

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

**THE ROLE OF AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE IN SECURING AFRICA:
CASE STUDY EAST AFRICA STANDBY FORCE**

JULIUS MUTHAMIA MINYORI

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SUPERVISOR

PROF, AMB. MARIA NZOMO

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DECLARATION

This my original research and has not been presented for either Diploma or Degree to any other university.

.....
Julius Muthamia Minyori

.....2018
Date

REG. No. R50/9976/2018

This Study has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor.

.....
Prof Maria Nzomo

.....2018
Date

(Director IDIS)

University of Nairobi

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
AU PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
ASF	African Standby Force
EASF	East African Standby Force
ESF	ECOWAS Standby Force
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African states
ECCAS	Economic community of central African states
EAC	East African Community
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on development
PSOD	Peace Support Operations Division
ACIRC	African Capacity for immediate response to crises
UN	United Nations
OAU	Organization of African Unity
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
UNPSIL	UN Integrated Peace building Office in Sierra Leone
AUC	African Union Commission
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
FIB	Force Intervention Brigade
FLS	Frontline States
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
NTM	Notice to Move
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
UNPOL	United Nations Police
REC	Regional Economic Community
RM	Regional Mechanism
EU	European Union
EASBRIGCOM	East African Standby Brigade Commission
EASFCOM	East Africa Standby Force Commission
EASBRIG	East Africa Standby Brigade
AFISM	African-led international mission to Mali
CADSP	Common African Defense and Security Policy
C3IS	Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems
MNJTF	Multi National Joint Task Force
HoSG	Heads of State and Government
PSO	Peace Support Operations
RDC	Rapid Deployment Capability
VN	Volunteer Nations
FOC	Full operational capability

PLANELM	Planning Elements
PSC	Peace and Security Council
MAPROBU	African Prevention and Protection Force in Burundi
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
MSC	Military Staff Committee
NATO	Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization
LRA	Lords Resistance Army
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
FOMUC	Force Multinationale du CentraleAfrique
MARAC	Central African Early Warning System
CDS	Chiefs of Defense Services
MICOPAX	Mission for the consolidation of Peace
COPAX	Peace and Security in Central Africa

ABSTRACT

The African continent has continued to experience diverse conflicts from the time the countries gained independence but the number of conflicts grew after the end of the cold war. At this point, after the genocide in Rwanda, Africa realized that the west was not keen to send peacekeeper or resolution experts to the continent. In other words Africa had ceased to be of strategic value to the west. This was what led to a re-evaluation of the utility of the OAU. It was decided at Sirte in Libya in 1998 that the OAU needed to be re-organized. Indeed the institution was reorganized to include a fully-fledged peace and security department with the mandate of managing peace and security in Africa. This led to the creation of structures that would ensure peace and security prevailed on the continent. However, despite the establishment of such mechanisms, Africa has continued to experience conflicts, some of which have become intractable.

Africa now seems at the verge of failure to manage its security despite the good intentions envisioned in the African peace and security architecture. The architecture establishes five pillars that should work together to mitigate insecurity and assure the continent viable peace. Among the more prominent pillars are the Peace and Security Council, the panel of the wise, the African Standby Force and the Continental Early Warning System. There is however lack of synergy on the function of the pillars that threaten delivery of the expected peace and security. This study evaluates the role of the African standby Force in securing Africa and concludes that the organ, as currently structured is in danger of failing as an AU instrument for peace enforcement but retains great value as a regional response mechanism. This will however depend on the nature of the relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs in regard to peace management. It will also depend on the level of development of ACIRC and how far the AUC is willing to support this development.

ASF success as a peace enforcement tool will further depend on the availability of funds as well as the political perception that follows military interventions. In this regard, the AU move from non-interference to non-indifference requires robust decision by the member states to cede a level of sovereignty to allow AU authorized interventions that do not have to revert to the problem states. Moreover, the existence of two enforcement mechanisms threatens to derail the entire force intervention initiative. It therefore remains uncertain as to whether the ASF can really play a crucial role in securing the continent. The fact that various regions are busy developing their own capacities for force intervention does not augur well for African collective security effort. It may however evolve into a robust framework where the regional forces collaborate using the various strengths within their capabilities to provide a continent-wide intervention infrastructure, as envisioned in the ASF protocol. This is yet to develop despite the force having been declared fully operational in 2015.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Background to the Research Problem

Africa has been steeped in violent conflicts for a long time and remains one of the most conflict prone regions in the world. Many of the conflict situations in Africa took place during the liberation wars but these were considered to be just wars because they sought to liberate the African from Colonial rule.¹ However, following independence, many African countries found themselves embroiled in internal conflicts but due to the bipolar nature of the world resulting from the cold war, these internal wars were never highlighted. At the end of the cold war where the USA emerged victorious in the ideological battle and democracy became one of the driving factors in international relations.² The USA then became obsessed with the idea of spreading its version of democracy across the world and it was assisted in this effort by the American media. Thus whereas previously many conflicts in Africa went unreported, the ubiquitous American media now had a free hand in highlighting the many problems affecting Africa.³

It can be argued that there were fewer conflicts during the cold war than after its collapse. The end of the cold war and the attendant increase in openness in the face of a globalizing world brought an end to old political affiliations and this radically shifted Africa's security paradigm in regard to the end of the cold war.⁴ Although the continent has made attempts to respond to emerging security threats, there are regional and

¹ Paul D. Williams ., *War and Conflict in africa, 2011*, Polity press, Cambridge Uk, p 35

² Francis Fukuyama., The end of history in Betts (ed) *Conflict after the cold war: Arguments on causes of war and peace*. Allyn and Bacon. Massachussets, 1994, p 16

³ Richard Betts., *Conflict after the cold war: Arguments on causes of war and peace*. Allyn and Bacon. Massachussets, 1994, p 35

⁴Hailu Solomon., A new start for African Security. *International Journal on World Peace Vol. XXVI No 4 December 2009*

international dynamics that have impeded effective conflicts resolution. This research sets out to investigate Africa's capacity in peace support to ensure that there is sustainable security in the continent.

Africa's attempts to engage with its own security issues date back to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Although the organization was not successful in its efforts to construct continental security architecture it managed some modicum of demonstrative action. In 1980 the OAU directly intervened in Chad and deployed 3,500 peacekeepers⁵. However, due to the ad hoc nature of the deployment, the mission was soon beset by problems in command and control and a mandate structure within which it could operate⁶. Despite these apparent failures the OAU continued its efforts at conflict management. For example in 1993, the organization set a department of conflict resolution management and prevention at the Cairo summit and committed it with the responsibility for mediation, reconciliation and arbitration of conflicts on the African continent. However it soon became evident that the organization lacked the institutional capacity to deal with the ever mutating and complex conflicts occurring on the continent especially after the cold war. OAU was simply not prepared to undertake the required institutional and policy shift that was needed to effectively address the conflicts.

Understandably, OAU member states understood the need to re-conceptualize African Security issues and since the organization is an organ of the member states, they endorsed the transformation of the OAU to the new African Union (AU). The new AU was anchored on the constitutive act of the African Union, which replaced the OAU

⁵Hailu Solomon., Op cit

⁶Mulikita,N.M et al (1998). "The Peacekeeping Profile of the Organization of the African Unity"
Peacekeeping and International Relations Vol 27 (6) p 12.

charter. The AU took over some of the OAU features but also developed new ones in line with its vision. These additions included the Pan African Parliament, the African Standby Force, A Peace and Security Council, Panel of the wise, A Peace Fund, A court System and a Continental Early Warning System.

One of the main objectives of the AU under the constitutive act is the promotion of peace and security on the continent. Article 4 of the constitutive act specifically provides for the right to intervene in member states pursuant to a decision of the assembly in regard to grave circumstances such as crimes against humanity and genocide⁷.

Indeed, the AU has been active in pursuit of its Peace and Security objectives. Theoretically, it has undertaken some crucial doctrinal and structural changes geared towards designing a coherent African multilateral security system, which can replace the former OAU traditional concerns with sovereignty and non-interference⁸. This construct is the African Peace and Security architecture, which consists of five pillars expected to work in a symbiotic manner to resolve conflicts on the continent. Practically however it would be a mistake to expect the new doctrinal and structural framework to work alone to deal with the expanded conflict crises involving complex multilateral tasks of rebuilding collapsed states, support weak ones and provide interventions in civil wars. The AU therefore needs to gain high-level political, operational and financial capacity in order to construct a comprehensive security structure covering the whole continent. As of now, the current contributions from member states are not enough to help Africa achieve its ambitions.

⁷ AU Constitutive Act Article 4 (h) and (j).

⁸Hailu Solomon 1998 *op cit*

On the political side, Africa is still not integrated enough. There are simmering rivalries, which create complex political and security problems. These rivalries are informed by economic as well as hegemonic desires, which is rather odd in a continent with inherent common incapacities⁹. Another issue affecting the African peace and security effort is the nature of alliances existing in the continent. The transnational alliances between warlords and unscrupulous western and eastern economic interests have contributed to the growth of conflicts in Africa.¹⁰ The plunder of African natural resources has led to a situation where conflicts become self-sustaining with repercussions felt across entire regions.¹¹ Moreover, globalization has ensured that Africa can no longer afford to remain in the global periphery and thus needs to open up. This includes opening up to investment, which has led to economic vulnerabilities of even the most stable nations due to perceptions of endemic conflicts on the continent. Thus if future investment in Africa are to be assured, then all African states have to regard security as indivisible and make contributions as well as sacrifices that will steer collective security requirements.

This therefore means that Africa needs to approach the issue of security from a common understanding. The AU has indeed become alive to this need and has taken steps to ensure that security is no longer perceived as a divisible concept but a concern for all.¹² Towards this goal has been the idea of ensuring that states respect their citizens and where they fail to do so, the AU can forcefully intervene to restore order and pre-empt human rights violations.

⁹Hailu Solomon op cit p 65.

¹⁰ Thomas M. Callaghy., *Africa and the World Political economy: More caught Between a Rock and Hard Place*, in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds), *Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux*. Westview Press, 2000,p 48.

¹¹ Ibid, pp 46-48

¹²AU Constitutive act op cit

These are however lofty aspirations and the AU has yet to demonstrate capacity and capability for effective implementation of its security specific objectives. Whereas there are mechanisms to address the problem, they remain largely at the mercy of political goodwill and hence aspirational.

One of the instruments at the disposal of the AU in responding to Peace and security situations in Africa is the African Stand By Force (ASF). The ASF is to be used along the other pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which envisages a graduated response to emerging crises with the ASF being the last option after all the other mechanisms such as Panel of the Wise have failed and conflict meeting the criteria stipulated in the constitutive act article 4(h) takes place.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The African continent has experienced persistent conflicts more than any other region since the end of the cold war. Despite various attempts to make the continent conflict free, the problem has continued to persist and seems to defy even the legal structures that have been established to deal with it.¹³The security problem in Africa is complicated because it is closely linked to the idea of sovereignty and the way states view internal and external security.¹⁴ The concept of sovereignty makes it difficult for states that have internal security problems to accept external interventions even when they clearly do not have the capacity to restore order within their countries.¹⁵The reluctance by problem states to allow assistance or help from especially the AU is a function of the complexities and uncertainties in the distinction between state security and regime

¹³ The AU Constitutive act

¹⁴ Khadiagala Gilbert, *Europe in Africa's Renewal* in John Hebranson and Donald Rothchild (eds) *Africa in World Politics; The African State System in Flux*. Westview Press, 2000. p 83. Oxford, United Kingdom

¹⁵ Barry Buzan, *People, states and Fear: An agenda for International Security Studies in the post-cold war era*. ECPR Classics, University of Essex UK 2009, p 234-235.

security and, the ambiguities in interpreting the military intentions of the intervening states that exists among African governments.¹⁶

African countries engulfed in internal violent conflict are often not willing to accept assistance from other African countries despite the existence of continental intervention framework to which they are signatories.¹⁷ This study seeks to establish why the African continent has continued to experience internecine violent conflicts despite the existence of a framework with the right tools for collective security, among them the coercive element of the African Standby Force. The African security problem therefore is compounded by the failure to effectively employ the ASF as a tool for conflict management when dealing with breaches of peace and security on the continent.

1.3 Research Questions

1. Why does Africa have difficulties in securing itself despite the available conflict intervention structures?
2. Is the African Standby Force the right tool for peace enforcement and other interventions?
3. What are the impediments to rapid deployment of the regional Standby Forces?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1. To analyze the Africa's preparedness in providing its own security
2. To Asses the African Standby Force Peace and Security enforcement capabilities

¹⁶Dokken Karin, *African Security politics redefined*. Palgrave Macmillan, New York New York. 2008. P.195.

¹⁷ AU Constitutive Act, AOU Charter

3. To establish the institutional capacity of RECs/RMs to intervene in conflicts within the continent.

1.5 Justification of the Research

This research is expected to identify the real reasons why Africa has failed to effectively use the available tools for conflict management. The ASF is one such organ that has not been able to deploy for conflict management. Despite regional blocks deploying forces under their own arrangements, so far none has been undertaken specifically under the banner of the ASF. Understanding the reasons why Africa has not been able to utilize its conflict management instruments and especially the ASF, will assist the regional as well as the continental policy makers in coming up with workable policies through which conflict can be better managed. This way, the ASF will cease to be seen as a white elephant and instead appreciated as a useful intervention tool in times of crises as earlier envisaged. The research will further establish the reasons why the AU has been sluggish and even ineffective in responding to security crises, yet it is the organ mandated with maintaining peace and security in the continent. This will provide new knowledge that can assist the African Union to formulate strategies that provide solutions to African problems.

1.6 Literature Review

Interstate wars in the African continent have declined greatly and since the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict in the 90s no major interstate war has been fought on the Africa. Jack levy observes however that, these types of wars may still occur in the international arena but the phenomenon of war is rapidly shifting from interstate conflicts to intra state

and terrorism informed conflicts¹⁸, which can easily lead to internal conflicts escalation. Conflicts within the state or outside of it by their very nature engender insecurity. Since security is a relational concept, which can only be understood in the context of the security interdependence in which it is embedded¹⁹, it becomes necessary to conceptualize the establishment of a suitable response mechanism through regional security relationships context. According to Buzan, this relationship is supposed to be sufficiently autonomous to offset the tendency to underplay the importance of regional organs in international affairs²⁰.

According to Horonaka²¹ the international system changed its behavior and new rules were established in 1945, which encouraged and supported the growth of new states many of them weak and barely viable, but largely susceptible to civil wars. The presence of such states presented the international community with myriad problems ranging from humanitarian disasters and entrenched conflict, which led to the development of the concept of peacekeeping²². According to Jackson, allowing every other state to join the international community was a recipe for trouble and would extend the resources available for peacekeeping. Moreover, failure to shepherd these 'ramshackle states' into juridical statehood would mean that the ensuing conflict would be borne by the international community.²³ Freedman on the other hand observes that to establish a secure and orderly world will make demands on the military forces ranging from

¹⁸ Jack Levy, *International Sources of interstate and Intrastate war*, in Chester Crocker et al (eds). *Leashing the Dogs of War; Conflict Management in a Divided World*. USIP., Washington, D.C. 2009, pp. 28-30.

¹⁹ Barry Buzan., *People, States and Fear, an agenda for international security studies in the post cold war era*, 2nd ed. ECPR press Classics, 2009. p 157.

²⁰ Ibid

²¹ Horonaka, in Jack Levy op.cit

²² Robert Jackson, *Quasi States*, Quoted in Levy Op cit. p 48

²³ Ibid.

provision of humanitarian interventions and maintenance of security against those who would want to disrupt such countries to securing the peace therein should the former fail²⁴. This observation has direct implications for sovereignty, which is a sensitive issue and breaching it is only envisaged in times of conflicts that are classified as genocide and crimes against humanity.²⁵

It seems that Africa is acutely aware of the implications for introducing the concept of non-indifference where before all peace and security activities on the continent were guided by non-interference.²⁶ This shift defined new relationships that the countries on the continent would adopt in regard to peace and security. According to Desmit and Hauck, the shift that was adopted during the transitioning of the OAU to AU led to a better conflict response structure within the continent as it birthed the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) that has since become the defining collective security response framework for the African Union.²⁷ The APSA comprises of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise (POW), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Peace Fund (PF). Among all the components, the AU PSC is the most powerful as it has the mandating authority for all the actions of the other organs, while the ASF has the enforcement mandate, meaning it is structured to forcefully intervene within the context of non-indifference. Whereas the APSA has been widely employed in conflict management, this

²⁴ Lawrence Freedman, *Using Force for Peace in the age of Terror*, in Chester Crocker et al op cit. pp. 245-251.

²⁵ Paul Williams, 2015, Op cit

²⁶ Ibid, pp 26-28

²⁷ Sophie Desmitt and Volker Hauck., *Conflict Management under the African Peace and Security architecture: Analysis of conflict prevention and conflict resolution interventions by the African Union and Regional Economic Communities in violent conflicts in Africa for the years 2013-2015. ECDPM Discussion Paper no 211 April 2017*

has been largely for the instruments that utilize diplomacy more than coercion.²⁸

It would therefore follow that African Union identified core deficiencies in the provision of security in the continent when it decided to establish the African Standby Force (ASF). This could have been informed by the hitherto lackluster support the continent was receiving from the United Nations. The rationale provided by the founding documents seems to indicate that the ASF was needed for Africa to resolve own problems in the context of African solutions to African problems²⁹. It is surprising that not much reference is made to the most humiliating and devastating conflicts in Africa such as the Rwanda conflict, which would have assisted in formulating a proactive operational concept for the ASF. Although the scenarios envisaged by the ASF deployment concept are clear on what constitutes a requirement for intervention, anchoring the same in the constitutive act would have probably emboldened the continental conflict management framework and thus facilitated a faster operationalization. As Freedman notes, it seems that AU is still expecting help from the former colonizers, but there are no imperatives for the west to intervene in the continent especially after the end of the cold war³⁰. In fact, where the west has been involved, it's only France, which has acted to save situations in its former colonies. It's probably this dependence on the external support for conflict management in Africa that has informed the current status of the ASF as the AU feels no pressure to deliver a Force that can be used for interventions in the continent as previously envisaged.

In other words Africa is on its own - yet beholden to the west in managing its conflicts. This sounds anachronistic but such is the reality and may not help in the final

²⁸ Ibid

²⁹ AU Constitutive Act.

³⁰ Freedman. Op. cit.

desire to realize a functional ASF. This problem is buttressed by the response Africa gets whenever a state in the continent gets engulfed in conflict. Sometimes one wonders what would happen were it not for the international media pressure that bears down on the western countries and thus elicits response. Maybe the best Africa would expect without such media influence would be the travel warnings and the airlifts of expatriates working in the conflict zones³¹.

The establishment of the ASF is therefore a good thing as it promises to provide the continent with a mechanism in which it can forcefully respond to a multitude of crises. According to the ASF Peace Support operations doctrine manual, the AU envisions a continent united in acting to prevent conflict and the ASF is the tool of choice for realization of this vision along with the other pillars of the APSA. Operationalization of the ASF is therefore key to the vision and the sooner it becomes deployable the better³².

According to the same doctrine manual, the success of the ASF is seen to be located in the involvement of the regional organizations. The capacity of the organizations to provide the required capability is seen as a critical enabler in the progress towards achieving operational capability for their regionally domiciled brigades. The capabilities expected are supposed to be in line with the UN and AU standards but this has fallen into problems, as the regional mechanisms and economic communities have adopted different models especially with regard to command and control³³. The ASF is further challenged by the very nature of interventions. According to Freedman, interventions can create new interests as the intervening States and sponsoring

³¹ Robinson, *CNN Effect in Chester Crocker* et al (eds). *Managing Global Chaos: Sources and Responses to International Conflict*. United States Institute of Peace Press. Washington D.C, 2007. pp. 239-240.

³² ASF Doctrine, p 70

³³EASF Deployment Concept Manual 2014, p 14

multilateral organizations compete for glory. When the intervention fails, there will be blame games but when success is realized every organization wants to take the credit³⁴. No one wants to be associated with failure but all want glory, which if well managed can be attributed to the organization as collective contribution rather than one state show.

The ASF operates under the concept of collective security as defined in the UN charter and the AU constitutive act. Regional and sub-regional organizations should therefore support the success of the ASF. However this has not happened and the Force has been struggling to meet its objectives. Despite being declared fully operational after an exercise code named AMANI AFRICA II, the ASF has yet to show tangible results. Although the regional states are able to see the onset of crises and report the same to the AU, the authorization structure in the UN and the AU has hampered the utilization of the ASF as expected³⁵. The combinations of UN and AU political imperatives have worked together to slow down the impact of the ASF on ground.

There are doubts as to whether Africa is a security community or a security complex, a situation that makes collective security difficult. Under a security complex, Africa security would be considered holistically whereby infringements in one state would be seen to affect all the other states on the continent³⁶. A classification of this nature would thus allow collective action to take place and probably help in conflict mitigation as well as reduce the ever-present suspicions between states. This would allow the employment of conflict management tools that have regional rather than global application despite the role of the United Nations in peace and security management.

³⁴Freedman, op cit.

³⁵ UN Charter Chapter VI

³⁶Buzan Op cit. p 36

It is probably in this regard that Glennon has dismissed the UN Charter as tool for provision of security³⁷. It does not however mean that the UN charter is completely incapable of being used especially if the concept of subsidiarity is considered when dealing with regionalized conflicts. Ruggie, a renowned multilateralist, on the other hand opines that the UN is lacking in capacity to save the world from the scourge of war³⁸. Could it then be possible that the AU is biting more than it could chew? If even the UN remains challenged, what's the probability of AU succeeding in establishing what essentially defeated the UN? The answers to these questions remain in the realm of being able to conceptualize collective security in the continent, underpinned by regional cooperation and integration. Collective security holds the promise of joint action and response should there be a case of crisis in a region. Regional cooperation devoid of competition has more potential than individual state action when responding to complex crises. According to Goodby, had the European Union acted together during the Yugoslavia crisis, the situation might have been different but by coming together late, atrocities occurred³⁹. He notes that collective security is based on enforceable broad international rules of behavior, legitimate enforcement action and commanded by multinational coalitions⁴⁰. Collective security also has the benefits of reducing the expected transactional costs associated with military deployments. The AU is greatly incapacitated in terms of finances as will be seen in the ensuing discussion⁴¹. The ASF suffers from these impediments as observed above due to the nature of the relationship

³⁷ Michael Glennon quoted in Edward Newman., *Global Institutions; A Crises of Global Institutions? Multilateralism and international Security*. Routledge, London and New york. p.43

³⁸ Ruggie John, quoted in Jamse Goodby., *Can Collective Security Work? Reflections on the European Case*, in Chester Crocker et al, 2007 (Eds) p 239.

³⁹ Goodby James., *Can Collective Security Work? Reflections on the European Case*, in Chester Crocker et al, 2007 (Eds) p 239.

⁴⁰ Ibid

⁴¹ Hailu Solomon., Opcit

between the UA and the regional organizations under which the brigades emanate.

The AU has enlarged the mandate of the ASF despite objections from member countries, Kenya included.⁴² The expanded mandate has seen the inclusion of functions such as terrorism, drug trafficking, and action against criminal activity. This move is probably made to attract funding from the donor countries but has the potential of derailing the ASF from its initial vision, besides making the AU view the ASF as tool with which to respond to every imaginable crisis. This will make the ASF too unwieldy for effective employment. Although the realm of peacekeeping may entail all manner of crises, objectivity of deployment must be maintained⁴³. Thus having a utility force with which to undertake peacekeeping operations in good time is a good thing

Despite the good intentions, ASF has never deployed despite several crises breaking out in Africa during its existence. In 2013 the AU general assembly authorized the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) as stopgap measure because operationalization of the ASF was taking too long⁴⁴. This initiative ran into problems especially when hegemonic competition between South Africa and Nigeria manifested at the technical committee level going all the way to the summit. Whereas this was supposed to give Africa the needed rapid response mechanism, it soon became another avenue for competition. Walter Lotze has argued that ACIRC was useful in that it helped to nudge the ASF from perpetual slumber.⁴⁵ Since the ACIRC was based on the concept of volunteering African nations, then it was expected that the regional dynamics would not impede its operationalization.

⁴² Author observation as the Kenya Representative at the ASF Full operational capability after action review in Maputo, 16 – 21 Januray 2016

⁴³ Brian Urquhart, *Limits of the use of force*, in Chester Crocker et al (eds) 2009,p 268.

⁴⁴Summit Decision 2013 XV.Available online at www.peaceau.org.

⁴⁵ Walter Lotze in Kuwali and Viljoen 2015,op cit p 247

The mandating authority of this new construct was also different from that of ASF. Whereas the ASF needed the authority of the Assembly, ACIRC only required authority from the AUPSC. This would make a huge difference in response time if only the volunteer countries could actually provide the capabilities as pledged. As Lotze notes, the capabilities pledged were mere pretensions and the so-called volunteer nations soon reverted to requesting the European Union for support. Derso has observed that although the life of ACIRC has become contentious and the issue of when it shall fold and join the ASF remains unresolved, it was initially a good idea⁴⁶. This disconnect will continue to mean that deployment of a force to respond to crises in the continent still remains a mirage. Furthermore, this means that ASF will continue to have challenges in its attempts to provide the continent with a robust multi disciplinary force for use in African conflicts.

Other scholars have noted the nature of the African conflicts is such that territorial disputes, civil wars and externally instigated rebellions still remain observable.⁴⁷ This threatens regional peace and security and may require continent wide responses, especially military responses executed by well trained soldiers deployed to intervene in conflict zones while politicians seek for political solutions in regional and sub regional organizations⁴⁸. As Deane-Peter and Maeresera observe, sub regional responses to conflict by a member state requires a synchronized political and military procedures⁴⁹. These procedures can only be synchronized under an institutional framework vested with a legal mandate and supervised by recognized organs.

This is probably what is lacking in the AU mandating system and may be what

⁴⁶Solomon Derso., *The Role and place of the African Standby Force in the African Peace and Security Architecture*, ISS, Pretoria. 20

⁴⁷, Mugisha and Muttawa 2015 in Kuwali and Viljoen 2015 op cit pp 174-178

⁴⁸ Deane-Peter Baker and Sadiki Maeresera., *Africa Security Review Vol 18, No 1 2009 pp107-110*

⁴⁹ *ibid*

requires assessment with a view to establishing a better collaboration mechanism, which ensures that once a mandate has been given, the tools for execution will not be impeded in any way. Moreover, this would meet and even reinforce the Peace and Security Council, which according to the constitutive act article 5(2), has a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflicts and crises situations in Africa.

The AU and its predecessor organization (OAU) perspective on security has remained state-centric and is often explained in terms of territorial integrity, state survival, self help and the protection of the ruling elites. This is a largely realist view of security and thus at the center of the collective security problem⁵⁰. Moreover, security in Africa is still organized as a mitigation of threats emanating externally even though the situation has changed and the majority of threats currently emanate from within the states. According to the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, Sub-Saharan Africa remains with the most 'high-intensity' level conflicts with 14 of a total of 38 conflicts globally in the category of intra state violence.⁵¹ This demonstrates that conflicts have been moving from purely interstate to intrastate and hence a need to establish elaborate responses that transcend the traditional conflict management methods. According to Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), most conflicts in Africa have proven difficult to manage because of the level of political involvement of the parties and the leverage such parties may have with African leaders.⁵² Thus the continent relies heavily on the instruments of diplomacy when dealing with conflicts and has to a large extent been

⁵⁰ Samuel Makinda and Wafula Okumu, Op Cit. p 77.

⁵¹ Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). 2016. *Heidelberg Conflict Barometer 2015*. February 2016

⁵² Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Conflict Trends (No. 45). *Real-time Analysis of African Political Violence*. January 2016

reluctant to use the enforcement mechanism, especially the use of force.⁵³ However, there are instances when the AU has either authorized the use of military force or has looked the other way as the regional communities and mechanisms have acted to manage security within their own members.

The use of the military to respond to internal crises in many of the African states has not helped matters. It could even be a considerable contributor to the difficult experienced by the AU in providing continental security.⁵⁴ The AU article 4 (h), which is at the center of collective security and hence should provide the interventionary mechanism, is both a hope and a contradiction. Whereas it allows for interventions in situation of gross violations of human rights and also in instances of crimes against humanity, it also recognizes the concepts of sovereign equality and interdependence, the respect of existing borders of states. This smacks of a bygone era in which impunity ruled because heads of state were able to default to inviolability of borders and state sovereignty⁵⁵. Despite the articulation in Article 4 (h) that AU member states are allowed to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision by the assembly whenever it has been determined that there are grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crime against humanity, actual interventions have remained a mirage⁵⁶. Although article 4 (j) allows states to request the AU to intervene in order to restore peace and security, no state has invoked this clause to date. Thus the AU seems to have created the right language and probably even inculcated the intent for durable peace and security but challenges still remain.

⁵³ Ibid,

⁵⁴ Mr Bam Sivuyile, Head of Peace Support Operations, Speech at the ASF after action review in Maputo cited in Darkwa, *The African Standby Force: The African Union tool for the maintenance of peace and security*, *Contemporary policy*, 38:3, 471-482

⁵⁵ Ibid, p 38

⁵⁶ AU Constitutive Act, article 4 (h) and (j) op cit

Africa seems to be pursuing a policy of self-pacification. As Mazrui notes in his *Pax Africana* concept, this is what may be needed to assure the continent of usable mechanisms that can bring about such ideas⁵⁷. Makinda and Okumu on the other hand have pointed out that *Pax Africana* is observed more in breach than observance because Africa is still afflicted by political, economic, ideological and financial problems as well as differences of opinion for effective concert in the security sector⁵⁸. The AU is therefore expected to change member states attitudes towards peace and security but finds itself on a limb due to the fact that member states act in a self-preserving way while alluding to regional security integration. Thus a gap on intent and actualization remains a mirage. There is currently no literature that directly addresses why Africa seems to be heavy on peace and security rhetoric and light on actual performance. Diehl however notes that the AU has been engaged in many peace efforts but largely in mediation and not direct military interventions. Where attempts have been made to engage militarily, the results have been mixed in terms of success and failure.⁵⁹ In most of internal AU literature, there is a tendency to praise the achievements made so far but in reality, most of the claims are really what the RECs/RMs have been able to do.⁶⁰ The AU itself is still not able to deploy an enforcement mechanism anywhere on the continent.⁶¹

There are several reasons for increased emphasis on regional conflict management. A new paradigm towards security is needed especially in Africa due to the

⁵⁷ Ali Mazrui, *Towards PaxAfricana: A study of ideology and Ambition*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967. pp 3-20

⁵⁸ Samuel Makinda and Wafula Okumu op cit. p 78

⁵⁹ Paul Diehl, *New roles for regional organizations*, in Chester Crocker et al (eds), *Leashing the dogs of war: Conflict management in a divided world*. USIP, Washington. 2009. p 538.

⁶⁰Desmit and Hauck op cit,p 11

⁶¹Desmit and Hauck,opcit, p, 13

itinerant crises prevailing in the continent⁶². The demand for conflict management has further increased in Africa because most of the major threats to peace and security are evidenced by armed conflicts and not other security issues that daily affect the African person. As observed above, the effects of conflict in one country can have very adverse effects in another.

Migration and refugees from one state to a neighbouring one has the potential to engender tensions in areas that range from environmental to political contests. Again, due to the African continent demographics, the possibility of intra-state conflicts becoming internationalized becomes greater where ethnic groups straddle state boundaries. No mechanisms exist in regard as to how such problems can be addressed. Since the international system functions on the basis of anarchy, states seek to secure themselves from external threats and internal ones as well. In seeking security for themselves, as Buzan observes, states can easily threaten the power aspirations of other states⁶³. In this regard, where there is evidence of human rights violations in pretext of internal security operations, and the spillover effects are adverse to neighbouring states, or the responses are contrary to AU constitutive act article 4(h), the AU is obligated to intervene. There is still scant literature on the appropriate responses in the event that a member states rejects a duly authorized intervention under article 4(h). Alghali and Mamadou opine that the reason for the establishment of the ASF and the need for expedited operationalization were so that the AU could have a ready tool for enforcement where other methods failed⁶⁴. Collective security is therefore well envisaged in the AU concept of continental

⁶²Paul Diehl Ibid.

⁶³Barry Buzan Op cit. p 235.

⁶⁴Alghali and Mamadou., The African Standby Force and Regional Standby Brigades; *Conflict Trends*, Volume 2008, Issue 3, Jan 2008, p 34-38.

security and some scholars such as Alghali and Mamadou 2008⁶⁵, Kuwali 2014⁶⁶ have argued that indeed there is real hope for a paradigm shift in African security with the full implementation of the constitutive act.

Although article 4 seems to downplay the concept of sovereignty, it really does not denounce it altogether. The fact that the assembly must authorize all interventions means that States retain the final say on whether an intervention can take place or not⁶⁷. There is no literature looking deeply into the implications for giving the assembly of the union final say on the need for interventions. This literature gap has left the member states with the prerogative of rejecting any military type interventions and even categorizing them as foreign occupation forces. Some scholars (Semkange 2002, Mepham and Ramsbotham 2007)⁶⁸ have posited that the concept of sovereignty should not hinder interventions where grave circumstances exist. This is well and good but as experience has shown, where a government exists, and has some control over its own military, external interventions are difficult if not outright impossible. Kioko observes that heads of state form kind of a club where they protect each other and this makes the implementation of article 4 a fiction and largely dependent on individual idiosyncrasies⁶⁹. It would appear that political survival and diplomatic etiquette drives decisions made by the heads of state at their summits.

The AU therefore has a clearly demonstrated intent to provide security for the entire continent and has indeed made the provisions within the legal framework for

⁶⁵ Ibid

⁶⁶ Dan Kuwali, *The Rationale for Article 4(h)*, in Kuwali and Viljoen (eds), *Africa and the Responsibility to Protect, Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive Act*. Routledge, 2014. London and New York.

⁶⁷ Kioko, 'The right of intervention under the African Union Constitutive act: From non-interference to non-intervention', *International Review of the Red Cross*, 2003. p 807-824.

⁶⁸ Cited in Dan Kuwali and Viljoen (eds), *op cit*, p 17

⁶⁹ Kioko, *ibid*.

actualization of this objective. However, there is a disconnect between the stated objective and the implementation mechanism. The AU constitutive act is well meaning and has established the linkages and tools needed for effective security provision in Africa. What is lacking however is a powerful implementation mechanism that can forcefully intervene in times of grave circumstances as envisaged in the constitutive act article 4(h). Moreover, the literature does not explain how the AU should react when the forceful deployment is rejected due to political interference. This study seeks to fill this gap by explaining the reasons behind the inability by the AU to deploy the ASF as a collective security tool, and why the regional standby forces act without mandate from the PSC or the AU summit.

1.7 Theoretical Framework

This research problem can be explained by collective security theory and its role in determining how international and regional organizations provide security to member states. African security issues are well articulated in the founding instruments of the OAU and currently the AU. The AU constitutive act Article 4(h) and (j) identifies circumstances when the continent may consider collective action in order to restore peace and security in a member state. Indeed it envisages situations where not even the sovereignty of the state would be sacrosanct. In this regard, the AU acts under an institutional framework in executing its peace and security objectives and has several tools that it can employ to this end.

Collective security rests on regulated, institutionalized balancing based on the idea of all against one that can provide stability in the global arena than the unregulated

self-help balancing predicated on the notion of each for his/her own.⁷⁰ Thus institutions such as the AU and the UN can mobilize the international community to act in a collective effort when international peace and security are threatened.

In other words, collective security provides collectivized defence without creating a collective defence construct.⁷¹ Although international institutions cannot transform anarchy, they have the potential to change state behavior by influencing the character of states in the international environment by making it clear that a threat to security in one state will be seen as a threat to other states as well.⁷² International institutions do this by using several methods that create incentives for cooperation like favorable trade status, financial aid or through disincentives like sanctions⁷³. Thus collective security refers to policies that are authorized and conducted by the international community and intended to deal with threats to international peace and security.⁷⁴ The target of collective security was initially the rogue states that display aggressive behavior against weak neighbors. According to Inis Claude, the notion of collective security is located in the conceptual space between anarchy and state sovereignty and the ideas of world government.⁷⁵ In this regard, collective security theory applies to those incidences that require collective action, and where problem states may not be willing to accept external intervention. It can be invoked whenever there is a threat to international peace and security and thus does not matter whether the threat emanates externally or internally. This calls for

⁷⁰ Charles A Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan., The Promise of Collective security in Micheal E. Brown etal (eds) *Theories of War and Peace; an international security reader*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1986, p 397.

⁷¹ Martin Wight., op cit,p 22

⁷² Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss (eds)., *Collective Conflict Management and changing world politics*. State University of New York press, Albany. 1998, p 7.

⁷³Navari Cornelia.,*Liberalisms* in Paul D. Williams (eds), *Security Studies: An Introduction*.Routledge, London and New York 2013, pp 32-46.

⁷⁴Butfoy op cit

⁷⁵Inis Claude., Cited in Butfoy op cit.

cooperation between states, which means that states accept a level of supranationalism,⁷⁶ in effect ceding a level of sovereignty to an institutional framework, which then coordinates the collective security effort.

This theory is useful because it addresses the relationship of cooperation between states in a world of egoists without a central authority.⁷⁷ In other words it allows us to look and assess the nature of interaction within an integrated organization and answers the question of why states choose to remain within international organizations and how security can be managed collectively. Axelrod advances the argument that when there is continuous interaction between egoistic elites prosecuting different agenda, a level of trust eventually develops which allows them to work together for the common good⁷⁸. In other words, the ruling elites decide the level of sovereignty they wish to cede to the international organization for the purposes of managing security among them. The theory explains that states cooperate because they feel more re-assured collectively than when acting alone.⁷⁹

States hence hesitate to abandon the organization due to fear of the unknown ahead⁸⁰. This can be explained in terms of shared transaction costs, which include the cost of information, costs of measuring the attributes of what is being exchanged and how valuable these are, the costs of protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements⁸¹. When states consider the costs involved in unitary action versus collective action, they opt for collectivity despite the constraints this imposes on states because institutions reduce the transaction costs involved in rule making, enforcement, negotiation,

⁷⁶Lepgold and Weiss, op cit p 21

⁷⁷ Robert Axelrod.,*The evolution of cooperation*, 1984. New York, Basic books.p 147

⁷⁸ Robert Axelrod, op cit

⁷⁹Lepgold and Weiss, op cit, pp 7-11.

⁸⁰Axelrod, Ibid.

⁸¹ North Douglass.,*Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfomance*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1990.p 27

information gathering and even in conflict resolution. Thus institutions emerge and survive because they serve to maximize the exogenously determined interests and preferences of their members through collectivization of the very costs that would have accrued to a lone actor.

The advantage of collective security is that it provides effective balancing against aggressors while promoting trust and cooperation among the members of the international or regional organizations.⁸² Thus collective security theory, with its emphasis on the role of promoting collective interests through cooperation policies that are internationally acceptable is useful in analyzing and explaining how Africa can work through the AU to effectively manage conflict on the continent.⁸³

1.8 Hypotheses

1. The African Union is well prepared to respond to violent conflicts that result from political differences in the continent.
2. The African Standby Force does not have the requisite capabilities to enforce peace and security in the continent
3. The regional economic communities and mechanisms remain a major impediment to the employment of regional standby forces for peace and security in Africa.

1.9 Research Methodology

This research will largely depend on work already existing in this area. Thus a qualitative approach is appropriate. A close analysis of the AU founding documents, seminar presentations as well as APSA documents and personal experience will be used

⁸² Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan, op cit p 399.

⁸³ Moravcsik Andrew., *Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific Assessment*. Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2001. pp 67-9

to explain and predict the effectiveness of the ASF in African conflicts. Limited interviews with key informants and participants in African Union led peace support operations as well as managers of security in the continent will be used to bring out practical lessons on the state of AU capacity and capability to respond to crises. This means that most of the research will rely on secondary data, however by primary data obtained by the researcher as direct participant within the AU Military Staff Committee member as well as Liaison officer with a regional mechanism will be added. Due to the various locations and the schedule of the key informants who are based at the AU headquarters, email questionnaires and telephone interviews will be used. Finally an analysis of the data collected will be done to bring out the answers to the above questions.

1.10 Research Design.

This research will adopt a case study research design where the East African Standby Force (EASF) will be the unit of analysis. Limited interviews with selected members of the EASF as well as AU staff will be conducted. Moreover this will be supported by observations made by the researcher from participating in the ASF operationalization process. Case studies in social science research are quite advantageous as they allow researchers to examine a particular area and use it as a representation of the situation of a greater area. In this research, the study of the EASF will be representative of the greater ASF concerning the whole situation of conflict management. Moreover, the case study method is increasingly being used and there is growing confidence in the case study as a rigorous strategy in its own right and in any case, this method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.

1.11 Scope and Limits of the Research

This research will be limited by constraints in time and money. Whereas it would have been more beneficial to travel to the various RECs/ RMs and the AU headquarters to collect data on the deployability of the ASF as well as on the effectiveness of other APSA pillars, this cannot be possible and the researcher will have to make do with telephone and email interviews, which suffer from credibility as it is not clear who may be at the other end of the line. Time is a further constraint, as this research has to be conducted under National Defence college guidelines, which means one has to manage extra workload, thus leaving little time for conducting the research.

1.12 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Background to the Study

Chapter Two: The Capability of African Union to provide security.

Chapter Three: African Standby Force Peace and Security enforcement capabilities

Chapter Four: Institutional capacity of regional standby forces to intervene in conflicts.

Chapter Five: Data analysis and Findings

Chapter Six: Conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

THE CAPABILITY OF THE AFRICAN UNION TO PROVIDE SECURITY

2.1 Introduction

The African Union (AU) is the regional institution that represents the aspirations of Africa after the demise of the OAU. But what is a regional institution and what defines the security component within the institution or in other words, what's the role of such institutions in ensuring security for its members? What really is the difference between the United Nations and the African Union when it comes to understanding of what security is all about? Although both espouse collective security as a key concept towards peace and security, they vary largely in terms of capacity and institutional reach. The UN has more resources and authority when it comes to Peace and security making it more responsible than the AU. However, under the subsidiarity concept, the AU is obligated to highlight breaches of security in its areas of jurisdiction and propose to the UN the best ways of responding.⁸⁴ Thus both the AU and UN operate under an institutional framework that seeks to maximize resources in a collective effort to manage international security.

According to Keohane, institutions refer to formal organizations with 'prescribed hierarchies and capacity for purposive action' and international regimes with complexes of rules and organizations, the core element of which have been negotiated and explicitly agreed upon by states.⁸⁵ Regional institutions are therefore a combination of organizations and regimes comprising membership, which is geographically delimited in

⁸⁴ James Cocayne, "The futility of force? Strategic lessons for dealing with unconventional armed groups from the UN's war on Haiti's gangs," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 37, no.5(2014): pp 765-766.

⁸⁵Keohane Robert., 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(4): 379-96.

some way and may or may not have border contiguity.⁸⁶ They also operate under agreed rules explicitly written and ascended to by member states such that the agreements constitute legal responsibility.⁸⁷ Hedley Bull applies a slightly different terminology referring to the importance of rules and institutions in international society where rules are general principles, which require or authorize prescribed group to behave in certain prescribed ways.⁸⁸ The African Union therefore qualifies as a regional institutional because it comprises membership of states and these states are situated within the African continent, meaning that they impact each other by virtue of contiguity of boundaries. Secondly, the African Union functions under an agreed organizational regime in the embodiment of the constitutive act, which defines the nature of relations and interactions between the member states.

Although the idea of collective security management can be encompassing, as indeed demonstrated by the tendency to focus on formal rather than informal security based institutions, it is important to keep in mind that even informal institutions have become increasingly involved in security affairs especially at the regional level.⁸⁹ For example, we often witness ad hoc groups of states coming together to provide security while negotiating for spinoff benefits that are possible for playing such a role. A demonstration of such effect is seen in the case of East Timor or closer home in the role played by South Africa in the South Sudan peace Process following the attempted coup of 2013, when South Africa tried to create a coalition of Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to revive the inter Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement Dialogue

⁸⁶ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. Boston: Little Brown, 1977. p 19.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, p 54.

⁸⁹ Hettne Bjorn., *The new Regionalism Revisited*, in Frederick Soderbaum and Timothy Shaw(eds.), *Theories of New Regionalism*. London: Palgrave 2004, pp 22-42.

in Arusha. This despite the efforts made by IGAD in trying to resolve the conflict in South Sudan showed that no problem is isolated by geography alone.

The security dimension of regional institutions role in the management of security on the other hand can be understood variously. Drawing on the definition of security that incorporates a wide range of threats it is easy to see why every regional organization has some security component within its structure.⁹⁰ Thus if states agree to institutional requirements, they remain the sole players and gatekeepers in regional security, and assuming that such association of states is voluntary, any attempt to promote cooperative and more predictable relations among states may be seen as a step towards a more secure community.⁹¹ Moreover, institutions are not some temporary arrangements that change when power shifts or when interests vary. As observed above institutions are the rules and norms and should not be confused with agreements. According to Jervis, institutions imply norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation but are themselves a form of cooperation that rise above the short-term self-interests of the members.⁹²

On a narrower scale, a regional security institution can be seen as an organization whose charter or other founding document contains some explicit reference to security provision by member states.⁹³ In other words, there exists a formal mechanism within the organization detailing how conflict and its consequences are to be dealt with. Such a mechanism would include, in a typical construct, the coordination of defence, security,

⁹⁰Buzan Barry, *People States and Fear; An Agenda for Security Studies in the Post Cold war era*, 2nd Ed. ECPR Press classics. University of Essex, UK, 2007, p124.

⁹¹ Adler, Emmanuel and Michael Barnett (eds.), *Security communities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. London and New York 1998. p 243

⁹² Robert Jervis, *Security Regimes in Stephen Krasner (ed), International regimes*, Cornell University Press, 1995, p 3.

⁹³ African Union Constitutive Act, 2002.

and foreign policy at some level.⁹⁴ The distinction between the two definitions remains fuzzy however because the vision most people have about security among states and even between states revolves around military operations and peacekeeping. We therefore need to expand this conceptualization and adopt a deeper meaning that will enable further analysis especially in the face of emerging threats and conflicts both within and without the states. This is even more critical because security operations involve civilians as well as military functionaries who need to work together but have differing views on the concept. It is probably due to defined roles for the civilian and the military in as far as state survival is concerned that has brought about the differences in understanding, especially the difference in how either cohort understands the meaning of state sovereignty. Whereas state sovereignty is a non-negotiable concept for the military, it may not be such a serious issue to the non-informed civilian.

Since the peace of Westphalia of 1648, when state sovereignty became the undergirding principle in interstate discourse, it has remained one of the most valued and protected concepts in international relations. The ‘Westphalian’ model of interstate relations views the state as the principal actor and accepts that states will almost invariably act in ways that best preserve their independence and territorial integrity.⁹⁵ This view allows states to believe that they have equal rights when it comes to issues concerning the conduct of a particular matter within the confines of its boundaries. Although well aware that states are very different in terms of capabilities and various capacities, all states are proud of the inherent freedom to play ‘boss’ within their territories and sometimes they use this freedom to violate the rights of their citizens.

⁹⁴Fawcett Louise., *Regional Institutions*, in Paul D Williams (ed.), *Security Studies: An Introduction*, 2ndEd. Routledge London and New York, 2013, p 359.

⁹⁵ Edward Newman., *A crisis of Global Institutions? Multilateralism and International Security*. Routledge Global Institutions, Manchester, UK. 2008, p 14.

Nowhere else is this more apparent than within the African continent where human rights violations continue to be the order of the day with very little response from the regional organizations such as the African Union despite the existence of elaborate legal frameworks to ensure that peace and security are achieved in the continent.⁹⁶ This has tended to restrict the provision of security to the internal responses of states, sometimes rendering the efforts of collective security ineffective.

Whereas the understanding of security has been widened and broadened and the role of the regional institution increased, the focus should be on what is measurable in terms of prevention, resolution or mitigation and post conflict reconstruction.⁹⁷ These factors must be anchored in any security regime expected to function effectively within an organizational framework. There are two main types of institutions that can be said to have acquired claims to a role in security management within their regions. These are multipurpose institutions like AU, Organization of American States (OAS) and the League of Arab States and Security alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and single purpose ones such as Intergovernmental Authority on Draught (IGAD) and the East Africa Community (EAC) which are regional mechanism and regional economic communities respectively.⁹⁸ It follows therefore that not all regional economic institution have developed security provision and not all regional security institutions are economic blocks. However, as Haas observes, there are spillover effects on both types of institutions.⁹⁹ These effects may be positive or negative or even in between, which makes affected states seek the intervention of the regional institutions to

⁹⁶ AU Constitutive Act, 2002, article 4(h)

⁹⁷ *Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in African Union Instruments relating to Peace and Security*. African Union 2014, p 91.

⁹⁸ Grant A. and Soderbaum F. (ed) *Introduction: The new Regionalism in Africa*, Aldershot, UK Ashgate 2003., p 4.

⁹⁹ Ernst Haas., *The uniting of Europe*, Stanford, CA. Stanford University Press. 1958, p 65.

either legitimize the positive effects or mitigate the negative ones. Indeed, the secretariat of the regional institution may on its own motion commence interventionist mechanisms where it feels regional security could be threatened by the actions of a member state even when such activity is taking place within territorial boundaries.¹⁰⁰ This may seem to reduce the power of sovereignty and could be said to be a form of imposed supra nationality but in reality a very difficult concept to implement, meaning there remains a need to create structures that can effectively help transcend the ‘sovereignty’ default position often used by states to deny any form of external interventions.

The concept of sovereignty has remained somewhat mythical to many. A lot has been written about it and many discussions describing it have been conducted but a proper description remains elusive.¹⁰¹ In its classical meaning, sovereignty connotes an absolutely powerful state acting within its own jurisdiction and recognizing no other power above. This power allows states to claim that intervening forces whether humanitarian or peacekeeping need to acquire consent from the offending state to deploy within its territory.

This notion of sovereignty has however been challenged by the advent of ubiquitous human rights regime where the individual human being has been placed at the center of the security milieu.¹⁰² It is in this regard that the AU decided to establish a legal mechanism in which it could respond to the escalating human rights abuses and hence insecurity in the continent. The tool of choice is entrenched in the AU constitutive act Article 4(h) and strengthened by the establishment of Africa Peace and Security

¹⁰⁰*African Union Constitutive act*, Article 4(h),iv.

¹⁰¹ Jens Bartelson., A Genealogy of Sovereignty in Tomothy Zick., Are the States Sovereign, *Washington University Law Quarterly*, Vol83:229

¹⁰² Fen Osler Hampton, Human Security in Paul Williams (ed) *Security Studies, An Introduction*, 2nd Edition, Routledge, London and New York 2013,pp 279-281.

architecture that is anchored within the AU peace and security protocol.¹⁰³ Indeed, article 4 (h) seems to have been influenced by the atrocities that took place in Rwanda in 1994 where more than one Million people were killed in the span of about three months and the OAU was unable to respond due to the hindrances resulting from the concept of sovereignty. Moreover, compared to the quick response the European Union adopted in the Bosnia conflict, the lethargic response displayed by the UN and its funders was enough demonstration of the fatigue setting in as far as conflicts in Africa were concerned.

2.2 The evolution of Pan-African Peace and security

In terms of undertaking security action in the broader context of collective security, Africa Union finds itself among other continental and regional organizations that have increasingly become involved in such matters despite not having had the intentions to engage in security matters during the formation stages. Indeed the growth of regional security institutions over the last few decades is quite impressive, with almost every such institution establishing a department of peace and security. The desire to secure the continent can be said to be a direct result of its previous experience with colonialism coupled with the apparent lack of interest to intervene by the former colonial powers in times of crises.

At the onset of mass emancipation of African states from colonialism, the idea of Pan-Africanism took an institutional form.¹⁰⁴ From the Pan-African Congress under the leadership of the African-American writers and thinkers such as W.E.B du Bois, Henry Sylvester Williams of Trinidad and Tobago, who were inspired by the likes of Jamaican – American Marcus Garvey, their ideas greatly influenced the reformist African leaders in

¹⁰³ AU Constitutive act 2002 article 4 (h) op cit.

¹⁰⁴ Babatunde Fagbayibo, A Supranational Perspective in Kuwali and Viljoen (eds), , p 136

the continent in the middle of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁵ African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Leopold Senghor of Senegal and Banar Abdel Nasser of Egypt who all became presidents of their respective countries further promoted the ideas. These leaders grasp of the Pan-African idea was elevated to another level on 25 May 1963 when they jointly created the Organization of African Unity¹⁰⁶. The primary objective of the OAU was to create a condition in which the member states could continue the tradition of solidarity and cooperation. It was also the genesis of the desire for a united continent without colonialism abounding in peace and unity.¹⁰⁷ Moreover, it was expected that the OAU would unite its members to ensure independence for all African states and then lead them to perpetual peace and prosperity in the ethos of democracy and brotherhood.

This was however not to be as it soon emerged that despite success in pushing for liberation of all African states from colonialism largely with assistance from international actors, the OAU was unable to monitor and police its own members when it came to issues of violent conflict, economic mismanagement, poor governance, corruption and human rights abuses.¹⁰⁸ This could be attributed to the fact that the OAU charter was categorical on the issue of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. It was further compounded by the existing rivalry between the West and East blocks where Africa became the quintessential pawn in a deadly game of universal superiority commonly referred as the cold war.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵Babatunde Fagayibo Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ OAU 1963 cited by Babatunde Fagabayibo in Kuwali and Viljoen op cit .p 141

¹⁰⁷ OAU Charter, Article ii.

¹⁰⁸ Makinda and Wafula Okumu, op cit pp 27-35.

¹⁰⁹ Tafotie J R, Conflicts in Africa and Major Powers: Proxy wars, Zones of influence or provocative instability. *Journal of international relations*, RUDN University Russia, 2016.

The end of the cold war heralded a new reality for African Unity and thus exposed the weaknesses of the OAU in the new world politics dispensation. The conflicts that afflicted the African continent at this time required necessary changes that would drastically alter the way of doing things especially in regard to peace and security¹¹⁰. It became clear to many African leaders that it was necessary to find a way to revive the hitherto moribund idea of Pan – Africanism but this time crafted for functionalism at another level which would galvanize the continent to respond to issues affecting it beyond the end of colonialism. Pan-Africanism, taken to another level was thus crucial to the establishment of the AU, as an idea born in Sirte Libya in 1999. Subsequently, the AU constitutive act was signed in Lome, Togo in July 11 2000 and the AU officially inaugurated in July 2002 in Durban South Africa.

The AU replaced the OAU and took over all assets and liabilities from the former organizations.¹¹¹ It seems that the AU may have taken over everything including the bad operating methods that crippled the OAU. The vision of the AU remained closely linked to the spirit of Pan-Africanism, which was to end the discrimination and marginalization of Africa and to ensure peaceful social, economic and political development. However, the primary task of the AU deviated from that of the OAU as it clearly stated that it would prioritize the promotion of peace and security so that development could be achieved across the entire continent.¹¹²

Moreover, what makes the AU institution a requirement for Africa is the idea of globalization, which directly impacts the geopolitical dynamics of the continent. African countries can no longer work individually without being exposed to the global

¹¹⁰Babatunde Fagabyibo op cit p 142

¹¹¹Kuwali op cit, p 25

¹¹² AU Constitutive act., Preamble

manipulation and exploitation, which could otherwise be mitigated by working together as an institutionalized block.¹¹³ Thus events in other areas of the world had defining effects on the continent and hence a requirement to align with the global realities. Africa needed to survive in a globalized world and the leaders realized that strength lay in unity of purpose and deed.

To defeat the effects of globalization and achieve its primary objectives, the AU adopted a constitutive act, which has established elaborate legal relationships that are hoped will steer the continent to greater development without conflict emanating either internally within states or externally between members of the organization. The constitutive act replaced the charter of the OAU, which had guided the operations of the institution and demarcated relationships between states.

Central to the shift in institutional focus is the process of continental integration based on the need to adhere to the universal values of democracy and good governance by African states, a requirement not previously emphasized in the OAU. The AU Constitutive Act in Arts 3 and 4, respectively expressly outlines that respect for human rights, democratic governance, gender equality and the rule of law are some of the principal objectives of the institution.¹¹⁴

A careful look at the constitutive act demonstrates that the rationale for the establishment of a new institution to replace the hitherto moribund OAU was premised on the need to recognize the role of the African person in emancipation of the continent, improvement of political independence and human dignity in a peaceful, stable and secure environment that ensures development and integration.¹¹⁵ The AU therefore has an

¹¹³ Tim Muriithi, cited in Kuwali and Viljoen. Op cit p 140.

¹¹⁴ AU Constitutive act Article 3 and 4. Available online.

¹¹⁵ AU Constitutive Act Preamble.

intent to ensure that security and stability are achieved if the continent is to experience the expected growth. The AU therefore placed the security of the African person at the forefront of development. According to Buzan, the inclusion of human security in the overall security debate has deepened and widened the meaning of security.¹¹⁶ This places the human agency squarely at the center of security provision within the continent. As stated above, Africa learnt its lesson when genocide took place in Rwanda where the OAU could not respond at all.¹¹⁷ As the preamble of the constitutive act states, Africa owes a peaceful future to itself. At last Africa has realized that no other state or conglomeration of states would underwrite its security. In this regard, the AU emulated the UN by creating a Peace and Security Council with the sole purpose of ensuring that the aspirations of the continent in matters of security are realized.

2.3 The African Union Peace and Security Council

The African Union Peace and Security Council was created out of the desire to ensure that decisions arrived at during the HoSG meetings in as far as security was concerned were indeed implemented.¹¹⁸ Article 3 defines the objectives for which the AU PSC was established which include: promotion of peace and security, anticipation of conflicts and taking appropriate action, promotion of peace and security through post conflict construction, issues to do with terrorism and responses to the threats as appropriate, promotion of good governance and human rights as well as the task of developing a common African defence policy.¹¹⁹ In article 2, the organs of the AUPSC are defined as the African Standby Force, a panel of the wise, a Continental early

¹¹⁶Buzan et al op cit

¹¹⁷Dokken, *Africa Security Politics Redefined*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, p 130.

¹¹⁸ Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Preamble.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, Article 3.

warning System and a special fund.¹²⁰ It is important to note that the AU PSC comprise 15 members who are elected to serve for a period of two or three years where ten members serve for two years and five serve for three to ensure continuity.¹²¹ In this, AUPSC differs with the UNPSC that has five permanent members. The members meet to deliberate on security matters and decide which organ of the council to deploy for whatever the situation may be. The AU PSC also differs with UNSC by not having veto powers and the decisions reached are either by consensus or by majority present and voting.¹²² It therefore means that the AU PSC as created, has immense powers when it comes to peace and security management within the continent. However, the ability of the PSC to act is premised on a properly integrated and functioning council membership where members speak with the same voice and decision are by consensus as opposed to split decisions that often lack enthusiasm in implementation and follow up.¹²³

It is nevertheless necessary to view the decisions of the PSC in light of the existing legal and institutional capacity inherent in the AU. Despite the establishment of the APSA, other mechanisms are in place to assist the AU in its endeavor to anticipate and manage conflicts in the continent. Under the AU constitutive act and the PSC protocol, the decision-making responsibility and operationalization of various articles is deposited with the AU assembly and the PSC. Thus the implementation of article 4(h) is squarely the responsibility of the Assembly of heads of state and government (HoSG) and the PSC, normally through the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD).

The AU assembly is the supreme organ of the institution and monitors the operations of the various organs of the AU including, the PSC and commissions to ensure

¹²⁰ Ibid, Article 2

¹²¹ Ibid, Article 5

¹²² Dokken Op Cit, p129

¹²³ Donald Puchala and Raymond Hopkins., *International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive analysis* in Stephen Krasner (ed), *International Regimes*. Cornell University Press, 1983, pp 61-64.

that decisions arrived at during the annual meetings are implemented by the secretariat. This means that the assembly discusses and takes decision on all matters that affect security in the continent. However, normatively, the PSC has decision-making authority on matters of security and makes recommendations to the assembly.¹²⁴ The assembly rarely departs from the advice given by the PSC. The PSC has several mandates, which it monitors, and the results of which form the basis of its recommendations to the AU assembly¹²⁵. The mandates range from the role of human rights, implementation of APSA, the early warning, the African Peer Review Mechanism, and the development and deployment of African Standby Force. The PSC is expected to make use of these mechanisms when advising the assembly on the action to take, and also recommend the right tool. Challenges have however been experienced in achieving the real objectives of the AU and could be due to the institutional weakness inherent in each of the available instruments that the PSC employs when analyzing and assessing various conflict trends in the continent. Each of these instruments has a critical role in ensuring the realization of security in Africa but success depends on the goodwill of member states and prudent determination of the AU Commission.¹²⁶ A look at the structure of these instruments provides a clear picture of how the AU has entrenched security as a core requirement for development and further demonstrates the methodology in place to assure implementation.¹²⁷ Thus, in theory there is supposed to be an escalation in the use of available instruments as the situation changes in the conflict zone.

¹²⁴ Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 2

¹²⁵ Cilliers and Sturman., Challenges Facing the AU Peace and Security Council, 13(1) *African Security Review* 2004, pp 1-5.

¹²⁶ AU Framework Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Document in African Union Instruments Relating to Peace and Security, *AU Publication* 2014.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is the security implementation toolbox created by the AU to ensure conflicts are not allowed to get out of hand and are managed in a viable and sustainable manner. Within the toolbox, there are several tools available to address various types of conflicts in the continent. These include; the panel of the wise, which is composed of various eminent African personalities, the African Standby Force, the Military Staff Committee (MSC), which advises on ASF deployment and logistics, the Continental Early Warning System and the Peace fund¹²⁸. These tools are supposed to work synergistically to ensure that the conflict prevalence on the African continent is mitigated.

2.4 The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

The entire logic of securing Africa is located in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The fact that it is called an architecture means that it is structured in such a way that it forms the basis on which African peace and security can be built. Therefore the assumption is that APSA has the correct design, resources and the political good will necessary to achieve its objectives.

As an architectural design, the APSA has several organs through which it should function to ensure that peace and security exists in Africa. The key organs of the APSA are: the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund.¹²⁹ Among these, the PSC is the most powerful as it has advisory and deployment power over other components, either directly by instructing the organs to act or through advising the Heads of State and Government during the summit meetings on what action may be

¹²⁸ African Union Peace and Security Protocol

¹²⁹ Moving Africa Forward; *African Peace and Security Architecture, 2010 Study*.p 8.

required on the specific situation needing attention. Thus the APSA is design to have an integrated approach to security and is therefore implementable at least in theory.

The applicability of the architecture is however premised on the role of sub-regional institutions such as the regional economic communities and Mechanisms for it to function fully¹³⁰. The sub-regional institutions are therefore important in ensuring that the APSA execution is flawless, but the institutions suffer from internal incoherencies and pose some problems to the AU when there is a need to deploy an organ of APSA. This could be a result of how the prevailing problem is framed and so the construction of APSA may not be to blame.¹³¹ If the problem is framed in such a way that it does not appear to be *hostishumani generis*, it may indeed fail to attract the needed response and thus cast the APSA in bad light.¹³² Once framed right, insecurity situations are wont to attract the needed and correct responses but this still needs an enforcement mechanism. In other words, the regional institutions such as the AU must have the power to compel offending member states to accept the role of APSA in resolving internal conflicts. This means that the state in trouble must accept interventions from all the organs of APSA including military interventions and such interventions must be funded from the peace fund. Such states must not doubt or contest the reports obtained by the continental early warning system (CEWs) so as to deny interventions. Viewed in this manner, the APSA logic has the potential to establish a nascent security community in Africa. However, theory and practice are normally strange bedfellows and thus the mere establishment of APSA may not adequately address the idea of collective security so central to security communities and hence continental peace and security.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Sarah Nouwen; Proceedings of the Annual Meeting; *American Society of International Law*, Vol. 107, *International Law in a Multipolar World* (2013), pp. 330-335

¹³² Ibid

The problem of internal incompatibility is not unique to the APSA or the AU but it is one that affects even the UN.¹³³ On many occasions where the UN has purported to intervene, it has often emerged that indeed it is the United States that has deployed its forces in pursuit of its national interests while purporting to act under a UN mandate.¹³⁴ Despite clear declaration on the need to save future generations from the scourge of war, the UN charter has not been very well enforced or uniformly applied because of the inherent national interests of states.¹³⁵ Robert Howse captures the difficulty of establishing a UN based collective security system by calling the attempt “an internationalist fantasy” full of good intentions but devoid of practical realities.¹³⁶ A casual view here reveals that there is contestation between the realists and the constructivist perception of collective security and that according to the realists, collective security is a myth while the constructivist follows the logic of Alexander Wendt and define anarchy as what one makes of it.¹³⁷ Thus the frame within which one wishes to evaluate the idea determines the level of APSA contribution to collective security lie in the development of regional security communities. A security community is crucial to the achievement of collective security as it behooves all participants to view the security of other members as being intrinsically linked to their own, thus become willing to contribute in the achievement of security across the community.¹³⁸

Since APSA is an African idea for ensuring peace on the continent, it is important to adopt a positive view about it but also ask the question ‘how ready are African states to

¹³³*American Interests and UN Reform, Report of the Task Force on the United Nations*. Washington DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2005,vii.

¹³⁴ Ibid

¹³⁵ Michael Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, *Foreign Affairs* 82, no 3, 2003: p 23.

¹³⁶ Robert Howse, The Road to Baghdad is paved with Good Intentions, *European Journal of International Law* 13, no.1 2002, p 89.

¹³⁷ Alexander Wendt, Anarchy is what states make of it, *International organization*,46(3), 1992, 391-425.

¹³⁸ Barry Buzan, People states and Fear, an agenda for international studies in the post-cold war era, op cit.

cede a part of their sovereignty in order to receive security assistance from the rest of the continent so as to achieve collective security? In other words, 'are African states ready for collective security? This is because collective security is dependent on the realization by states that peace is indivisible and that aggression and insecurity anywhere is a threat to every state.¹³⁹ Moreover, an ideal security community is more likely to function where there is some distribution of power in the institutional framework underpinning security than where states compete for hegemony.¹⁴⁰ By establishing the APSA, the AU was hoping to create a situation where member states would feel obligated to cede some form of sovereignty and thus have some power distributed to the regional and sub – regional institutions in order to enforce security among them.¹⁴¹

The realization of APSA therefore holds the promise for achievement of peace and security in Africa but since there are several pillars holding the architecture in place, the manner in which each pillar is operationalized will determine the effect it will have in the overall APSA institution. Every pillar of APSA is expected to contribute to peace and security in Africa but some pillars have been structured to play bigger roles than others. This makes it easy for such pillars to be more visible than others. Such is the case for the panel of the wise, AU PSC and the continental early warning as opposed to the ASF, which in most cases is viewed as a foreign intervention mechanism.¹⁴² In this regard, the mediation arm of APSA has been used more than the coercive arm leading to a

¹³⁹ Edward Newman, *A Crisis of Global Institutions: Multilateralism and International Security*. Routledge, Taylor and Francis, London and New York. 2007 p 46.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Tim Muriithi, The role of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the implementation of Article 4 (h), in Kuwali and Viljoen (eds), *Africa and the responsibility to protect: Article 4(h) of the African Union Constitutive act*, p139-140

¹⁴²Desmitt and Hauck, op cit p 27.

generalized feeling that the ASF may not be crucial to securing Africa.¹⁴³

Among the positive aspects of the establishment of APSA is that it has created or has been endowed with an interventionist stance at the policy level.¹⁴⁴ The APSA has allowed the continent to adopt a more flexible collective security policy of non-indifference, meaning that conflicts taking place within the confines of states' boundaries can no longer be seen as the business of the concerned state but a problem to the entire continent. By abandoning the previously unspoken policy of 'non-intervention' to non-indifference the AU now holds the promise of alleviating the suffering of the African people.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, the AU's commitment to play a greater role in promoting peace and security in the continent and to support the efforts of the regional intergovernmental organizations in their peace and security endeavors is a positive move.¹⁴⁶ This is founded under the common African defence and security policy that aims at mobilizing the available resources for the defence and security of the African continent.

2.5 The Common African Defence and Security Policy

The common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) is essentially a strategy based on a set of principles, instruments and objectives that the AU wishes to apply and achieve in promoting peace and security in the continent.¹⁴⁷ Proposed and declared in Sirte, Libya in 2002 and eventually adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 2004, the policy rests on a set of notions, objectives, principles and instruments that define it and which at the same time constitute its substance. Defence, security and

¹⁴³Desmitt and Hauck, op cit,p 157

¹⁴⁴Ibid,p 149

¹⁴⁵ Ibid

¹⁴⁶ Protocol relating to the establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council, article 3.

¹⁴⁷Touray, The African Common Defence Policy. *African Affairs*, Vol. 104, No. 417 (Oct., 2005), pp. 635-656

common threat are the underlying concepts of the CADSP.¹⁴⁸ The CADSP objectives are meant to respond to both external and internal threats effectively. They are to be pursued on the basis of several principles but the principle of indivisibility of the African security is deemed to have an overriding power over all.¹⁴⁹ Despite the fact that all African countries have a responsibility to implement the CADSP, it is the AU PSC that has direct role in overseeing the implementation. As stated above, the AU PSC has been given extensive power under the protocol to enable it carry out its mandate.¹⁵⁰ Thus the AU PSC has authority mount and deploy peace support missions and to recommend to the assembly interventions in member states where it considers it appropriate in accordance with article 4(h) of the constitutive act.

According to Touray, CADSP has adopted a liberalist approach to African security where states' welfare is more related to collective security under international regimes and has shifted from realism and neorealism where emphasis is often placed on the concept of state sovereignty.¹⁵¹ In this regard, the principles of CADSP make several assumptions on the philosophy of common security that are necessary if Africa is to develop a common security infrastructure. These assumptions are based on a tiered approach to conflict management that starts with diplomatic activity to military action, identification of aggressors, and that aggressors remain aware that Africa is always ready to act in unity.¹⁵² The role of the CADSP is therefore to create a framework through which African security can be established and the policy is indeed what formed the basis of creating the APSA. This is why the APSA tools are directly under the deployment of

¹⁴⁸Dokken Op cit, p 129.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ AU Constitutive Act Article 4(h)

¹⁵¹Touray, Op Cit,p 648.

¹⁵²Ibid, 649.

the AU PSC. An understanding of this relationship is crucial to any analysis intending to situate the ability of the AU in securing the continent by using any collective enforcement mechanism, not least the ASF. However, for effective response to conflict and other crises occurring in Africa, the AU PSC requires a mechanism that can observe and report trends leading to any threat.

2.6 The African Union Continental Early Warning System

The continental early warning system (CEWS) was established for the sole purpose of anticipating and preventing conflicts in the African continent.¹⁵³ The early warning system consists of a situation room and is closely linked with other early warning mechanisms existing within the regional economic communities and mechanisms.¹⁵⁴ In other words, the way the early warning is structured within the continent is such that it has the potential to identify the onset of conflicts and other security threats from any corner. The CEWS is therefore the preventive arm of the APSA and thus AU's tool for realizing the existence or even the approach of serious conflicts and hence early preparation for effective response.¹⁵⁵ The CEWS should at the very least provide policy makers with timely information indicating where and what is happening on the ground.¹⁵⁶ The AU policy makers are also required to take such warnings seriously and adopt appropriate strategic responses to avoid conflict emerging or escalating. According to Woodhouse and Duffy,¹⁵⁷ an early warning system seeks to observe

¹⁵³ AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of Peace and Security Council, Article 12.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid

¹⁵⁵ Carnegie Commission on Preventing Conflict. *Report of the Carnegie Commission on preventing deadly conflict*,. New York: Carnegie Foundation 1997, p 43.

¹⁵⁶ Dorn, W A. Early and late warning by the Un Secretary- General of threats to peace: in A Schnable and D. Carmens (eds), *Conflict Prevention from rhetoric to reality volume II: Opportunities and Innovations*. Latham: Lexington Books, London 2010, pp 305-344.

¹⁵⁷ Woodhouse t. and Duffy T. *Peacekeeping and International Conflict resolution*, Virginia Peace Operations Training Institute, 2008, p 98.

specific areas of probable conflicts and devise means of responding to prevent the occurrence on the ground. This means that an early warning mechanism is complimentary to conflict prevention but cannot prevent the occurrence from actually breaking out or escalating.¹⁵⁸ Preventing occurrences is the duty of the organ with response mechanism, which in the case of the AU, is the Peace and Security Council or the assembly depending the level of conflict atrocities involved.¹⁵⁹ According to Cilliers, the main function of CEWS is to strengthen the capacity of the AU PSC, the AU Commission, and other APSA structures with regard to identifying critical developments in a timely manner so that coherent strategic responses can be formulated to either prevent or mitigate the potential destructive effects.¹⁶⁰ It therefore means that the information provided must be timely and accurate if its going to be of any use. Indeed CEWS as currently structured engages well with its mandate but it is difficult to say whether the information it produces is accurate and timely.¹⁶¹ From personal experiences at the AU headquarters, it is clear that CEWS, despite being a good institution for peace and security management is largely incapacitated by the fact that it does not have an investigative capacity. This capacity would have been useful in determining the extent of the of the contestations leading to conflict well before they appear in the newspaper and other media, which is where CEWS collects most of its information.¹⁶² A strong link exists between information collection, analysis and action and hence early warning

¹⁵⁸Wulf H. and Debiel T. Conflict early warning and response mechanisms: tools for advancing the effectiveness of regional organizations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF, *Institute Fur Entwicklung und Frieden Crisis States working Paper Series No 2, May 2009.* p 4

¹⁵⁹ Ibid

¹⁶⁰Cilliers and Sturman, The Challenges facing the AU's Peace and Security Council', *13(1) African Security Review 2004.*

¹⁶¹Cilliers Op Cit.

¹⁶² International Peace Institute, 2012, available at www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT7390-preventing_Conflicts in Africae

becomes critical for effective prevention responses.¹⁶³ In order to fulfill this objective CEWS must engage in rigorous data collection and strategic analysis, which forms the basis of the reports it issues to policy makers for decision-making. CEWS also collaborates with regional early warning institutions, making the conflict prediction effort continent wide and thus more likely to succeed.¹⁶⁴ Gomes-Porto recommends a gradualist approach which starts with the more serious conflicts, basically the ones that have violence with real threat to loss of life and then moving along a continuum which helps to build measureable and verifiable database.¹⁶⁵ Such database is useful when determining threats with potential to escalate into violent conflicts.

It follows therefore that early warning is important for conflict management in Africa and should be strengthened. However, on several occasions, including the escalation of civil violence in Kenya after the 2007 elections the AU CEWS and even the IGAD CEWARN were caught unawares, a scenario that was not envisaged during the establishment of the monitoring institution. Indeed, it can be argued that despite the mandate to monitor and report, CEWS has no way of predicting when and where a conflict may erupt, neither does it decide when intervention decisions are made or even when such decisions are to be implemented.¹⁶⁶ The AU PSC retains the choice of the appropriate tool for intervention and when the situation is judged to be grave, the organ may advise the chair of the commission to call for an extra ordinary summit where the authorization for the deployment of the ASF may be sought.

¹⁶³ John Mark Iyi, Role of AU Continental Early Warning System in Kuwali and Viljoen Op cit, pp 154-172.

¹⁶⁴ CEWS Roadmap 2008: para 7.

¹⁶⁵ Gomes-Porto. The African Union Continental Early Warning System: methodological design, implementation and operationalization', Paper presented at postdam Spring Dialogues, The key to success in Peace and Development? *Regional Governance in Africa, 27-28 March, 2009*, (Department of Peace studies, university of Bradford)

¹⁶⁶ Bellamy A.J. Mass atrocities and armed conflicts: links, distinctions and implications for the responsibility to protect', *Stanley Foundation Analysis Brief 2011*. p 11

2.7 The African Standby Force

The AU leaders, especially the heads of state and the military and police chiefs have demonstrated a commitment to act collectively in protecting civilians from atrocities especially those fit the grave crimes definitions and which attract the invocation of article 4(h) of the constitutive act.¹⁶⁷ Among the tools available to the AU PSC and the general assembly for responding to conflicts in the continent the ASF is the only one with a coercive human protection mission within the APSA toolkit.¹⁶⁸ Thus the ASF is a critical aspect of the entire peace and security dialogue in the African Union and its success is seen as crucial to resolving the endemic conflicts existing in Africa.¹⁶⁹ Therefore the way the ASF concept and eventual evolution patters out will determine the level of success the AU will have in securing Africa. It should be noted that we do not see the ASF as a hammer in which the AU can respond to all conflict problems and that's why the next chapter is dedicated to this organ of APSA. The relationship between the deployment of a military force and the political process involving such deployment is vital for success and thus the need to have a clear understanding of the discourse required when conflicts have to be resolved by the deployment of the ASF.¹⁷⁰ Another aspect of the role that ASF could play is that there is potential to utilize the force beyond the traditional peace support operations well into humanitarian action, which may seem like dragging the

¹⁶⁷Charlest. Hunt. The role of African Standby Force in Implementing Article 4(h) in Kuwali and Viljoen Op cit,p 173.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Bam Sivuyile, Head of AU PSOD, Speech at the AU briefing during the inauguration of the training of umpires for exercise AMANI Africa II at AU HQs in Addis Ababa, 14 October 2014. Excerpts with the Author.

¹⁷⁰International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; The Responsibility to protect. Ottawa: *International Development Research Council, ICISS Report, 2001*, p 67

military and indeed the ASF out of the duties prescribed by the APSA and AU PSC protocols.¹⁷¹

2.8 Chapter Summary

The African union has established several instruments through which it can mobilize member states to respond to conflict situations in the continent. These instruments enable a concerted effort in managing violent conflicts and could have been informed by the events that took place in Rwanda in 1994 as well as the realization that the western countries were no longer keen to solve African problems. Under the concept of African solutions to African problems, the AU established the constitutive act under which all affairs in the continent would be considered. Article 4(h) specifically gave the AU legal authority to intervene in member states that were deemed to engage in conflict that led to genocide and crimes against humanity.

In this regard, the AU established the APSA, led by the AU PSC as the organs that identify and manage conflict situations. The APSA comprises five pillars as discussed above but is further strengthened by the CADSP, which allows for collective security in the continent where AU member states have agreed to act together to stop violent conflict in the continent. The African standby force is a creature of the APSA and thus functions within the collective security arrangement that informs African security endeavors.

¹⁷¹ Proposal made by the AU Commission in Maputo, After Action Review of AMANI AFRICA II. 23 January 2016

CHAPTER 3

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE PEACE AND SECURITY ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES

3.1 Introduction

The AU Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council establishes the ASF in article 13, with a view “to enable the Peace and Security Council to perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and declares that the ASF shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian, police and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. Whereas the military and police have been associated with peacekeeping and law enforcement respectively, the idea of civilian participation and their role in peacekeeping was largely not discussed, despite many of them taking part in such operations.¹⁷² The success of establishing the ASF was a promise to providing a panacea to conflicts in Africa that the AU found comforting and was willing to pursue, because it was believed that the force would provide the tool for collective security that had been lacking, making the continent depend on external powers for its own security.

The African Standby Force (ASF) was declared fully operational on 15 January 2016 following a validation exercise codenamed AMANI Africa II, conducted in Lohatla Army training base in South Africa. Established under the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol), the ASF is one of the tools available to the AU for Peace and Security management.¹⁷³

¹⁷² Cedric de Coning: the Civilian Dimensions of the African Stand-by Force System in: Conflict Trends Vol.41 (2005), pp. 10-16.

¹⁷³ Darkwa Linda and Attuquayefio, P., Analysis of norm diffusion in the African Union Economic Community of West Africa States. *African Conflict and Peace Building Review*, 4(2), 11-37.

The ASF formation was informed by the prevailing security situation on the continent where, following the events of genocide in Rwanda, Africa discovered that the rest of the world was not willing to respond quickly to save lives in the continent. This was during the OAU days and therefore no continent wide mechanism that could respond to violent conflicts existed. The leaders of West African states under the aegis of Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) established a military observer group (ECOMOG) to respond to the crisis in Liberia with the intent of avoiding another Rwanda in their doorstep¹⁷⁴. This formed the genus for a continent peace and security enforcement mechanism, ASF. The ASF is structured to perform six missions and scenarios as indicated hereunder:

Scenario 1: Provide military advice to a political mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate provided by the PSC.

Scenario 2: Provide an observer mission co- deployed with a UN mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.

Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.

Scenario 4: AU/regional peacekeeping force for UN Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions. Deployment required within 30 days of an AU mandate.

Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers. ASF completed deployment required within 90 days of an AU mandate, with the military component being able to deploy in 30 days.¹⁷⁵

Scenario 6: AU intervention, for example in genocide situations and crimes against humanity, where the international community does not act promptly. Here it is envisaged that the AU would have the capability to deploy a robust military force within 14 days.

¹⁷⁴Darkwa Linda., The African Standby Force: The African Union Tool for the maintenance of peace and security, *Contemporary Security Policy*, 38:3, 471 – 482.

¹⁷⁵ Protocol relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and security council, 2003.

There was therefore a lot riding on the ability of the ASF to reach maturation and become a useful tool for AU during times of violent crisis either within states or between contracting parties. Hence the announcement of full operational capability made in January 2016 should have marked a new beginning for African peace and security architecture of which the ASF is one of the pillars. However, the true position on the ground remains such that despite the FOC declaration, the ASF is yet to be truly operational. So what went wrong and where are the capabilities so critical to ASF operationalization?

Despite the shortcomings, the ASF remains the only legally available tool for coercive diplomacy and peace enforcement missions on the African continent.¹⁷⁶ Moreover, combined with other aspects of the APSA, the ASF becomes an option that promises results but only if employed in an audacious manner. This is to say that the ASF has no legal applicability outside the APSA and article 4(h) and (j) but there exists possibility of stretching its utility through innovative thinking.¹⁷⁷ This chapter analyses the capabilities inherent in the ASF that give it the potential to forcefully react to conflicts in Africa. It evaluates the capabilities inherent in the ASF in regard to peace and security and not just peace because the idea of security has been widened and deepened to include hitherto unforeseen factors that affect humanity¹⁷⁸.

3.2 The Civilian Component Capabilities

In an attempt to ensure the security transcends the military understanding in modern day conflicts where the vulnerable have become primary targets, traditional peacekeeping has gradually evolved into broad and multidisciplinary “peace support

¹⁷⁶ Charles Hunt., The role of the ASF in implementing Article 4(h), in Viljoen and Kuwali op cit, pp 173-174

¹⁷⁷ *ibid*

¹⁷⁸ Barry Busan 1992., Op cit, pp 62-67

operations”(PSOs). This involves employment capabilities that are not normally found in the military or the police and what may be referred to as the soft skills of conflict management. For this reason, PKOs have increasingly incorporated civilian experts who offer advice in areas of refugees, child protection, judicial and corrections services as well as in the development of the rule of law.¹⁷⁹ More often than not, missions require the responses of well trained and well equipped group of military, police and civilians in order to establish a secure environment where peace and security can be built. Moreover the international community has become increasingly conscious of the insecurity that war affected populations face.¹⁸⁰ Indeed, international norms surrounding the protection of civilians require the right strategies for implementation.¹⁸¹ This means that for effective management of civilians involved in the conflict, it is necessary to have a robust civilian component operating in the multidimensional PSOs that exist in today’s conflict management.

The challenges of modern PSOs and the changing nature of inter-state conflicts require a response that, the mandates of peacekeeping operations take on board not only military tasks, but also policing and civilian issues such as political affairs, legal advice, human rights protection, gender mainstreaming, HIV/Aids awareness, public information and civil affairs.¹⁸² In this regard therefore the type of the civilian expected to operate in the mission areas differs from that who are found in the organizations’ headquarters. Moreover, modern peacekeeping missions structures from both the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) operate under the civilian leadership of a Special

¹⁷⁹ SIPRI, Experts Workshop., Expanding the civilian role in peace operations: Assessing the progress and addressing the gaps, Rio de Janeiro, April 2011, pp 2-3

¹⁸⁰ Ibid

¹⁸¹ Hunt op cit, p 175

¹⁸² David NiiAddy and Samuel Atuobi., Towards the operationalization of the civilian component of ECOWAS Standby Force. Koffi Annan Peace Keeping Training Center, policy brief 2/2009.

Representative, supported by the military Force Commander and a Police Commissioner who are normally supported by civilian heads of specialized technical sections. Thus it is necessary to retain certain capabilities and expertise within PSOs.¹⁸³ Indeed, in some instances some PSO transition completely into civilian hands, as was the case for UN Integrated Peace building Office in Sierra Leone (UNPSIL). When such events take place, the mission needs qualified civilian personnel capable of conducting both legal and security operations and winning over the hearts and minds of the population. This is critical because at the end of every mission is a requirement for reconstruction and development, which if not well handled can lead to reversion of the gains made in the peacemaking period and even return the society back into conflict. According to Neil Kritz, legal means of control over the population are necessary in the post conflict phase as the law establishes an institutional framework through which prevailing differences can be sorted without reverting to violence.¹⁸⁴

It is therefore necessary to create a critical number of qualified civilian personnel in the ASF who can be entrusted with such roles. In this regard, the AU has an established civilian recruitment program where all those interested are invited to apply for both available and projected positions, after which those that qualify are entered into a deployment roster. Selection of civilians for PKO duties is thus well established but the relationship between the various components remains problematic as each component has a different reporting line that end at the chairperson's desk as well as in the home countries of those officers involved in decision making.¹⁸⁵ Whereas it is now an established fact that the head of mission will be a civilian appointed by the AUC

¹⁸³ David NiiAddy and Atuobi Samuel, *Ibid*.

¹⁸⁴ Neil Kritz., *The rule of law in post conflict phase*, in Chester A. Crocker et al (eds), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to international Conflict*. USIP Washington D.C. 1999,p 588

¹⁸⁵ Mr. Bam SiVuyile, Head Peace Support Operations Division, AUC. Phone Interview Feb 2018

chairperson, friction between the military, police and civilian components still remains and impediment to effective command and control of such missions.¹⁸⁶ Although there are clear reporting lines in the standard operating procedures, these are often disregarded in AU led missions because African states compete for visibility and seek attention internationally in order to attract funding from the donors, especially the EU. This is driven by the fact that the EU has identified countries that it considers “partners for peace”, which they fund directly and encourage to develop peace keeping capabilities.¹⁸⁷ In this regard, donor countries encourage involvement of civilian capabilities in areas such as finance, law, demobilization and re-integration and capacity building as well as reconstruction and development.¹⁸⁸

Thus the development of the civilian capability within the AU PSOD and indeed within the missions is dependent on external financial support as well as qualified candidates within Africa. Although there is no lack of qualified personnel in the continent with the soft skills needed in PSOs, the need to adhere to UN standards has at times led to competition between the two organizations with the EU sometimes playing in the periphery.¹⁸⁹ Such competition reduces the available number of experts because the AU is unable to attract the best due to funding constraints and whereas the UN should come to aid the AU, the competition does not allow. Civilian capability in the AU therefore depends on personnel seconded by member states and in most cases paid by their home countries. Since decision making at the mission and the AUC level is civilian led, allowing seconded officers the leeway to decide on operations has several disadvantages

¹⁸⁶Hon. Lydia Wanyoto, Former Deputy Special Representative of the AU Chairperson to AMISOM. Interview conducted at NDC Kenya, 4 Jan 2018.

¹⁸⁷Brig Waititu, Commandant IPSTC, Interview on 6 Feb 2018, Nairobi.

¹⁸⁸Funmi Olonisakin: Lessons from Peace Support Operations in West Africa, KAIPTC/GTZ: Accra, 2007.

¹⁸⁹Markus Derblom, Eva HagströmFrisell, Jennifer Schmidt., UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa. Swedish Defence Agency Report. November 2008. p 42

that work to reduce the effectiveness of AU PKO, more so the ASF.¹⁹⁰ This means that the civilians in AU missions are more likely to take orders from their own countries than act within the prescribed AU ASF protocols. This has the potential to undermine operations as the mission pursues interests that are inimical to the aims of the continental body. The civilians in peace operations therefore need to have a clear command chain that can be used by the AUC to ensure the needed soft skills are collectively exploited for the success of PKO and conflict management in the continent. The soft skills already discussed above need to be tested before deployment to the missions.

The Policy Framework for the Civilian Dimension of the ASF is based on the understanding that AU PSOs cooperate closely with the UN and that the UN, will at some point, take over responsibility from the AU. It recognizes that most African civilian, police and military peacekeepers are trained to deploy both in AU and UN operations. The Policy Framework, therefore, aims at achieving coherence between AU and UN integrated management structures, as well as its police and civilian components, “so that the ease with which missions and its personnel can transition between the AU and the UN is enhanced”.¹⁹¹ In this regard, the ASF should have extensively tested the civilian capacity during the exercise to declare full operational capacity. However according to Darkwa, this capacity, together with the police were the least tested prior to the declaration of FOC.¹⁹² Thus the civilian capabilities necessary for effective AU PSOs are still wanting and will need further development through concerted capacity building and funding efforts. Globally, civilian capacity for peace operations is characterized by a ‘strategic gap’ in terms of providing the required link between political, security,

¹⁹⁰ Maj General Okello, PSOD head of planning Cell, Phone interview 11 Feb 2018

¹⁹¹ Darkwa op cit, p 7.

¹⁹² Ibid.

developmental and humanitarian strategies and building the required capacity.¹⁹³ Moreover, the AU remains acutely aware of this weakness and has indeed lamented the “need to further develop the police and civilian components of the ASF to reflect the multidimensional nature of Peace Support Operations.”¹⁹⁴ It is therefore apparent that the AU has focused more on developing the military component more than the civilian and the police. According to observation by the researcher made during participation in the final exercise to test the operational capability of the ASF, it is indeed the military component that was well tested.

The problem of developing civilian peace operations capabilities is compounded by the fact that the ASF is not a permanent construct. It is comprised of standby units domiciled in home countries, meaning that each standby force must have a standby civilian capacity. This is a challenge because no budgetary arrangements are available to retain a critical number of civilian expertise on the ASF payroll. Whereas it is easy to pool police and military police for operation due to the nature of their formation – they have a defined call up structure – this is not easy for the civilians, who might be having employment elsewhere. Moreover, the police and the military have an established PKO support structure where they maintain certain capabilities in readiness for deployment through training and roosting.¹⁹⁵ This assures the various RECs/RMs as well as the AU PSOD that there will always be critical expertise available for deployment at short notice should such a requirement arise.

¹⁹³ Rahul Chandran et al: Rapid Deployment of Civilians for Peace Operations – Status, Gaps and Options, Center on International Cooperation/New York University, April 2009, p.2.

¹⁹⁴ Conclusions of the Meeting of the African Chief of Defense Staff and Heads of Security on the Operationalisation of the ASF, 24-28 March 2008.

¹⁹⁵ Col Radina, Commandant International Humanitarian peace support school, IPSTC. Interview 24 April 2018

3.3 Police Capabilities

As indicated above, the police form one of the critical components of the ASF and hence bring on board invaluable capabilities that contribute directly to the success of any PKO mission. According to official UN doctrine, UN police (UNPOL) perform two main functions. First, they provide operational support to the host state police for ‘prevention, detection and investigation of crime, protection of life and property, and the maintenance of public order. When needed UNPOL are expected to support host governments in maintaining law and order where it has broken down. Secondly, UN police provide support for the reform, restructuring and rebuilding of the host State police, if the conflict has affected the police structure and service delivery, specifically support developing host state police capacity for responsive and accountable police service of professional standards.¹⁹⁶ This means that the police should be among the very first capabilities that are deployed in any PKO mission.

Police roles in a PKO vary slightly from those in their own countries of origin and thus certain capabilities peculiar to PKO are necessary.¹⁹⁷ In this regard, the ASF police component must comply with framework on the doctrine of police deployment in both AU and UN mandated operations. The police are expected to engage in law and order activities as well as in capacity building. Thus, a well-trained police component is a requirement for successful PKOs. The police need to train and equip in soft skills beyond the normal law and order requirements. These may include first aid, negotiation and protecting civilians from physical harm.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁶ Marina Caprini, *op cit*, p 11

¹⁹⁷ Jackie Cilliers, *The African Standby Force: an update on the progress*, ISS paper 160, March 2008, p 2

¹⁹⁸ Sofia Sebastain, *The role of the police in UN peace operations*, Stimson Center Report, Sept 20, 2015, available @ <https://www.stimson.org/content/role-police-un-peace-operations> accessed on 24 April 2018.

Police in multidimensional peacekeeping missions were originally assigned responsibility for a growing number of tasks linked to law and order, providing operational support to host state police, and assisting with the reform and reconstruction of police and other law enforcement institutions.¹⁹⁹ This has not changed but has been increased to include border and maritime management, investigations and security of UN and AU civilian personnel deployed in mission areas.²⁰⁰ This requires a well-prepared police force that is well aware of its roles. It takes training in the regional centers of excellence and a clear plan to retain such skills once acquired.

In the ASF standby forces that have declared FOC, the police component is only slightly better than the civilian in terms of readiness. It was noticed during the ASF operationalization final exercise in South Africa that only a handful of police officers were available for the exercise.²⁰¹ For example, the East Africa Standby Force had only one police officer. The apparent lack of the police component's participation was attributed to the member states inability to release such officers for the exercise.²⁰² Moreover, a close look at the EASF secretariat in Nairobi and Addis Ababa indicates that the police are not well represented although the ASF protocol recognizes their roles in peace and security in the continent. The inability to entrench the police component makes it difficult for the ASF to effectively meet the requirements of multidimensional peacekeeping operations that are needed in Africa. It would be inappropriate to deploy

¹⁹⁹ Marina Caparini., Challenges in deploying effective police to international peace operations, Norwegian Institute of international Affairs, NUPI working paper 877.2017.

²⁰⁰ UNSCR 2151 on security sector reform, 2014.

²⁰¹ Perosnally observed the few number of police in the command post and some roles had to be simulated instead of being carried out due to lack of police personnel.

²⁰² Col Minyori, Kenya Defence Forces liaison Officer for AMANI II Africa exercise in Lohatla, South Africa, Report to Kenya Defence Chief, 28 November, 2018.

just the military in a PSO and assume that they can perform police roles.²⁰³

The requirement for availability of police capabilities in complex multidimensional PSO, as part of the initial deployment force and not as a follow on entity is informed by the various scenarios under which the ASF may be required to begin operations.²⁰⁴ According to the six scenarios, a police presence is required because of the need for law and order. However, the regional standby forces have tended to be heavily under the influence of the military probably because it is the military that has the capability for quick response and deployment in areas of conflict.²⁰⁵ This capability however diminishes quickly once some form of separation of belligerents takes place and the military find it difficult in managing civilians in areas where soft skills are needed. Thus the police needs to be incorporated in the entire ASF deployment and training process if this capability is going to be useful for PSO. As things stand currently, the police and the civilian components seem to be reacting to what the military are doing and thus may not be very useful at the beginning of conflict management when soft skills are necessary for more enduring peace. Moreover the police capabilities are not being tested constantly and the AU deployment are based on the police contributing country's experience.²⁰⁶ At the AU police commission, the planning is based on the need to acquire universal police standards but this has been hampered by lack of trainers and the failure to have a uniform curriculum that can inform such training.²⁰⁷ Although it is vital to have uniform police capabilities, Africa is still faced with the Anglophone and Francophone divide, which undermines standards in police performance.

²⁰³UNSCR 2151 op cit.

²⁰⁴ Serge Kabinyera, deputy Police component commander at EASF interviewed on 17 May 2018.

²⁰⁵Cilliers, opcit p 8.

²⁰⁶ ibid

²⁰⁷Crowd Chirenje, Interview with AU commissioner of police at PSOD, 03 April 2018.

3.4 Military Capabilities

The military has often been at the forefront of PSO in the AU as well as UN. However, in the case of AU deployments the various scenarios created by the AUPSC, and based on expeditious deployment that is meant to arrest conflict situations before they deteriorate and result in genocide or mass atrocities inform the military's role. The military therefore needed to develop capabilities that would ensure that it could execute its mandate as per the vision of the AUPSC.²⁰⁸ Thus the concept of rapid deployment is central to the development of military and indeed the entire ASF response.²⁰⁹ The Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) will consist of an integrated (civilian, police and military) as baseline capability, configured in accordance with the mission requirements. Inherent in the concept is the need to reduce the Notice To Move (NTM) of the follow-up elements from the standby brigade and the police components and to activate the civilian call-up process commensurate with the operational requirements. The RDC should, where possible, be based on a single region.²¹⁰

For effective response in PSO, the military must have certain capabilities that ensure efficiency and delivery of results. The military require heavy logistics to be able to deploy because of the nature of equipment that is required within the theater of operations, as well as communication capabilities that ensure effective command and control. Moreover, field operations are detached from the force headquarters and thus need the development and deployment of a field level headquarters as a capability.²¹¹ This means that the AU should be made aware of the capabilities that the TCC will be

²⁰⁸Adam C. Smith and Arthur Boutellis, "Rethinking Force Generation: Filling the Capability Gaps in UN Peace-keeping," *Providing for Peacekeeping* No. 2, New York: International Peace Institute, May 2013. p 2

²⁰⁹ Draft Concept paper on African Standby Force Rapid deployment Capability June 2004

²¹⁰ Ibid

²¹¹ Adam Smith and Boutellis , op cit.

bring into theater. These may include declaration on weapon types and logistics such as field hospitals.

The ASF concept however does not provide for an AU level field headquarters capability. In other words, the AU depends on the various regions for the provision and deployment of a headquarters at short notice.²¹² This is despite the fact that once instituted, ASF missions come directly under the AU command and control, meaning that the deployed capability falls under the AU despite being a contingent owned item. The lack of deployable headquarters impacts greatly on the military that are used to a system of command and control that is clear and precise. Although attempts have been made to improve command and control for AU deployed missions, it remains clear that the lack of a centralized headquarter has negative effects on the ability of Addis Ababa to direct operations as it would wish. The experiences of the troop contributing countries (TCC) in African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) show that states often revert to their own countries for advice on operations instead of relying on decisions made in Addis Ababa.²¹³ This has made it necessary for the TCCs to make attempts to sustain their forces in logistics, meaning that the ASF is still not able to support itself.

Since the military forces comprising the ASF are retained in the home countries, awaiting deployment whenever a conflict arises, there is no way, besides joint continuous training that can guarantee troop availability because retaining troops in constant readiness is always a challenge.²¹⁴ This is a serious challenge to force generation and deployment of ASF may not be raised in a timely manner due to each contributing

²¹² Billy Batware.,The African Standby Force, A solution to African Problems? M.A Thesis online available at <https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/AfricanStandbyforce.pdf> accessed on 29 April 2018.

²¹³Sivuyile Bam, Interview, op cit.

²¹⁴ Interview with Brigadier Otiato, Commander Kenya Rapid deployment Capability, 5 June 2018.

country's internal defence and security needs as well as the nature of billeting that exist in the military barracks.

The ASF, as envisaged in the founding documents was expected to operate regionally as well as continentally and could in some events be deployed beyond the continent.²¹⁵ The success of the idea was premised on the ability of the ASF to generate a robust military force capable of projecting into the conflict area within the shortest time possible, normally 30 days for conflicts that did not pose direct threat to destruction of human life and 14 days to conflicts that had been defined as direct threats to large losses of life. Thus the ASF military component needed to develop an interoperability capability. This is a situation where the forces are able to work together despite the doctrinal and equipment differences brought about by joint training and centralized logistics system that procures interchangeable equipment. This could only be done through joint training and also by establishing a centralized logistics system that would acquire and deploy weapon and communication systems acceptable to all regional states pledging troops for duty in ASF.²¹⁶ Moreover, doctrinal differences between the various armies would need to be addressed. Although the AU PSOD has created a standard operating procedure for the ASF, its permeation into the various ASF regional forces remains a challenge.²¹⁷ This was clearly seen during the AMANI AFRICA II exercise in South Africa where the discord resulted in the death of one soldier due to misunderstanding in live firing instructions.²¹⁸ Lack of common doctrine has been known

²¹⁵ ASF Protocol op cit

²¹⁶ Brigadier Otiato Interview, Ibid

²¹⁷ Solomon Dersso, op cit p 6

²¹⁸ During the exercise, doctrinal differences between South Africa and Angola became a point of contention as South Africa wanted to conduct the exercise according to its own doctrine while Angola having played a key role in planning and facilitating the exercise wanted a common doctrine as per the ASF doctrine framework.

to lead to troops behaving and executing operations differently. For the ASF to become a useful tool in solving security problems in Africa, there will be need for training exercises that link the various doctrines that inform the African military operations.

3.5 Logistics Challenges

The final operational capability exercise exposed the weaknesses inherent in the ASF logistics organizations. The East Africa Standby Force contingent to the exercise could not be lifted to South Africa due to lack of an airlift capability. This problem had been identified earlier and presented to the donors for funding. However, the EU, which was the lead donor and had promised to avail the airlift capability changed mind just before the exercise kicked off, making it impossible to bring forces from outside the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) to the field. Whereas the SADC countries were able to drive their troops to South Africa, EASF, ECOWAS and ECCAS needed to be transported to theater. Moreover, the problem of logistics during the exercise in South Africa brought to the forefront the teething operational concepts between the ASF and the African capacity for immediate response to crises (ACIRC), because whereas ACIRC members were able to deploy specific states' pledged capabilities to deploy troops, ASF depended on the logistics promised by Addis Ababa, which itself depended on donor support. Indeed, it was ACIRC member state, Angola, that airlifted the EASF contingent to Lohatla.²¹⁹

It therefore means that the ASF has not yet developed the logistic capability needed to deploy the military in theater according to scenario 5 and 6. These are the two scenarios that require rapid deployment capability of the military component to pacify the

²¹⁹Personal observation as part of the Kenya team to the exercise, Lohatla 23 November 2015.

situation while waiting the arrival of the other two components with their soft skills.²²⁰

The proposed logistics base in Douala, Cameroon, is yet to get the needed traction although it is now agreed that the base will indeed be located in Cameroon. The ASF and indeed the AU lacks sealift capacity as well. Deploying the military with its heavy equipment – tanks, artillery guns and vehicles and so on – require more than airlift, which, in any case is restricted to personnel and light weapons, and thus the need for sealift capabilities. Although it would be possible to hire such services, locating the right equipment within the time frames necessary to stop escalation of violence is a serious challenge. Failure to have dedicated sealift and airlift capabilities impacts on the rapid deployment capability that is critical to stopping conflict from escalating.

The fact that the ASF comprises regional standby forces that are populated by pledged capabilities but which do not have a permanent concentration area is in itself a weakness when it comes to executing collective security action.²²¹ The time needed to respond to conflict can be very short as violence could escalate very fast and the number of deaths rises tremendously requiring the intervention of the ASF through the AU. This means that there will be a requirement for mobilization of capabilities besides the tedious process of mandating. Locating ASF troops in home countries can be problematic despite the creation of a readiness roster that identifies standby regions.²²² This is because the troops are likely to be engaged by their countries in other duties, meaning that those trained but engaged elsewhere become difficult to deploy for AU PSO and therefore other soldiers, police and civilians not trained get deployed, thus reducing the response

²²⁰AUPSC Protocol relating to the establishment of the African Standby Force, op cit.

²²¹ Brig Kendagor, Head Peace and security Division, EASF Secretariat, interview 30 April 2018.

²²²Maputo declaration on the ASF 2016.

capability.²²³ The ability to intervene quickly and forcefully is critical to reduction of violence and this can only be done by the military while awaiting the arrival of other components. This ability must however be made known to the AU PSC in time so that decisions that can mitigate conflict in due course can be made and implemented.

3.6 Command and control Challenges

Effective command and control of the ASF requires a structure and system that elaborates relationships and establishes limits of authority. Although the AU established an ASF command and control system in the initial prioritization of the operationalization roadmap, it however has been slow in moving beyond the document into reality.²²⁴ To achieve a concrete command and control structure, the AU will need to recruit the necessary expertise and experience which should operate from Addis Ababa to provide the headquarter capability.

The problem of command and control during some of the missions conducted by the AU are related to strategic and operational command and control, as demonstrated in the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).²²⁵ The problems of a clear command and control structure also affect the provision of the requisite military specialties and technical capabilities. Therefore there is need for a clear definition of the different levels of command and control at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, linked through functional communications.²²⁶

The AU and RECs/RMs need to closely coordinate also and put in place the

²²³Maj General Okello, Head AU PSOD planning Section, Phone Interview, 25 Feb 2018.

²²⁴Dersso Solomon., The role and place of the African Standby Force in APSA. ISS paper 209, January 2010, p 12.

²²⁵ A Ekengard, *The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): experiences and lessons learned*, Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2008; p 16

²²⁶ Ibid

infrastructure that will enable the different actors to exercise and enforce command and control on deployed ASF missions. Jakkie Cilliers observes that, this entails ‘the installation of an appropriate Africa-wide, integrated and interoperable command, control, communication and information system (C3IS) infrastructure, that would link deployed units with mission headquarters, as well as the AU planning elements (PLANLEMs) and regions’.²²⁷

3.7 Training Challenges

Training is critical and an important technical requirement and a prerequisite for the operational readiness of the ASF capabilities. Given that ASF regional standby forces are made up of multidimensional contingents based in their countries of origin, there is a need for continuous training at different levels. Personnel that states pledge towards an ASF capability should acquire the necessary basic training in order to contribute effectively to ASF peace support operations. The training should be joint in nature and should be tested by means of exercises at both REC/RM and continental level.²²⁸

Achieving the required standards of training is not easy thing to accomplish, as it requires well-equipped and resourced training centres with the capacity to provide continent-wide training support. The few training centers that exist in Africa at the moment not all of them have the necessary capacity, making the training to lack uniformity. Moreover, they still do not have a singular training curriculum, which is a prerequisite for standard performance.²²⁹ The differences in training standards can be seen from region to region with ECCAS having the lowest standards due to lack of

²²⁷JakkieCilliers, African Standby Force, 2.

²²⁸Dersso Solomon, op cit.

²²⁹ Brig General (rtd) Kabage, Former director of International Peace support training center, Karen Nairobi, interview on 24 April 2018.

training institutions.²³⁰

A lot of work has already gone into attempts to standardize ASF training within and across RECs/RMs.²³¹ The success of such efforts will ensure that all the standby forces adhere to the same standards and are at the same level of technical preparedness. Training is also a means of facilitating the interoperability of troops coming from different regional standby forces.²³² Moreover, interoperability is one of the major challenges in raising the regional standby forces, because different member states have different standards for operational procedures, approaches, equipment, traditions and training.

3.8 Funding capabilities

Funding capabilities have been identified as core to the problems afflicting the ASF functionality. According to AU PSOD, over 90% of PSO funding comes from donors and the AU contributions cater for less than 10%.²³³ In fact, most of the experts working at the AU PSOD have their salaries paid either by donors directly or their own countries second them gratis. Such individuals, though experts in their own specialties, may not owe loyalty to the AU and indeed will act to please whichever side that pays them. In the case of those that receive pay from their own countries, it is normal to expect that they will push national agenda and interests. This renders the command and control of the ASF secretariat at the AU difficult as was clearly demonstrated by the

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ OkekeMateyins, Head of Political unit at AU PSOD, Addis Ababa, phone interview, 6 January 2018

²³² Brig Kabage, op cit.

²³³ SmailChergui, AU commissioner for peace and security, opening remarks at the Specialized Technical Committee on safety and Security, 2 March 2014, Addis Ababa.

intransigence of Burundi when the issue of deploying ASF in that country came up during its tenor as the chair of the PSC.²³⁴

Besides the money needed to sustain the management personnel in Addis Ababa, PSO require large capital outlay for initial deployment and sustenance. Due to the lack of funds in the AU and the RECs/RMs, operations have always depended on external support making it impossible for the AU to deploy on its own. This has rendered the ASF a lame duck in the sense that despite the declared operational capability, it still lacks the most vital requirement for action, namely funding. According to Darkwa, ASF may never be deployed in its current form because the AU does not have the financial capability to put intentions into action.

3.9 Chapter Summary

The ASF was declared fully operational in January 2016 but the reality is that it has many capability gaps that need filling. Moreover, the idea that the ASF mandate be extended to include almost any form of threat is itself a challenge especially considering that the inclusion of essentially non combat and non-force roles must take into account the inherent civilian capability residing in the ASF.²³⁵ Currently, the ASF civilian capability is very small but this can be improved with proper planning and prioritization. The civilian capability is reduced by virtue of the fact that the ASF is not a permanent organization and thus those civilians with the requisite expertise are not easily billeted, as is the case with the military. Moreover, the lack of adequate funding makes it difficult to retain a critical number of civilians on standby status and pay them.

²³⁴ Author observation as a member of Kenya Embassy team to the AU, 2016/17.

²³⁵The African Union peace and security council., Press statement the 570th meeting of the peace and security council on AMANI Africa-II and AFRIPOL. Addis Ababa: African Union.

The police and the military on the other hand may not face such challenges but the problems are more on the police contingent. Since the police have to continue with their law and order duties in their own countries, only a small number maybe available for deployment when a situation requiring such deployment arises.²³⁶ This problem is further complicated by retirements, training and promotions which means that the ASF police may have to deploy what they have not trained, meaning that those who are presented for deployment lack the requisite skills for PSO police work.²³⁷

The problem of deploying people who are not trained is also seen in the military component due to natural attrition where soldiers die, retire or are sacked just before deployments. Due to the nature of sustaining the various components in the regional rapid deployment capabilities, it is difficult to assure any components perpetual availability. When viewed in the context of conflict development, where there can be sudden onset of violence such that response from the AU is overwhelmed, the ASF remain challenged in all its components and may become reactive instead of being proactive as the founding documents initially intended.

²³⁶OkekeMartyns, op cit.

²³⁷Gariba, Commissioner of Police Ghana. Former head of police planning cell at AU PSOD, interviewed on LinkedIn. 24 February 2018.

CHAPTER 4:

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF REGIONAL COMMUNITIES AND MECHANISMS TO INTERVENE IN CONFLICTS

4.1 Introduction

Regionalization of peace operations responsibility is not a new idea. Indeed, Articles 52 and 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter envisioned an important role for regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of regional disputes as well as in enforcement action under the authority of the Security Council. The rationale behind a regional approach to conflict management is based on the actors' familiarity with the problems at hand as well as their cultural, social and historical affinity with each other and the parties to the conflict.²³⁸ Such familiarity may however be both an advantage and also a disadvantage. Skeptics of collective security maintain that it is this connection to the region and its actors with its effect on impartiality that is one of the disadvantages associated with regional peace operations. In other words, regional peace operations are viewed to have the likelihood of entrenching regional political competition to the detriment of the managing the conflict. Other impediments to successful regional collectivization of security are negative regional power perceptions, the resource capacity constraints of regional organizations, and the lack of authoritative legitimacy as well as the institutional weakening of the United Nations and the AU.²³⁹ Due to perception of familiarity with conflict dynamics and hence sensitivity to the drivers of conflict, regional economic communities and mechanisms in Africa have continued to play an increasing role in the management of security within their regions.

²³⁸Benedict Francke, *In Defence of regional peace operations in Africa*, online @sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a185.pdf accessed on 24 June 2018.

²³⁹ Ibid.

Under the subsidiarity rule, the UN can authorize the AU to take steps to ensure peace and security within the continent. Conversely, the AU can authorize RECs/RMs to intervene in conflict situations that occur within the African sub-regional communities. In this regard, the AU makes use of the various instruments at its disposal for peace and security. Despite the subsidiarity principle, the various regions in Africa have experienced differing levels of success in terms of collective security.²⁴⁰ In this regard, there have been significant efforts in Africa to provide for regional intervention in conflicts that directly impact on regional security. Indeed, since 2003, over half of African PSO have been conducted by the RECs/REMs.²⁴¹ The RECs/RMs however do not operate outside the AU, and this is what gives the AU the ability to claim credit for operations that have been successfully conducted by the regions. The RECs/RMs therefore may use either diplomatic or coercive means in order to achieve peace and security within their regions. This chapter assesses the capacity of the various RECs/RMs in securing Africa.

4.2 The Role of RECs and RMs

The AU recognizes eight RECs and Two RMs in its economic and social council as well as in the Peace and security commission. In this regard, the regions have been linked to the AU in terms of conflict management but are required to inform the organization in the event of the need to immediately act to prevent escalation of violence in their regions.

Regionalization of peace operations responsibility is not a new idea. Indeed, Articles 52 and 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter envisioned an important role for regional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of regional disputes as well as in

²⁴⁰Darkwa, *op cit* p14

²⁴¹Brosig, *Cooperative Peacekeeping*, p 12

enforcement action under the authority of the Security Council. The rationale behind a regional approach to conflict management is based on the actors' familiarity with the problems at hand as well as their cultural, social and historical affinity with each other and the parties to the conflict.²⁴² Such familiarity may however be both an advantage and also a disadvantage. Peace regionalization skeptics maintain that it is this connection to the region and its actors with its effect on impartiality that is one of the disadvantages associated with regional peace operations.²⁴³ In other words, regional peace operations are viewed to have the likelihood of entrenching regional political competition to the detriment of the managing the conflict. Other impediments to successful regional collectivization of security are negative regional power perceptions, the resource capacity constraints of regional organizations, and the lack of authoritative legitimacy as well as the institutional weakening of the United Nations and the AU.²⁴⁴ Due to perception of familiarity with conflict dynamics and hence sensitivity to the drivers of conflict, regional economic communities and mechanisms in Africa have continued to play and increasing role in the management of security within their regions.

Under the subsidiarity rule, the UN can authorize the AU to take steps to ensure peace and security within the continent. Conversely, the AU can authorize RECs/RMs to intervene in conflict situation that occur within the African sub regional communities. In this regard, the AU makes use of the various instruments at its disposal for peace and security. Despite the subsidiarity principle, the various regions in Africa have experienced differing levels of success in terms of collective security.²⁴⁵ In this regard

²⁴²Benedict Francke, *In Defence of regional peace operations in Africa*, online @sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a185.pdf accessed on 24 June 2018.

²⁴³Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss (ed), *Collective conflict management and Changing World Politics*, op cit, p 9.

²⁴⁴Benedict Francke, *Ibid.*

²⁴⁵Darkwa, op cit p14

there have been significant efforts in Africa to provide for regional intervention in conflicts that directly impact on regional security. Indeed, since 2003, over half of African PSO have been conducted by the RECs/REMs.²⁴⁶ The RECs/RMs however do not operate outside the AU, and this is what gives the AU the ability to claim credit for operations that have been successfully conducted by the regions. The RECs/RMs therefore may use either diplomatic or coercive means in order to achieve peace and security within their regions. This chapter assesses the capacity of the various RECs/RMs in securing Africa.

The level of involvement in peace and security operations within the regional security arrangements in Africa differs according to the level and depth of integration within the region. Hence, in West Africa, ECOWAS has been at the forefront in security management while in North Africa,²⁴⁷ a big gap appeared with the demise of the former Libyan strongman, Muammar Gadhafi who single handedly underwrote the majority of operations.²⁴⁸ Whereas the southern Africa region has demonstrated some capability in responding to regional conflicts, it has done so more in liaison with the AU and the UN than on its own volition, a strength that seems to reside in ECOWAS. In the Eastern and central Africa regions, the responses have been varied with the central region having demonstrated better collectivization of effort by its response in the central Africa crisis than the reaction of eastern Africa in both Somalia and South Sudan conflicts. The regional organizations are expected to intervene in conflicts within their areas of

²⁴⁶Brosig, *Cooperative Peacekeeping*, p 12

²⁴⁷Darkwa, *op cit* p 9

²⁴⁸ Peter Koenig., Interview with Russia 24 TV on 25 May 2017, cited in Pambazuka news, available @ <https://www.pambazuka.org>, accessed on 27 June 2018.

responsibility and also be ready to support the AU operations in other areas when called upon to do so by the AU PSC.²⁴⁹

Regional mechanism and economic communities involvement in conflict management is further necessitated by the reality that such conflicts have a regional impact and have the potential to create insecurity beyond the countries where they occur. Moreover, there has been an increasing ownership of primary responsibility towards conflict management in Africa after the realization that western interventions were no longer prioritizing African conflicts.²⁵⁰ In this regard, the various regional organizations have established Peace and security department through which they engage the AU in dealing with matters of collective regional security. They are at liberty to apply all the structures within the APSA in pursuit of security within their regions and at times may be called upon by the AU to combine efforts in regard to intractable conflicts like the case of IGAD plus in the matter of the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan.

4.3 The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)

SADC is a regional economic community in southern Africa that seeks to promote sustainable economic growth and socio-economic development through integration, good governance and durable peace and security.²⁵¹ SADC's formation can be traced back to the 1960s and 1970s, when the leaders of newly independent African states and national liberation movements in southern Africa mobilized together politically, diplomatically and militarily as the Frontline States (FLS) to unite against apartheid South Africa and to support continental decolonization. However, its full maturation into

²⁴⁹ AU PSC Protocol on the establishment of the African Standby Force.

²⁵⁰ Martha Mutisi., SADC Interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, *Conflict trends, No 3, 2016.*

²⁵¹ Ibid

an economic community occurred in 1992.

The institutions' move into peace and security developed progressively as it became more linked to the OAU and eventually the AU. The most important legal documents guiding SADC's role in peace and security are the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation and the Mutual Defence Pact. This means that SADC is structured and organized as a collective security construct for purposes of peace in the region.

SADC has been involved in several security operations and management in member states. The most notable include its role in the management of the Lesotho crisis, the intervention in DRC, Comoros and Madagascar.²⁵² In this regard, SADC has mostly acted with authority from the AU except in the case of Lesotho when South Africa, which surrounds Lesotho territorially, decided to unilaterally intervene. Even then, the need to put a veneer of collective security was apparent as the decision to intervene was communicated to the SADC secretariat in Gaborone.

In the DRC, the action by SADC to intervene can be viewed in light of the AU constitutive act article 4(j) because the government of DRC requested the regional organization to intervene.²⁵³ The operation was eventually taken over by the UN under the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), but the troop contributors remained from SADC. In this event, SADC decided to deploy military forces instead of adopting the diplomatic approach largely due to the nature of the prevailing conflict in DRC. According to Head of Peace Support Operations at the AU, FIB has been successful in separating the warring factions in DRC and although it is under the UN, SADC and AU count it part of the

²⁵² Ibid

²⁵³ Adriana LinsAlberquerque and Cecilia Hull Wiklund., Challenges to peace and Security in Southern Africa: The role of SADC. *Studies in African Security*, December 2015.

successful homegrown solutions to African problems.²⁵⁴ Despite the apparent success in peace and security operations, SADC has experienced the very problems that seem to affect collective security in Africa. In 2009, the organization failed to respond in time in the crisis in Madagascar despite the early indicators of violence following the country's disputed elections. Moreover, the desire and ability of South Africa to use its superior economy and military might to control the rest of the states has often led to disputes on how to collectively participate in security operations.

According to former president of Botswana, Festus Mogae, the ubiquity of South Africa in all security matters in the region was making it difficult for other members to effectively contribute.²⁵⁵ Thus SADC has played a critical role in the security of Africa and indeed is one of the few regional organizations that have supported the AU in its endeavor to achieve continental peace and security. SADC has also managed to use its military forces for security purposes and for this reason has been very supportive of the creation of the ACIRC, where South Africa plays a leading role. In terms of deploying its diplomatic muscle, the organization oversaw the mediation efforts that resulted in a power sharing agreement in Zimbabwe in 2008.²⁵⁶

However, SADC has not been very cooperative when it comes to linking with other regions for peace and security across the continent. According to Okeke, this can be attributed to the desire by South Africa to play the role of the African hegemon, probably with an eye to the UN permanent member seat should it become available in the future.²⁵⁷ Such desires have acted to derail the collective security agenda in Africa with countries that wish to play regional hegemonies being blamed for the slow development of collective

²⁵⁴ Bam Sivuyile, Interview op cit.

²⁵⁵ Festus Mogae, Speech to the AU IGAD plus, Addis Ababa, 17 October 2015.

²⁵⁶ Alberquerque and Wulkind op cit

²⁵⁷ Dr. Martyn Okeke, head of political affairs unit at PSOD, Addis Ababa. Interview op cit.

security management instruments. This is not only for SADC but applies to other regional organizations as well. Since SADC hosts and manages the standby brigade domiciled within its region, it would be expected that all enforcement action would be located within the force. This has however proven problematic, as South Africa has tended to drive the security effort in the region with lip service to the concept of regional standby brigade.²⁵⁸ Indeed, under the direction of South Africa, SADC has to a large extent abandoned the African Standby Force deployment concept and has instead embraced the ACIRC concept. The former president of South Africa, Jacob Zuma is on record having declared that South Africa would spearhead the realization of ACIRC and urging all members of SADC to support the initiative for their own good.²⁵⁹ Therefore in the SADC region, there is still conflict on the status of the regional standby Force and that of ACIRC. At the moment, only Tanzania, South Africa and Angola are members of ACIRC out of the fifteen SADC members.

4.4 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS was created for the purpose of economic development of West African states about 40 years ago. It has however moved very strongly into the field of peace and security in realization of the fact that security; development and economic growth are closely intertwined. ECOWAS developed its conflict prevention and management frameworks and tools, namely the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1999) and the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001). These instruments together form the basis for the ECOWAS Conflict and Prevention Framework (2008).

²⁵⁸Alberquerque and Wulkind, opcit

²⁵⁹ Jacob Zuma., Speech during the ASF final Full Operational capability exercise at Lohatla Army Combat training Base, South Africa, 21 November 2015

ECOWAS as an institution was notably absent militarily in the two major armed conflicts ravaging the region in recent years, namely the crisis in Mali and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, Cameroun and Chad. ECOWAS member states however participated militarily in the African-led international mission to Mali, (AFISMA).²⁶⁰ Although ECOWAS did not deploy militarily in this two incidents after their onset, it has remained actively involved in seeking to manage the Malian crisis through non-military means, particularly through its mediation and by imposing a sanctions regime.²⁶¹ The failure to intervene in the Mali case as opposed to previous action in countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone can be attributed to lack of logistical support and also the delay by the UN in authorizing the intervention. By the time such authority came in, it was already too late as France had already intervened.

ECOWAS has also suffered an institutional crisis due to the hegemonic tendencies of Nigeria. For example the decision to revive the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in October 2014, to deal with the threat posed by Boko Haram was seen as an attempt to sideline ECOWAS, but which ended exposing the inherent weakness in both organizations in terms of military deployments.²⁶²

ECOWAS has however a well developed early warning mechanism, ECOWARN that predicts conflict and informs the organization for mitigation. The problem is that the organization lack adequate logistics to implement mitigation measures. According to Darkwa, the potential for effective responses is hampered by lack of regional logistics and communication capabilities that would have enabled the organization to achieve

²⁶⁰ Johan Tejpar and Adriana LinsAlberquerque., Challenges to Peace and Security in West Africa: the Role of ECOWAS. *Studies in African security*, August 2015

²⁶¹ Ibid

²⁶² Ibid, Sivuyile Bam, op cit.

faster responses.²⁶³ Current the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) does not have a proper logistical framework but the efforts to establish a logistics base in Sierra Leone is well under way and could prove useful in future. Moreover, ESF suffers from over dependency on troops from Nigeria that has the responsibility for contributing more than 50% of the forces.²⁶⁴

ECOWAS has however made significant inroads in its conflict prevention work. The experts' opinion is that ECOWAS has accomplished quite a lot in the sphere of conflict prevention. Moreover, ECOWAS's work on democratic governance front, especially in areas of election monitoring, is an emerging area of success.²⁶⁵ The recent action in the Gambia where ECOWAS led a military threat to remove the defeated president YahyaJahmeh and install the newly elected president, Adama Barrow is a case of regional efforts to institutionalize democracy. ECOWAS however suffers from the same problem that have plagued SADC due to the powerful nature of Nigeria.²⁶⁶ These problems are likely to be encountered in other regions where hegemonic competition is still prevalent.

Another area where ECOWAS has experienced challenges leading to negative effects on collective security is in the differences that exist between Francophone and Anglophone countries comprising the membership. Whereas the Anglophone countries are faster in responding to crises, the Francophone countries seem to await cues from France.²⁶⁷ A balance is therefore needed going forward for the effective management of peace and security in the region. Moreover, such balance will mitigate the need for

²⁶³Darkwa, opcit

²⁶⁴Tejpiet and Aberquerque,opcit

²⁶⁵Tajpiet and Alberquerque, ibid.

²⁶⁶ Camilla Edowson and Justin Macdermott.,*ECOWAS Capabilities in Peace and security: A scoping study of progress and challenges*, FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, December 2010, p 9

²⁶⁷Ibid,p 10

lengthy bureaucratic requirements as states will move from insular to shared sovereignty, thus creating a more linked security system.

In terms of linking with the African Standby Force and hence APSA, ECOWAS has a well-developed Standby Force. The concept of operations and deployment is structured under the ASF rapid deployment capability, where the regional task Force plays the role of RDC while troops and other capabilities such as civilian and police are domiciled in their own countries but ready to deploy on call. However, the ECOWAS standby Force (ESF) suffers various capability gaps including lack of adequately trained civilian and police personnel, logistics and deployable communications equipment.²⁶⁸ These gaps will need to be comprehensively addressed if ESF is to declare FOC in real terms.

Despite success in mediation and other diplomatic efforts at security management, the ECOWAS region has been more proactive in use of force to enforce peace than other African union regional standby capabilities. The efforts of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and Liberia remain clearly etched in the African peace and security historical achievements. Moreover, the presence of a hegemon in the region has served to galvanize action against recalcitrant members as well as entrench democracy not only in the region but within the hegemon itself as it would not be fair for Nigeria to demand democracy in other countries while within its own boundaries democracy failed to thrive. Democratic governance in West Africa has functioned well under the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework that brings together policy makers concerned with governance issues in the region with a

²⁶⁸ Ibid, p 13

view to Assess progress and come up with measures to ensure effective conflict management.²⁶⁹

An assessment of the ECOWAS capabilities in the areas of peace and security shows that it has developed more in the areas of diplomatic engagements than in the forceful intervention because the ESF is still constrained in scenario five and six operations due to lack of capacity in the various capabilities that make up the force.²⁷⁰ In this regard, the role of the ESF has been more in regional peace and security enforcement than in humanitarian interventions.

4.5 The Eastern Africa Region

The Eastern Africa region is probably one of the most complex in terms of collective security management. The region comprises of countries that are in different regional institutions, often overlapping jurisdictions and have serious hegemonic competitions without a stand-alone state that can call the shots in terms of regional security. Despite hosting the AU headquarters the, the region is still not cohesive enough and thus operates as a mechanism when it comes to issues of peace and security.²⁷¹

The types and nature of conflict that exist in this region compound collective management of security in eastern Africa. These include interstate, intrastate and non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence against civilians. The region suffers heavily from humanitarian emergencies, natural disasters, extreme poverty and famine, while struggling with massive refugee flows and large population of internally displaced people. What complicates the security situation further is the depth of mistrust, enmity

²⁶⁹ Akin Iwilade and Johnson Uchechukwu Agbo., ECOWAS and the regulation of Peace and security in West Africa, *Democracy and Security*, Vol 8, 2014 No 4, 358-373

²⁷⁰ Elowson and Macdermott op cit and Albuquerque and Tajpier op cit.

²⁷¹ Camilla Elowson and Adriana Albuquerque., Challenges to Peace and Security in Eastern Africa: The role of EAC, IGAD and EASF. *Studies in African security*, February 2016

and rivalry that defines relations between states in the region.²⁷²

This results from the nature of the regional communities that are found in eastern Africa. On one hand, the IGAD, which was formed for the purposes of managing drought and development in relation to effects on regional security, has established a robust peace and security department while the East African Community (EAC) has concentrated on advancing economic integration with just a small department dealing with peace and security matters. IGAD focuses on three main areas: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; Political Affairs; and Humanitarian Affairs. It also has ‘specialized institutes’, such as the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism and the Security Sector Programme.²⁷³

The EAC on the other hand, adopted a Regional Strategy for Peace and Security in 2006. Moreover, a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Defence has been signed by the member states and currently guides the relations between the regional defence forces. Other documents in use include the Protocol on an Early Warning and Response Mechanism and a Regional Framework for Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution. Thus the conflict of interests that exist between the members due to overlapping presence in more than one regional organization presents problems to peace and security management in the region because states have divided loyalties. Although IGAD passes itself as a regional economic community, there is no economic or any other type of integration that has taken place in the organization.²⁷⁴ Indeed IGAD has remained a peace and security organization more than an economic one.

²⁷²Ibid, p 1.

²⁷³ Ibid

²⁷⁴Dr Mohammed Guyo, IGAD special envoy to Somalia, Interviewed by phone on 17 May 2018.

According to Elowson and Albuquerque, the disagreement resulting from multiple memberships in different regional organization has served to stymie collective security responses in the region.²⁷⁵ This means that the region is unable to function as REC and has thus been classified as a RM. In this regard, the security management in the region suffers from duplicity and this affects even the impetus of the regional Standby Force, the EASF. In order for the EASF to succeed, it was found necessary to establish a different management mechanism outside the regional organization influences. Security in the region has therefore been managed largely through diplomatic means but even then problems have been experienced. In IGAD for instance, the current stalemate on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan can be attributed to the lack of diplomatic finesse by the lead negotiators as well as hegemonic contestations between Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda.²⁷⁶ EAC on the other hand stands to be blamed for the failure to intervene in the chaos that engulfed Kenya in 2007/8 as well as the recent violence that took place in Burundi in 2015. Indeed, the EAC has been lackluster in collective security management especially in areas of democracy and good governance where the member states seem to value the status quo more than the implementation of the various conflict management instruments that exist within the community.

Such failures have therefore negatively impacted the capability of the EASF to respond to conflicts. Whereas the EASF is comprised of states that straddle IGAD, EAC and SADC as well as others that do not subscribe to any REC, its operations have been affected by hegemonic competition between Kenya and Ethiopia, who have laid stakes at

²⁷⁵Elowson and Albuquerque, op cit.

²⁷⁶Phillip Apuuli Kasaija, "IGAD's Mediation in the Current South Sudan Conflict: Prospects and Challenges," *African Security* 8, no. 2 (2015): 126.

where the regional administration and headquarters should be located.²⁷⁷ The Eastern Africa region therefore depends heavily on the goodwill of member states of the various organizations that manage security between and within the region. This means that without a central body to order action, delays are likely to be experienced, often resulting to unnecessary loss of life. The way the EASF deployment is structured does not lead to efficient response. The requirement that only an EASF summit can authorize deployment defeats the essence of rapid deployment and the expectations of scenario five of the ASF deployment requirements.²⁷⁸ Despite the teething problems resulting from the above issues, the EASF has managed to make impressive progress towards becoming the regional violent conflict response tool of choice. The EASF has undertaken several initiatives to provide collective security in the region by sending fact-finding missions in Somalia, South Sudan and recently demonstrating capability to deploy in Burundi.²⁷⁹ Thus EASF remains the only robust response capability that the Eastern Africa region can use for interventions on a wide scale while diplomacy is likely to remain a viable tool within the various sub-regional organizations albeit with the danger of intractable hegemonic competitions.

4.6 The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

ECCAS was revived in 1998 after six years of inactivity. This was informed by the need to establish a collective security framework following the events in Rwanda that

²⁷⁷Endalcahew Bayeh., The East African Standby Force, Roles, Challenges and prospects, *International Journal of Research and development*, vol 29, pp 197-204. October 2015

²⁷⁸Neethling T (2005). “Shaping the African Standby Force: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects”, *Military Review*, pp. 68-71.

²⁷⁹Mumma-Martinon CA (2013). “Efforts towards Conflict Prevention in the Eastern African Region: The Role of Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms”, *Occasional paper, series 1, No. 1.*, Karen: International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) ., Maj General Tai Gituai., Former Chief of Staff EASF Secretariat Nairobi, Interview 16 December 2017.

saw the death of over one million people.²⁸⁰ Initially structured as an economic community, the ECCAS began to gradually move into peace and security issues in the 1990s and has continued to date. In this regard, the region has engaged very effectively with the AU PSC and has made efforts to play its role in developing APSA.²⁸¹ The ECCAS has made good strides in the establishment of the regional Standby Force as its contribution towards collective security in the region and the continent at large.

Initially operating under the French acronym CEMAC, the region shifted from economic heavy relationship to encompass security in the early 2000. In 2002, the region deployed its first mission in the Central Africa Republic, a move that proved pivotal in the future operations of the organization. The deployment of the Force Multinationale du CentraleAfrique (FOMUC) was led by troop contributions from Chad, Gabon and Congo Brazzaville. The mission was put in place to provide security of then-CAR-President Ange-Félix Patassé, to restructure the national army and consolidate peace and security in the capital of Bangui. The mandate was however revised when General François Bozizé took power through a coup d'Etat in March 2003. On 12 July 2008, the FOMUC has been transformed into the Mission for the consolidation of Peace (MICOPAX) and has passed under the authority of ECCAS.

ECCAS Heads of States met in Malabo in 2002 and decided to establish a Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX), a Commission for Defence and Security (CDS), a multinational rapid reaction force (FOMAC) and an early warning system (MARAC) to support the Community's new mission.²⁸² These are the instruments available to ECCAS for security management in the region. Thus in a similar way,

²⁸⁰ Angela Meyer, Regional integration and security in Central Africa-Assessment and Perspectives, 10 years after revival. *Egmont paper 25, December 2008*, Academia Press. p 3

²⁸¹ Ibid p 7

²⁸² Angela Meyer, *ibid*

FOMAC can be seen as Central Africa's contribution to the African Standby Force, comparable to the West African ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) or the EASF in Eastern Africa.²⁸³

According to Obi Cyril, the central African region has deployed forces several times to respond to crises in the region.²⁸⁴ Apparently this sudden reactivation of forceful intervention was informed by the 'western intervention in African conflicts fatigue' that was demonstrated by the events in Rwanda and the evacuation of American forces in Somalia earlier in the 1990s.²⁸⁵ In ECCAS, the early warning system works closely with the AU CEWs but it is clear that diplomacy has not taken root in the region. Indeed, in 2013, ECCAS was quick to deploy in CAR after the French Sangari forces arrived in Banjul to separate the warring factions that had taken clear religious lines. The success of the intervention led to the eventual take over of the mission by the UN. Thus the central African region has tended to make use of the regional standby force arrangement better than the other regions.

4.7 RECs/RMs Responses to Crises

The RECs/RMS have been active in securing their regions through military and political interventions.²⁸⁶ In the East African region, the RM has adopted political interventions more than enforcement. This is demonstrated by the action of IGAD in South Sudan and Somalia as well as the East Africa Community role in the Burundi crisis. In West Africa, ECOWAS was able to overcome political problems associated

²⁸³ibid, p 11.

²⁸⁴ Cyril Obi, in Angela Meyer, Peace and Cooperation in Central Africa, Developments, Challenges and prospects, Nordiska Afrika Institutet, Discussion paper no 56,p 7

²⁸⁵ Boutros Boutros Ghali, In: United Nations, *Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peace-keeping in Africa: Report of the Secretary General*, UN Doc. A/50/711-S/1995/911, 01.11.1995 <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-711.htm> (accessed April 25, 2018).

²⁸⁶Darkwa op cit.

with patrimonialism²⁸⁷ and has intervened in more conflict situations than any other region, proving that indeed Africa can use force to resolve conflicts. These include interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia and recently in Gambia. Moreover, ECOWAS was instrumental in initiating action against the insurgency in Mali.²⁸⁸ In Southern Africa SADC has taken part in several PSOs that have returned normalcy to deteriorating security situation in countries such as the Comoros, Lesotho and the DRC.²⁸⁹ It's probably the NASF region that has been less active in peace operations.

According to Sivuyile, the RECs and RMs often deploy without the authority of the AU or the UN only to later request for such authorization post facto. This has made it difficult to consolidate the ASF and thus affected the overall capacity of the AU the collective respond to issues of security in the continent. According to him, there is a need to delink the regional standby forces from the control of the RECs/RMs and place the forces directly under the command of the AU.²⁹⁰ Darkwa on the other hand opines that the RECs/RMs should be allowed to continue playing the role of first responders within their regions because they are able to master the politics involved in the conflicts by virtue of proximity.²⁹¹ Warner on the other hand supports RECs/RMs interventions on the basis of the ability to understand the cultural drivers of conflicts within their regional and thus have the capacity to respond. This capacity includes the ability to get the local buy-in from the conflict leaders because of the understanding of local cultures that involve

²⁸⁷ Levitt, J.I. ., *Illegal Peace in Africa: an inquiry into the legality of power sharing with warlords, rebels and junta*. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2008, p 103.

²⁸⁸ Nicoll, A. and Delaney, J. 'France in Mali: rapid reaction receive strategic' 19(1) *strategic comments*, pp 4-6

²⁸⁹ Interview with Col Ali Katimbe, Head of ACIRC planning cell at AU PSOD, Addis Ababa, 4 February 2018.

²⁹⁰ Bam Sivuyile op cit

²⁹¹ Darkwa op cit

spiritual derivatives.²⁹²

The idea by Sivuyile to place the regional standby forces under the AU is good but may never be acceptable to the regions. This is because the various RECs/RMs are not yet cohesive enough to act as single unit.²⁹³ According to General Karangi, the constant hegemonic contestation that is apparent in East, Central and Northern Africa make it difficult for the regions to agree on ceding their troops to the AU, where they believe that such forces would be deployed against their interests.²⁹⁴ This means that the RECs/RMs will continue to play a key role in the deployment of the ASF and thus a clear command and control mechanism between the AU and RECs/RMs need to be put in place to ensure that once the RECs/RMs take the initiative to secure their regions, the AU can assume command as soon as practicable. This will turn the RECs/RMs effort into AU action and thus convert the regional standby force activity into an ASF intervention.

4.8 AU deployments in Regional Peace and Security Management

The AU has been involved in several peace and security deployments even though it has never deployed the ASF as currently constructed.²⁹⁵ The deployments against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) as well as the establishment of the multinational joint task force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) are good examples.²⁹⁶ Moreover, the AU was quick to take over regional peace and security initiatives in Mali and Central Africa Republic after the initial regional forces action.²⁹⁷

²⁹²Warner J. in Linda Darkwa, op cit.

²⁹³Desmitt and Huack,opcit

²⁹⁴General(rtd) Julius Karangi interview on 4 April 2018. What in your opinion ails the success of ASF and why cant the Forces be placed directly under the AU command?

²⁹⁵Darkwa Ibid.

²⁹⁶Sivuyile Bam, op cit.

²⁹⁷ Bright Nkrumah and Frans Viljoen, Drawing lessons from ECOWAS in the implementation of Article 4(h) in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds) op cit. p 261.

The AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is the jewel in the AU PSO. Despite the fact that the AU does not fund the mission but merely administers it has not reduced the role it plays. Although the troops are from the East African region and can be viewed as from the regional standby force, the involvement of troops from Sierra Leone served to make the mission truly an African one. However the departure of Sierra Leone in 2015, and the failure to attract alternative troop contributors from across Africa shows difficulty in entrenching the concept of collective security in Africa. This has direct implications for the development of ASF because its operations are hinged on the idea of collective security.²⁹⁸

Whereas the UN took over the Mali and Central Africa Republic missions, this is yet to happen for AMISOM. One of the reasons for the delay in handing over to the UN is the apparent reluctance by the AU to hand over the mission.²⁹⁹ The AU views AMISOM as its own initiative and that its success would be the evidence of providing African solutions to African problems. In fact, the AU is so involved in AMISOM to the extent that it has denied any role to the regional standby force secretariat despite the fact that all the forces in the mission belong to EASF troops pledging countries.³⁰⁰

4.9 Hindrances to the deployment of ASF

The ASF as conceived has yet to be deployed in African conflicts. The closest that the ASF came to be deployed was in the Burundi conflict that occurred after President Pierre Nkurunziza decided to run for a third term despite a constitutional

²⁹⁸ Fred Mugisha and Gilbert Mittawa., *Multilateral Interventions: the AMISOM experience in Dan Kwali and Frans Viljoen (eds) op cit. p 265*

²⁹⁹ Personal observation. The director of Peace and security Mr Aboudalahi Wane on 28 January 2015 during the meeting of Military Operations Coordinating Committee, stated that the AMISOM mission was an opportunity for the AU to demonstrate to the world its ability to initiate and lead a fully fledged multidimensional peace support operations. He stated that it was time for Africa to show the world that it can manage its own security.

³⁰⁰ Mugisha and Muttawa op cit, p 269.

requirement limiting the presidential term limits to two. The AU PSC in its 565th meeting decided to deploy the ASF with a view to containing the violence in that country.³⁰¹ The AU proposed a 5,000 strong force named the African Prevention and Protection Force in Burundi (MAPBROBU) and proposed an initial deployment of six months.³⁰² This idea was immediately opposed on the floor by Burundi, which at the time was a member of the AU PSC. Although Burundi's opposition was defeated and the mission agreed on, the matter never ended there as it was taken up in Bujumbura where the minister of foreign affairs declared that the AU was out of touch with reality if it expected to deploy foreign troops in the country.³⁰³ Finally the deployment, which was supposed to be led by the EASF never, took place, rendering a big blow to the idea of providing African solutions to African problems. The failure to make use of ACIRC as constituted complicated matters and may eventually lead to re-evaluation of the AU constitutive act article 4(h) in which such operations obtain their legal basis.³⁰⁴

Thus whereas the AU did show the wherewithal to make use of the ASF to resolve a conflict in an African state, the failure to actually deploy can be attributed to several factors. One is the very nature of the AU PSC. The AU PSC is part of the APSA and is vested with the power to determine the seriousness of conflicts and advice the heads of state and government summit on the same with suggestions on the way forward. The problem is that within the PSC, some states support the offending member and never

³⁰¹ Peace and Security Council 565th meeting Communiqué, 17 Decemebr 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ McCormick T.Y., African Union set to deploy 5,000 peacekeepers in Burundi, Foreign policy, 18 December 2015 online @ foreignpolicy.com 2015/12/18/African-union-set-deploy. Accessed on 6 May 2018.

³⁰⁴Dersso., The role of the African human rights system in the operationalization of article 4(h), in Kuwali and Viljoen op cit.

agree for collective action.³⁰⁵ This emboldens the offending state, which may at the same time be a member of the PSC as was the case for Burundi during the crisis in that county. This makes it difficult to reach a consensus. The PSC is also plagued by hegemonic contestations between the members. Some countries have become kind of permanent seats in the AUPSC. These countries will often want to have their way during decisions and where the differences are too wide; they can render decisions of the council of no effect as the regional hegemons act outside the AU to sabotage the decision. This was evident during the Burundi crisis when members of EASF, such as Rwanda refused to send troops into Burundi citing cultural ties.³⁰⁶ This scenario was not foreseen in the constitutive act.

Moreover, the constitutive act is not clear on the mandating system for force deployments within the continent. The constitutive act provides a lacuna that states can exploit and refuse interventions by claiming that the mission is not properly authorized because the UN may not have been involved in the initial deployment of the RDC.³⁰⁷ States that engage in genocide and crimes against humanity can thus play for time in the hope that by the time the UN finally comes around to authorize the mission, the winning side would have prevailed and hence present a *fait accompli* for the peacekeepers.

States often revert to the inviolability of their sovereignty when it comes to issues of intervention. Indeed Burundi was quick to use the sovereignty card to reject any external forces into their territory. Although the constitutive act article 4(h) gives the AU the power to intervene in a member country without its consent, it does not state how the

³⁰⁵ During the debate on 17 December 2015 for the deployment of the ASF in Burundi, Rwanda supported the move in the plenary but refused to send its troops, making it difficult for the EASF to raise the required troop numbers that were needed to control the violence in Burundi. Personal observation.

³⁰⁶ Ibid

³⁰⁷ AU PSO Doctrine 2006

intervening forces should behave if confronted by the country's security forces without resulting to a full-fledged war that might escalate into regional conflict.³⁰⁸ Considering the nature of international relations existing in Africa, the potential for states to take sides is very high. Thus, states, especially those that are wont to abuse human rights and have a tendency to authoritarianism are likely to revert to sovereignty whenever questioned about such violations. The fact that many African countries still subscribe to some form of authoritarianism means that such state are likely to pay lip service to the idea of African solutions to African problems and thus exalt the concept of sovereignty above that of collective security, making it difficult for either the ASF or the ACIRC to provide security for the continent.³⁰⁹

The ASF effectiveness has also been hindered by the manner in which it is designed. The ASF is composed of multidisciplinary forces domiciled in their own countries and controlled by either a regional economic community or mechanism. The RECs/RMs have established their own mandating system that run parallel to that of the AU. The EASF for example requires a decision by the EASF member states HoSG before it can deploy in an AU authorized mission.³¹⁰ According to Sivuyile, this double authorization is very problematic as it contributes to the delay in deployment, leading to deterioration in human rights violations and loss of life.³¹¹

Thus a combination of political decision making process, hegemonic contestation among AUPSC members and the failure to penetrate sovereignty as well as the RECs/RMs decision making process all contribute to hinder the deployment of the ASF.

³⁰⁸ Hunt Charles., op cit p 178

³⁰⁹ Karin Dokken, op cit p 130

³¹⁰ EASF charter

³¹¹ Sivuyile Bam, op cit.

It is not clear whether ACIRC faces the same problems as attempts to understand its challenges outside the logistical ones was met with nil response.

4.9 Chapter Summary

The ASF was established so that the AU could have a tool for intervention in conflicts within the continent. However it is emerging that the ASF may never be employed as initially envisaged. It may however evolve into a robust framework within which African conflicts can be addressed.³¹² This may be especially possible within the context of the RECs/RMs that seem to retain the final say on whether a deployment takes place or not. Although the constitutive act has crafted a legal basis from which interventions can take place, states remain sovereign and control the monopoly of violence within their territories. This makes it very difficult for the AU to intervene, especially due to lack of funds and logistical back needed for enforcement missions. This problem was noticed when violence broke out in Mali and Central Africa Republic with the AU unable to use the ASF. This led to the establishment of the ACIRC, which despite its promise has also not been able to deliver. The events that took place in Burundi did so after the ASF had been declared fully operational. Despite the political decision to deploy it in that country, nothing happened as hegemonic contestations both at the PSC and AU summit level led to a withdrawal of the authority to deploy.

As a tool for provision of peace and security in instances of violent conflict within member states the ASF remains useful especially if every region will develop an actual rapid deployment capability as opposed to declaring the existence of one for political and diplomatic expediency. The concept of deployment of the RDC is viable but only when there is consent from the member state. Thus the ASF and ACIRC are likely to be more

³¹² Linda Darkwa, op cit p

successful under article 4(j) than (h) because whereas 4(h) requires forceful entry into a sovereign state, 4(j) is a result of invitation by the state with problems. The ASF does not provide solutions to interstate conflicts. It seems there was no conceptualization of dispute resolutions for such conflicts or maybe the assumption is that the UN will handle these kinds of conflicts. Thus, EASF provides a model force from which the ASF can extract useful lessons in its endeavor to provide security for Africa.

CHAPTER 5.

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

This study uses the EASF as a case study to explain the role of the ASF in securing Africa. In this regard, an evaluation of the activities undertaken by the EASF as part of the ASF are examined with a view to establishing how far the organization has advanced towards becoming a useful tool for responding to conflict situations. Moreover, the³¹³ relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs will be clearer once an examination of how EASF relates functionally with the AU. The EASF progress once identified can be used to assess the level or degree of convergence that has so far been established in the entire ASF construct.

What comes out of the evaluation does not portend good news for the ASF. There are political undercurrents that threaten to create gaps between the ASF as constructed and the regional standby forces.³¹⁴ Such an occurrence would define the beginning of the end of the ASF and the growth of regional standby forces. This means that the AU PSC would be weakened as power moves to the RECs/RMs many of which already have peace and security divisions. Moreover, the ASF, as currently structured is encumbered by many regional political dynamics that impact directly on its deployment concept making it difficult for the AU to utilize the institutional capacity inherent in the RECs/RMs directly. This is contrary to the ASF protocols and although the AU continues to argue that it can make good use of ASF, many hurdles remain for full utilization to be realized.

³¹³ Brig Albert Kendagor., Head of Peace Operations, EASF Secretariat. Interview on 7 April 2018, Nairobi.

³¹⁴ Col Jean Marie Barumpishe, chief of Staff, EASF Secretariat. Interview on

5.2 Development of EASF

The EASF, which was previously the EASBRIG, was initially constructed as a regional mechanism to provide rapid deployment capability for intervention, preventive deployment, stability operations and peace enforcement.³¹⁵ It was expected that the EASF would operate with the vision to contribute to regional and continental peace and stability, through fully operational multidimensional forces. Joint and integrated EASF was expected to be ready for deployment by 2015, with an initial operational capability by 2010. The establishment of EASF followed the decision of the summit of the AU held in July 2004 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.³¹⁶ Developments in this regard have taken place through several stages starting with the establishment of the EASBRIG concept, planning element (PLANELM) to EASBRIG coordinating mechanism (EASBRICOM) to the establishment of a secretariat and finally the Peace operations department, within the secretariat. While this was taking place in the command and control level, the regional member states were busy building their capacities so that each country could have a rapid deployment capability available for EASF duty roster.

The EASF was originally designed as a multidimensional force with functional military, civilian and police components. Initially structured as a rapid response brigade for eastern Africa known as East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). The name was thus changed to EASF in June 2010 during Extraordinary Council of Ministers' meeting held in Nairobi, Kenya.³¹⁷ This enabled the organization to demonstrate the multidimensional nature inherent therein. Moreover, a memorandum of understanding

³¹⁵Endalcachew Bayeh., *The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and prospects, International Journal of Political science and development, Vol. 2(9), pp. 197-204, October 2014*

³¹⁶Ibid.

³¹⁷ AU 2010, Exercise AMANI Africa command post exercise. Addis Ababa: Unpublished/AU Restricted.

between the countries contributing to EASF was signed on 11 May 2005, although it was not legally binding, thereby allowing for some form of defection.³¹⁸ The possibility of defection, to an extent, undermined the collective security intent underpinning the rationality of EASF. The development of EASF was however affected by the absence of a regional economic community that could cover all the countries contributing to the capabilities. This led to the regional heads of state and government to authorize the creation of an independent mechanism that would coordinate activities within the standby force. On 28 January 2007, the East African Brigade Coordination Mechanism was established (EASBRIGCOM) to serve as the EASF secretariat.³¹⁹ The secretariat was eventually renamed East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) in March 2007.³²⁰ EASFCOM eventually became the EASF secretariat in 2015 after the EASF became fully operational.

5.3 EASF status

The EASF was declared fully operational in September 2015 after a field exercise in Adama, Ethiopia. After the declaration, the EASF presented its status to the AU and thus joined the ASF as a fully compliant organ.³²¹ Almost immediately after being fully operational, the EASF was mandated to intervene in Burundi following the internal conflict that took place in that country when the sitting president decided to run for a third term.³²² The EASF however never got to deploy after the AU decided to rescind the decision after the HoSG summit in January 2016 failed to agree on the issue of

³¹⁸AndalcahewBayeh op cit, p 198

³¹⁹AndalcahewBayeh, op cit, p 201

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹Col Barumpishe interview op cit.

³²²Crisis Group Africa Report N°224, *Elections in Burundi: Moment of Truth*, 17 April 2015 available @ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/Africa/central> accessed on 16 May 2018

intervention.³²³ The heads of state and government argued that invoking Article 4(h) of the constitutive act would violate Burundi's sovereignty, thereby appearing to reject the legality of the constitutive act in as far as live interventions were concerned.³²⁴

Had the EASF managed to intervene in Burundi, it would have demonstrated the utility of the ASF in responding to conflicts within the continent.³²⁵ The failure to authorize deployment as advised by the AU PSC indicated that African leaders were concerned more with sovereignty than collective conflict management even when it was clear that atrocities were taking place in a member state. The EASF deployment was thus stood down even after the completion of elaborate planning and mobilization.³²⁶

In 2014, the EASF embarked on a resource mobilization plan meant to ensure that the organization had enough funds and logistical back up for effective deployment in crises affecting the region. The plan was to make fund raising proposals to the international donor community including private philanthropic groups. The aim was to raise USD 3Billion to form a start up kitty for peace support operations.³²⁷ Thus the EASF has been working towards self-sufficiency in terms of funding and logistics despite the fact that the ASF is the one vested with funding peace and security missions that are undertaken by regional standby forces.

Although the EASF considers itself ready for any deployment within the region it also believes it has the capability to deploy outside the region in line with ASF

³²³ African Union Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.598(XXVI), 30 January 2016, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

³²⁴ International Crisis Group Briefing., The African Union and the Burundi Crisis: Ambition Versus reality. Available @ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/Africa/central> accessed on 16 May 2018.

³²⁵ Paul D. Williams, "[The African Union's Conflict Management Capabilities](#)", Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011. Available @ <https://www.crisisgroup.org/Africa/central> accessed on 16 May 2018

³²⁶ Brig Albert Kendagor, interview op cit.

³²⁷ EASF director, interviewed during the conduct of a fund raising conference at the AU headquarters, 29 January 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

doctrine.³²⁸ However there is a growing feeling that the AU is neglecting the regional standby forces in favour of ACIRC. This has contributed to the regional standby forces seeking funds for PSO within their regions and a reluctance to consider deployments outside the sponsoring RECs/RMs.³²⁹ According to Brig Kendagor, the AU seems to have decided to support the ACIRC more than the ASF and is subsequently funding it more. The competition between the two organs has the potential to derail the efforts of ASF and according to Col Birumpishe, the EASF does not intend to be caught in the middle. In this regard, elaborate programs are in place to create adequate funding capability that will ensure the EASF can deploy without waiting for funds from the AU.

5.4 The Role of EASF in Conflict Management.

The EASF as one of the organs of ASF has a responsibility to ensure that it has the capacity and the capability to respond to conflicts in a timely manner. In this regard, the EASF has identified several enablers that make it possible for rapid response to conflicts. First, the EASF has established its own funding mechanism based on member states contribution, external donor support and international philanthropists.³³⁰ According to Birumpishe, the EASF has managed to accumulate enough capacity for response to scenario five and six conflicts. This is impressive considering that the organization was unable to airlift its contribution of forces to the ASF operationalization final exercise in Lohatla, South Africa. Indeed the EASF contingent had to be airlifted by Angola, who were operating under ACIRC during the exercise. Thus the claim by the chief of staff that the organization now has its own lift capacity is welcome news to the AU as well as the regional collective security arrangements in IGAD, EAC and parts of SADC.

³²⁸ Brig Kendagor, Interview op cit

³²⁹ Col Barumpishe, Interview op cit.

³³⁰ Ibid

According to Col Mwasi, who was the EASF contingent commander during the ASF operationalization exercise, the EASF did not at the time have the airlift capacity needed to deliver the personnel and equipment to the exercise area. Moreover, the EASF contingent that participated in the ASF Final exercise did not have any significant police or civilian personnel.³³¹ Thus the development of the EASF to the current status is commendable.

The ability of the EASF to respond therefore should be viewed in the lenses of its current status. According to the Chief of Staff, the EASF conducted a more recent evaluation exercise in Sudan where it tested several capabilities. These included the starter up kit, which comprises of a deployable headquarter, an integral communications, Computers and command, and intelligence systems (C3IS).³³² During the exercise, the EASF was able to test its logistic chain, airlift capabilities as well road movement. This demonstrates that the EASF is able to effectively respond to conflict situation within the region if given proper support.

On the question of its failure to deploy in Burundi, it was clear from all the interviewees that the problem was not of capacity nature. Both Brig Kendagor and Col Birumpishe were agreed that the EASF was stopped from deploying as a result of political decisions.³³³ The EASF operates under a dual authorization mechanism where every AU mandated mission is subject to authorization by the HoSG of the countries that provide troops and other capabilities. Thus the EASF cannot deploy without the regional HoSG authority, making it difficult for AU to use it expeditiously.

³³¹ Col Mwasi, EASF contingent commander, ASF FOC final exercise, Interview After action Review in Maputo, 15 April 2016

³³² Col Birumpishe Interview., op cit.

³³³ Kendagor and Birumpishe op cit.

Nevertheless, the EASF can be seen as a ready organization with the right combination of capabilities to respond when properly mandated. According to Birumpishe and Mugume, all the components were tested during the exercise in Sudan and although some problems of mobilization were experienced with the civilian component, the police from all the pledged forces were available.³³⁴

The respondents however lamented the lack of support by the AU with regard to EASF efforts to become fully operational. According Brig Kendagor the AU was engaging in duplicitous efforts that were likely to negatively impact not only the EASF but also the other regional standby forces. Col Birumpishe was of the opinion that by allowing the development of ACIRC alongside the ASF, the AU was undermining the regional Standby Forces ability to respond because there were troops-pledging countries that were in both ASF and ACIRC. He opined that should a deployment be ordered by the AU for the deployment of ACIRC forces where the troops were also the same ones pledged to the regional Forces, there would be problems. The possibility of non deployment by either organ becomes real in such a scenario because those states that have pledged forces to the regional standby forces but were also in ACIRC do not have any extra troops and the same forces were expected to deploy in both ASF and ACIRC missions. Thus where the ASF deployed first, ACIRC would not be able to raise the required forces and the reverse would also apply. This possibility of failure due to AU duplicity seems to have forced the EASF to re-evaluate the overall intervention strategy. According to Col Birumpishe, the EASF began to prepare for missions that would not be supported by the AU. This was one of the reasons for the fund raising effort undertaken by the secretariat in from 2014. Although the EASF does not believe that it wants to

³³⁴Birumpishe interview, .opcit, Col Mugume Interview.

become a stand-alone regional conflict management instrument, it remains well aware that no peace support operation can be outside the AU PSC mandate. Moreover, the EASF is well aware that the AU can start a mission but fail to sustain it. Hence, EASF has adapted its structure to include financial, logistical and communications freedom. The EASF has moved ahead and established a situation room that includes an early warning mechanism, meaning that as a collective conflict management tool for the region it is preparing to launch operations that are authorized by the region.³³⁵

The EASF is however not structured to intervene in interstate conflicts. This is a big failure of the ASF as collective security tool. The reasons given by the EASF, and which may inform the entire ASF are that no interstate conflict is of such sudden occurrence as is the case with intra-state conflicts. Moreover, the AU believes that interstate conflicts are more the responsibility of the UN and thus it should only play a peripheral role.³³⁶

5.5 EASF Components Readiness

Compared to the ASF, the EASF seems more ready to deploy in multidimensional PSOs than other regions. Whereas ECOWAS has deployed its forces more than its East African counterpart, it has always done so as a military force. Despite the rapidity of such deployments, they do not qualify to be called multidimensional as they simply act to stop the escalation of violence but have no capacity for humanitarian operations or other security challenges after the violence is controlled.³³⁷ EASF is however better organized and structured. According to the head of human resources, the civilian roster is well

³³⁵ Irene Ogaja, Head of the situation room at EASF, Interview 16 May 2018.

³³⁶ Dr. Admore Kambudzi, Acting Director, AU Peace and Security Department, Phone Interview on 3 February 2018.

³³⁷ Linda Darkwa, op cit.

populated and the personnel, though domiciled in their home countries are available at short notice for deployment. This was corroborated by some of the civilians rostered from

Kenya who said that they have arrangements with their employers to be released for EASF duty should such a requirement arise.³³⁸

The police component for EASF is also more prepared than what is available for the ASF. During the ASF final exercise it was clear that no regional force police component was ready. The fact that EASF has a demonstrable police capacity sets a good example for other regional forces to follow.³³⁹

The military component within the EASF remains the most prepared. Like other regions, the EASF relies heavily on military leadership for effective planning and deployment. According to col Birumpishe and Brig Kendagor, the military forces are the most ready and this can be attributed to the fact that the military is sequestered in barracks, making it easy to mobilize adequate numbers during force generation. The two however acknowledge that the military needs the other components for effective PSOs. The EASF, just like other regional standby Forces is part of the tools available to the AU in establishing the ASF and can be deployed by the AU in liaison with the regional institutions.

5.6 ASF Contributions to African Security

The idea of a continental force was born out of the desire to ensure that Africa would not have to depend on external powers for its security.³⁴⁰ Thus the delay in operationalizing the ASF has had varying effects on the overall security situation in Africa. Indeed, the delay has seen the growth of a counter idea that sought to fast track

³³⁸Mr James Theuri, Nursing officer with AMREF, Mr George Kamau, Aircraft Technician with bluebird aviation at Wilson airport interviewed on 14 and 16 May 2018 respectively

³³⁹Kendagor op cit

³⁴⁰Darkwa, L., &Attuquayefio, P. (2014). Analysis of norm diffusion in the African Union and the economic community of West African States. *African Conflict and Peacebuilding Review*, 4(2), 11–37.

intervention capability within the AU. It seemed that the ASF, though initially constructed as a collective security effort, was too lethargic to be useful.³⁴¹ After the events in Mali, where the French launched operation Serval, it dawned on the African leaders that the attempt to remove western dependency was not working well.³⁴² According to the report of the independent panel of experts issued in 2013, the ASF had not been deployed in its designed capacity since the idea was conceived.³⁴³ The failure to create innovative ways that could encourage the deployment of the ASF according to the conceptual framework led to the creation of a stopgap measure known as the Africa Capacity for Immediate response to Crises (ACIRC).³⁴⁴

The formation of ACIRC drew mixed reactions from AU member states, with those that had made significant progress in establishing standby force capabilities such as ECOWAS led by Nigeria and Eastern Africa Region led by Kenya opposing it as it was seen as a parallel initiative, which could only be used to delay the operationalization of the ASF.³⁴⁵ Those who stood for the entrenchment of ACIRC were viewed as having hegemonic aspirations and that they had territorial expansionist designs. The establishment of ACIRC was opposed because of the ease of deployment, which made some states wary of a powerful intervention mechanism that would infringe on their sovereignty. Authority for ACIRC deployment was based on the authority of the PSC as

³⁴¹ Ibid

³⁴² Kasumba, Y., & Debrah, C. (2010). An overview of the African standby force (ASF). In Y. Kasumba, C. Debrah, C. de Coning, & Y. Kasumba (Eds.), *The civilian dimension of the African standby force* (pp. 10–19). Durban: ACCORD.

³⁴³ Independent Panel of Experts. (2013, December 10). *Assessment of the African standby force and plan of action for achieving full operational capability by 2015*. Addis Ababa: African Union.

³⁴⁴ African Union. (2013b, May 26–27). *Decision on the establishment of an African capacity for immediate response to crises*. Addis Ababa

³⁴⁵ Author personal observation, as a representative to the AU for Kenya on ASF

opposed to that of ASF, which needed a heads of state and government summit decision.³⁴⁶

The establishment of ACIRC has however not resulted into the expected faster response to conflicts in Africa. ACIRC, was unable to attract a critical number of volunteer countries, coupled by the endemic lack of funds in Africa, it soon resorted to soliciting for funds from the same kitty that was to fund the ASF further compounding the collective security problem, by creating competing funding needs. Although ACIRC was supposed to self-terminate with the achievement of FOC by the ASF, and despite the decision to merge the two efforts, this has not happened and the AU continues to operate two parallel organs with the same mandate albeit with differing deployment authorizations.³⁴⁷ To move forward, the two initiatives need to be harmonized in order to maximize the available capabilities in light of the limited funds for PSO in Africa.

5.7 The ASF and ACIRC in context

Since the aim of this research is to establish whether the AU can effectively employ the ASF to secure Africa, it is important that we understand the differences and similarities that exist between ACIRC and the ASF. The establishment of ACIRC has however not resulted into the expected faster response to conflicts in Africa. Due to the fact that ACIRC was unable to attract a critical number of volunteer countries, coupled by the endemic lack of funds in Africa, it soon resorted to soliciting for funds from the same kitty that was to fund the ASF further compounding the collective security problem.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁶ ASF Protocol, Decision on the establishment of an African capacity for immediate response to crises. Addis Ababa.

³⁴⁷ African Union (2015).,Communique. Peace and Security Council 549th meeting. Addis Ababa.

³⁴⁸Okeke, J. M. (2016). United in challenges? The African standby Force and the African capacity for the immediate response to crises.in C. de Coning, L. Gelot, & J. Karlsrud (Eds.), The future of African peace operations: From Janjaweed to Boko Haram(pp. 90–105). London: Zed Books.

The AU's failure to deal with the 2012 Mali crisis led to some soul searching on Africa's capacity to provide for its own security. The chairperson proposed the idea of establishing mechanism that would react quickly to crisis without necessarily being hindered by the legal requirements that had hitherto impacted the ASF. In the proposal, the mechanism was supposed to be transitory pending the full operationalization of the ASF. Moreover, it was required to have an operational capability that could address complex challenges.³⁴⁹

Following the Chairperson's recommendations, the AU Heads of State and Government decided to:

“establish, as a transitional arrangement and pending the full operationalization of the ASF and its rapid deployment capability (RDC), an African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), to provide the AU with a flexible and robust force, made up of military/police capabilities, force enablers and multipliers, equipment and resources to be voluntarily provided by Member States on the basis of their willingness and capabilities, to be deployed very rapidly to effectively respond to emergency situations, within the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)”³⁵⁰.

ACIRC was therefore a provisional mechanism for rapid deployment that would be dissolved upon the operationalization of the ASF. However, in October 2015, it became apparent that the volunteer nations driving ACIRC wanted it to become part of the ASF's rapid deployment capability and it expected it exercised alongside the ASF. Thus even after the ASF was declared operationally ready, the ACIRC neither dissolved nor integrated into the ASF.³⁵¹

³⁴⁹ African Union, 2013, Report of the chairperson of the commission on the operationalization of the rapid deployment capability of the African standby force and the establishment of an 'African capacity for immediate response to crisis'. Addis Ababa:

³⁵⁰2013 Decision on the establishment of an African capacity for immediate response to crises. Addis Ababa

³⁵¹ Linda Darkwa., op cit, p 474

Although ACIRC and ASF have the same role, their construction differs markedly. Whereas the ASF comprises multidimensional standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice,³⁵² ACIRC comprises mostly military forces structured as rapid deployment capability. This composition sets the two organs apart and at the same time gives them utility. Moreover, unlike the ASF, ACIRC is comprised of volunteer nations that pledge certain capabilities that they place at the disposal of the ACIRC command and which are made available upon request.³⁵³

The ASF is unique in two main ways. First, it is expected to be composed of standby capabilities that are identified, prepared, and placed on standby by member states and RECs/RMs, for the use of the AU upon request. Second, member states accept that once deployed, their brigades are placed under the command and control of the Chairperson of the AUC through his/her appointed officials.³⁵⁴ Deployed standby forces are therefore directly answerable to the AU's officials in Addis Ababa and not national or regional commanders.

ACIRC on the other hand uses the rapid deployment capability, under the lead nation concept. This means that one state with the right combinations of capabilities takes the lead and sends its troop into the conflict situation. In the meantime, other volunteer nations (VN) strengthen the capability by ensuring that their pledges arrive in theater on time and at their own cost. The advantage of ACIRC therefore lies in the ability for the

³⁵²African Union. (2002, July 9). *Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of the African Union*. Durban

³⁵³African capacity for immediate response to crises (ACIRC) outcome of the meeting of the chiefs of defence staff of ACIRC volunteering nations, 18 July 2014, p 7

³⁵⁴African Union. (2002, July 9). *Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of the African Union*. Durban

VN to fund the deployment for a period of 90 days without expecting any compensation from the AU.³⁵⁵ However, no volunteer nations is willing to provide strategic lift, which brings the ACIRC concept to the same level with the ASF when it comes to rapid deployment of the military component, which in any case is what the ACIRC is comprised. Thus ASF and ACIRC are really two sides of the same coin and they operate on the same concept making it difficult to discern which construct is better than the other. In any case, the AU has not deployed the ASF or the ACIRC as a stand-alone organ to respond to violent conflicts in the continent.

According to Okeke, the ASF appears to be caught up in a political tug of war between the volunteer member states of the ACIRC and those connected to the ASF idea³⁵⁶ (Okeke, 2016). However, both tools have the potential of enhancing the AU's capacity for the maintenance of peace and security³⁵⁷ (Warner, 2015). Whereas the ASF enjoys widespread legitimacy, it lacks the requisite resources to deploy its rapid deployment capabilities. The ACIRC, on the other hand, has an impressive rapid deployment capability but enjoys less legitimacy. Harmonization of the two concepts is critical if AU is to avoid wastage of resources and unending political hegemonic contests.

Further appraisal of the two organs is explained below where we evaluate the AU peace and security deployments and look at the opportunities in which the AU could have demonstrated its ability to provide security for Africa by using the available intervention

³⁵⁵African capacity for immediate response to crises (ACIRC) outcome of the meeting of the chiefs of defence staff of ACIRC volunteering nations, 18 July 2014,

³⁵⁶OkekeMartyens,. (2016), United in challenges? The African standby Force and the African capacity for the immediate response to crises. In C. de Coning, L. Gelot, & J. Karlsrud (Eds.), *The future of African peace operations: From Janjaweed to Boko Haram* (pp. 90–105). London: Zed Books.

³⁵⁷Warner, J. (2015). Complements or competitors? The African standby Force, the African capacity for immediate response to crises, and the future of rapid reaction forces in Africa. *African Security*, 8, 56–73.

tools. This will help in assessing the utility of both the ASF and ACIRC and map out how the two can complement each other instead of competing to deliver same effects.³⁵⁸

5.8 The ASF deployment concept.

The idea of establishing a standby force was based on the need to quickly respond to evolving crises within Africa. In this regard, the envisioned force must have certain capabilities that make it possible to fulfill this objective. Core to the ASF functionality is the development of the rapid deployment capability (RDC) for every regional standby force.³⁵⁹ The RDC is therefore the most adaptable arm of the ASF as it is the element that can be easily assembled and deployed into conflict situation to bring calm while other political and diplomatic activities take place.³⁶⁰ The RDC thus cannot survive in theater for long because it is not structured to sustain itself for more than 90 days.³⁶¹ Thus the first to enter the theater is the RDC, which comprises the various capabilities such as the military, civilian and police components, but with the military leading while the police and civilian component following.

The way the structure works is that the AU PSC initiates the process of peace management in a potential conflict or actual conflict situation by calling up the various APSA tools and employing them appropriately to mitigate the conflict. Where all other APSA tools fail to achieve the required results, the AU commission in conjunction with the PSC mandates the ASF to intervene and bring the situation to normalcy.³⁶² The ASF

³⁵⁸Okeke J.M., op cit


³⁵⁹ACIRC power point presentation to volunteer nations Defence Attaches on 24 August 2014, AU PSOD Addis Ababa.

³⁶⁰African capacity for immediate response to crises (ACIRC) outcome of the meeting of the chiefs of defence staff of ACIRC volunteering nations, 18 July 2014,

³⁶¹ACIRC power point presentation to volunteer nations Defence Attaches on 24 August 2014, AU PSOD Addis Ababa.

³⁶² Paper No 1 AU PSO.eng.doc. Conceptualizing AU PSO, presented at ASF meeting in Nairobi, 14 August 2008

then begins the deployment of its capabilities beginning with the RDC, which deploys into the conflict zone with the capacity to self sustain for 30 days, after which the other ASF capabilities are expected to arrive and create a robust PSO. This process is shown below.



The ASF deployment concept as developed by AU PSOD.³⁶³

The concept shows the process followed when the PSC decides that a conflict situation in a member state has reached an intervention level in line with the six scenarios explained above. For effective deployment, the AU PSOD is required to constantly connect with the RECs/RMs that are the true owners of the regional Standby Forces. Moreover, the deployment concept defines the roles of the various capabilities making it easy for interoperability and accountability.³⁶⁴

Without the cooperation of the RECs/RMs, the AU cannot employ the ASF for security purposes in Africa. This situation presents a problem in terms of force generation and command and control of such forces. According to the head of PSOD, in whose docket the deployment of the ASF remains, the deployment of the ASF is dependent on

³⁶³ Paper No 1 AU PSO.eng.doc , ibid.

³⁶⁴ Ibid

the good will of the RECs/RMs and thus the AU remains merely a facilitating organ and not owner of the ASF, as it would like to believe.³⁶⁵ Thus the RECs/RMs seem to have been more successful in peace and security interventions than the AU, although the later takes credits for all such interventions.

5.9 ASF as an intervention tool

ASF was established pursuant to the AU constitutive act articles 4(h) and (j), which only recognize interventions when there is violent conflict within states.³⁶⁶ The establishment of the ASF was never meant to provide security where interstate conflict existed. This means that the AU cannot deploy the ASF for peacekeeping purposes between states and thus has to rely on the UN to provide this capability. In this regard, the AU cannot claim to have created a collective security tool for peace in Africa. This is because in collective security, the threats to one state means a reaction from all other states³⁶⁷.

The ASF therefore remains an intra-state enforcement mechanism incapable of being used for interstate conflicts. Thus for the AU to employ the ASF in inter state conflicts it must identify one state as the aggressor and subsequently deploy the ASF against it. The problem with such an approach is that it would rally all those states that do not support the idea of convicting one side to support the condemned state, dividing the continent and putting the ASF troops at risk. For example it would be very difficult to deploy the ASF in the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, or in the dispute between Morocco and the Western Sahara Arab Republic.

³⁶⁵ Bam Sivuyile, Head PSOD interview on 25 February 2018. Q, What challenges do you face in deploying the ASF?

³⁶⁶ AU Constitutive act, article 4(h) and (j).

³⁶⁷ Charles Hunt., Role of the African Standby Force in Dan Kuwali and Frans Viljoen (eds) op cit, p 182.

Under article 4(h), the ASF intervention can override the concept of sovereignty whenever the AU PSC determines that the violence in a conflict state has reached levels that could be described as genocidal or meeting the threshold for crimes against humanity. Under such circumstances, the AU invokes the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P) and initiates a scenario 6-type mission.³⁶⁸ Therefore, according to the rationale for the ASF – that is article 4(h) and (j), and the various scenarios in which the ASF is to be deployed, at no time does it contemplate interfering with the sovereign decision of member states to go to war pursuant to their national interests, but hopes to sanction internal behaviours that subject the people to abuse.

5.10 Findings

This study set out to establish the role of the African Standby Force in securing Africa. In other words, what role has the ASF played, or what can it be used for in the security of the continent. In this regard, the ASF is one of the tools at the disposal of the AU in managing security on the continent. We set out with certain hypothesis that if proven, then the location and utility of the ASF as tool for conflict mitigation and management will be authenticated.

The failure of collective security in Africa as represented by the establishment and development of the ASF is a result of the nature of security as perceived to exist between the African states that form the AU. This study finds that the ASF as currently structured has not been deployed in African conflicts because states in conflict have applied political pressure to the AU. In this regard, the AU has tended to favour diplomatic means even when there is clear indication that such means are not going to produce the required results.

³⁶⁸ASF protocol op cit.

The APSA has developed more in the areas of diplomatic conflict management than the coercive. This is demonstrated in the number of conflicts that have attracted the panel of the wise, as well as regional diplomatic initiatives than the deployment of coercive instruments such as the ASF. A good example is the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan where IGAD has taken the lead role to employ diplomacy rather than invoke the non-indifference rule despite obvious gross violation of human rights in that country. the preference for diplomatic conflict management is informed by the political atmosphere that prevails among the African leaders. According to the observation by the author made at several AU summits, the African Heads of state and Government still have the tendency to cover the excesses of each other and may never want to militarily intervene in internal conflicts of states that they consider friendly. This gives confidence to sitting presidents and prime ministers to mistreat their populations as happened in Burundi.

The ASF is actually in a bind. The fact that it has never been deployed in its original idea means that it may remain moribund at the continental level but continue to function at the regional level. The study finds that ASF as constructed has not been deployed because the conflict states apply political pressure to derail any intentions to intervene. This becomes even more complicated when the problem state is a powerful member of the regional Standby Force. It would be impossible for example for ECOWAS to deploy troops in Nigeria without its consent. Similarly, deployment in South Africa or Ethiopia would face same challenges.

The regional standby Forces are also not in the same level of capability development. Whereas EASF and ECOWAS are highly developed and have the capacity to effectively intervene even in the absence of unanimity in authorization, SADC and

ECCAS remain challenged in the civilian capacity fields and would require more development. This disparity in development opened the window for the development of an alternative enforcement mechanism, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to crises, which premised on a military heavy intervention. Due to failure by ASF to guarantee ready forces across the continent, ACIRC appears a viable option. Moreover, hegemonic contestation has ensured that ACIRC remain an alternative and indeed a competitor to ASF. The two peace and security enforcement organs continue to operate side by side, while feeding from the same kitty. This is duplication and wastage of scarce resources. The perception that the AU commission favours ACIRC discourages the regional ASF Standby forces. It also stretches the available capabilities because some state have pledged the same troops to the two organs.

Since collective security instruments work best under institutional political bodies such as the AU and the UN, ASF full functionality remain at the discretion of such organization and in this regard the AU commission. As Downs and Lida observes, collective intervention in internal disputes and unrest when done with “finesse and attention to due process” will over time create commitments that are more precise and legitimate.³⁶⁹ This is exactly what the ASF needs to become a viable tool for conflict management in Africa. Thus the development of a counter force such as ACIRC, play a reductionist role in the ability of ASF as coercive instrument for African security. Success of the ASF is possible if it is allowed to grow incrementally. Thus the competition from ACIRC is unwelcome.

³⁶⁹ George Downs and Keisuke Lida., Assessing the theoretical case against collective security, in George Downs (ed), *Collective security beyond the cod war*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994, pp 17-21.

The study further finds that Africa has been able to make considerable progress in the conflict management arena through use of APSA structures and delegation to RECs and RMs. Although coercive conflict management has been sparingly used, more diplomacy has ensured that it becomes less necessary. This is to say that the ASF has not yet found a proper footing in securing Africa. This is likely to remain the case as long as the authorization mechanism is located at the HoSG level, where the leaders may wish to establish a dictators club and protect their colleagues. However, the utility of the regional standby forces is such that they provide an instrument through which members can threaten intervention and indeed intervene should one of them become uncooperative. Hence, regional standby forces such as the EASF and ESF will continue existing even when ASF becomes moribund.

The study finds that despite aspirations to collective security, Africa is not prepared for interventions in interstate conflicts. In all the documents reviewed as well as the interviews conducted, it is clear that Africa has opted for the easy way out when it comes to interstate conflicts. It appears that the continent and the AU does not expect interstate conflict. In the words of Sivuyile, international conflict between member states will be handled diplomatically and if the situation escalates, handed over to the UN.³⁷⁰ This means that the AU is not ready to use force to settle interstate conflicts. This is understandable as the organization is not ready to appear to take sides on such an issue.

Another area that Africa is ill prepared to respond is that of terrorism. The recent events in Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon where Boko Haram has forced the revival of the Lake Chad Commission is illustrative. The establishment of the MNJTF is a result of lack of response from the AU. This is one area where a capable ASF could have been used to

³⁷⁰ Bam Siuyile., Interview on 21 March 2018, Question:“ What if war breaks out between member states, can the ASF respond?

respond to grave violations of human rights but this was never the case. Moreover, the fight against Al Shabaab, although spearheaded by the AU has never been put under the ASF. Thus the AU does not have structures to respond to terrorist attacks and seems content to let the regional security organizations as well as the affected member states to deal with the problem.

5.11 Chapter Summary

The EASF has come a long way since its establishment in 2004. Along the way, it has developed capabilities that are useful for PSOs across Africa and the world. However there is neglect of regional standby forces by the AU, EASF included. This is a result of the perception by the AU that deploying the regional forces that form the ASF is difficult because the regions have established internal force deployment authorization regulations that do not sit well with the AU concept of ASF deployments.

The development of EASF has advanced faster than other regional forces in regard to the ASF operationalization protocol and roadmaps. Whereas other regions have more robust military components, the EASF has demonstrated better mix of capabilities, brining in police, civilian and military components together. This has contributed to he growth of robust RDCs within contributing countries where the pledged forces reside.

The mix has allowed the EASF to have better capabilities at multidimensional PSOs than what maybe available in the competing ACIRC construct. Whereas it remains a fact that the AU has more preference for ACIRC due to its perceived ease of mandating and deployment, ACIRC lacks the multidimensional capacity of the ASF because it is a military only organization. The AU has demonstrated that it is more concerned with ACIRC development than the ASF, a situation that has brought worries to the EASF in general and the ASF in particular. This preference has led the regional standby forces to

seek funding outside of the ASF because according to the EASF, there is fear of being abandoned in missions due to lack of funding from the AU. The search for funds by the EASF is furthermore informed by the fear that in case of delay in AU reimbursements, the missions may collapse altogether to the detriment of regional peace and security.

The EASF is a ready to deploy force that however cannot be deployed directly by the AU. It requires a decision of the HoSG of the contributing countries for such deployment to take place. This duplication of roles seems to be what is driving the AU's desire for another conflict management tool that it can easily deploy. Moreover, the EASF has established other structures that are more advanced than what the ASF in Addis Ababa has managed to have. These include a start up kit, C3Is, logistics, a deployable headquarter, as well as a firm financial base.

The EASF blames its failure to deploy in Burundi on lack of political will. According to EASF sources, the force is ready to deploy any time within Africa if there is political will to support such action. The EASF is able to quickly mobilize forces because those civilians and police on the roster have made special arrangements to be released by their employer for ASF duty any time such a requirement may arise while the military are always ready due to their nature of being sequestered in barracks. Furthermore, training for PSO is a continuous activity in EASF with the last exercise having taken place in Sudan in 2017.

The EASF can form the basis for which to analyse the progress of the ASF as a tool for collective security in Africa. However, its utility must be measured against the emergence of a competitor organ, ACIRC. Although the two are very similar in construction, they are ideationally different. Whereas ASF encompass a multidimensional

approach to peace and security, ACIRC only considers the security aspects. In fact ACIRC does not envisage transitioning to multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Its mandate seems to end at the pacification level.

The application of diplomacy in peace and security has been more than the use of force. This is a good thing but there should be a mechanism that makes it possible to expeditiously deploy the coercive forces. This will make the ASF more visible and thus contribute directly to peace and security in the continent.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Conclusion

This study set out to find out why African conflicts remain unresolved despite the presence of structures and tools of conflict management that if prudently employed promises to provide security for all the member states. Moreover it seeks to understand how the coercive elements of peace and security have been used in security management in Africa. It uses the collective security theory to examine the roles of various institutions that have been mandated to deal with security in Africa. The research design is that of case study as it provides a viable way to template what one region has done in terms of collective security and use this to assess what other regions and the AU in particular can do to achieve continental security.

Africa has been steeped in conflicts especially after the end of the cold war. The demise of the soviet union heralded a new political dispensation in the African continent with those states that leaned towards the east finding out they no longer had a benefactor. This brought about agitation for greater freedoms that were hitherto unknown to the people. The agitation led to breakout of violent conflicts on the continent with some being resolved through diplomatic and military means while others have continued to fester.

The African security problem is the prevalence of conflict within the continent but more so those that occur within the states. The presence of intractable conflicts can be said to be root of the change of the OAU to AU, after the continent realized that the main objective of the OAU had been achieved. It was therefore necessary to chart a new objective for the continent. Moreover, the events that took place in Rwanda in 1994 made

the African leaders to believe that they were on their own when it came to handling conflicts that did not affect the interests of the Western powers.

Under the principle of subsidiarity, the AU can underwrite its own security but in conjunction with the UN in the realization of the fact that overall responsibility for international security remain with the UN. By exploiting the subsidiarity principle, the AU could deploy peace support operations missions on the continent without having to depend too much on the UN except for authorization to do so. Thus security in Africa cannot be contextualized outside international peace and security neither can the AU operate outside the direction of the UN. African security is therefore a function of international security and vice versa.

In this regard the AU has adopted the African Peace and security architecture as the guide in dealing with security problems in the continent. The architecture comprises five pillars that combine in a sequence manner to address any emerging or existing problem. However, viewed holistically, the architecture comprises three arms, namely, the diplomatic, the coercive and the logistical. The genesis of the APSA can be traced to the nature of African security post-cold war when the western powers seemed to lose interest in African peace and security. The way that the APSA has been designed is such that one pillar feeds into the other and together all the pillars drive a common agenda.

The APSA is also anchored in a continental defence construct known as the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), making it an African policy on security. This means that the continent is ready to act collectively to respond to issues of breaches of security. However, the implementation of the policy across the continent remains a challenge as some countries, especially the more powerful ones do not fully subscribe to it. The CADSP is the responsibility of all African states under the guidance

of the AU PSC. This makes the CADSP a policy requirement for all members and promises to entrench the culture of collective security in the continent.³⁷¹

Collective security in Africa is also defined in the AU constitutive act article 4(h) and (j). Where the right to intervene in conflict situation either as a result of judgment from the AU PSC and a decision from the assembly or by invitation of any member state is anchored.³⁷² The inclusion of article 4(h) in the constitutive act removed the idea of non-interference in a states' internal affairs and introduced the concept of non-indifference, meaning that African states could no longer claim sovereignty when mistreating their own people. The concept of non – indifference meant that should a situation be judged as a crime against humanity, genocide or a gross violation of human rights, then the AU had a right to intervene in the problem country, in the spirit of responsibility to protect.

Africa has adopted the APSA for all peace and security management. However, diplomacy has tended to overshadow other mechanisms even when the situation demands that coercive means replace it. This has lead to some conflict situations becoming difficult to resolve because the perpetrators have always found ways to manipulate the diplomatic effort. The case of Burundi and South Sudan is illustrative in this regard. According to Desmitt and Hauck, the reason for the preference of diplomatic means is that the method can be done without exposing the leaders of the problem country into ridicule.³⁷³ The preference to diplomacy has therefore relegated coercion into some form of irrelevance and this as led to lethargy in the development of coercive instruments. This is the fate that now faces the ASF.

³⁷¹Touray, op cit.

³⁷² AU Constitutive act Article 4 (h) and (j)

³⁷³Desmitt and Hauck, op cit

Due to disregard of the coercive elements in resolving African security issues, the perpetrators of human rights violation have become bolder and thus continue to abuse their people. Although some progress has been made in the overall peace and security management, the AU as it stands cannot claim much credit directly. The can however claim success through the efforts of the regional organizations because the regions are part and parcel of the AU.

The efforts made by the regions in peace and security management needs to be lauded. The action taken by SADC in Southern Africa to ensure peace and security in countries such as Lesotho, Madagascar and Zimbabwe are good examples. The ECOWAS region has also done fairly well in ensuring peace and security in its area while the Eastern Africa, though suffering from hegemonic contestation has shown the ability to contribute positively by deploying forces in Somalia as well as spearheading peace in South Sudan³⁷⁴. Although other regions such as the Northern Africa Regional Community does not have much data and was not evaluated in this study, there are indications that Africa is willing to pull together in terms of achieving continental security.

There is promise that ASF could still provide the bulwark against violent conflicts in Africa. The success will however depend on how much member state in problems are willing to cede sovereignty. As long as there is a requirement for consent from problem countries before an intervention can take place, the prospects of actualizing the ASF deployment concept remain dim. Events in Burundi demonstrate that the AU has no capacity to intervene in accordance with the constitutive act article 4(h). Maybe when a

³⁷⁴ Julius Minyori, *The role of regional organizations in managing peace and security in fragile states: case study of IGADs interventions in South Sudan*, Unpublished dissertation submitted to Cranfield University for the Award of Master of Science in Security Sector Management, March, 2018

scenario where Article 4(j) is invoked will provide us with the proper tools to analyse the true capability of the ASF. As things stand now, every regional standby force claims to be ready yet none has been deployed in accordance with the deployment concept. Moreover, the contest between the ASF and ACIRC has the potential to ensure that the coercive arm of APSA does not fully function. As observed by Col Birumpishe, it is the same forces that are pledged for ASF duties that are also on standby for ACIRC deployment. This makes it very difficult to operate as competing interests have the potential to ensure no deployment takes place.

Thus a lot still remains to be done if the ASF is to achieve the same recognition as the diplomatic effort. Indeed, unless the apparent perception that coercive interventions are foreign occupation missions is debunked, there is the likelihood of continued resistance to such operation because states' are still not willing to cede some sovereignty. This alone presents serious challenges to collective security not only in the regions but across the continent. In fact, this alone has the potential to derail the entire peace and security effort in the continent.

African peace is also affected by the lack of logistical muscle. The ASF has identified logistics as one hindrance to full operational capacity. Although there are plans to establish a continental logistics base in Cameroon, the ability to fully stock it remain in doubt given the financial capacity of the continent. Africa still depends to a large extent on the EU to fund its security operations. This dependency allows European Union to have a huge say on what operations have priority, making it difficult for Africa to claim to be in charge of its operations. The fact that France has twice deployed its forces in Africa before any response from the ASF and the AU is a clear demonstration of how dependent Africa is on the EU.

In realization of the inability of the AU to fund security operations, the regions have embarked on fundraising initiative to ensure that that can sustain operations within their regions for sometime before seeking help externally. In this regard, the EASF is leading the pack and has established a robust fund from which it can conduct operation for at least 90 days.³⁷⁵ This should be a lesson for other regions. Moreover, the idea of ACIRC volunteer countries pledging capabilities is useful in the overall peace construct because it helps to pull together resources. Once these are brought to bear, each contributing state feels obligated to the peace effort and thus becomes part of the collective security community. This helps to create synergy in the achievement of continental security and thus reduces the effects of sinecure sovereignty. Since sovereignty has remained a hindrance to collective security, the AU will probably need to establish a policy on how best to circumvent it. In this regard, the idea floated by ACIRC that the AU PSC authorizes all coercive operations is actually good and worthy to be pursued.

There seems to be a problem between the AU commission and the regional standby forces secretariats in terms of preparation of the standby forces and ACIRC. Whereas the AU commission is in favor of ACIRC, the RECs and RMs are for the standby forces. Although the regions are mostly for economic development, they are also aware that no development can take place without security. They have therefore established peace and security departments that spearhead security management within the members. Regional security management is however challenged by hegemonic competitions that still exist in the continent. Except for ECOWAS where the position of Nigeria is unchallenged, South Africa has yet to achieve complete control in SADC while

³⁷⁵ Col Birumpishe, Interview, op cit.

Kenya and Ethiopia compete for control of the Eastern region. Such competition have meant that collective deployment of coercive instruments of security is difficult if not completely impossible. This is another challenge to the success of collective security in Africa.

The ASF was designed to be a tool of choice for African peace and security. It is based on the idea of an easily available force that can quickly intervene in a fast deteriorating conflict and bring normalcy within a short period, eventually leading to multidimensional peace support operations. The current situation is that although the regions claim full operational capability, deployment within the dictates of the ASF protocol is not possible. Due to funding difficulties within the AU, coupled with the mandating system existing in the AU, the ASF may remain a paper tiger rather than the giant it was envisaged. This study finds that although the ASF has the potential to become the tool it was designed to be, the total benefits may never be realized. The ASF is still viable but may never be deployed in its current form. Instead it may evolve into a robust framework, adaptable mainly by the RECs/RMs, for addressing varied security challenges. Things that are critical to enhancing the utility of the ASF include: the political willingness of the RECs/RMs, the strategic interest of the member states, predictability and sustainability of finances, and clarity on the role of the African Capability for Immediate Response to Crisis, the temporary conflict response mechanism that was created to provide the African Union with a rapid response capability, pending the ASF's operationalization.

The ASF is not structured to deal with interstate conflicts, or terror activities. The proposal to include these into the roles of the ASF has been floated but is yet to be accepted. Moreover, interstate conflicts could negatively affect AU cohesion by requiring

states to take sides in the conflict. This would seriously affect collective security in the continent and may even destroy the AU.

6.2 Recommendations

AU PSO should be conducted within a political framework informed by peace and security considerations. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), of which African Member States (MS) are part, and the regional and the international entities, are the main contributors to developing this framework.³⁷⁶ Decisions made within this Framework should be implemented through an organizational structure. This structure should be made up of static as well as operationally deployed capabilities.³⁷⁷ PSOD provides the strategic level structure under the guidance of AU Peace and Security commission and the AUPSC. The implementation tools are provided by the ASF inherent capabilities— military, police and civilian components that make up a multi-dimensional rapid deployment capability. In this regard, the AU needs to establish a permanent command and control headquarters at Addis Ababa, separate from PSOD. PSOD should then be charged with directing peace and security operations cutting across the entire APSA spectrum. This will ensure that a reporting structure that starts from the field where operations take place and goes all the way to the summit is in place, which serves to educate the African leaders on the success of security missions.

The ASF as structured is in danger of becoming moribund. The AU commission should establish a command and control secretariat dedicated solely to the development and management of ASF operations. Within this secretariat, other pillars of APSA should be adequately represented to ensure that security operations have synergy and are

³⁷⁶ZinurineAlghali and Mamadou Mbaye, *The African standby force, conflict trends, issue 3, Jan 2008, 34*
-38.

³⁷⁷ Ibid

conducted as continuous process instead of being ad hoc. This way all departments will work together and the product will be more acceptable to the problem states because it will be seamless instead of appearing like invasion when the ASF deploys.

Regional security arrangements also need to be evaluated. The level of development of the regional peace and security capacities are worrying to say the least. The fact that the regional standby forces are actually at different levels yet they all claim full operational capability needs to be addressed. It is not possible to have mission ready forces yet unable to deploy when called upon to do so. The issue of funding should be addressed once and for all. The regions should be allowed to raise their own funds and be provided assistance from the AU only when they are unable to meet the required amounts. The AU needs to allocate funds to the regions in line with assessed capacity. For example, the EASF has managed to raise substantial amounts of money for peace operations. These figures should be disclosed to the AU so that it can use them as the basis of what should be allocated to EASF.

The issue of what Africa needs for coercive security management capability should be urgently addressed. The AU commission should decide whether to pursue a multidimensional capability such as the ASF that comprises police and civilians and is capable handling scenario five and six operations or whether it should go with a military only option such as ACIRC. This decision is important as it will help focus efforts and structure the funding.

A study on resource sharing should be conducted to determine the best method because the regional fundraising efforts are likely to target the same donor community. This will assist to avoid donor fatigue as the AU can use the results to advise the regions on where to direct the fundraising efforts can use the results of the study. Further studies

on the viability of both ASF and ACIRC going forward are needed to determine the best collective security tool for the continent. It looks like the ASF is too unwieldy and expensive to run while the idea of voluntary contributions espoused by ACIRC looks attractive. However without a comprehensive study to determine the benefits of both to African security it may be difficult to chose.

The APSA should be restructured to allow for regional peace and security initiatives responding to ad hoc eruptions of violence. In the event that sudden violence arises in a region there is never enough time for the AUPSC to make decisions on the type of intervention to adopt. In such situations, regional peace and security organizations in whose jurisdiction the violence erupts should proceed to use whatever tool they may have to restore normalcy. This is one area where the AU needs to foster growth of regional Standby Forces by funding and encouraging their growth as well as removing the duplication that is currently affecting such institutions

Regional institutions should establish a conflict information sharing mechanism. Currently, the regions only share such information with the AU and not among themselves. Regions such as Eastern Africa and SADC that have overlapping members need this information. Moreover, they also need a coordinating mechanism that assist in determining the best intervention method especially where members belong to more than one regional block. A study to determine the security implications for member states in more than one economic block would serve to provide insights as to how collaboration can be established without causing more friction across regions.

The AU should a role for the ASF in interstate conflicts. In this regard, the AU should have a policy on interventions in interstate conflict. The policy should be adopted by all members at the general assembly and become binding. The ASF can then be

restructured to have an interstate conflict management role, whereby the states in conflict can be restricted from participating in operations that involve their countries. Similarly, a role in terrorist activities should be included in the ASF protocol and new deployment concepts and training incorporated into the structure.

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Author observation, as a representative to the AU for Kenya on ASF

Questions presented to key informants guide.

1. EASF attempts to raise own funds for PSO, why?
2. Does it mean that EASF wants to operate alone?
 - a. If yes, then what are the prospects for ASF?
3. On the mandating system, does the EASF consider the requirement for regional authorization necessary?
 - a. If yes, isn't this a duplication and delay-causing requirement?
4. What challenges does EASF experience when requested to deploy in a member state?
5. How prepared for intervention was EASF in regard to MAPROBU?
6. What were the chances of fully fledged war in East Africa if the EASF forcefully entered Burundi?
7. How was the MAPROBU operation to be funded?
8. What is the role of EASF should conflict between states occur in the horn of Africa?
8. The secretariat and the Headquarters are not co-located, why?
9. What challenges are presented by this arrangement?
10. In all honesty, can the EASF deploy as currently constructed?
 - a. If not, why?
11. After the final exercise to declare FOC, what other joint training has the EASF undertaken?
 - a. If none, what are in the pipeline?

12. What is Effect of ACIRC to EASF operations?
13. Some Members are in both ASF and ACIRC, what are the challenges of such duplicity?
14. What other challenges exist?
15. In the rostering of civilians, how prepared is EASF
16. How is the police structured for response among the TCCs?
17. What are the challenges in assembling the civilian/police components?