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THE NKRUMAH AND NYERERE REGIMES.

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POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN GHANA AND TANZANIA

THE NKRUMAH AND NYERERE REGIMES

A Dissertation

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by

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PREFACE

A salient, if not the major, feature of modern African history is the change of dominant political authority over Africans. The chiefs of traditional, so-called tribal societies were superseded as the supreme rulers by European administrations; and the latter came in turn to give up their power to new, Western-educated African leaders. The modern African leaders organized successful liberation-movement parties, and they emerged as heads of newly independent states that are virtually coextensive with the former colonial territories. During the colonial period all three kinds of authority --the traditional, the European, and the modern African--existed in some form and in certain interrelationships. Many Africans owed some kind of allegiance, whether voluntary or involuntary, to more than one of these kinds of authority at the same time.

Many studies by anthropologists, political scientists and sociologists have analyzed the processes of socio-political change in modern Africa; but little attempt has been made to reveal the meaning of the political transition through which Africans have gone. This dissertation undertakes to interpret the meaning of that transition as it is manifested (perhaps typically) in two, widely separated African countries, Ghana (before 1957, the Gold Coast) and Tanzania (before 1964, Tanganyika). It proceeds through a theoretical exposition and comparison of the successive types of dominant political authority in these two countries.

The terms Ghana and Tanganyika are employed throughout most of the dissertation. The reasons are these. Even though the term Gold Coast was generally used of most of what is now Ghana before independence, it properly signified the coastal crown colony and not the protectorates of Ashanti and the Northern Territories that were linked with the colony and are incorporated into modern Ghana; moreover, Ghana also includes the former United Nations trust territory of British Togoland. However, in Part Two of this study, the term Gold Coast frequently is used in its usual extended sense of the colony and its associated territories. Tanganyika was the name used both before and after independence until the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was created in April 1964 and renamed United Republic of Tanzania the following October. This dissertation is not concerned with the island of Zanzibar, which presents unique characteristics and problems. Accordingly, the term Tanzania is used in the latter part of this study only with reference to the regime which in recent years has ruled Zanzibar as well as Tanganyika.

Ghana and Tanganyika were chosen for comparative analysis because of certain great differences between them. Among the new states in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana was the first and Tanganyika one of the last to achieve independence. Economically, Ghana is one of the richest while Tanganyika has been one of the poorest African countries. Ghana was a "colony" without colonists, while Tanganyika was not a "colony" and yet had colonists. The two countries vary greatly in tribal diversity, and there has been no direct influence on the tribes of one country by those of the other. The two countries are distantly separated geographically. Although both were governed by the British, Tanganyika was originally ruled by Germany. By 1961, Ghana was regarded as one of the most "radically leftist" African countries and Tanganyika as the most "moderate" and "responsible." Yet they have both, at different times and in different ways, been regarded by many Africans and Westerners alike as models for emulation by the rest of the continent.

The organization of the dissertation is as follows. Part One presents, in two chapters, an interpretive exposition of the traditional political authority and societal order of selected, representative African peoples in Ghana and Tanganyika. The third chapter of this part contains a theoretical comparison of the African regimes that have been individually treated in the first two chapters; it examines literature on other African and non-Western societies in order to determine how typically and specifically African the Ghanaian and Tanganyikan regimes are.

Part Two consists of two chapters, one on the Gold Coast and one on Tanganyika. Each is devoted to an analysis of the foundation, ideas and institutions of European colonial rule. Each considers the African experiences of and reactions to that rule.

Part Three is concerned with modern African authority in Ghana and Tanzania, namely with the regimes of Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere. Treating the two regimes together in a comparative analysis, it is divided into three chapters: one considers the major political institutions of Ghana and Tanzania; a second examines the symbols of the Ghanaian and Tanzanian leaders' authority; and the third deals with their ideas of African society and history. In these chapters, a major concern is to compare, and to clarify the relationship of, the modern African authorities with the traditional African and the European colonial authorities.

The materials for the first part of the dissertation are mainly anthropological accounts of the indigenous African societies. These are mostly descriptive, but they contain various amounts of ethnological analysis. Relevant theoretical studies of problems dealt with in this part and, for comparative purposes, works on other premodern societies are also used. Materials for the second part consist primarily of the writings of colonial administrators and documentary sources on German and British rule. Various anthropological, historical, political, and sociological studies of the two countries under colonial rule are utilized. The third part is based primarily on the writings and speeches of Nkrumah and Nyerere, on the African press in the two countries, and on political studies and histories of Ghana and Tanganyika. In a dissertation such as this, wherein the concern is to interpret theoretically a body of extant data, no clear distinction between primary and secondary sources can be maintained. Therefore the bibliography consists of a simple alphabetical listing of the sources.

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This dissertation hardly bespeaks the assistance and encouragement which I have had in my study of Africa. To Rev. Stanley Parry I owe a passing remark in a class on Aristotle's Politics for sparking my initial interest in Africa. Professor Stephen D. Kertesz encouraged my pursuit of that interest. Professor M. A. Fitzsimons generously supplied me with new books on Africa during and after the flush of independence in 1960, accepting reviews of them for publication in The Review of Politics. Professor Edward Goerner's criticism of my writing on Africa was of considerable help.

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To my family and friends, I offer the joy of a commencement.

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PART ONE

AFRICAN CHIEFLY AUTHORITY AND SOCIETAL ORDER

The purpose of this first part of the dissertation is to examine the political rule and order characteristic of traditional African societies located within the present boundaries of Ghana and Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania).

Since the Akan peoples comprise nearly half the population of Ghana, the first chapter presents and interprets materials on the indigenous Akan states in that country.

The second chapter deals with seven societal groups selected as most representative of the more than a hundred so-called tribes in Tanganyika.

The third and final chapter of this part presents a comparative analysis of the societies treated individually in the previous chapters. In establishing the nature of traditional political authority and order, it provides the basis for the attempts in the second and third parts of this study to understand the European colonial regimes and the first African regimes of Ghana and Tanzania.

CHAPTER I

THE AKAN OF GHANA

In Ghana the most highly developed indigenous authority was found among the Akan people, particularly in that section of the Akan called Ashanti.[1] The term "Akan" was first of all linguistic, identifying one group of the Kwa languages containing numerous dialects.[2] However, it has come to be used more extensively to refer to people whose religion, culture and institutions are similar. Whether these similarities can be attributed to a common origin of the Akan people is a historical problem on which scholars have not agreed,[3] and it is irrelevant to this study. What is relevant, however, are the ideas on this question that prevail among the people who are called Akan.

The Akan themselves hold that they once constituted a single tribe or race which they called Ntafo or Nta; that they were pastoral, living in the country north of the forest belt; and that they migrated south into the areas they now inhabit when they were encroached upon by a stronger and lighter-skinned people.[4]

The Akan are differentiated into exogamous matrilineal clans having no territorial basis or organization. Definite clans are common to all the Akan states, and members of the same clan living in different states regard themselves as kinsmen even though they may be strangers living many miles apart. Each clan is regarded as having descended from a remote, nameless ancestress; and each is identified with a totemic animal.[5]

The number of Akan-wide clans, as opposed to localized lineage groups that trace descent from a remembered ancestress, is seven. This is a symbolic number, representing the cosmos with its seven divine planets and the seven-day week of the Akan ritual calender.[6] This number symbolism, which Meyerowitz says is still intact,[7] is significant; and it raises a problem. Meyerowitz claims that the number seven represents the state as well as the universe, for the state had once been a confederation of seven clans: "seven heavenly bodies...rule the heaven. Seven abusua or matrilineal clans represent them on earth and rule the ideal and complete state."[8] This type of state, she asserts, broke down and gave way to a state that was a confederation of towns. This new type of state, an oman, retained the sumbolism by giving the chiefs of the seven major towns politico-military positions; and these chiefs replaced the clan chiefs as constituting the state council. The continued existence of the clan system "inevitably led to complicated arrangements in the administration of the state."[9]

The problem, then, can be approached through Rattray, who finds no trace of entire clans as clans having been politically united in Ashanti.[10] Rattray is obviously speaking of a group that is something less than an Akan-wide clan and something more than a localized lineage. When, however, one considers the Akan-wide clans, he must conclude that their political organization would require nothing less than the political unification of the entire Akan people. Since, as Meyerowitz was shown above to have found, the "ideal" or true Akan state is an organization of the seven clans in representation of the divine-cosmic order, it is possible that the new organization of the oman as an incomplete Akan state on military lines implies as its purpose the forceful unification of the Akan.

It would seem, then, that the Akan regard themselves as one society explicitly in their traditions of origin, and implicitly in their clan system. Moreover, this one society is considered to represent the divine-cosmic order. The hypothesis that this society, which is divided into numerous petty states, is striving to existentially realize its self-conception as an ordered representative of cosmic order through the adoption of military postures by each state has been suggested. With this hypothesis in mind we therefore proceed to examine the Akan political institutions and their relationship with the order of reality posited in Akan religion.

The Akan states (Aman, sing. Oman) have quite similar constitutional structures. Each state centers around a capital town and contains many subordinate villages. The capital is the seat of the king (Omanhene) and his court, which includes the Queen Mother (Ohena), Elders (Mpanyinfo), and various functionaries who attend to the king and his household. The Elders, who constitute a state council to advise the king and perform administrative functions, are mainly the heads of important lineages inhabiting the capital; and their titles are usually military. The most important other state offices are court chamberlain (Gyasehene), spokesman or linguist (Okyeame), royal clan chief

(Abusuahene), stool carrier (Akonnuasoafo), and bearers of the gold plate and state sword (nkrafo, awoso).[11]

The state is articulated into progressively smaller units, each under the rule of a chief and council; and there is thus a hierarchical chain of command. The king rules indirectly through chiefs of territorial subdivisions, the chiefs through subchiefs, subchiefs through village headmen, and the headmen through lineage heads. The number of levels of authority varies from state to state, but generally the state is composed of subdivisions (chiefdoms), the latter of villages, and the villages of matrilineages. Usually no authority directly intervenes in a group represented by a lower authority. Hence the king rules directly over only the highest level of chiefs and the inhabitants of the capital and its immediate environs. The chiefs and headmen have a large measure of autonomous authority over the purely internal affairs of their units; and their authority at each level is, within its own realm, similar to that of a higher authority over themselves.[12]

The links in the hierarchical chain of command are constituted by councils, with the notable exception of the state council. Villages are composed of quarters, each of which is occupied by a lineage group (abusua) that traces its origin to an ancestress some eight or ten generations back. The lineage heads (abusua panyin) together comprise the village council and choose the village headmen (odekuro) from among themselves. The head of the village belongs to the council of the chief immediately above him, and that chief serves on the council of yet higher rank. Sometimes all the chiefs down to and including the village headmen represent their peoples in a great council of state, but territorial chiefs have not usually been regular participants in the king's council.[13]

It was suggested above that the military aspects of Akan constitutional structure are significant. Most of the Akan states were established in their recent constitutional form only within the last three hundred years – at the close of a period of vast migration of peoples and during the period of European activities on the coast. Many owe their institution and expansion to war.

Apparently the Akwamu state at the beginning of the seventeenth century, became the first to be organized militarily. The Akwamu had settled some twenty miles north of Accra, the present capital of Ghana, and from thence established a powerful and expanding kingdom that in time came to control the main trade route connecting Accra with the interior.[14] Meyerowitz affirms that the military organization emerged "during the incessant wars with the aboriginal population and their neighbors"; and she describes the organization as follows:

> Seven of the most important chiefs of towns in the state were given military titles and were appointed to command five battle formations and two sub-divisions; the Benkum and Benkum-Naase formed the left wing and was commanded by the Benkumhene and Benkum-Naasehene (nowadays called the Akwamuhene in Asante and other states); the Nifa and Nifa-Naase formed the right wing and was commanded by the Nifahene and the Korontihene; the Adonten or main body of the

> army was commanded by the Adontenhene; the Gyaase, the Royal Household Guards, were commanded by the Gyaasehene; and the Kyidom or rearguard was commanded by the Kyidomhene. Each town and village was alloted to a particular battle formation....[15]

The military organization assumed political dominance, for the war-chiefs formed an oman council as the highest political institution in the state besides the king himself. This new system was adopted and developed by the great Ashanti state when it was formed a century later, and it spread to all the Akan states in Ghana.[16]

The military bearing of Akan politics is revealed in other ways too. Akan traditions consist largely of military exploits.[17] Certain major taboos are connected with military disasters, particularly the great oaths that play so important a role in the judicial system.[18] Akan kings are, among other things, considered great conquerors.[19] The true significance of these predominant military features cannot, however, be determined before it is clear how the Akan kings' authority is sanctioned by the realities posited in Akan religion.

The Akan clearly distinguish four major levels of spiritual powers: a high God, lesser gods, ancestral spirits, and magical powers associated with certain objects.[20] To say no more than that is, however, not to distinguish Akan beliefs from those prevailing generally in Africa and, indeed, among many other premodern peoples.[21] It is, accordingly, necessary to inquire more deeply into the substance of the Akan religious ideas if an understanding of the distinctive character of Akan religious experience is to be gained.

The great God of the Akan has many names that testify to the complexity of the Akan experience of supreme power. These include Nyame (The Shining One), Nyankopon (Nyame alone great), Nyankopon Kwame (Nyankopon whose day is Saturday), Odomankoma (Creator), Tweaduampon ("lean on a tree and do not fall," meaning the one on whom men may confidently depend), Borebore (Maker), Opanyin (Elder), Otumfo (The Powerful), and Nana (Grand Ancestor).[22] Chief among these is Nyame, who is, as his name implies, a Sky-God. He is behind and manifested by the various qualities and phenomena of the heavens. The various bodies of heaven -- stars, moon, sun -- are associated in Akan art with Nyame. The rainbow is "Nyame's bow." Shooting stars "abide with Nyame."[23] When it rains the people say Nyame oreba ("Nyame is coming").[24] Despite strong etymological objections, many Akan hold that the name Nyame derives from the two words nya, "to get," and me, "to be full." Thus he is considered also "a God of Fullness, a God of Satisfaction."[25]

The Akan make no attempt to clarify in doctrinal terms the apparent confusion arising from the multiplicity in their conception of the high God.[26] They do, however, afford some basis for clarification, particularly in their proverbs. Names like Nana, Otumfo, and Opanyin are certainly of the same order as "Father," "the Omnipotent," and "King" or "Lord" are in Christian references to God; they express in human terms the relationship of

God to man and are, therefore, names of God in only an extended sense. Similarly, these kinds of names are by the Akan "also legitimately used of exalted men, such as kings and heads of families or commanders of armies."[27] Beyond that, however, there can be little precision. One can merely say that the Akan distinguish between, and yet identify, Nyame, Nyankopon, Borebore, and Odomankoma. The question, then, whether the names are various titles of one supreme God or the names of various gods, each of which, from one point of view, is the supreme God, finds no precise answer in Akan terms. It is enough to suggest, however, that the Akan high God is of the archaic type, differing significantly from the transcendent God of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.[28]

Gods and spirits of a lower order (abosom) are considered descendents of Nyame. According to a widely prevailing Akan myth, Nyame sent his children, the abosom, down to earth to confer benefits upon, and to receive religious attention from, men. These sons, the major rivers and lakes so basic to Akan life, are "children of the rain" and "husbands" to the land, which is personified as a feminine spiritual power. The tributary streams are, in turn, the children of Nyame's sons and Mother Earth. Consequently, all waters are sacred life-giving forces; and the divine power in shrines of abosom is derived from water. At the major periodic ceremonies of the Akan, all the shrines are taken to be washed with water. The shrines -- and through them, the people and the land -- are thereby purified and revivified by the power or effective presence of the gods.[29]

The matrilineal descent group has been described. Here, in connection with the sacredness of water, another type of Akan clan should be mentioned. Spiritual descent is traced patrilineally. An Akan derives his spirit (ntoro) from his father. Ntoro is semen, "water that procreates." The word sunsum denotes the personality of a man and is the specification of the generic ntoro. A sunsum is a "child" of a ntoro. A ntoro group is a patriclan, which is divided into local groups comparable to the matrilineage, that consists of men who "wash," or participate in, the same ntoro.[30] Busia explains:

> In the same way that these children (abosom) of the Supreme Being share in his spirit, so the Ntoro are children of the rivers from whom they derive their spirits; and in the same way that the Ntoro is a child of the river, so the sunsum of a man is a child of the Ntoro and shares its nature; thus...all spiritual power derives from the Supreme Being.[31]

This, then, is the hierarchical and generative order of reality from the high God to man. It constitutes a spiritual universe in which man, lower than the gods but higher than other forms of life, exists as a mediating and often integrating factor. The Akan participates in this universe in great measure through his rulers, the Akan kings and chiefs; and an understanding of this Akan world is a necessary prerequisite to an understanding of political authority among the Akan.

One cannot, however, grasp the Akan view of the world until he sees the crucial part played in it by the ancestors. The Akan experience themselves as complexes of what may be called several spiritual components, or souls. There is the sunsum discussed above, which after death "joins the group ntoro god (obosom) or spirit, and is reincarnated again through any male of the same ntoro."[32] Next is the mogya, a clan or blood soul transmitted by the mother. Also called abusua (clan), it gives bodily form to a person. After the death of a man his mogya becomes a saman and, retaining its form, enters the spirit world (samando) to await reincarnation through a woman of the same clan. The kra is yet another element; and there are seven kinds of kra, one for each day of the week. The kra is a divine, impersonal soul given by Nyame, to whom it returns after death. The honhom (breath of life) is closely connected with the kra, and after death it also returns to Nyame.[33] While the honhom goes directly, however, the kra must give an account of its life to the court comprised of the late king and his elders; if the life was imperfect the kra must first undergo purgative reincarnations.[34] These, then, are the elements of which the Akan hold men to be composed.

After death, men retain their ties of kinship with the living as samanfo (ancestral spirits), which are dependent on the continuity of their clans for propitiation, honor and, if necessary, reincarnation. The mortuary rite has for its purpose the provision of such items as food, clothing, bedding and other things that will help the dead on their journey to the world of spirits and maintain them there. They are also given messages to convey to the ancestors. The spirit world is, in short, considered by the Akan to be a duplicate of life on earth and an extension of it, albeit a superior world. There are found all the ancestors, who retain the status in the spirit world that they had on earth. Only those ancestors are remembered by name, however, who held political office while on earth.[35]

The samanfo are regarded as vital to the well-being of society. They "are believed to be always watching the behavior of those they have left behind on earth, helping and protecting them, or punishing them if they do not behave."[36] They "are the custodians of the laws and customs of the tribe and will punish with sickness and misfortune those who infringe these rules; this is a very powerful sanction of morality among the Akan."[37] Each saman is, however, generally concerned with its own kinsmen, the dead kings looking after the whole society.[38]

The Akan ruler is the major link between this world and the spirit world, and he is the representative of the latter to his own society. This is exemplified in many ways. The high God and the great kings who founded states are sometimes assimilated to one another. In the Ashanti state of Mampon one of the drum chants clearly identifies the first king of Mampon with Tweaduampon, Nyame. This kingly ancestor-god is credited with creating the herald drummer, and (it is emphasized) the executioner.[39] The Omanhene of Akim Abuakwa is addressed by his people as Otumfo, the divine name meaning "he who is (or has) power." He is also called Nana (grandparent), Deefo (benefactor) and Katakyi (valiant).[40] Nana, like Otumfo, is one of the names of the high God. That the same names are used of God and the kings is significant, for it implies at least that the king is a father to his people as God is a father, and that the king's power is in some way comparable to God's. If, however, it is at least comparable, it may be identical; for Frankfort assures us that peoples whose thought is mythopoeic know nothing of analogy.[41] This is not to say that the Akan king is, like the Egyptian pharaoh, a god like Horus, for the Egyptians are explicit in a way that the Akan usually are not. One should not thereby be dismayed, for the Akan are not explicit about many things, as for example whether they have one or several high gods. Their conceptions inhere much more in ritual and in brief, often proverbial, references to their religious experiences. Only one source maintains an explicit identity, finding among "the one section of the Akan people that had preserved the past with more completeness and detail than any other," the idea that the ancient kings of Bono were the incarnations of Borebore and Nyankopon.[42] This idea seems not to have been retained by the later Akan states, so that we must conclude merely that Akan kings are understood as earthly re-presentations of the high God, an identity between them only rarely being expressed. Elaborating no political theology, the Akan did not address themselves to the problem of whether the relationship was one of analogy or identity.

The Bono kingdom was destroyed and absorbed by the powerful Ashanti state in 1740, and its influences are noted in Ashanti. The Ashanti king is "the destroyer of towns" and he "who never forgives."[43] What these expressions indicate is that the power of the king is seen to be like God's in that it is irresistable and not to be provoked. The king, moreover, though a vengeful power, is yet benevolent to his people. He is Deefo, their benefactor. Since his state has certain militant purposes, he benefits the state as Katakyi, the one who inspires his army with the virtue of victory, bravery.[44]

The king is not the benefactor in any mere functional or utilitarian sense. The taboos surrounding the king protect the beneficial powers concentrated in his sacredness. This conception is seen in the Akan concern that the king's feet never touch the ground lest the state suffer a famine.[45] No explanation is given why a famine would result, but the answer is found in the sacredness of the earth, who is a goddess.[46] If the physical separation of king and earth is not maintained, two important orders of reality which had been differentiated would be confounded. The contact of the king's feet with the ground would constitute a reversion to the chaotic condition preceeding the existence and order of human life.[47] Another motive for the taboo would be the earth's unique relationship with Nyame's sons, the rivers. The king possesses sufficient sacredness that he, unlike ordinary men, could transgress that unique relationship.

The sacredness of the king is protected in various ways by certain state officials. The purpose of the king's spokesman (okyeame) -- and chiefs also had their spokesman -- is to act as an intermediary between the king and those with whom the king must deal. The spokesman lessens the chance of pollution of the king,[48] and in turn protects the people from direct contact with the searing power of the king.

Rattray informs us that all important gods each have "a whole court of functionaries based exactly on the model of a king's court."[49] This is another way of saying that the Akan themselves understood their kings to be imitators of the gods. Members of the court, and holders of certain other sacred offices, have their divine counterparts. The okyeame of the king is the most important member of the court; he represents the abosom, each of whom is Nyame's okyeame.[50] The various offices are considered to exist not merely because they are useful or even appropriate for governing, but because the gods have shown the right way for men to order their societies. The same pattern is attributed to the samanfo. As a result, "human sacrifices at royal funerals were made in order to provide the departing personage with the services of a retinue of human attendants."[51]

Not only do the three levels of existence thus differentiated -- that of the gods, that of the ancestors, and that of living men -- have patterns that correspond to one another, but an order pervades the three that is of like pattern. Nyame rules the pantheon just as Akan kings rule men; he also oversees and rules the whole order of reality through intermediaries. In terms of this order, the samanfo are the pre-eminant rulers of the Akan. For example, the judgements of an omanhene were generally considered the decisions of his royal samanfo. "When a Chief opens his mouth in court he speaks with the power of the samanfo." The king or chief is their "mouthpiece" (okyeame) and representative among the living.[52]

The living kings and the dead kings were linked in several ways. Each king is a descendant of previous kings, though indirectly by virtue of matrilineal succession. The Ashanti king is therefore called "Osai's son," for Osai Tutu was the founder and first king of the Ashanti state.[53] In most Akan states a new king or chief is installed by suspending and lowering him three times over the blackened stool of his earliest predecessor. He is declared ruler "by the direction and guidance of the spirits of his departed and august ancestors."[54]

In order to be "enstooled" on any level, a male must belong to the stool (ruling) family. He may thus be a brother, nephew, or uncle but not a son of the preceeding chief because the succession is always in the female line.[55] This requirement of membership in a particular family which owns the office indicates that Akan societies adhere to a principle of continuation of authority in time. The first member of the family who established rule manifested his authority by making his family stool prevail over other stools (or families). The stool is believed to incorporate the spirit (and authoritative power) of that original ruler and his successors.[56] Thus the current occupant of the stool is not only regarded as the descendant of the previous chiefs, but he is identified with them through the stool. They and he rule together as one. Thereby the foundation of authority is merged with its continuation and exercise.

Another fundamental requirement in a king is physical perfection. The stool aspirant is to become a sacred vessel, a mediator of divine and ancestral power. His body must therefore be without defect. So too must his character. Besides their practical advantages, good leadership qualities are testimony of the candidate's favor with the ancestors and gods. Since the candidate is to channel divine and ancestral blessings to the society, he is expected to show that he has not offended the spirits and that he already has influence with them.[57]

The nature of an Akan king's authority is reflected in the various symbols of that authority. The Akan are hardly unique in regarding the royal insignia as "charged with the superhuman power of kingship."[58] Yet their symbols are quite distinctive, and the most important of them -- the stool and umbrella -- are worthy of discussion here. Generally, among royal insignia "the throne occupies a special place," and sometimes the throne is itself considered divine, as in ancient Egypt.[59] The Akan stool is not, however, a throne upon which the king sits. An examination of its pre-eminant significance will take us to the heart of Akan political order.

We begin by noting that every Akan has a stool, attached to which are certain taboos attending on the well-being of its owner. In addition to these personal stools are the stools of families. Some of these family stools became state stools when certain families attained hegemony over other families.[60] The stool is not only the chief symbol of authority; it is itself the bearer of the office it represents.

> In a sense, the occupant of the Stool -- the Chief -- is not very important. Chiefs come and go, but the stool lives on. So that when an Akan talks about a Chief he is not thinking so much of the personality of the ruling Chief, as of the Stool he occupies. So long as he remains Chief, therefore, he and the Stool are one, and the terms are interchangeable.[61]

Besides being the symbol and source of authority, the stool is the symbol and center of the state religion. It embodies the spirit of the state's founder, and it binds the people together into a community.[62] The stool so represents a kingdom that "a conquered kingdom is not considered to be finally subjugated until the Royal Stool has passed into the hands of the conqueror."[63] Thus the Ashanti went into mourning not when their king was exiled by the British but when their great Golden Stool was desecrated and, in effect therefore, largely destroyed.[64] The Ashanti believed their stool to embody the sunsum (soul) of their society, "upon which the health, life and well-being of the people depend."[65]

The umbrella is the second important item in the king's regalia. The Ashanti king could not go outside or from one palace room to another without being covered by an umbrella. His umbrella was called Boaman (the nation's conqueror), and its top ornament was always of gold. The requirement of an umbrella covering for the king is explained by the proverb, "Nyame must never behold the crown of the King's head." The reason for this taboo is not clear when it is considered that a paramount chief "must always step out from beneath his umbrella before greeting the king."[66] One might have assumed that the chief and the king would act similarly in the presence of higher authority. The fact that they do not suggests several ideas that are not explicitly formulated. First, it suggests that Nyame is experienced as far more august with respect to the king than the king is to the chief. Second, it suggests that the chief in a sense ceases to represent the people to Nyame when the king is present, for the king represents Nyame to all the chiefdoms which are in him combined as an undifferentiated whole. No authority has determined or ventured to infer the significance of the umbrellas. Perhaps Rudolf Otto's discussion of "covering" is relevant here.[67] If so, the umbrellas would serve to shield the kings and gods from the tremendous power of Nyame, and to symbolize their unworthiness in comparison to Nyame whose place they tend to take among men. This further suggests an element of rivalry between the lower authorities and the highest authority, a tendency of the former to assert themselves as supreme within their own spheres of activity. The uncovering of the paramount chiefs in the king's presence would then signify that within the king's own domain or court there is no question of their rivaling him. They can rival him and "act the king" only in their own chiefdoms. This explanation would agree with the fact that the ancestral cult increased with the growth of the power and authority of the chiefs, and that it replaces the cult of the sky god.[68]

The annual Odwira ceremony was the most important of the Akan rituals. Its object was primarily the royal ancestors, and its chief priest was the king. Through it the king would re-establish his own office and the society by cleansing it of corruption and the ravages of time, by restoring its order, and by providing for its prosperity. Although Odwira was not found among all the Akan peoples, all at least had similar annual purification ceremonies.[69] The Odwira honored and propitiated the "kings who 'had gone elsewhere'" and purified the state and all of its shrines.[70] It was the time when the public worshipped their national gods and were cleansed of their transgressions of the previous year. All stools and their holders were sanctified for the coming year. The Odwira was a "national" festival also in the sense that every chiefdom and clan in the state participated in it. Chiefs of all levels and all healthy people were expected to attend.[71]

The most detailed account of the rite is Rattray's description of the Ashanti Odwira, which took place in September at the time of the annual harvest.[72] Eleven days before the rite began, the king would sacrifice at the mausoleum of dead kings, whom he addressed as follows: "The edges of the Years have come round, we are about to celebrate the rites of odwira; do not permit any evil at all to come upon us and let the new year meet us peacefully."[73] This prayer shows that the rites were to renew the year, the new year being a regeneration and therefore a repetition of the old year. Society and nature were again to return to the beginning, the creation. But creation was out of chaos, so that this was a time of danger. The ancestors were thus asked to protect them from evil.[74]

At one point during the _Odwira_ the king would remove his royal garb and dress as "the poorest slave in the realm," an inversion of constitutional order signifying a return to the original chaotic condition out of which order emerged. Sacrificing to a sacred object associated with the first king, he prayed: "_Odwira_ of Oasi Tutu, accept this wine and drink, any one who does not wish to serve you, ...let me kill him." Later the king's _okyeame_ would pray to the hermaphrodite Awo, the first human killed as a sacrifice to make Mother Earth fruitfull. "Any one at all who does not wish to serve the King of Ashanti, let our hand slay him."[75] It is clear that these ceremonies identify the establishment of the kingship whom all must serve, herewith renewed, with the original act rendering nature fruitful and beneficial to man. Service to the king is ritually (and thus really) identified with the guarantee of food necessary for life. Social life and physical life are ritually established from a common source.

Another of the _Odwira_ rites was not only to establish but to perpetuate the king's authority. Many of the Ashanti kings were of the _Bosommuru ntoro_, which myth proclaims as the first _ntoro_, deriving from Nyame himself.[76] Its shrine is a sacred sword. In the rite the shrine is deliberately and publicly polluted by the breaking of a taboo. This "poisoning" or desacralization breaks the power of the sword. Later the king sprinkles the sword with a mixture made with water from the sacred rivers (abosom) in order to re-establish the shrine and its cult; and as he does so he prays:

> O Bosommuru the edges of the years have met; you were sharp but I took the thing which you abhor and touched you (with it), but to-day I sprinkle you with water in order that your power may rise up again. When I and my equal, some war lord or other, meet, cut off his head and give it to me.[77]

This rite was followed by a general purification. The king and his court go to a sacred stream, led in procession by the Golden Stool, blackened ancestral stools, the Odwira shrine, the Bosommuru shrine, and all the regalia of state authority. After the purification, the king prays to the stools for victory, plenty and wealth. This rite was also one of renewal, for when the king addressed the Golden Stool he prefaced his requests with the words: "Stool of Kings, I sprinkle water upon you, may your power return sharp and fierce." Later yams from the new crop are offered to the ancestral kings and at the shrines of the abosom, Odwira, and Bosommuru. The kings, chiefs and people could not eat of the new crops until these sacrifices were made.[78] In this practice it is seen that the yearly renewal of the state is total. The king and other officials, the people, the land -- all of these are renewed, and they are all situated in a spiritual realm.

The various cult groups reveal the articulation of the Akan states. The whole people of a state join in a ritual celebration of their community but once a year at the Odwira. The state as a whole is thereby rooted in the great annual cycle of the universe and not in the smaller cycles contained within it. Other periodic rites of more frequent occurance are celebrated by smaller societies within the state headed by chiefs. Among these societies is the one for whom the king is its particular chief. Harking back to the tradition of clan unity are the rites of the royal family itself. In them the king acts as the family head, renewing the vitality of the clan and his own authority over it. Just as the universe as a whole moves through concentric cycles of varying duration, the whole of an Akan state is articulated into corresponding concentric societies and levels of authority. The king acts as a priest on each of the three major levels by performing the rites of the state, of his own division of the state, and of his family.[79]

Akan kings and chiefs, then, are priests in a twofold manner. First, they perform priestly functions. As representatives of their societies they sacrifice and pray to the various spiritual powers -- the high God, lesser gods, and ancestors. Those in Akan society known as priests have a quite different position. They are not considered representatives of the people so much as representatives of the gods among the people. Each priest was believed especially close to, and often possessed by, one particular god to whom he is considered wed.

The kings and chiefs were regarded as priests in an existential as well as functional sense. They were vessels of divine power by virtue of their offices. In this sense, their persons were sacred. Although not themselves gods, they were sacral kings because through and from them flowed the order of society, the strength of the state, the fecundity of nature, and the prosperity and life of the people.

The king is creator of the order of society in several respects. He is so in that he descends from the first king, the one who established the constitutional order. Moreover, he is closely identified with the first and all subsequent kings through his occupancy of the state stool, which is held to contain the spirits of all the previous kings and the soul of the kingdom.

The king maintains the order of society and nature by periodically recreating it through rituals. The greatest of these are the annual Odwira ceremonies whereby the king abolishes the old and restores it as a new year for a new society.

The king is also the strength of the state. His power in it is supreme. Himself saturated with all the symbols of sacred power, the king more than anyone participates in reality. His is the state's efficacy, the will and ability to do well and to allow others to do well.

CHAPTER II

BANTU SOCIETIES OF TANGANYIKA

Some 95 percent of the people of Tanganyika are Bantu.[1] "The Bantu are a congeries of peoples, belonging predominantly to Central and Southern Africa, named from and defined by the peculiar type of language that they speak."[2] This chapter will treat selected Bantu tribes of Tanganyika, and the selection of tribes will be based upon the classification by scholars of the Bantu tribes into groups.

The classifications of Bantu tribes are geographico-cultural. "On the basis primarily of geographical distribution, but taking into account cultural and, to a lesser extent, historical factors,"[3] Seligman divides them into Eastern, Southern, and Western groups. The Eastern Bantu are divided again into Interlacustrine, North-Eastern and Eastern. Some Interlacustrine tribes, living around Lake Victoria, are in northwestern Tanganyika. The North-Eastern Bantu are mainly in Kenya, so that most Tanganyika Bantu are in the Eastern subcategory of the Eastern division of the Bantu. The Eastern subcategory he divides again into the East Coast and the East Central Bantu. Seligman includes the Sukuma tribe in the Interlacustrine group, the Sambara in the East Coast subdivision, and the Nyakyusa in the East Central subdivision.[4]

The classifications of Murdock are more detailed, and they correspond only in part with Seligman's. On the basis of Bantu expansions and mixture with non-Bantu peoples, he finds that the appropriate divisions that include Tanganyikan tribes are the Northeast Coastal Bantu, the Interlacustrine Bantu, the Kenya Highland Bantu, and the Tanganyika Bantu. The Northeast Coastal Bantu he groups into three distinct clusters: the Nika, primarily in Kenya; the Zigula, embracing the Luguru and other tribes near the coast whose identities as tribes have been little affected; and the Swahili. The Kenya Highland Bantu include the Shambala. Murdock's Interlacustrine Bantu are in three clusters: Ruanda, which includes the Ha tribe; Uganda, containing the Haya and Zinza; and East Nyanza, among which is the Sonjo and Zanaki. According as they have assimilated elements of surrounding cultures, the Tanganyika Bantu, constituting the majority of people in the country, are in five clusters. The Sukuma he places in the Nyamwezi cluster, strongly affected by the Interlacustrine culture. The Bena are in the Rufifi cluster, and the Nyakyusa are in the Nyasa cluster.[5]

What these attempts at classification make clear, is that the cultural traits that would be grounds for any but an arbitrary geographical breakdown are distributed neither in neat patterns nor in whole blocs. Therefore any classification will be a rough one, and the by now conventional ones will usually be the most useful for purposes of reference. Since little attempt has been made to determine the essential characteristics of the tribal societies and groups being classified, the categories reflect not essential but merely phenomenological differences. None of the classifications therefore have theoretical relevance. What the classifications can do, however, is to enable the analyst to choose a limited number of phenomenologically different tribal societies from the approximately 120 tribes[6] in Tanganyika. Using all the classifications, the analyst will be as certain as he can be[7] that the tribes he selects to examine will at least be a representative cross-section of the indigenous societies of that country.

The present study will investigate the following Bantu tribes in Tanganyika: Sukuma, Ha, Shambala, Sonjo, Bena, Luguru, and Nyakyusa.[8]

SUKUMA[1]

Numbering approximately a million people, the Sukuma comprise more than a tenth of the population of Tanganyika and is its largest tribal group.[2] Their home is in the northwestern part of the country, immediately south of Lake Victoria.[3] The Sukuma are related in language and culture to the neighboring Interlacustrine Bantu, and particularly to the half-million Nyamwezi south and west of them.[4] They have never been unified under a central political authority. "Instead, tribal affinity is based on similarity of language, laws, customs and political and economic institutions; on the spread of kinship ties throughout the various chiefdoms; and on joint residence in one region for many years."[5]

The chiefdom is the object of strongest Sukuma loyalty. A Sukuma identifies himself by the name of the royal clan of his chiefdom. According to the legends of the Sukuma chiefdoms, the royal clans derive from pastoralists called Hima who, descending from the western side of Lake Victoria, were established as rulers over the indigenous Bantu.[6] The Hima "were not military conquerors and they were obviously accepted as leaders by common consent," because they met a "latent demand" for leadership of groups of isolated families or villages when the population was becoming increasingly dense; not belonging to local clans, they apparently impressed the Bantu of their mental and physical superiority and were accepted as good judges.[7] The Hima and Bantu intermarried, and "the ownership of cattle and the right to participate in the festive and religious ceremonies of the Sukuma chiefdoms are enjoyed by all."[8] But the result of the Hima arrival was the emergence of a political "hierarchy consisting of chief, headmen, village elders and commoners."[9]

The Hima ruler of a Sukuma chiefdom is called an ntemi, and he appears as a despot of the oriental type.[10] As the supreme judge, he could sentence to death or confiscate property. He controlled the wealth of the chiefdom. His royal guard, consisting of captured slaves and the best warriors, depended on him for life and favors and was therefore reliable. Given the system of matrilineal succession in most chiefdoms, chiefs could rely on their sons as loyal administrators.[11]

The major authorities on the Sukuma deny, however, that the power of the ntemi was absolute, and their reasons differ in emphasis.[12] Cory says the ntemi "was a 'Democratic Feudal Leader'." His empirical account does not elaborate on this term. However, it seems clear that the "democratic" element lies in the small size of the chiefdoms, the consequent familiarity between chief and people, and the practice of deposing a chief when the people are dissatisfied.[13]

These reasons are, however, but half the story. Cory himself indicates that rarely was a Sukuma chief replaced.[14] Moreover, Liebenow found that chiefs were inaccessible. Perhaps the decisive argument against the notion of democracy is the fact that chiefs were not elected by the people, and in fact were selected before the people were told that the preceding chief had died.[15]

Leaving aside Cory's concept for chiefly authority and returning to his straightforward account, one finds that he emphasizes certain "constitutional restrictions on the chief's authority." He writes:

> All the officials and members of corporate bodies within the chiefdom had their clearly defined functions and therefore acted as restrictions on the superior authority of the chief. None of these institutions served only as executives under the orders of the chief.[16]

The chiefdom elders (banangoma) are the first group of officials who restrict the power of the ntemi. The ntemi must choose the elders from among a few privileged men of certain families. The functions of the elders were to act as the chief's advisors, to mediate between the chief and people, to serve as the chief's deputies in matters requiring on-the-spot attention, and to act in the chief's court as judges or assessors. They controlled all matters concerning the chief's public and private life, even choosing his wives. Sitting in council with headmen of chiefdom subdivisions, they selected the new chief. Often they also had power to replace a chief with another member of the ruling family. They performed many of the chief's rituals.[17]

The term banangwa referred to two kinds of office. The first were the subchiefs, who were generally the sons and other near relations of the chief. Their duties were similar to those of the chief and they were the chief's deputies in their own areas.[18] Other subchiefs or headmen were followers of the early Hima "who aided in the hearing of minor court cases, in collecting tribute, overseeing the cultivation of the chief's fields and, later, in allocating new land." In return for their fealty, they "were maintained at court, shared in the collection of fines, had their personal fields cultivated by ordinary peasants and enjoyed the privileges of leadership."[19] The second kind of office was that of subdivision (parish) headmen, who were not merely the chief's administrative officials but holders of their position by traditional right. Although they were to carry out the few orders emanating from the chief, their people regarded them not so much as subordinate officials but as descendents of leaders or chiefs who first established the subdivisions. They were responsible for the religious ritual of their subdivisions. They held their own courts, and their judicial power was great; they had parish elders who served as advisors and helpers as well as assessors in their courts. They organized communal labor for digging dams, clearing the bush of tsetse, and other public works.[20]

A distinctive Sukuma office, which Cory maintains was restrictive of the chief's powers, was that of the great commoners (basumba batale). It derives from those leaders who originally established settlements, which endure as distinct parts (subparishes) of chiefdom subdivisions. It is often hereditary, but sometimes the great commoner is chosen from among their ranks by the youths or people of the subparish. The term of office was limited, varying usually from three to five years. The great commoner was not a political leader, but a head of working parties in the common interest. He led a permanent organization (elika) of all subparish young men for the supply of labor for the community and for hire by individuals, with priority given to the old and sick.[21]

It is primarily in connection with the religious character of the chief's authority that Liebenow and Millroth question their "autocracy."

> The chief in historic times was not specifically an autocrat ruling the tribe; he was always the bearer of the essence of kingship which linked the powers of God controlling the rain and sun with the welfare of his people. His worthiness or unworthiness for this role was shown in rain and drought and his continuance as chief was dependent on his mystical association with the elements.[22]

This mediatory role of the chief between the spiritual powers and the society is revealed primarily in the rituals connected with the office of chief. These rituals are described in detail in Cory's The Ntemi: The Traditional Rites in Connection with the Burial, Election, Enthronement and Magic Powers of a Sukuma Chief with a minimum of interpretive commentary. Some of this description, along with other accounts of Sukuma religion, will here be examined to determine the position of the chief in Sukuma religious experience and practice.

When it was apparent that the ntemi was fatally ill, he was strangled by several banangoma if he entered a coma or the illness did not result in early death.

In explanation, Cory refers his readers to J. G. Frazer's treatment of the killing of divine kings in the Golden Bough,[23] which provides this general explanation: "if the course of nature is dependent on the man-god's life, what catastrophes may not be expected from the gradual enfeeblement of his powers and their final extinction in death"; these dangers are therefore averted by killing the divine king when "he shows symptoms that his powers are beginning to fail" and by transferring his soul "to a vigorous successor before it has been seriously impaired by the threatened decay."[24] The selection and installation of the new ntemi would appear consistent with this view. The banangoma selected the ntemi from among the candidates, the dead chief's sisters' sons, through divination.[25] Thereupon the dead ntemi was buried with, among the human sacrifices and sacred objects, the head of the chief who preceded him and half of a stool. The other half of the stool "was kept and used for the grave of the successor, who himself got a complete chair for his common use, the upper half of which would be used for this chief's successor."[26] Cory finds this rite a "symbol of the continuity of the chief's office and of the unity between the ruling chief and both his predecessor and successor."[27]

The ceremonies surrounding the installation of the new ntemi point to two major aspects of the chiefly office: the office is constitutional and, apart from ruling, the chief's reign was to initiate and maintain the natural and societal orders. The constitutional character of the new ntemi's position was emphasized in the instructions given him. Many of the instructions were given during a pre-installation period of initiation, when the chief was instructed in his duties and proper attitude toward his subjects by the banangoma as follows:

> If you see a man with a wound, take him, receive him well. Give him food. May he leave pleased. A chief like this, possessing a soul, knows how to care for men. Give up following the words of children; childhood has passed, you have become an elder. Follow the words of your country. Give up feeling desire for property. All are your people; even the one-eyed, he also is your man.[28]

These teachings and expectations are quite clear: the chief rules for the good of his subjects, even the most lowly of them, and not in his own interest; and he rules well by following "the words of his country"; that is, by adhering to both the traditions of his office and to the advice of his councillors, the banangoma, who are the voices of the people. The banangoma also instructed the chief in the traditions of his chiefdom; told him "to be just in court, to listen to complaints and to avoid favouritism"; and taught him ceremonial songs and his special taboos.[29] These instructions were reinforced during the installation rites. Twice the chief threw a spear, once among the people and once among the cattle. A person hit by the spear was forbidden to complain; a beast hit by the spear was slaughtered. "This symbolic act made known to every subject the power of the chief over their lives and also his duty of sovereign generosity."[30] A calabash was held over the chief's head and broken with these words: "The bitter calabash is broken over your head. Be gentle and righteous. If you do not follow this advice your reign will be broken like the bitter calabash."[31]

The chief was asked if he could kill his father, his mother, his elder brother, his sister; after each question the chief replied "I could kill him (her)," a promise to avoid favoritism.[32]

The chief's responsibility for the order of nature and society was also emphasized in the coronation ceremonies: "Take these sorghum leaves. May your reign bring fertility to the fields." "Here the spear in your hand to protect your land." "Here the fly-switch in your hand, it is the fly-switch of rain."[33] The last of the coronation ceremonies was the kindling of new fire. Cory writes:

> Before the village headmen and people had left their homes to attend the enthronement ceremonies, all fires in the chiefdom had to be extinguished. Each of the banangwa now took a piece of live charcoal from this fire and kept it glowing until he arrived home. With the embers he set on fire a huge pile of wood collected in front of his house, and each inhabitant of the village took fire from there in order to kindle new fire on his hearth. Before this was done a general cleaning of house and yard was performed.[34]

Cory does not comment on the meaning of this ceremony, but it obviously signifies a renewal of the life and well-being of the chiefdom. The chiefdom was symbolically darkened while the office of chief was vacant, but with the installation of a new chief the light of life was renewed. It is perhaps relevant that Lyuba, the Sukuma high God, is associated with the sun. "From the sun comes light, heat, growth etc., benefits that Lyuba gives."[35] Fire also gives light, heat, and growth; and from the new chief it is spread among the people by the banangwa according to the constitutional route for the exercise of the chief's political authority. It follows that this distribution of fire is the first chiefdom-wide act of the chief, and its beneficence symbolizes the essential character of chiefship as the source of societal well-being.

Having assumed office, the chief was expected ritually to control the agricultural cycle, to secure rain, to prevent epidemics, and to ensure success in war. The chief had to see that the seed for the new season was magically prepared, sometimes requiring human sacrifice.[36] When this was done, he initiated the kuchamila ng'waka (kuchamila means to circle back as elephants do to ambush a pursuer; ng'waka = the year), a yearly agricultural ceremony that had to be performed before hoeing and sowing began in the fields. It was explained by Sukuma in this way: "There will always be evil in the world, and laziness and stupidity can be observed every year. If we anticipate them in this way we shall be finished with them and they will not occur in real life."[37] In other words, each year the Sukuma returned ritually to the pristine beginning before evil developed; and this beginning recurs each spring at the start of a new agricultural cycle.

Millroth has been cited maintaining that the chief "linked the powers of God controlling the rain and sun with the welfare of his people." Millroth's study contends that calamities were believed to be punishments visited by God as well as the ancestors for misconduct, and that in the practice of the ancestor cult prayers are often addressed to God. Yet in the section dealing with the ntemi's role in "the cult of the high God and of the ancestors" no evidence of chiefly concern is provided.[38] This section is based mainly on Cory's The Ntemi, which also provides no indication of such concern. Tanner, however, provides an explanation of the relevance of the high God to ancestral ritual. He writes:

> The ancestors are one stage nearer the Supreme Being than the living and are therefore regarded more as a link with the supernatural powers than an end in themselves. The Supreme Being is not usually mentioned in ancestor ceremonies and, if he is brought in, the conclusion of the ceremony is offered to him for his confirmation. However strong the ancestors may be there is never any diminution of the paramountcy of the Supreme Being who is...approached indirectly.[39]

The ancestors are intercessors whose powers to benefit society are derived from the high God. Their good will is deemed a necessity by the Sukuma, but their favor is not automatic. Since ancestral care must be actively sought, the ancestors dominate Sukuma ritual practice.[40] Both Tanner and Millroth provide sufficiently abundant evidence of Sukuma belief in a supreme God who is an all-powerful if remote creator and orderer of the world that there can be little doubt of the God constituting the ultimate meaning and justification of the royal cult of the ancestors and of the ritual use of medicines by the chief. This God of many names is the unreachable source of the power of those spirits who can be reached. He "arranges all things" and "gives all things" the Sukuma say;[41] and: "death to us is the clearing away by the Supreme Being so that we may live well."[42]

The Sukuma "idea of a good life is essentially one of economic prosperity,"[43] and God is regarded as the dispenser of riches and poverty:[44] "He who gives and takes away."[45] The ntemi was "the only truly wealthy person in his domain by virtue of the annual and occasional tribute payments...his ownership of ivory and other precious commodities; his share in the tribal chase; his collection of court fines and fees."[46] The implication of these beliefs and situations is that the chief is favored by the supreme power in the universe, and that this power has arranged his prosperous position.[47]

Since Sukuma chiefdoms were composed of clans, only royal ancestors, and particularly chiefly ones, "could be regarded as impartial spirits and speak for the whole chiefdom." The reigning ntemi was their mediator.[48] Prosperity in the chiefdom was thus taken as a sign of the chief's good favor with the ancestor-chiefs; "and to attack him or rebuke him for his excesses would be a crime of impiety."[49] In this sanction Liebenow sees "autocratic tendencies"; it made it possible for a chief to act irresponsibly, because "responsibility for the performance of chiefly duties appeared to lie not so much with a group within the society but with a non-empirical and external source, the ntemi's ancestors, who indicated their approval or disapproval by visiting good or bad fortune upon the chiefdom."[50]

Liebenow, however, finds that circumstances have blunted the autocratic tendencies. He maintains that the sanctions proved precarious supports for chiefs, because drought and pestilence were frequent. When the chief's powers appeared to fail, his "responsibility to natural elements internal to the social system became evident." During such crises, "the true character of chiefly tribute as a famine relief fund for the benefit of the people was revealed"; and a "vague responsibility to 'the people'" was manifested. In protracted crises "the strength and loyalty of the special guard were the only means by which a chief could be saved," and some chiefdoms retain the memory of depositions of chiefs whose powers "failed."[51]

Granted that a chief could be deposed, that his subjects could desert him for another chiefdom, that the small size of the chiefdoms militated against the development of an impersonal bureaucratic administration, and that most problems of economy and order were handled on the village or parish level -- it remains to be considered whether, as Cory[52] and Liebenow deny, the power of the ntemi was absolute. First of all the possibility of escape is not a limit to chiefly power: a real limit would be an institutionalized means whereby subjects are protected from serious and arbitrary deprivations by the supreme authority.[53] Another aspect of the problem can be disposed of by pointing out that both authors mean by ntemi the man who happens at any given time to be the chief. Certainly anyone who can be dismissed as ruler because his religious powers are considered to have failed, or because his rule is too oppressive, exercises something far less than absolute power.

The problem assumes a new form, however, when ntemi is taken as the designation not primarily of the person in authority but of a family and ancestral authority residing in an office.[54] The question then becomes: what power does the office of chief exercise over the people? Now it becomes relevant that the Sukuma never "assumed that a displeased ancestor of the ntemi desired that his own line should not be perpetuated in office."[55] In other words, deposition was an accepted possibility, but a revolutionary overthrow of the existing regime was not.

We return, then, to the constitutional limitations on the ntemi as an office. The major institutions said to limit the ntemi are the already cited banangoma, banangwa and basumba batale. Yet members of the first two of these institutions are either members of the chief's family or of families that are part of the ruling establishment and that enjoy a permanent status superior to the majority of families. They comprised the chief's administrative system and were accountable to the chief rather than to the people. They also performed major functions in the royal ancestral rites,[56] sharing with the chief responsibility for successes and failures in securing the well-being of the chiefdom. The basumba batale were primarily of local significance and subordinate to the banangwa. There is no question of the ntemi being a democratic authority; the chief and his officials were accountable to the ancestors, and the people accepted that accountability as proper. An unpopular chief could usually maintain himself in office by using his royal guard, which was in effect his personal army distinct from the forces he organized for external wars; but in any event the office was secure in the royal matriclan, and all the powers in the chiefdom had an interest in maintaining the traditional order of inheritance, for they too were either dependent on the ntemi's favor or their own hereditary position for their power. Nor was the chief a feudal authority; for the client relationships referred to above obtained only among the chief and his officials, particularly the *banangwa* who were often his own sons and therefore ineligible to succeed to the chieftaincy but loyal to the chief who appointed them. The client relationships did not extend further from the official family to the common people. Yet, while the office of *ntemi* was not accessible to occupancy by a commoner or official and could not be abolished, the office could not exercise a total and arbitrary dominion over the people.

The limitation of the *ntemi*'s power inhered almost solely in the undeveloped state of the bureaucratic apparatus. While a lack of development is not easily accounted for, there are some aspects of Sukuma life that are apparently relevant. The first is that the chiefdoms were too small and sparsely populated for a large-scale, fully differentiated bureaucracy to emerge.[57] Of greater import was the fact that the Sukuma undertook no major chiefdom-wide projects requiring continuous and highly organized activity. The Sukuma relied more on the efficacy of their ritual and the beneficent powers of the ancestors than on their own industry. For example, in the face of recurrent and ruinous drought[58] they continued to believe that sufficient water was to be secured by the ritual powers of the chief from his ancestors.

Since reliance on the royal ancestors dominated Sukuma public ritual and apparently hindered an adequate response to the problem of drought, we are led to inquire into the source and nature of this overriding experience of royal ancestral power. This beneficent power is attributed to the founders of the chiefdoms and their successors. Cory speculates concerning the experience the indigenous Bantu had of the Hima pastoralists who came to rule them as follows:

> The man who became the founder of a dynasty was inevitably a man far above his contemporaries in mental and physical powers. Presumably the ordinary man could only explain the skill, ability, endurance, strength, and success of his leader by assuming that the latter had supernatural powers. The founding ancestor and those of his blood were probably considered to surpass other human beings through powers of which the origins could not be subjected to speculatives. The manifestation of the leader's supremacy was recognizable in the success of his magico-religious functions, and his authority in secular affairs was the consequence of this success.[59]

This statement is based on traditional accounts of the founder's birth, exploits, accomplishments, and death prevailing in each chiefdom. According to Cory, the Bantu experienced the Hima leaders as a superior power and consequently considered that this power descended to their successors. They believed the founders' spirits "to be able to influence their fate and the fate of the land for good or ill, just as their own ancestors had power over the fortunes of their own families."[60] Yet earlier Cory indicated that the tradition of each chiefdom "tends to increase the importance of the first arrivals and to compete therein with chiefdoms ruled by other branch lines of the same family,"[61] and he more cautiously states that the founders "may also have impressed the indigenous population by superior mental and physical qualities."[62] His evidence that the founders "were obviously accepted as leaders by common consent" and not as conquerors is the fact that in the traditions "no major fights are related as occurring between them and the people they found living in the country."[63] Cory's account, which is accepted by later writers uncritically,[64] is highly conjectural. It assumes that the traditions, while exaggerated, belong to the genre of history rather than mythology.

Let us consider the problem of these traditions for a moment. First of all, they are not meant to provide accurate historical information. While the assumption of power by immigrants from the north is not to be doubted,[65] the traditions indicate nothing of how and why the assumption occurred. The exaggerated and conflicting[66] accounts of the founders indicate that the Sukuma have assimilated the real events to the typical archetypal categories of myth, and the historical founders into models for the living chiefs. The constitution of a Sukuma chiefdom, and particularly the royal status of a particular family, is unchangeable because the foundation of the chiefdoms, expressed as myth or "exemplary history," is taken by the Sukuma as an enduring paradigm of the true mode of human existence.[67] The instructions given a new chief are meant to ensure that he models himself on the archetypal hero, and the annually recurring agricultural ritual of the chief is meant to renew the chiefdom in the pristine integrity of its foundation. The latter point is indicated by the prominence of hunting in Sukuma traditions of their pre-Hima life, and by the Sukuma emphasis on the land as overgrown with bush before the Hima arrival.[68]

Cory's treatment of the Sukuma would seem to indicate that the Bantu assimilated their experience of the Hima newcomers to their prevailing belief in the power of ancestral spirits. It raises the question whether the Hima introduced any religio-political elements that would set the Sukuma clearly apart from other Bantu societies. Since nothing certain is known of Hima life prior to the immigrants' absorption by the Bantu,[69] a comparison of Sukuma society as it has been described with the general features of Bantu societies is the only recourse open. Bantu religious life is based on ancestor worship, and the sole "exception to the domestic nature of the cult is that the ancestors of the chief are the source of strength for the whole tribe"; therefore "among the Bantu religion provides a powerful sanction for the chieftainship."[70] Audrey Richards describes Bantu political systems as follows:

> Authority is almost invariably based on descent, whether within the family, the village, the district, or the nation, and the chief of the tribe combines executive, ritual, and judicial functions according to the pattern of leadership in each constituent kinship unit. Like the family head, he is a priest of an ancestral cult, believed in many cases to have a mystic power over the land...The hierarchy of Bantu society allows only one type of authority, one basis of power, and one set of attributes in its leaders in most of the tribes so far described.
>
> ...Political power and prerogatives tend to become concentrated in the hands of descendants of the original lineage group, of which the chief is the living representative, and in many cases tribal cohesion seems very largely to depend on the predominance of this ruling line, whether the latter is to be reckoned as the first Bantu people to occupy the particular territory, or whether it conquered the earlier inhabitants and consequently built up a new state.... The descendants of the first chief's clan may form a ruling caste (e.g. Zulu, Swazi, Bemba), and the total number of clans in the tribe may be arranged in order of precedence based on the tradition of the original migration into the area,

> or else the degree of relationship with the descent group of the chief. The next of kin of the chief may play a definite part in the political organization, may claim rights to territorial chieftainships or villages, membership of tribal councils...or they may act as a regency council at the chief's death.[71]

This description of the political system that prevailed generally among the Bantu closely fits the Sukuma chiefdoms, even though the founders of the chiefdoms were not themselves Bantu originally. Since the Sukuma are near neighbors of, and sometimes classified with, the Interlacustrine Bantu, a consideration of one of the Tanganyika members of the Interlacustrine group as well as of Tanganyika Bantu societies whose chiefs are not of alien origin should provide a basis for a comparative assessment of traditional authority in that country.

HA[1]

Living in western Tanganyika along the border with Burundi, the Ha is the third largest tribe in Tanganyika with a population of about 300,000.[2] It is one of the Interlacustrine Bantu tribes, and the only member of that grouping to be considered in this study. These tribes are akin in language, but it was because of their similar political organization that they were considered a distinct group.[3] All of the Interlacustrine ruling dynasties are, like those of the Sukuma, derived from immigrants who established their authority over indigenous Bantu populations.[4] Among the Interlacustrians there was a tendency for the sons of kings, after appointment as princely rulers over subdistricts, to assert their independence and eventually form the separate states that comprise the "multi-kingdom tribes." Later kings generally appointed territorial governors or chiefs from among their supporters and favorites instead of their sons and relatives. These appointed chiefs gradually superseded the hereditary chiefs in power.[5]

Although denying that the founders of the ruling dynasties were the leaders of invading armies, Richards lays great stress on the Interlacustrian kingdoms as "conquest states."[6] She notes a general lack of a sense of community between the rulers and ruled. Many of the kings were "extremely autocratic," bolstering their powers against hereditary princes and clan authorities by appointing reliable supporters to administrative posts, and by having clan leaders report directly to them and not to the territorial administrators.[7] "The centring of these different authority structures on the person of the monarch was one of the characteristic features of the Interlacustrines."[8] According to Richards, the kings did try to establish some sense of community with their subjects "by adopting the taboos of their predecessors..., by reciting myths of common origin and by a conscious policy of intermarriage with the girls of the different local clans."[9] They emphasized earlier culture-heroes rather than the royal ancestors, and thus differed from other Bantu chiefs by not being priests of an ancestral cult. In short, the Interlacustrians prided themselves on their monarchies, and these monarchies were of a quite specific type.[10]

The Ha manifest many of the above characteristics. There is first of all a sharp distinction between the rulers and ruled. In each of the seven Ha kingdoms there is a racially distinct class of nobles called Tusi. The Tusi do not differ from the commoners in language or culture; but they object to being called Ha, which is a term they apply to the commoners. The major distinction between the two classes is political; for, despite intermarriage being allegedly forbidden, a mixture of the two racial classes has occurred.[11] "The traditional political system of the Ha, then, consisted of a number of petty kingdoms, dominated by a Tusi caste composed of different clans of which some became the ruling dynasties in the different kingdoms."[12]

Ha kings or chiefs apparently were wont to appoint their sons or brothers as governors of outlying provinces, and these governors sometimes asserted their independence. However, they usually appointed their favorites as district governors with administrative and judicial duties. Even when such governorships became hereditary, their authority was fully dependent on the original appointment and recurring confirmation of the king. A king always retained the power of deposition. Fontaine maintains that the governors' "relationship to the ruler was comparable (and actually is compared by the Ha) to that between a cattle-client and his patron."[13] Scherer also notes this comparison and regards it as "feudal," writing:

> The Tusi political organization in many ways resembled the feudal system of mediaeval Europe. A Tusi chief or _umwami_ (pl. _abami_) was in fact a feudal lord, whose sub-chiefs ...were vassals who held their provinces in feud. These sub-chiefs in their turn had divided their countries into small parts ..., which were held by vassals of lower rank, the...headmen....The Ha themselves like to compare the relationship between a chief and his sub-chiefs, or a sub-chief and his headmen, with the one between a patron and his clients (a real relationship like the latter, i.e. one based on cattle transactions, may often have existed also among the dignitaries).[14]

It appears that here the Ha self-interpretation of these political relationships in terms of the socio-economic patron-client relationship is taken as a fact of sociological relevance to indicate the nature of the institutional relationship. The danger of this procedure is immediately evident when one considers that the Ha themselves customarily looked upon the patron-client relationship as a father-son relationship.[15] The problem is a conceptual rather than a factual one. The fact that cattle may have been transferred in the appointment of district governors may be readily explained by the fact that patron-client relations did not necessarily coincide with the Tusi-Ha distinction, and that Tusi dominated the major territorial offices. Interpretation of the relationship between king and subchief in patron-client terms, and the rule of some subchiefdoms by commoners, would be accounted for by a Tusi desire to establish a sense of community with the Ha while retaining a dominant position for themselves. In the patron-client relationship the accent was on friendship and mutual concern rather than on obligatory service. The Tusi success in identifying a community with their Ha subjects is indicated by the fact that European-appointed chiefs to replace European-deposed hereditary Tusi chiefs were held in lower esteem by the people than were the hereditary chiefs.[16]

A Ha chief is succeeded by one, though not necessarily the eldest, of his sons, who must be physically perfect.[17] The installation occurs during the time of a new moon. In the Heru chiefdom, the new chief must successfully withstand an ordeal wherein he must dance on a drum; if the drum fails to stand firm, he is rejected. He is on the following day taken to a sacred grove where he is given a name by one of the minor chiefs, who announces to the people assembled: "Obey his commands without fear." The minor chiefs respond that the Ha are joyful and that they beg to be governed rightly. Sometime later the chief, whose title is Mwami of the Spears, is taken to a sacred grove to receive the sacred spears, of which the most sacred is called Mkalinga. The other rites have as their purpose the identification of the new chief "with that spirit called Imana, so that thereafter the crops, the birth of children and everything upon which the Ha tribesman depends, come from the great spirit Imana through the medium of the chief."[18]

In the Manyova-Ujiji chiefdom, the dying chief breathes on Mkalinga and nominates his successor, usually one of his sons, in the presence of Linga, who as head of the slave clans is a very powerful official. Linga descends from the chief slave who came to this part of Uha with the first Mwami; he has influence over the choice of successor, and he is official guardian of the sacred spears and drums. Linga conducts the heir to a sacred dwelling that houses the sacred spear and drums, there to inspect his body for physical defects, and thence secretly to the sacred grove. There Linga invests him with a sacred royal vestment, saying, "You are Mwami, you have risen above all people, all things bow before you, even the heavens; take the country but have regard for all people showing favour to none, not even to those connected with you by blood." Finally, the new Mwami is taken to a man who descends from the first Ha tribesman to accept the original Mwami. The new chief is seated in the lap of this "living stool."[19]

According to Tripe, a prominant part of the ceremonies in these two chiefdoms was the planting of trees into which the spirit of the God Imana was to descend and to unite in some way with the Mwami's spirit. In fact, Tripe claims that there appears to be "very little distinction between the personality of Imana the God and Mwami the chief; indeed they may be one and the same thing." Scherer correctly regards this statement as an exaggeration, adding that not only the Ha commoners but the chiefs sacrificed to and worshipped their ancestors.[20]

What then is the relevance of Imana to the political authority of the chief? Imana is a supreme being, primarily thought of as the creator whose power is especially manifest in the procreation of men and animals. Imana is experienced as a remote power having little interest in his creation, although his name is frequently applied, apparently in flattery, to the ancestors when favors are sought from them. The vital character of the sacred generally for the Ha is indicated by the conjunction of the word Imana with the names of objects and places connected with ritual,[21] which is to say objects and places differentiated from the ordinary or profane as having a special, sacred quality. Foremost among these sacred realities would be the ancestral spirits. Imana is the fundamental power of fertility experienced primarily in or through the ancestors, for Tripe avers that the spirit of the deceased Mwami returns to its source of life, Imana.[22]

With the appointment of a new chief, Imana is thought to have returned again to the land. Moreover, the same names recur repeatedly throughout the line of chiefs, an emphasis that fosters, according to Tawney, the idea of "the divine spirit of the royal line." Further, the Heru Mwami has his own grove for sacrifice to the ancestors (Tambiko) where, so it is said, the Mwami's python resides. It is believed that the python emerged from a deceased Mwami's stomach and therefore "represents the divine spirit of all Mwamis."[23]

The chief's most important regalia are the royal spears and drums mentioned in connection with the chief's installation rites. The spear was generally regarded as a symbol of manhood, and the chief's spear was a token of his authority. The sacred spear of the Heru, Mkalinga, is supposedly the one brought in by the first Tusi chief.[24] Mkalinga is in the charge of an official who produces it once a year when all pay obeisance to it. It is also displayed during various annual agricultural ceremonies and at the death and installation of a chief. The most important of these ceremonies comes at the time of harvest, when the moon is in the last quarter. Part of this ceremony is called the Tambiko la Mwami (offering to the chief). Herein the Ha people renew their allegiance to the Mwami, and the departed chiefs are implored to help the society in the future. During the final stages of this ceremony Mkalinga is placed before the chief, who holds in his hand the Mulinga wa Imana (God's bracelet), another of the regalia. The Mulina wa Imana is believed to have been worn by the first Tusi chief.[25] The sacredness of these and the other regalia of the chief is implicit in their association both with Imana and with agricultural fertility. Moreover, a new chief has no power to hear cases and give decisions until he has been shown the regalia. The chief is also able to "read" Mkalinga, who (this spear is personified) prophesies concerning prospects for the chiefdom in the year ahead.[26]

The power of a Ha chief was apparently considered absolute. He was the supreme judge whose court was the final court of appeal. Assisted by a council of his favorites he "practically controlled every sphere of tribal life, decided about war and peace," and modified customary law through his judgements. He obtained his income from tribute, fines, and seizures. He could obtain corvee labor from his subjects. However, given his lack of a standing army or a developed military organization, his power in outlying provinces depended on the loyalty of the sub-chiefs (governors) and on his ability to maintain a balance of power among them.[27]

At the beginning of this section on the Ha, Richards was cited to the effect that among the Interlacustrians there did not generally prevail a sense of community between rulers and ruled. Fontaine, on the basis of material collected by Scherer, concludes that among the Ha the Tusi were generally less successful in identifying themselves with their subjects than were the rulers of the other Interlacustrian states.[28] Tripe comes to the conclusion that the Tusi chiefs were able "to bind their alien subjects to them through a multiplicity of ritual and in the process to make them pay for the benefits received."[29] He gives the example of the process whereby the Ha commoners were able to secure permission to wear Mulingas like the Mulinga wa Imana. This much sought after privilege required that the applicant must, among other things, gain admission to the insignia room and contemplate the Mulinga wa Imana, then sacrifice to the spirits of the deceased Waami, and finally make an offering to the ruling Mwami.[30]

In attempting to reach a conclusion whether the Tusi succeeded in establishing a common interest with their Ha subjects, one must consider several things. First of all, the evidence indicates that the Tusi rulers insisted upon their position of political dominance as a right inherent in their aristocratic origins and their superior abilities. They distinguished themselves from the Ha by having taboos on joint eating and intermarriage. Yet the Tusi did partake in joint ceremonial, including feasting, with the Ha. The Tusi chiefs seem to have ruled with an iron hand. Yet they would enhance their prestige by sharing their wealth with needy subjects.[31] Of Hamitic origin, the Tusi are alien to the Bantu Ha. Yet they both share the same language and culture. "The Tusi admit that in a way they are Ha, as they live in Buha and speak the same language as the others. But apart from that, a Tusi is not a Ha; a Ha is merely a commoner."[32] In short, the data, depending on how one interprets it, points toward contradictory conclusions. If one stresses the alien origin and caste proclivities of the Tusi he easily decides that the Tusi are a distinct society ruling over another society. On the other hand, if he emphasizes the common culture and, as mentioned, the Ha preference for the customary Tusi rulers over European appointees during the colonial period, then a contrary decision seems warranted. Yet a common culture and language do not of themselves constitute the consensus that identifies a political society. Nor, conversely, do ethnic and even caste differences necessarily negate the existence of political community. Are there then no criteria by which some of the Ha data might be considered decisive on this question?

As we saw with the Sukuma, and as we shall see with all but one of the remaining Tanganyikan societies to be examined, the alien origin of the rulers is a prevalent characteristic of African societies in Tanganyika. One of the problems dealt with in the next chapter is whether the regimes in Ghana and Tanganyika are of the despotic type which some authorities suggest is typical of Africa. This question, as the preceding analysis of the Sukuma suggests, is inseparable from the question whether the societies in question experience effective power as a manifestation of the sacred and therefore as divinely sanctioned authority. Perhaps the data most relevant to our problem with the Ha is the data that will be most relevant to the more general problem of African despotism.

We have seen that the Ha chief is considered the medium through whom the fertilizing powers of Imana effect the growth of crops and the birth of children, that he is installed by being accepted in the lap ("living stool") of a representative commoner, that the Ha commoners sought to wear bracelets modeled after the archetypal Mulinga wa Imana worn by the first Tusi ruler, and that it is specifically in the realm of ritual that Tusi and Ha come together without the usual caste distinctions. Since Imana is remote and unconcerned, it is the line of Tusi chiefs culminating in the reigning chief that is the immediate and relevant ordering power. The Tusi chief, who in his physical perfection is a fitting vessel of divine power, puts both society and nature in order. From him flow benefits. By virtue of his beneficent power, he is accepted as ruler by his subjects. His subjects, to the extent that their station admits, seek to display at great inconvenience[33] an image of their chiefdom. The subjects participate in the ordering activity of the chief by not only conforming their lives to his rule but by joining in the ritual activity that obtains the goods which, in agreement with their chief, they view as the common end of their association. Since there is no differentiation between the political and the religious realms, any weakening or discrediting of the power of the chief is incompatible with his responsibility (or function) to maintain and renew the socio-agricultural order and to ensure the attainment of the ends of life.

SHAMBALA[1]

The Shambala are a primarily agricultural, but also herding, Bantu people occupying the Usambara Mountains of north-eastern Tanganyika.[2] They number somewhere between 150,000 and 200,000,[3] making them one of the largest tribes in Tanganyika.

At the time of the first European contact the Shambala were organized into a centralized state, Shambalai, which was headed by a paramount chief, or king.[4] The king and the chiefs subordinate to him were all members of a single royal clan, the Wakilindi, which according to tradition came into the area and established its authority over the original inhabitants.[5]

The story of the Wakilindi is the story of Mbega and his descendents. Winans maintains that this story serves as a "charter" for Shambala political authority.

> This charter specifically identifies the right to rule through the idea of the inheritance of special qualities by persons viewed as descendents of a hero. Further, it establishes an order of precedence in the hierarchy and in the succession to chiefships. It also provides guides for the proper behavior of ruler and ruled and indicates the limitations on the legitimate power of the rulers. Finally, it focuses and maintains attention upon the channels of communication which it provides.[6]

The Mbega tradition is well known among the people; but most of their versions are brief, containing only the essential outline of the qualities and founding act of the hero.[7] One very elaborate version does however exist,[8] and it is used in this study.

The story begins: "Of old time there was in the country of Uzigua...a man named Mbega. This man was at strife with his kinsfolk."[9] The first words, "of old," set the beginning in the indefinite and prescriptive past. The strife was serious, for Mbega's kinsmen deprived him of his share in the inheritance whenever one of his kin died. He was rejected because certain omens led his kinsmen to consider him a dealer in black arts, responsible for deaths in the family. Mbega resolved to leave his home, following the path suggested by the dreams induced by medicines. He went to Kilindi, where he was respected as a great hunter and welcomed. There his great powers were manifest. "Now God had given him grace of person and of speech, and knowledge of healing charms; if any was sick he healed him; and charms for war he knew, and to protect the town he could use magic."[10] However, one day while Mbega was hunting with a group that included the Kilindi chief's son, the chief's son was killed. The group fled.[11]

By this time Mbega's magical powers had been developed. His mere survival amidst danger when bereft of family and tribal protection was an achievement; his influence over the lives and fortunes of alien peoples among whom he stayed was indicative of a uniquely great potential. So it was that eventually he came to Bumburi where "the people loved him" and "without dispute acknowledged him as their Chief." Then news reached the town of Vuga "that he knew war charms and that he could bring clouds over the land, and that if any man was sick he healed him."[12] Now Vuga was the chief town of Usumbara upon which Bumburi and other territories were dependent, and Vuga was at war with the Pare tribe. There Turi was headman of the clan that held the country "because God gave them the gift of working iron and skill in war."[13]

Turi secured the consent of his people to obtain Mbega and his magic, for they heard that he was not only a great magician who could blind enemies but "a goodly person and compassionate."[14] Mbega, after covering the sun with clouds to demonstrate his power, talked with Turi and the Vuga elders. "They noted the calmness of his countenance, and the beauty of his eyes, and his speech, and the sound of his voice--he spoke, a man could pay him close attention." Mbega stated his condition: the men of Zirai must build a "house of charms" at "a grove near Vuga where the Headmen of Vuga were buried." Then he would come.[15]

Mbega came to Vuga, and all the people of Usambara were called to meet the stranger who worked wonders. "They went in and they saluted Mbega and...they saw his fine bearing and the grace of his countenance and his eyes and his smile and his stature; of all the men of Usambara there was not one who was up to him by half a head."[16] They chose two men of understanding from each country to confer. The conferees decided to make him king.

> They brought him out...to the multitude and took his hand to signify that he was indeed their lord, and they proclaimed, Every word that he says we accept, and if any man refuse, and he says, Let him die, we will kill him by universal consent. The whole assembly responded....So the men of Vuga dwelt with their King, and he governed and enforced the laws, and all the country brought their questions to him and he decided them, and no one could dispute his decrees, all approved of them.[17]

The new order was now established. Mbega ruled from his capital Vuga by popular consent as well as by the consent of the previous authorities. He was made king for three distinct but related reasons: he wielded a powerful magic, he was a good man who used his powers to benefit the people, and he displayed to the highest degree those physical and personality traits that mark a man for leadership. It was on the assumption that he was both wise and good that he was accepted as an absolute authority whose command would not be questioned.

The story does not, however, attribute to Mbega solely on his own account the qualities that have been described. God is credited as the source of Mbega's graces and magical knowledge. Winans, who repeatedly describes Mbega as charismatic in the Weberian sense, does not comment at all on this part of the story. Yet it is crucial. Who is this God of the Shambala, and why might he have chosen Mbega as the recipient of his favor? Unfortunately, there are but meager hints for us to go on; for none of the writings on the Shambala examine this question. The Shambala have long been in close contact with the coast and the majority of them are now Moslems.[18] There are, however, two reasons to doubt that the God who favored Mbega is an acquisition from the Islamic religion of the coast. The first is a statement of a Shambala recorded about the middle of the last century by the German missionary Krapf: "we are all slaves of the Zumbe (king), who is our Mulungu."[19] Edwin Smith, an authority on African religious ideas and on the Bantu languages, explains that the name Mulungu "in its various forms--Murungu, Mlungu, Mluku, Mungu, Mngu--has been adopted in translation of the Scriptures in some twenty-five of the languages of East Africa, covering the area from the lower Zambezi to Lake Victoria, and from the coast inland to the River Loangwa."[20] He accepts the Culwicks' description of the Bena conception of Mulungu as true of other tribes throughout this region. Mulungu is both a personal creator God "associated with thunder, lightning and rain," and an impersonal pervasive spiritual power.[21] To the foregoing must be added Krapf's observation that the Shambala king is addressed as "*Simba wa Muene*," meaning "Lion [son] of Heaven."[22] The evidence, though certainly not conclusive, points to Shambala belief in a supreme, but wholly indigenous African God associated with the powers of the sky who orders life and earth and "showers" replenishing gifts upon it. The second reason is found in the Mbega story itself. What Mbega hunts for food is pigs--hardly an occupation that would recommend itself to a Moslem or to the God of the Moslems--and he does not abandon this occupation after being graced by God.[23]

Why did Mulunga favor Mbega? The question put in this form could be illegitimate if taken to mean, "By what virtues did Mbega *merit* Mulungu's favor?"[24] What must be sought, then, are signs indicating what can only be stated as the purposes of Mulungu in choosing Mbega. Such signs may reveal something of the nature of Mulungu and of his way toward the Shambala. We recall that Mbega was rejected by his kinsmen; his mother and father are dead. The rejection was unjust, based as it was on the misreading by his kinsmen of certain omens. Mbega, sorely distressed, asked: "What does it [his kinsmen's hostility] mean? What is my sin?"[25] Rejected and deeply troubled, he set out alone. At this point, Mbega is bereft of mundane connections and reliances. He has reached a point of undoubted spiritual crisis, for he is aware of no fault of his own and yet he has been marked by events as one set apart from other men. The crisis is such that it can be resolved only by openness to a divine source of meaning and strength or by despair. His travel to Kilindi is also an internal motion, and indeed when he finds rest at Kilindi he finds there also the full revelation and manifestation of Mulungu's gifts to him. But, the rest at Kilindi was temporary, a period of spiritual initiation and preparation when he practiced his good works and gave his counsel, which was sought and accepted by the elders, in a private capacity without holding office.[26] His spiritual initiation at this time is implied by his apparent maintenance of ritual purity, for he did not take a wife until he came to Bumburi in Usambara country.[27] Why then is the ruling clan of the Shambala known as the Wakilindi? None of the sources even raise the question of why the clan is called Kilindi, perhaps because the question is unanswerable in strict genealogical terms.[28] However, if the foregoing interpretation is correct, it suggests an answer. Whereas Mbega's physical life takes its origin in Uzigua, Mbega began to live in a meaningful sense only in Kilindi; and the father, or perhaps androgynous parent, of this meaningful life is Mulungu who revealed himself at Kilindi.[29]

The remainder of the story is a normative account of how Mbega organized his kingdom and ruled. Mbega had a great house built for his pregnant Bumburi wife, a house in which the next king of Vuga was to be born. This son, Buge, he named Simba (Lion) son of Mwene.[30] The men of Bumburi, fearing that Buge would grow up unfamiliar with them, requested that he be raised in Bumburi. Mbega consented, commanding that they choose, in consultation with the men of the various villages of the Bumburi district, a good man who would be set up to watch over and protect Buge. This man was to lead and govern them, so that Buge would have a judge among the people.[31] The men of Ubiri, hearing what the men of Bumburi had achieved, also wanted a son of Mbega by one of their daughters. They persuaded him to marry a girl of their village, and she bore him his second son Kimweri.[32]

When Buge reached fifteen years of age, the Bumburi elders came to Mbega saying: "we want to set up Buge as chief in Bumburi; he is grown up; the people have agreed to wait on him, they have agreed that he shall be their judge, they have agreed to till his fields and to plant them, and that men shall wait on him, each for two days."[33] Mbega's approval was given, contingent on the consent of the Vuga elders which was apparently not in doubt. Mbega sent his herald to Bumburi for Buge's installation. The whole country subject to Bumburi--sixteen villages are mentioned by name--assembled, Mbega's herald telling them: "I have been sent by Mbega to come to give you his son...If he does wrong, call me...and I will correct him; and if he does not listen, he shall be removed and his brother Kimweri of Ubiri set in his place."[34] After ten days, Buge went to Vuga with tribute as required by Mbega. "So Buge ruled in Bumburi, and there was great peace between him and his brethren," who were chiefs also of sections of Usambara.[35]

When Mbega died only five elders knew, for it was not his custom to appear in public. The secret was kept until Buge was brought from Bumburi. Buge sent for the men of Kilindi, the men who had accompanied Mbega into Usambara country, telling them "Your brother is dead" and asking them how they bury. Mbega was buried according to the Kilindi ritual, and Buge sought to return to Bumburi to take counsel. The chief elder of Vuga detained him, however, fearing that if Buge's brothers heard of Mbega's death and Buge's absence they would seize Vuga. Therefore the men of all the tribes in the country were summoned by the drum war signal, and the chief elder of Vuga proclaimed Buge Chief of Vuga. The people of all the subject tribes assented, and Buge was presented to them and given his father's spear.[36] The story here ends with Buge reigning in Vuga as king over all the country.

This part of the story concerning the rule of Mbega and the succession of his eldest son makes several points about the nature of the rule and the institutions of authority. First of all, Mbega retained the elders who had formerly ruled; and he consulted with them on important matters. However, he transformed into an administrative unity what had previously been a weak position of dominance by Vuga, whose chief elder Turi was looked up to by the peoples of the mountains. His sons became the chiefs of subordinate areas. These chiefs were expected to rule benevolently and according to law as a condition of their tenure. The Vuga king sired these sons by wives from the areas in which they were to rule; and his sons were brought up and educated in these areas by local men who could be expected to imbue their future chief with the local customs and with a concern for the people. The chiefs, like the Vuga king, were judges to whom matters were brought for decision. Apparently the chiefs were generally independent of Vuga in matters affecting only their areas. Vuga, however, could summon the warriors of all the areas directly by drum without going through the chiefs. Finally, the men of Kilindi enter the story for the first time in Usambara only when the proper conduct of a crucially important ritual, the burial of the king, must be determined. In this, local custom was not adhered to. Although the Kilindi are called brothers of Mbega, nowhere in the story is it hinted that their sons became chiefs.

The institutions of Shambala as described by observers actually conform to the dictates of the Mbega story. Moreover, it is extremely significant that "nearly all commoners claim that their ancestors voluntarily asked for chiefs, and, similarly, chiefs do not claim to rule by right of conquest but rather by invitation and right of descent."[37] At the top is the paramount chief or king, who is considered a descendant of Mbega. Alternative kings are named Shebuge and Kimweri after Mbega's two eldest sons. Below him are some sixteen or seventeen chiefs accountable directly and only to the king. Below them in turn are lesser chiefs. The chiefs and subchiefs are usually Kilindi. Chiefs at all three of these levels have councils of elders, who are commoners and who are selected by the councils themselves. The chiefs act only with the advice and consent of these councils. The king's council chooses and installs an heir when the king dies.[38]

The authorities on the Shambala say emphatically that they constitute a state which is democratic. Winans calls Shambalai a "segmentary state." It is a state because it possesses the essential features of statehood: a central authority, specialized administrative institutions, and judicial institutions.[39] It is segmentary because coexisting with the specialized administrative institutions is a segmentary organization and because the powers exercised at all the administrative levels are the same.[40] Winans explains:

> A distinction has been made between two types of authority within Shambala society. There is that authority which we may call familial and which is exercised within recognized kinship groupings, and there is the authority of chiefship which extends to all members of the society....The acceptance of /Mbega's/ descendants is based upon their inheritance of /charismatic/ qualities. This recognition of the inheritance of charisma leads not only to the acceptance of each particular royal chief but has a further implication. The growth of the lineage of the magical leader leads eventually to segmentation. The new lineages thus founded also eventually segment and so on. Since chiefs are bound together within this continually segmenting system, the acceptance of such a chief means the acceptance of the whole system of chiefs....
>
> Within a system of this type the source of power of each royal authority is essentially the same. Each chief, through inheritance, participates directly in the charisma of the founder. A royal chief does not exercise power delegated by the paramount and limited by the over-riding and essentially different powers of this supreme authority; rather he exercises the same powers and possesses the same rights limited only by the lesser number of his people and his familial subordination to the heads of greater lineage segments in the royal clan.[41]

Thus within each of the two strata, the rulers and ruled, "it is primarily kinship which provides the structure of authority, but between the two strata it is not."[42] Walter Goldschmidt similarly emphasizes that "Shambalai is a state and not a tribal society," because there is a government and an internal order to which the lineages and clans are subordinate.[43] Moreover, as does Dobson, Goldschmidt regards the Shambala political system as "democratic" because "the citizens (through their lineage heads) had an important say in matters of government."[44] That it is democratic in any Western sense is contradicted by Goldschmidt's recognition that the Shambala did not recognize the individual "as a jural entity."[45] This whole question of African statehood and democracy is taken up in more comprehensive fashion in the next chapter.

The sanctions of the hierarchical structure of chiefly authority are manifest primarily in the royal ancestor cult. Only royal ancestors who achieved political importance in life have shrines erected to them. Each royal village contains a special fenced area wherein the royal ancestors are buried. Associated with this sacred area is the chief's official residence (nyumba ya mufika, house of ancestor observances).[46] The sanction is operative in this respect: "a rite directed to immediate ancestors may be performed by the lesser chief but rites directed to more remote ancestors in the royal genealogy must be carried out by a chief at the relevant higher order of segmentation." Evasion of this ritual subordination by a chief damages the relation between him and the royal ancestors.[47]

The king wields great power, and his legitimate "coercion may reach inside the corporate lineage but most frequently deals with lineages as units." He must settle disputes between lineages and maintain peace.[48] He can command services from his subjects and exact fines or tribute. According to Krapf, commoners feared that the display of wealth might result in its seizure by the great chiefs or paramount.[49] But Winans reveals that such seizure was not very systematic and that chiefly wealth was used primarily for ritual offerings, the sustenance of the warriors, bridewealth, and provisions for corvee laborers.[50] When installed as chief, the candidate "takes a solemn oath to respect the rights of the people" and to ritually attend to the maintenance of the country.[51] Thus what sanctions the power of the chief also demands that the power be used rightly. To the extent that the chiefs adhere to belief in the force and demands of their royal ancestors, to that extent also might they fear the loss of power through its abuse.

SONJO[1]

The Sonjo are one of the smallest tribes in Tanganyika, numbering only some 3,593 in 1948.[2] They are in the distinctive position of constituting "an enclave of Bantu agriculturalists surrounded by nomadic pastoralists who differ from them in language and culture."[3]

The political system of the Sonjo is simple. Each of the six Sonjo villages is to a great extent politically autonomous and economically self-sufficient. Each is governed by a hereditary council of elders known as wenamiji ("children of the village"), whose authority is corporate and not possessed by its members individually. The council is the sole executive and legal authority for the whole village, and its decisions normally represent unanimity among the elders.[4]

The wenamiji are accepted by the Sonjo as having legitimate authority, for their broad powers "appear to be universally accepted as right and authentic and are not seriously questioned by anyone."[5] According to Gray, their "power is derived mainly from the control of irrigation water."[6] But Gray does not adequately establish this proposition as true. The enumeration of several weaknesses in his study will help introduce the question of what sanctions the elders' authority.

First, Gray does not consistently carry through a distinction between "power" and "authority."[7] It is entirely conceivable that power could be derived from some source like the control of the major economic resource, but authority requires another source for its legitimacy.

Not distinguishing sufficiently between power and authority, Gray then falls into the trap of holding that the power or authority is "bolstered" or "reinforced" by "supernatural sanction" and a "mythical charter."[8]

Finally, Gray does not, nor is he able to, show that historically a group of men gained control of the irrigation system, and that later there developed the idea of a legitimating religious sanction. Lacking this historical evidence, one might just as easily surmise that the "supernatural sanction" conferred authority, and that this authority extended to the control of irrigation works as one among the activities of the society.

We are presented, then, with this situation: among the Sonjo there are village councils that exercise sovereign power in the villages; a crucial aspect of the economic life of the villages is the maintenance and control of irrigation; responsibility for which is possessed by the councils; the authority of the councils is accepted as legitimate by the Sonjo; and the Sonjo regard this authority as having some sanction superior to their own consent.

It remains only to examine this sanction. Gray tells us that all his Sonjo informants identified the council members as "the descendants in patrilineal line of a like number of men who lived in the days of Khambageu and were ordained in their positions by him."[9] Khambageu, or Hambageu, is thus in some sense, whether historical or mythological, the founder of Sonjo society; and from him its order derives.

The most complete account of Hambageu is that of Simeon Ndula, a summary of which follows. Hambageu, having neither father nor mother, was not born into the world but came "automatically." The people of Sonjo first saw him as a grown man living in poverty at the village of Tinaga. His first encounter with the village came with his refusal to participate in work on the irrigation ditches. The elders' attempts to punish him through fines and ultimately through strangulation were foiled by his performance of miracles: twice the goats that he had been fined reappeared overnight; fleeing for his life to Samunge, he repelled his pursuers by wounding them with exploding guinea-fowl feathers that he had miraculously ignited with his fire stick and had thrown at them.[10] Hambageu remained among the Wasamunge; his magic "astonished the people and, since he had neither father nor mother and as he himself could not explain how he came into the world, they considered him to be God."[11]

Hambageu married and his children became so numerous that he turned all but two of them to stone despite the resistance of the Wasamunge. Again, against the advice of the Wasamunge, he expelled one of the two sons from his house. Aka, the remaining son, flew away like a bird. Distressed at the loss of Aka, Hambageu left Samunge and settled in Kisangiro (Belwa), where he remained until his death. Contrary to Hambageu's expressed wish, his body was buried; but when his grave was later opened it was found empty. It was believed that he rose from the dead, and all the Sonjo consider that he remains their God.[12]

This account was later expanded by Simeon Ndula and other sources. It seems that Hambageu turned his sons into stones in response to a revelation from the sun that he could "become firm of heart" only by having nothing more to do with his sons.[13] Later some of the Sonjo saw Hambageu arise from his grave and fly up to the sun-god Riob, with whom he was then identified.[14] "The word mugwe is a generic term for God and is also used in the plural form --bagwe. It is applied to Khambageu and Riob...In his role as sun-god, Khambageu-Riob is thought to rule the heavens. The stars are conceived of as his children."[15]

While on earth Hambageu made two major prophecies concerning the future. He told the Sonjo that white people would come to help and rule them, and that the Sonjo were to obey them.[16] The second prophecy concerned the end of the world, the signs of which he described. Hambageu is to return at this time and "save all Sonjo who are properly marked with the ntemi scar under the left breast."[17]

This account of the Hambageu myth was preceded by the claim that the Sonjo village elders have an authority the legitimacy of which derived from Hambageu and descends to them by way of patrilineal succession. It has further been shown, in the identification of Hambageu with the ruler of the heavens, the sun-god Riob, that this source is divine. It remains to sketch in more fully the links between the elders and the transcendent sacred powers.

First of all, "every village claims to have been founded by Khambageu, this despite the statements in the central myth that the villages were already in existence when Khambageu first visited them."[18] A related difficulty arises from the existence in authority of the elders prior to Hambageu's appearance and from his (successful) defiance of that authority. Suggestive here is the idea that Hambageu had no mother or father, which is to say that he "came to them a stranger, a solitary figure with no tribal bonds whatsoever."[19] Suggestive further is the adherance of Hambageu to the pre-existing order of offices, even though he himself exercised a kind of monarchical rule while he lived.[20]

Several surmises offer themselves for consideration here. One is that the elders who opposed Hambageu exercised illegitimate power or that their authority, the source of which is lost to memory, was given a new and superior basis by Hambageu. Another is that while some order of life existed prior to Hambageu, nevertheless he created a new order (a new world) in comparison with which the former order is as nothing (a dis-order). Finally, one might emphasize the conception of Hambageu as the creator of the world, but regard his appearance in the story among men already socially organized as necessary if an account was to be given of his socially relevant miraculous powers. None of these surmises would contradict the conclusion that two elements are essential to the authority of the village elders after Hambageu: a sacred ground of the authority derived from Hambageu, and the transmission of this authority through lines of ancestors to the living elders. Hambageu could defy the elders without negating the ancestral principle precisely because he was not of the tribe. Being over the tribe, he provided the requisite second element: the sacred element to be transmitted through heredity. Not of the tribe, he could neither establish nor sanction the principle of lineal descent. Had he left heirs the Sonjo constitution could not but have been different--either the monarchical rule of one son or the aristocratic rule of one family.

Similar considerations apply to the status of the irrigation waters. According to the myth Hambageu's first confrontation with the elders arose out of his refusal to work on the irrigation ditches. We find, however, that Hambageu is considered to have originated miraculously the springs that provide the major sources of irrigation waters.[21] This belief is of special significance since the Sonjo are apparently the only tribe in East Africa whose agricultural economy is entirely dependent upon irrigation.[22] Before Hambageu's arrival there was water, but it was insufficient. The implication is that Hambageu perfected a pre-existent deficient order and thus "brought in a golden age of the Sonjo."[23]

Hambageu is also credited with founding the villages that were made habitable by the springs he created, and with initiating or sanctioning many Sonjo customs.[24]

> The most important village mythologically is Belwa, which...is now thought of as located in heaven, or as synonymous with heaven. The name occurs in the invocation with which communal prayers are opened, in the phrase, '...open the sluices of Belwa', which is meant as a supplication for rain.[25]

Belwa is "a symbol of the Sonjo homeland,"[26] whereas the Sonjo refer to themselves as a people by the name Batemi (a word containing the same root as the word ntemi, which is the name of the rite of initiation whereby the ntemi scar is marked under the left breast in anticipation of Hambageu's return).[27]

According to Gray, the dominant myth places Hambageu's death at the village of Rokhari after Hambageu had paid a long visit to Belwa, which is regarded as the place of his origin.[28] Rokhari is "the ritual centre of the tribe" and "the headquarters for the clan of priests"; there is located the main tribal temple at the gravesite of Hambageu.[29] The importance of this temple to all the villages is indicated in this account of the annual ceremonies following the harvest:

> This festival is celebrated for four days at all the villages

> in rotation...Preceding the festival proper at a village, a delegation of ritually pure men and women march in procession to Rokhari, bearing offerings to Khambageu. They spend the night in the temple precincts, and if favourable omens are obtained by the priests the delegation returns to its village with the news that the festival may begin the next day....People from other villages come to watch the dancing and visit friends during a Harvest Festival.[30]

Thus, while politically independent, the Sonjo villages are integrated in a pan-tribal ritual system in which Rokhari and to a less extent Samunge have a "superior ritual status" among the villages.[31]

The elders "take a prominent part in village ritual."[32] Finch's account of the cult of Hambageu's sons provides one example of their role, as well as of the ritual status of the villages. The stones into which Hambageu had turned his sons are identified as the large stones in various parts of Sonjoland that project vertically from the ground. Each stone son of Hambageu is considered a god, and each is covered by a hut.

> Every year at each of these shrines there are held celebrations to honour the god-son of Hambageu there. ...These gods can themselves hear the prayers of men and aid them...
>
> Attendance at these rites is obligatory on all the inhabitants of the village concerned....There is no special priesthood of these shrines; the elders officiating as a body in that role.[33]

None of these shrines is at Kisangiro (Rokhari) because of the special significance of Hambageu's temple. Their cults do not detract from that of Hambageu, but they constitute an integral element in it.[34]

Undoubtedly the major ritual function of the elders is implied in the following passage:

> rain is ritually assimilated to irrigation water; in the phrase 'open the sluices of Belwa', which occurs in communal prayers, rain is represented as a heavenly irrigation system. The irrigation system also has a social dimension. 'It must be controlled and regulated to be effective.[35]

The assimilation of the earthly irrigation waters to the heavenly waters is accomplished by the elders: by their effective control and regulation of the irrigation waters the elders alone have the power to "open the sluices of Belwa."

BENA[1]

The Bena, who number in excess of 158,000 and are fourteenth in size of Tanganyika's tribes,[2] consist of two different neighboring groups. The hill Bena live in the highlands area of southern Tanganyika. The Bena of the rivers migrated from the hills sometime about 1870 to the soutwestern end of the Ulanga Valley.[3]

The hill Bena were divided into many small independent, warring chiefdoms. Each chief ruled over three to five villages. He acceded to office normally as the eldest son of his predecessor's senior wife, and he appointed the village headmen and other officials. The chief's power was considerable, and his decision absolutely binding. He made levies on the people to fight, to work in his fields, to build his houses, and to pay him tribute. The chief always exercised his powers and made his demands through the subordinate officials, he himself remaining aloof. Although the chiefs inspired fear in their subjects, apparently their demands were generally moderate and their rule usually benevolent. Between 1870 and 1875 the Sangu tribe conquered a large part of Ubena, in which they killed the Bena chiefs.[4]

Rather more detailed and comprehensive data is available on the river Bena, who constitute a single kingdom of some 16,000 people.[5] They warrant our primary attention because they possess an organizational unity, while the term Bena "had a purely territorial and linguistic significance" and the people of each small hill chiefdom took the name of their local area, a name that did not denote kinship or a common descent.[6]

In the early nineteenth century the Manga clan, which later ruled all of the river Bena, exercised authority over but one of the petty chiefdoms. But in the 1840's the Wakinimanga (descendants of Manga) had united a group of chiefdoms into a single conquering force holding sway over a large area. When their further expansion in the hill country was blocked, they began in about 1860 under their paramount chief Ndaliwali to spread toward the low country of the Ulanga valley. This movement was continued by Ndaliwali's son Mtengera I, who established the new kingdom in its present location and reigned from about 1863 to 1884.[7]

The Culwicks describe the religio-political order of the Bena in terms of their dominant characteristics.

> They are primarily an agricultural people and are governed now, as in days gone by, by a Paramount Chief, or Mtema,

> assisted by an aristocracy. The chief is, however, not merely a secular ruler. The principal feature of the tribal religion is ancestor-worship, and the Chief as the living descendant of the most powerful of the spirits, i.e. the former holders of his royal office, is not only the temporal but also the religious head of the tribe.[8]

The following examination of the river Bena will, accordingly, be concerned with the traditional accounts of the Mtema's early ancestors, with the powers and ritual significance of the Mtema, with the relation of ancestor-worship to other elements in the Bena religion, with the nature of the ruling aristocracy, and with the relationship between the rulers and the ruled.

According to Bena tradition, as related in the early 1930's, seven generations previous three hunter brothers came down in search of game from the Kidodi area, which lies about midway between the Ulanga Valley and Uluguru. Their father was a white man whose name is forgotten. The brothers quarreled and, with their followers, went their separate ways. Two remained in the highlands, winning the hill people's admiration for their hunting prowess. One married the daughter of a ruler near Iringa, and fathered the royal house of the Hehe tribe. His brother Nguruchawangi married the daughter of a ruler in the Bena area, who bore him a son Kihugura. Nguruchawangi died of starvation when he was trapped by falling rocks in a cave wherein he sought shelter from a storm one day while hunting. People thereafter called him Manga, meaning a cave. Kihugura had such courage and personality that he came to rule over his maternal kinsmen, and he founded the royal Manga clan. This is the extent of the account of Manga and his son, and of the two next Manga chiefs nothing is related but their names and the story of the death of one of them. No legends of their great deeds exist, and the detailed historical account of the Manga royal line begins only with the next Manga chief, Ndaliwali.[9]

"Manga," the Culwicks say, "is invested with every heroic virtue and is regarded with great awe." His original home is considered sacred ground, the "country of the spirits" where the Bena Wakinimanga say they would never fight. The Bena also believe that through him, from some unknown forefather of his, comes the sacred drum of the tribe, "the symbol of all that is most sacred in the Bena constitution," and the medicine of the Mtema's ancestral sacrifice.[10]

The interpretation of this tradition should be evident. Manga may have been a mighty hunter, but the outstanding qualities he is regarded as having possessed are imputed. They are imputed to him for no other reason than that he is the generative source of the political, and hinted military, effectiveness of his son Kihugura and their later successors. Implicit is something akin to the philosophical principle that the effect cannot be greater than its cause. Manga is more prominent than earlier ancestors merely because he is the earliest in the line who has a name and the one who first entered Bena country.[11] On both counts he is the immediate cause and namesake of the power-bearing clan.

In resuming the story of the Manga royal line with Ndaliwali, this account may begin to clarify the powers of the Mtema and his family. Mtema Ndaliwali's death was kept secret from the people for two years, the elders of the royal family ruling in his name. Mzawira, whom during his life Ndaliwali had specified as his successor because he was the son of his senior wife, then began his reign. Mzawira gave his brother Mtengera the charge of warriors to defend the country, and Mtengera fought so well that the elders advised Mzawira to give up to him the stool of the kingdom. Mzawira gave up his political authority to Mtengera and, at the elders' behest, assumed the title Mtema wa Tambiko (Chief of the Sacrifices).[12] According to Mtema Kiwanga, "There was never a Chief like Mtengera amongst the Wakinimanga of Ubena."[13] Mtengera went on to achieve many great military victories.[14] The Culwicks comment:

> Mtengera excelled in the art of war and had all the characteristics likely to make him a hero of heroes in the estimation of his people. But Mzawira had been appointed by his much revered father and had been installed with full religious rites ...The elders felt that he was unsuitable; an unwarlike Mtema was liable even to open insult by his warriors. But they could not remove him from his religious position, for he had done nothing...for which he could be justifiably deposed with the approval of the ancestral spirits. The way out lay in the temporary separation of religious and secular authority.[15]

It remained true, however, that no Mtema is fully Mtema without the title Mtema wa Tambiko.[16]

The Mtema possessed great power which, although theoretically absolute, was proportionate to the respect he inspired as the representative of the royal ancestors and the military commander of a fighting tribe.[17] The Bena's idea of the characteristics of a good and powerful Mtema is explicated as follows:

> Primarily he must guide the affairs of his people in accordance with tribal custom and the "will of the ancestors,"

> with whom he must maintain good relations for the benefit of the whole tribe. Formerly, he had to be a skillful and keen warrior so that his men could have plenty of fighting and be proud to follow him....He must rule justly according to Bena standards...He must put the proper cross-cousins at the top of his household and be politic in dealings with their families, to consolidate the position of the royal family and avoid intrigue. Traditionally he must be open-handed and hospitable to an astonishing degree.[18]

His outward marks were few: a robe and feather headdress. He was entitled to the special greeting "Kwahawanga!" which referred to his unique authority to command that the war medicine be drunk. He was ~~the~~ only man of wealth, deriving his revenue primarily from tribute and the sale of ivory; yet he lived simply, distributing his riches to the people.[19] He selected many children, the majority of those of important men and promising ones of lower birth, to be educated under his supervision from the age of about four years. As many as six to eight hundred of these children at a time might be in the boys school and the girls school, the latter under the direction of the Mtema's senior wife. The products of this training provided a reservoir of loyal and efficient men for appointment to various posts or to serve in the Mtema's bodyguard or army. Through this system the Mtema also exercised considerable control over the marriages of the aristocracy, with brides of the highest rank given in reward to boys who made a distinguished record in the school.[20]

The ritual importance of the Mtema is stressed in this statement of the Culwicks:

> While it is open...to the tribe as a whole to offend

> the spirits of the departed Chiefs, it is in the power of only one man to propitiate them on behalf of the tribe as a whole. The Mtema is the religious head of his people, and it is his most solemn duty to carry out all the rites necessary to retain the favour of the tribal ancestors and thus to ensure prosperity and avert disaster. He is the only priest of the whole community, though the head of every family is a priest at his private family sacrifices.

The Mtema offers the tribal sacrifice (*tambiko*) at the graves of the chiefs who were buried in the Ulanga area.[21]

Assisting the Mtema in the performance of the *tambiko* is an important official known as the *Mzagira wa Tambiko*. The Mzagira is not a priest, but the Mtema cannot offer the sacrifice without him. The Mzagira has "the final decision regarding the admission of the Mtema to the secrets of the heirlooms, the final word which permits or denies him the possession of the Stool and initiation as Mtema wa Tambiko."[22] It is his duty "to keep the ancestral spirits posted in all news affecting the tribe, and the royal house in particular, by going into the shrine [housing the sacred Drum, Stool and other hierlooms] and there, squatting before the sacred Drum, recounting to the spirits what is happening to their children."[23] Although the Mzagira is appointed by the Mtema, he served to check or influence the Mtema's exercise of power by serving as his deputy and chief advisor and especially by his authority to dictate concerning the performance of the tribal ritual.[24]

The royal ancestors are believed to inspire the living Mtema with the wisdom to make right decisions and to watchfully guide his affairs.[25] These ancestors are considered to be "the source of all law, the givers of all prosperity, and the senders of all misfortune."[26] Yet they are subordinate to Mulungu in his aspect of a high creator God. The Bena are quoted as saying: "Mulungu is the Chief of the mahoka (spirits of the ancestors), who live with him."[27]

Mulungu is also regarded as an impersonal spiritual force or, more precisely, the sacred substance common to all spiritual forces.[28] The Culwicks associate this idea of Mulungu mainly with the most uneducated and "backward" people, finding that the more "advanced" conception of Mulungu as a god is strongest among the more educated people who have some knowledge of Islam and/or Christianity.[29] Two facts would seem to indicate, however, that the conception of Mulungu as a high God may well be indigenous. First, under this aspect he is known under a variety of traditional names, two of which are cited: Nguruwi, the origin and meaning of which is unknown; and Mlongaweka, meaning "He who speaks of Himself."[30] Secondly, Bena apparently do not conceive of Mulungu as a Muslim or Christian conceives of God, for some are wont to make such statements as: "I have been poisoned, Mulungu has entered me. I must seek out a doctor who will give me good medicine which is Mulungu. And Mulungu will help me so that I shall recover, for he has not yet called me to him."[31] Here both conceptions of Mulungu are expressed in the same breath.

Towegale, the Mtema installed in 1932, called on Mulungu when he sacrificed to the ancestors and spoke of him as a personal spirit who rules the dead whom he rewards according to their deeds in life.[32] Since the charms, medicine and divination of the medicine-man[33] apparently have no place, or only a subordinate one at most, in the public ceremonies, one must conclude that the propitiation of the royal ancestors, through whom perhaps Mulungu was traditionally worshipped, by the Mtema as the representative of the whole society was the essential and dominant characteristic of the Bena public ritual. These public rites were held in the event of any major public crisis like drought, flood, or political disorder; "but even without some special reason the great ancestors must not be neglected for too many months on end."[34]

A great tambiko was held at the funeral of an Mtema, with many days of feasting for which people came from all over the country. It occurred only after about two years had elapsed since the Mtema's death, which was kept secret until a tree planted on the grave in his house forced its way through the roof. During this period the new Mtema and tribal elders carried on as ostensible deputies of the dead Mtema, whose hut they often visited to receive his orders.[35]

The Mtema, as has been shown, was the central and supreme figure as ruler and representative of the society. The constitutional structure of the society must now be examined in order to see how the ancestrally inspired rule of the Mtema reaches the people. The Culwicks distinguish five "classes" among the Bena: slaves, common people, warriors, village headmen, and provincial chiefs.[36] The term "class" is used very loosely, for these categories are not distinguished according to a single standard and some of them overlap.

At the bottom of society were the Wawanda or slaves, consisting of war captives, certain debtors and criminals, and the children of slaves. Some bondsmen were above the menial position of slaves, and some of these were warriors or influential counsellors.[37] The lowest rank of freemen were the Wanu (pl. of munu, person). These were not professional warriors, but in war they would be called to fight under their village leader. They were also subject to corvee during game drives in their locality.[38] The Wenyewaha or warrior class contained men from all strata of society from bondsmen to the royal family. Trained in the Mtema's school, they served in units of a standing army or as bodyguards and assistants to the Mtema or other officials. The administrative officials were drawn from this class.[39]

The Wanzagira or village headmen were appointed by the Mtema, who took into consideration the villages' preferences. The position was often semi-hereditary, the Mtema choosing from among the heirs in the predominant family.[40] The headman "was responsible for all that concerned his village, for reporting to his superior anything of note that occurred, for the maintenance of discipline and the settlement of disputes. On the whole, he aimed at keeping the Wanu contented."[41] Under him were assistants, Wanyambiki, whom he appointed from among the Wanu. Respected commoners, Watambule, made up an advisory council lacking any administrative authority.[42]

Wanzagira had yet a second meaning. "The bravest and most honoured warriors were called Wanzagira and ranked higher than those, also warriors, who only held the administrative title, though, of course, the village ruler was usually an Mzagira of both types." The military Wanzagira held the major military posts, each leading at least thirty men into battle. They were friends and counsellors to the Mtema.[43]

The headmens' superiors were the Watwa Wenyelutenana, meaning the chiefs on the hill. They ruled the provinces and answered to the Mtema, who selected them from among near relatives. In making his appointment the Mtema has to strike "a balance between hereditary claims, personal qualifications, the will of the ruler, and the wishes of the ruled."[44]

In conclusion, the river Bena are found to have a society organized politically and militarily. All authority flows down into this structure from the royal ancestors through the Mtema, who appoints all but the lowest village officials and who links the military and the political hierarchies at the top.[45] The Mtema, while absolutely supreme, is not remote. He and his family are related to the rest of the society through numerous marital connections, and in his rule he is subject to the demand that he have benevolent concern for the common good as a condition of his favor with the ancestral powers who sanction his authority and make his power effective and thus secure. In turn, as a result of the marriage customs of the royal family, many of the Mtema's subjects can look to the royal ancestors as being their own in a more immediate way than through their membership in the tribe over which they ruled and, in a sense, continue to rule through their inspired successors. Finally, the political structure of the river Bena, while much more complex and sophisticated, reproduces many of the features of the hill Bena model from which it derives--features such as a semi-hereditary office of chief, the eldest son of the chief's senior wife normally succeeding; a group of officials appointed by the chief; and the fearsomeness and unchallenged power of the chief. Moreover, the substantive order is without doubt the same, with societal order and prosperity dependent on the good will of the royal ancestors who sanction the chief's authority by accepting him as the only representative of the whole society.

LUGURU[1]

The Luguru is listed among Tanganyika tribes as eleventh in size, with a population of somewhat over 178,000.[2] They live in and around the Uluguru Mountains in East-Central Tanganyika. Not only was there no comprehensive tribal organization or developed idea of tribal unity, but the "tribe" was not even coextensive with the culture group. The Luguru share many cultural features, as well as language, with neighboring peoples, even having a number of clans in common with them. In fact, the cultural similarities between the Luguru and these other "tribes" are greater than those obtaining within certain other groups like the Sukuma that have distinct names and thus are considered tribes. The geographic character of the term Luguru is indicated by the practice of people who change their "tribal" name upon moving to another area.[3]

Young and Fosbrooke describe Luguru society as "segmentary" and "acephalous."[4] "Traditional authority was decentralized and segmented, based on lineage, with descent passing through the mother's line."[5] Since the Luguru are articulated into local communities, clans and lineages, these may be examined in turn.

The local community is politically, economically and religiously independent. It is defined territorially, with the land considered the property of one particular lineage. Moreover, it sometimes consisted of lineage members almost entirely. The clans are not localized, and some are not even limited to the Luguru. There are over fifty of these exogamus, matrilineal groups claiming descent from a remote ancestress.[6]

The lineage is the really important political unit, for it is here that one encounters political authority. "The possession of a duly installed lineage head, with jurisdiction over a defined territory and over a group of people, here termed a local community, is a distinguishing mark of a lineage's independent existence."[7]

The lineage head assumes the name of the first lineage head.

> Thus in the case of the Mganga lineage of the Mwenda clan the head will be known as Mganga. If asked his name, such a person would state 'Mganga,' and not give the name...by which he was known prior to assumption of office. Likewise, if asked from whom he inherited, he would reply, 'Mganga.' The identification of present officeholders with their predecessors is close. The same name is used to denote the lineage: in the case quoted, ask a member what clan he is and he will reply 'Mwenda'; ask his lineage and he will say 'Mganga' or more specifically 'Mwenda Mganga.'[8]

This symbolism is instructive. It indicates, first, that the lineage head is identified with the source of his authority. By adopting the name of the first lineage head he is in a sense transformed into him or, to put it another way, he assumes the nature of his predecessor. Thus he is said not to rule a society but to "rule the name," and the assumption of this name is the dominant element in the succession.[9]

The name obviously derives its significance from the first lineage head.

These founders, according to oral tradition, were individuals who, often with their families, infiltrated and settled in the Luguru highlands. There is no tradition of a common origin of the Luguru, some lineages tracing their ancestors to a southwestern source, others to a southern origin, and still others to the coast or the north. However, unlike some Tanganyika tribes, "no Luguru lineage claims non-Bantu origin and there are no legends of pre-existing hunting people."[10]

Apparently the Luguru, in maintaining the institution of lineage head and symbolizing it by the name of the first head, experience themselves as still subject to these founders and to the foundation. By symbolizing the lineage with the founder's name, they imply the inseparability of the foundation from the founder. The lineage, while it extends through time and was founded in time, is not regarded as a historical reality. This is certainly implied not only by the identification of the later lineage heads with the first, but by the omission of the notion of ruling over subjects in the symbolism of lineage headship. The later lineage members are identified not with earlier members in any direct way, but only by virtue of their assumption also of the name of the founder which is the name of the lineage. Thus they do not really conceive of themselves as "subjects." The lineage head and the lineage group as a whole are both "Mganga," and the lineage head is thus of the essence of the corporate group: he "incorporates" it by virtue of himself being a founder through identification with the first founder.

Consistent with the foregoing is the selection and removal of the lineage head according to the popular consent of the lineage members. Lacking any military tradition or organization, the lineage had no basis for experiencing its head, whether first or last, as the bearer of sacred powers manifest in coercive or violent form. Unfortunately, the sources do not provide more than the barest hints concerning the religion of the Luguru. However, these hints --namely, the coincidence of the installation of a new head with his predecessor's funeral, the head's performance of sacrifice at the "sacred grove" of the lineage, and the role of "shared ritual" in the cohesion of the lineage--[11] lead one to surmise that the lineage ritual centers on sacrifice led by the lineage head to the lineage founder. Presumably the "sacred groves" are the burial sites of the founders, and the head is known not only as the ruler of the name but as "the owner or possessor of the soil." This suggests that the founder and his successors are important to the fertility of the soil, the lineage heads' duty being to ensure rain and good harvest through sacrifice.[12]

Thus far it would appear that Young and Fosbrooke beg the question when they describe the Luguru as an acephalous society. The Luguru, as they indicated, are but part of a culture group distinguished according to geographical criteria. The only true political society--namely, the only group in which political authority exists and is exercised[13]--is the lineage; and the lineage, as we have seen, is certainly not headless. The head of the lineage exercised authority over his kinsmen and over others who occupied lineage land. He was thus a territorial ruler.

It is, however, not entirely correct to assert that the only true Luguru political societies were the lineage-centered local communities. Prior to the colonial period larger political societies were being articulated. Three lineage heads, one named Kingalu, in different parts of the Luguru area began to exercise authority over lineages other than their own.

> The institution of a supra-lineage political organization --if the position was sufficiently stable to be regarded as institutionalized--was manifestly based on the lineage system. At some undefined period one of the Kingalus...started to exert his power as a rain-maker. His sacrifices did not replace the sacrifices conducted by other lineage heads in their own groves, but perhaps because of a run of speedy answers to prayer they came to be regarded as more efficacious. A special tribute....was paid to Kingalu. Also it became customary for all cultivation to be suspended for three days while he was sacrificing. In addition, Kingalu's tabu against living in anything but a rectangular hut with unplastered walls became imposed on a considerable area, which today includes five headmen's areas with a total of approximately 1,500 houses... Kingalu's insignia are more elaborate than /those of/ the usual lineage head.[14]

Kingalu and the other two supra-lineage authorities were able successfully to demand "tribute as a thanks offering for successful supplication to the supernatural powers responsible for rain and for harvest." In this way they were in competition with the lineage heads who also received token payments of tribute for ensuring the groups' prosperity through sacrifice. Lineage heads who attempted to set themselves up over larger groupings through force failed, while Kingalu retained his authority in the eyes of his people when the British removed him from power: "only emergent political leaders with supernatural backing retained their prestige when the temporal power which supported them was withdrawn."[15]

No data is available that would indicate the character of the supernatural powers backing Kingalu. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that, since he was originally merely a lineage head and remained such after expanding his authority, the sacred powers were not essentially different than those of the Luguru lineages generally; and that therefore he was identified with these sacred forces through his assumption of the name, Kingalu, which is traced back thirteen generations to a founder of the same name who is said to have migrated to the Luguru area from Ubena.[16]

In any event, the evidence shows that the Luguru political society was the lineage, but also that there had emerged an incipient hierarchical political order culminating in a chief whose lineage would constitute a royal kinship group. Nothing would indicate that the internal order of this larger society and the authority of the head of this multilineage group differed essentially from that which prevailed within the lineage itself.

NYAKYUSA[1]

The Nyakyusa live in southwestern Tanganyika at the northwest end of Lake Nyasa, a once isolated area that is enclosed on three sides by mountains.[2] Numbering some 192,816 in 1948, the Nyakyusa are the eighth largest tribe in Tanganyika.[3]

According to Monica Wilson, "Nyakyusa society may be viewed as three circles of relationship--the relationships of kinship, village relationships, and relationships within and beyond the chiefdoms."[4] Our concern herein is with the third of these circles. Yet, because these three types of groupings "interlock in a complex fashion,"[5] it is appropriate that a description of each of the "circles" be initially provided.

In general, "economic and religious co-operation link the descendants of a common grandfather, and marriage between the descendants of a common great-grandfather is excluded."[6] There is no clan system. The lineage is important in terms of religion and wealth. Elaborate kinship rituals attest to belief in the power of the ancestors and senior relatives.[7] Property, which circulates within the lineage, "passes not directly from father to son, but from brother to brother, through each group of full brothers, until, when the last full brother is dead, and the son of the eldest is an adult, the family stock comes to him."[8]

The peculiar feature of Nyakyusa society, wherein the Nyakyusa differ from their neighbors and other Bantu peoples generally, is its division into age-villages composed of contemporaries rather than kinsmen. The village is "formed by groups of boys or men, all roughly of the same age, together with the wives and children of those who are married."[9] Although age rather than kinship is the basis of the village, "the villages of fathers, sons, and grandsons commonly adjoin one another."[10]

Nyakyusa was divided into numerous distinct chiefdoms, which numbered over one hundred in 1938. While each chiefdom was politically independent, it was associated with other chiefdoms in politically relevant ritual units.

> Besides sacrificing to a distant ancestor in company with representatives of a large group of chiefdoms, two or more chiefs who are neighbors participate in a sacrifice at the grove in which their common father, or grandfather, is buried. Thus common worship links both large groups of chiefdoms, whose chiefs are more or less distantly related, and small groups of contiguous chiefdoms whose chiefs are close kinsmen. The sacrifices made are to the chiefs of immediately preceding generations, and to certain great heroes of the distant past, such as Lwembe and Kyala.
>
> All these sacrifices are believed to bring rain and fertility, for the well-being of each chiefdom is thought to be bound up with the health of the chief and the goodwill of the ancestors.[11]

Beyond the chiefs is a living figure whom Monica Wilson styles a "divine king," but who lacks any political power whatsoever. Clarity regarding this figure is essential to an understanding of Nyakyusa chiefship. According to Nyakyusa mythology, some eight or ten generations previous "strangers" descended upon them from the Livingstone mountains bringing fire, crops, cattle and iron tools and weapons.[12] The founding hero Lwembe is credited with bringing fire, cattle, and iron. The major hero, he "left many descendants who spread over the valley as chiefs, ruling a people who had not known chiefs."[13] Lwembe, certain other of the early heroes, and the heir or "living representative" of Lwembe are the "divine kings."[14]

In the center of the Nyakyusa valley is a hill, Lubaga, that dominates the area. There, at the sacred grove where he is buried, Lwembe is worshipped; and there his descendant, "the living Lwembe," resides.[15] As the most sacred person in the country, the latter was subject to many taboos. He was secluded from ordinary men;

> he might not tread in water lest the country should be flooded;...he must not sit on a green banana leaf lest the bananas in the country should fail,...and he ate only the middle portion of a banana throwing away the ends for 'if he finished the whole of the banana he would create hunger in the country.'[16]

Men feared to be chosen Lwembe, for his life was generally short. The people believed that in his "fearful and terrible" body resided "the power of making rain, food, milk and children." If he became sick the priests smothered him, so that the people would not also fall ill. Since he, "and in a lesser degree his 'sons' who are ordinary chiefs, are identified with the power of growth," he was not to "die with the breath still in his body, or with his hair and nails still upon it."[17] Nor were chiefs allowed to die with their hair and nails, which embody growth and vitality, lest this vital power be buried with them.[18]

Political authority lay with the chiefs rather than with the Lwembe, while in the related Ngonde people in Nyasaland the situation differed. The contrast is instructive, as explained by Monica Wilson:

> The two heroes who established divine kingships among the Nyakyusa in Tanganyika and the men of Ngonde in Nyasaland sprang from the same lineage and spoke the same language...In BuNyakyusa, the founding hero, Lwembe, was primarily a ritual leader and he never developed any extensive secular authority. His descendants became chiefs...and they sacrificed to him and recognized the spiritual overlordship of his heirs, but they did not pay taxes to him or refer appeals from their courts....In Ngonde...the divine king gradually acquired secular power. This power was based on the control of an external trade in ivory, and the import of cloth, and later of guns. The Nyakyusa had no such external trade because geographically they were much more isolated.[19]

The Nyakyusa apparently had no explanation for the Lwembe's lack of political power. However, the Lwembe's religious position can properly be considered as having implicit in it a claim to political authority, for the Lwembe successfully began to assert such a claim after the European occupation.[20]

The foundation myth is, however, somewhat more complex than the above account would indicate. Lwembe had two brothers, Nkekete and Kyala, who begot no children. Nkekete, because buried in Kisi country, is of no significance to the Nyakyusa; but Kyala is an ambiguous figure of great importance to them. Kyala is not only regarded as Lwembe's brother and credited with creating crops,[21] "but his name is also used in the sense of 'the lord': a chief is kyala gwake (his lord) to a commoner, a father is kyala gwake to his son or daughter 'because he created him' and a shade is kyala to his living kinsman." The term for chiefs, aba-nya-fyale, is commonly understood as meaning "the sons of Kyala." And one is called Kyala who performs a difficult feat.[22]

Monica Wilson hesitates to regard Kyala as "an overriding deity," explaining that the European missionaries used the name as the indigenous term equivalent to "God" and that the forty years of missionary activity makes it impossible to establish the traditional conception of Kyala.[23] She found expressed in the then current myths the conception of Kyala as the creator of life and death, of the country and people, and of the Nyakyusa institutions, customs and rituals. People and things are what they are because Kyala made them so. Yet Kyala, like Lwembe, is thought to dwell below with the ancestral spirits, there being "no hint of a sky god in the traditional system."[24]

Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect that Kyala, even though not a "sky god," was traditionally regarded as a divine power in some sense beyond the other sacred beings. Kyala's place in the obviously traditional foundation myth is secure, and in fact sacrifices were made to him by Nyakyusa priests and chiefs at the cave that encloses his shrine prior to the advent of Europeans.[25] Yet he is the only sacred figure to whom sacrifice is made who is not an ancestor. Moreover, Kyala was very infrequently mentioned by the Nyakyusa in contrast to the constant discussion of more immediate forces like the ancestors and witchcraft. This would be consistent with the tendency of supreme sky gods to become "otiose," and to be supplanted by fertilizing deities.[26] Further, the material quoted by Monica Wilson indicates that the myths and sayings concerning Kyala do not contain Christian elements but retain wholly traditional tones. It is by Kyala's will that other forces prove effective.[27]

The chiefs, as indicated, enjoy an authority sanctioned by the founding myth. They are thought to have differed physically from the aboriginal commoners, the former being of lighter color and the latter still known as abatitu (black people), although there is intermarriage and no observable physical difference between chiefs and commoners. As the sons of Lwembe, they are also "founding heroes" who are believed to have "settled on hill-tops which became centres of worship, numerous sources of power." Their descendants constitute the lines of chiefs who participate in the sacredness of Lwembe.[28]

The peculiar structure and symbolism of the Nyakyusa chiefdom is manifest in the "coming out" ceremony, which was both a political act and a religious ritual. In this ceremony, which takes place but once each generation, "the two heirs of a chief are acknowledged as rulers, and the government of the country is handed over to them and their village headmen."[29] Thus each chiefdom has a dualistic structure and it divides in half each generation.

> Two villages in each chiefdom are senior to the others and their headmen are responsible each for half of the country. During the 'coming out' ritual the chief marries two wives, 'mothers of the country', and one is established in each senior village...The eldest sons of these two wives are the heirs, and later divide the old chief's country between them.[30]

The "coming out" ritual is replete with symbols indicative of the sacred character of the chiefs' authority. A prominent feature of the ritual is the extinguishing of the old and the lighting of the new fire, for the Nyakyusa sayings are that "Fire is lordship" and that "These are chiefs because they brought this fire." Monica Wilson explains that "the lighting of fire by friction is a symbol of potency" and that "the fertility of the chiefdom is thought to be bound up with the virility of the chief." The process of making the new fire is begun by the new chiefs and consumated by their senior headmen, who pass it to subordinate headmen for distribution to the people.[31]

Another part of the ritual involves the "spear of chieftainship." After the seizure and seclusion of the heirs to chieftainship in a hut for a period of about a month, during which time they are admonished and instructed concerning their new duties by the senior headmen of their father, the heirs rush out and grasp the chieftains' spears in response to the cry:" Come out! War has come!" The spear symbolizes greatness and strength and "represents the authority of the ruling chief."[32] This ritual "war" and the victorious power of the young chief re-present the original foundation of the chiefdom and its order.

> At the 'coming out' all things are made new. No matter how crowded the country the young men must move to new sites and the shelters in which they live must be new...Meat is abundant, for the young chief now rules and has the right to take what cattle he chooses, even from the villages of the old men in his country. 'It was as if there were war, the young men seized cattle, food, and women', and though they did not fight their fathers directly, ...they clearly asserted their power. And ...the accession of a chief was the occasion for raiding the neighbors: the young men, we were told, went forthwith to test the efficacy of the magic spears and the medicines with which their chief and headmen had been treated.[33]

During the "coming out" trees are planted to mark the border between the two sections of the chiefdom where it will divide during the next generation's "coming out." These trees symbolize the powers of growth inherent in the chiefship. During the planting the headmen address the trees thus: "we are at the ritual of establishing a new chieftainship, you are a symbol for our chief, spread branches that our young headmen and other people may rest in your shade." If the trees grow and florish the chief is a real ruler and his reign will be successful, but if they wither the chief will be defeated in war and have an unsuccessful reign. Finally, the new chiefs marry the women who are to be the mothers of their heirs, a ritual that renews the essential themes distinguished above.[34]

These are just some of the major features of the elaborate rituals that comprise the "coming out," and Monica Wilson is certainly correct in her interpretation that throughout this ritual the idea of "a new beginning" is repeatedly expressed.[35] What she does not explicitly indicate, however, although her account certainly points to it, is that the "new beginning" that occurs each generation is ritually identified by the Nyakyusa with the original creation of Nyakyusa life (as in the bringing of new fire) by Lwembe and his sons, which in turn is assimilated to the emergence of life itself.[36]

A Nyakyusa chief must maintain the sacred virility of his person upon which his authority and the fertility and security of his chiefdom depend.[37] He does so primarily through medicines and sacrifice to the chiefly ancestors. The chief's great medicines are used "to create amanga, i.e. spiritual power, and ubusisya, i.e., dignity, majesty, in order to make the chief fearful 'so that men obey him'." The most powerful of his medicines gives him the strength to be victorious in war and to attract men to his chiefdom.[38] Other medicines are used to overcome famine and to protect the chief from "the fearfulness of the groves in which they sacrifice."[39]

Sacrifices are made at the sacred groves on such occasions as the advent or expectation of drought, flood, locust plague, epidemic, poor fishing, and war. "Since every ruling chief normally had two heirs, sacrifices involved cooperation between independent chiefdoms--two chiefs at the grove of their father, four at that of their grandfather, and so on."[40] The sacrifice is conducted by chiefs in cooperation with the senior village headmen of the dead chief. An implicit hierarchy, which was never organized, was expressed in the notion that sacrifices should proceed according to seniority from Lwembe through his sons to their more recent descendants.[41] Since the performance of these sacrifices was a political act involving the cooperation of chiefdoms, and since in these political acts the chiefs functioned less as the representatives of one polity to another than essentially as mediators between their people and the source of their constitutional order, an order shared ultimately with all the other Nyakyusa chiefdoms--it follows again that the whole of the Nyakyusa implicitly constitutes a political society and that Monica Wilson, although she makes no explicit defense for choosing the term, is quite proper in calling the Lwembe a "king" even though he lacks political power.

It remains, finally, to examine the relationship between the chief and the people. According to Monica Wilson the institution of chieftainship did not oust "another, perhaps older, tradition of democratic leadership."[42] The chiefs, and Lwembe as well, feared the rightful anger of the people, and especially that of the commoner village headmen and priests.[43] What they feared essentially is called "the breath of men," a force innate in the people that could bring sickness and paralysis to the chiefs.[44]

The village headmen, who act as advisers to the chief, are commoners, never the chief's kinsmen. Theirs is not an hereditary position, for they are selected each generation by their predecessors.[45] There is no indication of any influence over this selection by members of the headmen's generation who would be subject to his authority. The determination of who would be headmen does not appear at all democratic.

The process whereby the chief is selected is not democratic either for, as we have seen, the chiefly succession is precisely defined. The fact that the chief was expected to act constitutionally and with concern for his ritual integrity and the welfare of the people; the fact that the people were regarded as having a recourse in the face of an oppressive ruler; and the lack of any development of an extensive professional, hierarchical government apparatus--all would indicate that the Nyakyusa chief was a benevolent ruler whose exercise of power was no more harsh than desired by a people who wanted their representative to maintain his power to order society and nature and to awe enemies.

CHAPTER III

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGIMES

The preceding two chapters have analyzed, on an individual basis, the sanctions and organization of authority characteristic of eight culture groups of people, commonly called tribes, in two widely separated African countries. The task of this chapter is a comparative one, dealing as it does with the question of whether these regimes constitute but one type or a variety of types; and, if they are mainly or exclusively of one type, whether that type is sufficiently prevalent in and unique to Africa to warrant its establishment as the "African type" of regime.

The procedure of this chapter is as follows. The African authorities will be compared in terms of the nature of their sanctions and of their organizational articulation. In the course of this inquiry, analytical literature bearing on the problems under consideration will be evaluated in order to clarify criteria for the determination of a typology of African political authority.

One way of formulating the first question is this: are the religions of our eight groups of societies (hereinafter abbreviated as "eight societies") all of the same type and, if so, do they "relate" to the eight political authorities in the same way? This formulation is suggested by the practice of those academic experts[1] on these societies who distinguish what they call the "secular" aspects of traditional African authority. Yet we have seen that the Africans themselves do not differentiate between the "religious" and the "political" realms--or, better, they do not differentiate between the religion that is held by or participated in by the society as a whole and the political realm; for certainly the religion of the individual African, perhaps more or less involving recourse to magic, and of a corporate group like a lineage, centered on the cult of its own ancestors, may not directly be a part of the public religion shared by all members of the society. The formulation is not therefore entirely invalid for our purposes, because the religious value of political authority can vary among societies whose religions appear essentially the same. Thus a better formulation of the question would be: are the eight political authorities considered by their societies to be sanctioned by similar transcendent realities, and do these realities occupy the same positions in the religions of the eight societies?

We may begin considering this question by recalling that the supreme political authorities in all but one of the societies, whether they were kings (paramount chiefs), chiefs, or headmen,[2] were sanctioned by descent from certain founders who, as objects of the societal ancestral cult, are regarded as continuing to exercise a crucial influence over the society of the living. Some of these ancestral founders are remembered by name, and their deeds recalled in story. The founder of Sonjo societal order, the sole exception to the above, was not regarded as himself an ancestor, but as the confirmer of ancestral rule. In some cases, as among the Sonjo, the founder is explicitly regarded as a god. However, as Strauss observes:

> Prephilosophic life is characterized by the primeval identification of the good with the ancestral. Therefore, the right

> way necessarily implies thoughts about the ancestors and hence about the first things simply.
>
> For one cannot reasonably identify the good with the ancestral if one does not assume that the ancestors were absolutely superior to 'us,' and this means that they were superior to all ordinary mortals; one is driven to believe that the ancestors, or those who established the ancestral way, were gods or sons of gods or at least 'dwelling near the gods.'[3]

From this modest beginning of our consideration of the problem a host of questions suddenly swarm out: Are the stories of the ancestral founders also about "the first things simply" and thus myths in Elidde's sense of an account of events that occurred at the mythical time of creation?[4] Are the ancestors, who "were superior to all ordinary mortals," superior to all beings? If not, if superior to some of these "gods" are other gods or a God, what is the significance of the difference between the ancestor "gods" who are the supreme and those who are not?

According to Gray, borrowing Malinowski's phrase, the "mythical charter" for the authority of the Sonjo village rulers is the belief in their inheritance of "legitimate powers from ancestors who were divinely appointed [by Hambageu] to their positions."[5] Similarly, Monica Wilson entitles her chapter on the story of Lwembe and Kyala "The Mythological Charter."[6] Winans too follows Malinowski in calling the Mbega story a "charter."[7] What did Malinowski say?

> Myth...is not merely a story told but a reality lived. It is...a living reality, believed to have happened in primeval times...[8]
>
> ....
>
> ...Myth fulfills in primitive culture an indispensable

> function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief;... it is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active force; it is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom.[9]
>
> ....
>
> Myth, as a statement of primeval reality which still lives in present-day life and as a justification by precedent, supplies a retrospective pattern of moral values, sociological order, and magical belief....The function of myth, briefly, is to strengthen tradition and endow it with a greater value and prestige by tracing it back to a higher, better, more supernatural reality of initial events.[10]

Eliade, who quotes Malinowski approvingly,[11] defines myth as a narration of "a sacred history; it relates an event that took place in primordial time, the fabled time of the 'beginnings.'" He explains as follows:

> myth tells how, through the deeds of Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence, be it the whole of reality, the Cosmos, or only a fragment of reality--an island,... a particular kind of human behavior, an institution. Myth, then, is always an account of a 'creation'; it relates how something was produced, began to be. Myth tells only what really happened...The actors in myths are Supernatural Beings. They are known primarily by what they did in the transcendent times of the 'beginnings.'...In short, myths describe the various and sometimes dramatic breakthroughs of the sacred...into the World.[12]
>
> ....
>
> Because myth relates the gesta of Supernatural Beings and the manifestation of their sacred powers, it becomes the exemplary model for all significant human activities.[13]

By virtue of these criteria the stories of Hambageu, Mbega, and the royal ancestors generally are truly myths that serve as models, charters, and sanctions for political authority and its exercise in African societies. Moreover, even though these stories do not pretend to tell of the creation of the world, they do tell of the creation of significant fragments of reality, and especially of social reality.

One is led at this point to ask how these kinds of African myths differ from the great "cosmological myths" of the archaic civilizations such as Egypt and Mesopotamia. According to Voegelin, "cosmological myth...is generally the first symbolic form created by societies when they rise above the level of tribal organization."[14] With specific reference to the experiences that motivate the Mesopotamian cosmic myth, Voegelin writes:

> To establish a government is an essay in world creation. When man creates the cosmion of political order, he analogically repeats the divine creation of the cosmos. The analogical repetition is not an act of futile imitation, for in repeating the cosmos man participates, in the measure allowed to his existential limitations, in the creation of cosmic order itself. Moreover, when participating in the creation of order, man experiences his consubstantiality with the being of which he is a creaturely part. Hence, in his creative endeavor man is a partner in the double sense of a creature and a rival of God.[15]

Now Eliade has asserted that all myths, regardless of their nature, are "cosmogonic" and that all recount "an event that took place _in illo tempore_," a mythical time outside of history.[16] These statements would appear to direct one to the conclusion that the sanctions of authority and the substance of order in the African and the ancient Near Eastern societies are not of two essentially different types. Have not the African founding ancestors established governments, thereby creating new orders? Moreover, is not the double sense of partnership described by Voegelin adumbrated in the assimilation by Africans of some of the royal founders, who were certainly men, to a supreme God?

This conclusion of the essential sameness of the African and archaic orders has been reached by two scholars who have examined Voegelin's distinction between the primitive and higher orders. These positions deserve our consideration before we venture our own solution to the problem.

Robert Bellah, accepting Voegelin's principle of compactness and differentiation, distinguishes between primitive and archaic religion. Characteristic of primitive religion is the detailed similarity between the mythical and the actual worlds; the dominance of participatory action over worship or sacrifice, and the lack of mediating representatives between the people and the mythical beings. The religions of much of Africa as well of the ancient Near East, India and China are classified as archaic. These archaic religions are more differentiated, tending to elaborate vast cosmologies. The distinction between men and gods is more definite, requiring mediators and the "communications systems" of worship and sacrifice between the two orders.[17] Finally, and most relevantly, Bellah states:

> The emergence of a two-class system, itself related to the increasing density of population made possible by agriculture, has its religious aspect. The upper-status group, which tends to monopolize political and military power, usually claims a superior religious status as well. Noble families are proud of their divine descent and often have special priestly functions. The divine king who is the chief link between his people and the gods is only the extreme case of the general tendency of archaic societies. Specialized priesthoods attached to cult centers may differentiate out but are usually kept subordinate to the political elite, which at this stage never completely divests itself of religious leadership. Occasionally priesthoods at cult centers located interstitially relative to political units...may come

to exercise a certain independence.[18]

This characterization of archaic religion and society certainly obtains for the African societies described in the preceding two chapters. In most of these societies either a royal clan or a group of aristocratic clans exercised political power that was sanctioned by sacred myth and by the ritual mediating functions of the political representatives of the society. Even among the Sonjo and Luguru, political authority has been shown to be the prerogative of certain families. With the Nyakyusa Lwembe we even have an example of a priest whose cult center was interstitial to the chiefdoms and who tended to assert a certain independence. The one perhaps key discrepancy is the lack of elaborate cosmologies among the African societies, a point to which we shall return presently.

The second position is that of David Goddard, who takes issue with both Voegelin and Bellah. Goddard refers to a widespread assumption among scholars that "primitive societies possess simple, undifferentiated social structures that are ordered solely in accordance with principles of kinship." This assumption, he says, "is extended to the forms of consciousness regarded as typical of such undifferentiated societies, and, in particular, to forms of religious and mythological consciousness."[19] He continues:

> .../T/he picture of the truly primitive is nearly always linked to an evolutionary schema. Institutional and symbolic differentiation are thought of as starting from some simple, undifferentiated level. The first stage beyond it is that of archaic society.[20]

Goddard's reply to the proponents of this picture is that even the "a priori grounds for assuming that /Neolithic/ social structures were simple and undifferentiated" are called into question by the excavations of Neolithic cities,[21] and that moreover "no existing society is fully grounded in kinship, so none are truly primitive."[22] Concerning African societies he wirtes:

> Where kinship is elaborately organized, so are other institutions. Most of the large African societies, for example, maintain very complicated religious, political and legal institutions which, while apparently articulated with the kinship system, are to some degree independent of it and often cut across it. Although the societies of sub-Saharan Africa are something of a special case, large-scale and highly elaborate as they are (and for this reason they are sometimes said to be 'archaic'), we are faced in nearly all societies with social structures which are emphatically not simple or undifferentiated.[23]

Our African data certainly support this claim in its essentials. While Shambalai and Ashanti are the only large African political societies with which we deal, political rule in all of the African societies described does cut across kinship lines. Even the Luguru lineage head who rules a village asserts authority over nonmembers of his lineage. Moreover, among most of our eight groups, the hereditary qualification for political office does not preclude the constitutional (that is, institutionalized and sanctioned) prerogative whereby some authority outside of the ruling family determines who shall succeed to office.

What then of the African "special case?" Is the general lack of cosmological myth a significant and specific difference between African societies and other archaic or primitive societies? Voegelin tells us:

> All the early empires, Near Eastern as well as Far

> Eastern, understood themselves as representatives of a transcendent...order of the cosmos...The empire is a cosmic analogue...Rulership becomes the task of securing the order of society in harmony with cosmic order; the territory of the empire is an analogical representation of the world with its four quarters; the great ceremonies of the empire represent the rhythm of the cosmos; festivals and sacrifices are a cosmic liturgy, a symbolic participation of the cosmion in the cosmos; and the ruler himself represents the society, because on earth he represents the transcendent power which maintains cosmic order.[24]

Not only the early empires but much of Oceania has in our time had elaborate cosmological mythologies.[25]

Now, if we are to follow Eliade, must we not regard the African stories of foundation implicit cosmogonies? Or, possibly, we might regard them as incipient cosmologies. This is suggested by Susanne Langer's analysis of symbolism. She distinguishes between the fairy tale, whose hero is strictly human and never a helper of man, and the religiously serious myth, whose hero

> is always felt to be superhuman, even if not quite divine. He is at least a descendant of the gods, something more than a man. His sphere of activity is the real world, because what he symbolizes belongs to the real world... (this is exactly contrary to the fairytale technique, which transports a natural individual to a fairyland outside reality).[26]

According to Langer, myth exists "when not only social forces--persons, customs, laws, traditions--but also cosmic forces surrounding mankind" are symbolized in a story that at once expresses man's relationship to society and society's relationship to the cosmos.[27] The transitional form between the fairytale and "the emergence of full-fledge nature-mythology dealing with divine characters of highly general import, is the so-called legend, which produces the 'culture-hero.'" This hero

> is half god, half giant-killer. Like the latter, he is often a Youngest Son, the only clever one among his stupid brothers. He is born of high parentage, but kidnapped, ...or magically enslaved, in his infancy. Unlike the dream-subject of fairytale, however, his deeds only begin with his escape from thraldom; they go on to benefit mankind. He gives men fire, territory, game, teaches them agriculture...; he 'makes' the land, ...and controls wind and rain.
>
> ...His activities lie in the real world, and their effects are felt by real men forever after; he therefore has a somewhat vague, yet unmistakable historical relation to living men, and a tie to the locality on which he has left his mark.[28]

The stories of the African founders conform in a general way to Langer's characterization of the legend, but the important question is whether they are properly to be regarded as transitional. If, following Eliade and Langer, one were to emphasize the cosmological implications, if indeed there are such implications, of the African legends, would it be correct to regard African order as incipiently cosmological? With this problematic background we turn, then, to a consideration of the African data.

The Akan like all but one of the Tanganyika societies emphasize the ancestral founders of the existing societal orders as primary.[29] This despite certain variations, the significance of which requires examination. First is the existence and political relevance of belief in a high God among several of the societies: namely, the Akan, Sukuma, Ha, and Shambala. Second is the apparent assimilation of the founder to a supreme God, as among the Sonjo. Then there are the societies whose ancestral founders are not explicitly regarded as gods: The Bena and Luguru. Finally, there is the peculiar situation among the Nyakyusa, for whom an ambiguously supreme God, who is not a high God, is related as a brother to the founder of their order.

Our purpose here should not be to seek a common denominator. It is rather to consider whether these variations should be regarded as significant, and to consider the substance of the orders so variously symbolized. Among the Akan, for example, what is the relative weight of concern with Nyame and with the royal ancestors? The first chapter shows that the experience of Nyame, insofar as it is relevant to the whole society and not merely to individuals, is indirect: the ancestors, as intermediaries between the society and Nyame, are the ones who manifest the ordering power of Nyame. Nyame, as the object of a civil theology, is known primarily through the royal ancestors. To Nyame is attributed, at least by implication, the descent from the sky or the emergence from the ground of the clan ancestors. This was the first major articulation of the societal order. The Golden Stool of Ashanti, which symbolizes and embodies the substance of Ashanti society, descended upon Osai Tutu from the sky or the heavens, by implication from Nyame.[30] This was the latest articulation of order, as here Akan society reached its highest level of institutional development. Thus Nyame determined who is to rule. Moreover, the royal ancestors benefit society by leave of Nyame. Is Akan order therefore of the same type as the ancient Near Eastern, and is it best described as cosmological? It would seem so.

There is, however, the remaining difficulty of the absence of cosmological myth. Nyame is indeed conceived of as primarily the creator and maintainer of cosmic order, and as one whose operation is at one with the cosmic regularities. But this idea is expressed in the prayers of ritual and in the proverbs, not in the elaborate myths characteristic of the archaic societies of the Near East. Moreover, experiential differences are detectable. Departures from everyday normalcy (in the sense of "sacred" breakthroughs into the profane realm) are experienced by the Akan as the effects of ancestral rather than of divine activity (by leave of a usually indifferent Nyame). Thus Akan ritual concern is almost exclusively with the ancestors until in dire straits and after all other objects of recourse have been tried; only Nyame remains for the ultimate appeal. Such extreme necessity would be homologous to the pre-creation chaos or formlessness. Thus Nyame would still be the primordial creator of order, but not the one who ordinarily maintains that order in human terms. The chief in his being and activity orders and renews what we shall distinguish as "nature"--namely, that part of the cosmos that is relevant to the life and well-being of society--just as he orders society. The whole socio-natural order, whose proximate source is the line of chiefs--is conceived of as the fruition of generative powers derived ultimately from Nyame, primarily through the life-conferring powers of the royal ancestors and of water. The microcosmic character of Akan society had begun to differentiate, adumbrated as it was in the conception of Nyame as the chief of a divine-cosmic pantheon, in the fragmentary cosmic symbols exemplified by the homologization of the seven clans to the seven planets and the seven days, and in the military impulse to make of the seven Akan-wide clans a unified society under a single chief. Nevertheless, what prevails are the epithets for gods and chiefs, and particularly accounts of the qualities and exploits (primarily military) of the chiefs. Thus, while the cosmic dimension of political rule and society are unmistakable, the Akan emphasis itself points to the conclusion that the symbolic form of Akan order is, as Langer's typology suggests, an intermediate one that fulfills a function similar to the legend of a culture-hero. However, evidence of possible religious corruption, in which an original cosmological symbolism became subordinated to an ancestral cult whose concern was with more immediate vitalities, precludes the characterization of Akan society as "incipiently" cosmological.

What then of the societies in Tanganyika? Are they like the Akan? The prevalence of legend, which is more elaborate than that of the Akan, rather than myth (or even proverb) as the symbolic form would make that the obvious hypothesis, for in all the societies except the Sonjo the cult of the ruler's ancestral predecessors is dominant. We consider first the Sukuma, Ha and Shambala among whom belief in a high god is politically relevant.

Nyame, we have seen, is associated with the sky and such cosmic phenomena as thunder and rain. The waters deriving from him bring life. Like Nyame, the gods in Tanganyika--Lyuba (Sukuma), Imana (Ha), and Mulungu (Shambala)--also bestow and renew life. Lyuba is a creator specifically associated with the sun, from which source the Sukuma experience the benefits of heat, light and growth. All important benefits are attributed ultimately to him. Imana is also a creator whose power of fertility is manifest especially in procreation. With him are associated all holy and benefit-conferring things. Mulungu too is a creator, associated with both cosmic phenomena like lightning and rain and with all manifestations of power.

Nyame, Lyuba, Imana, and Mulungu are all regarded then as creators. All are remote and rarely approached directly, yet all confer major benefits upon the societies by virtue of the regular operations of the cosmic forces. Yet there are some perhaps significant differences. Nyame's sons are the minor gods who make up the pantheon over which Nyame reigns supreme, whereas the other three gods are the only gods of the peoples.[31] The underlying experience is, however, the same. If Nyame has sons, these sons are the products of his generative act in fertilizing the earth with rain (semen). Nyame, like the other three gods, is a cosmic fecundator. All life, the life that prevades the cosmos, the life that men thrive on, the life that men order in human terms for their societies--this life has as its ultimate source and pervasive principle these high Gods. It is not the structure of the cosmos, its form, so much as its vital substance that the Africans experience. Reality for these peoples is that which teems.

The significance of the fertilizing powers of these four gods can be gathered from Eliade's treatment of high gods. According to Eliade, it is a general phenomenon, particularly true in Africa, that the great sky god, an omnipotent creator, has been largely replaced in cult by other religious forces, in Africa by ancestor-worship. Yet in Africa belief in the supreme sky god generally persists.[32] The new religious forms that replace the primordial stress on the sky god are "more dynamic, active and easily accessible."[33] Often the shift of religious emphasis is expressed in a change of symbolism for the supreme god. Sky gods become specialized into storm gods or gods of rain, with emphasis on their fertility powers. Eliade thus distinguishes "two lines of development: first, the god of the sky, master of the world, absolute sovereign (despot), guardian of the law; and second, god of the sky, creator, supremely male, spouse of the great Earth Goddess, giver of rain." He goes on to explain that these two types never exist in isolation, but "that the sovereign is often the giver of rain, that the 'fecundator' is often a despot." The elements which the storm gods and fecundators have in common are primarily: "the power of originating life..., thunder and rain; the epiphanies, in fact, of force and of violence, the necessary sources of those energies on which the life in the universe depends." Yet this specialization does not destroy the celestial character of the gods: storm gods and sky gods have the same attributes and powers.[34] Moreover, when the "meteorological (storm, lightning, rain) and generative functions" of the sky god are stressed, there is an "interdependence between the 'generative' and 'celestial' symbols" of the god.[35] The sun is a special example of the substitution of a more fertile and dynamic god for the sky god.[36] Eliade explains:

> /O/ne of the main factors in the lowering of people's conceptions of God, most obvious in agricultural societies, is the more and more all-embracing importance of vital values and of 'Life' in the outlook of economic man. And...it is interesting to realize that the supreme gods of Mesopotamia often combined the prerogatives of fertility with those of the sun....
>
> This conjunction of sun and vegetation elements is clearly to be explained by the Sovereign's having the added role of storing and dispensing 'Life', both on the cosmic and

> on the social level. When, therefore, sky divinities gradually turn into sun divinities, it is the same sort of process which results, in other situations, in their transformation into gods of atmosphere and fecundation.[37]

Eliade goes on to assert that the transformation of the supreme god of the sky into a sun god is quite common in Africa.[38] The fact, therefore, that Nyame is a sky god with meteorological functions, that Lyuba is specifically a sun god, with control over rain, that Imana is not specifically associated with either the sky or the sun, and that Mulungu is a storm god is less important than the fact that they are all important to their peoples as gods of fertility.

The four gods are experienced not only in the cosmic phenomena but in specifically political terms. They are manifest through the powers that be, the chiefs, by way of the chiefs' ancestors. The ancestors organized or maintained the socio-natural order and in so doing provided life more abundant for the people, and it is primarily through their cult that the high Gods are relevant to the societies. Among the Sukuma, Lyuba was sometimes mentioned in the ancestor ceremonies when he is asked to confirm what has taken place. Lyuba is the source of the power of the chief, who mediates benefits from Lyuba through the ancestors to the society. Imana's role among the Ha is similar: the royal ancestors are associated with him, as are the chiefs through certain of their regalia and in their installation rites. The Shambala god Mulungu favored Mbega, the founder of the Shambala society, with unusual powers, which to some degree are passed down the line to the current chiefs. In all of these societies the sign of the god's favor, or confirming sanction, is the manifest power of the chief to maintain the order of society and nature. If the chief fails--through loss of internal control, defeat by enemy forces, or natural catastrophe-- he is thought to have lost the divine mandate.[39] What is primary, then, in the experience of these four societies is the effectiveness of the chief. Moreover, since the effectiveness of the chief is measured by his success in ensuring the well-being of the society mainly in terms of its prosperity, the power of the chief is experienced as of the same order as the power of fertility in the cosmos. The analogy (rarely explicit) is made between the chief (through the line of predecessors back to the founder) as the source of teeming life in society and the high God as the source of the vital universal order. It is this dynamic quality that distinguishes the religio-political order of these societies.

Our conclusions concerning the other Tanganyikan societies that lack a high god should be evident. The Sonjo have been shown to identify their founder with the high God, a variation that might be attributed to two circumstances: the tenuous condition of agriculture so dependent on irrigation, and the fact that the Sonjo elders who rule are not Hambageu's descendants and are not exercising a power proportional to that which Hambageu had. Hambageu's gifts to the Sonjo were more exclusively nonpolitical, and his gift of so great a benefit as fire made it easy to assimilate him to the sun-god Riob.[40] Although there is no politically relevant ancestral cult, the authority of the elders is hereditary; the elders' ancestors were given their authority by Hambageu, who is vaguely a man-god. Given his human characteristics, Hambageu can serve as the immediate object of Sonjo ritual as well as, by virture of his divinity, the ultimate object of it. Even among some of the other societies, namely the Akan and Ha, the (ancestral) objects of the societal cult are thought to have returned in some way to their creator, Nyame or Imana. So the substance of Sonjo order is of the same kind as that of the other societies even though the structure differs. The mark of the elders' authority is their ability to regulate the irrigation waters, for these waters have a heavenly dimension. Among the Bena, the founder Manga and his descendants ruled by virtue of qualities and abilities that are not attributed to any divine source. The theme of the regulation of nature by the chief is here subdued, though it is present in the legend of Manga the great hunter and in the royal ancestral cult. What is prominent is the military prowess of the chief, although it has proven separable from what we may comparatively call his religious prowess. The Luguru, on the other hand, lack a military tradition; yet here too the ruling lineage heads lead the ancestral cult and are responsible for the fertility of the soil. The emerging supra-lineage authorities were regarded as having the power to bring rain. Finally, among the Nyakyusa the chiefs trace their ancestry to the sons of Lwembe, whose brother Kyala is regarded as the supreme god who, though associated with the ancestors in a vague subterranean realm, is the creator of all.

The Bena, Luguru and Nyakyusa pose in its most pronounced form the question whether all of the eight African societies with which this study is concerned are of the same type. Our criterion in this part of the comparative analysis is the nature of the reality that sanctions the authority of the chiefs. For the Akan, Sukuma, Ha, Shambala and Sonjo it has been shown that the life-giving powers of the founders, passing through the chiefly line and manifest in the chief's ability to ensure the security and prosperity of the society, is the experiential nucleus of their societal order. These powers are experienced as holy (in its aspect of the tremendum[41]) and beyond those of ordinary men (the chiefs' subjects). In all of these societies a high God is regarded as the ultimate source of these powers, with the vitalizing substance of the cosmos streaming into the societies through the chiefs.

The experiential nucleus of the Bena, Luguru and Nyakyusa societies is the same as that of the foregoing societies. The Bena and Luguru do not explicitly distinguish any godly source for their rulers' powers, but they do experience those powers as divine (superhuman).[42] Or, perhaps a better formulation, the Bena and Luguru chiefs manifest certain powers that are experienced as cosmic, while the Akan, Sukuma, Ha, Shambala and Sonjo symbolize their experience of the fundamental principle of cosmic life as a god. In each case the highest reality is vitality, and in each case the founder of the society is the major source of that vitality for the people. This is true also of the Nyakyusa; for the sons of Lwembe bring fertility through the chiefs, Lwembe brought fire and cattle, and his brother Kyala with the ancestors below fertilizes the ground to produce crops.

If, however, on this level of the experience of power in terms of vitality all of our African societies are of the same general type, they are not on these grounds distinguishable from most other so-called primitive societies throughout the world. Since virtually all authorities[43] agree that ancestor-worship is the most prevalent and dominant characteristic of religion in Africa, one is moved to consider the role of the ancestors in the eight societies with which we are concerned. Are the ancestors relevant to the African regimes in some way that would make the African regimes distinctive? The answer to this question should by now be evident from the foregoing discussion in this chapter. The royal ancestral cult is the dominant public cult, in which the rituals are led by the reigning chief (Luguru: lineage head), in each of the societies except the Sonjo.[44] Yet here again possible significant variations are detectable. Among the Akan, Sukuma, Ha, and Shambala the ancestors are explicitly regarded as intermediaries between the society and the supreme god. Among the Sukuma the rituals were not directed to the ancestors as the ultimate recipients of sacrifice, nor were the ancestors considered to possess inherent powers with which to benefit the society. The ultimate reference to Lyuba was always present. On the other hand, a deceased Tusi chief of the Ha is vaguely thought to return to Imana, and the ancestors are besought for favors by being called Imana. Yet Imana himself is thought to have little interest in his creation. The Shambala present yet a third variation: the ancestral ritual is concerned with only the politically important of the dead chiefs, and it culminates in the founder Mbega whose powers, while gifts of the god Mulungu, are according to every indication thereafter inherent. Thus Mulungu is out of the picture in a way that Nyame and Imana are not. Here is ancestral ritual with a vengeance. So too among the Bena and Luguru is ancestor worship quite pronounced. Yet the Bena regard the ancestral spirits, from whom stem all good fortune and prosperity, as living with the high God Mulungu; while, on the other hand, the Luguru are recorded as paying regard only to the lineage founders and their successors. Finally, the Nyakyusa sacrifice only to the ancestors and to the god Kyala who dwells with them and is also related to the first chiefs as an uncle.

A further consideration that is relevant to our problem is the fact that among several of the African societies--the Akan, Sukuma, Bena--the ancestors are regarded as the true rulers, who make the law and major decisions by inspiring their representatives, the chiefs, with the right words. The integral society is thus one that incorporates not only the living but also the dead, just as the lineages and families which make up the society include their dead. The same idea is implicit in the installation of a Ha chief, in the assumption of Mbega's sons' names by Shambala kings, in the designation of the Luguru lineage head as "ruler of the name," and in the Nyakyusa "coming out" ritual of the lighting of fire.

In sum, we must conclude that the typical--although not general--sanction of chiefly authority is the combination of a fertility god and the chiefly ancestors. The Luguru lack the god and the Sonjo recognize the ancestral principle only in the hereditary nature of their offices (which differ also in their corporate character). In all cases except the Sonjo the ancestors are supremely relevant, although in four of the cases they are not autonomously so. In at least one of the latter cases, the Sukuma, the dependence of the ancestors on the supreme God is emphasized. In each of the eight societies the ruling authorities are the representatives of their societies to the transcendent powers. All the rulers are responsible

--through maintenance of their inherent powers by the use of medicines and by the protection of taboos, as well as through ritual sacrifice and prayer to the relevant spiritual powers--for the well-being and prosperity of their peoples. Thus all the rulers (among the Sonjo, the councils of elders) are channels through which enter the invigorating and life-giving cosmic forces that pervade and move the socio-natural structures in which the peoples are organized.

Before turning to the organizational articulation of authority, it will be helpful to consider how typical the sanctions of the authorities in Ghana and Tanganyika are of all of Africa. Geoffrey Parrinder, who is probably the outstanding student of African religion and a recognized scholar of comparative religion, has dealt with the question "how can one speak at all usefully of African religion?" His answer is that "there is much more kinship between the various peoples of Africa" than would appear from the numerous anthropological monographs on specific African peoples. A comparison of anthropological findings shows that "in religious beliefs there is great similarity between many parts of the continent that cuts across racial origins."[45] Other scholars of Africa agree with this assessment.[46]

According to Parrinder, common to most Africans is belief in a supreme god, spirits associated with natural phenomena, and ancestral spirits. The high god is often remote, but he is sovereign. Parrinder writes:

> The power of God is supreme; all flows from him...Godlings and ancestors are intermediaries....

> The relationship between these spiritual powers has been aptly represented by a triangle. At the apex is the sky, which symbolizes the Supreme Power from whom all life flows...The base is the earth, sometimes personified as a goddess, but always important to man as the producer of his food and the burying place of his dead. On the earth lives man, and his chiefs and kings are rungs in the ladder between himself and God. On one side of the triangle are the ancestors rising up in the hierarchy by their increased powers. Dead kings and chiefs are their leaders and potent to help or harm. On the other side of the triangle are the gods or natural forces, which must be propitiated lest they become angry at neglect and cause the seasons to fail.
>
> 'Man beneath the sky' lives on the land, not in a void but as a sovereign vital force. He has no doubt that he was made to have dominion 'over every living thing that moveth upon the earth'. It is his duty to 'be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it'. On the other hand he knows that he is not able to do these things by himself, and he seeks the help of every available power.[47]

What is to be noticed in the above passage is not only the emphasis on hierarchy but on power, particularly vital power. This stress is affirmed and amplified by other scholars. Smith holds that the supreme god of Africans is experienced primarily as "the ultimate power and authority behind the world and all life," yet radically "distinct from Cosmic Mana" for he is a person having "a life and consciousness analogous to that of man."[48] Bohannan finds African religion to be characterized by "a single high God, who is...a central source of order" and by "either pantheons of gods or large numbers of spirits or ancestors...between man and the ultimate God."[49] He places stress on the provision of energy for the divinely created order by men, their ancestors, and the low-grade spirits. "Human effort and spiritual energy (which often had to be primed by human effort) were the driving forces." Like Parrinder, but using a different metaphore, he finds two "channels between God and men: first, the ancestors; second, a set of aspects of God or more straightforward, personalized godlings." He adds: "The will of God (which may be fixed, and therefore unwilled in any specific instance) is made known down through the channels; it is satisfied by ritual, sacrifice, and the protestations of prayer, which carry up through the same channels."[50]

The ancestors are of prime importance. They are considered closer to the high God than men are, and therefore Africans both fear them and implore their help. They are regarded as active, authoritative members of the community;[51] yet there can be no doubt that "we are in the presence of religion when Africans commune with their kinsmen in the unseen world, who have enhanced powers associated with their new status and particularly as mediators between man and God."[52]

So far the general characterizations of African religion which have been cited confirm the prevalence of the sanctions noted for our Ghanaian and Tanganyikan societies throughout Africa. These general accounts, with minor modifications, could be regarded as expressive of the essential features of the specific societies with which this study is mainly concerned. Since, however, seven of these latter societies are Bantu, it is worthy of our effort to examine two studies of Bantu religion that may help to bring out with greater clarity the essential features of the Bantu, and indeed most, African religious experience.

The first of these studies, written by a Franciscan missionary in the Belgian

Congo and published in French in 1945, evoked such recognition and response on the part of African intellectuals and Western Africanists (including missionaries and colonial officials) that Soviet experts were forced to recognize its influence and to attempt to discredit it.[53] The book, by Placide Tempels, entitled Bantu Philosophy, cannot be summarized briefly; and it is our task here only to indicate some of the concepts expressed therein that are relevant to this study. According to Tempels, a dynamic ontology underlies the African conception of reality as hierarchical and ordered: "beings are differentiated...into species according to their vital power." God "has force, power, in himself. He gives existence, power of survival and of increase, to other forces." Next come clan founders, who "constitute the most important chain binding men to God," then ancestors, and finally men. Below men are animal, vegetable and mineral forces. The chief, as "the source of all zestful living," "is as God himself." Or, by way of analogy with a lower group, the "Chief in the class of humans shows his royal rank by wearing the skin of a royal animal."[54] For the Bantu, therefore, the "supreme value is life, force, to live strongly, or vital force." This power is the object of their striving.[55] This power must not be understood in materialistic, or even in purely spiritual, terms. Life is essentially spiritual,[56] but the African makes no sharp distinction between the spiritual and the material.[57] The Africans conceive of a universal cosmic force that is not abstracted from its manifestations.[58] "The spirits of the first ancestors...possess extraordinary force inasmuch as they are the founders of the human race and propagators of the divine inheritance of vital human strength." To them man must give his attention, for the greatest happiness of man is "to possess the greatest vital force."[59]

Tempels' ideas of African religion were derived from his experience of one Bantu people, the Baluba who live in the Katanga. Our second study, however, is based on a thorough survey of all the literature on the Bantu peoples. Maurice Culver's "The Bantu Concept of Man" is in effect a comprehensive analysis of Bantu religion. He affirms that the Bantu world "is a universe of forces,"[60] and he contends that the chief, as the religious link with the ancestors, is the center of the order that he enforces.[61] The will of god, who is "the Chief in the sky," is none other than the general and predictable order of the universe.[62] Culver interprets the common story that man drove God away into the sky as an expression of man's assertiveness against the divine will; the human desire to create (a divine act) was a rebellion that caused a fall. Thus the chief is as God, a fecundator of the human, animal and vegetal realms.[63] Just "as a chief may not be approached except through his counselors, and as the ancestors may not be approached except through the elders of the tribe, so the High God may only be propitiated through the ascending line of those in the invisible world."[64] The chief is therefore the most important link in the hierarchical chain of forces, and the one through whom the life of the society is maintained. He is a representative in the double sense of the living agent of the ancestors and the head of the society. He is the bearer of power, responsible for the fertility of the land and of the people.[65] What Culver has shown us is that the chief, in his ordering activity, is a partner and rival of God in the sense indicated above by Voegelin. Thus, to his people, his subjects, he is as God. Fatherhood has the dual aspect of "generative-creative" and "authoritative-ruling,"[66] and it is under both aspects that God, the royal ancestors, and the living chiefs appear.

Culver goes on to analyze "the relationship of the group here to the group there," finding both groups to be "of one community."[67] The "group there" is, of course, the superior powers, gods and ancestors. Thus Culver concludes that human life is patterned after that of his gods. The "identity of the two worlds is primarily a concept of order," and it "means life."[68] Therefore, among the Bantu, "the laws of society are one with the total law and order of the universe and an integral part of it."[69] What Culver fails to maintain is the distinction between ancestors and gods: "The pattern of life which the midzimu /ancestors/ lived and which they continue to live, and which is perfect for every muntu /man/, is the pattern by which this present life is lived. The life of man is patterned after the life of his gods."[70] Culver therefore discounts the creative activity of the founders in this connection. The founders rivaled God not by imitating the order He created, but by exercising a comparable spontaneous act of creativity. The ancestral acts are the models because they formed the society, but the divinely created cosmos is not the model for the Bantu societies. Therefore, human society does have a transcendent reference to the ancestors, which Culver admirably shows; but it does not have the other reference that Culver claims. The constitutional order of society is not one with the universal order, but is the product of the autonomous act of an extraordinary, perhaps even divinely gifted, man. Consequently, when Culver says that an insult to "a chief's authority overthrows the order,"[71] we must understand the overthrow of the socio-natural order and not, as he does, of the cosmic order.

We turn, then, to compare the organizational articulation of authority in the eight African societies. Here our concern is no longer with substance but with constitutional form or structure, although it must become our concern to treat of the relation between form and substance if we are to clarify fully the nature of political order in the African societies.[72] At this point it is useful to recall the prevalence of such terms as "democratic," "autocratic," and "feudal" in the descriptive accounts upon which the preceding chapter is based.

The most obvious characteristic of all the societies is that the ruling prerogative is in the possession of a certain distinct hereditary group. Six of the societies have a hierarchy of offices, but the components of the hierarchies are by no means identical. Confronted, then, by a potentially bewildering variety of forms, an analyst does well to evaluate first of all the constitutional typologies that scholars have developed in the study of African polities.[73]

Practically all efforts in the comparative study of African politics take Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's African Political Systems as their point of departure. In this seminal work, published in 1940, the author-editors present an elaborate statement of principles, methods, and conclusions. Their premise is that "the theories of political philosophers" do not help one to understand African societies and are "of little scientific value." Their own scientific approach to political institutions is to "be inductive and comparative and aim solely at establishing and explaining the uniformities found among them and their interdependencies with other features of social organization."[74]

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard find two main types of political system in Africa. The one is constituted of a group of societies ("Group A") having "centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions--in short, a government--and in which cleavages of wealth, privilege, and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority." The second group ("Group B") "consists of those societies which lack centralized authority, administrative machinery, and constituted judicial institutions--in short which lack government--and in which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status, or wealth." Those who define a state "by the presence of governmental institutions will regard the first group as primitive states and the second group as stateless societies."[75]

Most of our Ghanaian and Tanganyikan societies belong, on the face of it, to Group A; and it is to these that we first direct our attention. The Akan, Sukuma, Ha, Shambala, Bena, and Nyakyusa all have chiefs. Some of these chiefs might plausibly be considered kings. Are these kingdoms and chiefdoms to be entitled primitive states? Are they sufficiently similar to warrant their classification into one category, or do significant differences between them make for a variety of types or subtypes? Since the previous chapters contain the data, what remains is the determination of the criteria by which to measure the data.

Fortes and Evans-Pritchard maintain that the primitive states (Group A) are territorial and administrative units. "The head of the state is a territorial ruler."[76] Some authorities would insist that the essential feature of the state is not so much government as government by professionals, that is by full-time officials. Thus Wittfogel distinguishes between a state and primitive government. Both have control over a particular territory, but only primitive government is "operated in the main by nonprofessionals." Unlike state government, primitive government lacks the power potential to stifle the society. Wittfogel grants that the head of a primitive government may engage in impressive acts of absolutist character, yet he claims that the power is nevertheless limited. The head of the primitive government is properly designated "Chief" rather than "king," for the latter is the head of a state.[77]

Wittfogel thus directs us to consider whether the six African societies headed by single rulers are in fact kingdom-states or chiefdoms, and to do so by answering the question whether the ruler governs primarily through professional functionaries. He directs us further to consider the power of the ruler and the extent of its limitations. This problem is presented in its most acute form by Murdock, who asserts that "the states of Negro Africa appear essentially as similar as peas in a pod" and that they manifest "a despotic political structure" which he calls "African Despotism." He asks whether "African despotism /is/ merely a subtype of the Oriental despotism" or represents "a separate major type of political system." Unable to "give a definite answer," he has the impression that African despotism is so similar to the oriental type as not "to warrant its establishment as a distinct major type."[78] Unfortunately, Murdock uncritically accepts Wittfogel's idea; yet the validity of the problem depends on the validity of Wittfogel's idea. It is our judgment that Wittfogel's conclusions are crucially vitiated by two deficiencies of method. By failing to pay sufficient attention to archaic religious experience, he could not avoid reaching the erroneous conclusion that the typical oriental state is one of "total terror--total submission--total loneliness."[79] By failing to distinguish another alternative to freedom besides slavery to man,[80] he could not but conclude that the people in oriental societies are oppressed by their human rulers.

It is not therefore to be our task to consider whether there is an African despotism that is akin to oriental despotism, but simply whether the African societies in Ghana and Tanganyika are states governed by despotic regimes. Here we may, however, find Wittfogel's distinction between king and chief a valid one, provided that we extend it. If the king is to be distinguished by the "unlimited" character of his power and the chief by the limits to his power, then it would be useful to maintain this distinction with respect to authority as rightful power. Again Murdock becomes relevant, for he claims that every "king or independent paramount chief enjoys absolute power, at least in theory."[81]

Vansina defines "African kingdoms as sovereign political groups, headed by a single leader who delegates authority to representatives in charge of the territorial units into which the country is divided." He finds that the king's power is usually limited by such institutions as councils. Yet it is the king who delegates authority to chiefs, who in turn delegate it to subchiefs. "This delegation of authority may descend for a maximum of three territorial levels below the king, if the kingdom is large."[82] Vansina emphasizes the important role of the authorities intermediate between the king and the people:

> The principle of delegation implies that the chief is the representative of the king for his subjects. But for the king he is the representative of the people. And this second aspect of the position of chiefs and headmen is very real. For chiefs depend on their subjects in a number of ways, the most important of which is their need for military services and labour from them. Now it is general in this type of political structure that subjects may move from one chiefdom or village to another if they find a chief's or a headman's rule too harsh. The chiefs and headmen are therefore in competition amongst themselves to attract more subjects. Thus they have to take into consideration, and they are the true representatives of, the interests of the communities which they lead.[83]

Here, then, the distinction between king and chief is the distinction between a sovereign, delegating authority and a subordinate, delegated authority. And this distinction is not essentially different than Wittfogel's, if one considers that delegated authority is certainly a limited authority.

By combining the two criteria of the degree of centralization and the principle of political succession, Vansina is able to distinguish five major structural types of African kingdoms. In the despotic kingdom the king has absolute power in theory and practice, and he appoints all other officials. In the regal kingdom, as among the Sukuma, the king and his chiefs are members of the same clan or lineage. An aristocratic kingdom, such as among the Ha, is one in which "chiefships are vested...in hereditary lineages or clans, descending either from the aboriginal rulers of the chiefdom, from companions of the first kings, from favourites of the first kings, or occasionally from members of the royal lineage," and in which the center and the provinces are linked only through "the payment of tribute and allegiance to the king by the chiefs." Finally, Ashanti is the only clear example of the federation, which is distinguished from the aristocratic kingdom mainly by its self-identification as a federation rather than as a unitary state. "The effective centralization of the Ashanti Union has, however, been as great as, if not greater than the centralization within most aristocratic kingdoms."[84]

What Vansina's typology suggests is that the degree of centralization of power is interrelated with the principle of succession to chiefship. In the despotic state the king appoints all territorial officials and controls all of the affairs in the kingdom. In the regal kingdoms, where succession to chiefship is hereditary only or mainly in the royal line, the authority is still highly centralized; yet this type of state is subject to internal strife, steming from conflicts within the royal clan, and to wars of succession and even secessions. In the aristocratic kingdom, where succession to chiefship is hereditary in a group of lineages, the king controls only the external affairs, having no administrative links with the provinces.[85]

Goldschmidt calls this organization the "articulation" of the state, and he warns that as Westerners we tend to view the articulation in spatial terms, seeing the state divided into wards, districts, provinces and the like. Instead, it often happens in Africa that the articulation is expressed in the idiom of kinship.[86] If this is so, then perhaps Vansina was most perceptive in his emphasis on the principle of succession in the morphology of African political societies. This may indeed constitute the connection between the nature of the supreme political authority in the society and the organization of the society.

Returning, then, to the eight African societies that have been our concern, we observe a variety. Akan kings ruled through territorial chiefs who had a large measure of autonomy. Chiefship was hereditary in certain families, but the candidate was subject in his appointment to confirmation by the king. The Sukuma were divided into what Vansina calls "regal kingdoms," in which the kings often appointed their own sons as administrative officials. However, the Sukuma king also appointed as members of his council of elders, as subchiefs, and as headmen, descendants of followers or favorites of the first kings or descendants of the pre-Hima indigenous rulers. In the Ha kingdoms, which Vansina calls "aristocratic," the kings appointed their own sons as well as others to governorships; and in all cases, even when the office became hereditary, authority was fully dependent on the king's confirmation. In the Shambala state the subordinate chiefs are usually members of the royal clan, and the major chiefs are strictly and directly accountable to the king. Yet the king and the chiefs rule in association with councils of elders, the constitutional position of which is indicated by the fact that, although composed of commoners, they select their own members. The Bena king rules through an elaborate administrative system; he appoints a non-hereditary group of officials, often from among his kinsmen, according to a multiple set of criteria. The Nyakyusa rulers act through village headmen, who act as their advisors; these headmen, who are always commoners, are selected by their predecessors.

The six organizations discussed briefly above can, loosely, be considered kingdoms. The Sonjo and Luguru, which we put aside for the moment, cannot. What is immediately apparent about the six is that they do not substantiate Vansina's typology. The Sukuma, for example, have the characteristics of the aristocratic as well as of the regal kingdom. And the Ha portray regal as well as aristocratic features. If on the basis of which characteristics are dominant one were to accept Vansina's distinction between the Sukuma and Ha as two different types, he would be disregarding what are in fact great structural similarities between them.

The Sukuma and Ha have been called feudal, a point discussed briefly in the previous chapter. Maquet's typology distinguishes feudality in two of the three types of societies having rulers: in the stateless society, and in the non-despotic state, but not in the despotic state. The state is a government organization having a permanent coercive agency. It is non-despotic when there is an institutionalized protection of subjects against serious injury by the rulers; that is, when the subject can have recourse to means other than revolt and escape. The essential feature of feudal regimes is the bond of vassalage between nobles. Therefore, feudality has no essential reference to land property; and it is distinct from clientship relations between nobles and commoners. Maquet defines feudality solely in terms of personal relations: "Feudal institutions organize between two social roles unequal in power, relations of protection on the one hand, and of service on the other one."[87] Now, the Sukuma states were not radically decentralized; and the relationship between the ruler and his subordinates was either a constitutional one, as with the headmen (who were often his sons), or a coercive one, as with captured slaves incorporated in the royal guard. If there were some who offered service to the king, there is no indication that it was in return for protection. It is neither unusual nor feudal for the king to have men in his service merely because they seek the advantages of his association and of a political role. With the Ha the question is somewhat different, for here the claim is made that a fief or benefice is involved. Mrs. Chilver discusses the imputed feudal character of the Interlacustrine Bantu states generally, and her conclusions apply equally to the Ha and the Sukuma. In contrasting, point by point, the political structures of the societies of feudal Europe and the Interlacustrians, she argues that stress on even the feudal features common to Europe and Japan obscures significant differences that their subsequent development implies. She therefore directs analysts to beware of analogies and generalizations, to concentrate on historical realities, and to attempt to develop an appropriate terminology to describe the political institutions of "Bantu states characterized by dynastic monarchy and delegated territorial administration exercised by beneficed royal favorites."[88]

The foregoing survey and rejection of structural typologies apparently relevant to the analysis of the African political societies with which we are dealing means that the attempt to describe these societies with comparative concepts is inseparable from the development of appropriate descriptive concepts. The concepts needed are ones that will at once highlight the dominant structural characteristics--that is, show how the political authority is articulated--and indicate the relationship between the nature of the authority and the political structure.

It is to be noted first that none of the rulers (and here the term "rulers" includes the Sonjo village councils of elders and the Luguru headmen) is constitutionally organized to rule independently of others possessing some inherent authority, with the exception of the Sonjo councils and the Luguru headmen. The Akan ruler rules with a hereditary council of elders, and the chiefs subordinate to him also hold office by hereditary right. A Sukuma ruler also had a council of elders apart from which he could not rule; membership was hereditary in certain families although the ruler could choose among candidates, but the crucial feature was the council's role in selecting or deposing a ruler. Moreover, subdivision elders were not appointive, but held office by traditional right. A comparison of the Akan and Sukuma structures indicates major similarities in the dependence of the ruler on administrative councils and subordinate chiefs or headmen that were hereditary.

The Ha differ from the Akan and Sukuma in several important ways. No office other than the ruler's was strictly hereditary; and the dominant Tusi, unlike the Sukuma Hima, remained a distinctive, almost caste-like group distinct from the commoners.

Shambala manifests yet another structure: the dominance of a single royal clan on all levels of the administrative hierarchy, and thus a clear distinction between rulers and ruled (comparable to the distinction between Tusi and commoners among the Ha); also non-appointive councils of elders at each level in association with the rulers, the king's council having the right to choose his heir. The chiefs subordinate to the king, like Akan chiefs, come into office by right of descent; but, unlike Akan chiefs, are of the same clan as the king. Like many Sukuma chiefs, they are of the royal family; but, unlike Sukuma chiefs, they are not appointed by the king.

In all four of these societies--Akan, Sukuma, Ha, and Shambala--the chiefs are regarded as in some sense the delegates of the king. This idea is strongest in the Ha states, but it is present in the king's appointive or confirming rights in the other three groups. Moreover, in all four of the societies the king actually rules through the chiefs. The major difference between the societies inheres not in the relation of the rulers to their subordinates, but in the relation between their subordinates and the people. The latter relationship was closest among the Akan and most distant among the Ha.

The Sonjo present the clearest example of a (corporate) ruler acting without intermediaries: the councils ruled the people directly. However, the small size of the societies, the rootedness of council members in their families, and the unanimity principle together ensured that the government be minimal and benevolent.

The Bena structure is not unlike those of the other monarchical societies: as among the Ha, the king has no formal council; as among the Sukuma, the king's sons or relatives were often appointed to rule provincial territories; as among the Akan and Sukuma, lower offices were often the virtual possessions of certain families; as among the Ha, there was a class system. Yet the Bena system is not identical to any other.

The Luguru lineage head, like the Sonjo council, ruled directly and was closely associated with his subjects. The emergent supralineage rulers, like Akan kings, ruled through subordinates who inherited their offices.

The Nyakyusa rulers differ from all the others in their ritual (but not political) subordination to a "divine king," and in the division of the society each generation. These rulers act through advisor headmen whom they do not themselves select.

How, then, should all this be conceptualized? First, the term "chief" seems inappropriate for the rulers of Akan, Sukuma, Ha, Shambala, and Bena societies. "Chief" has two major connotations: personal, often military, qualities of leadership; and headship of a natural, or kinship, type of group. These qualities do, indeed, inhere in African rulers: the offices are hereditary, and leadership is taken as a sign of candidacy for office or of a successful tenure of office. These rulers, however, "reign" as well as "rule;" and their offices have an aura of sacred power about them. These characteristics can only be conveyed by the term "monarch," which implies a superior and enduring "majesty."

Among these we can distinguish "primitive monarchs" and "tribal monarchs."[89] The "primitive monarch" is one who rules through a simple system of appointees, and is thus to be distinguished from the highly bureaucratized monarchical regimes of the Asiatic empires.[90] The "tribal monarch" is one who rules through subordinates who assume their offices on the basis of hereditary and selective processes mainly outside the ruler's control. The Ha and Bena would thus be primitive monarchies; and the Akan, Sukuma and Shambala would be tribal monarchies. Both types must be distinguished from another type of monarchy, which for convenience can be styled "modern," in which the realm is articulated all the way down to the individual subjects, and in which subordinate offices have fully differentiated from kin relationships.

The distinction between the tribal and primitive types of monarchy is, however, less significant than the fact that they are both premodern, in the sense in which "modern" is used above. The primitive type is obviously possessed of greater despotic potential, but the potential is blunted precisely by the primitive character of the institutions. A factor of equal relevance to potential despotism is the class distinction maintained not only in the Ha and Bena societies but in the Shambala as well. This distinction does not exist among the Akan, and it has apparently been overcome among the Sukuma. Moreover, the necessity of the Ha and Bena rulers to satisfy respectively the dominant class and the royal family approximates these two examples of primitive monarchy to the tribal type. The basis of all of these monarchies is the possession of the ruling office by a single family, the religious character of the office as the channel through which the life of the society enters, and the influence of persons representative of the society on the selection of the ruler from the multiplicity of candidates in the royal family.

The Sonjo, Luguru and Nyakyusa are morphologically distinct from the other, clearly monarchical societies. The Nyakyusa can only be termed an abortive monarchy of the same type as the Shambala. The Luguru can only be understood, comparatively, as an incipient monarchy of the Akan type, for the larger order initiated by Kingalu had not become institutionally stable. Only the Sonjo, which has so frequently figured as an exception to our previous statements, defies assimilation to the monarchical categories. Hambageu left no living descendants, and the ancient order endured under his sanction. Only an extremely powerful historical experience could be expected to transform this society, for it would have to supersede the Hambageu legend as the explanation of Sonjo life. As a taxonomical residue,[91] Sonjo society may either henceforth be entirely disregarded in this inquiry or valued as "an exception proving the rule."

The conclusion of this chapter is, therefore, that the typical indigenous historical experience of African societies in Ghana and Tanganyika is religious in nature, political in form. The experience finds its typical embodiment in a monarchical figure descending from some god-like or god-gifted founder who ordered men and nature into a harmonious societal whole. The kingly ruler maintains this whole by his ritually pure existence ("reigning"), by performing or superintending the periodic sacrifices of renewal, and by ruling (that is, daily ordering the affairs of) his subjects through men ("offices") that at once represent him and (often kinship) associations of his subjects. The order of this societal whole is, in substance, life--seen in terms primarily of women's fertility, bountiful harvests, and military might; in form it is seen in the organization of political office, the founder-ordained institutions for deciding on and organizing action, and for adjudicating conflicts arising in the society.

That this substance and order of authority is typically "African" can only be briefly suggested on the basis of general works about Africa and other premodern non-Western areas, the purpose here being to point to possible implications of this study by suggesting a hypothesis. Since the question of African religion has been considered earlier in this chapter, the analysis may move directly to the problem of political organization.

In most African societies the people were ruled by some kind of chief. Although that "chief" was sometimes no more than the headman of a lineage group or small village,[92] many African societies articulated higher levels of authority; and some of these had paramount chiefs whose authority would correctly be designated as kingly.[93] Moreover, high authority was experienced only indirectly by most Africans, the immediate authority being the family or lineage head. African kings often exercised their rule through a chain of authorities who held office by virtue of lineage membership and local selection procedures rather than of appointment by the king, even though the assumption of office usually required the approval or confirmation of the king. Thus Lowie refers to an African "inveterate disposition to monarchical rule, though qualified by the influence of elders or other officials."[94]

We have had occasion to note the distinction between states and stateless societies in Africa.[95] Ottenberg maintains that in between the rare "small scale societies," whose membership varies from twenty to several hundred, and the "more than forty indigenous states in Africa, ranging in population size from a few thousand to hundreds of thousands," is found the "middle range society" consisting of from several hundred to thousands of members. The latter is said to be "the most widespread type of political unit in Africa."[96]

This tripartite classification, while based primarily on the size of the political unit, reflects other differences as well. In middle range societies authority is rarely centralized, being "usually internally differentiated into smaller and smaller segments that have some political functions." However, often there is "a recognizable head or spokesman and a council of advisors, composed of elders, who are the leaders of the smaller segments of the political group."[97] It is these uncentralized societies that have most defied efforts of anthropologists to reach agreement on the classification of structural types. Murdock, for example, characterizes "the most widespread" African political system as "primitive democracy," in which the political society is the local community led typically by a headman, who possesses no authority but is merely primus inter pares in a council of elders.[98] Middleton and Tait distinguish several types of "politically uncentralized societies" according to several structural-functional criteria. We are less concerned with such complex differences than with their conclusion that "usually there is some form of institutionalized political leadership," whether of chiefs, elders or lineage heads.[99]

African states all "were kingdoms of one sort or another,"[100] and they are "found widely in Negro Africa."[101] They are characterized by the centralization of authority, by permanent and specialized organs of administration, and by a "monopoly on the legal use of force." Authority derives from "a recognized head" and "is usually delegated from the king through the so-called administrative machinery, or bureaucracy, to the heads of smaller territorial units, which are provinces or principalities." There are "from two to five levels of delegation of authority within African kingdoms," the chief at each level representing his superior and the people to each other.[102] There are "bureaucratic officials at each level responsible for maintaining order, collecting and transmitting taxes, and levying troops and corvee labor." These officials, even when their posts are hereditary and not appointive, "are firmly subordinated to the central authority."[103] African kings also maintain elaborate courts with numerous specialized functionaries. A detailed protocol governs court behavior, and "abject prostrations in the presence of the monarch is a nearly universal ingredient." A king is usually "assisted by a Council of State drawn from the head chiefs of provinces, where each head chief was himself assisted by district or subordinate chiefs making up his own council and so on down the line to the village level."[104]

It appears that the African kingdoms described above as typical of Black Africa are more bureaucratic than those of Ghana and Tanganyika. Moreover, they appear to differ from the societies described as "middle range" and as "democratic" in the same way that authority differs from leadership.[105] It nevertheless would seem a reasonable hypothesis that the major difference between the middle range society and the state inheres in the differentiation of political institutions, a difference of degree rather than of type; for if in the state "the power of the head seems clearly to be much greater than that of the councils,"[106] it is also true that the councils and courts with which he is surrounded are institutions one of whose functions is to prevent an abuse of kingly authority.[107] Murdock writes: "Even a petty paramount chief who has subjugated a few neighboring communities and destroyed the primitive democracy seems invariably to institute, in so far as he can on a small scale, the forms prevailing in larger states in the vicinity or even at some distance."[108] This passage, while it suggests formal imitation, still leads one to surmise that African kingdoms represent the development of tendencies operative in the middle range society, and that sanctions for a monarchical authority are available to these societies.

Let us examine this proposition. What gives a man authority is the belief that he, often by virtue of his inherited status, can perform rites that are indispensable to the well-being of the society. As Lucy Mair indicates, "the kind of authority which rests on such beliefs in the inheritance of special powers is particularly important among peoples where government is minimal."[109] It is also claimed that it is especially true of "uncentralized societies" that authority is thought to derive from the ancestors or God, and that those who have authority are responsible for its exercise to its ancestral or divine sources.[110] Generally, that member of the village council who is village headman is the head of the local family that traditionally provides ritual services to the village.[111]

These facts point to two important and related features of African society. The first is the validation of societal institutions provided by the "myths" of their origin,[112] and the second is the widespread dominance of the ancestors over the society of the living. Frequently the African explains the existence of the world and of the first members of his group as creations of a high God. To these first men are often attributed extraordinary characteristics. It is further a prevalent belief in Africa that "at the beginning God and man lived together on earth and talked one to the other," but that God withdrew to the sky because of some human misconduct.[113] Consequently, sometimes the ancestral function is so expanded that the ancestor, "for all practical purposes, takes the place of God in the minds of his descendants."[114] In most of black Africa the people pass directly from belief in a high God to the ancestors, having little belief in intervening nature gods.[115]

The remote progenitor of the group is often a cultural hero to whom is attributed the invention under divine auspices, or reception from God, of the cultural equipment enjoyed and revered as sacred by his descendants. Africans conceive of their societal order not as emerging in a historical process but as given and fixed, for their legends assert "that it came into existence by divine authority and so should continue as it is."[116] This holds equally for societies that trace their order to a first king and for those that lack a central authority. "Even genealogies of descent groups, often partly fictional, may be myths to explain the present arrangement of the groups: the supposed role of the ancestors in past times is closely related to the present nature of the group."[117] The ancestors are so related because they remain part of the societal group, overseeing its activities and enforcing compliance to traditional norms.[118]

Some scholars note a parallel between the structure of religion and the structure of society.[119] Among uncentralized societies, "although the pattern of belief concerning supernatural forces or personalities may be common to the people as a whole, the ritual units may be confined, according to context, to the household, kin-group, or local community." Here the ancestors who "protect the living and sanction their conduct...are not the ancestors of the tribe as a whole or of a royal line, but those of the several bodies of kin, each of which ascribes power and authority to its own."[120] Where political power is centralized and there is a hierarchy of authority, the pantheon of spirits is often "an 'empire' with a formalized power structure."[121] Primacy is afforded a royal "state cult which sanctions right conduct and subordinates or curbs other magical or religious activities."[122] This cult is centered in the king, who is widely looked upon "with religious awe" in Africa.[123]

The basis of kingship in much of black Africa is a "belief that the power to approach supernatural beings has been given only to members of particular descent groups." Such kings are therefore priests, and they officiate at the great religious ceremonials of the state. More significant and widespread is the belief that the king descends from original ancestors who "originated the traditional order." Although the first king may not be regarded as part of the original creation of the world, "his appearance is somehow linked with the establishment of the political order under which his subjects live."[124] The first sanction, therefore, of kingly authority is its derivation from an original manifestation of power. The divine manifests its presence or effect as power, so that the ability of the ancestor to order a group of people and to rule them effectively is taken as a divine gift. This original rule and its perpetuation is thus by its very nature divinely sanctioned. It is transferred to the living king through the rites of accession.[125]

There is a sense in which the living king manifests an inherent sanction for his authority. The "succession to the throne is almost never automatic." In addition to qualification by descent, a candidate must be acceptable to the people or at least to those having "constitutional elective powers."[126] He must be free of mental, moral and physical defects,[127] so as to be a fitting vessel of sacredness, mediating favors to his people. Acceptability to the people is a requirement for kingship because it is by virtue of his representative function that he may perform his mediatory function. He represents the whole society to the ancestors and gods, from whom he secures benefits for the people.

The king symbolizes the whole order of the state embracing people and land. Even when he is not acting as a priest in the sense of officiating at any ritual, he is always a priest in the sense that the welfare of the state depends on his maintaining himself in what Lucy Mair calls "an appropriate ritual state."[128] She writes: "The rulers themselves benefited the country by their mere existence. They personified it, and their state of health and fortune affected its welfare; the ritual prohibitions to which they were all subject were intended, by preserving their own persons, to protect the country as a whole."[129] When a king failed "to order the course of nature," he was often dismissed from office; and, conversely, an attack on the authority of the ruler was expected to bring disorder among men and to overturn nature.[130]

Unlike the so-called stateless societies that have numerous family and local mediators between kin or residence groups and certain transcendent powers, the African state has one overarching mediator upon whom the well-being of everyone depends. This single mediator has a powerful and delicate position as king; for, unlike other authorities within his domain, he is totally absorbed by his mediatory function. It is his ceaseless business to protect "the power of a non-material kind that he requires in order successfully to play his royal part."[131] To ensure that this power is not weakened or contaminated, and to protect ordinary men from its searing effects, the king is isolated. He speaks to his subjects through a so-called linguist. Only certain attendants, whose own offices have a sacral character, may touch him or his possessions. "Often he eats in private or must be fed by others, or his feet may not touch the ground, or he is concealed by curtains because his glance is considered dangerous."[132] These taboos are required by the nature of the absolute power inherent in the kingship. The power to affect the order of nature and society was exclusive, but the king's discretion was usually severely limited by the established norms of his office, by the councils of chiefs and elders, and by the possibility of destoolment.[133] The power of the king was typically symbolized by an array of titles, some of which are shared with the high God, and by "distinctive regalia, among which stools, drums, and animal tails are especially common."[134] The regalia were associated with past monarchs who continue to exercise ancestral authority, and they sometimes display cosmic symbols representing the king's association with and influence over the divine forces of nature.

The determination of whether there exists a specifically African type of political order is based on answers to these three questions: (1) do similar societal characteristics prevail throughout much of black Africa; (2) do the prevalent characteristics include all the features essential to any one type of political order; and (3) is the combination of essential features that constitutes a certain type of political order peculiar to Africa? An affirmative answer to these questions will establish the hypothesis.

The prevalence of similar societal characteristics throughout black Africa has been shown. A summary of the most prevalent characteristics will allow us to approach this question with refined data. African religion is characterized by: dominance of ancestral cults, belief in an often remote high God who created and ordered the world; incomplete or vague relationship between the ancestral and divine cults; little identification of gods with specific functions; relative lack of cosmological and cosmogonic speculation in myth; and experience of the sacred primarily as power. African political organization is characterized by: hierarchical or simple structure of offices; hereditary qualification for office; and ritual nature or function of office. Kings are sacral, not divine.

Religion and political authority are intimately connected in several ways. Power to found or maintain a socio-natural order is experienced religiously as sacred, and therefore as authoritative: the effective exercise of authority is experienced as a manifestation of spiritual power. Political authority is also sanctioned by its function of mediating ancestral and vital benefits to the whole society: the king is an omphalos through which enters the vitalizing substance of society. The relation between religion and authority is especially clear in the central position of the ancestors: political authority is inherited from the ancestral founders; its ritual function is to keep society open to the ancestors who are, for their part, open to the high God or at least to the sacred forces of the cosmos; it therefore emphasizes the ancestral cult as the dominant cult of the society, but not necessarily in opposition to other cults.

Within the type we have been discussing, and in fact defining its limits, is the African kingship. Among the multiplicity of authorities, kingship is the highest articulation. It is, in one sense, the father of the family writ large. The kingship, an hereditary office, is patterned after the headship of a kin-group; and it retains the latter's primary concern to link the living with the dead members of the community. It is, however, precisely in this connection that the kingship is seen to depart from its prototype. The monarch, unlike the lineage head, exercises authority primarily over men who are not his kin. The royal ancestors are not ancestors to all of the king's subjects, although they did rule the ancestors of the king's subjects. The founder of a descent group requires no other claim than his paternity: everyone derives from him; and, as he has produced them, they are his. The royal ancestors can make no such claim. The kingship therefore necessarily implies a sanction other than ancestral for the political authority that it has.

What is this sanction? One explicit answer is provided by those peoples who attribute favor with, and a ritual duty toward, the gods to the king. In essence, these societies hold that the gods choose, or expect them to produce, a representative of the whole society from whom they can receive praise and through whom they can distribute blessings. While it is most doubtful that the African high Gods are merely glorified royal ancestors,[135] often they are conceived of as the fathers of all ancestors.[136] Having "unique personal access to the dominant divine powers,"[137] the king therefore enjoys a sanction beyond the merely ancestral, even if it is connected with the ancestral sanction. Moreover, even if there is no explicit conception of these transcendent powers to which the king has unique access, there is at least associated with him and his ancestral predecessors inherent powers of unusual and sacred character. Since the king is "the source of all zestful living," he is as a god to his people.[138]

It would appear that the prevalent African characteristics do indicate a specific type of societal order. They outline the structure of society and show what its basis is. Most significant of all, they reveal that the substance of the society is not cosmic order as such; it is best described as a power, perhaps rooted in a divine order, that transcends ordinary men. This power is usually associated with the ancestors, who are vaguely thought either to possess or to mediate it; it is manifest in the effective activity of political authorities.

The crucial question that we must now consider is whether the societal order that we have defined is peculiar to Africa; for if it is specifically African, then the political transition necessarily has a different meaning in Africa than in other so-called emerging areas where recent political phenomena seem so like the African. We have to compare the dominant African political characteristics with the major features of other non-Western societies, and do so in detail, before the hypothesis can be substantiated and transformed into a conclusion. The following brief survey can only indicate a basis for venturing the hypothesis of a specifically African type.

Most kingships in history, and virtually all of them among primitive and archaic peoples, go hand in hand with an explicit public recognition of the sacred character of political authority.[139] The same obtains in Africa. It follows that kingships may be classified into types according to the nature of the principle that renders them holy and legitimate. Easily distinguishable is the primitive or tribal type of king who derives his authority from royal ancestors according to some principle of descent; for the royal ancestors, although usually not deified, are regarded as superhuman powers. Such is the African king: and he is thereby clearly distinct from the ancient Egyptian pharaoh, who embodied and can be said to have been many gods;[140] from the ancient Mesopotamian kings or ensi who were each considered the representative of one of the gods of a vast pantheon;[141] from the universal emperors, such as the Mongol rulers who claimed to be the sole earthly representatives of a single supreme God,[142] the Chinese Son of the impersonal cosmic power of Heaven,[143] and the Sapa Inca who as the divine son of the Sun had universal authority on earth;[144] and from the Hindu kshatirya-kings who found their sanction in Dharma (cosmic law or order, comparable to the Chinese tao and the Egyptian maat)[145] and their function in punishing those who deviated from Dharma.[146]

African societies differ greatly from these archaic civilizations. The latter all had complex cosmologies, elaborated by professional priests. Where ancestor-worship existed, it had a significance other than in Africa. In China it was primarily of social rather than of political importance.[147] In Egypt it was intimately related to the divinity of the king himself.[148] Mesopotamia and the Maya had a temple-city organization of society as their dominant form.[149] Hindu society was dominated by a rigid caste system.[150]

Turning to the societies that are not ordinarily ranked with the great archaic civilizations, one finds equal differences from the African societal characteristics. Australian societies, for example, are gerontocratic, and totemism is dominant in their religion; nowhere else are elders so dominant and totemism so developed.[151] Polynesia has professional priesthoods that systematize religious thought and practice, elaborating vast pantheons and remarkable cosmologies and cosmogonies that are generally unparalleled in Africa.[152] Polynesian societies are divided into commoners and nobles of divine lineage, the latter subdivided according to "the relative loftiness of the divine ancestors or...the directness of descent from a common ancestor."[153] In Melanesia, mana is dominant in religion, as totemism is in Australia and ancestor-worship in Africa;[154] and Melanesian divine rulers are "petty" in comparison with African monarchs.[155] The North American Indians also differed from the African pattern: their societies were generally very individualistic; and the chiefs, who were primarily war leaders, had little political authority.

A prominent feature of Indian society was the brotherhood, which usually exercised the real power and was united by some religious element. Chiefs often rose by virtue of their deeds or popular election.[156]

Finally, despite its diversity, Southeast Asia presents characteristic contrasts to Africa. Kachin society in highland Burma differs in several important respects: a Kachin chief is chief by virtue of descent from chiefly deities, and his palace represented Mount Meru in the center of the world. Kachin religion involves an elaborate pantheon of gods and cosmological and cosmogonic myth,[157] so that Kachin society would not differ essentially from those which Voegelin calls "cosmological." It is generally true of Southeast Asia that society was conceived of as "the microcosm of the divine cosmological order represented by the capital city and its god-king." The purpose of government, centered in the king, was "to reproduce on earth the pattern in which the gods had arranged the heavens." The cosmologico-political ideas were either Hindu or Buddhist.[158] Burling explains:

> Where Hindu ideas were strongest, the king was considered to be an incarnation of a god or a descendant of one of the Hindu deities, Shiva or Vishnu. Later, when Buddhism became dominant, this view was modified, but even then the king's position in the world was considered to parallel the position of an important deity in the cosmos. The palace became the earthly equivalent of the celestial mountain believed to occupy the center of the universe....Certain sacred laws of Hinduism, the Dharmashastras, and particularly the so-called Laws of Manu, as taught by the Brahmans, became important.[159]

The same characteristics obtained in the Brahmanized kingdoms of Indonesia.[160]

The foregoing indicates that most non-Western societies interpret themselves as microcosms; so that the fact that most African societies do not do so must be emphasized as one of the major differentia. Yet it has passed unrecognized in the search for "micro-macrocosmic correspondences"[161] that homologize society to the cosmos.[162] No distinction is made among imitations of "paradigmatic models established by the gods and mythical ancestors."[163] Thus often no distinction is made between the divine-cosmic myths, in which the actors are gods, and the legends in which the actors are men possessed of sacred, extraordinary powers. Since the sacred sanctions of African political order are associated with the ancestors primarily,[164] and are typically given symbolic expression in the legendary accounts of political foundation, the African type of society stands as clearly distinct from the cosmological or archaic type of societies.

It is not, however, so clearly distinct from Australian societies, which Durkheim assures us "all belong to one common type." Australian societies are considerably smaller, less hierarchical, and less centralized than not only the African but even the North American Indian. Like the Indian and most African societies, the Australian societies are organized on a clan basis.[165] "The clan cannot be defined by its chief, for if central authority is not lacking, it is at least uncertain and unstable." Given the nomadic character of the people, it cannot be defined territorially. Therefore there is a totemic identification.[166] We shall disregard as irrelevant to this discussion several of Durkheim's more problematic theses, particularly his sociological explanation of the genesis and nature of religious ideas as well as the related evolutionary schema.[167] What is of interest to us is his understanding of totemism as cosmological and of vital force as a dominant element in totemism. For the Australians, "no known thing exists that is not classified in a clan and under a totem."[168] Therefore everything in the universe is considered a part of the tribe.[169] The Australian tribal-cosmological order strikes one as similar to what in Africa we have called the socio-natural order. Yet there are major differences: the sedentary Africans do not regard the cosmos as homopolitical, for nature is a territorially defined and humanly ordered part of the cosmos. All things in the universe are not assimilated to the society; and, conversely, societal organization is not homologous with the universal order.

According to Durkheim, the essential elements of religion are not gods and spirits but "indefinite powers, anonymous forces."[170] This force is called wakan by the Sioux, other names by other Indian tribes, and the well-known mana by the Melanesians.[171] Now Durkheim maintains that sacred things and political authority are both created by social opinion.[172] Thus a sacred character is attributed to political authorities, which in Polynesia and Melanesia are said to have mana. The force common to both is moral and impersonal, psychical and objectified, internal yet collective.[173]

> Moreover, the idea of force...implies the idea of power which, in turn, does not come without those of ascendancy, mastership and domination; now the relations expressed by these ideas are eminently social. It is society which classifies beings into... commanding masters and obeying servants; it is society which confers upon the former the singular property which makes the

> command efficacious and which makes power. So everything tends to prove that the first powers of which the human mind had any idea were those which societies have established in organizing themselves: it is in their image that the powers of the physical world have been conceived.[174]

This force is life and the source of life.[175]

Disregarding Durkheim's unproven assumption of the social nature of religion, what remains is his assertion that political authority in a society is sanctioned by what that society experiences as holy, in the case of the primitive Australians as power. Is this vital power essentially the same as that experienced by the Africans?

Yes and no. It is the same in that it is an authoritative and life-giving power that transcends the merely profane. It is different in that different realities are transparent to this sacredness. The Australians experience it in the animal and vegetable species that serve as clan totems, while the Indians and Melanesians experience it in the myriad phenomena and represent it in the abstract form of a name. The Africans experience it primarily neither in species nor in all phenomena, but primarily in specific offices and medicines and in the general prosperity of family and state. It may be personalized as a deity (Imana, for example) or conceived as a divine gift (for instance, rain from Nyame), but it is nearly always associated with the ancestors. In Africa it is thus a religious experience that has a pre-eminently political form; because ancestor worship is a lineage rather than a domestic cult, because only a man's politico-jural status and not his whole being assumes ancestorhood, and because it is the political as well as ancestral status of the royal ancestors that endows their cult with societal importance.[176] It may be "the experience of filial dependence" that provides the symbols of authority,[177] but the considerations of this chapter point to filiation itself, the derivation and manifestation of renewed life, as the nucleus of the experience.

PART TWO

IMPERIAL RULE: THE DUAL MANDATE

The nature, sanctions and prerogatives of the traditional authority of African chiefly regimes representative of indigenous societies in Ghana and Tanganyika have now been examined. The task of the second part of this study is to examine the justifications of European authority over those indigenous societies as well as to clarify African views of those justifications.

CHAPTER IV

THE GOLD COAST

There were, of course, many different British views of British rule over Africans; our concern is with the conceptions of those men who in major capacities exercised that rule, and in particular the meaning of that rule that emerges from the historical situation itself and that expressed itself in the documents, policies and activities of the British government relevant to that rule.

No single method recommends itself as obviously the best way to analyze briefly the ideas connected with British rule in the Gold Coast; the reasons are these: British rule was established gradually in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so that it cannot be attributed to a single stroke of policy associated with a single set of justifications; its establishment was not the work of a handfull of outstanding men who have written concerning the legitimacy of what they had wrought; and finally, the Gold Coast occupied a peripheral position in dominant British thinking about empire. There were, moreover, different emphases placed by the British at different stages on their conception of imperial rule in the Gold Coast during the century and more that they exercised authority; and to trace these changes in all their details is beyond the scope of this study. As to African views of British rule and of the ideas by which the British sought to justify their hegemony, a similar difficulty presents itself: the Western educated Africans tended to express themselves primarily in terms of specific British policies and actions in the African newspapers, while the traditional African leaders indicated their ideas primarily through action.

Our procedure must therefore necessarily take account of the historical development of ideas, and it must also facilitate a clarification of the dominant themes that might have been easier ascertained had the pattern of rule and ideas crystallized at a point of beginning. Accordingly, a proper start will be made with the British conception of empire that prevailed in the nineteenth century, against which background ideas of British purpose in the Gold Coast can then be understood. The reaction to the establishment of British rule by the indigenous societies and their authorities will then be examined for indications of African conceptions of British rule; here the guiding assumption is that at least the major lines of that reaction would be in terms of traditional Akan ideas, and that the reaction would properly be interpreted in terms of traditional ideas. Then we shall examine the writings of the first highly educated Africans who emerged in the latter part of the nineteenth century and who represented not only the Africans most affected by European ways but, to a considerable extent, the traditional African rulers whose cause they undertook. The writings of these articulate African leaders is very much a key to understanding the complex relationship between European authority, traditional African authority, and a new kind of African authority that was ultimately to attain dominance. Finally, the British system of African administration will be examined in terms of its provisions for and effects on traditional African authority. The elaboration by the new Western-educated African elite of themes that, from a later perspective, should be regarded as the first glimmerings of later African nationalist thought will only be adumbrated in this chapter; it will be enough to show that they clearly arose in response to a situation of African subordination to an alien authority that depreciated African traditions and presented itself as superior in power and culture.

The old British empire had collapsed during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, but a new empire rose in the Afro-Asian area during the following century. In addition to many of the arguments that were used in support of the old empire, some of which had been discredited by the economists, there was one major new idea that was prominent in the advocacy of a new empire: "that of Great Britain's providential mission to spread order, civilization, and prosperity over the world."[1] This was the message of a powerful movement in nineteenth-century England that combined two major patterns of thought: that of the Evangelicals, who spawned a missionary movement whose "essence was an aggressive cultural imperialism, propaganda for the spread of European ideas and ideals over the face of the globe";[2] and that of secular liberalism, motivated by a "spirit of egalitarianism and brotherhood and its belief in human perfectibility," originating in the Enlightenment.[3] Thus "the issues presented by tropical Africa to the British nation had been derived from the ethical constructs of these movements."[4]

Within this nineteenth-century imperial movement several closely related ideas predominated. The Evangelicals had "implanted in the British mind the idea of the Elect Nation."[5] Their civilizing mission was "the dispensation of Providence"[6] according to Palmerston in 1842. "Few doubted that _gesta Dei per Anglos_."[7] Britain mediated "the blessings of Christianity and civilization."[8]

She was the nation pre-eminently chosen for this task, as attested to by the fact that Britain is "the standard for all that is excellent," that "all nations" follow her lead in matters of law and manners, and that she had received "the first and purest beams of the reformed religion."[9] The British simply projected "their own image as the universal ideal."[10] The strong element of British pride in her mission is perhaps best expressed by Macauley, speaking of the Indian empire in the House of Commons in 1833: "That a handful of adventurers from an Island in the Atlantic should have subjugated a vast country" on the other side of the world and governed its diverse peoples "are prodigies to which the world has seen nothing similar. Reason is confounded. We interrogate the past in vain."[11] This vision should be compared not so much with that of Athens' mission by Pericles in the Funeral Oration as with Thucydides' conception of the Peloponnesian War as a movement without precedent and valid for all time.[12] "England is intimately identified with...progressive perfection...Britain will be the nucleus around which all the nations of the earth will, eventually, form themselves in concentric circles, in proportion to their advancement in the scale of social bliss."[13] "Providence" adequately and obviously endowed Britain for this great destiny, and other nations can achieve their destinies only by copying the British constitution and national character.[14] Britain thus had "a moral duty to the rest of humanity";[15] it was her duty to maintain and expand the empire in the view of such statesmen as Peel, Gladstone, and Lord John Russell.[16] As Earl Grey wrote: "the nation has incurred a responsibility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw off. The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under Providence, of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the earth."[17] A withdrawal from West Africa in particular would result in the full revival of the slave trade.[18]

Perhaps the most important idea of all with reference to Africa was that the British were bound to make amends for the evils they had done to Africa. This idea was characteristic of the abolitionist movement especially, and it combined easily with the purposes of expanding trade, civilization and Christianity in Africa.

> The duty to free the slaves and to convert the heathen had been thrown into high relief by the statute of 1807 which declared the Slave Trade illegal, and throughout the century the Churches and anti-slavery societies were to keep up the call of duty. Concern for Africa flowed from some of the more vivid experiences of Victorian religious and political life. And for this reason the chief African questions for the Victorians were ones of atonement and duty. The chains had to be struck from the African's neck. He must be converted. He would be civilized. He should be traded with. But for all their enthusiasm, the earlier Victorians refused to rule him.[19]

The later Victorians did rule him, but the earlier emphasis was on ending the slave trade at its place of origin; "this object could be reached best by offering to the African slave-trader an adequate alternative in the pursuit of a lucrative trade in other African products."[20]

Other evils besides trade in slaves were imputed to their countrymen by British writers, including cruelty, rapaciousness, genocide, and corruption of African morals.[21] "The demand for government intervention on behalf of the aborigines in all British colonies became increasingly urgent."[22] This demand was the outstanding feature of a Parliamentary report in 1837: "The protection of the Aborigines should be considered as a duty peculiarly belonging and appropriate to the executive government, as administered either in this country or by the governors of the respective colonies."[23]

We see, then, that the British imperial endeavors were motivated by some extensive goals in the nineteenth century. Britain conceived of herself as engaged in an unprecedented work to bring to other peoples, particularly those of the Afro-Asian worlds, the essentially spiritual and cultural "blessings" that while peculiarly British are yet universally valid. This work is considered a moral duty, ordained by Providence and the hope of all mankind. This destiny is taken as evident in the superior excellence of the substance of British national life. Despite the contribution to this national outlook by the Evangelicals, there is nothing essentially Christian in the British idea of empire. "Providence" has the character more of history than of the Christian God, for it is a symbol of the principle whereby the British national character and its superiority are explained: Britain is superior, and therefore providence must have ordained that superiority; Britain's achievement lies in her attainment of a high level of civilization, in the development as her ordering basis of an incomparable constitution and ethic to which are shown loyalty and devotion. Only if patriotism be accounted sanctity, the nation be identified as the community of Christian faith, and sacrifice of life to empire be martyrdom could the imperial concern be accepted as a manifestation of Christian spirituality. Yet this imperial concern is understood as a spiritual reality, transcending and even opposed to material interests. It is a calling that contradicts Britain's economic welfare; nevertheless it is heeded. What Britain manifests therefore is the apotheosis of civilizational achievement, the substitution in the center of communal life of human achievement for orientation toward the transcendent reality, for faith in and dependence on God. The substitute is not only accepted as adequate, but it is confused with what it has replaced. Consequently, it is sincerely presented to other men as their proper concern and salvation. Here, then, is what one should expect to find in modern Africa: the confrontation of the African, whose soul has been formed by the religion of his society, by Christianity, the essence of which many missionaries adhere to and proclaim, but also by a divinization of civilizational and national achievement that represents itself as Christian. The African would thereby be required, with little prospect of European assistance, to distinguish between manifestations of robust Christian spirituality and the perverted spirituality that motivates and guides the imperial authority.

The dominant features of British activity in the Gold Coast in the nineteenth century were the increasing British assumption of authority over the coastal Fanti peoples and the series of wars with the Ashanti, culminating in the extension of British rule over the greater part of the territory of modern Ghana in 1901. The British assumption of authority began in 1821, when the eight forts on the coast were transferred from the Royal African Company to the Crown, to be administered under the authority of the Governor of Sierra Leone.[24] This act was a response to British humanitarians who intended the colonial foothold to be used as a base for replacing the slave traffic with "legitimate commerce and civilization."[25] In 1828 the forts were returned to a Company of Merchants, only to be taken again by the Crown in 1843.[26] During this period, however, there occurred a remarkable development of considerable import for later British rule and the attitude of Africans toward it. Governor George Maclean, who assumed his duties in 1830, soon came to exercise, contrary to the conditions under which the forts were placed with the merchants, an authority far beyond the forts themselves.[27]

> His reputation as a judge spread outside his official court at Cape Coast from end to end of the country...Chiefs brought their disputes to Maclean and begged him to decide between them; and unofficial though his position was, his judgments were hardly ever questioned.
>
> It was on this reputation for wisdom and uprightness that Maclean's political authority was based. From asking his advice on a dispute that had already arisen, it was a small step to consulting him on disputes that threatened to arise. Thus he was able to add executive to his judicial functions. He scattered the greater part of his small police force as resident constables at the courts of all the prominent chiefs, with instructions to keep him informed on everything that was going on. The force behind Maclean was the force of public opinion. ...A chief who was inclined to resist Maclean's authority was always opposed and blockaded by his neighbors, and often disowned by his own people.[28]

This authority extended inland as far as Ashanti, so that Ward calls this area a "Protectorate" even though it had not been legally proclaimed a protectorate and "until 1874 its inhabitants were entirely independent of the British

Crown."[29] It was a sufficiently efficient authority, however, to undertake major reforms in African life; for Maclean set out to abolish those customs which he found objectionable, customs that were intimately associated with African religion.[30] And it was under him "that the first serious attempt was made to introduce the Christian religion among the people of the Gold Coast" by the Wesleyan and the Basel missionaries.[31] Appropriately, Maclean saw his work in the same terms as were described above for the British view of empire. Believing "in the over-ruling direction of Providence," he trusted "that a good object, undertaken from pure and disinterested motives...would be crowned with success."[32] Such was the belief and trust of the missionaries.

> Instead of taking the trouble to study the beliefs the people already held and then trying to engraft something better in their place, they rashly and erroneously concluded that because they made use of certain inanimate objects in connection with their worship, they must be idolaters and the whole system essentially corrupt.[33]

Hence they tried to eradicate all traces of African religious beliefs. The result was religious disturbances, as the Christian converts desacrated sacred objects and provoked the chiefs.[34]

Later educated and nationalist leaders were to look back on Maclean's administration as an example of the true and proper relationship between Britain and the Gold Coast. Sarbah, for example, wrote in 1906 that Maclean's policy was the best both for the British and the Africans: "That policy was to respect and support generally the natural rulers of the country and to do nothing without their active co-operation."[35] But they placed even higher value on the Bond of 1844, which they considered the charter of their essentially voluntary relationship with Britain.[36]

Upon the resumption of control by the Crown over the forts, Maclean was made Judicial Assessor to the Chiefs and instructed to continue exercising the judicial jurisdiction that he had established.[37] The new governor, Commander H. Worsley Hill, in response to the recommendations of a parliamentary committee, undertook to clarify the British obligations toward the Gold Coast Africans who, while not subjects, were nevertheless in a deferential position vis a vis British power and enlightenment.[38] He accordingly negotiated the Bond with eight Fanti chiefs. The Bond refers to the fact that "power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, within divers countries and places adjacent to Her Majesty's forts and settlements on the Gold Coast." Here the Crown formally accepted Maclean's extension of jurisdiction, even though it was done contrary to his legal prerogatives. The chiefs in the Bond "acknowledge that power and jurisdiction" of the British and declare that "barbarous customs," some specified but others not, are "contrary to law." Murder, robbery, "and other crimes and offences" are to be tried "before the Queen's judicial officers and the chiefs of the districts, moulding the customs of the country to the general principles of British law." Numerous other chiefs entered into the same agreement during the same year.[39] The importance of the Bond was later dismissed by a British governor, who argued that, "whether by virtue of our protection or by consent or by usage or by usurpation, we had undoubtedly acquired the right of jurisdiction, civil and criminal."[40] One should not, however, underestimate a document like the Bond, for it conveys more than it appears to and its ambiguity must be attributed to a British quest for easy influence; not an economic sphere of influence, but a sufficient basis for affecting an increasing modification of the whole African way of life toward conformity with British norms and the manifestation of British civilizational talents. The unspecified "barbarous customs" and "offences" to be specified later by the British and legally proscribed--this is clearly a wedge for the expansion of British control of African life; for the British, having undertaken what they regard as a great historical mission; could not but adopt their own standards as the criteria for acceptable African thought and action. The mission, if not for the mitigating circumstances of material and human resources, would be clearly akin to modern totalitarian movements in its desire for total control, even if the ideas and actions that would be demanded are much less reprehensible than those of Western totalitarian movements.

The de facto extension of British jurisdiction that was characteristic of Maclean's tenure was maintained and increased in the years following.[41] Finally, the earlier practices of negotiating with the chiefs and of exercising an undefined jurisdiction was "replaced by the direct proclamation of authority as a means of extending British jurisdiction"[42] and defining it as a right rather than a grant. Following the sixth Ashanti War (1873-74), it was reluctantly decided by the British that annexation and direct government of the territory south of

Ashanti under British protection would be the only feasible alternative to complete abandonment.[43] So in 1874, by royal proclamation, Britain annexed the coastal areas as the Gold Coast Colony; the Legislative Council of the Gold Coast was given authorization to legislate for the protected territories for the first time; and the Queen's authority and powers over the protected areas were broadly defined, specific mention being made of abolishing "immoral, barbarous and cruel customs," and of regarding "native laws and customs where they are not repugnant to justice, equity and good conscience."[44] Of course, "good conscience" is equated with British conscience, the proclivities of which have been shown. The explanation of this policy was given by the Secretary for the Colonies Lord Carnarvon, who held that the Bond of 1844 had been superseded by events and that on a large range of matters not mentioned in the Bond--civil administration, public health and education, roads, customs duties, public works, police--"the Legislature or Government of the settlement has, with or without the co-operation of the native rulers, exercised authority to an extent which, strictly speaking, could be justified only on the assumption (the justice of which I am satisfied is not open to question) that these matters have by usage and by the sufference and tacit assent of the natives fallen within the province of the Queen's authority."[45] This is an interesting statement if only for the air of moral self-confidence about it; its importance, however, lies in its apparent regard of British rule as just because it exists, for it is unthinkable that the rule would exist if it had not the "tacit assent" of the Africans regardless of whether or not the African rulers had cooperated in its establishment. It is this line of thought that led to the British conception that the acquisition of the Gold Coast was by cession, even though no treaties or agreements exist in which any cession was formally made.[46]

"Doubts remained, however, as to what part of the area which the British administered was a 'colony' and what part a 'protectorate.'"[47] Accordingly, in 1901 an Order in Council declared that all the protected and other territories within the defined boundaries "as have not heretofore been included in His Majesty's dominions shall be, and the same are hereby annexed..., and the whole of the said territories are declared to be part of His Majesty's Gold Coast Colony, and to all intents and purposes as if all such territories had formed part of the said Colony."[48] The final defeat of the Ashanti was sealed in the same year by the Ashanti Order in Council, which annexed Ashanti as a conquered territory. At the same time a third Order in Council placed the Northern Territories under British protection and under jurisdiction of the Gold Coast Government. The Colony, Ashanti, and Protectorate together made up the British Gold Coast, which had through the orders in council emerged in the form that would remain substantially unchanged until, with the addition of British Togoland, it would emerge as the independent state of Ghana in 1957.

The British conception of their authority in the Gold Coast may best be summarized in the words defining the basis of British authority in the Northern Territories Order in Council. The bases of that authority are declared to be the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 that, in the words of the Order, "enacted that it should be lawful for Her Majesty to hold, exercise, and enjoy any jurisdiction which Her Majesty then had or might at any time thereafter have within a foreign country"; and the alleged "treaty, grant, usage, sufferance, and other lawful means" whereby "power and jurisdiction" were obtained. Since the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, no matter how valid it may have been in British law, could not be considered legally binding on people not already subject to the British Crown, the second basis was required for the legitimacy of British authority. The thing to notice, however, is that in the list of "lawful means," which may not even include some "other" means that happened to have lawfully been used, no specific legitimate basis of authority is given. What the Order says in effect is that whatever means was employed to obtain power over African societies is to be deemed legitimate. This legitimacy that expresses itself always in a legal context we shall call "putative legitimacy" so as to distinguish it from the "ideological sanctions" of the authority that were described in the early part of this chapter. The co-existence of these two conceptions of British authority is easily explained by several considerations: the forms of British law were more stable than British thought, so that they resisted wholesale incorporation of ideological justifications of British rule over Africans; the putative legitimacy of British authority, which employs the language of democracy for imperial relations ("treaty," "grant," "sufferance," "cession" of power by those subject to that power), could easily be interpreted in terms of the ideology; and the putative legitimacy, especially since it did not conflict with the ideological sanctions, could for all practical purposes be ignored by those who assume a priori that whatever they have done or are doing must be righteous. The interpretation of putative legitimacy in terms of the ideology is certainly implied by the idea that British rule is justified by the benefits and civilization that it brings to the Africans. The unstated premise is that the Africans, to the extent that they understood this rule to be good for them, do or would consent to it. Such an idea is, of course, dominant in eighteenth-century enlightenment political thought, and expressed in perhaps its most salient form in Rousseau's notion of the general will.[49]

Essentially the same set of ideas that we have traced in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century persisted throughout the twentieth century. There were, however, two noteworthy changes of emphasis. There was a more intense stress on benefiting, developing and civilizing the African, while at the same time the confrontation with African realities led to increasing doubts of the inevitability of civilizational progress in Africa and of the unadulturated benefit of British rule for Africans. The two trends did, quite clearly, reinforce one another: the intensification of efforts to improve the Africans produced untoward results that inculcated doubt, and the growing doubts and difficulties inspired new efforts of thought and action to vindicate the ideology that explained and justified the venture embarked upon. These themes are all evident in Governor High Clifford's appraisal of British rule written in 1915 as the Introduction to Claridge's monumental two volume history. Clifford maintained that British rule could be justified only by an "ability to govern the country in a manner more conducive to the common good and happiness, and with a higher regard to the rights and well-being of the weak and inarticulate masses, than would be possible to the natives themselves if left to their own devices."[50] This proposition, which is described as an "opinion" and a "theory," will according to Clifford "readily" be accepted by "most thinking men." Clifford admits that the chiefs and kings "stand to lose much" by the imposition of peace and good administration, "for it has usually been the peculiar privilege of the great ones of the earth to thrive at the expense of their subjects."[51] British rule is thus based on the assumption that the chiefs and kings do not truly represent the people, for their rule is exploitative, and that the interests of the indigenous rulers and ruled are contradictory. It assumes also that the British are unusual among "the great ones" because they do not "thrive at the expense of their subjects." British authority is thus consciously set in favor of the "inarticulate masses," whose very inarticulateness allows the British to disregard any African expression concerning British authority, and whose well-being is to be secured against the chiefs and articulate Africans.

The noteworthy thing about Governor Clifford's position is that it is held so firmly despite a recognition that the dominant motive in the extension of British authority was the protection of trade rather than any humanitarian considerations.

> Even after the national conscience had been sufficiently awakened to bring about the abolition of the slave-trade, the commercial interests of the British traders continued

> to be the principal preoccupation of the authorities on the Coast, and the assumption of responsibility for the welfare of the natives, whose world our coming had turned topsy-turvy, was shirked and evaded as much as possible.[52]

This motive he distinguishes from "an insatiable appetite for power and dominion" and from the "newly awakened sense of responsibility toward the native races" that "forbade continued toleration of savage and barbarous practices."[53] The "bitter and humiliating memories" of earlier deplorable British acts on the Coast gives rise to "shame and horror" and to a concern to vindicate the "fair fame" of Britian.[54] Thus the new mission is at once patriotic and humanitarian.

The new mission is not, however, without its price. One cannot avoid "the ugly fact that the path to the establishment of a durable peace in semi-civilized countries is almost invariably paved with the victims of a series of devastating little wars," which are difficult to forestall because of the "imperfect understanding of the character, the polity, and the outlook upon life of the peoples with whom, in tropical lands, Great Britain has had to deal."[55] Thus the conception of securing the well-being of people who are exploited by their own rulers is an intention and a dogma rather than an empirical judgment. The Governor does reveal a twinge of doubt when he says that perhaps "modern civilisation is the lion, and that barbarism is the lamb" but his position nevertheless remains firmly on the idea that "the incompatible ideals" of the British and Ashanti made "anything resembling a permanent friendly alliance" between them impossible. The abolition of such religious practices as human sacrifice could not be effected save "where Great Britain exercises full executive authority."[56]

Clifford's was not the only British position, but it is most representative of the official British attitude. Moreover, those who reached different conclusions, tended to do so on the basis of similar principles. Thus R. A. Freeman, who had served as Assistant Colonial Surgeon and Anglo-German Boundary Commissioner of the Gold Coast, severely criticized the British for having "identified themselves with the debased coast tribes" against the Ashanti. He wrote: "With the unerring instinct of a professedly philanthropic nation, they have selected the sturdiest, most enterprising and most courageous tribe as the special object of hostility, and have consistently endeavoured ...to secure...the survival of the unfittest."[57] He shows that in the early nineteenth century British policy tended to encourage "Fanti agressions... and the banishment of Ashanti trade from the settlements"; that in 1816 the British, directly violating an "understanding" with the Asantehene, "once more made common cause with the Fantis against their conquerors"; and that in 1820 the British at Cape Coast repudiated a treaty concluded by the British Consul at Kumasi which recognized "the sovereignty of the King of Ashanti over the Fantis," an act that was the basis of British policy thereafter.[58] He points out further that when the war of 1873 ended, the British encouraged the states tributary to the Ashanti King to assert their independence and revolt; this policy led to the expedition of 1896 which destroyed the Ashanti kingdom.

He concludes that, contrary to the philanthropic expectations of peace, civilization, and the abolition of human sacrifice, British interference "tended to increase the amount of human suffering"[59] and to destroy indigenous trade.[60] In short, their ideological dogmas and ignorance of African life led to results contrary to what the British either desired or expected.

So far British ideas have been examined largely apart from the responses to British rule of the Africans subject to it and from the concrete situation of British hegemony over African societies. Since the implications and full substance of these ideas can be adequately understood only in terms of time and place, it remains for us to consider these factors. The appropriate place to begin is with the reactions of the Africans to the European presence before they assimilated Western ideas and attitudes.

There are no records of what the Akans thought of the first Europeans who established themselves on the coast. We do know that Africans elsewhere on the continent "regarded the earliest European visitors as supernatural beings," for the white men appeared to them as "wonderful, uncanny." Unusual origins and powers were attributed to the Europeans. "It is widely believed that white men come out of the sea," even in the interior where men had never looked upon the sea. In central Africa, European travellers were considered able to make or prevent rain, a divine power. In some places "the European's white skin is taken as proof of his favour with the creator"; for among most black Africans white is the color representing "happiness and blessedness," while black symbolizes "sadness and misfortune." Thus the power of the Europeans rested on the awe with which the Africans regarded them rather than on force.[61]

There are several reasons why we may take the above as an acceptable general account of the initial Akan experience of the Europeans, even though direct evidence is lacking. First of all, we have seen in the first chapter that the Akan regarded bodies of water as divine; such water purifies and sacralizes whatever is immersed in it. Therefore, in traditional terms the appearance of white men from the sea could find no other explanation than that it was a divine manifestation. Second, the Akans associate white with "all such virtuous, spiritual entities as God, and the deified spirits of ancestors," and black with "vice, deepened feelings of melancholy, and such vicious spiritual bodies as the devil and death."[62] Third, the most important reason is the indiscriminate African imitation of the European in the early phases of the relationship. With equal ease, the African adopted European firearms, European dress, European laws, and a European version of Christianity. Indeed, even when there were no genealogical reasons for doing so, Africans often adopted European patronymics.[63] Finally, a more recent study of African attitudes toward their rulers in Ghana indicates that the Africans generally found the Europeans to be priestly. It asserts:

> /T/he ordinary member of a village community will not only accept the distant authority of the whites, but will come to regard their position as an essential part of the order of the universe, on which his own life and security rest. It is thus more than a mere relationship of dominance and submission...[64]

Since colonial authority was accepted for traditional reasons as valid, representing as it was thought the exercise of superior divine power, the Africans were disposed from the start to accept what the Europeans had to teach them as a revelation of the divine. The Europeans explained, and the Africans assimilated, the colonial interpretation of colonial authority. The Africans accepted colonial authority as superior and beneficient. They did so the more easily because the Europeans represented the Christian religion whose God they came to understand as the same as their high God, superior power as reflected in their arms and technology, and greater wisdom as manifested by their laws and sciences. This acceptance is reflected in various prayers at important Ashanti religious ceremonies, recorded by Rattray.[65]

> "Grandfather Eguayeboafo, ...do not let us offend the Castle (i.e. the Government)" (p. 98)
>
> "Ta Kese Birimpon (the god), your grandchild is Kwesi Ntwi /the 'linguist'/;...do not let him get into trouble with the white man;...when this white man goes to the forest, permit that he kill an elephant that we may have something to eat." (p. 119)
>
> "Santeman Kobina...Life to the Ashanti nation, life to the Castle (the Government), life to the white man." (p. 127).
>
> "Santeman Kobina, ...life to the white man, life to the 'Castle' (Government); today it is the 'Castle' whom we serve;...may the Ashanti people work for the good of ...the Castle." (p. 129)
>
> "...life to all the English white men, ...life to me Yao Kramo, who rule this town;...grant that I may have no quarrel with the Castle (the Government)." (p. 169)

There were, however, a growing number of Western-educated Africans with different ideas and many demands. Chief among these were John Mensah Sarbah (1864-1910) and Joseph Casely Hayford (1866-1930), who succeeded Sarbah as the major nationalist leader in the Gold Coast. Both were considerably influenced by the Rev. Edward Blyden, a professor in the Liberia College.[66] According to Blyden, the black Africans had founded Babylon and Nineveh and had built Babel and the Pyramids. They were superior to all peoples. Migrating into Africa, and having lost contact with the East, they were degredated; and the climate enervated them. Yet he argued that but for the slave trade Africa, through peaceful contact with European civilization, would be the equal of Europe in science, civilization and religion. As a God-favored people, the African mission is to create a great Christian Empire in Africa. This is to be the noblest and last human achievement.[67] Sarbah and Hayford echoed some of these ideas in their criticism of the British. Since we deal with Hayford's influence on Nkrumah in a later chapter, we shall here devote primary attention to Sarbah.

John Mensah Sarbah was one of the major representatives of the Western-educated elite that emerged in the nineteenth century and exercised leadership during the first half of the twentieth. He was among the first pupils in the first high school established in the Gold Coast in 1876; in 1887 he became the first man entirely of Gold Coast descent to qualify for the bar; ten years later he was one of the founders of the Gold Coast Aborigines' Rights Protection Society (A.R.P.S.); and he was one of the first Africans appointed to the Legislative Council.[68]

Fanti National Constitution, Sarbah's major work published in 1906, complemented Casely Hayford's Gold Coast Native Institutions and shared its purpose: "my chief endeavor...has been to demonstrate...the existence of an African State...and to explain the principles controlling and regulating the government thereof."[69] And like Casely Hayford, Sarbah elaborates some ideas that will later be taken up by the African nationalists seeking independence. Our interest here, however, is in Sarbah's estimation of British rule.

Sarbah specifically alleges:

> The sole reason for the presence of Europeans in West Africa was, and is even now, principally Trade, and for the purposes of trade only were...the power and jurisdiction of the local rulers subsequently undermined.[70]

In pursuing trade and consolidating their interests "British sovereignty over the Gold Coast territories was gradually acquired, and at times by such gradual, slow, and imperceptible steps that even now many questions of public importance are not free from doubt and difficulty."[71] Sarbah's approach to the questions of British sovereignty is legalist. He begins with the idea that independence is indivisible, but that sovereignty is divisible. "Assuming the King of England is the only independent sovereign in this territory, the aboriginal rulers, however, enjoy several sovereign rights, not the least of which has been the exercise of judicial functions."[72] Examining the treaties concluded between the British and chiefs as well as other official papers and documents, he attempts "to establish the position that no right or power was originally exercised by the queen's officers without the consent of the aboriginal rulers first had and obtained."[73] He explains:

> Gold Coast territory was not an uninhabited district settled on by British subjects, or an inhabited territory obtained by conquest or cession. Whether the inhabitants were taken to be half or wholly savages, they had their aboriginal tribal government, each regularly established, invested with the rights of sovereignty and exercising its powers. With these governments, treaties were made from time to time.[74]

On this basis Sarbah argues in favor of a policy that later became known as "indirect rule." Citing the loyalty of the chiefs, he maintains that the British have come to recognize "that the best and only satisfactory way to rule West Africa is to do so through the aboriginal authorities."[75] He harkens back to the administration of Governor Maclean under the Committee of Merchants in the 1830's, affirming that Maclean's policy secured the desired expansion of trade: "That policy was to respect and support generally the natural rulers of the country, and to do nothing without their active co-operation."[76]

Later years, according to Sarbah, brought a quite different British position. "Ashanti was, in the Order in Council of September, 1901, declared to be a British possession by right of conquest. All Gold Coast territory, by an Order in Council of even date, was declared to be a portion of the British Dominions."[77] This marked a change in the Gold Coast Africans' position from "faithful allies and protected friends" to "subjects" of the British.[78] The major difference is, however, explained in these terms:

> There was a time when the declared policy of the British nation towards the West African protected territories was to encourage the inhabitants to train and qualify themselves for the administration of the settlements to be transferred to them. This policy was never heartily supported by British officials in West Africa. The new Imperialism of recent times, however, altered it, and declared these territories undeveloped estates, to be specially exploited with all expedition primarily, if not mainly, for the benefit and profit of Great Britain. While this policy was in vogue,...there were not a few Government officials...who thought it good policy to ridicule and try to break up the aboriginal institutions of the people, to undermine the authority of their natural rulers, and to subordinate everything possible to the paramount claims of what they called Imperial uniformity. In the minds of such persons, the doctrine of the individualism or distinct characteristics of each nation or race had no existence; to introduce English laws wholesale, abolish what is peculiar to Africans, and to treat them as subject races, saved them much trouble...Thoughtful men realize that each of the colonies essentially British should develop her own individuality.[79]

This passage contains all the major themes of Sarbah's position. He sees the British-Gold Coast relationship as properly one of mutual benefit:

> ...The ancient tradition of Gold Coast peoples is to trade and live with Great Britain. He knows not the people or their history who suspects their affection for...England. In these days of a new imperialism against aboriginal races, the English sojourner in tropical Africa should know that a sublimer function of imperial rule is to respect and encourage their sense of self-help and self-reliance; that for the mutual and permanent advantage of both alike (whether in developing the mutual resources of Africa, or in the assimilation of European culture) no obstacles should be put in the way of Africans to rise from a condition of mere passive subjugation, to prove their undoubted capacity to discharge successfully their legitimate responsibilities, public or private.[80]

The importance of this idea is immense. Sarbah is an educated African; as such, he represents African opinion: "definite public opinion...emanates from the educated classes."[81] In his capacity as an educated African he expresses essentially the same idea that, elaborated in a book by Lord Lugard in 1922, became known as the "dual mandate."[82] The African is to remain African and not become an imitation of the European,[83] for his country cannot "benefit by the wholesale adoption of foreign institutions, nor by things which have not grown with its own growth or which have not been the natural outcome of its own history."[84] Yet it is European knowledge that alone can improve the Africans: "science and the scientific method alone can effect a successful and permanent reformation."[85] It is this requirement that justifies British "direction" of Africans: "The backward races are looked upon and treated as children, but they are not trained as children destined for some definite career in the future."[86] The best policy would therefore be "to govern the African through his natural rulers under the direction of the British Government"[87] and under the strong influence of the Western-educated Africans. The latter are "in a position to...recognize such natural talent as should be brought to the knowledge of the well-disposed white man for encouragement ...and proper training," for the educated African is placed midway between the European authorities and the "untutored" African "masses."[88] On him therefore "depends the successful administration of these tropical countries," especially since his class is destined to become the vast majority.[89]

The perhaps surprising thing about Sarbah's ideas is that they do not ostensibly represent themselves as a challenge to traditional African authority.

> It is the duty of every educated African not in any way to belittle the kings, chiefs, and headmen, or push them to the background...; he should rather, by his example and influence, raise up them and the people generally to a higher level of usefulness.[90]

The British rulers share this duty with the educated Africans, and it is in their best interest to adhere to it. "To smash up or gradually undermine aboriginal authority, to degrade or belittle African rulers, although professing to govern through them, can only end in the failure of European rule and the demoralization of Africans."[91]

The inherently ambiguous character of his position is recognized by Sarbah. He is quite aware that "contact with Europeans and the advance of British ideas tend to change, if not to break up, some distinctive features of the African social system, which is communalistic." Even though this results in "confusion" and "the widespread demoralization of the rising generation," he does not find it either desirable or possible "to stay the operation of the natural laws of evolution." If the Government were sympathetic with this problem it would manifest its concern by recognizing and enforcing customary laws, thereby helping the Africans in "adjusting things."[92]

Since "foreign ideas" are affecting "the national and social character" of the Africans,[93] and since a radical break with traditional ways would be disastrous, Sarbah casts about for a way out of the dilemma. His ingenious solution is that of the Japanese.

> Fanti patriots and Japanese Emperor with his statesmen were both striving to raise up their respective countries by

> proper education and efficient training of their people... The African's attempt was ruthlessly crushed, and his plans frustrated. Japan was not under an unsympathetic protection; she has succeeded, and her very success ought to be an inspiration...to the people of Gold Coast Territories.[94]

What Japan accomplished in raising the level of civilization in Formosa, "surely British statesmen can accomplish"[95]--especially since Africans are superior to Asians and more on a par with the British.[96]

Casely Hayford dominated the Gold Coast African scene during the interwar period as the founder (in 1920) and president of the National Congress of British West Africa.[97] In his first book, he set out to describe African institutions, for just a few years earlier the Ashanti War of 1900 had been precipitated by a British governor who disparaged Ashanti custom and demanded as the representative of the Queen the Golden Stool as his rightful seat.[98] In 1896 the Asatehene had formally submitted to the British, taking off his sandals--thus breaking a taboo and destooling himself in traditional terms[99]--and prostrating himself at the feet of the British authorities as if they were oriental despots.[100] Casely Hayford, with these events in mind, disparaged Britain's "boasted civilization," seeing primarily a "primitive instinct of acquisitiveness" and "an insane thirst for territorial acquisition cost what it may."[101] He indicts the British for lacking a clear and consistent policy and for experimentation in the Gold Coast.[102] He accuses the British for not living up to their "Christian propaganda," which is "almost the first element which confronts the aboriginal mind." He writes of the castles as "emblems of European greed." He contends that "unwholesome /British/ influence over the Fantis" is the cause of a "difference in the characters" of the Fantis and Ashantis, though the two peoples are "really one." He blames the British for retarding African development by weakening the office of kingship and its accompanying traditions.[103] Yet in spite of all this, he affirms in all of his writings the connection with Britain, confident that on balance Africans will gain from it and also benefit the British by humanizing and spiritualizing the European civilizational achievement. Africa's "universal spiritual mission" is to create a new and permanent civilization.[104] His purpose is thus to work within the existing order, to reform and transform it rather than to sweep it aside.

There thus emerged in the latter nineteenth century a group of intellectuals, many of them barristers, who organized themselves on the basis of a claim to be spokesmen for both Africa and modernity, and thus to be the rightful representatives of the chiefs and people and of the British regime to one another. As mediators they sought to be loyal to and cooperative with both the indigenous and the colonial authorities, while themselves in effect claiming a unique authority deriving from their union of Africanness and of Western learning, and from their consciousness of a great moral mission to redeem Africa and ultimately all mankind. Combining disparate African and modern qualities in their own personalities, and having before them the example of a modern "Japanese" Japan, they sought to embody these qualities in society. The developing African society of the future was to be, in effect, their own personalities writ large. While they envisioned no break with the British empire, they did seek self-government within it. The major organizations of these men were, as we recall, the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) and the National

Congress of British West Africa. Many intellectuals elected to work in the 1930's and 40's with the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs (JPC) which, dominated by Nana Ofori Atta, replaced the ARPS as the body recognized by the Governor as representative of the African people.

In August 1947 the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) was formed as "a nation-wide movement which would draw chiefs and people together, restore leadership to the right hands /the intelligentsia/, knit together existing organizations /e.g., of cocoa farmers, ex-servicemen, youth/, and prepare for the time when the country would be self-governing."[105] It was to replace the ARPS, one of whose last acts was to make a financial contribution to the Fifth Pan-African Congress at Manchester in 1945, of which Nkrumah and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya were the organizing secretaries.[106]

The UGCC was the idea of Joseph Danquah, who founded it with a small group of intellectuals. Danquah is a crucial figure in the story, for he was at once deeply rooted in the politics of the pre-war period and pre-eminently involved in Nkrumah's rise. He was a member of the royal family of Akim Abuakwa, being the younger brother of Chief Ofori Atta; he was founder in 1930 of The Times of West Africa, which called for constitutional reform in the Gold Coast; he was founder and secretary general of the Gold Coast Youth Conference in the 'thirties and 'forties, an organization of politically minded intellectuals supported by the JPC; and he was elected by the JPC to represent them in the Legislative Council in 1947. He it was also who arranged for Nkrumah to become general secretary of the UGCC and who soon became Nkrumah's major political rival, running against him in the presidential election of 1960 and dying in Nkrumah's prisons in 1965.[107] Danquah was therefore in 1947 the major African political leader in the Gold Coast. He was a nationalist, having promoted among the youth the idea that the Gold Coast peoples "are homogeneous in quality and embody completely...a natural nationalist idea," an idea which was to be realized in a national state, governed by Gold Coast Africans, to be sought through a "Gold Coast Races Nationalist Movement."[108] He had the support of the chiefs. He was the major representative of a "small independent professional /barristers, teachers/ and trading class /that/ could look back over more than fifty years of political effort, sometimes with, more often against the colonial administration."[109] Responsible for arousing nationalist feeling in the 'thirties and early 'forties, he still sought in the middle 'forties "to move along a broad front of the chiefs, the 'intelligentsia' and the educated 'youngmen'."[110]

He failed. Within less than two years Nkrumah had risen to the dominant position in Gold Coast politics. Why? Disregarding the proximate causes to be sought in the events between 1947 and 1949, certain salient features of the situation indicate why Nkrumah--or, better, why a man such as Nkrumah was--could emerge so rapidly and decisively to the top.

The first consideration is that no political organization of the intelligentsia had proven successful without the support of the chiefs. The ARPS became but a relic with the establishment of the JPC, to which the chiefs switched their support. Despite Danquah's good standing with the chiefs, the latter rebuffed the UGCC[111] because of its aim of replacing chiefs by educated commoners, elected according to the criterion of competence, on the Legislative Council.[112] Having lost the chiefs' support, the UGCC was exposed to the challenge of any group that could muster mass support.

Second, Nkrumah was able to use the UGCC as a sanction for his own work to build up a following. The UGCC leaders were not full-time politicians, but as their paid secretary Nkrumah could be just that.[113] Further, when Nkrumah, who was recently returned to the Gold Coast after an absence of twelve years, was introduced to the Working Committee of the UGCC, the uneasy members led by Danquah questioned Nkrumah about his political ideas; the members quickly brushed aside their suspicions and invited Nkrumah to "use the Convention as if it were his own organization."[114] Moreover, Danquah took Nkrumah on a six week speaking tour throughout the Colony and Ashanti to drum up support for the UGCC; they drew large crowds, and Nkrumah was a spellbinding orator.[115] Nkrumah was able on the one hand to present himself as "the humble and obedient servant of the Convention," while dissociating himself personally from unpopular UGCC decisions.[116]

Third, Nkrumah concentrated on the youth, organizing them and taking up their causes just as Danquah had in the pre-war years. He established a radical Committee on Youth Organization (CYO) with leaders loyal to himself rather than the UGCC. The CYO was the immediate basis of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP).[117]

Fourth, the long-term effects of British rule and of Westernization had been the growth of youthful elements in the villages and in the towns opposed to the prevailing order.[118] The authority of the chiefs had been discredited by their subordination to the colonial administration, whose support of the chiefs presupposed that subordination. The chiefs, supported by the colonial power, often exceeded their traditional prerogatives; and they were used for unpopular administrative tasks such as tax collection. African Christians tended to reject the political authority of the chiefs because of its religious basis.[119] All this contributed to the "desanctification of the chief."[120] Paralleling the decline of the chiefs was a flood of youths who had left elementary schools into the towns and villages with their new ideas and desires.[121] Within this "colonial situation"[122] emerged voluntary associations, with increasing political interests, as substitutes for the waning tribal order and particularly as responses of people to their urbanized needs and desires.[123] Each group "was an active nucleus of an anti-chief, anti-colonial movement, quick to acquire new life as a radical commoners' party."[124] The chiefs and intelligentsia were no longer united;[125] the second world war had compounded the emergence of restive commoners;[126] and the organized youth were with Nkrumah. It was only to be a matter of time before the masses of modernized people consisting of urban laborers, petty traders, artisans, market women, clerks, fishermen, farmers and junior teachers were to be caught up in a movement and were to raise for themselves a champion.[127]

The time was to be the immediate years after Nkrumah's return.

> This was the period when few of the leaders knew precisely what they wanted, but the mass of the people were becoming

> clear about what they disliked. Prices were rising, jobs difficult to get, cocoa incomes falling off...; the more-than-barely-literate now included many from the middle schools...who disliked the alliance between the chiefs and the officials, who read of events in Burma and India, and listened to those who had served abroad with the West African Frontier Force.[128]

Yet these "particular grievances of the post-war years...only added fuel to a fire that was already smouldering and ready to burst into flame."[129] What is to be particularly emphasized is the example of Asia, where successful anti-colonial, independence movements were rife, coupled with a newly developing general distrust of the British and their intentions by the Africans.[130]

Finally, not only was Nkrumah foremost among those, including Danquah, whose oratory fanned the flames of discontent and aspiration,[131] but he was prevailed upon by his followers to make a sharp break with the UGCC and to establish a new party making more radical demands. The same followers successfully resisted Nkrumah's effort to reinstate himself in the UGCC and to disband the CPP. So the CPP, formed in June 1949, was to remain and to win the first general election in 1951.[132]

The role of the British regime in the rise and eventual monopoly of power of Nkrumah and the CPP is not to be minimized: it was in fact crucial. It fully aided men like Nkrumah precisely by placing a premium on the mastery of Western organizational technique. The British on the one hand spoke of parliamentary democracy for the Gold Coast, and they insisted on independence under constitutions that formally provided for it; yet such was not to be their legacy. Bretton writes:

> The colonial regime, beneath a thin veneer of democratic formalism, rested on a highly centralized, hierarchical, authoritarian administration that was deliberately somewhat militaristic. As a matter of policy, the democratic content of the political system at home was not passed on to the subject peoples. It appears that an effort was made, behind a smokescreen of constitutionality, to extend to the African successor regime not the heritage of the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy but the authoritarian features of the colonial administration.[133]

Thus despite the conclusion of an official commission of inquiry that Nkrumah had all the marks of a totalitarian and a communist,[134] the British welcomed as colleague and successor a man who was able to manipulate the masses toward objectives that were regarded as modern. Upon the CPP victory in the 1951 elections, Nkrumah was released from prison and made Leader of Government Business, prime minister in all but name. Nkrumah's claim to represent the people of Ghana was based on electoral victory, which the British required as evidence of that claim. Decolonization policy required that the right of the successor regime to represent the whole people in negotiations with the British with a view to independence be given such a political foundation, and this was a spur to the quest for control over the people and over the electoral process itself by Nkrumah.[135] Beyond this, however, Nkrumah had asserted the need of "totalitarian measures" for a period after independence,[136] and the last British governor agreed that a "dictatorship" would be necessary for a time.[137]

In the final elections before independence, the question of whether Ghana was to have a unitary or federal constitution was paramount. Nkrumah's CPP strongly advocated a unitary system, and it won the election. However, the National Liberation Movement, which advocated federalism, won in Ashanti and the federalist Northern People's Party won in the Northern Territories. The plebiscitary character of this 1956 election obscured the fact that the underlying assumptions guiding the interpretation of its results were precisely the questions to be determined by the election. Nkrumah won the election if the country is considered as a whole, but he merely won two and lost two if the results are considered regionally. The election was indecisive in terms of the issue it was meant to resolve. Nevertheless, the British accepted Nkrumah's proposed unitary constitution, and in so doing turned over to his control peoples who had by a majority rejected him.[138]

The epitome of later British rule in the Gold Coast was the governorship (1919-1927) of Sir Gorden Guggisberg, who had succeeded Governor Hugh Clifford discussed above. Guggisberg was a transitional figure between the early period of British rule and the late period of African nationalist reaction. Of the old school, he wanted to preserve the indigenous institutions and to protect them against the effects of Westernization. His constitution of 1925 had many of the features of what later became known as "indirect rule."[139] Yet Guggisberg was also the modernizer par excellence. He undertook an ambitious ten-year development plan to effect progress and civilization. Transportation, communications and the whole economy were to be vastly developed, and social services were to be improved. The keystone of this plan for the progress of civilization was to be education, which Guggisberg equated with (Western) character and technical training.[140]

It was Guggisberg who set up the Joint Provincial Councils of Chiefs, which were nontraditional institutions comprising traditional authorities. These rather than the nationalist intelligentsia were accepted as the spokesmen of the African peoples. Guggisberg expected the JPC's to ward off disintegrating Western influences but to build up an African Gold Coast nationality out of the tribes.[141] "The irony of the position was that Guggisberg and the nationalists wanted very nearly the same things."[142] Guggisberg wanted things in the Gold Coast African but modern, and he rejected the nationalists. In the end, the nationalists came to prevail on the colony level where the Crown Colony system of centralized, direct governance overlaid the institutions of indirect rule,[143] and the most extreme elements in the intelligentsia came not only to proclaim an African modernity as their policy but to present themselves as the successful embodiments of Africa and modernity. Each world war had marked a decisive change in the Gold Coast: the first was followed by Guggisberg, and the second by Nkrumah. Nkrumah's purpose was to prevent a third.

CHAPTER V

TANGANYIKA

German East Africa, which included not only Tanganyika but the present territories of Rwanda and Burundi, was established near the end of the nineteenth century and lost as a result of the First World War. Its acquisition was the culmination of a colonial movement that developed in Germany after the creation of the Reich by Bismarck in 1871. The German colonial movement, in turn, was itself part of the broader European colonial movement in the nineteenth century. The intention of this section is to examine the literature on German East Africa, particularly the writings of Germans who founded and ruled German East Africa and of their major supporters. The purpose of this examination is to reveal the dominant ideas and attitudes connected with the foundation and administration of German East Africa, namely ideas about the legitimacy and purposes of German rule and German attitudes toward their African subjects; to estimate as far as one may the African conception of German rule; and to show how the Germans administered this vast African territory. Since the British attempted to justify their possession of Tanganyika after the defeat of Germany by alleging German unfitness to rule in East Africa, the following section on British rule will examine that allegation, compare the British with the German conceptions of their authority in Tanganyika, and show to what extent British and German administrative practice differed.

THE GERMAN REGIME

Dr. Karl Peters, the man who acquired a large portion of East Africa for Germany, and his supporters stated in their writings and implied by their actions a definite conception of why that acquisition was justified. Peters' own account of the acquisition is in fact an apology for and explanation of his purpose and Germany's. He begins with an autobiographical sketch: his father was impressed by Livingston's explorations and tells his son that the lakes region is to be the future of Africa; the boy dreams of winning Kilimanjaro for Germany; the founding of the Reich when he was fourteen makes him a fervent nationalist; he sees that even Denmark and Holland had many colonies, but that Germany had none;[1] inspired by Cecil Rhodes he resolves to become a colonizer. The rapid increase of population in Germany makes colonization necessary in his view, and in 1884 he formed the German Colonization Society (GCS).[2] In that same year he organized a treaty-making expedition to obtain territory in East Africa, and in 1885 the GCS was reconstituted as the German East Africa Company (GEAC) to administer the newly acquired territory.[3]

Throughout his writings Peters manifests little regard for the African people who are to be affected by his concern with the national pride of Germany and the economic prosperity of the colonists. First of all, his opinion of Africans is quite low: he considers them lazy and "naive," and he refers to them as "cattle" (*vieh*);[4] he writes of his "contempt for the Wagogo" people, and explains how he exhorted his men: "Plunder the village, set fire to the houses, and smash everything to pieces that will not burn." He tells the Wagogo that they "must be destroyed off the face of the earth" unless they "become the slave of ther Germans."[5] Peters cites opposition to his acquisitive ventures in the German press, giving as an example an editorial opinion that the Germans have human obligations to fulfill toward the Africans, that any German rights to African territory would presuppose a long cultural work, and therefore that it was wrong to begin by grabbing land. Peters, on the contrary, stresses that any land acquired had to offer the possibility of German rule. Though acquiring East African territory through "treaties" with African chiefs, he scarcely indicates a concern for the Africans whose "protection" he undertakes in the treaties.[6]

Peters does indeed write of a civilizing and Christianizing mission in Africa, but even in this context his focus is little on the African. He appeals to history as a justification of his work, saying that advanced peoples have always colonized, sometimes peacefully but often enough through "the brutal law of the gun." He holds that "if the final goal of spreading a higher civilization over a lower is accomplished, world history has always recognized it as justified and necessary."[7] Presumably the highest civilization of all is the one most justified in spreading its culture, even at the point of a gun. Peters writes: "It certainly is far more consonant with our interest and with civilization if we take it as our motto...that we will impart some of our characteristics to the natives of Africa, instead of simply truckling to their faults." German "interests" and "characteristics" are virtually equated with "civilization," and apparently "severity" and "Prussian discipline" would rank among the foremost of these characteristics.[8] Peters proudly writes of German "moral influence" on the Africans as a result of the Emin Pasha Expedition "for the rescue of one remarkable white man," and he goes on to say that the Expedition "has stamped us in these countries as a superior race";[9] as has the superiority of European firepower. Peters recognizes it as a problem and a duty to civilize the Africans, but in concrete terms this means that they are to be put to work for the colonizers.[10]

The question of African labor is clearly the dominant concern manifested in German writings about East Africa. Labor is represented as mutually advantageous for the colonist and for the African workers, for it is deemed the mediator of civilization. As the major prerequisite for the education of the African, there must be established in his mind "an unbreakable *nexus idearum* between contract breaking and beatings." The contracts are labor contracts, for the ideas of the age impel the Germans to grant the African the freedom to decide whether or not he will work. Since, however, the African does not pay much attention to contracts, either rewards or punishments must be used to secure fulfillment of the contracts; and rewards are impractical. The Africans are accustomed to slavery, and thus external force alone can overcome their natural inclination to avoid work. This, then, is the benefit and freedom that Peters has in view for the African; and even so, Peters finds it necessary to warn that too much freedom will make the African a burden and a threat.[11] The development of a great German *Kolonialreich* in East Africa would not, he thinks, be served by those manifesting the attitude of a "Negrophile."[12] The assessment of the various African tribes by Peters and later German writers on

East Africa typically took the form of an estimate of their potential as workers.[13]

Peters does not elaborate at much length his idea of Christianization, but it appears little different from his notion of civilizing the Africans. It means to erect a power "barrier against Islam," for "by demonstrating the superiority of European arms" to the African tribes and "by breaking the Arab power" he has "worked for Christianity in Eastern and Central Africa."[14] He claims that the Africans gladly gave over territory to him for little payment and protection because they hoped thereby to be released from the "yoke" of the Sultan of Zanzibar,[15] who had a nominal but very weak authority over the hinterland.

These, then, are the ideas of the man who established German rule in Tanganyika; and despite the fact that Peters was to some extent discredited in Germany,[16] some of his ideas endured. They can be summarized as follows: impelled by a dual motivation, nationalist glory and relief of population pressures on the German economy, he established German rule; having a low estimation and concern for the Africans, he nevertheless justifies that rule on the legal basis of treaty agreements and on the moral basis of advancing civilization and Christianity; he promises to protect the Africans, implying protection from other alien hegemony besides the German; and he virtually identifies the requirements of civilization and Christianity with the interest and superior position of Germany in Africa. This conception will be clearer if a distinction is made between the idea of advancing civilization and the idea of civilizing or benefiting the African people. While Peters does not explicitly make this distinction, it is implicit in his ideas and in the ideas of many of his supporters and successors.[17] Since the distinction is most pronounced in the League of Nations mandate terms for British administration in Tanganyika, its full implications will be elaborated in the section following.

Peters' acquisition of East African territory had been secretly undertaken in the face of Bismarck's avowed opposition to the establishment of a colonial empire and of Bismarck's warning that Imperial protection would not be extended to territories acquired; yet in 1885 Bismarck prevailed on the Kaiser to issue a letter of protection.[18] Bismarck defined the Imperial protection as follows:

> The German Empire cannot carry on a system of colonization like France's. It cannot send out warships to conquer overseas lands, that is, it will not take the initiative; but it will protect the German merchant even in the land which he acquires. Germany will do what England has always done, establish Chartered Companies, so that the responsibility entirely rests with them.[19]

The allusion to conquering warships and promise of protection implied that the German government took no notice of or responsibility for the subjects ruled by German chartered companies. And indeed the Imperial charter of protection, which Peters took as the primary basis of the GEAC's right of possession and rule in East Africa[20] and which conveyed sovereign authority to rule and dispense justice, enjoined no duties to perform for the benefit of the Africans.[21]

The justifications of Peters' work and of German rule in more emphatically humanitarian terms found quick expression in the German press,[22] and they set the theme not only for German but for later British rule in Tanganyika. The theme is essentially the same as the British imperial idea popularized by Lord Lugard as the "dual mandate" and by the League of Nations and United Nations idea of "trust." It was best expressed in a series of articles on German East Africa by Friedrich Fabri in the Kölnischer Zeitung. Fabri held that in East Africa Germany could advance civilization for the common good.[23] By educating the African to work, he could be advanced from his then slave state to a position of serfdom and thence to full freedom. This "freedom" is conceived of as an economic freedom: the completely free labor of the African is to result from good policies and good example on the part of the colonizers. Thus the Germans are not disinterested benefactors; they are driven on by "material interest" in their humanitarian task: "But woe to that people who, in pursuing its economic exigencies, is not moved by human and moral points of view." Fabri upholds the validity of Peters' treaties with African chiefs, claiming that the name of the Kaiser and "his powerful chancellor" are well known to the Africans as their protectors from the Arabs.[24]

It is very questionable whether the treaties concluded by Peters were binding on the Africans. Freeman-Grenville, for example, calls them "a gigantic and deliberate fraud."[25] According to these documents, the chiefs ceded to Peters the sole and exclusive rights to colonize and to exploit the land, and to introduce his own methods of justice and rule; the chiefs came under GCS protection but retained title to the land; the GCS would attempt to prevent slaves from being taken from the chiefdoms. Fabri argues that the chiefs were quite crafty in matters of property and were not duped into signing the treaties. He admits that they may not have understood European contractual formalities; but he holds that the chief, as representative of the tribe, could give up tribal land because African land was not privately owned. He considers it a fair exchange that the GCS undertook an obligation to protect and fulfill the needs of the African peoples.[26] Several points on this question may now be clarified. First of all, all of the treaty negotiations were carried out through a translator. It is for this reason, and because of different conceptions of land and legal instruments, that it can be assumed that the Africans who concluded the treaties did not understand clearly either the substance or implications of the contracts. Secondly, it is clear from Peters' own account that the right of possession was based on the letter of protection rather than the treaties. He advised bold action, unimpeded by any other considerations, to increase the territory of the GCS; treaties were to be made with chiefs if possible, but it was sufficient to raise the flag in the name of the Imperial protection and proclaim possession.[27]

Already, then, by 1886 a body of ideas governing the German East African venture had emerged. Treaties with African chiefs provided a pretext for German colonization activities. These activities were motivated primarily by economic and nationalist considerations. They were regarded as acceptable, or at least as promising ultimate benefit, to the Africans. The idea of civilizing the Africans was expressed, but less as a glorious mission voluntarily pursued than as a necessary duty and justification for those who were taking their land and preparing to rule them. In this connection it is important to distinguish between the idea of civilizing Africans and the idea, expressed by Fabri, of advancing civilization in Africa.[28] The latter idea places emphasis on an inherently unlimited quest of civilization represented by Germany to acquire and absorb uncivilized areas like Africa. Thus Africans were to advance primarily by learning to work for the colonizers; here was suggested a community of interest in which what was economically good for the colonizers was identified as a civilizational good for the Africans.

The Africans, however, would have none of it. While there is no documentary evidence of what Africans thought of the German attempt to establish rule over them, a series of African uprisings beginning in 1888 and culminating in the Maji-Maji Rebellion of 1905-1907 are evidence enough. The Maji-Maji outbreak is particularly important, for it "was in fact a national war of independence" participated in by many tribes over an area of 100,000 square miles.[29] It must be understood, however, against the background of developments in the preceding decade. The revolt of 1888 was initially Arab and coastal, but it spread inland among some of the African tribes like the Shambala and Hehe. It led to the permanent intervention of the German government. The pretext upon which Bismarck based the intervention was the claim that suppression of the rebellion was necessary for putting down the slave trade, and it secured British naval cooperation. Treaties with Britain in 1886 and 1890 delimited the British and German territories in East Africa and paved the way for the Sultan of Zanzibar's renunciation of sovereignty over the coast.

In an 1890 agreement between the Reich and the GEAC the latter gave up its administrative functions to the Reich.[30]

Only with the assumption of control by the German government could the territory be effectively occupied and an administration be established. The occupation of the hinterland proceeded by way of gradual exploration and extension of power. Recalcitrant chiefs were put down by punitive expeditions; military posts were set up, and finally civilian district officers replaced the military authorities.[31] A governor was appointed to head the German East Africa colony; he was to enforce the laws, imperial edicts and chancellor's instructions, while himself having power to issue local decrees.[32] "In some places a system of local native administration which was already in existence in the 1880's was retained. Officials (akidas) of Arab or Swahili extraction had limited powers over groups of villages which they sometimes shared with influential headmen (jumbes)."[33] By 1896 there were 37 Germans in Dar es Salaam and 89 distributed among 14 administrative districts or stations.[34] Freeman-Grenville describes the arrangement as follows:

> Each station was commanded by a semi-military commissioner known as a Bezirksamtmann, to whom were directly responsible liwalis and akidas, with village headmen, jumbes, as the lowest stratum, or, in certain areas, hereditary chiefs. Thus ....among the Nyamwezi and the Sukuma,...and in the Usambaras and a number of other areas, the hereditary rulers were recognized as far as their loyalty made it practicable to do so ...This local government was responsible for the maintenance of law and order with the assistance of the small bodies of troops under the Bezirksamtmann, and later for the provision of labour for public works, and, after 1896, for the collection of the hut tax.[35]

By the turn of the century rumors were circulating in Germany concerning brutal treatment of Africans, many of whom were killed for resisting the hut tax. Count Adolf von Götzen was appointed governor in 1901 in response to the public storm. Götzen, who remained as governor until April 1906, "pursued a more liberal native policy and tried to collect taxes without resorting to violence. It seemed as if he had allayed African fears," so that the Maji-Maji Rebellion came as a complete surprise in the summer of 1905.[36]

Assessments of the Maji-Maji Rebellion vary. Governor Götzen wrote of a well-planned conspiracy of chiefs and medicine-men for "a rising of the Bantu negroes against any alien intrusion,[37] while Bell held that it was "the fortuitous result" of the spread of water believed to bestow magical powers and of German oppression.[38] Bell convincingly shows the lack of evidence to support the notion of a conspiracy, but his evidence of German cruelties[39] is not sufficient to establish a specifically anti-German character for the Rebellion. According to Bell, "the secret of the Rebellion's origins...can be summed up by the one word 'OPPRESSION'."[40] He emphasizes the institution of the lash: "Twenty-five was the standard number of lashes awarded for any offence and it was often inflicted by the German N.C.O.s" who were mostly illiterate. "Natives tell of how these men when administering a flogging would smoke a cigarette between the lashes, and few things are more abhorrent to natives than this cold, calculating method of inflicting punishment." Bell finds:

> The order for forced labour on government cotton plantations, whereby slaves and freemen worked together under conditions of slavery, was the load of oppression which

> finally sent the ediface tumbling down. The native could endure the lashes on his body but, when blows on his pride were added, he turned to fight in desperation.[41]

Yet Henderson argues that "if the revolt was due to resentment against forced labour and the hut tax and to the harsh treatment of the native inhabitants by the Germans and by minor Swahili and Arab officials" as alleged by critics of the German administration, then it is inexplicable that only the southern part of the country was in rebellion.[42]

The facts which seem indisputable are these. A medicine-man distributed magic water with the claim that he had been sent by God to do so. To the water was attributed the power to protect crops from wild animals and to make them florish. "Those who drank the water and anointed themselves with it would have health and wealth, be immune from witchcraft, and in time of war would be invulnerable to the bullets and missiles of the enemy." Soon the idea spread "that even Europeans were not strong enough to overcome the power of the water."[43] This was not surprising, for previous to this time similar ideas had been expressed among various African tribes. Among the Bena the whites were thought to have protected and spread witchcraft; in 1898 the Konde were told by a prophet that the whites' disappearance would occur, but that it could be hastened by a sacrifice; again in 1904 the Konde were told by their God that he would drive the whites away. Similar expectations are also recorded for 1907. Generally, in the period preceding the Maji-Maji Rebellion, "Europeans were considered to possess evil powers."[44] It was thus quite appropriate that Africans extend the application of their traditional magico-divine safeguards against evils to the Europeans, especially when they could attribute traditional evils like witchcraft to the Europeans.

The Rebellion was the first inter- or supra-tribal African resistance to alien rule, with nine tribes over an area of some 100,000 square miles in the southern part of the territory participating.[45] There were several unusual features of the Rebellion that merit attention. First, none of the militant tribes like the Hehe took part in it, a fact that can be attributed to their having experienced the power of German arms at first hand during the period of pacification a decade before.[46] The tribes that participated had theretofore been noted for their peaceful character; yet the rebels exhibited a fanatical disregard for death: "Shouting 'Maji-Maji'--'Water! Water!'-- they faced a hail of bullets without flinching."[47] Moreover, the rebels spared no one connected in any way with the German regime or who failed to join them: Arabs, Swahilis, akidas, jumbes, missionaries, "even small boys in the service of German askari and porters carrying loads of merchandise."[48] It was clear that they envisioned a total destruction of the new order that had been imposed upon them. An estimated 120,000 persons perished in the course of the Rebellion,[49] which resulted in widespread disease and famine.[50]

Bell denies "that the rebellion was a religious war." Yet he maintains that "the witchdoctors who dispensed the magic water...were regarded as intermediaries of a divine power"; that "eventually Mohammedans, Christians, and heathens all joined the cause and, no matter what their religion might be, all regarded the cause as a divine mission"; and that the rebels regarded themselves as God's soldiers.[51] Apparently Bell means that it was not the war of a religion such as Islam, Christianity, or a tribal religion; for it is certainly indisputable from his evidence that the African rebels conceived of themselves as active in a divinely sanctioned eradication of a great evil. The Rebellion thus had strong overtones of a ritual act. When, however, it was decisively put down by the relatively small German forces,[52] the ultimate outcome could only be the waning of African belief in the efficacy of the divine powers upon which they traditionally relied, a more rapid adoption of Western ideas and practices, and a search for a new relief from European domination. It is therefore not surprising that one of the British administrators who best understood the Africans observed that in the period prior to World War II "almost divine qualities were ascribed to the White Man" by the Africans.[53] The new relief from alien domination came in the form of the nationalist movement of the 1950s and after, and this movement explicitly looked to the Maji-Maji experience for inspiration and for the lesson that a successful alternative must avoid violence.[54]

The Maji-Maji Rebellion marked the last significant African resistance to German rule. It had taken two decades to pacify the country, and Germany was to have control over the area for less than a decade before the war with Britain would sweep across the territory. Nevertheless, the era from 1907 to 1914 was considered a period of peaceful reform and progress. The era began with the transfer in 1907 of colonial affairs from the chancellor's office to a newly created colonial ministry, and with the appointment of Bernhard Dernberg as Secretary for the Colonies. Dernberg initiated a policy of "scientific colonization,"[55] holding that "the progress of civilization" made possible the use of "the most advanced theoretical and practical knowledge in all fields." The new policy was "to colonize by building up instead of by tearing down, in which process the missionary and the physician play just as important a role as the railway and the machine."[56]

Götzen's successor as Governor was Dr. Albrecht Freiherr von Rechenberg, the first governor who had not been a professional soldier. Rechenberg, who governed from 1906 to 1912, was in agreement with Dernberg's purposes and sought to implement them in East Africa. Recognizing the African as their paramount concern in the colony, they opposed the exploitation of the Africans and their resources in the interest of the settlers. With Dernberg's approval,[57] Rechenberg "strongly opposed the indiscriminate use of the whip"; he "promoted the extension of native health and education services and fostered scientific advance in tropical agriculture to benefit native cultivators."[58] Accordingly, flogging was restricted to a punitive measure, officially administered, only for a healthy, fully grown man, to the limit of twenty-five lashes; it could not be given as a disciplinary measure or by a private person. After 1907, compulsory labor was prohibited except for public works, and the Africans were paid for work on public projects; African land could not be sold to settlers.[59] "Between 1902-1914 in East Africa, 99 government schools--10 higher and 89 primary--were established" in addition to the 832 mission schools that existed in 1914. In the year prior to the war, there were 48 on the medical staff in East

Africa treating over 60,000 African patients.[60]

In short, the principles of "dual mandate" were rapidly being adopted in a more obvious way, especially since Dernberg was fostering adoption of British methods of colonial rule.[61] Dernberg's successor and last German colonial secretary, Dr. Solf, told the Reichstag in 1913 that the Africans were Germany's "wards" and that "therefore it is the duty of the German government to consider their just interests as its own."[62]

The conflict between the imperial regime and the settlers was an enduring feature of the British as well as the German period, and it is treated in the following section; it is sufficient here to mention that with Rechenberg it concerned the question whether a commercial or plantation economy should predominate in the colony. This question involved the question of labor, which earlier in the German period had been so emphasized as the crux of German civilizing influence. Henderson writes:

> Employers wanted to expand the labour force by compelling or persuading Africans to seek employment on plantations or public works. Governor Rechenberg tried to prevent this by refusing to levy a poll-tax or to extend...forced labour... Yet Rechenberg himself wanted to secure native labour for public works sponsored by the Administration.[63]

A plantation economy was opposed because it would result in migratory labor, the disruption of tribal society, and the growth of a depressed class of African workers. Yet the number of plantations increased, and it was left to Governor Heinrich Schnee, who assumed office in mid-1912 and remained until the end, to attempt reconciliation between settler interests and beneficial African development.[64] The tension between these two desiderata endured until the war, when it ceased to be a German problem.

One of the important policies of the administration that involved little controversy was the encouragement of missionary education of Africans. Education in German East Africa developed more rapidly than in the British territories.[65] From the beginning of the German period the missionaries more than any other "represented the civilizing mission of the West,"[66] and the Germans regarded them "as the pioneers of civilization." The dominance of the idea that to civilize is to put to work in the thought of Peters and other Germans concerned with the Africans has been noted; the missionaries were also no strangers to this idea, although there was some difference in the emphasis of the regime and the missionaries as Brode makes clear: "The moral education of the natives has been the work of missionary enterprise.../but/ it would perhaps be better if the doctrine of Christian fraternity were less instilled into the natives than the Divine command that 'if any would not work, neither should he eat.'"[67]

The missionaries, particularly the Benedictines whom Peters had successfully sought to obtain, taught both agricultural and industrial skills.[68] As one authority put it:

> A number of missions, especially Roman Catholic, assumed that civilization was a prerequisite of Christianization. Although one Anglican divine complained that the measure of success of mission work had become the ability to grow cabbages, the training which the first converts received...gave them a good start in life...The motive of character formation through manual work was soon combined with that of training for economic self-sufficiency to make converts independent of the need for labour on plantations.[69]

The missionaries, therefore, while sharing with the regime the idea that manual labor had ethical value, nevertheless were more discriminating in their choice of kinds of work than the settlers, whose self-interest was dominant, and the regime that had to accommodate the settlers to some extent. Missionary education continued as a pronounced feature of European work with the Africans throughout the British period, so its full implications will be elaborated in the next section. What must be noted here, however, is that the men most responsible for African education occupied a mediatory position between the German administration and its African subjects that was not without its tensions and dangers. Raum writes:

> Africans found missionaries valuable as advocates in certain situations in which the colonial system placed them. They appealed to the officials on behalf of the Africans and curbed the self-interest of the settlers. In Usumbara, for instance, they secured for the workers the right to choose the farm on which they would work off the three months' compulsory labour per annum...Missionaries advised Africans on the habits of the white man and in turn drew upon their own experiences with Africans to put their case to officials.... /M/any of them...considered among other things the importance of laying the basis of an enduring relationship between rulers and ruled...Such advocacy on behalf of the Africans was certainly appreciated: but it did not prevent occasional expressions of opposition, if not of hostility, towards the mission.[70]

At the root of African suspicion of and opposition to the missionaries were such things as missionary attacks on ancestor-worship and other tribal religio-educational rituals such as initiation, and missionary emphasis on going to school which Africans compared with slavery. Chiefs were jealous of the relationships established by missionaries directly with their tribesmen. "By deciding to live in a certain chiefdom, a missionary was bound to disappoint a neighboring chief, who also wanted 'his white man'."[71] In short, the missionaries represented an opposition to the sanctions of chiefly authority; and to a chief's subjects with whom they dealt directly, they could easily be regarded as representative of the colonial regime which was an authority superior to the chief.

THE BRITISH REGIME

During the Second World War German East Africa was a battleground contested by Allied and German forces.[1] Although the Allied forces never defeated the German defense forces under General von Lettow-Vorbeck, they occupied the territory under instructions to assume progressive administrative control. The intention was not "merely to turn the Germans out of the country," but to conquer it. Still, Germany lost its East African territory in Europe, just as it lost all of its colonial territories there.[2] Germany formally renounced its rights to these possessions in the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, which stipulated that the victorious powers should retain the German colonial territories. The war in German East Africa had devastated the country, so that a temporary administration under Horace Byatt was faced with the problems of restoring order and of alleviating disease and famine. This temporary administration was ended by the British Order in Council establishing a permanent administrative organization on July 22, 1920, which was two years before the terms of the League of Nations mandate under which Tanganyika was to be administered were promulgated on July 20, 1922.[3]

The first problem that arises therefore is this: by what right did Britain assume authority over the people of Tanganyika? There was of course a semblance of legal justification in the Treaty of Versailles; yet even here is a problem, for this Treaty was not negotiated with the defeated power, as peace treaties traditionally have been, but was a diktat imposed on Germany by the victors. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was part of the Versailles Treaty, laid down "the principle that the well-being and development" of peoples formerly governed by Germany who were "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world" formed "a sacred trust of civilization." This principle was to be effected by entrusting "tutelage of such peoples...to advanced nations."[4] Here again is the idea, so prevalent in the German writings discussed in the previous part of this chapter, of "civilization" not as a descriptive term for societies with certain identifiable characteristics but as a term indicating a great historical reality, modern in essence, that transcends individual societies. It is significant that this idea of civilization has so prevailed as the sanction of alien power over peoples considered unrepresentative of civilization. Now, however, the pre-eminent representative of civilization is the league of civilized states rather than the several states. Yet the element of superior power that the Germans considered the mark of a bearer of civilization remains; for the League of Nations was organized by the victorious powers, whose pre-eminent position in the League was implied by their permanent seats in the League Council.

There are other aspects of the transfer of authority that allow one to elaborate, and supplement if not amend, this idea. The first aspect was that of the British attempt to justify the transfer of "Germany's prize colony"[5] to Britain. That attempt was based on two claims: first, that Germany was unfit to rule by virtue of its previous colonial record; and second, that the Africans preferred British to German rule. The first claim was developed during World War I, chiefly by the British; and that it was expressed in an Allied Note of June 16, 1919, to the German delegation at Versailles. The Note, emphasizing the priority of "native interests" according to the fifth of President Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 8, 1918, condemned German colonial administration in these terms: "the cruel methods of repression, the arbitrary requisitions, and the various forms of forced labour...resulted in the depopulation of vast expanses of territory in German East Africa." The Note concludes:

> Germany's dereliction in the sphere of colonial civilization has been revealed too completely to admit of the Allied and Associated Powers consenting to make a second experiment and of assuming the responsibility of again abandoning...millions of natives to a fate from which the war has delivered them.[6]

Charles Dundas had been appointed at the end of the war to compile an atrocity report on German rule in East Africa; but his report was never published. Dundas' later comments on this task are nevertheless instructive. He claims not to have been "blindly biased against the enemy," yet notes that "it was idle to imagine that a wholly impartial exposition of German administration was desired." His familiarity with German rule made him "well aware" that the merits of German administration were more than balanced by "grave shortcomings" and were insufficient "to exonerate them from the charge of misrule." Dundas utilized "to the utmost German sources of information, so as to convict the Hun out of his own mouth." Dundas' references to the Germans as "the Hun" and "the master race"[7] may bespeak an attitude resulting from the Nazi period; but disregarding them, one still finds Dundas revealing sufficient indication that the report could not have presented an integral picture of German rule. His assignment was not to write a general assessment of German administration; it was rather to compile a documented record of German atrocities. Assuming that every atrocity recorded actually occurred, it would still be a matter of judgement whether German colonial practices were significantly different from the practices of the other colonial powers. And Dundas clearly reveals that his own judgement on this question was formed prior to his undertaking the report. Dundas also reveals the attitude of his superiors; they too had prejudged the case and would certainly not have accepted a report that found German administration anything less than atrocious.

There had built up in Britain during the war strong anti-German feeling and a campaign against return of the German colonies.[8] A major figure in this development was Evans Lewin, librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute in London. Lewin wrote in 1915 that German acquisition of African territories "seemed like the incursion of a wolf into a well-stocked sheepfold."[9] In the introduction to Lewin's book Earl Grey asserted that while the British "acquired colonies either in order to protect ill-treated natives, and to substitute peace, law, order, and prosperity for tyranny, bloodshed, famine, and war, or for legitimate purposes of trade, Germany had in her colonisation been actuated by military considerations." With this understanding, he adds:

> Mr. Lewin also shows that extensive areas in Africa might have been reclaimed from savage barbarism, and won for the higher purposes of British civilisation, if the efforts of patriotic Britons gifted with disinterested imagination, humanitarian sympathies, and unfaltering resolution had been supported by H. M. Government.[10]

Three things need be pointed out in Grey's position: he first appears to subordinate trade to protection of the Africans as proper motives for the acquisition of colonies; he sees no conflict between patriotism and humanitarianism in the colonial movement; and finally, he emphasizes "British civilization" in contrast to those who speak simply of "civilization." The latter point is most important, for if civilization is considered only insofar as it is national in character--that is, as specifically British as opposed to European or western or universal--then there can be no tension between patriotism, understood as nationalist chauvinism, and humanitarianism, regarded as a civilizing mission. That this line of thought is appropriate can be shown from Lewin's own ideas, for these ideas were the explicit occasion and basis of Grey's statements. Lewin is at great pains to demonstrate the economic advantages of Germany's colonies to Britain.[11] He mixes moralistic criticism of German colonialism with a call for a British campaign to obtain Germany's colonies. "The mailed Teutonic fist was unwelcome amongst peoples unused to methods of German culture," and German native policy failed "because they have been unwilling to learn from other nations and have initiated methods of their own, 'peculiar to the German spirit,' that have been quite unsuitable when dealing with native races."[12] Several comments should at this juncture be made: British methods were no more familiar to Africans in the German territories than German methods were; and, of greater import, Lewin criticizes the Germans for utilizing methods peculiar to their national spirit and not learning from other nations, but he nowhere suggests that the British would learn from the Germans and not be motivated by the British trade spirit. Grey's concern to spread British civilization and Lewin's criticism of the Germans for, in effect, equating civilization with German ways are inexplicable unless one concludes that there has been an oversight or that there is an unstated assumption that the British are pre-eminently the representatives of civilization. In any event, the implication is there; and it is in a work whose purpose is to prepare the country for the assumption of rule over the German colonies, despite Lewin's recognition that German abuses were more characteristic of the early period of German rule and that there was a change in the German attitude toward the Africans during the final years resulting in "great efforts..., especially in East Africa," to benefit the Africans through education.[13]

The significant aspect of Lewin's position is that while extremely critical of Peters, it is in certain important ways the same as Peters. Lewin, for instance, says that Peters' treaties were in reality the pitiful legal symbols of the doctrine that might is right," and that "the action of Europeans in taking possession of native territories was but the exercise of la force majeure under the polite observances and customs which are the veneer of any civilised nation."[14] Yet he asserts essentially the same argument that Peters made: "To raise a colonial system upon a foundation of blood can only be justified should there be no other alternative and should success ultimately attend the sacrifice of the potentially valuable life." Lewin does assert a different criterion in raising the question "whether the Germans have justified their self-appointed guardianship over the native races by bringing to them the blessings of civilisation," but his emphasis like that of the Germans is on the legitimacy of any means required for the acquisition of colonial territory that would benefit the Europeans. Lewin's key words are "success" and "potentially valuable life." Civilization is for him the standard, and this standard is closely associated if not identified with economic benefit for the Europeans: financially the sacrifice of life "can only be justified in the event of the industrial output being increased owing to the 'removal' of the native population."[15] Germany is to be condemned because its economic "success has been achieved...in spite of the dragooning of the natives, and not because of it." The German sin was first and foremost "indiscretion."[16] Discretion is, of course, a virtue commonly regarded as one of the major characteristics of British statesmanship and character. British interest and culture is the mark of civilization.

This identification of British characteristics with civilization is particularly clear in the post-war assessment of German rule in Africa which we now consider. The book is by an anonymous British author who clearly has a knowledge of and interest in African colonial affairs. The book's title is The Prussian Lash in Africa, which is indicative of much of its contents; and it draws its examples of German colonial practices primarily from the early period, giving major emphasis to Peters. This book adopts the uncompromising position that Anglo-German partnership in Africa would be impossible because "the two countries follow opposite ideals and conflicting policies." British policy, which is wise from even a selfish viewpoint, is beneficial and popular among the Africans: the African "is allowed to maintain his own tribal organisation, and the native chief is made the link between the people and the Government"; he is free to work for anyone whom he prefers and thus "he is not a serf"; and consequently "the native population in British territories is prosperous, numerous, and independent."[17] But German policy is described as quite different:

> From the beginning the Germans went upon opposite lines. Their hatred and scorn of everything British made them the more determined to prove that their way was right and our way wrong....They established a Prussian militarism on a foundation of terror and power; they denied all rights to the native...As the underlying principle was coercion, so the instruments were cruelty and force....
>
> The German military system in Africa is the key of German policy. Those who know anything of Africa know that the native tribes may be divided into two classes, rulers and subject races, exploiters and exploited. The great mass of the natives have always been the terrified subjects ...of a comparatively few warrior tribes...This system the Germans found, and this system they adapted with cruel ingenuity to their own ends. The warrior races were turned into German soldiers....and it was their privilege to tyrannise over all other natives....Here is the sinister secret of the German boast of the fidelity of their natives. Their soldiers, their askaris,...are indeed faithful to them--at a price; but the price is the betrayal of civilisation to savagery.[18]

Despite the exaggerations in this comparison of British and German colonial administration, these passages are remarkable in the insight they afford into British thinking. The claim is made that Africans under British rule are free; but this is a peculiar sort of freedom, for the Africans are "allowed" by the British to keep their tribal organization and the chiefs are "made" intermediary administrative officials between the colonial authority and the people. This is perhaps not coercive in the sense that it was undoubtedly preferred by Africans to any alternative possibility, but it certainly was coercive in that the Africans had no choice in the matter and would have been put down by force if they openly resisted what the British had determined for them. This much we know at least from the above account of British rule in the Gold Coast, and it will also be evident from the following treatment of British rule in Tanganyika.

The above characterization of German rule would apply much more to the earlier period than to the years immediately prior to the war, but even here one's attention is drawn to the attitude accompanying the characterization. It appears that the Germans went wrong precisely in their unwillingness to take a British rather than a German approach to the question of colonial policy.[19] The British way is unquestionably the humane and civilized way.

The description of indigenous African rule is important, for it provides the basis of the accusation that there was a German "betrayal of civilisation to savagery." It is of course not true that a few militant tribes exercised tyrannical power over all the other tribes, but the important point to be made in this connection is that the Germans are accused of adapting their administration to a prevailing African system. The British are said to do likewise with respect to the tribal system of presumably peaceful tribes; so the accusation boils down to Germany favoring different tribes than the British would favor. Again the dominant idea is that the British standard is the standard of righteousness and civilization.

The singular flaw in the whole British view is the contradiction inherent in their criticism of German rule and their justification of British rule: Germany is condemned for imposing an unpopular rule that constitutes the sell-out of civilization to barbarism; while Britain is praised for exercising an authority justified by its purpose of civilizing--that is, changing--Africans, and that authority is also justified by the argument that it is popular. This contradiction could be avoided only by assuming that the Africans wanted to be changed, and that they wanted to change just as the British wanted to see them changed. The latter assumption would, however, imply a community of interests commonly shared by the British and the Africans. That such a shared perception of common interests did not in fact obtain is a major burden of this chapter to establish. In fact, when the idea of common interests is explicitly discussed, as it is in the book in question, there is expressed the recognition that the African must learn to understand and accept these interests: "the white man's chief work in Africa is to administer and manage this great native population. If he does this work...justly, without harshness, and yet without weak sentimentality he earns the gratitude of the native and produces the essentials of civilisation--gold, diamonds, and...varied tropical products."20

If the British were satisfied that they had shown Germany to be an unfit representative of civilization in Africa because of the aforementioned features of German colonial rule, they could not have been satisfied that their most important claim to rightful authority had been established. It was deemed a requirement of democracy that it be shown that the people of East Africa wanted to be ruled by the British rather than the Germans. This was not a fully separate justification for the transfer of authority; for it was assumed that Africans, having experienced the harsh rule of the Germans, would jump at the chance to exchange their German masters for British ones. Accordingly, the British government ordered an inquiry after the war to determine what the Africans preferred. The inquiry was dutifully reported, and the report proved a disappointment to the British. It was therefore ignored. Sir Charles Dundas, who served in the British colonial service in Tanganyika until 1928, the last three years as Secretary for Native Affairs, writes of the inquiry:

> It was, of course, fatuous to pretend that any answer to such a question could be taken as a free and genuine expression of native opinion. Even Africans are not so simple as to tell the victor that they prefer to be ruled by the vanquished. Moreover, in conditions of warfare the natives hardly had an opportunity to judge between the old and the new masters....If the truth were known, the native might have said the equivalent of: 'A plague on both your houses.' More resignedly, he said: 'When two elephants fight the grass will be trodden down'. Which was the heavier-footed elephant did not greatly matter, in double sense both were white.[21]

This result could have been anticipated: Africans in the area of Tanganyika had generally remained loyal to the Germans during the war,[22] and the German Commander Lettow-Vorbeck cites the frank admission of an African that it was all the same to Africans whether they were ruled by Germans or British.[23]

The report on the inquiry was worse than inconclusive, as Schnee pointed out:

> The result of the inquiry...appears in still worse light when we consider
>
> (1) That the purpose of the inquiry was to furnish a justification for the seizure of German colonial property by the British;
>
> (2) That British troops had captured the territory in question by force of arms and were in complete occupation; and
>
> (3) That the subjects of the inquiry were natives, who notoriously are given to currying favour with their patrons and easily yield to persuasion and the pressure of the moment.[24]

Thus the report concluded that further inquiry of a public nature would be imprudent as it would have an unsettling effect, and that the idea of self-determination was inapplicable. Sir Horace Byatt, who was to serve as Administrator (1916-1920) and first Governor (1920-1925) of Tanganyika, wrote in the report quite frankly that the Africans might not prefer British rule, and that the requirements of the war had made the British unpopular in German East Africa. He concluded:

> I am opposed in any case to the application of European theories of self-determination to the uncivilized natives of Africa...The negro in his present stage of development is intellectually incapacitated by his general ignorance from deciding...his own real interests....It is for the European ruler to decide these questions for him, and then assume the responsibility of giving him an enlightened and progressive system of government designed directly for his improvement.[25]

Thus the interwar period already had its major characteristic already stated: the ideal was to be the "improvement" of the Africans during a time when their influence on how they were to be governed had reached its nadir.[26]

The tenuous basis of British claims to German colonial territory was strengthened by President Wilson's extension of General Smut's proposal of a mandate system for the Turkish possessions to the German colonies. As U.S. Secretary of State Lansing wrote: "In actual operation the apparent altruism of the mandatory system worked in favour of the selfish and material interests of the Powers which accepted the mandates."[27] Britain got most of East Africa and was able to justify the acquisition in terms of the League of Nations idea of mandate despite the poor results of the attempt to find a basis in African expressions of preference. If this democratic basis was not to be had, the old idea of representing civilization was a handy substitute. Thus British Under-Secretary of State Amery stated in the House of Commons: "we have justified our authority not merely in our own interests, but by the general consent of other nations with regard to this rule."[28] Since "other nations" could be no other than the League members, particularly the allied victors in the war, and these nations' consent was deemed sufficient, the implication is that the League is the representative of mankind or at least its superior and thus its representative part, the civilized world. Yet Sir Charles Dundas, as much a part of British rule of Africans in Tanganyika as anyone, writes:

> It may be asked why Britain then consented to accept this country under a mandate. I think the answer is that she did not want to appear laden with the spoils of war. It was a gesture of renunciation of imperialistic aims and ambitions. And with that gesture I believe the grand conception of Empire was discarded.[29]

This suggests that the British clothed naked acquisitiveness with the appearance of higher motivation, but that the appearance then took on the substance of reality. It raises the question whether the British with their vast colonial experience learned, as the Germans very quickly discovered, that an explicit concern for African welfare, like honesty, pays in the business of colonialism. Further inquiry into the appearance should point to an answer.

As mandatory power, Britain was accorded "full powers of legislation and administration" by the Council of the League of Nations. Under the terms of the mandate Britain was to "be responsible for the peace, order and good government of the Territory" and was bound to "undertake to promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants."[30] These definitions were specifications of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League which, as shown at the beginning of this section, laid down the principle that the tutelage of the German colonies by "advanced nations" was "a sacred trust of civilization." Article 22 stressed that the central African peoples "are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals." Freedom of religion was repeated in the terms of mandate, which extended that freedom to the missionaries from all countries in the League.[31]

Consider the implications of these ideas. Britain is considered a representative of "civilization" embodied in the League. "Civilization" is typically represented by states victorious in war; it sacralizes the power it confers, for it is considered the highest achievement a people can attain. It is man-made salvation, the ultimate issue of progress in history.[32] Moreover, it can be taught; thus the powers it sanctions are tutors or, perhaps better, the missionaries of civilization. If these elements of victory in modern welfare and of tutelage are examined, the conclusion is inescapable that knowledge of the modern sciences, from sociology and psychology to physics and engineering, and their products, managerial and technological prowess, constitute a dominant constituent of "civilization." Hence the assumption by Peters and others that European firepower was a major sign of European superiority; hence the major emphasis on economic development, which will be shown to have dominated the concern of the British as well as of the German regime.

We have called the colonial powers missionaries of civilization, and we have also shown the regard of the League of Nations for missionary endeavors. Several questions thus emerge: what is the relationship between the Africans' freedom of religion and the missionaries' freedom to proselytize; are the African indigenous religions and the proselytizing religions tolerantly regarded as having equal value or validity, or is the League indifferent to this question? What is the relationship between the religious missionaries and the missionaries of the civilization whose responsibilities are "sacred"? Pertinent to the first set of questions is this: despite the promise of freedom of religion for the Africans, the League went out of its way explicitly to protect missionary activities emanating from League members. Since virtually all League members were Christian countries and in any case among the League members Christianity was the only proselytizing religion of any probable consequence to Africans, the League was in effect sanctioning massive attempts to convert Africans from their tribal religions to the religion of the European powers. This implication is reinforced by the common knowledge that the mandatories were wont to entrust education in their African colonies to Christian missionaries, and by knowledge that African religions were not conducive to the kind of civilizational advances envisioned by the "civilized world."[33] Thus the guarantee of freedom of religion for the Africans was pre-eminently a dedication to their free conversion rather than a protection of the religious basis of their life from the tribally disintegrating force of alien influences. That the missionary influence had the effect of disintegrating tribal society and culture necessarily followed from the missionary practices in the pre-war territories of the Gold Coast, German East Africa and all the other colonies as well; the missionaries were pre-eminently the bearers of modern Western culture, which they so closely associated with their evangelism that they often regarded some measure of Westernization a necessary prerequisite for Christianization.[34] The second of our questions is thereby partly answered: the missionaries of civilization regarded the Christian missionaries as their allies, for they deemed Christianity and modern technological progress two aspects of the same thing. This is not the place to examine this question thoroughly, for many scholars have competently dealt with it and have concluded that the modern West is post-Christian in its essential character and that in it Christianity is prevalently considered a market-place ethic.[35] The League Covenant itself elevated morality to a position superior to religion by making the religious freedom of the Africans subject to the maintenance of morals. Since the mandatory power was made the judge of what is moral (subject of course to the supervision of the League), there could be no doubt that men imbued with the modern ethic identified with Christianity would find much in African religion repugnant to morality. Thus the major political effect of British rule in Tanganyika as in the Gold Coast was the weakening of the religious sanctions of traditional authority and the dissolution of the indigenous societal orders.

Britain therefore undertook the administration of Tanganyika without undue concern over being restricted by the terms of her mandate. As Ingham writes:

> For the mandatory system left the administering power with a very free hand to design its own policy. This was still unashamedly a colonial era and the leading signatories of the peace treaty were all colonial powers. It was not, therefore, their intention to impose too close a restraint upon the experienced colonial rulers.[36]

The Tanganyika Order in Council of July 22, 1920,[37] which formally organized the administration of Tanganyika, required the Governor to "respect existing native laws and customs, except so far as the same may be opposed to justice and morality." The League Covenant and the terms of the mandate were not mentioned.

The Order established the usual institutions of Governor, representing the king and having broad powers, and an executive council, administrative service and high court. The Secretary of State in London retained a complete power of disallowance. Byatt remained as the first Governor until 1924, and he largely adopted the German system of administering the country with a small group of officials and the use on the local level of Akidas, who were almost never natives of the districts in which they exercised authority. The 32 administrative districts created by the Germans were retained, often with only one government officer in each district despite immense distances and large populations. The financial system provided that Africans contribute most of the territory's revenue through hut and poll taxes and customs duties. In this sytem the European colonists had a privileged position.[38]

In Tanganyika there were always two attitudes toward the natives and two ideas of what policy toward them should be, namely the colonial administration's and the colonists'. Governor Byatt was roundly condemned by the editor of the Dar es Salaam Times as a "negrophilist" for reportedly saying that the development of African agriculture was the key to Tanganyika's future.[39] "There was no doubt in the Europeans' minds that the best means of benefiting the African population was to increase the demand for labour, thereby, as they argued, putting money into the Africans' pockets, food into their stomachs and clothes on their backs."[40] In short, what was good for the European economically was bound to be to the African advantage also.

The official view of the Africans was slightly different. In late 1921 Governor Byatt issued a Native Authority Ordinance that placed African authorities under the authority of the British local administrative officers.[41] It was explained in these words:

> The system of administration is to support and supervise, with the least possible interference, the native administration as existing or established....In many districts... the chiefs have scant control over their subjects, and efforts are made to reinstate them in the proper and just

> regard of their people...In many...cases, it is to be feared that the chiefs have as yet little conception of their duties and responsibilities. For the most part men in middle life, too young to abdicate but too old to progress, they are brought up in the enjoyment of despotic privileges, of which they have been shorn, and are unable to adapt themselves to the new order. Uneducated and uncivilized, they are really in sympathy with the past...Fortunately such chiefs are by no means the majority, and on the other hand, there are many tribes which possess a well developed capacity for administration whose Sultans are energetic and progressive rulers. Amongst these the functions of the district officers are, in the main, advisory....It has been the policy of the Administration always with the consent of tribesmen to restore central authority to the hands of the rightful paramount chiefs, and this policy is showing pleasing results in the better ordering of tribal affairs.[42]

This passage makes clear that the British administration from almost the very beginning looked to the indigenous authorities as potentially, and in some cases actually, the best local administrators. Yet the indigenous authorities are considered transformed in character, for customary "despotic privileges" have been withdrawn and adaptation to "the new order" is essential. Thus government recognition and definition is the basis of their position of authority, and certainly not any traditional constitutional sanctions. African consent is deemed important as a practical necessity if the authorities are to function effectively, but is not considered in any way productive of the legitimacy of the authorities.

Sir Donald Cameron was governor of Tanganyika during the period 1925-1931, before which he had spent 17 years in Nigeria where he had worked with the system of "indirect rule" developed by Lord Lugard.[43] According to Lugard, the African chiefs were to have a defined status and duties within a single government system:

> The native chiefs...were not to be regarded as independent rulers. They were the delegates of the Governor whose representative was the Resident. The Central Government reserved to itself the sole right to raise and control armed forces, to impose taxation of any kind, to make laws and to dispose of such lands as are, under native law and custom, vested in the paramount power.[44]

To the recognition of "native chiefs" as local authorities was later added the establishment of native treasuries and native courts; and from these three elements Cameron, developing what Byatt had begun, created a local administrative system in Tanganyika.[45]

Cameron stated his purpose in a circular in 1925, which we quote at length: -

> Everyone, whatever his opinion may be in regard to direct or indirect rule, will agree, I think, that it is our duty to do everything in our power to develop the native on lines which will not Westernize him and turn him into a bad imitation of a European -- our whole education policy is directed to that end. We want to make him a good African and we shall not achieve this if we destroy all the institutions, all the traditions, all the habits of the people, super-imposing upon them what we consider to be better administrative methods, better principles; destroying everything that made our administration really in touch with the customs and thoughts of the people....
>
> It may be argued that we can achieve our object by continuing the present practice of using the chiefs as our instruments, as our mouthpieces through whom the orders of the Government are issued to the people, but with all the disintegrating influences that are at work to impair the authority of the chief over his people, ...above all, the orders of the 'Whiteman' to the chief, that authority will be undermined and will completely disappear...
>
> ....
>
> With the decay of the tribal organization we shall get a numerous body of broken and disgruntled chiefs, disaffected... and hostile to the Administration. The natives will have ceased to be tribesmen and...will have become mere flotsam on the political sea of Tanganyika. No native will have any share in the

> administration of the country, but a class of politically-minded natives will have arisen in the meantime (this must come with the spread of education, guard it as we may) and the seed of the agitator will have had a very...fertile soil prepared for it.
>
> On the other hand we could employ the other method of trying, while we endeavored to purge the native system of its abuses, to graft our higher civilization upon the soundly rooted native stock,...moulding it and establishing it into lines consonant with modern ideas and higher standards...Under this system the native becomes a living part of the machinery of government and the cry of the agitator for a large share in the administration of the country on western lines loses any weight...
>
> ...It is quite impossible for us to administer the country directly through British officers...[46]

Explication of the meaning and implications of this passage can best be effected with the aid of the personal testaments of Cameron and other top British administrators in interwar Tanganyika.

The first major assertion of the quoted passage is perhaps the most difficult to handle, and it is the most important. Cameron thinks that everyone would agree that it is the British duty to develop the African without Westernizing him. Here is an authoritative expression of British colonial purpose, and it accords with the modern African nationalist purpose to produce a civilization that is both wholly modern and wholly African. The nationalist position is developed in the following chapters, so we shall limit ourselves to the explication of this one of its roots. The dominant feature of Cameron's idea is its ambiguity and apparent self-contradiction. The "good African" is distinguished from "a bad imitation of a European," a distinction that could imply that a good African would be a good imitation of a European or at least an African who selectively, gradually and without disrupting society models himself after his British mentors who are noted for their discretion. Dundas expresses the educational implementation of the policy: "The aim, I thought, should be to preserve what was worthy and genuine in the African character rather than to turn out a poor imitation of English youth," for the latter would have left "his soul behind and be left only with ideas and cash."[47] A "poor imitation" would thus be a materialistic ideologue, if such is possible.

Turning Cameron's idea around, one observes that the British administration is to be "in touch" with African ways, and that it is not to destroy "all" the habits, traditions and institutions of the Africans. Which, then, are to be destroyed? Cameron gives partial answer that "with the advance of education a people thus becoming enlightened cannot be expected to continue faithful to a native authority which is reactionary and oppressive in its tendencies, especially where (as in some instances but not to a great extent in Tanganyika) it depends for its influence on fetish and superstition for the most part."[48] The alternative turned out not to be a purged and transformed indigenous authority but a new modern African authority.

Sir Phillip Mitchell was the Acting Secretary for Native Affairs under Cameron and his successors between 1925 and 1934. He tells how Cameron and himself proceeded to implement indirect rule "with the enthusiasm of religious revivalists," and he speaks of its devotees as a sort of orgiastic cult of monks.[49] This was the passion of an idea, an idea of what could be accomplished by dedicated men. According to Mitchell, the idea worked: indirect rule was a successful attempt to adapt old tribal authorities to modern conditions and needs.[50] The assumption was that the African chiefs and people were in favor of the changes envisioned.

Mitchell held that the tribal system was "essentially and strongly democratic," and that therefore "an extremely democratic system" would "be attractive to them because it stretches back into their own past."[51] Thus he and Cameron agreed that the destruction of the old institutions, traditions, customs and habits of the people would not make the African "a good African." It was necessary to avoid "a European veneer and outlook totally out of keeping with /African/ conditions."[52] The British were to guide the Africans in modernizing the tribal system, "helping--obliging, if you like--the African to civilize himself."[53] This implies the assumption that the British really understood the tribal system, and the term "obliged" can mean only one of two things: either that the Africans will change in accordance with British direction out of a sense of obligation to obey a superior authority, or that the Africans will be coerced to change. Yet Cameron wants to prevent Africans from "becoming a servile people," and to keep their society together: "we want to make him proud of being an African; ...on the basis of a true African civilization stimulated in the first instance by our own culture and example." He rejects the idea that the adoption of Western clothing and other conveniences ruins the African's chances of remaining African.[54] No better statement of the later African nationalists' raison d'etre can be imagined that that of Cameron's. Governor and anticolonialists agree. Only the later African nationalists pierced the weak link in the armour of this argument by seeing that no alien rule could make a people servile to it proud. When Mitchell, with the tribes in mind, asserts that the African must rise above narrow nationalism if he is to be civilized,[55] the Pan-African nationalist will go him one better by attempting to rise above a nationalism of the colonial territory. Insofar as his vision soars to the scope of an African civilization, he will rise above the members of the once vaunted European civilization whose horizons are circumscribed by national purpose.

The purpose of colonialism and of Mitchell himself, says Mitchell, is to help the African "to believe in" the modern world, a world for which the Bible has all the answers.[56] According to Cameron, material progress is the key to "moral progress and social advancement." In this, the Africans educated by European teachers are to raise Africa from primitiveness and barbarism to "something higher in the scale of civilization."[57] Here, then, is a basis for the African dedication to economic development. The modern African leaders, as we shall see in the upcoming chapters, often use biblical terminology to express their faith in the modernizing African mission. Insofar as these ideas were enshrined in the United Nations oversight of the trust territories, the UN maintained the League's purpose in Tanganyika; and that purpose, backed by international (world) sanction influenced the movement of Tanganyika to independence under Nyerere.[58] The pattern had long been laid.

Our conclusion to this second part of the study is that colonial rule was inherently contradictory and therefore inherently hypocritical. Its contradiction was revealed in its claim and attempt to subordinate and yet to protect, and coexist with, indigenous chiefly authority. It was hypocritical in that this claim, embodied in the policy of indirect rule, was belied, particularly in Ashanti and Tanganyika, by the original antagonism and conflict between chiefs and European imperialists. The very pretension of ruling indirectly presupposed a higher and more valid purpose for colonial authority, rendering invalid the previous raison d'etre of chiefly rule. If the chiefs could legitimately be retained under the colonial regime, the legitimizing principle was no longer the same as before. If the name was retained, the chiefs were no longer really chiefs: they were made the instruments, in intention if not in full actuality, of the imperialists' higher purpose; and thus their authority was derivative and based on the same principles that legitimized its source, the colonial regime.

Yet this is but half the story. For the policy of indirect rule necessarily implied that the Africans did not consider the raison d'etre of colonial rule valid, that they rejected colonial rule as authoritative. Had they accepted the colonial principle, there would have been no reason for instituting indirect rule. Indirect rule could be instrumental to the colonial purpose only to the extent that either the African people were deceived about who was really ruling them or the chiefs could effectively reconcile the dominant purposes of their own societies and of the colonial regime. Since the two purposes were essentially opposed and incapable of reconciliation, deception emerges as the paramount characteristic of indirect rule. Deception, however, can go only so far before it is dissolved by obstreperous reality. Hypocrisy in a man is one thing. When it is not only public and institutionalized but instrumental in intention, then it is something quite different. The instrument of indirect rule could endure as long as it was not used.

Once the attempt was made to use it to move African societies toward ends that they rejected, the deception was broken: the Africans became aware that the colonial regime was not only more powerful but was incompatible with the old order. This double awareness underlies and informs the modernizing, anti-colonial movement of the post-war period. Since the colonial regime was more powerful, even in traditional African terms it was more valid; for the divine typically was experienced as manifest in power and effectiveness. Moreover, as Africans came to master the modernizing skills through Western education, they came to reject colonial power as illegitimate because it was alien and thus incompatible with the principle of self-determination. In short, traditional Africa and modern Europe seemed to agree that power itself implied an authoritative sanction, even though the essence, and therefore the meaning, differed; for the African initially experienced power as a divine or spiritual force, while the Europeans and Westernized Africans had a scientific and ideological, basically historical, interpretation of it.

The inquiry moves, then, to the African leaders who superseded both the African chiefs and the imperial regimes as the supreme powers.

PART THREE: MODERN AFRICAN AUTHORITY

THE NKRUMAH AND NYERERE REGIMES

In Part One of this study it was shown that the indigenous political authorities in the Gold Coast and Tanganyika are of one essential type, and that in these African societies the experience of authority (legitimate power) was inherent in the very experience of effective power itself: this type of regime and societal order was called "African." Part Two of this study concluded that the colonial regimes also understood their authority to be inherent in their superiority of power, wherein scientific knowledge and technology were considered both the marks and the substance of the power to make "history" in the form of "civilization"; and that this conception ultimately came to be shared by many of their African subjects. In this Third Part it is our purpose to examine the modern African regimes in these two countries now known as Ghana and Tanzania.

Here our procedure will differ somewhat from that of the previous parts of this study: instead of treating each regime in separate chapters before comparing them, we shall in each of the three final chapters deal with certain common characteristics of the two regimes. We do so because both President Nkrumah of Ghana and President Nyerere of Tanzania have interpreted themselves as Pan-African leaders of the same type; because both have headed political parties in what are called "one-party states"; because the Nyerere regime has consciously followed some of the examples of the Nkrumah regime; and because copious data relevant to this part of the study are adequately compiled and described in recent, easily available works.[1]

Kwame Nkrumah (in 1947) and Julius Nyerere (in 1952)[2] returned to their countries after some years of university study abroad to organize political "parties" and very rapidly to achieve leadership of what are generally known as "national independence movements." Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) and Nyerere's Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) won a series of elections, the former in 1951, 1954, and 1956 and the latter in 1958/59 and 1960, which secured the hegemony of the two parties; Nkrumah (from 1951 to 1957) and Nyerere (from 1960 to 1961) assumed leadership of the government under the British in a "dyarchy"[3] wherein authority was shared between colonial and African regimes; Ghana and Tanganyika came to independence in 1957 and 1961 respectively; both replaced the independence constitutions with republican constitutions, Ghana in 1960 and Tanganyika in 1962, as Nkrumah and Nyerere became Presidents rather than Prime Ministers formally under the British monarchy; in 1964 Tanganyika united with Zanzibar to form the United Republic of Tanzania, which the following year became constitutionally, and self-consciously, a one-party state; and in early 1966 the Nkrumah regime was overthrown in a military coup.

Such are the major events of the Nkrumah and Nyerere periods, the contents of the stages in these periods being roughly as follows: the period of pre-independence political activity, during which Nkrumah and Nyerere successfully created a political organization, competed with both the African kings and other African claimants to modern territorial leadership for recognition of their authority by both the African people and the colonial regime, opposed the colonial regime with unwelcome demands for independence, and cooperated with the colonial regime in the transition to independence; the post-independence period, during which the two African regimes sought, with considerable success, to weaken or eliminate the authority of African kings or chiefs, to eradicate all symbols and break all ties of subservience to Britain and to the West generally, to unify their countries and to mobilize their peoples in pursuit of their ends, and to assert themselves as models for African emulation and as representative African voices in world affairs.

The contents of the pre- and post-independence periods are, in essence, the same. During both periods Nkrumah and Nyerere asserted a claim to rightful authority within and over their countries, presented themselves as Pan-African leaders with a mission beyond their own countries, and contended with three sorts of rivals to leadership: the African kings, and traditionalism in general; the British, and colonialism in general; other modern African politicians, and disunity in general. The fact of independence was important, but the day of independence, despite its symbolic significance and emotional exuberance, was not; for the British remained in the form of military officers, high ranking civil servants, and primarily a pervasive influence exemplified in no small way by the constitutions.

What we have is the emergence of new regimes that claim to be founding a new order, which is at once an explicit expression, in ideology and institutions, of an implicit, essential pre-colonial African order that was in the process of realizing its potential when interrupted by colonial deprivations; a re-formulation of the truth of the old African society in terms of the experience of the destruction of the old societal order by the forces of modern Western civilization as well as in terms of a "new truth" manifested by those forces; and a re-formation of old African institutions according to the exigencies of existence and effective action in the modern world. In their very "beginnings," the new regimes claimed rightful authority as representatives of an old-new, "African but modern," truth; and all that has followed these "beginnings" -- which, as "resumptions" also, are assimilated to the "beginnings" of premodern Africa -- has been but an elaboration of the implications of that claim; or else, since the order is not yet realized, an attempt by the regimes, which are not only the representatives but also the efficient causes of the order, to progress toward the envisioned order. In the examination of the Nkrumah and Nyerere regimes we shall not adhere to the chronology of their development or distinguish phases of their existence; what we are instead concerned to do is to examine the symbols of Nkrumah's and Nyerere's authority as well as the major ideas which these regimes have had of the indigenous African societal orders, of the nature and contemporary political relevance of colonial rule, and of the "African but modern" principles upon which they claim to be instituting a new order.

In order further to specify the intention of this study, it is appropriate that the analysis of the two regimes be prefaced by a brief consideration of the major interpretations of them that already exist.[4] Two American political scientists, David Apter and Henry Bretton, are the two most intensive and prolific students of the Nkrumah regime, and they have expressed quite different conceptions of it. Apter's approach has been that of the political sociologist, and an overly optimistic one at that. He was concerned to portray Nkrumah as an authority whose "charisma" served as the source of a "normative shift away from traditional authority and toward secular authority" ("rational-legal authority") in the form of parliamentary democracy.[5] A year after Ghana's independence Apter already noted "a decline in Nkrumah's charisma," but he still regarded the state as a "one-party democracy" with "genuine elections."[6] By 1963 Apter recognized that parliamentary democracy was hardly the dominant tendency in Ghana. Instead, he claimed that there was a "premature decline of charisma," in which Nkrumah's "charisma was not routinized in secular practices as originally hoped" (at least by Apter) but became "ritualized in a form of neo-traditionalism." Remaining "parliamentary in form," Ghana had become subject to "a mobilization system" with a "Presidential-monarch" at the top. "The nation has replaced the ethnic community. The Presidential-monarch has replaced the chief. The authority of charisma has been ritualized into the special role of the warrior-priest. Ideology has become a political religion...expressed through the militant elect of the party."[7]

Apter's work is deficient on a number of counts. His earlier studies were considerably affected by his assumption of the democratization of Ghana, an assumption which served as the overriding criterion of his analysis. Even more damaging was his uncritical use of the Weberian typology in the analysis of political authority in Ghana.[8] The term charisma, which in Apter's work tended to displace Nkrumah as the object of study and which scholars still prevalently attribute to African and Asian leaders, has been shown to be a particularly weak concept, misleading in a number of ways.[9] In his later work, Apter failed to clarify the nature of the "neo-traditionalist" regime headed by the "Presidential-monarch-warrior-priest." Instead, he began to emphasize the "modernizing" character of the regime as mobilizing all the resources of the country for "a grand assault on the problems of poverty, ignorance, and backwardness." If the regime was unrestrained by constitutional legality, at least it was utilizing its power in a manner acceptable to Apter.[10] Modernization replaced democracy as the criterion in Apter's analysis.[11]

At the same time that Apter was describing Ghana as a "one-party democracy," Henry Bretton was writing of Nkrumah as a mere power-seeker who showed no indication of any democratic orientation.[12] In 1966 he elaborated his interpretation of Nkrumah's rule as wholly personal and authoritarian, served by a political machine, a fact which most scholars (like Apter) obscure by writing of a movement, a party, a government and political institutions in Nkrumah's Ghana. He emphatically denies that anything approaching mass mobilization was ever achieved by Nkrumah,[13] and he argues his "realistic" view against the "nation-building" and "developmental" illusions of most writers on Ghana.[14] Bretton's cynicism is a beneficial dissolvant of the notions of Western scholars who wish to see, and indeed to make, Africa after their own image. His is moreover a useful study of the structure and mechanisms of Nkrumah's power. However, his disregard of the ideas of the regime as irrelevant[15] and his treatment of it as no more than a power structure in themselves constitute an unrealistic approach to politics in Ghana. In his attention to the purposes of the Nkrumah regime, Apter is superior. What remains to be done, after the work of these men, is to examine the self-interpretation of that regime, an examination that sets out with the intention of understanding the experiences and ideas which underlie a regime that consciously and explicitly attempts to base its actions and institutions thereon. Even if, as Apter and Bretton agree, the symbols and ideas serve a useful function in the regime's attempt to maintain its power and to increase its hold on its subjects, nevertheless there are reasons why a regime selects from among many ideas the ones which it finds appropriate to express its position and to appeal to its people.

Another political scientist, Aristide Zolberg, also attempts to classify the form of government in Ghana and other West African states, suggesting that they are "populist and nationalist avatars of what used to be called 'oligarchies' or 'despotic' states." Zolberg himself recognizes the weaknesses of his conceptual apparatus which results in such convoluted statements.[16] The term "avatar" is most awkward, and no major political thinker has ever confused an oligarchical with a despotic regime. One must conclude from Zolberg, as well as from Apter and Bretton (of whose work and differences Zolberg is acutely aware),[17] that it is necessary to begin with an examination of concrete data on the Ghanaian regime, and on any other non-Western regime. A theoretical intention precludes any attempt to assimilate such a regime to categories that have emerged in the study of classical ("oligarchic"), archaic ("despotic"), or modern Western ("parliamentary democratic") regimes. It requires that a determination be made of the fundamental and essential characteristics of the regime and of the mode of societal existence, and that appropriate concepts be made to express those characteristics. Thereby may one elucidate and compare regimes rather than concepts, for concepts have meaning only in reference to the realities that they stand for. Zolberg emphasizes the importance of examining "the legitimacy on which the authority of the rulers of the West African party-state rests," indicating that this concern would properly extend also to "the strikingly similar case of Tanzania."[18] He points to the need of a new start, based on the compilations of extant data and going beyond the recent interpretive studies which merely apply concepts of Western derivation and relevance. The primary current desideratum in the field of African studies is not field research or analysis with the stale sociological apparatus, but a fresh attempt to see African politics in its essentials and to embody such a direct though sophisticated vision in language that is at once appropriate and open to further problematics.

The latest important attempt to understand African politics in terms of Western politics is Gregor's interpretation of "African socialism" (which is, as shall be made clear further below in Chapter VIII, by no means merely an economic concept) as "a contemporary variant of Fascism."[19] His is a plausible position if only because of the obvious importance of Fascism in modern European politics and because of the equally obvious influence of Europe on Africa during the Fascist era of the two world wars.[20] Citing among numerous other African leaders both Nkrumah and Nyerere as "charismatic leaders so incompatible with traditional socialism," Gregor develops his conception of the Fascist ideology as that of "developmental dictatorship, as a revolutionary, populist, nationalist and anticapitalist doctrine sharing impressive affinities with the African Socialism of our time."[21] So impressed is Gregor with the "affinities" that he ignores the warning of an expert on Fascism to be "careful

...not to infer fascism from isolated 'fascist' traits."[22] Since Gregor makes President Senghor of Senegal the spokesman for the "African socialists" in his attempt to demonstrate their Fascist character, we shall reserve criticism of his position for our later treatment of Senghor in relation to Nkrumah and Nyerere.[23]

Finally, all of the writers on Ghana recognize that Nkrumah employs primarily Marxian concepts.[24] None of the scholars, however, follow U.S. Senator Thomas Dodd in considering him a communist.[25] The question of Nkrumah's "Marxism" is taken up in a later chapter, where it is shown why Nkrumah and his regime are not properly regarded as communist.[26]

The analyses of the Nyerere regime in Tanzania have been less conceptualized. The major treatments are descriptive.[27] Some do, however, if only briefly, express an interpretation of sorts when they emphasize that there has been "an original contribution made to the art of democratic government" by Tanzania, whose system "lifts to a new level the debate on the possibility for democracy in single-party states";[28] that Nyerere's "leadership is closer to that of the philosopher-king than any other in Africa, or for that matter the world";[29] and that in Tanzania Nyerere's socialist ideology is being translated into institutional reality.[30] Like Nkrumah, Nyerere is regarded as a "charismatic" leader.[31]

The foregoing survey of literature on the Ghanaian and Tanzanian regimes warrants the drawing of several conclusions which indicate what ought to be done in a new study of African politics such as this. The extant literature is copiously descriptive and theoretically deficient. The scholars have attempted to assimilate African realities to concepts of Western derivation and relevance, and their efforts have produced peculiar and contradictory results. They have either uncritically accepted the symbols by which the African regimes have interpreted themselves and treated them as if they were adequate theoretical concepts, or else they have rejected the symbols as mere slogans having little value apart from their functional use to the regimes. It is clear that the previous scholarly work not only does not preclude but urgently points to the need of renewed efforts to achieve an adequate theoretical understanding of contemporary African regimes. Such an understanding cannot emerge from a practical concern with the African peoples as fodder for the type of economic and political "development" which the Western scholars are wont to call "modernization." Nor can it emerge from an attempt to classify all of the African characteristics and tendencies as either democratic ("pro-Western") or "authoritarian" (and thus possibly "pro-communist" or even Fascist!). Nor can it suffice to make fascile images of the African leaders as a modern type of African tribal king or chief by coining hyphenated terms like "Presidential-monarch." One must instead analyze the ideas which these regimes have of the history of their peoples, of the indigenous political orders and of the colonial regimes, of their own positions as successors to the tribal and colonial authorities, and of the way of life which they are trying to foster.

This final part of our study is divided into three chapters. Chapter VI describes the major institutions of the governments and ruling parties in Ghana and Tanzania, showing the hegemony of Nkrumah and Nyerere over all the political institutions of their party-states. Chapter VII then examines the symbols which interpret the pre-eminent authority of the two rulers. Finally, Chapter VIII considers the language symbols through which the Nkrumah and Nyerere regimes have attempted to constitute new supra-tribal societal orders.

CHAPTER VI

PARTY-STATE INSTITUTIONS

In this chapter we shall consider the political institutions of Ghana and Tanzania after the two countries achieved independence. We shall examine the organization of the two parties which dominated the political life of the countries, the governmental institutions under the two regimes, and the relationships between the parties and states.

Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) had as its forerunner and prototype an organization founded by Nkrumah while he was in London prior to his return to the Gold Coast after many years abroad. Known as "The Circle," its members trained "to commence revolutionary work in any part of the African continent."[1] The constitution of this organization indicates that its purpose was to prevent "demagogues, quislings, traitors, cowards and self-seekers" from leading the African masses astray. Membership was restricted to professional revolutionaries who would unquestioningly obey "the Leadership of Kwame Nkrumah" and who would, among other things, fast one day each month and "meditate daily on the cause THE CIRCLE stands for." The ultimate aim of the group was the creation of "a Union of African Socialist Republics."[2]

The CPP constitution listed among CPP domestic aims the struggle for the independence and unity of Ghana, "for a speedy reconstruction of a better Ghana," and the promotion of "the Political, Social and Economic emancipation of the people." Internationally, the CPP was to cooperate "with other nationalist democratic and socialist movements in Africa and other continents, with a view to abolishing imperialism, colonialism, racialism, tribalism and all forms of national and racial oppression and economic inequality among nations, races and peoples and to support all action for World Peace." It was also to "support the demand for a West African Federation and of Pan-Africanism by promoting unity of action among the peoples of Africa and African descent." Membership was not restricted to professional revolutionaries. The organs of the CPP consisted of a National Secretariat, appointed by the National Executive Committee (NEC) and controlled by the latter's Central Committee (CC). The NEC was to carry out the CPP program and policies as determined by the Annual Delegates' Conference. The CC, composed of the "Party Leader" (Nkrumah) and other members whom he selects and whom the NEC approves, "directs" the NEC and supervises all the administrative organs of the Party. It was the power center of the Party, which was further organizationally articulated into regional, constituency and branch organizations. Women's and Youth leagues were attached to the Party.[3]

From the very beginning, Nkrumah insisted that factionalism would not be tolerated; and that the modus operandi was "democratic centralism," the Leninist term describing the provision of discussion under party auspices before, not after, decisions are made at the top by the party leader.[4] After 1960 the constituency and branch organizations of the Party declined in importance, while the auxiliary and functional organizations of the Party increased rapidly in number and importance. The latter were to counteract localism in the constituency organizations and to serve "as a basis for reorganizing society along lines of Nkrumaism and socialism."[5] It is beyond the scope of this study to describe these various bodies that had been formed and integrated with the Party. It is enough to note that these organizations covered every major aspect of life and that no competitors to them were allowed to exist. The major of them were: Trades Union Congress (labor), United Ghana Farmers' Council and Ghana Cooperative Movement (agriculture), Ghana Legion (ex-servicemen), Workers' Brigades (the unemployed), National Council of Ghana Women, and the Central Organization of Sports. Ideological youth organizations included the National Association of Socialist Students' Organizations and the CPP Study Groups, abolished when within them "the militant left" was gaining considerable autonomy within the Party, as well as the Young Pioneers, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute at Winneba, and the League of Ghana Patriots. Each major auxiliary of the Party had its own newspaper, each edited by one of the most radical and ideological of the party militants.[6]

If the CPP and the Ghana Government were one, as Apter and others claim,[7] the expression of this identity is the "Program of the Convention People's Party for Work and Happiness," which appeared in 1960 along with the Republican Constitution. Stressing "strong centralised leadership," the program refers throughout to the policies, activities and accomplishments of "the Party and Government" without differentiation.[8] At the time of the constitutional referendum of January 1964 establishing Ghana officially as a "one-party state," of the 32 opposition MP's in the 104 member National Assembly elected in 1956 (the year before independence), only seven remained. In the general election in June 1965, an unopposed slate of CPP members was "elected" to the new 198 member Assembly. Strong representation in the Assembly was accorded to the CPP bureaucracy and the auxiliary organizations listed above, especially the ideological ones. This signified yet another increase in the importance of the auxiliary wings, especially the more militant of them, and of the executive at the expense of the already attenuated parliament.[9]

All of the foregoing is, however, of little relevance when one considers that the party and the government were subordinate to Nkrumah himself. Nkrumah achieved his extra-constitutional position in the name and with the cooperation of the CPP. The major instrument at his disposal before 1960 was the Preventive Detention Act of 1958, which empowered the president to hold in detention for up to five years any Ghanaian citizen whose acts the president considered prejudicial to Ghana's defense, foreign relations, or security. The Avoidance of Discrimination Act of the previous year had prohibited the identification of any political party with a particular tribal group or religion.[10] Measures were taken by Nkrumah under these acts to weaken the opposition.[11]

CPP officials tampered with the polling in the 1960 plebiscite when the first day's vote was considered an insufficient approval of Nkrumah and the new constitution. Moreover, the full resources of the regime had been brought to bear in the campaign.[12] A provision of the 1960 constitution, which was not part of the draft constitution submitted to the people, gave power to Nkrumah to make law and "had the effect of merging the executive and legislative functions of government, reducing Parliament to an appendage of the personal political machine for the duration of Nkrumah's rule."[13]

Other provisions and acts gave the president control over the civil service and the judiciary, and in late 1963 Nkrumah actually dismissed the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court when former cabinet officers were acquited of having conspired to assassinate Nkrumah.[14] In 1961 it was made a criminal offense in any way to make the president an object of "hatred, ridicule, or contempt." This had the effect of strongly dampening criticism of Nkrumah's policies, actions and ideas.[15]

> Thus, by the end of 1961, Nkrumah was free to rule by fiat through a controlled Parliament, to reach into the judicial structure at will, and to remove from the courts cases that he considered to be of security interest. With the aid of the 1958 Preventive Detention Act, he could reach anybody--including leaders of the party and Members of Parliament--who dared to criticize him or complain about his public or private conduct.[16]

By the time of the 1964 referendum establishing Ghana as a "one-party state," the party itself "had been stripped of all power, potentialities, and initiative as thoroughly as the rest of the state apparatus."[17] While the CPP increased its representation in the Assembly, the latter's functions had ceased to be anything but "marginal."[18] In his final year in power, Nkrumah had achieved power over every governmental and administrative organ. "Substantive distinctions between the presidency and the cabinet, between these two branches and Parliament, and between all three and the judiciary had been wiped out."[19] Moreover, the CPP itself, whose leaders as well as "rank and file had welcomed the enforced destruction of the opposition," were now paying the price of subjection to "an extreme concentration of power" on which they had not reckoned.[20]

Contrary to the premises of the "one-party state," the party had not merged with the civil service or army. "Accordingly, the role of the party in the actual administration of the state was wholly subsidiary."[21]

One is led at this point to consider the "totalitarian" label attached to Ghana. Austin explicitly refers to Nkrumah's authority and power as "totalitarian," while Bretton repeatedly uses the terms "personal rule" and "authoritarian," but not without implying that it is totalitarian.[22] Let us briefly consider the validity of this conclusion.

The authorities on Ghana agree that while Nkrumah purged the "old guard" of early, moderate CPP leaders, he also swung around to subdue the militant ideological wing of the Party and to reinstate some of the old guard.[23] However, the Marxist ideological militants remained strongly entrenched in the press, the Young Pioneers, and the Nkrumah Ideological Institute.[24] Of them, Bretton writes:

> It is hard to imagine a weaker group, a group more dependent on one leader for its very survival than the vaunted Ghanaian Left.
>
> What members of the Left had been able to do, and with reasonable success, was to provide Nkrumah with sets of rationales...that he could use to cloak the old-fashioned, garden-variety political machine in ideologically respectable garments.[25]

Although he recognizes that Nkrumah devoted "an extraordinary large share of his time and a considerable share of his country's scarce manpower and material resources to what might be called ideological pursuits," Bretton, guided by "communication theory," does not take such pursuits seriously.[26] Moreover, he says that most of Nkrumah's ideologists gave him "the impression" that they did not really believe in "the nonsense" they propounded. This is, of course, "the impression" likely to be received by one who recognizes so clearly the "intellectual nakedness" of Nkrumaism.[27] It is a frequent tendency of analysts to find it hard to accept the fact that others may adhere to what they find so obviously ridiculous. However, it is important to recognize that three of Nkrumah's latest books (Consciencism, Neo-Colonialism, and Challenge of the Congo), and perhaps parts of his other works, were not written by him.[28] Moreover, Nkrumah himself recognized the use to which ideas and symbols could be put, as the final chapter will show.

Yet there are other considerations equally relevant to this question. There is no reason to doubt that Nkrumah would entrust his ghost-writing to men who were like-minded or else would himself read, or have a trusted advisor read, the manuscripts before publication in his name. Nkrumah is not known to pass out blank checks. Moreover, Bretton himself notes that Nkrumah's formative years were spent moving in "a make-believe world."[29] There is no basis for holding, therefore, that "only the vacuity, the ambiguity at best," of Nkrumah's ideas on man and society "is socially of major relevance."[30] We prefer, on the basis of evidence known to Bretton himself--namely, Nkrumah's background and continuously manifest concern with such ideological pursuits--to hold that the Nkrumah regime ruled on the basis of certain ideas and attitudes and that this is not incompatible with both an ongoing quest to realize an identity and a manipulative use of the ideas.

The CPP became "a massive propaganda machine,"[31] according to Austin.

And that precisely is what Nkrumah appeared to have in mind. Whereas Bretton subordinates ideological formation to every-day administration, Nkrumah apparently placed major value on the former. Thus all members of the new parliament in 1965 were required to spend three weeks studying Nkrumaism at the Nkrumah Ideological Institute, using Consciencism as the basic text. In fact, Nkrumah stressed in his address at the first seminar held at the Institute that Party education had to become mass education, with special attention given to the youth.[32]

All of the foregoing does not, however, make of Nkrumah's regime a "totalitarian" state. Despite Bretton's vision of the resurrection of "the ghosts of Hitler and Stalin, of Fascism, Communism, and Marxism,"[33] in Nkrumah's Ghana, "totalitarianism" in the sense of "metastatic activism," of a volitional urge to redeem man by effecting a radical change in his nature and in the conditio humana,[34] was absent. Indeed, in the attempt of the régime to make of Nkrumaism a political religion, and in the subordination of the party and state to the leader,[35] there are to be observed similarities to the "totalitarian" regimes of Hitler and Stalin; yet, even so, these and other "totalitarian" characteristics were all present in but a crude and rudimentary way. Any orientation towards a complete control of life was decisively mitigated by ideological confusions, deficiencies in technique, the absence of a developed communications-transportation network, and large residues of African traditionalism and Western liberalism among those upon whom the regime had to rely. Moreover, African traditional life was characterized by the "total" claim on men's lives of the ordained modes of action. When appropriately used, the term "totalitarian" acquires its meaning within the context of the Western tradition of the limited state: a state limited, first and foremost, by its inability to embody, as a Church, the spiritual dimension of man as destined for a supernatural end that transcends the world and history.

This is not to deny the relevance of Nkrumah's early addiction to Leninist organizational principles and his oft-repeated dictum that "organization is everything." Nkrumah's party organization was to replace the lineage structure of traditional African society and to remedy a deficiency in the colonial regime, which through indirect rule had used that structure. The colonial regime had contributed the idea of "nation-making," the idea that through creation of appropriate institutions one could make a large political society out of a multitude of different societies.[36] Nkrumah shared with that regime the idea that a new society could be built. The CPP was that society in miniature, made, so that through its expansion it would make the larger society in turn. This accounts for the restriction of membership in "The Circle" to professional revolutionaries at a time when power was not yet in sight, and for the later attempt to make of the CPP a mass party with links to all social activities through the auxiliary organizations. Nkrumah stressed the overwhelming importance of the propagation of "Nkrumaism" within the party itself, because it was to be the substantive content of the organizational unity of the society as an entity through the party. In this sense, the party was to be to the state what society is to the state in a country whose people share a common perception of the true and the good.[37]

Tanzania's political institutions invite comparison with those of Nkrumah's Ghana if only by virtue of their resemblance to and imitation of them. Thus a close student of Tanzania writes:

> It is no accident that the structure of local administration built up in Tanzania since the achievement of independence in December 1961 closely resembles that of Ghana. Both countries had been administered by Britain and therefore inherited a system of representative local government, though the latter was not well developed in Tanzania. At independence, each was controlled by a dominant political party... which pursued similar aims. In fact, the constitution of T.A.N.U. was modelled on that of the C.P.P. Moreover, the leaders of Tanzania followed Ghana's example in appointing regional and area commissioners and in making them respectively regional and district party secretaries.[38]

The formal structure of TANU is much like that of the CPP. There is an administrative headquarters, comparable to the CPP Secretariat, and an Annual Conference, National Executive Committee, and Central Committee. TANU is articulated into regional, district, and branch organizations. Its auxiliaries are the TANU Youth League, which since 1960 has been headed by Julius Nyerere's brother Joseph, and women's and elder's sections. TANU, like the CPP, absorbed the trade union organization.[39]

Whereas it took more than three years for Ghana to replace its independence constitution with a republican constitution, Tanganyika made the change in a single year. Nyerere had resigned as Prime Minister a few weeks after independence in order to travel around the country working to strengthen and renew TANU.

> During his political *safaris*, he pruned the dead wood from Tanu's branches, recruited new local leaders, cut Communist links where he found them, and worked out tasks and targets for every region down to the smallest units of the social

> framework....Nyerere speeded up the appointment of Regional and Area Commissioners, to replace the non-political Provincial and District Commissioners. The new Commissioners were Tanu men, who had to report directly to the Tanu President, that is Nyerere. This change, more than any other, demonstrated that the party, not the elected Parliament, was becoming the source of authority.[40]

Nyerere was to resume state authority under the new constitution as Tanganyika's first president.

The republican constitution was explained by Prime Minister Kawawa and Nyerere himself as in the African democratic tradition. Meaningless Westminster forms and the separation of head of state from head of government had to be replaced by a single executive authority, with full responsibilities and powers under the rule of law.[41] Accordingly, the new President of the Republic, Nyerere, was given exceptional powers under the constitution, and by statute law, in almost every area of government. He was given exclusive power to administer the Preventive Detention Act of 1962, a power even more sweeping than that provided by the Ghanaian statute after which it was modelled.[42] He was empowered to direct and control all prosecutions through "directions" which the Director of Public Prosecutions must obey.[43] He appoints the Chief Justice and puisne judges and, inheriting the royal prerogative, may pardon or reprieve anyone convicted of any offence. He is immune from criminal suit. He appoints all ministers and terminates their appointments at will. He alone may create or abolish, and make appointments to, civil service offices.[44] Under the Transfer and Delegation of Powers Act (1962), with few exceptions, the President may assume, or transfer to any other, the statutory power or duty of any public officer.[45] As an integral part of the legislature, his powers of giving or refusing assent to bills passed by the National Assembly are extensive.[46] Moreover, the President was given "all those powers of making emergency regulations which in the days of 'colonial' rule were vested in the Governor."[47] Finally, with limited reservation, he may act in his own discretion, free neither to seek nor follow the advice of any other.[48]

The next step in the "Africanization" of the government of Tanganyika came in 1965 with the formal establishment of a one-party state. Even prior to that, however, the true position of Nyerere was to be seen not in his assumption of the office that has just been described, but in his ascendancy over TANU. Every seat but one in the Assembly was already in the hands of TANU; and in the Assembly TANU presented a united front on important questions, the TANU position having been determined in TANU councils where Nyerere's influence was enormous. TANU also held all elective seats in local government. Furthermore, the only opposition party, the African National Congress, was declared unlawful and its head imprisoned. These facts, in addition to the already noted assumption by TANU men of provincial administration, had led the ordinary Tanganyikan to equate the government with TANU.[49] Nyerere's election as president and the celebration of the advent of the republic in 1962 thus stimulated local party activity, with an increase in dues paying membership in TANU.[50]

"In January 1963, Nyerere announced that the TANU Annual Conference had approved a National Executive resolution to make TANU the only legal party--converting a de facto one-party state into a de jure one."[51] And at the same time the government rusticated Victor Mkello, the secretary-general of the still independent Tanganyika Federation of Labour (in 1964 it will dissolve the TFL, place 200 more labor unionists under preventive detention, and establish a government controlled labor organization).[52]

So, in 1965, with the Tanzania government admitting that 120 people were under preventive detention (held without trial), and refusing to make public who they were, proceeded to establish the one-party state.[53] In the September parliamentary and presidential elections, Nyerere received 96.5% of a heavy vote--which was not surprising, as he ran unopposed. What was truly significant about this election, and Tanzania's version of a one-party state as compared with Ghana's, was the parliamentary part of it. Unlike the CPP, TANU did not run a single slate of candidates. Most of the 101 constituencies in mainland Tanzania were contested by more than one TANU candidate; and it turned out that a surprising number of incumbents, including eleven ministers, were defeated.[54]

We are now in a position to describe and assess the constitutional system which finally emerged in Tanzania and to compare it with the system that existed in Ghana during Nkrumah's last year. In January 1964, empowered by the TANU National Executive, President Nyerere appointed a commission to recommend changes in the constitutions of Tanganyika and TANU that would best convert Tanganyika into "a democratic One Party State." The commission included representatives from TANU, the Co-operative Movement, the TANU Elders, non-African citizens of Tanganyika, and the civil service.[55]

The commission gave broad publicity to a questionnaire, seeking to have the views of the public on all major questions with which it was concerned. Its report, submitted in March 1965, consisted of summaries of the public response on each question, response that was by no means without variation; a discussion of the implications of each issue; and recommendations. It was a well-written, carefully reasoned report that deserves consideration here, especially since its recommendations were adopted almost without change.[56]

Recognizing that in the one-party state "the basic character of the party /would/ have a deep constitutional significance," the commission rejected the idea that the party should consist of "an elite group, a minority ideologically dedicated who provide from above the leadership necessary to activate the inert mass of the community." In accord with "democratic principles and, in particular, with the principle of democracy as understood in traditional African society," TANU is to be "a mass party." TANU is to be open to all who adhere to its principles, which are not "narrow ideological formulations" but rather constitute "a broad statement of political faith" (p. 20). Some of these "ethical principles," as listed by Nyerere in his letter of guidance to the commission, are: the dignity and equality of all men; the right of all citizens to equal participation at all levels of government; the right of citizens to "freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief, of association within the context of law"; the right to receive protection of life and property from society; the "duty to uphold the law"; social ownership of natural resources; and "equality of opportunity." (p. 25).

Since the distinction between government and party is not understood by the people, the distinction between the institutions of each is to be eliminated. While this should not result in party institutions assuming the functions of government institutions, the NEC should receive "high constitutional status," with "the power to summon witnesses and call for papers," because its function is not the same as that of the Assembly (p. 22).

Candidates for public office are to be TANU members. "If the voters are to make an intelligent choice there must be some limitation on the number of candidates standing in a constituency." The British requirement of a deposit by candidates is impractical in a poor country. Moreover, the party should have a "positive role" in pre-selecting candidates, a role which would be consistent with democratic principles if performed "in a spirit of tolerance and good faith." Thus in each constituency there should be three candidates, whose nomination has the support of 25 registered voters and is approved by the NEC. Further, the electioneering of the candidates must be sponsored by the local TANU organization (pp. 22-23). TANU leaders ultimately decided to have two candidates for each constituency, although there were sometimes more in the election that followed.[57]

Previously, debates in the Assembly were "lifeless and superficial" because the real debates took place in the NEC. "In particular the TANU Parliamentary Party...continued to function in the manner appropriate to a Party caucus in a Legislative Assembly divided on Party lines" (p. 23). This should be replaced by vigorous and free discussion. Thus the TANU Parliamentary Party and the Party Whip should be abolished, MP's should have the right to question and criticize, and therefore Ministers are to be MP's "ready to answer questions and to explain and justify government policy." This requirement "emphasizes the responsibility of the Government to the electorate and prevents discussion in the Assembly becoming academic or unreal" (p. 24).

"Great importance was attached to the special position of the President as the symbol of national unity." He is to be nominated by TANU (acting jointly with the Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar) and "presented to the voters at a ballot in which they will be asked to vote either for or against the candidate." If a majority vote against him, another candidate is to be presented to the voters. The President may dissolve Parliament at his discretion, but there must then be a new presidential as well as general election. This provision is "to maintain the sovereignty of Parliament in the context of a Presidential system" (pp. 24-25).

The commission approved the abrogation by the President in 1964 of rules prohibiting members of the civil service, army and police from joining TANU, and it recommended that civil servants be eligible for membership in the Assembly only if nominated by the President (p. 26). It approved the affiliation of the National Union of Tanganyika Workers and of the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika with TANU, and it recommended that they be given representation in the NEC (p. 27).

It was recommended that the TANU Constitution be revised by enlarging the TANU Annual Conference to include all MPs and three elected delegates instead of one delegate from each district; and by giving the Party President the power to remove major administrative officers of the Party (p. 27). In effect, the NEC and Nyerere were to assume even greater authority within the Party.

The commission gave considerable thought to the question of a bill of rights. It observed that the new system was not to impose "bureaucratic restraint on a mass of unwilling citizens" but to "enable the ordinary man to participate more fully in the process of government." It concluded, however, that "a Bill of Rights would invite conflict between the Judiciary and the Executive and Legislature." Moreover, Tanganyika's economic development plans "cannot be implemented without revolutionary changes in the social structure." Having in mind the conflict between President Roosevelt and the Supreme Court in the 1930's, the commission argued that "the extent to which individual rights must give way to wider considerations of social progress" are properly political rather than judicial decisions. Citing the example of the United Kingdom, it argued that "the rights of the individual in any society depend more on the ethical sense of the people than on formal guarantees in the law." Thus a Bill of Rights would "be neither prudent nor effective" given Tanganyika's present circumstances (pp. 27-28).

On the basis of the foregoing, the commission found that Party and Government officials were inevitably to have "wide discretionary powers."

There was therefore needed some means of remedying abuses and of limiting those powers without hindering "the task of nation building." The Disciplinary Committee of TANU is one means. Another is the recommended "permanent Commission to be appointed by the President, with a wide discretion to inquire into allegations of abuse of power by officials of both Government and Party alike." This Commission is to report all findings and recommendations to the President, but not itself initiate any action. Existing provisions regarding the judiciary are approved, and trial by jury is deemed impractical (p. 28).

Paper provisions such as the above are one thing, and the will to implement them as well as their actual implementation are yet others. The nature of the provisions along with their explanations do, however, allow one to make a tentative assessment. First of all, true freedom, at least in a poor country like Tanzania, is seen to depend on economic improvement. On this basis, political and personal freedoms, while hardly neglected, are clearly subordinated to the requirements of economic development and "nation building." Moreover, at least a possible conflict between such freedoms and requirements is assumed. Second, the implication runs throughout the report, and in fact is embodied in the political institutions of the state, that the people of Tanzania are incapable of sustaining democracy in the modern Western sense, and that the constitutional order provided for is the one that could best link the traditional "democratic" forms with a true, yet new African type of, democracy yet to be realized. Third, the new provisions appear decisively to shift the locus of major political activity from the party to the government, and most especially to the President and the National Assembly. Fourth, emphasis is placed more on the development of what might be called a national civic culture or fundamental national consensus that could tolerate and sustain much diversity on the level of issues and procedures, as opposed to an attempt to found societal unity on the inculcation of a rigid, elaborate ideology. Finally, the plan assumes that regardless of what institutions and laws are created, the future of Tanzania is decisively dependent on the quality of the leadership and the acceptance of that leadership by the people. The attempt is therefore made to give the leadership utmost discretionary powers while providing institutional means for the closest possible communication between the leaders and people. These implications find confirmation in Nyerere's assertion of primary concern with the long term: "what matters is...what kind of life our people will be able to lead in the more distant future--say in the year 1980 and after."[58]

When one turns from constitutional form to political content, some of the inferences drawn above find further support. In the presidential election of 1962 Nyerere had won 97% of the votes as Zuberi Mtemvu, the racist leader of the opposition African National Party, ran very poorly in an election that gave no indication of having been dishonestly conducted.[59] Nyerere appears to have retained the genuine popularity among the people that Nkrumah lost. Also unlike Nkrumah, there is no evidence of his using the vast powers at his disposal in his own interest and to the detriment of the asserted ends.

Since Tanganyika's independence there has been an increasing shift of power within TANU from its administrative side to its policy-making side, and from the CC to the NEC. More importantly, power shifted from the Party to the Government, particularly to Nyerere's cabinet many of whose members were also NEC members. "The abolition of the distinction between party and government servants" in 1964 was "a sign of weakness in TANU."[60] In 1965, however, a new trend emerged. TANU district conferences nominated candidates for the 1965 Assembly elections, almost all of whom were approved by the NEC. The election results indicated that MP's would have to consider their constituencies, and that no safe constituencies remained. Moreover, the creation of six specialized committees in the Assembly would contribute to the enhancement of its debate, as would its selection of fifteen members from nominees proposed by the national organizations of workers, cooperatives, women, and the university, and approved by the NEC.[61]

What exists in Tanzania, then, is a complex structure of institutions. At the top the President and his Cabinet and the NEC make policy, and oversee and direct the state and the party.[62] At the next level, the National Assembly in particular is the embodiment of democratic purpose. Much has been done to make it representative within the limits imposed by Tanzania's lack of a representative tradition and by the leaders' commitment to economic development. A step was taken to stimulate discussion within it and to subject government policy to that discussion.[63] Moreover, the election procedures--whereby at least two candidates are nominated through the party organization in each single member constituency--shows some promise of revitalizing the local party organizations by providing them with an important function that, normally, can be exercised without dictation from above.

The true nature of the Tanzanian political order is to be understood therefore from the kind of development the regime is dedicated to, and from the means adopted in the pursuit of these ends. One observer notes that "Tanzania has joined the small vanguard of West African states that have decided...to scrap most of their inherited institutions, political values, and infrastructure, and build a new and genuinely African society from the ground up." The key to this attempt is "the rural majority, who had been introduced to politics by TANU in opposition to the then-colonial government."[64] The new one-party system, as we have seen, emphasized local political activity by providing for direct election from among several candidates, by making the MP's sufficiently free from party discipline to initiate legislation and to criticize government policy, and by therefore giving the people the opportunity to express themselves on policy when the MP's present themselves for re-election. In 1965 Tanzania also reduced its ties with its East African neighbors, a move contrary to its Pan-African aspirations, and began to look increasingly inward.[65] This culminated in a series of sweeping changes and a new declaration of policy in 1967.

In January 1967 Nyerere spent a month touring rural Tanzania, and then convened a meeting of the NEC in a small town in northern Tanganyika, Arusha. The outcome was the Arusha Declaration of February 5 on national development. This Declaration reaffirmed the goal of transforming Tanzania from a poor into a prosperous country through a "revolution" that would overcome the weakness that had led to their being oppressed and disregarded. It pointed to a past emphasis on money as the key to development, a mistaken emphasis for a poor country and a dangerous one because it leads to dependence on those who provide grants and loans. It pointed also to a mistaken emphasis on industrialization. In the interest of genuine development, independence of foreign control, and of preventing the urban few from benefiting at the expense of the rural many, Tanzania is now to be self-reliant, developing its agriculture through hard work.

> Let us go to the villages and talk to the people and see whether or not it is possible for them to work harder.
>
> ....
>
> The energies of the millions of men in the villages and thousands of women in the towns which are at present wasted in gossip, dancing, and drinking, are a great treasure which could contribute more toward the development of our country than anything we could get from rich nations.[66]

On the following day Nyerere, with the promise of "full and fair" compensation, nationalized foreign-owned export-import firms, commercial banks, and insurance companies; and the government assumed a controlling interest in large industries and agricultural estates. "Nyerere had at a stroke brought his country further along the road to socialism than even...Nkrumah had taken Ghana."[67]

The major effect of the doctrine of self-reliance is to be increasing mobilization of the people through increasingly central control over local affairs. Whereas one might speak in 1965 of "a population interested, but not too mobilized,"[68] the centralizing trend was already unmistakable.[69] Even prior to 1965 there had been "a basic conflict" in the districts "between central control...and local autonomy."[70] It was seen particularly in the creation of Village Development Committees (VDCs) as the basis of local government. While the VDCs were described "as the institutional expression" of traditional African communal norms, "the functions that are presently devolved upon the VDCs are clearly intended to adapt the rural populations to an entirely new way of life, geared to the requirements of a modern, secular administration."[71] The government recognized that the rural Africans "resist change," and that "they are puzzled and sometimes hostile to people who are trying to bring new ideas and new ways of doing things." Yet the key to development is "that the people themselves must experience a genuine motivation as well as a sense of collective responsibility for the performance of the tasks they have been assigned, with the outside agent merely acting in an advisory capacity."[72] Thus "nation-building," to be based on the voluntary rather than forced participation of the people, requires an unusually influential leadership that can re-interpret traditional ways to make modernization acceptable.

It is perhaps most relevant to this problem that Ghana based the "rural local authorities on small traditional units of local government,"[73] with the local chief eligible for appointment as president of the local council;[74] and that these councils have been subject to tight control and considerable interference by the central government. Tanzania, however, abolished the powers of chieftaincy[75] and did not base its larger districts on the small traditional polities. "The voluntary basis of her one-party state has been more marked than in Ghana, and this fact has probably tended to reduce the amount of political interference to which her local authorities have been subjected."[76] If the political order of Tanzania is more acceptable to its people than the order of Ghana was to Ghanaians, the difference is to be sought in large part in the quality of its leadership; for in each country the dominant policies, political symbolism, and institutions were determined by its one high ruler.

CHAPTER VII

SYMBOLS OF AUTHORITY

There are two major types of symbols to be examined in this study. The first group of symbols consists of certain titles, gestures and rituals expressive of the personal authority and office of Nkrumah and Nyerere as rulers. A distinct yet closely related body of symbols consists of the more elaborate statements of the regimes concerning their rootedness in the African historical experience, their foundation upon the essential principles of a pristine African type of polity which was prevailing in Africa when the Europeans came, and their purposeful mission to realize Africa's appointed destiny. The present chapter is devoted to the analysis of the first group of symbols. Chapter VIII treats of the aggregate of ideas about an African type of political society extending through the present and linking Africa's past with its future.

With the advent of the republican constitution of Ghana in 1960, Nkrumah's official title became "Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana."[1] In this melange of symbols, the term Dr., expressive of recognized intellectual attainment, and the term President, denoting the supreme executive authority in a modern constitutional republic, pose no difficulty, for their significance is immediately apparent to the Western world. The symbol Osagyefo is the one which requires special attention, for in unofficial references to Nkrumah its use by itself was assiduously cultivated as a short title, indicative of its dominance over the other symbols.

The symbol has both traditional and Christian meanings. In the past it was commonly used as an adulatory form of address to Fanti chiefs. Connoting "the twin ideas of salvation and struggle," it could best be rendered in English as "Warrior-Savior."[2] The chief as captain in war, deriving magical victory-conferring powers from the royal ancestors through his sacred stool of office, was Osagyefo ("Conqueror").[3] The specifically Christian meaning of the term emerges from the fact that this word was used by the Basel missionaries for the terms "Messiah," "Savior," and "Redeemer" when they produced the first translation of the Bible into the Twi language in the latter part of the nineteenth century.[4]

A number of other traditional titles ordinarily applied to chiefs, and taken from the various dialects of the country, were given to Nkrumah. He was "Kukudurini (Man of Courage, Unfrightened, Brave) Katamanto (Man Whose Words Are Irrevocable, And Who Protects the People) Kasapieko (Man of Final Words, Who Says Things Only Once) Oyeadieyie (Man of Action, Who Does Things Right) Nufeno (Strongest of All, Who Surpasses Everybody)."[5] In his autobiography Nkrumah asserted a claim by descent to two chieftaincies in the county, both of which he apparently assumed.[6] It was therefore emphasized in a CPP organ that Nkrumah is "himself a Chief and a direct descendent of the famous warrior Chief Aduku Addiae." He is, however, higher than other chiefs, for he not only released them from "foreign bondage" but "further elevated them to positions of dignity and respect." Osagyefo is no less than "their redeemer and benefactor."[7] Thus the press would show such things as a picture of a young chief with Nkrumah, the caption having the former say "welcome father" to "the Great One" Nkrumah.[8]

The chiefs were looked upon by the Nkrumah regime as "the custodians of the tribal heritage."[9] This idea is in keeping with the traditional Akan distinction between the rulers (chiefs) and the custodians of the tribal traditions (Queen Mother, linguist, priests). Nkrumah himself assumed the chiefly function of being the effective mediator between the ancestors and the state, and the chiefs in modern Ghana were to be the repositories of knowledge about the ancestors. Thus while Nkrumah swore to guarantee and preserve chieftaincy when he took the oath of office as President of Ghana,[10] it was with the understanding that the functions of chiefs in Ghana are "ceremonial... only."[11]

Nkrumah was accompanied by the trappings of chiefship on all important occasions. For example, the new Republic of Ghana was ushered in by an elaborate ceremony opening the first session of Parliament on July 4, 1960. It began with the President's approach, "signified by the beating of traditional drums, and his entry into the Chamber by the blowing of traditional horns." As the great chief of Ghana, he was "accompanied into the Chamber by linguists representing the various Regions." In the Chamber Nkrumah was seated in the State Chair, which was modelled after a chiefly stool.[12] A new mace of traditional design stood in front of the table "giving the effect of a traditional kyiame's /linguist's/ stick." Nkrumah faced the members seated in the traditional "U" arrangement assumed by the lesser chiefs in the councils of Akan states.[13] The ceremony was marked by a libation prayer[14] that fused primarily Akan and modern, but also some Christian, ideas. It began:

Grand Spirits of Ghana's Ancestors [*samanfo*]
Drink!
Harken, grand Sires [*nananom*]
That God may know
That Ghana is up
To greet
And thank Him.
Great, Dependable God [*Nyankopon*, *Tweaduampon*] of our Ancestors
Creator of all [*Bore-Bore*], the secret
Of whose design no one can tell.

God, the "Ever-beckoning Grandfather," is then asked for grace, health, progress, good fortune, and long life. Then come the words:

Ghana went into consultation,
We went and consulted the *Old Lady*,[15]
....
She bade us tell the world
Progress follows after change,
And Ghana must change
From incomplete independence
To become a fully-fledged Republic.
Whereupon the sons of Ghana
Went in search of a leader
And went to the base
Of the *Stool of Prosperity*
We directed our staffs
We were told
That wise son Kwame Nkrumah
Is the courageous one
Who with humility
And the fear of God
And the nature of wisdom
Should come to rule the Republic
....
If the Head of State has any power
Then it is the people's will
That has given it to him;
And what people's will has given
The same people's will can reclaim.

If we regard the last lines as a reference to the sovereignty of the people, a principle that is indeed proclaimed in the constitution, then the modern conception of political authority is merged with the traditional Akan idea. This conclusion must emerge from a consideration of the whole passage, which is a clear expression of the procedures for selecting the king or chief of an Akan state.

The "consultation" is about a "ruler." In Akan politics it is the prerogative of the Queen-Mother to designate the new chief. She is also the bearer of the most sacred traditions of the state. Therefore, she declares in the prayer what kind of a state Ghana is. The "sons of Ghana" who have "staffs" are elected members of parliament assimilated to the lesser chiefs who constitute the chief's court but are not members of the royal family. They represent the people (the major families) and mediate popular consent to the candidate for enstoolment. Thus the reference to "people's will" in the prayer must, in context, mean not only the democratic idea of popular sovereignty but also the traditional Akan practice. The Parliament is Nkrumah's court.

The "stool of prosperity" is a symbol expressive of both old and new ideas. The stool is the channel of ancestral influence, an omphalos through which prosperity flows into the whole society. In the prayer, the meaning of prosperity is extended to include the substance of modern plenty. The stool is the channel of ancestral election of Nkrumah as ruler.

The prayer continues:

> Our Great Ancestor /Nana, a name for Nyame/
> A climber that climbs a good tree

> Deserves our aid.
> We pray Thee
> Be the protector and guide
> Of this our Head of State.

A "good tree" is an omphalos that links this world with the transcendant world and mediates life, order and prosperity to the society. The most famous kind of tree among the Akan is called Nyame dua (God's tree) and is used to make stools and altars to Nyame.[16] The prayer ends with a request that the "Grand Spirits of our Ancestors" (samanfo) drink the libation offered and give life to Ghana and "the union of Africa." The Ghanaian ancestors will be the source of a living African unity because it is to be realized under the aegis of their descendant Nkrumah, the "climber" of the omphalic tree.

We referred above to the title Osagyefo as having Christian as well as traditional connotations. Beyond that, however, there has been a deliberate attempt to portray Nkrumah's authority as Christian. Political versions of the Lord's Prayer and the Apostle's Creed circulated widely in Ghana. The latter reads in part:

> I believe in the Convention People's Party,
> The opportune Saviour of Ghana,
> And in Kwame Nkrumah its founder and leader
> ....
> Suffering under victimisations;
> Was vilified, threatened with deportation;
> He disentangeled himself from the clutches of the U.G.C.C.
> And the same day he rose victorious with the
> "verandah boys,"
> Ascended the Political Heights,
> And sittith at the Supreme head of the C.P.P.[17]

Notice that in this credo it is the CPP which is identified as the "Savior," the richness of this symbol emerging from the identification of Nkrumah as likewise the Savior with the CPP.[18] The CPP itself is assimilated to the Kingdom of Heaven, and membership in it constitutes a life of grace, a saving participation in the life of Nkrumah. The colonial regime, the agent of his redeeming passion, rejected his leadership but became the unwitting instrument of his mission. The U.G.C.C. is the abode of the dead from whence Nkrumah arises victorious over a death of essential slavery to the light of full freedom.

Perhaps the most blatant identification of Nkrumah with Christ was asserted in an article in Nkrumah's Evening News entitled "Osagyefo, the Prince of Peace."[19] It claims that Isaiah's prophecy "concerning the Messiah has come true in the life of Osagyefo," who is "the Son of Man," "the everlasting Father," and "the Prince of Peace." Like Jesus, Nkrumah was of humble birth, loves children, and appoints disciples. The latter are regional and district commissioners and CPP secretaries who are "doing the work of God" in "telling the people about the new doctrine of Nkrumaism," for "Jesus and his disciples were not capitalists" but socialists. The Gospels are to be read and understood "in conjunction with Osagyefo's mission." Nkrumah "has come not to destroy but to fulfil. He is the Saviour as well as the Light of Africa as a whole, and a way-shower to the world in general."

Sometimes the symbolism was mixed, as when Nkrumah was called the "Black Star," the "Moses," and the "Messiah of Africa"; or the "Great One" (usual English equivalent of the Akan god Nyankopon) who fulfills the Biblical prophecy that "Ethiopia shall arise."[20] Finally, he was "the Prophet, the Sage, the Nobleman of our age shining as bright as the sun."[21]

Nkrumah was not only presented as the successor to the Akan chiefs and to Christ, but to the colonial authority as well. Christianborg Castle has been an important symbol of authority in Ghana since it first became "the home of the European governors and the seat of the colonial powers." Nkrumah decided a couple of months after independence that the seat of his government would be established at the castle. He later explained:

> It was important and indeed psychologically necessary that the people's government should be seen to operate from the castle. Only in this way would the masses of the people realize that effective power was now in the hands of their own elected leaders and that the might of the colonial power was no more.[22]

Flagstaff House was the center of government from 1959 to 1963, and upon Nkrumah's return to Christianborg he said that henceforth it was to be known as "the Castle." This was a most appropriate choice, for the people of the Gold Coast generally referred to the colonial authority simply as "the Castle."[23]

The symbols of Nyerere's authority are not unlike those of Nkrumah's, although they are less elaborate. In an interview on a BBC-TV program, which among other things showed Nyerere at ceremonies of unification with Zanzibar, wearing leopard-skin garb in the fashion of a chief, Nyerere stressed his own symbolic importance as a leader. He cited the chief as the personal embodiment of traditional African authority; the governor as the symbol of colonial authority; and the new African leader as the symbol of independence and national society. "We act in symbols," Nyerere affirmed.[24] Thus, when Tanganyika became a Republic in December 1962, Nyerere took a double oath during his installation as president. The first oath was administered by the chief justice in the usual procedure followed in modern Western republics. The second oath was tribal, and it was administered by an old African chief who presented Nyerere with the traditional chiefly regalia:

> This long ROBE marks you as the Father of the Nation. May the favor of your leadership spread all over the Country, as this ROBE spreads all over your body...
>
> Accept this SPEAR as the symbol of Courage and Protection, both for yourself and for the citizens of Tanganyika. May you stand firm at all times...
>
> This SHIELD symbolizes the Defence of our young Nation. Our Country is now entrusted to the protection of your able hands. With these arms...with all your power and might...protect all the Citizens from their enemies...[25]

Nyerere was then annointed according to Nyamwezi custom:

> Chief Mazengo placed some "LWANGA" on Dr. Nyerere's forehead and said: "By the Power of Almighty God, may your ruling bring forth Blessings, Peace, Health, Success and Prosperity at all times..." Dr. Nyerere, all decked out in his tribal garb, promised to fulfill all his obligations ...then he stepped down from the dais and faced the huge crowd filling the stadium...The Royal Kiha drums started to roll, and the delirious citizens gave their First President a deafening ovation.[26]

This ceremony is noteworthy for several reasons. The first oath, which the Catholic missionary source merely refers to as "religious," was, given the important Muslim minority in the country, very likely administered with the

Koran as well as with the Bible.[27] Yet the burden of this part of the ceremony was to establish Nyerere as a modern president, who in assuming the position as head of state as well as of government replaced the imperial British monarch. Nyerere succeeds to the colonial authority in the fullest sense, yet the oath of office binds him to the obligations and purposes that constituted the colonial justification.

The second part of the ceremony was clearly a composit of the chiefly ceremonies of at least two Tanganyika tribes, the Nyamwezi and the Ha. Administered by an old chief, its burden was to confer traditional legitimacy on Nyerere as the supra-tribal chief of a new multi-tribal society. Accordingly, in invoking divine blessings on Nyerere, the old chief refers to Nyerere as a ruler, a usage that jars with usual republican language; and he substitutes "citizens of Tanganyika" for the people of the tribal society or chiefdom. Moreover, as "Father of the Nation" Nyerere is regarded as the first of this new type of chief in Tanganyika. To Nyerere, as to all chiefs but most especially to the founders of new orders, is attributed the military virtues.[28] In addition, the old chief asks that Nyerere's rule, through divine power, produce the traditionally valued goods of such things as health and prosperity. The form of this invocation is tribal, and the implication is that Nyerere as president assumes the chiefly ritual duty of fecundating the complex of man, society and nature. In this connection, finally, Nyerere's "power and might" and his effectiveness in ensuring life find their sanction in God under His aspect of the "Almighty." Since the dominance of the tremendum is common to both Islamic and African religious experience[29] while it is not foreign to Christianity, one may see in the old chief's invocation an attempt to place Nyerere's political authority on a religious foundation that does not conflict with the various religions of the country. The invocation would also be consistent with Nyerere's emphasis on economic development that does not depend primarily on foreign aid.

Like Nkrumah, Nyerere has a traditional title, Mwalimu, the Swahili word for teacher. The title is apt, for Nyerere was a teacher in Tanganyika for some years before and after his study at Edinburgh University from 1949-1952, and he only resigned as a teacher when his superiors at the mission school in Tabora required in 1954 that he choose between teaching and politics. According to one student of Tanganyikan politics,[30] the term was first applied to Nyerere after independence by certain TANU members who "objected to Nyerere's moderate racial stance and his policies of compromise and common sense." This authority continues:

> Realizing that an open attack upon such a revered public figure would be suicidal, and noting Nyerere's habit of using public platforms to lecture his followers and colleagues, rather than serve up bombastic political harrangue, the few detractors coined the nickname "Mwalimu." This was meant to connote, mildly, it must be remembered, a slight tendency towards pedagogic pomposity on Nyerere's part.

Their plan backfired, as "both Nyerere's supporters and the mass of the people took the title as a compliment," and "Nyerere's close associates began to use the title in a praiseworthy sense." This was possible because the term not only connotes a "tendency towards pomposity, towards empty moralization, towards patronization," but also "intelligent concern and scholarly authority."

The source of the above information doubts that the title implies authority in a religious sense, even though its specific meaning is an official teacher attached to an Islamic mosque. He argues that the Christians in Tanzania are probably unaware of the religious connotation of the title, and that "the Muslim population, who are well aware of the connotation, know full well that Nyerere is a Christian." Despite these facts, there is still reason to think that the title connotes something more than merely secular authority to many Tanzanians. In support of this position it may be alleged that, in the interests of political harmony in a largely non-Christian state, Nyerere plays down his own religious adherence and ensures that adherents to Islam and indigenous African religion are well represented in the party and government.[31] His own religion is largely a personal and private affair. There is therefore no reason why he could not be a religious figure in his public capacity. Nor is there any reason why the religious implications of his authority would have to be associated with any specific religion or denomination. Mwalimu is a Swahili term and Swahili is spoken by virtually all of Tanzania's people, only a minority of whom are Muslim. For the Muslim, the Mwalimu is a teacher, and traditionally all learning was religious; for the Swahili, who represents a blend of the Islamic and the indigenous African, the "Walimu are those who deal with cases caused by...spirits" or jini;[32] and to the non-Muslim Africans who speak Swahili, and have therefore been influenced to some extent by

Swahili-Islamic culture, the term probably conveys at least a vague religious connotation. In the Segeju tribe the diviners are called walimu, which is the plural form of the word. Their method was thought to derive from "orthodox Islamic science," and their great dignity derived from their religious position.[33] In at least one town in Western Tanganyika, the "religious leader" or mwalimu of the Muslim community played "the part very much of a headman" to that community.[34] Finally, the very sound of the word mwalimu has a numinous quality that could be expected to inspire a sense of awe in those who have no idea what the term means, and this sense would be reinforced by the mystery of an obviously important title of whose meaning they are ignorant.

Other praise names were applied to Nyerere, but none of them have been used with the regularity of Nkrumah's titles. Nyerere was called such things as "our Savior," "the Immaculate," and "the Most Honorable."[35]

Just as Nkrumah moved into Christiansborg Castle, Nyerere moved into Government House, the home of the colonial governors, and stressed the importance of doing so.[36]

The symbols of the two authorities are thus quite similar. They are, moreover, very revealing of the quest for order in the two countries, of the struggles being waged in the souls of the men of these regimes, and of the impediments to any easy resolution of that struggle. Since the full meaning of these things requires an examination of the second set of symbols, it behooves us here to restrict our assessment of the first set of symbols to a brief consideration of their more immediate implications, reserving a more complete statement for the concluding chapter.

The symbols surveyed above present the authority of Nkrumah and Nyerere in several different ways. They suggest that these two men are essentially African monarchs of the old type, deriving their authority from the ancestors and the divine powers of whose experience and cult the indigenous religions of African tribal societies consisted. This type of authority experiences the effective power which it is able to exercise as originating in a sacred realm and as transmitted through certain sacred objects that connect the society to that transcendant realm. The primary function of such a ruler is not so much the governance of men, much less the administration of things, as it is to maintain the sacred powers through periodic ritual purifications and adherence to the taboos, as well as to ensure the people's compliance with the proper modes of action and life as established by the ancestral founder of the societal order.[37]

The authority of Nkrumah and Nyerere is also symbolized as being sanctioned by the God beside whom there is no other, the God of the Jews, Christians and Muslims. Nkrumah is another Christ, going far beyond the divine right doctrine of Christian kings. Even here, however, is the hint of a specifically archaic interpretation. We have seen in the earlier chapters that the assumption of a new king or chief was experienced as a repetition of the original foundation of the monarchy, that the new king is in a sense the first king. Nkrumah is in a sense Christ "in our time," but being Christ he is in that sense "immortal," justifying the chant of his followers that "Nkrumah never dies." It is precisely in this connection, however, that an insurmountable difficulty arises. The integrity of the archaic view of the primordial act being repeated is dependent upon an historical experience of existence.[38] Nkrumah's view, as will be explained in the next chapter, is radically historical; he operates within a world made historical in a decisive way by the advent of Christ, an event that underlies even the most anti-Christian of modern historical thinking.[39] The tension between archaic and Christian experiences of history is manifest in the symbols by virtue of the presence of that tension within the soul of Nkrumah and the lives of his people, who remain caught up in two worlds, in two modes of existence.

A similar tension is manifest in the symbol Mwalimu and in the ceremonies attending Nyerere's installation as President. As the first Tanganyikan university graduate, his claim to authority by virtue of his Western learning and mastery of modern organizational techniques was superior to that of Dr. Nkrumah. Yet religious learning and authority ("wisdom") is suggested by his title as well as secular learning ("knowledge," "skill"). The two types of learning, different in reality, are merged in the one symbol. The installation ceremonies juxtapose a derivation of authority from the sacred objects, which traditionally mediated power from the divine forces recognized by the tribe, but responsibility to that Almighty God beside whom there is no other.

The tension becomes extremely marked when it is seen that these new "chiefs" assume the seats of colonial power and of Western purpose to obtain the blessings promised by the application of the knowledge and techniques which were developed in Europe.[40] An African chief is not a republican president, and what is basically African is not the modern secular world that emerged from Christendom. Yet Nkrumah and Nyerere seem compelled to have it both ways. This necessity constitutes the major dilemma for the regimes, further implications of which will emerge in the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER VIII

IDEAS OF AFRICAN SOCIETY AND HISTORY

Ghana and Tanzania became constitutionally one-party states under the Nkrumah and Nyerere regimes. These regimes claimed not only to be democratic and socialist, but to represent a peculiarly African form of democracy and socialism. The heads of these states presented themselves as leading theorists of "African democracy" and "African socialism." They maintained that their actions, as well as the institutions of their states, have been based upon principles derived from African tradition. It is appropriate, therefore, that we turn now to their ideas of the indigenous African societies which they and Western scholars alike call "traditional."

Both Nkrumah and Nyerere assert that traditional African society was at once democratic and socialist. Since neither of them specify the societies of particular tribes or peoples, it may be inferred that they speak of what is general or typical. Traditional African society in Nkrumah's view "is basically communalistic--i.e., socialistic--'a society in which all live with all, and all for all,' a society in which the welfare of the individual is bound up with the welfare of all the people in the community."[1] Nkrumah writes:

> In every society, there is at least one militant segment which is the dominant segment of that society. In communalistic societies, this segment coincides with the whole. This dominant segment has its fundamental principles, its beliefs about the nature of man, and the type of society which must be created for man. Its fundamental principles help in designing and controlling the type of organization which the dominant segment uses. And the same principles give rise to a network of purposes, which fix what compromises are possible or not possible. One can compromise over programme, but not over principle.[2]

In other words, traditional African society was classless and in fundamental agreement on the nature of man and the good society; no part of the society ruled over the rest. Thus "no sectional interest could be regarded as supreme; nor did legislative and executive power aid the interests of any particular group. The welfare of the people was supreme." Africa is held therefore to be traditionally democratic. This democratic-socialist "attitude towards man ...as primarily a spiritual being," which is "refreshingly opposed to the Christian idea of the original sin and degradation of man," is "the theoretical basis of African communalism" that "expressed itself on the social level in terms of such institutions as the clan, underlining the initial equality of all and the responsibility of many for one."[3] Ghana's High Commissioner in London under Nkrumah also points to "the extended family," whose characteristics "are the security, mutual aid, and affection made available for everyone," as the basis of what he calls "Africanism" or the African "ideology."[4]

Nyerere's conception of traditional African society is essentially the same as Nkrumah's. The African is "communitary" rather than "communistic"; he belongs not to "a 'commune'--some artificial unit of human beings"--but to "a genuine community, or brotherhood," with which his individual interests never conflicted. He has avoided the two extremes of Western individualism, "where freedom becomes license," and the Communist subordination of the individual to the state.[5] Traditional African politics, similar to that of the ancient Greeks, was "'pure' democracy," in which affairs were conducted by discussion and agreement among equals, whether or not there was a chief.[6]

Nyerere's major statement on African socialism is entitled Ujamaa, which means "familyhood." In it he maintains, just as Nkrumah does, that traditional African society was "a direct extension of the family." It was characterized by an "attitude of mind" that is communal rather than individualist, and egalitarian rather than elitist. It was characterized by a classless social structure, by the uniform obligation of all to work, and by the security and aid which each member of the society received from his fellows.[7]

Let us see, then, how these characteristics of traditional African society are to be perpetuated in some way in the modern African states of Ghana and Tanzania. We deal first with the "socialist" and thereafter with the "democratic" aspects. According to Nkrumah, a socialist state is a "welfare state."[8] Its purpose is to raise economic production and the people's standard of living. Socialism is required for "the restitution of Africa's humanist and egalitarian principles of society."[9] Nkrumah explains as follows:

> If one seeks the socio-political ancestor of socialism, one must go to communalism. Socialism stands to communalism as capitalism stands to slavery. In socialism, the principles underlying communalism are given expression in modern circumstances.
>
> ....
>
> Revolution is...an indispensable avenue to socialism, where the antecedent socio-political structure is animated by principles which are a negation of those of socialism, as in a capitalist structure, for a colonialist structure is essentially ancillary to capitalism....
>
> But from the ancestral line of communalism, the passage to socialism lies in reform, because the underlying principles are the same. But when this passage carries one through colonialism the reform is revolutionary since the passage from colonialism to genuine independence is an act of revolution. But because of the continuity of communalism with socialism,

> in communalistic societies, socialism is not a revolutionary creed, but a restatement in contemporary idiom of the principles underlying communism /sic/.[10]

It should be understood that Nkrumah is a staunch enemy of tribalism and communalism in contemporary Africa. The essential principles of traditional African society are to remain, but only in a form consistent with the requirements of technological development, industrialization, and the "mastery of nature."[11]

Is Nkrumah's socialism nationalist or communist? This question must inevitably arise, but Nkrumah provides no basis for an unequivocal answer. He allowed members of his regime to dispute this point. Kofi Baako, the Ghanaian defense minister under Nkrumah and one of his major ideological spokesmen, defined Nkrumaism as "a nonatheistic socialist philosophy which seeks to apply the current socialist ideas to the solution of our problems."[12] The question would appear to boil down to one of which "current socialist ideas" are to be applied, with atheistic communism eliminated. Nkrumah meanwhile remained noncommittal, emphasizing such socialist features as state planning, control and initiative in the economic sphere.[13]

The self-proclaimed "scientific socialists" in Ghana made their answer in Spark, the organ of the Bureau of African Affairs. One article by an unidentified "Ghana University Lecturer" contrasts "African socialism" with "scientific socialism" or "Nkrumaism." The former, it holds, is based on the false claim that no antagonistic classes exist in African tribal society and that deep within the African are "spiritual strivings which move him to worship the gods of the ancestors..., to pour libation and above all to pray for guidance and protection of the great one, or God Almighty."[14] The writer maintains that the advocates of "African socialism" compromise "scientific socialism" in order to reconcile its principles with their incompatible religious ideas or their political and economic interests. Such compromises are especially to be rejected at the early stage of the African socialist revolution, for "the masses are yet to find their proper bearing in the revolution." Another article also insists that "religion and a return to the traditional collectivist way of African life" are "elements alien to socialist thought" introduced to "defeat scientific socialism" by "African socialism." Like Lenin, the writer argues that "the basic conflict is between capitalism...and socialism," in Africa as elsewhere.[15] African socialism is thus by implication a deviation into capitalist ideology.

Nkrumah himself has never clearly resolved the conflict between the "African socialists" and "scientific socialists" among his followers. He has, in fact, confused the issue, for reasons to be explained below.[16] On the same day that the two articles condemning "African socialism" and religion appeared in Spark, he published an article in Kenya entitled "The Basic Needs of African Socialism." In it he writes throughout simply of "socialism," which he emphasizes as an "economic and social program" for bringing about "the good life," characterized as emergence from poverty and "ability to pay." The "foundation upon which socialism can be built" he finds in "complete industrialization." Ghana's economic development projects, if they are to work, must be run by men having "a socialist perspective"; and the people "must stand together as one man."[17] Socialism, then, is the mobilization of the people in building an economically strong and unified nation.

The closest Nkrumah comes to confront the issue is in a pamphlet on Spark itself. Greater than its "Russian prototype Iskra," Spark was founded by Nkrumah to propagate the African socialist ideology of African revolution, which is "scientific socialism." "Africa is to embrace these universal principles of socialism while giving the institutional forms that take into account our African heritage," writes Nkrumah.

> The need here is to give a philosophic statement of socialism that will preserve the universally valid principles of ideology within the context of African history, African tradition and African aspirations. In short, socialism includes the restitution of the egalitarian and humanist principles of traditional African life within the context of a modern technical society.[18]

The Spark socialists had one more crack at the problem, praising Nkrumah for his book on Consciencism, which is said to establish "in a logical and rational manner the link between the essence of socialism and the quintessence of traditional African life," thereby overcoming "the dangerous intellectual vulgarization which is reflected in what is called 'African socialism.'"[19] Nevertheless, the above statement of Nkrumah must stand as the statement that best expresses Nkrumah's attempt to have it both African and universal, both traditional and modern.

Both Nyerere and Nkrumah wholly reject capitalism and imperialism. Nyerere asserts that the basic principles of capitalism are acquisitivism and the quest for power over others, and that European socialism glorifies social conflict. African socialism is thus equally "opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man .../and/ to doctrinaire socialism which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man."[20] Nyerere holds that "capitalism went wrong when it divorced wealth from its true purpose" of satisfying the simple human needs for food, shelter, education, and the like. Wealth was instead directed toward the perverted "purpose of acquiring power and prestige." Hence, it came to tolerate poverty, because "there is not enough wealth in any nation to satisfy the desire for power and the prestige of every individual." Socialism came into existence "to remedy this sin," and capitalist countries are to recognize that within socialist countries "personal wealth is not a symbol of power or prestige, and wealth is used to banish poverty." However, on the international level the socialist countries are now committing the capitalist "crime" of using wealth to acquire power; "socialist wealth now tolerates poverty--which is an even more unforgivable crime!" Socialism in Africa is to be "used solely for raising the standards of our people" and not for the growth of "national power and prestige." "Marx was right," claims Nyerere, in recognizing "an inevitable clash" within a society of the rich and the poor, but today this division between rich and poor is not between the capitalists and the socialists or communists; it is "between the poor countries of the world and the rich countries of the world."[21]

Nkrumah regards capitalism as unjust, divisive, overly complicated for

Africa, alien, and contrary to the principles of African society. He follows Lenin in regarding capitalism as the essential basis of imperialism, but implies that he has replaced Lenin for the contemporary world. His followers were allowed to call his thought "Marxism-Nkrumaism," displacing Lenin's position in the accepted term "Marxism-Leninism."[22]

Nyerere's socialist statements lack the pronounced Marxist flavor of the Ghanaian leader's. In substance, however, they are quite similar; although one can observe different points of emphasis. Both leaders root African socialism in the egalitarian and fraternal principles of the tribal communities. Both regard it as good by nature, and of universal validity. They consider it directly contrary to capitalism, which in principle is the same as an imperialist quest for exploitative power over other men. Both recognize in Marxian socialism a valid principle in opposition to capitalism, although Nyerere expresses certain reservations in this regard. The two men see in African socialism a promise for a better future in their countries and in Africa generally, a future conceived of primarily in terms of life's necessities; poverty and radically unequal distribution of wealth are to be overcome.

We turn, then, to the Ghanaian and Tanzanian leaders' idea of "African democracy." Nkrumah early expressed his adherence to the formal principles and procedures of Western democracy.[23] He writes:

> In our struggle for freedom, parliamentary democracy was as vital an aim as independence....It was not our purpose to rid the country of the colonial regime in order to substitute an African tyranny....
>
> We introduced principles basic to the settled and

> established democracies of the world, such as the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. As the repository of the people's will, the legislature is supreme.[24]

Yet at the time of independence, Nkrumah wrote that "a system based on social justice and a democratic constitution may need backing up, during the period following independence, by emergency measures of a totalitarian kind."[25] Accordingly, the Republican Constitution of 1960, while recognizing that "the powers of Government spring from the will of the people and should be exercised in accordance therewith," confers on Nkrumah as the first president the power of making law.[26]

Nkrumah refers to the poor social, economic and educational conditions in Ghana.

> I think no one would deny that the maintenance of a democracy by the people of Europe and America at the parallel stage would have been a massive task. Yet it is the task we faced in Ghana on the assumption of our independence.
>
> This task might have been eased a little had we been blessed with a reasonable and not violently destructive opposition. A serious, well-intentioned opposition keeps a government alive to its responsibilities, ...and underlines the need for sponsors of legislation to be able to justify their proposals.[27]

He then contrasts the opposition parties in Ghana with the British Labour Party whose "community of view" with the Conservative Party ensures that their opposition will be responsible and constructive. He refers to Nyerere's experience with a nationalist-movement party that enjoys such overwhelming popularity that the opposition's chances of forming the government are remote, resulting in irresponsibility and separatism; and more importantly Nkrumah was faced with "the question whether a seedling less developed state, eager to modernize itself in the interests of the community, threatened by the unpatriotic deeds of a minority opposition, could permit itself all the forms which established democracies have taken generations to evolve." Yet democracy is not merely a goal. Nkrumah calls the then existing form a "People's Parliamentary Democracy." The government is using its overwhelming popular mandate by employing its power to develop the country. "To abdicate any part of that power to an opposition that has been repeatedly rejected by the people and engages itself in activities prejudicial to the...forward growth of the State, would... be a betrayal of the popular will and trust."[28] Accordingly, in 1964 a constitutional referendum officially established a one-party system, thereby "disenfranchising the electorate and rendering the electoral process obsolete."[29] Nkrumah explained: "A people's parliamentary democracy with a one-party system is better able to express and satisfy the common aspirations of a nation as a whole, than a multi-party parliamentary system, which is in fact only a ruse for perpetuating, and covers up, the inherent struggle between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots'." It embodies in modern form the realities of "traditional African society" wherein "no sectional interest could be regarded as supreme," wherein the "welfare of the people was supreme."[30] Ghana's High Commissioner in London uses a Leninist term to describe Ghana's system as "democratic centralism," which "is fundamentally the reiteration of traditional African democracy in modern circumstances." Although based on tradition, democratic centralism is hardly "tradition-bound and inward-looking." It is peculiarly adapted to the task of preserving democracy while pursuing economic development.[31]

If the foregoing lends itself to an interpretation, it is this: Nkrumah originally came into power through free election under colonial auspices; true independence required a republican constitution; the people's true will is for socialist development and reconstruction; socialism requires discipline and the mobilization of resources by the government; the latter requires that the actual will of the people be given no means of political expression that would impede pursuit of the ends really willed;[32] and full democracy is the future coincidence of the actual and of the true popular wills.

Nyerere also has this problem. According to Nyerere, democracy is not only "African" but "right." It is right because men are rational and equal.[33] But how is the identity of the individual with the common good in modern Africa obtained? More specifically, Nyerere writes: "Our problem is just this: how to get the benefits of European society--benefits that have been brought about by an organization based upon the individual--and yet retain Africa's own structure of society in which the individual is a member of a kind of fellowship."[34]

Nyerere's solution is like Nkrumah's: "self-interest and the genuine good of the individual...are two quite different things. The former may well conflict with the good of the community; the latter will not."[35] Therefore, what is required is an organization of society that will "solve the fundamental conflict between the individual and society."[36] This organizational form is the one-party state in which the party absorbs major associations and orients them to the societal good.

Nyerere rejects the Anglo-Saxon two-party system as inappropriate for Africa and as inferior to the one-party system. The basis of the two-party system is the division of society into classes (rich and poor, capitalists and workers). It was once justified:

> a Two-Party system can be justified only when the parties are divided over some fundamental issue;...the only time when a political group can represent the interests of a section of the community, without being a faction, is when that group fights to remove a grievous wrong from society. But then...there can therefore be no question of national unity until the differences have been removed by change... any change in fundamentals is properly termed 'revolution' ....the existence of really fundamental differences within any society poses a 'civil war' situation.[37]

What was historically justified persisted after its justification ceased: "habit is equated with philosophy," as people in the West came to deem an opposition party essential to democracy. What remains, where differences between the parties are not fundamental, is "football politics" which promotes "factionalism" based on self-interest. In factional parties, as in "the vanguard aristocracies of an ideological dictatorship," the leaders really elect each other; in the former, the people at most decide "from which sectional group the 'people's representatives' shall be selected for them."[38]

African parties, on the other hand, are "nationalist movements" that represent "the interests and aspirations of the whole nation." They were formed to challenge foreign rule.

> Now that the colonists have gone, there is no remaining division between 'rulers' and 'ruled'; no monopoly of

> political power by any sectional group which can give rise to conflicting parties. There can, therefore, be only one reason for the formation of such parties in a country like ours--the desire to imitate the political structure of a totally dissimilar society.[39]

The argument thus comes full circle: what is African is identical with what is natural and right. Systems which are deficient democracies, and are therefore simply deficient, are also alien. The African and right order is one in which party and government and party and nation are identical.

Modern African democracy, according to Nyerere, can no longer be the unorganized "pure" democracy of the tribal society; it must be institutionalized (parliamentary and representative). Free elections are of its essence. Doctrinaire politics, as with communism, is incompatible with it.[40] There is to be a circulation of leadership and ideas within the party-state. Nevertheless the personal character of traditional African rule is to be retained, with an emphasis on the president under the republican constitution of 1962.[41]

If in Tanzania a single party is identified with the nation as a whole,[42] in Ghana it is identified with the nation and the leader. Nkrumah himself says, "The Convention Peoples Party is Ghana, and Ghana is the Convention Peoples Party";[43] and "the people and the Government are one."[44] Under Nkrumah's auspices, others add: "the name Ghana is synonymous with the name Kwame Nkrumah."[45] These ideas find their full meaning in the fact that the two African leaders envision themselves as the heads of nascent societies. They represent and rule in the name of a societal substance which does not yet fully exist but which they must create. The mode of existence of these substantive entities is ideational: the nations yet to be are already in the minds of the leaders. The leaders themselves are engaged in the great task of "nation-building." In founding new societies they are like those first royal ancestors whom we have described as having "rivaled God not by imitating the order He created, but by exercising a comparable spontaneous act of creativity."[46] They differ from the founders of the African tribal societies, however, in that the forces at their disposal to be utilized in their great task are not so much the vital forces which pervade a cosmic order as they are resources and techniques which have emerged in the historical development of man. This experience of the historical dimension of existence is the major legacy of the colonial regimes. When this experience is combined with the traditional African experience of the founding political act, the result is a new type of authority in Africa.

If the nascent societies, the nations-to-be, exist in the minds of the new African leaders, they are also embodied in the organizations which have been called "parties" in the two states of Ghana and Tanzania. Recall that the colonial regimes imposed an external and superior organizational structure over a multitude of indigenous African societies. Earl Grey, in his final year of tenure (1846-52) as Secretary for the colonies, had expressed the prevalent idea that the creation of an assembly of chiefs as an African Parliament was sufficient to convert a number of tribes into a single nation.[47] As authorities superior to the chiefs, Nkrumah and Nyerere were not about to accept an idea such as this. However, they did accept the principle that a nation could be created through organization. Both of them have repeatedly asserted the identity of their parties with the "nations" of Ghana and Tanzania. This must not be understood merely in the sense that the party "represents" the nation, or that the party expresses the "true will" of "the people," for this would imply the pre-existence of a national people. In reality, there is no nation: neither the colonial entity nor the present independent country consists of a "people" or political society. Since apart from the party there is no people, the party itself must take the place of the nonexistent natural or historical people. As "the people," as "the nation," the party could hardly tolerate the existence of other parties within the state, for "this people" sought its own state.

The party, however, is man-made; therefore it would seem to constitute an artifical people. Moreover, the integrity of a people would seem to depend upon the bond of a common historical experience. Thus, while recognizing the "artificial" character of the colonial territories, deliminted as they often were by virtually arbitrarily drawn boundaries, the African leaders sought to make their creations, the party-peoples, natural. This could be done in two ways: first, by attributing an essentially "African" character to them--hence the symbols of "African socialism" and "African democracy"--and, secondly, by attributing to them the function of recovering the glory and inherent unity of the African past on the basis of the common African experience of colonial depredation. The nature and function of the African type of party thus differentiates it sharply from any other type of party. This explains

Nyerere's dislike for the term "party," for he regards TANU as essentially a nationalist "movement." Indeed it is such a movement, not as the movement of a nation but as the movement to realize nationhood. The African type of party thus differs from the Communist Party, which conceives of itself as the militant organization of a new type of man, who is of the future alone and who expects that the expansion of his power will ultimately reach the point whereat men will cease to be anything but men, existing no longer as subjects or even citizens but as perfected masters of their own lives. It differs also from Western parliamentary parties, which conceive of themselves as "partisan," as parts of a constitutional order, as private organizations which in their mutuality fulfill crucial public functions.

We turn, then, to Nkrumah's and Nyerere's ideas of African history and of the place of Africa in the world. Neither leader has attempted to present a full-blown philosophy or ideology of history, yet they have said enough that one may infer what their major ideas are. We consider Nkrumah first. The Ghanaian leader frequently referred to Asia in various ways, but especially to assert the influence of Gandhi on him. In his "Motion of Destiny" on constitutional reform in July 1953 he spoke of his "coloured brothers in Asia" achieving sovereign independence in the context of a demand for Ghanaian independence.[48] The "new sense of dominant nationalism in Asia" resulted in a successful struggle for freedom in Asia that preceded the similar African struggle, and the independent states of Asia and Africa face similar problems. China has a great contribution to make to world civilization.[49]

More significant are the thoughts on Asia of W.E.B. DuBois, George Padmore, and Casely Hayford, all of whom influenced the original development of Nkrumah's nationalist ideas.[50] Casely Hayford in particular among Gold Coast Africans is frequently cited in Nkrumah's writings and speeches as the major nationalist forerunner to Nkrumah himself.[51]

Casely Hayford is particularly impressed by Japan. "The Japanese, adopting and assimilating Western culture, of necessity commands the respect of Western nations, because there is something distinctly eastern about him." He uses his own language and has his own literature. "He respects the institutions and customs of his ancestors, and there is an intelligent past which inspires him. He does not discard his national costume."[52] Japan is, however, but the barest semblance of what Africa is to be.

Africa, claims Casely Hayford, "was the cradle of civilisation." Western ideas, as of God, came from the Romans, who learned much from Africa through the Greeks. Christ was nurtured in Egypt and "Buddha from Africa taught Asia." Not only was Africa "the nursing mother of its religions," but "the cradle of the world's systems and philosophies."[53] Nkrumah, citing scientific authority,[54] finds Africa to be the birthplace of man and the source of European culture. He elaborates on the greatness of ancient Ghana (from which the present state derives its name) and of the superior civilization of West Africa before it was ravaged by the Europeans.[55]

The white man then came. According to Casely Hayford, Africans "took the coming of the stranger for the visit of a god," worshipped "the new god, and greedily devoured the good things found on his altars." They imitated him, "and when they bowed the knee in the House of Mammon, they thought they worshipped the true God, and seemed to forget that once they were Ethiopians." Yet it was in "the order of Providence" that slavery "made it possible for the speedier dissemination and adoption of the better part of Western culture."[56] Nkrumah's writings and speeches abound with a Leninist interpretation and moral condemnation of the West, emphasizing that the effect of colonialism was not only political and economic, but intellectual. The "colonial mentality" and the loss of African-ness are particularly deplored by him: "colonialism imposed on the mind of Africans the idea that their own kith and kin in other parts of Africa were aliens and had little, if anything, in common with Africans elsewhere."[57] Many Africans "came to accept the view that we were inferior people."[58] Nevertheless, Nkrumah frequently praises particular benefits derived by Africans from the West. The modern African society must harmonize the elements of Christianity and Western culture that have infiltrated into Africa with the indigenous African tradition.[59]

Casely Hayford envisions a glorious future that will overcome the iniquity of the West, preserve the good elements in Western culture, and involve a return to pristine African principles. Nyiakropon (=Nyame, Zeus, Re, Jupiter, "God of Love," Hebrew "I am," "Father of all" who orders and rules in the heavens)[60] will hear the cry of the afflicted sons of Ethiopia, and he "will establish a kingdom which is different from all other kingdoms. Mammon will have no place therein." Africa is to again become the spiritual leader of the world.

> [The African] was the scion of a spiritual sphere peculiar to himself; for when Western nations would have exhausted their energy in a vain struggle for things that satisfy not, ...it would be to these people to whom the world would turn for inspiration, seeing that in them only would be found those elements which make for pure altruism, the leaven of all human experience.[61]

The Ethiopians are thus "a peculiar people" whose destiny it is to play a "peculiar part" in the regeneration of the world. And the Gold Coast people are to be "the nucleus of the free Ethiopian Empire that is to be," for they are "an Eastern type" marked "for leadership in the spiritual realm."[62] The new civilization, based on truth to their African selves, will be permanent.[63]

These ideas of Casely Hayford, and the experiences they represent, are much more at the core of Nkrumah's socialism and Pan-Africanism than his Marxist terminology might allow one to think. Nkrumah's ideas of democracy and of socialism, we recall, were referred by him to the principles of traditional African life. The future society is envisioned as African rather than communist, although insofar as it is to be modern it is described by him in Marxist rather than liberal terms.

Nyerere has said even less than Nkrumah about Africa's place in past history. He and Nkrumah certainly share the idea that colonialism divided Africa and retarded its natural development.[64] Perhaps the clearest statement of this historical conception of Africa is that of Tanganyikan Minister S. A. Maswanya:

> As to our /Tanganyikan/ African policy we believe in the concept that Africa is one unit and that it was balkanized by European colonialist conspiracy. Basing our belief in true Pan-African ideology we believe that the present territorial boundaries...are artificial and our Government will leave no stone unturned in its endeavour to promote and assist Africa to reunite.[65]

Africa is thus the natural and essential unit of action, and the purpose of action is to bring Africa's actual being into line with its historical and essential reality. Nkrumah explains the unity of Africa also in terms of a mystique: "It is not just our colonial past, or the fact that we have aims in common, it is something which goes far deeper. I can best describe it as a sense of one-ness in that we are Africans."[66] In other words, there is something substantial that Africans are, and this "something" is peculiar to them. Moreover, this something is not a pathos (the common experience of suffering under alien rule) and not a rational and voluntary creation (the determination and pursuit of purpose); rather it is a reality that underlies these things and makes them possible.

Nkrumah, who speaks of "the African nation that must be," has often asserted that "Ghana's freedom would be meaningless if it was not linked up with the total liberation of the entire continent."[67] Thus Article 2 of the Ghana Constitution provides that the Parliament is empowered to surrender the sovereignty of Ghana to a union of African states.[68] Similarly, Nyerere states that unity is "necessary for the whole of Africa to achieve and maintain her independence," and that "African nationalism is meaningless...if it is not at the same time Pan-Africanism."[69] Nkrumah, unlike Nyerere, embelishes his visions with profuse symbols of glory and power:

> God Himself brought up the man, and that man led them out of Egypt. A greater exodus is coming in Africa today...
>
> ....
>
> We must work for a greater glory and majesty, greater than the civilisations of our grandsires, the civilisation of Ghana...
>
> ....
>
> When you have a big territory and you have a hundred million population, then you know the other powers also will see and respect you because they know that force is behind you...
>
> ....
>
> The vision that I see /is of/...a parapet, and upon that parapet I see the mother of West African unity and independence. Her body besmeared with the blood of the benighted of the race. On the same parapet I see the heroes of the race both living and dead, in unison, singing one national anthem. On the same parapet I see...West Africa cities...springing up and becoming the metropolises of art and learning and science and philosophy; and I hear, beyond that parapet, mortals resounding the rejoinder: Seek ye first the kingdom of freedom and liberty, and all other things will be added unto you.[70]

Richard Wright marvelled at the "bewildering unity Nkrumah had forged: Christianity, tribalism, paganism, sex,[71] nationalism, socialism, housing, health and industrial schemes."[72] The unity of these and other elements is to be questioned, for the gamut of symbols and emotions is the manifestation more of a quest for identity than of its expression.[73]

The identity is sought primarily in a willed reality, in a purpose beyond that of any other. Africa is to make an indispensable and distinctive contribution to mankind.

> Nkrumaism believes that the surest way to achieve peace and understanding in the world is the achievement of the total liberation of Africa and the establishment of a continental federal government in a complete political union of Africa. This will enable the continent to pool its resources--material and human--for the common good of its people and for the general good of mankind. It will also help Africa to exert its influence on the international scene.[74]

This, then, is a new version of "dual mandate." In helping itself, Africa contributes to the general good of man. Thus Nkrumah looks forward to "the day when we shall be able to refer to ourselves simply as the African power,"[75] and finds no difficulty in stating flatly that the struggle for freedom and unity in Africa "is for the future of humanity." He asserts "in categorical terms that the greatness of this objective...transcends all other purposes" in Africa.[76] The basis for the achievement of this objective is the emergence of an ideology that will replace the competing ideologies that animated traditional African life, the Islamic tradition in Africa, and the colonial legacy of Christian tradition and West European culture:

> With true independence regained...a new harmony needs to be forged...that will allow the combined presence of traditional Africa, Islamic Africa and Euro-Christian Africa, so that this presence is in tune with the original humanist principles underlying African society.[77]

This is to be achieved through philosophical synthesis, which is none other than Nkrumah's own philosophy of "consciencism."

More than two years before Tanganyikan independence, Nyerere was already speaking of Tanganyika giving, beyond its borders, "hope where there was despair, love where there was hate and dignity where before there was only humiliation." He has regarded nation states as "an intermediate stage" in the international development of man. He too stresses the need of "working out a new synthesis, a way of life that draws from Europe as well as Africa, from Islam as well as Christianity." Yet Africa will not duplicate Europe; in regaining its full "integrity" by unifying, Africa will speak to the world through "just one authority,"[78] and with a distinctive personality of her own --what Nkrumah calls the "African Personality."[79]

The Nkrumah regime in Ghana and the Nyerere regime in Tanzania thus present a peculiar pattern of ideas and institutions, of symbols and actions. This pattern is a new one, and the major changes in Africa, especially the most radical of them, are effects of the Western impact during and after the colonial period. This is a truism. However, the facts require an interpretation. The most obvious interpretation is that the major characteristics of contemporary Africa are both radically new and essentially Western: African ideas, institutions and customary behavior have been overlaid and largely replaced by a Western mode of life. This has indeed been the most prevalent Western conception of what has occurred in Africa, and in the non-Western world generally.

It has been shown that the African leaders of Ghana and Tanzania have not shared this view. What exists in Africa--what really exists and dominates --is certainly new, but not radically so; it is the partial and potentially full realization of the old, of what has always been African, of what the colonial regimes caused to be corrupted, repressed, and nearly forgotten. This realization does involve new symbols--for example, socialism, democracy, Pan-Africanism --but the African leaders strongly maintain that the meaning or content of these terms is traditional. It also involves modernization--the economic and institutional development that makes for viability in the contemporary world--but again this is seen as the working out and adaptation of traditional African modes.

This African view of modern Africa not only colors the African view of the modern world and of modern ideas, but it also constitutes the criterion for the adoption of non-African ideas and institutions. Let us examine this proposition. We may begin by considering that the indigenous African conceptions could not adequately express, interpret or provide the norms of change in recent African history. A new doctrine was required that would interpret what changes had taken place and that would establish ends, direction and norms for future change. It would have to be a dynamic doctrine, and one might have thought that progressivism would have lent itself well to the African need. Progressivism does, the Africans must realize, put a premium on change itself; and it assuredly offers promise of a better future. Yet this ideology was tainted for the Africans. First of all, it was the ideology of the rejected colonial masters. Secondly, and more significantly, given its European genesis, the historical criterion of "better" was also European: progress was the multiplication, improvement and spread of things European, and thus imperialism was seen as the march of progress. Finally, and most relevantly, progressivism posits no historical denouement. Primarily for this reason the Africans rejected it: there could be no return to, and fulfilment of, Africa's glorious beginnings without a substantive future denouement. The Pan-African civilization being striven for is not merely better; it is the achievement of the best.

What then of the idea that somehow, sometime man will achieve the goal of mundane effort, a realm of perfect peace, morality, knowledge, prosperity and health? Besides being too vague to support a political regime, for action rather than expectation is the stuff of politics, this "idealist" position is devoid of the nationalist exclusiveness that is characteristic of African politics.

Neither would National Socialism do. It was avowedly racist, and its racist doctrine placed the black races far below the white ones. It was not only non-democratic, but explicitly anti-democratic. Moreover, it was a historical loser, having been defeated by a Western alliance that included the colonial rulers whom the Africans were rejecting. The same argument applies to fascism.

Some but not all the chief aspects of Marxism, especially the Leninist form of Marxism, were appropriate to the African situation. Communism appealed first of all as a historical winner that, unlike the United States, was not tainted by close association with the European colonialists or by adherence to European values. The attraction of communist China was unmistakable in the two countries,[80] for here was a country that appeared on the way to recovering its former greatness through communism. The Sino-Soviet dispute served only to enhance China's apparent relevance to Africa, since China seemed to present a revolutionary position that pretended to be at once specifically Chinese and universally valid. The Chinese alone among the Africans' colored and erstwhile oppressed brethren had apparently achieved the proper fusion of orthodox Marxism and nationalism. The Africans by no means tried to copy Chinese communism; they did try to Africanize certain of communism's doctrines just as the Chinese had with apparent success Sinicised it. It remains to be considered what of Marxism the Africans accepted, what they rejected, and why. We have already seen that the Marxian doctrine of class warfare culminating in the revolutionary overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat was not accepted by the Africans. On the contrary, Nkrumah and Nyerere held that African society was basically classless. They did, however, accept the Leninist extension of class conflict to the anti-imperialist struggle of the colonial peoples. They also opposed the capitalism of the imperialists, primarily on moral grounds but also because they shared to some extent the Marxist idea that capitalism is destined for the trash heap of history. Regarding their own societies as basically classless, their avowed purpose was to prevent the development of classes, which had begun to emerge as a result of the economic tie with the imperial power. Harmony, not conflict, was to be the hallmark of national life. No African class as such--whether it was the tribal "feudalists" or the nascent bourgeoisie--was regarded as an "enemy," despite the competition for political power with the tribal chiefs and the African liberal leadership that prevailed in Ghana prior to Nkrumah's rise. The "enemy" was the "colonial mentality," which the Nkrumah regime in particular regarded as a powerful and destructive residue of colonial rule.[81]

Communism had much to recommend itself to the African leaders, especially if they were free to pick and choose among its tenets. It offered the idealist vision of a perfect culmination of human endeavor, and recent developments in the communist world had apparently shown that it could be nationalized. Its Leninist version, without losing sight of the Marxist notion of the historical inevitability of human perfection, emphasized the importance of conscious revolutionary effort through a new type of party.[82] The Africans accepted the Marxian promise of a new society, retained Lenin's revolutionary will, and developed organizations (parties) which like the communist party claimed a monopoly on truth and were therefore unwilling to share power with, or even regard as acceptable alternatives, other political parties. This is not to say that Nkrumah and Nyerere are communists. If they accepted the Marxian promise of a new society, that new society was to be African. There is no Marxian vision of de-alienated man mastering reality, of freedom from the division of labour, of the withering away of the state.[83] If they accepted the premium placed by Lenin on conscious effort, they did not focus attention on the laws of history. If their party, like Lenin's, did not conceive of itself as one party among others, competing but sharing faith with others in a political system of which any given party was no more than a part, then it does not follow necessarily that their party is communist.

There is ample basis in Nkrumah's books especially for one to get the idea that Nkrumah might well be a communist who merely paid necessary lip service to African tradition but does not adhere to it. In fact, Nkrumah has not been shy about speaking of the need for an ideology around which to rally and mobilize the people.[84] Moreover, there is prominent in Marxism itself the idea that theory and practice inform each other, which combined with the Leninist stress on agitation could easily be misconstrued into the notion that although a revolutionary movement must be based upon an ideology, any ideology likely to appeal to the relevant group of people would do. Whereas Lenin stressed that the vanguard party and the revolutionary movement must be guided by Marxian revolutionary theory, Nkrumah considers the CPP "a vanguard political party" embodying "African consciousness."[85] Moreover, it is quite clear that Nkrumah has a fond regard for the "ordered...pattern of African village life" in which he grew up.[86] Therefore the view of Apter and Bretton, namely that Nkrumah's ideological efforts are to be understood solely as rhetorical and instrumentalist, is deficient.

With the frustration of African aspirations--for the unification of Africa, for rapid economic development, and for political and social harmony--communism became even more relevant. The Leninist idea of imperialism could explain, as progressivism and idealism could not, the failures as due to opposing forces that deserve hostility. The lack of economic and cultural independence from the West received increasing emphasis. Political independence was seen as only partial independence. The remnants of imperialism and the new reality of neo-colonialism were now seen as the greatest threats to Africa. These ideas were prominent in the resolutions of the All-African Peoples Conference, held in Cairo, March 1961.

> /I/mperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism act directly or indirectly to divide the African states, create real obstacles to the realization of African Unity and the affirmation of African Personality.[87]

> /N/eo-colonialism, which is the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which become the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means, is the greatest threat to African countries.[88]

Most African leaders, and certainly Nkrumah and Nyerere, subscribe to these views.[89]

Our treatment of Nkrumaism would be greatly unbalanced if we were to ignore the role which religious, and particularly Christian, symbolism has played in it. Here we must consider not only the symbols themselves, but the religious experience of Nkrumah that makes this symbolism meaningful. We may recall from the previous chapter that Nkrumah was compared with Christ. Such a comparison in itself could mean, as it does for all Christians, that the true life, which he is attempting to lead, is an imitation of Christ. This conception, which assumes the radical inferiority of the human imitator to the God-Man who is his model, is not at all that of Nkrumah. In his autobiography Nkrumah stresses his early "longing for things supernatural," and explains that upon conversion to Catholicism he took his religion seriously. However, as he became older he found Catholic discipline stifling:

> It was not that I became any less religious but rather I sought freedom in the worship of and communion with my God, for my God is a very personal God and can only be reached direct....To-day I am a non-denominational Christian and a Marxist socialist and I have not found any contradiction between the two.[90]

The connection thus established between Christianity and Marxian socialism, both in Nkrumah's own person and in principle, was implied by Nkrumah's activities as a student in the United States (1935-45). Nkrumah won a Bachelor of Theology degree at the head of his class at the seminary of Lincoln University. He also studied philosophy, becoming convinced that Marx and Lenin provided the true understanding and solution to the problem of imperialism. He established connections with political organizations, including communist and Trotskyite ones, in order to learn organizational techniques.[91] He also preached in various churches, his last sermon in a Philadelphia Presbyterian church being later described by him in these words:

> My text was 'I saw a new Heaven and a new Earth' and I reminded the people of how history repeated itself. Just as in the days of the Egyptians, so to-day God had ordained that certain among the African race should journey westwards to equip themselves with knowledge and experience for the day when they would be called upon to return to their motherland and to use the learning they had acquired to help improve the lot of their brethren.

This vision of "a new Heaven and a new Earth," Nkrumah neglects to mention, is taken from the book of Isaias (65: 17; 66: 22). Recall also from the previous chapter that Nkrumah was regarded as the "Prince of Peace" who came in fulfillment of the Isaianic prophecy (9: 6-7). Why this emphasis on Isaias? What is it about that book which attracts Nkrumah and his eulogists? Perhaps the answer is suggested by Voegelin's treatment of Isaias, in whose experience he finds a magic element that is subtly "beyond magic in the ordinary sense." Voegelin is reminded of later Gnostic phenomena by "the state of the /prophetic7 psyche in which the experience of cosmic rhythms, in the medium of historical form, gives birth to the vision of a world that will change its nature without ceasing to be the world in which we live concretely."[92] We are reminded of our own earlier suggestions that Nkrumah and Nyerere have tried to treat historical forces in the way (magical) the royal ancestors had used the vital forces that pervaded the cosmic order. The theme of Nkrumah's graduation oration was "Ethiopia shall stretch forth her hands unto God."[93] Later, at the head of a successful party organization and government, Nkrumah himself becomes the savior of Africa.

While purporting to be a Christian, Nkrumah participated in a libation-pouring ceremony in the United States with fellow African students,[94] and ample evidence shows that Nkrumah in power relied heavily on the advice and magic of African "holy men."[95] Baako, himself a Catholic, speaks of Nkrumah as a "religious and God-fearing man" in the context of a claim that "atheism is foreign to Africa, and religion is the basis of our culture." Nkrumaism, which consists of the "ideas and teachings" of Nkrumah, "is not a religion and has not come to replace any religion." Yet "it preaches and seeks to implement all that true religion teaches." It is, therefore, "applied religion, and it is a way of life which must be lived." It is not an "applied religion," for it is concerned to effect "all" the teachings of "true religion." No particular religion is singled out as "true," for Nkrumaism is compatible with "Christianity, Islam, and even Buddhism."[96] Thus the seeker after religious truth is to find it through Nkrumaism, which "preaches," and organizes life according to, all religious truth. Anything in religion that conflicts with Nkrumaism is, accordingly, spurious religion. Nkrumah's teachings become the criteria by which what is true in the spiritual realm is determined. The basis for this pre-eminence of Nkrumaism is Nkrumah's own "direct link" with God.

Some obvious reasons for the prevalence of religious symbolism in Ghana are the deep penetration into that country of Christianity under colonial auspices and the influence of Marcus Garvey on Nkrumah himself. Garvey set an example for the creation of separatist African churches, references to the God or gods of Africa, and the foundation by Africans of their own religion.[97] Thus an article in the Ghanaian press was entitled "Can't the African Found His Own Religion." It asserts that the Ghanaians were "God-fearing and religious people...long before the advent of the Christian missionaries." It calls upon the Africans or Ghanaians to "found a religion" that would be suitable to their "environment" and based upon the rediscovery of the religion of their past.[98] Other articles in the Ghana press assert in various ways that God is on Africa's side, that Africans are his special people, that He has given Ghana and Africa a great mission; and most of these articles praise Nkrumah as the divinely elected leader of this people and their mission.[99] These religious expressions are needed because the Marxian idea of class struggle is rejected. For Marx, the proletariat was a special class; it alone would effect the greatest event in history, the revolutionary overthrow of the existing order. But Africans were not proletarians, and Christian terminology, well understood in Ghana, was utilized to express the special character and unique mission of the African people.

The true import of the religious expressions of the Ghanaian regime can be seen in some of the statements of Nkrumah and his colleagues. First, Nkrumah:

> What our ancestors achieved in the context of their contemporary society gives *us* confidence that we can create, out of that past, a glorious future...The heroes of our future will be those who can lead our people...into the valley of light where purpose, endeavour and determination will create that brotherhood which Christ proclaimed two thousand years ago.[100]
>
> God made all of us equal. In the sight of God we are one. We must combine. The only thing, as that philosopher Hegel said, the most important thing in the world, 'God is in the state.'[101]

The glorious future of Africa, to be realized under the leadership of Nkrumah, is thus presented as the fulfillment of Christ's mission. It inheres in the combination of Africans who are essentially one. This unity, in which the divine is immanent, is the state. The full meaning of this is to be seen in a poem by Nkrumah's advisor Dei-Anang, who writes that "he scaled the dizzy heights of Earth in an aeroplane," searching vainly for God "above the clouds." However, looking down on "our tiny world," he "heard a still small voice whisp'ring persistently; 'Your God He dwells among the midget millions of mankind--down, down, below.'"[102] Here the divine is found in the multitudes seen afar, in the masses who are individually insignificant. This experience is similar to the most vivid experience Nkrumah relates in any of his writings. Nkrumah tells of how his work one day kept him from the lunch that was served at his desk. His attention was finally drawn to the meal by an invasion of ants. Instead of taking measures to rescue his lunch, he entrancedly looked on. He was overwhelmed by the display of power in the efficiency and numbers of the ants, and he thought how wonderful it would be if men could exhibit the same discipline.[103] Nkrumah's experience is undoubtedly genuine, for the description is fully concrete and lacking in any of the artificiality and abstraction that would characterize a mere literary construct.

In Tanzania there are no explicit references to Nyerere in religious terms other than his title Mwalimu. The discussion in the previous chapter of the ceremonies attending his assumption of the presidency are sufficient to show, however, that a divine sanction of Nyerere's authority is implicit. The religious composition of Tanzania has so far proven sufficient to inhibit the elaboration of the type of expressions noted for Ghana.

Some scholars assert, while others imply by their treatments of African political ideas, that the African leaders are eclectic.[104] If by eclecticism one means the borrowing of concepts and doctrines from disparate sources, then Nkrumah and Nyerere are assuredly eclectic. If, however, it means that the concepts and doctrines so borrowed are not integrated by some idea or principle that transcends them, the question takes on new life. It is the idea that the leaders and institutions are both African and modern, and that their purpose is the historical realization of a modern African order of existence, that integrates the borrowings. This realization is not inevitable, but it is the culmination of the natural working out of what is inherent in contemporary Africa. The present leaders understand this, and their knowledge sanctions their power. Their knowledge of and dedication to this end makes them the natural rulers, superseding the earlier natural rulers, the chiefs. They are the means required by the end.

The unifying element in the profusion of ideas and symbols is thus an immanentist eschatology. The highest human end is to be attained within history as the result of human effort. The expression of this belief is religious, and the premise of such expression is the immanentization of the divine in man himself, in this case African man. The attempt is being made to "close," the African political community, to abolish the transcendent reference of the society by employing, and perverting, the symbols of transcendence. This process is explained by Voegelin:

> The formerly open group with spiritual threads running from every single member beyond the earthly reality into another ontological realm closes by the transfer of the center from the beyond into the very community itself. This process is practically completed when the unit of a group is believed to lie in a group mind, in a national spirit, in the character of a class as an agent of history, or when society is interpreted by analogy to a self-centered organism.[105]

This passage explains the essential core common to communism, nationalism and national socialism--indeed to modern politics generally. The Africans manifest one version of it, comparable to the others by virtue of their share in this essential core. In the case of Ghana and Tanzania the center has become the people, represented by the leader and embodied by the party.

The Leninist and Christian concepts adopted by the African leaders are in this connection most appropriate. Voegelin shows why:

> The closure of the community is accompanied by a phenomenon of...far reaching consequences...In the Christian anthropology

> man is an essentially imperfect being...Such evil as there is in the world is intimately connected with the status of man in general, and every human being in particular.... In the course of secularization these Christian categories change their meaning, or are replaced by new interpretations of man..../W/e see the first symptoms of a process which we may call the externalization of evil. The idea of evil becomes dissociated from its Christian context of human imperfection and sin, and is transferred from an internal problem of the soul to the external problem of an unsatisfactory state of things which may be overcome by intelligent and concerted action of man. While this attitude does not imply necessarily an open repudiation of the ideas of sin and salvation they certainly become rather pale.[106]

What Voegelin here describes is not at all peculiar to Africa, but it is nevertheless an accurate statement of what is happening there. In fact, Voegelin has in mind primarily the West itself, so we may properly regard the attitude he describes as the West's major legacy to Africa. It is an attitude that can assume protean forms, and it lends itself most readily to the colorful African garb.

Yet another phase of the process Voegelin describes occurs when the community of Christians breaks up into a multiplicity of closed groups.

> The empire of darkness which in the spiritualized Christian idea signifies a region of the human soul and its forces, becomes transformed, parallel with the closure of a particular group, into the external empire of the forces which are supposed to threaten the existence of the particular group. In strict parallelism with the vision of new group orders arise the visions of the evil forces opposing the new order; and every modern political movement produces along with its positive idea the counter-idea of the realm of its particular evil.[107]

Thus in the political movements headed by Nkrumah and Nyerere the positive idea of Pan-African unity finds its "counter-idea" in colonialism and neo-colonialism. This was adopted from Leninism. In Ghana, after Nkrumah escaped an assassination attempt in 1962, Nkrumah "the immortal" was said to have triumphed over evil. An Nkrumah lieutenant accused of the plot was called "the devil himself."[108] The assassination failure was described in this way:

> At Kulungugu the diabolical bomb was aimed at the people of Ghana and the people of Africa through Osagyefo. At Kulungugu, by the will of God, the will of Ghana and of Africa, and Osagyefo's own will, the attempt failed.[109]

A year previously, Kofi Baako accused Gbedemah, a former aide of Nkrumah being purged, of trying to kill him with bags of magic black powder. This charge, made in the National Assembly, made it apparent that Baako regarded the magic of the powder as dangerous to himself.[110] These examples, and others which might be multiplied, show that the Nkrumah regime regarded itself as threatened by three evil counterforces: neo-colonialism, satanism, and black magic. To these correspond the positive ideas of African independence and unity, true religion, and traditional African life. The compound of these ideas--deriving from Leninism, Christianity, and African tradition--is the idea of the Nkrumah regime.

The question obviously to be raised is this: just what kind of ideas have we been discussing? Are they what Voegelin calls "political ideas"?

> A political idea does not attempt to describe social reality as it is, but it sets up symbols...which have the function

> of creating the image of the political group as a unit . . . .What welds the diffuse mass of individual life into a group unit are the symbolic beliefs entertained by the members of a group. Every group has its symbols which permit of concentrating into an emotional energy and volitional substance that which, if viewed empirically, is a stream of human action, articulated by behavior patterns and purposes, of highly questionable unity. A symbolic idea . . . is not a theory in the strict sense of the word. . . [I]t is not the function of an idea to describe social reality, but to assist in its constitution.[111]

Since it is the purpose of Nkrumah and Nyerere to "constitute" new political orders, it would seem that they would have need of ideas whose function it is to create "the image of the political group as a unit." Moreover, if such ideas are to accomplish this purpose, they would have to be symbolic of common "beliefs entertained by the members of the group."

Now the ideas that we have been discussing would appear to be of this type. They are ceaselessly propagated through the daily press and over the radio as well as in the speeches and writings of the political leaders. They are aimed at concentrating the actions of their subjects into an emotional and volitional unity. However, some problems remain. There is nothing to indicate that their subjects share a common perception of the true and the good: some are pagan tribesmen, others are Christians; some are Westernized liberal secularists, others are communists; and perhaps most important of all, many are not one of these pure types, but see things confusedly in several different ways -- ways which are in principle contradictory. This suggests that when Nkrumah and Nyerere identify the language symbols of socialism and democracy with their symbolic ideas of traditional African societies, and that when Christianity is virtually identified with Nkrumaism, the attempt is being made through such verbal identification magically to evoke a substantive unity. Herein is found the explanation of the emphasis in both regimes on the person of the leader, for it is in him, only in his mind and will, that the contradictory ideas achieve unity.[112] Do the leaders believe these ideas are true? There is no reason to doubt that they do. They believe that they understand the nature of the traditional African societies in which they grew up and over which they rule; they believe that they have penetrated the deficiencies of modern Western society that led to exploitation of and imperial rule over Africa; they believe that they are establishing an essentially African type of nation that is democratic and socialist; they believe that this type of state can achieve and enjoy the prosperity which they observe as characteristic of modern Western societies; they believe that a united Africa will have the power and influence to make a unique and decisive contribution to world peace and culture.

It is important to emphasize, however, that the ideas which we have been discussing are not theoretical, that is, essentially critical-analytical. The assertion of their "truth" is a practical rather than a theoretical matter: it is the self-interpretation of a "political" reality, of what Voegelin calls "a stream of human action." Nor are the ideas properly regarded as "myths," in the sense in which Eliade speaks of myth as the revelation of an essentially atemporal cosmic order.[113] Recall that we concluded in Chapter III that the dominant symbolic form in the indigenous African societies was the legend rather than the myth proper. The legends concerned an extraordinary man and his foundation of the societal order that prevailed. The "extraordinary" qualities of the legendary founder were those powers of the founder to acquire or provide those things which were deemed good -- pre-eminently the fertility of man and nature. Similarly, the ideas of Nkrumah and Nyerere, like the symbols that pertain to their authority, suggest that these leaders possess the "extraordinary" qualities of understanding and control that promise the provision of the multiplicity of things deemed good by their countrymen and by Africans generally. Thus the ideas of African socialism and African democracy are assimilated to the legendary figures of their advocates: the second set of symbols discussed in this chapter is subordinate to, and properly understood in terms of, the first set of symbols treated in the preceding chapter.[114] The traditional African idea of the legendary foundation of an order of life by a godlike or divinely gifted man persists as the dominant motif of contemporary African politics. Only the contents of the legendary model change: the new founder can be godlike in a Feuerbachian sense: his mastery of "scientific" knowledge can be imputed as an "extraordinary" quality that promises the provision of those things which the West has taught the African to deem good. Yet the change is not complete. The new elements in the legend find their place alongside of traditional ones, as the attempt is made to establish out of their disparate tribal, Christian, Muslim, Westernized liberal and communist subjects an order of existence that would consist of amity in personal relations, agreement on a common good, and a common action in the pursuit of that good. The attempt is doomed to failure only if its success is dependent on the logical coherence of the various propositions that constitute the symbolism.

There are, however, numerous examples of societies and civilizations whose orders not only long persisted but were defined by the tensions between the disparate and even irreconcilably contradictory principles upon which their existence was based.

The modern African leaders Nkrumah and Nyerere conceive of themselves not so much as typical African monarchs of the traditional type, but as founders of new orders and thereby akin to the royal ancestral founders who inspire their ruling successors with authority and vitality. It was suggested that they differ from those founders by ordering the resources and powers which have emerged in the dimension of historical (secular) existence, rather than the enduring anhistorical vitalities which pervade the cosmos.[115] We are now in a position to show how it is appropriate to conceive of their authority. First of all, the new society which it is their overriding purpose to create and in whose name they rule, is to be attuned to the fundamental principles of the old African type of society: it is to consist of a harmonious ("harmonized") entity of man and nature. Secondly, however, the relationship between man and nature is not to be symbiotic, as in the indigenous orders: man is to rule nature, not gently by evoking its powers and channelling them, but by exploiting it. In the third place, the techniques for so mastering nature have emerged in an "historical" and lately Faustian type of civilization (the Western), which introduced them into Africa during the period of colonial "tutelage." Finally, this new African type of society when fully developed will be a continental power that resumes the primordial action of making a decisive contribution to the emergence of a new world order -- an order of high civilization, characterized by peace and prosperity, which resumes the human task of making history but in a superior (as of now inexplicable) way.

The dominance of modern Western elements within the traditional legendary form corresponds to the existential situation of the traditionalist tribesmen having been subordinated first to the European rulers and subsequently to their Western-educated African successors. Despite an organizational network superimposed upon a multitude of tribal societies, the essential reality is the persistence of the traditional tribal forms as the context in which the new African leaders and their ideas must operate. The inhabitants of Ghana and Tanzania are neither nations nor peoples. The success of a modern African leader in creating a substantive unity is therefore dependent on his ability to supersede the tribal chiefs as the accepted authority in each society, preferably through a recognition of his paramountcy by the tribal chiefs.[116] This process would involve the assumption of the position of the European colonial authority ruling indirectly through the chiefs and then the gradual shift of their functions to representatives of the new chief of all the tribes, namely the party functionaries.[117] At the same time the process of propagating the new symbolism would be directed at the people through the properly indoctrinated party representatives throughout the country. This symbolism, consisting as it does of modern ideas presented in a traditional way, would be attractive to tribesmen whose traditional order had been shaken by years of colonial endeavor and African "nationalist" politics.

Let us consider the historical situation, not only of Nkrumah and Nyerere, but of all the leaders who headed an independence movement in Africa and continued to rule their newly independent countries. Their forebearers had experienced the new European rulers as the bearers and representatives of superior powers, with a resulting attempt to imitate--often ludicrously--European dress and manners and to acquire a European education in order to learn how to acquire those powers. The next relevant phenomenon was the emergence of a new type of African leader who ceased to experience European superiority in traditional terms but who embraced the self-proclaimed European mission of spreading "civilization" in Africa. Once these African leaders became convinced--on the basis on the academic degrees they earned in Western universities--that they had mastered Western learning, they began to contest colonial authority as illegitimate. They rejected the authority of the traditional African rulers as well, for by and large those rulers were "backward" according to the standards of Western progress.

The new African leaders could not base themselves on the popular Western principle of national self-determination; they were themselves often quite alienated from their own particular societies, they sought to rule other societies included within the territorial boundaries of the colony, and they regarded a larger state than the traditional ones as a necessary prerequisite to the development of a modern political and economic system. Thus began a search for a new truth: for the sake of dignity, it had to be African; for the sake of a new modern order, it had to offer the promise of the power and prosperity enjoyed in the West. Here Lenin's conception of imperialism reinforced a train of thought that led to the conclusion that the substance of civilizational achievement, and particularly modern Western progress, was derived from Africa--in earlier times through learning, in later days of slaving and colonial rule through exploitation. In regaining her independence, Africa would, these new leaders claimed, resume her peaceful and dominant influence in the affairs of mankind.

If, however, European colonialism interrupted a "normal" African development, why would not the overthrow of colonial rule reinstate the tribal chiefs as the legitimate rulers of African peoples? The new African leaders found that they could explain their actual hegemony only by maintaining that there is a truth higher than the chiefs' yet essentially African. The experience of the West supposedly brought an awareness of that "new yet African" truth to their consciousness. These leaders, and they alone, are thus equipped to realize that truth both in theory and practice.

The search for an adequate statement of the truth goes on. So too does the effort to gain the adherence of the people in the various African countries to the symbolic statements of their leaders. Meanwhile, during the period from independence to the achievement of African unity, the truth is embodied in the leader who is oriented to the realization of the true order. One may follow this truth only by adhering to the will of the leader; the norms do not yet have an objective status allowing for their interiorization in the minds and spirits of the individual citizens. The embodiment of chiefship by the modern

African leader is the resolution of the discrepancy between the idea that the chiefs would have naturally led Africa to its destiny, and the reality of the modern leaders' connection with that destiny. The new leaders rule over entities which they themselves recognize as "artificial," having been originally created by the imperial powers. They accept the creation of the colonial regimes, but only tentatively; it is their great task to transcend the colonial achievement in "making" a new entity that, although a new creation, is essentially "natural" rather than "artificial." Nation-making is a repetition, on a superior modern level, of the act of the royal ancestral founders, rivalling that of God.

The new African leaders remain modern men who have mastered modern organizational technique. They consider themselves capable of organizing society according to "scientific" principles. Yet they have assimilated all that a traditional African ruler was. This assimilation is signified by the adoption of chiefly epithets and other traditional symbols, and by the use of tribal ritual in such state ceremonies as the installation of the leader as the president of the state. The future orientation is expressed in the idea that the new leaders have been selected by God ("God" is the high God of the African religions and the God of the Christians and Muslims) as His instruments for realizing the providential destiny of Africa. This destiny is revealed progressively to the mind as it emerges historically. The African leaders are less the instruments of necessary historical laws than they are the agents of the new order itself.

The quest for identity, for the ultimate crystalization of the modern African mode of life, is indeed a conscious one; and African leaders have determined upon some of the elements which must go into it. These include the concrete but exaggerated glories of the precolonial African empires like Ghana, as well as the more fundamental qualities of Africanness ("African Personality," *Negritude*) like communalism (as opposed to individualism and majoritarianism, and distinguished from collectivism). Of course, what is "best" and most "fundamental" in the indigenous life is what is susceptible of modernization--or, better, what can Africanize the best in modernity, the products and techniques of Western civilization, and content of political power in the contemporary world. The other elements, then, the modern ones--nationalism, socialism, democracy--are thus regarded as implicit in African tradition. The terms "socialism" and "democracy" may be Western; yet what they connote in Africa is considered not derivative but an inherently African development which, they concede, was stimulated by the experience of the West and assimilates Western and Christian elements that enter into the new but essentially African synthesis: hence "*African* nationalism," which is equated with Pan-Africanism, and "*African* socialism," which like "*African* democracy" is none other than tribal communalism written in the large letters of a modern alphabet.

We are brought, then, to the independent African state as the great political achievement of the new African leader. The state is typically dominated by a single party that had, under the auspices of the leader, led the independence movement.[118] The party recognizes no legitimate rivals, for it regards itself as the successor to traditional African government by discussion and consent; it embodies both the will of the leader, which is identified with Africa's destiny, and the will of the people as articulated by the leader. The modern leader acts through the party; for it mobilizes the people, constitutes the government, and oversees the activities of all types of socio-economic organizations. The party allows him to act in his state, which in turn is his instrument of action in the rest of Africa and the world. There is thus a symbiotic relationship between leader and party: the party depends upon the leader as the source of its authority and for active guidance and ideological rectitude, while the leader's claim to a link with Africa's future is validated by his possession of the party as a historical instrument.[119]

How typical are the ideas of Nkrumah and Nyerere of those of other African leaders? It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the ideas propounded by the leaders of the other thirty-odd independent African states. It should suffice here to indicate that most of them avow their dedication to African unity, African socialism and African democracy.[120] Moreover, most of them regard Nyerere as an articulate spokesman of their position, and some of them considered Nkrumah a leading spokesman of their ideas. On a continental scale, the split between the radical Casablanca states which included Ghana and the moderate "Monrovia-Lagos group" of states which included Tanganyika was overcome with the creation in 1963 of the Organization of African Unity, which counted as members all of the independent African states.[121]

It will be instructive to compare the ideas of Nkrumah and Nyerere with those of several major leaders of Franco-phone Africa. We may begin by noting that many of the states in former French Africa are one-party states, and their leaders have spared no effort in attempting to justify their regimes based on the hegemony of a single party. For example, Mali President Modiba Keita's brother, who has held several important ministerial positions in the Mali government, argues that there is "no reason to increase the number of parties, since the differentiation of interests is not very great," since the common aspiration is "for unity," and since the single party is an efficient and democratic "exercise of public authority in conformance with the will of the masses."[122]

President Sekou Touré, who made Nkrumah the co-President of his state of Guinea after his overthrow in Ghana, likewise advocates the single-party system for Africa. He sees his people "on the path of history, which is... inseparable from the history of their [Democratic] Party" of Guinea. The Party links Guinea with "the future of the democratic forces of the world." Its mode of rule is "dictatorship which is by its nature, the logical consequence of a democracy established at the level of [the] people, and which finds its expression in the application of democratic centralization." Party pre-eminence is based on the people's will to achieve happiness.[123]

French-speaking African leaders share with Nkrumah and Nyerere their view of traditional African society. Touré prefers the term "communaucratic" to "African Socialism," since the latter could lead to misunderstanding of the African purpose as being the importation of a foreign ideology.[124] He writes:

> Africa is essentially "communaucratic." Collective life and social solidarity give her habits a humanistic foundation which many

> peoples may envy. It is also because of those human qualities that an African cannot imagine organizing his life outside that of his social group--family, village, or clan. The voice of African people is not individualistic.[125]

President Leopold Senghor of Senegal is the most highly educated and articulate of the African leaders. He has written extensively in attempting to show the connection between African socialism and what he calls "Negritude," which he defines as follows:

> Negritude is the whole complex of civilized values--cultural, economic, social and political--which characterize the black peoples, or, more precisely, the Negro-African world. All these values are essentially informed by intuitive reason. Because this sentient reason, the reason which comes to grips, expresses itself emotionally, through that self-surrender, that coalescence of subject and object; through myths, by which I mean the archetypal images of the collective Soul, above all through primordial rhythms, synchronized with those of the Cosmos. In other words, the sense of communion, the gift of myth-making, the gift of rhythm, such are the essential elements of Negritude, which you will find indelibly stamped on all the works and activities of the black man.[126]

Senghor contrasts Negritude with European values, which he sums up "in the threefold expression: discursive reason, technical skill, and a trading economy. In other words, *Capitalism*." European capitalist civilization "ravaged black Africa like a bush fire, wiping out images and values in one vast carnage." Yet the "negroid civilization" that once flourished provides the roots of the values of Negritude, and these values were fertilized by European values.[127] Thus the new African Socialism is to be "a synthesis of Negro-African cultural values, of Western methodological and spiritual values, and socialist technical and social values."[128]

Senghor's writings draw heavily on Marx's pre-1848 works and the

French socialist thought of the early nineteenth century.[129] However, perhaps the major influence on him is the Personalism of Emmanuel Mounier and the visions of Teilhard de Chardin.[130] Black Africa has benefited from Europe, using "European values to arouse the slumbering values of Negritude, which they will bring as their contribution to the *Civilization of the Universal.*" Senghor finds the justification of his fostering the values of Negritude in his vision of their pouring into "the mainstream of cultural miscegenation," flowing towards "the meeting point of all Humanity" as Africa's "contribution" to a universal civilization.[131]

African Socialism, according to Senghor, does not seek so much to end "the exploitation of man by his fellow, but to prevent its ever happening, by bringing political and economic democracy back to life," and "by borrowing from European Socialism its science and technical skill" in order to "modernize" the African values of Negritude. The traditional type of African society is to be modernized, revived at a higher level. Senghor characterizes this type of society in these words:

> Negro-African society is a classless society...It is a *community-based society*, in which the hierarchy--and therefore power--is founded on spiritual and democratic values: on the law of primogeniture and election; in which decisions of all kinds are deliberated in a *Palaver*, after the ancestral gods have been consulted... A community-based society, *communal*, not collectivist. We are concerned here, not with a mere collection of individuals, but with people conspiring together,...united among themselves even to the very centre of their being, communing through their Ancestors with God, who is the Centre of all Centres.[132]

In liberty, "man conquers nature and reconstructs it on a universal scale," and in this freedom he "realizes himself as a god." In the exercise of this freedom, the Nation is not a natural society but the embodiment of the conscious will to construct a new order by distilling and transcending the values of the traditional societies. Man uses the realities of his immediate life "to snatch himself from the earth, to rise above his roots and blossom in the sun."[133]

Senghor's idea of African Socialism and his vision of a distinctively African contribution to a universal civilization are quite similar to the ideas of other African leaders, including Nkrumah and Nyerere.[134] He would seem to differ from them, however, in his idea of Negritude. Gregor emphasizes this symbol of Senghor's as a "racist myth...similar in essential respect to Fascist race theory."[135] Yet Senghor speaks of setting up "an 'anti-racial racialism'" that is opposed to "European racialism, of which the Nazis were the symbol." He grants that Negritude is a myth, but he sees "Free Enterprise, The American Way of Life, Democracy, Communism" and the like as also "myths, around which hundreds of millions of men organize their lives." Negritude is a myth not in any pejorative sense, but is "a living, dynamic" expression of the essence of Negro-African life that evolves into "a form of humanism."[136] It is therefore something to be realized and asserted, a symbol expressing the same idea and purpose as Nkrumah's "African Personality" or "Africanism." Yet Nkrumah typically uses the term "myth" in a pejorative sense, as when speaking of the European denial that Africans are a historical people,[137] and he flatly rejects Senghor's account of Africanness.[138]

Senghor indeed provides, as do the other African leaders, ample grist for Gregor's grindings. One article in particular, which Gregor does not use, provides an account of the influence of German culture, especially the German romantics, on Senghor and his colleagues since the First World War. He cites Frobenius, who opposed to the prevalent idea of "Negro primitivism" and "pre-logical mentality" the reality of an "Ethiopian" civilization that was different from, but certainly not inferior to, the European "civilization of the fact." "Frobenius defined this civilization, which we would call Negritude, as a civilization of the senses--of reality and intuitive reason"; and he likened it to "the German mystique" and the Russian "mysticism" of the East. Senghor sees this great German civilization as having been conquered by "the civilizations of the fact" and "of comfort." Recalling the "Holy Roman Germanic Empire," he sees a solution "in a return to the sources, to a symbiosis of the two cultures which once formed, within the German nation, German humanism." As for the future, he is guided by the conviction that it "belongs to a hybrid civilization, to the one which joins with its own creative powers the gift of expressing them in the Graeco-Roman way."[139]

Unless one pounces on Senghor's attraction to German romanticism, making much of his concern with myth and mystique, there is little of fascism to be found here. Senghor is quite clear on the point that a symbol of myth is an indispensable element in the constitution of an order of human life. He is also clear, as Gregor is not,[140] that a political myth is to be found in the Western democracies and is far from the exclusive domain of fascism. One finds none of the glorification of war and violence so characteristic of fascism[141] in the modern African leaders. For Mussolini, the myth was one of the "Nation" and its greatness; he rejects "the dream of a great humanity,"[142] and therefore the African dream which Senghor calls the "civilization of the universal."

The Italian fascists certainly identified the Party with the State and the Nation; in Gentili's words, it was "the future nation not yet born or not yet arrived at that maturity which makes it valid in all its import."[143] Here again, however, there is a decisive difference. Italy was already a nation-state. The purpose of the Party was not to create a nation-state where there had been none, but to change the nature of the one that already existed. The Africans, on the other hand, lack this kind of revolutionary intention. Rather than glorify and expand any existing tribal "nation," they seek to create not a new national order but a new nation that is ordered.

The prevalent African political "myth" is thus not communist, fascist or liberal, although it has derived and transformed symbolic ideas from those three ideologies as well as from the Bible. The African idea is rather a vision of society and history that bespeaks the unique situation of an African type of societal order encountering a liberal Western-Christian civilization that had achieved ascendancy over the whole world but was lately being challenged from within by fascism and communism and from without by the Sino-Soviet axis. The Africanleaders and their ideas are best understood not in terms of the similarities to Western phenomena which have been noted but in terms of the Africans' own expressions of their situation and purpose.

Traditional African politics, as the first part of this study indicates, were rooted in the experiences of foundation. The political religion of each African tribal society celebrated and periodically repeated the founding act. The institutional order of each society was regarded as that established in the beginning by the first king or chief. Each African monarch was looked upon as a re-presentation of the founding father of the society, a father who continued to rule through his inspiration of the living ruler.

The modern African rulers--Nkrumah of Ghana, Nyerere of Tanzania--interpret themselves as a new type of African king. In this idea are combined several distinguishable components. First of all, as African kings the new rulers are identified with the line of former kings going back to the original founders. Second, as new kings ruling over societies composed of many African kingdoms, the former kings are dropped a notch to the position of chiefs. African polity had undergone a radical, unprecedented expansion. Third, as a new type of ruler, the modern African authority is more directly identified with the original foundation; because unlike the founders' successors they emphasize not the maintenance and periodic renewal of the order once established but the creation of a new order for which the old serves as an archetype.

Conspiring with the traditional African emphasis on the foundation to influence the modern African political order was the colonial idea of empire. This idea was a complete reversal of the old saw about "always something new out of Africa." It posited the creation of something new in Africa through human effort, the effort made or stimulated by the European rulers. The policy of indirect rule manifested in Africa was not incompatible with the continuation of essentially African institutions, and in fact that the institutions could be used as instruments for this purpose without destroying them. These ideas also inform contemporary African politics. The modern rulers do not, of course, attempt to maintain the political authority of the traditional African rulers. As rulers who regard themselves as of an essentially African type, it is their explicit purpose to create a continental civilization that is both African and modern, that reflects the same principles that underlay the tribal societies and yet manifests an economic and cultural achievement that rivals that of the West. This modern African civilization, the glories of which existed in nascent form in the ancient African civilizations and the development of which was interrupted yet ultimately insured by colonialism, is pre-eminently a willed reality. The African leaders derived from the West a faith in the virtually unlimited power of man to master nature and transform it in a creative movement from idea to reality. The most important ideas exist neither *in re* nor *post rem*, but in the imagination which has the power of in-forming future--and indeed, it would seem, past--history.

The institutional formation of the modern African party-states is also derived to great extent from the colonial regime. The authority of the governor, unlimited by any domestic, territorial institutions, finds its counterpart in the authority of Nkrumah and Nyerere, who unlike the presidents of Western democratic republics are regarded as rulers. Their regimes, like the colonial but unlike the traditional African regimes, are bureaucratic. Their parties developed and came to monopolize political life in response to the British requirement of elections and a demonstration through elections that the parties in question truly represented the people.

Finally, since the newly independent countries correspond to the territories carved out by the colonial rulers, since the tribal societies were too small to become modern powers, and since the actual and potential great modern powers (United States, Soviet Union, a united Europe, China) are continental or semi-continental in scope, the African leaders had to reject the tribal societies and even their independent countries as the ultimate nation. As Pan-African leaders, their authority is not to be limited to their countries; and their authority in their countries finds its ultimate sanction in their mission to bring about African unity. They are the rightful rulers today, for their consciousness and ability points toward the realization of the grandeur that would have been the historical culmination of traditional rule had the African rulers not been corrupted and superseded by colonialism.

As successors to the traditional and colonial authorities, the modern African rulers of Ghana and Tanzania have interpreted themselves as the effective reconciliation of the African tradition and modernity represented by their predecessors. Nkrumah and Nyerere are modern men, and it is solely by virtue of their combined experience of the African tradition of royal foundation and of the Western civilizational achievement that they could persist within the contemporary post-colonial situation in portraying their work as a renewal of African life. To assert the integrity of Africans in the modern world--an integrity the denial of which was the basis of colonial authority--it was necessary for the modern African leaders to deny that they are the belated imitations of European man, to deny that they had become what the colonial regimes had tried to make them. They had to assert and effect the sovereignty of a specific and unique African people or state. While unique--that is, possessed of traditional identifying characteristics and, in fact, maintaining continuity with the essentials of precolonial African life--the state had to be sufficiently large and powerful to secure recognition and to maintain itself in the modern world of superpowers. Since the major powers were hardly ready to respect a small tribal society, and since the individual colonial territories hardly had the potential power to assert strong influence in the modern world, only the energy of a united Africa gave promise of fulfilling their need.

NOTES

PART ONE

AFRICAN CHIEFLY AUTHORITY AND SOCIETAL ORDER

CHAPTER I: THE AKAN OF GHANA

[1] The materials on the Akan are copious, but the major contribution to our knowledge of them was made by Robert S. Rattray in the following ethnographic works: Akan-Ashanti Folk Tales (Oxford, 1930); Ashanti (Oxford, 1923); Ashanti Law and Constitution (London, 1929); Ashanti Proverbs (Oxford, 1916); Religion and Art in Ashanti (London, 1927).

A mine of important information is provided by Eva L. R. Meyerowitz in the following of her works: The Akan of Ghana: Their Ancient Beliefs (London, 1958); Akan Traditions of Origin (London, 1952); The Divine Kingship in Ghana and Ancient Egypt (London, 1960); The Sacred State of the Akan (London, 1951). Meyerowitz's works require cautious use, because she draws most of her materials from one section of the Akan that has retained in its traditions strong cosmological elements rarely observed by others elsewhere among the Akan. Another weakness in her works is the frequent lack of clear indications whether specific Akan ideas and practices are historical only or prevalent also during the colonial period. For a comprehensive criticism of her poor methodology and ambiguities, particularly with reference to her attempt to demonstrate ancient Near Eastern origins of Akan kingship, see R. W. Wescott, "Ancient Egypt and Modern Africa," Journal of African History, II, 2 (1961), 315-321.

Another important source, himself an Akan scholar, is Joseph B. Danquah, whose relevant works are: The Akan Doctrine of God (London, 1944); Gold Coast: Akan Laws and Customs (London, 1928); The Akim Abuakwa Handbook (London, 1928). The first of these books presents an intellectualized version of Akan religion in terms of Western philosophy, so it is of very limited use to one concerned to grasp the concrete religious experiences of the Akan through the Akan religious symbols rather than to construct a philosophical representation of essentially non-philosophical ideas.

Important early works on the Akan are: William Bosman, A New and Accurate Description of the Coast of Guinea (London, 1705); T. E. Bowdich, Mission from Cape Coast Castle to Ashantee (London, 1819); Joseph Dupuis, Journal of a Residence in Ashantee (London, 1824); John Beecham, Ashantee and the Gold Coast (London, 1841); A. B. Ellis, The Tshi-Speaking Peoples of the Gold Coast of West Africa (London, 1887); Ellis, A History of the Gold Coast of West Africa (London, 1893); Carl C. Reindorf, The History of the Gold Coast and Asante (Basel, 1895); Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions (London, 1903); John Mensah Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution (London, 1906); Walton Claridge, A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti, 2 vols. (London, 1915).

The most useful recent sources are: A. L. Adu, *The Role of Chiefs in the Akan Social Structure* (Accra, 1929); Rev. Patrick Akoi, "Divine Kingship and its Participation in Ashanti," in *The Sacral Kingship* (Leiden, 1959), pp. 135-147; Kofi Antubam, *Ghana's Heritage of Culture* (Leipzig, 1963); Kofi A. Busia, *The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti* (London, 1951); Busia, "The Ashanti of the Gold Coast," in *African Worlds*, ed. Daryll Forde (London, 1954), pp. 190-209; Rev. H. St. John T. Evans, "The Akan Doctrine of God," in *African Ideas of God*, ed. Edwin W. Smith, 2d ed. rev. and ed. E. G. Parrinder (London, 1961), pp. 241-259; Margaret J. Field, *Akim-Kotoku: An Oman of the Gold Coast* (Accra, 1948); A. A. Y. Kyerematen, *Panoply of Ghana* (London, 1964); Madeline Manoukian, *Akan and Ga-Adagme People of the Gold Coast*, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, ed. Daryll Forde, Western Africa, Pt. I (London, 1964); William Tordoff, "The Ashanti Confederacy," *Journal of African History*, III, 3 (1962), 399-417; W. E. F. Ward, *A History of Ghana*, 2d ed. (New York, 1963).

[2] David Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana* (Oxford, 1963), p. 509. See Diedrich Westermann and M. A. Bryan, *The Languages of West Africa* (London, 1952); J. H. Greenberg, *Studies in African Linguistic Classification* (New Haven, 1955); Ward, pp. 37-38.

[3] Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, pp. 21-26, denies a common origin. Claridge, I, 3-10, inclines toward accepting the idea of a common origin. Ward, p. 42, emphasizes: "It is possible to be sure about a language, but it is hardly possible to be sure about the origin and the composition of the people that speaks it. We know so little about the early history of the nations of the Gold Coast, we see such clear evidence of widespread recent migrations, invasions, conquests and fusions, that we cannot feel sure that any tribe existing today has a history of more than a few centuries behind it."

[4] Ward, pp. 43-45; Claridge, I, 4-5; Meyerowitz, *Akan Traditions of Origin*, p. 64; Meyerowitz, *Akan of Ghana*, p. 17; Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, p. 64.

[5] Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, pp. 62-71; Claridge, I, 8; Ward, p. 117; Bowdich, pp. 229-230; Busia, *Position of Chief*, pp. 85-86. Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, p. 65, and Claridge, I, 8, hold that the clan is also regarded as descended from an animal, which has become a totemic taboo. Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, p. 30, finds evidence contradicting belief in such a descent, but admits not making detailed inquiries on this point.

[6] Ashanti, however, had eight clans until recently, an archaic survival. Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, pp. 33, 96, 143. Busia, *African Worlds*, p. 196, gives seven clans for Ashanti. See Danquah, "The Akan Claim to Origin from Ghana," *West African Review*, November 1955, p. 1107; Danquah, *Akan Doctrine of God*, p. 47.

[7] Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, p. 94. Rattray, *Ashanti*, pp. 121-123, describes the Ashanti belief that the ancestors of the ruling clans were seven in number and that they emerged from the ground.

[8] Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, pp. 27-28.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34. This first occurred in Akwamu in about 1600, and the *oman* is now the political organization of all Akan states. *Ibid.*

[10] Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, p. 69. In an earlier work, however, he wrote that Ashanti tradition refers to an early period "when the various clans...were living in isolated, independent groups,...each looking upon the senior woman of the clan, the Queen Mother, who delegated some of her power to her male kinsman, as its head." Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 219. Confirmed by Meyerowitz, *Akan of Ghana*, Chs. I-II.

[11] Manoukian, pp. 35-40; Danquah, *Gold Coast*, pp. 21-48.

[12] Ellis, *Tshi-Speaking Peoples*, pp. 273-274; Rattray, *Ashanti Law*; Manoukian, pp. 35-36.

[13] Manoukian, pp. 24-37; Ward, pp. 99, 101. In some states the king has several councils, with different compositions and purposes. In Akim Abuakwa, for example, there are three. See Danquah, *Gold Coast*, pp. 11-20; *Akim Abuakwa Handbook*, pp. 62-68.

[14] Ward, pp. 42, 52, 54-56, 104, 107-108; J. D. Fage, *Ghana:* A Historical Interpretation (Madison, Wis., 1959), pp. 23-29.

[15] Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, pp. 33-34, citing king and elders of Akwamu as her source of information. Slightly different accounts, which mention neither the sub-divisions of the two wings nor the number of war-chiefs as seven, are in Reindorf, p. 119; Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, pp. 120-122; Manoukian, pp. 35-39. See, however, Busia, *Position of Chief*, pp. 13-14, for a seven-section army formation.

[16] Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, p. 34, Danquah, *Gold Coast*, p. 17; Field, p. 43.

[17] See, for example, Claridge, I; Ward; Rattray, *Ashanti Law*.

[18] Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 205-215.

[19] Adu, p. 6.

[20] Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 11.

[21] Geoffrey Parrinder, *African Traditional Religion*, 2d ed. (London, 1962); Edwin W. Smith, ed. *African Ideas of God*, ed. E. G. Parrinder, 2d rev. ed. (London, 1961), p. 17. With Eliade, I apply the term "premodern" or "traditional" to archaic and primitive peoples inclusively. Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1959), p. 3.

[22] Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 19; Evans, pp. 246-249; Danquah, *Akan Doctrine of God*, p. 55; Meyerowitz, Sacred State, pp. 69-83.

[23] Rattray, *Ashanti*, pp. 173-174, 179.

[24] Field, pp. 158-159.

[25] Evans, p. 246.

[26] Evans holds that there is a single Supreme Being, Nyame, and that the other names are all "praise-names." *Ibid.*; Busia, *African Worlds*, p. 192, speaks of the names merely as titles of the Supreme Being. Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, pp. 81-82, reveals some relationships between several of the names and does no violence to their concrete complexity. Danquah, *Akan Doctrine of God*, pp. 46, 62, also indicates their complexity; but he states that, for example, Nyame and Nyankopon "are both much of the same nature" and that God is sometimes called Nyankopon Odomankoma.

[27] Danquah, *Akan Doctrine of God*, p. 55.

[28] As Frankfort rightly says: "Complexity is of the essence of the relationship between man and deity." Henri Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion* (New York, 1961), p. 7. He makes this statement with reference to the religion of the ancient Egyptians, who "had many gods, but all ultimately of one nature." Frankfort *et al.*, *Before Philosophy* (Baltimore, 1949), p. 75. "Three gods are one, and yet the Egyptian elsewhere insists on the separate identity of each of the three." *Ibid.*; see also Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*, p. 20. The African high Gods are further treated below in Ch. III.

[29] Rattray, *Ashanti*, pp. 143-146; Evans, p. 255; Manoukian, p. 55; Field, pp. 158-159, 171. One Akan proverb states it thus: "As a woman gives birth to a child, so may water to a god." Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 146.

Other *abosom* of yet lower order are associated with rocks or trees. Spiritual powers of still lower order are the souls (*sunsum*) of animals, trees and plants with which men must sometimes reckon. When *abosom* possess one of these objects, they generally ignore the *sunsum*. Evans, p. 255; Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 1-8.

Suman are magical charms or fetishes. Whereas an *obosom* is a god of a corporate group (family, village or state), a *suman* is usually a personal object, wherein spirits of inferior status come to dwell. Magically used for either good or evil personal ends, *suman* are neither referred to Nyame nor derived from *abosom*. While *suman* often constitute a part of an *obosom* shrine, a proverb reveals that the Akan recognize this as "a degeneratory element" in their religion: "*suman* spoil the *abosom*." Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 23-24; Evans, pp. 256-257; Manoukian, pp. 56-57; Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 182.

Besides the *abosomfo*, the priest in charge of *abosom* and their worship, and the *ākomfo*, passive mediums or mouthpieces of *abosom*, there are the practicioners of medicine and witch-doctors. Witchcraft is feared as the major source of evil, as are *Sasabonsam*, a terrible forest monster, and *mmoatia*, little people (fairies) whose feet are backwards. Field, p. 172 n.; Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 25-34, 39.

[30] Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, p. 116; Busia, *African Worlds*, pp. 197-198.

[31] Busia, *African Worlds*, p. 198.

[32] Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 319. Meyerowitz, *The Divine Kingship*, p. 124, says however that the *sunsum* joins the *saman* after the trial of the *kra*, for which see further in this paragraph.

[33] Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, pp. 318-319; Busia, *African Worlds*, pp. 196-200; Manoukian, p. 58; Meyerowitz, *The Divine Kingship*, pp. 121-125. Akan thus say: "All men are children of Nyame, no-one is a child of the earth." Busia, *African Worlds*, p. 200.

[34] Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, p. 86; Manoukian, p. 58. Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, pp. 86, 88, 213, says that the "trial" of the *kra* occurs in *Nyankopon-kuro* (city of Nyankopon), to which the departed souls of good men return to enter the *Nyankopon-fie* (house of Nyankopon). Meyerowitz, *The Divine Kingship*, p. 121, says that the house of Nyankopon is believed situated on the sun in *Osoro Ahemmam* (the Upper Kingdom), which is a confederation of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies.

[35] Busia, *African Worlds*, p. 201; Manoukian, p. 58.

[36] Manoukian, p. 58.

[37] Manoukian, pp. 58-59.

[38] Manoukian, p. 59; Busia, *African Worlds*, pp. 201-202.

[39] Rattray, *Ashanti Proverbs*, p. 137. Nyame is said to be, "of all the earth, King and Elder." Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 144.

[40] Danquah, *Gold Coast*, p. 128; Danquah, *Akim Abuakwa Handbook*, pp. 4, 24. Danquah relates that Akim Abuakwa is "one of the few Akan states whose dialect has remained unadulturated" and whose institutions retained "their original meaning and significance."

[41] Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*, p. 104.

[42] Meyerowitz, *The Divine Kingship*, pp. 16, 59, 85ff.

[43] Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 102.

[44] As captain in war, an Akan ruler is *Osagyefo* (a conqueror). Adu, p. 6. His valiance is more than human. Akan tradition rarely records the death or defeat of a king in war. Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, p. 126. Death is the usual penalty for even mentioning the death of a king. Claridge, I, 192. The usual euphemism is that "a great tree has fallen." This avoidance points to the Akan belief that the king's death brings chaos, for the king upheld the order of nature and society. Meyerowitz, *The Divine Kingship*, p. 186. The euphemism also has apparent reference to the high God as a tree on whom one may lean and not fall.

[45] Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 275.

[46] Meyerowitz, *Sacred State*, pp. 76-78.

[47] Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 101.

[48] Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 276.

[49] Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 166 n.

[50] Evans, p. 257. The divine counterparts are not only exemplars; they also assist their human representatives. For example, an Ashanti drummer assumed his part in a major ritual by drumming a prayer, beginning as follows:

"O Divine Drummer, I am scarcely awake and have risen up,
"I, the Ashanti porcupine chief's drummer,
……
"I am about to sound the drum.
"If you have gone elsewhere and I call you,
"Come." Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 101.

It would not be farfetched to see in this the idea that the human drummer drums through inspiration, that through him the divine drummer is really doing the drumming.

[51] Field, p. 42, adding: "few Africans deny that human sacrifice is still practiced at all Akan royal funerals."

[52] Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, pp. 81, 87, 307.

[53] Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 102.

[54] Danquah, *Akim Abuakwa Handbook*, p. 114; Meyerowitz, *The Divine Kingship*, p. 218.

[55] Danquah, *Akim Abuakwa Handbook*, p. 110; Meyerowitz, *The Divine Kingship*, p. 216; Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 295.

[56] For a discussion of the Akan stools, see below, pp. 17-18, in the text, and notes 64-65.

[57] Danquah, *Akim Abuakwa Handbook*, p. 111; Meyerowitz, *The Divine Kingship*, pp. 216-218. The link of kings with the royal ancestors is revealed in yet another way. Adulterous intercourse with the wives of a king was punished by death, because the king succeeds to the wives of his predecessors, now *samanfo*. Whereas one might expect the supreme penalty for such an offense against any chief or headman, it was restricted to those in which the head chief or king was injured. The ancestors of lesser chiefs absorbed by greater chiefs were regarded as also declining to subordinate positions comparable to those of their living successors. Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, p. 307. Whereas shifts in political authority on earth were regarded as reflections of similar shifts among the gods by the ancient Mesopotamians, the Akan apparently took them to be reflections of changes in the ancestral order. See Thorkild Jacobson, "Mesopotamia," *Before Philosophy*, pp. 207-210.

[58] Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*, p. 6.

[59] *Ibid.*

[60] Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 278; Rattray, *Ashanti Law*, *passim*; Adu, p. 6.

[61] Adu, p. 5.

[62] *Ibid.*

[63] Richard Austin Freeman, *Travels and Life in Ashanti and Jaman* (Westminster, 1898), p. 442.

[64] Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 287. Rattray's account of the origin of this stool clarifies its importance. The Okomfo (priest) Anotchi claimed "a special mission from Onyame, the God of the Sky, to make Ashanti into a great

and powerful nation." In the presence of a great multitude, he is believed "to have brought down from the sky, in a black cloud, and amid rumblings, and in air thick with white dust, a wooden stool with three supports and partly covered with gold." It slowly alighted upon the knees of the Omanhene of Kumasi, Osai Tutu. Anotchi explained that this stool contained the sunsum of the nation, and that their welfare and power were bound up in it. Then "he caused the King and every Ashanti chief and all the Queen Mothers to take a few hairs...and a piece of nail." These were ground and mixed with medicine, some of which was drunk and some smeared on the stool. This ceremony insured that the sunsum of each chief combined into one and was embodied in the Golden Stool. (Rattray explained that when an Ashanti died and his body could not be returned to his home for burial, "some hair and nail parings are...brought home to convey the sunsum of the deceased to look after the persons of its ntoro who are still alive.") Anotchi proclaimed that if the stool were lost or destroyed, the Ashanti nation would "sicken and lose its vitality or power" as does a man whose sunsum has left him or been injured by another sunsum. The stool was never to be in direct contact with the ground, and its power was to be invoked only on special occasions. Golden fetters, taken from the defeated king of Denkyira, fastens the sunsum to the stool. Masks representing another defeated king, cast from the gold on his stool, adorn the Golden Stool; and each Ashanti chief added something to it. When taken each year to the burial site of the kings, "it was conveyed under its own umbrellas and surrounded by its attendants who in number and adornments surpassed those of the King who followed after it." It was more holy and powerful than the Asantehene himself. Rattray, Ashanti, pp. 288-291.

The special veneration given to stools was intimately connected with the military organization of society: "the stool was taken to war as a special 'medicine' for bringing victory. The person of the 'Chief' also acquired from the stool magical victory-bringing properties and the worship of dead-and-gone 'chiefs' became a part of stool worship." Field, p. 171. A chief as captain in war was thus Osagyefo (a conqueror). Adu, p. 6. Among the Ashanti "the last rallying-point was the Stool, ..which was always taken to war. All members of the aristocracy were expected to lay down their lives rather than this should fall into the hands of the enemy. When the battle was going against them, an Ashanti Chief would stand upon the stool, an insult to his ancestral ghosts to fire their anger and make them fight more vigorously." Rattray, Ashanti Law, pp. 122-123.

[66]B. Wasserman, "The Ashanti War of 1900: A Study in Cultural Conflict," Africa, XXXI, 2 (1961), p. 176. Among the Akan generally the stools symbolize Omankeraa (the soul of society). The stool is the "symbolic link between the common people...and their head of state." The most basic and earliest state stool is called the Mbaadwa (female stool). Each of its component parts "represents one of the main ideas

that go to make up the Ghanaian's conception of a perfect society." Its seat is in the shape of a crescent moon. Its circular center pillar "symbolizes *Nyametum* (God's presence and power) in society." The perforations in it "symbolize the qualities of justice and fairness believed to be essential attributes of God, for which he stands in society." Antubam, p. 161. One of the two kinds of wood used in the making of stools is called *Nyame dua* (God's tree). A forked branch cut from the *Nyame dua* is the main component of an altar to Nyame. Rattray, *Religion and Art* in Ashanti, p. 271.

[66] Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 130 n. 2. Besides the king, the Golden Stool of Ashanti was sheltered by an umbrella called *Katamanso* (the covering of the nation) and the various *abosom* dwelling in shrines had their umbrellas. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, p. 130 and n. 2; Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 155.

[67] Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (New York, 1958), pp. 53-54.

[68] Evans, p. 258; Field, p. 171; Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Cleveland, 1963), pp. 31, 44.

[69] Danquah, *Akim Abuakwa Handbook*, p. 125; Field, pp. 152-158, 166-168.

[70] Rattray, *Ashanti*, p. 127.

[71] Danquah, *Akim Abuakwa Handbook*, pp. 129-131.

[72] Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti*, Ch. XII, pp. 122-143. Because of its connection with the harvest, Europeans were wont to call it the Yam Festival, a symptom of their ignorance rather than of the Africans' imputed superstition.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135. During the eleven-day interval all the symbols of state authority--stools, umbrellas, drums, regalia--were repaired and cleansed. On the first day of *Odwira*, the king with his councillors and ministers, preceded by the Golden Stool, went to the sacred houses of state to offer sacrifice. At these houses, the homes of the major office holders, the ancestors were beseeched to let no evil befall the state and informed that *Odwira* was begun.

[75] *Ibid.* For Osai Tutu, see above, n. 64.

[76] Rattray, Ashanti, pp. 45-50.

[77] Rattray, Religion and Art in Ashanti, p. 137.

[78] Ibid., pp. 138-139. In earlier times criminals and captives were sacrificed during Odwira, each accompanied with the words: "Off with you to the land of ghosts and serve Osai Tutu (or whichever king he was being sent to serve)." Ibid., pp. 139-140.

[79] See Manoukian, pp. 59-60; Busia, Position of Chief, pp. 27-29; Rattray, Ashanti, Chs. V-IX.

CHAPTER II: BANTU SOCIETIES OF TANGANYIKA

[1] J. P. Moffett, Handbook of Tanganyika, 2d ed. (Dar es Salaam, 1958), p. 284.

[2] C. G. Seligman, Races of Africa, 3d ed. (London, 1957), p. 162.

[3] Ibid., p. 164. See I. Schapera, "A Working Classification of the Bantu Peoples of Africa," Man, XXIX, 63 (May 1929), 82-87; Melville J. Herskovits, "The Culture Areas of Africa," Africa, XXX (1930), 59-77.

[4] Seligman, pp. 164-166, 196-197. Sambara is another name for the Shambala tribe. George Peter Murdock, Africa: Its Peoples and Their Culture History (New York, 1959), p. 343.

[5] Murdock, pp. 306-309, 342-343, 347-348, 357-360. See Brian K. Taylor, The Western Lacustrine Bantu, Ethnographic Survey of Africa, ed. Daryll Forde, East Central Africa, Pt. XIII (London, 1962), p. 13, for a similar breakdown of the Interlacustrine Bantu.

[6] Moffett, p. 294, lists 113 tribes by name. On p. 283 he gives the figure 120 as the usually stated number, but notes the impossibility of giving a precise figure because of the lack of agreement on the definition of a tribe and because of the changing character of tribal groups.

[7] Most of the Tanganyika tribes have been little studied, and information on many of them is restricted primarily to unpublished district notebooks. See Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 33 (July 1952), p. 76.

[8] These tribes also vary greatly in size: "we get groups from the size of the Sukuma (888,800) to the Sonjo (3,536) regarding themselves as single tribes." Moffett, p. 283. They are, moreover, well-distributed throughout the country.

SUKUMA

[1] The major sources on the Sukuma are: Hans Cory, *The Indigenous Political System of the Sukuma* (Dar es Salaam, 1954); Cory, *The Ntemi* (London, 1951); Cory, *Sukuma Law and Custom* (London, 1953); Cory, "Religious Beliefs and Practices of the Sukuma/Nyamwezi Tribal Group," *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (hereafter cited: TNR), No. 54 (March 1960), pp. 14-26; B. J. Hartley, "Land Tenure in Usukuma," TNR, No. 5 (April 1938), pp. 17-24; J. Gus Liebenow, "The Sukuma," in *East African Chiefs*, ed. Audrey I. Richards (New York, 1960), pp. 229-259; D. W. Malcolm, *Sukumaland* (London, 1953); Berta Millroth, *Lyuba*: Traditional Religion of the Sukuma (Uppsala, 1965); T. M. Revington, "Concerning the Banangoma and Basumba Batale Societies of the Bukwimba Wasukuma, TNR, No. 5 (April 1938), pp. 60-62; R. E. S. Tanner, "An Introduction to the Northern Basukuma's Idea of the Supreme Being," *Anthropological Quarterly* (hereafter cited: AQ), XXIX, 2 (April 1956), 45-56; Tanner, "An Introduction to the Spirit Beings of the Northern Basukuma," AQ, XXIX, 3 (July 1956), 69-81; Tanner, "The Spirits of the Dead," AQ, XXXII, 2 (April 1959), 108-124; Tanner, "Sukuma Ancestor Worship and its Relation to Social Structure," TNR, No. 50 (June 1958), 52-62. Works of a more general nature containing references to the Sukuma will be cited where relevant. For other literature on the Sukuma, see Warren J. Roth, "The Wasukuma of Tanganyika: An Annotated Bibliography," AQ, XXXIV, 3 (July 1961), 158-163.

[2] Hartley, p. 17, denies that they are a tribe and calls them a language group. The other authorities refer to them as a tribe.

[3] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 1.

[4] For this reason Seligman included the Sukuma and Nyamwezi among the Interlacustrine Bantu. C. G. Seligman, *Races of Africa*, 3d ed. (London, 1957), p. 192. Cory, *The Ntemi*, p. 1, included the Sukuma among them. They are not now usually included among them according to Richards, *East African Chiefs*, p. 27. "On the southern border, between Sukuma and Nyamwezi, the Nyamwezi influence is marked, but the two groups are so closely connected that this cannot be described as alien influence." Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 2. The two can for some purposes be treated as a single tribe, for they "speak the same language with differences in dialect. Kinship ties and similarities in law, custom and political and economic institutions unite them." Liebenow, p. 231. I shall, like Liebenow, treat only the Sukuma.

[5] Liebenow, p. 232. "The designation of the Sukuma as a tribal group is a relatively recent innovation. Indeed, the name 'Usukuma' merely means 'north country' in the Nyamwezi tongue." *Ibid.* Hartley,

p. 17, says the same. In Tanganyika "'chiefdom' rather than 'kingdom' is the accepted term." Brian K. Taylor, *The Western Lacustrine Bantu* (London, 1962), p. 133 n. 157.

[6] Liebenow, p. 233; Cory, *The Ntemi*, pp. 1-3.

[7] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 3. Liebenow, pp. 233-234, says essentially the same.

[8] Liebenow, p. 233. "It is remarkable that the customs and language of these peaceful conquerors have been wholly absorbed into those of their Bantu subjects, and only tradition remains to tell of the invasion and the establishment of ruling dynasties." Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 2.

[9] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 4.

[10] In the pre-Hima period the term *ntemi* applied merely to "pioneers who opened up the country and retained leadership of their followers, who were mostly members of their own families." *Ntemi* derives from *kutema*, meaning "to cut down trees in the bush." It "is also used to denote the leader of any type of society and for the leader of a working party." *Ibid.*, pp. 4, 73. For the *ntemi* in East Africa see Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew, eds. *History of East Africa*, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1963), I, 191ff. The term *oriental despot* is used in the sense of Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, 1963).

[11] Liebenow, pp. 234-235; Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, pp. 4, 8-30.

[12] See Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, pp. 32-33; Liebenow, pp. 236-238.

[13] Cory also writes: "it is difficult to be bloodthirsty for many years if one has not many subjects and knows them all by name." "A Sukuma chief was accessible in his residence to all his subjects. . .People meeting him did not have to perform elaborate obeissances. They clapped their hands, conversation was without formality after this greeting." *Indigenous Political System*, p. 51.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[15] Liebenow, "Chieftainship and Local Government in Tanganyika," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Northwestern University, 1955), p. 51; Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 237. "The superiority of the person of the chief was enforced by his isolation from the ordinary people and by the

transformation of deference into an attitude of awe. . . .The chief was usually only accessible at his baraza." Liebenow, "Chieftainship. . .," p. 50. A baraza is a public court or audience. Cory writes: "A chief formerly led a very secluded life. . .The only regular occasion on which he showed himself to his subjects was the *bumwoga* (ceremonial shaving after harvest)." *Indigenous Political System*, p. 43. Cory gives no indication of why he considers the chief a "feudal" authority. Apparently the feudal character consists in a kind of client relationship that obtains between the chief and his royal guard, and especially between the chief and his *banangwa* (headmen), who were often his own sons. Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, pp. 234-235, refers to these as client relationships. Since many of the royal guard were captured slaves, they hardly could be considered an integral part of the society. Moreover, the client relationship would certainly be subordinate to their involuntary incorporation into the chief's service. Any feudal element here would thus be of peripheral importance. The *banangwa*, on the other hand, were an integral part of the constitutional system; and they are considered presently. The problem of African feudalism is discussed below in the section on the Ha, pp. 46-47, and in Ch. III, pp. 135-135; see especially n. 15 in the section on the Ha.

[16] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 32.

[17] The elders derive high status from the following sources: membership in the ruling clan or one of its subclans, followers of the immigrating Hima chiefs, pre-Hima indigenous rulers, favorites of ancient chiefs. Usually each family delegates from two to ten of its members as chiefdom elders. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-44; Revington, pp. 60-61; Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, pp. 236-237.

[18] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 48.

[19] Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 235.

[20] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, pp. 49-62, 81.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 75-84. Liebenow stresses the role of the chiefdom elders as a check on the power of the chief; of organizations like the *alika*, dance societies and age-groups "which served as counter-balances to the exercise of chiefly authority or which performed political functions independently of the chief"; and of the ability of people to "remove themselves and their cattle to a neighboring chiefdom, thereby depriving a tyrannical chief of a source of tribute as well as of warriors and labourers." With respect to relations between the great commoners and the chief, he writes:

> "Chiefs relied heavily on the young men's societies in recruiting warriors, organizing collective labour, and in assisting new

> immigrants...The leaders of the *elika*, the *basumba batale*, were influential personages in their chiefdoms and they were able to arrange the terms of work contracts with the chiefs through a process resembling 'collective bargaining.'.../It was/ the *basumba batale*, acting jointly, who demonstrated before a chief's hut and demanded his abdication when it was evident that his religious powers had 'failed' him."

Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 237.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 236; Millroth, p. 127, citing Tanner, "The Installation of Sukuma Chiefs in Mwanza District, Tanganyika," *African Studies*, XVI, 4 (1957), 197. Millroth's study is a thesis written under the supervision of Professor George Widengren, the University of Uppsala. It is based to a large extent on unpublished documents from the archives of the White Fathers' Missionary Society, Rome, and the Church Missionary Society, London. This material supplements but does not challenge the accuracy of the published materials used in this section of my study in any important respects.

[23] Cory, *The Ntemi*, pp. 5-6.

[24] Theodor H. Gaster, ed. *The New Golden Bough* (New York, 1959), pp. 224-225.

[25] Cory, *The Ntemi*, pp. 7-8.

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 11 n.; Liebenow, "Chieftainship...," p. 51, says that the division of the stool emphasizes "transfer of the supernatural powers of chieftainship."

[28] Cory, *The Ntemi*, pp. 14-15.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24.

[31] *Ibid.* p. 25.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

[35] Millroth, pp. 95-96.

[36] Cory, *The Ntemi*, pp. 33-36; Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 235. Epidemics and other calamities were frequent among the Sukuma. The chief was responsible for preventing them. He had to determine their cause by sending his *banangoma* to diviners, and then adopt the remedies prescribed by the chiefdom diviner.

> "If the cause of the calamity was found not to be a hostile witch doctor, the *ntemi* himself was sometimes considered to be directly connected with the cause of the trouble. The idea was that because the calamity had laid hold on the whole district, only a powerful spirit like that of a predecessor of the *ntemi* could be the cause of the universal trouble. The diviner indicated that one of the *ntemi*'s ancestors felt insulted by his descendant because he had neglected him, and the *ntemi* had then to perform a solemn ceremony of ancestor-worship with the sacrifice of a bull.
>
> "Sometimes the oracle went even further and accused the *ntemi* of being the cause of the misfortune...It may have happened that the *ntemi* had illegally deprived one of his subjects of his property...or adopted the Mohammedan religion. In the first case he had to hold a solemn ceremony of ancestor-worship after having made good the injustice; in the latter case he had to transfer his magical duties to one of his near relatives."

Cory, *The Ntemi*, pp. 62-63. Before war, the *ntemi* consulted a diviner regarding the prospects of success, and he obtained war medicine and administered it to his warriors. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 38. The *ntemi* also conducted the harvest ritual "by which all taboos imposed in connection with the crop were removed and by which everyone became free to use the crop as he wished." *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[38] Millroth, pp. 127-131.

[39] Tanner, "Sukuma Ancestor Worship...," p. 54.

[40] Tanner, "Spirits of the Dead," p. 119.

[41] Millroth, pp. 99-100.

[42] Tanner, "Introduction to Northern Basukuma's Idea...," p. 48.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[44] Tanner, "Introduction to Spirit Beings...," pp. 69-70.

[45] Millroth, p. 98.

[46] Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 234.

[47] Another belief would also indicate a divine sanction to the chief's authority, and that is the conception of the God as one who watches over and tends men. Millroth, p. 98. There could, however, be a restrictive aspect to this divine sanction, as contempt for the less fortunate would tempt the divine anger.

> "Although the Supreme Being lies beyond the normal boundaries of men's influence through invocations, it is possible, nevertheless, to anger him; for instance, a wealthy man sneering at a beggar would make him angry, not because it was an uncharitable thing to do but because it was sneering at the Supreme Being's system of dividing up property."

Tanner, "Introduction to Northern Basukuma's Ideas...," p. 53.

[48] Liebenow, "Chieftainship...," p. 50.

[49] *Ibid*., p. 56.

[50] Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 235; Liebenow, "Chieftainship...," p. 55.

[51] Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 236.

[52] Cory is not fully consistent in his position. In *The Ntemi*, pp. 74-75, we read: "Usually the person of the chief, his mode of life, and his capacity for ruling, were not criticised...failures could be readily ascribed to transgressions of...taboos by members of the community." "It can be said in general that the magic powers possessed by the Sukuma chiefs were not only the source of their authority but also that of their security." Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 235, also notes that the chief could shift blame for calamities to those whom he delegated to perform his rituals.

[53] Jacques J. Maquet, "A Research Definition of African Feudality," *Journal of African History*, III, 2 (1962), 308.

[54] Cory recognizes this distinction but does not pursue it. "The authority of the chief was vested in his office and not in his person." *Indigenous Political System*, p. 33.

[55] Liebenow, "Chieftainship...," p. 57. Succession was matrilineal. Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 235. "The people...could believe in the possibility that one brother was more popular with the ancestral

spirits than another brother. Thus in cases of famine...epidemics or defeat in war the royal dynasty remained and only the person of the chief was changed." Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 7. Defeat in war was "never...of political consequence," for the enemy "could not defeat the spirits and their powerful influence in the country's affairs." Cory, *The Ntemi*, p. 74. The political "system lasted undisturbed until recently when it began to be affected by increasing contact with western culture." Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 4.

[56] See Cory, *The Ntemi*. Millroth, p. 133, observed that the *banangwa* assisted the chief to exercise his religious duties in the villages to which they were appointed.

[57] There were some 60 chiefdoms in the 1920's. Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 239. The Sukuma people numbered 569,000 in 1928. Gerald F. Sayers, ed. *The Handbook of Tanganyika* (London, 1930), p. 38. The area of Sukumaland is some 19,000 square miles. Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 1. These figures give a population density of only about 30 people per square mile.

[58] "The economy of the Sukuma is based primarily on agriculture, despite the fact that the tribe is one of the leading cattle-herding peoples of East Africa." Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 231. "Normally water is available in sufficient quantities for household and stock consumption without undue toil, but for stock the situation may become precarious in years of drought. This danger is being increasingly met by the construction of artificial reservoirs. There are very few permanent water courses." Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 1.

[59] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 5.

[60] *Ibid.*

[61] Cory, *The Ntemi*, p. 2.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

[64] Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 234; Millroth, p. 175.

[65] Although the Bantu "wholly absorbed" the Hima culture and language, the chiefs retained a distinctive non-Bantu physical appearance because chiefs' daughters "were usually married to *banangwa*,...often of other chiefdoms, so that any new chief...was of comparatively pure royal blood." Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 2; *The Ntemi*, p. 27 n. But Liebenow, *East African Chiefs*, p. 233, sees "no observable physical differences."

[66] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 2.

[67] For this function and characteristic of myth, see Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Cleveland, 1963), pp. 410-434; *Cosmos and History*: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1959), pp. 34-48.

[68] Cory, *Indigenous Political System*, p. 2.

[69] *Ibid.* There is some argument whether the Hima were Hamitic or Nilotic, and no agreement whence they came. See George Peter Murdock, *Africa: Its Peoples and their Culture History* (New York, 1959), pp. 349-363; Richards, *East African Chiefs*, pp. 28-32. There were several waves of northern immigrants, and throughout the Interlacustrine Bantu the term *Hima* is applied to any ruling dynasty. Richards, p. 32.

[70] C. G. Seligman, *Races of Africa*, 3d ed. (London, 1957), pp. 178-179; see also Maurice Edwin Culver, "The Bantu Concept of Man," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Drew Theological Seminary, 1952).

[71] Audrey I. Richards, "The Political System of the Bemba Tribe--Northeastern Rhodesia," in *African Political Systems*, ed. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London, 1940), pp. 83-84. See I. Schapera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (London, 1956), pp. 65, 208-221, *passim*.

HA

[1] Major sources on the Ha are: C. H. B. Grant, "The Uha in Tanganyika Territory," *Geographical Journal*, LXVI, 5 (1925), 411-422; J. E. S. Griffiths, "The Aba-Ha of the Tanganyika Territory," *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (hereafter cited: TNR), No. 2 (October 1936), pp. 72-76; J. La Fontaine, "The Ha," written from material collected by J. H. Scherer, in *East African Chiefs*, ed. Audrey I. Richards (New York, 1960), pp. 212-228; J. H. Scherer, "The Ha of Tanganyika," *Anthropos*, LIV, 5-6 (1959), 841-903; J. J. Tawney, "Insignia and Ceremonies of the Heru Chiefdom of Buha, in the Kasulu District," TNR, No. 18 (December 1944), pp. 81-88; Tawney, "A Note on the Death and Burial of Chief Gwasa of Heru," TNR, No. 21 (June 1946), p. 25; W. B. Tripe, "The Death and Replacement of a Divine King in Uha," *Man*, XXXIX, 21 (February 1939), 22-25; Tripe, "The Installation (kusamwa) of the Chief of Uha," *Man*, XXXV, 54 (April 1935), 53-56; Tripe, "The Tribal Insignia of Heru," TNR, No. 16 (December 1943), pp. 2-6.

[2] J. P. Moffett, ed. *Handbook of Tanganyika*, 2d ed. (Dar es Salaam, 1958), pp. 270, 294.

[3] The Interlacustrine group is composed of two other Tanganyika tribes, the Haya and Zinza, and the major peoples of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi. Ganda and Nyoro had formed powerful states under hereditary kings in Uganda, and the other tribes were composed of "similar but tiny kingdoms of which the rulers were often connected by blood ties." Richards, pp. 27-28.

[4] Richards writes:

> "Some at least of these were of the physical and cultural type now described as 'Hamitic', and these are still acknowledged as rulers of the western peoples, the Ruanda, the Rundi, the Nyankole and the Ha; they form an honoured and mainly endogamous caste among the Haya and Zinza...These Hamitic invaders, together with other intruders who were Nilotic..., seem to have come in small bands without large armies or efficient administrative machinery and to have usurped 'thrones' rather than defeated whole peoples."

Ibid., p. 33.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35. "The struggle between the king's appointees and the hereditary clan heads and nobles is characteristic of this group of conquest states and the 'appointed chiefs' or king's governors and their deputies form a class of territorial rulers which is uncommon in other parts of Bantu Africa." *Ibid.*, p. 35. Among some of the tribes the clan authorities at various levels retain some powers in their jurisdictions and certain ritual prerogatives at court. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 347-349.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 350.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 347.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 38, 40.

[11] Scherer, pp. 844-845, 864, 878; La Fontaine, p. 214. The Tusi were the wealthy class generally, but there were poor Tusi and rich Ha. Scherer, p. 879.

[12] La Fontaine, p. 215.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 217. "The conditional gift of cattle created a relationship of patron and client between donor and receiver, usually associated also with the status of superior and inferior in the political system." *Ibid.*, p. 213.

The kings also would give portions of territory to other Tusi lineages "as bride-wealth" in lieu of cattle. La Fontaine calls this territorial gift a "fief" (p. 215), which Richards explains is a term used to describe estates given "in return for political and military services to the king" (p. 37). But such a "fief" should not be taken to imply a feudal system like the medieval European. See E. M. Chilver, "'Feudalism' in the Interlacustrine Kingdons," in *East African Chiefs*, pp. 378-393. Chilver emphasizes: "The dispersal of authority characteristic of feudal government ... has no counterpart in the Interlacustrine states." *Ibid.*, pp. 381-382. In the Interlacustrine states, "estates granted to office-holders to maintain or reward them are not fiefs, but office lands." *Ibid.*, p. 391.

[14] Scherer, p. 880.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 877. The root of the difficulties in describing the Ha political system, and that of the Interlacustrians generally, is indicated by Chilver:

> "Indeed, it is something of a paradox that institutions described by anthropologists a 'feudal' in East Africa resemble most nearly those mistakenly described by historians as 'tribal' in Europe ... No convenient terminology has been devised to describe either the political institutions found in many Bantu states characterized by dynastic monarchy and delegated territorial administration exercised by beneficial royal favourites, or for that matter those found in pre-feudal Wales, Scotland and Ireland."

Chilver, p. 391. Chilver, p. 390, writes also: "Tusi forms of clientship secured by cattle have much closer affinities to some pre-feudal forms of free clientship, and if they resemble vassalage it is in their reciprocal nature, the possibility of diffidation and the heritability of the relationship."

[16] Scherer, p. 885.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 881-882.

[18] Tripe, "Installation of Chief of Uha," pp. 54-56.

[19] Tripe, "Death and Replacement of Divine King," pp. 22-25.

[20] Tripe, "Installation of Chief of Uha," p. 54; Tripe, "Death and Replacement of Divine King," p. 25.

[21] Scherer, p. 888.

[22] Tripe, "Death and Replacement of Divine King," p. 24.

[23] Tawney, "Insignia and Ceremonies," pp. 86-87.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 81; Scherer, p. 883.

[25] Tripe, "Tribal Insignia of Heru," pp. 2–3, 5–6.

[26] Tawney, "Insignia and Ceremonies," pp. 83, 86.

[27] Scherer, p. 881.

[28] La Fontaine, p. 214.

[29] Tripe, "Tribal Insignia of Heru," p. 4.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] La Fontaine, p. 214; Scherer, pp. 878, 881; see above, p. 46.

[32] Scherer, p. 845.

[33] The Mulingas, which often weigh nearly eight pounds and are always worn, even while hoeing, are signs of affluence that serve also to bring "peace, prosperity and happiness through the propitiation of spirits." Tawney, "Insignia and Ceremonies," pp. 84–85.

SHAMBALA

[1] The important sources on the Shambala are: Abdallah bin Hemedi bin Ali Liajjemi, "The Story of Mbega," trans. Roland Allen from *Habari za Wakilindi* (Msalabani, German East Africa, 1900, 1904, 1907), *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (hereafter cited: TNR), No. 1 (March 1936), pp. 38–51; No. 2 (October 1936), pp. 80–91; No. 3 (April 1937), pp. 87–98; Oscar Baumann, *Usambara und seine Nachbargebiete* (Berlin, 1891); E. B. Dobson, "Land Tenure of the Wasambaa," TNR, No. 10 (December 1940), pp. 1–27; J. L. Krapf, *Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labors, During an Eighteen Years' Residence in Eastern Africa* (Boston, 1860); Edgar V. Winans, "Observations on the Changing Nature of Shambala Society, Tanganyika," paper presented at 56th annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, 1957; Winans, *Shambala: The Constitution of a Traditional State* (London, 1962).

[2] Dobson, pp. 1, 3; Winans, *Shambala*, pp. 7, 14.

[3] J. P. Moffett, ed. *Handbook of Tanganyika* (Dar es Salaam, 1958), p. 294; Winans, "Observations...," p. 1; Winans, *Shambala*, pp. 14–15.

[4] Krapf, pp. 306, 313 n.; Winans, "Observations...," p. 1.

[5] Dobson, p. 4.

[6] Winans, *Shambala*, p. 5.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. xxxv.

[8] This version was put together by Abdallah bin Hemedi before the turn of the century and published in Swahili in three parts. We use Roland Allen's English translation. Abdallah prefaced the story with the explanation that what he did not himself know he learned from "reliable" Shambala elders, and that the story is such that it is "good that all men should know it."

> "It is the story of the origin of the Wakilindi and of how they conquered the country of Usambara and Bonde, and that part of Uzigua which is called the country of the Waluvu. Their command ran as far as the coast at Tanga and Pangani and Morongo; as far as Vanga they were masters. In those days there was no higher authority but all judgment came from Vuga and all paid tribute, even freemen and Arabs paid tribute. See, then, the beginning until they became corrupt and lost their country through their ill-doing."

Abdallah, TNR (March 1936), p. 38. We undertake an analytical and interpretive account of the essential themes of the story, which runs to 38 large pages.

[9] *Ibid.* The Zigua are a Bantu people southeast of the Shambala whose language is mutually intelligible with that of the Shambala. Winans, *Shambala*, p. 7.

[10] Abdallah, TNR (March 1936), p. 45.

[11] Abdallah, TNR (March 1936), pp. 45–49.

[12] Abdallah, TNR (October 1936), pp. 80-81.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 87.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 81.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 85.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

[18] Winans, *Shambala*, p. 80 n., *passim*.

[19] Krapf, p. 313 n.

[20] "A Note on Mulungu," in *African Ideas of God*, ed. Edwin W. Smith, 2d ed. rev. and ed. E. G. Parrinder (London, 1961), p. 58. He explains further that other local God-names occur in this region.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59. See A. T. and G. M. Culwick, *Ubena of the Rivers* (London, 1935), pp. 99-101. Dr. Hastings Banda, now President of Malawi, told Smith concerning the importance of Mulungu in the religion of his own tribe: "The spirits of one's ancestors had to be prayed to...because they were the means of approaching the Deity, who was above everything else." *African Ideas of God*, p. 60. The name Mulungu may derive from the verb *-lunga* in many Bantu languages, meaning to "put together rightly" or "put in order." *Ibid.*, p. 59; T. Cullen Young, "The Idea of God in Northern Nyasaland," in *ibid.*, p. 51.

[22] Krapf, p. 321.

[23] Abdallah, TNR (March 1936), pp. 40, 49.

[24] We recall that Yahweh chose a people in slavery, a people that even resisted being chosen, as a vehicle for the revelation of Yahweh's action in history. What recommended the Israelites was not their merit but their abject condition as "bondsmen" through whom Yahweh could show "signs and wonders." Deut. 6: 21-22. See also Exod. 14, and Ps. 136. Similarly in Christianity, where merit depends on a Divine *gratia praeveniens*.

[25] Abdallah, TNR (March 1936), p. 39.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[27] Abdallah, TNR (October 1936), p. 80. The ritual purity of unmarried men is indicated in *ibid.*, p. 89. Mbega's son was given a wife only when he was installed as chief. Abdallah, TNR (April 1937), p. 96.

[28] The story records Mbega as taking two wives and mentions five sons, but there is no indication in the detailed account of his having married a woman of Kilindi. Moreover, descent is reckoned patrilineally. Winans, *Shambala*, pp. 1, 34.

[29] The sources apparently pass over the question and this possible answer because they take their clue from other data. When Mbega fled from Kilindi, he was accompanied by his companion hunters from Kilindi. This group was welcomed into a number of towns as Kilindi, the townsmen not yet knowing that Mbega was not of Kilindi. Abdallah, TNR (March 1936), pp. 50-51. Dobson reveals the possible reason for the implicit

stress on this fact by all the sources when he writes: "The Wakilindi... imposed themselves on the original inhabitants as many other conquerors imposed themselves on Bantu tribes throughout African history." In other words, it is inconceivable to them that Mbega alone could achieve his dominant position in Usambara; it must have been achieved through force exercised, or threatened, by the whole group, of which all were Kilindi but Mbega himself. It is inconceivable, to be more explicit, to one who discounts the truth of the story's assertion that Mbega was freely accepted by the people as manifesting the signs, goodness and personal power, of a divine mandate to rule. Moreover, this other interpretation is perforce led to discount the fact that the story drops all references to Mbega's Kilindi companions when Mbega enters Usambara, describing only what "he" did. See Dobson, p. 4; Abdallah, TNR (October 1936), pp. 80ff.

[30] Abdallah, TNR (October 1936), pp. 88-91. Abdallah is uncertain of the meaning of Mwene. We noted above from Krapf, p. 321, that it means heaven, which would suggest the identification of Mbega with Mulungu. This identification is made, as noted, by a Shambala. Krapf, p. 313 n. Shortly before being made King of Vuga, Mbega killed a lion and thereafter slept on its skin instead of that of oxes. Abdallah, TNR (October 1936), p. 86.

[31] Abdallah, TNR (April 1937), pp. 88-90. Mbega's messengers instructed the man chosen: "Dwell with the lad in all honour, do justice without respect for any man's person, even though it be your son or your brother, judge according to the law." *Ibid.*, p. 90. "The law" was apparently a combination of the laws under which they lived before the advent of Mbega, for Turi and the elders of the various parts were retained by him in office, and the judgements that Mbega himself made. *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 94; Abdallah, TNR (October 1936), pp. 88-90.

[32] Abdallah, TNR (April 1937), pp. 91-92.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 94.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

[37] Winans, *Shambala*, p. 76.

[38] Dobson, pp. 5-7; Winans, *Shambala*, pp. 87-88, 121, 123, 126.

[39] Winans, *Shambala*, pp. 4-5.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104. "The development of the state is seen by the Shambala as a process of splitting off of son or brothers of a chief, who found lineages and expand the control of their clan....The acknowledgment of the authority of a new chief by a group of commoners...means also their acknowledgment of the authority of the head of the lineage from which this new chief segmented, and so on, up to the ruler as head of the whole royal lineage system." *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[43] Walter Goldschmidt, "Foreword" to Winans, *Shambala*, pp. xxiv-xxviii.

[44] Dobson, p. 5, with reference to the commoner elders described above; Goldschmidt, pp. xxx-xxxi.

[45] Goldschmidt, p. xvii; see also Winans, *Shambala*, p. 103.

[46] Winans, *Shambala*, pp. 46-47. Acceptance as chief by the people is regarded as a sign of the inheritance of Mbega's "charisma." *Ibid.*, p. 152.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[48] *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 104-110. In the lineage head two types of authority meet, the familial and the chiefly. The relation between chiefs is of course familial. *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 104.

[49] Krapf, p. 317.

[50] Winans, *Shambala*, p. 112.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 118; see also p. 110.

SONJO

[1] The following are major sources on the Sonjo: F. G. Finch, "Hambageu: Some Additional Notes on the God of the Wasonjo," *Tanganyika Notes and Records* (hereafter cited: TNR), Nos. 47-48 (June-September 1957), pp. 203-208; H. A. Fosbrooke, "Hambageu, the God of the Wasonjo," TNR, No. 35 (July 1953), pp. 38-42; Robert F. Gray, "Some Parallels in Sonjo and Christian Mythology," in *African Systems of Thought* (New York, 1965), pp. 49-63; Gray, *The Sonjo of Tanganyika* (London, 1963); J. E. S. Griffiths, "Notes on Land Tenure and Land Rights among

the Sonjo of Tanganyika Territory," TNR, No. 9 (June 1940), pp. 15–19; E. Simenauer, "The Miraculous Birth of Hambageu, Hero-God of the Sonjo," TNR, No. 38 (March 1935), pp. 23–30.

[2] J. P. Moffett, ed. *Handbook of Tanganyika*, 2d ed. (Dar es Salaam, 1958), p. 294; Gray, *The Sonjo*, p. 25 n., gives a population figure of 4,500 for a decade later. Gray's book is the most important source of data relevant to our present concern. Gray's own purpose was to establish the relationship between the structure of Sonjo society and the Sonjo irrigation system of agriculture. Since there existed no other comprehensive account of Sonjo society, Gray made it a point to provide copious data. *The Sonjo*, pp. vii–viii, 1.

[3] Gray, *The Sonjo*, p. 1.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 58, 130, 132, 139–140.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

[7] See *ibid.*, pp. 143, 154.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 143. The other sources give the name as Hambageu. "About the main events in Khambageu's career there is general agreement among all the villages." Gray, *African Systems of Thought*, p. 56.

[10] Fosbrooke, pp. 38–39. Gray, *The Sonjo*, p. 101, adds that the Tinaga men are supposed to have lost their knowledge of the Sonjo language, and that their village suffered pestilence and famine. "This act of blazing fire without the normal instruments so astonished the Wasamunge that from that day they idolized Hambageu as the creator of the earth...and made him their God." Fosbrooke, pp. 39–40.

[11] Fosbrooke, p. 40. "He cured all sicknesses, ensured good crops, and even resurrected the dead." Gray, *The Sonjo*, p. 101.

[12] Fosbrooke, pp. 40–41. Simenauer deals with this version of the Hambageu story with the assumptions and "the methods of modern depth-psychology" (p. 23). His concern is with the "original contribution" it makes to our understanding of "the basic psychological traits of man" (p. 24). His analysis, which is deficient on many grounds, leads him to speculate that Hambageu's "narcissistic constitution" (p. 25) is basically a "projection" of the "repressed" and otherwise "hidden" selfishness and "individualism" of the Sonjo: Hambageu is "the personification of their hidden idol, ...their narcissism" (p. 28).

[13] Finch, p. 204.

[14] Gray, *African Systems of Thought*, pp. 57, 59.

[15] Gray, *The Sonjo*, p. 107.

[16] Fosbrooke, p. 42. Hambageu also "told them of the coming of a thing with great lights shining in front at the hill near Yasi." Motor vehicles coming up the road near Yasi were taken to be the "thing" prophesied. Finch, p. 207.

[17] Gray, *The Sonjo*, p. 108; see also Fosbrooke, p. 42; Finch, p. 207. Gray, *African Systems of Thought*, p. 60, addresses himself to the question of "resemblances between Sonjo and Christian mythology," concluding that the resemblances "in general ideas...do not extend to detailed episodes, subsidiary characters, or names. This is hardly what we expect to find in cases of cultural borrowing of mythological elements." Thus there is no reason to doubt the independence of Sonjo mythology from European influence, or at least its origin prior to such influence. Gray does not probe beyond the level of ideas to their underlying experiences, and therefore is unable to reject the possibility of such an influence on the basis of the essential differences between Christianity and Sonjo religion.

[18] Gray, *The Sonjo*, p. 102.

[19] Simenauer, p. 28.

[20] Finch, p. 205.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 207-208; Gray, *The Sonjo*, pp. 103-104.

[22] Gray, *The Sonjo*, p. 1.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 105.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 119.

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 101; *ibid.*, p. 30, identifies Rokhori with Kisongero, which unlike in Fosbrooke is distinguished from Belwa.

[29] Gray, African Systems of Thought, pp. 54, 57-58.

[30] Ibid., p. 54. Another annual festival has Hambageu, whose "presence is made known by the sound of a concealed horn," visiting each village where the people make offerings to him and ask for blessings. Ibid., p. 55; Gray, The Sonjo, pp. 109-117, describes these festivals in greater detail.

[31] Gray, The Sonjo, p. 12.

[32] Ibid., p. 127.

[33] Finch, pp. 205-206.

[34] Ibid., pp. 206, 207.

[35] Gray, The Sonjo, p. 127. The elders meet daily at the khoseri, a closed off, sacred area at one end of the village plaza. It is from here that Hambageu's voice, the horn, emanates often during the day when Hambageu is making his annual visit. Ibid., pp. 114, 139.

BENA

[1] The sources on the Bena are: A. T. and G. M. Culwick, "Religious and Economic Sanctions in a Bantu Tribe," British Journal of Psychology, XXVI, 2 (October 1935), 183-191; Culwicks, Ubena of the Rivers (London, 1935); Mtema Towegale Kiwanga, "The Kingdom of the Wakinimanga," in Ubena of the Rivers, Ch. II, pp. 30-56; Marc J. Swartz, "Continuities in the Bena Political System," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, XX, 3 (1964), 241-260.

[2] J. P. Moffett, ed. Handbook of Tanganyika, 2d ed. (Dar es Salaam, 1958), p. 294.

[3] Culwicks, Ubena, p. 17; Swartz, p. 241 n. 2.

[4] Swartz, pp. 243-249. Nothing is published on the ideas and religion of the hill Bena.

[5] Culwicks, Ubena, p. 29. The population figure is for 1931. Apparently the kingdom was once considerably larger.

[6] Ibid., p. 20. The river Bena speak a different dialect than the hill Bena, but the two dialects are mutually intelligible. Ibid., n.

[7] Ibid., pp. 20-22. Mtengera kept his hold in the hills until a bloody battle with the Hehe in 1874-5 and opportunity for conquest in the east caused him to shift the center of tribal life to the valley. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

[8] Culwicks, British Journal of Psychology, p. 183. The Culwicks have little appreciation of Bena religion in itself. "Hobgoblins and ghosts, spirits and spooks," play a part in helping enforce practical rules that experience has shown to be effective in maintaining the society. Ibid., p. 185. They consider that "the real sanctions behind the supernatural, in the everyday life of the people, are economic." Ubena, p. 220. They assert that the laws and customs that the Bena ascribe to the religious inspiration of the ancestors are really practical, that the Bena raise "the sum of tribal experience to the level of the sacred," and that religion "gives custom a healthy stability." Ibid., pp. 418-419. Since the ancestors, as will be shown, are considered to show concern for the prosperity of the people, it would be strange if the inspired customs were impractical. Fortunately, the Culwicks' copious description of the Bena is objective and little affected by their interpretation.

[9] Culwicks, Ubena, pp. 57-58.

[10] Ibid., p. 59.

[11] At the sacrifices Manga "is asked to greet and propitiate the spirits of those unknown ancestors beyond him." Ibid.

[12] Kiwanga, pp. 30-33.

[13] Ibid., p. 33.

[14] Ibid., pp. 33-39.

[15] Culwicks, Ubena, p. 66.

[16] Ibid., p. 106.

[17] Ibid., p. 149.

[18] Ibid., p. 150. Marriage with cross-cousins is strictly observed in the royal family, and the Mtema must be the son of a cross-cousin wife. Ibid., pp. 66, 301. Generally, "men of the royal family marry cross-cousins who rank in their households in order of their importance, and... the eldest son of the Mtema's senior wife is the person most likely (in theory) to succeed to the Stool, though he is only one among a number of men whom birth makes them eligible for the office of Mtema." The importance of a cross-cousin depends on such criteria as " the nearness of

relationship to the common ancestor, his rank and power, and the presence of genealogical links between the woman and other famous men." *Ibid.*, p. 64. The son of the Mtema's senior wife may not succeed if her first child was a daughter. *Ibid.*, pp. 42, 152. The Wakinimanga policy was "to establish a marriage alliance with the ruling clan in most of the kingdoms which they conquered and absorbed into the tribe, and in accordance with the rules of cross-cousin marriage the first alliance was naturally supplemented by a succession of others in later generations. Thus every prominent clan in the tribe was eventually bound to the Wakinimanga by ties of kinship, and honoured the Manga spirits not only as tribal ancestors, but in some measure its own." The Bena participate in rites to maternal as well as to paternal ancestors, but the latter are considered much more important. *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 102-103.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 150-151, 296-297.

[20] In these schools the curricula were comprehensive--the boys were taught, among other subjects, tribal history, religion, law, military tactics, agriculture and medicine--and the training rigorous. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-164.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 102-104.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 106. The heirlooms and Stool are called *vinu vya tambiko* (the things of the *tambiko*) and are housed near the Mtema's and Mzagira's huts. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 112, 114. The Mtema chooses him from among the sons of princesses so that, while of the royal blood, he is not in the male line and is thus not eligible to high administrative position. The Mzagira's appointment is for life. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-113.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 100.

[28] The Culwicks compare it to the Melanesian *mana* and the American Indian *orenda*. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 101.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 100 and n. The Culwicks spoke the Bena language; so if the meaning of the name is unknown, it has probably been lost: it would thus be very old.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 96, 100.

[33] Discussed in *ibid.*, pp. 116-121.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 127-128.

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 149. Also, the kinsmen of the Mtema bore several kinds of titles according to their relationship. See *ibid.*, p. 132.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 131-133.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 143-144.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 139.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 145.

[45] The Culwicks note that a distinction between military rank and social and political rank can sometimes be seen and in other cases not be discernable. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

LUGURU

[1] The only published work on the Luguru is the combined product of an American political scientist and an anthropologist who served as Senior Government Sociologist of Tanganyika as well as a district officer under British administration. Roland Young and Henry A. Fosbrooke, *Smoke in the Hills: Political Tension in the Morogoro District of Tangnyika* (Evanston, Ill., 1960).

[2] J. P. Moffett, ed. *Handbook of Tanganyika*, 2d ed. (Dar es Salaam, 1958), p. 294.

[3] Young and Fosbrooke, pp. viii–ix, 40–41.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. ix, 39. The term "segmentary" is used by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard to describe political systems of "stateless societies" in which the lineage is the relevant political unit and the political system is none other than the structure of relationships between the lineages. M. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, eds. *African Political Systems* (London, 1940), pp. 5–6. See John Middleton and David Tait, eds. *Tribes Without Rulers:* Studies in African Segmentary Systems (London, 1958).

[5] Young and Fosbrooke, p. vi.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 52. We discuss here only what Young and Fosbrooke describe as the "medial lineage," which has an authoritative head. The "maximal lineage" is merely the largest descent group, often the same as the clan. The "major lineage" is the largest descent group claiming proprietary rights in an area of land. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 56.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 21–22.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 43, 53, 57, 69.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[13] Following Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago, 1952), p. 49: "a political society comes into existence when it articulates itself and produces a representative." See Voegelin's discussion, pp. 36–37, 41–43; John Fortesque, A Selection from *On the Merits of the Laws of England*, trans. S. B. Chrimes, in *Medieval Political Philosophy*: A Sourcebook, ed. Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (New York, 1963), pp. 520–521. The lineage head is clearly the representative of the lineage, for he takes the lineage insignia when he attends the installation of heads of other lineages. Young and Fosbrooke, p. 57.

[14] Young and Fosbrooke, pp. 41–42. "The Luguru neither express nor imply a belief that any mystic element responsible for the well-being of the lineage resides in the insignia." *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 42–43.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 48.

NYAKYUSA

[1] Copious information on the Nyakyusa is provided in the writings of the Wilsons. The following are by Godfrey Wilson: "An African Morality," *Africa*, IX, 1 (January 1936), 75-99; "An Introduction to Nyakyusa Law," *Africa*, X, 1 (January 1937), 16-36; "The Nyakyusa of Southwestern Tanganyika," in *Seven Tribes of British Central Africa*, ed. Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman (London, 1951), pp. 253-291. These works are by Monica Wilson: *Communal Rituals of the Nyakyusa* (London, 1959); *Divine Kings and the "Breath of Men,"* Frazer Lecture for 1959 (Cambridge, England, 1959); *Good Company*: A Study of Nyakyusa Age-Villages, 1st publ. 1951, reprinted (Boston, 1963); "Nyakyusa Ritual and Symbolism," *American Anthropologist*, LVI, 2 (April 1954), 228-241; *Rituals of Kinship among the Nyakyusa* (London, 1957). Most of the materials on the Nyakyusa were gathered by the Wilsons during the period 1934-1938.

[2] M. Wilson, *Good Company*, pp. 1, 8; G. Wilson, *Seven Tribes*, p. 253.

[3] J. P. Moffett, ed. *Handbook of Tanganyika*, 2d ed. (Dar es Salaam, 1958), p. 294.

[4] *Good Company*, p. 18.

[5] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, pp. 90-91.

[6] M. Wilson, *Good Company*, p. 14.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 13; M. Wilson, *Rituals of Kinship*, p. 3; G. Wilson, *Seven Tribes*, pp. 266-277.

[8] M. Wilson, *Good Company*, pp. 14-15. Polygyny is common among men over forty, and it increases the wealth of a man: "The polygynist is likely to command the labour of many sons as well as several wives, and in due course he expects to receive the marriage cattle of many daughters." *Ibid.*, p. 15; see also G. Wilson, *Seven Tribes*, pp. 256-257, 262.

[9] M. Wilson, *Good Company*, pp. 14, 18-19; G. Wilson, *Seven Tribes*, pp. 269-270.

[10] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, p. 91.

[11] M. Wilson, *Good Company*, pp. 10-12. Moreover, "the villages and lineages were all held to be dependent upon their chief for... success in warfare." M. Wilson, *Rituals of Kinship*, p. 3.

[12] M. Wilson, *Good Company*, p. 12; M. Wilson, *Divine Kings*, p. 20; M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, pp. 1, 3.

[13] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, p. 7.

[14] M. Wilson, *Divine Kings*, pp. 6–7. In the lineage "an heir assumes the name and obligations of a father or brother who has died. He takes on the whole social personality of the dead and becomes, as it were, his living representative." *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[15] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, p. 21. "The numinous quality of everything connected with Lubaga can hardly be exaggerated; the Nyakyusa believe that it overcomes even curious Europeans." *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 22.

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 23.

[18] M. Wilson, *Divine Kings*, pp. 15–16.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 23. By *secular* in this passage, Mrs. Wilson apparently means *political*. She refers to "evidence from Central and South Africa to show that the development of centralized kingdoms...was directly linked either with an external trade in ivory and slaves, or with a high degree of internal specialization." *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 24. However, under the conditions of European occupation the Lwembe heir exchanged sacred for profane authority, refusing to be ritually installed as Lwembe apparently because "the tenure of that office was always highly precarious and unpopular." *Ibid.* The "unpopularity" of the Lwembe is yet another hint of his implicit challenge to the chiefs' authority.

[21] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, pp. 7–8.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[24] *Ibid.*, pp. 157–159.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 46–48.

[26] Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Cleveland, 1963), pp. 46–58, 96–102.

[27] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, p. 158. She writes (*Ibid.*, p. 157): "the numinous quality of the heroes is conceived of as contamination, not holiness. Like the shades, the heroes must be 'driven off' lest men go mad, and it is when they have driven them away that men are *belu* -- white, innocent, free of anger. Men should be *belu* but this is never cited as an attribute of the pagan Kyala. It is the terribleness, not the goodness or purity of God of which the Nyakyusa are aware." This terrible contamination, we might suggest, *is* holiness. See Rudolph Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (New York, 1958), pp. 12-24.

[28] M. Wilson, *Divine Kings*, p. 1; M. Wilson, *Good Company*, p. 13. The quoted text (*Divine Kings*, p. 20) refers to the hill-tops as "numerous" power sources, but I suspect that Mrs. Wilson may have used the more significant term "numinous," which would in any case be more appropriate in the context. See nn. 15 and 27 above in this section.

[29] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, p. 49. G. Wilson calls this ceremony "the most important legal act" of the Nyakyusa. "It is at once the initiation of all the youth of the old chiefdom into public life, the constitution of two new political units, and the proclamation of two new chiefs." Religious "action is taken to increase the personal qualities appropriate in a chief, his wives, and his great commoners, and to ensure prosperity for their people." *Seven Tribes*, pp. 278-279.

[30] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, p. 4. "Between the time of the two chiefs' 'coming out' and their own father's death there is between him and them a delicate balance of prestige and power. Each of the three, traditionally, has political authority in his own age villages, but appeals in cases of inheritance may be taken from either of the young chiefs ... to the old chief ... while the religious duties of chieftainship are exercised entirely by the old chief.... an old chief is believed usually to die soon after the 'coming out' of his sons. The 'breath' of the people is believed to kill him because men love his sons rather than himself.... it is commonly said that 'after his sons' "coming out" the old chief's power decreases, while that of his sons increases." G. Wilson, *Seven Tribes*, pp. 281-282.

[31] M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, pp. 53-54.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53. Examples of the admonitions given by the old chief's senior headmen to the heirs are: "Listen to the people: they are the real chiefs! Be hospitable! Greet people politely! Don't beat your men!" and "Feed your people ... Fear your people!" During the period of seclusion, the heirs wash only with certain ritual medicines. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[35] An elaborate description of the "coming out" is given in *ibid.*, pp. 49–57. See p. 57 where she indicates direct parallels between the "coming out" ritual and the rituals of death and puberty in their "dramatizations of death and rebirth." Also see M. Wilson, *Divine Kings*, p. 15; M. Wilson, *Rituals of Kinship*, pp. 200–205.

[36] Nyakyusa accepted M. Wilson's suggestion that "young men enter an enclosed house...and 'come out' (*ukusoka*) renewed as a child 'comes out' (*ukusoka*) of the mother's womb" as expressing the true meaning of "coming out." *Communal Rituals*, p. 57.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 54, 62.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 57–58.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 70–71. The sacrifice takes the form of the offering of blood and meat from a black bull or cow and petitions for fertility, rain and health. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 73.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

[44] M. Wilson, *Divine Kings*, pp. 18–19. Wrongly used, this power is witchcraft; "and how any particular case is labelled depends upon the viewpoint of the speaker." M. Wilson, *Communal Rituals*, p. 66. See M. Wilson, *Good Company*, pp. 91–108, for an elaborate treatment of "the breath of men."

[45] M. Wilson, *Good Company*, p. 13. The Nyakyusa have no clan system, and the kinsmen of the chief have no special prerogatives. *Ibid.* G. Wilson, *Seven Tribes*, p. 279 *et passim*, calls the headmen "great commoners."

CHAPTER III: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REGIMES

[1] See, for example, Monica Wilson, *Communal Rituals of the Nyakyusa* (London, 1959), pp. 97–98.

[2] These conventional titles are used uncritically in this chapter until, pp. 139-140, they are refined.

[3] Leo Strauss, *Natural Right and History* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 83-84.

[4] Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1959); *The Sacred and the Profane*: The Nature of Religion, trans. W. R. Trask (New York, 1961), esp. Ch. II.

[5] Robert F. Gray, *The Sonjo of Tanganyika* (London, 1963), p. 127.

[6] Wilson, pp. 7-16.

[7] Edgar V. Winans, *Shambala*: The Constitution of a Traditional State (London, 1962), pp. 22, 39, 79, 160.

[8] Bronislaw Malinowski, "Myth in Primative Psychology," in *Magic, Science and Religion and Other Essays* (Garden City, N. Y., 1955), p. 100.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 146. Malinowski's functional understanding of religion must be distinguished from Durkheim's theory. *Magic, Science and Religion*, pp. 56-60. See William A. Lessa and Evon Z. Vogt, eds. *Reader in Comparative Religion*: An Anthropological Approach, 2d ed. (New York, 1965), p. 2; Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (New York, 1961).

[11] Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, trans. W. R. Trask (New York, 1963), pp. 19-20.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[14] Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, Vol. I: *Israel and Revelation* (Baton Rouge, 1956), p. 14.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[16] Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, trans. Rosemary Sheed (Cleveland, 1963), pp. 416, 429-430.

[17] Robert N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (1964), reprinted in *Reader in Comparative Religion*, pp. 74, 77-79. Voegelin, p. 5, writes: "the history of symbolization is a progression from compact to differentiated experiences and symbols."

[18] Bellah, p. 79.

[19] David Goddard, "The Concept of Primitive Society," *Social Research*, XXXII, 3 (Autumn 1965), p. 256.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 257. Eliade asserts that the "visions of Supreme Beings with all the powers of an omnipotent Creator-God" nullifies those "evolutionist hypotheses which deny the primitive any approach to 'superior hierophanies.'" *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, p. 7.

[21] Goddard, p. 259.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 274.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

[24] *The New Science of Politics* (Chicago, 1952), p. 54. See also Henri Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods* (Chicago, 1948); Frankfort et *al.*, *Before Philosophy* (Baltimore, 1949); Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion* (New York, 1961); *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, comp. Wm. Theodore de Bary et *al.* (New York, 1964); D. Mackenzie Brown, *The White Umbrella* (Berkeley, 1959).

[25] Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Religion* (New York, 1952), p. 84; Paul Radin, *The World of Primitive Man* (New York, 1960), p. 50; Leo Frobenius, *The Childhood of Man*, trans. A. H. Keane (New York, 1960), p. 381.

[26] Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite and Art (New York, 1948), pp. 142-143.

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 147-148.

[29] The Sonjo regard Hambageu more as a confirmer than as a founder. Hambageu and his sons, not the ancestors, are the objects of ritual.

[30] See n. 64 to Ch. I above.

[31] This is not monotheism, which presupposes and denies polytheism.

See Raffaele Pettazzoni, Essays on the History of Religions, trans. H. J. Rose (New York, 1954), Ch. 1; Voegelin, Israel and Revelation, p. 108; William F. Albright, From the Stone Age to Christianity, 2d ed. (Baltimore, 1957).

[32] Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, pp. 44, 47, 51.

[33] Ibid., pp. 52, 54-55.

[34] Ibid., pp. 82-83.

[35] Ibid., pp. 87, 91.

[36] Ibid., p. 109.

[37] Ibid., p. 127.

[38] Ibid., p. 129.

[39] Compare the ancient Chinese concept of t'ien-ming and the Hindu concept of sarkar. Sources of Chinese Tradition, I, 6, 96, passim; Richard L. Park, India's Political System (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1967), pp. 49-50.

[40] Solar heroes are common among nomad shepherds, especially in Africa where a prominent example is the Masai, within whose territory the Sonjo occupy an enclave. The Masai share belief with the Sonjo in the latter's god and myths. Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, p. 149; Gray, pp. 117, 125.

[41] Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (New York, 1958), pp. 12-24.

[42] "A king is an absolute powerhouse of forces simply because he is a king." Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, p. 16. For the separation of the divine from divinities, see Albright, p. 177.

[43] For example, Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, p. 31; Lowie, p. 174; E. Geoffrey Parrinder, African Traditional Religion, 2d rev. ed. (London, 1962), p. 57.

[44] The Sonjo have household ancestral cults of minor importance in the religious life of the people. Gray, p. 123. If, as Voegelin maintains, "society is illuminated through an elaborate symbolism, in various degrees of compactness and differentiation--from rite, through myth, to theory"--it does not follow that what is symbolized by the rite necessarily differs

from what is symbolized by myth. New Science of Politics, p. 27. Danielou asserts that in "cosmic religion" the "relationship between God and the cosmos is revealed at the same time in the myth that explains it and in the ritual that makes it work." Yet he considers myth "the normal form, on the level of cosmic religion, of the expression of God's relation to the world." Jean Danielou, God and the Ways of Knowing, trans. Walter Roberts (New York, 1960), pp. 28-29. Eliade, Sacred and Profane, p. 27, finds that "myth sometimes followed the rite" and justified it. Myth as explanation is emphasized by Langer, pp. 142-155, and by Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Garden City, N. Y., n.d.), p. 17. Van der Leeuw emphasizes that myth is "not reflective contemplation" but an effective verbal repetition and celebration of primordial acts, and that it is thus as another form of rite. G. Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and Manifestation, trans. J. E. Turner, 2d ed. 2 vols. (New York, 1963), II, 413. Since Voegelin finds myth more differentiated than rite, presumably ritual for him would typically be the dominant expression of tribal order just as myth is of cosmological order. Yet ritual renewal of order, Voegelin recognizes, is "one of the symbolic elements developed within the cosmological civilizations." Israel and Revelation, p. 299. The point that we make in reference to the foregoing is this: one ought not to emphasize the symbolic form at the expense of the substance of the experience of a reality which constitutes the content or meaning of the symbolism. In both tribal society and archaic empire one finds both ritual and verbal symbols or accounts (myth or legend) associated with the ritual. It is not the cosmic symbolism that distinguishes the archaic empires from the African societies, but the primary emphasis in the former on a divine order and in the latter on a human order; for the ancestors, while of heightened character, are still men in life and human spirits in death. It is significant that the Akan and the Bantu societies lack a concept like the Egyptian Maat (or Hindu Dharma), which signified at once cosmic order and political order. See Frankfort, Ancient Egyptian Religion, pp. 43, 49-58.

[45] Parrinder, pp. 10-12.

[46] See Daryll Forde, ed. African Worlds: Studies in the Cosmological Ideas and Social Values of African Peoples (London, 1954), p. x; Paul Bohannan, Africa and the Africans (Garden City, N. Y., 1964), p. 224.

[47] Parrinder, pp. 24-25.

[48] Edwin W. Smith, ed. African Ideas of God, 2d ed. rev. and ed. E. G. Parrinder (London, 1961), pp. 21-22. While affirming that "the godhead is generally conceived in terms of power" (p. 21), Smith elaborates the other typical characteristics of the African god and cites numerous sources for the prevalent features of African religion. See, especially, pp. 10, 13, 21-22, 27-29, 33. See Albright, p. 171.

[49] Bohannan, p. 222.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 225.

[51] Parrinder, pp. 57-66; Smith, pp. 24-27; Simon and Phoebe Ottenberg, eds. *Cultures and Societies of Africa* (New York, 1960), p. 61.

[52] Smith, p. 24.

[53] B. I. Sharevskaya wrote in a review of the book that Western "scholar henchmen...try now to give such an interpretation to indigenous African cultures as will allow neo-colonialism to attract to its side the young African Intelligentsia and use it in its political aims." *Sovetskaya Etnografiya*, No. 6 (1960), quoted in *Mizan Newsletter: A Review of Soviet Writing on the Middle East and Africa (London)*, III, 7 (July-August 1961), 19.

[54] Placide Tempels, *Bantu Philosophy*, trans. Colin King (Paris, 1959), pp. 41-43, *passim*.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 30.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[57] Diedrich H. Westermann, *The African Today* (London, 1934), p. 181.

[58] Janheinz John, *Muntu*: An Outline of the New African Culture, trans. Marjorie Grene (New York, 1961), pp. 100-101; Parrinder, pp. 20-25; Smith, pp. 16-21.

[59] Tempels, pp. 31-32.

[60] Maurice Culver, "The Bantu Concept of Man," unpublished Ph. D. dissertation (Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J., 1952), p. 17. "Dynamism, then, is the 'weltanschauung' of the Bantu." A. A. Louw, "The Animism of the Bantu: Dynamism as a World View," *Nada* (Salisbury), IV (1926), 57. Parrinder, p. 20, finds the Africans to conceive of "a spiritual universe."

[61] Culver, p. 134.

[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 56.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58, 63.

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[65] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

[66] Van der Leeuw, I, 180, quoted by Culver, p. 79.

[67] Culver, p. 80.

[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 94, 97-98.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 101.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[72] "African religions...tend...to have precise, one-to-one association with a particular form of social group. In this characteristic they are unlike the international religions, which are supple enough to subserve many forms of social structure." Bohannan, p. 222.

[73] The following have been found particularly relevant to this problem: Bohannan, pp. 188-198; T. Olawale Elias, *Government and Politics in Africa*, 2d ed. (Bombay, 1963), Ch. 2; Walter Goldschmidt, "Foreword" to Edgar V. Winans, *Shambala*: The Constitution of a Traditional State (London, 1962); M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, eds. *African Political Systems* (London, 1940); Lucy Mair, *Primitive Government* (Baltimore, 1962); Jacques J. Maquet, "A Research Definition of African Feudality," *Journal of African History*, III, 2 (1962), 307-310; John Middleton and David Tait, eds. *Tribes Without Rulers*: Studies in African Segmentary *Systems* (London, 1958); George Peter Murdock, *Africa*: Its Peoples and their Culture History (New York, 1959), pp. 33-39; Audrey I. Richards, ed. *East African Chiefs* (New York, 1960); Ottenbergs, pp. 46-57; I. Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies* (London, 1956); Jan Vansina, "A Comparison of African Kingdoms," *Africa*, XXXII, 4 (October 1962), 324-334; Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism*: A Comparative Study of Total Power, 2d ed. (New Haven, 1963).

[74] Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, pp. 4, 5. This structural-functional school, which has given primary attention to Africa, is the "orthodox" one in anthropology. David Goddard, "Conceptions of Structure in Levi-Strauss and in British Anthropology," *Social Research*, XXXII, 4 (1965), 408, 410.

[75] Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, p. 5.

[76] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[77] Wittfogel, pp. 238-241. Some political thinkers, following common speech, identify the state with the government. See, for example, Jacques Maritain, *Man and the State* (Chicago, 1951), pp. 1, 9-12,

15-19. Wittfogel, it should be noticed, tends to use the term state often as a synonym for government.

[78] Murdock, pp. 36-37. Wittfogel concluded that what he designates as a "hydraulic society" having an Orientally despotic regime depends for its original formation "on the presence of a hydraulic economy proper as an essential condition." The institutions and methods of this type of state could then spread to non-hydraulic societies. Wittfogel does, however, leave room for the possible independent emergence of the type in non-hydraulic areas. Wittfogel, pp. 192-194, 227. Murdock, although holding that some aspects of African despotism are "reasonably attributable to diffusion from Pharaonic Egypt," finds nevertheless that much of what cannot be accounted for either by diffusion or by irrigation agriculture is like Oriental despotism. He suggests that perhaps "the economic basis for the African despotic state" is "the exploitation of slave labor, which Wittfogel finds surprisingly minimized in his Oriental despotisms but which is enormously developed in many of the most typical African states." Murdock, pp. 36-37. Paul Radin states that among the "aboriginal civilizations" there was nothing "even remotely approaching the absolute and personal despotism which existed at one time or another among the major civilizations of Western Europe, the Mediterranean and Asia." Yet he finds that some "sections of what we customarily designate as aboriginal Africa have been basically transformed by Egyptian, Persian, Greek, Carthaginian, Roman and Arabic-Mohammedan invasions," so that only some parts of South Africa can be excepted from the "many provisos" to terming them aboriginal. Radin, pp. 14, 16, 18. Our concern is not with the problem of historical causality but with what Voegelin calls the "ontological connection" between a political organization and its spiritual substance that allows us to discern "configurations beyond causality." "World Empire and the Unity of Mankind," *International Affairs*, XXXVIII, 2 (April 1962), 171-173. There is consequently no need for us to engage in the inconclusive debate over the reception by African societies of diffusions from the Near East. The literature relevant to this debate is vast and highly speculative. The more important works are: Charles G. Seligman, *Egypt and Negro Africa: A Study in Divine Kingship* (London, 1934); V. Van Bulck, "La place du roi divin dans les cercles culturels d'Afrique noire," in *The Sacral Kingship* (Leiden, 1959), pp. 98-132, and bibliography, pp. 132-134.

[79] Wittfogel, Ch. 5, pp. 137-160. Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*, argues that in Egypt, a state that to Wittfogel is a prime example of Oriental despotism, the people "did not consider their condition as a state of intolerable slavery" but "showed their affection for the institution of kingship by placing it in the center of their entertainment literature" (p. 43). Wittfogel, however, emphasizes "government by intimidation" (p. 137). The question boils down to whether the people in question experience the authorities ruling them as oppressive; namely, as inducing "terror,"

"submission," and "loneliness." Granted that Wittfogel like any Westerner would experience oriental government as restrictive and stifling. They would similarly regard oriental religion as superstition. The important fact for Wittfogel, who misses the compactness of experiences that do not differentiate between the religious and the political orders, is the attachment of the dominant religion to the regime (pp. 87-100). Even when directly confronted with the evidence (p. 138), Wittfogel does not recognize that the divine is experienced in the political authority as an "awe-ful" power to which man's natural and proper response is a kind of fear. All religion, especially when the numinous is experienced as the *tremendum*, involves submission to the holy reality that is revealed. Otto, pp. 12-24; Joachim Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religions*, ed. Joseph M. Kitagawa (New York, 1961), p. 53. Wittfogel overlooks the fact that men who experience their submission as enjoined by the religion that integrates their lives with the true order of reality do not experience, as the modern Westerner would, what he calls "total alienation" (p. 157). Quite the contrary, for it is disobedience that results in "alienation" from the true order of life. It is only for a Westerner, who would deny a transcendent reality and considers his fellow men his equals, that any form of submission should be avoided. Compare the treatment of obedience in Mesopotamia by Wittfogel (p. 138) and by Thorkild Jacobsen ("Mesopotamia," in *Before Philosophy*, pp. 217-223). In Egypt even the Pharaoh lost his individuality (Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*, pp. 32-33, 46-48), so that in effect Wittfogel's criticism is a condemnation of the Egyptian religion--and this despite the fact that he does not consider it in itself but only as if it were a separate entity related only in an external fashion to the Egyptian state.

[80] Henri Frankfort writes of the ancient Egyptians: "None of these people was free...But it must not be forgotten that the reverse of freedom, isolation of the individual with or without 'inalienable rights' was likewise lacking in Egypt." *The Birth of Civilization in the Near East* (Garden City, N. Y., 1950), p. 107. The lack of human freedom as a right with respect to the divine is, of course, a characteristic of all religion. For example, the very term "Islam" means submission to God's will--perhaps a submission given "freely" but not something that one has the right to refuse.

[81] Murdock, p. 37.

[82] Vansina, p. 325.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

[84] *Ibid.*, pp. 332-333. The *incorporative kingdom* is irrelevant here.

[85] *Ibid.*, pp. 331-333.

[86] Goldschmidt, pp. xvi-xvii.

[87] Maquet, pp. 307-309.

[88] E. M. Chilver, "'Feudalism' in the Interlacustrine Kingdoms," in East African Chiefs, p. 391. By benefice, Chilver means here not a fief but office land. Ibid., pp. 379, 391. On the question of feudalism, see Wittfogel, pp. 417-418.

[89] The terms are adapted from Goldschmidt, pp. xxii-xxv.

[90] Namely, those analyzed by Wittfogel.

[91] Wittfogel, p. 418.

[92] Middleton and Tait, pp. 16ff., *passim*.

[93] See the books by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard and by Schapera.

[94] Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, 1961), p. 370.

[95] See also Bohannan, p. 189; Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, p. 5; Mair, *passim*.

[96] Ottenbergs, pp. 49, 51, 53.

[97] *Ibid*., pp. 51, 52.

[98] Murdock, p. 33. Murdock says that the position of headman is often hereditary, and that "nothing remotely approximating the structure of a state is detectable." See Mair, p. 104.

[99] Middleton and Tait, pp. 2-3, 16.

[100] Bohannan, p. 191.

[101] Murdock, p. 36.

[102] Bohannan, pp. 191, 193; see also Murdock, pp. 36ff.; Ottenbergs, pp. 54ff.

[103] Murdock, p. 38.

[104] Elias, p. 18.

[105] Compare the distinction between *dux* and *rex* in Bertrand de Jouvenal, *Sovereignty*: An Inquiry into the *Political Good*, trans. J. F. Huntington (Chicago, 1957), pp. 21, 34, 299-300.

[106] Ottenbergs, p. 54.

[107] Bohannan, p. 191.

[108] Murdock, p. 37.

[109] Mair, p. 66. Three things may make government minimal: few subjects, few governmental positions, little governmental authority. *Ibid*., p. 62.

[110] Middleton and Tait, p. 22; see also Parrinder, p. 71.

[111] Elias, p. 14.

[112] Daryll Forde, ed. *African Worlds*, p. vii.

[113] Smith, p. 7; see also Parrinder, pp. 40-41; Susan Feldman, ed. *African Myths and Tales* (New York, 1963), pp. 23, 35-48.

[114] Smith, p. 27.

[115] Parrinder, p. 43.

[116] Mair, p. 128.

[117] Ottenbergs, p. 63.

[118] Parrinder, pp. 57-58.

[119] Bohannan, p. 222.

[120] Forde,pp. xvi-xvii.

[121] Ottenbergs, p. 62.

[122] Forde, p. xvi.

[123] Parrinder, p. 67.

[124] Mair, pp. 216, 218, 247; Parrinder, p. 78.

[125] See Parrinder, pp. 72-74. Human sacrifice at royal funerals

provided the kingly ancestors with retinues necessary to the continuation of their royal function. *Ibid.*, p. 76; Murdock, p. 39.

[126] Murdock, p. 39. Compare the early English kings, who claimed "descent from Wodin" as "a supernatural sanction," and the Witan, which had "the right of election and deposition" but "could only exercise their right within the limits of the royal family." John Neville Figgis, *The Divine Right of Kings*, 2d ed. (New York, 1965), pp. 18, 20.

[127] Schapera, pp. 51-52.

[128] Mair, pp. 217, 220.

[129] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

[130] Parrinder, pp. 78, 143.

[131] Mair, p. 220.

[132] Murdock, p. 37.

[133] The king could be destooled--that is, dismissed from office--by breaking a taboo and thus separating him from the grounds of his sanctity. Parrinder, p. 78.

[134] Murdock, p. 38.

[135] Parrinder, p. 31; Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, Ch. II.

[136] Smith, p. 28; Parrinder, pp. 36-37, 40.

[137] Murdock, p. 37.

[138] Tempels, p. 42.

[139] Figgis, pp. 17, 36.

[140] Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*; Frankfort, *Kingship and the Gods*; John A. Wilson, "Egypt," in *Before Philosophy*, Ch. III, esp. p. 73.

[141] Jacobsen, pp. 203-208.

[142] Voegelin, *New Science of Politics*, pp. 56-58; Albright, p. 12.

[143] Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, 4th ed. (New York, 1964), pp. 455-456; Sources of Chinese Tradition, I, Ch. VII; Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, pp. 62-63.

[144] Victor W. von Hagen, Realm of the Incas (New York, 1957), pp. 123, 131, 214.

[145] Eliade, Cosmos and History, pp. 31-32; Brown, p. 15.

[146] Brown, pp. 18-21.

[147] Latourette, pp. 536-540.

[148] Frankfort, Kingship and the Gods, pp. 32-34.

[149] Frankfort, The Birth of Civilization, p. 50; Hagen, World of the Maya (New York, 1960), pp. 45-46.

[150] Brown, pp. 21-22, 169.

[151] Lowie, Primitive Society, p. 359; Lowie, Primitive Religion, p. 351; Kaj Birket-Smith, Primitive Man and His Ways, trans. Roy Duffell (New York, 1963), pp. 26, 48.

[152] Lowie, Primitive Religion, pp. 78, 81, 84; Radin, p. 50; Frobenius, p. 381.

[153] Lowie, Primitive Religion, p. 76; see also Birket-Smith, pp. 189, 192; Marshall D. Sahlins, "Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia," Comparative Studies in Society and History, V, 3 (April 1963), pp. 287-288, 295.

[154] Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, p. 31.

[155] Lowie, Primitive Society, p. 367. Sahlins points out that the Melanesian leaders are precisely "leaders," for they do not enter into or hold institutionalized positions of authority (offices) but establish personal power by creating a followership (pp. 289-290).

[156] Lowie, Primitive Society, pp. 383-387; Birket-Smith, pp. 61-67.

[157] Edmund R. Leach, Political Systems of Highland Burma (Boston, 1965), pp. 113, 127, 129, 172-176.

[158] Robert C. Bone Jr., Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York, 1962), pp. 10-11.

[159] Robbins Burling, *Hill Farms and Padi Fields: Life in Mainland Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), p. 68.

[160] Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Urbana, Ill., 1960), p. 232. See also Robert Heine-Geldern, "Conceptions of State and Kingship in South East Asia," *Far Eastern Affairs*, II, 1 (November 1942).

[161] Eliade, *Sacred and Profane*, p. 169.

[162] See *Ibid.*, Ch. I.

[163] *Ibid.*, p. 37.

[164] And thus different than "the divine sanction of the accepted way of life" in archaic societies like Egypt. Frankfort, *Ancient Egyptian Religion*, p. 82.

[165] Durkheim, pp. 115-116.

[166] *Ibid.*, p. 265.

[167] Society is the basis of religion. *Ibid.*, pp. 466-467. The tribal God is a pre-eminent ancestral spirit. *Ibid.*, p. 332.

[168] *Ibid.*, p. 179.

[169] *Ibid.*, p. 166.

[170] *Ibid.*, p. 229.

[171] *Ibid.*, pp. 221-223; see Albright, p. 169.

[172] Compare Sahlins, p. 295: "In the Polynesian view, a chiefly personage was in the nature of things powerful. But this merely implies the objective observation that his power was of the group rather than of himself." Sahlins apparently disregards his own observation that Polynesian chiefs inherited *mana* by divine descent, and this *mana* was power. *Ibid.*

[173] Durkheim, pp. 238-239, 244, 408.

[174] *Ibid.*, p. 409.

[175] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

[176] Meyer Fortes, "Some Reflections on Ancestor Worship in Africa," in *African Systems of Thought* (London, 1965), pp. 123, 130, 133.

[177] *Ibid*., p. 139.

PART TWO

IMPERIAL RULE: THE DUAL MANDATE

CHAPTER IV: THE GOLD COAST

[1] Klaus E. Knorr, *British Colonial Theories, 1570-1850* (Toronto, 1944), pp. 155, 246, 248. "The development of the notion of Britain's supreme mission to civilize the world by means of her far-flung Empire... made rapid headway at a time when many of the economic arguments in favour of colonization and colonies were being torn to shreds by the economists." *Ibid*., p. 246.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 381, citing E. C. Moore, *The Spread of Christianity in the Modern World* (Chicago, 1919), p. 19.

[3] Knorr, p. 376.

[4] Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, with Alice Denny, *Africa and the Victorians: The Climax of Imperialism in the Dark Continent* (New York, 1961), p. 27.

[5] Knorr, p. 408 n. Knorr notes that the Evangelicals "curiously" directed their "charitable sentiment" to "the negro slave, the heathen, and the aborigine," meanwhile showing little concern for the downtrodden sections of the British population. *Ibid*., p. 376 n.

[6] *Hansard*, 3d ser., LX, col. 619, February 16, 1842.

[7] Robinson and Gallagher, p. 3.

[8] Earl Grey, *The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration*, 2 vols. (London, 1853), I, 13.

[9] David Laurie, *Hints Regarding the East India Monopoly* (Glasgow, 1813), pp. 5, 51.

[10] Robinson and Gallagher, p. 2.

[11] *Hansard*, 3d ser., XIX, col. 515. For the dominance of pride of empire in the imperialists' motives, see Goldwin Smith, *The Empire:*

A Series of Letters published in *The Daily News*, 1862-63 (Oxford, 1863), pp. viii-ix, 74, *passim*.

[12] Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, I, 1, 21-24; VI, 35-47, esp. 36.

[13] R. M. Martin, *Colonial Policy of the British Empire* (London, 1837), pp. 80-81, quoted by Knorr, p. 366.

[14] See Gladstone's statement in 1855 quoted by Paul Knapland, *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy* (New York, 1927), pp. 202-203; Archibald Alison, *Essays, Political, Historical, and Miscellaneous* (Edinburgh, 1850), I, 304-305.

[15] Robinson and Gallagher, p. 2.

[16] Knorr, p. 367.

[17] Grey, I, 15-16.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[19] Robinson and Gallagher, p. 27.

[20] Knorr, p. 378.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 382-384.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 386.

[23] *Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes*, ed. Aborigines Protection Society (London, 1837), p. 117. The Aborigines Protection Society, founded in 1836, was soon "an exceedingly influential pressure group." Knorr, p. 383.

[24] W. E. F. Ward, *A History of Ghana*, 2d ed. (New York, 1963), p. 175.

[25] Robinson and Gallagher, p. 26; W. Walton Claridge, *A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti*, 2d ed., 2 vols (London, 1964), I, 331.

[26] Ward, pp. 189-193.

[27] Claridge, I, 416.

[28] Ward, p. 191; see also Claridge, I, 405-425.

[29] Ward, p. 192.

[30] Claridge, I, 414.

[31] Ibid., pp. 424-425; see G. E. Metcalfe, *Maclean of the Gold Coast: The Life and Times of George Maclean, 1801-1847* (London, 1962), pp. 118-123, *passim*.

[32] Brodie Cruickshank, *Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa, Including an Account of the Native Tribes, and their Intercourse with Europeans*, reprint ed., 2 vols. (London, 1966), I, 172; Claridge, I, 407. For a contrary view, see Metcalfe, pp. ix, 119.

[33] Claridge, I, 464.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 464-473.

[35] John Mensah Sarbah, *Fanti National Constitution* (London, 1906), p. 81.

[36] The Bond is printed in full in Ward, p. 194; Claridge, I, 452-453; Joseph E. Casely Hayford, *Gold Coast Native Institutions* (London, 1903), app. D5.

[37] Dispatch of 16 Dec. 1843 from Stanley to Hill, cited by David Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana*: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928 (Oxford, 1963), p. 194; reprinted in G. E. Metcalfe, ed. *Great Britain and Ghana*: Documents of Ghana History, 1807-1957 (London, 1964), pp. 192-194.

[38] Ward, pp. 193-194; see Report of the Select Committee on West Africa, in *Great Britain and Ghana*, pp. 179-183.

[39] Kimble, p. 194 n.

[40] W. Branford Griffith, *A Note on the History of the British Courts* in the Gold Coast Colony (Accra, 1886), quoted in *ibid*., p. 195.

[41] Claridge, I, 536.

[42] Kimble, p. 457.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 302; Ward, p. 262.

[44] Ward, pp. 262-263; Kimble, pp. 302-303. The royal proclamation defining the Crown's powers is printed in Sarbah, *Fanti Customary Laws*, 2d ed. (London, 1904), pp. 293-295. Other relevant documents are found in *Great Britain and Ghana*, pp. 361-371.

[45] Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws, pp. 288-292; Great Britain and Ghana, pp. 369-370.

[46] Lord Frederick D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 5th ed. (London, 1965), p. 36 n. 3.

[47] Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, 2 vols., reprint ed. (London, 1965), I, 798.

[48] Copies of the Gold Coast Order in Council, 1901, and of the Ashanti and Northern Territories orders in council of the same year are printed in Sarbah, Fanti National Constitution, pp. 170-182, from which this and the following quotations are taken. They are also found in Great Britain and Ghana, pp. 521-525.

[49] Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. anon., rev. and ed. Charles Frankel (New York, 1957), p. 9. According to Rousseau, "all justifiable authority among men must be established on the basis of conventions." The sovereign authority is established by and expressive of the "general will," which "is always right and tends always to the public advantage" and is therefore distinguished from actual wills, the "will of all," that often err. Ibid., pp. 16-17, 23, 26.

[50] Claridge, I, x.

[51] Ibid., pp. x, xiii.

[52] Ibid., p. x.

[53] Ibid., p. viii.

[54] Ibid., p. ix.

[55] Ibid., p. viii.

[56] Ibid., p. xi.

[57] Richard Austin Freeman, Travels and Life in Ashanti and Jaman (Westminster, 1898), p. 471.

[58] Ibid., pp. 454-460.

[59] Ibid., pp. 471-476.

[60] Ibid., pp. 476-491.

[61] Edwin W. Smith, *The Golden Stool*: Some Aspects of the Conflict of Culture in Modern Africa (London, 1926), pp. 72-73. Dr. Smith is credited by two of the major contemporary anthropological researchers in Central Africa with founding modern anthropological research in that area during the first quarter of this century. Elizabeth Colson and Max Gluckman, eds. *Seven Tribes of British Central Africa* (London, 1959), p. ix.

[62] Kofi Antubam, *Ghana's Heritage of Culture* (Leipzig, 1963), pp. 78-79; see also E. Goeffrey Parrinder, *West African Psychology*: A Comparative Study of Psychological and Religious Thought (London, 1951), p. 28: "The best people have a white aura, and are full of light."

[63] Metcalfe, *Maclean*, p. 238 n.

[64] Gustav Jahoda, *White Man*: A Study of the Attitudes of Africans to Europeans in Ghana before Independence (London, 1961), pp. 77, 111.

[65] Robert S. Rattray, *Religion and Art in Ashanti* (London, 1927), from which the following quotations are taken.

[66] Magnus J. Sampson, *Gold Coast Men of Affairs (Past and Present)* (London, 1937), pp. 160, 212.

[67] "The Negro in Ancient History," *Methodist Quarterly Review* (January 1869), pp. 72-93; see Hollis R. Lynch, *Edward Wilmot Blyden*: Pan-Negro Patriot, 1832-1912 (New York, 1967).

[68] Kimble, pp. 84-85 n., 96 n., 341, 431.

[69] Sarbah, *Fanti National Constitution*, pp. vii-viii.

[70] *Ibid*., p. 74.

[71] *Ibid*., p. 92.

[72] *Ibid*., p. 91.

[73] *Ibid*., p. 108.

[74] *Ibid*., p. 109. Sarbah provides copies of these treaties and other relevant official documents in *ibid*., pp. 153-224.

[75] *Ibid*., p. 122.

[76] *Ibid*., p. 81.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 112. The orders in Council are printed in *ibid.*, pp. 170–177.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 226.

[80] *Ibid.*, p. 120. "With Great Britain is linked the destiny of the Akan nation as a whole." *Ibid.*, p. 254.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

[82] See n. 46, above, in this chapter.

[83] Sarbah, *Fanti National Constitution*, p. 250.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 234.

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 230. "Were the gradation of authority, which is universal in African communities, properly recognized,...civilization would, perhaps, make great strides,...and progress become better and more rapid." *Ibid.*, pp. 235–236.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 250.

[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 237–238.

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[91] *Ibid.*, p. 231.

[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 232–233.

[93] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[94] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 255; see pp. 240–241 also.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 127, citing agreement with a passage to this effect from Mary Kingsley.

[97] Sampson, p. 164.

[98] B. Wasserman, "The Ashanti War of 1900: A Study in Cultural Conflict," Africa, XXXI, 2 (1961), pp. 169-172.

[99] Rattray, Ashanti (Oxford, 1923), p. 216.

[100] Ward, p. 304 n. 31. This was a trifle to the Ashanti compared to a loss of the Golden Stool. Rattray, Ashanti, p. 291.

[101] Casely Hayford, p. 4.

[102] Ibid., pp. 217-218; Casely Hayford, The Truth about the West African Land Question (London, 1913), p. 8.

[103] Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions, pp. 232, 239, 241, 259.

[104] Casely Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race Emancipation (London, 1911), p. 215; The Truth, p. 11, passim; Casely Hayford, United West Africa (London, 1919), passim.

[105] Dennis Austin, "The Working Committee of the United Gold Coast Convention," Journal of African History, II, 2 (1961), 279. Austin's article is based on the unpublished Minute Book of the Working Committee.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid., pp. 273-275, 279-280; Ronald Segal, Political Africa: A Who's Who of Personalities and Parties (New York, 1961), p. 65; George Padmore, The Gold Coast Revolution: The Struggle of an African People from Slavery to Freedom (London, 1953), p. 57.

[108] Joseph B. Danquah, Liberty of the Subject (Kibi, Gold Coast, n.d.), quoted by Padmore, pp. 57-58; see also The Doyen Speaks: Some Historical Speeches by Dr. J. B. Danquah (Accra, 1957).

[109] Austin, p. 273.

[110] Ibid., p. 276; Segal, p. 65.

[111] Padmore, pp. 40, 61.

[112] Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1950 (London, 1964), p. 53. The JPC allotted seven of its nine seats to chiefs, the other two going to Danquah and Rev. C. Baeta. Ibid., p. 51.

[113] Austin, "The Working Committee...," p. 280.

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 281, from Minute Book, entry for December 28, 1947. See also Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, pp. 54-55.

[115] Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, p. 73; Austin, "The Working Committee...," p. 281; Bankole Timothy, *Kwame Nkrumah*: His Rise to Power, 2d ed. (London, 1963), pp. 45-48, and Ch. XIII, "Nkrumah the Orator," pp. 124-151.

[116] Austin, "The Working Committee...," pp. 286-287.

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

[118] The deep roots of this development were: "(a) the dynamism of the Idea of Progress, the processes of commercialism and industrialism, and other distinguishing attributes (that is, individualism, rationalism, and secularism) of that historical cluster of phenomena known as 'Westernism'; and (b) the confusions, frustrations, and bitterness produced by the 'Western impact'." James S. Coleman, "Current Political Movements in Africa," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 298 (March 1955), 95-96. See Lord William M. Hailey, *An African Survey*, rev. ed (London, 1957), p. 257; David E. Apter, *Ghana in Transition*, rev. ed. (New York, 1963), p. 158.

[119] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Road to Independence*: Ghana and the Ivory Coast (Paris, 1964), p. 23.

[120] *Ibid.*, p. 9. See Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, pp. 22-26; Apter, pp. 119-158. Rattray, *Ashanti Law and Constitution* (London, 1929), p. ix, warned that indirect rule would destroy the foundation of traditional authority, leaving only the "shell and outward form" but not "its vital energy."

[121] Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, pp. 13-17, 27.

[122] The sociology of the "colonial situation" is developed in Georges Balandier, *Sociologie Actuelle de l'Afrique Noire* (Paris, 1963); see also Wallerstein, ed. *Social Change*: The Colonial Situation (New York, 1966).

[123] Wallerstein, *Road to Independence*, pp. 85-134. "Colonial administration is not a thin veneer over a traditional base. It is a framework within which new social relations are forged, a framework in which the relations of African and European, of African and African, are radically changed." *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[124] Austin, *Politics in Ghana*, p. 27.

[125] Attempts to renew the alliance between them foundered. Austin, "The Working Committee...," p. 288.

[126] More than 65,000 of the less than four million Gold Coast Africans experienced military service during the war. Moreover, American and British servicemen stationed at airbases in the Gold Coast had a considerable influence. J. D. Fage, Ghana: A Historical Interpretation (Madison, Wis., 1959), pp. 82, 114 n. 64.

[127] These modernized elements are listed in Padmore, p. 67; Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 55. Although modernized and often antitraditional and urban, these are best not called "detribalized."

[128] Austin, "The Working Committee...," p. 273.

[129] Austin, Politics in Ghana, p. 27.

[130] Great Britain Colonial Office No. 231, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948 (London, 1948), pp. 7-9, which also lists the other grievances, including the slowness in providing governmental experience to Africans, fear of losing tribal lands, resentment over alien dominance in some fields of trade, and a housing shortage. In connection with the latter, Nkrumah's followers were known as "Veranda Boys," in reference to where many of them slept in the towns. The above cited report is generally known as the Watson Report.

[131] Joseph G. Amamoo, The New Ghana: The Birth of the Nation (London, 1958), p. 13. The flames were also fanned by Nkrumah through the newspaper he established in September, 1948, called the Accra Evening News.

[132] Austin, "The Working Committee...," pp. 291, 294, 296; Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Edinburgh, 1957), pp. 100, 106-107; Timothy, p. 56.

[133] Henry L. Bretton, The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa (New York, 1966), p. 13.

[134] Watson Report, passim; Nkrumah, Ch. 7.

[135] Nkrumah, p. 202.

[136] Ibid., p. viii.

[137] Bretton, pp. 188-189 n. 5. What this last governor has written confirms this view of the British; see Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, "Eight Years of Transition in Ghana," African Affairs, LVII, 226 (1958), 29-37; "Gold Coast into Ghana: Some Problems of Transition," International Affairs, XXXIV, 1 (1958), 49-56.

[138] See F. M. Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence, 1919-1957, rev. ed. (Stanford, Calif., 1960), pp. 187-196.

[139] Ibid., Ch. IV, pp. 36-52; R. E. Wraith, Guggisberg (London, 1967), Ch. 8, pp. 189-214; Apter, Ch. 6, pp. 119-130. The policy of indirect rule, as it was in Tanganyika, is treated in the next chapter. Guggisberg's successors were much influenced by Governor Cameron's policy of indirect rule in Tanganyika, but the policy had existed before Lugard and Cameron described and defended it. Wraith, p. 265.

[140] Bourret, pp. 27-35; Wraith, Chs. 5-6, pp. 98-159.

[141] Bourret, p. 48.

[142] Wraith, p. 161.

[143] Bourret, p. 36.

CHAPTER V: TANGANYIKA

THE GERMAN REGIME

[1] Karl Peters, Gründung von Deutsch Ostafrika (Berlin, 1906), pp. 2-4; in the Foreword, Peters refers to vitriolic and unfair criticism of his East African activities, and states that his purpose is to document his deeds for posterity to judge as well as to contribute to an understanding of Bismarck's overseas policies. "In Germany...the colonial interest which awoke by-and-by was mostly concentrated on the East African possession." Dr. H. Brode, British and German East Africa: Their Economic and Commercial Relations (London, 1911), p. 157. Mary Evelyn Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, 1871-1885 (New York, 1921), p. 13, writes: "the intense nationalism...engendered by the wars of unification found a natural outlet in enthusiasm for expansion. Now that Germany had become a nation, she, like the other great states of Western Europe, must express her self-consciousness in the extension of her nationalism to a colonial empire."

[2] Peters, pp. 30, 32, 39. A prominent theme of Peters' writings is his regard for England as both a rival and model in colonial affairs. He claims that the GCS was modeled after English "adventurers societies" in the time of Elizabeth. Ibid., p. 39. He writes that in 1884 England was doubtful of German colonial endeavors, but that within three years England was convinced of German efficiency. Peters, Deutsch-national: kolonialpolitische Aufsätze (Berlin, 1887), pp. 108-110. The anti-British emphasis in Bismarck's colonial policy is considered below, but see Peters, Gründung, p. 101.

[3] Peters, *Gründung*, pp. 55-78; G. S. P. Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere, 1884-1898," in *History of East Africa*, 2 vols., Vol. I ed. Roland A. Oliver and Gervase Mathew (Oxford, 1963), pp. 435-436; W. O. Henderson, "German East Africa, 1884-1890," in *History of East Africa*, Vol. II ed. Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver (London, 1965), pp. 123-132. On the GEAC, see Dr. Bruno Kurtze, *Die Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft* (Jena, 1913); treaties with the African chiefs are printed in Peters, *Das Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Schutzgebiet* (Munich, 1895), pp. 420-423; *Gründung*, pp. 77-78; Kurtze, pp. 178-187.

[4] Peters, *Gründung*, pp. 43-44, 179, 251; Peters, *Das...Schutzgebiet*, p. 40.

[5] Peters, *New Light on Dark Africa*, trans. H. W. Dulcken (London, 1891), pp. 527, 530-531.

[6] Peters, *Gründung*, pp. 47-49, 55, 69-78.

[7] Peters, *Das...Schutzgebiet*, p. 2.

[8] Peters, *New Light*, pp. 192-193; *Gründung*, p. 250. An expression of this spirit in Germany at the approach of the twentieth century is seen in Thomas Mann, *Dr. Faustus*, trans. H. T. Lowe-Porter (New York, 1948), p. 301: "We were bursting with the consciousness that this was Germany's century...it was our turn to put our stamp on the world and be its leader;...that now, at the end of the bourgeois epoch begun some hundred and twenty years before, the world was to renew itself in our sign."

[9] Peters, *New Light*, p. 479.

[10] Peters, *Gründung*, pp. 179, 250.

[11] Peters, *Das...Schutzgebiet*, pp. 40-41, 403.

[12] Peters, *Gründung*, pp. 61, 228.

[13] Peters, *Das Schutzgebiet*, p. 39. Later examples are a professor's geographical study and the Reichstag vice-president's economic study: Dr. Hans Meyer, *Das Deutsche Kolonialreich*: Eine Länderkunde der deutschen Schutzgebiete (Leipzig, 1909), pp. 182, 292; Dr. Hermann Paasche, *Deutsch-Ostafrika*: Wirtschaftliche Studien (Berlin, 1906), *passim*. Meyer depreciates African culture and asserts that the Africans are interested in nothing but material advantages (p. 75); he claims that Germany performed a great humanitarian work by taking territory in East Africa, and he praises Peters (p. 79). Paasche emphasizes the value of East Africa to Germany,

saying of the benefits to Africans only that the GEAC bought their land and that "the needs of the present-day Negro population and of those coming after are carefully being taken into consideration." (p. 426).

[14] Peters, New Light, pp. 478, 480. In a strange passage that appears to contradict the statements already cited, Peters indicates a hint of a divine mandate for his work: "Thus life here gains in mental depth and purity of aspiration... In the throes of the grasping strife and struggles of civilization the mind longs for the grand impressions and feelings of the wilderness, where the Creator Himself appears to come nearer to us in His works, and eternity seems to speak to us in its own mighty language." Ibid., p. 507. The emphasis on feeling may be attributed to the influence on him of Schopenhauer. Ibid., pp. 489, 550; Peters, Gründung, p. 12. Peters notes without comment that he got German Benedictines to found a mission. Ibid., p. 154.

[15] Peters, Gründung, p. 211.

[16] In 1896 Peters was found guilty by a disciplinary court of hanging an African servant for petty theft when he was Reich Commissioner in the Kilimanjaro region in 1891-92, of several derelictions of duty, and of unworthy conduct for one in his position. Henderson, p. 146. However, after Peters, Gründung, and others defended his deeds, the Kaiser restored his title in 1907 and his pension in 1914.

[17] Townsend, p. 86, says that Hübbe-Schleiden and Fabri were the major propagandists of the colonial movement. She writes, p. 90, of the former: "Hübbe-Schleiden emphasized the fact that it was Germany's duty to expand and preserve her Kultur not only for her own sake, but to advance the cause of world civilization." He thought that the spread of German Kultur in Africa would mean progress for all Negroes. "Unfortunately, we gain the impression that this would be true only if Africa proved 'good business;' if not, the negro was incapable of culture." This idea, while more pronounced, certainly seems to accord with Peters' position. Fabri, who is treated presently, holds essentially the same idea. See also Townsend, The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire, 1884-1918 (New York, 1930), pp. 78-81.

[18] Peters, Gründung, pp. 57, 92-93. Scholars do not agree on the apparent change of Bismarck's policy. Freeman-Grenville, p. 431, calls it an abrupt reversal. Henderson, p. 125, attributes the change to new circumstances, stressing economic considerations. John Flint, "The Wider Background to Partition and Colonial Occupation," in History of East Africa, I, 364-366 n., emphasizes rivalry with Britain as the primary motive; but he finds Bismarck generally neglectful of German colonial territories later. Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, p.

195, argues that "when the Chancellor appeared to oppose colonialism he was merely applying the brakes as a diplomatic stratagem, . . . and that he gave his whole-hearted, if secret, support to the movement from 1879 onwards." More recent scholarship indicates that Bismarck did not decide on a colonial policy until 1884. See Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., "Bismarck's Imperialist Venture: Anti-British in Origin?" in Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, ed. Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (New Haven, 1967), pp. 47-82.

[19] Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, p. 180, citing Kurt Herrfurth, "Bismarck als Kolonialpolitiker," Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik, 1909, p. 736.

[20] Peters, Gründung, p. 113.

[21] An English translation of the Imperial Charter is given in Reginald Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890: The Slave Trade and the Scramble (London, 1939), p. 405. British royal charters imposed obligations. Freeman-Grenville, p. 436. Yet Bismarck had asserted in June 1884 in the Reichstag that he would "follow the example of England in granting to these merchants something like Royal Charters." Ludwig Hahn, Fürst Bismarck, 5 vols. (Berlin, 1878-91), V, 24.

[22] It should be noted here that in 1884-85 Bismarck waged an intensive campaign to arouse public enthusiasm for colonies based on national pride and anti-British sentiment. See Townsend, Origins of Modern German Colonialism, Ch. VIII, "National Inauguration of Colonialism," especially pp. 182-193.

[23] Friedrich Fabri, Deutsch-Ostafrika: Eine colonialpolitische Skizze (Cologne, 1886), p. 19. "Where semi-barbaric civilizations exist, the annexation of their lands by a great, strong power is an act of humanity." Fabri, Bedarf Deutschland der Kolonien? (Gotha, 1879), p. 57. Fabri was Inspector of the Rhine Mission for 27 years; honorary professor at the University of Bonn; and founder in 1880 at Dusseldorf of the West Deutsch Verein für Kolonisation und Export. He was known as "the father of German colonisation." Evans Lewin, The Germans and Africa: Their Aims on the Dark Continent and How they Acquired their African Colonies (London, 1915), p. 31.

[24] Fabri, Deutsch-Ostafrika, pp. 28-31.

[25] Freeman-Grenville, p. 436. O. F. Raum, "German East Africa: Changes in African Life under German Administration, 1892-1914," in History of East Africa, II, p. 171, however, writes: "With regard to the treaties ceding sovereignty to the Gesellschaft für Deutsche Colonisation it would be underestimating the intelligence of the chiefs to suggest that they did not know what their purpose was. Tributary dependence, after

all, was a recognized political relationship in East Africa. Chiefs may not have been acquainted with the technicalities of concluding treaties of this nature, but they knew the importance of documents." It is sufficient to indicate that the chiefs' purpose was not the German purpose, and that the latter did not envision a tributary arrangement.

[26] Fabri, Deutsch-Ostafrika, p. 30.

[27] Peters, Gründung, pp. 78, 113. Numerous treaties were in fact signed, many with Africans who had little position of authority. Freeman-Grenville, pp. 436-437; J. P. Moffett, ed. Handbook of Tanganyika, 2d ed. (Dar es Salaam, 1958), pp. 51-52.

[28] Fabri, Deutsch-Ostafrika, p. 19.

[29] R. M. Bell, "The Maji-Maji Rebellion in the Liwale District," Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 28 (January 1950), pp. 38, 40.

[30] Freeman-Grenville, pp. 439-440; Henderson, pp. 129-132. The Reich-GEAC Agreement is printed in Kurtze, pp. 193-196.

[31] Freeman-Grenville, pp. 441-442; Henderson, pp. 134-135.

[32] Henderson, pp. 132-133.

[33] Ibid., p. 135.

[34] Fritz F. Müller, Deutschland--Zanzibar--Ostafrika (Berlin, 1959), pp. 765-767. In 1913 there were 21 districts and a German administrative staff of 79 men. Moffett, p. 78.

[35] Freeman-Grenville, p. 448.

[36] Henderson, p. 137. The major studies of the Rebellion, besides that of Bell cited in n. 29 above, are: Margaret Bates, "The Maji-Maji Rebellion" (unpublished paper, 1955, copy in Boston University African Center); Gustav Adolf Graf von Götzen, Deutsch-Ostafrika im Aufstand, 1905-06 (Berlin, 1909); John Iliffe, "The Effects of the Maji Maji Rebellion of 1905-1906 on German Occupation Policy in East Africa," in Britain and Germany in Africa, pp. 557-576. Most of Bell's material was obtained from African participants in the Rebellion.

[37] Götzen, p. 47.

[38] Bell, pp. 38-39. This is Moffett's opinion also (p. 71). Moffett, p. 72, quotes the Bishop of Zanzibar, Monseigneur de Courmont, as having earlier said that the Germans were always "unfurling their flag, talking of

their judges, *their* governors, *their* taxes, and *their* regulations. The population, being taken by surprise, supports them, but little by little discontent increases, spreads, and balzes up."

[39] Bell, pp. 53–56.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 56. Iliffe, basing his recent research on records of the German East African Government in Dar es Salaam and of the German Colonial Office in Potsdam, points to Götzen's cotton scheme as the cause. In this "revolutionary departure from the traditional subsistence farming of peasant families," the cotton was "grown by the forced communal labor of neighborhood units." This scheme covered the southern coast and inland, with some 5,000 acres in Kilwa district under cotton. Iliffe emphasizes that the rebellion started at the time to pick cotton approached, that it began in the hinterland of Kilwa and spread through the south and east of the country, and that therefore it was "coincident and coterminous" with the cotton scheme. He concludes that the scheme is thus "the only factor which satisfactorily explains the particularity of the rebellion." Iliffe, pp. 560–561.

[42] Henderson, p. 138. Brode, p. 82, citing rebellions also in British East Africa, wrote: "It cannot be expected that native tribes should accept without reluctance the blessings of civilization for which they have to sacrifice many of their inherited customs and liberties."

[43] Bell, p. 41.

[44] Raum, pp. 180–182. Raum, p. 174, also observes that pacification had led to increasing recourse to magic in place of more sanguinary methods in intra-tribal struggles.

[45] Henderson, p. 138 n.; Bell, p. 40.

[46] Henderson, p. 141; Moffett, p. 75.

[47] Henderson, p. 138; Bell, p. 38. Gerald F. Sayers, ed. *The Handbook of Tanganyika* (London, 1930), p. 74, explains that the idea prevailed that the power of the water would be lost if they looked back.

[48] Bell, p. 49; see also pp. 41–43, 48, 55. *Askari* is the Swahili word for soldier.

[49] Sayers, p. 75.

[50] Götzen, pp. 233–234.

[51] Bell, pp. 38-39.

[52] Henderson, pp. 140-141.

[53] Sir Charles Dundas, *African Crossroads* (London, 1955), p. 240. Dundas was Secretary for Native Affairs for Tanganyika from 1925-1928. Prior to that he was District Commissioner in charge of the Chagga tribe, on whom he wrote a major study.

[54] Julius Nyerere, "Foreword" to Kathleen M. Stahl, *Tanganyika: Sail in the Wilderness* (The Hague, 1961), pp. 6-7.

[55] Townsend, *Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire*, pp. 246-247. See *ibid.*, pp. 246-264, for an analysis of this policy; Iliffe, p. 567. Colonial policy was a leading issue at the Reichstag general election of January 1907. The (Catholic) Centre Party...joined the Socialists in criticising colonial scandals....The paradoxical result of this election was that (to a great extent) the colonial policy advocated by the opposition was the one subsequently followed by the Government." Henderson, p. 146.

[56] Bernhard Dernberg, *Zielpunkte des Deutschen Kolonialwessens* (Berlin, 1907), p. 9.

[57] Dernberg wanted "to equalize as far as it was possible the opportunities for whites and blacks; to protect the blacks in the possession of their own land and in their position as hired laborers on the estates of the white planters; and finally to extend to them the measures of self-government" that had begun before his tenure of office. Townsend, *Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire*, p. 274. See ibid., pp. 273-301; Henderson, p. 147; Moffett, p. 77.

[58] Henderson, pp. 147-148.

[59] Townsend, *Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire*, pp. 281, 286-288.

[60] *Ibid.*, pp. 291, 298.

[61] Henderson, pp. 147-148; moffett, p. 77. One German writer refers to ex-President Theodore Roosevelt's speech in Nairobi in 1909 and records with approval Roosevelt's idea "that, by raising the black man, who is incompetent to better himself, the colonizer fulfils a demand of righteousness, and in the meantime serves his ultimate self-interest." Brode, p. 74. German Governors, "even the Secretary and Under-Secretary of the German Colonial Office went to British East Africa to collect information there." *Ibid.*, p. 156. Dernberg's policies are seen almost as a prelude to F. D. Lugard's "dual mandate." Dernberg spent two months in East Africa in 1907. Iliffe, pp. 567-568.

[62] *Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstages*, 1912–1913, vol. 285, pp. 1560–1561, quoted by Townsend, *Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire*, p. 275. See also Iliffe, p. 573 and n.

[63] Henderson, p. 149. The result was the emergence of a labor black market. Critics alleged that the strict labor policy "encouraged the rise of a new 'slave trade'." *Ibid.*, pp. 149–150.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 148, 151–153.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 151; Raymond L. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 2 vols. reprint ed. (London, 1964), I, 478; Moffett, p. 81; George Hornsby, "German Educational Achievement in East Africa," *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, No. 62 (March 1964); Stokes Foundation, *Education in East Africa*, ed. J. Jones (New York, 1925), p. 178.

[66] Freeman-Grenville, p. 430.

[67] Brode, p. 74.

[68] Peters, *Gründung*, p. 154; Freeman-Grenville, p. 451; Brode, p. 75.

[69] Raum, pp. 199–200. "Planters vacillated between vociferously demanding that Africans be trained for work on European farms and complaining that the 'educated native' was useless there." *Ibid.*, p. 204.

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 202. For the African identification of the missionaries with the colonial order, see *ibid.*, p. 198.

[71] *Ibid.*, pp. 202–203.

THE BRITISH REGIME

[1] Major treatments of the campaign in East Africa are: J. H. V. Crowe, *General Smuts' Campaign in East Africa* (London, 1918); C. P. Fendall, *The East African Force, 1915–1919* (London, 1921); P. E. von Lettow-Vorbeck, *East African Campaigns* (New York, 1957); Lettow-Vorbeck, *My Reminiscences of East Africa* (London, 1920); Leonard Mosely, *Duel for Kilimanjaro* (New York, 1963); Heinrich Schnee, *Deutsch-Ostafrika im Weltkriege* (Leipzig, 1920); Gerald F. Sayers, ed. *The Handbook of Tanganyika*, 2d ed. (London, 1930), pp. 79–91; Sir Charles Dundas, *African Crossroads* (London, 1955).

[2] Dundas, pp. 90, 104.

[3] Kenneth Ingham, "Tanganyika in the 'Twenties: The Era of Byatt and Cameron," Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 52 (March 1959), p. 18; Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration, 1920-1955," unpublished thesis (St. Hilda's College, Oxford, 1957), pp. 38-39; Dundas, pp. 98-99; Ingham, "Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron, 1919-1931," in History of East Africa, 2 vols., Vol. II ed. Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver (Oxford, 1965), 547.

[4] Article 22 is printed in Buell, I, 545-546.

[5] Dundas, p. 105; see also Evans Lewin, The Germans and Africa: Their Aims on the Dark Continent and How they Acquired their African Colonies, 1st ed. (London, 1915); p. 261.

[6] Extracts from the note are printed in Dr. Heinrich Schnee, German Colonization Past and Future: The Truth about the German Colonies (London, 1926), pp. 67-68. Schnee was the last Governor (1912-18) of German East Africa; his book is a defense of German rule and critique of mandate rule.

[7] Dundas, pp. 106-108.

[8] Bates, "Tanganyika: The Development of a Trust Terrotory," International Organization, IX, 1 (1955), 45; Schnee, German Colonization, p. 66.

[9] Lewin, p. vi. Schnee, German Colonization, pp. 71, 101, wrote: "A publication called German Colonizers in Africa, written by one Evans Lewin and published in German at Zurich in 1918 played a large part in the propagandism" against German colonization in South-West Africa; it is a "notorious and libellous pamphlet." I was unable to secure this pamphlet, but I suspect that it contains no more of importance than the earlier English work that runs to over 300 pages. Lewin brought out a revised edition of The Germans and Africa (London, 1939) during the height of the Nazi period. He wrote in the Preface of this edition: "In preparing a new edition of a book first published in 1915, during the stress of the war-period, it might have been thought that much modification would have been desirable. This, however, has not been the case...Recent events have made German policy so abundantly clear that it is hoped that this book will be one more illustration of the fact that German designs on Africa are not new,...and are not likely to have been greatly modified since the pre-war period" (pp. ix-x). See also Gaddis Smith, "The British Government and the Disposition of the German Colonies in Africa, 1914-1918," in Britain and Germany in Africa, ed. Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (New Haven, 1967), pp. 275-299, esp. p. 284. "By mid-1916 hardly a voice was being raised anywhere in Britain, public or private, in favor of returning any colonies to Germany." The Foreign Office saw the need of a justification, particularly to the Americans, of their annexation. Ibid., pp. 287, 290.

[10] Lewin, 1st ed., pp. xii-xiii.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 256, *passim*.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 188, 270.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 273, 283. "In view of the possibility that at the end of the present war there may be an arrangement of colonial territory under which Great Britain might conceivably benefit considerably by the addition to her present Empire of portions of the German colonies, it seems desirable that steps should be taken to organize and co-ordinate the system of colonial education at present existing in the country." *Ibid.*, p. 285. Lewin suggests that Britain and "the United States as a plantation Power" are the two countries to share a future responsibility in Africa, urging that the U. S. be persuaded to enter Africa. *Ibid.*, pp. 264-266. In late 1921 Lloyd George told President Wilson that the U. S. should administer East Africa as a mandate, but Wilson rejected the suggestion. Ingham, "Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron," p. 545.

[14] Lewin, ist ed., pp. 177-178.

[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 270, 271.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 188.

[17] "Africanus," *The Prussian Lash in Africa* (London, 1918), pp. 16-17, 77-87. In his Introduction to Schnee, *German Colonization*, p. 17, William Harbutt Dawson notes that none of the anti-German, pro-annexation works took any account of the German recognition of and remedy for their faults before the War broke out.

[18] "Africanus," pp. 18-21. For rebellion in British Africa, see Brode, p. 82.

[19] "German interest in their neighbors is keener than *vice versa*. Governors of the German colony have often visited the neighboring colony;...but a British Governor has never called at Daressalaam." Brode, p. 156.

[20] "Africanus," pp. 34-35. Immediately prior to the quoted passage, the author observes that white men in Africa do not do manual labor.

[21] Dundas, pp. 105-106. See Great Britain, *Correspondence Relating to the Wishes of the Natives of the German Colonies as to their Future Government*, Cd. 9210 (London, 1918); Schnee, *German Colonization*, p. 163.

[22] Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration," p. 39.

[23] Lettow-Vorbeck, *East African Campaigns*, p. 28.

[24] Schnee, German Colonization, p. 163.

[25] Great Britain, Cd. 9210, pp. 27-28.

[26] Ralph A. Austin, "The Official Mind of Indirect Rule: British Policy in Tanganyika, 1916-1939," in Britain and Germany in Africa, p. 577.

[27] Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston, 1921), p. 139.

[29] 111 H. C. Debates, 5th ser., col. 2175, July 30, 1919. Amery was in charge of the negotiations of the terms of mandate. Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration," p. 47. See David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York, 1928).

[29] Dundas, p. 144.

[30] Article 3. The document of terms for the British East African mandate is printed in Buell, I, 546-550.

[31] Ibid.,pp. 545, 549.

[32] See Romano Guardini, The End of the Modern World (New York, 1956), pp. 50-51, 59.

[33] Common knowledge is not easily or briefly documented. The knowledge that African religions did not lend themselves to the stimulation of modern Western technology can be assumed from the familiarity with the anthropological literature, such as is used in Pt. I of this study; the vast influence of the work of Max Weber, particularly The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York, 1958) and later works on non-Western religions in China and India, countries considered in Europe far advanced of African societies; and by the common European regard of African religion as "fetishism" and "superstition."

[34] It was quite easy for Christian missionaries from modern Europe to extend the Christian injunction to practice corporal works of mercy (Matt. 25: 41-46) like feeding the hungry and clothing the naked to the initiation of continuous education of those Africans who, though neither starving nor afflicted by cold, do not possess Western technological prowess in agriculture and industry.

[35] See Arnold Toynbee, Civilization on Trial and The World and the West (New York, 1958), p. 102; Guardini, pp. 45ff.; Weber.

[36] Ingham, "Tanganyika in the'Twenties," pp. 20-21; see also Ingham, "Tanganyika: The Mandate and Cameron," p. 546.

[37] The text is found in Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report by His Britannic Majesty's Government on the Mandated Territory of Tanganyika for the Year 1923*, Col. No. 2 (London, 1924), Ap. I, Col. No. 2.

[38] Ingham, "Tanganyika in the 'Twenties," pp. 18, 21; Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration," p. 57. Byatt had an administrative corps of 108 men, as compared with the German total of 79. Half the administrative service were recruited from former army officers. Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration," p. 50 n.

[39] *Dar es Salaam Times,* June 3, 1922.

[40] Ingham, "Tanganyika in the 'Twenties," p. 19.

[41] *Native Authority Ordinance*, No. 16 of 1921; Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration," p. 60 n., writes: "One indication of government thought is the change in the title of subordinate British officials: in early 1921 Political Officer became Administrative Officer, suggesting that important issues...were seen mainly as those which a good civil service could handle."

[42] Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report on Tanganyika Territory for the Year 1922* (London, 1923), pp. 5-6. The term "Sultan" is a synonym for "chief."

[43] Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration," pp. 76-78.

[44] Lord Frederick D. Lugard, *Revision of Instructions to Political Officers on Subjects Chiefly Political and Administrative* (Lagos, Nigeria, 1919), p. 297. The major literature on indirect rule is: Buell; Lord William M. Hailey, *Native Administration in the British African Territories*, 5 vols. (London, 1950-53); Lugard, *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*, 5th ed. (London, 1965); Lucy Mair, *Native Policies in Africa* (London, 1936); Margery Perham, *Native Administration in Nigeria* (London, 1937).

[45] Bates, "Tanganyika Under British Administration," pp. 62, 86, rejects Cameron's denial that he intended to introduce the Nigerian system.

[46] Parts of this memorandum were printed in Buell, I, 451-453, and in *Tanganyika Report, 1925* (London, 1926), pp. 6-10.

[47] Dundas, p. 138.

[48] Sir Donald Cameron, *My Tanganyika Service and Some Nigeria* (London, 1939), p. 96.

[49] Sir Phillip Mitchell, *African Afterthoughts* (London, 1954), p. 127.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 82.

[51] *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

[52] Cameron, pp. 92-93.

[53] Mitchell, pp. 130-131.

[54] Cameron, p. 93.

[55] Mitchell, p. 131.

[56] *Ibid.*, p. 50; see also Cameron, p. 167.

[57] Cameron, pp. 166-167.

[58] See B. T. G. Chidzero, *Tanganyika and International Trusteeship* (London, 1961); Bates, "Tanganyika: The Development of a Trust Territory,"

PART THREE: MODERN AFRICAN AUTHORITY

THE NKRUMAH AND NYERERE REGIMES

[1] Among the many works on the Nkrumah period in Ghana, the following are the most important: David E. Apter, *Ghana in Transition*, rev. ed. (New York, 1963); Henry Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York, 1966); Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960* (London, 1964); Leslie Rubin and Pauli Murray, *The Constitution and Government of Ghana* (London, 1961). The published writings and speeches of Nkrumah are also important, particularly *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (Edinburgh, 1957).

On the Nyerere period in Tanganyika-Tanzania, the following are best consulted: Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika," in *African One-Party States*, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter, ed. with supp. (Ithaca, N. Y., 1964), pp. 395-483; Judith Listowel, *The Making of Tanganyika* (London, 1965); J. Clagett Taylor, *The Political Development of Tanganyika* (Stanford, 1963); Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity--Uhuru na Umoja:* A Selection from Writings and Speeches, 1952-65 (London, 1967).

[2] Nkrumah: born 1909, Nkroful, Gold Coast; studied and taught in Catholic mission schools and government schools in the Gold Coast; in 1935 went to the United States, studied at Lincoln University and the University of Pennsylvania, earning several degrees and teaching political science at Lincoln; was President of the African Students Organization of America and Canada; went to London in 1945, beginning doctoral studies at the London School of Economics; in London served as Vice-President of the West African Students Union, was a joint Secretary of the fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester, and as Secretary of the West African National Secretariat edited The New African; arrived in the Gold Coast in 1947 to assume position as General Secretary of the United Gold Coast Convention party, which had recently been formed by leading African professional men and intellectuals; established the Convention People's Party in 1949. Additional biographical informationis to be found below in Part III of this study. Ronald Segal, Political Africa: A Who's Who of Personalities and Parties (New York, 1961), pp. 209-211; Nkrumah, passim; Bankole Timothy, Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power, 2d ed. (London, 1963), passim.

Nyerere: born 1922, son of a chief of the Zanaki tribe; entered Tabora Government School for chiefs' sons at age twelve; studied at Makerere, the University College of East Africa, in Uganda, 1943-45, obtaining a teaching diploma and organizing a College branch of the Tanganyika African Association (TAA), a forerunner of the present ruling party of Tanzania; was the first Tanganyikan to enter a British University, beginning study at Edinburgh in 1949; returned to Tanganyika in 1952 to teach in a Catholic school; became president of TAA in 1953, the following year forming and becoming president of the Tanganyika African National Union. Additional biographical information is provided where relevant in the following chapters. Segal, pp. 215-216. Neither Nyerere nor anyone else has produced a full-scale biography of the Tanzanian President. A biographical note is given in Nyerere, pp. xi-xii.

[3] See Immanuel Wallerstein, The Road to Independence: Ghana and the Ivory Coast (Paris, 1964), pp. 55-71.

[4] Our concern here is with the ways in which scholars have sought to interpret the Nkrumah and Nyerere regimes, and therefore not with various biographical, legal, historical and other works of a descriptive nature.

[5] David E. Apter, "Political Democracy in the Gold Coast," in Africa in the Modern World, ed. Calvin W. Stillman (Chicago, 1955), p. 135. This analysis is elaborated in Ghana in Transition. The Nkrumah regime itself adopted the idea of Nkrumah's authority as "charismatic." Evening News, October 2, 1965.

[6] Apter, Ghana in Transition, Preface to second printing, pp. vii-viii.

[7] Ibid., pp. 330-331, 339, 361, 371; see also Apter, The Politics of Solidarity in Ghana (Berkeley, 1966).

[8] See Apter, Ghana in Transition, p. v, passim; Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons, trans. A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons (Glencoe, Ill., 1947).

[9] See Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), pp. 55-57; Carl J. Friedrich, "Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power," Journal of Politics, XXIII, 1 (1961), 3-24.

[10] Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton, 1961), pp. 4, 20, 22-23.

[11] The "modernizing autocracy" was creating "a genuinely new form of society." Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), pp. 110 n. 36, 357-390; Apter, "Ghana," in Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, ed. James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 259-260.

[12] Henry Bretton, "Current Political Thought and Practice in Ghana," American Political Science Review, LII, 1 (1958), 46-63.

[13] Bretton, Rise and Fall of Nkrumah, pp. 74, 198 n. 14.

[14] Ibid., pp. 3-7, passim.

[15] Ibid., pp. 82-90, 157-164.

[16] Aristide R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa (Chicago, 1966), pp. 157-158.

[17] Ibid., pp. 3-5.

[18] Ibid., p. 135.

[19] A. James Gregor, "African Socialism, Socialism and Fascism: An Appraisal," Review of Politics, XXIX, 3 (1967), 344.

[20] See Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, trans. Leila Vennewitz (New York, 1966), pp. 3-28.

[21] Gregor, pp. 352, 353. Hugh Seton-Watson and Tibor Szamuely

find that Nkrumah conforms to the model of Hitler and Mussolini. See the latter's introduction to Col. A. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup--24 February 1966* (New York, 1966), pp. 15-17.

[22] Nolte, p. 9.

[23] Ch. VIII, pp. 341-345.

[24] See especially Thomas Hodgkin, "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism," in *African Affairs Number One*, St Antony's Papers, No. 10, ed. Kenneth Kirkwood (Carbondale, Ill., 1961), pp. 22-40.

[25] U. S. Senate, "Is U. S. Money Aiding Another Communist State?" *Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 87th Congress, 2d session. Testimony of Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia, December 3, 1962* (Washington, 1963), p. 1. See also "Four Recent American Views of Ghana," *Africa Report*, VIII, 8 (1963), 19.

[26] Ch. VIII, pp. 317-320, *passim*.

[27] For example, those of Taylor, Listowel, and Bates cited above.

[28] Ruth Schacter Morgenthau, "African Elections: Tanzania's Contribution," *Africa Report*, X, 11 (1965), 12.

[29] Martin Lowenkopf, "The Meaning of Arusha," *Africa Report*, XII, 3 (1967), 10; see Harvey Glickman, "Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context: The Ideology of Julius Nyerere," in *Boston University Papers on Africa*: Transition in African Politics, ed. Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno (New York, 1967), p. 198.

[30] Lowenkopf, p. 8; Aaron Segal, "Where is Tanzania Heading?" *Africa Report*, X, 9 (1965), 11.

[31] William H. Friedland, "Charismatic Leadership in a Developing Society: The Case of Tanganyika," a paper presented at the 1962 meeting of the American Sociological Association.

CHAPTER VI: PARTY-STATE INSTITUTIONS

[1] *Ghana:* The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah (Edinburgh, 1957), pp. 60-61.

[2] *Ibid.*, App. B, pp. 303-304.

[3] *Ibid.*, App. A, pp. 291-302.

[4] Nkrumah, *The New Stage (C.P.P. vs. Imperialism)* (Accra, 1952), p. 4. See V. I. Lenin, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," *Selected Works* (New York, 1943), II, 447; Lenin, "The Conditions of Affiliation to the Communist International," *Selected Works*, X, 204; Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics--The Dilemma of Power*, 2d ed. (New York, 1965), pp. 64-70; Alfred G. Meyer, *Leninism* (New York, 1962).

[5] Apter, *Political Parties and National Integration*, pp. 292-293.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 294-299. Some of the auxiliary organizations were affiliated with international communist organizations such as the World Federation of Trade Unions. *Ibid.*, p. 308. See Nkrumah, *Guide to Party Action* (Accra, 1962); John Hatch, "Nkrumah's Ghana: A Positive View, *Africa Report* (hereafter cited: AR), VII, 8 (1962), 9.

[7] Apter, *Political Parties and National Integration*, p. 308, writes: "Party and state are one....By mid-1962 Ghana seemed well on the road toward building a popular one-party socialist state."

[8] Apter, *Ghana in Transition*, App. B, pp. 396, 397, *passim*.

[9] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's New 'Corporate Parliament'," AR, X, 8 (1965), 6-9. The MP's were elected in 1956 for five-year terms. The Nkrumah Government considered the constitutional referendum of 1960--88.5% for the republican constitution, 89.1% for Nkrumah as first President--an adequate substitute for Assembly elections and a mandate for CPP dominance of the Assembly. See "Ghana Revisited," AR, IX, 2 (1964), 25.

[10] Leslie Rubin and Pauli Murray, *The Constitution and Government of Ghana* (London, 1961), pp. 230-232; see the Emergency Powers Acts of 1957 and 1960, *ibid.*, pp. 228-230.

[11] Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960* (London, 1964), p. 380.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 387.

[13] Henry Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah*: A Study of Personal Rule in Africa (New York, 1966), p. 50.

[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51; AR, IX, 2 (1964), 25.

[15] Bretton, pp. 53-55, 195, nn. 25, 30.

[16] Ibid., p. 56. Four CPP and six opposition MP's were removed from the Assembly and held in preventive detention by 1965. Kraus, p. 6.

[17] Bretton, p. 61.

[18] Ibid., p. 120.

[19] Ibid., p. 107.

[20] Austin, pp. 416–417.

[21] Bretton, pp. 117–118. Notice that the civil service and army are not represented in Ghana's 1965 parliament. Kraus, p. 9.

[22] Austin, p. 417; Bretton, p. 167, passim; see also Tibor Szamuely, Introduction to Col. A. A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup--24 February 1966 (New York, 1966), p. 14: "Nkrumaism represents a variety of the modern totalitarian system--this much is today more or less generally accepted.".

[23] Austin, pp. 405–411; Apter, Political Parties and National Integration, pp. 303, 310.

[24] Apter, Political Parties and National Integration, pp. 297, 299; Austin, p. 411.

[25] Bretton, p. 85.

[26] Ibid., pp. 82–83.

[27] Ibid., pp. 5, 128.

[28] Ibid., pp. 20, 202 n. 47.

[29] Ibid., p. 10; see also ibid., p. 167.

[30] Ibid., p. 135.

[31] Austin, p. 418.

[32] Nkrumah, Guide to Party Action, pp. 3, 6; Kraus, p. 9.

[33] Bretton, p. 167.

[34] Eric Voegelin, Order in History, 3vols., Vol. I: Israel and Revelation (Baton Rouge, 1956), p. 452; Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago, 1952), p. 124.

[35] See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 2d enlarged ed. (New York, 1958), pp. 395-419.

[36] See Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History, 1807-1957, ed. G. E. Metcalfe (London, 1964), p. 233.

[37] This interpretation is elaborated in Ch. VIII, pp. 305-308.

[38] William Tordoff, "Regional Administration in Tanzania," Journal of Modern African Studies, III, 1 (1965), 63-64. See Bretton, p. 117, for the merger of party and state "only at the politically insignificant local-government level." Nyerere is said to have modelled TANU's constitution on that of the CPP printed in George Padmore, The Gold Coast Revolution: The Struggle of an African People from Slavery to Freedom (London, 1953), pp. 254-266. Padmore's book was banned at the time in Tanganyika. George Bennett, "An Outline History of TANU," Oxford University Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Reprint Series No. 31, pp. 3, 16 n. 13.

[39] Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika," in African One-Party States, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter, reprint ed. (Ithaca, N. Y., 1964), pp. 451-456; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "TANU and UPC: The Impact of Independence on Two African Nationalist Parties," in Boston University Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics, ed. Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno (New York, 1967), pp. 225-229. See William H. Friedland, "Co-Operation, Conflict, and Conscription: TANU-TFL Relations, 1955-1964," in Boston University Papers on Africa, pp. 67-103.

[40] Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika (London, 1965), pp. 411-412.

[41] J. S. R. Cole and W. N. Denison, Tanganyika: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, Vol. XII of The British Commonwealth: The Development of its Laws and Constitution, gen. ed. George W. Keeton (London, 1964), p. 25; Listowel, pp. 411, 413.

[42] See Cole and Denison, pp. 262-263 and n. 70.

[43] Ibid., pp. 153-154.

[44] Ibid., App. I, "An Act to Declare the Constitution of Tanganyika," Arts. 13, 14, 18, 19, 47, pp. 271-273, 282.

[45] Ibid., pp. 32-33.

[46] See ibid., p. vii; Art. 34, p. 279.

[47] Ibid., p. 82; see also pp. 80-81.

[48] Ibid., Art. 3, p. 269.

[49] Ibid., pp. vii-viii; Nyerere, Democracy and the Party System (Dar es Salaam, n.d.).

[50] Nye, p. 237.

[51] Ibid., p. 238.

[52] Ibid.; A. Segal, p. 15; Friedland, "Co-operation, Conflict, and Conscription," pp. 91, 93.

[53] AR, X, 5 (1965), 40.

[54] AR, X, 9 (1965), 17. In all, there were 208 candidates. Ruth Schacter Morgenthau, "African Elections: Tanzania's Contribution," AR, X, 11 (1965), 15.

[55] The appointment and terms of reference of the commission were announced by President Nyerere on January 28, 1964, in a statement reprinted in AR, X, 9 (1965), 21. See also the President's letter of guidance to the commission, ibid., p. 25.

[56] Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State, submitted to President Nyerere on March 22, 1965. The recommendations were incorporated in the Interim Constitution of Tanzania Bill passed by the National Assembly, July 5, 1965. Excerpts of major parts of the thirty-five page Report are found in AR, X, 9 (1965), 19-28, entitled "Blueprint for a One-Party Democracy." In what follows, I quote from the latter, to which my page citations in the text refer.

[57] Morgenthau, pp. 14-15.

[58] Nyerere, "The Costs of Nonalignment," AR, XI, 7 (1966), 61.

[59] Nye, pp. 238, 249 n. 47; John B. George, "How Stable is Tanganyika," AR, VIII, 8 (1963), 3.

[60] Nye, pp. 238-240.

[61] Morgenthau, pp. 14-15.

[62] J. P. W. B. McAuslan and Yash P. Ghai, "Constitutional Innovation and Political Stability in Tanzania: A Preliminary Assessment," Journal of Modern African Studies, IV, 4 (1966), 484, 508.

[63] However, the National Assembly is limited by the infrequency of its sessions, meeting only a few days several times a year. *Ibid*., p. 500.

[64] Segal, pp. 11, 13.

[65] *Ibid*., pp. 16-17.

[66] Excerpts from the Declaration, AR, XII, 3 (1967), 13.

[67] Martin Lowenkopf, "The Meaning of Arusha," AR, XII, 3 (1967), 8.

[68] Morgenthau, p.12.

[69] McAuslan and Ghai, pp. 482, 508.

[70] Tordoff, p. 84, *passim*.

[71] Rene Lemarchand, "Village-By-Village Nation Building in Tanzania," AR, X, 2 (1965), 11.

[72] *Ibid*., p. 12, quoting an unnamed government circular.

[73] Tordoff, p. 87; J. K. Nsarkoh, *Local Government in Ghana* (Accra, 1964), p. 19.

[74] Nsarkoh, p. 39.

[75] Segal, p. 12.

[76] Tordoff, p. 89.

CHAPTER VII: SYMBOLS OF AUTHORITY

[1] *Ghana Today*, IV, 14 (1960), 13.

[2] Leslie Rubin and Pauli Murray, *The Constitution and Government of Ghana* (London, 1961), p. 104 n. 77.

[3] See above, p. 357, n. 64 for Ch. I.

[4] My source is Stephen G. Gebelt, U. S. State Department Desk Officer for Ghana from July 1962 to July 1963. Gebelt's sources were Ako Adjei, former Ghanaian Foreign Minister, and an unnamed Catholic missionary. I could not obtain the first edition of this translation of the

Bible of 1871. The third edition uses "agyenkwa" for "Savior." Rev. J. G. Christaller, trans. *The Holy Bible Translated into the Tshi (Chwee) Language*, 3d ed. from 2d rev. ed. (Basel, 1905), p. 217, *passim*. According to the translator, a synonym of "agyenkwa" is "ogyefo." Christaller et al., *A Dictionary, English, Tshi (Asante), Akra* (Basel, 1874), item "savior," p. 211.

[5] Rolf Italiaander, *The New Leaders of Africa*, trans. James McGovern (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1961), p. 227. For the use of these terms in the press see, for example, *Evening News*, April 14, 1958.

[6] *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (Edinburgh, 1957), p. 25; Henry Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York, 1966), p. 200 n. 33.

[7] *The Party*, No. 21 (March 16-31, 1962), inside front cover.

[8] *Evening News*, May 28, 1963.

[9] *Ghana Builds*, I, 2 (1961), 8.

[10] *Ghana Today*, IV, 11 (1960), 6.

[11] Kwame Nkrumah, *Guide to Party Action* (Accra, 1962), p. 10.

[12] *Ghana Today*, IV, 11 (1960), 10. For a picture of the Presidential Chair, see *Ghana Builds*, I, 2 (1961), back cover. An organizer and leader of the coup that overthrew Nkrumah writes: "In all our history, our chiefs are known to be our natural rulers....In the institution of chieftaincy are enshrined basic democratic ideas that are as old as our people. ...All their traditional powers were removed and vested in Kwame Nkrumah. He even claimed some of their titles...He also, without authority, abrogated to himself the paraphernalia of our chiefs. I know that our chiefs were not happy about these things. Honours that their forefathers fought and won were being trampled underfoot by this upstart, Kwame Nkrumah. He took upon himself titles like Osagyefo and Kantamanto which belonged to the Ashanti kings. We all know that Nkrumah was never a soldier; none of his ancestors ever led an army before the white man came. To the outsider, this might seem insignificant, but to us, particularly the Ashantis, our battle honours mean a lot." Col. A. A. Afrifa, *The Ghana Coup--24 February 1966* (New York, 1966), pp. 115-116. Leaving aside the soldier-author's emphasis on martial honor, one sees in the quoted passage the meaning of Nkrumah's titles and rituals of office to the people of Ghana generally. The much discussed economic failures of the Nkrumah regime could be understood in traditional terms as an absence or loss of favor with the ancestors.

The passage makes vividly clear the traditional motives behind the coup. Moreover, Nkrumah was rejected also for having departed from the democratic principles imputed to traditional African society, principles which Nkrumah himself emphasized as traditionally African. See Ch. VIII below.

[13] The Government changed parliamentary practice, which had followed that of the British House of Commons, so that it would have a "Ghanaian character" in keeping with the Ghanaian "way of life and thinking." The wearing of wigs was discontinued, and the terms "Government side" and "Opposition side" were abolished. Ghana Today, IV, 11 (1960), 10.

[14] Ibid., pp. 12-13. I add Akan religious terms to indicate the traditional nature of the prayer.

[15] A reference to political descent from an ancestress and to the role of the Queen-Mother; could also be understood as "Mother Africa."

[16] See above, p. 358 n. 65 to Ch. I.

[17] Quoted by Bankole Timothy, Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power, 2d ed. (London, 1963), pp. 78-79. The "verandah boys" were the uprooted and homeless urban followers of Nkrumah who found shelter at night under the verandahs of the more prosperous.

[18] See Ch. VIII, p. 305. Notice the lack of differentiation between the role of God the Father and that of the Son as Savior in the symbolism; compare this with the urge to overcome the differentiation between the head of state and the head of government.

[19] January 28, 1963.

[20] Guy Warren, Evening News, May 27, 1963.

[21] Glover C. S. Kotey Osu, letter to editor, ibid., May 30, 1963.

[22] Nkrumah, Speech at formal opening of Castle offices on July 1, 1963, Accra Domestic Radio, U. S. Federal Broadcast Information Service, Africa, July 1, 1963.

[23] Ibid.; Robert S. Rattray, Religion and Art in Ashanti (London, 1927), p. 129, passim; see above, Ch. IV, p. 181.

[24] British Broadcasting Corporation, "African Revolutionary," a TV program on President Nyerere, shown on WENH-TV, Ch. 11, Durham, N. H., September 12, 1966.

[25] Father Paul Heon, Circular Letter from Tabora Mission, February 11, 1963.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] The only translation of the Koran in an African language is in Swahili. Ali Muzrui, "Language and Politics in East Africa," *Africa Report*, XII, 6 (June 1967), 61.

[28] It is perhaps not merely coincidental that the first major work of European political philosophy to be translated into an East African language is the Swahili version of Machiavelli's *Prince*. Mazrui, p. 61. See my remarks in "Elections and Political Reconstruction in Africa," *Review of Politics*, XXIII, 3 (1961), 422-423.

[29] Joachim Wach, *The Comparative Study of Religions*, ed. Joseph M. Kitagwa (New York, 1961), p. 50; Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (New York, 1958), pp. 12-24.

[30] Letter from John R. Nellis, November 16, 1966. Nellis, an assistant in the Program of Eastern African Studies, had recently spent a year and a half doing political research in Tanzania. He kindly responded to this writer's inquiry. The following quotations are from his letter.

[31] According to White Fathers missionaries in Tanzania who know Nyerere well, the Tanzanian President is especially concerned with the danger of religious, particularly Islamic-Christian, conflict in Tanzania. Interview with Rev. John Bell, W. F., Director of AFRIC, Washington, D. C. See also Julius Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity--Uhuru na Umoja* (London, 1967), pp. 179, 181, *passim*.

[32] Saada Salim bin Omar, "The Swahili Life," *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, No. 9 (June 1940), pp. 24-25.

[33] Robert F. Gray, "The Shetani Cult among the Segeju of Tanganyika," a Paper read at the meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Chicago, November, 1962, U. S. State Department External Research Paper M3434.

[34] R. G. Abrahams, "Kahama Township, Western Province, Tanganyika," in *Social Change in Modern Africa*, ed. Aidan Southall (London, 1961), p. 252.

[35] Martin Lowenkopf, "Political Parties in Uganda and Tanganyika," M. Sc. (Econ.) thesis (University of London, 1961), p. 140.

[36] British Broadcasting Corporation. See n. 24 for this chapter above.

[37] See above, Ch. III.

[38] See Mircea Eliade, Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1959).

[39] See Henri De Lubac, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, trans. Edith M. Riley (Cleveland, 1963); Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics (Chicago, 1952). Christianity so radically changed the historical existence of man through the differentiation of the spiritual and the temporal realms that no society can any longer cease to isolate itself from modern history--that is, from a temporal world whose development presupposes that differentiation and the emancipation of the temporal from the restraints deriving from the spiritual order--without forsaking the compactness of its traditional life. When any society seeks to be active and to deny the differentiation of existence, it is doomed to impotence or led to substitute modern ideologies for the traditional religion. This problem is manifest even in the Islamic world. See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (New York, 1959).

[40] This point is substantiated and elaborated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER VIII: IDEAS OF AFRICAN SOCIETY AND HISTORY

[1] Kofi Baako, "Nkrumaism--Its Theory and Practice," in The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, ed. Paul E. Sigmund, 1st ed. (New York, 1963), pp. 189-190.

[2] Kwame Nkrumah, Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution (London, 1964), p. 57.

[3] Ibid., pp. 68-69. Nkrumah makes explicit reference to the Marxian idea of class society, his assumption here being that in most societies the government rules in the interest of the ruling class.

[4] Kwesi Armah, Africa's Golden Road (London, 1965), p. 127.

[5] Julius Nyerere, "Will Democracy Work in Africa?" in Africa: Continent of Change, ed. Peter R. Gould (Belmont, Calif., 1961), pp. 54-55.

[6] Nyerere, Freedom and Unity--Uhuru na Umoja (London, 1967), p. 195.

[7] Nyerere, Ujamaa (Dar es Salaam, 1962); Freedom and Unity, pp. 162-171.

[8] Baako, p. 189.

[9] Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, pp. 72, 77.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

[11] Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite* (New York, 1963), pp. 170-171, 173; *Consciencism*, p. 76.

[12] Baako, p. 188.

[13] Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, pp. 119-120.

[14] "African Socialism--A Neo-Colonialist Ruse," *Spark*, April 19, 1963. The last quotation is taken by the unidentified author from a Baako lecture at the University of Ghana in January 1963, but it is not attributed to anyone by name.

[15] Julius Sago, "The Ideological Battle in Africa," *Spark*, April 19, 1963.

[16] See pp. 317-324, 329-331.

[17] *Pan-Africa* (Nairobi), No. 1 (April 19, 1963), pp. 13-14.

[18] Nkrumah, *Why "The Spark"* (Accra, 1964), pp. 3-4.

[19] Editors of the *Spark*, *Some Essential Features of Nkrumaism* (New York, 1965).

[20] Nyerere, *Ujamaa; Freedom and Unity*, p. 170.

[21] Nyerere, "Nationalism and Pan-Africanism," in *Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, 2d ed. (New York, 1967), pp. 282-285.

[22] Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, pp. 74, 76; Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, p. 171. See *Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom : Africa in the Struggle Against World Imperialism*, 1st published in London, 1947; reprinted (Accra, n.d.). Compare Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism* (New York, 1966) with V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism*, 1st published 1916 (New York, n.d.).

[23] Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology* (New York, 1961), pp. 77-80; *Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (Edinburgh, 1957), *passim*.

[24] Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, p. 66.

[25] Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p. x.

[26] "The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana," in The Constitution and Government of Ghana, by Leslie Rubin and Pauli Murray (London, 1961), App. 1, Arts. 13, 55, pp. 253, 266. The latter provision was not included "in the draft Constitution put to the people and accepted by them in the plebiscite." Ibid., p. 108.

[27] Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 68.

[28] Ibid., pp. 68-70, 77-78.

[29] Jon Kraus, "Ghana's New 'Corporate Parliament'," Africa Report (hereafter cited: AR), X, 8 (1965), 6. The referendum was rigged. The regime claimed that over 93% of the registered voters came to the polls, with less than 1% opposed. Col. A. A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup--24 February 1966 (New York, 1966), pp. 134-135.

[30] Nkrumah, Consciencism, pp. 69, 100-101.

[31] Armah, pp. 90, 94.

[32] This corresponds roughly to Rousseau's distinction between the "general will" and the "will of all." Social Contract, Bk. II, Ch. 3.

[33] Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System," a Speech delivered to the opening session, January 14, 1963, of the TANU annual Conference (Dar es Salaam, 1963), unpaged.

[34] Nyerere, "Africa's Bid for Democracy," African and Colonial World, VIII (July 1960), 3.

[35] Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System."

[36] Nyerere, "Africa's Bid for Democracy," p. 3.

[37] Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System"; Freedom and Unity, p. 299.

[38] Ibid., pp. 299-301.

[39] Ibid., p. 300.

[40] Ibid., pp. 294, 301.

[41] Nyerere, "Africa's Bid for Democracy," p. 3; Speech by the President-Designate at Inauguration of the Fountain of the Republic, Dar es Salaam, December 8, 1962, Tanganyika Information Service press release.

[42] Nyerere, "Democracy and the Party System"; Freedom and Unity, p. 298.

[43] Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, p. 209.

[44] Nkrumah, Guide to Party Action (Accra, 1962), p. 12.

[45] Tawia Adamafio, A Portrait of Osagyefo, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Accra, 1960), p. 1. He adds: "Kwame Nkrumah is Africa and Africa is Kwame Nkrumah."

[46] Above, p. 127.

[47] Great Britain and Ghana: Documents of Ghana History, 1807-1957, ed. G. E. Metcalfe (London, 1964), p. 253.

[48] Nkrumah, Ghana, pp. 112, 196.

[49] Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, pp. 41, 109, 276, 277.

[50] See Nkrumah, Ghana, pp. 49, 52-53, 199-205; George Padmore, The Gold Coast Revolution (London, 1953); Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism? The Coming Struggle for Africa (New York, 1956); W. E. B. DuBois, The Souls of Black Folk, 1st published 1903 (New York, 1961); DuBois, The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part which Africa has Played in World History, enlarged ed. (New York, 1965).

[51] See, for example, Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, p. 107.

[52] Joseph Casely Hayford, Ethiopia Unbound: Studies in Race Emancipation (London, 1911), p. 170.

[53] Ibid., pp. 9, 27, 194. These themes abound in the poetry of Michael Dei-Anang, who was Nkrumah's advisor on African affairs. A collection of Dei-Anang's verse is entitled Africa Speaks, 2d ed. (Accra, 1960). See his reference to Casely Hayford, p. 46.

[54] Louis S. B. Leakey, The Progress and Evolution of Man in Africa (London, 1961), p. 1. See also Nkrumah, Africa's Glorious Past (Accra, 1962).

[55] Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, pp. 2-5.

[56] Casely Hayford, pp. 159-160, 171.

[57] Nkrumah, "Address to the Conference on Positive Action and Security in Africa, Accra, April 1960," printed in The Political Awakening of Africa, ed. Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1965), p. 145.

[58] Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 32.

[59] Ibid.; Nkrumah, Consciencism, p. 68.

[60] Casely Hayford, pp. 8, 41, 58, 204.

[61] Ibid., pp. 2, 63.

[62] Ibid., pp. 91, 160.

[63] Casely Hayford, The Truth about the West African Land Question (London, 1913), pp. 11, 101-102.

[64] Nyerere, The Second Scramble (Dar es Salaam, n.d.), p. 1; Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, p. 153; Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, passim. Nyerere emphasizes that the achievement of African unity is a "duty" that Africans and their leaders owe both "to their ancestors, and to their descendents." Freedom and Unity, p. 350.

[65] Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central and Southern Africa, Addis Ababa Conference, February 2-10, 1962 (Addis Ababa, 1962), p. 19.

[66] Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, p. 132.

[67] Ibid., "Dedication," p. v; Nkrumah, I Speak of Freedom, p. 133.

[68] Rubin and Murray, The Constitution and Government of Ghana, p. 250.

[69] Nyerere, The Second Scramble, pp. 1, 6.

[70] Speech in Liberia, January 1953, text in Bankole Timothy, Kwame Nkrumah: His Rise to Power, 2d ed. (London, 1963), pp. 125-126, 130.

[71] Before his marriage, Nkrumah called every woman in Ghana his "bride." Karl Eskelund, Black Man's Country (London, 1958), p. 144; Richard Wright, Black Power (New York, 1954), p. 59.

[72] Wright, p. 64.

[73] I would suggest that the mixture of symbols is deliberate, for reasons advanced below, pp. 329-332.

[74] Baako, pp. 191-192.

[75] Nkrumah, "Speech to Nationalists Conference of African Freedom Fighters, Accra, June 4, 1962," Voice of Africa, XXX, 47 (1962), 4.

[76] Nkrumah, "Address to Conference on Positive Action and Security," pp. 147-148.

[77] Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, pp. 68, 70.

[78] Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, pp. 72, 116, 270, 338, 340.

[79] Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom*, pp. 125ff., 189, *passim*.

[80] During his last few years in power, Nkrumah always appeared wearing a Mao-type jacket. Nyerere, who exchanged visits with Chinese communist leaders, referred to the Chinese as "primitive" and said Tanganyika could learn from them "to use tradition to break tradition." British Broadcasting Corporation, "African Revolutionary," interview with Nyerere video taped. See above, n. 24 to Ch. VII.

[81] Compare Lenin's idea of living in harmony with the peasants, who corrupt the proletariat "with a petty-bourgeois atmosphere." Lenin explicitly advocates an all-out struggle "against the forces and traditions of the old society," against the "force of habit" of the majority of the people. *"Left-Wing" Communism, An Infantile Disorder* (New York, 1940), p. 29.

[82] See V. I. Lenin, *What is to Be Done?* (New York, 1943).

[83] See Karl Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program"; Frederick Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," *Marx-Engels Selected Works*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1955), Vol. II.

[84] See, for example, Nkrumah, *Consciencism*, p. 5.

[85] Lenin, *What is to Be Done?*, pp. 28, 65; Nkrumah, *Ghana*, pp. ix, 53.

[86] Nkrumah, "Preface" to *Kamiti*, by Richard St. Barbe Baker (London, 1958), p. 6; see also Nkrumah, *Ghana*, pp. 1-12, 25.

[87] All of the resolutions of this conference are found in Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide*, rev. ed. (New York, 1965), App. 22, sec. IV. The quotation is from p. 279.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 272.

[89] See *ibid.*, pp. 119-121.

[90] Nkrumah, *Ghana*, pp. 9, 11-12.

[91] *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 44-45. The following quotation from *ibid.*, p. 166.

[92] Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, 3 vols., Vol. I: *Israel and Revelation* (Baton Rouge, 1956), pp. 450-451, 452.

[93] Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p. 32. Words taken from the 68th Psalm. As any dictionary indicates, the term "Ethiop" means an Ethiopian, an African, or a dark-skinned person. Nkrumah used "Ethiopia" in the sense of "African." After 1896, "Ethiopia acquired special importance in African eyes as the one surviving African state." Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, pp. 145-146. The term "Ethiopian" came to be applied to separatist churches in Africa, and Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia gave the term renewed significance. George Shepperson, "Ethiopianism and African Nationalism," *Phylon*, XIV, 1 (1953), 9-18; Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p. 27.

[94] See Timothy, pp. 31-32.

[95] Rolf Italiaander, The New Leaders of Africa, trans. James McGovern (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1961), p. 238; Henry Bretton, *The Rise and Fall of Kwame Nkrumah* (New York, 1966), pp. 30-32 and the sources cited on p. 191, n. 10; *Afrifa*, p. 125 and n. 2.

[96] Baako, pp. 188, 190.

[97] Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p. 45. Padmore, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?*, p. 96, writes: "Challenging the authority of traditional Christianity in matters appertaining to the spiritual life of the Negroes, Garvey adopted a 'Black Christ and Black Madonna' as symbols of his African Orthodox Church." See Marcus Garvey, *Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey or Africa for the Africans*, comp. Amy Jacques Garvey, 2d ed. (London, 1967); Edmund David Cronon, *Black Moses*: The Story of Marcus Garvey and the Universal Negro Improvement Association (Madison, Wisc., 1955).

[98] Joseph Asare-Akotua, *Ghana Times*, January 25, 1960.

[99] For example, *Ghanaian Times*, November 20, 1961: "The Osagyefo is really fulfilling the biblical prediction that "Ethiopia shall arise." The people are "rallying behind him as God's own representative in Africa and a saint in politics."

[100] Nkrumah, "The Motion of Destiny" Speech, July 1953, extract in *African Voices*, ed. Peggy Rutherfoord (New York, 1960), p. 181.

[101] Nkrumah, Speech in Monrovia, Liberia, in Timothy, p. 127.

[102] Poem entitled "Looking for God," in Dei-Anang, pp. 98-99.

[103] Nkrumah, *Ghana*, p. 223. Nkrumah exults in the vision of a

"whole nation from the President downwards" forming "one regiment of disciplined citizens." Nkrumah, Guide to Party Action, p. 8.

[104] Thomas Hodgkin, "A Note on the Language of African Nationalism," in African Affairs, Number One, St Antony's Papers, No. 10, ed. Kenneth Kirkwood (Carbondale, Ill., 1961), p. 29; Harvey Glickman, "Dilemmas of Political Theory in an African Context: The Ideology of Julius Nyerere," in Boston University Papers on Africa: Transition in African Politics, ed. Jeffrey Butler and A. A. Castagno (New York, 1967), p. 197. "Positions that are originally incompatible with one another can be combined in two ways. The first way is the eclectic compromise which remains on the same plane as the original positions. The other way is the synthesis which becomes possible through the transition of thought from the plane of the original positions to an entirely different plane." Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1953), p. 170.

[105] Eric Voegelin, "The Growth of the Race Idea," Review of Politics, II, 3 (1940), 303.

[106] Ibid., p. 307.

[107] Ibid., p. 308.

[108] Ghanaian Times, August 3, 1962; Evening News, September 4, 1962.

[109] Accra Domestic Radio, September 10, 1962, Federal Broadcast Information Service, Africa, September 11, 1962.

[110] Debates, October 16, 1961, col. 54.

[111] Voegelin, "Growth of Race Idea," p. 284.

[112] "The monolithic foundation of the Party's organization and philosophy can best be expressed in the fusion of the Party's ideology with the personality of the author of this ideology, Osagyefo." Ghanaian Times, September 30, 1965.

[113] Eliade thus denies a mythical character to Fascism and National Socialism, although finding mythical characteristics in Marxism. See Mircea Eliade, Myths, Symbols, and Mysteries, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York, 1965), Ch. I.

[114] The distinction between the two sets of symbols is made above, p. 277.

[115] Above, p. 306.

[116] Nkrumah's high-handed and often violent manner of dealing with the chiefs was a major element in his downfall. See Afrifa, pp. 116-117, for an indication of the frequent destoolment and imprisonment of chiefs.

[117] In 1962, Nyerere moved "to eliminate administrative and judicial duties of chiefs, while leaving their traditional powers untouched. In effect, this ended Tanganyika's forty-year history of native administration, transferring most of the chief's powers to the new councils or their executive officers." These councils were locally elected bodies. Margaret L. Bates, "Tanganyika," in *African One-Party States*, ed. Gwendolen M. Carter (Ithaca, N. Y., 1964), p. 524.

[118] See *African One-Party States*; James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds. *Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa* (Berkeley, 1966).

[119] Relevant to what appears in the last four pages is my article, "Premises of Modern African Politics," *Review of Politics*, XXVIII, 4 (1966), 433-446.

[120] The literature is enormous. We single out: Legum, *Pan-Africanism*; William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., eds. *African Socialism* (Stanford, 1964); Emerson and Kilson, eds. *The Political Awakening of Africa*.

[121] See my article, "Pan-Africanism: African Odyssey," *Current History*, XLIV (January 1963), 5-7; Legum, Ch. VIII.

[122] Madiera Keita, "Le Parti Unique en Afrique," *Présence Africaine*, No. 30 (February-March 1960), trans. in *Ideologies of the Developing Nations*, ed. Sigmund, pp. 232-233. See also Frank G. Snyder, *One-Party Government in Mali* (New Haven, 1965); Ruth Schacter Morgenthau, *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa* (New York, 1964).

[123] Sekou Touré, *The International Policy of the Democratic Party of Guinea* (Conakry, Guinea, n.d.), pp. 180-181, 189-192.

[124] Touré, *Texte des Interviews Accordées aux Représentants de la Presse* (Conakry, 1959), p. 149.

[125] Touré, *The Political Action of the Democratic Party of Guinea for the Emancipation of Guinean Youth* (Cairo, 1961), p. 108.

[126] Leopold Sedar Senghor, "Negritude and African Socialism," in *African Affairs, Number Two*, St Antony's Papers, No. 15, ed. Kenneth Kirkwood (Carbondale, Ill., 1961), p. 11.

[127] *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 13.

[128] Senghor, "Some Thoughts on Africa: A Continent in Development," *International Affairs*, XXXVIII (April 1962), 191.

[129] See Senghor, *On African Socialism*, trans. Mercer Cook (New York, 1964), *passim*.

[130] Senghor, *Pierre Teilhard de Chardin et la Politique Africaine* (Paris, 1960).

[131] Senghor, "Negritude and African Socialism," pp. 12, 13. See also Mamadou Dia, *The African Nations and World Solidarity*, trans. Mercer Cook (New York, 1961).

[132] Senghor, "Negritude and African Socialism," p. 16.

[133] Senghor, *On African Socialism*, pp. 11-12.

[134] "Open to all peoples," writes President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, Africa "shall reconcile all peoples. From its hot greenhouse will grow...a new democracy, which...shall make the fraternity between peoples reign forever." "Le continent Africain en march," *Démocratie Nouvelle*, No. 2 (February 1947), p. 79. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia: "Africa's gift to world culture must be in the field of human relations." *Africa Report*, XII, 9 (December 1967), 25.

[135] A. James Gregor, "African Socialism, Socialism and Fascism: An Appraisal," *Review of Politics*, XXIX, 3 (1967), 350.

[136] Senghor, "Negritude and African Socialism," pp. 12, 13. President Modiba Keita of Mali cites Renan: "Nothing great is achieved without chimeras." *Africa Report*, XI 4 (April 1966), 46.

[137] Nkrumah, *Africa's Glorious Past*, in *The Political Awakening of Africa*, pp. 24-25.

[138] Nkrumah, "African Socialism Revisited," *African Forum*, I, 3 (1966), 8.

[139] Senghor, "Negritude and the Germans," *Africa Report*, XII, 2 (February 1967), 46-48.

[140] Gregor, pp. 338-339.

[141] Herman Finer, *Mussolini's Italy* (New York, 1965), pp. 173-175.

[142] *Ibid.*, pp. 216, 218.

[143] Quoted in *ibid*, pp. 341-342.

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