

UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI

INSTITUTE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

MA RESEARCH PROJECT

**DEVELOPMENTAL DIPLOMACY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA; A
CASE STUDY OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY**

BY

PAUL OTIENO

R50/88897/2016

SUPERVISOR: DR.SHAZIA CHAUDHRY

**A Project Paper Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Award of the
Degree of Master of Arts in International Studies**

22 November, 2018

DECLARATION

This Project paper is my original work, and it has never been presented to any other Institution for academic examination.

Paul Otieno

Candidate, Institute for International Studies and Diplomacy, University of Nairobi

REG. No. R50/88897/2016

.....

Sign

.....

Date.

This Project paper has been submitted for examination with our approval as University Supervisors.

Dr. Shazia Chaudhry

.....

Sign

.....

Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank God for His grace that enabled me pursue this course and complete this study. I want to thank my supervisor Dr Shazia Chaudhry for her guidance and close supervision of this work. Her guidance, attention and advice that saw me complete my work on time. To all my lecturers who took me through the course of International Studies, your support and encouragement were motivating. My appreciation also goes to the University of Nairobi, and all others who contributed to the success of this study. Finally, my deep thanks go to my parents Mr. Tom Omedi and Dr. Joan A. Magero who gave me moral support during my studies.

Table of Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iii
ACRONYM.....	1
ABSTRACT.....	2
CHAPTER ONE.....	3
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY.....	3
1.0 Introduction.....	3
1.2 Statement of the Problem.....	8
1.3 Research Questions.....	9
1.4 Objectives of the Study.....	10
1.4.1 Overall Objective.....	10
1.4.2 Specific Objectives.....	10
1.5 Literature Review.....	10
1.5.1 DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS.....	11
1.5.2 Development Diplomacy and Regional Integration in Africa.....	13
1.5.3 Gaps in the Literature.....	17
1.6 Justification of the Study.....	18
1.6.1 Academic Justification.....	18
1.6.2 Policy Justification.....	18
1.7 Hypothesis.....	19
1.8 Theoretical Framework.....	19
1.10 Research Methodology.....	22
1.10.1 Population Sample.....	23
1.10.2 Data Collection Procedures.....	24
1.10.3 Scope and Limitation of the Research.....	25
1.10.4 Data Analysis.....	25
1.10.3 Data Presentation.....	25
1.11.0 Chapter Outline.....	26
CHAPTER TWO.....	28

Role of Developmental Diplomacy in Regional Intergration Process.....	28
2.0 Introduction	28
2.1 Developmental Diplomacy.....	28
2.2 The Concept of Regional Integration (RI)	29
2.3 Regionalism in African	31
2.4 Pan-Africanism and regionalism in Africa.....	31
2.5 Role of AU in Regional Integration in Africa.....	35
2.6 The African Integration Model	38
2.7 Role of Developmental Diplomacy in the East African Community.....	40
2.8 Post-collapse to the revival of the East African Community	41
2.9 The New East African Community	43
2.10 The Expanded East African Community	43
2.11 The Operationalization of EAC Organs	47
2.12 East African Development Strategies	48
2.12.1 The First East African Development Strategy (1997-2000)	48
2.12.2 The Second East African Development Strategy (1997-2000).....	48
2.12.3 The Third East African Development Strategy (2006-2010).....	49
2.12.4 The Forth East African Development Strategy (2011-2016)	50
2.12.5 The Fifth East African Development Strategy (20017-2022).....	51
2.13 Conclusion.....	52
CHAPTER THREE	53
Challenges faced in Administering Developmental Diplomacy.....	53
3.0 Introduction	53
3.1 Political Challenges.....	53
3.2 Peace and Security in EAC	55
3.3 Insufficient Financial Recourses	56
3.4 Lack of Strong Political Leadership.....	58

3.5 Lack of Strong Private Sector, Civil Society and Public Participation and Awareness.....	60
3.6 Sovereignty and Political Will	62
3.7 Multiple Memberships	64
3.8 Conclusion.....	66
CHAPTER FOUR.....	68
Impact of Developmental Diplomacy on East African Community Integration Process	68
4.0 Introduction	68
4.1 A United EAC	68
4.2 New EAC Members	70
4.3 Movement of Capital, Goods, Labor and People across Borders	71
4.4 Environmental Development.....	72
4.5 Harmonizing National and Regional Policies	74
4.6 Embracing Education, Research and Technological Advancement.....	75
4.7 Empowerment of Women and Vulnerable Groups	77
4.8 Good Governance, Peace and Security	78
4.9 Conclusion.....	80
CHAPTER FIVE	82
Summary, Conclusion And Recommendations	82
5.0 Introduction	82
5.1 Summary of Study Findings.....	82
5.2 Conclusion.....	84
BIBLIOGRAPHY	88
APPENDICES	97
Appendix 1: Letter of Introduction	97
Appendix 2: Interview Guide.....	98
Unstructured Respondent Schedule	98

ACRONYM

AU	African Union
CET	Common External Tariff
COMESA	Common Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements
EU	European Union
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NTBs	Non-Tariff Barriers
OAU	Organisation of African Union
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
RECs	Regional Economic Authorities
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SMEs	Small and Medium Size Enterprises
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commissions for Africa

ABSTRACT

The study examines the role of developmental diplomacy in the East African integration process. The main objective is to examine and developmental diplomacy in East Africa in the last two decades, looking at the gains and drawbacks that developmental diplomacy has encountered. Generally, it tends to assess whether developmental diplomatic missions have been able to achieve its objectives in fulfilling the aspirations of its proponents and the people of the East African community. The study interrogates developmental diplomacy involvement in the East African integration process. It analyses developmental diplomatic strategies within the EAC. It primarily seeks to evaluate the relationship between developmental diplomacy and the entire components of the East African community. The study exposes developmental diplomatic strategies that states use to engage EAC; it seeks to evaluate whether the tools being used are effective or inept when it comes to influencing the entire EAC. The study also gives a synopsis of the strategies states should apply when it comes to lobbying within the EAC. The data in the study was collected through both primary and secondary means. Primary sources involved key informant interviews with with openended questions as well as review of academic literature and policies. The findings of the study showed that the EAC member states are still struggling to implement regional policies, harmonize national policies and laws with those of the EAC, solve issues that resulted to the previous EAC and to track progress of the EAC as well as promote public participation. The study recommends that member states should be committed to align national policies and laws to those of the EAC, the EAC to set its priority right in line with its objectives, public participation is vital for intergration and members to commit fully and avoid multiple membership to other RECs.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction

Development is a concept viewed to describe growth dates back to the 17th Century but metamorphosed in the 19th Century when it was greatly used by the Greco-Roman Civilized society to refer to humanities' great well-being. Hodge and Holtz argue that the well-being traditionally took a social, economic, political and dimensions, however for development to be effective there is need to ensure that it is sustainable, this means that for there to be growth there is need to shift from the traditional "development" to "sustainable development" which takes place through a combination of human and ecosystem's well-being and thus for states to experience growth the political, social and economic aspects of human survival cannot be disassociated with the environment if humanity well-being is to make sense.¹ Developmental diplomacy

Regional integration has been defined as a process through which two or more neighbouring states come together and enter into an agreement to enjoy peace, stability and wealth. Integration usually involves one or more written agreements that describe the areas of operation as well as explaining the coordinating bodies representing the countries involved. A State's desire to integrate is usually instigated by the political class as a means of safeguarding their position locally and in the regional political arena or maximising the state's economic

¹ Hodge T, Holtz S., Smith C., Baxter K.H., (1995). *Pathways to Sustainability, Assessing our Progress*, Ottawa, ON, Canada, p. 229

interests as they mobilise behind the regional block. This is referred to as Political and economic integrations respectively. According to John McCormick, single market acts as a midpoint between political and economic integration whereby all barriers of integration like free movement of services, free labour and capital are removed.²

Throughout the ages, the purpose of diplomacy has been evolving through different stages. From societal evolution where interpersonal diplomacy takes root to international level where the ultimate goal is to secure global order, peace and stability.³ The effects of the First World War states changed their perception and focus from the physical security of their citizens to collective security and stability of the world. This shift was precipitated by the devastations caused by the war as well as the high influence by the Inter-Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 saw an emergence of Developmental Diplomacy to solve the human suffering where bilateral and multilateral actors converged their diplomatic efforts on poverty eradication and developmental issues.⁴ Developmental diplomacy being integral to finding solutions to economic, political and social problems at national, regional and global levels has developed to be an essential component of foreign policies.

Regional integration has been a dominant feature in international relation dating back to the second half of the 20th century.⁵ The history of regional integration can be traced back in time. The formation of the currently known European Union (EU) has been a successful model that

² The European Union, (1999), *Politics and Policies*. Westview Press: Boulder Colorado, p. 221-225

³ John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens,(2005), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, p. 338

⁴ John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens,(2005), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, p. 392-394

⁵ African Union (AU) Braude 2008, p.157

inspired most states across the world including states in Africa to initiate the adoption of the model. The EU has been a success due to the effective developmental diplomatic strategies deployed by professional diplomats and politicians Europe. Since 1960s various initiatives by African states have been on the verge to initiate regional corporation and integration in efforts to facilitate economic development which was and remains their priority. To date, Africa has fifteen regional economic communities which is a show of progress however only eight of them are recognised by the The Regional Economic Communities (REC) is characterized by overlapping roles,⁶ mandates as well as membership for instance Kenya and Uganda in East African Community are members of Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) while Tanzania which is also a member of EAC exited COMESA in 2001 to join the Southern African Development Community (SADC) a clear demonstration of the complex nature of REC in Africa.

Founded in 1967 and dissolved ten years later, the EAC sparked a series of developmental diplomatic missions that saw the signing of the Treaty Establishing EAC in 1999 by three heads of state from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Later in 2007 Burundi and Rwanda joined in, and in 2006 the newborn state South Sudan became a member. The treaty signed in 1999 set out the principles for customs, economic and monetary union and eventually a political federation (Article 5(2)). As stipulated in the EAC treaty, the main objectives are primarily to develop policies and programs that are geared towards widening cooperation among member states in economic, political, socio-cultural fields, defence, security, research and technology, legal and justice affairs for mutual benefits.⁷ The EAC Member states have the desire to

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Baregu, M 2005. The African Economic Community and the EAC: Any lessons. In R Rok Ajulu, The Making of a Region. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue, p. 56-58

industrialise the region in a bid to spur the much-needed development through intra- and international trade cooperation that would expose the regional economy to the global economic mainstream.

The EAC member states voluntarily joined the REC which is recognised by the African Union (AU) with the intent to foster the adoption of policies through diplomatic channels to achieve high economic growth, political stability, sustainable growth, and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration.⁸ The study, therefore, intends to assess the roles played by developmental diplomacy in the East African Community integration process in line with the regional integration protocols and policies implementation at regional level. The states desire to foster understanding, promote peace and tolerate each other has significantly been affected by the increase of new actor in already complex international relations that is struggling with the dynamics of globalisation. The roles of diplomatic envoys that were traditionally unique by design are slowly grappling with the new era where the speed at which news travels through modern technology has made their work more complicated.

1.1 Background

The East African Community currently comprises of six partner states namely, Kenya Uganda Tanzania, Rwanda, and South Sudan. Collectively they cover a geographical area of about 2.46 million square kilometres, with a population of 168.5 million people with a GDP of US\$ 159.5 billion and average GDP per capita of US\$ 918 billion. Total importation in the

⁸ Qobo M., Draper, (2003), *Multilateralizing Regionalism*, Case Study of African Regionalism, Cambridge University Press, p. 411-415

region amounts to US\$ 40 billion while total exports are estimated to be US\$ 13 billion.⁹ The former EAC's collapse in 1977 was attributed to ideological differences among its three partner states with Kenya's demand for more representation than the rest further dividing the union.¹⁰ The journey to re-establish the intergovernmental organisation took eight years of preliminary diplomatic negotiations between the head of states from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania leading to the formation of the Secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission in 1994. In 1999, there was a breakthrough, and a Memorandum of Understanding on foreign policy cooperation was signed.

Africa presents a unique quest for integration. Since the independence of most African States, there has been failed attempts to industrialise efficiently and thereby using a significant substitution of regional integration as a means to achieve structural transformation in Africa. African states opt to use developmental diplomacy as an essential driver to embrace regional integration which in their view is a vital component for their developmental strategy in a bid to overcome economic constraints that are experienced when states are working in isolation. Several Pan-African organisations have successively been working towards deepening economic, social and political cooperation and integration in Africa.

The states find themselves in very compromising situations given the current state of affairs where in most cases they cannot control the actions of the new actors in the international space. Traditionally, diplomats were key figures caring state confidential information as they go about their diplomatic missions, the modern era has brought with it an environment where

⁹ United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

¹⁰ Christian P. Potholm, Richard A. Fredland, (1980), *Intergration and Disintergration in East Africa*. University Press of America.

confidential information of a state is no longer preview to few privileged state officials, instead, it has now become susceptible to accessible by the public. States can no longer dictate to players at the international space in as much as they wish to be the only existing monopoly using diplomatic missions to drive state secrecy with other states amidst growing desires by the public to hold their governments to account through transparency.

The good efforts made by professional diplomats who invest a lot of time in trying to secure the much desired national interest do so with the hope of positively impacting the lives of individuals in their respective states. There has been a major contribution to public diplomacy because of the power of globalization, specifically the media through the World Wide Web (www) or internet which has made the world a small global village where dissemination of information is a button click away. This people driven initiative has seen an improvement in the socio-economic status of communities across the world.

Over the years states have always felt insecure from external threats despite good relations that they may be enjoyed from their neighbors as well as states that may be geographically far.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Fifty years down the line, the six member states of East African Community are yet to align their domestic policies with the treaty establishing the new East African Community under the enshrined article 5 (2) of the treaty.¹¹ The different political dynamics of each member state has changed over time affecting the different foreign policies of these states. The change of leadership in these states has had a significant impact in the adoption of different foreign

¹¹ The East African Community (EAC)

policies affecting state behavior in the region. The history of African leaders in the continent has been characterized by the misuse of power and disregard for the rule of law and therefore states either have poor policies or good policies that they do not implement to the letter. If leaders are unable to implement policies in their own states effectively then it is equally expected that state leaders are unlikely to implement regional policies.

It is important to note that since the establishment of the new EAC, member states have had difficulties to comply with the EAC treaty and in most cases states have been after their national interest. Lead by Kenya “the big brother,” EACJ has been busy solving regional disputes related to state representation at East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) and thus a setback to effective developmental diplomacy in the region.

1.3 Research Questions

- i) What has been the role of developmental diplomacy in regional integration in Africa and especially in the East African Community?
- ii) What challenges are faced by the states in administering developmental diplomacy to facilitate regional integration in the East Africa Region?
- iii) Has developmental diplomacy impacted regional integration in the East African Community?

1.4 Objectives of the Study

1.4.1 Overall Objective

The overall objective of the study is to evaluate and examine the role of Developmental Diplomacy in the EAC integration process.

1.4.2 Specific Objectives

More specifically, the study aims to;

- i) examine the roles of developmental diplomacy during the process of regional integration in Africa and especially in the East African Community.
- ii) Analyze the challenges faced by states in administering developmental diplomacy to facilitating regional integration in the East Africa Region.
- iii) To examine the impact of developmental diplomacy on EAC regional integration.

1.5 Literature Review

This section reviews literature that contributes to the ongoing debate on regional integration issues. The literature reviewed explains the advent of developmental diplomatic missions in EAC integration process and how they have evolved from the historical point of view to the current modern society reflecting on the EU as a successful model to emulate. It further explains the general relationship between developmental diplomacy and regional integration. It is important the view others successful REC globally that have been a motivating factor for EAC.

1.5.1 DEVELOPMENT DIPLOMACY: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Diplomacy is a term dominantly used in the field of international relation and political science however other fields have not shied away from using this concept. Diplomacy is broad, and at international level, it involves states and other actors like non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations. Early days diplomacy was concerned with negotiation process as a means to achieve state's national interests but was limited to states as main actors, later on, it became clear to scholars that it was imperative to include state representatives as well as other actors who were effectively involved in the negotiations that involved state matters.¹²

In the 1980's and the previous years, diplomacy was viewed as formal communication between states through the use of intermediaries. It is widely understood that the communication between states could be either bilateral diplomacy where two states are negotiating or it could be multilateral diplomacy where more than two states engage one another. States were viewed as the only actors involved in the communication process making them the only diplomatic actors at the time. Soon after the cold war 1967-1991, the global economy started to pick up as globalization took center stage. The flow of goods, services, and culture across the borders created an environment where new actors came in such as the non-governmental organizations like the Red Cross, multinational corporations like Toyota, multilateral organizations and intergovernmental organizations.¹³ New players like the sub-national actor also joined in; a good example are the provinces representing themselves at the

¹² Ronald Peter Barston (2006), *Modern diplomacy*, Pearson Education, 4th Ed, p. 1

¹³ René Wadlow (2002), *International Journal on World Peace*, Professors World Peace Academy, p. 97-100

international arena which are in a unique field of international relations known as paradiplomacy.¹⁴

According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, integration has been defined as a process leading to a condition of the political community. The integration process is perceived by integration theorists as consensual, based principally on the development of shared norms, values, interests or goals. Taylor argues that integration is whereby states transfer authority and legitimacy to a new supranational institution or a set of institution triggered to respond to conditions of interdependence where actors in the international system are sensitive and vulnerable to actions of other entities.¹⁵ These actions could be from other states or trans-national actors such as multinational corporations or terrorist groups.¹⁶

The 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall marked the emergence of developmental diplomacy as by this time the world had experienced various challenging times marked by wars and unpredictable economic growth. The humanitarian situation in the world was recognized, and according to Smith and Baylis, there were a lot of bilateral as well as multilateral negotiations that took place targeting to address poverty and development challenges significantly. Today developmental diplomacy is being used globally by states to inform domestic and foreign

¹⁴ Mathew S. Mingus, (2006), *Transnationalism and Subnational Paradiplomacy*, Western Michigan University, Michigan USA, p 577-594

¹⁵ Conybeare J., Lindberg L., Dilton R.J., O Neal F. H., Pearson F.S., Eichenberg R.C., Garnham D., Ray J.L., Hughes B.B., Sbragia A.M., Kurzer P., Smith L.D., *The 1992 Project and the Future of Integration in Europe*, M.E Sharpe Inc., New York, p.37

¹⁶ John A. Gentry, (2015) *Toward a Theory of Non-State Actors' Intelligence*, National Intelligence University, Washington, DC, p. 465-489

policymaking.¹⁷ Development diplomacy is state formal communication geared towards a social, political and economic growth of states.

1.5.2 Development Diplomacy and Regional Integration in Africa

The history of Pan-Africanism ideology in Africa had played an inspirational role in uniting Africans to push for state liberation that included economic freedom. Pan-Africanist led by Nkrumah and Nyerere were of the opinion that despite the political freedom that states had acquired from colonialist Africa was still not enjoying the freedom that they had vigorously fought for, Africa was still struggling with neo-colonialism.¹⁸ After the independence of Ghana in 1957, Kwame Nkrumah was on the forefront to champion for the integration of the African continent as a whole to solidify the solidarity of the continent against imperialism.¹⁹ The movement believed that the socio-economic and political progress would only be achieved if Africa was unified under “collective self-reliance”.²⁰

The All-African People’s Conference (AAPC) in Ghana set the pace for a united Africa fully supported by politicians across Africa. After the majority of African states gaining independence most of the African leaders had tasted real power and would soon turn to be against the ideology of a United Africa since they would have to surrender their respective state sovereignty exposing them to the political mercy of the “president of Africa.” The selfish

¹⁷ Baylis and Smith, (2005), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 392-394.

¹⁸ Falola, Toyin; Essien, Kwame, (2013), *Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity*. London: Routledge. p. 71–72 .

¹⁹ Mkandawire, P., (2005), *African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development*, Dakar: Codesria/London, p. 58.

²⁰ Jaime De Melo & Yvonne Tsikata, 2014. *“Regional integration in Africa: Challenges and prospects,”* Working Papers p. 93

nature of the political class overtime has been of personal help at the expense of the masses, and thus the majority of African leaders have not peacefully transferred power. The movement was led to a series of diplomatic missions that saw two factions; the Monrovia Block and the Casablanca Block to meet in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 1963 under the invitation of Emperor H. Selassie to form the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which was disbanded in 2002 and replaced by an intergovernmental organization, the African Union (AU).²¹

A state will experience different effects to regional integration that range from the provision of security to member states, conflict management among member states and the region, solidify bargaining power of member states at the international space, cooperation among members in mega projects across borders to the provision of enabling environment and mechanisms that facilitate policy reforms. The state has to live with the reality of sacrificing part of its sovereignty to enjoy these benefits despite strong forces to maintain national interests.²²

In Africa RECs, the political class has neglected other stakeholders like the civil societies and the public in regional integration process for so long making the efforts to integrate look like a political federation targeting to benefit interests of the regional political class and not the citizens of the region. In this regard, EAC is not an exception. It has become difficult for states to implement domestic and regional policies that require them to withdraw trade barriers making it hard for developmental diplomacy to take root.²³

²¹ Haynes J., Hough P., Malik S., Pettiford L,(2013) *World Politics*, Longman Publishing Group, p.308

²² Ng'eno K., (et al) (2013), *Regional Integration Study of East Africa: The Case of Kenya*, KIPPRAP, p.19-21

²³ Jaime De Melo & Yvonne Tsikata, (2014). "*Regional integration in Africa: Challenges and prospects*," Working Papers P. 93

The East African Community in Perspective

Unlike the EU, the EAC integration took a different path, founded in 1967 and dissolved ten years later; the EAC sparked a series of developmental diplomatic missions that saw the signing of the Treaty Establishing EAC in 1999 by three heads of state from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Later on, in 2007 Burundi and Rwanda joined in, and in 2006 the newborn state South Sudan became a member. The treaty signed in 1999 set out the principles for customs, economic and monetary union and eventually a political federation (Article 5(2)).

As stipulated in the EAC treaty, the main objectives are primarily to develop policies and programs that are geared towards widening cooperation among member states in economic, political, socio-cultural fields, defense, security, research and technology, legal and justice affairs to benefit its members.²⁴ The EAC Member states have the desire to industrialize the region in a bid to spur the much-needed development through intra- and international trade cooperation that would expose the regional economy to the global economic mainstream.²⁵ The EAC member states voluntarily joined the REC which is recognized by the African Union (AU) with the intent being to foster the adoption of policies through diplomatic channels to achieve high economic growth, political stability and sustainability as well as growth and accelerated sub-regional, continental and global economic integration.²⁶

In the past decades, the East African Community member states have been grappling with various challenges that have crippled the integration process. The EAC member states have

²⁴ The East African Community (EAC)

²⁵ Qobo M., Draper, (2003), *Multilateralizing Regionalism*, Case Study of African Regionalism, Cambridge University Press, p.412

²⁶ Ibid. p. 412

perused different ideologies which slowed the momentum to integration. Kenya was advocating for capitalism, Tanzania was pursuing socialism while Uganda had a history of the using the two ideologies. President Milton Obote had made several attempts to adopt socialism between 1952-1971 after Idi Amin overthrew him in 1971, the incumbent president decided to select elements from both ideologies.²⁷ President Idi Amin's forceful reign into power further divided the community with growing mistrust among the leaders. This was a clear indication that the EAC debate was centered between the three leaders rather than ideas revolving around social, political and economic growth for the region. Kenya being the great economic giant among the EAC members it was believed that Kenya benefited more economically than its counterparts and thus was a disadvantage to the other members. Like other African RECs, the EAC member states locked out important stakeholders in the process due to lack of strong policies.²⁸

The EAC members are putting effort to revive the community, several organs were created to facilitate the realization of EAC objectives of; protecting human rights, democracy, accountability, transparency and good governance, the rule of law as well as promoting social justice.²⁹ Member states of the EAC have in the past neglected their core responsibilities of implementing Article 7 of the EAC treaty which is clear on the conduct and expectations of members. The inaction by EAC institutions to resolve emerging problems amicably has created a loophole in the system which sets bad precedent that influences a cycle of intolerance where states in the system disregard the treaty. A case in point where Kenya's list of nominee selected to join East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), 2006 was rejected

²⁷ Ryan, Selwyn D. (1973). *"Economic nationalism and socialism in Uganda"*. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, p.11: 140–158

²⁸ N. Ng'eno et al.(2003), *Regional Integration Study of East Africa: The Case of Kenya*, p. 102

²⁹ Emanuel U., *East African Community, Treaty Establishing the East African* , Article 6(a) , : Brill

due to a fallacious process instead of carrying out a free, fair and transparent elections, a clear violation of Article 30 of the EAC treaty which precipitated the opposition to go to the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). The Republic of Kenya was furious after the decision made by the EACJ and vowed to retaliate against it. In 2017, the president of South Sudan had no choice but to revoke the nine EALA nominees appointed through a decree which was confirmed by the National Assembly. This was after it was discovered that some provisions were not met including one-third women representation and a breach of the EALA Article 50. This is a clear demonstration of insincere commitment by member states to uphold the rule of law at national and regional level.³⁰

1.5.3 Gaps in the Literature

The relationship between developmental diplomacy and the EAC has not been well documented in numerous Secondary materials in different concepts. The flip side of that is, the very limited secondary material does exist to explain the relationship between development diplomacy and the EAC.

Scholars have not taken their time to simplify the concept of developmental diplomacy, failure to which a good number of Africans do not understand the operational framework of the idea. The researcher, therefore, wants to define developmental diplomacy as a concept. And also break down its operational structure. And further, explain the role of developmental diplomacy in the EAC.

³⁰ Adewoye O.(1997), *Constitutionalism and Economic Integration; Regional Integration and Co-operation in West Africa*, World Press Inc., Trenton, NJ, p. 321-332

1.6 Justification of the Study

1.6.1 Academic Justification

Available academic disclosure has shown that scholars have written widely on regional integration in Africa as they use various theories in explaining their applications in the process. They have also looked at the national diplomacy and regional integration. The existing research, however, lacks comprehensive coverage on the role developmental diplomacy has played in the integration of the East African Community.

This study will significantly contribute to the existing literature by providing insights on the contribution developmental diplomacy can make to the EAC integration process. This study will, therefore, give a better picture towards placement of developmental diplomacy in the process. The reality of the ongoing integration process further justifies this study and may provide a framework for further research in this field.

1.6.2 Policy Justification

The issue of developmental diplomacy lies at the root of most successes or failures of regional integration efforts. The decision by a state to integrate will result in significant consequences that will, in turn, have a substantial impact on that nation. This study will elucidate on the role played by developmental diplomacy, its implications and generated policies to further inform policymakers on how best to go about developmental policies to mitigate fears of negative impacts of EAC regional integration and further sustainability. The study will assist policy

makers at both national and regional levels on how developmental diplomacy impacts EAC regional integration as it gears to move towards a political federation.

1.7 Hypothesis

This study will endeavor to test the following hypothesis:

1. Developmental diplomacy can promote regional integration in East Africa by fostering cooperation among member states.
2. Effective policy implementation improves the performance of developmental diplomacy.

1.8 Theoretical Framework

The researcher will use liberalism theory of international relations.

In analyzing the role of developmental diplomacy in regional integration understanding state interest is fundamental. Realism theory is conceptualized in five key proponents with the first one viewing the state as the major actors in global affairs, state being penalized by the global environment in the event that they fail to safeguard their state interests as they try to pursue ambitions beyond their means, global anarchy as a force that dictate state behaviors and actions, states in anarchy are obsessed by power and security that motivates them to compete aggressively getting into conflicts hence unable to cooperate on common interests. Lastly, the international institutions in one way or the other affect future cooperation.³¹

³¹ Grieco M. J., (1988) *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation*: The MIT Press, p. 118

According to Krasner, the political order in any system is as a result of territorial control. At the international space, the system is anarchic where the norm is 'self-help.' In the global system there is a gap in authority that is powerful enough to suppress state actions. He argues that state security is supreme to a particular state and as such will deploy self-help tactics to survive in the harsh anarchic environment through mobilizing resources to neutralize potential threats to its survival.

National approaches to integration through various strategies have primarily been influenced by domestic politics that is dynamic. Sengor argues that local politicians have been directly or indirectly influential in affecting state decisions and policies and they by having a ripple effect on regional cooperation and integration especially when matters sovereignty takes center stage. The need to involve different stakeholders in some sensitive state decision matters should not be underestimated.³²

The lack of a legitimately constituted international body with ultimate mandate and authority over state sovereignty seems to exist and therefore states behavior towards a common good is at their discretion. This weakness at the international system extends to lack of a binding international legal framework which will be vital in taming state actions. Thus states can use literary misuse their authority and not be accountable in anyway whatsoever. This phenomenon exposes weaker states to the political interference by strong powers.³³

³² Senghor C.(1990), *Theoretical Foundations for Regional Integration in Africa: An Overview* in Nyong'o, E. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (London: 1939) p. 297

³³ *Ibid.* p. 297

Actors running the state have always claimed that state interest is a collective interest to benefit the state however this is far from the truth. Realist argues that state interest is often used as a decoy to divert the attention of the public while in a real sense it is the interests of the elite which are being protected. The political elites do not embrace public participation and if they do it is for formality the end game is to ensure they safeguard their wealth or business alliances abroad.³⁴

In the event states full integration takes effect, it will have positive gains for the public, uncertainty to the balance of power and threat to the survival of the ruling class. Realists argue that in some cases states that were in good cooperation in the past could turn against one another and be worst enemies in future a situation that could not have occurred had the two states not been partners. States are concerned and afraid that full integration is likely to wash away their sovereignty and thereby causing a security lapse.³⁵

Democratic states according to liberalist scholars do not go to war with other democracies. Kant denotes that economic dependency among democracies which is capitalistic creates an environment where states are more likely to resolve conflicts diplomatically since leaders are answerable to the people and are much concerned about their reelection.³⁶ This school of thought revolves around three key principles that are interrelated, first it rejects power politics as the only possible outcome to state cooperation, secondly it underscores mutual benefit as a result of states cooperation and finally it acknowledges international organizations and

³⁴ S. J. Maclean, (2001) *'Challenging Westphalia: Issues of Sovereignty and Identity in Southern Africa'* Macmillan Publishers Limited. p. 149

³⁵ Grieco M., (1988), *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation*, The MIT Press. p. 131-132

³⁶ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?* P.110

nongovernmental actors to have influence over states' policy choices through either interconnected trade or providing forums to peacefully resolve conflict in order to enjoy economic, social and political gains.³⁷ Scholars further argue that with proper institutions and diplomacy, states can effectively interact with each other seeking nonviolent solutions to their emerging problems.³⁸

It is clear that states national interest drives states willingness to give up their sovereignty to join regional institutions however states recognize that regional the outcome of effective development is through regional cooperation. It is with the above understanding that states deploy developmental diplomacy as a quick fix to influence regional politics with much consideration on use of international institutions to resolve disputes, international and cross-border trade as well as spread of democracy; hence liberalism theory of integration will help shed light on state behavior within the East African Community.³⁹

1.10 Research Methodology

The three types of research approaches that are usually used in data collection and analysis are Quantitative, Qualitative, and Mixed method research.

The research employed two-pronged research approaches, Literature review and Qualitative. Qualitative means for exploring and understanding in-depth views of a key informant with vital knowledge on the diplomatic affairs of the EAC. The qualitative process involves

³⁷ Shiraev, Eric B. (2014). *International Relations*. New York, Oxford University Presses. p. 78.

³⁸ Shiraev, Eric B., Vladislav M. Zubok. (2014). *International Relations*. New York, NY:Oxford University Press,p. 86-90

³⁹ Shiraev, Eric (2014). *International Relations*. Oxford University Presses. p. 80–87

handling emerging questions and procedures of data collection in the participants setting. The data shall then be analyzed inductively building from particulars to general themes. The researcher will then interpret the collected data.

The researcher used direct interviews with Key Informants. Direct Interviews will focus on the interviewer engaging a respondent on a one on one basis. In the event a respondent cannot be reached physically an electronic questionnaire will be administered via the web known as Computer Assisted Web Interviews (CAWI). After collecting the views of key informants, the researcher will, later on, analyze and interpret the views inductively.

The researcher, therefore, believes that Qualitative approach will enable the study to achieve its desired goals.

1.10.1 Population Sample

Developmental diplomacy being a strategy used by government agencies and few international actors very few people and organizations understand its functionality. It is with this view that the researcher intends to use non-probability sampling to settle upon sample size. The use of non-probability will be efficient for the researcher to target a sample size that can give tangible and reliable data. It is however argued that the outcome from this technique cannot be used to generalize to the larger population, but it should be noted that the primary

issues in this study were not to infer the outcome rather focus on explaining specific aspects of regional integration.⁴⁰

The research employed a purposive technique where the researcher used his judgment and observation to select individuals and organizations that provide rich information on the concept. Respondents, therefore, were drawn from relevant government ministries like the Ministry of foreign affairs, Embassies and academicians with vast knowledge of EAC. Similarly, Merriam argued that the power of this technique is based on getting in-depth information about a concept as well as identify the climax of sample selection resulting from the realization that realization more inclusion of more samples does not introduce new evidence from what has already been collected.⁴¹

1.10.2 Data Collection Procedures

The researcher used both primary and secondary means to collect data. Primary means entailed collection of raw data from key informants through direct interviews. Direct Interviews involved face to face questioning and discussions. The researcher used a purposeful sampling technique where the respondent is thoughtfully and purposely recruited in order to answer the research questions fully.

⁴⁰ Merriam, S.B. (1998) *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education*, San Francisco (USA): Jossey-Bass, P.11

⁴¹ Merriam, S.B. (1998) *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education*, San Francisco (USA): Jossey-Bass, P.63

Secondary means, on the other hand, entailed the collection of data from print materials such as reports, books, articles and journals from libraries. Digital print and credible websites were also used to extract relevant materials.

1.10.3 Scope and Limitation of the Research

The study is limited to EAC member states only. Some of the constraints that the researcher is faced range from; time, geographical coverage, human and financial constraints, limited sources of secondary data among other factors that researcher is yet to realize during the study. The study targeted ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, and organizations that are geared towards the EAC this included Trade and Customs Director, East African Community, Monetary and Evaluation Officer East African Community, East African Court of Justice.

1.10.4 Data Analysis

The researcher maximized the use of technology in analyzing data collected through the use of NVivo which is more reliable in giving useful information that will inform the conclusions of this study. NVivo is a qualitative data analysis computer software that helped the researcher to organize the qualitative data in an organized manner.

1.10.3 Data Presentation

The researcher intends to present analyzed findings in word format that included the use of tables.

1.11.0 Chapter Outline

Chapter One:

Chapter one provides the Introduction, Background, Research Problem, Objectives, Research Questions, Hypothesis, Justification of the Study, Literature Review, Gaps within Literature Review, Summary, Theoretical Framework, Research Methodology, Scope and Limitation, and the Chapter Outline.

Chapter Two:

This chapter examines the role of developmental diplomacy in regional integration in Africa and specifically in the EAC. The chapter also gives a synopsis of the strategies states use when it comes to lobbying within the EAC.

Chapter Three:

Chapter three of the study analyzes challenges faced by states in administering developmental diplomacy to facilitate the East African integration process. It also focuses on reasons why the old EAC failed. It primarily seeks to evaluate the relationship between developmental diplomacy and the regional integration in the East African community.

Chapter Four:

This chapter exposes the impact of developmental diplomacy on EAC as well as strategies that states use to engage EAC; it seeks to evaluate whether the tools being used are effective or inept when it comes to influencing the entire EAC.

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

This chapter provides a summary and conclusions of the study as well as give recommendations and suggestions on areas for further research. This study provides recommendations to what has been investigated on developmental diplomacy's roles and challenges in the East Africa Community integration process.

CHAPTER TWO

Role of Developmental Diplomacy in Regional Intergration Process

2.0 Introduction

Development is an integral aspect vital for the survival of any state. Over the years states have embarked on developmental agenda to ensure that they safeguard their influence both regionally as well as internationally. This desire by states led to the widespread use of developmental diplomacy globally as well as by the EAC member states. This has largely been informed by the increased economic, social and political globalization currently experienced all over the world thus influencing states foreign ministries to act accordingly. To date, many countries including EAC member states through their foreign ministries have adapted rapid changes by aligning their geographical and fictional lines to their developmental national and regional agendas.⁴² This chapter endeavors to examine the roles played by developmental diplomacy in the regional integration process as well as a synopsis of strategies that states have used so far to achieve their desired end.

2.1 Developmental Diplomacy

Developmental diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policies demands a comprehensive approach by Ministries of Foreign Affairs from each of the respective member states that intend to form a regional bloc. To understand developmental diplomacy at work, it is vital to unraveling state behavior which has been discussed in the previous chapter. States seek to achieve two primary objectives as they engage either through bilateral or multilateral

⁴² Kafeero, (2008), *World Trade Report 2008*, World Trade Organization, p. 63

diplomacy. States seek political and non-political primarily objectives. As the political class formulates domestic and foreign policies their first point of reference is the political implications that may arise once the set policies take effect.

The decision to implement a particular policy will be determined by various factors that range from the desire by the political class to run for office in subsequent years, the reactions by the domestic population on the policy to the reactions by the international community. For instance, it is rare for a democracy to ignore dissatisfaction by the public especially if and when they decide to hold demonstrations protesting unpopular policy. This is due to the periodic elections that are highly influenced by popular ideologies and therefore it is highly unlikely that unpopular ideology might secure any space contrary to authoritarian states.

For instance, during March, 2016, a demonstration by Kenyan traders selling second-hand clothes opposing the EAC move to have the trade banned by 2019 saw legislatures backtrack on the move because they wanted to maintain their political relevance at the expense of regional agreements at the EAC. States will always work to increase their influence over other states using means like persuasions and promise of rewards to seek cooperation. The facts are that no state is an “island,” states need one another to conduct business. The non-political objectives of states indicate that they will depend on others for economic, commercial and cultural links as a peaceful and non-persuasive means for survival.

2.2 The Concept of Regional Integration (RI)

Regional Integration is said to be a scenario in which two or more neighboring states voluntarily enter into an agreement to strengthen their cooperation to achieve peace, stability,

and economic benefits. According to J. Nye, regionalism is "the formation of interstate associations or groupings by regions".⁴³ The main objectives of a state to enter into such cooperation is to ensure that they capitalize on cooperation to realize political, social, economic as well as environmental gains that will see the populations way of life improve. As states sign the agreements, they form a supranational institution that will control the rules of engagement and as states slowly lose their sovereignty they acquire unique stature where conflict resolution is channeled through diplomacy.⁴⁴ Members of the created regional unit are responsible for formulating policies that are of the essence in addressing regional challenges as well as strengthening the position of the regional unit at various international fora. Though the objectives of regionalism remain the same, the concept can be distinguished to range from community awareness to regional and international treaties.⁴⁵

Geographical proximity has been known to be the significant linkage between states in forming regional institutions however in some cases the link between states have been influenced by economic, political, cultural and supranational institutions that defy the geographical odds.⁴⁶ The globalization witnessed over the years has been on an upward trend making the world a global village that has intensified transportation and communication technologies which have made boundaries more of a political symbol. Neighboring states cooperate at a regional level targeting to remove trade barriers to free trade to increase the movement of labor, capital, goods, and services across national borders. The cooperation is

⁴³ Nye, J. S. (1968). *International Regionalism*. Boston: Little, Brown.

⁴⁴ Haas, Ernst B. (1971), *The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing*, p. 3-44. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

⁴⁵ Fawcett, L. (2004). *Exploring Regional Domains: A comparative history of regionalism*, Oxford University Press, p. 429-446

⁴⁶ Kimmo Kiljunen, (2004). *The European Constitution in the Making*. Centre for European Policy Studies. p. 21-26.

further used as a vehicle to champion for peace and stability by providing a platform and institutions that can peacefully resolve conflict between member states through development diplomacy as well as working together in addressing security challenges facing the region in most cases involving joint military operation as well as bargain collectively at the international level as they work toward collective responsibility in matters that touch on the environment.

2.3 Regionalism in African

Regional integration in Africa is unique in nature and thus differs from other models of integration. First and foremost the concept in Africa is mostly informed by the Pan African ideology which was a strong force in the struggle against the oppression of the African race which played a significant role in shaping the identity of Africa. During the colonial era in Africa, Africans were subjected to discrimination by their colonial masters in their mother land. Treated as slaves and servants Africans were economically disadvantaged as the colonial masters exploited resources in Africa and exported them abroad. With time Africans who were able to get education abroad got to test freedom and would later play an influential role in advocating for equal rights and freedom in back home. The emergence of academics such as W.E. Du Bois, Malcolm X, and Marcus Garvey led to the much-needed drive that would unify African leaders towards liberating the African continent.

2.4 Pan-Africanism and regionalism in Africa

Pan Africanism was a worldwide solidarity movement that was formed to unify all peoples of African descent based on a common fate that dates back to the Atlantic slave trade. The

ideology was widely supported by Africans and was viewed by African elites as the way to uplift the economic, social and political progress as well as unify peoples of African descent.⁴⁷ The ideology was supported by both Africans in the continent of Africa as well as those in the diaspora who saw that their challenges were intertwined. Pan-Africanist such as Marcus Garvey, Malcolm X, W. E. B. Du Bois, Haile Selassie, Julius Nyerere, Ahmed Sékou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah, Thomas Sankara, and Muammar Gaddafi elevated Pan-Africanism to another level.⁴⁸ They stressed the idea of collective self-reliance which was psychological energy that would seek to consolidate power to the hands of Africans by shifting the global resources and unsettle the social and political structures in Africa.⁴⁹ The idea was to promote African values that would champion for civilization and the struggles against slavery, racism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.⁵⁰

The ideology developed to modern Pan-Africanism in the 19th and 20th century that saw the establishment of the Pan-African Association in 1897 which was subsequently followed by Henry Sylvester William's effort to organize the First Pan-African Conference in London in 1900.⁵¹ This was geared towards advocating against racism and pushing for self-governance in Africa. ⁵² Even though these deliberations were not between states, they were negotiations between elites of whom majority became political figures and played a major role in creating a roadmap in preparation for future developments for the African continent.

⁴⁷ Frick, N., Janari, S., et al. (2006). *History: Learner's Book*. South Africa: New Africa Books, p. 235

⁴⁸ Falola, Toyin; Essien, Kwame (2013). *Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity*. London: Routledge, p. 71–72.

⁴⁹ Agyeman, O. (1998), *Pan-Africanism and Its Detractors: A Response to Harvard's Race Effacing Universalists*. Harvard University Press, Harvard, p.4

⁵⁰ Falola, Toyin; Essien, Kwame (2013). *Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity*, London: Routledge, p. 71–72.

⁵¹ Lubin, Alex, (2014) "*The Contingencies of Pan-Africanism*", *Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political Imaginary*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p.71.

⁵² Tony Martin, (1985), *Pan-African Connection: From Slavery to Garvey and Beyond*, Dover: Majority Press, p. 207.

The independence of Ghana in 1957 under Kwame Nkrumah came as a surprise to many. Nkrumah, a political activist, became the major advocate for a united Africa which focused on integrating the entire African continent.⁵³ This meant that Africa would become united and governed by one political leader. The efforts sparked a wave of solidarity among other African elites who championed for decolonization from the western powers.

With various attempts by Nkrumah to unite Africa, in 1960, second All-African People's Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia proved that the developmental diplomatic agenda that tried to unite continent to be under one political leader would be a great challenge since there were diverging ideologies that cropped up regarding the political and economic integration of the independent states at the time. This left two opposing groups, the Casablanca bloc, and the Brazzaville bloc. However, in 1963, the Pan-African movement was able to unite African voices in the African Summit conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia establishing the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which had 32 signatories. The objective of the OAU was to coordinate efforts towards raising the standard of living of member States, defending their sovereignty as well as end colonialism in the continent. This marked a new beginning for African states to streamline developmental negotiations on the continent.

The OAU charter was a defining moment for the much-needed cooperation in the continent since independent African states would provide financial and military assistance to freedom fighters in their efforts to decolonize their countries. The donations from independent African

⁵³ Mkandawire, P. (2005). *African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development*, Dakar: Codesria/London: Zed Books, p. 58

countries came from far and wide led by Ben Bella, the then president of Algeria who donated 100 million francs.⁵⁴

The death of Nkrumah in 1972 left a gap in the movement which was immediately filled by Muammar Qaddafi who kept the spirit of Pan-Africanism alive by advocating for United States of Africa that would see the continent transform into a political federation. The ideology was good and had the potential to transform the lives of peoples in Africa, however the dilemma of whether states should lose their sovereignty or not became a reality that saw various freedom fighters who rose to power reluctant to give up their newly acquired roles due to selfish interests. The OAU that was seen as a platform to drive the Pan-Africanists agenda was deemed ineffective in its missions since there was a rise in dictatorial regimes which sparked a lot of violent confrontations in the continent. Civil wars witnessed in Nigeria continued for years unabated by the OAU, the human rights violation by the Amin regime in the 1970's were also unresolved. This showed the greatest weakness of the institution that relied on the policy of non-interference in the affairs of member states.

Since the OAU was a formation where African leaders met to represent their people, it would be highly expected that the politicians would do little to criticize their colleague given that majority of these leaders had serious governance and civil rights violations in their respective countries. However, despite doing little on protecting rights and liberty of the people of

⁵⁴ Hakim Adi, Marika Sherwood. (2003), *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*. New York: Routledge, p.10

Africa, the “dictators club” (OAU) was able to unite the continent, and for the first time, Africans were committed to end colonialism and promote cooperation in the continent.⁵⁵

2.5 Role of AU in Regional Integration in Africa

With the OAU seen as a bureaucratic talk show with limited powers to act there was a need to replace the institution with a more vibrant regional institution relevant to the needs of Africa and hence the OAU was reorganized as AU. The African Union (AU) formed under the AU charter signed by all 55 countries on the African continent replaced the OAU which was deemed ineffective to the evolving challenges facing the continent. The most important decisions at the AU are made by heads of states annually through the Assembly of the African Union. The geographical area of the AU covers 29 million square kilometers, a population of 1.2 billion as of 2016 and a GDP of over USD 2 trillion.⁵⁶ Africa is seen as the fastest growing continent at 5.6% annually, and the GDP is expected to rise at an average of over 6% between 2013 and 2023. The United Nations (UN) predicted that Africa would reach 3.7% in 2019 as a business in the continent responds to the growing economy.⁵⁷ This is a motivation for African nations to put more efforts on bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

The AU had a specific objective that was focused on addressing emerging challenge affecting the continent which had earlier become hard for OAU to address. The new continental union would be formed with new powers that included the intervention of AU in domestic affairs of a member state putting emphasis on the African people as opposed to the OAU that was seen

⁵⁵ Jaynes, Gerald D., (2005), *Encyclopedia of African American Society*, Volume 1 (contributors: Thomson Gale (Firm), Sage Publications), SAGE, p. 672

⁵⁶ International Monetary Fund, (2018), "*GDP Nominal and PPP Data, current prices*".

⁵⁷ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, (2018), "*World Economic Situation and Prospects 2018*"., Development Policy and Analysis Division. p. 106

as the organization of African leaders who were determined to defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its members through accelerated political and socio-economic integration of the continent. Made up of both political and administrative bodies, the Assembly of the African Union formally known as the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AU-AHSG) has over the years shown the political will to try and put forth critical agendas that member states need to address.

Governance being a critical aspect of integration, AU member states convened in Ghana to discuss the formation of a Union Government at 2007 at the AU summit. In the summit, members felt the need to solidify Africans Unity politically driving the idea of the United States of Africa that would complete the real African Union project. The heated negotiations led to the assembly agreeing to accelerate political and economic integration as well as conducting an audit on the relationship between the AU and RECs to involve the African peoples in the organisations affairs. This was to be followed by various summits including the 2008 summit in Egypt and 2009 in Addis Ababa respectively. These were crucial meetings that to a great extent exposed the thinking of member states in the best way forward to a political union.

The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action for the Development of Africa and the 1991 Abuja treaty to establish the African Economic Community was a game changer in the integration process in Africa for it was instrumental in the creation of the strategic plans to make Africa self-sufficient especially after African leaders realized that the continent was very unstable in the unfolding world economic crisis. In 1973, the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries proclaimed an oil embargo targeted at nations perceived to support Israel during the Yom

Kippur War however the Oil crisis that saw various countries in Africa suffer as a result.⁵⁸ Furthermore, African leaders were blaming for their demise on Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that were loans provided to them by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB).⁵⁹ Therefore the plan was to have RECs to assist members states comfortably absorb any other world economic shock. This became an issue of concern as it brought about the eight RECs overlapping roles in Africa as will be further explained in details in the following chapter.⁶⁰

Africa has a long history of high levels of conflict among other issues. The conflicts range from political, ideological to border-related conflicts. The conflicts have to a greater extent affected development efforts in various countries in the continent with different scenarios having the potential to spillover to neighboring countries and thus impacting on regional cooperation. This is mostly attributed to the colonial legacy where colonial masters formed territorial blocs for proper coordination and flow of goods and labor across the boundaries. The existence of ethnolinguistic diversity in the continent manifested itself after the African states started to gained independence from their colonial masters. African leaders were struggling to expand their territories hoping that the move will be a show of military might

The AUs superior mandate to intervene in domestic affairs that are seen as a potential threat to peace, security, and stability on the continent has reduced conflict among member states through the active role of Peace and Security Council (PSC). Under AU Constitutive Act, [2] which provides the right to the AU to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of

⁵⁸ Smith, Charles D. (2006), *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, New York: Bedford, p. 329.

⁵⁹ Eyoh, Dickson, (1998), *African Perspectives on Democracy and the Dilemmas of Postcolonial Intellectuals in African Affairs*, Africa Today, p.281-306: p. 284

⁶⁰ Bizoza, Kayitesi, Sipangule, (2016), *Africa's bewildering spaghetti bowl*, in: DC 9, p. 12-14. [1]

the Assembly on issues regarding war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity has seen the PSC which calls for a collective security and has developed early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and effective response to conflict. The PSC has been involved in a number of cases since 2004 decelerating tension in the continent, for instance it adopted resolutions creating the AU peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Darfur, as well as going further to impose sanctions against persons undermining peace and security such as imposing travel bans and asset freezes against the leaders of the rebellion in the 2007 hot contested elections in Anjouan, President Bacar of Anjouan was among those sanctioned.⁶¹ The founding treaty further called for the establishment of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including the African Standby Force (ASF) which would be deployed in conflict areas where grave human rights violations were being witnessed.⁶²

The AU has been successful in the execution of its mandate however it has had various challenges and failures that have impeded the developmental agenda in the continent. The problems cut across all the socio-economical to political constraints further discussed in the next chapter.

2.6 The African Integration Model

The African models' desire to have free markets, free flow of goods, labor and capital and a common currency that would compete at the international market has been slow given the current political will by member states. Formation of a political and monetary federation is usually the hard part of integration where states lose their sovereignty and use a common

⁶¹ May 9, 2007; *African Union (AU) report*

⁶² Hany Besada, (2007), *Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century*, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p.24

currency as they join to form one political union under one leadership and a common currency. In 1991, African heads of states and governments ratified the treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) in Abuja in 2000. This was after the African leaders deliberated that for development to have meaning, there was a need to have a development strategy that would give a clear roadmap on how development would be achieved in Africa. The treaty was meant to incorporate guiding principles and goals as well as a regional framework that would see REC align their policies to the agenda of the treaty. The negotiations in Abuja were focused on establishing grounds for mutual economic developments that would see its implementation take effect in six-phased approaches. At the same time, the members saw the need to have the vision to integrate consolidated at the regional level. The idea of having a regional institution on board was to strengthen the RECs to fasten their development that would eventually have them merge together to form an integrated African Economic Community. The stated duration was 34 years with the first milestone to strengthen RECs scheduled to take place from 1994 to 1999.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an effort recognized where member states have progressively engaged in developmental diplomacy as they try to improve their economic situation. NEPAD is an economic development program under the umbrella of AU and was adopted in 2001 by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government. The program has been on the forefront to provide a policy framework to accelerating economic co-operation and integration among member states. The 2001 summit in Sirte, Libya members of the then OAU agreed that the NEPAD and Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) should be merged if Africa is to benefit from the economic regeneration of Africa. The former president of South Africa Thabo Mbeki led the process

consolidating the two programs. With the assistance of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), a compact recovery plan for Africa was developed that saw the adoption of the plan by United Nations Millennium Summit of 2000.

The merged documents were submitted to African Ministers of Development and Planning and Ministers of Finance which constituted NEPADS primary objectives of; poverty eradication, promotion of sustainable growth and development, integrate Africa in the world economy and empowering women as well as incorporation of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which focused on thematic areas that included; Political and Democratic Governance, Corporate Governance, Economic Governance and Management and Socio-economic Development. So far, 38 countries out of the 53 countries have signed the MOU to join APRM.

2.7 Role of Developmental Diplomacy in the East African Community

Efforts to integrate the EAC began in the 1890s by the British to have a structured and efficient administrative influence in the region. This led to the creation of the East African High Commission (EAHC) which sorted to link services in the region. The signing of the 1961 treaty for East African Co-operation gave life to the East African Cooperation. In 1967 The EAC was founded and ten years later leading to a series of developmental diplomatic missions that saw the signing of the Treaty Establishing EAC in 1999 by three heads of state from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The collapse of the EAC in 1977 was attributed mainly to the wide political differences among the member states. The treaty signed in 1999 set out the principles for customs, economic and monetary union and eventually a political federation

(Article 5(2)). After several negotiations, the EAC was created in 2001. Later in 2007 Burundi and Rwanda joined in when members in 2000 ratified the 1999 Treaty Establishing the East African Community, and in 2006 the newborn state South Sudan became a member.

2.8 Post-collapse to the revival of the East African Community

The collapse of the Community in 1977 saw member states negotiate to have the separation of assets and liabilities under the Mediation Agreement of 1984. This agreement was to enable members to be in a position to explore areas of further cooperation as stipulated under Article 14.02 of the Agreement. Implementation activities took off in 1993 focusing attention to economic cooperation between Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Tanzania experienced a major transformation in the infrastructure, health and education sectors. This progress was linked to the support Tanzania received from multilateral donors in 1986. Tanzania made a significant improvement of 3% annual average GDP between 1990 to 2001.⁶³ This was a move that saw Uganda emulate Tanzania's strategy by approaching the world bank. Between 1990 to 2005, Uganda's macroeconomic growth was an average rate of 6.5%. Kenya, on the other hand, was experiencing economic shocks in the 1980s since the tea and coffee market was on a downward trend as a result of the world recession.

The EAC member states voluntarily joined the REC which is recognised by the African Union (AU) with the intent to foster the adoption of policies through diplomatic channels to achieve high economic prosperity, political stability, sustainable growth, and accelerated sub-

⁶³ Ng'ang'a Wanjiru, (2006), *The 'New' East Africa Community: Effects on Trade, Welfare and Productive Activities in East Africa*, University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon. p.10

regional and continental economic integration.⁶⁴ Traditionally, African states including those in the EAC considered the EU as the most trade and development partner guided by a series of the Lomé Conventions that was first signed in 1975 covering the European Economic Community (EEC) and African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries (ACP). The agreement was meant to provide countries at the periphery with unilateral preferential access to the EU market, however, South Africa was excluded. This meant that the ACP countries would export their goods to EEC duty-free.

In 1992, the EU emerged to form a single market that became disadvantageous to the ACP countries.⁶⁵ The conclusion on the Cotonou Agreement between the EU and African countries led to the World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible Economic Partnership Agreements negotiations that cut across the regional integration in Africa and EAC. This was a performance-based partnership that abandoned aid entitlements to ACP countries thus meant that the EU-African trade would be encouraged with strings attached to good governance practices. This paradigm shift exposed the complexity of integration in Africa and the EAC. The East African and other African leaders had divergent views on governance that had severe gaps on the economic reality in EAC as well as their political ambitions.

The EAC member states have realized that working together as a unit guarantees greater economic, social and political regional stability.⁶⁶ Member states through the legislative arm of the EAC, East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) which has 27 members representing their respective states have engaged in various debates and discussions in matters affecting

⁶⁴ Qobo M., Draper, (2003), *Multilateralizing Regionalism*, Case Study of African Regionalism, Cambridge University Press, p. 411-415

⁶⁵ Hans-Peter Werner, (1997), *Lomé, the WTO, and bananas*, in *The Courier*, ACP-EU, p. 59-60

⁶⁶ David Booth, Diana Cammack, Thomas Kibua and Josaphat Kwek, (2007), *East African integration: How can it contribute to East African development?*, Overseas Development Institute

the region as well as approving the budget and giving recommendations. Today the EAC members are in exploring developmental diplomacy to achieve great economic cooperation through intra-regional trade among member states. To ensure negotiations and activities within the region are smooth members are actively engaged in the EAC main organs are the EAC are the Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Co-ordinating Committee, the East African Court of Justice, the Sectoral Committees, the East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat.

2.9 The New East African Community

Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania signed an agreement in 1993 leading to the establishment of a Permanent Tripartite Commission for co-operation with clear objectives first resolve outstanding differences that led to the collapse of the previous EAC and secondly to promote cooperation in social, cultural, political and security aspects of member states. The East African National Assemblies debate on a draft treaty that was drafted and circulated by the 1996 Secretariat to the Commission played a critical role that leading to the reestablishment of the East African Community and the historic signing of the treaty by the three presidents of the EAC in 1999.

2.10 The Expanded East African Community

Established under Article 2 of the Treaty Establishing the EAC, the Community is recognised as an intergovernmental organisation. In 2000, the treaty entered in to force after the ratification of the treaty paving the way for Rwanda and Burundi to join the Community

which had a population of 130 million people and a collective GDP of \$74 billion in 2009.⁶⁷ The successful referendum that enjoyed an overwhelming majority of 99% of the voters supporting secession, the newly born state was eager to join the EAC. In 2011 the Republic of South Sudan gained independence, and in 2016 after a series of negotiations, it ratified the EAC agreement increasing the number of member states to six. The region was estimated to have a population of 168 million and a GDP of US\$ 439.039 billion in the same year.⁶⁸

As stipulated in the EAC treaty, the main objectives are primarily to develop policies and programs that are geared towards widening cooperation among member states in economic, political, socio-cultural fields, defence, security, research and technology, legal and justice affairs for their mutual benefits.⁶⁹ The EAC Member states have the desire to industrialise the region in a bid to spur the much-needed development through intra and international trade cooperation that would expose the regional economy to the global economic mainstream.

The EALA which is the legislative organ of the EAC has been influential in moving forward the objectives of the REC. Established under Article 9 of the EAC treaty, the organ was set to fill the gaps that led to the collapse of the EAC in 1977 adopting a proactive approach to issues affecting the region. In the past, lack of clarity around functions, responsibility, and powers of different organs presented a significant challenge. Currently, the problem has shifted to political will by the ruling elite to implement recommendations and policies agreed upon at the EAC. This has had a significant blow to developmental diplomacy for it cannot have an impact while operating in a politically toxic environment.

⁶⁷ East Africa community porta, (12014)

⁶⁸ IMF,(2016), *Report for Selected Countries and Subjects*.

⁶⁹ Baregu, M (2005), *The African Economic Community and the EAC: Any lessons*. In R Rok Ajulu, *The Making of a Region*, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand SA, p. 56-58

The Treaty for East African Co-operation signed in 1993 between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania establishing a Tri-partite Commission for Co-operation paved the way for member states to pursue development agenda amongst themselves. In 2004 members ratified the signed Customs Union Protocol that saw an increase in intra-regional trade in goods and services encouraging cross-border labour and foreign investment. New industrial developments were also witnessed thus called for more diplomatic engagements that led to the Common Market Protocol in 2009, the first of its kind in Africa. The EAC members have an ambitious goal to progressively transform into a single market that will foresee free movement of labour, people, goods and services across borders. The negotiations to see this idea become a reality are ongoing between relevant stakeholders.

Diplomatic efforts to have tariffs reduced have been slow but progressive. Under Article 13 of the Customs Union Protocol member states agreed to do away with the existing non-tariff barriers and not to replace them with other new ones. However this has been implemented with a lot of laxities by some conservative members like Tanzania who view tariffs as a major source of income. Kenya and Uganda have worked immensely hard to improve services within their border post; in 2018 the two neighbours upgraded their Busia border post at to a One Stop Border Post (OSBP) where clearance is done once as opposed to how it was previously done, clearance was on both the Kenyan side and the Ugandan side.

Table 1 Dynamics of Integrating EAC

1. Customs Union	Eliminate trade barriers (tariff & quota among partner States) Common external tariffs against non-members
2.Common Market	Customs union; harmonisation of taxation

	<p>policies & laws</p> <p>Free movements of factors of production</p> <p>Common Commercial Policy</p>
3. Monetary Union	<p>Common currency</p> <p>Harmonisation of factors of production</p> <p>Common Commercial Policy</p>
4. Total Economic Integration and Political Federation	<p>A supranational political authority whose decisions are binding on partner states.</p> <p>Common foreign and security policy</p>

Source: Adapted from Kaisi 2003.⁷⁰

Table 2 EAC Member States Strategic Vision

Member State	Time Frame	Strategic Vision	Priority Areas
Kenya	Vision 2030	Globally competitive and prosperous.	To achieve Sectorial objectives including meeting regional and global commitments.
Uganda	Vision 2035	Transform Ugandan society from peasant to modern, prosperous country.	Prominence is given to knowledge-based economy
Tanzania	Vision 2025	The high quality of life anchored on peace, stability, unity and good governance, the rule of law, resilient economy and competitiveness.	Inculcate hard work, investment and savings, culture; knowledge-based economy; infrastructure development; and Private Sector Development.
Rwanda	Vision 2020	Become a middle-income country by 2020	Reconstruction, HR development and Integration to the regional and global economy
Burundi	Vision 2025	Sustainable peace and achievement of global development	Poverty reduction and reconstruction and

⁷⁰ Kaisi, John Hosi, (2003), *Assessment of Regional Integration Progress in the East African Community*, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, 2003

		commitments in line with MDGs.	Institutional development
South Sudan	Vision 2040	A united and peaceful new nation, building strong foundations for good governance, economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all.	Seven pillars: educated and informed nation; prosperous, productive and innovative nation; free, just and peaceful nation; democratic and accountable nation; safe and secure nation; united and proud nation; and compassionate and tolerant nation.
EAC	Treaty	Attain a prosperous, competitive secure and politically united East Africa	Widen and deepen economic, political social and cultural integration at regional and global levels

Source: Adapted from 4th EAC Development Strategy 2011/2-2015/6⁷¹

2.11 The Operationalization of EAC Organs

All EAC members now consider development as the key to national prosperity which they believe has a great impact if developmental negotiations are engaged in their foreign diplomatic missions. The work to promote international engagements with other EAC members has seen states in the region. Subject to the provisions of the Treaty establishing the East African Community, members have consistently engaged the organs of the EAC; The Council of Ministers which is a policies organ that consists of the Ministers responsible for regional co-operation of each Partner State, The Co-ordinations Committee that consists of the Permanent Secretaries responsible for regional Cooperation in each Partner State, Sectorial Committee that consists of experts whom responsible for tabling their country's position on paper on various issues and preparation of comprehensive implementation programs, The

⁷¹ East African Community, (2011-2015), *Deepening and Accelerating Integration*, 4th EAC Development Strategy 2011/2-2015/6, p.13

Secretariat, an executive organ of the Community responsible for the general administration and financial management of the Community, East Africa Court of Justice established under Article 9 of the Treaty for Establishment of EAC which arbitrates on conflicts among members, East Africa Legislative Assembly which is a supranational parliament and the legislative organ of the community formed under Article 49 of the Treaty where members initiate new regional policies as it sets agenda for the region.

2.12 East African Development Strategies

2.12.1 The First East African Development Strategy (1997-2000)

Launched in 1997, the three founding members of the EAC came up with a strategy to achieve specific goals between the periods of 1997 to 2000. The objectives of the strategy were to promote the spirit of regional integration with emphasis on economic cooperation by strengthening various institutions within the region to build capacity to handle the region as well as facilitating the free flow of people, goods, and services across the borders. This progressively led to the signing and ratification of the EAC treaty which became a guiding legal document for regional co-operation.

2.12.2 The Second East African Development Strategy (1997-2000)

This stage was broad and focused on the economic areas touching on cooperation. The had main considerations; first it was to look at the lessons and experiences learned from the First Stage of the EAC Development Strategy 1997-2000; second was to deliberate on the ongoing activities as well as decisions made by various committees, third was to effect the findings of studies commissioned by the Secretariat properly and to build capacity to effectively take part

in the global economy guided by the provision the Treaty.⁷² The strategy had envisaged starting with the establishment of a reliable and well-structured Customs Union then later an efficient Common Market. This according to the relevant parties would be achieved if the tourism and agricultural sectors are fully exploited and to maximise the use of readily available natural resources to boost infrastructure, science and technology and human resource development for the smooth flow of the strategy.

To make the strategy work it was imperative that issues emerging from the First Stage of the EAC Development strategy like harmonisation of the regions exchange rate and policies, currency convertibility and sharing relevant budgetary information on fiscal policies and capital markets were vital in strengthening the East Africa Banks in financing regional projects. There was a consensus to allow cross-border purchasing of shares within the region that made it possible to issue international bonds.⁷³ The liberalisation of trade being a priority, members called for the adoption of Common External Tariffs (CET) which in essence was to eliminate non-tariff barriers and a common anti-dumping of illegal toxic waste that led to the signing of the Customs Union Protocol that entered in to force in 2005.

2.12.3 The Third East African Development Strategy (2006-2010)

The third East African Development Strategy (2006-200) focused on the national economy, the regional economy and finally the world economy. The third strategy was laying a foundation to a Monetary Union and eventually a political federation through the amalgamation of the Customs Union and a Common Market.

⁷² East Africa Community, (2001) *The 2nd EAC Development Strategy 2001-2005.*, Arusha Tanzania . VIII p. 8

⁷³ EAC Report of the Committee, (2004) *Fast Tracking East Africa Federation*

The growth of trade within the EAC from 2005 to 2009 was as a result of the member states facilitating the public sectors to work together with the private sectors. Intra-EAC trade increasing from US\$ 1,979.2 million to US\$3,339.4 million during 2006-2008 was an indication of a strong relationship between the two sectors thus promising signs to achieve the ultimate objective of the strategy at the time. With the establishment of a common market being the main objective of the third strategy, there was a deliberate push by the member partners through developmental engagements to fasten Common Market within the region to attractive single investment area to experience a free flow of people, labour, goods, and services.

The question of how this was to be made possible would be made possible within the short period was to be solved by the member partners to share management, production and operation of major reliable supporting infrastructure especially roads, energy, and the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sectors. The foundation laid the harmonization of monetary and fiscal policy within the EAC as part of resolving the outstanding issues from the previous plan, however, efforts to political federation was a sensitive issue that members felt it had to involve the peoples of East Africa largely.

2.12.4 The Forth East African Development Strategy (2011-2016)

This Strategy was informed by the state's national commitment to global affairs. The major issues of concern were the climate change that largely affects the environment as well as has an impact on food security, insecurity and finally the financial crisis. The fourth strategy was still focused on the consolidating benefits gained from a fully functional Customs Union, the

operationalization of an effective Common Market and a reliable foundation for a Monetary Union and a Political Federation in the region.

The fourth Strategy had its focus on monitoring and evaluation of the previous strategies as opposed to setting out new strategies which would mean new activities and processes. Specifically, member states were to evaluate the outcomes and impacts of the strategies. This would give answers to whether the strategies have worked or not, or to what extent they have accomplished and what are the challenges, opportunities and action plan. Therefore, the periodic reports compiled monthly, quarterly, bi-annual and annual progress reports were to be generated and evaluated for purposes of exploring intervention measures that might involve policy generation to keep the implementation strategy on course.⁷⁴ This process of data collection, analysis and dissemination were squarely put under the EAC Secretariat and Partner States implementing Ministries. Data being sourced is collected from EAC Secretariat, the Partner States implementing Ministries, Private and Public Institutions.

2.12.5 The Fifth East African Development Strategy (20017-2022)

In line with the Treaty Establishing the EAC and EAC Vision 2050, the Fifth EAC Development Strategy is formed by transforming the EAC into a stable, competitive and low middle-income region by 2021. The community is focusing on seven key areas of; Consolidating the Single Customs Territory, development of regional infrastructure, promote a common market, improve agricultural productivity, promote regional peace and stability, security and good governance, improve regional infrastructure and transform regional institutions at national and regional levels. The fifth strategy intends to be a people-centered

⁷⁴ EAC (2018), *Accelerating a people-centered and market-driven integration*, development strategy (2016/17 - 2020/21)

and market driven with the hope of steering the region to greater heights through the involvement of stakeholders and development partners. Mandated to spearhead the region's economic, social and political integration, as well as sustainable social-economic development agenda by the heads of states, the EAC provides guidelines and formulates on which policy action matrix under the fifth matrix. The participation included relevant stakeholders however there were little awareness and understanding among the stakeholders before getting into details in the process.

2.13 Conclusion

The process of integration in East Africa has been lengthy and complex. The region is under the colonial rule by the British in the early twentieth century tried to consolidate regional states under one administrative unit. After the collapse of the first EAC in 1977, member states engaged on various occasions to revive the community implementing policies through negotiations to guarantee a more stable and long lasting REC emphasizing on sealing the gaps that led to the collapse. The newly revived EAC increase its members to widen and solidify cooperation among its members. The EAC aims to achieve development through the formation of a Customs Union, the establishment of a single regional currency, increase and improve economic integration and finally to form a political federation.

CHAPTER THREE

Challenges faced in Administering Developmental Diplomacy

3.0 Introduction

This chapter analyses challenges faced by states in administering developmental diplomacy to facilitate the East African integration process. It also focuses on reasons why the old EAC failed. It primarily seeks to evaluate the relationship between developmental diplomacy and regional integration in the East African community.

3.1 Political Challenges

The political and economic globalisation among other factors has had a significant influence on regional integration across the globe. As individual states seek political and economic interests, they are faced with a wide range of issues beyond their control. This has affected operations of different foreign ministries including those in the East African Community. Regional integration in East Africa was a concept convened by the British at the House of Commons and the House of Lords, and therefore it was not an initiative of the peoples of East Africa. This marked a shaky foundation for co-operation in the region because regional leaders and the people did not buy into the idea of integrating. Furthermore, the effects of colonialism had greatly impacted on the unity of East Africans since the divide and rule strategy imposed by the colonial masters had serious negative impact on the unity between neighbours as well as states. The political class eventually embraced the idea after some persuasion as well as the growing economic challenges faced by member states at the time.

East African member states led by Kenya have over the years faced some political instabilities which have to a greater extent affected development in the region.

Before the collapse of the EAC in 1977, the EAC member states had perused different ideologies which slowed the momentum for states to integrate. Kenya was advocating for capitalism, Tanzania was pursuing socialism while Uganda had a history of the using the two ideologies. President Milton Obote had made several attempts to adopt socialism, 1952-1971, but after Idi Amin overthrew him in 1971, the incumbent president decided to select elements from both ideologies.⁷⁵ President Idi Amin's forceful reign into power further divided the community with growing mistrust among the leaders. This was a clear indication that the EAC debate was centred between the three leaders rather than ideas revolving around the social, political and economic growth of the region.

Kenya being the great economic giant among the EAC members it was believed that Kenya benefited more economically than its counterparts and thus was a disadvantage to other members. Like other African RECs, the EAC member states locked out essential stakeholders in the process due to lack of strong policies.⁷⁶ The Hilton Young Commission in 1928 conducted an investigation that was critical in understanding the mindset of political leaders. The findings identified East African leaders at the time to be thinking in nationalistic terms and not in regional terms. This situation was still manifesting itself after the independence of member states. President Amin became overambitious trying to expand his territory by claiming part of western Kenya and Rift Valley culminating into a diplomatic war with Kenya. Amin also brushed shoulders with President Nyerere over asylum given to Milton

⁷⁵ Ibid, p.140–158

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 102

Obote further impacting on the spirit of regional co-operation. Kenya and Uganda have also been in a struggle over the ownership of Migingo Island where both parties claim that the Island is in their territory.

3.2 Peace and Security in EAC

South Sudan, a new member of the EAC, has had a history of violence that came as a result of poor leadership. The president Kiir accused the then former deputy Riek Machar of attempting to overthrow the government through a coup d'état. The former deputy fled, and fighting broke out between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). This led to an outbreak of a civil war that has been on and off since 2013 leaving hundreds of thousands homeless, destruction of property and loss of innocent lives.

Attempts by the International community to resolve the conflict has not had required results. The conflict spilling over to neighbouring states are a threat to peace and security as well as integration process in the regional. Uganda has been struggling to suppress the Lord's Resistance Army (LRM) led by Joseph Kony since 1987. In the 1990s LRM was receiving support from Sudan which was retaliation to the support Uganda government gave to rebels that would later become South Sudan.⁷⁷ This level of impunity has affected cooperation by undermining developmental negotiations since regional leaders do not trust each other.⁷⁸

Terrorism activities have been active in the EAC. The role, ability and the potential of EAC to respond to terrorism in the region has been in question. Jihadist sponsors and sympathizers

⁷⁷ Green, Matthew (2008), *The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa's Most Wanted*. Portobello Books. p. 56.

⁷⁸ Interview: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018

have used the unstable state of Somalia as a breeding and training ground for terrorist activities in the region. The region has experienced the most heinous terrorists' attacks in Sub-Saharan Africa. The region is vulnerable to increasing terrorist-related activities due to the weak capacities of member states to respond effectively despite significant approaches being deployed.

Intra and interstate conflicts have taken centre stage giving space for Islamic radicalisation to thrive, corruption in some member states like Kenya has seen enforcement agents equipped with substandard military hardware and software and competing for national priorities. The 2010 twin bombs in Kampala, EAC member states realised that regional security was under threat. Since 2014, the regional head of states has been discussing ways to combat security threats in the region jointly. These threats were broadened to include piracy, sectarian confrontations, resource based-conflicts, drug, and human trafficking among others.

The Regional Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted today by the EAC Council of Ministers before being endorsed by the Heads of State at the 2014 Extraordinary Heads of State Summit held in Arusha, Tanzania. Despite the effort to tackle the challenges, various terror attacks continue to be witnessed within the region with the Nairobi Westgate attack exposing various loopholes within security agents in combating terrorism.

3.3 Insufficient Financial Recourses

Uganda's economy was stricken by the 1972 coup d'état that saw Obote overthrown while on attending a Commonwealth function in Singapore. Donations and financial support from Uganda's allies were at a record low. To make things worse, Amin was a vicious dictator who

evicted all the Asian businessmen and Israeli investors who make Uganda's economy flourish and replaced them with his political cronies and relatives. The lack of experience businesspeople caused the economy to move on a downward trend, and in the end, Uganda was unable to meet her regional financial obligations. In June 1977, partner states withheld the General Service Budget that starved the Community from effectively executing its mandate. This led to the staff members of the EAC retreat to their countries rendering the EAC headquarters in Arusha, Tanzania dysfunctional.⁷⁹

Today EAC members are struggling to increase their GDP yet they import more than they export at regional and international level. The fact that they cannot generate enough resources at the national level they resort to depending on financial aid, grants and borrowing of unsustainable odious debts from developed countries and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) which in most cases are misappropriated and unaccounted for.

It should not be misconstrued that the rich countries do not borrow. However, the flipside of the matter is that their borrowing is well structured and utilised, and they are based on the fact that other states owe them. The situation has impeded sustainable human development, security and political or economic stability in African and among members of the EAC due to the structural adjustment programs and the required terms of repaying odious debts through hard currencies yet most developed countries have soft currencies. Thus significantly affecting developmental diplomacy in the region becomes member states are not willing to

⁷⁹ V. Umbricht, (1988), *Multilateral Mediation: Practical Experiences and Lessons*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 19

equally share the burden of paying back odious debts, and they view some regional policies like those on tariffs and NTBs as an obstacle to national revenue collection.⁸⁰

3.4 Lack of Strong Political Leadership

The unequal distribution of resources that continued after independence that saw Kenya get the lion's share was never resolved leaving the other two members dissatisfied with the reality that Kenya was becoming strong in all fronts while they were struggling to keep up. The member states were struggling to focus on national interests, therefore, there were no conclusive developmental negotiations on how to disproportionate sharing of benefits among members.⁸¹ The hostilities between Uganda and Tanzania in January, 1971 was of concern to the region, President Amin was furious at President Nyerere for providing asylum to former president Milton Obote exacerbated the situation to a level where the two leaders could not sit on the same platform to discuss regional matters or any reconciliation meetings at the East African Authority which was the decision making body made up of the three Heads of State.⁸²

National politics was of concern, for instance, Kenyan politics had divided the nation, the opposition strongly criticizing the government while political parties operating along tribal lines. The environment was politically toxic, there was a tiny window for developmental diplomacy to take root among the EAC member states. Kenya also a victim of coup d'etat attempt was a clear indication that the voices of a large population went unheard by the political class who by and large interfered with democratic processes of electing people's

⁸⁰ East African Business Council, (2005), *A Study on Non-Tariff Barriers and Development of a Business Climate Index in the East African Region*, EABC, p. 13

⁸¹ F. I. Nixon, (1973), *Economic Integration and Industrial Location: An East African Case Study*, Nairobi: Longman Publishers, p. 59

⁸² R. Mukandala, Killilian, B, (2004), *Political Cooperation in East Africa*, Dar es Salaam: REDET p. 91

representatives. The desire by leaders to stay in power at all cost has meant that no new fresh ideas would see the day of light and therefore minimal contribution and political will are channelled towards the integration of the region. President Moi and Museveni stayed for so long in power thus had little impact on the integration process due to their strong ideas on national interest and fear to embrace change.

The change in political structure in the region over the years, especially in Kenya and Tanzania, has been a boost to the EAC process with more negotiations geared towards developing the entire region despite the expensive cost of democracy that has seen the region witnessed a lot of emotive and violent demonstrations. After elections in Kenya's opposition has over the years been contesting electoral results. In 2007 the country was divided over the voting exercise resolution to the 2007 post-election violence.

Uganda has had a long-serving dictator that has ruled with an iron fist sparking many demonstrations by the public that range from opposing government's actions to demanding the release of detained political prisoner to massive bungled elections.⁸³ This unpredictable electoral cycle within the regions is a threat to the integration process since the demonstrations escalate to become violent. The result is usually destruction of property, loss of life, displaced individuals and affected businesses especially for landlocked countries. A good example is when Kenya witnessed the worst post-election violence in the history of the East African nation. Uganda and other countries inland that were beneficiaries of the port of Mombasa were greatly affected, and no business could freely flow across the country.

⁸³ Collier P & SN Ndungu, *Strategies for growth*, in Adam *et al.*, *op. cit.* See also Mutiga M, *How Nation Can Avoid Economic Ruin*, 2012',

The EAC as an institution has also been a platform where members have continuously and on various occasions had power struggles over its leadership. Since November 2011 Kenya has held the chair's position of the EAC which made other partners worried.

The Kenyan government had not given a clear direction on the responsibilities of Kenyans elected at EALA two months down the line yet other regional members had already debriefed their representative. The tag of war among leaders at EALA has shown the loopholes that undermine regional integration. The 2006 case where Kenya's list of nominees selected to join East African Legislative Assembly were rejected due to undemocratic process and the 2017 South Sudan case have exposed the lack of seriousness by regional governments in implementing regional policies. Kenya went as far as promising to retaliate against EACJ for its firm ruling which was disrespectful to the institution that set a dangerous precedent in the region contrary to the provisions of Article 7 of the EAC.⁸⁴

3.5 Lack of Strong Private Sector, Civil Society and Public Participation and Awareness

Critics and scholars have cited poor public diplomacy in the old treaty as one of the major factors that undermined co-operation contributing to the collapse of the former EAC. This meant that it was a process driven by heads of member states leaving out the East African people in general. At the time two of the EAC members, Kenya and Uganda were led by dictatorial regimes that would not tolerate criticism from the public, private sector or even the civil societies. These regimes sort to cracking down on any resenting voices representing the people in total disregard for human rights as a strategy to holding on to power.

⁸⁴ Ibid p. 321-332

Thus the people could not contribute to the debate on integration due to fears of victimisation and intimidation by the respective state officials. The growing concerns that the civil society to some extent have been put their focus on the elite given that some of these organisations in the region have been formed on weak foundations targeting to make profits as opposed to protecting the rights of the people.

Article 127 of the 1999 EAC treaty provides that member states should create an enabling environment for the civil society and the public in development activities within the region.⁸⁵ However the political actors in the region have not fully embraced the public, private sector and civil society in the process. Human rights continue to be violated by national state apparatus within the region while very little or no condemnations are being raised by the EAC or other partner states apart from other international actors. The private sector is the major implementers and drivers behind integration process yet for so long their contribution in the process has been ignored.

In the EAC the private sector is represented by the East African Business Community (EABC) which surprisingly has been given an observer position at the EAC thus possessing very little influencing powers on policies being discussed on the floor of the house. Despite the fact that member states acknowledge the importance of supporting the private sector some member states have been approaching regional policies with a cold feet especially on matters NTBs, monetary union and political federation. The slow progress by member states has left the business community frustrated and lost confidence in the process. To make matters worse regional members have been slow in disseminating relevant agreements and discussions to the

⁸⁵ EAC Secretariat, The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, Article 127

public. The common citizen especially those living in the rural areas have limited options access of accessing information.⁸⁶ The region is not doing better with the high numbers of illiterate adults despite numerous efforts by member states, thus there is dire need to see how information can be effectively communicated to benefit people in the region.⁸⁷

3.6 Sovereignty and Political Will

Members of RECs in Africa including the EAC are hesitant to relinquish power to supranational entity. The fears by states surrendering their sovereignty to a supranational institution is guided by the fact that the integration will have entered a final stage where member states will be subjected to operate under a single leadership with ultimate authority over the region backed by a legal foundation. These will also mean that the heads of states will be under the head of the region “United states” who will be responsible of the distribution and allocation of power and resources within the region. This is a bitter pill for greedy heads of states within the region to swallow, since some of these leaders have held power for so long they fear that once they lose sovereignty they too will lose their positions, a political gamble they do not want to make.⁸⁸

The states prefer to hold on to power but at the same time desire the benefits enjoyed by members in a supranational institution. The EAC members voluntarily joined the organization by signing agreements committing themselves to implement regional policies. Though the EAC secretariat has the mandate to push countries to observe the treaty establishing the EAC, member states have the freedom to choose whether to implement or not to implement these

⁸⁶ Lee, D., and Ruel, H., (2012), Introduction: *Commercial Diplomacy and International Business*,. Advanced Series in Management, p.9

⁸⁷ UNESCO, (2013), *Education in East Africa*, Education for All Global Monitoring Report, P. 11

⁸⁸ Kayunga, S S (2005), *Deepening Political Integration of the EAC Countries: The Uganda Case*, op.cit. p.210.

policies. Furthermore, each member of the community freely decides to design and implement their respective foreign policies which are usually different from those of other members, but they are centered more on national interests as opposed to regional interests. This leads states to have national policies that are not in line with regional policies thus affecting regional negotiations and co-operation. The process of liberalizing NTBs has received different reactions by EAC members where some members like Tanzania have been reluctant to implement policies, other regional members have adopted non-tariff barriers to maintain the status quo resulting to slow progress in achieving the objectives of the EAC.

The structural manner in which the EAC is designed lives more than is desired. Decisions made at the EAC are either through discretion, consensus or both. When decisions made are through discretion or consensus the intentions are to hold onto sovereignty. The appointment of EAC key officials is done through a selection process closing the window of accountability thus decisions made are seen as the ideas of political leaders and technocrats that discriminates public opinion.⁸⁹ It is evident that states in Africa are more committed to multilateral and bilateral agreements as compared to regional agreements. EAC member states have been reluctant to align their policies with those of the EAC an indication that political will is lacking. The MDGs which started in 2000 and later succeeded by the SDGs had received little attention from the region. It was until 2015 that the EALA got up to take a more central role in monitoring progress. However, the institution admits that it is up to regional parliaments to enact their action plans, a contradiction of EALA speaker who said

⁸⁹ N. Ombeni Mwashia, (2011), *The Benefits of Regional Economic Integration for Developing Countries in Africa, A Case Study of EAC.*

that they would hold member states accountable.⁹⁰ The concern here is that EALA does not have grounds to hold members accountable.

3.7 Multiple Memberships

The EAC members have subscribed to more than one REC. Kenya is a member of the EAC, COMESA, IGAD and ICGLR, Rwanda is a member of EAC, COMESA and ECCAS, Uganda is a member of EAC, COMESA, IGAD and ICGLR, Tanzania is a member of EAC, SADC and ICGLR, Burundi is a member of EAC, COMESA and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and South Sudan is a member of the EAC, IGAD and COMESA.

The RECs have more less the same roles of attaining sustainable growth and development among member states and therefore there are a lot of duplicated and conflicting roles that creates confusion among EAC members. According to the 2004 EAC Customs Management Act, Section 112 has seen different application of external tariffs for instance goods imported by partner states under COMESA agreement attract preferential tariff treatment. The EAC members and COMESA members' agreement provided for a preferential tariff or members of the two RECs, however Tanzania charges CET rates on all goods imported from COMESA member countries because it does not have any trade agreement with COMESA, this is the same situation with Uganda that charges CET rates on all goods imported from SADC member states.⁹¹ This is a clear indication of a complicated system of engagement between members of RECs in Africa that lacks harmonized policies to increase co-operation among members within RECs. This problem has had a major huddle in the EAC policy

⁹⁰ EAC, (2000-2017), *EALA to Play More Central Role In Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals*, Press Release

⁹¹ EAC Report (2010), *The EAC Trade Regime COMESA-SADC*

implementation affecting trade and developmental negotiations that is now characterized by so many regional meetings which ends up with very many agreements and policies that states are unable to implement.

Legal uncertainties are inevitable in situations where the benefits have been transferred to third parties and jurisdiction matters become hard to determine. Since this condition becomes complicated for states to operate, it becomes even more difficult for a common man in one of the member states to internationalize and operate in such complex regional arrangements. A typical case of biting more than you can chew. A further complicated scenario is the COMESA and SADC separate EPA negotiations with EU that ideally leaves Tanzania in a unique place to negotiate. The tenth EU Development Fund had to carefully rethink implementation of the aid, whether to maintain the EAC as a region or at East and South African angle.⁹² To some extent this explains Tanzania's laid back attitude and position towards the implementation of some region policies to support the East African integration process.

Table 3 REC Memberships

Country	EAC	COMESA	SADC	ECCAS	IGAD	ICGLR
Kenya	X	X			X	X
Burundi	X	X		X		
Uganda	X	X			X	X
Tanzania	X		X			X

⁹² EU, (2009), *Fact Sheet on the interim Economic Partnership Agreements*. The East Africa Community

Rwanda	X	X		X		
South Sudan	X	X			X	

Source: Author's

States have worked hard to mitigate the situation by making relevant adjustments on their geographical as well as functional lines despite the challenges they have faced along the journey of integration. States have adopted various reforms as a mechanism to deal with emerging challenges affecting integration which is their driving force to achieve national development. Most states today acknowledge the output of area specialists who are experts in different functional issues that cut across development to tailor-make policies that coincide with both state and regional developmental agenda. Kenya has been on the forefront to implement structural reforms to recognise international and regional directorates in its foreign policies with emphasis on developmental agenda which has seen other East African Community member states follow suit. This chapter discusses the role of developmental diplomacy in regional integration process in Africa and especially in East Africa.

3.8 Conclusion

From the above, it is conspicuous that some of the reasons that contributed to the failure of the former EAC in 1977 are still cropping up at the new EAC. The cited causes are; economic and political challenges, different ideologies, strong national interests, peace and security, insufficient financial resources, lack of strong political leadership and poor governance, uncoordinated regional and national policies, lack of strong private sector, civil society and public participation and awareness, Sovereignty and Political will, Multiple Memberships and

fears to surrender sovereignty to the EAC has consequently slowed the pace to implement the EAC protocol.

The achievements that member states desire from the EAC can be arrived at if the REC works closely with members to address these challenges to pave way for developmental diplomacy which will intern foster co-operation.

CHAPTER FOUR

Impact of Developmental Diplomacy on East African Community Integration Process

4.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the impact caused by developmental diplomacy on EAC regional integration process. This includes shedding light on major events that positively or negatively affected EAC integration process as a result of developmental diplomacy conducted by member states.

4.1 A United EAC

The journey of to the EAC to unite partner states has been long and challenging despite the achievements made so far. It is however important to note that despite the challenges faced by the REC discussed in the previous chapter, the EAC has been able to mobilize partner states to embrace developmental diplomacy so as to achieve the objectives of the EAC as prescribed under (Article 5(2) of the EAC treaty. By providing platforms where member states can deliberate on regional agenda, issues affecting the region and coordinated mechanisms where states can resolve conflicts, member states have been empowered to openly debate on regional issues as well as come up with recommendations that help in relevant policies that address emerging challenges which impede on implementation of EAC objectives. This has seen more member states willing to co-operate towards the regional agenda due to smooth and structured operations running within the EAC.⁹³

⁹³EAC, (2016), *Consensus and the Future of the East African Community*, ACODE, p.18-23

The Summit, the Council of Ministers, the Co-ordinating Committee, the Sectoral Committees, the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly and the Secretariat are organs of the EAC. These organs are composed of representatives from partner states which are vital in ensuring that there is inclusivity from member states with each member having an equal opportunity to head these organs. The regular interactions among representatives from member states have been cordial and has strengthened regional co-operation. The Summit which is composed of the heads of states from regional members has been influential in giving direction towards the realization of the goal and objectives of the Community.⁹⁴

In May 2017, the EAC held the 18th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State of the East African Community that took place at Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The agenda was to get the EAC Annual Progress Report of the Council of Ministers for the period 2015-2017. The Summit directed that, the Council of Ministers resolve the outstanding issues and report progress in the subsequent meeting as well as resolving the issue of NTBs, partner states and the Secretariat to implement outstanding decisions made by the Summit. Emerging concerns were on the declining trade among EAC members that was handed over to the Council of Ministers to resolve as well as the EU-EAC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) which Kenya had already signed the agreement but other regional members had not because they were still seeking clarification from the EU.⁹⁵ The Summit clearly elaborated that the developmental negotiations to achieve the ultimate goal of adopting a political federation as a transitional model was on course directing the Council of Ministers to constitute a team of constitutional experts to draft a constitution for the political confederation. The regular meetings of EAC

⁹⁴ Ibid, (2016), p8

⁹⁵ EAC, (May 2017), *Joint Communiqué: 18th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State Of The East African Community*

heads of governments has without doubt created awareness highlighting the need for regional partners to work as a unit if they are to not only influence but also enjoy economic benefits from the international community including RECs like the EU.

4.2 New EAC Members

The EAC has seen new members join the REC. This is attributed to the success of the community that has seen member states grow economically, politically and socially. Initially the community was made up of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The EAC treaty that entered in to force in 2000 paved the way for new members to join the community. This is traced back from the negotiations between the founding members in 1984 when members signed a Mediation Agreement for the pision of Assets and Liabilities. Among the issues discussed members agreed to explore areas of future co-operation governed by a strong agreement. The Secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission was launched in 1996 backed by the second East African Heads of State Summit in 1997 and the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation that saw operations to unite the EAC co-operation. Rwanda and Burundi joined the EAC in 2007 while South Sudan the youngest nation in Africa joining the Community in 2016, five years after attaining her independence.⁹⁶

The Federal Government of Somalia has on numerous occasions attempted to join EAC but has been unsuccessful. In 2016, Somalia's bid was turned down by the EAC siting insecurity concerns. Therefore the fate of Somalia to join the EAC is on the negotiations and verification process which is centered on peace and stability of Somalia; this has been undermined by al Shabaab a terrorist group linked to al Qaeda. The fear of members to accept countries that are

⁹⁶ East African Community (2000-2017)

unstable into the community is driven by the fact that the instability could spill-over to other members thus affect the economic, political and social stability enjoyed by member states.

4.3 Movement of Capital, Goods, Labor and People across Borders

The EAC through its organs has been influential in promoting the free movement of goods, services, labor, capital and people across regional borders. The agreement by members to do away with NTBs under Article 13 of the EAC Customs Union Protocol has seen the business community increase trade and investment activities across the region. This has seen the market bigger than the domestic market with focus on specialization, limited barriers to trade, research and technological advancement, increased production and free play of the market forces with little or no government interruptions. The SME sectors in EAC member states have experienced growth over the years increasing the employment opportunities and reducing poverty rates. At the same time the SMEs have been effectively contributing to the GDP of their respective countries. The losers in the common market like the smugglers and the corrupt customs and other government officials have been locked out of the system creating confidence within the business community.⁹⁷

Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi agreed to waive work permit fees for EAC citizens back in 2012 however Kenya and Rwanda were serious in implementing the idea. In 2015, Uganda joined Kenya and Rwanda to have citizens from the three countries exempted from the work permit fee however one is still required to have a work permit. The challenges arising from the common market is still alive with Kenya siting that the policy is only on paper and not in practice. The slow action by Tanzania has made business between Kenya and Tanzania

⁹⁷ David Booth, Diana Cammack, Thomas Kibua and Josaphat Kwek (2007), *East African integration: How can it contribute to East African development?* Overseas Development Institute

expensive and difficult.⁹⁸ The single East African Tourist Visa for the EAC countries of Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda has been a milestone for the three countries in efforts to boost the tourism sector. Since 2014, the three states have been negotiating on coming up with a single visa for tourist intending to visit the all three countries. Since the concept came into effect it has become easier for tourist to pay for a single visa at a subsidized rate giving the tourists access to all the three countries as opposed to paying for visas at the entry point of each state. The citizens of the three countries have since 2014 enjoyed the use of a national identity card as the only document required to move across these states with the visiting period limited to six months.

4.4 Environmental Development

To preserve and manage a healthy present and future generations the EAC member states acknowledge the benefits that come with having a sustainable eco-system. The community has various natural resources that are under threat and need protection. The natural resources found in the region are forests, water bodies, wildlife, mountains, minerals and energy. These are vital resources that greatly contribute to the economic development both at national and regional levels. The EAC members agreed to co-operate in environmental and natural resources under Articles 111, 112 and 114 of the EAC treaty with efforts focused on efficient management of these vital resources including Climate Change adaptation and mitigation, natural resource management and biodiversity conservation, disaster risk reduction and management, and pollution control and waste management.

⁹⁸ Kagwe, Winfred (19 May 2011), "*Kenya: Traders Say Common Market Yet to Benefit Them*" – via AllAfrica.

EAC takes the environmental issues seriously and has gone ahead to strengthen resilience and sustainable management of biologically significant trans-boundary freshwater ecosystems. EALA members have been pushing for a more sustainable utilization of the environment with the recent effort channeled to the largest freshwater Lake Victoria since 2012 which has witnessed high levels of pollution and overfishing under Lake Victoria Water Supply and Sanitation Programme II. The legislators further recommended the need to incorporate other components of Water Supply; Hygiene and Environmental Sanitation; Urban Drainage Improvement; Capacity Building; and Programme Management in a bid to ensure that the conservation of the ecosystem is of value to beneficiaries. The EAC extends its efforts in supporting adaptive capacities and resilience to the negative impacts of Climate Change; developing and harmonizing framework, standards and regulation on pollution control and waste management as well as strengthening management and policies on disaster reduction and risk.

A huge challenge affects the REC in implementation of some policies touching on the environment. First is that the Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources Management was signed in 2006 by the three founding members of the community; Kenya Uganda and Tanzania and at that time Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan were not members of the EAC. In 2010 and 2011, Kenya and Uganda ratified the Protocol respectively while Tanzania has not ratified the Protocol citing various issues. The protocol is therefore not in force because it is not legally binding since other members are yet to ratified the Protocol. Second, it is the duty of individual member states to protect their natural resources. The EAC is still working on an inventory of mineral and mining policies using the Ghana Petroleum Legislation as a benchmark. The recent discovery of oil in Kenya and Uganda and gas in Tanzania has created

excitement to the region.⁹⁹ The challenge is on the EAC Secretariat to harmonize the national policies that Uganda and Tanzania have on mining with legal policies for the East African Region.

Tanzania's plan to build a super high through the famous Serengeti National Park back in 2012 was a challenge for the EAC. If Tanzania's actions would have been effected, it would have a negative effect on wildlife migration and the ecosystem of the park contrary to environmental and social assessment findings. The EACJ ruling in favor of African Network for Animal Welfare to stop the project came as relief to the people of Tanzania and wildlife conservationist.¹⁰⁰ Kenya on the other hand is constructing a standard gauge railway that will pass through Nairobi National Park. Ugandan government in 2009 intended to cut down the 30,000-hectare Mabira forest to clear way for sugarcane growing. This is a clear indication of member states are defying the spirit and aspirations of the Protocol to preserve natural resources with long term negative effects projected to affect SDGs within the region.

4.5 Harmonizing National and Regional Policies

The EAC has a team of legal experts who assist in in giving legal advice as well help in policy formation. The harmonization of relevant laws within the EAC takes two forms, the harmonization at national level and regional level (EAC). The EAC member states have the responsibility to align their respective national policies and laws to fit into those of the EAC.

⁹⁹ EAC Legislative Assembly, (2012), Committee on Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources, *Report of The Workshop on Governance of Natural Resources In The EAC Region*, p.5-12

¹⁰⁰ EACJ, (2014), *In The East African Court of Justice at Arusha First Instance Division*, Reference No. 9 of 2010, p. 31-32

All members of EAC have complied but there are some states that are yet to harmonize some of their laws, in other cases some states are yet to ratify some Protocols as discussed above.¹⁰¹

The EAC on its part has been able to work on harmonizing some of its policies and laws on issues where states were ahead of the REC in coming up with legislations and laws already in use. In the 2012 EAC workshop on Governance of Natural Resources in The EAC Region, the EAC realized that the Tanzanian 2010 Mineral Law was already in operation while Uganda had a draft Oil law that was already in parliament for debate therefore the EAC through its Secretariat was tasked with the responsibility of strengthening the Tanzanian law and Ugandan legislation as well as to fast track and harmonize legal framework in legal framework on Natural Resource for the region.¹⁰² The Protocol on the Establishment of the EAC Common Market acknowledges further harmonization and cooperation of various Sectoral policies including the Customs Union, Common Market, roads and infrastructure, civil aviation regulations, the Power Master Plan, Food Security Action Plan and Health under East African Community Health-Policy Initiative need to be addressed. It is worth to note that these efforts by the EAC have so far made the REC to stand out as the REC that has made most progress in Africa.¹⁰³

4.6 Embracing Education, Research and Technological Advancement

The region has recognized the fundamental importance of education, science and technology in enhancing economic development. Regional members have undertaken various steps like

¹⁰¹ EAC, (2016), *Report of The Committee on Legal, Rules and Privileges on the oversight Activity on the Approximation and Harmonisation of National Laws in the EAC Context*, p.1-p.9

¹⁰² EAC Legislative Assembly, (2012), Committee on Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources, *Report of The Workshop on Governance of Natural Resources In The EAC Region*, p.9

¹⁰³ Africa Growth Initiative, (2018), *Foresight Africa, Top Priorities for the Continent in 2018*, Brookings, p.11

harmonizing curricula, examinations, certification for schools as well as locating and developing centers of excellence to nurture creativity and excellence through supporting scientific and technological research initiatives. The EAC has been advocating for its citizens to acquire knowledge by encouraging members to embrace education programmes as well as selective trainings that will empower the region to meet its needed technical and business demands which are dynamic in the 21st century.

These advancements are critical in creating an enabling environment for human resource moving across borders as well as promoting social cultural development within the region. In 1999 under Article 137 of the EAC, partner states had the desire to work together on culture and linguistic fields leading to the formation of the East African Kiswahili Commission in 2007.¹⁰⁴ The EAC members have over the years negotiated towards this end with the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) passing a resolution to make Kiswahili an official language of the EAC besides English. Countries like Rwanda and Burundi which were using French as their official language have adjusted their policies and laws to accommodate English and Kiswahili as their official languages taught in schools.¹⁰⁵ Uganda has also incorporated Kiswahili as part of its national language. A progressive effort by the partner states to prioritize the harmonization of education curricula in the region.

EASTECO an organ of the EAC promoting more conferences and workshops to promote Regional Science, Technology and Innovation in the 2018 workshop in Kigali Rwanda, regional challenges came to light. It was evident that EAC members are still struggling to harmonize and implement their Science, Technology and Innovation policies with those of

¹⁰⁴ EASTECO, (2007), *Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Kiswahili Commission*, p. 1-14

¹⁰⁵ Commonwealth Secretariat, (2018), *The Commonwealth*

EASTECO as well as the lack of resources by members to implement these policies at the national level.¹⁰⁶ The organ of the EAC has adopted a liberal approach to work with other stakeholders including the ministries responsible for science and technology, the national science and technology commissions and councils, universities, research institutions, civil society, and the private sector, among others in support of the development of a five-year strategic plan.

4.7 Empowerment of Women and Vulnerable Groups

In line with the Social Policy Framework for Africa, the EAC has been on the forefront to protect women and the vulnerable groups in society; this has made significant progress over the years through various platforms that bring different representatives from the members within the region. Women and the youth play a critical role in development yet this section of the society is widely ignored for long. Women, youth and persons living with disabilities in Africa including EAC have been discriminated against by the state. These groups have great potential to immensely contribute to development affairs of a nation and the region at large. According to the UNCTAD, the EAC can harness their trade policies which focus on education, employment, access to resources, unpaid care, domestic work burden, gender mainstreaming in trade policy, Decision-making and gender policy at the national and regional level in order to empower the vulnerable groups.¹⁰⁷

It is worth to note that the region has made significant improvements towards these goals, however, a lot needs to be done regarding policy formulation and implementation.¹⁰⁸ The

¹⁰⁶ EASTECO (2018)

¹⁰⁷ UNCTAD, (2017) , *Advocating for Gender-Sensitive Trade Policymaking in the East African Community*

¹⁰⁸ UNCTAD, (2018), *Advocating for gender-sensitive trade policymaking in the East African Community*

EAC has since 2012 engaged partner states leading to the formulation of the EAC social Development Policy Framework that saw the adoption of important policies like the Persons with Disabilities Policy in 2012. In 2017, EALA passed the EAC Gender Equality and Equity Bill, 2017 which was anchored in article 6, in 2018, the EAC went further to launch Gender Policy that seeks an inclusive Community that aims to guarantee equal rights for women and men, boys and girls as a form of social protection measures.¹⁰⁹

4.8 Good Governance, Peace and Security

According to the EAC objectives, partner states have undertaken governance as an essential aspect of development. The Summit has worked immensely hard to ensure that partner states work together in support of good governance within the region. Partner states believe that good governance in the region is the bedrock of development, peace, and security at national and regional levels. The EAC has been pushing member states to finalize the Protocol on Good Governance which is a framework for good governance in the region. Under Article 49 of the EAC Treaty, EALA has been vested with powers to establish committees which are responsible for assessing and evaluating activities of the community including good governance in the region.

EALA has been able to recommend regional partners to support good governance framework by upgrading to Good Governance Protocol leading to the 2011 multi-Sectoral meeting of the East African Community (EAC) held in Zanzibar. Ministers responsible were to draft a Good Governance Protocol. The Protocol would incorporate human rights and promotion of equal opportunities, adherence to the rule of law, constitutionalism and access to justice, equality

¹⁰⁹ Ibid 2000-2017

and equal opportunities, transparency, accountability through democratic and economic governance democracy. EAC members have tried to uphold good governance at national levels through adhering to the rule of law, and at supporting the EAC process, however, a majority of members have governments marked with credibility issues especially on matters to do with electoral processes. Member partners in 2012 questioned whether the Protocol on Good Governance was a co-operation issue that would warrant the formulation of a Protocol on the matter.¹¹⁰ Some regional leaders still rule with an iron fist and have little or no regards for democracy, a model for good governance practice. Democracy has been a model for good governance emulated in EAC from the west. However it is feared that democracy in the region is on a declining trend.¹¹¹

In the past two decades Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, and South Sudan have experienced violent protests resulting from disputed elections. The violence has led to massive loss of lives, destruction of property, homelessness and a decline in business activities. In South Sudan the situation became worse, despite the formation of a coalition government after the disputed elections, President Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar both from opposing political parties were involved in power struggles that led the country into a civil war in 2013 threatening regional peace and stability.¹¹² The situation poses a great danger to neighbouring states including the potential for war spillover to other nations as well as the flow of illegal immigrants and weapons across borders that affecting regional peace and security.¹¹³ The AU mission in Somalia has active forces from the region including AMISOM's which have

¹¹⁰ EAC, (2013), *Report of The Committee on Legal, Rules and Privileges on the Assessment of Adherence to Good Governance in The EAC and The Status of the EAC Political Federation*, p.5

¹¹¹ SDI, (2016), *Political Economy of Inequality in East Africa*, Society for International Development, p. 31-.34

¹¹² Mahmood Mamdani, (2007), *The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency*, p.2-4

¹¹³ Boston Review, (2014), *Small Arms Survey*, p.5-20

recorded significant success over Al Shabaab militants. EAC member states agreed to conduct joint military exercises to boost security intelligence and response in the region with the latest exercise to be conducted in November 2018.¹¹⁴

4.9 Conclusion

Based on the backdrop of the empirical findings above, it is clear that indeed the EAC has made a remarkable positive impact by effectively encouraging members to adopt developmental diplomacy in conducting activities within the region that has sparked growth within various sectors. The cited positive impacts are; a more united East African Community, new members joining the community, increased movement of capital, goods, labour and people across borders, environmental development, harmonizing national and regional policies, embracing education, research and technological advancement, empowerment of women and vulnerable groups, Good Governance, Peace and Security. These factors have strengthened the bond among partner states and have seen the EAC identified as the REC that has made the most progress in the continent.

The EAC integration process has also had its fair share of challenges that in one way or the other are linked to positive impacts but have eventually impacted the region negatively. Even though regional partner states are seen to be united, other members of the community seem to be dragging their feet in implementing some of the regional policies and agreements. The decline in trade as cited in 2015-2017 EAC Annual Progress Report by the Council of Ministers was as a result of members not fully complying with the NTBs Customs Union Protocol and the unresolved EU-EAC Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA).¹¹⁵ Free movement of capital, goods, labour and people across borders is not uniform across the region. Kenya, Uganda and

¹¹⁴ EAC, (2017), *EAC Armed Forces Command Post Exercise*

¹¹⁵ EAC, *Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation* op.cit. para, p. 249

Rwanda being the only members that have waived work permit fee for members of the three countries, Kenya and Uganda are the only member states that have ratified the Protocol on Environment and Natural Resource Management in 2010 and 2011 respectively. Indeed harmonization and implementation of national and regional policies is still a considerable challenge. It is therefore clear that regional integration can achieve desired goals if member states engage in meaningful negotiations to develop effective policy formulation and implementation which conforms to the consistency of the hypothesis in this study.

CHAPTER FIVE

Summary, Conclusion And Recommendations

5.0 Introduction

This chapter will provide study findings in summary, conclusion, and recommendations in that order. This study aims to evaluate and examine the roles of Developmental Diplomacy in the EAC integration process, the challenges faced by states in administering developmental diplomacy to facilitating regional integration and the impact of developmental diplomacy on EAC integration.

It is worth mentioning that the EAC members recognise the vital role played by the REC despite an earlier collapse in 1977 and has emerged to be more determined and resilient to emerging challenges as it puts more emphasis on attaining the ultimate goal of a political federation.

5.1 Summary of Study Findings

The summary of the study findings are discussed in the following sections according to the research objectives;

5.1.1 Summary

It is evident the EAC has enabled members to develop their economies through a series of developmental diplomatic missions, however the region's complex nature where partner states have pledged loyalty to multiple RECs in the continent has seen overlapping roles and

mandates affecting the negotiation patterns, policy formation and implementation at national and regional levels. These negotiations with other RECs pose great risk to the functions of the EAC since states in the region are still developing and cannot fully comply with all requirements of all the RECs in which they are members. Furthermore the partner states have budget constraints leading to limited and delayed funding to facilitate activities of the RECs.

The advancement of globalization has had a major boost in the region's economic growth. Members of the EAC have adopted advanced technological knowhow in coordinating activities of different organs of the EAC as well as pursuing mega projects to link the region in a bid to facilitate free movement of capital people and labor across borders. However some governments within the region are still struggling with issues of good governance and are therefore working against free flow of information that threatens to expose poor leadership at the national level.

In as much as the EAC has not fully honored their core responsibilities of implementing Article 7 of the EAC treaty to resolve regional matters amicably, the EACJ among other organs of the EAC stands out to be more effective in implementing their mandate despite threats from member states to undermine their functions. It is therefore evident that state representatives at the EAC are committed to the course.

Political dimensions have taken centre stage in the EAC regional integration. The ultimate goal of the region is to form a monetary union and eventually a political federation. The political class in the region is still sceptical of the idea, and they are firmly holding on to national interest giving little attention to regional interests. This is witnessed in the slow

action by some partner states to implement regional policies and laws that they have passed as well as aligning their national policies and laws with those of the EAC.

5.2 Conclusion

Based on the findings the EAC member states consider developmental diplomacy as a key pillar in foreign policy to facilitate national and regional growth. The pillar seemingly applies the liberalism theory of integration in advocating for regional political and economic cooperation. Member states have largely been seeking compromise within the various national interests within the states through the EAC in order to provide cooperation within the region. The REC has laid out vision 2050, a strong foundation on which the region will maximise its resource productivity for its members by adopting the regions four pillars; common market, monetary union, and political federation thus meeting the domestic and regional policy objectives in the long-run. Each member of the EAC has set their vision, and it is vital that the EAC check and assess the progress of every member for the region to achieve vision 2050.

The EAC set out the Forth East African Development Strategy (20011-2016) with the aim of monitoring and evaluating the progress of previous strategies with concerns on setting out new strategies which would mean new activities and processes yet other strategies were pending. In 2014 the EAC launched a scorecard to monitor the progress of the community which was reviewed in 2016 and 2017. This creates a pattern of inconsistencies in data collection. The introduction of new variables cannot be used in tracking. There is a need to

consult experts from all quarters if the community is to track and monitor the progress within the region effectively.

The extent to which the region can benefit from developmental diplomacy is dependent upon the commitment by partner states to effectively implement regional policies. Where a partner states harmonises their national laws and policies, they stand to enjoy the benefits of co-operation. Kenya Uganda and Rwanda have been able to enjoy free movement of labour across their borders through the agreed waiver fee on work permit living out other members. The situation is the same in other areas including the ratification of the Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources Management, Customs Union, Common Market, roads and infrastructure, civil aviation regulations, the Power Master Plan, Food Security Action Plan and Health under East African Community Health-Policy Initiative which needs to be addressed.

Despite the fact that regional partners have had successful negotiations and agreements on how to tackle concerns in the region, some of the issues that caused the collapse of the first EAC are still haunting the region including; economic and political challenges, strong national interests, peace and security, insufficient financial resources, lack of strong political leadership and poor governance, uncoordinated regional and national policies, lack of strong private sector, civil society and public participation and awareness, lack of political will, multiple memberships and fears to surrender sovereignty to the EAC. This has consequently slowed down the pace to implement the EAC protocol. The developmental negotiations have led to the formation of good policies however policies have been seen to be more on paper than in action. This situation is linked to the unresolved disputes that spilt over from the

previous EAC where other members feel that there is an unequal distribution of benefits in the integration process.

The EAC can achieve its ultimate goal if members are willing to effectively implement policies by harmonising their national laws and policies with those of the EAC to support developmental diplomacy in the quest to uplift social, political and economic growth of member states.

Recommendations

Developmental diplomacy provides EAC member states with the opportunity to leverage on co-operation at interstate as well as international levels for the benefit of all. Nevertheless, this is dependent on member states' commitment to the course. Moving forward, the progressive implementation of regional policies is a step in the right directions, however there is a need to set timelines for implementation by member states, failure to comply should attract specified consequences. The EAC needs enforcement machinery and sanction mechanism with legal executive authority.

The region needs to get its priority right. To achieve a political federation, it is justifiable for the region to put this concept as first priority for the region's agenda. This will minimise on the currently divided loyalties on national and regional interests; furthermore it will place the region under one leadership eliminating sovereignty concerns strengthening the idea of a collective interest.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ EAC, *Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation* op.cit. para. 300

The EAC member states need to incorporate public participation both at national and regional levels as stipulated under Article 127 of the 1999 EAC Treaty.¹¹⁷ Lack of public participation in regional matters was one of the mistakes done by the previous EAC and is still being witnessed today. Members should take full ownership and provide an enabling environment for civil society, the public and private sector protected under their respective constitutions. It should include the states' providing free information on regional issues to the public through the various medium of communication.¹¹⁸

The high cost experienced by member states as a result of joining multiple RECs has had its toll on the financial status of members. A combined administrative, political, and financial responsibilities of the multiple agendas can immobilise the effective functioning of the EAC.¹¹⁹ It is thus practical for members to concentrate on the EAC in order to rip maximum benefits; alternatively, all members should negotiate to join other RECs under the EAC as a unit.

This study had some limitations. Given the scope of this study, time was a significant factor that made it impossible to examine how other regional members particularly South Sudan and Burundi on the extent of implementing developmental diplomacy with member states. There are opportunities for further studies to explore the effectiveness of developmental diplomacy in the East African Community integration process.

¹¹⁷ Ibid. EAC

¹¹⁸ East African Community, *Treaty Establishing the East African Community* op.cit. Article 127(3), (4)

¹¹⁹ Wolfe Baude, (2008), *SADC, COMESA and the EAC: conflicting regional and trade agenda*, IGD, SA, p 76

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Hodge T; Holtz, S., Smith C., Baxter K.H.,(1995). *Pathways to Sustainability, Assessing our Progress*, Ottawa, ON, Canada, p. 229
2. The European Union, *Politics and Policies*. Westview Press: Boulder Colorado, p 221-225
3. John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens,(2005), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, p. 338
4. John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens,(2005), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, p. 392-394
5. African Union (AU) Braude 2008, p.157
6. Baregu, M 2005. The African Economic Community and the EAC: Any lessons. In R Rok Ajulu, *The Making of a Region*. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue, p. 56-58
7. Qobo M., Draper, (2003), *Multilateralizing Regionalism*, Case Study of African Regionalism, Cambridge University Press, p. 411-415
8. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
9. Christian P. Potholm, Richard A. Fredland, (1980), *Intergration and Disintergration in East Africa*. University Press of America.
10. The East African Community (EAC)
11. Ronald Peter Barston (2006), *Modern diplomacy*, Pearson Education, 4th Ed, p. 1
12. René Wadlow (2002), *International Journal on World Peace*, Professors World Peace Academy, p. 97-100
13. Mathew S. Mingus, (2006), *Transnationalism and Subnational Paradiplomacy*, Western Michigan University, Michigan USA, p 577-594

14. Conybeare J., Lindberg L., Dilton R.J., O Neal F. H., Pearson F.S., Eichenberg R.C., Garnham D., Ray J.L., Hughes B.B., Sbragia A.M., Kurzer P., Smith L.D., *The 1992 Project and the Future of Integration in Europe*, M.E Sharpe Inc., New York, p.37
15. John A. Gentry, (2015) *Toward a Theory of Non-State Actors' Intelligence*, National Intelligence University, Washington, DC, p. 465-489
16. Baylis and Smith, (2005), *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 392-394.
17. Falola, Toyin; Essien, Kwame (2013). *Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity*. London: Routledge. p. 71–72 .
18. Mkandawire, P. (2005). *African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development*, Dakar: Codesria/London, p. 58.
19. Jaime De Melo & Yvonne Tsikata, 2014. *"Regional integration in Africa: Challenges and prospects," Working Papers* p. 93
20. Haynes J., Hough P., Malik S., Pettiford L,(2013) *World Politics*, Longman Publishing Group, p.308
21. Ng'eno K., (et al) (2013), *Regional Integration Study of East Africa: The Case of Kenya*, KIPPRAP. p.19-21
22. Jaime De Melo & Yvonne Tsikata, (2014). *"Regional integration in Africa: Challenges and prospects," Working Papers* P. 93
23. The East African Community (EAC)
24. Qobo M., Draper, (2003), *Multilateralizing Regionalism, Case Study of African Regionalism*, Cambridge University Press, p.412

25. Ryan, Selwyn D. (1973). *"Economic nationalism and socialism in Uganda"*.
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics. p.11, 140–158
26. N. Ng'eno et al.(2003), *Regional Integration Study of East Africa: The Case of Kenya*, p. 102
27. Emanuel U., East African Community, *Treaty Establishing the East African* , Article 6(a), : Brill
28. Adewoye O.(1997), *Constitutionalism and Economic Integration; Regional Integration and Co-operation in West Africa*, World Press Inc., Trenton, NJ, p. 321-332
30. Grieco M. J., (1988) *'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: The MIT Press. .*
118
31. Senghor C.(1990), *'Theoretical Foundations for Regional Integration in Africa: An Overview'* in Nyong'o, E. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis* (London: 1939) p. 297
32. S. J. Maclean, (2001) *'Challenging Westphalia: Issues of Sovereignty and Identity in Southern Africa'* Macmillan Publishers Limited. p. 149
33. Grieco M., (1988), *Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation*, The MIT Press. p. 131-132
34. Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?* P.110
35. Shiraev, Eric B. (2014). *International Relations*. New York, Oxford University Presses. p. 78.
36. Shiraev, Eric B., Vladislav M. Zubok. (2014). *International Relations*. New York, NY:Oxford University Press,p. 86-90
37. Shiraev, Eric (2014). *International Relations*. Oxford University Presses. p. 80–87

38. Merriam, S.B. (1998) *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education*, San Francisco (USA): Jossey-Bass, P.11
39. Kafeero, (2008) world trade report 2008, World Trade Organization, p. 63
40. Nye, J. S. (1968). *International Regionalism*. Boston: Little, Brown.
41. Haas, Ernst B. (1971), *The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing*, p. 3-44. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
42. Fawcett, L. (2004). *Exploring Regional Domains: A comparative history of regionalism*, Oxford University Press, p. 429-446
43. Kimmo Kiljunen, (2004). *The European Constitution in the Making*. Centre for European Policy Studies. p. 21–26.
44. Frick, N., Janari, S., et al. (2006). *History: Learner's Book*. South Africa: New Africa Books, p. 235
45. Falola, Toyin; Essien, Kwame (2013). *Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity*. London: Routledge, p. 71–72.
46. Agyeman, O. (1998), *Pan-Africanism and Its Detractors: A Response to Harvard's Race Effacing Universalists*. Harvard University Press, Harvard, p.4
47. Falola, Toyin; Essien, Kwame (2013). *Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity*, London: Routledge. pp. 71–72.
48. Lubin, Alex, (2014) "*The Contingencies of Pan-Africanism*", *Geographies of Liberation: The Making of an Afro-Arab Political Imaginary*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p. 71.
49. Tony Martin, (1985), *Pan-African Connection: From Slavery to Garvey and Beyond*, Dover: Majority Press, p. 207.

50. Mkandawire, P. (2005). *African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development*, Dakar: Codesria/London: Zed Books, p. 58
51. Hakim Adi, Marika Sherwood. (2003), *Pan-African History: Political Figures from Africa and the Diaspora since 1787*. New York: Routledge, p.10
52. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, (2018) "*World Economic Situation and Prospects 2018*"., Development Policy and Analysis Division. p. 106
53. Smith, Charles D. (2006), *Palestine and the Arab–Israeli Conflict*, New York: Bedford, p. 329.
54. Eyoh, Dickson, (1998), *African Perspectives on Democracy and the Dilemmas of Postcolonial Intellectuals in African Affairs*, *Africa Today*, p.281-306: p. 284
55. Bizoza, Kayitesi, Sipangule, (2016), *Africa’s bewildering spaghetti bowl*, in: DC 9pp. 12-14. [1]
56. May 9, 2007; *African Union (AU) report*
57. Hany Besada, (2007), *Crafting an African Security Architecture: Addressing Regional Peace and Conflict in the 21st Century*, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., p.24
58. Ng’ang’a Wanjiru, (2006) The ‘New’ East Africa Community: Effects on Trade, Welfare and Productive Activities in East Africa, University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon. p.10
59. Qobo M., Draper, (2003), *Multilateralizing Regionalism*, Case Study of African Regionalism, Cambridge University Press, p. 411-415
60. Hans-Peter Werner, (1997), *Lomé, the WTO, and bananas*, in *The Courier*, ACP-EU, p. 59-60

61. David Booth, Diana Cammack, Thomas Kibua and Josaphat Kwek, (2007), *East African integration: How can it contribute to East African development?*, Overseas Development Institute
62. East Africa community porta, (2014)
63. IMF,(2016), *Report for Selected Countries and Subjects*.
64. Baregu, M 2005. The African Economic Community and the EAC: Any lessons. In R Rok Ajulu, *The Making of a Region*, Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, SA, p. 56-58
65. Kaisi, John Hosi, (2003) *Assessment of Regional Integration Progress in the East African Community*, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa, 2003
66. East African Community, (2011-20015), *Deepening and Accelerating Integration*, 4th EAC Development Strategy 2011/2-2015/6, p.13
67. East Africa Community, (2001) *The 2nd EAC Development Strategy 2001-2005.*, Arusha Tanzania . VIII p. 8
68. EAC Report of the Committee, (2004) *Fast Tracking East Africa Federation*
69. EAC (2018), *Accelerating a people-centered and market-driven integration*, development strategy (2016/17 - 2020/21)
70. Green, Matthew (2008), *The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for Africa's Most Wanted*. Portobello Books. p. 56.
71. Interview: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018
72. V. Umbricht, (1988), *Multilateral Mediation: Practical Experiences and Lessons*, Dordrecht: Martinus
73. Nijhoff Publishers, p. 19

74. East African Business Council, (2005), *A Study on Non-Tariff Barriers and Development of a Business Climate Index in the East African Region*, EABC, p. 13
75. F. I. Nixon, (1973), *Economic Integration and Industrial Location: An East African Case Study*, Nairobi: Longman Publishers, p. 59
76. R. Mukandala, Killian, B, (2004), *Political Cooperation in East Africa*, Dar es Salaam: REDET p. 91
77. Collier P & SN Ndungu, *Strategies for growth*, in Adam *et al.*, *op. cit.* See also Mutiga M, *How Nation Can Avoid Economic Ruin* , 2012’ ,
78. EAC Secretariat, *The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community*, Article 127
79. Lee, D., and Ruel, H., (2012), *Introduction: Commercial Diplomacy and International Business*,. Advanced Series in Management, p.9
80. UNESCO, (2013), *Education in East Africa*, Education for All Global Monitoring Report, P. 11
81. Kayunga, S S (2005), *Deepening Political Integration of the EAC Countries: The Uganda Case*, *op.cit.* p.210
82. N. Ombeni Mwashu, (2011), *The Benefits of Regional Economic Integration for Developing Countries in Africa*, A Case Study of EAC.
83. EAC, *EALA to Play More Central Role In Implementation of Sustainable Development Goals*, Press Release
84. EAC Report (2010), *The EAC Trade Regime COMESA-SADC*
85. EU, (2009), *Fact Sheet on the interim Economic Partnership Agreements*. The East Africa Community

86. EAC, (2016), *Consensus and the Future of the East African Community*, ACODE, p.18-23
87. EAC, (May 2017), *Joint communiqué: 18th Ordinary Summit of Heads of State Of The East African Community*
88. East African Community (2000-2017)
89. David Booth, Diana Cammack, Thomas Kibua and Josaphat Kwek (2007), *East African integration: How can it contribute to East African development?* Overseas Development Institute
90. Kagwe, Winfred (19 May 2011). "Kenya: Traders Say Common Market Yet to Benefit Them" – via AllAfrica.
91. EAC Legislative Assembly, (2012), Committee on Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources, *Report of The Workshop on Governance of Natural Resources In The EAC Region*, p.5-12
92. EACJ, (2014), *In The East African Court of Justice at Arusha First Instance Division*, Reference No. 9 of 2010, p. 31-32
93. EAC, (2016), *Report of The Committee on Legal, Rules and Privileges on the oversight Activity on the Approximation and Harmonisation of National Laws in the EAC Context*, p.1-9
94. EAC Legislative Assembly, (2012), Committee on Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources, *Report of The Workshop on Governance of Natural Resources In The EAC Region*, p.9
95. Africa Growth Initiative, (2018), *Foresight Africa, Top Priorities for the Continent in 2018*, Brookings, p.11

96. EASTECO, (2007), *Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Kiswahili Commission*, p. 1-14
97. Commonwealth Secretariat, (2018), *The Commonwealth*
98. EASTECO, (2018)
99. UNCTAD, (2017) , *Advocating for Gender-Sensitive Trade Policymaking in the East African Community*
100. UNCTAD, (2018), *Advocating for gender-sensitive trade policymaking in the East African Community*
101. EAC, (2013), *Report of The Committee on Legal, Rules and Privileges on the Assessment of Adherence to Good Governance in The EAC and The Status of the EAC Political Federation*, p.5
102. SDI, (2016), *Political Economy of Inequality in East Africa*, Society for International Development, p. 31- 34
103. Mahmood Mamdani, (2007), *The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency*, p.2-4
104. Boston Review, (2014) *Small Arms Survey*, p.5-20
105. EAC, (2017), *EAC Armed Forces Command Post Exercise*
106. EAC, *Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation* op.cit. para, p. 249
107. EAC, *Report of the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation* op.cit. para. 300

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Letter of Introduction

Paul Otieno
Institute of Diplomacy & International Studies
University of Nairobi,
P.O. Box 30197-00100,
Nairobi, Kenya

Dear Respondent,

RE: FIELD RESEARCH

My name is Paul Otieno, I am a post-graduate student in International Studies at the Institute of Diplomacy & International Studies University of Nairobi. I am currently conducting a field study to collect information for my dissertation entitled: “Developmental Diplomacy and Regional in Integration in Africa; A Case Study of The East African Community” the purpose of this letter is to request for your co-operation in answering questions related to the objectives of the study. The main objective of the study is to: Evaluate and examine the role of Developmental Diplomacy in the EAC integration process.

The data collected will only be used for the purpose of this study. And the findings will be published on the dissertation and also on an academic journal and newspapers. Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and serves as proof of your informed consent. Your identity will not be sought and revealed to third parties. Further All information received will be treated with utmost confidentiality. Your sacrifice of personal time is highly appreciated.

Yours Sincerely,

Paul Otieno

Appendix 2: Interview Guide

Unstructured Respondent Schedule

1. Does developmental diplomacy play a role in East African Community integration process?
 - i. If Yes, Why do you think it plays a role?
 - ii. If No, Why do you think it does not play a role?

2. What roles does developmental diplomacy play in East African Community integration process?

3. What are the challenges faced by EAC partner states in administering developmental diplomacy to facilitate regional integration?
 - a) Why do member states face these challenges?
 - b) How can partner states overcome these challenges?

4. What are the impacts of developmental diplomacy on East African Community integration?
 - i. Positive
 - ii. Negative

5. What can be done to mitigate the negative impacts?

6. Do EAC members adhere to the EAC Treaties and Protocols?

THANK YOU