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TRADE AND PASTORALISM:
ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE HISTORY OF THE SOMALI
OF NORTHEASTERN KENYA, 1892-1948

by

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DISSERTATION

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INTRODUCTION

"There is one-half of Kenya about which the other half knows nothing, and seems to care even less."

Negley Farson,
Last Chance in Africa

The Somali of northern Kenya, although often portrayed as a group culturally and historically distinct from the other peoples of Kenya, can be viewed as an integral part of the history of three modern African countries: Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Somali Republic. The Somali have a part to play in many themes related to the history of eastern Africa: migration, Islam, trade, the clash with Europeans, and African nationalism. Indeed, during the precolonial and colonial eras the dynamic and aggressive Somali character involved them with neighboring African agriculturalists and pastoralists and with peoples from Europe, Arabia, Asia Minor, and India.

Prior to the imperial expansion of the late nineteenth century, the Somali interacted on a number of levels among themselves and with other peoples. Although

their origins are still unclear, the Somali are undoubtedly related to the Galla-speaking peoples of Ethiopia. As such the history of these two groups intertwines intimately. In the precolonial period the Somali also developed into two separate yet related types of societies. In the desert areas of the north the Somali pursued a nomadic way of life. Along the rich river valleys of the Webbi Shebelli and the Juba in the south, the Somali became agriculturalists. Often these two groups fought with one another, but they also traded and intermarried with one another. Somali development also resulted in centralized as well as decentralized societies. Some such as the Ajuran kingdom of the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries grew and disintegrated. But others such as the Obbia and Mijertein sultanates lasted into the twentieth century.

Closer to the coast the Somali belonged to the maritime sphere connecting the Horn of Africa with the peoples of Arabia, Persia, and India. One of the earliest records of the Horn is the Egyptian Queen Hatesheput's frieze, now in the Cairo Museum, depicting an expedition

to Punt for ivory, gold, and myrrh. The Somali also actively participated in the slave trade and commerce of the Indian Ocean, receiving cloth and other manufactured goods for livestock, rhino horn, and slaves. The Somali claim to Arabic descent illustrates their link to Arabia, and Islam became an integral part of their culture. Coastal contacts also resulted in the introduction of the European presence to the Horn.

Aside from the Portugese interlude from the fifteenth century, the Somali had little contact with the Europeans until the late nineteenth century. Then they experienced a direct threat in the form of British and Italian imperialism. On the whole the Somali, because of a lack of unity, a lack of fire arms, and the ability to retreat to the hinterland, failed to combat this new challenge. Some merely accepted the situation and attempted to work within the new framework. Some resisted, most notably Mohamed Abdille Hassan, popularized by the British as the "Mad Mullah." For many years, combining desert warfare and religious zeal he inspired successful resistance

to the British. Most Somali, however, found it easier to avoid confrontation by retreating farther inland.

Those in northeastern Kenya, perhaps more than any other, were on the periphery of Somali society. They were offshoots of larger groups located in neighboring Ethiopia and Somaliland. The Ogaden and the Hawiye in northeastern Kenya were less organized, less numerous, and less connected to the traditions of their brethren. Nevertheless they were the vanguard for Somali expansion in the area between the Tana and the Juba rivers. They provided the challenge to the Orma and the Boran, the Rendille and the Samburu, the Masai, the Pokomo, and the Kamba. They also controlled the trade of this area. And when the British established administration in northern Kenya, these Somali nomads finally faced the challenge met earlier by the larger groups in Somaliland.

In downcountry Kenya another group of Somali, represented by the Herti and the Isaaq, became the major instruments in the livestock trade. These traders provided white settlers with cattle, sheep, goats, horses, and

donkeys for their farms and ranches. They became urbanized and engaged in organized political agitation to obtain rights equal to those of the Asians. After World War II the Herti especially became involved in the Somali Youth League which attempted to unify all Somali in one nation. Although this movement failed, it came alive again as Kenya neared independence. From 1964 to 1967 the Somali waged a guerilla war against Kenya's troops until the Somali Republic surrendered its claims to northern Kenya. Today, however, the Somali still continue to move from southern Somali into northern Kenya.

Although the Somali played an important role in the history of Kenya, few authors have dealt with them except on a peripheral basis. Recent dissertations by E. R. Turton and Lee V. Cassanelli have contributed to the historiography of these neglected people. This dissertation contributes further by tracing the relationship of trade and pastoralism in Somali society in precolonial and colonial northeastern Kenya, and in analyzing the conflict

between these nomadic pastoralists and the British induced economy which threatened Somali independence and their traditional livelihood.

CHAPTER I

SOMALI EXPANSION INTO NORTHERN KENYA,

1892-1914

The intimate relationship between Somali nomads and their environment significantly effected their movement into northern Kenya. Because of inadequate supplies of water and pasturage, the Somali developed an expansionary outlook and frequently fought with one another as well as with non-Somali peoples. These conflicts gave impetus to migration. In the last decades of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth, the Somali entered the area that became northeastern Kenya in increasing numbers, and began regarding it as permanently theirs. The expansion was not "mindless"¹ but rather dictated by Somali awareness of historical and economic forces related to the ecological conditions of the Horn. The Somali manifested an economic awareness

¹ John David Evans, Jr., "The Dilemma of the Horn of Africa: A Study of Conflict in Northeast Africa," unpubd. dissertation (Georgetown University 1967). Evans characterized Somali expansion into northern Kenya as "mindless migration that recognized no bounds," p. 337. William Hance in The Geography of Modern Africa (New York, 1964), has stated, "Guided by the principle that Allah will provide, they [the Somali] look upon the economic motive with obvious contempt," p. 366.

in their methods of animal husbandry. Somali livestock herding was a core institution in that the animals served symbolic and practical roles in Somali attitudes toward wealth, prestige and trade. While trade and political power were important factors in the expansion of this period, pastoralism continued to be the major motivating force in Somali society.

The social and political structure of the Somali pastoralists revolved around a segmentary patrilineage.¹ The system operated at five main levels: clan-family, clan, sub-clan, primary lineage, and dia-paying group. The clan-family consisted of six major groups: the Dir, Isaaq, Darod, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanwein. Being highly segmented, widely dispersed and too unwieldy to control,

¹The following section on Somali pastoralism is heavily dependent on I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa (London 1961). Although Lewis deals primarily with those Somali in ex-British Somaliland, the nomads of northern Kenya are closely related to them. See also Lewis, Peoples of the Horn of Africa Somali, Afar and Saho in Ethnographic Survey of Africa Northeastern Africa Part I (London 1955). For a brief but useful account of the Somali in northern Kenya, see J. H. Chambers, "Report on Social and Administrative Aspects of Range Management Development in the Northeastern Province of Kenya," (Kenya Ministry of Agriculture 1969), cyclostyled at the Ministry of Agriculture Library, Nairobi. For a comparison of the nomadic economy with Somali agricultural society, see I. Lewis, "From Nomadism to Cultivation: The Expansion of Political Solidarity in Southern Somali," in Mary Douglas and P.M. Karberry, eds., Man in Africa (London 1969), pp. 61-79.

the clan-family rarely functioned as a political entity. At the next level, the clan, the nomads were loosely localized in that each clan inhabited a particular geographical area. Often a single leader--a Sultan, Garad, Wobur, or Bogor--existed, often in a symbolic capacity. Nevertheless the personality of an individual, the strength of his kin, and even geographic locale often enhanced the power of the office. Additionally, within the clan and sub-clan, a particular lineage sometimes served as a pool from which the Somali chose a Bogor or Garad, e.g., among the Aulihan, the Rer Ali; among the Marehan, the Rer Farah Ugas; and among the Ajuran, the Garen.¹ In the primary lineage no traditional office of leadership existed, nor was there any tendency toward localization. The dia-paying group, however, was the fundamental and legal basis of Somali organization. It ranged in size from a few hundred to a few thousand nomads. The elders held decision making powers since there were no established offices of leadership.

¹There is much confusion over these titles and no set definition of duties for any of them. See Ali Daud, interviewed June 1972, Wajir, and Ali Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa. Officer in Charge (hereafter OC) Northern Frontier to Governor (hereafter Gov), January 14, 1913, C.O. 533/116; E. R. Turton, "The Pastoral Tribes of Northern Kenya, 1800-1816," unpubd. dissertation (London University 1970), pp. 22-27; Lee V. Cassanelli, "The Beñaadir Past: Essays in Southern Somali History," unpubd. dissertation (University of Wisconsin 1973), p. 32.

Contractual agreements related to the payment of dia (blood price), and the usage of water and pasturage linked the dia-paying group with other kinsmen and even newcomers. Religion also influenced Somali organization. Islam provided a unifying link in Somali society. Most nomads were adherents of the Sunni sect, possibly because of connections with the Hadraumat. The two supports of Somali male society were the waranleh (spear bearers) and the waadad (sheikhs). Occasionally sheikhs rose to prominent positions. But as I. M. Lewis has pointed out, "Somali sheikhs are not normally political leaders and only in exceptional circumstances assume political power."¹ The Somali also belonged to tarikas (Islamic brotherhoods) especially on the Benaadir. During the middle of the nineteenth century conflict between tarikas, along with other factors led to the war between Bardera and Lugh.² In northern Kenya, however, Islam was much less organized. A Somali sheikh needed no formal training. He only had to be considered holy. The system, therefore, provided flexibility especially needed because of constant movement.

¹I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland (New York 1965), p. 5.

²Cassanelli, pp. 43-69.

Most Somali who swept into northern Kenya at the end of the nineteenth century were members of only two Somali clan-families, the Hawiye and the Darod.¹ The Hawiye were mainly Degodia (clan): Fai (sub-clan), Massareh, Jibrail, Hobeir, Rer Mohamud Dekatch, Rer Mohamed Liban, Gelibleh. The Darod were mostly Ogaden: Aulihan, Mohamed Zubeir, Maghabul, Habr Sulieman, Abdalla, and Abd Wak. In addition to these two major groups, the Ajuran and the Gurre, who not only spoke both Borana and Somali, but who had arrived much earlier, inhabited territory in the area bordering southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. Two other sub-clans, the Herti and Isaaq, later joined the earlier Somali, but they lived in townships and functioned as traders. In the case of the nomads, those found in northern Kenya were but a vanguard of a much larger population which remained in neighboring Ethiopia and Somaliland. New arrivals steadily supplemented

¹For a list of the major Somali-speaking peoples in northeastern Kenya, see Table I. For the areas they inhabited, see Map IV.

the vanguard, thus maintaining contacts with those left behind.¹

The Somali entering northern Kenya belonged to a much larger geographical sphere. Between longitude 39W-42E, and latitudes 26S-6N, the larger area contained parts of future Ethiopia, Kenya and the Somali Republic. The Juba River and its connections with the Benaadir coast, provided the eastern boundary; at its mouth the border ran from Kismayu southward along the Indian Ocean coast to the Tana River. Moving inland in a westerly direction, with the Tana as the southern limit, the Somali inhabited territory as far west as Hameye. From that point an indistinct line of influence extended northward

¹It is difficult to ascertain the number of Somali in northeastern Kenya at any given time. Population figures, which are far from accurate, appear in the administrative reports of the Northern Frontier in the Kenya National Archives, Nairobi: Northern Frontier District Annual Reports (hereafter NFAR), 1915-1948, PC NFD 1/1; Northern Frontier District Handing Over Reports (NFHOR), 1919-1948, PC NFD 2/1; Wajir District Annual Reports (WAR), 1914-1948, PC NFD 1/5; Wajir District Handing Over Reports (WHOR), 1913-1948, PC NFD 2/5; Garissa District Annual Reports (GAR), 1923-1948, PC NFD 1/7; Garissa District Handing Over Reports (GHOR), 1923-1948, PC NFD 2/7; Mandera District Annual Reports (MDAR), 1914-1948, PC NFD 1/3; Mandera District Handing Over Reports (MDHOR), 1931-1948; Moyale Annual Reports (MYAR), 1915-1948, PC NFD 1/6; and Moyale District Handing Over Reports (MYGOR), 1915-1948, PC NFD 2/6. For an idea of the territories inhabited by the Somali of Kenya and those in the neighboring Somaliland and Ethiopia, see Map I.

to the Ethiopian border; the line ran about 70 miles west of the Lorian Swamp, the Wajir wells and Moyale. In Ethiopia the Somali moved even farther west into the southern Borana golbo (lowlands), in the regions known as Dirre, Liban and Oddo. Moving eastward through southern Borana, they reached the Webbi Shebelli River, and then went into the Ogaden. While the western border remained fluid, those Somali in northern Kenya gradually secured control of the territory bounded by the Daua, the Juba, and the Tana rivers. The Somali spoke of their area in terms of distinct names: Jub, Lugh, Afmadu, Daua, Wama, Biskaya, Lorian, Wajir and the Uaso.¹ The Somali competed for this area with the nomadic Boran, Gabbra, Sakuye and the Kore, a collective name for the Samburu and Rendille, as well as with agriculturalists

on the Tana such as the Pokomo, and on the Juba such as the Gosha.²

¹Heri Abdi, interviewed July 1972, Sankuri. The British, who began to administer the area in 1909, divided it into the following administrative districts: 1) Jubaland, which they transferred to Italy in 1925; 2) Moyale; 3) Wajir; 4) Gurra, which became Mandera; 5) Telemugger, which became Garissa; and 6) Isiolo.

²Relatively little has been published on the non-Somali peoples of northeastern Kenya, but there is a good deal of information scattered throughout the files in the Kenya National Archives. Among the more recent works are: Paul Spencer, Nomads in Alliance Symbiosis and Growth Among the Rendille and Samburu of Kenya (London 1973); Robert L. Bunker, Jr., Islamization Among the Upper Pokomo (Syracuse 1973); and Asmeron Legesse, Gada Three Approaches to the Study of an African Society (New York 1973), which deals with the Boran of Ethiopia.

As in the larger area pastoralism fitted well into the desert environment of northern Kenya. Most of the area consisted of an arid semi-desert with a desiccating wind blowing during the hot seasons of hagai (June through October), and jilal (January through March) when temperatures hovered between 90° to 120° F. The land was flat, an occasional hill a rarity, although near Moyale and the Ethiopian escarpment heights reached 4,000 feet above sea level. From there the land sloped toward the coast, and Garissa was only 500 feet above sea level. Rainfall was sparse. In the dry, sandy soil bush and thorn thicket were interspersed with areas of sparse undergrowth and dwarf-acacia trees. Extensive denudation of the sandy soil occurred in localized places, especially near sources of permanent water. Thus the area surrounding the Wajir wells, and farther north the banks of the Daa, consisted of sandy areas surrounded by bush. This deterioration resulted in a loose shallow soil which, although desert, was not like the deep shifting dunes of the Sahara. Other types of soil affecting the nomadic

way of life ranged from the dusty, gray, soft adabla which provided good grazing for cattle, to the black, moist boji which could be cultivated. Little cultivation occurred, however, except along river banks. Agriculture suffered more from the lack of water than any other factor, since the land held sufficient minerals for farming.¹

Because supplies were few and scattered, the lack of water played an important part in migratory movements. Permanent water existed only in rivers and at a few well centers. The three rivers, the Daua, the Tana and the Juba held dependable resources but were distant from one another. The well centers were few and spread far apart. Only Moyale, El Wak, Afmadu and Wajir held adequate and permanent supplies necessary for large numbers of livestock. Wajir, the largest, contained some 100 wells scattered over a seventy-mile area. Smaller centers existed at Buna and Takabba. Semi-permanent water courses and natural depressions which filled after the rains also provided supplies. Their availability ranged from only a few days to a few weeks, but these

¹D. C. Edwards, "Report on the Grazing Areas of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya," November 20, 1943, pp. 2-3 and p. 12, EC NFD 5/5/8. See also John Parkinson, "Notes on the Northern Frontier Province, Kenya," Geographical Journal (London), vol. 94 (1969), pp. 162-166.

small pans could be found throughout the north. The Lorian Swamp, the Deshek Wama, and the Uaso Nyiro were among the more important semi-permanent sources of water.¹

Sparsely and erratic rains exacerbated the situation. Rain fell only during two seasons. The gu or long rains came during the months of March through May, whereas the dir or short rains occurred from late October through mid-December. The volume of rainfall in any given month, however, was highly unpredictable. Yearly cycles of light rainfall and heavy rainfall compounded the problem. For example, in the period 1923-1948, Wajir reached a high of 24.16 inches in 1926, and a low of 3.96 inches in 1934. The amount also varied from one locale to another. Moyale averaged approximately 25 inches per year, Wajir 10 inches, Mandera 11 inches,

¹ Frank Dixey, "Hydrographical Survey of the Northern Frontier District, Kenya," 1943, PC NFD 5/2/8; Sir Michael Blundell, African Land Development in Kenya 1946-1962 (Nairobi 1962), p. 222. See also F.M. Ayers, Geology of Wajir-Mandera District North East Kenya (Nairobi 1952); P. Joubert, Geology of Wajir-Wajir Bor Area (Nairobi 1963) and Geology of Mandera-Damassa Area (Nairobi 1960); E.P. Saggerson and S.E. Quarters, Geology of the Takabba-Wergudud Area, Mandera District (Nairobi 1957); A.O. Thompson and R.G. Dodson, Geology of the Bur Mayo-Tarbai Area (Nairobi 1960) and Geology of Derkali-Melka Murri Area (Nairobi 1958); L. Aylmer, "The Country Between the Juba River and Lake Rudolf," Geographical Journal, vol. 38 (1911), pp. 289-296.

and Garissa 14 inches.¹

In this arid environment the Somali raised four basic types of livestock: camels, cattle, sheep and goats.² Their survival depended on these animals. Ownership patterns varied among the different Somali groups. Cattle owners frequently kept a few goats and only a few transport camels. Camel owners rarely herded cattle, but frequently had large herds of goats. For example, the Aulihan Rer Afgab, though known primarily as camel men, also raised sheep and goats. Most Degodia herded only camels, but among them the Rer Mohamud Dekatch owned mainly cattle. The nomads also allowed kin in neighboring territory to herd livestock for them. Thus, a camel man might own cattle but never herd them. Such differentiation occurred due to a combination of historical factors and the locale inhabited. The Somali did not aimlessly wander but had a definite purpose to their

movement. An important factor in this purpose was the

¹Compiled from the rainfall statistics in administrative reports listed in footnote no. 1. Statistics appear regularly for all districts only in the period 1923-1948. Although measurements are not exact, they are useful to indicate the disparity from one area to another. See Edwards, pp. 2-3. For an ecological overview of the area, see Map II.

²For the scientific categorization of Somali livestock, see Lewis, Peoples of the Horn (1955), pp. 67-71. I. L. Mason and J. P. Maule, The Indigenous Livestock of Eastern and Southern Africa (Farnham 1960), place the Somali animals in a broader setting.

attainment of economic objectives such as survival, prestige, wealth and trade. Thus the Somali, besides striving to survive the rigors of a harsh environment, also engaged in an economic venture to increase the size of their herds as they moved throughout the north.

The Somali nomads do not fit easily into categories devised by anthropologists. Certain scholars suggest that all nomads can be categorized according to their objectives in raising livestock. On this basis the Somali should be considered as "semi-pastoralists" rather than "pure-pastoralists."¹ A more realistic approach is to study Somali clans separately. Some Somali raised livestock for food consumption and internal social exchange in addition to exchanging their animals for agricultural foods which they did not produce. Therefore, they participated in a system related to external trade and markets. Others were less likely to trade and relied almost exclusively on their livestock for subsistence. For example, many Gurre herded only cattle. Sometimes they traded this cattle for grain produced by the Daua

¹ Alan H. Jacobs, "African Pastoralists: Some General Remarks," Anthropological Quarterly (Washington, D. C.) vol. 38 (1965), pp. 144-54; Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," pp. 10-14. For another view, see Rada Dyson-Hudson, "Pastoralism: Self-Image and Behavioral Reality," Journal of Asian and African Studies (Leiden), vol. 7 (1972), pp. 30-47.

River agriculturalists, and some even engaged in farming. The Degodia, on the other hand, subsisted almost solely on milk from their own camels. Cassanelli has also shown that camel keepers are much more self-sufficient than cattle owners.¹ Thus, to base judgment solely on diet and trade is too simplistic since social factors must also be considered.

The Somali gauged wealth and prestige according to the amount of livestock owned. While authors have disagreed about the degree to which prestige affected societies in the East African cattle complex,² the Somali economy undoubtedly included prestige as a factor. The Somali practices of bride-wealth and blood-wealth are good examples of how prestige functioned in Somali society.

Yarad (bride-wealth) varied according to the particular situation. The standing of the parties involved, the quality of the bride, and the aims of the groups concerned in establishing a link between lineages were important. The Somali exchanged both a yarad and a

¹Cassanelli, pp. 10-13.

²For a discussion of Melville Herskovits' hypotheses regarding the East Africa cattle complex and for arguments against it, see Mark Karp, The Economics of Trusteeship in Somalia (Boston 1960), pp. 60-63.

dibaad (dowry). The nomads paid both in livestock, with camels and cattle being the most prestigious animals, and in some areas horses, firearms and cloth. Although there was little net difference the dibaad did not minimize the importance of yarad. Without it, a satisfactory transition could not take place. Even after the exchange, however, a Somali did not legalize his marriage until the holding of a proper Muslim ceremony.¹

Somali payment of dia (blood-wealth) also reflected Somali economic values. Payment occurred when a member of one Somali section physically harmed a member of another section. The practice alleviated tensions and therefore prevented extensive bloodshed. The amount payable, decided in a meeting of elders, depended on the following variables: 1) the status of the persons involved; 2) whether or not the incident took place within the dia paying group; 3) the size of the sections included in the incident; 4) the sex of the person harmed; and 5) whether or not the incident was accidental. In the northeast the Somali usually paid 100 camels or 200

¹ I. M. Lewis, Marriage and the Family in Northern Somaliland (Kampala 1962), pp. 21-22.

cattle for the death of a male, and only 50 camels or 30 cattle for that of a woman. If the claim involved a Somali and a Boran, payment followed Somali customs.¹

Many Somali relied almost exclusively on livestock for subsistence. Their diet consisted mainly of milk, although some supplemented this with grain and bush fruits. On the rare occasions when they ate meat, they killed camels or cattle. The nomads reserved camels and cattle for feasts and marriages, or killed a dying animal if the disease was not contagious to man. Occasionally they also hunted wild game. The Somali valued highly goat and cattle milk, but above all camel milk. The nomads also favored ghee (clarified butter), and they used it in preparing cooked foods.² Trade brought maize and rice, as well as coffee beans which were the main component of the Somali drink known as buni. Later the Somali began purchasing tea and sugar.

¹Senior Commissioner Northern Frontier to Chief Native Commissioner, May 20, 1927, OC NFD 4/1/8. See also Officer in Charge Northern Frontier to Governor, January 14, 1913, C.O. 533/116; Lewis, Peoples of the Horn, pp. 107-110; and Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy, pp. 72, 84 and 186-187.

²Lewis, Peoples of the Horn, p. 84 and A Pastoral Democracy, p. 85; Nello Puccioni, "Caratteristiche Antropologiche ed Etnografiche Delle Popolazione Della Somalia," Bollettino Royale Societa Geografica Italiana (Rome), vol. 1, Series 7 (1936), p. 218; Mohamed Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa.

Somali survival, therefore, depended on keeping an adequate number of livestock. The Somali way of life reflected the importance of livestock and the nomad's reliance on his animals. The Somali manifested a definite economic attitude which went far beyond ideas of prestige. Mark Karp has termed this attitude as "pre-cautionary hoarding." He has described how threats of drought and disease caused the Somali to treat livestock on the basis that "the larger his herd, the stronger is the probability that a sufficient number of animals will survive."¹ In order to achieve the growth of large herds, therefore, the Somali arranged their lives around livestock management. They undertook two vital activities: maintaining a balanced herd and utilizing the available water and pasturage.

Maintaining livestock entailed the keeping of a proper sex ratio within the herd and balancing the number of animals to the number of humans involved in herding. Management necessitated establishing the proper sex ratio of male to female animals. An oversupply of

¹Karp, pp. 64-70. For similar studies in a more recent setting, see C.AA.Konczacki, "Nomadism and Economic Development of Somalia," Canadian Journal of African Studies (Montreal), vol. 1 (1967), pp. 163-75; and Thadis W. Box, "Nomadism and Land Use in Somalia," Journal of Economic Development and Cultural Change (Chicago), vol. 19 (1970-71), pp. 222-28.

males was inefficient in that the males required herding. Yet males were relatively unproductive because only a few could be used for breeding, and none yielded milk. The Somali also placed less value on barren female livestock or poor milk producers. The ideal herd, therefore, consisted of a minimum of males for breeding, a low proportion of barren females, and a sizeable proportion of potential foal-producing, high-milk-yield females. Furthermore, the nomad balanced as best as possible the herd numbers with humans in this symbiotic relationship. To manage a herd efficiently the nomad needed to know how many livestock were essential to support a certain sized family, and at the same recognize how many persons were necessary to care properly for that herd. Thus the size of a herd could possibly dictate how many wives a man had, and even how many children. I.M. Lewis has estimated that a family consisting of a mother and three children needed a minimum of 50 sheep and goats to subsist in northern Somaliland.¹ Nomads in northern Kenya suggested that they needed at least 10 milk camels to

¹Lewis, Peoples of the Horn, p. 69 and
A Pastoral Democracy, p. 58.

support a man and his immediate family.¹

To survive the Somali constantly moved their herds to find adequate water and pasturage. Mistakes in judgment resulted in more than the death of livestock. For example, in 1931 the Orma attempted to move from Italian Somaliland through Garissa district to the Tana River during the dry season, but their failure caused the death of 150 nomads and 8,000 head of livestock.² The Somali also fought with other competitors for these scarce resources. The nomads, therefore, had to match the needs of the livestock to the locale. They aimed at maximizing the number of animals in the dry season in order to take advantage of the gu and the dir rains.

During the rainy seasons as the herds moved away from permanent sources of water, the Somali found life less difficult. Each animal, however, had different

¹Farah Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Gargar Moosa, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Unshur Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Giriftu; and Hussein Alew, interviewed July 1972, El Wak.

²The Orma are a Galla speaking people, related to the Boran, and known to the Somali as Wardai. For a first hand account of the disaster, see H. B. Sharpe, "A Tragedy," Blackwood's Magazine (Edinburgh), vol. 236 (1934), pp. 621-631; and R. G. Turnbull, "The Warden," Kenya Police Review (Nairobi), July 1957, pp. 268-289 and October 1957, pp. 308-313.

grazing and watering habits which restricted that type of animals' range. As the dry season approached, this factor became crucial and herds moved toward more permanent sources of water. Goats required the least attention, and usually grazed alone. Sheep needed to be watched constantly, and were more selective in their grazing habits since they did not browse. Camels were the most flexible because they browsed and grazed. The animals also responded differently to soil and mineral content. For example, although cattle developed well on adaba and gave a higher milk-yield while grazing on it, sheep fared poorly.¹ Furthermore, herd movement depended on watering needs. During rainy seasons goats and camels went without watering for two to three months because they obtained sufficient moisture from vegetation. Dry season capacities were different. Then sheep and goats watered every four to eight days, and cattle every four days.

¹Chambers, pp. 5-6; and R.M. Watson, "A Census of the Domestic Stock of Northeastern Province," (Kenya Ministry of Agriculture 1969), cyclostyled at the Ministry of Agriculture Library Nairobi. Travellers' literature suggests the existence of an imaginary line below which camel herding should not take place. See I.N. Dracopoli, Through Jubaland to the Mysterious Lorian Swamp (London 1911), pp. 145, 278 and 438; T.S. Thomas, Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District (Nairobi 1917), p. 7; E.M. Clifford, "Notes on Jubaland," Geographical Journal vol. 72 (1928), p. 438; Puccioni, p. 211; and W.B. Minnis, "Notes on Durran," and "Notes on Rock Salt," February 25, 1951, PC NFD 4/1/10. Asking my informants about this line only elicited vague replies that some places are better for raising camels than others, and that all Somali own some camels.

Camels, however, watered only every fourteen days.¹

The least mobile animals, therefore, were cattle. As such cattle owners were more susceptible to the failure of the rains, more likely to trade for grains to supplement their diet, and because they were more localized than their camel owning kin, more open to attack by raiders.

Disease also influenced the herding of livestock. Malaria affected man most seriously,² but the nomad had to remain near water sources because of the livestock. Cattle and camels suffered from trypanosomiasis. For example, two types of dukkan (trypanosomiasis) attacked camels. One confined itself to the vicinity of dense bush near water, and could be found as far as a mile and a half from water. The other fly, had a wider distribution because it did not need shade to survive. Both appeared in abundance after the rainy season with their

¹Lewis, Peoples of the Horn, pp. 67-70 and Robert G. Mares, "Animal Husbandry, Animal Industry and Animal Diseases in the Somaliland Protectorate," British Veterinary Journal (London), vol. 110 (1954), pp. 411-423.

²Humans also suffered from other diseases such as tuberculosis. A. S. Mackie, "Life in the Northern Frontier District," Kenya Medical Journal (Nairobi), vol. 1 (1924), pp. 368-372; and R. B. Heisch, "Two Years Medical Work in the Northern Frontier District, Kenya Colony," East Africa Medical Journal, January 1947, in PC NFD 12/3. For a broader perspective on humans, disease and environment, see R. Mansell Prothero, Migrants and Malaria (London 1965), pp. 64-78.

numbers falling off rapidly as the dry season approached.¹ Rinderpest, pleuropneumonia, and foot and mouth disease posed problems for cattle owners. Trypanosomiasis and caprine pleuropneumonia attacked sheep and goats.² When herds moved from one area to another, belts of disease often dictated decisions.

The Somali devised herding systems to cope with these problems of disease, scarce water, varying types of vegetation and soil. Camel owners, for example, resorted to a division of labor. They separated their herds into two basic units: the camel camp and the nomadic hamlet. Young boys usually took the majority of camels into the bush, and women and young girls remained behind at camp with the sheep and goats. The women also kept a few milk camels. In the bush the nomads often divided the herds further into groups of milk animals and

¹District Commissioner (hereafter DC) Wajir to DC Garissa, April 20, 1942, DC GRSSA 12/1; W. B. Minnis, "Notes on Dukkan," February 24, 1951, PC NFD 4/1/10; A. S. Leese, "Jubaland Veterinary Annual Report 1913-1914," and "Preliminary Report on Military Camels in Jubaland," Syracuse University Microfilm Collection of the Kenya National Archives (hereafter S.U. KNA MIC), Film No. 2084, Reel 104.

²P. Z. Mackenzie and R. M. Simpson, The African Veterinary Handbook, 4th ed., (Nairobi 1967); Third Progress Report of the Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis Survey and Control in Kenya Colony (Nairobi 1948); "Post War Development Plan for Veterinary Department," August 22, 1944, cyclostyled, pp. 2-5, at Kabete Archives.

dry animals. Those herding the latter were more mobile. As the wet season ended, these different groups tended to unite, and the nomads moved toward the permanent supplies of water.

Although the Somali believed in "precautionary hoarding," they intended that some of their livestock be traded for goods that they did not produce. They exchanged both livestock and livestock products for agricultural produce and manufactured goods. The Somali traded for grain, mainly maize, cloth, buni, tea, sugar, beads and utensils. In addition to trading livestock, skins, hides, milk and ghee, the nomad also collected, transported and traded ivory, rhino horn, ostrich feathers, gum, perfumed wood, orchella weed, and for a time, slaves. In their transactions the Somali evinced a definite preference for trading some livestock more readily than others.

The nomads preferred to trade what they considered the least valuable of their livestock. They readily exchanged male camels or barren female stock, or the

least healthy beasts. Whenever possible they avoided trading off good milk animals or young, potential, foal-producing females. Of course, on long treks to coastal centers they necessarily took the strongest and healthiest animals, or those best able to survive the journey.¹ The Somali, therefore, were not uneconomic in their trading. A more difficult question arises when trying to define which Somali were traders as opposed to nomads.

Although trade was an integral part of the Somali economic structure, some groups involved themselves more than others. For example, the Gurre traded to a greater extent than the Degodia. Nevertheless, even within Gurre society most considered themselves as nomads not traders. Furthermore, there was the question of what level of activity constituted a trader. Some Somali, who made only two or three trips to the coast or the entrepots on the upper Juba during their entire lives, were primarily nomads and not traders. Even those who undertook many trading journeys in their lifetime did so infrequently. While not trading the Somali

¹Lewis, Peoples of the Horn, pp. 78-89; Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Heri Abdi, interviewed July 1972, Sankuri; and Walter Amadio, "L'Oltre Guiba un anno nel nuova territorio," L'Esplorazione Commerciale (Milano), vol. 16 (1925), pp. 206-215.

continued to live as nomads. Certainly when a trader retired he returned to a nomadic way of life.¹ Thus pastoralism, not trade, remained the core economic institution of the Somali even though some nomads became involved in all facets of trade including the collection and production of goods, their transport and sale. Dependent on external markets to obtain goods, the Somali developed a system of camel caravans linking the interior to the trading centers on the Indian Ocean Coast. This caravan trade will be the subject of Chapter II.

Somali dependence on livestock for prestige, wealth, trade and survival plus the harsh environment shaped attitudes toward water and territorial rights. In theory no individual, or group of individuals, held exclusive rights over any particular grazing area. Somali did apply individual rights to specific permanent wells. But a more realistic gauge of ownership entailed the effective occupation of an area, and the maintenance of its wells. The mobility of Somali groups and the manpower it mustered were of the utmost importance.

¹Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Mohamed Warfa, interviewed August 1972, Nairobi.

During the dry season the Somali contested such claims more frequently than in the rainy season. The Somali often sought solutions to disagreements in raids and counter-raids. Somali caravans also faced danger from hostile clans. Most caravans traveled during the period November through December when plentiful water supplies existed along the trade routes. They could be denied access to an area or looted by hostile Somali.¹ The Somali also employed non-violent methods in resolving conflicts. One example, which also reflects economic attitudes, is the system of shegat (client or clientage).

The Somali practice of shegat provided both patrons and clients with a peaceful means of settling potential conflict. Through shegat the Somali shared available pasture and water. Patrons viewed the system as a way of controlling potentially disruptive newcomers while strengthening their own position vis-a-vis other hostile Somali in the area. They adopted these strangers and assumed responsibility for their protection. Clients used the process to achieve a foothold in new territory.

¹ For a discussion of territorial rights, see Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (1961), pp. 49-55; and J. A. Hunt, A General Survey of the Somaliland Protectorate (London 1951), pp. 153-154.

with a minimum of difficulty. Usually Somali shegats came from recently defeated groups, or from those so small in number that they obviously were at a military disadvantage.¹

Although each Somali group had its own rules regarding shegat, similarities were more apparent than differences. Shegat usually took place at the sub-clan level, and could include non-Somali. In the northeast for example, the Mohamed Zubeir were known as the most generous hosts toward shegats; the Ajuran and the Gurre lived as clients to the Boran before breaking away.² The Somali also had clients individuals from the Gabbra, and the Sakuye, as well as the Orma and the Boni, although in the case of the two latter groups the Somali held them in a position lower than that of a shegat. Under the system of shegat newcomers could go to any potential host

¹ Lewis, Peoples of the Horn, p. 116; Cassanelli, pp. 12-14; Saadia Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge 1963), pp. 67-68; R. G. Burnbull, "The Darod Invasion," unpubd. typescript at Fort Jesus Library, Mombasa; and Anon., "Notes on Wajir's Political Background," Appendix A; WHOR 1952, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2804, Reel 94.

² My Ajuran informants were much more open in discussing the shegat status of their people to the Boran prior to the arrival of the British. The Gurre on the other hand often denied such. See Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir for an example of the Ajuran viewpoint. Mohamed Jari, interviewed July 1972, El Wak for the Gurre.

and propose a merger, but needed a host to introduce the suggestion to the sub-clan. Then the hosts held a shir (meeting) and gave a decision. If favorable, the Boqor announced it as official. The hosts accepted the shegats into a specific section; any relatives that came afterwards, if they sought a shegat status, also had to join that same section. For example, the Mohamed Zubeir Rer Hersi accepted as their allies all Fai that came to the Wajir area, and the Ugas Guled allowed all Rer Mohamud Dekatch to become shegats.¹ In this way the galti (strangers) achieved peaceful penetration of a territory. At the same time the hosts increased the number of fighting men, and the pool of marriageable women. The hosts also benefitted from the increased numbers of livestock from which dia payments, if necessary, were made. The larger the number of livestock available, the less the incidence of dia assessed on individual stock owners.

In theory the process of shegat assured equality between clients and hosts. According to its principles

¹ Nuria Dido, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Ali Daud, interviewed June 1972 and July 1972, Wajir; "Notes on Wajir's Political Background," WHOR 1952, S.U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2804, Reel 94.

the hosts allowed full rights to clients regarding pasturage and water. They permitted their clients' animals to water and to graze throughout the territory. The patrons also allowed the clients to settle differences within their own group, and even gave them the right to sit in shiria voicing opinions on raids, livestock movement, and dia payments. In matters of dia hosts and clients were equal. If a client's actions resulted in conflict with another Somali group, the host contributed to dia payments and vice versa. Likewise during war the hosts and clients stood shoulder-to-shoulder. Finally, hosts and clients could intermarry.¹

In reality hosts discriminated against their shegats. Frequently the hosts restricted their clients to given wells on given days, and gave the shegats no voice in the matter. Nor did they allow shegats to dig their own wells, although the hosts expected clients to aid in the maintenance of those already existing. Second, hosts often interfered in their clients' internal disputes. They excluded shegats from shiria, and from important

¹The following informants were most useful in discussing the system of shegat: Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Ali Daud, interviewed June 1972 and July 1972, Wajir; Mohamed Kulamama, interviewed June 1972, Giriftu; Sagana Hussein, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Mohamed Madey, interviewed June 1972, Habbaswein; Hajir Abdullai, interviewed July 1972, Wajir. See also OC to all DCs, May 23, 1939, DC GRSSA 18/1; and Stephen to Jock, February 12, 1958, DC ISO 5/1.

military and advisory positions. Third, they often forced clients to pay a disproportionate amount of dia. In fact, some hosts required shegats to give them cloth and other goods in the form of a tax. Fourth, while marriage usually was not an area of discrimination, in cases involving Boran and other non-Somali, non-Muslim groups, often hosts married their clients' women but would not allow the reverse. Fifth, during times of drought hosts made shegats undertake the difficult task of searching for water. Finally, hosts employed the time-honored practice of insulting shegats by raising the question of their origins when tempers became heated.¹

The Somali took advantage of the flexibility in the system. If a dispute arose, either the host or the client could break off the relationship. When such a situation occurred each group retained its own livestock; and usually the weaker group, sometimes the original host, moved elsewhere. The Somali use of shegat was apparent in the last decade of the nineteenth century when convenience, war, and the harsh environment combined

¹Ibid.

to thrust the Somali into northern Kenya in greater numbers than ever before.

The entrance of Somali-speaking peoples into northern Kenya was the consequence of a process which had been taking place in the Horn of Africa since the tenth century A. D.¹ Scholars do not agree on the origin of the Somali²--the name did not appear until the fifteenth century, and its meaning is still unclear. Most scholars suggest a gradual expansion of different sized groups, employing militaristic as well as peaceful means, and taking a general south-southwesterly direction. Motivation included the search for better water and grazing supplies, population pressure, trade, expansion by other peoples, and undoubtedly, Somali aspirations of power.

Before the late nineteenth century, other Somali-speaking groups had reached northern Kenya. Both written and oral sources have indicated that the Ajuran, who were

¹ I. M. Lewis, "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa," Journal of African History (London), vol. 1 (1960), pp. 213-239; D. A. Low, "The Northern Interior, 1840-84," in Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew, eds., History of East Africa, vol. 1 (Oxford 1963), pp. 320-322.

² Ibid.; Herbert S. Lewis, "The Origins of the Galla and the Somali," Journal of African History vol. 7 (1966), pp. 27-46. For a synthesis of the disagreement, see Harold C. Fleming, "Baiso and Rendille: Somali Outliers," Rassegna di Studi Etiopici (Rome), vol. 20 (1964), pp. 35-96.

of Hawiye descent, migrated from the Horn into northern Kenya prior to the nineteenth century. When the Ajuran kingdom, which dominated the Benaadir from the end of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth, dissolved, some sections gradually drifted toward northern Kenya. Around the same time, the Gurre left the Shebelle and moved down the Juba to their present position.¹ Thus, extensive contact between the Ajuran and the Gurre with Boran-speaking peoples probably occurred from the middle of the seventeenth century onward.

The Ajuran relationship with the Boran proved more durable than that of the Gurre with the Boran. The Ajuran were allies of the Boran-Gona and the Gurre of the Boran Sabo. The Ajuran openly acknowledged their role as shegats while the Gurre perceived the relationship as one between equals. Undoubtedly some Gurre were shegats.² Both the Ajuran and the Gurre adopted Boran language and customs. Many lost their attachment to Islam. The assimilation was so thorough that as late as 1962 the British administration viewed the Ajuran and the

¹ Lewis, Peoples of the Horn (1955), pp. 47-48; Cassanelli, pp. 20-42; and J. W. K. Pease, "An Ethnological Treatise on the Gurre Tribe," pp. 16-20, DC MDA 4/3.

² Paul Goto, "The Boran of Northern Kenya: Origins, Migrations and Settlements in the 19th Century," unpubd. B.A. thesis (University of Nairobi 1972), pp. 47-48.

Gurre as Boran in origin, and at best "half-Somali."¹ Around the middle of the nineteenth century the Gurre openly raided and attacked Boran encampments. They caused an irrevocable split with their previous hosts, and the beginning of the decline of Boran power.² The Ajuran continued their friendship, but with the arrival of the Eji they expressed an ambivalent attitude toward their hosts.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century a spurt of activity carried the Somali from neighboring Ethiopia and Somaliland into northern Kenya. The Eji who swept into northern Kenya were mainly Ogaden, but the name was a general one applying to all Somali newcomers at this time. They consisted mostly of nomads and some traders. Few in numbers at first, the Somali increased as the major migratory movements progressed. The pressure to find pasturage and water was a constant factor in Somali expansion, but more proximate reasons for the migrations of the 1890's and early 1900's existed. The expansion of the Ethiopian empire under Menelik,³ the

¹Report of the Northern Frontier District Commission, Cmd. 1900 (London) 1963).

²Pease, DC MDA 4/3; Goto, p. 52.

³G. Marcus, "Imperialism and Expansion in Ethiopia from 1865 to 1900," Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan, eds. Colonialism in Africa, vol. I (Cambridge 1969), pp. 420-461; and Vico Montegazza, Menelik, l'Italia e l'Ethiopia (Milano 1910).

Jihad of Mohamed Abdille Hassan in northern Somaliland,¹ and the arrival of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA Company) on the Indian Ocean Coast,² contributed to Somali expansion. Furthermore, fighting among the Somali generated even greater movement. As a result, larger number of Somali penetrated farther west than ever before.

Three distinct yet interrelated flows of Somali people can be discerned. From the Oddo in Ethiopia the Degodia streamed across the Juba and the Daua into Gurre territory, and to that of the Ajuran and the Boran near present day Moyale. They also drifted southward toward Wajir and the Uaso. In the second main movement, the Ogaden pushed toward the Wajir wells. The Aulihan, migrating from Ethiopia and northern Jubaland, passed through the Mohamed Zubeir around Wajir. They came up against the Boran to the west, and the Abd Wak Somali to the south. Meanwhile, the Mohamed Zubeir continued to control the area between Wajir and Afmadu, gathering strength by accepting more shegats than any other Somali

¹E. R. Turton, "The Impact of Mohamed Abdille Hassan in the East Africa Protectorate," Journal of African History, vol. 10 (1960), pp. 641-657.

²Marie Dekiewet Hemphill, "The British Sphere 1884-94," in Oliver and Mathew, pp. 391-432. See also M. DeKiewet, "History of the Imperial British East Africa Company 1876-95," unpubd. dissertation (London University 1955).

group. The third movement occurred in the Tana River region. The Abd Wak and the Abdalla not only encroached on the Boran eastern flank, but also harassed the Pokomo to the south and the Orma to the east. Somali penetration established a vanguard allowing for further immigration which continued even beyond the colonial period. Additionally the Somali not only gained control of the trade routes to the coast, but also of substantial territory once inhabited by Galla-speaking peoples.

The Degodia movement from the north was longstanding. The gradual exodus of Degodia westward from El Bai in the mid-nineteenth century resulted from Ogaden pressure along the upper Webbi-Shebelli River. By the end of the century the Degodia reached the area between the Ganale Doria and the Webi Gestro, as well as the area north of Lugh along the Juba. They challenged the Gurre for the control of the Daua at this time. Soon both the Degodia and the Gurre faced the threat of Ethiopian expansion.

Although they dispersed in a number of directions,

the Degodia entered northern Kenya in two main groups. The Rer Mohamed Liban led one group which moved along the northern side of the Daua until halted by the Boran. In 1893, not able to move farther west, the Degodia crossed the Daua. Near Takabba they allied themselves with the Ajuran. In 1904 the first Degodia arrived at Wajir. In the meantime, another group of Degodia, the Rer Mohamed Dekatch, moved south from Bai reaching Bardera around 1896. Since they could not overcome the strength of the Rahanwein south of Bardera, these Degodia forded the Juba in 1904. Four years later after gradual westward progress, they reached Wajir. The Rer Mohamud Dekatch became shegats of the Mohamed Zubeir. Another Degodia thrust took place near Dolo on the Juba. These Degodia became involved with the Marehan who then controlled the area to the west of Lugh. In the mid-1890's, however, an alliance of Marehan, Gasr Guda, and Gobowein drove the Degodia from Jubaland. The Gurre interceded as peacemakers, and accepted some Degodia shegats. Other Degodia moved across the Daua toward Oddo. In 1904

those Degodia who had returned to Oddo, re-crossed the Daua. Four years later some of the Degodia arrived at Wajir. These Degodia included the Fai and the Jibrail. On arriving at Wajir, the Degodia split into their different lineage groups and became shegats to the hosts of their kin.¹

The second and third major movements of Somali peoples into northern Kenya consisted mainly of Ogaden. The Ogaden approached Wajir from the east and the south. In the process they drove the Orma from the Juba valley, and after that seriously challenged the Boran for dominance of the north. Farther south the Ogaden established themselves on the lower Juba, and expanded toward the Tana River region. Thus, in the period from 1848 to 1892 a combination of migratory movements by Ogaden peoples ensured their influence of the territory from the upper to the lower Juba, and stretched inland to the Lorian, Wajir and along the Tana. The Marehan led the movement on the upper Juba. The Kablallā--Mohamed Zubeir, Aulihan, Maghabul, Abd Wak and Abdalla--thrust toward the Lorian,

¹R. G. Turnbull, "Some Notes on the History of the Degodia up to 1912," 1953 PC NFD 4/1/1; Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," pp. 361-372 and 492-493.

the Uaso Nyiro and Wajir. The Abd Wak and the Abdalla, known collectively as the Tellemugger, were also important in extending Somali control along the lower Tana.

During the period 1848-1858 the Ogaden movement toward Wajir gained impetus. Because of their relative strength the Ogaden could not challenge the Rahanwein, and therefore, they crossed the river into the sparsely populated trans-Juba area. The Ogaden became allies with their Galla-speaking predecessors, the Orma, known to the Somali as the Wardei. As soon as they were powerful enough, the Ogaden turned on the Orma and almost exterminated them in a series of wars. Previously the Orma had controlled the area ranging from southern Ethiopia to Wajir and to the Juba. By mid-century the Somali posed a serious threat. As early as 1848 a Somali raiding party reached Wajir Bor, some 30 miles from the main wells. By 1860 Somali herds grazed at Afmadu. In the next decade a combination of forces defeated the Orma and drove them across the Tana. On the upper Juba the Marehan, joining with Somali from Bardera, raided the

Orma. The Gurre also attacked the Orma near El Wak. At about the same time, the Herti, having arrived at Kismayu by dhow, began their expansion toward Afmadu. Farther inland the Boran and their Ajuran allies pushed the Orma farther south. By 1872 the Somali raids at El Wak, Afmadu and Wajir forced the Orma to flee in defeat until they reached and crossed the Tana.¹ The Ogaden, however, did not immediately attempt to settle the area deep in the interior. Rather they contented themselves with consolidating their gains near the Juba River. Thus the Boran, and their Ajuran shegats, first migrated to the vacated Wajir and El Wak well centers. Although they successfully met Somali challenges during the period 1870 to 1890, the Boran could not permanently stay the Somali infiltration.

During these years the career of Abdi Ibrahim, Boqor of the Abd Wak, illustrates Somali relationships with non-Somali peoples. Well known for his fighting prowess, Abdi Ibrahim ably organized and led far afield large Somali raiding parties consisting of the different

¹Turnbull, "Darod Invasion," p. 19; and "The Wardeh," pp. 268-269 and 308-313; Lewis, "The Somali Conquest," (1960), pp. 225-263; Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," pp. 73-85.

Ogaden sub-clans. In the 1880's he reached the Lorian Swamp and the Uaso Nyiro as his raiders clashed with the Kore. Soon after, his men fought the Boran at Buna. In 1886 his raiders, including Abd Wak, Aulihan, Mohamed Zubeir, Herti and even Marehan warriors, encountered a force of Samburu and Dorobo near Garba Tula. After losing many to the enemies' bowmen, Abdi Ibrahim retired from the battle of Bur Balayo (the hill of shame). Six years later after collecting an army of 700 Somali, he launched a campaign into Meru. Internal dissension weakened the expedition, and some members returned to Jubaland. Thus, in 1892 near the present town of Meru, Abdi Ibrahim's forces suffered a resounding defeat at the hands of the Meru and the Samburu. He and almost 300 of his men died in battle.¹ Abdi Ibrahim's death marked a turning point in Somali expansion. Thereafter, Somali expansion rarely included large scale raids, but rather depended on small scale sporadic infiltration. Nor did they attempt to move as far west as Abdi Ibrahim had. The cumulative effect of this penetration, however,

¹Ibid.; A. Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries (New York 1896), p. 351; Heri Abdi, interviewed, July 1972, Sankuri; and personal communication, Mohamed Dahir, September 1972.

posed a continuous threat to the Boran and their allies.

Meanwhile, in the third major Somali movement, the Telemugger gradually extended their control on the Tana. Whereas British records cited 1909 as the date of the Somali arrival on the river,¹ recent research has shown that the Somali came much earlier. Robert Bunger has placed their raids against the Pokomo and the Orma as early as the 1850's and 1860's, and E. R. Turton has contended that the Somali certainly arrived in force by 1874.² In the 1870's the Somali undoubtedly defeated the Orma in the area, and drove them across the river. Some Somali probably followed them. At the same time Somali harassment of the Tana riverine population, while not always successful, forced the Pokomo to cultivate only the southern bank. Somali depredations against the Pokomo and the Orma continued during the 1890's and into the colonial period.³

¹ Tana River District Annual Report, 1912-13, S.U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2081, Reel 51; J.S.S. Rowlands, "An Outline of Tana River History," DC TRD 4/1; W. Ross McGregor, "Report on the Tana River and Diary of a Tour Along its Valley," 1909, MSS Afr s. 1178(2), Rhodes House.

² Bunger, p. 22; Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," pp. 79-80.

³ Bunger, pp. 62-63; J.W.R. Pigott, "Diary of My Journey up the Tana River and Back Through Ukambani and Along the Tabaka River," 1899, typescript at the University of Nairobi Library; E. Gedge, "A Recent Exploration Under Captain Dundas up the Tana River to Mt. Kenia," Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society (London), vol. 14 n.s. (1892), pp. 520-521; and William-Astor Chanler, Through Jungle and Desert Travels in Eastern Africa (New York 1896), pp. 312-313.

Farther north the Ogaden moved closer to the Wajir wells. The Mohamed-Zubeir Rer Abdille and their Habr Suliman shegats led the penetration. By 1906 they occupied the southernmost wells. They gained reinforcements against the Boran, Ajuran, Sakuye and Gabbra by accepting many Degodia shegats. The increase in the Somali population caused strife not only with the Boran, but also among the Somali. For example, the Mohamed Zubeir fought wars against the Aulihan, and the Abdalla in 1908, and engaged in a major conflict against the Abd Wak from 1912 to 1914.¹

Among the causative factors behind this extensive Somali expansion into northern-Kenya, pastoralism was the most important. Competition for scarce resources resulting in conflict, raids, defeats and migration determined movement. Trade, although an integral part in the Somali economy, was secondary especially to the camel owners. The various Somali groups established their territorial claims in the newly conquered lands. The Gurre remained strong in the Dawa area although

¹ F. G. Jennings, evidence, Kenya Land Commission vol. II (Nairobi 1933), 1649-1653; and DC Wajir to Chief Secretary, January 20, 1914, C.O. 533/134.

increasingly challenged by the Degodia on one flank, and the Marehan on the other. Moyale remained in Boran and Sakuye hands. The Ajuran played an ambivalent role by staying allied to the Boran, but accepting increasing numbers of Degodia shegats. At Wajir the different Ogaden pushed the Boran off the wells. Farther south the Abd Wak and Abdalla pressured the Boran, the Orma and the Pokomo. Thus, during the late 1890's and the early 1900's the Somali penetrated into and established their presence in the vast area encompassed by the Daua, Juba and Tana Rivers. They gained not only territory but control of trade routes to the coast. From this point onward Somali expansion no longer depended on sporadic raids such as those undertaken by Abdi Ibrahim, but rather the increasing numbers constantly applied pressure to the ever retreating Boran. The only serious challenge to the Somali was offered by the expanding Ethiopian empire in southern Ethiopia, and by the appearance of the British at Kismayu. Nevertheless, it would not be accurate to portray this period as solely

one of conflict. Nor can one view the situation as pitting the "Somali" against the "Boran." Cooperation occurred on a number of fronts as exemplified by shegat, and as will be illustrated in the next chapter, in that of trade.

CHAPTER II

THE SOMALI CARAVAN TRADE 1890 - 1920

During the period from 1890 to 1920, although the role of the nomad remained much the same, Somali trade routes and commercial centers gradually shifted. At the beginning of the period the territory encompassing southern Ethiopia, the upper Juba river, and the Benaadir coast held the major portion of Somali trade. The area that became northern Kenya was peripheral to that trade. By the 1920s, however, northern Kenya began supplanting the upper Juba as the main catchment area for those Somali who moved across the Juba.¹ Environmental conditions and political factors contributed to the change. As the Somali migrated from Ethiopia and Somaliland clashes with other nomads increased. The Somali not only fought against the Boran, and withstood aggressive Ethiopian expansion, but also quarreled among themselves. Thus Somali expansion often adversely affected trade. Nevertheless, until 1920 the Somali

¹See Map III.

dominated the pattern and organization of commerce in the vast interior between the Juba and the Tana rivers. At that time the Somali were forced to reconsider their role in trade because of the stabilization of British administration in northern Kenya.

In the pre-colonial period the towns on the Juba river played a crucial role in the commerce of the area. During the late 1890s and early 1900s the greatest amount of trade flowed from southern Ethiopia through northern Jubaland, and then moved to the Benaadir coast. Ports such as Mogadishu, Merka, and Brava were far more important to the Somali than Kismayu or Lamu. In the interior towns such as Lugh and Bardera served as staging points for the camel caravans travelling between Borana and the coast. While Lugh, the more important of the two, had strong connections with Mogadishu, Bardera oriented its trade toward Brava. These two rivals also traded with one another.¹ Two major routes linked the upper Juba with

¹Vittorio Bottego, Viaggi di scoperta nel cuore dell'Africa: Il Giuba Esploratore (Roma 1895), p. 450; Ugo Ferrandi, Seconda Spedizione Bottego: Lugh Emporio Commerciale (Roma 1903), pp. 318-321, and E. Ravenstein, "Somali and Galla Land: Embodying Information Collected by the Rev. Thomas Wakefield," Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society, vol. 6 n.s. (1884), p. 266.

southern Ethiopia. To reach Borana caravans from Lugh traveled along the Dawa before striking for Dirre and Liban. Those from Bardera usually halted at El Wak before moving farther north.¹ Once in Borana places like Ascebo or Cercale served as meeting points where traders, nomads, and agriculturalists gathered to exchange goods.² But not until the late 19th century did much of this trade affect the Somali nomads of northern Kenya.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the area that became northern Kenya was drawn into the Borana-Lugh-Benaadir sphere. Camel caravans began extending much farther inland. Gradually the vast area between the Tana and the Juba became integrated into the pre-existing patterns of trade, and then came to dominate it. Trade centers developed on the periphery. Thus Moyale became a funnel for Boran trade in the early 1900s. Goods and livestock were

¹ Baird Report, October 14, 1903, F.O. 1/48.

² L. Vannutelli and G. Citerni, L'Omo Viaggio nell'Africa Orientale (Milano 1899), pp. 147 and 164-165.

sent to Nairobi via Marsabit, or to Kismayu via Wajir.¹ Kismayu, a port at the mouth of the Juba on the Indian Ocean coast, supported Somali trade to the west of the river. The southernmost Somali, the Abdalla and Abd Wak, even began looking to Lamu as an outlet. Even Somali from Kismayu traveled to that island to dispose of livestock. Because of these developments Lugh's dominance of the area was weakened, even though the new centers were not yet firmly established. In the period 1910 to 1920 trade shifted even farther into Kenya. The nomads relied more heavily on goods available at newly opened British administrative stations. Just prior to World War I nascent townships like Wajir and Serenli attracted traders who set up dukas. In the 1920s, Bura, Sankuri, and Garissa developed on the Tana. Mandera became the most important station on the Daua. By then Nairobi and Kismayu threatened to replace the Benaadir as the major supplier of goods to the Somali in northeastern Kenya.

¹P. Zaphiro, "Commerce in the Frontier Districts," August 10, 1907, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2084, Reel 77; and T. B. Hohler to Sir Edward Grey, December 12, 1907, C.O. 533/50.

Before the Borana-Lugh-Benaadir connection weakened, regular trade routes attested to the advanced degree of organization in the Somali trade. Noting the extent of the trade one Italian traveler referred to Lugh as the "Timbuctu nella occidentale."¹ Although they never reached the heights of that West African city, Lugh and Bardera were indeed the major entrepôts on the Juba. As another Italian explorer explained:

Lugh è forse il più importante centro commerciale dell'interno della penisola Somala: Vi affluiscono, dalla costa numerose carovane portando riso, zucchero, datteri, olio di cocco, cotonati, ecc. dalla valle de Webi, portanti bestiame, dell'estremo occidente del paese Galla, per la via Dana sic portanti ricchi carichi di avorio. . . .²

Boran, Ajurán, and Gurre caravans came to Lugh to dispose of their products; some even journeyed to the coast. Somali traders, however, handled most of the trade. Known as safara, these

¹ Vannutelli and Citerni, p. 82.

² E. Ruspoli to father, Giugno 1, 1893, in L'Esplorazione Commerciale, vol. 8 (1893), p. 357. "Lugh is the most important commercial center in the Somali interior. Many caravans carry rice, sugar, dates, coconut oil, and cotton to the coast from the Webi valley and ivory from the country of the Galla by way of the Daua." See also M. Abir, "Southern Ethiopia," in D. Birmingham and R. Gray, eds., Pre-Colonial Trade (London 1970), pp. 131-132.

Somali left from Lugh to carry on trade in the interior.¹ A floating population of traders from Merca, Brava, and Mogadishu resided in the town.² There they could hire men, camels, equipment, and provisions in preparation for safaris (journeys) to Borana or for return to the coast.

A normal safari from the Benaadir to Lugh lasted between ten and fifteen days.³ Journeys were made on a regular basis. Camel caravans covering the area were not uniform in size, nor were they comparable to those engaged in the trans-Saharan trade. Two or three traders usually combined their efforts and products for safety, and each might own only six camels. Ferrandi noted one caravan of eight camels carrying goods worth Maria Theresa Dollars (MT\$) 1,200, while another of twenty camels was valued at MT\$ 4,000.⁴ On such a journey a

¹ Paul Goto, "The Boran of Northern Kenya: Origins, Migrations and Settlements in the 19th Century," unpubd. B.A. thesis (University of Nairobi 1972), p. 50.

² A. C. Jenner to C. H. Craufurd, April 2, 1899, Coast Province, S.U. KNA MIC Film no. 1995, Reel 89.

³ Bottego, p. 451; Vannutelli and Citerni, p. 83; Ravenstein, p. 265.

⁴ Ferrandi, pp. 329 and 339-340.

camel carried a load ranging from 275 to 360 pounds.¹ Merchants traveling between Lugh and the coast also engaged in regional trade. Gasr Gudda, Elai, and Garre from Lugh, as well as coastal Somali and Arab traders participated in markets at Baidoa, Bur AcaBa, Audegle, and Afgoy.²

At Lugh a system of regulations defined trading operations. The Sultan established a procedure for entering or leaving the town. Without his permission no one could open a trading house in Lugh. He also accepted fixed amounts of cloth annually from each trading house and for every camel from the coast which entered the town. The Sultan also set rates for the sale of livestock and for the exchange of cloth for ivory.³

¹C. Wightwick Haywood, To the Mysterious Lorian Swamp (London 1927), p. 98; and Islam Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa.

²Lee V. Cassanelli, "The Benaadir Past: Essays in Southern Somali History," unpubd. dissertation (University of Wisconsin 1973), p. 74.

³Bottego, pp. 444-446 and 552-553.

Common business practices also existed. For example, in order to assure regular business, a system of contracts was used. They were not rigid in the modern business sense, but drawn up between trading parties. Often a letter, written in Arabic, sufficed. The following, translated into Italian, was typical:

Lugh 12 Ottobre 1896

Scerif Abubeker di Merca, commerciante qui residente, si presenta avati al Residente Italiano di Lugh in compagnia di Omar Mali Muti di Brava e commerciante nel Boran, dichiarante il primo volere dal secondo, a tre mesi data dalla presente convenzione, cioè al 12 gennaio 1897 (ossia 8 Sciaban 1314) frassele 1-1/2 di avorio babulaia, Omar Mali dichiara e conferma d'aver ricevuto in anticipo da Scerif Abubeker il valore dell'avorio in tanta merce abied ed assued per il valore di \$100, e d'aver ricevuto in consegna (amana) \$10 in contanti, e si obbliga a pagare il tutto come da convenzione alla data stabilita.

Firma di OMAR MALI MUTI¹

¹Ferrandi, p. 344. "Sherif Abubekr of Merka, a resident trader, presents to the Italian Residente of Lugh in company of Omar Mali Muti of Brava and a trader in Borana, an agreement stating that the first wants from the second, three months from the date of this agreement, that is on January 12, 1897, one and one half frasilas of babulaia ivory. Omar Mali Muti confirms that he has received from Sherif Abubekr the value of the ivory in cloth valued at \$110.00, and has received on consignment \$10.00, and is obliged to pay the remainder by the above date."

Although control of commerce at Lugh existed, trade was not as organized as that of the Mijertein coast, or at Harrar.¹ The difference was partially attributable to the Sultan's ineffectiveness outside the immediate territory of the town. Neighboring Somali, notably the Degodia and the Garre Marre, attacked caravans, or extorted goods from them under the pretense of levying customs.² In northern Somaliland traders solved this problem by creating a system of protection. To avoid harassment a trader became allied to an abban (protector). A person holding such a position usually came from a very important and powerful Somali section; secondarily he was well known and of good character. Like shegat the system provided for the introduction of strangers into the clan society with which they were dealing. The abban also offered visible protection, i.e., he sometimes provided armed guards to travel with a caravan, but other times a letter of introduction sufficed. The abban also acted as a broker for the

¹For a detailed description of Harrari trade, see R. Pankhurst, Economic History of Ethiopia 1800-1935 (Addis Ababa 1968), pp. 409-413.

²Ferrandi, pp. 325-329.

trade goods. For his protection and aid in commercial transactions, the abban received a percentage of the profits.¹ In southern Somali, and thus around Lugh, according to Ferrandi, "il vero abban. . . non esiste."² Instead a person merely was appointed head of the caravan. His role fell somewhere between that of an abban and a guide. Such a man needed to be a well known individual of good reputation. At the same time he necessarily should be acquainted with the existing caravan routes, their pitfalls and advantages. He rented camels and hired camel drivers. On the march he decided the pace and direction of the caravan.³

¹L. Robecchi-Brichetti, Nel Paese degli Aromi (Milano 1903), pp. 388-389; I. M. Lewis, "Lineage Continuity and Modern Commerce in Northern Somaliland," in P. Bohannon and G. Dalton, eds., Markets in Africa (Northwestern University Press 1962), pp. 369-370; M. Abir, "Brokerage and Brokers in Ethiopia in the First Half of the 19th Century," Journal of Ethiopian Studies (Addis Ababa), vol. 3 (1965), pp. 2-4; R. Pankhurst, "The Trade of Southern and Western Ethiopia," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, vol. 3 (1965), pp. 49 and 80; and Cassanelli, 74-76.

²Ferrandi, p. 338.

³Hussein Alew, interviewed July 1972, El Wak; and Nuno Abiker and Abdi Dai, interviewed July 1972, Wajir.

The Sultan of Lugh did not function as an abban because he could not guarantee the security en route. Nor is it clear what his role regarding contracts was. Bottego claimed that the Sultan did assure justice in the matter of abuse of contracts, but Ferrandi stated that they were merely registered with the cadi.¹

Surprisingly the traders traveling from Lugh to Borana were relatively safe. Peoples living along the route from Lugh to Borana held a monopoly of trade as well as territorial control. Throughout the 19th century the Gurre and the Ajuran were the most prominent Somali near Lugh, and toward the end of the century the Gasr Gudda joined them.² Their unique position provided them with the means to assure protection and to facilitate trade. These pastoralists rather than the Ogaden were professional traders.

Camel caravans entering the interior were similar to those which came from the coast to Lugh. But in the

¹ Bottego, pp. 340 and 446.

² A. C. Jenner to C. H. Craufurd, April 2, 1896, F.O. 2/196; Ferrandi, p. 315; and Captain Guiseeppe Colli di Felizzano to Ministero d'Affari Esteri, Agosto 3, 1903, in F. Martini Papers, no. 52, Archivio dello Centro Stato, Rome.

interior more of the indigenous Somali and Boran participated. The Gurre especially were known as professional caravaneers.¹ Camel caravans frequently set out at night to avoid the heat. Relying on moonlight they could travel for about ten hours. During the day everyone rested, and the camels were allowed to feed. The caravans were small although Bottego encountered one that included 40 men and 35 camels.² A straight-forward journey from Lugh to the center of Borana required almost 20 days. Usually, however, traders did not set a specific time limit on the length of their stay. They preferred to remain until they completed a process which entailed the exchanging of goods for livestock, and then the exchanging of livestock for ivory and other game trophies. This activity was time-consuming, and six months was

¹ Ibid.

² V. Bottego to G. Doria, February 22, 1896, in Bolletino Royale Societa Geografica Italiana, vol. (), pp. 162.

common for a round trip expedition. If it were only from Lugh to Moyale the safari might take four months to complete.¹

Although they frequented the interior, the exact number of traders during any given period is unknown. Zaphiro probably exaggerated when he stated: "When I first visited the Boran country. . . I found in nearly every Boran hut a trader from Lugh, Bardera, Benaadir & c."² Baird's estimate of three or four traders in every sizeable village seems more reasonable.³ At the time of his visit Felizzano guessed that about five hundred traders operated in the area.⁴ In any case on arriving in Borana, the Somali trader was dependent on Boran hosts. The trader provided the host with a score or so of pieces of cloth, some brass

¹ P. Zaphiro, "Commerce in the Frontier Districts," August 10, 1907, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2084, Reel 77; and T. B. Hohler to Sir Edward Grey, December 12, 1907, C.O. 533/50.

² P. Zaphiro to T. B. Hohler, December 5, 1907, C.O. 533/50.

³ Baird Report, October 14, 1903, F.O. 1/48.

⁴ Captain-Guisepe Colli di Felizzano to Ministero d'Affari Esteri, Agosto 3, 1903, in F. Martini Papers, no. 52, Archivio dello Centro Stato, Rome.

wire, and perhaps some tobacco. In return the trader received the use of a hut, and milk for the length of his stay. Additionally the host acted as a broker for the trader and aided in the trading of goods. Finally, the host supplied the trader with transport animals for the return journey.¹

Although the Boran definitely extended aid to Somali traders, scholars are unsure whether or not the Boran allowed Somali penetration into neighboring territories. Mordechai Abir has pointed out the apparent contradictions in the travellers' accounts which reported Somali trading activity beyond Borana. Abir, therefore, has concluded that the Boran actively and successfully prevented the Somali from traveling to Konso and Giam-Giam territory.² E. R. Turton, on the other hand, has argued in support of Somali penetration beyond Borana to trade with the Konso, the Burji, the Rendille, and the Samburu, and even possibly with peoples near Mt. Marsabit.³ Research by

¹ Baird Report, October 24, 1903, F.O. 1/48.

² Abir, 131-132.

³ Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," pp. 112-113.

Lee Cassanelli and Richard Kluckhorn bolsters the claim that the Somali traded independently with the peoples living adjacent to the Boran.¹

In spite of such frequent activity, trade in northern Kenya was precarious. During the last half of the 19th century the Ogaden gained control of the area along the Juba down to Kismayu, and frequently raided along the Tana. Somali trade in this area, when compared to Lugh, was more recent, less in volume, and included more Arab involvement. Moreover, the Ogaden did not have the professional reputation of the Gurre.

Arab contact with the Somali at the coast was longstanding, but their involvement in the hinterland between the Juba and the Tana was not. Their penetration of the interior predated British administration by only a few years. They were present at the coast long before the British, but the Arabs were not able to enter very far inland. Some from Lamu, along with the Swahili, managed to travel up the Tana in canoes and trade with

¹Cassanelli, 74; and R. Kluckhorn, "The Konso Economy of Southern Ethiopia," in P. Bohannon and G. Dalton, eds., Markets in Africa (Northwestern University Press 1962), p. 417.

the Pokomo.¹ On the coast, the Arab presence was sizeable, especially at Kismayu. Nevertheless the Somali limited Arab influence and power to the immediate environs of the town.² The Herti and other Ogaden restricted access to the interior, and even halted Boran caravans from going to Kismayu in the 1880s and early 1890s.³ Barawa traders penetrated the area to contact the Pokomo on the Tana, and the Rendille to the west of the Lorian Swamp.⁴ Still this southern trade was irregular and of small volume.

¹R. Bunger, Islamization Among the Upper Pokomo of Kenya (Syracuse 1972), pp. 65-66; E. Gedge, "A Recent Exploration under Captain Dundas up the River Tana to Mt. Kenia," Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society, vol. 14 Series 8 (1892), p. 516; A. H. J. Prins, The Coastal Tribes of the North-Eastern Bantu Pokomo, Nyika, Teita in Ethnographic Survey of Africa: East Central Africa Part 3 (London 1952), p. 15; and J. S. S. Rowlands, "An Outline of Tana River History," DC TRD 4/1.

²The Arab lack of power outside of the towns that they controlled on the East African coast was typical not only in Somaliland, but also in the ports to the south. See A. I. Salim, The Swahili-speaking Peoples of Kenya's Coast 1895-1965 (Nairobi 1973), pp. 17-18.

³Ferrandi, p. 316.

⁴Bunger, pp. 20 and 60; W. A. Chanler, Through Jungle and Desert Travels in Eastern Africa (New York 1896), pp. 121, 197, 304 and 312; and W. A. Chanler to Directors IBEA Company, September 22, 1893, F.O. 2/59.

Prior to the British arrival in the NFD, Arab caravans traversed the north. They frequented watering spots such as Wajir, Moyale, and El Wak which became crossroads. Starting from the coast, Arab traders purchased camels from the nomads near Kismayu, and hired Somali syces to care for their beasts. Thus while caravans required Somali employees, most members were Arab. Moreover, while many spoke Somali, Arab traders usually hired a local Somali to act as an interpreter and guide. Three or four traders then banded together, each owning or hiring three camels. They carried all necessary food supplies, although they purchased some, such as goats, en route. The traders halted at available watering places such as Wajir, Moyale, and El Wak. A journey from Kismayu to Wajir lasted between ten and seventeen days, while one from Wajir to Moyale, five days. Thus the route from Kismayu to Borana was shorter than that from Lugh to Borana. On arriving at their destination, the traders camped near wells or by a river. They set up camps either in the open air, or with tents. While they sought out nomads, they often left their goats unattended. At this time more Boran than Somali inhabited the Wajir area, and

not so many Somali were on the Tana as in the subsequent years. Cloth was the most common medium of exchange, although goats were used to purchase smaller goods such as beans, and camels exchanged for items of great demand such as firearms. As the Arab trade increased, Wajir became more oriented to Kismayu, and the Tana area more linked to Lamu.¹ The trade remained exclusively a camel caravan trade until the early 20th century when the duka was introduced.

Another important component of the commercial system of northern Kenya was the so-called "alien" Somali. These Somali, mainly Herti and Isaaq, originally came from British Somaliland. In the 1870s Herti appeared at Kismayu in great numbers, reaching that area by dhow. While the large proportion remained nomads, many entered the British service as askari (soldiers), clerks, mail-runners, interpreters, and syces. Herti contacts remained strongest at Kismayu, and the Isaaq developed extensive

¹Islam Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; Omar Basabra, interviewed June 1972; Wajir; Mohamed Said, interviewed July 1972; Wajir; Abdulla bin Omar Zaid, interviewed July 1972, Wajir; and Ahmed Salim Bayusuf, interviewed July 1972, Hola. See also C. Gwynn, "A Journey in Southern Abyssinia," Geographical Journal, vol. 38 (1911), p. 135; and Tana River District Annual Report, 1909-10, and 1910-11, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2081, Reel 51.

connections in the Rift Valley and Nairobi. On retirement these Somali often became livestock traders. They dominated the trade from southern Ethiopia to the settled areas of the Protectorate. As the white settler population increased, the Herti and the Isaaq supplied cattle, horses, and donkeys to them, but this was not a camel caravan trade as such. Moreover, these Somali adopted an urban life style as they settled in the nascent Rift Valley and NFD townships. Much like the Arab and Indian traders, the Herti and Isaaq also entered the duka trade.¹

¹I am indebted to Dr. E. R. Turton who allowed me to see unpublished material on the "alien" Somali. A substantial amount of correspondence on the Herti and the Isaaq appears in the Kenya National Archives collection. Among the most informative reports are: V. G. Glenday, "The Origins of Somalis with Special Reference to their Political Development in Kenya," 1938, AA 7/704; and "The Somali Ordinance- History of the Somali Status and Its Legal Aspect," March 30, 1931, PC NFD 4/1/6; G. Reece, "The Position of the Alien Somali in Kenya Colony," April 25, 1945, PC NZA 2/533. See also V. G. Glenday, evidence, Kenya Land Commission, vol. 2 (Nairobi 1933), 1641-1645; and P. Dalleo, "Economic Factors in Somali Resistance to British Rule in Kenya, 1916-1948," cyclostyled, at University of Nairobi History Department Archives. Some of these Somali also served as scouts and gunbearers for hunting and exploring expeditions, and others worked on settler farms and ranches as servants, firemen and general factotum. For example, see V. M. Carvegie, A Kenya Farm Diary (London 1930); Lord Cranworth, Profit and Sport in British East African Empire, vol. I (London 1987); and T. Roosevelt, African Game Trails (New York 1910).

Still others participated in the camel caravan trade from Kismayu to the north.

In addition to the forms of trade mentioned above, another less organized, more regional commerce developed. This type of trade involved individual nomads, or smaller nomadic groups, who traded with non-Somali neighbors in localized areas. It was an informal trade done on a small scale. The Somali participants considered themselves as nomads, not as traders. Indeed most Somali traded in this fashion rather than undertake long arduous trips to the coast. For example, the Abd Wak exchanged sheep or goats for grain from the Pokomo on the Tana. Since the Pokomo lacked iron, Somali knives were an important item of trade.¹ The Ogaden near Afmadu and the Juba traded

¹For Somali-Pokomo trade, see Bungler, pp. 19-20; OC Northern Frontier to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, August 4, 1922, PC NFD 4/1/4; Lt. Col. J. Llewellyn, "Notes on the Abd Wak and their Country," S.U. KNA MIC, Film no: 2084, Reel 104. See also Heri Abdi, interviewed July 1972, Sankuri; and Yusuf Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa.

with the Gosha for grain.¹ Nomadic women near towns or settlements often sold milk, ghee, rope, mats, and other handmade products.² There was also a caste of Somali known as Tomals who acted as iron workers. Although the Somali considered such work as menial, and beneath the dignity of a nomad, the Tomals performed an important function in the Somali economy. They fashioned spears, knives, and utensils. In northern Somaliland large sedentary villages of Tomals, and Midgan leather workers, were found. In northern Kenya, however, they were few in number. Most Tomal,

¹ Provincial Commissioner (hereafter PC), Kismayu, "Jubaland Somalis," December 18, 1917, Coast Province, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 104; C. Crauford, "Journeys in Gosha and Beyond Deshek Wama," Geographical Journal, vol. 9 (1897), pp. 56-57; Haywood, p. 207; and N. Puccioni, "Caratteristiche Antropologiche ed Etnografiche Delle Popolazione Della Somalia," Bolletino Royale Societa Geografica Italiana vol. 1 series 7 (1936), p. 20

² See Lewis, pp. 14 and 188; Cassanelli p. 78; Ferrandi, p. 101 and p. 342.

therefore, roamed with the nomads. They exchanged their wares for smaller livestock like sheep and goats.¹

Trade goods remained basically the same throughout the period 1890 to 1920. Major exports included cattle, camels, sheep, goats, horses, donkeys, hides and skins, ivory and rhino horn, hippopotamus teeth, ostrich feathers, leopard and gazelle skins, perfumed wood, gum, salt, and slaves. Imports consisted almost exclusively of cotton cloth piece goods, iron and copper wire, coffee beans, condiments, tea, sugar, firearms, and various types of beads. A myriad of lesser goods ranging from mirror to sewing needles were also imported but did not readily become available until after the establishment of the duka trade.

While it must be emphasized that the volume of trade was not as great as that elsewhere in eastern

¹ Among Gurre the Tomal are called Warabeya, and among the Ogaden are known as Rer Bahar. Yusuf Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; Ali Hussein, interviewed June 1972; Wajir; Ibrahim Farah Mohamed, interviewed July 1972, Rhamu; Mohamed Hussein, interviewed July 1972, Wajir; and "The Tomal in District" in D. H. Wickham to Senior Commissioner Northern Frontier, June 5, 1927, PCNFD 4/1/8. For literature on the Tomal in northern Somaliland, see J. Kirk, "Yibir, Midgan and Tumul," Journal of the African Society (London), vol. 4 (1904), pp. 91-108.

Africa, establishing the exact volume of Somali trade is difficult. Few records were kept, and available statistics reflect the irregular and haphazard manner in which they were taken. Traders sometimes traveled directly to the coast, and avoided towns in the interior. While coastal ports kept records of exports, these records do not always reveal the origin the goods being exported. Smuggling also occurred. Thus statistical data can be illusory. Compounding the problem was the lack of a standard measurement applying to the entire area of the trade.

Measurements were based largely on Arabic systems, but varied from one locale to another. Besides different goods were measured in different manners. Wood was measured by the camel load, milk by cups, and small amounts of tobacco by the tips of gourds or even by handfuls. Larger products such as bundles of cloth, or ivory, were accorded a more uniform system. For example, weights were based on the following:

1 ferasil	equals	36 rotoli
1 thumum ferasil	"	4.5 rotoli
8 thumum	"	1 rotolo
2 weikiya	"	1 thumum

Yet while traders recognized the above at Harrar and on the Benaadir, at Lugh and at Aden, one frasila equaled only 32 rotoli.¹

The measurement of cloth was even more inexact. The standard measurements were the jorah, the taga, and the tob. The usual method of measuring cloth was by matching the length of cloth to the distance between a man's elbow to the tips of the fingers. Thus the length differed according to the individual. Nomads purchasing cloth, therefore, always allowed the person with the longest forearm to do the measuring.² Such a length of cloth was known as a drahar, or in Swahili as a makona, which measured out to 18 inches or so. Four drahar equaled one doti, and ten doti, equaled one jorah. A jorah, therefore, because of the possible variation of an arm's length, consisted anywhere between 20 and 25

¹D. Powell-Cotton, "Somali Notes," 1935, Document #293, British Museum; Bottego, p. 439; and G. Revoil, Voyages au Cap des Aromates (Paris 1880), p. 279.

²Hassin Mumin, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

yards of cloth.¹ Most Somali wore two lengths of cloth known as top. One top was equivalent to 14 drahar or about seven yards of cloth. Still even this differed from area to area. Among the Ogaden eight drahar equaled one top, while among the Gurre the ratio was six to one.² Likewise a taga was equivalent from five to seven top.³

The range of cotton piece goods available to the Somali further complicated the matter. Ferrandi noted at least 15 varieties carried by traders to Lugh.⁴ Some cloth, notably top Benaadir, was made near Mogadishu. Much of the colored cloth came from India, but by far the largest percentage of imported cloth arrived on ships from the United States. The most popular was called

¹A. Arkell-Hardwick, An Ivory Trader in Northern Kenia (London 1903), pp. 52-53; E. Huxley, White Man's Country (London 1935), p. 45; British East Africa Handbook (London 1893), p. 170; C. H. Stigand, To Abyssinia Through an Unknown Land (New York 1969), p. 97.

²Bottego, p. 439.

³Ferrandi, p. 361.

⁴Ibid.

mericani, and the second most was arduf. Nomads openly evinced a preference for such cloth, sometimes only buying it if a specific trademark appeared.¹ Furthermore, they used certain cloth like American uard chebir as currency, and at Lugh gave all other goods a fixed value in relation to it.²

Although cloth was the most popular, other forms of currency existed. Goats and even rifle cartridges were sometimes used to make smaller purchases. Cash was available but it was not in widespread usage except near the coast. Although prevalent in coastal ports, the British and Italian rupee did not appear often in the hinterland. The MT\$, however, was fairly popular especially in southern Ethiopia. Even that was sometimes used as an ornament rather than for commercial purposes.³

¹ E. Berkeley to Secretary IBEA Company, February 22, 1892, Mackinnon Papers, London University, Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; and Ahamed Salim Bayusuf, interviewed July 1972, Hola. For information on the Benaadir cloth weaving industry, see Cassanelli, p. 90.

² Bottego, pp. 443-444.

³ Ibid.; and Ali Daud, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

The MT\$, even though prevalent in Ethiopia, was probably introduced to Lugh and then Borana by coastal traders. It certainly penetrated slowly from Addis to the south. In any case its value fluctuated considerably in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.¹ Thus during this period from 1890 to 1920, except at the coast, cloth and livestock remained the major mediums of exchange, with only the MT\$ functioning as popular coinage.

In spite of shifting prices some traders made substantial profits. Robecchi-Brichetti when visiting the Benaadir estimated that a trader made 20 to 30 percent in profit when trading in the interior.²

J. B. Llewellyn, the D.C. for Wajir from 1916 to 1920, estimated that a successful caravan could earn as much

¹R. Pankhurst, "The Maria Theresa Dollar in Pre-War Ethiopia," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, vol. 1 (1963), pp. 16 and pp. 18-19; E. Bradbridge, "Coinage," February 1896, F.O. 107/49; and Precis of Mail Received from Mombasa, February 22, 1892, Mackinnon Papers, London University.

²L. Robecchi-Brichetti, Somalia e Benadir (Milano 1899), pp. 580-637, gives a detailed description of the Benaadir trade. For an opposite view on the poor profits made trading, see A. Donaldson Smith, Through Unknown African Countries (New York 1897), p. 330.

as 100 percent in profit.¹ One Somali safari, led by Ahmed Musa in 1899, trading among the Somali, Boran, and Rendille, exchanged goods worth Rupees(Rs.) 3,400 for 45 frasila of ivory and two frasila of rhino horn. Selling these trophies in Kismayu netted a profit of at least Rs.4,600, and he still retained the 28 camels acquired on the expedition.² In 1903 a trader on the Daua could buy one frasila of ivory for MT\$90 and sell it for MT\$125 on the coast.³ Also in the early 1900s, horses costing Rs.22 to 42 on the Ethiopian frontier could be sold in Nairobi for Rs.500 to 600.⁴ Another trading venture in 1912 cost Rs.2,200 for the purchase of 300 head of cattle, and the expense of camel transport,

¹ John Llewelin, interviewed May 1972, Nanyuki.

² Report of Ahmed bin Musa, February 14, 1900, F.O. 2/285.

³ Captain Giuseppe Colli di Felizzano to Ministero d'Affari Esteri, Agosto 3, 1903, in F. Martini Papers, no. 52, Archivio dello Centro Stato, Rome.

⁴ Marquis Hornyhold to Captain Ridell, June 30, 1907, C.O. 533/57. See also, C. A. Neave, "Horses and Stable Management in British East Africa," Agricultural Journal of British East Africa (Nairobi), vol. 1 (1908), pp. 397-398; and Sheikh Abdi Adot and Haji Farah, interviewed August 1972, Nanyuki.

men, food, and equipment. When the cattle were sold at Nairobi, however, a profit of Rs.1,492 was expected.¹ Traders, therefore, viewed the period, especially before the arrival of the British, as a time in which great profits could be made.²

The Somali viewed trade from a different perspective. To the nomad individual livestock held different values. A young, potential foal-producing female was valued much more highly than a barren one. Milk camels were much more prized than young males. Still, a certain number of stallions or bulls, were necessary for breeding purposes. And, cattle and camels, were considered more valuable than sheep or goats. Thus a number of variables affected bargaining.

If the object was in low demand, a sheep or goat might be traded, or at most a barren female animal. When the item was considered to be exceptionally valuable, the

¹ C. C. Bowring to H. M. Minister Addis Ababa, July 8, 1912, F.O. 371/1570. For more on prices, see R. N. Newland, "Review of Cattle Trade in British East Africa," Agricultural Journal of British East Africa, vol. 1 (1908), pp. 267-268; and Leader of British East Africa (Nairobi), August 22, 1908, p. 2 and June 14, 1909, p. 3.

² Islam Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; and Sheikh Abdi Adot and Haji Farah, interviewed August 1972, Nanyuki.

Somali would surrender young females. Thus firearms always brought good prices. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the cost of a rifle ranged between five and seven female camels.¹ In other words the Somali viewed the situation from an economic standpoint also, and wherever possible shaped the trade according to their values.

While these problems make difficult the task of estimating the volume of trade, since some records were kept, an attempt can be made to illustrate what the volume was in the area under consideration. For example, early Italian travelers left accounts of Lugh's trade. The explorer Vittorio Bottego estimated the annual value of exports in the late 19th century at MT\$375,000 which included 34,000 kilos of ivory, 340,000 kilos of myrrh, 2,000 hides, and 20,000 skins. The Italian residente Ferrandi, however, offered a more conservative, and probably more realistic estimate. Ferrandi claimed that the annual value of exports totaled MT\$18,000. These exports included 3,298 kilos

of ivory, 14,467 kilos of myrrh, and 969 kilos of rhino horn. Moreover, while Bottego set the figure of imports at MT\$375,000, Ferrandi calculated that only MT\$20,000 worth of goods entered Lugh each year.¹ The British Frontier Inspector also provided an estimate for Lugh's imports and exports during the early 1900s. According to Zaphiro, during 1906-1907 Lugh's exports included 1,500 tusks of ivory, 1,000 rhino horns, and 200,000 goat skins. Exports declined substantially during 1906-1907 as only 200 tusks of ivory, rhino horns and 50,000 goat skins left the town.² Italian records were also kept for the period 1906-1910:³

<u>Year</u>	<u>MT\$ Imports</u>	<u>MT\$ Exports</u>
1906	113,824	72,415
1907	89,977	84,354
1908	159,353	81,948
1909	132,501	100,059
1910	241,392	140,008

Lugh and the Gurre, therefore, remained important factors in the trade of this area. Even as late as 1917 a British

¹ Bottego, p. 447; and Ferrandi, p. 360.

² P. Zaphiro, "Commerce in the Frontier Districts," August 10, 1907, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 77.

³ T. Carletti, I Problemi del Benadir (Roma 1912), p. 220.

source noted that "a considerable transit trade" from Lugh to the coast still continued.¹

Kismayu also experienced a steady growth even though trade fluctuated. According to British records the trade was not so well established as Lugh's. One observer commented that at Kismayu "the merchants are poor and cannot afford to keep large stocks, and unless they can be frequently supplied, run out of trade goods required to buy ivory and other up-country produce."² Nevertheless the IBEA Company obtained the port from the Sultan of Zanzibar in expectation of an annual revenue of at least MT\$11,000. They were to be disappointed. From July 1891 to December 1893 exports amounted to Rs. 248,713. Of the Rs. 320,652 of imports, Rs. 118,957 was in cotton piece goods.³ Hardinge noted that during 1897 trade at Kismayu

¹ Handbook of Abyssinia (London 1917), p. 343.

² Report by Sir A. Hardinge on the Condition and Progress of the East Africa Protectorate from its Establishment to the 20th July, 1897, Cmd. 8683 (1897), p. 17.

³ C. H. Craufurd to Administrator IBEA Company, January 27, 1894, F.O. 2/73. From 1890 until 1915 approximately 1 to 3 Rps. equaled 1MT\$. From 1915 onward the value ranged from 4 to 5 Rps. for 1MT\$.

TABLE II-2
PORT of KISMAYU

Value of Export Trade for period between 1st July 1891 & 31 Dec. 1893

Description	1891	1892		1893		Total For 2-1/2 Years Rs
	1 July to 31 Dec. Rs	1 Jan. to 30 June Rs	1 July to 31 Dec. Rs	1 Jan. to 30 June Rs	1 July to 31 Dec. Rs	
Ivory	23,799	19,139	21,795	18,560	15,889	99,182
Rhinoceros Horns	262	227	468	34	248	1,239
Tortoise Shell	90		284	263	359	996
Orchella weed	588	642	194	3,925	310	5,659
Maize	1,293	8	853	445		2,599
<u>Live Stock</u>						
Camels				150	950	1,100
Cattle	116	2,095	120	3,580	2,440	8,351
Donkeys	256	522	210	20	280	1,288
Goats & Sheep	235	4,780	1,296	524	5,078	11,913
<u>Live Stock Products</u>						
Hides	93,924	15,424	2,699	1,071	534	113,652
Ghee				85	260	345
Grease					310	310
Sundries	196	1,623	40	51	169	2,079
	Rs 120,759	44,460	27,959	28,708	26,827	248,713
		Total 1892		Total 1893		
		<u>Rs 72,419</u>		<u>Rs 55,535</u>		

increased by 50 percent.¹ Figures from other towns further up the Juba which were tied to Kismaju also were kept. For example, those at Serenli reveal that during the period April to May 1911 372 lbs. of ivory, 250 lbs. of rhino horn, 15-1/2 lbs. of ostrich feathers, 48 head of cattle, and eight giraffe skins were exported from Serenli. In 1914 trade from that town to the Italian side totaled export of goods valued at Rs.118,000 while exports of imported cloth cost Rs.48,000.²

Figures for the livestock trade from southern Ethiopia to the Rift Valley towns also were kept. Moyale functioned as the collection center for livestock on the frontier, and then traders trekked the livestock to the Rift Valley via Marsabit. The total of exports fluctuated but Moyale remained an important part of the trade into the 1920s:³

¹ Report by Sir A. Hardinge, 1897-98, Cmd. 9125 (1898), p. 7.

² DC Serenli to PC Jubaland, May 8, 1911, PC JUB 1/17/1; DC Serenli to PC Jubaland, May 25, 1914, PC JUB 1/6/1.

³ These figures were compiled from the following sources: Lord Cranworth, p. 188; R. Pankhurst, "The Trade of Southern and Western Ethiopia," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, vol. 3 (1965), p. 57; R. J. Sturdy, "From Nairobi to the Red Sea Through Ethiopia being an account of a mission to the Abyssinian Government and a visit of inspection to the Northern Frontier District of British East Africa," 1912, folio ms. 12315, Colonial Office Library; T. S. Thomas, Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District (Nairobi 1917), p. 112; MYAR 1915-1922, PC NFD 1/6; Veterinary Officer to PC Northern Frontier, November 20, 1930, VET SERV. 9, Kabete.

YEAR	CATTLE		SHEEP & GOATS		HORSES & MULES		HORSES & MULES		MOYALE
	NFD	MOYALE	NFD	MOYALE	NFD	MOYALE	NFD	MOYALE	
1910-11	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1,400-1,500	x			
1911	800	x	x	x		x			
1911-12	N.a.	x	x	x	598	249			
1912-13	8,900	x	x	x	156	57			
1913-14	14,203	7,000	44,850	x	333		150	400	
1914-15	6,193	1,537	29,380	x	9	132	324	905	
1915-16	8,964	3,622	7,812	x	80	435	203	788	
1916-17	3,358	3,035	405	x		912	175	584	
1917-18	6,581	4,362	1,403	x		405	151	205	
1918-19	10,441	7,796	12,770	x		148	157	280	
1919-20	15,400	5,500	15,950	200		490	278	911	
1920-21	x	3,764	x	x		x	1,083	856	

Over the 35-year period of the camel caravan trade certain factors consistently affected trade. Relations between the Somali and their neighbors remained important. Hostilities between Boran and Somali, as well as among the Somali often determined the movement of goods. The relative security of the Ethiopian frontier depended on the activities of Amhara empire builders or "Tigre" raiders.¹ The most significant long range factor, however, was the development of British administration. Gradually the British changed patterns of trade and the role of the Somali in that trade.

Somali-Boran relations were not always hostile. E. R. Turton has shown that "relations between the Boran and Somali appear to have been unduly complex, and they were far from conforming to a pattern of simple hostility."² Nor was it a matter of the "Somali" versus the "Boran." It was a situation in which certain Somali in specific areas

¹The Ethiopians were known on the frontier by many names. To the British they were "Abyssinians" and to the Somali the "Habash." "Tigre" on the other hand was a name given to outlaws of Ethiopian origin. See p. 86.

²E. R. Turton, "The Pastoral Tribes of Northern Kenya, 1800-1916," unpubd. dissertation (London University 1970), p. 278.

entered into friendly alliances with the Boran. In other areas Somali raided Boran and the latter reciprocated. Both trade and the clientage system, however, tempered hostilities.

Conditions allowing for special Somali-Boran links existed. The system of shegat resulted in agreements for the sharing of water and pasturage between these potentially hostile groups. Some Somali, especially the Ajuran, because they utilized this opportunity more than any other Somali, almost became absorbed by the Boran. The Boran gained from having Somali shegat because raiding was minimized, and because groups like the Ajuran were actively involved in trade. Thus Ajuran and Gurre often acted as middlemen in the trade between Borana and Lugh. Some shegat agreements even stipulated that the Ajuran provide a set number of pieces of cloth to their Boran hosts at specified intervals.¹ Many Benaadir Somali also hawked their goods throughout Borana, and they were given protection even during periods of war

¹Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir:

because the Boran placed a religious significance on trade goods.¹ Some Boran took caravans to Lugh and Bardera, and even to Kismayu, but during the Wardei wars of 1867-1869, Somali hostilities increased. The ensuing conflict led to Somali seizure of trade, and a change in the status of many Boran shegat.

War and famine weakened the Boran in their attempts to keep the Somali from encroaching on their territory. In the area of Lugh, the Daua, and in southern Ethiopia, the Gurre openly raided the Boran. The relationship between the two groups over the last half of the 19th century ranged between periods of peace, trade, and war. In the 1890s and into the 1920s, intermittent hostility characterized their relationship. Consequently conflict adversely affected trade. By the 1890s the Gurre finally gained a monopoly over Lugh's trade, and they prevented the Boran from trading at that town.² The Boran were also seriously

¹Goto, p. 55.

²Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," p. 112.

weakened by a cattle disease which decimated their herds, and consequently led to famine.¹ Boran attempts to circumvent the Gurre led them to initiate a trade route to Kismayu.

Increasing Ogaden hostility hindered Boran contacts with Kismayu. The Gurre monopoly over Lugh weakened the Boran camel caravan link to Kismayu. The route did not prove viable and the Boran relied more heavily on Bardera.² In the last quarter of the 19th century the Ogaden increased their pressure on the Boran. Abdi Ibrahim's raids had a detrimental impact on Boran attempts to reach the coast for trade. For over a year Abdi Ibrahim and his cohorts, known as the Eji, remained near Buna raiding in the heart of Boran territory.³ In the 1890s the great Somali

¹R. Pankhurst, "The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888-1892," unpubd. ms., Kennedy Library, Haile Sellassie I University, Addis Ababa. See also Hussein Alew, interviewed July 1972, El Wak; and Nuno Abiker and Abdi Dai, interviewed July 1972, Wajir.

²R. Simon to Administrator IBEA Company, May 26, 1890, F.O. 2/59; and A. C. Jenner to C. H. Craufurd, March 12, 1899, F.O. 2/96.

³R. G. Turnbull, "The Darod Invasion," unpubd. typescript at Fort Jesus Library, Mombasa, pp. 8-9; and Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," p. 278.

expansion caused even more fighting. The Ogaden gained control of the routes leading to Kismayu. Because of the insecurity en route, the Boran feared to come south.¹ The arrival of a Boran caravan in Kismayu in 1896 provoked a visiting British naval officer to point out that it was the first in 20 years.² Some nomads did attempt the trip, but the Boran usually found it prudent to leave the Ogaden side of the river near Bardera and to come down to Kismayu on the opposite side.³ The Somali, therefore, dominated the movement of trade from the interior. A different situation developed, however, as Ethiopian expansion reached into northern Kenya.

The impact of Ethiopian expansion on trade must be viewed from a number of perspectives. Conquest and raiding on the part of Ethiopian troops and irregulars proved disruptive, and the early years of

¹ Captain Ridell to Secretary of State for the Colonies, November 10, 1907, C.O. 533/31.

² M. P. O'Callaghan to the Admiralty, May 26, 1896, F.O. 10 /68.

³ Jubaland Annual Report 1904, Coast Province KNA MIC, Film No. 1995, Reel 89; and P. Zaphire to Sub-Commissioner Kismayu, October 18, 1908, C.O. 533/28.

Ethiopian frontier administration created more instability than traders would have preferred. The newly created Italian and British administrations also depicted the Ethiopians as destroyers of people, livestock, and trade. From the Ethiopian viewpoint, such expeditions aimed at establishing control over an area, and peoples, that they considered to be part of their empire. Secondly, the Ethiopians sought to prevent the flow of trade out of the empire.

Although its influence affected the peoples of the area, Ethiopia never conquered northern Kenya. In the 1890s, after settling expansionary ambitions farther north, the Ethiopian Government undertook a vigorous campaign in the southern part of its empire. In 1896 military expeditions invaded Dirre and Liban, and by May of 1897 the Ethiopians had conquered Borana. The Ethiopians established a main administrative post at Arero. Menelik's goals undoubtedly included both economic and political considerations. The former seemingly were more important to the central government,

whereas the latter were more apparent in the actions of local frontier officials.¹ In either case, climate and environment plus the nomadic habits of the Boran, Somali, and kindred peoples, prevented full control of the area beyond the golbo.

Actually the Ethiopians raided but never attempted to conquer the peoples deep in northern Kenya. Using Borana as their base, Ethiopian troops reached as far west as Samburu and as far south as the Lorian. As late as 1905 forty Ethiopian riflemen, of which fifteen were mounted, appeared near the Lorian. At Wajir they stopped to take camels, sheep, goats, and water vessels from the Boran there. Ethiopian ivory hunters raided intermittently.² Raiding continued into the 1920s, but by that period it was restricted to the immediate area of the border. There was, however, much confusion as to who actually was

¹ Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," pp. 266-267 discusses this problem. See also G. Tareke, "Colonial Rule and the Response of the Borana 1897-1935," cyclostyled paper in my possession; and H. G. Marcus, "Motives, Methods and Some Results of the Unification of Ethiopia During the Reign of Menelik II," in Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, vol. 1 (Addis Ababa 1966), pp. 269-272.

² W. E. H. Barrett, "East African Military Intelligence Report," April 17, 1905, F.O. 410/8. See also Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," p. 371.

carrying out such activities. The raiders sometimes were government officials and soldiers. At other times they were bands of outlaws originating in Ethiopia. It was difficult to distinguish between the two, and whether or not officials were acting on government orders or merely carrying out private sorties. The Ethiopian soldiery had to live off the land and also suffered from a high rate of desertion. As one official explained, with every change of Governor "a certain number of soldiers prefer to remain where they are and consequently desert, with the result that, when their lands are taken over by the incoming chief for his soldiers, they have no means of livelihood open to them but hunting and brigandage."¹ Nor did the central government effectively control the periphery of its empire. Although Ras Tafari attempted to coordinate activities with the British to stop the raiding on the border, such plans met with little success. At this time the Ethiopian central government

¹Wilfred Thesiger to C. C. Bowring, October 2, 1917, C.O. 533/57.

was too weak to exercise firm control.¹ Raids not only disrupted trade, but caused mass movements of Boran, Gabbra, Sakuyu, Ajuran, and Somali nomads.

Ethiopian military expeditions adversely affected trade throughout the area. In 1896 Ethiopians beseiged Lugh and devastated the surrounding countryside. As a result all caravans from Borana stopped going to Lugh. Moreover, Benaadir caravans expected from the coast failed to come until order was restored. The Sultan even appealed to the Italians for aid.² Three years later a Somali merchant near El Wak noted the reluctance of the Boran to trade. They had recently fled from Ethiopian raiders in the Moyale-Debel region.³ Around the same time the Ethiopians raided Buna, and the Gurre on the Daua. A few reached the Wajir-Lorian area,

¹ OC Northern Frontier to Chief Secretary Nairobi, July 14, 1913, C.O. 533/122; Wilfred Thesiger to British Minister Addis Ababa, October 2, 1917, C.O. 533/188; Gerald Campbell to Secretary of State Foreign Affairs, October 23, 1918, C.O. 533/201; and OC Northern Frontier to British Minister Addis Ababa, March 20, 1919, PC NFD 4/1/5.

² Handbook of Abyssinia, p. 337.

³ Report of Ahmed bin Musa, February 14, 1900, F.O. 2/285.

causing the nomads to complain to the British.¹ Raids this far south tapered off after the arrival of the British, but were commonplace on the border into the 1920s. On rare occasions a trader was killed.² As late as 1920 raiders attacked Moyale and killed two traders. They took about MT\$500 in goods. As trade came to a halt the local Ethiopian official apologetically wrote:

To Moyale traders namely Mohamed Tigre, Halo, Said Ahmed, Sherif, Hassan Darod--Salaamo etc. You people are like fathers and brothers to us. We do not therefore intend to harm you in any way. If we had any attention [sic] of doing you harm we would have seized your animals which always graze on this side. We want only relations with you all. Now as we are hard up for clothings [sic] please arrange for some as there are no Boran here as before.³

¹Ag. Sub Commissioner Jubaland to Deputy Commissioner Mombasa, Sept. 4, 1905, C.O. 533/11; and Chiefs of Boran to OC Jubaland, Rajab 4, 1321, Coast Province, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 89.

²G. G. Foster, "Fortnightly Summary," March 15, 1918, C.O. 533/196; and Moyale Monthly Report, January 1920, PC NFD 4/3/2.

³Abbeba to Moyale Traders, n.d., in Moyale Monthly Reports, October 1920, PC NFD 4/1/3.

Even as raids had a detrimental effect on Somali trade, so too did Ethiopian regulations designed to control frontier commerce. Menelik definitely attempted to influence the flow of goods. Both the British and Italians argued that Menelik openly discouraged all trade not passing through Addis.¹ If the basis of his plan was not to shift all trade north, Menelik at the least sought to prevent as little trade as possible from flowing into adjoining British and Italian territory. Harold Marcus has provided a brief description of the establishment of Ethiopian military camps, or ketamas, from which Ethiopian troops launched attacks and patrols.² Menelik, and his successors, also instituted a series of regulations and a customs system designed to control commerce. For example in 1910 the Emperor banned the export of ivory, and the following year livestock was placed

¹ Lord Herbert Harvey to Sir Edward Grey, December 12, 1908, F.O. 371/594; and for a similar Italian view, see C. Citerni, Ai Confini Meridionale (Milano 1913), pp. 119-120.

² H. G. Marcus, "Imperialism and Expansion in Ethiopia from 1865 to 1900," L. Gann and P. Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, vol. I (Cambridge 1969), p. 453.

under the same restriction.¹ Such measures threatened to shut off trans-border trade. Even more discouraging, however, were the abuses practiced by Ethiopian frontier officials related to the collection of customs duties.

Somali traders reported numerous instances of illegal treatment at the hands of Ethiopian border officials. Beatings, whippings, outright theft of trade goods, inordinate delays, and the necessity of bribing customs officials contributed to the insecurity of the merchants.² An additional problem arose from the irregularities of the collection of customs duties.

As one source has described:

¹ Lord Herbert Harvey to Sir Edward Grey, December 12, 1908, F.O. 371/594; and DC Moyale to OC Northern Frontier, April 23, 1912, C.O. 533/104.

² Captain Giuseppe Colli di Felizzano to Ministero D'Affari Esteri, Agosto 3, 1903, in F. Martini Papers, no. 52, Archivio dello Centro Stato, Rome; Maud Report, September 1904, 1903, F.O. 1/48; P. Zaphiro, "Commerce in the Frontier Districts," August 10, 1907, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Réel 77; and "Report from the Resident at Lugh to the Governor of Italian Somaliland," September 18, 1907," translation in C.O. 533/35; DC Moyale to British Minister Addis Ababa, January 25, 1911, PC NFD 4/1/3.

The methods of imposing customs seems to be altogether vague and indeterminate, except in so far as the Emperor is bound by treaty to Foreign Powers. Customs duties are charged on both imports and exports, and are fixed on an ad valorem basis; but there is no method for valuing goods at the customs stations, except that in 1913 a tariff was introduced for some of the more commonly imported articles, about fifty in all. Other imported goods, and all those exported, are valued by the local customs officers, with the result. . . that sometimes 25 per cent. or more of their value is charged instead of 5 per cent. or 10 per cent.¹

The situation encouraged smuggling, but the quantity exported in this manner probably did not compare to that during the period of free trade.² Besides smuggling entailed certain risks. The Somali trader, therefore, generally viewed the expanding Ethiopian presence with disfavor.

The arrival and development of British administration made more of an impact on Somali trade than did Somali contacts with the Boran, or their clashes with the Ethiopians. Hostilities between Somali and

¹ Handbook of Abyssinia, p. 278.

² Captain Giuseppe Colli di Felizzano to Minister D'Affari Esteri, Agosto 3, 1903, in E. Martini Papers, no. 52, Archivio Dello Centro Stato, Rome; and Ag. DC Moyale, to OC Northern Frontier, April 23, 1912, C.O. 533/104.

Boran, and even those caused by Ethiopian expansion, were of a short-term nature. Such conflict caused only temporary dislocation of trade. British administration, however, was more pervasive and resulted in long term changes. Not only did the British shift the pattern of trade, and eventually eliminate the camel caravan, but their activities significantly changed the role of the Somali in that trade. The change began at the coast in the 1890s, and gradually appeared in the interior by the early 1900s. Still up until 1920 the Somali remained important participants in trade. The British, however laid the foundations for the substantial alterations that occurred in the 1920s and 1930s.

The spread of British administration in Somali territory occurred over a 30-year period. The British began their administration at the Indian Ocean port of Kismayu, thus broaching the eastern flank of the Somali. After punitive expeditions in Jubaland, administrative stations were opened to the north and west of the main

Somali population. Finally in 1912 the British established a station at Wajir in the heart of Somali territory. The Somali manifested mixed reactions to the British. Some violently resisted while others openly collaborated. Armed resistance, however, was sporadic and lacked unity.¹ Most Somali were able to move deeper into the interior and ignore the short arm of administration.

At the coast the IBEA Company posed a serious problem for the Somali. The Company had acquired Kismayu from the Zanzibar Sultanate. It valued the town as a base for navigation of the Juba River. The Company viewed penetration beyond the Juba as second only to the building of the railroad to Lake Victoria. The Company's tenure proved short, however, and little administrative advancement was made. Like the previous Arab administration, the Company's influence existed only in the immediate area of Kismayu. The Somali

¹E. R. Turton, "Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule, Journal of African History, vol. 13 (1972), pp. 121-127; and T. H. R. Cashmore, "Studies in District Administration in the East Africa Protectorate, 1895-1918," unpubd. dissertation (Cambridge 1965), pp. 314-369.

managed to control access to and ingress from the hinterland. In 1895, due to the Company's financial failure, Jubaland came under the control of the Foreign Office. The Foreign Office undertook pacification of the Somali in the form of punitive expeditions in 1899 and 1902. Another major expedition was sent in 1909. By then Jubaland had passed into the hands of the Colonial Office.¹

British expansion in the interior gradually encompassed territory inhabited by the Somali, Boran, Gabbra, Sakuye, Rendille, and Samburu. In 1909 the area officially became known as the Northern Frontier District. The British opened stations at Archer's Post, Marsabit, and Moyale. At first decision makers vacillated between a policy of "observation" or action. As the period progressed, direct intervention in local affairs became more common. By 1912 they had occupied Wajir, and soon after opened a post on the Daua.

¹There are a number of informative sources available which deal with the establishment of administration in Jubaland and the NFD. E. R. Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," incorporates them into his dissertation. See also Susan Brodribb-Pugh, "History of the Northern Frontier District Kenya," n.d. cyclostyled paper, private papers of Hugh Walker.

In 1914 Serenli became a station, but two years later the Aulihan, under Abdurrahman Mursal, sacked the town and killed the D.C. In 1917 the British also sent a King's African Rifles contingent to a post among the Abd Wak on the Tana. By that date, therefore, the basic foundation of British administration among the Somali in northeastern Kenya had been laid.¹

British reasons for establishing administration in northern Kenya went beyond the mere desire to control the Somali. Unrest along the Ethiopian border, which in turn potentially threatened the settled areas, was the major motivating factor behind the decision to enter the north. The desire to halt the Somali expansion was secondary. Additionally, the British were very much

¹Ibid. See also, G. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912 (Oxford 1966), pp. 161-171 and 229-238; and J. Barbour, Imperial Frontier (Nairobi 1968), pp. 45-52. For strictly military matters see, Lt. Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kings African Rifles (Aldershot 1966), pp. 95-106, 111-120, 212-227 and 434-439. Also useful are the Political Record Books of the NFD districts: Moyale Political Record Book (hereafter Moyale PRB) 1902-1907, Wajir Political Record Book (hereafter Wajir PRB) Gurreh District Political Record Book (hereafter Gurreh PRB), PC NFD 4/1/2, and Garissa Political Record Book (hereafter Garissa PRB), S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reels 69, 75, 77, 81 and 82.

aware of the economic potential of the area.¹ Almost from the beginning of their arrival, both at the coast and in the north, the British attempted to mold patterns of trade to suit their needs. Early British efforts at Kismayu and Moyale reflected this intent.

Kismayu functioned as an important trade center before the British arrived, and continued to grow in importance after they came to the coast. Nevertheless it never reached the size nor the importance of ports like Brava and Mogadishu. Before Kismayu developed, nearby Giumbo acted as a place of cattle exchange. Even passing ships stopped on the coast to purchase Somali livestock. Kismayu was not begun until 1869. Major growth took place in the 1870s, and by 1875, sixty families and over 1,000 Somali lived in the village. Since it was under the Zanzibar Sultanate, Kismayu also included a stone fort occupied by 100 Arab soldiers. Trade connections between the coast

¹ The British even spoke wishfully of finding gold and precious gems. See R. Simons to Administrator IBEA Company, May 26, 1890, and W. A. Fitzgerald to Mr. Mackenzie, August 3, 1893, F.O. 2/59; A. C. Jenner to C. H. Craufurd, April 2, 1899, F.O. 2/196; P. Girouard to G. Crewe, August 6, 1910, C.O. 533/76.

and the interior were not well developed at this point.

Only Boran initiative, in the form of camel caravans sent from southern Ethiopia, changed that situation.¹

Kismayu attracted an increasing number of Arab and Banyan traders. In succeeding years the growing number of Ogaden moving into Jubaland affected trade. First, they cut off the Boran from Kismayu, and second, the Ogaden achieved a monopoly of the trade from the town to the interior. By then Kismayu's population numbered nearly 1,000 inhabitants, with 3,000 to 5,000 nomads living on its fringes. In 1895 the town included "13 stone houses, the property of local merchants, 25 large thatched houses and 127 thatched houses and huts."²

Two years later the population had increased to 1,304 townspeople. By 1913 the number had grown to almost 4,000. In 1924, just before being handed over to the

Italians, Kismayu's population totalled nearly

¹See E. G. Ravenstein, pp. 266-268; and Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," p. 110.

²C. H. Craufurd to Administrator IBEA Company, January 27, 1894, F.O. 2/73. See also U. Ferrandi, "Da Kismayu a Lugh," L'Esplorazione Commerciale, vol. 10 (1895), p. 341, who set the population of the town at a mere 400.

5,000 inhabitants.¹ As it grew Kismayu became the major trade outlet for the Mohamed Zubeir, Aulihan, Abd Wak, Abdalla, and the nomadic Herti.

The Somali managed to protect their interest in the caravan trade to Kismayu in the face of the British intrusion. Actually throughout the Benaadir the Somali, for reasons partly commercial and partly religious, exhibited anti-administration feelings toward both the British and the Italians.² At Kismayu the Somali openly challenged the IBEA Company's attempts to change the pre-existing patterns. For example, interference in the slave trade by Company representatives resulted in severe conflict. On one occasion a baraza held to discuss the issue ended in the stabbing of a Company spokesman. In retaliation the British launched a major military expedition, and supported the military pressure with a blockade on Somali trade to Kismayu.

¹ Report by Sir A. Hardinge (London 1897), p. 17; F. Elliot, "Jubaland and Its Inhabitants," Geographical Journal vol. 41 (1913), p. 555; and G. Piazza, "L'Acquisto dell'Oltre Giuba," Rivista della Coloniale, vol. 19 (1924), p. 240.

² M. DeKiewet, "History of the Imperial British East Africa Company 1876-1895," unpubd. dissertation (London University 1955), 236.

Company officials hoped that once the Somali felt the economic pinch caused by the loss of the Kismayu outlet, their leaders would surrender to Company demands.¹ The Somali, however, easily avoided the blockade, and took their goods across the river to trade with the Italians.² The Somali also resisted attempts to penetrate the interior. While concessions were given to the Company to trade in the hinterland and to put ships on the Juba, the Somali maintained control of who went into the interior and who came to Kismayu. Thus the Boran still found it difficult to go through Ogaden territory in spite of Company efforts to re-open that connection. Nor did the Arab and Indian merchants venture far from the town in any great number until administration became established in the interior.³

¹ Ibid.; R. M. Bird-Thompson to Administrator IBEA Company, May 11, 1893, F.O. 2/58; and Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," pp. 161-165.

² OC Commanding Troops Jubaland to OC Commanding Troops EAP, January 11, 1902, F.O. 2/569; W. Monson, "Intelligence Diary," n.d., F.O. 2/59; and C. Eliot to Marquis of Lansdowne, June 14, 1901, F.O. 2/449.

³ Haywood, pp. 22 and 26; Handbook of British East Africa (Nairobi 1920), p. 295; and E. Coronaro, "La popolazione dell'Oltre Giuba," Rivista Coloniale, vol. 20 (1925), p. 330. For a similar situation at Lamu, see A. LeRoy, D'Aden a Zanzibar Un Coin de l'Arabe Heureuse Le Long des Cotes (Tours 1894), pp. 349-350.

Thus the opening of a station such as Moyale had important consequences for the Somali.

Approximately ten years after its inception at the coast, British administration began on the Ethiopian frontier. In 1905 Philip Zaphiro became the first Frontier Inspector and he remained until 1909. Under Zaphiro's supervision, British levies built Ft. Harrington near the wells at Moyale. Zaphiro's main goal was to insure the British presence on the frontier at the expense of Ethiopia. To achieve this end Zaphiro set out to assure safety along the 400-mile border, and to stop Ethiopian raids on the Boran and their allies. With a small force of askari operating from the fort at Moyale, Zaphiro combined action with bluff to bring a semblance of order to the region.¹

Zaphiro recognized the potential for trade in the region. He also understood the major obstacle to British control of that trade as early as 1907: "Nearly all the produce of Borana and the south (cattle, goats, camels, goatskins, ivory, rhino horn, ostrich feathers,

¹Cashmore, p. 335; and C. Chenevix-Trench, "Why a Greek?" History Today (London), vol. 15 (1965), pp. 48-56.

salt and a few horses and mules) is exported to Lugh and Bardera."¹ Zaphiro also complained that the Ethiopian prohibition on the export of game products actually tended "to drive the traders into Italian territory."² The Frontier Inspector, therefore, attempted to divert the traffic from Lugh to the British sphere of influence.

Besides making numerous suggestions to the British Legation in Addis as to how this goal might be achieved, Zaphiro took direct action on the frontier. He sent traders to Marsabit to obtain supplies and trade goods. He held meetings with traders encouraging them to bring their products to Kismayu. To ease merchants' fears of Ogaden attacks, Zaphiro contacted Sultan-Ahmed Magan. In a letter Zaphiro demanded that the road to Kismayu remain open to the Boran, and threatened to "take some Abyssinians and open it."³

¹ P. Zaphiro, "Commerce in the Frontier Districts," August 10, 1907, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 77.

² T. B. Hohler to Sir Edward Grey, December 12, 1907, C.O. 533/50.

³ P. Zaphiro to T. B. Hohler, December 5, 1907, C.O. 533/50; and P. Zaphiro to OC Kismayu, August 29, 1907, C.O. 533/27.

As Frontier Inspector, following a tradition of the area, he required hunters and traders to surrender one tusk of ivory to him at Moyale for the privilege of obtaining a pass to trade the other tusk at Kismayu. Zaphiro also relied on Gurre aid. These Somali aided Zaphiro by turning back any traders found going toward Lugh.¹ Zaphiro, however, was not so successful in shifting Boran trade to Kismayu as he was in contributing to the growth of the livestock trade between Borana and the Rift Valley.² Zaphiro also provided time for a township to become established, thus solidifying British claims in the area. As British presence on the frontier became established, Moyale began to attract traders interested in settling near the fort. The station's population reflected the varied background of the peoples of the area, and soon it included Arab, Indian, Somali, Boran, Gurre, Sakuye, Ajuran, Burji, and Konso inhabitants.

¹"Report from the Resident at Lugh to the Governor of Italian Somaliland," September 18, 1907," translation in C.O. 533/35; and P. Zaphiro to Sub-Commissioner Kismayu, December 10, 1906, C.O. 533/28.

²Chenevix-Trench, p. 53.

By 1916 the Moyale's population, excluding British administrative staff, numbered 100.¹

Once administrative stations like Moyale and Wajir were opened, the British controlled trade more easily. By 1914 the British enacted a system of rules and regulations applied to camel caravan movement enabling them to restrict the movement of trade in northeastern Kenya. For example, a permit, with the names of all Somali with a caravan, was needed to travel in the north. For this privilege a trader paid a security deposit of Rs.500. The caravan also had to carry cash or goods worth at least Rs.300, excluding camel transport. Once in the NFD caravans could not split up. Nor could any trading take place until the caravan reported to the D.C. at a given station.²

The livestock trade also became subject to stricter rules. Most regulations concerned the movement of livestock and the potential danger of

¹MYAR, 1916, PC NFD 1/6.

²Chief Secretary Circular No. 90, November 1926, Coast Province, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 119; PC Jubaland to Customs, August 30, 1913, PC JUB 1/6/2; J. B. Llewellyn, interviewed May 1972, Nanyuki; and Farah Osman, interviewed May 1972, Nyeri.

the spread of disease. In the early years of the trade the Herti and Isaaq had a monopoly. Some traders received substantial monetary support from European settlers.¹ The main route followed a line from Borana to Moyale, and from there to Marsabit and Rumuruti. Isiolo later replaced Rumuruti as the chief NFD outlet. Some stock was taken from Moyale to Kismayu via Wajir, but at infrequent intervals. Even less used was the route from Kismayu across the southern NFD to the Rift Valley. The Telemugger also brought livestock from the Tana to Lamu. In all cases the administration checked for disease. Fear on the part of the Rift Valley settlers that their herds might be decimated by disease, led to Government instituted quarantines.

The first occurred at Moyale in 1913, but it was short lived. In the period after World War I, however, settler agitation became more vociferous, and complaints

¹ OC Northern Frontier to Chief Secretary Nairobi, April 25, 1912, C.O. 533/104; DC Moyale to Chief Secretary Nairobi, June 4, 1913, PC NFD 4/3/1; J. B. Llewellyn, "Diary of Kenya Administration, 1914-1917," MS Afr. 5567, Rhodes House, Oxford; and Governor BEA to Secretary of the State for the Colonies, December 5, 1918, C.O. 533/199. Lord Delamere was perhaps the best known of the settlers who utilized Somali in this fashion.

against Somali traders increased.¹ Thus in 1922 a quarantine station was opened at Isiolo. No cattle were permitted to be exported. With the major outlet closed, and Lamu able to absorb only a minimum of cattle, the Somali could only sell sheep and goats. The arrival of the British also proved disruptive to the Somali slave trade.

The slave trade played a significant role in the Somali economy from the mid-19th century to the early 20th. The Benaadir ports served a dual function for the slavers. On the one hand, ports like Mogadishu, Merca and Brava, served as collection centers for slaves sent inland to the fertile agricultural regions of the Juba and the Webi Shebelli. On the other, slaves destined for Arabia often were held on the Benaadir before being re-exported. While the trade undoubtedly took place from at least the early 1800s, large numbers probably were not needed until mid-century. Because the coast was closely patrolled during the 1860s, the

¹ For examples of British settlers' complaints against Somali movement of livestock, see the Leader, June 19, 1909, March 14, 1910, January 20, 1912. See also Stock Inspector to Chief Veterinary Officer, January 20, 1921, QUAR, 2/2, Kabete Archives; and Northern Frontier Annual Report 122, PC NFD 1/1.

trade gradually switched to an overland route from Lamu. This route was extremely treacherous, however, and mortality rates reached 75 percent. The Somali were intimately connected with the transport, buying and using slaves for their own plantations, as well as in the re-export of slaves to Arabia. To a lesser extent the Somali were involved in the obtaining of slaves. The British, however, felt that by 1876 the trade north of Lamu had been brought to a virtual standstill.¹ While the exact number of slaves is unknown, in the 1870s John Kirk, the British Consul, estimated that 10,000 slaves annually were brought across the Juba River.² The Italian occupation of southern Somali at the end of the 19th century revealed that the slave trade still flourished there. As late as 1903 the residente of Merca noted that "slavery is still at its zenith; Lugh and Bardera are two veritable

¹Turton, "Pastoral Tribes," pp. 108-109.

²Cassanelli, p. 100.

slave markets."¹ The Italians expressed an ambivalent attitude toward the trade. While the Government in Rome and Italian anti-slavery societies maneuvered to end the trade, officials of the Filonardi and Benaadir Companies not only allowed slavery to continue, but some openly owned slaves themselves. Only in 1903 did the Italians take measures to bring the system of slavery to an end.²

The greatest demand for slaves came from Somali agriculturalists. These Somali, especially the Rahanwein, needed slaves to work their plantations for the production of grain such as millet and sesame, as well as cotton. Few landholders, however, owned more than ten or fifteen slaves. Slave holding was connected to the ownership of the land, and the combination had an impact on traditional Somali society in the 19th century. First, as the Somali along the rivers increased their wealth, some gained influence in nearby towns. As Cassanelli

¹R. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia (Chicago 1966), p. 76. For a description of slavery at Lugh, see Ferrandi, pp. 357-358, and 111-114.

²Ibid. 76-82. See also the Government report on the slave trade in Somalia, G. Chiesie E. Travelli, Le Questioni del Benadir (Milano 1904).

has shown, residents along the rivers often were creditors of town dwellers. Secondly, within the clan an individual who owned slaves and land could create clients whose indebtedness was personal rather than corporate. Nevertheless, while the new wealth in slaves and land increased the prestige of certain individuals, the change occurred within the traditional system. No new centers of power were created outside of it.¹

The pastoralist was not so involved in the slave trade as the agriculturalist. Nomads did raid for slaves, but the number captured probably was small compared to those shipped or trekked north by slavers from the eastern African coast. It is likely that in times of strife, such as during the Somali-Wardei wars, greater supplies of slaves were created than in normal times. The Somali involvement in Witu also involved raiding for slaves.² More typical, however, were the raids carried out by Somali along the Tana. These were irregular and sporadic, involving small groups of Somali. While the overall pressure of the Somali attacks finally

¹Cassanelli, pp. 97-100.

²Salim, pp. 65-69.

drove the Pokomo across the river, the nomads took few slaves. The normal raid only netted two or three of these riverine agriculturalists.¹ The Somali also obtained slaves from the Boran. It is unclear of the exact role played by the Boran in bringing agriculturalists from Ethiopia to places like Lugh for sale, but recent research has indicated that very few Boran acted as middlemen in this trade. Certainly some Boran sold their children for livestock to the Gurre and other Somali during the great cattle disease of the 1890s, but this was not a typical situation. Nor did Somali raids result in widespread slaving. Galla women were valued highly as concubines on the Benaadir but there was no large scale trade in them. In any case raids were carried out to capture cattle not people. On such a raid the Somali killed any men, women and children not fortunate enough to escape. The raiders took a few young boys and girls for herders or future wives.² Thus while the slave trade was important to the agriculturalists, the

¹Bunger, pp. 20 and 62-63.

²Goto, p. 55; Luling, pp. 117-118; and Hussein Alew, interviewed July 1972, El Wak.

Somali nomad had relatively little to do with it.

The slave population consisted of a variety of African peoples. By far the bulk came from eastern Africa via the Benaadir coast. The Benaadir remained a mainstay of the Kilwa trade into the 1870s.¹ Gosha settlements reflected their varied origins. The Gosha were freed slaves who settled along the Juba River. Nyika, Nyamwezi, Yao, and Makua peoples could be found in their villages. They were agriculturalists, and by the late 1890s they numbered almost 24,000.² While they traded grain to the Somali, the Gosha also lived in fear of being recaptured. Strong leaders emerged among them, such as Nasib Punda, whom the Italians dubbed, "lo Spartaco della Somalia," and Sangora Mafula.³ Aided by the Italians and the British, the Gosha maintained their independence. Indeed by 1905 for all practical purposes, because of European efforts, the slave trade was brought to a halt. Just as British

¹Salim, p. 37.

²Report by Sir A. Hardinge 1897, p. 18.

³U. Bargoni, Nella Terra di Nassib Bunda (Livorno 1931).

interference ended the slave trade, so too did administration affect the arms trade.

The Somali arms trade was similar to that in the rest of eastern Africa although it operated on a lesser scale. The firearms possessed by the Somali were definitely of poor quality. Usually the weapons were obsolete and European rejects.¹ Nevertheless firearms were in great demand. Most Somali preferred the French fusil gras. Used in raids these guns were valued more for their noise than accuracy. Nevertheless a Somali group possessing guns, especially in large numbers, could successfully challenge Somali groups without such weapons. Besides using them in war, the Somali also lent weapons to non-Somali hunters. For example, near the Tana the Somali sometimes lent rifles to the Boni elephant hunters in return for ivory tusks.²

¹R. Beachey, "The Arms Trade in East Africa in the Late Nineteenth Century," Journal of African History, vol. 3 (1962), pp. 451-467. See also Capt. R. B. Farquar to Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean, March 25, 1903, F.O. 2/969. And for a discussion on arms in southern Ethiopia, see R. Pankhurst, "Linguistic and Cultural Data on the Penetration of Firearms into Ethiopia," Journal of Ethiopian Studies, vol. 9 (1971), pp. 47-82.

²J. B. Llewellyn, interviewed May 1972, Nanyuki; and Nuria Dido, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

The Somali obtained these weapons from Ethiopia even after the British made the arms trade illegal. Both the Boran and the Gurre acted as middlemen, but frequently individual Somali or traders traveled from as far as the Tana to Ethiopia to obtain them. On their return to Kenya, when nearing administrative stations, the Somali hid the rifles outside the town, and concealed cartridges in bags of coffee beans. Or members split off from the main body and rejoined the caravan when it left the town.¹ Ironically the Somali even obtained some guns from Goshu agriculturalists who had been given them by the British for protection against Somali raiders.² Ethiopia remained the major source for firearms but a few came from Zanzibar.³ Prices fluctuated according to locale and the make of a gun,

¹Major Pope Hennessey, "Memorandum," 1906, F.O. 371/3; Thomas, pp. 151-158; and Heri Abdi, interviewed July 1972, Sankuri.

²R. G. Farrant to Ag. Administrator Mombasa, July 26, 1893, Coast Province, S.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 110; and D. M. Stewart to Under Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, January 19, 1894, F.O. 2/73.

³Commander E. L. T. Leatham to C. Eliot, August 21, 1903, F.O. 2/969; and Governor BEA to Secretary of State for the Colonies, May 21, 1912, C.O. 533/104.

but a rifle cost roughly five to seven camels in northern Kenya and Jubaland, while at Addis it could be purchased for MT\$40 to 55.¹

The British viewed firearms in the hands of the Somali as dangerous, but did little to end the trade until they established administration. The Aulihan attack at Serenli, and the consequent death of Elliot, afforded the British the opportunity to take action. In 1917 they sent an expedition to quell the Aulihan uprising and to disarm Abdurrahman Mursal's followers. On successful completion of that expedition the administration laid plans for the disarmament of the remaining Somali in their territory. Beginning in the early months of 1919, the British sent troops to Jubaland, Wajir, the Lorian, and the Tana to carry out disarmament. As one officer wrote, the British believed that they employed moderate means in achieving disarmament: "It was not affected without pressure being brought to bear, but this was all to the good, as the natives were at least

¹C. H. M. Doughty-Wylie, Addis Ababa Intelligence Report, July 5, 1914, C.O. 533/145; Capt. G. F. Phillips, Intelligence Report, October-November-December 1910, C.O. 533/85; and "Dates by Captain Bois," n.d., PC NFD 4/6/1.

taught without a punitive expedition that a Govt. order must be obeyed promptly."¹ The Somali held a different view. In the Wajir area disarmament was known as the time of El Dug, while the Telemugger called it the time of Orkorkoit. Both names reflect the measures used by the British to force the Somali to surrender their firearms. Roughly translated the names mean "the burying of the wells." In order to prevent the Somali from fleeing or at least from remaining in the inaccessible areas of the north, the British filled in all but a few wells. In this way the nomads were forced to come to the usable wells to water their livestock. If a nomad refused to surrender his weapon, then he was not allowed to water his animals. Askari also raided villages, burned heriós, and confiscated livestock. However, very few Somali were shot. The Somali offered very little resistance. Some gave their guns to kin in Ethiopia while others chose to bury theirs to be lost

¹PC Northern Frontier to Colonial Secretary
Nairobi, August 6, 1932, PC NFD 4/1/5.

forever in the sands of the north.¹ From the British standpoint the operation was successful. The disarmament expedition collected a total of 1,456 rifles and six revolvers from the Somali in Wajir and Jubaland.² In subsequent years the British employed more peaceful methods of disarming the remainder of the NFD Somali. Thus not only was the firearms trade halted, but more importantly, the Somali lost whatever military potential, however inadequate, they had to resist further administrative encroachment. Disarmament therefore, marked a significant turning point in the tenuous relationship between the Somali and the British.

Thus while at the beginning of the period the Somali virtually monopolized trade on the Dawa and the Juba by controlling egress from the interior to the coast as well as access to the hinterland, by the

¹ For the Somali view of disarmament, see Hassan Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; Mohamad Made, interviewed June 1972, Habbaswein; Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Hassin Mumin interviewed, June 1972, Wajir; and Sheikh Haji Nur Yusuf, interviewed June 1972, Wajir Bor.

² PC Northern Frontier to Colonial Secretary Nairobi, August 6, 1932, PC NFD 4/1/5; and Edward Northey to Viscount Milner, September 22, 1919, C.O. 533/213 J. B. Llewellyn, interviewed May 1972, Nanyuki, looked on disarmament as one of the most significant turning points in British-Somali relations in the NFD.

1920s they faced a serious challenge. In the 1890s and early 1900s the Somali participated in all facets of trade both in the interior and at the coast. Somali acted not only as merchants, but also as financial agents for firms at Zanzibar, middlemen, transporters, caravaners, interpreters, guides, syces, dhow captains, producers, and consumers. The majority of Somali, however, especially those in the hinterland between the Dawa and the Tana, remained nomads. Except for the occasional caravan they remained untouched by trade. Pastoralism remained the core of their economic system. Trade was a stronger factor in the areas near the Juba, especially in the towns of Lugh and Bardera, and to a lesser extent Kismayu. Certain groups, notably the Ajuran and the Gurre, had more professional traders than most Somali nomadic groups. Arabs and Somali from the coastal ports on the Benaadir also were known as traders. The trade was well organized even though currency and measurements varied from one locale to another. It was basically a camel caravan trade with

the major trade routes existing in the area between southern Ethiopia to the Juba River towns of Lugh and secondarily Bardera. Until the early 20th century, the area which became northern Kenya was on the periphery. The Somali held a monopoly of trade until challenged by the Boran, the Ethiopian expansion, and the arrival of British administration.

While Somali control suffered from Ethiopian and Boran encroachment, for the large part they retained control of the trade. The Boran proved to be a minor threat as they actually were pushed even farther west by the Somali. Ethiopian expansion, while it did interfere with Somali trade, was more serious in Boran territory. For the Somali, therefore, Ethiopian expansion proved more of an irritant than a serious challenge. The most pervasive change came with the appearance of British administration. The British first arrived at the coast in 1888 with the establishment of the IBEA Company. Then Foreign Office and later Colonial Office rule replaced the Company.

Gradually the British extended administrative control in the interior. Some Somali collaborated with the British, and others openly resisted. Most just ignored administration by moving farther inland. The British, however, continued to expand the area under their control, and by the 1920s had laid the basic foundation for administration in northern Kenya. The British also instituted rules and regulations to control the flow of trade. They ended both the slave trade and the firearms trade. The camel caravan trade also came under close scrutiny, as traders were forced to apply for permits which restricted their movement. A livestock trade from southern Ethiopia to the settlers in the Rift Valley flourished until the administration banned the export of cattle from the NFD. More importantly the overall situation created encouragement for Arab, Indian and "alien" Somali duka owners. In 1920 this trade was only in its beginning stages, but the British laid the foundations for its growth and the concomittant ending of the camel caravan trade.

With the introduction of a new economy based on dukas run by aliens in administrative centers, the role of the Somali in trade diminished considerably.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF THE NEW ECONOMY 1920 - 1948

In the 1920's and the 1930's a new economic system led to the development, growth and expansion of townships and dukas. This new system undermined the previously dominant Somali camel caravan. Strongly supported by the British, ~~the new economy~~ not only altered the structure of trade in the NFD, but substantially changed the Somali role in commercial activities. It meant that townships, which had their origins in administrative intentions, became focal points for economic development. In turn, townships and dukas increasingly attracted nomads, assuring the NFD's orientation toward Kenya rather than to the Benaadir coast. The new economy also encouraged the use of trucks and cars on an expanding network of roads to the detriment of the camel caravan. As the period progressed, it provided more varied goods which became available to a wider populace. Since the British encouraged the use of cash in the duka trade, the

new economy minimized the usefulness of barter. Additionally, the system effected the structure of the livestock trade. The combination of these trends resulted in a reduction of the importance of the nomads' role in trade. The new economic system favored the replacement of Somali nomads by Arabs, Indian, Herti, and Isaaq as merchants, middlemen, transporters, hawkers, and caravaners. Simultaneously, it actively discouraged nomads from entering directly into the duka trade. Thus, the new economy left the nomads to act only as producers of livestock and consumers of imported goods.

Trade centers in the NFD resulted from the foundation of British administrative posts. These stations usually were sited on the basis of available water supplies, health considerations, existing centers of nomadic population and known caravan routes. The posts gradually attracted enterprising Arabs and Indians who set up shops. Since the nomads came to these shops to trade, the towns directly contributed to the change in the old pattern of the trade characterized by Somali

camel caravans. From 1906 until the mid-1920's Moyale acted as the leading administrative and trade center. Then as trade shifted away from the Benaadir, Wajir gained in importance. Gradually other administrative stations came to dominate their own geographic spheres of influence. For example, Mandera, founded in 1922, was the major duka center in the Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia border triangle. In the southeastern portion of the NFD a number of smaller posts including Sankuri and Bura remained prominent until 1932 when Garissa opened. That town then served as the major trade center along the upper Tana. Minor centers, some of which had humble beginnings as police outposts, also developed. Places such as Derkali, Rhamu, El Wak, Muddo Gashi, Habbaswein, Buna and Ijara survived years of marginal existence before becoming established, though smaller, duka towns. Even farther west towns such as Marsabit, Isiolo, and to a lesser degree, Garba Tula grew into important commercial centers.

Wajir illustrates the post-1920s growth of NFD

towns. In the 1920s Wajir replaced Moyale as the major NFD township although it never became so important as an administrative center for the entire north. From 1926 to 1936, due to political reshuffling and its geographic locale, Wajir was the most important NFD commercial center. Simultaneously, Isiolo became NFD administrative headquarters. In 1928 Wajir's commercial importance increased when it became the NFD customs post. Its central geographic position enabled the town's traders to tap nearby Jubaland and Ethiopia while retaining connections with downcountry Kenya. The township developed at the junction of a number of caravan routes:

- 1) to Moyale and the Ethiopian frontier; 2) to the Ethiopian frontier via El Wak and Mandera; 3) to Kismayu and the Benaadir; 4) to Lamu via Muddo Gashi and Bura;
- 5) to Nairobi via Garba Tula and Isiolo; 6) to Marsabit.

Although it lost in 1936 its tenure as a customs post and again followed Moyale's lead, Wajir continued as a viable economic entity.¹

The town of Wajir originated from a British boma

¹Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, January 10, 1925, PC NFD 4/1/7; and OC Northern Frontier to Colonial Secretary Nairobi, December 3, 1937, PC GRSSA 20/1.

(station). Prior to the arrival of the British neither towns nor dukas existed in northern Kenya. At Wajir only the wells attracted passing Arab and Somali trade caravans. In 1912 Wajir officially opened as a British post. Two years later when John Llewellyn arrived to take over as DC, the only edifice in Wajir was Fort Siddeh. Built by his predecessor on a gentle rise, the fort appeared as "a white castellated square block of wall, with two flat roofed rooms close to each other--~~very Eastern--all glistening in the sun.~~"¹ Siddeh, named after one of the nearby wells, sat in the middle of a clearing about 1,000 square yards in radius, surrounded by bush and a loose sand only a few inches deep caused by constant camel grazing. The fort also provided a place for the Somali to set up their mobile encampments just outside its walls. Although Llewellyn attempted to stimulate trade during his six-year stay, the station included no permanent structures other than the fort. Wajir's traders, instead used wood from the nearby acacia trees to construct lean-tos. By 1920 Wajir contained only

¹J. B. Llewellyn, "Diary of Kenya Administration 1914-17," Ms AFR. 5567, Rhodes House, Oxford.

"one semi-permanent ramshackle duka."¹ From these inconspicuous beginnings it was to grow during the next fifteen years into the major trade center for northeastern Kenya.

Throughout its history Wajir township underwent periods of boom and stagnation, and thus grew haphazardly. In the 1920s it gained in importance. In 1922 its first stone shop appeared, erected by Maalim Mohamed Hassan, one of the Somali traders. By the end of that year the post also included four stone shops and the beginnings of a stone mosque. Wajir offered plentiful supplies of limestone construction material in the surrounding countryside, and two of the town's enterprising "alien" Somali, one of whom was known locally as Ali Cash, cornered the building trade. The town's shops usually were one-storied flat-roofed white-washed limestone-walled buildings.² In 1923 another "alien" Somali partitioned his shop to add a tailoring section. Two years later the town held 14 dukas, and its number fluctuated around this figure until the mid-1930's. Meanwhile the success of Wajir encouraged the opening of outstations. As early as 1927

¹WAR 1920, PC NFD 1/5. See also J. B. Llewellyn, interviewed May 1972, Nanyuki.

²Ali Hussein, interviewed June 1972, Wajir was most helpful for information on the early growth of Wajir as a township.

Muddo Gashi and Habbaswein had duka owners. The former was soon abandoned because of cattle disease. By 1934 Habbaswein included four shops, Muddo Gashi had been reopened, and Buna started as a trade center. During the Italo-Ethiopian war, Wajir and its outstations received a substantial economic boost. By 1937 Wajir supported 27 shops. By then the town also contained a butchery, numerous coffee shops and eating places, and many of the unique Somali rest houses known as Hoteli. During World War II it added a new hospital built by Italian prisoners of war. Then in 1944 the town replaced the old mosque with a new one. Around the same time shopkeepers began letting smaller plots to artisans such as tailors, iron workers, and leather workers. By then Wajir had stabilized at 31 dukas. In fact, in 1948, three of these plots were vacant. Wajir's last addition in this period was the Government African School.¹

Elsewhere in the NFD townships like Wajir developed unevenly and differed according to the districts. Compared to Moyale and Wajir, Mandera always remained

¹See WAR 1914-1948, OC NFD 1/5; WHOR 1913-1948, PC NFD 2/5; and DC Wajir to OC Northern Frontier, January 17, 1937, DC WAJ LG 5/1.

small. Its only outlying trade centers were at El Wak and Rhamu, and attempts to open dukas at Derkali and Takabba failed. Farther south only in 1932 when Garissa opened, did a major town appear in Telemugger. But in that district, outlying trade centers such as Saka, Bura, Ijara, Sankuri, Balambala and Muddo Gashi proliferated. Even so by 1934 the total number of shops in the entire district was only 22. Meanwhile Wajir and Moyale dominated their districts with very few outlying trade centers.¹ The populations of the towns also reflected geographical and ethnic differences. Moyale, probably the most cosmopolitan of the towns, included Gabbra, Sakuye, Konso, Burji, Gabawein, Boran, Ajuuran, Gurre, Somali, Arab and Indian inhabitants.²

British administrators remained ambivalent toward township development. In the earlier years administrators believed that small trade centers with shops would encourage the Somali to become anchored to a specific area. The DC's felt that if the Somali moved about less, then aggression and conflict would diminish.³

¹See the Annual Report and Handing Over Report referred to in footnote 1, page 6.

²MYAR 1927, PC NFD 1/6.

³H. J. Read to Sir G. Fiddes, February 27, 1912, C.O. 533/111; R. Salkeld to Chief Secretary, April 6, 1944; and NFAR 1926, PC NFD 1/1.

As the number and size of the towns grew, however, official opinion changed. Then the British aimed at stabilizing growth. The British based their reasoning on the claim that larger towns required substantial administrative time, effort, and expense which could be employed more fruitfully elsewhere. They also argued that the trade potential in the north did not justify large towns. And, as one Provincial Commissioner bluntly stated, "Nomads should remain nomads."¹

The Somali nomads also manifested an ambivalence.

Most Somali looked at towns as a source of needed goods and therefore frequented them only for trade purposes. Though some settled in towns, the "average" Somali as late as 1948 preferred a nomadic life.² Those who lived in towns usually were ex-nomads who once worked in the police or military services, British appointed headmen, "alien" Somali traders and the maskini (poor).

The maskini lived in unofficial settlements for most of the period. Other nomads viewed these settlements

¹ Minutes of DC's Meeting, December 29/31, 1941, PC NFD 8/1/2. For a further explanation of this remark, see Sir Gerald Reece, interviewed August 1974, Edinburgh; Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London; and Negley Farson, Last Chance in Africa (London 1949), p. 291.

² Unshur Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Gariftu; and Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London.

as convenient places to leave the aged, infirm, and poor. The maskini frequently set up herios (huts) outside the town limits, and they created an administrative problem for the British. During dry seasons and times of drought, the maskini population usually increased considerably. In 1946 at Wajir the unofficial settlement included 500 huts, whereas in 1938 it had consisted only of 249 huts. In that same year the maskini population diminished due to British recognition of only four main settlements: Ogaden, Degodia, Ajuran and Herti.¹ The maskini, however, were of peripheral importance to the duka trade.

Essentially the duka trade remained a petty trade. It began primarily as a supply source for administrative staff and troops, with only a small portion of goods included to attract the nomad. Its main items of sale throughout the period were tea, sugar, posho (maize meal), cotton cloth, kitchenware, utensils, and canned goods. The trade encouraged the nomad to exchange livestock, hides and skins, milk and ghee. Until 1931 when taxation was introduced, duka owners did not rely on cash

¹DC Wajir to OC Northern Frontier, June 20, 1939 and DC Wajir to OC Northern Frontier, October 15, 1946, DC WAJ LG 5/1, and WHOR 1947 PC NFD 2/5.

to any great degree. Because of British administrative support and regulations that eliminated hawking in the bush, duka transactions increased. Dukas gradually offered a greater variety of goods and extended their availability to the nomads. In the 1930s one traveler described a typical Wajir duka as follows:

Here was the merchandise right enough, but the purchaser had to find for himself what he wanted; and the fun began with the bargaining. Here were fine cloths from the Benadir coast, cottons from Manchester; coils of camel rope, camel bells, carved from the desert acacia, piles of saddle cloths; sandals; very large safety pins; a coronation tea-pot ornamented with crude pictures of King George and Queen Mary; stocks of Kenya tea and coffee made up in little packets; cups and saucers, enamel mugs and plates; hunting knives and cutlery for the home, ghee in great jars; jaggery, or brown sugar in big sticky lumps; clocks and lamps and tall walking sticks; and Heaven alone knows what else.¹

Among the "what else" could be found razor blades, aspirin, quinine, padlocks, scales, umbrellas, hammers, safari beds, flashlights, mosquito nets, needles, ink, honey and vermicelli.²

A number of interrelated factors created a

¹E. A. T. Dutton, Lillibullero or the Golden Road (Zanzibar 1946) 2nd. ed., pp. 65-66. For descriptions of dukas in Moyale and Mandera, see Roberto di San Marzano, Dal Giuba al Margherita (Rome 1935); pp. 18-20 and 62-66.

²Ahamed Salim Bayusuf, interviewed July 1972, Hola; and Ahamed Lakiča, interviewed July 1972, Mandera.

situation in which the absence of the nomads resulted in control of the trade by aliens. A major reason for their absence was Somali disinterest in townships as places of settlement. Coupled with this was the administrative attitude typified by one official's comment that "few if any of the natives of the district are sufficiently advanced as to be able to run a store."¹ Not surprisingly few nomads opened shops in the major towns, although occasionally they set up dukas in outposts such as Buna and Habbaswein. Even then the Somali shopkeepers usually came from these areas. For example, an Ajuran might receive a license for Buna, but at Habbaswein an Ogaden would more likely open a duka. An important factor from which the nomad suffered was the lack of capital. Only headmen and chiefs could obtain the necessary funds for opening a duka, and they were checked by British policy. Because of administrative fears that a combination of political and economic power would lead to abuses, chiefs and headmen could not own shops.² Local ownership, therefore, did not occur to any great extent until after

¹WHOR 1927, PC NFD 2/5

²DC Wajir to OC Northern Frontier, April 30, 1940; DC WAJ 2/6; and OC Northern Frontier to DC Garissa, March 19, 1947, DC GRSSA 4/4.

World War II. Until then alien merchants dominated the duka trade.

Alien traders actively seeking shops existed in sufficient numbers to assure the growth and establishment of the duka trade. These petty businessmen came from three distinct groups: Arabs, Indians and "alien" Somali. Goans and Barawa, actually subgroups, made smaller contributions. Attracted by the prospect of earning a living, these entrepreneurs easily merged into the Muslim desert atmosphere which pervaded NFD towns. Most were between the ages of 20 and 49, had been born outside of the NFD, and indeed outside of Kenya, and were male. Although small in number they increased considerably by World War II. That conflict, however, caused a mass evacuation of the NFD townships. The following figures give an idea of their numbers.¹

NFD	INDIAN	ARAB
1921	13	14
1926	1	5
1931	47	67
1937	202	356
1945	235	550
1949	250	418

¹ Report of the Non-Native Census Enumeration in Kenya Colony on the Night of 6th March 1931 (Nairobi 1931); Report of the Non-Native Census, February 21, 1936 (Nairobi 1936); Northern Frontier Internal Security Report 1937, Schedule A, ADM 15/3 at the PC's Office, Garissa; WAR 1935 through 1939, Appendix No. 1, PC NFD 1/5; WHOR 1939, Schedule No. 1, and 1941 Appendix No. 3, PC NFD 2/5; NFAR 1945, Appendix No. 2, PC NFD 1/1, and PC Northern Frontier to Education Office, December 2, 1949, at the DC's Office, Mandera.

WAJIR	INDIAN	ARAB
1931	18	26
1936	43	49
1937	50	90
1939	50	110
1941	6	108

Although these traders, settled throughout the NFD, each town had its own flavor which could change yearly.

For example, in 1930 the Garissa trading community consisted mostly of Somali, in 1931 mainly of Arabs, and in 1932 mainly of Indians. Isiolo, on the other hand, held a strong Isaaq community, and Wajir a strong Herti one.

Mandera had the largest Barawa population in the NFD.¹

In all cases those who came to the NFD like the nomads were a minority of larger groups living in Kenya or in neighboring Jubaland.

The "alien" Somali had a checkered career throughout Kenya and the NFD was but one of the areas into which they penetrated. As one authority explained:

The first Alien Somalis made their way into the Colony towards the end of the last century; they came as askaris attached to the expeditions of the early explorers, as personal servants, syces and gun bearers and, later, as enlisted men in the K.A.R.; many settled in the various townships,

¹See the Annual Report and Handing Over Reports referred to in Footnote 1, page 6.

to which were attached extensive commonages, and devoted themselves to stock-trading and the ranching of their cattle. The first settlements were at Dagoretti, Laikipia and Rumuruti in Central Kenya and at Wajir, Garba Tulla and Isiolo in the N.F.D.¹

In the early years of the Protectorate their numbers were relatively small, but the community, steadily supplemented by the arrival of illegal newcomers, grew. In the 1920s many migrants came overland on foot from the north via Ethiopia or Italian Somaliland, and by sea via Aden to Mogadischio or Kismayu and then on to Wajir and Kenya. In the 1930s they found their entrance facilitated by the advent of motor vehicles.² The "alien" Somali included two main groups, the Isaaq and the Herti. The former settled mainly in the Rift Valley Province, Nairobi, and in the late 1920s at Isiolo. The Herti, who could also be found in such places, preferred the NFD towns. The Herti prominence at Wajir probably occurred because they, like many of the nomads there, were of Darod descent.³ By 1938 approximately 900 male "alien"

¹G. Reece, "The Position of Alien Somalis in Kenya Colony," April 25, 1945, PC NZA 2/533 at PC's Office, Nyeri.

²WAR 1929 and 1933, PC NFD 1/5.

³Ahamed Aden Lord, interviewed June 1972, Wajir, Haja Jama, interviewed July 1972, Mandera; and Gulied Hassan, interviewed July 1972, Mandera.

Somali lived in Kenya. Of these 180 were in the NFD, and only 70 were at Wajir. The majority were stock traders rather than duka owners.¹

Although the Hertti and the Isaaq were an important segment of the economic community, the administration viewed them with great distrust. Policy aimed at limiting their numbers in the NFD. The British gave licenses only to those who had "rendered exceptional and long service" to the Government as askaris, clerks, or interpreters, and as long as they held sufficient capital to operate a shop.² Administrators also claimed that the Hertti and Isaaq functioned more like stock traders than duka owners.

Compared to the Arabs and the Indians the "alien" Somali allegedly "did not do much retail trade." The British accused them of using their shops as "headquarters for stock trading syndicates and while there was little for sale in the shop the assistants were out in the bush buying sheep and goats--probably without licenses."³

Additionally, administrators singled out the Hertti as the

¹Chief Secretary to PC's, June 25, 1938, OC SP 6/1/2; NFDOR 1938, OC NFD 2/1; and WAR 1938, PC NFD 1/5

²NFDOR 1925, OC NFD 2/1; OC Northern Frontier to all DC's, October 12, 1948, DC GRSSA 4/4. See also Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London; and Sir Gerald Reece, interviewed August 1974, Edinburgh.

³Wajir Monthly Intelligence Report (hereafter WMIR), April 1927, PC NFD 3/2/1.

chief smugglers of ivory and other game trophies.¹ But what niggled administrators the most was the Herti and Isaaq participation in local politics. As one prominent NFD official bemoaned:

They are as a race restless, volatile, politically minded and treacherous. They seldom, if ever, content themselves with their trading and domestic affairs, but almost invariably interest themselves in local and international politics and sedition of every kind. They endeavour to influence tribesmen to resist or to defeat the activities of Government officials.²

Thus, the Herti and Isaaq found themselves blamed for nomadic reluctance to participate in government schemes. In 1922 this was most apparent with Registration, from 1930 to 1931 and again from 1936 to 1938 with taxation, and finally from 1946 to 1948 during the short life of the Somali Youth League.³ As a result of these fears

¹Game Warden to Chief Native Commissioner, August 23, 1928, PC NFD 4/1/7.

²OC Northern Frontier to Chief Secretary, July 16, 1938, DC ISO 2/31. See also DC Moyale to Director of Intelligence, March 26, 1942, PC NFD 4/7/2.

³M. Mahony, "Herti-Mijertein," August 1928, and H. G. Sharpe, "Further Notes on the Herti," June 6, 1932, Garissa PRB, Vol. 2, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 69. For an overview of Herti and Isaaq agitation against the British in Kenya, see E. R. Turton, "Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule," Journal of African History, vol. 13 (1972), pp. 111-119.

British administrators kept a wary eye on them and their movement in the NFD. At each administrative station they kept a list of undesirables and a characterization of each man in what they euphemistically entitled "Noted Blokes." On the whole the British accepted these traders, however reluctantly, because of their important economic function.

The Wajir Arab community generally was a welcome addition to the north. Many Arabs who ventured to Moyale, Mandera, Wajir, and even Garissa previously had lived and traded in Kismayu or Bardera. A few came from Lamu. Some, such as Haji Jama, had contacts with the Somali prior to 1925. After the Jubaland cession another influx of Arabs occurred. In most cases they or their parents originally came from the Makalla region of the Hadramaut in Arabia. These men took advantage of the British advance in the north which offered them an opportunity to escape from the rigors of the camel caravan trade and from the crowded competition of Kismayu. Many, therefore, opted for the settled existence of duka

ownerships. The largest Arab populations existed in Moyale and Wajir, with Garissa a distant third. The Arabs handled trade on a family basis, and only in the later years were many connected with what can be considered as large firms.¹

The Asians, who were not so widespread in the north as other alien traders, formed the third major trading community. The Indians at Wajir were an exception to the general trade pattern in that prior to World War II a large number owned dukas in that town. Elsewhere in the NFD few Indian traders operated. Goans seemed especially attracted to Borana areas to the west of the Somali, and they ran dukas in Marsabit, Garba Tula and even Moyale.² Like the Arabs, many Indians retained coastal contacts with Kismayu, and when the British ceded Jubaland another influx of Indians occurred. Unlike the Arabs, some Indian traders worked for or owned large firms. Men like Lalji Mangalji and Mohamed Moti not only had dukas in the NFD, but also operated in places such as Meru, Nairobi, Mombasa,

¹For a discussion of the Arab role in the duka trade, see Islam Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; Omar Basabra, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Abdalla bin Omar, interviewed July 1972, Mandera; Abdulla bin Omar Zaid, interviewed July 1972, Wajir; Ahamed Salim Bayusuf, interviewed July 1972, Hala.

²Alys Reece, To My Wife 50 Camels (London 1963), p. 81; Isiolo Handing Over Report, March 3, 1930, DC ISO 2/2; and Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London.

and even Kisumu. Overall, however, the Indian duka trader did not penetrate the northeastern Somali area as extensively as other parts of the colony.¹

Very few traders, whether Asian, Arab, or Somali, ran more than one shop. Because of the lack of capital, and the British efforts to discourage "chains," they remained one-shop operators. Any attempts to establish "chains" of dukas met with British discouragement because of fear that the limited capital would accumulate in the hands of a few. The British also wanted to avoid absentee landlordism.² But some of the more enterprising traders managed to extend their holdings. Ali Sigara, a Herti, kept shops in Mandera, El Wak, Murri, Moyale, and Wajir. Omar Basabra, an Arab, owned shops in the same places with the exception of Wajir and the addition of Garissa. Yusuf Abdulgani, an Indian, had dukas in Balamballa and Ijara and also operated a posho mill and a petrol store in conjunction with this shop in Garissa. Those who traded on this scale needed a sizeable number of employees,

¹ J. S. Mangat, A History of the Asians in East Africa c. 1886 to 1945 (Oxford 1969), pp. 87 and 97 briefly mentions Indian interest in northern Kenya. For a detailed description of Indian influence in eastern Africa, see R. G. Gregory, India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations within the British Empire 1890-1939 (Oxford 1971).

² OC Northern Frontier to all DC's, July 16, 1941, DC MDA 5/1.

usually relatives. For example, Islam Bayusuf, an Arab in Garissa district, sent his brother-in-law to handle a shop in El Wak. At the same time Islam Bayusuf employed an 18 year old relative at the shop in Muddo Gashi which in turn belonged to another Arab whose main base was Moyale. Bayusuf himself operated a duka in Garissa.¹

Competition as well as cooperation among traders also took place. Failures occurred but they seem to have been rare. Competition and cooperation often depended on ethnic variables. A Herti normally depended more on other Herti than on Arabs for aid, and vice versa. Nevertheless traders easily crossed ethnic lines, especially in the smaller towns. Since most traders could not afford trucks, they often purchased space for goods, or the goods themselves, from the owners of these vehicles. Some of the larger traders, such as Bayusuf, Mangalji, or Sigara, also issued loans or credit, sometimes to their loss. Some sublet shops illegally, or backed front men for obtaining licenses. Competition remained sharp enough, however, so that fitina (malicious gossip) about

¹Ibid.; and DC Garissa to PC Northern Frontier, October 21, 1947, DC GRSSA 4/4.

the illegalities usually reached the DC's.¹ Enough cooperation existed to ensure that even the weakest links continued functioning and created a viable system.

In much the same way the nomad-trader relationship wove a web which facilitated the continuance of the duka trade. Traders often extended credit to nomads despite the high risk. One Arab trader claimed that he lost nearly Sh. 10,000/- over the years. He incurred most of these losses during his early years at Mandera.² Traders continued to extend credit because the practice encouraged the nomads to come into the towns to trade. They also accepted livestock in payment for goods long after cash became the official currency and barter was outlawed. Sometimes the traders failed to benefit from this practice as much as they expected. They often ranced their livestock with nomads in the bush and thus trusted the Somali with their herds. The Somali had a saying that "a trader only has male stock," explaining why traders' herds never increased.³ At times, traders also received financial aid from local Somali leaders,

¹DC Moyale Safari Diary, July 1930, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2084, Reel 104; and Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London.

²Abdulla bin Omar, interviewed July 1972, Mandera.

³Ibid.

and some traders could depend on the business of a particular Somali sub-clan. For example, the Herti relied more on trade with the Ogaden than with the Degodia. The Isaag traded more with the Degodia. Traders who had married wives from the nomads also had unique connections. Nevertheless the Arabs and the Indian traders survived, so ethnic considerations were not the most important factors in the trade.

During the period from 1920 to 1948 a number of interacting factors assured the existence of the duka trade at the expense of the camel caravan. Active British encouragement of duka traders was of the utmost importance. In response to the introduction of motor vehicles the British extended the road network, giving those traders with trucks an advantage. The British also established cash as a medium of exchange through taxation, and changed the structure of the livestock trade. These actions combined to establish the duka trade in the preminent position it held by the end of 1948.

At least until the outbreak of World War II, the

British openly encouraged shopkeepers to migrate to the NFD, but after that period they favored local Somali as duka owners. The British introduced rules which stimulated the duka trade and protected the shopowner from competition. Although it was not all powerful, administrative strength grew in time and its backing assured the duka trade's long range success. During 1920 to 1925 the NFD military administration contributed to the establishment of permanent shops. It required that all dukas be built of stone. This practice also eliminated marginal traders from owning shops. The cost of such a structure at that time ranged from Sh. 1200/- to Sh. 1500/-. Since the administration also required that each applicant show proof of Sh. 5,000/- operating capital, the British assured that each trader was a "man of substance" and could afford to stock his shop adequately.¹ The NFD administrators also constantly belabored the Central Government with the uniqueness of their area, and claimed that duka traders, therefore, deserved certain privileges. Sometimes they won concessions for NFD

¹WHOR 1925, PC NFD 2/5.

shopkeepers. For example, prior to 1925 Wajir traders paid only Sh. 2/- per annum for a license. Gradually they were forced to pay Sh. 10/- p.a., and by 1924 Sh. 24/- p.a. This was quite different from downcountry duka owners who by that date were paying at least Sh. 200/- p.a. In the 1930s fees in the north fell more into line with the rest of the colony, but even then only the largest traders paid on scale.¹

Another example of British regulations designed to protect the duka owner was the campaign against hawkers. In the earliest years of administration, British policy aimed at controlling the traders in the district by obtaining information about the latter's traveling habits and companions. As long as a merchant reported to the DC, the British permitted hawking in the bush. With the beginning of townships and its investment in supporting town merchants, the administration started to limit the scope of the itinerant trader. Then the military administration banned hawkers. Except for a brief span between 1931 and 1934 the civil administration followed suit.

¹Senior Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, October 20, 1926, CS 1/89 Fin. 5/2; DC Garissa to Chief Native Commissioner, October 10, 1933, PC GRSSA 9/5; and DC Wajir to OC Northern Frontier, February 2, 1949, DC WAJ IG 5/1.

The British offered five reasons for this action:

- 1) nomads who traded in towns acted more peacefully
- 2) hawkers often swindled nomads in the bush, or left behind unpaid debts; 3) since hawkers operated on a lower profit margin than the duka owner, the latter's interest and investment must be better protected;
- 4) trade centers in outlying areas were useful sub-administrative posts and were kept alive only by the efforts of duka owners; 5) hawkers were potential purveyors of dissent and sedition.¹ The fact that most itinerant traders were Isaaq and Herti reinforced British reasoning.

The British introduction of cash through taxation also contributed to the development of the duka trade. The use of cash followed a system previously characterized by barter. Even before taxation, however, some coinage such as the MTS or the rupee found acceptance. But in 1928 the British banned the MT¹, and two years later instituted the Kenya shilling as the official currency. In 1931, after a number of failures related to Somali

¹ Minutes of DC's Meeting, October 10, 1928, PC NFD 8/1/1; and M. Mahony, "Trade," May 7, 1929, Garissa PRB, Vol. 1, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 69.

resistance, the British introduced taxation. At first the British accepted livestock, animal products, and even camel mats and kibuyus (hand carved wooden containers) in lieu of cash for tax payments. By 1935, however, they would take only cash, and they no longer allowed shopkeepers to transact business through barter. During the Italo-Ethiopian War, because of high prices paid for livestock, cash became more popular. Not until World War II and the introduction of the state livestock purchasing agencies did the use of the shilling become widespread. Thus by 1948 Somali nomads generally accepted cash as a medium of exchange even if they wondered what new currency would replace the shilling in the future.¹

Just as taxation and cash altered pre-existing patterns, so too did cars and trucks as modes of transport introduce significant changes. The utilization of motor vehicles, and the simultaneous construction of a road network, substantially affected trade in the north. The advent of trucks directly led to the end of the camel

¹A. Smith, "The Open Market: The Economy of Kenya's Northern Frontier Province and the Italo-Abyssinian War," East Africa Journal (Nairobi) vol. 6 (1969), pp. 34-35.

caravan. At the same time, motor vehicles made practicable the shift of the sources of supply and outlets away from the Benaadir to downcountry Kenya. Although immediately noticeable, the impact of motor vehicles as agents of change was gradual.

A number of difficulties hindered the growth of motor transport. Among the most important obstacles to the establishment of regular and rapid motor transport was the physical character of the north. The building and upkeep of reliable roads was no easy task. Indeed road was a euphemistic term for sandy tracks interspersed with sharp limestone outcrops meandering through the desert. Road gangs faced the logistical problem of obtaining sufficient water while working far from the towns or the wells. Labor was not immediately available for road work primarily because the nomads shied away from such tasks. Patterns of rainfall contributed to problems of speed and maintenance. Actually from mid-March to mid-May rains caused the closing of the roads and except for camels travel was virtually impossible. Secondly,

rain-drenched roads became seas of impassable mud if trucks traveled on them. The rains, therefore, forced traders to plan the provisioning of their shops to avoid shortages when the roads were closed. A third problem related to the lack of proper car-maintenance facilities, mechanics, and even gasoline. Drivers, who were usually Herti and Arabs, often were in short supply. They had to carry their own car repair equipment and gasoline on their vehicles. They also had to make major repairs at any point during a journey, frequently relying on makeshift solutions. Shortage of gasoline posed serious problems, and not until 1936 did Lalji Mangalji install the first petrol pump at Wajir. The expense of owning and operating vehicles also hindered the growth of motor transport. Because of their expense, few shopkeepers purchased their own vehicles.¹

About 1927-1928 motor traffic reached a watershed in northern Kenya. Although the first lorry did not reach Wajir until 1920, a number of shopkeepers had purchased trucks by 1927. A trader on the scale of Ali Sigara

¹A. Reece, *50 Camels*, pp. 100-101; and Ahamed Aden Lord, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

needed at least one truck to support his business, and of course, two or three were preferable.¹ In 1927 the first car from Kismayu, a Fiat, arrived in Wajir. In that same year departures from Meru to Moyale, Wajir, and Garba Tula became "almost daily occurrences."² Motor traffic also benefitted from the completed roads from Moyale to Mandera, and from Lamu to Bura.

The increase of motor traffic benefitted the duka trade and lessened the usefulness of the camel as a means of transport. Speed coupled with a greater carrying capacity gave motor traffic an advantage over camel transport. For example, a truck could cover the Lamu-Wajir run in two and one-half days, and that from Kismayu to Wajir in two days, while a camel caravan took 15 days from Lamu to Wajir and 17 days from Kismayu to Wajir. A truck could complete the Lamu-Bura stretch in eight hours but a camel took six days.³ Not surprisingly, motor traffic increased. During 1927 a mere three cars per month arrived at Moyale, but in the following year the

¹This is the view of Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London.

²NFAR 1927, PC NFD 1/1; and WMIR, March 1927, PC NFD 3/2/1.

³Native Affairs Department Annual Report (Nairobi 1928), pp. 27-28; WHOR 1929, PC NFD 2/5; and Ahamed Aden Lord, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

number reached an average of five per week. By 1946, 110 trucks passed through Isiolo in the month of July alone. In that same year a record of 781 vehicles drove through Garissa.¹ Often the increase in traffic resulted in the immediate stimulation of the duka trade. For example, when the Lamu-Bura extension was completed, the number of dukas in Bura increased from two to thirteen. Meanwhile the camel caravan trade declined. Even though an occasional caravan could be found after World War II, they had fallen into disuse much earlier. As early as 1928 the DC Moyale reported that "camel safaris have decreased accordingly and the string of fine Jubaland camels with trade goods from Kismayu is seldom seen their place being taken by the universal motor lorry."²

The advent of the motor vehicle also contributed to the shift of NFD dependence away from the Somali coast toward downcountry Kenya. Even though the transfer of Jubaland to Italy proved a structural blow to the previous trade pattern, merchants continued to prefer Kismayu as a source of goods. Motorized transport, however, gradually

¹ Isiolo Monthly Intelligence Report (hereafter IMIR), July 1928, DC ISO 2/28; MYAR 1927, PC NFD 1/6; NFAR 1928, PC NFD 1/1; and DC Moyale Safari Diary, April 1930, S. U. KNA, MIC, Film No. 2084, Reel 104.

² MYAR 1928, PC NFD 1/6.

oriented the NFD to Meru, via Isiolo, or to Lamu. It overcame attempts by Wajir traders to ignore downcountry Kenya's high transport costs and customs duties. On occasion, in spite of the double British-Italian duty on frontier goods, traders provided some products for a cheaper price at Wajir and Mandera than could be purchased from Meru and the Right Valley Towns. For example, in 1932 beet sugar imported from Hungary via Kismayu was sold at Wajir more cheaply than Kenya produced sugar.¹ Attempts to establish regular connections with Lamu also met with difficulties.

Lamu suffered from two distinct problems. First, Lamu was 78 miles farther from Wajir than Kismayu. Thus, while it attracted Telemugger trade, the island did not have the access to the remainder of the NFD that Kismayu did. Second, the Lamu-Bura road needed constant repair and that situation "thwarted" efforts to establish regular connections" with NFD towns.² At the time of the Italo-Ethiopian War, Lamu increased its contacts with the NFD. Italian restrictions on trade with Kismayu

¹ WAR 1932, PC NFD 1/5.

² WHOR 1929, PC NFD 2/5.

aided Lamu's attractiveness. At the same time the new rating system on the Kenya-Uganda Railroad allowed Lamu merchants to sell goods more cheaply than those available at either Kismayu or downcountry Kenya. Indeed some traders began using the road from Lamu to Meru and to Nyeri via Garissa.¹ After the war even though trade between Kismayu and the NFD recommenced, Lamu became the major supplier of imported goods for the eastern side of the Province. Meanwhile, Meru and Isiolo became the most important source of goods on the western side. During World War II Lamu lost some ground because the British not only constructed an all weather road to Mombasa but they also deliberately allowed the Lamu road to Garissa to decay.² In spite of the firm establishment of the NFD links to Lamu and downcountry Kenya, some NFD traders, especially those at Wajir, continued to state their preference for trading at Kismayu.³ Meanwhile the livestock trade underwent alterations.

Numerous restrictions subjected livestock traders

¹ NFAR 1934, PC NFD 1/1.

² GHOR 1940 and October 1946, PC NFD 2/7.

³ Wajir Traders Council to DC Wajir, January 7, 1942, PC GRSSA 20/5; DC Garissa to PC Northern Frontier, October 15, 1948, DC GRSSA 1/6; and Omar Basabra, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

to a system that favored administrative rather than nomadic needs. During the years between 1922 and 1948, two fundamental changes altered the structure of the livestock trade. Neither favored the nomad. The first occurred in 1922 with the institution of a quarantine on cattle exported from the western NFD outlet of Isiolo. Thereafter only sheep and goats were a viable livestock export. Attempts to create a cattle outlet at Lamu, despite participation of the Telemugger, never proved satisfactory. The second took place during and shortly after World War II. The introduction of monopolistic government livestock agencies resulted in the loss of opportunity for nomads to decide when, where, to whom, and for how much they would sell their livestock. Additionally the "alien" Somali middleman became obsolescent. Although the Somali resisted these trends, the restrictions enabled the administration to gain the initiative in the livestock trade.

For a number of years the British vacillated over defining exactly who could and who could not hold a

livestock trading license--nomads; shopkeepers, bona fide stock traders, and their assistants. The original Stock Traders License (STL) Ordinance of 1918 stated that "a native resident in a native reserve or area set apart for the use of the tribe to which he belongs who buys or sells or barter stock in such reserve or area," need not pay the license fee.¹ In 1932 because downcountry officials experienced difficulty differentiating between Somali nomads and "alien" Somali, the administration modified the ordinance. Accordingly, nomads traveling to Isiolo or to the Rift Valley to sell their stock merely needed a pass specifically stating that they need not carry a STL. Officials became even more confused after the introduction of taxation when the nomads requiring cash increased. Policy then became discretionary, leaving DCs to ponder the question of who raised livestock as a nomad as opposed to who raised and traded livestock as a living.² The answer was not easy since nomads after selling their livestock often purchased large quantities

¹"Stock Traders License Ordinance 1918," Kenya Gazette (Nairobi 1919).

²OC Northern Frontier to Chief Secretary, July 16, 1938, DC ISO 2/1; PC Northern Frontier to all DC's, May 11, 1933 and OC Northern Frontier to all DC's, November 14, 1942, DC MDA 5/1.

of cloth which they resold on their return to the north.¹

The STL Ordinance and its amendments attempted to control who traveled in the NFD. Actually even if a trader held a license, he could still be denied permission to travel in the north. This was possible under the Outlying District Ordinance pass system, and the Special Districts Ordinance. The STL Ordinance supplemented these laws. The 1918 Ordinance stipulated that both stock traders and their employees pay fees. Since this requirement seemed onerous at the cost of Rps. 300/- each, the Ordinance effectively limited the number of traders willing to engage in the livestock trade. The administration amended the law twice, and by 1921, while both the trader and his agents had to purchase licenses, the British reduced the fee to Rps. 50/- each. The law came under sharp criticism from Somali traders who hired lawyers and petitioned the Governor for changes. The Somali argued against what they considered an exorbitant fee and viewed it as a punishment for undertaking a high risk business. They complained that traders faced a

¹Attorney General to Treasury, September 7, 1932, PC GRSSA 3/51; Northern Frontier Monthly Intelligence Report (hereafter NFMIR), June 1922, PC NFD 3/1/1; and WHOR 1921, and July 1939, PC NFD 2/5.

harsh environment, potential danger from hostile peoples, and yet they not only had to pay high fees for their own licenses but for their trusted servants.¹ The STL remained in effect, and since the trade remained profitable enough, the "alien" Somali continued to pay for licenses for themselves and their employees.

Shopkeepers who traded in livestock also held STLs, but they benefitted from a modification of the rule specifically designed to aid them. Duka owners, especially before the advent of taxation, relied heavily on the trade in livestock. They accepted mostly sheep and goats, and sometimes cattle or camels, in exchange for their goods. Some abused their position and used the duka as a front for their livestock trade. Instead of properly disposing of accumulated livestock, some traders ratched it in the bush with the nomads. The Herti and the Isaaq purportedly the worst offenders. In spite of their connections with the livestock trade, NFD duka owners did not have to hold STLs. In 1932, in official recognition of this practice, any NFD shopkeepers

¹"Stock-Traders License Ordinance 1921, Statement, Object and Reason," January 10, 1922, in ATOR GENL Deposit No. 5, 962/128/3; and Ega Musa et al., "Petition to the Governor," September 9, 1930, STOCK 29, Kabete.

who had paid STL fees received rebates. In 1939, however, shopkeepers came under more stringent laws. Those who exchanged their goods for livestock in designated trade centers remained exempt from paying STL fees. Only those who sent representatives into the bush to purchase livestock needed STLs. By 1944, all shopkeepers dealing in livestock had to hold STLs unless specifically exempted by the Provincial Commissioner.¹ Thus the law had come full circle.

After 1922 traders faced a decline in the cattle trade. Prior to that date cattle was the most important export from the north. In the aftermath of World War I and because of Ethiopian export regulations, traders became more dependent on the sale of sheep and goats.² The Somali purchased these animals from the Samburu, the Rendille, the Boran, and other Somali nomads. A trader frequently procured camels at Wajir, took them to Marsabit, and there exchanged them for sheep and goats. Then he took the sheep and goats for sale at Isiolo, Nyeri,

¹"Ordinance to Amend the Stock Traders License 1932," Kenya Gazette (Nairobi 1933). OC to all DC's, May 23, 1939, DC MDA 5/1; Minutes of DC's Meeting, October 14/16, 1944, PC NFD. 8/1/2.

²See Raymond Hook, evidence, Kenya Land Commission, Vol. II (Nairobi 1933), 1463-1469; and MYAR 1914-1915 and 1918-1919, PC NFD 1/6.

Nanyuki, or at the illegal Kikuyu market. At first traders moved about at will, but soon they found their activities hindered by administrative regulations.

Because of the British fear that the herds on which the administration depended for rations would soon be depleted, traders were subjected to tighter controls under the Outlying Districts Ordinance, the Special Districts Ordinance, and the Stock Traders License Ordinance.¹ More importantly traders no longer could export cattle from the western side of the NFD. Thus the structure of the livestock trade changed considerably. Traders found it difficult to bypass the permanent quarantine at Isiolo, and therefore resorted to smuggling, or to a trade solely in sheep and goats.

Settler pressure on the Veterinary Department to curtail cattle exports resulted in the establishment of the Isiolo quarantine. Not until 1922 did the Rift Valley interests succeed in shutting off exports from the NFD. Originally the settlers sought to prohibit pleuropneumonia infected cattle from being brought into the

¹NFAR 1920-1921 and 1921, PC-NFD-1/1. The QDO and SDO, as they were known in the north, were enacted to allow NFD administration to treat the area as unique and set apart from the remainder of Kenya.

White Highlands. As one group warned in 1930, if the cattle trade reopened "it would jeopardize a large number of cattle . . . by the spreading of disease, especially Pleuro-Pneumonia . . . and because there is an alternate route for cattle from the N.F.D. through Lamu,"¹ traders should take that route. Furthermore, they suggested that traders wishing to reach Kikuyu could travel through Embu and Meru.

Thus, the number of sheep and goats taken out of the north increased while cattle exports declined. Only during 1927, from 1935 to 1938, during World War II, and in 1945 and 1946 were small numbers of cattle exported from the NFD. On the other hand the sheep and goat trade boomed. Between 1922 and 1948 the yearly average of sheep and goat exports fluctuated between 40,000 to 80,000 animals. Yet prior to 1922 the largest number exported had been 44,850 in 1912-1913, and the second largest only 29,380 in 1913-1914. The following figures indicate the trends in the livestock trade.²

¹Secretary of the North Kenya Settlers Association to Director of Agriculture, October 15, 1930, STOCK 17/V.II, Kabete. See also President of Laikipia Farmers Association to Chief Secretary, March 30, 1928, STOCK 17/V.I, Kabete; and Proceedings of Stockowners Conference 1930 (Nairobi 1930), motion no. 15.

²Isiolo Annual Report, 1922-1948, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2801, Reel 48, and Isiolo Handing Over Reports, 1922-1948, DC ISO 2/2.

TABLE III-1
LIVESTOCK EXPORTS

	Cattle	Sheep and Goats	Horses and Mules
1925	nil	73,282	1,614
1926	nil	37,312	260
1927	nil	21,700	nil
1928	nil	80,015	nil
1929	nil	44,446	24
1930	nil	70,295	123
1931	nil	69,851	146
1932	nil	68,160	19
1933	nil	41,554	58
1934	nil	58,152	24
1935	32	56,184	114
1936	679	67,499	12
1937	768	64,018	55
1938	530	59,947	7
1939	nil	78,853	6
1940	1,679	91,133	nil
1941	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1942	20,000	255,000	n.a.
1943	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1944	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1945	6,431	60,345	n.a.
1946	4,765	69,984	n.a.

Once they succeeded in stopping the cattle trade, the settlers agitated against the export of sheep and goats. They again raised the bugbear of disease. Their pressure achieved some constructive action, such as the dipping of the shoats at Isiolo, and the fencing of the Isiolo-Nanyuki route.¹ The settlers found support for their claims in the Veterinary Department. As one NFD

¹Proceedings of Stockowners Conference 1930, Motion No. 33; Stockbreeders Society Mount Kenya to Chief Veterinary Officer, June 21, 1926, STOCK 4; Nanyuki Stockbreeders Association to Director of Agriculture, November 6, 1929, STOCK 17/V.I.; Chief Veterinary Officer to Veterinary Officer Nanyuki, November 26, 1935, VET SERV 9, Kabete.

official complained, the shift to the sheep and goat trade was "forced upon us by Veterinary restrictions and the opposition of highland farmers to cattle passing over their land."¹

Between 1922 and 1948 the Veterinary Department undertook little in the way of disease control or live-stock improvement in the north. During those years the typical complement for the entire NFD consisted of one lonely Stock Inspector at Isiolo, two or three Veterinary scouts in Garissa District. From 1931 to 1933 there was an abortive attempt to establish a Veterinary Training School at Isiolo. While the Chief Veterinary Officer claimed that reasons of economy dictated the size of staff, other factors contributed to the decision to limit veterinary activity in the north.

The Veterinary Department had its own reasons for acquiescing to settler demands even though it increasingly came under criticism from the NFD staff and the Somali. While it asserted that restrictive measures be "imposed largely in the interest of native owners,"² the department's

¹NFAR 1930, PC NFD 1/1.

²Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1922, Kabete.

actions suggest another motivation. Actually during the years immediately following the opening of the Isiolo quarantine, the Veterinary Department held the support of NFD officials. Both sets of officials agreed that at that time intensive veterinary measures could not be introduced. After the introduction of taxation the Veterinary Department lost this support. Because NFD officers and some Somali expected improvements in veterinary work and the provision of water supplies, when the Department failed to provide them, delusion set in.¹

The Veterinary Department's lack of action revealed a motivation similar to that of the settlers. Both knew that the Isiolo quarantine benefitted the settlers far more than it did the Somali. Likewise plans for combating disease favored these same interests. For example, even though they undertook disease campaigns against diseased Samburu, and Telemugger livestock, Veterinary officials aimed only at limiting the disease not eradicating it. Similarly, departmental plans called for the elimination of rinderpest throughout Kenya with the sole exception of

¹"Report of a Tour and Recommendation of the Chief Veterinary Officer, the Provincial Commissioner of the Northern Frontier and the Veterinary Officer," n.d. (1930) STOCK 17/V.II, Kabete; and NFAR 1931, PC NFD I/1.

the north. According to a veterinary publication, department officials intended "to place a limit of rinderpest free areas along roughly the southern boundaries of the Northern Frontier District, Turkana and West Suk, for at least the time being." That way if disease broke out, active immunity would occur, only some inoculating need take place, and the department could destroy diseased animals. At the same time, quarantines on the southern boundary should serve as "filters--not dams."¹ But since disease remained a constant problem in the north, quarantines did become dams. Thus from the NFD viewpoint the Veterinary Department never effectively dealt with the problem. As late as 1946 Provincial Commissioner complained "that virtually no veterinary work of any kind is being done in this half of Kenya."² Nor did Lamu

¹R. Daubney Director of Veterinary Services Kenya, "Proposals for the Eradication of Rinderpest from Kenya," in Report of the Proceedings of the Second Conference on Rinderpest, Conference of Governors of British East African Territories Held at Nairobi 7 & 8 February 1939 (Nairobi 1939), pp. 48-52; see also "Post War Development Plan for Veterinary Department," August 22, 1944, Kabete; Third Progress Report of the Tsetse Fly and Trypanosomiasis Survey and Control in Kenya Colony (Nairobi 1948). For a brief sketch of veterinary growth in Kenya, see The Kenya Veterinary Department Fifty Years of Service 1910-1960 (Ministry of Agriculture 1960). For what occurred in Italian Somaliland, see Dario Pelligrini, "Il Servizio Veterinario Somalia," in L'Italia in Africa, Serie Civile Volume Seconda (Roma 1965), pp. 69-81.

²NFAR 1946, PC NFD 1/1. See also Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London.

prove a viable outlet for NFD livestock traders.

In part, Lamu failed as a substitute for Isiolo because its port no longer could handle a large trade. Previously Lamu had served as a major coastal entrepot for the Indian Ocean trade linking Africa to Arabia and India. During the colonial period the town's importance diminished.¹ Because an island the size of Lamu could not hold much livestock, Somali kept cattle, sheep, and goats on the Mainland at Makowe. Only after the Lamu traders purchased the livestock was it brought on to the island. Lamu's poor port facilities, combined with the lack of a regular steamer service like Kismayu's, exacerbated the situation. Lamu could not guarantee a full load of livestock to passing dhows and steamers, and therefore, it was not visited regularly. And since steamers stopped infrequently, Lamu did not improve its port facilities which remained relatively undeveloped. As a result accidents occasionally occurred. For example, in 1939 one Lamu livestock trader lost 22 of 69 head of cattle when a pontoon capsized while he attempted to load

¹For a description of Lamu's pre-colonial role and its decline, see J. H. Clive, "Short History of Lamu," 1923, typescript, Macmillan Library, Nairobi.

livestock on a dhow.¹

Accordingly Lamu supported few livestock traders. A trader needed a sizeable amount of capital to meet immediate expenses connected with shipping. Lamu's landing fees and freight charges remained high in spite of poor business. In 1933 Lamu licensed only two livestock traders, and in 1939 the same situation existed. Occasionally traders ventured into the interior to acquire NFD livestock, but mainly they waited at Lamu for the Somali and Galla traders. Only in the late 1930's did the Lamu Arab traders organize an agency in Zanzibar in an attempt to obtain better prices for their livestock.² Even if the port could handle a substantial livestock trade, it is questionable if Lamu could market the livestock elsewhere.

Lamu never broke the monopolies which supplied the Zanzibar and Mombasa Markets. It neither could compete with the longstanding Kismayu connection to Zanzibar, nor could it supply the high quality of cattle which that

¹Lamu Annual Report (hereafter LAR), 1929, 1932, 1934 and 1939, S. U. KNA MIC; Film No. 2081, Reels 52 and 53. See also Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1931, Kabete; and East Africa Standard (Nairobi), January 5, 1935, p. 36.

²LAR 1933 and 1939, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2081, Reel 53; Veterinary Inspector to Chief Veterinary Officer, October 3, 1934, VET SERV 9, Kabete, and A. Dykes, evidence, Kenya Land Commission, Vol. II, 1676-1682.

island demanded. Lamu also failed to break the Mombasa monopoly held by the Tana River Galla, and the peoples inhabiting the area near that coastal city.¹ Between 1926 and May 1930, Lamu sent only 468 head of cattle to Mombasa.² Traders did benefit from the boom during the Italo-Ethiopian War sending 1,277 cattle, and 6,487 sheep and goats to Zanzibar, whereas prior to the outbreak of the war in 1934 only 407 cattle, and 2,304 sheep had been sent.³ Thus, although it alleviated the Telemugger need for an outlet, Lamu never became a major catchment area for NFD cattle.

Although they held a virtual monopoly of the livestock trade with Lamu, the Telemugger failed to break into the Mombasa market. Geographically, the Abd Wak and Abdulla Somali had the easiest access to Lamu. Telemugger leaders extracted privileges in the form of credit from Lamu duka owners. They recognized their favored position and actively defended it. Ironically,

¹ PC Coast to Chief Native Commissioner, October 13, 1931, STOCK 4, Kabete; and R. G. Stone, evidence, Kenya Land Commission, Vol. II, 1481-1497.

² Chief Veterinary Officer to Chief Secretary, July 5, 1930, STOCK 17/V.II, Kabete.

³ Smith, p. 40. See also East African Standard, April 26, 1935, p. 29, May 17, 1935, p. 33, January 5, 1936, p. 46, and November 2, 1938, p. 7.

when some Abulihan tried to trek their livestock to sell it at Lamu, the Telemugger lodged a complaint against them based on the problem of disease. But it is more likely that Lamu's low prices for livestock, its lack of amenities for traders, and the strenuousness of long treks from other NFD districts, did more than Telemugger complaints to discourage trade at Lamu.¹ Occasionally groups other than the Telemugger such as the Wajir Somali, the Garba Tula Boran, and even the Boni sold livestock at Lamu.² The Telemugger were less successful at Mombasa. They attempted to send livestock overland but met opposition on two fronts. Coast peoples near Mombasa, backed by local British administrators, complained that the influx of Somali livestock flooded the market and lowered prices. Secondly, the Galla petitioned the Government to prevent the Somali from traveling through their territory. In 1928, even though they legally gained the right to move livestock overland to Mombasa,³ the

¹GAR 1926 and 1933, PC NFD 1/7; and GHOR 1925, PC NFD 2/7.

²IAR 1927, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2081, Reel 52; WMIR November 1927 and January 1937, PC NFD 3/2/1; GAR 1933, PC NFD 1/7; and IMIR, March 1937, DC ISO 2/28.

³M. Mahony, "Mombasa Stock Market and Galla," 1929, and H. B. Sharpe, "Further Notes," 1931, Garissa PRB Vol. 2 S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 69; and Veterinary Inspector to Chief Veterinary Officer, March 28, 1928, and Chief Veterinary Officer to PC Coast, April 30, 1928, STOCK 4, Kabete.

Telemugger never penetrated the Mombasa market to any great degree.

Somali preference for trading in Italian Somaliland also undercut British efforts to establish the NFD-Lamu link. Somali from the NFD and Jubaland frequently sold livestock in the Juba River towns and on the coast. The nomads continued to do so even after the Jubaland cession, even though many relied on the dukas to provide necessities, and even though many no longer wanted to undertake strenuous safaris to the coast. The Gurre looked to Lugh as an outlet, while the Ogaden of Wajir and Garissa preferred Bardera and Kismayu. Unlike the trade at Isiolo, the Somali nomads dominated the trade with Italian Somaliland. Some Gurre allowed duka owners to handle a substantial part of the livestock, and the hides and skins trade with Lugh.¹ The nomads participated in this trade in spite of British efforts at discouragement. For example, in 1933 and again in 1935, the latter being related to League of Nations sanctions, the Somali ignored orders not to trade across the Kenyan border.

¹Haji Jama, interviewed June 1972, Mandera; and DC Telemugger to PC Northern Frontier, November 7, 1929, PC NFD 4/2/2.

The Somali easily evaded the British who could not adequately control the 450 mile border. The nomads also continued in the face of the uneven Italian attitude toward the trade. The nomads never knew for certain whether or not the Italians would confiscate or purchase livestock.¹ Until the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian War, the trade remained unheralded.

The Italo-Ethiopian War created a boom in the sale of livestock. Italian colonial troops stationed in Somaliland, and later Ethiopia, needed increased supplies of cattle, sheep and goats, and even camels as they expanded their war effort. In 1934 the Italians opened their campaign against Ethiopia at Wal Wal. By 1935 the Italians had designated Lugh and Dolo, among others, as military outposts. In October of that year open warfare broke out.² Italian demands for livestock extended well into 1936, but after that their need for Kenya livestock lessened considerably.

While it lasted a substantial trans-border trade

¹Farah Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Kulamama; Mohamed Kulemama, interviewed June 1972, Giriftu.

²There is a great deal of literature on the Italo-Ethiopian War. I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland (New York 1965), briefly explains events leading up to the war, pp. 107-108. For a general but useful account, see A. Del Bocca, The Ethiopian War 1935-1941 (Chicago 1965).

took place. Beginning slowly in 1934 it reached its height during the first half of 1936. High prices attracted both nomads and "alien" traders from Wajir, Mandera, Garissa, Moyale, and even from European ranches in the Rift Valley. Lugh, Dolo, Bardera, and Kismayu served as the main collection centers in Italian Somaliland, although Afmadu and Serenli briefly functioned in the same capacity. The trade stimulated livestock sales. Between November 1935 and July 1936, the Italians purchased 6,616 head of cattle, and 25,357 sheep and goats from Wajir district alone.¹ The wartime trade even provided camel owners with an opportunity to dispose of their beasts, at least until November 1935 when they came under the League of Nations sanctions forbidding the sale of transport animals to the Italians. Until that time the official trade resulted in the sale of 236 Wajir camels. After the introduction of the sanctions the Italians had to rely on smuggled animals. When the sanctions ended in July 1936, the Italians quickly purchased another 112 camels from Wajir Somali.² Farther

¹ WMIR, November 1935 through July 1936, PC NFD 3/2/1.

² Ibid. See also Mohamed Kulamama, interviewed June 1972, Giriftu.

north on the Ethiopian border the Somali also avoided sanctions by bringing livestock from Mandera to Moyale, and then taking it across the border through Ethiopian territory to the Italians at Lugh.¹ The trade's popularity with the Somali proved so great that while the war lasted the sale of Somali livestock at Isiolo and at Lamu almost ended.²

The Italians did not create, as some authors have contended, an open market.³ The Italians strictly regulated livestock movements, prices, and sales. Their demand did result in prices higher than those in the neighboring NFD, but they also delayed payment. In 1935 the Italians openly refused to pay sellers promptly, and they required traders to remain at centers such as Lugh and Bardera for long periods of time. In 1936 the Italians placed an embargo on the export of lira from Somaliland. Such actions caused difficulties for Somali trying to sell livestock. For example, in July of 1936 Italian officials at Bardera gave a five day quit notice to the Somali who had been waiting there to sell their

¹ MYAR 1936, PC NFD. 1/6.

² Smith, p. 39.

³ Ibid.

livestock. The Italian action put the Somali at a disadvantage because the water pools necessary for the safe return of their livestock to Wajir had already dried out. The Italians purchased the Somali cattle at "cutthroat prices."¹ Two of the more resourceful traders, rather than lose the lira gained from the livestock sale, immediately declared their willingness to become Italian subjects. One even went through preliminary preparations for marrying a local Somali girl in order to show his good faith. After he collected his money, however, he escaped to Kenya.² Although the exact volume of the trade is unknown, the Italians paid out at least 2,500,000 lira to Wajir traders during the war.³ The boom proved short-lived and by 1938 prices were back at 1935 levels. Isiolo regained its place as the chief outlet for sheep and goats, and Lamu continued to accept Telemugger and other Somali livestock.

Disease also retarded the development of the NFD-Lamu livestock trade. Rinderpest, usually traceable to Somaliland, attacked cattle, and caprine pleuro-pneumonia

¹WMIR, July 1936, PC NFD 3/2/1.

²NFMIR, May and October 1936, PC's Office, Garissa; WMIR, December 1936, PC NFD 3/2/1.

³Smith, p. 39.

most seriously affected sheep and goats. As was the case on the western side of the NFD, disease went unchecked by veterinary staff, with the exception of establishing quarantines. Makowe, on the mainland opposite Lamu, was the first station, and later surrendered its position to Ijara. Golbanti and then Garsen served the same function on the overland route to Mombasa.¹ Disease constantly created problems of movement, and because of it quarantines were in force for all or parts of 1928, 1930, 1931, 1933, 1938, and 1939. Livestock disease, therefore, effectively prevented the smooth and steady flow of livestock to Lamu from the NFD.

Because of the serious factors enumerated above, Lamu's livestock trade with the NFD never reached the proportions of the pre-1922 Isiolo trade. The optimistic hopes of NFD and Veterinary officialdom and the exhortations of the settlers for Lamu as Isiolo's replacement proved false. In 1937 the Lamu-NFD link experienced its best year when the town received 3,035 cattle, and 14,094 goats and sheep from the NFD. Otherwise during the 1930s,

¹OC Northern Frontier to Chief Veterinary Officer, September 26, 1934, VET SERV 9, Kabete.

Lamu's annual purchase from the NFD averaged about 2,000 cattle, and 6,000 sheep and goats.¹ The Lamu route therefore, never really was more than a convenient outlet for the Telemugger. The next blow to the livestock trade occurred during World War II.

World War II's impact on the Somali of the NFD went far beyond the fighting which occurred. Wartime regulations affecting the movement and sale of cattle, camels, sheep and goats substantially altered the livestock trade in the NFD. The war itself was short and involved little action. As one writer has described it, warfare was mainly "an affair of patrols skirmishes at wells, water-holes and hills, of marches and counter marches in the great, and no-man's land."² As such the fighting touched few nomads except those who enlisted in the British and Italian armed services. More importantly wartime requirements necessitated the development of a regularized and efficient system for obtaining and transporting food supplies from all parts of the colony to

¹ GAR 1930, 1931, 1934, 1937, 1938, PC NFD 1/7; IAR, 1935, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2081, Reel 53; NFAR 1937 and 1939, PC NFD 1/1. See also Smith, p. 40.

² M. Hill, The Permanent Way (Nairobi 1950), p. 540. See also W. F. Coutts, "History of the War--Wajir 1940--March 1941," Wajir ERB vol. 1, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 81.

British troops in the field. Even after the war the organizations constructed to meet these goals dictated the character of the livestock trade on the north.

During the war the Kenya Supply Board established a purchasing agency to meet demands for livestock. The Livestock Control (LC) succeeded in its assigned task well enough to merit its continuance until 1946. Then the Meat Marketing Board (MMB) replaced it.¹ Although these two agencies differed in theory, the LC and MMB appeared to be performing the same task to the Somali. They limited sales, fixed prices, and lessened the scope for the middlemen.

From 1939 to 1944 for the most part the Somali reacted favorably to the demands on them to sell their stock locally. During the war the nomads met the troop requirements without difficulty, just as after it the Somali supplied troops, road gangs, and locust control crews. During 1942 alone the Somali sold 5,000 to 7,000 head of cattle to troops stationed in the north, and still managed to provide another 20,000 head for export. The

¹The Meat Marketing Board was in turn succeeded by the African Livestock Marketing Organization (ALMO) and then the Kenya Meat Commission (KMC). Most Somali when speaking about any of these agencies refer to them all as the KMC.

nomads benefitted from the price structure which dictated that the same price be paid for poor and high quality cattle. Since prices remained relatively high during this period, the Somali willingly parted with his livestock.¹ Indeed Somali sales in the NFD were so good that from 1939 to 1945 the trade with Lamu was completely dislocated.²

After 1944 the Somali appeared less willing to sell their mature livestock. Their attitude made it more difficult for the military to acquire meat supplies. In part the change resulted from the depletion of mature male livestock sold off during the preceding years. Since they considered the sale of any more mature stock a threat to their herds' survival, the nomads became more cautious. They offered only immature livestock which the agencies rejected. Somali reluctance to sell was especially marked in Garissa district where wartime cattle sales took the heaviest toll of herds.³ Unlike cattle owners, camel owners never found a good market.

¹GAR 1940 and 1942, PC NFD 1/7; WMIR, May 1940, PC NFD 3/2/1; WHOR 1940, PC NFD 2/5; and MYAR 1945, PC NFD 1/6.

²LAR 1939 and 1949, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2081, Réel 53.

³GAR 1943 and 1945, PC NFD 1/7; and DC Garissa to Executive Officer MMB, July 5, 1947. See also WHOR 1943, PC NFD 2/5; and Veterinary Annual Report 1947, Kabeté.

Somali camel owners gradually lost their opportunities to dispose of their animals. At first they sold meat and baggage camels to the K. A. R., the Police, and other administrative groups. Due to the appearance of motorized vehicles, the nomads found a limited market for baggage animals. Ironically, when the petrol shortage limited motor transport during World War II, the Somali could sell baggagers in the north, but the export of male camels was forbidden. Therefore, the Somali camel owner usually sold his animals only to cattle owners in Garissa district, or to the Samburu and Rendille, all of whom needed a few transport camels and some milk camels. In exchange the Somali received sheep and goats, and they trekked these for sale at Isiolo or at Rift Valley auctions. The Somali still encountered British restrictions on this end of the trade. According to the British the Somali presence in Samburu and Rendille territory was suspect. First the Somali according to the British, were known subversives and smugglers. Secondly, Somali willingness to exchange female camels for sheep and goats.

endangered their herds survival. Third, the devious Somali should be prevented from taking advantage of the naive Rendille who purchased these soft footed camels which fared poorly on the stony ground in their territory.¹ With the restriction of the Samburu and Rendille trade, the Somali camel owner could only wait for an occasional European zookeeper to buy some stock.²

Actually the government livestock agencies did attempt to create a market for camel meat: Agency officials hoped to substitute camel meat for beef as the main ration for troops in East Africa. Their decision met with opposition, and as such the agency, and a few private traders, exported a minimal number of camels to Nyeri, to Nairobi, and even fewer to Mombasa. In 1945 the agency easily met Wajir's quota of 200 camels per month.³ Two years later officials opened a biltong factory at Garba Tula which also produced fat, soap, bone meal, and fertilizer. That same year, however, the agency's interest dwindled when the army cancelled its

¹ NEMIR, November 1941, PC GRSSA 27/30; WHOR 1944, PC NFD 2/5; Minutes of DC's Meeting, October 16/24, 1944, and July 1946, PC NFD 8/1/2; and PC Northern Frontier to all DC's, August 13, 1946, DC GRSSA 21/3.

² NEAR 1948, PC NFD 1/1.

³ WAR 1945, PC NFD 1/5; and Ahamed Aden Lord, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

contract for camel meat. After that the agency only provided prisons with camel meat.¹ Because of these problems the agency dropped its price, and found the nomads less willing to sell their camels.²

The major impact occurred in the sale of cattle, sheep and goats. Both the LC and the MMB attempted, but failed, to establish a regularized system for marketing livestock. The LC achieved an effective marketing system which produced large amounts of livestock through compulsory quotas and sales without significant Somali complaint. Under the tenure of the LC, the system limited abuses, and these occurred because of the actions of Somali headmen and askari. The LC relied on Somali headmen to meet quotas. It gave the headmen a commission based on the number of livestock sold. It also paid the headmen the money realized from the sale with the expectation that the headmen would equitably distribute the proceeds. Sometimes the headmen acted fairly and sometimes they did not. If headmen proved uncooperative, the agency sent askari to collect livestock. The askari often took

¹NFAR 1948, PC NFD 1/1.

²NFAR 1947 and 1948, PC NFD 1/1; WMIR, October 1947 and August 1948, WAJ DC 4/3.

livestock from the first nomads they encountered, ignoring the concept that the burden of quotas should be equally distributed.¹ The MMB eliminated the major Somali complaint-- that against compulsory sales. Its effectiveness suffered accordingly. MMB auctions often went unattended.² Still aside from smuggling, the MMB offered the only authorized market for livestock. Furthermore, agency buyers legally fixed prices. Its organization of auctions left something to be desired. Frequently, after administrators and headmen had gone to great effort to arrange for nomads to gather their livestock at certain locales on specific dates, the MMB buyers canceled the auction.³ In other words, while the agencies limited the opportunities for individual enterprise, both the IC and the MMB failed to provide reasonable and regular markets at which nomads could sell their livestock. If the Somali nomad appeared skeptical, the "alien" Somali openly rejected the agencies.

The introduction of state directed monopolistic purchasing agencies almost eliminated the "alien" Somali

¹ OC Northern Frontier to all DCs, June 15, 1944, DC GRSSA 21/3; and OC Northern Frontier to all DCs, April 13, 1948, DC GRSSA 21/7.

² G. M. Hector to Parents, February 15, 1948, Brit. Emp. s. 38 Box 1, Rhodes House, Oxford.

³ NFAR 1947 and 1948, PC NFD 1/1.

middlemen from the livestock trade. At the beginning of the war Agency administrators acknowledged the usefulness and knowledge of the experienced Herti and Isaaq traders. These officials also encouraged the nomads to become more active participants in the livestock trade. By 1946, however, the MMB in an attempt to increase its power, advocated the removal of the Herti and Isaaq as middlemen.¹ Due to the political situation related to the Somali Youth League (SYL), the MMB modified its demand. As a result the agency developed a farcical policy which one NFD administrator dubbed as "Alice-in-Wonderland" in concept. For the first nine months of 1948 the MMB allowed independent stock buyers to attend the sale of sheep and goats, and to bid against Board buyers. The MMB, however, did not recognize the right of the trader to sell livestock to anyone but Board buyers! In late October the MMB approached the problem more realistically. Officials of the agency allowed Herti and Isaaq livestock traders to work auctions in the north, and required them to bring the livestock purchased to

¹Member of Agriculture and Natural Resources to PC Northern Frontier, December 28, 1946, DC GRSSA 21/3

MMB auctions held at Isiolo and Lamu. Although this decision ameliorated the conflict somewhat, the MMB did not solve the situation satisfactorily. As one NFD official wryly commented, the Herti and Isaaq "methods and conception of profit did not at all coincide with that of the Meat Marketing Board."¹

Thus by 1948 a new economy had established itself in northern Kenya. At first, due to the circumstances of specific areas, it grew and expanded in a haphazard, uneven manner. It received its greatest impetus from active British administrative support. British regulations transformed administrative stations into economic centers. These rules aided duka owners rather than hawkers and occasional nomadic trading, favored a cash economy through a taxation program, fostered motorized transport by expanding the NFD road network, and discouraged unauthorized livestock sales. These developments also encouraged the appearance of an alien entrepreneurial community--Arabs, Indians, Herti and Isaaq--which insinuated itself into all aspects of the Somali

¹WAR 1948, PC NFD 1/5. See also "Minutes of Meeting Held at Wajir," in Buyer MMB to DC Garissa, September 1, 1948, DC GRSSA 21/7; and NFAF 1947 and 1948, PC NFD 1/1.

economy. Furthermore, the new economy succeeded because it proved sufficiently attractive to gain general Somali acceptance. On the other hand the new system brought about a substantial restructuring of previous trade patterns and of earlier Somali participation in the different functions of that trade. The new economy meant the end of the camel caravan safari for trade, and the shift of NFD dependence to sources of supply away from the Benaadir. The new economy caused the loss of Somali economic roles as merchants, caravaners, and middlemen, and it reduced nomads to mere producers of livestock and consumers of imported goods. Secondly, it so restricted the livestock trade that camel and cattle owners found no easy markets for their herds. On the whole the existence of the townships and the duka trade did not generate extensive resistance, but some did occur, the dimensions of which will be discussed in the next two chapters.

CHAPTER IV

SOMALI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEW ECONOMY 1920 - 1948

The Somali manifested different attitudes toward the British induced economy. They exhibited both acceptance and rejection of the new economic system. In the former sphere, rather than undertake long journeys to the coast, the nomads utilized the dukas as sources of needed goods. Some even directly entered into the economy by taking employment associated with it. On the other hand the Somali also resisted some of the new trends. For the most part such resistance was passive. Active rejection centered on the smuggling of traditional products such as livestock and game trophies, and their longstanding refusal to accept taxation. Through these manifestations the nomads forced the British to take Somali opinions into account before enacting administrative schemes. Even though some aspects of the new economy seemed appealing, the vast majority of the Somali remained nomads.

Somali participation in the trade in game trophies is a prime example of their rejection of the new economic structure. Every major group in the NFD, including the Somali, involved themselves in the trade and poaching was widespread. Although the British portrayed the Herti as the chief transgressors in the NFD, that Somali group was but one link in an extensive, if loosely organized, network. The Somali sold ivory, rhino horn, leopard skins, giraffe and oryx hides, hippo teeth, ostrich feathers, and other exotic items just as they did before the arrival of the British. They usually took these products for sale in Italian Somaliland. Although the British identified the general routes from the NFD to the Italian colony, they could not calculate the volume of the trade.

In Kenya the British restricted the trade in game trophies. They formulated laws designed to prohibit the hunting of wild animals and the trading of trophies without proper licenses. In 1897 the first Game laws appeared. These laws aimed at protecting animals from mindless slaughter while earning revenue for the administration. Although they underwent periodic changes, their basic

structure remained intact. The Ordinance hinged on three constants: 1) no one could possess ivory or rhino horn unless he held a hunting license for elephants and rhinos; 2) no person could sell game trophies without a proper license; 3) each license had a schedule and thus a different price.¹ Although the Somali continued to hunt game and to deal in trophies, very few obtained licenses. After 1927 no Somali name appeared on rhino or elephant hunting lists. Yet the Somali, and the Arabs, were the largest holders of bird shooting licenses,² for they then could carry guns. In spite of these laws an illicit trade flourished.

The illegal trade in the north was part of a larger Kenyan activity. In this perspective the Somali did not rank among the major poachers. Rather, according

¹For a discussion of the development of the Kenya Game Laws, see M. Stone, "Organized Poaching in Kitui District: A Failure in District Authority, 1900 to 1960," International Journal of African Historical Studies (Boston) vol. 5 (1972), p. 5; "A History of the Ivory Question," in Annual Report of the Game Warden 1911-1912 (Nairobi, 1912); and Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, November 30, 1909, C.O. 533/63.

²See Annual Report of the Game Department (hereafter ARGD) 1927 through 1934.

to the British, the Turkana, the Dorobo, and the Kamba held this dubious distinction.¹ Kenyan traders in game trophies traveled along two main routes, both of which led to the Indian Ocean coast. In the area south of the Tana River poachers and middlemen sold their products at coastal outlets such as Mknumbi, Mambrui, Kilifi, Takanungu, and Mombasa.² In the north they operated in the area stretching from Turkana to the eastern portion of the NFD, and they sold their contraband in Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. The participants did not remain in a given area and often entered the other sphere. For example, the Kamba hunted in the NFD, and the Somali killed game in Ukamba.³ The British apprehended one Somali on a train going from Moshi with eleven rhino horn destined for sale in the north.⁴

The 1925 cession of Jubaland to Italy facilitated access to Italian Somaliland. Prior to the cession the

¹ East Africa and Rhodesia (London), October 7, 1937, p. 131.

² ARGD 1927. See also Stone, who discusses the Kamba role in the southern sphere.

³ Senior Commissioner to Commissioner of Customs, Mombasa, May 12, 1921, PC JUB 1/4/10; GAR 1930, PC NFD 1/7; and East African Standard, March 3, 1934, p. 34.

⁴ ARGD 1935.

British unrealistically viewed the Juba River as a natural physical barrier to smugglers. Yet ivory traders "crossed anywhere between the mouth of the Juba to Lugh."¹ They sold their trophies at Gobwein, Yonti, Giumbo, Margherita, Fur Wama, Sheikh Merjan, Koban, Songolo, Dunia, Fanole, Hakakhubli, and Bardera. The poachers probably favored the transfer of Jubaland to the Italians because it brought the frontier sixty miles closer to the game havens of the southern NFD, and returned Kismayu to its traditional role as an exporter of game trophies.

By the 1930s the traders operated on a number of alternate routes. They favored Wajir not only because it served as a direct source of animals for neighboring territories, but also as a collection point for game products from other parts of the colony. They traveled from as far as Isiolo which they used as a funnel for ivory and rhino horn poached by the Turkana and the Samburu. From Isiolo they came to Wajir via Garba Tula, or went to Muddo Gashi and Satesa. An alternate route existed from Ao to Benane.² From Wajir they usually took the trophies to

¹DC Mfudu to PC Jubaland, August 4, 1917 and DC Mfudu to PC Jubaland, July 29, 1917, DC GOS 6/4.

²WAR 1928, PC NFD 1/5; WHOR, PC NFD 2/5; and G. Adamson, Bwana Game (London 1968), p. 173.

Italian Somaliland, and from Moyale and Mandera into Ethiopia. Mandera traders also kept up their contacts with Lugh.¹ In Garissa poachers hunted in the Koreh-Kinna, Kurde-Kama, Ijara-Welho, and Jira-Jelho areas. They took trophies from these places directly to Somaliland. On the Tana poachers went to a market at Nanagi, and from there carried their products to Tula. From Tula they went by Bajuni dhows to Italian Somaliland. The Somali also utilized an overland route from Mombasa to Somaliland.²

In this trade different NFD peoples assumed a variety of functions involved in the handling of illegal game trophies. No one specific group dealt with the trophies along the entire length of the northern route. Rather some hunted, or in the British parlance poached, others transported the products, and still others specialized in buying and in exporting them from the coast. Almost every group living in the north hunted wild animals for trophies. The Samburu and Turkana provided rhino horn to

¹A. Hodson to Charge D'Affairs Addis Ababa, April 23; 1920, PC NFD 4/3/3; and Abdalla bin Omar, interviewed July 1972, Mandera.

²DC Lamui to Senior Commissioner Coast, June 23, 1921, Coast Province, S.UL KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 84; GHOR 1933, PC NFD 2/7; GAR 1936, PC NFD 1/7.

Somali stock traders in the western half of the NFD. Nearer to Isiolo the Dorobo were the main suppliers.¹ The Boran, the Gabbra, and the Sakuye, sometimes on horseback, hunted wild game near Marsabit, Moyale, and Garba Tula. They killed giraffe to obtain the hides of these animals from which they fashioned strong water buckets and sandals. A servile Boran group, the Waata, specialized in the killing of elephants.² The Kikuyu, the Meru, and the Kamba also sold ivory and rhino horn to Somali traders.³

The Somali and their clients also hunted for game trophies. They included representatives of most of the nomadic subclans--Mohamed Zubeir, Aulihan, Abd Wak, Abdalla, Maghabul, Marehan, Hobier, Bartiri, Dirisama, Degodia, Herti--in the NFD, Jubland, and Ethiopia. Usually these nomads did not hunt game for a living but they certainly took advantage of a situation if it arose. Among

¹ IHOR 1934, PC NFD 2/4.

² E. A. Dutton, Lillibulero or the Golden Road (Zanzibar 1946) 2nd ed., pp. 44-46. See also E. Cerulli, "The Folk Literature of the Galla of Southern Abyssinia," Harvard African Studies (Cambridge) vol. 3 (1922), pp. 222-228.

³ Sheikh Abdi Adot and Haji Farah, interviewed August 1972, Nanuyuki.

the Somali the professional hunters usually came from servile backgrounds. In the NFD the Bon Marehan were the most active. Actually although they lived in northern Jubaland they ranged deep into the NFD. Some Somali parties from the Italian side of the border undertook forays as far west as Isiolo.¹ On the Daua some of the Somali agricultural groups such as the Garre Marre also poached. And Somali raiders from Ethiopia occasionally entered the NFD in search of game trophies.² Farther south along the Tana River the hunters included the Boni, the Pokomo, the Orma and the Kamba. At times even European poachers appeared in the north.³

Somali hunters had their own methods but they sometimes relied on other peoples to aid them. The Somali usually waited until after the rainy season to begin their

¹E. Coronaro, "La popolazione dell'Olke Guiba," Rivista Coloniale, vol. 20 (1925), p. 337; and MDAHOR 1937, PC NFD 2/3.

²NFMIR June 1922 and February, March 1925, PC NFD 3/1/1; Moyale PRB, and Garre PRB, SS.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 75 and 77; A. Reece, 50 Camels to My Wife (London 1963), p. 46; and Abshiro Herin, interviewed July 1972, Rhamu.

³DC Digo to Senior Commissioner Coast, October 1, 1925, Coast Province, SS.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 38; NFMIR January 1925, PC NFD 3/1/1; NFA 1948, PC NFD 1/1; Adamson, p. 169; and G. Archer, Personal and Historical Memoirs of an East African Administration (London 1963), pp. 37-38.

work. The best part of the season occurred just before surface pools dried up yet still held enough water to attract game and to provide the hunters a safe exit from the more isolated areas. At such times the hunters easily watched the few existing pools. They only used rifles sparingly for big game. More commonly they relied on the bow and poisoned arrow, or metal traps baited with giraffe meat. Hunting gangs varied in size. Sometimes as many as twenty to fifty men established a central camp before splitting into smaller groups of from four to eight men while tracking their quarry. Individuals also hunted.¹ The clientage system afforded the nomads with another means of obtaining game trophies. The Somali usually paid the Pokomo for ivory with sheep and goats and relied on the Pokomo to hide rifles in their huts.² The Somali-Boni relationship functioned similarly. The Abdalla and Mohamed Zubeir had special connections with these hunter-gatherers. The Somali usually paid the Boni

¹ Abshiro Herin, interviewed July 1972, Rhamu; Nuria Dido, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; and DC Wajir to PC Jubaland, December 13, 1920, PC JUB 1/4/10.

² DC Kipini to DC Lamu, January 10, 1921 and DC Lamu to Senior Commissioner Coast, February 18, 1921, PC NFD 1/4/10; and "Extract from Game Warden's Report 1923," in C.O. 533/308.

in cloth because the latter refused to accept cash, and because they had little need of livestock in the tse-tse infested forest they inhabited. In return the Somali received ivory and poison for their arrows.¹ The NFD Somali, however, had more difficulty in disposing of game trophies than their Italian counterparts.

The Herti willingly offered their services to those who wished to sell game trophies. They had certain advantages which no other group in northern Kenya could match. Their occupation as duka owners and livestock traders afforded them mobility and a base of operations throughout the north. In the western portion of the NFD the Isaaq had much the same opportunity.² The Herti, however, held even another advantage. Because they were of Darod descent, the Herti easily affiliated with not only the Herti nomads near Kismayu, but with the Ogaden who ranged on both sides of the Kenya-Somaliland border. Their ubiquitousness enabled the Herti to fill the need for middlemen. By taking such a position they saved the Boni from making arduous treks from the Tana to the coast,

¹ Game Warden to Chief Secretary, October 29, 1925, Coast Province, SS.U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 38; E. Coronaro, p. 335; LAR 1927 and 1933, SS.W. KNA MIC, Film no. 2081, Reel 52 and 53.

² NFMIR February 1934, PC NFD 3/1/1.

and provided the Telemugger with a means to avoid the Mohamed Zubeir blockade on Kismayu.¹ They carried the contraband by camel and mule either strapped to the backs of the transport animals, or cut into smaller pieces and packed into milk boxes.² Not surprisingly the British accused the Herti of holding "a practical monopoly of the business of middlemen in the illicit ivory trade and [they] do all the buying from the natives who actually kill elephants and [then the Herti] run the ivory across the frontier."³ NFD Arab and Indian duka owners also functioned as middlemen in this trade, but they were better known at the coast as buyers and sellers of contraband goods.

As previous authors have shown a worldwide demand for game trophies existed. The Indians and Chinese purchased rhino horn for use in aphrodisiacs, and ivory for

¹DC Chore to Game Warden, August 9, 1921, PC NFD 1/4/10; DC Mfudu to PC Jubaland, August 4, 1917, DC GOS 6/4; and Tana River District Annual Report, 1920-21, S.U. KNAMIC, Film no. 2081, Reel 51.

²East Africa and Rhodesia, October 7, 1937, p. 131; and Omar Basabra, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

³M. Mahony, "Herti Mijertein," Garissa PRB. vol. 2, SS.U. KNAMIC, Film no. 2082, reel 69.

carvings and adornments. Europeans also sought ivory for a variety of purposes ranging from billiard balls to piano keys. Other items such as leopard skins found a ready market in New York City and Paris.¹ Such demand stimulated the export of these products from Africa.

On the East African coast Arab and Indian traders at ports such as Brava, Kismayu, and Lamu energetically met the demand. Both before and after the cession of Jubaland these two groups remained the most important buyers and exporters of illicit game trophies on the coast. They utilized their contacts with Arabia and India, especially via Zanzibar.² At the same time they maintained their connections with the NFD duka owners, most of whom were also Arabs and Indians.³ These traders

¹For a general discussion of the trade in game trophies, see R. Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of African History, vol. 8 (1967), pp. 269-290; and Stone, p. 3.

²Walter Amadio, "L'Oltre Guiba un anno nel Nuova Territorio," L'Esplorazione Commerciale, p. 205; R. Ciani, Il Guibaland (Napoli 1921), p. 27; C. Zoli, Relazione Generale Dell'Alto Commissario Per L'Oltre Guiba (Roma 1926), p. 196 and Notizie Sul Territorio Di Riva destra del Guiba (Roma 1927), p. 361; and Coñonaro, p. 330.

³East Africa and Rhodesia, October 7, 1931, p. 131; Abdalla bin Omar, interviewed July 1972, Mandera; and Omar Basabra, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

were more than passive recipients who waited for game trophies to appear on the coast. To assure a continuous supply of these valuable products, they financially supported hunters and middlemen.¹ Thus, the Arabs and the Indians were an effective, well oiled cog in the network which dealt in contraband game trophies.

Attempts to break up this extensive network encountered a number of obstacles. The administration saw poaching as more anti-government in nature than anti-animal. They, therefore, emphasized making examples of those caught rather than undertaking preventative measures.² Their most effective action occurred during disarmament. But even then that campaign was not geared toward ending poaching but rather toward pacifying the Somali. By taking away the Somali firearms the British limited poachers to the use of the less effective bow and arrow.³

Otherwise the major enforcement agency responsible for

¹Senior Commissioner to Chief Native Commissioner, August 4, 1921, Coast Province, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 84; DC Goshā to PC Jubaland, October 14, 1919, DC GOS 6/8; and ARGD 1924.

²Stone, p. 9.

³For disarmament see p. 113.

poaching, the Kenya Game Department, had little to effect in the NFD. Like every other NFD department it suffered from a lack of staff. Even in the late 1930's only 35 Game Scouts patrolled the 80,000 square-mile Northern Reserve.¹ Obviously these few men could not adequately control such a vast area. The staff also functioned under the handicap that some Somali scouts cooperated with poachers. For example, scouts in Wajir might reveal information about the hunting of giraffes, but not that of elephants. The Game Department did make some captures and confiscations but on the whole had a negligible effect.²

Accessibility to Italian Somaliland compounded the problem of inadequate staffing. Even before they acquired Jubaland the Italians regarded it together with neighboring territories as sources of ivory.³ Although they agreed to a treaty stipulating joint control of the ivory trade, and in spite of repeated confirmations during the years

¹Adamson, p. 163.

²See NFAR 1915 through 1948, PC NFD 1/1.

³Alemanni, "La regione del Guiba," Rivista Coloniale vol 17/ (1920), p. 236; G. Pistolese, "L'Acquisto Dell'Oltre-Guiba," in T. Sillani, ed., L'Africa Orientale (Roma 1933), p. 100.

following the cession, the Italians failed to meet their obligations.¹ Indeed, according to the British, some Italian officials stationed in Somaliland directly benefitted from the illegal trade.² Only during the Italo-Ethiopian war did the Italians act against the trade by seizing and confiscating game trophies.³ After the war they reverted to purchasing them.

Traders sold their trophies in Italian Somaliland because of the high prices offered in that colony. Under the British system the Somali could bring in only "found" ivory. If they came across a dead animal the nomads could turn in its tusks for a reward. But first they had to accede to rigorous questioning before receiving a miserly Sh. 4/- per pound. If they sold the same ivory on the Italian side they received up to Sh. 20/- per pound. And since there was no "found" price for rhino horn in Kenya, the nomads often took that item across the

¹ See Mussolini to Sgr. Ambasciatore, November 26, 1932, Exchange of Notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Italian Government regarding the Control of Traffic in Game Trophies across the Frontier Between Kenya and Italian Somaliland, Cmd. 4232, (London 1933).

² R. Sperling to Undersecretary of State for the Colonial Office, October 10, 1923, C.O. 533/301; ARGD 1924; and NFHOR 1938, PC NFD 2/1.

³ ARGD 1936, NFMIR December 1936; PC NFD 3/1/1.

border. At Kismayu they could sell rhino horn for Sh. 12/- to Sh. 40/- perppound.¹ After 1933 when Kenya banned the sale of leopard skins, nomads and poachers brought them to Somaliland towns. Whereas a confiscated leopard skin brought Sh. 5/- in Kenya, in Kismayu or Bardera the nomads earned as much as Sh. 100/- or Sh. 150/- for each skin.² Since traders no longer brought "found" ivory for sale to Lamu and probably sold it in Italian Somaliland, the administration there suffered a loss in revenue.³

It is difficult to determine the volume of the trade in illicit game trophies. Kenyan administrators only speculated as to its extent. The Italians kept export accounts, but they did not record the origin of the game trophies. Since these products could have come from Ethiopia, British Somaliland, southern Kenya, and even Zanzibar before being re-exported, the Italian records

¹Senior Commissioner Coast to Game Warden, July 18, 1927, Coast Province, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 85; ARGD 1926 and 1929; and Abdalla bin Omar, interviewed July 1972, Mandera.

²WAR 1934, PC NFD 1/5; MDAR 1941, PC NFD 1/3; GAR 1943, PC NFD 1/7. See also Abdalla bin Omar, interviewed July 1972, Mandera; and Nuria Dido, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

³East African Standard, December 3, 1927, p. 21.

are not that useful. Whatever the volume was, the trade in ivory and rhino horn continued as it had before the coming of the British but probably on a lesser scale. The reduction in the trade probably directly related to the disappearance of game animals. Kenyan officials claimed that by 1948 poaching was "negligible." They cited the fact that at least in the eastern portion of the NFD, poachers had brought the leopard close to extinction on the Daua and the Tana Rivers. Poaching and the dessication of the Lorian Swamp also caused the reduction of the great elephant that had once roamed the area.¹

The Somali also participated in an illegal live-stock trade. In many cases the nomads merely continued selling to traditional buyers because they could obtain better prices for their animals than those paid at British regulated auctions. Because of their nature some markets existed for a brief but heightened time, but others proved longer lasting. At these markets the nomads sold cattle, sheep, goats and occasionally camels. To do this they

¹PC to all DCs, October 26, 1933, DC MDA 5/1; MDHOR 1937, PC NFD 2/3; and MNEHOR 1948, PC NFD 2/1.

frequently crossed international borders into Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland, and also held markets within Kenya.

The most popular operated in Somaliland, especially during the Italo-Ethiopian war,¹ near the "alien" Somali Isiolo quarantine area,² and along the southern NFD border.

On the southern border many different Kenyan peoples shared in the trade. The main livestock sellers included the Boran, the Orma, the Somali, and occasionally the Rendille. The buyers came from Central Province and the Tana River District including the Kikuyu, the Meru, the Embu and the Kamba. Some of these people had traded with one another from at least the middle of the 19th century.³ Certainly by the early 1920s the Boran and the Central Province Bantu regularly exchanged grain and livestock, but they soon came under British regulations. They continued to trade as the Kikuyu and others illegally herded livestock back to Central Province.⁴ In 1922 when

¹WHOR 1936, PC NFD 2/5; NFMIR May 1936, at PC's Office, Garissa; and Mohamed Kulamama, interviewed June 1972, Giriftu.

²IHOR 1939 and 1940, PC NFD 2/4.

³J. Lamphear, "The Kamba and the North Mrima Coast," in D. Birmingham and R. Gray, eds., Pre-Colonial Trade (London 1970), pp. 77-89 and 100.

⁴Veterinary Officer to DC Meru, June 4, 1927, Stock/v. I; Senior Commissioner Northern Frontier to Chief Veterinary Officer, September 8, 1927, SHEEP5; Assistant DC Burra to OC Northern Frontier, March 21, 1928, PC NFD 4/2/2.

the British instituted the Isiolo cattle quarantine, the traders moved the markets farther and farther south to escape administrative detection. And in the 1940s Somali interest in this illegal trade increased due to the creation of the monopolistic livestock purchasing agencies.

Even in the 1940's the smugglers did not hold markets in set places. They moved them from one area to another and held them in inaccessible places where roads did not exist and even land rovers experienced difficulties. The Somali patronized markets in two distinct yet general geographic locales. One existed in the Kinna-Koreh area. Here Boran from Garba Tula acted as the chief sellers, although some of their Marsabit kin, the Rendille, and a few Somali joined them. They usually sold their livestock to agriculturalists from Central Province. The second market operated in the area south of the Tana near Malka Rupia. The Orma were the primary sellers with the Somali taking a supportive role. The buyers were mostly Kamba from Kitui.¹ In both locales, therefore, the Somali

¹DC Isiolo to DC Isiolo, October 19, 1946, DC GRSSA 21/3; GAR 1944 and 1945, PC NFD 1/7; and DC Garissa to DC Kitui, May 20, 1948, DC GRSSA 21/7.

were only secondary sellers. While the Herti and the Isaaq frequented the market near Kinna-Koreh, the Telemugger appeared more regularly at Melka Rupia. The Wajir Somali, especially the Aulihan, were infrequent visitors.¹ Even though the administration knew of these markets, because of their inaccessibility and the belief that it was a small scale trade, the British expended little effort to halt the trade.

As with the trade in illegal game trophies, it is difficult to gauge the scale of this trade. British officials speculated that at such markets perhaps 1,000 livestock changed hands yearly. Others mentioned only that trade was "considerable."² One raid uncovered a group of 30 Herti, Abd Wak, and Maghabul dealing with 30 Kamba, but only captured three men and 15 head of cattle.³ The British realized that these markets offered almost

¹GAR 1944 and 1945, PC NFD 1/7; DC Wajir to DC Garissa, October 31, 1946, DC GRSSA 21/3. See also Ismail Ahamed, interviewed July 1972, Muddo Gashi and Sheikh Abdi Adot, and Haji Farah, interviewed August 1972,

²DO Isiolo to DC Isiolo, October 19, 1946, DC GRSSA 21/3; and DC Garissa to DC Kitui, December 2, 1943, DC GRSSA 21/3.

³Inspector of Police to OC Northern Frontier, November 8, 1944, DC GRSSA 21/3.

double the LC's or MMB's auction prices. For example, the Somali could dispose of goats for between Sh. 10/- and Sh. 15/- to Kamba buyers.¹ Although cash served as the major medium of exchange in the 1940s, prior to that NFD sellers often accepted ivory of rhino horn for their animals.²

In addition to game trophies and livestock, the Somali smuggled other goods. Because of shortages in Ethiopia and Somaliland, during seasonal migrations the nomads often took tea, sugar, and cloth to relatives in spite of British regulations prohibiting such trade.

Although the trade was small scale in nature, the nomads regularly participated in it.³ At times such activity was part of the illegal livestock trade. The Somali exchanged contraband cloth for cattle in Somaliland. They then took these animals for sale in Samburu. Some Somali also dealt in miraa, a drug grown in Meru but prohibited in the NFD.

¹ NFD 1946, 1947 and 1948, PC NFD 1/1. See also Ismail Ahamed, interviewed July 1972, Muddo Gashi.

² DC Garissa to DC Isolo, August 14, 1945 and DO Isiolo to DC Isiolo, October 19, 1946, DC GRSSA 21/3, and NFD 1947, PC NFD 1/1.

³ GHOR 1933 and October 1946, PC NFD 2/7; NFDOR 1946, PC NFD 2/1; and Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London.

The Somali community at Isiolo, advantageously situated, spread this drug throughout the NFD townships where it was in great demand. As long as the township Somali sought it, the British could do little to stop the miraa trade.¹

Thus the nomads smuggled a variety of goods based on the higher prices offered outside of the NFD. Motivated by both anti-government sentiment and economic rationality, the Somali resisted the new commercial structure. They were even more dramatic in rejecting taxation, another pillar of the new economy.

The British introduced taxation to the Somali at a comparatively late date. They feared that an adverse Somali reaction would lead to violence, and thus they delayed its imposition until the early 1930s. Their action caused vociferous Somali opposition. Somali hostility and mobility, the vastness of the area and the British inability to administer it properly, combined to hinder the establishment of taxation. By the end of the period, however, the Somali generally accepted taxation and the use of the Kenya shilling as currency.

¹ IHOR 1939, PC NFD 2/4. See also Ahamed Aden Lord, interviewed 1972, Wajir.

Before the introduction of cash through taxation, NFD nomads paid tribute in the form of livestock. As early as 1914 the Samburu and the Rendille gave one and one-half per cent of their herds to the British in return for protection. They therefore, lost 1,100 sheep and goats and 120 camels. In 1916 the Boran in Moyale and Garba Tula, the Sakuye, the Gabbra, and the Ajuran began paying tribute. At first these nomads had to meet an assessment of only 30 bullocks and 30 sheep and goats per group. In 1921 they found the assessment increased to 300 sheep each. Additionally, the Boran also gave the British 100 cattle, the Ajuran 75, and the Sakuye a lesser amount.¹ By the 1920s the NFD administration still did not levy tribute on the Somali with the exception of the Ajuran.²

The British did require that the Somali meet a camel quota. They expected each subclan to supply a

¹Marsabit PRB, PC NFD 4/1/2; Uaso Nyiro Annual Report 1920-21, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2081, Reel 48; MYAR 1918-19 and 1920-21, PC NFD 1/6; and Garba Tula Baraza Book, October 15, 1922, DC ISO 6/1.

²Telemugger trading at Lamu were liable to taxes on that island but they rarely paid them. See Lamu PRB, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 74.

specific number of baggage animals. If they did not receive the camels immediately, it was British policy "to just take them."¹ The administration did not consider the camel levy as tribute because they paid the Somali for their animals. As they expanded, however, the British concerned themselves with the inequitable treatment of the different NFD peoples. As one administrator explained, "the richest tribes the Somali and the Gurre pay nothing at present and give the Government officials the most trouble in policy and administration."² Therefore, the British decided that the Somali should be brought into line with other NFD nomads.

In the early 1920s the Somali reacted violently to British attempts to collect tribute. In 1923 the Gurre received orders to produce 100 camels, 250 goats, and 100 oxen as tribute. The Gurre Sultan, Gababa, allegedly agreed to the levy. However, he did nothing to collect it, and therefore the British arrested him. Aden Ido, who had the support of the administration, replaced him. When Aden Ido attempted to comply with the British order some of the

¹ J. B. Llewellyn, interviewed May 1972, Nanyuki.

² NFAF 1921, PC NFD 1/1.

younger Gurre attacked him. During the ensuing melee eight of his attackers died under the guns of the British troops. To mollify the Gurre the British freed Gababa. He and many of his followers fled to Ethiopia where they remained until 1928. Meanwhile those who stayed in Kenya paid tribute.¹ As in Mandera, the Wajir Somali actively opposed the payment of tribute. In one incident the Habr Sulien man ambushed a patrol that had just taken some of their camels, and although they lost that battle, soon afterward attacked the DC. Because of this incident the officials in Nairobi declared the collection of tribute illegal.² But the British began to speak more seriously about taxation.

Longstanding Somali objections and hostility delayed the introduction of taxation. They presented both practical and hyperbolic reasons for their opposition.³

¹MDAR 1922 through 1924, PC NFD 1/3; Gurre PRB, PC NFD 4/12; and Deputy Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 9, 1923, C. O. 533/296.

²Chief Native Commissioner, "Eil Tulle Incident," September 3, 1924 and OC Northern Frontier to Chief Secretary, September 19, 1924, PC NFD 4/1/3; WHOR 1924, PC NFD 5/2/1; and "History of Administration," Wajir PRB, Vol. 1, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 81.

³For some of the more imaginative Somali complaints, see G. Reece, Moyale Safari Diary, October 1930, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2084, Reel 104.

The nomads complained of their inability to obtain cash and pointed to the problems caused by the livestock quarantine. Others expressed their fears that taxation would weaken their contacts with Jubaland. The nomads realized that taxation would enable the British to identify more easily anyone who was not a Kenyan subject. Since the Kenyan and Jubaland Somali were interdependent as reflected in the herding of livestock, trade, and marriage connections, the Somali spoke out against taxation. They also feared being reduced to slaves like the Bantu in downcountry Kenya.¹ The Somali also offered religious objections. The sheikhs and waadads firmly believed that Muslims should not pay a Christian tax. The holy men, therefore, exhorted their fellow nomads not to pay.²

Even after they reluctantly agreed to taxation, the Somali voiced concern as to its implementation and what

¹The Somali frequently stated that they did not want to become Kikuyu. Superficially such statements appeared to be racist in content--the Somali despised the Bantu as inferiors--but in reality the nomads were concerned with the loss of freedom.

²There is a good deal of information about Somali discontent concerning the impending imposition of taxation. See M. Mahony, "Taxation," Garissa, July 1928, PRB, Vol. 2, and F. Jennings, "Taxation," June 1933, Wajir PRB, Vol. 3, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 69 and 82; J. Lambert, Safari Diary, October 1929, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2084, Reel 103, and NFMIR 1931, PC GRSSA 27/3. See also Ali Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; and Abdi Noor, interviewed June 1972, Muddo, Gashi.

they expected in return. Somali elders pressed for payment in livestock rather than in cash. Some, especially those in Wajir, adamantly refused to pay individually. The nomads also pressured the administration to produce some tangible improvements proving that British rule benefitted the Somali. They demanded better water facilities, lower duka prices, and a relaxation of the quarantine. These demands reinforced the British fear of violence. The British knew that an uprising would present a serious threat to administration and felt that taxation might spark wide-scale, unified Somali resistance.¹

The British, however, ably exploited Somali disunity. First they took advantage of the natural divisions at the highest levels of Somali society. For example, in Wajir the British played the Ogaden against the Degodia, and the Ajuran against both of these other groups. In Telemugger they intensified the differences between the Abd Wak and the Abdalla. Thus the Somali presented varying degrees of hostility toward the idea of taxations. The

¹NFAR 1926, PC NFD 1/1; "Denham's Diary" 1927, PC NFD 6/1/1; "Minutes of a Meeting at Government House," October 7, 1929, PC NFD 8/2/3; V. G. Glenday, "Secret Instructions on Taxation," September 26, 1930, Wajir PRB, Vol. 2, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 82, Reel 81.

Degodia remained the most vocal in their denunciation of its enactment. At a very early stage in negotiations the Ajuran consented to it. The Mohamed Zubeir and the Aulihan, after first opposing any form of taxation, later mischievously suggested that they would pay the Non-Native rate of Sh. 30/- which was Sh. 10/- more than the British wanted from them.¹ Elders, headmen, and individual nomads also disagreed about the problem. Headmen faced the precariousness of maintaining their power against external and internal pressures. Some who opposed taxation lost their positions because the British undermined them. At barazas with the nomads, the DCs easily identified anyone who spoke out against taxation. Others who collaborated openly received

¹MYAR 1928, PC NFD 1/6. These nomads obviously knew of the Herti and Isaaq attempts to be registered as Non-Natives. Unlike the resistance in the north, this attempt was well organized. The Isaaq led it and used organizations, petitions, conferences, lawyers, and letters to England to gain their goals. At first they also tried to enlist the aid of the nomads but the Isaaq lost their support when they claimed Arabian descent. In 1936 the British officially rejected the Somali claim to be Non-Natives. See E. R. Turton, "Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule," Journal of African History, vol. 13 (1972), pp. 121-127. The Isaaq attempts in the north made little headway in the NFD. Alien Somali-NFD townships seemed more than willing to avoid paying any tax, or at most pay the special reduced rate of Sh. 10/- available in the north. See WAR 1938, PC NFD 1/5; MDHOR August 1939, PC NFD 2/3; and DC Wajir to OC Northern Frontier, March 23, 1939, PC NFD 4/1/10.

British support. Within their subclans headmen had to balance the demands of the young men and the views of the elders. The former clamored for throwing the British out of the NFD. On the other hand, the elders remembered the Jubaland punitive expeditions and disarmament. They, therefore, moderated their opposition with warnings of superior British military power.¹ The elders also could point to the British practice of presenting full K.A.R. contingents at barazas called to discuss taxation. Thus although few accepted the idea of taxation, the Somali realized their limitations. They had almost no option but to meet the British demand. As one NFD official bluntly stated, the Somali had to "pay or get out."²

In 1928 the Government first announced the imposition of taxation, but not until 1931 did it collect any taxes. In Wajir the announcement elicited a flat refusal by the Somali to pay an individual tax. Indeed it caused

¹GAR 1927, PC NFD 1/7; DC Wajir to PC Northern Frontier, December 22, 1930 and F. Jennings, "Taxation," June 1933, Wajir PRB Vol 3, S. U. KNA MIC Film no. 2082, Reel 82. See also Abdi Noor, interviewed June 1972, Muddo Gashi.

²PC Northern Frontier to DC Wajir, June 28, 1933, Wajir PRB, vol. 3, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 82. For a comparison with the Italian see R. Hess, Italian Colonialism in Somalia (Chicago 1966), pp. 161-162.

a large number of Habr Suliman led by Sultan Iman Mohamed, to move to Italian Somaliland. The British then decided not to levy taxes and proffered the lack of rainfall and, therefore, Somali inability to pay, as the official excuse for the change in mind.¹ During the next few years the Government conceded to some Somali demands. It promised to improve water and veterinary facilities. It reduced the tax from Sh. 20/- to Sh. 10/- per poll. It refused, however, to accept livestock in lieu of cash payments. After all the British did not want to be in the Somali position of having nowhere to market excess livestock. In Wajir Government allowed the Somali to pay a commuted tax by section; and in Telemugger it permitted individual taxation. Thus in 1931 when the actual collection of taxation began, the British had alleviated many of the Somali complaints. In spite of British compromises, many Somali continued to oppose taxation. Some openly resisted its introduction but on the whole British fears of violence proved unwarranted.

During the first few years of its existence, the Somali held the upper hand. As the period progressed,

¹"Notes on a Meeting at Government House," October 7, 1929, PC NFD 8/2/3; and NFAR 1929, PC NFD 1/1.

especially after 1935, the nomads became more acquiescent. Prior to 1935 many Somali successfully avoided paying taxes. They merely remained in the bush and stayed away from DCs and askari. The British never made an exact count of the population. Headmen, whom the British made responsible for collecting taxes, frequently did not cooperate fully with the DCs. They balanced administrative needs against the pressures from within their own sections. Sometimes they deliberately distorted the size of their sections far below their actual numbers.¹ The British had to accept the situation. They feigned satisfaction with the early counts and DCs actively encouraged those who would not pay to leave Kenya.

Many Somali migrated from Kenya and entered Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. In Moyale the Gurre and the Ajuran departed for Ethiopia. Approximately twenty per cent of the Degodia soon followed. By far the greatest movement involved the Somali in Wajir. One DC claimed that

¹"Minutes of a Baraza with Mohamed Zubeir, December 24, 1930 and "Minutes of a Baraza Wajir," January 11, 1932, Wajir PRB Vol. 3, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 82, and Unshur Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Giriftu.

²Moyale PRB, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel,

taxation drove every Somali group but the Degodia out of the district. Although hyperbolic the statement is indicative of the massive extent of the movement. In 1931 the Mohamed Zubeir and the Maghabul were the first to leave en masse. Some Geri followed them to Italian Somaliland, and the Jibrail went to Ethiopia. In 1932 due to a ten per cent tax increase another exodus occurred. Those Habr Sulieman who had returned to the district in 1929 once again departed. Their former shegats, the Murille, also left. Then in 1933 because of poor rainfall and an attempt to introduce individual taxation, an even greater movement began.¹

The years immediately following 1933 comprised the turning point in Somali-British relations concerning taxation. Resistance continued to surface but an informal growth in Somali acceptance developed. The Somali valued the superior water and grazing supplies of northern Kenya, and recognized the overcrowded conditions in Jubaland.² The Somali response also reflected the impact of the Italo-Ethiopian war which popularized the use of cash. It

¹WAR 1931 through 1933, PC NFD 1/5.

²Hassin Mumin interviewed June 1972, Wajir; and Sheikh Haji Nur Yusuf, interviewed June 1972, Wajir Bor.

also caused many Somali to flee the turmoil of a wartime situation. The nomads also reacted quickly to British actions against the small segments of Somali society caught avoiding tax payments. In 1935 and 1936 both the Habr Sulieman and the Mohamed Zubeir fell into line when the British confiscated some of their livestock.¹ Thus although slight for the first two years, by 1935 revenue increased to a record of 1200. (See Table IV-1)

TABLE IV-1
TAX REVENUES 1931-1935^a

	Wajir	NFD
1931	917	5782
1932	613	6264
1933	704 (includes 304 arrears)	6573
1934	1000 (includes 204 arrears)	7530
1935	1200 (includes 200 arrears)	6784

^aIbid., and Report on Native Taxation 1936 (Nairobi 1936), p. 12.

¹"Taxation," n.d., Wajir PRB, Vol. 3, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 2082, Reel 82.

Although after 1935 the Somali generally accepted taxation, they did not fully comply with the British system. The nomads, especially the camel owners, still had no suitable markets at which they could sell their animals and obtain cash.¹ Many, therefore, refused to pay taxes. Headmen continued to falsify the size of their sections. Some of the more suspicious nomads paid their taxes, but only under assumed names. Thus even in the late 1930s headmen needed the "extensive use" of Tribal Police for collecting tax money.² A small percentage of the Somali never paid any taxes until the mid-1940s when they no longer could avoid the tax collectors.³

In the 1940s the Somali began manipulating the system to their own ends. After the war the Somali realized that they could not evade the newly installed practice of linking tax payments to livestock sales. Thus at MMB auctions Somali sellers, under supervision of the DCs,

¹ Native Affairs Department Annual Report (Nairobi 1931), pp. 20-21; and WMIR April, June and August 1932, PC NFD 3/2/1.

² WHOR July 1939, PC NFD 2/5.

³ Nuria Dido, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; and Abshiro Herin, interviewed July 1972, Rhamu.

immediately paid their taxes from the receipts of their livestock sales, and entered their names into the tax registers. Migration into Kenya continued, spurred on by rumors of the impending return of Somaliland to Italy and the introduction of taxes in Ethiopia. In order to gain official status as Kenyan subjects, and thus become eligible to use the superior grazing and water supplies, illegal immigrants willingly paid taxes. The Somali already in Kenya aided them in this deceit.¹

Although they resisted the British inspired economy by smuggling livestock and game trophies and by avoiding the tax collectors, the Somali also accepted some of the new trends. The majority willingly patronized dukas and in the post-World War II era some even became shopowners. A smaller percentage undertook other types of employment connected with the township economy.

Almost immediately the Somali accepted the appearance of dukas as a source of essential goods. Time and accessibility were important factors that stimulated Somali interest. Nomads in the bush preferred a

¹"Minutes of a Meeting Wajir," January 21, 1949, DC WAR 2/4; and WAR 1948, PC NFD 1/5.

two or three day journey to a duka center rather than undergoing a ten or fifteen day safari to the coast. The dry season heightened the difficulties of travel. Since the nomads had to be near sources of water at this time of year, and since duka centers had been sited at such locales, the Somali had a double attraction for patronizing them. The Somali demand also resulted in the establishment of dukas in outlying areas. Thus places such as Ijara, Buna, and Rhamu became important segments of the economy. At these smaller centers the Somali purchased their basic needs, became more acquainted with the use of cash, and came under closer British supervision.¹ As the variety of goods grew the Somali expanded their buying habits. Normally the nomads sold no more livestock than necessary to meet their tax payments. After paying them, the Somali frequently retained surplus cash. With their extra money they usually purchased cloth, or smaller items such as utensils, packets of tea, and sugar. Although frugal in their buying habits, as the variety of goods

¹MYAR PC NFD 1/6; and Lt. W. Dibben to DC Lamu, August 18, 1921, S. U. KNA MIC, Film no. 1995, Reel 61. See also Hassin Mumin, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

increased the Somali began selling an extra goat or two to buy occasional luxury items such as mirrors.¹

Because of their increasing dependency on dukas the Somali accepted minor dietary and cultural changes. Prior to the arrival of the British the nomads in Wajir and Jubaland drank buni (coffee). The Somali sent caravans to Ethiopia to trade for large sacks of coffee beans. From the beans they made buni, a mixture of the beans, honey, and ghee. They drank buni not only for social reasons, but often before making major decisions.² Gradually the Somali replaced buni with tea. Somali who traveled to the coast and early Arab caravan traders introduced tea to the hinterland. At first the Somali only used it occasionally or for special events such as marriages. As the period progressed tea and sugar became important elements in the Somali diet.³ Somali tastes were a major reason for this change, and the British action of banning coffee imports from Ethiopia probably

¹For an example of the variety of available goods, see MYAR 1934, PC NFD 1/6.

²I. N. Dracopoli, Through Jubaland to the Lorian Swamp (London 1911), p. 152; and J. B. Llewellyn, interviewed May 1972, Nanyuki.

³Islam Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; and Samboul Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Garissa.

accelerated the spread of tea as a popular beverage.¹ Even though they welcomed food products such as tea, the Somali adamantly refused to buy posho (maize meal). The Somali only ate maize meal, a staple of the down-country Bantu, in times of emergency such as drought.²

Another item which the Somali valued was metal kitchenware. The Somali purchased pots, pans, enamel mugs, dishes, and tea kettles. They prized these products for their utility and durability. Otherwise they relied on the Tomals for their utensils. The Tomals claimed that dukas did not offer serious competition to their livelihood because each specialized in different goods. These iron workers continued to fashion the unique Somali knives and spearheads, hakdha (axes), and the large wooden spoons used by women for cooking. They also survived because they adapted well to the development of townships. Instead of staying out in the bush, the Tomals took advantage of the expanding township system and moved to the outskirts of towns. Additionally, even after

¹ Major Arthur Bentinck to Sidney Barton, March 22, 1933, F. O. 371/6989.

² Islam Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; Hassin Mumin, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

the spread of cash, the Tomals continued to accept goats and sheep from the nomads as payment for their products. Some acquired and developed large herds. The Tomals also benefitted from the steady influx of new migrants which assured them of a growing market. And finally, after the eclipse of the camel caravans the Tomals actually experienced a decline in the cost of iron. No longer reliant on iron from the coast to fashion their wares, the Tomals found ready supplies of this metal in the rusted hulks of the abandoned trucks which dotted the desert of the north.¹ As the townships grew in the 1940s they filled the increased need for artisans in occupations such as iron workers, leather workers, tailors, weavers, carpenters, and even laborers.²

Generally speaking, in spite of their changed buying habits, the Somali did not develop into consumers along the lines of a western model, or for that matter on

¹The administrative records do not contain much useful information on the Tomals during the colonial period. Therefore, see Yusuf Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; Ali Hussein, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Ibrahim Farah, interviewed July 1972, Rhamu; and Mohamed Hussein, interviewed July 1972.

²PC to all DCs, September 11, 1943, PC GRSSA 21/1; and PC Northern Frontier to all DCs, March 11, 1948, PC GRSSA 20/3.

the downcountry Kenya model. The nomads remained too mobile to purchase much more than they could carry such as a few utensils or food products. Even in the latter category their tastes did not extend to posho of canned goods. Those Somali who lived in townships probably indulged more in consumerism than the nomads. Townspeople increasingly bought European clothing such as shirts, trousers, and even topcoats. They also frequented the hotelis and town eating places for dishes of rice and meat, or spaghetti.¹

In terms of occupations, a combination of Somali reluctance and a lack of opportunities delayed their entrance into the new economy in any significant fashion. The decline of the camel caravans resulted in the Somali loss of roles as caravaneers, middlemen, and traders. The Somali seemingly raised no outcry about this change. Until late in the period very few Somali attempted to insert themselves into the new economic structure. Most of the new occupations held little appeal for the nomads, and the large majority of Somali remained primarily cattle or camel owners.

¹ Ibid.

The nomads were not attracted by many of the occupations brought by the new economy. For example, they normally rejected chances to work as government laborers. Because of this, the British portrayed the nomads as arrogant, lazy people who preferred to sit contentedly in the shade of acacia trees watching their livestock increase multifold.¹ Yet these nomads watered thousands of head of livestock by hand, bringing bucketfuls of water up from wells between thirty and forty feet in depth. Granted that women seemingly performed the more menial tasks in Somali society, but raising livestock also entailed difficult work.² In any case the Somali rarely accepted positions as road or town laborers. Their primary interest in livestock herding forced them to remain mobile. The British, therefore, recruited laborers from outside of the NFD and brought Arabs from the coast, Turkana from the Lake

¹For examples of this type of attitude, see C. Wightwick Haywood, To the Mysterious Lorian Swamp (London 1927), p. 21; and Dracopoli, pp. 88 and 143.

²N. Farson, Last Chance in Africa (London 1949) pp. 340-341, gives a romanticized version but nevertheless useful description of the laborious work entailed in the watering of livestock. See also Dutton, pp. 31-32 on "the desert university."

Rudolf region, and Burji and Konso from Ethiopia.¹ The Somali occasionally participated in pan-digging, road repair work and bridge building, but only if it directly affected them.

The Somali responded more favorably to government service. During the early years of administration the Herti and Isaaq filled the British need for interpreters, mail runners, and syces. Some nomads also gained such employment. As administration expanded and education became a requirement, few local Somali could obtain such positions. Thus in the NFD the Arabs and the Indians dominated the clerical class.² The only real outlet for occupational change appeared in the armed services.

The armed forces offered the Somali the opportunity to merge traditional interests with the means to earn cash. In the NFD the Somali joined the K. A. R., the Kenya Police, the Tribal Police or dubas, the Game Scouts, and the Grazing

¹ Islam Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; K. Mude, "The Amaro-Burji of Southern Ethiopia, "Ngano (Nairobi) vol. 1 (1969), pp. 44-48; and NEAR 1915 through 1948, PC NFD 1/1. For Italian problems with labor in neighboring Somaliland, see S. Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge 1973), p. 71

² The career of Mohamed Said provides a good example of how the British utilized Arabs as clerical staff. See Mohamed Said, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

Guards. These organizations appealed to the Somali because they carried a certain amount of authority and prestige, and some allowed the nomads to handle firearms.¹ Employment in the armed services provided the Somali with a way to advance economically as well as socially. Becoming a policeman, for example, permitted the Somali to obtain cash for purchasing more livestock. In turn the livestock could be used for marriage payments.² During the early years of administration, however, the Herti and the Isaaq dominated the armed services stationed in the north. Later more locals enlisted.

In the NFD the British limited the number of Somali enrolled in the armed forces. They feared that the independence of the Somali might lead to difficulties. As one DC warned, "a straight Somali force is not only a useless unit but a positive danger."³ The administration, therefore, restricted the number of Somali stationed in the NFD

¹For an example of their attitude see Khahiya Samanter interviewed August 1972, Nairobi. See also Sir Francis Loyd, interviewed June 1973, London.

²Abdi Dugaw, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

³DC Marsabit to Commissioner of Police, May 29, 1928, PC NFD 4/1/4. The Italians felt much the same. See Touval, p. 71.

Kenya Police contingents. No more than 50 to 55 per cent of any given post could be Somali. Of these no more than 20 per cent could be related to the local population.¹

Policy also dictated that certain limitations be placed on other services. For example the British regarded the dubas as an elite corps. Since they aided headmen and DCs, the British outfitted them in red turbans and cloth, and romanticized their image. More importantly, the administration restricted enlistment to the sons of headmen and leading Somali families. On the other hand, the Grazing Guards had a less striking image. The British sought only men from "decent middle class families who have a fair degree of intelligence."²

Although this form of occupation appealed to the nomads, the armed services never provided wide scale employment. For example, in Wajir between 1926 and 1935 the full complement of Kenya Police numbered only from 15 to 50 men. In 1948 it reached a high of 75. During the same period the dubas never needed more than 17 to 20 men. The

¹ DC Wajir to PC Northern Frontier, April 13, 1941, PC NFD 4/1/3; and WAR 1932 and 1934, PC NFD 1/5,

² DC Mandera to PC Northern Frontier, December 28, 1951, PC GRSSA 4/3. See also A. Reece, pp. 40-41; Farson, p. 273; and Ahamed Lakicha, interviewed July 1972, Mandera.

Grazing Guards, only created in 1946, and the Game Scouts had even smaller contingents. The situation was generally the same in the rest of the NFD.¹ In 1947 even the Kenya police which increasingly accepted Somali enlistees, listed only 267 Somali in its ranks.² During World War II the K. A. R. provided a number of openings, but the north could not depend on a war economy for any great length of time.

World War II was a turning point for the NFD duka trade. During the war the Italian threat forced the British to evacuate township populations and abandon the trade centers in Moyale, Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa. In their absence Italian bombs and Somali looters seriously damaged or destroyed shops. Many Arab and Indian duka owners never recovered from the upheaval. Because of financial losses a number never returned. Secondly, these traders faced a new British policy which discouraged alien ownership in favor of that by local nomads.³ Another

¹ NFD 1915 through 1958, PC NFD 1/1.

² Kenya Police Annual Report (Nairobi 1926-1948); See also W. Foran, The Kenya Police 1887-1960 (London 1962).

³ Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies, April 23, 1940, PC NFD 11/3.

factor stimulating the Arab and Indian exodus was the post-war appearance of sufficient numbers of Somali ex-servicemen eager to own and operate shops. Actually most ex-servicemen preferred to buy livestock from their wartime savings and return to the nomadic way of life. This pleased the administration, for although in theory they wished to replace the alien traders with local Somali, in practice the British were very selective.²

The career of Ahamed Lakicha, a Gurre of the Birkaya section in Mandera, serves as a case study of this new trend. In the 1930s he enlisted in the army after rejecting the dubas as a career. Because the dubas at that time did not hold the respect of the general populace, and because they could not carry guns, Ahamed joined the K. A. R. As he rose in the ranks from private to Sergeant, his salary increased. Since his expenses for rations were low, he saved most of his salary. He sent his savings to relatives, or brought them home himself, and invested in more livestock. During World War II he

¹DC Wajir to PC Northern Frontier, September 22, 1951, PC GRSSA 4/23.

²OC Northern Frontier to all DCs, April 15, 1941, DC MDA 5/1; and PC Northern Frontier to all DCs, September 19, 1947, DC GRSSA 4/4.

achieved the rank of Regimental Sergeant Major and served in northern Kenya, Egypt, South Africa, Madagascar, Ceylon, Burma, and Japan. In 1946 he received his discharge and returned to Kenya with a total savings of almost Sh. 5,000/-. Ahamed then purchased a truck and a land rover. He hired out the truck to duka owners and transported goods from Isiolo to Mandera, earning Sh. 800/- a trip. Business proved successful enough to hire a driver. Not until 1948, however, could Ahamed open his own duka.¹ Other ex-servicemen, after working as butchers and auctioneers, also belatedly entered the duka trade.² Thus in the post-World War II era for the first time the Somali became seriously involved as entrepreneurs in the duka trade.

Therefore, the introduction of the new economy resulted in attitudinal changes among the Somali nomads. The duka trade met the nomads' basic needs for cloth, and introduced some new items such as the increasingly popular beverage, tea. It also supplemented rather than challenged

¹Ahamed Lakicha, interviewed July 1972, Mandera.

²See Aden Ibrahim, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; and Salat Hadhe, interviewed July 1972,

the traditional function of the Tomals. But the new economy failed to attract significant numbers of Somali to enter directly into it occupationally. Some nomads joined the armed services, and toward the end of the period a few even became duka owners, but on the whole the new economy provided few opportunities. Thus, it did not counter the Somali preference for remaining nomads. The new economy also spurred several levels of resistance. Active Somali rejection focused on the smuggling of livestock and game trophies, and on opposition to the introduction of taxation. The most important form of resistance was the Somali persistence in a way of life. Thus the new economy, although it succeeded in insinuating itself into the nomadic lifestyle to a degree, did not provide an alternate way of life to the nomads.

CHAPTER V

SOMALI PASTORALISM AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST BRITISH ADMINISTRATION 1912-1948

Between 1912 and 1948 Somali migration resulted in a clash with the NFD administration. During this period the Somali continued to enter Kenya in a general south-western direction. Penetration was not a one way movement. Rather it approximated the ebb and flow of an ocean tide. Ignoring lines and borders drawn in Ethiopia and Europe, the Somali moved their livestock according to seasonal needs. As their population increased, some sub-clans penetrating deeper than others, the Somali exerted constant pressure on the Galla-speaking peoples they encountered. Their aggressiveness forced the British to take a stand which favored the Boran and the Orma. As one DC wrote, "the Handing Over Report, the files, the handbooks, the history of the N.F.D. all drummed in one lesson: the Somali must come no further."¹ Until the 1930's the Somali effectively evaded British

¹C. Chenevix-Trench, The Desert's Dusty Face (London 1964), p. 6.

attempts to control movement across the "Somali-Galla line" and the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border. In the post-World War II years when the British introduced intra-clan and grazing areas, the Somali faced an even greater threat. In their effort to resist these new plans, many of the nomads joined the Somali Youth League (SYL).

Somali expansion into northern Kenya consisted of a number of distinct yet interrelated movements. First, from the area north of Oddo, the Degodia filtered through Gurre territory in Mandera, and spread into that of the Boran and the Ajuran in Moyale and into the Ogaden spheres of Wajir and Garissa. In the area of the Kenya-Italian Somaliland-Ethiopia triangle, the Marehan also pressured the Gurre from the east, and some pushed the Degodia deep into Boran territory in Ethiopia. In another major movement, the Aulihan, also migrating from northern Jubaland, passed through Mohamed Zubeir territory and came up against the western flank of the Boran and the northern limits of the Abd Wak. The Mohamed Zubeir, ensuring the

Ogaden presence at the Wajir wells, continued to move back and forth between Wajir and Afmadu. On a third front, the Telemugger threatened the Boran to their west and the Orma and the Pokomo along the Tana. By the time the British arrived, the Somali had set the pattern for further expansion.

British indecision aided Somali migration in northern Kenya. The British definitely lacked the power to halt the migration but official policy stressed the aim of protecting the Boran. Although some DCs adopted a firm approach in their dealings with the Somali, most like J. B. Llewellyn acted in an advisory capacity. Llewellyn knew that he could deal only with the Somali at the broadest levels, and that he could not force the Somali to move from one area to another.¹ Such an approach minimized chances of success since only the Ajuran had a Sultan capable of controlling all of his people. Other DCs spoke about the creation of a Somali reserve in Jubaland and of forcibly removing the Somali from the NFD. Some even illegally engineered the movement.

¹J. B. Llewellyn, interviewed May 1972, Nanyuki.

of Somali sections back to Jubaland. But the central government frowned on such tactics.¹ Officials in Nairobi seemed especially aware of the potential costs of challenging the Somali, and readily admitted that until such financial commitment was forthcoming, little chance existed of moving the Somali to Jubaland.²

Aggressive DCs, therefore, lacked the support of the Nairobi officials. Thus, except for a few occasions, the British rarely took direct actions limiting Somali expansion.

In a major effort to halt Somali expansion the British created the "Somali-Galla line." In 1912 the British first devised the line to keep the Ogaden off the Wajir wells and to prevent the Telemugger from reaching the Tana. Theoretically they confined the Somali to the east of the El Wak-Wajir-Habbaswein track.³ Even at that time the British plan appeared weak because certain Somali, notably the Ajuran and their Degodia shegats, already inhabited and shared Boran areas to the west of the line.

¹J. O. W. Hope, "Notes on Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District," October 24, 1918, OC NFD 4/1/4.

²For examples of conflicting attitudes, see P. J. Waddington to PC Jubaland, August 31, 1920 and R. Salkeld to Chief Secretary, January 2, 1921, PC JUB 1/4/7.

³F. Jennings, evidence, Kenya Land Commission (Nairobi 1933), 1649-1653.

The Degodia migration assumed a more aggressive and extensive character than any other Somali movement in Kenya. They came into conflict with the Boran, the Ajuran, the Gurre, and the Ogaden. Major influxes, occurring in the early 1900's and in the 1920's, combined with a steady flow of small scale infiltration to increase the Degodia population. Originally from Ethiopia, the Degodia passed through Gurre territory in the NFD and Ogaden spheres in Jubaland before reaching the Wajir wells. From that center they managed to penetrate as far south as Afmadu and the Uaso. Degodia relations with other Somali remained tenuous. On the one hand the Degodia established intimate and crucial contacts through the clientage system. But the Degodia frequently engaged in confrontations with their hosts while asserting their independence.

Degodia-Gurre relations are illustrative of this dual approach. Some of the first Degodia to arrive in Gurre territory on the Daua, such as the Jibrail, allied themselves as shegats. Others persisted in raiding the

Gurre. By 1912, although some of their kin had moved to Wajir and to Moyale, the Degodia secured the area near the Takabba wells. In that year they lost a battle to Ali Bukey and his combined force of Gurre and "Tigre" warriors. Consequently some Degodia fled across the Daua and still others toward Wajir. In the following years the Degodia and Gurre sent small raiding parties against one another. Then in 1916 a major eruption occurred. Once again the Degodia suffered defeats at Kormu, Adow and Awal Bone, this time at the hands of Gababa Mohamed.¹ At this point in time the Degodia, realizing their serious disadvantage, reverted to small scale raiding.

Farther south the Degodia shrewdly insinuated themselves into the Ajuran-Boran alliance. This alliance, forged in centuries past, gradually came apart due to the Somali intrusion. The earliest Ajuran arrivals, the Gashe and the Gelberis, became Boran shegats and adopted their customs. They merged into Boran society, and were known as the Baladda, or Boran-speaking Ajuran. This harmonious relationship continued until the end of the

¹MDAR 1926, PC NFD 1/3; Sheikh Ali Hussein, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; Yusuf Maalim Mohamed, interviewed July 1972, Tarbaj; and Haji Abdullahi Maalini, interviewed July 1972, Wajir.

nineteenth century when the Eji disrupted it. In raids against the Boran, many Ajuran supported their Somali kin. In the early 1900's the Ajuran also responded favorably to the Degodia influx, and they accepted many of the newcomers as shegats. They moved closer to the Somali religious and political spheres but continued to share Boran grazing and water supplies. In 1908 another Ajuran sub-clan, the Wagleh camel owners, arrived. The Wagleh were more mobile, more aggressive, spoke no Boran, and considered themselves as Somali.¹ Their arrival strained the Ajuran-Boran alliance. Although they remained a buffer between the "Somali" and the "Boran," the Ajuran involved themselves more and more with the Somali.

The Ajuran-Degodia relationship was exceedingly complex. In some cases these Somali carried clientship to a tertiary level. For example, in the early 1900's many Degodia became Ajuran shegats. Some, especially the Rer Mohamed Liban, who comprised the majority of Ajuran clients, accepted their own shegats: the Idris, the Dumal, the Rer Samanter, and the Dirisama. The Ajuran, therefore,

¹Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; and Abdi Dai and Nuno Abiker, interviewed July 1972, Wajir.

experienced difficulty in exerting control over their territory. Secondly, the Degodia deliberately abused their position and often acted independently of their hosts. They watered and grazed their herds where they wanted, ignoring restrictions placed on their movement by the Boran. In fact, they often openly insulted the Boran and provoked fights. Then in 1916 when the British evacuated the NFD, the Degodia wasted no time in testing their strength. Many who no longer feared the Ajuran rejected their status as clients. Some attacked the Boran on the Wajir wells. At the same time, however, still others continued to seek access to Boran territory through their connections with the Ajuran. Certain Degodia chose to remain shegats, such as the Gelibleh, or the Abdi Majid, the Ferdano, and the Rer Gedid.¹ By playing a double game the Degodia upset the balance between the Ajuran and the Boran, and also gained entrance to Boran territory.

Meanwhile the Ogaden had made substantial territorial inroads at the expense of the Boran. The Aulihan,

¹ Anon., "Notes on Wajir's Political Background," in WHOR 1952, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2084, Reel 94.

Mohamed Zubeir, Abd Wak, Abdalla, and their shegats clashed with one another and with Galla-speaking peoples located in the area between the Wajir wells and the Tana. The Mohamed Zubeir, who accepted more shegats than any other Somali group, fought with the Abdalla, the Abd Wak, and with the Boran. During the Mohamed Zubeir-Abd Wak war from 1912 to 1914, both sub-clans suffered extensive losses and the Mohamed Zubeir Sultan died of wounds. Battles took place at Kalalud, Habbaswein, and unnamed places on the Tana.¹ The war resulted in a stalemate. Each sub-clan temporarily gave up ideas of expansion near the Uaso, and instead consolidated its position. Thus, the Mohamed Zubeir concentrated on pushing the Boran off the Wajir wells. They extended their control from the base at El Bey and El Tulli, which they had gained in 1910. They forced the Boran to the westernmost wells at Siddie and Wagalla. Compared to the Mohamed Zubeir-Abd Wak war, Ogaden penetration at Wajir was peaceful if aggressive. Occasionally violence erupted. For example, one attack left 11 Boran and one Sakuye dead.² By 1915

¹"Mohamed Zubeir-Abd Wak War," Garissa PRB Vol. 2, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No: 2082, Reel 69.

²OC Northern Frontier to OC Troops Moyale, December 15, 1911, PC NFD 4/1/3.

the Mohamed Zubeir had completely driven the Boran from the Siddie wells.¹ In 1916 they and their Degodia shegats made even greater gains. By then the Ogaden controlled the Wajir wells and no longer feared the Boran. The Mohamed Zubeir dominated the area between Wajir and Afmadu, but did not attempt to return to the scene of the 1912-1914 war.

The Aulihan inserted themselves into the vacuum created by the Mohamed Zubeir-Abd Wak war. They were relative latecomers to the NFD. Pressure from the migration caused by the wars of Mohamed Abdille Hassan and Marehan expansion forced them to vacate northern Jubaland. They first arrived on the Deshek Wama and then made their way to the Uaso. Their aggressiveness brought them into direct conflict with the British. In 1916 the Tur Adi and Jibril sections raided the Samburu, and then almost killed the DC sent to pursue them.² In 1917 when they sacked Serenli, they did kill the DC there. In that same year they suffered defeat at the hands of a British punitive expedition, and also surrendered their firearms

¹H. B. Kittermaster to Chief Secretary, November 12, 1918, PC NFD 4/1/4.

²Uaso Nyiro Annual Report 1917-18, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2081, Reel 31; and T. S. Thomas, Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District (Nairobi 1917), pp. 136-137.

and paid a fine.¹ In 1919 and 1920 even more Aulihan entered the NFD in spite of the protests of Aulihan already ensconced on the Daua. The Aulihan threatened the Boran to their west and thus the British extended the "Somali-Galla line" to Muddo Gashi. They also clashed with the Abd Wak to their south.

The Abd Wak belonged to a larger Telemugger movement on the Tana. They and the Abdalla moved from the Afmadu and Biskaya region toward the Uaso and the Tana. Hostilities with the Mohamed Zubeir prevented them from penetrating too far north. To the south they basically stayed on the right bank of the Tana but a few crossed to the other side. By the 1920's the Telemugger herded almost 150,000 head of cattle and 230,000 sheep in this area. Their presence involved them in problems with the Pokomo and the Orma.

The Pokomo-Somali relationship included periods of hostility and cooperation. These agriculturalists frequently complained to the British about Somali depredations along the Tana. They especially voiced their anxiety

over the destruction of their shambas (farm plots) by Somali livestock, and to a lesser degree about Somali assaults against their men and the raping of their women.¹ These Pokomo allegations resulted in Somali counterclaims. The Somali characterized the Pokomo as liars. The nomads denied undertaking any such hostile activity, and asserted that the Pokomo frequently stole Somali sheep. The Telemugger suggested that some Somali might be involved but the British would be better advised to speak to the Aulihan.² These two peoples also interacted on a more cooperative level. The Pokomo worked for the Telemugger as herders and as gravediggers. They also aided the Somali in the illicit ivory trade. More importantly the Pokomo provided the Somali with grain in exchange for sheep and goats. As one DC wrote to his superior, "The Pokomo of Kipini District are mainly dependent upon the Northern Frontier Province Somalis for the marketing of their produce."³

Elsewhere on the Tana the Somali became embroiled

¹F. Homan, "Notes for District Records," November 22, 1939, PC NFD 4/1/10; and DC Kipini to OC Northern Frontier, March 30, 1928, PC NFD 4/2/2.

²GAR 1923, PC NFD 1/7.

³DC Tana River District to Senior Commission Coast, September 24, 1927, PC NFD 4/2/2.

with a number of distinct but related Galla-speaking peoples. Prior to the Somali threat in the area between the Juba and the Tana, the earliest Galla-speaking nomads had crossed the Tana and at one time extended as far south as Malindi. As they contracted, these Galla established themselves near the Lamu coast and on the left bank of the river. Administratively they were divided into three distinct groups: the North Galla of Bura, the Central and Southern Galla of Kipini, and those at Witu, M'konumbi, and Lamu. The North Galla posed the greatest obstacle to Somali expansion. These nomads raised cattle and had managed to obtain a monopoly of the overland livestock trade to Mombasa. Sometimes, against administrative rules, they made individual arrangements with the Somali allowing them to graze livestock in the Galla reserve.¹ In the early 1920's the Somali pressure increased and between 4,000 and 5,000 Somali encroached on Galla territory as far east as Masabubu with a few reaching Mwina.

Another Galla-speaking group, the Orma, experienced

¹M. Mahony, "Notes on the Galla," June 6, 1929 and H. B. Sharpe, "Galla-Further Notes," July 28, 1932, Garissa PRB Vol. 2, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2084, Reel 69; and Robert L. Bunger, Jr., Islamization Among the Upper Pokomo (Syracuse 1973), pp. 13, 27 and 60.

even greater difficulty. Their defeat in the second half of the nineteenth century left the Orma with two options. Some fled across the Tana and others remained as subjects to the Somali. Those staying behind lived with the Mohamed Zubeir, the Aulihan, the Maghabul, and the Telemugger, especially the Abdalla. Their position fell between that of a shegat and a slave. Wardei, as the Somali called them, could not marry Somali women but had to give their daughters to Somali overlords for purposes of marriage and concubinage. Children resulting from such marriages were known as Weil Tullo, and those from pure Somali marriages as Weil Tuggo. The Wardei also suffered from discrimination in terms of dia payments and inheritance laws. Not surprisingly some Orma attempted to join their kin on the other side of the Tana. But since they usually lost their livestock if they left, few crossed the river. Attempts in 1909 and in 1915 renewed Somali opposition to their leaving. In 1915 the Orma agreed to a British decision to move all Galla on the right bank across to the left bank. The Somali remained firm in

refusing to accept the loss of livestock, and the British effort failed. In 1919 widespread Orma agitation led to the "Lamu agreement," which allowed departing Orma to retain 50 percent of the livestock that they herded. Somali threats, however, minimized departures,¹ and the issue remained a problem.

After 1920 the proposed Kenya-Italian Somaliland border hardened the British attitude toward Somali migration. During World War I the British and the Italians conducted secret negotiations related to that European holocaust. One result of the meetings was the agreement ceding Jubaland to Italy.² As early as 1920 NFD officials became aware of the probability of the cession. They still hoped to remove from Wajir all Ogaden who had connections in Jubaland. From 1920 to 1925 the existence of a military administration in the NFD reinforced a hard line stance.³

The Somali adamantly opposed any British plan to remove them from Wajir. Although they had not been

¹R. G. Turnbull, "The Wardah," Kenya Police Review, October 1957, pp. 312-313; and PC Tanaland to Chief Secretary, October 23, 1921, Coast Province, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 1995, Reel 111.

²R. L. Hess, "Italy and Africa: Colonial Ambitions in the First World War," Journal of African History, Vol. 4 (1963), pp. 105-126.

³For military administrative plans for the NFD, see Col. G. Phillips, "Memorandum," December 29, 1919, C.O. 533/229.

consulted about the forthcoming cession, and although they had not been officially informed of the results of the secret negotiations, the Somali learned of the proposal. In 1922 the Mohamed Zubeir led an Ogaden movement opposing the British plan. Osman Galile headed an Ogaden deputation to Nairobi. Their petition asserted the right to remain in the NFD by virtue of conquest and their 50 year presence in the area. The Ogaden complained about the overcrowded conditions in Jubaland. Their petition elicited only a noncommittal response in which the Governor linked the possibilities of minimal migration to the introduction of registration and taxation.¹ In a separate incident some Mohamed Zubeir, who had noticeably been removed to Afmadu the previous year, returned to the Wajir wells without British permission. Their obstinance forced the British to reconsider their aims, and to agree to allow camel owners to remain in the district.² The Ogaden thus gained an important concession.

In subsequent negotiations with the Italians the

¹R. Coryndon to Osman Galile, November 8, 1922, Coast Province, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 1995, Reel 104; "Memorandum Submitted by Italian Experts," June 2, 1924, C.O. 533/320; and WHOR 1925, PC NFD 2/5. For an example of earlier Somali complaints, see E. Northey to Secretary of State for the Colonies, September 27, 1919, C.O. 533/213.

²F. Jennings, "Jubaland with reference to Somali Tribes, their grazing grounds, movements of Tribes within and without those boundaries" (hereafter "Jubaland"), January 15, 1923, C.O. 533/307; and DC Afmadu to PC Jubaland, December 16, 1920, PC JUB 1/4/7.

British seriously considered the importance of potential Somali recalcitrance. In drawing up new plans the British attempted to allow for the mobility of the camel owners by creating a limited area through which NFD and Jubaland camel peoples could cross during specific times of the year. But they also hoped to make the Wajir and Jubaland Somali separate and independent peoples. They planned to achieve this by actively enforcing the border.¹

The border proved unenforceable because of the Somali refusal to accept it, and because of the British failure to patrol it. The British opened the border in 1925, delimited and cut it for the first time in 1926, and again in 1933.² But the border suffered from a major weakness. As one discerning officer noted, the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border was "arbitrary and meaningless, running as it does through the middle of nowhere for a hell of a long way."³ As with the other Kenya boundaries,⁴

¹"Jubaland Revised Memorandum, " n.d., in C.O. 533/320.

²L. N. King, "The Work of the Jubaland Boundary Commission," Geographical Journal, Vol. 72 (November 1928), pp. 420-434.

³P. Fullerton, "Notes on the Somalia Border," 1960, DC MDA 7/3.

⁴For a discussion of Kenya's border, see A. McEwan, The International Boundaries of East Africa (Oxford 1971).

administrative necessities rather than on African realities. Thus, it artificially divided the grazing areas of Somali sub-clans, especially that of the Mohamed Zubeir and the Abdalla. It ignored the fact that during the dry season the nomads could not depend on finding water anywhere between Afmadu and Wajir. And to separate the Somali on the basis of whether they owned camels or cattle was unrealistic.¹ By their own admission the British never adequately patrolled the border because of the lack of finances and insufficient Italian support.²

The Somali certainly ignored the existence of the boundary, and the movement in and out of Wajir is illustrative of their opposition to it. Two major clan families, the Degodia and the Ogaden, represented by at least 15 sub-clans, herded livestock in Wajir. Until the introduction of taxation reportedly only one sub-clan, the Rer Mohamud Dekatch, remained in the district and never crossed into Jubaland. The others moved back and forth responding to

¹"Minutes of a Second Meeting Between British and Italian Experts," June 2, 1924, C.O. 533/320; and Sheikh Haji Nur Yusuf, interviewed June 1972, Wajir Bor. See also E. Cucinotta, "Nomadi e Nomadismo nei Trattati Coloniali," Rivista Coloniale, vol. 22 (1927), pp. 193-194.

²Political Officer Jubaland Boundary Commission to Senior Commissioner Coast, December 6, 1926, PC NFD 4/2/2.

population pressure and seasonal variations. They easily avoided British patrols although some who were caught paid fines.¹ Their relatively unrestricted movement resulted in an increased population. Although its size fluctuated, from 1912 to 1926, the Somali population definitely grew larger. In 1913 the British estimated the Somali population in Wajir at approximately 8,000 nomads, in 1921 at 23,000, and in 1926 at 37,000.²

As the Ogaden population increased in Wajir, the Degodia between 1918 and 1924 fled from Ethiopian harassment. A number of incidents in Ethiopia sparked Degodia migration across the border. In 1918 the Ethiopians attacked a Yaben village killing some nomads, mutilating others, and capturing 145. Two years later an outlaw band set upon Bagul Maina, a village near the Daua causing a mass exodus. Soon after Lij Beli, the Ethiopian official in the Degodia area, decided to collect tribute. His methods provoked Degodia displeasure and he killed anyone who opposed him. In 1922 he attacked Aimole forcing

¹ P. Fullerton, "Notes on the Somalia Border," 1960, DC MDA 7/3. See also Mohamad Made, interviewed June 1972, Habbaswein; Hassin Mumin, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

² Governor BEA to Secretary of State for the Colonies, June 1923, 1913, C.O. 533/119; and WAR 1921 and 1926, PC NFD 1/5. The British admitted that their figures were inexact and frequently based on speculation. They did not undertake a census until 1936.

many Degodia to flee. Wobur Abdi, Boqor of the Degodia, frequently complained of the pillaging, murder, mutilation, rape, and forced marriages. The Ethiopian central government promised reform, but it seemed powerless in the border area.¹ The failure on the border and the resulting Degodia migration increased the friction between the Ethiopian and Kenyan governments. Relations between the two were already strained over a number of issues including the delimitation of the border, the problem of the "Tigre," and Boran migration into Kenya.

The British wanted to ignore the matter but the presence of the Degodia forced them to act. At first the British agreed to return the Degodia to Ethiopia. British troops collected the Yaben and their livestock. On a forced march under British control one group of Degodia lost a large amount of livestock due to the harsh pace and the lack of water. Fearing a Parliamentary uproar the British underwent a change of mind. Then in 1923 another large Degodia influx made the British realize that these nomads meant to remain in Kenya. Thus, although

¹At T. Miles to Claude Russell, May 29, 1924, F.O. 371/9995.

the government openly encouraged the Degodia to leave, privately it eschewed the use of force on the grounds that the Degodia might react violently. Instead the government pushed the Ethiopians for guarantees which resulted in the arrest of Lij Belli, in his replacement by Fitaurari Ayele, a respected administrator, and in Hapte Georgis' promise that only future taxes would be collected and those past due forgiven.¹

Although it served the ends of international amity, the British-Ethiopian agreement did nothing to solve Gurre problems south of the Daua. It failed to hinder the Degodia displacement of the of the Gurre, who received little sympathy from the British. Owing to their previous truculence exhibited during attempts to collect tribute, the British refused to lighten the Gurre burden. Since some Gurre had abandoned their territory to avoid paying tribute, the British declared the area "abandoned." Then they offered it to the recently arrived Degodia.²

¹N. Ronald, "Southern Frontier of Abyssinia," November 17, 1925, and Hapta Georgis to Fitawrari Ayele, August 20, 1925, C.O. 533/341. For correspondence between the two governments, see Correspondence Respecting Abyssinian Raids and Incursions into British Territory, Cmd. 2553 (London 1925).

²OC Northern Frontierto Chief Secretary, March 15, 1925, PC NFD 4/1/7.

At this time the Degodia solidified their hold on territory previously denied them by the Gurre and penetrated farther south. Due to the British the Degodia gained access to El Wak, Takabba, and Melk Re. In 1923 an additional 3,000 Degodia adults and 30,000 head of livestock arrived putting an end to whatever hopes the British nurtured concerning the distribution of land. In fact this new influx not only contributed to overcrowding in the areas occupied by the remaining Gurre, but provided the Degodia with an avenue to the south. They penetrated as far as Afmadu in Jubaland and to the Uaso in Kenya, only 80 miles from Meru.¹ The Degodia harassed the Gurre and the Boran, trespassing, looting, and keeping "the Boran from their own wells."²

In 1924 the Abdalla also gained important concessions on the Tana. In that year the Abdalla received an acknowledgement from the British that they needed an eastward extension. Therefore, the Abdalla were granted seven watering spots between Sankuri and Mwina, with the proviso that they were temporary. By the 1930's, however,

¹"Minutes of a Second Meeting between British and Italian Experts," June 2, 1924, C.O. 533/320.

²"History of Administration," Wajir PRB Vol. 1, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 81.

the Abdalla regularly used these spots to water livestock and permanently established themselves on the Tana.¹

The Aulihan also advanced into Boran and Abd Wak territory. A major key to Aulihan penetration in the Boran area was the activity of Hilole Mohamed, a retired frontier agent. Given a special concession in the midst of the Garba Tula Boran, Hilole's village attracted a growing number of Aulihan newcomers. Their presence threatened the Boran and acted as "the thin edge of the wedge" for Somali expansion there.² The Aulihan also overcame administrative plans to remove them from Abd Wak grazing areas. In 1923, with the British acting as mediators, the Aulihan and Abd Wak agreed to a new arrangement of territorial spheres. According to its terms the Aulihan gained access to the pasturage from Habbaswein to Muddo Gashi, from Gorialeh to Udole, and from Satisa to the Uaso, just east of Toorgooda. They also received permission to share the water pools at Gorialeh and Ndoleh.³ Since they had trespassed in this area prior to the

¹"Baraza Galla, Abd Wak, Abdalla at Sankuri," April 6, 1925, Coast Province, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 1995, Reel 93.

²WAR 1919 through 1924, PC NFD 1/5.

³R. Darroch, "Abd Wak--Aulihan Boundary," Garissa PRB Vol. 2., S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 69.

agreement, the Aulihan welcomed the change. Important in the decision was the Abd Wak dependence on the Aulihan for transport camels, and the fact that this extension was the only area suitable for camel raising in the Abd Wak sphere. These two groups also intermarried and exchanged livestock, activities which probably aided Aulihan penetration.

The Aulihan, however, almost immediately broke the agreement. Although most of the Aulihan cattle owners remained near Habbaswein, the camel owners increasingly moved out of the prescribed area to find water. Some reached the Tana where they became embroiled with the Pokomo.¹ They continued to take an aggressive stance toward the British, and only an unofficial relationship with the Abd Wak prevented violence.²

Between 1927 and 1932 tensions heightened. In 1927 the Aulihan rejected a compromise measure whereby they would have received an extension into Abd Wak territory if they agreed to cut a road as the new boundary.

¹ M. Mahony, "Notes on the Aulihan," Garissa PRB Vol. 2., S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 69, DC Bura to DC Wajir, July 2, 1928, PC NFD 4/2/2.

² PC Northern Frontier to Assistant DC Garba Tula, October 26, 1927, PC NFD 4/2/2. Ali Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa.

They felt that by cutting the road they would be acknowledging that they had no rights to further extensions.¹

Instead they crossed the Muddo Gashi-Sankuri track and occupied the Abd Wak wells at Gorialeh, Labba Dullā, and Dullahi. But their open defiance still prevented the British from taking direct action against them.²

In 1929 the Aulihan gained another significant concession which permitted them to mix and share as communal grazing, land once considered as belonging to the Abd Wak. They did not receive, however, the final sanction of the Abd Wak leadership. Two years later the Aulihan obtained Abd Wak support by agreeing to remain behind a line west of Garissa to Udole to Satisa.³ But the Aulihan still continued to press forward, and finally forced the British to respond. The British sacked Aden Hassan, the Aulihan headman, and replaced him with Hilole Mohamed. Secondly, the British levied a collective fine of Sh. 16,000/0- against the Aulihan.⁴ Aulihan-Abd Wak relations stabilized after that.

¹DC Bura to Senior Commissioner Northern Frontier, April 12, 1928, and DC Wajir to OC Northern Frontier, July 20, 1927, PC NFD 4/2/2.

²DC Telemugger to DC Wajir, February 27, 1929, and DC Wajir to PC Northern Frontier, March 25, 1929, PC NFD 4/2/2.

³"Proceedings of Aulihan Baraza," August 14, 1929, Garissa PRB, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 69.

⁴H. S. Skene, "Aulihan," April 24, 1933, Garissa PRB Vol. 2., S. U. KNA MIC Film No. 2082, Reel 69.

At approximately the same time the "Somali-Galla line" once again became an issue. In 1930 the Rer Mohamed Liban chose to disassociate themselves from the Ajuran. They worked out a new agreement with the Ajuran and the Boran, agreeing to withdraw from Boran territory in return for ownership of five wells at Arbo.¹ But the Rer Mohamed Liban never adhered to their part of the agreement. Many remained in Boran territory. Then in 1931 severe drought forced the Somali to move far and wide in search of water. Some, such as the Jibrail, returned to Ethiopia while others such as the Fai gathered around Debel. The Rer Mohamed Liban returned to Boran territory first near Moyale and then farther south near the Uaso. Other Degodia followed. In October the Boran reported the first violations. By then the Degodia had precipitated what the British coined as the "Muslim-Pagan" feud. The "Muslim-Pagan" feud ended with the removal of the Boran from Wajir. The feud consisted of a number of violent episodes involving the Degodia and the Boran, but it never reached the scale predicted by British administrators.

¹"History of Administration," Wajir PRB Vol. 1, S. U. KNA MIC, Film No. 2082, Reel 81.

The British, in a grande peur manner, envisaged a general outbreak ranging from Ethiopia to the Tana in which the Muslim Somali would attack the pagan Boran. The murder of some isolated Boran by the Gurre, and fighting on the Uaso stirred their imagination further.¹ In actuality most of the fighting took place between the Degodia and the Boran in Kenya. The first incident occurred at Melka Oda. When the Boran refused permission to water livestock, the Degodia retreated. But when the Boran tried to prevent them from using Melka Churra the Rer Mohamed retaliated. They lost three warriors and killed two Boran. The next major clash occurred at Arrodimba. There the Rer Mohamed lost almost 4,500 sheep and goats, and 21 men to a mounted force of Boran and Sakuye horsemen.² The Rer Mohamed had created an unusual solidification of the Boran ranks: On the Uaso the Degodia now had to contend with mounted Boran patrols. In response the Somali banded together a force "of various Somali groups," 800 strong, five hours east of Habbaswein. Only the presence of K.A.R. contingents prevented the Boran and the Somali

from fighting. The situation soon deteriorated into a series of petty thefts and the murder of isolated individuals.¹ Although the Somali suffered the heaviest losses in the "Muslim-Pagan" feud, they did achieve the final removal of the Boran from Wajir district. In 1932 the Boran agreed to move out of Wajir into neighboring Isiolo. The Somali agreed to remain to the east of the following line: Takabba-Buna-Wajir district western boundary--Arbajahan-Habbaswein-Garissa District western boundary--Tana River.² The Ajuran, however, stayed on the Boran side of the line until 1934. Except for minor adjustments in 1935, 1939, and 1942 the "Somali-Galla line" remained set. The Somali had made substantial territorial gains.

In the 1930's the Somali also resolved their disagreement with the Orma, and the conflict between the Aulihan and the Abd Wak. In 1932 the Telemugger agreed to a settlement with the Orma in response to that group's agitation led by Aden Yako. The Abdalla collected their Orma herders at Bura and warned them to stop complaining

¹WAR 1931, OC NFD 1/5 and MYAR 1931, PC NFD 1/6.

²See Map IV.

or to leave under the terms of the 1919 agreement. Some did leave. But then a rumor spread that the Telemugger would not honor the agreement.¹ This led to an attempt by the Orma in Jubaland to reach the Tana during the dry season. Over half of those who started died before reaching the river and a large number of livestock perished.² Finally in 1936 the Telemugger once again agreed to honor the Lamu arrangement on the basis that anyone who wanted to leave had to do so before the end of the year or remain forever with the Somali. In the next two years the Telemugger also reached an agreement with the Aulihan. At this time the personalities of the leaders of these groups, Hilole Mohamed of the Aulihan and Stamboul Abdi of the Abd Wak, exacerbated the situation. Then in 1938 the rains failed and the Abd Wak found the Aulihan watering in their district. Fighting broke out but luckily only one Abd Wak warrior died. The hostilities forced the government to intervene. After a number of barazas the Aulihan and the Abd Wak each paid a Sh. 5,000/- bond securing their good behavior.³

¹Turnbull, "The Wardeh," p. 313.

²H. B. Sharpe, "A Tragedy," Blackwood's Magazine, vol. 236 (1934), pp. 630-631.

³F. D. Homan, "Notes for District Records," November 22, 1939, PC NFD 4/1/10.

British intervention in the Aulihan-Abd Wak affair was a general exception to NFD policy prior to World War II. Up until that time the British were much more interested in controlling movement across the "Somali-Galla line" or the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border. They usually left intra-Somali movement alone. Some PC's held different views on the matter. For example, Vincent Glenday, adopted a harsh if consistent program. He allotted each section a given area and allowed no movement beyond it. As he bluntly stated, "this is a hard country and if God does not send rain to a particular tribe it must be accepted as God's will that they perish."¹ Thus, Glenday denied numerous requests from the Somali to move during times of drought even though he realized that the nomads would disobey his orders. Gerald Reece, his successor, modified this policy and permitted temporary movement in times of hardship. Once the drought had passed, Reece demanded that the Somali return to their usual grazing grounds. Otherwise he levied fines.²

In the post-World War II period the British

¹OC Northern Frontier to Chief Secretary, March 15, 1925, PC NFD 4/1/7.

²NFAR 1938 through 1946, OC NFD 1/1.

instituted plans to control Somali intra-clan movement. The plan rose out of the post war discussion concerning the two major threats to an economically viable situation for the north: overstocking and overgrazing. Therefore, the British devised plans based on recent surveys of the available water and grazing supplies in the north.¹ Exempting Garissa because there was no reasonable way to divide that area into controllable segments,² the British chose Wajir as the best area to introduce their schemes. Thus, in 1946 the administration first enacted the Grazing Control Scheme (GCS) and then two years later introduced the Pilot Control Scheme.

These plans projected the most efficient use of pasturage and water by the Wajir nomads. They required not only Somali cooperation but good weather. The overall plan called for: 1) the division of Wajir into three major areas--Ogaden, Ajuran, and Degodia--in which there was to be no trespassing; 2) the segmentation of a circular area around the Wajir wells, with the closing

¹ D. C. Edwards, "Report on the Grazing Areas of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya," November 20, 1943, PC NFD 5/5/8; and Frank Dixey, "Hydrographical Survey of the Northern Frontier District, Kenya," 1943, PC NFD 5/2/8.

² PC Northern Province to Commissioner African Land Utilization and Settlement, October 25, 1948, PC GRSSA 4/4.

of one segment every two years to allow for the regeneration of pasturage; 3) the increase of permanent and temporary water supplies in the dry weather grazing zones. In order to assure cooperation the British created a new police force, the Grazing Guards.¹

The Somali response to the scheme reflected the self-interest of the different groups. Some such as the Maghabul who had few Degodia shegats supported the plan because they felt that the removal of the Degodia would mean the availability of a larger area for the Ogaden to exploit. The Telemugger and the Aulihan also spoke in favor of it because they wanted an end to Degodia infiltration.² In Wajir, however, many Somali opposed the plan. The Degodia, especially the Rer Mohamud Dekatch, vociferously agitated against its introduction. They received some support from their Mohamed Zubair hosts, but even the latter eventually welcomed the GCS because they no longer controlled their shegats. Thus the GCS offered them an opportunity to rid themselves of a nuisance while providing them with more land on which to raise

¹OC Northern Frontier to DC's, July 23, 1945, PC GRSSA 4/2; and WAR 1948, OC NFD 1/5.

²Mohamad Made, interviewed June 1972, Habbaswein; and Mohamed Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa.

their livestock.¹

The Rer Mohamud Dekatch wanted to remain in the Ogaden area that they had roamed since the early years of the century. Entering the district as Mohamed Zubeir shegats, the Rer Mohamud gradually extended their territory. They aided their hosts in the Mohamed Zubeir-Abd Wak wars. After that conflict some demanded and received an independent status. Nevertheless, when they thought it to be to their advantage, the Rer Mohamud pretended to be Mohamed Zubeir.² As they penetrated southward the Rer Mohamud acquired more cattle. From their base on the Uaso Nyiro, they ranged into Boran territory, south of the Uaso, and back toward Wajir. Very few entered Italian Somaliland. They were a singularly independent group and managed to avoid British attempts to appoint a headman to control them. They also survived an abortive plan to merge them with the Rer Mohamed Liban.³ Not surprisingly the Rer Mohamud reacted negatively to the British announcement of the grazing scheme.

¹Ali Daud, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

²F. Jennings, evidence, (Nairobi 1933), 1649-1653; and Yusuf Maalim, interviewed July 1972, Tarbaj.

³WAR 1924, 1934 and 1938, PC NFD 1/5.

When they received orders to vacate the Ogaden area, the Rer Mohamud elders first responded with legal maneuvers. During 1946 and 1947 the Rer Mohamud delayed their removal by enlisting outside aid. They gained the support of the Darot Welfare Association which reinforced the claim that they were Ogaden. Secondly, they found a spokesman in Eliud Mathu, then serving on the Kenya Legislative Council. They also sent appeals to the Governor of Kenya, the Colony's Supreme Court, and to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in England.¹

In their protestations the Rer Mohamud put forth both historical and practical reasons for remaining in the Ogaden sphere. Some Mohamed Zubeir backed the Rer Mohamud claim that they were Ogaden, Mohamed Zubeir, and Ugas Guled. The Darot Welfare Association petitioned the Governor and asserted that the Rer Mohamud "settled at their present place of abode over fifty years ago and have never been interfered and disturbed since then until recently."² The Rer Mohamud also explained that the only suitable areas for raising cattle in Wajir existed near

¹PC Northern Province to DC Wajir, April 28, 1949, PC GRSSA 4/2.

²Secretary Darot Welfare Association to Chief Secretary, February 20, 1946, AA 7/116.

the Uaso. Since the scheme called for their removal from the Uaso, and prevented their settling in Moyale or Garissa, the Rer Mohamud would have to dispose of their cattle and return to raising camels. And even the camel owners complained that the newly delineated Degodia area contained insufficient supplies of salt bush.¹

Once the Rer Mohamud recognized that their legal maneuvers were failing, they resorted to another, more political group to defend their interests--the Somali Youth League. The SYL connected the issue of the grazing scheme to broader questions involving the Somali in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia. In the NFD the immediate stimulus for the creation of an organized political movement came from neighboring Somaliland. The League originated in 1943 in the British part of the Somalilands with the consent and encouragement of officials there. By 1947 it gained official party status. The League held four general aims: 1) to unite all Somali and to reject all harmful older prejudices such as "tribal" distinctions; 2) to educate youth in a modern fashion through schools

¹DC Wajir to PC Northern Province, August 9, 1948, OC GRSSA 4/2. See also Unshur Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Giriftu.

and cultural circles; 3) to eliminate through constitutional means any situation prejudicial to Somali interests; and 4) to develop the Somali language and to introduce into common usage the already extant writing known as Irmaniya. Somali representatives of the League in London supported Parliamentary discussion about the possibilities of "Greater Somalia."¹

Although until 1946 most SYL activity occurred in the Somalilands, the NFD Somali soon joined the controversy. Herti truck drivers who covered the run from Somaliland through the NFD towns to the Rift Valley brought the League in the form of membership slips. At the end of 1946 a chapter of the Somali Youth Club opened in Wajir. By the early part of the next year chapters also existed in Mandera, Isiolo, Garissa, Moyale, and Marsabit. Although the NFD remained the focal point for SYL activities in Kenya, and Wajir acted as the provincial headquarters, branches also appeared in Kericho, Eldoret, and Nakuru.² At first the NFD branches looked to Somaliland for direction. Gradually discontent over the mismanagement

¹I. M. Lewis, A Pastoral Democracy (London 1961), pp. 285-286 and 305-306.

²Ahamed Aden Lord, interviewed June 1972, Wajir. See also NFAR 1947, PC NFD 1/1.

of SYL funds and the obvious prosperity of the Mogadishu officials led to a split. In September 1947 the President of the Wajir branch negotiated the financial independence of the SYL in Kenya. Thereafter it acquired a more local character. In the preceding May through August the League had undertaken a major registration drive, especially in the towns. It held parades and public meetings. At these gatherings its leaders discussed such issues as the lack of education, the need for Somali unity, and the injustice of the newly instituted grazing controls.¹

Although the issue of grazing controls appealed to the nomads, the SYL found its support in the NFD towns not in the bush. It attracted traders, butchers, tribal police, hospital dressers, government askari, and clerks. The Wajir chapter also sponsored an active women's branch.² The SYL depended on the towns for leadership. Each SYL branch reflected the local character of the area. In Wajir the Herti dominated the League, and in Mandera they shared power with the Gurre. At Garissa the Aulihan, Abd Wak, and the Abdalla shared the leadership.³ The

¹ WAR 1947, PC NFD 1/5; and MYAR 1947, OC NFD 1/6.

² SalatheHussein, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

³ Mohamed Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa.

SYL members even accepted non-Somali members. In Moyale it included some Christian Amaara and some pagan Burji members, and in Garissa some Pokomo joined.¹ In Wajir, however, an open clash between the SYL and the township Arabs surfaced. In one incident SYL members assaulted three Arabs.² The branches also differed from one another in degree of interest and activity. The Wajir and Garissa branches were the most active, and those in Moyale and Mandera were comparatively quiescent.

The pastoralists greeted the League with mixed emotions. They reacted favorably to the themes of unity and independence but still adopted a wait-and-see attitude. They saw no reason why the British would leave, and saw little benefit in talk about improved educational facilities or social welfare. In fact many viewed the membership dues as just another form of taxation. They also questioned the SYL about the use of the dues since there were no tangible programs enacted.³ Some nomads, especially the Rer Mohamad,

¹ MYAR 1947, PC NFD 1/6; and GAR 1948, OC NFD 1/7.

² NFAR 1948; PC NFD 1/1; East African Standard, February 23, 1948, p. 5. See also Omar Basabra, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; and Mohamed Said, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

³ MDAR 1948, OC NFD 1/3; Ali Hassan, interviewed June 1972, Garissa; and Dahir Arap, interviewed July 1972, Rhamu.

joined the League because of the grazing control issue.¹ But the large majority remained aloof and membership stayed small. Garissa claimed the largest membership with a total of 5,000, and Mandera had the smallest with only 500 members.²

Other factors limited the growth of membership. The British influence over Somali Chiefs and headmen was among the most important. At first when "Greater Somalia" seemed a political viability, the British encouraged the Somali to join the SYL. As the official line changed the NFD administrators adopted a neutral stance. This attitudinal change perplexed the headmen and the elders.³ Some Somali, such as the Ajuran leaders, came out against the League in its early stages. Without British backing, the Ajuran gauged correctly that the League had little chance of success. In August 1947 Hussein Ido, the Ajuran Sultan, and Omar Dima, the leader of the Wajir Ajuran, ordered their followers not to join the League. They claimed that it interfered with the smooth running of administration.⁴ In

¹Abdi Dugaw, interviewed June 1972, Wajir; and Khahiya Samanter, interviewed August 1972, Nairobi. See also East African Standard, June 8, 1948, p. 1.

²MDAR 1948, PC NFD 1/3; and GAR 1948, OC NFD 1/7.

³"Minutes of DC's Meetings" April 10/14, 1947, PC NFD 8/1/2.

⁴WAR 1947, OC NFD 1/5; and Abdi Dai, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

Mandera the Waima section of the Gurre, openly opposed the League.¹ Not surprisingly, the attitude of the government headmen brought them into conflict with the SYL leaders.

The SYL directly threatened the leadership of the NFD headmen. The SYL accused these leaders of being government lackeys and for working against the best interests of their people. In Wajir the League singled out such men as Abdi Ogle, Unshur Mohamed, and Ahamed Liban as the main enemies of the League. The SYL spread fitina about these men and ridiculed them in poems:

Ali Hele iyo ina Omar Subtow
 Iil Kama bahayino Ayagaa
 Ilol-Huma Dorsaden
 Abdi Ogle Raa-en.

The League also established illegal courts to hear complaints and levied fines.

The British ultimately destroyed the League by jettisoning their neutral attitude. They claimed that the League aimed at the "usurpation of the lawful functions of the established Government,"³ and therefore, should be

¹MDAR 1947, OC NFD 1/3.

²Salathe Hussein, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.
 Ali Hele and the son of Omar Subtow
 Will never be free from regret
 because they chose that way of slavery
 by following Abdi Ogle.

³GAR 1948, OC NFD 1/7.

proscribed. In January 1948 the British took the first steps toward weakening the League. They announced that it was illegal for any government employee to belong to any political party or organization after March of that year. This action forced most members of the League who held government positions to resign. In Wajir, however, the British arrested one Tribal Policeman and four medical dressers for failing to resign by the specified date.¹ They next proscribed the Garissa branch and arrested seven SYL leaders, detained and tried them, and unceremoniously sent them to Lodwar. A few days later they closed the Wajir branch. Its president, Sheikh Kassim, handed over the League's funds which amounted to Sh. 3,668/- before he left for Mogadishu.² The League died quietly. No alternative society replaced it. Aside from the pressure created for educational reforms, the SYL made little immediate impact, although some scholars have related it to the growth of Somali nationalism.³

¹ WMIR March 1948, WAJ DC 4/3; Unshur Mohamed, interviewed June 1972, Giriftu; and Ali Daud, interviewed June 1972, Wajir.

² WAR 1948, OC NFD 1/5; and East African Standard, July 13, 1948, p. 1.

³ E. R. Turton, "Somali Resistance to Colonial Rule," Journal of African History, Vol. 13 (1972), pp. 135-140.

From the Rer Mohamud viewpoint the SYL completely failed them, and therefore, these Degodia resorted to a favorite Somali device--non-compliance with the law. These Somali challenged the British to act forcefully realizing that the NFD officials feared creating an incident which might bring Parliamentary criticism. But since the government vigilance. The Rer Mohamud found it more difficult to avoid patrols, and some suffered the indignity of arrest and of having their livestock confiscated. Although their headmen officially agreed to leave the Ogaden area, the Rer Mohamud did so under protest.¹ Many Rer Mohamud never returned to the new Degodia area, and some of those who did eventually made their way back to the Ogaden sphere. The Rer Mohamud remained a problem for the British into the 1950's.

Thus throughout the period from 1912 to 1948 Somali migration into Kenya continued in spite of British efforts to halt it. The Somali, pushed forward by population pressure and the poor water and grazing supplies in Jubaland, advanced into Kenya at the expense of the

¹NFAR 1947 and 1948, PC NFD 1/1. See also Abdi Guled to Governor, December 12, 1945, AA 7/1/6.

Galla-speaking nomads. They ignored British creations such as the "Somali-Galla line," and the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border. Their mobility combined with the lack of British commitment, allowed the Somali to move at will. Among the different Somali groups, the Degodia were the most aggressive, and they clashed with the Gurre, the Ajuran, and the Boran. The Ogaden, represented mainly by the Mohamed Zubeir, continued to pressure the Boran at the Wajir wells. Farther south the Aulihan and the Telemugger challenged the Galla near the Uaso and on the Tana. On occasion Somali expansion erupted into violence but on the whole it remained characterized by small scale yet persistent penetration. The overall effect resulted in substantial territorial gains for the Somali. They pushed the Boran completely out of Wajir and forced the British to revise the "Somali-Galla line" in their favor. The Somali activity also precluded British attempts to control intra-clan movement. In the 1940's, however, the Somali faced new restrictive measures in the form of experimental grazing controls in Wajir district. The Somali there

viewed the measures in terms of their own self-interest. Thus the Ogaden, because they gained more territory with the removal of the Degodia, supported the new scheme. The Rer Mohamud Dekatch, however, vigorously opposed the new rule through legal and illegal measures. They even resorted to joining the Somali Youth League. For a time the SYL seemed to have the support of the British, the nomads, and the Somali leadership, but soon this town-oriented organization came apart under British pressure. With its failure, the Rer Mohamud once again resorted to non-compliance. Although they suffered from renewed British vigilance in patrolling the new grazing areas, the Rer Mohamud continued to enter Ogaden territory. Thus, at the end of the period the Somali still continued to resist any British efforts to control their movement.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In the precolonial and colonial periods the Somali, influenced by the interrelated factors of trade and pastoralism, expanded into northern Kenya. During the former era, Somali peoples vied with other Africans for control of the vast area stretching between the Tana and the Juba. They clashed with the Galla-speaking Orma and the Boran, the Rendille, the Samburu, agriculturalists such as the Pokomo, and the imperial forces of Menelik II. Although they accepted fighting as a way of life, the Somali modified their contacts with neighboring peoples through trade and clientage. In the precolonial period Somali camel caravans transferred goods from the interior to the Benaadir coast. The Somali relied on and cooperated with other peoples in this trade, and they functioned as traders, caravaners, and financial agents. The Somali also utilized a clientage system for peacefully penetrating into non-Somali areas, and interacted with their neighbors

at different levels. In the 1890's and the early 1900's, therefore, the Somali dominated the area. Then they faced a new challenge in the form of British expansion. They saw their trade patterns upset by a new economy characterized by dukas and townships. But they were more successful in combatting British attempts to control their movements.

Somali pastoralism and livestock herding reflected environmental and commercial considerations. Dependent on livestock, the nomads constantly sought better supplies of water and pasturage. They moved their herds on the basis of the availability of such supplies, the presence of disease, and the types of animal that they herded--camels, cattle, sheep and goats. An important factor in their migrations was the concept of "precautionary hoarding." The Somali raised livestock not only for social prestige, but for the purpose of keeping herds large enough to sustain heavy losses during times of drought and epidemics. Furthermore, the Somali utilized livestock as a means of exchange for products such as cloth and grain which they did not produce. They viewed their animals in an economic

sense. For example, they traded "good" animals, such as female milk producers for valued goods such as guns, and paid taxes with those they considered to be less valuable such as steers. The Somali, therefore, followed a tendency to raise as many head of livestock as possible within the bounds of available water supplies and sufficient numbers of nomads to herd them.

Although they reacted to the constant environmental pressure, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Somali also faced other factors which contributed to their movement. Due to the expansion of Menelik II's empire, and its subsequent maladministration in southern Ethiopia, many Somali fled to Kenya. Others suffered from the migration caused by the rebellion of Mohamed Abdillé Hassan in northern Somaliland. Still more retreated to the interior as the Italians and the British appeared at the coast. Although some cooperated with the Europeans, many Somali resisted this intrusion.

By attempting to establish territorial control in Kenya, the Somali also exhibited political aspirations of

their own. Until he died in 1892, Abdi Ibrahim led large Ogaden expeditionary forces against the Boran and the Kore. The Mohamed Zubeir, in an attempt to gain control of the area from Afmadu to the Lorian, adopted large numbers of clients as they expanded into Kenya. Other Somali such as the Ajuran recognized the strength of the invading Eji and then of the Degodia, and in order to retain their rights in Boran territory also accepted shegats.

In spite of British efforts to control their movement, the Somali achieved substantial territorial gains at the expense of the Galla-speaking peoples. Some such as the Degodia insinuated themselves into the Ajuran-Boran alliance before attacking the Boran. The Mohamed Zubeir, on the other hand, waged a constant battle finally driving the Boran from the Wajir wells. Farther south the Telemugger impinged on the Orma along the Tana. Even when the British interfered by establishing the "Somali-Galla line," the Somali pushed forward until they drove the Boran out of Wajir altogether. Although the pressure on the Boran lessened after that date, the Somali continued to ignore

the existence of the "Somali-Galla line" as they also disregarded the artificiality of Kenya-Italian Somaliland border. Somali persistence not only led to an increase in population, but forced the British to give up any hope of removing the Somali from northern Kenya, or of halting migration without a substantial commitment of men and expenditure. As a result the Somali moved at will, motivated more by seasonal changes than by British rules and regulations.

The Somali influx also resulted in a struggle for control among themselves. On the Dawa the Degodia and the Gurre fought a number of battles resulting in the eventual establishment of a Degodia population in Mandera. Near Wajir the Mohamed Zubeir engaged in a major war against the Abd Wak which finally ended in a stalemate and a withdrawal of both groups from the Uaso. When the Aulihan filled this vacuum, these newcomers became embroiled in a dispute for the valuable camel raising territory in that area.

Until the 1940's the British normally refrained from attempts to control intra-clan movement. The British

acted more as advisors and focused enforcement on the "Somali-Galla line," and the Kenya-Italian Somaliland border. In the post-World War II years, however, the British instituted an experimental grazing control scheme in Wajir, hoping to eliminate the problem of overstocking and overgrazing. Instead they created another issue that led to legal and illegal maneuvers to overturn the scheme. Gradually the British implemented their plans although the Rer Mohamud Dekatch remained a problem. Thus throughout the period, although the British slowed Somali expansion, they failed to halt it.

Although they achieved moderate success in maintaining their migratory habits, the Somali were less fortunate in the sphere of trade. In the precolonial era the Somali engaged in varying degrees in trade. Camel caravans moved in the area encompassing southern Ethiopia, the Juba, the Wajir wells, the Tana, and the Benaadir coast. On the Juba the Gasr Gudda and the Gurre at Lugh controlled the commerce of the area. Lugh's dominance forced the Boran to look for an alternate route to the coast. But

farther south the Ogaden, who were not the professional traders the Gurre were, limited access to and from the coast. On the coast the Somali relied more on Indian and Arab traders. Farther in the interior the nomads involved themselves less in trade although they made occasional trips to the coast. But the combined activity of the Somali meant that they participated in all facets of the caravan trade as producers of goods such as livestock, ivory, myrrh, and orchella weed; as middlemen and transporters; as importers and exporters on the coast; as financial agents in Aden and Zanzibar; and finally, as consumers.

The imperial expansion of Italy, England, and Ethiopia disrupted precolonial trade patterns. The Italians gained control of the Benaadir and gradually worked their way to the Juba, taking control of the important Somali entrepot of Lugh. The Ethiopians conquered Borana and the Oddo, and established controls to prevent the flow of trade from their newly acquired territories. More important to the nomads in Jubaland and northern Kenya, the

British after attempting to establish themselves as the coast, entered the interior and restructured trade.

The British set up a new economy which resulted in the decline of the Somali camel caravan. Characterized by dukas, townships, cash, motorized transport, quarantines on livestock exports, and monopolistic state livestock purchasing agencies, the new economy altered the pre-existing commercial structure. The British encouraged alien ownership of shops, a reliance on downcountry Kenya for supplies, the growth of motor traffic, and the restriction of the livestock trade. Thus, they destroyed the basis of the camel caravan trade. At the same time they reduced the role of the Somali in that trade without providing alternative employment. The new economy reduced the Somali to a producer of livestock and a consumer of imported products.

The Somali exhibited an ambivalence to the new economy. On the whole they actively opposed the introduction of taxation, and once it appeared, many continued to avoid paying taxes. Most stayed away from townships and continued to pursue their nomadic existence. The Somali

also manifested tendencies toward adaptation. The Herti and the Tomals were among the most adaptable to a township way of life. Indeed outside of the NFD, the "alien" Somali adapted easily to a township existence and functioned as butchers, stock traders, shopowners, gun bearers, and even foremen on European ranches. Additionally, the nomads used the NFD towns as places to leave the poor, the aged, and the infirm. Most nomads also preferred to purchase goods in the NFD dukas rather than make the arduous journeys to the coast. As such they accepted minor changes in material culture by using such items as metal kitchenware and drinking tea. Furthermore some sought government employment, especially in the armed services. By the end of World War II some even became duka owners. Nevertheless, the towns remained the preserve of the Arabs, Indians, and "alien" Somali. As in the previous period, the majority of Somali remained nomads.

Thus during the period from 1892 to 1948 trade and pastoralism were important factors in Somali history. Of the two, pastoralism was more significant, certainly in


terms of stimulating Somali migration throughout the period. Pastoralism also led to Somali opposition to the British intrusion, whereas the alteration in trade caused no major resistance. The Somali lack of unity, and the pattern of ethnically oriented resistance, enabled the British to overcome fears of widespread uprisings, and to establish a new economy. The Somali maintained an ambivalent attitude toward towns and dukas, adapting only when it was to their advantage.

TABLE VI-I

MAJOR SOMALI GROUPS IN NORTHEASTERN KENYA

Darod	Ogaden	Abdalla Abd Wak Aulihan Habr Sulieman Maghabul Mohamed Zubeir
	Herti	Warsengeli Dolbahanta Mijertein
Hawiye	Degodia	Fai Gelibleh Jibraail Rer Mohamed Liban Rer Mohamud Dekatch
	Ajuran	Wagleh Welemoga
Pre-Hawiye	Gurre	Kuranyo Tuf


M.P. I




Numerical Key to TRIBAL FAMILIES

- 1 Darod (Ogaden Branch)
- 2 " (Mijertein Branch)
- 3 " (Other Branches)
- 4 Dir
- 5 Ishaak
- 6 Hawiya
- 7 " Associated Tribes
- 8 Rahanwein
- 9 Digil
- 10 Somali Arab
- 11 Negroid

MAP II




MAP III



MAP IV

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT



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Series F.O. 84 Slave Trade.

Series F.O. 369 Consular.

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Samboul Mohamed, June 1972, Garissa.
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Mohamed Made, June 1972, Habbaswein.
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Ali Daud, June 1972, Wajir.
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Adan Mohamed Liban, June 1972, El Wak.
Mohamed Jare, June 1972, El Wak.
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