THE DYNAMICS OF INTERMITTENT ESCALATION OF CONFLICT AMONG
NILOTIC PASTORALISTS OF NORTHERN KENYA, 1990 - 2017

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Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi

2019
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own original work and has not been submitted to any other institution for the award of a diploma or degree.

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Jonathan Lodompu

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Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration
DEDICATION

I dedicate this thesis to my beloved wife, Alice Lodompui, and my sons and daughters.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The preparation of this thesis would not have been possible without the assistance I received from several institutions and individuals at the University of Nairobi. I received pieces of advice and encouragement from my supervisors: Dr. Joshua M. Kivuva and Dr. Fred Jonyo, who I undoubtedly owe a heartfelt gratitude for their patience as they read through several manuscript versions of the Thesis. I further extend my appreciation other individuals who availed their private research papers and collections and who read parts or the entire thesis and made useful contributions included Steve Obaga and M. Gloria. To them am also most grateful.

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My family stood with me during my long hours of study and sometimes I could reach home late and creating some inconvenience for them. They however prayed and encouraged me to continue with my thesis despite various challenges I went through.

The Vision 2030 secretariat offered me a job and this became my financial base without which I could not have undertaken the research that facilitated the writing of this thesis. I therefore would thank them most sincerely the Vision 2030 secretariat. I would also wish to thank the other institution that gave me great assistance either by availing their senior staff for interviews or discussions with me or by letting me use their valuable records and documents, They are not limited to : University of Nairobi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ministry of Interior and National Coordination, the government officials from Samburu, Turkana and Baringo county Governments.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASALs</td>
<td>Arid and Semi-Arid Lands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>District Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENFA</td>
<td>Eritrean Forces Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td>Focus Group Discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEMA</td>
<td>Gikuyu, Embu, Meru and Akamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSU</td>
<td>General Service Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOA</td>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Courts Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIBRC</td>
<td>Interim Independent Boundary Review Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAMATUSA</td>
<td>Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHRC</td>
<td>Kenya Human Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KI</td>
<td>Key Informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNBS</td>
<td>Kenya National Bureau of Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPR</td>
<td>Kenya Police Reservist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWS</td>
<td>Kenya Worldlife Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPSSET</td>
<td>Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Corridor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFD</td>
<td>Northern Frontier District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>County Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPPP</td>
<td>Northern Province Peoples Progressive Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCPD</td>
<td>Officer Commanding Police Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLF</td>
<td>Oromo Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONLF</td>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PISP</td>
<td>Pastoralist Integrated Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Protracted Social Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Research Assistants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>Small Arms and Light Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDM</td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Somali National Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNDU</td>
<td>Somali National Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNF</td>
<td>Somali National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Somali Peoples Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Supreme Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDF</td>
<td>Somali Salvation Democratic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNM</td>
<td>Somali Salvation National Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federation Government of Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TJRC</td>
<td>Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNLA</td>
<td>Uganda National Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Developement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>United States Institute for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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ABSTRACT

In the study, conflict is a serious protracted disagreement among the Turkana, Pokot and the Samburu communities brought about by cattle raids, historical difference and the existence of incongruent interests and is characterized by intermittent violent confrontations. The three Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya have had a long history of conflict facilitated by the young men called Morans. The long-standing conflict between these pastoralist communities have been characterized by cattle rustling, destruction of property, displacement and sporadic killings. Various factors combined to promote a vicious circle of recurring escalation of conflict among the Nilotic pastoralist living in Northern Kenya. Specifically, the study sought to explain the internal and external triggers that account for the periodic escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya, between 1990 and 2017. Conflict escalation is observed when there is increased frequency of attacks, high fatality rates, widespread destruction of properties and indiscrimination killings of women, elderly and children. The study was based on Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) Theory which was significant to the study as it uncovers how groups are denied fulfillment of their fundamental needs based on the common personality. The hardship is mind boggling from variables, for example, the state and different linkages including frontier inheritances, multi-shared nature and recorded local settings. The study used a descriptive research design because of its capacity to fuse both quantitative and qualitative data in the study. The fundamental concern in descriptive research was to highlight the conditions, practices, structures, differences or relationships evident in the study. Consequently it enabled the study to take a multifaceted approach towards data collection to capture and give a detailed description of the factors contributing to the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. The population of the study was persons aged 18 years and above which was estimated at 164,825 people. The study however sampled 399 respondents from the three Nilotic Pastoralist Communities. The study conducted expert interviews from each of the identified counties in the region. These personalities included: security experts, elected leaders, Morans, county officials local traditional elders, representatives of women groups and CBOs (specifically Oxfam, World Vision and the Peace Caravan). The study used both primary and secondary data collection methods through surveys and interviews. Surveys helped to capture a large percentage of
the targeted group while interviews helped capture the points of view of specific groups in various communities. Collected data was analyzed by use of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Qualitative data analysis began with note writing and used content analysis of all qualitative secondary sources with a focus on the issues most salient to the study questions. From the findings, the culture through elders, had suitable ways of precipitating cattle raiding and limiting the number of young men ready to engage in these raids. The study further revealed how taming of the youths in age sets developed them into Morans; a group of budding youth who correctly and adequately guided on their current and future roles; and keep vigil against cattle raiders and wild animals preying on their cattle. Consequently, the study revealed that pastoralists must initiate a number of coping mechanisms in regard to conflicts such as raiding. On the other hand, political uncertainty in the Horn of Africa region led to the militarization of citizen population through a number of mechanisms. The study established that militarization of civilians in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Eritrea due to their rivalry led to the attainment of small arms and light weapons amongst the Turkana, Samburu and the Pokot. The study further established that loss of life and property made the pastoralists to hope for help from former President Moi after assumption of power in 1978; regarding monetary and political allotment from the new government. These elevated requirements were never acknowledged to a substantial degree, in any case. In the outcome, new types of banditry and cattle raiding increased in Northern Kenya. The nature of Africa’s borders and the relative ease of concealing small arms made it difficult to control the movement of weapons, which have been found to destabilize regions, and facilitate violent crime. As such, poor population has been mostly undermined, hence leading to ineffective sustainable development in Northern Kenya. Notably, internal conflict triggers are the main cause of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist in Northern Kenya. These internal conflict triggers are hot buttons that have their origin within the three Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Samburu, Pokot and Turkana. The study has shown that these internal conflict triggers, are advent of multi-partism in Kenya in the early 1990s, political entrepreneurs and Kenya police reservist. External conflict triggers are events, processes, individuals and actions that originates from outside the three communities. These triggers are instability in the Hon of Africa – regimes, economic entrepreneurs and modern technology. Moranism has been the epi-
center of these conflicts as both internal and external triggers manifest around these young men. Ethnic conflicts in Northern Kenya have become more frequent in the recent past, going beyond the five-year electoral cycle and outside the pastoral communities. The study shows that the proliferation of small arms has spread to the urban centers. These guns have also found way into the hands of youth from non-pastoral community who are using them for robberies and other criminal activities in the urban centers. These young men have terrorized residents in urban centers deteriorating the well being of the urban dwellers. In the recent past, urban dwellers are spending more resources and time in trying to curb or manage complex security situation rather than investing them in resourceful initiatives. Therefore, the study recommends that all ethnic groups in Kenya should co-exist peacefully regardless of the differences in the cultural believes and ways of livelihood. The government through the judiciary to prosecute and bring to justice politicians, tribal leaders or other persons found to be inciting different ethnic community members over others for leadership and political gains. Scholars who may be interested in pursuing research in conflict among pastoralists are encouraged to focus on internal and external triggers of conflict while paying more attention to the role of Moranism in conflict perpetuation among the pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya. Similarly, diversification of livelihood for Morans is highly recommended to avoid idleness and culture of cattle raiding which contributes immensely towards the precipitation of the menace discussed under this study.
Map 1: Map of Northern Kenya
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background Information
Pastoralism is an economic activity and land use system with its own distinct characteristics. It is a way of life for people who derive most of their income or sustenance from keeping domestic livestock reared in conditions where most of the feed is natural rather than cultivated or closely managed (Bainomugisha, Okello, and Ngoya, 2007). In pastoral systems livestock production is the mainstay of people’s livelihood. Pastoralism arises out of, and is the response to the harsh environmental conditions. Due to the harsh climatic conditions, scarcity of water and inadequate pasture, pastoralists tend to be nomadic in search of pasture and water which predisposes them to endless conflicts. Animal raids to fulfill cultural rites as payment of dowry as well as other rites of passage have complicated relations among pastoralists’ communities. The Horn of Africa has some of the harshest climatic conditions in the continent, with Suguta valley being amongst the worst hit areas (Jeong, 2010).

The Nilotic pastoralist in the Horn of Africa (HOA) have therefore been characterized by endemic conflict caused by historical rivalry, deep-seated cultural values of hero worship, livestock raiding, competition over pastureland and watering places, cattle rustling and land boundaries. So endemic is conflict among them that all pastoral communities have a warrior groups, commonly known as Morans to protect the communities and its values. The Karamojong fight against Turkana and Pokot of Kenya (Bainomugisha, Okello, and Ngoya, 2007). In Kenya, conflict among the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot are an epitome of pastoral conflict which has lasted since time immemorial.

Dynamic and interactive processes in individual and collective behavior explain whether hostile attitudes and behavior escalate or not. Escalation may be vertical or horizontal, while hostile behavior becomes more intense when the same intensity spreads over a larger area. Escalation can be caused by the parties themselves or by actions that third parties take. Spiraling conflicts are fueled by a set of social-psychological phenomena within each
party’s collective mind and behavior. People get more committed to a struggle as they become more involved. A sense of urgency takes over; time pressure to make quick decisions with narrow options is more little than existing courses of action. The psychological investment that conflict requires shapes each side’s perceptions of the other: one’s own cause is seen as just, the other side’s as evil (Jeong, 2010).

A conflict has generally been defined as a situation in which two or more parties strive to acquire the same scarce resources at the same time. According to Melander (2009), conflict is an existing state of disagreement or hostility between two or more people. By this, it means that when two or more parties do not have an accord and are as such on two different parallels on the same issue, conflict is bound to arise. It thus suggests the pursuit of incompatible goals. Put differently, conflict means collision course; it also refers to opposition to existing view, stand, or position. In politics, conflict is more explicitly defined. Conflict is said to exist when two or more groups engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate the rivals (Bevan, 2008).

In this study conflict is defined as a clash between individuals arising out of a difference in thought process, attitudes, understanding, interests, requirements and even sometimes perceptions. Conflict, refers either to a violent dispute or to an incompatibility of positions (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996). Traditionally, conflict was defined as competition for resources or other interests, value differences or dissatisfaction with basic needs (Jeong, 2010). In this study, conflict means, a serious protracted disagreement between different Nilotic Pastoralist communities brought about by the existence of incongruent interests which is characterized by intermittent violent confrontations.

The Suguta Valley constitutes the most arid environment in Kenya (Ojany and Ogenoo, 2011) and is probably the most arid locality on Earth in the immediate vicinity of the Equator. Limited available data document a rainfall amount of<300 mm per year, which is distributed following a unimodal cycle, with a peak between March and May, but both the periodicity and the quantity of rainfall are highly variable (East African Meteorological Department, 2009). The Suguta River, draining a catchment area of 13,000 km², is the only
perennial stream in this environment. It is 175 km long and originates on Paka volcano to the south, it terminates in the swamps south of the Barrier volcanoes to the north. This section of the rift valley, the Suguta, is 80 km long and 20 km wide, and consists of a wide flood plain and swamp area rising at elevations between 340 m in the south and 275 m in the north. The northernmost part of this sediment-filled depression is occupied by the temporary shallow Lake-Logipi. It is an alkaline, 0.5–5 m deep lake primarily fed by the Suguta River, ephemeral streams from the flanks during the rainy season, and possible seepage from Lake Turkana, as well as hot springs along the volcano-tectonic axis (Castanier et al., 1993). Due to climatic variability on interannual time scales, Lake Logipi may grow considerably in extent, such as during the wet years of 1975 and 2007, while it may virtually disappear during protracted drought, such as during the extremely dry years of 1987 and 2006 (Casanova et al., 1988).

The kinship system where elders are held in high esteem is still quite strong amongst the Pastoralist groups where organization and internal disputes are addressed by the respected elders of each community. Age-sets become adults once the younger age-set (separated by approximately 12 years) has been circumcised into the Moran age-set, which signals the elder group to begin marrying and to become trained in the ‘ways of the elder.’ The position of the elder is highly structured by the age-set system, and members of the elder group are expected to act with authority, thoughtfulness, and moderation and to not actively engage in conflict with other ethnic groups (Sommer and Vossen, 1993). Age set system and elders regulated conflict among pastoralist groups.

Although Nilotic pastoral conflicts are not a new phenomenon, in the last two or so decades, the scale and intensity have escalated (Krätli and Swift, 1999). The frequency and indiscriminate killings have all increased. For example, in August 25, 1996 15 people were killed from an attack by cattle-rustlers in Baragoi division, Samburu. Six of the victims were children. Raiders, numbering 400, escaped with 5000 head of cattle. In March 1998, at least 100 people were killed and scores wounded when armed cattle rustlers attack manyattas in Turkana District. No raider was captured or cattle recovered up to date. There have been many studies and theories as to why conflict is escalating among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya. Scholars like Eaton (2010) points to resource scarcity as an explainer for the escalation, while Eriksen, (1999) and Posen, (1993) point to
environmental degradation as an explainer to the escalation. More recently other explanations have dominated the escalation of conflict debate: the proliferation of small arms (Mktu, 2006; Hendrickson, Mearns, and Armon, 1996). Proponents for the proliferation of arms point out at the following factors the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the cold war, the disintegration and the political upheavals of the Horn of Africa states and governments, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, and the political instability in Kenya and Uganda have led to the proliferation of small arms in quantities not witnessed before and in the hands of non-state actors (Hendrickson, Mearns, and Armon, 1996).

However, proponents for commercialization of raids argue that the existing conflict has enabled people who are not herders to profit from livestock raiding. This also enables herders to raid independently for purposes other than customs and rites, which takes the animals away from the region which translates that the raided cattle cannot be raided back. Consequently, the practice reduces the supply while increases the demand, which has escalated the conflict (Baxter and Hogg, 1990). Conflict in the region has been occasional due to interval revenge raids facilitated by Morans.

No conflict can arise on its own, there has to be an event which triggers the conflict. The study focusses on internal and external conflict triggers among the Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Northern Keya. The Turkana, Pokot and the Samburu never got along very well with each other. Each group raids cattle from the other at will through a fierce fight. According to (Wanjala, 1997) and (Azar 1990), conflict triggers are hot buttons that should not be pressed else conflict will escalate.

The study seeks to examine the internal and external triggers to understand the intermittent escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. Internal triggers are those hot buttons that can be pressed within the three Nilotic Pastoralist communities. These are in form of activities like Moi and Multipartism in Kenya, Political entrepreneurs’ and Kenya Police Reservists. The external triggers are those activities happening outside the three Nilotic Pastoralist communities like Economic entrepreneurs’, Proliferation of small arms, instability of political regimes in the HOA, modern technology (M-pesa/ cellphones, trucks/vehicles and vernacular FM stations).
1.2 Problem Statement

There has been a long standing conflict between various pastoralist communities in Kenya and are characterized by cattle rustling, destruction of property, displacement and sporadic killings. Various factors combined to promote a vicious circle of intermittent escalation of conflict among the people living in Northern Kenya. Northern Kenya encompasses about 68% of the country’s surface area, and is home to about 20 per cent of the country’s population approximately 9 million, mainly pastoralist communities such as the Samburu, Turkana, Pokot, Borana and Somali (Little, 1996). The region has become a conflict prone area, where life is lived by the day and pastoral conflict is destroying the very existence of these communities. The Northern Kenya is inhabited by the Nilotic Pastoralists and is one region where conflict has escalated in the last two decades. Although these communities have engaged in conflicts perpetuated by young warrior groups, the conflicts have been predominantly about livestock and its related productive assets, such as water, land and pasture (Mwangi, 2006).

Since early 1990s, the scale, intensity and lethality of conflicts among the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu has increased steadily. They have become increasingly widespread, severe, destructive and less manageable, with increased fatalities. Indiscriminate killings during raids have also become common (Bevan, 2008). They have involved large-scale livestock raiding, seizure of the neighboring ethnic group’s territories by force and what has virtually become warfare (Goldsmith, 1997). These conflicts seem to be confined to the Moran youths who are traditionally known for their aggressive behavior. A more worrying factor is the fact that the elders seem not able to control these raids that unfortunately have caused the deaths of children, women and the elderly. Seemingly, the elders encourage such ill practices.

From 1990-2017, both internal and external triggers have contributed to escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya beyond manageable levels. Political and economic entrepreneurs have commercialized cattle raiding practices, hence increasing, lethality and frequency of cattle raids. Political entrepreneurs are politicians who use power to raid animals and sell them for their own gains while economic entrepreneurs are warlords from outside Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South
communities who plan for cattle rustling outside the three pastoralist communities by organizing their community mercenaries (Morans) to raid animals for a fee. These warlords use raided cattle for commercial purposes by feeding the markets outside the three communities with raided cattle meat and earning wealth at the expense of the lives lost and property destroyed.

The study sought to examine the dynamics of intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist of Northern Kenya between 1990 and 2017. In the late 1990s and around 2000 local patterns of conflict among pastoralists in the north were influenced by national politics or regional politics in other parts of Kenya. State control over Northern Kenya has been weak resulting in the emergence of cattle warlords who run armed militias to protect their interests. During the period, cattle raiding as changed from the cultural practice to that which is driven by commercial considerations and a luxurious economic activity.

1.3 Research Question

The general research question was why there has been intermittent escalation of conflict among Nilotic pastoralists of Northern Kenya. 1990 - 2017 was the period when many conflict related activities were taking place in the HOA, Northern Kenya and within the three Nilotic Pastoralists groups in Northern Kenya, conflict reaching unmanageable levels between 1990 and 2017? Specifically;

1. What are the internal triggers that perpetuate the intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic pastoralists of northern Kenya, between 1990 and 2017?
2. What are the external triggers that account for the intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic pastoralists of northern Kenya between 1990 and 2017?

1.4 Research Objectives

The overall objective for the study was to examine the triggers that explain the escalation of conflict among Nilotic Pastoralist of Northern Kenya. More specifically, the study sought to;

1. Major objectives is to explain the internal triggers that account for the intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya, between 1990 and 2017.

1.5 Justification
Conflict in Northern Kenya had been ongoing for decades pitting pastoral communities against each other. The conflict had increasingly become a serious challenge to an extent that it does hinder development of this region but also pose an existential threat to the communities in the region. In the post-cold war period, conflict escalated and even became a regional threat. There have been numerous attempts to try and end the conflict in the region however; they have fallen short of their intended objective as the conflict still rages on. Therefore, it is pertinent to understand triggers contributing to the intermittent escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. Understanding the process dynamics of pastoral conflict is an important policy implication which can facilitate its management or subsequent control. As the country transits to democracy, and as the state tries to exert itself in the peripheral areas, the results of the study might be useful to the policy makers.

To the academic field, the study adds knowledge on conflict transformation, specifically the conditions under which latent conflict is transformed to a warfare and how best to manage such conflicts. From the literature review, it is noted that studies on pastoral conflict in Northern Kenya have tended to analyze the conflict from a political economy point of view often ignoring the role of political sociology in the escalation of conflict as facilitated by Morans. Therefore, the study hopes to fill the gap left by contemporary studies by examining both internal and external conflict triggers, which explain the escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist in Northern Kenya. The study might not have come in any opportune time.

1.6 Scope and Limitations
The study was carried out in Kenya, within the three Counties of Samburu, Turkana and Baringo which are inhibited by the major three Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya, namely Turkana, Pokot and Samburu between 1990 and 2017. The focus of the study is to establish the internal and external triggers for intermittent escalation of conflict
among Nilotic Pastoralist of Northern Kenya. Further, the study included experts on pastoral conflict, Morans, elders and special groups that are of interest. The study included a critical review of the changing dynamics of pastoral conflicts in the region.

The limitation to the study is that some pertinent information sought was classified as confidential by government institutions, due to the nature of conflict in the region. The researcher however aimed at assuring the respondents of the sole academic purpose of the study and at the same time sought supplementary material on the issues at hand. During the surveys, respondents may not have felt encouraged to provide accurate and provide honest answers that present themselves in an unbiased manner. During the interviews, the study foresaw that interviews can be very time-consuming since setting up, interviewing, transcribing, analyzing, feedback and reporting required elaborate time. The process proved too costly since different interviewers may have understood and transcribed interviews in different ways. Finally, it was foreseen that academic literature that was available within the period under study was limited to provide the study with adequate literature review desired.

On the other hand, Suguta Valley area is an insecure area hence KPRs escort was required in most of the areas. The study area is also extremely hot and temperatures raise up to 46°C. This become a challenge in terms of movement to conduct the survey in time. The topography of the area is rugged with hills and deep valleys. The shrubby vegetation consists of thorny trees which prevented access to various villages. A research assistant had a day long to reach homes which were visible across ridges and valleys.

In order to overcome the limitations, the researcher first sought permission from the local and county administrators to conduct research within the study region. This allowed the researcher to make use of opinion leaders, Morans and elders who understood the nature of conflict in the region. School teachers also were used to shed light on various issues and gave a wider scope on the historical conflict happenings in the past. Given the long distances between villages and the remoteness of the areas, the researcher resorted to using motorcycles to access the villages. Lastly, the researcher speaks local language which gave interviewees and FGDs confidence to provide accurate and honest answers.
1.7 Definition of Concepts

Conflict
Conflict is defined as a clash between individuals or groups arising from an existing
difference in thought process, attitudes, understanding, interests, requirements and even
sometimes perceptions. Conflict, refers either to a violent dispute or to an incompatibility
of positions (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996). Traditionally, conflict was defined as
competition for resources or other interests, value differences or dissatisfaction with basic
needs (Jeong, 2010).

In the study, conflict is a serious protracted disagreement among the Turkana, Pokot and
the Samburu communities brought about by cattle raids, historical difference and the
existence of incongruent interests which is characterized by intermittent violent
confrontations. The three Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya have had a
long history of conflict facilitated by the young men called Morans.

Pastoral Conflict
The Pastoral conflicts were facilitated by Morans armed with local weapons, like spears,
rungus, swords and bows and arrows because of resource scarcity, culture of cattle raiding,
cultural differences and history of marginalization. Morans were controlled by elders and
only raided on specific times with a purpose. Pastoral conflicts are numerous depending on
place and type.

In the study, worst community conflicts which are endemic have been witnessed among
the three Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya, the Turkana, Pokot and
Samburu. Pastoral conflicts have often accredited with the increased movement of people
southwards throughout African history. Pastoral conflicts is not a new phenomenon
because throughout history, the pastoralists have been fighting between and amongst
themselves, using crude weapons like rungus, spears, wooden clubs and bows and arrows
(Iliffe, 1979).
Conflict Triggers

Conflict triggers are hot buttons, which can either come from within or from without. Internal conflict triggers are buttons that are being pressed from within the three communities, for example, Morans role in cattle raiding, KPRs role as mercenaries, scarcity of natural resources, like water, land and pasture. While external conflict triggers are buttons pressed by someone else outside the three communities, for example commercialization of cattle raids facilitated by Economic entrepreneurs and incitement.

In the study, conflict triggers are actions and strategies that activate latent conflict. Conflict escalation is always triggered by a party and to understand how it occurs one only need to examine these triggers. According to Azar, 1990, these triggers are either internal to the communities engaged in the original conflict, or they are external to the communities engaged in the conflict. The former is what we can call internal triggers while the latter is what we call external triggers. Combined they have also been called “process dynamics” or conflict triggers (Azar, 1990. Leff, 2009).

Internal Conflict Triggers

Internal conflict triggers are those hot buttons internal activities like history of marginalization, Political entrepreneurs’ and Kenya Police Reservists that have their origin within the three Nilotic Pastoral communities of Samburu, Pokot and Turkana.

External Conflict Triggers

External conflict triggers are those hot buttons, events, processes, individuals and actions that originate from outside the three Nilotic pastoral communities. These triggers include economic entrepreneurs who have made cattle rustling a complex activity that enables raided cattle to be slaughtered in towns outside the 3 communities, cold war and modern ways of conflict escalation (Mpesa/cellphones, trucks/vehicles and vernacular FM stations) which are used to facilitate funding, transportation or incitement against a particular community.
Moranism
A Moran is defined based on age group and rite of passage. The Morans ‘are the young unmarried men who would at one time have been the warriors of the tribe’ (Spencer 1973). The hallmark of moranism is solidarity. The institution instills in young men a bond of comradeship. They are supposed to stay together, eat in a group, raid in a group and also suffer together. It ensures unquestionable loyalty to the group and the community.

In this study, all the three Nilotic pastoral communities of Northern Kenya, Turkana, Pokot and Samburu have an age set group called the Morans. Morans are young (male) aged between 14 and 25 years. They are the foot soldiers of these three communities who perform various roles as dictated by culture. Morans are trained in warfare and participate in cattle rustling. However, Moranism in the study is used to mean the institutionalized socialization of a Moran into this warrior-like war behavior. There are two levels of Morans, junior Morans aged between 14 and 25 years mainly young unmarried men and senior Morans aged between 26 and 31 years mainly newly married Morans who have not yet been accepted as junior elders. All men aged 32 years and above are referred to as elders but as soon as one turns 45, one graduates to a privileged senior elder position which entails specific roles like blessings, curse, prayers and advice.

Conflict as Intermittent
Whereas competition is a continuous process, conflict is recurrent. Conflict has the tendency of occurring again as the differences are seldom resolved permanently. It is this starts and stops character of conflict which helps to distinguish it from competition.

In the study conflict is universal. It occurs in all times and places indiscriminately. There has never been a society in which some individuals or groups did not come into conflict. According to Malthus, reduced supply of the means of subsistence is the cause of conflict. According to Darwin, the principles of struggle for existence and survival of the fittest are the main causes of conflict.
Figure 1: Intermittent Escalation of Conflict in Northern Kenya

![Graph showing frequency of conflict vs years]


Based on the figure 1, there is a consistent trend and persistent pattern, indicating that intermittent conflict have existed in Northern Kenya among Nilotic Pastoralists for a long time, with the highest rise of conflicts noted in the years between 1990 to early 2000s. The peak was observed between 1990 and 2017 and it is for this reason that the study seeks to understand why escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya around this period was beyond manageable levels.

**Conflict Escalation**

Escalation of conflict will be premised on an increased frequency of attacks, high fatalities rates, and widespread destruction of properties and indiscriminate killings of women, elderly and children. In the study conflict escalation is the dependent variable. Conflicts are dynamic and can develop and change at astonishing speed. The process of conflict escalation is complex and unpredictable. It occurs when new issues are added to the already existing issues, tactics and goals are altered, and when conflicts spirals further erupting into overt violence complicating the situation.

In this study, conflict escalation is a process of increased intensity, increased frequency, high fatalities, widespread destruction and indiscriminate killings. Conflict escalation can also be worsening of the conflict situation, characterized by: (1) tactics going from light to heavy, (2) proliferation of issues; (3) the parties’ becoming increasingly absorbed in the struggle; and (4) goal shifts, from self-advancement to subverting or punishing the other (Pruitt and Rubin, 1986).
**Dynamics:**
These are forces or triggers which stimulate social cultural, political and economic conflict. In the study, the dynamics used are those forces which stimulate political conflicts. The internal and external triggers as explained above sustain the conflict in Nilotic pastoralists in Northern Kenya.

**Pastoralism**
In the conceptual framework, pastoralism is given as a way of life. It is characterized by resource scarcity, culture of raids, local politics and history of marginalization. Traditionally, these factors have sustained a protracted conflict between and among the Nilotic pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya.

**Resource Scarcity** - Lack of adequate resources is viewed as a noteworthy purpose behind conflicts. Without the impediment of accessibility of resources compels in the district, groups are basically left to self-improvement courses of action. Without doubt, increasing competition for natural resources poses considerable conflict potential. It can further destabilize an already fragile countries and regions or inject tension into otherwise cooperative inter-state relations, so conflict risks are found at different levels: within the producing and consuming groups and in relations between them.

**Culture of raiding** - Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups. This include their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values. Culture systems may on the one hand, be considered as products of action, as well as conditional element for future action. Raiding is a sudden assault or attack to destroy and steal properties. Raiders raid the communities to try and steal cattle among the three pastoralist communities.

**Local politics** - Politics that goes for taking out voters from groups seen to be a danger to the fruitful candidature of a specific competitor has been one of the main causes of many ethnic conflicts in Kenya (Krätli and Swift, 2010). According to Umar (1997), rich and
politically compelling individuals from pastoralists' community utilize both youth and men to execute barbarism with the idea of driving out individuals of different communities from one area to the other during periods of election to benefit politically.

**History of marginalization** - While other parts of Kenya have undergone great socio-economic transformation since independence in 1963, Northern Kenya and most other arid lands have remained largely under developed. The marginalization of ASAL regions has also meant that their livestock remains primarily a sociocultural symbol rather than economic asset, since the regions (denied appropriate social and physical infrastructure investments) have remained largely outside the market economy. ASAL regions are characterized by extensive land degradation, which is often blamed on a pastoralist ‘tragedy of the commons’ for which privatization has traditionally been seen as a solution (Ayot, 1999).

1.8 Literature Review
This section reviews literature on the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. The literature takes a thematic approach. It is organized in two sub-sections. The first sub-section discusses the conflict among pastoralists in a thematic approach, while Conflict triggers and conflict escalation, taking a theoretical approach which forms the second sub-section.

**Conflicts among Pastoralists**
Despite living under the most difficult ecological conditions and making life possible in these areas that are otherwise unsuitable for agriculture, pastoral communities in the drylands, just as others elsewhere around the world, have been in a persistent state of conflict. The twentieth century particularly saw the world’s pastoralists experience widespread violence as a response to pressures from various circles and ironically that’s the period they demonstrate incredible resilience on preservation of their values (Lamphear, 1976).
Nilotic people are people indigenous to the Nile valley. They comprise of the Nilo-Saharan languages spoken in South Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya and Northern Tanzania. These are the descendants of the original Nilo-Saharan speakers which include the Luo, Maasai, Samburu, Turkana, Pokot, Tugen, Elgeyo- Marakwet and Teso of Kenya. Maasai of Tanzania, Dinka and Nuer of South Sudan. The Acholi, Adhola, Kumam, Lango and Karamojong of Uganda.

These Nilotic Pastoralist are the cattle keepers of the larger Nilo-Saharan people. They are also called plain Nilotes signifying the presence of livestock, they are war- like, as cattle raids become more frequent and deadly. There are three groups of Nilotes namely, plain Nilotes or Pastoralists, river -Lake Nilotes and highland Nilotes. In Kenya the Nilotic Pastoralists are the Turkana, Pokot, Samburu and Maasai. The River lake Nilotes are the Luo while highland Nilotes are the Kalenjin group. The Nilotes are typically dark skinned, slender, tall bodies and long limbs.

Early ethnographers like Gulliver (1955) and Dyson-Hudson (1966) on the history, politics and social organization of pastoralists in Africa tended to locate violence among these communities in its normalcy. Cattle raiding was first viewed as a form of tribal conflict that the colonial administration decisively dealt with and contained using the arms embargo imposed on pastoral districts (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Barber, 1968). These studies often describe pastoral conflicts as tribal warfare (Lamphear, 1976), and particularly point out the forms of political organization and how they facilitate cattle raiding and provide cultural functions such as rites of passage for the young boys who are circumcised to become Morans.

More recent studies that build on the work of Barber (1968), Dyson-Hudson (1966), Lamphear (1976) explore notions of how pastoralists’ livelihood in non-equilibrium ecosystems and the symbiotic processes influenced their survival (Dyson-Hudson, 1966 McCabe, 2004; Galaty, 1994). They examine raiding practices in respect of the ways through which pastoralists have successfully exploited East African dry-lands by showing how these practices maintain symbiotic relationships between the people and their livestock (Horowitz 1985; Broch-Due 1990; McCabe, 2004). While Broch-Due (1990).
McCabe et al (2004) have tried to locate poverty within the violence–social or cultural and ecological nexus. They argue that currently images of poverty and pastoralism have become inextricably bound up in apocalyptic scenes of drought, famine and warfare. Such studies have tended to concentrate on the discrepancy between the perceptions of the state machinery and the perceptions of the pastoralists themselves regarding violence.

Studies by de Varennes (2003) and Knighton (2005) predicted doom for pastoralism. They perceived pastoralism as having no potential for development. Further some Scholars such as Crawford (1998) went to the extent of suggesting that pastoralists could steadily be ‘en route to extinction’. The basis for that analysis lay in the persistent crisis that was bad, which is still characteristic of pastoral regions (Dietz, 1987; de Varennes 2003). Reference is always made to the fluctuating circumstances such as drought, population pressure, ecological deterioration, lack of institutions of state and undesirable political and economic interventions (Knighton, 2005).

Most scholars’ contributions on conflict among Nilotic Pastoralist communities especially in the Horn of Africa suffer from one or more of the following shortcoming: First, many studies tie at least one or a combination of several factors; political, economic, institutions, market access, spread of small arms to the escalation of conflicts. Some analysts hold contradictory views about mechanisms that link livestock trade and small arms, such contradiction leading to conflicting policy recommendations: Secondly since there is no systematic (cross country/ temporal) study of the conflict phenomenon, the few studies that exist capture the dynamics of pastoral conflict at only a specific point in time; Lastly, perhaps one of the most important deficiencies in the pastoral conflict literature is that the discussion of the role of Morans in conflict escalation is completely sidestepped. The literature rarely investigates how the Moran’s presence and socialization has influenced conflict escalation in Northern Kenya. It is this literature gap that the study aims to fill.

**Political Competition and conflict**

Political competition has been identified as a major cause of conflict in Kenya and so is in Northern Kenya among the pastoralists. According to Krätli and Swift (1999) conflicts in Kenya, including those in the Northern Kenya, have provided the government with a strong
argument against pluralism and multi-party representation. Writing on the links between “tribal warfare” and political conflict, Fratkin (1994) argues that a government policy of low-response or non-intervention in contexts of increasing pastoral conflict is an indicator of vested interests and should be added to the list of the potential causes of conflict.

According to Markasis et al (1998), the imposition of majority onto pastoralists’ cultural tradition of consensus decision-making, particularly within a context of clan based politics, is a primary cause of political disputes, leading to increased conflict between ethnic groups or clans. According to Ocan (1992), the Parliamentary Democracy System of territorial and residence-based representation clashes with the reality of a largely mobile electorate. Often, for residential reasons, some people do not have the right to vote or to access political and administrative appointments within the constituency where they have their major interests. Consequently, this creates situations where those who are involved in disputes are not represented by those who are officially in a position to prevent, mediate and resolve conflicts (Ocan, 1992).

It is usually overlooked that the early 1980s not only saw an upswing in the marketing of light weapons but was also a turning point in Kenyan development policy for pastoral regions. The adoption of a neoliberal perspective in which the introduction of a market economy had first priority was seen as the instrument and not, as before, the objective of development (Evangelou, 1984). Perhaps the transformation of conflict should be analyzed in light of the ongoing, complex and lengthy integration of pastoralists within a market economy, which is a process of combining what in Sambanis terminology (2001) is an economy instituted through reciprocity with one instituted through the market.

The introduction and diffusion of wage-labor has provided an institutional framework which enables richer people to hire fighters, not only mercenary soldiers from outside the pastoral economy, but “Morans” as well. Therefore this phenomenon should be seen as directly linked to structural changes within pastoral economy, and not just as a consequence of its exposure to the market. A classical case is supported by instances where the Samburus occasionally hire feared Pokot Morans to fight on their behalf during the raid (Krätli and Swift, 1999; Mkutu, 2006).
Commercialization of cattle is purely for business purposes by smaller section of individuals to provide for meat-loving urbanite population enabling people who are not herders to profit from livestock raiding. The practice also enables the herders themselves to raid independently and for non-traditional reasons for raiding. More importantly, once cattle were raided they were taken to major towns, especially Nairobi where they were slaughtered and therefore could be not raided back hence create a scarcity of cattle amongst the three pastoral communities. From the actual availability of land or labour for livestock management and excludes reciprocity as marketed cattle cannot be raided back. As in livestock both relations of property/exchange and social boundaries overlap, changes in the patterns of ownership affect inter and intra-ethnic relations as well as values associated with sociality (Baxter and Hogg, 1990). Within an economy based on reciprocity, livestock and military strength are independent variables. Indeed one of the reasons for raiding was to restock the herd. Thus raiding was by and large a cyclical process in which groups in a restocking phase raided enemies who happened to be momentarily better off (Hendrickson et al., 1996).

The progressive introduction of the market as the integrative process of the economy and the new links between the commercialization of cattle, weapons and labour created within this process, enable the transformation of livestock capital into military strength, which can then be used to further increase livestock capital in a cumulative process (Belshaw, 1999). Conversely, the ability to raid effectively increases long term differences between groups in marketing strategies (Dietz, 1987).

Goldsmith (1997) points out how due to the “commercialization of raiding” in conjunction with the input of firearms into the livestock trade, informal agreements previously in existence have broken down and opened up the way to indiscriminate violence. As the raided herds need to be restocked, professional raids which are well equipped, organized and highly effective may cause a shower of clan raids which are smaller, less equipped, extemporaneous which can easily generating a chain reaction of violence. Furthermore, large-scale raids appear to play an important role in the process of impoverishment and destitution of pastoralists (McCabe, 2004, Hendrickson et al. 1996), therefore reproducing and increasing the pool of potential cheap fighting manpower, among the Morans.
From early 1990s, commercialized livestock raiding in which wealthy businessmen, politicians, traders and local people pursue economic objectives has interfered with pastoral livelihoods and contributed to conflicts among pastoral communities. Local businessmen and even politicians reportedly funded raids in order to sell cattle to the black market to places as far away as South Sudan and Saudi Arabia (Mkutu, 2003). Stolen cattle are also used to supply meat to large towns which have grown in population through rural to urban migration.

Wasara (2002) and Duffield (1997) argue that the clashes in the Rift Valley and Western Kenya were part of a wider political strategy for President Moi who felt threatened by advocates of multi-partism which was directly supported by most of the western donors. Threatened by the advocates of political pluralism Moi reacted by unifying the pastoral communities into what came to be called Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu (KAMATUSA), making the pastoral communities a political bloc to reckon on with. Moi armed them or started ethnic conflict to slow down advances by advocates of multi-party politics. Moi organized KAMATUSA to demand for Majimboism (regionalism) as a counter measure against the advocates of multi-partism, mainly spearheaded by Gikuyu, Embu, Meru and Akamba (GEMA) bloc and other disgruntled communities. The political divide prevented real multi-party politics from taking root in Kenya. Moi kept on saying that “Siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya, means that bad politics demeans life”

With the banning of multi-partyism a robust debate was muzzled, political intolerance set in and opposition became subterranean. Rather than address the scourge aggravating away at the country’s body politic successive political leaders indulged, Moi faced with political uncertainty during the wake of multipartism resorted into activating politically the pastoral communities by organizing them into an umbrella political body. The Nilotic Pastoral communities were handsomely rewarded by Moi, through political and military appointments. Minister of Energy- Lotodo, Peter Ejore, PC Nairobi –Lekolool, PC Chelanga, PC Rugut, Army Commandant- Gen. Lengees, Bethwel Kiplangat, Speaker Kaparo, Nicholas Biwot, Gen. Sumbeiyo, Gen- Tonje are few of the many rewards given to the KAMATUSA bloc. Moi also went further to give all Nilotic Pastoral groups government guns, through a scheme known as Kenya Police Reservist (KPRs). These automatic weapons in the hands of Morans that were used to raid neighbors, hence escalation of conflict in the region (Mkutu, 2006).
**Internal Dynamics of Conflict Escalation**

*Changing Nature of Morans*

From around the 1970s, writers started basing conflict analyses of Northern Kenya on the cultural or ecological variables. McCabe (2004) argue for the importance of cultural factors associated with the traditional social structures of pastoralist societies and identified belief systems, identities, warrior ideals, prestige, and competition between age sets as drivers of violence.

Culturally, conflict among Kenyan Nilotic pastoralists involved small scale manageable violence (Mkutu, 2007). Loss of human lives was rare, and when this occurred, compensation in the form of livestock was paid to the victims or their families of the deceased (Bollig and Osterle, 2007. Little (1996). McCabe (2004) portrayed this conflict through raiding as a maladaptive cultural institution in which the value of cattle was placed above that of human beings and in attempting to preserve their cultural identity, pastoralists would undermine their biological survival.

Osterle and Bollig (2007) argue that inter-group violence in Northern Kenya is deeply embedded in local cultures and is thoroughly modern at the same time. However, the situation seems to have changed with time. Since the 1990s guns have been of crucial importance in the region. During 1960s and 1970s most battles were still fought with simple traditional weapons. In the 1990s automatic guns like AK-47 and the G-3 have replaced earlier weapons. The AK-47 and G3s have recently been referred to as ‘change agents’.

Intergroup relations have changed profoundly as young men who usually run the automatic weapons or at least the people having the skill to deal with them, act independently and out of control of elders (Tornay, 1976; Mkutu, 2007; Bollig and Swift, 2007). Ownership of small arms has eroded customary methods of dealing with matters of justice or disputes resolution mechanisms since it emboldens young men who no longer respect the elders in the three communities (Mirzeler and Young, 2000; Bevan, 2008).
**Conflict Escalation**

This section discusses four major explanations of conflict escalation: spiral; structural changes; predestination and contingency explanation. These explanations show that escalation evolves along a variety of routes: First, a spiral one where one’s side contentious behavior encourage or fosters conflict from the other (Wasara 2002). Second, a structural one, where the initial conflict causes serious structural changes that intensify it. Third, is the predestination theory that argues that the causes of conflict will automatically trigger its escalation. Finally, it is the contingency explanation, with the assumption that conflict is likely to escalate if the feuding communities have experienced a history of antagonism.

Escalation of conflict can unfold in a cycle or spiral where one side’s contentious behavior encourages or fosters conflict from the other in the process escalating conflict (Parson, 1985). This is referred to as the “aggressor-defender” model. According to Posen (1993) the aggressor-defender model describes a state where one party is active in pursuing its ends, escalating its use of contentious tactics progressively. While on the other hand, the other party only reacts, increasing levels of response in accordance with the activity of the aggressor. According to Malama (2013) in the aggressor-defender model, the aggressor is viewed as having a goal that places it in conflict with the defender. The aggressor begins with mild tactics and moves to heavier tactics with the failure of mild strategies. The defender responds, escalating its efforts in response to the aggressor’s escalatory actions.

It is important to note that while aggressor-defender model reflects some cases of escalation, suggesting that escalation moves simply in one direction with the defender always reacting to the aggressor’s action in many instances escalation is better understood as a circular process in which each side reacts to the other’s behavior. However, this does not mean that the aggressor—defender model is limited to explaining escalation. Malam (2013) contend that many escalation cases exhibit the aggressor-defender process.

Escalation can also happen when the conflict produces structural changes that perpetuate and intensify it. These changes come from one disputant, as when one side starts to perceive the other as the enemy, one who should be beaten structural theory focuses on the conflict situation and asks how different variables in the situation are impacting behavior (Rigby, 1992). According to structural change theorist, the experience of conflict and the tactics
used to pursue it produce residues that affect or tend to change the parties and communities involved. Kriesberg 2007 is of the opinion that conflicts can be structural or non-structural. If structural, conflicts may be concerned with change in, or maintenance of existing political, economic, social or other systems. In the light of Anstey (1999), Asserts the structural change theory builds on the conflict spiral theory, arguing that conflictual tactics produce residual changes in the parties, consequently encouraging further escalation. However Rigby (1992) observes that there are three types of changes in conflict situations: psychological, group and community changes. As the conflict escalates, the issues in contention between the adversaries also proliferate. Emerging issues are vital in conflict analysis. This justifies an argument put across by Posen (1993) that the structural change theory has the unique ability to explain why escalations tend to persist and recur. The spiral, aggressor-defender, and structural explanations indicate that escalation evolves within the party-other interactions. But it can result just as easily, as from one side’s ratcheting up the intensity (Straight, 2009). While the definition of escalation and the process through which it unfolds are well understood, its causes are vague. What precipitates escalation? This question unfortunately has drawn more speculation than research.

However according to the predestination theory, conflict has a strong predisposition to escalate. That is, the initial and residual causes of the conflict form a solid base for its escalation as the disputants’ interactions nudge it along. Philip (2000) “crude law of social relations” is the primary member of this school. To him, these interactions elicit overt competition which in turn tends to escalate the conflict. Philip and Ludwig (2000) predisposition explanation is rather explicit. Others are more implicit than Philip when discussing this theory. Escalation automatically evolves from conflict while Straight (2009) assert that conflict has a built-in tendency to escalate.

On the other hand, contingency theories of escalation fall into two categories: general conditions under which escalation is apt to occur and specific causes of the escalation. According to Posen (2009), escalation is more likely to arise when there are cultural differences between the sides or whenever they have experienced a history of antagonism. Such a history can socialize people toward conflict escalation. Escalation is also more likely when the parties are unaware of its potential, when they are not concerned about its consequences, or when their actions are not limited in some manner (Posen, 2009).
Based on the existing literature, it is evident that no research has ever been done focusing on the internal and external triggers of conflict in Northern Kenya. Available scholars assumed that conflict among pastoralists is due to hostile environment and marginalization. The study hypothesized that internal and external triggers are responsible for intermittent and sustained conflict amongst the pastoralists. Unlike in the study, scholars have not taken Moranism as an institution to be the main perpetrator of conflict in Northern Kenya. These gaps have been identified in the study to provide new knowledge on the pastoralist conflict.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) Theory

Northern Kenya suffers from conflicts based on socio-political, historical and economic grievances. They are acted out on a community level. Azar’s (1990) PSC theory has been chosen since it deals with conflicts among communities and links them with their structural and historical foundations. There is no single universal theory that applies to all conflict situations in the world since every conflict possesses peculiarity of its own. One conflict theory may generally resonate well with some conflicts, but not with all types of conflict. Azar’s (1990) theory forms the basis of the study because it generally resonates well to the Northern Kenya conflict scenario.

PSC Theory is a hostile interaction which extends over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in frequency and intensity (Azar, Jureidini, and McLaurin, 1978). Azar argues that conflict has breaks and what we observe is a relative peace since there is a potential for conflict to start again and even escalate. Insecurity about a group’s cultural identity coupled with political and economic marginalization underlies the PSC Theory. PSC Theory originates from a set of conditions such as the communal content of a society; needs; governance and the roles of the state and International linkage (Azar, 1990).

The communal content of a society: refers to the colonial period where community groups are marked by historical rivalries and/or colonial legacy of divide and rule. As a consequence, in the post-colonial period a single communal group or a coalition of groups emerges and dominates in many multiethnic societies. In a multi-communal society, historical pattern of rivalry and contest among communities (defined by shared ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other cultural characteristics) have caused strain in the social fabric thus, weakening the nation-building process (Azar, 1990).
**Developmental Human Needs:** Individuals strive to fulfill their developmental needs through the formation of identity groups (Azar, 1990). Developmental needs are expressed in terms of cultural values and security. These are pursued through every possible means for over a long time and cannot be easily suppressed. Individual and communal physical survival and well-being is an ontological need and is contingent to the satisfaction of material needs. The deprivation of these needs prepares conflict grounds for a PSC.

**Governance and the State’s Role:** The role of the modern state is to encourage impartiality and regulate socio-political and economic interactions that satisfy basic human needs in order to promote communal harmony and social stability. Incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs produce PSC because they fail to stand as impartial arbiters of conflicts among rival groups in various regions.

**International Linkage:** Patterns of international linkage with international system, through economic dependency within the international economic system and political-military client relationship with strong states greatly influence the formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state. The formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced by the pattern of linkage within the international system (Azar, 1990). For instance, many states are dependent on an external supply of armaments. PSC theory suggests that most current conflicts around the world and especially in underdeveloped parts of the world are characterized by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors.

The four elements (communal, need, governance and international) are preconditions for the rise of a PSC. Overt conflict actions (escalation) are then dependent on activating (triggering) factors or variables that Azar calls ‘process dynamics’ (Azar, 1990). Within the situation where needs and values clash, a simple effective trigger factor, a trivial event escalates the PSC. Because of the asymmetric power relations, a group seeks external military and economic assistance (often from neighboring actors). In reaction, the state
actors also involve in conflict actions (coercion/containment or cooption/accommodation, and seeking external assistance). The ‘built-in properties’ of conflict (attitudes and perceptions, interpretation of events, stereotypes, fear of marginalization or loss of communal integrity) takes up its role either in conflict escalation (protraction) or de-escalation, depending on the types of conflict actions.

Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) Theory is relevant to the study as it reveals how communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of the communal identity. The deprivation is made complex by factors such as the state and other linkages including colonial legacies, multi-communal nature and historical domestic settings (Azar 1990). For instance, the theory provides a platform on how communities in Northern Kenya have been devastated physically, psychologically, politically and economically. The cost of living is high and it consequently undermines the satisfaction of basic needs. The meager resources are excessively spent on security. Further protracted social violence institutionalizes underdevelopment (Azar, 1990). Additionally, PSC Theory highlight the process of escalation of the initial insecurity through continuous loss of life and means of support. Also, PSC deteriorates physical security it paralyses socio-political and economic institutions, renders the government weak, and causes the degeneration of the broader social fabric as experienced in Northern Kenya situation.
1.10 Conceptual framework

Figure 2: Conceptualization of PSC for Northern Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Intervening Variable</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Dynamics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Internal Conflict Triggers 1990-2017**
- Advent of Multipartism
- Political entrepreneurs
- Kenya Police Reservists

**External Conflict Triggers 1990-2017**
- Cold war and Instability among political regimes in the HOA
- Proliferation of small arms in Northern Kenya
- Economic Entrepreneurs
- Armed Moran and Modern technology

Source: Author (2017)
Conceptualization of PSC for Northern Kenya

Genesis is a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones. Azar 1990 identifies key variables for this process. Most significant of all factors that lead towards the formation of PSC are societies that can be characterised as having a ‘multi-communal’ composition. Multi-communal societies whether formed as a result of divide-and-rule policies of former colonial powers or whether through historical rivalries often resulted in the dominance of one group over the other which is characterised by disarticulation between the state and society as a whole. Azar 1990 suggests that efforts to reconcile the disparity either by enforcing integration or cooperation hinders communal identity, strains the social fabric and eventually breeds fragmentation and protracted social conflict.

The most obvious need is individual and communal physical survival and well-being. Individual or communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of basic needs. In the world of physical scarcity, these basic needs are seldom evenly or justly met. Whilst one group of individuals may enjoy satisfaction of those needs in abundance, others do not. Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively and failure to redress these grievances cultivates a niche for conflict.

Azar’s 1990 third variable turns its attention to the role of the state and its role in ensuring that all communal groups under its jurisdiction are able to meet their basic human needs. Azar 1990 notes that in those countries that are experiencing conflict, political power tends to be dominated by one identity group that uses its resources to maintain power over the other. In turn, to ensure that the group in power remains, PSC-affected countries will often see attempts by the dominant group to resist participation of minority groups. Such crises exacerbate already existing competitive or conflictive situations which eventually diminish the state’s ability to meet basic needs and lead to further developmental crises. Thus regime type and the level of legitimacy are important linkage variables between needs and protracted social conflict.
Azar’s fourth variable points to the role of how internal policy is dictated by international linkages. Azar 1990 categorises two distinct forms in which these international linkages can assume; economic dependency and client relationships. States which are economically dependent on the broader international economic system. In turn, they see their autonomy weakened as economic development policies are partly dictated by outside influences. Dependency often exacerbates denial of the access needs of communal groups, distorting the domestic political and economic systems through the realignment of subtle coalitions of international capital, domestic capital and the state. Client relationships refers to arrangements whereby a state’s security is guaranteed in return for loyalty which is immensely significant with governments potentially distracted from their key responsibilities, client loyalty and obedience involved some sacrifice of autonomy and independence subsequently this, induces the client state to pursue both domestic and foreign policies disjointed from or contradictory to the needs of its own public.

The second component of PSC is the process of dynamics variables which based on the preconditions mentioned previously, are responsible for the escalation of conflict. Azar recognises three key determining factors: First, communal Actions and Strategies: This refers to the potential of various ‘triggers’ which activate otherwise latent conflict which then escalate into broader and possibly more violent conflict. Azar argues that there are internal and external triggers which when pressed escalate conflict. Azar summarises this process as follows: Initially, a trigger may but not need be a trivial event. Subsequently, the trivial event tends to become a turning point at which the individual victimization is collectively recognised. Collective recognition of individual grievances (Morans) in the study (or incompatible goals) naturally leads to collective protest. Collective protest is usually met by some degree of repression or suppression. As tension increases, the victimised communal groups begin to draw the attention of their constituents not only to the event itself but also to a broad range of issues involving communal security, access and security needs. A typical conflict situation among the three Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya.
The spill over of the event into multiple issues increases the momentum for organising and mobilizing resources. As the level of communal organisation and mobilization becomes greater, communal groups attempt to formulate more diverse strategies and tactics which may involve civil disobedience, guerrilla warfare or secessionist movements. The extent to which this escalates is partly dependent on the ability of communal groups to effectively organise and develop strong leadership as well their tendency to gather support outside of national boundaries which may in turn result to the conflict spilling over to the entire region.

**Built in Mechanisms of Conflict**

The last of Azar’s 1990 process variables relates to the effects of long-term conflicts on perceptions of the other and how this in-turn, can impact on the behaviour of belligerent groups. The perceptions and motivations behind the behaviour of the state and communal actors are conditioned by experiences, fears and belief system of each communal group. In a situation of limited or proscribed interactions, the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side. There is little possibility of falsification and the consequence is reciprocal negative images which perpetuate communal antagonism and solidify protracted social conflict.

**1.11 Hypotheses**

The study hypothesized that there were internal dynamics and external dynamics that were happening among Nilotic pastoralist in Northern Kenya that has resulted in conflict escalation.

1. Internal dynamics have triggered escalation of conflict among the Nilotic-Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya.
2. External dynamics have triggered escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist communities of northern Kenya.
1.12 Methodology
This section presents a detailed description of the research design, study area, sample size, data collection and data analysis procedures.

Research Design
The study used a descriptive research design because of its capacity to fuse both quantitative and qualitative data in the study (a mixed design). The fundamental concern in descriptive research is to highlight the conditions, practices, structures, differences or relationships of variables evident in the study. The characteristics enabled the study to take a multifaceted approach towards data collection to capture and give a detailed description of the factors contributing to the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. The design was also instrumental in making generalizations about conflict management in Northern Kenya. Further, the design enabled the researcher to easily identify time series of conflict trends in Northern Kenya in pre and post 1990.

Population
The estimated population of Samburu West, Turkana South and Tiaty sub-counties is approximately 347,000 people based on 2009 census of Kenya. (KNBS, 2009). The proposed study focused on persons aged 18 years and above, which is estimated at 164,825 people which translate to 47.5% of the entire population. Therefore, the target population for the proposed study was 164,825 people.

Though it was most ideal to involve the entire population of the three Sub-Counties in the proposed study, it was however not possible due to time and financial constraints. For this reason, a select sample was picked which was as representative as possible. The sample size for the proposed study was calculated using the formulae below (Yamane, 1973).

\[
n = \frac{N}{1 + Ne^2}
\]

\[
n = \text{sample size}
\]

\[
N = \text{population}
\]

\[
e = \text{error of sampling method} = 0.05
\]
\[
n = \frac{164,825}{1 + 164,825 (0.05)^2} = 399 \text{ respondents}
\]

**Study Area**

The study is concerned with the Nilotic pastoralists in Northern Kenya namely Samburu, Turkana and Pokot who live in Samburu, Turkana and Baringo Counties. The three communities were selected because of the observed continuous escalation of intra and inter community conflict. Interestingly, these communities are residents of Kenya’s conflict hot spots of Kapedo, Baragoi, Suguta Valley and Nadome. The study was carried out in Samburu West Sub-County, Turkana South Sub-County and Tiaty Sub-County in Samburu, Turkana and Baringo Counties respectively.

**Study area and sample size**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Names of sample areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counties</td>
<td>3 (Counties)</td>
<td>1. Turkana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Baringo and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Samburu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub- county/Constituency</td>
<td>3 (Sub – counties)</td>
<td>1. Turkana South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Tiaty in Baringo and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Samburu West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>2 divisions per sub- county 2 x 3 = 6 (Divisions)</td>
<td>1. Turkana South Sub-County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Lokichar and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Katilu division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Tiaty Sub-County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Churo and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Tangulubei division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Samburu West Sub County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Lerroki and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>▪ Kirisia division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locations</td>
<td>4 locations per sub-county 4 x 3 =12 (Locations)</td>
<td>Turkana South Sub-County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1. Lokichar division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

31
### Lokichar location
- Kapese location

### Kapese location

#### 2. Katilu division
- Katilu and
- Kainuk location

#### Tiaty Sub – County of Baringo

1. **Churo division**
   - Amaya and
   - Churo location

2. **Tangulubei division**
   - Tangulubei and
   - Orus locations

#### Samburu west Sub-County

1. **Lerroki division**
   - suguta Marmar and
   - Loosuk location

2. **Kirisia division**
   - Porro and
   - Maralal location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Method</th>
<th>Details</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>133 survey questionnaires per sub-county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>133 x 3 = 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Group discussions</td>
<td>4 FGDs per sub-county</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 x 3 = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Informants Interview</td>
<td>20 key informants per sub-County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 x 3 = 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133 Respondents per sub-county</td>
<td>3 x 133 = 399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 FGD per location</td>
<td>1 x 12 = 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Key Informants per location</td>
<td>5 x 12 = 60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1: Getting to Answers Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Questions</th>
<th>Data collection methods</th>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Sampling or selection criteria</th>
<th>Data Analysis methods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have the internal dynamics observed resulted in the intermittent</td>
<td>Survey</td>
<td>Individuals Archival information</td>
<td>Random sampling and Purposive selection</td>
<td>SPSS, content analysis and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>escalations of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya?</td>
<td>KIs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pattern analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary material</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have the external dynamics observed resulted in the intermittent</td>
<td>KIs</td>
<td>Individuals Archival information</td>
<td>Purposive selection and Random sampling</td>
<td>SPSS content analysis and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>escalations of conflict among the Nilotic pastoralists of northern Kenya?</td>
<td>FGDs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>pattern analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surveys</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Sample and Sampling Techniques

The researcher interviewed key informants from each of the identified counties in the region. These Key informants were categorized as: security experts; elected leaders; Morans; county officials; local traditional elders; representatives of women groups and CBOs (specifically Oxfam, World Vision and the Peace Caravan). Key Informants were drawn from various individuals from the respective targeted counties who were knowledgeable about conflict in the region.

There was no sampling frame prepared for the selection of key informants. The criteria for selecting the key informants was based on their ages ranging from 50 yrs and above. They are professionals who exude understanding of the Samburu, Pokot and Turkana practices, as well as their length of stay in the study site.

The study population was 399 which was composed of 133 residents from each of the three communities. Sixty expert interviews were conducted, 20 from each of the three selected sub-counties. The nature of the study dictated the use of purposive sampling technique. Purposive sampling technique was used in the study largely because of the limited number...
of people who can be referred to as experts from these communities, who had the historical and current knowledge within the domain of the study. The study conducted 4 FGDs in each of the 3 selected sub-counties. The FGDs comprised of Morans, Elders, CBOs, Women representatives, County officials and local administrators.

**Data Collection and Analysis**

The study adopted two data collection methods: surveys and interviews. Surveys helped to capture a large percentage of the targeted group and at the same time capturing the demographic data of respondents as shown above. FGDs was essential in capturing points of view of specific groups in the community on the escalation of conflict among Nilotic Pastoralist in Northern Kenya. This was conducted using a designed questionnaire with both open-ended and closed questions administered (Appendix II). The questions were grouped under broad themes: The respondents were requested to talk freely about their views on the escalation of conflict in the region and how this has increased the intensity, scale and frequency of conflict. The researcher probed for more information to seek more clarity on some issues raised as shown in appendix III and IV below.

The study used both primary and secondary data. Primary data collection was done through surveys, key informant interviews and focus group discussions (with separates tools) as shown below in appendix (III and IV) Secondary data included government policy documents and reports, journals on pastoral conflict in Northern Kenya. The study also incorporated published and unpublished research and reports on historical, socio-economic, cultural, political, ecological, national, and area-specific issues which were reviewed and used as background information to strengthen the presentation of findings and analysis. The main source of secondary data was library and documents from the national archives.

**Survey**

This was conducted using a designed questionnaire with both open-ended and closed questions administered (Appendix II). The respondents were encouraged to talk freely about their views on the escalation of conflict in the region and how it has increased the intensity, scale and frequency of conflict. The researcher sought for more information
which was meant to clarify on some issues raised. The principal language of the interview was the local vernaculars presented appropriately.

**Area Sampling Procedures**

The study adopted the Afro-barometer Methodology in carrying out the survey. The researcher divided each county (Samburu, Turkana and Baringo) into sample Sub-counties, Administrative Divisions and locations. The researcher gave each location a number and used random sampling to select location 1 marked (X), skipped one location and picked the 3rd (X) and continued in that order for the rest of the sample frame. In each of the random sampled locations, he interviewed 133 respondents from each sub county selected as shown above.

Within each location, the researcher randomly selected a sampling start point. This practice was essential since it helped the researcher and his assistants could know where to start the interview within the location. Starting as near as possible to the sampling start point, the researcher chose any random point (like a church, school, water point). From this point, the researcher and his 3 assistants followed a strict walk pattern. Research Assistant (RA), 1 walked towards the East, 2nd walked to the West, 3rd to the South and 4th to the North. Each RA used a 3 interval pattern (i.e. an interval of three household for the entire exercise, using the Manyattas as the main point of random sampling). Once a household has been selected, the RA identified themselves and requested to conduct the interview with preferably the head of the household taking into account a realistic gender balance.

**Focus Group Discussions**

Different groups in the community have initially been affected and responded differently to the escalation of conflict. Therefore, the researcher aimed at collecting data from specific groups in the community who in one way or another had been involved or affected by the escalation and perpetuation of conflict in the region. The groups targets were; elders, women, morans, security officers, Peace Committees, County Government officials and NGO s and/CBOs officials. One FGDs was composed of a minimum of 10 persons but with a maximum of 18. A homogeneous group could be 10, this is a situation where only
one group is interviewed, for example Morans, Elders or Women. Non-homogeneous consisted 18 people. Consequently this situation drew up mixed membership from various groups, three members from each of the above groups made up the composition.

**Validity of the Instruments**

Validity refers to the degree to which a study accurately reflects or assesses the specific variable/concepts that the researcher is attempting to measure. In order to test the validity of the evaluation tool, the proposed study administered questionnaires to selected respondents using test-retest pilot method. This exercise was done at the study area/site, to validate the instruments. Although there was no specified percentage of the study respondents who were covered during pilot study, Nieswiadomy (2002), recommends that 10% of the study sample size would be sufficiently serve as a sample for the pilot study. The study administered questionnaires to 40 sampled respondents on the site. The researcher then modified the content of the questionnaire based on the assessment and responses. The aim of this exercise was to ensure that questions elicit only desired and intended responses.

**Reliability of the Instruments**

Reliability is the extent to which an experiment, test, or any measuring procedure yields the same result on repeated trials. In the proposed study, a reliability co-efficient (alpha value) of more that 0.7 was assumed to reflect the acceptable reliability. The Alpha value ranges from zero to one and indicates the reliability of an instrument. The more the Alpha value was closer to one, the more reliable the instrument.

**Data Analysis and Presentation**

Data collected was analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. For the qualitative data, the researcher used content analysis and pattern analysis. The researcher documented narrative responses at a sufficient level of detail to permit as systematic content analysis of these qualitative data. Narrative reviews of interviews and discussion
responses were expected to provide an in-depth understanding of the conflict escalation in the selected counties.

Qualitative data analysis began with notes writing. Each interview was recorded. In addition to recording, the researcher transcribed the interview which helped to identify common themes that were used later for coding the collected data during the formal data analysis process. The team also used this coding process for the content analysis of all qualitative secondary sources with a focus on the issues most salient to the study questions. From the content analysis, the researcher examined interview notes for patterns to determine whether some responses received appear to be correlated with other factors such as geographical location, respondent group, age, gender, etc. Preliminary primary data analysis began during the fieldwork which enabled the researcher to capture the information necessary to fully address the study questions.

Results from the pattern analysis based on the document review, interview and discussion notes that had emerged was compared against the survey findings. This approach facilitated both within case and between case comparisons. In this way, key pieces of evidence from the various sources are compared and triangulated to identify the main findings that respond to the study questions.

For the quantitative data gathered from the survey, a computer package SPSS was used. Qualitative data was presented in form of narratives while quantitative data was presented in the form of tables, percentages, pie charts, and graphs, with specific findings on the variables.
**Conclusion**

Conflict is a demonstration of cross-purposes of distinct or similar political groups which often ends in political violence when contextualized in the Weberian sense is an acceptable weapon to ventilate anger. Conflict may also connote hostility or physical confrontation. In conclusion. When goal incompatibility or perception/value differences reach a crescendo, a manifestation of actual hostility or clashes is possible. In general literature, conflict is interchangeably used with other terms. This is where it becomes pertinent to mention words or terms that represent synonyms of conflict. These include contrast, disharmony, discord, struggle, contest, strife, antagonism, controversy, clash, rivalry, contest, contention, brawl, fisticuff, fight, battle, feud, combat and war. In politics, it is not too dissimilar; however, conflict technically means an existing state of disconnect between two or more parties on a prevailing issue.

There are 3 pastoralists communities who live in Northern Kenya, namely, Turkana, Pokot and Samburu with an Age set and elderly systems of governance. An age-set system is composed of structural and social elements. Structurally, an age-set system is the particular means by which an age-set is brought into being, is advanced from one grade to another and is held responsible for performing certain tasks as a corporate group in a particular age-grade. Socially, Lamphear (1992) argues that an age-set system is defined as conduct between members of different age-sets, between members of the same age-sets and between the individual member of an age-set and his society at large. An age-set system, therefore, incorporates males of approximately the same biological age for the purpose of advancing them up a series of distinct societal levels, each of which require them to perform certain duties and to follow certain behavioral norms (Sommer and Vossen, 1993). Ideally, no two age-sets should occupy the same age-grade, as each senior age-set vacates its age-grade prior to its occupation by the junior (Lamphear, 1992).
CHAPTER TWO

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE
NILOTIC PASTORALIST CONFLICTS IN NORTHERN KENYA

2.1 Introduction
Northern Kenya has in the past witnessed numerous cattle raids. These raids are widely believed to have increased after 1990, an escalation which was attributed to a variety of factors including resource scarcity (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Ocan, 1992) and the criminal nature of the post-colonial state (Knighton, 2003). For the longest time, the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot communities in Northern Kenya have been perpetrators and victims within a cycle of conflict that has claimed lives and destroyed property.

Therefore, this chapter gives a critical look at the genesis of protracted conflict in northern Kenya but more specifically within the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot communities. To achieve this, the chapter progresses as follows; First, the chapter discusses the communities involved in the conflict. These are the Turkana, the Pokot and the Samburu. Second, the chapter discusses traditional cattle raiding and the role of age in the conflict sets paying special attention to the institution of Moranism. Lastly, the chapter discusses traditional coping mechanisms that have been employed throughout generations followed by how this ‘normal’ raiding was transformed with the advent of the British rule and the independent state to become a deadly affairs where lives are lost and properly destroyed.

The conflict among these communities has been attributed to many factors such as; celebration of a culture of heroism that elevates the social status of raiders, the decline of the role community elders play in the management of raids, competition over scarce and diminishing water and pastures for their animals, marginalization by successive governments and little presence of state security. Among these communities conflict can be seen as a cycle of revenge killings and cattle raids that often starts with Morans from one community raiding a rival community. Consequently, this spirals into attacks and counter attacks that after a while leads to long periods of hostilities punctuated by series of massacres. But has the conflict within these communities been existence always as it is
today? The answer is no. There has been a drastic change from normal tribal conflict through communal cattle rustling to a deadly warfare involving armed Morans from these communities as explained below.

2.2 Nilotic Pastoralists
There are three Nilotic Pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya, namely the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot. Other Pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya are the Rendille, Borana, Gabra and Somali, who are Cushitic pastoralists. The Cushitic Pastoral communities largely live in North Eastern Kenya and their Pastoral life revolves around the Camel due to the harsh environmental conditions in the region. The Nilotic Pastoralist on the other hand are predominantly cattle keepers.

There are major differences between the Cushitic and Nilotic Pastoralist. The Cushitic Pastoralist are light skinned and does not embrace Moranism while Nilotic Pastoralist are of dark skin with long limbs and with a standing Army of foot soldiers called Morans. It is this institution of Moranism among the Nilotic Pastoralist that makes escalation of conflict intermittent in Northern Kenya because the unfinished cattle raids assignments are handed over from one Moran age set to the next. The practice inculcates the need for conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist intermittent and complex particularly when either internal or external conflict triggers are pressed.

2.3 Contextualizing the conflict: The parties involved

The Turkana
The Turkana people are estimated to be 800 000 within Kenya, accounting for around 2% of the entire Kenyan population as per the 2009 census. They are found predominantly in Turkana County. Being pastoralists, their primary commodities are livestock such as cattle, goats, camels, and sheep. They thus heavily rely on following the rains and tend to migrate from one location to another moving in temporary camps. Age is a key factor in the organizational structure of Turkana society, and commonly there is a generational structure of leadership with elders taking the helm in mediating disputes and directing trade defense. Authority is generally decentralized and while there are clan leaders, small communities
generally decide collectively on actions to take. For defense purposes, enforcement is generally granted to village Morans and their age-mates (Mathew and Boyd, 2014). Although historically there has been a warrior sect of Turkana society, increasingly. This role has become increasingly voluntary for purposes of raiding which is generally a large-scale community effort.

There are two generation sets in the Turkana society, namely stone (imuru) and leopards (eraiat) which alternate generations in each family. Generation-sets function as groups only during initiation or other ceremonies and raids (Gulliver, 1955). Entry into the age-set is determined at birth, and every male child become a member of the opposite age set of the father (Gulliver, 1955). One of the major functions of age-sets is raiding to acquire territory, pasture, water supply, and animals, as well as to protect these homesteads from external aggression. Morans are always ready to fight and defend homesteads, herds, pastures, and water points. Age-set systems are built on the basis of military activities for raiding to acquire stock and pasture and kill enemies. The elders from clans and generation-sets are also asked to say traditional prayers at these events (Gulliver 1955).

The Pokot

The Pokot people roughly number 512,690 according to census 2009 (KNBS, 2010). They inhabit the semi-arid plains of north of Lake Baringo, West Pokot and Tiaty sub county. They are mainly pastoralists keeping herds of cattle, camels and small stock of goats and sheep. The Pokots community is organized in similar fashion to the Turkana. The society is based on patrilineal heritage and is organized around a clan entity living in a village-style setting. The Pokot heavily rely on livestock and migratory patterns. Again, age is an important organizational structure and a generational top-down approach is manifested in many aspects. The Pokot community is governed by a series of age-sets. Group membership is determined through the age at which one undergoes initiation. For young men this is done at around the age of twelve and at the onset of menarche (Wanjala, 1997). According to Thomson (1884), after an encounter with the Pokot wrote that the Pokot were strong-boned fellows who went absolutely naked. He described them as very uncontrollable and generally quite a match for the Maasai or Samburu, in whose country
they frequently made raids for livestock. Conflict in the Pokot community has been mainly attributed to the cultural concept of “we” and “they”. The Pokot people have no word or term for a visitor. Anybody who is not a Pochon- one of them is described as an enemy. This is used to differentiate an insider “we” Pokots and the non-Pokots “they”. Due to this perception, therefore, all the cows belong to “us” insiders and not to “them” outsiders. This is also embedded in their myth of creation story which has it that God created the first Pokot man and gave him the cattle. They usually use this kind of explanation to justify cattle rustling. They don’t regard cattle rustling as an act of stealing since they believe that they are bringing them back to where they belong.

For the Pokot, raiding livestock from enemies has been an integral aspect of their culture and they claim the practice has existed from time immemorial. For as far as can be traced back in the national archives, the Pokot and surrounding neighbors, most notably the Samburu and Turkana, have been raiding each other on a regular basis, at least since the end of the 19th century. The Pokot therefore generally refer to themselves as an isolated group that is surrounded by enemies (Bollig, 2006). Historically, this led to the ideological belief that in order for them to survive, they have to conceal their identity through adopting cultural characteristics of their neighbors.

The Samburu
The Samburu are a Nilotic-speaking people originating in Sudan but most closely resembling the Maasai in terms of subsistence and cultural traditions to an extent that 98% of their language is shared between the two groups (Sommer and Vossen, 1993). They are nomadic pastoralists living in presently Samburu County and they rely most heavily on milk production from cattle and small stock (sheep and goats). Paul Spencer’s *The Samburu* (1965) and *Nomads in Alliance* (1973) are regarded as vital works in providing the most comprehensive account of Samburu organization, traditions and practices despite the majority of Spencer’s fieldwork being conducted under colonial administration. Much has changed for the Samburu from the colonial period until now in terms of environmental conditions, political influences, development initiatives, and livelihood pursuits. However, Spencer’s work continues to stand as the major authority in describing Samburu age set systems, genealogies, and kinship relationships.
Up to now, most Samburu remain pure pastoralists. However, there are agro-pastoralist areas found around the Maralal highlands where there are higher levels of precipitation. Samburu herds tend to have high numbers of small stock but the cow remains the most precious inclusion in the herd. However, due to an overall reduction in grass-cover and other grazing fodder, along with the cow’s high dependence on water, the number of cows in the herd have decreased substantially over the last generation.

Male Samburu youths remain children until the age of circumcision (around 14 to 15 years old). After this rite of passage, taken with other youth members of the same clan, the initiated age-set is collectively responsible of protecting their ethnic group’s livestock and personal safety. For this reason, all Morans carry weapons (knives, spears, or Arrows). High labor demands are placed on the Morans as they are required to herd animals far from home territory areas when the environmental conditions require substantial migrations in search of pasture and water. However, during rainy periods, the Morans are able to return to their home areas where they will be at leisure. Moran spend this free time singing and dancing in the evenings with young ladies from their area where the subject matter of these songs range from the re-telling of battles to where Morans have travelled during the dry season to acts of bravery or praise for animals. The Moran age-set period ends when the new Moran age-set is ready to take its place, and the current Morans begin to marry when they reach approximately 26 to 30 years old.

**Genesis of the Nilotic Pastoralist Conflicts**

Between the Samburu and the Pokot, the conflict is bedeviled with territorial, livestock, murder, attempted murder and kidnapping claims and counter claims. According to Pokots the conflict between them is traced from Uasin Gishu when Samburu and East Pokot bulls fought resulting into a Samburu bull breaking the front leg of the Pokot’s bull. This incidence infuriated the Pokot bull owner who demanded compensation from the Samburu. Consequently he was given a heifer. This incident marked the historical origin of the conflict between the two communities.
Between the Pokot and the Turkana, much of the existing literature is recent and biased that their relationship has always been conflictual. Lamphear (1992) speculates the Pokot and the Turkana were allies as they frequently combined to raid the Samburu to push them further south of Lake Turkana and must have come together to push the Samburu again from the Kerio Valley (Lamphear, 1992). The expulsion of the Samburu from Kerio Valley allowed the Pokot to descend from the hills to the valley they presently occupy. Lamphear further indicates that there was active trade between the two communities. In particular, the Turkana Keebotok (considered a poor clan) played a middlemen role between them. By 1900, there was considerable cultural exchange, linguistic and economic affinities. Many Pokot and Turkana became bilingual, a fact which mis-informed colonial observers who mistook Suk for Turkana language (Barton, 1957). Johnson (1904) indicates that there was increased intermarriage between the Pokot and Turkana to the extent that the two communities could almost be described as one people. In the process, the Pokot adopted the sapana from the Karimojong a song and baboon dance from the Turkana. Colonial administrators’ interests rudely punctured this beneficial exchange between the Pokot and Turkana since the British were determined to bring the Turkana under their control (Johnson, 1904). They used the Pokot to stop the Turkana’s southward expansion. The settler community deprived the Pokot of grazing land, hence forced them to move nearer to the Turkana, leading to more frequent conflicts over limited resources.
2.4 Traditional Cattle Raiding
Cattle’s raiding is a very old cultural practice that has been in existence for generations among Nilotic pastoralist of Northern Kenya. The practice has been defined as forceful attack by an ‘outside group’ whose main objective is stealing cattle rather than seeking territorial expansion. The ‘theft’ is culturally accepted and is carried out by groups of young male Morans who engage in the practice as part of the societal requirement for achieving manhood as well as in response to symbolic and economic motives. Raiding also occurs in retaliation to prior attacks in order to (re)acquire stolen stock or simply to intimidate enemy groups (Mulugeta and Hagmann, 2008). Customarily, raiding was done under very strict traditional control and raided cattle were to serve three key motives. Firstly, the raiding had a social and economic purpose of creating a better economic base and
enhancing one’s social status in the society. Secondly, it served the motive of territorial control of grazing areas which subsequently led to an entrenched position of the stronger group. Lastly, it had a motive of increasing one’s herd as insurance against unexpected misfortunes such as drought, famine, and cattle epidemics.

Traditionally, raiding among pastoral societies had three main objectives. It had a social and economic base. An individual without livestock could not actively participate in the socio-political affairs of the society. Secondly, there was competition for grazing land and water. Due to scarcity or dwindling of resources as a result of overpopulation or adverse climatic changes, some groups are forced to move their livestock to territories that belong to other ethnic groups or clans and this led to conflicts. Thirdly, there are survival strategies. Loss of cattle could lead to raids which was one of the options of replenishing depleted herds. Similarly, raids could be undertaken as means of increasing one's stock as an insurance against unforeseen calamities. In other words, cattle wars constituted a communal response to natural calamities (Ocan, 1992).

Traditional raids had very limited economic gains in comparison with the more certain and peaceful mathematics of natural growth. Formal raiding acknowledged the emergence of a new age-set. The raids were shaped by numerous sets of taboos and restrictions. The raids were planned openly and the raided animals were usually distributed among the members of the clan or age-set. Historically, cattle raiding involved the entire society. It would begin with a consultation of seers, elders, renowned Morans and women to establish whether or not it was possible for a raid to be carried out. There was communal responsibility and reverence for the different roles played by different groups in the manyattas and kraals for the wellbeing of the society. For instance, before a raid, seers would be consulted for information on issues of rituals, timing, and routes to be followed. The Elders would perform all the required rituals (Almagor, 1979). The women also played a very important role of blessing the Morans and preparing the special meat that they took with them. Spies and guides would also be raised from the manyattas and kraals and the entire community would offer their support thus having a direct influence on the planning and implementation of all cattle raids.
Likewise, the returns would be shared by all members of the community as raided animals were amalgamated into the joint herds and everyone benefited from the proceeds. The Morans were particularly supposed to reciprocate by killing a bull for the elders as some form of pay back (taxes) to the elders for blessing the raid. The bulls were killed for the elders to feast on. Younger people say that sometimes the elders could withhold their blessings at the onset of a raid but readily share in the spoils of the raid once it was successful.

The raids were also integral to the cultural requirements for boys to demonstrate courage as they pass through the rites of passage to be declared men. Elders talk about the kind of special body tattoos that a Moran who kills several people in battle with enemies is decorated with and as such is considered as a great warrior. The more tattoo marks a warrior obtains, the more popular and respected he becomes in the community prompting more girls to will try to dance with him and want to marry that warrior. On the other hand, the men who grow to maturity without such body tattoos are ridiculed in the community prompting them to go on raiding expeditions so as to kill the enemy and earn respect, and prove that they are not useless men in the society. Girls and women normally sing war songs to praise successful Morans and ridicule those who have not raided a single cow or goat. Girls only choose to dance with brave Morans during the evening beer party or at the traditional festive dancing parties; the undecorated men are shunned and verbally abused as cowards.

Therefore, unique to this period, survival was the primary motive for cattle raiding, closely followed by factors such as maintaining group solidarity or accumulating prestige. Other socio-political reasons such as providing an opportunity for young men to prove their manhood were more of motivational factors. Redistributive raiding served to rebuild herds of cattle depleted by drought, diseases, and raids or serve the needs of marriage and rituals (Mkutu, 2008). Cattle raiding assumed a redistributive function as a traditionally recognized way of reallocating pastoral resources between rich and poor herders which has and have been an equally common feature of both intra- and inter-tribal relations (Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Lamphear, 1976). Through the diverse forms of engagements, cattle
raiding served to rebuild herds after livestock have been devastated by drought or decimated by disease or seized in raids, and both the frequency and intensity of these happenings was often closely tied to climatic conditions and the prevailing state of the ‘tribal peace’.

Key to raiding of this period was the concept of reciprocity. Historically, pastoral communities in Northern Kenya operated on communal grazing lands rather peacefully. Because grazing lands could only be used for several months of the year, arrangements on land sharing were made between communities. Reciprocal institutional arrangements were borne in which some communities allowed grazing on their lands during certain periods in return for grazing rights in neighboring regions (Ngaido, 2005). Reciprocity emerged as the key mechanism which enabled collective action among the pastoralist of Northern Kenya. However, with the onset of colonial land policies and the encroachment on pastoral grazing lands by administrative policies, reciprocity was interrupted. There could no longer be an internal guarantee of reciprocity.

Under the circumstances discussed above, raiding was traditionally managed within the context of the pastoralists’ notion of a cattle being a communal property. The raiding operations by young Morans were sanctioned by elders and evolved according to strict rules governing preparation, engagement, disengagement and conflict resolution (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns, 1998). Cattle’s raiding was not perceived as stealing; instead, it was a social, economic as well as a heroic endeavor. This cultural practice was very important and was loaded with livelihood-enhancing functions. A warrior enhanced his status in society by acquiring wealth. The wealth in cattle which earned him a wife and reverence and above all, changed his social status. That is why pastoralists in Northern Kenya would never admit any fault as far as raiding is concerned (Knighton, 2005). The use of excessive violence especially against the elderly, women and children was taboo and socially intolerable. Raiding was more of a cultural prerequisite for the advancement of social, political and economic matters.
Rather than spark violence, traditional raiding contributed to the stability of the pastoral system as a whole. In the absence of any over-arching authority in pastoral society, raiding and other forms of warfare served to maintain separate identities and rule-governed relations between different groups as well as acting as a balance (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns, 1998). From the above assertion it can be concluded that traditional raiding occurred within an acceptable social framework which was able to accommodate its excesses (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns, 1998).

After independence, pastoralist communities in Kenya saw increasingly violent conflict with one another. Many scholars pinpoint the cause of these recurring conflicts to the fact that colonial administrators were pushing these ethnic communities out of their historical homelands to make room for farmland (Murunga and Nasong’o, 2007; Kanyinga, 2009). Consequently, these communities now found themselves fighting over new territories where they were often at odds with the previous inhabitants. Notably, the Turkana and Pokot communities adapted to these colonial policies by adopting ‘transhumance forms of pastoralism’ in which they generally abandoned a nomadic lifestyle for themselves but maintained nomadic herding of cattle (KHRC, 2010). This adaptation shifted the battlegrounds from the communities themselves to the grasslands on which the cattle were grazed; the rustling of livestock thus increased.

2.5 Discipline and the Age-set system

Whereas cattle raiding involved considerable use of force, the organization of the age-sets that nurtured warrior groups functioned like contemporary military formations that train disciplined military personnel. Military discipline here refers to a special form of principles that govern relations in the age-set system. Usually the conduct of the members of the forces is regulated by special rules delineating required standards of behavior as stipulated in the regulations and orders of commanders (superiors) and reflecting the specific features of the state (Spencer, 1973).
Inclusion in age-set is not necessarily a question of chronological age. Younger men could sometimes be initiated ahead of older ones because of greater physical maturity or for some other approved reasons. Sometimes members of the same age-set were never initiated together in the same year. The ceremonies are held for small groups, in their own neighborhood at an appropriate time and when the required sacrificial beasts can be offered. When an age-set is initiated, it may not adopt a name already in use by a superior generation set while any member of that set is still living. This is out of respect for those still living or it might be out of fear that some hurt or harm (violence) might follow, that is, out of superstition (Pazzaglia, 1982).

Therefore, the society through elders has proper means of controlling cattle raiding and limiting any excesses young men who would be tempted to engage in raiding. The elders do this in two ways; First is the religious way – which involves the elders taking control over the significant rituals linked to raiding itself and those that attend to the age-class system that defined the young men’s rites of passage. Since the spiritual wellbeing of the society rests in their age old wisdom and links to the supernatural, they can make threats of a curse which is greatly most feared. Secondly, given the fact that cattle are collectively owned by families, the management of wealth falls directly on the authority of the elders who control the flow of wealth in the community and their sons desire to get married (Lamphear, 1998; Knighton, 2005). The age-set organization provides the groups with the principles for political or military behavior. They are able to take corporate action by sanctioning a specific class to wield authority and exact obedience in public matters (Dyson-Hudson, 1966).

Traditionally, control of the behavior of Morans was exercised within the age-set system. The Morans have a king in every age – set for disciplinary control and maintaining law and order as stipulated in the cultural values. And the society was able to control these young men whom they organized to move together through social roles as well as arming them to defend the society and its resources. In addition, it inculcated in them “the ‘queue discipline’ which encouraged young men to wait their turn, entailing group solidarity, communal brotherhood, and obedient deference until such time as they enter a new role where individual acquisitiveness and differentiation are the norm (Lamphear, 1998).
Pastoral societies were always confronted with the problem of safeguarding internal peace and harmony which included persistently fighting enemies and raiders from other groups. For this reason a disciplined standing force was always required. Hence a sense of group consciousness and an almost constant condition of physical and emotional readiness to fight in defense of the society was imparted in the Morans. Additionally, they were armed, high discipline was necessary to keep them in check lest they go on the rampage and spread disorder in the society (Lamphear, 1998).

2.6 Moranism
Moranism remains one of the most enduring aspects and tradition of pastoralists in Northern Kenya. Moranism is the social tradition among pastoral communities that involves the admission of young men into warrior-hood. The title of Moran has been conceived by some scholars as a metaphor for heroism due to the military and aesthetic exploits Morans are famed for. Traditionally, moranism was primarily meant to promote comradeship, self-esteem, courage, strength, perseverance, self-sacrifice and adventurism in young men (Almagor, 1979). While examining the role of Morans, Ndagala (1991) noted that Morans, among others, serve as the military wing of the community by keeping vigil against cattle raiders and wild animals preying on their cattle. They were socially-wired to believe that their foremost duty was to defend the community and their livestock. The defense and military like responsibility bestowed on the Morans demanded of them to exercise utmost perseverance, courage, glamour and freedom (Ndagala, 1991). These Morans were urged to kill fierce animals and even in extreme cases in some communities a human being as a sign of their bravery and courage. Such courageous and heroic acts would be marked by bodily tattoos carefully crafted on the body of the warrior for every killing committed. Through the socialization that elevates courage, bravery and heroism, Moranism became the most adored institution by the young boys to an extent that each of them looks up to the time they will become Morans.

Mburu (2002) asserts that the art of tattooing, which portrays one as a raiding maestro, exacerbates the unrelenting desire to kill those branded as enemies. Tattooing is an element of the quest of heroism and “pet-naming”. Pet names are associated with having big bulls
and killing enemies. Special warrior names distinguish one from the rest of the men in the society. Constant reference and praise of heroes in meetings and cultural festivals encourages others to engage in raiding and in other acts of lawlessness as a way of emulating or surpassing the prowess of heroes. In Turkana county, raiding has traditionally been part of the ritual process by which young men proved they were ready for manhood (Mkutu, 2007). In addition, ‘the status of a warrior is determined once a man has killed his first enemy – an event he will mark by notching a scar on his right shoulder or chest (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004). Among many pastoralist communities and especially the Turkana and Pokot people, youths are generally entrusted with implementation of the decisions of the elders and the security of the community. Extensively encouraged by a composition of anecdotes and proverbs, music, dance and drama, the youth execute this task at whatever cost.

Inevitably, this provokes counter revenge from the opponent party. Among the pastoralists, men are considered to be the breadwinners for their families. In times of scarcity, men must replenish food supplies through any means, which is not limited to raiding. Raiding is in fact considered by the society as the first option. Livestock rustling is believed to be the most direct way to wealth accumulation because livestock occupies such a central place among pastoralists. Social status being determined by the number of livestock in one’s possession. Those without cattle are rebuked as poor and enthused to raid other communities to overcome their condition. Rites of passage/ initiation ceremonies elevates a youth to an elder of a special age set are an entitlement to all men but they are only possible for those who have cattle. The need to go through this rite encourages those without cattle to go raiding to get cattle to undergo it. Without that ceremony, one becomes a laughing stock in the community. Every successful raid is accompanied by a traditional ceremony of “Lokwa” (Bull killed by the youth for the elders as a thanks giving for further blessings and for success in upcoming raids).

The significance attached to traditional institutions meant the community ensured that Morans were properly and adequately guided on their current and future roles. Consequently, the role of elders was very important. Social order hinged on the respect the
Morans had for the elders. Buttressing such respect was Samburu community’s belief in the curse of elders. Morans feared that disobedience would spell curse on them which served as deterrence to any wayward behavior (Baxter, 1993).

2.7 Pastoral Communities Conflict Coping Mechanisms

In Semi-Arid areas, pastoralists have to have a number of coping mechanisms. First, a high degree of mobility and open utilization of communal grazing land is of a vital importance. Herds can be moved away from unproductive to more productive lands (Bollig and Göbel, 1997). Movement for this purpose can be generally characterized as residing in wet season areas that lack permanent water supplies when rainfall allows the exploitation of these areas followed by an increased rate and range of movement during the dry season/at times of resource scarcity in search of perennial water sources and available grazing (Angassa and Beyene, 2003). Mobility not only allows for the use of productive tracts of land and water but it also enables previously-inhabited land to rest and recover after utilization which is an essential component of successful rangelands management (Oba and Lusigi, 1987; Cossins and Upton, 1988). With correct management, mobile pastoralism has been proven to be more economically profitable and productive than classical ranching models within paddocked and sedentarised areas (Behnke, 1994). Dyson-Hudson (1980) note that, as a strategy, mobile herding is a favorable coping response to resource scarcity as it does not require a large capital investment nor high inputs of fuel energy neither does it entail the transference of foods suitable for human consumption into supporting livestock.

A second coping mechanism employed by pastoralists is accumulating herd stocks by effectively creating an insurance policy against drought extremes which often results to large herds of cattle dying.. Coughenour et al. (1985) explain that accumulation allows for the keeping of large numbers of breeding females necessary for food requirements as it simultaneously allows for breeding herds to remain intact during scarcity periods so that when conditions once again become favorable. Herders are more able to rebuild herds close to pre-crisis numbers (Coughenour, et al., 1985). Accumulation for pastoralists in East Africa is vital; a place where livestock off-take due to the effects of drought can diminish herds by estimates of more than half (McCabe, 1985) and such devastation has the possibility of affecting herd numbers, particularly of breeding females, for up to ten years (Dahl and Hjort, 1976).
A third coping mechanism is building strong social networks through interethnic marriage. Far-reaching social networks allow alliances to be called upon in times of individual hardship (Almagor, 1979; Sobania, 1988). The result of these reciprocal relationships allows for affected parties to ‘borrow’ livestock from others in order to replenish breeding stocks after disturbances or to readily move animals into more productive pastures during times of environmental distress. Dyson-Hudson (1966) has estimated that maintaining social networks effectively opens up four or five times the amount of space within a pastoral territory than one herder would have access to if he were managing his herd in isolation (Dyson-Hudson, 1966).

Elders and conflict management institutions are another coping mechanism. Given a motivation to limit conflict, traditionally the ability of the elder age-set to act as an effective conflict management institution relied on three main sources of authority: control of access to resources/marriage; being part of a large cross-clan, cross-ethnic, cross-generation network; and, supernatural legitimacy (Gulliver, 1955; Spencer, 1973). One customary means that they used to prevent or manage prevented or managed conflict was the neutralization of raiding rewards. In Turkana, raided cattle could only be given to a related elder as a gift or sold to buy weapons, and were not allowed to be used to build up a raider’s own herd. Further, the raiders were prohibited from marrying abducted girls. The bride wealth was smaller for a fostered daughter and not likely to be available to the raider in time to affect his chances to start an independent life. The prestige gained from raiding could not be converted into strengthened individual status or into an improved group position in the age system (Almagor, 1979).

2.8 Masculinity and the Associated Stereotypes

It should be taken into account that pastoralism remains the foremost source of livelihood to most inhabitants of Northern Kenya. It should further be noted that all aspects of pastoral social and economic life are ordered in relation to livestock and the environment in which they live. To this extent, cattle does not only hold central value among most communities in Northern Kenya but also forms the basis of association in a complex of social, political and religious institutions. Possession of adequate livestock therefore remains one of the most aspirations of the inhabitants of the region. While inheritance and purchase are the
only non-conflictual ways of owning livestock in the village, these avenues while appreciated, do not ensure ownership of adequate livestock. Further, they do afford the Morans the opportunity to express their masculinity. Cattle raiding are thus preferred not only as a means of acquiring adequate livestock but also an opportunity for the Morans to express their masculine-bravery, courage and related revered virtues.

Traditions, cultural songs and dances carried from one generation to another highlight the existence and significance of cattle raiding in Samburu community with other pastoral communities being no exception. Although the practice of cattle raiding has evolved over the years, it was understood in the traditional sense. The practice was considered to be a deeply entrenched cultural practice where young men would steal livestock as a means of re-stocking or acquiring more heads of cattle for various purposes which included raising enough animals for the payment of dowry or as a show of heroism and/or a means to wealth enhancement. In cases of theft, injury or death, there may be significant cultural pressure for youth to engage in revenge attacks. Failure by the Morans to avenge these deaths or injuries was interpreted as an act of cowardice and such men would even be shunned by potential girlfriends or wives. At the extreme end, they would be cursed and ostracized by the elders. Morans in their effort not to be seen as traitors would often engage in revenge attacks. It is adherence to such cultural norms and desire to express their masculinity that is primarily responsible for not only the escalation of conflicts but also cycles of violent conflict in northern Kenya.

Beading was yet another cultural practice in Samburu community that Morans used to express their masculinity. Beading involves Samburu Morans giving specialized beads to an uncircumcised young girl to signify the commencement of a sexual relationship with the girl. Some of these girls could be as young as 14 years. Morans would often approach the girl’s mother and brothers who in most cases are also Morans. Once the relationship is agreed, the girl’s mother builds a hut for the couple called a ‘singira’ where the Moran will have access to the girl for sex. Most of these negotiations are done often at the total exclusion of the girl. Elders for example argue that beading reduces conflict between them and Morans because it provides Morans with sexual partners and prevents them from seducing the elders’ wives. Similarly, Morans observe that the practice reduces conflict amongst themselves since it prevents intra-conflicts emanating from seducing the same potential sexual partners.
Although beading was ostensibly done to reduce conflicts between the Morans and the elders and between Morans themselves, closer examination of this practice reveals otherwise. The practice has in away emboldened the Morans to run roughshod on the girls. Morans have increasingly become violent towards girls if the accounts of girls that have undergone through the practice is anything to go by. There are numerous accounts of relatively elderly women who had been beaded as a young girl (Surmelei), describing the fact that the Moran beat them up whenever they went against what he wanted done. Several women described the fact that because of beating by the Moran who had beaded them they ran away and ultimately their families returned the beads rather than return the girl to an abusive relationship. Equally, women described the fact that if Samburu girls refuse to be beaded, they will sometime be beaten by their mothers and brothers who have made the arrangement. Girls have also often described the practice as “torture” because they are forced to have sex while still young and because of the physical beatings they receive from the Morans (Spencer, 1973).

Beads that are used for these practices are very expensive and costs a lot of money that at times are beyond the reach of individual Moran. Such individuals have to be assisted to acquire sufficient beads to be used for beading. Where such assistance are lacking some Morans have to engage in cattle raids from neighboring communities to get cattle which they in turn, sell in order to raise money for the beads. Beading in this case increases conflicts between the community and its neighbors through organized cattle raids. From the forgoing, it is thus clear that beading has not resulted in reducing conflicts not even with the community as previously thought but has instead precipitated the gender-based and inter-community conflicts.

The institution of marriage was yet another important avenue that Morans have used to express their masculinity. Samburu Community is traditionally polygamous. This was thought to be a long standing and practical adaptation to high infant and warrior mortality rates. Most of the pastoral communities including the Samburu are yet to embrace modern demographic practices and trends and as such still perceive children as a source of wealth and insurance against old age. Consequently, many still consider polygamy as an important practice that guarantees them not only wives but also many children. Men with large families in the name of wives and children are highly valued hence the pressure to marry many wives.
While polygamy as a form of marriage and cultural practice is socially valued and approved among the pastoral communities including the Turkana and Pokot, the practice increases the potential for conflict. Men who wish to have several wives must engage multiple cattle raids so as to raise several heads of livestock not only as a bride price for their wives but also for their male children’s wives. The social prestige associated with polygamy may pressurize Morans to engage in unnecessary cattle raiding. Traditionally, all raids should first be approved by the elders but faced with this desire, young men often decide in secret and took action quickly without informing the elders of their intentions (Gulliver, 1951). Such raids may turn out to be large scale attacks typical of escalated conflict and all-out war that ordinarily require a degree of organization and mobilization that was only within the power of elders.

Polygamy as a cultural practice also increases the demand for land for settlement and grazing. The large family set up arising from polygamy requires huge tracks of land for settlement as well as for grazing the large herd acquired through cattle raiding and natural growth. Additionally, water is also needed by such families for their livestock. The fact that polygamy is preferred by most Morans implies that many of them will require large tracks of land and huge grazing fields for their livestock. This may lead to competition for land for settlement as well as pasture resulting in both intra and inter-community conflicts as each polygamous family tries to acquire as much land as possible for their settlement and grazing. Although access and utilization of land was regulated by the elders, Morans are increasing defying elders on this role and have thus engaged in self-acquisition of land, a move that has not only strained the relationship between them and the elders but also between them and other members of the community.

The desire to become a successful warrior has also contributed to the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. The social recognition individuals receive for conflict participation can be enormous. Successful Morans may receive honorific chest scars denoting the kills made, be entitled to a new name indicating their success in war, wear special insignia, have songs sung about them, and gain the respect of their peers. Similarly, females and elders may also encourage aggression during raids by teasing or mocking individuals to participate in conflict especially if there has been unavenged raid against their group. The prestige and symbolic capital for successful raiders is still a powerful motive particularly amongst
Morans who have no chance of social advancement through formal education. It should be noted here that the taboo-regulated traditional nature of cattle raids shunned the killing of members of the rival communities. Morans driven by desire for social recognition normally disregard the rules of reciprocal raiding which prompt many to indulge in looting great numbers of livestock, deliberate killings and cruelty among other related prohibited raiding practices. While it is clear that Morans at times engage in violent behaviors that are not sanctioned by the community, the teachings that Morans get is the community’s most respected in the institution of elders, which seeks to instill bravery and courage largely served to instill aggression and violence in the minds of the young men. This has made most Morans to prefer aggression and violence as the most convenient means of resolving disputes even if other peaceful means would have generated amicable solution to the problem in existence.

While such indulgence will aid the Morans in massaging their heroic ego, the danger is the emotions and desire for revenge that such indulgence generates from the raided community. This definitely leads to an escalation in both frequency and intensity whose likely outcomes are more loss of human lives, more animals being looted as well as the development of deeply rooted mistrust and hate between the warring parties. Further, such escalation causes disruption to the pastoral routine, because the young men stop tending the cattle in order to go to war, and because cattle are forced to graze in restricted areas due to the danger of hostilities (Almagor, 1979). Almagor points out ‘that once a raid gets started there is no guarantee that the excited raiders will not commit excesses which may attract a large-scale retaliation’ (1979). Ultimately, escalation is prompted by one group’s perception that the raiding practices of the other group have become “excessive”. Such increased raiding may result in a campaign which involves organized recruitment and strategic decision-making process. Inter-tribal co-operation ceases and daily social life and economic routines are disrupted hence a creation of an intermittent cycle of conflicts.

2.9 Pastoral Economy
Control of pastoral economy has been cited as a contributor to conflict escalation in Northern Kenya. It should be taken into account that pastoralism is the main source of livelihood in Northern Kenya thus making it the backbone of the region’s economy. For a
long time, pastoral economy used to be a monopoly of the elders. Elders own the livestock, control resources and dispose of marriages. The young are poor by definition to the point that should a young man inherit a herd and family responsibilities, he would become an "elder" regardless of his age (Baxter, 1979). Elders use different tactics to retain their foothold on the pastoral economy. For instance, they control cattle raiding, regulate access and use of pastoral resources such as grazing lands and watering points, as well as overseeing the distribution of livestock acquired through raids. While most of these interventions were important in preserving unity and cohesion in the community, some Morans increasingly perceived these as roadblocks placed on their way and are designed to confine them to perpetual poverty. For instance, it has been noted that while Morans are the ones who engage in the raids, a higher percentage almost 90% of the proceeds go to the elders, leaving hundreds of Morans with a paltry 10% to share amongst themselves (Baxter, 1979). The small herds of livestock left with hundreds of Morans to share imply that some of the Morans actually miss out despite risking their lives during the raids. Based on these perceptions of systematic exploitation, some Morans choose to ignore elders’ role especially those relating to cattle raids and thus sought to engage in unsanctioned raids. In this light, raids may be seen as a form of competition for control over pastoral resources between the Morans and the elders.

An escalation of conflict through cattle raids causes economic disruption which damages the elders’ position and prestige in society. When Morans raid other communities for livestock and the raided livestock are probably those belonging to the elderly in the other communities. In the event of counter-raids, there is a high likelihood that the elders of the raiding community will equally lose their livestock to the raiders. By virtue of their age and position Morans are likely to fiercely defend their newly acquired livestock thus leaving those belonging to the elders as the easy target. While there is strong evidence on this, Morans may capitalize on their rivalry with the elders and fail to offer protection to the elders’ livestock thus exposing them to the raiders. Consequently, it weakens the elders economically as well as socially to the point of robbing them the prestige attached to the eldership. These political and economic transformations of the eldership disaggregate the attributes of the status of “elder”. Political authority and economic control may thus
become new forms of elder characterization. The implication of this is that the social role of elder is not any more a prerogative of age. For instance, young people who are wealthy and have political authority may be regarded in the Samburu Community as elders.

Persistent and unrestrained intermittent conflict escalation occasioned by wealth and status inspired raids by Morans also has the potential of constraining elders’ roles in peace making. The traditional peacemaking role of the elders was understood as the affirmation of the elders’ interests as custodians of the inter-community co-existence. Elders are better placed to preside over peacemaking mechanism during in conflicts that they have full knowledge of and especially those that are occasioned by activities that they have sanctioned. However, it would be extremely difficult for elders to initiate peace between the Samburu and the neighboring communities over issues they are least informed about such as unsanctioned cattle raids. But failure by the elders to intervene could also be interpreted as their inability to exercise their institutional role of conflict management in the community while their intervention may also be seen as aiding wayward behavior among the Morans whose activities are largely for personal aggrandizement rather than collective interest. It is such half-hearted interventions on conflict situations that have contributed to strained relations between communities leading to revenge and counter-revenge missions.

Morans’ broader goal of challenging the inequality perpetrated by the elders who control a disproportionate share of community’s resources and the elders’ resolve to actively defend their advantages is what has led to the intermittent escalation of conflicts in the region. Morans’ realization that their loyalty to the elders is not guided by any reasonable shared values but by the coercive powers of the elders’ has inevitably led them to question the authority of the elders. Morans have used a variety of methods to defy elders’ authority including engaging in unsanctioned raids, disobeying elders’ authority over grazing areas and watering points and challenging the myth of elders’ curse as a social control mechanism. Groups and individuals advance their own interests, struggling over control of societal resources. The result of this power struggle between Morans and elders has heightened the escalation of both inter-community and intra-community conflicts in Northern Kenya region.
2.10 Conflict Entrepreneurship

Some of the conflict situations in Northern Kenya are motivated by greed and lust for power and prestige rather than grievance. Community Morans or Morans are at times not necessarily heroes struggling for any collective or worthwhile cause rather they sometimes fight for their own selfish ends. Some of these young men pretend that they are public-spirited individuals fighting against some form of injustice, unfairness, marginalization or exclusion but in the real sense, they are simply people who feel that they will not do well without a conflict. They therefore generate one grievance or another conjured by massaging one form of prejudice, propaganda or blackmail. Such promoters and profiteers of conflict are often referred to as conflict entrepreneurs. The study defines conflict entrepreneur as an individual who profits from conditions that promote conflict to undermine efforts of good governance. This narrative partly captures the situation in Northern Kenya and other parts of the country.

Some of the conflict situations in Northern Kenya are increasingly being organized around wage-labour. For instance, an increase in ‘commercial’ raiding includes cases of ‘sponsored’ raiding where guns are provided to young men by wealthy people who wish to acquire livestock for sale. These markets are unconstrained by national frontiers and are largely controlled by people in positions of political power or with access to weapons (Hendrickson et al. 1998). The existence of conflict entrepreneurs has been exemplified by the emergence of conflicts in non-traditional areas. Traditionally, most of the conflicts in Northern Kenya revolved around pastoralism; cattle raiding, conflicts over grazing land and watering points. Recent years has, however, seen the emergence of conflicts between Morans and wildlife agencies. Morans have especially been accused of engaging in poaching, an area that was traditionally unheard of among pastoral communities. In Kenya, for example about 60 rhinos were killed for their horns in 2013, compared to 30 in 2012 (KWS, 2014). Some of the poaching activities have been reported in wildlife conservancies located in Kenya’s Northern counties notably Laikipia, Samburu and even Turkana. Further, Morans have also engaged in banditry and high robbery some of which have resulted to large scale inter-community conflicts. For instance, incidences of banditry, which ideally are caused by a few opportunistic Moran criminals easily transform into a
full blown inter-ethnic conflicts. When such wayward Morans are being pursued by members of a different ethnic group or government security agencies for their criminal activities, they often seek refuge in their communities thereby transforming an individual’s problem into a communal concern which usually leads to strained relations between the concerned parties.

Similar incidences have also been reported among the Turkana Morans. The most noticeable incident of opportunistic warrior raids occurred in Kainuk, when three armed Turkana Morans ambushed a truck driver resulting in the death of the driver and his assistant (Bevan, 2008). The bandits made way with valuables including cash. There were further evidence that Morans from the Turkana community often engaged in banditry directly or had their firearms hired for raiding and other criminal activities. Morans from Northern Kenya have also in the past been enrolled as fighters in conflicts across the border where they received military training and weapons that they usually keep if they survive and return. Meanwhile, deserters and ex-combatants drift into Kenya from the areas of fighting in neighboring countries, swelling the ranks of bandits or making a living as mercenaries or cheap fighters in commercial raids. Schlee (1989) reports that during the Ogaden war, it was common that young men pretended to want to join the guerrillas but once armed and trained in Somalia, returned to Kenya and gave themselves to banditry. According to Goldsmith (1997), Somali internal conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s had a direct effect on the rate of banditry in northern Kenya, including Tana River and Lamu.

A more robust conflict entrepreneurship, and which Morans and their equivalents in other northern Kenya communities is the arms and ammunitions trade. For instance, while a brand new AK-47; much coveted for its firepower and simplicity-, can be purchased from a Russian factory at 240 US Dollars. In certain parts of Africa including northern Kenya where supplies are plentiful, it can be bought for as little as between 13 and 30 USD (Controlarms, 2006: SAS 2009). There are also instances where arms sellers often supply weapons on credit, a practice that is seen as a form of investment and equated to the old practice of richer people “investing” a camel (for a young man with no camel to ride) in Saharan raids and caravans and taking part of the profit from the operation as payment (Goldsmith, 1997).
The deployment of Morans as Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) by the government to help it maintain law and order in Northern Kenya has also seen the institution of Moranism contribute to conflict escalation in the region. While the original intention to arm the Turkana and Samburu community against their hostile neighbors was very noble, the conversion of some Morans into KPRs appeared to have not been a wise move. It should be noted here that Morans are well trained persons who were already feared even when they were using traditional weapons to defend the community. Therefore, arming this already strong group meant that they became lethal and vicious in their attacks. Morans did not only use the arms issued to them for purposes of defending the community against external aggression but also employed the guns to purposes of expanding their territory beyond its traditional borders. For instance, with help of well-armed Morans, the Samburu community has annexed a constituency in Marsabit called Laisamis with an MP, a division in Isiolo County with two county representatives and a constituency in Laikipa County with an MP. Morans and junior elders have stationed themselves in newly acquired territories so as to ensure that the areas remain under the custody of the Samburu community. Although there has never been any violent conflict reported following these annexations, silent protests and disapprovals of these activities of the Morans loom large.

The ongoing government crackdown of the illegal grazers in Laikipia an initiative aimed to curb a potential annexation attempt by the Pokot and Samburu Morans.

The institution of Moranism is being seen here to have opened new frontiers of conflict with their neighbors. Traditionally, conflicts between Samburu community and its neighbors centered on pastoralism especially cattle raiding, competition for pastoral resources such as water, pasture and livestock migration corridors. Politics as a resource is emerging as a new frontier for potential conflicts in Northern Kenya as Morans and their equivalents in other communities will surely play pivotal role in these conflicts. The next face of these conflicts are likely to move away from control over political units such as constituencies and wards to demand for equitable sharing of political offices such as county executive positions at the county level and national government resources that go to their counties. Communities with well trained and equipped Morans may use such social capital to force their agenda and load on others who do not possess such a social set up. Counties
such as Marsabit, Wajir and Laikipia have had many incidences of conflicts arising from competition for the county’s political resources-appointments, allocation of resources among others. These conflicts have taken the dimension of inter-clan conflicts. The trail of human lives lost, property destroyed and human displacements left behind in the wake of these conflicts clearly show a well-organized and structured conflicts. Such organizations witnessed in these conflicts cannot be executed by persons without prior training. It is such organizations of these conflicts that fuel the suspicion that clan Morans have been used in these conflicts.

From the foregoing, it is clear that conflict in Northern Kenya is being seen by some Morans more as an opportunity to profit from and will thus do whatever it takes to sustain the conflicts in their determination to continue profiteering from the same. From the provision of their military labour, engaging in poaching to arms trade, some Morans have discovered the opportunity of wage labour that conflicts offer them. As they profit from these conflicts, the rest of the population have remained helpless due to the diminishing opportunities in non-conflict areas. The emergence of local elites notably Morans that aim to profit from conflicts is a fairly new phenomenon that has changed the scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives that did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality of conflict especially those associated with raiding and has created links between the illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms.

2.11 The Advent of Colonialism and Post-Independence

Between 1885 and 1963, Kenya was under the ‘protection’ of the British administration. Morgan (1973) argues that for easier management, the British administration divided Kenya into three distinct regions: a highly developed White Highlands; a less developed nature lands which was a pool of cheap labor; and the frontier/pastoral zones that were out of bounds. The British were mainly interested in the ‘White Highlands’ (Morgan, 1973). According to Morgan (1973), the prime interest of the British in the ‘white Highlands’ was derived from a desire for transformation and intensification of crop production for export. The pastoral areas in Kenya were then seen by the British administration as areas where they could not develop reliable sources of strategic raw materials with which to supply
their home industries. This was compounded by the distance of pastoral territories from the administrative center of the colonial powers. The pastoral areas were closed off and one needed a permit to travel there. Barber (1968) pointed out that the colonial government priority in pastoral areas was order rather than development. Left on their own, pastoralists suffered from negligence and lack of attention. They witnessed very little interaction with the other communities in Kenya, and development within their areas was only focused on preserving security and the culture of the community (Republic of Kenya, 1992).

Hendrickson, et al. (1998) argued that the isolation of the pastoralist people was generally because of the colonial government’s mistrust of their lifestyle. The colonial government had a notion that pastoralists were politically unreliable and difficult to control, and therefore a threat to security. Furthermore, they were perceived as primitive, violent, and hostile towards change, and they lacked loyalty because of cross-border movements (Hendrickson, Armon, and Mearns, 1998). (Markakis (1993)) argues that the use of negative terms by the colonialists such as “uncontrollable” and “violent” was a way of creating an enemy image and using it as an ideological justification for counter aggression.

During this era, pastoralist in Northern Kenya suffered heavy losses in human life and destruction of property, and there was a complete disruption of their economy leaving many households impoverished (Lampheare, 1976; Barber, 1968). Lampheare (1992) describes the experiences as traumatic and devastating. Many were fired at from sight, and, on more than one occasion, they referred to themselves as wild animals hunted through the bush by the colonial government. Lampheare (1976) maintained that the imperial wars and punitive expeditions also destroyed the existing institutional relationships amongst these groups, making the basis for inter-ethnic relations insecure. He further asserted that social security system of reciprocal assistance was completely disrupted. Due to such disruptions, the end of 1918, pastoralist in northern Kenya had lost nearly all their cattle, and as late as 1963, many had still not been able to rebuild their herds to former size (Barber, 1968; and Lampheare, 1976).
Further reports during the same period expressed the fear that the district was faced with the challenges of rapidly increasing human population and declining livestock numbers. Diseases and raids by the colonial troops were blamed for the depletion of the herds (Lamphear, 1976). Livestock diseases such as rinderpest and pleuropneumonia, which were unknown in the past, became a permanent scourge to the animal population during this period. By the mid-1920s, officers on the spot voiced concern that large captures had led to cases of human-induced starvation and hoped that the colonial policy towards pastoralists in the region would be reversed to avert a future economic crisis (Oba, 1992).

The colonial policy in relation to land use is of particular interest to the study, as the issue constitutes the major underlying causes for changes in livelihood strategies among pastoralists during the colonial era. Prior to the colonial rule, the laid tenure system was communal and that meant that no land boundaries separated the areas where the various communities lived or grazed their livestock herds. The Turkana had access to grazing lands of the Pokot, the Pokot to the Samburu land and vice versa (Lamphear, 1992). The situation drastically changed when the British colonial rule was enforced in the area. The British ratified borders, and embarked on policies which had profound ramifications for pastoralism. One policy prohibited pastoralists from crossing international borders. They created a no-man’s land along the international frontiers. The idea was to make important pasture and water resources, which they depended upon during drought years, legally inaccessible (Oba, 1992). Lamphear (1976) reports that violators of these restrictions were punished by an instant fine of 20% of the total number of livestock found trespassing.

Fixed borders are alien to the pastoral mode of land use. The borders hinder free movement of pastoralists and livestock, and access to grazing land and water sources which are important during drought seasons (Spencer, 1983). Furthermore, the establishment of borders prohibited their movements between high and low seasons (Oba, 1992). Traditionally, pastoralists-maintained concessions over grazing and water rights, expecting reciprocal access when conditions were reversed. This important fact, though well-known, was ignored by the British administration (Turkana Development Annual Report, 1938).
These artificial boundaries imposed by the British to control human and capital livestock movements caused serious ecological problems in the region. Following the droughts of the 1930s and ’40s, environmental degradation became a contentious issue in the whole of Northern Kenya. In efforts to rehabilitate the degraded range lands, the colonial government established controlled grazing schemes culminating in the first ten years development plan 1946- 1955 (Dietz, 1987).

According to Ocan (1992), colonialism made political relations in the area worse because as access to land shrank and animal numbers and populations in restricted areas increased against available resources, acute competition for water and pasture between settlements became inevitable. Restricting movements meant that when animals of one group died, the only way to replenish stocks – the most natural and socially available to such levels of socio-economic and political formations – was cattle raiding. Ocan seems to concur with the fact that even before colonialism relations between neighboring pastoralists were already bad and therefore one cannot place the blame on colonialism for the cattle rustling conflict. However, colonialism made the situation worse (Ocan, 1992).

At independence in 1963, the Kenyan government realized the chronic conflict nature in pastoral areas of the north. A holistic development plan and strategies were therefore formulated for the areas recognizing the potential of livestock products for export and consumption (Republic of Kenya Annex Report, 1992). These measures saw some greater attention being focused on pastoral districts. However, these measures were still limited. Policies to encourage pastoral production were only to be directed towards sedentary livestock production, a system not suited to climate and ecological conditions in pastoral areas (Brown, 1963; Dames, 1964). The measures also meant changing the pastoralists themselves, rather than the circumstances that surround their existence.

Characteristic to this post-independence period, conflict in Northern Kenya still had some resemblance of the traditional cultural conflict. Among the Samburu, guns available were the old Mark IV rifles, which were operated by Home guards, most of whom were for older men. Samburu Morans still preferred the more fashionable twin spears (Mao) in battles. The Turkana, on the other hand, had already started acquiring newer guns and other arms from the Sudanese SPLM, (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004). Despite this, there was
relative calmness in the North. The Samburu would graze as far west as Suguta valley as well as go for water at Lokalaale, a Turkana village. However, in 1962 Turkana from Lodwar attacked Samburu and made away with 400 cows. A large number of goats were stolen about and government then sold Turkana animals irrationally and compensated the Samburu later on; disarmament of the Turkana community was initiated by the Government albeit few guns were retrieved.

In 1970, the Turkana from Lodwar and Baragoi attacked Samburus once again and stole 800 cows. No was action taken by the government. Conflict abated from 1970 to 1990s because both communities were up against a foreign intervention called Shiftas, the Somali bandits. The first armed raid in Baragoi happened on 28th May 1994, when heavily armed raiders from Pokot Community came and raided villages occupied by both the Turkana and the Samburu and animals of unknown number were stolen, and still no action was taken by the government. In 1996 hundreds of men from the neighboring Turkana community conducted a morning raid on the Rendille and Samburu livestock which were grazing on Soito yo Lkokoyo, Lamirok, Suyian to L tepes, 20,000 cattle were taken and dozens killed in the same year; besides, the Government District Commissioner (Mr. Nyandoro) together with 46 other people were killed by the Turkana raiders (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004). The government of the day sent Kenya army which did little in terms of conflict resolution. Samburu bought guns and armed themselves from Ethiopia and Somalia, to defend themselves.

Towards the 1970s, the Turkana in collaboration with some elements in government and the security organs employed sophisticated raiding methods using heavy guns, military trucks for transport and large scale networks of smuggling extending up to Sudan (Markasis, 1993). After 1979, the Pokot adopted similar military tactics. Consequently, from a means of obtaining a few animals and improving one’s fighting prowess, raiding evolved into military operations using conventional war tactics.

After 1979 the process of undermining pastoralism in Kenya gained momentum because of a combination of factors. First, cattle diseases wiped out most of the livestock. Secondly, a two-year drought caused harvest failure and famine. Thirdly, an upsurge in cattle raids
and military attacks by heavily armed Turkana, collectively termed Ngorokos (bandits), took place. These bandits had sophisticated weapons which they had acquired from ex-president Idi Amin’s fleeing soldiers in Uganda. In 1984 to 1986 the Kenyan government sent a punitive military operation to Pokot district purportedly to seize illegal firearms. During the operation, thousands of Pokot livestock were confiscated by the government while others died due to drought or lack of proper attention while in the hands of the security forces. The Pokot have never forgiven the government for this callous act against them and their livestock.

2.12 Changing Role of Elders

According to Duffield (1997), the elders’ authority has been undermined by the introduction of a market economy and the increasing polarization of rich and poor which resulted in labor migration. The youth have found new sources of influence and wealth including the flourishing armed militias of young men and the new income available through banditry (Duffield, 1997). Odhiambo (1996) says that traditional authority is being eroded by the progressive replacement of council of elders and tribunals with government-appointed agencies and functionaries. Meanwhile, urbanization and increasingly frequent migrations to town by young people especially men, expose them to other cultures and make them question traditional values (Odhiambo, 1996).

Another way in which elders may have lost their authority is through increasing distrust from the communities particularly from the warrior age sets. This may have various causes. One may be the association with an increasingly distrusted administration. The elders may increase their influence and prestige by providing an interface between their communities and local government. When the public sector is reduced, so is role of the elders. In a study of pastoral institutions in Somaliland, Hashi (1996) points out that traditional leaders, having been absorbed by urban political machinery, are rapidly losing the trust of the herders. The same happens when the association with administrative power is used for personal advantage through land speculation or bribery (Galaty, 1994).
Although relations between elders and their neighbors were dominated by common suspicion. Elders could not negotiate with neighbors since their neighbors’ situation was equally precarious but more so, previous negotiations and terms of rescue had been abused by the Pokot elders so they could not take advantage of this option. Lack of reciprocal grazing rights with Turkana was occasional while the level of mistrust and suspicion between them was deep-rooted. The frequent Pokot incursions and livestock raids into Tugen, Turkana and Samburu territory diminished or extinguished the possibility of such a negotiation.

The progressive personalization of interests (through the introduction of a market economy and the creation of opportunities for individual entrepreneurship) has not been matched by the personalization of responsibility. The actions of the individuals even when aimed at personal interest, are likely to be treated as the responsibility of the whole community. The Pokot-Samburu clashes in 2006, for example, are commonly said to have started after a young Pokot man known to be involved in the illegal guns trade was killed by one of his clients, a Samburu during a fight over payment. Although the circumstances and the reasons for the incident could hardly have been less traditional, the episode was followed by a chain of mutual retaliations by young men of the two groups consequently, the situation rapidly escalated and were directed by and large against people who have nothing to do with the previous incidents. Within less than two months more than 20 people had been killed and several hundred families had been displaced, while those responsible for the first two or three incidents, although well known, had not been arrested (Wanjala, 1997).

2.13 From Raiders to Rustlers: The Escalation of Conflict in Northern Kenya

As the preceding section has shown, traditional conflict among pastoralists in Northern Kenya had more in common with raiding than with the large scale, pitched battles of European history (Fukui and Markakis, 1994). However, at present, there is emerging an increasing tendency towards the Europeanization of war amongst the pastoralists of Northern Kenya. This has narrowed the distinction between raiding and rustling. As discussed earlier, traditional conflict was determined by socially accredited values and beliefs. However, this new form of conflict is one where the actor is an individual or small
group acting with limited or without societal approval. As defined in the introduction, escalation of pastoral conflict refers to the increase in scale, intensity and frequency of pastoral conflicts. This includes the emergence of indiscriminate killings especially of women and children, groups which traditionally it was a taboo to kill. This section highlights the nature of conflict escalation in Northern Kenya. This is accomplished by the use of specific cases that illustrate increase in scale, intensity of frequency of conflict in Northern Kenya.

**Changing role of Morans, from Raiders to cattle Rustlers**

After 1992, violence in Northern Kenya reached a new climax. Violent clashes took place not only between the pastoralists but also between the pastoralists and the agriculturalist and even with the Kenyan army. In additional to the normal cattle raiding, other forms of violence emerged. The Pokot attacked a school in Marakwet and left 50 pupils dead. In 1995, the Turkana invaded Pokot under the leadership of Lopurkoyan—a young warrior leader. Under Lopurkoyan, the Turkana were not organized as morans as they were in the company of women and children moving with them. Also in their company were livestock and other household supplies, a complete new picture in the art of raiding in the region. In 1996, an alliance of the Samburu and the Pokot attacked a Turkana community near Baragoi (Lokorkor attack). Many Turkanas irrespective of age and sex were killed. In May, 1996, at least 13 people were killed on the spot in a raid by more than 200 heavily armed Pokot bandits, on a manyatta at Kapedo, Turkana. What is interesting to note is that no animals were stolen. It was purely a killing spree. Two months later in August 1996, fifteen people were killed in Samburu when they were attacked by Pokot cattle-rustlers. Among the victims were two children. Raiders, who were numbering over 400, escaped with 5000 head of cattle. Police eventually recovered only 1000 three days after attack.

In 1996, Samburu and Pokot bandits massacred people in which claimed the lives of over 50 Turkanas, most of them women and children (Umar, 1997). The Bandits made away with 15,000 heads of cattle. When security officers tried to follow and recover the stolen animals, the District Commissioner (DC) was dismembered and burnt by the bandits when his helicopter was shot down in Suguta Valley. Other security officers were engaged in a
“Rambo-style” in pursuit of the bandits. However, the animals were never recovered. In a statement later released by political leaders from the region, the motive of such concerted and sustained attacks was not the supposed hunger for animals, but the need to terrorize and inflict fear among rivals, and by so doing, push them away from points of conflict – pasture and water.

In April 10, 1997, seven people were killed and four others injured by Pokot in a raid on Manyattas in Turkana District. The raiders made away with 400 animals from Kainuk and Laya in Katilu and Turkwel divisions. The following month in May, armed bandits said to be Turkanas killed four children and seriously injured three adults in an attack on a Samburu manyatta in Baragoi Division, Samburu. More than 50 bandits from Turkana also stole 500 cattle belonging to a local politician, late Peter Lekisaat. The attack came barely hours after a security team led by the Samburu District Commissioner Paul Yatich left Baragoi after camping there for two days following rumours of an impending attack. In the same month of May, two armed bandits and an elderly man are killed during a raid in Samburu. Local police boss Kaua Mbijjiwe said 200 head of cattle were stolen. In June of the same year, eleven people perished in fierce fight between Turkana and Samburu communities in Baragoi Division, Samburu County. The battle was sparked by Samburu herdsmen pursuing stolen cattle who confronted by Turkana people in Nachola Location. These raids, in the same year, reflect an increase in frequency of cattle raids.

In September, 1997, at least 31 people were killed when armed raiders believed to be Pokot attacked a Turkana manyatta in the Lorengipi and Lokiriama areas of Turkana County. Nine of the dead are said to be raiders. Police sources say the raiders drove animals towards Alale Division, West Pokot. But as Turkana herdsmen from Lorengipi rushed to assist and reinforce their kinsmen, the attackers raided the manyatta left behind, which had nobody to guard. In the raid, the attackers killed five women, eight children and seriously injured eight women and two elderly men. The children are reportedly aged between one-and-half to three years. This indiscriminate killing point to negative side of conflict escalation in the region. At least seven of the raiders were also killed, two of them in uniforms used by Kenya police reservists.
In March, 1998, at least 100 people were killed and others wounded when armed Pokot cattle rustlers attacked manyattas in Turkana District. Interestingly, it seemed as though animals were not a target in this raid but only killing of the Turkana people. None of the bandits were captured despite a large security deployment in the region. In April the same year, a series of coordinated small raids led to deployment of armed security personnel to the border of Turkana and West Pokot districts. Despite this, a raid occurred, where 7,000 animals were stolen. A few weeks later, in the same month of April, 1998, 6 civilians died in crossfire when bandits invaded a police camp in West Pokot and stole firearms.

In May, 1998, the Government announced that the Army was to be deployed in trouble spots throughout Kenya with orders to disarm anyone holding illegal weapons. Troops were to work alongside police to end violence in areas hit by cattle rustling and ethnic clashes. Moi made the announcement at the Armed Forces Training College, Eldoret, where he was the guest of honour during a passing-out parade of more than 2,000 new soldiers. According to the announcement, the police, directed by Commissioner Duncan Wachira, and the military was to be joined by other regular security units. He claimed that many illegal guns had been smuggled into Kenya because of insecurity in neighboring countries. At the same time the President cautioned politicians against inflammable language, saying it incited communities against one another. He said when leaders speak in such a tone it is the citizens who suffer while the same leaders are tucked safely away. Opposition politicians and the clergy roundly accused the Government of either laxity in its response or of condoning the violence. Cabinet Minister Francis Lotodo was cited as being involved in the raids. A parliamentary motion of censure against him, moved by Kimilili MP Mukhisa Kituyi, was defeated. Critics claimed Government response to the raids as erratic, uncoordinated and at best ineffective.

In the year 1999, the Pokot attacked the Turkana killing 60 Turkanas and stealing 8,000 cattle. The Pokots were made up of over 1,000 men armed with AK47 assault rifles. It is notable here that this attack was highly organized with a working chain of command. Similarly in March 1999, another violent attack occurred where 1,000 Pokot gunmen attacked a Turkana village killing 30 people and made away with 2,000 herds of cattle. The
sheer numbers involved in terms of raiders and cattle stolen and the fact that 1,000 young men could be recruited to participate in violence also points out to the increase in the scale of cattle raiding.

In 2005, Pokot bandits attacked a Kainuk village in Turkana stealing 600 goats and sheep. This was an alleged revenge attack following an earlier Turkana killing of one Pokot herder and stealing of 47 herds of cattle in Turkwel. In the Kainuk attack, three Turkana businessmen and a Kenya Police Reserve Officer were killed after an ambush on their truck by Pokot bandits who fired at them even after establishing their identities. In 2006, Samburu Morans attacked Pokot patients in Maralal hospital, castrating patients and killing others. This attack is a classic case of conflict escalation as no animals were targeted. No animals are available in hospital. In addition, the victims were harmless patients who would not be able to defend themselves against the well-armed Morans.

2.14 Conclusion
The intermittent conflict situation in Northern Kenya today has undergone massive transformation. Turkana, Samburu and Pokot societies respond negatively to one another’s actions—violence begets violence. Cattle were indeed raided throughout their history. However, these raids were more of a form of wealth redistribution through cattle. There were customary rules in which cattle raids were limited to times of need, were small in number, and generally characterized by little violence. This marks the genesis of protracted social conflict in Northern Kenya. However, as rules began to be increasingly violated during the 20th century, these raids escalated in intensity. Victims responded with raids of increased intensity, and the conflict spiral was born.

A number of factors account for the conflict transformation. First, colonial policy which aimed at pacifying pastoralists and to ensure peace and order, this tendency had several implications. It tended to present the pastoralist as an unreliable people prone to violence and, hence, to encourage abandonment of the activity. This was an elite outsider’s view of pastoralism as a primordial mode of production which should be discouraged. However, it is shown that the colonial period was marked by the increasing occurrence of conflicts as pastoralist rebelled against the British and tried to maintain their mode of livelihood.
The period witnessed the drawing of political boundaries and creation of block grazing schemes. Borders were fixed, and access to key resources was curtailed with little regard to seasonal variation and the needs of the people for pasture. These measures greatly affected the transhumant patterns already mastered by the pastoralists from their long experience with ecological hardships. The border restriction also destroyed the lubricating social rubric traditionally obtained through trade and intermarriages between pastoralist neighbors. All this resulted in increased conflict between pastoralists of the North.

Currently, each group perceives the other’s actions as increasingly hostile and as aimed at cultural and social targets rather than commercial livestock targets alone. What is essentially a financial conflict erupts into full-scale ethnic war. The contention between the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot communities goes beyond a simple conflict. According to PSC theory, any refraining from an escalated response is generally perceived as weakness, and groups fear that failing to respond will invite further encroachment and aggression.

Transformation of cattle raiding to cattle-rustling and its transformation from a traditional practice to the current criminal activity of livestock theft can be traced back to the 1970s. In the early 1970s, the pastoralists were faced with acute and prolonged famine and were at the mercy of donor-assisted development programmes. In keeping in line with a “fend-for-yourselfs” approach which was anchored on government policies of developing the “high potential areas first”, the government made no particular effort to alleviate the suffering of the pastoralist communities occasioned by the said famine. On the contrary, the government policies during the seventies, the eighties, the nineties as well as those ushering in the second millennium have focused on agriculture and cultivation, thereby persistently relegating and side-lining the development concerns of the pastoralists to the periphery. Naturally speaking, such endemic marginalization has led to the upsurge of livestock theft among the pastoralists, manifested through intense inter-clan and inter-tribal armed conflict, as a means of survival.
CHAPTER THREE
INTERNAL TRIGGERS AND THE ESCALATION OF CONFLICT
IN NORTHERN KENYA

3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the study analyses the internal dynamics that happened in Kenya and the impact they had on conflict among pastoral communities. This chapter argues that with the coming of Moi into power in 1978, and with political and economic liberalization happening in the late 80s and early 90’s, a trend emerged where traditional pastoral conflict was increasingly being used for political and economic gains. Moi introduced pastoralists to National Politics.

This chapter provides a critical look at how the emergence of Moi as a pastoralist President triggered conflict in Northern Kenya. Moi a Tugen, which is a pastoralist community, wanted to protect his community from the Pokots who used to attack their enemies using concealed spears and savagely killed many of them. Moi armed his community with arms and denied the Pokots facilities like a tarmac road which terminates at Loruk (the boundary of Tugen and Tiaty), denial of electricity until the former president Moi, a Tugen retired in 2002. In absence of motor able roads, bridges, few schools, no hospital in East Pokot, two boarding schools in the entire constituency. Yet East Pokot district is one quarter of the total Baringo district land mass hence this is interpreted by the East Pokot as a Tugen revenge for the 1907 humiliation, this was the period the Pokots massacred the Tugen. Moi also introduced KPRs in order to use Government resources to protect and arm his community.

The emergence of political entrepreneurs through bad politics also fueled conflict in Northern Kenya. Bad politics is where political leaders continue to marginalize, harass and intimidate other members of different communities in Northern Kenya. Political leaders tended to encourage their people to continue with the age-old cultural practice of cattle rustling. These politicians fear that any attack on the practice of cattle rustling may be politically suicidal. Previous governments have recognized the importance of pastoral
communities only when it requires their political support, such as during election time, thus the emergence of the political entrepreneurs. These political entrepreneurs reached their peak in the early 90’s especially with the advent of multipartysm and the calls for *majimboism*. The second section of the chapter discusses the emergence of political entrepreneurs. This section argues that, with opening of northern Kenya, to a more capitalist system, there was the emergence of warlords, who took advantage of the readily available arms coming into the region to train and arm local Morans. These Morans were then used to raid for commercial purposes. This form of raiding intensified the scale of raiding in Northern Kenya, escalating conflict in the region.

The proliferation of guns and the Kenya government’s biased participation in the conflict has equally fueled it among the East Pokot and her neighbors. According to the East Pokot, the Turkana, Marakwet, Tugen, Njems and Samburu have been recruited as Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) and supplied with guns. The East Pokot allegedly are not recruited as KPR because the government argues that they already have guns. The KPR are not trained, hardly monitored, and demoralized. They use the guns to steal livestock from the neighbors and are involved in a bristling bullet trade in the region. Due to lack of accountability on bullet use, they usually report that they were used in gun battles with livestock raiders. To the East Pokot, being surrounded on all fronts by armed communities’ forces them to buy guns for self-defense.

### 3.2 The Emergence of Moi as a Pastoralist President

Moi come from the Tugen community where cattle were raided into. In 1907, Tugen and East Pokot fought over access to Chepkasing River which the Tugen had denied the East Pokot access. Chief Louwalan of the East Pokot called for a peace meeting to resolve the dispute amicably but the Tugen did not attend and proceeded to deny the East Pokot access to the river. Coming from this background, Moi entered politics when he was elected Member of the Legislative Council for Rift Valley and later in 1967 became the Vice-president of the Republic of Kenya.
In 1978, Moi, assumed the office of the president following the death of Jomo Kenyatta. Moi came from a small semi-pastoral community, the Tugen of Baringo district. Most of the pastoral communities welcomed the political changes, hoping that it would bring good tidings to them since their son was now head of state. They claimed that Kenyatta’s government had ignored them in the distribution of the “fruits of independence” or national resources. The pastoralists therefore hoped to obtain favours in terms of economic and political dispensation from the new government. These high expectations were never realized to a large extent. However, in the aftermath, new forms of banditry and cattle rustling sprung up in northern Kenya apparently perpetrated by political entrepreneurs with different sinister motives. Among the Pokot, the warlords were allegedly led by a senior politician in Moi’s government, who in the 1980s had been jailed for two years after conviction in a court of law for engaging in “uncontrollable activities” of cattle rustling (Dames, 1964).

The bone of contention was the feeling by pastoralists that the previous government had taken them for granted for too long. Moi Government opened political space among the pastoralists. This introduced new political and economic dimensions to cattle rustling and banditry. Politically, pastoral communities during Moi’s era were staunch supporters of the government and the ruling party-KANU. Moi formed an outfit called KAMATUSA to protect his political interests and encounter political agenda driven by GEMA and other opposition political parties. Moi’s appeasement were clear when dealing with the pastoral communities. He engaged in systematic appointments of personalities from the region to strategic and plumb positions. For example, a lot of Kenyan Pokot and Samburu were appointed to security related dockets including the military, provincial administration and foreign affairs and international co-operation’s dockets. Further, Moi made efforts to mend fences with key figures from the region whom he had fallen out with previously. General Lengees, a Samburu- also a pastoralist- was appointed as the Kenya Army Commander. Ismail Chelanga, another figure from the pastoralist was also appointed to the powerful docket of provincial commissioner in charge of Eastern Province. Francis Lekolool, another personality from the pastoral community was appointed as provincial commissioner in charge of Kenya’s capital City-Nairobi (Günther, 2009).
It is instructive to observe that most of the key personalities from the pastoralist communities served in the Northern Kenya districts, a move that was designed to help in persuading Northern Kenya communities to support Moi in the first multi-party elections of 1992. The first multi-party elections presented Moi with the first real threat to his presidency. On the professional front, Moi appointed Godana from the Gabra, the upper Eastern Kenya region to the influential position of foreign affairs docket, a position that he held until Moi relinquished power in 2002. Francis Kaparo was yet another personality from the pastoral community that the government propped to prestigious position who served as speaker of the Kenya National Assembly for fifteen years. Moi also reconciled with Francis Lotodo-an influential Pokot politician; appointing him to serve in several ministerial positions. Moi also appointed Prof. George Saitoti as Vice-President. It is clear that for the first time in Kenya’s pastoral communities were in charge of the presidency, vice-presidency, legislature, military, provincial administration and foreign affairs (Almagor, 1979).

The community holding such important positions could bring resources and improve the security of their community. Since independence, leaders often filled the civil service and state-owned institutions with members of their ethnic group, and those from ethnic communities viewed as being supportive of the ruling regime. Moi appointing Prof. George Saitoti as Vice-President and having ministers from the pastoral community gave the community advantage to rule in favor of their community. The pastoral community took charge of National security and armed their communities in order to protect themselves from cattle rustling.

To make KAMATUSA effective, a systematic strategy of displacement was muted to drive non-KANU communities out of Rift Valley. Non-KANU communities had benefited from land settlement in and around Rift Valley and therefore became the target of "revenge" by the KAMATUSA. Expecting at the time to be humiliated at the forthcoming elections, the KAMATUSA group in KANU got together and decided that those ethnic groups that were betraying them should be taught a lesson. The lesson in question involved their expulsion from especially the “Kalenjin-Maasai lands” in the Rift Valley. Such an expulsion would
also rid the province of anti-KANU and anti-Moi voters thereby denying the opposition critical votes needed to attain the 25% requirement. The ethnic ideology was at once invoked and politicized in order to mobilize the KAMATUSA group throughout the Rift Valley to evict the "outsiders" from their ancestral land (Crawford, 1998).

The mobilization campaign was spearheaded by some very senior cabinet ministers who addressed rallies in major towns in the Rift Valley and exhorted their kinsmen to protect their "own" government. As has been documented elsewhere (Oyugi 1997) most of these statements were very inflammatory, and in normal circumstances would have earned a sack for a minister. As the elections drew closer, war-like speeches increased in intensity. Cases of ethnic clashes erupted towards the end of 1991 directed practically against all non-KAMATUSA Rift Valley inhabitants. Cases of people being killed here and there begun to appear frequently in the local press. But the most effective strategy employed was the destruction of homes and property of the victims in the hope that they would flee to their ancestral lands. Those who sought refuge in mission centres became targets of ruthless attacks (Kimaiyo, 2009).

In the early 1990s, clashes started in many Rift Valley Districts with multi-ethnic populations. Maasai and Kipsigis Morans raided neighbouring Kikuyu, Luhya, Kamba and other farming communities in rural areas like Molo and the Naivasha hinterland. The clashes subsequently spread to Laikipia where Samburu and Pokot started attacking the Kikuyu community, who had settled there as small-scale farmers as a result of the post-independence land reforms. The clashes in Ol Moran, a small town in Laikipia, escalated in January 1998 when Pokot and Samburu morans raided Kikuyu farmers, killing two of them, stealing their livestock and burning down their houses. A counter attack of the Kikuyu farmers on pastoralist settlements was ambushed by well-armed Pokot and Turkana Morans who killed 39 Kikuyu youth (Kimaiyo, 2009).

Shortly thereafter, Pokot and Samburu morans attacked a Kikuyu settlement, killing two people and burning down over 25 houses. The Kikuyu did not react subsequently, and so this incident marked a provisional end to the violence. The report of the Judicial Commission appointed to inquire into tribal clashes in Kenya (the Akiwumi Report)
concluded that the conflicts between these communities were instigated by ‘unsavory and inflammatory statements by politicians. It is noted that the Kikuyu of Ol Moran complained of repeated livestock raids before and received unsigned letters asking them to leave the area. The Akiwumi Report states that the violence was instigated by politicians of the Kalenjin faction to clear the area of oppositional voters with respect to the elections in 1997. This escalation of violence was related to more general shifts in the political landscape that are part of Kenya’s troubled nation-building process (Branch and Cheeseman, 2010). Anderson describes in detail how the pressure for multi-partyism in the early 1990s led to the revival of majimboism as a defensive reaction particularly by Kalenjin and Maasai politicians loyal to President Daniel Arap Moi who had been in power since 1978 (Anderson, 2010).

In the attempt to find alternative livelihood after conflict induced displacements, the displaced and other conflict victims have cut down trees for charcoal and firewood for sale. This has seriously affected the fragile ecology of the Northern Kenya pastoralist areas. On the other hand, informal displacement camps established in various places have put high pressure on water sources, leading to high water shortage. Those living in displaced camps are hard hit by severe droughts and other disasters. During droughts, pastoralists’ livelihoods become particularly precarious. There more worrying incidences of conflict over scarce water and pastures during dry spells, which could last for as long as eight months. Economic insecurity and deprivation during drought has increased the risk of violence and social breakdown. There was also a serious food shortage among many pastoralists’ communities (Wanjala, 1997).

The unrelenting skirmishes were blamed for the displacements of whole settlements and for destitution in the region. In Todonyang village (Lapur division, Turkana County) for instance, frequent raids from neighboring Dassenech of Ethiopia forced the relocation of the entire village to Lowareng’ak, twenty-three kilometers away (USAID and FEWS NET 2005). Poverty and destitution is visible in the kind of livelihood activities undertaken by the newly displaced. These activities include small scale farming, basketry, and small scale retail trade. In such areas, pastoralism as a livelihood activity is itself threatened since very few pastoralists are willing to take up the activity again because of lack of initial capital and the prevailing insecurity (Barasa, 2010).
Majimboism which was originally intended as a form of federal regionalism was later turned into a quest for ethnically exclusive territoriality and became vehicle for ethnic mobilization. Political campaigners from the Rift Valley’s pastoralist groups, who became known under the pseudo-ethnic acronym of KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu), played a central role in pushing the idea. Majimboism was propagated as an alternative to multi-partyism, which was seen as a threat to KAMASUTA interests. Within weeks after the first rallies were started, violence erupted against non-KAMASUTA minorities in the Rift Valley particularly against Kikuyu who were branded as aliens and land-grabbers. The clashes which were instigated by political leaders and carried out mostly by young men in traditional pastoralist dress, claimed about 1,500 lives and displaced an estimated 300,000 people between 1991 and 1993. The electoral violence of 1997 largely followed the same pattern (Anderson, 2010).

In contrast to their ‘formerly passive role in national affairs,’ pastoralists were prominently involved in these politicized clashes of the 1990s (Günther, 2009). Militant majimboism, which stirred up the violence of the 1990s as well as the post-election violence in 2008, also has repercussions for more localized conflicts between pastoralists. It fuels conflicts over control and access to territories that had formerly been used in a more flexible and less exclusive manner. In the late 1990s and around 2000 local patterns of conflict among pastoralists in the north were influenced by national politics or regional politics in other parts of Kenya. In order to mobilise the government for their own causes, local leaders had to find out which degree of ethnicisation had become usual and subsequently legitimate elsewhere. There the ethnicisation of politics and the tolerance towards or even promotion of ethnic violence proceeded in giant steps, and the idea that every group had a homeland and the right to expel minorities by force gained ground (Günther, 2009).

Moi’s decision to lift the curfew in Northern Kenya in 1997 was a politically calculated move to appease Northern Kenyan communities most of whom the government had neglected since independence. The government did this to wade off competition from the opposition who had promised to develop a Marshall plan for the development and transformation of the Northern Kenya region and to bring at par with other parts of the country. The lifting of curfew, however, came in the wake of other dynamic unfolding in
the greater Horn of Africa region. Free movement of people in the region allowed for cross-border movement between Kenya’s North Eastern province and Somalia (Arero, 2005). Barely a month into Kenya’s independence from the British in December 1963, the nascent government led by then Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta declared a state of emergency and a dawn-to-dusk curfew in the North Eastern region of the country, then commonly known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD). This action was necessitated by multiple isolated attacks targeted at the Kenyan government facilities by the militant arm of the Northern Province People’s Progressive Party (NPPPP), a political party representing the opinions of the Somali people in the NFD. Over the next four years, the situation in the NFD deteriorated into a state of anarchy as the Kenyan government fought a low-key yet inhumane war against the Kenyan Somali insurgents seeking secession from Kenya and consequent union with the Somali Republic with support from the latter’s government. Despite the heavy costs of the war, the nationalistic Kenyan government, under the Kenya African National Union (KANU) party, could not bear the loss of almost a third of Kenyan territory and it was only after an agreement with neighbouring Somalia in July 1967 that The Shifta War, as the conflict was popularly referred to, petered out. Kenya retained the NFD but that did not put an end to the state of dissatisfaction and marginalization amongst people in the area and the effects of that war and its outcomes are still felt to date (Corriere, 2006).

During the transition to independence period, between 1960 and 1963, more events and activities that significantly contributed to the buildup of the Shifta War happened. The first event to bring the NFD secessionist claims to official recognition was the 1960 London Constitutional Conference in Lancaster House. Here the Legislative Council representative of the NFD, Ahmed Farah, articulated the feeling of alienation felt by the people of the NFD and predicted that if the administration of the area was not reformed then the Somali-inhabited areas would turn to Mogadishu while the non-Muslims in the area would join Ethiopia. The feeling expressed by Ahmed Farah was to be manifested in 1961 Kenya national elections when most of the people in the NFD boycotted it. Only 1,622 people registered to vote as most Somalis believed that doing so would mean accepting Kenyan citizenship, something they felt alien to. The election boycott only served to intensify the
self-determination campaign in the NFD which now looked to newly independent and unified Somali Republic for support for its cause. Delegations were sent to Mogadishu to drum up support both from the Somalia Republic government and the public in Somalia. The fruits of this lobbying were visible as in November 1961, the Somali national assembly passed a resolution welcoming unification between the NFD and Somalia Republic and urging the government to use all means possible to pursue this ideal. In addition, the publicity campaign created an atmosphere of solidarity amongst the Somalis in the Republic and those of the NFD going into the Second Constitutional Conference in the Lancaster House in London (Dahl and Hjort, 1976).

The Second Lancaster Conference in 1962 was critical for the NFD situation as the secessionist aspirations of the people of the NFD had then reached fever pitch. As expected, the NFD representatives pushed for autonomy of the NFD and subsequent Act of Union with the Somali Republic when Kenya gained independence. The other two political parties delegations represented in the conference, KANU and KADU, despite their bitter disagreements over other issues such as how to conduct devolution, found consensus in disagreeing with the NFD delegation. They argued Kenyan concession of the NFD would jeopardize Kenyan territorial integrity and lead to a domino effect that would inspire similar secessionist groups around the country. To ease the dispute, the British Colonial Secretary resolved that an independent commission was going to be appointed to establish the public opinion in the NFD with regard to their future. Given the popularity of the secessionist calls, the NFD delegation left the conference hopeful but little did they know that the British were never going to respect their wishes (Hjort af Ornäs, 1989).

One would have thought that having spent so much to retain the NFD territory in Kenya, the government was going to find ways of integrating the people of the NFD with the rest of the population. However, historical evidence from 1967 to date poignantly and quite disappointingly points in the opposite direction. Given the relatively little economic output of the NFD and its scattered, albeit occasionally militant, population, successive Kenyan regimes have used a policy quite similar to the one employed by the British colonizers: one of neglect coupled with sporadic use of excessive force when conflict arises. A recent documentary by an Al Jazeera correspondent, Mohammed Adow, aptly entitled Not Yet
Kenyan, to a great extent illustrates the grim manner in which the Kenyan government has treated the people of the North Eastern Province since independence. The levels of infrastructural development in the area are very low and so are other indicators of socio-economic development (Kandagor, 2005).

Over the years, several massacres have been committed by the Kenyan government in the North Eastern Province and thrown under the carpet as established by the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), a commission mandated after the 2007/08 Kenyan post-election violence to investigate historical injustices and offer recommendations. Such merciless massacres that were committed by Kenyan state against its own people in the Northern Eastern Province include the Bulla Karatasi Massacre in 1980, the Wagalla Massacre in 1984 and the Malka Mari Massacre. The TJRC established that these massacres were aimed at, like the Shifta War responses, mass punishment of entire communities and that yet nobody has been prosecuted for perpetrating them (Malam, 2013).

The people of the NFD have also experienced a very precarious form of Kenyan citizenship and national identity. While most have resigned to the fate of being Kenyan citizens, the Kenyan government has not treated them in that regard. In Not Yet Kenyan, Adow highlights the plight of young Kenyan Somalis and other pastoralist groups who are denied identity cards, a critical marker of Kenyan citizenship, by the Kenyan government thus reducing their opportunities in life. This is just a tip of the iceberg compared to the levels that the Kenyan state has gone to ensure that people living across the Ewaso Nyiro and Tana Rivers continue to say “I am visiting Kenya” once they cross these rivers. Due to fear of the effect that events in Somalia might have on the Kenyan Somalis as well as insecurity in the area, post-Shifta War governments have sought to regulate citizenship through extensive screenings as expressed by national identity cards and passports among the people of the NFD (Lamphear, 1998).

It is therefore quite clear that Kenyan Somalis and other pastoralist groups have not really enjoyed the fruits of independence that freedom from colonization by the British was expected to bring. The state of Kenya continues to treat them in a manner similar to that of
the colonizers and the unstable state of the former Somali Republic in the past two decades only makes things worse. However, at independence, when the NFD Somalis were completely alienated from Kenya and expressed their strong desire to unite with their fellow Somalis in the Somalia Republic through the NFD Commission, I am of the opinion that the British should have honoured their pledge of respecting the opinion on the ground and granted the NFD its wishes. That would have prevented the costly Shifta War and probably, albeit counter-historic, contributed to stronger Kenyan and Somali nations and a more stable Horn of Africa (Ranger, 1999).

In 2009, an initiative to review the existing constituency boundaries added fresh fuel to these patterns of territorial conflict. An Interim Independent Boundary Review Commission (IIBRC) was assigned the task of approving the physical boundaries of the 210 existing constituencies and of suggesting an optimal number of constituencies. The IIBRC, known as the Ligale Commission after its chairman Andrew Ligale, toured all over the country to meet with representatives of the existing constituencies and listen to their views and suggestions. These regional meetings immediately proved to be highly conflictual (Nzioka, 2009). The commission’s report finally suggested the creation of an additional 80 new constituencies, a decision that turned out to be ‘legal and political land mine (Shiundu, 2010). The announcement of 20 new constituencies in pastoralist areas, for example, immediately sparked heavy protests by residents of areas that felt discriminated against or ignored by the commission’s suggestion (Barasa, 2010).

The conflict between the Pokot and the Turkana is among the oldest conflicts in Northern Kenya (McCabe, 2004). New waves of conflict escalated in 1995 when Turkana tried to occupy part of Pokot country and were defeated ‘devastatingly (Bollig and Österle, 2007). Since then, the conflict has turned more and more openly into a boundary dispute that, in early 2012, involved mutual killings and large-scale displacements on an almost daily basis (Andae and Bii, 2012). One of the hotspots of violence is the village of Kapedo. A Memorandum to the Interim Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IIBRC) describes in great detail the Pokot claims to the place, and particularly to the Primary School which was supposedly built for them by Finnish missionaries but ‘mischievously’ transferred to Turkana District in 1985 (East Pokot leaders, professional groups and
community council of elders, 2010). In the last decade the Pokot have conquered territory that stretches far into former Turkana territory and turned Kapedo into a virtual Turkana bridgehead, which, according to many Pokot, had to be eliminated. Matthias Österle mentions that at times Pokot snipers shot at Turkana who dared to leave the village in search of water or firewood (Österle, 2007). Only recently, new factors have emerged onto the scene to fuel the on-going conflicts along the Pokot-Turkana border. Successful oil prospecting missions and a proposed geothermal power plant increase the desirability of areas of land that are claimed by both sides.

In an IIBC trough, bad politics has also been blamed for the spread of the practice of livestock theft among the pastoral communities. Most of these political leaders are normally anointed by their respective ethnic spiritual leaders and as a result, the communities that they represent follow and obey what their leaders tell them faithfully. Some of the political leaders abuse the hallowed positions they occupy in their communities to mislead their people and/or incite them against other communities, thereby contributing to an increase in tension among the different communities. Further, some of the political leaders have been reported to influence the appointment of KPRs and home guards from their communities. These “yes men” of the respective politicians are more likely than not to act in a way that advances the interests of the said individual politicians as opposed to advancing the interests of the whole community, (Weiss, 2004).

The act of cattle-rustling has evolved over a period of time from being an accepted traditional practice sanctioned by the village elders into being a commercialized and criminal venture, with attendant grave human rights violations. Some of the causal factors that have contributed to the recent development and new trends in cattle-rustling in Kenya and her neighboring countries are discussed below. New Administrative Units as an Impediment to the Pastoral Way of Life, the establishment of the colonial administration, which introduced the imposition of permanent tribal boundaries, had major ramifications on the pastoral communities as these boundaries were set up without due regard to the seasonal variations and demands of the nomadic lifestyles of the pastoralists. Although the new administrative units were meant to provide distinct and exclusive units of governance along ethnic lines, pastoral communities were oftentimes forced to ignore these colonial
boundaries during times of drought. Subsequently it has inevitably led to tensions between them and the agricultural communities over allegations of trespass. In the past, such conflicts have led to the loss of lives and damage to crops and property. An example of a conflict attributable to exclusive units of ethnic governance is the attack between the Samburu pastoralists and the Laikipia farmers in February 1998 where the conflict ended with the fatalities of 70 people Weiss (2004).

For many years, the Samburu living in the north-east of Pokot territory were brothers in arms with the Pokot in a common fight against the Turkana, particularly in the Baragoi area, where Morans of both groups repeatedly attacked Turkana households in a conflict which was politically instigated in order to ‘disenfranchise “enemy” community voters during electioneering period (Masinde, Adan, and Pkalya, 2004). In 2006, however, war also erupted between the Pokot and the Samburu. The bone of contention in this case was the planned implementation of a wildlife conservancy (Ltungai) in an area that had formerly been used by both groups without dispute, but which now attracted exclusive claims. The conflict eventually spread to Laikipia. Since mid-1990s, Pokot and Samburu herders had been moving into vacated areas of Laikipia, located in the east of Pokot territory to make use of available pasture. Fueled by the tensions around the proposed wildlife conservancy they fought each other over land claims (Greiner, Bollig, and McCabe, 2011). These fights found a sad climax in the massacre of Kanampiu village in September 2009, where a Pokot attack led to 35 casualties (Kariuki, 2009). According to a Pokot elder, this massacre was meant to teach Samburu a lesson. The Samburu were explicitly warned not to move their settlements into a zone claimed by Pokot. Kanampiu, the settlement in question, was eradicated in the attack.

About three decades ago, Tornay (1979) noted that there is ‘no conscious, explicit territorial strategy’ behind pastoral warfare. This view was shared by many of his colleagues of his time and after. Viewed in the light of current trends, however, tremendous changes in the drivers of such warfare become obvious. Presently, territorial expansion and boundary adjustments are at the core of many, if not most, conflicts. The expansionist tendencies now pursued through the act of raiding recall accounts of pre-colonial warfare among pastoralists. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, many authors suggest that
in the past raiding was used as a means of territorial expansion until this was contained by the colonial administrations. In contrast to the current dynamics, raiding without territorial aspirations might be considered to have been a product of the colonial order. It began to revert to a semblance of its original form once the state lost the capacity to control boundaries, which in Kenya was noticeable when Daniel Arap Moi’s grip on power began to fade (Greiner, Bollig, and McCabe, 2011).

While the political dimensions of inter-tribal violence are largely explicable, the nexus between political leaders and the actual raiders is much less clear. There is evidence that Kalenjin politicians were actively involved in the distribution of modern firearms to the Pokot in mid 1990s. Sometimes it was also reported in the mainstream media (Barasa and Kipkoech, 2006; McCabe, 2004) yet finding out exactly which politicians are involved has proven challenging. This does not come as a surprise because since the post-election crisis of 2008 and the subsequent prosecution of Kenyan politicians by the International Criminal Court (ICC), more public attention is being devoted to politicians instigating ethnic hatred. In private talks, people mostly blamed area MPs and local councilors as culprits. Both are elected by the public and have to compete hard for their positions and balance different claims. Bollig, for example, describes how MP hopefuls were judged according to their capacity to guarantee organized provision of relief food (Bollig, 2006). In order to safeguard their positions, MPs must shield raiders from prosecution while at the same time fearing that their raids may lead to a devastating government response and disarmament campaigns by the security forces, which they must also prevent.

In this context, it is also important to mention that at least in East Pokot, most politicians are former herds-boys, and are familiar with the dynamics of violence. One active politician, once a cattle rustler himself, confirmed that during the 1990s booty from raiding was used to finance political campaigns and that today continuous raiding is particularly used to push people out of places that are perceived to have an economic benefit. Livestock raiding is an excellent strategy to this end for several reasons. It undermines their enemies’ livelihoods to such an extent that it very often results in large-scale displacement. Acquisition of livestock provides sufficient incentive in itself. Lastly, in light of this fact, it is very easy for politicians to blame cattle raiding on forces beyond their control. Since
there seems to be no clear chain of command between politicians and raiders. The raiders can hardly be described as militias in an emerging system of warlords, which appears to be the situation in West Pokot.

Apart from territorial expansionist, the politics of *majimboism* and political pluralism in Kenya in the early 1990’s also played a huge role in the transformation of traditional cattle raiding to cattle rustling. The re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya had a number of far reaching consequences one of which was the eruption of ethnic clashes especially in the Rift Valley province. This was partially a fulfilment of President Moi’s earlier prediction that a return of his country to a multi-party system would result in an outbreak of tribal violence that would destroy the nation (Human Rights Watch/Africa November, 1993). It was also because of the misconception of pluralism and *majimboism* by leaders from the ruling party and opposition parties as well as the general public. Beginning with the late 1980s, after the 1988 rigged elections and early 1990s many Kenyan political elites started questioning propaganda perpetuated by the ruling party. They began viewing pluralism as a cure-all for bad governance. They believed that pluralism could offer a forum for competitive politics and hence guarantee freedom of choice.

*Majimboism* is a quasi-federal government system akin to the devolved government we now have but is yet to be fully implemented. The pro-majimbo crowd is a coat of many colors knit together by the common fear of the effects of liberal democracy. Others have drawn out their swords against the unitary state, disowning it as a relic of colonial autocracy that privileged ethnic majorities and trampled on the cultural, social and economic rights of ethnic minorities. *Mamdani* posits that *Majimbo* system guaranteed self-governance at local level with oversight of local resources including land while and providing checks and balances to the exercise of power at the national level. The idea of *Majimboism* is popularized by the notion that it will encourage the distribution of the national cake more equitably throughout the country, as opposed to the perception that the present day government financially benefits small groups (Anderson, 2010).
Leff (2009) posits that the success or failure of Majimboism as a policy in Kenya will depend entirely on the manner in which its two conflicting interpretations are delivered to the people. Many people and entire communities, feel that the getting into Statehouse gives communities exclusive, or at least, priority access to the feeding trough where they literally take food from the mouths of poor Kenyans including from their own communities. Proponents of the system comprised primarily of political luminaries of the day including Jean Marie Seroney, Taita Towett and Daniel Arap Moi from the then Rift Valley Province and Ronald Ngala from Coast (Diamond, 1987).

The violence has coincided with calls by high-ranking Kalenjins within the government for the creation of a majimbo system of government in Kenya, a federal system based on ethnicity. The proponents of majimboism have simultaneously called for the expulsion of all other ethnic groups from land occupied before the colonial era by the Kalenjin and other pastoral groups, including the Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu. Inflammatory statements by these figures have been ignored by the government, while similar calls made by opposition politicians have led to immediate action, including arrest and detention (Eller and Coughlan, 1993).

The calls for majimboism have taken on a decidedly ominous tone. Its proponents have called for majimboism as a means of undermining the recent political liberalization and as a way of demanding the expulsion of all ethnic groups from the Rift Valley except for those pastoralist groups-Kalenjins, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu-that were on the land before colonialism. Galaty (1904) analyses that if implemented, majimboism would mean the expulsion of millions of members of other ethnic groups who have settled there since the 1920s and who have legally purchased land since the 1950s. Almost all the political parties in Kenya are made up of powerful tribal leaders who command immense despotic powers in the areas of their origin.

In addition, few of the proponents of majimboism have attempted to articulate the mechanism--federalism, semi-autonomous states or regional confederations--by which such a system could be established. It is interesting to investigate the link, if any, between the Majimboism debates and the associated rhetoric of resources being taken from non-
GEMA communities to the center as well as the clashes that erupted after the voting. Leo discusses that any people, and entire communities, feel that the getting into Statehouse gives communities exclusive, or at least, priority access to the feeding trough their own communities. This opinion has been reinforced in the blogosphere this Century when many Kenyans from various communities have asked "when will it be our time to eat (Michela, 2009).

Moi’s continued intolerance of dissent and of any effective semblance of opposition coupled with his intimidation of the press came to a head in July 1990 when two prominent political leaders publicly criticized Moi and were subsequently detained without trial. Following the detention of these political leaders, the international donor community joined the following pressure groups who had launched massive campaigns at different levels towards a multi-party dispensation (Mkutu, 2007).

This new multi-party movement continued for over a year very cautiously underground, as many feared intimidation, detention and even assassination. In November of 1991 international organizations led by the World Bank and IMF suspended all new development aid to Kenya, until a democratic multi-party government was elected in a "free and fair" election. Moi was forced to begin the process toward a multi-party election. Not until late September 1992 was the December election date announced (Mkutu, 2007). The Moi government had for long resisted multiparty claiming it would bring divisions and conflicts as Kenyan society was still not cohesive enough. With the 1992 election period approaching, the ruling elite realized that all was not well with them as the support was turning more to the opposition. To scuttle this, the government instigated tribal classes ostensibly to deny the opposition victory. The calculation was to unleash fear and scatter potential voters from their voting bases especially in opposition strongholds. Those behind this plan had recruited and gave special training to Pokot Kalenjin youths who were later released to various parts of the country to create mayhem (McCabe, 2004).

From the ecological aspects, the arid and semi-arid areas of Kenya are characterized by the steady erosion of the natural resource and social asset base from which households and communities construct their (predominantly pastoral) livelihoods. This is further intensified by seasonal variations or shocks such as drought. Pastoral livelihood systems
have adapted to these ecological patterns through the development of highly resilient production systems: The nature of pastoral livelihoods demands a high degree of mobility guided by the need for access to water and grazing land without deference to State borders.

These systems have been extensively eroded, by the activities of colonial and post-colonial legal definitions of land ownership and resource use. The increasing emphasis on individual rather than communal property rights has led to increasing restrictions on population movement and grazing rights the foundations of pastoral economy which has in turn undermined historic coping strategies and increased the vulnerability of pastoral communities. As a result, communities no longer retain the capabilities, activities and resources required to secure a minimal means of living. In addition to these factors, the proximity of these border regions to wider regional conflict: Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia has made access to small arms relatively easy. In a context of increasing vulnerability at the household level both from insecurity and economic decline small arms are regarded as household or community assets. This is the case in Turkana and other districts in northern Kenya where communities acquire weapons as a means of protecting, replacing or accumulating assets from both cross-border and internal raiding.

The pattern of conflict in Kenya is a very complex one. It offers difficult perspective thereby making classification altogether varied. Broadly, the patterns are determined by; rainfall patterns and ecological conditions, clan settlement pattern and distribution, interaction-contagion with group outside the district and the country, with occupations orientation and finally with the existence of water points. In recent times, Government authority has exerted pressure on the pastoralists in an attempt to reduce resource conflicts. Interventions mechanism such as sinking boreholes/wells, and controlling movements and banditry have also defined as patterns of conflicts.

The latter has ensured that settled life and development have emerged in certain areas thus reducing conflictual practices of nomadic pastoralism. It also ensured a controlled use of boreholes/wells thereby guarding potentials clashes between the users. In places with high Government visibility like district and divisional headquarters conflicts and insecurity are
low compared to far away areas. Idle Morans become a rogue fluidy army ready for hire on the highest bidder (Chazan and Mortimer, 1992).

After elections (1992) which the incumbent government won, these Morans became uncontrollable. The government had merely used them as a means to achieve political end but did not care about them thereafter. These Morans began a new form of banditry and cattle rustling never before seen in northern Kenya. In February 1998 after general elections the previous year, bandits from Pokot launched the bloodiest raids ever seen at the time against the Turkana. It claimed several lives and displacement of thousands of populations. Homes, farms and stores were torched, women were raped and thousands of livestock were stolen (Oyugi 1997). The government stood accused of complicity in this violence. The government response in dealing with the conflict was to send the military armed heavily including helicopter gunships. The mission was however, frustrated. The bandits, who had mastered the rugged terrain easily outwitted the government forces. The bandits also seemed to be well-trained and coordinated in their operations. They had become brutal and ruthless often times they organized and extended their activities into neighboring counties thereby inviting revenge attacks.

Conflict transformation in the North of Kenya was also attributed to the calls by high ranking KANU officials for the re-introduction of a majimbo (federal) system of government based on ethnicity. In the built up for the 1992 elections and after, the advocates of majimboism often called for the expulsion of all other ethnic groups from land occupied before colonialism by the Kalenjins and other pastoral ethnic groups (Weekly Review June, 29 1993; Kenya Times May 20 and 21, 1993; Daily Nation June 30th, 1993). The majimbo debate proved to be a recipe of chaos, ethnic animosity and conflict that be fell Kenya between 1991 and 1995. The country’s political history has it that the clashes began shortly after the infamous Kapsabet and Kericho majimbo conventions held by prominent Kalenjin and KANU politicians like Joseph Misoi, Nicholas Biwott, Kipkalya Kones, Henry Koskey, Ezekiel Barngetuny, Wilberforce Kishiero among others. The majimbo meetings were conducted later on in numerous places in the Rift Valley and it took Moi a long time to comment on this disastrous and loop-sided debate.
3.3 Emergence of Political Entrepreneurs

The escalation of pastoral conflict in Northern Kenya has also been attributed to the emergence of political (warlords) entrepreneurs in pastoral conflict. This is a practice which involves commercialization of cattle raiding. Commercialization of raiding cattle has affected pastoralists’ warfare practices in three main ways. First, has been the introduction of hired fighters. This has provided an environment where rich people can hire fighters. These fighters may necessarily not be from the same community. This phenomenon should be seen as directly linked to structural changes within pastoral economy, and not just as a consequence of its exposure to the market. This transformation is supported by cases such as that of the Pokot, who on certain occasions have hired groups of (more feared) Karimoja Morans to fight for them in clan raids.

Since independence, throughout to the 1990, state control over northern Kenya has been at best weak. Over time this has resulted in the emergence of cattle warlords who run armed militias to protect their interests. The emergence of the warlords was first experienced among the Pokot and Turkana communities from the 1980’s onwards. The first cattle warlord emerged in the 1980’s from the West Pokot community. He mobilized a group of about 500 youths by promising them security and livestock. Most of the youth were recruited from the nearby trading centers where they were eking out a living as night watchmen, farmhands, or by performing odd jobs. These young men underwent some vigorous military training under the supervision of ex-military men.

After undergoing the training the Morans were sent on raiding missions against the Tugen, Marakwet and Keiyo. Through several similar raids, the warlord and his retainers managed to replenish their stocks. Later more raids were organized further afield against the Turkana and Karamoja of Uganda. Most of these raids yielded good results. This marked the emergence of political entrepreneurs to pastoral conflict in Northern Kenya. Due to the region’s systematic marginalization since independence and the natural calamities experienced in the late 80’s and early 90’s compounded by a serious state of permanent insecurity created by bandits and to some extent by government security forces, the warlords have managed to win strong support from the people for their own personal gains.
The warlords created strong and heavily armed private armies which, apart from providing local security, also went for cattle raids near and far. The warlords therefore have very many retainers whom they can send on raids while they maintain and supervise the raiding party. The warlords have become the final authority on cattle relations overriding the traditional powers of the elders. Available evidence shows that there are links between warlords and livestock traders from Kenya and neighboring countries.

The system of cattle warlordism has gained prominence over the years for various reasons. First, there is the fact that the high numbers of destitute, uneducated youth who are desperate to make a living by any means necessary have proven an easy recruitment ground for the warlords. The warlords keep the youth as retainers who are in turn used for livestock theft for financial gain of the warlords. The second reason is due to the Government’s failure and/or unwillingness to curb the spread of warlordism through its security systems. Cattle warlords work hand in hand with some government security agents in propagating livestock theft. The warlords have become increasingly powerful and that even in instances where stolen livestock has been intercepted by non-complicit junior security officers, the same have been called with express “orders from above” to let the stolen livestock free.

Secondly, commercialization of raiding has resulted in a gun culture and a thriving gun market. Guns elevate ones status. As a key informant stated ‘one with a gun is not the same as one with a spear’. The gun culture has introduced a system where a few raiders, acting outside societal sanction can raid independently without much consequence. Thirdly, commercialization of cattle enables people who are not herders to profit from livestock raiding. It has also enabled the Morans themselves to raid independently from the social constrains. The resultant effect is that this form of independent raiding excludes reciprocity as marketed cattle cannot be raided back as the raided cattle are normally disposed of very quickly to the market.

Traditionally, within an economy based on reciprocity, livestock and military strength were independent variables. Indeed, one of the reasons for raiding used to be the need of restocking. Thus raiding was by and large a cyclical process in which groups in a restocking phase raided enemies that happened to be momentarily better off. The introduction of the market and the new links between the commercialization of cattle, weapons and labor
created within this process, enable the transformation of livestock capital into military strength which can then be used to further increase livestock capital in a cumulative process. Conversely, the ability to raid effectively increases long term differences between groups in marketing strategies. In Pokot, particularly, marketing of animals was liberalized and taken out of the hands of local councils which used to control the organization of cattle and goat auctions. Shortly after the control of local markets was taken over by Somali traders and powerful businessmen.

The transformation of cattle raiding into a commercial and entrepreneurial activity has increased the intensity of that raiding and is leading to major changes in economic, social and political structures in the border area. It is creating a black market for commercial cattle trading that straddles the localities, urban areas and the wider region. Access to small arms has become essential to successful commercial cattle raiding. Since the mid-1990s, the main form of cattle raiding has become that which is driven by commercial considerations. There is a lot of evidence linking businessmen and politicians to this raiding, many believe that they are powerful and well-connected people in authority in Kenya, who are also characterized by their ability to easily access weapons. The financing of cattle raids for commercial purposes appears to originate in the towns and cities, with local organizing ‘agents’ in the rural areas. Migration from rural to urban centers in Kenya has increased demand appetite in the towns and cities for nyoma choma (roasted meat). This has increased the demand for cattle, which must be accessed by all means.

Most of local political leaders are normally anointed by their respective ethnic spiritual leaders and as a result, the communities that they represent follow and obey what their leaders tell them faithfully. Some of the political leaders abuse the hallowed positions they occupy in their communities to mislead their people/and or incite them against other communities thereby, contributing to an increase in tension among the different communities. Further some of the political leaders have been reported to influence the appointment of KPRs and home guards in their communities (Odegi, 1992).
A disguised relationship between politics and cattle raids instead of just ethnic succession or competition over scarce resources has been established by Greiner (2013). This scholar correctly recognizes that local politicians have quietly promoted rustling both as a means of raising funds for enrichment and to finance campaigns, but also to destabilize groups perceived to be in opposition to their election. He observes that cattle rustling practices thrive under deteriorated governance structures as in Northern Kenya where the State appears unable or unwilling to commit adequate resources to ensure stability and development. Mutahi (2003) in examining the politics of cattle rustling and political violence in Trans-Mara observed that in the past warriors were always on alert to repel raiding parties foraging for stock. Mutahi employed both qualitative and quantitative research mechanisms during the course of his data collection and analysis. His target population was local leaders, young herders and pastoralists in Pokot. He points out that, warriors were ever ready to make forays themselves whenever opportunity seemed to offer plenty of plunder with little fighting. The weapons of war consisted of spears, bows, swords and arrows or long knives. The inter-ethnic raids were not as a result to to bad blood but desire to increase their stock. The study by Mutahi points out that cattle raid was a traditional practice conducted for purposes of increasing stock- most valuable economic resource in the region.

Misol et al, (2002) in their study titled “Playing with Fire: weapons Proliferation, Political Violence, and Human Rights in Kenya” observed that the government security presence was minimal or ineffective in conflict-hit pastoral areas of Kenya and that Police Reservists played a very critical role in providing security to citizens in these areas. The study illustrates the importance of the Reservists to both the government and the citizens hence justifying the need to continuously monitor and review their program for betterment of their services.

The above observation was supported by Mkutu (2008) in his study titled “Guns and Governance in the Rift Valley: Pastoral Conflict and Small Arms” who noted that the Reservists were advantageous in protecting the community since they were within reach, respond quickly, are familiar with the local people and endure the difficult conditions of the local terrain. In The study Mkutu identifies the characteristics of tolerance that the Reservists have over police officers and that which police can use to their advantage in protecting pastoral areas.
Kizito and Mkutu (2004) in their study titled “The Impact of Armed Criminality in Urban and Rural Kenya” have equally echoed the importance of Police Reservists in pastoral areas of Kenya by positing that the government uses them to supplement the police in these areas. The study reveals that the government in its dilemma of balancing between overstretched police resources and the obligation to ensure safety and security to Kenyans in all parts of the country is left with no choice but to engage the services of Police Reservists to bridge its police personnel gap in the vast and volatile pastoral areas.

Mwasaru (2006) in her study titled “Community Policing in a Pastoral Community” observed a trend where there is a shift in the role of Police Reservists mainly due to the difficulties associated with pastoral environments. She noted that police inadequacy has created a security vacuum which has forced the community to preconceive the Reservists as their only hope for security. Mwasaru further noted that the commitment of Police Reservists to secure the community has made the community members to view them as their ‘small government’ on security matters, hence allowing them to make key security decisions without involving the police. However much the government is in dire-need to employ the services of Police Reservists in the pastoral areas, it should discourage a perception by the community that the reservist can be a substitute for police officers, so as to avoid a trend where they may be diverted from their intended goal.

Mwasaru supported her observation by arguing that Police Reservists have shouldered the bulk of police work in the pastoral areas, since police have delegated to them the duties of gathering information, preventing crime, arresting and interrogating suspects. She however noted that failure to include them on the government payroll makes them vulnerable to traps of corruption and violation of human rights, hence worsening the security situation. The study reveals over-delegation and failure to pay Police Reservists as challenges which can easily lead them into misuse of their role.

Mkutu and Kizito (2007) in their study titled “Private Security Companies in Kenya and Dilemmas for Security” observed that Police Reservists were very effective in 1990s, as regulations governing their operations were strictly followed. They however noted that with the rise in corruption people of questionable behavior have been recruited as Reservists. The study identifies failure to follow regulations and rise in corruption as challenges facing the management and control of Police Reservists in Kenya.
Ndung’u (2010) in his study titled “A Reserve Force in Decline: Dilemmas of Supporting Community Security through Auxiliary Police in Greater Marsabit” also noted corruption within the police as a challenge influencing the performance of Police Reservists. He argued that their recruitment and deployment is politicized, uncoordinated and highly controversial. Ndung’u further observed that, although Police Reservists play a noble role, some have privatized the arms given to them by the government and allegedly use them for criminal ends.

Allegations of corruption, political interference and weak accountability in the recruitment, deployment and control of Police Reservists were also noted in a KHRC (2010) report titled “Morans no More: The Changing Face of Cattle rustling in Kenya”. The report observed that there is a lot of political interference with respect to recruitment and management of Police Reservists. The politicians ensure that their community members outnumber those of their rivals in the recruitment exercises. The report further argued that, while Police Reservists recruitment was initially meant to be a transparent Community Policing initiative, the same has been marred with allegations of corruption, incompetence and favoritism along ethnic lines. The report also noted that there are weak accountability procedures within the Reservists system, as it has been reported that some of them either use their official guns to carry out criminal activities or loan them out to criminals.

Similar challenges were also found in a study conducted by Wepundi et al (2012) titled “Availability of Small Arms and Perceptions of Security in Kenya”. The study noted that although Police Reservists enjoyed legitimacy from the local communities and were a better option in securing the pastoral areas, they were facing poor supervision and management which has been seen to create grounds for misuse and abuse of their role. The study further noted that the Reservists are not well equipped, supervised, trained and motivated to work for the community, providing remote livestock security to providing private security, with the younger Reservists more easily tempted than the older ones. Mkutu and Wandera further observed politicization of the Reservists, under resourced police force, communal versus private property conflicts, unequal distribution of resources, state’s arbitrary arming of some Reservists and not others and availability of illicit arms and ammunition as some of the factors causing problems with the Reservists system.
Wepundi (2011) in his study titled “Analysis of Disarmament Experiences in Kenya” examined some of the actions the government has taken in reaction to the problems facing Police Reservists. He noted that in 2003, the government committed to disarming all Police Reservists countrywide since it could no longer entrust the security of its people in them. This commitment was restated in 2010 when the government disarmed Police Reservists in the North Rift and Upper Eastern and promised to re-establish them after thorough vetting. Wepundi observed that the move was based on the Reservists’ previous implication in banditry, cattle-rustling and trafficking of small arms with people using unscrupulous means to join the system and later using the guns issued to them for personal purposes. The table below is a summary of the changing typology of pastoral conflict in Kenya.

**Table 2: Typology of Pastoral Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict Contexts</th>
<th>Traditional</th>
<th>Commercial</th>
<th>Political</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives</strong></td>
<td>Disputed natural resources</td>
<td>Accumulate cattle for sale</td>
<td>Remove voters of another party at election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>restocking depleted herds</td>
<td>eliminate competition</td>
<td>electoral fund-raising via sale of raided animals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>revenge for previous raid</td>
<td>exploit inaccessible Resources (pasture, water and labour)</td>
<td>gain political control</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>establish age set reputation</td>
<td></td>
<td>‘ethnic cleansing’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accumulate livestock for bride wealth and starting one’s own family</td>
<td></td>
<td>strategy of tension and political pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevailing authority system for management</strong></td>
<td>Customary rules</td>
<td>Formal rules</td>
<td>Formal rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of violence</strong></td>
<td>Killing has symbolic value, increasing numbers killed as by-product, women and children are not deliberately targeted</td>
<td>Killing people is not an aim, but increasing numbers are killed as by-product</td>
<td>Killing people is an aim, large numbers killed, ‘exemplary violence’, deliberate targeting of women and children, rape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Contexts</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance covered by raiders,</td>
<td>Normally within the region (just neighboring communities)</td>
<td>Wide spread even cross country boarders. stolen animals marketed over very long distances using vehicles, trucks to transport stolen animals.</td>
<td>Depends on cause Hired mercenaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>geographic scale</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity of participants</td>
<td>Warrior age-set of specific ethnic group</td>
<td>Hired fighters of any origin, not only herders; people not on raids may have invested by providing arms</td>
<td>Hired fighters and morans of specific ethnic group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime mover</td>
<td>Elders and prophets of specific ethnic group</td>
<td>Businessmen Venacular FM stations</td>
<td>Politicians, warlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposal of booty</td>
<td>Divided between elders and Morans, used as productive herd capital</td>
<td>Sold within Kenya or abroad, some distributed to clients Mpesa Payments</td>
<td>Sold, distributed between clients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing</td>
<td>after drought, large-scale raids or other causes of serious impoverishment;</td>
<td>When livestock price is high in large markets Need to supply meat to urban markets</td>
<td>Before and after election; related to strategic considerations Funding political campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>at the beginning of the rainy season; after age-set initiations; in coincidence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with concentrations of people and livestock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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3.4 Kenya Police Reservists

From the time of the Imperial British East African Company’s interest in the region and the building of the Kenya–Uganda railway, private police forces were formed to protect these enterprises. With the establishment of Kenya as a colony in 1920, these were absorbed into the Kenya Police. Until the end of colonial rule in 1963, the Kenya Police had the main function of serving the economic and political interests of the regime, such as protection of property of European settlers and enforcement of tax collection and labor laws. Policing by the force was limited to urban and white highlands although after World War II, this was gradually extended to include the “native reserves” (nonwhite areas) (Deflem 1994).
The nature of the most remote frontier areas, however, meant that they were largely “unpoliced” and the rule of law by the state was irrelevant. Livestock and natural resource conflicts were common (Lamphear 1992). However, community protection was often a self-help affair although from time to time the state (through the military) could “summon resources and strike hard if it saw the need to do so (Waller 2010). The administration of the arid north was supported by the military, with a few African constables also seconded there (Anderson & Killingray 1991). To this day, the state continues to use the military in periodic disarmament and “pacification” operations to subdue intercommunal conflict in Northern Kenya.

The Kenya Police Reserve is interesting because it is a well-established force that is enshrined in law as a provider of community security, although in practice it is inadequately overseen by the state and only partly carries out this assigned function. It has been described as “security on the cheap” (Mkutu 2001) for rural areas owing to the voluntary nature of the force, and as will be seen, a lack of resourcing that severely curtails its effectiveness. The Reserve is often considered a “home-guard” is a voluntary force created and armed by the state to supplement police activities. However, historically, home-guard units were a separate entity in Kenya and were distinctly different from Reserve units. Home-guards in Turkan and other northern border areas have been in operation since the 1960s under the supervision of the provincial administration to protect locals from raiding threats. In 1952 in Central Province home guards were created as self-protection groups in a response to the nationalist militant Mau Mau rebellion. In the settler areas of the White Highlands, these were paid units from among the labor forces of the property owners. Together with Tribal Police personnel, they were used as guides, trackers, and collectors of information for the state who later undertook night patrols to enforce government curfews or other regulations (Mkutu 2005). Later the home-guards joined the assault against the Mau Mau.

The Kenya Police Reserve, by contrast, was established in 1948 as a body of unpaid volunteers, a large number of whom were Europeans (around 35% in 1952) (Clayton & Killingray 1989). The duty of the Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) was to provide assistance to the regular police in the maintenance of law and order but they acted rather
autonomously, leading to concern from some (Clayton & Killingray 1989). They were also used in supporting the resistance against the Mau-Mau insurgency from 1952, particularly through air attacks carried out by the Reserve air wing. After independence the Kenya Police Reserve was retained, but its presence in urban areas was withdrawn in 2003 by the Kenya government which noted that it had become corrupt and unmanageable (GoK 2004).

However, KPRs has been the key contributing factor in the increased use of ammunition and increase in cattle rustling. Government’s initiative to recruit and arm the Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) has escalated conflicts among Pastoralists communities. While this was initially meant to be a transparent community policing initiative, the same has been marred with allegations of corruption, incompetence and favoritism along tribal lines as far as the decision on who should be armed as a KPR or home guard is concerned. In some instances, there have been allegations of political interference with respect to recruitment, as the politicians are said to ensure that their clan members and/or community members outnumber those of their rivals in the recruitment exercise. Even more worrying is the fact that there are weak accountability procedures within the KPR and home guard operations and it has been reported that some of them either use their official guns to conduct criminal activities like livestock theft or loan out the said guns to criminals. Although started with the noblest of intentions, it must now be categorically stated that the KPR and home guard community policing initiative has on the contrary, aided in the fueling of crime and livestock theft among the pastoralist communities. The weakening of state control over the pastoralist region has resulted in the emergence of cattle warlords who run armed militias to protect their interests (Mwasaru, 2006).

The militarism and emergence of cattle warlordism was first experienced among the Pokot and Turkana communities from the 1980’s onwards. The first cattle warlord emerged in the 1980’s from the West Pokot community, having recruited about 500 young men who underwent informal military training complete with relevant raiding techniques. The first raiding missions were held by the Turkana, Karamajong of Uganda, and Toposa of Ethiopia and later spread to Pokot Tugen, Marakwet and Keiyo. The system of cattle warlordism has gained prominence over the years for various reasons. First, there is the fact that the high numbers of destitute and uneducated youth who are desperate to eke a living by any
means necessary have proven to be an easy recruitment target for the warlords. The warlords keep the youth as retainers who are in turn used for livestock theft for financial gain of the warlords. The second reason is due to the Government’s failure and/or unwillingness to curb the spread of warlordism through its security systems. In its second fact-finding mission to Samburu and Isiolo, the KHRC team was reliably informed that the cattle warlords work hand in gloves with some government security agents in propagating livestock theft. The KHRC team was informed that the cattle warlords have become increasingly powerful and that even in instances where stolen livestock has been intercepted by non-complicit junior security officers, the same have been called with express “orders from above” to let the stolen livestock free.

In rural areas, especially in Northern Kenya, Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) have always played an integral part of the administrative structure. Throughout their history, the KPR have metamorphosed to become an important, if not the only, security agency in Northern Kenya. However, beginning in the mid to late 90s, the KPR gradually became more of a private security. Increasingly, politicians and business people started requesting KPR as their security. This transformed a force that was meant for the community to be a private force controlled by a few who were able to pay for their services.

Two particular issues account for this trend in the KPRs, first is their recruitment into the service. These KPRS were and still recruited on the basis that they are from a certain community and they can fire a gun. These KPRS were recruited on voluntary basis and hence the incentives to use the gun sometimes for their own survival or for commercial gains were high. In some instances, they began using the gun to harass other people as they were not trained in police work. Over time, the KPRs have become synonymous to a private army that is available to the “highest bidder” Second, KPRs in Northern Kenya are armed by government issued guns. This has resulted in the criminal use and firearm misuse by some. The governments, through the OCPD, officer commanding Police Division have not found an effective way of checking the use of firearms supplied to the KPRs.
3.5 Conclusion

Politicians have been accused of instigating cattle raids and conflicts. They have done so through funding of the raids and verbally igniting the youth to engage in conflict during political rallies. Politicians have been accused of their active involvement in distribution of firearms to the Pokot in the mid-1990s.

The transition from cultural to commercial raiding has tremendously escalated conflicts. The cultural raiding had rules that governed the number of cattle to be raided, the manner in which to carry out the raids and prohibited any killing especially of women, children and the elderly. This assisted to control escalation of conflicts. The weapons used were inferior and incapable of mass destruction. With introduction of more sophisticated weapons like AK-47 rifles, conflicts resulting to deaths, mass displacement and annihilation of some villages became a new phenomenon. This in turn encouraged more arming of communities and cyclical retaliatory attacks. The cattle industry out of cattle rustling is a huge one supplying meat in urban areas. It is controlled by business people who are not necessarily pastoralists but very well politically connected. This has in turn increased black market for the meat out of stolen cattle thus further enhancing the illegal industry and demand for more cattle leading to more rustling and conflicts.
CHAPTER FOUR
EXTERNAL TRIGGERS AND ESCALATION OF CONFLICT IN NORTHERN KENYA

4.1 Introduction
After 1990, there were serious external dynamics that took place in the Horn of Africa (HOA) which have had direct influence in the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. These external dynamics indirectly resulted in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into the arms of pastoralists in northern Kenya aiding in the transformation of traditional conflict into all-out warfare in pastoralist regions.

This chapter discusses the external dynamics that resulted in the proliferation of arms into Kenya in general and Northern Kenya in specific. The chapter has two major arguments. First, during the cold war, there was an arms race in the region because of its strategic position. This resulted in the two super powers, USA and USSR to arm specific countries that were considered to be friendly to them. Once cold war ended, these arms were flooded in the market as they were no longer controlled by the superpowers. Eventually, they got into the arms of civilians particularly the pastoralists communities and exacerbated already existing conflict.

Second, the chapter argues that beginning in the early 70’s into the 80’s and early 90s, a number of countries in the Horn of Africa experienced turmoil or civil strife. Such incidents resulted in many citizens of such countries being armed. These arms eventually found their way to pastoral communities in Northern Kenya which precipitated the conflict. The specific country upheavals discussed in this chapter are: political instability in Somalia; Ethiopian-Eritrean rivalry; instability in Uganda; and, the conflicts in Sudan.

4.2 Cold War and Instability among Political Regimes in the HOA
The Horn of Africa is one of the most complex and conflicted regions of the world. For over a century, the Horn has been a theatre for strategic power struggles and the Cold War confrontation when each of the principal countries of the Horn of Africa switched sides at crucial junctures (Michael 1998). Cold War was generally driven by material interests or ideological controversy and the Horn of Africa as a strategic location was turned into a
pawn during the Cold War (Mohamed, 2009). Its strategic location which is directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula thus located close to major oil-lines constituted a prime spot for the United States and Soviet Union and their allies to project power, control politics, and provide advanced military support to their Middle East and Persian Gulf allies (Lefebvre, 1991). Aware of this strategic location, United States embarked on increasing its presence in the region which among others was necessitated by the need to support and stabilize pro-Western governments, control of the sea route, and ensure the economic security of the West thereby restraining the possibility of a Soviet Union’s attempt at influencing post-colonial societies into joining the communist camp.

USA began to increase its presence through the control of the Mediterranean Sea route, Suez Canal channel further restraining the possibility of a Soviet blockade of oil lanes mainly located in Sudan. Additionally, the United States intended to keep the Red Sea and Indian Ocean open for international trade as well as for Israeli shipping. The control of the strategic ports in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean were critical for both super powers, mainly the Kismayu, Berbera, Boossaso in Somalia, Masswa in Ethiopia and Port Sudan in Sudan. Their strategic influence of these ports enabled them to control the political activities in the Horn of Africa (Schwab, 1978).

The United States’ increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world countries of socialist influence prompted it to provide financial and military support to Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. To further prevent any Soviet enlargement on the Horn of Africa, the United States tried unsuccessfully to cooperate with the Somalia as well. The Soviet Union, however, succeeded in procuring the support of Somalia through advanced shipment of military hardware pending the signing of full military aid agreement in 1963.

These developments marked the beginning of the significant presence of the two former super powers’ in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union’s foothold in Somalia was strengthened following the overthrow of Siad Barre’s government, who thereafter established what he called scientific socialism (Birnbaum, 2002; Mohamed, 2009). Through sheer blackmail, both Somalia and Ethiopian governments being anxious to benefit from this international political situation, threatened their newly found allies to
change sides in case of inadequate support. While the United States was aware of these schemes, the Soviet Union fell into the trap and went a heard to sign a Friendship and Cooperation agreement with Somalia in 1974 thereby making Somalia as one of the most heavily militarized countries in the continent (Parsons, 1995). Through this Friendship and Cooperation agreement, Somalia received heavy arsenal from the Soviet Union.

The United States’ alignment to Ethiopia changed when conflict erupted between Ethiopia and Eritrea. United States’ advised Ethiopia’s leadership against using an untrained peasant militia in Eritrea. In a subsequent slaughter of Eritreans, Ethiopia was rendered by the United States ineligible for military aid when it was listed as among the human rights violators. However, United States’ suspension of military aid to Ethiopia occurred not only when the country was running out of essential military hardware but was also facing Eritrean and Somali insurgents. To overcome the twin problems, Ethiopia turned to the Soviet Union for military aid. The Soviet Union’s recognition of the benefits of allying with Ethiopia brokered a $1 billion arms deal and signed a treaty of friendship with Ethiopia while simultaneously continuing their presence in Somalia.

It should be noted here that while the United States withdrew its official military assistance to the Ethiopian government, it also established clandestine military cooperation with opposition groupings notably TPLF which was fighting Mengistu’s regime. This made TPLF popularity grew and they became a major threat to the Mengistu regime. Mengistu retaliated by putting many Tigrayans in prison without charge. Many were tortured and executed in a cold blood. The famine in 1984/5 was not helped by the regime’s politics which contributed towards it and it was the worst in living memory. The Mengistu government imposed a restriction of movement on goods and aid to the famine affected regions. Hundreds of thousands of people died of starvation due to the Mengistu’s regime refusal to allow aid to be transported to the regions affected by the famine which were controlled by the rebels. Instead, the Mengistu regime devised and implemented a policy of resettlement in the famine affected regions as a cover to prevent people from supporting the rebels’ causes. The TPLF exploited on the plight of the people and the resettlement policy to help its cause.
The decision by the Soviet Union to support Ethiopia against Somalia insurgency during the Ogaden war which led to the eventual defeat of Siad Barre in his quest, angered Somalia who decided to terminate its military treaty with the Soviet Union. Siad Barre then welcomed the United States’ military and economic aid leading to the swapping of alliance between Ethiopia, Somalia and the Cold War superpowers. The new found alliance remained until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant the end of the polarization of the world. As the sole superpower, the United States did not have any real need of or interest in Somalia any more.

The strategic importance of Somalia vanished following this collapse, leading to the suspension of all financial and military aid. Starved of much needed financial and military aid, Somalia regime became extremely vulnerable leading to its collapse. Somalia did not have the chance or ability to establish a functional political system because it benefited from the ideological rivalry for a long time. Due to huge amounts of both Soviet and American military hardware, Somalia became the most militarized state per capita in the Horn of Africa (Parsons, 1995). The precarious situation, that was more than welcome to the Somali warlords who saw their chance to step into the huge vacuum of power. Certainly those huge amounts of military hardware from Somalia’s former sponsors during the Cold War guaranteed and ensured a long-term destabilization of the country, leaving the situation almost hopeless today.

By taking into consideration the situation described above, it is clear that the rivalry between the superpowers had its effect on today’s conflict in Northern Kenya because the states around the Horn were systematically thrown into a Cold War that has been raging in spite of assumed détente. When the Soviet Union and the United States started to internationalize regional conflicts on the Horn of Africa, the whole region automatically turned into a serious flashpoint (Schwab, 1978).

A similar fate also befell the regime of Mengistu, who also could not hold together following the demise of its military ally; the Soviet Union. Both Siad Barre and Mengistu were deposed through military revolts and were replaced by General Mohammud Aideed and Meles Zenawi respectively. However, due to huge amounts of both Soviet and
American military hardware, both Somalia and Ethiopia became the most militarized state per capita in the Horn of Africa. The huge stockpiles of military hardware from Somalia’s and Ethiopian former sponsors during the Cold War guaranteed and ensured a long-term destabilization and proliferation of small arms and light weapons both in those countries and later after 1990 to the neighboring countries including Northern Kenya (Micheal 1998).

4.3 Political Instability among Regimes in the Horn of Africa

Somalia has had less than ten years of relative peace since independence in 1960. Conflicts in the country arose following the assassination of its second president in 1969. This occasioned power struggle among competing political forces. The ensuing leadership and political vacuum was exploited by the military who through a coup installed its military chief-Siad Barre- as the country’s new president. The new president established governing council called the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) to steer the country until new elections of a civilian president. However, the council failed to organize elections and instead embarked on the arrest and torture of members of the fallen regime, banned all political parties and movements, abolished the National Assembly and suspended the national constitution. These developments strengthened the public belief that Barre’s led military masterminded the assassination of the country’s second president.

Barre’s attempts to consolidate and have a firmer grip of power led him to embark on a systematic exclusion of clans and civil society from the government. However, he did these on the pretext of promoting a stronger sense of nationalism in the government. The move nonetheless sparked off fierce opposition leading to the formation of various clan-based rebel groups. In an effort to quell the growing rebellion, Barre, engaged in oppressive and dictatorial rule, which was characterized by persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents and dissidents, a situation that prompted UNDP to describe Barre’s regime as one of the worst human rights records in Africa. Militias sprouted under the leadership of members of Barre’s fallen regime as well as that of the various clans. Clans had been a target of Barre’s regime; when the clans had a common enemy, they worked commonly.
With that enemy fallen, their ideals began to clash and each clan hungered to establish itself superior over the others. Warlords emerged from the ranks of the former military and also through the endorsement of clan elders and sub-clan leaders. These groups are but not limited to Somali National Alliance (SNA), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Peoples Movement (SPM), Somali Salvation National Movement (SSNM), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), Somali National Democratic Union (SNDU) and Somali National Front (SNF) (Mohamed, 2009).

Political instability in Somalia especially under Siad Barre led to the militarization of civilian population through a number of mechanisms. Marginalization of established military institutions and military officers was one of the mechanisms that led to the militarization of the civilian population in Somalia and beyond. The Supreme Revolutionary Council of Somalia under Barre doubted the allegiance of some of the then existing military officers most of whom it perceived to be supportive of the former political establishment. The Council through intensive purge systematically weeded out what it considered the undesirable elements from the military. Some of the fleeing or purged military officials left with substantial quantities of weapons that fell into the hands of already existing armed groups in the country. Some of the purged military personnel later headed the various rebel groups thereby recruiting and arming civilians to fight Barre’s government. Further, some of the purged officers also went ahead and established their own militia groups and combined forces with others in their effort to oust the government of Siad Barre.

Lack of an effective disarmament program meant that most of these weapons remained with civilian population long after Barre’s failed destabilization project. Further, the government hosted clan leaders who were also potential power seekers were consequently ready to mobilize members of their clans to be trained by the government and then used to fight forces opposed to the government. Groups that were armed by the government later became fully fledged militia groups who later turned against the very government that armed them. Other members of the civilian populations, who were recruited, deserted with arms upon receiving military training.
The disintegration and indiscipline in the ranks of rebel movements was also a mechanism through which the militarization of the civilian populations has occurred. Many armed political movements experience schism within their organizations. This situation resulted in splits, massive recruitment of new fighters, who are usually civilians. For instance, the quarrel between Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi that arose as a result of political differences led to the split of Somali National Alliance. Such factional groupings appealed to members of their respective clans for political support and recruitment. This occasioned the proliferation of clan-based political movements with armed militia wings. The disintegration and subsequent indiscipline in these militia movements saw the systematic mobilization and arming of civilian populations resulting in high number of arms in civilian hands (Baxter, 1993).

One of the most bizarre developments in Barre’s led Somalia was when the government decided to release arms to the public to scare off a determined opposition. This was seen as colonial tactic of ‘divide and rule’ to ward off opposition forces. However, despite these dirty tactics, Barre was deposed in 1991 by Farah Aideed. Aideed’s government was not internationally recognized and his leadership was fiercely contested, particularly by Ali Mahdi Muhammad. However, Aideed and Mahdi were not the only figures vying for power. With an absence of established government, a power vacuum emerged and all political and military leaders from Barre’s fallen regime took up arms that made available through the millions of dollars’ worth of weaponry provided by the Soviet Union and United States. Further, other clan leaders questioned the legitimacy of Aideed’s government leading to the eruption of total chaos and disorder in the entire Somalia. Since then Somalia has become one of the sources and transit points of small arms and light weapons, which unfortunately have been pilfered into Kenya. It is today estimated that about 15 out of 100 civilian populations in Somalia own firearms (Knighton, 2003).

In an effort to incorporate various territories inhabited by Somalis into a ‘Greater Somalia’, Barre in 1970s stockpiled arms intended for use in the armed struggle to his expansionist policy of creating the “Greater Somalia.” The greater Somalia was to cover North Eastern Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. Barre sought to arm rebel movements to fight Kenyan, Ethiopian and Djibouti governments. He thus armed the Ogaden National Liberation Front.
(ONLF) and Shifta to fight Ethiopia and Kenyan governments respectively. In 1977, Somalia invaded Ethiopia and occupied Ogaden and its forces advanced to Harar. War subsequently broke out in the region, and the Somalis were initially successful, capturing much of the territory. However, when the Soviet Union shifted its support to Ethiopia and halted its supplies to Barre’s regime, the invasion abruptly ended and Somalia troops were forced out of the Ogaden by 1978. All these happenings in Somalia had a direct impact in the security of Northern Kenya (Ranger, 1999).

Many Kenyan Somalis were able to obtain guns by volunteering to join the fight for the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and then slipped back into Kenya. In some cases, renegade Somali soldiers did the same. The establishment of Daadab Refugee camp in Northern Kenya to offer sanctuary to Somalis escaping from the conflict in their country also fueled the availability of arms in the region. Although majority of the refugees were ordinary citizens afflicted by protracted wars in their country, a significant number of the refugees comprised of the former soldiers of the ousted Siad Bare’s government with others coming from the numerous armed groups that emerged after the fall of the military government under Siad Bare. A number of these refugees could not be easily accommodated in the camps while in possession of arms, thus prompting the sale of weapons cheaply to the locals. Pastoralists in Northern Kenya were the immediate beneficiary of these arms, making Northern Kenya saturated with automatic guns from the Kenyan Somalis. Pastoralists replaced their spears with guns. At the height of the conflict in unconfirmed estimates for the volume of arms entering Kenya from Somalia ranged as high as 5,000 automatic rifles per month, with recovered weapons reportedly showing Chinese, Soviet Union, U.S., and Bulgarian markings (Muggah and Breman, 2001).

4.4 Ethiopia-Eritrea Rivalry
Apart from the conflicts in Somalia, the rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea also contributed to the militarization of civilians in the region. This rivalry is traceable to late 1990s. The regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea were the product of alliance between rebel movements to overthrow the dictatorial regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. Ethiopia was partitioned by a mutual consent of the new rebel governments. Bilateral relations were normal between the two countries until border war broke out in 1998. It is after this period
that the warring neighbors sought alliance with Sudan and perhaps other neighbors to destabilize each other. Eritrea urged the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) to accelerate armed action against Ethiopia. In return, Ethiopia played an active role in the creation of Eritrean Jihad Movement (EJM) and Eritrean Forces Alliance (ENFA) to weaken Eritrea. The two countries have continued to fight proxy wars through providing military and other forms of support to various warring groups (Assefa, 1998).

The Ethiopian government provided broad and vital support to the Transitional Federation Government of Somalia (TFG) and friendly Somali clans which included materials, training and troops even before it invaded it in late 2006. While the amount of support that Ethiopia has provided to date is difficult to verify, successive U.N. reports have pointed to substantial support from Addis Ababa to the TFG and authorities in Puntland and Somaliland. The UN Monitoring Group (2005) reported that Eritrea had supported and armed groups in Somalia fighting the TFG. The Monitoring Group’s report in 2010 also report that Eritrea was providing significant and sustained political, financial and material support, including arms, ammunition and training, to armed opposition groups in Somalia since at least 2007. Eritrea’s involvement as noted by the report, an attempt to counter Ethiopian influence in Somalia, especially because it perceives the TFG as a proxy for the Ethiopian Government (Straight, 2009).

Ethiopian-Eritrean rivalry was most demonstrated in the year 2006 when two military cargo shipments from Eritrea meant for Islamic Courts Unions (ICU) was delivered through Mogadishu airport. This prompted Ethiopia to invade Somalia and within a relatively short period drove ICU leadership into exile. Ethiopia then installed the first FTG, but which also faced a barrage of opposition groups supported by the Eritrean government. The two countries to date still wage proxy wars in Somalia. While Ethiopia supports the government of Somalia under the auspices of the African Union, Eritrea has been accused of supporting Islamic insurgents in Somalia including Al-Shabaab (Yeros, 1999).
The rivalry between Ethiopia and Eritrea has led to arms race between the two nations, where each country is involved in massive acquisition of arms. Eritrea for instance, purchased weapons from Belarus, Bulgaria and France between 2006 and 2009 worth over have 15 million pounds, majority of which being small arms and light weapons. In the same period, Ethiopia purchased weapons from Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and France worth over 25 million pounds. Although these purchases are done in readiness for war between the two nations, some of these weapons are diverted and used to fuel wars in Somalia. While not training their guns at each other, the two countries find themselves supporting proxy wars in the horn of Africa, with Somalia being a particular concern. The danger of the unregulated arms supply to Somalia and other militia groups in the Horn of Africa is that other than fueling protracted conflicts in Somalia, there is an escalation of arms availability and access to other areas including Northern Kenya (Osamba, 2000).

4.5 Instability in Uganda
An ideological paradox has been played out in Uganda under its most enduring presidents: Milton Obote, Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni. In the First Republic under Obote, the country flirted with socialism at home while remaining basically part of the Western camp. In the so-called ‘Second Republic’ under Idi Amin, the country flirted with the Soviet Union in foreign policy, while trying to Africanize capitalism. Under Museveni, capitalism at home and pro-Westernism in foreign policy converged (Lefebvre, 1991).

Obote tried to turn Uganda into a socialist country without distancing himself too far from the West. Amin acted in ways that did distance him from the West, but in pursuit of indigenization of capitalism. Museveni was less worried about whether capitalism was indigenized or not provided that it was unrestricted. Obote’s ‘Move to the Left’ was influenced more by Julius Nyerere than by Karl Marx. Obote’s Common Man’s Charter of 1969 was inspired more by Tanzania's 1967 Arusha Declaration than by The Communist Manifesto. In his last two years in office, Obote’s rhetoric was markedly more leftist. The stage was being set for nationalization measures as illustrated below (Ambeje, 2004).
Uganda plunged into conflict just about four years after independence. The conflict was triggered by the invasion of Kabaka’s palace in 1966 by Ugandan soldiers under the command of newly appointed army commander Idi Amin. Prior to this, the country experienced strained relations between the state, led by President Obote and Baganda Kingdom led by Kabaka Mutesa. Subsequently, the state through the introduction of a new constitution, abolished both the hereditary kingdoms and nation's federal structure and in their place established the position of an executive president, with Obote doubling both as the president and the prime minister. Aware of the disapproval of his action by several Ugandans especially the proponents of traditional kingdoms, Obote enlisted the services of the military and the police to silence any dissent arising from his actions. Despite of the conflicts between Obote and Mutesa (1966) Obote and Amin, (1971), Obote and Museveni (1985), the small arms acquired by these factions were mainly confined to the domestic problems in Uganda, and limited supply to the neighboring countries including Kenya (Irin 2005, Irin 2006).

Obote’s reign in Uganda came to an abrupt end while on official visit abroad. He was deposed by the army chief Idi Amin in 1971. Obote decided to settle in neighbouring Tanzania where he maintained a small army of Ugandan exiles under the command of Tito Okello. Amin’s tragic decision to invade Tanzania in 1978 without provocation offered Julius Nyerere, the Tanzanian president, the opportunity to not only repel Uganda’s invasion but also to topple Amin’s government. Therefore Obote was once installed as the president with Tito Okello as the army chief. Obote’s second assumption of power lasted between 1979 and 1985, during which time the country was turned into a police state, economy deteriorated and ethnic conflicts reached new heights. The ensuing disorder led to the ascension of Tito Okello into power, but whose rule lasted for only a year. Yoweri Museveni, once Uganda’s defense minister, with the assistance of guerrilla army-National Resistance Movement- toppled Tito Okello in 1986, and has to date remained Uganda’s head of state. However, most parts of Uganda still remain volatile following consistent attacks by armed rebellions, with the most notable one being Lord’s Resistance Army, under Kony (Tornay, 1979).
The military assault on Kabaka’s palace by government forces and the ensuing resistance marked the first known avenue through which arms in Uganda began to pilfer into civilian hands. Although Kabaka’s forces were no match for Amin’s troops, Kabaka managed to escape alongside some of his forces who were also heavily armed. While Kabaka eventually sought political asylum in London, most of his forces retreated into the civilian population. Further, Kabaka’s palace after the assault remained unguarded leading to arms looting by both members of the public and renegade soldiers both from the government and the defeated kingdom (Österle, 2007).

The rivalry between Obote and Amin further provided channels through which arms reached civilian populations (Holger, 1977). The author observes that at the height of their disagreements, Obote and Amin both resorted to ethnic manipulation in their effort to shore up their support in the armed forces’, as well as in their attempt to control the entire country. For instance, Obote created a number of armed organizations in an attempt to rival the regular army, namely the Special Force and the General Service Unit (GSU), and appointed his cousin Akena Adoko as the overall command (Irin 2006).

The Special Force and the GSU were largely dominated by individuals from Obote’s own district of Lango and were favoured in terms of arms, equipment and budgetary allowance. This drew the fury of the regular police and army. This behaviour drew an equal reaction from Amin who mobilized his own ethnic affiliates from West Nile to counter balance the inflated numbers of Langi and Acholi in the army. The disarmament of the Obote’s forces-following his ouster in 1971- without appropriate disbarment program meant that most of the soldiers left the barracks with arms most of which were sold to the civilian population while others used for criminal activities by the former soldiers. The fact that soldiers lacked a common command structure further implied that monitoring their activities and enforcing appropriate discipline became a bit cumbersome. The result of this was the flooding of civilian population with illegal firearms (Mace and Houston, 1989).

The dramatic and unexpected fall of Amin’s government in 1979 led to soldiers at Moroto and Kotido Barracks flee leaving behind huge stoke piles of firearms unprotected. It is estimated that 15,000 guns and approximately two million rounds of ammunition were stolen (Human Rights Watch Report, 1999). These barracks were situated in the larger
Karamoja cluster which is not far away from the Kenyan border. The development allowed Dodoth, Karamojong and Jie morans to loot arms from the barracks. To bolster their front against the National Resistance Army (NRA) led by Museveni, which had been waging a guerrilla war against Obote’s government, Okello recruited hundreds of Dodoth and Karamojong morans into the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA). When the NRA defeated them in 1986, the Dodoth and Karimojong fled with all their arms back to Karamoja. Faced by an insurgency from the Lord’s Resistance Army, the government of Uganda under Yoweri Museveni has often enlisted the services of Dodoth and Karamajong morans to help it fight the insurgency. Most of these morans end up deserting and retreating into the civilian population with their government issued guns.

These developments have led to the proliferation of arms in the Karamoja cluster. It is today estimated that nearly half of the illegally held firearms in Uganda are found within the Karamoja cluster. Dodoth and Karamojong have over the years used these arms to launch massive cattle raids throughout the neighbouring districts. The agro-pastoralists of Teso and Lango lost over one million heads of cattle between 1984 and 1988 (Ocan, 1992b). The Obote II government responded by placing units of special militias on the borders between Karamoja with Lango and Teso. Cattle rustling were contained briefly until rifts developed between the Acholi (led by the late Okello Lutwa and Bazillio Olara) and the Langi (led by President Obote himself) which led to the July 1985 overthrow of the Obote II government. However, with such massive fire power, the Dodoth and Karamojong extended their raids into neighbouring Kenya, with Turkana and Pokot communities being their greatest target (Kimaiyo, 2009).

Dodoth’s and Karamojong’s initial incursion into the Turkana community seemed to have caught Turkana community unawares leading to heavy casualties and livestock losses. The Government of Kenya intervened by providing ammunition to the Turkana community for self-defense. Although government’s intervention was welcome, Turkana community felt that they needed to arm themselves for self-defense. Ownership of arms, the community thought could provide them with a head start in the region. For this reason, many parents in Turkana North purchased weapons for their male descendants, both for the purposes of defending the family’s livestock and also to ensure that the morans have the means to raid
and augment livestock, should they need to in the future. The Turkana exploited the ethnic rivalry between their foremost enemy in Uganda—the Dodoth and their Ugandan cousins, the Jie to get arms supplies from the latter. Similar tactics were used by the Turkana community to obtain arms from Sudan where they purchased arms from Didinga, who happened to be the traditional enemy of the Toposa, who coincidentally have over the years been the Turkana’s foremost challengers from the Sudan side (Boutwell, 2002). The Turkana armed warriors extended their cattle raids to their Kenyan neighbours, the Pokot and Samburu. During the cattle raids, Samburu and Porkot Morans benefited from the guns of the killed Turkana morans.

4.6 Conflicts in the Sudan

The administration perceives the 60-year-old regime in Khartoum as among the most heinous in the world. It is accused of sponsoring terrorist groups in at least a dozen countries, housing would-be assassins, human rights violations, denial of food aid to starving people, and complicity toward an active slave trade within its borders. Moreover, Khartoum has imposed strict Islamic laws over the people in the non-Muslim south (Eller and Coughlan, 1993).

The complex factors that divide the people of the Sudan (north and south) have given rise to two prolonged wars during most of the second half of this century. The first war (1955-1972) ended in a negotiated settlement. The next phase of the civil war, started in 1983, and is primarily between the radical Arab-Islamic northern government in Khartoum and southern rebels (SPLA—Sudan People’s Liberation Army) who are primarily Christian and animist Africans. Many, including some American officials, had hoped that the United States could be part of a new negotiated agreement to bring the war to a less divisive end (Schlee, 1989).

The US government proposed to provide direct food aid to the SPLA soldiers who, it should be noted, had been accused by the State Department in the past as being guilty of some of the same human rights violations as the regime in Khartoum. According to John Pendergast, a foreign policy adviser in the State Department, the provision was intended to allow the rebels to stay in position or expand positions in places where it is difficult to
maintain a logistical line. Such intentions indicated an open hostility toward Khartoum and a warm embrace for the rebels at a time when U.S. leverage was extremely weak in the Arab world, to say the least in the Sudan. The Arab League condemned the United States for its actions and pledged open support for the Khartoum regime against any threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Mkutu, 2007).

Conflict in Sudan is traceable to the 1956 following the decision by non-Arab Sudanese challenge on the domination of control economic and political by Sudanese of Arab origin. The conflict pitting the Muslim North and Christian South led SPLA remained the longest conflict in Africa (1956-1972 and 1983-2006) causing more than two million deaths and much suffering to the Sudanese people. The SPLA rebels received arms from sympathetic governments like Uganda. They also raided government armoires and purchased weapons from disgruntled government soldiers. Unfortunately rebel movements do not have mechanisms for tracking and monitoring how arms are used, so many can end up in wrong hands. Political instability in Sudan was also an important source of arms for the Turkana community (UNDP 2002).

The first and most significant impact of the war in Sudan was an influx of refugees into northern Kenya. Most of these refugees camped at Kakuma refugee camp located in Lokichogio Division of the larger Turkana County. Many of these refugees were armed and, seeking sanctuary in Kenya, were therefore anxious to get rid of their arms and ammunition. The refugees were keen to sell their weapons quickly and consequently offered them at values well below the existing market rate in Lokichogio to the Turkana community.

In the early 1980s a personal agreement between president Moi, and the SPLA leader, John Garang, allowed for the creation of a relatively small SPLA base in Kenya. The station, named Key Base, was situated about 3km to the north of Lokichoggio. The base offered the SPLA a rearward base of operations and a convenient resupply location for military materiel shipped overland from Mombasa and Nairobi, or by air to the airstrip at Lokichoggio. However, this base soon became an important nexus of Lokichoggio’s arms trade throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The implication of this was the beginning of the transformation of conflict in Northern Kenya (Collins, 2006).
4.7 Economic Entrepreneurs

Economic entrepreneurs are mostly arms dealers and livestock traders. They often supply weapons to livestock keepers, traders ‘bandits and even mercenaries. They see this as a form of investment and take profit from the direct participants in the conflict. Weapon traders also are the ones marketing raided livestock. The political transformation in Somalia after 1991 generated a change of shifita ‘banditry towards financed and well-connected trade barons who recruits from retired army personnel; and school leavers to form a new class of professional and sophisticated highwaymen.

To a certain extent, all raids are “commercial”, not just those usually referred to by the term, in which the promoters and paymasters are businessmen, officers or administrators. The so called “commercial raids”, do not represent a separate category in which “external” interests interfere with pastoral economy. They are probably better understood as an aspect of the wider integration of pastoralists within a market economy. It is usually overlooked that the early 1980s not only saw an upswing in the marketing of light weapons, but was also a turning point in Kenyan development policy for pastoral districts. The adoption of a neoliberal perspective in which the introduction of a market economy had first priority, was seen as the instrument and not, as before, the objective of development (Evangelou, 1984).

The marketing of livestock has always been part of the East Pokot landscape. All along they were the suppliers of livestock at Nginyang River market every Saturday. The longtime and established buyers were the Tugen and Kikuyu from Marigat, Mogotio and Nakuru and they enjoyed a monopolistic position on livestock pricing. According to the FGD participants of Nginyang and Chemolingot in particular, indigenous livestock traders at Nginyang, the Tugen and Kikuyu traders would form a cartel and agree beforehand on the maximum prices for particular livestock irrespective of size. Alternatively, they would deliberately arrive at Nginyang Market late, find desperate livestock sellers afraid that they would go back with their livestock and, out of desperation, the sellers would dispose off their livestock at appallingly low prices. Hjort (1981) captures this scenario when he says that the purchasing trick of the main buyers of livestock favoured them, thereby decreasing the profit of small producers and manipulating the timing of sales and auctions. Nginyang Market is the oldest and most famous livestock market in East Pokot and serves areas such as Kapetd, Mt. Kulal, Silali, Chemsik, Kositei, Maron and the eastern parts of Kerio valley.
There are many changes concerning livestock marketing in East Pokot. New livestock markets have sprung up. The Ministry of Livestock Development, Department of Livestock Production, Chemolingot in a (2009) Annual Report indicated the following livestock marketing yards: Tangulbei, Kokwototo, Amaiya, Loruk, Chesirimioni, Nginyang, Kolloa and Kapunyang. Key informant interviews indicated Churo and Chepkalacha as additional livestock markets. Although all markets are accessible, Amaiya remains volatile due to East Pokot –Samburu intermittent conflicts, which make traders not reach the market on some days. The County Council of East Pokot levies charges on livestock as follows: Ksh. 60 for a goat or sheep and Ksh 200 for a cow. In both cases the buyer and seller contribute 50% of the total levy.

The introduction and diffusion of wage-labor has provided an institutional framework which enables richer people to hire fighters, not only mercenary soldiers from outside the pastoral economy, but “warriors” as well. That this phenomenon should be seen as directly linked to structural changes within pastoral economy and not just as a consequence of its exposure to the market, is supported by cases such as that of the Samburu, who on certain occasions have hired groups of (more feared) Pokot warriors to fight for them in community raids.

Livestock rustling has been commercialized in the recent past. Cases of well-organized raiding missions to gather spoils for the market have been reported in Turkana, Marakwet, West Pokot and Samburu districts. It has been alleged that wealthy individuals from outside the three Pastoralist communities are actively involved in organizing cattle raids, the proceeds of which they purchase for sale at various livestock markets. Commercialization of cattle enables people who are not herders to profit from livestock raiding. It also enables the herders themselves to raid independently from the actual availability of land or labor for livestock management and excludes reciprocity as marketed cattle cannot be raided back. As in livestock both relations of property/exchange and social boundaries overlap, changes in the patterns of ownership affect inter and intra-ethnic relations as well as values associated with sociality (Baxter and Hogg, 1990).
Together with mercenaries (group of hired fighters), commercial and political raids are increasingly, organized around wage labor. Mercenaries and guns are used by other clans or groups to counter raids or help such groups acquire pasture and grazing territory for them. In recent times nomadic pastoralists are defended or spear headed by hired groups well-armed to enable them graze and water livestock in hostile territories.

According to the Global Forum on Agricultural Research, Kenya will have a beef deficit of about 4,500 tons in 2014 due to high local consumption and export demands. The Kenya Meat Commission estimates that some 500 tons of beef are exported from Kenya each week to the Middle East (United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and Africa (Egypt, Tanzania, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan). In many areas, an intensifying shift from a 'breeding herd' (rearing for prestige) to a ‘trading herd’ (rearing for sale) in part to take advantage of the growing markets for animals and livestock products in urban areas as well as export markets. There is an emergence of commercialized cattle-rustling where wealthy businessmen, politicians, traders or local people pursuing economic objectives finance raids among the pastoral communities. The meat-loving urbanite Kenyans are the unsuspecting accomplices of these unscrupulous businessmen.

Livestock markets like Dagoreti, an informal settlement in Nairobi, are thriving. Transporters from Northern Kenya take their trucks to such markets and slaughterhouses to offload cattle, sheep and goats. They later travel back to pastoral areas by trucks to bring more goats, cows and sheep. The demand in Nairobi is very big. Economic entrepreneurs are making good money from this business for every animal brought to the city as the price triples, making conflict through cattle rustling a cyclical phenomenon.

**4.8 Impact of External Triggers on Pastoralists in Northern Kenya**

As it has been shown in chapter two that cattle rustling among pastoralists of Northern Kenya date back to pre-colonial period where it was considered as a means of acquiring wealth, raising dowry, restocking and psychosocial atonement. Traditional cattle raiding had due regard for human life and were largely under the guidance and direction of community elders. Traditional weapons such as spears, swords, bows and arrows were the
main weapons used in the raids. Although at times lives were lost during the raids on either side, such losses of lives were never celebrated even if they were all from the enemy community. However, extreme caution was taken to ensure that raids were avoided when the neighboring community was undergoing catastrophic moments since raids done at such times were considered opportunistic and cowardly acts, and could attract future extreme revenge from the enemy community.

Traditionally, raiders were also advised against targeting non-combatants such as children, women, the elderly and the frail. Raiders found to have attacked such persons would be rebuked publicly and excluded from future community raids. All these ensured that raids were conducted with the acceptable bounds. The timings of traditional cattle raiding were guided by elders. This was meant to largely control cattle pests and diseases and reduce fatalities during the raids. Elders were aware of times of the year when livestock pests and disease outbreak were prevalent, which enabled them to advise the community when and when not to conduct the raids. Raiding infested livestock and driving them to the community could lead to disease and pest outbreak in the community herd leading to unnecessary loss of livestock. Raiders also needed to use the right routes that were safe in terms of terrain, free of predators as well as those that raiders could easily escape through in case of heavy attacks from the enemy community. But even more important was the raids were to be conducted when pastoral resources-pasture and water-were in plentiful.

Although cattle raiding have been part of pastoral communities of Northern Kenya history, the frequency and scale of the practice has been on the rise since the late 80’s and early 90’s. Interestingly, this transformation was marked by a number of processes happening in within the region. In Uganda, there was the invasion of Kabaka’s Palace and Obote’s forces in 1966, in Sudan there was the outbreak of civil war between Sudanese forces and SPLA in 1956; in Ethiopia, there was the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie by military committee called Derge led by Mengistu in 1974, in Somalia there was the assassination of Somalia president by the military led by Siad Barre in 1969. As already observed political instability in these countries led to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into civilian hands due to dysfunctional state structures. While some of these weapons were used for rebellions against governments, some of the arms were used to commit other crimes including cattle raids.
4.9 Proliferation of Small Arms in Northern Kenya

Baven (2008), and Boutwell (1999) argue that several factors account for this flow of small arms. Un-manned Porous borders pastoralists groups across the common borders, conflicts in the Horn of Africa; and, middlemen and brokers. The unstable states in the Horn of Africa are one of the principal sources of small arms and lights weapons to Northern Kenya before 1990. Kenya stands at the crossroads between the conflict areas of South Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia.

It is also important to note that while the proliferation of small arms is generally associated with conflict and post-conflict situations. The long and porous nature of Kenya’s borders and the relative ease of concealing small arms make it difficult to control the movement of weapons into Northern Kenya. Moreover, the agencies responsible for border control are underfunded and ineffective. The map below is an illustration of small arms inflow into Northern Kenya.

MAP 3: Map of the HOA and the flow of SALW to Northern Kenya.

Figure 3: Inflow of SALW into Northern Kenya
The map shows the routes and the flow of small arms to Kenya and specifically to the Northern Kenya. South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Somalia are the main sources of small arms and light weapons to the region. The movement of arms to the region is a very gradual process taking several years before guns reach their intended destination, this is because these guns are illegal and could only be sold through a black market or commercial brokers. In general small arms entry to Northern Kenya was from the western side, mainly from Uganda and Sudan. On the Ugandan side of the border the Karamojong is a pastoralist group that acquired guns in the 1970s mainly from the unstable political regimes in Uganda. After the collapse of Amin’s regime in Uganda, the Karamojong received a lot of guns which were turned against the Turkana and the Pokot of Kenya. They restricted the access of guns to their neighbors, meaning the proliferation of small arms was reduced from the Uganda side since the Karamojong never sold their guns.

The Karamojong during dry spells cross the Kenyan border in search of pasture and water. Naturally this creates conflict between the Karamojong and the two pastoralists group in Kenya namely the Turkana and the Pokot. The Karamojong had superior guns than the Turkana and Pokot of Kenya and every time the Karamojong cross the Kenyan border, they raid the Turkana and Pokot and pushed them away from the common border. Consequently the Turkana and the Pokot turn to the less armed Samburu in order to restock from the losses occasioned by the Karamojong raiders. A continuous fighting between the Karamojong and the Kenyan groups, enabled the Pokot and Turkana to access guns. Though the Karamojong did not sell their guns to the Kenyan groups, serious cattle rustling episodes is one way in which Pastoralist groups armed themselves (Irin 2003).

Turkana and Pokot continued to attack the Samburu since they remained a soft target for these groups. The Samburu could not resist these groups because they possess guns that were superior to the Samburu spears and swords. To continue attacking the Samburu, the Pokot and the Turkana formed a rugged group of cattle rustlers called the Ngoroko, who became mercenaries for hire. The Ngoroko were members of these two communities and their main role was to raid cows from the Samburu in order to feed the militant elements from the Turkana and Pokot communities. The Ngoroko mercenaries could occasion raids at will since they possessed guns against the Samburu Morans who had traditional spears. All the time the Samburu Morans remained victims since they could not match the power of the gun from the Turkana, the Pokot and the Ngoroko (Irin 2003).
In 1960’s and early 1970’s, during the rule of Siad Barre, the government of Somalia stockpiled arms intended for use in the armed struggle to create a ‘Greater Somalia’, which was to include parts of Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia. The government armed the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) to fight against Ethiopia and the Shifta to fight against Kenya. The efforts by Somalia failed. However, due to internal wrangles; however the Shifta, the militant wing of the Somali ethnic group waged a serious sustained conflict in Northern Kenya with an aim of pushing non-Muslim members out of the region. As fate had it, the only non-Muslim or Cushitic groups in the Northern Kenya are the Samburu. Since the Shifta war in early 1960s Samburu and the Somali have been fighting mainly because the Shifta militants from the Somali group were sustained through cattle raids from the Samburu. The guns from the Somalia then fed on to the Shifta militants from the Somali ethnic group. The Shifta guns were turned to the Samburu, who were pushed from their traditional grazing areas to more environmentally unfriendly locations, mainly the Borana from Ethiopia and Rendille.

There had been alliance formation between and amongst the pastoralist groups, mainly prior to the collapse of the Somalia state in early 1990s. These alliances kept on shifting according to pasture and water needs as well as protecting strategy for survival. The Samburu for example kept shifting their alliances between and amongst the Turkana, Borana, Somali and the Pokots. The alliances were crafted according to the intensity of threat, seasonal migratory routes, and availability of pasture and water. These alliances regulated conflict in the region, where the Samburu survival before acquisition of guns was through these alliances.

On the Northern side of the Kenyan border, Ethiopia is host to a number of armed belligerents in the southern part of the country, including the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and others. Recently, Ethiopia has also become involved in Somalia’s civil war on the side of the elected government against the Islamic Courts. Ethiopia has loose laws on guns, where local population is allowed to own guns through a licensing procedure. The Ethiopians were able to sell these same guns bought from Ethiopian open gun markets to the Borana pastoralist along the porous border. The Borana also sold their guns acquired from Ethiopia to the Samburu. The Borana like
the Rendile and the Somali are predominantly Muslims or Cushitic groups. The Samburu acquired automatic guns from the Borana militants who run to Kenya after the fall of Mengistu Haille Merriam in 1994. These guns acquired by the Samburu were used to contain the Turkana and Pokot raids. Pastoralists’ conflicts become more complex and accelerated beyond acceptable levels.

Several decades of regional instability have adversely affected Kenya. According to Mkutu and Wandera (2013), there are sustained arms flows across Turkana’s long, porous borders, such that the Turkana community has become the most militarized in Kenya. They also explain that Turkana has a small government presence, and is heavily dependent on the KPR force as its first line of security. This has led to more arms in the hands of civilians especially in Pokot and Turkana and Samburu regions where KPRs are the first option for security.

In an FGD held in Lokichar, it was reported that the Turkana used home made guns which they used to raid the Pokot and other neighboring communities. Then, raiding was not as frequent as it is now. But with the advent of merchants bringing arms for sale from Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda, they only needed to give 3-5 cows for a gun depending on its cost. This cost has considerably dropped to around 2 cows for a gun now. This is probably due to the ongoing conflicts in neighboring countries sustaining arms flow into Northern Kenya. Presently, pastoralists spend cash instead of cattle because the guns have become cheaper and easier to access. At the moment, one AK-47 would go for Ksh.60,000 while a G3 would go for 30,000. With the cheapness and abundance of guns in the region, there is a constant supply throughout, sustaining and escalating the conflict in the region (Mtuku and Mandera, 2013).

Interviews with key informants revealed that guns from as far as South Sudan found their way into Alale in Pokot territory through the Karamoja region of Uganda. The respondents also informed the researcher that some Somali traders brought arms from as far as Somalia to sell in Pokot in Tiaty. The respondent further reported that with the Somalis bringing arms from Somalia and others from South Sudan, there was a constant supply of arms and ammunitions and this complicates the conflict situation among the pastoralists in Northern Kenya.
4.10 Conclusion

The development of increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world countries of capitalist by the USA marked the beginning of the significant presence of the two former super powers’ in the Horn of Africa. USA began to increase its presence through the control of the Mediterranean Sea route, Suez Canal channel further restraining the possibility of a Soviet blockade of oil lanes mainly located in Sudan. Its increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world countries of socialist influence prompted it to provide financial and military support to Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.

Political instability in Somalia made Kenyan Somalis able to obtain guns by volunteering to join the fight for the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and then slipped back into Kenya. In some cases, renegade Somali soldiers did the same. In Ethiopia and Eritria, the rivalry between the countries led to arms race between the two nations, where each country is involved in massive acquisition of arms. Meanwhile, The Turkana exploited the ethnic rivalry between their foremost enemy in Uganda-the Dodoth and their Ugandan cousins, the Jie to get arms supplies from the latter. Similar tactics were used by the Turkana community to obtain arms from Sudan where they purchased arms from Didinga who happened to be the traditional enemy of the Toposa who coincidentally have over the years been the Turkana’s foremost challengers from the Sudan side.

Therefore, one of the reasons why conflict is escalating in Northern Kenya is the proliferation of small and light weapons an effect of the upheavals experienced in neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. Transformation of the conflict from a traditionally sanctioned practice to an all-out criminal activity can be attributed to the increased prevalence of so called ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons’ (SALW) in the area. Pastoral communities in northern Kenya provide an excellent market for fire arms. Where they traditionally relied on bows, arrows, spears, pangas and rungus for protection and warfare they now resort to assault rifles such as the AK-47 and the G-3 rifles which are relatively cheap due to high availability. The availability of SALW’s has scaled up the number of fatalities and indiscriminate killings among the Nilotic Pastoralist of Northern Kenya.
Other modern triggers of conflict like M-pesa/Cellphones and Vernacular radio stations are used by economic entrepreneurs to communicate and finance with the hired Morans during the raids. They use M-pesa to send money after the raids as a form of compensation. Cellphones are also used to advice on the best route to follow during and after the raid. This helps hired groups or Morans to know which route to follow for the raid to be successful.
CHAPTER FIVE
STUDY FINDINGS ON THE ESCALATION OF CONFLICT
AMONG THE NILOTIC PASTORALIST OF NORTHERN KENYA:

5.1 Introduction
The overall objective of the study was to examine the triggers that explain the escalation of conflict among Nilotic Pastoralist of Northern Kenya. The study sought to establish the internal and external triggers that account for the intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya, between 1990 and 2017. The study hypothesized that; internal and external dynamics have triggered escalation of conflict among the Nilotic communities of Northern Kenya.

The study used a descriptive research design owing to its capacity to fuse both quantitative and qualitative data in the study. The estimated population of Samburu West, Turkana South and Tiaty sub-counties is approximately 347,000 people (KNBS, 2009). The proposed study focused on persons aged 18 years and above, which is estimated at 164,825 people (47.5%). Therefore, the target population for the proposed study was 164,825 people. From the study population, a sample size of 399 respondents was determined using the sample determination formulae above in chapter one. The study conducted expert interviews from each of the three identified counties in the region. These experts were categorized as: security experts; elected leaders; Morans; county officials; local traditional elders; representatives of women groups and CBOs (specifically Oxfam, World Vision and the Peace Caravan). The criteria for selecting the key informants was their ages, especially the old, (50 years and above), professionals and their knowledge base of the Samburu, Pokot and Turkana practices, as well as their length of stay in the study area. At least 60 expert interviews, 20 from each of the three selected sub-counties, were conducted.

The study adopted two data collection methods: surveys and interviews. Surveys helped to capture a large percentage of the targeted group and at the same time capturing the demographic data of respondents as shown in chapter one. FGDs helped capture points of view of specific groups in the community on the escalation of conflict among Nilotic
Pastoralist in Northern Kenya. The study used both primary and secondary data to complement each other. Primary data collection was done through surveys, key informant interviews and focus group discussions. Surveys were conducted using a designed questionnaire with both open-ended and closed questions were administered. The study findings are critical in shaping and understanding the confirmation or otherwise of the research question and objectives. As demonstrated in the study, both internal and external triggers have significantly contributed to conflict escalation among Nilotic pastoralists in Northern Kenya, between 1990 and 2017. Data collected was analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative techniques as presented below.

5.2 Background Information and the Conflict among the Pastoralists of Northern Kenya

The study sought respondents’ demographics in order to ascertain that respondents were residents of the targeted locations, the study focused on gender balance, age sets and levels of education. Findings are presented below.

Administrative Location

The study requested respondents to disclose their administrative locations, in order to test variables appropriately. This was because, some locations experience high rate of conflict than others. This enabled the researcher to find out the worst hit areas and the less hit areas by conflict. Table 3 below presents the findings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Location</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Samburu West - Sub-county</td>
<td>Samburu</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiaty - Sub-county</td>
<td>Baringo</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkana South - Sub-county</td>
<td>Turkana</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the findings, the three administrative regions within Northern Kenya were equally represented since 133 respondents were drawn from each region. This gave equal strength and opportunity to all the three communities in the study survey and presentations were carried out.
Gender Distribution

Gender affects and indeed permeates conflict dynamics at the societal and individual level. Violence has come to be perceived as normal through a political project that has actively employed terror to pursue its ends. This process has been made possible by a legitimization of violence as a key element of male gender identity. Political circumstances in many areas/regions, principally the war, have both nourished and reinforced a sense of gender identity based on polarization, exclusion, and hegemony. Conflicts cause and leave behind a myriad of problems and issues that affects several spheres of a country. Conflicts affect a country economically, politically, socially and environmentally on a broader level while the micro level impact is what is immediately seen and felt. Conflict has gender specific impacts as well, although it is women who are mostly affected by conflict, they are affected in several more different ways than men are, and at a higher intensity in most cases. In certain parts of the world, women face deliberate gender-based violence and discrimination. Among the pastoralists, women were found to sing war songs to encourage Morans to go for more raids.

Women are affected by conflict during the time it takes place as well as in the post conflict period. The study sought to find out the distribution of the respondents by gender. Table 4 presents the findings.

Table 4: Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>63.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the findings in Table 4, it is evident that both men and women took part in the study. The figures show that out of the 399 respondents who were sampled from the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu communities, 253 were male and 146 were female who gave information about triggers that explain the escalation of conflict among Nilotic Pastoralist in Northern Kenya. In the study 63.4% of the respondents were male, because the study focused on the head of the house hold, who are predominantly male in this case.
While men and women both are affected by conflict, there are gender specific impacts, which need to be identified and addressed in any post conflict reconstruction. The loss of income, the psychological trauma, the insensitivity of the state apparatus, sexual harassment and the dual burden of motherhood and being the primary earner have made life difficult for women affected by conflict.

A severe consequence of armed conflict faced by women is the gender-based violence during wartime. Gender based violence includes the physical, sexual and emotional abuse of women, sexual abuse of female children, marital rape, sexual assault, forced prostitution and trafficking in women and young girls. Rape is being used as a weapon during war has been documented for years. Raping women of other communities not only destroys the women but also humiliates the men who are given the traditional role of protecting women. Their helplessness is an assault on their masculinity. A community’s honor is seen to lie in the bodies of its women.

Increasingly, young boys are directly involved in fighting, at least in a defensive role. Belshaw (1999) includes the ―gestation period‖ of future fighting manpower (as short as 8-9 years if the availability of modern weapons is high) among the variables which can affect cumulative differentiation in power between pastoral groups. In many pastoral societies, women sing war songs. These songs normally taunt the men and incite them towards more fighting. As such, songs reach elders, youth, or the business elite; they can make or break reputations and are an important source of motivation of conflict. Therefore women play a vital role in perpetuating conflicts.

Although the social position of women in pastoral societies tends to give them only a minor part in formal mediation systems, women may be important in informal contexts. Among Samburu for example, a woman’s ties to her lineage of birth are not fully severed with marriage. As women marry out of their clan, they are key figures in inter-clan linkages and can provide crucial channels for communication between rival clans. This is true also for women who joined their husbands’ social group through abduction. Thus, abduction of girls during the raids may have the double effect of calling for retaliation.
Age Set
Age set is important since conflict in pastoral areas has two dimensions namely: youth driven conflict and elder driven conflict. Young men are usually the fighters in both cases, but the elders have a determining role in planning and negotiating out of conflict. The study sought to find out age interval distribution of the respondents. Table 5 presents the findings.

Table 5: Age intervals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age intervals</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-27</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-37</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-47</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48-57</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58-67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68-77</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 78</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on Table 5, there are different age sets and all the age sets were more than 18 years of age. This age set qualifies for circumcision as a rite of passage from childhood to adulthood. All adult males are culturally required to be organized into a series of groups based on degrees of common age. Under this system each age-set comprises all those men within the ethnic group who get initiated within (ideally) a single period. These generation-sets are linked not to location but to date of initiation, i.e. the men who graduate in the same year, the interval being about 10 or 12 years.

Elders have their own herd and family. They have the immediate role of ensuring good relations in order to widen access to resources, facilitate commercial activities and promote security in general. Sometimes they start violent conflicts in order to gain access to resources or political power. Ibrahim and Jenner studies of 1992 and 1985 clashes in the Northern Kenya districts, found out that the elders drove it. Married women also have a role in the conflict; they feed the family and do some trading. They have interest of securing market access, safeguarding their children, and increasing milk production. This means ample grazing land must be acquired or controlled in order to produce more milk.
In the case of young men, ambitions, prestige and recognition drive them into conflict. They are a group waiting to start their own homesteads, need to attract more girls for marriage and be able to have more wealth in form of cattle. They are advantaged by the fact that they are highly mobile and are keen to shake up existing power relationships within the society. As usual, the elders should first approve all raids, but occasionally young men, decide in secret and take quick raid without informing the elders of their intentions.

However, any large-scale daylight attacks that typify escalated conflict and war require a degree of organization and mobilization and these only can be found within the powers of elders and war leaders. Elders also control pastoral economy. They own the livestock, control resources and determine marriages. According to Baxter, any young man in pastoral community aspires to become an elder in order to transform his status, alter power relations and have access to wealth.

The internal structure of age-set system is undergoing a process of differentiation as noted by Simonse and Kurimoto (1998) in their studies. The status of elder is seen not as a biological principle of ageing beings, but as a social construction. In the past, it encompassed age, economic control and political authority. This is now changing fast among the pastoralists. Study among the Turkana by Lamphear (1976) for example noted that being a war leader is to gain political authority independently from economic control and age.

More political and economic transformation in pastoral societies has further disaggregated the attributes of the status of an elder. Political authority, economic control and age, still characterize the elder role. Such role of an elder can today be played by young men as well if they are wealthy or enjoy political authority like the chiefs and councilors do. To a certain extent conflictual interest in the age groups generate inter-group conflicts or affect the nature of conflicts. However, today there exists a collision between modern State and traditional pastoralist system that has made the use of the latter in conflict resolution system more difficult.
Highest Level of Formal Education

Education means a lot in everyone’s life as it facilitates our learning, knowledge and skills. It completely changes our mind and personality and helps us to attain the positive attitudes. We must give importance to the education than other targets in life, as it is the only source of real happiness in our life. The study sought to find out education levels of the respondents. Table 6 presents the findings

Table 6 Highest Level of Formal Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No formal education</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the findings pertaining education profile, 47% of respondents had not attained formal education, 26% had attained primary level education, 12% had attained secondary, 13% had gone to college while 2% only had gone to the university. The indication is that majority of the people were not highly educated. However, they had a level of understanding of the internal and external triggers of conflict escalation in the regions under study and they could interpret or give answers to the questionnaire accordingly. Furthermore, those that were incapable of reading, the researcher spoke local language and could translate the questionnaire and give its content accordingly.

From the findings, 47% of the respondents had not received any form of formal education making their sole livelihood to be livestock keeping. According to Nnoli (1989), pastoralism is the finely-horned symbiotic relationship between people, domesticated livestock and local rangelands in fragile and highly-variable ecosystems, often existing at the threshold of human survival. Pastoral groups inhabit arid areas where soil, rainfall and temperature conditions constrain land use options. This means that groups have to move seasonally between regions with their herds in search of grazing opportunities and freshwater sources. Lack of education among the pastoralists groups creates a cycle of movement within the range lands making conflict more prone.
In most of the ASAL regions, education is not highly regarded as compared to livestock production. Pastoralist’s societies in Africa share similar problems of economic production, despite inhabiting a wide variety of environments and owning various types of livestock. It is worth noting that education has been a process which has not been limited with respect to time and space. A research document published by UNESCO (1983) entitled Learning needs and Problems in Primary Education hinted that, for children to succeed, their educational needs ought to be valued by the child’s culture. The report further stated that in societies where education is not adequately supported, participation, retention and completion rates in education are low while incidence of problems and difficulties is higher (Fratkin et al, 1994).

In Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South for instance, the school dropout rate is 45% for boys, 50% for girls and 25% in pre-school with low transition rate from ECD to primary to secondary, majorly attributed to poverty, insecurity and cultural practices (SRA, 2013). Majority of the population 63.6% have no formal education and only 28.9% can read and write ranking Samburu county at 43/47 (CRA, 2011). Conflict corresponds with impoverishment in northern Kenya. During livestock raids, many households’ herds diminish to the extent of material insignificance and arguably the armed violence coupled with lack of alternative economic opportunities, creates irreversible conditions of poverty, which is mostly because of lack of education. Arero (2005) identified the positive and negative faces of education in relation to ethnicity and conflict. He observed that school education amplifies social divisions and precipitates political violence. Thus, destructive educational practices when combined with casual factors such as economic tensions, poor governance and perceived threats to cultural identity potentially fuels suspicion, hostility and ethnic intolerance and subsequent violence.

Education has many benefits and has positive impact in our life. An educated person is an asset for any country. In today’s world, human capital is considered the best national resource. On one hand an educated person can explore better opportunities for himself, and on the other hand, the entire nation would benefit from his/her works. Education is necessary for world citizenship or global citizenship. Such a person always works for the benefits of humanity. He treats the entire human-race as brothers and sisters. We all
acknowledge the importance of education, knowledge and truth for promoting the world outlook. Education produces citizens who are men and women of intellectual and moral integrity, who are neither fanatical nor cynical but are public-spirited, tolerant and wise. Education aims at producing ideal human beings. These people are truly cultured, wise, tolerant and public-spirited. Different ages have different conceptions of ideal men and women.

Education also promotes national interest. The highly educated people have a critical intelligence of an exceptional order. They can form independent conclusions from given facts. An educated person has the wisdom and knowledge to work for the good of the country. The doctors, engineers, scientists, soldiers, police officers, etc. all work together in protecting the national interest.

Education is the backbone of developing countries. Developing countries should understand the importance of education and develop a sound educational system. Sustainable development of economy and society is closely related to education. The most important resource of a nation is its human-capital. Educated people have more understanding of themselves and of the others. They have the ability to become entrepreneurs, scientists and agriculturists. Information Technology drives the world of today and education in this field may become a deciding factor for the future economic development of developing countries.

Educated people promote equality of opportunity. Any privilege when based on merit alone, is bound to be more moral because it has to justify unmerited privilege, advocate no ethical system which promotes class-feeling or social snobbery and defend nothing, which is unjust or ethically wrong. The aim of education, whatever the social system, must be not only to disseminate knowledge, but also to stimulate the questioning spirit. Educational institutions cannot produce saints. However, they can certainly inculcate among students respect for spiritual and ethical values and make them understand that the promotion of human welfare, not self-aggrandizement, is the end of life. No man, however brilliant or gifted, can be considered truly cultured unless he identifies himself with the wellbeing of others, unless he has the passion to make the Kingdom of God prevail on earth.
The aim of education is not to develop one single virtue but to produce healthy normal human beings who understand the meaning of life and what it demands from them. From childhood to youth, educationists and psychologists that the fundamental law of life is co-operation, not self-aggrandizement, domination, or conflict must constantly remind students. If students are intellectually and morally brought up on co-operation, most of our troubles would be at an end and life would be much healthier, richer and nobler than ever before. Lack of education creates narrow minded persons whose view of the world manifest suspicion, enmity, fear and conflict.

5.3 Escalation of Conflict in Northern Kenya
The study sought to find out if the frequency of attacks, fatalities (deaths), destruction of properties during attacks and indiscriminate killings (women, children and the elderly) increased, decreased or remained the same in Northern Kenya. The findings are presented below.

Conflict Escalation Periods
In order to determine the periods conflict escalated most within the communities in Northern Kenya, the study requested respondents to state the period conflicts escalated within the communities in Northern Kenya. Figure 4 presents the findings.

Figure 4: Level of Destruction/Loss of Property
Figure 4 shows that during the pastoralist intermittent conflicts there was an increase of destruction and loss of property (61%) between the years 1990 – 2017 during the era of conflict and resistance. From the study, intermittent escalation of conflict has been increasing since 1975 but from 1990 – 2017 was the period when the escalation increased to unmanageable and worrying levels. Respondents under the survey from all the age intervals under study agreed that conflict not only led to deaths but heavy destruction and loss of property. Respondents explained that the rise of conflict during this period was as a result of intensified cattle rustling, proliferation of illicit arms, inadequate policing and state security arrangements, diminishing role of traditional governance systems, competition over control and access to natural resources such as pasture and water, land issues, political incitements, ethnocentrism, increasing levels of poverty and idleness amongst the youth.

Respondents explained that gangs of gun-slinging raiders usually stormed villages at night, shooting people indiscriminately before driving away entire herds of cattle, sheep and goats, leaving entire communities devastated. The introduction of trucks to drive away cattle during this period made it easy for the raiders to transport raided animals hence raising the number of conflicts within the regions. According to Fratkin (1994) the innate instinct for aggression in man is the main cause of conflicts. Thus various causes have been mentioned leading to conflicts. It arises primarily from a clash of interests within groups and societies and between groups and societies. Conflicts also ensue as a result of the difference between the rate of change in the moral norms of a society and men’s desire, hopes, dissatisfactions and demands, this makes conflict in Northern Kenya intermittent.

Kenya experiences multiple and, overlapping conflicts, which sometimes coincide with electoral cycles that act as triggers for politically motivated violence (Dowd and Raleigh, 2013; Elder et al, 2014; Halakhe, 2013). These conflicts include militia activity in urban areas; communal violence in the Rift Valley and elsewhere; spill over conflict from neighboring Somalia with implications for unrest in the Northeastern; and the confluence of separatism and Islamist mobilization in the Coast province (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013). Cases of conflict include the 2007-2008 severe post-election violence, where identity based clashes caused over 1,100 fatalities and widespread population displacement, especially in
the Rift Valley (Cox et al., 2014; Halakhe, 2013). The central Isiolo region, a pastoralist dryland has been a hotspot of violence in recent years (Sharamo, 2014). There were ethnic clashes in 2012 in Tana River (Cox et al., 2014). In 2014, there were clashes in Marsabit County in Northern Kenya and ethno-religious riots in Mombasa (Cox et al., 2014). Violence in areas like Marsabit County are persistent, ranging from economic boycotts and hate speech to unexplained deaths and small wars (Scott-Villers et al., 2014). The causes of these various conflicts are related to Kenya’s deep and persistent fault lines, relating to factors such as socio-political marginalization and elite manipulation of identities for political mobilization (Cox et al., 2014). These multiple, overlapping conflicts ‘profoundly shape the nature of conflict and vulnerability of civilian populations in particular to violence’ and require distinct responses (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013). Present conflicts are often informed by past conflicts whose wounds have never been healed, which leads to cycles of revenge attacks (Mbugua, 2013).

Kenya experiences high levels of inter-communal violence; much higher than elsewhere in Africa (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013; TSA, 2014). This violence is perpetrated by identity based communal militias and often involves cycles of attacks and counter attacks (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013; Okumu, 2013). Competition over land ownership and land use drive local conflicts, which is sometimes triggered by the migration of herders in search of water and pasture (TSA, 2014; KNCHR, 2012). This is not helped by a minimal presence of security and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (KNCHR, 2012; Okumu, 2013; Mbugua, 2013). The violence, which has flared in recent years across Kenya’s periphery, relates to struggles around Kenya’s political devolution (expert comments). Political agendas sometimes ‘mobilise and prey upon competition and animosity between communities to stoke violence between ethnic and regional groups competing over access to resources and power’ (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013; Scott-Villers et al., 2014; KNCHR, 2012). ACLED warns that this is a ‘particularly pressing danger in the context of on-going decentralization in Kenya which, though it promises to bring government and power closer to marginalised populations, risks exacerbating tensions among communities with competing claims on ethnic homelands, right to land, and political representation’ (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013). Elite sponsorship is suspected to have been a factor in communal violence in 2013 in Mandera and Moyale, and in the Tana River region in August 2012 (Dowd & Raleigh, 2013; Mbugua, 2013).
In 2012, the Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) carried out a baseline report which mapped conflict in the 47 counties in Kenya (Kituku, 2012). It established that Kenya generally had higher incidences of violence in the majority of its counties, which were the result of ‘ethnic intolerance, border conflicts, political party zoning, competition over land and other resources, proliferation of small arms, weak security and poverty’ (Owuor in Kituku, 2012).

The conflicts in the pastoralist drylands of Kenya are highly complex and multi-layered (Gibbons, 2014). Conflicts and violence have tended to take the form of cattle rustling, ethnic violence, displacements, massacres and revenge attacks (Sharamo, 2014; Okumu, 2013). There is a long tradition of cattle raiding for prestige and bride prices, as well as competition over scarce and diminishing water and pasture resources (Okumu, 2013). However, ‘commercial’ cattle raiding, involving excessive violence also occurs for mass sale to urban markets (Okumu, 2013). Stress factors include climate change; environmental degradation; drought, famine and other natural catastrophes; land related conflicts (some relating to administrative and electoral boundaries); the politicization of communal relations; the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs); tensions with agricultural communities; and human-wildlife conflicts aggravated by competing uses of land for commercial ranching and wildlife conservation (Sharamo, 2014; Okumu, 2013; Mbugua, 2013). The conflicts have become increasingly intractable as a result of weakened traditional governance systems; breakdown of intercommunal social contracts; elders’ loss of control over the youths; the persistence of moran (warrior) culture; and politicisation of peacemaking processes (Sharamo, 2014; Okumu, 2013). In addition, one report suggests that the conflicts have intensified partly because of the weakness or unwillingness of the state to protect its citizens in these areas (Okumu, 2013).

The conflicts in the pastoralist drylands are also being transformed, moving away from traditional resource based incidents to being driven by economic and political gain (Gibbons, 2014; Sharamo, 2014). Drivers from institutional, political-economic and social spheres operating at national, regional and even global levels (Gibbons, 2014) fuel them. The ‘institutional factors driving conflicts include contested borders, weak land tenure rights, and failures of policing and justice; political-economic factors include extractive
commercial enterprises without adequate benefit sharing, land alienation, divisive politics and corrupt local administrations; whilst social factors relate to historical marginalization and exclusion, as well as issues of identity, gender and ethnicity’ (Gibbons, 2014). Development projects have been accompanied by violence and militarism; while ‘fear of devolution and complex political and economic interests converge to fan violence among Nilotic Pastoralists communities’ (Sharamo, 2014). Politicians and war financers have used ethnicity and identity to mobilise young people’s engagement in violence as a means to an economic end (Sharamo, 2014). Efforts to build peace at one level are impacted and negated by processes at another (Gibbons, 2014).

**Major Perpetrators of Conflict**

Violent conflicts involving pastoralists have become widespread and increasingly severe in the Northern region of Kenya. The pastoralists in the region under study are largely nomadic. They live primarily in arid or semi-arid areas and depend on livestock (cattle, sheep, goats and camels) for their livelihood. They rely on access to pasture and water, for the survival of their livestock. Such resources are scarce and under increasing pressure. They must be shared amongst the pastoralists’ communities. Conflicts involving pastoralists associated with resource competition, cattle rustling and wide availability of small arms are widespread and of increasing concern. The study thus, sought information on major perpetrators of conflict among the Nilotic pastoralism in Northern Kenya. The findings are presented below.

**Figure 5: Major Perpetrators of Conflict**
Based on figure 5, the figure shows that major perpetrators of conflict were the Pokot having 33% followed by politicians (22%), Samburu (13%), Turkana (8%) and external factors (6%). The findings show that Turkana and Samburu regions are not the major perpetrators of war as compared to the Pokots. Looking at the county levels, majority of Samburu’s and Turkana also accused the Pokots as the major perpetrators of conflict. The study showed that Pokots are the main aggressor among the three Nilotic Pastoralist communities.

Conflict has grown rapidly in Kenya in the last three decades, and pastoral areas are among the most vulnerable. Conflict is now widespread in the arid and semi-arid zones, and often overlaps with extreme food insecurity. Many local civil society organizations have programmes to manage conflict, and international NGOs, intergovernmental organizations and donors are increasingly preoccupied with understanding conflict and experimenting with solutions.

The pattern of conflict in Kenya has a complex perspective thereby making classification altogether varied. In this regard, the patterns are determined by; rainfall patterns and ecological conditions, clan settlement pattern and distribution, interaction/contagion with group outside the district and the country, with occupations orientation and finally with the existence of water points. To date government intervention mechanisms such as sinking boreholes/wells, and controlling movements and banditry have also identified as patterns of conflicts.

In addition, resource conflict in Northern Kenya and the Greater Horn of Africa conflict is now characterized by multiple numbers of actors and influence from within the Northern Kenya counties and even internationally. Some of these actors include the herders and pastoralists, age group systems and organizations, business groups, political leaders and warlords, administrators, civil society organization and non-governmental organizations, refugees, the State and its determination of conflict, and women and children.
Frequency of Attacks
Livestock is a symbol of wealth and source of livelihood among the pastoralists. Land ownership among the pastoralists is still largely communal. Sharing pastures and water is therefore inevitable and competition is unavoidable when the resources become scarce. Recently, the natural resources required to sustain pastoralism have been diminishing. Water sources are drying up and grazing pastures are shrinking due to frequent and severe drought and famine.

Rainfall and drought data and household surveys from Northern Kenya highlighted that the frequency and severity of droughts have increased in recent decades with episodes of moderate to severe drought occurring more frequently since the 1980s'. Data collected from Lodwar indicated decrease in rainfall by 13 millimeters between 1950-1973 and 1974-2008. Long rains in central Kenya have declined by more than 100 millimeters since the mid-1970s. This is clear evidence of conflict in the region. The study sought information about the frequency of attacks among the Nilotic Pastoralist in Northern Kenya.

Table 7: Frequency of Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remained the same</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the survey that was done on 399 respondents, 310 of them were in agreement that the frequency of attacks had increased among the Pokot, Samburu and Turkana. This is supported from the ministerial statement submitted to Kenya National Assembly, Umar (1997) which reported that in 1996, the Turkana had attacked their Samburu neighbors eleven times in six months, while the Pokot had staged eight raids across the region the same period. This highlights the increase in frequency of cattle raiding.

For instance, on May 2nd, 2011, in what later became known as the infamous Todonyang massacre, 28 Turkana traders, mainly children and women were attacked, brutally killed and bodies mutilated by Dassanech’s Merille militia. A total of 46 people died later in a retaliatory attack by Turkana warriors. The conflict was instigated by climate induced natural resource scarcity (fish, water and grazing pastures).

Cross tabulation of gender and frequency of attacks was conducted to determine the views of male and female respondents on the frequency of attacks. The findings are presented in Figure 6.
In the survey that was carried out by the researcher, more male (269) and female (119) concurred that the frequency of attacks had increased hence increasing violent conflict. However, 4 male respondents and 7 female respondents were of the contrary opinion. People with contrary opinion were mostly those who migrated recently and those from school. The study further sought information on the frequency of attacks in Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South constituencies. People with contrary opinion were found to be new immigrants into the community and therefore had no first-hand information on the history of conflict in the region.

The survey that was carried out by the researcher revealed that male (269) and female (119) argued that the frequency of intermittent escalation of conflict between Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South had increased, hence increasing violent conflict. The findings indicate that the conflicts in the regions were on and off after a short period of time. The study further did a cross tabulation of gender, constituency name and frequency of attacks and the findings are presented in Table 8.
Table 8: Gender, Constituency Name and Frequency of attacks Cross-tabulation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of attacks</th>
<th>Constituency Name</th>
<th>Samburu West</th>
<th>Tiaty</th>
<th>Turkana South</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased Gender</td>
<td>Samaru West</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>127</strong></td>
<td><strong>114</strong></td>
<td><strong>121</strong></td>
<td><strong>362</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decreased Gender</td>
<td>Samaru West</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remained the same Gender</td>
<td>Samaru West</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Gender</td>
<td>Samaru West</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The findings from the survey as revealed by both male (86) and female (41) from Samburu West were in agreement that the frequency of conflict had increased. Male (63) and female (51) respondents from Tiaty also agreed that the frequency of conflicts had increased. Turkana South respondents, male (70) and female (51), were also for the same opinion that frequency of conflict had increased.

The cross tabulation that was done between gender, age intervals and frequency of attacks revealed that respondents from all the age intervals were also in agreement that attacks had increased in the regions under study as shown in Table 9.
Based on the survey that was carried out by the researcher as highlighted in Table 9, both male (93) and female (43) who were aged between 18-57 years stated that the frequency of conflict had increased. From age set 38-57, 69 male and 60 female were in agreement that the frequency of conflict had increased while 57 and 17 male and female respectively who are more than 58 years were for the same opinion. 84.9% of the respondents from all age intervals agreed that the frequency of attacks increased during the study period.

The survey that was carried out in Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South sought to explain the increase in the frequency of attacks in the regions. The findings are shown in the Table 10.
Table 10: The Increase in the Frequency of Attacks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sophisticated weapons/Guns</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing livestock/land/wealth</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superiority contest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political reasons</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradictions of modernity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the findings, majority of the respondents (63.2%) attributed the increase of attacks to an increase in sophisticated weapons/guns which has been brought into the country. The findings also indicated that 32.8% of the respondents argued that access to small arms in Kenya has reduced the livestock/land/wealth in the regions. Political reasons also partially contributed to the increase in the attacks in the regions.

Humanitarian crises in Africa are prolonged and exacerbated by the misuse and availability of small arms and light weapons. Their availability has been responsible for turning the traditional communal activities of pastoral societies or inter-communal competitions over resources – cattle rustling, for example - into deadly confrontations in communities in Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya. Another source of the demand for these weapons stems from economic and physical insecurity. Most of Africa’s conflicts are in countries in the bottom end of the UN’s Human Development Index. Thus it is not only a matter of controlling supply, the demand for small arms also needs to be addressed. By reducing poverty, crime, corruption and political instability and by facilitating and encouraging sustainable development, people's perceived need for small arms can be countered (Baven 2008).

It is also important to note that while the proliferation of small arms is generally associated with conflict and post-conflict situations, the long and porous nature of Africa’s borders and the relative ease of concealing small arms make it difficult to control the movement of weapons. Moreover, the agencies responsible for border control are underfunded and
ineffective. According to UN estimates, there are over 600 million small arms and light weapons in circulation worldwide: almost one for every 10 people on the planet own a weapon (guns). These weapons destabilize regions, facilitate violent crime and undermine sustainable development. While one may question whether these weapons are a cause or a symptom of conflict, Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, believes this debate to be sterile. "Arms build-ups can give rise to threats leading to conflict; and political conflicts can motivate the acquisition of arms, nowhere is this more true than in Africa (Kofi Annan 2002). There are about 680,000 SALW in the hands of Pastoral Communities in Northern Kenya (SALW Survey, 2010). This is a serious threat not only for the Kenyan state but for the Pastoralist communities living in this region.

**Increase in Fatalities/Deaths**

Conflict in the Northern Kenya leads to deaths. Every time there is conflict in the region, there must be deaths of innocent citizens as well as those in the line of war. The study sought information about the fatalities and deaths of civilians because of conflicts in the Nilotic pastoralists in Northern Kenya.

| Table 11: Fatalities/Deaths |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-------|
|                             | Frequency       | Percent |
| Valid                       |                 |       |
| Increased                   | 342             | 85.7  |
| Decreased                   | 52              | 13.0  |
| Remained the same           | 3               | 0.8   |
| Don't Know                  | 2               | 0.5   |
| Total                       | 399             | 100.0 |

The survey findings based in the Table 11 shows that there were increased deaths/fatalities during the conflict violence. In 2008, the Samburu attacked the Pokot killing 25 villagers including twelve from one family in Baringo County on 28th March 2008. The Samburu Morans numbering 200 made a way with 2000 herds of cattle. This was a revenge attack for the killing of eight Samburu villagers by suspected Pokot raiders just two days earlier on the 18th of March 2008. More killings were further reported during the same period,
where 11 Turkana villagers were shot dead and another seven wounded by suspected Pokot raiders in a retaliatory attack in the same month. Interesting to note is that these attacks were occurring outside the normal raiding periods, pointing to the increase in frequency of cattle raiding. In the same year, Samburu attacked Amaya in Pokot killing and wounding 21 Pokots in April 2008.

Inter-communal fighting mainly over land and water continued with violent clashes taking place between the Murule and Garre communities and between the Borana and Gabra communities in north-eastern Kenya near the Ethiopian border. On several occasions government troops clashed with groups of armed attackers including a large number of cattle raiders from Baragoi and Kapedo in Samburu and Turkana Counties respectively, in attempts to apprehend those responsible for inter-ethnic violence.

In 2002, a number of inter-ethnic conflicts over land, cattle and politics took close to 100 civilian lives in the first nine months of 2002, among the Nilotic Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya. The December presidential elections of the same year followed by an outbreak of politically-motivated violence throughout the country.

Table 12: Gender, Constituency Name and Deaths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fatalities/Deaths</th>
<th>Constituency Name</th>
<th>Samburu West</th>
<th>Tiaty</th>
<th>Turkana South</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased Gender</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>133</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the Table 12, cross tabulation between gender, constituency name and deaths revealed that male and female from all the three constituencies under study incurred increased loss of their loved ones during the conflicts. For instance in July 2009, Samburu morans attacked Pokots in Malaso Market, Lorok and subsequently killing two Pokots. A month later, Pokot morans killed 22 Samburus as a retaliation in Kanampio. The Pokots again followed with an attack on the Samburu, what has commonly come to be known as the Kanampiu Massacre where 47 people were killed.
Table 13 shows a cross tabulation of gender, age intervals and fatalities/deaths during the conflicts. Both male and female from all age intervals stated that there were increased deaths during the conflicts.

Table 13: Gender, Age intervals and Fatalities/Deaths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the massacres between the Samburu Morans and the Pokots in July 2009, 68 Samburus were killed and 1420 herds of cattle stolen. Key to note in this massacre was that the motive for the raiding were not the traditional motivations, rather, the raiding was a strategy devised by Pokot herders to scare away the Samburu from the area in order to gain exclusive use of the 6,000-acres EX P&D Ranch for herding their animals. The study sought reasons that led to the increase in the deaths/fatalities of civilian people. The findings are presented in Table 14.

Table 14: Fatalities Increase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sophisticated weapons/Easy availability of guns</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing livestock/land/wealth</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political reasons</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the Table 14, 47% of the respondents who took part in the survey that was carried out in Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South stated that the entry of sophisticated weapons/Easy availability of guns had increased the number of fatalities in the regions. The weapons had breached security in the regions hence leading to reduced livestock, land and wealth of the residents in Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South.
**Level of Destruction/Loss of Property**

Conflict over boundaries, whether political or administrative need not be a guise to cause disharmony, insecurity, death, loss of livestock and destruction of property. The violence pitting the communities in these areas have also been blamed on political incitement as opposed to natural resource or any other causes.

The study sought information about the level of destruction/loss of property as a result of cattle raiding and conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist in Northern Kenya. In order to determine how both males and females from different age intervals reported the level of destruction during cattle raiding conflicts, the study conducted cross tabulation between Gender, Age intervals and Level of Destruction and the findings are presented in Table 16. Conflicts related to livestock raiding are not new phenomena in many pastoral societies in the Horn of Africa. Traditionally, various pastoral communities use raiding as a cultural practice for restocking of herds, especially after periods of drought or outbreaks of diseases. However, in recent years, livestock raiding has become more frequent, violent and destructive.

Hunger and drought taking toll on availability and access of resources are critical raiding motives among the Turkana while increasing wealth and payment of dowry are the most important motives for the Pokot community. Violent conflict poses a significant threat to pastoral livelihoods which are already under pressure from recurrent droughts, diseases and political marginalization. The direct impact of violent raiding is felt in terms of loss of human life and property, reduction in livestock numbers, limited access to water and pasture resources and forced migration. Indirectly, violent conflicts create a strong and omnipresent perception of insecurity which results in ineffective resource utilization, reduced mobility, food insecurity and closure of markets, dispensaries and schools. These factors combined undermine adaptation strategies and pastoralism altogether. Hence, a framework of conflict mitigation is needed which addresses the specific raiding motives of each community.
Table 15: Gender, Age intervals and Level of Destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Destruction</th>
<th>Age intervals</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18-37</td>
<td>38-57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the cross tabulation of gender in Table 15, constituency level and level of destruction in the table above, the findings revealed that both male and female from Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South reported systematic increase destruction and loss of property. 208 (52.1%) of the age intervals between 18 – 37 years confirmed that the level of destruction increased during the study period. The junior and senior elders between ages 38 – 58 also confirmed the increased level of destruction of property under the same period. The study further sought information on how gender per constituency reported the level of destruction during cattle raiding conflicts. Table 16 presents the findings.

Table 16: Gender, Constituency Name and Level of Destruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Destruction</th>
<th>Constituency Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samburu West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the findings, both male (91) and female (42) from Samburu reported an increase in the level of destruction of properties and loss of people during conflicts. Respondents from Tiaty and Turkana South constituencies also reported an increased level of destruction during periods under study.
Pastoralist in Northern Kenya suffered heavy losses in men and property, and there was a complete disruption of their economy leaving many households impoverished (Lamphear, 1976; Barber, 1968). Lamphear (1992) describes the experiences as traumatic and devastating. Many were fired at from sight, and, on more than one occasion, they referred to themselves as wild animals hunted through the bush by the colonial government. Lamphear (1976) maintained that the imperial wars and punitive expeditions also destroyed the existing institutional relationships amongst these groups, making the basis for inter-ethnic relations insecure. Social security system of reciprocal assistance was completely disrupted (Lamphear, 1976). By the end of 1918, pastoralist in northern Kenya had lost nearly all their cattle and as late as 1963, many had still not been able to rebuild their herds to former size (Barber, 1968; and Lamphear, 1976).

Further reports during the same period expressed the fear that the region was faced with the problems of rapidly increasing human population and declining livestock numbers. Diseases and raids by the colonial troops were blamed for the depletion of the herds (Lamphear, 1976). Livestock diseases such as rinderpest and pleuropneumonia which were unknown in the past became a permanent scourge to the animal population during this period. By the mid-1920s, officers on the spot voiced concern that escalation of conflict had led to cases of human-induced starvation and hoped that the government policy towards pastoralists in the region would be reversed to avert a future economic crisis (Lamphear, 1976).

The study further sought information on the reasons that led to the increase in the level of destruction of property among the Nilotic Pastoralists in Northern Kenya. Table 17 presents the findings.

**Table 17: Increase in Level of Destruction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sophisticated weapons/Easy availability of guns</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing livestock/land/wealth/destabilize economy</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contradictions of modernity</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The findings showed that the entry of sophisticated weapons and easy availability of guns in Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South had increased the level of destruction of property and livestock. This had reduced livestock, land, and wealth and destabilized the economy greatly. Armed violence disproportionately affects the poor population and is an important factor undermining development and poverty reduction efforts in Kenya. Chronic insecurity impedes the provision of services to the poor in the vast Kenya’s underdeveloped peripheral regions. Much of this insecurity is fueled by the widespread availability of small arms as Pastoralist communities often trade cattle for weapons.

**Indiscriminate Killings**

The survey that was done in Turkana South, Samburu West and Tiaty asked respondents if there has been an increase in indiscriminate killings of women, children and the elderly. The findings are shown in Figure 7.

**Figure 7: Indiscriminate Killings**

Majority of the respondents (83%) were in agreement that indeed there has been an increase in indiscriminate killings of women, children and the elderly. The disappearance of hand-to-hand and face-to-face fighting significantly reduced the possibility of targeting particular categories of people and avoiding others. This resulted in an extensive
transformation of conflict and violence in Northern Kenya. With external dynamics in the region and internal dynamics within Kenya, one far reaching consequences happened in Northern Kenya, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This section shows the trends in proliferation of arms to Northern Kenya since 1964. The survey further conducted a cross tabulation on constituencies, showed that there has been an increase in indiscriminate killings of women, children and elderly, with a potential of going beyond proportional levels if not curbed.

**Figure 8: Analysis by Constituency and Increase in Indiscriminate Killings**

![Bar chart showing the percentage of increase in indiscriminate killings across constituencies.](chart)

This was to identify if the case of increased indiscriminate killings was the same in all the three constituencies. From the findings in the Figure 8, all the three constituencies reported an increase in indiscriminate killings. Samburu West had the highest level of 92% followed by Turkana South (82%) and lastly Tiaty (76%). The study cross tabulated gender and increase in indiscriminate killings among the Nilotic pastoralists in Northern Kenya.
The analysis based on the gender also revealed that both male and female reported an increase in increased killings during the attacks in the regions. From the figure below, 85% of male and 80% of female reported that there was an increase in indiscriminate killings during the conflicts. The findings on the analysis by gender, age intervals, and indiscriminate killings is presented in Table 18.

Table 18: Analysis by Gender, Age intervals, and Indiscriminate Killings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age intervals</th>
<th>18-37</th>
<th>38-57</th>
<th>58+</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>122</strong></td>
<td><strong>112</strong></td>
<td><strong>44</strong></td>
<td><strong>278</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>42</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>121</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total</strong></td>
<td><strong>182</strong></td>
<td><strong>154</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Based on the findings from the Table 18, both male and female from all the age intervals stated that there has been increase in indiscriminate killings when the communities go into conflict. The table shows that 81, 61 and 20 men from the age brackets 18-37, 38-57 and 58+ respectively were in agreement that indiscriminate killings have been on the rise while 41, 51 and 24 women from 8-37, 38-57 and 58+ respectively also agreed that there was an
increase in indiscriminate killings. The study further sought information about the weapons that led to the increase in indiscriminate killings in Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South.

Table 19: Weapons leading to increase in indiscriminate killings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sophisticated weapons/Easy availability of guns</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing livestock/land/wealth</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political reasons</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Weapons leading to increase in indiscriminate killings

The findings showed that the entry of sophisticated weapons and easy availability of guns in Samburu West, Tiaty and Turkana South increased the level of indiscriminate killings of women, children, and elderly in the region. These killings had reduced livestock, land and wealth in the regions as well.

There is a large variety of lethal weapons found in Kenya, including AK-47s, G3s, M-16s, Uzis, American carbines, rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades, land mines and many brands of pistols. These arms are illegal and often in the wrong hands. There is a readily
available market, particularly among nomadic communities in Northern Kenya, though in the underworld of major cities and towns such as Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Nakuru and Eldoret markets is also readily available. In fact, among African cities, Nairobi has the third worst problem with small arms after Lagos and Johannesburg.

Kenya shares porous borders with some of the most politically unstable countries in Africa such as Somalia and South Sudan. Kenya’s long and isolated borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia – and its 536 km coastline though with the new Coast Guard launched recently. These areas are difficult to patrol owing to limited resources and insufficient training. Poor and corrupt policing of the borders between Kenya and its neighbors has facilitated the influx of large quantities of small arms into Kenya. The fact that the borders are not properly and effectively policed means that arms traffickers and bandits find easy entry points along the porous borders. Specifically the rebel movements in Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda benefit from this state of affairs. Towns on or close to the borders of these countries are major entry points for illegal firearms.

According to those living in communities in Northern Kenya such as Samburu, Pokot, and Turkana, national law is not adequately enforced by Kenya police in their marginalized regions. The only option they have is to arm themselves for personal, communal, clan or larger family defense requirements. They do this as a defensive measure against bandits and other communities as well as to advance their own interests (Wensley 2002).

A further source of conflict stimulating arms flow stems from livestock keeping, the only viable occupation in much of the region. By nature, livestock keeping tends to generate conflict over grazing land, access to water and rustling. All of these increase demand for small arms in Kenya. The population of the livestock keeping (pastoralist) communities in Kenya is estimated at about 20 percent of the total population of the country (i.e. about 9 million people out of a total 45 million). Most of these people occupy the vast arid and semi-arid region of northern Kenya. They keep cattle, camels, goats, sheep and donkeys (Adele 2005). Kenya, like many countries in the Horn of Africa, does not have the capacity to guarantee the security of her citizens. Facing this reality, Kenya has, overtly or covertly, opted to arm groups in frontier counties which suffer from marginalization and
underdevelopment. This policy has sent unambiguous signals to communities that they should take care of their own security and it has solidified the belief among opinion leaders and heads of ethnic groups that the government itself is unable to take care of this basic need.

The existence of warrior cultures among pastoral communities cannot be gainsaid. Among other factors, this may be attributed to the competition for meagre natural resources in which the use of force developed gradually as the primary strategy to ensure access to essentials. For instance, among the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu peoples, initiates must exhibit high levels of aggression before they are admitted to Moran-hood (Moranism). The ancient cultural practice of using bows and arrows, spears and machetes has mutated into the use of small arms and light weapons to fulfill cultural obligations.

5.4 Internal Triggers and the Escalation of Conflict in Northern Kenya

The study sought information on internal triggers that account for the intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya between 1990 and 2017. The study sought information on the influence of morans, local politicians, KPRs and elders on the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. Findings are presented in sub-sections below.

Moran Contribution to Conflict

Cattle raids, inter-communal resource conflicts and banditry are common across much of the arid lands of northern Kenya, where firearms are increasingly common among pastoralist communities. In 2009 alone, such violence claimed more than 354 lives, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Kenya. In the northeastern Isiolo region, drought management officer Paul Kimeu told IRIN: People are no longer attacked using spears and arrows. Sometimes very sophisticated guns are used, increasing fatalities. According to OCHA, the onset of the short rains from mid-October to December tends to increase the likelihood of cattle raids and thus conflict, because this is when pastoralists restock their herds and it is also when rites of passage take place, increasing the demand for livestock. The study sought information on the contribution of Morans to conflict among the Nilotic pastoralism in Northern Kenya. The findings are presented in Figure 11.
Based on the figure 11, respondents who took part in the survey indicated that the morans contributed to conflict with 95% while 4% said they do not contribute. The explanation to the contribution by morans was sought and the table below shows that the morans bought sophisticated weapons/guns that were used in the conflict. It was also found out that Morans conducted the raids at will without control.

In Samburu county, Morans, or young warriors, frequently target livestock traders and passenger cars on main roads. “People are not able to take their livestock to the market in Dagoretti [in Nairobi about 350km South],” said Peter Emanman, a resident of the Samburu town of Maralal. “If security were improved, people could be self-reliant,” he said. Umuro Roba Godana, executive director of the Marsabit-based Pastoralists Integrated Support Programme (PISP), a national NGO supporting pastoral livelihoods in the North, is worried there may be even more conflict now that the rains have come. “If you steal during the drought, where do you take stunted animals?” he asked. “People fight when there is plenty, not a lack.” (2017).
Livestock movement in search of water and pasture remains a driver of conflict. “Competition for scarce natural resources is widely understood to be a primary cause of conflict in the region,” notes UK think-tank, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), in a November report, *Pastoralists’ vulnerability in the Horn of Africa, Exploring political marginalization, donors’ policies and cross-border issues*. The movement of livestock and herders often transcends national borders and pastoralist groups across the region depend on the same communal pool of natural resources. Endemic conflict represents one major obstacle to the free movement of pastoralists and their livestock, and therefore greatly contributes to pastoralists’ chronic vulnerability in the region.

Pastoralist communities across the Horn of Africa frequently cross national borders in search of pasture and water. Although neighbouring states often share ethnic groupings, such migrations can be problematic. *Sometimes there are cross-border attacks*, Ekiru Lomwa, an assistant chief in the town of Lokichar, told IRIN, adding that these were especially frequent during the rains. During the drought, the police are sent to seal the wells, but during the rains it is less secure, he said. Rainfall is an indicator of conflict.

Land demarcation is also presenting a problem, Godana of PISP told IRIN. “Communities are claiming ownership of territories and regions yet the boundaries are not clear,” he said. The loss of communal grazing land to farming and environmental degradation has also fuelled conflicts in a number of pastoral areas across the Horn of Africa region, states ODI, noting that freedom of movement over large areas was a crucial element of the pastoralists’ dry lands resource management system. *Competition for scarce natural resources is widely understood to be a primary cause of conflict in the region and is in part related to the inability of pastoralists to assert their land rights*, ODI adds.

“The absence of the government in some parts makes people take the law into their own hands,” said PISP’s Godana. Poor leadership and a breakdown in community values also help to foster insecurity, he said, adding: “The role of elders is fast diminishing and people are [instead] operating in cliques, with Morans roaming the region with deadly automatic guns, attacking villages and raiding cattle without control.”
“Nowadays, even the elders cannot sanction raids.” Remote areas in the north rely on community-organized security groups such as home guards and Kenya Police Reservists to maintain law and order. This has in part led to the proliferation of weapons in the North which has the proximity to unstable neighbors such as Somalia.

According to one Samburu resident, the availability of weapons was to some extent a deterrent to petty crime. “Here, even if you leave the door to your house open no one will come in. You never know what kind of weapon your neighbour may have.” Lesinkiran, 2017.

Table 20 below shows the conflict contribution by Morans.

**Table 20: Explanation of the conflict Contributed by armed Morans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanation of the conflict</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sophisticated weapons/guns by Morans</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing livestock/wealth</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political influence</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The internal politics of Kenya particularly the struggle between the pro-majimbo and pro-multi partism groups forced Moi to attempt to unite the various groups in the Rift Valley to support the Majimbo groups against the advocates of Multi partyism. This made Moi to make peace with the warring pastoralists communities in the North Rift eg the Samburu, Pokots, Turkana, Borana and the Somali. The efforts by Moi to reach and reconcile with Lotodo the king of the Pokots was a classic example of reconciliation efforts. Moi knew that the only group that would protect him against the advent of multi partism were the Pastoral communities. Moi went ahead to form a pastoralist outfit called KAMATUSA-Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana, and Samburu to counter the GEMA groupings (Jeffrey 2002).

The appointments of Gen. Mohamud as the Army commander by Moi, Salleh and Hussein as the provincial commissioners for North Eastern province and Rift Valley respectively and Haji as the Defense Minister was a clear way in reaching out to the Somali ethnic group. In 1997 Moi also lifted the emergency law that was slapped to the Northern Province by Kenyatta regime in 1965. These actions by Moi with various appointments of District
Commissioners from the Pastoralists groups improved the relations between the Communities and Moi regime immensely (Fearon and Latin, 2000). The introduction of Kenya Police Reservist was also one attempt by Moi to remove the threats the pastoralists groups had in the region, mainly amongst themselves. The arming of the pastoralist communities was another attempt by Moi to reduce risks posed by disarmament exercises in the region as a way to weed out the illegal guns from the region.

The fall of Mengistu Haille Mariam of Ethiopia in 1994 added fuel to already gun saturated situation in Northern Kenya. The soldiers from the Borana community and their cousins Oromos crossed Kenyan border when escaping wrath of the Meles Zenawi’s. Some military men from the Borana community that lives in Ethiopia were recruited to the Haille Mariam’s security organs and when the regime was overthrown, most of these men came to their Borana cousins in Kenya with lots of guns which were sold at throw away price. Samburu also benefited immensely on this gun trade. The Samburu Morans acquired sophisticated weapons and were no longer intimidated by any pastoral group. The Samburu Moran became bold, adventurous and a complex cattle rustler who only obeyed his gun and no one else. The conflict situation in Northern Kenya has never been the same again. The Moran position in the society became totally different from the previous loyal community defender. The Morans turned out to exercise the power through the barrel of the gun. Morans no longer obeyed the traditional set structures of the Samburu people led by elders (Kimaiyo 2005).
Map 4: Map of Samburu County, showing the flow of arms to and out of the County after 1990

Flow of arms to Towns and cities: Nairobi (Eastleigh), Nakuru, Mombasa and Eldoret.
Based on the illustration from the map, the arrow pointing to Laikipia from Samburu indicates that by late 1990s Samburu had received sufficient supply of guns and the Morans were ready to move out in an expansion mission. The movement of the Samburu people out of their County was necessitated by the fact that Morans had already equipped themselves in readiness for adventure and conquer. It is of interest to note that Samburu people living in Laikipia County are junior elders, mainly the age group that was circumcised in 1991. The Samburu have occupied Likipia North Constituency, Isiolo North Constituency and Laisamis constituency, through the expansion programme. The pokots have pushed towards Lake Baringo from Tiaty and Lonyek in Laikipia North Sub-County. The Turkana on the other hand have forcefully occupied Kapendo and Lomelo areas of Baringo and Baragoi in Samburu. These pastoralist communities have started terrorize agricultural communities and private Rangers in Laikipia country by forcefully grazing in the private farms, the flow of arms went beyond Laikipia County to other Urban centers and cities in Kenya (Kamenju, 2003 and Ayissi 2005).

**Political Contribution to Conflict**

Cattle raiding in Kenya is often viewed in the legitimizing context of tradition, climate change and resource conflict, but increasingly it has much more to do with organized crime meeting a rising demand for meat, and political violence resulting from a new devolutionary constitution. The study sought information on the contribution of politics to the rise of crime among the Nilotic pastoralism in Northern Kenya. The findings are presented in Figure 12.
Politicians had a great contribution to conflict as shown in the Figure 12. During electioneering period, politician incite their kinsmen to start conflict aimed at displacing voters who are unlikely to vote for them. 79% of the respondents were of the view that politicians incite people for conflict. They use incitement to start conflicts in the region and supply weapons like guns and bullets to the community as shown in Table 21.

**Table 21: Explanation of the conflict contribution by Politicians**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supply of sophisticated weapons/bullets</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitation (food/water/market)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political influence( inciting)</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting tribalism</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The cattle raids by armed young men involve attacks on rival ethnic groups or clans. At times, raiders come from neighboring countries such as South Sudan and Ethiopia. But while traditional cattle-rustling did not always involve killing, it is now invariably lethal. Increasingly, some argue, cattle-raiding is motivated by a competition for political power and resources. Political barons use organized attacks to drive out their political rivals and extend their business interests. Politicians organize raids as a way of mobilizing resources required for campaigns and elections.

The Kenya constitution (2010) provided for devolved power and resources to the grassroots and this has in turn increased competition for political power and resources in formerly marginalized areas and as such, issues like cattle-rustling have transformed from being cultural to a tool to perpetuate power and violence in Northern Kenya, it would be foolhardy for anybody to view cattle raids in isolation and forget the political and economic motivations behind it. With devolution, the power struggles between pastoralists have become common. Kenya’s Pastoralists, Conflict increased during the 2013 elections, the first to be held under the devolutionary constitution, in which significant powers are decentralized to 47 new counties, under influential governors.

In a country where political allegiance is driven far more by ethnicity than ideology, communities competed against each other for representation, and particularly for the role of governor. A tribe’s local dominance can swing a local election, and in some areas smaller ones formed alliances such as the Rendille, Gabra and Burji (REGABU), which was established to counter the dominant Borana in Marsabit. Whether the outcome is the rule of one dominant tribe at the exclusion of others, or a coalition of minority tribes ruling over a dominant one, there is an inherent risk of instability and tension. “The erosion of traditional governance structures has led to a power vacuum that is increasingly filled by political leaders and other power brokers who grasp the opportunity to renegotiate boundaries and access to land. They have realized that on the national level, ethnic mobilization has played a major role in political struggles, and they carry these dynamics even into the remotest pastoralist areas, where the struggle for land is progressively ethicized. In this context, livestock raiding emerges as a specific form of violent regulation, a well-adapted, dangerous, and powerful political weapon. Lenkidi, a Samburu elder, 2017.
According to Josephot Nanok, the governor of the North western county of Turkana where cattle raids are common, continuing to treat [cattle-rustling] like a cultural practice is akin to condoning an illegal business. It has been highly commercialized and many politicians are now using it to create support zones for themselves. Cattle rustling has always been an activity to replenish herd stock but it is not [just] that any more. Cattle raids in the lawless Horn of Africa are driven by the desire by those communities to get money to buy arms, and by business people who want to cash in on a growing urban population in need of meat. That some still do it as a cultural practice isn’t completely false, but it isn’t completely true either. Tribal conflicts are common and communities need arms to protect themselves when the governments fail to do so, and meat traders provide an easy source of money to buy arms.

**Multiparty Contribution to Crime**

In order to find out if multiparty contributed to the rise of conflict, the survey was conducted among the Samburu, Pokot and Turkana communities to ascertain the same.

**Figure 13: Multiparty Contribution to Conflict.**
The findings in the Figure13 above revealed that yes indeed multiparty struggle in Kenya contributed 61% of the respondents agreed that multypartism was a major contributor to the rise of conflict in the region, 24% denied while 15% did not know. In an effort to consolidate the votes of the pastoral communities, Moi formed the KAMATUSA-euphemism for Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu in response to the already existing agro-cultural formation called GEMA. Although this project was dropped after facing heavy criticisms, Moi had already raised the consciousness of the pastoral communities of the need not divide their votes in the multiti-party era. Moi’s efforts appeared to have paid off since he emerged victorious though with allegations of rigging in both the 1992 and 1997 general elections. Further, KANU won the majority seats in the National Assembly. Similarly, pastoral communities remained steadfast in KANU even as other regions were embracing multi-party democratic politics. The region only appeared to join other political parties following the crumbling and fatal defeat of KANU after Moi exited power in 2002.

**Contribution of conflict by Kenya Police Reservists**

The study further sought information on the role Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) in the rise of conflicts in Northern part of Kenya.

**Figure 14: Contribution of conflict by Kenya Police Reservists**

The Figure 14 shows that Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) contributed to conflict in the regions. Personalization of the Kenya Police Reservists (KPR), also contributed to the transformation of cultural conflict into a political conflict. Table below explains how KPRs
are involved in the conflict. KPRs are young Morans who have been selected by their Pastoralist Communities to receive government guns in order to protect their communities from other pastoralist communities living along the Porous borders. The explanation to the contribution by KPRs are shown in Table 22.

### Table 22: Explanation to the Conflict Contribution by KPRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution by KPRs</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avail sophisticated weapons by KPRs</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train/Advise raiders by KPRs</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in raids by KPRs</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the findings, majority of the respondents (45%) were in agreement that KPRs avail sophisticated weapons to the raiders while 34% of the respondents were in agreement that KPRs participate in the raids which leads to the rise in crime in Northern Kenya. The findings indicate that KPRs avail sophisticated weapons to the community and even participate in the raids without community members. They also train the civilians on how to use the weapons and advice raiders on the best tactics to use to win the battle.

According to a key informant,

**The KPRs are the commanders of the thugs: ... they are key organizers and even raiders. Some are the most respected commanders. They are now being used as assassins, for robbery, stopping vehicles on roads, and intimidation in urban areas where they behave like messengers of Politicians by arresting people…**

Another key informant responded,

**The KPRs are like ‘legal criminals’. They are given guns without much vetting. All you need to become one is a few ‘politically correct’ ties and you will get a gun, after that no one cares what you do with the gun. Imagine even if a KPR dies, the gun rarely gets back to the police. In most cases, it is inherited by the family and after sometime it is completely lost.**
In rural Kenya, the main visible security force is the Kenya Police Reserve, an unpaid force guarding localities and armed by the state. Northern Kenya faces challenges of low state penetration, small arms flows, and armed inter-communal conflict. The state has a weak hold on Kenya Police Reservists (KPRs) and their arms, and this situation is weakening further as many move into paid private security roles, including guarding oil exploration and drilling sites. Security is critical in view of the recent oil discovery and ensuing land disputes, which could trigger widespread conflict, and the recent devolution of development and administrative functions to counties in Kenya.

5.5 External Triggers and the Escalation of Conflict in Northern Kenya
The study sought information on external triggers that account for the intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya, between 1990 and 2017. The study sought information on the influence of commercial entrepreneurs, availability of small arms and light weapons and introduction of modern ways of conflict escalation, on the escalation of conflict in Northern Kenya. Findings are presented in sub-sections below.

Influence of Commercial Entrepreneurs
The study sought to find out the Influence of Business People/Economic Entrepreneurs in the escalation of crime/cattle raiding in Northern Kenya. Figure 15 shows the findings.
From the findings, majority of the respondents (66%) were in agreement that business people/economic entrepreneurs have influenced the rise of crime in Northern Kenya. However, 31% of the respondents were of the contrary opinion while 3% were not aware of any influence from business people/economic entrepreneurs. This shows that the emergence of economic (warlords) entrepreneurs in Nilotic pastoralist of Northern Kenya has led to the rise of conflict. According to several key informants.

Looking at the Pokot Morans, they are no longer just the Pokot, when they raid, they are mixed and most of them are hired from neighboring countries especially Uganda and South Sudan. This form of raiding is not even communal raiding as it used to be. This is a private army of well trained and armed bandits.

Based on an information provided by informant Ask yourself a particular question, why on a particular day in the year (2014), there were coordinated raids in mount Kulal, which is in Marsabit, Tuum,, which is in Samburu, and Losuk, which is in Samburu. These places are like a 200 kilometers apart. How do you manage those dynamics? What were the reasons? I think somebody, somewhere, managed this thing deliberately. Not for pasture but for commercial purposes.
The study further sought information on the contribution of people outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana in the escalation of cattle raiding in the regions. The findings are presented in Figure 16.

Figure 16: Contribution of Conflict by People outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana Communities

From the findings in Figure 16, majority of the respondents (61%) were in agreement that there is contribution of people outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana in ethnic conflict. However, 27% of the respondents stated that there is no contribution of people outside the three communities. The study further sought information on the explanation to the contribution of people outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana. Table 23 presents the findings.
Table 23: Explanation to the Contribution of conflict by People outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana Communities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supply sophisticated weapons</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide ready market</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in raids</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political reasons</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquisition of local land and resources</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>399</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
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People outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana supply sophisticated weapons, provide ready market for the animals and participate in the raids as shown in Table 23. Increase in cattle demand has transformed the art or raiding in one fundamental way. Cattle raided cannot be raided back anymore. Traditionally, the cattle raids could not deplete entire stocks. In addition, the community raided knew after sometime they would reorganize and once ready, they could raid their animals back. However, commercialized raids with elaborate planning and logistical know-how can render communities destitute. This is because the animals raided are quickly sold and can never be raided back by their owners. According to a key informant...

I remember clearly around 10 years ago (2007) there were like five large raids in Turkana in one year. These large raids were punctuated by small repeated raids. They almost wiped out the cattle Turkana’s owned. The sad part is, the Turkana were not able to recover even a single cow as they were nowhere to be found. Generally, these created an environment of insecurity and financial hardship.

The study further sought information on where commercial entrepreneurs took raided animals. The findings are shown in Figure 17.
The raided cattle, as shown in Figure 17, are sold outside Pokot, Samburu and Turkana based on the response of the 55% of the respondents. However, 43% of the respondents indicated that the raided cattle are retained within the communities. People outside Samburu, Pokot and Turkana who are the beneficiaries of the cattle from the regions also contributed to the escalation of conflict in the region. The survey that was done revealed the external people had a role to play in ensuring that they get cattle for their businesses even if it included war as shown in the figure 18 below.

Key informants spoke of a meat seller very widely known in Kacheliba town in West Pokot. He possesses many lorries and apart from trading in cattle, has also traded in guns in the past. He is one trader whom the people speak in hush tongues as a very rogue cattle rustler. However, because of the immense power he wields, he is ‘untouchable’. Traditionally, all the raided animals end up in the raiding community. The conflict scenario among the Nilotic pastoralists of Northern Kenya is that the raided animals cannot be raided back and therefore, destocks the animals in the region. There are other destinations where the raided animals end up to. The emergence of business people/economic entrepreneurs has led to the rise of the market outside the three Nilotic Pastoralist Communities. The study sought to know the markets set by commercial enterprises for raided cattle. Figure 18 presents the findings.
From the findings, 45% of the respondents identified Dagoreti Market as the major destination where raided animals are identified but never recovered. Dagoreti market is known to have the biggest slaughter house in Nairobi justifying why raided animals are not recovered once they reach there. Other destinations are Isiolo/Meru, Nakuru/Central Rift and Foreign countries like S/Sudan, Uganda, S/Arabia and Yemen.

In Samburu, it was discovered that many of the raided cattle ended up for sale in Dagoretti or Isiolo. Some have suggested that some of the raided cattle meat from Samburu could be sold as far away as South Sudan and Saudi Arabia. This implies that coordinated trading cartels on a transnational scale are operating. The increasingly organized and militarized nature of commercialized cattle raiding in the Northern Kenya and its links to wider trading networks means that the authorities face a tough struggle to combat it. This struggle has been rendered all more difficult because some politicians and government officials have become part of that trade themselves.

**Availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

The unstable states in the Horn of Africa are one of the principal sources of small arms and lights weapons to Northern Kenya before 1990. Kenya stands at the crossroads between the conflict areas of South Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia. For the last 50 years these countries have been embroiled in a series of civil wars and unending strife as political ambition has overtaken common sense, resulting in violent changes of government and the release of more tools of violence into society (Boutwell 1999).
Map 5: Proliferation of Small Arms before 1990 (Times Series 1)

Source Author, 2017
The map above shows the routes and the flow of small arms to Kenya and specifically to the Northern Kenya. South Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and later Somalia are the main sources of small arms and light weapons to the region. The movement of arms to the region is a very gradual process taking several years before guns reach their intended destination. This is because these guns are illegal and could only be sold through a black market or commercial brokers. In general, small arms entry to Northern Kenya was from the western side, mainly from Uganda and Sudan. The first beneficiaries of these small arms are the Turkana and the Pokots of Kenya (Irin 2003).

The Karamoja from Uganda are also among the first pastoral groups to acquire guns in the region. The Karamoja are cousins to the Turkana and Pokots but they never valued this relationship and continued to terrorize the Kenyan groups through cattle rustling. A continuous fighting between the Pokot and Karamoja and Turkana enabled these two Kenyan groups to access guns through cattle rustling and deaths of the armed militants (Irin 2003).

The map above shows the Samburu County in green. Samburu County is located in the Northern half of the Rift Valley, and lies within the Arid and Semi–arid Lands areas of the country, mainly referred to as the central part of the Northern Kenya. A common denominator of the region is pastoralism and this explains the prevalent and widespread conflict over resources especially pasture and water in terms of resources, Samburu county has fertile soils, plenty of water, forestry, wildlife, commercial minerals, thick clay soil well-drained soils suitable for farming and livestock production. The county receives higher rainfall than other pastoralist areas, both short and long rains unlike any part in Northern Kenya. This makes Samburu more attractive to other pastoral groups in search of pasture and water. Samburu is surrounded by six pastoral Counties namely Turkana to the northwest, Baringo to the west, Laikipia to the south, Isiolo to the south east and Marsabit to the north east. Most of these pastoral communities in the above counties have access to the border line. Samburu people have no border line with either Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan or Somalia (Murunga 2005).
Samburu unlike the Pokots, Turkana, Borana and Somali, who have the common border with the above, hence the limited supply of small arms to the Samburu people. Samburu did not have access to the cross border trade in small arms, therefore continued to rely on the middle men or the alliances with either of these groups to acquire small arms. Samburu had limited supply of guns since they never had direct contact with the source, Uganda, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Somalia. The Samburu remained the least armed in the region and were vulnerable to the attacks. It is this vulnerability to attacks that gave the Samburu people and Morans in particular to arm themselves to the fullest. Samburu Morans inspiration to arm themselves might have been overdone to an extent that Morans acquisition of small arms created a violent situation, hence perpetuation of conflict in the region (Bevan 2008).

On the Eastern Kenya in particular, the Samburu did not have access to arms from the Somalia because of the traditional enmity between the Samburu and the Somali. This would change in the early 1990s mainly because of the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia in 1991 which saturated the region with weapons. By the time Siad Barre was deposed in 1992 by Farah Aideed, other clan leaders refused to recognize new government’s legitimacy and the country was plunged into an abyss of anarchy. This gave the Somali gun traders access to the Pastoralist gun market. Guns were exchanged with cattle in a primitive barter trade, mostly in the bushes. In a worst case scenario guns were exchanged with liters of milk, which demonstrate how easily guns were accessible.
Many ordinary citizens were in possession of small arms after 1990. Since then Somalia has become one of the sources and transit points of small arms and light weapons which eventually found a ready market in Kenya. It is compounded by lawlessness, the lack of a legitimate government and the illegal use of the Somali coastline by war lords who continue to reap huge profits from the sale and trafficking of arms in the neighboring countries.
A commercial Somali class developed which specialized in gun business, which made guns available among the Samburu. During the Shiffa war, the Somali militants ensured that guns were protected from either being misused or sold to their traditional enemies—the Samburu. The only way of ensuring constant supply of meat for the Somali militant was to prevent the Samburu Morans from acquiring guns. After the collapse of Siad Barre who funded the Shiffa menace, a new crop of Somali businessmen emerged. These businessmen were not part of the greater Somali expansion agenda and when the guns were easily available they found a quick way of making money, by selling guns to anyone willing to purchase. The Samburu Morans became the first beneficiaries of this trade as the Morans sold their livestock to purchase the guns. Morans always exchanged livestock for guns, for example a G-3 would be exchanged with three bulls, an AK-47 and an M-16 with two bulls and pistols with an effective range of 75 meters with a heifer (Farah 2005). Generally almost every family has a gun or two, young boys and women are also armed as a precaution of a raid takes place in the absence of Morans.

**Armed Moran and Modern technology**

The study sought to find out how the modern Moran used modern ways to escalate conflicts in the Pastoralist communities. Figure 19 presents the findings.

**Figure 19: Modern Ways of Conflict Escalation**

From the findings, 76% of the respondents indicated cell phones as a modern way of conflict escalation. The perpetuators use cellphones to communicate to Morans on the best tactics to use during the raid and the specific routes to use. Elites from these communities communicate to their rural folks every day using cell phones. Every morning and evening,
the elites would inquire on their kins safety. Almost all morans have cellphones for this purpose. In case of a conflict situation, elites would use cell phone to advise the morans on the best tactics to use, as elites monitor the conflict both locally and nationally. The role of truck drivers with cellphones is to receive instructions from the elites to the raiders on the best routes, where they can access their enemies easily and avoid being ambushed. Elites finance Morans by sending them money Via M-Pesa services or even hire mercenary and pay their fee through mobile money (M-Pesa) since 71% of the respondents stated M-Pesa as a modern way of conflict escalation. Vernacular radio stations are becoming instrumental since even the raiders have small pocket radios which they use to listen on the conditions of the raids. This gives them information on what government security forces are planning to do and where they have pitched their camps. This helps them to escape from the government security agents and the raided communities.

Vernacular radios can play important roles in conflicts. They can be the channel of communication between the parties to the conflict, provide information about the parties to the conflict and issues at hand and offer education on the different ways to peaceful resolution of the conflict. They can also help in building trust among parties to the conflict and the public, counteract misinformation, analyze the conflict, help identify the underlying interests of issues, allow parties to express their emotions, empower the parties like marginalized groups and help in consensus building (Villanueva, 2009).

Osamba (2011) suggests the abuse of ethnic competitions through sending money through M-pesa between local political leaders prompt groups into ethnic viciousness all together for self-protection in control. Likewise, Krätli and Swift (2010) claim the involvement of legislators in backing attacks to increase political mileage among the voters and to have an edge over contenders. Cottle (2006) writes that conflicts provide the raw material for strong human interest stories where people use cellphones to find pathos and tragedy, heroism and camaraderie’s, acts of selfishness and personalized experiences of suffering. Galtung (1993) says that not only do cellphones have a perverse fascination with war and violence, they also neglect the peace forces at work.
Furthermore, Brown (2001) in Yanacopulos & Hanlon (2006) argues that many ethnic and internal conflicts are triggered by selfish leaders who will do anything to get to power. They often incite ethnic violence. Youths in these areas have been supplied with trucks which they use in carrying out attacks, as well as carry the raided animals to the markets in towns and cities. As such, humanity’s failure to prevent, mitigate and resolve ethno-political conflicts suggest that those seeking to end them may be missing certain insights or new alternative perspectives and dynamics involved in the conflict.

5.6 Conclusion

The conflict in North Eastern Kenya is caused by scarcity of resources. Economic and political marginalization, active resistance by pastoralist communities to assimilation, resource depletion and demographic changes, and the growing availability of small arms and light weapons are among the major factors causing conflicts in the country. As a result of conflicts, communities experience reduced crop and livestock yields, increased casualties as many people are left injured and some killed, residents in the communities are also displaced with their property left destroyed. In addition, social services are also affected leading to closure of schools, health centers and other outdoor activities as intensified insecurity looms in the communities.

Furthermore, as an extension of political fallout, livestock have become the triggers and the medium for sustaining conflicts through cattle raiding for wealth accumulation and also for dowry payments. The militarization of the unemployed young men and related affiliation with various political groups has become a major driving factor in aggravating livestock-based conflicts. While the signed agreement between the SPLM and the SPLM-IO and the return of some members of the latter to Juba provides hope for peace and reconciliations, there are also a host of issues that have not yet been resolved and remain a cause for concern.

Modern technology has also become a clear instrument of conflict escalation, where M-pesa, vernacular FM stations and cellphones have made the conflict situation in Northern Kenya worst. Cattle rustling and conflict in general is experienced from forces outside the three communities. The parties involved are many and powerful hence endangering the very existence of these communities.
CHAPTER SIX
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 Introduction
The study looked at the dynamics of intermittent escalation of conflict among Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya, 1990 – 2017. The specific objectives were to examine the internal and external triggers that explain the intermittent escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralists of Northern Kenya, between 1990 and 2017. This chapter gives a summary of the findings, conclusion and the recommendations of the study.

6.2 Summary
The analysis singles out how the age set amongst the youths, propagation of small arms and light weapons, political incitement, competition over scarce and diminishing water and pastures for their animals tend to increase raiders’ social status of the Turkana, Samburu and the Pokot. With small arms easily available, an implication of this is that age has been found to have a significance on Turkana, Samburu and Pokot societies, which on the other hand upsurges the youth’s voluntary determination of raiding. Marauding amongst these rustic people indicate three purposes which include social and economic base, competition for grazing land and water and finally survival strategies. Both men and women have a role to play during cattle raid. Before raiding, most of the youth were organized into age-sets and nurtured into disciplined warrior groups. In regard to each age-set, all the men within the ethnic group who got initiated within (ideally) a single 10 to 12-year period were categorized in the same class.

The findings of the study is that the culture through elders had suitable ways of scheming cattle raiding and limiting the number of young men ready to engage in these raids. The study further reveals how taming of the youths in age sets develops them into Morans; a group of Morans that are correctly and adequately guided on their current and future roles; and keep vigil against cattle raiders and wild animals preying on their cattle. Consequently, the study reveals that pastoralists needed to have a number of coping mechanisms in regard
to conflicts such as raiding. For instance, the study established how most societies such as the Turkana, Samburu and Pokot have embraced robust social linkages through inter-ethnic marriages. The result of the relationships allowed for the affected parties to ‘borrow’ livestock from others in order to replenish breeding stocks after turbulences.

The study further establishes that the arms race between the USA and USSR in the region of Horn of Africa because of its strategic position led to transformation of traditional conflict into all-out warfare in pastoralist regions. Political uncertainty in the Horn of Africa region led to the militarization of citizen population through a number of mechanisms. Somalis residing in Kenya were able to obtain guns by volunteering to join the fight for the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and then slipped back into Kenya. Since Dadaab refugee camp cannot accommodate all the refugees entering Kenya, those in possession of arms tend to sale the weapons cheaply to the locals.

In addition, the study established that militarization of civilians in Ethiopia and Eritrea due to their rivalry led to the attainment of small arms and light weapons amongst the Turkana, Samburu and the Pokot. Furthermore, critical effect of the war in South Sudan led to an influx of refugees into Northern Kenya. Most of these refugees were armed and seeking sanctuary in Kenya. Accordingly, the study revealed that propagation of small arms and Light weapons had a long standing consequence of the disruptions felt among the Pastoralists communities of Northern Kenya, including increase in number of fatalities and indiscriminate killings.

As a result, the study affirmed that loss of life and property made the pastoralists civilians to hope for help from former President Moi after assuming power in 1978; in terms of economic and political dispensation from the new government. These high expectations were never realized to a larger extent. However, in the aftermath, new forms of banditry and cattle rustling sprung up in Northern Kenya. The government response in dealing with the conflict was to send heavily armed military men including helicopter gunships. The bandits who had mastered the rugged terrain, easily outwitted the government forces. The bandits also seemed to be well – trained and coordinated in their operations
It has been established in the study that the nature of Africa’s borders and the relative ease of concealing small arms make it difficult to control the movement of weapons, which have been found to destabilize regions, and facilitate violent crime. As such, poor population has mostly been undermined hence leading to ineffective sustainable development in Kenya. Even their source of income, which is livestock lean towards generating conflict based on grazing regions, accessibility to water and cattle rustling. The study findings also reveals that the presence of Moran culture in the pastoral communities cannot be gainsaid.

The intermittent conflict situation in Northern Kenya today has undergone massive transformation. Turkana, Samburu and Pokot social orders react contrarily to one another’s actions—violence begets violence. Cattle were indeed raided throughout their history. However, these raids were more of a form of wealth redistribution through cattle. There were customary rules in which cattle raids were limited to times of need, were small in numbers and generally characterized by little violence. This marks the genesis of protracted social conflict in Northern Kenya. However, as rules began to be increasingly violated during the 20th Century, these raids escalated in intensity (Krätli and Swift, 1999). Victims responded with raids of increased intensity, and the conflict spiral was born among the Pastoralist communities of Northern Kenya.

There are varied number of factors account for the conflict transformation. First, colonial policy, which aimed at pacifying pastoralists and to ensure peace and order, this tendency had several implications. It intended to present the Pastoralists as unreliable people prone to violence and, hence, to encourage the abandonment of the activity. This was an elite outsider’s view of Pastoralism as a primordial mode of production which should be discouraged. However, it is shown that, the colonial period was marked by the increasing occurrences of conflict as the Pastoralist rebelled against the British as they tried to maintain their mode of livelihood.

Similarly, politicians have been accused of instigating cattle raids and conflicts. They have done so through funding of the raids and verbally igniting the youth to engage in conflict during political rallies. Some Politicians have been accused of their active involvement in distribution of firearms to the Pokot in the mid-1990s.
On the other hand, the transition from cultural to commercial raiding has tremendously escalated conflicts. The cultural raiding had rules that governed the number of cattle to be raided, the manner in which to carry out the raids and prohibited any killing especially of women, children and the elderly. This assisted to control escalation of conflicts. The weapons used were inferior and incapable of mass destruction. With introduction of more sophisticated weapons like AK-47 rifles, conflicts resulting to deaths, mass displacement and annihilation of some villages became a new phenomenon. This in turn encouraged more arming of communities and cyclical retaliatory attacks. The cattle industry out of cattle rustling is a huge one supplying meat in urban areas. Business people who are not necessarily pastoralists but very well politically connected control it. This has in turn increased black market for demand the meat out of stolen cattle thus further enhancing the illegal industry and demand for more cattle leading to more rustling and conflicts.

The development of increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world Countries of capitalist by the USA marked the beginning of the significant presence of the two former super powers’ in the Horn of Africa. USA began to increase its presence through the control of the Mediterranean Sea route, Suez Canal channel further restraining the possibility of a Soviet blockade of oil lanes mainly located in Sudan. Its increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world Countries of socialist influence prompted it to provide financial and military support to Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.

Political instability in Somalia made Kenyan Somalis able to obtain guns by volunteering to join the fight for the Ogaden in Ethiopia, and a short time later slipped again into Kenya. In some cases, renegade Somali soldiers did the same. In Ethiopia and Eretria, the rivalry between the countries led to arms race between the two nations, where each country was involved in massive acquisition of arms. Meanwhile, the Turkana exploited the ethnic rivalry between their foremost enemy in Uganda-the Dodoth and their Ugandan cousins, the Jie to get arms supplies from the latter. Similar tactics were used by the Turkana community to obtain arms from Sudan where they purchased arms from Dinga, who happened to be the traditional enemy of the Toposa, who coincidentally have over the years been the Turkana’s foremost challengers from the Sudan side.
Therefore, one of the reasons why conflict is escalating in Northern Kenya is the proliferation of small arms and light weapons an effect of the upheavals experienced in neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa. Transformation of the conflict from a traditionally sanctioned practice to an all-out criminal activity can be attributed to the increased prevalence of so called ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons’ (SALW) in the area. Pastoral communities in Northern Kenya provided an excellent market for fire arms. Where they traditionally relied on bows, arrows, spears, pangas and rungus for protection and warfare, they now resort to assault rifles such as the AK-47 and the G-3 rifles which are relatively cheap due to high availability. The availability of SALW’s has scaled up the number of fatalities and indiscriminate killings among the Nilotic Pastoralist of Northern Kenya.

6.3 Conclusion
The study concludes that in Northern Kenya, the situation of skirmishes has gone through enormous revolution. Most of the pastoral communities including the Turkana, Samburu and Pokot tend to retort undesirably to one another’s actions thus leading to ethnic conflicts. For ages, cattle raiding has taken place as a form of wealth relocation and this has noticeable origin of protracted social conflict in Northern Kenya.

In the study, Morans have played critical role in the escalation of conflict among the Nilotic pastoralist of Northern Kenya. Being foot soldiers within the communities, they have sustained conflict through cattle rustling. The study has shown the traditional Moran has been transformed into a complex group which uses lethal weapons for cattle rustling. These complex Moran rustlers have changed from previous loyal community defender led by community elders to deadly group for hire by political and economic entrepreneurs. The study concludes that several factors have been found to lead to conflict transformation. For instance, with the colonial policy intended to calm down pastoralists and guarantee peace and order, they described pastoralist as an undependable individuals inclined to violence and encouraged for abandonment of the activity. As such, this led to upsurge in incidence of skirmishes as pastoralist protested contrary to the British and tried to maintain their mode of livelihood. This led to the political boundary illustration and formation of block
grazing schemes that significantly influenced the transhumant arrays previously understood by the pastoralists from their extensive knowledge involving the natural adversities.

Presently, these communities, the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot view each other’s actions as hostile and this has resulted in increased conflict between pastoralists of the Northern Kenya. PSC theory indicates that the disagreement between the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot societies go outside a simple conflict due to the fact that any community that desists from an intensified war is usually alleged as flawless, and this summons further infringement and aggression on the flawless society.

The study concludes that several external factors triggered conflict in the Northern Kenya. For instance, the United States’ cumulative curiosity of protecting developing nations of socialist influence provoked it to offer military funding to Ethiopia while the Soviet Union delivered military hardware to Somalia. The enormous stoke masses of army hardware from Somalia and Ethiopian guaranteed a long-term weakening and propagation of SALW both in these countries and far long after 1990 to the neighboring nations with Kenya being included. The study also concludes that political unpredictability in Somalia led to the militarization of citizen by use a number of contrivances such as marginalization of established military institutions and military officers. Due to inadequate and ineffective disarmament program, a large number of the weapons endured with civilian population inside Somalia and beyond.

Furthermore, the study established that the enmity between Ethiopia and Eritrea also backed to the militarization of civilians in the region. Ethiopia and Eritrea rivalry has resulted to arms race between the two nations, where each country is involved in massive acquisition of arms. Due to unlimited regulation of arms supply to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and other militia groups in the Horn of Africa, there has been prolonged skirmishes in this region, and an intensification of accessibility of arms to other areas including Northern Kenya which includes the Turkana, Samburu and Pokot.
In regard to politicians, the study concludes that they have been blamed for initiating skirmishes and cattle rustling by backing raids and orally flaring up the minority to take part in conflicts during political rallies. The study has also concluded that the change from traditional to profitmaking raiding has extremely intensified the conflicts. In the past, raiding that followed cultural ways meant that the manner in which the process was carried out, the number of cows to be raided was governed unlike the profitmaking raiding that involves killings of anything at close range such as women, children and the elderly.

In addition, it can be argued that traditional weapons were the most common amongst the Turkana, Samburu and the Pokot. These weapons were lesser and unable to cause mass destruction. However, classy arms such as the AK-47 rifles led to severe battles which ensued deaths, shift of people and total destruction of some villages. It can be concluded that deaths, shift of people and total destruction of some villages invigorated communities to arm themselves more and call for cyclical retaliatory attacks.

The study further concludes that the mismanagement and obtainability of small arms and light weapons has protracted and worsened altruistic disasters in Africa. Countries in the lowest end of the UN’s Human Development Index tend to suffer most on matters concerning conflicts. Therefore, apart from monitoring supply, there is need to address the increased ultimatum for small arms since it is one of the major security encounters presently facing Kenya. The study concludes that not only has the trading and extensive accessibility of SALW fueled uncertainty, skirmish and sham a danger, but has also affected the sustainable development of the involved communities. In addition, poor controlling of the Kenya and its neighbors’ borders has eased the arrival of huge amounts of small arms into Kenya. Arms traffickers and bandits find easy entry points along the porous borders due to the fact that the borders are not properly and effectively policed.

It can be concluded that the undertaking of arms to the region is an actual process taking numerous years before guns stretch their envisioned terminus, due to the fact that SALW are prohibited and can only be sold through a black market. The study concludes that entry of small arms to Northern Kenya mainly from Uganda and Sudan and the first beneficiaries of these small arms are the Turkana and the Pokot of Kenya. An incessant combat between the Pokot, Karamoja and Turkana empowered these two Kenyan groups to access guns through cattle rustling and deaths of the armed militants.
6.4 Recommendations

In the light of the findings and conclusions of the study as detailed explained above the following recommendations are made:

Recommendations to the Kenyan Government: Ethnic conflicts in Kenya have become more frequent in the recent past, going beyond the five-year electoral cycle and outside the pastoral communities. The study shows that the proliferation of small arms has been felt, even within the urban centers. The guns are in the hands of the youth from non-pastoral communities who are using them for robberies and other violent activities in the urban centers. The spillover effect of the proliferation of arms from Northern Kenya has led to other non-pastoral communities to be heavily armed hence leading to potential conflict in specific pockets of the Country, like Lower Tana Basin, Meru-Isiolo Border, Baringo-Marakwet Conflicts and Sotik-Borabu Conflicts. The study therefore recommends that all ethnic groups in Kenya should co-exist peacefully regardless of the differences in their cultural believes and ways of livelihood. Conflict triggered in Northern Kenya will have a spillover effect to other communities outside conflict zones. The study has also indicated that proliferation of small arms has extended to other communities outside pastoralists in Northern Kenya and have found their way to the urban centers, making conflict and insecurity more complex and uncontrollable. It is therefore recommended that the government should use National Staring Committee on Peace Building and Conflict Transformation and National Cohesion and Integration Commission to facilitate harmonious coexistence among the various conflicting communities in Kenya.

Recommendations to the policy makers: the study recommends that the government through Director of public prosecution, National Cohesion and Integration Commission, the Judiciary should prosecute and bring to justice politicians, tribal leaders or other persons found to be inciting different ethnic community members against others for leadership and political gains. To the government policy makers, the government should formulate and implement policies on conflict management and peace building. Such strategies could provide frame works for understanding these conflicts, how to manage them, institutionalize and legalize the role of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Check the proliferation of illicit arms, address the issue of displaced persons as well as strengthen community policing. With this policy in place, it will provide guidelines for conflict management in the respective communities as well as entrench conflict management into
existing and future national plans. This policy will also promote linkages between local communities, County governments and national instruments or actors on conflict management. Cattle rustling should be banned altogether through a legislative arrangement.

With this arrangement set up, it will give rules to conflict administration within the individual groups particularly on the issue of cattle rustling, because the meat business should be regulated through livestock and marketing division to avoid raided cattle becoming a source of conflict. Various meat black markets should be investigated with a view of closure when found culpable.

The government should intensify disarmament program among the pastoralist communities, with a view to remove all illegals arms from these communities. The disarmament program should be conducted without harassment and infringement of the rights of the locals. The previous disarmament approaches were forceful and the locals ended up giving out the old and obsolete guns which excites government officials.

To compliment disarmament program the government should implement Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia corridor project (LAPSSET) which aims to be a game changer a cross the Arid and Semi - Arid lands (ASALs) and counties which are predominantly occupied by Pastoralists communities. LAPSSET aims to develop a Super Highway and other road network in Northern Kenya, Crude oil pipeline from Lokichar to Lamu, International Airports. LAPSSET aims to spur development in Northern Kenya with a potential to transform this region into a serious economic zone.

Recommendation to scholars: Scholars who may be interested in pursuing research in conflict among pastoralists are encouraged to focus on internal and external triggers of conflict while paying more attention to the role of Moranism in conflict perpetuation among the pastoralist community in Northern Kenya. The scholars are also encouraged to research on the underlying motivation that makes a human being to be a conflict animal. More focus should be put on the internal and external conflict triggers to understand their potential in causing conflict in other conflict prone areas. Recommendations to the county government officials: Poor State of service delivery to Arid and Semi-Arid areas is central to the conflicts that destroy them. Raising the education, delivering other services such as health and infrastructure, provision of security services through increase deployments of security forces, and improving communication services are important in their indirect role of reducing conflicts. Other Nilotic groups seems that conflict is inherent.
Recommendations to the peace committees; Peace building activities include sports and dance festivals which form the basis of inter community friendship that brings together groups in a non-threatening setting. In the end, these exercises ought to close in and bury group transactions over combative issues. These transactions and conventional specialist structures ought to be fused into peace advisory groups, where different partners, for example, government and common society performers can direct and encourage procedures and guarantees that conform to the common law. The study has shown that most Peace committees are major obstacles to peaceful environment in this region because, peace programs are funded by foreign donors and national government, and hence several members of these committees found a steady income for their poor families, they would not like the conflict to end for obvious reasons.

Most of the residents tend to have large herds of animals in relation to the grazing lands, and during famine they move to other regions to feed them. This has been found to be the primary cause of conflict amongst the Turkana, Samburu and Pokot. The study therefore recommends that these communities should possess a sizeable number of livestock that they can manage in their grazing lands, seasonal migration of livestock from one place to another in search of water and pasture should therefore be discouraged. When it becomes unavoidable, then structured grazing program should be put in place to prevent conflict due to scarcity of resources.

To the pastoralists communities, the study recommends that the communities should rear hybrid cows rather than zebu cows. This is due to the fact that the ability of zebu cows to walk/run long distances, favors the bandits unlike the hybrid cows that cannot manage to even walk over three kilometers without getting tired. Through grazing committees, the communities in the Northern region of Kenya should take care of their own migration routes. This will on the other hand minimize cases of conflicts over grazing zones. In addition, the study recommends initiatives that revitalize and restore important elements of community culture and the place of elder in traditional governance systems. In addition, establish social initiatives that boost cross border interactions such as joints sports and markets to revive need for kinship ties and networks. This could also be done through building up the broken social networks, improving cross border interactions and
intermarriages as well as recognition of traditional local governance systems. It is imperative that the three Nilotic Pastoralists should learn to share the scarce resources found in the region because nature has never endowed all people and facilities with the same or equal resources.

The frequency of conflict among the pastoralist communities in Northern Kenya is because the raided cattle cannot be raided back which creates insufficient numbers of cattle within the three communities to complete the cycle of livelihood. Therefore, prompting a serious shortage of cattle within the three communities making revenge raids more frequent and deadly. The economic entrepreneurs should be prevented or not allowed to have their source of meat coming from the pastoral communities since this escalates conflicts. A verifiable mechanism is recommended to determine the source of meat, to the urban centers and cities.

The Morans have to be de-linked with the cattle rustling. The study has shown that they are the main perpetrators of conflict escalation in Northern Kenya. The institute of Moranism should be remodeled gradually to allow young Morans to go to school in order to eradicate ignorance while at the same time diversify their livelihoods. The local Moran, would be useful when introduced to live-skills like livestock entrepreneurship, dry land irrigation, informal education with an aim of making the Morans join the robust village polytechnic programs to learn simple skills like carpentry, tailoring and auto mobile mechanic. Morans are also encouraged to form cooperative movements within the Livestock business for profit making. This will transform the conflict situation in Northern Kenya like never before.
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**News Papers**


Appendix I: Introductory Letter

Jonathan Lodompui
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
P.O Box 30197-00100,
University of Nairobi

27/6/2017
Dear ____________

Ref: Introductory Letter
My name is Jonathan Lodompui, a PhD candidate at the University of Nairobi, Department of Political Science and Public Administration. I am in the process of collecting data for my dissertation titled “THE DYNAMICS OF INTERMITTENT ESCALATION OF CONFLICT AMONG NILOTIC PASTORALISTS OF NORTHERN KENYA, 1990 - 2017”. The study seeks to understand why conflict has escalated in Northern Kenya among the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot and the role, if any, Moranism have played in it. Based on your expertise you have been chosen as a Key Informant.

I would appreciate if you could spare a few minutes to answer some questions.

Your identity will remain confidential as well as everything you tell me. Data gathered will be used for academic reasons only and no other purpose.

Your cooperation is highly appreciated.
Jonathan Lodompui
Appendix II: Questionnaire

This questionnaire is designed to obtain data and information on the role the internal and external conflict triggers have played on the escalation of conflicts in Northern Kenya. Respondents are asked to be as objective as possible in their responses. Respondents will be provided with foolscaps [if need be] for delivery of additional information.

A: Demographic Information

1. State your administrative Location
   - Turkana county
   - Baringo county
   - Samburu county

2. State your Gender
   - Male
   - Female

3. What is your age?
   " "

4. State your highest level of formal education
   - No formal education
   - Primary
   - Secondary
   - College
   - University
Escalation of conflict in northern Kenya.

5. (a) State whether the following activities have increased, decreased or remained the same in northern Kenya. Please use a (tick) for your answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>activity</th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>decreased</th>
<th>Remained the same</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased frequency of attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher fatalities during attacks (deaths)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wide spread destruction of properties during attacks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There has been indiscriminate killings during attacks (women, children and the elderly)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 (b) If there has been an increase in each of the above activities, explain why?

a) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

b) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

c) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

d) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. (c) To what extent is Nilotic Pastoralist conflicts be termed as intermittent?

ii) Which of the following periods was escalation of conflict among the Nilotic Pastoralist more pronounced?

a) 1945 - 1959
b) 1960 - 1974
c) 1975 - 1989
d) 1990 - 2017

iii). Explain why escalation was more evident in this period?
6. Who are likely to be the perpetrators of conflict amongst the Pastoral communities?.
Please use a tick for your answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Individuals, events, actions and processes</th>
<th>More likely</th>
<th>likely</th>
<th>Not likely</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Politicians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proliferation of small arms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. For those who have been more likely as perpetrators of conflict within the pastoral communities, explain why?

a) ________________________________________________________________

b) ________________________________________________________________

c) ________________________________________________________________

d) ________________________________________________________________

e) ________________________________________________________________

8. Do you think any of the following groups have significantly contributed to the escalation of conflicts within or without the pastoral communities?. Please use a tick for your answer.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Groups, processes and events</th>
<th>Internal triggers</th>
<th>External triggers</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political entrepreneurs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic entrepreneurs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercialization of raids</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi- Partism in Kenya in the early 1990s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. If it is yes, that the above groups have significantly contributed to the escalation of conflict in northern Kenya, please explain why?
   a) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   b) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   c) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   d) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   e) -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

10. When the cattle are raided from the pastoralist communities, where are they taken to? -
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

11. What do you think can be done to reduce conflicts in your community? -----------------------
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appendix III: Interview Guide

For KEY INFORMANTS from the Turkana, Pokot and the Samburu communities (The interview will be done one to one with the expert).

My name is Jonathan Lodompui, I am trying to understand the conflict triggers in Northern Kenya.

1. In your opinion, has conflict escalated between the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu?
   If conflict has escalated, why?
   Probe For:
   (a) participation of Morans, politicians, elders, KPRs, women and business people

2. In an earlier interview, I was told that, some of these raided animals are no longer found either in Turkana, Pokot and Samburu.

3. Would you know where these raided animals are taken to?
   Probe for,
   Slaughter houses, new markets outside these three communities, new routes for the raided animals

4. Do you know of any commercial entrepreneurs in this region?
   a) What role have they played in the escalation of conflict in the region?

5. Please comment on the role played by politics in the escalation of conflict in the region.
   a) We saw an elevated level of conflict in the run up to the multi-partism in 1992, do you think this event contributed significantly to the escalation of conflict in the region?
   b) Please comment on the Moi’s creation of KAMATUSA.
   c) Has Majimboism played a role in escalation of conflict in this region?

6. What role do elites from these communities play in conflict

7. Who funds these conflicts?
Appendix IV: Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)

This will be an interview for groups among the three Nilotic pastoral communities. (These groups are women, elders, Morans, civil societies, religious organizations and government officials).

My name is Jonathan Lodompui, am trying to understand the conflict triggers in Northern Kenya.

1. In your opinion, why has conflict escalated in Northern Kenya?
   Probe for:
   - Observation trends
   - Changing nature of conflict in Northern Kenya
   - Changing role of elders
   - Nature of pastoral conflicts

2. In your opinion, has conflict escalated between the Turkana,Pokot and Samburu?
   If conflict has escalated, why?
   Probe For:
   (b) participation of Morans, politicians, elders, KPRs, women and business people

3. In an earlier interview, I was told that, some of these raided animals are no longer found either in Turkana, Pokot and Samburu.

4. Would you know where these raided animals are taken to?
   Probe for,
   Slaughter houses, new markets outside these three communities, new routes for the raided animals

5. a) Do you know of any commercial entrepreneurs in this region?
   b) What role have they played in the escalation of conflict in the region?
   6. Please comment on the role played by politics in the escalation of conflict in the region.
   d) We saw an elevated level of conflict in the run up to the multi- partism in 1992, do you think this event contributed significantly to the escalation of conflict in the region?
   e) Please comment on the Moi’s creation of KAMATUSA.
   f) Has Majimboism played a role in escalation of conflict in this region?

7. What role do elites from these communities play in conflict

8. Who funds these conflicts?