THE ROLE OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN RESTORING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A CASE OF AMISOM IN SOMALIA

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2018

DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my original work and has not been submitted for the award of degree in any other university

Signature …….. **Date……..**

MUSOMA ALBERT LUSIOLA

R50/87008/2016

This thesis has been submitted for examination with my approval as University Supervisor

Signature …….. **Date……..**

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my parents and siblings especially for their support in my academic pursuits that have been a great inspiration.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Foremost I thank God for His favour that has been the source of my strength enabling me get this far in my academic endeavours. My sincere appreciations are extended to my supervisor Dr. Ouma whose invaluable input and guidance have been instrumental in developing this piece of work alongside in-depth understanding the wider concept of military diplomacy within the broad scope of international diplomacy. Special thanks to my employer, the Kenya Defence Forces for the support offered during my graduate studies-sponsorship for my studies, granted leave days during the period of study and insights on my work.

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ABSTRACT

Despite relative consensus on the efficacy of military diplomacy for peace and security, it remains unknown its relative contribution to shortening cycles of civil war and violent conflict and lengthening or prolonging cycles of peace. To this end, this study explored the role of military diplomacy in restoring peace and security in the Horn of Africa region. Specifically, the study investigated the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy, the role of AMISOM in peace and security through military diplomacy efforts and the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa. The study was anchored on three theoretical concepts, the theory of collective security, classical liberalism theory and the democratic peace theory. The study adopted an exploratory and mixed methods research design given limited studies within the research subject and allowing the investigation of a broader and complex research problem enabling the researcher to utilize both quantitative and qualitative approaches of data collection. The study target population comprised AMISOM staff and civilian contingent to whom interviews and questionnaires were administered.

The study established AMISOM relied on a broad spectrum of strategies in their military diplomacy efforts although these only realize a little to moderate impact on the restoration peace and security in Somalia. Moreover, the study revealed that while AMISOM military diplomacy efforts are relevant do not yield much on fostering regional peace and security, implying, regional peace and security is multifaceted, requiring multi-stakeholder involvement but largely anchored on peace and stability within the region. Notably, the military diplomacy efforts are mainly constrained by lack of an exit strategy and competing interests among the troop contributing countries. Based on the findings, the study proffers recommendations, first, the need to streamline unity among troop contributing countries that comprise AMISOM that has challenged the implementation of different strategies by the peace and security organization. The study underscores need for engagement with both regional partners, given that peace, security is a multifaceted, and dynamic issue, as well as local government and clan involvement especially for the management of say the airport and port.

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ABBREVIATIONS/ ACRONYMS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
IGA	Interim Galmudug Administration
IGAD	Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IJA	Interim Juba Administration
ISDC	Inter-state Defence and Security Committee
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
NEPAD	New Partnerships for African Development
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PSOs	Peace Support Operations
RSA	Republic of South Africa
SADC	South African Development Cooperation
SLOC	Sea Lanes of Communication
SNA	Somalia National Army
TFG	Transitional Federal Government (of Somalia)
UN	United Nations
UN DPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1.1 Introduction

Military diplomacy is a relatively new concept given the shift in diplomacy over the last few decades contextualized not only within the broader aspect of a country's diplomatic practice that is enshrined within its foreign policy but also in the realm of defence diplomacy. Conceptually, it can be regarded as the set of activities carried out by state institutions whose aim is pursuit of the states' foreign policy interests in the realm of security and defence policy[1]. The actions in this case are based on diplomatic instruments and the use of negotiations. As such, military diplomacy is used in various functions including: information gathering and analysis on the security status quo and the armed forces of the receiving state, sending state representation and its armed forces in official ceremonies of the receiving country and sending state support of contracts forms arms and military equipment with the receiving country[2].

Moreover, military diplomacy performs other basic functions of organizing working visits of defence authority representatives from the sender state and peaceful coexistence and stay of the military units in the receiving state, promoting mutual relations, communication and cooperation between the armed forces of the sender country and the receiving country[3]. This study investigates the role of military diplomacy on peace and security, a case study of the African Union Mission in

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[1] Muthanna, K. A. "Military diplomacy." *Journal of Defence Studies* 5, no. 1 (2011): 1-15.

[2] Shea, Timothy C. *Transforming military diplomacy*. George C Marshall Centre Apo Ae 09053 European Centre for Security Studies, 2005.

[3] Ibid

Somalia (AMISOM) military diplomacy efforts in the Horn of Africa. This chapter entails a background to the study characterizing the concept of military diplomacy, statement of the problem, research questions and study research objectives and literature review encompassing empirical and theoretical literature review. Further, it details gaps in the review of literature, research hypothesis, study justification, theoretical framework and the research methodology.

1.2 Background to the study

Somalia has a long history of internally inspired terror mainly arising from the threat of terrorism that has threatened both domestic and international interests and has drawn increased military efforts from both African continent partners and China and the United States[4]. That military diplomacy has utility in the management of conflict is not contestable, but rather the objectivity lies in how in an analytical sense and when in an exploratory sense can military diplomacy lead to restoration of peace and security. Notably, a narrow focus on defence diplomacy involving military intervention possesses only limited capacity in prevention of conflict. Military diplomacy can be contextualized within the framework of a country's diplomacy, which also entails the foreign diplomacy. On the other hand, it can also be in the context of defence diplomacy.

Military diplomacy can also be considered as one of the tools of a county's diplomatic practice in continuance of the objectives within their policies. It is logical to argue that military diplomacy is within the limits of the traditional practice of diplomacy of any state. In many circumstances military is doubted if it conducts diplomacy, and this brings us to what is military diplomacy giving a clear distinction from the previous allusion of the normal traditional diplomacy. Military

[4] Barbosa, Ailton Jose F. "The Challenges and Difficulties of Sino-Us Military Diplomacy in the African Continent." *European Scientific Journal, ESJ* 10, no. 10 (2014).

diplomacy has gained relevance over time due to the significant transformation that has been experienced especially between the last periods of the 20th century. This can be alluded to the erosion of the barrier of sovereignty that has suppressed states from meddling in the internal affairs of other states[5]. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 configures the present system, that is, the acquisition of sovereignty in different states meant that the newly formed states had new political organizations that were equal and no supreme authority overarched over the other authorities. In spite of this relationship, the relation between these groups is characterized by competing self-interests in an anarchical state internal system. This therefore makes it a forever present conflict in the international system because of the lack of common authority. Indeed, the core of a state's relation to another is to influence the relations between them. It is within this relationship that diplomacy gains credence. Therefore, the whole process entails, building alliances, prevention of aggression, cautioning the enemy and seeking for international support in order to have legitimacy[6].

In Africa, there are several organizations within the regions that were not formed purposely to focus on conflict resolution and management. For instance, IGAD's primarily aimed to develop the North-East Africa region but gradually assumed the role of restoring peace and security, pretty much in Sudan and Somalia. Recently, African regional institutions have made significant steps in assuming the primary responsibility of promoting peace and security[7]. The conflicts experienced in Africa need more proactive ways of approach. In reality, unless the conflicts that have spread

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[5] Hamilton, K., & Langhorne, R. *The practice of diplomacy: its evolution, theory and administration*. Routledge, 2010

[6] Croxton, Derek. "The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty." *The international history review* 21, no. 3 (1999): 569-591.

[7] Berman, E., & Sams, K. E. *Peacekeeping in Africa: capabilities and culpabilities*. United Nations Publications UNIDIR, 2000

across different regions are solved, there would be no hopes for development, economic integration and prosperity. Achievement of many goals is impossible in atmospheres of instability. This is the reason why African regional and sub-regional organizations have considerably been involved in security and conflict resolution through conflict prevention or mediation form[8].

The African Union (AU), established in 2002, has played an active role toward addressing protracted conflicts in the continent, deploying peace operations and venturing into conflict zones neglected by multilateral organizations including the United Nations. The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to AU was marked by the change in principle from that of non-interference to that of non–indifference. Consequently, this has allowed member states to intervene in internal affairs that span issues of crimes against humanity and genocide[9]. The formation of a comprehensive security agenda, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) comprising six components sought to redefine handling of African problems by recommending African designed solutions. This way the APSA had the clear mandate to deploy peace operations in conflict zones across the continent[10]. The components of APSA include the African Standby Force (ASF), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), Peace and Security Council (PSC), Panel of the Wise, African Peace Fund (APF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC)[11].

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[8] Francis, D. J. *Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems*. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2006

[9] Article 4 (h), *Constitutive Act of African Union*, (adopted in 2000 at the Lome Summit (Togo), and entered into force in 2001.)

[10] Møller, B. (2009). The African Union as a security actor: African solutions to African problems?

[11] Article 2 (2) – *The Protocol Establishing the AU Peace and Security Council*, (Addis Ababa , http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Protocol_peace_and_security.pdf, accessed 1 April 2018)

Military diplomacy is an important activity of foreign policy for several states, primarily encompassing the pursuit of foreign policy interests of different states within the context of defence policy and security. State representatives and the state defence bodies carry out a set of activities and which are informed by the use of negotiations and the use of other diplomatic instruments[12]. During the 19th century, military diplomacy focused on almost entirely on the performance functions that entailed the collection and analysis of information concerning the armed forces concerning the situation in different foreign countries. Their main emphasis at that time was on the threats and possible military interventions. This can be seen from the instructions that were given by the Austrian imperial military officers who were working in the positions of the military diplomats during the diplomatic missions of the Austrian Empire abroad. From these past military diplomacy activities, several roles of military diplomacy can be learnt. Comparing the past portfolio of military diplomacy with today's, the role of military diplomats has diversified[13].

Precisely, Johnson[14] makes clear the role of military diplomats in the developing world. He posits that the role of military diplomats involves; information gathering and analysis of the security situation; promoting cooperation, mutual relations and communication between the armed forces of the receiving and sending state; providing support for the business contracts with armed military equipment between the sending states and the receiving states; Organizing visits and

[12] Melissen, J. The new public diplomacy: Between theory and practice. In *The new public diplomacy* (pp.3-27). Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005.

[13] Held, David, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton. "Global transformations: Politics, economics and culture." In *Politics at the Edge*, pp. 14-28. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2000.

[14] Johnson, J. A. *Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. Princeton University Press, 2015

representations for the defence authorities to ensure a peaceful stay for the military units of the sending states who are to work in the receiving states; and providing representation of the state sending a representative to the receiving state at official ceremonies and other official events in the receiving states. Military diplomacy therefore is instrumental in promoting peace and security within the continent, which informs the focus of this study.

1.3 Statement of the research problem

Despite a relative consensus on the efficacy of military diplomacy for peace and security, it remains unknown its relative contribution to shortening cycles of civil war and violent conflict and lengthening or prolonging cycles of peace given limited empirical evidence. In Africa, areas under regional peacekeeping mission organizations including UN peace and security organizations constantly experience cycles and resurgence of violent conflict, which underpins challenges that counter diplomacy in areas of Somalia, Sudan, Western Sahara, DRC Congo and lately South Sudan. The Somalia conflict largely accounts for the instability experienced in the horn of Africa region, a conflict that has claimed 350,000 to 1,000,000 deaths due to conflict[15] and seen total breakdown of country infrastructure. International and regional actors have made significant strides in Somalia notably through the security council of the United Nations approval of a unilateral UN military intervention in 1992[16]. Other African countries including Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan and Eritrea through the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) have equally been involved in finding a lasting solution to conflict but with limited progress worth accountability.

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[15] Brookes. G, Pooley. J. A, & Earnes, J (2015). *Terrorism, Trauma and Psychology: A Multilevel Victim* Perspective *of the Bali Bombings*. Routledge Tailor and Francis Group. London, New York. Pg. 8

[16] Harper, Mary. *Getting Somalia wrong? Faith, war and hope in a shattered state*. Zed Books Ltd., 2012.

While military diplomacy technique is entrusted to solely attain lasting peace in Somalia, how successful this could be, and its progress are prospects that determine how well the cycle of violent conflict could be shortened. Fundamentally, the resurgence of violence and conflict in areas under peace and security operations, say AMISOM in Somalia considerably highlight the challenges that counter military diplomacy efforts. There is still yet minimal progress in attempts to restore peace and stability and ordinarily previously peaceful countries including Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti increasingly witnessing insurgent attacks within their borders[17]. The strategies employed including disarmament strategies have yielded minimal progress[18]. The relevance of the study resides in the fact that it links military diplomacy and peace and security to determine how and when military diplomacy makes a substantial contribution to peace and security. Therefore, this study sought to explore and explain how military diplomacy contributes to peace and security in the Horn of Africa region, with contextual analysis of the AMISOM peace operation in Somalia.

1.4 Research Questions

i. What are the key strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa?

ii. How do AMISOM military diplomacy efforts enhance regional peace and security in the Horn of Africa?

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[17] Eriksson, Mikael, ed. *External Intervention in Somalia's Civil War: Security Promotion and National Interests?* Försvarsanalys, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2013.

[18] World Peace Foundation. *Somalia: AMISOM Short Mission Brief.* The Fletcher School. Retrieved http://fletcher.tufts.edu/African-Peace-Missions/Research/Case-Studies/Somalia , 2016

iii. What are the key challenges faced by AMISOM in their military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa?

1.5 Research objectives

1.5.1 Broad objective

This study sought to investigate and analyse the role of military diplomacy in restoring peace and security in the horn of Africa.

1.5.2 Specific objectives

i. To investigate the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.
ii. To assess the role of AMISOM in peace and security through military diplomacy efforts in the Horn of Africa.
iii. To explore the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa.

1.6 Literature Review

This section embodies an empirical review of scholarly evidence on the subject of military diplomacy under exploration and a theoretical review of literature. The theoretical review explores the study relevant theoretical aspects while the empirical review draws from previous research presented in books, journals related to the study objectives.

1.6.1 Theoretical literature review

This study is anchored on the theoretical framework of the the theories of liberalism, collective security and democratic peace to establish a basis for analyzing the military diplomacy and the peace and security nexus in the horn of Africa.

1.6.1.1 Classical Liberalism Theory

According to Sally[19], both the classical and the non-liberalists play an important role in organizations and view them as instruments of the states more so great powers. This is reflected in the distribution of power within any international system. Therefore, this school of thought suggests that great powers not only suggest what an organization can do but also suggest what they think is best when done unilaterally. Both the classical and the neo-liberalists put a lot of emphasis on institutions thus granting them autonomy and their own identity. The institution of liberalism therefore, foresees a self-help group that is anarchical in nature in terms of international relations. When such kinds of integrations exist, then there is stronger potential of the democratic process. This entails the promotion of peace strongly and transforming the warring regions into communities with security.

This study therefore, adopted the liberal institutional theory of international relations that is anchored on the good nature of human beings that see to it that peace becomes a normal state of affair among citizens of a given state. This theory makes wars to be viewed as both irrational and unnatural. The democratic process and the institutions in place help break the power of the ruling elite and deal with the violence that they propagate. This helps to bring bringing the communities

[19] Sally, Razeen. *Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: Studies in Theory and Intellectual History*. Routledge, 2002.

involved in the process together and such collective activities broadens self-interest and the scope of cooperation. When the whole state complies with the rules of the organization, the pursuit of national interests is discouraged and weakened and the state of sovereignty will apply throughout.

The importance of this theory is anchored on the concept of interdependence between communities. Collective scrutiny is therefore one of the means that is used by the liberals to maintain international peace and each state or man is allowed to realize their potential. The relevance of this theory is premised on the fact that it explains the role that is being played by AMISOM in terms of military diplomacy in a bid to restore peace and security in the Horn of Africa. An underlying potential weakness of this theoretical aspect is that some states pursue their national interests either under the international laws or under international organizations.

1.6.1.2 Theory of Collective Security

Collective security theory in the field of international relations underscores the aspects of mutual obligation and avenues of cooperation among states. Within a framework of an overarching organization, states enter into a multilateral agreement to refrain from attacks to each other alongside economic benefits. In light of theory, pledging to an international organization by the different states creates a more reliable commitment relative to several bilateral treaties between states that can be confusing[20]. Moreover, collective security agreements stipulate states desist from attacking each other and instead come to the rescue of a member state in situations of conflict.

[20] Jordaan, Evert. "Collective Security in Africa: The Tension between Theory and Practice 1." *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 39, no. 1 (2017): 160.

According to Claude[21], collective security rests upon the proposition that war is preventable from the deterrent effect of overwhelming power upon countries that prove excessively rational to invite defeat. Also emphasized in the context of collective security is the fact that international organizations should swing into action to avert conflict or defend states subjected to armed attack.

Notably, the League of Nations was the first collective security agreement that was necessitated following the devastating World War I, where the many trilateral and bilateral agreements had no grounds of reconciliation with each other when the hostilities were commenced by the various nations. However, states were never ready yet for this overarching community system and the world economic depression, isolationism and the war reparations subsequently contributed to the collapse of the League of Nations and the onset of the Second World War Beyond the Second World War, the United Nations suffices as one of the most successful collective security organizations, the obligation of mutual defence enshrined within its Article 51[22]. Alongside the UN, the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO are collective security arrangements that have equally flourished[23]. In Africa, a number of regional and sub-regional organizations have the collective security arrangements including the AU, IGAD, EAC, SADC, ECOWAS although AU has been the most commonly involved alongside the UN relative to collective security agreements in Africa[24]. The collective security theory notion that security of one is the concern of all hence the

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[21] Claude, Inis Lothair. *Swords into Ploughshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization*. University of London, Press, 1956.

[22] Thakur, Ramesh. *The United Nations, peace and security: from collective security to the responsibility to protect*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

[23] Oneal, John R. "The theory of collective action and burden sharing in NATO." *International organization* 44, no. 3 (1990): 379-402.

[24] Jordaan, Evert. "Collective Security in Africa: The Tension Between Theory and Practice." *Strategic Review for Southern Africa* 39, no. 1 (2017): 160.

collective response to threats and that it is more ambitious than any other systems of alliance security addressing a wide range of possible threats explains the African Union involvement through AMISOM in Somalia.

However, collective security is defined by overlaps that point to its potential weaknesses. For instance, several collective organizations have been established sharing an economic or military cooperation agenda with most countries belonging to more than one organization having differing membership. The overlap in security alliances is seen as to complicate the scenario. A further constraint to collective security agreements are the non-state actors including terrorists and international crime syndicates and less commonly other collective security agreements.

1.6.1.3 The Democratic Peace Theory

Proponents of the democratic peace theory advance that democracies are hesitant for armed conflict engagement with other democracies[25]. Archibugi[26] posits that the state of peace is not singular to the democracies but rather easily sustained between the democratic states. Under this theoretical approach, proponents argue that states people are accountable for the establishment of diplomatic institutions as to resolve international conflict and tensions. Moreover, other democracies are not inclined to the view that the states with adjacent policy and doctrines of governance are hostile. Democratic peace theorists also agree democracies possess greater public wealth than other states hence war is eschewed for subsequent preservation of resources and

[25] Pugh, Jeff. "Democratic peace theory: A review and evaluation." *CEMPROC Occasional Paper Series* (2005).

[26] Daniele Archibugi, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy Archived April 15, 2010, at the Wayback Machine., Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2008.

infrastructure. Herman & Kegley[27] opine that interventions between democracies are very likely and that these democracies far more likely to intervene. Kegley[28] agrees arguing that such interventions between democracies have been subsequently on the increase.

From the above theory, AMISOM can be regarded as an establishment of the different democracies and as well a diplomatic institution to resolve the largely recognized international conflict in Somalia. Different states under the umbrella of AMISOM considered the conflict a threat to the regional peace and stability hence holding the greater public good to preserve infrastructure and resources and create room for reconstruction of the country. On the other hand, the different country troops are less likely to engage in conflict given the shared democratic and liberal values but focus toward the greater good of coming together in establishing peace and security in Somalia. Consequently, the theory provides a logical reason for the global spread of democracy hence resulting in greater international peace.

1.6.2 Empirical literature review

The relevant concepts analyzed are the peacekeeping and security followed by a section on the evolution and development of diplomacy and a section that draws on the armed conflict and the military diplomacy nexus.

1.6.2.1 Strategies Applied in Military Diplomacy

The issue of instability and conflict that arise among states have diverse causes. These causes range from political discrimination, ethnic hatred, to unequal distribution of resources. All these end up

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[27] Kegley Jr, Charles W., and Margaret G. Hermann. "Military intervention and the democratic peace." *International Interactions* 21, no. 1 (1995): 1-21.

[28] Kegley Jr, Charles W., and Margaret G. Hermann. "Putting military intervention into the democratic peace: A research note." *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 1 (1997): 78-107.

spilling across borders[29]. Societies in which there is a dearth of dissent ideologies highly stand the risk of nurturing appealing ideologies to those who feel insecure because of the existing norms. In most occasions, the authentic grievances pave way for corrupt leadership and subsequently exploitation and aggravation of tensions. As such, unstable relations among the states potentially harbour threat to the relative wealth, ambitions and power. The transformation in the democratic system cuts across the world and this provides support for the stability by doing away with the possible conflicts that may occur.[30]

Over the past decades, there has been the view of durable peace against great powers based on the strategic placement against common security threats. In spite of recent developments in matters security and intelligence, regional tensions and crises in varying degrees threaten the national security of states. Such tensions constrain the alliances and threaten the peace creating a good ground for terrorism to thrive, consequently threatening the regional peace and stability. It is therefore fundamental to secure peaceful and stable relations as a traditional goal for diplomacy. To promote the objective of peace and security, addressing issues of root causes of conflict are vital. In every region, effective ties will be built with the friends, partners, allies, and organizations to ultimately resolve the existing conflicts that emerge. In spite of the tremendous influence of power by those in command, their involvement in creation of regional foreign policy objectives and implementation of the programs on military diplomacy is limited. This only enables the achievement of goals but not in agreement with recommendations of established state authorities.[31]

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[29] Muthanna, K. A. "Military diplomacy." *Journal of Defence Studies* 5, no. 1 (2011): 1-15.

[30] Mearsheimer, John J. "Back to the future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War." *International security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5-56.

[31] Levy, Marc A. "Is the environment a national security issue?" *International security* 20, no. 2 (1995): 35-62.

In view of the fact that common strategic thinking amid allies and partner's effective communication includes shaping an effective communication, it remains one of the strategies that is used by military diplomats in their operations. This is usually done through strategic communication to decipher and establish requisite conditions to foster national interests and objectives using useful information, programs and plans that are in synchrony with the national power. Cumulatively, strategic communication comprises the elements; defence support to diplomacy, public affairs, military diplomacy, and public affairs.[32] The state department exists as the lead federal agency for strategic communication although this does not undermine the need to equally engage the department of defence. The US military for example is well trained, equipped, and organized to plan analyse, coordinate, and integrate the spectrum of responsibilities that are put in place to promote the interests of Americans.[33] Subsequently, the Department of Defence ensures the ability to conduct good strategic communication is increase and offer support to institutionalize the whole process. Effective communication is key in any military operation to keep the whole process of operation in sync with the relevant bodies concerned with the security of any state.[34]

Another strategy used by the military diplomats is the idea of presence. This is ability to appropriately place the militants in positions to be able to defend their territory when attacked by the combatants. This strategy has been employed by the U.S to provide support to the state to

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[32] Shea, Timothy C. *Transforming military diplomacy*. George C Marshall Center APO AE 09053 European center for security studies, 2005.

[33] Larson, E. V., Eaton, D., Nichiporuk, B., & Szayna, T. S. (2009). *Assessing irregular warfare: A framework for intelligence analysis*. Rand Corporation.

[34] Wald, C. F. *New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign*. National defence university Washington DC institute for national strategic studies, 2006.

ensure there is regional stability, a projecting power, and a support in providing deterrence to ensure there is continued access and security commitments.[35] Since 1990s, there has a been a general trend in the reduction of forward posture as the forces are not expected to engage in fight where they are positioned unlike the period of the cold war. The 1989 case of the United states provides a classical example where the European command forces was reduced in 1989 from approximately 240,000 to a force of roughly 100,000 people. Generally, the United States turned over the local government oversees installation by 60% in the 1990s.[36] In like manner, the EUCOM changed its geographies south and east to be involved in Eastern Europe and Africa. Since 2004, empirical evidence points to a declining trend as echoed in the global posture review and BRAC 2005. At the same time, the Navy fleet has been reduced too based on the shrinking of the time base inventory. Even though the shrinking took place, the small force is still able to engage as the global posture review primarily focuses on the efficacy relative to tasks for zero operation phases.[37] The U.S Navy has also crafted other ways of enhancing presence by including global fleet stations that will enable the establishment of a self-sustaining activities that will help conduct the general regional operations using tailor-made adaptive packages. This is the same case with the military whose presence matter a lot in their operations. The AMISOM has always laid good strategies on ensuring militants are deployed in various parts of Somali to provide the required protection to the citizens of Somalia. The KDF of Kenya have been deployed along the Kenya Somalia boarders in various positions to provide counter-terrorism help.

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[35] Reveron, D. A. Shaping and Military Diplomacy. *Article, US Naval War College*, 2007.

[36] Henry, R. *Transforming the US global defence posture*. Naval War Coll Newport Ri, 2006.

[37] Reveron, D. A. Shaping and Military Diplomacy. *Article, US Naval War College*, 2007.

Security cooperation is another strategy that is employed by most militants and it mainly includes the building of relationships that within the foreign defence establishment in order to promote specific security interests. For instance, in the U.S, the specific security interests have seen to it that there is the development of allied and friendly military competences for self-defence and collective operations.[38] This cooperation includes improvement of information exchange, intelligence sharing, and transformation of allies to help in harmonizing various views on challenges of security and provide access to peacetime and contingency in the U.S forces. The main objectives of security cooperation are to help combat terrorism, build coalitions for the future, cooperate with regional disputes, transform alliances, combat mass weapon destruction, realign global defence posture, deterring and isolating problem states, and combating terrorism. Cooperation has worked well for most military groups when dealing with terrorists.[39] For instance, the AU, UN, IGAD among other state unions, have brought countries together to not only look at issues to do with development but also those that deal with the security of the states exiting within the unions. It is the collective security agreements that have led to establishments like AMISOM, to foster the restoration of peace and conflict in the Horn of Africa.

Building of military partner capabilities has also been used by military diplomats in dealing with issues security. Different approaches have been employed including; foreign military finding, training programmes, foreign military sales, and international military education. Under the umbrella of Joint Combined Exchange Training, foreign militaries have benefited from assistance on novel ways of dealing with security threats including drug trafficking, conduct rescue hostages,

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[38] Reveron, D. S. Military Diplomacy and the Engagement Activities of Combatant Commanders. In *Inside Defense* (pp. 43-54). Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008.

[39] Reveron, D. S., & Mahoney-Norris, K. A. *'Military-Political 'Relations: The Need for Officer Education*. National defense univ washington DC institute for national strategic studies, 2009.

and conduct insurgencies. The collaboration of militaries has been so beneficial to the personnel trainings and has enhanced new relations with the foreign counterparts. For instance, in the American training there is always an obvious benefit in terms of financial assistance and the training and these activities help in in bridging the gap in interoperability.[40]

The importance of Militaries across the world cannot be overemphasized. Most of the successes experienced after militaristic efforts are fully based on the strategies laid down by the militaries to ensure that their operations go as planned. Even though different states have contradictories strategies, it is important to for the forces that come together to do one mission support other countries militaries so that their impact may be experienced in the society and the goals are achieved. These strategies are therefore important when aligned to the benefit of all the countries within the union.

1.6.2.2 Role of Military Diplomacy in Enhancing regional peace and security

The national security of a state implies its ability to provide physical and social protection for the country. This is always a guarantee to the country's sovereignty and ability to execute its own national objectives in order to protect the country's core values from both external and internal threat. National security also ensures that a state is at its peak of peace and freedom and it is only in these kinds of environments that the regional peace and security of a state thrives.[41] On the other hand, a state that is resilient and experiencing growth allows the maintenance of defence capability and also allows for quick response to the demands during a crisis. The peace and security of a country must therefore develop in order to support the capability that is required for the national

[40] Ibid

[41] Patrick, Stewart. "Weak states and global threats: Fact or fiction?" *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (2006): 27-53.

security. This therefore makes a country's peace and stability and the role of military a perfect example of the proverbial cases of the egg and the chicken.[42]

The role of the military in fostering a stable and peaceful environment seeks to create an enabling environment of peace and security for the citizenry. Military power on the other hand is a function of state's resources and its economic marshal while its ability to command high level military equipment and personnel hinged on a favourable peace and security framework. Therefore, strong military power, its role and effectiveness is defined by the country's economy[43]. Military diplomacy as a security umbrella for host nations. Security is one of the likely mechanisms through which potential growth of an economy is evident. The security guarantee created by presence of military troops is enough of a signal to foreign investors and in instances where foreign military-guarantee security in the host nation, higher levels of both domestic and foreign direct investment and low risk premium in interest rates would be realized. As such, a host nation is able to lower its defence expenditures, hence sizeable savings are realized allowing the country to divert more resources towards physical and human capital accumulation.[44]

Military diplomacy is instrumental in foreign policy to realize the peace and stability of any state[45] and accomplish given objectives. In the absence of military diplomacy, much would be non-existent including international organizations and peace most likely unheard of as most states

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[42] Nilsson, M. *Tools of hegemony: Military Technology and Swedish-American Security Relations, 1945-1962* (Doctoral dissertation, KTH), 2007.

[43] Tomforde, Maren. "How Much Peace Can the Military Instigate? Anthropological Perspectives on the Role of the Military in Peace Intervention." In *Ethnographic Peace Research*, pp. 207-229. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2018.

[44] Cottey, A. *Reshaping Defence Diplomacy: New roles for military cooperation and assistance* (No. 365). Routledge, 2013.

[45] Tan, See Seng. "Military diplomacy." *The Sage handbook of diplomacy. London: Sage. Google Scholar* (2016).

would be submerged in conflict. It can therefore be alluded to that the peaceful coexistence of states is brought about by diplomacy that potentially averts war and violence and fortifies relations between nations. While defending the interests of a state through negotiations, it is assumed that a middle ground will be struck despite inherent differences, to at least meet the interest of each state but potentially avert conflict. The positive common interests achieved help a state to expand politically and economically. In the arena of foreign policy, military diplomacy seeks to facilitate the observation of international law.[46]

The military plays a strategic through providence of aid to civil authority thus ensuring peace and security of a country. For instance, from the case study of Egypt and India, it can be seen that the armed forces play their primary role in defending the country against external attacks and also takes into consideration the role of aiding the civil authority. The military in these two countries play the role throughout the country. This helps in facilitation of quick reaction to the incidences that affect the country. The forces are also not constrained by equipment or personnel. The forces are also not involved in other functions of other ministries and departments within the government. Within the countries, there are those charged with the responsibility of managing and preventing disasters. Special teams are there that cater for any after-effects of disaster. The force is therefore involved in the National Transformation Technology Programme because of the high advancement in the area.[47] In Kenya, the military serve free in time of crisis and this save a lot on finances that would have been channelled to the military. Other departments like Navy, the Army and, Air Force are usually involved in prevention and management of crisis. This saves the counties a lot in terms

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[46] Willard, J. E. *Military Diplomacy: An Essential Tool for Foreign Policy at the Theater Strategic Level*. Army command and general staff coll fort leavenworth ks school of advanced military studies, 2006

[47] Perlmutter, Amos. "The praetorian state and the praetorian army: Toward a taxonomy of civil-military relations in developing polities." *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 3 (1969): 382-404.

of their economy because the financial bit that would have been spent in the disaster management will be channelled to the improvement of the economy in other areas.

In most countries that are still developing, military establishment give a representation of best-organized, most-westernized, and highly-organized structure in the society. Military officers are likely to be best educated people especially in sectors like engineering, administration and, physical sciences. It also the nature of their occupation that have a greater sense of nationhood and loyalty to the citizens of the country. These qualities of a military officer make them very useful in the society and are not only assets to their own department but also the civilian sector.[48] Without the military, the security of the nation is at jeopardy, without the military, the foreign policy of the country may not fully realize the growth of the state and without the military, the aid provided to the civil authority not be termed as aid. Therefore, however much the military is pegged on its primary role as a security provider, it also plays a vital role to the economy of different states and many end-up not knowing it.

1.6.2.3 Challenges Facing Military Diplomacy

Military Diplomacy has been one the peacekeeping strategies of African Union, United Nations, IGAD, individual states and other state unions around the world. Whenever there arises a conflict/war in a member state or among states there is need to bring tranquillity and harmony. For this reason, military power maybe involved to achieve this[49]. Amidst all this military machinery also face various challenges in their quest to enhance peace and security. Military personnel face

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[48] Verlegh, Peeter WJ, and Jan-Benedict EM Steenkamp. "A review and meta-analysis of country-of-origin research." *Journal of economic psychology* 20, no. 5 (1999): 521-546.

[49] Shea, T. C. (2005). *Transforming military diplomacy*. George C Marshall Center Apo Ae 09053 European Center for Security Studies.

hostile environment. The political atmosphere in host countries characterised by lack of sincerity to treaties among warring factions largely constrains the peacekeeping efforts caused. Recent scholarly evidence points to a wider opposition for military intervention within the African context, either independently or together with the opposing forces. In peacekeeping missions like Somalia and Sudan the UN and AU where military intervention was key, armed reaction has been witnessed either from the host nations and rebel groups[50].

In the wake of political upheaval within the country and non-adherence to established treaties limit the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. Most African countries are characterised by high level sensitivity to their culture, religious beliefs and gender[51] and which peacekeepers need to take into account to avoid unwarranted hostile reactions. The arbitration over disputes calls for local leadership involvement, not to mention the certain restrictions that peacekeeping forces ought to pay attention to in the line of duty. Infringement of the cultural norms can be costly and in instances where this has been the case, individual peacekeepers have often been withdrawn or relocated from the peacekeeping mission in fear of the damaging reputation to peacekeepers. Such experiences have rightly prompted serious consideration among African peacekeeping militaries to include studies on host country culture and religious beliefs and that is now mandatory now for pre-deployment peacekeeping training among African military forces.[52]

The performance of African states in supporting pre-deployment preparation, sustainability and performance of their forces during peacekeeping operations in Africa is limited even in the UN

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[50] Ibid

[51] Utley, Rachel E. *Major Powers and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention*. Routledge, 2017.

[52] Onoja, Adoyi. "Peacekeeping challenges in Africa: The Darfur conflict." *conflict trends* 2008, no. 3 (2008): 39-44.

and AU Peacekeeping operations. African peacekeeping contingents are often characterized by ill-preparedness and poor equipment among the forces as in the case of Sierra Leone, Sudan and the DR Congo that saw the insufficiency in troop strength and limited poor equipment.

Resultantly, most African missions have been widely considered as ineffective characterised by this ill preparedness of the peacekeepers[53]. While the United Nations and the AU require military contingents to be facilitated for at least three months in supplies and logistics before they can step in, most African peace keeping operations have often been constrained by limited resources, contingent equipment often difficult to maintain given the lack of accessories and spare parts, and most states barely meet the mandatory rations and petroleum stores for self-sustenance of the three months before UN and AU takeover. The effectiveness and efficiency of African peacekeepers is thus a challenged ground, a notable case being the AU mission in Darfur where the operational efficiency of the troops before UN takeover was widely constrained by logistics difficulties[54].

Peacekeeping operations often suffer the constraints insufficiently trained troops. Even in the presence of UN provides guidelines, most African militaries are insufficiently trained, ill prepared and equipped relative to the peacekeeping requirements and to handle the opposing forces[55]. In several missions have host regime and rebels been rated to be of higher in military capacity and equipment creating challenging the ability of peacekeepers to restore peace and stability. Further challenging their preparedness and capacity is the fact that most African economies are barely struggling sustain themselves and to procure basic military equipment and modern training aids

[53] Lamphear, John, ed. *African military history*. Routledge, 2017.

[54] Piombo, Jessica, Koh Ernest, and Ann Igoe. "The Darfur Conflict" (2005).

[55] Squires, Chase. "New War Demands New Training for Troops." *Guardian Unlimited* (2006).

leading to the utilization of only improvised aids coupled with poor logistics and lack of realistic approaches to training[56]. In the absence of well-articulated training, suitable logistics and relevant equipment, the training is never objective to realize the success of military diplomacy efforts. The case of DRC Congo suffices in this regard, where contingents were largely inefficient given absence of pre-deployment training on issues culture and language and equipment of both staff officers and observers.

Intelligence gathering and information sharing especially among troop contributing countries is essential for the success of peacekeeping operations, although the lack of a seamless intelligence sharing has often challenged coordination efforts within the mission. This is further worsened by the fact that different contingents employ different chains of command in information sharing thereby creating communication challenges for peacekeeping missions. With inferior technology during such operations, the fate of their operational efficiency and effectiveness is almost sealed[57]. In most instances, the borderline on the degree of force to employ remains unclear, a dilemma that has often confined peacekeepers to their bases in hostile situations and compelled them to adopt defensive mechanisms and await information flow from the chain of command despite situations demanding quick action to establish peace and calm.[58]

Different states ascribe to unique military doctrines, mainly defined by the respective former colonial powers and therefore undergo different training approaches. Doctrinal differences have had major impact on peacekeeping training undertaken by different contingents hence differences

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[56] Lamphear, John, ed. *African military history*. Routledge, 2017.

[57] Ibid

[58] Collins, J. M., & Kingston, R. C. (2002). *Military strategy: Principles, practices, and historical perspectives*. Potomac Books, Inc.

in the operating standard of militaries. While the UN training syllabus provide common guidelines, countries have remained at discretion to adopt conventional training practices although the dynamic methods employed by rebels have consistently challenged the effectiveness of peacekeeping efforts[59]. This largely accounts for the proactive or passive nature in the conduct of certain peacekeeping missions. Very few countries have the expertise and resources to carry effective peace operations training coupled by the fact that absence of qualified trainers translates to a dearth of requisite knowledge and skills necessary for success of peacekeeping operations[60].

Delayed employment of military diplomacy as a peacekeeping mission strategy has become a predominant feature in the troubled states around world. This is because several operational and administrative logistics procedures have to be followed as prescribed by the affected state. These laydown procedures are common to peacekeepers and still exist. Resultantly, peacekeeping forces often are deployed for operations when it is late and not having undergone sufficient pre-deployment training not to mention the poor equipment and limited logistics during the launch of such missions.

In certain instances, the military equipment and capabilities of rebels have often been superior to those of peacekeepers with the latter consequently face operational difficulties. This may even give rise to fresh conflicts emerging.[61] Amidst the challenges, peacekeeping mission have been successful in most parts of the world. Therefore, it is a clear indication that if involved member

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[59] Schaab, Brooke B., and J. Douglas Dressel. *Training the troops: What today's soldiers tell us about training for information-age digital competency*. No. ARI-RR-1805. Army Research Inst for The Behavioural and Social Sciences Alexandria VA, 2003.

[60] Kaufman, K. R., Brodine, S., & Shaffer, R. (2000). Military training-related injuries: surveillance, research, and prevention. *American journal of preventive medicine*, *18*(3), 54-63.

[61] Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peace-making and peacekeeping. *International Relations*, *11*(3), 201-218.

states work together on security policies with a common goal in their respective regional and continental levels then greater achievements in peace and security will be realized.

1.7 Gaps in Literature Review

From the review of literature, the study acknowledges the utilization of a number of military diplomacy strategies in different conflict environments. Notably, The UN and now increasingly Regional organizations play important roles in matters peace and security and the contribution of these institutions with peace agenda have realized considerable gain in literature, relative to reduction of conflict. Resurgence of violence and conflict especially in Africa in areas under regional peacekeeping mission organizations including UN peace and security organizations underpins pitfalls that counter diplomacy in areas of Somalia, Sudan, Western Sahara, DRC Congo and lately South Sudan. This diplomatic inertia has been plausibly alluded to failure of UN diplomatic efforts to restore peace and security and address underlying issues of conflict.

Subsequently, there is a dearth of scholarly evidence documenting the application of military diplomacy strategies and their effectiveness in conflict in the war-torn Horn of Africa state. Whether the pursuit of peace and security through military diplomacy in Somalia is effective remains in doubt given the recent recurrence of violence and conflict. While empirical evidence points to likelihood of AMISOM success relative to previous UN military operations in Somalia, given its formative structure from a regional organization, scholarly evidence is limited on novel strategies that could be employed to achieve this success.

Considerably, there is no clear scholarly evidence of pitfalls undermining the success of AMISOM military diplomacy efforts within the Somalia context, although there is considerable literature from UN operations in Africa especially Central Africa and West Africa. Notably, these suffice as

important need to fill in gaps in literature thus contributing to further understanding of the research problem and the role of military diplomacy in international relations. Whether AMISOM military diplomacy efforts would establish long-lasting peace in the horn of Africa remains a case whose progression id to be witnessed. What remains undoubted is AMISOM efforts substantially span the scope of military diplomacy explored in subsequent chapters of this work.

1.8 Research Hypothesis

H_0: Military diplomacy strategies applied by AMISOM are not effective in the peace and security architecture in the Horn of Africa.

H_1: AMISOM military diplomacy strategies enhance regional peace and security through military diplomacy efforts in the Horn of Africa.

1.9 Justification of the Study

This study sought to address the effectiveness of military diplomacy efforts in the horn of Africa region through assessment of AMISOM military diplomacy strategies in Somalia. Simultaneously, this study sought to identify whether strategies enhance regional peace and security while equally examining potential pitfalls to the effectiveness of the strategies.

1.9.1 Policy justification

Research has played a substantial role traditionally relative to the understanding and creation of effective means of conflict resolution and peace building. If well understood, Schnabel[62] opines that research proffers opportunities for analysts to provide solutions to relevant actors as to initiate

[62] Porter, E. J., Robinson, G., Smyth, M., Osaghae, E., & Schnabel, A. (Eds.). (2005). *Researching conflict in Africa: Insights and experiences*. United Nations University Press.

change from their various positions. While civil conflict in Africa and the institutional response to these conflicts have been subject of a plethora of studies, there's a paucity of substantial evidence to infer from on military diplomacy in the HORN OF AFRICA region.

Thus, the study is practically relevant and timely for policy makers to extricate significant strategies as contributing factors to the peace mission success in its entirety. The African Union and Sub-regional organizations including regional mechanisms like the East African Standby Force (EASF) would potentially gain from this study as it contributes to recommendations that can possibly be adopted in the development of policy and best practices for military diplomacy operations of the ASF. This ensures ultimate comprehensive and holistic interventions toward the complex conflict landscape in Africa thereby advancing solutions to international peace and security.

1.9.2 Academic justification

From the academic field premise, this study sought to provide greater insights on the role of military diplomacy in peacekeeping especially in the horn of Africa region. The study sheds light on the nature of military diplomacy along the broader spectrum of the transformed nature of security, especially from the former peacekeeping approach that placed a premium on non-interference and norms of state sovereignty. While peace operations have flourished since the end of the cold war, Roland[63] observes that they are policy relevant heavy and largely drawn from among others international relations and political science disciplines ignoring external environments which are drivers in conflict zones.

[63] Paris, R. (2000). Broadening the study of peace operations. *International studies review*, *2*(3), 27-44.

This study further sought to contribute to the academic discourse on regional organizations interventions in peace and security especially the AU insight into their potentials and pitfalls in the horn of Africa region. As argued in previous scholarly evidence[64], peace and security is a dynamic and not static concept; and so are the strategies and tools employed in conflict transformation and conflict management. This study adds to knowledge and theory on strategies and measures that enhance peace and security operations effectiveness through an analysis of individual strategies employed in military diplomacy.

1.10 Theoretical Framework

This study adopted the theory of Realism to establish a basis for analysis of the role and effectiveness of military diplomacy efforts by AMISOM in enhancing peace and security in Somalia.

1.10.1 Theory of Realism

According to Forde[65], the theory of realism is a school of thought that was founded by Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes that explain the relationship of power internationally. This theory is centered on four propositions; First, proponents argue that states are the most important actors. Realists advance that states represent a key unit of analysis and when international relations are studied, it is these units that are being studied. Realists therefore use the interrelated parts of a system to represent the international system of a state[66].

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[64] Tardy, T. (2004). *Peace operations after 11 September 2001*. Routledge.

[65] Forde, S. (1995). International realism and the science of politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and neorealism. *International Studies Quarterly*, *39*(2), 141-160.

[66] Rossi, Enzo, and Matt Sleat. "Realism in normative political theory." *Philosophy Compass* 9, no. 10 (2014): 689-701.

Secondly, it proposes that the international system is anarchic. According to realists, the presence or absence of a government largely defines the international political outcome. Whenever there is lack of a common rule making authority then, the international arena is considered self-help system. Each state is considered autonomous and is free to define its own power and interests. Anarchy therefore became the source of the overriding power that is shaping the interstate relations. Realists further argue that, since there is no authority that exists above the states, the condition of lawlessness of the international anarchy is the directive that makes the powerful states to dominate the weaker states.

Thirdly, realists propose that states pursue self-interests. According to them, the state is the principal actor of the international arena. In this case, most states are usually more concerned with their own security and in their acts, they tend to rely on their own national interests and struggle for power as opposed to the international struggle. Lastly, they propose that the principal concern of all the states is survival[67]. Since the realists see the states in the world as anarchical and view security as a central issue. To achieve the desired security, most of the states try and increase their power and engage in power comparison that in the end deter the possible aggressors. Wars are always fought to prevent the competing nations from improving into stronger nations with strong military force[68].

From the above four propositions, realists view international relations as a struggle for power that is anchored on self-interest. They argue that since there is no central authority over the international society and the states tend to act independent and sovereign in terms of their own survival.

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[67] Sleat, Matt. "Realism, liberalism and non-ideal theory or, are there two ways to do realistic political theory?" *Political Studies* 64, no. 1 (2016): 27-41.

[68] Ibid

Therefore, the objective of the national security is not reached because most state's security are not pegged on the international security[69]. The key issues that realists see, as dilemma is the security issue as most states define their own security and power. States are more inclined to acquiring more power in order to escape being subject to the power influence of other states. This theory therefore implies that, achieving national security becomes a problem because; the security of other states is threatened by the powerful states. Hence, when striving to achieve maximum security, new insecurities emerge between states thus leading to regional conflicts. Whenever a state is overwhelmed by non-actor states, an issue affects the entire region thus calling for intervention. The most common forms of interventions are military interventions, which can be in form of peacemaking, and peacekeeping. This theory is therefore relevant to this study because it does explain the rationale behind role of military diplomacy on peacekeeping and security in horn of Africa intervention in Somalia.

From the above theory, given that states are motivated by their national interests and preserve their autonomy, there is usually a clash of command in operations; some soldiers have to receive orders from their own country chain of command, which has often resulted in catastrophe following late response to attacks during operations. Moreover, this theoretical approach further explains the absence of a common intelligence gathering and sharing platform for AMISOM, most country troops running own platforms and the sharing of intelligence of information between troops is at bare minimum a success. Different country troops are aligned along different doctrines; Kenya uses the maneuver warfare doctrine of the US, Ethiopia uses the attrition doctrine of Russia, Uganda uses the maneuver doctrine of the UK while Tanzania uses a mixture of these doctrines

[69] Haftendorn, H. (1991). The security puzzle: theory building and discipline building in international security. *International studies quarterly*, *35*(1), 3-17.

signaling the lack of a common doctrine for AMISOM. Notably, states under AMISOM purchase their military hardware from different countries, Kenya purchases from US, Uganda from Russia and China, Ethiopia from Russia but all these are needed during the course of military operations. These elements underscore the high-level state centricity among troop contributing countries, which is agreeable under the theory of realism.

1.11 Research Methodology

This section presents the methods that were employed in this study by the researcher to address the objectives and answer the research questions. The study sought to investigate the role of military diplomacy on peace and security in horn of Africa region and the subsequent sections detail the research design, study target population, sampling procedures, data collection techniques and the data analysis techniques. The study was carried out in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia where African union operations are based. The capital enjoys relative calm and tranquility and is where most of the logistical field operations are conducted.

1.11.1 Research Design

The study adopted an exploratory and mixed methods research design. According to Streb[70], exploratory research designs suffice where there are limited or fewer studies, important for obtaining background information about a given topic and is flexible, able to address a variety of research questions. Mixed methods approach allows for investigation of a broader and complex research problem enabling the researcher to utilize more than one approach, both quantitative and

[70] Streb, Christoph Klaus. "Exploratory case studies." *Encyclopedia of case study research* (2010): 372-373.

qualitative approach of data collection[71]. Consequently, the approach produces complete knowledge and understanding of the research problem hence chosen by the researcher for the investigation into the role of military diplomacy in peace and security in Horn of Africa Region, the case of AMISOM in Somalia.

1.11.2 Target population and Sample size

The study target population entailed AMISOM staff who relevant respondents provided sufficient information to answer the research questions. Currently, AMISOM has 22,000 military troops, 234 police officers and 81 civilians (AMISOM, 2018). Moreover, the study equally targeted the Somali civilian population since they were important stakeholders in providing information on the effectiveness of military diplomacy in the country. Thus, the target population comprised 22,315 AMISOM staff and civilian contingent. The sample size for this study was obtained from a sampling formula by Yamane[72];

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2} = 99.9$$

Where,

n= the sample size

N = the size of population

e= the error of 10%

The calculation from a population of 22,315 AMISOM Staff and Civilian contingent was:

[71] Tashakorri, Abbas and John W. Creswell. "The New Era of Mixed Methods." *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1 (January 2007): 3-7

[72] Yamane, Taro. "Statistics: An introductory analysis." (1973).

$$n = \frac{22315}{1 + 22315(.1)^2} = 99.9$$

Therefore, a target sample of 100 respondents was chosen from the AMISOM Staff at the proportions as indicated on Table 1 below.

Table 1: Sample Size categories

AMISOM Component	Population size	Sample size	Sampling Procedure
Military	22000	50	Purposive Sampling
Police contingent of AMISOM	234	30	Purposive Sampling
Civilian contingent of AMISOM	81	20	Purposive Sampling
TOTAL	22,315	100	

Source: Researcher, 2017

1.11.4 Validity and Reliability

To ascertain the validity of the research instrument, the researcher employed the content validity technique. This would entail examining how well the instrument answered the research questions. Validity ensures the instrument measures exactly what is intended to measure[73] hence the instrument was submitted for expert review to the supervisor to ascertain this. To ensure reliability, the researcher employed the test-retest technique to measure the capability of the research instrument to guarantee consistency, dependability or trustworthiness in measurements of the desired study variables.

[73] Kothari, B. L. (2007). *Research Methodology: Tools and Techniques*. ABD Publishers.

1.11.5 Data collection and procedures

This study employed a breadth of both primary and secondary sources for data collection. Primary data was being collected from study respondents by means of a research questionnaire and an interview schedule. This comprised a set of well-structured and unstructured questions defined by the research questions as well as interview schedules. These allowed room for detailed responses from the study respondents. For reliability and validity of the findings, relevant documents constituting AMISOM literature was reviewed to provide qualitative data for analysis.

The researcher carried out a pilot test of the research instrument. Pilot testing is important as it helped establish the suitability of the tool and any identifiable errors before undertaking the study. The researcher carried out a pilot study at the East African Standby Force headquarters in Karen, on a sample of 20 respondents.

1.11.6 Data analysis techniques

The data analysis process involved both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Content analysis was mainly used to analyze the qualitative data and which would be reported normatively. Quantitative research findings were analyzed and reported using descriptive statistics, tables, graphs, charts and inferential statistics in Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS v23). Moreover, the data analysis was structured objectively to address each of the study research questions.

1.11.7 Ethical considerations

This study sought to adhere to the ethics of conducting research. All study respondents consented before taking part in the study with freedom to withdraw at any time. Consequently, all information

obtained from the study was treated with uttermost confidentiality, anonymized and utilized only for the purpose of this study.

1.12 Scope and limitations of the study

This study focused on military diplomacy strategies applied by AMISOM in the conflict torn Horn of Africa state, Somalia exploring the strategies employed, potential challenges and how military diplomacy has translated into regional peace and security. It mainly sought to evaluate one of the most contemporary cases, the period 2007-2018 that has been characterized by an active role of the African union mission in Somalia. The study was be conducted at the AMISOM headquarters in Mogadishu and mainly targeted AMISOM troops as well as police and civilian components embedded to AMISOM.

The researcher experienced limitations of language barrier from some respondents who use French as their official language. A research assistant with fluency in both languages was hired to mitigate the effect of the barrier. Secondly, the study being undertaken in a conflict prone setting was liable to the effects of any security concerns and possible outbreak of tension. To overcome this, the researcher was in close working with AMISOM security forces and provided with intelligence information on likely occurrences.

1.13 Chapter Outline

Chapter One: Introduction- The chapter introduces a background to the study topic, providing an overview of military diplomacy and its role in peace and security in different contexts. Specifically, it entails the background, statement of the problem, study objectives, hypothesis, study justification, literature review, literature review, theoretical review and research methodology.

Chapter Two: The second chapter entails the strategies applied in military diplomacy by AMISOM in the horn of Africa.

Chapter Three: The third chapter focuses on the role of AMISOM in peace and security through military diplomacy efforts in the Horn of Africa.

Chapter Four: This chapter seeks to review the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the horn of Africa.

Chapter Five: This chapter seeks to present the summary of findings and conclusions from the study results. Further, these equally proffered recommendations arrived at from the findings and linked to each of the study objectives.

CHAPTER TWO

STRATEGIES APPLIED IN MILITARY DIPLOMACY BY AMISOM IN SOMALIA

2.1 Introduction

The unique nature of present-day conflicts that affect the African continents today, is a dilemma that most of the peace keeping bodies have to deal with. Ideally, there is limited evidence to substantiate the fact that institutions established solely with a peace restoration agenda have considerably restored peace in regions consistently characterized by recurrent conflict. Restoring peace in most African countries has been a struggle for most of the institutions as the assurance of promoting peace is almost considered as no promise to most of the suffering citizens in conflict-filled nations. The UN has been struggling to deal with peace but fortunately the AU proved to be more reliable on the issue of peace. The AU has played a major role in the AMISOM body and this has seen to it that there is peace enforcement that acts as a precursor in achieving peace. With AMISOM in place, various strategies have been put in place and elimination of the threat of insurgency in Somalia is in the process of being declared over.[74]

The primary goal of keeping Somalia secured is only tied on defeating and eliminating the threats by al-Shabaab. Since the inception of the works of AMISOM it is evident that the erratic terrorist attacks that were being experienced back then have reduced and most of the militant groups have been pushed out of the towns of Somalia. The terrorists are now mostly found in the rural areas of Somalia and this is an evidence of counter terrorism efforts put in place.[75] The efforts applied by

[74] Makinda, S. M., Okumu, F. W., & Mickler, D. (2015). *The African Union: Addressing the challenges of peace, security, and governance*. Routledge.

[75] Tase, P. (2013). Terrorism, War and Conflict, an analysis into the Horn of Africa-Al Shabaab in Somalia; US and UN efforts to reduce violence.

the military might have not yielded much to what is seen today without very serious strategies being put in place. AMISOM has applied various strategies in eliminating the threat of insurgency in Somalia and this has been enforced by the military.

This chapter is mainly providing elaborative strategies that the military have employed in Somalia. Some of the strategies to be discussed in details include; Counter offensive and deterrent measures to undermine the threat posed by al-Shabaab; Consolidation of and pursuance of political and diplomatic settlement of armed conflicts; Dialogue and reconciliation; Protecting Somalia authorities and key infrastructure; facilitating implementation of the national security and the stabilization plan.

2.2.1 Supporting dialogue and Reconciliation

The UN Security Council on November 2012 at its 6854th meeting resolved that one of the tasks AMISOM was to carry out in Somalia is to support the dialogue and reconciliation process in Somalia by facilitating the free movement of people and guarantee the security of all stakeholders involved with the peace process within the country including the political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and civil society representatives.[76] AMISOM has continued to play an important role in Somalia, supporting the current unfolding political process of the dialogue and reconciliation efforts. Among top of priorities has been to stabilize the security situation and strengthen the functionality of established government institutional frameworks. The previously existing stalemate of political differences between the interim parliament and the transitional Government have consistently undermined the peace process, although concerted AMISOM efforts have realized much achievement.

[76] Nduwimana, D. (2013). *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre.

Under heated up engagements, AMISOM has significantly recognized home-grown peace players or aspects that can moderate rigidities in addition to lure the societies together. Clan leaders in Somalia have historically in the previous year fundamentally engaged the state's mandate in security and law. They have amalgamated their customary role as difference intermediaries and implementers of accustomed regulations, together with the locals, that standardize supreme characteristics of community life within and between clans. In this regard, traditional leaders have been instrumental personalities in fostering the establishment of governance structures alongside being supportive in conflict resolution between clans and regulating access to water and pasture especially in Northern Somalia.

Besides sustaining a crucial mandate in local conflict resolution as a key decision making authority, traditional leaders have assumed positions of being the legitimate leaders as bestowed on them by their clan members. In the wake of fundamental and authentic location of the customary structures in Somali civilization particularly in the aftermath of the state downfall in 1991, it suffices to mention that their involvement in the actual peace processes in the re-establishment of Somalia state is important to support dialogue and reconciliation.

2.2.2 Protecting Somalia key infrastructure and authority

The establishment of the Somalia Federal Government in 2012, governed by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was part of efforts to bring the country under rule of law. Clan elders were selected to represent the people in the House of the People of the Federal Parliament. On elections carried out during the year, former transitional government president Sheikh Shariff conceded defeat while the in the Puntland and northwest of Somalia the self-declared regional governments

ruled.[77] In the Central part of Somalia was established the Interim Galmudug Administration (IGA), with other establishments including the Interim South West Administration (ISWA) and the Interim Juba Administration (IJA). Despite the presence of these regional establishments, the IGA, ISWA and IJA weakly governed their regions thus enabling Al-shabaab to gain control of several towns in the South and Central regions including those of Bardheere and Dinsoor before being acclaimed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali Authorities.[78] Government security forces and associated local militia, personnel wearing uniforms, local uniformed militaries, Al-Shabaab, and anonymous aggressors committed uninformed or illegitimate homicides. Government and regional authorities hanged individuals without due procedures and widespread impunity persisted as a norm.

According to the temporary federal constitution, the responsibility to protect and guarantee the sovereignty of the state was a function of the military troops while the State Police whose effectiveness has been limited responsible for protecting the lives of people and property while promoting the rule of law. AMISOM primarily manned the South and Central regions deemed to be under control of to be under the control of Al-Shabaab, but nonetheless chiefly relied upon by the federal government to execute police functions. AMISOM has equally been widely involved in the execution of roles engaging with the relevant ministries including the Ministry of Defence

[77] Hammond, L. (2013). Somalia rising: things are starting to change for the world's longest failed state. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, *7*(1), 183-193.

[78] Mohamed A, Beza, T. Ondo, J et al. (2012). The AMISOM Response to Conflict and the Implementation of Peace and Security in Somalia. New Generation University College: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

responsible for controlling the armed forces and the Ministry of National Security and local and regional administrations responsible for the operations of the national Police.[79]

With increased support from the African Union Mission in Somalia, the Ministry of Defence's control over the army has greatly improved. The army comprised about 23,000 soldiers and at least 17 independent brigades, with the bulk of forces located in Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle, as well as the Bay, Bakool, and Gedo Regions. In the environs of Mogadishu and areas extending the lower and middle Shebelle regions, Merca, Baidoa, Jowar and the Bay region the Ministry of defence has increased heavy presence of the Somali National army to operate alongside AMISOM deployment areas.[80]

The Central government and the Benadir Regional administration have maintained command of two separate police forces in Mogadishu, maintaining their presence in 17 districts of the capital although police officers more than often paying allegiance to their clans and familial links that to government authorities. Complementing federal government and Benadir policing efforts in Mogadishu are the AMISOM-formed police units, providing support on strategies for emergency response, crime prevention, community policing, human rights support among other police functions. Mohamed[81] postulates that over 300 AMISOM police officers worked alongside the Somali national police while providing basic training support.

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[79] Amadi, A. I. (2014). *An Analysis of Peacekeeping Strategies in Africa: The Case of the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom)* (Doctoral Dissertation, Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies (IDIS), University of Nairobi).

[80] Lewis, I. & J. Mayall. (1996). Somalia: The New Interventionism 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia (pp. 94-124). Cambridge: University of Cambridge

[81] Mohamed A, Beza, T. Ondo, J et al. (2012). The AMISOM Response to Conflict and the Implementation of Peace and Security in Somalia. New Generation University College: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

The conflict laden Somalia landscape has considerably contributed to a lag in infrastructure development, a highlight being the one paved road extending to Kismayu through Mogadishu and from Berbera in the north. The country road network for instance is often impassable over rainy seasons, and only spans about 22,100 kilometres, only 2,608 kilometres having been paved. Moreover, the country only served by a single international airport at Mogadishu, 8 paved civilian airfields and less than 20 additional widely-scattered gravel airfields. The power systems within the country are no different with electricity produced entirely from diesel and petrol powered generators, run entirely from imported fuel, but only able to produce about 300 million kilowatt hours (kWh) from these privately-owned generators. With recurrent cycles of conflict, exploitation of resources as the hydroelectric potential on Somalia's rivers has been impossible.

Despite the port modernization programme in the late 80s supported by the US aid to support the establishment and expansion of deep-water facilities at Berbera, Mogadishu, Kismayu and a lighter port at Marka and Maydh that significantly improved cargo handling capabilities, increased the number of births and deepened the harbour at Berbera, the is limited to show for as a result of conflict. Communication systems within the region are no different either, having been completely destroyed by the rebel forces during engagements with the peacekeeping forces and organizations offering peacekeeping or relief having to depend on their own private systems. This has however changed following the recent establishment of local cellular telephone systems in Mogadishu and in several other population centres. International connections are available from Mogadishu by satellite.[82]

[82] Kinfe, A. (2002). Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development.

AMISOM continually supports federal government objectives, providing protection to the country's Federal Institutions in carrying out their mandate and secure Somalia's key infrastructure including its airports and seaports as a strategy to achieving peace. In all the four regions of Somalia, AMISOM has established footing to further these objectives.

The AMISOM military constituent has formed a moderately protected atmosphere which has permitted the Somali reconciliation process to yield fruit, allowed indigenous populace the opportunity to instigate accountable home-grown authority of traditions that can provide amenities as well as re-establish the local economy and build relationships to the countrywide economy and government.

2.2.3 Carrying out counter offensive and deterrent measures to minimize the threat of Al-Shaabab

AMISOM has for the longest time worked out ways to do away with Al-Shabaab from the capital Mogadishu until August 2011 when they managed. This was a combination of efforts between the troops deployed from Africa together with the TFG (Transitional Federal Government) forces. A lot of the contributions were experienced from the troops that were deployed into Somalia from Djibouti and Kenya who were member states. The neighbouring countries contribution was coupled with greater coordination from the TGF forces and the AMISOM together with a thorough training on the Somalia intelligence operatives by the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). This was the main reason for the turnaround of the events and it was the first success AMISOM and Somali

forces experienced. Since then, a lot of improvements have been experienced as the security situation in Somalia is taking root.[83]

The involvement of the well-equipped Kenyan navy, air force and the Kenyan Defence forces (KDF) has in great ways contributed to the achievement of the fight against al-Shabaab in Somalia. The KDF managed to liberate the Juba, Gedo, and the Kismayo areas of Somalia. Furthermore, the Ethiopian nation also redeployed troops into Somalia who managed to capture the Beledwyne, they also moved further into the central regions of Galgadud and Hiraan and extended further into the Shebelle Rift valley. This great coordination of the AMISOM, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya has had a great impact on the degree of the peace being experienced in most parts of Somalia.[84] Also, the Burundian and the Ugandan armies cannot be forgotten having worked so hard in the insurgency warfare. The experiences they gained, in the past protracted civil wars that their countries went through helped them to play a part in the countering the attacks in Somalia. They demonstrated more resilience to the asymmetric warfare and proved invaluable in pushing out and defeating the al-Shabaab out of the capital Mogadishu.

The US also appears to have increased its operations in Somalia against al-Shabaab in response to the attacks however temporarily. This was depicted in the Obama administration that began to target the low-level and the mid-level operatives. This was first witnessed in the March 2016 airstrike that killed approximately 150 al-Shabaab fighters in their training camp that was located 120 miles north of the capital Mogadishu. This led to a threat to the US forces that had combined efforts to work with the local force. The US in turn provided air transportation to the Gashaan

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[83] Thomas, M. J. (2013). Exposing and exploiting weaknesses in the merger of Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, *24*(3), 413-435.

[84]Nduwimana, D. (2013). *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre.

forces during the actions raids in 2016. The American strategy of containing and defeating the al-Shabaab has always relied on the AMISOM and the National Army of Somalia. The United States has provided training to the AMISOM contingents and also equipped them to develop into elite Somalia counterterrorism units. Currently AMISOM is inclusive of troops from five African countries. Burundi has (5,400), Uganda has (6,000), Kenya has (3,600), Ethiopia has (4,300), and Djibouti (1,000). In total they sum up to approximately 22, 000 troops that helps Somalia in conducting counter offensive and deterrent measures to do away with al-Shabaab in Somalia. AMISOM has continued to receive enormous support from the American Logistical and Intelligence support. Between 2007 and 2015 alone, the UN mission and the AMISOM forces of Somalia has received nearly one billion to help in countering the al-Shabaab attacks.[85] Counter offensive and deterrent efforts have so far been felt in Somalia since the fight to kick al-Shabaab out began. It was a good strategy that AMISOM applied to counter al-Shabaab.

2.2.4 Facilitating the implementation of the national security and the plan of stabilization

The implementation of a National security architecture in Somalia was anchored on the close working between the federal government, federal member states and the Benadir Regional Administration. In an agreement reached in November 2017, these institutions agreed to facilitate the political decisions and atmosphere to guarantee implementation of the national security architecture

Implementation of the National Security Architecture, The Federal Government of Somalia, the Federal Member States and the Benadir Regional Administration agreed to work closely together to accelerate agreement on the political decisions necessary to ensure full implementation of the

[85] Jones, S. G., Liepman, A. M., & Chandler, N. (2016). *Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Somalia: assessing the campaign against Al Shabaab*. Rand Corporation.

National Security Architecture, improve working relations on constitutional and federal issues and enhance security within the region. Key elements to the implementation of the national security architecture entailed the political agreement on implementation among the three parties, definition of roles and responsibilities of each arm of the security forces, integration of regional forces into the country's security institutions and forces as well as the operationalization of regional security councils in tandem with those of the National Security Council.[86]

Security sector reforms have been a primary focus of the federal governments' efforts to establish a stable and peaceful Somalia as pointed out in the National Security Architecture agreement of April 2017 and the Security Pact at the London Somalia Conference of May 2017. Notably, the progress and the considerable efforts of AMISOM troops and the police contributing countries are acknowledged in the support of peace and security to spur development efforts in Somalia.

To allow Somalia protect its political process, the presence of AMISOM remains critical, alongside strengthening the security institutions, and assuming responsibility for security. The commitment from all partners has been instrumental, working in coordination and coherence through approaches reached at the London Somalia Conference. Notable achievements encompass the implementation plan agreement for a National Security Architecture in Somalia, integration of approximately 3000 Puntland troops into the Somali National Army, as well as the completion of the Operational Readiness Assessments widely agreed upon as an essential component for 'right-sizing' and reforming the SNA and the National Police Force. Participants commended this first

[86] Kasaija, A. P. (2010). The UN-led Djibouti peace process for Somalia 2008–2009: results and problems. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, *28*(3), 261-282.

realistic assessment and looked forward to the assessment of regional and local forces to complete the picture and form the foundation for transition over the coming years.[87]

2.2.5 Consolidating and pursuing political and diplomatic settlement of armed conflict

The world is fast transforming in decades since the end of the cold war and it is so easy to identify the changes that are taking place in the new system. The end of the bipolarity era to the beginning of a new wave of democratization that has increased globalization of information as well as the economic power, increased efforts of international coordination in matters of security, a redefinition of sovereignty that imposes the states with new responsibilities for the entire world community. This changes and transformations have even shaped the organized crimes being experienced in the world today.[88] Conflict transformation approach has been used since the 1960's as one of the sets of techniques pioneered by the NGO's and academicians. In this approach, meetings of the members in conflict was facilitated so that both parties could understand the other's position as well as the views of the world in order to create a conducive atmosphere for resolving conflicts. In the course of the meeting, the participants will now be able to realize and reinterpret their relationships and thereafter live a more peaceful future. This was done back in the days and it is also evident as a strategy of resolving disputes in this era. This was applied by the commissions of South Africa and some other Latin American countries whenever they worked to construct a shared understanding of history. This kind of reconciliation led to an emotional reconciliation,

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[87] Nduwimana, D. (2013). *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre.

[88] Buzan, B. (2008). *People, States & Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era*. Ecpr Press.

reduction of tension, and the creation of an environment that is more cooperative in terms of political climate.[89]

For a long time, AMISOM have been mandated to monitor, interpret, and provide reports on the political and other diplomatic developments throughout the regions of Somalia. They are also to assist in advising the political processes that are taking place in Somalia. Also, they are assigned with the obligation of implementing political decisions in Somalia with the help of the African Union Peace and Security Council in order to aid in capacity building of the nation's public service. The collaboration AMISOM has had with Somalia following the country's current political situation, has realized a general improvement that has been noted in terms of the political situation.[90]

According to William,[91] the federal government has continued putting effort to implement a six-pillar plan which is a comprehensive strategy outlined by the president of Somalia for the sake of stabilization and reconstruction of the country. These plans are supposed to be aligned with the supporting communities which are the AU and the International community at large. The first pillar talks of full stability of the country. This pillar is to see to it that the supremacy of the laws and good governance incorporates both security and rule of the law. The second pillar is economic recovery of the country at large. This pillar is to help boost livelihoods and the economic infrastructure of the country. Third, is the pillar of peace building which entails conducting of social relations through building bridges of trust where there were none or where trust seized. The

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[89] Ramsbotham, O., Miall, H., & Woodhouse, T. (2011). *Contemporary conflict resolution*. Polity.

[90] Menkhaus, K. (2007). The crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in five acts. *African Affairs, 106*(424), 357-390.

[91] Williams, P. D. (2013). AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper, 13.*

fourth pillar is service delivery. This pillar ensures that the health, environment and the education system of the country is dependable by the citizens and the Somalia nation at large. The fifth pillar talks about international relations. This is the pillar that exists to ensure collaborative relations are built. In the end, this ensures the national image of the country is polished. Lastly, the sixth pillar is that which represents the unity and integrity of the country. This pillar stands to ensure that the country prevails together in order to achieve a better future.[92] The Somalia nation has been on a journey towards achieving the peace they have been striving for and most of the achievements have been reached because of the laid down strategies of attaining the peace.

2.3 Conclusion

Somalia has been making substantial contributions towards achieving the peace that the country needs. Key to this contribution towards the improvement of security in Somalia is the subsequent ejection of the al-Shabaab militants from the capital Mogadishu in 2011 which was thereafter followed the ejection that took place in the port of Kismayo in 2012. The liberations in these key areas have been so instrumental to this day since the civil strife that began over 20 years ago. The strategies applied by military in Somalia has made the central government together with its populace slowly rebuild from their shattered lives. The continued working of the AMISOM and the government of Somalia has continued and hold more ground that was previously by al-Shabaab.

[92] Nduwimana, D. (2013). *AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?* International Peace Support Training Centre.

CHAPTER THREE

THE ROLE OF AMISOM IN PEACE AND SECURITY

3.1 Introduction

For six years, AMISOM was deployed by the AU in Somalia after the Ethiopian military campaigns that instilled the TFG in Mogadishu. AMISOM was given the mandate by the AU in 2007 and was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council to initialize its operations. The mission of AMISOM evolved during the six-year period that had the Ethiopian troop withdraw from Mogadishu. AMISOM had to protect some key members of the TFG as well as other strategic locations that were heavily armed by the opposition.[93]

AMISOM remains a typical peace and support operation that has continued to chart its own trajectory both militarily and politically. Their main aim has been contributing to the AU Commissions policy process and also articulate the peace support operation. AMISOM's major roles have been to provide peace support operations in African countries who are members of the AU. To be specific, the major roles in the peace support operations include; conducting military operation enforcement against anti-government actors; Facilitating civil military operations; and providing protection on the transitional government personnel and institution.[94]

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[93] Bryden, M., & Brickhill, J. (2010). Disarming Somalia: lessons in stabilisation from a collapsed state: Analysis. *Conflict, security & development*, *10*(2), 239-262.

[94] Kromah, L. (2010). The role of AMISOM's civilian component. *conflict trends*, *2010*(2), 21-27.

3.2.1 Conduct military operation enforcement against anti-government actors

According to Peter,[95] over the last decade, peace and enforcement missions have been trending particularly in the African regions. This has been ranging from the regions of Afghanistan through to central Africa, from Somalia to the Sahel, Lake Chad to the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo). Many State coalitions and International organizations have been tasked with fighting for peace in most of the countries that are in conflict between either the terrorists, spoilers, or the insurgents. Most of the missions have ended up being difficult especially in trying to help bring stability to areas that experience no functioning government; combating the armed groups that have symmetrized the terror attacks and are deeply rooted in the segments of the local population; how many organizations have come up to partner effectively to defeat the enemies; and how to work out issues when there is a gap between the mandated tasks and the mission's capabilities.[96] Initially, a total of 1,600 Ugandan soldiers were deployed to Mogadishu, Somalia's capital in 2007 March. These were African peace-keepers who played a major role in combating the al-Shaabab one of the lethal insurrectionaries in the world. Along the way, the AMISOM were introduced and were mandated to provide protection to the political VIP's of Somalia, support the electoral processes, facilitate humanitarian assistance, and build the new national security forces.[97]

Since the deployment of the AU to Somalia after the Ethiopian campaign had installed the Transitional Federal government (TFG) in Mogadishu in 2006, the mission of AMISOM has been

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[95] Peter, M. (2015). Between doctrine and practice: The UN peacekeeping dilemma. *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, *21*(3), 351-370.

[96] Williams, P. D. (2009). Into the Mogadishu maelstrom: The African Union mission in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping*, *16*(4), 514-530.

[97] Hansen, S. J. (2013). *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The history and ideology of a Militant Islamist group*. Oxford University Press.

changing and evolving considering the increase in challenges. When the Ethiopian troop withdrew from Mogadishu in 2009, AMISOM had to step in so fast to provide protection to the key members of the TFG and also protect some specific locations in the country from their opponents who were so armed. The locations included the sea ports, airports, the K4 junction linking them, and the presidential palace situated in Villa Somalia. Initially, the AU had envisaged that after six months, the UN peacekeeping operation will take over form AMISOM. The withdrawal of troops from Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia who were making up the AU made AMISOM experience a lot of attacks. His is because these three troops were making up the AU force and were behind the prevention of TFG from being attacked by the al-Shabaab fighters.[98] During the 2009 and 2010 the al-Shabaab and the AMISOM engaged in bloody attack that only resulted into a stalemate and neither of the them won. From these defeats, the al-Shabaab attempted to weaken the Ugandan's by carrying out two suicide bombings in Kampala which did not have a desired effect. Instead of Uganda pulling out, they responded by deploying additional troops to Mogadishu. Faced with a growing enemy, the al-Shabaab launched major attacks against the AMISOM and the TFG but were repelled and sustained heavy losses. The next few months, AMISOM engaged in bloody street fight across Mogadishu and the result was the withdrawal of al-Shabaab fighters from the center of the city as the fighting continued in the next nine months in the suburbs and outskirts.[99] The Kenyan forces also launched a unilateral military intervention in relation to the al-Shabaab attack on the Kenyan territory. The AMISOM and the UN conducted military operations against the opponents as a key role in ensuring peace and security.

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[98] Williams, P. D. (2018). *Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A History and Analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007-2017*. Oxford University Press.

[99] Anderson, D. M., & McKnight, J. (2014). Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa. *African Affairs*, *114*(454), 1-27.

3.2.2 Facilitate civil military operations and humanitarian assistance

According to De Coning,[100] the humanitarian partners of both Central and South Somalia continued facing various challenges due to the state of insecurity; movement of vulnerable populations who were constrained to access humanitarian services and movement. These challenges increased and heightened the risk for humanitarian workers as well as those in need of humanitarian services. With all these challenges, there was need to provide guidance and support for the civil military working group. AMISOM demonstrated an effective role in facilitating humanitarian access through the use of the mission's access as the only way to ensure that assistance reaches the people who are in need. Also, they opened places where humanitarian partners had limited access and undertook efforts to maintain a clear distinction between the role played by the military and the function of the humanitarian actors.

All through till the end of 2016, Somalia has been facing severe drought with approximately 6.7 million people who are in need of humanitarian assistance; 3.2million who cannot meet their daily requirements of food. The famine that took place between 2011-2012 gave some similarities of another famine that was beginning to take place in early 2017from an analysis by the Famine Early Warning Network (FewsNet). The only difference was that a larger percentage of the country's population was a higher risk of experiencing the famine.[101]

In addition, armed conflict is also one of the main drivers of civilian displacement in both the Central and the South Somalia. Many civilian displacements took place because of the strategic

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[100] De Coning, C. (2007). Civil-military coordination practices and approaches within United Nations peace operations. *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, *10*(1).

[101] Bolognesi, M., Vrieling, A., Rembold, F., & Gadain, H. (2015). Rapid mapping and impact estimation of illegal charcoal production in southern Somalia based on WorldView-1 imagery. *Energy for sustainable development*, *25*, 40-49.

realignments AMISOM bilateral forces, militia violence and combat operations. Despite all these challenges, AMISOM worked towards providing an environment that enables the humanitarian actor to deliver life-saving assistance. On the other hand, AMISOM was also ready to put in place resources as their last option to deliver these life-saving humanitarian supplies to people in need of the assistance more urgently.[102]

In humanitarian assistance, AMISOM remains to facilitate. An obligation of AMISOM is to within its capabilities facilitate humanitarian operations including reintegration and repatriation of displaced persons and refugees. However, this perhaps contrasts the fact that AMISOM in itself lacks the capacity, both human and material resources to accomplish a full humanitarian mandate.[103] To accomplish its limited humanitarian mandate, AMISOM has secured the all-important humanitarian corridors including seaport, airport and key streets of Mogadishu hence enabling humanitarian access to affected populations. Mreover, AMISOM has consistently provided security to humanitarian convoys through the capital Mogadishu and environs in need of emergency relief operations.

The Burundian contingents attached to the AMISOM have been involved in the distribution of fresh and clean water to the regions of Modmoday and Baidoa. In close working with the Somali National army, the troops have been able to contain in the eastern regions of Baidoa through foot patrols the Al-Shabaab attacks against local herdsmen, villagers and travellers along the Baidoa-

[102] Civins, B. (2010). Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia 2006-2009. *Yonsei Journal of International Studies*, *2*(2), 121-138.

[103] Murithi, T. (2008). The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. *African Security Studies*, *17*(1), 69-82.

Mogadishu road. Occasionally, the AMISOM troops are involved in offering free medical treatment to residents within their regions of their operation.[104]

The AMISOM Humanitarian Liaison Unit works in liaison with several humanitarian agencies including World Food Programme, UNICEF-Somalia, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities (OCHA) among other UN agencies and NGOs, as well as Somali Ministry of Health and that of Humanitarian Affairs and Resettlement to enhance information sharing to improve service delivery.[105]

Beyond the responsibility of establishing peace, AMISOM field hospitals and medical personnel have more often than not rendered medical services to the civilian population traditionally designed to serve the deployed troops. Given the breadth of challenges experienced in Somalia, AMISOM Medical facilities have turned to be the most of reliable options not only for the general population but also the TFG troops most of whom receive emergency surgical interventions.[106] The full implementation of the Somalia Civil-military Guidelines by AMISOM and the humanitarian actors are plainly seen in the different assistance that AMISOM ensured took place. The success of this is based on the guidelines that were put in place by the AMISOM and humanitarian actors that led to the promotion of civil-military issues to be dealt with according to the standards of the international law and the humanitarian principles.

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[104] Menkhaus, K. (2010). Stabilisation and humanitarian access in a collapsed state: The Somali case. *Disasters*, *34*, S320-S341.

[105] Lotze, W., & Kasumba, Y. (2012). AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia. *conflict trends*, *2012*(2), 17-24.

[106] Williams, P. D. (2013). AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper*, *13*.

3.2.3 Provide protection on the Transitional Government personnel and institutions

Long-lasting peace has eluded Somalia in many years. The downfall of Siyad Barre's regime in 1991 was a blow and thus Somalia had disastrous interventions and strategies of negligence, the entry of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) prospected a whole new start to moderate the terrorizations from the Al-Shabaab and furthermore build a suitable atmosphere in which to consolidate national institutions and encourage dialogue and reconciliation among the protagonists. Nevertheless, the philosophical hindrances that have undermined every previous mission continue – AMISOM functions in an unsolidified political background noticeable by the non-existent stable political agreement amongst the main parties to the conflict. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) is still new and fragile, and disputes within the Somali politics continue to aggravate state-building and stabilization efforts. At the same time, terrorist and insurgent groups including (but not limited to) Al-Shabaab have proved pernicious, resolute, and adaptable in their efforts to undermine any progress toward the FGS's consolidation.[107]

The establishment of AMISOM in 2007 was recommended to substitute the Ethiopian military that had earlier began peace efforts at the invitation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to overthrow the Islamic courts that had occupied and taken the rule over large parts of the country. At the establishment of the TFG in 2004, Somalia had been without a central government rule for about 13 years, the period being characterised by conflict as rival clans clashed for power. Several approaches had been implemented including peace conferences, peace agreements supported by the International community but there was limited success beyond the region of Mogadishu. The

[107] Williams, P. D. (2013). AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper, 13.*

Transitional federal government was the product of a three-year negotiation process led by IGAD, to have an interim five-year mandate over Somalia in preparation for elections in 2009. Despite previous attempts by Ethiopia to undermine the establishment of a government in Somalia, the TFG had their backing and that of the United States which envisioned this as progress in its war against terrorism.

AMISOM was launched as a support vehicle for the TFG which at the moment had promising expectations to create a new system of government in Somalia with key responsibilities of supporting efforts for stabilization of Somalia and creating an enabling environment for the dialogue and reconciliation process. Since the TFG was established from a peace process, it emerged AMISOM had no peace to keep and Islamic courts had been defeated, but for limited time before opposition to government sprung. Essentially, the TFG was not the result of an all-inclusive process for all relevant stakeholders including Somaliland, Puntland or organizations like al-Shabaab. AMISOM efforts to support the federal government were therefore envisioned by key stakeholders as a form of foreign invasion. Consequently, the TFG increasingly proved to be corrupt and weak, failing to achieve significant and timely progress on key transitional objectives.[108]

3.3 Conclusion

AMISOM has played a major role in seeing Somalia at least stabilize the security situation in Somalia's capital Mogadishu. In spite of the challenges they faced from troops withdrawing from

[108] Murithi, T. (2008). The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: The African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia. *African Security Studies*, *17*(1), 69-82.

the mission to inadequacies faced in most of the areas in Somalia, AMISOM's role of providing peace and security has always been the leading in their mandate. The key role played have seen Somalia move a step towards peace and stability and African troops have played a big role in ensuring that the sister country also experiences the same peace that the other countries face. Facilitating humanitarian assistance and civil military operation; conducting military operation against anti-government actors; and providing protection on transitional government personnel and institutions is a major step taken by AMISOM and remains a reflection into almost a peaceful Somalia in the coming years.

CHAPTER FOUR

CHALLENGES FACING AMISOM IN MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN SOMALIA

4.1 Introduction

Since the African Union launched its fourth peacekeeping operation in 2007, it is approximately ten and a half years old. Just this period that AMISOM has been working in Somalia life during these operations has been one of ups and downs. It is just the same case that was experienced in the 1990s when AMISOM operations IN Somalia were authorized by the UN. AMISOM has faced a lot of serious challenges that have hindered the operations of AMISOM from yielding the required fruits. Despite a success in conducting military intervention in South Central of Somalia, AMISOM has been facing a lot of challenges. Some of the challenges are similar to those faced by its precedents including: UNOSOM I and II and UNITAF.

4.2.1 Hostile environment

The introduction of the TFG in Somalia brought about a significant deterioration in the security situation in Somalia instead of bringing peace and stability. This situation caused by the government led to a new phase of warfare. In this context, AMISOM's biggest challenge was taking charge as a peacekeeping body when in real sense there was no peace to keep. Even though the UCI forces were to move to Mogadishu, the attackers realized and they ended up attacking the TFG Soldiers, Ethiopian soldiers, and the AMISOM peacekeepers in Somalia.[109] By 2008, the deadliest militia group was the youth militia al-Shabaab that was approximately having 2000 youths who undertook the attack operations. These youths operated in groups of about 200-300

[109] Kromah, L. (2010). The role of AMISOM's civilian component. *conflict trends*, *2010*(2), 21-27.

militias in each group.[110] This well-armed group attacked the AMISOM peacekeepers in a single attack and killed 11 Burundian peacekeepers, injuring 28 others in 2009. After investigations, it was noted that the insurgent attacks against AMISOM were well coordinated and were becoming more sophisticated and lethal. The ongoing conflict produced an escalating violence because it was mostly the TFG, AMISOM, and the Ethiopian forces that were responding to most of these attacks. This brought a collateral damage among the civilian population as the most people began to flee the city of Mogadishu. Approximately, 1.3 million people fled the city and this generated a feeling of anti-Ethiopian as well as an anti-American feeling.[111]

For the AMISOM, this kind of environment meant two main things. First, the security was to be highly pegged on the Ethiopian peacekeepers who were to do most of the work related to the security of Somalia. Second, AMISOM personnel had to face restriction in terms of their operations. This can be evident when AMISOM has restrictions on helping to protect the president and the prime minister of the TFG as well as to keep open the Airports and Seaports of Mogadishu. This was not an easy task for AMISOM because it meant that they have to security on the 4 Kilometer intersection that linked the presidential palace and the airport. These sites were the potential escape routes and were heavily guarded because the supplies in the country had to be maintained.[112]

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[110] Rollins, J. (2010). *Al Qaeda and affiliates: historical perspective, global presence, and implications for US policy*. DIANE Publishing.

[111] Williams, P. D. (2009). Into the Mogadishu maelstrom: The African Union mission in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping*, *16*(4), 514-530.

[112] Dersso, S. A. (2010). Somalia dilemmas: changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(218), 24.

Unfortunately, the response to the peace-keeping process in this kind of environment sounded impossible ass the peacekeepers themselves became the target of attack. In most cases, the Somalia troops used a lot of force that in turn left many civilians dead and wounded. It is in April 2009, that AMISOM realized this problem and made a change to their tactics. This time round they could only fire at the attackers when the soldiers of Somalia clearly identified that the attackers were their opponents. They also resolved to using weapons that allowed for discriminate fire.[113]

4.2.2 Negative Local Perception of AMISOM

Somalia perception of the AMISOM operations have improved over time and AU has been struggling to win the trust and support of the Somalia elites, populace, and security forces. Negative perceptions on the AMISOM have been on the increase due to lots of local perceptions. Some of the perceptions from the locals is that; AMISOM has been a money-making enterprise to its contributing countries which has reduced the incentive to defeat the al-Shaabab; the locals also claim that AMISOM has become a vehicle for the Somalia neighbours who want to pursue their own selfish agenda. These perceptions have costed AMISOM a significant resentment that is very evident in both the leadership rank and file.[114]

Some of the aging professionals who belonged to the Somalia's Army before 1990 now found out that AMISOM's participation in peacekeeping is a reminder to the Somalia Army of how weak they have grown to be. It is a perception derived from the fact that in AMISOM, it is both Ethiopia and Kenya that play the leadership roles. To them, it sounds like an effective way of keeping the

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[113] Dersso, S. A. (2010). Somalia dilemmas: changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(218), 24.

[114] Williams, P. D. (2018). Strategic Communications for Peace Operations: The African Union's Information War Against al-Shabaab. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development*, *7*(1).

Ethiopian and the Kenyan troops occupied with a goal of keeping Somalia weak as they also manipulate the regional and local administrations to leverage over the Somalia federal government. In the past years, Kenya has been the focus of Somali criticism partly because, the KDF were seen to be conducting operations in Somalia with little knowledge of the local population; also, the troop was also accused of conducting illicit business of sugar and charcoal with the al-Shabaab.[115]

These tensions began growing stronger when the Kenyan authorities began issuing concessions in the oil-producing Indian Ocean maritime boarder that Somalia claims it owns. This contention prompted an international appeal to determine the maritime boundary between Kenya and Somalia.[116]

The SNA and the rank troops are also aware that they are subordinate to AMISOM in terms of influence, stature and power even though they have always fought alongside the forces from AU without communication equipment, medical care, barracks, salaries, armoured vehicles and sophisticated weapons. This was a luxury the troops never experienced as their counterparts the AMISOM experienced all the above luxuries inclusive of good food and protection. This made the Somalia commanders become critical of the external proportions of resources that were being allocated to the AMISOM. This led to a negative perception on the AMISOM by the Somalia troops.

AMISOM has also proved to Somalia its inability to protect the Somalia nation especially when they were unable to protect the parliamentarians and since 2012, more than 4% of parliamentarians

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[115] Robinson, C. (2016). Revisiting the rise and fall of the Somali Armed Forces, 1960–2012. *Defense & Security Analysis*, *32*(3), 237-252.

[116] Albrecht, P., & Haenlein, C. (2016). Fragmented Peacekeeping: The African Union in Somalia. *The RUSI Journal*, *161*(1), 50-61.

have been killed. This has brought an open criticism to AMISOM with questions regarding its performance thus, harbouring doubts of whether its long-term mission of peace keeping will be accomplished. The civil society on the other hand have also voiced their complaints on AMISOM absorbing most of the resources that would rather be used by the locals and also, they handled a lot of non-peacekeeping issues that were not necessary for their mission.[117] The presence of AMISOM has also been criticized by most civilians who were not satisfied with their interactions with the peace keepers. The civilians claimed that the AU mission focused their efforts of protection only on the top government officials and also guarded strategic facilities like the airport and the seaports of Mogadishu. The civilians also noted misconduct among the AMISOM as they killed some civilians, exploited people sexually and also conducted illicit businesses of fuel, food, sugar and charcoal. In other instances, the civilians have also accused AMISOM of their inability to prevent al-Shabaab forces obstructing their town especially in the newly liberated towns. The withdrawal of the AMISOM in the newly liberated towns also posed a lot of risk to the administrators, civilians and the Somalia Security Forces who welcomed the arrival of AU publicly in Somalia.[118]

AMISOM's decision of commandeering some of the public and private properties and converting them into military bases that is the Stadium of Mogadishu and University of Kismayo have also become a public debate. Generally, the Somalia citizens have been critiquing the presence of AMISOM in their country if it was for the promotion of peace or increment of violence.[119]

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[117] Roble, F. (2007). Local and Global Norms: Challenges to "Somaliland's" Unilateral Secession. *Horn of Africa*, *25*, 165-196.

[118] Anzalone, C. (2016). The Resilience of al-Shabaab. *CTC Sentinel*, *9*(4), 13.

[119] Elmi, A. A. (2014). Decentralization options for somalia. *The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies. The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies*.

4.2.3 Funding dynamics

According to Andrews,[120] AMISOM has been unable to sustain itself with the funding from its member states and this has made it be largely dependent on external support. This is the same case with the AU that has been greatly depending on the international donors. The support from the international donors greatly sustains the peace operations that AU undertake and without this kind of support, the architecture of security will not be sustainable.[121] The problem of obtaining ammunition and other military hardware has also been a problem and eliminating the influence of the outsiders will just do more harm to the security operations.[122] The AU is generally dependant on the outsiders more than it can provide within its limits. The funding also experiences delays especially the ones from outside because of the tedious process of clearing the funds and this causes a whole delay in the process of peacekeeping.[123] Besides the tedious process, the management of AMISOM also involves too many actors and this has affected the ability of AMISOM to conduct its missions and operations according to the plans that were initially laid out.

In essence, lack of funds limits the operations that are to be carried out by creating uncertainty on the number of peacekeepers to be deployed, duration of the mission, the intensity of the operations, and the equipment required during the mission. Chances are that, whenever funds are disbursed in time, the operations of the peace missions perform better. The UN has tried to address this critical

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[120] Andrews, K. N., & Holt, V. K. (2007). United Nations-African Union coordination on peace and security in Africa. *Issue Brief*, *3*.

[121] Ferras, P. (2013). Security stakes and challenges in the Horn of Africa. *State and Societal Challenges in the Horn of Africa*, 48.

[122] Dersso, S. A. (2010). The role and place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(209), 24.

[123] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.

issue by establishing a voluntary trust fund to reimburse commissions for equipment to be used in such operations and also match allowances to the UN peacekeepers. The funding process has however been irregular and not adequate and has left some of the reimbursements in arrears. This has generally disrupted the supply of maintenance of essential equipment for Peace Operations in.[124] Currently, the largest AU donors are the UN, USA, and the EU. USA is the largest bilateral donor for humanitarian assistant in Somalia.[125]

4.2.4 Proxy wars

The global powers will always continue to influence the peacekeeping as long as the largest influencer and contributor remains to be the most influential member of the security council USA. Since 2007, the USA have conducted more than half a dozen missile raids on al-Shabaab using their special forces and their aircrafts. The USA has also piloted intelligence surveillance of Somalia using the drones from the installations done in Seychelles, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.[126] Since the USA troop withdrawn from Somalia in 1993, it has been reluctant to get involved in issues of Somalia. Among its fears is al-Shabaab has strong networks in the region and they might go ahead and launch terrorist attacks on the Western World.

The Ethiopian occupation that was being support by the major powers in the world as a way of helping to end the war on terror instead produced violent extremism which they had ironically set to combat.[127] The proxy war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has also paved way for the external

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[124] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.

[125] Swan, J. (2007). US Policy in the Horn of Africa.

[126] Shinn, D. H. (2012). International Efforts to Counter Al-Shabaab. *E-International Relations*, 1-2.

[127] Scarlett, C. CheruFatu et al. *Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century*.

parties to be involved with Somalia in a way they deem best. Some people who support the al-Shabaab insurgents have been on the government side of Eritrea while those who are supporting Somalia have always sided with the Ethiopian government. These two countries are therefore not aimed towards a common goal and instead key keep Somalia engaged in a war that is damaging as the wars take place inside Somalia. It is so unfortunate that the horn of Africa lacks a state of hegemony that is ready to handle political and militaristic responsibilities to ensure peace and security prevails in the region. The absence of hegemony and the hegemonic actors has had great impacts on the conflict in Somalia and this is just a clear explanation why the war has taken long.[128]

4.2.5 Lack of coordination, intelligence and capacity to conduct operations effectively

The problem of coordination between different troops involved in an operations and between the AU headquarters and the major hegemonies have made the support provided by the AMISOM a challenge.[129] For instance, the troop from Kenya have been accused of working independently from the central command that comes from AMISOM.[130] The Ugandan troop has also been accused of lacking proper coordination with other countries that also contribute their troops and also for not willing to share their intelligence.[131] AMISOM lacks critical analysis, adequate intelligence, and strategic focus on its planning this is why the whole process is filled with inadequacies and lots of incoordination. This has made AMISOM find difficulties and complications in confronting with the faceless and the irregular Al-Shabaab that have tactics that

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[128] Sharamo, R., & Mesfin, B. (2011). Regional security in the post-Cold War Horn of Africa. *Institute for Security Studies Monographs*, *2011*(178), 436.

[129] Tadesse, M. (2009). Somalia: Bailing out the TFG. *InterAfrica Group Briefing*, 9-15.

[130] Miyandazi, L. (2012). Kenya's military intervention in Somalia: An intricate process.

[131] Dersso, S. A. (2010). Somalia dilemmas: changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(218), 24.

are asymmetrical and guerrilla like.[132] The terrorists seem more organized the peacekeepers themselves. This is evident from different training sites that they have put in place for their people to specialize in explosives and bomb making, suicide attacks, and kidnappings which are believed to be well managed by the Al-Qaeda trainers.[133] Gathering intelligence is more critical in AMISOM operations rather than fighting the al-Shabaab. This is because, the al-Shabaab have done hiding within the community and they cannot be easily identified and this makes them understand the local dynamics more than the international forces.[134] The al-Shabaab are also advantageous because of the language barrier that the international forces experience as well as their ability to adapt to the ever improving IED technology. The government of Somalia has provided AMISOM with all the needed intelligence services and have gone an extra mile of connecting the population of Somalia with AMISOM. In spite of all these, the forces in Somalia are still dependent on AMISOM because AMISOM has not yet given enough personnel in this operation.[135]

4.2.6 Troops contribution

Troop's contribution as a challenge materialized from the multidimensional nature of the AMISOM mission. Actually, more or less the mission has been so disjointed that it is probably

[132] Oder, S., & Lisa, P. (2011). Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police. a Seminar on 15th April.

[133] Omar, M. (2012). Intervention in the Somali Conflict. *Managing Peace and Security in Africa: Essays on Approaches to Interventions in African Conflicts*.

[134] International Crisis Group. (2008). *Kenya in crisis* (No. 137). International Crisis Group.

[135] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali

precise to reason of it as detached AMISOMs than singling it as one unit, coherent operation. The challenge of in-house harmonization and coherence also has quite a few scopes.

First, the topographical separation of some of the significant mission components deserves mention. AMISOM's strategic planning and political work is based in different regions, the military units and operational command based in Mogadishu while the head of mission and mission analysis are based in Kenya. Notably, the international training structures for the TFG security forces are spread through Kenya, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda complicates the situation further. A widespread mission setup hardly enables effective internal coordination of missions especially for operational and tactical issues

AMISOM internal dynamics including spread of its political leadership for instance its head of mission being based in Nairobi until the end of 2012 left military commandants in the difficult situations of acting as the principal political representative of the mission in Mogadishu. Despite acting commandants actively managing this responsibility, holding this position undermined efforts to establish a peace and reconciliation process, given the absence of a dedicated and appropriately sized military headquarters in Mogadishu until 2012. While this constraint could overcome by greater commitment to regular travel between Nairobi and Mogadishu by the heads of mission, they all failed in this aspect.[136]

A third facet of the challenges constraining AMISOM military diplomacy efforts is the ineffective organization and coordination between its troops, police and the civilian contingents. At the onset of the AMISOM peacekeeping efforts this was however absent as the state of affairs in Mogadishu then only implied it was unsuitable to engage the police and the civilian contingents. The AU only

[136] Williams, P. D. (2013). Fighting for peace in Somalia: AMISOM's seven strategic challenges. *Journal of International Peacekeeping*, *17*(3-4), 222-247.

had limited civilian capacity while the police were only deployed to Mogadishu from mid-2012 following the arrival of police units from Uganda and Nigeria after undertaking training mainly outside Somalia. The arrival of civilian peacekeepers mid-2012 change the face of the peacekeeping process with considerable debate on their tasks as AMISOM progressed beyond Mogadishu getting involved in governance and stabilization issues and how these would complement military diplomacy efforts.[137]

Following the establishment of new military and strategic concepts of operations in 2012, AMISOM has had to contend with challenges in its internal dynamics following the arrival of new troop contributing countries and their redeployment across Somalia. Kenya, Sierra Leone and Djibouti signed a memorandum of understanding with the African Union although this was met by protracted debates over the financial, logistical and deployment aspects of their involvement in mission. Consequently, coordination of activities across the four areas manned by the TCCs and respective contingent commands has become a hurdle. The experience was varied though, for instance, the Djiboutian military scheduled for placement to sector four reached approximately one year late, while the Kenyan forces in sector two were particularly concerned with operational security and thus never updating progress to the AMISOM force headquarters.[138] This was particularly factual in the course of the assault on Kismayo in September 2012.

[137] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.

[138] Williams, P. D. (2013). AMISOM in transition: The future of the African Union Mission in Somalia. *Rift Valley Institute Briefing Paper*, *13*.

4.2.7 AMISOM Mandate

According to Williams,[139] AMISOM gave people a very complex mandate that made its mission very impossible to be achieved within a short period of time. The provided mandate has also been too ambitious to be implemented and at the same time work in the hostile environment with a small number of troops. This incompetent mandate made AMISOM an easy target for insurgents and this led to the numerous attacks they faced.[140]

AMISOM deployed a peacekeeping force in the middle of the war zone and this made al-Shabaab believe that AMISOM was not neutral in this war but instead was siding with the TFG of Somalia. In fact, the troop from Uganda were immediately shoot at immediately they arrived in Mogadishu International Airport.[141] This incident pulled the peacekeeping mission into a conflict because its forces already suffered attacks from the al-Shabaab. AMISOM's main problem was mention TGF in their mandate and this appeared to be lacking impartiality and neutrality in its peace keeping principles.[142]

Also, the AMISOM's mandate lacked a provision that they will protect their civilians but instead clearly stated that they would offer protection to the TGF and the TFI's. In other peace operations the bodies concerned with peacekeeping included the issue of protection of human rights in their

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[139] Williams, P. D. (2011). Pathways to peace in the Horn of Africa: what role for the United States?

[140] Oder, S., & Lisa, P. (2011). Seeking Peace in Somalia: A Review of the Impact of AMISOM Police. a Seminar on 15th April.

[141] Omar, M. (2012). Intervention in the Somali Conflict. *Managing Peace and Security in Africa: Essays on Approaches to Interventions in African Conflicts*.

[142] Dersso, S. A. (2010). Somalia dilemmas: changing security dynamics, but limited policy choices. *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, *2010*(218), 24.

mandate and many operations excluded the protection of the civilians in their mandate as one of the core mandates. Most of the military interveners tend to offer priority to their own security and have the civilian security come second. This can be reversed and a crucial role be taken in ensuring the general population is protected and is indicated within the mandate.[143]

The force that was employed by the TFG, AMISOM and the Ethiopian forces in a collective manner made some observers conclude that both the peacekeepers and the enemies were committing crimes against humanity. This was witnessed in Somalia and abuses of civilians undermined the legitimacy of the peace operations in the nation.[144]

When AMISOM was established, the only lack it had was a clear set of mandates that ensured the protection of civilians. This was mainly attributed to the fact that there was an implicit understanding that the peacekeeping mission was to be taken over by a better and more capable peacekeeping force, the UN.[145] It took AMISOM some time to realize the depth destruction its operations had caused on civilian lives as well as acknowledging the responsibility they had on the lost civilian lives because of their use of rocket fire and mortar artillery. This made the AMISOM to change its military rules of engagement and focus on accommodating the civilian casualties.[146]

The AU began shifting focus and attention to the civilians late in 2010. Therefore, a significant number of casualties dropped from because the AU incorporated the protection of the civilians in

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[143] Ray, M., & Katarina, M. (2008). Peace Operations and Human Rights.

[144] Bellamy, A. J. (2010). *Global politics and the responsibility to protect: from words to deeds*. Routledge.

[145] Lotze, W., & Kasumba, Y. (2012). AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia. *conflict trends*, *2012*(2), 17-24.

[146] De Coning, C., & Freear, M. (2013). Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for peace operations in Mali.

its operations. In spite of this, some significant gaps could still be noted and this required a timely attention by the AU for its operations to be termed credible to Somalis. This was a challenge that that AMISOM faced and at the same time, they had to fight back the insurgents. In 2012, AMISOM troops increased but AMISOM still remained understaffed and under-funded. The implementation of protection of civilian mandate required more resources that seemed so hard to be allocated.[147]

4.3 Conclusion

AMISOM was an impractical mission that involved grave political champions. The anticipated results were some riskily under-resourced operations that placed numerous peacekeepers in destruction's way for justly and political uncertain reasons. The success of AMISOM is dependent on a political support from both the international and the regional community. As most of the western powers gradually withdraw from the Somali politics, AU will still remain the body that assumes leadership in attempting to find solutions for the African problems. The fact that cannot be ignored is that there is a high risk that the international peacekeepers will be withdrawn from Somali and the cost of operations will increase. Only if more support is provided to AMISOM, the attacks are more likely to occur again and again. This will either make AMISOM to remain resilient in the hostile environment or withdraw from the operations.

[147] Lotze, W., & Kasumba, Y. (2012). AMISOM and the Protection of Civilians in Somalia. *conflict trends*, *2012*(2), 17-24.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA ANALYSIS AND PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter entails the presentation of findings to understand the role of military diplomacy in restoring peace and security in the horn of Africa. Specifically, this presents findings on the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy, how AMISOM military diplomacy efforts enhance regional peace and security and the challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy. Data was collected through questionnaires and interviews of key informants from relevant government ministries and regional organizations.

5.2 Demographic characteristics

In this study, 100 respondents were interviewed, and the demographic characteristics are presented in table 1 below. Most of the respondents interviewed were males (69%), given the highly skewed recruitment patterns especially for military operations. Moreover, more than half of the respondents (56%) were less than 35 years of age signifying younger composition. All the respondents interviewed had at least secondary level of education, with a significant proportion (75%) having at least a tertial or university level qualification.

Table 1: Respondent demographic characteristics

Characteristic		Percent
Gender	Male	69 (69%)
	Female	31 (31%)
Age category	< 26-30 years	(21%)
	31-35 years	(35%)
	36-40 years	(15%)
	41-45 years	(17%)
	Above 46 years	(12%)
Highest level of education	Primary level	(0%)
	Secondary level	(34%)
	Tertiary level	(37%)
	University level	(29%)

5.3 Strategies applied in Military diplomacy in Somalia

As presented in figure 4 below, most of the respondents agree there are military diplomacy strategies applied by AMISOM for the restoration of peace in Somalia.



Figure 1: Utilization of military diplomacy strategies by AMISOM

However, only about two-thirds of the respondents agree that military diplomacy strategies contribute to peace experienced in Somalia. Further, there are significant differences with only a third of the respondents (33%) indicating that the strategies have little impact, 22% indicate they have moderate impact and slightly less than half of the respondents (45%) pointed out that these strategies are of great impact.

On understanding the activities undertaken by military diplomats, most of the respondents agree fostering ties with other countries and the discerning the national security threats were important roles of military diplomats alongside conduct of trainings of concerned personnel to respond to certain emergency situations as presented in figure 2 below. Study findings reveal differing levels

of agreement with fewer respondents agreeing to the need for equipping militaries with equipment and conducting sales and purchases of weaponry and other military technologies.

Figure 2: Activities undertaken by military diplomats

Moreover, the study sought to establish the strategies applied in military diplomacy, findings that are presented in figure 4 below.



Figure 3: Strategies employed by AMISOM in military diplomacy

Study findings presented above reveal that training of military to respond to emergency situations was the most common strategy employed by AMISOM in military diplomacy, followed by the to fostering of ties among countries, defence consultations and the establishment of spheres of influence. Other important strategies entailed engagement in bilateral and multilateral security exercises among countries, strategic dialogues, professional military education exchanges while the least commonly employed approach was arms transfer and regional activities.

5.4 Role of AMISOM in enhancing regional peace and security through military diplomacy

The study sought to understand in what ways military diplomacy strategies by AMISOM enhance regional peace and security within the horn of Africa region.



Figure 4: Extent of AMISOM involvement in enhancing military diplomacy

The findings presented in figure 5 above reveal that most respondents agree military diplomacy efforts by AMISOM play an important role in regional peace and security, with only less than a third of respondents indicating otherwise. Despite the recognition of this important role play in enhancing regional peace and security, only slightly less than half agree they are effective on this role, with more than half indicating AMISOM is little to moderately effective in enhancing regional peace and security. This probably highlights the fact that access regional peace and security is not necessarily a lone function of peace and the military diplomacy efforts by AMISOM on the horn of African country, but rather defined by a multiplicity of factors, others may be country specific. This further underscore the fact that regional peace and security is multifaceted, requiring multi-stakeholder involvement but largely anchored on peace and stability within the region.

Findings presented below indicate the involvement of key stakeholders in decision was the most widely implemented approach towards regional peace and security, followed by the need for effective policies to combat transnational terrorism, a primary contributor to the situation witnessed in Somalia and majority of the horn of Africa states. AMISOM engagement with the sub-regional organizations like IGAD is considered instrumental as established in this study. Findings from a key respondent equally highlight this when he pointed out: "*There has been increased realization of the importance of regional organizations by the UN, and for the Somalia case, IGAD was the sub-regional institution primarily involved, driving the course of peace through AU and then through to UN……Thus the UN has importantly considered it better to work with the countries and institutions close to the problem, that has since the wider involvement of troops from countries within the horn of Africa region.* "

Increased need for civilian component in AMISOM, beefing up of regional security and countering the piracy off the Somali coastline have also been employed by AMISOM at varying degree to further the course of stability within the region as presented in figure 6 below.



Figure 5: Roles played by AMISOM to enhance regional peace and security

5.5 Challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy

The study further sought to establish challenges facing AMISOM in its military diplomacy efforts in Somalia. Findings are presented in the figure 7 below.



Figure 6: Challenges facing AMISOM military diplomacy efforts

Study findings reveal the lack of an AMISOM exit strategy as the biggest constraint in their military diplomacy efforts in Somalia. Notably, the competing interests among the TCCs that comprise AMISOM and organizational internal dynamics limit its functionality and effectiveness. However, with the increased commitment of more African states to the course of peace in Somalia, "*there has been a renewed sense of optimism in AMISOM military diplomacy efforts to salvage Somalia given the pan-African outlook that greatly transformed the overall efficiency of the peacekeeping mission*." As established in the findings, AMISOM continues to suffer an insufficiency of troops although at present things are considerably better as pointed out by a key informant who underscored: "*only few countries considering Somalia an active warzone agreed to committing their forces to AMISOM. In fact initially it was only Uganda and Burundi, but the*

KDF came in while other states like Nigeria declined initially to commit their troops. Even with the commitment of Djibouti and Sierra Leone, there's much more need to expand troop levels to attain full control of Somalia."

The findings in figure 7 above indicate the lack of a multilateral approach in addressing security challenges as third most commonly cited challenge facing the institutions military diplomacy efforts. Insufficiency of troops, poor coordination among external partners, limited civilian component and the lack of local strategic support suffice as other key challenges inhibiting the success of military diplomacy efforts. Especially at the beginning of the mission, the poor coordination among external partners proved a great hitch, a key informant respondent said: "*initially the arguments between the UN and the AU on whether military diplomacy was an appropriate approach undermined efforts*". This is equally captured by a key informant who mentioned: "*earlier on there was widespread international pessimism across most states over the role AMISOM would play in Somalia, in Africa and even beyond. Many felt that given the earlier failures of the UN intervention, AMISOM may simply never succeed and although this has declined overtime, partly is still existent."*

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction

This final chapter embodies the presentation of the summary of study findings, conclusions and recommendations as presented in subsequent sections. It analyses the role of AMISOM military diplomacy efforts in restoring peace and security in the horn of Africa, summarizing the findings on the military diplomacy strategies, role of military diplomacy efforts in promoting regional stability and the key challenges faced by AMISOM in military diplomacy. Finally, the chapter highlights the suggestions for further research based on gaps.

6.2 Summary of Findings

6.2.1 Strategies applied in Military diplomacy by AMISOM

Based on the first objective of the study that was to investigate the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, this study established that the Somali conflict presents a complex situation to AMISOM military diplomacy efforts given the conflict dynamics. AMISOM has employed different military diplomacy strategies aimed at restoring peace and stability in the horn of Africa mainly training of military to respond to emergency situations, defense consultations and fostering of ties among countries hence contribute to the military diplomacy efforts in Somalia. While the study findings establish the implementation of strategies, these strategies do not have, as may be expected, greater impact on the peace and stability in Somalia, probably implying the need to revisit current approaches to military diplomacy.

6.2.2 Role of AMISOM in regional peace and security

Relative to the second study objective, assessing the role of AMISOM in peace and security through military diplomacy efforts in the Horn of Africa, it is established AMISOM plays a considerable role in enhancing regional peace and security through military diplomacy efforts in the horn of Africa. It suffices from the study that the aim of conducting military diplomacy relates to the furthering and establishing peace and security although even for the countries comprising AMISOM that country's national interests are safeguarded, a prerequisite for economic growth. The threat posed by transnational terrorism by Al-Shabaab to the region relative to the economic challenges and provocations have often sent jitters to the states within the region. Before the AMISOM intervention and the involvement of the KDF, the regions' standing was at the risk of being compromised.

6.2.3 Challenges facing AMISOM military diplomacy efforts

On exploring the key challenges facing AMISOM in military diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, it suffices that, even with often-promising results from AMISOM military diplomacy efforts in Somalia, competing interests among troop contributing countries contribute to its inefficiency. AMISOM's situation is further worsened by the fact it lacks a well-articulated exit strategy to its Somalia operations thus limiting to the realization of its goals.

6.3 Conclusion

6.3.1 Strategies applied in Military diplomacy by AMISOM

This study suffices to demonstrate that AMISOM involvement in Somalia as an act of military diplomacy occasioned by the need to foster peace and regional stability on the horn of Africa region. The study demonstrated AMISOM employs different military diplomacy strategies

although at different capacities. From the foregoing, the study points to the need for restructuring of AMISOM's peace and security architecture to bring out focus and responsiveness to the dynamic nature of the conflict and the enemy.

6.3.2 Role of AMISOM in regional peace and security

The study demonstrates that turmoil in Somalia has been a great course of instability experienced throughout the region especially in terms of transnational terrorism and has hampered regional peace and security. Nonetheless, military diplomacy at the point of implementation by peace and security organizations alone achieve relatively little, and should broadly involve collaborations and different key actors including external partners.

6.3.3 Challenges facing AMISOM military diplomacy efforts

While competing interests may have clouded the scene at regional level, partly alluded to lack of a common approach to deal with the Somalia issue among the various countries, military diplomatic engagements by AMISOM are the most agreeable way to address regional peace and security. The study highlights the greater need for revised strategies in military diplomacy efforts and novel approaches to address competing interests among troop contributing countries that comprise AMISOM.

6.4 Recommendations

6.4.1 Strategies applied in Military diplomacy by AMISOM

There is need for further exploration into military diplomacy in Africa, especially given the dearth in empirical literature that is mainly from the West. Following this exploration of the role of military diplomacy in restoring peace and security in the horn of Africa, this study points to research gaps on the influence of civilian component in military diplomacy efforts on peace and

security. Further there is need to understand the psychological effects in AMISOM troops participating in military diplomacy efforts in Somalia.

6.4.2 Role of AMISOM in regional peace and security

On AMISOM military diplomacy efforts and the role in enhancing regional peace and security, this study recommends the need for engagement with both regional partners, peace and security being a multifaceted and dynamic issue, as well as local government and clan involvement especially for the management of say the airport and port. Moreover, peace and security need be considerable drivers of economic and political integration hence the need for the inclusion of issues security into the agenda of regional economic operations. Based on objective three which was to establish the challenges facing AMISOM in its military diplomacy efforts in Somalia, the study recommends the need for definite goals and objectives that informs an exit strategy from its military diplomacy efforts in the country. As in any course of restoring peace and security, there is need for a strong and united conduct of the operation for a viable peace process hence there's need to enhance coordination among the troop contributing countries and eliminate competing interests among different troops that limit its effectiveness.

6.4.3 Challenges facing AMISOM military diplomacy efforts

Arguably, the most important dimension of its success is hinged on the strategic unity and partnership of the different troops. At present however, the inconsistency in unity and strategic alliance among these countries continue to challenge the seamless command and probably influence the implementation of different military diplomacy strategies based on competing interests. Further, while assets remain a critical component of military diplomacy, the success of such multidimensional peace operations is equally anchored on a civilian component and the need

for civilian capabilities. The realization of effective peacemaking and peacekeeping calls for efficient management structures at the field and in Addis for strategic and support of mission teams. AMISOM currently experiences an insufficient institutional capacity and human resources required to effectively handle complex peace operations and peacemaking initiatives. Recent assessment reveals the institution bureaucratic processes are still weak.

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APPENDIX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

By means of a **tick** kindly indicate an option that best describes:

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. **Your gender: -**
   a) Male ☐
   b) Female ☐
2. **Your age: -**
   Below 26-30 yrs. ☐
   Between 31-35 yrs. ☐
   Between 36-40yrs ☐
   Between 41-45yrs ☐
   Above 46yrs ☐
3. **Your highest level of education: -**
   Primary Level ☐
   Secondary Level ☐
   Tertiary / Collage Level ☐
   University Level ☐

SECTION B: STRATEGIES APPLIED BY AMISOM IN MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN SOMALIA

4. Are there strategies used by AMISOM in military diplomacy in Somalia?
   a) Yes ☐
   b) No ☐
5. If yes, do these strategies contribute to the peace experienced in Somalia?
   a) Yes ☐
   b) No ☐
6. If yes, in your own opinion, how do you rate the impact of the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy in Somalia? (Circle the answer)
   a) Little impact

b) Moderate impact

c) Great impact

d) Very great impact

7. On a scale of 1 to 5 to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following activities that military diplomats undertake in cases of armed conflicts.

KEY: 1 = Strongly Agree; 2 = Agree; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Disagree; 5 = Strongly Disagree

STATEMENT	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
a) Conduct trainings to the concerned personnel who will offer response to emergency situations.					
b) Foster ties with other countries.					
c) Conduct sales and purchases of weaponry and other military technologies.					
d) Equip the militaries with equipment and a way of working.					
e) Discern the national security of the country as well as the threats that emanate during the relationship with other states.					

8. What are some of the strategies applied by AMISOM in military diplomacy in Somalia?

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SECTION C: THE ROLE OF AMISOM IN ENHANCING REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGH MILITARY DIPLOMACY EFFORTS IN SOMALIA

9. In your own opinion, do AMISOM play a role in enhancing regional peace and security through military diplomacy efforts in Somalia?

a) Yes ☐

b) No ☐

c) I don't know ☐

10. If yes, how effective is the role of AMISOM in enhancing regional peace and security through military diplomacy in Somalia? (Circle the answer)

a) Less effective
b) Moderately effective
c) Very effective

11. What roles do AMISOM play in terms of enhancing regional peace and security through military diplomacy in Somalia?

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SECTION D: CHALLENGES FACING AMISOM IN MILITARY DIPLOMACY

12. What are some of the challenges AMISOM face in military diplomacy in Somalia?

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APPENDIX II: INTERVIEW SHEDULE

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

By means of a **tick** kindly indicate an option that best describes:

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. **Your gender: -**
   c) Male ☐
   d) Female ☐
2. **Your age: -**
   Below 26-30 yrs. ☐
   Between 31-35 yrs. ☐
   Between 36-40yrs ☐
   Between 41-45yrs ☐
   Above 46yrs ☐
3. **Your highest level of education: -**
   Primary Level ☐
   Secondary Level ☐
   Tertiary / Collage Level ☐
   University Level ☐

SECTION B: STRATEGIES APPLIED BY AMISOM IN MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN SOMALIA

4. What strategies has AMISOM employed in deploying military in Somalia?

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5. How effective are these strategies employed by AMISOM in contributing to the peacekeeping process and security in Somalia?

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6. What measures has AMISOM taken to mitigate the threats to the security in Somalia?

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SECTION C: THE ROLE OF AMISOM IN ENHANCING REGIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY THROUGH MILITARY DIPLOMACY EFFORTS IN SOMALIA

7. What has been the contribution of AMISOM to peace and security in Somalia?

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8. What are some of the regional economic growth experienced in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM?

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9. Do you think AMISOM should continue with their peacekeeping mission in Somalia? Give reasons for your response.

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SECTION D: CHALLENGES FACING AMISOM IN MILITARY DIPLOMACY

10. Do you consider AMISOM successful in its peacekeeping mission in Somalia? Give reasons for your response.

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11. What factors pose threat to the establishment of peace in Somalia?

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12. What challenges has AMISOM faced in its peacekeeping process in Somalia?

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ROLE OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN PROMOTING PEACE AND SECURITY

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