA	The Institute for Social Accountability
WA	Ward Administrator
WHO	World Health Organization

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a process of citizen involvement in the formulation and implementation of public budgets through a deliberative exercise of decision-making in public-resource distribution (Wampler, 2007; World Bank, 2008). PB is a form of practical participatory democratic governance. It seeks to promote key concerns in governance such as: social justice¹ (Gaventa, 2004; Moynihan, 2007; Mullins, 2007); socialize citizens into a vibrant democratic culture² (Cabannes, 2004; Hilmer, 2010); and administrative efficiency³ (Fung, 2006; Moynihan, 2007; Santos, 1998). Consequently, PB is cited as improving service delivery and quality of life (Moynihan, 2007; Wampler, 2007, 2012).

Three decades since its first application in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, PB has been widely adopted across the world (Moynihan, 2007; Speer, 2012). PB arose against a backdrop of increasing post-structuralist criticisms of development and diminishing confidence in liberal-democratic governance in the global South (Mkandawire, 2010; Nelson Dias, 2014; Santos, 1998; Ziai, 2015).

PB finds its roots in the normative theories of participatory democracy, which encourage the direct involvement of the public in public policy decision-making, in what has been conceived as a form of co-governance (Santos, 1998). Studies suggest that such arrangements promote better governance, which in turn promotes a country's economic and social rights, and poverty reduction prospects (Fukuda-Parr, Guyer, & Lawson-Remer, 2011; Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-lobatón, 1999).

Today, PB is touted as a revolutionary complement to the flailing patrimonialist and clientelist techno-bureaucracies of the global south (Fung, 2006; Santos, 1998). It is furthermore seen as a panacea for development management both as a tool and

¹ PB promotes political inclusion of historically marginalized segments of society

² PB promotes the democratic capacities of citizens as agents in their own governance

³ PB encourages government transparency, which could improve public sector capacities and also mitigate corruption

approach promoting popular democracy and good governance (Fung, 2006; Wampler & Hartz-karp, 2012).

Many parts of the world initiated their own PB experiments just within a decade of its prototyping in Porto Alegre (Dutra, 2014; Sintomer, Herzberg, Rocke, & Allegretti, 2014). PB finally made its debut in Sub Saharan Africa in the 2000s, at which point the World Bank and the United Nations were its most prominent patrons in the global south (Oliveira, 2014; Wampler, 2012).

However, in spite of enjoying vogue status in development, participatory practices, and PB in particular, are seemingly recording dismal results⁴ (Bland, 2011; Thompson, 2008). Some studies suggest that a contextual blindness to the cultural and socio-political character of different developing societies is a contributing factor to the failure of many of such experiments (Batliwala, 2010; Contandriopoulos, 2004; Cornwall & Shankland, 2013; Rahnema, 2010).

It can also be observed that the African experience of PB as a participatory mechanism is far removed from its 'progressive' political tradition. It is in this form that participatory mechanisms have allegedly been reduced to mere tools for project implementation (Cornwall & Brock, 2005; Leal, 2010). In Sub Saharan Africa, these mechanisms have undergone various interpretations. They are said to have accommodated various ideologies, and even neo-liberal policies⁵ (Barkan & Chege, 1989; Cornwall, 2007; Leal, 2010; Rahnema, 2010).

Kenya has not fared any better in this regard having experimented with different participatory models over the years without much recorded progress in ameliorating social and economic inequalities and underdevelopment (FES, 2012; Lakin, 2013b; Mitchell, 2013). Nonetheless, through its relatively new pro-democracy legal framework, Kenya has made ardent effort in granting participatory practices the needed fiat in national and sub-national structures of governance (Gitegi & Iravo, 2016; Lakin, 2013b; Mitchell, 2013).

⁴ Participatory practices have over the years produced mixed empirical results across the world

⁵ Neo-liberal interpretations of public participation have included such ideas as 'do-it-yourself,' 'self-help' and 'cost-sharing' with the poor

1.2 Problem Statement

Popular participation has been argued to be a tool with a great potential for enhancing good governance by promoting government performance and accountability (Moynihan, 2007). This strategy has also been said to promote the quality of democracy by effectively drawing the instruments of government closer to the citizenry (Uraia Trust & IRI, 2012). However, the mere participation of citizens in for example public budgeting processes has been shown not to guarantee developmental outcomes (Barnes et al., 2003; Fukuda-Parr et al., 2011; Kaufmann et al., 1999). Similar assertions have also been made when assessing local experience. Many researchers for example have studied the redistribution of public resources, and persistent regional socio-economic inequalities in Kenya (Barkan & Chege, 1989; FES, 2012; Lakin, 2013b; Mitchell, 2013). These studies have highlighted how different development policies – including participatory experiments – have failed to address key development concerns like public service delivery in the country. The most overt expressions of particularly public participation in public budgets have been through the Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) programme in 2000, and most recently the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) of 2012. In spite of its forward thinking principles LASDAP only recorded dismal results; this was on account of little political will in the process. The PFMA on the other hand has been accused of vaguely outlining the requirements for meaningful participation (Lakin, 2013b; Mitchell, 2013).

There is now a renewed vigour in Kenya in the discourse over public participation. The Senate is spearheading efforts to have a comprehensive national public participation policy formulated. So far, only broad guidelines on inclusive decision-making have been considered. There has not been much thought on what counts as reasonable and meaningful participation.

Studies, however, suggest merely designing and institutionalizing participatory frameworks guarantee neither improved inclusion of marginalised segments of society, nor better developmental outcomes from decision making processes (Gaventa, 2004; Mullins, 2007; Narayan, 2002). Citizen empowerment has in this

context emerged as a major factor of interest for participatory approaches in development planning and management (Cabannes, 2004; Gaventa, 2004).

The County of Makueni makes for a curious case study having initiated its very own PB experiment in response to the PFMA and the constitution. Makueni's elaborate experiment is reported to attract the participation of up to 350,000 citizens at different levels in its development management, thereby making it a one of a kind case in Kenya (Muasya, 2016; Musau, 2016). Makueni's experience with PB, therefore, provides a unique opportunity for learning important insights into the workings of participatory mechanisms for Kenya's pro-poor and inclusive development agenda. This study focuses on the effects of PB on the delivery of healthcare services in Makueni Sub County.

1.3 Research Questions and Objectives

The broad objective of this study is to investigate the effect of PB on healthcare service delivery in Makueni Sub County.

The study's specific objectives are:

- a) To examine the process of PB in Makueni Sub County
- b) To examine the level of citizen engagement in the PB process in Makueni County
- c) To investigate the effect of PB on delivery of healthcare services in Makueni Sub County

This study's general research question is: How does PB impact on healthcare service delivery, as a developmental outcome in Makueni Sub-County?

The specific research questions include:

1. How is the PB process conducted in Makueni Sub County?
2. What is the level of citizen engagement in the PB process in Makueni County?
3. What is the effect of PB on the delivery of healthcare services in Makueni Sub County?

1.4 Justification for the Study

This study was justified on the following grounds: Firstly, it sought to contribute to the on-going debate on whether public participation contributes to effective development outcomes. Secondly the study sought to take lessons from Makueni County, which has in the recent past been lauded by many as a successful case in PB. It is reported that Makueni has the most advanced participatory mechanism of all counties; involving citizen in development projects design, implementation and monitoring (Muasya, 2016). Reports further suggest that Makueni bears key features of interest in an investigation of public participation in development prioritizing: an extensive framework of citizen mobilization (Cabannes, 2004); partnership between government and civil society actors (Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2007); strong executive support for public participation (Wampler, 2007); political decentralization (Bland, 2011); and financial resources earmarked for public prioritized initiatives (Bland, 2011; Wampler, 2007). A case study of Makueni therefore offers contextual insights on the design and implementation of participatory frameworks in county governance. Thirdly, literature on PB and developmental outcomes in the context of Kenya's devolved system is only emerging and scant. Appreciating the varied results of participatory experiments in cities and municipalities across the world, it is only imperative that the process of PB and its outcomes are examined and better understood in the Kenyan context.

This study moreover makes policy recommendations on Makueni's PB mechanism. Consequently, this study contributes to the wider public policy discourse on participatory strategies in development planning and management in Kenya.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of literature on public participation practices in governance. The Chapter is divided into four sections: historical literature plotting the journey of PB into Africa; theoretical literature exploring the conceptual underpinnings of citizen participation and participatory-democratic governance; empirical literature on PB in Kenya and across the world.

2.2 Historical Review

2.2.1 The 30-year journey: From Porto Alegre to Yaoundé

Having arisen from theories of participatory democracy, PB emphasizes citizens' direct involvement in decision-making in a framework of co-governance – a shift from 'techno-bureaucracies' to 'techno-democracies' (Santos, 1998). Studies suggest that there is a positive causal relationship between better governance and improving developmental outcomes. It has further been suggested that countries with participatory and transparent public budgets have better economic and social rights, and poverty reduction prospects (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2011; Kaufmann et al., 1999).

Public participation as a democratic movement is attributed to the waning confidence in liberal democratic structures of the 1970s and 1980s (Cornwall, 2007; Rowe & Frewer, 2004). In this period there arose what could be termed as the 'crises of liberal democracy', a perceived growing alienation of citizens from their elected representatives and centres of influence. It was to address this alienation that participatory democracy⁶ emerged as an alternative to mere representative democracy (Aragonès & Sánchez-Pagés, 2009; Nelson Dias, 2014; Santos, 1998). PB consequently emerged as the amalgamation of practices embedded in the progressive theories of participatory democracy (Nelson Dias, 2014).

⁶ Participatory democracy is a co-governance theory of collective decision making between citizens and elected officials

PB was first initiated as an inclusive governance experiment in 1989 in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre in the state of Rio Grande do Sul. This was after the progressive Workers' Party won the mayoral seat in Porto Alegre. The Workers' Party ran a grassroots pro-poor campaign that sought to reform the exclusive clientelist governance structures spawned from a long legacy of totalitarian regimes in Brazil (Dutra, 2014; Matovu, 2007; Sintomer et al., 2014; Wampler, 2007). The Workers' Party promised to expand democratic participation in municipal governance with the goal of prioritizing pro-poor fiscal policies (Oliveira, 2014; Santos, 1998; Wampler, 2007).

In the first two years of the Workers' Party's tenure, the Porto Alegre PB experiment engaged not more than 1000 citizens. These numbers would however sharply increase to 8000 by 1992. With the re-election of the party in 1992 citizen faith in PB as a decision-making mechanism was consolidated. Thereafter, citizen participation increased to about 20,000 citizens on a yearly basis. By 1990, PB had been adopted in 12 Brazilian municipalities and proliferated globally thereafter with 300 municipalities around the world having implemented it by 2005 (Wampler, 2007).

PB had made its way through most of the world by the time it was inaugurated in Sub Saharan Africa in the early 2000s. In that decade, about 1269 to 2778 PB programmes had been legally mandated in the Americas, Europe and Asia (Oliveira, 2014; Sintomer et al., 2014). At the turn of the century, some rural communities in Senegal and Mozambique were practicing some experimental variants of PB with the help of some local Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) (Oliveira, 2014). PB was formally introduced on the continent in 2003 at the third Africities Summit of Africa's municipalities in Yaoundé, Cameroon. A number of local authorities went on to implement PB experiments in over 160 Africa municipalities in the same decade (Oliveira, 2014). With the growing interests and impetus from international institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations, PB and its various forms has since experienced an ardent thrust into many Sub Saharan Africa countries⁷ (Sintomer et al., 2014).

⁷ This 21st Century variant of PB implemented in Africa is cited as primarily serving interests and demands of international donors in line with neo-liberal development policies (Goetz & Jenkins, 2005).

2.2.2 Participatory Budgeting and Decentralization in Kenya

Taking lessons from the Latin American experience of PB, Bland (2011) underscores political decentralization and local access to resources as a determining factors in the success of PB programmes. Analogously, the rise of PB in Kenya is inherently tied to the evolution of decentralized governance in Kenya. By bringing government closer to its citizens, decentralization policies arguably promote public participation (Gitegi & Iravo, 2016).

Kenya's earliest efforts in decentralization were through the politically negotiated independence constitution of 1963. This constitution provided for *Majimbo*,⁸ a form of federalism. These provisions were however short-lived following constitutional amendments soon after (Anderson, 2005; Maxon, 2016). Regionalism was revisited in the later half of the 1960s at the behest of Kenya's international development partners. The Special Rural Development Programme (SRDP) was introduced in 1967 as an attempt at designing a "horizontally oriented" model of administration and development planning (Barkan & Chege, 1989). Fourteen pilot areas were selected, and six of these areas were engaged for the experiment's first phase. The experiment was a failure on account of its slow implementation resulting from lack of political goodwill. By 1977 the experiment had been phased out in its entirety having failed to achieve the degree of integrated local development and planning that it had envisioned in the grassroots and rural areas (Livingstone, 1976; Rutten, 1990).

Notwithstanding the challenges and failures of the SRDP, the experiment succeeded in bringing attention back to decentralization as an approach to administration and planning for rural development. As a result of the SRDP, District Development Committees were constituted. This marked the initial steps in broad participation beyond government in Kenya. These committees would later provide the institutional structures needed for District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) a decade later (Barkan & Chege, 1989; Rutten, 1990).

The DFRD was unveiled in 1983 as a bottom-up approach to development. The DFRD's major assumption was that development was much more efficient and

⁸ *Majimbo* is the Swahili word for regions implying political regionalism or federalism

relevant to the rural communities when state and rural populations shared the policy formulation and implementation space – in this scenario, the national objectives of the state and grassroots’ needs and interests not only intersect but as well align (Barkan & Chege, 1989; Gitegi & Iravo, 2016).

The Local Authority Service Delivery Action Plan (LASDAP) was unveiled in 2000. LASDAP sought to promote public participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of local services and resources (Gitegi & Iravo, 2016; Mitchell, 2013). Following the promulgation of Kenya’s constitution in 2010, public participation in budgeting processes came to formally enjoy legal fiat under the country’s new devolved system through county governments (Muriu, Mbai, Lakin, & Flynn, 2014; Wampler & Hartz-karp, 2012).

Public participation, accountability and transparency are key principles of democratic governance embedded Kenya’s constitution. These principles undergird the operative institutional arrangements and processes of government that promote efficiency, equity, inclusivity, and service delivery (Finch & Omolo, 2015).

The Constitution⁹ coupled with the PFMA 2012¹⁰ requires the creation of public participation mechanism in the County budgeting cycles (Gitegi & Iravo, 2016; Lakin, 2013b; Mitchell, 2013; RoK, 2010, 2012). However, contrasted to the now defunct LASDAP¹¹, the current legal public participation requirements are characteristically unclear (Lakin, 2013b). Efforts are, however, underway to have a comprehensive national public participation policy. On February 15, 2017, the Senate House had a first reading of The Public Participation Bill 2016. The bill provides guidelines for public participation for all public bodies and governance processes. These guidelines broadly address matters of inclusive decision-making, and further

⁹ Article 10(2)(a) of the Constitution of Kenya outlines public participation as a national value and principle of governance. It further states in Article 232(1)(d) that government bureaucracies should formulate and implement policy through a participatory process. Article 174 in the same stride mandates County governments to promote citizen participation in decision-making; and Article 201(a) outlines the participatory nature of principles of public finance.

¹⁰ The Public Finance Act 2012’s Article 125 on County government budget process requires the budget process to be open for public participation; Article 137 on the Establishment of County Budget and Economic Forum (CBEF), requires County governments to convene participatory and inclusive county budget consultation fora

¹¹ The LASDAP had fairly well articulated structures and procedures for local budget participation

give criteria for determining reasonable and meaningful opportunities for public participation. The criteria highlight the following considerations: nature of legislation or decision to be made; importance of the legislation or decision; and the intensity of the impact of the legislation or decision on the public. Before any public engagement is conducted, the bill suggests that some factors such as the purpose of the public participation; level of public participation required; and urgency of the matter, should also be considered. Unfortunately the bill does not articulate the mentioned considerations and factors any further (KAM, n.d.; RoK, 2018). The bill has also been criticised for adopting a broad “cookie cutter approach,” and a narrow vision of citizen engagement, “participation as an event, with a venue” (Ghai, 2017). Civil society has also called upon Senate to collaborate in this process with the Department of Justice, under the Office of the Attorney General, who too are working on a national public participation policy (TISA, 2018).

2.2.3 Participatory Budgeting in Makueni County

Makueni County is a unique case in citizen participation in county budgeting process. The County has designed a six-tier model of public participation engaging up to 350,000 citizens from the village level all the way to the county level. Makueni is today hailed as a trailblazer in public participation in Kenya (Musau, 2016). Public participation structures in development management in Makueni County are reported to be the most advanced of any county, involving citizens in project design, implementation and monitoring (Muasya, 2016).

A literature review of Makueni County’s PB mechanisms suggests that Makueni shares several salient features with the early Porto Alegre experiment, these being: an executive-initiated citizen mobilization process; collaborative relationship between government and civil society actors; an arguably politically insulated participatory mechanism; and access to resources (Cabannes, 2004; Mullins, 2007; Wampler, 2007).

Makueni instituted its own public participation frameworks and mechanisms shortly after its inaugural county government took office in 2013. The county government is said to have made deliberate provisions for the public, Civil Society Organisations

(CSOs) and other stakeholder to participate in decision-making for development planning and management. According to literature, Makueni County's PB is designed as a six-levelled process, which attracts the participation of citizens at the village, ward, sub-county and county levels (Muasya, 2016; Musau, 2016; Oduor, Wanjiru, & Kismwa, 2015). Additionally Makueni through the County Executive Committee's (CEC) office of Public Participation Coordinator (PPC) runs County civic education exercises aimed at promoting citizens capacities in effective public participation (Oduor et al., 2015).

2.3 Theoretical Literature

2.3.1 Participatory Democratic and Deliberative Democratic Theories

Public participation as an approach is believed to promote the quality of democracy and social justice in that it promises to transform top-down institutional structures that reproduce economic, social and political marginalization (Fung, 2006; Moynihan, 2007; Oduor et al., 2015; Wampler, 2012). It in the context of an inclusive political agenda that the focus and subject matter of this study is broadly situated within the normative¹² tradition of theories of democracy.

We further note a confluence of two theories within this theoretical tradition, which both attempt to account for participatory democratic practices such as PB – Participatory Democratic Theory (PDT) and Deliberative Democratic Theory (DDT). Both of these theories seemingly describe similar ideal-type mechanisms for public governance. There are however salient nuanced differences between the two traditions as is discussed below.

Being normative theories, many of the claims of both DDT and PDT emerge from value judgments about political systems. These theories tend to yield mixed findings when submitted to the scientific process (Hilmer, 2010; Mutz, 2006; Thompson, 2008). In spite of this shortcoming, the claims of the theories are increasingly getting

¹² Normative theories are 'ought' political theories. They make judgments on what choices are to be pursued based on a given philosophical principle or worldview. In contemporary scholarship, normative theories have two chief concerns: notions of equality among citizens, and democratization of decision making mechanisms in society (Hardin, 2011).

tested empirically. This has resulted to significant epistemological contributions to the discourse (Bachtiger et al., 2010; Thompson, 2008).

Participatory Budgeting, Santos (1998) argues, emerged from PDT. PDT lays emphasis on citizens' direct involvement in decision-making in a framework of co-governance – where political power is shared in the public sphere; this is contrasted to mere representative/liberal democracy (Barber, 2003).

According to Hilmer (2010), PDT contends for a system of self-governance in which citizens fully participate across all sectors of society, including those outside the political sphere. In PDT, decision-making is a collective exercise whereby citizens have the power to make policy priorities whilst elected officials are tasked with the role of implementation. Citizens can consequently monitor the performance of politicians by evaluating implemented policies alongside their own proposals. It is on this basis that citizens either reward or punish individuals through the electoral process (Aragonès & Sánchez-Pagés, 2009; Cabannes, 2004).

DDT on the other hand is a form of governance, which stresses a process of open policy discussions and deliberations between free and equal citizens. These citizens justify their policy preferences to each other with the intention of achieving consensus (Freeman, 2000; Heller & Rao, 2015; Miller, 1992).

Hilmer (2010) in differentiating DDT and PDT notes that deliberation, as a common feature in both theoretical traditions, is only a necessary but insufficient attribute in PDT. He uses the concepts 'Modes' and 'Sectors' of political participation to highlight the salient differences between the two. Hilmer describes sectors as the locations of participation, for example "social, civil and economic realms." Modes on the other hand, mean practices of participation, for example "deliberation, cooperative ownership and management, collective decision-making, administration, and so on." In making this distinction, Hilmer highlights two core assumptions of PDT: firstly, deliberation and collective decision-making are necessary but not sufficient modes of PDT practices, and secondly, the focus of PDT has traditionally been to extend the wide array of participatory democratic practices past the realms of traditionally non-political sectors.

Hilmer (2010) posits that PDT practices enable citizens to take part in their own self-governance, which in turn empowers them and yields favourable results. This is with the assumption that citizens achieve effective control over the various institutions affecting their lives.

Two further nuances of the deliberative approach can be borrowed from Lukes' (2005) 'radical view of power', and Contandriopoulos' (2004) conceptualization of symbolic struggles in public participation. Lukes (2005) postulates that the absence of grievance or contestations is not a sufficient indicator of consensus, thereby challenging DDT's narrow objective – consensus for consensus' sake. Lukes (and later Cornwall and Shankland's (2013) contextual analyses of PB in Porto Alegre) employs a sociological perspective highlighting culture, group behaviour and institutional arrangements as key determinants of public action and inaction. In so doing, Lukes emphasizes a power analysis of public policy formulation – this is in effect a sociological “explanation of how political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made.”

In appreciating the sociological context of public participation, Contandriopoulos (2004) points out that consensus building is a process of imposing one's perspective on to another. He further notes that the underlying power-relations in consensus building are often not obvious to the participants.

Additionally, using Porto Alegre as a case study, Mutz (2006) argues that the standards and claims of DDT are fundamentally incongruent to those of PDT. She argues that DDT cannot account for social contexts that exhibit strong political activism, as is the case with Porto Alegre. Mutz suggests that deliberative processes where citizens debate over opposing preferences only work in contexts where the participants have weak social ties between them. As such, deliberative approaches are not applicable in the context of political activism. Such contexts tend to have strong camaraderie, sharing ideologies that spur their collective action.

PDT therefore proves to be a useful analysis framework on the basis of the following: through PDT one can firstly assess the nature and type of participation in a specific context, say PB, in even a traditionally non-political social sector like healthcare

service delivery. Secondly, one can nuance the manner in which the different social actors in a participatory process transfer, distribute, and exercise power. Thirdly, one can appreciate the different ways in which citizens communicate policy priorities and induce policy incentives; in so doing, one is better placed to understand the dynamics of collective action and the different stakeholder interests in public policy formulation. It is for these reasons that, this study therefore anchors itself in the PDT tradition for an examination of Makueni's PB.

2.3.2 Level of Public Participation in Public Policy Processes

Rowe & Frewer (2004) broadly define public participation as the inclusive exercise of consulting members of the public in the decision-making processes of institutions with the mandate of public policy formulation and implementation. Matonyre's (2011) and Hickey & Mohan's (2004) definition of public participation draws from a political sociology tradition, which stresses the rights and agency of civil society¹³. It is in this sense that Matonyre defines public participation as “the act of becoming involved in the political process and working to better the community; and a means to guarantee the credibility of institutions, through articulation of citizens' demands and holding public officials accountable.” The very idea of public participation therefore presupposes a democratic regime, whereby political institutions and the public interact (Matonyre, 2011; Moynihan, 2007).

Public participation has however over the years become a ‘buzz-fuzz-word’ heavily employed in the ‘development industry’. As such, the concept has been variously manipulated to serve varied agendas and ideologies (Batliwala, 2010; Cornwall, 2007; Cornwall & Eade, 2010; Leal, 2010). It is on this basis that contemporary participatory practices, PB in particular, have consequently been accused of being divorced from their ‘progressive’ roots that envisioned alternative models of organizing society. These practices are now mostly associated with tools of project management in ‘neo-liberal’ developmentalism (Barkan & Chege, 1989; Cornwall, 2007; Leal, 2010; Rahnema, 2010).

¹³ Civil society is here understood in its classical sense as the ethical and political community of free citizens pursuing and achieving full humanity through active participation in the life of the public sphere; this is contrasted to State (World Bank, 2017).


It has been suggested that power and power relations are the key to the black box of participatory processes and developmental outcomes. Speaking of citizen power Arnstein (1969) notes that “participation without redistribution of power is an empty and frustrating process for the powerless.” According to her the disempowerment of citizens by definition is a neutering of participation, and further insists that “citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power.” Narayan (2002) too highlights the empirical link between citizen power and developmental outcomes by outlining voice, participation and civil liberties as key variables. Gaventa (2004) likewise, emphasizes ‘empowered’ participation as a key factor leading to both developmental outcomes and quality of democracy. Cabannes (2004) also highlights the positive relationship between citizen empowerment and quality of participatory budgets. Cobbinah (2015) on the other hand presents power as the great dilemma of participatory practice in the face of inequality and marginalization.

It is with this background in mind that several evaluation typologies and schemas have been developed to help assess a plethora of participatory practices. These schemas employ different qualitative measures that describe scales ranging between ‘pseudo-participatory tokenism’ and ‘full-participation’ (Moynihan, 2007). It is on this account that the level of participation was a subject of interest for this study.

2.3.3 Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation

Arnstein (1969) describes ideal citizen participation as the redistribution of power to politically and economically marginalized segments of society. Arnstein develops a schema that assesses the quality of participation along an eight-rung ladder. The rungs of this ladder describe the incremental distribution of power to citizens in policy-making processes (*Figure 1*).

Figure 1: Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation



Source: Sherry Arnstein (1969)

At the bottom of this conceptual ladder are the Manipulation and Therapy rungs. Manipulative participation ‘engineers’ public endorsement of top-down policies. On other hand ‘Group therapy’ participation seeks to pacify the socially aggrieved into conformity thereby curtailing their voice.¹⁴ Arnstein categorises these two rungs as ‘Non-Participation’.

Rung 3 and 4 are the ‘Informing and Consultation’ kind of participation. At the Informing level, the flow of information is unidirectional – top-down. At the Consultation stage on the other hand public views are invited. At these rungs citizens have little or no guarantees that their opinions will be taken into account.

Level 5 of Arnstein’s Ladder is ‘Placation’ participation. At this point citizens have a semblance of policy influence, albeit policy decisions are ultimately a reserve of the power-holders. Arnstein categorises level 3 through to 5 as ‘Tokenism’. It is at levels 6 through to 8 that legitimate citizen power is realized. At rung 6 there is ‘Partnership’ participation characterized by negotiated and redistributed power

¹⁴ Voice is a concept describing the various ways in which citizens express belief, articulate preferences and advocate and push for their interests at the individual and collective level (World Bank, 2017).

between citizens and the power-holders. At rungs 7 and 8 are the ‘Delegated Power’ and ‘Citizen Control’ rungs whereby citizens have a relatively greater decision-making mandate over a particular programme.

2.3.4 Burns’ Ladder of Empowerment

Burns et al. (1994) attempted to refine Arnstein’s concept by highlighting the fluid nature of citizen power across different spheres – the individual sphere, the neighbourhood sphere, the local government sphere, and the national government sphere. The authors argue that genuine citizen empowerment entails the maximising of citizens’ power across the four spheres.

Burns et al. (1994) create a schema of analysis for their Neighbourhood Sphere and the Local Government Sphere – they identified these two spheres as the most important in citizen participation. From these two spheres they develop two adjacent ladders of citizen empowerment. They further note that these two spheres are inextricably connected. Their elaborate schema attempts to address the distinction between ‘Participation’ and ‘Control’, and makes commentary on the assumption that the different rungs of Arnstein’s Ladder are equally spaced (CAG Consultants, 2009). Burns’ Ladder attempts to account for the wide array of qualitative experiences within the broad categories of the Arnstein Ladder (CAG Consultants, 2009).

The conceptual properties of Burns’ typology are however too detailed and dense for meaningful empirical application (Mair, 2008). Both the Burns et al. (1994) and Arnstein (1969) models are unable to comment on processes and approaches of public participation. These two models merely focus on end-user access to public services to evaluate the level of public participation. According to these two approaches, the value of participation is merely instrumental. As such these models are blind to the characteristics of social actors in participatory process and the spaces of decision-making in which they participate (Burton, 2004; Cornwall, 2008).

Cornwall (2008) notes that these kinds of ‘ladder’ typologies tend to be ambiguous in practice despite their normative and progressive attitudes. Cornwall further observes that many of the different forms of participation identified in these typologies are

often present in any one-development project. This challenges the logic of these kinds of models. She as well proffers a nuance for the concept citizen participation, which she posits does not necessarily imply citizen voice, which she defines as citizen's influence in decision-making.

2.3.5 Fung's Democracy Cube

Fung's (2006) contribution to the evaluation of public participation attempts to address three concerns of contemporary governance: the questions of legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness. The question of legitimacy is interested in whether public policy enjoys popular support – is it seen as relevant to the public or a select few? The question of justice is concerned with how well public policy addresses political inequalities and marginalization of segments of society. It highlights how power speaks to the needs of the marginalized. The question of effectiveness highlights the capacities of state agencies to innovatively provide effective solutions to social problems.

Fung (2006) posits that quality public participation addresses the three above-mentioned concerns effectively. Fung (2006) uses what he calls the Democracy Cube to assess the level of public participation along the three criteria. This Democracy Cube determines methods of participation selection¹⁵; the mode of communication and decisions making in participatory processes; and, the authority and power of the process. Fung's Democracy Cube is particularly relevant in addressing this study's specific research question.

2.4 Empirical Literature

Literature suggests that PB processes produce a wide range of social, economic and political benefits. These benefits can be both instrumental – relating to managerial efficiency and political legitimacy, and developmental – relating to the agency of individual and communities (Burton, 2009; Richardson, 1983). Developmental outcomes include political socialization and citizen empowerment, social and welfare

¹⁵ Participant selection includes such matters as, “who is eligible to participate, and how do individuals become participants?”

investment, improved quality of governance, and improved service delivery (IEA et al., 2014; Narayan, 2002; Petesch, Smulovitz, & Walton, 2005).

In his analysis of PB in Porto Alegre, Santos (1998) credits participatory mechanisms to the city's impressive performance in quality of life indicators such as literacy, per capita consumption, child mortality, life expectancy, number of hospital beds, and so on. Findings of a World Bank (2008) study commissioned by the Municipality of Porto Alegre, capital city of the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande, suggest that PB is an effective mechanism promoting pro-poor capital investments, which contributes to a reduction in poverty rates in spite of GDP per capita rates. This finding is especially significant as it speaks of the redistributive impact of PB in the long run. This study showed that municipalities that had adopted PB had recorded better scores in for example access to water and sanitation.

Public participation in public healthcare is believed to ameliorate health inequalities and promote the general performance of health systems (Loewenson, 1999; Mahmud, 2004). Loewenson (1999) argues that it is through participatory processes in the healthcare system that “the persistent skew in resource allocation” can effectively be addressed in favour of the needs of the poor. A survey of the literature on priority setting in public healthcare services however suggests an acute bias for top-down ‘consultative’ approaches that merely seek to elicit the views and opinions of public healthcare workers and experts (Alderman et al., 2013; Kapiriri & Norheim, 2004; Slutsky et al., 2016; Weale et al., 2016). Kapiriri and Norheim (2004) believe that a degree of democratic best practice in priority setting is useful especially when budgeting with limited resources.

In his study Choi (2014) narrows his focus to budget committees in Seoul, Japan. His study finds that there is a positive relationship between the level of citizen participation in local authority budget committees, and the rate of adoption of citizen proposals in the local government's budget. He also suggests that a citizen's expertise and technical-know-how affects their ability to influence decision-making in a deliberative budget committee.

In his study on citizen participation and public service delivery in Kenya, Muriu (2013) suggests that citizen participation is often non consequential in project design and implementation. Muriu further notes that citizen participation decreases with the progress of a project's cycle, from priority setting to implementation, monitoring and evaluation. These findings are contrasted to those of Kahara et al. (2014) who do not nuance quality or level of participation in making a positive correlation between participation and project implementation.

Gitegi & Iravo (2016) present similar findings as Muriu (2013) in their study of factors affecting public participation in Uasin Gishu County in Kenya. Their study highlights the relationship between quality of public participation and the achievement of developmental goals. According to their findings, many of Uasin Gishu's residents were unable to participate in county public forums; and for those who did, their preferences and opinions were not taken into consideration.

In a four-counties study commissioned by the Institute of Economic Affairs, Oduor et al. (2015) show that the Kenyan counties of Kisumu, Turkana, Isiolo and Makueni practice a form of public participation. Much as this study assesses the existence of public forums or participation without commenting on the manner in which citizens participate.

Barnes et al., (2003) suggest that the manner in which the notion of 'public' is conceptualised determines how questions of inclusion, exclusion and representativeness are addressed in participatory processes. These further suggest that existing power relations in a participatory exercise shape the definition of public in public participation. Mahmud (2004) in his study of Bangladeshi participatory processes in public health financing notes that hierarchical power relations and exclusion are fundamental factors affecting public participation.

Sheely (2015) contributes to this idea by investigating the relationship between mobilization, quality of public participation and elite capture in project implementation. In his findings he notes that mobilization may improve attendance and verbal contribution of citizens in public forums. His findings also suggest that citizen mobilization does not necessarily lead to meaningful engagement in decision-making. In their case studies of local participation in Kenya, Rose & Omolo (2013) show that extensive citizen mobilization could deter elite capture of participatory

processes. This study also found that citizen influence in top-down initiated participatory processes tends to be weak.

Lim (2007, 2008) suggests that neighbourhood ties are effective networks for mobilizing a community, especially in non-electoral forms of political participation. In their systematic review of literature McPherson et al., (2001) suggest that homophily – the idea that contact between similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people – determines how social networks are organized. They suggest that homophily has such implications as the information people receive, the attitudes and worldviews they adopt, and their social exchanges. It is for this reason that they further suggest that “cultural, behavioural, genetic, or material information that flows through networks will tend to be localized.” It is in this context that social ties and networks can be said to have significant implications in how people are mobilized for participatory processes.


It is therefore with the literature review presented herein that this study considered the following propositions:

1. Formal PB frameworks ensure the formulation of pro-poor fiscal policies
2. Participatory budgeting promotes citizen empowerment
3. Participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting healthcare service delivery

2.5 Study’s Conceptual Framework

In this section the relationship between the concepts employed in this study are outlined. The study’s independent variable is *level of citizen engagement* through PB whilst *healthcare service delivery* is the dependent variable. The conceptual framework as illustrated in Figure 2 suggests that the level of citizen engagement in public budget formulation and implementation is linked to the level of healthcare services delivery. This link is understood in the context of Makeni’s *county budget cycle* and the series of steps and actions making up *Makeni’s PB Process*.

Figure 2: Conceptual Framework



Source: *Author*

Citizen engagement describes the processes and practices through which citizens are involved in the formulation and implementation of public budgets. This is concerned with “the range of efforts by which citizens express their voice, engage in direct management or monitoring of public services, and/ or participate in service delivery.” The said various efforts vary in how well they convey information, and degree to which they induce policy incentives (Kabeer et al., 2008; Pettit, 2012; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2012). Citizen engagement attempts to capture the degree to which citizens communicate preferences and interests in an attempt to influence the management of public affairs (Gabriel, 2011; Schlozman et al., 2012). Citizens can exercise their voice “by acting on their own, with others, or in formal organizations” in different *spaces* (Gaventa, 2004; Schlozman et al., 2012). Space is here understood in both its symbolic and literal senses. In this context, space is seen as the intersection of the following elements of public participation: who participates; how participants communicate to each other to make decisions together; and how participants’ deliberations are linked to public policy (Fung, 2006). Gaventa (2004), and Cornwall (2004) contribute to the inquiry into spaces of public participation by highlighting the interests and power dynamics that create them. Gaventa in particular presents a continuum of spaces: closed spaces – exclusive decision making; invited spaces – the public is invited by different institutions to participate in one way or another in the

decision-making process; and, claimed/created spaces – where less powerful actors demand inclusion in an otherwise closed system. Gaventa (2004) further suggests that these three kinds of spaces share a dynamic interrelation between them where they perpetually open and close through “struggles for legitimacy and resistance, co-optation and transformation.” The study therefore understood this variable by examining the following measures of empowerment: *who sets PB agenda, where are the spaces of public participation, who participates, how are decisions made in PB, and what are the feedback mechanisms in PB.*

Healthcare service delivery as a variable was hereby understood in terms of the following indicators: *trends in health sector budget allocations, number of trained healthcare personnel, and number of healthcare facilities.* ‘Trends in budget allocation’ describes financial allocations to the health sector courtesy of PB. Whilst the ‘number of trained healthcare personnel’ describes the numbers of medical officers posted at PB initiated medical centres. In looking at the numbers of PB initiated healthcare facilities, this study was also keen to capture the profiles of these medical centres by describing the variety and quality of services they offer.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology used in the study and how both internal and external validity were achieved. The chapter firstly outlines the ontological and epistemological assumptions of the study, which inform the research design. The second section describes the study site, and the rationale used in selecting the site. The study's unit of analysis is thereafter discussed. This chapter also describes where and how the data in this study was collected and subsequently analysed, and the strengths and limitations of this study.

3.2 Research Design

This study situates itself in critical realism as a guiding philosophical paradigm. This paradigm combines two perspectives – ontological realism and epistemological constructivism – to present “a simplified and incomplete” understanding of a complex social reality (Babbie, 2007; Bryman, 2012; Maxwell, 2013; Porta & Keating, 2008). It is in this context that this study's research design is discussed here.

The study's overall research question, “How does PB impact on healthcare service delivery in Makueni Sub-County?” guided the researcher in selecting a research design. For an in depth understanding of PB as a socio-political experience, the study employed a case study strategy in examining the PB process in Makueni Sub County. The case study approach lends itself well to the examination of processes and relationships, which aligned agreeably with this study's objectives. With this research strategy the study obtained rich insights, highlighting both outcomes and the processes that bring them about. This strategy also allowed and accommodated the use of a variety of methods in answering the study's specific research questions (Creswell, 2007; Denscombe, 2010; Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). The study's rationale in electing to employ a single-case design was on account of the uniqueness of the case at hand – Makueni's PB framework. This approach allowed for the examination of a single-case in such a way as to provide an important test in theory building. Furthermore, much as a single case – the PB process – was the focus of the study, the research design also allowed for other embedded subunits such as the

various actors in PB, and the healthcare service delivery outcomes to be examined in line with the study's objectives (Yin, 2009).

3.3 Study Site

The study was conducted in Makueni Sub County, which is one of the sub counties of Makueni County. The greater Makueni County is largely an arid and semi-arid zone in the Eastern part of Kenya¹⁶. Makueni Sub County has an estimated population of 170,000¹⁷ and covers an area of approximately 1,370 Sq. Km. About 58,000 residents of Makueni Sub County participate in civic and governance processes¹⁸. The Sub County is made up of seven wards¹⁹: Wote Ward, Muvau/Kikumini Ward, Mavindini Ward, Kitise/Kithuki Ward, Kathonzweni Ward, Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba and Mbitini.


¹⁶ Vision 2025: Our County, Our Future (World Bank 2017)

¹⁷ <https://softkenya.com/kenya/makueni-constituency/> - Accessed 23 May 2017

¹⁸ <https://softkenya.com/kenya/makueni-constituency/> - Accessed 23 May 2017

¹⁹ Population estimate is based on the 2009 National Census. Population and area information sourced from <http://www.infotrackea.co.ke/services/leadership/constituencyinfo.php?cinf=wards&t=86>, accessed 13 May 2017.

Figure 3: Map of Makueni Sub County



Makueni Sub County was found to be ideal for this study on account of the following: 1) the government of Makueni County is headquartered in this Sub County; it is from this premise that the study makes the assumption that the most archetypical features of Makueni County’s participatory framework are found at the political centre of the County, and 2) the capacity and resources available for this study only allowed for a small-scale research project and in this sense Makueni Sub County was found to be suitable.

3.4 Sampling and Unit of Analysis

The case study’s unit of analysis was Makueni Sub County’s PB process in the financial years 2013/14 to 2016/17. Having employed a case study design, the study used purposive sampling and snowball sampling to identify relevant respondents for the study. Most of the citizens who participated in the study were purposively sampled from lists provided by Makueni’s Directorate of Public Participation (DPP). The sampling was purposive in order to achieve: 1) gender balance, 2) sampling across the six different levels or tiers of Makueni’s participatory framework, and 3) sampling across the seven wards making up Makueni Sub County. From time to time

these very respondents would give referrals and recommendations relevant to the study, hence the snowballing. Key informants and experts on the other hand were identified for interviews through snowballing, referrals, and through a review of literature. 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted; these allowed the interviewees to develop ideas and speak more widely on the issues raised by the researcher. Two Unstructured Interviews were also conducted – these sought to either further understand the thoughts of interviewees or follow up on certain ideas. Through observation, primary data was also collected at three medical facilities in Makueni Sub County. In all, 12 key informants (Table 1) were interviewed and 12 personal interviews were conducted with Makueni citizens engaged in PB.

3.5 Data Sources and Data Collection Methods

This study used both primary and secondary data sources to achieve its set objectives. The study's research questions highlighted what the researcher was interested in answering, which also helped in the selection of study design. The propositions on the other hand directed his attention to what was to be examined within the scope of the study. The study's theoretical propositions therefore guided the researcher in identifying relevant data sources (Yin, 2009).

Qualitative data was mostly collected to address the study's research questions and propositions. The data collection process employed an iterative approach, which continuously alternated between data collection and data analysis. Specifically, the study's three propositions directed the researcher to particular data sources as discussed below:

Proposition 1: Formal PB frameworks ensure the formulation of pro-poor fiscal policies.

To address this proposition the researcher focussed on Makueni's PB framework, its cycle and its link to the overall county budgeting cycle. As such, using personal interview guides, key informant interview guides, and surveys of documents, the study collected data from citizens engaged in the PB process (*Appendix 1*), County Government officials, civil society actors, county department of health officials, and medical personnel posted at PB initiated medical facilities (*Appendix 4 & 5*).

Proposition 2: Participatory budgeting promotes citizen empowerment.

To address this proposition the researcher was keen to find out how and who is involved in PB agenda setting, who participates in PB forums, where and how are PB forums convened and conducted, and how are decisions made during the PB process. Personal interview guides, key informant interview guides, and surveys of documents, were used to collect data from citizens engaged in PB, various County Government officials, and civil society actors.

Proposition 3: Participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting healthcare service delivery.

To address this proposition the researcher gathered data on trends in budget allocations in the health sector, number and status of PB initiated healthcare facilities, and the number of healthcare personnel posted at these facilities. The study used interview guides, observation survey guides and survey of documents to collect data from citizen participants, government officials, government documents/record, and at PB project sites. Primary data was also collected at PB initiated medical facilities using an observation guide (*Appendix 6*).

Surveys of documents were also conducted on secondary data generated by Makueni's Ministry of Devolution and Public Service (MoDPS) and Ministry of Finance and Social Economic Planning (MoFSEP), Ward Administrator records, Office of the Auditor General, Makueni Paralegal Community Association (MAPACA), World Bank's Kenya Accountable Devolution Program (KADP), International Budget Partnerships (IBP) Kenya, and the Office of the Controller of Budget (CoB).

Table 1: List of Key Informants

Key Informant Interview	Title
KII A	Grassroots Organization Coordinator with MAMAMWIKI Links Society, and Member of County Development Committee
KII B	NGO Programme Officer at Fahamu Africa working with Grassroots Organizations on PB
KII C	County Officer at Directorate of Public Participation
KII D	Dispensary Nurse
KII E	Director of Finance and Planning GoMC
KII F	Director of Budgeting GoMC
KII G	Former County Officer at Ministry of Devolution and Public Services and then Minister for Roads and Transport
KII H	Director of Public Participation
KII I	Director of Health Department
KII J	Programme Officer at local Paralegals NGO, MAPACA
KII K	Dispensary Nurse
KII L	Programme Officer at World Bank's Kenya Accountable Devolution Programme (KADP)

3.6 Data Analysis

The data analysis process was also iterative in nature where emerging data and the research questions and theoretical propositions were continuously juxtaposed. All the primary qualitative data was subjected to two rounds of analyses through coding. In the primary cycle of coding the raw field notes were entered in a Microsoft Word display matrix. In this matrix, the field notes were chunked according to emerging themes/categories and assigned descriptive codes. Analytic memos – comments and annotations reflecting on issues and ideas that emerged during fieldwork and preliminary data analysis – were also attached to data chunks of interest (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014; Tracy, 2013). In this cycle of coding, the researcher also looked out for key words used by respondents to generate *in vivo* codes; gerunds – words which connoted relevant processes; and notions of values, attitudes, and beliefs for value coding (Miles et al., 2014; Tracy, 2013). For the secondary cycle of coding, the codes identified in the previous cycle were grouped in taxonomic categories and

collapsed into succinct codes. This was done with the help of Microsoft Excel. These taxonomic categories were then aligned to the study's objectives and subjected to further analyses.

Secondary qualitative data collected from Government documents and records, and media reports was analysed through content and discourse analyses. This approach sought to critically understand how social realities in Makueni's participatory practices are constituted and made meaning of (Krippendorff, 2004). Samples of texts were purposively identified and were chunked and coded in the aforementioned iterative analytic process (Denscombe, 2010). The documents that were considered for this analyses included the Makueni Public Participation Matrix,²⁰ Makueni's Public Participation Methodology for the ADP 2017/18: Problem Tree Analysis,²¹ Makueni's Handbook of Public Participation for Development Committees and PMCs,²² PB in Makueni County documentary,²³ World Bank's KADP report,²⁴ and various media reports.²⁵

The quantitative data in this study was for the most part secondary data, which was analysed through simple descriptive statistics. This was done using Microsoft Excel pivot tables for displays and tabulations of datasets on healthcare investments.²⁶ The variables of interest were independently analysed and presented in percentage/frequency distribution tables, bar graphs and pie charts.

Specifically, the data collected to answer the study's three research questions were analysed as discussed below:

Research Question 1: How is the PB process conducted in Makueni Sub County?

This question used both primary and secondary data to test the proposition that "formal PB frameworks ensure the formulation of pro-poor fiscal policies." This data was analysed through pattern matching and explanation building. With pattern matching the study was able to compare patterns emerging from the data concerning

²⁰ Appendix 7

²¹ Appendix 8

²² GoMC (2017)

²³ World Bank (2016)

²⁴ World Bank (2017)

²⁵ Muasya (2016) & Musau (2016)

²⁶ Appendix 10

Makueni's formal PB framework and pro-poor fiscal policies with the suggested pattern of the proposition. With pattern matching, the study showed whether healthcare service delivery was in any way attributable to Makueni's PB framework. The study could therefore confirm or challenge the proposition (Hak & Dul, 2010; Yin, 2009). Where a proposition was disconfirmed the study used explanation building to better understand the state of observed affairs (Belk, 2010; Yin, 2009). The study also found content and discourse analyses very useful in analysing data collected from secondary sources concerning particularly the conceptualization and implementation of Makueni's PB framework (Krippendorff, 2004).

Research Question 2: What is the level of citizen engagement in the PB process?

This question generated mostly primary data from personal and key informant interviews. This data was used to examine the proposition that “participatory budgeting promotes citizen empowerment.” The study was keen to examine measures of citizen empowerment such as who sets the PB agenda, where are the spaces of public participation, who participates, how are decisions made in PB, and what are the feedback mechanisms in PB. This data was analysed through pattern matching and explanation building. With pattern matching the study was able to compare patterns emerging data on the manner in which citizens are engaged in Makueni's PB process with the suggested pattern of the proposition. In other words, through pattern matching, the study examined whether there was citizen empowerment attributable to Makueni's PB. Explanation building was also used to better understand the state of observed affairs.

Research Question 3: What is the effect of PB on the delivery of healthcare services in Makueni Sub County?

This question used both primary and secondary data to test the proposition that “participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting healthcare service delivery.” The primary data was analysed through pattern matching and explanation building. With pattern matching the study was able to compare patterns emerging from the data linking the PB process to the delivery of healthcare services in Makueni Sub-County. The pattern of the data was compared with the suggested pattern of the proposition. With pattern matching, the study showed whether healthcare service

delivery was attributable to Makueni’s PB. Explanation building was also used to better understand the state of observed affairs.

For the secondary data the study used descriptive statistics in analysing data generated by Makueni’s MoFSEP showing how PB allocated finances to the health sector.

The data needs table (Table 2) outlines the study’s research questions and propositions, which guided the study in identifying its data sources, methods and instruments of data collection, and techniques of data analysis.

Table 2: Data Needs Table

Research Question	Research Proposition	Data Needs	Type of Data	Source	Instrument	Analysis
1. How is the PB process conducted in Makueni Sub County	Formal PB frameworks ensure the formulation of pro-poor fiscal policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> County budget cycle PB framework & cycle 	Qualitative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Citizen Participants Government Officials Civil Society and NGO Actors Government documents/records Secondary data 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview guides Survey of documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pattern matching Explanation building Content & discourse analysis
2. What is the level of citizen engagement in the PB process?	Participatory budgeting promotes citizen empowerment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Who sets the PB agenda? Where are the spaces of participation? Citizen mobilization Who participates? How are decisions made in PB forums? 	Qualitative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Citizen Participants Government Officials Government Officials Government documents/record 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview guides Survey of documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pattern matching Explanation building
3. What is the effect of PB in the delivery of healthcare services in Makueni Sub County?	Participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting healthcare service delivery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trends in budget allocations Number of Healthcare Personnel Number of Healthcare Facilities 	Quantitative & Qualitative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Citizen Participants Government Officials Government documents/record PB project sites 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interview guides Observation Survey guides Survey of documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pattern matching Explanation building Descriptive statistics

Source: *Author*

3.7 Strengths and Limitation of the Study

The study found the single-case design appropriate in examining the PB process in Makueni. This design does however come with some challenges of its own. Firstly, this kind of design is empirically vulnerable in that a researcher takes all their chances with but one case to conduct an empirically meaningful study. Secondly, the power of any study to make analytical conclusions only increases with the number of cases examined in a study. This therefore underscores the interpretative shortcomings of a single-case design. To mitigate these design shortcomings, the study collected and triangulated data from multiple sources to achieve internal validity (Yin, 2009).

The study heavily relied on qualitative research. In doing so, it was able to deeply explore and critically nuance PB as a socio-political phenomenon in Makueni. A second strength associated with this approach is that the descriptions and theories it generates are grounded in social reality (Denscombe, 2010). However, this study, like many qualitative projects, was based on relatively small number cases. The value of this study is in its transferability' powers (Denscombe, 2010). Through qualitative research this study provides information about PB in a particular instance in Makueni to make plausible conclusions about the degree to which it would apply to other comparable instances. "The question becomes 'to what extent could the findings be transferred to other instances?' rather than 'to what extent are the findings likely to exist in other instances?'" (Denscombe, 2010)."

3.8 Key Challenges Encountered During Fieldwork

The researcher heavily relied on the assistance of Makueni's DPP to come up with a sample frame. The study's fieldwork was scheduled to commence between June and July of 2017 but was unfortunately delayed by about a month and half. In this period Makueni's incumbent government was preoccupied with national and gubernatorial elections scheduled for August 8. The researcher was meant to observe the County people's forum, which GoMC had initially scheduled for mid July. From this forum the researcher intended to experience the County's participatory development review process, meet the Makueni Sub County development committee members for a focus group discussion, and arrange for some key informant interviews. This forum was unfortunately called off at the last minute. Fortunately, the incumbent Government

was re-elected. With the advice and direction of the DPP the researcher began his fieldwork in Makueni Sub County in mid August and completed it in September 2017. Nevertheless, the researcher enjoyed the full cooperation from most of his respondents, which allowed for thorough data collection.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

The researcher received a permit (Permit Number: NACOSTI/P/1771542/18653) from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) authorizing him to collect data in Makueni County. He also obtained a letter of authorization and introduction from IDS. The researcher obtained the consent of all the study's participants before data collection. In line with fieldwork best practice, participation in this study was voluntary. Participants were assured of complete confidentiality. All participants were guaranteed anonymity in any published documents arising from the research (*Consent Form: Appendix 1*).

CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the findings of the study. The Chapter is divided into three sections. It begins by presenting and discussing findings on the PB process in Makueni. The second section is a presentation and discussion of findings on Citizen engagement in the PB process. The third section of the chapter presents and discusses findings on the effects of PB on healthcare service delivery in Makueni Sub County.

4.2 Participatory Budgeting Process in Makueni County

This section examines how Makueni's PB process is conducted and in so doing tests the proposition that "formal participatory frameworks ensure the formulation of pro-poor fiscal policies." This section is composed of two sub sections with the first focussing on the County budget cycle, and the second focussing on Makueni's PB framework and cycle. These sub sections also highlight the design of Makueni's participatory framework and its link to the overall County budget cycle.

4.2.1 The County Budget Cycle

The County Budget cycle is triggered when the County's Treasury releases a circular to all County sectors by August 30 of every year. This circular advises County sectors on how to prepare their annual budget requests in line with County priorities. The circular additionally gives a guideline on the budget calendar and advises on how citizens can participate during the budget formulation stage (Oduor 2014; Lakin 2013a; IBP Kenya 2015).

The County Budget is derived from the County's Annual Development Plan (ADP), which can be likened to a draft budget for the next year. The Executive prepares the ADP and tables it in the County Assembly by September 1 (IBP Kenya, 2016a; Oduor, 2014). Then the Executive receives the County Budget Review and Outlook Paper (CBROP) from Treasury by September 30. At this stage of the budget, the CBROP presents an outlook for the coming year. The CBROP evaluates the government's performance in achieving its revenue and spending goals during the

previous year. The CBROP also updates the forecasts for the current year and gives provisional budget ceilings for each government sector.

After County Executive approval, the formulation stage CBROP is tabled to the County Assembly by October 21, which also considers the paper for approval. The CBROP is then made accessible to the public within seven days of its tabling at the County Assembly (Lakin, 2013a; Oduor, 2014; TISA, 2013). The review phase of the CBROP is conducted at the evaluation stage of the budget cycle. The CBROP at this stage reviews the previous year's performance and updates economic and financial forecasts against the County Fiscal Strategy Paper (CFSP) (World Bank, 2017). Between October 21 and February 28, the government convenes ministerial/sector-working groups. These working groups bring together relevant stakeholders for discussions that help determine how each sector will bid for available resources.

The sector ceilings that are finally set are then captured in the CFSP. The CFSP gives an overview of a County's plans for collecting revenues and its expenditures through the sectors for the next year, whilst considering a two to three year County fiscal forecast. In Makueni the CFSP also considers Makueni's Vision 2025.²⁷ This paper too is to be made public within seven days of its tabling in the County Assembly. The County Assembly approves the CFSP by March 14 (IBP Kenya, 2016a, 2016b; Oduor, 2014). After this, the County Budget Proposal Estimates is submitted to the County Assembly by April 30. This document describes the County's plans for revenue collection, expenditure, borrowing and debt management, and any macroeconomic conditions or policies relevant to the County.

Thereafter the County Budget Proposal Estimates is amended then approved and results in the County Appropriation Bill by June 30 (IBP Kenya, 2016a, 2016b). The County Appropriation Bill is tabled in the County Assembly and is enacted into law by June 30. The County Appropriation Act authorizes the government to begin spending funds against the County budget lines. June 30 marks the end of a financial year; the Appropriation Act authorizes spending for the new financial year starting

²⁷ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

July 1. At this point the budget enters the implementation stage of the cycle (IBP Kenya, 2015; Oduor, 2014).

The County government produces quarterly implementation reports, which show how the budget is being implemented during the financial year. The first of such reports is produced by October 31. The other quarterly reports are published by January 31, April 30, and July 31. These reports help the County Assembly to provide oversight of the budget implementation process (IBP Kenya, 2015, 2016b).

At the audit and oversight stage of the cycle, the Auditor General (AG) and the County Assembly review the government's spending against the approved budget. The AG audits and reports on the previous financial year by December 31. After receiving the AG's Audit Report, the County Assembly debates and reviews the report for appropriate action by March 31 (GoMC, 2016b).

4.2.2 Makueni's Participatory Budgeting Framework and Cycle

In this sub-section, the study examines Makueni's PB framework by deconstructing its underpinning philosophy. The sub-section discusses the framework's design and operationalization within the county budget cycle.

4.2.2.1 Makueni's Participatory Budgeting Framework

The Government of Makueni County (GoMC) defines public participation as “a structured way of consulting with persons, groups and entities before decisions are made.” Through the mantra “*O kila nyumba kalila*,” which loosely means equity and fair distribution of resources to all citizens, the GoMC has championed for participatory approaches in development planning and management (GoMC 2016a). The Makueni County PB framework comprises a six-level process of public participation: Village people's forum, Cluster people's forum, Sub Ward people's forum, Ward people's forum, Sub County people's forum, and the County people's forum. Citizens at each level of participation nominate 11 of their own to a Development Committee (DC). A DC is tasked with the duty of representing the interests of its nominating people's forum at the subsequent level of participation. At the first four-levels, the DC negotiates and deliberates with other DCs on how resources are to be invested across the Ward. The Ward, as a unit of administration, is

the primary focus of all PB efforts. PB in Makueni is in this sense a mechanism for redistributing resources earmarked for the Ward’s development. In the subsequent two levels, Sub County and County, the DCs merely represent their nominating DCs in the verification and validation of their proposals as identified through the PB process in all 30 Wards of Makueni. The participatory forums at whatever level are open to all who wish to attend, but the nominated 11 DC members bear the responsibility of representing their fellow citizens in decision-making in these public forums.

Figure 4: Participatory Budgeting in Makueni's Participatory Model



Source: Adapted from the World Bank's Kenya Accountable Devolution Program, 2017

Actual PB is conducted at the first four tiers of the process, which make up public participation at the Ward level. The purpose of the last two tiers of the process is to respectively verify and validate citizen inputs as registered at the Ward processes. The

County Budget and Economic Forum (CBEF)²⁸ is convened at the County level of public participation. The CBEF is a validation forum that invites the inputs of different stakeholders in the designing and implementing of the County's plans. At this point, the outcomes of all PB processes in all of Makueni's 30 Wards are aggregated and presented as part of the County budget. All county stakeholders, which includes a citizen DC representing all the Wards in Makueni, discuss all county plans and budgets at the CBEF.²⁹

Through the MoDPS, in the document "*Public Participation Matrix*" (Appendix 7) the GoMC articulates the fashion in which citizens are to be engaged in public policy processes. According to this document public participation in Makueni, which includes PB, is designed to achieve two main objectives in the County: to include marginalized constituencies in decision-making, and yet still, to cement and consolidate the power and authority of the government. In other words, a mix of developmental (relating to the agency of individuals and communities) and instrumental (relating to managerial efficiency and political legitimacy) ends, as described by Burton (2009) and Richardson (1983).

In addition the GoMC, interestingly, describes Makueni's participatory mechanism as a non-partisan and non-political process. This is in contrast to both actual experiences in Makueni County and the corpus of literature in this topic, which suggest that public participation is essentially citizen engagement in political processes. It is of note that a high-ranking officer in Makueni's MoFSEP, while addressing the gap between planning and budgeting in the County, describes budgeting as "a political process, which requires trade-offs to be made."³⁰ This idea is further explored in a subsequent section highlighting how the PB agenda is set.

The Public Participation Matrix document considerably borrows from the parlance of Arnstein's work on public participation. A closer examination however reveals a superficial employment of Arnstein's ideas in conceptualizing Makueni's

²⁸ The Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) 2012 requires all counties in Kenya to each implement an annual County Budget and Economic Forum (CBEF) as a consultative mechanism promoting transparency and accountability in the management of county resources.

²⁹ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

³⁰ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

participatory framework. In this document the GoMC admittedly accommodates different Arnsteinian ‘rungs’ or models of public participation within their one participatory model.³¹ This would thus inadvertently suggest that the GoMC conducts a wide array of citizen engagements that ironically both promote and undermine citizens’ voice in decision-making:

“The government is committed to the promotion of *consultation, placation, partnership* and *citizen control* models of participation.”³²

An officer at the DPP, however, suggests that Makueni’s participatory framework for the most part draws from the ideas of Chamber’s Rapid Rural Appraisal (1983), than from Arnstein’s Participation Ladder (1969). It is at this point that this study notes that the Makueni’s public participation framework departs from the normative traditions of PDT, which are keen on achieving citizen power – self-governance and direct involvement – as an end in itself. In responding to this deviation, the officer from DPP suggested that the primary focus of Makueni’s model is rural development. This officer said the following:

“The shortcoming of the Sherry Arnstein’s model is that it does not look at the whole paradigm of development. But when you combine Chambers and Arnstein, you then have a winning formula. In rationalizing public participation we have chosen to focus on poverty alleviation at the village level, rural development at the Ward level – this primarily deals with social amenities, and urban development at the Sub County and County levels.”³³

Remarkably, in her criticism of ‘ladder-typologies’ in evaluating participatory engagements, Cornwall (2008) warns that different forms and qualities of participation can be found in any one participatory project. In her estimation, the degree to which power relations are transformed in favour of the citizen, as opposed to instances where power is delegated to citizens, is a better indicator of the

³¹ Refer to the Chapter on Literature Review for a discussion on Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation

³² Appendix 7: Public Participation Matrix, Ministry of Devolution and Public Service, GoMC

³³ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

‘genuineness’ of public participation. Cornwall therefore suggests that the context, “what people are participating in,” should be the focus of any evaluation of participation. In this sense, Makueni could very well achieve ‘development’ while involving the public, but not accomplish much in the way of redistributing power to its citizens.

4.2.2.2 Makueni’s Participatory Budgeting Cycle

PB comes in at the planning and formulation stage of the Makueni’s County budget cycle. Citizen engagement is preceded by sector working-groups hearings, which are conducted between October and December. These hearings set the overall budget agenda, they are however not open to the public (see section on *Agenda Setting* and *Spaces of Participation*).³⁴ Citizen inputs are usually collected, between January and March of every year, and incorporated into the County Budget Proposal by the time it is submitted to the County Assembly for appraisal and approval in August³⁵ (GoMC, 2017b).

Since 2016 the PB process starts at the Village level where public officers from the different sectors together with the Ward Administrator (WA) visit each village in groups of twos or threes (World Bank 2017). These officers facilitate participatory forums in these villages. They also conduct civic education with the citizens on basic government operations and then brief them on on-going GoMC programmes, plans and priorities.³⁶ From this point, citizens are invited to suggest not more than five development proposals.³⁷ These proposals are ordered according to agreed upon priority preferences, with the help of the public officers.³⁸

The GoMC has adopted the *Problem Tree Analysis* as its methodology for participatory engagement with citizens.³⁹ The Problem Tree Analysis is a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) approach that public officers use to record

³⁴ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

³⁵ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

³⁶ Key Informant Interview (KII F, September, 2017), Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017), Interview with Ward Administrator, Kitise/Kithuki (Respondent 4, August, 2017)


³⁷ Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017)

³⁸ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017), Key Informant Interviews (KII E & F, September, 2017)

³⁹ See Appendix: Public Participation for the ADP 2017/18, Problem Tree Analysis

information from citizens concerning community problems and their causes. The methodology is also said to help in capturing citizens' ideas on how to solve the said problems. The logic of this methodology is in identifying 'negative causes' of a problem and replacing them with 'positive causes' so as to achieve desired change. This methodology comes with a set of tools for data collection. The tools that are widely used for Makueni's PB are priority list forms, and priority charts and maps (Image 1). These tools help in collecting the needed data for project prioritization.⁴⁰

Image 1: Top left – priority list form, **Top right** – priority chart, **Bottom** – prioritizing map



Source: Author

⁴⁰ Interviews with Ward Administrator in Kanthonzwi (Respondent 10, September 2017)

The officers thereafter guide the citizens in electing 11 persons among themselves to form the Village DC, which is tasked with representing their village at the Cluster level.⁴¹ The priorities identified at the Village level are taken to the Cluster level for further prioritizing. At the Cluster level priorities are read from every village. From all these priorities a new list of five priorities is made through a process of deliberation and consensus building between citizens.

Public officers guide this exercise of prioritization in such a way as to balance the proposed spending across County departments and promote geographical equity.⁴² Another 11 citizens are elected to form the Cluster DC, which represents the Cluster and its priorities at the Sub Ward level. Another phase of deliberation for new priority lists is conducted here. At this level the citizens make ballpark budget estimates for their proposed projects. The MoFSEP's technical team then conducts feasibility studies of the proposed projects.⁴³

Another 11 citizens are elected from every Sub Ward to form Sub Ward DC that represents the Sub Ward at the Ward level. At the Ward level there is another consideration of geographical balancing in such a way as to ensure Sub Ward equity. If one area received a project in the last Financial Year (FY), representatives from that area are encouraged by the public officers to consider the requests of their counterparts from other areas. The list that comes out of this process is taken to the Sub County level for verification and accountability and then validated at the County level.

At the County level the proposals from every Ward are consolidated and incorporated into the County's Budget Proposal document, which is presented at the County Assembly. From the Assembly, the Members of the County Assembly (MCA's), who represent the Wards at the County Assembly, call for their own independent public

⁴¹ Interview with Cluster DC Member in Mayuu, Kitise Ward (Respondent 1, August 2017), Interview with Ward DC Member (Respondent 8, August 2017), Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September, 2017)

⁴² Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017)

⁴³ Key Informant Interviews (KII E, F & L September, 2017), Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017)

forums where they validate Citizen proposals and thereafter collectively approve the County's budget as an Assembly.⁴⁴

After this approval, the proposed Ward projects are then financed. The implementation of these projects is done together with five to seven Citizens who are elected in Project Management Committees (PMCs).⁴⁵ It was reported that nominations into the PMCs are done in such a way as to promote diversity by including persons with disabilities, women, youth and other minorities.⁴⁶ The findings of this study suggest that most of PMC members are recruited from existing area DCs. The PMC's monitor and evaluate the implementation of projects against project Bills of Quantities (BQs).⁴⁷ The BQ is an official document that outlines the inputs that are to go into a contracted project. It was reported that many PB projects were compromised in their implementation prior to the introduction of PMCs as project oversight mechanisms.⁴⁸ It was also reported that according to Governor, for a project to be considered validly implemented there must be a PMC chaperoning its implementation.⁴⁹ A respondent WA suggested the following:

“The Governor has put hot chillies in the money. The PMC's are the hot chillies in every project; there is therefore no worry in how money is used. There is accountability and transparency.”⁵⁰

When contractors have implemented a project to the PMC's satisfaction, the PMCs write a report to this effect – contractors cannot receive their payment in full without this report.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017), Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017)

⁴⁵ Key Informant Interview (KII J, September, 2017), Interviews with DC Members and Ward Administrator, (Respondent 1, 6, 8, 9 & 10, August, 2017)

⁴⁶ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

⁴⁷ A Bill of Quantities is an official document detailing the procurement and implementation specification of a project

⁴⁸ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

⁴⁹ Key Informant Interview (KII L, September 2017)

⁵⁰ Interview with Ward Administrator in Kathonzweni (Respondent 10, September 2017)

⁵¹ Key Informant Interview (KII J, September, 2017), Interviews with DC Members and Ward Administrator, (Respondent 1, 6, 8, 9 & 10, August, 2017)

4.2.2.3 Implementing the Makueni PB Framework

It is widely believed in Makueni that citizen engagement through PB runs on “the goodwill of the government.”⁵² The Executive through the Governor is particularly credited with the perceived success of PB in the County (World Bank, 2016). In this sense Makueni reflects some of Wampler's (2007) conducive conditions for PB, which include: strong gubernatorial support, political environment in which PB is insulated from attacks of the County Assembly, and funds earmarked for the PB process. Some also believe that Governor Kibwana’s background in civil society⁵³ inspired his political manifesto, which promised an inclusive and people-centred government for the people of Makueni.⁵⁴ His government has ardently invested in participatory processes especially in the latter half of his first term. Consequently the popularity and approval of the Governor has steadily grown with Makueni citizens embracing the PB mechanism in increasing measure.⁵⁵ As such the story of PB in Makueni is intricately tied to the person of the Governor and his government’s political narrative. In referring to a calendar hanging on his office wall (*Image 2*), a Ward Administrator made the following reflection on the Governor’s agenda in public participation:

“The Governor is walking with ordinary people. Women surround him. There is no security detail around him, no suits. The Governor is not show-offy... By the way he once decided to facilitate a public forum, the citizens would ask questions and he would have the ministers responding to the questions accordingly. He looks at things from the people’s end.”⁵⁶

⁵² Key Informant Interview (KII G, September 2017)

⁵³ Key Informant Interviews (KII H & J, September 2017), Interview with Ward Administrator in Mavindini (Respondent 12, August 2017)

⁵⁴ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

⁵⁵ Key Informant Interview (KII G, September 2017)

⁵⁶ Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017)

Image 2: “The People’s Governor”



Source: Author

A County DC member and market trader at Wote registered similar sentiments while referring to Governor Kibwana’s campaign poster (*Image 3*):

“Kivutha has uplifted us, we can brag that we are getting somewhere now. He is a man with no airs. He will interact with anyone, kids, even a drunk. He is peaceable and keeps no grudges. He for example was committed to working with MCAs who troubled his first term... At the County level forum, he never wants his ministers to give an account of grassroots development, he wants the PMC Chairs to do it.”⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September, 2017)

Image 3: “*Tano Tena*” Campaign Poster at Wote Market



Source: Author

To many, the Governor is the conceiver of PB:

“He is a smart man, he understands this devolution thing better than most governors. Do not forget he was part of the constitution writing process. That is why he has such a big head start on how public participation in the devolved system of governance should work.”⁵⁸

He is also seen as the patron and custodian of PB:

“At the County citizen forum, the Governor must be present. All the 11 Development Committee members who make it to this level interact with the Governor and give an account of the flow of citizen involvement from village level all the way up.”⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September 2017)

⁵⁹ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September 2017)

Many Makueni citizens, through PB, have found the GoMC responsive to their needs. As a result the GoMC has won over the hearts of many citizens as a key respondent, a former County officer at the DPP, described it:

“The government here has a great social acceptability – people request for things, they are planned for and implemented, and the government therefore has a good rating. This social acceptability also increases the quality of public participation and governance in general.”⁶⁰

Some respondents have however accused the Governor of implementing PB for his own political ends. Through PB, it is believed that the Governor enforces compliance for his vision for the County. The attitudes of respondents regarding this political deployment of PB vary. Respondents supporting Makueni’s administration see it as a smart way of reining in the saboteurs of development⁶¹ as a Cluster level DC member suggested, “In the last two years PB has really been working well, you see the MCAs are now in the system of the Governor.”⁶² Respondents opposed to this deployment of PB allege that the Executive has captured PB. These believe that the said capture has compromised the quality of democracy and subverted competitive politics in the County. A respondent reported the following to this effect:

“Public participation hurts the powers of MCAs as granted by article 8 of County Government Act. MCAs feel threatened; they feel that public participation is a way of campaigning against them. That is why they wanted to cut public participation money and allocate it elsewhere.”⁶³

In the inaugural years of the GoMC MCAs were seen as an impediment to the Executive’s agenda. This played out into a protracted political conflict pitting the County Assembly against the Executive. The conflict was mainly over the budgeting of County resources (World Bank 2017). Wampler's, (2007) work suggests that PB

⁶⁰ Key Informant Interview (KII G, September 2017)

⁶¹ Interview with Cluster DC Member in Mayuu, Kitise Ward (Respondent 1, August 2017), Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017)

⁶² Interview with Cluster DC Member in Mayuu, Kitise Ward (Respondent 1, August 2017)

⁶³ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017), Key Informant Interview (KII B, August 2017)

tends to threaten the patronage networks usually enjoyed by the legislative branch of a municipal government. According to him, when the Executive and legislature are at odds, a sitting Governor is forced to cede political ground to allow for government function. As a result the authority of PB suffers a loss. This was not the case in Makueni. Some respondents⁶⁴ reported that the GoMC orchestrated a public petition requesting the President to dissolve the GoMC (World Bank 2017). During this time the Executive is reported to have galvanized and consolidated popular support and legitimacy, through PB, in such a way as to shift power in its favour.⁶⁵ It is now reported that the County Assembly has since been subjugated to the agenda of the Executive in attempts at remaining politically relevant. It is for this reason that respondents critical of the GoMC believe that the PB framework is usurping the oversight mandate of the County Assembly as a respondent suggested:

“Public participation has been used to reduce external competition. The room for opposition has been eroded, obliterated... The Directorate of Public Participation is now seen by the *Wananchi*⁶⁶ as the opposition arm of Government.”⁶⁷

The GoMC has dedicated human resources to support the technical components of the PB mechanism. The DPP under the MoDPS is especially set up for this very purpose. The DPP’s mandate and role in the PB mechanism is to provide platforms for citizens to channel their ideas and requests to GoMC’s development planners. Additionally, the DPP links MoFSEP’s directorates of Planning and Budgeting within the PB process. There is however dispute between MoFSEP and MoDPS regarding the core mandate of DPP. MoFSEP insists that the role of the DPP in PB is to merely mobilize citizens for public participation, nothing more than “just providing a platform” to help register citizen’s requests.⁶⁸ The DPP on the other hand sees PB as more than an instrument for aggregated citizen requests. The thinking at the DPP is that PB should

⁶⁴ Interview with Ward Administrator in Mavindini (Respondent 12, August 2017); Key Informant Interview (KII J, September, 2017)

⁶⁵ Key Informant Interviews (KII H & J, September 2017), Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

⁶⁶ *Wananchi*, Swahili for citizens

⁶⁷ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017), Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

⁶⁸ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

focus on citizen empowerment for especially rural development. Because of these inter-departmental differences in perspectives it has been alleged that there is internal disharmony in the operationalization of the PB framework.⁶⁹ This disharmony was reported to have existed since the very initial conceptualization of public participation in Makueni. Back then citizen engagement was mostly concerned with mass civic education and sensitization campaigns on the Kenya Constitution 2010 (GoMC, 2013c). The focus of these campaigns was particularly on the functions and mandate of the County government, and citizens' rights.⁷⁰ It should be noted that prior to the GoMC formally initiating PB in 2015/16 financial year, MAMAMWIKI Links Society, a grassroots citizen movement, in conjunction with Fahamu Africa, a local NGO, was already organizing PB citizens forums, which were run as alternative budget processes to those of the government. It is reported that the GoMC merely adopted the methodology and structure of the MAMAMWIKI Links Society process.⁷¹

The Director of public participation at the MoDPS in describing this disharmony made the following remarks:

“Public participation has to be looked at as a socio-economic tool and not a political tool. If it is bent politically it will look like the civil society is in government, and yet civil society is meant to operate outside of government... When I came I was frustrated when working with the ministers. I was bashed for attempting to replace a human rights approach to participation with my development-approach. Many officers in government had human rights, civil society backgrounds when they were coming into government. I had to re-interview the Ward Public Participation Officers when I got anchored.”⁷²

⁶⁹ Key Informant Interview (KII E & H, September 2017)

⁷⁰ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September 2017); Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

⁷¹ Key Informant Interview – Community organizer with MAMAMWIKI Links Society (KII A, August 2017); Key Informant Interview – Project Officer at Fahamu Africa (KII B, August 2017). Also see Fahamu's *Participatory Budgeting Project* dated June 9, 2015 (<http://www.comminit.com/edutain-africa/content/participatory-budgeting-project>, accessed June 4, 2018)

⁷² Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

Public Officers from the different ministries are involved from the very beginning of the PB process. These preside⁷³ over participatory forums and thereby facilitate the smooth running of PB's citizen engagements. These officers are also meant to manage the various "interests and community gate keepers" that the PB process attracts.⁷⁴ Technical support is particularly important during Ward project identification where the feasibility of proposals is assessed. With these assessments, technical teams from MoFSEP either approve citizens' PB proposals or advise citizens on project alternatives that have a better chance of receiving funding for implementation.⁷⁵ A respondent describes this relationship between public officers and citizens on the basis of technical support using the following analogy:

"When a patient goes to the doctor's for a medical examination, the doctor does not treat and prescribe medicine without the patient participating in the examination. For the doctor to arrive to a conclusion and give an effective remedy to an ailment, the patient has to take part in the medical examination process."⁷⁶

Much as GoMC has committed human resources to the PB process, it would seem, going by this interview excerpt that a power dynamic is at play between the public and government officials. The officers occupy a position of power; they are the treating physicians, the patrons in participatory engagements. The citizens on the other hand are the patients, recipients of treatment, clients in the exchange. Another respondent further teased out this patron-client relationship by reporting that citizens are often beholden to public officers, the Ward Administrator in particular:

"They like being close to the office of the Ward Administrator because of the benefits that come from it."⁷⁷

⁷³ Interviews with various DC members and Ward Administrators (Respondent 1 & 6, August, 2017; Respondent 10 & 12 September 2017)

⁷⁴ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

⁷⁵ Key Informant Interviews (KII E, F & H, September 2017), Interview with Ward Administrator in Kanthonzweni (Respondent 10, September 2017)

⁷⁶ Key Informant Interview (KII L, September 2017)

⁷⁷ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

Citizens believe that these patrons determine their access to the benefits of PB and government. The study further interrogates this hierarchical interaction in a subsequent section examining *Spaces of Participation* in PB.

In this section the study considered the proposition suggesting, “formal participatory frameworks ensure the formulation of pro-poor fiscal policies.” Based on analyses and discussion of findings, we can tentatively conclude that the formalisation of a PB framework has led to the formulation of pro-poor fiscal policies. According to findings of this study, the institutionalisation of PB has democratised budget making, allowing Makueni citizens, to some degree, influence spending at the Ward level in line with their priorities. This dynamic does however operate in a political milieu of contested and negotiated power and legitimacy between the County executive, County assembly and citizens, County officers and citizens, and, the MoSEP and the DPP.

4.3 Level of Citizen Engagement in the PB Process

This section examines the level of citizen engagement in Makueni’s PB process by looking into how, who, and where the agenda of participatory public forums is set, who attends participatory forums, what kind of decision citizens can make in public forums, and how are such decisions made. In so doing, the section tests the proposition that “participatory budgeting promotes citizen empowerment.”

4.3.1 Agenda Setting in Participatory Budgeting

PB is designed in such a way as to align citizen inputs to the County’s ADP, which aggregates the visions and plans of all GoMC sectors/ministries.⁷⁸ It is for this reason that it was alleged that in spite of citizen participation, politicians or public officers have the final say in how budgets are formulated and monies are spent. A key informant at the MoFSEP reported, “At the end of the day, the final decision is made by a politician.” He went on to pose a rhetorical question, “so what is the role or point of public participation?”⁷⁹ Budgeting in Makueni County is a political process, and could very well be partisan too (*see section on Implementing the Makueni PB*

⁷⁸ Key Informant Interview (KII F, September 2017)

⁷⁹ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

Framework), factoring many actors, interests and influences at play.⁸⁰ This would thus suggest that ultimately political processes in closed spaces, as is discussed in a subsequent sub-section, determine how the Ward development funds are spent through PB. Consequently one is forced to ask the following of the PB mechanism in Makueni: to what extents can the public independently determine the agenda and outcomes of a participatory budget?⁸¹

The findings of this study suggest that some GoMC technocrats and officers are cynical of citizen's influence over policy processes and decision-making through PB. Citizens are thought of as inexperienced and lacking the needed competencies for public administration. Other officers feel as though citizens are usurping their mandates through PB. These public officers are concerned that the "poor and uneducated"⁸² public could wield too much power in the governance, planning and management of development.⁸³ Through capacity building and guiding of participatory forums, some public officers believe that the raw and untethered power of citizens in PB can be mitigated or managed. It is believed that without this guidance, citizens are predisposed to making imprudent decisions. A respondent reported that citizens may "have solutions, the point is to mid-wife" the solutions.⁸⁴ The notion of citizen empowerment or capacity building held by especially public officers imagines a citizenry operating within the logic of the GoMC bureaucracy as was described by a Key Respondent at the MoFSEP:

"The right linking of planning to budgeting involves the management of many interests and gate keepers and other people – there are many who prioritize projects that don't really address their needs... Can the public be trusted with too much? This question is concerned with improving the technical capacity of citizens. When development committees are well guided they can make right

⁸⁰ Appendix 7: Public Participation Matrix, Ministry of Devolution and Public Service, GoMC; Key Informant Interviews (KII E & G, September 2017)

⁸¹ Key Informant Interview (KII G, September 2017)

⁸² Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

⁸³ Key Informant Interviews (KII G & H, September 2017)

⁸⁴ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

decisions... just a bit of empowerment is needed. If citizens are empowered, they can be trusted.”⁸⁵

Regarding the alleged usurping of mandates and authority, a key informant intimated that:

“With public participation every single citizen knows power. If used politically, public participation will make public servants vulnerable, but the more you drive it towards development the more people are empowered.”⁸⁶

Perhaps the cynicism and vulnerability of public officers is not entirely without merit. In the nascent stages of Makueni’s participatory framework, public participation was understood through a ‘human rights/civil society approach’, as the key informant described it. The respondent gave the following remark and example as a case in point:

“Citizens can for example say ‘we don’t want this implementer’, and what will follow is a public reprimanding of a minister. Public participation is sort of like citizens versus ministers, or citizens versus MCAs... It is therefore critical for the Government to streamline the public participation structures, which are threatened at every end...”

A Ward DC member⁸⁷ suggested just as much by asserting the following:

“The Governor acts upon all our grievances. We, for example, had the County Administrator, Land Officer, and Agricultural Officer transferred after we complained that they had hosted us for a public forum at a meeting venue with no proper tenting and lavatories.”

This power dynamic between public officers and citizens in PB therefore suggests that public participation has vested just enough power to give the impression that citizens are in full control of the process, but perhaps not enough to allow citizens to

⁸⁵ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

⁸⁶ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

⁸⁷ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August, 2017)

independently set the agenda of the PB process. Cornwall (2008) anecdotally likens this sort of participation as “choosing the colour of paint for a clinic’s waiting room in the name of ‘patient involvement’ – in the absence of any involvement in decisions on what the clinic actually does...” Arnstein (1969) describes this kind of participatory interaction as manipulation and therapy, whereby public endorsement of top-down policies is engineered, and conformity and compliance are engendered.

The setting up of Early Childhood Development Education (ECDE) centres through the initial PB cycles (2014/15 – 2015/16) makes for a curious case reflecting on the idea of ‘participatory’ endorsement and compliance building. After several respondents reported prioritizing ECDE centres in PB, the researcher was eager to better understand the appeal of these projects in subsequent interviews. A County level DC member suggested that, “ECDEs used to be limited in number in the County, that is why so many Wards have prioritized them.”⁸⁸ A Ward DC member further suggested that citizens prioritized ECDEs centres because they are, “easy projects to implement. They are easily funded as space is already available in primary schools, unlike the land issues experienced with dispensary projects.”⁸⁹

An examination of Makueni’s ADP 2013-2014 further shows that the GoMC had prioritized ECDEs long before the PB framework had been adopted. These ECDEs have been implemented in all the 30 Wards of Makueni County.⁹⁰ This seemingly unanimous cross-county prioritization of ECDEs through PB is suspect, and is a testament of how the PB agenda is set in Makueni’s PB process. A public officer⁹¹ cited Makueni’s poor resource absorption rate⁹² in explaining this phenomenon. This poor resource absorption was as a result of the earlier discussed political stalemate between Makueni’s first Governor Kivutha Kibwana and Makueni’s County Assembly in the year 2014.⁹³ The ensuing impasse gravely affected the functions and operations of the GoMC in those early years. To redeem its image the GoMC

⁸⁸ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September, 2017)

⁸⁹ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August, 2017)

⁹⁰ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

⁹¹ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

⁹² See Office of the Controller of Budget (2014, 2015, 2016)

⁹³ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017),

undertook ambitious and frantic measures aimed at improving its rate of resource absorption. The ECDEs were seen as ideal projects for this very purpose – they were publicly visible projects and could be implemented in a relatively short time.⁹⁴

With PB outputs so congruently matching a clearly articulated government agenda on public spending one is forced to query the authenticity of citizen participation in Makueni's PB framework. It is in such contexts as Makueni's that Cornwall (2008) asserts that public participation does little in empowering citizens within the formal governance architecture. A key informant⁹⁵ in the GoMC came only short of outrightly making a critical assessment of Makueni's formalised participatory model by asking, "is it possible for public participation to give people what they want within certain structures of planning?" The key informant further suggested that the mere "formalising of public participation subverts the voice of the people." The respondent made their case with the following analogy:

"For public participation to be true, people's voices need to matter. The anecdote of the old man who wanted to sell off family property comes to mind. The old man got home and called for his family to gather together for this decision. He wanted to hear their views about selling off a family-owned piece of land. He told his family that the proceeds of the sale would go to paying the children's school fees. The family members shared their opinions about the matter. After listening to their ideas, the old man thanked them for participating in the brainstorming exercise saying, 'thank you, I have heard,' and went on to make his own decision. The old man merely gave the impression that the decision was collective, but in actual sense, he was in a way informing them of his already pre-determined decision. In such a scenario, one cannot accuse 'them' of anything like exclusion really, but in all honesty what one said does not matter at all."⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017), Interviews with citizen DC members (Respondent 7, August, 2017; Respondent 11, September 2017)

⁹⁵ Key Informant Interview (KII G, September 2017)

⁹⁶ Key Informant Interview (KII G, September 2017)

It is on this basis that the utility of participatory processes in governance is considered. What is the point of public participation – is it for citizen empowerment or for governance efficiency? There is however no consensus in literature on the matter with Fung (2006) insisting that it could be either depending on context. Fung further suggests, unlike many in the discourse, that there are contexts in which ‘public empowerment’ should be the end of participatory processes, and other contexts where a ‘consultative role’ is more appropriate. He however does little in elaborating these contexts. In rating the level at which public participation in Makueni operates, a key informant⁹⁷ at the DPP gave a ballpark assessment of 20 per cent, “Right now I should say we are at the consultation stage (using the Sherry Arnstein Model).”

A consideration of how participatory agendas are made in Makueni thus suggests that public participation serves a mix of both instrumental and developmental functions. The instrumental pursues managerial efficiency in budgeting, and political legitimacy. The developmental, on the other hand, emphasises more on a consultative role for citizens, and less on redistribution of power between citizens and the power-holders in development planning and management (Arnstein, 1969; Fung, 2006).

4.3.2 Spaces of Participation in Makueni’s PB Process

Fung (2006) sees participatory spaces as the intersection of three elements: who participates, how decisions are made, and the influence of these decisions on public policy. Using Cornwall (2004) and Gaventa (2004), this study forms a framework of locating and analysing spaces in decision making in Makueni’s PB. With Cornwall and Gaventa, one can examine how these spaces are created and who runs them. Gaventa in particular presents a continuum of participatory spaces for this very purpose: closed spaces – exclusive decision making; invited spaces – the public is invited by different institutions to participate in one way or another in the decision-making process; and, claimed/created spaces – whereby less powerful actors demand inclusion in an otherwise closed system. These three spaces have a dynamic relationship in which “struggles for legitimacy and resistance, co-optation and transformation” reinforce or undermine their characters.

⁹⁷ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

It is in this dynamic interplay that we see how ‘invited spaces’ of Makueni’s PB interact and coexist with other spaces (*Figure 5*). A close examination of the PB framework revealed that the model is composed of two distinct sets of invited spaces – at the Ward and Post Ward levels of PB. The nature of citizen voice differs with the type of space in consideration. Citizens’ capacity to induce policy incentives, which is voice, varies within this continuum of spaces, which ranges between the polar extremes of ‘closed spaces’ (e.g. sector/department level spaces of decision-making) and ‘created spaces’ (e.g. grassroots citizen organization’s spaces for action). Invited spaces could take any form in between these two spatial poles. It is in the closed spaces, as was inferred in a previous section, that the vision of the County is articulated. After the GoMC crafts the agenda of the year in these closed spaces, the WAs are briefed on it through the DPP. The WAs are thereafter sent out to their respective Wards to mobilize for PB (invited spaces) with the said agenda in mind and officially roll out the PB cycle.⁹⁸

Figure 5: Spaces of Citizen Participation in PB




Image Source: Author

⁹⁸ Interview with Ward Administrator in Kitise (Respondent 4, August, 2017)

In an ideal context, ‘invited spaces’ could be brave new innovations that encourage and empower the voice of citizens in their own governance. However, subject to prevailing political culture, invited spaces are often modelled after already existing socio-political hierarchies (Cornwall 2004). The findings of this study suggest that the participatory dynamics in many of Makueni’s ‘invited spaces’ reinforce pre-existing power relations between public officers, particularly ward administrators and the citizens. This could also be understood as a carrying over of a pre-devolution political culture, which strongly emphasised hierarchies between public officers and citizens. It would therefore seem that ‘top-down’ public policy interactions have been devolved as opposed to being transformed. A respondent⁹⁹ commenting on this dynamic, perhaps exaggeratedly, suggested the following:

“Ward Administrators are like old KANU chiefs during the Moi era – government stooges protecting the interests of those in power... I believe allowances influence the perception development committees have of the government – and I am not saying that they shouldn’t be given allowances.”

In explaining the powers of WAs in particular, a key informant¹⁰⁰ suggested the following:

“The Ward Administrators’ attitude of ‘I am in power’... I understand why they would feel puffed up. This can be traced back to the wrangles at the start of the last government. 80 per cent of our monies hadn’t been absorbed, and so there was political danger for the Governor lest he is perceived as a ‘PR’ Governor who doesn’t work for his County. There was a need to decongest the responsibility. The Ward Administrators were therefore given authority to even police heads of departments and hold them into account – this led to the absorption of about 7 billion by 2016/17... it came to be believed that Ward Administrators were also collecting intelligence in the departments for the Executive.”

⁹⁹ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

¹⁰⁰ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

It is in this context that some marginalized or repressed elements in Makueni Sub-County either attempt to ‘conquer’ these invited spaces for themselves, or ‘create’ their own alternative spaces where they can better exercise their voice towards their desired policy ends. This is best exemplified in the actions of civil society organizations (CSOs) and grassroots groups who hold protest marches and table petitions at the County Assembly in Makueni. Some grassroots groups are known to organise parallel forums to the PB process.¹⁰¹ These groups pre-empt the process by convening their meetings where the citizens determine their priorities beforehand and strategize on how to introduce them into the invited spaces of PB at especially the pre-budget hearings, village and cluster forums. Should they feel that their inputs have unsatisfactorily been incorporated at these levels of PB, the groups then attempt to inject their agenda into the budgeting process by filing petitions with the County Assembly.¹⁰² A respondent suggested the following:

“As much as civil society might be rendered voiceless in the official PB process, with this avenue (through the County Assembly), the Government finds the views and inputs of the civil society up ahead.”¹⁰³

The County Assembly having the mandate to review and make recommendations to the overall County Budget Proposal before it approves of it is therefore forced to consider these civil society inputs in the budgeting process.

4.3.3 Mobilization for Participatory Budgeting Forums

For public participatory forums to be convened in Makueni, the DPP firstly briefs the WAs on the development agenda of the GoMC. After receiving word from the DPP, WAs mobilize the public by making phone calls to area chiefs, village elders, village administrators and members of the DCs.¹⁰⁴ The County radio station, *Ene FM*¹⁰⁵, and

¹⁰¹ Key Informant Interviews (KII A & B, August 2017; KII J, September, 2017), Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

¹⁰² Key Informant Interview (KII A, August 2017), Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

¹⁰³ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Ward Administrator in Kitise (Respondent 4, August, 2017); Interview with citizen Ward DC member (Respondent 6, August 2017); Interview with citizen Sub Ward DC member in Kitise (Respondent 2, August 2017)

social institutions (e.g. churches and public schools) are also used as platforms for disseminating information on public forums.¹⁰⁶

Mobile phone communication was the most popular means of passing information for mobilization. Through phone calls, information was reported to flow from the WA to the citizens belonging to DCs in the Ward, “when we tell one or two committee members the rest will get the message.”¹⁰⁷ These then in turn share the information within their networks,¹⁰⁸ “If I just tell three people, these will help spread the word around.”¹⁰⁹ With perhaps the exception of Kithuki/Kitise Ward¹¹⁰ whose primary mode of mobilization is Twitter¹¹¹ text messaging, many of the Wards in Makueni Sub County are susceptible to a mobilisation bias. It would seem that often community mobilizers recruit PB participants within their social networks. These are even more inclined to rely on these networks and even very close personal contacts especially when late notices for public forums are passed down to them, as they often are. According to a WA, notices for PB forums should be made a week or two to the day. This respondent said that the DPP however instructs the WAs to invite the public for forums about three days to the date.¹¹² Citizen participants however report receiving much later notices. Many respondents have found the notices to be inconveniencing while some few others did not seem to mind it.¹¹³ Two respondents had the following to say about the matter:

“Notices for meetings should be issued in good time not just merely asking community leaders, ‘tomorrow I need five people from you’ the night before

¹⁰⁵ Interview with a Ward Administrator (Respondent 10, September 2017)

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Ward Administrator in Kitise (Respondent 4, August, 2017), Interview with citizen Ward DC member (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹⁰⁷ Interview with a Ward Administrator (Respondent 10, September 2017)

¹⁰⁸ Interviews with citizen Ward DC members in Kitikyumu and Kivandini (Respondent 6 & 7, August 2017)

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Ward DC Member (Respondent 8, August, 2017)

¹¹⁰ Kithuki/Kitise has enjoyed an unprecedented uptake of Twitter as a social media platform for transmission of community news. The area chief, Chief Kisambo does most of the social media mobilizing on Twitter. He has a twitter following of about 2,500 Kithuki/Kitise Ward citizens at the moment (@chiefkisambo, <https://twitter.com/chiefkisambo>, accessed October 31, 2017)

¹¹¹ Interviews with Ward Administrator in Kitise/Kithuki, and citizen DC members (Respondents 1, 2 & 4)

¹¹² Interview in Kitise (Respondent 4, August 2017)

¹¹³ Interview with citizen DC member in Mayuu (Respondent 1, August 2017), Key Informant Interview (KII B, August 2017)

the said meeting. It is hard convincing people to come for such kind of a meeting when they especially have plans for their day.”¹¹⁴

“There is poor planning especially with mobilization. Some meetings are mobilized the night before a suggested meeting date.”¹¹⁵

It was also reported that some WAs might be prejudiced in the manner in which they mobilise for participatory forums. A respondent suggested that mobilisation exercises discriminate against critical or ‘non-compliant’ citizens. In this way an invitation to participate at PB forum is also taken to be an act of bestowing favour or a token of reward to a citizen.¹¹⁶ As was intimated in a previous section, citizens in patron-client interactions are inextricably beholden to the WAs, whom they see as the conduits if not the very sources of ‘government benefits.’ Yielding similar results to Sheely, (2015) study on mobilization and capture of participatory processes in rural Kenya, this finding therefore suggests that the level of public participation in Makueni could be compromised by the playing out of power dynamics between public officers and citizens.

4.3.4 Who Participates in the PB Process?

This study was keen to know who participates in Makueni’s PB processes, and thereby looked into questions of inclusion, exclusion and representativeness in Makueni’s PB process. Following Barnes et al.’s, (2003) concept of “constituting the public,” the study focussed on three interlinking key factors influencing inclusion and exclusion in PB: i) ‘discursive practices’, which describe assumptions that determine whether certain people are able to participate; ii) ‘practices of participation’, which describe the practical implications of the said assumptions such as time, location, and style of public participation; and iii) the perceived competence of citizen participants.

It would seem that Makueni’s PB has adopted the pre-devolution social infrastructure of community assemblies. Different types of forums create different conditions for participation (Barnes et al., 2003). Taking after the basic style of especially

¹¹⁴ Interview with Ward DC member in Kitikyumu (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹¹⁵ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

¹¹⁶ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

community *barazas* and women *chamas*, Makueni's PB has certainly also appropriated their assumptions on who should participate and how they should do it. *Baraza* are community forums often associated with the council of village elders. Such forums deliberate on matters affecting the community for decision-making. *Chamas* are often associated with women community 'table-banking' or 'self-help' groups. Members of a *chama* tend to meet regularly. They each contribute into a group kitty, which provides credit facilities to the members. It is with this in mind that the underrepresentation¹¹⁷ of some constituencies, particularly youths and men, in PB engagements can be better understood. Interestingly, it was reported that both the youth and men do not feel accommodated in PB forums in one way or another. In accounting for youth 'exclusions', a WA commented on the implications of PB discursive practices by suggesting the following:

“Most of the meetings are announced and mobilized as *barazas*. The perception out there is that these are for older people.”¹¹⁸

Also speaking on the mobilisation bias inherent in the discursive practices PB has adopted, a youth leader recommended that, “Mobilisation methods should be redesigned in such a way as to reach youths.” He further suggested that, “If youths are able to attend, then they will meaningfully participate.”¹¹⁹ In accounting for the 'exclusion' of men, a WA reported that, “Some men think that public participation is about the 'women agenda' and are thereby not too eager to participate.”¹²⁰ A Kitise/Kithuki Sub Ward DC member went further to suggest that, “Women respond better to mobilization than men and youths do.”¹²¹ “Women are more likely to congregate than men do,” this was according to a community leader and Ward DC member in Kivandini. This respondent continued to also say, “I have no idea why or how to fix this.”¹²²

¹¹⁷ Interview with Sub Ward DC Member in Kitise (Respondent 2, August 2017)

¹¹⁸ Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017)

¹¹⁹ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

¹²⁰ Interview with Ward Administrator, Kitise/Kithuki (Respondent 4, August, 2017)

¹²¹ Interview with citizen Sub DC member in Kitise/Kithuki (Respondent 2, August, 2017)

¹²² Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

Barnes et al., (2003) further suggest that the assumptions of a type of forum have practical implications on such concerns as when and where a forum is conducted, which “evidence certain assumptions about who is the target group for participation.” The “youth challenge” for example, as a respondent referred to youth participation gaps, could be attributed to assumptions about the economic behaviour of the target participants.¹²³ It was reported that youths of Makueni tend to pursue economic opportunities and livelihoods in town centres or even away from Makueni.¹²⁴ A WA too suggested that, “Young people are often found in town centres (away from civic engagements in their home neighbourhoods). Older citizens, however, are usually available for meetings in rural areas.”¹²⁵ It would appear that conducting participatory engagements during ‘working hours’ is locking out not only the youth but also the voices of the many citizens who are in formal employment. A Makueni youth had the following to say about the matter:

“We as the youth are trying to lobby for participatory forums to be conducted over the weekend when most of us who work out of town could participate. It will however be hard as the process is captured by the older folks.”¹²⁶

A Ward DC member, in also citing economic reasons for men participation gaps, suggested that, “There are more women in public participation, especially in the reserves¹²⁷, many of these are housewives who are available for these forums while their husbands are out looking for a livelihood.”¹²⁸ In accounting for his own availability for PB, the very same respondent, a senior gentleman said, “I have been a community leader ever since I was retrenched.”¹²⁹ It is in this sense that the economic behaviour of some constituencies is seen to affect their availability to participate. A public officer for example reported that, “The intensity of participation robs (Makueni’s) middle class the potential to keep growing.”¹³⁰ A County DC member, a

¹²³ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017), Interview with Ward Administrator in Kitise (Respondent 4, August, 2017)

¹²⁴ Interview with aide to an MCA-elect in Kathonzweni (Respondent 5, August, 2017)

¹²⁵ Interview with Ward Administrator Kathonzweni Ward (Respondent 10, September 2017)

¹²⁶ Interview with aide to an MCA-elect in Kathonzweni (Respondent 5, August, 2017)

¹²⁷ *Reserves*, these are the distinctly rural areas of the Sub County

¹²⁸ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August, 2017)

¹²⁹ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

¹³⁰ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

citizen participating at all the six tiers of public participation, and trader at the Wote Market reported that, “My business gets affected when I cannot afford to hire someone to run it when I am away for public participation stuff.”¹³¹ Other citizens have found the economic opportunity cost of participating in DCs and PB in general too high. These have therefore chosen not to represent their areas or constituencies in PB. A Kitise Sub Ward DC member suggested the following to this effect:

“I had the opportunity of representing the community past the Sub Ward Development Committee level but I turned it down... they are always calling you for meetings, there are no incentives or compensation for attending these meetings, just tea.”¹³²

At the village and cluster level there is no form of compensation given to citizens participating in PB forums; at these levels only refreshments are provided as incentives. The rationale behind this is that these forums are within the locales of participating citizens, meaning that they incur minimal costs. Some citizen participants however feel that they should be compensated for their time too. Some other respondents felt that the travel and meal allowances given from the Ward level going up are not much of an incentive for participation: “We are given actual breakfast and some bus fare depending with distance travelled to the meeting.”¹³³ Much as these allowances are necessary, caution was registered about the role of compensation in influencing the power-relations between citizens and the Government.

The findings of this study also suggest that citizen participants tend to possess certain qualities/skillsets or play certain roles in the community. This is especially the case with citizens that get to move up the different levels of PB as DC members. The said qualities and skills, are intentionally or unintentionally (Barnes et al., 2003) understood to be indicators of competence and hence grant their possessors a ‘participation privilege.’ The study noted the following examples as cases in point: a

¹³¹ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September, 2017)

¹³² Interview with citizen Sub Ward DC member in Kitise (Respondent 2, August 2017)

¹³³ Interview with Ward DC Member (Respondent 8, August 2017)

community veterinary doctor,¹³⁴ a retired teacher,¹³⁵ a community paralegal,¹³⁶ secretary of a women's table-banking group¹³⁷, community health worker¹³⁸, member of the council of village elders,¹³⁹ local school board member,¹⁴⁰ church elder,¹⁴¹ and so on. For one to be nominated to a DC one needs to exhibit qualities of honour and maturity, "*watu wa rika*,"¹⁴² and have a history of community work¹⁴³ and "volunteering in the community"¹⁴⁴ as some respondents suggested:

"As a community veterinary officer, I have over the years learned how to collect data from the community, I do this now as a Cluster DC Member when I am surveying community or villages' needs... I began this work even before devolution came. As I said, I am a community vet, and was always an area leader."¹⁴⁵

"I am also a *Nyumba Kumi*¹⁴⁶ leader other than being a trainer of trainers and Sub Ward DC representative."¹⁴⁷

"I started my involvement in public participation in early 2014 when I was part of a civic education campaign."¹⁴⁸

One's history in community leadership and volunteership, as well as respectability (this could also include one's perceived religiosity¹⁴⁹) particularly stand out when electing DC members at the village and cluster levels, as suggested by a Ward DC

¹³⁴ Respondent 1, August, 2017

¹³⁵ Key Informant Interviews (KII C, August 2017; KII E, September 2017)

¹³⁶ Key Informant A, August 2015, and Respondent 2, August 2017

¹³⁷ Interview with citizen Ward DC member (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹³⁸ Interview with citizen Ward DC member (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹³⁹ Interview with Ward DC Member (Respondent 8, August 2017)

¹⁴⁰ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

¹⁴¹ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

¹⁴² Interview with citizen Sub Ward DC member in Kitise (Respondent 2, August 2017); "*watu wa rika*" is a Swahili expression, which can loosely be translated to mean 'mature individuals' or elders.

¹⁴³ Interview with Respondent in Kitikyumu (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹⁴⁴ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September, 2017)

¹⁴⁵ Interview with Cluster DC Member in Mayuu, Kitise Ward (Respondent 1, August 2017)

¹⁴⁶ *Nyumba Kumi* is a community policing initiative implemented by the National Government

¹⁴⁷ Interview with citizen Sub Ward DC member in Kitise (Respondent 2, August 2017)

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Ward DC member in Kitikyumu (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹⁴⁹ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September 2017)

member, “I was chosen because they felt that I help people out, for example when I know there are bursaries, I follow up on them.”¹⁵⁰ In the subsequent levels of DC nominations, one’s charisma, haggling chops, perceived influence, and commitment to community processes stand out as key attributes propelling individuals to subsequent levels of the PB engagement. According to a respondent, a DC member at these levels needs to be “a bright person who can advance your causes and needs as far up as possible.”¹⁵¹ In recalling her experience deliberating and haggling with other DCs, a Kitikyumu Ward DC member described the need for such kinds of qualities as follows:

“The representatives from the Market area, ‘*Watu wa Soko*’, are very fierce negotiators. If your representatives do not push for your schemes, your projects could easily be abandoned at this stage (or along the way). Deliberation is about making sense of your need for a project and influencing others to buy into your idea if not empathise with your need.”¹⁵²

Many citizens are confident in their contributions to the PB process. An altruistic sense of duty and service to the community also emerged as a key motivating factor for citizen engagement in the DCs and PB in general notwithstanding one’s social standing. Barnes et al., (2003) suggest that altruistic motivations, such as those exhibited in Makueni, are often associated with a pursuit for better services for the community or the desire to develop skills and self-confidence. Some respondents made the following remarks to the effect:

“When you are chosen by people, you have no option but to serve.”¹⁵³

“I am motivated by the pleasure of loving to help people.”¹⁵⁴

“When I do this, God blesses me in my other endeavours in business.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁰ Interview with Ward DC Member (Respondent 8, August, 2017)

¹⁵¹ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September 2017)

¹⁵² Interview with Ward DC member in Kitikyumu (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹⁵³ Interview with Cluster DC Member in Mayuu, Kitise Ward (Respondent 1, August 2017),

¹⁵⁴ Interview with Sub Ward DC Member in Kitise (Respondent 2, August 2017)

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Ward DC Member (Respondent 8, August 2017)

A Ward DC member tasked with mobilizing fellow citizens suggested that, “Phone calls (issuing notice for assembly) are usually made to responsible and respected people...”¹⁵⁶ In this sense the study was keen to understand who is a responsible and respectable person in Makueni. In their work Barnes et al. (2003) argue that citizen competence is socially constructed to determine a criteria for citizen qualifications for participation. These criteria inadvertently determine how the ‘public’ is to be constituted. Makueni’s participatory forums are reported to some degree be open to the public through self-selection. Fung (2006) suggests that self-selecting processes are often “unrepresentative of any larger public.” Martin (2008) takes it a step further by asserting that through a combination of open self-selection and a (conscious or non-conscious) selection of the ‘right kind of people’, participatory exercises are likely to “represent some subgroups of the public better than others.” It is in this vein, that this study’s findings firstly suggest that Makueni’s PB framework either attracts the participation of citizens who enjoy a degree of social status in the community, or citizens who have held certain leadership roles in the community – this is particularly exhibited in nominations to development committees. As a case in point, a Key Respondent suggested that, “often a retired teacher is active in all community processes. Same people get involved over and over again...”¹⁵⁷ In describing the criteria used in selecting DC members, a respondent outlined the following criteria: “One’s knowledge, how much one has been a leader, how well one can articulate themselves, and how well equipped they are in community related engagements and leadership.”¹⁵⁸

The findings further show how perceived ‘incompetence’ has discouraged the participation of especially youths. Notions of, for example respectability, maturity, and honour, which qualify some citizens for participation, are seen to also disqualify youths from the same process. In this sense, discursive practices appropriated from *barazas*, which are organised around notions of seniority based on age, can be cited for discouraging the participation of youths. In describing their own experience at a PB forum, a youth leader reported the following:

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Ward DC member in Kitikyumu (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹⁵⁷ Key Informant Interview (KII F, September 2017)

¹⁵⁸ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August, 2017)

“I’m a youth and this is my story. At one time I attended a budget forum. The budget estimates were distributed to participants. I then arose with an objection. I suggested that they (government officials) leave us with those documents to give room for critical review, and to reconvene the forum at a later date. Surprisingly, the common folks participating in the forum physically attacked me. My contribution offended them. They thought my opinions were disrespectful and out of order, a deviation from ‘normal practice’. This idea of ‘normal practice’ makes youth believe that participatory forums are not for them.”¹⁵⁹

At another level, the study also found that PB heavily relies on the social networks of select individuals, the “responsible and respected,”¹⁶⁰ for mobilization. This suggests that the target participants tend to be drawn from very specific social networks. This network-based inclusion (or exclusion) is further exacerbated by factors such as late forum notices, and the discussed patronage exchanges. Social ties and networks have been shown to be important in mobilizing for processes such as PB (Lim, 2007, 2008). In commenting on social networks, McPherson et al., (2001) assert that these tend to be organized around similarities of their members. They posit that homophily has implications on such things as the information people receive, the attitudes and worldviews they adopt, and their social exchanges. Mutz (2006) suggests mobilizing within strong social networks tends to bring like-minded people together for PB. It can therefore be argued that mobilizing within Makueni’s homophilous¹⁶¹ social networks, effectively excludes both individuals and ideas existing outside of these networks. It is at this level that Makueni’s mobilization practices can also be linked to ‘participation gaps’ in PB.

4.3.5 Decision-Making in Participatory Forums

The PB process between the village and the Sub Ward level is a series of deliberative exercises, which involve open discussions between citizens who justify to each other their developmental preferences and reach a consensus by listing their desired projects

¹⁵⁹ Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Ward DC member in Kitikyumu (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹⁶¹ Homophilous describes the tendency of individuals to associate and interact with people like themselves. Studies on social networks have shown that social networks are organized around the interactions of ‘similar’ people.

according to collectively perceived needs and priorities. These deliberations of preferences are of course within certain public policy parameters sanctioned by the GoMC. The deliberation process aims to achieve consensus. This often entails a protracted exercise of haggling, debating, persuading and negotiating between the different development committees representing the different areas. It was intimated that, “Deliberation is about making sense of your need for a project and influencing others to buy into your idea if not empathize with your need.”¹⁶² A respondent described this deliberative process in the following way:

“The prioritising and discussion process is fierce, ‘*moto kali*’, but at the end of the day the citizens must agree.”¹⁶³

The intensity of deliberation only increases the higher one goes up the PB levels of engagement as a respondent describes one of their experiences, “It was a protracted and fierce negotiation, we discussed from 9:00 AM to lunch time with no resolve.”¹⁶⁴ For this reason, representation plays an integral factor in drumming up support to successfully fund an area’s project. A locality with the most and committed citizen representatives serving in its development committee is likely to have more success in presenting and defending the area’s proposals than localities without. The charisma of citizens nominated to their area’s DC is also a vital asset in the resilience of project proposals through the various stages of PB prioritization. A respondent described his experience negotiating for his area’s projects as follows:

“Getting your project not dropped is a matter of numbers; the numbers of your representatives or people on your side determine whether your project will go through or not... For us, we mobilized all 11 of our Sub Ward Development Committee members for the numbers, other areas were underrepresented, and they were short of a number of their Development Committee members to our advantage... If I fail to defend my project it won’t be funded... I pushed for our road-drifts all the way to the Sub Ward level. The dispensary and tree projects we had suggested were dropped at Cluster level – they were not

¹⁶² Interview with Ward DC member in Kitikyumu (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹⁶³ Interview with Ward Administrator in Kanthonzweni (Respondent 10, September 2017)

¹⁶⁴ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

considered to be priorities – to give room for other projects at Cluster level.”¹⁶⁵

Distance to the forum venue was reported to affect the representation of different areas with those based within the vicinity enjoying the advantage of good representation, and therefore good support for their proposals. Another strategy adopted by some DC teams to escape the risk of missing out on a project is to intentionally orient project proposals to GoMC’s sectorial plans as they are captured in the ADP. A respondent suggested the following:

“Our village proposed for a dispensary, reforestation and road drifts in order of priority. The dispensary and tree projects were dropped at cluster level to give room for other projects; they weren’t considered to be priorities. I pushed the drifts all the way to the Sub Ward level and our village had them implemented.”¹⁶⁶

“We don’t just generally pick a project; we are strategic in our requests as we align them to the priorities of government departments.”¹⁶⁷

This strategy is believed by some to be a sure formula for proposal resilience and success in the PB process. For some of these DC teams, their engagement and strategy in PB, it would seem, is not per se informed by the community’s felt needs but settlements made to secure a project, whatever it might be, for their communities. It would seem that the mantra for many DC teams going into PB is ‘we will take whatever is available.’ It would also seem that DC teams with citizens that ‘shout’ the most have better chances of achieving success than those that don’t. This speaks to the inherent shortcoming of the Makeuni PB mechanism as a ‘consensus-oriented’ approach to decision making.

A Kivandini Ward DC member describes his experience lobbying for his area as follows:

¹⁶⁵ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

¹⁶⁶ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Cluster DC Member in Mayuu, Kitise Ward (Respondent 1, August 2017)

“We talk, negotiate, mobilise, and campaign for our projects. When we get at the Cluster level we convince each other to support our projects – we try to influence and seduce each other. We can even promise our support to other Clusters in the subsequent financial year for their support in current financial year. There has, for example, been collaborative trading and negotiating between Unoa and Kivandini Clusters.”¹⁶⁸

Sintomer et al., (2014) highlights how participatory models could achieve consensus and yet discount the claims and grievances of unregistered or under-registered voices. Parrado (2011) describes consensus building in participatory processes as a process of imposing one’s perspective on to another. He argues that the underlying power-relations in consensus building are often not obvious to the participants.

Makueni County with the help of the World Bank’s Kenya Accountable Devolution Program (KADP) has recently attempted to innovate around this phenomenon in some areas by introducing voting by secret ballot in the PB prioritization exercises.¹⁶⁹ This was after they realized that “the ‘dominant voice’, the loud person, on account of say social status, would influence the decisions made in the PB process.”¹⁷⁰ With this new voting exercise, citizens are encouraged to campaign and lobby for their project proposals and thereafter cast ballots for decision-making. This is an attempt at mitigating and addressing the false consensus that is endemic in many discursive participatory exercises such as Makueni’s. It is however unclear whether these voting experiments have meaningfully managed the excesses of power inequalities between citizen participants. Voting, which takes a majoritarian approach to decision making, is also unable to address participation gaps in PB. Participation gaps bear on the kinds of decisions a constituted ‘public’ makes. Even with voting, the voices of minorities and underrepresented constituencies remain unregistered or under-registered.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August, 2017)

¹⁶⁹ Key Informant Interview (KII L, September 2017)

¹⁷⁰ Key Informant Interview (KII L, September 2017)

Appreciating the need for greater inclusion in Makueni's participatory model, the KADP in the 2017/18 financial year yet again advised the creation of thematic¹⁷¹ participatory forums at the Sub County level.¹⁷² It was reported that these thematic forums seek to specifically pull in the voices of constituencies at the margins e.g. the youth, women, persons with disabilities, and people living with HIV.¹⁷³ This study was however not too keen to ascertain the rigor of these Sub County participatory processes.¹⁷⁴

4.3.6 The Feedback Mechanism in the PB Process

With the PB process, each ward prioritizes its developmental needs and has them financed by the County. Prioritization not only addresses the challenge of limited resources, it also helps in regional/spatial balancing of projects for equity in development. As was discussed in a previous section, the ADP guides public participation during the PB process. According to a key informant¹⁷⁵ at MoFSEP, Citizen priorities aligned to County Sector priorities, therefore, stand a better chance of getting implemented than those that are not. This study was, however, unable to ascertain the degree to which registered citizen priorities match sector plans as records of PB priority lists proved to be inaccessible. The key informant further suggested that about six to eight projects are funded in each Ward. 'Quick-win' projects also stand the chance of receiving funding. The key informant described these kinds of projects as small and easy to implement projects. Technical teams from MoFSEP appraise the feasibility of PB proposals from each Ward. They then share the findings of their appraisals with the DCs that presented the project proposals. If a proposal is found to be unfeasible the technical teams suggest alternatives for the consideration of DCs. After receiving a go ahead from the technical teams, the projects are incorporated into the County budget for implementation in the subsequent financial year.

¹⁷¹ PB thematics borrow from the work of Wampler (2007). Wampler distinguishes between PB thematics and PB public works. According to him, PB thematics are meant to further democratize the policy-making process by focussing on general municipal spending. It was reported that Wampler, through Making All Voices Count (MAVC), an IDS Sussex initiative, consulted with the KADP.

¹⁷² Key Informant Interviews (KII F, H September 2017)

¹⁷³ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

¹⁷⁴ This study does not dwell much on the Sub County participatory forums on basis that these, as was earlier discussed, are by definition not exercises of participatory budgeting.

¹⁷⁵ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

Makueni's CBEF as a platform acts as the default feedback mechanism for the public. There is no explicitly designed feedback mechanism in Makueni's PB process.¹⁷⁶ According to a key informant¹⁷⁷ from the KADP, citizens who are unable to attend the CBEF are easily cut off from the PB process information loop. Ad hoc feedback processes are nonetheless initiated by MCAs after the Executive has tabled the budget proposal estimates document in the County Assembly. The MCAs, through the County Assembly budget committee, organize their own independent Ward public participation forums for verification of citizen proposals. These forums have however been accused of mobilizing citizens that are beholden to the MCAs and citizens that did not participate in the PB process.¹⁷⁸

Proposals that fall off at the various stages of prioritization are recycled back into the system as inputs for fresh consideration in the subsequent financial year.¹⁷⁹ Some citizens have however felt that this feedback mechanism is slow and is furthermore, redundant. This has been said to discourage some citizens from participating in subsequent cycles of PB. A respondent suggested "people need to be motivated with actual physical project for them to actively engage in the process." He went on to also say, "in the last two financial years our cluster has not seen any other project since the drifts; people are therefore losing the momentum to participate over the same unsuccessful proposals."¹⁸⁰ Ward Administrators appoint citizens to the Project Management Committees (PMC's) to monitor and evaluate the implementation of successful PB projects in their areas.

In conclusion, based on analyses and discussion of findings, this study tentatively confirms the proposition that "participatory budgeting promotes citizen empowerment." Through PB, Makueni has encouraged the involvement of citizens in civic processes of decision-making. This involvement, however, falls short of the vision of citizen empowerment that early participatory democracy traditions of PB have espoused. There is still more to do for Makueni's PB to achieve even greater

¹⁷⁶ Key Informant Interviews (KII H & KII L, September 2017)

¹⁷⁷ Key Informant Interview (KII L, September 2017)

¹⁷⁸ Key Informant Interviews (KII B, August 2017; KII J, September 2017), Interviews with citizens (Respondent 9 & 10, September 2017)

¹⁷⁹ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September 2017)

¹⁸⁰ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

redistribution of power between citizens and ‘power-holders,’ and gradually maximising the decision-making mandate of citizens over government programmes. This study therefore posits that deliberation and collective decision-making are necessary but not sufficient indicators of co-governance and citizen empowerment in participatory processes.

4.4 Effect of Participatory Budgeting on the Delivery of Healthcare Services

This section examines the effect of PB on the delivery of healthcare services by looking into the trends in PB resource allocations, number of PB initiated healthcare facilities, and the numbers of personnel posted in the said facilities. This section tests the proposition that “participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting healthcare service delivery.”

4.4.1 Trends in Participatory Budgeting Resource Allocations

PB works with the Ward Development Kitty which takes about 25% to 30% of the County’s Development Budget according to a county officer.¹⁸¹ The Office of the Governor, through what is called the Head Quarter Development Budget, determines how the remaining 70% to 75% of the County’s Development budget is spent. This Head Quarter Development Budget often invests in large infrastructural projects that cut across wards and government ministries/sectors neglected PB’s citizen prioritising process.¹⁸²

According to the Office of the Controller of Budget, Makueni has registered inconsistent and poor rates of resource absorption spending only fractions of their approved budgets (Office of the Controller of Budget, 2014, 2015, 2016). Table 3 shows the actual monies spent during financial years 2013/14 to 2016/17. Table 4 on the other hand shows the approved budget estimates for the same period. A comparison of the two tables reveals that Makueni underspent its development resources during the time in consideration. Actual monies spent on development have

¹⁸¹ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

^d Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)

accounted for 19%, 28.6%, 31.7% and 26.6% of the total County spending for the financial years 2013/14, 2014/15, 2015/16, and 2016/17 respectively.

Table 3: Makueni Actual Expenditure (2013/14 - 2016/17)

FY	Total Expenditure	Recurrent Budget	Development Budget
2013/14	3.1 Bn	2.5 Bn (81%)	603 Mn (19%)
2014/15	4.38 Bn	3.13 Bn (71.4 %)	1.25 Bn (28.6%)
2015/16	5.51 Bn	4.0 Bn (68.3%)	1.5 Bn (31.7 %)
2016/17	8.92 Bn	4.88 Bn (73.4%)	4.04 Bn (26.6%)

Source: *Office of the Controller of Budget 2014 - 2017*

According to documentation from the MoFSEP, Makueni County's development budget has been on a steady increase in the last five financial years: from Ksh 18.5 million per Ward, to 18.6 million, to 20.6 million, to 27.4 million, for FY 2013/14 through to FY 2016/17. In the 2017/18 financial year the development budget is working with Ksh 1.38 Billion, which it will subdivide equally to its 30 Wards – about 46 million per Ward (*Table 4*). The share of the development budget earmarked for Ward development through PB reveals no discernable pattern in the last five years. Ward development was allocated 31%, 29%, 22%, 31% and 55% from 2013/14 through to 2017/18 financial years respectively. These Ward development budget shares however did not corroborate figures that a respondent at the very same ministry reported. According to the respondent the fraction of the development budget dedicated to Ward Development, that is PB determined budget has ranged between 25% and 30%: FY 2013/14 – 18.5 Million (Mn), FY 2014/15 – 19.5 Mn, FY 2015/16 – 23 Mn, and FY 2016/17 – 33 Mn. The respondent further reported that Makueni through MoFSEP is planning to subject up to 50% of the development budget to the PB processes in the 2017/18 FY.¹⁸³

¹⁸³ Key Informant Interview (KII E, September 2017)


Table 4: Makueni County Approved Budget Estimates (2013/14 - 2017/18)

	FY 2013/14	FY 2014/15	FY 2015/16	FY 2016/17	FY 2017/18
Total Budget	4.7 Bn	5.75 Bn	7.02 Bn	7.25 Bn	7.75 Bn
Development Budget	1.8 Bn	1.9 Bn	2.8 Bn	2.6 Bn	2.49 Bn
Ward Development Budget	558 Mn (31% of Dev Budget)	558 Mn (29% of Dev Budget)	618 Mn (22% of Dev Budget)	823 Mn (31% of Dev Budget)	1.38 Bn (55% of Dev Budget)
Share per Ward	18.5 Mn	18.6 Mn	20.6 Mn	27.4 Mn	46 Mn

Source: Adapted from the Ministry of Finance and Social Economic Planning, Makueni County

Records from the Makueni Project Monitoring system and MoFSEP suggest that through PB, the health sector in Makueni Sub County has received Ksh 119,827,620 of Ward development financing. These allocations are in response to 67 project proposals (*Appendix 10*) from the 2013/14 through to the 2016/17 financial years: Ksh 27,127,620, Ksh 27,200,000, Ksh 34,000,000 and Ksh 31,500,000 respectively (*Figure 6*). PB has therefore roughly allocated an average of Ksh 29, 956,905 per year to the healthcare sector in the Sub County. 29 of the 67 prioritized proposals, that is 43%, have been completed with another 21, that is 31%, being implemented at the time of fieldwork (*Table 5 and Figure 7*).

Figure 6: Investments Trends in Makueni Sub County




Source: Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)

Table 5: Status of Health Sector Projects in Makueni Sub County (2013/14 - 2016/17)

Status	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	Grand Total
Awaiting Contract				3	3
Complete	17	10	2		29
Delayed	1	1	1		3
Floated			1		1
New	1		2	4	7
Ongoing	5	6	9	1	21
Requisitioned			1	2	3
Grand Total	24	17	16	10	67

Source: Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)

Figure 7: Status of Health Sector Projects (2013/14 - 2016/17)



Source: Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)

The lion's share of these resources have been spent on the construction of new healthcare facilities which take up to 62% of all the resources at Ksh 74,577,620 as is shown in Table 6 and Figure 8. The expansion, equipping and operationalization of Makueni Sub County health facilities takes up Ksh 16,800,000 which comes to about 14% of the resources. This is closely followed by allocations worth Ksh 16,750,000 made to the upgrading of existing health facilities, which also accounts for about 14% of total resources. Investments in medical staff quarters and renovation and


rehabilitation of existing facilities comes in last at 7% and 3% respectively, accounting for Ksh 8,200,000 and Ksh 3,500,000.

Table 6: Types and Investments in Health Sector Projects

Project Type	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	Grand Total
Expansion, Equipping & Operationalization	Ksh9,800,000	Ksh1,500,000	Ksh1,000,000	Ksh4,500,000	Ksh16,800,000
New Facility	Ksh12,577,620	Ksh10,000,000	Ksh27,000,000	Ksh25,000,000	Ksh74,577,620
Renovation & Rehabilitation	Ksh2,500,000	Ksh1,000,000	-	-	Ksh3,500,000
Staff Quarters	-	Ksh6,200,000	Ksh2,000,000	-	Ksh8,200,000
Upgrade	Ksh2,250,000	Ksh8,500,000	Ksh4,000,000	Ksh2,000,000	Ksh16,750,000
Grand Total	Ksh27,127,620	Ksh27,200,000	Ksh34,000,000	Ksh31,500,000	Ksh119,827,620

Source: Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)

Figure 8: Types of Health Sector Projects



Source: Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)


Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba Ward invested the most resources in the healthcare sector accounting for 26% of all investments in 2013/14 FY to 2016/17 FY in Makueni Sub County at Ksh 30,877,620 (*Table 7 and Figure 9*). As shown in Figure 10, Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba Ward also has the greatest concentration of PB initiated healthcare projects. 21% of all 67 Sub County projects are in Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba Ward. According to this data set, Kitise/Kithuki Ward invested the least at Ksh 5,500,00, which accounts for only 5% of all healthcare related investments. The Ward however has 12% of the 67 healthcare projects in the Sub County. Wote Ward, where the County’s headquarters are based, has the second highest level of investment in healthcare projects having prioritised Ksh 21,000,000, that is 17% of all Sub County resources. However, only 8% of the Sub County projects were allocated to Wote in the four years. Mavindini comes at third place – 15%, while Kathonzweni and Kikumini/Muvau Wards tie at about 13% in fourth place in the level of healthcare investments through PB, Ksh 18,300,000, Ksh 15,350,000 and Ksh 15,800,000 respectively. Mbitini comes in fifth having invested Ksh 13,000,000 which accounts for about 11% of all resources and 13% of the 67 projects in the Sub County.

Table 7: Wards Investments in Healthcare

Ward	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	Grand Total
Kathonzweni	Ksh4,950,000	Ksh7,400,000	Ksh3,000,000	-	Ksh15,350,000
Kikumini/Muvau	Ksh3,000,000	Ksh4,300,000	Ksh2,000,000	Ksh6,500,000	Ksh15,800,000
Kitise/Kithuki	-	-	-	Ksh5,500,000	Ksh5,500,000
Mavindini	Ksh4,800,000	Ksh5,500,000	Ksh4,000,000	Ksh4,000,000	Ksh18,300,000
Mbitini	Ksh2,000,000	Ksh5,000,000	Ksh3,500,000	Ksh2,500,000	Ksh13,000,000
Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba	Ksh8,377,620	Ksh5,000,000	Ksh15,500,000	Ksh2,000,000	Ksh30,877,620
Wote	Ksh4,000,000	-	Ksh6,000,000	Ksh11,000,000	Ksh21,000,000
Grand Total	Ksh27,127,620	Ksh27,200,000	Ksh34,000,000	Ksh31,500,000	Ksh119,827,620


Source: Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)

Figure 9: Ward Investments in Healthcare



Source: *Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)*

Figure 10: Ward Share of Projects



Source: *Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)*

A government officer at the MoFSEP suggested that all these investments, as captured in Table 5 and 6, were a direct response to citizens’ PB proposals. The study was however unable to corroborate this link between PB and health sector project investments with actual lists of PB prioritised projects in each Ward and their corresponding budgetary allocations for the FY 2013/14 to FY 2017/18. A request for

these documents went unheeded. Supporting evidence like technical teams appraisals and PB forums minutes proved to be inaccessible too. The researcher was merely directed to the Makueni County Projects Monitoring System online page for all of these queries. It should be noted that Makueni has not consistently been publicly publishing all of its budget documents. Datasets generated by IBP Kenya in their County budget transparency reports show that in at least the last two financial years (2015/16 to 2017/18), Makueni has only availed one of five key budget documents on its website, this is the ADP document. Noticeably missing in this list is the citizens' budget.¹⁸⁴

4.4.2 Number of Healthcare Facilities and Healthcare Personnel

For this section, the researcher reviewed Makueni's ADPs 2013/14 to 2018/19, and its two CIDPs to obtain key healthcare statistics linked to the work of PB in Makueni. In this process the researcher noted some inconsistencies in some indicator statistics. The average household distance from a health facility, total number of dispensaries in the County, doctor to population ratios, and nurse to population ratios particularly stand out.

According to Makueni's County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP) 2013-2017 Makueni had 21 Level 3 healthcare facilities and 113 dispensaries. Most of these facilities were reported to be under-staffed and in short supply of drugs and equipment. The County had a bed capacity of 616 with a doctor population ratio of 1:22,712. The average household distance to health facility was reported at six kilometres. The GoMC intended to reduce this distance to three kilometres by 2017. The GoMC was also keen to reduce doctor population ratio to 1:18,000, and operationalize 15 facilities in the county by 2017 (GoMC, 2013c). The CIDP identified three strategic objectives in the health sector: to operationalize health facilities, to increase supply of medical equipment, and to increase health infrastructure.

According to Makueni's ADPs 2013/14 to 2015/16 (*Appendix 9*), the GoMC mostly prioritised maternal health, construction and rehabilitation, and operationalization of

¹⁸⁴ See IBP Kenya's 'How Much Budget Information Are Counties Publishing Online?' (Accessed on May 28, 2018 at <https://www.internationalbudget.org/budget-work-by-country/ibps-work-in-countries/kenya/understanding-county-budgets/tracking-county-budget-information-kenya/>)

health facilities, and, control and prevention of communicable diseases (GoMC, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). ADP 2016/17 (GoMC, 2015) was keen on mainly improving staff shortages. Other areas of improvement in this year included: diagnostics, and access to preventive and curative healthcare services at existing health facilities. Interestingly, ADP 2016/17 suggests that the doctor patient ratio did not improve remaining at about 1:22,217. This ADP also included figures of the nurse to population ratio, which was recorded as 1:2,197. It also reported that the County's medical personnel were overworked, attending to twice the number of patients by international recommended standards¹⁸⁵. The ADP 2016/17 further reports that Makueni has more health facilities than it has medical personnel teams. It further describes this facility-personnel mismatch as "idle capacities in the existing medical infrastructure."

Most of these facilities are level 2 and level 3, which are managed by a nurse each. The average household distance to a health facility nonetheless remained at six kilometres in 2016 according to the ADP 2017/18 (GoMC, 2016a). The focus of the GoMC in the financial year 2017/18 was mainly on the operationalization of the existing facilities, to reduce the idle capacities. The GoMC intended to do so by ensuring adequate equipping, drugs supply, and personnel postings (GoMC, 2016a).

The ADP 2018/2019 suggests that in the financial year 2016/17 49 dispensaries were constructed with another 86 getting upgrades (GoMC, 2017a). The County now is reported to have about 163 dispensaries¹⁸⁶ up from 113 (GoMC, 2013a, 2013c, 2016a). The ADP 2018/2019, without giving any numbers reports that dispensaries were also equipped and connected to power (GoMC, 2017a). 16 of these new medical facilities are in Makueni Sub County.¹⁸⁷ A key informant suggested that these new and upgraded facilities were the outputs of the PB process. The ADP 2018/2019 further reports that these facilities reduced the average household distance to a health facility to five kilometres. The CIDP 2018-2022 however, still reports this average at six kilometres (GoMC, 2018). All the same, the ADPs and an interview with a key

¹⁸⁵ WHO recommends 1:10,000 and 1:1,000 for doctor and nurse patient ratio respectively, see http://www.who.int/gho/health_workforce/physicians_density_text/en/

¹⁸⁶ Key Informant Interviews (KII D, August 2017; KII I, September 2017) and Makueni's 2018/19 ADP reports two conflicting figures, 163 and 168 dispensaries

¹⁸⁷ Appendix 10: Makueni Sub County PB initiated Healthcare Service Investments

informant¹⁸⁸ suggest that over the last few years, the GoMC has relatively reduced the average distance between households and public health facilities over the last few years. In speaking of the ease of access a clinical officer reported the following on her new a new dispensary:

“This facility is strategically located (between Nziu and Wote); people in this area used to go as far as Wote, which is over five kilometres away to find medical attention.”¹⁸⁹

The ADP 2017/18 and respondents further suggest that Makueni public health system is now grappling with the challenge of inadequate equipping and staffing at these new PB initiated dispensaries. A government officer in the ministry of health said the following to the effect:

“We have implemented many health projects – physical projects, the question now is how to equip and staff. According to World Health Organization (WHO) policy we have enough dispensaries – we are now trying to improve our existing dispensaries. Our main issue now is equipping and staffing.”¹⁹⁰

By recruiting medical personnel, CIDP 2018-2022 reports that the GoMC has now improved the doctor to population ratio to 1:16,149 from 1:22,712 and the nurse to population ratio to 1:1,502 compared to 1:1,932 in 2013. Both the ADP 2016/17 and a key informant suggest that a nurse is posted in each of the 49 newly commissioned (PB initiated) dispensaries.¹⁹¹ The study did, however, find that some of the 16 facilities commissioned in Makueni Sub County were yet to be operationalized as was witnessed at the idle Bosnia facility (*Image 4*).

¹⁸⁸ Key Informant Interview (KII I, September 2017)

¹⁸⁹ Key Informant Interview (KII D, August 2017)

¹⁹⁰ Key Informant Interview (KII I, September 2017)

¹⁹¹ Key Informant Interview (KII D, August 2017)

Image 4: The New Bosnia Dispensary in Makueni Sub County (Top: Main dispensary block, Bottom left: Waiting area, Bottom right: Medical waste disposal unit and pit latrine)



Source: Author

Makueni's ADP 2017/18 and 2018/19 suggest that operationalized facilities still require better staffing and equipping for optimum operation. A visit to two operationalized dispensaries in the Sub County, Kitikyumu and Prisons, revealed just as much. These PB initiated dispensaries were observed to be concrete blocks with about five to eight rooms, a lobby area and a conference room. The dispensaries also come with two pit latrines and one medical-waste incinerator, which are within the dispensary compound. The facilities generally seem underutilized with most of their rooms remaining vacant. Nearly all of the few activities these dispensaries can carry out are sufficiently conducted in only one room in the whole of the facility. The medical officers at the Kitikyumu and Prisons dispensaries, in commenting on the capacity of their facilities, respectively reported the following:

“There is no electricity here. I might have medical instruments for procedures but we cannot use these instruments because we cannot keep them sterile. I need electricity to keep medical instruments sterile... I have to turn away patients who come seeking advice on family planning or antenatal care, or actual child delivery – this is in spite of having the equipment here. There is no running tap water either. A proper medical centre needs to have tapped running water. We do however have a 10,000 litre and a 16,000 litre water-tank.”¹⁹²

“We offer no maternity services at the moment – we have equipment but no space but plans are underway.”¹⁹³

These PB initiated dispensaries are described as operating at bare minimum on account of limited resources. A dispensary’s personnel include one nurse/clinical officer, one security guard, and one casual labourer.¹⁹⁴ The services that these dispensaries can offer are limited to primary healthcare services. Even with just the provision of primary healthcare services, these new dispensaries fall short in meeting the needs of the community especially at times of emergencies. A clinical officer suggested the following:

“I can manage okay by myself as a clinical officer stationed in this dispensary. The facility however only administers first aid before referring serious cases to Wote Town... I cannot carry out invasive procedures here. We can only attend to minor ailments. For dire cases, the ambulance is called, we have three on standby in Makueni Sub County, and I escort the patient to Wote. While I am away with an emergency patient, the casual labourer takes charge. She can do basic things like measure blood pressure, temperature and administer medicines with my advice over the phone. The security guard posted to this facility also helps with the documentation of emergency cases reported at

¹⁹² Key Informant Interview (KII D, August 2017)

¹⁹³ Key Informant Interview (KII K, September 2017)

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Ward Administrator in Kanthonzweni (Respondent 10, September 2017); it was also reported that nurses have not been posted to all of these new dispensaries

night. There is need for a staff house within the compound. I am therefore unable to adequately attend to emergencies, which often occur at night.”¹⁹⁵

A WA in commenting on PB’s investments in healthcare, “We have implemented many health projects – physical projects – the question now is how to equip and staff them.”¹⁹⁶ According County health officers, future participatory processes in public health will attempt to direct resources to operationalization of County dispensaries. This key informant was however sceptical of how well PB could do this, confessing that there is only so much that PB can achieve in this regard. The assumption is that Public Health is a very specialist driven sector thereby making the contributions of the public through participatory approaches very limited. PB has so far only contributed to the implementation of Level 1 and 2 healthcare services.¹⁹⁷ In commenting on this, a key informant in the department of health said the following:

“Policy has to guide for a bigger impact to be felt by our population. Factors like training of medical officers and acquisition of medical skills, investment in equipment, drugs and other non-pharmaceuticals, these cannot be financed through PB.”¹⁹⁸

In this section the study considered the proposition suggesting, “participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting healthcare service delivery.” Based on analyses and discussion of findings in Makueni, notwithstanding some inaccessible data points, we can tentatively confirm this proposition. But this is insofar as the construction of healthcare facilities is seen as a sufficient proxy indicator for delivery of healthcare services. Should we however also consider the operationalization of these facilities, we are then forced to challenge the proposition.

¹⁹⁵ Key Informant Interview (KII D, August 2017)

¹⁹⁶ Interview with citizen Ward DC member (Respondent 6, August 2017)

¹⁹⁷ Level 1 facilities provide community health services – these merely identify medical cases that require the attention of a higher level of care; Level 2 facilities provide primary care services, they are therefore authorized to dispense (National Taxpayers Association, 2017).

¹⁹⁸ Key Informant Interview (KII I, September 2017)

This second scenario is informed by findings in Makueni, which suggest that PB has not in anyway directed resources towards the operation of these facilities in terms of equipping, staffing and offering medical services in general. This is in spite of a likely link between PB and the construction of healthcare facilities, dispensaries in particular. Technically, PB has merely improved citizens' physical proximity to dispensaries and would-be medical facilities.

The findings of this study suggest that the design and implementation of Makueni's PB framework has a bias for citizen inputs that produce 'material' outputs. It also emerged that citizens considered their participation to be meaningful only when it produced capital projects. The promise of physical projects is at the very heart of what citizens believe PB is as was captured by the response below:

“People need to be motivated with actual physical projects for them to actively engage in the process. Our Cluster, for example, has not seen another project since getting the road drifts two financial years ago. People are therefore reluctant to participate here.”¹⁹⁹

It would seem that all PB efforts in Makueni have so far only resulted in capital investments, which often entail the construction or repair of pieces of public infrastructure. Consequently, it would seem that the design and implementation of Makueni's PB is handicapped in directing investments into services and programmes for development. As a key informant suggested, “there isn't much on programmatic structures and the running of projects after implementation.”²⁰⁰

Wampler (2007) refers to these kinds of PB programmes as “participatory budgeting public works.” According to him, most PB programmes tend to focus on public works at their initial stages. The ideal is that over time this focus expands to include general social policy, which he calls “participatory budgeting thematics.” The utility of the public works, Wampler argues, is in socializing citizens into PB. In this sense, citizens are conditioned to associate their participation with outcomes. Makueni's PB is yet to make this transition into social policies even after thematics were deliberately

¹⁹⁹ Interview with citizen Ward DC member in Kivandini (Respondent 7, August 2017)

²⁰⁰ Key Informant Interview (KII B, August 2017)

introduced at the Sub County participatory forum. A key informant described Makueni thematics as, “Where people with special needs or marginalized groups like persons living with HIV and so on, are met separately... Where their needs are addressed for budgetary considerations.”²⁰¹ In this sense, Makueni’s thematics are for the most part platforms for identifying projects (often public works) for certain constituencies. Much as thematics in Makueni are keen to create more participatory spaces for greater citizen inclusion, they are yet to really expand the mandate of PB in general spending policies.

It would further seem that KADP recommendation of ‘Wampler thematics’ to Makueni’s PB does not interrogate the prevailing understanding of what constitutes ‘development’ in Makueni. Lakin (2017) queries the nature of these kinds of outputs in his commentary on devolution and development in Kenya. He observes that public discourses often conflate capital projects and development outcomes. Consequently resources for development are for the most part focussed on “building things, rather than on ensuring that services are actually delivered.” Some respondents went as far as to suggest that GoMC’s *realpolitik*²⁰² leverages on this kind of fixation on capital projects in Makueni. Capital projects in Makueni play well into the hands of GoMC as it garners public approval and support, in line with the earlier discussed objective of PB – this was especially the case in the run up to the August 8th 2017 gubernatorial elections. This is perhaps best captured in the response of a County level DC member and a supporter of Governor Kibwana’s who suggested the following:

“When people here criticize Governor Kibwana, we are quiet, then we point to the development projects, ‘look at the Marikiti Market extension, look at the social hall, look at the bodaboda shed, look at the toilets...’ the work speaks for itself.”²⁰³

²⁰¹ Key Informant Interview (KII H, September 2017)

²⁰² Key Informant Interviews (KII G & H, September 2017); Interview with grassroots community organizer and former Ward Public Participation Officer (Respondent 11, September 2017)

²⁰³ Interview with County DC Member in Wote Market (Respondent 9, September 2017)

It is within this context that a key informant stationed at a medical facility reported that, the “new facilities were commissioned in July, all at the same time, and nurses were hired in these facilities. Prof Kibwana hurriedly implemented these facilities as part of his smart politics.”²⁰⁴ It is for this reason, based on the findings, that this study posits that “participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting investment in public works.”

²⁰⁴ Key Informant Interview (KII D, August 2017)

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the findings in response to the study's research questions and objectives. The chapter additionally draws conclusions from these findings and thereafter reiterates the study's significance in development studies by making recommendations on policy and further research.

5.2 Summary of Findings

5.2.1 Participatory Budgeting Process in Makueni Sub County

The County treasury initiates the budget cycle by releasing a circular by August 30. This circular directs the different sectors on how to prepare their annual budget requests in line with County priorities. Additionally this circular gives calendar directives that also inform citizen participation in budget formulation. From these sector bids the Executive prepares the ADP and tables it in the County Assembly by September 1.

By September 30 the CBROP is drafted and is tabled in the County Assembly for review and approval by October 21. This document presents an economic outlook for the coming year. After the approval of the CBROP, the government convenes sector-working groups between October 21 and February 28. Relevant stakeholders are invited to participate in the discussions of these working groups. The working groups formulate the different sector bids for resources. From these bids each sector is given a budget ceiling. These ceilings are captured in the County Fiscal Strategy Paper (CFSP). The CFSP is a summary of a county's fiscal plan. This paper too is tabled in the County Assembly.

The County Assembly approves the CFSP by March 14. After this, the County Budget Proposal Estimates is submitted to the County Assembly by April 30. This document captures County revenue and expenditure estimates, debt management plans and relevant macroeconomic conditions and policies addressing the County.

After relevant amending, the County Budget Proposal Estimates is approved and results in the County Appropriation Bill by June 30. The County Appropriation Bill is tabled in the County Assembly and is enacted into law by June 30. The County Appropriation Act authorizes the government to implement its budget.

Makueni's public participation framework is comprised of a four-tier PB process and a two-tier process verification and validation of citizens PB inputs – making six tiers of citizen engagement. The Ward, as a unit of administration, is the primary focus of all PB efforts.

PB comes in at the planning and formulation stage of the County budget cycle. Citizen inputs are usually collected and incorporated into the County Budget Proposal by the time it is submitted to the County Assembly for appraisal and approval. PB is an escalating process of collective identification and prioritization of developmental needs. The process commences at the Villages, then proceeds to the Clusters, and unto the Sub Wards and concludes at the Ward level. At each stage citizens justify to each other their developmental preferences with the aim of arriving at a consensus. Citizen proposals are evaluated against each other at each successive stage with those enjoying the most support proceeding to the subsequent stage.

5.2.2 Level of Citizen Engagement in the Participatory Budgeting Process

PB is designed in such a way as to encourage the alignment of citizen inputs to the agenda of the different government sectors as set in the ADPs. It is for this reason that it has been alleged that in spite of citizen participation, politicians or public officers have the final say in how monies are spent.

This would further suggest that PB is not a fully independent process. Findings show that decisions that influence PB are made in different spaces, where citizens have varying say in each. The overall public budget agenda is set in 'closed spaces' (e.g. sector/department level spaces of decision-making). It is in the 'invited spaces' that citizens are often encouraged to build on to the already determined budget agenda through PB.

When the different sectors have formulated their yearly vision, the office of the DPP summons ward administrators for a briefing on the year's sectorial focus. The ward administrators are then tasked with the responsibility of convening PB forums at their wards. Citizens are for the most part mobilized over the phone. Through phone calls information is reported to flow from the WA to the citizens belonging to DCs, who in turn then share the information within their networks. Citizen mobilization is heavily reliant on established social networks in the community. This therefore suggests that participatory forums tend to draw citizens with shared values or belief systems. Makueni's PB has registered curious participation gaps in citizen engagement. There has been underrepresentation of some constituencies in the PB process, which have been primarily attributed to a mobilization bias. Findings also suggest that Makueni's PB attracts the participation of citizens who enjoy a degree of social status in the community, or citizens who have held certain leadership roles in the community. The study further found that youth and men were underrepresented in PB forums.

Participatory engagements are furthermore often conducted during 'working hours', thereby locking out the voices of the many citizens who are in formal employment. It also emerged that charismatic citizens have a way of exerting undue influence in decision making in the deliberative process of building consensus. This consensus building approach to PB is unable to register and address the concerns and grievances of minority groups. The Makueni's PB framework does not have provisions or mechanisms that encourage the participation of citizens from under-represented or unrepresented sub-groups in the community.

For budget decisions to be made, citizen PB participants discuss and deliberate among themselves with the aim of achieving consensus over budget items. The projects that citizens have consensus over are then appraised for feasibility by Ministry technical teams. If a proposal is not feasible the technical teams suggest alternatives and options the citizens, through their development committees, could consider.

5.2.3 Effect of Participatory Budgeting on Healthcare services delivery

PB works with the Ward Development Kitty, which is a share of the County's Development Budget. Makueni County's Development Budget has been on a steady

increase in the last five financial years: from Kshs 18.5 million per Ward, to 18.6 million, to 20.6 million, to 27.4 million, for FY 2013/14 through to FY 2016/17. In the 2017/18 financial-year the GoMC allocated about 46 million per Ward for development. The share of the development budget earmarked for Ward development through PB reveals no discernable pattern in the last five years. Ward development was allocated 31%, 29%, 22%, 31% and 55% from 2013/14 through to 2017/18 financial years respectively.

Through PB Makueni Sub County has allocated Ksh 119,827,620 of its Ward development budget towards the provision of healthcare services. These allocations are in response to 67 project proposals from the 2013/14 through to the 2016/17 financial years. An average of about Ksh 29,956,905 has annually been allocated to health sector through PB. 29 of the 67 prioritized proposals, that is 43%, have been completed with another 21, that is 31%, being implemented currently. Most of these resources have been spent on the construction of new health facilities.

Through PB, the GoMC reports to have set up 49 new dispensaries all across the County, 16 of which are in Makueni Sub County. The County is now reported to have about 163 dispensaries up from 113. This investment in dispensaries has effectively reduced the average distance to a health facility from about six kilometres to five kilometres. It has however emerged that these dispensaries offer limited healthcare services. What PB has accomplished is improving ease of citizen's access to primary healthcare services, which entails identification of medical cases that require the attention of a higher level of care, emergency first aid, and dispensing of medication for basic treatment. These new PB initiated dispensaries are described as operating at bare minimum. Most of these new facilities are inadequately staffed and equipped for optimum operation. PB has so far been unable to direct any resources towards the operation of these facilities.

5.3 Conclusion

This study interrogated the link between Makueni's PB framework and developmental outcomes particularly in the delivery of healthcare services. The study

achieved this by examining the process of PB in Makueni, level of citizen engagement in PB, and the effect of PB on the delivery of healthcare services.

Based on findings, this study concludes, “Formal participatory frameworks do indeed ensure the formulation of pro-poor fiscal policies.” PB does this by providing a platform for citizens to register their opinions in the budgeting process. The institutionalisation of PB has democratised budget making, allowing Makueni citizens, to some degree, influence spending at the Ward level in line with their priorities. Makueni’s PB, however, largely remains an addendum to the main County budget. Citizen participation through PB in Makueni operates in a political milieu of contested and negotiated power and legitimacy between the County executive, County assembly and citizens, County officers and citizens, and, the MoSEP and the DPP.

In examining the level of citizen engagement this study also concludes by confirming the proposition that “participatory budgeting promotes citizen empowerment.” PB does indeed promote a democratic culture in Makueni County. Through PB Makueni has encouraged the involvement of citizens in civic processes of decision-making. This involvement, however, in especially the budgeting process is guided by predetermined government plans. Makueni’s has faced challenges in including men and youth in PB process. This was linked to the *baraza* and *table banking* formats PB uses in convening public forums.

The study’s last conclusion is made by looking at the effect of PB on the delivery of healthcare services in Makueni Sub County. This is achieved by considering the proposition that “participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting healthcare service delivery.” This proposition can only be confirmed if the construction of healthcare facilities is seen as a sufficient proxy indicator for delivery of healthcare services. Otherwise, the findings further suggest that that there is no evidence showing that PB has in anyway directed resources towards the operationalization of health facilities. There is indeed a link between PB and the construction of basic healthcare facilities. There, however, is no indication that PB in Makueni has invested in actual healthcare service delivery. It would seem that all PB efforts in Makueni have so far only resulted in capital investments, which often entail the construction or repair of pieces of public infrastructure. It is for this reason that

the study therefore posits “participatory budgeting is an effective mechanism promoting investment in public works.”

5.4 Policy Recommendations

Based on the findings of this study, the following policy considerations are hereby recommended:

1. A Revision and Harmonization of the PB Framework

The study found that there is no agreement between MoDPS and MoFSEP over the mandate of the DPP and objective of public participation in the budget process. The MoFSEP believes the work of the DPP is to simply provide a platform for citizen to register their requests for budgeting considerations. The MoDPS on the other hand believes the role of the DPP is inclusive development financing. There is need for clarity across these two ministries on the purpose of citizen engagement in the budgeting process. Perhaps one practical step towards harmonization could be the collapsing of the DPP into the MoFSEP as a stand-alone department, which could streamline the chain of command in development financing. Or perhaps split the functions of the DPP and have PB embedded in the MoFSEP, and civic education embedded at the MoDPS.

2. Filling in Participation Gaps

There is need to make Makueni’s PB even more inclusive and representative. Citizen mobilization needs to be done in such a way as to give citizens ample time to schedule their participation and secondly attract the engagement of citizens belonging in diverse social networks. The GoMC should commit to giving timely notices inviting citizens to convene at public forums. The GoMC also needs to consider directly inviting minority or underrepresented constituencies in the fringes of popular social networks for PB forums. There is also need for more clarity in the mandate and objective of the thematic. As it stands, the thematic at the Sub County level are suggested to collect requests for project from some identified interest groups, and verification of PB processes at the Ward level. If Makueni aspires for its citizens to have more say in its spending policies, the thematic could be an avenue for more comprehensive public participation in the broader County budgeting process.

3. Encourage all-rounded participatory processes

The GoMC should promote holistic participatory development planning and management. First and foremost if inputs into PB must be aligned to ADP for managerial efficiency, it would only be prudent for the GoMC to therefore consider making sector working group hearings participatory. Additionally citizens should be trained and encouraged to make project proposals that consider both infrastructural/capital investments and programmatic/operational financing. In this way PB will address for example the question of limited healthcare services at PB initiated health facilities.

4. Improvement of data management system

There is need to make all of Makueni's budget related documents accessible to the public. This will first allow for informed citizen participation and public oversight, and secondly help researchers have more comprehensive data when conducting future studies on Makueni's budgeting process. A consolidated online open access platform should be effective in addressing this gap.

Makueni's MoFSP also needs to clean and verify all the data in its reports. The researcher found conflicting statistics in various ADPs and the CIDPs. The integrity of data will guarantee credibility of the reports and claims of the department. It will also help with accuracy in development planning and budgeting as a whole.

5.5 Recommendations for Further Research

Social and new media in citizen mobilization

This study recommends that further research should be done on new innovations in citizen mobilization with a keen look at social media as tools for disseminating information as was witnessed in Kitise/Kithuka Ward.

Social Networks and political participation

This study also recommends the conducting of a social network analysis of Makueni's PB process. This should particularly focus on how social ties and networks influence the information people receive, how people are mobilized, and representativeness and political participation in PB.

Political capture and County Assembly's oversight role

There is also a need to look into how the Executive insulates the PB framework from political attack and capture from either itself or other actors. The County Assembly's role of oversight, in the context of a thriving PB culture, should prove to be an interest focus of study.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Informed Consent Form

Dear Respondent,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research project. Ethical procedures for academic research undertaken as part of M.A. Development studies degree from the University of Nairobi require interviewees explicitly agree to being interviewed, and how the information contained in their interview will be used. This consent form is necessary for us to ensure you understand the purpose of your involvement and you agree to the conditions of your participation.

My study seeks to examine public participation in county budgeting process in Makueni County. The findings of this research will help policy makers in designing and implementing relevant and effective public participation mechanisms for county level governance.

Participation in this study is voluntary. It will involve an interview of approximately 30 minutes in length to take place in a mutually agreed upon time and location. You may decline to answer any of the interview questions if you so wish. Further, you may decide to withdraw from this study at any time without any negative consequences by advising the researcher. With your permission, the interview will be recorded to facilitate collection of information, and later transcribed for analysis. All information you provide is considered completely confidential. Your name will not appear in any thesis or report resulting from this study however, with your permission anonymous quotations may be used. Only researchers associated with this project will have access to the data collected during this study. There are no known or anticipated risks to you as a participant in this study.

You have the right to ask questions about this research study and to have those questions answered by the investigator before, during or after the research. If you like, a summary of the results of the study will be sent to you.

By appending your signature below, you will thereby certifying you understand the information provided above and you approve your participation in this study.

Approval

I hereby confirm the researcher, Mr Edwin Kibui Rwigi has informed me of the nature of this study. I have read and understand the contents of the consent form provided to me and have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction. I therefore voluntarily agree to participate in this study.

Participant's Name:

Participant's Signature: Date:

Investigator's Signature:Date:

Appendix 2: Citizen Participant Interview Guide

A: Basic Information

1. Gender of respondent
2. Age of respondent (years)
3. What is your highest level of education?
4. What is your occupation/Source of Income?
5. In which Ward are you based?

B. Level of Stakeholder Engagement in PB process

6. How many participatory forums have you attended?
7. What other roles do you play in the community?
8. Is there any qualification needed to attend these forums (diversity and inclusion)?
9. What special attribute makes you a citizen representative in these forums?
10. Who organizes for these forums?
11. How is participation in these forums determined?
12. How are participants mobilized to attend these forums?
13. How would you describe what goes on at a typical forum?
14. How is the agenda of the forums set (who, when, where)?
15. Where are these forums convened and who convenes them?
16. How far (time/distance) are the forums convening venues?
17. How are developmental decisions made in these forums?
18. In what ways does participating affect your livelihood?
19. What have been the development priority trends in the last 4 years?

Thank you for taking your time and patience to participate in this study!

Appendix 3: Interview Guide: Ward Administrators

A: Basic Information

1. Gender of respondent
2. Age of respondent (years)
3. What is your highest level of education?
4. What is your occupation/Source of Income?
5. In which Ward are you based?

B. Level of Stakeholder Engagement in PB process

6. What is the role of Ward/Village Administrators in PP/PB?
7. How did you come to be appointed as a Ward/Village administrator?
8. How would you describe the process of PB cycle?
9. How do you mobilize for citizen participants?
10. Is there a selection criteria used for mobilizing citizens?
11. How would you describe what that goes on at a typical forum?
12. How are developmental decisions made in these forums?
13. How are budget estimates made?
14. What is the link between Govt departments and PB estimates?
15. How are gaps in participation addressed in PB process?
16. Is there an oversupply of dispensaries?
17. Are there land issues in PB projects?

Thank you for taking your time and patience to participate in this study!

Appendix 4: Key Informants Interview Guide: County Government Officials

A. Participatory Budgeting Cycle

1. What is Participatory Budgeting?
2. What is the purpose/objective of PB?
3. Describe the design of the PB framework and Cycle
4. How are participatory forums organized?
5. How many participatory forums are conducted in a given time?
6. What are the successes of the Makueni PB experience?
7. What are the challenges of Makueni PB experience?

B. Who participates in PB?

8. How does citizen mobilization for forums conducted?
9. How are participants for forums selected?
10. Is there a special attribute that qualifies one as a PB participant?
11. How would you describe what that goes on at a typical forum?
12. How do citizens through PB participate in development?
13. What have been the development priority trends in the last 4 years?

C. Follow ups

PMC

- Vetting of Development Committees and qualification
- Look more into this. What criteria do they use in selecting one for PMC membership
- Inclusivity of PMCs
- A public service Board examination is administered
- There is universal health policy in Makueni
- On women and P.P. – some men think that P.P. is about “women agenda” and are thereby not too eager to participate
- WHO policy is that we have enough dispensaries – we are now trying to improve our existing dispensaries
- Look for a copy of a BQ
- Are the powers of MCA cut by the PB process

Civil Society actors

- What role did civil society play in the adoption of PB in Makueni County?
- Are the powers of MCA cut by the PB process
- Highlight the developing civil culture developing in Makueni and permeating in other aspects of public life

Thank you for taking your time and patience to participate in this study!

Appendix 5: Key informant Interview County Department of Health and Department of Finance

1. PB and health outcomes

1. Have the outcomes of the PB process in any way affected the delivery of health services?
2. How would you describe the trends in county healthcare budget allocation?
3. Are these trends in any way associated with the PB process?
4. How many health care facilities are in Makeni Sub County?
5. How many health personnel serve in these health facilities?

2. Inter-department Linkages, PB and Programme Based Financing

Departments and Programme Based Budgeting

- Programme Based budgets /Departments -- Explore more on this Priority System and Resource Distribution
- Every county government department is also represented in project financial allocation
- We prioritize projects, with the most important being taken up as the others are pending to be taken up in subsequent rounds
- The problem however is that people have a tendency to lean on same departments – water, health, roads
- From assembly, MCAs call ward barazas/forums (they are not well planned)
- There is **universal health policy** in Makeni, how is it implemented?
- **WHO** policy is that we have enough dispensaries – we are now trying to improve our existing dispensaries
- Programme Based budgets /Departments – (Explore more on this Priority System and Resource Distribution)

Thank you for taking your time and patience to participate in this study!

Appendix 6: Facility Observation Guide

1. What is your general impression of the facility?

- What is the size of the facility?
- How are the facility's amenities and infrastructure utilized?
- Does the facility have a waste management system (e.g. installed medical incinerator and pit latrines)?
- Is there a power connection and running tapped water installed at the facility?
- How would you describe the intensity of the operations of the facility?
- How many patients are in the facility's waiting area at time of visit?

2. How is the facility staffed?

- How many medical personnel are stationed at the facility?
- How many support staffs are stationed at the facility, and what are their roles?

Appendix 7: Public Participation Matrix, Ministry of Devolution and Public Service, GoMC²⁰⁵



GOVERNMENT OF MAKUENI COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF DEVOLUTION AND PUBLIC SERVICE

P.O BOX 78 – 90300, MAKUENI

Why Public Participation?

Public participation is a constitutional requirement specifically, Article 1 that states that sovereign power belongs to the people and Article 10 (2) (a) and the Fourth Schedule Part 2(14) of the Constitution of Kenya and is stipulated as a function of the County Government. Sections 87 to 92 and 115 of the County Governments Act, 2012 outline the principles of public participation and the imperative for facilitating public participation in the work of the County government. Public participation is a structured way of consulting with persons, groups and entities before decisions are made. It is designed to give a voice to the voiceless and cements the concept of agency to the County Government, this is, the County government becomes an agent of the people. Public participation is not meant to convey decisions already made, but to generate and confirm decisions. It is not a political process but a non-partisan process that involves the agent going to ‘take instruction and direction’ from the people.

The Government of Makueni County will seek to utilize the various levels of participation, this is, the government is committed to the promotion of consultation, placation, partnership and citizen control models of participation. The County government will promote and ensure people-centred and people-driven development as anticipated by the constitution. The government will continuously strive to create an enabling environment for citizens to be involved in and participate in the development of policies from the initial stages. As a result the government adopts the following forms of public participation:

- **Informing** the public by providing information to help them understand the issues, options and solutions;
- **Consulting** with the public to obtain their feedback on alternatives or decisions;
- **Involving** the public to ensure their concerns are considered throughout the decision making process particularly in the development of decision criteria and options;
- **Collaborating** with the public to develop decision criteria and alternatives and identify the preferred solutions; and
- **Empowering** the public by placing final decision making authority in their hands.

²⁰⁵ Source: GoMC

Public Participation Matrix

Forum	Number of Forums	Number and Source of Participants	Development Committee Representatives	How the Forum is Composed and its Working
Village Peoples Forum	3,159	All people from the village to be invited but at least 100 people (one from each household) per village forum Total =315,900 people County wide	11 members	<i>Village Peoples Forum (to hold meetings quarterly)</i> Each village of the approximately 3,159 villages will form a forum of its members mobilised at least one (1) per household. The forum shall elect/select a committee of 11 person's members to form the <i>Village Development Committee</i> and to represent it in the village Cluster forum. The Committee shall meet at least once quarterly .
Village Clusters Peoples Forum	232	143 participants, 11 representatives from each of the 13 villages per cluster Total =33,176 people County wide	11 members	<i>Village Clusters Peoples Forum (to hold meetings once quarterly)</i> There shall exist at least 232 village clusters; 1 cluster consists of approximately 13 villages. The composition of each forum will be the 11 representatives of each village. Persons coming from the cluster, even though not in the village committees, will be eligible to attend. In its first sitting, it shall elect/select eleven (11) members to form the <i>VillageCluster Development Committee</i> . The cluster development committee shall meet at least oncequarterly . The representatives at this level from the National and County government will be ex-official members of the forum. The Administrator and a community member shall co-convene and co-moderate the forum.
Sub-Ward Peoples Forum	60	53-75 people,11 representatives from each of the 3-5 village clusters in a Sub-Ward and 20 co-opted representatives of organized groups Total =3,180-4,500 people County wide	11 members	<i>Sub-Ward Peoples Forum (to hold meetings bi-annually)</i> There shall exist 60 such fora. They shall have its membership as follows: TheSub-Ward Peoples Forum shall consist of 3-5 village clusters and the 11 members of the village cluster development committees in the Sub-Ward. The representatives of County/National government and the community at these levels shall be conveners/moderators of the forum. The County Government and a community representative at this level shall form the Secretariat for the

				forum. Members of the Sub-Ward (Village) Advisory Council and the Village Administrator shall be in attendance as ex-officials. (If they are already in place). Every Sub-Ward Forum shall elect an 11 member <i>Sub Ward Development Committee</i> and another ± 15-25 representatives co-opted from the 3-5 village clusters to represent it at the Ward Forum. Regional balancing will be considered in getting the representatives.
Ward Peoples Forum	30	72-92 people,11 from the 2 sub-wards,15-25 co-opted and 20 organized groups representatives Total=2,160-2,760 people county wide	11members	<i>Ward Peoples Forum (to hold meetings bi-annually)</i> There shall be a Ward Peoples Forum consisting of ± 72-92 members from each of the two Sub-Wards in a Ward. Its membership shall be as follows:electd leaders at this level, theWard (village) Administrators shall be in attendance as ex-officials; the respective County government official shall nominate for consideration by the forum twenty (20) persons from each of the 20 organized groups to attend the forum. Every ward forum shall elect an 11 member <i>ward development Committee</i> that will represent the Ward at the Sub County Peoples Forum. The County Government representative (Ward Administrator) together with a community representative shall be in-charge of the secretariat.
Sub-County Peoples Forum	6	53-97 people,11 from each ward and 20 representatives of organized groups Total =318-582 people county wide	11 Members	<i>Sub-County Peoples Forum – (bi-annually)</i> There shall be Sub-County Peoples Forum in each of the six Sub-Counties. This shall consist of eleven (11) persons elected from the Ward Development Committee members and 20 people nominated by the forum.
County Peoples Forum	1	1,000 people, 11 from each of the 60 Sub-Wards and 10 representatives of each of the organized groups and 140 government officials.	660 Members of Sub Ward Development Committees	The County Peoples Forum shall consist of: the 11 members from each Sub-Ward Development Committees,140 county government officers and participants in the forum shall nominate10 persons in each of the 20 organized groups to attend the forum; The forum will have the respective County government official(County Secretary)and a

				representative of the community will run as the secretariat. The County Peoples Forum shall be co-chaired by the County Budget and Economic Forum (CBEF) and a representative of the community. The Governor and the Deputy Governor shall also co-chair the forum. Other elected leaders at this level shall be in attendance. The forum shall convene once annually .
Grand Total Target Participants	3,488	355,734 to 357,918	55	

NB:

The following are the organized groups from which all nominations shall be done:

1. Kenya National Union of Teachers (KNUT)
2. Kenya Union of Post Primary Education Teachers (KUPPET)
3. Kenya Secondary School Head Teachers Association (KESSHA)
4. Kenya Primary School Head Teachers Association (KEPSHA)
5. Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organization (MYWO)
6. National Youth Council (NYC)
7. Established Community Based Organizations (CBOs)
8. Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KNCCI)-County Chapter representatives
9. Hawkers representatives
10. Faith Based Organizations (FBOs):
 - a) Roman Catholic Church representative;
 - b) National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK);
 - c) Makueni County Pastors Foundation;
 - d) Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM);
 - e) Hindu Council;
 - f) Sikh Council; and
 - g) African Religion and any other.
11. Farmers groups representatives
12. Bodaboda groups
13. Most Affected Persons (MAPS)
14. Professionals in the Diaspora
15. People with Special Needs (PWSN)
16. Children representative
17. Parents Teachers Associations (PTAs)
18. Town committees
19. Project Management Committee (PMC) representatives
20. Minority and marginalized groups.

NB: All the groups to be represented where applicable.

The Impact and Sustainability of the Public Participation Framework

- **Social Impact**

Public participation helps in alleviating social conflicts by bringing different stakeholders and interest groups. Investment in public participation helps minimize Both the number and magnitude of social conflict arising over the course of implementation of policies, laws and development plans.


- **Economic Impact**

An enlightened citizen will effectively participate in development process hence influence decision making process which will impact on their livelihoods.

Public Participation in Governance Structure




Appendix 8a: Problem Tree Analysis²⁰⁶



²⁰⁶ Source: Ward Administrator of the GoMC

Appendix 8b: Problem Tree (2 Pages) insert as



Appendix 9: Healthcare Priorities FY 2013/14 to FY 2016/17²⁰⁷

Financial Year	Priority/Focus	Projects/Programmes
ADP 2013/14	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maternal health • Construction and rehabilitation of health facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To build patient wards to enhance the county inpatient capacity • County medical training • County Mother & Child Health care • County referral services • Health infrastructure rehabilitation and improvement • County medical outreach • County specialized health Equipment & infrastructure
ADP 2014/15	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Maternal health • Construction and rehabilitation of health facilities • Providing curative and preventive health care • Preventing, controlling and eradicating non communicable diseases 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purchase of ambulances County • Construction & upgrading of rural health facilities • Maternal health promotion programme • Health facilities expansion • Purchase of medical equipment
ADP 2015/16	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • STI/HIV/AIDs, TB prevention and management • Control of communicable diseases Maternal • Maternal Health • Child Health • Reproductive Health • Health Facilities operationalization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Upgrade Makueni level 4 hospital to a County Referral Hospital (Level 5) Wote/Makueni • Rehabilitation and equipping of existing health facilities County wide • Reproductive Health Care Programme Countywide • HIV/Aids Awareness Programme Countywide 40 • Child immunization Programme Countywide • Up scaling Community strategy • Improve hospital infrastructure Countywide • Construction of Rehabilitation Centre in Makueni county hospital • Establishment, equipping and commissioning a renal unit in Makueni Level 4 hospital • Health care Financing • Establish mental health Facility • Waste management (Sewage treatment plants) County wide
ADP 2016/17	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff shortages and inefficiencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Staff shortages and inefficiencies • Improve access to specialist doctor's services • Use of technology to provide diagnostic advice from a central facility • Maintenance of existing facilities • Balancing the facilities in existence with adequate personnel • Invest in basic preventive healthcare • Invest in curative services

²⁰⁷ Source: GoMC

Appendix 10: Makueni Sub County PB initiated Healthcare Service Investments²⁰⁸

Project	Kind of Project	Ward	Status	FY	Budget
Renovation And Electricity Supply At Kikumini Dispensary	Renovation/Rehabilitation	Kikumini/Muvau	Ongoing	2013/14	-
Renovation And Painting At Kambi Mawe Dispensary	Renovation/Rehabilitation	Kikumini/Muvau	Complete	2013/14	-
Electricity Extension of Maternity And Incinerator Construction At Mutulani Dispensary	Expansion, Equiping & Operationalization	Kikumini/Muvau	Ongoing	2013/14	-
Renovating And Painting At Mumbuni Dispensary	Renovation/Rehabilitation	Kikumini/Muvau	Delayed	2013/14	-
Maau Eli Dispensary	New Facility	Kitise/Kithuki	Complete	2013/14	-
Upgrading Of Kiangini Dispensaries	Upgrade	Kathonzweni	Complete	2013/14	-
Kalima Dispensary	New Facility	Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba	Complete	2013/14	-
Kilili Dispensary	New Facility	Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba	Complete	2013/14	-
Kakutha Dispensary- Renovation and painting	Renovation/Rehabilitation	Mbitini	Ongoing	2013/14	-
Mbenuu Health Centre	New Facility	Mbitini	Complete	2013/14	-
Kavuthu Health Centre	New Facility	Mbitini	Complete	2013/14	-
Kathonzweni Health Centre-Facility Toilets and painting	New Facility	Kathonzweni	Complete	2013/14	200,000.00
Kwa Kalui Dispensary	New Facility	Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba	Complete	2013/14	500,000.00
Upgrading Of Mutini Dispensary	Upgrade	Kathonzweni	Complete	2013/14	750,000.00
Nzeeni Dispensary	New Facility	Nzaui/Kilili/Kalamba	Complete	2013/14	800,000.00
Upgrading Of Kwa Kavisi Dispensary	Upgrade	Kathonzweni	Ongoing	2013/14	1,500,000.00
Iiani Dispensary Maternity	Expansion, Equiping &	Mavindini	Complete	2013/14	1,800,000.00

²⁰⁸ Source: Makueni County Projects Monitoring System (Accessed on November 9, 2017 at <https://www.makueni.go.ke/projects/public/index.php>)

	Operationalization				0
Kwa Mutula((Kaliini) Dispensary-Laboratory	Expansion, Equiping & Operationalization	Mbitini	Complete	2013/14	2,000,000.00
Rehabilitation Of Mbuvo Dispensary	Renovation/Rehabilitation	Kathonzweni	New	2013/14	2,500,000.00
Water Tank Installation Incinerator Construction At Kitonyoni Dispensary	Expansion, Equiping & Operationalization	Kikumini/Muvau	Ongoing	2013/14	3,000,000.00
Yekanga Dispensary-toilet & laboratory	Expansion, Equiping & Operationalization	Mavindini	Complete	2013/14	3,000,000.00
Matiliku Hospital	New Facility	Nzau/Kilili/Kalamba	Complete	2013/14	3,077,620.00
Nziu H/Centre	New Facility	Wote	Complete	2013/14	4,000,000.00
Kyeeko Dispensary	New Facility	Nzau/Kilili/Kalamba	Complete	2013/14	4,000,000.00
Yinthungu Dispensary	New Facility	Kitise/Kithuki	Complete	2014/15	-
Kithuki Health Centre	New Facility	Kitise/Kithuki	Complete	2014/15	-
Kitise Health Centre-staff Quarters	Staff Quarters	Kitise/Kithuki	Complete	2014/15	-
Miangeni Dispensary Upgrading	Upgrade	Mavindini	Ongoing	2014/15	1,000,000.00
Mavindini Health Care	New Facility	Mavindini	Complete	2014/15	1,000,000.00
Rehabilitation Of Kathamboni Dispensary	Renovation/Rehabilitation	Kathonzweni	Delayed	2014/15	1,000,000.00
Upgrading Of Mutulani Dispensary	Upgrade	Kikumini/Muvau	Ongoing	2014/15	1,300,000.00
Kikumini Dispensary-expansion and equiping	Expansion, Equiping & Operationalization	Kikumini/Muvau	Complete	2014/15	1,500,000.00
Upgrading Of Kilisa Dispensary	Upgrade	Kikumini/Muvau	Complete	2014/15	1,500,000.00
Construction of Staff	Staff	Mavindini	Complete	2014/15	

House at Muusini Dispensary	Quarters				1,500,000.00
Upgrading Of Itumbule Dispensary	Upgrade	Kathonzweni	Complete	2014/15	1,700,000.00
Itumbule dispensary- staff house	Staff Quarters	Kathonzweni	Complete	2014/15	1,700,000.00
Kanthuni Dispensary	New Facility	Mavindini	Ongoing	2014/15	2,000,000.00
Mutyambua Dispensary	New Facility	Mbitini	Complete	2014/15	2,000,000.00
Upgrading Of Mbuvo Dispensary	Upgrade	Kathonzweni	Ongoing	2014/15	3,000,000.00
Kwa Mutula (Kaliini) Dispensary-Staff Quarters	Staff Quarters	Mbitini	Ongoing	2014/15	3,000,000.00
Matiliku Hospital	New Facility	Nzau/Kilili/Kalamba	Ongoing	2014/15	5,000,000.00
Kyase Dispensary	Staff Quarters	Kitise/Kithuki	Complete	2015/16	-
Yikiuuku Dispensary	New Facility	Kitise/Kithuki	Ongoing	2015/16	-
Mwania Dispensary	New Facility	Kitise/Kithuki	Delayed	2015/16	-
Kathonzweni Health Centre Maternity Wing	Expansion, Equiping & Operationalization	Kathonzweni	Ongoing	2015/16	1,000,000.00
Mungyani Dispensary	New Facility	Mbitini	Ongoing	2015/16	1,000,000.00
Nziu Health Centre-staff house	Staff Quarters	Wote	Ongoing	2015/16	2,000,000.00
Construction Of Mandoi Dispensaary	New Facility	Kikumini/Muvau	New	2015/16	2,000,000.00
Yemulwa Dispensary	New Facility	Mavindini	Ongoing	2015/16	2,000,000.00
Muusini Dispensary	New Facility	Mavindini	Ongoing	2015/16	2,000,000.00
Construction Of Ngomano Dispensary	New Facility	Kathonzweni	New	2015/16	2,000,000.00
Kawala Dispensary	New	Nzau/Kilili/	Ongoing	2015/16	

	Facility	Kalamba			2,000,000.00
Mbenuu Health Centre	New Facility	Mbitini	Complete	2015/16	2,500,000.00
Bosnia Dispensary- construction of new dispensary	New Facility	Wote	Ongoing	2015/16	4,000,000.00
Upgrading Kilili Dispensary To A Health Center	Upgrade	Nzau/Kilili/ Kalamba	Requisitioned	2015/16	4,000,000.00
Ng'oi/Kathaatu Dispensary	New Facility	Nzau/Kilili/ Kalamba	Ongoing	2015/16	4,000,000.00
Construction Of Maviaume Dispensary	New Facility	Nzau/Kilili/ Kalamba	Floated	2015/16	5,500,000.00
Construction Of Nduumoni Dispensary	New Facility	Nzau/Kilili/ Kalamba	Awaiting Contract	2016/17	-
Katulye Dispensary	New Facility	Nzau/Kilili/ Kalamba	New	2016/17	-
Staffing,Equiping And Upgrading Of Mumbuni Dispensary To A Healthy Center	Upgrade	Kikumini/M uvau	New	2016/17	2,000,000.00
Mathanguni Dispensary	New Facility	Nzau/Kilili/ Kalamba	Ongoing	2016/17	2,000,000.00
Construction Of Mbulutini Dispensary	New Facility	Mbitini	New	2016/17	2,500,000.00
Construction of Ivinga Nzia Dispensary Dispensary.	New Facility	Mavindini	Requisitioned	2016/17	4,000,000.00
Operationalization and equiping of West Ngosini Dispensary	Expansion, Equiping & Operationali zation	Kikumini/M uvau	Requisitioned	2016/17	4,500,000.00
Construction Of Dispensary At Kitikyumu	New Facility	Wote	Awaiting Contract	2016/17	5,500,000.00
Construction of Kathuma Dispensary	New Facility	Wote	Awaiting Contract	2016/17	5,500,000.00
Matheani Dispensary	New Facility	Kitise/Kithu ki	New	2016/17	5,500,000.00