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SAMOFF, Joel, 1943-
POLITICS, POLITICIANS, AND PARTY:
MOSHI, TANZANIA 1968-69

The University of Wisconsin, Ph.D., 1972
Political Science, general

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POLITICS, POLITICIANS, AND PARTY: MOSHI, TANZANIA

1968-69

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of

the University of Wisconsin in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy.

by

JOEL   SAMOFF

Degree to be awarded
January 19—72

June   19—

August   19—

To Professors: Young

               Holden

               Hayward

    This thesis having been approved in respect
to form and mechanical execution is referred to
you for judgment upon its substantial merit.

                               Robert M. Beck
                                        Dean

    Approved as satisfying in substance the
doctoral thesis requirement of the University of
Wisconsin.

                                 Major Professor

                         Matthew Holden, Jr.

                       Fred M. Hayward

Date of Examination, 20 September 19 71

POLITICS, POLITICIANS, AND PARTY: MOSHI, TANZANIA

1968-69

BY

JOEL SAMOFF

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(Political Science)

at the

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

1972

PREFACE

The major debt of gratitude of this study is, of course, to the people of Tanzania. It was their willingness to open to outside scrutiny and criticism their experiments in developing political institutions that made it possible in the first place. It was their assistance in securing access to the relevant materials that permitted the field work to be carried out successfully. And the analysis presented here has benefited immeasurably from their willingness to share with me their keen insights into what their problems were and what they were trying to do about them.

With an apology for the long delay in getting it to them, then, this essay is dedicated to the people of Tanzania.

The enormity of the task, together with my promises of anonymity, preclude my mentioning individually the many Tanzanians who assisted me in the gathering of the data and the formulation of the ideas presented here. The assistance of the residents of Moshi and Kilimanjaro, and of the TANU office, government offices, and other individuals and groups in Moshi was of course invaluable. I am especially indebted to Mzee Yusufu Ngozi, who with patience and kindness led me through the back streets of Moshi town and Moshi politics. I am also grateful to the University of Dar es Salaam (then University College, Dar es Salaam), Kivukoni College,

and the Tanzania National Archives for their hospitality, for

their assistance in obtaining materials, and for their prob-

ing queries and stimulating comments on my inquiry.

Professor Crawford Young of the University of

Wisconsin, whose careful critiques lie at the root of many

of the thoughts presented here, provided a brilliant mix of

intellectual challenge, friendly support, and freedom to

explore. This essay has also benefited from the comments

of Fred M. Hayward and E. A. Brett.

Support for field work and writing was provided by

a grant from the Foreign Area Fellowship Program, who of

course bear no responsibility for the opinions and con-

clusions presented here.

The insights of my wife Rachel appear on each and

every page of this essay. It was her ingenuity and

persistence, as she tramped through the alleys of Moshi

to the various cell leaders' homes, that made it possible

to include the Moshi cell leaders in this study. A

perceptive, and patient, critic, she shared with me the

excitements and the frustrations of every phase of the

field work and writing.

What I have to say here, of course, is my

responsibility, and mine alone. My hope is that the

enthusiasm, the commitment, and the hard work of the

people of Tanzania can be seen clearly through the

academic overlay.

CONTENTS

TABLES

MAPS

ABBREVIATIONS

APSR   American Political Science Review

EAJ   East Africa Journal

EAPH   East African Publishing House

JMAS   Journal of Modern African Studies

KNCU   Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union

NUTA   National Union of Tanganyika Workers

TANU   Tanganyika African National Union

TAPA   Tanganyika African Parents Association

TNA   Tanzania National Archives

TNR   Tanganyika Notes and Records; Tanzania Notes
and Records

TYL   TANU Youth League

UWT   Union of Tanganyika Women (Umoja wa Wanawake wa
Tanganyika)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"To plan is to choose," Julius K. Nyerere explained. "[Planning] involves making decisions about the allocation of scarce resources; it means choosing between many desirable activities, because not everything can be done at once."[1] Tanzania's President, introducing the Second Five-Year Plan, told party delegates that in working toward the goals they had established, in fashioning the Tanzania they desired, the nation's leaders and its people were required to choose among alternative strategies. Directly and explicitly involved were considerations of who would benefit from the choices made, in what order, and to what extent.

This essay is not primarily about planning in Tanzania, but it is concerned with choosing. It is an attempt to explore the nature of politics--and thus the choices possible and those actually made--in one up-country urban area in Tanzania.

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[1]President Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania entitled his address introducing Tanzania's Second Five-Year Plan to the National Conference of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1969, "To Plan is To Choose." The address is reprinted in Tanzania, Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, 1st July, 1969 - 30th June, 1974 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), Volume I, pp. vii-xxii; the quotation is from p. ix.

The study of African politics, and of the politics of development and modernization, by social scientists, though a relatively recent undertaking has by now produced an extensive literature.[2] Much of the work done thus far has been macroanalytic in its approach, concerned with behavior at the national level. While this concern with politics at the national level in the study of recently independent states is certainly understandable and perhaps inevitable, the danger is, as Zolberg has argued, that

> The situation in most of tropical Africa is so extreme that studies focused primarily on incipient central institutions almost necessarily exaggerate their importance in relation to the society as a whole.[3]

Although these macroanalytic works have made substantial contributions to the understanding of politics in Africa and offered perceptive insights into the nature of political change, the theoretical frameworks they provide have proved dissatisfyingly incomplete for the purposes of this essay. Scholars

----

[2]It is not the purpose here to attempt a detailed analysis of the state-of-the-art in the study of African politics or an intellectual history of such studies. These introductory comments are intended simply to set the intellectual framework for this essay. For brief, and pungent, critiques of approaches to the study of comparative politics, see the Introduction to Jean Blondel, editor, Comparative Government (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor, 1969), and the papers by Colin Leys and J. P. Nettl in Colin Leys, editor, Politics and Change in Developing Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).

[3]Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," American Political Science Review (hereafter, APSR) LXII,1(March 1968): 86. Zolberg stresses the need for a greater microanalytic perspective in his Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 153.

have been least successful in focusing attention on and under-
standing the rapid change and flux that is perhaps the most
salient characteristic of African polities. They have large-
ly focused on the exercise of authority in situations where
the absence of effective authority is key. Although concerned
with problems of national integration, they have been insuffi-
ciently sensitive to the lack of agreement on the nature and
form of the political community. And in directing their at-
tention primarily to politics at the national level, they have
taken inadequate account of the lack of governmental penetra-
tion into the countryside and the inability of governments to
control and direct developments in the various localities
throughout the country.[4] More recently, political scientists
have directed greater attention toward local settings and
have attempted to incorporate an understanding of up-country
politics into a national analysis. It is toward that sort
of micropolitical analysis that this essay is directed.

This study, then, in very simple terms, represents
an attempt to move out of the national capital and to explore
the nature of politics in a single local setting. It is an
attempt to provide some of the basic source data at the mi-
cropolitical level on which the more comprehensive models
must rest.

[4]An outstanding exception among the macroanalytic
studies is, of course, Zolberg; _Creating Political Order._

From its microanalytic perspective--a setting where government and populace can experience face-to-face communication and direct interaction--this study is directed toward an examination of the form, the content, and the outcomes of politics in a major up-country urban area of Tanzania. But phenomenology and typology, though important and essential to a broader understanding, are themselves insufficient.

In describing local politics in Moshi, Tanzania, therefore, this essay will be concerned with the relationship of structures of local power to social and political change. It will attempt to explore the effectiveness of the implementation of developmental objectives in the local setting. And it will examine the role of local politics in providing a base for democratic participation. In the ideology and orientation of Tanzania's national leaders, the single political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), is key to all of these elements of local politics. It is the institution charged with promoting and managing political change. To a large extent, then, this essay is a study of TANU in Moshi.

One of the impacts of the behavioral revolution on the study of politics was to foster a search for precision in terminology. Unfortunately, one of the outcomes of that search has been a welter of common terms defined differently by different authors, with little agreement among students

of politics on what is meant by politics, by the political
process, by power, and the like. This is not an essay on
methodology, and it would serve little purpose, therefore, to
add one more voice to the orchestrated but cacaphonous termi-
nological debate. It is appropriate, however, to discuss
very briefly the major conceptual understandings employed.

It seems to me that it is useful to consider politics
as a process, a series of events, concerned with the distribu-
tion of resources, with the allocation of scarce goods, with
the selection of one set of values or objectives over another,
or with the implementation of one or another of a set of goals.
That is, I am less concerned with the question, why is that
series of events political, than with avoiding the limita-
tions implicit in a focus on specific structures or functions.[5]
In fact, my research suggests to me that we have much to lose,
and little to gain, by attempting to establish well-defined
and fixed boundaries between what is political and what is,
say, religious, or economic. I do not wish to belabor this
point, but simply to stress that local politics in Moshi re-
fers to a series of events related to conflicts over the al-
location of resources and the implementation of goals.

[5]My thinking on this point and on the following point
about relevant political actors has much in common with the
approach of Marc J. Swartz and his colleagues; see especial-
ly, Marc J. Swartz, editor, Local-Level Politics (Chicago:
Aldine, 1968), Introduction, and Marc J. Swartz, Victor W.
Turner, and Arthur Tuden, editors, Political Anthropology
(Chicago: Aldine, 1966), Introduction.

If politics refers to a series of events, clearly the actors--the individuals, groups, and institutions--involved in one specific event may not be involved in another, however much the observer might see the two events as closely related. For example, an individual who plays a key role in the granting of remissions of primary school fees may participate very little in the consideration of the location of new primary schools. As well, those actors concerned with a specific issue may vary over time, as it becomes more or less salient to different individuals and groups. Therefore, for the purposes of this essay, the relevant political strata in Moshi are those directly and indirectly involved in the events being studied. The importance of this is that the set of individuals and groups concerned with a specific issue may not be defined by any convenient geographic, administrative, or temporal space. Just as it is essential that we not presume that a given structure has a key and relatively constant role in the evolution of a specific series of events, so too it is essential that we recognize that the set of individuals and groups concerned with a specific event or series of events is continuously changing in its composition. Finally, I suggest that in order to situate a series of events and the actors concerned with them, it is important to examine the wider setting that encompasses them, itself continuously changing.

One approach developed for the study of politics in

micropolitical settings involves the identification of the

set of key local political notables, the collection of data

on their backgrounds, attitudes, and behavior, and the anal-

ysis of politics through the combination and comparison of

that data. But such an approach involves several a priori

assumptions about the stratification of the community, the

concentration and/or dispersion of power, and the congruence

of influence patterns that seem unwarranted. An alternative

approach directs attention toward a set of specific, govern-

mental decisions and outcomes and describes local politics

in terms of those decisions and the individuals and groups

participating in the decision-making process. That approach

as well has severe limitations for the purposes of this es-

say.

It seems to me useful to consider specific decisions,

however critical they may be in determining patterns of allo-

cation, stratification, and deprivation in a community, as

only one of several key points in the policy-making process

that must be examined.[6] To develop a more complete under-

standing of the allocation of resources in a given setting, it

is important to look first at the prevailing values and mores

[6]This point draws heavily on the work of Peter Bach-
rach and Morton S. Baratz. See especially, Power and Poverty:
Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970),
which elucidates, clarifies, and expands some of the notions
originally presented in "Two Faces of Power," APSR LVI,4(De-
cember 1962):947-952, and "Decisions and Nondecisions: An
Analytical Framework," APSR LVII (1963):632-642.

of the community, which themselves may prevent certain issues

from ever being formulated formally or from ever reaching a

decision-point. Second, the community's procedures and insti-

tutions, which by their nature and operation may exclude cer-

tain issues and certain types of issues from consideration,

must be examined. Third, of course it is essential to exam-

ine carefully the formal decision-making points, both govern-

mental and non-governmental, where proposals may be rejected,

altered, and approved. And fourth, it is also essential to

explore the process of implementation, which often, if not

always, operates in such a way that new proposals may be of-

fered for consideration and approved proposals altered or

even rejected. Again, not to belabor the point, what I am

suggesting is that to be concerned primarily with formal,

governmental decisions, like concentrating on formal struc-

tures or a presumed elite, may cause us to overlook much of

the essence of politics in Moshi.

        The theoretical basis and the methodology of this es-

say is, therefore, self-consciously eclectic. While I presume

that there is conflict over the allocation of scarce resources

in the area studied, a presumption for which there is ample

supporting evidence, I have attempted to draw on those ap-

proaches that seem able to assist me in understanding and ex-

plaining the phenomena I have observed. Such an eclectic ap-

proach poses two important problems. First, where a particu-

lar approach suggests that certain events are more important

than others, or supports one interpretation over alternative views, it is essential that the major assumptions underlying that approach not be accepted uncritically. That is, for example, I think it is both possible and useful to consider particular structures in terms of functions without asserting that the political system is characterized by a fundamental orientation toward harmony and equilibrium, an assertion that would be at odds with the conflict orientation of this essay. Second, eclecticism in methodology must not be a substitute for coming squarely to grips with major problems of analysis and interpretation. Although this eclectic approach makes excursions into theory-building in widely scattered areas very tempting, I have tried to avoid those excursions, however tempting, where they would detract from the major goal--the study of local politics in Moshi. For that reason, and also because this essay is not primarily concerned with problems of approach and methodology, I have found it most useful to discuss the methodology employed where appropriate throughout the course of the essay.

Tanzania, which has been independent for nearly a

decade,[7] is the setting for this study. It is one of the few

African states with a functioning single-party system, a sys-

tem entrenched in Tanzania's constitution. Although Tan-

zania's regime has been subjected to various stresses and

strains throughout its brief existence, it has remained quite

stable, and the mass popular support developed during the

struggle for independence seems not to have dissipated sub-

stantially since then. The set of structures and relation-

ships defined as the single party has been modified many times

and continues to be the key political institution in Tanzania.

The national leadership has made a concerted, albeit at times

unsuccessful, effort to manage and direct the nature of so-

cial change. And, committed to understanding change in order

to manage it, Tanzania's leaders have been receptive, rela-

tively more so than the leaders of most other African states,

to the study of its peoples, its institutions, and its goals.

This study concerns an up-country urban area in Tan-

zania. Of the several urban centers of similar size in Tan-

zania in 1968-69, Moshi seemed to have especially well-developed

[7]The United Nations Trust Territory of Tanganyika,
administered by Great Britain, became independent in 1961.
After the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in 1964 the result-
ant Republic was named Tanzania. In this essay, Tanganyika
will be used exclusively to refer to what is now mainland
Tanzania prior to its union with Zanzibar, and Tanzania will
be used to refer to the country as a whole. Since the per-
spective on national government will largely be that of one
local area, in references to the national government no at-
tempt will be made to differentiate the constituent mainland
and island elements of the government of the United Republic
of Tanzania.

patterns of interaction between the town and its rural hinter-
land and seemed readily accessible and hospitable to the sort
of research envisioned. The peoples of Kilimanjaro District,
in which Moshi town is located, are relatively educated, mod-
ern, and prosperous in comparison with the rest of Tanzania.
Although Kilimanjaro peoples are proportionately overrepre-
sented in the Tanzania government and civil service, the rapid
growth of the competing and neighboring town (Arusha) after
the location there of the headquarters of the East African
Community, and the commitment of national leaders to divert
allocations from the most to the least developed areas of the
country in order to equalize the distribution of resources,
are both seen in much of Kilimanjaro as threats to the rapid
development and key leadership role of the district. Kili-
manjaro residents, therefore, might be expected to be among
the most hostile of Tanzania's citizens to the national so-
cialist goals and most resistant to central direction. Thus,
while Moshi may be somewhat unique among Tanzania's towns (in
fact, none could be satisfactorily described as representative
of the others), a study of its politics contributes not only
to an understanding of the functioning of the single party
in an up-country setting but also to an assessment of central-
local relationships and thus of the ability of national lead-
ers to direct and manage social change.

This essay, then, is concerned with the nature of

politics in Moshi, Tanzania. But Moshi is not simply a convenient locale for the study of politics, a laboratory for the examination of alternative theories and hypotheses. It is a living, vibrant community, intensely active, where European buyers fly in each week to taste and purchase the coffee harvest, where children crowd the schools, where street vendors, cloth merchants, hardware salesmen, tailors, shoemakers, and other artisans mingle with the shoppers and the government officials and the rural cow-herders on the sidewalks, and where the backdrop consists of the luxuriant growth of Kilimanjaro's lowlands joined to its snow-capped peaks by thick clouds. It is situated in a district whose populace is often characterized, both by Tanzanians and by foreign visitors, as the enterprising and industrious go-getters of Tanzania. And it is a town whose residents, like people elsewhere, attempt to devise institutions that meet their needs, not as an academic exercise, but because they have a vision of the good life and they are willing to work for it.

To convey something of the activity and vibrancy that make Moshi a town and not simply a study, I have attempted to organize this essay to share with readers the process of discovery in the study of local politics there. It begins with a brief historical overview to set modern developments into their broader context. It then proceeds to draw on the insights of studies of community power in examining the nature

of local politics--first by exploring conflict over the allo-
cation of resources through detailed studies of three key issue-
areas, and then by studying the local political elite, focus-
ing especially on members of the town council and party cell
leaders.[8] What issues are local people concerned about? What
forms does conflict over those issues take? Who prevails in
those conflicts? Who are the local leaders--what are their
origins, who comes to see them, how do they picture the local
political system? The essay concludes with a detailed look at
the local party organization and its ability to initiate and
manage change in Moshi.

Readers primarily interested in the comments on party
and government in Moshi might prefer, having read the histor-
ical survey and structural overview in Chapter 2, to turn di-
rectly to the concluding chapters. The basic questionnaires
used in the survey of local elites, along with brief explana-
tory notes, are found in the Appendices.

Publications on Tanzania have proliferated in recent
years; the Bibliography includes those works cited in this
essay, as well as a selection of other publications deemed
useful.

[8]For a summary of findings and a bibliography of
studies of community power in Africa, see William J. Hanna
and Judith L. Hanna, Urban Dynamics in Black Africa (Washing-
ton: National Technical Information Service, U. S. Department
of Commerce, 1969).

CHAPTER 2

POLITICS IN KILIMANJARO: A HISTORICAL SURVEY

HISTORICAL SURVEY: INTRODUCTION

Kilimanjaro District is located in northwestern Tan-
zania, extending from a semi-circle girdling the west, south,
and east of the snow-capped mountain from which the district
draws its name down into the dry, dusty plain south of the
mountain. The district borders Kenya, and has direct road
and rail transport to Nairobi, Mombasa, and Dar es Salaam
(good road connection with the latter has been established
only recently, and rail connection is still subjected to the
vagaries of the annual rains). Moshi town, located to facil-
itate construction of the railway by the German colonial ad-
ministration, sits just below the most fertile areas of the
mountain, at 2900 feet. In 1967 there were almost one-half
million inhabitants in the district and some 27,000 in the
town.

Situated on a major trading route and attractive be-
cause of the allure of its snow-capped peaks and pleasant
hillside climate, Kilimanjaro has been visited and studied by
outsiders for more than a century. There are accounts of its
scenery, its people, and its politics written by explorers,
by naturalists, by colonial administrators, by professional

TANZANIA

SCALE 1:6,500,000

International Boundaries ✦✦✦✦
Regional
District

Bukoba
L. VICTORIA
Mara
Karagwe
Ukerewe
Musoma
Biharamulo
Mwanza
Ngara
Geita
Kwimba
Maswa
Kilimanjaro
Arusha
Kibondo
Kahama
Shinyanga
Mbulu
Masai
Pare
Nzega
Iramba
Lushoto
Kasulu
Singida
Korogwe Tanga
Kigoma
Tabora
Kondoa
Pemba
Handeni
Pangani
Dodoma
Zanzibar
Mpanda
Manjoni
Mpwapwa
Bagamoyo
Mzizima
Kilosa
Morogoro
Kisarawe
Chunya
Iringa
Rufiji
Mafia
Sumbawanga
Mbeya
Mufindi
Mbozi
Ulanga
Kilwa
Rungwe
Njombe
Nachingwea
Songea
Lindi
Mtwara
Mbinga
Tunduru
Masasi
Newala

REGIONS & DISTRICTS 1967

ARUSHA	IRINGA	MBEYA
Arusha	Iringa	Chunya
Masai	Mufindi	Mbeya
Mbulu	Njombe	Mbozi
		Sumbawanga
COAST	KIGOMA	Rungwe
Mzizima	Kasulu	
Bagamoyo	Kibondo	MOROGORO
Kisarawe	Kigoma	Kilosa
Mafia		Morogoro
Rufiji	KILIMANJARO	Ulanga
	Kilimanjaro	
DODOMA	Pare	MTWARA
Dodoma		Kilwa
Kondoa	MARA	Lindi
Mpwapwa	Musoma	Masasi
	N. Mara	Mtwara

Nachingwea	Songea	Tabora	Pangani
Newala	Tunduru		Tanga
		SINGIDA	
		Iramba	WEST LAKE
MWANZA	SHINYANGA	Manyoni	Biharamulo
Geita	Kahama	Singida	Bukoba
Kwimba	Maswa		Karagwe
Mwanza	Shinyanga		Ngara
Ukerewe		TANGA	
	TABORA	Handeni	
RUVUMA	Mpanda	Korogwe	ZANZIBAR
Mbinga	Nzega	Lushoto	PEMBA

B.B. Jensen, U N Team in Physical Planning, Landsurvey. Drawn and published by the Cartographic Laboratory, University College, Dam. 19

MOSHI   DISTRICT

+++ International Boundaries
—·— Regional Boundaries
—··—·— District Boundaries
······· Constituency Boundaries
++++ Railways
—— Main Roads
==== District Road

K I L I M A N J A R O   D I S T R I C T

Lionel Cliffe, editor, One Party Democracy
(Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 106

historians, as well as by some prominent Chagga themselves.[1]
As is the case with much of the history of Africa written dur-
ing the colonial period, most of the commentary on Kilima-
njaro relies heavily on impressionistic accounts by early
visitors and on the reports of selected informants from those
peoples receptive to the early travelers, is infused with the
explorer's ardor for making new conquests and/or the mission-
ary's zeal for bringing the light to the heathens, and only
rarely attempts a comprehensive, systematic analysis of the
history of this area. Even the most recent efforts are

---

[1]See especially Charles Dundas, Kilimanjaro and its
People (London: Frank Cass, 1968 reprint of 1924 edition),
which includes references to the observers who preceded
Dundas to Kilimanjaro, and Kathleen M. Stahl, History of
the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro (The Hague: Mouton, 1964),
a study commissioned and financed by the Chagga themselves.
For a listing of the major works on Kilimanjaro, see the
Bibliography in the special issue of Tanganyika Notes and
Records (hereafter, together with its successor, Tanzania
Notes and Records, TNR) on Kilimanjaro, 64(March 1965):153-
162. See also the Bibliography of this essay.

sorely lacking in this regard.[2]

It is not the purpose here, nor is it possible, to
attempt to offer a detailed history of Kilimanjaro or of the
Chagga-speaking peoples. Rather, the attempt will be to high-
light the events, the interactions, and the recurring pat-
terns of the history of this area in order to set in context
the analysis of modern politics that follows. It should be
stressed, then, that the historical survey presented here
rests largely on my own reconstruction of salient events.[3]

[2]For a critical review of the problems in Stahl's
approach, essentially a diplomatic history of the major Chag-
ga chiefs, see the reviews of her work by J. M. Ostheimer and
J. M. Lonsdale, TNR 64(March 1965):150-152. Several recent
accounts, though claiming to deal with the Chagga in general,
in fact refer to specific areas of the district [P. Marealle,
The Life of a Mchagga on Earth and After Death (Nairobi: Eng-
lish Press Ltd., 1947); S. J. Ntiro, Desturi za Wachagga
(Nairobi: The Eagle Press, 1953)]; others offer the perspec-
tive of particular participants in Kilimanjaro life [A. A.
Lema, "The Lutheran Church's Contribution to Education in
Kilimanjaro 1893-1933," TNR 68(February 1968):87-94; Alex O.
Lema, "The Role of the Machame Chiefdom in the Politics of
the Wachagga since 1930s," J. E. S. Makundi, "Precolonial
Forces Against the Creation of One Chagga Nation," and
Oliver J. Maruma, "Chagga Politics: 1930-1952," all unpub-
lished senior dissertations, Department of Political Science,
University College, Dar es Salaam, March 1969]. An exception
is the work of Basil P. Mramba, "Kilimanjaro: Chagga Readjust-
ment to Nationalism," East African Institute of Social Re-
search, Conference Papers, Part E, No. 35 (January 1966), and
"Some Notes on the Political Development of the Chagga of
Kilimanjaro," unpublished paper, Makerere University College,
Kampala, 1967.

[3]I am indebted to Susan Rogers for sharing with me
her insights into recent Chagga politics, on which she is
currently completing a doctoral dissertation. I am also
grateful to several members of the faculty at University
College, Dar es Salaam (now the University of Dar es Salaam),
for their assistance in understanding the intracacies of
Chagga politics.

HISTORICAL SURVEY: BACKGROUND TO MODERN POLITICS

Kilimanjaro was peopled by a succession of migra-tions.[4] Peoples of Taita, Kamba, Masai, Pare, Kahe, and Shambaa origins, that is, from all sides of the mountain, settled in its fertile belt, between 3000 and 7000 feet. Settlement was gradual, and small communities developed, sep-arated by the numerous ravines on the mountain.

As the population increased, these communities grew into chiefdoms of varying sizes.[5] The very name Kilimanjaro was not used locally, but was applied by outsiders, and the tribal appellation Chagga in fact refers to peoples speaking related but often mutually unintelligible languages.[6] Thus, by the time of the major colonial intrusion in the nineteenth century the people of Kilimanjaro were divided into several small more-or-less independent states, among which the pat-tern of interaction was one of recurring conflict and coali-tion.[7]

The natural trend toward enlargement of scale and

[4]See Dundas, Kilimanjaro and its People, Chapter II.

[5]Every European traveler remarked on these chief-doms. Dundas reported 28 small states, of which the popula-tion varied from 1,000 to 20,000, in 1924: Kilimanjaro and its People, 50.

[6]See J. A. Hutchinson, "The Meaning of Kilimanjaro," and W. H. Whiteley, "Chagga Languages," TNR 64(March 1965): 65-67, 68.

[7]Stahl, History of the Chagga People of Kilimanjaro, details the relationships both within and among these states.

amalgamation was accelerated by colonial rule, and especially

by the policy of indirect rule instituted by Great Britain

after it replaced Germany following World War I.[8] As the

British sought local administrators they looked to the chiefs

they and their informants could identify, and the impact of

this process was in many cases to fix very fluid power rela-

tionships. That is, some chiefs whose reign was tenuous were

assisted in consolidating their power by British support,

while other relatively prominent chiefs were rendered more

open to challenge by their opponents because of lack of Brit-

ish support. Of course, this process was not one-sided.

Chief Marealle of Marangu managed to convince the Germans

that his kingdom had hegemony over most of Kilimanjaro, when

in fact it was one of the minor kingdoms, and he was even

able to manipulate German administrators into eliminating

most of his enemies.[9]

          The introduction of coffee by Catholic missionaries

[8]What was later called Tanganyika became German East
Africa in 1885-86, was occupied by the British during the
First World War, and became a British Mandated Territory un-
der the League of Nations in 1920 (and subsequently a Trust
Territory under the United Nations). For a penetrating anal-
ysis of a portion of the German period, see John Iliffe, Tan-
ganyika under German Rule 1905-1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1969). For detailed descriptions of Tan-
ganyika under British rule see B. T. G. Chidzero, Tanganyika
and International Trusteeship (London: Oxford University
Press, 1961), and J. Clagett Taylor, The Political Develop-
ment of Tanganyika (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1963).

          [9]See Stahl, History of the Chagga People of Kili-
manjaro, Chapter XIV.

at the end of the nineteenth century and its development as
a small-holder crop after World War I,[10] furthered the trend
toward amalgamation, as the organization of the collection
and transportation of the cash export crop assumed greater
importance. In recent years the development of more advanced
agricultural techniques and substantial population growth have
made land shortage a serious problem in Kilimanjaro,[11] and in
1969, after several less successful attempts, many Kilimanjaro
residents were persuaded to move to other areas of Tanzania;
the pressure on the land, however, remains severe.

Moshi town itself was a manifestation of the central-
izing impact of colonial rule. Moshi was one of the major
Chagga chiefdoms, defeated by the Germans only after fierce
resistance in 1892. But the German government, taken in by
the wily Marealle, located its capital in Marealle's Marangu.
Moshi town, on its present site, did not develop until the
German Tanga railway line was extended from Mombo to Kili-
manjaro in 1911; apparently engineering considerations dic-
tated the location of the railway terminus, some distance

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[10]See J. Kieran, "The Origins of Commercial Arabica
Coffee Production in East Africa," African Historical Stud-
ies II,1(1969):51-67.

[11]Predictions that land shortage would lead to seri-
ous political problems were common in the annual reports of
British administrators. See, for example, the Annual Report
of the District Commissioner, 1944.

down the hillside from the capital of the traditional Moshi
chiefdom. The railway terminus quickly became the central
collecting point for the transport of coffee, and Moshi town
became the administrative headquarters of the district for
both the German and the British colonial administrations.

By 1931 Moshi's[12] African population had reached only
2,561.[13] The town population did not begin to grow rapidly
until the 1950s, a period of high coffee prices: in 1948 the
town population was 8,048, in 1952, 9,079, and in 1957,
13,726.[14] Moshi town has grown much more rapidly than Kili-
manjaro District (see TABLE 2.1) and has a more heterogeneous
ethnic population than Kilimanjaro District; in 1967 the town
population was primarily African and over half Christian (see
TABLES 2.2 and 2.3). The relationship of Moshi to its rural
hinterland is perhaps much closer than is the case for other
towns of similar size in Tanzania. The major cash crop is
grown on the hillsides and eventually collected in the town.
It is common for people to come to town to work, to shop, to

[12]Both in the historical literature and even today
Moshi is used to refer to the town and to the district; in
this essay, unless otherwise noted, Moshi will refer exclu-
sively to the town, Kilimanjaro District to the administra-
tive district as defined by the current Tanzanian government,
and Kilimanjaro (without qualifier) to refer to the mountain,
its surrounding land, and the peoples living there.

[13]June 1931 Native Census, recorded in Kilimanjaro
District Book, Volume II.

[14]Censuses of 1948, 1952, and 1957, reported in Tan-
zania, Recorded Population Changes 1948-1967 Tanzania (Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer, 1968), Table 5.

TABLE 2.1 KILIMANJARO DISTRICT AND MOSHI TOWN: POPULATION

	Population			Annual Growth Rate	
	1948	1957	1967	1948-57	1957-67
Kilimanjaro District (excluding Moshi town)	259,600	351,300	473,800	3.4%	3.0%
Moshi town	8,048	13,726	26,969	3.0%	7.0%

SOURCE: Tanzania, Recorded Population Changes 1948-1967 Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968), Tables 3 and 5.

TABLE 2.2 KILIMANJARO DISTRICT AND MOSHI TOWN: ETHNIC ORIGIN

	1957				1967	
	Kilimanjaro D.		Moshi		Moshi	
	Number	Per-cent	Number	Per-cent	No.[a]	Per-cent
African	359,094	98.4	9,399	68.4	6,883	88.6
Asian[b]	4,064	1.1	3,648	26.6	589	7.6
Arab	110	0.0	74	0.5	21	0.3
European[c]	1,267	0.3	441	3.2	70	0.9
Other, NS[d]	416	0.1	164	1.2	200	2.6
TOTAL	364,951	99.9	13,726	99.9	7,763	100.0

SOURCE: East Africa High Commission, Tanganyika Population Census, 1957. Analysis of Total Population (Nairobi: mimeographed, 1958), Tables 2 and 3; and preliminary analysis of the Tanzania 1967 census, supplied by the Tanzania Central Statistical Bureau (figures for Kilimanjaro District not yet available).

[a]Refers to heads of household. Because there are no data available on the incidence of multi-ethnic households, due caution must be exercised in extrapolating these figures for the urban population as a whole.

[b]Includes those listed as Indian, Goan, and Pakistani in the 1957 census.

[c]Includes all white peoples.

[d]Includes all others in the 1957 census and those listed as Not Stated in the 1967 census.

TABLE 2.3 MOSHI TOWN: RELIGION (1967)

	Number[a]	Percent
Christian	4,153	53.5
Muslim	2,930	37.8
Other World Religion[b]	278	3.7
Local Belief[c]	108	1.4
Other	20	0.0
Not Stated	275	3.5
TOTAL	7,764	99.9%

SOURCE: Preliminary analysis of the Tanzania 1967 census, supplied by the Tanzania Central Statistical Bureau.

[a]Refers to heads of household. Because there are no data available on the incidence of multi-religious households, due caution must be exercised in extrapolating these figures to the urban population as a whole.

[b]For example, Hindus.

[c]Independent, though non-systematic, observation indicates this figure may be understated, suggesting a tendency to report to census enumerators an affiliation with Christianity or Islam, regardless of actual belief or practice.

transact business, and then return to the hillsides each evening. Prosperous Kilimanjaro residents build their substantial homes on the hillsides and take pride in returning to them each evening. Most leading urban political figures consider themselves Chagga, and the Chagga peoples consider Moshi their town.

HISTORICAL SURVEY: DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN POLITICS

Since the arrival of the colonial powers, politics in Kilimanjaro has revolved around attempts to exercise control over local development and to minimize government

interference. As well, the continuing struggle for advantage, defined differently over time, among the small Chagga states has been a major framework for political conflict. That is, conflicts were rooted in disputes about the control of land, the control of coffee, and the control of the Chagga states, but the manifestation of the conflict depended on the nature of the colonial political system, only partially under local control.

Anti-government agitation developed in the late 1920s and 1930s, centered in the coffee growers' associations.[15] The Kilimanjaro Native Planters' Association and later the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union provided the first and for a time the only mountain-wide forum for the discussion of Chagga problems and interests and were led by men who were at the time the most highly educated and articulate farmers from throughout the district and who placed themselves firmly in opposition to the chiefs. Reforms in local government intro-duced by the British Tanganyika administration after World War II increased the authority of the divisional chiefs[16] and

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[15]In other areas of Tanganyika as well, growers' asso-ciations became the centers of opposition to the chiefs. See John Iliffe, "The Age of Improvement and Differentiation (1907-45)," p. 137, in I. N. Kimambo and A. J. Temu, editors, A His-tory of Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publishing House (here-after, EAPH), 1969).

[16]The more than thirty Chagga states were organized into three divisions; a hierarchy of chiefs was thus established, with the divisional chief superior to the area chiefs within his division. While this structure had traditional precedents in some areas, in others it forced some of the chiefs to sub-ordinate themselves to chiefs they had previously taken to be their co-equals.

at the same time began to undercut their position by intro-

ducing commoners into the various councils established and

by making the chiefs more and more responsible for the im-

plementation of government policy. This superstructure of

chiefs-as-native-authorities, nurtured by the British admin-

istration, soon came to bear the brunt of the discontent of

the Chagga, a discontent largely engendered by the vagaries

of coffee prices and the increasing land shortage and rein-

forced by the realization that local people were less and

less able to control the behavior of their own leaders.

Elders and clan leaders looked back to a more democratic

past when chiefs were more subject to their influence, while

young modernizers chafed under chiefly rule and looked for-

ward to a more democratic future.

In the late 1940s opposition to the divisional chiefs

began to coalesce--a coalition that included some of the

leaders of the anti-government agitation of the 1930s, some

traditional leaders (lesser chiefs, clan heads) disturbed

and threatened by the increased power of the divisional

chiefs, and some younger, educated individuals determined to

seek more rapid modernization for their people. This coali-

tion, organized in the form of a Chagga political party, was

able to boycott some local elections in Kilimanjaro and

prevail in others.[17] By the early 1950s it was successful in securing the selection of a paramount chief as a means of reducing the power of the divisional chiefs and as an attempt to assert the Chagga interest in Tanganyikan politics. The paramount chief who was elected, a colonial civil servant, combined royal blood, modern education, and a westernized

[17]The intracacies of party politics in Kilimanjaro in the 1940s and 1950s have yet to be adequately sorted out. Parties, plagued by leadership conflicts and often attempting to battle on two levels (the local and the national) simultaneously appeared, disappeared, and reappeared with astounding rapidity. The party that led the struggle against the divisional chiefs was called the Kilimanjaro Union (KU), but apparently the KU was reorganized as a proto-national body, and its leaders considered the Arusha and Meru political organizations to be branches of the KU. The Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union (KCCU), nominally the Kilimanjaro branch of the KU but hardly distinct from it, carried on the struggle for the paramount chief. An early political leader, Joseph Kimalando, who had been active in the Kilimanjaro branches of the African Association and the Tanganyika African Association (TAA) formed the Chagga Congress (CC) to oppose the KU-KCCU; the CC had the support of the chiefs, at least to the extent that it opposed KCCU attempts to reduce their power. After the election of the paramount chief, the CC was absorbed into the KCCU. As the anti-paramountcy campaign developed, the KCCU, formerly the militant organization promoting radical change, became a conservative organization oriented toward preserving the status quo. The Chagga Democratic Party (CDP) was formed in the late 1950s to oppose the paramount chief, and the Chagga Progressive Party, in membership a rebirth of the by then defunct KCCU, was created to counter the CDP. The CDP was successful and was ultimately absorbed into the Kilimanjaro branch of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Kimalando, who was ousted from TANU in 1956, attempted to start another TAA branch in Moshi. During this process there was also a Chagga Association, a vehicle for the chiefs and at the same time, with branches in other areas of Tanganyika, an organizational form for Chagga nationalism and welfare activities outside of Kilimanjaro. (This very brief summary, which owes much to the research of Susan Rogers, does of course not do justice to the richness and fullness of Kilimanjaro party politics during this period.)

life style. He seemed ideally suited to provide the image

for and lead a wave of Chagga nationalism that would bring

together the disparate elements of Kilimanjaro and that would

at the same time secure a substantial role for the advanced

and developed Chagga peoples in Tanganyikan politics.[18]

Thus, from the 1920s to the 1950s basic conflicts over

fundamental allocations in Kilimanjaro--who would benefit from

the new cash crop and the modernization, including education,

that went along with it--focused on the chiefs. As the young

political activists probed to determine where authority actu-

ally lay, some correctly recognized that it lay in Dar es

Salaam, but British policy forced political contests inward

among the leadership battles and profusion of parties in Kili-

manjaro. Chagga political parties, of which there were many,

were a secondary variable. That is, there was a set of lead-

ers and supporting networks, each vying for advantage, and

each ready to form a party, to join a party, or to disband

a party, as the strategy might dictate.

In the politicized atmosphere of the terminal period

of British rule there developed a substantial Chagga nation-

alism, manifested in the pomp and ceremony of the paramount

chief, and in the institution of a Chagga flag, a Chagga an-

them, and an annual Chagga holiday. That is not to say that

[18]On this point see Kathleen M. Stahl, "The Chagga,"
in P. H. Gulliver, editor, Tradition and Transition in East
Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969),
211-212 and 216-220.

the numerous Chagga states, and the recurring conflicts among them, had disappeared, but to suggest that as it became clear that the relevant political arena was to be all of Tanganyika, a sense of cultural, and political, unity emerged among the Chagga-speaking peoples, and that the battles over the paramount chiefship fostered that emergent unity. At the same time branches of a Chagga tribal association were established in other areas of Tanganyika, and, encouraged by the paramount chief, it celebrated the Chagga holiday and venerated Chagga symbols, as well as provided welfare services for the numerous Chagga peoples living outside of Kilimanjaro.[19]

Before long, however, important elements of the coalition that had secured the selection of a paramount chief began to realize that their grievances against the divisional chiefs, especially their dissatisfaction with decisions essentially made in Dar es Salaam and their complaints of abuses of authority, applied as well to the paramount chief, all the more so because he relied heavily on the divisional chiefs in order to govern. An anti-paramount coalition then began to develop, again including some people with long backgrounds of

[19]The development of tribal welfare associations was of course common throughout Africa at this period; for an overview of the situation, see Immanual Wallerstein, "Voluntary Associations," in James S. Coleman and Carl Rosberg, Jr., editors, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964). Henry Bienen stresses the role of tribal organizations in the development of modern politics in Tanganyika; see Tanzania: Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, revised edition, 1970), 25.

anti-government agitation, some traditional leaders unhappy

with the loss of autonomy by the small Chagga states, and some

younger, more educated modernizers. A new realignment of

Chagga political parties took place, now organized to support

and oppose the replacement of the paramount chief with an

elected president. By the late 1950s the anti-paramount

coalition was successful in eliminating the paramountcy,[20]

and much of this coalition which had formed the nucleus of

the Tanganyika African National Union[21] organization in Kili-

manjaro since the middle 1950s, was absorbed into TANU after

independence. Because the paramountcy was a local issue, and

because only a party and leaders with clearly a local base

could oppose it, the local TANU organization was not utilized

as the major vehicle of the anti-paramountcy coalition.[22]

[20]There is no single comprehensive summary of this
conflict, and most sources focus on the parties, rather than
the issues, involved. An exception is Basil P. Mramba, "Some
Notes on the Political Development of the Chagga of Kiliman-
jaro." For the government's view of the election of the
paramount, see P. H. Johnston (a Tanganyika District Officer),
"Chagga Constitutional Development," Journal of African Ad-
ministration V;3(July 1953):134-140.

[21]For the history of TANU, see Bienen, Tanzania: Party
Transformation, Kimambo and Temu, A History of Tanzania, and Li-
onel Cliffe, editor, One Party Democracy (Nairobi: EAPH, 1967).

[22]The leader of the successful anti-paramountcy ef-
fort, who had previously served in the Legislative Council
and subsequently became a Minister in the independent Tan-
ganyika government, told me that this strategy had the full
support of the TANU leadership. He indicated that TANU's
President, Julius K. Nyerere, did not want TANU to dissipate
its energies at that point by involving it formally in the
Kilimanjaro paramountcy struggle and at the same time wanted
a successful example of the rejection of chiefship by the lo-
cal people concerned.

One major theme of politics in Kilimanjaro in the period immediately prior to independence was the focus on local issues and problems. Although Kilimanjaro leaders clearly recognized the links between national and local politics, and although they repeatedly attempted to join the two in their own struggles, the thrust of British policy and the fierce competition over allocations within Kilimanjaro combined to restrict the scope of Chagga politics to Kilimanjaro district. Even as TANU began to establish firm footholds throughout Tanganyika in the late 1950s, what was to become TANU in Kilimanjaro was still concerned with a local issue--paramountcy--which it fought as a Chagga party and not as a local TANU branch.

A second theme was the progressive reduction in the authority and autonomy of the chiefs during the colonial period. The local autonomous chiefships had not long replaced clan organization when the colonial powers arrived, and colonial policy, even indirect rule, undercut the chiefs' ability to establish a strong traditional legitimacy. As the British made the chiefs powerful by vesting them with the authority of the government, they removed their claims to traditional legitimacy (chiefs were appointed, and the spiritual role of the chiefs was discouraged) and imposed on them the antagonism to government programs. By the time of

independence in 1961, although some chiefs continued to re-tain power in their local areas, the commoners had prevailed and chiefship as an institution was clearly on the decline. In fact, chiefship developed and was eliminated in a very short period in Kilimanjaro, and it may be that the institution of chiefship never really became firmly established. That is, chiefs were little able to consolidate their reigns during the period of conquest and coalition, those who did remain suffered the burden of serving as governmental agents during the colonial period, and they could not withstand the popular tide of the post World War II period. The former chiefs played little discernible role in Kilimanjaro politics after independence.[23]

A third theme was the proliferation of informal alliances and formal party organizations. Individuals allied, competed, re-allied, then competed again. At one point the Kilimanjaro District Commissioner, whose reports indicated that the colonial government at times had difficulty distinguishing among the major Kilimanjaro parties, was unable to

[23]The relative ease with which the chiefs were defeated in Kilimanjaro is perhaps atypical in Tanzanian history. Norman M. Miller details the ways in which traditional leaders among the Nyamwezi were able to redefine their roles and thus retain power after independence; see "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership," Journal of Modern African Studies (hereafter, JMAS) 6,2(August 1968): 183-201. Goran Hyden discusses the persistence of the traditional nyarubanja land-holding system and of traditional leaders in Buhaya after independence; see Political Development in Rural Tanzania (Nairobi: EAPH, 1969 reprint of the 1968 edition published in Sweden).

resolve an acrid dispute among three parties, one an off-
shoot of another, over which was the legitimate successor to
an earlier party and thus entitled to its bank account.
Change was so rapid that only if party labels were clearly
dated were they useful in sorting out the major participants.

A fourth theme was the enduring nature of the con-
flict among the small Chagga states. Much of the pre-
independence conflict was expressed in terms of one part of
the mountain against another. The victory of the anti-
paramountcy coalition in 1960 marked a shift from Marangu
dominance, first established when Marealle convinced the Ger-
mans he was the most powerful of the Chagga chiefs, subse-
quently overturned by British support for Chief Abdiel of
Machame and then returned with the election of a paramount
chief from Marangu, back to Machame dominance in Kilimanjaro
politics. This pattern of conflict among the former Chagga
states, now reinforced by religious cleavages since mission-
ary penetration in each of the Chagga states was limited to
one of the two major religious groups, manifests itself even
today in local contests for allocation of resources.

HISTORICAL SURVEY: LEADERSHIP CHANGES

The antagonism and indifference of the chiefly lead-
ership, coupled with the local orientation of the fight to
reduce the power of the Kilimanjaro chiefs, impeded TANU's
penetration into rural Kilimanjaro in the 1950s. As a

result, TANU concentrated at first on establishing itself in Moshi town, where it could secure support from urbanized Chagga and the urban Muslim population.[24]

This is not to suggest that TANU was not active in the rural areas. The first TANU branch in rural Kilimanjaro was established in West Hai (Machame) by three brothers, of whom one was the first chairman of the rural branch, one is current chairman of the rural district, and one served as a Member of the Legislative Council, as President of the Chagga, and as a Member of Parliament and a Minister in independent Tanzania. This Machame origin for TANU in Kilimanjaro was a natural outgrowth of local hostility to Marangu and the paramount chief, and the combination of the TANU activists with Machame's Chief Abdiel proved to be a powerful opposition to the paramount chief.[25] TANU's strength in Kilimanjaro was demonstrated in its sweep of the 1958 Legislative Council elections, when all three TANU candidates, even the Asian and European candidates who were not actually members of TANU, had more than twice as many votes as their closest opponents (see TABLE 2.4). But at least until the elimination of the

[24]Mramba, "Some Notes on the Political Development of the Chagga of Kilimanjaro," stresses the Muslim support, p. 15, but it is important to note that many of the urban Muslim TANU leaders, including the first town chairman, were Chagga. That is, from the beginning TANU was led by local people, not by recent immigrants to Kilimanjaro.

[25]On this point see Stahl, "The Chagga," 219.

TABLE 2.4   LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTION RESULTS, SEPTEMBER
            1958, NORTHERN PROVINCE[a]

Candidates[b]	Affiliation	Votes
Africans		
S. N. Eliufoo	TANU	3,348
S. K. George	Independent	1,275
Asians		
S. Mustafa	TANU	2,248
H. K. Virani	Independent	864
M. Sharif	Independent	682
N. M. Mehta	Independent	660
D. Behal	Independent	169
Europeans		
D. N. M. Bryceson	TANU	3,300
J. M. Hunter	Independent	1,323

SOURCE: E. B. M. Barongo, Mkiki Mkiki wa Siasa Tan-
        ganyika (Nairobi: East African Literature
        Bureau, 1966), 104.

[a]Northern Province included the current-day Arusha
Region and Kilimanjaro District.

[b]According to the "multiracial" electoral system,
voters were required to vote for one candidate in each of
the three racial groups.

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paramountcy in 1960, and even beyond, the primary focus of

Kilimanjaro politics was local and not directly nationalist

in orientation.[26]

TANU developed strong support in town, but during

the late 1950s and early 1960s the party urban leadership

[26]This point is made by A. J. Temu, "The Rise and
Triumph of Nationalism," p. 197, in Kimambo and Temu, A His-
tory of Tanzania, and by Basil P. Mramba, "Kilimanjaro:
Localism and Nationalism," Chapter 5 in Cliffe, One Party
Democracy.

was charged with complicity in anti-TANU activity during the
1958 Legislative Council elections,[27] with mismanagement of
party affairs, and with peculation of party funds. By 1964
the town branch had had four different chairmen, and when the
town was constituted as a separate district (for TANU pur-
poses) in 1965, a non-Chagga former civil servant was elected
Chairman.

In the drive for independence TANU led a broad na-
tional movement willing to welcome anyone prepared to fight
the colonial government.[28] After the sweeping TANU victories
in the Legislative Council elections of 1958-59 it was clear
that only TANU could govern in Tanganyika, and many likewarm
party supporters, even some opponents, began to take out
party cards. As TANU's leaders began to redefine the party's
goals after independence had been secured, as they began to
develop specific content to party policy, it became clear
that the alliance of mutual antagonisms and of contradictory
utopias in Kilimanjaro (and throughout the country) could not

[27]The European and Asian candidates selected by TANU
headquarters to run in the Northern Province were largely
unknown in Kilimanjaro; spurious posters appeared, picturing
individuals rejected by the party as the TANU candidates.
For a very personal account by one of the candidates, see
Sophia Mustafa, The Tanganyika Way (Dar es Salaam: East
African Literature Bureau, 1961).

[28]On this point see George Bennett, "An Outline His-
tory of TANU," Makerere Journal 7(1963):26.

endure. As well, a growing discontent with the self-aggrandizing behavior of some of TANU's early leaders made the leadership alliance even more tenuous. Opponents of the leadership coalition in Kilimanjaro were far from silent.

A third major change in the Kilimanjaro political leadership (now the TANU leadership) took place in 1962-1965.[29] Almost simultaneously the former District Commissioner was replaced by the new Area Commissioner--a political appointee who also served as party secretary, and a new chairman, of both the local council and the district party, was elected. Tension developed between them over the importance and authority of their respective roles, culminating in a request by the Kilimanjaro District Council for a meeting with the Minister for Local Government to criticize the Area Commissioner. The Council was rebuked by the Minister for not having made its complaints to its proper officer, the Regional Commissioner, and many of its key Chagga officials were replaced, among them its Executive Officer, who was succeeded by a non-Chagga.[30]

Shortly thereafter, the tension among the leadership

[29]The first major leadership change took place during the battle to create a paramount chief and the second during the successful struggle to eliminate the paramountcy.

[30]For a discussion of this conflict, see Mramba, "Some Notes on the Political Development of the Chagga of Kilimanjaro," 15-17. See also William Tordoff, "Regional Administration in Tanganyika," Conference Papers of the East African Institute for Social Research (Kampala, 1964).

manifested itself in conflicts between party and government
officials and members of the newly elected Council. In July
of 1963, while in much of the country TANU candidates for
local council seats had been returned unopposed, in Kilima-
njaro almost a quarter of the councillors elected were inde-
pendents, with the result that the TANU councillors`formed an
Elected Members Organization to caucus before Council meet-
ings.[31]

In 1965 the Regional Chairman, who had also served as
party District Chairman and as Chairman of the Moshi Town
Council and who was then the President of the Kilimanjaro Na-
tive Cooperative Union (KNCU), was defeated in his bid for
reelection by a primary school teacher. These party elec-
tions, together with the parliamentary elections in the same
year,[32] provided another opportunity for realignment among
the political leadership, with the result that several of the
most prominent early party leaders no longer held party of-
fice.

[31]See William Tordoff, Government and Politics in
Tanzania (Nairobi: EAPH, 1967), 115.

[32]For an extensive analysis of the 1965 parliamen-
tary elections in Kilimanjaro see Mramba, "Kilimanjaro: Lo-
calism and Nationalism." Mramba stresses the local orienta-
tion of these contests for national office. It should be
noted as well, however, that the nature of the electoral
system--which admitted to candidacy only individuals who
firmly supported TANU policies--required that competition
between candidates be over local issues.

Although it is of course too soon to comment with any certainty, the elections of 1969 seemed to presage a new realignment, a fourth major leadership change in Kilimanjaro. The new TANU leaders were not able to wrest control of the KNCU until 1962,[33] and the leaders elected then, although removed from party office in the early 1960s, were replaced in the KNCU only in 1969, when management difficulties enabled long-standing opponents of the KNCU President to win enough allies to defeat him. Mismanagement of KNCU affairs, which had led to the replacement of the Manager by a Ministry official seconded from Dar es Salaam, had undermined the former President's position. The same group that had been instrumental in his defeat as party chairman in 1965 was able to secure the cooperation of primary society leaders from the less prosperous, less developed, and largely Catholic eastern side of the mountain by agreeing to support the MP, a Catholic, who represented that part of the mountain, for the presidency. But it seems clear that the alliance is a

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[33]There is, unfortunately, no good study of the history of the KNCU. Important documents drawn from Tanzania's National Archives relating to the KNCU and its predecessor, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association can be found in Agriculture and Politics in Kilimanjaro, a collection organized and mimeographed by I. N. Kimambo for teaching purposes at University College, Dar es Salaam, 1969. The KNCU minutes for the meeting at which the leadership changes took place say only that "The whole list of previous members of the managing committee was overthrown . . ." and that "Many of the Senior Staff members also resigned. . . ." See Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union, Thirty First Annual Report 1962-1963 (Moshi 1966), 3.

tenuous one, founded only on removing the former leadership.
The expected resignation of the new President, who has taken
a post in Dar es Salaam, may provide an opportunity for each
of the major elements of the alliance to attempt to assert
its dominance.

In the 1969 party elections the Regional Chairman and
the rural District Chairman were reelected, but they both de-
feated weak opponents, and the latter, running against a dis-
credited former chairman at the time involved in an ugly
court case, was able to win by only a modest margin. At the
1969 TANU National Annual Conference the Member of the Na-
tional Executive Committee for Kilimanjaro Region was opposed
by almost the entire Kilimanjaro delegation and was reelected
only on the basis of his support outside of Kilimanjaro. His
opponent, an unknown in national politics, did surprisingly
well. All of this suggests that Kilimanjaro party members,
encouraged by the openness of the TANU one-party system,
mounted a strong challenge against the current party leaders
and began to develop a foundation for a set of alliances in
support of new leaders. That, coupled with local leaders'
at times less than wholehearted support of national policies
and with the assessment by party officials posted from the
center that Kilimanjaro party leaders are not fully committed
to party policy, suggests a new turnover in the political
leadership may be in the offing. The urban TANU Chairman,
arguing that the pressure of his job some 15 miles from town

prevented him from being an active party leader, declined to stand for reelection,[34] and was succeeded by an individual who had a long history of party activity, but who, as a Muslim and a Pare, had not been involved in the mainstream of Chagga politics. The 1970 Parliamentary elections seem to have been another step in the realignment of forces among the political leadership in Kilimanjaro—both the District and Regional Chairmen were defeated in their bids for Parliamentary seats (the former, running for the seat previously held by his brother, was outpolled 8-1 by his opponent), as were the President and the Vice-President of the KNCU.

Finally, it should be mentioned that during the course of 1969 the Kilimanjaro Regional Commissioner and Area Commissioner, both former civil servants,[35] were replaced by younger men with extensive managerial experience in cooperatives and business. Although of course it is too soon to draw any generalizations from their behavior, their appointment,

[34]The former Chairman was shortly thereafter convicted of accepting a bribe, in connection with his job (and not his political activity). The case was a complex one, in which personal animosity toward the former Chairman, who had replaced a European in a high position in a European-managed plantation, and whose salary was more than twice that of the Regional Chairman and Members of Parliament, played no small part. Prior to the arrest of the former Chairman, there were rumors, which he himself would not deny, that he intended to run for Parliament in 1970.

[35]A long-time, strong-arm-style politician, transferred from another region after a conflict with the Members of Parliament there, also served briefly as Regional Commissioner in Kilimanjaro during 1969.

which came at a time when a large number of commissioners
were replaced throughout the country, may indicate a need
both to weed out leaders less than fully committed to party
policy and to find leaders who combine the managerial and ad-
ministrative skills necessary to oversee development schemes
with an informed commitment to national policy.[36]

In summary, 1958 was a critical year in Tanzanian
history, and it marked the success of the attempts to join
local and national politics in Kilimanjaro. TANU's sweeping
electoral victories demonstrated for all to see that, short
of outright and large-scale suppression of opposition, and
the indications were that even that would have proved fruit-
less, colonial rule was in its terminal phase and Tanganyika
would see independence under a TANU government. In Kilima-
njaro, the leaders of the anti-paramountcy struggle paused
long enough to ensure the victory of the TANU Legislative
Council candidates. But not until the victory over the para-
mount chief in 1960 could national politics begin to occupy
center stage in Kilimanjaro. In an atmosphere of intra-
party conflict and anti-party feeling, a major turnover in
the political leadership of Kilimanjaro took place in the

[36]For a perceptive analysis of the need to replace
revolutionary with managerial elites after a modernizing
revolution--an analysis that is premature but suggestive
for the Tanzanian case, see John H. Kautsky, "Revolutionary
and Managerial Elites in Modernizing Regimes," Comparative
Politics 1,4(July 1969):441-467.

early 1960s. Party leaders committed to little more than op-
position to colonial administration were replaced with lead-
ers who more clearly supported party policy, but by the late
1960s, as party policy became increasingly better defined in
ways that seemed to threaten their (and Kilimanjaro's) priv-
ileged status, they themsleves faced substantial challenges.
At the same time, politics continued to have a very local
focus.

Yet the disparities in development among different
areas of Tanzania, at least since politics in Tanganyika be-
gan to have a national orientation, have created tension be-
tween Kilimanjaro and the rest of Tanzania. Since independence
this tension has been exacerbated by the TANU commitment to
an equalization of the level of development throughout the
country. That is, while Kilimanjaro is concerned with in-
creasing its share of national resources, especially for more
schools, hospitals, and public works, national policy is ori-
ented toward diverting some of the resources now allocated
to Kilimanjaro to other, less favored, areas of the country.
And since in the transition to independence the Chagga, be-
cause of the earlier spread of education in Kilimanjaro,
filled a disproportionately large share of the jobs left by
departing British administrators, and even among the polit-
ical leadership, as well as in the commercial sector through-
out the country, there has developed resentment against a
perceived substantial Chagga influence in national affairs.

Since government and party organization in Tanzania
cannot be reduced to a neat and clear schematic chart, a
brief word about political structures is in order here.[37]
Both government and party maintain nominally legislative and
executive institutions that parallel each other at each ef-
fective level of organization.

At the national level, there is a National TANU Con-
ference, convened at least every two years, with broad repre-
sentation from throughout the country, responsible for basic
party policy. The party executive consists of a National
Executive Committee that includes all Regional Chairmen, all
Regional Commissioners (who are party Regional Secretaries),
delegates from each region elected by the National Confer-
ence, representatives from party auxiliaries, and the Presi-
dential appointees to the Central Committee. The Central
Committee includes the major party officers, presidential
appointees, and as of 1969 individuals elected by the Na-
tional Conference. The President of the party, nominated as
the only candidate, serves as President of the country. There
is a National Assembly, of which approximately one-half the
membership is elected from mainland constituencies with the

[37]The structures outlined here are discussed in more
detail where appropriate throughout the course of this essay.
See also Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, Part II,
Cliffe, One Party Democracy, Part I, and Tordoff, Government
and Politics in Tanzania, Chapters III and IV and Appendices,
Part B (the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, which includes
the TANU Constitution).

remainder directly or indirectly selected by the President, the President of Zanzibar, the party, and/or party auxiliaries. Though functionally distinct, the overlaps between the party and the government at the national level are substantial--for example, elected MPs are delegates to the party National Conference, while Regional Commissioners sit in both the Parliament and the National Executive Committee.

The party structure at the regional level is similar to that at the national level (regional conference, regional executive committee, regional working committee). It is chaired by a locally elected Regional Chairman, and its executive consists of Regional Secretary (who is automatically the Regional Commissioner) and a Regional Executive Secretary appointed by party headquarters. The Regional Commissioner, a presidential political appointee,[38] is responsible for all governmental activity at the regional level, serves as the proper officer for district councils within the region, and chairs the Regional Development Committee. There is no governmental council at the regional level.

The party structure at the district level (for party purposes, urban areas are considered districts) parallels that at the regional level, including the tri-partite leadership (locally elected chairman, Area (District) Commissioner

[38]On the commissioners, see Bienen, _Tanzania: Party Transformation_, Chapter IV.

as District Secretary, and party-appointed District Executive

Secretary). The Area (District) Commissioner, a presiden-

tial political appointee, heads government business in the

district (note that an administrate district that includes a

town has in fact two TANU districts), and chairs the District

Development and Planning Committee. The TANU District Chair-

man automatically serves as Chairman of the District (or Town)

Council.

In urban areas there are no smaller governmental

units, while the party district is divided into branches,

which are in turn divided into cells.

Thus, while there are distinct party and governmen-

tal structures at each level, there are substantial overlaps

of personnel and responsibility.

With this abbreviated backdrop on the development of

modern politics in Kilimanjaro and overview of governmental

and party structures, let us now turn to the examination of

the politics, the politicians, and the party in Kilimanjaro.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICS OF PRIMARY EDUCATION

PRIMARY EDUCATION IN KILIMANJARO: INTRODUCTION

The critical role of education in the complex proc-
esses of change with which African states must deal is a fa-
miliar theme to students of Africa.[1] In very broad terms
education can be seen as a basic prerequisite to change--in
the development of the skills necessary to produce wealth
and of the desire to use it, in the development of widespread
literacy, essential to national leaders in their efforts to
penetrate the rural countrysides and thus to govern, and, in
a society with a strong egalitarian commitment, in the devel-
opment of values and norms that promote an equality of par-
ticipation in the nation's production and proceeds. At the
same time, education can also serve to nurture and perpetuate
societal cleavages and to permit some in the society to de-
velop and protect a favored position. In individual terms,
education, and often only education, can provide access to
the good life--job, wealth, security, comfort, prestige.

[1]For useful introductions to the literature on educa-
tion and development, see James S. Coleman, editor, Education
and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1965), and L. Gray Cowan, James O'Connell, and David
G. Scanlon, editors, Education and Nation-Building in Africa
(New York: Praeger, 1965).

It is with this latter that we are concerned here, with education as the individual's key to entrance into the life he desires. In Tanzania, as in much of the world, an individual's ability to secure the job he seeks, to become wealthy, to provide for his children, and to be a man of prestige in his community, depends to a very large degree on his education. For those who were educated during the colonial period, the colonial education system

> taught them that the single road of escape from forced labor, head taxes, relocation, long sessions of work with little return; and the one path to good houses, shirts and pants, bicycles, shoes, the city and money was the certificate of education. It was the sole means of breaking out of the oppressive confinement of peasant life into the glorious existence of the bourgeoisie.[2]

And despite concerted attempts by Tanzania's leaders to alter this situation, ". . . the rewards of the system still go to the educated."[3] As education expands and reaches more of the population, and as Tanzania continues to build a society in which advancement depends on individual achievement, the importance of education as a key to success will increase. Even now, for a young person to secure a job in town with a salary that permits a tolerable standard of living in the urban conditions, at least a primary education is necessary. And even now, individuals with some primary education

[2]Jane and Idrian Resnick, "Tanzania educates for a new society," _Africa Report_ 16,1(January 1971):26.

[3]Jane and Idrian Resnick, "Tanzania educates," 28.

experience difficulties in finding employment. In fact, the
majority of primary school graduates--in a system in which
until very recently it was assumed that all students would
enter the cash economy in salaried employment--have no pros-
pects of obtaining paid employment.[4] Thus, the determination
of who gets an education, and how good an education, is an
important, perhaps the most important, allocation of resources
in the local political system.

In this section primary education is examined as a
key political issue in Moshi. The conflicts over the pro-
vision of primary education form an issue-area that is sali-
ent, that has substantial impact on the ordinary lives of
the people, that can fundamentally affect the nature of re-
cruitment to leadership roles, and in which at least some of
the key decisions are accessible locally. The discussion will
focus on primary education, since although secondary education
is both salient and a focus for conflict, most of the decisions
about secondary education are removed from the local arena.
Because conflicts over educational decisions cross urban-
rural boundaries, this analysis will draw on data from both
Moshi town and Kilimanjaro rural district.

PRIMARY EDUCATION IN KILIMANJARO: HISTORY
During the nineteenth century Christian missionaries

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[4]Idrian N. Resnick, editor, Tanzania: Revolution by
Education (Arusha, Tanzania: Longmans, 1968), 8.

were attracted to the snows of Kilimanjaro and, more impor-
tant, to the pleasant climate of the hillsides. The Leipzig
Lutheran Mission, which succeeded the British Church Mission-
ary Society in German East Africa in 1893, opened mission
stations throughout the district. At about the same time,
the Holy Ghost Fathers established themselves in Kilimanjaro,
at Kilema, in 1890.[5]

Both the Lutherans and the Catholics began opening
schools almost as soon as they arrived. Although the Luther-
ans followed a pattern of opening schools for the children
of the faithful while the Catholics opened schools first
and used them as a means to encourage conversion,[6] both mis-
sions clearly saw education as a fundamental tool in the prop-
agation of the faith.[7] Since it was not until after World
War II that the British colonial government in Tanganyika
was willing to devote more than token resources to educa-
tion, schools, and thus educational content, were largely

[5]For a summary of early missionary involvement in
the development of education in Kilimanjaro, see G. N. Shann,
"The Early Development of Education Among the Chagga," TNR
45(December 1956):21-32.

[6]For this distinction, see Shann, "The Early Devel-
opment of Education Among the Chagga," 27-28.

[7]For an overview of ecclesiastical involvement in
African education, see David G. Scanlon, editor, Church,
State, and Education in Africa (New York: Teachers College
Press, 1966).

controlled by the missions.[8]

Until the time of the British Mandate, after the War of 1914-1918, the missions were given free land in many of the Chagga chiefdoms. Chiefs saw that missionaries could be useful allies in their battles with other chiefs, and with the colonial power, and for the most part welcomed them. But the pattern of missionary settlement was such that only one of the two major missions became established in each chief-dom. That is, due both to the colonial administration's attempts to develop missionary spheres of influence and to the nature of the alliances between the missionaries and the Chagga chiefs, there developed a checkerboard of religious influence, with each religion dominant and unchallenged in its own areas, a pattern that has proved so durable that today, even though communication among the former Chagga states has been facilitated by modern roads, bridges, and now telephones, religious cleavages continues to coincide with geographic divisions and remain powerful influences in local politics.

The peoples of Kilimanjaro early recognized the value

[8]Government expenditure on African education had reached only ₤ 94,500, 4% of total expenditures, by 1938; see Hugh W. Stephens, The Political Transformation of Tanganyika: 1920-67 (New York: Praeger, 1968), 89. In 1914, for example, there were 2,500 government primary schools with an enrollment of 3,700, while some 1,800 mission schools had an enrollment of 110,000 in the same year; see J. P. Moffett, editor, Handbook of Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, second edition, 1958), 365.

to them of the European education brought by the mission-
aries, and the missions, spurred by competition for alle-
giance, opened schools across the mountain. By 1889 the
Lutherans had 170 pupils enrolled in their schools, and by
1914 Lutheran schools numbered 97 with an enrollment of over
8,000. In 1892-93 the Catholics had 87 pupils at Kilema, and
by 1914 the Catholics had opened 150 schools with an enroll-
ment of 16,000.[9] By contrast, in 1969 fewer than 10,000 pu-
pils were enrolled in government schools in Kilimanjaro. Ed-
ucation continued to expand rapidly, so that despite the in-
terruptions of the two wars, there were some 14,000 pupils in
Kilimanjaro schools in 1947, 23,000 by 1951, and close to
30,000 by 1956. Throughout this period Kilimanjaro residents
benefited from a clear advantage over other Tanganyikans in

[9]For the statistics on Lutheran schools, see Shann,
"The Early Development of Education Among the Chagga," 21,
who cites mission records; and Anza Amen Lema, "The Lutheran
Church's Contribution to Education in Kilimanjaro," TNR 68
(February 1968):91. For statistics on Catholic schools,
see Shann, "The Early Development of Education Among the
Chagga," 28-29; and J. Kieran, "The Origins of Commercial
Arabica Coffee Production in East Africa," 51-67, who cites
mission records.

access to schools.[10] The enrollment statistics for 1968, which

show that more than three-quarters of the primary school pu-

pils in Kilimanjaro attended mission-managed schools, clearly

indicate the continued mission role in education (see TABLE

3.1).   That is, in Kilimanjaro, as in the rest of Tanzania,

because the missions could build, maintain, and run schools

more economically than could either the government or the lo-

cal authorities, this pattern of government dependence on, and

support of, mission-run schools was a fundamental characteris-

tic of the educational system at the primary level.[11] There

has developed an interdependence in the provision of educa-

tion, both church and state aware of, and at times unhappy

with, the need for the other's assistance, but both reluctant

and perhaps unable to alter the existing relationship.[12]

[10]Figures for 1947 from Tanzanian National Archives,
hereafter cited as TNA, 5/47/14; for 1951 from TNA 69/63/20;
and for 1956 from TNA 5/47/14.   In 1947 while Kilimanjaro pop-
ulation was approximately 3.5% of the total Tanganyikan popu-
lation, pupils' in Kilimanjaro schools represented approximate-
ly 12.6% of the total school population; the corresponding
figures for 1956 were 4.2% and 8.7% respectively (figures on
school population in 1947 and 1956 supplied by the British
Government to the UN Visiting Mission in 1958, UN Document
T/1401:64).   The British government estimated that 62% of the
children in Kilimanjaro were in school in 1951, compared to
15.5% of all Tanganyikan children in 1947 and 30% in 1953
(estimate supplied to UN Visiting Mission in 1954, UN Docu-
ment T/1169:4).

[11]On this point, see J. Cameron and W. A. Dodd, So-
ciety, Schools and Progress in Tanzania (Oxford: Pergamon
Press, 1970), 114.

[12]David Abernethy makes a similar point for the church-
state relationship in the provision of education in Nigeria;
see "Nigeria" in Scanlon, Church, State, and Education in
Africa, 240.

TABLE 3.1 KILIMANJARO DISTRICT ASSISTED PRIMARY SCHOOLS AND
ENROLLMENT, 1968, BY AGENCY (Moshi Urban and
Kilimanjaro Rural)[a]

AGENCY	SCHOOLS		ENROLLMENT	
	NUM-BER	PER-CENT	NUM-BER	PER-CENT
Central government	5	2[b]	616	1[c]
Local councils	36	14	9,019	15
Moshi Town Council				
Kilimanjaro District C.				
Lutheran (LCNT)	78	30	17,267	29
Catholic (HGF)	125	48	28,963	48
Muslim (MA)	13	5	2,758	5
Others[d]	4	2	900	2
TOTAL	261	101%	59,623	100%

SOURCE: District Education Office, Kilimanjaro District

[a]Note that this table refers to assisted primary
schools. If unassisted schools were included, the mission
role would be even greater.

[b]That is, 2% of all schools in Kilimanjaro District
are managed by the central government.

[c]That is, 1% of all pupils in Kilimanjaro District
are enrolled in schools managed by the central government.

[d]Includes Ismaili schools. There are some discrep-
ancies in the figures of the District Education Office; the
total number of pupils may be slightly greater than that
shown here.

As will be seen, the missions are able to maintain

this dominant role in primary education in Kilimanjaro through

a combination of almost exclusive access to the information

necessary to run the schools, retention of much of the ini-

tiative in the development of new schools, and functional

control over most of the schools now in existence. In this

respect, the dependence of the Tanzania government on the

missions to provide both the information and the resources

necessary to run primary schools insures the continued mis-

sion influence in educational decisions.

Over time, of course, the missions have been local-

ized and Africanized. Although it is impossible to deter-

mine the extent of external influence in local church deci-

sions, it is clear that by the 1960s the voluntary agencies,

as church groups are called in Tanzania, had become indige-

nous rather than expatriate institutions, and that as local

rather than foreign interest groups they had become all the

more closely involved in the local political process. Both

the Lutheran and Catholic bishops in Kilimanjaro in 1968

had been born and raised on the mountain.

PRIMARY EDUCATION IN KILIMANJARO: THE SETTING

Conflicts over who gets schools, and who gets into

them, have been a feature of Kilimanjaro life since the pol-

itics of interest groups and elections replaced warfare among

the chiefs. As education rapidly expanded in the 1920s it

created a demand for further education, a demand at first

resisted by the missions. After all, the missions were pri-

marily interested in conversion, and, at least at that time,

largely saw education as a vehicle for the propagation of

the faith. They did not regard education as their basic

responsibility, and although locally educated faithful were important in the conversion of other local residents, a widely-extended post-primary secular education could nurture an elite that would grow distant from its tribal origins and that could become critical of its religious teaching. This conflict became especially bitter in Kilimanjaro in the 1940s when the Chiefs attempted to get control of education from the missions and transfer it to the Native Authority (the Chiefs), even at Native Authority expense.[13] In 1944 the Chagga Council of Chiefs assessed a Shs. 2/- levy on each taxpayer for educational purposes. The intention of this levy was to abolish fees for primary education, and in fact the Native Authority absorbed some of the cost of primary education. Although the missions retained their dominant role in primary education, this initiative by the Chagga Chiefs was clearly an attempt to localize and integrate the schools, to make them less the property of a foreign body or of a particular section of the community.[14]

This pattern--initiative in developing schools by the missions, followed by demands for, and some seizure of, control by the local government--has recurred in Kilimanjaro,

[13]John Iliffe, "The Age of Improvement and Differentiation," 133, supports this interpretation.

[14]On this initiative see Nevil Shann, "The Educational Development of the Chagga Tribe," Oversea Education XXVI,2(July 1954):58 and Cameron and Dodd, Societies, Schools and Progress in Tanzania, 67-68.

with the result that initiative remains in the hands of the
churches, and when the burden becomes too great for them, the
burden is shifted to the local government, saddling it with
such enormous operating expenses that the missions are able
to retain the initiative by having a monopoly on the only re-
sources readily available for new development.

At independence Tanganyika found itself with an im-
mediate need for trained manpower and a paucity of schools.
Much of the modest educational expenditure made by the colo-
nial government was directed into schools for the children
of colonial civil servants and chiefs. At independence Tan-
ganyikans were encouraged by the government, and by TANU, to
embark on self-help schemes to construct their own schools.
In Kilimanjaro, this call met an enthusiastic response, and
schools, constructed out of local materials by the parents
of the neighborhood, sprang up all over the district. In 10
years, primary school enrollment in Kilimanjaro doubled: from
close to 30,000 in 1956, to 35,000 in 1963, to almost 61,000
in 1966.[15] But although parents built their own schools,
they could not operate them, and were dependent on the mis-
sions and on the government to provide teachers and materials,
and to meet recurrent expenditures. The burden became too
great for the missions, and the Kilimanjaro District Council

[15]Figures for 1963 and 1966, as well as all other edu-
cational statistics for 1961-1969, unless otherwise noted, are
from the District Education Office, Kilimanjaro District.

(the successor to the Chagga Council) was pressured to assume
responsibility for most of these self-help schools.

At the same time the government was encouraging par-
ents to build their own schools, it decided to shift basic
responsibility for primary education from the central to the
local (district) government. One of the major purposes of
this shift of responsibility was to divert political pres-
sure on the central government to provide more primary schools
to lower levels of government, since the provision of univer-
sal free education was not then possible and would not be for
a long time. In shifting responsibility to local government,
the central government restricted its education subsidies to
include only a few new schools each year and insisted that
local government units open new schools and expand existing
schools only when they could meet recurrent expenditures them-
selves. While the diversion of political pressure may have
been successful in relieving the central government of some
of the blame for the difficulty of access to education, the
net result of the diversion was to require the district coun-
cils to spend most of their funds on primary education. Since

local government income is fixed by the central government,[16] heavy educational expenses leave little money in the district budget for other expenditures, and practically none for development (capital) projects.[17] Many district councils in Tanzania have experienced difficulty in meeting their financial obligations, and several were essentially bankrupt in 1969. The combination of very heavy demands for increased educational expenditures and relatively fixed incomes for local councils in Tanzania is a phenomenon not uncommon elsewhere in Africa.[18]

In Kilimanjaro, between 60% and 70% of the annual

[16]The local rate assessed by the district council on taxpayers must be approved by the central government. For an extended discussion of the problem of financing local government, see Eugene Lee, Local Taxation in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1965). In 1969 the Tanzania government abolished the local rate and the produce cess, the major sources of income for district councils. At the same time, it assumed a greater role in the provision of health and educational services, previously left largely to the local councils. The trend seems to be toward a weakening of the district as a power center in favor of strengthening the regional apparatus. How this will work remains to be seen. Local government structure and finances will be discussed further in Chapter 6.

[17]See Aart Van de Laar, "Arusha: Before and After," East Africa Journal V,11(November 1969):16-17.

[18]Writing on primary education in Kenya, L. Gray Cowan found that "The County Councils are finding that educational expenditure is not only the highest single item in their budgets, but that even to maintain present expenditure levels many are having to exhaust reserves and are operating under deficits that are so large as to threaten councils with complete financial collapse." See The Cost of Learning: The Politics of Primary Education in Kenya (New York: Teachers College Press, 1970), 37.

budget of the Kilimanjaro District Council is spent on educa-
tion and culture, while in Moshi town, where most schools were
already government assisted at the time of the shift to local
control and thus did not represent an additional financial
burden on the Town Council, expenditure on education has been
about 20% of the total budget.[19]

No sooner had the missions shifted much of their bur-
den of primary education to the district council, than they
began to compensate for the council's inability to increase
the number of schools. That is, when the council assumed re-
sponsibility for a large number of unassisted schools, it was
barely able to meet their recurrent expenditures and was un-
able to open new schools. But in accepting the responsibil-
ity for the unassisted schools, the council freed mission re-
sources to open new unassisted schools. In fact, in 1969,
when the central government agreed to open new primary schools
in Kilimanjaro district (none had been opened in the rural
areas since 1965), the conflict was over which of the un-
assisted schools should be converted to assisted schools.

[19]Figures from the Annual Financial Statements of
the Kilimanjaro District and Moshi Town Councils. The expen-
diture on education includes a small amount for cultural ac-
tivities. The central government, of course, provides a
large portion of the funds expended on education, through
payment of teachers' salaries, equipment, buildings, and ad-
ministrative costs in assisted schools. In 1968, for exam-
ple, the central government subsidy amounted to approximate-
ly 33% of the total expenditure on education by the Kilima-
njaro District Council and approximately 70% of the Moshi
Town Council expenditure on education.

Because the district education office does not offi-
cially recognize the mission-sponsored bush schools, it is
difficult to estimate their number. In 1969 there were offi-
cially 247[20] assisted primary schools (in theory, no unassist-
ed primary schools were permitted to exist) in Kilimanjaro
District. In the same year, there were at least 113 bush
schools.[21] That is for every two schools at least nominally
under the control of the Ministry of Education, there was an-
other school of which the Ministry took no cognizance, and
over which the Ministry had no control (see TABLE 3.2).

While much of the political conflict over educational
decisions revolves around where schools will be located--and
thus which communities will be serviced and which children
will be disadvantaged by distance--and who will manage them,
a related issue is the extent to which children are denied an

[20]Statistics, even from official sources, are often
educated estimates and approximately-exact totals. In dif-
ferent places in the files of the District Education Office,
Kilimanjaro District, for example, the number of assisted
primary schools in the district in 1969 variously appeared
as 245, 247, 248, 249, and 251 (exclusive of Moshi town).

[21]Bush school is used as an inclusive term to denote
schools not appearing in official records, staffed by unac-
credited and untrained teachers, and located in sub-standard
buildings (often simply in a house or under a tree). In Kili-
manjaro, bush schools include schools registered as Primary
I-II which in fact continue beyond Standard II, and unregis-
tered Primary I-II schools. The UN Visiting Mission in 1954,
with figures from the British Government, estimated there
were 5,400 bush schools with an enrollment of 180,000 (half
again as many as were enrolled in assisted schools) in all of
Tanganyika. UN Document T/1169:5.

TABLE 3.2   ASSISTED AND UNASSISTED PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN KILI-
             MANJARO DISTRICT, 1968, BY AGENCY   (Not including
             Moshi town)[a]

AGENCY	ASSISTED SCHOOLS				UNASSISTED SCHOOLS[b]			TOT SCHOOLS
	I-IV	V-VII	I-VII	TOT ASSISTED	I-IV	I-II[c]	TOT	
LA/KDC[d]	15	5	16	36	--	--	--	36
LUTHERAN	18	10	49	77	--	73	73	150
CATHOLIC	41	13	68	122	9	27	36	158
MUSLIM	4	--	8	12	1	3	4	16
TOTAL	78	28	141	247	10	103	113	360

SOURCE: District Education Office, Kilimanjaro District, for
        assisted schools. Contacts with voluntary agencies
        for unassisted schools.

[a]As noted, statistics from official sources vary.
Thus, figures shown here may not agree exactly with those
shown elsewhere, but these slight differences do not affect
the analysis.

[b]Since most of these schools are at least technically
illegal, gathering data on them is difficult. The figures
shown are approximately accurate, though other evidence sug-
gests they may be understated for Catholic schools.

[c]Includes schools that in fact continue beyond Stand-
ard II.

[d]LA/KDC refers to Local Authority/Kilimanjaro District
Council. This figure includes one school managed directly by
the central government.

education by the lack of available schools.

    . . . in some areas children cannot get places in schools.
For four years, there have been no new Standard Is [pri-
mary schools] opened in Kilimanjaro. Even just taking
care of the schools already built almost brought the coun-
cil down. . . . to see the education officer is useless.

. . . many children are unable to get places in schools.
I have seen this myself. There are absolutely not enough
schools.

There are many primary-age children not in school. This
is because there are not enough places. The number who
are not in school is greater than the number of those
who are.[22]

At the same time, others insist that primary education in

Kilimanjaro is adequate, and that all children who seek plac-

es in primary schools find them. Estimates of the percentage

of primary school-aged children actually in school range from

under 50% (quoted above) to 95%. The District Education Of-

fice has calculated that there are enough places for all

(100%) primary school-aged children, but that since they are

not well distributed, some places are not filled. The Min-

istry of Education computed that for Kilimanjaro District in

1969 there were enough primary places for 74.5% of the chil-

dren expected to enter Standard I, suggesting that since

there were some places empty, the percentage of those actually

enrolled was somewhat smaller. An analysis of census data for

1967 shows from 60% to 70% enrolled for Kilimanjaro rural

[22]Statements from political leaders, Kilimanjaro,
1969. The study of Kilimanjaro political leadership is de-
scribed in Chapter 7; Appendix 1 includes a brief discussion
of the methodology of this aspect of the study, as well as
the questions used. The study included extended interviews
with Kilimanjaro politicians, from which these statements
are taken.

and from 62% to 83% for Moshi town.[23] Of course, if the num-

ber of children enrolled in unassisted schools were added to

the official enrollment figures, the enrollment percentage

would be much higher. Perhaps the situation is most accu-

rately summarized by suggesting that almost all parents who

work hard to get their children into school find places for

them in a school of one sort or another, but that there are

a substantial number of children of primary school age not

in school, or in an inferior bush school, either because

their parents have not sent them to school, or because they

live in an area not yet serviced by a primary school. For

comparison, the government calculated that in 1968 only 47%

of all Tanzanian children found primary school places.[24] In

any case, the perception of relative deprivation by those

parents who do not succeed in getting their children into

school and keeping them there is heightened by their observa-

tion that almost everyone else's children are in school.

[23]Figures on school enrollment from District Educa-
tion Office, Kilimanjaro District; calculations based on the
census analysis contained in Tanzania, Provisional Estimates
of Fertility, Mortality and Population Growth for Tanzania
(Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968), taking 7/10 (pri-
mary school is a 7 year course) of the 5-14 age group as the
base school-age population; breaking down the total popula-
tion by sex and residence before calculating the enrollment
percentage yields the higher figures.

[24]Nyerere, "To Plan is To Choose," xi.

EDUCATION IN KILIMANJARO: THE ACTORS

It is a mistake to assume that politics has to do primarily with rule-making, and with the articulation and aggregation of interests related to rule-making. For rural Tanzania, rule-making is a distant and largely inaccessible process, and attempts to influence the authoritative allocations, attempts to determine who is serviced by the political system and who is deprived, focus on the outputs, on rule-application. Further, in a polity in which communications between the center and up-country areas are poor, and in which the efficacy of central government control is reduced as it is transported to the peripheral areas of the country, those who apply rules tend either to become the rule-makers themselves, or to surrender their power to alternative individuals and institutions. Therefore, even minor administrative decisions in the local political arena have political content, and local political conflict focuses on the governmental outputs. And yet, governmental outputs are themselves only a modest part of the sum of the politics of education in Kilimanjaro, for the politics of education in Kilimanjaro are the politics of controlling the administrative structure and the politics of subverting national educational planning.

The district education officer is the Ministry of Education official charged with representing the Ministry in the District, and in that capacity, with overseeing all

schools in the district. Thus, the district education offi-
cer might be expected to play the key role in local educa-
tional decisions. It is he who has responsibility for com-
municating to the local area the government education plan,
for insuring that the plan is implemented, for supervising
the voluntary agencies that manage schools,[25] for supervis-
ing school inspectors, and for advising the local education
authority. But while it might be reasonable to expect con-
flict in education to center around the district education
officer, in fact that was not the case at all in Kilimanjaro
in 1968-69.

The district education officer does serve as the
voice of the central givernment in educational matters. He
introduces governmental decisions into the local political
system, and he interprets them. But even in these functions,
in introducing educational policy and interpreting it, he is
challenged by other individuals who have almost equivalent
access to educational decision-making in Dar es Salaam: the
mission education secretaries.

[25]The term voluntary agency is used to refer to the
managers of schools and includes the missions, the Muslim
association (the Muslim community was in the process of re-
organization in 1969, and, at least in Kilimanjaro district,
the successor organization to the East African Muslim Wel-
fare Society, BAKWATA, had not yet assumed responsibility for
Muslim schools), the Asian groups which have their own schools,
and any other group that manages a school. The Catholic and
Lutheran missions are of course by far the largest voluntary
agencies in Kilimanjaro.

As a result, the major function of the district education officer is that of a go-between, a mediator, an arbiter. For example, in 1969 it was decided at the Ministry level in Dar es Salaam that Kilimanjaro District would be permitted to open several new primary schools (primary schools are opened one grade at a time, so that there would be a Standard I the first year, followed by a Standard II the next year, and so on), and, in accord with the Five Year Plan for 1969-1974, to extend some of its primary schools from Standard IV to Standard VII. It was left to the local education authority--the district council, through its education committee--to determine which areas should get these new and extended schools.

The decision to do this was communicated throughout Kilimanjaro more quickly by the mission education secretaries than by the education officer, so that councillors learned of it from their own contacts rather than through the governmental network.[26] The education officer then asked the education secretaries to draw up lists of priorities for new and extended schools. That is, the missions were asked to recommend which areas were to get new schools. The education officer served to mediate between the education secretaries, to merge the separate lists into a single list, but he was

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[26] Here and elsewhere in this essay, unless otherwise noted, examples cited and events described are from personal observation in 1968-1969.

unable to compile the list himself because he lacked the requisite information about where people lived, where there were concentrations of children with insufficient school space, and where there were school facilities already begun (or parents willing to begin them). Because he did-not have this information himself, he could only with difficulty verify the assessments of the education secretaries. The combined list created by the mission education secretaries was then presented to the education-committee of the Kilimanjaro District Council for approval.

Many parents come to the education officer for assistance in getting their children into school or keeping them there, especially with requests that children be permitted to repeat Standard VII in order to have a second try at the examination for entrance into secondary school. But even in these decisions the education officer's power is circumscribed by the availability of places, and is thus ultimately contingent on the mission's and the head teacher's cooperation.

Like all government officers in Tanzania, the district education officer is a transient in Kilimanjaro, expected to spend only a few years, at most, there. While the two district education officers in Kilimanjaro in 1969 arrived in 1966 and 1968, the two mission education secretaries had spent most of their lives there.

Thus, the district education officer is a middleman,

with the ability to reconcile conflicting demands for alloca-
tions of resources, with the ability occasionally to alter
specific allocations, but without the ability to exercise a
monopoly over educational decisions.

The people to see in Kilimanjaro for action on more
schools, better schools, access to schools, are the mission
education secretaries. Because of the small size and dis-
array of the Muslim community in 1968-69, and the small size
of other groups managing primary schools, and because almost
all principal political elites in Kilimanjaro rural district
are identified with either the Lutheran or the Catholic
Church, the two key figures are the Lutheran minister and
the Catholic priest serving as education secretaries for
their churches in Kilimanjaro Region. They are the local
representatives of a network within each church that culmi-
nates in an education secretary general in Dar es Salaam.[27]
They are appointed by their bishops and approved by the gov-
ernment. And it is they, largely, who decide where new and
extended schools will be located, and who will thus be
served by them.

[27]They represent locally the Lutheran Church of
Northern Tanganyika (LCNT) and the Holy Ghost Fathers (HGF).
Nationally, school managers are the Tanzania Episcopal Con-
ference for Catholic schools and the Christian Council of
Tanzania for Protestant schools. Both Kilimanjaro education
secretaries regard their bishops, located in Moshi, rather
than their education secretaries-general, located in Dar es
Salaam, as their direct superiors.

Their ability to monopolize educational decisions depends primarily on their monopoly on the basic information and resources necessary to make those decisions. Since each of the churches is exclusively dominant in its own areas of the district, it essentially runs the entire educational program in that area. The local schools, together with the local church, have primary access to the local people, access much more direct and reliable than that of the school inspectors, tax collectors, and other government officials. TANU could provide an alternate communications network, and does in some places, but in most places the overlap of local TANU and church leaders, the discontinuities in the structure linking TANU branches with the district TANU office, and the belief by TANU leaders that schools are not their responsibility, mean that reliable appraisals of popular sentiments, of demands for schools, even of population, are made only by the church, and are communicated to the education secretaries by the parish priests and ministers. Thus, since only the education secretaries can effectively collect and provide the basic information on where people are concentrated and where schools are needed necessary to make educational decisions, their role becomes critical. Since both churches encourage school construction and expansion contrary to government plan and engage in other irregularities in the schools, it is imperative to the churches that they retain their control of the functioning of the primary schools in their areas.

As well as information, the education secretaries,
through their missions, have more access to resources for
school construction and expansion than do local government
officials. Church finances are difficult, perhaps impossible,
to sort out fully, but it is clear that both major churches
in Kilimanjaro can secure funds from sources outside of Tan-
zania with little, if any, control by the government, and
can expend at least some of these funds on school expansion
without accounting, directly, to the government. In the mis-
sion schools an additional device is used to secure money:
nuns and lay teachers employed in mission schools are often
paid less than the official salary. That is, in government
assisted mission schools, where the central and local govern-
ments pay most or all of teachers' salaries, the money dis-
bursed by the government is used to pay teachers in those
schools less than the full salary, and the remainder can then
be used to support unregistered and unassisted schools.[28]

The monopoly on information and on the availability
of resources, coupled with the support of the local popula-
tion, enable the education secretaries to be the initiators
of educational change. The churches begin bush schools,
with untrained teachers in sub-standard facilities and inade-
quate materials, using their own funds and funds diverted
from assisted schools. The parents support the schools,

[28]Abernethy reports the same arrangement in Nigeria;
see "Nigeria," 226.

happy to have a place to send their children. As the burden
on the missions becomes greater, and as parents increasingly
demand schools that will enable their children to progress
within the national educational system, pressure increases
on the local education authority (the district council) to
assume the responsibility for these schools and to regular-
ize their status. (While it might seem that there would be
pressure from government authorities to punish the missions
for these schools and close them down, in fact the demand
for education is so great that once a school has come into
existence, it is almost impossible to eliminate it.) When
the local council assumes the financial burden of these un-
assisted schools, it no longer has sufficient funds to open
new schools, so it again falls to the missions to use their
own and diverted resources to begin the cycle anew. As a
result, initiative in educational expansion remains firmly
in the hands of the Churches and the education secretaries.
At the time of official school expansion or construction,
the local council in effect reinforces this pattern. Since
the council has no money with which to construct new class-
rooms, when it is permitted to open new schools, or expand
existing schools, or when it decides to take over unassisted
schools, it looks for already well established schools, and
especially those with a developed physical plant and with the
better of the unqualified teachers. Thus, when the council
chooses among a large number of applicants for support, it

is almost invariably the mission schools that benefit the
most. Although the education officers speak piously about
eliminating unregistered and unassisted schools, they have
been largely unsuccessful, as is clear from the number of
unregistered and unassisted schools that continue to exist
and that surface to apply for official status when that be-
comes feasible.

Every local authority in Tanzania is a local educa-
tion authority, which means, for our purposes here, that the
Kilimanjaro District Council and the Moshi Town Council are
charged in law to manage the schools they control, to admin-
ister grants-in-aid, including those from the central govern-
ment, and to advise the Minister of Education on educational
development in Kilimanjaro District.[29] As a local education
authority, the district council is charged to create an edu-
cation committee, including district councillors, individuals
named by the council, and individuals appointed by the Minis-
try of Education. One might expect, therefore, that basic
allocations, with regard to council schools in particular,
but with regard to all schools in the district in general,
would emanate from the council through this committee.

[29]The councils, as the local education authorities,
were responsible for these and other tasks as of 1969.
Changes introduced in 1969 are discussed in the concluding
section of this chapter.

In fact, the basic role of the education committee of the district council is to legitimize decisions made by the education secretaries and the district education officer. In this process, councillors have an opportunity to protect the interests of their own areas. With minor alterations, the decisions of the education secretaries and the district education officer are issued as council decisions, bearing the full weight and prestige of the district council.

In the deliberations over new and extended schools in Kilimanjaro district mentioned above, the education secretaries established the lists of schools to be built and extended, and the district education officer merged these lists into a single list. In merging these lists, he alternated Catholic and Lutheran schools, with the few Muslim and council schools interspersed, thus both giving official recognition to the religious balance and binding himself to the specific priorities set by the education secretaries. After he secured agreement on the merged list, he presented it to the education committee of the district council for approval.

The education committee of the district council is an important arena for both religious and sectional conflict in Kilimanjaro. Since the Christian schools, because they are generally better financed, better organized, and better run, tend to be favored over Muslim schools, the education committee offers Muslims almost their only opportunity to defend and protect their access to schools. In 1969 the

East African Muslim Welfare Society had been dissolved, but
its successor organization had not yet begun functioning in
Kilimanjaro, so that the district education officers assumed
managerial responsibility for Muslim schools. Defense of
Muslim interests depended on active intervention in the edu-
cation committee by the Muslim councillors on the committee,
one of whom held leadership positions in both the old and
new Muslim organizations and was a leading political figure
in Kilimanjaro.

Since religious cleavages overlap with sectional dif-
ferences, and since many major political figures serve on the
education committee, much of the political conflict in Kili-
manjaro manifests itself in one way or another in the activ-
ities of the education committee. In the case of school ex-
pansion, because the Muslims are by and large located in the
plains (low) areas of the district, the argument turns to one
of mountain-coffee-farmers versus plains-maize-millet-and-rice-
farmers. The people who live in the plains of Kilimanjaro dis-
trict, both those ethnically related to the Chagga and others
who have settled there, have long charged that they are in-
adequately represented in the Kilimanjaro District Council,
and that they suffer from decisions made largely with the in-
terests of Chagga coffee farmers primary. For example, a
leading political figure, involved in both national and dis-
trict politics, comments:

> The lower areas are very far behind the other areas of
> Kilimanjaro and even behind many other districts in

Tanzania. . . . there is tribalism in the district coun-
cil--the council looks upwards [up the hillsides of Kili-
manjaro] and not downwards, so there is no progress in
the low areas. Sometimes some project is put in the low
areas to fool them--they built a dispensary, but they do
not send any medicine. The remedy is for them to have
their own organization--to have the Kilimanjaro District
Council for the mountain and a separate council for the
low areas. : . .

Likewise, for the Christian religions, the debates about

school expansion reopen and reinforce long-standing conflicts,

such as that between Machame and Marangu and the oft-repeated

charges by those living in Rombo and West Kilimanjaro--those

in the peripheral areas of the district--that they do not re-

ceive a fair share of council services.

In this particular case of school expansion in 1969,

after extended discussion in which each councillor criti-

cized the expansion list as not giving adequate attention to

his area (and thus his religion), the district executive of-

ficer, who sits in an advisory capacity to all committees,

feared that any change would destroy the compromises implicit

in the list, and proposed that no alterations in the list be

accepted. His recommendation was approved by the committee,

which meant that the allocations as originally made by the

education secretaries and the district education officer were

approved and legitimized. The acceptance of his recommenda-

tion also meant that the very political decisions on which

areas of the district were to benefit from this extension of

education were moved from the education committee, and thus

the council,[30] to the ostensibly non-political church education secretaries in consultation with the ministry technical officer. Thus, the basic function of the education committee is to legitimize allocations made by the education secretaries and the district education officer and to provide a forum for sectional interests.

Another function of the education committee, one in which its power is definitive,[31] is to deal with remissions of school fees--scholarships to children whose parents are unable to pay the fees for attendance at primary school.

Fees in Kilimanjaro district primary schools in 1969 ranged from $2 per year for the lowest grades to $10 per year for the upper grades in day schools, and went as high as $76 per year for boarding schools.[32] In Moshi town the fees varied from $2 to $6 plus food and uniforms for Swahili-medium schools, and from $17 to $60 per year in English-medium

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[30]Normal practice is for the full council to approve the recommendations of its committees with little or no discussion, though of course committee recommendations can be, and sometimes are, discussed at great length.

[31]Most council decisions are subject to review by its proper officer, the Regional Commissioner, or by the Ministry charged with responsibility for local government.

[32]Dollar amounts are approximate conversions from Tanzania shillings. It should be noted that in Tanzania fees are levied for primary, not secondary, schools.

schools.[33] Parents unable to pay can apply to a special com-

mittee for remission of fees. Although a government policy

that is moving toward universal primary education and the

maintenance of primary school fees may seem contradictory,

school fees remain the only effective means the local coun-

cil has for collecting funds from parents. That is, a large

percentage of taxpayers all over Tanzania, and throughout

Kilimanjaro, manage to avoid paying their local rates; but

when a child whose parents have not paid school fees is re-

fused entry to the school, at least in Kilimanjaro the pres-

sure on the parents for compliance is usually sufficient to

secure payment. Even non-payment of school meal fees--in

the government campaign against malnutrition and undernour-

ishment in children a meal eaten at school has been insti-

tuted--was formerly sufficient reason to return a child home,

but in 1969 schools were instructed to permit children whose

parents had paid the school fees, but not food fees, to re-

main in school. Defending the fees, one of the Kilimanjaro

Members of Parliament argued that payment of school fees cre-

ated for the parents an involvement in the schools, and thus

in the local government, that would be absent if schools were

free.

[33]Schools in which English is the medium of instruc-
tion, originally built for the children of colonial civil
servants, Asians, and a few well-to-do Africans, are being
phased out, and the fees are being adjusted to be identical
for all schools.

In Moshi town, school fee remissions are approved by a committee chaired by the chairman of the council education committee, and composed of the three town headmen, the town treasurer, and the town council clerk who deals with schools.[34] Parents applying for school fee remissions file applications with the council education clerk, who passes them on to the headmen[35] to verify. Parents are then given an opportunity to appear before the committee. After parents are interviewed, the committee agrees tentatively on the amount of the remission, if any, to be granted. After all parents have been interviewed, the treasurer examines the remissions proposed to insure that the proposed remissions comply with legal requirements and to attempt to insure that 60% of the funds go to local authority (town council) schools and 40% to voluntary agency schools, which also offer their own remissions. The final list of remissions is then drawn up, and approved by the education committee, with little or no discussion. This process takes place in February/March for the term beginning the preceding November.

[34]Composition of the committee is set by a Ministry of Education circular.

[35]The title headman is a colonial carryover from the Kiswahili word jumbe; ward executive officer, corresponding to the village executive officer in rural areas, might be more appropriate. When the office of jumbe, established under the colonial administration, was eliminated after Independence, the Moshi Town Council decided to retain the position, and the three headmen in Moshi are paid from Town Council funds.

In Moshi, in 1969, decisions on remissions were based almost entirely on the assessment by the headmen of the applicants' situations: those deemed needy by the headmen were granted remissions; those considered to have not told the truth or not needy by the headmen were denied remissions. That is, all who met the basic criteria--living in Moshi town, having children in Standard V or higher,[36] appearing in person, if possible,[37] and considered needy by the headmen--were granted remissions. In 1969, approximately 40% of the remissions went to local authority schools, and 60% to voluntary agency schools, the reverse of the goal originally announced. Less than 1% of the education committee's budget for 1968 was allocated to assist just over 2% of the children in Moshi schools, but although approximately one-third of the funds budgeted for fee remissions were unallocated, there was no consideration of relaxing the criteria for approval of remissions or increasing some of the remissions already granted.

The school fee remissions procedure was a cumbersome one--deliberations did not begin until several months after

[36]The committee limited fee remissions to children in Standard V or higher. No one on the committee could supply the source of that decision.

[37]Applicants who were healthy and who did not appear in person were not considered. Where the child's father was known to be healthy and living with the family, if the father did not appear, the application was not considered.

the beginning of the term, parents were difficult to locate,
some parents did not appear despite several opportunities to
do so--and many of those involved complained about it, but
the committee and the individuals in a position to take the
initiative to propose changes did not do so. This can be ex-
plained in part by the fact that those most inconvenienced
by the system, the parents, have the poorest understanding of
the administrative structures and are the most uncomfortable
and insecure in dealing with them, while those most able to
introduce change, the members of the remissions committee,
are not sufficiently inconvenienced to want to take action.
The treasurer was interested in streamlining the system, pri-
marily to make his job and the accounting easier, but as an
Asian in a political system dominated by Africans, and as an
employee rather than member of the council, he was loath to
be the initiator of change.

Thus, even in the question of the remissions of
school fees, where the education committee has full decision-
making powers, it functions to approve and legitimize deci-
sions made by others.

The lowest level decision-maker in education is the
headteacher in the primary school, and his power is consider-
able: the ability to deny access to education by refusing to
admit children or by sending them home. Because parents con-
sider primary education critical to the future success of

their children, and because parents believe that headteachers

can deny access to primary and future education,[38] they are

reluctant to challenge the headteacher in any fundamental

way. Committees of parents have been established at each

school to oversee the general running of the school--to safe-

guard the parents' interests in the educational system--but

they either function as the tools of the headteacher, or the

moribund. That is, either the headteacher plays a dominant

role in the school committee and uses his committee to back

his demands for additional materials, new classrooms, more

teachers, and other requests, or the parents are so afraid

that their children will suffer if they challenge the head-

teacher that the committee approves whatever the headteacher

recommends.[39] Thus, the decision-making chain runs from the

headteacher to the education secretary, with little role for

the school committees.

[38]Even among the local political elite, who might be
expected to be more secure from retribution by headteachers
than average parents, the complaints about headteachers' re-
fusing to admit children, discriminating against them and
punishing them unfairly in school, and even exchanging exam-
ination results to favor other children for admission to
secondary school, were numerous.

[39]For example, at a meeting of the Kilimanjaro Dis-
trict Council education committee, several councillors com-
plained about the hard work required of small children (in
self-reliance projects) and about misuse of school funds by
headteachers. The district education officer replied that
it was the job of the school committee to correct these
abuses, but there was unanimity among the councillors, in-
cluding the district chairman, that headteachers would find
some pretext for excluding the children of parents who pro-
tested, so that the school committee was impotent.

There are some individuals in Moshi, including the
MPs and party leaders, who have regular contacts in Dar es
Salaam, and who might be able to use their contacts and in-
fluence at the center to affect educational allocations in
the local area. But two factors mitigate against this. The
resources available for education in Tanzania are limited
and severely strained, and the already favored position of
Kilimanjaro vis a vis the rest of Tanzania (see TABLE 3.3)
reduces the leverage of those who can influence decision-
making at the center. To increase Kilimanjaro's share of the
limited resources would defeat the government's intention to
eliminate the gross inequalities between different areas of
Tanzania and would be politically impossible. Kilimanjaro
leaders who report having spoken with Ministry officials
about increased allocations for education in Kilimanjaro in-
dicate that Ministry officials always stress Kilimanjaro's
already favored position. Thus, even those with influence at
the center are forced to turn to the missions for assistance
when they seek to increase or improve the educational facil-
ities in Kilimanjaro. As TABLE 3.3 makes very clear. Kili-
manjaro has not suffered in allocations from the center; and
it should be noted that for much of Tanzania's first decade
of independence, the Minister of Education was a Kilimanjaro
Member of Parliament and the former President of the Chagga.

TABLE 3.3 ENROLLMENT IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN TANZANIA BY REGION,[a] 1965

REGION	ASSISTED SCHL		UNASSISTED SLS		TOTALS			
	SCHLS	PUPILS	SCHLS	PUPILS	SCHLS	PER-CENT	PUPILS	PER-CENT
Arusha	164	31,040	48	3,914	212	4.9[b]	34,954	4.6[b]
Coast (incDSM)	159	42,487	19	1,781	178	4.1	44,268	5.8
Dodoma	198	36,164	7	380	205	4.7	36,544	4.8
Iringa	173	31,755	12	1,934	185	4.2	33,689	4.4
Kigoma	134	22,342	1	155	135	3.1	22,497	2.9
Kilimanjaro	333	78,445	39	8,655	372	8.5	87,100	11.3
Mara	171	33,748	3	484	174	4.0	36,232	4.7
Mbeya	248	48,321	98	9,534	346	8.0	57,855	7.5
Morogoro	248	43,718	6	545	254	5.8	44,263	5.8
Mtwara	378	55,263	175	10,455	553	12.6	65,718	8.7
Mwanza	290	57,529	14	2,097	304	7.0	59,626	7.8
Ruvuma	160	28,119	5	900	165	3.8	29,019	3.8
Shinyanga	170	31,497	5	1,352	175	4.0	32,849	4.3
Singida	172	30,353	–	---	172	3.9	30,353	3.9
Tabora	166	28,118	2	355	168	3.8	28,473	3.7
Tanga	274	56,360	107	6,889	381	8.7	63,249	8.2
West Lake	282	52,941	113	9,718	395	9.0	62,659	8.1
TOTAL	3,720	710,200	654	59,148	4374	99.1	769,348	100.3

SOURCE: Tanzania, United Republic of. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning. Central Statistical Bureau. Statistical Abstract 1966 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968): 176.

[a]Since Kilimanjaro District has many more schools and pupils than Pare District (the other district in Kilimanjaro Region), an analysis by district would show even more clearly the favored position of Kilimanjaro vis a vis the rest of Tanzania.

[b]Percentages not included in original table.

EDUCATION

The local TANU organization plays no direct role in
educational decisions, and even though many people seek TANU
assistance in a wide range of problems, very few come to the
TANU office for school problems. While the TANU regional
executive secretary sits on the Moshi Town Council education
committee as a nominated councillor, he and other TANU offi-
cials subscribe to the prevailing mythology that education
is the concern of the technical experts, and do not become
directly involved in educational matters.

In 1969 the TANU Youth League (TYL) decided, at the
national level, on a fundamental reorientation, discarded
all its membership rolls, and began recruiting anew through
branches established only in schools. By late 1969, many
schools in Kilimanjaro district had functioning TYL branches
that concerned themselves with political education and the
politicizing of school children, for which instructions and
syllabi came from the center. They worked on developing a
spirit of support for and a commitment to socialist Tanzania,
largely through speeches, marches, parades, and rallies, but
they had no discernible impact on educational decision-making.
In the 1969 TYL Annual Conference for Moshi town a car sales-
man defeated the former chairman (a small businessman in the
town market) and the principal of the cooperative college for
the town chairmanship.

The Tanganyika African Parents Association (TAPA)
was created to be the element of the TANU structure concerned

with education, but despite repeated efforts to stimulate
TAPA, it has not become a significant force in Kilimanjaro.
Shortly after independence, TAPA's major purpose was to open
and run schools in areas where there were no schools. In
Kilimanjaro the school problem was much less severe than
elsewhere in Tanzania, reducing TAPA's possible impact. TAPA
did create and run several schools in Kilimanjaro, but almost
all failed after several years of existence. They never had
proper enrollment or staff, and whenever possible parents
preferred to send their children to mission bush schools
rather than to TAPA schools, reducing enrollment even fur-
ther. The Moshi Town Council supported TAPA by providing a
council building for a TAPA school, but the building lent to
TAPA was misused and poorly maintained and deteriorated so
rapidly that councillors were unwilling to permit TAPA con-
tinued use of the building. In 1968 it was decided, at the
national level, to close TAPA schools and transfer students
to other schools and to have TAPA represent parents in over-
seeing Tanzanian schools. That is, the task of TAPA was
shifted from that of managing schools to that of represent-
ing parents' interests on school committees. While that
might have ameliorated the perceived impotence of school com-
mittees by providing them with some direct access to the po-
litical structure, and while parents called together by TAPA
might have been a powerful force in influencing educational
allocations, that role was neither adequately defined nor

clearly understood, and the changes envisioned had not been
implemented in Kilimanjaro by late 1969. TAPA in Kilimanjaro
has had continuing difficulties in finding capable leadership,
and one former TAPA chairman was charged with misuse of funds.
Although political leaders in Kilimanjaro were attempting to
raise money for transport in order to hold meetings through-
out the district to explain TAPA's role and increase member-
ship, thus giving it a base from which to work, TAPA, with no
clear role and no leadership, had by late 1969 effectively
ceased to function in Kilimanjaro.

Ordinary citizens, then had little direct role in ed-
ucational decision-making. Although providing an education
for their children was an issue that clearly and deeply con-
cerned most Kilimanjaro residents, neither the school commit-
tees, nor TANU, nor TAPA offered a viable channel for popular
participation. It is possible that in time elections to the
local councils will permit popular participation in setting
some of the parameters for educational decision-making, but
the continued dependence on the missions to provide and man-
age schools, and the popular perception, reinforced by gov-
ernment and TANU officials, that education is a technical
matter, an element of the development plan, and thus not a
proper matter for politics and elections, will continue to
limit popular participation and to confine its focus to the
parish clergy.

EDUCATION IN KILIMANJARO: SUMMARY

In summary, then, a variety of factors combine to give the churches and their representatives--and not the government or TANU--the dominant role in the politics of education in Kilimanjaro.

The churches continue to rely on the provision of primary education as the major vehicle for the propagation of the faith and the primary weapon in the competition with other institutions for allegiance. The local population, assessing accurately that education is the key to the good life as it is currently defined in Kilimanjaro, resists governmental attempts to divert educational resources to other areas of the country in order to equalize development, and is thus willing to assist the missions in thwarting government education goals and priorities. The political elite themselves, though professing support for and adherence to Tanzanian socialism, and though required to swear that they will not use their leadership positions for personal or family gain, are also convinced that education is the key to the good life and are also determined to do whatever they can to insure that their children have access to good education.[40]

[40]Several Kilimanjaro leaders, in explaining their compliance with Tanzania's stringent leadership code, confessed that they were able to support the leadership code in spirit now, and would support it in practice as soon as their children were educated. Others, in complaining about the difficulties their children encountered in advancing in school, spoke of sending their children out of Tanzania to continue the education denied them in Tanzania.

Thus, they too are at least tacit supporters of mission dom-

inance in educational decision-making.

In this way, the missions, the ordinary population,

and the political elites unite to control the educational ad-

ministrative apparatus. At the same time, for several years

this coalition of interests effectively subverted national

educational planning in Kilimanjaro. The educational goals

embodied in the first Five-Year Plan (1964-1969), motivated

by the commitment to develop self-sufficiency in high level

manpower, linked a concentration of expenditure on secondary

and technical education with a restraint on the expansion of

primary education.[41] Yet primary education in Kilimanjaro

continued to expand, even beyond the ability of the district

council to support the new and recurrent costs.

The missions' ability to play the dominant role in

educational decision-making is further enhanced by their near

monopoly on the basic information necessary to run the edu-

cation system. While it is true that all administrative

[41]This is clear from the allocations proposed in the
Plan and from President Nyerere's speech introducing the plan:
"If we are to do that [expand secondary and technical educa-
tion] we cannot use our small resources on education for its
own sake; we cannot even use them to make primary education
available to all." See, United Republic of Tanganyika and
Zanzibar, Tanganyika. Five-Year Plan for Economic and So-
cial Development. 1st July, 1964 - 30th June 1969 (Dar es
Salaam: Government Printer, 1964), I,xii, and I,65. Cameron
and Dodd stress Tanzania's inability to implement the commit-
ment to the restriction of the expansion of primary educa-
tion; see Societies, Schools and Progress in Tanzania, 199-
208.

officers are to some extent dependent on the assistance and
cooperation of the interest groups within their jurisdiction,
in no other issue-area in Kilimanjaro are the administrative
officers more easily controlled by the very groups and indi-
viduals the officers are charged to manage. The education
officers, because of the widespread demand for education, be-
cause of the interests of the major participants in maintain-
ing the present relationships in primary education, and be-
cause of the government's difficulty in acquiring sufficient
information and resources, have much less local decision-
making autonomy than, for example, the health officers. The
fact that the local TANU organization does not become direct-
ly involved in education, and the failure of TAPA to repre-
sent the party and party policy in educational matters, or
to play any substantial role at all, permit alternative or-
ganizations--the missions--to mobilize people and resources,
and thus to determine and to alter educational decisions and
allocations.

Although competition for allegiance is a major incen-
tive for the missions to expand their schools, the two Chris-
tian churches manage to cooperate effectively to press their
demands on the political system. That is, while some Cath-
olics complain that the Lutherans are more energetic than
the Catholics in opening new schools, local residents are
much more concerned with getting a new school than with who
manages it, and neither the education officers nor any of

the local political leaders have been able to utilize con-
flict between the churches for leverage in implementing na-
tional or local educational goals. The need to compete in a
common arena, and the advantages of cooperation in opposing
government control, have functioned to mute religious compe-
tition among the Christians.

It is not uncommon for sectional interests to support
the missions' activities in opening new schools. The conflict
over the opening and the location of new schools of course
has a substantial impact on basic patterns of political re-
cruitment and allocation of social roles, and the eastern
part of Kilimanjaro district, for example, has long complained
of inadequate representation in district decision-making and
an inadequate share in district resources. This area, large-
ly Catholic, views a restraint on expansion of primary educa-
tion as a means of maintaining permanently its disfavored po-
sition, and has consistently supported the attempts of the
Catholic Church to open more schools there.

Since independence, the Tanzania government and TANU
have been aware of their depencence on voluntary agencies to
provide education and of the power the missions acquire as a
result of this dependence. The trend, since independence,
has been to assert governmental control to replace voluntary
agency control. At independence, all schools were opened to
all pupils, without regard to religion or race. Direct
prosleytizing has not been permitted in schools since long

before control over primary education was devolved to local
councils, but yet it is clear that the practice of religious
rituals, in both primary and secondary schools, continues.
When local councils assumed control of unassisted schools,
it was thought that the mission influence would be further
reduced, but in fact the change was primarily in financial
responsibility, since the missions continue to manage most
schools and are even able to divert public funds for their
own purposes. One local government officer stressed that
the missions were not unhappy with the assertion of govern-
ment control, since they had essentially the same control--
direct proselytizing and segregation by religion had already
been forbidden--with less to pay.[42] A Unified Teaching Serv-
ice was established to protect the teachers and to emphasize
their role as public servants, but basic hiring, firing, and
transferring of teachers in mission schools was still done
in 1968-69 by the education secretaries. There has been a
reorientation in the goals of primary education, with a com-
mitment to a seven-year course equipping, and more important,
psychologically preparing, children to play useful roles as
farmers in rural settings, but it is too soon to see any

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[42]Cameron and Dodd support this assessment for Tan-
zania as a whole. They argue that real conflict over educa-
tion between the missions and the government never developed
because changes were always "carefully negotiated and reluc-
tantly accepted . . . by the missions through their central
machinery in the capital." See Society, Schools and Progress
in Tanzania, 106.

change in the orientation toward salaried, non-agricultural,
urban employment. In 1969, further steps were made in this
direction: a new education bill sought to reduce mission in-
fluence in education by, among other things, routing teach-
ers' salaries through the local councils rather than through
the school managers (voluntary agencies), thus reducing the
opportunity to divert funds. As well, the central government
assumed responsibility for paying teachers previously on the
payrolls of the local councils, thus both freeing council
funds for other purposes and shifting some power away from
the local councils and into the hands of the district educa-
tion officers. Both mission education secretaries in Kili-
manjaro expressed concern over the restriction of their field
of operations. In addition, it is likely that government ed-
ucation officers will be increasingly better educated and
better trained, and perhaps better able to understand the
formidable alliance arrayed against them and better able to
deal with it. TANU continues to attempt to rejuvenate TAPA,
and it is possible that TAPA will emerge as a more potent
force in local educational decision-making.

        But the alliance that frustrates the government's
educational plans is a powerful one, and as long as the so-
cietal forces that nurture it continue--especially, dependence
on missions to provide the bulk of primary education, coupled
with the critical role of education as the key to the good
life and a commitment by elites to the education of their

as strong as or stronger than their commitment to government
and TANU policy--the alliance will be difficult to overcome.

CHAPTER 4

POLITICS OF LIQUOR LICENSING

A second key issue-area examined in the study of Kilimanjaro politics was liquor licensing. Like primary education, liquor licensing was an issue that was salient, that interested and excited the general public to a considerable extent, and that led to decisions made primarily within the local setting. In addition, the decision-making pattern in liquor licensing in Kilimanjaro, unlike that in primary education, was primarily concerned with individual, rather than community-wide decisions. Liquor licensing in Kilimanjaro, then, was a specific form of governmental output that determined who was to be permitted to profit in the controlled marketplace and who was not.

In Kilimanjaro the brewing and sale of local liquor, and the sale of bottled liquor, is a widespread activity, involving most of the adult population as brewers, sellers, or consumers. In April 1969, for example, one liquor license was granted for every thousand persons in Kilimanjaro rural, while the comparable figure for Moshi town was one license granted for every 250 persons.[1] Since over 40% of

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[1]Calculations from the records of the Kilimanjaro Liquor Licensing Board, 1969. Totals include all types of licenses issued--for brewing, for sale and consumption off the premises, for restaurants, and for bars. The term liquor includes all alcoholic beverages.

the population was under 14 years of age, and more than half
under 19, the percentage of the adult population involved
was very large. Licenses issued for the period September
1969 to March 1970 almost doubled the April-August totals,
so that even though some licenses granted may never actually
be used, the number of people concerned with the brewing,
sale, and consumption of liquor was enormous. The importance
of the brewing and sale of local liquor in Kilimanjaro is so
widely recognized in Tanzania that even casual visitors to
Dar es Salaam are told that local politics in Kilimanjaro
is centered on local liquor.

There are other types of licenses that are highly
desired, and thus hotly contested, in Kilimanjaro—transport

Not only does the widespread involvement in the liq-
uor trade make this a very salient issue throughout Kili-
manjaro, but in addition, liquor license fees provide an im-
portant source of income for both Kilimanjaro councils, and
after the changes in rural local government financing intro-
duced in 1969, liquor license fees, together with school
fees, became the major source of locally derived income for
the Kilimanjaro District Council (see TABLE 4.1).

There are other types of licenses that are highly
desired, and thus hotly contested, in Kilimanjaro—transport
licenses, for example—but the formal award of those licenses
is made by a national board, such as the Transport Licensing
Authority, whose decisions are removed from the local arena.

Thus, liquor licensing is a salient issue-area in
which the primary decisions are made locally, one important

TABLE 4.1   CONTRIBUTION OF LIQUOR LICENSE FEES[a] TO TOTAL REV-
            ENUE OF THE MOSHI TOWN AND KILIMANJARO DISTRICT
            COUNCILS, 1967-1969

YEAR	MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL		KILIMANJARO DISTRICT COUNCIL	
	LIQUOR LI-CENSE FEES	PERCENT OF TO-TAL REVENUE	LIQUOR LI-CENSE FEES	PERCENT OF TO-TAL REVENUE
1967	240,284.20	7.7[b]	748,352.00	6.0
1968	249,940.80	7.7	723,485.00	6.3
1969	210,000.00	6.1[c]	872,000.00[d]	5.6

    SOURCE: Annual Financial Statements and Estimates, Moshi
            Town and Kilimanjaro District Councils

    [a]Figures in Tanzania shillings. In addition, the Coun-
cils earn other income from the liquor trade (for example,
council-operated beer halls).

    [b]That is, liquor license fees provided 7.7% of Moshi
Town Council total revenue in 1967.

    [c]Estimates for 1969. Since the estimated budget in-
cluded an increase in site rates (the major source of Coun-
cil income) subsequently disapproved by the Minister, and
since budgeting practice was to underestimate expected in-
come, the actual figure and the percentage of the total can
be expected to be somewhat higher.

    [d]Estimates for 1969. Since in 1968 the Kilimanjaro
District Council overestimated its income by almost Shs.
4,000,000.00, this percentage can be expected to be somewhat
higher. In 1969, however, the central government eliminated
the local rate (the major source of Council income) and in-
creased its share of education and health expenditures; as
a result, liquor license fees, together with school fees,
became the major source of locally derived income.

to understand in studying the economy and social stratifica-

tion in Kilimanjaro.

    Like education, liquor licensing in Kilimanjaro was

an issue-area in which the formal decision-making apparatus

was unable to make effective allocations and produced deci-
sions that were often inconsistent and in conflict with its
stated intentions. As well, it was an issue area in which
the regulating agency became an ally of the principal forces
to be regulated.

LIQUOR LICENSING IN KILIMANJARO: THE SETTING

        Liquor licenses in Tanzania are considered and award-
ed by boards of local individuals. The method of selection
to the liquor licensing boards has varied somewhat since in-
dependence, but the boards have always been chaired by the
District and then Area Commissioner, and generally, the lo-
cal council has had a major role in selecting members. In
1969 new legislation combined the formerly separate licens-
ing boards for Kilimanjaro rural and Moshi town into a sin-
gle board, chaired by the Area Commissioner. The somewhat
complicated formula for selecting board membership insured
that the major political forces--the representative of the
central government (Area Commissioner), the political lead-
ers of the local area (the chairmen of the urban and rural
districts), and administrative officers of the two councils

--were included.[2] That is, while subscribing to the norm

that politics should not enter into the consideration of li-

quor licenses, the board was so structured that the major

political leaders, including both those selected locally (the

councillors) and those posted from the center (the Area Com-

missioner and the administrative officers) had to be included.

Since this structure included both urban and rural Kilimanjaro,

the analysis focuses on the district as a whole.

While the Liquor Licensing Board is responsible for

both bottled (including beer and distilled spirits) and lo-

cally brewed liquor, most of the sales and consumption in

Kilimanjaro are of locally brewed liquor. The local liquor

in Kilimanjaro is brewed from plantains and finger millet,

of which the latter provides the local name, mbege, differ-

entiating it from other locally brewed beer in Tanzania.

Served in most Chagga homes as a regular beverage, as well

as on festive occasions, mbege is only mildly alcoholic when

[2]The Kilimanjaro Liquor Licensing Board in 1969 was
composed of: Area Commissioner as chairman, town chairman as
Board vice chairman (the Minister responsible for local gov-
ernment had discretion to name the vice chairman), two mem-
bers elected by the Moshi Town Council, and four members
elected by the Kilimanjaro District Council, of whom one was
to be the chairman, a maximum of two chosen from the council
and its employees, and one ordinary citizen. There was no
specific provision in the law for secretary to the board,
but in Kilimanjaro the Moshi Town Clerk was named by the Min-
ister to that post. Since the Executive Officer of the Kili-
manjaro District Council was elected a member by the Council,
the chief administrative officers, as well as the chairmen,
of the two councils, were included.

consumed shortly after it is brewed. Because of its millet

content, it is a nutritious drink,[3] and is considered a nor-

mal, necessary part of the Chagga staple diet. Most of the

mbege sold in Kilimanjaro is brewed on a small scale by women

in their homes; much of it is purchased and transported to

bars, where it is sold out of large barrels and tubs by the

cup at a price substantially lower than that for bottled

beer.

Since the price for coffee, the major Kilimanjaro

cash crop, began to fall in the mid-1950s, the local popula-

tion has sought alternative sources of income, of which the

brewing and sale of mbege is an important one: in recent

years that has become, for many people, an integral part of

their basic income, rather than a supplement to the basic

income.[4]   These two factors--that the brewing and sale of

[3]Local health officers in Kilimanjaro often trace
the good health of Chagga children to the consumption of
mbege. The high caloric content of and the presence of B
vitamins in millet beer clearly make it a more nourishing
drink than European-type beer or distilled spirits; see Food
and Agriculture Organization, Food Composition Tables for
Use in Africa (Rome, 1968), 218-219.

[4]Most local leaders argue that mbege consumption has
increased in recent years and that the development of mbege
production as an alternate source of income has stimulated
this increase. One local government officer, whose origin
was outside of Kilimanjaro, argued that in other coffee-
growing areas, new crops, rather than local liquor, have com-
pensated for the fall in coffee prices, such as the cultiva-
tion of tea in Rungwe district. While it may be impossible,
because of the nature of the commodity, to document actual in-
crease in the consumption of mbege, this perception by the lo-
cal populace that it is an integral element of the local econ-
omy does serve to make the competition for licenses more in-
tense.

mbege are small scale and not the monopoly of a small group

of people, and that the trade in local liquor provides for

many people basic, rather than supplemental, income--help ac-

count for the intensity of the conflict over this particular

governmental allocation.

Although liquor licensing might seem to be a straight-

forward case of governmental regulation, like automobile and

hawker licensing, for example, and thus of little use in a

study of community power, in Kilimanjaro a combination of

factors, including bureaucratic inefficiency and incompetence,

conflict of goals, and availability of alternative decision-

making centers, renders the formal decision-making apparatus

impotent to monopolize the awarding of licenses.

LIQUOR LICENSING IN KILIMANJARO: THE ACTORS

The liquor licensing process seems simple enough.

Prospective brewers and sellers apply to the licensing board

with payment of a modest application fee, the applications

are made public and objections are invited, health officers

inspect the proposed premises to insure that they meet min-

imum health requirements, and the licensing board, acting

on its own information, on recommendations by local admin-

istrative officials, police, and health officers, and on ob-

jections filed, decides on licenses to be granted. Although

it receives some advice from the government and party in Dar

es Salaam, the local board is essentially free to develop

its own guidelines for awarding, and denying, licenses. Since

licenses are granted for six-month periods, the process takes

place twice each year. Formerly, applicants from rural areas

were required to secure the approval of the local village de-

velopment committee, but this provision was not included in

the 1969 law, though apparently it continued in some areas

in Kilimanjaro.

Due to the number of applications--a total of 867 in

April 1969 and almost twice that number in September 1969--

the deliberations of the Board are lengthy, usually involv-

ing a full day or more of meetings. The number of applica-

tions makes it impossible for each one to be discussed indi-

vidually, so that most applications from previous license-

holders are approved perfunctorily. Much of the decision-

making, therefore, is in fact made by the local government

bureaucracy, which is responsible for receiving applications,

listing them accurately, receiving objections, performing

health inspections, and providing supplementary information

where requested. The competence of the bureaucracy is sore-

ly tested in this process, and it is not always able to cope

with the demands on it.

First, the legislation governing licensing was not

fully understood by those involved. In part, this may be

due to the fact that new legislation was enacted in 1969,

but an examination of the Liquor Licensing Board records in-

dicated that even in previous years confusion over

interpretation of the law led to conflicting decisions in
identical cases. Because the basic law, drafted in complex
English and implemented by a Board most of whose members used
English with some difficulty, was not adequately understood,
on several occasions in 1969 the Board violated the very law
it was established to implement. Due to a confusion of cate-
gories, for example, the fee for a particular type of trans-
fer was in some cases Shs. 5/-, while in others Shs. 500/-
was assessed.

Second, records of previous decisions were usually
of little use in current deliberations. Even when the Board
members were aware that an applicant had previously been de-
nied a license, they could not determine the grounds for the
denial. In one case dating back several years--actually a
conflict between two local notables that manifested itself
in opposition to a liquor license--records were so scanty
and difficult to locate that a lengthy investigation by the
area commissioner was duplicated. Nor were records kept by
bar or location--in September 1969 three different people
were awarded liquor licenses for the same building. At times,
it was even difficult to determine the basic guidelines previ-
ous Licensing Boards used for awarding and denying licenses.

Third, in order to reduce public pressure on Board
members and administrative officers, the public was kept rel-
atively uninformed about the law and about the status of ap-
plications, with the result that public sentiment, rather

than being channeled into Board deliberations in a coherent

manner, was communicated sporadically to individual partic-

ipants in the decision-making process. This meant as well

that formal objections were rare--one Board member even sug-

gested not making applications public to reduce-even further

public involvement and thus pressure on Board members--and

that when objections were presented, most often they emanated

from competing bar owners objecting to the loss of their mo-

nopoly. Thus, Board members, seeking to avoid pressure on

them as individuals, were inclined to exclude the general

public from all phases of the decision-making process; the

outcome, however, was that formal objections and communica-

tions and other public pressure on the Board as a whole were

reduced, while pressure on the individual Board members,

often based on misinformation and misunderstanding, was in-

creased.

Fourth, the bureaucracies involved were often in com-

petition with each other. The urban and rural administrative

officers were responsive to different constituencies and re-

sponsible to different superiors. While the bureaucratic

norms did not permit open advocacy of urban/rural interests

in Board deliberations, the responsiveness of the officers

to their own constituencies was manifested in the treatment

and presentation of applications--urban members were in gen-

eral sympathetic and rural members unsympathetic to the spe-

cial conditions that applied to bars designated as night

clubs, while the reverse was true for the oft-repeated pro-
posal to be less stringent in enforcing health regulations
in small rural bars. As well, there was often conflict,
rather than cooperation, within the bureaucracy itself. For
several years, the administrative and health officers of one
of the two Kilimanjaro councils have been in conflict, each
accusing the other of chicanery in awarding liquor licenses.
The administrative officers accuse the health officers of
certifying, or refusing to certify, a bar without reason
(corruption suggested), while the health officers accuse the
administrative officers of granting licenses without their
certification (corruption suggested). Precisely because sev-
eral power centers were represented on the Board, aggrieved
applicants could present their cases to several different
people, and by varying the details slightly were often suc-
cessful in having the original decision reconsidered and al-
tered. That is, an individual denied a license because the
health officer refused to certify his bar as meeting health
requirements could seek out his councillor and with him com-
plain to the administrative officer that he was being har-
rassed by the health officer and thus get his case reheard.
Finally, because no one wanted the onus of being responsible
for denying a license, each sought to clear himself by blam-
ing other Board members in his public explanations for the
denial, thus reinforcing the popular belief that particular-
istic criteria and personalities, rather than general rules,

were involved.

An additional factor that served to incapacitate the Liquor Licensing Board was a continuing conflict of goals. There was conflict between the policy goals of the Board and as a result between the principles used to guide Board deliberations.

In 1968 the Kilimanjaro TANU Regional Executive Committee called on the Liquor Licensing Board to reduce consumption of alcohol in Kilimanjaro, reaffirming a resolution of the Kilimanjaro TANU Annual Conference of 1967. There is widespread aggreement in Kilimanjaro that consumption of alcoholic beverages is excessive, and many people trace all problems of social dislocation--theft, assault, rape, broken homes, corruption--to this cause. The Liquor Licensing Board regularly reiterated that its major policy goal was to reduce consumption of liquor.

At the same time, there is a strong commitment in the spirit of Tanzanian self-reliance to assert that locally brewed beer is as good as, if not better than, bottled beer (even though most of the bottled beer consumed is brewed in Tanzania, much of it under the brand name Kilimanjaro), and to promote the consumption of locally brewed beer over bottled beer. Even a Ministry circular urged local liquor licensing boards to encourage the consumption of local beer. As well, in Kilimanjaro there is a general commitment to encourage the population to diversify its sources of income--to

go into business--and to replace individual enterprise with cooperative endeavor. That is, both national policy and local feeling supported individuals, and especially small cooperatives, who wanted to increase their income by brewing and selling local liquor.

Thus, the policy goals of the Liquor Licensing Board included commitments both to reducing and to increasing consumption. In practical terms, this meant that the Board, which tried to reduce consumption by reducing licenses, was stymied in achieving its major policy goal. That is, while the Board was reluctant to grant new licenses, it was also reluctant to refuse applicants who asserted they were supporting the nation's policy of socialism and self-reliance by opening bars and selling mbege.

Another conflict of goals involves the conflicting demands of attention to community needs--health, order--and of protection of the individual against administrative abuse and chicanery. While the adverse recommendations of health and police officials might provide a simple means of reducing the number of licenses, Board members were inclined to side with the individual applicant who felt he was being harrassed by government officers using unnecessarily stringent and harsh standards. Especially in the rural area, where many bars were simply parts of private houses, the beer served from the barrels in which it is brewed, and the brew drunk from gourds supplied by the drinkers themselves, Board members

were reluctant to insist on needed improvements for a bar so
marginal economically that the improvements would force the
bar owner out of business. Likewise, police reports of law
violations were often regarded as undue harrassment of the
small man trying to eke out a meager living and insufficient
cause for denial of license. In both cases, the lack of
clear agreement on just how adverse a police or health offi-
cer's comment had to be to deny a license led to conflicting
decisions in identical cases. The fear of litigation by ag-
grieved applicants made the Board chary of denying licenses
solely on recommendation of health and police officers. As
a result, the most obvious and the most defensible reasons
for denying licenses were rarely used, and no other causes
for denial, other than rejecting new applications, were de-
veloped.

Finally, an additional conflict is that between the
commitment to reduce consumption and the political repercus-
sions of denying licenses. Individuals who feel deprived by
governmental decisions are never happy, and in Kilimanjaro
most people believed that license denial was a personal, not
an impersonal, decision. By not differentiating decisions
that are universal from those that are particular in their
application, they felt singled out and sought remedy, not in
the impersonal form of opposing policies and guidelines, but
in the directly personal form of attempting to persuade or
pressure the individual Board member believed to be responsible

or to have him removed from the Board. The Board members
themselves, while recognizing the standards of impartiality
applicable in their decisions, were unable to escape entire-
ly from the personal and particular obligations of family,
clan, and friendship ties.[5] As well, it was not uncommon
for local communities to interpret the denial of a license
as the rejection of one neighborhood in favor of another.
Therefore, since the personal cost of denying a license may
be very high, the grounds for doing so must be very solid in-
deed.

Although formal decisions on the awarding of liquor
licenses in Kilimanjaro are made by the Liquor Licensing Board,
there are alternative ways to secure a license and to profit
from the trade in liquor. The existence of these alternatives,
of course, reduces the power of the Liquor Licensing Board,
undermines its respect and legitimacy in the public eye, and
enables individuals to defeat its intentions.

Even though the liquor licensing law clearly speci-
fies that liquor licenses, once granted, may not be sold, in
Kilimanjaro they are both sold and leased, and on occasion
the original applicant's only intention is to profit from the
sale or rental of his license. Since the operator of a bar

[5]For a similar finding in Acholi, Uganda, see Colin
Leys, _Politicians and Policies_ (Nairobi: EAPH, 1967), 46-47.

can claim to be its manager, legitimately employed by the

license-holder, it has proved almost impossible to curtail

this practice. One of the most prosperous bar owners in

Moshi rents a section of his bar--as an American supermarket

chain would to a concessionaire--to a seller of "premium"

mbege for approximately six times what his license cost for

the entire six-month license period. When local rumors sug-

gested, in August 1969, that at its September sitting the

Liquor License Board would approve all applicants, several

individuals applied for licenses solely for the purpose of

selling them later.

Both confusion and corruption within the administra-

tive bureaucracy permit licenses to be granted without the

express authorization of the Liquor Licensing Board. In

April 1969, for example, when the Board attempted to reduce

the number of licenses by denying all new applications, some

new applications were approved because they were listed in

Board papers as renewals. While accusations of chicanery

are common when such cases come to light, there is sufficient

evidence of bureaucratic incompetence and error to make ac-

cidental mislisting credible. On the other hand, there is

also evidence of corruption, ranging from permitting an ap-

plicant to identify herself, falsely, as a local UWT chair-

man and thus insure preferential treatment, to issuing a

health certificate without ever visiting the prospective bar,

to forging a superior's signature in the issuance of a

license. Proof of corruption is difficult to obtain in such cases, especially since TANU policy considers the offerer of a bribe as guilty as the recipient, and it is rare that a license is denied or revoked because it was obtained illegally. In addition, the difficulty of enforcing licensing regulations in rural areas provides another path for operating a bar without Liquor Licensing Board approval.

Still another channel for circumventing the Liquor Licensing Board is to apply pressure on the Area Commissioner, its chairman, and even on the Regional Commissioner. As the representatives of the central government in the district and region respectively, and as direct appointees of the President, these two officials wield extensive powers, and although government circulars define the limits of their operations, it is widely believed that they are able to delay or alter directives emanating from the center and that they can exercise at will the ultimate coercive power--to jail an individual without reason indefinitely.[6]

The new liquor licensing law of 1969 specified hours for the sale of liquor, introducing changes widely opposed in Kilimanjaro. Opposition focused on closing bars between

[6]The abuse of their power by some commissioners supports these perceptions, though TANU and the government are increasingly successful in educating people about the limits of commissioners' power and methods of appeal against abuse. See the Annual Reports of the Permanent Commission of Enquiry, June 1966 - June 1967 and July, 1967 - June, 1968 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968 and 1969).

2 and 5 PM--the time a farmer returns from his field and is accustomed to drinking mbege with his meal--and on keeping bars open until 11 PM or midnight--believed to be the cause for an increase in anti-social behavior. This opposition developed just after the arrival in Kilimanjaro of a new Regional Commissioner, an individual transferred from another region where he had been supported by the party in a dispute with the local Members of Parliament.[7] As is the custom in Tanzania, the new Commissioner toured the mountain and held public meetings both to introduce himself and to give people an opportunity to present complaints. After several weeks of meetings that focused largely on opposition to the new beer law, the Regional Commissioner suspended implementation of the new law and announced that in regard to bar hours the old law would remain in effect, thus bringing to a halt both

[7]For details of this dispute see H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen and J. J. Sterkenburg, "The Party Supreme," Kroniek van Afrika 1(1969):65-88. The dispute was perhaps more complex than this article suggests, and involved a basic clash over the necessarily conflicting roles of Member of Parliament and Regional Commissioner. After acrimonious exchanges in the Parliament, a TANU committee was sent to the region to investigate, and supported the Regional Commissioner. The MPs were subsequently dismissed from the party, and thus lost their seats in Parliament. The Regional Commissioner was shortly thereafter transferred to Kilimanjaro, and after a few months in his new post, was retired. Subsequently, one of the dismissed MPs became an officer of the Moshi Town Council, and the former Regional Commissioner was appointed chairman of a national licensing authority. For the full report of the TANU committee, see Tanganyika African National Union, Taarifa ya Tume maalum iliyokwenda Mkoa wa Ziwa Magharibi kusikiliza Matatizo juu ya Wabunge wa Mkoa huo na Mkuu wa Mkoa huo (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968).

the demonstrations against the new law and its enforcement
by the police. When the Regional Commissioner sought sanc-
tion for his actions in the Liquor Licensing Board, he was
at first stymied by the Town Clerk, who, pointing out that
the board established under the old law had ceased to func-
tion and the new board had not yet been selected, refused to
call a meeting. When the new Board finally convened, it sup-
ported the Regional Commissioner's action, and requested
that the Minister direct that the bar hours suggested by the
Regional Commissioner be the hours applicable for Kilimanjaro.
After several more weeks, during which the Town Clerk and per-
haps others pointed out the illegality of the suspension of
the new law to the Ministry,[8] a high-ranking Ministry offi-
cial was dispatched to Kilimanjaro to insure that the hours
in force were those specified in the new law.

Another example of the power of the commissioners to
intervene in the functioning of the Liquor Licensing Board
involved a leading European bar owner in Moshi who was de-
nied a license because the Board, instructed by a Ministry
circular, restricted licenses to Tanzanian citizens. The
bar owner appealed to the Regional Commissioner, who tele-
phoned the Area Commissioner and instructed him to issue the

[8]Although of course cause-and-effect cannot be estab-
lished, this was widely believed to be a major factor in the
sudden demotion and transfer of the Town Clerk to a less
prestigeous rural post shortly thereafter.

license under a clause in the law exempting bars serving the tourist trade from the citizenship requirement. In this case, the Area Commissioner brought the matter to the Board (the applicant had by then appealed directly to the Minister), which, assessing the situation accurately, after some acrid comments approved a six-month terminal license, to permit the bar owner to close out his business or find a citizen to purchase it. When the time for the next application came, the bar owner indicated he had applied for citizenship, Board files contained no record that he had ever been notified that his license was a terminal one, and the license was granted without comment. Because of this power to intervene in the functioning of the Board, often aggrieved applicants approached the commissioners directly to influence or alter Board decisions.

Finally, applicants dissatisfied with Board decisions are permitted by the law to appeal directly to the Minister, who, apparently, upheld all appeals to him from Kilimanjaro in 1969.[9] There were widespread allegations of corruption involved in these reversals of Board decisions, and charges that the Minister, from a neighboring, rival ethnic group, acted out of dislike for the Chagga. Privately, the

[9]Liquor Licensing Board records show only notices of appeals granted--instructions from the Minister to issue the license in question. It was not possible to ascertain the number of appeals denied or cases pending, though members of the Board believed that all appeals had been successful.

Liquor Licensing Board was unanimous in its condemnation of the Minister's actions, and all agreed it made the Board purposeless. If all who were denied licenses by the Board could secure them from the Minister, the Board felt that it might as well approve all applications in the first place and thus avoid antagonizing people, and it was in large part this feeling that led to the nearly doubling of licenses awarded in September 1969.

Thus, although the Liquor Licensing Board was formally the locus for authoritative decisions on who would be permitted to engage in the liquor trade and who would not, in fact several alternative, viable means existed for profiting from the brewing and sale of liquor, and they were often used.

Liquor licensing is a type of governmental output whose impact is almost entirely restricted to the local area and which involves a form of decision-making in which local participation is maximized. Indeed, in Tanzania liquor licensing is considered by a local board, unlike, for example, transport licensing. Having examined the roles of individuals specifically mentioned in the liquor licensing law--the official participants, let us turn our attention to other participants in the liquor licensing process.

The popular reaction to the bar hours of the new liquor licensing law--which resulted in several demonstrations

and refusals to leave bars for the midday closing--has al-
ready been mentioned. Through the Regional Commissioner pub-
lic pressure was temporarily successful in altering the im-
pact of the law in Kilimanjaro, but the suspension of the
new law was ultimately thwarted in Dar es Salaam. Public at-
titudes, however, were contradictory. A strong religious
ethic--supported almost fervently by both Christian and Mus-
lim leaders--that alcohol is evil and individuals must be
kept from its evil influences by societal restraints was op-
posed by the importance of mbege in the local diet, and, per-
haps more importantly, by the extent to which the local popu-
lace in Kilimanjaro profits from the liquor trade. Since for
liquor licensing mass public opinion is recognized only when
it is manifested in large public outbursts, since for most
aspects of liquor licensing public opinion is rarely united
or cohesive, since no organized group attempts to mobilize
public opinion on this issue, and since there are few direct
channels for incorporating public opinion in the decision-
making process, public opinion plays little direct part in
the politics of liquor licensing in Kilimanjaro.

          Prior to the new liquor licensing legislation of 1969
the Moshi Town Council had set limits on the number of bars
to be approved to the different sections of town. But the
Council, unsure of its authority under the new legislation,
declined, at the election of its representatives to the new
Liquor Licensing Board, to instruct them to implement these

limits. That is, the only specific policy of the Town Coun-
cil in regard to liquor licensing fell casualty to the new
legislation. Other than this election of its representatives
to the Board, the Town Council took no official cognizance of
liquor licensing, though individual councillors did confer
with each other and with the Town Clerk as Liquor Licensing
Board secretary on licensing problems.

In Tanzania, party policy frowns on the formation of
interest groups in general, and economic interest groups in
particular. Except for trade unions, cooperatives, and so-
cial and charitable organizations, it is assumed that the in-
terests of any particular section of the population can be
adequately represented by TANU and its auxiliaries, and that
adherence to bureaucratic norms assures individuals fair and
just treatment without the need for recourse to interest group
protection. In other words, it is assumed that the political
functions performed by interest groups in other polities--
especially interest communication, aggregation, and articula-
tion--are performed by TANU and its auxiliaries, and that in-
terest groups, which could be used to form competing centers
of power, are both unnecessary and dangerous. In addition,
it is assumed that interest groups with a primarily economic
orientation represent anti-socialist elements in the society
and therefore should not be tolerated. This party policy,
coupled with the other factors discussed here, have largely
prevented the emergence of a strong interest group of beer

brewers and bar owners in Kilimanjaro.

Attempts have been made to organize individuals in-
volved in the liquor trade, but dissensions and splits among
those concerned have further eroded their already limited
ability to influence authoritative allocations. A national
association of local beer brewers was formed in Tanzania in
the early 1960s, but by 1969 it had become an association of
brewers and bar owners with its headquarters, and apparently
its only activity, in Kilimanjaro. And even there, it has
been unsuccessful in recruiting the majority of bar owners
and in obtaining official recognition as the representative
of brewers and bar owners. In fact, it was widely believed
that the president and major officers operated the associa-
tion as a profitable, and perhaps only quasi-legal, business.
Apparently the president is able to collect fees from unin-
formed bar owners to intercede in their favor with the Liq-
uor Licensing Board. Once decisions have been made by the
Board, but before they are made public, he manages to secure
advance information on the outcome of Board deliberations,
and visits the applicants--claiming an additional fee for
his intervention from those who were successful and collect-
ing money from those who were unsuccessful to finance appeals
in Dar es Salaam. Local police have conducted a lengthy in-
vestigation of the association, and the Board itself is suf-
ficiently convinced of his dishonesty to refuse to consider
objections filed by the president. On the other hand, many

people in Kilimanjaro, including several leading political

figures, are convinced of the power and influence of this in-

dividual, who also maintains an office as a Public Writer--

he writes letters for illiterates, completes applications and

forms, offers general advice on business ventures, personal

problems, and everything else, and functions as a lawyer in

quasi-legal and legal disputes, all for a fee. He himself

claims that he has been instrumental in several instances in

influencing government liquor licensing policy.

Although local politicians refer to the power of bar

owners and their association, their power stems not from a

formal organization and organizational activities, but from

concerted action to pressure decision-makers individually

and to discourage and weaken competition, and from the avail-

ability of sufficient resources to fight court cases, to fly

to Dar es Salaam to press appeals, and to direct some of

their funds into the hands of cooperative public servants.

Thus, the formal economic interest group has been diverted

to serve the interests of its officers and is not recognized

as a legitimate participant in the local political system,

and the bar owners influence allocations by marshalling their

considerable economic resources and acting in concert.

A major focus for UWT activities in Kilimanjaro has

been to encourage women to go into business, both to supple-

ment farm income, and, due to land shortage and low coffee

prices, as an alternative source of income. Among the most

attractive business enterprises are bars, where the capital

investment required is minimal and profits are high. By

1969 there were several women's groups running bars, some as

UWT branches and some independently, as well as individual

women running bars and maintaining stalls in the town beer

market. The Liquor Licensing Board, anxious to support UWT

activities and in accord with a Ministry circular directing

it to favor cooperatives over individual applicants, acted

favorably on almost all applications from women's groups.

And even in cases of competitive bidding to manage local-

government-owned bars, the Town Council has accepted low

bids, and thus reduced its own revenue, to assist the wom-

en's groups. But it should be noted that in fact, women's

groups active in the liquor trade in 1969 functioned as

share-holding companies and not as cooperatives. That is,

women bought shares in the joint venture and expected a re-

turn on their investment, but the consumers were not share-

holders and did not benefit (either by reduced prices or by

distributions of dividends) from the operation. Even

though the government commercial officer and other offi-

cials attempted to assist these women's groups in establish-

ing and managing their businesses, there were many com-

plaints by members that the bars were unable to show a

profit and that individuals had not received their shares

of profits made. As well, several groups obtained permis-
sion, on the grounds of the economic marginality of their
bars, to pay their employees less than the minimum wages,
so that in most cases, the women's groups were neither re-
placing private ownership with cooperatives, nor eliminat-
ing the long hours and low wages for employees for which
private ownership is regularly criticized. Thus, the UWT
was in the position of publicly condemning the consumption
of alcohol and at the same time devoting extensive energy
within the political system to insuring that women's groups
were assisted in entering the liquor trade.

The local TANU organization was not directly involved
in liquor licensing. Both the TANU Annual Conference and the
TANU Regional Executive Committee had called for a reduction
in the consumption of alcohol, and in so doing may have rep-
resented the views of the general citizenry, but TANU itself
took no specific, direct action to insure implementation of
that call. While all of the members of the Liquor Licensing
Board, save the citizen elected at large, can be considered
TANU leaders, TANU, as TANU, was not specifically involved in
their deliberations. In fact, on several occasions, party
influence was specifically cited in decrying the Minister's
reversals of Board decisions. When it was suggested that
this problem be raised at the TANU National Annual

Conference, one Board member, who held both a TANU and government post, argued that taking the issue to TANU was absolutely useless.

LIQUOR LICENSING IN KILIMANJARO: CONCLUSIONS

Formal awards of liquor licenses are made by the Liquor Licensing Board in Kilimanjaro. But we have seen that bureaucratic incompetence and corruption distort the decision-making process. Conflicts among the goals and guidelines used by the Board for granting licenses produce decisions that are at times inconsistent and contradictory. The existence of alternative means to obtain licenses and the ability of external forces to influence Board decisions permit individuals unsuccessful in the formal, official decision-making process to obtain liquor licenses nonetheless. Public opinion--a combination of vocal condemnation of alcohol and pressure on Board members to grant licenses--has not been mobilized and plays no significant direct role in Board decisions. And the contradiction between condemnation of the evil influences of alcohol and support for individuals and groups involved in the liquor trade is manifest even with TANU and its auxiliaries.

Thus in liquor licensing, as in education, the official, formal decision-making apparatus is largely bypassed. Not only is the Liquor Licensing Board thwarted in its

attempts to control consumption of alcohol and to promote an

orderly development of the liquor trade, but in fact, it is

relatively easily manipulated by the major bar owners, against

whom most of its efforts are ostensibly directed, as several

members of the Board admit in despair.

The method of control chosen by the Board--reduction

in the number of liquor licenses granted, or at least limita-

tions on the increase--cannot seriously be expected to lead

to a decrease in drinking. And in fact, because of the vari-

ous pressures on the Board discussed here, very few licenses

are actually denied. Likewise, raising the cost of the li-

censes (also proposed to reduce their number), while it may

produce additional revenue for the local councils, is unlike-

ly to reduce drinking. That is, it is possible that at some

threshold point reducing the number of bars will make it so

difficult to obtain liquor that some people will be discour-

aged from drinking, but currently Kilimanjaro District is so

saturated with bars that a reduction in the number of license-

holders, or a freeze, simply favors those who retain their li-

censes, making their bars larger and more profitable, and

gives forces opposed to a reduction in consumption a monopoly

position in the liquor trade. Indeed, one might argue that

a more rational strategy for socialist Tanzania would be to

attempt to attack the economic base of the large entre-

preneurs by granting licenses to anyone who applies.

As well, the channels available to reverse Liquor

Licensing Board decisions--appeal to the Minister, pressure
on political figures and Board members, corruption--are all
more easily utilized by the larger, richer bar owners than
by their less affluent, small-scale competitors. Thus, by
favoring the larger, richer entrepreneurs at all stages of
the liquor licensing process--in the legislation, in Board
decisions, and in enforcement, the Board becomes the ally of
those elements that dominate the trade it seeks to regulate.

An additional factor that enables the larger liquor
entrepreneurs to use their regulating agency in this way is
the extent to which the center involves itself in this pri-
marily local issue, limits the local Board's freedom of ac-
tion and ability to deal with the problems it perceives, and
overrides and reverses local decisions. While greater local
autonomy in liquor licensing might seem an obvious remedy,
most, though not all, participants in the liquor licensing
process oppose greater local autonomy, both because they find
it difficult to conceive of basic policy and control not
emanating from the center and because they feel that mainte-
nance of Dar es Salaam as the ultimate source of power pro-
tects them from what they fear would be intolerable local po-
litical pressure. At the center, greater local autonomy is
opposed because it would defeat one aim of the new law--to
curb arbitrary action by local commissioners, because it is
felt that coordinated development can only be achieved by di-
rection from the center, and because it would make one more

circumstance in which Kilimanjaro was accorded special treatment in Tanzania.

Thus, the Liquor Licensing Board has little real control over the liquor trade, it can be indirectly manipulated by those interests it is established to regulate, and its major stated policy goals--both exercising firm control over the liquor trade and reducing the consumption of alcohol, are little realized. The local party organization has at best a modest role in the decision-making in this issue-area, and the major brewers and bar owners manage to disregard it.

This modest role for the party has broader implications. The party, expected to manage change in Tanzania, has been able to exercise little influence on the direction of economic change in liquor licensing in Kilimanjaro. Committed to developing socialism, the party, in this issue-area at least, has not been able to replace the private entrepreneurs that dominate the liquor trade, and in fact the decision-making process has served to reinforce economic structures inconsistent with the socialist development described in party policy. And until the liquor trade is adequately assessed in its role in the local economy and the role of local government is more clearly delineated--that is, until liquor licensing is seen as one element in the direction of the entire economy and not simply as the regulation of a minor and inconsequential activity, and until there is a clearer definition of the division of powers and

responsibilities between central and local government--until

these major reassessments are made, it is difficult to see

how this situation can be fundamentally altered.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICS OF JOBS

JOBS IN KILIMANJARO: INTRODUCTION

The study of local politics in Kilimanjaro has thus
far focused on participants and outcomes in conflicts over
primary education and liquor licensing. A third issue-area
considered important by Kilimanjaro residents is jobs and un-
employment. Conflict over jobs and unemployment meets the
criteria of salience and concern--people are aware of and
very concerned about the shortage of jobs--and in addition
involves decision-making that differs from the patterns al-
ready described in that there are no specific, clearly de-
fined decision-points. That is, it is important to examine
this issue-area, at least briefly, because it is suggestive
of the types of conflict in Kilimanjaro that do not revolve
around or culminate in clearly defined decisions and because
it is a corrective to the institutional bias implicit in
studies that focus solely on clearly defined decision-making
and decision-makers. This overview of the conflict over jobs
and unemployment in Kilimanjaro will also provide some in-
sight into other elements of Kilimanjaro politics to be dis-
cussed in more detail later, especially development planning
and coordination and the role of the local TANU organization
as an expediter in local politics.

JOBS IN KILIMANJARO: BACKGROUND

The shortage of land in Kilimanjaro and the fall in coffee prices in recent years have reinforced the strong drive among Tanzania's youth for salaried employment. As well, a large number of students, unable to proceed beyond Standard IV or Standard VII, leave the school system each year oriented toward the wage economy. In 1968, for example, because of limited places at the higher levels, almost 3,000 children in Kilimanjaro District were unable to advance from Standard IV to Standard V, and another 7,500 ended school at Standard VII (see TABLE 5.1). Thus, more than 10,000 students finished their schooling in Kilimanjaro in 1968, most of them expecting to find salaried employment.[1] Since the total number of employees in all of Kilimanjaro Region (including Pare as well as Kilimanjaro District) in 1968 was some 26,000,[2] it is clear that only a small percentage of the more than 10,000 school-leavers in 1968 were able to

[1]President Nyerere has argued that this orientation toward salaried employment is one of the major shortcomings of the Tanzanian system of education. In his paper, "Education for Self-Reliance," he notes that "Individually and collectively we have in practice thought of education as a training for the skills required to earn high salaries in the modern sector of our economy," quoted in Resnick, Tanzania: Revolution by Education, 49.

[2]See Tanzania, Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Central Statistical Bureau. Survey of Employment and Earnings 1968 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), Appendix X. This figure includes almost 7,000 casual workers.

TABLE 5.1   SCHOOL LEAVERS IN KILIMANJARO DISTRICT, 1968

DISTRICT	NUMBER WHO SAT			NUMBER SELECTED			
	BOYS	GIRLS	TOTAL	BOYS	GIRLS	TOTAL	PER-CENT
STANDARD IV EXAMINATION							
Kilimanjaro rural[a]	4905	3998	8903	3502	2523	6025	63[b]
STANDARD VII EXAMINATION							
Kilimanjaro rural	4994	3140	8134	368	133	501	6.2[c]
Moshi Town	192	156	348	42	38	80	23.0

SOURCE: District Education Office, Kilimanjaro District
(Percentages not included in District Education
Office statistics)

[a]Does not include Moshi town, where in 1968 almost
all children enrolled were admitted to Standard V.

[b]That is, 63% of the pupils who sat for the Standard
IV examination in Kilimanjaro District in 1968 were selected
to enter Standard V.

[c]That is, 6.2% of the pupils who sat for the Standard VII examination in Kilimanjaro District in 1968 were selected to enter secondary school.

find salaried employment. Even though some Kilimanjaro

school-leavers were still too young to be looking for jobs

immediately, and even though some could find jobs elsewhere

in Tanzania, with more than 10,000 school-leavers yearly for

the past several years, clearly there is a large number of

young people in Kilimanjaro who expect to obtain jobs and

who are unable to do so.

The actual number of unemployed in Kilimanjaro is

difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. Local estimates

in 1969 ranged from 1,000 (Labour Office) to 5,000 (NUTA Dis-

trict Office), to 20,000 (Town Clerk's Office), to 30,000

plus 90,000 more who would take jobs if they were available

(NUTA Regional Office). The difficulty of obtaining a reli-

able assessment of the number of unemployed is exemplified

by the fact that NUTA figures showed a total employment for

Kilimanjaro Region of twice the Central Statistical Bureau

figures. While it may be that the error in the NUTA figures

simply resulted from the inclusion of Arusha Region figures

in the total (the NUTA office in Kilimanjaro served both re-

gions), the point here is that local officials were often

unaware of statistics compiled by the central government and

in dealing with their day-to-day responsibilities were only

rarely motivated to search for a more detailed picture of

the overall situation.

A survey of the Tanzania labor force in 1965 found

unemployment rates of 3.9% in rural and 7.0% in urban areas,

and underemployment (the full-time equivalents of individuals

working less than full time) rates of 14.8% for rural and

4.2% for urban areas (see TABLE 5.2).[3] Applying these per-

centages to Kilimanjaro District and Moshi Town yields a

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[3]Robert S. Ray, Labour Force Survey of Tanzania (Dar
es Salaam: mimeographed, January 1966). See pp. 60ff for
Ray's discussion of unemployment and underemployment. Ray's
Table 5.8: Unemployment Rates and Underemployment, p. 83, is
reproduced here as TABLE 5.2.

TABLE 5.2 UNEMPLOYMENT RATES AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT IN
            TANZANIA, 1965

	TOTAL	RURAL (thousands)	URBAN
Labor Force	3,805	3,663	143
Unemployed	152	142	10
Unemployment rates	4.0%	3.9%	7.0%
Unemployment equivalent of underemployment[a]	549	543	6
Equivalent unemployment rates	14.4%	14.8%	4.2%
Unemployment and under-employment combined	701	685	16
Combined unemployment rates	18.4%	18.7%	11.2%

SOURCE: Adapted from Robert S. Ray, Labour Force Survey
         of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: mimeographed, January
         1966), Table 5.8, p. 83.

[a]Underemployment based on standard 45 hour work week;
e.g., if 10,000 workers were employed half the standard work
week, this would be the equivalent of 5,000 totally unemployed
workers. See Ray, Labour Force Survey, 60.

somewhat confused picture, since the available labor force

for urban jobs includes much of Tanzania, but they suggest as

crude figures some 7,400 unemployed and 26,750 underemployed

for the district as a whole. Because in the design of this

survey people actually unemployed but who had not previously

had work, or who were not actively seeking work, were more

likely to be left uncounted, these figures probably serious-

ly underestimate the actual number of people who considered

themselves unemployed and looking for work, especially in the

town. In summary, then, there are certainly a large number

of people actively looking for jobs in Kilimanjaro, and an

even larger number who would seek jobs if they thought sal-

aried employment were more readily available. Local offi-

cials concerned with unemployment in Kilimanjaro in general

agree with Ray's findings on the typical unemployed person:

male, aged 25-45, with some primary education, and probably

Chagga.

Thus, a severe shortage of land, successive years of

poor return on the major cash crop, and an annual output of

more than 10,000 young people from an education system ori-

ented toward salaried employment create a high rate of un-

employment and underemployment in Kilimanjaro. The inability

to create jobs quickly enough to meet the demand for them is

recognized by local political leaders, who cite unemployment

as one of the most important local problems and who recog-

nize that other problems they mention--theft and prostitution,

for example--are related to unemployment. But the difficul-

ties in obtaining accurate statistics and a narrow view of

possible solutions combine with the unwillingness of any in-

dividual or institution to assume major responsibility for

dealing with this problem to produce a disjointed and large-

ly ineffectual reaction to the widespread demand for jobs.

JOBS IN KILIMANJARO: THE ACTORS

Although Kilimanjaro political leaders are almost

unanimous in their agreement that the shortage of jobs is a
critical problem, there is little coordinated or direct ac-
tion to deal with it. Most local leaders regard construc-
tion of additional factories by the central government as
the only viable solution to unemployment. Even those who
recognize the cycle--that low coffee prices make enterprises
dependent on the local market unable to expand and thus un-
able to create new jobs--confess they do not see anything
they can do about it.

The Regional Labour Office registered about 600 peo-
ple each month looking for employment during 1968-69, and
labor officers indicated there were many more looking for
employment on their own, without registering. Labor officers
did not consider it their responsibility to be concerned with
the general employment situation in Kilimanjaro, and were both
unable to provide statistics on employment and unfamiliar with
major reports and studies, such as the Labour Force Survey of
Tanzania and the annual Survey of Employment and Earnings.
Nor did they consider themselves responsible for dealing with
unemployment: their only efforts to assist job-seekers were
to request, occasionally, work from local employers, and they
stressed that the pressure on jobs makes that an unrewarding
approach; and when new factories are opened in Kilimanjaro,
job-seekers come from as far as Uganda and southern Tanzania
to apply for employment. Some local employers did use the

Labour Office when hiring--an employer who needed temporary

labor might hire by sending a lorry to collect men sitting

around the Labour Office, and the Moshi Town Council some-

times requested names of individuals with specific skills

needed. But in general, labor officers did not consider un-

employment in Kilimanjaro as serious as in other areas of

Tanzania where land is less fertile and agriculture able to

support fewer people. Thus, they did not regard unemployment

as a problem about which they could do very much, nor did

they consider the large number of individuals who unsuccess-

fully sought work a social, as opposed to simply a labor,

problem. To explain and justify their inability to do any-

thing to remedy the unemployment situation, labor officers

emphasized that other institutions, including the local coun-

cils, NUTA, TANU, TYL, and UWT, were also unable to do any-

thing about unemployment.

The second major institution concerned with the prob-

lems of work and workers, NUTA, also offered little assist-

ance to people seeking jobs. Official NUTA policy, at least

as interpreted and implemented in Kilimanjaro, was that in

general the unemployed were a problem for the Labour Office,

or someone else, but not NUTA. NUTA assumed responsibility

only for NUTA members, which meant individuals who had had

jobs, and even for them, NUTA offered assistance in finding

jobs only in unusual cases. For example, some effort was

made to find jobs for agricultural employees laid off because

of the contraction of the sisal industry, but that effort was

largely unsuccessful because sisal workers, interested in

half-day jobs to leave time for work in their own fields,

were largely reluctant to move into industrial employment.

Since NUTA had no institutionalized means of assisting indi-

viduals looking for work, when NUTA officials were willing to

help, they relied on informal contacts with employers to find

jobs.   That is, they could not adequately service the 25-30

people who came to NUTA each day looking for work, but for

a few members, or relatives or friends of members, NUTA of-

ficials were successful in finding employment.   Like the La-

bour Office, NUTA did not regard unemployment as its problem

--except for occasional cases of NUTA members laid off previ-

ous jobs and occasional assistance to friends and relatives

of NUTA members--and did not consider the existence of mas-

sive unemployment, which it recognized, a social problem.

While it may be common for trade unions to limit their con-

cerns to the immediate and work-place interests of their mem-

bers, it is clear that in Tanzania NUTA, perceived by TANU

leaders as one of the main pillars on which the party stands,

is expected to have a broader view of the needs of workers

and the society in general.   According to NUTA rules, for

example, no more than 50% of income is to be spent on admin-

istration, leaving half the organization's income to be spent

for social services or invested; a NUTA-operated Workers

Development Corporation has been established to invest union

funds in development projects.[4] Yet NUTA officials in Kili-

manjaro insisted that unemployment was not their concern.

Nor did the Moshi Town Council assume any responsi-

bility in dealing with the shortage of jobs. Although both

councillors and Council officers were aware of the problem--

an advertisement announcing six posts in the town fire bri-

gade, for example, brought 600 responses, and the Regional

Land Officer (a nominated councillor) reported that construc-

tion in town, and thus related employment, had dropped by

50%--the Council did not formally consider the creation of

jobs in the formulation, definition, and implementation of

its plans and programs. The Kilimanjaro District Council be-

gan an ambitious and at least initially successful program

to provide training in the use of hand tools. But while both

councils recognized the pressure of unemployment created by

land shortage, low coffee prices, and the massive annual pri-

mary school output, both Councils, forced to expend most of

their income on education, social services, and salaries, had

little money to commit to dealing with this problem and in

fact concentrated their efforts on assisting individuals to

settle in other parts of Tanzania and on training programs

reaching a few people at best. Neither council considered

[4]See Tordoff, _Government and Politics in Tanzania_,
Chapter V.

the creation of jobs--as opposed to the provision of train-

ing--a top priority or incorporated the creation of jobs in

an overall strategy to deal with these problems.

Thus, none of the formal institutions that might be

expected to assume responsibility and exercise local initia-

tive in dealing in a comprehensive way with the shortage of

jobs in fact assumed that responsibility or exercised that

initiative.   There were some efforts by private institutions

to deal with this problem, but none has thus far had notice-

able success.   The Y.M.C.A. operates a farm training school,

designed to take Standard VII leavers and equip them to be

modern farmers, able to set an example and lead other farm-

ers in their communities.   But difficulties in administra-

tion, inability to secure places for farm school graduates

in government settlement schemes, and confusion over the ex-

tent of government participation in the management of the

school have meant that the first graduates have returned home

to the very plots they knew were too small to support them

and their families before they went off to school, with an

unfulfilled expectation of prosperity and prestige as a re-

sult of their training.   The Catholic mission operates a

typing and secretarial course, but the graduates of the six-

month course are not sufficiently skilled to emerge success-

ful from the tight competition for office positions.   They

too must return home, their expectations unfulfilled.   A

crafts training program is planned, to be managed by the

Catholic mission and supported by the Town Council, but it

is not at all clear that the young men who will complete this

six-month carpentry course will be able to find jobs. A more

sophisticated plan, organized by two Kilimanjaro Members of

Parliament, to train girls to manufacture children's clothing

using remnants from Tanzania's textile factories would train

fewer than 20 girls annually, and although more than a year

had elapsed since the plan was announced, nothing concrete

had been established by the end of 1969. A committee on un-

employment, organized among local notables by these same two

MPs, effectively ceased to function almost as soon as it was

constituted. As in the public sector, private institutions

considered unemployment someone else's problem, and individ-

ual attempts to deal with it were not incorporated into a

coordinated plan.

Thus, a picture emerges of wide agreement that short-

age of jobs is a serious problem, institutions unwilling to

assume prime responsibility for dealing with it, and indi-

vidual efforts that are spasmodic, uncoordinated, and often

unproductive. What responses there are focus on training,

rather than creating jobs, and rely on informal networks

rather than institutionalized relationships.

Other than NUTA, none of the TANU auxiliaries played

a substantial role in dealing with the shortage of jobs. By

encouraging women to go into business, and by providing

sewing instruction for a small group of girls in Moshi, the

UWT did assist some women to find productive employment.

But in general these efforts were not directed toward allevi-

ating the problems of those seeking jobs, but functioned

rather to encourage some women who would not normally be

seeking jobs, and who would not normally be considered unem-

ployed, to seek remunerative work. As has already been men-

tioned, TYL in 1969 turned its attention toward schools and

away from school-leavers.

The local TANU organization itself provided a form

of job referral service, and in doing so may have assisted

more people in getting jobs than all of the other institu-

tions combined. That is, individuals seeking work could

come to the local TANU office and obtain a letter from the

TANU secretary asking the NUTA or Labour officers, or an em-

ployer, to assist the individual. Although NUTA and Labour

officers and employers insisted they treated all applicants

equally, it is clear that an individual who could produce a

letter from the TANU office did have a slight advantage over

other applicants.

Finally, one might look to the Regional and District

Development Committees to initiate a coordinated attack on

this problem. The Development Committees provide a frame-

work within which officials from the government technical

departments meet with local party and council leaders to pro-

pose, consider, and implement development plans. The

combination of problems--land shortage, exacerbated by low

prices for the major cash crop and coupled with an output of

over 10,000 school pupils a year--demands a coordinated ap-

proach. The reaction of local political leaders, and of the

Development Committees, to this combination of problems, how-

ever, has been to focus on relocating Kilimanjaro residents

in other areas of Tanzania. After extensive surveys of

available areas, a comprehensive plan was begun in 1969 to

move 2,000 people from Kilimanjaro to Mwese, near Mpanda in

western Tanzania. Over 800 people had been moved by the end

of 1969; they were to be supported by the government until

the first harvest, at which time it was expected that their

success would enable them to bring their families to join

them and would encourage others to migrate, thus relieving

the pressure in Kilimanjaro. The functioning of the Develop-

ment Committees will be discussed in more detail in the next

chapter, but for our purposes here it suffices to note that

the concentration of efforts on this response to the combina-

tion of overpopulation, low prices, and unemployment has the

effect of diverting attention from other, and perhaps more

immediately productive efforts. In fact, a comprehensive

and detailed report on development prospects for the region

went virtually unnoticed.[5] This report stressed more effic-

ient use of manpower in agriculture and expansion of indus-

tries servicing agriculture and facilitating food consump-

tion, and industrialization based on the expansion of exist-

ing technology and capabilities, and criticized the Regional

Development Committee view that pressure on the agricultural

resources of Kilimanjaro should be remedied by settling some

of the population on new agricultural lands:

> This view ignores the structural changes which agri-
> cultural development promotes. A more technical analysis
> of the situation is that there is insufficient division
> of labour in the area, and that human resources now in
> agriculture should be moved into non-agricultural pur-
> suits. This programme of specialization of labour needs
> to be accompanied by a programme of diversification in
> the use of land now under coffee cultivation. The re-
> turns from capital expenditure on improving the quality
> of the human resource and making more economic use of
> existing agricultural land are likely to outweigh the
> returns from bringing new land under cultivation.[6]

Although this report emphasized that the economy of northern

Tanganyika had reached a take-off point that would enable it

to alleviate the pressures of overpopulation and unemployment,

and included detailed recommendations for achieving these ob-

jectives, only a few local officials, most of whom said they

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[5]See Max B. Ifill, "Perspectives for Regional Eco-
nomic Planning in Kilimanjaro Region," mimeographed, Dar es
Salaam, 1969. This comprehensive report on development in
Kilimanjaro Region, which brings together in a convenient
form statistics from several sources on the economy of Kili-
manjaro, was prepared for the Ministry of Economic Affairs
and Development Planning during the formulation of the Tan-
zania Second Five-Year Plan.

[6]Ifill, 6.

were unable to do anything about unemployment, were aware of
the report, and only one had actually read it. The Develop-
ment Committees primarily concerned themselves with relocat-
ing people elsewhere and did not attempt to deal with these
problems by developing the local economy.

Nepotism and corruption compounded the problems of
the shortage of jobs in Kilimanjaro. It was widely under-
stood that a job applicant must have a "cousin" in the plant,
or friendly with the personnel manager, in order to obtain
employment. Preference for relatives, friends, and people
from the same local area was common in hiring. Common as
well was low-level corruption--a "gift," usually money but
occasionally beer, a goat, or other consideration, to the
manager as a prerequisite to employment. In one local fac-
tory the payoff was so well organized that job applicants,
informed by clerks that they should not come empty-handed,
presented their "gifts" to a taxi driver intermediary before
appearing in person. In another plant, employing women, only
young, pretty, and willing girls were employed. In addition
to this petty corruption in the employment process, employers
took advantage of the demand for jobs by retaining new em-
ployees on temporary terms for extended periods, which meant
that they received neither the full salary nor the welfare
benefits of regular employment and that they could be easily
dismissed if they complained. Not only private owners, but

also the managers of publicly owned plants, interested in
showing increased profits by holding down the total wage
bill, engaged in these practices. And these practices, which
are common in many countries and which have certainly been
noted elsewhere in Africa, flourish in Tanzania, despite a
monolithic trade union structure presumably able to bring to
bear the power and sanctions of both the government and the
single party.[7] Most local political figures in Kilimanjaro
charged that NUTA and Labour Office officials participated
in the payoff and were thus unwilling to halt these prac-
tices. But even were that wholly untrue, the importance of
his job to an individual makes him unwilling to jeopardize
it: he is ready to go into debt and prepared to participate
in the corruption in order to obtain the job, and willing to
work under illegal conditions in order to keep it. That is,
jobs are so scarce, and the formal institutions so unrespon-
sive to complaints of exploitation, that individuals are not
willing to risk their jobs to complain. In Kilimanjaro at
least, where the government owns an important or controlling
interest in many of the large factories, this was no less
true in publicly-owned than in privately-owned plants.

[7]In fact, the incorporation of NUTA within the TANU
structure and the reduction of its operating autonomy in or-
der to prevent the emergence of a competing power base have
clearly hampered its ability to defend workers' interests.
See Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, especial-
ly pp. 152-153. The NUTA-TANU relationship is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 11.

In Kilimanjaro, NUTA has proved so unresponsive to workers' complaints about these and other practices that the local TANU organization itself has absorbed some of NUTA's trade union functions. Especially in cases of alleged corruption and complaints against small urban employers, many workers with grievances sought assistance at the TANU, rather than NUTA, office, and TANU officials usually dealt with the complaints directly:

> . . . NUTA cannot do anything and just sends [the complainant] to TANU anyhow. There is no point in sending him to NUTA--that just makes him angry by sending him on pointless trips all over town.

In this regard, it is important to note once again the manner in which the local TANU organization functions to expedite action within local institutions without seeking or bringing about major change. Individuals could utilize TANU to improve their chances of getting and retaining jobs, but TANU did not provide the major initiative in dealing with the problems--either the large problem of unemployment or the small one of bribes to get jobs--of which its officials indicated they were aware. In this way, TANU served individuals who did not have "cousins," and absorbed the responsibilities of other institutions people found unresponsive.

JOBS IN KILIMANJARO: CONCLUSIONS

We have briefly surveyed the shortage of jobs in Kilimanjaro and the local responses to that shortage. Local

managers continue to be able to take advantage of their eco-

nomic power and the scarcity of jobs to exploit employees and

perhaps public institutions as well. Attempts to deal with

unemployment made little use of public power and formal in-

stitutions, but relied instead on informal networks so that

traditional relationships continued to play a critical role

in what is usually considered an index of modernity--salaried

employment. The recommendations of the central government's

planning adviser, suggesting a locally-based strategy to deal

with overpopulation and unemployment, were neither adopted

nor even carefully examined by local institutions, and lit-

tle was done about them. Although unemployment was recog-

nized by most local leaders as a serious problem, at the lo-

cal level the problem of unemployment and its ramifications

for planned development in an agricultural society were at

best only poorly understood. Local responses to this prob-

lem, both public and private, except for modest programs to

train and a substantial effort to relocate people, have not

thus far been characterized by concerted, direct action.

Two observations are important here. One is that

although local resources and expertise for dealing with un-

employment are sorely limited, and although any general

strategy to deal with unemployment must be national in ori-

entation, Tanzania's planners did conclude that local action

could have major payoffs in dealing with this problem and a

major role for the local-level development committees could

be the coordination of efforts and resources to deal with un-

employment. The second is that the quickly expanding number

of young people seeking salaried employment and not finding

it are not functionally represented by either governmental

or party institutions.

This issue-area has also provided some insight into

one aspect of the activities of the local TANU organization.

For job-seekers and workers TANU provides assistance, expe-

dites requests and applications, and attempts to deal with

grievances. It is recognized as legitimate and it is trusted.

But in general, the response of the local TANU organization

has proved reactive, not innovative.

CHAPTER 6

ISSUES IN MOSHI

ISSUES IN MOSHI: INTRODUCTION

The study of local politics in Moshi has begun by
examining decisions and decision-making in several key issue-
areas. The study of community power through the prism of
the participants and outcomes in selected local conflicts,
which owes much to the work of Robert Dahl,[1] provides a tool
with which to attempt to sort out the intracicles of power
and influence in a local setting. Yet, although this begin-
ning has outlined some of the major peaks of the Kilimanjaro
landscape, it has not taken us very far into the flatlands
and tortured valleys.

The major criticisms of this approach--that it fails
to distinguish routine from key decisions, that it takes
little account of non-governmental decision-making, and that
it is unable to assess the power exercised in narrowing the
range of issues that are considered by formal decision-makers

[1]The basic work, a study of New Haven, Connecti-
cut, is Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1961).

have been persuasively presented elsewhere.[2] The issue-

areas selected for this study, and the analyses of those

issue-areas, have been informed by these criticisms of that

approach. Decisions in the issue-areas selected are key,

and not routine, in that each in its own way involves a fun-

damental challenge to the basis and organization of authority.

In all three, substantial attention was devoted to non-

governmental decision-making, precisely because non-govern-

mental decision-making was clearly a significant element in

the allocation of resources at the local level in these

issue-areas. And in all three the analysis has dealt with

the ability of some groups in Moshi to pursue their own goals

by preventing some issues from ever coming to a formal deci-

sion and with the ways in which the mobilization of bias op-

erates locally--"the dominant values and the political myths,

rituals, and institutions which tend to favor the vested

[2]For a forceful critique of this approach, see Peter
Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, Power and Poverty (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), Part One; and Todd Gitlin,
"Local Pluralism as Theory and Ideology," Studies on the
Left V,3(1965):21-45. Both articles contain useful bibli-
ographies on the pluralist approach to the study of commun-
ity power. See also Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Com-
munity Power: the Pluralist Alternative," Journal of Pol-
itics 22,3(August 1960):474-484, and Community Power and Po-
litical Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

interests of one or more groups, relative to others."[3] The

missions, for example, were successful in maintaining their

dominant role in primary education by using the prevailing

demand for education to prevent their initiatives from com-

ing to formal decisions where they might be defeated. Like-

wise, in liquor licensing, the extent of the involvement in

the liquor trade worked to benefit those who were involved

by opposing clear decisions to reduce it. And even in re-

gard to jobs, the workers and the unemployed remained rela-

tively powerless to the degree they were unable to bring

pressure to bear on formal institutions to accept basic re-

sponsibility for dealing with their problems.

Although it is not the purpose here to provide an

extensive critique of this approach, several other problems

with it need to be mentioned to indicate its limited useful-

ness for the study of local politics in Moshi. The study of

decision-making focuses attention on the process by which

legislation and rules are created--both for the operational

ease of execution of the study and because of the commonly-

held notion that popular demands are funneled into rule-making

[3]The term "mobilization of bias" is taken from E. E.
Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1960),71: "All forms of political or-
ganization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some
kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because or-
ganization is the mobilization of bias [original emphasis].
Some issues are organized into politics while others are
organized out." This term is used here following Bachrach
and Baratz, Power and Poverty, 43.

institutions and that bureaucracies enforce impartially the
rules made, but in so-doing, it diverts attention from the
application of the legislation and the enforcement of the
rules.   Not only is most rule-making distant from the mass
of the rural population in Tanzania, but also the links that
do connect the up-country populace with the rule-making proc-
ess are few and fragile, and, as a result, function only in-
termittently.   To concentrate on legislation and rules is
surely to overlook much of what politics is all about in up-
country Tanzania.   That is, to concentrate on legislation and
rule-making is to assume that the important political process-
es are those that characterize the functioning of formal rule-
making institutions and those that in some way associate non-
elites with specific legislation and rules.   What is over-
looked is that much of what people are interested in has to
do with enforcement and not legislation.   Demands for a place
in secondary school, or a waiver in licensing requirements,
or a delay in the implementation of an eviction, are pressed
on the political system when distant rule-making is about to
be translated into immediate action by local officials.
Clearly, ". . . the nature of most political demands in
transitional nations is such that they are simply not

amenable to the legislative process."[4]

Another problem with this approach is its incorporation of the Weberian notion of bureaucracies and bureaucrats that stresses the impersonality of their operations. Although the norms of impersonality and objective, rational decision-making have been accepted by most Tanzanian officials, their behavior, because of the imperatives of their responsibilities, rarely conforms to those norms. As has already been mentioned, most bureaucrats and politicians as well are still heavily influenced by the social obligations of their local society.[5] But beyond that, these norms are to a large extent inappropriate where officials are charged to manage the extent and direction of economic and political change. That is, Tanzanian civil servants who are responsible for using their discretionary power to achieve a set of both general and specific goals tangential to usual bureaucratic concerns must reject the insulation demanded of bureaucracies by these norms, and move out into the community as leaders to develop the formal and informal contacts necessary to coordinate the

[4]James C. Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Change," APSR LXIII,4(December 1969):1142-1143. Scott's perceptive analysis supports the argument made here that to concentrate on legislation is to exclude from consideration much of the essence of politics in Tanzania.

[5]The impact of these obligations on decision-makers in the liquor-licensing process has been noted. For a humorous and moving treatment of this pattern, see Chinua Achebe, A Man of the People (London: Heinemann, 1966).

flow of resources to achieve these goals.[6]

Still another problem is the equilibrium point im-
plicitly assumed in most decision-making studies, the set of
structures and relationships defined as normal, through which
specific patterns are examined. In Tanzania, formal govern-
mental institutions have yet to become stable because they
are still being built, the modification of institutions is
both frequent and often self-conscious, and the rapidity of
change precludes the distribution of power around a stable
point of equilibrium.[7] And certainly it is a conflict the-
ory, and not the equilibrium orientation that is central to
the functionalist approach that underlies the analysis of-
fered here.[8]

Decision-making studies also may unnecessarily nar-
row the boundaries of the relevant political arena. Surely
several of the outcomes in local conflicts noted in the pre-
ceding chapters would make little sense without attention to
the intrusion of national politics and national influence

[6]The conception of bureaucracy as an institution for
the impartial implementation of policy, and the reliance on
bureaucracy to manage change, will be considered more fully
in Chapter 12.

[7]Seymour J. Mandelbaum makes this point for New York
in the nineteenth century in Boss Tweed's New York (New York:
Wiley, 1965), 4.

[8]On functionalism as a conscious alternative to con-
flict theory, see W. G. Runciman, Social Science and Polit-
ical Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965),
especially Chapter VI.

into the local political system and the lack of clarity in the delineation of national versus local government powers and responsibilities.

Finally, many decision-making studies embody a notion of government inappropriate to the Tanzanian context. The depiction of government as a neutral arbiter, as the manager of conflicts, as the registrar of political outcomes, distorts the theoretical framework where the government has self-consciously adopted a set of goals toward which it is working to move the society. This notion of government neutrality, presented both analytically and normatively in decision-making studies, makes it difficult to deal with the ways in which government always serves some interests more than others, and is inapplicable and misleading in Tanzania, where goals, albeit often vague and contradictory, are expressed explicitly.

The study of the conflict over key issues, then, has served to introduce local politics in Kilimanjaro. To round off the consideration of conflict over key local issues, this chapter will take a more detailed look at the formal institutions of local government in Moshi.

Before turning to that, however, a word about the selection of issue-areas is in order. The issue-areas to be studied were required to have the following characteristics: 1) they had to involve key, rather than routine, decisions-- challenges to the fundamental bases and structures of

authority; 2) they had to be issues that clearly concerned
and excited both local leaders and, at least in part, sub-
stantial segments of the local population; and 3) since the
study is concerned with the politics of Moshi, issues had to
be town-centered and to culminate in decisions essentially
within reach of the local political system. Especially be-
cause of the demand that the decisions be local in nature,
few issue-areas in Kilimanjaro met all of these criteria,
and in fact those studied were almost the only ones avail-
able. Unlike education, health (hospitals, rural medical
stations, medicine) has been defined locally primarily as a
technical issue, with major decisions reserved for technical
experts. That is, although of course there was local con-
flict over the siting of new medical installations and over
the allocations of resources, in general the health officers
had a much more determinative say in ultimate decisions than
did the education officers, and, in addition, despite the
large sums spent by the local councils for health services,
the councils were much less free to make their own decisions
about those allocations than they were in regard to educa-
tional expenditures. Likewise, decisions about communica-
tions, including the roads so critical to farmers with a
cash crop to transport to town, and the provision of water
supplies, were largely monopolized by technical officials
and were largely made, following the advice of ministry ex-
perts, in Dar es Salaam. In fact, the local Members of

Parliament and other leaders with contacts in the capital devoted extensive efforts to influencing allocations of this sort--the location of rural dispensaries, the construction of roads, and the provision of water, but they were not issues largely debated and decided locally.

ISSUES IN MOSHI: LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The Moshi Town Council is a largely representative body, modeled after British local government, charged with governing the town of Moshi,[9] composed of 19 councillors elected to represent the six town wards and 9 councillors nominated (appointed) by the President, and was chaired by the chairman of the TANU urban district. Subventions from the central government accounted for approximately 35% of Council revenue (see TABLE 6.1), and expenditures on public health and education comprised more than half of all funds spent (see TABLE 6.2). In fulfilling its statutory responsibilities, the Moshi Town Council is directly responsible to the Ministry, unlike the Kilimanjaro District Council, for which the Regional Commissioner serves as proper officer. That is, urban councils in Tanzania follow a chain of authority different from that of the more numerous district councils, and supervisory power over their activities--especially

[9]For an overview of local government in Tanzania, see William Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, Chapter IV; and Stanley Dryden, Local Administration in Tanzania (Nairobi: EAPH, 1968), especially Chapter 7.

TABLE 6.1 MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF REVENUE,
           AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE, 1968

Licenses and permits	
Liquor	7.7%[a]
Other	5.8
Market dues and rent	7.1
Central government subventions	
Vehicle licenses, health, salaries	20.0
Schools	15.9
Site rates and urban house tax	26.2
	82.7%[b]

SOURCE: Moshi Town Council Financial Statement, 1968 (per-
        centages not computed in the original)

[a]That is, Liquor License fees provided 7.7% of total
revenue.

[b]That is, these sources account for 82.7% of the
Shs. 3,227,338.54 total revenue in 1968.

control over their finances--is vested not in the office of
the local Regional Commissioner, but in the Ministry respon-
sible for local government in Dar es Salaam.

The Moshi Town Council is organized into six commit-
tees, in which most of the substantive work of the Council
is done. Committee decisions are usually approved with lit-
tle or no discussion by the full Council, although of course
on occasion matters decided in committee are debated in full
again at a meeting of the full Council. The Finance Commit-
tee, which is chaired by the town chairman, and which in-
cludes the chairmen of all of the other committees, func-
tions as the Council Executive Committee, and the fact that

TABLE 6.2   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL EXPENDITURES, BY COMMITTEE,[a]
             1963-1969

COMMITTEE	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969[b]
Public Health[c]	39.1%	31.7%	33.3%	33.3%	37.6%	37.5%	34.1%
Communications and Buildings[d]	33.0	25.9	25.8	24.6	23:8	18.4	18.7
Urban Planning	--	--	--	--	--	3.6	3.3
Finance[e]	22.3	20.7	17.3	16.8	14.1	16.5	12.3
Education	--	20.7	22.3	20.5	20.1	20.4	17.5
Industrial Development[f]	--	--	--	--	--	0.0	0.1
Total Recurrent Expenditures	94.4	99.1	98.7	95.2	95.6	96.4	86.0
Capital Expenditures	5.7	0.7	1.3	5.5	4.3	3.6	14.4
Total Expenditures	100.1	99.8	100.0	100.7	99.9	100.0	100.4

SOURCE: Annual Financial Statements, Moshi Town Council
        (percentages not computed in original Financial
        Statements)

[a]Expenditures are grouped according to the commit-
tees responsible for them.

[b]1969 figures are estimates. The Minister responsi-
ble for local government refused a request to increase the
site rate and ordered the budget reduced; most capital ex-
penditures were eliminated in order to secure approval of
the 1969 budget.

[c]In 1968 this became the Public Health and Markets
Committee.

[d]This committee, established in 1968, combined the
former Buildings and Works and Highways Committees: the
figures for 1963-1967 are the combined totals for these two
committees.

[e]The expenditures for the Finance Committee include
the salaries for the principal Council employees.

[f]The small percentages shown here reflect the fact
that the Moshi Town Council plays little role in the devel-
opment of industry in Moshi.

it normally meets monthly, while other committees and the
full Council usually meet four times a year, together with
its control over funds, gives this committee a key role in
Council decision-making.

The chief administrative officer of the Town Council
is the Town Clerk, who heads the almost 500[10] Council employ-
ees and who is responsible for the day-to-day management of
Moshi town. The term Clerk is rather a misnomer, since the
Town Clerk, with his cabinet of department heads, has the
responsibility, power, and authority of a town manager, and
is considered by most local political figures to be more
powerful and influential than the elected town chairman.
For the individual citizen, it is the Town Clerk who has ac-
cess to state power and public funds, and it is he who will
determine the impact of governmental decisions. The Town
Clerk and all senior town officials are appointed by the
Tanzania Local Government Service Commission, and may be
posted and transferred throughout the country without refer-
ence to the Moshi Town Council. The unification of local
government service in Tanzania provides the central govern-
ment a means for making a rational distribution of scarce
skilled manpower and offers local government civil servants
possibilities of advancement they would not have if they
were limited to service with a single council, but it also

[10]476 full-time, permanent employees, exclusive of
teachers, in 1968.

means that local councils must be dependent on officers who are not chosen locally, and who, as a result, are often not very responsive to the demands of the local situation in which they are serving. That town officials are often more responsive to Ministry than to Council reactions is a source of considerable discontent among Moshi councillors.

Thus, in summary, there is in Moshi a council roughly two-thirds elected and one-third appointed, with an organizational pattern that insures that most Council decisions are made in committee rather than in the full Council, a set of centrally-appointed officers responsive to Dar es Salaam as well as to the Moshi Town Council, and a limited range of Council authority that is subject to extensive review and control by the center. It is not the purpose here to make a detailed study of the Moshi Town Council per se, nor to look in detail at the town councillors, which is reserved for the next section, but to look at the Moshi Town Council as a locus for authoritative allocations and to explore the extent to which it may have a monopoly on decision-making in the local arena.

That Council decisions are constrained by Ministry action has already been noted. For example, although the Moshi Town Council is constituted by statute as a Local Education Authority, most of the major allocations in regard to education are limited by the education plan prepared by the Ministry of Education, by policies and rules set at the

center, and by the control on expenditures exercised by the

local education officers. The requirement that the Town

Council budget be approved by the Ministry responsible for

local government makes the Council subject to both policy

and executive decisions that are largely beyond its reach.

In 1969, for example, the Council proposed to increase the

site rate (a tax on the unimproved value of land in town

that is the major single source of Council income) and to

embark on an ambitious program of capital development, but

the site rate increase was rejected by the Ministry,[11] and

the proposed budget was ordered reduced. Since the paring

of the budget was not ordered until April of 1969--a quarter

through the fiscal year, most of the cuts had to be made in

capital rather than recurrent expenditures. Thus, Ministry

control of Council finances has an especially limiting ef-

fect on capital (development) expenditures, because they are

the most easily cut once the fiscal year has begun. The an-

nual Council estimates are prepared in October and submitted

to the Ministry in November, Ministry comments on the pro-

posed estimates, which usually include instructions to reduce

expenditures, are often not received by the Council until

[11]It should be noted that major changes in the fi-
nancing of rural local government were introduced in 1969,
and it is possible that the Ministry did not want to in-
crease further the tax burden of urban residents, who were
shortly to bear the brunt of a new 10-20% sales tax. The
Council was unaware of the proposed changes and could not
incorporate them into its planning.

April, and final approval, after the cuts have been made,
was not received in 1969 until October. That is, most of
the year has passed before the Council receives final approv-
al for its spending for that year. Since the Council is re-
quired to operate at a level no greater than that for the
previous year and is not permitted to begin any capital
projects until its estimates have been approved, most of the
year is over before expansion can take place and projects be
begun. This means that a major project, which may involve
several months, if not more, of deliberations before it can
be included in the budget, and several more months for com-
petitive bidding to take place once it has been approved,
usually takes several years from conception to completion,
even when it involves something as routine as road resurfac-
ing. Thus, the limitations imposed on Council authority by
the need to refer major decisions to Dar es Salaam make the
Council a legislative and executive agency for only very low-
level local issues, such as public sanitation, maintenance
of roads and cemeteries, and management of town markets. And
in fact the delays in the budgeting process, together with
the heavy demands of recurrent expenditures, are major im-
pediments to any development spending at all.

These limitations, coupled with the lack of technical
skills among town councillors, insure that the Town Council
itself is not a major source of initiative for change in the
local area. With few exceptions, major proposals are made

by Council officers, and not councillors, and the form re-
sulting projects take is largely determined by Council offi-
cers.   For example, in 1968-69 the Town Clerk proposed that
the Town Council become involved in the construction of a
factory to brew and bottle the local Kilimanjaro beer, mbege.
After the Council Industrial Development and Finance Commit-
tees approved the idea, which had been discussed for years
in Kilimanjaro, the Town Clerk pursued the contacts with a
major brewing concern in Dar es Salaam and with the Ministry.
The Council accepted, largely without comment, the major ele-
ments and changes in the plans, from method of financing to
location.   Although the project had foundered by the end of
1969, it is clear that the Council was limited to legitimiz-
ing proposals by its officers and perhaps exercising a vague
and rarely used veto.   The budgeting process--the annual
statement of priorities and allocation of resources to spe-
cific individuals and groups--is also dominated by Council
officers.   To obtain specific allocations by the Town Coun-
cil, as opposed to seeking generalized assistance, Moshi res-
idents most often seek out the Town Clerk and other Town of-
ficials, rather than their ward councillors.   To stress that
initiative in most matters lies outside the Council is not
to overlook the substantial efforts of those few active coun-
cillors who do propose new programs to the Council, nor is
it to suggest that this pattern of initiative outside the
Council is either dysfunctional or uncommon for elected local

government bodies, but it does suggest that the Moshi Town
Council is not the major source of authoritative allocations
in Moshi and that its power is severely limited by internal
and external constraints.

Just as urban councils in Tanzania do not fit into the
hierarchy of regional administration and rural local govern-
ment, so too are urban areas excluded from the chain of devel-
opment committees that link the rural areas with the politi-
cians and development planners in Dar es Salaam. Urban ward
development committees are occasionally mentioned in party
statements and Town Council records, but none were function-
ing in Moshi in 1968-69, and apparently none had ever played
a substantial role in Moshi town. Moshi town is not repre-
sented in the Kilimanjaro District Development and Planning
Committee (DDPC), and does not formally come under the purview
of the Kilimanjaro Regional Development Committee (RDC),
though the Moshi chairman and Town Clerk do attend Regional De-
velopment Committee meetings. For example, during the prepa-
rations for Tanzania's Second Five-Year Plan, a five-year plan
for Moshi, drawn up largely by the Town Clerk, was neither sub-
mitted to nor debated by the District Development Committee,
and was distributed to members of the RDC for their information,
but was not discussed by them. As well, Moshi town projects
are not eligible for support from the Regional Development
Fund, and town representatives are not involved in decisions
on the allocation of the Regional Development Fund. Thus,
both in the structure of local government in Tanzania and

especially in the structure of development planning, Moshi
town functions as an island, whose lines of communication to
the center are often more direct than those to its rural
neighbors, with the result that Moshi town, and the Moshi
Town Council, are only indirectly involved, at best, in de-
velopment planning.

We looked at the Moshi Town Council to explore its
role in decision-making in Moshi. We have found that it
serves to provide official approval and legitimacy for deci-
sions actually taken by its officers. In so doing, it has
a limited ability to veto proposals placed before it and
serves as a buffer between the urban population and its of-
ficers, absorbing criticism of their actions, albeit rarely
able to alter them substantially. Since the Council is both
responsible for administering some central government pro-
grams and limited by the central government in its own ac-
tion, it occasionally serves as a lightning rod for the cen-
tral government, absorbing criticism of it. For example,
many individuals unhappy with educational decisions direct
their criticisms to the Town Council even though the Coun-
cil's range of alternatives was severely limited by govern-
ment action. We have also found that the Moshi Town Council
does not normally function as a local legislature with the
power to make significant rules for the town, and that the
Council, although it is largely elected, because it is con-
strained by the central government and dependent on its

officers, is at times unresponsive to its electorate and only occasionally the prime arena for political conflict.

Perhaps an example will help sharpen this picture. In 1969 the Council decided that sidewalks in the commercial areas of town had become dirty and unsightly, and decided to eliminate commercial use of the sidewalks. The sidewalks in Moshi had long been used by merchants to display their wares, ranging from cloth to pots and pans to beds and mattresses, and by artisans--tailors, shoemakers, watch repairers--unable to afford to rent places of their own. The decision to clear the sidewalks originated in a proposal by the government officer who sat as a nominated councillor representing the Regional Commissioner, was approved by the Urban Planning Committee, and was implemented by Council officers even before it was presented to the full Council. After approval by the Urban Planning Committee, the decision[12] was announced, and town officers, accompanied by police, made a sweep of the sidewalks, confiscating goods found displayed and chasing off artisans. When the committee resolution became known around town, but before it had been implemented, many of the tailors went, as a group, to the Town Clerk, several town

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[12]It should be noted that this decision represented an indirect form of rule-making by the committee. Although the committee resolved to clear the sidewalks, legally a long-standing law that required Council permission to use the public sidewalks was to be enforced. This suggests, of course, that the Town Clerk could have acted on his own, but instead sought Council legitimacy for what was to be an unpopular act.

councillors, the Area Commissioner, the Regional Commission-
er, and to the TANU office to complain that they would be
forced out of business. On the one hand, the tailors were
paying exhorbitant fees to local merchants for storing their
sewing machines overnight and thus could ultimately benefit
from pressure to make other arrangements, but on the other
hand, much of their trade was contact business--a woman buy-
ing cloth could find a tailor to make up clothes on the side-
walk as she left the store. After a series of lengthy, and
often heated, meetings, the Town Clerk agreed to suspend en-
forcement of the committee resolution for the tailors--but
not for other artisans--to permit the TANU office to work
with them to make other arrangements. Six months later a
projected cooperative of tailors had not yet been formed (an
earlier tailors cooperative had continuing trouble surviving
economically, despite preferential treatment in contract bid-
ding from government units); and the tailors were still on
the sidewalks.

        The point of this lengthy excursion is that it is a
typical, and clear, example of the Moshi Town Council role
in those low-level local decisions it is charged to make.
The original initiative was by a government officer serving
as a nominated councillor. The decision was made in a Coun-
cil committee and subject to Council review only after it
had been implemented. The Town Clerk, who could have enforced
a long-standing law without having a Council committee baptise

it, was able to enforce the decision selectively, without
formal Council authorization to do so. And at least for a
period following the decision, it was not enforced on one of
the groups against whom it was directed.

Another major governmental institution in Kilimanjaro
is the chain of development committees, which function at the
village, district, and regional levels. Since there were no
functioning development committees in Moshi town in 1968-69,
and since for development purposes Moshi town was treated as
an island, not directly related to its rural hinterland,
this analysis will concentrate on the Kilimanjaro District
Development and Planning Committee and the Kilimanjaro Re-
gional Development Committee.

Tanzania is firmly committed to planned development,
and in 1969 began its second Five-Year Development Plan. De-
velopment targets are projected as far as the 1980s. Tan-
zania has attempted to deal with the problem of reconciling
local participation in decision-making with the need for ef-
ficient and rational management of national resources by cre-
ating a chain of development committees designed to link the
rural population with Dar es Salaam decision-makers in

planning for development.[13] The district and regional de-

velopment committees unite in a single institution popularly

elected representatives, TANU leaders, representatives from

major institutions (cooperatives, trade union), and govern-

ment administrators and technical experts. In theory, de-

velopment proposals are to originate at the village level,

to be considered at first the district and then the regional

level to assess their importance and feasibility and the

availability of resources to support them, and only after

careful consideration at each of these levels to be submitted

to development planners in Dar es Salaam for inclusion in the

national development plan. This procedure is designed to

maximize popular participation in the planning process and

to insure that the proposals submitted to Dar es Salaam fit

into a coordinated local development scheme.[14] In practice,

however, the development committees have been serving

[13]It is not the purpose here to discuss in detail
the overall philosophy and organization of development plan-
ning in Tanzania. Useful analyses can be found in the fol-
lowing: Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, Part III;
Dryden, Chapter 3; Reginald H. Green, "Four African Develop-
ment Plans: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania," JMAS III,
2(August 1965):249-279; G. K. Helleiner, "Tanzania's Second
Plan: Socialism and Self-Reliance," East Africa Journal
(hereafter, EAJ) V,12(December 1968):41-50; Goran Hyden,
"Planning in Tanzania: Lessons of Experience," EAJ VI,10
(October 1969):13-17; R. Cranford Pratt, "The Administra-
tion of Economic Planning in a Newly Independent State: the
Tanzania Experience 1963-1966," Journal of Commonwealth Po-
litical Studies V,1(1967):38-59; and Knud Erik Svendsen,
pp. 78-89 in A. Rweyemamu, editor, Nation-Building in Tan-
zania (Nairobi: EAPH, 1970).

[14]See Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, 323.

somewhat different purposes.

The development committees have been hampered by the lack of a clear association between structure and purpose. The Village Development Committees (VDC), for example, designed to facilitate a two-way flow of communication between the government and the mass of the population, have in fact largely been limited to applying for approval and assistance for self-help projects,[15] with little two-way flow at all. The link between village and district level development committees is a weak one, and research in 1968 indicated that there was little awareness at the lowest level of the development committee chain of the Regional Development Fund--a structure specifically designed to encourage local initiative and participation.[16]

The structure of the DDPC is an anomalous one, since it is formally a committee of the District Council and yet its chairman and most of its members are not councillors. (See TABLE 6.3 for membership of the Kilimanjaro District Development and Planning Committee) As well, since many District Council programs are officially considered development programs, the jurisdiction of the DDPC is often broader than

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[15]For an incisive analysis of the functioning of Tanzania's development committees, see Paul D. Collins, "A Preliminary Evaluation of the Working of the Regional Development Fund" (Dar es Salaam: mimeographed, 1969). See p. 11 for comments on Village Development Committees.

[16]See Collins. 12.

TABLE 6.3   MEMBERSHIP OF THE KILIMANJARO DISTRICT DEVELOP-
            MENT AND PLANNING COMMITTEE, 1969

Area Commissioner, chairman
District chairman
Kilimanjaro District Coun-
  cil Finance Committee
  (9 members, including
  Council vice chairman)
District rural development
  officer
District veterinary officer
District probation officer
District building and
  works officer
District forestry officer
District agriculture
  officer
District police commander
Prisons officer
District education officer

District cooperative
  officer
District commercial
  officer
District labour officer
District health officer
Water engineer
District executive officer
Area Secretary
Representative, Tambarare
  cooperative
Representative, Kilimanjaro
  Native Cooperative Union
Representative, NUTA
Representative, UWT
TANU district executive
  secretary

SOURCE: Kilimanjaro District Development and Planning
        Committee (Note that where the district repre-
        sentative of a Ministry is specified, that Min-
        istry may not have a district office in Kili-
        manjaro, in which case a regional officer
        attends)

NB: Paul D. Collins, "A Preliminary Evaluation of the Work-
    ing of the Regional Development Fund" lists the member-
    ship of the DDPC, p. 9, similarly, with the following
    exceptions:-

    Collins includes, but not included above:
      Members of Parliament from the District
      Representative from Ministry of Lands
    Collins does not include, but included above:
      Probation officer
      Building and works officer
      Area Secretary
      TANU district executive secretary
      Police commander
      Prisons officer
      Commercial officer
      Labour officer
      NUTA representative
      Forestry officer
    Collins notes that the DDPC is authorized to coopt
    members.

that of the Council itself, and since the Area Commissioner

and Ministry representatives are included in the DDPC and

not in the Council, many local leaders in Kilimanjaro con-

sider it a more powerful body.   Because of this inclusive

membership on both the district and regional planning commit-

tees (see TABLE 6.4 for the membership of the Regional Devel-

opment Committee), and because they are more responsive to

central direction and control, they often deal with local

problems and programs that have little to do with develop-

ment.   That is, because they include both popular representa-

tives and technical advisers and both government and TANU of-

ficials, problems that require coordinated action and prob-

lems in which the center is especially interested are brought

to the development committees, even though formally they may

be the direct responsibility of the district council and only

indirectly, if at all, related to development.   The research

in 1968 found that one-fourth of the items discussed by DDPCs

in Tanzania dealt with development, while most DDPC time was

spent on public festivities, social services, education,

school-leavers, famine, and land problems.[17]   This was cer-

tainly the case in Kilimanjaro, where much of the delibera-

tions of development committees was devoted to relocating

Kilimanjaro residents in Mwese and to discussing famine and

malnutrition due to a poor growing season.   Although

[17]Collins, 10.

TABLE 6.4   MEMBERSHIP OF THE KILIMANJARO REGIONAL DEVELOP-
            MENT COMMITTEE, 1969

Regional Commissioner, chairman	Town Clerk, Moshi
Administrative Secretary	District executive officer, Kilimanjaro District Coun-cil
Regional agriculture officer	District executive officer, Same District Council
Regional commercial officer	Regional chairman, TANU
Regional community develop-ment officer	Regional secretary, NUTA
Regional cooperative officer	Representative, UWT
Regional education officer	Representative, Chamber of Commerce
Regional forest officer	Representative, farmers' association
Regional information officer	Representative, Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union
Regional land officer	Representative, Tambarare Cooperative Union
Regional medical officer	Representative, Vuasu Co-operative Union
Regional engineer	Representative, factories
Regional mines inspector	Regional secretary, TAPA
Regional police commander	Representative, National Agricultural Products Board
Regional superintendent of prisons	Member, National Executive Committee of TANU
Regional veterinary officer	Members of Parliament
Regional water engineer	
Regional labour officer	
Senior welfare officer	
Head postmaster	
Regional accountant	
Area Commissioner, Moshi	
Area Commissioner, Same	

SOURCE: Regional Office, Kilimanjaro Region

NB: In addition to those listed here, the Chairmen of Kili-
    manjaro and Same Districts participated as members.

development committee efforts and resources are to be di-

rected only toward development projects--those that will di-

rectly increase production, such as seed nurseries or cattle

dips, most of the members of the development committees were

more concerned with social services, such as schools and

clinics.   And in fact, if the development committees are to

have real power in the allocation of resources locally, they

are the logical focus for popular pressure for social serv-

ices. But the result of the concern with social services is

that of the few projects that originate at the bottom of the

chain, many are rejected because they are not concerned with

development, and at the same time there is a continuing ef-

fort to divert development resources into social service

projects the District Council is unable to support by itself.

The situation was further complicated in Kilimanjaro by the

differing views on the nature of development planning held

by the key figures on the development committees. The over-

riding tendency was to consider the development plan a state-

ment of goals, a listing of good ideas that could not be im-

plemented immediately, with the effect that the difficult

choices involved in establishing priorities and rejecting

some projects in favor of others were rarely made by the de-

velopment committees. The councils' lack of funds available

for development projects nurtured this attitude that the de-

velopment plan was a statement of goals and not a working

document to be implemented.

The poor articulation of the links between the lev-

els in development planning, and the bureaucratic imperative

to avoid responsibility where rules and precedents were not

clear, function to nurture a tendency to shift decisions to

higher levels and thus to limit local participation in devel-

opment planning. Each level comes to believe that its pro-

posals are not evaluated fairly at the next level with the

effect that much of its attention is diverted from assessing specific proposals to determining how to protect whatever proposals are passed on. Members of the Kilimanjaro DDPC, for example, felt that they had not received a fair share of regional resources in 1968, and attributed the large allocation to Pare District to influence by the Minister responsible for rural development, whose origin was in Pare District.[18] As a result, when projects for 1969/70 were considered, the major focus of deliberations was the attempt to insure that Kilimanjaro received its share of regional funds. Consequently, although Shs. 1,000,000 were again expected for the Regional Development Fund, Kilimanjaro projects proposed to be supported by the Fund totaled 1.3 million shillings. Later, when the Kilimanjaro DDPC was asked to establish priorities for its projects, it agreed to aim for a total of Shs. 800,000-900,000, and when the District Executive Officer attempted to establish a priority order for these projects, DDPC members insisted on submitting them as a block, fearing that to order them would assist the RDC to reduce them. The refusal to set priorities at the district level resulted in shifting decisions to the regional level, thus reducing local participation in the determination of which projects were to be supported and which were not.

[18]Of the Shs. 1,000,000 Kilimanjaro Regional Development Fund for 1968/69, Shs. 652,872.65 were allocated to Pare District, and Shs. 302,650.00 to Kilimanjaro District.

This leads to perhaps the most critical problem in the functioning of the development committees, their dependence on, and as a result their domination by, government officials and technical experts. Although the chain of committees is designed so that projects will originate at the bottom, most projects approved originated in the various ministry offices.[19] The popular representatives on the development committees (the elected chairman and councillors) do not have the training and skills necessary to evaluate projects on a technical basis, and Ministry officials neither define their role as technical advisers to political leaders nor present their projects in a form suitable for evaluation by the less educated committee members. That is, in theory, projects should stem from popular initiative at the lowest level, they should be evaluated by the technical advisers, and then they should be assigned priorities by political leaders in coordination with technical advisers. In practice, however, projects originate in Ministry offices, and popular representatives at the local level have little to say about them. It was common for Kilimanjaro DDPC meetings to begin by considering several VDC proposals and rejecting them as not related to development (for example, a new school). The water engineer then presented his proposals for irrigation projects. Although councillors might object

[19]Collins found this to be generally true in Tanzania in 1968, p. 19.

that to supply water to place Y was more urgent than to sup-
ply it to place X, they were usually reluctant to challenge
Ministry officers, and the Ministry proposal was approved
with little or no modification. In another case, a Ministry
representative proposed that cattle dips be located in cer-
tain areas, elected members of the DDPC argued that they
were more needed elsewhere, and the Ministry proposal was
approved. The process is identical at the regional level,
where popular representatives are even more outnumbered by
Ministry officials, and where the RDC has only advisory
authority.[20] In 1969, for example, after the Kilimanjaro
DDPC approved its five-year plan for 1969-74, the plan was
submitted to Ministry officials for their comments (they had
of course already been involved in the initial deliberations
on plan proposals). At the subsequent meeting of the Re-
gional Development Committee, the Kilimanjaro plan existed
in two documents, one as approved by the DDPC and the second
as revised and amended by Ministry officials, and it was the
latter that was formally considered by the RDC. That sev-
eral of the Ministry officials were expatriates with little
knowledge of Kiswahili, and that communication between the

[20]The RDC was originally advisory to the Regional
Commissioner, who had final deciding power. After the cre-
ation of the RDC Subcommittee on the Regional Development
Fund, the RDC became advisory to that Subcommittee, which
itself is dominated by the Regional Commissioner. See Col-
lins, pp. 7, where he cites in fn 1 Staff Circular No. 14
of 1962, and 14, where he cites in fn 3 Presidential Circu-
lar No. 1 of 1968.

DDPC and Ministry offices was so poor that Ministry comments often were not received in sufficient time to incorporate them into DDPC documents, both served to further the exclusion of popular representatives at the regional level. Allocations of the Regional Development Fund, intended specifically as seed money for local projects not included in Ministry plans, are even more dominated by Ministry officials, and are ultimately made by very few officers. (See TABLE 6.5)

The development committees, then, are significant governmental institutions in the local area, and their structure and functioning might well be expected to surmount some of the problems that make the local councils relatively impotent--their membership, including technical advisers, overcomes the lack of skills that hampers the local councils, by including the commissioners and Ministry representatives they have more direct access to the center than do the local councils, and they link the rural population with the central government in a way that local councils cannot. In fact, however, they are dominated and controlled by government officers, and they function largely to legitimize government proposals placed before them. Thus, the decentralization of decision-making power and control over finances by locating them in the development committees does not lead to increased local participation and involvement, but rather to strengthening the hands of government officials at regional and

TABLE 6.5   MEMBERSHIP OF THE KILIMANJARO REGIONAL DEVELOP-
            MENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
            FUND, 1969

Regional Commissioner, chairman	Administrative Secretary Regional chairman, TANU
Regional agriculture officer	Area Commissioner, Moshi
Regional building and works officer	Area Commissioner, Same
Regional rural development officer	District Executive Officer, Moshi
Regional cooperative officer	District Executive Officer, Same
Regional veterinary officer	Members of Parliament
Regional water engineer	District chairman, Moshi [rural]
Regional commercial officer	
Regional information officer	District chairman, Same
Regional economic secretary	

SOURCE: Kilimanjaro Regional Office

NB: Collins, "A Preliminary Evaluation of the Working of the
    Regional Development Fund," who characterizes this com-
    mittee as primarily a technical body, lists its member-
    ship, p. 7, as above, except the following:-

    Collins includes, but not included above:
      Regional Land Officer
    Collins does not include, but included above:
      Regional chairman
      2 Area Commissioners
      2 District Executive Officers
      2 District chairmen
      Members of Parliament
      Regional water engineer
      Regional commercial officer
      Regional information officer
      Regional economic secretary

Thus, in Kilimanjaro at least, although the Regional Devel-
opment Fund Subcommittee remains dominated by government of-
ficers and advisory, several popular representatives have
been coopted.

---

district levels.[21]   While it is true that a broad range of

decisions in development planning must ultimately depend

[21]Collins concludes that this was generally true
for Tanzania in 1968, p. 19.

more on technical expertise than on popular sentiment, the

point here is that although Tanzania's party and its leaders

have committed themselves to widespread public participation

in the planning process, and although because the government's

implementation capabilities in up-country Tanzania are lim-

ited popular cooperation and support are necessary to success-

ful plan implementation, there was in fact in Kilimanjaro, as

in much of Tanzania, little popular participation in the cre-

ation and initiation of local projects and little direct pop-

ular input into the discussions about resource allocation

within the planning framework. It should be noted as well

t..at TANU, as TANU, was little involved in this aspect of de-

velopment planning. Although of course many of the members

of the district and regional development committees were TANU

leaders, the local TANU organization played little significant

direct role in development planning at those levels.

ISSUES IN MOSHI: CONCLUSIONS

        The chapters of this section have provided an intro-

duction to politics and community power in Moshi by focus-

ing on several key local issues. They have delineated the

ability of the missions, the bar owners, and other forces in

the community not formally represented in decision-making in-

stitutions to marshal economic resources, popular support,

key alliances with local officials, and local mores and values

to exert strong influence on the local decisions that concern

them.   And they have stressed the power of government offi-
cials not subject to popular elections and the relative im-
potence of several governmental institutions in the local
arena.

This preliminary view suggests a plural power struc-
ture, not dominated by a cohesive elite.   Only a few individ-
uals are able to influence decisions and determine outcomes
in more than one issue-area.   In fact, there are several
loosely-structured groupings, each seeking to mobilize sup-
port to deal with the issues with which it is most concerned.
This suggests that those few individuals who are most able to
influence outcomes--especially the commissioners and the chair-
men--depend on informal networks of these factional groupings
for their power.   This also suggests that what might be a
relatively stable pattern of factional alignments organized
into networks to support the key leaders must be frequently
unbalanced by the transfers of officials into and out of the
area.   What cannot yet be discerned, however, is the extent
to which those who exercise local power are drawn from a nar-
row and perhaps self-perpetuating stratum of the local popu-
lace.   That is, this plural system may in fact involve the
circulation of a very limited set of elites.

Let us now turn our attention, then, to a second ap-
proach to an understanding of local politics in Moshi, a
study of its politicians.

CHAPTER 7

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: INTRODUCTION

The focus thus far has been on several key issues in
Moshi politics. Having studied those issues in some detail,
let us now turn to the study of the major participants in the
political life of Moshi. Who are they? What are their back-
grounds? How do they interact? What is their picture of lo-
cal politics? To answer these questions--to explore local
politics from a different perspective--the political leader-
ship of Moshi was interviewed in depth. Political leadership
in this context refers simply to those individuals who, either
by virtue of some official or unofficial leadership position
in the community (to be specified shortly), or by nomination
by other leaders as a "powerful" or "influential" person in
the community, or by observation a major figure in key local
issues, could be expected to play a significant role in de-
termining how resources are allocated and which individuals
and groups benefit, and which do not, from the outputs of the
local political process.

It is of course a common technique in studies of com-
munity power to attempt to locate the local influentials and
describe the political process in terms of the characteris-
tics, attitudes, and actions of those individuals. The

shortcomings of that method of analysis have been discussed

at length elsewhere and need not concern us here,[1] but it

should be stressed that in interviewing the political leader-

ship of Moshi, it was not assumed that the individuals inter-

viewed constituted an exclusive elite, that they were cohe-

sive or organized, that they shared goals or even a common

value structure, or that they were somehow more powerful, or

influential, than other members of the community.[2] It was

simply expected that the perceptions and observations of the

major participants in the local political process would be a

valuable adjunct to other information available, and that an

analysis of the backgrounds and attributes of the political

leaders would enhance our ability to make some general com-

ments about the local political process. As well, these in-

terviews are also important tools in understanding local po-

litical institutions, such as the Moshi Town Council, and in

[1]For a critical review of the literature on commun-
ity power that focuses on local elites, see Polsby, Commun-
ity Power and Political Theory, Bachrach and Baratz, Power
and Poverty, Chapter 1, and Geraint Parry, Political Elites
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), who stresses the advantages
of combining decision-making and elite studies in understand-
ing local politics. For the use of this technique in African
urban settings, see William John Hanna, "Influence and Influ-
entials in Two Urban-Centered African Communities," Compara-
tive Politics 2,1(October 1969):17-40, and Dick Simpson,
"The Political Evolution of Two African Towns," Ph.D. Dis-
sertation, Indiana University, 1968.

[2]For distinctions between influence and authority,
see Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty, Chapter 2, and
the comments by William J. Hanna in Conference on The Govern-
ment of African Cities, 1968 (Chester, Pa.: Lincoln Univer-
sity, 1968), 89-95.

determining the importance, if any, of association with the
party, the government, or other institutions.

Therefore, the bulk of this Section is devoted to
more detailed examinations of the Moshi Town Council, the
Moshi town TANU cell leaders (a particular type of local
leadership), and the networks of support that form the foun-
dation of the local political process. To explore the dy-
namics of that process, special attention will be paid to
the origins and patterns of recruitment of local leaders,
their perceptions of their own power and influence, the link-
ages among them, and their ability to perpetuate elite status
by insuring that their children have continued access to
power and influence. But first, a brief explanation of the
methodology utilized.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: METHODOLOGY

During the field research in Kilimanjaro in 1968-69
interviews were conducted with 107 political leaders.[3] Be-
cause of the small size of the community, and in order to
avoid distortions caused by sampling, an attempt was made to
interview all individuals who could be considered political
leaders. That is, the approach was an inclusive one--anyone
whose role seemed important, even though remotely so, was

[3]For a more detailed discussion of the methodology,
and a complete interview schedule, see the Appendices. The
discussion here will be limited to a brief summary.

interviewed. As was noted earlier, the relevant political

arena has, throughout this essay, been defined by the nature

of the issues and the behavior of the participants, rather

than by any geographic, administrative, or temporal space.

Therefore, although this essay is concerned with politics in

Moshi, those individuals who seemed to be key in town poli-

tics, even though officially they were ostensibly more con-

cerned with the rural district, or with the regional or na-

tional levels, were also interviewed. In this way, 78 indi-

viduals were interviewed in depth--the interviews ranged

from 45 minutes to almost 6 hours, using a format in which

questions were open-ended, but always phrased identically to

insure comparability. That is, the individuals interviewed

were encouraged to discourse at length on their views about

local politics--major issues, their own roles, the roles of

key individuals and institutions, their views on integration

and nation-building, and their assessments of party and gov-

ernment activity. In order to cross-check information, they

were also asked to comment on the assessments of other lead-

ers. The standardized questions were intended to guide, but

not constrain, the conversation. In addition, a random sam-

ple of cell leaders--the lowest level of the TANU structure

--covering 20% of all cell leaders in town was interviewed,

using an adapted, largely closed-ended version of the same

question schedule. For all of the individuals interviewed,

biographical data, ranging from parents' education and

occupation through the respondent's own life to the education

and occupation of his children (somewhat abbreviated for cell

leaders), was also collected.

To compile the list of individuals to be interviewed,

leaders were first selected on the basis of positions held.

Then, individuals determined by observation to be important

participants in the decision-making in the three issue-areas

studied were included. Seven other individuals--principally

the leaders of the major religious and ethnic communities--

whose community role enabled them to play an important role

in the local political process were also included. All indi-

viduals interviewed (except cell leaders) were asked to name

persons they considered powerful or influential, but all of

those individuals nominated by 10% or more of those asked--

indeed a minimum standard for assessing influential-by-

reputation--turned out to have already been included under

one of the other categories. (See TABLE 7.1 for a breakdown

of the 107 individuals interviewed)

Local tax records were consulted in an attempt to

determine the economic leadership of the community, but that

proved impossible with the resources available. Records were

incomplete, names were confused, many properties were listed

to companies and joint holdings, and, more important, taxes

were computed on unimproved land values, so that individuals

who had small but highly profitable plots (bars, for example)

could not be identified from those records. As well,

TABLE 7.1   POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INTERVIEWS: SUMMARY BY
            CATEGORY

SELECTED BY:	NUM-BER	PERCENT OF TOTAL (107)
position held	69	64%[a]
major participant in 1 or more issue area(s)	36	34
significant community role	7	7
reputation (nomination by 10% of leaders)	10	9
economic leaders	2	2
cell leaders	29	27

[a]That is, of the total of 107 interviewed, 64% were
holders of key political positions in 1968-69. Since these
categories are not mutually exclusive--a holder of a key po-
sition might also be named by 10% of other leaders as an in-
fluential person--the sum of these percentages exceeds 100.

individuals whose income was derived from several sources,

or whose income was not reflected in land holdings, or whose

income was not fully reported, could not be identified from

local tax records. Finally, most of those individuals listed

as major property holders, at least by inspection of their

names, were either Asian or European and were clearly not

directly involved in the local political process. Observa-

tion during field research indicated that the most important

economic leaders, like the major property holders, were not

directly involved in local politics. Two individuals named

by others as major economic leaders were interviewed.

Local council and TANU party invitation lists were

consulted to determine the social leadership of the community,

but an analysis of those lists revealed that social status in

Moshi, by that measure, was a derived category. That is,
only individuals thought by local council and party officers
to be politically powerful were accorded the social status
of invitation to major parties and celebrations, and social
status was not used as a criterion to supplement the list of
interviewees.

Thus, using a very broad and inclusive definition of
political leadership, almost all individuals who could be
considered political leaders in Moshi town were interviewed.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: OVERVIEW

In studying the political leadership of Moshi, it
is clear that there is no single, cohesive elite group that
rules. Despite the overlaps of institutions and despite
the fact that many individuals hold several leadership posi-
tions, various factions among the political leaders are con-
tinually in conflict. Yet that observation should not be
overdrawn. While it is true that what might be termed the
aristocratic elite of the colonial period has been displaced
by a set of generally younger and more educated individuals,
it seems also the case that the new leadership has proved
increasingly able to entrench itself, and the flow of events
in 1968-69, the Arusha Declaration notwithstanding, seemed
to render that leadership even more secure in its position
of advantage. That is, while the evidence suggests substan-
tial competition for leadership positions, this circulation

of elites may well be restricted to a narrow stratum of the

Kilimanjaro populace, and that stratum, though still defen-

sive in a fluid situation, and though ostensibly circum-

scribed by the norms of Tanzanian socialism embodied in the

Arusha Declaration, nonetheless may be able to control polit-

ical recruitment sufficiently to exclude the mass of the lo-

cal populace from effective access to leadership positions.

Thus far the political leadership has been treated

largely as an undifferentiated whole. The concern of the

succeeding chapters of this Section, therefore, will be to

examine several of the subsets of the political leadership

separately to explore who they are, where they come from,

and how they conceive of the local political process. First,

however, it may be useful to make some general comments about

the political leadership as a whole.

Perhaps the most striking observation about the lo-

cal political leadership in Moshi is the extent to which in-

stitutions overlap and individuals occupy more than one posi-

tion. Branch chairmen are also local councillors, TANU lead-

ers hold government positions, and individuals at all levels

serve as cell leaders. The distinction between government

and party is blurred by the fact that many principal govern-

ment officials hold positions in the TANU structure. Dis-

tinctions of level are also blurred, as branch leaders hold

district and regional positions and regional officials serve

on the local councils. Even elected versus appointed leader-
ship is not an easy distinction to make, since several indi-
viduals hold multiple positions, of which some are elective,
some appointive.

This supports and helps explain the finding in the
studies of decision-making in key issues that local institu-
tions are multi-faceted,[4] and that the local political proc-
ess is multi-channeled--individuals frustrated in their ap-
proaches to one institution can pursue their goals through
another. Tailors unhappy with a Moshi Town Council decision,
for example, could take their grievances to several different
individuals, representing ostensibly different political
structures, and have them heard. To the extent that posi-
tional overlaps maintain TANU influence throughout the spec-
trum of political activity, this finding also provides some
empirical support for the conclusion that the party is un-
willing to permit the emergence of politically strong and in-
dependent institutions that might provide a foundation for
competition with the party. As well, this finding highlights
the difficulty in attempting to separate policy formulation
and implementation. Administrators not only have the power,
influence, and authority that always accompany responsibility
for implementing policies, but many administrators in Moshi

[4]Norman N. Miller explores the multi-faceted nature
of the local party in one area of rural Tanzania in "The
Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania,"
APSR LXIV,2(June 1970):548-571.

have direct access to the policy-making process as well.

Before moving on to examine several subsets of the
Moshi political leadership, it may be useful to take a quick
look at the leadership as a whole. Who are the political
leaders in Moshi, and what are they like?[5] The political
leadership is largely (79%) 30-54 years old, and almost all
leaders are male (90%). Most leaders (62%) were born local-
ly. Yet although many leaders (40%) have lived locally for
over two decades, because both government and party officials
are highly transient, more than one-fifth of the local lead-
ers have been local residents for less than two years. This
transience is reflected by the fact that one-fifth of the po-
litical leaders have held their current positions for less
than one year, and more than one-quarter have been in their
current jobs for less than two years.

The political leadership reflects the general popula-
tion of Moshi town in its ethnic and religious composition
(see TABLE 7.2). The political leadership is better edu-
cated than is the general population (61% have had more than
a primary education), largely in Christian schools; in addi-
tion, almost all of the political leadership seems able to

[5]Statistical analysis of interview data was com-
pleted at the University of Wisconsin Computing Center,
with support from the University of Wisconsin Graduate
School Research Committee and the University of Wisconsin
Computing Center.

TABLE 7.2   MOSHI POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GENERAL TOWN
            POPULATION: ETHNICITY AND RELIGION

ETHNICITY[a]	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	MOSHI TOWN POPULATION
Chagga	44%[b]	37%[c]
Neighboring Tribe[d]	12%	13%
Other African	34%	38%

RELIGION[a]	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	MOSHI TOWN POPULATION
Christian	60%	54%
Muslim	35%	38%
Other World Religion[e]	4%	4%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (1969) and Tan-
        zania 1967 Population Census (figures for Moshi
        town are preliminary computer totals and may be
        revised slightly before final publication of the
        Census). (There is no reason to believe there
        were significant non-random changes in the town
        population from 1967 to 1969.)

[a]Tribe and religion percentages for Moshi town are
of heads of households rather than of the total population.

[b]That is, 44% of the political leaders reported
their tribe as Chagga.

[c]That is, 37% of all heads of households in Moshi
reported their tribe as Chagga.

[d]Neighboring tribes for Moshi town are: Arusha,
Masai, Meru, Pare, and Taveta/Teita.

[e]For example, Hindu.

insure a much higher level of schooling for their children

than is currently the general average for all of Tanzania.

        The Moshi political leadership is not dominated by

long-time political activists. About half of the Moshi po-

litical leadership in 1968-69 reported they had not been ac-

tive in early nationalist politics (some 22% did indicate

they held leadership positions in the early phases of na-

tionalist agitation), and almost three-fourths came from

families that were not politically active. While nearly one-

third had joined TANU by 1956 and three-fifths had become

TANU members before independence, about one-tenth (13%) in-

dicated they had joined TANU since 1965 or were not TANU

members in 1968-69.

About one-quarter of the Moshi political leadership

was employed by the government in 1968-69, while a tenth had

no formal employment. In general the political leadership

was widely traveled--fully 70% indicated they had spent ex-

tended periods in areas of Tanzania other than their place

of birth, and half reported they had spent some time outside

of Tanzania.

The political leadership of Moshi, then, is a fairly

heterogeneous lot, largely local in origin and similar to

the local populace in ethnic and religious makeup, but clear-

ly differentiated from the local citizenry in what might be

called access to modernity--for example, education and travel.

But this sort of overview, even were the character-

istics briefly summarized here to be presented in extensive

detail, must prove frustratingly unspecific in understanding

local politics in Moshi. With this background on the Moshi

political leadership as a whole, then, let us switch to a

close-up lens to examine in more detail the membership of

the Moshi Town Council.

CHAPTER 8

MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL

MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: INTRODUCTION

> . . . there must also be an efficient and democratic
> system of local government, so that our people make
> their own decisions on the things which affect them
> directly, and so that they are able to recognize
> their own control over community decisions and their
> own responsibilities for carrying them out. Yet
> this local control has to be organized in such a man-
> ner that the nation is united and working together
> for common needs and for the maximum development of
> our whole society.[1]

> The development of Tanzania cannot be effected from
> Dar es Salaam; local initiative, local co-ordination
> of plans, and local democratic control over decisions
> are also necessary.[2]

The studies of decision-making in three key issue-

areas in Moshi have developed a composite picture of the

Moshi Town Council--rarely the locus for authoritative deci-

sions on significant issues and most often an institution

that functions to legitimize decisions made elsewhere. The

intention here is to pursue the examination of the Moshi

Town Council by rendering more precise and distinct some of

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[1] Julius K. Nyerere, _Socialism and Rural Development_
(Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), 11. (This pam-
phlet, and other major papers by President Nyerere defining
Tanzanian socialism are reprinted in Julius K. Nyerere,
Ujamaa--Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1968); henceforth citations from these papers
will be to this volume. This quotation is from p. 119.)

[2] Nyerere, "To Plan is To Choose," 34.

the elements of that composite view. In addition, after sur-

veying the makeup of the Council and the backgrounds and per-

spectives of its members, the Council will be assessed as an

indicator of the functioning of urban local government in

Tanzania.

Most of the study of local government in Tanzania

has paid careful attention to the British colonial heritage

and to constitutional, legislative, and administrative struc-

tures and institutions,[3] and it is only recently that atten-

tion has begun to be focused on the changing tasks of local

government and the interrelationships of government and

party at the local level in Tanzania.[4] The aim here, then,

is to supplement the findings of the Moshi decision-making

studies and of studies of local government in Tanzania by

concentrating on the participants themselves--the Moshi Town

Councillors (both those elected by the residents of the town

and those nominated (appointed) by the President) (see TABLE

8.1), and the officers of the Moshi Town Council. That is

[3]For a selection of such studies see the Bibliography
of this essay, and Taylor, The Political Development of Tan-
ganyika, Bibliography. For a study of the origins of Chagga
local government, see Johnston, "Chagga Constitutional Devel-
opment." For an early attempt to go beyond the narrow con-
fines of studies of transplanted British local government,
see J. Gus Liebenow, "Tribalism, Traditionalism and Modern-
ism in Chagga Local Government," Journal of African Admin-
istration X,2(April 1958):71-82.

[4]For example, Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation,
especially Chapter IX; Dryden, Local Administration in Tan-
zania, especially Chapters 7 and 8; and Tordoff, Government
and Politics in Tanzania, Chapter IV.

TABLE 8.1 MEMBERSHIP OF THE MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL

1   Chairman[a]

19   Councillors elected to represent 6 town wards[b]

9   Councillors nominated by the President[c]
          Representative of the Regional Commissioner
          Head Postmaster
          Regional Secretary, NUTA
          Regional Land Officer
          Regional Medical Officer
          Regional Engineer
          Regional Secretary, TANU
          2 individuals by name

[a]The individual elected to be chairman of the TANU urban district is automatically the Chairman of the Moshi Town Council. For the purposes of this analysis, he has been included among the elected councillors.

[b]There were two vacancies in 1968-69; one of the former councillors was interviewed.

[c]These councillors were nominated both by name and office by the President in General Notice No. 669 of 31 March 1967. It was presumed in Moshi in 1968-69 that the office was determining, so that when a named officer was transferred, his replacement was welcomed as a nominated councillor, without further action by the President. One of the councillors nominated by name had resigned, and was unavailable for interview. Two different holders of the post of Regional Executive Secretary, TANU, were interviewed in 1968-69, and both are included in this analysis as nominated councillors. A representative of the Regional Engineer actually served on the Council, and it was he who was interviewed.

not to argue for an artificial distinction between the institution and the individuals who constitute it, but to attempt to make the institution less the undifferentiated whole it has appeared thus far, both in the issue-area studies and in the literature of Tanzanian local government.

In general, the elected town councillors are similar in basic demographic characteristics to their constituents, the residents of Moshi town, and they are mostly individuals who became active in nationalist politics very early and who today serve largely as representatives to, rather than from, the government. Not only do they have little actual power to deal with the problems of the town and to make authoritative allocations, but by and large they see themselves as powerless to deal with both the problems they see as important and the problems brought to them by their constituents. The nominated (appointed) councillors, however, who are mostly government officials selected apparently for their technical and managerial expertise, are able to assume a more active role in determining Council policies and decisions, at least in their own special areas of competence. Council officers, whose responsibilities are divided between the Council they serve and the Local Government Service Commission that appointed them and that largely determines their future careers, are most often the key decision-makers in town affairs. The role of the local TANU organization is a complex one, and ranges from control to impotence, depending on the nature of the conflict, the specific form it takes, and the desire and ability of party officers to insert themselves into the decision-making process. In general, then, the Moshi Town Council normally concerns itself with only the lowest level issues and even at that level serves to

legitimize decisions made by administrative officers, with little direct impact on major policy formulations and resource allocations.

MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: COUNCILLORS AND TOWN POPULATION

The political leadership of Moshi is similar to the population of the town in regard to national origin, religion, and ethnicity.   To what extent is that true for the Moshi Town Council and its officers, or rather, to what extent are certain segments of the town population under- or over-represented in the Council makeup?

The Council and its officers in 1969 generally reflected the town population in national origin--primarily African (see TABLE 8.2).[5]   Although there were a few Europeans serving in technical and administrative posts in Moshi, and although Asians were involved in local commercial enterprises, Tanzanian Africans held almost all key posts in local government.

As has been noted, Christian missionaries were attracted to Kilimanjaro and have been established throughout the district for more than fifty years.   In Moshi town, however, as in most towns in Tanzania, travelers and traders,

[5]In evaluating the percentages in this and other tables in this chapter, careful attention must be paid to the small number of cases: for Nominated Councillors, for example, where N=9, one councillor is represented as 11% of the total.   The absence of Europeans in TABLE 8.2 is explained in notes b and d.

TABLE 8.2   MOSHI TOWN AND ITS COUNCIL: NATIONAL ORIGIN

	MOSHI TOWN	ELECTED COUNCILLORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCILLORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
African	89%[a]	95%	100%[b]	89%
Asian	8	5	0	11
Arab	0[c]	0	0	0
European	1	0	0	0[d]
Not Ascertained	3	0	0	0
	101%	100%	100%	100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey and Tanzania 1967 Census (Moshi Town percentages refer to heads of households)

[a]That is, 89% of all heads of household in Moshi in 1967 were African.

[b]An African assistant to the Regional Engineer (a European, later replaced by an Asian) represented him on the Council.

[c]Less than 0.5%.

[d]A European volunteer serving temporarily as Town Engineer was not interviewed. He spoke little English and no Swahili and consequently was unable to participate in most Council deliberations. His views had little discernible impact in local decisions.

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as well as indigenous administrators brought by the colonial powers from coastal regions, carried Islam with them,[6] and, more recently, TANU, at least in its early phases, was identified with the Swahili--including Islam--culture.[7] It is

[6]See J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in East Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), especially pp. 22-30.

[7]On this point, see Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, 43-46.

not surprising, therefore, to find that while more than half
of the town population is Christian, more than half of the
elected Moshi town councillors were Muslim (see TABLE 8.3).

TABLE 8.3 MOSHI TOWN AND ITS COUNCIL: RELIGION

	MOSHI TOWN	ELECTED COUNCIL-LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL-LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
Christian	54%[a]	38%	66%	55%
(Lutheran	--	16	22	22)
(Roman Catholic	--	11	33	0)
(Anglican	--	11	11	33)
Muslim	38	58	22	22
Other World Religion[b]	4	5	0	11
Local Belief	1	0	0	0
Not Ascertained	4	0	11	11
	101%	101%	99%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey and Tanzania
1967 Census (Moshi town percentages refer to
heads of households)

[a]That is, 54% of all heads of households in Moshi
in 1967 were Christian.

[b]For example, Hindu.

This suggests that the Muslim-Christian division is one of
the major cleavages dividing Moshi town from its rural hin-
terland, or rather, the elevated areas of the Kilimanjaro
foothills from the lower plains areas. More than half of
the nominated councillors and Council officers were Chris-
tian, indicating simply that Tanzanians in areas of mission-
ary penetration had earlier and better access to education,
and thus were more likely to be selected for civil service
posts.

The Chagga are the major ethnic group in Moshi town,[8] and the proportion of Chagga among the elected town councillors is even greater than the proportion of Chagga among the total town population (see TABLE 8.4).[9] This suggests that

TABLE 8.4 MOSHI TOWN AND ITS COUNCIL: ETHNICITY

	MOSHI TOWN	ELECTED COUNCILLORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCILLORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
Chagga	37%[a]	58%	0%	33%
Neighboring Tribe[b]	13	11	22	11
Other African	38	26	78	44
Other[c]	10	5	0	11
Not Ascertained	2	0	0	0
	100%	100%	100%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey and Tanzania 1967 Census (Moshi town percentages refer to heads of households)

[a]That is, 37% of all heads of household in Moshi in 1967 reported their tribe as Chagga.

[b]Arusha, Meru, Masai, Pare, Taveta/Teita.

[c]Coded "Not Applicable" in Tanzania 1967 Census; includes Asians, Europeans.

[8]While it may be anthropologically inaccurate to treat Chagga language-speaking peoples as a single ethnic group, under certain circumstances these people of Kilimanjaro recognize a common ethnic identity--call themselves Chagga--and so are grouped in that way here.

[9]Note that in the collection of census data in Tanzania in 1967 information on ethnic group was gathered from heads of households, which could introduce distortions in the data if there were many multi-ethnic households, or if there were many errors by census-takers in the numerous multi-household houses in Moshi town. The general trend of the results, which is what we are concerned with here, is likely to be sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this discussion.

while the Swahili culture may continue to be an important
element of local politics in Moshi, many individuals identi-
fied as Swahilis were local in origin and not immigrants
from coastal areas. Yet, since the nominated councillors
and Council officers were appointed from Dar es Salaam and
subject to frequent transfer,[10] most serving in Moshi were
not local people. That is, although the elected councillers
had strong local roots, and did not include as many foreign-
ers as the high percentage of Muslims might suggest, nonethe-
less, many individuals with key roles in Council activities
were not only not subject to a local electorate, but also
were not local in origin and were often unknown to local peo-
ple before their arrival in Moshi. In addition, nominated
councillors and Council officers were younger and better ed-
ucated than the elected councillors (see TABLE 8.5).

MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: ELECTED LEADERSHIP

        The inability of the Moshi Town Council to monopolize
allocation of resources locally and the frequency with which
the Council is included in the decision-making process prin-
cipally to legitimize decisions made outside the Council it-
self have already been noted. Assessed from that perspective,
the Council as a whole, and especially the elected

        [10]That is, individuals serving as nominated council-
lors were appointed to their posts by government or party
offices in Dar es Salaam, and while serving in those posts
were nominated to the Moshi Town Council.

TABLE 8.5   MOSHI TOWN AND ITS COUNCIL: EDUCATION

	MOSHI TOWN	ELECTED COUNCIL- LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL- LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
No formal schooling	40%[a]	5%	0%	0%
1-3 years of school	12	5	0	0
4-7 years of school	31	47	11	33
8-11 years of school	13	21	33	0
12-13 years of school	3	16	33	22
14 or more years of school	1	5	22	33
Not Ascertained	0	0	0	11
	100%	99%	99%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey and Tanzania
          1967 Census

[a]That is, 40% of the Moshi population in 1967 had no
formal schooling. Note that this refers to the entire popu-
lation, of which 18.9% in 1967 were less than 6 years old.

councillors, are unable to have a major impact on many of

the decisions that are ostensibly within Council competence.

The elected councillors are aware of this, and comment on it

frequently. Further, when asked specifically about the prob-

lems they see as important in Moshi and about the problems

brought to them by their constituents, many describe them-

selves as unable to do anything at all about them. There is,

among the elected Moshi town councillors, a pervasive feeling

of subjective incompetence.[11]

Political leaders were asked to indicate what they thought was the most important problem in Moshi. The question was open-ended, and responses covered a wide range of problems.[12] There was no substantial agreement among Moshi town councillors and Council officers that any single problem was indeed the most important problem (see TABLE 8.6).

TABLE 8.6 MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN MOSHI

	ELECTED COUNCIL-LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL-LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
Education	0%[a]	0%	11%
Unemployment	21	11	22
Land shortage; overpopulation	21	22	11
Quality of leadership; corruption	16	11	11
Social dislocation (crime, etc.)	0	0	11
Development (business, housing problems)	21	33	11
Other	21	11	22
Not ascertained	0	11	0
	100%	99%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Question 1)

[a]That is, none of the elected councillors listed education as the most important problem.

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[11]For the pioneer discussion of the sense of civic competence, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, abridged edition, 1965), Chapter VI. Almond and Verba dealt with the sense of competence of ordinary citizens, while the discussion here concerns the sense of competence of the political leadership. Note also that Almond and Verba dealt with subject and object competence, referring to an individual's assessment of his roles as subject and object of the political system, while subjective competence here refers to a leader's own assessment of his power.

[12]For the complete question schedule used, see Appendix 1.

Leaders were then asked what they were doing, or could do,

about the problem they had mentioned.   More than half of the

elected town councillors said they could do nothing at all

about what they considered to be the most important problem

in Moshi, and another quarter said they could do nothing

more than explain to their constituents government action

that dealt with the problem (see TABLE 8.7).   Fewer than

TABLE 8.7   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: ACTION ON THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN MOSHI

	ELECTED COUNCIL-LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL-LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
Able to do nothing at all	58%[a]	22%	44%
Can do nothing to solve the problem, but represents government to citizens, explains	26	11	11
Takes general remedial action (action actually taken--not simply proposed or possible; R's own explanation of how his action was remedial was accepted)	16	44	0
Takes specific remedial action	0	11	44
Cites no problems	0	11	0
	100%	99%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Question 2)

[a]That is, 58% of the elected councillors reported they could do nothing at all about what they considered to be the most important problem.

one-fifth of the elected councillors, compared to about one-

half of the nominated councillors and Council officers, felt

they could play a part in resolving what they saw as the most

important problem facing their town.

Leaders were asked to list several other problems they considered important in Moshi, and were asked specifically if they thought unemployment, primary education, and corruption in local licensing were serious problems in Moshi. Again, almost half of the elected councillors reported that they could do nothing at all about the other important problems in Moshi, and another third said they could do little more than explain to citizens government programs and plans. That is, more than three-quarters of the elected councillors said they were unable to have a substantial impact on the whole range of problems they regarded as important in Moshi. (See TABLE 8.8) It should be noted that even a majority of

TABLE 8.8 MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: ACTION ON OTHER IMPORTANT PROBLEMS IN MOSHI[a]

	ELECTED COUNCIL-LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL-LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
Nothing at all	42%[b]	22%	67%
Nothing to solve the problems mentioned, but represents government to citizens, explains	37	22	11
Takes remedial action	21	44	22
Cites no problems	0	11	0
	100%	99%	100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Questions 3-6)

[a]The major thrust of R's response to all other problems mentioned was coded.

[b]That is, 42% of the elected councillors reported they could do nothing at all about the other major problems they mentioned.

Council officers felt themselves incompetent to deal with
what they regarded as serious problems.

To get another perspective on this perceived incom-
petence of local councillors, leaders were asked to describe
the problems local individuals and groups brought to them--
problems in which local people sought the assistance of their
councillors and Council officers--and their responses to those
problems. None of the elected councillors, compared to al-
most one-half of the nominated councillors and three-quarters
of the Council officers, reported they were able to solve the
problems brought to them by themselves, and only one-half of
the elected councillors thought that the problems brought to
them by their constituents could be dealt with adequately
within town governmental and party structures (see TABLE 8.9).
Thus, even for the kinds of problems for which local citizens
seek out their councillors, a majority of the elected coun-
cillors themselves felt they were unable to be of much assist-
ance. Of course, this process is a reciprocal one, in that
local citizens are likely to attempt to seek assistance from
people whom they feel can help them--as they find that their
elected councillors are unable to help them, or that they are
more successful if they take their problems elsewhere, they
are less likely to bring their problems to their elected
councillors in the first place. But the general finding is
very clear: for the whole range of problems with which the
elected councillors must deal, both the problems they regard

TABLE 8.9 MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: ACTION ON PROBLEMS BROUGHT BY LOCAL INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS

	ELECTED COUNCIL-LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL-LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
R can solve problems by himself	0%[a]	44%	78%
R cannot solve problems alone, but they can be solved at his level (e.g., cell, branch, district)	53	44	22
Problems cannot be solved by R alone or at his level, but can be solved at next higher level, to which R has some access (e.g., for cell leader, at branch level)	37	11	0
Problems cannot be solved at a level where R has an official role (e.g., at regional level for town councillor)	11	0	0
	101%	99%	100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Questions 14-16)

[a]That is, none of the elected councillors reported that they were capable of solving by themselves the problems brought to them by their local constituents.

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as important and the problems their constituents bring to them, the elected councillors feel they are unable to have a significant impact:

I cannot do anything. Assessors [lay assistants in the primary courts] are powerless to do anything.

This problem can be solved only by money; the Council cannot do that. I cannot do anything.

I cannot do anything because it is in the hands of the Public Works Department.

There is nothing to do--it is all up to the government. There is nothing we can do.

Me myself, I cannot do anything.

I cannot do anything.   I have no land myself.

What can I do?

   It might be argued that this finding reveals nothing
more than that councillors listed major problems of such
scope and importance that very few individuals in any soci-
ety could feel able to do much to resolve them.   But council-
lors were asked to describe problems affecting the town in
which they constitute the leadership, and clearly far fewer
other political leaders (both the nominated councillors and
Council officers shown in these tables and other political
leaders surveyed) projected this subjective incompetence.
This finding does indicate, however, that both the prevail-
ing sentiment and the objective realities in Tanzania serve
to convince local leaders that only action initiated at and
supported from the national level can possibly cope with the
range of problems perceived in up-country Tanzania.

   To examine the possibility that respondents simply.
believed that all significant problems could be resolved only
at the national level, responses were coded to indicate
whether or not the problems leaders saw as significant could

be resolved locally.[13] For the problems described as most

important, the other significant problems mentioned, and the

problems brought by local citizens to the councillors and

Council officers, most councillors and officers thought that

local solutions were possible. That is, for this entire range

of problems, most Council leaders thought that local action

could contribute substantially to their resolution. (See TA-

BLE 8.10) As well, most elected councillors, when describing

how they might influence decisions affecting Moshi reported

they would see local level leaders (see TABLE 8.16). In sum-

mary, then, when discussing the most important local problems,

for most of which they believe that local action could con-

tribute substantially to their resolution, elected council-

lors think that they themselves can do little.

A further verification of this finding of subjective

incompetence is found in the responses of local leaders to

the Arusha Declaration. TANU leaders, meeting in Arusha in

1967, approved a statement of party (and thus national) pol-

icy that subsequently became a rallying cry, an explanation

of policy in terms comprehensible to ordinary peasants, and

[13]Questions were open-ended, and respondents were
encouraged to expand on their responses. When a respondent
mentioned a problem, he was asked what he could do about it;
if his response to that second question did not indicate how
he thought the problem he was discussing could be resolved,
he was asked to discuss it further until the full nature of
the problem and its solutions, as the respondent saw them,
were clear. It was then usually not difficult to determine
whether or not the respondent thought the problem(s) he was
discussing could be resolved locally.

TABLE 8.10   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: LOCAL RESOLUTION OF
             SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS

	ELECTED COUNCILLORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCILLORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM			
Problem can be resolved locally[a]	63%[b]	67%	78%
Problem cannot be resolved locally[a]	37[c]	22	22
R cites no problems	0	11	0
	100%	99%	100%
OTHER PROBLEMS			
Problems can generally be re-solved locally[a]	100%	56%	89%
Problems generally cannot be resolved locally[a]	0	11	11
Of problems R cites, some can and some cannot be resolved locally[a]	0	22	0
R cites no other problems	0	11	0
	100%	100%	100%
PROBLEMS BROUGHT TO R			
Problems are generally local in scope[d]	53%	44%	89%
Problems are generally not local in scope[d]	0	0	0
Of problems brought to R, some are and some are not local in scope[d]	47	44	11
Not ascertained/no problems reported	0	11	0
	100%	99%	100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Questions 1-6,
        14-15)

[a]Local resolution means that appropriate action
taken by a local institution or local officer (local offi-
cer includes central government officers serving in Moshi,
provided that action proposed need not be approved in Dar
es Salaam before being implemented) could substantially as-
sist the resolution of the problem(s). Assessment by the
respondent, even though in some cases objective determina-
tion suggests the respondent to be in error.

[b]That is, 63% of the elected councillors saw what
they considered the most important problem as capable of
local resolution.

[c]Objective determination suggests that of this 37%,
almost half--some 16% of the total--were in error in sug-
gesting the problems they cited, as they defined them,
could not be resolved locally.

[d]Problems local in scope refer to local quarrels, lo-
cal school issues, and the like. Objective determination.

a standard against which progress toward Tanzanian socialism could be measured.[14] Political leaders in Moshi were asked to describe what they themselves were doing to implement the Arusha Declaration, and a summary of their responses indicates that more than half of the elected councillors were either doing nothing specific to implement the Arusha Declaration or were concerned primarily with the restrictions imposed on leaders. (Leaders were required to limit themselves to a single source of income derived from their own efforts. Earning several salaries, absentee landlordship, and shareholding were thus forbidden to leaders.) Several leaders, while describing their sacrifices in complying with these leadership requirements, complained that they were left with an inadequate source of income. (See TABLE 8.11)

Thus, both the studies of issues and the interviews of the participants make it clear that not only are locally elected councillors largely excluded from the critical stages of local decision-making, but also that most of the councillors considered themselves (rather accurately) unable to deal effectively with the problems they regarded as important and

[14]See Nyerere, Ujamaa-Essays on Socialism. For an overview of the Arusha Declaration and related policy statements, see Henry Bienen, "An Ideology for Africa," Foreign Affairs 47,3(April 1969):545-559, and Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, Chapter XIII.

TABLE 8.11   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARUSHA
             DECLARATION

RESPONDENT'S ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING THE ARUSHA DECLARATION IS:[a]	ELECTED COUNCILLORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCILLORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
Does nothing, since Arusha Declaration had no impact on him	26%[b]	11%	44%
Does nothing, since was implementing the principles of the Arusha Declaration even before it was announced	5	0	0
Became more self-reliant	5	0	11
Took up, or substantially increased, farming	11	0	11
Made changes required by leadership code	26	44	11
Became involved in some group activity (including cooperatives)	11	0	0
Other (including encouraged, led others) and combination of several of the above (equal emphasis)	16	33	22
Not asked	0	11	0
	100%	99%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Question 9)

[a]Assessment by the respondent of his own role; where several were mentioned, the role described as most important was coded.

[b]That is, 26% of the elected councillors reported they were doing nothing to implement the Arusha Declaration because it had no specific impact on them.

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the problems brought to them by their constituents.[15] They

reported that what action they did take was largely con-

fined to explaining policy and action to their constituents

[15]For a discussion of political elites who consider themselves unable to influence government policy, see Victor T. LeVine, Political Leadership in Africa (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967), Chapter IV.

and representing their constituents to government and party.

What, then, is the nature of the elected leadership
(in the Town Council) in Moshi? What sorts of people become
elected councillors? If they do not have a monopoly on local
decision-making, and if they consider themselves unable to
deal effectively with major local problems, where do they
concentrate their efforts? These questions themselves sug-
gest the paradox involved in the call for dynamic local lead-
ership that is implicit and explicit in national policy and
the inability of the local council to attract capable and en-
ergetic local leaders willing and able to do something more
than simply forward complaints to the government and party
hierarchies.

The elected town councillors in Moshi in 1969 were
mostly local people, individuals who had lived in Moshi for
some time. Four-fifths were born in Kilimanjaro Region, and
more than half had lived at their current residences for more
than 20 years in 1969, while nominated councillors and Coun-
cil officers were more often born outside Kilimanjaro Region
and lived in Moshi for much shorter periods of time (see TA-
BLE 8.12). Elected councillors had a longer record of polit-
ical activity than did nominated councillors and Council of-
ficers--they joined TANU earlier and they had served in po-
litical positions longer. More than half of the elected
councillors joined TANU before 1956 and served in political

TABLE 8.12   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: PLACE OF BIRTH AND LENGTH OF
             LOCAL RESIDENCE

	ELECTED COUNCILLORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCILLORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
BORN IN:			
Kilimanjaro Region	79%[a]	11%	56%
Elsewhere in Tanzania	16	89	44
Out of Tanzania	5	0	0
	100%	100%	100%
HAS LIVED IN CURRENT RESIDENCE FOR:			
Less than 1 year	0%[b]	33%	22%
1-2 years	0	22	11
2-10 years	11	44	22
10-20 years	32	0	11
More than 20 years	58	0	22
Not ascertained	0	0	11
	101%	99%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey

   [a]That is, 79% of the elected councillors were born
in Kilimanjaro Region.

   [b]That is, none of the elected councillors had lived
at their current residences for less than 1 year in 1969.

_____

positions for more than 10 years (see TABLE 8.13).   Elected

councillors in 1968-69, then, were largely local people who

very early became involved in TANU activity, and who had

continued their political activity through membership in

the Moshi Town Council.

        Nearly half of the elected councillors in Moshi in

TABLE 8.13   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: HISTORY OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY

	ELECTED COUNCIL- LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL- LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
JOINED TANU:			
Not a TANU member	0%[a]	11%	0%
Joined TANU since 1963	0	22	33
Joined TANU 1957-1962	47	33	33
Joined TANU 1954-1956	42	33	11
Was active in a pre-TANU na- tionalist organization and subsequently joined TANU	11	0	11
Not ascertained	0	0	11
	100%	99%	99%
POLITICAL SERVICE:[c]			
No political service	0%[d]	0%	44%
Less than 2 years of polit- ical service	0	44	11
2-5 years of political service	21	22	11
5-10 years of political service	26	11	22
More than 10 years of polit- ical service	53	22	0
Not ascertained	0	0	11
	100%	99%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey

[a]That is, all of the elected councillors were TANU members in 1969.

[b]For example, Tanganyika African Association.

[c]Political service means holding a position in which a substantial portion of the individual's time and energy were devoted to political activity. Thus, depending on an individual's description of his own background, service in a government or trade union post might or might not be coded as political service.

[d]That is, all of the elected councillors (by defini- tion) had had some political service.

1968-69 had no formal employment,[16] and another third were
either farmers or operated small shops (see TABLE 8.14).
Thus, three-quarters of the elected town councillors were
individuals with a great deal of time available for political
activity. Service on the Council can be a time-consuming ac-
tivity, especially for those councillors who devote most of
their energies to being available to their constituents--
communication in Moshi is largely by word of mouth, and they
are in the neighborhood, ready to listen to complaints, ac-
company people to the TANU office or the Town Hall, and in-
tercede in disputes. These councillors often reported that
their constituents expected them to be available and to be
able to drop what they were doing to deal with a constituent's
problem.

In 1969, however, there were indications that this
councillor role--available locally to hear complaints and
represent constituents--was becoming less viable. First,
the leadership provisions of the Arusha Declaration make it
difficult for such individuals to find adequate means of sup-
port. Formerly, many councillors were able to acquire homes,

[16]Income was derived from a variety of sources--the
modest allowance to town councillors, farms maintained by
wives and relatives, support from grown children, the small
allowance for service as primary court assessors. Many
townspeople and some leaders believed that several council-
lors also had quasi-legal or illegal sources of income--fees
charged for intervention with the bureaucracy or legal or
business advice, unlicensed taxi services, rental income
from property officially listed to relatives.

TABLE 8.14   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: EMPLOYMENT

	ELECTED COUNCILLORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCILLORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
Farmer	16%[a]	0%	0%
Salaried--government	0	44	100
TANU	5	22	0
trade union	0	11	0
parastatal	5	0	0
cooperative	5	0	0
commercial	5	0	0
other	0	22	0
Self-employed--professional	5	0	0
commercial	16	0	0
Unemployed[b]	42	0	0
	99%	99%	100%

STATUS OF EMPLOYMENT[c]

	ELECTED COUNCILLORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCILLORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
Unemployed[b]	42%[d]	0%	0%
Ordinary farmer or herder	11	0	0
Job for which no training required (small business, middle-sized farm)	11	0	0
Job for which some training, education, experience required (craftsmen, big business, large farmer)	16	0	0
Job of some prestige (teacher, government (non-clerical, non-laborer) post, mission post)	16	22	67
Job of great prestige (doctor, lawyer, major chief, top government, party posts)	5	78	33
	101%	100%	100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey

[a]That is, 16% of the elected councillors reported their occupation as farming.

[b]No major income-producing activity. Income derived from farms maintained by wives and relatives, support from grown children, councillor allowance, and, in some cases, quasi-legal or illegal activities. See n 16.

[c]Objective determination.

[d]That is, 42% of the elected councillors reported no major income-producing activity. See note b and n 16.

in which they then rented one or more rooms, and land, which they either rented out or employed others to farm, but both of these sources of income--income not derived by the efforts of the individual himself--are specifically forbidden to leaders in Tanzania. Although it is difficult to secure reliable information, it is clear that some councillors in Moshi continued to receive income from these sources in 1969. At the same time, there was continuing pressure by the councillors to increase their allowances.[17] A second obstacle to this councillor role is the attempt to find better educated and more highly skilled councillors. Individuals with skills and education are likely to be found in government service, or working for cooperatives, trade unions, parastatal organizations, or large businesses, and in general they do not have the free time or accessibility that unemployed or self-employed councillors have.

In 1968-69 two seats on the Moshi Town Council became vacant when councillors resigned for reasons of health and unwillingness to comply with the leadership provisions of the Arusha Declaration. Three separate attempts to fill the vacancies by election in 1969 were unsuccessful, as each

[17]Despite regular demands for higher allowances over several years, at the end of 1969 the Moshi Town Council had not yet received approval from the Minister responsible for local government to increase the allowances.

time only a single candidate successfully filed nomination
papers.[18] Although both Council and party officers expressed
dismay about the continuing vacancies, neither took any ac-
tion to promote candidacies.   The inability to fill these two
vacancies, despite three attempts, highlights the contradic-
tion between on the one hand the perceived powerlessness of
the Council, the restrictive leadership requirements of the
Arusha Declaration, and the meager rewards (both symbolic
and other) for Council service, and on the other hand the
need for dynamic locally elected leadership.

Although the elected councillors did receive com-
plaints and did represent their constituents, only partially
did they link the urban populace with the larger polity.
That is, while by representing their constituents they as-
sisted in associating them with the local government struc-
ture, elected councillors in general received fewer complaints
from urban residents than did other political leaders, and
rarely had occasion to go beyond local level officials in

[18]To be nominated, a candidate must secure the sig-
natures of 25 voters registered in the ward to be represent-
ed (candidates may live anywhere in the town). Several pro-
spective candidates were unable to secure 25 signatures, or
secured signatures from individuals who were not registered
voters or who were registered in another ward. Only one
candidate secured signatures sufficiently far in advance of
the filing date to verify them in the registration rolls;
but election rules require that the number of candidates be
at least equal to the number of vacancies before the elec-
tion can be held.

Moshi in dealing with problems. By the leaders' own analysis,
local citizens were more likely to bring their problems to
Council officers than to elected councillors (see TABLE 8.15),

TABLE 8.15   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: LOCAL CONTACTS

	ELECTED COUNCIL- LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL- LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO BRING PROB- LEMS TO LOCAL LEADERS:			
Very many (11 or more/day)	21%[a]	33%	67%
Many (6-10/day)	16	22	0
Average (1-5/day or at least 25/month)	32	11	22
Few (2-7/week or at least 8/month)	11	0	11
Very few (2-7/month)	11	11	0
Only occasionally (1/month or fewer)	11	22	0
	102%	99%	100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Question 13)

[a]That is, 21% of the elected councillors reported
that "very many" (11 or more) people brought their problems
to them every day.

and most elected councillors, because they traveled so rare-
ly outside of Moshi, were unable to establish links between
Moshi residents and other areas of Tanzania. Leaders were
asked whom they would see if they wanted to influence deci-
sions affecting Moshi (both those made locally and those
made in Dar es Salaam), and most local councillors reported
they would seek out local level people, regardless of where
the decision in question was made (see TABLE 8.16).

Leaders were asked what they did about the problems

TABLE 8.16   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: CONTACTS TO INFLUENCE
             DECISIONS

	ELECTED COUNCIL- LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL- LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME ON A LOCAL MATTER, R WOULD SEE:[a]			
No influence; can do nothing	5%[b]	0%	11%
Local government official	16	0	33
Councillor or take to Council	32	0	11
Local TANU officer	21	22	33
Area Commissioner	0	0	11
Regional Commissioner	5	22	0
Member of Parliament, or Member of TANU National Executive Committee	5	0	0
Other person or combination of above	16	33	0
Not asked or Not ascertained	0	22	0
	100%	99%	99%
TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME ON A MATTER IN WHICH THE DECISION HAS BEEN MADE OR WILL BE MADE IN DAR ES SALAAM, R WOULD SEE:[c]			
No influence; can do nothing	5%[d]	11%	22%
Regional ministry or department official, or person at district level or lower	63	11	67
Regional Commissioner	0	11	11
Regional Chairman or TANU at Regional level	0	22	0
Member of Parliament	10	0	0
Person in or from Dar es Salaam	21	11	0
Other person or combination of above	0	22	0
Not asked	0	11	0
	99%	99%	100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Questions 7 and 8)

[a]Leaders were asked whom they would see if they wanted to influence the decision on a local matter.

[b]That is, 5% of the elected councillors reported they could do nothing to have influence on a local decision.

[c]Leaders were asked whom they would see if they wanted to influence a decision made or to be made in Dar es Salaam on a matter that affected Moshi.

[d]That is, 5% of the elected councillors reported they could do nothing to have influence on a national decision that affected a Moshi problem.

their constituents brought them, and two-thirds of the elected
councillors described themselves either as general sources of
assistance (helping individuals to find jobs, for example) or
as representatives to the government and/or TANU (carried
complaints to the Council, for example) (see TABLE 8.17).
Thus, three-quarters of the elected councillors concentrated
their efforts on carrying messages to, rather than from, lo-
cal institutions.

In summary, then, elected councillors in Moshi in
1968-69 were local people who had long been involved in pol-
itics, who served primarily as representatives to the govern-
ment, transmitting problems and complaints to Council and
other officials. At the same time, the Town Council had lit-
tle substantial direct impact on local policies and alloca-
tions, and many councillors considered themselves to be un-
able to deal effectively with what they regarded as important
local problems. Elected councillors were confined largely
to the local arena in representing their constituents, in
that they rarely sought out officials outside Moshi, even on
issues in which they assessed that the critical decisions
were made in Dar es Salaam, and that they rarely had occasion
to travel out of Kilimanjaro. Many elected councillors, be-
cause they were unemployed or self-employed, could be readily
available to their constituents, but the increasing need for
better educated local councillors in Tanzania, coupled with

TABLE 8.17   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: RESPONSES TO PROBLEMS
             BROUGHT BY CONSTITUENTS

R IS:[a]	ELECTED COUNCIL- LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL- LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
General source of assistance	21%[b]	0%	11%
Pacifier, reconciler, arbitrator	5	0	33
Able to assist only because of the nature of R's job (e.g., education officer who gets only school problems)	0	56	44
Representative to government[c]	42	22	0
Representative to TANU (including to TANU and government)	16	0	0
Representative from government	5	0	11
Representative from TANU (including from TANU and government)	5	11	0
Representative both to and from government and/or TANU	5	11	0
	99%	100%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Questions 14-
        16)

[a]Coded from all problems brought to respondent, according to respondent's own description of his behavior, into mutually exclusive categories, beginning from the bottom.

[b]That is, 21% of the elected councillors reported that they were able to be of general assistance to people who came to them with problems.

[c]To means carry messages toward. An individual whose response to problems brought by constituents was to bring the problems up in a Council meeting was coded as a representative to government, while an individual whose response was to explain Council action was coded as a representative from government.

the requirement that leaders' income be derived from their own efforts, nurtured a contradiction between the two different types of councillorship, a contradiction that contributed to the inability to fill two Council vacancies.

MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: APPOINTED LEADERSHIP

The nominated Moshi town councillors in 1968-69 were largely administrative officers, apparently appointed to the Council because of their managerial skills and technical expertise. They were not local people, and except for the TANU and NUTA secretaries, were not politicians. In their own areas of expertise their voices carried great weight in Council deliberations--the opinion of the Regional Health Officer on health matters, for example. In Moshi town at least, the position of nominated councillor has clearly not been utilized as a device of patronage, a means of rewarding political activists and faithfuls, nor has it been used to insure TANU dominance in Council affairs by appointing only TANU stalwarts. Although of course there is no clear boundary between what is political and what is not in Tanzania, the nominated councillors in Moshi (except the NUTA and TANU secretaries) consciously attempted to avoid becoming involved in what they saw as political matters, and in 1968-69 at least one was not even a TANU member.

The Council officers have already been discussed. It is clear that in most issues in which a decision is actually made locally, the Council officers, and especially the Town Clerk, are the key people. It is they who make most decisions; it is they who make recommendations to the Council and its committees, recommendations usually adopted with little modification; and it is they, with control of the

communications link between the Council and the Ministry responsible for local government and with primary responsibility for implementing Council decisions, who can alter decisions in the communication and implementation processes. Moreover, local people are more likely to seek assistance from Council officers than from their councillors, both because the officers in the Town Hall are the primary symbols of local government and authority and because town residents are aware that it is the officers, and not the councillors, who can make the decisions in which they are interested. Even when people seek assistance from their councillors, the common course of action for the councillors to follow is to represent or intercede on behalf of their constituents before Council officers. The officers themselves, at least in Moshi in 1968-69, were quick to deprecate the skills and abilities of the councillors and the political process in general, and, perhaps like administrators almost everywhere, they felt they could run the town more smoothly if there were no politics and politicians at all.

Council officers have divided responsibilities (and allegiances). They are directly responsible to the Town Council, and are generally accountable to it for their actions, but they are appointed, promoted, and transferred by the Local Government Service Commission. As well, the Town Clerk, as the executive officer of the Town Council, is responsible to the Ministry of Local Government for the actions

of the Council.   Thus, it is not uncommon for an officer to
evaluate a proposed course of action in terms of the antic-
ipated response, not of the Council, but of his superiors in
Dar es Salaam.   It is also not uncommon for the local coun-
cillors to feel frustrated by their inability to control the
actions of their officers.   For example, in 1969 a former
Member of Parliament who had been expelled from both TANU and
Parliament after a conflict with the Regional Commissioner in
his home area was appointed an officer of the Moshi Town Coun-
cil.   Before he had been in his post for a month, councillors
expressed concern with his independent decisions and state-
ments to the press, and about his unresponsiveness to the
Council.

MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: TANU

        In waging the independence struggle, TANU was a na-
tional movement that drew its strength from locally based
groups organized around local problems and grievances.   When
the TANU government replaced the colonial government after
independence, it became the focus for some of those local
grievances, and TANU was confronted with opposition in sev-
eral local councils.[19]   To offer the local electorate a

        [19]The Kilimanjaro (rural) case--so many independents
were elected in 1963 that TANU, even with its clear majority,
formed an elected members organization to caucus before coun-
cil meetings--has already been mentioned; another was in
Buhaya.   See Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, 103-106,
Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, 114-116, and
Hyden, Political Development in Rural Tanzania, 131-139.

democratic alternative TANU rebels and independents were permitted to oppose party candidates and were occasionally successful in defeating them. The dilemma for TANU was to encourage responsibility to the local electorate by providing for competitive open elections while at the same time insuring that national policy would be accepted at the local level and that national policy would guide the administration of local decisions. To deal with this problem the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State recommended that the TANU District Executive Committees be included in District Councils (and likewise in urban areas), and among the changes that developed from those recommendations was the decision that the elected TANU District Chairman automatically become the Chairman of the relevant district, town, or municipality.[20] As well, all candidates must be TANU candidates, approved by both the local party and the National Executive Committee.[21] Thus, both the elected councillors and the Chairman are approved

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[20] See Tanzania, _Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State_ (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1968), 24-25. The provision that the TANU Chairman be the local government Chairman is included in the TANU Constitution (which is itself the First Schedule of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965), Article IV, Section C.

[21] The procedure for election to local government councils mirrors the Parliamentary election procedure, for which see Belle Harris, "The Electoral System," Chapter 2 in Lionel Cliffe, editor, _One Party Democracy_.

and supported by the local TANU organization, and as has already been noted, many elected councillors have records of early affiliation with the party and long party service.

And yet, the studies of decision-making in several key issue-areas and the examination of councillors' understanding of the local political process suggest that the local TANU organization does not dominate Council activities. The missions, the bar-owners, and some employers are able to subvert, or at least avoid implementing, TANU policy. The local TANU organization is successful in altering some Council decisions, but unsuccessful in others.

The councillors themselves, in dealing with what they consider to be important problems in the local area, do not often turn first to TANU. That is, when the responses of councillors and Council officers on how they deal with what they consider to be important problems in the local area are examined, it is clear that only a few councillors respond in ways that directly involve TANU. And yet, an objective assessment of the problems as they are defined by the councillors and Council officers suggests that local political action--deputations, petitions, group pressure-- could substantially contribute to resolving them (see TABLE 8.18). The point here is simply that TANU dominance in local government--the overlaps of local TANU and local government institutions--do not mean that the local TANU organization directly controls the deliberations and actions of the

TABLE 8.18 MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: IMPORTANT PROBLEMS—ACTION
            INVOLVING TANU

	ELECTED COUNCIL-LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL-LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
ACTION ON MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM:			
R takes action directly involving TANU[a]	0%[b]	11%	11%
R takes action not directly involving TANU	16	44	33
R cites no problems or takes no action	84	44	56
	100%	99%	100%
ACTION ON OTHER PROBLEMS:			
R takes action directly involving TANU[a]	5%[c]	22%	0%
R takes action not directly involving TANU	16	22	22
R cites no problems or takes no action	79	55	78
	100%	99%	100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Questions 1-6)

[a]Action involving a TANU officer or the TANU organ-
ization at any level. Does not include action involving
government officer who happens to be a TANU member or offi-
cial.

[b]That is, none of the elected councillors takes ac-
tion that directly involves TANU on what are considered to
be the most important problems.

[c]That is, 5% of the elected councillors take action
that directly involves TANU on the other problems they con-
sider important.

Town Council, nor do they mean that when councillors and

Council officers confront problems they automatically turn

first to the local TANU organization. In fact, in 1969 when

one councillor complained loudly at a committee meeting that

town residents were taking local government problems to the
TANU office instead of to their councillors and Council of-
ficers, and suggested that the TANU office should refuse to
hear such problems, he was warmly supported by other coun-
cillors.

An example may help give substance to the complex
nature of the intertwined relationship between the Council
and the local TANU organization. A councillor (who was also
a Council committee chairman and a TANU branch chairman),
responding to complaints about high rents in his ward
(branch), wrote to the Town Clerk to seek redress. The Town
Clerk forwarded the letter to the Senior Resident Magistrate,
who was the vice-chairman of the local Rent Tribunal, which
has the power to approve, or disapprove, rental charges.
The Senior Resident Magistrate forwarded both letters to the
TANU District Executive Secretary, enclosing a letter from
the Dar es Salaam-based chairman of the Rent Tribunal en-
couraging local Rent Tribunals to make house-to-house visits
to insure that rents charged were fair. The TANU Regional
Executive Secretary (who was both a nominated councillor and
a member of the local Rent Tribunal) then wrote to the Town
Clerk, supporting action by the Town Council. Ultimately,
a subcommittee of the Council Urban Planning Committee was
selected to look into the matter. Thus, the initiative by
a party branch chairman (and councillor) was to the Council,
and a Council subcommittee assumed by default the role of

the local Rent Tribunal, with the encouragement of the local
TANU organization.

As has been stressed several times, the overlaps be-
tween local government and party organizations in Moshi are
extensive. The TANU urban Chairman is automatically the
Council Chairman. Elected councillors are all TANU candi-
dates. Four of six TANU urban branch chairmen were elected
councillors, and the previous Town Clerk served as a branch
chairman. The TANU Regional Executive Secretary was a nomi-
nated councillor. One elected councillor served on the TANU
Regional Working Committee, and he and another elected coun-
cillor served on the TANU Regional Executive Committee
(where both the TANU and NUTA Secretaries, who were nominat-
ed councillors, also served). Two elected councillors and
the Town Clerk served on the TANU Urban District Working
Committee, and they and seven other elected councillors
served on the TANU Urban District Executive Committee. One
of the two urban branch secretaries served as an elected
councillor--in fact, he lived in one ward, represented a
second in the Council, and was the TANU branch secretary in
a third.

Confusion among councillors as to what the local
TANU role should be both contributes to and helps explain
the overlapping roles. When councillors were asked what
they thought the role of TANU should be in the local area,
there was a wide spread of opinions, and no substantial

agreement among elected councillors on what the local TANU

organization should be doing (see TABLE 8.19).   Among the

TABLE 8.19   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: TANU ROLE IN THE LOCAL AREA

	ELECTED COUNCIL-LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL-LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
TANU is the defender of the people; TANU helps little people; TANU oversees the leaders	11%[a]	0%	0%
TANU's role is general assistance; receives local problems; expedites action	21	0	0
TANU's role is decision-making; TANU decides on local matters	5	0	11
TANU legitimizes; TANU enables the government to do its job; TANU is "mother" of govt.	5	0	0
TANU reconciles, brings conflicting groups together, builds unity	11	0	0
TANU is the local expression (mouth) of national policy (incl TANU's job is propaganda, political education, exhortation, party maintenance)	37	67	67
TANU mobilizes; TANU gets the masses to implement policies, promotes development	5	33	0
TANU is/does combination of the above[b]	0	0	11
Not ascertained (incl opposition to TANU)	5 / 100%	0 / 100%	11 / 100%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Question 20)

[a]That is, 11% of the elected councillors said that TANU's role in local matters is to defend the people, ...

[b]Although many individuals mentioned several roles for TANU in local matters, almost all stressed one; that role was coded.

nominated councillors and Council officers there was more
agreement, but their consensus--that the primary TANU role
was to express national policy in the local area--defined a
role that largely excludes TANU from direct involvement in
local decision-making and government. When local leaders
were asked to differentiate the party and the government,
fully one-third could find no clear differences (see TABLE
8.20).

TABLE 8.20   MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: DIFFERENTIATION OF TANU, GOVERNMENT

	ELECTED COUNCIL- LORS (N=19)	NOMINATED COUNCIL- LORS (N=9)	COUNCIL OFFICERS (N=9)
No difference--R unable to cite and explain clear difference	37%[a]	33%	44%
TANU decides, government implements	16	11	22
TANU persuades, government uses force	11	11	0
TANU creates and legitimizes government	16	11	0
TANU corrects government, is people's watchdog; TANU is the People's organ (government is not)	16	11	22
Other; combination of the above	5	22	11
	101%	99%	99%

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Question 21)

[a]That is, 37% of the elected councillors said they saw no difference between TANU and the government, or were unable to explain any difference between TANU and the government.

The local TANU organization is multi-faceted and is

at least partially integrated with local government. But

the extent of TANU control over local government actions and

of TANU participation in local government decisions varies

widely, depending on the specific issues involved, the na-

ture and the locus of the conflict generated, and the initi-

ative of local TANU officials. And, while most of the

elected councillors regarded the party as supreme over the

Council, administrators tended to regard the Council as

supreme:

> [TANU's] role should be, if they want to be more effec-
> tive, purely advice. If TANU tries to pop their noses
> into administration problems, then things will be in a
> muddle.

> The government people are stronger than party officers.
> . . . the government is supreme: the party can propose
> and the government can refuse, but not the reverse--
> the government cannot propose to TANU and be refused.

What is clear, then, is that the overlaps between

the local council and the local TANU organization, both in-

stitutional and through service in multiple leadership po-

sitions, are extensive. Within the limitations of national

policy, and it should be stressed that major policy emanates

from the center, the local council and the local TANU organ-

ization both complement each other and serve as alterna-

tives to each other. Both the Council and the party organ-

ization are involved in local allocations, and each is used

to appeal the decisions of the other. In the ultimate con-

frontation, the party is of course supreme, but in the

day-to-day affairs that challenge does not frequently develop, and the two function interdependently.

MOSHI TOWN COUNCIL: CONCLUSIONS

The elected town councillors, as a group, are individuals who have a long record of political activity, who think of themselves as largely unable to deal with what they consider to be the important local problems, who are generally accessible to local citizens, and who function primarily to represent their constituents to government and party institutions. In general, they do not constitute a dynamic local leadership, in touch with the critical problems and with a monopoly of local political power. The nominated councillors are largely administrative and technical officials, apparently appointed to the Council to contribute their skills and expertise. The appointment of town councillors in Moshi has not been used to reward party stalwarts, and the nominated councillors, except the TANU and NUTA secretaries, avoid political activity. The Council officers have the key decision-making positions within the local government framework; their recommendations are usually persuasive in the Council, and their responsibility for the implementation of Council decisions enables them to have substantial impact on local governmental outputs. At the same time, Council officers have a divided set of responsibilities--they are accountable both to the Ministry

responsible for local government and the Local Government
Service Commission in Dar es Salaam and to the Moshi Town
Council. When these responsibilities seem to be in conflict,
it is often the directives from, or the anticipated reac-
tions in, Dar es Salaam that prevail.

This evidence supports the finding that the princi-
pal role of the Moshi Town Council is to provide legitimacy
for decisions taken either by Council officers or at other
levels above the Council in the hierarchical chain that
links it to the Ministry in Dar es Salaam. A second role is
to provide, in a limited way, a forum to which the complaints
and demands of urban residents can be brought; this forum,
though severely constrained in its ability to influence lo-
cal decisions, is nonetheless heavily used.

This leads us to look again at local government in
Tanzania. The case for strong local government has been
made on three separate, but related, grounds. It is argued
that only strong local government can mobilize the up-
country population to the extent necessary for development
to take place. It is also argued that development efforts
cannot be directed from Dar es Salaam and that strong local
government institutions are necessary to implement success-
fully national policies and programs. And finally, it is
widely believed that for an up-country Tanzanian, partici-
patory democracy within the framework of the one-party
state has meaning primarily through participation in and

control over local decisions. At the same time, there is a growing trend in Tanzania to regard local government as inimical to coordinated development and national integration-- by aggregating and articulating local parochial interests, local government reinforces and entrenches opposition to national policies and programs. This trend is manifested in the strengthening of functionally specific institutions (ministry offices, cooperatives) at the local level.[22]

In 1969, spurred by the continuing failure of local government to shoulder a substantial share of the development effort and by the financial insolvency of many local councils, Tanzania began a fundamental reevaluation of local government. The local rate and the produce cess were eliminated. The central government assumed greater responsibility for education and health. The commissioner system (individuals serving simultaneously as government and party officers, already functioning at regional and district levels) was extended down to the ward level. Regional ministerial offices were strengthened. Development funds were made available for allocation at the regional level. And a broad study of local government, conducted by foreign experts, apparently recommended reducing the role of the unsuccessful district-level institutions and strengthening

[22]For an analysis of this trend, see Fred G. Burke, "Research in African Local Government: Past Trends and an Emerging Approach," Canadian Journal of African Studies 3,1 (Winter 1969):73-80.

the regional level apparatus.

Views on the future role of local government among the political leadership in Moshi varied widely. Some major leaders thought that district councils should be eliminated completely, in favor of strengthening the office of the Area (District) Commissioner and the regional level apparatus. Others, arguing that the mass of the population is effectively represented only at the district level, recommended strengthening the district and urban councils. Still others thought that merging party and government at all levels would solve the problem.

How has local government in Moshi, the Moshi Town Council, performed these tasks assigned to local government? Our overview of the Council, its members, and its officers suggests not well at all. The Town Council has rarely directly attempted to mobilize the urban populace, other than for parades and celebrations, and has certainly not been successful in mobilizing people for development projects. The Council has also not taken an active role in the implementation of national policy and programs, and the councillors have been largely unable to translate national policy into urban terms. Local officials cannot agree on what the Arusha Declaration means in the urban setting, and their general assessment is that it has had little impact in Moshi. Excluded from the local development committees, the Council has no real development program, other than to

attract new industry to the town. The functioning of the
Moshi Town Council provides local residents with few clear,
direct, accessible avenues for participating in, and con-
trolling, local decisions. It even proved impossible to
generate enough enthusiasm about service on the Council to
fill two vacant Council seats. And yet, if the Council has
not been active in promoting development goals and programs
and national integration, it is clearly not because the
Council has enabled local discontent to coalesce into con-
certed opposition to national strategies.

But local government in Moshi should not be equated
with the Moshi Town Council. The relationships that link
the Town Council and the local TANU organization are exten-
sive, and much of the local leadership holds positions in
both. Although the local party organization has not been
much more active than the Council in mobilizing the urban
populace or in implementing national policy, the party does
provide additional avenues of participation in local
decision-making. By appealing to the party, and by pressur-
ing the party to intercede with the Council, local groups
have been successful in getting some decisions--albeit very
low level ones--altered and reversed. What all of this
seems to suggest is that local government, including the
party, is at something of a crossroads in Tanzania. Thus
far it has had little success in meeting the broad develop-
mental charges placed on it by the national leadership,

though perhaps it has served to extend participation in the
political process far beyond the boundaries of the colonial
period. Yet it is not at all clear that to move in the di-
rection of relying more heavily on technical experts and ad-
ministrators, even when they are nominally party members,
will promote ujamaa in Tanzania.

Two more general comments are in order here. The
evidence in Tanzania since independence suggests that for
local government to be viable and to play a substantial
role, national leaders may have to be willing to tolerate
some tension between national and local interests.[23] Strong
local governing institutions, in which the local populace
can participate, and over which they can exercise substan-
tial control, can provide the sense of identification, and
ultimately allegiance, necessary to incorporate disaffected
parochial interests and can induce compliance with and sup-
port of national goals and programs.

Second, the extensive interdependence and overlaps
of the Town Council and the local TANU organization suggest
that it may be misleading to treat the local party organiza-
tion as a single unit. The local party is an alliance of
several different sets of interests and people--a coalition

[23]Goran Hyden argues that more local autonomy and
control over plan formulation and implementation are neces-
sary in "Planning in Tanzania: Lessons of Experience," 13-17.

of factions. There is tension between locally selected and
centrally appointed officers. There is tension between
those who associate themselves with Christianity and with
Chagganess and those who feel they represent the non-Chris-
tian, the non-Chagga, and the more transient segments of the
urban population. There is tension between those who have
a long history of party activity but who do not fully sup-
port the policies of Tanzanian socialism and the largely
younger, better educated individuals more firmly committed
to the goals of ujamaa. This is not to suggest that these
tensions and the factions within the local political lead-
ership, which will be examined more fully in Chapter 10 in-
hibit development and integration in Tanzania; rather it is
to suggest that they may provide a rational, though perhaps
at times unconscious and reluctant, strategy for incorporat-
ing conflicting pressures and molding them into viable de-
velopmental institutions.

CHAPTER 9

MOSHI CELL LEADERS

CELL LEADERS: INTRODUCTION

A major continuing concern of this essay has been
the nature of the contact between the government and the
party on the one hand and the ordinary population in an up-
country urban setting in Tanzania on the other. One set of
locally responsible leaders who link government/party and
people are the elected Moshi town councillors, examined in
Chapter 8. A second set of local leaders, elected by their
immediate neighbors and forming the lowest level of the
party structure, are the cell leaders. To extend the scope
of this study, and to get a glimpse of one of the ways in
which the party touches ordinary Tanzanian citizens, we will
explore the cell leaders in Moshi--who they are and what
they do.

First contemplated officially in 1963, cells were
established in Dar es Salaam at the end of 1964, and have
subsequently been instituted throughout the country.[1] As of
1965 cells were formed in about half of all TANU branches.[2]

[1]For the origins of the cells, see William Tordoff,
Government and Politics in Tanzania, 166-169.

[2]Estimate attributed to Second Vice-President
Rashidi Kawawa in Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation,
359.

M O S H I   T O W N   W A R D S

(Survey and Mapping Division, Dar es Salaam, 1969)

The spread of cells in Tanzania is still uneven. For exam-

ple, although the dense population of the urban area makes

it especially amenable to the organization of cells, in

Moshi in 1969 there were many homes, and people, not incor-

porated into a functioning cell.

The 1965 TANU Constitution defines the cell, to con-

sist of ten houses grouped together, as "the basic organ of

T.A.N.U."[3] In practice, however, cells vary greatly in

size. In rural areas where houses are widely scattered,

the cell may include fewer than ten houses, while in dense-

ly populated urban areas either fewer or more than ten hous-

es may constitute a cell. There was no uniform pattern of

cell size in Moshi in 1968-69, and in several cases both the

branch chairman and the cell leader were unsure about the

extent of the cells under their jurisdiction.

Cells were established to facilitate communication

between the mass of the population and the local and na-

tional leadership, to manage tasks of party maintenance, to

assist in maintaining security (identification and control

of both foreign elements and local trouble-makers), and,

[3]Interim Constitution of Tanzania, Act No. 43 of
1965, First Schedule (Constitution of the Tanganyika
African National Union), Article IV, Section A.

more recently, to mobilize people for development purposes.[4]
(In rural areas, the Village Development Committee, consti-
tuted largely of the local cell leaders, has marked a formal
merging of party and government.) In practice, the local
cell leader, who flies the party flag at his house, can
function as a repository for local problems and grievances,
and at the same time can keep local party leadership and
government officials informed on activity and attitudes
among the residents of his cell. Although the TANU Consti-
tution stipulates that the cell be composed of TANU members,
in practice all adults living in the houses grouped into a
cell are expected to participate in cell activities, includ-
ing election of the cell leader, and on occasion, even the
cell leader himself is not a TANU member.

The cell, then, is designed to be the lowest level
of the political structure,[5] and it is expected to provide
the key point of contact between the population and political

[4]See the discussions in Tordoff, Government and
Politics in Tanzania, 166-169, and Bienen, Tanzania: Party
Transformation, 356-359. For the statement by the TANU
publicity secretary announcing the introduction of cells,
see Wilbert Klerruu, "Whys and Wherefores of the TANU Cell
System," The Nationalist, 20 September 1965; see also, Tan-
ganyika African National Union, Utaratibu na Maongozi ya
Chama cha TANU (Dar es Salaam: Mwananchi Publishing Co.,
1966?).

[5]Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for studies of
local government to make little or no mention of party
cells--for example, Dryden, Local Administration in Tan-
zania.

leadership of Tanzania. Therefore, to supplement the study

of the district level leadership in Moshi, a sample survey

of cell leaders in Moshi town was conducted. The study was

limited to Moshi town--it is a study of urban, and not rural,

cell leaders--and since there is little comparative data, it

is impossible to generalize the findings, with any confi-

dence, beyond Moshi town.[6]

The survey had three basic purposes: to develop a

better feel for local politics in Moshi and a better under-

standing of linkages and allocations at the local level, to

explore further the overlap of party and government and the

grafting of new party structures onto existing institutions,

and to study the basic party cadres--to see who they are and

what they do. We will find that in some areas of the town

there are no functioning cell leaders and that the cell

leaders who do function do very little at all, while in

other sections cell leaders are very active, especially in

resolving local disputes and in assisting people to deal

with their everyday problems in finding food, shelter, em-

ployment, and the like. The most active of the cell leaders

become integral parts of the urban party and administrative

structures, though rarely do they devote much time or

[6]Fortunately, comparative data should shortly be
available. J. H. Proctor has collected papers by Tanzani-
an university students on the cell system to be published
by the Tanzania Publishing House; a volume including the
findings of American scholars on the cell system in sever-
al different areas of Tanzania is being prepared as well.

energy to explaining national policy or mobilizing the urban

population for national programs.

CELL LEADERS: MOSHI TOWN

In the discussion thus far Moshi town has been

treated largely as a single unit of analysis, but, as in

most towns, the different neighborhoods vary widely in com-

position and character. Moshi is an urban area segregated

residentially by racial origin, by ethnic group, and by re-

ligion. Before proceeding to the analysis of the cell

leader survey, therefore, let us look more closely at these

neighborhood differences.

The European residents of the town are concentrated

in a ward characterized by spacious, often sumptuous, homes,

lavishly maintained gardens, and tree-shaded lawns. The

Asian population, though more dispersed than the European,

is largely concentrated in the central business section of

town, much of it living in multi-apartment units or in flats

over downtown shops. Correspondingly, the African population

is concentrated in the other four wards, though Africans are

in the majority in all but the central business ward. (See

TABLE 9.1)[7]

[7]The census data utilized in this and succeeding
tables are drawn from the preliminary results of the Tan-
zania 1967 Census, which accounts for the small discrepan-
cies in totals among the tables. To preserve the anonymity
of informants, reference to wards will be by number.

TABLE 9.1 MOSHI TOWN: ETHNIC ORIGIN BY WARD

WARDS:	1	2	3	4	5	6	MOSHI TOWN
African	67.2%[a]	98.6%	47.8%	91.9%	89.4%	98.0%	88.6%
Asian	17.0	0.1	46.7	4.3	7.7	--	7.6
Arab	0.4	--	0.2	0.0[b]	1.2	0.1	0.3
European	11.8	--	0.3	0.1	0.1	--	0.9
Not Ascertained	3.7	1.3	5.0	3.7	1.6	2.0	2.6
	100.1%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.1%	100.0%
	(543)	(1960)	(640)	(2134)	(1363)	(1123)	(7763)

SOURCE: Tanzania 1967 Census (Totals refer to heads of household)

[a]That is, 67.2% of the heads of household in Ward 1 reported they were African.

[b]That is, less than 0.05%.

Although Chagga comprise almost two-fifths of the town population as a whole, the proportion of Chagga in the different wards ranges from 6.7% to 54.4%.[8] Of course, the

[8]The treatment of tribe is not fully satisfactory in the Tanzania 1967 Census. First, as has been noted, distortions may be introduced because only heads of household were asked their tribe. Second, census statisticians, in order to maximize comparability, largely limited themselves to the tribes listed in the Tanzania 1957 census, thus, perhaps, eliminating or coalescing by fiat groups whose linguistic affinities and common identification might otherwise lead them to be defined as tribes. Third, because of this a priori decision about what the tribes were, it is impossible to consider the shifting salience of ethnicity-- the circumstances under which an individual in Kilimanjaro might identify himself as a man-from-Machame and those in which he would call himself a Chagga. Fourth, there was no attempt to deal with mixed tribal origins, an especially unfortunate decision for the study of urban areas. The totals presented here, however, are likely to be sufficiently accurate for the purposes of this discussion.

proportion of Chagga is smaller in those two wards where
Europeans and Asians are concentrated. In Ward 6, an agri-
cultural area in the plains south of the town recently in-
corporated into the town proper, the proportion of Chagga is
substantially lower than in the older urban wards. (See
TABLE 9.2)

TABLE 9.2 MOSHI TOWN: ETHNIC GROUP BY WARD

WARDS:	1	2	3	4	5	6	MOSHI
Chagga	13.9%[a]	44.9%	6.7%	54.4%	36.9%	19.9%	37.2%
Neighbor-ing[b]	5.1	14.4	8.9	7.7	14.4	26.2	13.3
(Pare)	(3.3)	(10.4)	(6.6)	(6.6)	(10.5)	(22.9)	(10.4)
Other African	45.6	35.3	29.9	28.5	33.6	47.5	34.9
Not Applic-able[c]	30.4	1.2	48.8	5.2	9.5	0.4	9.7
Not Ascer-tained	2.0	1.1	1.9	2.6	0.9	2.0	1.8
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(545)	(1964)	(640)	(2127)	(1368)	(1116)	(7760)

WHERE CHAGGA IN MOSHI LIVE:	N	Percent
WARD 1	76	2.6%[d]
2	882	30.5
3	43	1.5
4	1158	40.1
5	505	17.5
6	222	7.7
MOSHI	2886	99.9%

SOURCE: Tanzania 1967 Census (Totals refer to heads of
        household)

[a]That is, 13.9% of the heads of household in Ward 1
reported their tribe as Chagga.

[b]Includes: Arusha, Masai, Meru, Pare, and Taveta/
Teita.

[c]Non-Africans.

[d]That is, 2.6% of the heads of household in Moshi
who report their tribe as Chagga live in Ward 1.

The wards differ as well by religion. One can almost detect the paths of religious influence. Islam was largely spread to Moshi by coastal traders who traveled up the Pangani (or Ruvu) Valley from the south, and the largest Muslim concentrations are in the two southeast wards, 5 and 6. Christianity came largely from the east (entry via Mombasa) and from the north (the hillside mission stations), and the northern and eastern wards, 1 and 2, have large Christian populations. Modern factors have reinforced this pattern-- location of mosques and churches, types and locations of schools, immigration of coastal (largely Muslim) peoples to work on sisal plantations south of town. The population in Ward 4 is rapidly expanding, especially as many of the prosperous coffee farmers have built homes there, and this perhaps explains the large Christian population in that ward. The Asian concentration in Ward 3 is reflected in the identification by nearly a quarter of the population of that ward with other world religions (for example, Hindu). The large number of Asian Muslims explains the high proportion of Muslims in that ward. (See TABLE 9.3)

Ward 1, then, is almost entirely a residential ward, where most of the Europeans in town, as well as many of the more affluent Asians and Africans, live. The Asian community in Ward 1--prosperous local businessmen--is rather stable, but because housing for senior government officials is located in that ward, many of the Africans in Ward 1 are

TABLE 9.3 MOSHI TOWN: RELIGION, BY WARD

WARDS:	1	2	3	4	5	6	MOSHI
Christian	59.1%[a]	66.8%	23.9%	66.9%	39.5%	36.0%	53.5%
Muslim	23.6	29.8	43.3	25.8	53.3	59.1	37.8
Other World Religion[b]	8.5	0.1	23.6	0.6	4.8	--	3.7
Local Belief	1.5	1.2	0.9	1.4	1.2	2.2	1.4
Other	0.0[c]	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Not Ascertained	7.2	1.7	7.8	5.1	1.1	2.6	3.5
	99.9%	99.6%	99.6%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%	99.9%
	(543)	(1960)	(640)	(2135)	(1363)	(1123)	(7764)

SOURCE: Tansania 1967 Census (Totals refer to heads of household)

[a]That is, 59.1% of the heads of household in Ward 1 reported they were Christian.

[b]For example, Hindu.

[c]That is, less than 0.05%.

civil servants, subject to frequent transfer, and many of the Europeans are on short-term contracts. Tanzania's Police Training School is located in Ward 1. Also included within the boundaries of Ward 1 is a small agricultural community located at the edges of the airport (this community in fact overlaps the boundary of Wards 1 and 4, but for TANU purposes is considered to be in Ward 1). This area formerly was more densely populated, but the farmers are rapidly being forced farther out by the planned expansion of urban housing. This area, with little in common with the rest of the ward, functions almost as a TANU sub-branch of its own.

Ward 2 is a relatively newer section of town, made up mostly of working class Africans. The Town Council fire station, and sanitation and street maintenance depots, as well as the most frequently used town football field, are located in this ward. Most houses are of reinforced mud construction, though there are an increasing number of larger, more substantial houses as well. A small market and a large Council-owned beer club are located in this ward. Ward 2 has its own TANU branch office, built by local residents, and a paid party secretary. The large number of temporary industrial employees and unskilled Town Council laborers who live in this ward make it somewhat more transient in character than the central urban wards.

Ward 3 is the primary business area of Moshi. Most major shops are owned and run by Asians, many of whom live above, or very near, their shops. The Town Hall, many of the regional and district administrative offices, the coffee cooperative headquarters, and regional, district, and branch party headquarters are all located in this ward. Ward 3 also includes the factory where all Tanzanian arabica coffee is cured, and a small settlement where many of the lower-level factory employees live, as well as the railway station and housing for railway employees. Nonetheless, the branch chairman in 1969 saw his job as representing and leading an entirely Asian ward.

Wards 4 and 5 include the oldest and most densely

populated sections of town. But Ward 4, in which is located

the central town market, also includes the newest section of

town. In the newer area there are many large, fashionably

decorated houses of cement block, a large proportion of

which are built to provide rental income by coffee farmers

who live on the mountain. Ward 5 is largely a lower class

African ward, where most houses are made of mud and wood.

A large Council-owned beer club, and most of Moshi's indus-

trial establishments, are located in Ward 5.

Ward 6 is a predominantly agricultural area only re-

cently incorporated into the town. Because Ward 6 is phys-

ically distant from the built-up urban area of the town,

and because the residents and leaders of Ward 6 are only be-

ginning to think of themselves as part of Moshi town, the

cell leaders of Ward 6 were not surveyed.

Thus the composition and characteristics of the

wards vary widely, and, because each ward forms a TANU

branch, the branches differ as well. We will find that the

nature of the ward, and the activity of the branch chairman,

largely determine party functioning at the lowest levels in

Moshi.

CELL LEADERS: THE SURVEY

Developing a random sample survey of Moshi cell

leaders proved a difficult and frustrating task.[9] There did

not exist a complete list of Moshi cell leaders, and the

partial lists that could be found were inaccurate. Branch

chairmen assisted in drawing up lists of the cell leaders in

their branches, but at times even they were unsure about

whether or not a given individual was in fact a cell leader

or still lived in his cell. Several people thought to be

cell leaders by their branch chairman turned out to have

moved or to have ceased serving as cell leader for some

other reason. And one former cell leader (who was a high

government official) thought that whoever had moved into his

former house (he had left his cell leader flag flying there,

hadn't he?) was the current cell leader.

Because of the differences among the wards, after

corrected lists of cell leaders were constructed, a sample

comprising 20% of the cell leaders in each ward was random-

ly selected.[10] Individuals in Moshi who had already been

[9]This section is intended to describe briefly the
survey of Moshi cell leaders; for the complete question
schedule used, see Appendix 2.

[10]The agricultural community included in Ward 1 was
treated separately, so that the sample of cell leaders in
Ward 1 represents 20% of the cell leaders in all of the
ward but that community, plus 20% of the cell leaders in
that community. For similar reasons, the small housing
settlement maintained by the coffee curing factory--which
in 1969 began to develop its own TANU branch--was not in-
cluded when the Ward 3 sample was drawn; otherwise the cell
leaders in the Asian neighborhoods in a predominantly Asian
ward might have been excluded.

interviewed as political leaders were excluded from the cell leader lists, both to limit the survey to ordinary cell leaders and to avoid duplication (since essentially the same question schedule was used) and to avoid giving undue weight to a few individuals' opinions. Many of the political leaders of Moshi indicated they had been elected cell leaders after having been selected for their leadership positions, suggesting that where a political notable lives in a cell—and where he has not estranged himself from the local residents—he is likely to be chosen cell leader, and that cell leadership may follow, not precede, selection to other leadership positions. Since the concern here is with the functioning and effect of the cell system as an institution grafted on to existing political structures, it is perfectly reasonable to exclude political leaders who also happen to be cell leaders. The latter have already been discussed; it is the former who are of interest here. Also excluded, with much regret though for obvious reasons, was the individual who served as a research assistant for this study.

Local political notables introduced the interviewer to the cell leaders to facilitate cooperation and allay suspicion. The cell leaders selected were then interviewed at their homes, using an adapted, largely closed-ended, version of the question schedule used for the Moshi political leadership. Twenty-nine such interviews, representing a random sample constituting 20% of the ordinary cell leaders

in Wards 1-5, were conducted in 1969. Only one cell leader

originally selected proved unwilling to cooperate.

It should be stressed that the data gathered from

this survey can be generalized to the cell leaders of Moshi

town only with due caution. The sample of cell leaders in-

terviewed was constructed to insure that each of the branch-

es, which varied widely in political behavior and attitudes,

was represented, with the effect that the peculiarities of

each branch may be overrepresented in the final results.

Local political leaders, many of whom also served as cell

leaders, were expressly excluded. The police barracks and

the police training school, both enclaves of non-local peo-

ple in Moshi, and both in the process of forming TANU branch-

es of their own in 1969, together with the coffee curing

company village, all not yet major participants in the lo-

cal political process, were not included. Ward 6, only

loosely connected to the town, was also not included. Be-

cause the survey was dependent on the assistance of branch

chairmen to construct cell leader lists, some very inactive

cell leaders, either forgotten or expressly overlooked by

their branch chairmen, may have been excluded. Thus, the

sample of Moshi cell leaders can be taken to represent the

ordinary, and among the ordinary perhaps the more active,

cell leaders of the regular population of Moshi town.

CELL LEADERS: WHO THEY ARE

In general, cell leaders in Moshi in 1969 were similar to the neighbors who elected them. Three-fifths (62%) were born in Kilimanjaro Region, and three-quarters (76%) had lived in their current residences for more than 10 years (almost half--48%--had lived in their current residences for more than 20 years). Two-fifths (41%) of the cell leaders were Chagga, and 17% came from neighboring tribes. (Because only Asian cell leaders had been selected from Ward 3, Asians, constituting 17% of the sample, were overrepresented in comparison with their proportion of the total town population.) Almost half of the cell leaders (48%) were Christian, and 41% were Muslim. Most of the cell leaders, like most of the town residents, rented their homes. The cell leaders in general had less education than the district and regional level leadership--31% had less than four years of schooling, and 65% had seven years or less. Cell leaders were not concentrated in a single occupation--48% had salaried employment, 31% were self-employed, and 14% gained their principal income from farming. Almost all (90%) of the cell leaders interviewed were male, but that finding simply reflects the large number of males in the urban area (130 males to 100 females) and the fact that the continuing impact of tradition in Tanzania restricts access to most leadership positions to men. Cell leaders in Moshi in 1969 were not former traditional leaders--there were no traditional leaders with

accepted claim to tribal authority in the urban area, and
Moshi as a town is so young that few people can claim to
have been in power long. Nor were Moshi cell leaders modern-
izers or ideological radicals--as will be noted, the most
modern elements had little use for cell leaders and in any
case were largely clustered into a single ward, and the very
few individuals in Moshi who publicly expressed an ideology,
other than repeating party doctrine, were either too young
or too eccentric to be respected and trusted by their neigh-
bors.

All of this suggests that in Moshi at least, where
there are functioning cells--and it should be noted that in
1969 there were several sections in town where cells did
not function at all--local residents have elected as cell
leaders people whom they regard as fundamentally like them-
selves. The cell leaders elected, because they are like
their constituents, can be expected to be on the one hand
people the residents of the cell will approach with little
fear or hesitation and on the other hand individuals whom
the district level leadership of the party can assume to be
representative of the residents of their cells.

But not all cell leaders elected, setting aside

those areas in which there are no functioning cells,[11] actu-
ally perform any services, and in fact cell leaders tend to
mirror their constituents' attitudes toward the cell system.
Few Asians in Moshi see TANU as their party in the way that
most Africans do, and consequently cell leaders in predom-
inantly Asian cells report they have little to do. Like-
wise, few residents of the more affluent residential sec-
tions of town see any need for the type of reconciliation
in local disputes and intercession with the bureaucracy that
cell leaders perform in other parts of town, and consequent-
ly cell leaders in those sections also report they have lit-
tle to do. These attitudes are reflected even at the level
of the branch leadership, so that how active a cell leader
actually is depends both on the nature of his cell and on
the demands, encouragement, and support from his branch
chairman.

CELL LEADERS: WHAT THEY DO

        Ordinary cell leaders in Moshi were not political

        [11]Short of a survey of the entire town population,
which was not attempted, there was no easily available
method for assessing the coverage of the cell system. Lo-
cal leaders believed that some areas of the town were bet-
ter covered than others; some areas could be identified
that had no cell leaders. The population per cell leader
in Moshi with an average household size of 3.5 people,
varied from 129 in Ward 5 to 340 in Ward 3.

activists.[12] Four-fifths (83%) reported that no one in

their families had been involved in political activity, and

three-quarters (76%) reported they themselves had not been

politically active prior to independence or in the early

post-colonial period. None of the cell leaders surveyed

had been politically active for more than 10 years (unlike

the town councillors, for example), and 83% had held no po-

litical positions prior to election as cell leader; a third

said they had been active in politics for less than two

years. A third of the cell leaders surveyed had served as

cell leaders for more than three years, while almost as many

(27%) had been cell leaders for less than two years. Re-

ported TANU membership is especially striking--fully 38%

had joined TANU since 1964 (one, when elected cell leader,

decided he ought to join), and one was not a TANU member at

all in 1969. In an important sense, cell leaders may be

major local figures and at the same time may not associate

that, either in their own minds or for their neighbors, with

party membership and/or activity.

In general, cell leaders see their job as dealing

with the disputes and conflicts that arise in their cells.

They perform the linkage and intermediary sorts of roles in

the fluid, transient, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious

[12]It should be stressed again that individuals who
held active leadership positions (councillors, party chair-
men and secretaries) were excluded from the cell leader sur-
vey.

urban setting that traditional leaders perform in areas

where clan and tribe are still the basic social units and

where traditional leaders have not been replaced by more

modern sorts of roles.[13]

When asked what they think is the most important

problem in their cells, more than half of the cell leaders

(55%) list the kinds of problems that might be grouped to-

gether as social dislocation—household and marital quar-

rels, disputes between landlords and tenants, drunkenness

and unruly behavior, and petty theft and minor assault. An-

other 17% mentioned unemployment. When asked what they can

do about these problems, only 28%—a far smaller percentage

than the proportion of other political leaders who describe

themselves as unable to deal with what they consider to be

major problems—say they can do nothing at all, and more

than half (52%) say they take action that does not involve

TANU. From another perspective, while 90% said the problems

they mentioned could be resolved locally, only 17% said the

problems they mentioned could be resolved politically.

Thus, unlike the elected town councillors, cell leaders de-

fine as important those sorts of local, immediate disputes

and conflicts that trouble residents of their cells, and

[13]Norman N. Miller stresses the continuing role for
traditional leaders in new bureaucratic institutions in one
area of rural Tanzania in "The Political Survival of Tradi-
tional Leadership," but also notes the role of the local
party organization in local dispute settlements in "The
Rural African Party: Political Participation in Tanzania."

they think they can deal with them effectively--largely as
reconcilers and arbitrators--without involving the political
machinery. Almost all cell leaders surveyed (90%) saw no
problem of excessive Dar es Salaam interference or influence
in local politics.

By the cell leaders' own analysis, fewer people seek
out their cell leaders for assistance in their problems than
seek out their councillors (see TABLE 9.4). The councillors

TABLE 9.4 CELL LEADERS AND ELECTED TOWN COUNCILLORS:
           LOCAL CONTACTS

	Cell Leader Sample	Elected Town Councillors
Very many (11+ per day)	0%[a]	21%
Many (6-10 per day)	0	16
Average (1-5 per day or at least 25 per month)	10	32
Few (2-7 per week or at least 8 per month)	7	1ì
Very few (2-7 per month)	31	11
Only occasionally (1 per month or fewer)	38	11
None	14	0
	100%	102%
	(N=29)	(N=19)

SOURCE: Moshi Political Leadership Survey (Question 13)
        and Moshi Cell Leader Survey (Questions 6-13)

[a]That is, none of the cell leaders reported that
very many (11 or more per day) people came to see them for
advice or assistance.

of course represent more people than do cell leaders, and

can be expected by local residents to be more influential,

but it is also the case that local residents seek help from

their cell leaders primarily for local quarrels and dis-

putes--conflicts more likely to be brought to leaders whom

the people know personally and in whom they have confidence.

Almost two-thirds (66%) of the cell leaders surveyed said

that the problems people brought to them were local in scope

and individual in nature, and another 17% said that both in-

dividual and group problems, but all local in scope, were

brought to them (see TABLE 9.5). That is, most cell leaders

TABLE 9.5   SCOPE AND NATURE OF PROBLEMS BROUGHT TO CELL
             LEADERS

	Cell Leaders
Problems brought are:	
Local, individual[a]	66%[b]
Local, group	3
Local, both individual and group	17
Not asked (said no one came to see him)	14
	100%
	(N=29)

SOURCE: Moshi Cell Leader Survey (Questions 7, 10, 12)

[a]Local refers to scope or arena, while individual
and group refer to type: for example, domestic quarrels
were coded as local, individual, while disputes between a
group of parents and a school headteacher were coded as lo-
cal, group. Objective determination. Note that no cell
leaders reported receiving problems that were national in
scope.

[b]That is, 66% of the cell leaders surveyed reported
that problems brought to them were individual in nature and
local in scope.

said that the problems people brought to them concerned a very limited local arena and rarely had an impact on anyone other than those who raised the problems. For example, a tenant who has lost his job may ask his cell leader to intercede with the landlord to request an extension on, rent payments. Or a parent may seek the cell leader's help in reconciling her daughter and her daughter's husband. Problems dealt with by cell leaders occasionally do extend beyond the local area--in 1969 one prominent cell leader, aided by elders living in the cell, spent several days dealing with a complex problem of marital discord, rights to the children, and ownership of bridewealth in which one side of the family had to come to Moshi from Tabora to participate in the discussions. Nor are all problems concerned with individual disputes--cell leaders are often asked to mediate between a group of parents and the headteacher of the local primary school.

Almost half of the cell leaders (41%) reported they were able to solve the problems brought to them by themselves, while none of the elected town councillors said that. In dealing with the problems brought to them, three-quarters of the cell leaders said they served as a general source of assistance and advice, or as a pacifier, reconciler, or arbitrator. That is, they said they served primarily to help cell residents with the problems they encountered in their everyday lives and to bring conflicting

parties together.. (See TABLE 9.6) This supports the find-

ing that cell leaders are primarily concerned with low level

local disputes and that they can utilize the authority that

TABLE 9.6   CELL LEADERS: DEALING WITH PROBLEMS BROUGHT TO
            THEM

	Cell Leaders
R can solve problems by himself	41%[a]
R cannot solve problems himself, but they can be resolved within the cell	3
Problems cannot be solved by R alone or within the cell, but can be resolved within the branch	24
Problems cannot be solved at a level where R has an official role	17
Not asked (R said no one came to see him)	14
	99%
R is:[b]	
General source of assistance, advice	21%[c]
Pacifier, reconciler, arbitrator	55
Representative to the government[d]	7
Representative to TANU (Including TANU and government)	3
Not asked (R said no one came to see him)	14
	100%
	(N=29)

SOURCE: Moshi Cell Leader Survey (Questions 7-13)

[a]That is, 41% of the cell leaders surveyed reported
they could solve by themselves problems brought to them by
their constituents.

[b]Coded from all problems brought to Respondent, ac-
cording to Respondent's own description of his behavior,
into mutually exclusive categories, beginning from the bot-
tom.

[c]That is 21% of the cell leaders surveyed reported
they provided general assistance and advice to people who
came to them with problems.

[d]To means carry messages toward: for example,
transmit a complaint brought by a cell resident to the ward
councillor.

is associated with the cell leader role together with their
familiarity with local residents and their problems to deal
effectively with the problems brought to them. The cell
leaders' definition of their own jobs further confirms this
finding. Some 41% of the cell leaders surveyed said that
they thought the primary job of the cell leader was to rec-
oncile, arbitrate, and adjudicate (see TABLE 9.7).[14]

TABLE 9.7   CELL LEADERS: THE JOB OF CELL LEADER[a]

	Cell Leaders
Reconciliation, arbitration, adjudication	41%[b]
Receive complaints and pass them upwards	10
Receive complaints and send people to proper place	3
Receive complaints and deal with them himself	7
Explain policies of TANU, Tanzania	10
Lead, exhort, encourage, enthuse people in cell	17
Generalized assistance to people in cell	10
	98%
	(N=29)

SOURCE: Moshi Cell Leader Survey (Questions 4, 23, 24)

[a]Major job, as defined by the Respondent himself,
coded into mutually exclusive categories.

[b]That is, 41% of the cell leaders surveyed saw
their job as one of reconciling, arbitrating, and adjudicat-
ing in local conflicts.

[14]Norman N. Miller's survey in a rural area of Tan-
zania in 1965 found that only some 7.8% of the individuals
surveyed (only a small percentage of those surveyed were
themselves cell leaders) mentioned this as the primary pur-
pose of the party cell. See the Codebook: Basic Question-
naire Data, p. 22, prepared in connection with his "Vil-
lage Leadership and Modernization in Tansania," Ph.D. Dis-
sertation, Indiana University, 1966.

While they are engaged in dealing with these local disputes, many cell leaders also link the residents of their cells with the party, both because they are identified as TANU officials and the party supervises their selection and because most cell leaders said that they referred to the TANU office the problems they were unable to handle themselves. In fact, a majority (59%) of the cell leaders saw this--reconciliation in local disputes--as the major function of the local TANU organization.[15] It is clear from all of our findings that different individuals and groups in Moshi view the local party organization from quite different perspectives, and as a result there are widely differing views on what the local party is and does. This perception of the cell leaders, that the primary task of TANU is to settle local disputes, is supported by the existence of a TANU Elders Council. When ordinary cell leaders visit the TANU office, they most often see the Elders, or the branch secretary who generally refers them to the Elders, and they are less aware of other TANU activities.

The Moshi Elders Council was a somewhat unique institution in Tanzania in 1968-69, but late in 1969 the

[15]Most cell leaders and ordinary citizens in Moshi regard the TANU office, and thus the local party organization, as an undifferentiated unit, even though the TANU office houses branch, district (both urban and rural), and regional party offices, as well as the TANU Youth League, the Elders, the Women's Union, and the Tanganyika African Parents Association.

government and party decided to establish Arbitration Tribunals, essentially similar to the Moshi Elders Council, throughout the country. The Council in Moshi, consisting of the chairman and vice-chairman of the elders at the district (town) level, sat daily in the TANU office to deal with local disputes and conflicts. They served as a board of appeal for decisions by cell leaders, they took the cases the cell leaders were unable to deal with, and they often heard cases brought directly by the parties to a dispute or referred by party or government officials. Without clear statutory authority and unable to impose sanctions, they heard cases, kept records, and tried to reconcile the individuals involved. They were often successful in re-uniting husband and wife, in settling inheritance and bride-wealth disputes, in reconciling landlord and tenant and employer and employee, and even in finding agreement between debtor and creditor. In some disputes the parties simply agreed publicly to accept the Elders' findings, while in others a formal signed agreement was created. Dissatisfied parties could then carry their cases to the primary court, but most primary court magistrates in Moshi were reluctant to hear cases of this sort if the parties had not already tried the Elders Council, and most acknowledged the agreements signed before the Elders as legally binding. Perhaps a major reason for the success of the Elders Council in

Moshi was that both members also served as town headmen,[16]

and thus carried the prestige and authority of the Town Coun-

cil officials, and the chairman was also the local Muslim

sheikh.   Thus, the Elders Council combined the respect ac-

corded elders with party, government, and even religious

authority and prestige to deal with a wide array of local

conflicts.   As well, in this way, institutionalized mechan-

isms for conflict resolution that began at the level of the

cell leader were incorporated into Tanzania's judicial ma-

chinery.

The prevalence of this view of the cell leader's

job--reconciliation in local disputes--helps explain the in-

frequency of meetings called by the cell leader for all of

the residents of the cell (only 14% had held a meeting with-

in the previous month and 28% said they never held meet-

ings).   If the major task is to assist individuals, why

call everyone together?   And although a few cell leaders

did mention calling meetings to discuss theft or drunken-

ness within the cell, most meetings that were called were

in response to instructions from higher party authorities,

primarily to deal with elections.

[16]As explained previously, this term is a carry
over from the colonial period; the three Moshi town head-
men might better be described as ward executive officers.

The ordinary cell leaders in Moshi in 1969, then,
were primarily concerned with local dispute settlement and
providing general assistance to the residents of their
cells. Because their first recourse, when they were unable
to handle problems themselves, was to turn to the TANU of-
fice, they provided a linkage between the urban population
and party and government. The most active of the cell
leaders become advocates for their constituents within par-
ty and government structures. Most cell leaders feel com-
petent to handle the problems brought to them, and most
cell leaders think they are successful in doing so. And in
dealing with these problems cell leaders assist the police,
the local judiciary, and local government officials in per-
forming their jobs. Less often are cell leaders concerned
with downward communication--explaining party policy and
mobilizing people to participate in government programs.
Although the national leadership asserts that cell leaders
are critical in communicating policy to up-country Tanzania,
and although occasionally lower level leaders exhort party
cadres to explain national policy to the mass of the popula-
tion, in Moshi in 1969 few cell leaders had the training or
inclination to bear very much detailed downward communica-
tion. Few had a clear understanding of the Arusha Declara-
tion, and fewer still were equipped or inclined to spend
much time explaining it to others. After the 1969 party
elections national, regional, and district party and

government leaders participated in political seminars, some
lasting as long as three months. When the newly elected
Moshi TANU Chairman returned from his three-month seminar,
he met with the cell leaders in each ward, primarily to in-
troduce himself and hear their problems, a common practice
for officials assuming a new post. He spoke also of organ-
izing seminars for cell leaders, but as will be noted short-
ly, even with the seminars the obstacles to developing a
set of dynamic and resourceful cell leaders will remain sig-
nificant.

It should be stressed again that cell leaders in the
most affluent sections of town, and in the sections of town
where the concentration of the European and Asian popula-
tion is high, felt they had little to do, were rarely sought
out by the residents of their cells, and performed few serv-
ices.

Another important factor in the performance of cell
leaders, impossible to quantify because of the small number
of cases in Moshi town, is the attitude and behavior of the
branch chairmen. Where the branch chairman feels that cell
leaders have little function, as was the case in the predom-
inantly Asian ward in Moshi, cell leaders do little. The \
cell leaders were the most active in the two wards where
the branch chairmen were self-employed and thus could al-
ways be easily found in their neighborhoods, and where the

branch chairmen, who knew most of their cell leaders well,

encouraged and supported their cell leaders. In the ward

where the chairman's job kept him away from the ward during

working hours, and where the chairman was considered by many

ward residents to be a somewhat irresponsible alcoholic,

there were several blocks without any cell leaders, and many

cell leaders said they did little. But it is an important

comment on the vitality and viability of the cell system in

Tanzania that in three wards with unenthusiastic and largely

inactive leadership, small communities--residents of the

police training school, the police barracks, and the village

for coffee curing plant employees--had a work-related stim-

ulus to be active politically, had selected cell leaders,

and had begun to form TANU branches of their own.

CELL LEADERS: CONCLUSIONS

We have found that in Moshi urban residents elect

as cell leaders people essentially like themselves. In

1968-69 ordinary cell leaders in Moshi were similar to

their constituents in ethnic origin and tribe, in religion,

and in level of income and type of occupation. The cell

leaders were usually not traditional authority figures, nor

were they often younger, better educated, or more modern

than the residents of their cells. Ordinary cell leaders

as a group had a relatively brief history of political ac-

tivity, and few were active politically, at least outside

their own branches, while they served as cell leaders.

Two basic types of cell leader role had developed in
Moshi by 1969. In wards where there were concentrations of
affluent and/or European and Asian population, and to a
lesser extent in wards where there was a largely lackadaisi-
cal or apathetic branch chairman, cell leaders performed few
services for their constituents. In other areas of the
town, however, cell leaders had active roles in local con-
flict resolution and generally assisted their constituents
with their problems. The implication of this finding is
striking. For the mass of the urban population, only rela-
tively recently uprooted from a rural agricultural society,
faced with the stresses and demands of urban life, of sal-
aried employment (and, more likely, unemployment), and of
imposing bureaucracies, without the security of traditional
networks of obligations and support, cell leaders can help
provide some of the interstices, some of the links, that
bind the society together. That is, cell leaders assume at
least some, and often a great deal, of the responsibility
for dealing with the myriad little problems of human inter-
action in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious urban commun-
ity that would be dealt with more comfortably in the tradi-
tional society but that become seemingly insoluble crises
in the urban setting. The local ethnic organizations that
are so common elsewhere in Africa and that once flourished
in Tanzania have, faced with concerted and persistent

opposition from party and government, by and large disappeared into relative insignificance in Moshi.[17]   That is not to say that there do not remain in Moshi associations based largely on ethnic ties that bring together segments of the urban populace and perform for them a range of welfare functions, but to argue that in Moshi in 1969 such organizations did not have the prominence and political power of similar organizations elsewhere and that for many Moshi residents TANU, and especially the cell leaders, provided the welfare services that such organizations provide elsewhere. Where people in Moshi are more accustomed to dealing with the stresses and insecurities of urban life, as in the more affluent and upper civil service residential areas, or where people deal with these problems within their own communities in traditional ways, as in the Asian sections of town, cell leaders are less needed to perform these functions.

In functioning in this way, in concentrating on general assistance and dispute settlement, cell leaders, as TANU officials, provide a link between the urban population, at least in those wards where cell leaders are active, and the party. As well, by channeling problems into the Elders

[17]For comments on the strength of ethnic organizations in other urban areas in Africa, see, among others, William John Hanna and Judith Lynne Hanna, "The Political Structure of Urban-Centered African Communities," Chapter 7 in Horace Miner, editor, The City in Modern Africa (New York: Praeger, 1967), and M. Banton, "Adaptation and Integration in the Social System of Temne Immigrants in Freetown," Africa XXVI,4(1956):354-367.

Council, cell leaders provide an extension of Tanzania's ju-
dicial machinery that reaches down onto the individual's
front porch. Since ordinary cell leaders in Moshi concen-
trate on these functions, and devote little time to explain-
ing policy and mobilizing people, generally they serve to
represent their constituents', or perhaps their own, inter-
ests to the party, rather than vice versa.

There are several limitations on this kind of activ-
ity by the cell leaders. We have already noted that in some
sections of town they are rarely sought out by local resi-
dents. We have also noted that the encouragement and sup-
port of the branch chairman are a key determinant of what
cell leaders are able and willing to do. The combination
of the transience of much of the urban population and the
stringent leadership requirements of the Arusha Declaration
provides a third limitation on the ability of cell leaders
to function effectively. Although precise figures are im-
possible to obtain, it is clear that a large segment of
Moshi's African population is transient: people from sur-
rounding areas come to town to work for several years and
then return home or move on elsewhere, as people find and
change jobs they often change neighborhoods, and as fami-
lies grow rented quarters become inadequate. To function
effectively as a cell leader, an individual must have lived
in his neighborhood for some time and be known to its resi-
dents, but as leaders in Tanzania, cell leaders are not

permitted to own homes to secure rental income. That is,
the stable residents in a cell are the landlords, who are
barred from election as cell leaders, and the frequent moves
among renters makes it difficult, in some neighborhoods at
least, for cell leaders to develop the trust and respect
necessary to their jobs.

All of this suggests that cell leaders play a key
role in ameliorating the stresses of urban life, and in pro-
viding for the urban populace a visible link--one in which
they can have some faith--with the party, and, to the extent
that they are effective in performing these functions, in
integrating diverse groups. But it also suggests that ordi-
nary urban cell leaders (and it should be stressed again
that all of this discussion refers to ordinary cell leaders
in an urban setting) are insufficiently equipped and moti-
vated to provide a dynamic local leadership able to relate
national policies to the Moshi setting and to mobilize peo-
ple to implement development schemes. The rewards for cell
leaders, even symbolic, thus far are few, and, where the
cell leader is expected to function as something of a local
elder, there is little to endear younger and more educated
residents to their neighbors or to encourage them to seek
the cell leader job.

This leaves, then, something of a paradox. The
place assigned to cell leaders in the national strategy for
developing Tanzania calls for just the sort of individuals

unlikely to emerge in the cell leader positions as they have come to be defined locally. And yet if it is not the cell leaders who are to carry the party ideology to the mass of the Tanzanian population and who are to carry the ideas, demands, and complaints of the ordinary citizens to its leaders, who are in short to be the backbone of a viable party at the local level, then who is it to be?

CHAPTER 10

POLITICIANS IN KILIMANJARO

POLITICIANS IN KILIMANJARO: INTRODUCTION

The comments on the political leadership of Kiliman-
jaro have thus far concentrated on Moshi town, the focus of
this essay. But, as has been noted, the list of leaders in-
terviewed for this study was an expansive one--all individ-
uals who, by virtue of formal position held, or by reputa-
tion, or by observation, seemed to be important actors in
the local political system were interviewed,[1] with the re-
sult that the set of those interviewed includes, in addition
to the town councillors, council officers, and cell leaders
already discussed, political leaders at the district,

[1]Lest there be undue confusion over terminology: the
term political leaders refers to that set of individuals as-
sessed by virtue of formal position held and/or reputation
and/or observation to be significant actors in the local po-
litical system; politicians refers to those political lead-
ers who have contested office and/or who hold office at the
pleasure of the party and/or the President. In this discus-
sion, elite refers simply to those relatively few people
whose education and/or occupation and/or wealth clearly set
them apart from the mass of the population, and elite status
refers simply to the prestige, perquisites, and presumed in-
fluence of elites. For an early anthology of research on
this subject, see the issue of the International Social Sci-
ence Bulletin devoted to African elites: VIII,3(1956). For
a more recent, brief, and caustic, comment on the state of
the discipline in the study of African elites by one of the
leading practitioners, see William John Hanna, "Methodology,
Technology, and the Study of African Elites," African Stud-
ies Review XIII,1(April 1970):95-103.

regional, and national levels, leaders who are elected and
appointed, party and non-party leaders, and leaders with
single and multiple roles.

Of course it would be impossible, and distracting,
in the space of this short essay to carry out an extensive
analysis of each of those categories. Rather, the goal here
is a more modest one and involves rendering more precise
some of the more salient elements of the local political
system, some of which have already been touched tangentially,
drawing on the insight gained from the entire range of in-
terviews conducted. That is, the aim here is three-fold:
first, to expand on several points that have emerged in the
study of Kilimanjaro political leaders, second, to discuss
several major themes of politics in Kilimanjaro, especially
the importance of religion and ethnicity, and finally, to
sketch out briefly the factional alignments that character-
ized political conflict in Kilimanjaro in 1968-69.

POLITICIANS IN KILIMANJARO: SOME OBSERVATIONS

When they discussed the sorts of problems their con-
stituents brought to them, both the town councillors and the
cell leaders in Moshi reported that no one came to see them
about problems that were national in scope (problems in
which key decisions were made in Dar es Salaam and/or prob-
lems that concerned all of Tanzania and not just Kilimanja-
ro). While no political leader reported receiving many

such problems, that none of the Moshi leaders received them
suggests the narrow range and isolation of the town council-
lors and cell leaders. Other indicators support this as-
sessment. While 80% of the urban leadership reported they
rarely traveled outside of the town, almost half of the
other district level leaders traveled extensively through-
out Kilimanjaro; of the political leaders who did not hold
formal leadership positions, half reported they traveled
regularly throughout Kilimanjaro and to Dar es Salaam, and
all of the regional and national level leaders maintained
regular contacts in the capital. In general, the appointed
leaders traveled more widely and more often than did elect-
ed officials. To travel widely and/or frequently is of
course not equivalent to performing representation or link-
age functions. But this finding does suggest that when
urban residents have problems that call for action at the
regional or national level, or when they are interested in
securing favorable decisions from officials not in Moshi,
their councillors are able to be of little direct help to
them. Support for this observation is found in the leaders'
descriptions of whom they would see to influence a national
decision--most of the locally-elected leaders said they
would talk to other local people. In short, the locally-
elected leaders in Moshi in 1969 were a distinctly local
leadership; neither they nor their constituents thought
much of their ability to provide representation in broader
decisional arenas.

The study of issues and individuals thus far has sug-
gested that there is no small elite with a monopoly of power
in the local setting, able to influence outcomes in a wide
range of issues. The observations of the political leaders
themselves support this view. Leaders were asked to name
people they considered to be "influential" or "powerful" lo-
cally; where further explanation was necessary, leaders were
asked to name individuals who were usually able to convince
other people and to secure favorable decisions on issues in
which they were involved.[2] From a group of fewer than 78
people[3] some 76 individuals were named. By a minimum stand-
ard of influence--mention by at least 10% of those asked (8
or more mentions)--ten people could be described as influen-
tial, and no single individual was named by more than a
quarter of those asked. That is, although leadership and
elite studies might lead us to expect relatively high agree-
ment by most of those asked that a few individuals were in-
fluential, in Moshi only a quarter of the leaders could
agree on anyone, and fewer than 20% could agree on anyone
else.

Likewise, there was little agreement among the lead-
ers on whom to see to influence local or national decisions.

[2]See Appendix 1 for the complete wording of the
questions used.

[3]Cell leaders were not asked this question; a few
leaders declined to respond, or would mention only posi-
tions and not individuals' names.

For local influence, three-fifths of the district level lead-
ers said they would see a local TANU officer, while one-
fifth said they would see a local government official. To
influence a national decision that affected the local area,
local leaders tended to say they would see other local leaders,
ers, while among the regional and national level leaders
some said they would take the matter up in Dar es Salaam,
and none reported that he would see a local official.

There is thus little agreement among the Kilimanjaro
political leadership on who is influential and little agree-
ment on who could be helpful in influencing local and na-
tional decisions. This evidence supports the finding that
there is no small cohesive elite with broad influence and
power in Moshi and that the local populace has (or, rather,
some of it has), and sees it has, several alternative, via-
ble channels though which it can attempt to secure the deci-
sions and outputs in which it is interested.

But to find competing elites is not the same as to
find mass democracy. To what extent have political elites
in Moshi been able to restrict access to key roles to a nar-
row stratum of the populace and to what extent are the pres-
ent political elites able to insure their continued predom-
inance in the local political system?

One of the major concerns of the Tanzanian leader-
ship since independence has been to attempt to insure that

the new leaders of Tanzania, those who replaced the depart-

ing colonial officials and those who assumed office in the

new regime, did not utilize their access to political power

to amass wealth, to guarantee continued access to political

power, or to subvert national policy in order to develop and

protect their own personal interests and fortunes. The manip-

ulation of power to get rich and stay in power is of course

not unique to Tanzania.[4]

In 1967 TANU announced a set of stringent restric-

tions on the ability of leaders--both party and government--

to accumulate wealth (see TABLE 10.1). In very broad terms,

the problem is one of maximizing the utilization of scarce

resources for national development without diverting sub-

stantial portions of those resources into the pockets of the

nation-builders and without enabling those who manage the

allocation of those resources to institutionalize their

elite status. In personal terms, the problem is one of per-

suading and/or coercing leaders not to demand the luxurious

[4]For a detailed exposition of the extent to which
"'. . . a few African political and bureaucratic elite . . .
are slowly merging with the commercial elite to form an
apex at the top of the socio-political and economic elite'"
(p. 259) in an economy still largely controlled by non-
citizens, see Who Controls Industry in Kenya? (Nairobi:
EAPH, 1968). For conflicting views on the significance of
corruption, see the collection of papers edited by Arnold J.
Heidenheimer, Political Corruption (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston, 1970). For an overview of elites, power,
and wealth in West Africa, see P. C. Lloyd, Africa in So-
cial Change (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967), Chapter 5.

TABLE 10.1   TANZANIA'S LEADERSHIP CODE

1) Every TANU and Government leader must be either a peasant or a worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism.[a]

2) No TANU or Government leader should hold shares in any company.

3) No TANU or Government leader should hold directorships in any privately owned enterprise.

4) No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries.[*]

5) No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others.

6) For the purposes of this Resolution the term 'leader' should comprise the following:
   Members of the TANU National Executive Committee; Ministers; Members of Parliament; senior officials of organizations affiliated to TANU; senior officials of organizations affiliated to TANU; senior officials of para-statal organizations; all those appointed or elected under any clause of the TANU Constitution; councillors; and civil servants in the high and middle cadres. (In this context 'leader' means a man, or a man and his wife; a woman, or a woman and her husband.)[b]

SOURCE: The Arusha Declaration, Resolution adopted by the TANU National Executive Committee, Arusha, Tanzania, January 1967, Part Five (a). Published in Julius K. Nyerere, Ujamaa--Essays on Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1968). (Part Five (a), p. 36.)

[a]This has been interpreted to mean, among other things, that leaders should not hire permanent labor to work their farms.

[b]Leaders were given one year to divest themselves of holdings prohibited by this resolution or to resign their leadership positions. Since then each leader must file an annual statement of wealth, showing all income for him and his spouse for the previous year, for scrutiny by local and national party officers. Because children and parents are not mentioned in clause (6), some leaders have retained control of prohibited income by transferring formal ownership to their children or their parents.

life of the colonial officials they replaced and not to view

becoming a leader as a means of getting rich.   In very human

terms, the problem is one of convincing leaders not to act

in what they see as their own self-interest.[5]   One approach,

an approach embodied in Tanzania's leadership code, is to

recognize that despite governmental and party efforts to

limit it, the easy life may be a necessary perquisite for

many, if not most, successful leaders, and to concentrate,

by restricting the accumulation of wealth, on insuring that

elite status is not a commodity automatically passed on to

succeeding generations.

Although this study has not been directed toward

questions of leadership recruitment and elite status, the

data gathered do permit several observations on the ability

of Kilimanjaro political leaders to manipulate political

power for their own personal interests and to pass advan-

tages thus secured on to their children.

Access to education and prominent occupations was

severely curtailed for Tanzanians during the colonial period,

and the fathers of most Kilimanjaro leaders surveyed in 1969

were farmers or otherwise self-employed.   Yet decisions made

[5]It is not suggested here that the manipulation of
political power for personal interests by key leaders may
not contribute substantially to rationalizing development
efforts at the local level and to enlarging the scale of
the nation.   The development of local political machines
will be discussed in Chapter 12.

during the colonial period, both by the colonial government
and by the European missionaries, largely determined the
composition of the new elite. Much of the early nationalist
leadership was composed of mission-educated individuals, and
education became the key determinant of who would replace
the retiring colonial officers.[6] That this was true in Kili-
manjaro is reflected in the fact that regional and national
level and non-positional leaders came from more educated
families and were themselves (along with the nominated town
councillors and town council officers) more highly educated
than other leaders and than the population at large. In
terms of education and occupation, then, Kilimanjaro lead-
ers have already acquired elite status in Tanzania, where
more than 90% of the population still lives in a subsistence
agricultural economy.

Although most leaders surveyed reported little po-
litical activity in their families, the current set of lead-
ers, with the exception of the cell leaders, has as a group,
held political positions for a long time. Some 40% of the
regional and national level leaders held leadership posi-
tions during the early stages of TANU activity, and 60%
have held political positions for more than 10 years--since

[6]On the educational determinants of elite status in
Africa, see LeVine, Political Leadership in Africa, P. C.
Lloyd, editor, The New Elites of Tropical Africa (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1966), and Remi Clignet and Philip
Foster, The Fortunate Few (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1966).

independence (53% of the elected town councillors, and none
of the non-positional leaders reported holding political po-
sitions for more than 10 years). Thus, the current politi-
cal leadership in Kilimanjaro is characterized not only by
elite status in occupation and education, but, except for
the non-positional leaders, also by early entry into polit-
ical activity. The significance of the length of political
service to a discussion of elite formation is that partici-
pants in the early phases of the struggle for independence
were far from united in their agreement on specific goals
beyond independence. That is, in demanding independence
TANU led a national movement that welcomed anyone who op-
posed the colonial government, largely regardless of his
political orientation.[7] Only several years after independ-
ence did President Nyerere and TANU begin to define the
specific content of Tanzanian socialism, and only then did
TANU begin to deal with those leaders who had been valuable
allies during the independence struggle but who had become
liabilities because they did not agree with Tanzania's so-
cialist policy. It is not surprising, then, to find that
some of the current leaders, who fought the colonial gov-
ernment to secure the good life for themselves, find it
difficult to accept and identify with the austerity now de-
manded of Tanzania's leaders. For these reasons, the

    [7]Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, makes this
point; see Chapters I and II.

leadership code of the Arusha Declaration notwithstanding, many of Kilimanjaro's leaders have utilized political office to move from humble backgrounds to lives of substantial comfort and affluence, and many, at least prior to the Arusha Declaration, had begun to use their wealth and access to power to accumulate property and shares in businesses in order to perpetuate their status.

The impact of the leadership code seems to have been slow but steady in Kilimanjaro. Leaders divested themselves of prohibited sources of income only when it became clear, in some cases not until more than two years after the announcement of the Arusha Declaration, that they would lose their leadership positions if they did not. Some Kilimanjaro leaders, as well as several prominent national figures, ultimately resigned rather than comply. As has been noted, some local leaders continue to avoid the leadership restrictions by transferring formal control of prohibited income to children or parents. And some leaders are able to utilize state power to develop sources of income to provide for a comfortable retirement. One Regional Commissioner who served briefly in Kilimanjaro, for example, began planting the type of banana seedling particular to the region of his former post, near the capital, apparently using government transport and labor in the process. When his appointment as commissioner was revoked, he was able to begin immediately a profitable business of supplying to the inhabitants of

his former region living iñ Dar es Salaam the type of plain-
tain they preferred.

But while the leadership code may have thus far had
some success in limiting leaders' incomes,[8] leaders have
been able to insure access to education to their children,
thus guaranteeing that they too will be in a favored posi-
tion in Tanzania, where education remains the major key to
advancement. Education becomes an even more significant de-
terminant of recruitment patterns as political ability and
loyalty become insufficient criteria, by themselves, for se-
lection to leadership positions.[9] Although quantification
is difficult because many leaders had very young children,
virtually all of the children of leaders in Kilimanjaro who
had reached school age were in school, compared to the na-
tional average of less than half of school-aged children ac-
tually in school.[10] More than half of the leaders who had

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[8]It is of course far too early to make any defini-
tive assessment of the efficacy of the leadership code. Slow
compliance is explained in substantial measure by the policy
decision to enforce it slowly and selectively and to attempt
to persuade rather than coerce recalcitrants.

[9]Lloyd argues that children of the current elite in
West Africa are outnumbered in the educational system by
the "new entrants from the masses," Africa in Social Change,
136-142. The evidence from Tanzania seems to suggest that
although there has been widely expanded access to primary
education, because of the narrowly restricted access to high-
er education the new elite will continue to be drawn largely
(but of course not entirely) from the children of the cur-
rent elite for some time to come.

[10]In 1969 47% of the Standard I age group found
Standard I places. See Tanzania Second Five-Year Plan for
Economic and Social Development, Volume I, p. 149.

children 12 years old or older reported that the average

length of education of their children was 9 years or longer,

while in 1967 Tanzania's total secondary school enrollment

was under 3% of the appropriate age group. The mechanisms

by which leaders insure that their children progress in

school (it is relatively easy to insure that they complete

primary school in Kilimanjaro) vary--some are able to inter-

cede with Education Ministry officials to obtain a second

chance for their children at the secondary school examina-

tion or to secure secondary school places poor examination

results notwithstanding, some provide a household environ-

ment conducive to and supportive of rapid educational prog-

ress, and many simply have sufficient money to be able to

send their children to private schools when they are unable

to secure places in the public school system. As one prom-

inent leader put it:

> I would like to be a good socialist, but I have not
> been able to up to now because of my family and chil-
> dren. Someday I will be a good socialist.

That is, many leaders admit quite candidly that the pres-

sure to insure that their children, and often those of rel-

atives as well, get an education prevails over their commit-

ment to Tanzanian socialism and the Arusha Declaration. It

is not that only the children of the current elite advance

through the educational system, but that most of their chil-

dren, and few of anyone else's, do gain access to higher ed-

ucation, and, under the current circumstances, where

education is so critical to advancement, it is difficult to
imagine procedures which would effectively deny to the chil-
dren of the current elite this comparative advantage. Thus,
Tanzania's attempts to control elite formation, embodied in
part in the leadership code of the Arusha Declaration, can
only be partially successful as long as current elites can
insure educational advantage for their children.

It is important to mention briefly here the develop-
ment of another kind of economic elite in Kilimanjaro, one
not hampered by the leadership code. Several individuals,
probably still numbering under a dozen in Kilimanjaro, have
successfully utilized business opportunities to build size-
able economic empires. One, for example, began as a poorly
paid assistant in a tanning operation, became a skins trad-
er, later bought and expanded the tannery, became a major
beer, soft drink, and tobacco distributor, and organized
with a few associates import, transportation, and other com-
panies. The interrelationships of his enterprises are so
intricate that tax records do not reveal their full extent,
and he himself claimed to be unsure of all of the business-
es in which he was involved and their net, or gross, worth.
In 1969 he was raising seventeen children, and all who had
reached secondary school age were either in or had complet-
ed secondary school or post-primary vocational training.
Until now he has been able to secure what he wants without

direct intervention into the political system, though it
would be surprising if appropriately placed contributions
and assistance were not a factor in his ability to secure
requisite licenses and permits. Although he has been able
to find new businesses to replace those nationalized or
taken over by the government, and although he professes to
be unconcerned about further nationalizations and takeovers,
clearly as the Tanzanian government continues to expand its
control over the economy he will find increasingly less room
to maneuver.

There are two basic tensions generated by the suc-
cess of these Kilimanjaro entrepreneurs, both as yet unre-
solved. Until very recently both national and local lead-
ers have praised their individual enterprise as one of the
foundations of Tanzanian development, and many young people
in Kilimanjaro look to them as models to emulate. And yet
they are rapidly entrenching themselves in a position of
economic advantage clearly inconsistent with the egalitar-
ian and communal tenets of Tanzanian socialism.[11] Likewise,
as they promote development in Kilimanjaro, as the scale of
their economic empires increases and at the same time comes
into greater conflict with national development policy, the
conflict between national policy and the local entrepreneurs

[11]J. Gus Liebenow found a similar tension in his
study of southeastern Tanzania, Colonial Rule and Political
Development in Tanzania: The Case of the Makonde (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1971), 328-329.

increasingly coincides with the extant feelings of Kilima-

njaro residents that they are being penalized by the central

government because they have successfully developed.   In

other words, as they promote local development--and every-

one seems to agree that they do indeed promote development

--they facilitate the creation of an economic elite and nur-

ture the already-present feelings of alienation toward the

Tanzanian government, neither of which is tolerable if cur-

rent national policy is to prevail.   From the central gov-

ernment's point of view the dilemma is that the expansion

of the control of the economy in Kilimanjaro has thus far

been carried out by increasing the activities of, and cor-

respondingly, the burdens on, the Kilimanjaro coffee cooper-

ative union,[12] with the paradox that takeovers of private

business by the cooperative implemented too precipitously

overburden the cooperative--service to consumers is affect-

ed by the takeover, and what had previously seemed to the

coffee farmers to be an eminently successful institution

began to look less and less reliable; yet takeovers delayed

too long permit the entrenchment of an economic elite diffi-

cult to replace.   The problems encountered in relying on

[12]The trend in Kilimanjaro in 1969 was to transfer
control from private enterprise to the KNCU, with the re-
sult that it had begun to expand into a broad range of ac-
tivities, from marketing coffees, to organizing cattle
herders associations, to making loans, to selling hoes
and grains.

cooperatives and state-directed operations in Tanzania and

elsewhere in Africa might seem to suggest it is difficult,

if not impossible, under present circumstances to do without

these local entrepreneurs. But Tanzania's antipathy to the

entrenchment of a local economic elite seems thus far to

have outweighed--in 1971 some large property holdings had

begun to be nationalized--the disadvantages of available al-

ternatives.

What this evidence suggests, then, is that it may

not be reasonable to speak of clearly defined classes, class

interests, and class conflicts in Kilimanjaro in 1969 as

Lloyd does for West African urban areas,[13] but it is possi-

ble to observe the often successful attempts of individuals

who have achieved elite status to pass that status on to

their children. It is also possible to observe a growing

congruence of the interests of diverse elements in Kilima-

njaro society in opposing, delaying, and preventing the im-

plementation of significant national policy. That growing

congruence, coupled with the belief among many Kilimanjaro

residents that their individual mobility in an increasingly

stratified society is closely tied to the advancement of

the Chagga as a whole, renders more distinct the outlines

[13]For Lloyd's discussion of "incipient class con-
flict" in West African urban areas, see Africa in Social
Change, 306-320.

of a nascent conflict between national goals and programs.
and a coalition of opponents located in Kilimanjaro.

POLITICIANS IN KILIMANJARO: POSITIONAL OVERLAPS

A major element of politics in up-country Tanzania,
and one that emerges clearly in the study of the Kilimanjaro
political leadership, is that different political structures
are related by the overlaps of key positions and by key
leaders who hold several positions. Not only do government
officers hold party positions and party officials govern-
ment offices, but also leaders of religious and ethnic com-
munities hold political office as well, and frequently in-
dividuals hold positions at several different levels--
branch and district, district and region, and branch, dis-
trict, and region together.

Two individuals filling multiple roles who are key in
up-country Tanzania are of course the Regional and Area (Dis-
trict) Commissioners. Appointed by the President, and thus
not directly responsible either to a local electorate or to
the party, they serve both as heads of government and as

party secretaries at the regional and district levels.[14]
With access to both government and party machinery, they can,
though they do not always, bring strong pressure to bear to
influence local decisions. For example, in order to attempt
to accelerate action on problems of famine and malnutrition
that plagued several areas of Kilimanjaro District in 1969,
the Area Commissioner worked, simultaneously, through the
District Executive Officer, district (and even regional) of-
ficials of the relevant Ministries, and district party lead-
ers, and, though not a locally-elected official, several
times he appealed directly to the local population for sup-
port. In addition, he appealed for assistance directly
from officials in Dar es Salaam. Yet, his inability to se-
cure rapid action in this instance--he was thwarted largely
by a cumbersome bureaucracy both locally and in Dar es
Salaam--indicates the constraints on his ability to secure
desired outputs, despite the weight he brought to bear on
numerous pressure points in the local political system.

In a similar way, the party executive secretaries,
who are posted from the center but who also serve as

[14]For the replacement of civil service with polit-
ical appointees as commissioners, see Tordoff, Government
and Politics in Tanzania, 96-105. For comments on the dif-
fuse role of the commissioners, see Bienen, Tanzania: Party
Transformation, especially pp. 119-152 and 310-333. Note
that both of these sources, written shortly after the
politicization of the commissioner positions, are concerned
more with expected behavior than with an analysis of actual
performance up-country over time in Tanzania. As was noted
previously, the commissioner system is currently being ex-
tended down to the ward level in Tanzania.

nominated members of the local councils, the district chair-
men, who also serve as chairmen of the local councils, and
the chief executive officers (the District Executive Offi-
cer and the Town Clerk), who in Kilimanjaro in 1969 also
served on the party district executive committees, all link
party and government, and all can have access to both party
and government power. These positional overlaps, instituted
to promote coordination and insure party control, often have
the effect of merging party and government at the local
level.

Not that the overlapping positions are limited to
the local level--indeed, the linkages between the local pop-
ulation in Kilimanjaro and major decision-makers in Dar es
Salaam are very diffuse. The Regional Commissioner serves
both as an ex-officio Member of Parliament and as a member
of the TANU National Executive Committee. As well, the Re-
gional Commissioner, the Regional Chairman, and the Member
for Kilimanjaro all serve on the National Executive Commit-
tee. All of these regional leaders, as well as Members of
Parliament for constituencies in the region, serve on the
party regional executive committee and are major partici-
pants in the Regional Development Committee.

Although no attempt was made to deal with role con-
flict in this study, it should be noted that not all of
these individuals with key, multiple, positions resolve the
inherent conflict between their roles in the same way--some

see clear boundaries between party and government authority
and behavior and consider themselves to be more on one side
or the other of the lines they draw, while others are unable
or unwilling to differentiate distinctly between their roles
and do not regularly subject either one to the other.[15]

These overlaps do serve to promote a degree of co-
ordination among policy-makers and administrators that the
bureaucracy and other formal governmental institutions can-
not provide. In development planning, for example, commun-
ication between ministerial offices and local government of-
ficials, and between development planners and party offi-
cials, is intermittent at best. But the fact that party
leaders serve on the local government councils (and develop-
ment committees) and local government officials sit in par-
ty committees does permit some duplication of effort to be
avoided and some coordination of programs to take place. In
a similar way, these overlaps serve to forge links between
the competing factions and groups in the local political

[15]For an incisive comment on the use of role con-
flict analysis in the study of African politics, see Alvin
Magid, "Methodological Considerations in the Study of
African Political and Administrative Behavior: the Case of
Role Conflict Analysis," African Studies Review XIII,1
(April 1970):75-94. Magid stresses that role conflict may
be more presumed by observers than present in leaders' be-
havior--leaders may in fact not perceive conflicting ex-
pectations of their behavior, and those who are aware of
conflicting expectations may not experience difficulty in
reconciling them.

system. That is, where overlaps are few and positions are
functionally specific, factional conflicts manifest them-
selves in institutional settings, but where overlaps are
many and positions very diffuse, individual leaders often
find themselves at the crossroads of several conflicting de-
mands. Local leaders, for example, must deal with the con-
flicting demands of their local constituencies and their
party leadership. Branch leaders who serve on the local.
councils are not infrequently caught in the vise of the in-
compatible pressures of their branch and district constitu-
encies. Religious and ethnic community leaders who serve
in government and/or party positions must simultaneously
look to the needs of their own communities and to the re-
sources and authority of government and party. And the in-
dividuals who are on the fringes of the local factional
alignments must deal with the cross-pressures of their mul-
tiple allegiances. While some leaders do not perceive os-
tensibly inconsistent demands as conflicting and others re-
act to conflicts with ambivalence, perceiving no need to
reconcile them, the overall impact of the personalization
of these conflicts in Kilimanjaro is a moderation in their
intensity and a fluid mediation between extremes.

Tanzania's leaders, in fashioning their political
system, have constantly tried to balance local responsibil-
ity and participation with a centrally-directed development

effort, or, in other terms, to manage the tension between those officers selected locally and those posted from the center.[16] For much of the local populace, these extensive overlaps, then, combined with the diffuse nature of official responsibilities, provide alternative channels through which to attempt to influence allocations--almost all of the major leaders are likely to be involved in the deliberations on most issues at some point or another. Although it is true that an individual who seeks some specific action by the Area Commissioner and who is refused may turn to the TANU office simply to find the Area Commissioner there in his capacity as party secretary, it is also true that he can appeal to other party leaders to intercede with the Area Commissioner as party secretary to influence his decision as Area Commissioner. Without exception all local leaders agree that because positions overlap and authority is diffuse, individuals with problems seek assistance from the official they determine offers the greatest chance of success. That is, where clan ties, or personal familiarity, or business or professional acquaintance, or recommendation from friends suggest that some official can be helpful, an individual will seek him out, even though the problem involved may not fall directly within his competence. It is not uncommon to find an MP interceding for a constituent with the

[16]For a discussion of this tension, see Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, 153-157.

Regional Commissioner or Town Clerk, and then to find the
Regional Commissioner or Town Clerk interceding for a local
resident with the same MP. For the ordinary citizens, then,
these overlaps provide a set of alternative advocates whose
assistance can be sought. That is, at the local level in
Tanzania's one-party system ordinary citizens have much the
same possibility of choosing among alternative advocates
for their concerns that citizens have in multi-party sys-
tems.

From another perspective, however, these overlaps
have a somewhat opposite effect. While the institutions
that aggregate interests are numerous and diverse, interest
articulation is largely confined within formal party struc-
tures.[17] That is, while a wide range of groups--tradition-
al societies, athletic clubs, religious and ethnic commun-
ity organizations, informal groupings of bar owners, and
the like--merge diverse demands into recognizable alterna-
tive courses of action, communication of demands and pro-
posed courses of action to decision-makers at the center is
confined within party structures. That many of the basic
interest groups--trade union, women, elders, youth, cooper-
atives, parents--are in fact party auxiliaries reinforces

[17]For the basic discussion of interest aggregation
and articulation, see Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham
Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), Chapters II-V.

this pattern. Demands for improving the life style and in-
come of women, for example, may be dealt with in church
groups, in women's associations, in traditional song groups,
in bar owners' and beer brewers' gatherings, and in party
branch meetings. The specific course of action proposed--
that women's groups receive assistance and preferred treat-
ment in opening shops and bars--is articulated through the
local party structure to the various decision-making bodies
and administrators. Where a recommendation to the Liquor
Licensing Board by a church representative that women be as-
sisted would be rejected as out of place and illegitimate,
the same presentation by a party official is readily accept-
ed and carries great weight.

POLITICIANS IN KILIMANJARO: MOBILIZATION OF BIAS

        The ways in which prevailing community sentiments
and values render it difficult or even impossible for some
issues and some points of view to enter decision-making
structures have already been discussed. A proposal to form
a party in opposition to TANU, for example, though occasion-
ally mentioned in Kilimanjaro, could not easily be raised
before decision-makers. Likewise, proposals to eliminate
private land holdings and to reduce the share of national
educational resources allocated to Kilimanjaro, though cer-
tainly consistent with national policy, are largely exclud-
ed from the decision-making process by the local

mobilization of bias.

The study of Kilimanjaro politicians suggests that
the prevailing community sentiments and values exclude, or
at least set substantial obstacles before, individuals as
well as issues. That is, a leader who seeks authority and
power on the basis of an anti-TANU position is of course
prevented from rising within party structures and is pre-
vented by community acceptance of the illegitimacy of oppo-
sition from organizing, at least overtly, an opposition par-
ty. Less hypothetically, leaders who attempt to secure of-
fice by championing the abolition of private property and/or
the diversion of national educational resources away from
Kilimanjaro find only a few listeners and almost no support-
ers, despite the fact that these proposals clearly form
basic elements of current national policy. Ideologues, and
especially ideologues who are radical in the Tanzanian con-
text, are simply not found in Kilimanjaro politics. Of
course the process by which the mobilization of bias ex-
cludes issues and individuals from the center of political
activity is a lengthy and complex one. It is not that in
1969 individuals who proposed certain party policies were
excluded. Rather, as the current leaders were educated and
socialized they were little exposed to such ideas; these
proposals are seen to be a clear threat both to the pattern
of individual land-holding that at least the Chagga see as
basic to their social organization and also to the ready

access to education that the people of Kilimanjaro see as
the fundamental gateway to the good life. During the 1969
party elections, for example, at the Regional Conference one
candidate for Regional Chairman was asked to explain ujamaa
(socialist) villages. In his response he backed himself into
to the position of asserting that Chagga villages were the
antithesis of ujamaa villages, a position that might have
some support among party leaders but one that brought hoots
of derision at the election meeting and that helped convince
party delegates that he would not be a good advocate for Ki-
limanjaro and thus contributed to his defeat. Since inde-
pendence the successful Kilimanjaro politicians have been
those who served as buffers against the threat of Dar es
Salaam intrusion into Kilimanjaro and not those who wel-
comed increased central control over and direction of local
endeavors.

One of the results of this mobilization of bias is
that local politics in Kilimanjaro have a very pragmatic
cast. Support for leaders revolves around what they can do
for their constituents. Traditional ties, detailed and at-
tractive ideology, and even personality are secondary fac-
tors, while a prospective leader's education, place of res-
idence and birth, and previous political service are all
evaluated through the prism of what the candidate can be
expected to do for his constituents. To argue that there
are no successful radicals among Kilimanjaro politicians is

not to suggest that national party policy is not accepted
and enunciated, but simply to suggest that to speak in favor
of party doctrine is little more than a basic requirement
for receiving serious consideration and does not in itself
provide significant support.

POLITICIANS IN KILIMANJARO: RELIGION AND ETHNICITY

Allegations of religious influence in politics are
not uncommon in Kilimanjaro. It was widely believed in
1969, especially among the supporters of the unsuccessful
candidate, that the success of the winner in a race for a
prominent party office was due to the promotion of his
candidacy by the local clergymen of one of the major re-
ligious groups, both from the pulpit and in their daily con-
tacts with their parishioners. Likewise, all of the major
participants in a substantial rejection of top office-
holders in the coffee cooperative union agreed that religion
played a major role. And the leaders of the major religious
communities each referred to one of the major political
leaders as "their" leader.

The situation in regard to ethnicity is similar.
Complaints by members of one Chagga sub-group that they
were disadvantaged in the location of a government project
because the local councillor was a member of a rival Chagga

sub-group are common.[18] During the 1969 party elections op-

position to electing a non-Chagga Regional Chairman were

openly verbalized. As well, some of the local opposition to

a major party representative at the national level centered

on the fact that he was not Chagga.

Yet none of the major political leaders posted from

the center was a Chagga, and town party members readily re-

placed one non-Chagga with another as Town Chairman in a

race in which none of the candidates was a Chagga. Thus,

clearly, in dealing with the impact of religion and ethnic-

ity on Kilimanjaro politics it is essential to pay careful

attention to the shifting salience of ethnicity and reli-

gion, a factor all too often overlooked in studies of

[18]As has been noted several times, it can be very
misleading to think of all of the people of Kilimanjaro who
are usually called Chagga as a single ethnic group. The
Chagga-language-speaking area is comprised of peoples who
speak several different, and often mutually unintelligible,
languages. To call them all Chagga is to overlook the sig-
nificance of the differences among them--the shifting sali-
ence of ethnicity--that is precisely the point at issue
here. For the purposes of this discussion, Chagga refers
the entire set of people who consider themselves Chagga,
and Chagga sub-group refers to the smaller groups of in-
habitants of Kilimanjaro who speak a common language and
who recognize a common identity. A classic discussion of
ethnicity in the politics of recently independent states is
of course Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Pri-
mordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States,"
in his Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Moderni-
ty in Asia and Africa (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963). But the
term "primordial" is an unfortunate one, since it stresses
the historic origins and psychological depth of such ties
at the expense of attention to specific situational determi-
nants of the exercise of such ties.

African communities.[19] How individuals group and identify

themselves is largely determined by the patterns of conflict

that develop. Individuals who recognize a common ethnicity,

or religion, in one set of circumstances might well see those

very people previously identified as co-ethnics or co-

religionists as enemies in other circumstances.[20]

The shifting salience of ethnicity and religion is

quite clear in the history of the peoples of Kilimanjaro.

During the early period of missionary expansion Kilimanjaro

was divided into 30 or more small chiefdoms and into two ma-

jor religions.[21] That is, when the lines of conflict were

drawn between the small states, the major religions, each

[19]See, for example, Hanna. "Influence and Influen-
tials in Two Urban-Centered African Communities." Hanna
discusses "co-ethnics" in a "polyethnic" community without
dealing with the problem that co-ethnicity may be situa-
tionally determined: in the eastern Nigerian town Hanna
studied, an individual's co-ethnic might be a fellow vil-
lager in one circumstance and anyone from eastern Nigeria
in another, and in the Ugandan town Hanna studied, under
certain conditions a Hindu's co-ethnic may be another
Hindu, while in other circumstances his co-ethnic might
well be any other Asian.

[20]Several authors have made this point. See, among
others, Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, and
Crawford Young, Issues of Political Development (Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967), Part One; Banton, "Adaptation
and Integration in the Social System of Temne Immigrants in
Freetown"; Howard Wolpe, "Port Harcourt: A Community of
Strangers," Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1967, and "Port Harcourt: Ibo Politics in Mi-
crocosm," JMAS 7,3(1969):469-493; and Martin Staniland,
"The Rhetoric of Centre-Periphery Relations," JMAS 8,4
(1970):617-636.

[21]Islam never became firmly entrenched on the Kili-
manjaro hillsides.

without competition in its own area, could bridge the gaps
between the warring parties and thus were integrative by
enabling peoples to broaden the scale of their basic alle-
giance. More recently, when the lines of conflict between
the (former) small Chagga states have begun to diminish in
significance before the conflict between the two major re-
ligious groups, the recognition of Chagganess, spurred by
conflict between the hillside (Chagga) and plains (non-
Chagga) peoples and between Kilimanjaro and the rest of Tan-
zania, has served to moderate religious competition and is
thus integrative by enabling people to recognize a broader
community.

In the current behavior of the peoples of Kilima-
njaro the shifting salience of ethnicity and religion is
also quite clear. While people from different Chagga sub-
groups compete vigorously in local politics, they recognize
their common identity with no difficulty when faced with
the prospect of electing a non-Chagga as party Regional
Chairman or when confronted by anti-Chagga sentiment in Dar
es Salaam. And while Lutherans and Catholics may consider
each other arch enemies in the struggles over the location
of new schools, they have little trouble recognizing their
common Christianity when dealing with what they perceive to
be excessive Muslim influence in party leadership. Perhaps
the most striking recognition by local leaders of the situ-
ational determination of ethnicity came when applications

were being solicited from Kilimanjaro residents to move to
new lands in western Tanzania in 1969. Since some of the
funds to support the move came from a Chagga Land Fund orig-
inally established to compensate the Chagga for land alien-
ated to European settlers, only Chagga were to be permitted
to go. But who was legitimately a Chagga? When the ques-
tion came up at a meeting of the Regional Development Com-
mittee in regard to an individual who had been born and
raised in Kilimanjaro but whose father was not Chagga, after
some discussion there was widespread agreement on the pro-
posal by the District Chairman (the elected leader of the
Chagga district in Tanzania) that all those who had lived
their lives in Kilimanjaro and considered themselves Chagga
faced the same land shortage as everyone else and should
therefore be officially considered Chagga for the purpose
of permitting them to move to the new lands.

        In Moshi town ethnicity and religion seem to play a
much less significant role in local politics. Although the
ethnic and religious residential segregation are evident,
there was no outcry over the election of a non-Chagga Mus-
lim as Town Chairman. Several factors differentiate the
urban area from its rural hinterland in this regard. First,
although the town is segregated, there is still substantial
heterogeneity in living patterns. Where the congruity of
place of residence, ethnicity, and religion on the hill-
sides usually strengthens their collective impact, the

urban heterogeneity--neighbors may differ in both ethnicity
and religion--seems usually to moderate the conflicts.
Moshi is a trading and administrative center, and the pres-
ence of many non-local civil servants, travel, work con-
tacts, and inter-marriage reinforce this heterogeneous pat-
tern.   Second, that so many of the urban Muslims are in fact
Chagga or neighboring peoples diminishes the alien cast char-
acteristic of Muslims in other Tanzanian urban areas where
they have coastal and Zanzibari origins.   Third, the psycho-
logical focus of the Chagga, at least as they themselves de-
scribe it, is on the mountain and away from the town.   Many
of the most prestigeous and affluent district leaders do not
build homes in the former European quarter of town, but
rather take pride in their return to their homes, often
quite sumptuous, in the rural area each evening or at the
end of the week.   That in general Kilimanjaro leaders do not
see in Moshi the Muslim domination of urban politics common
in other Tanzanian urban areas,[22] that the urban Muslim and
non-Chagga populations do not regard themselves as subjected
to continuing Christian, Chagga rule, and that in general
Chagga leaders are more concerned with the rural district

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[22]See, for example, Hyden's comments on Muslims in
the local TANU organization in Buhaya in Political Develop-
ment in Rural Tanzania, 133-134.   See also Bienen's com-
ments on Muslim and Swahili (Bienen very perceptively
stresses that individuals identified as Swahilis in a polit-
ical context are not necessarily either coastal or even Mus-
lim) influence in TANU and Tanzanian urban politics in Tan-
zania: Party Transformation, 45-49 and 187-188.

than with the town reduces the extent to which the possibly
conflicting groups perceive each other as threatening and
diminishes the intensity of those conflicts that do arise.

POLITICIANS IN KILIMANJARO: CONCLUSIONS

      To draw together the study of politics and politi-
cians in Kilimanjaro it is appropriate to begin to suggest
the outlines of the major factional alignments in the local
political system. Of course, any such sketch must be tenta-
tive since the patterns of political conflict have been
fluid and since there have been, and continue to be, impor-
tant changes among the major participants; the alignments
described here, those that characterized political conflict
in 1969, have already begun to be altered since the 1970
parliamentary and local government elections. But it is
possible, now that many of the salient features of local
politics have been noted, to attempt to sketch the major
patterns of interaction among the local politicians.

      All of the evidence available supports the rejection
of the view that allocations in Kilimanjaro are dominated
by a small, cohesive power elite. The evidence does sug-
gest, however, that there are a number of informal networks,
factional alignments, whose competition and coalition
largely determine which interests are served by decisions
in the local political setting. There are three major fac-
tional alignments in Kilimanjaro, and several minor ones,

none of which is sufficiently strong to prevail regularly
without the support of the others.

Political change is very rapid in Tanzania. As was
noted in Chapter 2, there have been three major turnovers
in the Kilimanjaro political leadership since the early days
of the British colonial period, and there are indications
that another major change is currently taking place. That
is, the life span of the current networks of political alle-
giance is relatively brief (Tanzania has been independent
for less than ten years), and an analytic approach stressing
equilibrium could not adequately encompass the successive
turnovers and rejuvenations in the political leadership.
The leadership factions in Kilimanjaro are further disrupt-
ed by the frequent transfer of high level government and
party personnel. Yet it is possible to delineate these
factions, whose outlines will be discussed briefly here.

In 1969 one major network revolved around the Re-
gional Commissioner, and included the Area Commissioner,
the District Executive Officer, and most upper level gov-
ernment officials. This faction, which essentially repre-
sented central government power in Kilimanjaro, usually in-
cluded as well the District Chairman, who was dependent on
the commissioners and on the District Executive Officer and
his subordinates for support in his competition with the
Regional Chairman. It is important to note here that the

Kilimanjaro District Chairman functioned almost as the Member of Parliament for his constituency, since the MP, his brother, a party elder statesman, had been incapacitated by illness in Dar es Salaam for several years. The District Chairman visited Dar es Salaam regularly two or three times a month to keep his brother informed and to see central government and party officials.

A second grouping revolved around the Regional Chairman, and included the head of the women's organization, much of the Lutheran leadership (the Chairman was an official of the Lutheran Church), and much of the traditionalist (former chiefs and clan heads and respected elders) element from the mountain. Although there was usually fierce competition between the Regional and District Chairmen, on some issues they did ally.

A third major grouping revolves around the Kilimanjaro Member of the National Executive Committee, and largely represented the interests of the plains (as opposed to the hillsides), the urban area, and the Muslims.

There were also several somewhat weaker and less tightly organized networks. One revolved around the Member of Parliament for the far eastern side of the mountain, and represented the interests of the residents of that part of the district, who have long claimed that they have been disadvantaged vis-a-vis the rest of the district. This MP, the only Catholic among the major leaders despite the

Catholic plurality in the district, was also seen by local
leaders and by the Catholic hierarchy to represent Catholic
interests. A second grouping linked the MP for Kilimanjaro
Central and a National Member of Parliament who resides in
Moshi,[23] and represented much of central Kilimanjaro, which
includes several large sisal plantations and a sugar planta-
tion located in the plains, as well as the urban area and
especially its Asian population. This grouping was somewhat
transitory because the Kilimanjaro MP, a Junior Minister,
spent most of her time away from Kilimanjaro and because the
National MP, an Asian with no real constituency either lo-
cally or in Dar es Salaam, was often reluctant to exercise
forceful leadership on his own. Very often this faction
allied with the grouping around the Regional Commissioner;
the Kilimanjaro MP depended more on local government offi-
cials than on party officers to keep her informed on devel-
opments in her constituency. At least until the 1969 party
elections a third small network functioned in Moshi town
and usually supported the factions led by the Regional Com-
missioner and the MP for Kilimanjaro Central. Common back-
ground and experiences facilitated co-ordination among the

       [23]Under Articles 24 and 30 of the Interim Constitu-
tion of Tanzania the National Assembly selects ten members
from a list of nominees submitted by institutions designat-
ed by the President as national institutions. The National
MP residing in Moshi, an Asian, was originally nominated by
the Chambers of Commerce.

top town leaders: until the middle of 1969 the top town lead-
ership--the Town Chairman and vice chairman and the Town
Clerk and deputy town clerk--were all raised as Christians
with a missionary education in a largely Muslim area, had
all served in government posts, and were all except the
deputy town clerk members of the urban district party work-
ing and executive committees. A fourth small network, the
remnants of the previous generation of party leaders (who
had been largely replaced in party offices in the early
1960s) retained some control of major offices in the coffee
cooperative union, but were all removed from office by a
coalition of all of the other major factions in 1969.

These factions differed in their sources of author-
ity, in their access to power, and even in their ideologi-
cal outlooks. The grouping around the Regional Commission-
er drew its authority from Presidential and governmental
appointment and had control of government machinery, in-
cluding the forces of coercion. The grouping around the
Regional Chairman traced its authority to the local party
electorate,[24] and relied on persuasion and popular support
in its competition with other factions. The grouping
around the Kilimanjaro Member of the National Executive
Committee drew its support from a combination of a Dar

[24]Party chairmen are elected by the delegates to
party conferences at each level, and not by the population
or the party membership at large.

es Salaam base and the local Muslim and plains population,

and relied heavily on access to key decision-makers in Dar

es Salaam for leverage in the local factional struggles.   In

outlook, the Regional Commissioner's faction was in general

primarily concerned with the management of development and

administrative tasks, while the network supporting the Re-

gional Chairman regarded itself as the representative of

Chagga interests and the faction led by the MNEC considered

itself the representative of the interests of the plains-

dwellers and Muslims.

Because of the frequent changes among the party

executive secretaries in Kilimanjaro in 1969,[25] the party

executive secretaries were not closely aligned with any of

the major factions, and served to mediate among them.

Ironically, party executive secretaries saw themselves as,

and were, "above" local political competition.

A few examples may sharpen the images of these fac-

tional alignments.   At the elections for the top leadership

of the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union in 1969, the

Regional Commissioner, reflecting pressure from Dar es

Salaam to deal with management problems in the coffee

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[25]During the course of 1969 there were three re-
gional executive secretaries and three rural district ex-
ecutive secretaries; the urban district executive secretary
spent most of 1969 at a training course in Dar es Salaam.
Between the departure of one secretary and the arrival of
his replacement, as well as during the absence of the urban
district executive secretary, the office was vacant.

cooperative, the District Chairman, motivated by a long-
standing enmity toward the incumbent KNCU President, and the
Regional Chairman, who had replaced the incumbent KNCU Pres-
ident as Regional Chairman, all allied to defeat the incum-
bents. This alliance to unseat the incumbents, which had
been unsuccessful in previous attempts, was successful in
1969 largely because it was able to enlist the support of
disenchanted Rombo farmers and Catholics by supporting the
Rombo MP for the Presidency. In competition over the loca-
tion of new and expanded schools, for another example, the
District Chairman regularly allied with local government
officials to oppose the demands of the Regional Chairman;
the District Executive Officer willingly approved travel
allowance payments to the District Chairman and several
councillors who support him for frequent and seemingly pur-
poseless visits to Council headquarters; and at election
time, the District Executive Officer and Area Commissioner
boost the District Chairman's candidacy by introducing him
at meetings as a man who had done so much for the district,
thus suggesting that his intervention was indispensable in
securing governmental allocations. The District Chairman
was a vociferous supporter of the Area Commissioner and
District Executive Officer in his local contacts on the
mountain: both faced the resentment of local inhabitants
because they were seen as outsiders sent to govern the Chag-
ga, and the District Executive Officer suffered from the

additional stigma of being considered an individual from too backward a tribe to have authority over the Chagga. There are also, of course, exceptions to these patterns. For a brief period in 1969 a particularly disliked Regional Commissioner was unable to hold together his network of supporters and was regularly stymied in competition with other major leaders, his frequent use of dire threats notwithstanding.

This brief sketch of factional alignments can at best be suggestive. Further detail must await the examination of the local party organization. But it is clear that the local political leadership in Kilimanjaro consists of a set of interrelated and interdependent factions, none of which was strong enough by itself to prevail regularly. And it is also clear that in the overall scheme of Kilimanjaro politics, the role of Moshi town tends to be very modest, and the impact of Dar es Salaam tends to be quite substantial. Now let us turn our attention to the local party organization.

CHAPTER 11

THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION

THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION: INTRODUCTION

A major goal of this essay has been to examine the local party in Moshi--to study its goals, its structure, and its behavior. The issue-area studies provided one set of insights into the local party organization by asking which groups prevailed in the decisions concerning those key issues and in what ways the party was involved. The leadership studies provided another set of insights on the party by asking local leaders to describe the local political system and how they perceived their roles in it. That is, while the discussion has thus far focused on issues and leaders, it has also concerned the party--what is the role of the local TANU organization in an up-country urban area. Even though the larger setting was that of a single party state, in order not to pre-determine the findings it was not assumed that the local party organization monopolized (or even had any role in) local decision-making, nor was local power studied simply by assuming that TANU officials were the key leaders in the local political setting. The aim was to explore, from as broad and as encompassing a perspective as possible, the goals, structure, and behavior of the local party organization in order to provide some

insight into the content, rather than simply the theory, of

a functioning single party system in Africa. The search for

what the party does in Moshi has made it abundantly clear

that for a wide range of political outcomes the direct role

of the local TANU organization is very modest indeed.

This chapter and the next, then, will deal with

TANU in Moshi. The primary attention here will be focused

on the composition of the local party organization--its sec-

tions and affiliated institutions--and an analysis of its

structure.

∧It is clear that a major thrust of the Tanzanian

political system, especially as it has developed in Kiliman-

jaro and despite the constraints imposed by decisions made

at the center, is to encourage and foster attention to local

issues and problems. Politics in Kilimanjaro had a very

local orientation during the pre-independence period, and

local concerns continued to occupy the center of the polit-

ical stage in Kilimanjaro throughout the first decade after

independence. Supportive of this orientation is the dis-

jointed and poorly articulated nature of inputs from the

center. As a result of these, and other, factors, the lo-

cal party organization largely concerns itself with commun-

ication and mediation in the local political setting.

The principal goal of this chapter, then, is de-

scriptive: how is the local party composed, how is it

structured, and what is its basic orientation. Since this

essay is concerned with the political system of Moshi town,
the bulk of the comments in this chapter will refer to the
urban party organization. But because party headquarters
for the rural district and for the region are both located
in Moshi town--in fact all in the same building--and be-
cause some of the party auxiliaries do not have a separate
functioning urban organization, and because it would be im-
possible to understand the behavior of the urban party or-
ganization without setting it in its rural and regional con-
text, the discussion will as necessary include both rural
Kilimanjaro District and Kilimanjaro Region.

THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION: COMPOSITION

        The picture of the local party organization in
Moshi that emerges from the discussion thus far is one of
a congeries of formal interest groups and informal alli-
ances, a set of relatively fluid networks in which differ-
ent elements prevail in different circumstances. To fix on
the fact that the urban party chairman is selected by the
urban District Annual Conference,[1] for example, is to

        [1]The officers and organs of TANU are defined in the
Constitution of the Tanganyika African National Union, ap-
pended to the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965, as
the First Schedule. The Interim Constitution of Tanzania,
1965 is published as Act No. 43 of 1965 (Dar es Salaam: Gov-
ernment Printer, 1965); as well, it can be found in Tordoff,
Government and Politics in Tanzania, Appendices, Part B. A
slightly revised version was published in Swahili in 1967:
Tanganyika African National Union, Katiba ya TANU [TANU Con-
stitution](Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967).

overlook the fact that he also serves as Chairman of the
Moshi Town Council, that the District Executive Secretary is
posted from party headquarters, and that the District Secre-
tary is the Area Commissioner, appointed by the President.
To stress the supremacy of the local party organization over
the local council is to overlook the fact that two-thirds of
the councillors are ultimately responsible to their popular
electorate--only some of whom are party members--and that
the remaining one-third of the councillors are appointed by
the President and may be directly responsible to organiza-
tions, or bureaucracies not directly under party control.

The local party organization in Moshi, then, encom-
passes the elected and appointed officers, representatives
from the party sections, and representatives from the party
affiliates, as well as individuals selected at regional and
national levels (see TABLE 11.1 for the composition of the
District Executive Committee). The linkages among these
individuals are characterized by diverse sources of author-
ity and patterns of responsibility, cross-cutting and con-
gruent hierarchical chains, and independent and interde-
pendent roles. (See TABLE 11.2 for a schematic representa-
tion of the linkages among the members of the District Ex-
ecutive Committee) The procedure used to elect members of
the District Executive Committee at the District Annual
Conference virtually insures regular turnover in its mem-
bership--election is by nomination. In the chaotic tumult

TABLE 11.1 COMPOSITION OF THE DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

District Chiarman

District Secretary (Area Commissioner)

All members of the Regional Executive Committee resident in the district

All members of Parliament representing constituencies in the district[a]

Members of the District Working Committee appointed by the District Chairman[b]

Ten delegates elected by the Annual District Conference[c]

A delegate from each of the affiliated organizations[d]

A representative from each of the following sections in the district:-
  Women's Section, TANU Youth League, Elders Section

District Executive Secretary[e]

SOURCE: The Constitution of the Tanganyika African National Union (First Schedule to the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965), Article IV, C, 3, (1), and Katiba ya TANU, 1967.

[a]In Moshi this was taken to include the National Member of Parliament (who is elected by the Parliament and thus does not represent a local constituency) who resided in Moshi. The 1967 TANU Constitution explicitly includes such MPs.

[b]The District Working Committee was composed of the Chairman, the District Secretary, the District Executive Secretary, and up to four persons appointed by the Chairman. In 1969 the composition of the District Working Committee was altered to include representatives elected at the party District Annual Conference, and they are in turn included in the District Executive Committee.

[c]Note that Branch Chairmen and/or Branch Secretaries are not automatically included in the District Executive Committee, primarily for reasons of size--Kilimanjaro rural district had 38 branches in 1969.

[d]Conditions for affiliate membership in TANU are defined in Article III, Section B, of the TANU Constitution. Clause (8) declares the National Union of Tanganyika Workers, Co-operative Union of Tanganyika, and the Tanganyika African Parents Association to be affiliated members of TANU. The 1967 Swahili version of the TANU Constitution also lists the Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika (UWT) as an affiliated member.

[e]Although not specifically designated in the TANU Constitution, the District Executive Secretary, posted from TANU Headquarters, carries on most of the day-to-day party business and serves as secretary of the District Executive Committee.

TABLE 11.2   SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF LINKAGES WITHIN THE DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (MOSHI)

Natl HQ	Natl HQ		National Assembly	National Party HQ	President
NUTA CUT	TYL UWT TAPA				

Regional Executive Cmte.

Local Electorate

District Conference

C C[c]

DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

NUTA CUT[a]	TYL ELDERS UWT[b] TAPA	Members of REC living in dist.	MP MP	District Executive Secretary	District Secretary (Area Comsnr.)	10 Elected Delegates	CHAIRMAN District Working Cmte.

NOTE: This diagram is concerned with the composition of the District Executive Committee. Horizontal links at regional and national levels are not shown. The diagram groups Executive Committee members according to actual chains of authority for Moshi (they differ slightly from those specified in the TANU Constitution.

[a]In Moshi, this means the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union. There is no CUT organization at the district level.

[b]The UWT is both a party section and an affiliated organization.

[c]Prospective candidates for District Chairman must be approved by the Central Committee, which receives recommendations from Regional and Area Commissioners, among others.

of claims for recognition from all corners of the hall, names
are proposed and seconded, and when the allotted vacancies
have been filled, the election is declared completed. Chance
plays a large part in determining which of the better-known
party leaders are thus selected.[2]

Formally represented within the local party organ-
ization are the women's, youth, and elders' sections of the
party, as well as NUTA, the CUT (which in Moshi usually
means the KNCU), and TAPA. Before proceeding to discuss
each of these groups separately, it is important to make
two general comments. First, in Moshi in 1968-69, these or-
ganizations, although formally part of the political party,
functioned, when they functioned at all, as interest groups
and only rarely participated in the more specifically po-
litical activities of the local party organization. That
is, by and large they concerned themselves with servicing

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[2]No election procedure is specified in the TANU
Constitution. This procedure--election by nomination--was
utilized at the District Annual Conferences for the urban
and rural Kilimanjaro Districts and at the Kilimanjaro Re-
gional Annual Conference in 1969 to elect members to the
Executive Committees and to elect delegates to the Confer-
ence at the next level and to the National Annual Confer-
ence. In the excitement of the elections at these three
Conferences the Chairmen recognized more than one delegate
who had no one in mind to nominate. Ticket-balancing was
impossible because it was impossible to be sure who had al-
ready been elected and difficult to obtain recognition by
the Chairmen. At the rural Kilimanjaro District Annual
Conference the Chairman was accused of having recognized
only delegates from one area of the hall (and thus one area
of the district); after some discussion the original elec-
tion was annulled and the process begun anew.

that specific sub-set of the population for whom they are or-
ganized, and only infrequently, with some important excep-
tions, did they become involved in broad programs of polit-
ical education, mobilization of the general populace, and
implementation of broad aspects of national policy. They
were expected to remain aloof from electoral campaigns and
to communicate with governmental bodies at the local level
only through the party. For example, although one of the
functions of NUTA is to promote the policies of TANU,[3] re-
cent evidence in Tanzania suggests that the party leadership
has determined that party branches are to be established in
industrial situations to promote party policies.[4] In Moshi
at least one factory had both TANU and NUTA branches, while
in Dar es Salaam some factories had simultaneously TANU,
NUTA, UWT, and TYL branches. Second, the primary reason for
the restricted scope of these party sections and affiliates
is the unwillingness of the party to permit the development
of organizations that could provide strong, alternative,
competing power bases.[5]

[3]From the Act creating NUTA; see Tordoff, Government
and Politics in Tanzania, 148.

[4]For the party announcement of this policy see the
Secretary's report prepared for the 1969 TANU National An-
nual Conference: Tanganyika African National Union, Taarifa
ya Ofisi Kuu Kuhusu Hali na Kazi za Chama, Novemba 1967 -
Aprili 1969 (Dar es Salaam: Printpak Tanzania Limited, 1969),
11-13.

[5]A clear case in point is the party's unwillingness
to permit autonomous activity by the trade unions.

THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION: PARTY SECTIONS

   The TANU Youth League (TYL) in Kilimanjaro has been
continually beset by difficulties in defining its purpose
and in finding effective leadership. As well, local factors
have inhibited the development of a self-conscious youth
group. Because of the dense population and highly commer-
cialized coffee cultivation in Kilimanjaro, youths require
substantial sums of money to leave their parents and start
out on their own; and because Kilimanjaro residents were
among the most educated of Tanzanians at the time of inde-
pendence many young people secured employment in replacing
the departing Europeans, thus minimizing, until very recent-
ly at least, the emergence of a large group of unemployed
school-leavers. The lack of unused land suitable for settle-
ment by a youth group (as has occurred elsewhere in Tanzania),
a continued dependence on parents for income and land, and,
at the same time, the individual opportunities for employ-
ment have all been obstacles to the creation of a coordinat-
ed, energetic, and effective youth organization in Kilima-
njaro.

   This is not to suggest that no youths have been po-
litically active in Kilimanjaro. Many of the leaders of the
anti-chief agitation and many of the early TANU activists
were young. The TANU Youth League was active in the 1958
Legislative Council elections and was accused of over-
zealous activity on behalf of one candidate in the 1965

parliamentary elections.[6] Youth League members have assist-
ed local government and party officials in maintaining law
and order. But the problems in defining a clear purpose for
the TYL and the leadership difficulties have prevented it
from emerging as a strong, or independent, force in Kilima-
njaro.

One obstacle, both to defining goals and finding ef-
fective leadership, is that although in theory members of the
Youth League are to be not more than 35 years old, in fact
several of the most prominent members of the TYL in Moshi in
1969 were 50 years old or older and were simultaneously ac-
tive in the Elders Section.[7] The older members were unwill-
ing to accept a substantially younger leadership, yet they
themselves were unable to provide effective leadership for
the bulk of the TYL membership. At the 1969 TYL District
Annual Conference for Moshi town the older members were re-
luctant to recognize the legitimacy of the full participa-
tion of the representatives of the TYL school branches. In

[6]For a report on the challenge, dismissed by the
Chief Justice of the High Scourt, to the election of S. N.
Eliufoo, see the Reporter (East Africa) V,155(25 March
1966):11-12.

[7]The age limit is specified in the TANU Constitu-
tion, Article V, A, 2. In a booklet explaining to members
the TYL reorganization, the TANU Youth League stipulates
that members are to be from 6 to 35 years old, with current
members who have passed 35 to continue as "advisers"
(mshauri): Muhtasari wa Mafundisho kwa Vijana wa TANU (Dar
es Salaam: Dar es Salaam Printers, 1969?), p. 3. This dis-
tinction of member and adviser is not made in Kilimanjaro,
nor does it seem to have any significance in most of Tan-
zania.

the contest for urban Chairman, the former Chairman, a petty

merchant supported by most of the older members, and the

Principal of Tanzania's Cooperative College, a forceful and

eloquent educator supported by many of the teachers present,

were defeated by a local auto salesman, supported largely by

the school children. The older members took the election

results as an indication of the lack of wisdom in permitting

school children to participate actively in decision-making

and seemed unwilling to work with the new Chairman. Without

· the support of these individuals, some of whom were branch

officials and town councillors, the new Chairman, an affable

young man with little previous political activity, was un-

willing and/or unable to initiate activity, with the result

that the leadership burden fell on the secretary posted from

Dar es Salaam. Because of transfers and unfilled vacancies,

the secretary was responsible for both the rural and urban

Kilimanjaro districts, and, overwhelmed by the mammoth reor-

ganization necessary in the two districts and disenchanted

with his work, he devoted little time to Young League activ-

ities in town.

Projects begun under the previous TYL leadership had

been largely unsuccessful. Youth League members had pres-

sured local officials for land and began a communal cotton

plot, but all except the Chairman quit working before the

harvest and the Chairman was in jail as a result of an auto

accident, so that the cotton planted was never harvested.[8]

The TYL was active in recruiting volunteers to join the move

to western Tanzania, but those young people who went did not

go as a TYL group.

A major restructuring of the TANU Youth League, di-

rected from TYL national headquarters, was begun in 1969.[9]

As of January 1969 the former TYL membership lists were dis-

carded, and new membership applications, to be verified by

both local and central TYL officials, were to be accepted.

In announcing the new policy, Moshi TYL officials explained

that it was necessary to eliminate the existing confusion

over current membership lists and to insure that all Youth

League members were firm supporters of the Arusha Declara-

tion, especially its requirement that an individual's income

be produced by his own work.[10] It was suggested, though

never clearly stated, that youths whose fathers were

[8]The District Secretary (Area Commissioner) comment-
ed caustically, ". . . youths who are not in school have a
lot of words but no action," in the District Secretary's
Six-Monthly Report for July-December 1968.

[9]The change is announced in a letter by the TYL
President, L. N. Sijaona, dated 18 October 1968. The new
organizational pattern, concentrating on schools, is ex-
plained in Muhtasari wa mafundisho kwa Vijana wa TANU.

[10]The TYL booklet states that since independence
there had been no clear purpose or plan for the TYL and
that many members were simply card members--TYL membership
card-holders unwilling to engage in any TYL activities.
The inference was that the only way to develop an active
membership was to begin anew. See Muhtasari wa Mafundisho
kwa Vijana wa TANU, 1-2.

considered exploiters under the definitions of the Arusha

Declaration would not be accepted as TYL members. The TYL

secretary indicated that there had been approximately 2000

Youth League members before January 1969, and that by Sep-

tember 1969 some 3000 membership applications had been ap-

proved by TYL central headquarters with an additional 20,000

pending.

As a concomitant to the new policy, almost all pre-

viously existing TYL branches in Kilimanjaro were eliminat-

ed, and the process of forming branches was begun anew.

Where the jurisdiction of the former branches had largely

been congruent with that of party branches, the new branches

were opened almost exclusively in schools. In October of

1969, of 13 branches in Moshi town, only one was not a

school branch, and of the total of 148 branches registered

in rural and urban Kilimanjaro, all but 3-4 were in schools.

Youth League headquarters prescribed a wide range

of activities for TYL branches, ranging, depending on mem-

bers' ages, from parading to storytelling to learning how

to handle weapons, all grouped under the rubrics politics,

culture, and defense. In 1969, TYL activity in Kilimanjaro

schools was limited for the most part to parading and march-

ing, though some TYL branches in secondary schools and col-

leges had a much wider range of activity. There were exten-

sive celebrations of Youth Week, which included a gathering

of youths from throughout the region in Moshi and

competitions in everything from athletics--to farming skills
to traditional singing and dancing. A national TYL campaign
against decadent influences of foreign cultures--soul music,
short skirts and shorts, makeup, skin and hair bleaches, and
wigs--was not well received in Kilimanjaro and had a short-
lived impact. As a part of Tanzania's redefinition of its
national goals agricultural training and political education
were introduced as required subjects in all schools.[11] Al-
though in some schools TYL branches take the lead in these
activities, they are required for all students and are
taught by regular teachers according to syllabi provided by
the Ministry of Education, and thus cannot be considered
primarily Youth League activities.

Thus, the lack of a clear purpose and the difficulty
of finding effective leaders, coupled with local factors
that impede the development of a self-conscious youth group,
have produced in Kilimanjaro a Youth League whose activities
are intermittent and inconsistent. Youth League headquar-
ters has recognized the problem of the lack of purpose and
has begun a major reorganization of the TYL to attempt to
deal with it. But the beginnings of the restructured TYL

[11]The defects of the educational system adapted by
Tanzania from its colonial heritage in the early 1960s and
its tendency to develop an elite ill-prepared for implement-
ing national policy goals are discussed in a TANU policy
booklet published in 1967, Education for Self-Reliance, re-
printed in Resnick, Tanzania: Revolution by Education, 49-
70.

have been uneven, at best, in Kilimanjaro, and the concentration on schools has done little to cope with the problems of leadership and of finding a suitable vehicle for the vast number of school-leavers. Perhaps it is this last that is most striking--with very restricted access to post-primary education, why orient the youth organization toward those already favored, those few in school? No satisfactory discussion of this decision has yet emerged, but it may be that the concentration on the schools is related to first, the belief that since the conflict between the government and the university students in 1966 it is the students who pose a more serious threat to national policy and leadership than the school-leavers, and second, because the leadership will be drawn largely from the more educated it is more important to concentrate on their political education. But if TYL is to concentrate on the schools, which of the party sections and affiliates is to work with the school-leavers, a not-insignificant group in Tanzanian society?

Women have long been prominent in Kilimanjaro politics. Almost as soon as TANU was established in the Northern Province, party minutes listed a Provincial Lady Chairman along with the Provincial Chairman. Several of the most active early TANU supporters in Moshi town were women; several of them later became councillors. The daughter of one of the most active women became the MP for Kilimanjaro Central

and a Junior Minister in the Tanzanian government.

A branch of the Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika [Union of Tanganyika Women] (UWT) was formed in Kilimanjaro in 1963, and when separate rural and urban districts (for UWT purposes) were created in August 1968, there were more than 6,000 members in rural Kilimanjaro and about 600 members in Moshi town, according to UWT records. But membership is a deceptive index of strength and activity, however, since few women, including many of the leaders, regularly pay their dues, which must be paid in addition to the basic TANU dues. As well, membership numbers are deceptive, since they include all membership cards ever sold, and do not take into account women who have died, who have moved, or who have purchased new cards because they lost the old one or because they are unwilling to pay all the dues that would be required to validate the old one. During 1968-69, regular UWT participants were probably far fewer than, and certain UWT activities probably reached far more than, the recorded membership.

UWT activity in Moshi town has been concerned largely with business enterprises. Forming themselves into what they call cooperatives, groups of women have opened shops and bars. As was noted in the discussion of liquor licensing, even though these groups functioned as private shareholding companies rather than cooperatives, they received preferred treatment when applying for licenses and assistance

from governmental agencies. Lack of business acumen and
quarrels among the group members have led to a continuing
series of complaints about poor leadership, unpaid dividends,
and unprofitable operation. Often those profits that are
realized are divided at the end of the year, rather than re-
turned to the business, so that it is begun anew each year.
One major tea room operated by a women's group, for which it
offered the Town Council less than half of the monthly rent
offered by two private bidders, and which is guaranteed a
substantial trade as the only tea room serving the town bus
depot, has been troubled by internal conflict since it
opened, and has continued to pay its employees less than
the minimum wage, claiming it could not pay them at all if
it were forced to pay them more.

     Along with its business activities, the UWT runs a
small sewing class at the TANU building in town and cooper-
ates with development assistants in running occasional sew-
ing and cooking classes. The UWT in town also has a facil-
itating role--it calls together women's groups and assists
government officials in running seminars on nutrition and
child care. The UWT urban Chairman, a bright and energetic
young school teacher, spent most of 1969 at a political ed-
ucation course in Dar es Salaam and indicated that she ex-
pected to take a much more active leadership role when
she returned. In general, then, the UWT in town has been

neither very active nor very strong, though some of its ward

organizations were individually successful in running class-

es for women and operating businesses.

The rural Kilimanjaro District UWT organization had

more diverse and extensive activities, though much of its

energies in 1969 were concentrated on encouraging and aiding

women's groups in opening businesses. One reason for its

more extensive activity was that the rural Chairman was em-

ployed as a rural development assistant and was thus able to

combine her work throughout the district on development proj-

ects with her UWT leadership. That is, in promoting the

opening of a day-care center, for example, she was both a

rural development assistant and the UWT Chairman. A second

reason for greater activity in the rural district was that

the local churches have traditionally organized women's as-

sociations for the women of the parish, and those organiza-

tions have become the local UWT branches. This pattern is

very common in Kilimanjaro--the youth group of the parish

becomes the local TYL branch (at least before TYL branches

were limited to schools), the women's group becomes the UWT

branch, and the parents' association becomes the TAPA

branch. The group members are the same, changing only their

label, and not always that, when they move from fund-raising

for the church to organizing the celebrations for a party

holiday. When a local women's group meets in the parish

church to learn sewing skills, whether they are called the

UWT or church women's group depends on who is talking about
them.   This relates to a third reason for greater activity
in the rural district--women are encouraged in the Christian
churches to engage in activities outside the home, to devel-
op a private income, and to meet with other women to talk
about their problems, while the activities of the large num-
ber of Muslim women in the town are still circumscribed by
traditional attitudes toward the seclusion and protection of
women.

        Although the 1967 version of the TANU Constitution
places the UWT in the anomalous position of being at the
same time both an integral section of the party and a TANU
affiliate,[12] the UWT in Kilimanjaro has its primary respon-
sibility to the regional party leadership rather than the
UWT national headquarters.   The party Regional Executive
Secretary serves as regional secretary for the UWT (and the
TYL as well), and party files in Kilimanjaro are replete
with admonitions by central party headquarters to local
party officers to improve and strengthen the UWT, indicating
clearly the subordination of the UWT to local party leader-
ship.

        During the 1969 party elections, only one candidate
had submitted nomination papers for the post of UWT regional

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[12]See the _Katiba ya TANU_, Paragraphs 7 (8) and 10
(1)(g).   This means that in theory at least the women have
two votes in the District and Regional Executive Committees.

Chairman (the former chairman did not stand for reelection,
possibly because her husband, an unsuccessful MP candidate
in 1965 and a very successful local entrepreneur, could not
meet the Arusha Declaration leadership requirements), and
she was declared elected without opposition at the Regional
UWT Annual Conference. The TANU Regional Working Committee,
however, felt that the newly elected Chairman, a very early
party activist in Kilimanjaro who had developed many enemies
throughout the region, did not have the full support of the
membership. The election was annulled and a new Conference
scheduled; the official explanation was that the original
election had not been properly publicized throughout the re-
gion. According to the party leadership, that decision of
the party Regional Working Committee could not be appealed
to UWT national headquarters, and in the event it was not.
At the second Conference, the woman who had previously been
elected unopposed withdrew her candidacy, saying she would
run for the vice-chairmanship and then seek a national UWT
office, and was subsequently defeated in her bid for the
vice-chairmanship and unsuccessful in seeking national of-
fice. The rural district Chairman, who had previously
served as a national UWT vice-president, was elected re-
gional UWT Chairman. Although some local leaders argued
that as regional and district UWT Chairman and a rural de-
velopment assistant she held too many offices, there was
little pressure on her to give up her district post; some

leaders suggested she was laying the groundwork for a second

bid for a parliamentary seat (she had been defeated in her

bid in 1965), and in fact she ran and won in 1970.

Another example of this relationship--that the local

UWT organization is directly responsible to the local party

leadership--developed when one of the urban UWT branches

asked the Town Council to construct a tearoom at one of the

town markets and then rent it to the UWT branch. The TANU

Branch Chairman and the Regional Executive Secretary, both

very disturbed that they had not been informed, explained to

the councillors that it was party policy that such requests

should go from the UWT branch to the party leadership and

only then to the Council. Thus, the chain of command links

the UWT to the local party organization first, and only sec-

ond to the national UWT headquarters.

The UWT in Kilimanjaro does serve as an advocate of

women's causes. When one urban UWT branch applied to the

Town Council for permission to open a bar in the town com-

munity center, its application was rejected on the grounds

that selling alcohol was an inappropriate activity for the

town community center and that the proposed bar would con-

flict with other activities, especially classes in sewing

and cooking, that took place in the community center. A

UWT leader appealed directly to a Minister, who was a per-

sonal friend. Shortly thereafter an officer from the Minis-

try attended a meeting of the Council executive (finance)

committee--a meeting that was technically illegal because of
the short notice on which it was called--and the original de-
cision was reversed, because, it was announced, the council-
lors had been unaware that the women's group had already been
granted a liquor license and it would be unfair to deny them
the bar when they already had their liquor license. In an-
other case, when small-scale merchants in the town market
were required to take out full merchant's licenses, the ur-
ban UWT leadership (the UWT urban Chairman was in town, on
leave from her course in Dar es Salaam) vigorously pressed
the case of the women (a few men were also included) at all
levels--with the Town Clerk, the Area Commissioner, the Re-
gional Commissioner, and various party leaders. After an
acrid meeting in which the Town Clerk was called to the TANU
office to defend the Council decision before the assembled
women, and after two Council sub-committees looked into the
equity of the decision, the women were finally compelled to
comply.

UWT activity in Kilimanjaro, then, has been spas-
modic. In the urban area it reaches a few women with its
classes and other educational activities, it reaches more
women in its business activities, and when it advocates a
particular cause or facilitates a particular program it may
reach many women indeed. And although many of these activi-
ties may have little directly to do with the implementation
of national policies and Tanzanian socialism, they do have

the effect of drawing the women out of the seclusion of
their homes, encouraging them to work together for their mu-
tual benefit, and demonstrating to them that through con-
certed action they can have impact on governmental outputs--
that the government and party are theirs and subject to
their control.

The functioning of the TANU Elders, the third party
section, has already been discussed. The Elders are infor-
mally organized, where they are organized at all, in the ur-
ban branches, and the pattern seems to be similar for the
rural branches. (In rural areas the role of local elders,
who may or may not have been organized as TANU Elders, in
dispute settlement and conflict resolution may create some
friction between them and local cell leaders, but the data
gathered for this study, which concentrated on the urban
area, do not permit more than speculation about rural pat-
terns.) The urban district Elders Chairman, who, as has
been noted, also served as the regional Muslim sheikh and a
town headman, presided over a semi-formal court that heard
cases and attempted to mediate, arbitrate, and reconcile.
It seems likely that the formal creation of local arbitra-
tion tribunals, begun in 1969, will strengthen and enhance
the authority and prestige of the Moshi Elders. As of 1969
there had not developed an Elders organization at the re-
gional level in Kilimanjaro, and the urban district Elders

Chairman sat as the Elder's representative at regional level meetings. As a matter of fact, when a new Elders Constitution was introduced in 1969 calling for the establishment of a separate Elders membership fee and dues, few Moshi Elders were willing to pay the additional fee to get the new cards. Why pay another fee, most argued, when they could participate as effectively and get the same services without paying the additional fee.

A number of Moshi Elders have formed a farmers' cooperative and cultivate a communal plot in town. Their organization has been plagued with continuing administrative problems, and the sale of their harvest has often been barely adequate to cover their costs. Although formally a separate organization, the Elders farmers' cooperative was led by the principal members of the urban party Elders Section, met in the TANU office, and utilized the services of a TANU branch secretary to take minutes and keep records.

These activities only hint at the special role played by the TANU Elders. As in many societies where tradition accords elders a special respect and deference, elders in Tanzania, both those formally organized in the TANU Elders Sections and those not part of the party structure, are often called upon for their interpretation of traditions and precedents, for their advice on important matters, and for their assistance in settling disputes. This role is institutionalized in the Tanzanian judicial system, where lay

assessors, most often elders, assist primary court magis-
trates, and in special cases higher magistrates and judges,
in hearing cases, evaluating evidence, and deciding on judg-
ment.

Although the TANU leadership has always been charac-
terized by youthfulness, the TANU Elders have since TANU's
inception had a special role in party activities. While of
course some Elders do participate in the day-to-day decision-
making, the Elders as a group, considered somewhat removed
from the hard debate over policy alternatives and program
strategies, are utilized to give legitimacy to, and enhance
the weight and importance of, policy decisions by sharing
the status accorded them as elders. President Nyerere, for
example, summoned the Elders to hear his explanation of the
decision to allow Tanganyika citizenship to non-Africans;
subsequently they were convened to hear the explanation of
his resignation from the government in 1962.[13] In 1966
President Nyerere summoned the Elders to hear his explana-
tion of the conflict between the government and the students
at University College and his defense of the decision to
send home most of the students.

In a similar way, not only do the Elders in Moshi
function as a semi-formal arbitration tribunal, but also by
virtue of their status as elders they are in a position to

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[13]Bennett, "An Outline History of TANU," 29. Ben-
nett cites Spearhead, November 1961, p. 2.

assess the behavior of party officials. On several occa-
sions they have summoned a party official to inform him that
his behavior, especially drunkenness, was unacceptable and
undermined respect for the party. When one Regional Commis-
sioner was abusive of TANU Youth League members, and even of
party officials, the Elders called him in to criticize his
behavior.

      , Thus, although it is not well organized in Moshi,
the Elders Section does have a special role in the local
party. The Elders' semi-formal arbitration tribunal is a
widely used and highly respected institution for dispute
settlement and conflict resolution, and their status as el-
ders permits them to assess critically the behavior of even
senior party officials. In doing both of these they not
only assist ordinary citizens with their everyday problems,
but they also provide them with a direct channel of access
to the local party and a trustworthy friend in court. It
should be stressed here that much of the success of the
Moshi TANU Elders in these endeavors is due more to the en-
ergy and activities of the Elders Chairman (also the sheikh,
also the town headman) than to any organizational pattern or
constitutional charge.

      There is a continuing tension, then, between the
attempts to establish the TANU sections as at least partial-
ly autonomous organizations and the need to maintain tight

party control over their activities. Organized now largely

in schools, the Youth League has the most autonomous exist-

ence, at least to the degree that most of its members are

not yet old enough to be admitted to full party membership.

Most of the women and elders in Kilimanjaro, however, see

little reason to pay an additional fee to belong to an or-

ganization that they little differentiate from the party it-

self. That is, for women who see TANU and the UWT as one

and the same thing, there is no point in paying to belong to

both.[14]

In more general terms, the question is if TANU en-

compasses everything, why have strong party sections, and it

relates to the difficulty of defining the nature of an inde-

pendent single-party system. When the struggle was against

the colonial government, the enemy was clear and easily iden-

tifiable, and the party sections could each deal with some

of the organizational and tactical problems to strengthen

the national independence movement. Now, when the enemy has

been defined as ignorance, poverty, and disease, and when it

is TANU policies that determine the allocation of scarce re-

sources, the enemy is much harder to see clearly, and a ten-

sion develops between a need to use the UWT, for example,

to lead the women, and a need to insure that in defending

[14]In fact, the TANU Constitution, in defining the
party sections, stipulates that all TANU women and elders
belong to the appropriate sections: Article V, A.

the women the UWT does not lead the battle against the TANU
government. How to develop an organization strong enough to
have an impact on the women's behavior and sufficiently iden-
tified with women to be accepted as a legitimate leader and
yet at the same time not permit it to set women's interests
first and foremost? This paradox will be taken up again in
relation to the organizations affiliated to the party.

THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION: PARTY AFFILIATES

     The establishment of close government and party con-
trol over the trade union movement through the creation of
the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) in 1964,
shortly following the army mutiny in which some trade union
leaders were implicated, capped a decade of alternating co-
operation and hostility between the party and the trade

unions.[15]   Although some 7.5% of Tanzania's mainland employ-

ees work in Kilimanjaro Region, which ranks fifth among the

regions in total number of employees,[16] NUTA is little ac-

tive in Kilimanjaro and in general is neither liked nor

trusted by Kilimanjaro residents.

In part this is due to the fact that NUTA officials

often find themselves in the position of representing, and

defending, the employers (often the government) to the em-

ployees.   NUTA is charged not only with representing work-

ers, but also with leading the government's struggle to pre-

vent the development of a small group of privileged salaried

[15]For the development of conflict between the trade
unions and the party in Tanzania, see William H. Friedland,
"Co-operation, Conflict, and Conscription: TANU-TFL Rela-
tions, 1955-1964," Chapter III in Jeffrey Butler and A. A.
Castagno, editors, Boston University Papers on Africa.
Transition in African Politics (New York: Praeger, 1967),
and Tordoff, Government and Politics in Tanzania, Chapter V.
For the history of trade unions in Tanzania, see William H.
Friedland, Vuta Kamba: The Development of Trade Unions in
Tanganyika (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969). Dis-
cussions of the important question of consumptionist vs.
productionist activities of African trade unions can be
found in Elliot J. Berg and Jeffrey Butler, "Trade Unions,"
in Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties and National In-
tegration in Tropical Africa, and Ioan Davies, African
Trade Unions (Baltimore: Penguin, 1966). For the investiga-
tion of NUTA and the government reactions to the investigat-
ing commission's report, see Tanzania, Report of the Presi-
dential Commission on the National Union of Tanganyika Work-
ers (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), and Tanzania,
Proposals of the Tanzania Government on the Recommendations
of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into the National
Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) (Dar es Salaam: Govern-
ment Printer, 1967).

[16]Survey of Employment and Earnings, 1968, Appendix
X. Kilimanjaro's total wage bill ranks fourth highest among
the mainland regions (Appendix XI).

workers whose high salaries and benefits consume a dispropor-
tionate share of national resources in an agricultural econ-
omy. When an official from NUTA central headquarters met
with Moshi Town Council employees in 1969, his opening cry
of Freedom!--a common salutation in meetings of a political
nature in Tanzania which usually brings the response of Free-
dom and Work! or Freedom and Peace! from the audience--was
greeted by the assembled workers with a shout of Freedom and
Hunger! After explaining to the workers that long-promised
improvements in wages and conditions would be delayed still
further by the financial difficulties of the local councils,
the NUTA official, together with local NUTA and Town Council
officers present, was beseiged by the workers with harsh and
strident accusations of failing to represent their interests.
The responses of the NUTA officials, which drew repeated and
loud expressions of disagreement and discontent from the
workers, were in terms of explaining why wages could not be
raised, benefits could not be increased, and individual re-
quests could not be granted. Never did the NUTA leaders as-
sume the posture of representing the employees to their em-
ployer (the Town Council), and in many cases they simply
supported the responses of the Town Council officials pres-
ent.

Perhaps more important in explaining the discontent
with NUTA in Kilimanjaro was the widespread belief that NUTA
officials supported and even participated in, various

corrupt and illegal employment practices. As was mentioned
in Chapter 5, jobs could be had in some local factories only
through payment of a bribe to the personnel officer, and it
was not uncommon to find employees working on terms and con-
ditions proscribed by law. Nor was it uncommon to hear of
employees fired for protest against these illegal terms of
employment.

The primary result of this distrust of and dislike
for NUTA was that employees often brought their problems di-
rectly to the TANU office instead of taking them to their
NUTA representatives. Not only did individuals seek party
assistance, but even the TANU branch formed in a local fac-
tory wrote to the Regional Secretary (the Regional Commis-
sioner) complaining, among other things, that "the Workers'
Committee . . . does not fulfill its responsibility, espec-
ially its Chairman. . . ."[17] TANU officials in Kilimanjaro
who have often criticized NUTA for lack of attention to work-
ers' problems, usually dealt directly with the problems
brought to them rather than referring them to NUTA.

In Kilimanjaro, then, this combination of the need

[17]Letter from the Chairman, TANU Branch, Kibo Match
Corporation, Ltd., to Regional Secretary, Kilimanjaro Re-
gion, dated 21 February 1969. The letter was especially in-
teresting in that its major complaint was that production,
and employment, were being reduced by adverse market condi-
tions manipulated by capitalist entrepreneurs from another
country, thus linking suffering by the employees with de-
creased production. The author of the letter reported that
as far as he knew no action had been taken by October 1969.

to prevent the concentration of scarce resources in the
hands of the few salaried workers, the lack of trade union
autonomy, and the apathetic, if not corrupt, behavior of lo-
cal NUTA officials mean that neither does NUTA really repre-
sent the workers in protecting their wages, hours, and work-
ing conditions, nor has it shown itself to be effective in
utilizing its branch organizations to increase production.
As well, rather than serve as an additional source of sup-
port for TANU and its policies and as an additional channel
through which Tanzania's leaders can reach the employed sec-
tor of the population to involve it in development policies
and programs, NUTA, perceived as an unreliable ally or even
enemy by the workers, undermines support for TANU and re-
stricts its access to the workers. That is, because NUTA
concentrates on the minimal tasks it is required to perform
--formal representation of workers in contract negotiations,
some dispute settlement in cases that have come to public no-
tice, and some attempts to deal with dislocations caused by
the fall in sisal production--it comes to be seen as a
superfluous adjunct to the Labour Office. To the extent
that it is distrusted and disliked by workers, it restricts
party access to them and cannot provide a positive channel
through which the party can communicate policies that call
for self-restraint and sacrifices by the workers. It under-
mines support for the party to the extent that workers con-
clude that this organization affiliated to and clearly -

controlled by TANU is unresponsive to their demands and is

more concerned with protecting employers than employees.

The second major institution affiliated to TANU is

the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika (CUT). The CUT is a

union of cooperatives, and, unlike NUTA, the CUT does not

maintain regional and district offices,[18] so that where CUT

representation in TANU committees is called for, it is nor-

mally the KNCU (and occasionally the two other major cooper-

ative unions in the region) that is represented. The other

cooperatives active in Kilimanjaro, including 13 consumers

cooperatives, 23 savings and loan cooperatives, and 11 other

cooperatives--among them the economically very strong associ-

ation of estate coffee producers--are not formally included

within the local TANU organization.[19]   °

The political role of the KNCU is a long and rich

[18]While workers in Kilimanjaro belong directly to
NUTA, the ordinary coffee farmer is two steps removed from
the CUT--he belongs to his local cooperative primary soci-
ety, which belongs to the KNCU, which in turn belongs to
the CUT. For an analysis of the structure of the coopera-
tive movement in Tanzania, see Tanzania, Report of the Pres-
idential Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operative
Movement and Marketing Boards (Dar es Salaam: Government
Printer, 1966), and Tanzania, Proposals of the Tanzania Gov-
ernment on the Recommendation of the Special Presidential
Committee of Enquiry into the Co-operative Movement and Mar-
keting Boards (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966).

[19]Information on cooperatives in Kilimanjaro from
the annual report on cooperatives for Kilimanjaro Region,
1968: Taarifa ya Mwaka 1968 ya Vyama vya Ushirika Mkoa Kili-
manjaro.

one, and it was discussed in Chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter. With a membership of some 70,000 in 1969,[20] the KNCU occupies a central position in the daily lives of the vast majority of Kilimanjaro residents, so that the leadership changes discussed earlier are clearly a reflection of the fundamental political alignments in the region. The KNCU merits a study all its own; it is important here, however, to make two general observations about its impact on the local party organization.

First, after the rejection of the former leadership in the 1969 KNCU elections, the KNCU was directed by what can only be an interim administration. The Manager, seconded from a Dar es Salaam post, saw his task as one of remedying basic defects and establishing a strong administrative structure and appeared anxious to return to his former post. Because the new Manager was associated with the replacement of the former Manager, a widely liked and respected individual, and because he was suspected of being in league with the ousted president, a relative, many of the local farmers and primary society leaders as well were anxious to see him return to his post. The new President has taken an important position in Dar es Salaam and reported

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[20]The Manager of the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union in 1969 listed 69,000; the KNCU President estimated the 1969 membership at 87,000, while the Regional Cooperatives Officer, Kilimanjaro Region, estimated that the KNCU and 76,000 members in 1969.

late in 1969 that he did not think he could continue as KNCU

President while living in the capital, and in 1970 he was de-

feated in his bid for reelection to Parliament. Other KNCU

leaders said that it would not be possible to have the or-

ganization's president live in Dar es Salaam. Thus, the cur-

rent KNCU administration came into office as a lever through

which to pry the former office-holders out of office. But

since its major support developed from votes cast against the

former leaders, each of the major elements of the alliance

that elected it can be expected to attempt to install its

own preferred office-holders, and it is not impossible that

those evicted in 1969 will attempt to return to office.

Second, as the Tanzanian government has moved to ex-

pand its control over the economy it has increasingly relied

on the KNCU as its basic agent in Kilimanjaro. As of 1969

the KNCU had assumed monopoly control over the wholesaling

of all crops except cotton, had been assigned a monopoly on

the sale of tin and cement, and had begun to assist in the

development of dairy farming in Kilimanjaro. At the same

time, TANU leaders have concluded that, unlike other areas

of Tanzania where communal farming schemes have been used to

introduce socialist principles, in Kilimanjaro the coopera-

tives must serve as the main vehicle for introducing and de-

veloping socialism. That is, because the shortage of land

and the tightly-held attitudes on individual land-holding

preclude any significant local development of communal

farming schemes, the cooperative societies are to be util-
ized for educating the public about the principles of Tan-
zanian socialism.[21] Even though the Presidential Special
Committee of Enquiry into the cooperative movement recommend-
ed against forming cooperatives solely for political purposes,
numerous cooperatives, ranging from artisans to bar owners,
have been begun in Kilimanjaro with little attention to their
economic utility and viability, several with markedly little
success.[22] The combination of these two trends suggests the
development of a strong, self-supporting and somewhat auton-
omous cooperative movement. But it can hardly be expected
that cooperative societies sufficiently strong and independ-
ent to provide services to their members and act as a vehi-
cle for voluntary acceptance of socialist norms will refrain
from occasionally opposing and attacking TANU and its lead-
ers in order to be responsive to their members' interests.

[21]"Socialism--like democracy--is an attitude of
mind," begins a TANU pamphlet, Ujamaa--The Basis of African
Socialism, first published in 1962. For a succinct state-
ment of Tanzanian socialism, see Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom
and Socialism/Uhuru na Ujamaa (Dar es Salaam: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1968), Introduction. For a fuller review,
see the series of TANU papers (including the one mentioned
above) collected in Ujamaa--Essays on Socialism.

[22]See the Report . . . Co-operative Movement and
Marketing Boards, Paragraph 51 and Part Ten. The government
accepted the criticism that premature registration of unvi-
able cooperatives had led to problems in some areas, but re-
iterated its intent "to employ the economic arm of co-opera-
tion to achieve the political aim of socialism. . . ." See
the Proposals of the Tanzania Government . . . Co-operative
Movement and Marketing Boards, p. 17.

That is, although possible conflict between strong coopera-
tives and the local TANU organization may for a time be con-
tained within the TANU structure by the assurance of CUT
representation on decision-making bodies, it is difficult not
to imagine a repetition of the trade union scenario--conflict
with the party, followed by the institution of firmer party
control over the cooperative movement. An example of this
pattern, in regard to communal village settlement schemes in
southern Tanzania, took place in 1969, when, apparently over
President Nyerere's objections, the TANU National Executive
Committee decided to impose direct TANU control over the ad-
ministration of the villages, replacing the semi-autonomous
association created to manage them.

There is nothing in the ideology of the Tanzanian
single party system that precludes the development of strong,
somewhat autonomous trade union, cooperative, women's, and
other groups--in fact, it may be the interplay among such
groups that nurtures the ability of the single party struc-
ture to recognize undesirable policies and correct and/or
eliminate unviable programs. The conduct of contested elec-
tions clearly indicates that competition and conflict, at
least within the broad bounds defined by the party leader-
ship, are not inimical to the strong, centralized governmen-
tal structure that Tanzania's leaders have developed in
their attempts to foster and direct development. But the
current leadership, or at least a strong, persuasive segment

of it, seems unwilling to tolerate the development of power-
ful institutions that might serve, at least in some locali-
ties, as a counterweight to the party, especially where such
institutions threaten the local power bases of national lead-
ers.

The third organization affiliated to TANU, the Tan-
ganyika African Parents Association (TAPA), has never devel-
oped as a separate entity with a clear purpose and effective
leadership. Just after independence TAPA's purpose was de-
fined as the organization and management of schools, in or-
der to assist in the rapid expansion of the very limited ed-
ucational establishment left by the departing colonial admin-
istration. But in Kilimanjaro, where parents did not need
to be convinced of the value of educating their children, and
where the local parents, aided and encouraged by the missions,
were already building schools as fast as they could, TAPA had
little to do. The one TAPA school in Moshi town so misused
a building lent to it by the Town Council that councillors
refused to continue to make it available to TAPA. The TAPA
record in Kilimanjaro also includes recurring allegations of
misuse of funds by TAPA officials.

By 1967-68 it was decided that the establishment of
new schools should be carefully coordinated under Ministry
supervision. At the same time it was clear that many, if
not most, TAPA schools were poorly run with untrained staff

in sub-standard buildings. The TAPA schools then in exist-
ence were placed under the jurisdiction of the local coun-
cils, and TAPA was expected to function in some sort of over-
seer role for all schools. In Kilimanjaro new TAPA officers
were elected, but because TAPA's purpose had not been clearly
defined, they were unsure of their duties, and as a result
did little.

Currently TAPA is to be represented on all school
committees (committees of parents and teachers) in order to
explain national education policy. At the same time, par-
ents are to bring their problems to TAPA, rather than to Min-
istry officials or the local council, and TAPA will act on
behalf of the parents to seek remedy for their complaints.
Although this new plan has yet to be really implemented in
Kilimanjaro, and it is thus too soon to assess TAPA's effec-
tiveness under its new charge, it seems clear that Kilima-
njaro parents are so accustomed to taking problems directly
to Ministry and council officials and/or their local churcn-
es (which run the schools) and have such little faith in the
independence and power of the school committees that unless
TAPA can produce clear and prompt action, it will continue
to be little used.

Prior to the most recent changes in TAPA's role only
parents who needed TAPA schools for their children became
members; some 1300 members were enrolled in all of Kilimanj-
ro District. TAPA activity in 1969 focused almost

exclusively on attempting to explain its purpose, to in-
crease its membership, and to raise money. But with little
to offer Kilimanjaro parents, TAPA leaders met with little
success.

THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION: A PARADOX

          Several observations emerge from this analysis of
the TANU sections and affiliated organizations. First, de-
spite its seeming comprehensiveness and inclusiveness, the
local party organization does not encompass the entire range
of an individual's activities. Not only are the day-to-day
family interactions and the holding and use of land (and
even the operation of such important institutions as the
schools) little affected by TANU, but also several of the
institutions important to Kilimanjaro residents retain iden-
tities, and operating patterns, distinct from, and occasion-
ally in conflict with, TANU. The local churches, which are
perhaps the institutions with the most significant impact on
the daily lives of many residents of rural Kilimanjaro, are
of course not incorporated within the local party. Women's
groups, youth groups, parents associations, and the like,
which are in many areas organized by the local clergymen and
meet in the churches, function at times as the UWT, TYL, and
TAPA branches for the neighborhood, but at other times they
retain a distinct, local, non-party identity. The KNCU,
whose control over coffee marketing, and thus to a

significant extent over production, affects the daily lives
of almost all residents of Kilimanjaro--for even the urban
businessmen depend on the coffee crop for their livelihood--
fits imperfectly at best into the local party organization.
In fact, to develop the additional services now required of
it and to promote a socialist orientation through its opera-
tions it may seek greater, rather than less, autonomy from
party direction and control. And even where TANU sections
and affiliates do seem to encompass broad segments of an in-
dividual's life pattern, the lack of organizational defini-
tion and poor leadership may mean that these institutions
have little regular, sustained impact on much of the popula-
tion.

Second, although the ostensible purpose of incorpor-
ating all of these organizations within the party structure
is to promote coordination and prevent conflict among them,
lack of coordination and the existence of conflict are still
evident. Rarely does a KNCU meeting take place when com-
plaints are not heard that farmers on their way to sell
their coffee are harrassed by party secretaries to pay their

dues.[23] The TANU office absorbs many of the trade union

functions of NUTA. Although the TANU leadership, where the

UWT is represented, commits itself to reducing the consump-

tion of alcohol, the women's organization stresses opening

bars as part of its program to assist women.

Third, the manpower weakness apparent in government

and party at the national level in Tanzania is clear in the

local party organization as well. Organizations are inac-

tive for lack of effective leadership. Programs begun are

left unfinished. Often the effective leaders posted from

the center are needed elsewhere in the country and are trans-

ferred on short notice. And on occasion even when central

leaders recognize the inadequacy of a particular local lead-

er, they are at a loss to find someone capable of replacing

him.

Fourth, despite the seeming breadth of coverage of

the party sections and affiliates, some segments of the lo-

cal populace are represented only poorly, at best, in local

decision-making. That is, although a major theme of this

essay has been that the diffuse nature and overlapping

[23]This practice continues despite government accept-
ance of the committee of enquiry's finding that cooperative
societies may refuse to permit such collections on their
premises. See the Report . . . into Co-operative Movement
and Marketing Boards, Paragraph 300, p. 77, and the Propos-
als . . . the Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards,
19. Where the primary society does not refuse permission,
or where the party secretary stations himself near but not
on the society's premises, such collections are of course
perfectly legal.

positions of the local party organization provide Moshi res-
idents with alternative advocates, it is clear that some
groups--the workers, for example--are often effectively ex-
cluded. To the extent that the urban party office is unable
to respond adequately to the demands placed on it by the ur-
ban unemployed and school-leavers, they too are effectively
excluded.

Finally, these comments return us to the paradox
that the implication of the incompatibility of program goals
and manpower weaknesses is that programs and policies can be
implemented only through strong functionally specific insti-
tutions, and yet the party is unwilling to yield those insti-
tutions the independence that seems to be the necessary con-
comitant of strength. That is, if TANU cannot itself meet
all of an individual's needs--protecting his status as a
worker, for example--then it must rely on some other insti-
tution to do that job; but it cannot expect that institu-
tion--NUTA in this case--to do its job effectively if in or-
der to minimize possible conflict between TANU and NUTA,
NUTA is effectively emasculated. To suggest that TANU's
fears of competition from its auxiliaries are groundless,
or, conversely, to suggest that TANU disregard its manpower
problems and disregard its policy goals in order to attempt
to be all things to all Tanzanians, would be gratuitous.
Tanzania's political system has exhibited an elasticity, and
its leadership a willingness to experiment, that have thus

far enabled contradictions of this sort to be dealt with
without severely impeding orderly development. To highlight
this particular paradox here is simply to stress the dilem-
ma of attempting to utilize fragile institutions and inade-
quately prepared leaders to manage the reconciliation of
conflicting goals and to build practical utopias.

THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION: STRUCTURE

There is a tripartite structure to TANU's leadership
at the regional and district levels, and a similar pattern
is currently being extended to branch level. The Chairman
is elected by the delegates to the party Annual Conference
at each level.[24] The Commissioner is the party Secretary at
each level: the Regional Commissioner serves as the regional
party Secretary, and the Area Commissioner serves as the dis-
trict party Secretary. The Executive Secretary at each lev-
el is a party employee. The Regional and District Executive
Secretaries are posted from Dar es Salaam and are subject to
transfer throughout the country, while most branch (execu-
tive) secretaries are employed from within the district. It
should be noted in passing that it is not uncommon for

[24]Although termed Annual Conference, the meetings
are normally convened every second year. In the urban dis-
trict all cell leaders are entitled to attend the Confer-
ence, while the more numerous branches of the rural dis-
trict each send delegates. More than 800 delegates were
entitled to attend the Kilimanjaro Regional Annual Confer-
ence in 1969.

individuals to cross these lines, frequently moving from party to government service. Early Provincial Chairmen and Secretaries became Regional and Area Commissioners, while several Regional Executive Secretaries have been appointed Area Commissioners.[25]

This tripartite leadership provides structural links between the party and the government. The District Chairman is automatically the chairman of the district or urban council, thus holding both local government and party posts. At the same time, as council chairman, he must look to the Area Commissioner, his party secretary, for assistance in implementing council decisions. Likewise, the Area Commissioner, who must utilize party assistance to implement central government directives, must also depend on the party machinery under the supervision of the District Executive Secretary.

The point here is simply that the tripartite party leadership, together with the structural overlaps and the political networks that characterize the local political system discussed in Chapter 10, though they may create a tangled maze on a bureaucratic chart, serve to link

[25]According to Bienen, by 1964 of 10 individuals who had been Provincial Secretaries in 1961, 6 had become Regional Commissioners and 3 had become Area Commissioners, while of 19 Provincial Chairmen in 1961, 7 had become either Regional or Area Commissioners; see Tanzania: Party Transformation, Table 6, p. 134. During the course of 1969 the Regional Executive Secretary in Kilimanjaro was appointed an Area Commissioner (after having served briefly as Regional Executive Secretary in two other regions) and the current Area Commissioner had been a Regional Executive Secretary.

significant institutions within the local community. This

was particularly clear in Kilimanjaro in the rejection of

the former KNCU leadership--the different networks allied in

opposition to the old leadership, and in so doing reinforced

the KNCU's position in the mainstream of political competi-

tion in Kilimanjaro. During the course of 1969, conflict in

Kilimanjaro between the Regional Chairman and the Regional

Commissioner, in part over the latter's handling, as party

Regional Secretary, of an incident with an urban Asian busi-

nessman, served, as the conflict rippled through the town,

to link the Asian business community, often a reluctant par-

ty supporter, with the Regional Chairman and Regional Execu-

tive Secretary. It is also clear, however, that however

much this tripartite leadership structure may serve as a

counterweight to the centrifugal tendencies inherent in

Kilimanjaro politics, the continued strength of the churches

testifies to the incompleteness of the party's dominance of

the local political system.

A second dimension of the linkage effect of the tri-

partite local party leadership relates to the ties it pro-

vides between the center and up-country in Tanzania. TANU

at the center has continued to rely on local grievances and

on local party organizations to provide its main source of

strength and support, but at the same time the local party

organization is dependent on the center for its continued

operation. For example, although basic local party expenditures are paid from entrance and membership fees, sales of party posters, calendars, and pamphlets, and miscellaneous collections, the largest party expenditures in the local area--the salaries of party employees--are paid from centrally-supplied funds. At the center, the party depends not on its local party organizations but on the government for the bulk of its revenue. In 1968, for example, all of the regions in mainland Tanzania forwarded to central party headquarters a total of only Shs. 217,000.80, while the direct government subsidy to the party for that year amounted to Shs. 4,370,000.00. The support from Kilimanjaro Region to central headquarters for 1968 was Shs. 6,000.00.[26] In fact, although the government subsidy to the party increased, party income showed a substantial decline from the 1966/1967 to the 1967/1968 fiscal years. Income for the three party districts of Kilimanjaro Region (Kilimanjaro rural, Moshi urban, Pare) decreased by almost half in that period, while the government subsidy to the party as a whole increased by some 41%, from Shs. 3,000,000.00 in 1966/1967

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[26]Reliable statistics for party income and expenditures are difficult to obtain. The figures cited here were taken from T.A.N.U., Taarifa ya Ofisi Kuu . . . Novemba 1967 - Aprili 1969, 37-41.

to Shs. 4,240,000.00 in 1967/1968.[27] Thus the share of lo-

cal party operations financed from subsidies from the center

exceeded the share financed from local collections.

Although the central and the local party are linked

by this need for mutual support, there is a continuing ten-

sion between the locally and centrally selected party offi-

cials. In his comprehensive study of TANU, viewed largely

from the center, Bienen argues that since the commissioners

are the interpreters of the center at the local level and

carry the weight of governmental authority and force, they

normally prevail over the local chairman.[28] The case is

much less clear, and regular, in Kilimanjaro than Bienen

suggests. While it is true that the political networks cen-

tered on the Regional Commissioner and the Regional Chairman

are frequently in conflict, basic conflicts are usually re-

solved in the Regional Executive Committee, where neither

can be sure of prevailing regularly. In 1969, for example,

the Regional Chairman often prevailed over a particularly

[27]Figures from the TANU Financial Statement for 1
July 1966 to 30 June 1967 and 1 July 1967 to 30 June 1968:
Tanganyika African National Union, Minzania ya Mapato na
Matumizi ya Ofisi Kuu na Mikoa, Mwaka wa 1966/1967 na 1967/
1968 (Dar es Salaam: TANU Headquarters, 1969).

[28]The tension between central and local and the in-
ability of the central party headquarters to control fully
the behavior of the local party organizations are main
themes of Bienen's work, Tanzania: Party Transformation;
for the statement of the relative positions of the commis-
sioners and chairmen, see p. 157. Bienen stresses that
commissioners prevail through a process of compromise and
consensus and do not rule through fiat, p. 456.

disliked individual who served as Regional Commissioner
briefly, but the Chairman was much less successful with both
that Commissioner's predecessor and his successor. In deal-
ing with these conflicts among the political networks the
TANU Regional Executive Secretary self-consciously attempted
to hold himself aloof and to establish himself as a mediator
and arbitrator among them.

What is suggested here is that formal organizational
patterns and hierarchical chains of authority are only one
determinant of fundamental decisions within the local party
organization. Other factors can, and do, permit the weaker
networks to overcome the resources available to the commis-
sioners.

Another important factor is tenure in office--a lo-
cal chairman who has held office for a long time and who has
developed allies within the party is in a strong position
vis a vis a recently posted commissioner who has not yet had
time to develop his own position, and allies, locally. Of
course, the reverse may also be the case, when it is the
commissioner who has had a long tenure in office and the
chairman is newly elected. A third factor that conditions
the development of a local power base is the individual per-
sonality of the principal leaders. The abrasiveness and
ready willingness to resort to the use of coercion of one
Regional Commissioner in Kilimanjaro, coupled with his
aloofness from the local populace and his occasional

inebriated appearances in public, severely crippled his ability to win local support and allies. On the other hand, the personal charm of his predecessor, his willingness to socialize with the local populace, and especially his leadership in developing local football teams and competitions, helped overcome some of the natural hostility to an outsider in Kilimanjaro.

A fourth factor is the ability of local leaders to project themselves as defenders of local interests. The forcefulness of the Area Commissioner in attempting to cut through the bureaucratic red tape that delayed central government assistance to areas of the district suffering from famine and malnutrition and his perseverance in traveling to the new Chagga settlements in western Tanzania to deal with troubles that developed there enhanced his already substantial access to government authority and power as commissioner, and in the process overshadowed the District Chairman.

Access to a Dar es Salaam power base is also an important factor in the local political competition in Kilimanjaro. The Regional Commissioner, who combines his direct access to the Ministry of Local Government and, on occasion, the President, with seats both in Parliament and in the National Executive Committee, is normally in a stronger position than local leaders who sit in only one of those--the MPs, the Regional Chairman, and the Member of the National Executive Committee. As well, evaluations of the

prospective candidates by the Regional (and Area) Commissioner are important inputs when the party Central Committee screens candidates for local elections. But the other leaders themselves may have strong, or weak, ties in Dar es Salaam. The Kilimanjaro Regional Chairman, at best a lukewarm supporter of national policy, was accused of utilizing tribal and religious ties in his bid for reelection. Although he was able to thwart an investigation by party headquarters requested by the Regional Executive Secretary, it is clear that his voice has lost much of its persuasive force in Dar es Salaam. On the other hand, the District Chairman, whose brother was an MP, an early party activist, and the leader in the anti-paramountcy fight, visited Dar es Salaam regularly and maintained close ties there whose support he could draw on in local competitions.

Two recent changes both strengthen and weaken the chairman's position. Until 1969 the membership of the Working Committee at each level (effectively the set of party leaders who actually carry on party business) was largely selected by the chairman, so that the basic day-to-day decisions were made by a committee dominated by the chairman and his appointees. Since all members of the Working Committee are automatically members (though non-voting) of the Executive Committee at that level, the chairman was assured of several faithful allies in that committee. The changes introduced in 1969 require that some members of the Working

Committee be selected by the party Annual Conference at the appropriate level, thus reducing the chairman's ability to select his own allies. At the same time, amid complaints that leaders, both party and government, were in office in a particular locality too short a time to accomplish success-fully their tasks, the chairman's term of office was extend-ed from two to five years, thus insuring a long time when the chairman will be secure from defeat, and, as well, per-haps guaranteeing that the chairman's tenure will be longer than that of the commissioner.

Two points are important here. One is that Tan-zania's leaders will continue to react to criticisms that decisions do not adequately reflect local participation and preferences and that development strategies are being sub-verted by inefficient and uncooperative local officials and institutions by experimenting with new organizational pat-terns. Terms and conditions of office will be altered, over-laps will be increased and/or eliminated, and the composi-tion and authority of decision-making bodies will be varied. This suggests, second, that structural forms will continue to be only one of the determinants of power within the lo-cal political system and that the strength of the local roots of the local political networks will be an important determinant of political outputs.

It is important to note here another trend in

Tanzania that has a significant impact on the local party

organization. As has often been stressed, one of the par-

ty's most frustrating problems has been to find able, honest,

and dynamic leaders. In recent years at least four party

officials have been dismissed in Kilimanjaro for misuse of

party funds. At the same time, it has become clear that

some party activists who were welcomed as allies during the

struggle for independence have become liabilities as Tan-

zanian socialism has become more clearly defined. In the

Arusha Declaration the TANU National Executive Committee

noted that the time had passed when all Tanzanians were wel-

come members of the party, and its charge that only those

individuals who fully supported party policy be accepted as

members was repeated in the report to the 1969 TANU Annual

Conference:

> Since the Party was founded we have put great em-
> phasis on getting as many members as possible. This
> was the right policy during the independence struggle.
> But now the National Executive feels that the time has
> come when we should put more emphasis on the beliefs
> of our Party and its policies of socialism.
>   That part of the TANU Constitution which relates
> to the admission of a member should be adhered to, and
> if it is discovered that a man does not appear to ac-
> cept the faith, the objects, and the rules and regula-
> tions of the Party, then he should not be accepted as
> a member.[29]

From November 1968 to December 1969 the appointments of four

Regional Commissioners and fourteen Area Commissioners were

[29]Arusha Declaration, Part Four. The charge to the
1969 Annual Conference is in T.A.N.U., Taarifa ya Ofisi Kuu
. . . Novemba 1967 - Aprili 1969, 13.

revoked.[30]   A substantial number of would-be candidates for

regional and district party chairmanships were disallowed at

the national level.   Nine Members of Parliament were dis-

missed from the party, and thus from Parliament, in 1968.[31]

Clearly a weeding-out process has begun, directed from the

center.   Although it is too soon to gauge its significance

for, and the reactions of, local party organizations in Tan-

zania, its impact on them will be substantial.

THE LOCAL PARTY ORGANIZATION: SUMMARY

        This extended description of the composition and

structure of the local party organization in Kilimanjaro has

made it clear that a wide range of complementary and contra-

dictory trends and institutions are encompassed by the local

party organization.   The overlaps of structure and personnel

that link sections and affiliates within the party, that tie

party and government, and that provide bridges to other

        [30]As announced in the Tanzania Gazette.   Reasons for
these revocations are not given; at least one Area Commis-
sioner was an older man who retired, at his own request,
from active political life.

        [31]Except for two accused of attempting to subvert
TANU and the government (one was in exile, the other in pre-
ventive detention), specific reasons were not given for
these expulsions; several of those expelled had been con-
sistent critics of the government and party.   Since only
party members may serve in Parliament (Paragraph 27, In-
terim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965), those expelled from
the party automatically lost their seats in Parliament.
For a discussion of the expulsions, see Thoden van Velzen
and Sterkenburg, "The Party Supreme," 73-74.

institutions in the community are complex and often not
clearly defined. Because of the multiple channels through
which it must percolate communication from the center is in-
termittent and discontinuous. The manpower weaknesses that
plague the party and the government at the center are pres-
ent as well up-country and further weaken the links that tie
the local party organization to the center. TANU is a con-
geries of local party organizations throughout Tanzania, and
the center continues to be unable to impose clear, firm, di-
rect control on the behavior of its up-country units. The
continued dependence of TANU on its local party organiza-
tions coupled with its inability to impose firm control on
them and the practical impossibility of opposing basic party
policy at the local level combine to foster a continuing lo-
cal orientation to politics in Tanzania--a concern with lo-
cal grievances and with who among the local leaders can best
represent his area in the competition for the allocation of
national resources.

Like TANU at the center the local party organization
is a cluster of political networks and factions, at times in
alliance, at times in competition. In this way, the local
party organization is a framework within which many of the
basic conflicts over the allocation of resources at the lo-
cal level take place; the TANU officers posted from the cen-
ter, while they do attempt to insure that the competitions
take place within the limits prescribed by national policy,

devote much of their effort to acting as go-betweens among

the competing factions. In performing in this way, the lo-

cal party organization provides important communication and

mediation functions, both among the factions at the local

level and between Kilimanjaro and the center. At the same

time, it is clear that some of the conflict over substantial

local allocations takes place largely outside the local par-

ty organization.

CHAPTER 12

TANU IN MOSHI

TANU IN MOSHI: INTRODUCTION

The consideration of TANU in Kilimanjaro has thus far largely been concerned with the composition and structure of the local party and its auxiliaries. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the functioning of the party in this up-country Tanzanian setting, approaching it from several different perspectives.

The study of TANU in Kilimanjaro--how the local party functions, who it serves, how it is directed--furthers our understanding of politics in Tanzania, and at the same time may make a modest contribution to sharpening our tools for assessing politics in single-party African states. But this is not primarily an exercise in theory-building: the sorts of data presented and discussed here are directed toward a single up-country urban setting in one state. These data may, however, provide a foundation for low- and middle-level observations, a base for the construction of viable theories, and, more immediately, they can serve to refine, to clarify, to challenge some of the sweeping generalizations characteristic of the literature on African politics. This chapter, then, will summarize and regroup the findings discussed earlier and attempt to relate politics in

Kilimanjaro to some general patterns in Tanzania. Because of the rapidity of change in Tanzania, as in most of Africa, much of this discussion must remain suggestive.

To deal with the complex and multi-faceted nature of the local party organization in Kilimanjaro the approach of this chapter will be to examine TANU from several different vantage points. That is, this is not a scatter-gun attack, but because TANU is different things to different people in different circumstances, and because TANU's functioning is characterized by extensive spatial and temporal variations, this is an attempt to examine the party in Kilimanjaro from both a local and a national perspective, and from a concern with development and national integration, in order to encompass as fully as possible what TANU is all about in Moshi.

A major task of the Tanzanian leadership is the reconciliation of the goals of development--rational planning, expansion of income, increased productivity--with the goals of politics--independence, participation, control, harmony, in Tanzania. Much of the dilemma of policy choice derives from the frequent contradiction of these two. The major mechanism for this reconciliation is the single party, TANU, structured nationally as an assembly of more-or-less autonomous local party organizations. The local TANU organization in Kilimanjaro is one of the constituents of this national assembly, but it too is a coalition of sub-units and

represents a regularized factionalism. One important TANU role in Kilimanjaro is educative. A second is to provide support for TANU and the government and legitimacy for TANU and government policies. A third is to facilitate communication, both horizontally within Kilimanjaro, and vertically between Kilimanjaro and the center. A fourth is to mediate among the factions in Kilimanjaro. In providing support, legitimizing outputs, facilitating communication, and mediating, TANU also stimulates participation. In this way, the local TANU organization becomes a framework within which much of the major local conflict takes place, and while it is only one of the institutions that serves to aggregate interests, interest articulation is essentially monopolized within party channels.

While noting all of these TANU roles, it is important to note as well that the local TANU organization in Kilimanjaro does not have a monopoly on resource allocation locally, nor are its functions principally distributive or regulative. And, unlike what has apparently been the experiences of single parties in other African single party states, TANU has thus far not become in Moshi and Kilimanjaro a tool though which the elite is able to institutionalize its status and to deny access to new elites. In fact, to a large extent, the opposite seems to be taking place--TANU provides an openness and a lever through which the old elites can be evicted and new elites substituted. This

observation should not be phrased in class terms, however,
since the data deal with elites and not the behavior of
large segments of the population. That is, TANU is stimu-
lating a significant circulation of elites in Kilimanjaro,
but it is clear that some segments of the populace fare bet-
ter than others in that circulation and it is unclear wheth-
er or not some segments of the population are regularly ex-
cluded.

Finally, it should be stressed that one of the most
significant (and at the same time one of the most trouble-
some for analytic purposes) features of TANU is the commit-
ment of its leaders continually to refine, reorder, and re-
organize structures and personnel to achieve their goals.

TANU IN MOSHI: NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Viewed from the center, the local TANU organization
is expected to lead, to mobilize--to be an agent of change.[1]
That is, in the revolution in mass attitudes and behavior

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[1]See the Introduction to Nyerere, Freedom and So-
cialism, especially p. 30; see also Nyerere's "Independence
Message to TANU," reprinted in Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom
and Unity (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1967),
138-141. The Arusha Declaration asserts: "It is the re-
sponsibility of TANU to see that the country produces
enough food and enough cash crops for export." (The Arusha
Declaration, along with other papers on Tanzanian socialism,
is reprinted in Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, as well as
Nyerere, Ujamaa--Essays on Socialism; this quotation can be
found on p. 247 of the former.) In his study of TANU and
development in Tanzania, Bienen concluded that "TANU sees
itself as the propagator of social change"; see Tanzania:
Party Transformation, 334.

necessary to develop Tanzania, TANU is expected to be a
prime motivator. In Kilimanjaro, only a few party officers
can be described as largely oriented toward social change.
Further, the studies of several key issue-areas clearly in-
dicate that TANU does not have a monopoly on resource allo-
cation in Kilimanjaro and therefore cannot always (or even
frequently) control the direction of change in key issues.
A tacit coalition among the churches, much of the local pop-
ulace, and several important leaders renders TANU unable to
stem the rapid expansion of education in Kilimanjaro, an ex-
pansion of education that makes it difficult to divert re-
sources from Kilimanjaro to other areas of Tanzania, that
thus reinforces the inequalities in development between
Kilimanjaro and other areas, and that nurtures the problems
engendered by the annual output of a large number of school-
leavers who cannot be absorbed in salaried non-agricultural
employment. In this issue-area, TANU has in fact become a
spokesman for local interests at the center, rather than
the implementer of national policy at the local level.

Likewise, despite the publicly enunciated goal of
managing, and restraining, the sale and consumption of li-
quor, TANU has been unable to control the rapid expansion
of the liquor trade in Kilimanjaro. To a large extent,
TANU's behavior has been responsive both to local pressure
and to the involvement of several of its key leaders in the
liquor trade--to avoid becoming directly involved in this

issue as much as possible. While the publicly enunciated

goal of restraining liquor consumption may indeed mask pri-

vate goals oriented toward expansion rather than restriction,

the evidence is clear that the local party organization has

not been able to secure the implementation of a goal enunci-

ated publicly at both national and local levels.

Similarly, TANU, as TANU, has been largely unable to

bring about significant change in major social patterns in

Kilimanjaro by itself: it does not have the skills, man-

power, and resources required, nor does it control the

skills, manpower, and resources, themselves limited, of the

government.[2] It has not attempted to alter the pattern of

individual land-holding that many party leaders argue is a

major obstacle to the rationalization of agricultural pro-

duction and a major impediment to the development of the

communal rural socialism envisaged in party policy. Nor has

it attempted to prevent the accumulations of large land-

holdings, or the aggregation of massive business interests,

by the very individuals local party leaders recognize as be-

coming an entrenched and resourceful opposition to party and

government policy.

TANU has been able, however, to play an important

role in facilitating change introduced by other institu-

tions. By legitimizing specific governmental outputs, for

[2]Bienen, Tanzania: Party Transformation, stresses
this point; see especially Chapter XIV.

example, it has enabled an easier acceptance of the dis-
placement of Kilimanjaro residents to other areas of Tan-
zania.

There are two important problems involved in attempt-
ing to use up-country party structures to foster change.
One is that development, as defined by the national leader-
ship, may depend on the ability of the party and government
to do the very things that alienate it from the urbanized
and educated segments of its population without provoking
them to intransigent resistance and rebellion. That is, the
commitment to equality and to reverse the trend toward con-
centrating national resources of the country already most
favored means that party and government must demand sacri-
fices, must restrain demands for better living conditions,
higher salaries, and the like, and must focus on rural and
less developed areas, all of which serve to make the edu-
cated and urbanized segments of the population feel they
have been neglected and deprived.

Thus the role of an urban TANU organization is para-
doxical in that it must work to restrain the demands of the
urban populace and at the same time convince them that it is
working to promote their interests. It must attempt to per-
suade them that the apparent unresponsiveness of the govern-
ment to their demands is a temporary situation and that in
the long-run there is a congruence of local interests and

national goals. To exercise this restraining influence,

without frequent recourse to coercion, the party must be re-

sponsive to local demands in order to develop an identifica-

tion with and commitment to the party that will permit it to

facilitate the acceptance of policies to which there is lo-

cal opposition. In other words, in order to implement na-

tional policy at all, the local party must seem more respon-

sive to local demands than to national directives. To the

extent that servicing local individuals and groups (servic-

ing, because the resources available to the local party are

largely symbolic rather than utilitarian or coercive[3]) pro-

motes a willingness to accept policy outputs, TANU is able

to facilitate change. And to the extent that some groups,

like the town workers, have at best limited access to such

services, they are unresponsive to calls to support national

policy. That TANU has been able to convert the provision of

services into a willingness to accept governmental decisions

in Moshi is evident from TANU's ability to calm the market

women angered over demands that they pay high license fees

and ultimately to persuade them to acquiesce in the new

fees. Similarly, that the party did not insist that land in

the new settlements in western Tanzania to which Kilimanjaro

residents were being moved be farmed communally (with the

[3]That is, as has been noted, the party has few mate-
rial rewards to distribute, and, in general, is reluctant to
resort to coercion.

result that the pattern of individual land-holding common in Kilimanjaro was transplanted to the new areas) was an essential element in the party's ability to persuade a large number of people to make the move.

This particular paradox highlights the importance of the pedagogical, and socialization, roles of the local party. It must be an instrument to educate people about development and nation-building, and it must strive to persuade them that sacrifices in the short-run are justified in terms of long-run gains. In a setting where most adults have had little, if any, formal schooling it must be a vehicle for inculcating the values of Tanzanian socialism. At the same time, it must deal with immediate needs and teach people how to have better lives with the resources available.

The pedagogical and socialization roles of the local party also depend on its ability to secure acceptance among the local population; distrusted and disliked, it cannot be effective. But to win acceptance often means that the party must mute its teaching. Rather than moving directly and forcefully toward communal settlement schemes in Kilimanjaro, where land is short and the attachment to individual land-holdings is strong, the party attempts to explain and promote Tanzanian socialism by focusing on cooperatives; rather than stressing the sacrifices demanded of the more affluent sections of the population, the party is often responsive to local demands for more schools, more hospitals,

and more government services.

The second problem in attempting to use the local

party to foster change is the combination of the reliance on

the bureaucracy to manage socioeconomic change--since it is

the only institution with the necessary skills--with a con-

ception of bureaucratic management ill-suited to developmen-

tal tasks. The rapidity with which available managerial

skills have been concentrated in the bureaucracy has been

amply demonstrated throughout Africa.[4] In Tanzania as

well, after independence skilled manpower was funneled into

government service. As skills become concentrated in the

bureaucracy, civil servants are assigned the major role in

shaping and directing development.[5] But the bureaucracy,

characterized, at least in theory, by impersonal decisions

based on clear-cut norms and rules and a compartmentalized

hierarchy shielded from public and political pressures, is

an inefficient managerial tool in a state in which the

government assumes a major role in shaping and directing

[4]For a selection of views on the role of the bureau-
cracy in developmental administration, see Joseph
LaPalombara, editor, Bureaucracy and Political Development
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).

[5]Bienen stresses the reliance on planners, as
opposed to politicians, in the planning process in Tan-
zania; see Tanzania: Party Transformation, especially Chap-
ter VIII.

the economy.[6] Its commitment to impersonal decisions and

hierarchical chains makes the bureaucracy too slow-moving

and cumbersome to develop new programs.[7] For example, a ma-

jor obstacle to alleviating the famine and malnutrition that

plagued some areas of Kilimanjaro in 1969 was the inability

of the bureaucratic structures charged with dealing with

this problem to react quickly and to deal with the root

causes as well as the immediate effects. The bureaucracy

does not have the political resources, except for the occa-

sional use of coercion, to implement new programs, especial-

ly where there is strong resistance to the social changes

embodied in the new programs. Only when the party took an

active role in recruiting Kilimanjaro residents to move to

other areas of Tanzania did the repeated attempts of civil

[6]Donald B. Rosenthal, in reference to India, argues
that specific historical circumstances make Weber's legal-
rational bureaucracy ". . . a highly inefficient instrument
for a modern welfare state or a new nation seeking rapid
modernization." See "Deurbanization, Elite Displacement,
and Political Change in India," Comparative Politics 2,2
(January 1970):169. That the bureaucracy in new nations
may in fact be less impersonal, compartmentalized, hierar-
chical, and shielded than bureaucratic theory requires both
indicates the persistence of traditional, anti-bureaucratic,
obligations and relationships and supports the argument
made here.

[7]B. B. Schaffer offers support for this point in
arguing that a bureaucracy is adaptive rather than innova-
tive and more concerned with maintenance than with change;
see "The Deadlock in Development Administration," in Leys,
Politics and Change in Developing Countries, 177-211.
Schaffer concludes that where rapid change is sought, bu-
reaucratic administration is an inappropriate means. For a
similar conclusion, see Okello Oculi, "Applied Literature
and Social Imagination in Africa," EAJ 7,8(August 1970):17.

servants to encourage migration show some success. Nor does
the bureaucracy have the access to and the support of the
mass of the rural population, which in the absence of the
use of coercion or substantial resources to distribute offer
the only viable means of attempting to attack the traditional
attitudes that are a brake on development.[8] It does not
provide administrators with the necessary discretionary pow-
er to work toward general societal goals,[9] nor does it pro-
vide them direct and immediate feedback on reactions to and
the success of on-going programs.

One response to this problem in Tanzania has been to
create a set of commissioners who link the bureaucracy and
the civil service. Combining authority from the center with
some control over the civil servants under their jurisdic-
tion and with a key role in the local party organization,
they are expected to be able to minimize the impediments of

[8]Albert Meister, writing specifically about East
Africa, follows Rene Dumont in stressing the need for a
revolutionary core among the leadership elite willing and
able to break down traditional attitudes that constrain de-
velopment. See Meister, East Africa: The Past in Chains,
the Future in Pawn, translated from the French (L'Afrique
Peut-Elle Partir?) by Phyllis Nauts Ott (New York: Walker,
1968), and Dumont, False Start in Africa, translated from
the French (L'Afrique Noire est Mal Partie) by Phyllis Nauts
Ott (London: Deutsch, 1966).

[9]Michael J. Brenner makes this point in arguing the
inappropriateness of the Weberian notion of bureaucracy in
areas of economic management in reference to modern indus-
trial states; see "Functional Representation and Interest
Group Theory," Comparative Politics 2,1(October 1969):122.

the bureaucracy and to make firm bold decisions.[10] There
are some indications of success in Kilimanjaro in this re-
gard--in organizing and facilitating the movement of Kili-
manjaro residents to other areas of Tanzania, and in encour-
aging the organization of cooperatives among urban craftsmen,
for example. But the bureaucratic norms are already well es-
tablished in Tanzania, and local civil servants in Kilima-
njaro have proved to be much less responsive to the local
commissioners than to their superiors at the Ministry level
in Dar es Salaam, to the extent, as was noted above, that
both the Kilimanjaro Regional and Area Commissioners, to-
gether with the local party leaders, were unable to acceler-
ate the provision of relief to areas of the district suffer-
ing from famine and malnutrition.

Another aspect of this problem, of course, is the
need to insure that the reliance on the bureaucracy to man-
age economic development does not nurture a class of man-
agers committed to no ideology and responsible to no one
outside the administrative structures. Or, in other terms,
it is essential that this reliance on the bureaucracy not
foster among civil servants an orientation toward their own

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[10]This of course runs counter to the recommenda-
tions of many of the commentators on bureaucracy and devel-
opment. LaPalombara, for example, argues that "democratic
development requires some separation of political and ad-
ministrative roles." See Bureaucracy and Political Devel-
opment, 24.

norms, status, and power that makes them resistant to, rather than managers of, the fundamental socioeconomic changes envisaged in party policy. The creation of commissioners attempts to deal with this problem by appointing the commissioners party secretaries. While the commissioners appointed have indeed been responsive to party goals, attempts to develop a political commitment among civil servants, who in general are expected to be party members and to adhere to leadership norms, have shown little success in Kilimanjaro.

Viewed from the center, then, TANU's role in Moshi in fostering change has been one of legitimizing and facilitating governmental outputs. In attempting to maintain the support among the urban population that enables it to perform this legitimizing function, it has had to walk a narrow tightrope between restraining the demands of the most favored sectors of the population and alienating those individuals and groups best situated to oppose and thwart party and governmental initiatives. That is, in order to legitimize the party must be responsive to local demands, but at the same time it must utilize its ability to legitimize to support policies and programs that may be very unwelcome locally. It must develop patterns of interaction such that legitimizing governmental outputs does not undermine its ability to legitimize.

TANU IN MOSHI: LOCAL PERSPECTIVE

TANU had early difficulties in penetrating Kilima-
njaro. The thrust of colonial policy since the 1930s was to
restrain the inclination of Kilimanjaro leaders to link lo-
cal grievances with national opposition to colonial rule.
Local issues absorbed political energies in Kilimanjaro, and
not until the paramountcy was eliminated in 1960 did TANU
begin to expand beyond the small base it had earlier devel-
oped. Its spread in the 1960s indicated the willingness and
ability of Kilimanjaro leaders to utilize TANU to pursue
their own local ends.

It is clear that TANU is not a monolithic organiza-
tion in Kilimanjaro, even to the extent that it is almost
confusing to speak of a single TANU organization, since the
local party encompasses so many groups and individuals among
whom competition is often more significant than cooperation.

In some cases, TANU is a framework for local con-
flict--some, though far from all, key policy decisions are
battled within the norms and structures of the local party.
In providing a framework for local conflicts, TANU func-
tions to mediate and to facilitate communication. It medi-
ates in that the secretaries posted from the center define
their job as one of mediating among the different TANU sec-
tions and affiliates and among the principal local party
leaders. Conflicts over allocations are often expressed in
terms of conflicts between personalities, many of which are

resolved through the intervention of local party leaders.
It facilitates communication within Kilimanjaro in that com-
peting groups turn to the party for support and in so doing
insure that proposals, opposition, and alternatives are fil-
tered through the network of factions that constitute the
local party and thus throughout the district as a whole.
Parenthetically it should be noted that the local party has
a major role in mass communication in Moshi because word-of-
mouth remains the basic medium of communication[11]--located
in the center of town and frequently visited by both party
leaders and ordinary citizens, the party offices provide a
continuous stream of information (and, on occasion, misin-
formation) about what is happening in town and in the coun-
try as a whole. Urban residents often turn to the party of-
fice, or to someone who has visited the party office, to
seek information and to verify rumors. TANU also facili-
tates communication between Kilimanjaro and the center in
that at times it is more responsive to local demands than
other institutions with links in the center, in that inter-
ests are almost always articulated through one or another

[11]Although in the past there have been local news-
papers in Kilimanjaro, none were published during 1968-1969.
The average daily sale of all national newspapers, which
occasionally contained local news, in Moshi in October,
1969, was 1512, for a town of nearly 30,000 population serv-
ing a district with a population of close to one half mil-
lion. Many more people of course had access to radios, but
even more infrequently did national news broadcasts include
local news.

of the party channels, and in that party leaders have direct
access to the principal decision-makers.

Because the TANU organization in Kilimanjaro is not
monolithic and because it does not have a determining role
in all key decisions, there are channels for avoiding it.
The local churches, for example, have been able to wind
their way into, out of, and around the party on the provi-
sion of primary education so that they seem to be working in
harmony with the party when in fact they are in direct con-
flict with it. To the extent that basic issues are defined
as technical, rather than political, and there is a strong
inclination among those political leaders who represent the
center to define key issues in that way, conflicts over al-
locations are focused on administrative officers and regula-
tory boards, with the party little involved. The bureau-
cratic norms--that decisions are technical and should be
made only by experts--often override the political norms--a
commitment to an integrated party-state apparatus in which
emphasis is placed on the political consequences of techni-
cal decisions. As well, the paucity of skills and resources
directly available to the local party render it unable to
assert itself in many local conflicts.

It is important to stress, however, that in the lo-
cal political situation expected outcomes, rather than cen-
tral directives or specific structural arrangements, deter-
mine the locus and type of conflict. That is, the

anticipated reactions of particular individuals or struc-
tures condition the forums in which conflict takes place.
Because party structures extend into many aspects of urban
life, and because local responses to policy and programs
emanating from the center are usually articulated through
party channels, TANU does form the umbrella under which much
local conflict takes place.

TANU in Kilimanjaro is a coalition of factions. The
rapidity of change in Tanzania and the frequency of transfer
among party and government officers, coupled with the per-
sistence of the basic geographic and religious cleavages
within the district and with the basic incompatibility of
the demands of the urban, salaried, educated and the rural,
agricultural segments of the population, nurture continual
realignments among the factions. There thus develops a
regularized factionalism, a continuing search for allies,
and an on-going attempt to find a base for support. Associ-
ated with this regularized factionalism is a circulation of
elites--old leaders are replaced by new, with those current-
ly predominant unable to be sure that they will be able to
continue to prevail.

In organization, TANU in Kilimanjaro has stood
somewhere between a party seeking mass membership and a
party seeking to restrict its membership to a leadership
vanguard. Almost anyone may join TANU, but until

individuals are seeking some specific party action (either in general, like independence, or in particular, like a job), or until the party leadership mounts a campaign to encourage people to join, they see little purpose in doing so. TANU leaders in Kilimanjaro themselves differ on whether or not the party should seek mass membership, and no one has an accurate idea of how many members there are.[12]

The regularized factionalism, the circulation of elites, and the openness of party membership combine to insure that the local party organization remains responsive to local demands and that it thus builds a base of support it can utilize in legitimizing policy and program outputs. But because it is responsive to local demands, the local TANU organization, or major elements within it, is often unable and unwilling to implement directives from the center. This in turn poses other problems for TANU as a developmental institution in Tanzania.

TANU IN MOSHI: DEVELOPMENT

Development is a term widely used in the literature

[12]Despite extensive efforts over almost eighteen months to arrive at reasonably accurate party membership figures for Kilimanjaro, I was never able to reconcile satisfactorily the widely divergent estimates of party leaders and the error-ridden party records. Studies that make important use of party membership figures in Tanzania, as, I suspect, in much of Africa, unless the scholars have been able to collect or verify the figures themselves, can, therefore, only be misleading.

of comparative politics, but only rarely is it defined very

closely. Despite repeated attempts to formulate culturally

neutral or objective definitions, all definitions of devel-

opment explicitly or implicitly contain a set of value

choices describing which alternatives are desirable and sug-

gesting how they should be sought, value choices that may,

or may not, be related to the definition of development by

the leaders of the country being studied.

Rather than become embroiled in that semantic, and

perhaps ethnocentric, bind, let us take development as it is

commonly defined in Tanzania--elimination of poverty, ignor-

ance, and disease, and the specific set of programs designed

to achieve those goals within a commitment to an egalitarian

pattern of social organization and to self-reliance as the

primary means of development.[13] That is, the concern here

[13]Elimination of poverty, ignorance, and disease is
the shorthand formulation used popularly throughout the
country, and is contained in the TANU Creed, defined in the
Arusha Declaration, Part I. The more explicit formulation,
in terms of increase in the per capita income, self-suffi-
ciency in trained manpower, and rise in life expectancy,
all by 1980, can be found in the address of President
Nyerere to the National Assembly announcing the (First) Five
Year Development Plan, 12 May 1964, reprinted in Hadley E.
Smith, editor, Readings on Economic Development and Admin-
istration in Tanzania (London: Oxford University Press for
the Institute of Public Administration, University College,
Dar es Salaam, 1966), 360-370. Of course, development is
defined as diversely in Tanzania as elsewhere, but a thor-
ough reading of party position papers and pamphlets, almost
all authored by President Nyerere, makes it clear that this
definition, including the commitment to self-reliance and
equality, describes the specific elements of the general
concern with the improvement of the quality of life enunci-
ated as Tanzania's major goal.

is not to analyze development in Tanzania, but to examine

the party as a vehicle for reaching certain kinds of nation-

al goals. In this context it is important to stress that in

general Tanzania's approach to development programs is non-

coercive; a politics of accommodation prevails over a pol-

itics of rapid development. While some authors have argued

that it is not possible to promote development without in-

stituting programs that are fundamentally socially disrup-

tive, that is not the concern here. The aim is to examine

the local party in Kilimanjaro as a vehicle for fostering

development as it is defined in Tanzania and within the con-

text in which it is approached in Tanzania.

As is the case in much of Africa, Tanzania's leaders

are confronted by what they regard as a fundamental conflict

between developmental and political goals.[14] That is, de-

velopment is conceived in terms of rational management of

the economy, planning, and the like, while political goals

have to do with participation, control, stability, and

unity. To a large extent, development planning has been re-

garded as a technical matter, to be kept out of the hands of

[14]Nyerere discusses this problem in a position pa-
per prepared for the TANU National Executive in 1966, Prin-
ciples and Development (reprinted in Nyerere, Freedom and
Socialism, 187-206).

politicians.[15] A major manifestation of this conflict is

the commitment of Tanzania's leadership to a politics of ac-

commodation--it is deemed preferable to shelve a particular

program or decision that threatens party unity than to push

ahead with it. There is a tendency to avoid issues that

might foster deep divisions among the leadership and to han-

dle possibly divisive crises slowly and with great caution.[16]

A clear case in point is the decision taken in 1969 to trans-

fer control of a series of village development schemes in

southern Tanzania from the association created to manage

them to the party itself. The growing challenge to local

political leaders by some of the participants in the suc-

cessful villages was deemed a greater danger than the risk

that reducing the villages' autonomy would hamper the devel-

opment effort.[17] In Kilimanjaro the initiatives likely to

cause the greatest conflict among local party leaders--even

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[15]See Bienen, _Tanzania: Party Transformation_, Chap-
ter VIII, for comments on the First Five Year Plan, and p.
441 for comments on the Second Five Year Plan. Hyden also
stresses the lack of political participation in the planning
process in Tanzania; see "Planning in Tanzania: Lessons of
Experience," 13-15. Many authors have dealt with develop-
ment and planning in Tanzania; Bienen's Bibliography pro-
vides a useful starting point.

[16]Pratt makes this point; see "The Administration
of Economic Planning in a Newly Independent State: the Tan-
zanian Experience, 1963-1966," 38-59.

[17]Impressions based on published accounts of the de-
cision taken and conversations with party and government of-
ficials; the full details of this decision and its anteced-
ents are not yet available.

those deemed to be integral aspects of the development effort, such as the consolidation of land holdings and the prevention of the emergence of a group of wealthy local entrepreneurs--are treated in ideological and policy terms; that is, while local leaders may make forceful statements about the incompatibility of development and capitalist enterprise, local entrepreneurs are not named and rarely, if ever, is specific action proposed. And when action is taken, almost always the initiative emanates from national rather than local leaders.

At the center of this conflict between developmental and political goals up-country is the local party organization. On the one hand it is the only institution in Tanzania whose contact with and support among the mass of the rural population enables it to attempt to liberate individuals from the traditional constraints that impede development--it can be a vehicle for mobilizing people to make abrupt changes in life style and social relationships, to facilitate the acceptance of new methods and technology in farming, and to communicate new sets of values. On the other hand, the local party needs to win the support of the local population in order to use that support to facilitate change and foster the acceptance of new programs. A major TANU function in Kilimanjaro, then, is to develop a set of structures and relationships with which local people can identify and over which local people feel they have some

control and then to utilize those structures and relation-
ships to foster development.[18]

One major innovation, originating from the center,
is the attempt to coordinate and reconcile political and de-
velopmental goals through the commissioners. Success in
this regard in Kilimanjaro has been intermittent. Certainly
until 1969 development policy and planning were the province
of technical advisers and ministerial officers, with little
input from either local governmental units or from the par-
ty. The individuals who were appointed Regional and Area
Commissioner in Kilimanjaro in 1969 were much more success-
ful in translating development programs into terms and al-
ternatives comprehensible to local leaders and in communicat-
ing political priorities to the officers involved in imple-
menting the programs. This was due both to the skills of
the individuals involved and to the renewed commitment of
national leaders to involve local leaders and the party in
development planning. Nevertheless, planning and programs
remained largely removed from local control: basic decisions
continued to be made by technical advisers and ministerial

[18]It should be noted that many of the major changes
in farming technology with which the local party organiza-
tions in other areas of Tanzania are primarily concerned
have already taken place in Kilimanjaro. The problem there
is not one of encouraging people to recognize the value of
fertilizers, pesticides, and the like, but one of further
improvong soil productivity and crop quality, and ultimate-
ly, of developing communal patterns of crop production and
income distribution.

officers with little, if any, consultation with local polit-
ical leaders. At the same time there was no attempt to pur-
sue initiatives that might severely threaten local party
unity. That is, Tanzania's leaders seem willing to accept
the private land-holding and the rapidly expanding group of
local entrepreneurs in Kilimanjaro in return for Kilimanja-
ro's contribution to the national economy and political
quiescence, while Kilimanjaro's leaders grudgingly acquiesce
in what they consider to be a disproportionately small share
of national resources in return for a national willingness
not to force changes in fundamental patterns of social or-
ganization. This understanding is of course tacit and not
explicit, but, although described here in very simplistic
terms, seems adequately to characterize the situation.

A second structure developed to reconcile political
and developmental goals is the set of local development com-
mittees in which both civil servants and local political
leaders participate. But as has been mentioned, the local
development committees have largely functioned to legitimize
decisions made by government officials, with little atten-
tion to the political concerns expressed by local leaders.
Only where local leaders have been able to enlist the as-
sistance of officials at the national level have they been

able to rearrange the priorities established by civil serv-
ants.[19]

A third structure that has developed is a variant on
the machine model discussed by Zolberg and others.[20] Devel-
oped from the urban experience in America, the notion is
that the local political party, working in the context of a
transitional population where deference patterns have been
weakened by socioeconomic change and where vertical ties can
be maintained only through patterns of reciprocity, is able
to utilize frequent electoral competition to secure power
and then distribute material particularistic rewards to gov-
ern in a situation where other institutions are less viable.
In the one-party state in Tanzania, however, the party is
not concerned with securing votes--although elections are
contested, all candidates must be approved by the party and
must support party policy. But the machine model is useful
in understanding the reciprocal nature of the interaction
between party and people in Kilimanjaro: the party provides
services, which range from finding jobs, to reconciling

[19]For example, a project to supply water to the
drier, eastern section of the district showed little progress
until one of the Kilimanjaro MPs took special interest in it
and lobbied extensively for it in Dar es Salaam; from his
perspective the water supply project was an obvious symbol
of the service he was providing to his constituents.

[20]See Zolberg, Creating Political Order, especially
159-161. See also Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and
Political Change," 1142-1158. The literature on political
machines in American cities is extensive; particularly per-
ceptive is Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed's New York.

conflicts, to interceding with landlords, to attempting to alter governmental outputs, in return for--since the party does not need votes--support for party and government policies. The objections of market women to the high license fee and of street vendors and artisans to their eviction from the public sidewalks are cases in point, where local TANU leaders were able to utilize the support among the population earned through the provision of services to persuade those who were aggrieved to accept the governmental decisions. It is true that much of the mass acceptance of TANU stems from its role in leading the fight against colonial rule and from the personal prestige of President Nyerere, and, to a lesser extent, other important leaders. But that kind of acceptance, which has withered away in other African countries and even in some areas of Tanzania, has been preserved and reinforced in Kilimanjaro both through TANU's ability to distribute particularistic rewards--jobs, reduced rents, plots to farm, and the like--and through TANU's ability to service larger sections of the population by affecting governmental outputs. TANU has been able to demonstrate to local residents that they can have some control over the governmental decisions that affect them, and in so doing has encouraged widespread participation in the local political system as people seek remedy for their grievances; it has been able to translate some of that participation into a willingness to accept unwelcome decisions.

Another aspect of this pattern is its potential for fostering integration in Moshi. Because of the broad range of activities in which it is involved, TANU brings together the major groups in Moshi. It is one of the few institutions that forces Asians and Africans, Christians and Muslims, rural and urban to interact continuously. At the same time, in functioning as a local machine, TANU provides services primarily to the unattached populations of the town. That is, it is most often those individuals who do not belong to one of the major groups, who have just recently moved into the urban area, or who belong to some minority group who seek services from the local party. In servicing them, TANU helps Pare see they have something in common with Chagga, workers with farmers, and the like. TANU is able to do this because, at least in the urban area, it is scrupulously non-tribal and non-religious in base and orientation.

Because TANU can thus provide legitimacy for governmental outputs, the regulative and distributive capacities of local government are in fact increased through TANU support. It is in this regard where the local party has been most successful in making an immediate contribution to the development effort. As well, in the rapidly changing environment of Moshi town, TANU provides a certain stability and continuity and at the same time communicates a set of values relating to the nature of the change that is desirable and how it should be brought about, all of which are a

foundation for development.

The evidence indicates that, for the moment at
least, TANU has not become a tool of perverse growth in Moshi
--it has not been captured and dominated by an urbanized ed-
ucated, and salaried elite as a focus for opposition to na-
tional policy. In fact, the local party organization has
not been captured by any principal class, or group, or fac-
tion locally. In part this is because many of the principal
party leaders are not elected locally, so that the local po-
litical arena has very permeable boundaries, permitting both
inflows from the center (officials posted by Dar es Salaam
to Moshi) and outflows to the center (alternate channels
that permit avoiding the local party).

In part, too, this is due to the leadership provi-
sions of the Arusha Declaration. Even though the restric-
tions on leaders' sources of income have not been fully en-
forced, they have had the effect of forcing out of the lo-
cal party most of the major local land-owners and entre-
preneurs and of destroying the legitimacy of their claim to
access to major decision-making centers.

In part TANU has not become a tool of perverse
growth because it must do the very things that alienate it
from the urban elite. Since the party, and its trade union
auxiliary, for example, are busy attempting to restrain the
demands of salaried employees, the party often becomes their

enemy. Likewise, since the party is trying to restrain the
demands of the educated elite, they too often turn away from
it.

To some extent, all of this reduces the ability of
the party to promote participation and legitimize governmen-
tal outputs, and to some extent rather than shielding the
center from the host of demands it cannot satisfy, it forces
some of those demands to be directed to the center. Similar-
ly, to the extent that major segments of the local popula-
tion feel alienated from the party, clearly it cannot ap-
pear responsive to their demands. But the important point
is that the party must continually walk a tightrope, balanc-
ing attempts to win the support of the local population with
attempts to do the very things that will alienate them. The
striking finding is not that the party has not been more suc-
cessful as a major agent of social change, but that the par-
ty has been able to renew itself locally and has been able
to remain sufficiently responsive to local demands to pro-
vide a base of continuity and stability from which the de-
velopment effort can progress.

TANU IN MOSHI: NATIONAL INTEGRATION

We have already stressed that TANU in Tanzania is
best described as a national assembly, bringing together a
number of locally-based party organizations. TANU at the
center cannot exercise clear and direct control over its

local units in matters about which both the center and the
local unit care a great deal. In practice, the center can-
not really order, nor can the local units directly refuse,
and neither can disregard the constraints on the other, but
there is a filtering process that often greatly distorts
what passes between them.[21] The lack of resources at the
party center and the fragility of party institutions produce
an imperfect, intermittent direction of local party units.
Thus, the national party must rely on semi-autonomous local
organizations for its strength and support.

        This relationship between center and locality fos-
ters continuing conflict between them, a conflict that is
often congruent with the extant tensions between center and
up-country in Tanzania's plural society. This conflict is
manifested in local government: while local leaders demand
greater autonomy central leaders move toward restricting
their scope of operations. It is manifested in the behavior
of Members of Parliament, Members of the TANU National Exec-
utive Committee, and other leaders who represent their con-
stituencies at the center: while they seek to represent lo-
cal interests, they are at the same time expected by na-
tional leaders to subordinate parochial attitudes and alle-
giances to the principles and needs of national policies and

        [21]Bienen stresses this fundamental characteristic of
TANU as a party; see Tanzania: Party Transformation, espec-
ially Chapter XIV.

programs. And this conflict is manifested directly in the local party organization in the tension between locally and centrally selected officers.

But this is not to suggest that this tension between center and locality has been dysfunctional or destabilizing. To the contrary, the evidence from Kilimanjaro supports the conclusion that this tension has had a stabilizing effect and that it promotes, rather than inhibits, growth.[22] This tension has permitted the political system to be responsive to local demands and sensitive to local discontent. It has permitted some shielding the center from a broad set of local demands that the center cannot meet.[23] And it has permitted an expansion of the polity not possible with the resources available to the center--direct contact with much of the rural population, development of identification with and some commitment to the values and structures that characterize Tanzania as a nation, and the creation of structures to

[22]Growth both in the sense of progress toward explicit and implicit development goals and in the sense of increasing the capabilities of existing structures, creating new institutions, and fostering structural differentiation and flexibility of response.

[23]See Stephens, The Political Transformation of Tanganyika, for a discussion of the ways in which the mobilization process has led to an increase in demands that sorely challenge Tanzania's resources and capabilities. Unfortunately, Stephens' reliance on sets of unreliable and poorly chosen data and on a model of modernization that does not encompass some fundamental elements of the Tanzanian situation leads him to overlook sources of stability in the Tanzanian political system.

permit participation and communication.

Through this process of interaction between center
and locality there has developed a continuing localization
of politics in Tanzania. It is true that national leaders
often express their dissatisfaction with their inability to
insure that local areas adopt what they consider to be appro-
priate and necessary developmental strategies. Yet in the
first decade of independence, this localization, in the con-
text of the very limited resources of the center and within
the commitment to foster a sense of national unity as a pre-
requisite to development without coercion, has been a facil-
itating and not inhibiting factor. At the same time, this
localization has promoted the integration of Tanzania's dis-
parate ethnic and religious communities, at least at the
level of enabling people to recognize a commonality of iden-
tity and interests and building institutions that require
functional interaction, and has not so far manifested the
disabling reinforcement of parochialisms that leaders and
observers so fear.

These more general observations apply as well in
Kilimanjaro. The regularized factionalism of the local par-
ty organization has permitted it both to incorporate the
disparate elements of the Kilimanjaro population and to be
responsive to the often strident demands of the local citi-
zenry. This is not to minimize the magnitude of the divi-
siveness of the ethnic and religious cleavages that persist

in Tanzania, but to argue that the local TANU organization
plays a key role in developing patterns of interaction and
sharing and thus fostering a recognition of commonality of
identity and interests. That is, to the extent that Chagga
and Pare market women, and Muslim and Christian sidewalk
tailors, to pursue those two examples once again, seek rem-
edy for their grievances in the party, they recognize an af-
finity that at least for the moment, and when that affinity
is reinforced probably much longer, overcomes the cleavages
that divide them. Similarly, this is not to suggest that
Kilimanjaro, as a relatively well developed and highly mo-
bilized area in Tanzania, will not continue to press many
demands inconsistent with national policy, but to argue that
the local TANU organization plays a key role--by being re-
sponsive to local demands even when that means delaying or
avoiding the implementation of national policy to avoid se-
vere conflicts--in developing a sense of identification with
the norms and structures of the Tanzanian political system
and thus promoting a willingness to press demands through it
and to accept outcomes from it.

TANU IN MOSHI: SUMMARY

        TANU does not govern in Kilimanjaro. The local par-
ty organization, a coalition of factions characterized al-
most as much by competition as by cooperation, spends most
of its time expediting demands made on government and party

and resolving a large number of small conflicts. It uses
its continuing appeal from the independence struggle, to-
gether with its ability to distribute particularistic re-
wards and affect some local allocations, to legitimize gov-
ernmental outputs and to extend the perimeters of the polity.
That is, TANU in Kilimanjaro legitimizes, it facilitates
change, and it fosters both horizontal and vertical integra-
tion, but only rarely does it have direct control over local
decisions or propose or initiate change.

TANU does not represent initiative at the local
level. Likewise, little policy is made at the local level,
and, in fact, most local party leaders have an imperfect and
incomplete, at best, understanding of the content of basic
national policy and in general have great difficulty in re-
lating national policy to the local setting.

Yet despite the paucity of skills and resources, and
despite the fundamental underlying discord between the val-
ues of the relatively educated, prosperous, entrepreneurial
coffee farmers of Kilimanjaro and the national policy of
communal rural socialism, the local party in Kilimanjaro
has proved a surprisingly resiliant institution. It has
played an important intermediary role between Kilimanjaro
and the center, as well as among the local factional group-
ings, and in so doing has nurtured patterns of communication
and interaction that facilitate development and national in-
tegration. TANU has been able, albeit haltingly, to

institutionalize its accountability to an increasingly larg-

er constituency, and in so doing has begun building a set of

institutions and relationships that can promote and facili-

tate major social change.   As well, it has developed an ide-

ology that is conducive to change, that has remained flexi-

ble and responsive to social forces resistant to change, and

that has not assumed a comprehensiveness, a finality, and an

intensity that would make it distant from and inaccessible

to the mass of the population and that would require fanat-

ical adherence and perhaps coercion to pursue.[24]

Lest this picture of TANU's success in Kilimanjaro

seem too rosy, it should be stressed that major paradoxes

remain unresolved.   The conflict between political and de-

velopmental goals, the conflict between central direction

and local autonomy, and the conflict between reliance on

functionally specific institutions and the assertion of par-

ty supremacy all present major and continuing challenges to

the Tanzanian political system.   Institutions remain fragile

and the shortage of skilled manpower continues to be a great

problem.   The party has vastly extended participation in the

national political system, no mean accomplishment in the

Tanzanian, and African, setting, yet some groups do find

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[24]Manfred Halpern makes these points in referring
to the accountability and ideology of parties in the Middle
East and North Africa; see The Politics of Social Change in
the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1963), Chapter 14.

themselves excluded from active participation. TANU has

clearly successfully accomplished a renewal of its independ-

ence mandate, but then independence is scarcely a decade

old in Tanzania. Perhaps what is most exciting about pol-

itics in Kilimanjaro, at least to one observer, is the se-

lectivity and eclecticism of party officials in choosing

appropriate models and their flexibility in fashioning ap-

propriate institutions to build a nation and manage its de-

velopment.

APPENDIX 1

MOSHI POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SURVEY

One of the major aspects of the field research for
this study was a set of interviews with Moshi political
leaders. The purpose of Appendix 1 is to describe the
methodology of that survey, and to list the questions used.

The goal of the survey was to be as comprehensive as
possible. Rather than attempting to identify a narrow set of
individuals who could be described as the elite of Moshi,
the attempt was to identify all those who seemed to fill
major community leadership roles and then to talk with them
to get their understanding of the local political system,
the role of the party, and so on. Accordingly, all holders
of key local positions during 1968-69, 69 individuals, were
interviewed (see TABLE A). In addition, individuals who
observation showed to be major participants in one or more
of the three issue-areas studied, a total of 36 individuals,
were interviewed. Seven individuals who held significant
community leadership positions, but who were not politicians
or governmental officers (for example, the two bishops),
were interviewed. Each individual interviewed was asked
to name town influentials, and with the exception of an
individual who had moved from town, all those who had been
named as an influential by 10% or more of the other leaders,
some ten individuals, were interviewed. I attempted to use

TABLE A   POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INTERVIEWS: POSITIONS FOR
           WHICH CURRENT OCCUPANTS IN 1968-69 WERE
           INTERVIEWED

National:[a]   Members of Parliament
                Member, TANU National Executive Committee
Regional: Regional Commissioner
                Administrative Secretary
                TANU Regional Working Committee
                TANU Regional Executive Committee
                TANU Regional Officers[b]
District: Area Commissioner (2)[c]
                Area Secretary (2)
                Town Clerk (2)
                District Executive Officer
                TANU District Working Committee, Moshi town
                TANU District Executive Committee, Moshi town
                TANU District Officers[b]
                Moshi Town Councillors
                Moshi Town Council Department Heads
                Moshi Town Headmen
                Finance (Executive) Committee, Kilimanjaro
                  District Council
Branch: Moshi Town Branch Chairmen
                Moshi Town Branch Secretaries
Cell: Random sample constituting 20% of Moshi town
                  cell leaders

[a]Because of overlaps, many individuals hold several
positions. For example, MPs are also members of their TANU
Regional and District Executive Committees, while the Regional
Commissioner is an ex-officio Member of Parliament.

[b]Officers of TANU auxiliaries--UWT, TYL, NUTA, TAPA,
Elders, Cooperatives--are included in this category. This
category (at the district level) includes the officers of
both the urban and rural Kilimanjaro districts.

[c]Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of
holders of that position actually interviewed.

NOTE: Except for 2 members of the TANU Regional Executive
Committee, 1 member of the TANU District Executive Committee,
Moshi urban, and 4 members of the Kilimanjaro District Council
Finance (Executive) Committee, and except where positions were
vacant for a long period in 1968-69, holders of all of the
positions listed were interviewed. There is no reason to
believe that these omissions produce any systematic
distortions.

Town Council and TANU celebration lists--lists of local

people to be invited to official parties--but I found that

the names appearing on those lists were drawn from lists of

major town political positions. Since social status was a

derived category, it did not yield additional individuals to

be interviewed. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 7--

that tax records proved to be an inadequate source for

determining a primarily economic elite, other than

Europeans and Asians not directly involved in the local

.political process--it was impossible to develop an

additional category of economic elite. My observation

over the year enabled me, however, to identify several

major local entrepreneurs, of whom two were interviewed.

Due to the extensive overlaps of positions, all of

these methods of selection yielded a total of 78 political

leaders to be interviewed. In addition, a 20% sample of

town party cell leaders, 29 individuals, was interviewed

(see Appendix 2).

The basic thrust of the questions used--to ask

local leaders how they conceived the local political

system and their roles in it--was developed in English,

and with the assistance of Robert Ndunguru, a student at

Old Moshi Secondary School, the questions were drafted in

Swahili. Only after that was the final English version

drafted. After several trials on Swahili informants, who

were also low-level leaders unlikely to fall into the net

of the leadership survey, the questionnaire was revised

slightly and then administered.

The first three months in the field were spent developing competence in Swahili, surveying government and party records, and getting to be known and accepted in the community. The bulk of the 78 interviews, which I conducted personally, took place during the third through ninth months of the field work. By the time I asked local leaders for an appointment, most had already gotten to know me, and everyone knew about me and my research. The leadership interviews ranged from 45 minutes to 5 hours in length, where necessary over several sittings and were primarily in Swahili (see TABLE B). With one exception, there was no one but the respondent and me present during the interview.

TABLE B   POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INTERVIEWS: DURATION
            AND LANGUAGE

Duration	Number	Percent
Less than 30 minutes	12	11%
31-60 minutes	23	21
1-2 hours	53	50
2-3 hours	14	13
3-5 hours	3	3
Not noted	2	2
	107	100%

Language	Number	Percent
Primarily English	14	13%
English and Swahili equally	4	4
Primarily Swahili	88	82
Not noted	1	1
	107	100%

The questions were phrased identically each time to insure comparability, and the respondent was encouraged in engage,

essentially, in a directed conversation on local politics.
The responses were recorded long-hand during the interview
and supplemented from recollection immediately after the
interview; they were typed the same day. It was often the
case that the more formal interview followed and/or preceded
conversations with the respondent about specific local
problems, decisions, and the like. In only one case did
it prove impossible to secure cooperation from a local
leader.

      The questionnaire schedule used follows. In
addition to the questions listed here, respondents were
asked to supply biographical data, ranging from their
parents' education and jobs through their children's
education and jobs.

QUESTIONNAIRE SCHEDULE

Introduction) Kama ujuavyo, nafanya uchunguzi wa maendeleo
kuhusu serikali za mitaa na uendeshaji wake katika Tanzania.
Uchunguzi ninaofanya ni wa siri. Yote tutakayoongea yatakuwa
ya siri kwa maana serikali kuu imetambua umaana wa kazi hiyo
na imetaka mambo hayo yaendeshwe kisiri. Kwa hiyo, tunaweza
kuzungumza kirafiki bila ya kuogopa.
(As you know, I am studying development, especially concern-
ing local government in Tanzania. The study that I am doing
is confidential. All that we discuss will be confidential
because the central government has recognized the importance
of this work and wishes it to be conducted confidentially.
Therefore, we can chat as friends without fear.)

1) Wewe, kama mwenye ujuzi wa siasa na mambo ya serikali,
kadiri unavyowazo [ya maoni yako] jambo la muhimu zaidi
kuliko mambo mengine ni jambo gani?
(As a person closely involved in the political activity in
Moshi, in your opinion, what is the most important problem
you see [must deal with]?)

2)   Umesema kwamba jambo la _____ ni la muhimu sana
[_____ ni shida ya kwanza hapo mjini]. Mpaka hivi
sasa, matendo yako katika shida za _____ ni namna gani?
(You have said _____ is the most important problem you
see. What exactly do <u>you</u> do about it?)

3)   Umekwishanieleza mambo ya _____. Je, kuna mambo
gani ya muhimu yafuatayo?
(You have explained _____ to me. What are some of the
other important issues in Moshi?)

4)   Wenzako wanafikiri shida ya elimu ni ya muhimu sana.
Wewe mwenyewe, unafikiriaje? Mpaka hivi sasa, matendo yako
katika shida hii ni namna gani?
(The difficulty of getting an education is an issue that
concerns a great many people. Are you involved in this
matter in any way?)

5)   Wenzako wanasema kuwa kuna shida ya kazi. Na hasa
kuhusu wasichana wafikao hapa mjini kutafuta kazi na
hawapati. Wewe mwenyewe, unafikiriaje? Mpaka hivi sasa,
matendo yako katika shida hii ni ya namna gani?
(Many people say that unemployment is an important issue
in town. Perhaps especially of girls who come to town
seeking jobs, who don't find jobs, but stay on in town
anyway. Are you involved in this matter in any way?)

6)   Hivi hivi, ninapendelea kujua njia ambazo serikali ya
hapa mjini hutumia katika kuwapa ruhusa au liseni, hasa
Waafrika kuliko Wahindi ama wageni, katika mambo ya
biashara na usafirshaji. Mambo hayo yanakuhusu?
(I am interested in the system of granting licenses for
local trade and transport. This is one way in which the
governments in some countries make sure that Africans or
citizens get the best opportunities. Are you involved in
this in any way?)

7)   Katika mji wa Moshi, ukitaka kuvutia mambo katika
upande wako, utafanyaje? Kuna watu wa pekee ambao lazima
uwaone? Au kuna kikundi, chama, ushirika ambacho lazima
ukione?
(In Moshi town, if you wanted to have some influence on a
particular matter, what exactly would you do? Are there
any special people you would see? Is there any organization
or group you would go to?)

8) Kama ungetaka kuvutia mambo katika upande wako, shauri
ambalo limekwishakatwa au litakatwa Dar es Salaam,
utafanyaje?
(If you wanted to have some influence on some matter in
which the decision was made in Dar es Salaam, what exactly
would you do?)

9) Miaka miwili imepita tangu Mwalimu Nyerere ametangaza
Azimio la Arusha. Watu wengi katika nchi ya Tanzania wanazo
njia nyingi za kulitekeleza Azimio hili, na wengine wamefaulu
kutekeleza Azimio la Arusha zaidi kuliko wengine. Njia gani
maarufu watu wa mji wa Moshi wameifuata katika kutimiza hilo
Azimio la Arusha? Mpaka hivi sasa, wewe mwenyewe unafanya
kazi gani katika kuunga mkono Azimio la Arusha kwa vitendo?
(It has been some time since President Nyerere announced the
Arusha Declaration. Many people throughout the country have
different ways of putting the principles of the Arusha
Declaration into effect, and some have been more successful
than others. What is the main way in which the people of
Moshi have worked to put the principles of the Arusha
Declaration into effect? What is your role in this?)

10) Nimesikia watu wakizungumza kuhusu mambo ya kujenga
taifa. Unaelewa nini na neno hilo la kujenga taifa? Mpaka
hivi sasa, wewe mwenyewe unafanya kazi gani katika mambo ya
kujenga taifa?
(I have often heard many people speaking about nation-
building. In your view, what is nation-building exactly?
What is your role?)

11) Wageni toka ng'ambo hufikiria kuwa ni ngumu, au
pengine haiwezekani, kujenga taifa la umoja katika nchi
ambayo una madhehebu mengi ya kidini na makabila mengi
yanayohitilifiana. Unafikiriaje?
(Many foreigners think that there are so many different
tribes and religions and local interests in Africa that it
will be hard to build a unified nation. What do you think?)

12) Utokea wakati fulani mtu mmoja mwenye kazi kufuata mila
ya kabila lake hugongana na kazi na muhimu wake katika
serikali. (Kwa mfano Mmasai mila yake humfanya avae nguo au
ngozi za wanyama na kufuata simba kuonyesha uhodari wake. Na
papo hapo serikali inamlazimu aache mila hizo mbaya na kuacha
kufuata simba.) Je, hutokeaje katika jambo hilo?
(Sometimes it does happen that a person's responsibility, let
us say, to his tribe, is not entirely in agreement with his
responsibility to the government. (For example, a Masai be-
lieves that to follow the customs of his tribe he must wear a
blanket and kill a lion to show his bravery. But to follow
the laws of the government, he must discard those habits.)
What is happening in such cases?)

13) Ni mara ngapi watu kutoka katika sehemu yako kufika
kukuona au kuandikia barua au ni mara ngapi wanawaomba
rafiki zao kuwawakilisha kuhusu shida au matatizo yao?
Ni watu wangapi ungesema hukufikia au.hukuona kila juma?
Ni watu wangapi kati yao ambao unawafahamu?
(How often do people from your local area come to see you,
or write to you, or ask their friends to see you, about
their problems? How many people would you say contact you
each week? How many of these people who contact you would
you say you know personally?)

14) Wakati watu wa sehemu yako wanapofika hukutolea shida
ama matatizo gani ambayo yanawahusu?
(When people from your local area come to see you, what
problems are they mostly concerned about?)

15) Kuna chama ama kikundi cha watu ambacho huja kukuona
kwa ajili ya shida zao?
(Are there any groups or organizations who come to see you
about their problems?)

16) Wakati watu wanapofika kwako kwa ajili ya shida hizo
ambazo tumeziongelea wewe kama kiongozi unachukua hatua gani?
(When people come to see you about these problems we have
been discussing, what exactly do you do about them?)

17) Ningependa kujua ni vikundi gani kati ya hivyo ni vya
maana katika mji wa Moshi. Kwa upande wako, chama gani au
kikundi gani unakifikiria ni cha kufaa na cha maana?
(I am interested in finding out what are the most important
groups in Moshi. What groups or societies or organizations
do you think are most important?)

18) Je, kuna vyama ambavyo hujishughulisha sana na mambo
ya siasa katika mji wa Moshi? au katika siasa ya nchi nzima?
(Are there any groups that take a very active role in local
political matters? in national political matters?)

19) Kama ujuavyo, nauliza watu wengi katika uchunguzi wangu.
Kutokana na ujuzi wako unafikiria ni watu gani maarufu katika
mji wa Moshi? Na watu gani hujishughulisha kwa kiasi kikubwa
katika siasa hapa mjini? Na watu gani wanaoweza kutoa maoni
yao katika kukata mashauri?
(As you know, I am speaking to many people in Moshi during
the course of my research. From your experience, who would
you say are the most important people in Moshi? the people
most involved in political activity? the people most able
to influence decisions?)

20)   Wageni, hata Waafrika, hushangaa jinsi siasa ya chama
kimoja cha kidemokrasi huweza kufanya kazi katika nchi ya
Tanzania.   Unafikiria TANU ifanye nini kuhusiana na mambo
ya mitaa hapa Moshi?
(Many people in other countries have wondered exactly how a
one-party democracy works.   What do you think the role of
TANU should be in matters that concern Moshi?)

21)   Tume iliyochaguliwa na Rais Nyerere kuchungua namna gani
wataweza kuunda nchi yenye chama kimoja cha kidemokrasi
walitazama katika uwezekano wa kuunganisha TANU na serikali
katika shirika moja.   Walikata shauri kuwa hilo halitakuwa
wazo zuri kwa sababu TANU na serikali ina kazi ya pekee ya
kujenga taifa.   Katika sehemu fulani fulani ni ngumu kutambua
ipi ni kazi ya TANU na ipi ni kazi ya serikali kwa vile zote
mbili hufanya kazi pamoja.   Je, hapo Moshi, kuna nini
(kuhusiana na jambo hilo)?   Ungesema kuna tofauti gani
katika kazi zifanywazo na serikali na TANU kuhusu mambo ya
hapa Moshi?
(The Commission that was appointed by President Nyerere to
examine just how to set up a democratic one-party state
looked into the possibility of combining TANU and the
government into one organization.   They decided this would
not be a good idea, since the government and TANU each has
its own role to play in building the nation.   In some places,
TANU and the government work so closely together that it is
hard to say what is the responsibility of each.   What about
Moshi?   What would you say are the differences between what
TANU does and what the government does, when it concerns
local matters?)

22)   Watu wengi hufikiria kuwa masharui na matatizo mengi
lazima yakatwe na viongozi wa Dar es Salaam, lakini wengine
hufikiria kuwa ni nzuri zaidi mashauri yahusikanayo mambo ya
miji yenyewe yakatwe katika kila mji.   Unafikiriaje?   Je, ni
mambo mengi yanayohusikana na Moshi hukatwa Dar es Salaam?
(Some people think that all decisions should be made by the
leaders in Dar es Salaam, while others think that it is better
for decisions about local matters to be made in each town.
What do you think?   Are many of the decisions about matters
that concern Moshi made in Dar es Salaam?)

23)   Wewe mwenyewe, unafanya kazi gani?   Na hiyo kazi,
umeipata lini?   Je, una kazi nyingine zaidi ya hiyo ambayo
umekwishaitaja, labda katika chama cha TANU au serikalini?
(What is your exact position?   When did you get that
position?   Do you have any other position, perhaps in TANU
or the national government?)

24)   (if national) Watu wengine wameniambia kuwa ni ngumu
kuwa katika ---national--- na muda ule ule kuwa ---local---.
Je, unafikiria hiyo ni hivyo? Katika uchaguzi wa Bunge wa
mwaka 1965 mawaziri na wabunge wengine walishindwa katika
uchaguzi huo kwa sababu walitumia muda mchache katika sehemu
yao. Je, unaona kuwa ---national--- hukuzuia sana kwenda
kwenye wilaya yako? Je, hilo ni tatizo kwako?
((if national) Some people have told me that it is
difficult to be both a ---national--- and at the same time
a ---local---. Do you think this is so? In the Parliamentary
Elections in 1965 some Ministers and Members of Parliament
were defeated because they spent very little time in their
constituencies. Do you find that being a ---national---
keeps you away from your district very much? Is this a
problem for you?)

      (if no national) Watu fulani ambao hufanya kazi ya siasa
katika sehemu yao hushiriki pia katika mambo yahusuyo taifa.
Je, unafikiria kuwa kuna uwezekano mtu kujishughulisha katika
mambo ya taifa na bado kuweza kufanya kazi nzuri hapa Moshi?
((if no national) Some people who play an important role
in their local areas also participate in making decisions at
the national level. Do you think that a person can be in-
volved in national affairs and still do a good job in Moshi?)

25)   Kama ujuavyo, nafanya uchunguzi wa maendeleo, kuhusu
serikali za mitaa na uendeshaji wake katika Tanzania. Je,
kuna kitu ambacho ungetaka kuongeza kwa hayo niliyokwishayasema?
Je, kuna kitu ambacho nimekiacha? Je, kuna mambo yanayonifanya
nijishughulishe sana nayo?
(As you know, I am studying local government, administration,
and development in Tanzania. Is there anything that you
would like to add to what you have already said? Is there
anything that I have left out? Are there some things I
should devote more attention to?)

(Closing) Nakushukuru sana kwa msaada wako ulionipa katika
uchunguzi wangu. Ujue kuwa mambo hayo yote tuliyokwishasema
ni ya siri na wala usiyatoe nje. Nataka kuhakikishia kuwa
sitayatoa mambo hayo nje.
(I want to thank you very much for the help you have given
me in my study. Remember that everything we have discussed
is confidential, and you should not speak about it with
others. And I want to assure you that I will not speak of
this to others.)

APPENDIX 2

MOSHI CELL LEADER SURVEY

To supplement the Moshi Political Leadership Survey, which was largely concentrated at the district (town) level, a 20% sample of the urban party cell leaders was interviewed.

The most difficult problem in the Moshi Cell Leader Survey proved to be the creation of a reliable sampling frame. The party maintained no list, or map, of cells in town. Nor was it possible to locate, anywhere in town (including party, Town Council, and governmental offices), a complete list of town cell leaders. A thorough search of party files yielded several incomplete, outdated, and in several cases overlapping, lists of cell leaders by ward. In consultation with the appropriate branch (contiguous with ward) chairmen I corrected, updated, and verified the names on those lists, thus producing lists of current cell leaders by ward. So that the Cell Leader Survey would tap ordinary cell leaders, those individuals listed as cell leaders who had already been interviewed as part of the larger leadership survey were removed. From those amended lists a 20% random sample by ward was drawn. Since the residential patterns and community composition varied by ward, and since the town population was not evenly dispersed throughout the wards, it was essential that the samples be of each ward rather than of the town as a

whole. Several other corrections, all to insure that the
final sample would adequately reflect the regular town in-
habitants, were made. A small agricultural community on the
edge of town, not at all integrated into the largely upper-
class residential ward of which it was formally a part, was
treated separately: the 20% sample was drawn of all of the
rest of the ward and of that community. In the small
central business ward, where the Asian chairman claimed to
represent an all Asian ward even though the ward boundaries
included, among other Africans, a new settlement of employees
of the coffee curing factory (in the process of constituting
itself as a separate TANU branch), it was impossible to
determine if there were any African cell leaders. Party
files suggested there were, but the branch chairman claimed
there were not. In the event, only the Asian cell leaders
were included in the survey, since otherwise Asians might
have been excluded entirely. For the purposes of this
essay that does not produce significant problems. Although
the Asians are relatively overrepresented in regard to the
town population as a whole, that overrepresentation permits
greater confidence in the comments about the political be-
havior of the Asian community. Finally, the police barracks
and the police training academy, both of which had highly
transient and largely non-local populations that were in
the process of forming party branches of their own, were
not included in the Moshi Cell Leader Survey.

The questionnaire schedule used for the Moshi
Political Leadership Survey was adapted for cell leader use.
Rachel Samoff conducted the interviews at the respondents'
homes in Swahili. The responses were recorded long-hand
during the interviews, which lasted about one hour.
Immediately after the interviews the recorded responses
were supplemented by recollection, and they were typed
within two days. Only one cell leader proved unwilling
to cooperate, and the next cell leader on the randomized
list for that ward was interviewed instead. It might be
noted that the branch chairman was irate when he discovered
the case of non-cooperation and subsequently dismissed the
cell leader for failing to live up to his charge to serve
the public.

What follows is the complete set of questions asked
of cell leader respondents. The questions were drafted in
Swahili (adapted from the Moshi Political Leadership Survey);
an approximate English translation follows.

MOSHI CELL LEADER QUESTIONNAIRE SCHEDULE

(First meeting) Namsaidia mume wangu katika uchunguzi wa
maendeleo hasa kuhusu serikali za mitaa na uendashaji wake
katika Tanzania. (Labda umekwishamwona katika mkutano
fulani--mwenye ndevu, anayependa kuvaa shati ya kitenge.)
Tunatoka kwa Chuo Kikuu cha Dar es Salaam na uchunguzi
tunaofanya unafanyika chini ya mamlaka ya Ofisi ya Makamu
wa Pili wa Rais. Tunakuomba kutusaidia kupata maelezo
kidogo juu ya shida za hapa Moshi na za nyumba kumi zako
na kadhalika. Utakuwa na nafasi siku gani . . . .
(I am helping my husband in his study of development,
especially concerning local government and its conduct in
Tanzania. (Perhaps you have already seen him at some
meeting or other--he has a beard and likes to wear kitenge
shirts.) We come from University College, Dar es Salaam,
and the study we are doing is being done under the
authority of the Office of the Second Vice President. We
seek your help in gaining some understanding of the problems
of Moshi and of your ten houses and so on. When do you
think you will have time . . . .)

(Introduction) Kama ujuavyo, nafanya uchunguzi wa maendeleo,
hasa kuhusu serikali za mitaa na uendeshaji wake katika
Tanzania. Uchunguzi ninaofanya ni wa siri. Yote
tutakayoongea yatakuwa ya siri kwa maana serikali kuu
imetambua umaana wa kazi hiyo na imetaka mambo hayo
yaendeshwe kisiri. Kwa hiyo, tunaweza kuzungumza kirafiki
bila ya kuogopa.
(As you know, I am studying development, especially concern-
ing local government in Tanzania. The study I am doing is
confidential. All that we discuss will be confidential
because the central government has recognized the importance
of this work and wishes it to be conducted confidentially.
Therefore, we can chat as friends without fear.)

1) Wewe ukiwa kama balozi, kadiri unavyowazo jambo [shida]
la muhimu sana kuliko mambo mengine kuhusu nyumba kumi zako
ni hasa jambo gani?
(As a cell leader, in your opinion what is the most important
matter [problem] in your cell?)

2) Umenieleza kwa kirefu kidogo jambo la _____. Katika
jambo hilo matendo yako ni namna gani, au labda huwezi kufanya
kitu cho chote?
(You have explained to me the problem of _____. What
exactly do you do about that problem, or perhaps you are
unable to do anything at all?)

3)   Miaka miwili imepita sasa tangu Mwalimu Nyerere ametangaza Azimio la Arusha. Wananchi wa Tanzania wana njia mbali mbali za kutekeleza hilo Azimio la Arusha. Na kusema kweli, wengine wamefaulu kuliko wengine katika kutimiza hilo Azimio la Arusha. Kwenu kuna nini?· Hawa jamaa wa nyumba kumi zako wamefuata hasa njia gani katika kutimiza Azimio la Arusha? Au labda unaona ya kuwa Azimio hilo haliwahusu wakaaji wa mji?
(Two years have passed since President Nyerere announced the Arusha Declaration. Tanzanians have many different ways of implementing the Arusha Declaration. But, to tell the truth, some have been more successful than others in implementing the Arusha Declaration. How is it where you live? These neighbors of your ten houses--what have they done to put into practice the Arusha Declaration? Or perhaps you think that this Declaration does not concern people who live in town?)

_____ leadership code   _____ self-reliance (individual)
_____ cooperative work   _____ do your own job well;
_____ work for good of the   general hard work
        community, incl self-   _____ social ownership of
        help projects   production/stores/etc.
_____ no change, but greater   _____ no impact, change at all
        emphasis on previous
        policy
_____ other: _____ other:

4)   Unaelewaje kazi yako, kazi ya ubalozi?
(How do you understand your job, the job of cell leader?)
_____ reconciliation, arbitration, adjudication
_____ receive complaints and pass them upwards
_____ receive complaints and direct people to proper place
_____ explain policies of TANU, Tanzania
_____ lead, exhort, encourage, enthuse the people in my cell
_____ choose the leaders of TANU, Tanzania
_____ generalized assistance to the people of my cell
_____ other:
_____ other:

5) Bila shaka [kama ulivyosema sasa hivi] mara kwa mara wananchi hufika kwako kukuletea shida ama matatizo yao. Ungesema ni wangapi wanaofika kwako kwa juma moja kwa wastani?
(Doubtless [as you have just said] from time to time people come to you to bring their problems. How many people would you say come to see you in a week on the average?)

6) Mtu wa mwisho aliyeleta shida yako kwako alifika lini?
(The last person who brought you his problem came when?)
____ today   ____ within week   ____ longer than month
____ yesterday   ____ bet week & month ____ none at all

7) Sipendi kujua jina lake, lakini yeye alileta shida gani?
(I am not interested in his name, but what problem did he
bring?)

8) Ulifanyaje?
(What did you do about it?)

9) Kuna mtu aliyeleta tatizo lingine kwako, wewe ukiwa kama
balozi? Alifika lini?
(Is there someone else who brought his problem to you as
his cell leader? When did he come?)
____ today   ____ within week   ____ longer than month
____ yesterday   ____ bet week & month ____ none at all

10) Vile vile, sipendi kujua jina lake. Alikuletea shida
gani?
(Again, I am not interested in his name. What problem did
he bring you?)

11) Ukafanyaje?
(What did you do about it?)

12) Na kuna shida nyingine ambazo huletwa kwako, wewe ukiwa
kama balozi? Shida za namna gani?
(And are there other problems that have been brought to you
as a cell leader? What sorts of problems?)

13) Wewe, uwezaje?
(And you, what could you do about them?)

14) Mara kwa mara inatokea kwamba huwezi ama unashindwa
kutoa msaada katika shida fulani. Unaposhindwa, unaomba
msaada kwa mtu mwingine. Huyo ni nani?
(Sometimes it happens that you are unable to help in some
problems. When you are unable to help, you seek aid from
someone else. Who is that?)

15) Kabla ya kuwa na mabalozi, mlikuwa mnapeleka shida zenu
wapi? [Kwa mfano, aliyepokea shida hizi alikuwa ni nani?]
(Before there were cell leaders, where did you take your
problems? [For example, who was it who received these
problems?])

16) Bado mnaendelea [anaendelea] kufanya hivi?
(Do you still continue [does he still continue] to do this?)

17) Kama wewe mwenyewe [binafsi] ukiwa na shida, unakwenda kwa nani?
(When you yourself have a [your own] problem, whom do you go to see?)

18) Kama ungetaka msaada katika kazi yako ya ubalozi, ungekwenda kuonana ama kuzungumza na nani?
(If you wanted some help in your work as a cell leader, whom would you go to see, or whom would you talk to?)

19) Mara kwa mara, inatokea kwamba wewe unakwenda kuonana ama kuzungumza na: . Safari yako ya mwisho ya kuonana naye ilikuwa lini?
(Sometimes it happens that you go to see or speak with: . When was your last visit to see him?)
your branch chairman
a member of your branch council
the chairman of the Elders
the chairman of Moshi town
a TANU officer (who?)
the Area Commissioner
a regional officer (who?)
a Member of Parliament (who?)

20) Mara kwa mara unafanya mkutano na wananchi wa nyumba kumi zako?
(Do you occasionally have meetings with the residents of your cell?)
  yes/no/formerly did, but no more/just moved into the cell

21) Mkutano wa mwisho ulifanyika lini? Kusudi lake nini?
(When did the last meeting take place? What did it concern?)

22) /if election meeting/ Kabla ya mkutano huo wa uchaguzi, palikuwa na mkutano mwingine? Mkutano huu ulifanyika lini? Kusudi lake nini?
(/if election meeting/ Before that election meeting, was there another meeting? When was that held? What did it concern?)

23) Kazi ya ubalozi ni ngumu? Kwa nini?
(Is the job of a cell leader difficult? In what way?)

24) Kati ya vitu vyote unavyofanya wewe ukiwa kama balozi, unaona ni kitu gani ambacho ni cha maana sana [kuliko vitu vingine]?
(Among all the things that you do as a cell leader, what do you think is the most important?)

25) Umenieleza kwa kirefu kazi ya ubalozi. Lakini unajua
mara kwa mara wageni toka ng'ambo wanashindwa kuelewa kazi
ya chama katika nchi yenye Chama Kimoja Cha Kidemokrasi.
Maana yake, labda wanaweza kuelewa kazi ya bunge, na hata
kazi ya makao makuu ya chama, lakini kazi ya tawi hawaielewi.
Katika maoni yako, kazi ya tawi la TANU ni hasa kazi gani?
(You have explained to me in detail the work of a cell
leader. But sometimes foreigners have difficulty under-
standing the job of the party in a country with a single
democratic party. That is, they can understand the job of
the parliament, and even the job of the party headquarters,
but they do not understand the job of the branch. In your
opinion, what is the job of a TANU branch?)

____ receive complaints from   ____ govern
       the people   ____ set policy
____ explain national policy   ____ carry out policy
____ get development for   ____ encourage, exhort
       Tanzania
____ oversee, check govern-
       ment
local ____security ____justice ____discipline
____has no job at all   ____ other:
____ other:

26) Watu wengi hufikiri ya kuwa ni lazima masharui ama
matatizo yakatwe Dar es Salaam. Lakini wengine wanaona
kwamba matatizo yanayohusu mji wa Moshi inafaa zaidi
yakatwe hapa hapa. Uonaje? Imekwishatokea kwamba kukata
jambo fulani Dar es Salaam kumeleta taabu kidogo? [Unaweza
kunipa mfano, kunieleza kidogo?]
(Many people think that all decisions should be made in
Dar es Salaam. But others feel that problems that concern
the town of Moshi are better dealt with right here. What do
you think? Has it already happened that some decision in
Dar es Salaam has created some problems here? [Can you give
me an example, explain a little?])

27) Sasa, nimemaliza yale maswali ya uchunguzi wangu. Kama
nilivyoeleza, nafanya uchunguzi wa maendeleo, kuhusu serikali
za mitaa na uendeshaji wake katika Tanzania. Je, kuna kitu
ambacho nimekiacha? Au, labda kuna kitu ambacho ungetaka
kuongeza kwa hayo niliyokwishasema?
(Now, I have finished the questions of my study. As I
explained, I am studying development, especially concerning
local government and its conduct in Tanzania. Is there some-
thing I have left out? Or, perhaps there is something you
would like to add to what I have said?)

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
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