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TRIBE AND ELECTIONS IN UGANDA

by

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An Acknowledgment

This thesis began and might well have stayed
A melange of phrase, word and line.
It's final completion owes much to the aid
Of Kautsky, Burnham, Le Vine.

The errors and failings that you will find here
I sadly acknowledge as mine;
The virtues, however, owe much to the care
Of Kautsky, Burnham, Le Vine.

Now that I've finished I offer a toast.
Join in. Raise up your stein:
To the best committee of which you could boast --
Kautsky, Burnham, Le Vine.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

It is the thesis of this study that while tribal al-
legiance was a determinant of electoral cleavage in Uganda
in the early 1960s, conflicts related to such allegiance
did not consistently generate high levels of political in-
volvement.

In the course of presenting evidence for this thesis
I will examine data from two national elections (1961 and
1962) held under British auspices prior to the declaration
of Ugandan independence in October 1962.

The general thesis that I shall advance consists of two
parts. I shall briefly discuss each in turn in this chapter
and elaborate upon them in more detail in later chapters.

The first part of the thesis asserts that, <u>given ade-
quate scope</u>, a tribal cleavage is likely to take precedence
over any alternative cleavage as the basis of electoral
conflict. The idea of "cleavage precedence" has been devel-
oped by E. E. Schattschneider. Cleavages, according to
Schattschneider, may be viewed as being in competition with
each other over which defines electoral conflict within a

society.[1] He suggests that when there are several alterna-
tive axes·of conflict within a community, each elite will
struggle to make salient that cleavage whose successful reso-
lution will enhance its own and its group's interests. It
is my contention that in Uganda, whenever possible, tribal
cleavages have transcended alternative sub-tribal (clan,
village, lineage, clientage) and pan-tribal (religious,
traditional-modern, left-right) cleavages and defined elec-
toral conflict in the society.

What do I mean by the qualification "whenever possible"
or "given adequate scope"? It is a critical part of the
thesis and requires a careful explanation. When Schatt-
schneider asserts that a cleavage pattern defines the poli-
tics of a society, such an assessment presupposes prior
agreement as to what is meant by the term "society." This
is not, however, always clear. Ostensibly "society" refers
to the locus of political action, primarily a geographical
expression, within which the conflict occurs, but this can
be ambiguous. What indeed is the geographical context, or
"arena" of an electoral conflict--the country as a whole,
or the electoral constituency in which the conflict finds
institutional expression?

Consider the classic case: Lilliput, after a colonial

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[1] E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), especially chapter
four, "The Displacement of Politics," pp. 62 ff.

period and modernizing revolution, has been split into five electoral constituencies. But it remains divided by that awesome religious conflict described by Lemuel Gulliver nearly three centuries ago: Big-Endians vs. Little-Endians.[2] The distribution of the Big-Endians (who insist it is proper to break an egg at the big end) and the Little-Endians (who believe with equal fervor in the propriety of breaking the other end) is as follows within the five different constituencies (in percentages):

Constituency	Big-Endians	Little-Endians
1	95%	05%
2	60	40
3	10	90
4	85	15
5	45	55

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[2] Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 48 and 49:

> It is allowed on all hands that the primitive way of breaking eggs before we eat them was upon the larger end: but his present Majesty's grandfather, while he was a boy, going to eat an egg, and breaking it according to the ancient practice, happened to cut one of his fingers. Whereupon the Emperor his father published an edict, commanding all his subjects, upon great penalties, to break the smaller end of their eggs. . . .It is computed that eleven thousand persons have, at several times, suffered death rather than submit to break their eggs at the smaller end. Many hundred large volumes have been published upon this controversy: but the books of the Big-Endians have been long forbidden, and the whole party rendered incapable by law of holding employments.

And, for a similarly classical discussion of "modernizing revolutions" see: John H. Kautsky, The Political Consequences of Modernization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972).

Were the arena of conflict the entire society we would ex-
pect the electoral results in each constituency to roughly
parallel the above distribution. Thus each contest would
be between Big-Endians and Little-Endians. However if the
effective arena of conflict is the constituency, then there
would be electoral conflict between the Big-Endians and the
Little-Endians in only two constituencies, number two and
five, for only in these constituencies is the relative
strength of both sides of the cleavage large enough to gen-
erate genuine competition. In the other constituencies
alternative cleavages would be activated. That is to say
when the dimension of the conflict is the constituency, the
deciding factor as to whether or not a given conflict is
manifest is whether or not an effective opposition can be
mounted--that is, whether the numerically smaller side of
that cleavage is of sufficient size to sustain a viable op-
position. (In either case the overall result would probably
be the same. A Big-Endian wins in 1, 2, and 4; a Little-
Endian in 3 and 5. For it is precisely because a conflict
within the majority group could not result in a member of the
minority group winning the election that such a conflict is
permitted.)

In Uganda, I submit, the constituency is the "dimen-
sion of electoral conflict," and therefore we can expect
a tribal cleavage to express itself only in the event that
the constituency is relatively evenly divided between two

or more tribes.[3] In that event, and in that event only,
tribal cleavage will define the conflict.

Having clarified the "qualification," let us now ex-
amine the basis upon which one can make the claim that tribal
conflict will take precedence over other possible cleavages.

From the perspective of an elite who seeks position
and influence through electoral politics that cleavage is
most attractive that (a) places them on a potentially win-
ning side and (b) provides them with a relatively influential
position on that "side."[4] In order that the first of these

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[3]The essentially local character of political agitation
during the 1950s is acknowledged by nearly all students of
the period. See especially D. A. Low, Political Parties in
Uganda 1949-62 (London: The Athlone Press, 1962), pp. 33 ff.
The proof, however, of the assertion that electoral cleav-
ages were opened at the constituency level must stand or
fall with the analysis of these elections in Chapter Four.

[4]See again Schattschneider, op. cit., p. 68: "He who
determines what politics is about runs the country. . . ."
He seeks, that is, to organize politics around a cleavage
that places him on the winning side. It stands to reason
that he seeks also membership on a winning team that will
grant him status and provide him with rewards. Such an anal-
ysis, of course, presupposes that elections are contested by
ambitious men who seek elective office and political power
for reasons quite apart from the rationalizations attending
the conflicts that brought them to office. In some respects
this argument is similar to that put forward by Anthony
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and
Row, 1957), pp. 28 ff., but where Downs views contestants
for elective office as pursuing only personal goals ("parties
formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win
elections in order to formulate policies") such a purist
position is unnecessary for the substantiation of the Schatt-
schneider thesis. The contestant may have non-personal
goals, may represent (with respect to future plans) broad
interests, and remain capable of divorcing these interests
from the tactical needs of a winning electoral coalition.

two conditions be met, their side of the cleavage must not
only have a potentially large base of support, but they must
have the capacity to mobilize that support. With respect
to the second condition, the elite in question must have
either traditional standing within the cleavage or the skills
needed by those with traditional standing.

Thus an electorally-oriented elite will support a
cleavage, i.e. seek to define politics along an axis, that
(1) is a cleavage in which they have traditional standing
or (2) is a cleavage in which those that have traditional
standing lack certain necessary skills, and (3) provides a
potential for majoritarian mass mobilization for "their"
side, and (4) holds out hope that the process of mobiliza-
tion will be "easy," i.e. of low cost. A tribal cleavage
pattern admirably fulfills each of these criteria. Elites
who have traditional standing within the tribe may lack
some of the skills necessary for electoral politics and
would need to recruit allies from among the "modernizers"
in the society. Furthermore, informal structures of tribal
authority and communications provide advantages for mobili-
zation, and, to the extent that the political arena is

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That is, he chooses to support a cleavage that may be ir-
relevant to the interests that he will seek to serve after
election if this cleavage will insure him electoral victory,
a necessary prerequisite for any personal post-election
agenda.

viewed as a setting where scarce resources are distributed to the deserving, the victory of one's tribe can be promoted as a prerequisite to the distribution of such goods as loans, scholarships, wells, paving, and improvements in medical, education, police, and other services.[5] Finally, tribal membership encompasses most members of the society and hence the scope of possible mobilization extends to the very edge of the total population of the area.

The second basic thesis of this study is that intertribal cleavages will not consistently generate higher levels of partisan activity than will be generated by other cleavages.[6] Electoral contests based on tribal cleavages, that is to say, will be no more intense than electoral contests based upon alternative cleavages. The nub of this

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[5]There is little doubt that these are the "scarce resources" of the underdeveloped society. See the more extended discussion of the point in Chapter Four.

[6]There is an important distinction implicit in this thesis that should be clearly stated. I refer to "partisan activity" and later to "partisan electoral mobilization," not "general electoral mobilization." General mobilization reflects, among other things, governmental activity, the level of economic development of a region and the civic consciousness of the population. Partisan electoral mobilization is that portion of general electoral mobilization that can be attributed to (a) the activity of elites on the behalf of candidates and (b) the responsiveness of the electorate to these specifically partisan appeals. That is, we are describing as "partisan mobilization" the extent of electoral "interest" engendered by a particular cleavage, holding constant as best we can the level of participation that can be attributed to non-partisan factors, that is, the level that would have occurred had Tweedledee and Tweedledum been the candidates.

position is the supposition that while elites may, indeed, define the terms of political conflict and, indeed, choose the cleavage that will structure elective choices, they cannot invest this choice with more personal meaning than it already has for the electorate. Tribe may be, from the standpoint of elites, the most convenient basis, wherever possible, for electoral politics; that does not make it invariably a more "important" conflict from the standpoint of the mass electorate. Thus while tribe may take precedence over other cleavages in _defining_ political conflict in certain settings, as elites choose to do battle on this ground, it cannot be expected generally to mobilize a larger (or even as large a) proportion of the population than alternative sub-tribal cleavages that surface where tribe is a manifestly unsuited basis for partisan conflict (i.e. in uni-tribal constituencies).

The reason for this is, I believe, that the importance that attaches to tribal allegiance varies both within and across tribes. For instance, it is possible to align tribes along the continuum suggested by David Apter; placing at one end tribes that ritualize nearly all aspects of human behavior and at the other end tribes that treat virtually all aspects of social life as instrumental elements serving a narrow central core of tribal identity. At the former

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[7]David E. Apter, "The Role of Traditionalism in the Political Modernization of Ghana and Uganda," _World Politics_, XII, No. 1 (October, 1960), 45-68.

end, a "modern" assault upon any custom is a direct assault upon the integrity of the tribe; at the other extreme, almost all new modes of life can be incorporated--new habits, activities, functions--without endangering the tribal nexus, without severing a man from his tribe. Along the continuum are many possible gradations, dependent in each case upon the degree to which the "essence" of a given "tribe" resides in ritual acts of the common life or in a few ultimate commitments of the people. Thus within some tribes numerous persons lose their tribal identity as technology, Christianity, and the symbols and artifacts of European culture crush the traditional nexus that binds the individual in loyalty to his tribe. A political party that appeals to such individuals on the basis of tribe will not touch deep well-springs; the appeal will fall upon deaf, even hostile ears. However, similar appeals addressed to men and women whose tribal center of allegiance has remained intact (whether because they have not been exposed to modernizing pressures or because their tribal loyalty cannot be eroded by incremental change) will evoke strong responses. This is especially true when an election seems to threaten the very safety or existence of the tribe itself.

Thus from Apter's perspective, we might expect tribally-based electoral appeals on some occasions to elicit strong support and intensive mobilization and on other occasions to fall on stony ground. And it is for this reason that we can

say that tribal conflicts will not consistently generate
greater levels of mobilization than will alternative cleav-
ages.

Recently some of the assumptions that underlie the
Apter model have been questioned. To the extent that these
questions do force a revision or adaptation of the Apter
approach, however, the new formulations reinforce rather than
weaken this thesis (that tribal cleavages are not invari-
ably more intense than non-tribal cleavages).

The questionable assumptions associated with the Apter
thesis are that "modern identities" invariably replace
"traditional identities" and that modern roles relative to
traditional roles are of a different kind or oder. That is
to say that some students of African society doubt that it
is necessary or useful to view traditional identity and
modern identity as antipodal. Melson and Wolpe, for in-
stance, assume that several different communal identities
can coexist and can be, in an important sense, coequal.[8]
They argue that as old loyalties change, and old habits are
modified, such learning may transform, but not necessarily
destroy, the former self. The shell is not always left be-
hind, the skin is not always sloughed. Instead a new-in-

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[8]Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the
Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," Ameri-
can Political Science Review, LXIV, No. 4 (December 1970),
1112-1130. They provide an excellent review of the litera-
ture which dissents from that viewing African politics in
the perspective of a simple traditional-modern dichotomy.

tegument may gradually replace the old, bearing lineaments
of the past, but styled to weather new occasions. Thus, in
new urban areas, as immigrants seek membership in a company
of people--usually their co-ethnics--that can provide both
mutual assistance and companionship, tribal ties are os-
tensibly renewed. Yet, in the process, the meaning of tribal
association is perceptibly altered. New tribal organizations
replace the old, and, insofar as they are "modern" affilia-
tions, coexist with such other "functional" memberships
(of the work-place, church, trade union, etc.) as weld the
individual to new centers of power, control and opportunity.
As a result tribe, while remaining a salient component of
identity and a source of emotional security, ceases to exert
sole dominion over a man's life.

As I stated above, such a formulation need not weaken the
central thesis of this section that inter-tribal conflicts
are not invariably any more intense than sub-tribal or super-
tribal conflicts. For, not only does Wolpe and Melson's
formulation view "tribal" conflict as similar to non-tribal
conflicts, and hence not productive of a different order of
intensity, but their formulation also leaves much of Apter's
position intact. Indeed these two positions, Melson and
Wolpe's and Apter's, are, for my purposes, entirely compatible.
Accepting Apter's perspective, we establish grounds for ex-
pecting that members of different tribes exposed to the same
degree of modernization will display variable loyalty to

tribe and, hence, variable patterns of support for tribally-based partisan appeals. Moreover, we are able to demonstrate that, under variable levels of modernizing experience, members of tribes similar in their position with respect to Apter's continuum will display variable loyalty to the tribe and, hence, variable patterns of support for tribally-based political structures. Turning to Wolpe and Melson, we find the additional idea that under certain circumstances a new tribal identity can replace the old tribal identity. That is, let us read Wolpe and Melson to say that specific conditions may encourage an African with a weakened or discarded tribal identity to prize membership in a new entity that bears the same name as the traditional entity (the tribe), but is substantially different in its substance, form, and the nature of his membership within it.

How is this new tribal membership relevant to our concern over variable mass responses to electoral appeals based upon tribe? It has, I believe, central relevance. The tribal membership that Melson describes is not an exclusive identity. It is one of a multiple set of functional identities, embracing other communal identities, as well as class and occupational identities. Its strength will vary with respect to its particular salience within the life of an individual, and this salience will vary with respect to a host of variable life experiences. Thus, appeals based upon tribe

will have highly variable individual impact when addressed
to the "new tribalist." And just as surely, from Apter's
perspective, these appeals will have variable impact when
addressed to a variable mix of "old tribalists" and Africans
with weak or discarded tribal identities.

There is, however, yet a further consideration that
might be profitably taken into account in explaining this.
thesis. While both of the above formulations, Apter's and
Wolpe and Melson's, suggest that the variable character of
an individual's response to "tribal" appeals is a conse-
quence of his varying dislocation from the traditional com-
munity, an African's ties with his "tribe" are not "unset-
tled" only as a result of the pressure of modern modes of
existence. Even in "undisturbed" settings tribe has had a
variable meaning for the African. For tribe was not the
only traditional community that raised deep emotional re-
sponses and tapped well-springs of human emotion. In some
areas in Africa the tribe was a remote and abstract entity,
in part a creation of Western ethnographers. First exper-
ienced as a set of common behaviors (a tribe fought and
lived and worshiped together) and later codified as a lin-
guistic phenomenon (a tribe spoke a mutually intelligible
language), tribe, as an anthropological definition, encom-
passed contradictory elements. The people of several con-
tiguous villages, speaking mutually intelligible dialects
of the same language did not invariably consider themselves

separate parts of the same body. In point of fact, the
dominant locus of corporate identity might have been the
village, the lineage or the clan. Tribe, as defined by
Western ethnographers and respected by Western administra-
tors, might have been simply the context in which conflicts
between constituent elements (village, lineage or clan)
were waged. A given land form might have more accurately
defined a "people"--i.e., a dry portion of land surrounded
by swampy land or lakes and rivers, where villages sheltered
together for common occasions and needs; a community rein-
forced rather than weakened by the presence of neighbors on
other "islands" who spoke the same language and shared the
same culture but whose intent was normally hostile and whose
actions were often perceived as threatening. For such
peoples, tribe was at best an approximation of the primordial
community and a convenient approach to problems of establish-
ing boundaries of social interaction; at worst, a meaning-
less linguistic distinction; or, on middle ground, it was
simply a secondary community, of major but not ultimate im-
portance. In a given instance then, an appeal based upon
tribal loyalty would have achieved a variable effect. It
would not invariably have reaped a higher level of partisan
participation than an appeal based upon another level of
ethnic loyalty. Thus even apart from the impact of modern-
izing forces there is a basis for assuming that appeals
addressed to "fellow tribesmen" will have an uneven effect

and little evidence for assuming that tribally based elec-
toral appeals would necessarily elicit a stronger response
than appeals made to other loyalties or identities.

Now let me attempt to sharpen these two propositions
and state them in a form that will allow for empirical
tests. Proposition One: In tribally heterogeneous con-
stituencies the partisan vote will mirror a constituency's
tribal composition. That is to say, the relative size of
the majority partisan vote will correspond to the relative
size of the majority tribe, and the relative size of the
combined votes for the losing candidates will correspond to
the combined relative size of secondary tribes in the con-
stituency. In order to test this proposition it will be
necessary to devise measures that express both the tribal
composition of the constituency and partisan composition of
the vote. It will also be necessary to determine the pre-
cise set of constituencies that are "tribally heterogeneous."

Proposition Two: In those constituencies where elec-
tions are contested by tribal coalitions (that is, in those
constituencies with a tribally-based electoral cleavage),
electoral mobilization directly attributable to the activity
of partisan elites and the responsiveness of a partisan
electorate will be no greater than in those constituencies
where electoral cleavages are non-tribal. As the extent of
partisan mobilization is strongly influenced by the degree
of partisan balance (or partisan competition), we must con-

trol for this third factor in any test of the proposition since the subset of constituencies that are tribally heterogeneous may include a disproportionate number of constituencies where the election is close. Taking this into account we can restate the proposition in the following manner: <u>at any given level of partisan balance the nature of the electoral cleavage (whether it is tribally based or non-tribally based) does not appreciably affect the degree of partisan mobilization.</u>

In order that this proposition be tested it will be necessary to devise the following additional measures:

1. a measure for partisan mobilization;

2. a measure for partisan balance;

3. a determination as to whether or not the electoral contest in a given constituency is tribally based.

Having established two propositions that will test the basic thesis of this study and having specified the measures that are necessary for testing these propositions, it remains for me to outline the strategy by which I shall present and test the propositions in this study:

<u>Chapter Two</u>: The second chapter of this study will describe the country of Uganda--its tribal divisions, history and political system; culminating with a brief description of the 1961 and 1962 elections.

<u>Chapter Three</u>: The third chapter will derive the measures necessary for an empirical test of the two propo-

sitions. In this chapter I will discuss the theory behind the determination of measures for partisan balance, tribal heterogeneity, and partisan mobilization and will describe the process by which each set of measures was obtained. This chapter will conclude with both a graphic and tabular presentation of the data sets.

Chapters Four and Five: The fourth chapter will present an empirical test of the first proposition and the fifth chapter, an empirical test of the second proposition.

Chapter Six: The sixth chapter is a concluding statement: an attempt to state clearly and evaluate critically the findings of this study and to suggest further related research problems.

CHAPTER TWO

UGANDA: HISTORY AND SOCIETY

Cleavage Patterns and Early History

The table-top plateau tilting down and northward from
Lake Victoria has been a crossroads of travel and settle-
ment. At the time of British intrusion, roughly the last
quarter of the 19th century and the early decades of the
20th, Uganda sheltered many peoples and many histories.[1]
Some had settled in quasi-permanent villages and kingdoms;
others were still aggressively probing, following the traces
of earlier movements. On the lush quasi-tropical shores of
Lake Victoria artisan-farmers peopled centrally governed
states; in the East, nomadic herdsmen shifted across dry

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[1]Virtually all general treatments of Uganda stress the
multi-tribal nature of the complex of peoples that inhabited
the area prior to the 20th century. For a general discussion
of the literature on the traditional peoples and cultures of
Uganda see Terence K. Hopkins, A Study Guide for Uganda,
African Studies Center, Boston University, November, 1969.
Two especially useful accounts of settlement patterns in
East Africa may be found in Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew
(eds.), History of East Africa, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1963): "The Peopling of the Interior of East Africa
by Its Modern Inhabitants," by G. W. B. Huntingford (pp. 58-
93) and "Discernible Developments in the Interior c. 1500-
1840," by Roland Oliver (pp. 169-211).

plains with the play of wet and dry seasons. Perhaps
nearly as many as five million people lived in the terri-
tory of Uganda at the turn of the century.

The political community, the locus of group-loyalty
and expression, was as small as the extended family and as
large as an extensively articulated state. For some peoples
kinship networks formed the basis for social life.[2] For
others the clan served as the focus of an effective politi-
cal community.[3] In other areas, pre-colonial military
structures, chiefdoms in Colin Leys' term, were important
intermediary forms between tribe and clan.[4] Still other
peoples had established social units based on the authority
of a ruling elite over a given territory.[5]

Students of traditional African societies have sought
to differentiate peoples primarily on the basis of language.
From such often arbitrary classification schemes have come

[2]Fred B. Burke, Local Government and Politics in Uganda
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964), p. 124.

[3]Burke, op. cit., p. 181 and Colin Leys, Politicians
and Policies (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967),
p. 15.

[4]Ibid., p. 16.

[5]Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Century of
Political Evolution Among the Basoga of Uganda (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965), pp. 25 ff. [See also
the general ethnographic literature on Bantu Kingdoms, such
as Lloyd A. Fallers, The Eastern Lacustrine Bantu and Brian
K. Taylor, The Western Lacustrine Bantu, both parts of
Daryll Ford, ed. (London: International African Institute,
1960 [Fallers] and 1962 [Taylor]).]

our sense of tribe and tribal boundary; in Uganda as many
as thirty-one separate tribes were distinguished, the largest
no more than 20 percent of the total, across four main
language families. Within the Protectorate, at the moment
of British intrusion, the territorial boundaries of these
entities were poorly defined. There was limited cohesion
within many groups.[6] Yet nearly every "tribe" obtained a
viable identity during the colonial period as its existence
was first recognized and then normalized by British over-
rule.[7]

This consequence was a logical outgrowth of British
policy, the ruling ideology of which was the theory of "in-
direct rule."[8] Viewing a tribe as a proto-state, a nation-

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[6]Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy, op. cit., pp. 21 ff.

[7]The precise meaning of these distinctions, however,
has remained variable. To share a common tongue may imply
common values and purposes; it may, however, just as easily
provide a turbulent setting for intra-group hostility. Our
own--European and North American--history, often viewed as
the clash or insurgency of linguistically-based ethnic
nationalisms, is of limited help as we seek to understand
the role of tribe in Uganda. That our heroes were national
leaders opposing, in the name of ethnic communities, dy-
nastic, religious, or ideological hegemonies, may have par-
tially blinded us to alternative scenarios in other socie-
ties. If, as in Uganda, intra-tribal groupings and loyalties
were paramount in many areas of the country, we might also
expect that intra-tribal conflicts were intense. Neverthe-
less, British colonial policy tended to emphasize the sep-
arate nature and identity of tribal units.

[8]For a useful discussion of the policy of indirect rule
in Africa with specific reference to colonial rule in Uganda,
see chapter seven (pp. 163-178) and subsequent chapters in
D. A. Low and R. C. Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule:
1900-1955 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

ality in the process of evolving toward defined boundaries,
the proponents of indirect rule valued the elaboration of
political roles within the linguistic unit and the develop-
ment of a specific traditionality-rooted political culture.
They thus sought to strengthen tribal consciousness and to
develop concrete structures of tribal life and expression.
Out of such respect for indirect rule the British government
created within Uganda administrative units that mirrored as
much as possible the diversity of tribal life and were in-
tended to "develop" tribally-based political structures.
The largest "tribes" were made coterminous with districts,
the smaller with counties within districts. See Map I.
The largest tribe in Uganda, the Buganda, comprised four
districts and had a separate "kingdom" government, pro-
tected by express agreements with the British government.

And yet these procedures did not always accomplish their
expressed aim: to inflate and sustain tribal communities.
The linch-pin of the actual governing system was as much the
sub-county as it was the tribally based district, and sub-
counties were almost always divisions within tribally homo-
geneous areas. The sub-county thus provided a forum from
which locally-based, intra-tribal hostilities could be in-
cubated and expressed. As the British government sought
to develop representative political institutions at this
level in the 1940s and 1950s they developed into seedbeds

Map 1: Uganda: District Boundaries, 1962

UGANDA

With District Boundaries (1962)

(The Kingdom of Buganda is shaded)

of intra-tribal politics.[9]

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[9]Initially administrative boundaries were imposed upon
the enigmatic structures of clan and lineage, of age groups
and village alliances, by the inspired improvisation of both
British officers and their African agents. Burke and Fallers
(op. cit.) suggest that these boundaries were drawn where
possible to correspond to preexisting structures to the ex-
tent that these structures were comprehended by early admin-
istrators and amenable to a fixed location in space. Yet
the early administrator was partial to administrative hier-
archies such as characterized the Bantu Kingdoms, and hence
more often than not did violence to traditional institutions
in an effort to raise hybrid approximations of either British
or Bantu Kingdom models.

The sub-county, then, as it was promulgated followed
only in part natural land forms or traditional usage. In
large part its character was subservient to the projected
needs of the colonial administration. In Teso, sub-counties
initially corresponded to the locale of forts thrown up by
Kakungura as he subjugated the Iteso on behalf of the Brit-
ish. In Busoga major chiefdoms, within the small tradi-
tional kingdoms of the District, were designated sub-counties
(Fallers, op. cit., pp. 146 and 147). In the County of
Budama the sub-counties roughly correspond to areas formerly
ruled by the lieutenants of a prominent leader of the Padhola
who created an embryonic paramountcy in that area at the
turn of the century (Burke, op. cit., p. 197). In other
parts of Bukedi District sub-county administration was re-
lated to "the coincidence of area and extensive kinship
organization" (Ibid., p. 182).

Notwithstanding these differences in origin, throughout
the country the subcounty became an extension of county ad-
ministration, with between seven to ten thousand people, its
size and number reflecting in part the number of people in
an area and in part the size of the district in which it is
imbedded.

In Uganda the subcounty is more often than not the
locus of the interaction between processes of central direc-
tion and expressions of local petition, on the one hand a
prism diffracting central government policy into comprehen-
sible directives, on the other, a forum for the grievances
and curiosities of the villager (Burke, op. cit., p. 54).
The subcounty chief was, during the colonial period, a civil
servant, pensionable, carefully recruited, periodically
evaluated and a candidate for advancement to the office of
County Chief. Tax registers were based at the subcounty
headquarters. The lowest level official court of the pro-
tectorate judicial system was at the subcounty level. The

And as the elaboration and political development of sub-
counties provided the structure for the expression of intra-
tribal hostilities, the district government, its bureaucracy,
councils and committees, provided the arena in which such
oppositions were aired and contested. Moreover, the iso-
lation of the districts from each other and the lack of
national structures for inter-district (i.e. inter-tribal)
indigenous politics tended to preclude effective inter-
tribal hostility. (The nationally-based legislative body,
the Legislative Council, was until the middle 1940s a forum
for British residents and officials excluding African mem-
bers.) Thus, as Low points out, the 1930s and 1940s saw

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subcounty was an extremely important administrative division,
a very tangible extension of Protectorate authority. But
it was not, as Burke insists, at the same time a government
distant from the concerns and life of villagers: "The im-
portance of local government in the daily lives of the
people can hardly be overemphasized" (Burke, op. cit., p.
53). Indeed, the Central government of the Protectorate,
through the subcounty administration, affected the lives
of the people in many ways: regulating personal behavior,
challenging customs, taking production surpluses in taxes;
and its government was the major wage-employer in many areas.
   While, however, the administration of the subcounty
was an extension of the central government, the subcounty
council was more an expression of local interests. Since
the 1940s local councils have been in operation at the
parish, subcounty, county and district levels in most areas
of the country. While the county and district councils
were in the main until the eve of independence, representa-
tive of the official hierarchy, and the parish council so
informal as to be in essence a town meeting of interested
villagers, sub-county councils were often articulate rep-
resentational bodies (Fallers, op. cit., p. 186).

the growth of intra-tribal politics in Uganda.[10]

The significance of these developments, however, went largely unnoticed by scholars and administrators. Indeed the convenient, reassuring rhetoric of tribalism[11] seemed confirmed in the continuing mutual hostility of several tribes. During the years following the imposition of British overrule, two important inter-tribal conflicts, abetted and structured by British governance, continued to cast long shadows across the society.

The first of these conflicts was between the Buganda and the Bunyoro--two highly structured "imperial" collectivities ("kingdoms") that had been engaged is a see-saw battle for supremacy prior to British intrusion. The nature of this conflict was altered by British intervention

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[10]D. A. Low, _Political Parties in Uganda, 1959-1962_, Institute of Commonwealth Studies; Commonwealth Papers, No. 8 (London: Athlone Press, 1962), pp. 33 and 34:
> . . . in Busoga in 1955 there was rioting because a chief of one religion was appointed county chief of an administrative county which was felt to be the preserve of another religion. Through the 1950s there was acute rivalry between different groups in Ankole. In Bugisu there was continuing agitation surrounding its powerful Coffee Growers Cooperative Union. There was acute conflict in Teso between its two major halves--the Iseera and the Ngoratok. And in January 1960 there was rioting in both Bukedi and Bugisu Districts _inter alia_ against local chiefs.

[11]What else to "save" Africans from and hence legitimize colonial rule? See the reference to Furnivall (J. S. Furnivall, _Netherlands India_ (Cambridge: The University Press, 1939) in Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle, _Politics in Plural Societies_ (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill, 1972), pp. 11 and 12.

on the side of the Buganda. The damage and humiliation thus
inflicted upon the Bunyoro--loss of major territory, destruc-
tion of a traditional ruling elite, and subjugation to for-
eign rule--altered the nature of the conflict. Henceforth
the Buganda and Bunyoro eyed each other as deadly enemies.[12]

And it was not only the Bunyoro that viewed the Buganda
as enemies. Bugandan agents had been used by the British
in their efforts to subjugate several Northern tribes.
The abuses, real or imagined, of these alien rulers were
long remembered by the Northern tribes.[13] In addition, as
the Buganda benefited from their privileged location near
the centers of British rule and economic life, their sense
of superiority and separateness grew. As the people of
Buganda achieved more wealth, greater sophistication in
European ways, and higher educational attainments than other
tribes, it was assumed routinely by the Baganda that it was
the kingdom's destiny to lead and rule all Ugandan peoples.
This generated resentment and mistrust on the part of other

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[12]The focus of this conflict was the unresolved issue
of which tribe or kingdom should "rule" several counties
that had traditionally been under the rule of Bunyoro (be-
fore the wars of the late 19th century) and which had been
awarded to Buganda upon the conclusion of these wars. These
counties were known to the Bunyoro as the "Lost Counties."
See for a background discussion of this conflict: Commis-
sion of the Privy Councillors on a Dispute between Buganda
and Bunyoro (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office,
1952), the Molson Report.

[13]See T. K. Hopkins, "Politics in Uganda: the Buganda
Question," in Butler and Castagno, eds., Boston University
Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics (New York:
Praeger, 1967), pp. 251-288.

peoples, especially those "Northern tribes" outside the
major linguistic family that encompassed nearly all the
Southern shore-line tribes (Bantu).[14]

As these two inter-tribal conflicts (the Buganda vs.
the Bunyoro and the Buganda vs. Northern tribes) remained
a focus of national political conflict within the society,
they obscured (to the outside observer) the intra-tribal
nature of conflict in many areas of the country by strength-
ening stereotypes about the preeminence of inter-tribal con-
flict.

Still another historical reality confounds a simple
rendering of conflict patterns during the colonial period.
The missionaries of three major movements sought converts
in Uganda. Catholic, Protestant and Muslim all competed
with and/or complemented traditional beliefs and aspira-
tions. Their adherents sought special positions, wealth
and power within the political and social orders. Presum-
ing that the kingdom of God might be no worse served by the
rich and the powerful than by the poor and humble, converts
sought political favors, organized partisan cliques, and
curried special privileges.[15]

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[14]Ibid.

[15]Any general treatment of the history and society of
Uganda will provide basic information as to the nature and
extent of religious rivalry and factionalism in Uganda.
Particularly useful are David Apter, The Political Kingdom
in Uganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961);

Such religious cleavages, so important to an understanding of the intra-district politics of the 1940s and 1950s, probably have further obscured the essentially ethnic but intra-tribal nature of political cleavage in Uganda. This is because religious conflict, viewed as an independent variable, has been trumpeted as the sole explanation of all non-tribal conflict, of all intra-tribal politics.[16] Viewed as a cross-cutting national cleavage, it not only detracted attention from its own local nexus of intra-tribal conflict, but it obscured the question of the relationship between religious affiliation and sub-tribal partisan cleavage. Is it not likely--though little documentary evidence can be found either pro or con--that religious affiliation followed the lines of least resistance, that missionaries recruited along the fault lines of traditional groupings--age groups, lineage groups, class, villages, etc.? If so, then religious rivalry may well be viewed not as crosscutting tribal or even sub-tribal ethnic cleavages, but as complementing

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D. A. Low, Political Parties in Uganda 1949-1962, op. cit., and F. B. Welbourn, Religion and Politics in Uganda (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1965), especially chapter two and three.

[16]"Ethnic and religious politics, in sum, dominate Uganda's voting patterns." Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin, "Uganda," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 384.

and reinforcing such traditional conflicts.[17] Were this the
case, it might well follow that contemporary "religious"
differences are but a surface manifestation of clan, village,
or lineage conflicts. In any case, it cannot be simply
assumed that religious differences explain that conflict
"left over" after ethnic, i.e. inter-tribal, differences
are accounted for.

Such was the background against which British-sponsored
economic change and administrative activity must be viewed.
In the 1920s and 1930s Britain consolidated its fragile hold
on Uganda, chose to discourage European settlers, developed
marketing arrangements and production assistance for several
cash crops (coffee and cotton), protected missionary ad-
vances, encouraged an Indian middle-class to settle and
develop processing and distributing capacities, built roads
and railheads.[18] All seemed in order. Then a second major
war, events in other lands, a new rhetoric, a new day, and
all was again in movement. With much baggage, with an un-
certain train-crew, Uganda lurched out of a quiet station

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[17] Rothchild and Rogin hint at this possibility without
attempting to follow up its implications: "In some districts
religious factionalism is simply the continuation of tradi-
tional intratribal conflict under a new label." Ibid., p.
381.

[18] For a detailed, if somewhat ponderous, account of
these years see Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958) and Low and
Pratt, op. cit., and Low and Pratt, op. cit.

toward a new destination: independence.

In the beginning, however, political changes were few and the post-war society resembled the slow movement, the cautious administration of the inter-war years. The first Africans took their seats as unofficial members in the Uganda Legislative Council of 1945, a belated accommodation to African aspirations, reflecting the low priority the colonial government had placed on "political" reform during the inter-war years.[19] (There had been European and Asian

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[19]This position of the colonial government during the 1930s and early 1940s might best be understood as the consequence of two primary assumptions of British colonial policy that underly the specific policies and actions of two Uganda Governors: Sir Phillip Mitchell, 1935-1940, and Sir Charles Dundas, 1940-1944. The first assumption was that "British overrule would continue for a very long time." (Low and Pratt, op. cit., p. 262) The second, that throughout this period Protectorate influence would remain capable of imposing its will on the country with respect to "major" questions. Based on these two premises a policy evolved that encouraged the development and strengthening of both central authority and local (tribal) authority without providing the latter authority with a role in the formulation and execution of Protectorate policy. For it was assumed that the emerging tribal authorities would continue to accept Protectorate advice and that they would "eventually" be assimilated into a national political system. Indeed Mitchell, and especially Dundas, removed Protectorate officials from the close supervision of Buganda government affairs, encouraged internal reforms of the Buganda policy, while asserting the right of Protectorate overrule and laying the foundation for Protectorate wide economic growth. (Mitchell initiated new capital development plans, as the economic depression of the early 1930s gave way to relative prosperity. Such development, however, tended to concentrate on the "rehabilitation of existing services" (Ingham, op. cit., p. 210), i.e. to the repair and strengthening of Protectorate resources and institutions (Ibid., pp. 209-212). In essence the policy followed by the Mitchell government was contradictory: to strengthen the authority of the central government and to

unofficial members since 1921.)[20]   At first the post-war
policy of the colonial administration seemed consonant with
this tradition.   While a new commitment to economic develop-
ment and the eventual transition to independence implied
the need to initiate political change, it was assumed "ade-
quate" time for gradual reform existed.   It was also assumed
that self-government would not occur immediately and that
therefore a crash program to involve Africans with the for-

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encourage local autonomy.   However, in terms of the two
assumptions described above, such an emphasis on central
development and tribal autonomy were viewed as complementary.
The policy of Mitchell and his successor Dundas, to strength-
en both the "advisory functions of the Protectorate govern-
ment" and "independent activity of the Buganda government"
(Apter, op. cit., p. 211), visualized the development of a
strong, efficient central authority that could provide aid
and advice to local tribal authorities.   In turn these
authorities were expected freely to choose, heed and imple-
ment that advice and assistance.   Hence African participa-
tion was, in this view, secured at the local level and was
unnecessary either from a moral or a practical view, at the
level of central government.   See, with reference to the
above discussion, Low and Pratt, op. cit., pp. 260-262 (es-
pecially the last paragraph) and pp. 317-318; also Ingham,
op. cit., pp. 292 ff. and Apter, op. cit., pp. 208 ff.

[20]It was not until the early 1940s, however, that a
Uganda administration was willing to view such participation
as "representative" of communal interests.   Before then un-
official participation had been viewed as providing the
government with wise advice from men especially qualified
to provide the government with insight and knowledge.   In-
deed the Dundas government, in accepting the representative
concept only in principle and refusing to appoint additional
communal representatives, may have prevented European and
Asian communities in Uganda from viewing the Legislative
Council as their special preserve (as in Kenya where eventual
transfer of power within the Legislative Council to Africans
was complicated with questions of communal representation
and voter qualification).   However, as we shall see, such
questions were not entirely avoided.

mation and administration of policy was unnecessary.[21]   By
1950 there were eight African unofficial members on the
Legislative Council.

Buganda-Protectorate Conflict

The arrival in 1953 of a new governor, Sir Andrew
Cohen, signaled a new era. Cohen was expressly concerned
with questions of political change and "development." Un-
like previous governors, Sir Andrew was not a product of
long service within the colonial administration of African
territories. Under the post-war Labour government, he had
risen to the position of Head of the African Division of the
Colonial Office and was associated with post-war political
developments in the Gold Coast. As Governor of Uganda he
acted immediately to introduce his own plans for political
reform. Believing that it was urgently necessary to as-
sociate Africans with the formulation and implementation
of government policy at all levels, and being especially
concerned that Uganda not fracture into several rival tribal
states, he sought to establish significant African partici-

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[21]The reality was more complex than this implies. The
time dimensions that conditioned the historical and social
sense of colonial administrators had been foreshortened.
Independence at all deliberate speed was at least one of
the standing orders of the day. Nevertheless there were
wide differences of opinion as to the desired pace of change.
A new Labour government and the technical experts coopted
to work for economic and political change might foresee a
need for urgency. The colonial civil service, schooled in
the activities and thinking of the inter-war years and im-
bued with the values and perspectives of Tory paternalism,
took a more leisurely view.

pation at the center, the Protectorate level of govern-
ment.[22]

In March of 1953 a joint memorandum issued by the
governor and the King (or Kabaka) of Buganda included
the following paragraph:

> The Uganda Protectorate has been and will
> continue to be developed as a unitary state.
> The Kingdom of Buganda will continue to go
> forward under the government of His High-
> ness the Kabaka and play its part . . . as

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[22]Note the opinion of J. M. Lee, op. cit., p. 190, in
his study of British colonial policy, that the post-war
generation represented so brilliantly by Cohen himself was
particularly concerned with the problems of divisive plural-
ism:

> A great deal of the pre-war idealism to be
> found in the Labour party which laid stress
> on the benefits of international supervision,
> was diverted after the war into appealing for
> a positive policy in favour of the growth of
> nationalist movements which avoided communalism.

See also footnote to page 265 in Apter, op. cit. Also
D. A. Low, Buganda in Modern History (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1971), p. 105. The best statement of
the governor's intention is contained in Government Memoran-
dum on the Report by Mr. C. A. G. Wallis of an Inquiry into
the Uganda Protectorate (Entebbe, 1953), p. 3, which Low,
ibid., quotes (page 105) as follows: (Low quotes the pas-
sage in somewhat more detail.)

> . . . the future of Uganda must lie in a
> unitary form of central Government on par-
> liamentary lines covering the whole coun-
> try. . . . This can only be done by a central
> Government of the Protectorate as a whole with
> no part of the country dominating any other
> part but all working together for the good of
> the whole Protectorate and the progress of its
> people.

a Province and a component part of the Protectorate.[23]

This apparent accord was soon in question. The Lukiko (Buganda's legislative council) and the Kabaka progressively backed off from any undertaking to accept a role for Buganda as a constituent and hence subordinate part of an African state.[24]

In spite of Baganda opposition, Cohen proceeded with plans to build up African participation in central government policy-making. In a speech to the Legislative Council on August 11, 1953, he announced several reforms in that body, among them an increase in the number of Africans in the Council from 8 (out of 32) to 20 (out of 56) and an increase in the number of unofficial representatives from 16 to 28, of which, as in the past, one-half would be Africans to be elected by the African controlled District Councils. The Kabaka, however, refused to nominate members to the new Legislative Council. On November 30 the British withdrew

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[23] Memorandum on Constitutional Development and Reform in Buganda (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1953). This statement is item 46 in the anthology, D. A. Low, ed., The Mind of Buganda (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

[24] An interesting set of documents relating to the developing crisis are contained in Low, The Mind of Buganda, pp. 161-174. A central document for this period, that contains most of the major exchanges, is Withdrawal of Recognition from Kabaka Mutesa II of Buganda, CMD. 9028 (London, 1953). The crisis is described and analyzed in some detail in Low, Buganda in Modern History, pp. 101-138, and Apter, op. cit., pp. 262-286, and Low and Pratt, op. cit., pp. 317-333.

their recognition from Mutesa II as Kabaka of Buganda and he was immediately deported.[25]

The government's actions caused confusion and dismay within Buganda, raising the threat of civil disorder.[26] As the fears and concerns of Buganda separatism were brought to a head and focused by the crisis, the disparate political elements within Buganda drew together, and in the process, transformed a somewhat unpopular King into a national hero and martyr. Demands for increased Buganda autonomy within the Protectorate were forcefully stated. The Baganda were clearly afraid that a national government with a unitary constitution would subject them to the alien control of other African tribes. Participation as a minority in the Uganda Legislative Council had come to represent, in the minds of many Baganda, a symbolic and actual subservience to a non-Baganda government.

During the next two years extensive negotiations between representatives of the Buganda legislature and Great Britain produced a compromise agreement (The 1955 Buganda Agreement).[27] According to the terms of this accord, Bu-

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[25]David Apter, "Political Development in Uganda," Current History, Vol. 30, No. 177 (May, 1956), 274, cites the failure of the Kabaka to appoint Legislative Council members as the key factor in the withdrawal of recognition.

[26]Low, Buganda in Modern History, p. 112.

[27]The Draft Buganda Agreements, 1955 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1955).

ganda agreed to participate in an enlarged and more "Afri-
can" Legislative Council. (The Council was reorganized and
expanded to include 30 African members of which 18 would be
chosen by the Districts.) The Protectorate government, on
the other hand, agreed to respect Baganda autonomy, devolve
additional services upon the Kingdom government and to make
"no major changes in . . . constitutional arrangements . . .
for six years. . . ."[28]

This compromise was short-lived, for events soon proved
that the crisis had set in motion political forces in Bu-
ganda that remained unalterably opposed to unitary govern-
ment. One overall effect of the crisis was to mobilize, and
provide political legitimacy for, a coterie of chiefs and
notables who, in frustrated exile, had long opposed an older
generation of "progressive," "pro-British" chiefs. Desig-
nated by Pratt as the "Palace Group," this broad alliance of
"traditional" interests soon shifted their hostile attention
to all "modernizers," even those who had been their allies
in the struggle to restore Mutesa to his throne. (By the
term "modernizers" I refer to those outward looking men,
many the products of advanced Western education, who were
willing to engage in Uganda-wide strategies of nationalist

[28] H. E. The Governor's Statement on Constitutional
Development in Uganda (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1954),
p. 1.

activity. They were individuals compatible with the "new-style" political leadership emerging in other districts of the country.) Upon the return of the Kabaka, the Palace Group secured a substantial number of seats in the new Lukiko.[29] Able to control both this and subsequent Lukikos, they named the ministers of the Kabaka's Government and claimed to speak for the Buganda people.[30] They accepted the proposition that an independent government controlled by non-Baganda Africans, with unlimited power to mobilize the resources and order the life of the Kingdom, would pose a dangerous threat to the integrity of Buganda no matter what the safeguards proffered by the departing colonial power. While some advocated the separate and immediate independence of Buganda, the majority probably recognized that given the commitments of the British government, secession was impossible in terms of practical politics and thus sought an iron-clad federal settlement prior to any withdrawal of British sovereignty. With what was at times the active collaboration of almost every politically relevant stratum in the Kingdom, the "Palace Group" vigorously sought such guarantees in order to insulate their government and

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[29]R. Cranford Pratt, "Nationalism in Uganda," Political Studies, IX, No. 2 (June, 1961), 162. Apter, op. cit., pp. 372, 375 ff., 433-4. Low, Political Parties, pp. 24-25, 50-51. Low, Buganda in Modern History, ch. five.

[30]Low, Political Parties. pp. 24-25. Apter, op. cit., pp. 272 ff. and pp. 385 ff.

society as much as possible from future non-Baganda, non-British, African central authority.

Elections and Other Pre-Independence Skirmishes

At the same time, African leaders in other parts of the country, operating from their new vantage points of political power--local office in district councils and membership in the reconstituted national assembly--began to insist upon an accelerated pace toward independence and to oppose any prior obstruction to the potential sovereignty of the new state.

Early in 1956 the representative members in the new Legislative Council pressed upon the Council a debate on the advisability of holding direct elections for the next Council. The Governor set forth a new policy on elections that went far toward meeting the "nationalist" demands.[31] He stated that after sufficient time had elapsed for "full local discussion throughout the country," he intended to introduce direct elections on a common roll for the Representative Members of Legislative Council from all parts of the Protectorate, possibly for the election of the next Council but one in 1961. He specified, however, the issues that he felt had to be settled prior to such an

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[31]Sir Andrew Cohen, "Statement on Elections," in Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1957-58. (His Excellency the Governor's Speech to Legislative Council on the 24th April, 1956), (Entebbe, Uganda: Government Printer, 1957).

election:

> Some of the most important issues which will
> have to be studied and discussed are the quali-
> fications and disqualifications for voters and
> candidates, the question whether women should
> have the vote and the appropriate method of
> securing adequate representation of the non-
> African communities under the common roll.[32]

He further stated that the proper time to debate these
questions would be the period of the next Legislative
Council (1958-1961).

Nevertheless, the Governor went on to recommend that
direct elections be held in Buganda at the end of 1957,
as intended in the recently signed accords (1955 Buganda
Agreement) between the Protectorate and the Buganda Govern-
ment.[33] Such an election, he felt, would "provide an ex-
cellent opportunity of testing the method of direct elec-
tion in preparation for the general examination throughout
the country in the period between 1958 and 1961."[34]

He further stressed that 1961 should not be regarded
as a potential date for self-government. Instead he in-
sisted that

> the rate of progress of this country towards
> self-government will depend on the way in

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[32]Ibid., paragraph five.

[33]The agreement specified that, pending agreement be-
tween the two governments on mechanics, the Baganda delega-
tion to the next Legislative Council be directly elected
by the people of Buganda.

[34]Cohen, op. cit., paragraph seven.

which everyone in the country carries out
his responsibilities.[35]

He concluded with a short homily on the virtues of hard work
and steady progress.

The response to this statement is succinctly summarized
in a subsequent government report:

> . . . there began to develop rapidly a feeling
> in parts of the Eastern, Western, and Northern
> Provinces that any system of elections intro-
> duced for the African representative Members
> in 1957 should be applicable to all alike and
> should not be confined to Buganda.[36]

In July a committee (the Hartwell Committee) was estab-
lished, under the chairmanship of the Chief Secretary, to
study the possibility of extending direct elections to the
whole country in 1957. It was this committee's recommenda-
tion that direct elections be held in all parts of Uganda,
save Karamoja, for the African representative members of
the next Legislative Council on a restricted franchise.[37]

In response to this report the newly appointed Gover-
nor, Sir Fredrick Crawford, supported Legislative Council
debate on a motion petitioning the Secretary of State for
the Colonies to allow direct elections for the Council in

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[35]Ibid., paragraph twelve.

[36]"Report of Legislative Council Committee on Elec-
tions" in Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1957-58 (Uganda Govern-
ment Printer), paragraph four.

[37]Ibid. See whole report. Karamoja, a dry plain in-
habited by several groups of nomadic cattle herders, had
been only marginally affected by British overrule and its
inhabitants were judged unprepared for the subtleties of
parliamentary government.

1958. (The date of the convening of that council had been moved back in order that there would be time for the necessary preliminaries to a direct election.) This motion was unanimously adopted.[38] On October 10, 1957, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in Uganda as part of an East African fact finding mission, gave his formal approval to direct elections. On October 16, the Legislative Council (Elections) Ordinance, No. 20 of 1957 was enacted. .

In the meantime, however, the Buganda Government's initially positive stance toward direct elections had eroded, as had its related position favorable to continuing participation in the Uganda Legislative Council. Not only did it view an accelerated movement toward independence with foreboding, but the "Palace Group" itself apparently recognized that direct elections in Buganda, whether to a central government body or to the Lukiko itself, represented a threat to its own preeminent position in Buganda.[39] While the "Palace Group" was able to control the machinery of indirect elections in Buganda, it knew that new-style

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[38]"Be it Resolved that this Council do request Her Majesty's Government to make the necessary constitutional provision in order that effect may be given to the recommendations contained in paragraph 12 of the Report of this Council's Committee attached to the Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1957-1958." Proceedings of the Uganda Legislative Council, Fourth Meeting, Thirty-Seventh Session, p. 8.

[39]Apter, op. cit., p. 424; Pratt, op. cit., pp. 164 ff; A. I. Richards, "Epilogue," in L. A. Fallers, ed., The King's Men (London; Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 370 and 387.

political parties would have advantages in a direct election.

On November 26, 1957, the Lukiko pressed the British government to negotiate a separate settlement containing a definite timetable for Bugandan, rather than Ugandan, independence.[40] This move foreshadowed new opposition in

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[40]The sources that I have available are ambiguous as to the exact nature of the many Lukiiko statements on the subject of autonomy and/or independence. Relying upon the London Times in the main, and other sources that mention Lukiiko action in passing, I cannot determine the extent to which at this period the Lukiiko maintained, in part at least, a nationalist stance, that is to say appearing to negotiate for the independence of all Uganda. Lacking any direct evidence to the contrary, I am disposed to agree with a statement by a correspondent of the Economist (October 8, 1960, p. 136): "The line taken by the Kabaka's government in the past has been that the agreements with Britain should be ended so that Buganda can negotiate with the other parts of Uganda about their future relationship--which are presumably to be on a federal basis." Further it is not unlikely that the Baganda intended to negotiate in this fashion directly with the ruling elites of the Kingdoms and districts bypassing the Legislative Council and as much as possible bypassing the "new-style" political leaders who, entrenched in the Legislative Council, were also a strong force in many local District Councils. How successful this strategy would have been is unclear. However there is little indication that the District Councils would have been any more willing than the national Legislative Council to placate the Baganda.
    Such speculation is in part academic. The British refused to stand aside and let the Baganda negotiate future constitutional arrangements with other subnational units. And when in June, 1960, representatives of the Buganda government met with representatives of other local government units, they discovered themselves "a minority of one in favour of a federal constitution for the whole of Uganda." (Low, op. cit., p. 207)
    It is however clear that, while continuing to reassure the Baganda that any future independence settlement would respect the traditions and customs of the several Kingdoms, and while hinting that they might consider a federal "solu-

the Kingdom to Baganda participation in a Legislative Coun-
cil. When a Buganda member of the Legislative Council re-
signed in November of 1957, the Buganda Government refused
to replace him. Throughout the first several months of
1958, the Protectorate government and the Buganda Govern-
ment sparred over Buganda's role in the direct elections
to the Legislative Council scheduled for October.[41] On

tion," the British insisted that the terms of self-govern-
ment would be negotiated through, at least in part, a
national assembly convened by a national election. It was
against this position that the Baganda maneuvered, sending
a continuous stream of memoranda and declarations from the
Halls of the Lukiiko to the seat of British government.

[41] The Protectorate Government "handed" the Baganda
several issues and a constitutional pretext, out of which
the Lukiiko constructed a "case" against participation in
the election. Under such rubrics, the "Palace Group" was
able to cloak its separatist moves in nationalist cloth:
attacking the Protectorate Government for its failure to
increase the number of African members of the Legislative
Council and for its insistence upon a commitment to a com-
mon roll and safeguards for Asians and Europeans. (Hart-
well, The Chief Secretary, had defined safeguards to mean
"that the electoral mechanism of the constitution must be
such as to ensure that the number of non-Africans pre-
viously decided to be adequate were in fact returned to
the representative side." London Times, October, 1957,
p. 9, col. 3, spoken in the Legislative Council debate of
September 30). The Buganda legal case was based upon
several minor changes that the new Governor, Sir Fredrick
Crawford, had introduced into the Legislative Council in
January of 1958: the appointment of two new backbench
African members to replace the Governor and the Buganda
Resident and the appointment of a Speaker (previously the
Governor had served as Speaker in the Council). These
changes, the Baganda argued, were violations of the 1955
Agreement (in which the British had agreed to postpone all
constitutional change for a five year period). Further-
more, the Baganda claimed that as a result of these changes,
the old Council, to which Buganda was required by law to
appoint representatives, no longer existed. Hence, the

March 19, the Lukiiko decided against direct elections for the five Baganda members of the Uganda Legislative Council. Hoping that the Lukiiko would provide for the indirect elections of their representatives (an eventuality that did not occur), the Protectorate government did not contest this decision.[42]

Meanwhile, plans for the election were progressing, albeit unevenly, in other parts of the country. The local council in Ankole district voted to elect its two representatives indirectly.[43] The Busoga Council voted 65-13 to accept direct elections for the two Busoga members.[44] The Bugisu District Council demanded additional African representation before agreeing to participate in the election. (The Governor, rejecting their condition, proceeded as if the Bugisu had refused to participate in the election and subsequently nominated a representative for Bugisu.)[45] At the last moment, the Toro District local council opposed the election and succeeded in depressing the poll in that

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Baganda obligation to appoint representatives no longer existed. Throughout 1958 the Buganda government tested this interpretation in the courts, eventually carrying a losing appeal to the Privy Council.

[42] This is implied in an article appearing in the London Times, March 21, 1958, p. 8, col. f.

[43] Low, op. cit., p. 32.

[44] London Times, January 3, 1958, p. 7.

[45] Low, op. cit., p. 27.

contest.[46] Nevertheless, during the week of October 20,

45 candidates stood, of which ten were directly elected

from nine districts.

The new 62 member Legislative Council took up its re-

sponsibilities in the closing weeks of 1958. The Baganda

were not directly represented.[47] In its debates, the non-

Baganda African representative members sought rapid progress

toward full independence. They joined and supported a

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[46]This is not well documented. Allen, The 1958 Elec-
tions (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1959), p. 29 states:

> In Toro, which achieved the lowest percentage
> (51%), 5½ inches of rain fell during polling week.
> This must have affected the poll to some extent,
> although there was some political opposition to
> the elections in that district.

Low, op. cit., p. 27, states:

> In Toro there was a poll of only fifty-one per
> cent, but this reflected a recent quarrel within
> the fourth phase regime.

By "fourth phase regime" Low refers to his own organiza-
tional scheme that places district level politics prior to
the emergence of formal "parties" as the last of four his-
torical phases. The scheme seems to better fit Buganda than
it does the rest of Uganda. See his entire essay, Political
Parties.

Apter, op. cit., does not mention, as far as I can find,
Toro's role in the election.

The London Times, October 27, 1958, p. 7, col. e,
claimed that the low poll was due to the fact that the Toro
local parliament, or Rukurato, opposed the elections.

[47]To be sure, there were several Baganda members of
the Council, official backbench nominees, but the five rep-
resentative seats were left vacant. For a detailed descrip-
tion of membership in the Council, see Report of the Con-
stitutional Committee, 1959, op. cit., pp. 6 and 7.

Legislative Council Committee, appointed by the Governor,

> to consider and to recommend to the Governor
> the form of direct elections on a common roll
> for representative members of the Legislative
> Council to be introduced in 1961, the number
> of representative seats to be filled under
> the above system, their allocation among the
> different areas of the Protectorate. . . .[48]

In addition to these "strict terms of reference" the Governor, while maintaining that decisions in these areas were "a very special responsibility . . . [of] Her Majesty's Government," authorized the Committee to inquire into "the size and composition of the Legislature and also possibly of the Government."[49]

This Committee, under the chairmanship of the Administrative Secretary of the Uganda Protectorate, Mr. J. V. Wild, was representative of informed non-Baganda African opinion.[50] Its 15 members included the chairman and two other Europeans, two "Asians" and ten Africans, of whom six were directly elected representative members of the Legislative Council.[51]

The Committee toured the country extensively, held public meetings and received memoranda. The Kabaka's gov-

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[48]Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959 (Wild Committee Report) (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1959), p. 1.

[49]Ibid.

[50]Richards, op. cit., p. 371.

[51]Bukedi: B. K. Kirya; Bunyoro: G. B. K. Magezi; North Busoga: W. W. Kajumbula-Nadiope; Lango: A. M. Obote; Teso: C. J. Obwangor; West Nile: G. Oda.

ernment refused to put forward names for additional appoint-
ments to the Committee and refused to give evidence before
the committee.[52]   It appeared to the Buganda government that
Uganda was plunging precipitiously toward independence.   The
Baganda sought at the very least to consummate lasting con-
stitutional agreements with the British before central
authority in the Protectorate passed into African hands.
At the same time, non-Baganda political elites sought a
transfer of power prior to any final arrangement or settle-
ment of the federal question.[53]

For the time being it appeared that the non-Baganda
had the upper hand.   The Wild Committee submitted its report
early in December, 1959.   The recommendations were far

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[52]_Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959_, para-
graphs 10 through 12.

[53]"Once the demand for self-government [had been made]
they [the Palace group] became concerned about Buganda's
position in an independent Uganda.   A balance of power be-
tween Buganda and Uganda that was favourable to them and to
their dominance in Buganda depended upon the continued
presence of the British.   The British are more inhibited
from a blunt use of central government powers against Bu-
ganda than a nationalist government would be that was led
by non-Ganda or by Ganda opposed to the Buganda ministers.
If the first independent Uganda Government assumed the full
powers of the present Protectorate Government, Buganda would
have little genuine security.   The future constitution of
Uganda has therefore become a major political issue, and the
Buganda government has tried to insist that there should
be no further constitutional advance until Buganda's posi-
tion is clarified and secured."   Pratt, _op. cit._, p. 164.

reaching, and especially alarming to many Baganda.[54] The
Committee recommended the direct election by universal
adult suffrage of a representative assembly by 1961. Such
an assembly would then proceed in due course to inaugurate
responsible self-government. While a European and Asian
minority (including one African) recommended that at least
at first the new "Council of Ministers," chosen from the
majority party in the Assembly, would be advisory to the
Governor, the Committee's African majority (including one
of the Asian members) recommended that the leader of the
majority party should form a government collectively re-
sponsible to the Assembly and, with the title of Chief
Minister, preside over the Council of Ministers.

Essentially, the Committee's recommendation was rapid
advance toward African self-government under a unitary con-
stitution. The Baganda reaction was immediate and pre-
dictable. While the Wild Committee was still taking evi-
dence, the Baganda political elite closed ranks behind an
all-Buganda protest movement. Ostensibly to protest the
British insistence upon minority safeguards and to oppose

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[54]"The Committee's report confirmed Buganda's worst
fears and the nationalists' highest hopes. The Committee
had in effect decided that the Protectorate Government must
back the nationalists. Indeed, one of its main arguments
was that such major concessions were needed to stimulate
the growth of strong national parties. Buganda's reaction
was understandably hostile." Ibid., p. 166. See also
Richards, op. cit., p. 372.

the activities of the Wild Committee, an effective trade boycott of Asian merchants was organized during the Spring and Summer of 1959 by the Uganda National Movement.[55] Coupled with the boycott were acts of physical intimidation.[56] First by banning mass meetings, then by declaring the UNM unlawful, and finally by detaining its leaders and declaring the boycott itself illegal, the Protectorate Government moved to contain the movement.

While a strong Protectorate Government response to the trade boycott seemed to forestall further mass protest, the release of the Wild Committee Report in December, 1959, triggered a renewed round of Buganda Government statements and resolutions threatening secession.[57] Fearful of provoking the Baganda to a new level of militancy, the Protectorate Government stopped short of accepting the full

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[55]Membership in the UNM was varied. The "Palace Group," new style party leaders and disaffected traders, small scale farmers, and tradesmen combined to achieve surprising strength. Richards, op. cit., pp. 371-2; Low, op. cit., p. 193; Pratt, op. cit., pp. 168-9; The Economist, May 30, 1957, pp. 837-8. See also Rothchild and Rogin, op. cit., for a discussion of the UNM, the boycott and especially Obote's reaction to the events (not elsewhere discussed), pp. 355-6.

[56]The Economist, June 20, 1959, pp. 1102-3.

[57]Low, op. cit., p. 206.

majority report of the Committee.[58]   Yet the Government,
by accepting the principle of a national election in 1961
prior to a settlement of the federal-unitary constitutional
question, did endorse the central intent of the report.   As
the Protectorate Government proceeded to implement this in-
tent, the Baganda threatened to boycott the election unless
a prior constitutional agreement could be arranged, guaran-
teeing Buganda autonomy.[59]   Both the Buganda and the Rep-
resentative Members of the Legislative Council sent dele-
gations to London during the summer of 1960 to argue their
respective positions: for the Baganda, that a constitu-
tional settlement precede direct elections; for the non-
Baganda, that the full recommendations of the Wild Committee
be implemented.[60]

When the Protectorate Government, responding in sooth-
ing but uncompromising terms to both initiatives, continued
to prepare for direct elections, the Buganda Lukiko voted

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[58]Ibid., pp. 206-7; The Economist, March 5, 1960, pp.
884-5.   On the other hand, Apter, op. cit., p. 467, seems to
feel that Bagandan intrangience, if anything, hastened Pro-
tectorate acceptance of the Report.   In addition the Pro-
tectorate announced its intention to appoint a commission
to study the question of the future relationship between
Buganda and the rest of the country (the Munster Commission).

[59]The Legislative Council debated in June the Legis-
lative Council Elections (Amendment) of 1960.   In July the
electoral districts were gazetted.

[60]The Economist, June 25, pp. 1324-5; August 13, pp.
628-9.

in December, 1960, to secede from Uganda. However, the
Baganda backed away from any direct action to implement
this decision. The Protectorate government refused to
call off the elections and pressed forward with plans for
the Spring vote, struggling against official Baganda op-
position to voter registration in Buganda.

Two major parties, several minor parties and many in-
dependent candidates contested this first all-Ugandan
direct election. It is an irony of Ugandan politics that
one of the minor parties bore the name of the first attempt
to achieve an all-Ugandan anti-colonial movement, the Uganda
National Congress (UNC). The 1950s had seen the breakup
of this "party" as its Buganda elite had fractured under
autochthonous pressures within the Kingdom and its non-
Buganda Northern membership had withdrawn to form a separate
party.[61] As for the two major parties, one, The Democratic
Party, had been organized through the agency of the Catholic
Church out of a fear of potential "radical" tendencies in
the nationalist movement and a concern for the autonomy of
the denominational school system in the country.[62] Though

[61]Apter, op. cit., pp. 310-336, especially p. 333; and
Low, Political Parties, pp. 30 and 31. See also an undated
(1956?) manuscript in the Africana collection at North-
western University, by Neal Ascherson, on the UNC, pre-
sumably based on field research in Africa.

[62]Welbourn, op. cit., pp. 18-19; Apter, op. cit.,
pp. 340-344; Low, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

it attempted to recruit Protestants into its leadership,[63] 76 percent of its candidates in the 1961 election were Catholics.[64] The other major party, the Uganda Peoples Congress (U.P.C.), had been formed as a result of a merger between the Northern faction of the UNC and leaders of non-Buganda Southern districts who had won election to the old Legislative Council as independent candidates.[65] The 1961 election was contested in 73 of 82 single member constituencies. (There were eight unopposed seats.) The following table details the extent to which the leading parties put up candidates for the election.[66]

TABLE I

CANDIDACIES FOR 1961 ELECTION

Party Name	No. of Candidates
D.P. (Democratic Party)	78
U.P.C. (Uganda Peoples Congress)	66
U.N.C. (Uganda National Congress)	22
U.H.C.P. (Uganda Hereditary Chieftainship Party)	4
U.A.U. (Uganda African Union)	1
Independents	27

[63] Low, op. cit., p. 22.

[64] Robert O. Byrd, "Characteristics of Candidates for Election in a Country Approaching Independence: the Case of Uganda," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VII, No. 1 (February 1963), 20.

[65] Rothchild and Rogin, op. cit., pp. 357 ff. and 394 ff.; Low, op. cit., p. 43; Apter, op. cit., pp. 347-8.

[66] R. C. Peagram, A Report on the General Election in the Legislative Council Held in March, 1961 (Entebbe: Uganda Government Printer, 1961), p. 9.

Possibly as few as two percent of the Buganda electorate registered for the election since the Kabaka's government stressed that support for this election would be traitorous. Further, the traditional authorities of each administrative area within the Kingdom exerted "pressure" to insure a low registration.[67]

Throughout the rest of the country the election campaign was marked with moderate levels of interest and participation.[68] The two major parties, the U.P.C. and the D.P., sparred with each other; the U.P.C. accused the D.P. of being a religious, i.e. foreign, force; the D.P. accused the U.P.C. of radical "Eastern" influences. Their policy statements and party programs, however, were essentially the same. The economic and social backgrounds of their candidates,[69] save with respect to religious affiliation, were likewise similar.

Outside of Buganda the U.P.C. won over 50.3 percent of the vote and 34 out of 61 seats. However, within Buganda, even with an extremely low poll, the Democratic Party won 20 out of 21 seats and with a majority of seats in the new

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[67] Ibid., p. 3; Welbourn, op. cit., p. 40; Rogin and Rothchild, op. cit., p. 357.

[68] Welbourn, op. cit., pp. 22-24; Peagram, op. cit., pp. 16 and 20.

[69] Byrd, op. cit., pp. 18 and 19.

Assembly formed the government. In addition, a candidate of one minor party, the U.N.C., and two independents won seats.[70] Table 2 summarizes the results.

As the leader of the Democratic Party, Benedicto Kiwanuka (now designated "Chief Minister"), began his new responsibilities, the British government, seeking to overcome Buganda resistance to full participation in the new order, invited representatives of the Kabaka's government, the new D.P. Uganda government and leaders of the U.P.C. to a Constitutional Conference. At this conference the British obtained Buganda acquiescence to a "federal" arrangement whereby the Kingdom of Buganda would be in federal relationship to the rest of the country and there would be special provisions to protect the traditional monarchical institutions of the other Bantu kingdoms--Ankole, Bunyoro, and Toro.[71] Furthermore, the Baganda representatives secured the right to elect Baganda's representatives to the next National Assembly indirectly, the Buganda Parliament (the Lukiko) sitting as the electoral college. New national elections were scheduled for April of the following year (1962). New elections for the Lukiiko were set for January, 1962.

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[70]Peagram, op. cit., appendix I.

[71]Report of the Uganda Constitutional Conference, 1961 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1961) (Cmnd. 1523).

TABLE 2

1961 ELECTION RESULTS

Party	Seats won in Buganda (21 seats)	Vote in Buganda	Seats won elsewhere (41 seats)	Vote elsewhere	Total Seats (82 seats)	Total Vote
DPO	20 (5 un-contested)	11,880 (contested 21 seats)	24 (1 un-contested)	403,838 (41.0%)	44 (6 un-contested)	415,718 (41.6%)
UPC	1	955 (contested 7 seats)	34 (2 un-contested)	494,004 (50.1%)	35 (2 un-contested)	494,959 (49.6%)
UNC	0	408 (contested 9 seats)	1	31,304 (3.2%)	1	31,712 (3.2%)
UHCP	0	0	0	6,559 (0.7%)	0	6,559 (0.7%)
UAU	0	0	0	1,172 (0.1%)	0	1,172 (0.1%)
Independents	0	54 (contested 1 seat)	2	48,403 (4.9%)	2	48,457 (4.9%)
Total	21	13,297	61	985,280	82	998,577

The next months saw intense jockeying for position
among the many elements that comprised Ugandan politics.
The Kiwanuka government attempted to create a favorable
climate for election victory by supporting dissident claims
with new government initiatives. A new district was created
in the East to satisfy the Sebei. New marketing arrange-
ments were offered to coffee growers in Bugisu. However,
the U.P.C. achieved the most far reaching political break-
through by fashioning an electoral coalition with the
Baganda.[72] Under the terms of this accord the U.P.C. agreed
not to contest the Lukiiko elections in January and the
Baganda agreed to join with the U.P.C. in the new Assembly
and support a coalition government. In fulfilling this
arrangement the Buganda government formed a new political
force, a "movement" not a "party" in the words of its found-
ers, to contest the Lukiiko elections against the Democratic
Party. It was named "Kabaka Yekka" which loosely translated
means "the King above all others."[73]

In January the forces of Kabaka Yekka (KY) won an over-
whelming electoral victory in Buganda over the D.P. and

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[72]Rothchild and Rogin, op. cit., p. 359; Welbourn, op.
cit., p. 28; Low, op. cit., p. 55.

[73]C. J. Gertzel, "How Kabaka Yekka Came to Be," Africa
Report, IX, No. 9 (October, 1964), pp. 9-13; Low, op. cit.,
p. 54; Rothchild and Rogin, op. cit., p. 358; Welbourn,
op. cit., pp. 26 ff.

gained firm control of the Lukiiko.[74]   In the remaining
months before the national election Kiwanuka tried in vain
to link the U.P.C. with the Baganda and thereby to mobilize
anti-Buganda support in the country.   He was successful
only in Bunyoro where people saw the election primarily as
a way to protest the continuing Buganda rule of those areas
of the country, dubbed "the Lost Counties," that had been
taken from the Bunyoro late in the last century as a result
of the military defeat inflicted upon the Bunyoro by com-
bined British and Buganda forces.[75]   The elections were a
clear-cut victory for the U.P.C.   In the 61 non-Buganda con-
stituencies the U.P.C. secured 52.2 percent of the vote and
37 seats.[76]   It was thus a U.P.C. government, led by Milton
Obote, that brought Uganda to full independence on October
9, 1962.

The Uganda Elections and This Dissertation

Political analysts of the years prior to Ugandan in-
dependence have viewed the partisan struggles that culmi-
nated in these two contested elections of the early 1960s
as a curious overlay of factional ambitions, religious con-

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[74]Welbourn, op. cit., pp. 30-36; Peagram, R. C., A
Report on the General Elections to the National Assembly of
Uganda Held on the 25th April, 1962 (Entebbe: Uganda Gov-
ernment Printer, 1962), Appendix H.

[75]Commission of the Privy Councillors. . ., op. cit.

[76]Peagram, op. cit.

flicts and traditional loyalties.[77] In my exploration of
the patterns of support that underlay the results of these
two elections, I will focus upon the non-Baganda constitu-
encies. The reason for this decision is that the elections
in Buganda during this period were hardly comparable to the

[77]"Politics, of course, hang about polarities--polari-
ties of ideology, polarities of interest, polarities of
expediency. It is widely assumed that in a colonial terri-
tory the major polarity is between indigenous people and
colonial authority. But in Uganda this was not so; here
was certainly one polarity, but in the 1950s rarely the over-
riding one. In consequence other polarities were especially
free to operate; and as it happened a number of these were
very important. Some of them may be listed: the polarity
between 'ins' and 'outs'; between 'advanced' elites and less
'advanced' populace; between Catholics and Protestants;
between Baganda and non-Baganda; between those who would
defy their opponents and those who would seek accommodation
with them; between those who would say in Luganda 'sitakange',
'what I have I hold', and those who would say 'simudda
nnyuma', 'there is no turning back'. It is not often that
these polarities have firmly coincided with one another.
Frequently they have run at angles to each other, so that
all manner of combinations have become possible--both at
one and the same time and in kaleidoscopic succession.
Different combinations, moreover, have been found in people
who at first sight might appear similar; they have been
found too in the same person at different times." Low, op.
cit., p. 57.

"In some districts religious factionalism is simply
the continuation of traditional intratribal conflict under a
new label. Elsewhere religious cleavages cut across tradi-
tional ones. Often tribalism is important in determining
the vote independently of religious allegiances. It is
necessary to distinguish between two types of tribalism.
In one, the tribe acts as a unit in politics and separatist
overtones exist. Buganda is the classic case of this
phenomenon. But tribalism can also be a perpetuation of
traditional intratribal differences in modern politics.
Kigezi district provides an example of this kind of tri-
balism." Rothchild and Rogin, op. cit., p. 381.

elections in other parts of the country. So substantial a proportion of the Baganda boycotted the first election (1961) as to result in an ambiguous poll among a highly unrepresentative sample of the population. Further, the possibility of intimidation during this election casts serious doubts upon whether or not it should be considered a "free election." As for the second election within Buganda (1962 Lukiko election), it was held at a different time than the subsequent national election for the national legislature, from constituencies of a different order, for a different representative body (the Lukiko). The results of this election are therefore probably not manageable within a comparative framework.

I have also chosen to exempt the six urban constituencies from my analysis. Their varied tribal mix and the presence of sizeable number of "Asians" in the eligible population makes them, in my judgment, unsatisfactory for comparative purposes. They introduce an unmanageable number of additional factors. Furthermore, it is not necessary to include them in order to test the two propositions of this study. There are enough non-Buganda, non-urban constituencies in Uganda (55) to provide a thorough examination of the propositions of this study.

Map Two details the boundaries of these constituencies; the numbers on the map correspond to a list of the constituencies, marked Table 3.

UGANDA

Map 2: Uganda: Electoral Districts, 1961 and 1962

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS (1961 and 1962 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS)

TABLE 3

CONSTITUENCIES FOR THE 1961 AND 1962
UGANDAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS

Urban Constituencies

1. Kampala East
2. Kampala West
3. Kampala South
4. Jinja North
5. Jinja South
6. Mbale

Non-Urban, Non-Buganda Constituencies

7. North Bukedi
8. North Central Bukedi
9. South Central Bukedi
10. South Bukedi
11. South East Bukedi

12. North West Bugisu
13. North East Bugisu (Sebei)
14. South West Bugisu
15. South East Bugisu

16. North West Busoga
17. West Busoga
18. North East Busoga
19. Central Busoga
20. East Busoga
21. South East Busoga
22. South Busoga

23. North Teso
24. West Teso
25. South Teso
26. East Teso
27. South East Teso

28. South East Acholi
29. North West Acholi
30. North Acholi
31. South West Acholi

32. North Karamoja
33. Central Karamoja
34. South Karamoja

35. West Lango
36. Central Lango
37. North East Lango
38. South East Lango

39. West Nile and Madi North East
40. West Nile and Madi North West
41. West Nile and Madi West
42. West Nile and Madi Central
43. West Nile and Madi South

44. North East Ankole
45. North West Ankole
46. Central Ankole
47. West Ankole
48. South West Ankole
49. South East Ankole

50. South West Bunyoro
51. North East Bunyoro

52. South West Kigezi
53. West Kigezi
54. North Kigezi
55. East Kigezi
56. South East Kigezi
57. South Kigezi

TABLE 3--Continued

58. East Toro
59. North West Toro
60. Central Toro
61. South Toro

Buganda Constituencies

62. South West Masaka
....
82. West Sezibwa

In this chapter I have narrated a portion of Uganda's history and have described aspects of its society. It remains now, before turning to the heart of the study, to ask whether or not Uganda is a happy choice for the testing of my central thesis.

Uganda has been one of the most intensively studied of all African societies, because a major center of sociological and anthropological research (the East African Institute of Social Research at Makerere University) was located within its boundaries during the last several decades of the colonial period. However, the two elections in question and the specific questions to which this dissertation addresses itself have not been given much attention. Presumably the obscure complexities of the many conflicts exhibited by the elections have not proven amenable for an overall scholarly

judgment in general treatments of Ugandan society. Thus
while having a near "virgin field" for the central questions
of the study, there is excellent supporting information and
documentation for their examination.

There are difficulties in selecting any African case
study to test propositions with respect to tribe and voting.
Even if tribal divisions do prove to be basic determinants
of social action in sub-saharan Africa, electoral statistics
for many African countries will not reflect the extent of
this influence. This is a consequence of the special nature
of independence politics in many African societies.

The anti-colonial movement sought independence from
colonial rule. In most cases this meant that the movement
was in part a supplicant before colonial authority and in
part an adversary. As supplicant, the leaders of nationalist
movements asked to be recognized as the responsible "African"
government of the territory. As adversaries they sought the
strongest possible base for resistance to continued colonial
rule. In either case the substance and appearance of unity
was important above practically all else. Since many an-
tagonistic groups--tribes, classes, occupational groups--
had coalesced in the nationalist movement, the leadership
was fearful of those issues or ideologies that might prove
divisive. Electoral politics therefore was, if elites
could prevail, preeminently a non-politics--an expression
of unity, not an arena for conflict.

As a consequence of this, electoral statistics taken at the height of anti-colonial mobilization often obscure more than they display. The unity they describe is forced and momentary, and the deeper antagonisms remain hidden beneath the surfaces of an anti-colonial mandate.

Thus, for an African society to meet the requirements for a case study to test the kind of propositions that I have chosen to examine, it must have a somewhat atypical pattern of independence politics.

Uganda's unique political history makes it an exception to the usual course of pre-independence political mobilization. Many leaders within Uganda felt that independence would follow without massive anti-colonial efforts. That being the case, a unifying national political movement, with opposition to colonial rule as its primary focus and standard of orthodoxy, never developed. Politics displayed a rich fabric, as various groups and individuals jockeyed for position in a post-independence order, the inevitability of which was generally accepted, even while its exact nature was in doubt. Hence at least two vigorous parties and several independent candidates contested most of the constituencies in both national elections.

Thus, the 1961 and 1962 Ugandan elections afforded an opportunity for open and extensive political conflict. The colonial government sought to insure a fair contest between a variety of contending forces. To the extent that tribal

elites, or sub-tribal and pan-tribal factions, viewed an assault upon the "political kingdom" as valid and important, such elites were free to pursue what they might regard as appropriate strategies. Their adherents among the general population were similarly free to respond in an appropriate manner. Such elite initiatives and mass responses are the subjects of this dissertation.

CHAPTER THREE

METRICS

In this chapter metrics will be devised to measure
in each constituency the following: (1) partisan proportion
and ethnic proportion, (2) capacity for tribally-based elec-
toral cleavage, (3) partisan mobilization. These metrics
will be used to derive several sets of data for Uganda
electoral constituencies. In subsequent chapters these
data will be utilized in testing at the constituency level
the two specific propositions delineated in chapter one.

Partisan Proportion and Ethnic Proportion

In developing a measurement rule for both partisan pro-
portion and ethnic proportion, it is helpful to keep in
mind that the ultimate intent is to relate these two pro-
portions--necessitating a measurement strategy to capture
that specific characteristic of the tribal matrix of an area
that might translate into partisan electoral strength.
Voting outcomes are normally expressed in terms of a funda-
mental dichotomy--winning and losing or the winning candi-
date and the "others." Can ethnic heterogeneity not like-

wise be expressed in terms of a basic dichotomy? One such
common-sense approach to the description of a set of groups
is to distinguish the largest group from the other groups.
Since a dominant group, when its hegemony is not seriously
threatened, will tend not to offer sufficient rewards to
entice other groups to join it, it will on most occasions
remain aloof. And one might thus expect that, in an open
election, the dominant group (or tribe) would support its
own candidate and not reach out to subordinate groups who
would either combine in offering a common opposition or,
unable to coalesce, offer separate opposition candidates.
The strength, therefore, of the defeated candidates should
tend to equal the strength of the non-dominant tribes.
These institutions lead to a simple measurement rule for
partisan and ethnic proportion, two basic dichotomies:
largest tribe--other tribes; winning candidate's vote--
other vote. And in order to emphasize an interest in heter-
ogeneity (rather than homogeneity), the rule can be ex-
pressed as % oppositional tribe and % oppositional vote.

The derivation of "% oppositional vote" is straight-
forward. The published reports of both elections provide
raw returns for each contest.[1] I have calculated percentages

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[1] R. C. Peagram, A Report of the General Election in the
Legislative Council Held in March, 1961 (Entebbe: Uganda
Government Printer, 1961); R. C. Peagram, A Report on the
General Elections to the National Assembly of Uganda Held
on the 25th April, 1962 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1963).

from these raw figures. These percentages--"Partisan Pro-
portions, 1961: Percent Losing Candidates" and "Partisan
Proportions, 1962: Percent Losing Candidates"--are given
in Table 1. Their spatial distributions are shown on Maps I
and II.

To apply, however, the analogous rule to ethnic data
is a more formidable task. First, one must establish tribal
categories, that is determine what is and what is not a
tribe. While many traditional ethnic groups are clearly
different from each other--people who speak entirely sep-
arate languages, live apart, and are self-conscious of their
differences--some "tribal" divisions in Uganda, as suggested
in chapter two, may be artificial. The Jonam are, from an
anthropological point of view, almost indistinguishable from
the Alur. "Jonam" means in the language common to both
groups, "People of the river." And the Jonam are simply
that, Alur who live by the Nile. Yet even though they live
alongside the Alur and share a common "culture," they regard
themselves and are conventionally regarded as a separate
people.[2] On the other hand, all Iteso, although dispersed
in separate groups and living in non-contiguous areas of the
country, are commonly viewed as members of the same tribe.[3]

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[2]*Atlas of Uganda* (Department of Lands and Surveys, Uganda
Protectorate) (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1962), p. 36.

[3]Fred G. Burke, *Local Government and Politics in Uganda*
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1964), p.
180.

TABLE 1

PARTISAN PROPORTIONS, 1961 AND 1962

Constituency	% Vote Losing Candidate(s) 1961	% Vote Losing Candidate(s) 1962
07	61.90	47.73
08	26.03	30.99
09	49.30	44.27
10	53.04	47.38
11	34.75	42.28
12	63.43	39.97
13	46.76	40.25
14	55.39	42.01
15	62.26	47.07
16	19.47	18.42
17	07.10	03.36
18	50.85	30.59
19	67.76	26.23
20	63.47	51.70
21	48.81	42.95
22	18.20	21.98
23	51.19	50.85
24	32.92	39.64
25	48.43	47.31
26	21.11	26.67
27	45.74	44.39

TABLE 1--Continued

Constituency	% Vote Losing Candidate(s) 1961	% Vote Losing Candidate(s) 1962
28	42.08	45.38
29	48.90	54.17
30	41.46	39.80
31	49.82	48.33
32	-----	48.67
33	34.80	34.85
34	26.12	36.79
35	26.87	28.48
36	17.56	19.67
37	-----	19.35
38	24.03	24.39
39	42.39	38.68
40	47.24	42.68
41	27.64	41.71
42	-----	49.95
43	45.09	45.80
44	37.96	40.19
45	32.41	34.14
46	42.17	42.73
47	48.17	47.12
48	45.69	48.11
49	46.02	49.77

TABLE 1--Continued

Constituency	% Vote Losing Candidate(s) 1961	% Vote Losing Candidate(s) 1962
50	32.02	38.66
51	43.39	51.16
52	44.08	48.84
53	45.54	45.72
54	49.74	47.13
55	49.42	48.02
56	49.10	48.76
57	47.83	49.39
58	47.81	43.02
59	37.62	28.26
60	21.59	42.16
61	50.14	36.81

Map 1: Uganda: Partisan Proportions, 1961

UGANDA

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS (1961 and 1962 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS)

(Voting Districts 32, 37 and 42 are stippled
to indicate that they were not contested.)

Partisan
Competitive
Districts (above
the median) are
striped.

(The section of the map enclosed with a
stippled border is the Kingdom of Buganda.)

Map 2: Uganda: Partisan Proportions, 1962

UGANDA

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS (1961 and 1962 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS)

Partisan Competitive Districts (above the median)
are striped.

(The section of the map enclosed with a
stippled border is the Kingdom of Buganda.)

Notwithstanding this, the Japadhola, related to the Acholi
in language and separated through migration (as were the
Iteso in East Budama Country from the Iteso in Teso District),
are acknowledged as a separate tribe.[4] Moreover, as Fallers
notes, there are extensive differences, not least of which is
dialect, between several traditionally separate Bantu states
which regard themselves as members of one tribe--the
Basoga.[5]

Fortunately, considerable effort has been expended on
efforts to systematize ethnic categories in Uganda. I shall
employ in this study a commonly accepted list that was used
in the 1959 Uganda Census:

> A list of African tribal names was . . .
> prepared, based on recommendations of an
> ad hoc committee under the chairmanship
> of the Permanent Secretary to the Ministry
> of Social Services. All major tribes were
> included, the indigenous and immigrant.
> Small indigenous tribes were included in
> the main tribe of their areas and small im-
> migrant tribes were classified under the
> broad heading of their country of origin.[6]

It is a fairly exhaustive list. And, in so far as we assume
that those ascriptive cleavages which are perceived by

---

[4]Ibid., pp. 183 ff.

[5]Lloyd A. Fallers, Bantu Bureaucracy: A Century of
Political Evolution among the Basoga of Uganda (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 25.

[6]Uganda Census, 1959: African Population (Statistics
Branch, Ministry of Economic Affairs) (Nairobi, 1961), p. 5.

people themselves as important are most likely to have a subsequent effect on behavior and social structure (the census sought self-definitions of tribe), it is a classification that is satisfactory for our purposes. Table 2 reproduces Appendix VII to the Uganda Census, containing the list of tribes prepared by the aforementioned ad hoc committee and used in the 1959 Census.

Fortunately, among the public reports of the Uganda Census are a set of mimeographed reports that list tribal membership by sub-counties.[7] From these data, the percentage of "non-dominant" tribes ("all but the largest tribe") was derived from each constituency. These percentages are presented in Table 3 and Map III.

Capacity for Tribally-based Electoral Cleavage

The second concept to be discussed in this chapter concerns the nature of the tribal configuration of a constituency. How does one determine whether or not a given constituency has a large enough tribal opposition to support tribally based electoral conflict?

In order to determine this "threshold" it will be helpful to make several simplifying assumptions. It is hoped that these assumptions will at least approximate the

---

[7]Uganda, General African Census, 1959 (East African Statistical Department), Volume II, Parts 2 through 5 (Entebbe, 1960).

TABLE 2

UGANDA AFRICAN TRIBES AS LISTED IN APPENDIX VII OF THE 1959 UGANDA CENSUS

Acholi
Alur
Baamba
Badama
Baganda
Bagisu
Bagwe
Bagwere
Bakenyi
Bakiga
Bakonjo
Banyankore
Banyaruanda
Banyole
Banyoro (including Bachope)
Basoga
Batoro
Batwa
Iteso
Jalue
Jonam
Kakwa
Karamonjong
Kikuyu (including Embu and Meru)
Kumam
Labwor
Lango
Lendu
Lugbara
Madi
Rundi (including Bazinja)
Samia (including Bahehe)
Sebei
Suk
Tepeth (including Kadam)

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE NON-DOMINANT TRIBES
IN EACH CONSTITUENCY

Constncy	Percentage Minority Tribes	Constncy	Percentage Minority Tribes
07	45	37	04
08	22	38	15
09	52	39	39
10	63	40	23
11	54	41	10
12	17	42	68
13	44	43	05
14	10	44	12
15	01	45	09
16	31	46	05
17	16	47	22
18	13	48	47
19	24	49	34
20	16	50	09
21	53	51	28
22	40	52	01
23	55	53	11
24	35	54	05
25	07	55	01
26	03	56	04
27	09	57	13
28	05	58	08
29	09	59	64
30	02	60	23
31	12	61	23
32	17		
33	12		
34	48		
35	06		
36	01		

Map 3: <u>Uganda: Tribally Heterogeneous</u>
<u>Voting Districts</u>

UGANDA

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS (1961 and 1962 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS)

Voting Districts where non-dominant
tribes are 30% or more of total
population are stippled.

(The section of the map enclosed with a
stippled border is the Kingdom of Buganda.)

ad hoc processes of simplification that characterize
decision-making among political elites in African societies.
It is a central contention of this study that tribe per se
provides a congenial base for electoral conflict. Where
elites of two different tribes (composing most of the
electorate in a constituency) decide to contest an election
on a tribal basis, they pose formidable problems for any
other contenders who seek an alternative basis for electoral
cleavage. That is, it takes two to make a fight, and when
these two are strong, others will either stay out or ally
themselves with one or the other of the sides.[8]

A key requisite, then, to having a tribally based elec-
tion is that elites of at least two different tribes be
strong enough to seize the center of the field. Under what
circumstance of numerical distribution of tribe in the con-
stituency will this occur?

Let us assume three potential elites in any given con-
stituency:

> (A) An elite within the dominant tribe closely
> allied with traditional authority in that
> tribe.
>
> (B) An elite within the dominant tribe less close-
> ly associated with the tribe and/or its tradi-
> tional authorities.

---

[8] See the discussion both in Chapter One of this dis-
sertation and in Chapter Four.

(C) An elite within a non-dominant tribe that is

closely associated with the non-dominant

tribe and/or its traditional authorities.

We shall assume tribally-based conflict when "A" and "C"
are both taken seriously be each set of actors and by na-
tional political leaders. "A" can by definition always be
taken seriously. The question is with respect to "C."
When is a non-dominant tribe large enough to mobilize ef-
fective opposition? Let us make another assumption and
assume that effective opposition is synonymous with winning
potential.[9] Then the question becomes: when can a non-
dominant tribe be expected to put together a potentially
winning candidacy?

In establishing a rule for the determination of this
threshold, it is necessary to make several additional sim-
plifying assumptions: (In keeping with our attempt to par-
allel the thinking of elites, these hypotheses are not
purely arbitrary. They correspond, we hope, in part, to
the "hunches" a professional politician might use in assess-
ing the field of battle prior to an electoral contest)

(1) Members of the dominant tribe will vote for

candidates of the dominant tribe.

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[9]That is to say, the plausibility that the oppositional
tribe(s) could win the election. We make the assumption here
that the objectives of electoral politics are primarily to
achieve victory while realizing that in some instances par-
ties to an election consider presence in the lists, without
hope of victory, as an important and even sufficient reward.

(2) Members of non-dominant tribes will not vote
for a candidate of the dominant tribe.

(3) Members of non-dominant tribes will turn out
in greater numbers to support a fellow tribes-
man than a candidate from another minority
tribe; that is to say, while the second largest
tribe will secure maximum mobilization of its
members on behalf of its own candidates,
members of other tribes in the constituency
will not turn out to vote for such a candidate
to the same extent.

On the basis of these assumptions what is the critical
level for at least a possible success for an elite from a
non-dominant tribe? It will be the point at which, assum-
ing one further possibility--as divisive as possible a two-
man intra-tribal competition within the dominant tribe--and
assuming the highest possible mobilization of the opposition,
the candidate of "the other tribes" pulls even with the
leading vote-getter of the dominant tribe. That is: assume
two candidates from the dominant tribe. Assume further a
minimal mobilization of the dominant tribe ("u") and a
maximal mobilization of the second largest tribe for a
candidate from that tribe ("w") and a lesser mobilization
("z") of the other tribes in support of the candidate from
the second largest tribe. Also assume that all tribesmen
who are not members of the dominant tribe will unite behind

the candidate of the second tribe and that all tribesmen
of the dominant tribe who do vote will vote for one of
"their own" two candidates. Thus the percentage vote for
the leading candidate of the dominant tribe must be at
least $\frac{1}{2}$ u times the % of the dominant tribe in the con-
stituency. The vote for the candidate of the minority
tribes would be: w times the % of the second tribe plus
z times the % all other tribes. A non-dominant tribe would
be in victory range if the dominant tribe's % of the total
population were such as:

$\frac{1}{2}$uD were equal to or less than wS + zT, where D

is % dominant tribe and S is % second tribe and

T is % of all other tribes.

Thus the threshold itself would be given by the value of D
in the equation:

$$\frac{1}{2}uD = wS + zT$$

Solving for D:

$$uD = 2wS + 2zT$$

$$D = \frac{2wS + 2zT}{u}$$

$$D = \frac{2(wS + zT)}{u}$$

Upon assigning values for u, w and z and inserting the
actual values of S and T, it can be discovered whether or
not the tribal configuration in a specific constituency is
such as to support tribally-based electoral competition.

In order to make realistic estimates for u, w, and z let us examine Chart I, "Percent Voted of Eligible, for the 1961 Uganda Election."[10] Elements within Toro opposed the election and the low turnout in constituencies marked "T" reflect this. Constituencies marked "K" are in Karamoja, an atypical District inhabited by nomadic cattle herders where there are relatively little British intrusion during the colonial period.[11] These constituencies excepted, it would appear that the range, from minimum to maximum, of turnout runs from 20-25 to 95-100. Assuming elites are in touch with "reality," let us establish values for "u," "w" and "z," that reflect the facts of the 1961 election. How high might turnout go? The second largest tribe could "threaten" dominant tribe elites with a mobilizing capacity of 100%. Let "z," then, equal 100. As the sub-dominant

---

[10]This table has been constructed utilizing techniques that will be described later in this chapter.

[11]There are several good accounts of the Karamojong that stress their separation from the general colonial experience in Uganda. Beyond the general surveys of Ugandan history and society--Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), and D. A. Low and R. Cranford Pratt, Buganda and British Overrule, 1900-1955 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960)--one might consult: James Barber, Imperial Frontier: A Study of Relations between the British and the Pastoral Tribes of Northeast Uganda (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), and Neville Dyson-Hudson, Karamojong Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), especially pages 6 through 21, where he argues that it was as much the misdirection of protectorate policy and administration as a policy of benign neglect that contributed to the political isolation of the Karamojong.

tribe strives to envision an electoral success, they are
likely to view their opponent's mobilizing capacity at a
low potential. Yet, assuming two candidate intra-tribal
competition (within the dominant tribe), it would not be
reasonable to expect minimal mobilization of the dominant
tribe. (Each factional candidate would commit loyal parti-
sans to the battle.) If simply average mobilization is as-
sumed, "u" should be set at 40, a liberal (from the non-
dominant elite perspective) estimate of the median of the
distribution in Chart I. While there is no additional in-
formation that would allow for a different determination of
"z," let us continue to replicate an essentially "optimistic"
non-dominant tribe elite and set "z" equal to 50, a rather
liberal estimate of the median.

Note that in each case we have made a rather liberal
estimate from the perspective of the non-dominant tribe
for the coefficients in our equation:

$$u = 40$$
$$w = 100$$
$$z = 50;$$

assuming what I think would be probable, that a sub-dominant
tribal elite would be likely to err on the side of a liberal
estimate of its resources, maintaining as hopeful a posture
as possible toward electoral victory. Armed with these
estimates, for "u," "w," and "z," we can test for each con-
stituency the real value of "D" with its threshold value and

categorize the constituency with respect to three designations:

I) Complete Hegemony:

Two-man intra-tribal electoral conflict does not threaten the prospects of electing a member of the dominant tribe as representative.

II) Marginal Hegemony:

Tribal elites can only expect victory for a candidate of the dominant tribe if they suppress intra-tribal conflict.

III) Multi-tribal:

The dominant tribe is less than 50% and hence cannot be assured of victory even when its leaders achieve maximum mobilization. Hence a strategy of coercion or coalition is implied. Either suppress the turnout of rival tribes through intimidation or electoral fraud or seek a coalition with a minor tribe.

Table 4 places the non-Buganda rural constituencies with respect to these categories. Map IV displays their spatial distribution.

Partisan Electoral Mobilization

The last concept to be discussed in this chapter is "partisan electoral mobilization." "Partisan electoral mobilization" designates a specific type of mobilization—"partisan" in so far as it is actively on behalf of candidates who seek elective office (specifically, in this con-

TABLE 4

CONSTITUENCIES GROUPED ACCORDING TO POTENTIAL
OF NON-DOMINANT TRIBAL OPPOSITION

Group One	Group Two	Group Three
12	07	09
14	08	10
15	13	11
17	16	21
18	22	23
19	24	42
20	34	59
25	39	
26	40	
27	47	
28	48	
29	49	
30	60	
31	61	
32		
33		
35		
36		
37		
38		
41		
43		
44		
45		
46		
50		
51		
52		
53		
54		
55		
56		
57		
58		

Map 4: <u>Inter-Tribal Character of Uganda</u>
<u>Voting Districts</u>

UGANDA

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS (1961 and 1962 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS)

Stripped: GROUP TWO
Darkened: GROUP THREE

(The section of the map enclosed with a
stippled border is the Kingdom of Buganda.)

text, activity in 1961 and 1962 to advance the candidacy of men and women aspiring to seats in Uganda's National Legislative Assembly); "electoral" in that it is activity that seeks to reach and influence an electorally relevant behavior (in this instance, participation in the 1961 and 1962 national elections). Thus "partisan electoral behavior" is, in effect, the impact of partisan appeals upon the mass electorate. Let me repeat; it is not simply mass involvement in politics. It is that portion of mass action attributable to partisan elite activity and the partisan predispositions of the electorate.

In developing an operational definition of partisan mobilization in a Uganda voting constituency for the 1961 and 1962 elections, we are working with three different measurement primitives: the number of adults eligible by law to vote, the number who registered to vote and the number who actually voted. These in turn can be transformed into three standard statistical descriptors of electoral behavior; Registration (R), the percent registered of eligible adults; Poll (P), the percent voting of those registered; and Turnout (T), the percent voting of eligible adults. Which of these three statistics provides an index of partisan mobilization? Or can better measures be constructed from these primitives? The answer to these questions lies in a critical analysis of the acts of registration and voting themselves.

Let us view registration and voting from the perspective of rational choice theory, that is, let us regard individual acts of registration and voting as decisions consequent upon a personal and rational assessment of anticipated costs and anticipated benefits (i.e., when the benefits expected by an individual from registering are greater than the expected costs, then the individual will register).[12] As both "benefit" and "cost" vary among individuals, so the proportion of individuals deciding to act or not to act varies across voting constituencies. For example, perceptions of the importance of the voting act (and hence the allied act of registration) should vary across major groups or areas of a society. For if some portion of the citizenry believe that electoral institutions have failed to provide them with meaningful choices, they will not place much importance on the act of voting or registration. Or, if they are ignorant of the institutions and policies of their government, they will not value the franchise; or, on the other hand, if they are especially satisfied with their government, and see no threat to its continuation, they may not feel a compulsion to

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[12]This manner of analyzing political behavior is clearly stated and illustrated throughout Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957). It is reflected in an article that I found particularly helpful in my efforts: Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard E. Ayares and William G. Bowen, "Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First," American Political Science Review, LXI, No. 2 (June, 1967), 359-379.

register or vote. Contrarily, those that have been taught
to regard registration and voting as a moral duty, and citi-
zen participation as an important responsibility, will be
more likely to regard the franchise as important, more like-
ly, that is, to value it highly, and to experience a feeling
of accomplishment or virtue (i.e., a benefit) upon exer-
cising the franchise.

And with respect to the "cost" side, there is similar
variance. There are varying rules, regulations and prac-
tices imposed by the central authority for both registration
and voting--i.e., number of polling places, placement of
polling places, length of period during which polling places
are open (which increase or decrease the effort necessary
to vote and register, i.e., the cost). Then there are often
such explicit costs as special fees (poll taxes). Such
"costs" are, moreover, mediated by a varying set of infra-
structures that condition the context of the act of register-
ing and/or voting: communications infra-structures that de-
termine the "cost" to the individual of relevant information
as to the time, place and purpose of registration and voting;
transportation infra-structures that determine the "cost"
to the individual of travel to register and vote; and educa-
tion-income structures (the extent and nature of education
in an area and the relative degree of wealth in an area)
that determine the relative impact on the individual of all
explicit and implicit costs.

In addition, the impact of costs and benefits upon a given individual can be altered by the actions of other individuals who consciously seek either to make more or less costly, more or less beneficial, the acts of registration and voting. Such individuals may be public relations experts or representatives of mass media who sweeten the benefit side of the equation by interpreting the act in ways that are especially appealing to an individual and lessen the "cost" side by providing transportation and information. Such individuals may be administrative officials who facilitate registration and voting, who exhort citizens to do their duty and register to vote, or who impede (misleading or threatening the would-be registrant or voter) the process. Such individuals may be private citizens, motivated by such non-partisan concerns as commitment to values of "good citizenship" and "participatory democracy," who sponsor educational campaigns and "get out the vote" drives. Finally, such individuals may be the representatives of partisan causes and candidates that have a stake in both seeing that their potential supporters are fully mobilized for a given contest and that their opponents are not.

Thus the statistics that I outlined above (Registration, Poll, and Turnout) reflect a complex set of forces. One way of summarizing these factors is the following characterization:

(I) Elite activity: the initiatives of government de-
   cision-makers, administrators, public-minded
   citizens and partisan organizers.

(II) The Environment: the intervening infra-structures
    that mediate elite activity and condition the rela-
    tive costs of individual action.

(III) Citizen Receptivity: the values and interests of
     the citizenry with respect to registering and vot-
     ing.

In seeking a measure of partisan mobilization one is
seeking a measure of the effectiveness of one specific com-
ponent of category I, partisan activity, mediated through
II (that is holding II constant) on the template of the
partisan component of III. That is, one is seeking to
measure from constituency to constituency the effectiveness
of partisan appeals, reflecting both the activities of parti-
san elites and the receptivity of partisan constituents in
specific facilitating environments. The official Uganda
Government reports of the two national elections and pub-
lished studies of other African elections suggest that where
political parties were, prior to the elections, weak or non-
existent, the major task of registering eligible fell to ad-
ministrative officials.[13] Subsequently, however, party
elites were primarily responsible for mobilizing voters from

_____

[13]Peagram (1961), op. cit., pp. 4, 19 and 20.

the rolls of those registered. This division of labor was by no means complete. Political parties have often worked to register voters, and administrative officials have often striven to encourage registered voters to vote in the general elections. Nevertheless, the relative "successes" or registration, on the one hand, and the poll, on the other, often apparently reflect the activities of different groups.

Can this insight be useful in our efforts to devise a measure for partisan mobilization? I believe it can. For the fact that new factors can be associated with the act of voting and that these factors are directly traceable to partisan mobilization, suggests that we have only to isolate these factors to obtain a measure of partisan mobilization. How is this to be achieved? Can we assume that the forces represented in the above analysis: elite activity, intervening infra-structures and mass receptivity remain constant except for the addition, on the one hand, in Class I of explicitly partisan appeals, and in Class Two, of explicitly partisan predispositions? I believe we can. If so, then our task becomes that of finding a way to isolate the old factors and thus to assess the impact of the new. The old factors are all reflected in "Percent Registered" (Registration). The new and the old are conjoined in the statistic "Poll." Our task is thus to predict from Registration what the value of Poll would be without the addition of any new inputs and then compare that value with the real

value of Poll. The resulting differences, for each con-
stituency, should be a measure of the strength of partisan
associated factors.

Can we predict Poll, knowing Registration, assuming
that all factors associated with the three sets of variables
(Classes I, II and III) are constant? Let us use "p" to
designate the probability that a given individual will
participate in the political act of registration. Then our
question becomes, assuming that the act of registration and
voting are essentially similar with respect to the factors
of cost and benefit described above, with the sole and im-
portant exception of the addition of partisan activity and
response, and then leaving out the effect of partisan activ-
ity and response, will "p" be also the probability that a
given individual who registered will participate in the
political act of voting.

First, let us ask if the central assumption of the above
sentence is plausible. Are indeed registration and voting
similar acts of political participation, similarly situated
that is with respect to the non-partisan factors of the
three classes of explanatory variables? An argument for
such an assertion is as follows: Those who register in each
constituency are those for whom the benefits from regis-
tration outweigh the costs of this act of political partici-
pation. Since registration is simply a preliminary act to
voting itself, the same benefit structure that applies to

registration would be at least a component part of that
applied to voting. That is to say people register in order
to be able to vote, whether from a sense of civic duty or
some form of compulsion. Thus the value they attach to
the act of voting is similar to the value they attach to
the act of registration save for the additional value that
voting may have as an explicitly partisan act. Thus the
"benefit" structure, partisan appeal aside, is similar.

The "cost" structure does, however, appear to vary from
registration to vote. Instead of a month to register, there
is only a day to vote. Yet this advantage, this lower cost
for registration, is apparently offset by the greater pub-
licity attached to the vote. Furthermore, when the place
of registration and polling are the same as was the case in
Uganda, the cost of access to each act of political partici-
pation tends to be similar.

On the whole then, leaving out partisan mobilization,
the cost/benefit structure for poll appears roughly similar
to that for registration. Now, let us ask whether, the
central assumptions being plausible, the conclusion, $P = f(R)$,
follows. Let us examine some examples. Assume the follow-
ing two hypothetical constituencies. Each has 1,000 eligible
voters. For convenience sake I have grouped them by mul-
tiples of 100s and given each group of 100 a common "propen-
sity" to participate in the electoral system, that is "p"
is the probability that any member of the particular subset

will register and all else being equal the probability that
once registered the individual in the subset will vote.

Constituency One

number of eligibles	"p"	number Regis.	number Vote
100	0.1	10	01
100	0.3	30	09
100	0.5	50	25
100	0.7	70	49
500	0.9	450	405
1,000	0.61	610	489

REGISTRATION = 61.0
POLL = 80.2
TURNOUT = 48.9

Constituency Two

number of eligibles	"p"	number Regis.	number Vote
300	0.1	30	03
100	0.2	20	04
100	0.3	30	09
100	0.4	40	16
100	0.5	50	25
100	0.6	60	36
100	0.7	70	49
100	0.8	80	64
1,000	0.38	380	206

REGISTRATION = 38.0
POLL = 54.2
TURNOUT = 20.6

With the propensities remaining constant across both regis-
tration and poll, the statistic "poll" reflects these pro-
pensities as much as does registration and is apparently a
function then of Registration.

However, Poll is not an exact function of Registration (all things being the same, that is "p" being constant). For constituencies of similar Registration may well have different Polls providing only that the internal arrangement of propensities are different. Consider for example the second constituency displayed above.

If the number of eligibles were arrayed with the following set of propensities:

```
300 -- 0.1        100 -- 0.5        100 -- 0.7
300 -- 0.3        100 -- 0.6        100 -- 0.8
```

the number registered would be the same but the number voting would be less (204 rather than 206) and hence the poll would be slightly less.

Nevertheless, as the above example indicates, the arrangement would have to be considerably different before a major impact would be felt on the statistic Poll. Thus while Poll is not an exact function of Registration, all things being constant, Registration does provide a rough indicator of the level of Poll that one might expect. Further a set of constituencies in the same country might be expected to exhibit reasonably similar patterns of internal distribution of propensities and hence display a reasonably consistent pattern of $P = f(R)$.

What, then, is the nature of this function? Is it essentially linear? Consider, for example, eight separate constituencies characterized by the following simple pattern of "p" distributions:

Constituency	first half p =	second half p =	R	P
1	10	20	15%	17%
2	10	30	20	25
3	10	40	25	34
4	10	50	30	43
5	10	60	35	53
6	10	70	40	63
7	10	80	45	72
8	10	90	50	82

The distribution is nearly linear. A more "erratic" pattern
of "p" distributions, however, will exhibit a corresponding-
ly erratic correlation between R and P. This is then to say
that while P is not an exact linear function of R, the best
approximation that we can achieve, without detailed knowl-
edge of the "p" distribution for each constituency is a
linear estimate.

Now we come to the problem of establishing a plausible
linear equation for our specific Uganda data. Again we are
unable to determine the exact nature of this equation for
the available data. We are left again with the task of
attempting the best estimate. I suggest that without
additional information we should take the equation of the
regression line of Registration (1961) and Poll (1961) and
the equation of the regression line of Registration (1962)
and Poll (1962) for our best estimates. The scatter dia-
grams for these distributions and the resulting equations
are displayed in Charts Two and Three. Now the residuals
for each of these two equations are measures of the deviation
of P from the expected relationship. Thus they can in each

CHART. 2 — 1961 UGANDA ELECTION, REGISTRATION AND POLL.

POLL

Y = 0.40X + 51.07

r = 0.678

REGISTRATION

CHART 3 — 1962 UGANDA ELECTION: REGISTRATION AND POLL

POLL

$Y = 0.60X + 23.79$

$r = 0.757$

REGISTRATION

case serve as estimates of the factors unique to the act of voting that affected participation. These are, as we have already said, the factors associated with partisan mobilization.

Let us emphasize again the roughness of these measures. They are, however, the best that can be constructed without entertaining even more speculative assumptions (the distribution of "p" for instance) for which there is no extant data. Thus let us use the best estimates that we have-- the residual of Poll on Registration for each election as a measure of partisan political mobilization.

To derive such a measure we need to establish three measurement primitives: number eligible, number registered, number voted. Both Peagram Reports give totals of registered voters and the vote for each constituency, from which I have calculated poll for both elections.[14] The data are presented in Table 5. The achievement of an accurate estimate of the size of the eligible electorate, however, presents the analyst with two problems. It will be necessary to estimate the population 21 and over within each constituency at the end of each registration period (in the late summer of 1960 and in the early spring of 1962). And it will also be necessary to determine the extent of disenfranchise-

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[14] Peagram (1961), op. cit., Appendix C and Appendix I; Peagram (1962), op. cit., Appendix F and Appendix J.

TABLE 5

POLL, 1961 AND 1962 UGANDA ELECTIONS

Cnstncy	Poll-'61	Poll-'62	Cnstncy	Poll-'61	Poll-'62
07	60.7	57.8	37	----	66.6
08	59.3	53.3	38	67.8	57.4
09	70.7	58.8	39	77.0	80.0
10	44.4	61.9	40	88.9	72.5
11	77.1	72.4	41	90.6	72.7
12	81.6	72.4	42	----	79.1
13	86.5	74.9	43	88.2	87.1
14	77.3	65.5	44	92.3	79.8
15	83.3	64.1	45	91.7	88.8
16	70.3	16.7	46	94.4	86.4
17	72.2	66.4	47	95.7	90.0
18	58.6	49.4	48	91.4	84.1
19	67.0	47.3	49	94.3	86.4
20	68.6	49.7	50	74.0	56.3
21	63.8	49.6	51	60.2	38.9
22	50.1	48.4	52	84.4	83.7
23	65.7	39.6	53	89.9	85.8
24	68.1	41.8	54	91.6	90.7
25	73.8	51.9	55	93.0	87.8
26	71.6	37.0	56	91.1	85.2
27	76.7	52.8	57	91.1	84.9
28	88.6	77.5	58	68.2	52.9
29	82.9	69.9	59	70.0	31.2
30	87.4	80.6	60	58.4	48.9
31	83.4	77.3	61	73.9	57.5
32	----	33.3			
33	37.6	23.7			
34	52.0	23.0			
35	65.9	64.0			
36	62.7	58.4			

ment due to the legal rubrics under which the 1961 election was conducted.

First, a consideration of the problem of estimating the proportion of the population 21 and over: We are dependent upon the 1959 census for information about age distributions in Uganda. This census consisted of two parts: a general census where enumerators recorded limited data about every African who was present in the Protectorate on a given night (the 18th/19th of August), and the sample census.[15] In the sample census a 5% sample of the population of each district was asked a further set of questions. From these samples, estimates were made of several attributes of the population of each district.

In the general census age was determined with respect to the following classifications:

> i) under 1 year
>
> ii) 1 to 5 years
>
> iii) 6 to 15 years
>
> iv) 16 to 45 years
>
> v) over 45 years.

From such a table (the method was to construct a smooth

---

[15]This census was officially reported in two separate publications. The first (Uganda, General African Census, 1959, op. cit.) was mimeographed by the East African Statistical Department and was released in two volumes (and six parts). The second (Uganda Census, 1959: African Population), op. cit., was printed and contained the results of the sample survey as well as summaries of the results of the general census.

curve from categorical data and then to read back data into narrower discrete categories), five-year age estimates were rated for each district.

On the basis of such calculations, we are presented in the published record of the census with two different sources of information about age distribution. In the general summary edition census tables for each district display population distribution by five year intervals. In the detailed published record of the Census (Volume One, Population by Sex and Age Group to Protectorate Census Area Level) population data are given, separately for men and women, and for those under 16 and those 16 and over, for each sub-county.[16] For each voting constituency, therefore, the aggregation of sub-county statistics will produce the size of the population (men and women) 16 and over.

Surprisingly, the population 16 years and over for each constituency does not accurately reflect the total population for each constituency. Chart Four describes the weak relationship between these two variables. This discrepancy suggests that all estimates from one age category to another will be misleading.[17] An explanation for these differences

---

[16]Uganda, General African Census, 1959, op. cit., Volume One.

[17]Thus, in studies of "participation," a series of statistics from one society, based upon some "available" population parameter, such as total adult population, may not be comparable with similar data from another society.

Population 16 and over

('000)

CHART 4: AFRICAN POPULATION 16 AND OVER BY TOTAL AFRICAN POPULATION FOR UGANDA VOTING DISTRICTS (1959 CENSUS)

Total Population

10 Squares to the Inch

apparently lies in the fact that different tribes in Africa manifest different grids of population age-distribution. This is illustrated by Charts (Five through Seven) of population grids by district (substantially coterminous with tribe) in Uganda. Setting the population "four and under" equal to 100 for each district, these charts proceed to set forth the relative age distributions at other levels. Note especially the flat descent of the distribution in Bunyoro and Teso. In both districts there are a large number of citizens over thirty relative to the population under four. Kigezi, on the other hand, has a very young population, the curve falling off markedly after puberty. It is likely that this reflects patterns of out-migration rather than major differences in the birth rate, although the birth rate itself does vary from district to district and hence from tribe to tribe. (The crude birth rate of Teso is 31 (per thousand), while that of Bukedi is 50; the crude birth rate of Bunyoro is 32 while that of Kigezi is 50.)

However, this discrepancy--between total population and population "16 and over"--is not itself a problem in estimating population "21 and over." It is, nonetheless, indicative of a real difficulty for it casts doubt on the use of "16 and over" figures for deriving "21 and over" estimates. Can, that is, the population "16 and over" be an estimate of population "21 and over"? Is there, that is to say, no significant difference in the population

CHART 5

EASTERN PROVINCE

AGE DISTRIBUTION: MALE AND FEMALE

(Based upon the 1959 Census, with population under five set equal to 100, for each District.)

Teso

Busoga

Bugisu

Bukedi

Age Sets

CHART 6: NORTHERN PROVINCE

AGE DISTRIBUTION: MALE AND FEMALE

[1959 CENSUS]

(Based upon each district's population in the under five range set equal to 100.)

Age Sets

West Nile
Karamoja
Acholi
Lango

Karamoja
Acholi
Lango
West Nile

CHART 7

WESTERN PROVINCE

AGE DISTRIBUTION: MALE AND FEMALE

(Based upon the 1959 Census,
with population under five
set equal to 100 for
each district.)

Kigezi

Ankole

Toro

Bunyoro

Age Sets

"16 to 21" across constituencies? Note that in Table 6
the proportion of the population age "15 to 20," of the
total population, varies by as much as 9.5% from district
to district.

No age distribution statistics for the sub-counties,
beyond the simple dichotomy "under 16" and "16 and over,"
are available. However, at the district level there are
important demographic tools: five year age groupings, death
rates, and rates of infant mortality. With these data, the
number of people within each district "21 and older" at the
time of the census can be estimated. Assuming constant birth
and death rates, we can estimate as well within each district
the likely population "21 and older" for several years after
the census. Such calculations have been made and then ap-
plied at the sub-county level to estimate in effect the
population "21 and over" for each sub-county in Uganda one
year and 10 months after the 1959 Uganda Census, the last
day, that is, for registration for the 1961 election, and
similarly for the end of the 1962 election registration
period.

Following is the argument and the formula for determin-
ing for each constituency an estimate of the African popula-
tion "21 and over" at the close of registration in 1960:

SYMBOLS USED IN THE DETERMINATION:

   c - total population "16 and over" for the con-
       stituency

TABLE 6

POPULATION 15 TO 19 AS PERCENTAGE
OF TOTAL POPULATION OVER 15
BY DISTRICT IN UGANDA

District	Percentage 15-19[*]
Mubende	10.6
East Mengo	11.8
Masaka	12.3
West Mengo	13.2
Teso	13.7
Bunyoro	14.3
Toro	15.6
Busoga	15.6
Bugisu	16.1
Bukedi	17.0
West Nile	17.6
Kigezi	17.7
Ankole	17.7
Lango	18.1
Acholi	18.5
Karamoja	20.0

[*]As the five year population figures were available to
only two significant digits, these figures cannot be trusted
to more than two significant figures. Total population,
for purposes of calculation in this table, was derived by
summing the five year age groups (to two significant figures)
for ages 15-19 and above.

> a - population "15 to 20" (district)
>
> b - population "15 and over" (district)
>
> d - crude death rate (district)
>
> e - population under one (district)
>
> g - total population (district)
>
> r - crude birth rate (district)
>
> i - infant mortality (district)

A Verbal Statement of the Problem:

The number eligible to vote in a constituency shall be determined by taking the population "16 and over" for the constituency at the time of the 1959 Census and subtracting from that an estimate of the population "16 years to 19 years 10 months" at the time of the census (i.e., that population that one year and two months later would not yet have reached 21) and further subtracting an estimate (for the constituency) of all adults 19 years and 10 months old or older at the time of the census that would have died during the period of one year and two months that intervened between the taking of the Census and registration.

A Mathematical Rendering of the Problem:

$E = c - c$, times that proportion of the 16+ population in the district as a whole who were 16 to 19 years 10 months at the time of registration - estimate for constituency of adults 19 years and 10 months or older at the time of the Census, times 1 and 1/6th the annual death rate

in the district as a whole for adults 19 years 10
months and older.

That is:

$$E = c - c\frac{(a - (7/30)a)}{b - (1/5)\,a} - (c - c\frac{(b - 28/30)a)}{b - (1/5)\,a}) \text{ times}$$

1 and 1/6th the district level number of deaths per
year of people 19 years 10 months and over as a propor-
· tion of those 19 years and 10 months and over.

That is:

$$E = c - c\frac{(a - 7/30)a)}{b - (1/5)\,a} - (c - c\frac{(b - 14/15)\,a)}{b - (1/5)\,a}) (7/6)$$

(district level number of deaths per year of people 19
years and ten months and over) $(\dfrac{1}{b - (14/15)\,a})$

The phrase in parenthesis above: "district level number of
deaths. . ." can be viewed as (deaths over 1 year) times
(people 19 years 10 months and over as a proportion of the
total population 1 year or over) or (all deaths - infant
deaths) $\dfrac{(b - (14/15)\,a)}{g - e}$. "All deaths - infant deaths" can

be expressed by the phrase: $\dfrac{d(g)}{10^3} - \dfrac{r\,(1)\,(g)}{10^6}$.

Thus we have the formula:

$$E = c - c\,\frac{(a\,(1 - 7/30))}{b - (1/5)\,a} - (c - c\frac{(b - (14/15)a)}{b - (1/5)\,a}) (7/6)$$

$$\frac{(d\,(g)}{10^3} - \frac{r\,(1)\,(g)}{10^6}) \frac{(b - (14/15)\,a)}{g - e} (1\ \frac{}{b - (14/15)\,a})$$

OR

$$E = c(1 - \frac{23 (a)}{6 (5(b)-a)} - \frac{7(g)}{6000 (g-e)}) (\frac{d-r(1)}{1000}) (\frac{a-15(b)-14(a)}{15(b)-3(a)})$$

The results of this set of calculations are found in Table 7.

Now with estimates for the African population "21 and over" in each constituency established, attention can turn to the problems presented by the restricted franchise of 1961. (Virtually universal adult suffrage was in effect for the 1962 election.) The law governing the 1961 election, with respect to eligibility, is as follows:[18]

9. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 10 of this Ordinance any person with the following qualifications shall be entitled to have his name entered on a register of electors in an electoral district--

    (a) he is twenty-one years of age or over; and

    (b) he is resident in such electoral district; and

    (c) he is a British subject or a British protected person or has lived in the Protectorate for five years within the eight years immediately preceding his application for his name to be entered on the register; and

    (d) he or his spouse--

---

[18] The law governing the elections was The Legislative Council (Elections) Ordinance, 1957 (No. 20 of 1957) as amended by the Legislative Council (Elections)(Amendment) Ordinance, 1960 (No. 220 of 1960) passed by the Legislative Council, on 30th June, 1960. See appendix A in Peagram (1961), op. cit.

TABLE 7

AFRICAN POPULATION 21 AND OVER BY CONSTITUENCIES
ESTIMATED FROM 1959 CENSUS DATA
AS OF DECEMBER 30th, 1961

Cnstncy	Population	Cnstncy	Population
07	45,133	37	38,452
08	41,150	38	41,443
09	37,435	39	30,819
10	34,357	40	39,428
11	34,580	41	39,906
12	43,679	42	39,850
13	38,755	43	36,851
14	44,076	44	35,273
15	40,960	45	39,091
16	44,785	46	39,802
17	50,300	47	35,260
18	48,849	48	38,751
19	52,223	49	39,661
20	47,822	50	35,913
21	42,933	51	36,403
22	51,343	52	29,733
23	50,716	53	32,370
24	52,351	54	30,281
25	57,288	55	31,515
26	53,561	56	33,277
27	51,983	57	31,640
28	29,460	58	37,282
29	32,977	59	42,269
30	31,174	60	44,405
31	30,517	61	40,376
32	25,277		
33	21,131		
34	20,386		
35	35,977		
36	42,835		

(i) is the owner of any freehold, leasehold or mailo land in the electoral district, or occupies any land under a written occupation licence; or

(ii) for one year immediately preceding the application for registration has occupied land on his own account for agricultural or pastoral purposes in the electoral district, or for such a period has paid busulu or rent for Crown Land in the electoral district, or has been lawfully exempted from paying such busulu or rent; or

(iii) has a cash income of Shs. 1,500 or more a year or property worth Shs. 6,000 or more; or

(e) he—

(i) is over forty years of age; or

(ii) is able to read and write his own language; or

(iii) has been employed in the service of the Protectorate Government, the Kabaka's Government, a District Council or an African Local Government for a continuous period of five years and his employment has not been terminated with dismissal; or

(iv) has been in regular paid employment in agriculture, commerce or industry during five years out of the eight years immediately prior to his application for registration; or

(v) is at the time of his application to register, or at any time has been the holder of one of the offices

set out in the Second Schedule to this Ordinance.

It is not readily apparent precisely who and how many were eligible to vote under this law. While the law provides criteria to test the eligibility of anyone who presents himself or herself to a registration official, estimates as to the numbers of people disenfranchised or their relative distribution among constituencies must proceed haltingly from an analysis of the law itself. There are two possible approaches that might be taken to reach these estimates. First, statements of interested parties can be searched to determine the presumed intent of the law. Second, based on knowledge of the demography of Ugandan society, a logical estimate of the categories of people that would be eligible and ineligible under the law could be attempted and estimates made of their relative numbers in each constituency. Let us proceed along both lines--taking up first an analysis of the history of the election law and the views expressed toward it by concerned citizens, the British dominated official majority in the Legislative Council and the African minority on the same Council.

Delimitations of the franchise was an important subject of debate in the Legislative Council as far back as the 1958 elections.[19] British officials then demanded a limited

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[19]All standard works on the political history of Uganda have some passing reference to these arguments. See my own historical account in Chapter Two. Official documents of this period trace this debate in part. See especially,

franchise based upon the extent of the elector's "stake" or involvement in the productive processes of the society. The intent of this position was to enfranchise the culti- vator of land and any who either held substantial property or performed important and skilled work. The Administrative Secretary, J. V. Wild, argued in the Legislative Council in August of 1957 that

> we have always been clear that the peasant producers of food and economic crops in this country must have the vote.[20]

A similar statement of Government intent, contained in the report of the joint negotiating committee of the Protectorate and Kabaka's governments, stressed as criteria for enfran- chisement: "a sense of responsibility and/or the capacity to understand the issues involved."[21] How would this general principle work out in practice? On the whole most men, Wild opinioned (up to 80% in some areas), would be enfran- chised but relatively few women would have the vote.[22]

Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1959?) (Wild Committee Report) and Elec- tions to Legislative Council (Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1957/58) (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1957). Nonetheless, the best source, and also the most lively, were the debates in the Legislative Council: Legislative Council Proceedings (Entebbe: Government Printer, annual).

[20]Legislative Council Proceedings, op. cit., 8th of August, 1957, p. 52.

[21]Elections to Legislative Council, op. cit., p. 20.

[22]Legislative Council Proceedings, op. cit., 8th Aug- ust, 1957, p. 52.

However, the specific rules that were promulgated proved difficult to apply uniformly in all areas.[23] Thus the Wild Committee, established to make recommendations on the political fate of the country, while unanimously approving the basic conception behind the 1958 franchise (that the elector should have a "stake" in the country--in the words of the report, "a close association and a stake in the country"--recommended the enfranchisement of virtually all adults, replacing the detailed conditions of the 1957 regulations with a simple residence requirement: right of occupancy over land or presence in Uganda for five years out of the eight years prior to registration. It was also recommended in this report that such a right of occupancy should be assumed to include wives.

The Protectorate Government did not fully implement the recommendations of the Wild Committee. Standing by the principle that the electorate must be "responsible," the government agreed only to "extend" still further the franchise--keeping the form of the 1957 law while loosening its writ.[24] Central changes were, however, an unambiguous

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[23]In particular, because of variations in tribal custom, it happened in 1958 that "in some districts virtually all the women were regarded as being qualified under section 9 (1) (c) (11) whereas in other districts it was held that women could not occupy land on their own account." (Wild Committee Report, p. 24)

[24]See the Legislative Council debate on the matter (March, 1960) and especially the closing statement by the Chief Secretary, Sir Charles Hartwell, Legislative Council

assertion that women would have the same right to vote as
their husbands and the specific enfranchisement of all adults
40 years old or older. In introducing the Bill in its Com-
mittee Stage in the Uganda Legislative Council the Attorney-
General, R. L. E. Dreschfield, stated the government's posi-
tion as follows:

> At the present moment, it is considered
> necessary that a voter should, in addition
> to the basic qualification I have men-
> tioned [residence] have some stake in the
> Protectorate. At the present moment we
> believe that a voter should be something
> more than just a mere resident in the
> Protectorate.[25]

He then asserted that these

> qualifications for voters . . . cover
> practically every man and woman in
> the Protectorate who has any real stake
> in the country, who has any real right
> to vote.[26]

This was, interestingly enough, as close as any gov-
ernment official came to estimating the effect of the new
franchise. From our standpoint, it is a vague judgment
indeed. A government supporter and representative of the
European community, Mr. G. D. Cannon, improved somewhat
upon the vague estimates of government spokesmen. He opined

Proceedings, op. cit., 8th March, pp. 402-409; and the
statement by the Attorney General, R. L. E. Dreschfield,
13th June, 1960, pp. 1359 ff.

[25]Ibid., p. 1360.

[26]Ibid., p. 1361.

that at least 90% of the African population would have the
vote and even stated who, in his judgment, would be left
out:

> . . . the only Africans who are left out
> of the franchise are the immigrant labour
> who are under 40 years of age, who cannot
> write and who are not earning Shs. 112
> a month.[27]

African representatives were equally as reluctant to
provide quantitative estimates of the Bill's effect. In
the debate on the Bill in the Committee State, A. M. Obote,
after posing the "classic example" of "a person working in
Lugazi Sugar Works who does not occupy land on his own ac-
count and does not have sufficient cash income to qualify
under that section of the law and is under 40 years of age,"
went on to argue that ". . .there are thousands and thousands
of these labourers in Lugazi. There are thousands and
thousands of these labourers in Kakira. They are everywhere
in the country."[28]

Thus there was little direct statement on the part
either of the government or the opposition on the specific
extent of disenfranchisement practiced by the new election

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[27] Ibid., 14th June, p. 1387.

[28] Legislative Council Proceedings, op. cit., 17th
June, 1960, p. 1462. Later in the debate another African
member questioned whether or not young men still living at
home could vote under the Bill (Ibid., p. 1470). Throughout
the debate African members suggested that the length and com-
plexity of the requirements would intimidate otherwise quali-
fied adults who might fear the intent of questions as to
their wealth or education or relation to the land.

regulations. The debate, on the whole, dealt with the "principles" involved and the discussion's fervor lay more in the importance attached to these principles, by both the government and African representative members, than in the substantive effect of the requirements. Thus African members expressed deep concern over the implied enfranchisement of Italian residents in Uganda, surely a negligible number of people. What can be concluded, I believe, from a study of the legislative debates is that disenfranchisement was probably minimal and therefore the representatives were neither really interested in, nor knowledgeable about, the precise nature of the limitations. It was the principle, not the application of the principle, that fueled debate on the franchise.

The second approach to the problem of the 1961 electoral regulations takes a careful look at the regulations themselves. Interested in knowing not only whether or not "x" numbers of citizens were disenfranchised but also who, and where, for we need to know the pattern of disenfranchisement with respect to electoral constituencies if we are to accurately estimate eligible voters by constituency, we must try to assess the impact of the regulations on various demographic groups in the population, and the distribution of these groups among sub-counties.

For those "under 21" and "over 40" there is no ambiguity in the regulations. No one "under 21" could vote; everyone

"40 or over" was eligible in both elections. Also there is no doubt as to the exclusion in both elections of newly arrived immigrants (less than six months for British subjects and an extended residence requirement for immigrants from non-British territories.)

For established residents, however, between the ages of 21 and 40, it is unclear as to who could and who could not vote in the first of the two national elections. There are two sets of discriminating regulations. The first applies only to the individual in question; the second applies to both the individual in question and his spouse. (I am using "his" to denote the compound "his/her" as is the practice in the electoral regulations.) Let us examine first, the latter set of regulations, those jointly enfranchising both partners to a marriage with respect to the attainments of either. The intent of these regulations seems to have been to enfranchise, in the electoral district where its productive activity takes place, the adult nuclear family of the yoeman farmer, whether subsistence traditionalist or cash-crop market-oriented modernist. It also seems intended to enfranchise the nuclear family of status or wealth--ownership of land, of property worth 6,000 or more shillings (nearly a thousand dollars), or with an income of at least 1,500 shillings a year ($17 a month).

The other set of qualifications refer to the individual alone (i.e., his or her spouse would not automatically

qualify if he or she were to qualify.) They can be reduced to two components: literacy and regular employment. A man or woman who had maintained regular employment (five out of the preceding eight years) or was literate in at least one language was eligible to register. Domestic employment seems to have been excluded (only "payed employment in agriculture, commerce, or industry"). Domestic servants, however, who either farmed themselves on the side or whose wives farmed, would thus have qualified for the franchise.

It thus appears that the following groups were ineligible to vote in the 1961 election, although physically present in the country, twenty-one years of age or older, and enumerated in the 1959 African Census:

1. Non-British subjects, resident less than five out of the preceding eight years.

2. Workers making less than 1500/ a year who have not been in regular paid employment for five out of the last eight years provided that they or their spouses did not farm on their own account.

3. Domestic servants with the same proviso as in "2."

4. The unemployed with the same proviso as in "2."

Can the extent to which each of these groups were distributed across constituencies be determined such that an appropriate correction factor be subtracted from the population "21 and over" in each constituency? With this goal in mind, let us examine each group in turn.

How many non-British subjects were there in the country that had been resident less than five out of the preceding eight years? Italians, Americans, Swedes?--a very small part of the population. There was only one major group that might be important in a calculation of persons in this category: migrant labourers from the neighboring Belgian trusteeships of Ruanda and Urundi. Estimates vary as to the number of such immigrants and to their length of stay in the country. Possibly as many as 35,000 adult males seeking work passed yearly in Uganda.[29] Most would spend less than a year in Uganda.[30] Many, however, would return again to Uganda.[31] And yet this movement may not necessitate a major adjustment in our estimate of the eligible electorate. Most migrants either moved to the major cities of Jinja or Kampala or settled either as tenants or labourers on the land of Buganda landowners.[32] This fact is reflected in sex dif-

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[29] Any estimate is fanciful. Note the discrepancies and qualifications in A. I. Richards (ed.), Economic Development and Tribal Change (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd., 1954), especially Appendix A; and A. I. Richards, "The Travel Routes and the Travellers," ibid., Chapter III, p. 53 ff.

[30] Walter Elkin, Migrants and Proletarians: Urban Labour in the Economic Development of Uganda (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 4.

[31] A. I. Richards, "Methods of Settlement in Buganda," in Richards (ed.), op. cit., p. 136.

[32] A. I. Richards, "The Problem and the Methods," in Richards, op. cit., p. 4. Elkins, op. cit., p. 34. J. M. Fortt, "The Distribution of the Immigrant and Ganda Population within Buganda," in Richards, op. cit., p. 79.

ferential statistics from the 1959 Census. Commenting upon the fact that short-term migrants did not bring wives, the Census Report states "a crude approximation of the number of short-term migrants is given by the difference between the males and females."[33] Only in Buganda is there a marked surplus of men over women of working age. (In Charts Eight, Nine and Ten the contrast is illustrated between a Buganda district (West Mengo) and two non-Baganda districts, Lango, a district of little out-migration, and West Nile, a district of comparatively great out-migration.) Thus, as we have excluded urban and Buganda constituencies from our analysis, we need not concern ourselves with the special problems posed by the migration into Uganda of people from Urundi and Ruanda.

The next group to be considered are those who have not "been in regular paid employment . . . during five years" out of the preceding eight and who earn less than 1500/ a year. This provision of the election law presumably excluded more than just migrant workers from Belgian territories; it may have excluded migrant workers from the Sudan, Kenya and Tanganyika; it may further have excluded men who had migrated from the district of their birth to seek work in another part of the country and did not leave behind a spouse to farm or herd of their own account.

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[33]Uganda Census, op. cit., p. 20. Richards, "The Travel Routes and the Travellers," op. cit., p. 64.

CHART 8

WEST MENGO

AGE DISTRIBUTION: MALE AND FEMALE

MALE

FEMALE

CHART 9

LANGO

AGE DISTRIBUTION: MALE AND FEMALE

CHART 10

WEST NILE

AGE DISTRIBUTION: MALE AND FEMALE

(thousands)

MALE

FEMALE

Would many such workers have been disenfranchised?
We know from several published studies of the work patterns
of the Uganda worker that unskilled workers generally earn
less than 1500 shillings and that migrants from distant
parts of the country do not stay long on the job.[34] (Some
of course move from job to job; while others return time and
time again from their place of birth to seek work in more
prosperous areas.) Probably no more than ten percent of un-
skilled workers could claim eligibility as a result of hav-
ing spent five out of a preceding eight years at regular
employment.

Can the relative number of this disenfranchised group
be determined for each constituency? Allowed the following
assumptions, an estimate of the number of workers in the
towns and sub-counties of Uganda who were excluded by the
election requirements can be made: (1) Workers employed in
the same district where they were born are likely to also
farm on their own account and be eligible on this basis.
(2) At best only ten percent of the workers who make less
than 125 Shs. a month and who were born in another district
have had regular paid employment five years out of the pre-
ceding eight. (3) Nearly all workers making less than 125
Shs. a month are not literate in their own language. (4) Ap-
proximately ten percent of such workers are, however, over

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[34]Elkin, op. cit., pp. 4 ff. and 90 ff.

40 years of age and hence automatically eligible. (This is a generous estimate. Target workers, and most unskilled workers in Uganda are target workers, will by this age have returned to their home district and be settled permanently on the land. The only exceptions would be skilled labourers who are making relatively high salaries and have acculturated themselves to urban life.)

On the basis of the above assumptions, the following conclusion can be drawn: (1) workers working in the district of their birth are eligible; (2) workers making less than 125 Shs. a month and working in a district that is not the district of their birth are likely to be ineligible with the following exceptions: (a) ten percent are over 40 years of age and automatically qualified; (b) ten percent are likely to have worked in regular paid employment for five out of the preceding eight years. Therefore by taking the number of workers making less than 125 Shs. a month and working in a district other than that of their own birth, and then subtracting ten percent from that number, and then by subtracting another ten percent from the subsequent number (or taking 81% of the original number), we achieve an estimate of the number of workers in each district who were not eligible to register under the rubrics of the 1961 Election ordinance. Data necessary to such a determination are available. An annual government report on employment in the Protectorate provides both tables of numbers of employees by

district of work and district of birth and a table that
gives wage levels of African employees by district for both
private and public service employment.[35]

Is there a further method by which one can then assign
this pool of ineligibles at the district level to appropri-
ate voting constituencies within the district? Fortunately,
I believe that there is.

We can assume that the presence and extent of African
wage employment is highly correlated with non-African resi-
dence, a reasonable assumption to make since almost all
private and public enterprises employed Asians and/or Euro-
peans in supervisory positions. Therefore, after determining
the proportion of non-Africans in each constituency, we
have a factor by which we can calculate the proportion of
African wage labourers in each constituency and therefore
estimate the number of ineligibles in each constituency.
Can we, though, determine the number of non-Africans in each
constituency? Fortunately, we can. The published report
of the 1961 election contains a table that gives the total
adult population for each constituency and the census re-
port gives the African population by subcounty.[36] The dif-
ference between these two sets of figures is the non-African

[35]Annual Enumeration of Employees, summary tables pub-
lished in duplicated form by the East African Statistical
Department.

[36]Peagram (1961), op. cit., p. 80 (appendix C); and
Uganda, General African Census, 1959, op. cit., Volume II,
part two.

population.

It was possible to check the accuracy of the election report totals for each constituency and hence to confirm that they do reflect both African and non-African components. This was done by aggregating the data reported by Peagram for each constituency to the district level and similarly aggregating the Census data for the African population. The difference between these two sets of data was the presumed non-African population. These data were compared with the District level totals of non-African population found in the report of the non-African Census. (These data are not available at the subcounty level.)

In only one instance is there a radical departure from the expected relationship. The non-African population for West Nile and Madi is 1203; the difference between the Election Report aggregated figures for these two combined districts and the calculation that I undertook based on Census reports for the African population is 2622. Thus there is an unaccounted difference of more than 1400. Examining the record more closely we note that the difference, hence assumed non-African population, for West Nile and Madi Central (no. 42) is 1560, that is the official election report suggests that there are more than 1500 non-Africans in this constituency. Yet there are no trading centers of any size, nor any large towns in this constituency (the same Census report that publishes the district

level figures for the non-African population also provides
the non-African population by towns and trading centers.)[37]
As the presumed non-African population of the other constitu-
encies in this district correspond with an expected Asian
population based on the town and trading center data, we
might suspect an error in the official election report in
transcribing the total population of this constituency.
An estimate of 141 for the Asian population of this constitu-
ency, conforming to expectations based upon the trading
center and town data, would fulfill the expected correspon-
dence between the district level non-African population as
stated in the Census report and the aggregated differences
at the constituency level between the election report and
my own assessment of African population for each constitu-
ency. Therefore I believe the figure 141 to be a close
approximation of the non-African population of West Nile and
Madi Central, thus completing the set of estimates as to
the number of non-Africans residing in each constituency.

With these estimates in hand an estimate of working low
income ineligibles can be derived for each constituency.
This estimate, presented in Table 8, has been derived accord-
ing to the procedure described in the following outline:

_____

[37]Uganda Census, 1959: Non-African Population (Entebbe:
Government Printer, 1960).

TABLE 8

AN ESTIMATE OF LOW INCOME IRREGULAR EMPLOYEES
UNDER 40 BY CONSTITUENCY INELIGIBLE
TO REGISTER UNDER THE REGISTRATION STATUTUES
GOVERNING THE CONDUCT OF THE 1961 UGANDAN ELECTION

Constituency	Estimate	Constituency	Estimate
07	253	35	126
08	91	36	112
09	235	37	446
10	144	38	15
11	1084		
		39	38
12	83	40	10
13	15	41	120
14	85	42	26
15	105	43	25
16	825	44	1095
17	1838	45	90
18	1202	46	174
19	1911	47	36
20	1183	48	110
21	654	49	73
22	2726		
		50	970
23	160	51	1518
24	521		
25	112	52	32
26	24	53	10
27	110	54	29
		55	12
28	95	56	04
29	748	57	278
30	248		
31	72	58	494
		59	322
32	115	60	2871
33	252	61	3093
34	139		

A Procedure for Estimating Irregular Low Income,

Non-farming/Herding Workers Under 40 in Each Constituency

i) Find the number of employees by district (in private
industry and in public service) that were born outside the
district of their present employment.

ii) Reduce each component (private and public) by that
proportion of all private and all public workers respectively
making more than Shs. 125 a month.

iii) Combine these two figures for each district, thus
creating an estimate of total workers born outside district
of employment and making less than Shs. 125 a month for each
district.

iv) Multiply each district total by 0.81 to correct for
age (40+) and the possibility of regular employment (5 or
more out of preceding 8 years).

v) Calculate the proportion of the total non-African popu-
lation that reside in each constituency within a district.

vi) Apportion the result of step (iv) for each district
among that district's component constituencies with respect
to the ratios calculated in step (v), that is with respect
to the relative non-African population of each constituency.

Let us now turn to the two remaining groups of ineli-
gibles: domestic servants and the unemployed. It is diffi-
cult to estimate the relative numbers of ineligible domestic
employees. It is likely that house servants who were born
in the same area where they have employment would farm and

hence be eligible to vote. Only the wealthy paid their servants enough to induce them to leave an area and travel with the employer to another part of the country. And such servants are likely to be (a) over forty years of age, or (b) literate in their own language, or (c) making 125 Shs. or more a month. Thus the number of domestic servants excluded from the franchise by the 1960 registration requirements were probably minimal and a correction factor seems neither possible nor necessary.

What about the unemployed? There is no easy way to estimate the number of persons who neither farm nor work for wages. One might assume that most of the unemployed would be concentrated in the major cities of Entebbe, Kampala and Jinja, and hence not of concern for this study. Yet some would be present in the capital towns of the districts. Indeed the number of men seeking work, temporarily out of work, or dependent upon the largess of those with wage jobs, should roughly correlate with the extent of wage employment and hence be related to the correction factor we have chosen for low-wage employees. As, however, there is no way of determining the overall numbers involved, even if the proportional distribution might be estimated, we cannot make a determination.

However this failure adds importance to the correction factor for low-wage employees previously calculated. For, if the estimates erred in being too high, the fact that the

unemployed were not taken into account then would help correct that error. And if the error was in the other direction, we are still at least better off with some estimate than with none at all.

The preceding analysis suggests that the estimate of population "21 and over" for each constituency for the 1961 election must be corrected if it is to accurately reflect the eligible electorate for the 1961 election. Moreover, such correction is apparently possible with respect to the low-income working class population. It is presumably neither possible nor necessary with respect to the other categories of ineligibles.

In addition, however, to such a correction for low-income workers, there is one additional adjustment which must be made before achieving a satisfactory estimate of the eligible population for each constituency. As the initial estimate of the population "21 and over" was based upon a census of the <u>African</u> population, it does not include those Asians and other non-Europeans who were eligible to vote in the election. Thus an additional correction factor must be added to our estimate in order to take this segment of the electorate into account. As noted above, the election report states the total population of each constituency. The aggregation of sub-county data from the African census has provided the total African population for each constituency. The difference between these two sets of data is the non-

African population. Age distribution tables for the non-
African population suggest that approximately 50 percent
of the non-African population is "21 and over."[38] As the
number of these who fail to meet the 1961 registration re-
quirement is impossible to determine, I have used a "low"
estimate for the population 21 and over. The error intro-
duced by this expedient is minimal, since the size of the
non-African population is so small.

The adjusted estimate of population "21 and over" for
each constituency is given in Table 9 (for both 1961 and
1962).

With an estimate of eligible population in hand it is
a relatively simple matter to calculate R (registered of
eligible) (Table 9). Having already calculated P (voted of
registered), we can now calculate the residuals of a regres-
sion of P on R, that is the deviation of individual P values
from the expected P values indicated by the general pattern
of relationship holding between R and P. These data for
the residuals from the 1961 and 1962 elections are presented
in Table 10 and Maps V and VI.

[38] 1961 Statistical Abstract (Statistics Branch, Ministry
of Economic Development) (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1961),
Table U. B. 10.

TABLE 9

ELIGIBLE POPULATION AND PERCENT REGISTERED,
1961 AND 1962 UGANDA ELECTIONS

Constituency (and District)	Estimated Population 21+, 1961	Estimated Population 21+, 1962	Prcntg. Rgstrd. 1961	Prcntg. Rgstrd. 1962
07	45,059	47,192	57	62
08	41,125	43,093	56	60
09 BUKEDI	37,375	39,160	61	77
10	34,316	36,027	47	52
11	34,124	36,957	41	64
12	43,668	45,655	52	53
13 BUGISU	38,753	40,458	72	76
14	44,065	46,071	48	51
15	40,946	42,836	44	46
16	44,225	46,917	55	57
17	49,054	52,989	65	65
18	48,034	51,273	65	65
19 BUSOGA	50,927	55,016	51	50
20	47,020	50,197	54	56
21	42,489	44,933	45	45
22	49,494	54,360	51	52
23	50,065	52,904	63	68
24	52,778	55,430	49	55
25 TESO	57,428	59,623	67	70
26	53,639	55,562	60	68
27	52,122	54,122	70	72

TABLE 9--Continued

Constituency (and District)	Estimated Population 21+, 1961	Estimated Population 21+, 1962	Prcntg. Rgstrd. 1961	Prcntg. Rgstrd. 1962
28	29,416	31,028	67	80
29 ACHOLI	32,631	35,078	53	64
30	31,059	32,913	56	68
31	30,484	32,127	56	78
32 KARAMOJA	25,211	26,806	40	44
33	20,986	22,475	11	20
34	20,306	21,638	14	19
35 LANGO	35,992	37,938	51	53
36	42,830	45,107	59	59
37	38,421	40,823	54	55
38	41,443	43,553	55	58
39 WEST NILE	30,881	32,414	59	62
40 AND	39,444	41,366	61	88
41 MADI	40,099	42,154	56	72
42	39,891	41,849	52	64
43	36,891	38,703	32	53
44 ANKOLE	34,513	37,334	82	86
45	39,045	41,384	91	100
46	39,713	41,834	104	112
47	35,242	37,003	102	109
48	38,695	40,701	96	103
49	39,825	41,838	86	96

TABLE 9—Continued

Constituency (and District)	Estimated Population 21+, 1961	Estimated Population 21+, 1962	Prcntg. Rgstrd. 1961	Prcntg. Rgstrd. 1962
50 BUNYORO	35,189	37,505	41	46
51	35,270	38,153	59	60
52 KIGEZI	29,747	31,250	60	78
53	32,374	33,987	97	104
54	30,292	31,820	110	121
55	31,519	33,092	102	110
56	32,279	34,930	110	112
57	31,741	33,586	104	106
58 TORO	36,853	38,921	31	48
59	41,990	44,096	46	57
60	42,145	46,890	21	39
61	37,693	42,491	22	37

TABLE 10

RESIDUALS, 1961 AND 1962
UGANDA ELECTIONS

Constituency	Residual 1961	Residual 1962
07	-13.84	- 5.15
08	-15.21	- 9.69
09	- 3.96	13.49
10	-29.52	- 1.27
11	3.51	9.50
12	7.36	9.34
13	11.14	12.37
14	3.28	2.30
15	9.46	0.89
16	- 4.02	- 1.26
17	- 2.65	3.62
18	-16.36	-13.48
19	- 7.18	-15.82
20	- 5.78	-13.39
21	- 9.96	-13.63
22	-24.11	-14.68
23	- 9.18	-23.22
24	- 5.99	-21.30
25	- 1.17	-10.76
26	- 3.00	-25.81
27	1.44	- 9.93
28	13.55	14.94
29	8.55	7.00
30	13.02	17.78
31	8.92	14.70
32	------	-30.07
33	-34.37	-40.18
34	-20.19	-40.91
35	- 8.22	0.85
36	-11.84	- 4.51
37	------	3.60
38	- 7.63	- 5.64
39	2.45	17.14
40	14.12	10.12
41	16.13	9.97
42	------	16.28
43	15.03	24.05
44	16.43	17.37
45	15.43	26.79
46	22.75	22.32
47	24.27	25.87

TABLE 10--Continued

Constituency	Residual 1961	Residual 1962
48	14.75	19.93
49	18.29	24.31
50	0.44	- 6.92
51	-14.45	-24.10
52	9.81	21.21
53	13.27	21.55
54	19.74	26.93
55	21.57	23.79
56	18.79	21.14
57	19.56	20.79
58	- 4.84	-10.28
59	- 3.83	-31.76
60	-14.07	-14.58
61	1.26	- 6.02

Map 5: Uganda: Partisan Mobilization, 1961

UGANDA

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS (1961 and 1962 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS)

Residual of poll on registration
greater than zero.

No election (seat uncontested).

(The section of the map enclosed with a
stippled border is the Kingdom of Buganda.)

Map 6: <u>Uganda: Partisan Mobilization,</u>
<u>1962</u>

UGANDA

ELECTORAL DISTRICTS (1961 and 1962 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS)

Residual of poll on registration
greater than zero.

(The section of the map enclosed with a
stippled border is the Kingdom of Buganda.)

CHAPTER FOUR

ETHNIC OPPOSITION IN UGANDAN ELECTIONS

In this chapter I will test the first proposition of
this study--that in Uganda, wherever an effective ethnic
opposition could exist, electoral politics was organized
by inter-tribal cleavages; this is, in operational terms,
that in the 1961 and 1962 elections ethnic proportion was
positively correlated with electoral proportion in that
set of constituencies which had a base capable of supporting
tribal conflict.

What are the merits of this proposition? Is it rea-
sonable to assume that tribe will organize partisan activity
in Africa? This question has two foci: (1) what "interests"
might tempt elites to seek a tribal organization of political
life and (2) what promised gains might encourage ethnic
electorates to vote for tribally-identified candidates? Let
us examine these two aspects of the question with regard
first to expressive benefits, second to material payoffs and
finally with respect to "power" itself (as an instrumental
intermediate goal).

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While, as was suggested in Chapter One, the principal
appeal of a tribal organization of politics is its "useful-
ness" in providing a constituency-wide focus for electoral
activity within a heterogeneous electorate for which the
other units of ethnicity (clan, lineage, birthplace) are
small and fragmentary, I would not willingly exclude the
possibility of other appeals, even to acknowledging that
membership in a tribe may have for both elites and mass
great intrinsic importance. For even if tribe is not for
every African the only social reality, it is for many a
reality of high salience. Thus in these opening arguments
for the first proposition of this dissertation I will attempt
to touch several bases. The reader will excuse, I hope, an
unwillingness, or perhaps an unreadiness, to provide an
index of importance for each and every argument. However,
I believe, the sum of many plausible statements as to why
tribe should be a congenial basis for electoral organiza-
tion makes a rather persuasive case.

Expressive Benefits

First, let us consider the distribution, in the after-
math of political victory, of expressive benefits. It should
not be assumed that politicians are simply rational actors.
They are themselves members of a tribe; they may prove loyal
to their tribe's leaders and symbols; they may prove com-
mitted, at least in part, to a life encompassed by the shared
language, ideas, and actions of the tribal community. Can

they then remain unmoved as they participate within, and contribute to, the success of the tribe? Will not an African politician who supports his tribe and advances its interests feel himself a loyal servant of the good cause? He is then rewarded not simply by the esteem in which he may be held by his fellow tribesmen, but through his own sure knowledge of good accomplishments.

Obvious as this would appear, however, it is a contested position in the descriptive literature of African politics. It can be argued that modernist elites bear subtle connections with older tribal elites and come naturally to manifest tribal identity and loyalty. Kilson stresses the fact that traditional elites were able to parlay their privileges during the colonial period into economic and educational advantages for their sons and nephews.[1] Such beneficiaries are likely, so the argument would go, to remain, partially at least, within the tribal nexus. Indeed loyalty to tribal associations has long been noted as characteristic of African elites. Coleman, for example, claims that indigenous political elites in Nigeria, especially in the inter-war period, were in general more concerned with creating tribal structures and advancing tribal goals than in serving pan-Nigerian interests.[2] Staniland generalizing

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[1] Martin Kilson, _Political Change in a West African State_ (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[2] James Smoot Coleman, _Nigeria: Background to Nationalism_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 210.

to all "nationalist" movements suggests that new elites
honored ethnic attachments above class interests.[3]

On the other hand, some analysts have made a sharp
distinction between elites that support traditionalist
structures and those that support nationalist movements.
Emerson, for example, categorizes contemporary elites as
either nationalists or tribalists, and describes the latter
as men who seek to restore traditional privileges and/or
conserve traditional customs.[4] The absolute nature of this
split is emphasized as well by Coleman and Rosberg who argue
that the nationalist ethic eschews all narrow tribalisms as
it upholds the ideal of national unity.[5]

However, while it is true that the generation of
modernizers who came to power in the wake of anticolonial
movements in the late 1950s and early 1960s did condemn tribal
privilege and urge national harmony, they neither altogether
abandoned their past, nor completely denied its traditions.
As they sought the coherence and power of a unified national
movement, they were always careful to retain at least a

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[3]Martin Staniland, "Frantz Fanon and the African Politi-
cal Class," African Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 270 (January 1969),
p. 23.

[4]Rupert Emerson, "Parties and National Integration in
Africa," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), Politi-
cal Parties and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Prince-
ton University Press, 1966), p. 287.

[5]James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., Political
Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1964), p. 663.

symbolic identification with "the people." For example,
W. E. Abraham, a close associate and sometime spokesman for
Nkrumah, and a professional ideologue of the nationalist
elite, pleaded with African leaders to remain close to the
traditional cultures of Africa's people:

> Because that vast majority of our populations
> are still traditional, politicians and states-
> men of Africa have a clear choice before them:
> whether to be as alien to their own people as
> the colonial government has been, to complete
> the deculturisation which set in, and to sub-
> stitute in Africa some new effective culture
> which has no roots in Africa, or whether to
> pose problems, to formulate ideals and national
> objectives meaningfully in terms of the cul-
> tures of Africa, which have in fact continued
> to be in force.[6]

It is, of course, hard to separate rhetoric from
reality. Both those who expressed condemnation of tribalism
and those who voiced respect for traditional cultures may
have had ulterior motives--the former seeking to rationalize
their bid for power by discrediting all oppositions and the
latter courting popular support and legitimization for
elitist policies and programs. Or, in the case of the former,
it may be, as V. O. Key suggests, that a shrewd political
leader will not overstate his partisan loyalties:

> No matter how devoted a party leadership
> may be to its bedrock elements, it attempts
> to picture itself as a gifted synthesizer
> of concord among the elements of society.[7]

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[6] W. S. Abraham, The Mind of Africa (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 38.

[7] V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New
York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 4th ed., 1958), p. 242.

Still, in the absence of certain knowledge, it is arguable that loyalties established in childhood socialization were reflected in the behavior of the adult, no matter how foreign or extensive his later experiences and that some political elites gained more than mere strategic advantage from symbolic actions that expressed the tribal will or achieved tribal goals.

Tribal victory held equally attractive expressive rewards for the mass electorate. Many people have held a low opinion of their neighbors. Names that one tribe has for another are often words of contempt in the host language. We can assume that elites and mass alike welcomed apparent electoral substantiation of age-old assumptions of superiority. Large mass meetings cheered the tribal candidates; long nights of celebration honored electoral victory. In D. J. R. Scott's apt phrase, "A general election . . . is . . . a civil war without bloodshed."[8] And it is commonly observed that voters respond strongly to elites with whom they can identify. Peter Leslie states that ethnic groups within the electorate tend to support parties whose leaders self-consciously identify with their group, who are "of us."[9]

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[8]D. J. R. Scott, quoted in R. S. Milne, "Elections in Developing Countries," Parliamentary Affairs, XVIII, No. 1 (Winter 1964/65), p. 59.

[9]Peter M. Leslie, "The Role of Political Parties in Promoting the Interests of Ethnic Minorities," Canadian Journal of Political Science, II, No. 4 (December 1969), p. 424.

Not only is such a mood characteristic of enclaves of unchallenged traditionalism in the society; it is perhaps even more pronounced where economic changes have promoted new cultural forms. It may well be, as Alford asserts,[10] that cultural defense increases as cultural vulnerability expands under the impact of new modes of life and structures of thought; for, as William John Hanna observes,

> predominant identification with one's ethnic group, accompanied by hostility to out groups, appears to have increased in some African states since independence.[11]

Material Benefits

In addition, though, to the expressive rewards that grew out of tribal loyalty and service, both elites and mass could well have expected extensive material payoffs. Indeed it is this combination--strong ethnic loyalty coupled with group-related material interests--that seems to fuel tribal conflict and tribal politics.[12]

Certainly for elites the call to tribal service was more often than not a call as well to share in the material

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[10]Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: the Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), p. 143, where Alford quotes Tom Brennan, W. E. Cooney and H. Pollins, Social Change in Southwest Wales (London: Watts, 1954), p. 172.

[11]William John Hanna (ed.), Independent Black Africa: The Politics of Freedom (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), p. 22.

[12]Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 680.

benefits of tribal success. Top jobs were available at the time of independence. The British were leaving. With international backing, new economic and social enterprises were begun--schools, banks, commercial establishments. Achievement criteria for advancement and recruitment were not firmly established. Thus traditionally-sanctioned norms of responsibility toward kith and kin often determined who gained the best positions. Many expected a political victor to distribute the spoils of office on the basis of extended family, clan or tribe.

In Gabon, for example,

> people [had] the utmost confidence that
> their interests were being taken care of
> when they can say they have a close rela-
> tive in a high position. .. . .[13]

Forsyth states an even stronger opinion:

> . . . political power means success and
> prosperity, not only for the man who holds
> it but for his family, his birthplace and
> even his whole region of origin. As a re-
> sult there are many who will go any lengths
> to get it and, having got it, will surpass
> themselves in order to keep it.[14]

And, for Africa in general, Coleman and Rosberg, in their magisterial summation of the scholarship of their colleagues, stress the use of patronage in the new order.[15]

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[13] Brian Weinstein, Gabon: Nation-Building on the Ogoowe (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 191.

[14] Frederick Forsyth, The Biafra Story (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 23.

[15] Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 655.

The lure of tangible benefits was not only felt by elites. As Reinhard Bendix suggests, the struggle over the distribution of national sovereignty gives way eventually to a struggle over the distribution of the national product.[16] They can exist, however, side by side. Who in Africa in the early 1960s could claim that the issues of national sovereignty had been settled? And who would wait for that decision before pressing the claims of ethnic communities for their "fair" share of the national product? These are anything but separate questions. In Africa, the well-being of a group was not determined so much by its relationship to the means of production as by its relationship to state authority.[17] The struggle to achieve material gain for an ethnic unit was thus indistinguishable from the complementary battle to gain access to centers of national authority.

The rewards of access were indeed impressive: preferential awarding of government scholarships for higher education, selective area support for public amenities--subsidized housing, piped water, electricity, hospitals; the

[16]Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification of the Political Community," European Journal of Sociology, I (1960), pp. 181 and 213.

[17]George Balandier, "Problematique des classes sociales en Afrique noire," Cahiers Internationales de Sociologie, 38 (1964), pp. 131 ff. Cited in Staniland, op. cit., p. 20.

further development of a local infra-structure--roads, com-
munications services, transportation facilities; and the
location of productive enterprises--manufacturing estab-
lishments, processing facilities, ranching schemes, agri-
cultural developments.[18]

And, in addition to all these, stood that one condition
viewed as indispensible to all other advantages--education.
In Coleman's words:

> Africans . . . had a strong conviction that
> the real secret of the white man's strength
> and superiority was not his religion, but
> his education. Thus, in the new scale of
> values, education was not simply a desirable
> thing in itself . . . but the absolute pre-
> condition for political, economic, and social
> emancipation of the race.[19]

All these and more were valued and coveted and sought. And
all seemed obtainable--nothing altogether beyond reach--
if only the right people were put on the thrones of grace,
if only one's fellow tribesmen answered the roll call in the
National Assembly.

Power

Finally power itself, as an instrumental goal, was
sought by presumptive and claimant elites. For the advent
of independence awakened dreams--new visions glimpsed, old
hopes revived. Their fulfillment seemed contingent upon the

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[18]Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 666.

[19]Coleman, op. cit., p. 125.

attainment of political office, i.e., high salary, oppor-
tunity to express new values and interests, or settle old
feuds; opportunity to use new skills or reconfirm old privi-
leges. For an education appropriate to a technologically
sophisticated society produces in a technologically less
developed society either men that embrace the new order or
men who reject its claims. In either instance they are pur-
poseful men. They may use their organizational skills and
communications advantage to oppose colonial rule and change
the economic and social life of the society, seeking to
bring the society into phase with their own values and
skills; or they may seek to reinstate the old culture,
bringing back the familiar structures of the old order and
reestablishing traditional control over community norms.

Since those who seek power must seek also an efficient
path to that power, the tribe represented a ready made
constituency for such ambitions, especially but not exclu-
sively when the ultimate goal itself was tribal resurgence.
The tribal nexus lay near at hand--authority and communica-
tions networks, intact--waiting only to be energized by
skilled leaders. No new language would be necessary. No
new symbols would have to be defined and invested with sig-
nificance. Thus, according to Coleman, even such national-
ists as Awolowo and Azikwe found themselves relying more and
more upon traditional structures as they sought political

power.[20]

 And yet, to the extent that victory was valued, might we then assume that a tribal base was inappropriate for some leaders--that only leaders of majority tribes would attempt to coalesce the political struggle around an ethnic focus, that others would attempt an alternative definition of the axis of politics? Perhaps in theory. However, elites with traditional standing within a minority tribe often lacked any standing at all within the potential hierarchy of the majority side of an alternative cleavage. And even leaders of minority tribes with equal standing on the majority side of an alternative cleavage might prize the strategic advantages of a tribal organization of politics. For, just as a judicious definition of the bases of political conflict is of great importance in ensuring the maximum in potential troops, so a shrewd strategist would seek to command the best possible lay of ground and structure of supply. The tribal matrix of shared symbols, networks of intercommunication and patterns of instinctive loyalty, provide such advantageous ground for political combat that a politician would disband to his hazard so sure a structure of

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[20]Ibid., p. 350. See also: Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 64 and W. J. M. MacKenzie, "Some Conclusions," in W. J. M. MacKenzie and Kenneth Robinson, Five Elections in Africa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), p. 484.

political mobilization. And finally it might be questioned

whether there was a valid alternative. Elites might well

have doubted their ability to shift the definition of poli-

tics from the ethnic axis. Aware of these realities, elites

of minority tribes were indeed likely to gamble on their

ability to out-maneuver, to out-organize, the elites who

commanded the opposing heights or at least to acquiesce in

an ethnic definition of electoral conflict.

Thus both elite and mass had powerful incentives to

seek their political objectives through a tribal definition

and tribal organization of the political process. It should

then follow that electoral politics in Africa has indeed

been tribally based. Has this been the case?

Rabushka and Shepsle in a recent general survey of

ethnic politics point to the ubiquitous nature of ethnic

cleavages but cite Africa as a special locus for their

disruptive potential.[21] This is a constant theme in studies

of African politics. Robinson, evaluating the findings

of a series of separate election studies states

> . . . at present all African parties tend
> to become tribal parties . . . it is very
> difficult to approach local electors except
> by a campaign which enlists the support of
> local magnates, hammers at local issues,
> and repeats very simple slogans about tribal
> loyalties and the wicked ways of strangers.[22]

[21]Rabushka and Shepsle, op. cit., p. 10.

[22]MacKenzie, op. cit., p. 484.

Emerson has stated: "The most evident and omnipresent divisive force in Africa is tribalism . . .,"[23] pointing especially to the tendency of tribalism to become the key factor in determining partisan loyalties in multiparty systems.[24] Coleman and Rosberg are equally insistent about the importance of tribe in organizing partisan conflict.[25] Even Hodgkin admits that tribal nationalism has been the basis of some "special interest" parties in Africa.[26]

With respect to individual countries the references are equally forthright. Lemarchand writes of the Congo, "affiliation to a political party was viewed as secondary to, and derivative from, affiliation with the tribe."[27] And Coleman emphasizes the tribal basis of Nigerian political movements throughout his "classic" study of Nigerian nationalism.[28] A study of Sudanese electoral politics states that

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[23] Emerson, op. cit., p. 287.

[24] Ibid., p. 289.

[25] Coleman and Rosberg, op. cit., p. 690.

[26] Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 160.

[27] Rene Lemarchand, Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 187.

[28] Coleman, op. cit.

> a multiplicity of culture groups has spawned
> a large number of active political groups,
> each representing the interests of one specific
> ethnic community.[29]

Thus the impression is pervasive that ethnic loyalties structure partisan choices in Africa. And yet most of the above citations are vague with respect to two questions that I have come to consider as vital to a formulation of the problem of tribal cleavages. The authorities quoted above seem to refer interchangeably to tribe or ethnic community. It is unclear whether several of these opinions refer to sub-tribal or tribal conflicts. Further, none of these accounts comes to close terms with the problem as expressly formulated in Chapter One. West African political parties were closely identified with tribes at the national level. In Uganda the parties were not tribally specific. In West Africa in order to claim that the parties were based upon tribal cleavages one needed simply to identify the leadership of the party with inter-tribal disputes at the national level. But this does not essentially touch the question of the particular basis of electoral cleavage in specific constituencies. And even if it did, even if one could demonstrate a strict adherence to tribal candidacies in heterogeneous constituencies, it would not distinguish the source of this phenomenon. Does it suggest that national

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[29]Cited in Rabushka and Shepsle, _op. cit._, p. 196.

elites can impose their will upon local decision-making
with respect to political slate-making, or does it suggest
that, as I am asserting in this dissertation, tribal cleav-
ages are likely to occur whenever there is sufficient scope
for such a cleavage, regardless of the national identifica-
tions of the parties?

With this question still very much unresolved, let us
turn to an analysis of the 1961 and 1962 Uganda elections.
That set of constituencies whose ethnic base is capable of
sustaining inter-tribal competition--those constituencies,
that is, where the non-dominant tribe(s) have a chance of
success--was theoretically established in Chapter Two. Table
1 lists the constituencies that fall in this set. Before
we can test, however, the relationship between tribe and the
partisan vote in these constituencies, a further distinction,
must be made within this set. For, when the dominant tribe
constitutes less than one-half the population of a constitu-
ency, a different pattern of ethnic politics is likely to
develop. We should therefore treat such a set of constitu-
encies (dominant tribe less than 50%) separately. The con-
stituencies listed in Table 1 have been so divided into two
sets. Each set is analyzed in turn in the following discus-
sion.

We begin our analysis with those constituencies in the
first set, where the dominant tribe is greater than 50% of
the total population.) As decided in Chapter Two, "ethnic

TABLE 1

### COMPETITIVE CONSTITUENCIES WHOSE ETHNIC BASE
IS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING INTER-TRIBAL COMPETITION

Dominant Tribe Greater than 50%	Dominant Tribe Less than 50%
07*	09
08	10
13	11
16	21
22	23
24	42
34	59
39	
40	
47	
48	
49	
60	
61	

*Numbers refer to constituencies listed and numbered in Chapter Two in Table 3.

proportion" shall be defined as the percentage of minority tribes in the constituency, that is "100 minus the percent of the largest tribe"; and electoral proportion, as the aggregation of all votes for losing candidates expressed as a percentage of the total vote--the total opposition that is to the winning candidate--in both the 1961 and 1962 elections. Chart One describes the relationship between ethnic proportion and electoral proportion in the 1961 election and Chart Two the relationship between ethnic proportion and electoral proportion in the 1962 election for the appropriate subset. The patterns appear random, with correlation coefficients of 0.118 and 0.085 respectively. However, a careful examination suggests that the right-hand side of each diagram (encompassing those constituencies where dominant tribe was closest to 50% of the population), albeit with several exceptions, exhibits a positive correlation. Could our theoretical calculation of the subset of tribally competitive constituencies be in error? Can we empirically establish an alternative set?

If we arbitrarily accept 30% secondary tribes as the upper-limit for inter-tribal competition, then a modest correspondence between ethnicity and partisan vote is indicated. The correlation coefficients are, for 1961, 0.338, and, for 1962, 0.378, explaining 11 and 14 percent of the variance respectively. Indeed, at least for the 1961 election, constituencies 13, 16, 24, 39 and 48 lie nearly on the

CHART-ONE: THE-RELATIONSHIP-BETWEEN-ETHNIC
PROPORTION-AND-ELECTORAL-PROPORTION
FOR-TRIBALLY-COMPETITIVE-CONSTITUENCIES
1961-UGANDA-ELECTION

$r = 0.1177$

ELECTORAL-PROPORTION (y-axis, values: 60, 55, 50, 45, 40, 35, 30, 25, 20)

ETHNIC PROPORTION (x-axis, values: 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50)

Plotted points: 07, 61, 47, 40, 49, 13, 48, 39, 24, 08, 34, 60, 16, 22

CHART TWO: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ETHNIC PROPORTION AND ELECTORAL PRO-
PORTION FOR TRIBALLY COMPETITIVE
CONSTITUENCIES, 1962 UGANDA ELECTION

$r = 0.0847$

electoral proportion

60

55

50   49

47   07   48

45

40   13

40   34
60   39

40   34

61

35

08

30

25

25

20   22

20

16

15   20   25   30   35   40   45   50

ethnic proportion

expected regression line. Constituencies 49, 22, and 34 are, however, clearly out of phase with the rest. Is 30% too low a figure? If we choose "35% minority tribes" as the "threshold of boldness" (that is all constituencies where the minority tribes are less than 50% and greater than 35%), the correlation coefficients are not improved: 0.263 and 0.372.

Could it be that not only the placement of this threshold but the measurement rule for the independent variable needs rethinking? The measurement rule that I have chosen for the independent variable (ethnic proportion) is based upon the assumption that each minor tribe contributes to an ethnic coalition in proportion to its size. Is this not suspect? A reasonable alternative assumption--that members of tribes other than the second largest will not be especially enthusiastic about an opposition candidate from the second largest tribe--would force a change in the rule. For in elections contested by two parties, each primarily an expression of one of the two largest tribes in the constituency, while the party representing the second largest tribe might have a greater incentive to make an appeal to the other tribes (it needs their vote to win, while the party of the largest tribe can win simply by full mobilization of its own troops) it is unlikely that its success with members of other minority tribes will equal its success among its own people. Accept-

ing this assumption, let us therefore expect the opposition vote to reflect the numerical strength of the second largest tribe plus some limited proposition of the strength of the other "minority" tribes. Table 2 contains the correlation coefficients of the "over 30%" and "over 35%" constituencies, for both elections, where the independent variable is set at (a) the total oppositional potential; (b) the second largest tribe plus 3/4 of the other tribes; (c) the second largest tribe plus 2/3 of the other tribes; (d) the second largest tribe plus 1/4 of the other tribes; (e) the second largest tribe plus 1/8 of the other tribes; (f) the size of the second largest tribe. The highest correlation coefficients occur when the eligibility threshold is 65% and the measurement rule for the independent variable is "second tribe and 1/4 of other." These coefficients however are not significant at the .05 level.

There is one further consideration. Are all the cases that I have included in the analysis comparable? Table 3 gives for each constituency the estimated percent of eligible adults who voted in the 1961 election. Note the low mobilization of the electorate in South Karamoja. In 1961 only 1,474 people voted in this constituency; in 1962 an even smaller number, 954, voted. A sparsely settled, large constituency, South Karamoja contains two major tribes, both herdsmen relatively undisturbed by the "civilizing" mission of the colonial period. How likely was it that each tribe

TABLE 2

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ELECTORAL PROPORTION AND ETHNIC PROPORTION FOR SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF ETHNIC PROPORTION FOR TWO DIFFERENT SUBSETS OF CONSTITUENCIES, FOR THE 1961 AND 1962 UGANDA ELECTIONS

1961 Election

Ethnic Proportion Rule	Minority Tribes Greater Than 30%	Minority Tribes Greater Than 35%
100% Minority Tribes	0.338	0.263
2nd Tribe + 3/4 others	0.417	0.404
2nd Tribe + 2/3 others	0.432	0.430
2nd Tribe + 1/2 others	0.456	0.466
2nd Tribe + 1/4 others	0.464	0.481
2nd Tribe + 1/8 others	0.476	0.477
Only 2nd Tribe	0.457	0.477

1962 Election

Ethnic Proportion Rule	Minority Tribes Greater Than 30%	Minority Tribes Greater Than 35%
100%	0.378	0.372
3/4	0.439	0.527
2/3	0.446	0.549
1/2	0.464	0.590
1/4	0.463	0.604
1/8	0.458	0.584
2nd Tribe	0.444	0.590

TABLE 3

PERCENT VOTE OF ESTIMATED ELIGIBLE POPULATION
IN THE 1961 UGANDA ELECTION FOR THOSE NINE
CONSTITUENCIES WHERE THE LARGEST TRIBE IS
GREATER THAN 50% BUT NOT LARGER THAN 70%
OF THE TOTAL POPULATION

Constituency	% Voted of Eligible
North Bukedi (07)	32.9%
North East Bugisu (13)	59.9
North West Busoga (16)	25.4
South Busoga (22)	23.7
West Teso (24)	32.4
South Karamoja (34)	07.0
West Nile and Madi North East	44.1
South West Ankole (48)	83.8
South East Ankole (49)	68.6

had equal opportunity of access to the polls? (Without a
detailed map of location and movement to contrast with the
actual polling arrangements it would be impossible to
answer this question.) As it is clear that government of-
ficials and partisan elites failed to mobilize any but a
small proportion of the population, must one not assume that
those few who were mobilized were an unrepresentative sample
of the total population? Let us on this basis exclude South
Karamoja from the analysis.

Table 4 presents an array of correlation coefficients for all subset A constituencies except South Karamoja. Several correlations are statistically significant at the 0.05 level of analysis (P less than 0.05). The highest correlation occurs within that set of constituencies defined by 35% or more ethnic opposition. There is evidence here for an attenuated version of our original proposition; namely, that tribe did organize opposition in at least the 1961 election in those constituencies where the dominant tribe was larger than 50% but less than 65% of the population.

What should be said, however, of the two clearly deviant cases? In South-East Ankole (no. 49) the poll was high. Yet the ethnic composition of the constituency:

        Banyankore -- 66.5%
        Bakiga   -- 13.9
        Ruanda   -- 12.7
        Baganda   -- 5.3
        Others   -- 1.6

does not correspond with the two electoral results:

        1961:   54% to 46%
        1962:   52% to 48%

Apparently in this constituency tribe was not the focus of opposition in these two elections. Why? Either an alternative cleavage was sufficiently strong to "overcome" the hostilities of tribe or the antimonies of tribe were insufficient to generate inter-tribal conflict. I suspect the

TABLE 4

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ELECTORAL PROPORTION AND ETHNIC PROPORTION FOR SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF ETHNIC PROPORTION FOR TWO DIFFERENT SUBSETS OF CONSTITUENCIES, EXCLUDING KARAMOJA, FOR THE 1961 AND 1962 UGANDA ELECTIONS

	1961 Election	
Ethnic Proportion Rule	Minority Tribes Greater Than 30%	Minority Tribes Greater Than 35%
100%	0.575	0.597
3/4	0.702	0.804
2/3	0.721*	0.827*
1/2	0.751*	0.851*
1/4	0.745*	0.838*

	1962 Election	
Ethnic Proportion Rule	Minority Tribes Greater Than 30%	Minority Tribes Greater Than 35%
100%	0.452	0.508
3/4	0.537	0.707
2/3	0.546	0.727
1/2	0.566	0.762
1/4	0.559	0.759

*significant, p greater than .05.

latter lies closer to the truth. A large part of the minority in the constituency were immigrants. An immigrant population is likely to be disorganized and insecure—with weak social structures, minimal skills, little financial surplus and vulnerable to the displeasure of the dominant tribe. It would find it hard to sustain a focus for partisan political activity.

The other deviant case, North Bukedi, cannot be interpreted without additional information.

Let us now consider those constituencies where the largest tribe was less than 50% of the population. Such constituencies pose novel problems for ethnic/partisan proportion analysis; for, even if the ethnic base does organize the partisan vote, there would be no necessary correspondences between the size of the opposition vote and the proportion of the population that is not a member of the dominant tribe. For, as the largest tribe cannot insure electoral victory solely through mobilization of its own members, it must attempt either a strategy of coalition or coercion if it is to be victorious against the combined efforts of the minority tribes. In either case the resulting electoral proportions will correspond to the ethnic proportions of the constituency only in the unlikely instance that each tribe has sought to enter the lists through its own political party. For, it is more than likely that the minority tribes will succeed in forging a competitive

coalition against the dominant tribe or that the dominant tribe will enlist allies in a competitive venture against an opposition coalition. Thus the expected division of the vote cannot be precisely specified by a single estimate.

Nevertheless, if ethnicity does provide the central focus of partisan politics within the constituency, one of a limited set of patterns should emerge; For example, if a constituency of A ... N tribes with a ... n proportion of the population is mobilized with respect to ethnic identities, we would expect the partisan vote to be an aggregate of some sub-set of the "a through n" ratios. Consider a constituency with the following ethnic pattern:

Tribe	Proportion of the Population
A	.40 (a)
B	.25 (b)
C	.20 (c)
D	.15 (d)

we might expect one of three results:

|	Winner (%)	Loser (%)	Coalitions
Either	65%	35%	a + b vs. c + d
Or	55%	45%	a + d vs. c + b
Or	60%	40%	a vs. b + c + d
			a + c vs. b + d

If the actual vote differs substantially from all of these patterns, we must assume either (a) factors other than ethnicity were instrumental in organizing the political

process in the constituency, or (2) coercion was success-
fully employed to depress the turnout of a particular tribe
or set of tribes or (3) exogenous factors created differen-
tial turnout rates between tribes, or some combination of
the three.

In the set of Ugandan constituencies presented in this
study there are seven where the dominant tribe is no larger
than 49% of the population. The ethnic composition of these
constituencies is illustrated in Chart Three. Table 5
summarizes these data and in addition specifies expected
patterns of partisan vote. With respect to the medley of
minor tribes (less than 5%) in each constituency (unspeci-
fied or denoted as "other" in the chart), I have simply
assumed a 50% split of their vote for each coalition, for
I judge that concerted ethnic appeals to these fragmented
tribal groups would be difficult and "expensive," and that
it would be "catch as catch can" with their vote. (Notwith-
standing the probability that turnout would be low among such
groups, in the absence of exact data I have not taken turn-
out into account in apportioning half their potential vote
to each party.)

After projecting partisan patterns based on the ethnic
distribution of forces within these seven constituencies,
I have compared these projections with the actual election
results. (In order that these two sets of figures be com-
parable it is necessary to simulate a two party vote in

Chart 3: Tribal Composition of Constituencies with Largest Tribe Less than 50 Percent

other

47.9%

43.2%

South Central Bukedi (09)

other

46.1%

42.2%

South East Bukedi (11)

other

47.0%

4.8%

7.7%

8.4%

14.0%

South East Busoga (21)

other

45.1%

43.0%

North Teso (23)

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
South Dukedi (10)

North West Toro (59)

West File and Nadi Central (42)

TABLE 5

ETHNIC PATTERNS OF SEVEN CONSTITUENCIES
AND EXPECTED PARTISAN RATIOS

Constituency Number	Ethnic Composition	Expected Vote
09	48 - a	$a + \frac{1}{2}c = \underline{52}$
	43 - b	
	8 - other (c)	
11	46 - a	$a + \frac{1}{2}c = \underline{52}$
	42 - b	
	12 - other (c)	
23	45 - a	$a + \frac{1}{2}c = \underline{51}$
	43 - b	
	12 - other (c)	
21	47 - a	$a + \frac{1}{2}c = 59$
	14 - b	$a + (c \text{ or } d) + \frac{1}{2}e = 67$
	8 - c	$a + c + d + \frac{1}{2}e = 75$
	8 - d	
	23 - other (e)	(note that c and d might split $\frac{1}{2}$ to each coalition)

TABLE 5--Continued

Constituency Number	Ethnic Composition	Expected Vote
10	37 - a	$b + c + \frac{1}{2}d = 57$
	29 - b	$a + c + \frac{1}{2}d = 65$
	21 - c	$a + b + \frac{1}{2}d = 73$
	13 - other (d)	
59	37 - a	$b + c + \frac{1}{2}d = 60$
	31 - b	$a + c + \frac{1}{2}d = 66$
	25 - c	$a + b + \frac{1}{2}d = 72$
	8 - other (d)	
42	32 - a	$b + c + \frac{1}{2}e = 56$
	28 - b	$a + c + \frac{1}{2}e = 60$
	26 - c	$a + b + \frac{1}{2}e = 62$
	12 - d	$b + c + d + \frac{1}{2}e = 68$
	3 - other (e)	$a + c + d + \frac{1}{2}e = 72$

those constituencies where there were minor parties. If less than 5%, the minor party is divided evenly between the two coalitions; if more than 5%, each of several apportionings between the two parties are reported.) See Table 6.

It is not easy to interpret these results. The patterns are complex. Nevertheless, I think that the "batting

TABLE 6

ETHNIC PROJECTIONS AND THE ADJUSTED
PARTISAN VOTE TOTAL FOR SEVEN CONSTITUENCIES
IN THE 1961 AND 1962 UGANDA ELECTIONS

Constituency	Partisan Vote From Ethnic Estimation	1961 Election	1962 Election	Combined Average 1961 and 1962 Elections
09	52%	55%	56%	55%
11	52%	65%	60%	63%
23	51%	51%	51%	51%
21	59% 67% 75%	51%	59%	55%
10	57% 65% 73%	51.5% 59%	53%	
59	60% 66% 72%	62% 77% 85%	72%	
42	56% 60% 62% 68% 72%	---	52%	

average" is high. For instance, constituencies nine, eleven and twenty-three are composed of two nearly equal large tribes. In South Central Bukedi (9) the two tribes occupy largely separate areas within the constituency, a situation especially auspicious for inter-tribal competition. And indeed there is apparently aggressive ethnic conflict in

South Central Bukedi (9), as well as in North Teso (23).
South East Bukedi (11), however, deviates from the expected
pattern in both elections.

South East Busoga (21) evidences a marginal corres-
pondence between actual and predicted electoral data. In
this instance some of the assumptions we used in deriving
the predicted relationships may be in error. As the second
largest tribe is quite small, although still large enough
to be a political force, it can mobilize oppositions without
itself being a threat to any other minor tribe. Perhaps,
therefore, it is inappropriate to divide the "other" tribes
between the major tribe and the minor tribe coalition. If
we, for instance, can credit the second largest tribe (14%
of the population) with the capacity to mobilize 90% of the
other tribes, its coalition loses 51 to 49 percent. The
actual votes in the two elections were as follows:

	1961 Election	1962 Election
UPC	48.8%	57.0%
DP	51.2%	39.0%
Bataka	-----	04.0%

The second election resulted in a reversal of the first
election. One might hypothesize that the first election
went to the minority coalition, mobilizing 90% of the op-
position vote (assuming of course equivalent turnouts for
all tribes), and the second election to a coalition wherein

the largest tribe was able to mobilize possibly one other tribe or a larger percent of the minor tribes. Although encouraging to our original proposition, such speculation is extremely tenuous. It should not be overlooked that there was the possibility of coercion by either or both major tribes. At this distance, all I can say is that ethnic factors cannot be eliminated as an explanation of the result.

Constituencies 10, 59, and 42 represent a relatively parallel situation. While Constituency 42 contains a moderately large fourth tribe (12%) and three major tribes of more equal strength than the others (32:28:26 vis-a-vis 37:29:21 and 37:31:35), they all present a variety of multiple-coalition possibilities. The problem is complicated further by a multi-party contest in the 1961 election for both constituencies 10 and 59. Nevertheless "59" corresponds closely with our estimates, as does "10," while "42" does exhibit a possible ethnic balance in the one election contested in that constituency.

Thus in six out of 13 instances, at least one "two-party interpretation" of the election results is within two percentage points of an expected ethnic coalitional distribution; in ten out of 13 instances, one interpretation is within five percentage points of the expected. As we might expect some variance given disproportionate tribal mobilization, an "error factor" of five percentage points

seems tolerable. Thus we have a strong argument for the
proposition that the "less than 50 percent" constituencies
were organized politically along ethnic lines. The ap-
parent exceptions are South East Bukeda (11) and possibly
West Nile and Madi Central (42) and South East Busoga (21).
(The latter two, however, may, as we have shown, be explained
by ethnic factors. Even the partisan vote in South East
Busoga may, if we assume exceptionally strong hostility be-
tween the 47% Basoga inhabitants and the "others," be
tribally based.)

What are we to make of these correspondences? Does the
central proposition of this chapter stand or fall? It must
first be admitted that I was unable to devise a subsetting
procedure (for separating constituencies with an ethnic base
capable of sustaining ethnic politics from ethnically "homo-
geneous" constituencies) that would prove wholly independent
of the subsequent test; that is, I could not isolate the
constituencies where ethnicity "should" organize the elec-
tion in the absence of data from the test for such a re-
lationship; and since I thus use the test to establish
conditions for the test, I weaken, of course, the indepen-
dence of the subsequent conclusion: that ethnicity does
organize electoral politics. My reasoning is not, however,
merely circular; i.e., the relationship defines the con-
stituencies and then we look at the constituencies to demon-
strate the relationship. There are independent constraints

on the choice of constituencies: (a) dominant tribe more
than 50%, (b) the set as an unbroken series of constitu-
encies beginning with that constituency where the dominant
tribe is closest to 50% and extending to some upper limit.
The reader must judge whether or not these constraints are
sufficient to allow independent standing to the conclusions
of this chapter. The same problem confronts us as we estab-
lish empirically the independent variable. Again, although
we operate with independent constraints, we derive a measure
that is not altogether independent of the results it seeks
to test. There is however no alternative to these procedures
and thus the significance of the results must stand or fall
on the basis of a clear awareness of the method.

What are these "flawed" conclusions, these "partial"
insights? First, in Uganda a tribally based electoral
pattern did apparently surface when the dominant tribe was
less than approximately 2/3 of the population.

The theoretical argument for a different threshold
(made in Chapter Three) proved erroneous. There are several
possible reasons: We may have estimated incorrectly a
tribal elite's perceptions of the mobilizing capacity of
self and others. Our evidence suggests that "by-stander"
minor tribes cannot be mobilized at better than half their
potential while major tribes (the two largest), if each
fields a candidate, can be mobilized to a much greater ex-
tent. And while we have data that suggest that there are

major differences within Uganda as a whole between the
mobilization potential of different electoral coalitions
(some constituencies mobilized 90% of their eligibles and
other constituencies mobilized 25%) it may be unrealistic to
employ inter-constituency data to conditions within any given
constituency. Thus, we implicitly assumed in our calcula-
tion of the upper and lower limits of mobilization potential
that the degree of mobilization of faction "a" within a con-
stituency is independent of the degree of mobilization of
faction "b" within the same constituency. In order to
estimate an upper and a lower limit of mobilization potential
for two tribes within the same constituency, we took data
from two different constituencies on the extreme edges of
the overall distribution. However, it is likely, I believe,
that the mobilization of one side of a cleavage in a con-
stituency will affect the degree of mobilization of the
other side. For appeals to action made in the midst of a
heterogeneous population cannot be successfully directed to
one component of that population. Thus the differences
within a constituency, as to the extent of mobilization of
each side, is probably much less than we initially esti-
mated. Further, it is unlikely that tribal elites, espec-
ially at the time of the first election, were aware of the
extent to which mobilization potentials might differ within
the society as a whole. There had been no reliable prior
demonstration. As it is elite expectation that we tried to

estimate in determining the threshold of inter-tribal competition, this was a serious defect in our theoretical model. Thus, I suggest that our initial calculations were not necessarily based upon inadequate theory but were rather predicated upon poor estimates of the practical constraints, expressed as coefficients in the predictive equation. Better estimates can only now, after the fact, be suggested.

A second major finding of this chapter is that the expected relationship between tribe and partisan vote does not necessarily hold when general mobilization falls too low. At especially low levels of voter mobilization the relationship will be unpredictable. Thus the election returns of South Karamoja deviate from the expected partisan vote.

A third conclusion of this chapter is that minor tribes are not strong partners in oppositional coalitions. Their prospective gain through coalitional electoral victory is apparently insufficient to offset the losses that they may incur if they oppose the dominant tribe--that is, either the good graces of the dominant tribe are so valued or the anger of the dominant tribe is so feared, that minor tribes are unlikely to risk open opposition.

A fourth conclusion is that the second election (1962) seems to have been less expressive of tribal cleavages than the first. Either this reflects lower levels of popular participation in the second election or a subsequent (after

the first election) nationalization of politics around
issues and groups other than tribe. Our conclusion on
this score must be very tentative, as the differences in
our data are not great.

In general I would conclude that the evidence supports
the central proposition of this chapter. Apparently tribal
cleavages will organize electoral politics in Uganda when
the constituency has a "genuinely" multitribal electorate.

CHAPTER FIVE

PARTISAN MOBILIZATION IN
TRIBALLY HETEROGENEOUS CONSTITUENCIES

> "A statesman is an easy man,
> He tells his lies by rote;
> A journalist makes up his lies
> And takes you by the throat;
> So stay at home and drink your beer
> And let the neighbours vote. . . ."
>
> --- W. B. Yeats[1]

During the preparations for the 1961 election several members of the Uganda Legislative Council argued that beer should be available near polling places.[2] How else, they wanted to know, to compensate a man after a long dry walk from farmstead to town? They felt that people, without such incentive, would stay at home. Yet even though beer was denied, many "neighbours" did make the long walk. Yeats' advice was not heeded. What brought out the vote? Why

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[1] W. B. Yeats, "The Old Stone Cross," _The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats_ (London: MacMillan & Co., 1950), p. 368.

[2] _Legislative Council Proceedings_ (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1960).

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did Uganda's subsistence farmers vote in these two elections?

It was not the presence of extensive tribal cleavage in the local community. Inter-tribal conflict was neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for high levels of partisan mobilization. In constituencies where partisan conflict was organized on a tribal basis, there was no greater intensity of partisan activity than in those where pan-tribal or intra-tribal issues polarized the electorate.

And yet the assumption that tribal allegiance should prove a more potent focus of partisan activity than other cleavages is an attractive proposition. As the last chapter argued, it is likely that tribal cleavages will translate directly into partisan political organization; that inter-tribal competition will take precedence over intra-party competition. And if it be argued that inter-tribal conflict assumes such dominance because it offers opportunities and employs capabilities for mass mobilization greater than intra-tribal conflict, then, ceteris paribus, elections contested over inter-tribal conflicts will elicit a higher degree of mobilization than elections contested on an intra-tribal or pan-tribal basis.

And does not this argument conform to the experience of political scientists in their analyses of generic political behaviors? A commonly accepted view of political behavior is that political action is a function of the "need of the

organism, the stimuli available in the environment, and the strength of the various predispositions relevant to those stimuli."[3]

"Need of the Organism"

It can surely be argued that such needs as security, autonomy, redress of ancient grievances and even "freedom" are sponsored by the tribe-party. As Lucy Mair states:

> 'Freedom' in African does not mean primarily civil liberties; it means not having to obey somebody you think of as an outsider, and once the most conspicuous outsiders, the expatriates, withdraw, small political units with common traditions begin to look uneasily at their neighbours (with whom they may share a tradition of mutual hostility). These attitudes are identical in essence with the territorial or pan-African nationalisms which command the sympathy of the liberal-minded. They are the nationalism of the people who still belong to the small-scale society. Their existence presents serious problems for the new States. But they will never be eliminated by homilies about the pettiness of parochialism. People's ideas are necessarily limited to the world of their experience.[4]

Such needs can be uniquely served by the mobilizing "mission" of the tribe-party. In addition, however, the tribe-party may appeal directly to other needs that are not its exclusive preserve: better roads for "our" area, better

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[3]Lester W. Milbrath, <u>Political Participation</u> (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1965), p. 30. The exact quotation in the manuscript is different from that in the text. It is the same as an earlier version of the Milbrath treatise--a not for release mimeo copy. The change is not, however, substantive.

[4]Lucy Mair, "Social Change in Africa," <u>International Affairs</u>, XXXVI, No. 4 (October 1960), 447-456.

schools for "our" villages, better opportunities for "our" people. In fact, there are few "needs" felt by the people that cannot be exploited by the tribe-party. As Markovitz has written,

> . . . tribal appeals and identifications
> are of the greatest importance in creating
> coalitions, swaying audiences, . . . or
> affecting a political party.[5]

And to the extent there are "needs" that cannot by their very nature be touched through tribal appeals— redress, for example, for economic or status inequalities within the tribe—they are poorly understood and minimally felt by the African peasantry.[6] Thus tribe-parties can apparently appeal to virtually all the felt needs of the mass population.

"Stimuli Available in the Environment"

The tribe-party has major advantages with respect to "stimuli available in the environment." Either by word-of-mouth or from the traditional structures of authoritative speech, the tribe-party can control and shape messages and "stimuli" that are conducive to its interests and framed in its symbolic mode. The mass media, the principal vehicle

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[5]Leonard Markovitz, ed., African Politics and Society (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 56, (Introduction to Part II).

[6]Martin Staniland, "Frantz Fanon and the African Political Class," African Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 270 (January 1969), p. 20.

for non-traditional political elites, are an inadequate
substitute for such traditional patterns of social inter-
action, especially when such preconditions of media com-
munication as literacy and primary education are often
weakly developed.[7]

"Strength of the Various Predispositions"

With respect to the third factor in the above state-
ment, the variant strength of predispositions relevant to
stimuli, the mobilizing capabilities of tribally-based par-
ties appear especially strong. The literature of "moderni-
zation"[8] suggests that peasant mobilization anywhere has
proved difficult. Although modernizers work hard to es-
tablish means of communication between their organizations
and the mass electorate, they find the peasants apathetic
to their efforts. Stimuli must reach a responsive mind-
set. Berelson et al. has said of electoral appeals,

> Campaigning for votes is not writing on a
> public tabula rasa; it is showing men and
> women that their votes are a normal and
> logical and more or less inevitable expres-
> sion of tendencies with which each has al-
> ready aligned himself.[9]

[7]Richard L. Sklar and C. S. Whitaker, Jr., "The Federal
Republic of Nigeria," in Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., National
Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 25.

[8]M. I. T. Study Group, "The Transitional Process," in
Claude E. Welch, Jr., ed., Political Modernization (Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., 1967), p. 45.

[9]Bernard Berelson, et al., Voting (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1954), pp. 83-84.

Thus the tribal leader, appealing in tribal voices to tribal needs, can effectively reach men whom the revolutionary could only touch by first shattering "habitual bonds. . . to established political authorities" and then "promising extensive rewards to compensate for the risks and discomforts of change."[10] Even if the appeal of the non-traditional leader is to aspirations that are indeed present in the bulk of the peasantry--"to see their children healthy, educated and advanced"--they will act with respect to such appeals only if they feel that such an expression provides "a realistic opportunity for beneficial change."[11] Parties organized on the basis of tribal solidarity and fighting for tribal gains, will seem to the peasantry more familiar and hence more realistic an approach for achieving desired objectives. The tribe-party can thus better mobilize a constituency to participate in new behaviors--such as registering and voting--than can detribalized intellectuals and their movements.

Mass "Modern" Parties and African Elections

And yet has not the discussion of African elections in the journals and popular magazines of the last decade stressed the success and appeal of mass membership "modern"

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[10]Frederick M. Watkins, The Age of Ideology: Political Thought, 1750 to the Present (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall), p. 4.

[11]M. I. T. Study Group, op. cit., p. 45.

political parties? Perhaps. <u>Success</u> and <u>appeal</u>, however, are not necessarily synonomous. A party can win an election by mobilizing a larger vote than its opponent. In absolute numbers its appeal may be small. Indeed, while data are not readily available in every instance, we know that the mobilization capacities of many mass parties at the time of their greatest victories in West Africa were modest.[12] It is not unreasonable to assume that the alien character of the appeals of "modern" parties and the essential caution of small landholders have placed restraints upon full mobilization. Stimuli which do not correspond to the felt needs of a population, which do not traverse effective channels and do not strike responsive networks of predispositions, will not promote mass political action.

The foregoing analysis has been generalized, based on broad statements about political life and rather vague insights into contemporary African society. The case study has been a popular method for the study of African elections. What do the authors of these studies conclude with respect to the mobilizing capacities of tribe-parties over against the mobilizing capacities of alternative cleavage patterns

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[12]Philip Whitaker, "The Western Region of Nigeria, May 1956," in W. J. M. MacKenzie and Kenneth Robinson, eds., <u>Five Elections in Africa</u> (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960), pp. 95 ff. and Aristide R. Zolberg, <u>Creating Political Order</u> (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966), pp. 22 ff.

in the society? Let us examine several relevant state-
ments.

Case Studies of African Elections

Whitaker suggests that the high level of registration
achieved in the constituency of Warri-East in the Western
Region Nigerian election of 1956 was due either to "the
tribes more or less spontaneously [realizing] that the
register could be used as a trial of their relative strength"
or "the politicians [realizing] that they could exploit
tribal feelings for their own ends."[13]

Price and Post discussing two different general elec-
tions for the Eastern Regional Assembly imply that the high
rates of participation in the non-Ibo areas of Eastern
Nigeria were due to intense inter-tribal competition.[14]
The average poll in the non-Ibo constituencies in the 1957
election for the Eastern House was 54.3%, in the Ibo areas
(essentially homogeneous with respect to tribe), 49.8%.
Post suggests that in the 1957 election these multi-tribal
areas tended to exhibit a more "bitter" form of politics
and a higher level of registration.[15] And he suggests that

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[13]Whitaker, op. cit., p. 87.

[14]J. H. Price, "The Eastern Region of Nigeria, March
1957," in Five Elections in Africa, op. cit., appendix II,
p. 165, and p. 151 ff and K. W. Post, The Nigerian Federal
Election of 1959 (Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 204.

[15]Ibid.

the "solidarity and political awareness of certain of the
minority groups also had a bearing on the response to the
campaign" and hence on turnout in Northern Nigeria in 1959.[16]
Also he avers that the support of local (tribal) authorities
made considerable difference in the extent of registration
achieved in parts of the Northern Region.[17]

Others seem to agree in part. Bennett and Rosberg
suggest, in their study of the 1960-61 Kenyan election,
that the difference in registration levels may have been
due to different levels of political consciousness between
tribes.[18] Perhaps the most explicit statement of the rela-
tive advantage of a tribal juggernaut is MacKenzie's assess-
ment of evidence from a series of case studies of African
elections:

> . . . it is very difficult to approach
> local electors except by a campaign which
> enlists the support of local magnates,
> hammers at local issues, and repeats very
> simple slogans about tribal loyalty and
> the wicked ways of strangers.[19]

These insights, however, cannot be regarded as the last
word on the question of tribe-parties. The assertions cited

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[16]Post, op. cit., p. 157.

[17]Ibid., pp. 200 and 201.

[18]George Bennett and Carl G. Rosberg, The Kenyatta
Election: Kenya 1960-61 (London: Oxford University Press,
1961), p. 68.

[19]W. J. M. MacKenzie, "Some Conclusions," in MacKenzie
and Robinson, op. cit., p. 484.

above are observations made in passing. The studies dealt
primarily with other matters. Students of African elections
have not systematically studied the specific questions in-
volved. If European observers of African elections have
noted a possible correspondence between the nature of the
electoral cleavage and the extent of partisan mobilization,
they have not presented conclusive evidence for this as-
sertion. In general they have simply suggested that inter-
tribal competition leads to "intense" politics and intense
politics leads to high levels of participation. (Since,
for the purposes of this study, intense political activity
has been defined as a high level of mobilization, the second
part of the statement is, from my perspective, tautological.)

Even, however, if this general observation can be shown
to be true, it does not follow that inter-tribal cleavages
per se lead to higher levels of partisan mobilization. For
it is not clear whether their examples of "intense inter-
tribal competition" are examples of an inter-tribal inten-
sification of political conflict or of an inter-tribal
exploitation of already intense political conflict. That
is, one cannot tell from their descriptions whether or not
they have systematically compared all inter-tribal areas,
or whether they are primarily referring to only those inter-
tribal areas where competition is nearly balanced. Com-
petitive elections are per se likely to be more highly
mobilized. If inter-tribal constituencies are isolated for

study on the basis of their "closeness" (i.e. an inter-tribal area is by definition one in which two or more tribes are "balanced"), then we might expect them to exhibit a higher level of mobilization even if tribe-parties have no special advantages for mobilization. Higher levels of mobilization in such constituencies, that is to say, would be fully accounted for by their greater degree of competitiveness. Unless the competitive extent of the cleavage is held constant it is impossible to establish the nature, or even the existence, of a relationship between the tribal basis of the cleavage and the extent of partisan mobilization.

Further, the scholars who comment upon the extent of mobilization in given constituencies often fail to distinguish between electoral mobilization and its partisan component. It may be that the high levels of mobilization observed in some inter-tribal constituencies can be explained by a greater "government" presence, a larger administrative superstructure, in tribally diverse areas. Or it is possible that the intervening infra-structures--wealth, communications, etc.--are more developed in areas where there are several different tribal communities. For tribal intermixture may be more likely to occur in urban areas or at important intersections of trade or commerce. Without holding these factors constant, one cannot stipulate that high levels of mobilization were in essence high levels of partisan mobilization.

Mobilization and Tribe Revisited

Such arguments as cited in the last paragraph throw doubt upon even explicit reference in the literature to a correspondence between tribally heterogeneous areas and high rates of mobilization. On the other hand, are the inferences that can be drawn from the more general statements about politics cited above any more valid? Such general statements are undoubtedly true. Some combination of needs, stimuli and predispositions will affect political behavior. The critical question, however, is whether or not the tribe-party has a unique advantage with respect to these three elements. The case for the tribe-party not only emphasizes that the resources of the tribe antedate the party and are available to the party, but that there are no other comparable loci of such capabilities in the society. This is not the case. While it may well be that such resources are available to the tribe, they are hardly unique. For example, in many areas of Uganda tribes traditionally were structurally weak and of secondary importance to the inhabitants.[20] Subtribal units--the clan, lineage, age-group or village--were more important than the tribe as centers of allegiance and community. All that can be said in favor of the tribe as a favorable locus of partisan activity can be said, sometimes with additional emphasis, of sub-tribal groupings.

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[20] See chapters one and two of this dissertation.

Moreover, in Uganda, as we have seen, at least one pan-tribal cleavage is highly salient and extensively organized. Catholic-Protestant-Muslim struggles have persisted for well over half a century in most areas of the country. Low maintains that they have dominated district level politics.[21] Welbourn insists upon their significance in the formation of every major political force in the country.[22]

Furthermore, religious groups have many of the same advantages as tribe or sub-tribal groupings in mobilizing political action: they generate their own specific needs--the needs of denominational schools the autonomy and success of which insure a continuance of successful propagation of the faith; they maintain an organizational structure that can focus stimuli for a mass audience--the church and school, its staff and communicants; and they create and sustain a predisposition to respond to such stimuli--the presumed presence of God and the authority of His teachers.

The point is not that tribe as party lacked resources to wage political combat; the point is simply that such capabilities have not been the unique possession of the tribe per se. Thus it should not be expected that the tribe-party would have commanded greater loyalty or elicited more extensive partisan mobilization than any of several

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[21]D. A. Low, Political Parties in Uganda 1949-1962 (London: The Athlone Press, 1962).

[22]F. B. Welbourn, Religion and Politics in Uganda, 1952-1962 (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1965).

alternative modes of partisan organization. Data from the
1961 and 1962 Uganda elections would tend to support this
assertion. The question precisely framed is this: in an
open electoral system will inter-tribal conflict condition
a more vigorous political activity than alternative sources
of conflict; expressly: will an explicitly tribal organi-
zation of politics result in higher levels of partisan
mobilization than an organization of politics around non-
tribal groupings, provided the relative competitive posi-
tions of the groupings are similar?

The Data

Two measures of partisan mobilization were derived in
Chapter III: Residual (1961) and Residual (1962). In the
last chapter it was determined that a tribal organization
of politics is highly likely when opposition tribes (i.e.
all tribes except the largest) are 35 or more percent of the
population. Utilizing this basis for dichotomizing Ugandan
constituencies into, on the one hand, tribally-based, and,
on the other hand, non-tribally based sets, Table 1 examines
the means of partisan mobilization measures for each set.
The mean value is higher for non-tribal constituencies than
for tribal constituencies, strongly suggesting that tribal
constituencies do not have a monopoly of resources for
partisan mobilization.

It was hypothesized that "competition," conceptualized
in this study as partisan balance and measured as the extent

TABLE 1

MEAN VALUES FOR MEASURES
OF PARTISAN MOBILIZATION FOR TRIBAL
AND NON-TRIBAL AREAS

Measure	Mean Value (Tribal)	Mean Value (Non-tribal)
Residual (1961)	-0.83	+5.33
Residual (1962)	-1.86	+0.73

of opposition in each election, might affect the relation-
ship between the tribal base of constituencies and the
degree of partisan mobilization, an hypothesis based upon
(a) the fact that the set "tribal constituencies" were so
selected that they may be composed of a disproportionate
number of constituencies with strong oppositional strength
and (b) the fact that degree of participation often corre-
lates with "closeness" of an election. Thus it was assumed
that the observed relationship between the tribal nature of
the political base and partisan mobilization might have ap-
peared more positive than was warranted. In this light
the lack of any relationship at all between these two vari-
ables (mobilization and tribal-base) is the more surprising.
Could possibly the effect of competition on the relation-
ship be the reverse of what was initially assumed? Might
the non-tribal set of constituencies have by chance a dis-
proportionate number of "close" constituencies? Apparently,

not. Tribal constituencies have a slightly higher mean
value for partisan balance in each election, but as dis-
played in Table 2, the differences are insignificant. As

TABLE 2

MEAN VALUES FOR MEASURES OF PARTISAN BALANCE
FOR "TRIBAL" AND "NON-TRIBAL" AREAS

1961 Election		1962 Election	
Area	Mean Value	Area	Mean Value
Tribal	42.21	Tribal	41.37
Non-tribal	41.64	Non-tribal	39.41

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a matter of fact, there is very little relationship even
between "partisan balance" (competition) and partisan mobil-
ization. The intercorrelations of these variables for the
two sets of constituencies, tribal and non-tribal, are given
in Table 3. As this table suggests, there is at best the

TABLE 3

THE CORRELATION OF PARTISAN BALANCE
AND PARTISAN MOBILIZATION
FOR THE 1961 AND 1962 UGANDA ELECTIONS

Year	Tribal Set	Non-Tribal Set
1961	-0.152	0.232
1962	0.293	0.016

most marginal relationship between partisan balance and partisan mobilization, and there is little difference between the two sets of constituencies with respect to the relative weakness of this relationship.

One further test was attempted. The closeness of the election (partisan balance) was held constant in four separate multiple regression equations, where the nature of the cleavage base (tribal or non-tribal) was the independent variable (coded "0" or "1"), and the four different measures of partisan mobilization each served as dependent variables. All constituencies were included in this analysis (except constituencies in which no election was held).

The partial correlation coefficient $R_{yx.z}$, measuring the independent correlation of X and Y with Z constant, gave the following values (when Y was set equal to each of the four indices of partisan mobilization):

X Variable	Y Variable	Z (Control)	$R_{yx.z}$
Tribal/ Non-tribal	Partisan Mobilization, 1961 (Residual, 1961)	Partisan Balance, 1961	-0.259
Tribal/ Non-tribal	Partisan Mobilization, 1962 (Residual, 1962)	Partisan Balance, 1962	-0.098

Again the picture is clear. There is no evidence in these findings to support an assumption of association between tribal contests and partisan mobilization. Whatever

the factors were that overcame the inertia of a farmer's
routine and moved him and his wife to vote, without beer,
in the 1961 and 1962 elections, they were clearly more than
simply the appeal of inter-tribal conflict.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

It is my belief that this dissertation raises several interesting questions and while failing to provide conclusive evidence for any of several plausible "answers" does suggest promising directions for future research. Leaving aside the "solutions" to measurement problems offered in the third chapter, this study has two major findings. First, and by far the strongest finding (i.e. that in which the author has the greatest confidence): a tribal organization of politics does not appear to engender appreciably greater partisan activity than do alternative bases for political organization and electoral conflict. Second: tribe is likely to form the basis for electoral conflict in inter-tribal constituencies where two or more tribes each provide a propitious base for partisan organization. I have speculated in these pages what ratios of

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[1]They may hold some interest for those who seek to solve similar measurement problems in other societies, but are in the main of intramural interest within the general themes and discussions of this dissertation.

minority tribe population to total population might embolden an elite associated with the second largest secondary tribe to engage in electoral conflict. The data suggest that when the size of the second largest tribe augmented by $\frac{1}{4}$ the size of all other secondary tribes reaches 35% of the population, inter-tribal contestation becomes likely.

Turning to the first of these two primary findings: what explanation can be advanced for the lack of correspondence between the existence of a tribal basis for electoral conflict and intense partisan activity? Whenever results that are rationally expected do not materialize, that is whenever the relationship between two abstract concepts is not as initial speculation would infer, one has at hand several logical explanations for the "anomaly:" the speculation may be in error; the concepts themselves may be inadequate constructions; the measurement of the concepts may be inadequate. I believe that we can dismiss the possibility that the measurement of these concepts is inadequate. Both the principles underlying the measurement transformations (the processes of operationalization), and the applications of these measurement rules to the data, seem to me to be satisfactory. And I believe that the "argument" whereby one might expect tribal conflict to be appreciably more intense than non-tribal conflict is on the whole adequate. This leaves in question the adequacy of the two concepts, "tribe" and "partisan mobilization." Let me urge again upon

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the reader the arguments made for the concept "partisan mobilization" in Chapter Three. It is, I repeat, a valid construct. Let me also, though, recollect at this point the arguments made in Chapter One and again in Chapter Five against the validity of the concept "tribe." In that the concept "tribe" is suspect, it was possible to anticipate the lack of a relationship between tribal base and intensive partisan combat.

Thus it was possible to "expect" the essentially negative findings of Chapter Five. I believe that the concept "tribe" has been abused in the literature of African politics and comparative elections. The issue here is neither obscure nor complex. Tribe is not the same as ethnicity (that is subsets of the population characterized by a common language, culture, history and a self-conscious identification as a fundamentally separate human group).[2] Tribe is not a synonym for ethnicity. It is not even a sub-category of ethnicity. Tribe is a polyglot expression. It can be a linguistic convenience. It can be a racist slur; black peoples collect in tribes; white people in groups or as-

[2]Among many other commentators that have correctly identified "primordial loyalty" with ethnic affinity, one might cite Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 22, and the source he cites on this page; Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 105-57.

sociations, or states, or nationalities. It can be a people, an ethnic group, a cohesive political unit. Where it is one of several identities of people in cosmopolitan environments it can serve as the basis of interest group affiliations. It may thus become a convenient basis upon which politicians can construct alliances, creating the symbolisms and ersatz identities required by the electoral process.

However, in establishing that "tribal·conflict" is not a harbinger of partisan holocaust, I have said nothing with respect to the question of the relationship of partisan vigor and ethnicity. I simply wish to attack the contention that the mere existence of tribes in African societies of sufficient size to form partisan movements predicts the emergence of ethnic-partisan forces of such intemperance as to submerge the fragile structures of democratic governance. Indeed, in the absence of the "tribe" as a focal point of "primordial" conflict, the ethnic patterns of a society may prove to be of such a scale and pattern as to provide no convenient structure for a contemporary emergence of "primordial" conflict.

Turning now to the other "major" area of this dissertation, we must admit that the "findings" of the fourth chapter are at best heuristic. The "significant" correlation coefficients of the first part of the chapter are not ultimately satisfactory as they reflect speculation about individual behavior--the voting habits of tribesmen--with

aggregate level data. The discussion in the second part of the chapter of voting patterns in constituencies where no one tribe had a majority of the population is not even adorned with the suggestion of statistical significance. At best we deal with an agenda for future research.

One such future direction is easily indicated. Were it possible to specify the tribal identification of the candidates in the two elections it would be possible to determine at least the extent to which inter-tribal contests were held in those constituencies that we specified as having an appropriate inter-tribal base. This would be a better indication of the existence of inter-tribal conflict than inferences from parallel distributions of partisan vote. Such data are available for the 1961 election as part of the Robert O. Byrd study.[3] These data are probably not available, however, for the 1962 election.

Another alternative direction might be to collect data on the religious make-up of the constituencies. Data on the religious affiliation of Ugandans are available as census data only at the district level. It is therefore not helpful for our purposes. Yet church archives may contain church

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[3]Robert O. Byrd, "Characteristics of Candidates for Election in a Country Approaching Independence: the Case of Uganda," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VII, No. 1 (February 1963), 1-27. I have talked with Dr. Byrd and he assures me that interested scholars could obtain access to his data.

membership data that could be aggregated from the sub-
county to the constituency level. Even if the archives
contained only school attendance figures, these might prove
adequate measures of religious affiliation as virtually
all elementary schools were established and administered by
religious denominations and hence reflected in their dis-
tribution and size the religious composition of an area.
With such data, and utilizing some of the newer methods of
dampening the dread hand of the ecological fallacy,[4] one
might in a multivariate analysis of partisan voting specu-
late as to whether religion or tribe was the overriding
factor in determining partisan preferences. As the Byrd
study also contains data as to the religious affiliations
of the candidates, it would be possible to first separate
out all those contests in which the contest was both inter-
tribal and inter-religious and to then subject this subset
of the constituencies to multivariate analysis, with partisan
proportion as the dependent variable.

In addition, data as to the religious proportions of
the population by constituency would improve the analysis
in Chapter Five as it would make possible an analysis of
participation as a consequence of (a) the competitive posture
of the religious cleavage; (b) the competitive posture of

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[4]See for instance, W. Phillips Shively, "'Ecological'
Inference: the Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals,"
American Political Science Review, LXIII, No. 4 (December,
1969), 1183-1196.

the tribal cleavage; and (c) the competitive posture of the
partisan vote.

Notwithstanding these future possibilities, the find-
ings such as they are, as presented in Chapter Four, are
not without interest. Their fascination is in large part,
however, a consequence of the questions that they raise.
At what point will the opposition coalesce around a tempting
yet decidedly minority factional base in a voting constitu-
ency? Assuming "rational" victory-maximizing elites that
possess negligible emotional stake in representing a particu-
lar cleavage in a society, and assuming that these elites
have come upon a cleavage base, in this instance tribe,
which has substantial advantages with respect to mobiliza-
tion costs and allows for a realistic basis for electoral
contestation; assuming these two statements, then how large
must such a cleavage base be before such elites will build
their candidacy upon it? Is it a question of seizing a
particular height before some alternative elite stakes their
flag upon it? Do elites allow themselves the luxury of assum-
ing factionalization within the dominant side of the cleav-
age? What different rates of mobilization can be antici-
pated across the various parts of the cleavage, and thus
what is the likelihood that a "minority" side might pull an
upset through achieving a significantly higher level of
mobilization? These questions should be addressed by
theorists of voting and especially by theorists of voting

in African and Asian societies.

These are not unimportant questions. If we are troubled by the nature of political faction in the world today, if we are alarmed by the rise of antidemocratic activists and theorists who call our attention repeatedly to the explosive potential of conflicts based upon primordial loyalties, then we will do well to ponder both the nature and distribution of potential bases of ethnic conflict within a society. And, as we do so, our attention must be drawn to the dynamics of electoral cleavage within constituencies, that is, the kind and extent of cleavage base that is likely to support electoral conflict.

We hear it said that under certain conditions prized institutions of governance--legislative assemblies, elections, competitive parties--are inimical to peace, prosperity and orderly change. It is argued that societies divided by primordial ethno-cultural conflicts cannot long tolerate an open political system. Factionalism spawned by "democracy" will rend them. Military rule, the abrogation of parliamentary traditions, the cessation of open political debate will be necessary to stem the tide of ethnic violence. Is this so?

It may prove impossible to track the role of ethnic

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[5]This is surely the drift of the impressive argument of Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle in Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972).

affiliation, of tribal cleavage, and of religious factional-
ism through the obscure land forms of contemporary African
politics. The task is difficult. We deal with scores of
overlapping and unsettled political systems, not a national
pattern of political loyalties. Each village, each valley,
each lineage, each clan, may be either the setting of a
political system or the component part of a larger political
drama. In this sense there are no Ugandan politics; indeed
there are not even an Acholi politics.[6] For neither Uganda
nor Acholi is an unambiguous political arena wherein the same
contestants repeatedly reach for the same political weaponry
to establish temporary resolution to perdurable questions.
We may lack the skill or the endurance to see pattern and
meaning within this welter of diverse systems and events.
And yet, not to try to understand the nature of African
politics is to cease altogether to resist the attractive
suggestions of those who counsel disaster and shrug their
shoulders at military rule.

As I write these words I am looking at a Nigerian
carved mask that hangs from the ceiling of my study. The
face is severe. It demands attention, perhaps insists upon
a formal, even a ritual, management of human affairs; yet
it is not implacable. To admit that the face of tribal

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[6]A district within Uganda. For an interesting discus-
sion of Acholi politics such as it is see Colin Leys, Poli-
ticians and Policies (Nairobi, Kenya: East African Publish-
ing House, 1967).

Africa is still essentially unexplored, that all the journeys, all the inquiries and commissions, all the academic studies have not read these faces with any confidence, is not, I hope, to believe again that what we do not know must be hostile, dangerous, and even sinister.

In Uganda in 1961 and 1962 the majority of the population elected a representative assembly. They expressed a maze of different loyalties and antimonies. Were "primitive" intentions masked by the facade of British institutions? Did the voter casting his ballot really intend the abolition of a primordial foe? Was politics then, or might it yet become, a furnace of ancient hatreds? There is no evidence that I can see that would support such a thesis, either in Uganda history or in the particular events of these two elections.

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