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of the One-Party State on the Mainland of Tanzania

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Sociology

by

Alifeyo Bartholomew Chilivumbo

Committee in charge:
    Professor Leo Kuper, Chairman
   Professor Peter Orleans
    Professor John E. Horton
    Professor Michael G. Smith
    Professor Daniel P. Kunene

1968

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it is acceptable in quality and form for publica-
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
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Committee Chairman

University of California, Los Angeles

1968

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To My Mother, Mrs. Milka Kanyaso Chilivumbo

and to Professors Leo Kuper and John Horton

To My Mother, Mrs. Milka Kanyaso Chilivumbo

and to Professors Leo Kuper and John Horton

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August 24, 1939 – Born – Kota-Kota, Malawi

1960–1963 – Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Scholarship

1963 – B.A., Makerere University College

1963 – Makerere University College Research Prize

1963–1965 – University of California, Los Angeles Fellowship

1965–1966 – Commonwealth Scholar, Manchester University

1966–1968 – State Department Fellowship

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Sociology

    Urban Sociology
            Professor Peter Orleans

    Political Sociology
            Professor Leo Kuper
            Professor John Horton
            Professor Anthony Oberschall

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Tanganyika Mono-Party Regime. A Study in the Problems, Conditions
and Processes of the Emergence and Development of the
One-Party State on the Mainland of Tanzania

by

Alifeyo Bartholomew Chilivumbo

Doctor of Philosophy of Sociology

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Professor Leo Kuper, Chairman

This is a sociological study of the conditions of the colonial
situation which underly the development and processes which culminated
in the creation of a one-party state in Tanganyika. The structure of the
colonial situation, the manner in which the colonial situation was
conflict-generating, the factors which encouraged and stimulated the
colonial conflict, the conditions under which the conflict became overt
and manifest, and how this led to the formation of political parties,
the factors which promoted the growth of and the development of a
dominant territorial African political party, the Tanganyika African
National Union, and the structure of the one-party and how the one-party
state functions, are examined using historical and structural analysis.

The structure of the colonial situation in Tanganyika is
found to be a plural society, in which Europeans occupied superordinate
positions, Africans occupied subordinate positions and Asians the inter-

mediate positions. The conflict which emerged, the patterns it
followed, the ensuing political parties and the development of the
party system in colonial Tanganyika are seen as being directly related
to the structure of the colonial situation. Mostly this colonial
conflict involved Africans and Europeans.

The data used in the study are primarily from secondary sources,
newspapers, journals, magazines, books, petitions, letters and govern-
ment documents. The references and works used are annoted both in
the bibliography and in the footnotes.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Tanzania - the United Republic of Tanzania, 1964 to present.

Tanganyika - the colonial state, 1920 to 1963.

One-party State - as used here, a state in which by statutory law
the organization of rival parties is unlawful.

Quasi-groups - unless otherwise stated, African quasi-group refers
to all Africans in the country: African-parochial
quasi-group refers to quasi-groups based on ethnic
(tribal) groups: European quasi-group, all
Europeans; and Asian quasi-group, all Asians.

Ethnic groups - refers to tribes.

Race - as used here, refers to each of the three social categories
into which the population of Tanganyika was classified, namely
Europeans, Asians and Africans. Both the African and the
European categories formed entities which approximate or
correspond to what the anthropologists term the negroid and
caucasoid races, respectively. On the other hand, Asians
were a residual category, which did not correspond to the
anthropologist's definition of a race. However, in
Tanganyika, Asians and the other two categories, Europeans
and Africans were defined by the colonial state and were
treated and regarded as separate races. In many instances
these categories regarded themselves as belonging to different
races. In the text there will be documentation which shows
the extent to which associations, interest groups and
political parties used a racial frame of reference.

PROBLEM AND APPROACH

In the Third World, political parties have a relatively late history of development. This is especially true among ex-colonial countries where political parties emerged as a response to the colonial situation,[1] and matured into a replacement of the colonial state. The origins of such parties are thus seen to be imbedded in the very fabric of the colonial situation and are not just the result of latter day or, as some students deem, "postwar" influences. Similarly, the mechanism responsible for change--conflict--is likewise seen to be operating as a continuum which stretches from the most dormant, non-vocal discontent to the final reversal of power. A less broad perspective of political revolution would perhaps concern itself with only the visible and audible range of political phenomena, thereby restricting the understanding of the real and more subtle nature of party origin.

Among the recently independent nations of Africa, the emergence of the one-party state has been most prevalent. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the specific conditions responsible for the emergence and development of the one-party state. For this purpose

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1. For a detailed account of the colonial situation see George Balandier, "The Colonial Situation: A Theoretical Approach" in Immanuel Wallerstein, Social Change: The Colonial Situation, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966, pp. 34-61; also Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie, No. 11, 1951, pp. 44-79.

Tanganyika is chosen as an instance of this occurrence and will be analyzed in relation to the following propositions:

a. That the structure of the colonial situation is intrinsically conflict-generating and that this conflict, initially latent, may under certain circumstances become manifest.

b. That the conflict which arose from the colonial situation in Tanganyika developed along racial lines.

c. That under certain conditions such conflict leads to the emergence of a single political party among the subordinate quasi-group which may, in turn, be a prelude to the formation of a one-party state.

In this study, I examine the historical conditions of the Tanganyika colonial situation, which underly the development of events culminating in the creation of a one-party state in Tanganyika. I do so by raising questions as to the nature of the Tanganyika colonial situation, the manner in which it was conducive to conflict, the conditions under which the conflict became manifest, leading to the formation of political parties, the factors which promoted the development of a dominant single party system, and the role and function of the party in a one-party state.

The questions are raised in the hope that I may be able to find explanations, formulate generalizations and show relationships between the structure of the colonial situation and the origin, growth and development of party systems among Africans in colonial conflicts. The findings may also be a basis for comparative studies in comparable situations. Perhaps historical analysis of this type may clarify some

of the confusions created by previous studies, many of which have

analyzed one-party states in relation to concepts of democracy and/or

dictatorship.[2]

Because of the political and historical nature of this study,

2. Lionel Cliffe (ed.), One-Party Democracy: The 1965 Tanzania General
   Elections, Nairobi: The English Press Ltd., 1967. Gwendolen Carter
   (ed.), African One-Party States, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
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   Zolberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast, Princeton:
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   1965, Vol. XXV, No. 6, pp. 51-54; Michael Blundel, "Independence
   Puts the African on Trial," Optima, Vol. 11, No. 2, June, 1961,
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   tember, 1962, pp. 9-18; William McCord, "Democracy and Dicatorship
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   Julius Nyerere, "Will Democracy Work in Africa," Africa Special
   Report, Vol. 5, No. 2, February, 1960, pp. 3-4; Babatunde A. William,
   "The Prospects for Democracy in Africa," Phylon, Summer, 1961,
   pp. 174-179; Aristide R. Zolberg, "Government for the People,"
   Africa Today, Vol. 9, No. 4, April, 1962, pp. 4-7; Henry Bienen,

the historical-structural[3] approach will be employed. The main struc-
tural elements we shall discuss in this study are: the three races,
(in the sense specified in the definition of terms), ethnic groups, the
urban and the rural sectors, the peasants and the wage earners, the
labourers and the white collar workers, the trade unionists and the
middle class Africans. I shall analyze these structures, in both the
colonial and post-colonial epochs, from a historical perspective, as
dynamic rather than static phenomena. The causal relationships suggested
in the propositions cited above, are not assumed to be simply and
directly related.[4] In an effort to establish the causal relationship
between the development of the party system and the colonial conflict,
a multiple causation theory will be used. Under such a theoretical
analysis the final product--the creation of the one-party state--is the
consequence and product of the cumulative effects of the totality of
the combination of these various component factors? The end product,
in turn, is also related to and explained in terms of the specific
causal combination of these conditions. Thus it is assumed that the

The Role of Tann and The Five Year Plan, East African Institute
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Review, Vol. 55, March 1961, pp. 294-307; Aristide R. Zolberg,
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Henry Bienen, "The Ruling Party in the African One-Party State:
TANU in Tanzania," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 5,
No. 3, November, 1967, pp. 214-230.

3. Charles Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1955.

4. Herbert Hyman, Survey Design Analysis, New York: The Free Press,
1955.

same conditions when related differently may yield different results. Hence, specific causal relationships conducive to the formation of a one-party state may hold for only one pattern of causal relationship. While Tanganyika is employed as a case study,[5] use will also be made of some comparative material.

The preponderance of data used in this study is historical fact: events, statistics and statements. This information is available primarily from secondary sources and institutional documents. These sources as well as textual references are presented fully in an appended bibliography. Specific references are annotated in their respective chapters. The majority of publications referred to are available in libraries in the United States. The specific libraries I visited are: The UCLA Libraries, Library of Congress, United Nation Trusteeship Council Library, United Kingdom United Nations Mission Information Library, Tanzania U.N. Mission Information Library, Uganda U.N. Mission Information Library, Boston University African Studies Library, Syracuse University East African Studies Center Library and Harvard Social Relations Library.

The problem of explaining the genetic and causal relationship between the colonial situation and the origin, growth and development of party systems which culminated in the creation of the one-party state in Tanzania is presented in the nine chapters which follow.

5. For a detailed account of the case study as a sociological approach, see Seymour M. Lipset, "Methodological Note," Urban Democracy; The Internal Politics of the International Typographical Union, New York: Doubleday Books, 1962, pp. 470-492.

Chapter I discusses the colonial situation. Chapter II presents the general geography and demography of Tanganyika, necessary information for characterizing the structural units in the colonial conflict. Chapters III and IV are concerned with the reasons why the structure of the colonial situation is intrinsically conflict-generating, whereas Chapter V deals with the conditions under which the conflict becomes manifest and is expressed through political parties. The nature of the colonial conflict, and of the conflict between the opposed parties, together with party ideologies, programmes and membership are discussed in Chapter VI. Chapter VII looks at the conditions under which a strong party system developed among Africans in Tanganyika. Chapter VIII looks at the conditions under which Tanganyika became a one-party state, and further examines the role, functions and structure of the party in a one-party state. Lastly, Chapter IX presents conclusions.

CHAPTER I

THE COLONIAL SITUATION

This chapter deals with the colonial situation and its relevance for this case study. Pertinent thinking of colonial researchers will be reviewed and from this parameters will evolve on the subject applicable to Tanganyika. These parameters represent a material summary of the study which will then follow.

COLONIAL SITUATION

Since first formulated by the French sociologist Balandier, the concept of colonial situation has become increasingly accepted among analysts of African political parties. According to this concept, a colonial territory is conceived as a single power structure within which several strata, caste-like in form, exist. These strata are almost always distinguished on racial grounds. One stratum, a numerical minority, dominates the rest politically, economically and technologically. The dominant stratum in almost all colonies consists of Europeans, the majority of whom are citizens of the metropolitan power. Because the subordinated group is denied full participation in the exercise of colonial power, the colonial situation tends to generate discontent among the dominated group.

Basically, the concept of the colonial situation refers to the

same structure described by Furnivall as the plural society.[1]

Those who have studied the rise of colonial conflict and political parties in Africa have traced the source of colonial conflict directly to the colonial situation. Thus Balandier has written: "African parties are essentially products of a 'colonial situation'-- in the sense of a situation in which an indigeneous society is politically, economically, and culturally subordinate to a dominant European group."[2]

In general, however, explanations regarding the causes of colonial conflict vary tremendously. These explanations range from psychological to historical explanations. Among those who employ the former is O. Mannoni.[3] Although Mannoni writes on the Malagasies, he generalizes his findings to all colonial situations.[4] He explains the emergence of colonial conflict in terms of a psychological theory of dependence-relationship. By this theory the colonised, or dominated,

1. For a full discussion of this use of the term plural society, see John Sydenham Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice, London: Oxford University Press, 1960; Ansu Datta, Tanganyika: A Government in a Plural Society, The Hague, Leiden, 1953.

2. Quoted in Thomas Hodgkins, African Political Parties, Penguin African Series, 1961, p. 21.

3. Dominique O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban; The Psychology of Colonialisation, translated by Pamela Powesland, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964.

4. Dominique O. Mannoni, ibid., p. 62; also see Frantz Fanon, "The So-called Dependency Complex of Colonized People," in Black Skin and White Mask, translated by Constance Fallington, New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967, pp. 83-108.

have dependence-traits which lead them to establish dependence-relation-
ships with their colonizers. As long as this dependence-relationship
lasts the colonized people are content. The loss of the relationship,
on the other hand, makes the colonized people resentful of their
colonizers:

> When he has succeeded in forming such relations with
> his superiors, his inferiority no longer troubles
> him; everything is all right. When he fails to
> establish them, when his feelings of insecurity are
> not assuaged in this way, he suffers a crisis.
> This may, as I have shown, revive old memories of
> abandonment and lead to an outburst of hostility.
> ...at the same time, in their efforts to escape
> the horrors of abandonment, the Malagasies
> endeavour to reestablish typical dependence systems
> capable of satisfying deepest needs.[5]

The need to establish typical dependence systems, in turn leads the

Malagasies to join nationalist movements. So, according to Mannoni,

the Malagasies who join nationalist movements are merely replacing

the white masters with the nationalist "agitators." "Political systems

and constitutions meant nothing to them. They wanted these particular

leaders in order to restore the broken bonds of dependence which they

saw no hope of re-establishing with the Europeans."[6]

Although Mannoni maintains that the conflict which arise from

the colonial situation can be explained only in terms of psychological

analysis, his approach is inadequate. At best it gives us insight

into the psychology of symptoms while the source remains structurally

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5. Mannoni, op. cit., pp. 61-62.

6. Ibid., p. 138.

problematic. Since the colonial conflict is a structural problem, it
cannot be explained adequately by psychological analysis alone.

. Those who employ an historical analysis of the colonial problem
fall into two broad groups. One group in its analysis of the colonial
conflict emphasizes events of post-World War Two. Among such writers
are Hodgkin, Kilson, Wallerstein and Coleman.[7] The other group sees
post-war events as having merely accelerated deeper and more salient
forces. Among these is Rotberg. Rotberg and others[8] perceive post-
war events merely as the final coordination and intensification of all
the "tangled strands of earlier, usually unrecognized dissatisfaction."
This approach which is more inclusive takes into account the whole
colonial history. Events such as the uprising of John Chilembwe of
Nyasaland, which took place in 1915,[9] are generally considered
precursors to nationalism.

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7. Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, London, Man and
    Series, 1956; African Political Parties, London, The Penguin
    African Series, 1961; Martin Kilson, Political Change in a Western
    African State: A Study of Modern Process in Sierra Leone, Cambridge
    Harvard University Press, 1966; also "Nationalism and Social
    Classes in British West Africa," in Immanuel Wallerstein, Social
    Change; The Colonial Situation, New York: John Wiley and Sons,
    Inc., 1966, pp. 559-571; Thomas Hodgkin, "The African Middle Class,"
    in Wallerstein, ibid. pp. 359-362; James Coleman, "The Emergence
    of African Political Parties," in C. Grove Haines (ed.), Africa
    Today, Baltimore, John Hopkins Press, 1955, pp. 225-226; Crowford
    Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence,
    Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

8. Robert I. Rotberg, "The Rise of Nationalism: The Case of East and
    Central Africa," in Wallerstein, op. cit., pp. 505-519.

9. George A. Shepperson, The Independent African, Edinburgh: University
    Press, 1958.

Students[10] of collective behavior have observed some aspects of social movements which are similar to the dynamics of colonial conflict. Structural-functional analysts have developed elaborate models which can be applied to the colonial situation. In this approach, useful concepts for the study of colonial conflict appear to be structural strain and structural conduciveness. The application of these concepts would help uncover the specific strains in a particular colonial situation and would help explain why under certain conditions these strains are translated into open conflict while under other conditions they do not. Further, the concepts are useful in that they expose what these conditions are.

STRUCTURAL STRAINS

Tanganyika fits the model of a colonial situation. Unlike the West African colonies, however, Tanganyika's society had a three-tier pyramid consisting of three categories, Europeans, Asians and Africans as did the other East and Central African territories. This structure is summed up by Datta as follows: Thus in a pyramidal class structure the top is white and the base is black, while the middle which joins the two and merges with black and white is overwhelmingly brown.[11]

These positions on the pyramid gave rise to different interests which created a gap between the top, the highly privileged few, and the

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10. Neil Smelser, The Theory of Collective Behavior, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1964, esp. pp. 319-338 and 47-66.

11. Datta, op. cit., p. 25.

bottom, the relatively impoverished many. In turn this gap created
attitudes which were inimical to group integration and cooperation.
As the gap coincides with racial cleavages the colonial situation
became a stage for racial confrontation. In colonial Tanganyika, the
middle-group, the Asians, wavered in their support, and never assumed
a definite stand as shown in Chapter VI.

In terms of power, the structure of the colonial situation is
one of domination of the many by a minority. Because of this, the struc-
ture creates strains among the dominated strata whose members may in
time seek to change and rearrange the structure.

Since the colonial conflict arises directly from the strains
generated by the colonial situation, the task of this study will be
to expose the specific strains contained in the Tanganyikan colonial
situation and then to examine and relate them to the manifestation
of colonial conflict. The central question here is what are the
sources of the colonial strains, and what was the substance of these
strains. Taken as the basic sources of colonial strains in Tanganyika
are the unequal distribution of power in the colonial state, the
control of the central government and its various practices, and the
allocation of material resources such as salaries, wages, jobs, land
and housing facilities among the various races. Since the colonial
structure is characterized by unequal distribution of its power and
resources among its racial categories, it is intrinsically strain
generating. But the presence of these structural strains in a
colonial situation, does not necessarily lead to an open conflict.
For colonial strains to be translated into manifest colonial conflict,

other conditions must obtain. What then, are these conditions? One
such array of conditions is here termed structural conduciveness.

STRUCTURAL CONDUCIVENESS

The central problem posed here is, what are the components of
the structural conduciveness and how are they related to colonial
conflict? The concept of structural conduciveness gives a framework
for analyzing the context within which mobilization for colonial con-
flict in Tanganyika became manifest. Without these conditions of
structural conduciveness, the colonial strains in Tanganyika might have
found a totally different outlet. Basically, colonial conduciveness
refers to facilities and opportunities within the colonial situation
through which mobilization proceeds; in this process the strains may
be transformed into open conflict. It includes a broad range of factors
from the colonial state's policy and tolerance to the movement's own
requisite growth facility. Ethnographic literature on colonial
conflict indicates that the following conditions are generally pre-
requisite to the transformation of latent conflict to manifest: the
spread of education; a money economy; the break up of the traditional
stagnation of tribal horizons; legal provisions for organization; the
presence of a middle class; urbanization; the growth of the press and
the spread of communication.

It is generally agreed among writers on the subject that colonial
conflict does not arise immediately upon contact with or occupation
by the colonial ruler. L. Krader, a social scientist, notes that "the
nativistic cult is never a primary response; it necessarily occurs

late in the history of contact and invasion."[12] Mannoni, a French

psychologist, advances a similar thesis when the writes that, "racial

conflict is not, however, a primary or spontaneous phenomenon.

Racialism develops gradually in the course of events."[13] During this

course of events the rise of structural conflict is not an automatic

evolution. Certain conditions are necessary as mentioned above, for

colonial strains to be translated into open conflict. Among these

conditions is structural conduciveness.

Hodgkin and others stress leadership as a vital pre-requisite

to colonial conflict.[14] In the colonial situation, such leadership

comes mainly from the African middle class, composed largely of the

western-educated. This class supplies the energy of change to challenge

the colonial power structure. The challenge may be expressed openly

and through political parties if the existing structure permits

political organization. If the structure does not, the movement may

go underground. Conflict involving political parties normally occurs

when the legal structure facilitates and permits freedom of speech,

association and assembly.

12. Lawrence Krader, "A Nativistic Movement in Western Siberia," in
     American Anthropologist, Vol. 58, No. 2, April, 1956, p. 290.

13. Mannoni, op. cit., p. 11, also see the chapter on "The Colonial
     Situation and Racism," pp. 110-124.

14. Leonard Reissman, Urban Process: Cities in Industrial Societies,
     Glencoe: Free Press, 1964; Thomas Hodgkin, "The African Middle
     Class," in Wallerstein, op. cit.; Paul Mercier, "Problems in Social
     Stratification in West Africa," in Wallerstein, ibid., pp. 340-358;
     Kenneth Little, "The African Elite in British West Africa," in
     Andrew Lind (ed.); Conference on Race Relations in World Perspective,
     Honolulu, University of Honolulu Press, 1955, pp. 267-288; P.C.
     Lloyd, "New Economic Classes in Western Nigeria," in African

The presence of structures facilitating the dissemination of the movement is stressed by Burckhardt: "One of the essential preliminary conditions for revolution is a high development of traffic and a widespread similarity of thought."[15] Newspaper, radio, and television facilities were not available for the masses in Tanganyika. Further, in a multi-language country the spread of ideas by normal media is not easy. The question then arises, how did the nationalist ideas spread in Tanganyika? In Tanganyika, colonial education provided a common mass medium among the literate stratum. In addition, Tanganyika's long association with the Arabic world gave the country one common language--i.e., Swahili. Therefore the spread of the nationalist movement in Tanganyika did not suffer from linguistic problems.

Nationalism also spreads through the process of urbanization. Urbanization facilities internal migration which creates ties between town and country, town and town, and between countrymen themselves. In Tanganyika this provides avenues of dissemination into the otherwise isolated rural areas.

Wallerstein wrote that "a nationalist movement, in order to succeed, had to make battle for the minds of men. It had to try to

14. (continued) Affairs, October, 1953, pp. 327-334.

15. John Christoph Burckhardt, Force and Freedom: Reflections on History, New York: Pantheon Books, 1943, pp. 268-269.

inculcate among the majority of the people resident in a territory, a system of values and norms that was often at direct variance with that of legal government."[16] Such transformation and mobilization is usually a slow process, yet, in Tanganyika this was not the case. Within three years the whole country was under the influence of one party. The rapid spread and mobilization was the result of basic changes already contained in the structure of Tanganyika, as a result of the process of colonization, and imposition of colonial administration by both the German and the British. The political activities of the United Nations and its Visiting Missions precipitated dramatic changes and encouraged in the African masses receptivity to radical change. The indirect rule, as it was practiced in Tanganyika, also helped to stimulate political consciousness in rural Tanganyika.[17] Lastly, the Second World War may also have greatly accelerated political organization in Tanganyika, as it did elsewhere in Africa through the many Tanganyika Africans, who, by serving in armies in Asia, Europe and other parts of Africa increased their contact with the outside world and acquired new aspirations.

The cumulative effect of all these conditions of structural conduciveness provided a framework within which the transformation of

16. Immanuel Wallerstein, Africa: Politics of Independence, An Interpretation of Modern African History, New York: Vintage Books, 1961.

17. See Horace B. English, and Ava C. English, A Comprehensive Dictionary of Psychological and Psychoanalytic Terms, New York: Longmans Green, 1958; Earnest R. Hilgard, Theories of Learning, New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1956. Also see discussion on cross-cultural and the adoption of changes, Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962.

latent conflict, (i.e., colonial strains) into manifest conflict
proceeded. Once manifest, the next problem is, what is the form and
nature of the colonial conflict?

COLONIAL CONFLICT

In the Third World colonial conflict is basically a racial
conflict. Why? To answer this question, the colonial conflict in
Tanganyika is examined using Dahrendorf's quasi-group model.[18]   In
terms of power conflict, Dahrendorf's imperatively coordinated associ-
ation does not differ structurally from the colonial state. The
only difference in the former is that the quasi-groups are based on
classes, while in the latter they are based on race.

Like members of social classes in an imperatively co-ordinated
association, members of one race in a colonial situation are placed
in identical authority-positions. In this respect members of one
race resemble what Dahrendorf calls a quasi-group. By this term he
is referring to:

> Aggregates or portions of the community which
> have recognizable structure, but whose members
> have certain interests or modes of behavior in
> common, which may at any time lead them to form
> themselves into a definite group. To this
> category of quasi-groups belong such entities as
> social classes, which without being groups, are a
> recruiting field for groups, and whose members
> have certain characteristic modes of behavior in
> common.[19]

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18. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society,
    Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965.

19. Ibid., p. 180.

As members of one race find themselves in a common situation and derive similar latent interests from their positions, they resemble Dahrendorf's "portions of the community which have recognizable structure," and demonstrate certain interests and modes of behavior in common.

Thus in Tanganyika the three racial categories, Europeans, Asians, and Africans are seen as forming three quasi-groups from which conflict groups (political parties) arose.[20] The model of quasi-group in a colonial conflict does not imply that members of the different races are engaged in the open conflict, but rather only the members of the conflict groups themselves; i.e., political parties. But the races form potential conflict-groups.

Since colonial conflict usually arises from an attempt by parties from the subordinate quasi-group to change the power structure, which in turn evokes resistance from the dominant group, the emerging parties are racial in nature. But as the cleavages between quasi-groups in colonial situations coincide with racial divisions, the conflict takes on a racial tone. This racial character is then reflected in the political organization's membership, ideologies and programs.[21] Once the conflict has started to be manifested through

20. Ibid., pp. 181-187; See also Kurt H. Wolff, Sociology of Georg Simmel, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, especially section on "Authority and Domination" for a detailed discussion of party membership see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organisation and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara and Robert North, Science Editions, 1963, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., "Party Membership," pp. 61-132.

21. Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements, An Introduction to Political Sociology, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951.

political parties, the next problem is, how is the development of the
party system determined?

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY SYSTEMS IN A COLONIAL SITUATION

If mobilization is to be strictly along racial cleavages, the
parties being purely racial, then, since the Africans form the great
majority of the population, the African party will be the largest.
But events in Tanganyika and the general literature of colonial conflict,
do not support this thesis. However, in terms of probability, and
given the nature of the colonial power structure, the probability that
a single largest party will emerge from the largest quasi-group is
very high.

The size of the party becomes relevant when the method for
changing the power structure, as in the colonial situation, and the
control of the structures of power, as in the post-colonial era,
involve numerical strength. This was the case not only in Tanganyika
but in most of the white settler dominated British colonies. Because
of the importance of numerical strength, it follows that at a
particular stage of the colonial situation such as when elections
are introduced in which members of the subordinate quasi-groups are
given the right to vote, the dominant white minority would seek to
retain control by de-emphasizing the racial issues in their organizations.
On the other hand, leaders of organizations from the subordinate quasi-
group would emphasize racial issues and their organizations would tend
to be more racialistic in nature.

As regards the African quasi-group, the relevant question is
what are the factors affecting, and how do these factors hinder or

foster, the development of a single territorial party.

Various party systems have emerged from colonial conflict. In some areas such as Uganda and Sierra Leone, two fairly strong parties have emerged. Several competing parties arose in Kenya and Nigeria. In Tanganyika and Malawi only one strong party emerged from the African quasi-group. Since very strong single-parties have not developed in all the territories which have had colonial conflict, this section will examine the specific conditions which are related to the development of a strong one-party system in Tanganyika.

Intensity of Colonial Conflict

In a conflict within the colonial situation the organizations of the subordinate quasi-group are basically in competition with those of the superordinate group. Assuming that the function of conflict is to unite the in-groups against the out-groups as Coser asserts,[22] unity should increase with the intensity of colonial conflict, as expressed through the creation of a single party. If colonial conflict is taken to mean overt conflict, then Tanganyika unlike Kenya should be the least likely territory to have such unity since it is generally agreed that racial conflict in Tanganyika was not intense. However, when considered as a continuum, from latent to manifest, conflict in Tanganyika was tense, and as such promoted unity among Africans and thus greatly encouraged the creation of a strong single party from the African quasi-group.

22. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956, Georg Simmel, Conflict, Trans. by Kurt H. Wolff, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955.

Occupational Differentiation

In literature on political sociology, especially in industrial

societies, occupational cleavages have figured prominently as bases

for competing political parties, expressive of the class struggle.[23]

Here, classes which are economic strata form quasi-groups. Parties

as agents of social classes, are of course specially emphasized in

the writings of Marx and his followers.[24] Many studies on the politics

of the western countries, especially in the United States, also tend

to support the significance of social class as a basis for party

politics.

These studies indicate that a high level of occupational

differentiation is usually a prerequisite for this relationship to

hold. In Tanganyika on the other hand, there was no high occupational

23. Seymour Lipset, Political Man, Social Basis of Politics, New York:
    Doubleday, 1960; Party Systems and the Representation of Social
    Groups, Reprint No. 161, University of California, Berkeley, 1961;
    Political Cleavages in Developed and Emerging Politics, Reprint
    No. 244, I.T.R., University of California Press, 1964; The Changing
    Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics, Reprint No. 223,
    Institute of International Relations and Institute of International
    Studies, University of California Press, 1964.

24. Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels, The Communist Manifesto, New York,
    International Publishers, 1963; Vladimir I. Lenin, State and
    Revolution, New York: International Publishers, 1932; Milovan
    Djilas, The New Class, New York: Praeger, 1957; Friedrick Engels
    The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State, London
    and New York, International Publishers, 1933; Karl Marx, The Eigh-
    teenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, London and New York, Interna-
    tional Publishers, 1933; The Civil War in France, London, Interna-
    tional Publishers, 1933; Dahrendorf, op. cit., Guenther Roth, The
    Social Democrat in Imperial Germany, Totong: The Bredminister
    Press, 1963, pp. 250-256. Richard Centers, Psychology of Social
    Class, A Study of Class Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton
    University Press, 1949.

differentiation in the African quasi-group.[25] Although there were

economic cleavages such as that between the peasants and the wage-

earners, this differentiation was not sufficiently developed to create

social classes, nor did it create cleavages between the wage-earners

and the peasant farmer. In fact for most Africans the occupational

differentiation was apparently not a relevant divisive factor which

could prevent Africans from forming a single political party.

Ethnicity

Africans under colonial domination form a quasi-group only

in relation to their position in the colonial rule. Historically,

they are mostly aggregates of numerous ethnic communities. To many

Africans, ethnic loyalty has more meaning than their position in the

authority structure of the territory.[26] Thus, these ethnic communities

form potential fields of organizational recruiting. Both Zolberg and

Young[27] support this thesis. Zolberg, writing on the Ivory Coast,

shows how ethnic loyalty led to multi-party competition in the early

history of the country's colonial conflict. Young's research on the

Congo confirms that ethnic loyalty can be a base of strong parochial

25. Martin Kilson, Political Change in a West African State, op. cit., Crawford Young, op. cit., pp. 232-306.

26. Zolberg, op. cit., section on "Traditional Societies," pp. 11-18, Young, op. cit., section on "The Politics of Ethnicity," pp. 232-272.

27. Martin Kilson, op. cit., section on "Political Awakening of the Peasants," pp. 60-64.

quasi-groups. Where this is the case, the creation of a strong single territorial party from the African quasi-group becomes an impossibility.

This section, which uses data on Tanganyika, raises the question, under what conditions oes ethnicity become a non-divisive factor in a colonial conflict. The history of Tanganyika, with well over 100 ethnic groups, reveals that ethnicity did not play a significant divisive role in organizing the Africans. Below is a brief analysis of conditions, extracted from literature on colonialism in Africa, which helps explain why ethnicity did not become a divisive factor in Tanganyika.

The Size and Degree of Modernization Among the Ethnic Communities

From ethnographic literature on colonial situation, it appears that the size of ethnic groups has encouraged relevance on ethnicity as a basis for rival African political parties. Often ethnicity has become a basis of political parties when there are one or two large ethnic groups such as was the case in Uganda or Kenya. In Uganda, the Ganda, the largest ethnic group--one and a half million out of five and a half million people, became a basis for political organization. In order to exert their influence the traditional oriented Baganda formed the Kabaka Yekka party. Indeed through out the whole period of the colonial conflict in Uganda, Ganda ethnic loyalty was a constant source of internal division within the African quasi-group. In Kenya a number of small ethnic groups formed the Kenya African Democratic Union in opposition to the Kenya African National Union, which was dominated by the two largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu about two million out of six million people and the Jaluo, which

was the second largest ethnic group. Size of the ethnic groups seemed also to have played a significant role in making ethnicity a basis of political parties in Nigeria, Ghana, Southern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo. In all these places, there was the presence of one or two fairly large ethnic groups. Thus it seems, the presence of a large ethnic group is one of the prerequisites for ethnicity to be a basis for the formation of rival African political parties during the colonial situation.

Colonial societies are unequally developed. Normally, development depends on the economic planning of the colonial government, the strategy of which is governed by yield per unit cost of development. It follows that cash crops become a staple of rural development. As these are introduced into areas of most favorable yield, a marketing, transportation and communication network develops parallel to the developments already introduced. Areas of low yield remain correspondingly undeveloped.[28] As ethnic residence coincides with ecological geography, those ethnic groups in areas which are developed will be more modernized.

This unequal rate of development may cause friction between "underdeveloped" and "overdeveloped" ethnic groups, as was the case in Uganda and Kenya. In the former, the Baganda became a source of envy and a target of hatred by the "rest" of the country. In Tangan-

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28. Anold L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958; *Urbanization and Social Change in Africa*, a paper read at University of Manchester, Centre for Development Studies. Francois Borella, "Federalisme et Decolonization," *Esprit*, Vol. 26, Janvier, 1958, pp. 229-234.

yika, however, although unequal development occurred, it was not a divi-
sive factor, even though the Chaggas, and to a lesser degree, the Hayas,
were "overdeveloped" in relation to the rest of the country. The
lack of cleavages arising from differential or unequal modernization
was mainly a result of the low level of the general economic develop-
ment in the country. Even the Chagga's level of development did not
approach that of the Bagandas or Ibos.

Although ecological development can be a function of allocation
in agriculture, this relationship is not consistent for mining and
industry. Research on the Copperbelt and similar areas indicates a
relative lack of development among surrounding ethnic communities.[29]

For unequal regional development to play a divisive role it is
necessary that such development penetrate to the society. This is
more common in areas of rural agricultural development and only attains
a divisive effect when the level is of high contrast among regions.

The Location of the Capital and the Most Economically Developed
Ethnic Group

It appears that a relationship exists between the capital and
the distance of the ecological location of the most developed ethnic
communities on the one hand and the conflict between ethnic groups on

29. Francois Borella, op. cit.; Cordero Torres, "L'Administration des
    Territories d'Afrique," Revue Internationale des Sciences Adminis-
    tratives, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1956, pp. 175-192; F. Van Langenhove,
    "Factors of Decolonisation," Civilisations, Vol. 11, No. 4, 1961,
    pp. 401-428; Alan Spacensky, "L'evolution Politique Malgache,
    (1945-66)," Revue Francaise de Science Politique, Vol. 16, No. 2.,
    April 1967, pp. 263-285.

the other. In areas such as Uganda and Kenya where the national capitals are in the areas of the most developed ethnic communities, the less developed ethnic communities sometimes cluster together in opposition to the more developed ethnic groups. As the capital is the center of politics, its ethnic balance becomes an added divisive factor. When the capital coincides with the residence of the most developed ethnic community, the effect seems to be a heightening of its political status, political ascendancy coinciding with economic prominence. The combination of both political and economic leadership increases the likelihood of other ethnic communities joining together against the developed ethnic groups.

The level of urbanization becomes a relevant factor when referring to the relations between the capital city and other towns. If the capital dominates every other town, it may become a unifying center which attracts the most eminent leaders. Thus, the capital becomes the center of politics and the headquarters of national movements. If towns of comparable status are also regional headquarters, they may become bases for regional political organizations. As their status is comparable to that of the national capital, the latter will lack the monopoly of the eminent leaders. Further, as the regions coincide with ethnic communities, as was the case in the Congo, the two reinforce each other.

The Structure of the Central Government and the Development of Party Systems

The proposition suggested here is that the relationship between the structure of the central government and the unity of the African

quasi-group depends on the degree of centralization. A highly central-
ized government reduces the autonomy of regional politics. As the
center of power is the central government itself, national issues
rather than regional issues gain prominence. Consequently, the paro-
chial quasi-group lacks a strong lobby among leaders striving for
access and control of central government. As a result, the territorial
quasi-group assumes a disproportionate importance.

The structure of the administrative units provides another
factor in the distribution of power. Normally a decentralized govern-
ment has large regional administrative units whereas centralized
governments have small ones. The regional units of the centralized
government are therefore devoid of prestige and are economically incap-
able of attracting the highest echelon personnel. The parochial
units therefore suffer a loss of quality in their administration.

The ethnic content of the administrative units influences their
power. Normally, the structure of the centralized government divides
one ethnic group into several administrative subdivisions. These
subdivisions become the center of political activities and usually
gain political status. Where one tribe is divided into several dis-
tricts, as the Chagga of Tanganyika or the Chewa of Nyasaland, the
districts become the center of activities. One district is pitted
against the other as they compete over resources. This hinders the
development of ethnic pride. Residents begin to identify themselves
more with their district than with their ethnic community. When small
units embody several ethnic communities, feelings of ethnic loyalty
are reduced. Consequently, the ethnic communities fail to challenge

and compete with the territorial quasi-group. It is thereofre apparent
that a centralized and unified government creates conditions which
are less favorable for the rising to prominence of parochial quasi-
groups.

The Elective Principle and the Widening of the Franchise

Elections are related to the development of party systems. As
this involves the winning of votes, elections indirectly encourage
the creation of parties. This contention is supported by the political
history of Britain in the 18th and 19th centuries and similar trends
have been observed in the colonial situation.[30]   In Uganda, the lack
of strong political parties was associated with the absence of elections
and the limited franchise. This is the reasoning given by the Wild
Report which investigated the constitutional problems of Uganda.[31]
In the former Belgian Congo, Young equates the sudden outburst of
parties with the introduction of elections.[32]   The same effect was ob-
served in the Ivory Coast's early history of political parties. However,
in Tanganyika and Nyasaland the introduction of the elective principle

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30. Seymour M. Lipset, "The Parties of the Third World," in Political
     Cleavages in Developed and Emerging Polities, op. cit., pp. 38-51.

31. Uganda Protectorate, Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1959.
     Government Printer, Entebbe, 1959. Young, op. cit., "The Rise
     of-Nationalism, From Primary Resistance to Political Parties,"
     pp. 273-306. Donald A. Low, Political Parties in Uganda 1949-
     1962, University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies,
     Commonwealth Papers No. 8, The Athlone Press. René Lemarchand,
     Political Awakening in the Congo, Berkeley, University of California
     Press, 1964.

32. Crawford Young, op. cit.

did not lead to proliferation of political parties. Thus using the Tanganyika case, it is hoped a tentative answer may be offered to show the conditions under which the introduction of the elective principle and the widening of the franchise in a colonial situation is related to the creation and development of a strong single territorial party.

The Electoral Systems Introduced in the Colonial Epoch

A relationship exists between the types of voting and the various party systems.[33] Among those who have written on this relationship is Duverger. One relationship he discusses is that between the simple majority single ballot system and the two-party systems. He comments that, "the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system."[34] This thesis does not seem to apply in the colonial situation. Instead, we find that the simple majority single ballot system normally favors the development of a one-party system.[35] The history of the evolution of one-party states in the Ivory Coast demonstrates this hypothesis. M. Felix Houphouet-Boigny used this voting system to eliminate rival parties. Instead of several constituencies, the entire country became a single constituency. These measures led to the domination of the national assembly by one party and the total demise of opposition. Tanganyika's simple-majority single-ballot system

33. For a full discussion of relationship between political party systems and voting systems see Duverger, op. cit., pp. 206-280.

34. Duverger, op. cit., p. 217.

35. Zolberg, op. cit., section on "The Emergence of a One-Party System," pp. 149-218.

similarly operated toward the elimination of rival parties.

The proportional representative system of voting on the other hand favors the existence of multi-parties.[36] The types of voting and the electoral systems introduced in the colonial situation have direct influence on the development of party systems. Thus this section is concerned with the problem of the conditions, in the colonial situation, under which the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the development of a single-party system.

THE CREATION OF A ONE-PARTY STATE

On the eve of independence each British colony had a multi-party system. In some countries there existed one party with a preponderance of strength as was the case in Tanganyika. This single party had a monopoly of representation in the national assembly but the country did not technically constitute a one-party state. A one-party state is a result of a law passed by the national assembly.[37]

This section is concerned with the problem of what are the conditions under which a post-colonial country becomes a one-party state. It seems plausible that there is always a likelihood of political leaders staying perpetually in power if they can do so. By the same token it seems logical that a possibility always exists for any political party in power to perpetuate itself as the legitimate

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36. For a general discussion of proportional representation see Duverger, op. cit., pp. 245-255.

37. Colin Legum, op. cit.; Lewis, op. cit.; Myerere and the Party System, in Myerere: Freedom and Unity, London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

government, but this is impossible without certain supportive conditions. These conditions are not common but they did exist in certain periods of the post-colonial era. Consequently it is proposed that there are certain conditions under which a party in power can make itself the only legitimate party, and that when these conditions prevail as in some post-colonial epochs, a party in power may and/or does do so. The basic question in this section is what were the conditions in post-colonial Tanganyika under which the party in power—the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), turned Tanganyika into a one-party state? Basically, the conditions are taken to consist of the following: the presence of Tanu as a dominant political party, Tanu's overwhelming control of the Legislature, the popularity of Tanu and its leaders, especially Nyerere, and the absence of counter-checks in the country at large.

The relation between the conditions mentioned in the preceding sections and the creation of a one-party state in Tanganyika is discussed in the seven chapters which follow.

CHAPTER II

THE GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHY OF TANGANYIKA

Each of the African one-party states has divisions and cleavages
based on geographic, demographic, economic and religious factors. Tan-
ganyika, like the other Eastern African territories, had peoples of
different races and of different ethnic groups who lived at different
economic levels and had different levels of racial or different ethnic
consciousness. According to Lewis, these factors in West Africa "com-
bine to produce antagonisms which menace the unity of the state. The
result of these mutual antagonisms is that every political party has a
geographical base. Some tribes support it; others are hostile to it,
or at best indifferent. A single-party supported equally by all tribes
is an impossible dream."[1] This chapter, which is part of a study of the
conditions under which the colonial conflict in the Tanganyikan colonial
situation culminated in the creation of the one-party state looks at
these demographic, geographic and religious factors insofar as they may
throw light on the development of the one-party state. Basically, the
chapter raises this question: how significant were race, ethnicity,
religion and regionalism as independent bases of power and as bases of
political party formation in the colonial situation? The chapter offers

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1. Arthur W. Lewis, "Beyond African Dictatorship: The Crisis of One-
    Party State," <u>Encounter</u>, August, 1965, p. 4.

geographic and demographic information relevant to this question.

GEOGRAPHY

Tanzania lies south of the equator, stretching from Victoria Nyanza in the north to Lake Nyasa in the South, with the Indian Ocean on her eastern border. Her area of 361,800 square miles includes 21,100 square miles of inland waters.[2]

In general, Tanzania is a country of great topographical contrast, presenting the two extremes of relief features characteristic of the continent of Africa. These are the highlands, dominated by Mount Kilimanjaro (Africa's only permanent ice-cap), and the deep trough-like depression of the Great Rift Valley filled by several lakes, the largest of which are Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa. Except for a narrow coast, the land lies at an altitude of over 1,000 feet. From the coastal plains of the Indian Ocean, the land rises gradually to a central plateau, about 400 feet above sea level, which is sharply defined along its eastern and western margins by steep and eroded escarpments which, in some places, reach altitudes of over 7,000 feet. Toward the west, the land falls away to the level of the Great Rift Valley Lakes.

Tanzania has many rivers, all of which form two apparent river systems. One system flows to the east, draining its waters into the Indian Ocean, while the other system heads west to the Great Rift

2. Central Statistical Bureau, *Statistical Abstract*, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1957-1964; John P. Moffett, *A Handbook of Tanganyika*, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1958.

Valley. During the dry season most of these rivers cease flowing.

The vegetation of the country is predominantly that of tropical and semi-arid areas. The open woodland, consisting mainly of bush, grassland, or thicket characterizes most of the Central Plateau which is renowned for its aridity. Mangrove swamps and palms dominate a greater part of the coastal plains, while the remainder of the country is predominantly sub-tropical and semi-arid.

Tanzania may be roughly divided into three broad climatic zones. Tropical conditions with temperatures averaging 76 degrees Fahrenheit and high humidity with an annual rainfall of about 40 inches characterize the coast and intermediate hinterland. The Central Plateau is marked by hot and dry conditions with considerable daily and seasonal temperature variation. However, at higher altitudes, semi-temperate conditions with occasional frost is experienced the majority of the time. The third zone, the sub-tropical, characterizes the larger part of the country. One seasonal rainfall visits this region between December and May. It is highly irregular in both amount and occurence. Much of the land is not conducive to settlement, especially for Europeans. However, the highlands compare very favorably with those of either Kenya or South Africa in what is described as suitability for European settlement.[3] Because the area attracted both the Europeans and the Africans, competition over limited areas of fertile lands led to racial conflict which became very tense in the 1950's.

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3. J. Moffett, ibid.

During the colonial epoch, Tanganyika was divided into several administrative provinces. The provinces, although political units, tended to reflect distinctive geographical differences. These geo-graphical differences led to different concentrations of populations, making some provinces, which were more desirable than others, centers of racial conflict.

Central Province, the greater part of which lies within the central plateau, has an average altitude of between 3,000 and 5,000 feet above sea level. Due to an annual rainfall of less than 25 inches, this province has the most arid conditions of all. The hostile climate and lack of vegetation make a large part of the province uninhabitable. Because of the unfavorable geographic conditions, it remained relatively undeveloped. Attempts in the 1950's to develop the area through the Groundnut Project proved a failure. The lack of economic development explains why the ethnic groups remained relatively undeveloped and not very politically active in the 1950's.

Eastern Province lies mainly along the coast with a comparatively low altitude of about 500 feet. Its coastal plains present a scenic topography of undulating and broken hills in contrast to the flatness of Central Province. This area is very suitable for agriculture due to its high rainfall and great river system. Although the high humidity and temperature are very uncomfortable for those not indigenous to the tropics. Africans, Indians, and Europeans of Tanzania have co-inhabited the area for a long period of time. The moderate altitude is conducive to good communications. As Table 5:8 shows, the province is highly cosmopolitan and its long contact with the East underlies its

lack of strong ethnic-consciousness among the Africans in this area. The presence of Dar-es-Salaam emphasizes the cosmopolitan nature of the province. It was the center of Tanganyika politics.

On the western side of the country lie Lake Province and West Lake Province, which consist of flat rolling terrain lying between 3,000 and 4,000 feet.[4] With fairly low temperatures and an annual rainfall of over 35 inches, the area is one of the most habitable. The Haya and the Sukuma, who live in this area, were the most economically developed ethnic groups in Tanganyika and during the 1950's the province was highly politically conscious.

Northern Province, an extremely mountainous region, contains Mount Kilimanjaro (19,340 feet), Mount Meru (14,979 feet), Hanang (11,215 feet), and Oldeani (10,460 feet).[5] An annual rainfall of over 40 inches, sub-temperate climate and fertile soil make this province the best area for settlement in the entire country.

Tanga Province resembles the adjacent Northern Province in climate, geography, and suitability for settlement. Southern High-land Province, a similarly mountainous area, has a markedly mixed climate.[6] Consequently, a portion of the land is suitable for a broad range of tropical crops. Due to its high altitude and generally semi-

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4. J. Moffett, ibid., pp. 165-166.

5. "Some Hints on Climbing Masailand Mountains," Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 26, December, 1948, and No. 31, July, 1951 issues.

6. Central Statistical Bureau, Statistical Abstract, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1963, p. 2; J. Moffett, ibid., p. 201.

temperate climate, this area is very heavily settled with European
farmers.

Resembling these two provinces is the Southern Highland Pro-
vince.[7] As its name suggests, this region is a very mountainous area
with great variety and contrasts in climatic conditions. Consequently,
its soils are suitable for a variety of tropical crops. Due to its
high altitude and semi-temperate climate, this area is very heavily
settled by European farmers. The ethnic groups which lived in the
fertile areas of the Southern Highlands, the Northern and Tanga Provinces,
as shown in Chapters IV and VI, were both economically very advanced and
as a result of conflict over land between them and the Europeans, they
experienced most intense racial conflict.

In the extreme south of the country lies the Southern Province,
presenting a widely diversified topography which ranges from the sandy
coral shores with mangrove forests against a background of low country,
to the inland highlands which in places reach heights of well over
7,000 feet. Although this province has ample rainfall and a very good
drainage system,[8] it has not attracted many settlers.

The Western Province is a region of relatively uniform climate
with an annual average rainfall of 30 inches. The climate and generally
fertile soil of Western Province can support a fairly large population,

7. J. Moffett, ibid., p. 249; also, Tanganyika Notes and Records,
   June 12, 1954.

8. R. B. Barker, "Rivers of Southern Tanganyika," Tanganyika Notes and
   Records, No. 24, Dec. 1947; Captain C.H.B. Grant, Tanganyika Notes
   and Records, No. 23, June, 1947, pp. 29-30.

having much better conditions for settlement and farming than Central
Province. The ethnic groups, e.g., the Nyamwezi, who live in this area,
were relatively developed economically. Like Central Province, however,
this area did not attract European settlers, and hence lacked tho
political stimulus of racial conflict.

DEMOGRAPHY

The population of Tanzania is relatively sparse. The last
census, taken in 1957, showed a total population of 8,785,613;
8,662,684 Africans, 95,505 Asians, 20,534 Europeans, and 6,890 other.
According to the latest estimates[9] the total population is 9,798,000,
of whom 9,656,000 are Africans, 115,600 Asians, 21,100 Europeans and
4,900 are classified as other. Thus, within the last ten years the
estimated population increase is over a million. Table 2:1 shows
Tanganyika's population growth between 1913 and 1967.

Within each of the three racial categories there is an extremely
high degree of heterogeneity.[10] The basic internal divisions within
the African population are ethnic (see Map I). The 1957 census shows
the existence of 140 tribes, 20 of which were so small they are
normally disregarded. Although the most generally accepted figure is
120, the 1921 census shows 75, and the 1937 and 1952 censuses show
120. Since there is no established standard of classification, the
exact number is not known, and with the modern tendency towards national-

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9. Central Statistical Bureau, op. cit., 1963, p. 11; also, Population
Census, 1957.

10. Central Statistical Bureau, op. cit., 1957-1964.

ism which de-emphasizes tribalism, there is little hope of any serious attempt to define tribal lines in the next census. These ethnic divisions did not become a basis of political organization for Africans, either during the colonial conflict or in the post-colonial epoch. (See Chapters V and VII below for further discussion of the ethnic divisions.)

Of the 120 ethnic groups in Tanganyika, in 1957, only the Sukuma numbered more than a million--(1,093,767), out of 8,785,613 African. The second largest ethnic group was the Nyamwezi, which was 363,258. Indeed, there were ten ethnic groups with over 200,000 persons and only 23 ethnic groups had over 100,000 persons. The 23 largest ethnic groups totalled only half of the total population of Tanganyika. So it appears that in colonial Tanganyika there was no single ethnic group which was large enough to be a basis for forming a political party to control the state. The Sukuma, the largest ethnic group consisted of only about 12 percent of the whole population. Even if the ten largest ethnic groups had aligned together they would not have formed more than a third of the whole population. So this absence of an ethnic group large enough to constitute a basis for political domination explains in part why ethnicity did not become politically significant in Tanganyika during the colonial conflict.

The majority of the 120 tribes belong to the Bantu stock.[11]

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11. For a detailed discussion of Tanzania Ethnography see Tanganyika Annual Report; Colonial Number 220, 1947, p. 5; Colonial Number 293, 1952, London, H.M.S.S., 1948 and 1953; Diedrich Westermann, Africa Today and Tomorrow, London: Oxford University Press, 1949; Charles G. Seligman, Races of Africa, London: Oxford University Press, 1939, pp. 156-64; Sir Harry A. Johnston, The Kilimanjaro

Goldthorpe estimates that over 80 percent of the African population
falls into this group. Data from ethnographic literature reveals that
in addition to linguistic similarities, persons classified as Bantu
have similar social and political institutions, the latter tending to
be centralized.[12]

The non-Bantu peoples may be grouped into four types. These
are: the Iraqw consisting of Iraqw, Garowa, Alawa and Burungi; the
Nilo-Hamitic including Masai, Tatog, Barabaigans, and Arusha; the
Click-Speaking including Sandawe and Hadzapi; and the Nilotic with the
Jalou as the only sizeable known community in Tanzania belonging to
this stock.

Like the Bantu group, communities belonging to any one of
these stocks tend to have similarities in language structure, social
institutions and political institutions.[13] Physical anthropologists,

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11. (continued) Expedition, London, Oxford University Press, 1886,
    pp. 404-426; United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories
    in East Africa; Report on Tanganyika together with related documents,
    1954, p. 126; Walter Fitzgerald, Africa: A Social, Economic and
    Political Geography of Its Major Regions, London, Oxford University
    Press, 1952, p. 240; Shanti M. Varma, et al., Tanganyika: A Back-
    ground Study, New Delhi, Africa Publication, 1961; Henry A. Fos-
    brooke, "Clan Organization of the Lacustrine Bantu of Tanganyika
    Territory" International Congress of Anthropological and Ethno-
    graphical Sciences, 18, London: Oxford University Press, 1934,
    pp. 280-281.

12. For discussion of the traditional political institutions see Fortes
    and Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems, London: Oxford
    University Press, 1940; John Middleton and Tate, Tribes without
    Rulers, London: Rautledge and Paul Kegan, 1953; Lucy Mair, Primi-
    tive Government, London: Penguin Books, 1962. For a general dis-
    cussion of kinship systems see Alfred Reginald, Radcliffe-Brown
    (3d), African Marriage and Kinship Systems, London: Oxford
    University Press, 1950.

13. See footnote 11.

especially Seligman, have sought to establish physical similarities among members of the same stock.[14] The Bantu and non-Bantu divisions, like ethnicity, did not become a basis for political organization during the colonial conflict in Tanganyika.

The European population is the smallest group, but shows an excessively high degree of internal heterogeneity. In addition, Tanganyika holds a unique record of being the only British territory in Africa in which the non-British nationals outnumbered the British. This trend holds in both the 1952 and 1957 census, showing large numbers of Portuguese, Greek, Italian, Dutch, German, and American nationals. This internal heterogeneity was summed up by Datta when he wrote:

> The European population in Tanganyika is different
> in its composition from that of Kenya. It is not,
> as in Kenya, predominently British. Less than half
> of the European population....is of British nationality.[15]

The small size and the heterogeneity of the European population in Tanganyika accounts for the lack of a strong united European front and the inconsistency, as shown in Chapter VI, of European politics in the 1950's.[16]

The last group is that of the Asian which is not only the most complex internally but also the most difficult to define. It is a residual group in that persons who could not be easily fitted either into the African or European groups were thrown into this category. An

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15. Ansu Datta, Tanganyika: A Government in a Plural Society, The Hague, Leiden, 1955, p. 25.

16. "Report of the Commission on Closer Union on the Dependencies in East and Central Africa," Command Paper 3234, London, 1929, p. 93.

example of this is the Somali who originally came from the former
British Somaliland in the north-eastern part of Africa. In the 1948
census the Somalis were classified as Africans. This was not very
acceptable to the Somali and led to a number of protests including
petitions to the Secretary-General of the United Nations which demanded
that they be classified as Asians. One of these petitions reads in
part as follows:

> If the reason for the administration to classify
> us as Africans or natives (is) because of our
> country which is situated in Africa, this will
> not, however, coincide with the fact that many
> parts of Africa, e.g., Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria,
> Libya, Morocco, etc., though in Africa yet the
> inhabitants of those countries are not known as
> Africans but are classified as Arabs, thus Natives
> of Asia.[17]

The Somali demands were granted and by the next census, they were
known as Asians. The contextual definitions of the concept of Asian
in Tanganyika led to categories consisting of the following peoples:
Indians, Pakistanis, Goans, Arabs, Somali, and Coloreds or half-castes.

In 1957 the total Asiatic population was 95,505 with the
Indians constituting the largest group, 65,461, of whom 34,480 were
males and 30,981 females. The second largest group, with a population
of 19,100 was the Arab; then Pakistanis, 6,299; Goans, 4,776; Somali,
3,114; and Coloreds, 2,257.[18]

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17. United Nations Trusteeship Council; Petitions from Trust
    Territories; Tanganyika, T/PET2/58.

18. Central Statistical Bureau, op. cit., 1960, Table C5, p. 15;
    George Delf, Asians in East Africa, London: Oxford University
    Press, 1963, especially pp. 1-10, 28-30 and 49-54.

The Asiatic population is also divided along religious lines (See Table 2:2). The 1957 census shows that of the Indian population, 30,082 were Moslem, 29,035 were Hindu, 886 were Christian and the rest were either Sikhs or Jains. The largest group, the Moslem, is subdivided into two major sects, the Sunnis and the Shias. The Shias are further subdivided into the Ithana'ashri, the Bohra and the Ismaili Khoja, who are the followers of the Aga Khan. In addition to these divisions, further divisions are produced by the caste system to which the Indian community of Tanzania still conforms.

The other Asiatic communities are not as divided as the Indians, being predominantly Moslem except for the Goans who are almost wholly Roman Catholic (see Table 2:2). The Arabs, who are the second largest Asiatic community, are predominantly either Sunni or Ibadhi Moslems. These divisions threw the respective Asiatic communities into almost mutually exclusive units or camps and prevented the Asians, so defined, from developing on Asian racial consciousness, which would have been a basis of concerted Asian political action. Consequently, as shown in Chapter VI, the Asians remained the most divided section in Tanganyika.

Religious cleavages also existed in the other two racial groups but they were not as strong a dividing force as among the Asiatics. According to Table 2:1, the Europeans are almost exclusively Christian. The largest proportion of the Africans are Moslem, comprising about 30 percent. Of the remaining 70 percent, 18 percent are Roman Catholic. A large fraction of the African population belongs to either separatist churches or the so-called animist faith (see

Table 2:2). Religion did not become a basis for party organization

either within or between racial groups, though an attempt was made to

form an all-African Moslem political party towards the last half of the

1950's.

POPULATION DENSITY AND DISTRIBUTION

The population density of Tanzania is the lowest in East and

Central Africa with the exception of Zambia[19] (see Map 2). The

territorial density is 25.4 persons per square mile; however, distri-

bution is uneven and varies from province to province, with over-

crowding in some provinces.

Half the population of Tanzania is concentrated on about one-

sixth of the total land area; this was due mainly to the unsuitability

of much of the land. The 1958 Agricultural Census estimated that less

than nine percent of the total land was cultivated.[20] Thus, since

the population is predominantly peasant, overcrowding occurs on the

very limited cultivable land.

Overconcentration falls within two broad bands, the first

extending from the coast around Dar-es-Salaam westward through

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19. Population Censuses 1948, 1952 and 1957, op. cit., also Central Statistical Bureau, op. cit., 1957-64, U.N. 1949 Population of Trust Territories, Report: ST/SOA/Series, A/2; 1952 Population Studies, No. 14; Report on the Population of Trusteeship Territories, ST/SOA/Series A/14; 1960 World Population Census Programme: pre-paration of questionnaires for population census, ST/STA/2/4.26; 9th Report of the Committee on Rural Educational Development of the Trust Territories, T/1544 and T/1480. Population Land Categories in Tanganyika, T/AC.36/L.17 Ltd.; U.N. Demographic Year Book, N.Y., 1960.

20. Tanganyika Agricultural Census, 1958, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1958.

Morogoro, Dodoma and Victoria Nyanza, and the second extending from
the northern end of Lake Nyasa northward through Iringa to merge with
the first band around Dodoma. In addition to these two broad bands,
other clusters of population concentration are found around the Tanga
coast, extending to the Usambara mountains; around Moshi, the slopes of
Kilimanjaro; and in the south-east corner around the Mozambique border.

The population density and distribution also varies by province
with the overconcentration occuring in the desirable ones (see Map 2).[21]
The lake provinces, which are about one-tenth of the total area,
accommodate about a quarter of the total population. On the other hand,
the two largest provinces, the Southern and the Western, which comprise
two-fifths of the area, have only one quarter of the population.

The distribution of the non-African population is also very
uneven. Eastern Province contains the largest proportion of Europeans,
Indians, Pakistanis, and Goans. The smallest number of Europeans are
found in the Southern Province while the smallest number of Indians are
found in the Southern Highlands Province. The Arabs are concentrated
mainly in the Eastern, Lake and Tanga Province. A large proportion of
Somalis can be found in the Lake, Tanga and Central Provinces. The
Coloreds are more or less evenly scattered in the Western, Tanga,
Eastern, Lake and Northern Provinces. In every province the ratio of
non-Africans to Africans, as Table 2:3 shows, is very small. This ratio

21. "African Population of Tanganyika," Geographical and Tribal Studies,
    Nairobi, East African Statistical Department, 1958; Population
    Studies, Vol. 111 No. 3, Dec. 1949, p. 303; Tanganyika African
    Census Report, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1957, p. 1;
    Kieczynski,R.R. A Demographic Survey of the British Colonial Empire
    Vol. 11, London: Oxford University Press, 1949, p. 325.

had some relevant political implications in the first general election, held in 1958/1959. As shown in Chapter VI, to win any seats, the non-African political parties had to solicit African support in the provinces which had become electoral constituencies.

Generally, the ethnic groups in over-crowded areas in Tanganyika were more economically developed than those in thinly populated areas, because, as a result of fertile soils, cash crops were introduced and grown in these areas. The fertile soils and favorable climate conditions also attracted European farmers. This made these areas centers of racial conflict, as shown in Chapter IV.

As seen in Table 2:4, the African population has a marked sex imbalance with females outnumbering males. The male/female ratio was 93:100 in 1957 and 95.1:100 in 1967 respectively. According to both the 1958 and 1957 censuses, females outnumber males in all the provinces except in the Northern and Tanga, which were also the most economically developed provinces. This was probably a result of male migrant workers from other less developed provinces, or from Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Bulundi. This imbalance of sex, especially in the age groups 15-44 as Table 2:5 shows, coupled with the lack of employment for women in rural areas, might have led to the exodus of females to urban centers and areas of employment, where many became prostitutes. Prostitution in general and sex-relations between non-African males and African females, became one of the factors which created tensions between Africans on the one hand, and the Colonial Government and the non-Africans on the other.

The youth of the population became a significant political factor

in the colonial conflict. In the Northern Province, as shown in
Chapter IV, the pressure on land greatly intensified racial conflict.
This was particularly marked among the Chagga, where the ownership of
a plot symbolized a change in status, from boyhood to manhood.

When Tanu was founded, the presence of a large number of young
people became an asset. As they could not all be absorbed either in
the wage economy or peasant farming, which was not a full-time occupa-
tion, Tanu mobilized the youth into the Tanu Youth League, which still
remains one of the most powerful organizations in Africa. Through the
Youth League, Tanu had eager volunteers, who in the last half of the
1950's were its most active members, and, who now, form the backbone
of the National Service.

In Tanganyika racial cleavages became a significant basis for
the formation of racial parties by creating situations of racial con-
flict, especially in reference to competition over land. The size of
the European population and the heterogeneity of the Asian population
had some organizational relevance, which is discussed in Chapter VI.
Among Africans, the geographic, demographic and religious factors did
not become a significant basis for party formation. Lewis explains this
as follows:

> ...Tanganyika, is also one of the few new states
> in which cleavages are not much of a political
> problem. He (Nyerere) faced no powerful organized
> tribes, traditionally hostile in each other, and by
> comparison with Ghana or Togo, not to speak of
> Kenya, or Uganda, there are not wide economic differences,
> because the tribes are just equally poor.[22]

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22. Arthur W. Lewis, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

One feasible explanation is that ethnic consciousness and economic regional differences were just beginning to develop in Tanganyika during the period of colonial conflict, and may, in the future, as Chapter VIII suggests, become significant bases for new political divisions.

TABLE 2:1 TANGANYIKA, POPULATION GROWTH BY RACE*

Year	Europeans	Indians/Pakistanis	Arabs	Africans	Other	Total
1913	3,536	0	—	4,145,000****	—	4,148,536****
1921	1,483	5,289***	—	4,105,000	—	4,111,772
1928	0	10,374**	—	4,740,706	—	4,751,080
1931	4,480	13,767**	—	5,022,640	—	5,040,887
1948	10,648	46,254	—	7,407,517	—	7,464,419
1952	17,885	59,739	13,025	7,920,000	4,845	8,015,494
1957	20,534	76,417	19,088	8,662,684	6,890	8,785,613
1963**	21,100	90,200	25,400	9,656,000	4,900	9,798,000
1966**	15,000	85,000	26,000	10,247,000	4,000	10,377,000
1967**	—	—	—	—	—	10,582,000

Note: Race — presented as in 1957 census.

*Source: Population Census, op. cit.; Central Statistical Bureau: Statistical Abstract for selected years; op. cit.; Report on the Census of the Non-African Population taken on the night of February 25, 1948, Government Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1950, p. 6; Report on the Census of the Non-Africans taken on the nights of February 20 and February 21, 1957, Government Printer, Dar-es-Salaam, 1958.

**Estimates.
***Figures include all the non-African and the non-Europeans.
****Population figures include Urwanda and Uruandi which were part of the German East Africa.

TABLE 2:2 RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION BY RACE AND DENOMINATIONS IN PERCENTAGES*

| Religion | Europeans | Asians | | | | |
		Indians	Goans	Pakistanis	Arabs	Somalis
Christian	99.1 (20,334)	11.4 (886)	99.4 (4,732)	0.2 (15)	0.0 (5)	0.0 (3)
Animist	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Hindu	0.0 (1)	44.4 (29,035)	0.2 (10)	0.0 (3)	0.0 (1)	0.0 (0)
Islam	0.1 (28)	46.0 (30,082)	0.1 (9)	99.6 (6,272)	99.9 (19,075)	99.9 (3,075)
Jain	0.0 (0)	1.4 (913)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (1)	0.0 (0)
Sikh	0.0 (0)	6.4 (4,232)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (3)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Parsee	0.0 (0)	0.2 (170)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
Jews	0.3 (55)	0.0 (5)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (1)	0.0 (0)
Other	0.5 (106)	0.0 (42)	0.1 (6)	0.0 (2)	0.0 (5)	0.2 (7)
	100.0	99.8	99.8	98.6	99.9	100.1

*Source: Central Statistical Bureau, Statistical Abstract, 1965, Tables C13 and C14 page 24.

Religion	Asians Coloreds	Africans
Christian	23.6 (602)	24.9
Animist	0.0 (0)	42.2
Hindu	3.2 (81)	0.0
Islam	60.2 (1,539)	30.9
Jain	0.0 (0)	0.0
Sikh	1.1 (28)	0.0
Parsee	0.0 (0)	0.0
Jews	0.2 (7)	0.0
Other	11.7 (298)	1.0
	100.0	99.0

TABLE 2:3   POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND DENSITY BY PROVINCE AND RACE*

Province	Area in %	African Population		Non-African		Ratio of Non-African to African
		%	Density	%	Density	
Central	10.3	10.2	25.0	6.1	0.21	1:117
Eastern	12.0	12.0	25.0	36.4	1.08	1:23
Lake	8.1	19.8	62.2	11.5	0.51	1:121
West Lake	3.3	5.9	45.8	2.9	0.32	1:144
Northern	9.7	8.8	22.9	11.0	0.41	1:56
Southern	16.3	11.6	18.1	5.1	0.11	1:162
S. Highlands	13.1	11.8	22.9	5.3	0.14	1:158
Tanga	4.1	7.8	48.0	13.7	1.21	1:40
Western	22.0	12.1	13.5	8.0	0.13	1:107
Territory	100.0	100.0	25.4	100.0	0.36	1:70

*Source: Central Statistical Bureau, Statistical Abstract.

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TABLE 2:4   SEX RATIO BY PROVINCES*

Province	Males per 100 females
Central	87.0
Eastern	99.4
Lake	91.8
Northern	102.9
Southern	90.8
S. Highlands	84.2
Tanga	110.8
Western	85.5
Territorial Average	92.6

*Source: Central Statistical Bureau,
           Statistical Abstract, 1963.

TABLE 2:5 POPULATION OF TANGANYIKA BY SEX
AND AGE GROUP IN PERCENTAGES*

Age Group	Males	Females
0-4	18.2	16.3
5-9	14.1	13.0
10-14	11.1	11.3
15-19	10.1	10.4
20-24	8.9	9.6
25-29	7.8	8.5
30-34	6.7	7.3
35-39	5.7	6.1
40-44	4.6	5.0
45-49	3.6	3.7
50-54	2.9	2.8
55-59	2.2	2.1
60-64	1.5	1.5
65-69	1.1	1.0
70-74	0-6	0.6
75 and over	0.3	0.3
Total	99.4	99.5

*Source: Statistical Abstract, 1964.

Map 1

TRIBAL AND ETHNOGRAPHIC

Source: Atlas of Tanganyika, 1956

Map 2

POPULATION DENSITY

Source: Atlas of Tanganyika, 1956

CHAPTER III

THE COLONIAL STATE AND THE COLONIAL STRAINS

In this and the next chapter, a brief attempt is made to portray the colonial strains and discontents and the source from which they sprang. Colonial strains emanating from the philosophy of the colonial regime and from the central government form the basis of this chapter. During the colonial epoch the central government had three divisions; the Executive Council, the Legislative Council and the Civil Service Establishment. As each one of these generated different kinds of discontent the three divisions are analyzed separately. In addition, the chapter gives a brief note on both the Arab and the German colonial rule. The pre-British colonial rule and the British colonial history in Tanganyika are examined in their relation to the politics of the colonial conflict.

Basically the chapter falls into seven sections. These are:

1) The nature of the colonial situation in Tanganyika.

2) The history of the Arab, German and British colonization and its relation to the colonial conflict.

3) The general features of British administration in Tanganyika.

4) The nature and ideology of the colonial regime and how these were related to colonial conflict in Tanganyika.

5) The Executive Council and how it was a source of strains.

6) The Legislative Council and why it was the main center of the colonial conflict.

7) The Civil Service and its relationship to colonial strains.

GENERAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL ADVANCEMENT: THE COLONIAL SITUATION

In colonial Tanganyika, especially in the early days of its history, the Central Government was the only institution providing a basic framework within which people of different races and cultures were bound together in a single polity. Demographically, less than 1.5 percent of the country's population was non-African, but of the latter, as shown in Chapter II, the majority were Asians. The European community in Tanganyika, unlike that of Kenya or Southern Rhodeisa, was excessively small. While in Kenya the ratio of Africans to non-Africans was about 100 to 1, in Tanganyika it was 425 to 1.

To some extent, many of the social, political, and economic changes intended to re-organize these different and separate races into a unified whole, or nation state, were initiated by the colonial state, which was dominated by the Europeans. Like every other government, the colonial state sought to regulate these changes and force their political consequences into channels acceptable to the ruling stratum. This government, however, had certain unique features not found in a non-colonial situation.

First, the ruling stratum differed racially and culturally from the majority of the population. Second, sociologically, the

dominant group's alien status and largely superior technological culture clearly made it stand out from the majority of the population. Consequently, it could hardly claim for itself political legitimacy from either common race or culture, and least of all from common interests. The situation was aggravated even more by the dominant group's failure to admit into its ranks the emerging African middle class, which consisted largely of educated Africans employed in the Civil Service, teaching occupations, banking, commercial firms and companies (see Chapter VIII).

This exclusion had political consequences. The emerging African middle class, which was a product of the colonial situation itself, eventually recognized that to approximate the position of the dominant group presupposed the ultimate destruction of colonial rule. Short of this, there appeared no hope, since there existed an upper limit beyond which no African could proceed.

The domination of the Europeans in colonial Tanganyika was not limited to the control of the colonial state. It extended to cover almost all the facets of modernization, such as education, capital, technology, and other bureaucratic skills. It is this pervasive control that makes the upper limit extremely cloying to the dominated groups.

The circumstances surrounding the maintenance of this upper limit -- the few seeking to dominate the many -- on the one hand, and those seeking to break the limit, on the other, led to most of the colonial strains from which conflict sprang.

Pre-British Period

One may or may not think of Arab rule on the coast and its
influence inland as being colonial in character; however, colonial
power was clearly established by the 1880's. Arab interest in East
Africa was primarily commercial and not political, though in instances
in which peaceful trading was interrupted by local rulers, political
control was used to establish the stability necessary for trade.
Arabs either deposed ruling chiefs, replacing them with "puppet"
chiefs, or they established military posts manned by Arabs. This
Arab control, which was strongest on the coast, diminished as one
went further inland.[1] Arab rule, particularly their introduction of
the Islamic legal system such as Jumbo and Akida systems which were
strongest on the east coast, greatly modified and/or changed the
indigenous African political institutions, and this later underlay
many of the problems the British faced in their effort to establish
the system of indirect rule.

After the 1880's Arabic territorial acquisition was replaced
by that of Europe. In eastern and southern Africa, England, Germany,
France and Portugal competed for possession of territory. Somaliland,
in part, was colonized by France, Italy, and Britain. Britain also
colonized Uganda, Kenya, Nyasaland and Rhodesia. Belgium colonized
the Belgium Congo. The Portuguese ruled Mozambique. Germany

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1. Ronald Oliver and Gervase Mathew, History of East Africa, Oxford:
   the Clarendon Press, 1963; Lawrence W. Hollingsworth, Zanzibar
   Under the Foreign Office 1890-1913, London: Macmillan, 1953;
   Sir Reginald Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa, 1856-1890:
   The Slave Trade and the Scrimble, London: Faber and Faber, 1939.

Tanganyika.[2]

The initial colonization of Tanganyika was accomplished by establishing a company for purposes of trade. A charter was granted to the German East African Company in 1885. This German company proceeded to establish a series of trading posts along the coast, pushing the Arabs to the island of Zanzibar. Relations with the indigenous people were not amiable at first, so in 1888, the company decided to exert more military and commercial control. This resulted in a request for military and naval assistance from the German government. In 1890 a full-fledged German East African Protectorate, administered by the German Colonial Office, came into existence, its boundaries including Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi.[3]

Many of Tanganyika's ethnic groups strenuously resisted the German occupation, and the territory's early history was almost entirely one of military campaigns. Consequently, German East Africa was far more of a conquered territory than were neighboring Kenya and Uganda, and the destruction of tribal military power, as well as tribal political institutions, had considerable consequence for later political development, especially the implementation of

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2. Ronald Oliver, op. cit.; John Scott Kelite, The Partition of Africa, London: Edward Stanford, 1893; Evans Lewin, The Germans and Africa, London: Cassell, 1915; Mary E. Townsend, The Rise and Fall of German's Colonial Empire 1884-1918, London: Macmillan, 1930; Zoe Marsh, East Africa Through Contemporary Records, London and New York: Frederick Unger Publishers Co., 1961; George Lowther Steer, Judgment of German Africa, London: Hodder and Stoughton, Ltd., 1939; Mary E. Townsend, The Origin of Modern German Colonialism, London and New York, Columbia University Press, 1921.

3. Sir John S. Keltie, op. cit., pp. 12-13; Roland Oliver, op. cit., pp. 447-448.

indirect rule by the British.

Pacification and reconstruction were the principal policies of the German administration, especially before 1907, but the implementation of these policies was predominantly military in tone. One of the weaknesses of the German administration during the entire German rule was its lack of personnel (in the entire area the Germans had only seventy-nine administrative officials in 1914). The country was divided into districts, headed by District Commissioners, who were responsible to the Governor. The bezirksamtmann, i.e., German District Commissioner, had almost unlimited power, and his use of judicial authority made a special impression on the Africans. Judgments were usually direct and cursory, made with little knowledge of local law and custom, and the sentences included corporal punishment or forced labor.

On the local level of administration the Germans introduced direct rule.[4] They also adopted an Arab technique of using Akidas to assist the district officials. Akidas were either Africans or Arabs charged with the day-to-day administration of local areas. Usually they were appointed because they spoke the tribal language, and were friendly to the Administration, but they seldom came from the area in which they worked, and they had no traditional status.

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4. Latest research indicates that in some parts of Tanganyika, the German administration introduced indirect rule; see Gran Hayden, in Lionel Cliffe, One Party Democracy; the 1965 Tanzania General Election, Nairobi: East Africa Publishers, 1967.

As the British historian Moffett states: "It was equally unfortunate
for the reputation of the German Administration that they almost
entirely depended for the recruitment of their rank and file upon
Africans who belonged to races which were alien to German East
Africa, such as Zulus, Sudanese, and Swahilis from the Coast."[5]   Under
the Akidas were village administrations — Jumbes — who unlike the
Akidas, were usually local people. All officers at the various
levels in this system of direct rule were directly responsible to
the bezirksamtmann.

    German rule, although brief, did have great impact on the
masses of the people in Tanganyika. The wars of colonization such
as the Bushiri Revolt and the Maji Maji Rebellion[6] made German rule
and occupation of Tanganyika more felt by the Africans than that
of the British in either Kenya or any other East and Central African
territories. Further, German direct rule greatly modified the
indigenous political institutions, more so than did the Arab rule.

    After 1907, German colonial philosophy changed. More progres-
sive measures intended to develop the country required employment of
university educated men trained in colonial administration. Before

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5. John Perry Moffett, A Handbook of Tanganyika, Dar-es-Salaam:
    Government Printer, 1958, pp. 70-71; see also, Smith Hampstone,
    Africa: Angry Young Giant, London and new York: F.A. Praeger,
    1961.

6. Evans Lewin, op. cit., David Clyde, History of the Medical Services
    in Tanganyika, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1962; John
    Iliffe, "Reflections on the Maji Maji Rebellion," Spearhear,
    I, 10, November, 1962, pp. 21-24.

these measures could produce any results, war broke out, and German
rule ended.

INTERNATIONAL STATUS

· By the Treaty of Versailles, which ended the war, Tanganyika
was to be administered by Great Britain under a mandate of the League
of Nations. Britain agreed to adhere to a series of principles laid
down in the Covenant of the League and in the Mandate Agreement.[7]
These principles were designed to provide a paternal, impartial
governmental structure which would protect local Africans. Under
Article 80 of this mandate the indigenous people became British pro-
tected persons. Non-indigenous people retained their original
citizenship and at the same time acquired citizenship of the Mandate
Territory. This status was not changed when, after World War II,
Tanganyika became a Trusteeship Territory.

The British Administration

At the time when Britain took over the administration of
Tanganyika at the end of World War I, the country was in a disrupted
state. "Disease and famine had followed the German troops fighting
up and down the territory. Soldiers and civilians alike had died
by the thousands as malaria and dysentery spread. The world-wide
influenza epidemic wiped out whole villages. What records could be
salvaged were in German. African civil servants, who might have been

7. The League of Nations: Official Journal, 1919, United Nations
   General Assembly Official Report, 1948.

utilized, spoke only German.[8]

These serious problems faced the first Governor of the Territory, Sir Horace Byatt, who began establishing British rule by recruiting experienced officials from other parts of the British Empire. He appointed many as new District Officers, but he was forced to rely on the old Akidas and Jumbes, used by the Germans, to run village affairs.

In 1925 a new Governor was appointed Sir Donald Cameron, who had served in Nigeria under Lord Lugard. There, a system of indirect rule was being employed whereby African traditional authorities and institutions were used in the administration of rural areas.[9] This was now introduced in Tanganyika. Under indirect rule, much of the administration of the country was given back to the " traditional" chiefs.[10] The Akidas and Jumbes, most of them Arabs appointed by the Germans, were ousted and replaced by "native" chiefs and headmen, who were delegated the authority to make by-laws, to hold native courts, and to dispense funds allotted from the Native Treasury.

Indirect rule applied only to Africans. Non-Africans were not subject to native jurisdiction, both in town and country; they were placed under the jurisdiction of the District Commissioner.

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8. Alexander MacDonald, *Tanganyika*: *Young Nation in a Hurry*, New York, Hawthorn Books, Inc., Publishers, 1966, p. 35.

9. Lord Hailey, *Native Administration in British African Territories*, London: H.M.S.O., Vols. I and IV, 1950 and 1951.

10. Because of the changes introduced by the Arab, German and the British colonial rule few chiefs in the Tanganyika Local Government could be described as traditional — see Chapter V.

The Territory of Tanganyika was divided initially into eleven
provinces, but this was reduced to eight after the depression in the
1930's. Each Province was sub-divided into several districts, each
headed by a District Commissioner. Within each district were a ʼ
number of chiefdoms, and these were further divided into villages.
In Tanganyika, the chiefdom, not the district, was the center of
African life and as shown in Chapter VII, this led to chiefdom
loyalty and consciousness.

Under the carefully organized rule of Britain, the Territory
was administered by the Governor, who was assisted by an Executive
Council. The laws of the Territory were enacted by the Governor with
advice and consent of the Legislature. The Governor had the preroga-
tive to refuse assent to any bill passed by the Legislative Council,
but he was required to explain the reasons for his actions to the
Secretary of State for the Colonies.[11] Government policies were
implemented-by the Civil Service which was divided into several
departments, each headed by a Director with the Chief Secretary as
coordinator. At the provincial level, Provincial Commissioners were
the coordinators of all the administrative heads of the provincial
branches of government. Below the district level, there was local
government which was not part of the central Government.

The Colonial Regime: Nationalist Grievances and Conflicts

In Tanganyika the nature of the colonial regime and the policies

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11. Tanganyika: Government Notice No. 80 of 1920.

it pursued caused great discontent among middle class Africans. Before 1954, the political history of Tanganyika was essentially colonial administrative history being determined by the impact of British ideas and interests on the practical day-to-day problems of adminis- tration. This was mainly because the Executive Council was then almost wholly in the hands of British officials, as was the Legisla- ture.[12]

After World War II, the actions of the Government were based upon a policy of multi-racialism which, in theory, would have given equal benefits to each of the three races. In practice, however, these policies created a gap which resulted in a disproportionately small share of the national income being accessible to Africans. Economic and political structures based upon race reinforced an occupational caste system. The effect of these policies was to create latent colonial conflict along the color line, potentially thrusting races into hostile camps.

Embedded in the policies of the colonial administration was a basically paternalistic attitude. By this principle, the Europeans saw Africans as children. There was a pervasive sense and conviction on their part that Africans, and Asians to some extent, were dependent upon them as a child depends upon his father. This phenomenon created a situation approximating that which Mannoni called "dependence

12. See, Tanganyika Annual Report(s), Colonial No.(s), op. cit., 1921-1960.

relationship."[13]

In Tanganyika, paternalism involved a belief that Europeans should serve as a systematic guide for action. It was Europeans who had to decide what was proper for Tanganyika as a whole. These sentiments are evident in the reaction of the Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Edward Twining, who, in 1954, "was horrified by the thought of an African demanding rights instead of being grateful for the efforts the British Administration generally, and he personally, were making on Tanganyika's behalf."[14] Europeans did not willingly share with other races this paternal responsibility, as was shown in their reluctance to admit Asians, "on a basis of equality and partnership in the great responsibility the British people have accepted for the future of these countries and their native population."[15]

To some extent, paternalism by the colonial government led to an aggressive expansion into social and economic fields, and postponed African political advancement until some undefined threshhold of maturity had been reached. There was perhaps embedded in this post-ponement policy the assumption examined by Lipset[16] that there is

13. Dominique O. Mannoni, Prospero and Caliban, The Psychology of Colonialism, translated by Pamela Posnesland, London: Metheum, 1956.

14. Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, London: Chatto and Windus, 1965, p. 163.

15. The Times, London, June 27, 1952.

16. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, New York: Doubleday Books, 1960, Chapters I and II.

some correlation between the level of economic development and the
prospect for success of democratic government. This philosophy was
enunciated by the Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd in his speech of
October 28, 1957 in Dar-es-Salaam:

> ...to give us some idea of the sort of target,
> the target aim, at which our policy should be
> directed, and if I put first of all the greatly
> increased economic development without which no
> political advance can be built on anything except
> the most unsure foundation, it is because I know,
> as we all know from our experience, how precarious
> is the standing of any country when it's economic
> situation becomes perilous or extreme. I remember
> very well the late Mr. Ernest Bevin speaking once
> to a large gathering of coal miners who had been
> criticizing him on something he had not done as
> Foreign Secretary in Britain, and he said, "Give
> me more coal and I will give you a strong foreign
> policy."[17]

Thus, in Tanganyika, colonial paternalism meant that political
programs had to be preceded by economic development. The fallacy
here, however, lay in the assumption that the colonial rulers --
Europeans -- could methodically devise and carry out an economic and
social development program which would ensure that the pre-requisites
for political advancement would be instilled in the African. In
reality this led to the slow constitutional development which became
the source of the African nationalist agitation which later resulted
in conflict.

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17. Lennox-Boyd, *Speech by the Rt. Hon. Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary
    of State for the Colonies, at Luncheon in the Karimjee Hall,
    Dar-es-Salaam, on Monday, October 28, 1957*, Dar-es-Salaam:
    Government Printer, 1957, pp. 2-3.

African nationalists were particularly anxious to secure
constitutional changes and put an end to the paternalistic system.
The potential leaders, who were members of the emerging middle class,
resented the "monopoly" of decision making by the Europeans through
paternal colonial government. It became evident to the African
nationalists that it was necessary to control the central Government,
especially the Legislature, in order to reap the benefits of power for
their race in general and themselves in particular.

The Executive Council

Established as a Territory in 1920, Tanganyika was administered
by a Governor who combined both executive and legislative functions.
This system did not last longer than a year before an Executive
Council was set up by an Order in Council.[18] The Executive Council —
the policy making organ — remained exclusively European until 1952.
When first created in 1921, the Executive Council combined both the
executive and legislative functions previously held by the Governor.
In 1926 the first of the many changes occurred (see Table 3:1). A
Legislative Council was created, taking over from the Executive
Council the legislative function. Another change took place in
1947,[19] when the composition of the Executive Council was revised by
instituting a separation of functions.

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18.   Tanganyika (Executive Council) Order in Council, 1920.

19.   Colonial No. 220, and 249, p. 312, op. cit.

Between 1921 and 1947 the heads or directors of the Government departments constituted the membership of the Executive Council. Their role was a dual one, in that they were responsible both for implementing and formulating policy. Indeed this gave them a great amount of power, but with expanding and increasing governmental functions the pressure was becoming unbearable upon them. Thus in 1947, by order in Council, the various department heads ceased to be members of the Executive Council, but remained heads of their departments. The Governor appointed persons whose main role was to be members of the Executive Council. Occasionally, at the Governor's discretion, heads of departments could be appointed to the Council. Activities of Executive Council members were coordinated by the Chief Secretary.

These changes reflected the growing need for efficiency in the colonial administration. In essence, they brought about a structural alteration which did not, however, affect the European domination of the Executive, and this in turn frustrated the non-Europeans, especially members of the African middle class who wanted to participate in the decision making.

Tables 3:1 and 3:2 give an historical analysis of the composition of the Executive Council, showing how, over a period of time, membership of the Executive Council changed from being purely European to being predominantly African and changed from official to non-official.

It was not until 1952, that the Council welcomed to its ranks for the first time two non-Europeans, an African and an Asian. This

was the beginning of a series of changes which in the end transferred
control of the Executive Council from Europeans to Africans. Initially,
the incorporation of other races, especially African, into the Execu-
tive Council did not radically alter European deminance of the Council,
especially because the non-Europeans who were appointed to the Council
between 1952 and 1958 were basically in agreement with colonial
policy. Deference to colonial policy was ensured among the African
members by the fact·that members were appointed, not elected, and
that chiefs were appointed rather than African nationalists. Conse-
quently, in spite of these changes the Executive Council continued to
be a source of colonial strains.

In 1957, another major change occurred which affected the func-
tions of the Executive Council, namely a ministerial system was intro-
duced into the governmental structure by which the various Departments
of Government were grouped into ministries and each ministry was
under the direction, coordination and supervision of an ex-officio
member of Executive Council.[20] This gave them more policy-making
powers. However, all the official members of the Executive Council
were still European. In order to stem potential nationalist·agitation,
African assistant ministers with highly limited roles were appointed.
But this did not pacify the nationalities. This is reflected in
statements made to the visiting U.N. Mission in which Africans
condemned the whole system, particularly the role that African assistant

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20. Colonial No. 339, op. cit., paragraph 52, p. 11.

ministers were supposed to have assumed.[21]   They were especially

critical of the fact that the assistant ministers were limited to

African Affairs in their respective ministries. This confining role

was accentuated when they were not allowed to act in the temporary

absence of their ministers. Added to this was the complaint that the

appointees were all chiefs.

By 1959, after the first election was held in Tanganyika (as

described below), the Governor appointed a completely new Executive

Council of Ministers which replaced the former Executive Council.

This was the first change which radically changed both the structure

and the racial composition of the Executive Council. Of the twelve

ministers, five were elected members of the Legislature, three being

Africans, one European, and one Asian. This marked a revolutionary

step in the transfer of power from colonial rule dominated by Europeans

to representative government dominated by African nationalists.

The importance of this change was reflected in the Governor's

statement made at the inauguration ceremony of the new Ministers:

> Today's ceremony marks the introduction of as
> fundamental a change as any that has been brought
> about in the fast moving constitutional progress
> of the Territory; for it signifies the termination
> of a long period of wholly official executive
> government, and the setting up of a different kind
> of government...the kind of government in which
> Elected Members of the legislature will share in
> the formulation of government policies...

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21.   United Nations Trusteeship Council Visiting Mission to Trust
      Territories in East Africa, Report on Tanganyika, 1957, op. cit.,
      p. 7.

> The government we are establishing today is designed
> to bridge the gap between — on the one hand —
> the old form of colonial government in which the
> Executive Council, consisting of government
> officers plus a number of Nominated Unofficials,
> worked to a largely nominated legislature, and
> — on the other — what is known as 'responsible
> government' in which the Executive will contain
> a majority of unofficial ministers and will work
> to a legislature of which the majority of the
> members will be elected.[22]

Within a year, following a second general election, a new

government, with the first cabinet responsible to the Legislature,

replaced the Executive Council of Ministers, with the Africans (all

elected) out-numbering both the European and Asian ministers by seven

to five. Of the five, one was Asian and four were European. From

then on, the Executive Council, which in 1961 became the Cabinet,

ceased to be a source of colonial strains.

The Legislative Council: Further Source of Nationalist Discontent

The importance of the Legislative Council in the colonial

period cannot be minimized. This explains why its domination by

Europeans created even more tensions than their domination of the

Executive Council. Although the Legislature was initially instituted

as an advisory body[23] over a period of time — 34 years — 1926-1960

— it acquired and assumed full legislative powers including control

over the budget. In most matters of policy-making it shared the

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22. Judith Listowel, op. cit., p. 364.

23. Tanganyika (Legislative Council) Order in Council, 1926.

initiative with the executive branch and could also express its opinion on every other matter pertaining to the administrative and economic life of the country.

The Legislative Council in colonial times consisted of two types of members — official and non-official. Official members included all members of the Executive Council and a number of nominated civil servants. Non-official members were ordinary citizens who, up to 1958,[24] were nominated by the Governor. Both official and non-official members could communicate their views on the state of affairs in Tanganyika directly to the Governor. Notwithstanding their being nominated by the Governor, many members of the Legislature increasingly came to regard themselves as legislators in their own right and took their duties seriously. Many of the functions, however, of the members of the Legislative Council remained unwritten as conventions of the Constitution.[25]

Because of its acquired importance, the Legislature became the most prominent arena for the power struggle between the races. Its domination by Europeans in the colonial epoch was a source of unbearable strain to the emerging group of nationalists who sought to guide and

24. Colonial No. 346 and 349, op. cit.

25. Report of the Committee on the Constitutional Development, 1951, and Despatch of 22nd March, 1951, from His Excellency the Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Despatch of 25th July, 1951 from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to His Excellency the Acting Governor, 1952, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1952.

control the destiny of Tanganyika.

Until 1945, the Legislative Assembly was made up entirely of Asians and Europeans[26] (see Table 3:3). The conspicuous absence of Africans was officially explained by Sir Donald Cameron, the Governor, in his opening address to the first session of the Legislative Council in 1926;

> The Native Community cannot be directly represented for the present, for a native cannot be found with sufficient command of English to take part in debates on the Council, indeed to understand what is being said. I speak now, of course, of natives of standing who could speak on behalf of the various tribes of the country. But I do not by any means regard the large body of natives as being unrepresented on the Council. Their interests are directly in the hands of the Chief Secretary and the Governor himself.[27]

The period from 1926 to 1950 was one of political quiescence in which there was little overt racial conflict. Thus, there was no challenge to the official claim that non-official members were "nominated without regard to representation of race, interests, or public bodies."[28] It was not until after the end of the Second World War that this official claim of a non-racial legislative house was visibly shaken. A clear identity of interests between members of the Legislative

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26. Colonial No. 220, op. cit.

27. Colonial No. 25, op. cit., p. 8.

28. Ibid.

Council (M.L.C.s) and the race from which they came was demonstrated by the stands taken especially by European M.L.C.s on a number of racially important issues.[29]

With the rise of political consciousness defined along racial lines, interests became more clearly delineated, resulting in apparent cleavages between the races. This led to a full realization of the racial imbalance of power in the Legislative Council. European domination began to distress nationalists. When, in 1945, the Government appointed African M.L.C.s to represent African interests, it was an official recognition of the developing salience of racial divisions within the population. This sudden emergence of political identity along racial lines was part of a more general upsurge of political awareness which characterized the post war era, as discussed in Chapter 5.

Table 3:3 shows the development of the Legislature as it increased in size, changed in racial composition, and altered the mode by which members were selected. Between 1945 and 1954, all the Africans nominated by the Governor to the Legislative Council were, as in the Executive Council, chiefs. These African members were not accepted by African nationalists, largely because of their connection, through their positions as chiefs, with the colonial state. When asked whether he felt the nomination of the African M.L.C.s in 1945 indicated the representation of African interest, Mr. Nyerere retorted:

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29. Colonial No(s). 220, 242, 261, 271, 278, 293, 307, and 317, op. cit.

"Nonsense!... These members are representing their own ends. I saw one of them visiting Tabora. He drove straightway to the P.C.'s house. Later I saw him in Dar-es-Salaam where he drove to the Governor's house. Therefore, I conclude that he is representing the views of the P.C. and of the Governor."[30]

Nationalist discontent with their "representatives" in the House was justified when, on a number of occasions, they failed to speak up for African interests. One such occasion was a debate over the representation of races in the Central Legislative Council.[31] During the debate Europeans demanded twice as many representatives as those of Asians and Africans combined. While the Asian representatives spoke against it, the Africans remained silent. When the bill came up for voting, they abstained. Another incident occurred in 1951, when the Legislative Council was debating a bill to evict the Meru from their land so that it could be given to European farmers. The African members not only spoke for it, but voted for it[32] (for further discussion of this issue, see Chapter 4). Indeed, throughout the whole period, 1945-1954, there was an apparent lack of identification of interest between the African populace and the Africans M.L.C.s.

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30.   Alexander MacDonald, op. cit., p. 53.

31.   Judith Listowel, op. cit., pp. 136-140; United Kingdom Non-Parliamentary Papers, Nos. 191 and 210.

32.   Tanganyika Legislative Council Debates, Hansords, 1951, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1951.

In 1949, a Constitutional Committee was appointed to make recommendations on constitutional development.[33] In their recommenda-- tions, it was proposed that both official and non-official members be retained in the Legislature, and that non-official members be nominated on a parity principle (races having equal representation in the Legislature). In due course, all members of the Legislative Council would be elected. To implement these recommenddions, which the Governor accepted, a new committee, headed by W.J.M. Mackenzie, was appointed.[34] The Committee proposed that the unofficial members be elected on a common roll, that each should represent a constituency, and that, for the first election, for each race, the constituencies should be the nine Provinces and Dar-es-Salaam.

As expected, these recommendations evoked a storm of protests, largely from the European community. The Tanganyika Standard, a settler paper, noted: "on the difficult question of racial represen- tation, the views of the three races are irreconcilable. And well might be, for any Legislative Council in which Europeans find them- selves overrun by the two other races on the unofficial side could but retard the rate of progress in this territory....and weaken its stability in the eyes of the outside world...such a move could only

33. Report of the Committee on the Constitutional Development, op. cit.

34. Special Commissioner Appointed to Examine Matters Arising Out of the Report of the Committee on Constitutional Development, Dar- es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1953.

bring a sense of frustration among Europeans who have served this country well and proved the ability to lead, while others have concentrated on trading and taken little or no interest in the actual development of the country as a whole... The future well being of the country is at stake, and if the policy indicated in the Report is purused, more harm than good will result, not only within these borders but far beyond them."[35]

In the country at large, the same criticisms were being echoed by various European spokesmen. At a mass rally in Dar-es-Salaam the President of Tanganyika's European Council told his audience that "the Committee failed miserably in what they set out to do; to consider the best interests of the inhabitants of the territory as a whole. One section only seems to benefit, and that is the Asian Community. The African certainly does not benefit, as this must be regarded as a step detrimental to him and his development. All Europeans must definitely oppose the contents of this Report. It is my belief that it would be 25 years before these provisions could be merited."[36]

It was expected that the proposals would be accepted by the Asians, since they were generously treated, but the reaction of Africans was rather surprising and reflects lack of leadership and political maturity. A.W. Sykes, an African and the President of the African Association, in his communiqué implicitly endorsed the Report

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35. The Times, London, August 22, 1951.

36. Ibid.; also, see December 3, 1954, p. 8.

when he stated that "while the Report did not get anywhere near satis-
fying fully the aspirations of each community, it could not be denied
that those who formed it made an honest attempt to remove constitu-
tional anomalies. Europeans could best help to a solution of the
difficulties by refraining during the next two months from making
irresponsible and extreme demands."[37]

The next stage in the development of the Legislature was the
holding of the first elections to select thirty unofficial representa-
tive members to replace the unofficial nominated[38] members. The
elections, which were held on a common roll with a highly qualified
franchise, were in two parts:[39] the first, covering five constitu-
encies, was held in September, 1958,[40] and the second covering the
other five constituencies, in February, 1959.[41]

In its need to bridge the growing gap between the races and
to give practical meaning to the parity principle, the Government
introduced a tripartite voting system.[42] This system required voters,
on pain of invalidating their votes, to vote for three candidates,
one from each race. In order to qualify to vote, a person had to be

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37. The Times, London, August 22, 1954.

38. Colonial No. 342, op. cit.

39. Colonial No. 346, op. cit.

40. Colonial No. 342, op. cit.

41. Colonial No. 346, op. cit.; also The Times, London, May 28,
    1956, p. 11.

42. The Times, London, July 4, 1956, p. 8.

at least twenty-one years old, have resided in Tanganyika for three
years of the preceding five, and be able to satisfy one of the three
following criteria: to have attained an educational level of at
least standard eight; to possess an income of at least £150 per year;
or to have had experience in certain specified categories of office,
which included membership of the Legislature, or of one of the various
types of local governmental bodies, native authorities, or other
recognized authorities, and heads of clans or kindred groups. Candi-
dates were required to post a deposit of £25 in addition to being
sponsored by at least twenty-five of the voters in their constituency
of whom fifteen had to be members of their own race. [43]

The qualified franchise, outlined above, excluded the majority
of the Africans, who consisted largely of peasants living in a subsis-
tence economy and with very little education. On the other hand, the
qualifications were low enough so as to permit all adult Europeans to
qualify.

In the subsequent registration, only 59,317 out of eight
million persons registered to vote. [44] Even with the restricted

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43. Colonial No(s) 333, 339 and 342, op. cit.

44. See Margaret Bates, in Gwendolen Carter, (ed.), _African One-
Party States_, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1964; Edward B.M. Barongo, _Mkiki Mkiki Wa Siasi Tanganyika_,
Dar-es-Salaam: East African Literature Bureau, 1966; also
Tanganyika Order in Council, 1958; Colonial No. 342, op. cit.;
Tanganyika Legislative Council Debates, Hansards, 35th Session,
1959-60, pp. 3-7; _Tanganyika: Report of the Post-Election
Committee_, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1959.

franchise, the number of Africans registered exceeded the combined total of Europeans and Asians in all constituencies except in Dar-es-Salaam. The restrictive requirements favoring Europeans made Africans dissatisfied with the elections, and they demanded removal of the restrictions, but to no avail. The attitude of Asians was not clear.

In reaction to these constitutional developments, there was an upsurge of African nationalism, which was opposed to the restricted franchise and instead demanded self-government for Africans only. This new brand of African nationalism was regarded by Europeans as a threat. A _Times_ editorial described it as being "aimed at the total destruction of European and Asian influence... Immigrant races must remain, and multi-racial government, not exclusive African nationalism, must be the outcome."[45]

In reply to African demands, the President of the United Tanganyika Party stated that "there is no remote chance of Tanganyika ever being allowed to fall into the hands of irresponsible people... (who) encourage ill will and stir up racial hatred and act like cheap imitators of American gangsters. Those agitators were like sores on the body of Tanganyika and those concerned inspired by envy and greed."[46]

These disagreements and conflicts between the two races, African and European, were to be settled at the 1958-59 election, which ironically, the Tanganyika African National Union easily won.

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45. The _Times_, London, July 4, 1956.

46. Ibid.

The Tanganyika United Party, which was predominately European, won
not a single seat. This defeat resolved the racial conflict over
the control of the Legislature and also marked the end of European
dominance in the politics of Tanganyika.[47] Thus, with effect from
1958, the Legislative Council ceased to be a source of colonial
strains in Tanganyika.

THE COLONIAL CIVIL SERVICE ESTABLISHMENT: SOURCE OF MIDDLE CLASS
DISCONTENT[48]

In the colonial epoch, education fostered the development of
a small but growing group of Tanganyika Africans who shared a common
educational and occupational experience. In the 1950's this group
included the few hundred Africans who had attended the most renowned
secondary school in the country, Tabora, and had proceeded either to
Makerere University College in Uganda or overseas, for further educa-
tion. The majority became civil servants, because the color bar
practice restricted entry into other occupations in European and
Indian commercial firms. Although they were assigned to various parts
of the Territory, most of them were to be found in the few large
towns, especially Dar-es-Salaam, the territorial capitol. They

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47. Colonial No. 346, op. cit.; Report of the Tanganyika Constitutional
Conference, London, Cmd. 1360, 1961.

48. I use the term middle class, as defined by Kenneth Little, "The
African Elite in British West Africa," Andrew Lind (ed.), Race
Relations in World Perspective, Honolulu: University of
Honolulu Press, 1954.

usually lived in houses provided by the Government which were located

between the European and Asian sections of town and which were visibly

inferior in quality.[49]

In these African housing locations, a new community was growing,

in which traditional ties were being transcended. This development,

together with the educational similarity of the group, forced them

into social contact with each other and fostered an understanding of

their common interests and needs in relation to colonial occupational

limitations, especially in the Civil Service. The Tanganyika African

Association usually acted as spokesman for this group, especially in

the 1950's, as their members sought to push their way into the upper

levels of the Civil Service establishment.

In colonial Tanganyika, the demand to Africanize the Civil

Service as well as private industry, inevitably necessitated political

pressure upon the colonial state. This was, above all, true for the

senior posts of the Service.

The Civil Service of the colonial state, since the early 1950s,

was divided into three branches; the Senior, Junior and Subordinate

branches.[50] Officially, the Senior Service consisted of the

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49. For a detailed discussion of racial housing patterns in a colonial
    situation, see Epstein's discussion of the Copperbelt, Arnold L.
    Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester:
    Manchester University Press, 1958.

50. Commission of the Civil Service of the East African Territories
    and the East African High Commission; Report of the Commission on
    the Civil Service of the East African Territories and the East
    African High Commission, 1953-1954, under the Chairmanship of
    Sir David Lidbury, London: H.M.S.O., 1954.

administrative heads: the Directors, Provincial Commissioners, District Commissioners, branch heads of Provincial and District government departments, and other top executives. Recruitment to the branch, which was officially non-racial, was open to holders of university degrees or persons with comparable professional and techni- cal qualifications.[51] Beside the educational qualification, persons could be appointed to the Service on the basis of long experience, competence, and general suitability. However, in practice, almost all Europeans were put into the Senior Service, (see Table 3:5).

The Africanization of the Senior Service, which began in 1951 with the appointment of one African, was part of the Government's implementation of the parity system. Table 3:6 shows how the number of Africans in the Senior Service augmented during the last half of the 1950s.[52]

By 1956 only 112 Africans had been admitted to the Senior Service, with 23 of these acting as Assistant District Officers, a post created especially for Africans. It was not until 1958 that the first African District Commissioner was appointed.[53] From then on the number of Africans in the Senior Service expanded rather sharply. (See Table 3:6.) But this increase, instead of satisfying

51. Colonial No. 342, op. cit., p. 20; Colonial No. 278, op. cit., paragraph 536, p. 20.

52. See Tanganyika Annual Reports: Colonial No(s)., op. cit., from 1950-1960.

53. Colonial No. 342, op. cit.

Africans, as the Colonial Administration had hoped, only made them
continue to agitate for faster Africanization of the Service.

Much of this agitation was a result of the Colonial Government's
well publicized emphasis on employment in the Senior Service as one
of the conditions for self-government. As Lennox-Boyd, Secretary
of State for the Colonies at his luncheon in Dar-es-Salaam in 1957
pointed out, "there are far too few skilled and experienced local
people in the Civil Service, in commerce and the other professions.
It is only when there are enough of such people to guide and promote
the development of the country and also when some of their number have
the time and the inclination for public affairs, that parliamentary
democracy has any meaning."[54]

The Junior Branch differed from the Senior Branch in its func-
tions and qualifications for recruitment. Recruitment to the Service
was open to those without academic degree qualifications, but who had
attained at least Form IV.[55] In practice, especially during the early
part of the 1950s, the branch was essentially reserved for Asians. It
was not until the mid-1950s that de-Asianization of the Junior Branch
began. In 1954 three-quarters of the employees of that branch were
Asian, and just over one-eighth African, with an even smaller propor-
tion of Europeans.

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54. Lennox-Boyd, op. cit., pp. 3-41.

55. Colonial No. 307, op. cit., paragraph 96, page 17; Colonial
    No. 349, op. cit., paragraph 113, page 27.

The lowest branch of the Civil Service establishment was the
Subordinate Branch. Essentially, it included all clerical and other
related jobs. Unlike posts in the Junior Service, Subordinate Branch
positions did not carry automatic pensions nor were they permanent.
To quality for pension a prospective employee was required to pass
several in-service training tests. This branch was almost exclusively
reserved for Africans.[56]

Occupations in colonial Tanganyika offer a classic example
of the Weberian duality between traditional and rational elements, and
the Parsonian dichotomy of achieved and ascriptive roles in status.
In another sense, the situation approximates the caste system. Within
one race the criterion of achievement was applied, but not between
races. Superimposed upon the precolonial societies was the bureaucratic
state, which stressed, at least theoretically, bureaucratic norms.
However, in practice, these norms were only operational in intra-race
behavior patterns, whereas ascription governed the inter-racial rela-
tionship. As could be expected, this caste-like system, as a
practice, was denied publicly by the colonial state which maintained
that "such differences as at present exist in regard to opportunities
for employment, wages, and salary are not the result of discrimination
on grounds of race, nationality, religion, or tribal associations.
They are the inevitable result of differing standards of education,

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56. Colonial No. 278, op. cit., paragraph 536, p. 20.

experience, and personal qualifications."[57]

This view, which the colonial state maintained, was not shared by middle class Africans, as shown by the voluminous petitions sent to the United Nations and its visiting missions protesting against the practice of color bar in the Civil Service. In these petitions, Africans pointed out many incidents with which to support their grievances. For instance, they discussed the appointment to the Senior Service of European agricultural officers who had less than school certificate education, whereas African assistant agricultural officers, with degrees in agriculture from Makerere University College, were placed in the Junior Service.[58] (See Table 3:7)

These practices of color bar in the Civil Service, especially in the Senior Service, infuriated many Africans. The discontent with the Civil Service figured prominently among the African complaints to the United Nations Trusteeship Council.[59] In its petition to the United Nations Visiting Missions to Tanganyika, 1951, the Tanganyika African Association stated that "the Senior Service is the sanctum sanctorum of Europeans only, irrespective of whether or not they have the academic qualifications. There is not a single European in the territory in the Junior Service. Even European Road Foremen are in the Senior Service, where they draw salaries far above the salary of

57. United Nations Trusteeship Council: Petitions from Trust Territories, Tanganyika, T/PET2/103.

58. T/PET2/120, op. cit., pp. 4-5; T/PET2/102, op. cit., p. 13.

59. T/PET2/103, op. cit.; also, T/PET2/102, op. cit., p. 13.

the highest paid and highly respected African Civil Service."[60]   In
another petition the Association charged that "with Europeans, entry
into the Senior Service is automatic by viture of their color, (whereas)
for the entry into the Senior Service by an African the local govern-
ment demands very high qualifications, which is not the case with
Europeans... Any European goes into the Senior Service irrespective
of educational or technical qualifications. `In this case the African
is deprived of the opportunity to obtain responsible posts which are
exclusively in the Senior Service."[61]

In colonial Tanganyika, the problem of African occupational
mobility was not confined to the Senior Service. The same problems
were raised in regard to the Junior Service, only that here the target
for condemnation, instead of being the European, was the Asian. As
already pointed out, this branch was dominated by Asians, a situation
which the Africans saw as depriving them of their rightful posts. As
the Tanganyika African Association points out in the petition to the
United Nations, "We conclude, therefore, that Indians imported from
India block the way to African boys from Standard X to positions of
responsibility."[62]

African grievances against the Asians were mainly because many
Asians, especially Indians, who were classified in the Junior Service,

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60.   T/PET2/120, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

61.   T/PET2/103, op. cit.

62.   T/PET2/130, op. cit.

would by qualification have been in the Senior Service, since they held degrees from India. Although the Indians were in the Junior Service Branch they were assigned to do mainly Subordinate Branch jobs such as file or dispatch clerks, but received Junior Service remuneration. This action of the colonial government had its occupational consequences. Since there was a specified number of offices in the Junior Service, the employment of Indian graduates led to the exclusion from the Service of many African School Certificate holders, who were shelved into the Subordinate Branch.

The Government justified its policy in terms of efficiency, maintaining that the Asians were better and harder workers. This charge infuriated many Africans. In its petition to the United Nations, the Tanganyika African Association retorted that, "further excuses are made to convey to the world that the African is incapable of taking responsible positions of a European or an Asian. This is totally untrue... The attitude of keeping the African down and using him as a machine is responsible for the African lack of interest in his work, and shatters his ambitions."[63]

The colonial color bar in Tanganyika extended to the wage structure. The level of salaries, after the Second World War, was based on the 1947-48 Commission's recommendation, which stated that the time was not ripe for the introduction of a common salary scale

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63. Ibid.

for Europeans, Asians, and Africans engaged in similar work.[64]
Non-Europeans employed in Senior Service posts were to receive
three-fifths of European salary. After 1953, as a result of the
Lidbury Commission, separate salary scales for each of the three
races were established for posts in Junior and Senior Service
branches.[65] This salary difference is dramatically pointed out in
the case of an African university-trained doctor who received a lower
salary than that of his "lady telephonist" (a European telephone
switch-box operator).[66]

Quite often, in order to give more meaning to the difference in
salary for the three races, new job titled were created for the same
job (See Table 3:9). As the editor of The Nationalist put it:

> ...and quaint were the justifications for the
> differentials in salaries. Pompous terms were ·
> invented to make a job look more important than
> it actually was; thus two persons whose basic
> job was to chase and destroy vermin carried
> different titles according to their race — one
> was a Rat Catcher (African) and the other (the
> European) was a Rodent Officer.[67]

These practices were pervasive during the colonial epoch, and
permeated all facets of the colonial state. In the Police Force, for

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64. Lidbury Commission, op. cit.; and Report of the Commission on the
Civil Service of Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar, 1947-48,
Colonial No. 223, London: H.M.S.O., 1948.

65. Lidbury Commission, op. cit.

66. T/PET2/130, op. cit., p. 7; T/PET2/102, op. cit., p. 2; T/PET2/188,
op. cit.; and Colonial No. 339, op. cit., Appendix II.

67. The Nationalist, Dar-es-Salaam, May 2, 1967.

instance, a European, Asian, and an African, all of whom had School Certificates, would enter the Force at different ranks as Table 3:7 shows, and draw different salaries, as well as wield different powers and responsibilities.

Similar practices of giving different job titles and ranks to people of different races characterized the colonial Education Department (see Tables 3:7, 3:8, and 3:9). Here, especially in the early days, all Africans regardless of qualification were classified as African teachers. On the other hand, Europeans were either head-masters, superintendents, or education officers. As regards salary scales, the editor of The Nationalist notes "...of course, the Super-intendent of Education waxed fat and the African teacher struggled to exist."[68] However, toward the close of colonial rule, African graduates were elevated to higher educational offices. This change in title was not accompanied by equal changes in salary·scale, for like other Africans in top posts, they had to get three-fifths of the salary of the European.[69]

Evidently, part of the reason for the higher salaries paid to Europeans was to lure Europeans from their countries to come to Tanganyika. On the other hand, the low salaries paid to Africans were, according to the Government, "assessed and based on the living

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68. Ibid.

69. Lidbury Commission, op. cit.

conditions of the Africans."[70] The reaction of the Africans to the
government argument was summed up in the petition from the Government
Employees Association to the United Nations Visiting Mission to
Tanganyika, in 1951, which in part reads:

> We are always told that the salaries paid to
> the African employees are assessed according
> to the living conditions of the Africans. The
> Association feels the African who lives in
> urban areas and has to compete on the same
> market with the highly paid (non-African)
> colleague is deliberately placed in a difficult
> position. To illustrate that point, there is
> no market or store for Africans only. The
> Association, therefore, feels that there is
> racial discrimination in the Civil Service.[71]

A similar complaint was made by the Tanganyika African Association in
its petition to the United Nations Visiting Mission. The petition
condemned the racial discrimination in the Civil Service and in the
non-government employment concerns and warned that "such conditions
if allowed to continue will not create concord but conflict between
the white and the Black races... We ask that such discrimination be
abolished as quickly as possible to let people enjoy equal rights and
equal privileges."[72] Complaints against racial discrimination in the
Civil Service and other non-government firms came from almost all the
African Organizations in Tanganyika.[73]

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70. T/PET2/102, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

71. Ibid.

72. T/PET2/144, op. cit.

73. Ibid, from 1949-1959.

The grievances which I have outlined above are only a few of
the typical strains in Tanganyika's colonial situation stemming from
the colonial. the Executive Council, the Legislative Council and the
occupational structure. Stripped to their essentials, the tensions
and grievances arising from occupational situations among middle class
Africans in the 1950s were merely projections of an expanding appetite
for new jobs and related perquisites which only the Government could
provide. Inevitably, this upsurge recognized the sizeable European
personnel who claimed the most desirable posts and the Asians, who
dominated middle range jobs in the colonial wage structure, as the
main barriers.

TABLE 3:1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL IN
TANGANYIKA BETWEEN 1920 AND 1960*

Year	Ex-Officio	Officials	Non-Officials	Total
1920	13	0	0	13
1947	13	0	0	13
1952	8	0	6	14**
1954	8	0	6	14
1957	9	0	6	15
1959	3	4	5	12
1960	2	0	10	12

*Source: Tanganyika: Annual Report for the Year (for
selected years), Colonial Nos. 42, 220, 293, 317,
339, 346 and 349, London: Her Majesty's Stationary
Office.

**Note: the first non-official member of the Executive
Council was appointed in 1949, but no figures for
that year are available.

Ex-officio: A member of the Executive Council in charge of
a government department or departments.

Officials:. Members of the Executive Council who are also
Civil Servants of the Tanganyika government.

Non-official: A member of the Executive Council who is not
a Civil Servant.

TABLE 3:2 MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL BY
RACE FOR SELECTED YEARS*

Years	Europeans	Asians	Africans	Total
1920	13	0	0	13
1952	12	1	1	14
1954	10	2	2	14
1957	11	2	2	15
1959	8	1	3	12
1960	4	1	7	12

Note: These figures refer to December of each of
         the selected years..

*Source: Colonial Nos., op. cit., 42, 293, 317, 339,
         346 and 349.

TABLE 3:2 MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL BY
RACE FOR SELECTED YEARS*

Years	Europeans	Asians	Africans	Total
1920	13	0	0	13
1952	12	1	1	14
1954	10	2	2	14
1957	11	2	2	15
1959	8	1	3	12
1960	4	1	7	12

Note: These figures refer to December of each of
the selected years.

*Source: Colonial Nos., op. cit., 42, 293, 317, 339,
346 and 349.

TABLE 3:3 TANGANYIKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: DEVELOPMENT AND MEMBERSHIP BY RACE
FOR SELECTED YEARS IN WHICH MAJOR CHANGES OCCURRED*

Year	Membership by Office Government Side				Non-government Side or Opposition	Membership by Race			
	Ex-officio	Officials	Non-officials	Total		Europeans	Asians	Africans	Total
1926	13	---	---	13	7	18	2	0	20
1935	13	---	---	13	10	20	3	0	23
1945	15	---	---	15	12	22	3	2	27
1947	8	7	---	15	13	22	3	3	28
1952	8	7	---	15	14	22	3	4	29
1955	8	6	17	31	30	37	12	12	61
1957	9	6	19	34	33	31	14	22	67
1958	9	5	20	34	33	31	13	23	67
1959	9	23	5	37	30	24	15	22	61
1960**	---	---	70	70	1	10	11	50	71
1965***	---	---	204	204	0	3	4	197	204

Source: * Hilderbrand Meienberg, Tanzanian Citizen: A Civics Textbook, London: Oxford University
Press, 1966; National Assembly Election Act, 1964, Government Paper No. 11 of 1964;
Subsidiary Legislative Supplement, Government Paper No. 27, 31/5/65; and Tanganyika Annual
Reports, H.M.S.O., London: (for selected years).

Note: ** All of the 71 Members of Parliament to the National Assembly 1960 were elected, and of these
70 were Tanu supported and 1 was independent.

*** Of the 204 members of the National Assembly, only 107, all from the mainland, were popularly
elected in 1965. Of the rest 15 were elected by the National Assembly sitting as an
electoral college, 20 were Regional Commissioners (3 came from Zanzibar and Pemba) and
30 were appointed by the President.

TABLE 3:4   AFRICANS IN WAGE EMPLOYMENT FOR SELECTED
            YEARS*

Year	All Africans in Employment	Africans in the Civil Service
1948	--	9,114
1950	455,398	11,355
1952	443,597	13,719
1954	439,094	18,479
1955	413,100	19,106
1957	430,470	22,740
1960	442,092	26,160

*Source: Tanganyika: Annual Reports, op. cit.,
           (for selected years); Tanganyika Labor
           Department Annual Report, Dar-es-Salaam:
           Government Printer (for selected years);
           Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke, (ed)
           The Transformation of East Africa;
           Studies in Political Anthropology, New
           York: Basic Books Inc., Publishers,
           1966, p. 292.

TABLE 3:5   COMPOSITION OF THE SENIOR CIVIL
            SERVICE IN 1952 BY RACE*

Race	Senior Service	Non-Senior Service
Europeans	2,243	1
Asians	30	1,239
Africans	3	16,272

*Source: Tanganyika Annual Report, op. cit.,
           1952.

TABLE 3:6 THE AFRICANIZATION OF THE SENIOR
SERVICE*

Year	Africans in the Senior Service
1920-50	0
1951	1
1952	3
1956	112
1957	155
1958	181
1959	306
1960	453

*Source: Tanganyika Annual Report, op. cit., (for
selected years).

TABLE 3:7 ENTRY POINTS FOR THE THREE RACES
INTO THE TANGANYIKA POLICE FORCE
FOR FORM IV APPLICANTS*

Race	Rank on Entry
European	Assistant Superintendent of Police
Asian	Inspector of Police with One Bar
Africans	Sub-Inspector of Police

*Source: T/PET2/188; also Government Circular No. 12
of 1948, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer,
1948; 1958 Tanganyika Annual Report, op.
cit., Appendix II.

TABLE 3:8   TITLES AND SALARIES IN EDUCATION DEPARTMENT
FOR THE THREE RACES IN THE 1950S*

A: Africans

Titles – Teachers	Salary Scales per Month		
Makerere Trained	6– 2–0	to	10– 0–0
Grade I	3–12–0	to	10– 0–0
Grade II	2– 3–0	to	3–12–0
Unlicensed	1–10–0	to	2– 0–0
Women	1–10–0	to	10–0

B: Asians

Titles – Teachers	Salary Scales per Month		
Headmasters Grade A	35–10–0	to	40– 0–0
Headmasters Grade B	30– 0–0	to	35– 0–0
Assistant Headmasters Grade I	15– 0–0	to	25– 0–0
Assistant Headmasters Grade II	·7–15–0	to	20– 0–0

C: Europeans

Titles – Teachers	Salary Scales per Month		
Masters	33– 6–0	to	50– 0–0
Mistresses	29–10–0	to	41–13–4
Senior Education Officers	880 – 1,000 per year		
Education Officers	400 – 900 per year		
Women Education Officers	354 – 500 per year		

*Source: Tanganyika Annual Report, op. cit., 1947, pp. 160–1;
also Tanganyika: Government Circular No. 12, 1948.

TABLE 3:9   JOB TITLES FOR AFRICAND AND EUROPEANS
            DOING THE SAME TYPE OF JOB IN THE
            DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS IN
            TANGANYIKA IN THE 1950'S*

Africans	Europeans
Labor Overseer	Road Foreman
Carpenter	Chargeman Joiner
Clerk in Charge	Office Superintendent
Headman	District Assistant

*Source: United Nations Trusteeship Councils,
           Petitions From Trusteeship Territories,
           Tanganyika, T/PET2/188.

CHAPTER IV

OTHER SOURCES OF COLONIAL STRAINS: WAGE
SECTOR, LAND AND COLOR BAR

THE LABORING CLASS

In an analysis of colonial strains in Tanganyika, one cannot
avoid frequent reference to the "stratification" which existed among
Africans in the colonial situation, for this affected the specific
mode in which the strains were experienced. On the one hand there was
the African laboring class consisting of the unskilled laborers, the
domestic servants and the peasants; on the other hand there was the
middle class. The purpose in referring to the social structure is not
to suggest a theory of stratification in colonial Tanganyika, but only
to make explicit the varied specific experiences of the different sec-
tions of the Africans, both in rural and urban areas, for despite their
being incumbents of similar subordinate positions in the authority
structure of the colonial state, Africans were themselves internally
differentiated, as pointed out in Chapter I.

The importance of stratification is greatest with regard to
the urban and other employment centers, where the difference in
experience between the African middle class and the African laboring
class becomes so obvious that no temptation can arise to infer that
their grievances and discontents, as regards the specific substance
arising from the situation, would be similar.

In Tanganyika, the African middle class was the beneficiary of many of the material benefits of the colonial state; their situation was pauperism only in relation to the affluence of the Europeans and Asians.[1] Compared to the laboring class, members of-the middle class were relatively opulent. Their salaries and terms of service were far better than those of the laboring class. The grievances of the middle class in employment outside the Civil Service are similar in substance to those in the Civil Service, analyzed in the previous chapters. In addition to complaints about wages, they complained of exclusion from responsible posts, and they wanted more facilities for education, such as more scholarships and greater participation in the various decision making organs.[2]

Like the middle class in the west, the Tanganyika African middle class sought status by copying the life style of the Europeans who were a better paid group. Inevitably this led to conspicuous consumption, and their living beyond their means. This was the main cause of their financial problems.

Meanwhile, the African laboring class which constituted the largest group of those in the wage economy, as Table 4:1 illustrates, was struggling for bare survival. Not only was their salary low but

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1. *Tanganyika* Report *for the* Year *1957*; Colonial No. 339, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957, Appendix 11.

2. See Petitions from The Tanganyika African Association in *United Nations Trusteeship Council*, *Petitions from Trust Territories* Tanganyika, T/PET2/, 1949-1960.

most of their working conditions were very pernicious.

The total labor force in Tanganyika, employed for wages, was very small, about 3 to 4 percent of the total adult African population. The employment market for unskilled workers was dominated by jobs in agriculture, and in mining firms.[3] Of 294,422 laborers in 1949, 134,000 were employed in sisal estates alone, and 21,100 were employed in mining and quarrying.[4] This large number of Africans employed in agriculture and mining meant that in Tanganyika, a fairly large number of those in the wage economy resided outside the urban centers where they lived in large concentrations. Both in and outside urban centers, Africans were housed in compounds provided by either their employers, municipalities, or the government (see Table 4:2). In these centers, the workers were provided with recreation facilities such as football grounds, community centers, reading rooms, indoor games, and even films and cinemas. However, the quality of similar facilities given to non-African workers, was much higher.[5] The differences were so conspicuous that the inferiority of the quality of African facilities could but generate jealously among Africans.

Similar inequalities characterized colonial accommodation. In Tanganyika the pattern of housing, which was on a racial basis, parallels

3. See Tanganyika: Labour Department Annual Report(s), Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1920-1960.

4. Tanganyika: Labour Department Annual Report, 1949, op. cit., p. 9.

5. Colonial No. 278, op. cit., paragraph 642.

that which Epstein[6] describes on the Copperbelt. The quality of African

accommodation both in and outside urban centers, when compared to that

of Europeans, presents a comparison similar to that between residences

in the poor parts of East Los Angeles and those in the luxurious sub-

_urbs of Beverly Hills. In addition to the low quality of the buildings,

there was also a shortage of houses, which led to overcrowding, creating

in some areas slum-like conditions. The congestion became more acute

in the 1950's due to the sharp increase in the African urban population,

which was not accompanied by building programs. Even the Government

was aware of this problem. In his address to the Legislative Council

the Governor, in 1950, stated that:

> as regards the African urban population, constant
> and close attention has been given to the
> problem...with the two-fold purpose of relieving
> congestion and at the same time raising the standard
> of housing.[7]

The poor conditions plus congestion in African housing, situated adjacent

to what were by contrast European and Asian palaces, not only evoked

envy and anger; it must also have confirmed the inferior status of the

African in the colonial situation, and acted as a constant and sharp

reminder of their subordinate position in the colonial state.

The laboring class in Tanganyika was poorly paid. As Table 4:3

shows, the average monthly wage in the colonial period was about

£3.0.0. per month. However, the pay, in the absence of a minimum wage,

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6. Arnold L. Epstein, _Politics in an Urban African Community_, Man-
   chester: Manchester University Press, 1958.

7. Colonial No. 278, _op. cit._

varied sharply from one town to the other, from area to area, and from
employer to employer even within the same town. Despite a steady rise
of the cost of living in the 1950's, the wage for laborers remained
almost constant. Although the government was aware of this, it was
reluctant to impose a minimum wage on European employers, instead it was
left to the discretion of each employer. In its annual report of 1949,
the Labour Department noted:

> this increase in the cost of living has pressed
> more hardly on employees in urban areas than on
> those in employing concerns up-country for whereas
> owing to the wage structure the former have had
> to bear the full blunt of this increase themselves,
> in the case of the latter this has been met by
> the employer, who, by the terms of his contract
> with his employees, is usually required to provide
> free rations for the majority of them. ...Meanwhile,
> it must be recorded that some employers in urban
> areas are not unaware of the hardship suffered by
> their employees in this connection and have taken
> steps to relieve their lot either by increases of
> pay or issues of food stuffs when these can be
> obtained.[8]

A revealing picture of the condition of the laboring class
in urban centers in 1951 is painted in a petition of the African Cooks,
Washermen, and House Servants Association, addressed to the Colonial
Secretary, which states that:

> the common town people are those who know the
> needs of the people because they can starve
> for two or three days, but you people hold your
> meetings with the rich people so you can not
> find out the difficult of Tanganyika Territory...
>
> If you will not follow what we are telling you
> even for period of 1,000 years Tanganyika Territory

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8. Tanganyika: Labour Department Annual Report, 1949, op. cit.,
   p. 17.

> will not progress at all, because we
> fathers of our children we have no means
> at all to feed our fathers and our children and
> our wives and we cannot afford to send our
> children for high education, as our wages is like
> a daily wage, so our sons and daughters are
> working to support themselves for Europeans
> and Indians, and the reason is because we
> fathers have not enough money to do so, and you
> people there wonder why T.T. is behind, the
> reason is money, and education comes after money.[9]

Gulliver, a government sociologist, in his studies, confirms the poverty-stricken nature of Africans in the wage sector.[10]

The unskilled, unlike the white-collar workers in Tanganyika, were placed in an exceptionally vulnerable economic situation. This was mainly due, especially after 1945, to the excess of labor-supply over demand, as a result of an accelerating African exodus from rural to urban and other employment centers, leading to the presence of large numbers of unskilled Africans looking for temporary employment. This meant that the employer at the slightest cause could fire the unskilled employee and easily replace him. However, this excess of supply over demand had seasonal variations. During harvest periods, shortages of labor were not uncommon, particularly in the tea industry in the Northern and Southern Provinces and in the cotton ginneries in the Lake Province.

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9. United Nations Trusteeship Council; Petitions from the Trust
    Territories. Tanganyika, T/PET2/121, p. 7.

10. Philip Hugh Gulliver, Labour Migration in Rural Economy; A Study of
    the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Southern Tanganyika, Kampala: East
    African Institute of Social Research, 1955.

The high turnovers characteristic of the unskilled workers were, at times, caused by poor working conditions. In its report of 1949, the Labour Department noted that:

> any indigenous workers seeking employment
> can obtain work, but many prefer to forego
> any opportunity for paid employment, where
> the work is distasteful.[11]

The specific content of the "distasteful" working conditions varied. Other than the poor accommodation already outlined above, the laboring class provided the Europeans, particularly the settlers, with the occasion for verification of the mythical stereotype of the African as a lazy worker.[12] It was generally asserted by colonial employers that because of African laziness, it was not profitable to employ Africans in enterprises. Employers justified the stereotype by pointing to the low output of individual workers, and to the need for constant supervision. To a large extent these stereotypes were founded. However, it cost very little to employ an African. A European, qualified or not, earned in Tanganyika, about twenty times more than an African laborer while he did not produce half s much as 20 laborers, either in quality or quantity. In this respect it was more advantageous to use twenty Africans than one European. Further, a European employee, besides high salary, expected provision for medical care, travel expenses, good accommodation, car allowance, and even a pension. The African laborer, on the other hand, was only asked for his muscles, and

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11. Labour Department Annual Report 1949, op. cit., p. 17.

12. See Petitions from the Tanganyika African Association and from the Government African Employees Associations in T/PET2/op. cit., 1949-1960.

since he was lowly paid, 20 or more of them could be taken on for the
salary of one European.

The stereotype of laziness had social significance. By this
charge, the European employer could justify poor African renumeration,
and even sometimes his harsh treatment of Africans. In addition, parti-
cularly among settlers, it became supportive justification for their
treatment of Africans in general. henever and wherever the unskilled
laborer showed up late, especially after roll call, he was absented even
if he had to walk several miles to work. If found resting, even late
in the afternoon, he was absented as loafing on the job. If he was
unlucky he could be penalized by loss of his earnings for the days
he had worked. Where incidents of this nature happened during the middle
of the month, the worker, if unfortunate, could be fired, and have his
days of work forfeited. Such practices help explain the high absentee
rate among African employees in colonial Tanganyika which averaged 11
percent of total work days.

This stereotype of African workers was very ambiguous. It
was applied almost equally to all African workers, and in almost every
circumstance the anonymous comment, "they are all the same," was
applied even to workers who had in the past proved faithful, loyal and
reliable, such as the domestic servants, cooks, drivers, wood-cutters,
garden boys and babysitters. Often when a servant did not show up or
came late, the non-African employer would normally not say that he or
she might be ill or tired; since domestic servants were working a full
week of seven working days, he would hurridly conclude, "you can't
count on them." To him, personal private occurences in the lives of

his domestic servants received very little consideration..

Since most of the employers were Europeans and Asians, while the employees, both white-collar workers and unskilled workers, were Africans, there is pertinence to the thesis that there was in Tanganyika divergence in the economic interests of the African, European, and Asian population. These economic cleavages in Tanganyika coi cided with political cleavages, which put Africans in subordinate positions, and Europeans in superordinate positions, thus creating conditions of economic and political deprivation for the former.

The social consequences of such economic conditions and working situations for both the African middle class and the unskilled workers, was to provide, in relation to colonial rule, a common basis for political action on racial lines. The milieu in which this common fate occurred was structured by the authority positions occupied by the various races. In this respect, the working mass, like the middle class, potentially formed a ground for recruitment of organizations directed at correcting the structure, which defined the positions of the races.

THE EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT AND THE AGRARIAN STRAINS

Tanganyika possessed many of the possible agrarian causes which stirred up nationalism in other rural parts of Africa. In many cases, these carried racial overtones which at times assumed a very prominent role. One such major racial irritant among Tanganyikan peasants arose from pressure on land. This pressure, as specified in Chapter II, was most apparent in certain sections of the highland regions, starting from the Kenya border, extending in an irregular tail

down the center of the country through Kilimanjaro, Moshi and Arusha to rise again in the Southern Highlands. These areas, as stated in Chapter II, attracted European settlers as well as African inhabitants, who competed over fertile land. Consequently, there was in these areas congestion of population. Basically, Tanganyika, unlike Kenya, should not have a dense population, but because of poor soils, droughts and tsetse-fly, about two-thirds of the country was uninhabitable. This left only a few areas for human settlement.

Since World War II, Tanganyika had experienced a steady population growth which led to a slow but marked overcrowding in the few fertile areas. Already in the early 1950's, the Meru dispute was giving a warning of the violent racial feelings that could be aroused over land competition between Europeans and Africans.[13] Other hill ethnic groups, such as the Chaggas, began to show similar signs of restlessness, and also the Haya, who inhabit the crowded shores of Victoria Nyanza. Although the settler population, as discussed in Chapter VI below, was small, it was sufficiently large to have stirred up racial agrarian hatred.

Initially Tanganyikan government policy, unlike that of Southern Rhodesia or Kenya, discouraged European settlement, in accordance with the international treaty article 22 of the Treaty of Versailles, and article 3 of the Mandate which required the Administering Authority to pursue a policy not primarily directed to the economic development of the Territory for the benefit of Europeans, but to the development of

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13. T/PET2/99, op. cit.

the Native population. The trusteeship principle was intended to protect first, the interests of the natives, and secondly the interests of the non-natives, "which were only to be considered in relation to the direct or indirect exercise of protection over the former."[14]

To protect the interests of the Africans then, the government in the 1920's discouraged a European settler influx in Tanganyika. This policy was viciously assailed by Europeans in both eastern and southern Africa. In Tanganyika the settlers' paper, The Dar-es-Salaam Times, called the policy "the outcome of a fanatical Negrophilism, without rhyme or reason."[15] The paper was expressing the views of the European community that Tanganyika could only develop by "means of White settlement of land, which was the only remedy to the financial depression."[16] Finally, the government succumbed to pressure and a steady European settlement on a limited scale began; and with it, the seeds of racial conflict over land in Tanganyika were sown.

THE HAI CASE: THE LAND ISSUE IN CHAGGALAND

Hai is part of Chaggaland. Like the whole Kilimanjaro area in which Chaggaland lies, the Hai was densely populated. Much of the

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14. The League of Nations, Annexes to the Minutes of the Third Permanent Mandate Commission, p. 296.

15. The Dar-es-Salaam Times, June 31, 1920.

16. Ibid., July 11, 1925.

pressure over land among the Chagga resulted from cultural lag.[17] The

Chagga, as shown in Chapter V, were an economically advanced ethnic

group; however, the technological changes in their economy were not

accompanied by institutional changes in custom. The economic develop-

ment, good medical facilities and high level of education accounted for

a drop in mortality rate, a rise of live births, and increase in life

expectancy, while at the same time the Chagga basic customs in relation

to vihamba (plots) remained unchanged.

Among the Chagga the ownership of the vihamba symbolized a man-

hood status; as such it was highly valued by every male Chagga. It

was, in fact, the very essence of his living. The plots were hereditary;

but if a person did not inherit a plot, he could obtain an allocation

from the chief. But the chief could only provide young men with plots

if there was land available. From the late 1940's, the shortage of land

was becoming evident, at the same time as the demand for plots was

growing. However, adjacent to the land-seeking Chaggas lay vast areas

of land, owned by Europeans or ex-German, which was either unused or

lying fallow. The Chaggas would have wished to lay their hands on

this land.

The magnitude of the problem is revealed in the demographic

statistics. By 1948,[18] there were 19,505 male tax-payers in Hai;

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17. Otto Friedrich Raun, Chagga Childhood; a Description of Indegenous
    Education in an East African Tribe, London: Oxford University
    Press, 1940. Kathleen Stahl, History of the Wachagga People
    of Kilimanjaro, The Hague: Mouton, 1964.

18. T/PET2/99, op. cit.

5,400 of these were of plot age-group (18-25), but there were no plots
available for them. In their petition to the United Nations in 1949,
the Chagga exhorted the government to hand back to them all the
alienated land "so that at least 10,000 males aged 18-25 would get
vihamba who are just desparately in need of them." The petition
continues, that,

> even if we had these alienated lands handed
> over back to us, we will still be faced by
> the problem of finding vihamba for there is
> not less than a grand total of 814,000 Chagga
> males, who will be demanding vihamba in the
> next years....

> We will be most grateful if the government
> will hand over back to us these lands in
> the Moshi Districts: we will receive them
> most respectfully and make vihamba out of
> them according to the tradition and custom
> of our tribe. 19

For the next ten years, 1948-1958, the period in which
nationalism in Tanganyika was at its peak, the Chagga saw in the
European settlers a source of their land problem. During this
period the Chagga continued their pleas to the United Nations asking
for the alienated land to be given back to them. As their pleas were
not vouchsafed and as the unused land was not handed over to the
Chagga, the land grievances of the Chagga became a fervid source of
racial antagonism and anti-settler feelings which could easily be
utilized by Tanu organizers.

THE MERU PROBLEM---THE ENGARE-NANYUKI CASE

Wameru lived on a section of land similar to that of Hai in

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19. T/PET2/99, ibid., p. 19.

its fertility and suitability for European settlement. Like most fertile areas, Wameru land was overcrowded.

The Engare-Nanyuki area was part of Wameruland; it was once German-owned. After World War II, the area was given back to the Wameru but only after the government had levied communal taxes from the Wameru for a period of 19 years, as a payment for the land. To revert the land to the Wameru, a certificate of ownership was granted to them. On this land lived well over 3,000 Wameru.

The area lay between two European estates, whose owners, soon after World War II, began to importune for its annexation. Alarmed at the European demands, the Wameru requested reassurance that their land would not be taken away. In the form of a dispatch to the government of Tanganyika, Lord Hall, then Colonial Secretary, gave the ameru this assura ce. Among other points stressed in the dispatch were:

    (a)   that priority should be given to the need of Tanganyika Natives first;

    (b)   that non-Natives should not be given land although such lands belonged to the Enemy or otherwise, unless and until it is proved that Natives do not need such land, nor would they have a foreseeable need of it in the future;

    (c)   that it would not be the government's intention to give the best lands to non-Natives at the expense of Natives; and

    (d)   the settlement arrangements of non-Natives would not involve forcible eviction of the natives from lands.20

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20.   T/PET/99, op. cit., Addendum 3.

It was not too long before this assurance became meaningless.
Soon the government was to accept the Wilson Report[21] which recommended
the eviction of the Wameru from the Engare-Nanyuki Estate to be replaced
by European settlers "so that the two European estates be connected."[22]
To legalize this eviction, the Tanganyika Legislative Council
unanimously passed the Eviction Bill in 1951.[23] This Legislature
consisted of four Africans who surprisingly endorsed the forceful
eviction of the Wameru. The Legislative action was highly lauded in
the local settler press which called the decision justified because
it "provides for a homogeneous block of European settlement between
Kilimanjaro and Meru, in part of which the tribesmen are living."[24]

The Wameru attempted to exert pressure on the Government to
rescind the decision, but without success. Their appeals to the
United Nations in which they requested the Trusteeship Council to
ask the Administering Authority to have the eviction orders abrogated
because, "if we are evicted (it would) mean that some 3,000 members
of our tribe would suffer to make room for a few European settlers,"[25]
proved equally fruitless. In their petition, to the United Nations,
the Wameru described the Wilson Report as discriminatory:

> we strongly protest against such a discriminatory
> report to be implemented in our country and we
> humbly ask the United Nations Assembly and the
> International Committee of the Peoples Against
> Imperialism to help us at this critical moment,
> to insure that our land is not taken away from

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24. T/PET2/99, Addendum 2, op. cit.

25. Ibid., p. 4.

us nor are we evicted.[26]

The Wameru were particularly distressed at being evicted from

> the very land which belonged to our forefathers,
> when it was taken by force by the enemy without
> compensation, and we had to buy the same land
> from the government. Today, the government
> wants to evict us from the redeemed land, so
> as to keep both land and our wealth.[27]

Although the United Nation passed a resolution calling upon the

Tanganyika Government to reverse its decision, the Government went

ahead with the evictions.[28]

After eviction, both the Wameru and the Administering Authorit

presented their case to the Fourth Committee of the Trusteeshop Council.

The Wameru spokesman in presenting the Wameru case described the

sufferings on the Wameru as a result of the eviction, which included

police brutality in beating up men, women and children, and in pulling

down houses and setting them on fire. He cited the case of a woman

whose husband was arrested and house burned, and who gave birth in a

bush to a child which subsequently died. He also gave an account of

a sick Wameru who was drugged in a lorry by force and died on the way

to the police station. He pointed out how a swarm of police swooped

to drag the Wameru out of the area, together with their livestock.

As a result 80 Wameru tribesmen died, and 2,190 cattle, 4,422 sheep,

4,542 goats and 3,033 other livestock.[29] He called the Fourth

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26. Ibid., p. 3.

27. Ibid.

28. United Nations, General Assembly Trusteeship Committee Summary
     Records, 7th Session, A/2150 item 12, p. 259.

29. A/2150 item 12, ibid., p. 261.

Committee's attention to the fact that resulting from the eviction

many Wameru were made homeless and that many lived as squatters on

European farms. In conclusion he pleaded with the United Nations that

"the dreaded spectre of social segregation or apartheid should not be

allowed to bring misery, frustration and bitterness into a United

Nation Trusteeship."[30]

The United Kingdom spokesman, Mr. Mathieson, who presented

the government's case, did not deny any of the allegations of the

attrocities. He, instead, contended that the action of the government

was exonerated because it was taken in the interest of economic pro-

gress of Tanganyika as a whole. He called the Wameru stand, "stubborn,

conservatism of a limited group of people who were defying progress

by their exclusive attachment to not very unproductive areas to which

they were linked by sentiment and a short history."[31] He went on to

point out that:

> The United Kingdom Government was attempting
> to develop Tanganyika as a whole and to build
> a nation. It was the duty of the United
> Nations to help his Government to promote
> evolution rather than to help those who
> desired the petrifaction of social organisms
> which had outlived their usefulness...
> The moral problem was only one fractional
> aspect of the major problem of improving land
> utilization so that the land could make the
> biggest possible contribution to the prosperity
> of the population as a whole...The Ngare-
> Nanyuki Area was comparatively unfertile
> land, ... and the Tanganyika Government had
> concluded that it could make the biggest

30. Ibid., p. 272.

31. Ibid., p. 273.

> contribution if it were devoted to large
> scale ranching ... (in this) the discrepancy
> in the number of people involved was not
> a valid argument; the land would be more
> utilized, and for that the essential elements
> were money and skill, not numbers. 32

The removal of a large number of Wameru and their replacement by a

few Europeans were justified on an economic basis.[33]

The views of the Fourth Committee were summed up by the

Syrian delegate. N. Rifai, a Syrian delegate, called the United .

Kingdom representation "disappointing," and continued:

> Apparently, the sponsors of the draft
> resolution and the United Kingdom representa-
> tive had entirely different concepts of what
> was meant by progress. To the authors
> of the draft resolution it would be
> "progress" to consider the Wameru as full
> citizens of their country, to give them
> the same rights as the other inhabitants
> of the Territory, not to persecute them
> because of the primitive conditions in
> which they were kept and to open the door
> for them to compete with European settlers
> on at least and equal footing ... Progress
> did not mean giving the indegenous
> inhabitants a secondary role in the economy
> and in the political, economic and social
> advancement of their country. 34

The Wameru case, more than the Chagga, generated intense anti-settler

feeling among many Africans.

OTHER RURAL DISCONTENTS

Other rural discontents in Tanganyika stemmed from the

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32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., and T/PET2/99, op. cit., and United Nations 4th Committee
Resolution 468 (XI).

34. A/2150 item 12, op. cit., pp. 287-288.

implementation of the policies of the colonial state. The Government pursued, in the rural areas, a policy of force rather than of persuasion in its introduction of various measures of modernization, among which were agricultural development, soil conservation, reduction of stock and dipping of cattle.[35] The Government was also high-handed in its collection of poll taxes. It often dismissed many local government officials who did not co-operate in the implementation of its policies.[36]

The colonial state imposed and levied taxes on all Tanganyika adult males (see Table 4:4). The amount paid by each male throughout the colonial period was small, ranging from 6/- to about 14/-. However, due to the lack of a cash economy in most of the rural areas, not many could easily produce the money in one sum as the government required. Despite the lack of rural employment, the peasants were not allowed to pay the tax by installments. Consequently, many failed to pay their taxes. As a penalty, they were either imprisoned or made to do forced labor for a certain period of time.

The reduction of stock was an important part of the ubiquitous soil conservation program. Large numbers of cattle among the cattle owning ethnic groups, especially in Sukumaland, caused large scale

35. United Nations Visiting Mission to East African Trust Territories. Report on Tanganyika, 1954.

36. George Padmore, Africa: Britain's Third Empire, London: D. Dubson, 1949; How Britain Rules Africa, London: Wishart Books, Ltd., 1936.

soil erosion.[37] To conserve the soil, the government required that
the number of cattle owned by each individual be reduced. Many of
the ethnic groups were unwilling to part with their cattle even
when it meant selling them, because cattle were accumulated not for
sale but rather for status or for marital purposes. To enforce its
measures, the government merely seized a number of cattle and gave the
owners what it considered a fair compensation. Similar methods were
used to enforce cattle dippi g and measures of soil conservation.[38]
These government activities engendered a profound frustration and hatred
among the rural masses, especially in the less developed areas.

        The dismissal of chiefs by District Commissioners also rankled
many rural peasants. Normally chiefs who were not popular with the
District Commission, largely because of their reluctance to enforce the
government measures, were replaced by ones of the District Commissions'
choice.[39] Often the chiefs who were unpopular with the District
Commissioners were popular among their people. An interesting case of
a deposed chief was that of Chief Paul Wamba, who was deposed and
replaced by his sub-chief because he was reluctant to enforce govern-
ment measures.[40] The dethronement of Chief Kudiliwa caused a rural

37. United Nations Visiting Mission Report, 1954, op. cit.; Melville
     J. Herkovits, "The Cattle Complex in East Africa," in The American
     Anthropologist, Volume 28, No. 1, January–March, 1926, p. 32;
     Colonial No. 165, op. cit., p. 12.

38. See Petitions from The Tanganyika African National Union to the
     United Nations Visiting Mission, 1954, op. cit.

39. T/PET2/43, op. cit., also Tanganyika Government Letters, Ref.
     PW/8/412, Ref. PW/36/93 and Ref. BW8/456.

40. T/PET2/43, op. cit.

revolt and widespread protest. As a result, 24 headmen were arrested
and later deposed by the District Commissioner who replaced them later
by ones of his choice.[41] In their petition to the United Nations these
headmen stated that the District Commissioner had removed them from
their positions and had confiscated their plantations. They alleged
that the District Commissioner without a reason, imprisoned them in
order to compel them to accept the Mtemi who was selected by him and
whom they did not want.[42] Such incidents caused widespread frustra-
tion in many rural areas, and the feeling among many peasants that those
serving in local government were the agents of the colonial state.
Thus a gap between the peasants and the local government officials,
mostly chiefs, characterized colonial rural Tanganyika.

There was thus widespread dissatisfaction as a result of con-
flicts over land, and resentment of land policies.

COLONIAL COLOR BAR

On his arrival at London Airport from a visit to Tanganyika
in 1952, Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, told the press: "I
was glad to find racial harmony and cooperation. There is no doubt
about that out there."[43] In essence the Colonial Secretary was
echoing the officially held view that Tanganyika had no color bar

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41. Ibid., p. 3.

42. Ibid.; Addendum 1, op. cit., p. 8.

43. Lennox-Boyd, Speech by the Rt. Hon. Lennox-Boyd, Secretary of State
    for the Colonies, at a Luncheon in the Karimjee Hall, Dar-es-
    Salaam, on Monday, October, 28th, 1957, Dar-es-Salaam, Government
    Printer, 1957, pp. 2-3.

and that its racial relationships were very good. African political
quiescence, lack of volatile racialism in the society as a whole,
and the statesmanlike character of the nominated M.L.C.s up to
1954, were taken as indices of good racial relations. Indeed, the
political cooperation up to 1954, was construed as the major verifica-
tion of the thesis of racial cooperation upheld by the officials.

In practice Tanganyika had a racial structure just as dis-
criminatory as any of the Central and East African Territories
except Uganda. In Tanganyika, as in Kenya or Northern Rhodesia, the
color bar guided social relations between the various races. Hotels,
clubs and many other public places, such as recreational centers in urban
areas, were discriminatory. Although this was not authorized by law,
the owners of such places could call upon the police to evict non-
Europeans who wished to impose themselves in exclusively European
places. If it happened to be in an eating place, the owner could merely
refust to serve. The same color bar was also practiced in travelling
facilities. Normally in trains, first class was reserved for
Europeans, second for Asians, and third for Africans. Africans were
not often permitted in the first class even if they could afford it
financially. But whenever the Government was questioned about the exis-
tence of a color bar, as by an M.L.C. in 1953, it always brushed aside
such queries as unfounded.[44]

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44. The Times (London), October 1, 1953, p. 4; December 31, 1953,
p. 7; January 29, 1954, p. 9; December 6, 1954; September 5,
1955, p. 7.

Until 1955, Africans were forbidden by law to drink European liquor.[45] No other territory in East and Central Africa had such prohibitions. By this law, to sell, barter, give, or supply liquor to an African was an offense carrying a maximum fine of £100-£500 and 6-12 months in prison. It was also an offense to employ an African to sell liquor, in any capacity other than that of a servant, or to deliver beer to, or collect it from, a European purchaser. The law applied to all Africans in Tanganyika irrespective of status, education or income.[46]

In September, 1955, the Government repealed this law.[47] In a debate over the bill, the Rt. Hon. Capt. Bennett, a European settler, and M.L.C., expressed the general European stand when he declared that he cherished the bill, and reprehended the African demands to be permitted to drink liquor. He was particularly scornful of the African argument that "if the Europeans and the Asians do it, why not we." He maintained that Africans were neither mature nor ready to consume liquor. He then offered "fatherly" advice counselling Africans to "spend their money on clothes, food, education for their children and household necessities, rather than on the more selfish pleasure of drink."[48]

45. Tanganyika Laws, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, Chapter 198, "Intoxicating Liquor," Section 51, Supply of Liquor to Natives, Section 2 of 1931.

46. Tanganyika Laws, ibid., Section 53 of Chapter

47. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, September 1, 2, 3, 1955.

48. Tanganyika Legislative Council Debates, (Hansards), Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1957, Section 30, Volume 2.

In Tanganyika, the various practices of unequal pay, promotion, accommodation, and the distribution of seats in the Legislative and the Executive Council according to race, were all manifestations of the color bar. It is unequivocally clear that Tanganyika had a racialistic structure, like any other colonial imperial possession in Africa. The color bar also existed in the colonial educational system.

Tanganyika had separate schools for the three races. The separate systems were embued with inequality, as the European schools had the best facilities, followed by the Asian schools, while the African schools had the worst facilities. Much of this resulted from the unequal distribution of the educational expenditure for the three races.

African schools consisted largely of the following: Government Schools, Native Authority Schools and Moslem Schools. Of these types, the Native Authority Schools were the least religiously oriented; Government Schools were often Christian oriented.

Central Government provided most of the funds for the education of all three races, about 80 percent of the total expended on education. It was in the distribution of this money among the races that color bar practices became visibly evident. As Tables 4:5 and 4:6 show, the Government was spending disproportionally larger sums on one European school child than on either an Asian or African school child throughout the colonial epoch. In 1960, a year before Independence, it was costing the colonial state £95 per year to educate one primary school European child, in contrast to an annual expenditure of £15 for

one primary school Asian child, and £3 for an African primary child child. For secondary schools, the Government spent£ 262 annually per European child as compared to £162 per African child.[49]

In the 1950s, the European benefited even further from the principle of parity. This was particularly so in 1955, when the £2,400,000 obtained from the sale of ex-German lands was equally divided for the education of the three races, giving each race £80,000. The Europeans, as the smallest group, about 20,000, gained most, whereas the largest group, the Africans, 8 million, were hit harder than the Asians, 90,000. Speaking in the budget debate, the nominated Tanu member of the Legislative Council, the Rt. Hon. Mr. Bomani, objected to this allocation:

> Could anyone say that such a distribution
> was fair? If this is what is meant by
> parity I think the other party to the parity
> will always be discontent because when
> you come to distribute public funds and you
> distribute in spite of demands and desire
> of the other party, it will appear that
> the other party will not be satisifed
> and I think consideration should be given
> to the distribution of money. 50

As a result of the colonial distribution of educational funds, Africans had relatively few schools, which accounts for the low literacy rate among them. Indeed, Tanganyikan educational statistics, even by African standards, are alarming. By 1957, only 7½ percent of females aged 15 and above had ever received any school education. Of

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49. Colonial No. 349, op. cit.

50. Hansards, op. cit., Session 30, 1955; and the Tanganyika Standard, op. cit., 1, 2, 3 September, 1955.

the whole population, only about .1 percent could be described as occupying positions requiring skilled training and high education. On, the eve of Independence, Tanganyika, with an African population of eight million, had only 60 university graduates, no qualified African judge, less than 20 qualified African medical doctors and only five African lawyers.

The lack of higher educational facilities for Africans in Tanganyika in the colonial epoch was even more distinct. This rankled among Africans. The lack of secondary schools, training and technical colleges, and university provision, was remarkable. In 1956, there were provision for only 36 percent of the children in the primary school age group. This percentage increased to 40 percent by 1960. But the educational provision tapers off sharply above the primary school level due to the lack of secondary schools, technical colleges and training colleges. Educational plans envisaged an enrollment by 1956 of 3,260 in the first year of the secondary school, and a similar number for the second year. For the third and fourth year the maximum planned was 400 boys and only 60 girls. The actual enrollment figures were 2,531 boys and 95 girls in the first two years, and 195 boys and 12 girls in the last two years of secondary school. By 1960, only one out of five primary school graduates could find a place in a secondary school.

The picture was even worse for university students (see Table 4:8). Because of the lack of secondary school provisions, Tanganyika was unable to fill her quota at Makerere University College

throughout the colonial era.[51] However, from 1952, there was a slow but steady increase in the number of university students. In 1952, there were only 57 Tanganyika university students, in 1953, the number was 88,112 in 1954 and 457 in 1959. (See Table 4:8). Until 1961, there were no local facilities for university education in Tanganyika. Students went either to Uganda, Kenya, or abroad. All this spelled a great deal of frustration for the Africans.

The pitiable conditions of most of the African schools in Tanganyika accounted to a large extent for the high wastage and low enrollment. Despite the limited provision for education, the classrooms were never full. In 1957, although there were facilities for only 36 percent of the children of primary school age (6-9 years) and only five percent of the children of the middle school age (10-11), well over 100,000 places in primary schools and 5,000 in middle schools were unfilled.[52]

The low enrollment was also partly caused by the philosophy of colonial education. Education was normally accompanied by westernizing processes, by which children were made to resent their customs, and to adopt European names. In mission schools, particularly, education was combined with proselytization. Several petitions addressed to the United Nations made it known that "many parents resent the system whereby their children are required to repu-

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51. Colonial No. 342, op. cit.

52. Colonial No. 293, op. cit.

diate the faith of their parents when they enter mission schools."[53]

Such practices only re-enforced the lack of interest in education by many parents, especially in remote rural areas, where they were already reluctant to part with their children, preferring to have them at home and making use of their services either in the house or in the gardens.

Westernizing and proselytizing practices were particularly vexing to the non-Christian sections of the population, which formed 70 percent of the total population. The resentment seemed to be strongest amongst the proud Moslems, who exercised pressure on the government to provide schools where their children could go without being Christianized. The Moslems, especially in the latter part of the 1950's, were particularly distressed at the small number of Moslem schools (see Table 4:7). Although the Moslems accounted for 30 percent of the total African population, by 1960, they had only 38 primary schools with a total enrollment of 5,067, in contrast to 1,888 Christian primary schools with 265,393 pupils, although the Christians formed only about a quarter of the total population. Out of 29 secondary schools in the country, 16 were mission and 13 Government owned. The Native Authority and the Moslems had none.[54]

The non-Christian Africans were also perturbed at the mission's interference with the opening of the Native Authority schools,

53. Colonial No. 307, op. cit., paragraph 96, p. 17.
54. Colonial No. 278, op. cit., paragraph 536, p. 20.

which were less western oriented. Mr. Njare, a Moslem spokesman,

in 1948 wrote:

> The Missions detest N.A. schools and
> whenever they hear of an application by
> a section of the tribe to have N.A.
> schools they often try to open a bush
> school and they apply for its registration,
> which precludes the application for a N.A.
> school, which is then supposed to be proved
> superfluous by the existence of the inferior
> bush school or registered school.55

All in all, these grievances were frustrating because the

power lay in the colonial state which was mainly controlled by the

Europeans, and because petitions and protests against the colonial

educational system did not force significant change.

The strains arising from labor, competition over land between

the Europeans settlers and Africans, and from the various practices

of colonial color bar, as analyzed above, together with those arising

from the central government made the Tanganyika colonial situation

intrinsically a conflict ladden structure. The conditions under

which these strains became translated into open conflict are discussed

in the next chapter.

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55. £/PET2/103, op. cit.

TABLE 4:1 DISTRIBUTION OF AFRICAN ADULT MALES REGULARLY
EMPLOYED BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS FOR SELECTED YEARS*

Year	White Collar	Blue Collar	Domestic Servants	Unskilled Laborers	Total
1949	22,544	62,993	34,909	263,469	383,915
1951	25,771	30,557	24,457	249,739	331,524
1952	22,138	22,100	20,744	246,633	311,615
1956	23,481	72,993	3,198	230,009	329,741
1958	25,564	82,525	4,443	226,656	339,188
1959	30,110	72,436	3,991	236,374	342,911
1961	31,029	48,653	4,960	273,567	358,209

*Source: Annual Reports of the Labor Department (for Selected Years)
Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer.

Central Statistical Bureau: Statistical Abstract, Dar-es-
Salaam, Government Printer, 1950, 1952, 1953, 1959, 1960,
and 1962.

Note: White Collar'- Administrative/Executive workers, professional
clerical workers and teachers.

Blue Collar – Mechanics and Fitters, Drivers, Carpenters and
Joiners, Masons and Bricklayers, Headmen, Foremen
and other skilled workmen.

Laborers – Unskilled workmen.

TABLE 4:2 ACCOMMODATION OF EMPLOYED AFRICANS IN
TANGANYIKA BETWEEN 1951-60*

Year	Africans in Government Accommodation	Africans in Non-Government Accommodation	Total
-1951	225,349	230,049	455,398
1953	269,241	179,030	448,271
1955	224,240	188,860	413,100
1957	199,106	231,364	430,470
1959	177,795	250,473	428,268
1960	135,288	252,187	387,475

*Source: Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke (eds.), The Transformation
of East Africa: Studies in Political Anthropology, New
York, Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1966, p. 254.

TABLE 4:3 WAGE SCALE FOR LABORERS IN TANGANYIKA - 1949*

Groups	Wage Range per Month
I	£4- 2-50 cents to £5-2-50 cents
IIa	£4- 0- 0 cents to £5-2- 0 cents
IIb	£3-10- 0 cents £4-2- 0 cents
III	£1- 0- 0 cents £2-7- 0 cents

*Source: Annual Report of Labor Department, 1949,
Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1950.

TABLE 4:4 NATIVE HOUSE AND POLL TAX
FOR SELECTED YEARS*

Year	Total Amount Collected
1924–25	440,901
1936	637,305
1946	840,000
1953	1,723,000

*Source: Ansu Kumar Datta, Tanganyika:
A Government in a Plural Society,
The Hague: Leiden, 1955.

TABLE 4:5 GOVERNMENT ANNUAL EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION
PER SCHOOL GOING CHILD BY RACE FOR SELECTED YEARS*

Year	Per European Child	Per Asian Child	Per African Child
1947	£54.1.15	£5.4	£3.2
1950	£185.5	£29.3	£4.7
1952	£267.2	£37.4	£6.2
1957	£241.1	£29.9	£9.0
1959	£175.2	£29.1	£10.5
1960	£138.9	£20.6	£12.9

Note: Expenditure refers only to Primary, Middle and Secondary Schools.

*Source: Colonial No. 220, 271, 293, 339, 342 and 349, op. cit.

TABLE 4:6 NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN SCHOOL BY RACE
FOR SELECTED YEARS*

Year	Europeans	Asians	Africans
1947	884	10,499	119,262
1950	1,417	13,286	182,942
1952	1,757	15,353	239,642
1957	2,745	21,567	394,132
1958	2,785	23,209	406,800
1959	2,858	23,688	419,011
1960	2,837	25,031	702,896

*Source: United Nations General Assembly Annual Reports,
for the selected years.

TABLE 4:7 NUMBER OF AFRICAN SCHOOLS AND ENROLLMENT BY RELIGION IN 1960*

Types of Schools	Primary I-IV		Middle V-VIII		Secondary IX-XII	
	Number of Schools	Enrollment	Number of Schools	Enrollment	Number of Schools	Enrollment
Central Government and N.A.	753	114,510	149	17,480	12	1,080
Roman Catholic	1,000	144,389	120	14,158	10	1,559
Other Christian Schools	933	121,004	98	12,195	7	1,006
Moslem	138	5,667	3	77	0	0
Other	6	697	1	390	0	0
Total	2,733	386,267	309	44,789	29	4,645

*Source: Colonial No. 349, op. cit., part 11, Appendix II.

TABLE 4:8 EDUCATIONAL ADVANCEMENT FOR AFRICANS
AS MEASURED BY ENROLLMENT IN VARIOUS
GRADES FOR SELECTED YEARS*

Year	Primary School	Middle School	Secondary School	In Africa	Abroad
1922	100,000				
1929	96,978				
1930	126,381				
1938	58,227		44		
1947	115,025		2,034	34	10
1950	176,641		2,405	42	14
1952	201,051	20,427	2,810	49	8
1957	335,632	35,511	2,989	181	81
1959	375,008	39,871	4,132	257	200

*Source: Tanganyika Annual Report(s); Colonial No(s). op. cit., for selected years.

STRUCTURAL CONDUCIVENESS — PRECIPITATING FACTORS: TECHNOLOGICAL
CONDITIONS FOR THE EMERGENCE OF THE COLONIAL CONFLICT

This chapter will examine certain conditions which were
conducive to the development of the colonial conflict in Tanganyika.
In Tanganyika, these conditions brought about a shift in attitude
among the upper stratum of Africans as they experienced economic and
educational advancement without accompanying advancement in the social
and political spheres. Viewing their condition as opposed to that of
their reference group — Europeans and Asians — it was quite inevitable
that discontent and restlessness should result.

This discontent, amorphous at first, gained form after the
Second World War. At this time Tanganyika was experiencing an accele-
rated economic and educational development which, although limited in
scale, fundamentally transformed the frame of reference of a large
section of the African population.[1] There were indications of a slow
but steady shift from a peasant economy to a wage economy, from a
rural to an urban outlook, and from a "traditional" to a "modern"

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1. Robert King Merton, (ed.), Continuities in Social Research; Studies
   in the Scope of "The American Soldier," Glencoe: The Free Press,
   1950, "Contribution to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior,"
   pp. 40-105.

attitude.

The impact of the "West" and all it stands for in Tanganyika, had two major facets, both of which are fundamental to the general consideration of the country's development in its relationship to the rising colonial conflict. First, the colonial educational system, as instituted by both Government and religious organizations, had an extensive influence, in that it created a small body of educated men, who were later to be leaders in the conflict. Secondly, Tanganyika's economy was largely communal and based upon rural small-scale farming designed to produce both staple and cash crops which would raise the general standard of peasant life. This system of production led to the overdevelopment of certain areas, such as Chaggaland, Meruland, and Sukumaland. In these areas, a high level of economic development, accompanied by political consciousness, led to the early manifestations of colonial conflict. From here, it spread to the less developed areas.

In analysing colonial conflict, the distinction between conditions generating leadership on one hand and followers on the other is essential. Conditions creating leadership must be supplemented by the freedom for leaders to mobilize their followers. In discussing conditions within which the structural strains were transformed into open conflict, these points will be examined simultaneously.

EDUCATION

The educational system operating in Tanganyika possessed certain features and philosophy which became fundamental elements in the development of colonial conflict. It was basically education which

enabled a group of educated Africans to perceive more clearly the inherent contradictions embedded in the colonial situation. The colonial educational system for Africans, both as operated by the government and the missions, laid much emphasis on "westernizing" by familiarizing African students with the western values of freedom, liberty, equality, independence, and hatred of injustice. But this educational philosophy ran concurrently with the practice of the color bar in social relationships, and with general segregation in other domains, as discussed in Chapters III and IV. The situation was comparable to that examined by Fanon among the Malagasy as part of his criticism of O.D. Mannoni:

> quite simply, they are the instances in which the educated Negro suddenly discovers that he is rejected by a civilization which he has none the less assimilated.... All is for the best; if, however, he forgets his place, if he takes it into his head to be the equal of the European, the said European is indignant and casts out the upstart — who, in such circumstances, in this exceptional case pays for his own rejection of dependence with an inferiority complex.[2]

In Tanganyika, similar views were heard in statements by educated Africans, through the Tanganyika African Association, who in anger observed that,

> Government's policy of propelling a few natives into the august temple of higher knowledge and letting them eat their hearts out, isolated, without contacts of equal social standing in some substratum, is cruel.... (They blamed the Government particularly) for its refusal to

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2. Frantz Fanon, <u>Black Skin and White Mask</u>, (translated by Charles L. Markmann), London and New York: Grove Press, 1967, p. 93.

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2. Frantz Fanon, <u>Black Skin and White Mask</u>, (translated by Charles L. Markmann), London and New York: Grove Press, 1967, p. 93.

> permit the educated African to live as a modern
> technically trained person should, while at the
> same time, his (African) standard of living is too
> high to keep him as a primitive, but just at the
> level to savour dissatisfaction and heart burning
> throughout his career.[3]

Dissatisfaction with the inequalities of the colonial situation

increased with the increase in the amount of education, with the

result that colonization was most resented in the 1950s among the most

educated. This resentment was epitomized by those who studied abroad,

such as Nyerere, Kambona, and Bomani.

Education in Tanganyika produced effects similar to those

described by Fanon among the Malagasy:

> In other words the Malagasy can bear not being a
> white man: what hurts him cruelly is to have
> discovered first by identification that he is a
> man and later that men are divided into white and
> black. If ... (the) Malagasy continues his identi-
> fication, he begins to demand equality in a way
> he had never before found necessary. The equality
> he sees would have been beneficial before he
> started asking for it, but afterwards it proves
> inadequate to remedy his ills ... for every increase
> in equality makes the remaining differences seem
> the more intolerable, for they suddenly appear
> agonizingly irremovable.[4]

In the early 1950s there were few Tanganyikans who had studied

in the United Kingdom, which had become the training ground for

nationalist leaders. So when a man like Nyerere, the first British

trained African M.A., returned home, it was almost assured that the

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3. United Nations Trusteeship Council Petitions From Trust Territories,
   Tanganyika, T/PET2/130, p. 8.

4. Fanon, op. cit., p. 84.

burden of speaking as a leader for the nationalist movement would
fall upon him. It was fortunate for Tanganyika that the first British-
trained graduate, to whom the less educated looked for leadership,
was also a born politician. He, with a few other young Africans,
also of the middle class, preferred to fight for a distant and
idealistic concept of freedom rather than to seek such immediate
tangible gains as were offered by employment in the colonial state.

The colonial educational system was designed to train its
students for leadership. From the primary to the secondary schools,
African education was characterized by strict discipline and harsh
punishment. Character training, based on British public school
philosophy, was as much a part of the school curriculum as were
academic subjects. According to Raymond Hopkin,[5]

> as almost all schools, primary and secondary,
> were boarding schools, most of the time the
> pupils were being trained to participate in
> various exercised designed to promote leader-
> ship in various aspects of life, such as
> accepting the responsibility of being a prefect
> of one's house, being monitors in classrooms,
> or showing leadership in sports or in other
> para-school activities. All in all the
> training was very rigid and was comparable to
> that of the military. At all times the wearing
> of a uniform, mostly khaki tunics, was insisted
> upon. There was a well defined timetable for
> each day which was similar to the following:
> bell for waking up -- drill, breakfast, physical
> exercises, march to classes, classes from 8-12,
> lunch 12-1:30, afternoon classes, manual work
> or sports, dinner, homework or study period,
> evening prayers, and bed.

5. Raymond Hopkin, The Tanzanian Elites, Ph.D. dissertation, New
    Haven: Yale University, 1967.

Other aspects of Tanganyikan education which had a fundamental influence on the development of nationalism and colonial conflict were the small number of educated persons and the limited number of schools. Unlike some of the West African colonies, or even Kenya where there were many educated Africans, in Tanganyika the small number of educated Africans facilitated personal acquaintance and led to closer contact. To a large extent, this was a result of the limited number of schools, especially secondary schools, which meant that many of the educated had gone to the same schools. Of particular importance, was the presence of Tabora Secondary School, a school which produced most of the top Tanganyikan politicians. As an example, one half of the Ministers and Junior Ministers in 1964 had been educated at Tabora.[6] Although no figures are available, it seems a reasonable estimate that about half of the top men with post secondary education in Tanganyika had gone to Tabora. According to Hopkin,[7] these selected few who went to Tabora were very proud of the school, as it was considered the best school at the time. Raymond Hopkin, in his study of the Tanzania elites, mentions that most of the elites who had attended Tabora were able to cite a half dozen names of prominent Tanzanians who were their school mates, including Nyerere, for those who attended Tabora in 1940s.[8]

6. Who's Who in East Africa 1964, Nairobi: Marco Survey, Ltd., 1965.

7. Raymond Hopkin, op. cit.

8. Ibid., p. 113.

Of those who went on to a post-secondary school education, most went to Makerere University College in Uganda, and the rest went to Kenya or South Africa. In all these places Tanganyikan Students Associations were formed in which problems of their country were discussed. Thus, a common secondary school background and the pride generated in the identity of their school made this a unified group, and provided a basis for cohesive leadership in Tanganyika.

Post-primary education, the basis from which the educated group arose in Tanganyika, was of very recent origin, as shown in Chapter IV only dating back to the 1940s. Consequently, those who attended it and became the educated were the first, and, usually, the only ones in their families, which were generally rural. Hopkin writes that most of these elites:

> were born and raised either in a rural village or a small rural center containing a church, a dispensary, or a small shop. In their early years in the rural environment their lives seem quite ordinary for African society. About three-fourths of them remember herding cattle or goats as youngsters. Much of their time was taken up with farming or household chores or looking after young brothers;[9]

(See Table 5:1). This meant that a strong tie based on kinship and upbringing existed between the rural dwellers and the leaders of the nationalist movement. Most of the educated people came from large families. Hopkin estimates that about 66 percent of them had five or more brothers and sisters, 32 percent came from families where fathers had more than one wife.[10] Nyerere himself is said to have

9. _Ibid._, p. 110.
10. _Ibid._, p. 110.

had 25 brothers and sisters.

Table 5:2, which shows Members of Parliament in the 1965 Parliament, lends a crude verification to the claim that Tanganyikan nationalists were largely young. This fact becomes more evident when one realizes that most of the listed Members of Parliament started being active in politics 10 years previously. According to Hopkin, about 60 percent of those in the 1965 Parliament were also politically active during the colonial epoch.[11] This fact is supported by Table 5:3 and 5:4 which show the dates when various Members of Parliament joined Tanu.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The exact role played by economic development in the manifestation of conflict cannot be adequately assessed. However, like education, it brought about a set of changes within the African population which increased involvement and socialization into the colonial situation and further acted as a preparation for the acceptance of further changes, among which was political change. In this regard, Fanon has written that, "to understand something new requires that we make ourselves ready for it, that we prepare ourselves for it; it entails the shaping of a new form."[12] This thesis points to the fact that in order to accept and adopt changes one must be

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11. Ibid., p. 117.

12. Fanon, op. cit., p. 84.

ready for it, at least mentally.[13]

The way in which nationalism was adopted by those Africans in the wage economy and living in the most developed rural areas of Tanganyika, such as the Lake and Northern Provinces, tends to support this thesis. In these areas, the involvement in economic development created an ambition to go upward not only economically but also politically. Participation in economic development and enterprise also offered many Africans occasion for leadership.

In Tanganyika, the country's economy was divided into two — the African and the non-African. Subsistence largely characterized the African economy, whereas the non-African economy, wholly based on money economy, was composed of large scale agriculture, mining, commerce, and other industries[14] (For a more detailed breakdown, see Table 5:5. No data is available showing African ownership of any large scale commercial and agricultural concerns.).

The Europeans and Asians initiated a system of commerce based on importation of commonly used European and Asian goods and, in turn, exported agricultural products and other raw materials. European and Asian businessmen became importers, exporters, whole-salers, distributors, and retail salesmen for the country. In retail and wholesale trade, as Table 5:5 shows, the Indians and

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13. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movement, New York: Harper, 1951.

14. Tanganyika: Labour Department Annual Report(s), Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1948-1964.

Arabs excelled.[15]   To successfully operate their commerce, both the
Europeans and Asians relied upon African labor.

Evidence tends to suggest that much of Indian and Arab enter-
prise, especially in retail trade, was largely in terms of small
shops, which were owned and run by the same person. Such enterprises
eventually carried these merchants far into the rural interior, far
outside urban centers.

The Indians and Arabs faced serious competition in mining and
agriculture, where in 1957, the European share was over 60 percent.
European owned farms were large in size and not highly mechanized.
Both the farms and mines relied heavily on "cheap" African labor.
Consequently, the agricultural and mining enterprises in the colonial
epoch were the largest employers of Africans, accounting for well
over half[16] of all the Africans in the wage economy, and thereby
becoming centers for large concentrations of Africans living outside
both the traditional and the urban milieu. In these centers they
lived in segregated areas, in houses provided by their employers.

These African farm and mine workers, together with those in
secondary industries, provided concentration of Africans who were
highly socialized into the western value system. They were drawn from
all parts of Tanganyika. · As they concentrated in one place, lived in

15. Tanganyika: Annual Report, Colonial No. 293, London: H.M.S.O.
     also see Tanzania: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, Dar-es-
     Salaam: Government Printer, 1966.

16. Tanganyika Population Census 1957, Nairobi: East African High
     Commission, East African Statistical Department, 1958.

quarters exclusively African, and spoke a common language (Swahili), nationalist mobilization was made easy, more particularly as most of them were already organized into the labor movement which was formed before Tanu, and had worked closely with it. Their availability for mobilization is shown by the rapidity of the growth of the trade union movement (see Table 5:6).

In the colonial situation, the distinction between economic and political issues was hard to make. In fact the two were inter-woven. The issues which drew the rank and file to join Trade Unions, were the same as those for which Tanganyika African National Union, established in 1954, was fighting. There was indeed so great an overlap of the leaders of political and occupational organizations, as virtually to make the two a single movement. For instance Kawawa who, from 1955, was the President of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, was also head of the Tanu Youth League Movement. Both movements endeavored, in one way or the other, to modify the imbalance of social, economic, and political power between Africans on the one hand, and Europeans and Asians on the other. Further, as already indicated above, the leadership producing stratum — i.e. middle class — was a highly unified entity.

In some rural areas, as mentioned above, there was a development of a cash economy. This was particularly marked among a few ethnic groups, such as the Chagga, Wameru, Wahaya, Wasukuma, and some others. It was among these groups that colonial conflict first emerged in rural areas, and many of the nationalist leaders originated in those

groups, especially through the tribal associations and cooperative movements.[17] A substantial proportion of members of the economically developed ethnic groups, as they became organized into cooperatives, responded encouragingly both to the technical advice provided by the Government, and to cash incentives offered for more production. Writing on the effects of cooperatives, McDonald notes that:

> in no other part of the world had the cooperative movement so quickly and so completely effected social and economic change as it has within the past generation in Tanganyika. It also served the vital purpose of grooming leadership for the country, while other channels — in business, and in government particularly — were being denied to them.[18]

The cooperatives did in the rural agricultural economy, what Trade Unions did in the urban wage economy. The cooperative leadership, worked closely with Tanu leadership. Of the current top men in the Tanu government, about half previously held top positions in cooperatives.[19] As MacDonald points out, "from graduates of such training and experience in cooperatives, Julius Nyerere was to recruit the nucleus of his cabinet and his government department heads."[20]

Below leadership level Tanu gained early and strong support in those areas where economic development and cooperative movements

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17. Alexander MacDonald, *Tanganyika: Young Nation in a Hurry*, New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., pp. 124-36.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

19. *Who's Who in East Africa, 1964*, op. cit.

20. MacDonald, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

achieved the most growth. Excelling in this were the coffee-growing
Chagga who, on the basis of available evidence,[21] had accepted modern
methods of coffee-growing, which included the use of mechanical tech-
niques, as early as 1925.[22] Chagga coffee production, which by 1925
stood at 600 tons, rose by 1953 to 7,910 tons, bringing in more
than £3 million. From the profits, the Chagga Coffee Cooperative
formed an All African secondary school, costing well over £100.000.
It was the only school of commerce in Tanganyika, and it became the
center of cooperative training in the country. As MacDonald puts
it, from here trained cooperative leaders and inspectors graduated
from this school and "became a familiar sight around the countryside
where they travelled by motorcycles to hold meetings and inspect
books."[23] Many of these combined their cooperative functions with
politics, thereby spreading the nationalist movements in the rural
areas.

Other economic developments were accompanied by cooperative
movements, but on a smaller scale than that of the Chagga. The
Rungwe Cooperative Union sprang up in the Southern Highlands, which
produced mostly coffee. It was headed by Kasambala. In the Lake
Province, where cotton was most commonly grown, the Bukoba Cooperative
Native Union was formed. It was headed by C. George Kahama. Around

21. Tanganyika Annual Report(s) Colonial·No.(s) op. cit. 1920-1960,
    ·and Tanganyika: Department of Agriculture Annual Report(s),
    Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1921-1960.

22. Colonial No. 18 and 307, op. cit.

23. MacDonald, op. cit., p. 127.

Meru Mountain, the Meru Cooperative Union, headed by Silo Swai, was formed. In the east of Victoria Mwanza, the Lake Province Growers Association or the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Union was created. Its members were cotton growers, and its head was Paul Bomani.

As a crude indicator of the important role these cooperatives played in the colonial conflict, all the above mentioned leaders were also top Tanu men, who held ministerial posts in the post-independence government. This political role of the cooperatives penetrated lower to the rank and file, thereby giving Tanu, and the nationalist movement as a whole, a potential mammoth membership estimated to be 327,000 by 1960. Although membership in the cooperative movement did not mean automatic Tanu membership, a large number of cooperative members were also Tanu members. The cooperatives, therefore, did in the countryside what Trade Unions did in urban centers — they provided raw material for nationalist organization.

RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT

To join a nationalist party indicated acceptance of the replace-ment of the current power structure by a new brand of leadership, that of African nationalists. In rural areas, this involved the rejection of the traditional rulers, which was a revolutionary step as it meant discarding some of the dictates of tribal custom. Ironically, in Tanganyika, the colonial state's policy of indirect rule, initially intended to preserve traditional authority, became a stimulus for the rural mass to support the nationalists in their confrontation with

the colonial state.

The exposure of Tanganyikan traditional authority to foreign influence dates back to the time of Arab imperialism and economic adventurism, estimated to be 200 years before the coming of the Europeans, during which time the political institutions of Tanganyika's various ethnic groups underwent some modification.[24] Further changes, this time more dramatic, came with the German colonial regime, which as indicated in Chapter III, introduced direct rule in the rural areas.[25] One of the most radical changes affecting the traditional political institutions was the introduction of patrilineal succession and inheritance which drastically changed the structure of the matrilineal societies.[26]

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24. Francis Barrow Pearce, _Zanzibar — The Island Metropolis of East Africa_, London: T.F. Unwin, Ltd., 1920; Sir John Gray, _History of Zanzibar_, London: Oxford University Press, 1962; also "Zanzibar and the Coastal Belt, 1840-84" in Roland Anthony Oliver and Gervase Mathew (ed.), _History of East Africa_, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966; Sir Reginald Coupland, _East Africa and Its Invaders_, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961; Richard Reusch, "How the Swahili People and Language Came into Existence," in _Tanganyika Notes and Records_, No. 34 January 1953, pp. 20-27.

25. Greville Stewart P. Freeman-Grenville, "The German Sphere 1884-1896" in Oliver and Mathew, _op. cit._; Smith Hempstone, _Africa: Angry Young Giant_, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1961; Sir John Scott Keltie, _The Partition of Africa_, London: E. Stanford, 1893; John-Perry Moffett, _A Handbook of Tanganyika_, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1958; Zoe Marsh, _East Africa Through Contemporary Records_, New York: Frederick Unger Publishing Co., 1961.

26. Audrey Richards, _East African Chiefs; A Study of Political Development in Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes_, London: Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 230-239.

The arrival of the British colonial regime on the scene in 1920 and its introduction of indirect rule complicated and revolution-ized the traditional political structure even further. The period of British rural administration cannot be viewed only as a dominating phenomenon in rural areas. It was also a revolutionizing mechanism, forcing rural political change as it sought to reconstruct the traditional political institutions along the pattern of the colonial bureaucratic state, while not disintegrating the traditional system. Sir Donald Cameron, the Governor, stated this as follows: "We must not in fact destroy the atmosphere, the African mind, the whole foundation of his race. We must endeavour to purge the native system of its excesses, to graft our higher civilization upon soundly rooted native stock that has its foundations in the hearts of the people."[27]

Rural administration in Tanganyika stands as one of the most impressive forces that drastically changed and moulded the traditional systems, and gave to rural areas not only new political institutional structures but all the frustrations and strains that accompany any social change, let alone radical institutional change. The history of the colonial regime is that of a government short of both money and manpower, which set out to rule a vast country with inadequate communication facilities — and succeeded.

The colonial state, under Sir Donald Cameron, moved decisively

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27. Sir Donald Cameron, *Tanganyika Native Administration Memorunda I*, Dar-es-Salaàm, Government Printer, 1930, p. 4; "Native Administration in Nigeria and Tanganyika" in *African Social Journal*, Vol. 36, November, 1937.

to set up an intricate system of uniform rural administration, called Indirect Rule. In order to incorporate the 120 different ethnic political institutions while at the same time attaining uniformity, four models or types of Native Authorities were instituted:[28]

1. "Mfaume" — The Native Authority. This type approximates the typical model of native authority; where the traditional chief is the Native Authority in his chiefdom.

2. The Federation of Chiefs sitting as a council for common purposes, each individual chief having authority over his own area or chiefdom.

3. The Tribal Council composed of petty chiefs or headmen, all of the same tribes. Each sub-unit is semi-autonomous, and the council may issue rules for the whole area.

4. Minor chiefs who might be village headmen, heads of clans, or lineage leaders in siolated and not easily accessible sections of the country, it was impractical to federate. All these were designated as Native Authorities, each performed similar functions, enacted by-laws, had Native Authority Courts and Native Authority Treasuries.[29]

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28. Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Parts I and IV, London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1950 and 1951; Audrey Richards (ed.), op. cit.; Lucy Mair, Primitive Government, London: Penguin Books, 1962; Meyer Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems, London: Oxford University Press, 1940; John Middleton, Tribes Without Rulers, London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul, 1958.

29. John P. Moffett (ed.), op. cit.; also Tanganyika Local Government Memoranda, No. 2 and 3, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1951 and 1953.

Between the years 1925 and 1945, the main concern of the
Administration was to find "real" traditional rulers to fill the
traditional offices, a task impossible of realization in a country
that had undergone centuries of changes, such as Tanganyika had.
Fosbrook, at one time a Tanganyika District Commissioner, paints a
fascinating picture of the hunt for the traditional chiefs:

> I am not going to burden you with details when
> the sources are so accessible but a point to
> emphasize here is the matter of timing; we are
> talking about 1925-26, this time being a time
> when anthropologists themselves hadn't really
> made clear the existence of tribes "without
> rulers." So, lacking this guidance from the
> anthropologists, the framers of policy went
> in on the assumption that there had been a
> golden age when each tribe ran itself by some
> perfectly adapted to the conditions of that
> particular tribe; people realized of course that
> there was a difference between the Masai and
> the coastal people, but thought that there must
> be some underlying principles whereby all these
> tribes could be led to conform or fit themselves
> into a legal framework of general application.
> Well, with that as a basis, where you did not
> find any existing hierarchy or chief you thought
> something was wrong, that the fellow who was
> looking, was not looking hard enough. So many
> District Commissioners who reported to headquarters
> that they were sorry they could not find a chief,
> got a reply to say he had better do so or else!
> So it might well be that they went back again
> to the head messenger, that fountain of knowledge
> and information on which District Commissioners
> rely so greatly ... and if the head messenger
> was really bright he helped both himself and
> his District Commissioner by saying, "Well,
> my own family is the chiefly family of this
> area." So he got his name put down and often
> he could produce as evidence that he had a stool
> name, a genealogy or lineage that went back to
> a depth of ten or a dozen steps, he could show
> the insignia and explain how he had been presented
> with a particular type of hat or flywhisk or
> ceremonial axe; and, of course, all this sounded

very plausible. But I can quote one district
where I know of about 800 of these lineage
heads who are formerly enstooled and presented
with this insignia. So although the office
messenger was able to produce all this corro-
borative evidence to claim the chieftainship,
so could another 799 people in the same district,
if they had only been looked for.[30]

The post-war epoch was marked as much by changes of personnel

in the Colonial Office, Labour Party politicians replacing conserva-

tives, as by changes in the colonial philosophy of rural administra-

tion, summed up by Creech-Jones, who was the Under-Secretary in the

Colonial Office, as one of evolution rather than of maintaining the

status quo:

We have moved a long way since Lord Lugard
popularised the concept of indirect rule, a
policy which fully recognised the structure of
African society and which accepted and tried
to govern through the indigenous institutions
... The essence of the system was the continuance
of the old ways of life insofar as it was not
contrary to British conceptions of natural
justice. Apart from the desire to eliminate
certain objectionable practices, it was, broadly
speaking, a static policy, or one which moved
only at the speed of the societies for which
it was designed. It could not, in the nature
of things, remain permanently suitable when
new economic, political and social changes
began to work and modify the authority, habit

30. Henry Fosbrook, From Tribal Rule to Modern Government, Lusaka:
Rhodes-Livingston Institute, 1959, p. 21; Tanganyika Notes and
Records, No. 28, December, 1948, pp. 1-50; Gordon Wilson,
"Tatoga of Tarika," Tanganyika Notes and Records, No. 33, July,
1953; for more discussion on appointments of chiefs, Gus J.
Liebenow, "Legitimacy of Alien Relation: The Nyaturu of
Tanganyika," Western Political Science Quarterly, XIV, March,
1961, Part I, pp. 64-86; "Response to Planned Political Changes
in a Tanganyika Tribal Group," in American Political Social
Research, Vol. I, No. 2, June, 1959, also in Richards (ed), op.
cit., pp. 245-46.

and ways of life of the whole community...
We are now called upon to apply a new yard
stick to an awakening African society. We use
the word development to describe the new process...

   All this necessarily involves adjustment in
the conceptions of political structure and respon-
sibility. It means a marked change in approach
to indirect rule... In short, government requires
more dynamic and flexible expression in the changing
conditions of to-day. It is less that policy
should be restrained by the old, almost universal
conservatism in African society which served as
the basis of indirect rule policy; but that it
should meet the desire for change and improvement
on the part of the African people themselves.
Local government machinery is required for the
administration of plans for progress in the
economic and social fields, while an outlet is
required for the growing political consciousness
of the ordinary people. For these purposes the
unmodified traditional machinery is inadequate;
and, whenever possible, it must be adapted to
the new needs of local government and administra-
tion. It is no longer a question of maintaining
the status quo, where its use no longer meets the
wishes of the people; but clearly it must be an
object of policy, where the people are developing
their own ideas of progress, to help them build
up institutions which satisfy their wishes and are
adequate for more modern needs.[31]

In Tanganyika, this policy was directed at the amalgamation and

democratization of rural administration. Sir Charles Dundas, Secretary

for Native Affairs in Tanganyika describes the policy this way:

that the development of the system of Native
Administration should be in the direction of
creating and autonomous local native government
having its own legislation, treasury and authori-
ties, and that gradually the administrative
officers should assume more and more functions

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31. Journal of African Administration, Vol. I, No. 1, January, 1949,
    pp. 3-4.

of Resident Adivsers rather than executive officials;
and that one of the means whereby this system
can be developed is the establishment of local
native councils, and eventually councils composed
of the recognised native authorities over larger
native areas.[32]

This policy led the colonial state to embark on various
experimental procedures in amalgamation which reached their peak
in the early 1950s. At the base of these experiments was the colonial
belief that political construction in a colony should take place
from the ground up.[33] This principle was very greatly stressed
after 1950. The policy of starting from the ground up is perhaps
well summarized in the Crown Colonist's leading article, February
1948, which states that,

active participation in local government is
valuable not only as an education in public
affairs and for its direct benefits to the
community and individuals comprising it, but
because it forms both a training ground and a
stepping stone towards the efficient conduct
of larger affairs. Most people can understand
the problems at their doors — the village
school, local sanitation or housing, the better
cultivation of their own fields, and so forth —

32. Margaret Bates, Tanganyika Under British Administration 1920-1955,
    Dissertation, Oxford: St. Hilda's College, 1957, pp. 84-85.

33. For a discussion on experiments on local government see: C.
    Winning-Ingram, "Reforming Local Government in a Tanganyika
    District," Journal of African Administration (J.A.A.) 2, 3 July,
    1950, pp. 21-28; F.A. Montague and F.A. Page Jones, "Some
    Difficulties in the Democratization of Native Administration in
    Tanganyika," in J.A.A., 3, 1 January, 1951 pp. 21-27; Z.E. Kingdom,
    "The Initiation of a System of Local Government by African Rural
    Councils in the Rungwe District of Tanganyika," J.A.A., 3, 4
    October, 1951, pp. 186-191; Margery Perham, Lugard: The Years
    of Authority 1892-1945, London: Collins, 1960.

> more readily and surely than they can appreciate
> wider issues affecting the country as a whole.
> It is therefore to the field of local government
> that we must chiefly look for the training of
> an intellegent electorate, of competent executive
> officers and members of Legislative Council.[34]

This policy was one of gradualism, which, while realizing that Africans must in the end rule themselves, felt, at the same time, that there was ample time, and that such a process of transfer of power is of necessity a slow process, requiring apprenticeship. Rural local government was seen as the most likely institution for leadership training,[35] and efforts to make it a training ground for leadership in the Central Government came in 1951 as part of the Constitutional Committee's recommendations.[36] The result was that the development in rural government in the post 1950 epoch assumed more momentum.

In early 1951, as a first step, the elective principle and the secret ballot system were introduced for electing officers at the village level on a limited scale.[37] After that, the system was steadily extended until by 1960 almost all the officers at that level were elected in every village.

The next step was the application of the same principle at the level of the chiefdom. In 1953, a Native Authority ordinance was

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34. Crown Colonist, February, 1948, No. 195, Vol. 18, p. 6.

35. Colonial No(s)., op. cit., 201, 242, 271, 277 and 273 (sections on local government).

36. Report of the Constitutional Committee, 1951, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1951.

37. Colonial No. 278, op. cit.

passed purporting to make all Native Authorities constitutional rulers, who were to reign and not to rule.[38] The Native Authorities were to be transformed into local councils, whose officers were to be elected by the populace. On the eve of independence, there were in Tanganyika 2,800 such representative councils, representing well over three-quarters of the rural local government councils. As in the village councils, and the rest of the rural local government, Europeans and Asians in these areas remained above the Council's jurisdiction.

Very little progress was made at both district and provincial levels. At these levels, the Constitutional Committee's recommendations, which were accepted by the Government, required that nominated multi-racial advisory councils be established, from which statutory councils would evolve. However, on the eve of independence there were only two Provincial Councils, both of which were almost exclusively composed of European officials, and only three Advisory District Councils, out of 58 districts. These three were officially described as "multi-racial."

The changes in rural local government brough a familiarity with dramatic change to rural Tanganyika and broke down most of the aura surrounding traditional authority, thereby preparing the rural populace, though indirectly, for the acceptance of Tanu ideologies. In this sense, rural local government joins the trade unions and the

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38. Colonial No(s). op. cit., 307, 317.

cooperative movements in its contributory role to the success of the mobilization of the populace.

URBANIZATION, WORLD WAR II AND TANGANYIKA'S INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP STATUS

Urban centers in Tanganyika provided a milieu within which peoples of different race confronted each other. In these areas, colonial conflict was born and matured, to be spread later into the rural areas.

Two vital points about urbanization in Tanganyika are its recent development and rapid growth. The presence of towns in Tanganyika only dates back to the early 1920's. Since the end of World War II, the rate of urbanization has been very rapid. Between 1948 and 1957, it more than doubled (see Table 5:7). However, despite this rapid and mushroom growth, the level of Tanganyika's urbanization in 1957, namely 4.1 percent, still remained low, even by African standards. There were then 12 towns scattered all over the country, on the coast or at lakes as ports, or as communication centers located at major junctions, such as railway lines or major roads.

The urban centers, though small, drew their population from both far and near; Tanganyika, East and Central Africa, Europe and Asia. Consequently, the towns provided a meeting place for peoples of different races and cultures. Most of the non-Africans lived in urban centers, and most of the educated (i.e. Westernized) Africans also lived in towns, as they were the main centers for white-collar employment.

For the town dwellers to live peacefully together, a radical
change in the basic beliefs of each race was necessary for the adjust-
ment to new conditions which differed greatly from those where the
population originated. The rapid rate of growth, as well as the
technological and organizational changes which were taking place as
a result of urbanization, were not followed by corresponding cultural
or value changes. This circumstance created a gap, a cultural lag
comparable to that described by Redfield, when he wrote that, "The
moral order which refers to the nature of the bonds between men and
their value — their conviction of what is right and wrong -- will
change more slowly than the technical order in which men are bound by
things rather than by sentiment."[39]

This cultural lag, one of the sources of colonial tension, was
more characteristic of the European and Asian population than of the
African town-dwellers, whose cultural values underwent considerable
change from traditional to western. The conservative outlook of the
superordinate sections of the society added greatly to the discontent
that became instrumental in the transformation of conflict from latent
to manifest conflict. This explains the fact that urban Africans were
most aware of this gap, and that from them originated nationalist

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39. Quoted in Hortense Powdermaker, Copper Town: Changing Africa,
the Human Situation on the Rhodesian Copperbelt, New York: Harper
Books, 1966, p. 14; also see Robert Redfield, The Primitive World
and Its Transformations, Ithaca:_ Cornell University Press, 1953,
pp. 1-25.

political parties.

The cultural lag, in the colonial situation, extended to the urban institutions. Despite the preponderance of Africans in urban centers, four Africans to one non-African, the view of both the colonial state and the Europeans at large was that Africans were living in towns but were not basically urban in inclination, for they belonged to the rural areas from which they came. Until the middle of the 1950s, this view prevailed in Tanganyika, and was reflected in the urban institutions where no provision was made for the participation of Africans.[40] Although a large number of educated Africans lived in towns during the post World War II period, Urban Advisory Councils, comparable to those in the Rhodesian Copperbelt,[41] were manned wholly by "traditional rulers," whose functions were "purely advisory."[42] After 1954, this policy was modified in the large towns, especially in Dar-es-Salaam, where multi-racial urban institutions were established with equal racial representation.[43] This change, however, was seen to have come a little too late, for the seeds of discontent had already been sown and had begun to mature.

Another aspect of urbanization relevant in the discussion of colonial conflict is migration. A high rate of internal migration

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40. Tanganyika Annual Report(s), Colonial No(s)., op. cit.

41. Arnold Leonard Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958.

42. Tanganyika Local Government Memoranda 1952, op. cit., p. 32.

43. Tanganyika Annual Report(s) Colonial No(s)., op. cit., 1920-1960.

usually assists the spread of nationalist ideas, and promotes strains in the society, thereby facilitating the awareness of colonial conflict in the society. Thus Weiner writes of India:

> ... large numbers of rootless, crowded, and often unmarried urban workers are easily provoked to violence and readily organised by political groups. (In addition) the continued ties between the urban worker and the rural area to which he returns for births, weddings, and funerals, and in which he settles when he has sufficient income, serves to bring urban political ideas and organization to the rural areas.[44]

Both the official statistics and Gullivor's study of migrant workers in Southern Tanganyika lend rough support to the belief that there was a high rate of both intra-territorial and inter-territorial migration which increased each year. In 1949, an estimated 10,000 Tanganyikans were working in Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa. In the same year, 3,148 were in Kenya, and 6,573 in Uganda, and a large number of Tanganyikans were reported to be in the Congo, Angola, Mozambique, and Nyasaland. The inter-territorial migration involves constant movement to and fro between the countries, as some go out and others return. As 4,600 left in 1949 for Northern Rhodesia, 4,500 returned to Tanganyika.[45] As the labor migration

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44. Myron Weiner in Gabriel, A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), _The Politics of the Developing Areas_, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 174.

45. _Tanganyika, Department of Labour Annual Report, 1949_, op. cit.; Philip Hugh Gulliver, _Labour Migration in a Rural Economy; A Study of the Ngoni and Ndendeuli of Southern Tanganyika_, Kampala: East African Institute of Social Research, 1955; _Provincial Commissioner Annual Reports_, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1920-60.

affected particularly the poor and less developed areas, it must have helped the spread of nationalism. The exact role, however, of this type of contact, in the spreading of information and ideas, remains obscure.[46]

World War II was generally seen as a stimulus to the growth of African nationalism. In Tanganyika, while the period before the war was marked by an absence of political awareness, the period following the war saw a sudden rise in political consciousness, and the accompanying ideas which included the demand for self-rule. The exact role the war played in this outburst of nationalism remains unclear as writers on the political history of Tanganyika present differing theses. Young and Margaret Bates do not regard the war as having had an effect. On the other hand, Listowel, a historian, maintains that the war, through increased contact with Europeans by Africans who served in the Kings African Rifles (K.A.R.), stirred up new aspirations, and accelerated the organization of political parties.[47]

The war apparently offered for the first time, a significant number of Africans a "chance" to see the world outside their homeland by being sent abroad to fight the enemies of their colonizers. They were thereby exposed to some very new ideas and concepts of which they had not been aware under the pre-war colonial rule. Perhaps for the

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46. Anthony Oberschall, Media Exposure, Information Level and Aspiration in Rural Uganda, August, 1967 (Yale University, unpublished), 1967.

47. Margaret Bates in Gwendolen Carter (ed.), African One-Party States, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964, p. 186.

first time many of them had occasion to see the other face of the Europeans. For now, the European was no longer regarded as an all-loving Christian, as most British presented themselves in Tanganyika before the war. African soldiers saw the brutal killing of Europeans by other Europeans. It must have been a traumatic experience as it suddenly occurred to the African soldiers that their colonizers were not as perfect as they had appeared to be in Tanganyika. This experience and discovery not only changed the attitude toward Europeans but injected in some Africans new ideas for improving conditions at home. The war also opened the eyes of Tanganyikan soldiers by allowing increased foreign contact and by exposing them to new experiences. At any rate, as Listowel has shown, the bulk of the forerunners of Tanu came from K.A.R. soldiers. In the early 1950s it was from this group that the first well documented political petition to the Constitutional Committee was submitted. It was from these ex-soldiers that the name "Tanu" originated, and the President of the Tanganyikan African Association, the forerunner of Tanganyika African National Union, was himself an ex-soldier.[48]

The period after World War II was also characterized by a new colonial philosophy which was intended to give to the local people more participation in government. As already shown in Chapter III, the period saw the first African members of parliament, the de-Europeanization of the Executive Council, limited Africanization of

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48. Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, London: Chatto and Windus, 1965, pp. 182-194.

the Senior Service, and changes in both urban and rural government.
Between 1945-1954, colonial philosophy was in fact far ahead of
African expectations. This was a strange period in colonial history,
as the colonial state pulled Africans instead of being pushed by
Africans, along the path of constitutional development. One such
occasion was the acceptance of the 1951 Constitutional Committee's
proposals, which left the European Community desperately infuriated,
the Asians greatly amazed at their constitutional gains, and Africans
askance, unbelieving and unprepared for the changes, which explains
their initial acceptance of the proposals. Yet, these constituional
developments had quick and direct consequences, and did succeed in
stimulating nationalism, although it was not until four years later
that the effects became apparent. From then on, African demands began
to outstrip the constitutional programs of the Government.

Tanganyika's Trusteeship status also played its part in stimu-
lating nationalist feelings and in arousing hostility against the
colonial situation. Apart from the constant questions, petitions,
and presentations on Tanganyika which various countries raised in the
U.N., the U.N. Visiting Missions had a great influence in arousing
political irg among the populace. Since 1948, every third year welcomed
a U.N. Visiting Mission. ·On each occasion its members traveled all
over the country listening to political grievances. At times, they
even enticed the telling of grievances. Here, in the rural areas,
they sat under the shade of the tree, amidst a large crowd of Africans,
listening to orally presented grievances. In urban centers, educated

Africans were normally hard pressed by the Missions to present their demands. In writing up their reports, the Missions seemed to be over-biased in favor of the African point of view. This was especially true of the 1954 Mission, whose report was rejected by the British Government. These frequent visits which were not often welcomed by the Government and the Europeans, seem to have played an inspirational role for Africans and the rise of African nationalism.

The initial period, 1949-54, when African nationalism was born, was marked by the political activities of the Tanganyika European Council (T.E.C.), a European political party, which offered the African leaders a model of strategy in political organization. It also showed them the sort of activities on which to pattern their political parties. The extreme demands of the T.E.C. for more political rights for Europeans, and the most violent and bitter attacks on the government's acceptance of the parity formula in the early 1950's came both through public meetings and the press. These media offered the African a chance to see how political demagoguery works, while it also stimulated their interest in politics.

The use of political oratory, and the organization of public political meetings, were means of mobilizing and spreading political ideas. They were particularly useful in Tanganyika. In the absence of modern mass media, mass rallies became the only effective weapons for the mobilization of the African masses, especially after 1954. Unlike western countries, not many persons could read newspapers, and only a few had radios, which were in any event, largely Government

controlled. During the colonial era there was only one daily English newspaper in Tanganyika — the _Tanganyika Standard_ — which was owned by Europeans. It was not until 1957 that a Swahili daily, _Mwa Africa_, was started. Around the same time, three other papers: _Ngurumo_, _Uhuru_, and _Spearhead_, as well as a newsreel, called _Sauti Ya Tanu_, appeared. However, the circulation of the newspapers appears to have been very limited; as Margaret Bates observed in 1962, "readership is mostly confined to Dar-es-Salaam and other large towns, and the rural reader depends on newssheets issued by tribal administrations or by Missions, plus a monthly log issued by the Department of Education _Mambo Leo_."[49] The only powerful means of communication in the rural areas were mass meetings and word of mouth.

News passed through word of mouth normally originated from public meetings, towns, radios, newspapers, or "tribal _baraza_." In rural areas, a lot of time was spent on discussions of a wide range of topics. Those with fresh news, information leaders, would become centers of attraction as many would seek to solicit more information from them. The fresh news then became a basis of the day's discussion. Such discussions generally took place under the shade of a tree, or perhaps around a fire. An interesting news item might be discussed many times. Having heard the news, people passed it on to others, often not without exaggeration, in an effort to create more interest.

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49. Margaret Bates, _op. cit._, p. 443.

Thus, word of mouth became a powerful medium of mass communication in rural Tanganyika, and must have greatly aided the spread of nationalist ideas.

LEGAL STRUCTURES

A significant element in the development of colonial conflict is the opportunity for political organization. Not all the types of legal structure in the colonial situation permitted the previously mentioned conducive conditions to become a framework within which conflict might be readily transformed from its latent form to overt expression. In colonial Tanganyika, however, despite European opposition, the colonial laws in Tanganyika permitted freedom of organization to all the races.

The mobilization of the African mass into an African conflict group -- Tanu -- after 1954, was fought tooth and nail by the European settlers. Much of the recruitment of Tanu members, especially between 1956-58, was done in the face of the very fiercest opposition and counter-pressures from this group. No label was too vicious for the settlers to use in their name-calling of African nationalists, who were branded agitators, self-seekers, power-hungry, irresponsible, traitors, and gansters. To back the name-calling, and in an attempt to prevail on the Government to halt African nationalist political activities, settlers charged the Tanu leadership and its followers with subversive activities, intimidation, and other criminal acts. In their lobbying, Europeans stressed the economic dangers to Tanganyika. On the 4th of July, 1956, a European member of Parliament

asserted at a predominantly European mass rally that, "subversive activities are going on in Tanganyika and that extreme nationalism is frightening away foreign investments."[50]

To some extent, European activities were rewarded when, in 1956, the Government passed a sedition law which provides that: "any person who without lawful excuse makes any statement likely to raise discontent amongst any race of the Territory or to promote feelings of ill will between different classes or communities of persons of the Territory is guilty of a misdemeanor and is liable to imprisonment for twelve months."[51] The Government, however, was very lenient in enforcing this law. It was, therefore, much to the credit of the colonial state and the British belief in and respect for freedom of speech, assembly, and association that Africans were able to mobilize against the colonial situation.

In practice, it was the impartiality of the judiciary that guarded this freedom of assembly, as it gave fair public trial to those arrested for political crimes. It was no vain boast when, on the 27th of September, 1958, a first-class magistrate, in summarizing his reasons for an acquital, stated that "whatever may be the case in totalitarian countries, the broad principle of a right to speech is part of the law of this protectorate, and H.M.'s courts may always

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50. The Times, London, July 4, 1956, p. 8.

51. Tanganyika Laws, Dar-es-Salaam; Government Printer, Penal Code Section 63, B. Also T/PET2/198, Addendum 2, op. cit.

be counted upon to defend the proper exercise of this precious heritage."[52] The man on trial, the Central Province Tanu Chairman, was accused of sedition because he had called the Tanganyikan Government "an imperialist trap" and accused it of "encouraging disagreements between tribal groups," an accusation which the magistrate describes as "so much verbiage carrying a faintly dirty air."

Not all those accused of political crimes were acquitted, but in all cases they had a fair trial, with the noted British lawyer, Mr. Pritt, Q.C., defending most of the serious political cases. One such trial was of the editors of Mwa Africa, a daily newspaper, which carried a highly emotional article asserting that:

> the British are in our country to suck our blood
> and to obtain raw materials, not because he is
> sorry for us or wishes to teach us civilisation
> and progress. The longer he stays the more
> minerals and money will be taken out to his
> country where they cannot exist without us.[53]

Success in this case was mainly due to the brilliance of Pritt's defense, as he contended that the article was intended as a criticism of Government policy and was not an attack on an individual or the British community as a whole, as Europeans claimed. Although the editors were found guilty of a serious political offense, they received a light sentence of six months imprisonment, because the magistrate

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52. The Times, London, September 27, 1956, p. 5.

53. Ibid., July 29, 1958.

felt that full, frank and free criticism of the Government should not only be permitted but encouraged.[54]

The libel case of Nyerere climaxed the emphasis which the Government put on freedom of assembly for Africans. In an article, in Sauti Ya Tanu, Nyerere had accused the District Commissioner of Songea, Mr. G.T.L. Scott, of closing the branches of the Union, instigating the people to make false accusations against Tanu, and dismissing the sub-chief for refusing to give false evidence against the party.[55] Apparently, in court, Mr. Nyerere was unable to substantiate these serious charges against a top administrator. "These serious allegations were only supported by the evidence of Hassain Ngunyunka, a shifty, mendacious, and unreliable witness," said the Magistrate, who continued to point out that "as a leader of a nationalist movement Nyerere had the right to call the attention of the Government to the alleged maladministration in the Southern Province, but he (the Magistrate) did not agree that the publication was justified."[56] The Magistrate maintained that "it was evident Nyerere wrote the offending article and that there was no evidence to show the allegation was true... (and) that he (Nyerere) had accepted them without consulting any reliable source of information."[57]

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54. Ibid., July 29, 1958.

55. Ibid., July 13, 1958.

56. Ibid., August 13, 1958, p. 7.

57. Ibid., July 19, 1958.

In his defense, Pritt, Q.C., called the charge an attack on,

> the freedom of ordinary political expression.
> There was uncontradictable and undisputed evidence
> that the Government would not put things right
> unless a complaint was made publicly. The right
> to ventilate a complaint publicly was an important
> one. It had been essential to draw not only the
> attention of the Government but also of people of
> influence with the Government and therefore, the
> publication was not an offense.[58]

The defense case, which stressed the fact that the publication of the article was part of the right of freedom of speech, and that this included criticism of Government officials, failed and Mr. Nyerere was found guilty. To the surprise of many, he was fined only £150.

This leniency in dealing with political offenders was partly a result of the trusteeship status of Tanganyika, and the respect which Britain had for her pledges, one of which was to guarantee the right of freedom of association, by which Britain as an Administering Authority was required to positively encourage political organizations among Africans.[59] Because of its international status, events in Tanganyika were closely watched, especially by anti-colonial groups, who most of the time were ready to take Britain to task in the U.N. for any small infringement. Britain, if she desired, could ignore these criticism, as South African does regarding South West Africa, but Britain was very sensitive to what was going on in the U.N.,

58. The Times, London, July 19, 1958; and United Nations General Assembly Offical Report, 1957, Supplement No. 1, 2nd Session, p. 56; also Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter.

59. Ibid.

and sought to create a favorable image of herself as the home of democracy.

International pressure was very much evident during the trial of Nyerere, as various anti-colonial movements both in Britain and the United States became active. The International League for the Rights of Man, with headquarters in New York, petitioned the Trusteeship Council, claiming that it had been informed that Nyerere was

> now deprived of his right of free speech by the Administrative Authority because of certain criticisms of the Government... He further informs us that some of his members have been arrested and held on charges of sedition. It strikes us as wholly unjustifiable that any sedition law should exist in a Territory where speech and association should be entirely free... We draw your attention to these two facts with a request that the Council be informed and that consideration be given to urging the Administering Authority to accord native movements the liberties which the Trustee Agreement contemplates.[60]

The Movement for Colonial Freedom, another anti-colonial organization, called upon the Trusteeship Council to send an observer to Nyerere's trial because

> the Movement is not satisfied that Nyerere's case is likely to be presented in a spirit of impartial search for the truth... We believe that the court will be greatly assisted in coming to a firm decision by the presence in court of an observer or representative of the Trusteeship Council. We request that you send an observer with instructions to give to the Trusteeship Council a full report of the whole conduct of the trial and of the facts connected with the administration of the Trust Territory which

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60. T/PET2/211, op. cit.

> came to light during the trial... It is only
> in the light of such a report that the Trustee-
> ship Council will be able to assess the wisdom
> of the action taken by the Government, and the
> value of Tanu as a means of developing political
> understanding among the African people of the
> Territory.[61]

On the part of Britain these international pressures were not taken lightly, since they were exerted at a time when many members of the U.N., including the United States and Russia, were attacking British and French colonialism. Of all the British African colonies, Protectorates, and Territories, Tanganyika's legal structures were the best in terms of permitting African political organization.

In this chapter conditions under which the colonial strains outlined in Chapters III and IV became transformed into overt conflict are examined. These factors of conduciveness, namely the colonial educational system, the economic development, the colonial rural administration, the international status of Tanganyika both produced leadership stratum and brought about, at least for a fairly sizeable section of the population, an awareness of the existence of these strains. The Tanganyika legal structure, its internal status and the British belief in freedom of association stimulated and permitted the organization of political parties among the Europeans, Asians and Africans. These political parties became channels through which the manifest conflict proceeded. The nature of the overt conflict and the manner in which it proceeded are discussed in the next chapter.

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61. T/PET2/222, op. cit.

TABLE 5:1 EARLY ENVIRONMENT OF TANZANIAN ELITES

Size of Community	Administrators in Percentages
Rural Village	32.0
Rural Centre	42.0
Urban Area	26.0

Source: Raymond Hopkin, The Tanganyikan Elites, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1967. Table 3:8, p, 110.

TABLE 5:2 AGE OF TANZANIAN M.P.'S IN 1965 PARLIAMENT

Age Group	Percentages
30 and under	16.8
31-35	18.5
36-40	22.5
41-45	16.8
46-50	10.4
51-60	9.8
Over 60	5.5
Total	100.3

Source: Raymond Hopkins, op. cit., p. 116.

TABLE 5:3   DATE OF ENTRY INTO POLITICS AMONG THE 1965
            M.P.'S

Date of Entry	Percentage of M.P.'s
Before 1945	1.7
1945 - 1950	1.7
1951 - 1954	8.6
1955 - 1958	34.5
1959 - 1961	13.8
1962 and after	39.7
Total	100.0

<u>Source</u>:   Raymond Hopkin, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., p. 118.

TABLE 5:4   DATES IN WHICH THE 1965 M.P.'S JOINED
            IN TANU

Date of Entry	Percentage of M.P.'s
Before 1954	0
1954 - 1957	40.7
1958 - 1961	31.3
1962 - 1965	28.0
Total	100.0

<u>Source</u>:   Raymond Hopkin, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>.

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Total	100.0

Source: Raymond Hopkin, op. cit.

TABLE 5:5   NON-AFRICAN OWNERSHIP OF MAIN INDUSTRIES

Industry	Indians	Arabs	Goans	Pakistanis	Other Asians	Total Asians	Europeans	Total
Agriculture and Mining	838	325	108	101	194	1,566	2,184	5,316
Manufacture and Commerce	2,369	109	238	201	160	3,077	705	6,859
Wholesale and Retail	7,599	4,325	384	724	946	13,959	707	28,644
Banks and Insurance	375	147	150	15	2	556	159	1,404
Transport	1,333	167	309	210	95	2,116	589	4,819
Total	12,514	4,983	1,189	1,251	1,397	21,274	4,344	47,042

Source: 1957 Population Census, ibid., Table 45, p. 35.

TABLE 5:6 GROWTH OF TRADE UNIONISM IN TANGANYIKA
SINCE 1952

Year	Number of Unions	Total Membership
1952	2	301
1953	5	687
1954	6	291
1955	19	3,349
1956	24	12,912
1957	15	33,986
1958	18	44,600
1959	17	78,100
1960	16	91,770
1961	14	199,915
1962	12	182,153

Source: Tanganyika Annual Report(s), Colonial No(s),
op. cit., (for selected years).

Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke (eds.),
The Transformation of East Africa: Studies
in Political Anthropology, Basic Books,
Inc. Pub., 1966, p. 293.

TABLE 5:7 GROWTH OF URBAN POPULATION IN TANGANYIKA
BETWEEN 1948-57

Towns	1948	1952	1957
Dar-es-Salaam	69,227	99,140	128,742
Tanga	22,317	28,621	38,053
Mwanza	11,296	13,691	19,877
Tabora	12,768	14,011	15,361
Morogoro	8,173	11,501	14;507
Moshi	8,048	9,079	13,726
Dodoma	9,414	12,262	13,435
Ujini	0	9,737	12,011
Mtwara	0	8,074	10,459
Lindi	8,577	10,784	10,315
Arusha	5,320	7,698	10,038
Total	155,140	224,598	286,524

Note: Only towns with population not less than
10,000 by 1957 are included in this table.

Source: Central Statistical Bureau: Statistical
Abstract(s), Dar-es-Salaam: Government
Printer, for selected years; Population
Census, op. cit., 1948, 1952 and 1957.

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10,000 by 1957 are included in this table.

Source: Central Statistical Bureau: Statistical
Abstract(a), Dar-es-Salaam: Government
Printer, for selected years; Population
Census, op. cit., 1948, 1952 and 1957.

TABLE 5:8   LEVEL OF URBANIZATION IN TANGANYIKA IN 1957 BY RACE AND PROVINCES IN PERCENTAGES

Provinces	Europeans	Indians	Pakistanis	Goans	Arabs	Somalis	Coloreds	Africans	Others
Central	67.6	83.0	67.5	81.6	21.9	44.6	43.5	1.7	56.3
Eastern	78.8	92.7	89.2	95.2	58.6	15.1	71.3	10.7	84.6
Lake	24.9	65.4	76.7	73.6	79.4	45.9	27.4	1.2	29.9
Northern	36.5	86.7	94.5	82.2	65.9	34.0	55.5	1.9	56.2
Southern	41.8	70.5	52.0	89.6	39.9	0	52.6	2.8	67.7
S. Highland	28.7	70.2	50.6	87.4	66.8	68.9	63.0	1.8	59.7
Tanga	43.2	86.2	83.8	87.2	44.1	76.6	46.1	5.1	47.5
Western	32.9	77.6	68.6	82.6	17.3	71.9	23.0	2.7	83.6
Territory	49.9	83.5	81.9	90.8	34.4	49.0	43.4		70.8

Note: Race = is used as defined by 1957 census.

Source: Central Statistical Bureau, Statistical Abstract, op. cit., 1960.
         Population Census, op. cit., 1957.

CHAPTER VI

COLONIAL CONFLICT: A BREEDING GROUND FOR RACIAL
CONFLICT AND RACIAL POLITICAL PARTIES

Underlying Dahrendorf's conflict model is the problem of the

relationship between conflict groups (in the present study, political

parties) and their respective quasi-groups.[1] Theoretically, the

model postulates that conflict groups are the vehicles through which

conflict concerning the unequal distribution of authority proceeds,

rather than through quasi-groups. The conflict groups, then, recruit

their membership from the quasi-groups whose interests they advance.

According to this postulate, a link between a quasi-group and its

conflict group is established, by reason of the fact that the

conflict group advances the interests of the members of the quasi-

group. In reality, the problem is more complex.

In order that incumbents of identical positions identify them-

selves with the interests advanced by their conflict group, they must

first be conscious of the interests which arise from their position

in the authority structure. This realization leads them to identify

themselves with others occupying similar positions. Where this con-

sciousness develops, under certain conditions it can lead to conflict

1. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society,
Stanford:. Stanford University Press, 1965, pp. 157-318.

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over the unequal distribution of power; as Dahrendorf describes it,
"the occupants of positions of domination and the occupants of
positions of subjection hold, by virtue of these positions, certain
interests which are contradictory in substance and direction."[2]   In
the emanating conflict, various "contradictory interests" are vocalized
and promoted by opposing conflict groups, each linked to one of the
several authority positions.

When applied to Tanganyika, the unequal distribution of
authority in the colonial situation brought into being three authority
positions, placing the Europeans in the superordinate position, the
Asians in the intermediate position, and the Africans in the subor-
dinate position. However, occupation of identical positions in
colonial Tanganyika, as stated in Chapter I, did not automatically
lead to a consciousness of similar interests. As will be shown
below, and as examined in Chapter V, over a period of time a con-
sciousness leading to identification with those in a "common situation"
led to the development of uneasiness about the unequal distribution of
authority among the three races. This awareness, which in essence is
"racial consciousness," developed early among the Europeans, but
never really developed among the Asians.

Underlying the conflict of the 1950's in Tanganyika was the
status of the legitimacy of a colonial state in which positions of
unequal authority were maintained. Consequently, one would postulate

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2. Rudolf Herberle, _Social Movements; An Introduction to Political
Sociology_, New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1951.

that the growing European and African populations would each seek to either sustain or modify the status quo. One would also assume that in such a conflict Europeans and Africans would join the political parties which advanced either European or African interests. This, however, was not the case. For one thing, the Europeans, as a "ruling class," as shown in the discussion of paternalism in Chapter III, presented their interests as the legitimate interests of the whole state. As regards the Africans, not all were able to develop racial consciousness, nor did everyone perceive the "true" interests of their race, as will be shown below. In the ensuing conflict, "false" racial identification occurred, by which I mean that individuals joined a party which advocated the interests of the other races. Instances in which an African joined a European party occurred largely as a result of the ambiguity with which parties defined their goals and aims. Much of this confusion resulted from the failure, on the part of the individual, to make a clear distinction between what the political sociologist Heberle calls ideology, and the programs of political parties.[3] Programs express the collective goals of the party, whereas ideologies justify, and provide social support for the programs. Marx made the same distinction when he wrote that:

> as in everyday life we distinguish between what
> a man thinks and says of himself and what he
> really is and does, so much we distinguish even

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3. Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1961.

> more carefully in historical struggles catchwords
> and fantasies of political parties and their
> real organisms and their interests, their concep-
> tions and their reality.[4]

Further complications may arise as a result of some parties

having elaborate ideologies but no definite programs, or vice versa,

or as a result of the occurrence of changes in both ideologies and

programs over a period of time in which the party goes through

different phases of its development. Notwithstanding these inter-

vening variables, programs of any political party should be true

indices of their goals and aims.

THE EUROPEAN QUASI-GROUP

To say the Europeans in colonial Tanganyika formed a quasi-

group by virtue of their being incumbents of identical positions in

the colonial state is not to say that their positions were uniform.

It simply means that the position held by Europeans was, in relation

to those held by members of other races, privileged, and that most

of their privileges, in securing employment and other benefits, was

a result of their position. In spite of the identity of interests

as incumbents of superordinate positions, the European population in

Tanganyika could not be described as either cohesive or homogeneous.

Much of the internal cleavage was the outcome of occupational differ-

entiation and differences in countries of origin as shown in Chapter II

above.

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4. Karl Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Berlin: New
Editions, 1951, p. 38.

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4. Karl Marx, 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Berlin: New Editions, 1951, p. 38.

As discussed in Chapter II, the Tanganyikan European population was very small, mixed, and more occupationally heterogeneous than any other European population in the East and Central African British Imperial possessions. The population breakdown in 1951 shows that 6,000 Europeans were officials employed in the colonial state, and as such were debarred from active politics. Three thousand were missionaries, mostly non-political. The number of Europeans engaged in commerce, plantations, mining and farming was only 6,000, a figure which includes men, women, and children. Out of this number only 1,000 could be called settlers who had a permanent stake in the country. The number of settlers, by 1957, was estimated to be about 3,000. However, as a *Times* editorial points out, even settlers could not be considered as permanently settled. "Even the Settlers are not rooted in the sense that Australians or Canadians are. Most send their children "home" to school and spend leaves at "home" if they can afford it."[5]

Nationality introduced divisive elements into the European settler communities. In a small settler community in northern Tanganyika, in 1948, of 410 European farmers, 89 were English, 163 were Greek, and 60 were Afrikaners.[6] In addition, the settlers in Tanganyika were widely scattered. In the whole country, there were only two large European settlements, around the northeastern mountain

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5. The *Times*, London, September 7, 1951, p. 5; also see 1951 *Constitutional Debate*, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1951.

6. The *Times*, London, September 7, 1951, p. 5.

region on the Kenya border, and in the Southern highlands. A third fairly large settlement, a sisal estate, was found on the East coast, in Tanga Province. Poor communication heightened still further the isolation of the European farmers.

In spite of these internal divisions, the universally super-ordinate position of Europeans influenced their political behavior pattern to a large extent. As incumbents of "lofty" positions, they developed a sense of oneness which was fairly strong, a consciousness of being European in contrast to African.

For most Europeans, coming to Tanganyika was not an adventure sought because of its uncertain perils and risks, but it was more or less a choice of a simpler and easier life than that found at home in Europe. First of all, living in Tanganyika, especially in the post 1945 period, brought to any European a substantial material profit. Secondly, Tanganyika, like any other colony, was a place where Europeans earned more and spent less. For Europeans, jobs were guaranteed, remuneration high, promotion rapid, and business fairly profitable. The young English graduate from Cambridge or Oxford was offered a challenging position carrying far greater dignity and responsibility, in the form of a District Commissionership or other responsible positions in the administration, than he could ever get in Europe. The European public servant was offered a high rank, a businessman substantially cheap material and labor, and the farmer a long term land lease, often 99 years, rent free. In all this, the material and economic importance of the European venture in

colonial Tanganyika, is clearly exemplified.

The benefits given to Europeans cannot be explained in terms of merit alone, for much came to them as a result of their privileged position in the colonial situation. Consequently, the posts obtained by Europeans were secure, for had they been based on merit alone, they would have faced challenge by Indians. To offset the possible challenge, especially in the civil service, University degrees from outside Britain, especially from India, were downgraded because, as the government put it, the Indian degrees were of lower standard. This explains, as pointed out in Chapter III, why Indian graduates were put not in the Senior Service, but in the Junior Service. Since any changes or modifications in the political structure in which these positions were incorporated was threatening, it was imperative for Europeans to preserve the status quo. As shown in the analysis which follows, the goals of the European parties in Tanganyika emphasized either the preservation of the status quo or the slow progress of constitutional development, for the more time which passed, the longer the advantage lasted, and the more the threatened individual would by psychologically prepared and accustomed to the changing situation.

THE TANGANYIKA EUROPEAN COUNCIL -- (T.E.C.) .

Parties in Tanganyika seemed to have emerged as a response to two constitutional events, the 1951 Constitutional Committee's proposals (reprinted in the appendix), and the first popular election

held in 1958.[7] At both times, the party organizations were stirred
by intense racial conflict.

The Tanganyika European Council, a cadre party,[8] was initially
formed, in 1949, by the militant European farmers of the Northern
Province, but its influence rapidly spread to other areas. By the
early 1950s, it began to claim the distinction of being the organiza-
tion representing all non-official Europeans in the country. The
party constantly harassed the nominated European members of Parliament
whenever they did not, to the mind of the party, stand up for
European interests.[9]

Soon after the publication of the 1951 Constitutional Commit-
tee's proposals, which recommended an equal number of unofficial
members of the Legislative Council for each of the three races, the
T.E.C. became politically active, vocal, and outspoken. Its basic
arguments were, in essence, based on an objection to the proposals
on the grounds that the European representatives (seven) would be
outnumbered by the representatives of the non-Europeans (fourteen),
and that the Asians were being much too generously treated (the
Asians were given seven representatives). The T.E.C. argued for

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7. United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa,
   1954. Report on Tanganyika, 1954.

8. For the meaning and discussion of cadre party see Maurice Duverger,
   Political Parties, Their Organization and Activities in the Modern
   State, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965.

9. Moisei Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political
   Parties, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, Volumes 1 and 11,
   1966.

retaining European domination of the Legislature because:

> the European community had, up to the present
> played a predominant role in the introduction
> of civilization and in the development of
> Tanganyika; the Asian and African communities
> were still politically immature; the present
> proposals widely favor the Asian community;
> what was needed for the development of the
> Territory was a period of political stability
> to enable economic development, which was the
> prime necessity at the moment, to be carried
> out in an atmosphere of confidence ... and
> consequently further consideration of the
> report by the Legislative Council should be
> postponed until a system of election has been
> introduced for the Europeans![10]

However, as a non-centralized party, the programs and stands

of the T.E.C. were neither uniform nor internally consistent. The

most extreme branches of the party around the Kenya border differed

radically, in their outright opposition to the constitutional pro-

posals, from the party executive which took a moderate stand.[11]

In a meeting held on the 11th of September, 1951, the Arusha branch

passed a resolution "calling for South African intervention in

connection with these recommendations."[12] Earlier in June, 1951,

the Tanga branch had adopted a resolution demanding that

> the European community must have elected
> representatives in the Legislative Council,
> and the number of seats allocated to them
> shall not be less than half of those held

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10. 1951 Constitutional Debate, op. cit., p. 8.

11. 1951 United Nation Visiting Mission Report, op. cit., p. 7.

12. The Times, London, September 11, 1951.

by non-official members.[13]

Meanwhile the more moderate sections, such as the Eastern Province
branch, were mild in the tone of their opposition, which was quite
conciliatory, as shown in their resolution, which seemed to accept
the proposals in principle, but resolved that the "parity should be
maintained at least 15 years. ... (The resolution also asserted
that) nothing less than elected representation would satisfy the
European community of Tanganyika."[14]

Aside from opposition to the constitutional changes, the
T.E. Council's programs included demands for rescinding restrictions
on European immigration into Tanganyika, granting Europeans more long-
term land leases, and encouraging private enterprises.[15] In every
facet, its ideology and programs indicated concern with the preserva-
tion of the "exalted" position of the Europeans in the colonial
situation. The party died a natural death soon after the Government
accepted the Constitutional Committee's proposals.

UNITED TANGANYIKA PARTY (U.T.P.)

The United Tanganyika Party (U.T.P.) was formed in 1956, the
year the government announced that the first general election in

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13. The *Times*, London, June 5, 1951.

14. The *Times*, London, May 24, 1951 also 22nd and 29th August, 1951,
     September 7, 1951, *Tanganyika Standard*, Dar-es-Salaam, 23 and
     24 May, 1951.

15. The *Times*, June 5, 1951.

Tanganyika would be held in 1958/59.[16] Founded by a group of

unofficial members of the Legislative Council, meeting in the

Governor's house, the party subscribed to a multi-racial ideology

and membership. However, the interests of the party, as shown by its

programs, coincided with the interests of the Europeans.

The ideology of the U.T.P., as outlined in the communique

issued October 12, 1957, stated that:

> Political consciousness in Tanganyika and the
> tempo of events both within the country and
> outside it, makes it imperative that a non-
> racial political party should be formed now
> to uphold anf further the principles which
> have been generally accepted by people of
> good will in Tanganyika. ... We believe that
> responsible people throughout the country
> must adopt a positive attitude in supporting
> the acting upon these beliefs, an attitude
> which is vital to Tanganyika's moral, social,
> economic, and political progress without
> which the goal of nationhood and full self-
> government within the Commonwealth will not
> be achieved. The United Tanganyika Party
> does provide a common basic approach to
> problems which have to be faced.[17]

In its programs, U.T.P. articulated a desire for slow consti-

tutional progress, which included self-government for Tanganyika at

the earliest practicable moment, estimated to be not less than 20

years. Such a government, although largely African, should be multi-

racial which constitutionally guarantees minority rights. However,

16. Tanganyika Annual Report, Colonial No. 342, London: H.M.S.O.,
     1959.

17. The Times, October 4, 1957.

the speed at which Africans were to assume their political responsibi-
lity was to depend on their "progress," and on their efforts to
raise their economic and educational standards.

As regards the 1958 elelctions, the Party accepted the parity
principle and endorsed both the tripartite voting system and the
qualitative franchise, because the "right to vote carries with it
responsibilities and requires a political maturity which did not
yet exist among Africans."[18]   The party accepted the restricted
franchise, introduced for the 1958/59 elections, as a beginning which
in the course of time would be "gradually extended until adult
universal suffrage was achieved." The party also favored the creation
of a consultative second chamber, "whose membership would include
'outstanding' citizens of all races," and it also favored greater
political roles for chiefs.

Like the T.E.C., the U.T.P. fought for free and private
enterprise with more free land leases. The party pressed for the
encouragement of European immigration in Tanganyika, to help strengthen
the country's economy. Unlike Tanu, it stressed economic issues, and
made economic progress a step which should preceed political advance-
ment. It favored separate development of the three races, including
separate school systems, "as the only way to promote mutual understand-
ing between the races."[19]

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18. The Times, October 4, 1957.

19. Tanganyika Standard, op. cit., September 12, 1957.

By 1957, the party was claiming a total membership of about 100,000. According to the president, 67.9 percent were Africans, 23.6 percent were Asians, and only 8.5 percent were Europeans.[20] To strengthen their claim of multi-racialism, the party had an integrated leadership; a European president, the Right Hon. I.C. Bayldon, and two non-European vice-presidents, Sikeeba, an Asian, and Sheikh Hussein Juma, an African.[21]

THE TANGANYIKA NATIONAL SOCIETY (T.N.S.)

The Tanganyika National Society (T.N.S.) was founded, in December, 1955, by a group of idealistic and liberal-minded Europeans. This group, inspired by their liberal beliefs, sought to form a party which would give more meaning to and provide a basis for the cooperation of the three races.[22] To do so, a highly idealistic program outlining its world view was adopted, in which the party strove for:

1. Common citizenship
2. One loyalty to Tanganyika and its eventual self government
3. Abolition of all traces of discrimination
4. Protection of civilized standards and values
5. A single system of voting open to all but based on mutually agreed qualifications, such as property or salary, education, character, and evidence of responsibility and

20. United Nation Visiting Mission Report, op. cit., 1957.

21. The Times, London, July 4, 1956, p. 8.

22. The Times, London, 5th, 7th and 8th December, 1955.

attested loyalty

6. Recognition that only the attainment of social stability between races will allow for full economic development.[23]

The formation of T.N.S. was applauded both in the local and British press. A Tanganyika Standard editorial called it "the first multi-racial society to be formed in the country,... (and its formation was) particularly essential if the purely racial nationalism of the Tanganyika African National Union is to be successfully combated."[24] However, the party failed to attract any significant following beyond that, as Listowel puts it, of "a handful of idealistic Europeans, who had for some time wanted to break down the race barriers surrounding Africans."[25] The ideology and programs of the party, as outlined above, were too radical for many Europeans, unappealing to the apolitical if not apathetic Asians, and very conservative to the African nationalists. Despite the high ideals of the party, it failed to develop roots in the Tanganyikan political scene.

THE ASIANS

Similarity in the position of the people classified as Asians did not lead to the development of racial identity among them. So

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23. The Times, London, January 23, 1956, p. 5; also February 18, 1956, p. 5.

24. Tanganyika Standard, December 6, 1955.

25. Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, London: Chatto and Windels, 1965, p. 277.

pyramid, as clerks and small traders, many of them, such ad Karimjee, had risen to prominence. Some families among the Indians had raised five or six generations in Tanganyika.

The internal divisions among the Indians, so much stressed by writers on East African Indians, seem to be exaggerated. While caste persisted, it seems that most of the Indians who came to East African were from trading castes. There is no evidence to suggest the existence of Brahmins, warriors, or untouchables in Tanganyika.[26] It seems plausible to say that the divisions among Indian-Pakistan, Hindu-Moslem mentioned above were basically intra-caste rather than inter-caste. Consequently, these tended not to be deep enough to prevent the Indians from uniting.

THE ASIATIC CONFLICT GROUPS

Despite the existence of several organizations among the Asians, most of which were based largely on either sects, religion, or other divisions, the only one with substantial support was the Asian Association, which before 1951 was called the Indian Association. Initially an exclusively Indian group, it increasingly assumed the role of speaker for the whole Asiatic race in the 1950s. Because of the racially compartmentalized nature of Tanganyika, the Asian Association became a spokesman for Asiatic interests in the Legislature, to the United Nations Visiting Missions, and in the society at large.

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26. Lawrence W. Hollingsworth, The Asians of East Africa, London: Macmillan, 1960. Dharam Ghai, Portrait of a Minority; Asians in East Africa, Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Until 1953, the Association was very vocal; on most issues, it opposed

both Africans and Europeans. As shown below, in the discussion on

conflict, the Association became particularly active in 1951, when

it supported the parity principle. In its stand, the Association

favored a common-role electoral system, arguing that

> in the interests of harmonious development of
> a country where three different races live
> side by side, it is essential that better under-
> standing should be established and common-roll
> will bring about the desired outlook and
> afford opportunities to the electorate as
> a whole to pick out the most popular and
> efficient representative from different parts
> of the Territory.[27]

It also favored a Legislature consisting of unofficial members only.

The Association was concerned over the lack of Asiatic occupa-

tional mobility in the Civil Service, especially in the Senior Service.

It complained to the 1951 U.N. Visiting Mission that "the Colonial

Service has so far been denied to the Asian Community. By 1950, there

was only one Asian in the Senior Service."[28] The Iringa Branch,

meanwhile, was petitioning against the colonial state's policy of

"discrimination in business between Europeans and non-Europeans in

Iringa, in the shape of monopolies to European firms in one way or

another, ... (and called for) free trade and no restrictions and

monopolies."[29] Concerning land, the Association fought for more land

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27. U.N. Visiting Mission Report, op. cit., 1951, p. 4.

28. Ibid.

29. United Nations Trusteeship Council Petitions from Trust Territories,
Tanganyika, T/PET2/116.

for Asians. In its petitions to the U.N. Visiting Missions, the
Association blamed the colonial state because "all enemy farms have
been allotted to Europeans in spite of their having more than one
farm."[30] The Association also complained of the colonial education
system "because it discriminates against the Asians."[31]

With Nehru's announcement in 1953, of his government's policy
in Africa, outside of South Africa, the Association became less vocal,
and in most cases cooperated with the African nationalist opposition
to the colonial state. In a press statement in London, June 1953,
Nehru had said:

> Indians in Africa are there with the good will
> of Africans and if the Africans want to push
> them out they will be pushed out, ... of course,
> that may be an idealistic attitude, but it is
> also a constructive attitude because that is
> the only way that Indians can live there in peace
> and quiet. ... We have told the Indian nationals
> in Africa very definitely and very precisely
> that we do not encourage or support them in
> anything they might want which goes against
> the interests of the Africans. We shall support
> them, of course, in their legitimate demands,
> but not if these demands are to gain any
> privilege at the expense of the Africans.[32]

After this declaration, although the Association continued to fight
for Asian interests in the years between 1953 and 1958, it did not
take a stand which was in direct conflict with African interests.
In the 1958 election, the Asian Association sponsored Asian candidates

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30. T/PET2/116, op. cit.

31. T/PET2/116, op. cit.

32. Tanganyika Standard, June 13, 1953.

who stood however as Tanu candidates. During this period, 1958, too, the Association changed its orientation from Asian to Tanganyikan, thus following the trend of the country as a whole.

The exact support and following of the Association cannot be assessed since no membership figures are available. It seems that much of its support came from the Indian intellectuals, and was strongest in the large cities, especially in Dar-es-Salaam.[33]

AFRICANS

Several parocially-based proto-nationalist organizations, whose origins, perceptions, and modes of action resulted essentially from both the indigenous and the colonial situations, existed long before Tanganyika had an African political party. Many of these continued to exist even after the Tanganyika African National Union was founded. The social bases of these organizations were quite varied, but their goals tended to be similar as, despite their parochialism, they were all nationally oriented.

Long before the political awakening of the post 1945 period, Tanganyika already had an organization, the Tanganyika African Association (T.A.A.), whose outlook was national. Founded in 1927, the Association, which was confined to urban centers, was an exclusive club for educated Africans. It differed radically, however, from many organizations observed elsewhere in Africa, such as those described by Mayer in East London, Banton in Sierra Leone, and

33. <u>United Nations Visiting Mission Report</u>, op. cit., 1957, p. 4.

Epstein in the Copperbelt,[34] in that its field of recruitment trans-
cended ethnic horizons. Consequently, its membership consisted of
educated Africans from various ethnic groups in the country, and its
goals were more nationally oriented. In it are found the first traces
of national unity and of African territorial consciousness, which
scarcely existed among the rural mass, where an individual's interests
were essentially confined to matters occurring within his local area,
and center rather on present existence than on prospects for major
political action.

Although it began as a social and cultural organization for
the educated few, over a period of time, 1927-1953, the Association
increasingly became involved in politics, and in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, it provided the only articulate and organized African
political interest and voice. It was to the Association that both
the U.N. Visiting Missions and the 1949 Constitutional Committee
turned for enlightened African opinions.[35]

By 1948, the Association had 39 branches and 1,780 members.
Three years later the membership had swelled to 5,000 and branches
were established in every town of importance in the country. However,

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34. Arnold L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958. Michael Parker
Banton, West African City; A Study of Tribal Life in Freetown,
London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Philip Mayer, Townsmen
or Tribesmen; Conservatism and the Process of Urbanization in
a South African City, Capetown: Oxford University Press, 1963.

35. T/PETw/61 and T/PET2/102, T/PET2/111, T/PET2/112, T/PET2/114
and T/PET2/120, op. cit.

the activities of the Association continued to be confined to urban centers and its membership, by being limited to educated Africans, excluded the large body of the African mass.[36] As the 1951 U.N. Mission notes, "bodies like the Tanganyika African Association could also do much to awaken a political consciousness amongst the rural Africans, but so far their activities have been confined to the more educated Africans in the towns."[37] This, however, did not mean the total absence of organizations in the rural areas.[38]

A number of proto-nationalist organizations whose base extended beyond the veil of any specific ethnic region existed in Tanganyika, especially among the economically advanced ethnic groups. The Bahaya Union, the Chagga Cultural Union (sometimes known as the Tanganyika Citizens Union), and the Meru Citizen Union were the most outstanding ethnic association. These and several others not only had branches in almost all the towns, but their memberships, which were large, included both the educated and the uneducated "tribesmen" living in various parts of the country. As the Union attracted the most educated elements of the ethnic group, who also, as shown above, were members of T.A.A., and part of a cohesive "middle class," a link was established between the parochial and national organizations

36. U.N. Visiting Mission Report, op. cit., 1948, p. 202 and 1951, p. 6.

37. U.N. Visiting Mission Report, op. cit., 1951, p. 17.

38. According to Goran Hyden, in some parts of Tanganyika such as Bukoba the T.A.A. spread into rural areas, see Lionel Cliffe (ed), One Party Democracy, the 1965 Tanzanian General Election, Nairobi: The English Press, Ltd., 1967, p. 57.

which, instead of competing, complemented each other. The programs
of these ethnic organizations, although essentially parochially
oriented, included national issues. These encouraged a wider outlook
and placed the organizations more in the national context. This
national outlook also tended to provide a basis of common interest
between otherwise unrelated ethnic organizations. Evidence of a
common front on African issues is to be found in the various petitions
sent by these local organizations, to the U.N. Visiting Missions.[39]

Existing side by side with these associations and probably
competing for the loyalty of the "tribesmen," were the official bodies,
such as the Native Authorities and the Native (African) Council,
which were part of the rural local government system. Like the
associations, the Councils were important catalysts in the awakening
of rural political consciousness, and became important vehicles for
the organized expression of rural African opinion in the 1950s.
Unlike the associations, the Councils had no branches beyond the
ethnic or chiefdom boundaries. Outstanding among them were the
Chagga Council, the Bahaya Council, and the Wanyakusa Rungwe African
Council. As official bodies of the rural local government, they
tended, in most parts, to be more conservative than the associations
and in some cases cooperated closely with the colonial state's
effort to stifle the spreading of African nationalism in the rural
areas. However, it would be an oversimplification of the facts to

39. T/PET2/ op. cit.; 1948 to 1960.

describe them as "puppets" of the colonial regime. On many occasions, the Councils took an independent line, and at times openly opposed the Central Government. The Chagga Council, in the 1950s, sternly opposed the Government's parity principle, condemned the U.T.P.'s constitutional demands, and called for the development of Tanganyika as an exclusively African state. The official councils, especially those from very developed ethnic groups, often spoke for the interests of Africans as a whole. In the post 1954 period, most of them, especially the Bahaya Council, became increasingly nationalistically oriented and openly sided with Tanu.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this brief examination. First, there was a high participation in organizations both in rural and urban centers, especially when the Trade Union movement is considered. Second, preoccupation with national concerns becomes quite evident. But despite the national orientation of many of these organizations, there was a marked absence of national coordination. One other fascinating conclusion seems to be that whereas there was active participation in organizations in developed areas, the backward regions remained relatively dormant. In a sense, therefore, a large part of the country, still remained outside of these organizations. Furthermore, these organizations could not be described as political parties. However, when Tanu was founded, these constituted an intermediate stage, a jumping off place for joining a national movement.

THE TANGANYIKA AFRICAN NATIONAL UNION (TANU)

The Tanganyika African National Union (Tanu), was founded on

the 7th of July, 1954. Replacing the T.A.A., whose membership and entire organization it inherited, Tanu was formed because, as Nyerere put it, "the Government would pay no attention to national demands, however reasonable, unless they had the organized power of the people behind them. Only a political party would enable him to fight it out with the British."[40]

Unlike the T.A.A., Tanu was a mass party. Not only did it inherit the entire T.A.A. organization, but it strove to bring under its influence, largely through cooperation of the leaders, all the ethnic organizations analyzed above, as well as the Cooperative Movements, and the Trade Unions. To fully incorporate the entire population of Africans, three Tanu sub-organizations were formed: Wazee Wa Tanu (Tanu elders — men only), Umojaa Wa Wanawake Wa Tanu (The League of Tanu Women), and the Tanu Youth League for males and females aged 18 to 35 years.

The goals of the party, as laid down in its constitution, were as follows:

1. To prepare the people of Tanganyika for self-government and independence, and to fight relentlessly until Tanganyika is self-governing and independent.

2. To fight against tribalism and all isolationist tendencies amongst the Africans, and to build up a united nationalism.

3. To fight relentlessly for the establishment of a democratic

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40. Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika, London: Chatto and Windus, 1965, p. 222.

form of government, and as a first step toward democracy,
to fight for the introduction of the elective principle
on all bodies and the Central Government.

4. To achieve African majorities in all bodies of local
and central government and committies, boards, or public
service corporations.

5. To fight for the removal of every form of racialism and
racial discrimination.

6. To encourage and organize Trade Unionism and Cooperative
Movements, and to work with Trade Unions and Cooperative
Societies and other organizations whose objectives are in
harmony with the aims and objects of the Association.[41]

Initally Tanu adopted the ideology of traditional African
nationalism, based not on territorial polity but race. As defined
at the 1958 Mwanza Conference of Central and East Pan-African leaders,
the traditional African nationalism was racialistic, and transcended
all territorial boundaries. Leaders attending this conference pledged
themselves to "work for a government of Africans by Africans for the
Africans on Pan-African lines."[42] A London Times correspondent,
E.S. Tolson, describes the motives of the conference as follows:

> The basic aim of the Pan-African movement was
> to rid East and Central Africa of imperialism,
> white supremacy, economic exploitation, and

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41. Margaret Bates in Gwendolen Carter, (ed.), African One-Party States,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 421.

42. The Times, September 6, 1958, p. 9.

> social degradation, by stepped-up nationalist
> activities to attain self-government and
> establish parliamentary democracy. ... A
> freedom charter which was signed at the Mwanza
> Conference declared the so-called trusteeship,
> so-called patnership, multi-racialism, and
> white settlerism are enemies of freedom and
> can be eradicated only by African nationalism
> virile and unrelenting.[43]

Tanu dropped its racial ideology towards the end of 1958.
It did so as part of the compromise by which Tanu agreed to contest
the election on a tripartite voting system. By this system, to win
any seat, the support of other races was essential, and further, Tanu
could only contest non-African seats by sponsoring non-African candidates.
As mentioned in Chapter III, there were 30 seats in 10 three-seat
constituencies, one seat for each race. Each voter was compelled to
cast his ballot, on pain of invalidating his vote, three times; for
a European, an Asian and an African candidate. In the election, Tanu
contested all the 30 seats, sponsoring 10 European, 10 Asian and
10 African candidates.

In the process, Tanu adopted a new ideology, that of Tanganyikan
nationalism, based on allegiance to the Territorial polity. Tanganyikan
nationalism embraced everyone of any race who made Tanganyika his
home. In the campaign rallies preceding the election, the leaders
explained this new ideology to large crowds, predominantly African,
and called upon the Tanu followers to vote for Tanu candidates of any

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43. The Times, October 25, 1958, p. 7; also Tanganyika Annual Report,
    Colonial No(s) 339, 342 and 346, op. cit.

color.[44]

The extent to which this new ideology penetrated the mass remains unknown. As regard the party itself, it seems that the new ideology was no more than a political strategy, as it was not accompanied by any modifications in either Tanu's programs or membership, which continued to be exclusively African. None of the 20 non-African Tanu members of Parliament elected in the 1958/9 election was granted an honorary membership. However, the inclusion of a 20 non-African Tanu team of members in the Legislative council fostered racial cooperation at the legislative level. This was of much political significance, and at the time marked a revolutionary step.

In the period between 1954-58, Tanu programs were oriented to advancing African interests in Tanganyika. This included the endorsement of the 1954 U.N. Visiting Mission's Report, which, because it requested the colonial state to give a constitutional timetable for self-government in 25 years, was rejected by the colonial state, and denounced by the Tanganyikan European community as "irresponsible."[45] The opposition to the parity principly (the embodiment of the multiracial society), the qualitative franchise, as well as the tripartite voting system in the 1958 election constituted the core of Tanu's program. Tanu instead advocated universal suffrage and non-racial representation. Unlike the United Tanganyika Party, Tanu's program

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44. Sophia Mustafa, Mrs., The Tanganyika Way, London: Oxford University Press, 1962.

45. U.N. Visiting Mission Report, 1951 and 1957, op. cit.

called for limited and selective non-African immigration into Tangan-

yika, the cessation of land alienation, and the termination of the

privileged position of the non-African minority groups. In a petition

to the 1957 U.N. Visiting Mission, Tanu leaders asserted:

> Tanu was not only prepared but determined to see
> that every Tanganyikan of whatever race, gets
> all the rights of citizneship which he would
> get in any free country, but that what Tanu
> could not accept was a policy such as that adopted
> by the colonial government which treats immi-
> grant minorities as privileged groups, thus
> giving them political rights which they could
> not enjoy in any other democratic country.[46]

THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (A.N.C.)

Tanu's new ideology as well as its intention to contest the

1958 election led to the splitting off of a group of dissidents,

who formed a rival party, the African National Congress (A.N.C.) under

the leadership of Mtemvu, an Acting Secretary-General of Tanu. The

schism began at the 1958 Tabora Conference, where many delegates,

according to Listowel, favored boycotting the election, but the

Conference was forced instead by Nyerere into simply contesting the

election.[47] Mtemvu felt he would draw a substantial following from

Tanu, but his forecast proved wrong. Listowel, a pro-Tanu historian,

put it this way:

> he (Mtemvu) dreamt of taking with him a large
> part of the Tanu membership; he deluded
> himself that he was imitating Kwame Nkrumah,

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46. Tanganyika Standard, September 10, 1957.

47. Judith Listowel, op. cit., "The Tabora Conference," pp. 305-313.

> who was followed by the majority of the people
> when he broke with the United Gold Coast
> Convention in 1949. Mtemvu achieved nothing
> of the kind.[48]

Although the A.N.C. adhered to the "traditional" African
nationalism, based on race, which appealed to the bulk of the Africans,
it lacked both leadership and substantial programs. When Mtemvu
broke away, he failed to split the cohesive leadership stratum,
namely the middle class, which remained solidly behind Nyerere and
Tanu. Mtemvu, as a leader, was no match for Nyerere, who by this
time had already become a charismatic leader and a symbol of national
unity. Furthermore, the program which the A.N.C. advocated was not
different from that to Tanu. The only differences between the two
parties were ideological, which must have appeared trifling, overly
subtle, and altogether incomprehensible to the mass. Consequently,
the A.N.C. failed to emerge as a strong contender, which left Tanu
the only conflict group with a significant following among Africans
in the last phases of colonialism between the years 1958–1960.

COLONIAL CONFLICT

As we have seen, manifestations of colonial conflict in Tangan-
yika began to appear soon after 1945. Within a period of 13 years,
1945–58, the conflict grew, gained momentum, matured, changed form,
and then came to an abrupt end in the 1958/9 elections. Much of
the conflict centered on the control of the Legislature, which was
the core of political authority in the colonial epoch. Conflict

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48. Ibid., p. 308.

between the three races over the Legislature inevitably involved racial inequalities which existed also in other colonial institutions such as in education, the economy and various occupations.

Much of this conflict was vocalized in legislative debates, in the press, and in public rallies. On some occasions, it became unorganized, as when supporters of various parties resorted to uninstitutionalized behavior such as intimidation and destruction of property, or when European employers fired or threatened to fire non-European employees who supported rival conflict-groups. But on the whole, the conflict was organized and carried out largely through political parties. It centered mainly around two issues, the 1951 Constitutional Committee's proposals, and the 1958 popular elections. As described in Chapter III, the lack of leadership and political immaturity of Africans were shown in their quiescence during the 1951 conflict, which left the Europeans and the Asians to fight amongst themselves. While in the Legislative Council the European and the Asian M.L.C.s lashed out at each other, in the society at large the Tanganyika European Council and the Asian Association engaged in the same struggle, through the verbal attacks in rallies and in the press.

The European M.L.C.s were not unanimous in their stands on the parity proposals. The moderates, such as Bayldon, took a statesmans-like approach by accepting the proposals as the best compromise formula to ensure the representation of the three races, a stand which provoked the T.E.C. However, the less moderate Europeans, led by the Right Hon. E.C. Phillips not only expressed displeasure at

the proposals, but went on to dispute the Asian gains and Asian demands for even greater participation in all spheres of government. Speaking in the debate on the Committee's proposals, Phillips expressed his assessment of the general European feeling concerning the menace of Asian status in Tanganyika, as follows:

> There appeared to be a feeling that the rapid increase in population and wealth of the Asian community during the past few years was the real threat to racial harmony. It was felt that the Asian population would reach 100,000 in a very short time, even if immigration was strictly controlled and with their ever increasing population and wealth there was a real danger the Asians would become the dominant community in Tanganyika Territory, to the detriment of the Africans and the Europeans, ... The demand by Asians for equal opportunities in the Senior Service and the uncertainty of the policy being followed by His Majesty's Government are undoubtedly causing a lot of uneasiness among those residents who are moderate and clear thinking people.[49]

He next upbraided the Asian Association's demands "for an even larger share in the Government of the Territory. Some of these associations, as we have learnt from the press and otherwise have submitted memoranda to the United Nations Visiting Mission and these memoranda include a demand for equal opportunities in all posts in the Senior Service."[50]

Asian demands for greater participation on the ground of citizenship was brushed aside by Phillips as not valid:

49. Tanganyika, The Constitutional Debate, 1951, op. cit., p. 10.

50. The Constitutional Debate, ibid., p. 16.

Amongst the arguments put forward by the Asian
Association for being given the same opportuni-
ties as Europeans...is that Tanganyika is their
home and they are definitely Tanganyika citizens,
thereby implying that they were no longer subjects
of India or Pakistan. Well, Your Excellency,
this argument was dispelled by their own spokes-
men sometime ago after the publication of the
Holmes Report. Honourable members will no
doubt recall that the Report recommended overseas
leave for all Asians in the Government Service.
Government was unable to accept this, but after
some months were forced to do so. The arguments
put forward by all those who spoke on behalf
of the Asian community were that the sub-continent
of India was the homeland of Asians in this
Territory. It represented their culture and
their tradition and it was necessary for them
to pay regular visits to their homeland to
return to their family ties and connections and
in many cases for their marriage ceremonies.[51]

Europeans also had free home leave, but this was justified by

Phillips as follows:

There is, however, Your Excellency, a much
stronger argument as to why all these senior
positions should continue to be held exclusively
by British subjects of European descent until
such time as the majority of the inhabitants of
this Territory understand the meaning of the
common franchise and have reached a standard
that will enable them to use a vote intelligently.
This is that the Trusteeship of Tanganyika is
placed in the hands of Great Britain. ... The
fact is the position of India and Pakistan in
the Commonwealth is unique. They are associate
members with all privileges and benefits enjoyed
by full members but without any of the respon-
sibilities or obligations of full membership.
India and Pakistan are independent countries and
neither they nor their nationals owe any allegiance
to His Majesty the King. In the event of a
major difference between Great Britain and

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51. Ibid., p. 17.

> India or Pakistan a serious difficulty could
> easily arise in this Territory.[52]

In essence, he was expressing a European grievance that Asians enjoyed

privileges without discharging commensuarate responsibilities.

On their part, Asians felt that their contribution to the

country qualified them for a greater participation in the politics.

of the Territory. In his speech on parity during the debate, the

Rt. Hon. I.C. Chapra, an Indian, commended the Asiatic achievement

by quoting from Sir Winston Churchills' book, My African Journey:

> How stands the claim of the Indian, his right
> as a human being, his rights as a British
> subject are equally engaged. It was the Sikh
> soldier that bore an honourable part in the
> conquest and pacification of these East African
> countries. It is the Indian trader who, pene-
> trating and maintaining himself in all sorts of
> places to which no white man would go or in which
> no white could earn a living, has more than
> anyone else developed the early beginning of
> trade and opened up the first slender means of
> communication. It was by Indian labour that
> the one vital railway on which everything else
> depends was constructed. It is the Indian
> banker who supplies, perhaps the larger part
> of the capital yet available for business and
> enterprise and to whome the white settlers
> have not hesitated to recur for financial aid.[53]

On the basis of these achievements, he felt that Asians had earned the

right to political privileges and responsibility. He argued also that

Asian residence in Tanganyika, dating back well over 200 years, justi-

fied the claim to citizenship:

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52. Ibid., p. 18.

53. Ibid., p. 26.

> The Indian has made this country his home.
> He has made a stake in this country; he does
> not desire any privileged position, but by
> right, but injustice (sic) too, to the contri-
> bution he has made to the development of this
> country, it is only fair and just that they
> as one of the major races in the country should
> have an equal number of representatives in the
> Legislative Council.[54]

He then rebuked the European critics, on the grounds that they were
stirring racial hatred and disharmony, and did not realize that, by
so doing, they were doing a great deal of disservice to the country
in general and possibly to their community in particular.[55]

Meanwhile, the T.E.C. was pitted against the Asian Association,
each organization claiming that it was defending the rights of its
racial section. The T.E.C. at its rallies launched scathing criticism
of the Asians and their demands, and opposed the granting of equal
representation to Asians[56] while demanding increased seats for the
Europeans. The parity formula was basically unacceptable to the
T.E.C. because it marked the beginning of the slippery path that would
end in European loss of power. Blocking Asian political gains would
constitute a major victory by slowing down the trend toward the
gradual lessening of European political power, and by perpetuating
European political dominance and leadership through the policy of
colonial paternalism.

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54. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

55. Ibid., p. 29.

56. The Times, London, op. cit., September 11, 1951, June 27, 1952,
p. 5.

The Asian Association counter-attacked. In its petition to

the 1951 U.N. Visiting Mission, it charged Europeans with

> agitating to establish European leadership and
> unofficial European majority rule in this
> country. ... the Asian community strongly resents
> and opposes such fantastic demands put forward
> by the European Council and its supporters
> and considers that fanatic statements made
> are creating considerable misunderstanding
> and mistrust between the Europeans and non-
> European inhabitants of the Territory.[57]

At a joint meeting in Nairobi on April 23, 1950, under the

auspices of the East African Indian Congress and the Kenya African

Union, a resolution was passed condemning the T.E.C. and the Tanganyika

European community:

> This meeting strongly deprecates the racial
> issues raised and vociferously and hysterically
> discussed at various meetings held in Kenya
> and Tanganyika by the non-official Europeans
> which has created among the non-Europeans of
> East Africa feelings of insecurity about their
> future and of resentment against such an unreason-
> able attitude towards grave problems of East
> Africa. ... This meeting has noted the attitude
> of opposition by the non-official Europeans
> to the best interests of other inhabitants of
> East Africa who form over 98 percent of its
> population and declares that these non-official
> Europeans have completely forfeited the confi-
> dence of the non-Europeans as to their ability
> or unwillingness to be fair or just to others
> living in these territories or to exercise any
> power in their hands impartially.[58]

In its resolution the meeting endorsed the parity proposals as "a

necessary step in the right direction and saw any retraction from the

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57. T/PET2/94, Addendum 1, op. cit.

58. T/PET2/94, p. 4, op. cit.

proposals by the United Kingdom or Tanganyika Government on account of the agitation of a handful of Europeans of these Territories as an important disregard of the obligation of the Trust;"[59] and it warned the non-Europeans of East Africa of the grave danger and threat to their legitimate rights, interests and aspirations due to the agitation of the Europeans with the aim of permanently suppressing the non-Europeans and it called upon the non-Europeans to take vigorous action to safeguard their future.[60]

With the Government acceptance of the parity proposals, the raging hostilities between Asians and Europeans began to subside, while at the same time the T.E.C. gradually faded off the scene. But as this heated confrontation was dying off, another one, this time involving different actors, the Africans and Europeans, and involving a different issue, that of Tanganyika's constitutional development in general and the 1958 election in particular, was becoming evident. Although the Asian Association continued to exist and fight for the interests of the Asians, the post 1954 conflict largely involved two political parties, the United Tanganyika Party and the Tanganyika African National Union. In this conflict, unlike the struggle in 1951, Asians occupied the most neutral position, and except for followers of the Asian Association, they left the stage to Europeans and Africans.

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59. Ibid.

60. Ibid., p. 5; also T/PET2/116, op. cit.

How did this come about? Having accepted the 1951 Constitu-
tional Committee's proposal for parity in the Legislature, the
Government announced, in 1956, the holding of the first election to
select 30 unofficial M.L.C.s, 10 from each race. However, the control
of the House would still be in the hands of the official members of
the Legislature, who would be 33 in number. All the official members
were Europeans. With the ten elected European members, the house
would consist of 43 Europeans, 10 Africans, and 10 Asians. Thus the
House would still be European dominated up to the eventual time when
unofficial members would be replaced by elected members, as a prere-
quisite for self-government. When this time came, the parity formula
would give the minority races an equal number of representatives
with the majority races. While it was in the interests of the
Europeans as a minority race to secure parity, it was in the interests
of the Africans, as a majority race, to get rid of it. That parity
gives the minority over-representation was shown in the provisions
for the 1958 election which allowed a European M.L.C. for every
2,000 Europeans, an Asian M.L.C. for every 10,000 Asians, and an
African M.L.C. per one million Africans. It was basically the issue
surrounding this distribution of members of the legislature and the
manner in which they were to be elected that was at the core of the
conflict, in which the two parties representing the Europeans and the
Africans engaged each other after 1954.

This period saw the U.T.P. and its followers and supporters
press the government to take a firm stand against Tanu and its

supporters. Some took matters in their hands, such as those European

employers who required their employees on pain of losing their jobs

to have nothing to do with Tanu. As shown in Chapter V, the European

plea did not go wholly unheeded. It led to the closing down of a

number of Tanu branches by the government, arrests of Tanu officials

and supporters, refusal of permits for meetings in various parts of

the country, and the denial to some Tanu officials of the right to

address public rallies. On the 195h of February 1957, for example,

the government banned two meetings to be addressed by Nyerere. It

explained that "owing to the inflamatory natury of the speeched made

recently by the president of T.A.N.U. there are grounds for believing

that any further such speeched might lead to a breach of the peace;

permission to hold the meetings is accordingly refused."[61]   Indeed,

Lennox-Boyd, then the Colonial Secretary, concurred with U.T.P. demands

and indirectly joined in the criticism of Tanu and its supporters when

in October 1957 at a Dar-es-Salaam luncheon, he pledged to support the

Tanganyika Government, "for any measure they may feel it necessary to

take to deal firmly with bodies that claim in some parts of the

Territory to have assumed the functions of the government."[62]

Meanwhile, the U.T.P. was active in the society at large admon-

ishing Tanu, and blasting it as being racialistic and

61. The Times, London, February 13, 1957; Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-
     Salaam, September 12, p. 3, 16, 17, and 11, 1957, October 5, p. 2,
     15 and 25, 1957.

62. Tanganyika Standard, October 29, 1957; April 20, 1957, p. 5,
     30th and 31st October, 1957.

opposed to the farmer class of immigrants which is
largely European, ... this would mean that the vast
majority of immigrants will be squeezed out of
Tanganyika by Tanganyika African National Union
and only those setting up business and secondary
industries would be allowed in... Tanganyika
African National Union is today advocating
universal adult franchise on a programme which
secures support by advocating an anti-settler
policy... the heart and soul of the movement,
is the securing of the racial majority and
- the end of the settlers, in Tanganyika.[63]

The United Tanganyika Party contended that the activities of

Tanu were detrimental to the economy of the country. "One major

factor dominates the Tanganyika scene at the present time: a totally

irresponsible minority whose policy of extreme nationalism, if allowed

to spread further, will lead to economic suicide...(tanu) acts against

the true interests of the country and by its policy is undermining

its economic stability in the eyes of the immigrant races."[64] U.T.P.

officials branded as ridiculous Tanu's "cries of land alienation since

only 1.0 percent of land was owned by non-Africans in 1955." Tanu's

demands for self-government were described as resting on an "irres-

ponsible basis," and changeable "apparently according to sheer mood."

Further, Tanu was accused of wishing to relegate non-Africans to

second class citizenship: "T.A.N.U. is in fact saying that immigrants

may stay but as second class citizens... This attitude of mind is

common among T.A.N.U. supporters."[65]

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63. *Tanganyika Standard*, September 10, 1957.

64. *Tanganyika Standard*, September 16, 1957.

65. *The Times*, London, May 28, 1956. See also August 13, 1958, p. 7,
19th and 29 July, 1958.

These charges and attitudes of U.T.P. were more than reciprocated by Tanu and its supporters. Many of their actions were on the verge of slander and libel, and led to several arrests and imprisonments of Tanu supporters, as shown in Chapter V. Tanu officials were equally as vocal in their denunciation of U.T.P. as of the colonial state. Much of the activity of Tanu was directed at the termination of European domination of the legislative council. In this respect, Tanu opposed the tripartite voting system and called for one man one vote, which, in essence, would have given Africans control of the Government. Tanu's criticism also included charges of Government maladministration in its programs of modernization, such as in the agricultural policies discussed in Chapter IV. The resultant gulf between Europeans and Africans was summarized by a _Times_ editorial, in May, 1956 as follows:

> It is not that the immigrant races are slow to appreciate their ture interests and only too prone to pursue causes which amount to digging their own graves, it is that African nationalism, as it becomes more conscious, more powerful, and more subject to outside influences, adds to the difficulties. Unless Africans can see that multi-racialism leads to their betterment, not to their exploitation, they will refuse to cooperate.[66]

African antagonism to Europeans was also revealed in their ardent opposition, in the late 19t0's, to the inclusion of Europeans in the district councils. In Mwanza, in 1958, about 6,000 Africans marched to the Provincial Commissioner to protest against the formation

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66. The _Times_, May 28, 1956.

of multi-racial district councils. The methods used by the police
to disperse the protestors, and the generally harsh measures the
government resorted to in "imposing" multi-racial district councils
in Tanganyika, prompted the Committee of African Organisations in
London, most of whom were Tanu sympathizers, to petition the U.N.
Secretary General:

> In addition to this demonstration of public
> opposition to a multi-racial District Council
> the people have expressed their dislike of the
> idea through their traditional chiefs. This has
> resulted in the deposition by the government of
> Chief Makongoro and other chiefs.
>
> It is apparent from this that the government
> of Tanganyika is not prepared to carry out
> the assurances given to the U.N. Visiting
> Mission that the multi-racial Councils would
> only be introduced if the people agreed but
> that they are imposing them with considerable
> force. ...
>
> We are so concerned with the danger to peace
> in Tanganyika caused by recent government actions
> that we ask you to consider whether the Trustee-
> ship Council should not send out a special
> Commission of Enquiry to investigate the posi-
> tion without delay.[67]

Meanwhile, in Tanganyika itself, opposition to the multi-racial councils
was growing, especially in the areas where multi-racial councils were
being introduced. In Geita District, Africans cabled the following
plea to the United Nations:

> Save Geita, Tanganyika. We shall be
> grateful if you will send a commission
> of enquiry to witness the political ·

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67. T/PET2/225, op. cit.

> situation in Geita District. We Geita
> Africans prefer democracy to multi-racialism.
> Multi-racial local councils have been
> put in practice without our consultation.
>
> We do not want the chiefs who accepted
> multi-racialism. Geita is now a police
> district, people are being teargased,
> bombed, arrested, detained and imprisoned
> day by day. Last month more than 10,000
> Tanganyika peaceful demonstrators were
> teargased and bombed.[68]

The demonstrations by Africans against bringing non-Africans into the

previously unintegrated African Councils, clearly indicate the animo-

sity between the races and cast doubt on official claims of good

racial relations in Tanganyika.

However, in the end, racial animosity in Tanganyika did not

lead to the polarization of racial conflict. A number of factors in

play during the latter part of the 1950s were responsible for prevent-

ing a direct confrontation between the Africans and the Europeans.

Among these factors was the electoral system introduced for the 1958

election, the multi-racial ideology and membership of the U.T.P.,

and Tanu's official change of ideology, especially its acceptance of

the tripartite voting system and the common roll, and its participa-

tion in the election.

To enforce the cooperation between the races, the Government

as previously mentioned, had introduced a common roll, and a system

which provided that three candidates from the three races were to be

elected on a common roll in each constituency, i.e. the same voters

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68. T/PET2/226, op. cit.

would be voting three times, under the tripartite voting system. This meant that a voter, who disliked the other two races, was compelled nevertheless to vote for candidates from these races in order to have a valid vote for a candidate of his own race. The U.T.P. ideology also helped to bridge the racial gap. Despite its racialistic program, the general political approach and ideology of the U.T.P. was very ambiguous, and in the main, appeared to have transcended racial lines, thus toning down the racial animosities in the politics of Tanganyika. This was the effect also of Tanu policies, when in 1958, Tanu followered suit by adopting a policy of Tanganyikan nationalism which regarded citizenship of Tanganyika rather than race, as the basis for its new nationalism.

The playing down of racial conflict was climaxed at the election itself when both parties attempted with verying degrees of success to sponsor, for purposes of controlling the Legislature, candidates of the other races. In the process the U.T.P. did not fare very well, as it was only able to put up three non-European candidates, two Africans and one Asian, all of whom lost badly, as did the three European U.T.P. candidates. On the other hand, Tanu put up 20 non-African candidates all of whom, like the 10 African candidates, won easily. In this election, Tanu had the support of the Asian Association.

The presence of Tanu elected members, European Asian and African on the unofficial side of the House, prevented at the most crucial moment, a racial confrontation across the benches of the

Legislative Council between Tanu Africans, on the one hand and U.T.P. Europeans, and Asians, on the other. It thus prevented the Council from being split along racial lines, as was the case in Zambia, after her first election. Acting in a similar way to restrain racial conflicts was the U.T.P.'s multi-racial membership, discussed above. The presence of numerous non-Africans among its members, introduced criss-cross political relations in the society, which to an extent prevented the country from falling into polarized racial camps.

Mention should be made of the unintended consequence of the tripartite voting system. When introduced, the government intended to produce equal representation of each race. But, on the contrary, Tanu, which contested all the seats, confused the issue by winning them all, thereby throwing the plans for parity into the waste-paper basket. This came as a shock to many Europeans in Tanganyika, who were forced overnight to accept the loss of their representation as a single racial unit.

A _Times_ correspondent described the situation in the following terms:

> Unhappily, the Government of Tanganyika mis-
> calculated disastrously in introducing, in
> spite of warnings, a franchise system...
> That has inevitably put power into the hands
> of the Tanganyika African National Union,
> an extremist organisation which wants the
> fruits of self-government before the seeds
> of political understanding has begun to
> germinate. Tanganyika African National
> Union set out to smash the multi-racial
> United Tanganyika Party, which was created
> at the direct instigation of the late
> Governor, Sir Edward Twining and not one

person of any race standing under its
auspices came within sight of success.
Such are the facts.[69]

A *Times* editorial September 16, 1958, also attributed the loss of

European representation to the tripartite voting system:

The result shows that Tanganyika must develop
largely as an African state. It seems almost
certain that if the tripartite vote had not
been compulsory the result would have been
different.[70]

The editorial then lamented the defeat of the U.T.P.:

It is a pity that U.T.P. did not do better.
Theirs was a worthy ideal course, taking
practical form perhaps a little too late
for the tide of history.[71]

This was followed by a note of praise for Tanganyika:

On the credit side, the Africans, unlike
those of the Central African Federation,
have taken an active part in multi-racial
politics, while Europeans and Asians have
shown themselves adaptable to the racial
structure of the territory.[72]

Indeed, the Tanu compromise, which led to the presence of non-

Africans among its political leaders, was of immense importance. Their

presence, both in the Legislature and later, in 1960, in the Tanu

Cabinet, must have reinforced Tanu's new ideology of Tanganyika

69. The *Times*, October 6, 1968.

70. The *Times*, September 16, 1958, p. 9.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

nationalism, which in 1963, was institutionalized by opening Tanu membership to all Tanganyika citizens.[73]

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73. In 1963 Tanu membership was open to all the races in Tanganyika, in 1967, Tanu membership was restricted to staunch supporters of Tanu ideology.

CHAPTER VII

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES AMONG AFRICANS
IN THE TANGANYIKAN COLONIAL SITUATION

A cursory·look at the history of the development of the
African political party systems in the colonial situation indicates
that the emergence of a single strong party is not always the rule.
This Chapter, then, is essentially concerned with the problem of
examining the unique conditions in Tanganyika which led to the
development of the Tanganyika African National Union as the single
dominant party representing the interests of the African quasi-group.

In itself, the organization of African political parties
reflects a change in the colonial situation. With the introduction
of elected members into the Legislature, and the limited acceptance
of Africans on other levels by the administration, the mass, as voters,
suddenly assumes political prominence as for the first time they have
a voice in the choice of the legislators. Politicians are, therefore,
forced to gain the favor of·the newly enfranchised masses and win
their votes. The vote then gives the mass political power.[1]

This was particularly so between 1956 and 1958 in Tanganyika.
Even though the mass could not directly participate in politics, it

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became a recruiting field for rival political parties, which sought
to control the colonial state. In the ensuing mobilization and party
organization, only one party, the Tanganyika African National Union
(Tanu), emerged to represent and advance the interests of the
variegated African mass, and this in spite of the country's varied
ethnic composition, which in Africa has been a breeding ground for
rural political parties.

Tanu, as already indicated in the previous chapter, was formed
in 1954. Its initial membership of about 17,000 augmented within a
period of four years to a phenomenal figure of about a million (See
Table 7:1). However, in this process of mushroom growth, Tanu was
not completely unchallenged. In the period from 1954 to 1959, three
other parties, the United Tanganyika Party (U.T.P.), the African
National Congress (A.N.C.), and the All Moslem National Union (A.M.N.U.)
had, with varying success, challenged Tanu and endeavored to make
inroads into the African mass.

The mercurial growth of Tanu's following illustrates how,
within a short span of time, Tanu came to incarnate African unity.
Its position as embodiment of unity, was made clear by its challenging
of the legitimacy of the colonial state, which up to then was European
dominated and which to a large extent kept the African mass outside
of government by denying it any significant voice or participation, as
described in Chapter III. The manner in which the mass responded
indicates the existence of certain conditions within the Tanganyikan
colonial situation, which became instrumental in the creation of a
gigantic party, forecasting the birth of the one-party state. What

follows is an attempt to unearth the factors which contributed to this process.

THE INTENSITY OF THE CONFLICT

Under certain conditions social conflict between groups may foster internal cohesion of the members of each of the groups involved.[2] The intensity of the conflict is likely to affect the degree of internal cohesion. During the period 1954-59, Africans were involved in open conflict with non-Africans over the unequal distribution of authority in the colonial state, and the measure of the accruing racial cohesion is the degree to which African unity resulted in a single conflict-group representing their race's interests. However, the growth of a territorial party as an embodiment of racial unity in Tanganyika had to face certain counter-pressures hinder the cohesive functions of conflict. Of the relation between the counter-pressures and the unifying functions of conflict, James Coleman has written that in "the community which does not create in its members the potential for cross-pressures, individuals are constant, groups of friends are of one mind, and organizations are unified—all conflict is shifted to the level of the community itself."[3]

The unity of Africans, flowing from colonial conflict in

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2. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1956; Georg Simmel, Conflict, translated by Kurt H. Wolff, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955.

3. James S. Coleman, Community Conflict, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957, p. 7.

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Tanganyika, was very remarkable, since there existed in the colonial
situation a number of counter-pressures within the African quasi-
groups, deriving from ethnicity, from the formal colonial policies
of a multi-racial society, and from the U.T.P. multi-racial ideology
and membership. However, many of these counter-pressures, as discussed
below, were either palsied or not well-developed.

For conflict to be functionally unifying, Coser postulates the
prior existence of some sort of latent web of relationships or links
within the potentially unifiable group. He writes that, "where it is
lacking, disintegration of the group, rather than increase in cohesion,
will be the result of the outside conflict."[4] In Tanganyika, the
identical position of the Africans in the colonial state provided
them with a potential web of common interests, which Tanu channelled
and transformed into African demands for greater participation in
public life, eventual self-government, and hence release from subordi-
nation. Consequently, in the conflict with the outer-group, mainly
the Europeans, the identical position of Africans became a basis for
unity; the fact of belonging to an African race suddenly assumed
significance to those who became conscious of it. Racial conscious-
ness which had no political significance previously, acquired one
through the conflict and was accentuated with the intensity of conflict
and with increased encounters in situations reminiscent of or arising
from an inferior position in the colonial state. This offered Tanu
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4. Lewis Coser, op. cit., p. 93.

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4. Lewis Coser, op. cit., p. 93.

of their position in the colonial state. As repeatedly stressed above, during the conflict the idea of race as a political norm emerged, radiated, deepened, and widened to reach more and more Africans. The realization in many instances was accompanied by a feeling of emotional hostility, which at times evoked a corresponding open anger against the Europeans. It was a conflict in which one's anger was related to the degree to which one was conscious of the interests imposed by racial position.

The intensity of the entire colonial conflict in Tanganyika remains obscrue, for many reasons. First, there is no measure for the intensity. Second, repeatedly colonial officials stressed the formal existence of racial harmony in the country. Third, as mentioned above, there were occasions of racial cooperation in Tanganyika between African and European politicians. These occasions were more frequent than in either Central Africa or Kenya. However, to under-stand the intensity of the conflict, it ought to be considered as a continuum ranging from latent strains to manifest and overt conflict. Somewhere along this continuum, especially in its latent form, as depicted in Chapters III and IV, the colonial conflict in Tanganyika was extremely tense due to the polarization of the interests impressed upon the three races by their positions in the state. This to a large extent explains why within a brief period of four years of open conflict, an overwhelmingly number of Africans joined Tanu. The success of Tanu stands as a verification of the intensity of the latent conflict, and the ensuing African unity shows how the conflict with the outer-group obscured the internal cleavages within the African

ethnic groups. This cohesion, however, was not wholly attributable
to intense conflict alone, as there were, in Tanganyika, other factors
which were related to the development of Tanu, and are discussed below.

Ethnicity

Ethnicity, both in the colonial and post-colonial situations
in Africa, is a divisive as well as a unifying force. "At one and
the same time, it both divides Africa and unites it," writes Ray
Vicker. This paradoxical function of ethnicity is explained by
Vicker as follows:

> An intense loyalty and sense of responsibility to
> those of the same blood, one of tribalisms earmarks,
> give many of the poor nations of Africa a built-in
> system of public welfare. But loyalty to kin often
> is accompanied by dislike or contempt for other
> tribes under the same national umbrella; faction-
> alism and even civil war has resulted—as in
> Nigeria, for example.

Ethnicity normally unites "tribesmen" because, as Vicker puts it,

> the tribe also is a principle caretaker and
> carrier of African culture and tradition—a
> vital function of a time when the onrush of
> modern civilization threatens the African's
> very identity... But along with culture and
> tradition...the tribe also preserves primitivism
> and superstition that hinders Africa's develop-
> ment.

Because it promotes unity among "tribesmen," ethnicity, under
certain conditions, particularly where the polity coincides with ethnic
boundaries, is an embodiment of national unity. This is the case
with Swaziland. Vicker, writing on Swaziland, notes that,

> the King (Sobhuza) is perhaps fortunate that
> nearly all his 375,000 subjects are of Swazi
> tribes; in this land, soon to lose its British
> protectorate status and become independent,
> the nation is synonymous with the Tribe, and

the Chief-King's dominance is not seriously questioned.

However, most of the countries in Africa have many tribes. It is here that ethnicity is more divisive than cohesive. Ray Vicker comments that, "elsewhere in Africa south of the Sahara, tribalism and nationalism are in constant friction, with tribalism still the dominant force."[5] Unlike Swaziland, Tanganyika with over 120 ethnic groups, derived no unity from its own ethnic composition. The colonial state brought under one polity, Africans who differed not only in culture, but in their political institutions and languages as well. The thirty years, 1920 to 1950, before conflict began to be manifest, were too short a span of time to infuse into the many rural Africans a sense of territorial consciousness. So short was the time, that many people who were born before British rule, were still alive. To many of these, then, ethnicity and not territorial belongingness was more of a reality.

That ethnicity is a divisive factor in polities with several ethnic groups can be observed throughout the history of colonial Africa. Currently, it is particularly marked in the Rhodesian colonial situation where, as a result, it splits Africans into two camps—Shona and Ndebele. In post-colonial Nigeria it has led to an eruption of civil war. Under the colonial situation, in both Uganda and Kenya, ethnic divisions were instrumental in the creation of·

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5. The Wall Street Journal, December 11, 1967, p. 1.

equally strong rival parties.[6] Yet, in Tanganyika, during the colonial situation, the presence of many ethnic groups seemed to have fostered rather than hindered national unity. Ethnicity, as a norm for political behavior, did not develop among many of the ethnic groups. Where it did develop, instead of being a disintegrating force, it acted as a factor conducive to the national movement.

One reason for this reversed consequence of ethnicity, as outlined in Chapter V, was the size and unity of the Tanganyikan middle class. As argued in Chapter V, during the colonial situation the middle class provided leadership for both national and ethnic-group organizations. Thus unity among the leadership stratum provided the parochial organizations, whenever they emerged, with some common interests. As a result, the parochial organizations in Tanganyika largely complemented, rather than competed against, each other or Tanu.

The recency of the middle class is of some causal relevance. It meant that members of this stratum were not cut off from their rural people and yet, at the same time, they were not fully tied to ethnic obligations, because as westernized elites they were embued with national consciousness. The unique position of the Tanganyikan middle class was the crux of their success in gaining leadership of

6. The K.A.N.U.—K.A.D.U. Accord, Nairobi: Government Printer, 1961; Kenya African National Union: What a K.A.N.U. Government Offers You, Nairobi: Government Printer; Richard H.F. Cox, Kenyatta's Country, London: Hutchinson, 1956; Forward with Freedom: Being the Manifesto of the Democratic Party, Uganda Bookshop Press, 1960; Donald A. Low, Political Parties in Uganda, London: Athlone Press, 1962.

the mass from both the "traditional" chiefs[7] of the ethnic groups and from the colonial functionaries. The position of the Tanganyikan middle class provides the bridge between the modern and the traditional, the rural and the urban, and between one part of the country and the other. The failure of Mtemyu's A.N.C. in 1958, when he broke away from Tanu as discussed in Chapter VI to utilize the cleavages within the Africans to force a split in the African quasi-group left African unity in the colonial situation almost intact.[8]

The ethnic parochial organizations in Tanganyika, as depicted in Chapter V, emerged and developed largely among the most economically advanced ethnic groups. It was also from these ethnic groups that most of the members of the middle class came.[9] Being led largely by members of the middle class, the Tanganyikan ethnic organizations were in most cases intermediaries through which rural and ethnic identity and loyalties were transferred from the parochial to national movements like Tanu. Like the leadership, African membership in the two levels of organization, ethnic and national, fulfilled different functions, comparable to what Epstein calls, "multiplicity of roles, the relevance of each at any given time being dependent upon the

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7. Traditional chiefs: In Tanganyika many of the chiefs in the rural local government were not traditional rulers but appointed by the colonial state.

8. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Ethnicity and National Integration," Cahiers d'Etudies Africaines, July, 1966, pp. 129-139; Aristide R. Zolberg, "Effects de la structure d'un parti politique sur l'integration nationale," Cahiers d'Etudies Africaines, October, 1960, pp. 140-149.

9. Marco Public Poll Surveys, Nairobi: Marco Publishers, No's. 10 and 13.

situation."[10]

The absence of divisive effects of ethnicity in Tanganyika during the colonial period may also be explained in part by the generally low level of urbanization. Dar-es-Salaam was to Tanganyika as London is to England or Paris to France. The dominance of Dar-es-Salaam over the other towns in Tanganyika was particularly strong in that besides being the national capital, it was an economic, political, and social, recreational, and cultural center. It was here that the Governor's house, the heads of Government departments, and the Legislature were situated. Furthermore, all the headquarters of African organizations, both parochial and national, were located in Dar-es-Salaam. This prominence had the effect of preventing a built-in system of internal fragmentation, as was the case in the Belgian Congo.[11]

Since the 1920's, Dar-es-Salaam was the hub of African middle class activities, and no other town ever challenged this prominence. When, in 1954, Tanu officials began to mobilize nationally, the unfolding of the political processes began from Dar-es-Salaam, and as this city became the nationalists' national headquarters, it assumed greater importance. The other towns played a subordinate role as either provincial or district nationalist headquarters.

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10. Arnold L. Epstein, Politics in an Urban African Community, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958; also, Philip Mayer, Townsmen and Tribesmen; Conservatism and the Process of Urbanisation in a South African City, Capetown: Oxford University Press, 1961.

11. Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Dar-es-Salaam had an added advantage as a national capital, in that it was located in an area of neither a large nor well developed ethnic group, as was Kampala, which was in the Baganda area, or Nairobi in the Kikuyu area. Consequently, there was no problem of any strong ethnic group which might claim the city as its capital, such as the Baganda did in 1966 when their Kabaka formally asked the Uganda Government to move from Kampala to another place. Such attitudes would evoke animosity among the ethnic groups whose areas lay outside the capital. In addition, when the most economically developed ethnic group inhabits the area where the capital lies, it tends to give members of the lesser communities uncomfortable feelings by its condescending attitude towards them, and by making them feel like foreigners.

Dar-es-Salaam fell in the Zaramo area. The Zaramo were a highly detribalized ethnic group who, because of their situation on the coast of the Indian Ocean, had long been in contact with Arabs, and identified themselves more with the Arabs whom they saw as their reference group, and whose religion--Islam--they followed. Consequently, the Zaramo tended to regard themselves as Swahilis, or Arabs, more than as Africans. Also, a substantial number of them were the descendants of runaway slaves.[12] The lack of ethnic consciousness among the Zaramo meant that the national capital "belonged" to no

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12. Tanganyika Notes and Records, Vol. 34, January, 1953, pp. 20-27. Grenville S.P. Freeman-Grenville, Historiography of the East African Coast, T.N.R., op. cit., Vol. 55, September, 1960, pp. 279-289.

particular ethnic group, a condition which exalted and reinforced the
national status of the city. This status was further boosted by the
fact that all the large and economically developed ethnic groups,
such as the Chagga, Wahehe, Wasukuma, and Wanyakusa, had their ethnic
areas far away from the national capital.

One other important explanation for the tranquility of paro-
chial politics in colonial Tanganyika may be a consequence of the
general economic backwardness found in the country as a whole. As
already pointed out, Tanganyika, even by African standards, had
attained very low economic development. Although a few rural areas
were well developed, a large part of the country remained under-
developed.[13] The economic planning of the colonial state was, as
argued in Chapter V, limited to a few ethnic areas. Coffee and cotton
were the two major cash-crops leading to rural economic development.
Among the few ethnic groups which profited from this rural development,
the main beneficiaries were the coffee growing Chagga and Wahehe,
and the cotton growing Sukumas.[14]

The Chaggas, living in the fertile lands of Kilimanjaro, grew
coffee and bananas, and became the most economically developed ethnic
group. Because they had the highest literacy rate in the country,
the white collar workers were Chaggas. Indeed, the first African
District Commissioner in 1958 was a Michagga. Although the exact

13. The Times, London, March 30, 1951, p. 7.

14. Kathleen Stahl, Tanganyika Sails in Wilderness, Gravennage,
Mouton, 1961. (Section on the Sukuma)

numbers of the Chagga in white collar jobs in the 1950's are not
available, an estimate that 60 percent of African white collar workers
were Chagga would probably not be far from the truth.

The Lake Province Waheya also contributed appreciably to the
white collar workers. Coffee growing had brought them economic
prosperity. Their wealth, in the colonial era, was only surpassed
by that of the Chagga. The literacy rate among the Wahaya was also
high. A study, by Hopkin,[15] of the top administrators in the Tan-
zanian Government, in 1965, shows (See Table 7:2) that the Chagga,
only 3.6 percent of the whole African population, accounted for
17.2 percent of these administrators, and the Wahay, another very
economically developed ethnic group, though only 3.7 percent of the
total population, constituted 20.7 percent of the top administrators.
Thus the Chagga and Wahaya were 7.3 percent of the population and
provided 39.9 percent of the top Tanzanian administrators in contrast
to only 4.3 percent of the Sukuma, who made up 12.5 percent of the
whole population.

Of lesser importance for rural development were cattle and
cotton. These became sources of rural economic development in
Sukumaland.[16] In the Southern Highlands of Iringa lived other
fairly economically developed ethnic groups, such as the Wahehe and

15. Raymond Hopkin, The Tanzanian Elites, Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale
University, 1962.

16. Gus J. Liebenow, Chieftainship and Local Government in Tanganyika:
A Study of Institutional Adaptation, Ann Arbor: University
Microfilm, 1956, Thesis, Northwestern University, 1956.

the Nyakusa.[17] The Wahehes, because of their traditional reputation
as fighters, were largely recruited into the Army. Stahl estimates
that 25 percent of the Kings African Rifles in Tanganyika was made
up of the Wahehe. On the other hand, the Nyakusa formed the backbone
of the Tanganyikan Police. Outside these ethnic groups, the bulk of
Tanganyikan Africans remained relatively backward.

As already stressed, the economically developed ethnic groups
in Tanganyika, although they had developed an ethnic consciousness,
never developed it to the extent of leading to such deep conflict
among themselves, that they could not be accommodated in one single
territorial movement. Apart from those explanations outlined above,
this could be a result of functional specialization of the ethnic
groups, which might have ameliorated jealousy and tension between
the developed ethnic groups. A further explanation may be found in
the fact that none of Tanganyika's ethnic group was so dominating
over the rest, as the Banganda in Uganda, or the Ibo in Nigeria, as
to have been a source of envy, causing the other ethnic groups to
unite against it.

The structure and the system of administration in Tanganyika
may to some extent have affected ethnicity as a norm for political
behavior. The structure and form of rural local government greatly
weakened ethnicity as a base for local power. In Tanganyika, the
smallest unit of rural local government was the chiefdom. Because

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17. Kathleen Stahl, op. cit., (Section on Nyakusa).

of the special role of the chief in traditional society, where they had chiefs, the chief's court in the colonial epoch was a center of ritual, social and political life for the rural African. Here people came to get married or divorced, to listen to the settlements of various cases or disputes, to pay taxes, to settle the various cases in court, to elect officers, to listen to the chief or the District Commissioner, and to gather for various meetings. A community consciousness developed, which led the people to identify themselves with chiefdoms. Since almost each district had several chiefdoms, this meant that within at least each district there existed a number of chiefdom identifications rather than district consciousness.

Most ethnic groups were normally partitioned into multiple chiefdoms: the Wahehe of Iringa District, for instance, were divided into five chiefdoms, and consciousness of these chiefdoms propagated divisions within the ethnic group. Generally, too, a number of different ethnic groups would be placed in the same chiefdom, finding themselves united under the banner of their common allegiance, which cut them off from members of their ethnic group in other chiefdoms. In Tanganyika, a district normally had about an average of 14 ethnic groups. Most of the ethnic groups, especially the large ones, were interspersed and scattered over many districts, leading to the inter-marrying and intermingling of members of different ethnic groups. Here, political boundaries and ethnic affiliations criss-crossed. For instance, the Sukuma, the largest ethnic group, was divided into five districts. In each of these districts, they were further subdivided into several chiefdoms and co-mixed with many other

ethnic groups. Attempts by the colonial government, in the 1950's, to forge the Sukuma consciousness through the formation of the Sukuma Federation embracing the whole Sukuma ethnic group, were unsuccessful.[18] The Sukuma, up to the even of independence, identified themselves more with their chiefdom than with the Sukuma Council.

The size of these rural government units was also of some significance. Because the chiefdoms were small, their budgets were proportionally small. Consequently, they could not pay as well as the employing firms in urban centers. This deprived the ethnic groups of their educated young men who went to seek jobs in urban and other centers of employment, outside their ethnic home area. This "robbed" the ethnic group of potential leaders.

The thesis of chiefdom consciousness poses the problem of the inter-relationships between various units of the colonial government. As shown in Chapters III and V, a chiefdom, which consisted of a number of villages, formed the basis of rural local government. Several chiefdoms made up a district. Between the chiefdoms there were no horizontal links, only vertical ones, at district level, through the chiefs, Councilmen, or District Counsellors. The common people, apart from receiving occasional visits by District Commissioners, appearances at the Magistrate (District) Courts, or imprisonment in the district jail, had no involvement in the district organs.

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18. Gus J. Liebenow, in Audrey Richards (ed.), East African Chiefs: A Study of Political Development in Some Uganda and Tanganyika Tribes, London: Oxford University Press, 1960, pp. 229-259; Lord Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part I and IV, London: H.M.S.O. 1950 and 1951.

In areas which had District Councils, there were no facilities through which ordinary persons could participate, since Counsellors were normally nominated by the District Commissioner. It was not until the latter part of the 1950's that some local government Councils had elected Counsellors.

By the end of the 1950's, there were 58 districts and 8 provinces. In Tanganyika the provincial government organs were even more remote than the district organs from the common Africans, many of whom did not even know that there were such things as provinces. Due to the absence of both elected District and Provincial Councils, the ordinary person had no means through which he could feel himself part of the district or province.[19]

It was the same situation in the Central Government, which, up to 1958, had only nominated members of the Legislature.[20] As on the provincial level, the Central Government offered no mechanism which could permit or generate the development of consciousness and provide a basis for self-identification with the territorial polity among the mass.

Chiefdom consciousness proved beneficial to Tanu's development. When Tanu was spreading into the rural areas, it established its branches to correspond with the chiefdoms. Tanu branch offices stood adjacent to the Native Authority's headquarters. Consequently, when

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19. Tanganyika Annual Report(s) Colonial No(s), op. cit., 1950-60 (see sections on Local Government, District and Provincial Councils).

20. Colonial No. 342, op. cit., (See section on the Legislative Council).

individuals were urged to join Tanu, they were not joining a remote, super-territorial institution which seemed far removed from them, but a tangible organ. Tanu branches were placed on the already familiar ground of the chiefdom's headquarters. It was to the branch office that the African came to pay his membership fee and sub- scriptions, to elect branch party officials, and to listen to Tanu officials, both local and national, when they spoke at the highly charged and heated political rallies. Under the tribal tree, where he normally sat and listened to his chief or District Commissioner addressing him, the African now came to hear, initially in disbelief, the nationalist rhetoric demanding self-rule. The nationalists spoke of the ability of Africans to run the affairs of their own country, of the time when bad chiefs as well as District Commissioners would be removed, and Africans would be relieved of the grievances and strains arising from their position in the colonial state.

The chiefdoms, then, provided an intermediary stage for local recruitment of Tanu membership into the national movement. In this respect, Tanu operated at two levels, the local and the national. At the local level, each branch worked as a self-sufficient unit. The basis for each branch was chiefdom consciousness, but each branch was incorporated into the national movement, with headquarters in Dar-es- Salaam, from which they took all their directives.

The centralized structure of the territorial Government reduced the importance and magnitude of parochial politics. Because the power was highly concentrated in the Central Government, both the district and provincial organs attracted very little attention from the

nationalists. Consequently, this centralization of power bestowed
an exceptional prominence on the Central Government, espeically on
the Legislature, as already discussed in Chapter III. As a result of
the concentration of power, national issues dominated over provincial
and district issues; the attention of the entire country was drawn
to national rather than regional issues. Likewise, the colonial
strains outlined above, despite their local variations, were also
placed in a territorial perspective, not of the position of each of
the ethnic groups, but rather of the position of the African in the
colonial state, as a subordinate section of the population. The
consequence of this was that racism rather than ethnicism provided
the norm for political behavior. The territorial quasi-group over-
shadowed the parochial quasi-groups based on local interests.

The African quasi-group in Tanganyika was also strengthened by
the mode in which Africans were represented in the colonial Legislature,
which greatly de-emphasized ethnicity as a political factor. Since
1926, Africans were regarded as a single group and were represented
as one race in the Legislature. When in 1945, the first African
members were nominated, they represented all the Africans as a single
race. It was not until 1954 that M.L.C.s represented provinces
rather than the whole race. This, however, only lasted for three
years, 1955-58, and could not have developed any provincial conscious-
ness. Even if it had lasted longer, it is hard to visualize how this
could have generated either ethnic or provincial consciousness and
identity since the representatives were nominated, and represented all
the Africans in the province, each with at least 30 ethnic groups. It

seems that in the colonial epoch, Tanganyika lacked adequate structure, at either district, provincial, or national levevels through which local, regional, and ethnic aspiration could be expressed and harnassed into a norm for parochial political behavior.

The Widening of the Franchise and the Introduction of Election

The history of the growth of Tanu in Tanganyika tends to support the thesis that both the widening of the franchise and the introduction of the elective principle festers the growth and spread of political parties.[21] In Tanganyika, until 1954, there were no African political parties, as up to then all members of the Legislature were nominated by the Governor. There were also no explicit public demands for elections. When, in 1954, the Government announced the expansion of the number of the unofficial M.L.C.s to 30, ten for each race, and it became clear that elections would soon be held, African nationalistic activities began to gain momentum. Tanu was born in the same year, replacing the less politically-minded Tanganyika African Association. African political activities increased even more sharply when, in 1956, the Government followed the recommendation of the committee appointed to make recommendations regarding the qualifications of voters and candidates, and announted the holding of the first elections, to be held in 1958 and 1959.[22] Soon after this announcement Tanu membership and support in the country grew

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21. Ruth Schachter, "Single Party Systems in West Africa," A.P.S.R. LV, June, 1961.

22. Colonial No. 333, op. cit.

rapidly. Within a period of two years, as shown in Table 7:1, Tamu's membership had more than doubled, and its branches had increased by more than tenfold, from 25 in 1956 to 409 in 1958, and 496 in 1959. Equally, the attendance at Tamu political meetings and public rallies rose sharply. For instance, in Moshi, before the announcement of the election in 1956, only 2,000 people came to the Tamu meeting addressed by Nyerere, yet twelve months later, in 1957, an unbelievable 20,000 people came to hear him address another Moshi rally.[23]

As indicated in Chapter VI, during the same period, 1956-1958, the Government began taking increased measures against Tamu, by shutting down of branches, banning of meetings, and arrest of Tamu leaders and supporters for various political offenses. Charges by settlers and local pressure groups of intimidation and vandalism by Tamu members and supporters also increased. In addition, both the Europeans and their press blamed Tamu for, "becoming a threat to peace and order, sabotaging the development of democracy in Tanganyika."[24] An editorial in the _Tanganyika Standard_ on October 5, 1957, accused Tamu of

> resorting to intimidation even at the higher
> levels of leadership,... At lower levels .
> ardent followers resort to intimidation and
> hooliganism and often repeat the slogan that
> Tamu is the Government... (The paper accuses
> Tamu of having) degenerated into an irresponsible

23. Judith Listowel, _The Making of Tanganyika_, London: Ghetto and Windus, 1965, p. 290.

24. _Tanganyika Standard_, Dar-es-Salaam, September 17, 1957.

and dangerous organization, because its
members include the very worst elements in
the country.[25]

To some extent, most of these charges had some basis in fact,

as the period was witnessing the climax of colonial conflict. Bates,

a political scientist, writes that

> The administration continued to be concerned
> about Tanu action in rural districts, in
> keeping with its previous strong support of
> the native administration. There were some
> instances during the campaign of local TANU
> members' usurping a chief's executive and
> judicial duties; the formation of the TANU
> Youth League was also held to be dangerous,
> as the Government considered it to be full of
> young hot-heads, and thus as a direct-activist
> and even, a military group. The adoption of a
> TANU color, a flag, and songs and ceremonies
> was held to be on the border line of subver-
> sion.[26]

Since a highly charged political atmosphere followed the announcement

of the holding of the first popular election, it seems logical in

part to causally attribute to some degree both the rapid growth of

Tanu and the accelerated spreading of nationalism in this period to

the introduction of the elective principle.

The introduction of the franchise in a colonial situation had

a catalystic effect on the growth of rival political parties among

the Africans in Tanganyika. It gave the leaders an incentive to

mobilize, as the vote was used as bait with which to induce the

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25. Ibid., October 5, 1957.

26. Margaret Bates, in Gwendolen Carter, African One-Party States,
    Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 427.

people to join their party. Those who qualified to vote under the qualitative franchise were urged by the leaders to register so that they could vote to put in power the people of their choice. This gave the potential voter a sense of power and control over the density of his country. Those who did not qualify were called upon to join Tanu and help exert pressure on the colonial government to introduce universal suffrage.

While the introduction of both the elective principle and the franchise in some way helped the rapid growth of parties resulting from colonial conflict, there seems to be no causal relationship between their introduction on the one hand and the development of one single party among the subordinate quasi-group on the other. In essence, the introduction of the elective principle and the franchise normally tends to foster the proliferation of rival parties.[27] In fact, the emergence of the African National Congress, as shown in the previous chapter, resulted from the introduction of the elective principle. Its failure to emerge as a serious contender was, as already noted, dur to lack of program, leadership, and the fact that the A.N.C. began too late and at a time when Tanu's popularity was at its highest. Indeed, the introduction of the elective principle, when accompanied by the presence of local interests, such as ethnic interests, as was the case in the Belgian

27. Aristide R. Zalberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

people to join their party. Those who qualified to vote under the qualitative franchise were urged by the leaders to register so that they could vote to put in power the people of their choice. This gave the potential voter a sense of power and control over the density of his country. Those who did not qualify were called upon to join Tanu and help exert pressure on the colonial government to introduce universal suffrage.

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27. Aristide R. Zalberg, One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964.

Congo, becomes a catalyst for the proliferation and the development of numerous rival political parties.[28]

One other reason for the failure of strong rival parties in Tanganyika was Nyerere's charismatic appeal which was at its zenith at this period. To a large number of Africans, Nyerere was a national messiah, loved by every villager. Joan E. Wicken, a Research Fellow from Oxford, who in 1957 accompanied Nyerere on one of his political trips, tells of the reception Nyerere received this way, "...in every village, people rushed out to see him. They crowded around him, they tried to touch him, they wanted to hear his voice."[29] His three appearances before the U.N. General Assembly, in 1955, 1956, and 1957, on behalf of the Africans of Tanganyika, who had raised money for the trips, greatly enhanced his grip on the national leadership. The tumultuous reception and welcome-home after his third U.N. appearance illustrates his popularity. The scene is depicted by Listowel as follows:

> Unprecedented scenes took place at Dar-es-Salaam
> Airport when Nyerere returned from his third U.N.
> appearance. They were reported in the _Tanganyika_
> _Standard_ as well as in the vernacular press. Vast
> crowds, wild with excitement, milled around as
> far as the eye could see and all along the seven
> mile road into the city, waving palm leaves and
> green branches. Any dispassionate person could
> sense that Julius Nyerere was regarded by the
> ordinary Tanganyikan as a messiah, who would wipe
> out all the humiliations of the past and lead

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28. See Crowford Young, _op. cit._

29. Judith Listowel, _op. cit._, p. 291.

them to an independence in which they would
find dignity, happiness and well-being.[30]

It seems logical then, to conclude that, theoretically, the effect

of the introduction of the elective principle and the franchise would

be to foster the proliferation of rival parties among Africans. In

Tanganyika, certain events, which are specified above, occurred which

dominated the politics of Tanganyika during the conflict between

Africans and non-Africans in 1956-1958.

The 1958 Elections and the Types of Electoral Systems

As already pointed out in Chapter I, the types of voting

systems are related to the development of different party systems.[31]

Some electoral systems, such as proportional representation, by

making provision for the representation of small parties in the

Legislature, help the development and the existence of several parties,

including the small ones. The representation of a party in a colonial

Legislature in itself strengthens its standing in the society and

confers upon it the legitimacy necessary for existence. The number

of its members in Parliament, in the colonial situation, is often

used as an index for the party's social support which becomes a

legitimate basis for its existence.[32]

Other types of electoral voting systems do not favor the

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30. Ibid., pp. 297-99.

31. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and
     Activities in the Modern State, translated by Barbara and Robert
     North, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1955, (See section
     on Party Systems and Voting Systems).

32. Aristide R. Zalberg, op. cit.

representation of small parties, thereby jeopardizing their social
basis for legitimate existence.[33] The single member constituency,
simple majority, and single ballot system, which were introduced in
the colonial situation in Tanganyika, offer good examples of electoral
voting systems which impede the representation of small parties and
thereby indirectly work against the development and existence of small
parties in a colonial situation. However, they do so only under
certain conditions, such as those delineated below.

Under this voting system, for a candidate to win an election,
he merely has to have the largest number of votes in his constituency,
even if this number is less than half of the total votes cast. In
Tanganyika, this meant that in any of the 10 constituencies for the
1958-59 elections, a candidate had merely to obtain the largest
number of votes. However, in each of the 10 constituencies, as
states in Chapter III, the Africans, who were predominately Tanu
supporters, were in an overwhelming majority. Although there were
three candidates in each of the ten constituencies, one from each
race, because of the compulsory tripartite voting system and the common
roll ballot imposed by the Government, the situation was comparable
to a single constituency for each individual candidate. The prepon-
derant support enjoyed by Tanu in each of the 10 constituencies
ensured the party's victory in the election for all of the 30 candi-
dates. In the first part of the elections of 1958, involving five

33. Ibid.

representation of small parties, thereby jeopardizing their social basis for legitimate existence.[33] The single member constituency, simple majority, and single ballot system, which were introduced in the colonial situation in Tanganyika, offer good examples of electoral voting systems which impede the representation of small parties and thereby indirectly work against the development and existence of small parties in a colonial situation. However, they do so only under certain conditions, such as those delineated below.

Under this voting system, for a candidate to win an election, he merely has to have the largest number of votes in his constituency, even if this number is less than half of the total votes cast. In Tanganyika, this meant that in any of the 10 constituencies for the 1958-59 elections, a candidate had merely to obtain the largest number of votes. However, in each of the 10 constituencies, as states in Chapter III, the Africans, who were predominately Tanu supporters, were in an overwhelming majority. Although there were three candidates in each of the ten constituencies, one from each race, because of the compulsory tripartite voting system and the common roll ballot imposed by the Government, the situation was comparable to a single constituency for each individual candidate. The preponderant support enjoyed by Tanu in each of the 10 constituencies ensured the party's victory in the election for all of the 30 candidates. In the first part of the elections of 1958, involving five

33. _Ibid._

constituencies, each with three seats, Tanu put up 15 candidates,
five from each race. Three of these were unopposed. For the 12
contested seats, four Africans, five Asians, and three Europeans, a
total of 36 candidates stood (See Table 7:7). Among the other parties,
the U.T.P. contested six seats, three Europeans, two African, and one
Asian, whereas the A.N.C. contested only one African seat. The
remaining 17 candidates were independents. Of these, five were
Africans and twelve Asians.

In the election, there was a vote by 80 percent of the total
of those registered as voters. Although Tanu obtained only 67 percent
of the actual votes cast, it won all the 12 contested seats. Thus
the 67 percent support Tanu had at the polls, resulted in 100 percent
strength in the Legislature. This success is attributable to the
fact that Tanu's support was numerically strong in each of the twelve
constituency-seats contested.

This strength, and the realization that there was little hope
of victory for non-Tanu candidates, explains the conspicuous absence
of rival candidates in the second phase of the election, in February
1959, in which Tanu was the only party putting up candidates. In
the elections, 18 candidates stood, for the five, three-seat consti-
tuencies. Tanu contested all the seats, 12 of them (five Africans,
four Europeans, and three Asians) being unopposed. In the remaining
three contested seats (two Asian and one European), all of which had
two-cornered contests, Tanu was opposed by three independent candidates,
two Asians and one European. Tanu won easily. However, the three

independent candidates did not do very badly, as they collected about
a third of the total votes, 4,357 to Tanu's 11,393.

Here again, despite the small number of contested seats
involved, the strength of Tanu in the Legislature was to a large
extent a function of the voting system. Furthermore, this system
might have scared away other candidates, who were already sure that
they would not have strong support in any constituency.

The same thesis applies in the final election before indepen-
dence, in 1961. In this election, in which, as a result of lower
qualifications for voters, 299,055 registered, in contrast to
59,317[34] for the 1958-1959 elections, the electoral voting system
was the same as that used in the earlier elections. Here again it
seems plausible to surmise that the large number of unopposed seats,
58 out of 71, was directly related to the electoral voting system.
Of the thirteen contested seats from the 11 constituencies, involving
a total of 133,141 registered voters, 73 percent went to poll. Once
again, although Tanu's rival candidates polled 20,870 to Tanu's 100,581,
that is about 18 percent of the actual votes cast, Tanu won 12 out of
the 13 seats contested. In the only seat Tanu lost, the candidate
had overwhelming local support.

The success of the lone candidate suggests that under certain
conditions, such as where there are strong local issues and strong
support of local candidates, this electoral system may work against

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34. This figure 59,317 refers to the total voters registered for the
    two parts of the 1958-59 elections.

the development of a strong single territorial party. The success of Tanu resulted from the fact that it had control of each and every constituency, to the exclusion of the other parties. This unique support was itself a result of the specific conditions intrinsic in the colonial situation in Tanganyika which have been delineated above.

The control of the Legislature in colonial Tanganyika gave the party control of the National Assembly. With its newly acquired power, the party could enhance its own strength in the society while simultaneously degrading and extirpating the rival parties in the society as was the case in the Ivory Coast. As outlined in Chapter VIII, Tanu used this strength in Parliament to immolate and stifle the rival parties in Tanganyika. It did this by statutorily establishing itself as the only legitimate political party.

The total causal effect of these factors analyzed above was to lead to the formation and development of the Tanganyika African National Union as the dominant party, representing the interests of the Africans. The conditions under which Tanu became the only party and the manner in which Tanganyika became a one-party state are analyzed in the next chapter.

TABLE 7:1 GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF TANU

| Year | Number of Branches of Political Parties | | | Tanu Memberships |
	Tanu	Other	Total	
1948	39 T			1,780
1952	NA T			5,000
1954	17	NA	17	17,000
1955	20	63	80	100,000
1956	25	67	87	150,000
1957	48	69	117	200,000
1958	134	59	193	700,000
1959	409	NA	NA	1,000,000
1960	496	33	629	over 1,000,000

Note: T = Tanganyika African Association
NA = Not Available

Source: Colonial numbers for the selected years, Edward B.A.
Borongo, Mkiki Mkiki Wa Siasi Tanganyika, Dar-es-
Salaam, East African Literature Bureau, 1966,
pages 46 and 68; James Clagett Taylor, The Political
Development of Tanganyika, Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1963, pages 138, 151; Bates, in
Carter (ed.), op. cit., page 340.

TABLE 7:2 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATORS IN
TANGANYIKA, 1965

Ethnic Groups	Percentage of Administrators	Percentage of Total Population
Sukuma	4.3	12.5
Nyamwezi	3.4	4.1
Makonde	0.9	3.8
Haya	20.7	3.7
Chagga	17.7	3.6
Gogo	1.7	3.4
Ha	0	3.3
Hebe	0	2.9
Nyakusa	7.8	2.5
Luguru	0.9	2.3
Bena	2.6	2.2
Turu	0	2.2
Sambaa	4.3	2.2
Zaramo	1.7	2.1
Iramba	0	2.0
Yao	0	1.6
Mwera	0.9	1.6
Mbulu	0	1.5
Zigua	2.6	1.5
Pare	2.6	1.4
Ngoni	0	1.1
Nyasa	7.8	0.8
Others	20.6	37.9
Total	100.5	100.2

N.B. The sample is drawn from high ranking officials such as
heads of government departments, ambassadors, etc. (see
Hopkin, op. cit.).

Source: Hopkin, op. cit., p. 113, Table 3:1.

TABLE 7:3   RESULTS OF 1958 ELECTION BY PARTIES

Parties	CANDIDATES BY RACE					
	Africans		Asians.		Europeans	
	Number of Candidates	Total Votes	Number of Candidates	Total Votes	Number of Candidates	Total Votes
Tanu	4	12,157	5	13,688	3	9,761
U.T.P.	2	694	1	1,435	3	4,253
A.N.C.	1	53	0	0	0	0
Independents	5	3,043	12	6,235	0	0
Total	12	15,947	18	21,358	6	14,014

Source: Borongo, op. cit. and Colonial No(s) 342 and 346.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ONE-PARTY STATE IN TANGANYIKA

This chapter will examine events prior and immediate to

the creation of a one-party state. Basically, this will be an

inquiry into Tanu's liquidation of rival organizations, its party

structure, its party structure as a mechanism of control over public

discussion and decision making, and the extent to which different

interests are accommodated in Tanu.

THE CREATION OF THE ONE-PARTY STATE IN TANGANYIKA

On January 28, 1964, Nyerere made the following announcement:

> On the 14th January, I made public the decision of
> of the National Executive of T.A.N.U. that Tangan-
> yika should become a democratic One-Party State.
> At the same time, I made it known also that I
> had been empowered by the National Executive to
> appoint a Presidential Commission which would be
> charged with the task of considering the changes
> in the constitution of the Tanganyika African
> National Union, and in the practice of Government
> that might be necessary to bring into effect a
> democratic One-Party State in Tanganyika.
>   I am now happy to tell you that I have now
> appointed the Commission.[1]

Later in the same year, as a result of the Commission's

recommendations, the Tanu Government passed an Act to Make Tanzania

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1. Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a
   Democratic One-Party State. Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer,
   1965, p. 1.

a One-Party State.[2] As a result of this act, Tanzania became a one-party state both in law and in fact. The act marked a further step towards the finalization of the decolonization process, and the "total" appropriation of power by the Tanu oligarchy. At the time of the passing of this statutory law, there was in Tanganyika an excessive imbalance of power, both in Parliament and in the country as a whole. Part of this imbalance of power resulted from the Tanganyikan colonial situation which, as analyzed above, led to the emergence of Tanu as the nation-wide party, and partly from Tanu's new position as "the Government." Using its power as a Government, Tanu abolished all the existing pockets of power which might have acted as counter-checks.

Tanu in the post-colonial era had come to hold the position of dominance in Tanganyika as a result of events in the colonial era. However as soon as it came into power, divisions and opposition to Tanu among Africans not only began to emerge, but began to increase. The possible pockets of rival power were the traditional chiefs, the rival African parties (namely the African Congress, the All Moslem National Union of Tanganyika, and the People's Democratic Party which was founded by Tumbo, in 1962), and the trade unions. As soon as Tanu came to power in 1961, it set out to cleanse these

2. <u>Tanzania</u>: <u>National Assembly</u>, <u>Government Paper No. 1</u>, 1965. <u>The Interim Constitution of Tanzania and the Constitution of The Tanganyika African National Union</u>, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1965.

a One-Party State.[2] As a result of this act, Tanzania became a one-party state both in law and in fact. The act marked a further step towards the finalization of the decolonization process, and the "total" appropriation of power by the Tanu oligarchy. At the time of the passing of this statutory law, there was in Tanganyika an excessive imbalance of power, both in Parliament and in the country as a whole. Part of this imbalance of power resulted from the Tanganyikan colonial situation which, as analyzed above, led to the emergence of Tanu as the nation-wide party, and partly from Tanu's new position as "the Government." Using its power as a Government, Tanu abolished all the existing pockets of power which might have acted as counter-checks.

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2. Tanzania: National Assembly, Government Paper No. 1, 1965. The Interim Constitution of Tanzania and the Constitution of The Tanganyika African National Union, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1965.

existing pockets of power. The chiefs were the first target. In
1961, the Tanu Government abrogated the status of chiefs, transferring
both their judicial and administrative powers to the elected district,
urban, and municipal councils, thus ending 40 years of indirect
rule in Tanganyika. As depicted in Chapters III, V, and VII the
chiefs, in the colonial epoch, both as "traditional" rulers and
bureaucratic functionaries, wielded some powers and in certain cases
enjoyed great respect and prestige in the rural areas. By abolishing
the chiefdom, Tanu removed one of the powerful institutions in the
country, and one possible base for the formation of rival parties.

The trade unions were the second target for Tanu. Although in
Tanganyika, trade unionism was little developed, having a membership
of only 90,000 in 1960, it was however, well organized and had very
able leadership. In the colonial epoch, trade unionists and Tanu
joined hands against the colonial state and the non-African population,
who were largely employers. Between 1956 and 1959, the unions'
strikes proved a very effective weapon.[3] However, soon after Tanu
came to power, this cooperation began to falter, and open clashes
began to proliferate. One such clash between trade unions and Tanu
came in 1962, when Tanu Government tried to prevent mine workers
from going on strike. The Miners' Union went ahead with the strike,
which lasted 11 days and cost the mine £120,000. In a press statement,
Mamfua, Secretary for the Tanganyika Federation of Labour, expressed

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3. Tanganyika: Provincial Commissioner's Annual Report, Dar-es-
   Salaam: Government Printer, 1955; 1957, 1958 and 1959.

the general feelings of the leadership of the Trade Union Movement
when he stated that,

> I must warn the Government that Trade Unionism
> was put on trial at Mwadui. Trade Unionism
> has sustained that trial and Trade Unionsim
> is here to stay. We do not and shall not
> take orders from anybody other than from the
> members we represent.[4]

Between 1960 and 1963 the Trade Union Movement criticized
Tanu Government on a number of issues, and was particularly critical of
the Tanu Government's policy of Africanization, which treated resident
Europeans and Asians as Africans. MacDonald, an author and writer,
commented on one such dispute that,

> Labor and Government also crossed words on
> the issue of Africanisation of jobs, both in
> the Civil Service and in business. During a
> debate in the National Assembly, Chief Minister
> Nyerere announced that his government's policy
> was to get local people, whether they were
> Africans or not, into the civil service to
> supplant expatriate officials. The Tanganyika
> Union of Public Employees took angry exception;
> they wanted no jobs to go to Europeans, local
> or not. A TUPE press statement claimed that
> the Union could name twenty competent Africans
> to fill official posts for which the government
> was recruiting personnel in the United Kingdom.[5]

As the Trade Union Movement became more critical of the Tanu Government,
the Government began to coopt its leaders into the Government. For
instance, Kamaliza, the Secretary-General of the Tanganyika Federation

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4. Quoted in Alexander MacDonald, Tanganyika: Young Nation in a
   Hurry, New York: Hawthorn Books, 1965, pp. 141-43.

5. Ibid., p. ⊥

of Labour,[6] was made Minister of Labour, so that the union could be controlled. A Trade Union Movement spokesman called the action "a very shameful shortsighted declaration by the Government of their failure to accord fundamental human rights to the working people of this country."[7] The President of the Tanganyika National Union of Teachers, commenting on the Government's action, warned that, "we are fast moving into totalitarianism why force unions to join in a puppet federation controlled by a minister."[8]

Because of the growing criticisms in 1962 the Government passed the Dentention Bill which was intended to silence the critics.[9] In 1963, as a result of a mutiny by the Army, over 200 trade unionists and members of the armed forces were detained and accused of being implicated in the mutiny, trade unionism was dissolved and the Government formed a nationalized worker's union, the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA),[10] which was under the Minister of Labour, who was also the Secretary-General of NUTA (since 1967 the two posts are held by two different persons).[11]

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6. Tanganyika: Trade Union Ordinance (Amendment) Act, 1962. The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act, 1964.

7. MacDonald, op. cit., p. 145.

8. Ibid., p. 145.

9. Tanganyika: Detention and Deportation Act, 1962.

10. Tanganyika: The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act, 1964.

11. National Union of Tanganyika Workers' Presidential Commission Report, 1967, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1967. Tanzania National Assembly, Government Paper No. 1, 1967.

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6. Tanganyika: Trade Union Ordinance (Amendment) Act, 1962. The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act, 1964.

7. MacDonald, op. cit., p. 145.

8. Ibid., p. 145.

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11. National Union of Tanganyika Workers' Presidential Commission Report, 1967, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1967. Tanzania National Assembly, Government Paper No. 1, 1967.

To justify the elimination of the other remaining pockets of power in the country, that is the rival parties, Tanu claimed that its overwhelming victories at the elections and its control of the Legislature gave it the sole right to represent all the people in the country. But Tanu's support in the country was not as overwhelming and complete as its control of the Legislature. As argued in the previous chapter, Tanu's strength, as measured by the number of representatives in the National Assembly, has no one-to-one relationship with the support it enjoyed in the country. A number of factors account for this. One such factor as delineated in Chapter VII, was the single-ballot-simple-majority electoral voting system introduced in the country. Equally, the large number of uncontested seats was also related to the voting system.

Analysis of data on the few contested seats, notwithstanding the smallness of the figure of opposition votes, suggests a trend with either Tanu's support dropping, or the popularity of its rivals increasing. While almost all the rivals of Tanu candidates, in the 1958 election, forfeited their deposits because they were unable to poll an eights of the total votes cast, only two out of the 14 rival candidates lost deposits in 1960. In 1960, in the 13 contested seats out of 71 seats, Tanu's opponents not only polled better than in 1958 but there were several close polls, one of the closest being a three-cornered fight at Ufipa, where a Tanu candidate barely won over an independent by only 740 votes. In a two-cornered fight at Ukerewe, S. Mafura, an independent, polled 5,244 out of the 14,137 total votes cast in losing to a Tanu Candidate, N. Buhewa, who polled

8,893. Most outstanding was the lone loss Tanu sustained at Mbulu, where an independent, E. Stewart, defeated a Tanu candidate, Chief Dodo. Even the A.N.C., the only party to contest two elections, improved its polling in 1960, as it received 609 votes in 1960, as compared to 58 in 1958.

Had proportional representation been in effect in both elections, 1958 and 1960, Tanu representation in Parliament would not have been as it was. In 1958, although Tanu collected only 67 percent of the votes cast in the contested seats, it won all the seats. Equally, in 1960, although the ratio of Tanu's votes to those of its rivals was 5:1 (100,581 to 20,870), it won 12 out of the 13 contested seats.

The few polls taken in Tanganyika also tend to suggest that support for Tanu's opponents was increasing in the post-independence epoch. A Marco public survey taken in July, 1962, asked the question: "If an election were to take place tomorrow, which party would you vote for, TANU or ANC."[12] Seventy-seven percent of the Africans said TANU, 17 percent said ANC. A second poll taken in October of the same year asked, "For which party did you vote in the last election?" Ninety-five percent voted Tani, and only 2 percent voted ANC. When broken down between rural and urban voters, the rural population went 100 percent for Tanu, and the urban voted 92 percent Tanu and only 3 percent ANC. To the question, "for which party would you vote if

12. Marco Public Opinion Poll, Nairobi: Marco Surveys, Ltd., No. 10, July, 1962, p. 16.

an election was held today,"[13] 61 percent said Tanu, 21 percent
answered P.D.P., and 9 percent said A.N.C. Broken into rural and
urban categories, Tanu's support dropped from 100 percent to 49 per-
cent in the rural areas, P.D.P. had 34 percent, and A.N.C. had 14
percent. In urban areas, 66 percent said Tanu, 14 percent P.D.P.,
7 percent A.N.C., and 13 percent were undecided.

From these polls and the election results, a trend emerges
which indicates that opposition to Tanu is growing. This support for
rival parties was increasing while Tanu Government, like the colonial
state before it, was stifling the rival parties, and Tanu supporters,
perhaps with the complicity of the higher Tanu officials, were
engaging in intimidation and threats to the supporters of the rival
parties.[14]

As soon as Tanu came to power in 1960, it began to withhold
permits for public meetings from rival parties. In 1961, for example,
the Minister for Home Affairs maintained that the Government had
denied the A.N.C. a permit for public meetings, "because the Congress
speakers disregarded the conventions of public speaking."[15] Tanu
stepped up its garroting measures in 1962, when Tumbo, a dynamic

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13. Marco Public Opinion Poll, Nairobi: Marco Surveys, Ltd., October, 1962, p. 10.

14. Ibid.

15. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, July 6, 1962; also, September 13, 1962; "Social Change in Africa" in International Affairs, Volume 36, No. 4, October, 1960. (Special issue on Africa.)

speaker, resigned his post as the Tanganyikan High Commissioner in
England to found the People's Democratic Party, a party which was
gaining a ready following from the young educated Tanganyikans, the
workers, and the trade unionists. In the next year, 1963, Tumbo
was deported under the Detention and Deportation Act, and the Registrar
General revoked registration of the three existing rival parties,
A.N.C., P.D.P., and A.M.N.U.T., making their existence illegal. A
year later, 1964, the passing of the One-Party State statutory law
completed the destruction of the rival parties in Tanganyika.

On the basis of these limited data, it seems that the African
unity which existed inthe colonial epoch was falling apart, and that
internal divisions were not only becoming manifest, but were becoming
possible bases of rival parties. As regards the development of the
political party system, the trend was apparently towards a multi-party
system; however, the passage of the One-Party State law halted this
development. This move was a choice made by Tanu oligarchy rather
than the general populace, and it seems that the transition was peace-
ful because at the time there was in Tanganyika an excessive imbalance
of power.

The reasoning behind making Tanganyika a one-party state is
set forth in the 1964 Presidential Commission-Report.[16] Paragraph 34
of the Report effectively sums up this reasoning as follows:

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16. 1964 Presidential Commission, op. cit.

There are several major factors which justify
the formal establishment of a One-Party State
in newly independent countries which are striving
to achieve rapid development and to consolidate
their unity. These considerations apply in
Tanganyika as well, but with less force because
Tanganyika has been since 1959 de facto a One-
Party State. In Tanganyika the major considera-
tion has been to adjust the institutions of the
One-Party System in Government, to permit wider
democratic participation and fuller discussion
of national issues.[17]

THE PARTY STRUCTURE

The structure of Tanu is modelled after what Duverger calls

the branch party.[18] Tanu has five basic party subdivisions, composed

of the following: the national, regional, district, branch and cell

units. Except for the cell, each of the party units has an executive

council and holds party conferences. The head of the National

Executive Committee is the President, each of the Regional Executive

Committees is headed by the Regional Commissioner and the Area

Commissioner heads each of the District Executive Councils, while the

Branch Chairman heads the Branch Executive Council. All these

officers and the other members of the Executive Councils are elected

by delegates at the conferences of the respective party units. Each

unit has a paid administrative party secretary appointed by the

President. The administrative secretaries are responsible for the

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17. Ibid.

18. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Their Organization and
     Activity in the Modern State, translated by Barbara and Robert
     North, London: Methuen, 1961, pp. 5-12.

daily administration of their respective party units. Unlike the other units of Tanu, Tanu cells have only one official, the cell leader, who is elected annually by the cell members.

While the seat of national power is the National Conference, the National Executive Council is the national chief executive organ. In each of the 17 regions into which the mainland is subdivided, there is a Regional Executive Council which is the chief regional executive organ. Each region also holds regional conferences. Within each region, each of the administrative districts has a District Executive Council and holds district conferences. Each district has several branches, each of which has Branch Executive Councils and holds a branch conference.

Tanu membership is of two types, direct and indirect.[19] The latter is on an individual basis, while the former is open to <u>bona fide</u> organizations. Since 1963, direct membership is open to all Tanzanian citizens of all races. But, since 1967, Tanu membership is restricted to those who support its ideologies. Originally, to join Tanu a person paid a membership fee of two shillings and a monthly subscription of half a shilling thereafter. Tanu members aged 18 to 35 also belong to the Tanu Youth League. The League has a Green Beret section, which is quite militant and not adverse to the use of force. Male members over 35 automatically become members of <u>Wazee</u> <u>wa</u> <u>Tanu</u> (Tanu Elders), whereas all female members are also

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19. Duverger, <u>op. cit.</u>, see section on membership.

members of Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanu (Tanu Women's League).

For a bona fide organization to become a Tanu member, it pays an affiliate membership fee of 10, and may be "requested" to give "contributions" to Tanu. Currently, the following are the affiliate members: The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika (CUT), and the Tanganyika Parents Association (TPA).

Tanu holds intra-party elections to elect party officials. Other than the party secretaries, all officers, according to the Tanu Constitution, are to be elected. The elections are part of the programs for the conferences — branch conferences for branch officials and branch delegates to the district conference, and district conferences for the election of district officers and district representatives to the regional conference. Regional conferences are held to elect regional officials and regional representatives to the national conference, while finally, the national conference elects national Tanu officials. Apart from the office of Tanu President, which is for a five year period, and cell leader, a one year term, all Tanu offices are for two year terms, and office-holders are eligible for re-election.

The degree to which the rank and file participate in the election is very limited, being restricted to the cell and branch level. Beyond this, only the delegates participate. At the base, the turn-over from office by the elective process is frequent, but election as a mechanism for changing leaders becomes less and less effective, with the increasing level in the hierarchy, especially where

this involves the most important posts in the oligarchy, such as the
Party President, the Vice-President, the Area Commissioners, and the
Regional Commissioners. For the past seventeen years, changes affect-
ing the Regional Commissioners have come not as a result of elections
but by presidential action, such as when an Area Commissioner is
appointed an Ambassador, or a full Minister, and is replaced by another,
not by election, but by presidential nomination.

Regarding the top four Tanu leaders, the President, the Vice-
President, the Secretary-General and the National Treasurer, the
first change came in 1967, after 14 years, not by election but as a
result of Mr. Kambona's resignation as the party Secretary-General,
and the post was abolished a few months later. A second change,
affecting the position of the National Treasurer, was made by
abolishing the post. The third major change came when, in 1967,
Anangisye, the Secretary-General of the Tanu Youth League, was detained,
and subsequently dismissed from office, after which the President
appointed his own brother, Joseph Nyerere, to fill the post.[20] It
appears that the presidential nomination rather than election has
become the means by which change in office takes place at the higher
levels of Tanu hierarchy. As regards the office of the Presidency,
at no time has anyone offered himself as a rival candidate. In any
case, before anyone stands as a presidential candidate, he must have

20. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, October 4, 1966; also
    February 7, 1967, The Nationalist, Dar-es-Salaam, June 9, 1967.

the approval of the Tanu Electoral Committee, whose members are nominated by the President in office. Thus, election in Tanzania has not proved to be a means of changing top Tanu personnel.

TANU OLIGARCHY'S CENTRALIZED CONTROL OVER PUBLIC DISCUSSION, DECISION MAKING AND THE ACCOMMODATION AND REPRESENTATION OF COMPETING INTERESTS

In Tanganyika today, authority is strictly centralized into the hands of the Tanu oligarchy, and through it the society is controlled. How is this done? Tanu has managed to centralize authority by establishing two sets of links — horizontal and vertical.[21] The horizontal links enable the Tanu oligarchy to control the affiliate organizations and the state, whereas the intra-party units are controlled through the vertical links. In turn, the centralization of power enables Tanu to rigidly control the society at large.

In a multi-party state, parties and the state are exclusive, and exist independently of each other. However, this is not the case in a one-party state, such as is found in Tanzania, where the state has been subordinated to the party oligarchy. The nature of the relationship between Tanu and the state is defined by the Vice-President's speech in Parliament in 1966, where he said:

> (I want to make it) known that the Tanganyika
> African National Union is supreme even above
> the Government,... The President of our
> Republic, who is also the President of TANU,
> has in no uncertain terms made it clear that

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21. For a detailed and theoretical discussion on party links see Duverger, op. cit., pp. 40-52.

> TANU is more supreme than the Government and
> the Government as such is the people's instru-
> ment for administration.[22]

In Tanzania, Tanu uses the horizontal links to control the state.
At all its levels, national, regional, district, and village, both in
urban and rural areas, there is a strong Tanu oligarchy paralleling
the administrative bureaucracy of the state. This arrangement also
formally effects a division of labor, such that the technical and
bureaucratic actions fall into the domain of the skilled and well
educated bureaucrats of the state, the civil servants. Constitutionally,
the role of the Tanu oligarchy, at all these levels is restricted to
political action, centered on communication and mobilization of the
people for the implementation of the nation-building schemes.

In reality, however, there is no clear division of labor.
Instead, the less educated party oligarchy, in whose hands the power
is concentrated have turned out to be overlords, managers, and bosses
over the educated and better paid bureaucrats of the state, who have
no political power. At each level, the Tanu oligarchy demands
obedience from the state bureaucrats, and resents any respect they
may receive from the public. An example of this is to be found in
the question of Mr. Ng'wangwa, M.P., who in 1966 asked the Government,
"what steps are being taken to guard the prestige of the party officials
in view of the fact that sometimes the Government employees were
accorded more respect than the party functionaries, while this should

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22. The Nationalist, Dar-es-Salaam, June 17, 1966.

be the other way round."[23]   In reply, a Government spokesman stated
that, "the Government, however, cannot order people to respect this
or that individual, but we believe the people themselves know how to
best use their respect."[24]

The horizontal links are also used to control the affiliate
organizations.   All three of them, N.U.T.A., C.U.T., and T.P.A. have
parallel structures similar to that of the state.   At every level
these are under the supervision of the Tanu oligarchy.   The structures
of the affiliate organizations are modelled upon the state's units
in such manner that the units within each organization assume a
hierarchical pyramid coinciding at each level with Tanu's territorial
divisions.   Tanu oligarchy is able to assert its supremacy at each
of these coinciding points.

Through the vertical links Tanu is able to control the various
party units.   The vertical link subordinates the cells to the branch,
the branches to the district unit, the district units to the regional
units and the regional units to the national unit.   In terms of
communication, this means that units on the same level can only
communicate through the next higher unit.

One way in which this vertical link enables the higher circles
to control the subordinate units is through the principle of "divide
and rule."   The non-existence of horizontal communication precludes the

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23.   Ibid.

24.   Ibid.

overflow of dissent and discontent from one section to the other, and renders impossible the "conspiring" of units on the same level against the higher units or the creation of a united front. Since the units can only communicate through the next level, the higher officials can easily assert their influence over the delegates from the lower units who are their subordinates in the party hierarchy.

Control is also affected through the dual duties of the Tamu delegates. Although delegates meeting at the next higher unit, as in a conference, are elected by and represent their electors, their duty is not to present or defend the viewpoint of their mandators, but rather to help the higher units to control the lower units. In this regard, a Tamu delegate's duty is to keep the higher bodies informed of what is going on in the delegate's area. Should there be any dissent in the area, rather than conceal it or defend it, the delegate is required to report so that the higher unit can take corrective steps. In this respect, Tamu delegates from lower units to higher units are instruments of control. To ensure that the N.E.C. is kept fully informed, party administrative secretaries, who are responsible for the daily running of their respective units, are appointed civil servants and are responsible neither to the members or officials of the unit which they serve, but to the National Executive Council. As the party secretaries are responsible not to the people in the area in which they work, but to the N.E.C., their actions cannot be influenced by the local people. Consequently, they can report any dissent that comes to their knowledge to the N.E.C.

Besides control, the structure of Tanu is intended to provide forum for intra-party discussions.[25] These forums consist of the cells, branch meetings and conferences, district conferences, regional conferences, national conferences, and the National Assembly. Informal channels of discussions are also available. Members of the party can communicate directly with delegates, M.P.s, and party officials. Delegates and officials from the lower echelons can also communicate directly with officials at the higher levels.

Viewed cross-sectionally, the provisions for public discussion assume pyramidal form, being numerous at the based and tapering off at the apex. At the base, there are almost over a million cells in Tanzania. These make forums available to any member. Above the cells are branches, which are much fewer in number than the cells. Above the branches are the district units, of which there are about 60. The number is even smaller above the districts, as there are only 17 regional units. At the national level, the only forums are the National Conference and the National Assembly. From the base to the apex, the forum pyramid tapers from a million to only two, the National Conference and the National Assembly.

Regarding freedom of discussion and expression of views, these are most free at the base, where issues are trivial and local. Discussion becomes more controlled the higher one goes up the ladder. Equally, the higher up the ladder, the more important the issues are.

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25. <u>1964 Presidential Report</u>, op. cit., p. 14.

While at the base, participation in discussions is open to all the
rank and file, discussion higher up is confined to the party oligarchy,
and the higher up the hierarchy the more and more is the discussion
limited to top party officials.

These discussions in Tanu have several functions, among which
is that of helping the N.E.C. make decisions and assess reactions,
and the success of its decisions and policies. To this end, the
Tanu oligarchy does not only indicate its wishes, but keeps in touch
with the opinions of the rank and file. Before the decisions are
taken, the leaders, both national and local, listen to the presentation
of viewpoints from below. How much these views from below influence
decision-making is unclear. But once the decision is made all discus-
sion and criticism must end. The instructions and orders from the top
to the subordinate units of the party take the form of directions
designed to be used by the local leaders as a means of carrying out
policy and informing the party membership of the party decisions.
Above all, the top level requires strictest discipline, as the adherents
and members are all expected to do everything in their power to apply
the decision and make it work.

That Tanu rarely stands public criticism of its policies,
ideologies and decisions was dramatically demonstrated when Dar-es-Salaam
University College students were dismissed from the college when they
demonstrated against the National Service Bill[26] requiring that

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26. Tanzania National Service Act, 1967; also Tanzania: National
    Assembly, Parliamentary Debates, Dar-es-Salaam: Government
    Printer, 1967.

post-secondary school students enter the National Service for a period

of two years. During 18 months of the two years, they work full time

while receiving only 40 percent of their salary; the remaining

60 percent goes into the National Service Fund. National Service

is part of Tanzania's current ideology of self-reliance,[27] intended

to effect nation-building by coordinated effort and personal sacrifice

on the part of the entire nation. The success of the Tanu ideology of

self-reliance rests on the sacrifice of its young educated people.

In most cases the educated people have no choice, as was the case

with the National Service, where the Government merely passed a

Bill compelling post-secondary school students to serve. When 393

students, in protest, marched to the presidential palace, Nyerere,

the President, dismissed all of them from the University.[28]   (All

but one have now been reinstated). The Vice-President, Rashid

Kawawa, defended the dismissals as follows:

> To be ready and willing to render ideas and
> expert advice is one thing, to oppose is quite
> another. It is no part of the university to
> constitute itself as an unofficial opposition
> to the Government... The people of this
> country have thrown their might behind Tanu
> and have rejected the idea of disunity... Con-
> structive criticism is welcome, but opposition
> for opposition's sake has no sympathy with the
> people of this country.[29]

27. Arusha Declaration, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1967.

28. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, December 15, 1966; and
     December 5, 1966.

29. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, December 15, 1966; and
     December 5, 1966.

Meanwhile, in the country, there were nation-wide Tanu-organized demonstrations of support for the President's decision. A demonstration organized by <u>Umoja</u> <u>wa</u> <u>Wanawake</u> <u>wa</u> <u>Tanu</u> ended by issuing a declaration of support for the President and disapproval of the dismissed students. The League pointed out that:

> to demonstrate for a just cause is acceptable without argument, but to grumble and protest against the very state that feeds, clothes, and educates its young men and women at great deprivation to its masses and asks only a small return through the National Service is the height of small, mean, selfish, and ungrateful thinking... It is indeed a pity that rather than discourage unruly and willful behaviour, rather than lead the way as mediators in the heat and excitement of planning a demonstration, they (the female students) have thrown all discretion to the winds and followed like sheep to encourage and abet their male colleagues.[30]

In Dar-es-Salaam, over 800 Servicemen marched several miles to the presidential palace to pledge themselves and their support, then to the university college campus where they paraded carrying banners which called upon the remaining students to take part in the work of building the nation. One banner read, "University students have disgraced our nation," another read, "Kivukoni College condemns the Student Union of Tanzania," and yet another read, "Father of the Nation reinforces the National Service."[31] Both up country and in urban centers, Tanu demonstrations of support were being organized. The climax came when Kambona, Secretary-General of Tanu, and Minister

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30. <u>Tanganyika</u> <u>Standard</u>, Dar-es-Salaam, October 27, 1966.

31. <u>Tanganyika</u> <u>Standard</u>, Dar-es-Salaam, October 24, 1966.

for Local Government, led a Youth League demonstration in Dar-es-Salaam.[32]

These demonstrations organized by Tanu illustrate how Tanu operates as an instrument of social control, and as a mechanism which dramatizes support for the actions of its leaders. Such Tanu organized demonstrations always follow many major decisions taken by the party leadership.

However, Tanu does not completely rule out all discussion after decisions have been made by the party oligarchy. Often Tanu initiates discussions on its decisions and provides forums for controlled discussions, criticism, and other expressions of opinion on the working of its decisions as a measure of the success or failure of its policies. The findings normally are taken as a basis for the re-examination of the implementation of the decisions. When and wherever weaknesses appear to emerge, and there is strong evidence to indicate that the top should alter its decisions in the face of adverse reaction from below even after corrective measures have been pursued, then the whole decision may be dropped or reversed. The most notable example is the dropping of the Five Year Plan and its replacement by the Arusha Declaration. Or again, as a result of the N.U.T.A. Presidential Report, the posts of the Minister of Labour and Secretary-General of N.U.T.A. formerly held by one person, were given to two different persons.[33]

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32. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, October 4, 1966.

33. National Union of Tanganyika Workers'. White Paper, Dar-es-Salaam, Government Printer, 1967.

The creation of the One-Party State which was preceded by the liquation of possible sources of rival power, and the formation of the branch structure to accommodate and control all the different divisions in Tanzania have not completely succeeded. To some extent, the creation of the One-Party State and the manner in which it operates generate new divisions and tensions. Outstanding divisions which are becoming new sources of tensions in the post-colonial epoch are the plural features of the society, the middle class and the ecological divisions within the country.

In post-colonial Tanzania, the pluralism continues to exist and to determine most of the social relations between members of the three races. However, this lacks the political backing of the colonial situation.

The European population, largely composed of expatriates, still remains an exclusive stratum. Its status is based on its functional role in relation to the Tanzanian bureaucracy which needs its skills. Largely employed on contracts, it draws very handsome salaries. The other section of the European population, that of the settler-farmer, continues to control the large and profitable estates. Thus, despite loss of constitutional political power, the European community in Tanzania still retains its economic ascendancy, and with it, the exclusive social prestige and skill which bothers many "radical" Africans, who seek to terminate this status and constantly apply pressure on the Government to this end.

The nationalization, in 1967, of banks, and industrial enterprises,

both European owned, was probably an indication of the Government's
yielding to pressure, and an attempt to alleviate this pressure and
appease the discontented. Indeed in announcing the nationalization of
the banks, Nyerere told a mass rally that, "nationalization was taken
not for economic reasons but for the dignity of the Africans."[34]
The announcement was received with great applause by the crowd, and
according to a _Uganda Argus_ reporter, Tanu "Ministers at the rally
were seen hugging each other, and several members of the Armed Forces
clapped and jumped up and down."[35]

The Asian community, particularly the Indians and the Arabs,
still dominates in commerce, both wholesale and retail. However,
as this economic dominance is accompanied by little political power,
the Asiatic community is placed in a vulnerable situation, not unlike
that of the Ibos in Northern Nigeria until a year ago.

Everywhere in Tanzania, both in the rural and the urban areas,
the Asiatic control of retail shops puts them in constant contact
with African customers. This earns the Asian the hatred of many
poverty-striken Africans, who see him as the person who charges high
prices for the goods the African has to buy. Tension is exacerbated
by the separationist and isolationist customs of caste and religion
which hinder intermingling and assimilation of Asians in the Tanzanian
society.

34. _Uganda Argus_, Kampala, February 7, 1967.

35. _Uganda Argus_, Kampala, 7th, 9th, 10th and 11th February, 1967.

In the country at large, the Indians watch painfully the current

trend of Tanzanian socialism and hope their enterprises escape, and

that they personally are not departed. Already, many Indians have

experienced the loss of property, jobs, and residence. In the Arusha

region alone, in January, 1967, about 120 Asian traders are estimated

to have been served with notices to leave the country within a period

of two months.[36] A New York Times editorial, commenting on Indian

status in Tanzania, observes that:

> In Tanzania the elimination of Indian traders
> has begun in earnest. The Government is not
> giving out figures, but well over 100 expul-
> sion orders have been issued to Indian traders
> who do not have Tanzanian passports.[37]

The editorial points out how in post-independence Tanzania, Africans

"have directed their envy and anger against the aloof and easily

identifiable Indian Community."[38]

Tough measures, both in Government and non-Government employment,

are being taken against the Asians. Under the process of Africaniza-

tion, Asians who have not become citizens are losing ground both in

Government and in private trade. Publically, Tanu leaders are making

it known that hard days lie ahead for Indians. Early in 1967,

Sijaona, Minister for Home Affairs, had the Asian in mind when he

said, "foreigners were not needed to do the jobs Tanzanians could do."

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36. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, February 2, 1967.

37. New York Times, New York, February 5, 1967.

38. Ibid.

He singled out particularly, "the bankers, shopkeepers, and a long list of other Indian traditional professions," and then concluded, "I call upon all people in these categories to start packing."[39]

If he, the Indian, packs where does he go? Many Indians in Tanzania have no other place to go to, as India will not take Indians who are not Indian citizens and many Indians in Tanzania are not Indian citizens but citizens of the United Kingdom and the Colonies.[40] Since the Colonial Immigration Act was amended in February, 1968, Britain will only take a limited number of Indians per year. So many of the Indians have no choice but to stay in Tanzania.

The Indians, and the other Asiatic communities and the Europeans can, on an individual basis, be accommodated within the structure of the One-Party State. As citizens, they have all the rights, including holding ministerial posts. Already, one Indian and one European hold ministerial posts in the current Tanu Government. But in most cases, participation in Tanu on an individual basis means identifying oneself with the interests of Africans, especially of the African mass. The interests of the mass as defined by the Arusha

39. New York Times, New York, February 5, 1967; also Tanganyika Standard and The Nationalist of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th February, 1967.

40. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, 1st and 2nd February, 1967. The Times, London, for the months of January and February of 1968.

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39. New York Times, New York, February 5, 1967; also Tanganyika Standard and The Nationalist of 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th February, 1967.

40. Tanganyika Standard, Dar-es-Salaam, 1st and 2nd February, 1967. The Times, London, for the months of January and February of 1968.

Declaration[41] mean African socialism which is opposed to capitalistic enterprises. Yet both Europeans and Asians have their interests closely tied with private economic enterprises. The contradictions underlying the status of Asians and Europeans in Tanzania constitutes one possible cause of continued tensions in the post-colonial epoch.

Within the African population new divisions are developing. The resulting structure approximates the following comment by Shils on the general stratification of the Third World:

> In almost every aspect of their social structure, the societies on which the new states must be based are characterized by a gap. It is a gap between the few rich and the mass of the poor, between the cosmopolitan and the traditional, between the rulers and the ruled. It is a gap between a small group of active and aspiring, relatively well-off, educated and influential persons in the big towns, and an inert or indifferent, impoverished, uneducated, powerless peasantry.[42]

In Tanzania the African middle class, which consists largely of the western educated, is not a product of the post-colonial epoch. However, since independence, and, as a result of expanded educational facilities, at the various levels, this stratum has been increasing very rapidly.[43] The most distinguishable stratum of the middle class is the upper, whose members, as Irene Brown indicates, are drawn

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41. Arusha Declaration, op. cit.

42. Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States, New York: Mouton and Co., 1962, p. 30.

43. Tanzania: Ministry of Education Annual Report, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1960-67.

largely from the graduates and holders of university diplomas, the professionals, technicians, bankers, top administrators, and top civil servants.[44] By their education, style of life, and income, members of the upper stratum stand distinctly well above the rest of the African population and mingle uneasily with the Europeans whose positions, status, roles, and prestige they seek to supplant. Due to competition over jobs between the educated Africans and the Europeans, as pointed out earlier, there is a lot of tension between them.

Politically, members of this group vie for national power, and this has led them to an open conflict with the Tanu oligarchy, creating a situation which Pareto would call the struggle between the "ins" and the "outs."[45] Because the only channel to power in Tanzania is through Tanu, and as indicated earlier on, these channels are highly controlled, members of this stratum find their hopes, ambitions and aspirations to political power frustrated. On the other hand, the Tanu oligarchy sees this stratum as a threat to its status, and consequently portrays itself as champion of the mass, denouncing the former as exploiters.[46] In his speech, on World's Workers May Day, in 1967, in Dar-es-Salaam, Nyerere summed up the feelings of the Tanu oligarchy when he said that, "the educated

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44. Venture, Volume 19, No. 6, June, 1967, p. 13.

45. Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, edited by Arthur Livingston, translated by Andrew Bongiorno and Arthur Livingston, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942.

46. Speech by Julius Nyerere at Makerere University College, April 9, 1962.

clique was engaged in...the second scramble...quest for position and easy life."[47] The Nationalist, the party daily paper, backing up the President, also denounced the "educated clique" who are:

> not content with their new found wealth...ask for more...the bottom of the civil service which should shout more have not done so, but it is the top that does so...the loudest shouts as pointed out by the President have been the top.[48]

When public denouncement fails, the Tanu oligarchy resorts to containing the "outs." Mr. Kambona, who resigned in 1967 from his position as Tanu Secretary-General and is now living in London, describes part of the story when, in January, 1968, he wrote that:

> Today, detention in Tanzania not only means muzzling opposition to Government, but it is used as a cats-paw to flout human conscience ...it is inconceivable that the person who just takes a stand against dictatorship by attacking tyranny, can be detained without trial... According to my information, nearly 200 people have been detained by Nyerere to date. The indication is that before long many more people are going to be detained as the opposition to Nyerere's authoritarian rule grows... Nyerere (is) using detention laws to silence members of his own party, and is using it indiscriminately against his own people.[49]

It seems, the middle class, especially its upper stratum which consists largely of the post-secondary school graduates, constitutes

47. Tanganyika Standard, May 2, 1967.

48. The Nationalist, May 4, 1966.

49. Reporter: East Africa's Fortnightly News Magazine, January 12, 1968, p. 10.

a serious challenge to the party oligarchy. Because the party structure does not provide adequate means of meeting their aspirations to power, tensions between them and the party oligarchy is most likely to increase.

One other set of divisions in Tanzania comes from ecological factors. The ecological factors as social bases of interests create divisions between country and urban centers. Within the country, the notable divisions are between the poor and the rich areas, the economically underdeveloped and the developed regions. These divisions, which were "born" in the colonial epoch but remained relatively dormant, are now developing and are increasingly becoming new sources of tensions.

The urban interests are mainly interests in the wage-economy of Africans who are largely unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Their number since independence has in fact decreased.[50] But, unlike the middle class, they are well organized through NUTA, which replaced the Trade Union Movement in Tanzania. As stated above, NUTA is tightly controlled by Tanu. But this control is neither complete nor successful. Since 1964, there has been constant friction between NUTA and Tanu especially over the problem of the minimum wage and working conditions.[51] This conflict seems to be

50. Tanganyika: Labour Department Annual Report, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1960-64. Tanzania: Ministry of Labour Annual Report, 1965-67.

51. NUTA Presidential Commission Report, 1967, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1967.

increasing each year since NUTA was created by Tanu Government in 1964.

The ecological divisions in rural areas or in the country basically pits the economically developed areas against the less developed areas. Because the Government is the only major source for the planning and developing of the whole country, it is being pressured from all sections of the country for more funds. As there are not enough funds, the Government finds it is blamed for all sections.

The economically developed regions such as the Northern and Tanga Regions blame the Government for directing most of its funds to the less developed areas, while the less developed areas feel the Government is not doing enough for them to catch up with the already economically developed areas. The 1967 Budget Debate speeches reflect these divisions and the ensuing conflict. In his speech, the Rt. Hon. Mr. Mfauka (M.P. from an underdeveloped region) condemned the Government for developing only those areas which were already developed, such as Arusha and Moshi, but not the less advanced places such as Rufiji,[52] and he stressed the fact that all industry coming into the country is taken to the already developed places. He was particularly critical of the Government's housing program which was limited to urban and other already developed areas such as Mwanza.[53] On the other hand, the Rt. Hon. Mr. Mwaki Kwanga (M.P. from a developed region), speaking in the same debate, criticized the Government for

52. <u>Tanzania National Assembly</u>, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, June, 1967.

53. <u>Tanganyika Standard</u>, June 17, 1967.

paying farmers in developed areas lower prices than farmers in less

developed areas for the same crops, "while the world market was giving

the same price for the crop."[54]

Other speakers from rural areas directed their attacks against

urban development which was taking place at the expense of the rural

areas. Mr. R. Rufengwa (M.P. from Gerta, North) said he was,

"unhappy to see the Minister of Housing concentrating his efforts

in urban centres and neglecting rural areas." Mr. Nabahaw (M.P. from

an underdeveloped area) was sorry to see the National Housing Coopera-

tion concentrated in towns, forgetting the rural area. He continued,

"we will not agree to this. Electricity, housing, and water should

also be distributed to the rural areas."[55]

How are all these divisions and competing interests handled?

In Tanzania all interests are intended to be contained within the Tanu

organization.[56] The structure of the party is devised for this

purpose. However, Tanu structure, which has been outlined above,

only permits ample representation of ecologically based interests and

of well organized interests. The ecological interests are represented

in the cells, branches, districts, and regions, in an ascending

order. Within the country at large, the 17 regions each compete

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54. Sunday News, Dar-es-Salaam, July 9, 1967; Tanganyika Standard,
    June 23, 1967.

55. Tanganyika Standard, June 17, 1967.

57. Reporter, op. cit., January 12, 1968, p. 10; Tanzania: Interim
    Constitution, Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1965.

with each other for the re-allocation of national resources, while in each region the constituent districts compete with each other as do branches in each district and cells in each branch.

The non-ecological interests, such as those of the working class, and those of the rural groups, are represented in the affiliate organizations. N.U.T.A. represents the special interests of workers both in Government and non-Government employment. The relation of N.U.T.A., as already delineated above, is one of subordination to Tanu, but thereare signs of conflict. In 1967, N.U.T.A., despite Tanu Government pressure, approved at its National Conference a demand for a pay-raise for its members. Since then, there has been some tension between Tanu and N.U.T.A. This, in a way, indicates the tenuous control of N.U.T.A. by Tanu.

The interests of the Tanzanian farmers are represented in the C.U.T. organization. Although the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika is a very powerful organization its relations with Tanu have so far been very amicable.

Unorganized interests such as the university and other institutions are represented by special M.P.s who, since the National Conference in 1967, are members of the National Executive Committee. However, despite the presence of special representatives representing neither ecological nor organized interests, other non-spatial interests still remain unrepresented and find no avenue into the party machine. Among these are the interests of the members of the upper stratum of the middle class. Being largely non-white collar workers, and as such not members of N.U.T.A., they have no organized channel to represent

their interests. The situation is exacerbated by Tanu's anti-middle class or anti-intellectual attitude. Other interests not represented in the Tanu structure are those based on religion and race. In an attempt to remove race and religion as norms for political behavior, Tanu's Constitution forbids the organization of interests based on either race or religion.[57]

57. Tanzania: Constitution, The Interim Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Tanganyika African National Union. Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1965.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study has been to contribute toward an
understanding of the role played by the structure of the colonial
situation and of the processes underlying the events which culminated
in the creation of a one-party state in Tanganyika. The major areas of
analysis have been the colonial situation taken in historical perspective,
the role of racial, ethnic and economic factors in the ensuing colonial
conflicts, the development and nature of the political parties emana-
ting from the colonial conflict and the manner in which the dominant
party came to be the only party in the country.

The British had established in Tanganyika, since 1920, a
colonial situation in which the population was highly compartmentalized
and stratified. Both the compartmentalization and the stratification
were derived from a number of factors among which were: skin color,
ethnicity, education, occupation, economic development, religion and
place of origin. Of all these, skin color, in the form of race, became
a very dominant norm in the classification of people into groups and
categories, and also as a norm governing behavior and action. As a
result, the people of Tanganyika, were classified into three races,
European, Asian, and African. Three three races although united under
the flag of one polity lived as exclusive entities, creating a

phenomenon currently called plural society.[1] Race governed not only

the relation of one race to the other but it also governed the

relation of races to the state and other institutions in the country.

Both in the Executive and Legislative Councils Europeans,

Asians and Africans participated as separate races. Until 1958,

when the first general election was held, nominees, or un-official

members, in the Legislative Council represented races. Indeed, the

parity principle proposed by the 1951 Constitutional Committee, which

recommended an equal number of un-official members for each of the

three races, was intended to put racial representation in the Legis-

lature on a firm ground. Race also figured prominently in the other

institutions. In the Civil Service, and other employment, jobs were

largely allotted on a racial basis, the top positions being reserved

for Europeans, the middle range for Asians and the lowest and most

subordinate work for Africans. Both in the Civil Service and in other

employment there were separate scales of payment for Europeans, Asians

and Africans. Accommodation was also on racial lines. There were

separate living quarters for Europeans, Asians and Africans. It was

1. I use the term, plural society in the sense in which Furnival,
   Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith use it. John S. Furnivall, Colonial
   Policy and Practice; a Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands
   India, London and New York: New York University Press, 1956;
   Michael G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British West Indies,
   Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965; Leo Kuper,
   Conflict and the Plural Socieites: Ideologies of Violence
   Among Subordinate Groups, March, 1966, unpublished; Leo Kuper,
   Plural Socieites-Perspectives and Problems, October, 1965,
   unpublished; Leo Kuper, "Sociology: Some Aspects of Urban Plural
   Societies," in The African World: A Survey of Social Research,
   edited for the African Studies Association by Robert A. Lystad,
   Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965.

the same in the schools. Europeans had the best facilities, the facili-
ties for Asians were medium and those for Africans were the poorest.
The same story also applies to traveling facilities where, for instance,
in trains first class was for Europeans, second class for Asians and
third class for Africans. Even churches were divided along racial
lines as there were European churches and African churches. The
hospital service too, had European hospitals, Asian hospitals and
African hospitals. In all this, Europeans formed an elite group and
their position, which was privileged, brought them many benefits. To
them, then, the colonial situation was very beneficial. On the
other hand, the structure of the colonial situation did not benefit
Africans and Asians as much, and indeed in most cases it was
frustrating. This unequal distribution of power and material benefits
to the various races gave the Tanganyikan colonial situation a built-in
conflict.

The built-in conflict in the Tanganyikan colonial situation,
which initially lay dormant and might have remained so for a long
time, eventually found channels, through which it was transformed
into overt colonial conflict. This transformation from latent to
overt was partly a result of factors embedded in Tanganyika society,
namely education, economic development, urbanization and the legal
structure of Tanganyika. International factors also played a part.
Among these were World War II, the international trusteeship status
of Tanganyika and the general impact of the pan-African movement
which was developing at this time.

In Tanganyika education produced a class of people who became

the first to be disoncted with the colonial situation. Through
formal education, Africans were able to see the intrinsic contra-
dictions of the colonial situation. They were able to see that the
principle of equality and freedom taught in schools and churches, and
stressed by the colonial state, were not practiced. They also learnt
that they could do something to correct the situation. So, in the
1950s, educated Africans began to mobilize against colonial domination.
This consciousness among Africans, and their efforts to organize
against the colonial state, have traditionally been termed African
nationalism.

Economic development also acted as a catalyst for the emergence
and growth of nationalism, especially among Africans in the rural
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the first to be disonctented with the colonial situation. Through formal education, Africans were able to see the intrinsic contradictions of the colonial situation. They were able to see that the principle of equality and freedom taught in schools and churches, and stressed by the colonial state, were not practiced. They also learnt that they could do something to correct the situation. So, in the 1950s, educated Africans began to mobilize against colonial domination. This consciousness among Africans, and their efforts to organize against the colonial state, have traditionally been termed African nationalism.

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"injustices" of the colonial situation. The constant migration between one center of employment and the other, between urban and urban, and urban and country areas, and between different rural areas, greatly helped to spread consciousness against, and discontent with, the colonial state, moods current in urban areas and other employment centers.

Outside the urban centers, in the rural areas, at the level of the masses, the salient features were the profound impact of colonial rural administration and its penetrations of traditional rural society, through such practices as enforcement of various agricultural measures of soil conservation, and its emphasis not only n governing but on modernization. These measures of modernization, then, were felt not only by the educated and the migrant workers in towns and other centers of employment but also by most Africans in the rural areas of Tanganyika. In the colonial era, nearly every rural African was taxed, prodded by agricultural instructors, put in prison for some offenses, or put on the road by his chief on behalf of the District Commissioner to do self-help jobs. So, when, conflict became overt, in the form of African nationalism and when this reached the rural areas, it found a ready audience.

In colonial Tanganyika, consciousness of the discontents brought about by the colonial situation, or African nationalism, was also partly caused and stimulated by international events such as World War II, the international trusteeship status of Tanganyika, and the pan-African movement, which was then sweeping across the African continent, making Tanganyika nationalism part of a much broader phenomenon. The contribution of the war came through African soldiers

from Tanganyika who served with the Allied Forces in various parts of
the British Empire, Dominions and Colonies, and were exposed to new
situations and ideas, which infused into them new aspirations and hopes.
So, when they returned to Tanganyika after the war, they sought to
improve their economic, political and social status and that of other
Africans in the country. As a result, most of the nationalists in
Tanganyika in the 1950s came from ex-service men. By reason of its
international trusteeship status, Tanganyika has been visited every
three years since 1949 by the United Nations Visiting Missions which
solicited from, and were always eager to listen to, grievances of
Africans against the colonial state and Europeans. These visits
greatly generated interest in politics among a large section of
Africans, both in rural and urban areas, and this interest became more
after Tanu was founded in 1954. In the period, 1954-1958, the support
Tanu received from the United Nations offered and acted as a moral
support.

However, the actual manifestation of conflict in Tanganyika
was caused by factors embedded in the Tanganyikan colonial situation,
among which were education, economic development and the legal
structure. Had the colonial state not extended educational facilities
to a substantial number of Africans and further, had it not embarked
on a sizeable program of economic development, there may not have been
leaders to organize the mass of Africans against the colonial state.
Equally, had the colonial state adopted a policy of assimilation of
educated Africans, or had it accorded them better treatment than it did,
the rise of nationalism in Tanganyika might not have been possible.

But, above all, it was the legal structure of Tanganyika which permitted, encouraged and guaranteed a substantial degree of freedom of speech, of association and of assembly to all the people of the territory. Within this legal structure Africans were able to form political parties, through which grievances were expressed. It is because the legal structure permitted and even encouraged the formation of political organization that the conflict not only became overt but proceeded largely through political parties. Had the laws not permitted freedom of speech and assembly for Africans as is currently the case in South Africa and Rhodesia, the colonial conflict in Tanganyika, might either not have emerged, or it might have taken a totally different course, such as an underground movement or guerilla warfare.

When colonial conflict became manifest, it was basically racial, in the sense that the political parties advanced and defended the interests of their respective quasi-groups, and these quasi-groups, Africans and Europeans but not Asians, were synonymous with races. This was a conflict in which, for the most part, Africans were pitted against Europeans as each race fought to control the colonial state, especially the Legislative Council. In the conflict, Africans, particularly through their political parties, sought to change and to reconstruct the structure of the colonial state, while Europeans fought to preserve it, or if they could not, then only to permit or allow such changes as would not end their privileged status. The position of Asians was rather ambiguous. Although they did not derive as much benefit from the colonial situation as did Europeans, its destruction was not going to guarantee them any improvement over what they had;

indeed it would mean loss of the few privile es the colonial situation
offered them. As a result of this ambiguous position, and also because
of the internal heterogeneity of the Asiatic community, which impeded
development of a strong racial consciousness and identification among
Asians, Asians for the most part, took a middle road and did not really.
become very involved in the colonial conflict. The only time Asians
became serious.y involved was in the early 1950s, when Asians and
Europeans openly clashed over the 1951 Constitutional Committee's
proposals recommending equal representation of the three races on the
un-official side of the Legislative Council.

In Tanganyika, overt colonial conflict became more defined
and more sharpened after the Government had announced, in 1956, that
the first general election, to elect un-official members of the Legis-
lative Council on the principle of racial partiy, would be held in
1958/9. On the basis of this principle of parity, of the 30 un-official
members who were to replace the nominated un-official members, ten were
to represent each of the three races. In a sense, this principle was
a constitutional institutionalization of race as a political norm,
and the conflict which emerged followed racial lines. The programs
of the two parties reflect this. In the conflict, the programs
of the United Tanganyika Party advanced and were intended to preserve
the interests of the European quasi-group. These programs included
the endorsement of the parity formula, the acceptance of the restricted
franchise, slow constitutional advancement, free European immigration
into Tanganyika, and long and easy terms for land leases; they stressed
economic stability and urged that political advancement should be

preceeded by economic advancement. On the other hand, the programs
of Tanu and of the African National Congress, which advanced the interests
of the African quasi-group demanded immediate self-government and
unrestricted franchise on the basis of one man one vote, opposed
unrestricted non-African immigration, advocated the cessation of
alienation of land, and condemned parity representation in the legis-
lature.

Because of certain factors operative in the Tanganyikan colonial
situation during this time when overt conflict was at its climax, the
colonial conflict did not polarize the competing races into completely
hostile opposing camps. One of these factors was the multi-racial
ideology and membership of U.T.P. The presence of non-Europeans
among the U.T.P. members and the party's political strategy of stressing
the importance of racial cooperation gave it the appearance of being
a non-racial party. This was necessary for the U.T.P. because, as
Europeans were a minority, the party could only win the election with
the support of the other two races. The tripartite voting system, which
requ red that a voter votes three times, that is for a candidate of his
own race and for the two candidates belonging to the other races, the
introduction of a common roll in the 1958 election, forced cooperation
between the races. Further, the sponsoring of candidates of the other
races by both Tanu and U.T.P. in the 1958 election, coupled with
the absence of a political party advancing Asian interests, acted
against racial polarization of the colonial conflict. A sudden change
in the ideology of Tanu, in 1958, just immediately before the election,
from an ideology based on race, in this case African, to one based on

the territorial polity, a change that enabled Tanu to sponsor non-African candidates, was also a factor which contributed to prevent polarization of conflict on racial lines.

This conflict in Tanganyika, which as already stressed, centered around the control of the legislature, would probably not have become overt, despite the presence of factors which provided conditions for transformation of the conflict from latent to manifest froms, if Europeans had accepted in 1951 the parity representation, when it was first proposed by the Constitutional Committee. Instead, Europeans, especially the Tanganyika European Council, flatly rejected these proposals. This rejection was a political error which cost the European community dearly. At this time, both Asians and Africans responded very favorably to the proposals which they tacitly accepted because they felt the proposals marked an important political advance. When five years later, Europeans, realized that their only hope to retain power lay in the parity formula, and they accepted parity representation and became its fervent advocates, it was a little too late. By then, Africans were no longer interested in parity representation and were clamoring instead for an African majority in the Legislative Council. They based their demand on the fact that Tanganyika was a predominantly African country. Tanu was rewarded in the 1958/9 election when it won all the seats because it had overwhelming African support, while the U.T.P. lost because its quasi-group, the European, was in a minority, and because its ideology of multi-racialism did not attract many supporters from Africans. In a sense, the 1958/9 elections in Tanganyika shows the consequences of the dominance of race as a

political norm in the Tanganyikan colonial conflict.

Race played a significant role in determining the development of political parties in Tanganyika. The Asian community never really had a political party, in the true sense of the term. The Asian Association, although it did participate in political action, such as in 1958/9 when it helped Tanu to find and sponsor Asian candidates, never really became actively involved in politics. Among the Europeans, the only political party was the United Tanganyika Party. Although it advanced the interests of Europeans, the party had a substantial number of non-European members. However, it did not develop into a gigantic political par y. After defeat in the 1958/9 election, U.T.P. ceased to function and disbanded.

Among Africans, race played a very dominant role. Many Africans saw the colonial conflict in Tanganyika in purely racial terms, as a conflict between Africans and non-Africans, especially Europeans. When Tanu began to mobilize, Africans responded to the call basically on and along racial lines. They saw their grievances against the state and Europeans in terms of race. Because of this dominant role of race in the colonial situation during the colonial conflict, other factors of religion, ethnicity, occupational division and ecological differences did not play any significant role as political norms, and did not become bases of political organization. Because of this, Tanu, whose support was based on race, was able to mobilize Africans into a gigantic organization against the "outer group" Europeans.

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In the post-colonial era, Tanu used its strength derived from the colonial situation to suppress any exisiting sources of power in the African community. Thus the Tanu Government, abolished in 1961 the institution of chieftainship in 1963 it abolished all other political parties in the country; and in 1964, it abolished the trade unions and replaced them by the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) Finally, in 1964, Tanu Government passed an act making Tanganyika a one-party state. These measures were taken in order to strengthen Tanu's hold on all the people of the country. Now, in the post-colonial epoch, Tanu claims not to be a party of Africans but of all the citizens of the country. Thus race is no longer a significant norm governing political action.

With colonial domination removed, the colonial conflict resolved and color no longer a political norm, the factors which were once dormant are now becoming more and more prominent as bases of new sources of tensions. This is particularly marked in urban centers where Africans in the wage economy are increasingly becoming a source of anxiety for the Tanu oligarchy. As Tanganyika, like most other countries in Africa today, becomes more and more involved in a money economy, workers are finding that their interests are in direct opposition to those of the rural peasants or perceive their situation in these terms. At the present time, when the Government is advocating low salaries for those in the wage economy in an effort to raise the standard of living in the rural areas by expending more of its money in projects which will help develop rural areas, the workers are crying for higher pay. As a result, NUTA, which represents the interests of

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the workers, and Tanu are rapidly drawing apart. Although NUTA was originally formed by the Tanu Government as an instrument with which to control workers, NUTA is fast becoming an organization of the workers and Tanu's control over it is proving to be tenuous.

From the wage economy comes another source of dissensus, the middle class. Unlike the workers, this stratum consists of educated Africans, most of whom are post-secondary school graduates. Members of this stratum, who are employed largely in top positions in the state and, in commerce, find despite their education and skill, that power in post-colonial Tanganyika lies in the hands of the less educated and the less skilled party oligarchy. Their frustration is heightened by the fact that channels to political power are tightly controlled by the party oligarchy. On the other hand, Tanu oligarchy sees in this stratum a real threat to its very existence. Resulting from this, tensions exist between the two, and these tensions have been increasing since Tanganyika became a one-party state.

At the level of the mass, especially in the rural areas, the divisions which exist are mainly ecological. These range economically poor areas against economically rich areas and rural areas as a whole against urban areas. But ecological divisions although they are developing, have not reached a level to threaten the existence of the one-party state. In any case, Tanu structure provides adequate representation of ecological interests. Of the other fact rs mentioned above, religion and ethnicity have so far not been a source of political tension in the one-party state.

Whether or not the one-party state in post-colonial Tanzania

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Whether or not the one-party state in post-colonial Tanzania

will contain all these emerging divisions remain to be seen. But it appears that this will not be easy and it seems there are hard days ahead for the one-party state.

In the course of this study I sought to address myself to the following propositions:

a) That the structure of the colonial situation is intrinisically conflict-generating and that this conflict, initially latent, may under certain conditions become manifest.

b) That the conflict which arose from the colonial situation in Tanganyika developed along racial lines.

c) That under certain conditions such conflict leads to the emergence of a single political party among the subordinate quasi-group and that this may, in turn, be a prelude to the formation of a one-party state.

On the basis of the evidence on Tanganyika these propositions are supported. However, some reservations must be made. In the first place, the data available are not adequate to fully establish these propositions. Moreover, although I have shown that the structure of the colonial situation in Tanganyika was conflict-generating, I am unable to make distinctions as to the intensity and magnitude of conflict arising from institutions other than the political, such as economic, educational and religious institutions, and from various practices of the color bar. I also have reservations as regards the extent to which the colonial conflict in Tanganyika was racial. Since the racial categories which were involved in the conflict initially came from different cultural areas, there were no doubt also elements

of cultural conflict.

In regard to the generality for other colonial situations it is not quite possible to state how applicable they are. But the findings seem relevant for most of the African colonial situations under British imperial rule. These findings are particularly applicable to the White settler dominated colonial situations such as those in Central and East Africa.

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APPENDIX

REPORT OF 1951 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE:
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

(i)   Consideration should be given to the appointment of an African member (para. 101).

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL

(ii)   The Legislative Council should be considerably expanded in size (para. 91).

(iii)   Special regard should be had to the position of Chiefs and to the small class of educated Africans, of whom many are Government servants (paras. 92 and 93).

(iv)   The official majority should be maintained until experience has been gained in an enlarged council (para. 94).

(v)   The Governor should continue to preside over the Council (para. 95).

(vi)   The basis of unofficial membership should be equal division of seats among the three main races, as the most suitable expression of the principle of partnership (para. 96).

(vii)   The membership of the Council should be the Governor, twenty-one officials and twenty-one unofficials (para. 98).

(viii)   A limited number of unofficials might be appointed to the official side of the Council (para. 98).

DECENTRALISATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANISATION

(ix)   The Central Government should decentralise many of its administrative and executive powers to Regional Administrations (paras. 36-40).

(x)   The manner of division of the Territory into regions and the precise powers to be delegated to the regional authorities should be made the subject of a specialised inquiry (para. 41).

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(x) The manner of division of the Territory into regions and the precise powers to be delegated to the regional authorities should be made the subject of a specialised inquiry (para. 41).

(xi) The present Provinces are not of sufficient size to support the burden in staff, resources and finances involved in a transfer of any considerable portion of central government functions to regional organisations (para. 39).

(xii) The Regional Administrations should be supported by Regional Councils, inter-racial in composition (paras. 47-48).

(xiii) The Regional Councils should control expenditure by the voting of the regional budgets, control regional policy and exercise general powers of question and criticism (para. 47).

(xiv) For a limited period there should be an official majority (para. 48).

(xv) The unofficial members should be drawn from the administrative sub-regions of the regions (para. 48).

(xvi) The administrative districts should be grouped into sub-regions co-terminous with the areas of the proposed counties (para. 50).

(xvii) Inter-racial county councils should be established throughout the Territory (paras. 52 and 53).

(xviii) County councils should deal with matters affecting all races (paras. 54 and 55).

(xix) Revenues should be derived by grants from central government and by precept on Native and Township Authorities with limited rate raising powers (para. 56).

(xx) Councils should usually have an unofficial majority (para. 57).

(xxi) The Native and Township Authorities should not be subordinate to these Councils, except in respect of any delegated functions (paras. 60, 61 and 86).

URBAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

(xxii) The Councils of Township Authorities should progressively shed official members (para. 67).

(xxiii) Non-racial elective representation should be introduced based on wards (para. 68).

(xxiv) The franchise should not be limited to ratepayers (para. 69).

(xxv) Neighbouring Native Authorities should be represented on the Township Authority (paras. 70 and 85).

(xxvi) Government servants should have the vote and be bodies cor-

porate and should have power to make bye-laws (para. 73).

(xxviii) Financial autonomy should be granted to major townships based on grants-in-aid, assigned revenues and rates (para. 74).

(xxix) The rating valuation should be a Central Government service (para. 77).

(xxx) Autonomy should be granted to townships in possession of adequate executive staff and a good financial potential. Six townships qualify (para. 78).

(xxxi) Minor Settlements hould be upgraded to townships or be controlled by county councils or Native Authorities (paras. 81 and 87).

(xxxii) The Dar-es-Salaam Municipality should be developed into an all-purpose local government body. The township of Tanga should become a municipality or an autonomous township (para. 82).

ELECTIONS

(xxxiii) The principle of elective representation to the Legislative Council is accepted (para. 104)

(xxxiv) Elections for Regional and County Councils should be introduced as soon as possible (para. 105).

(xxxv) Elections to urban local government councils are recommended on a ward system (paras. 68 and 108).

MISCELLANEOUS

(xxxix) Kiswahili should not be admitted as a second language in the Legislative Council (para. 109).

PROGRAMME OF REFORM

(xl) County Councils should be introduced without delay, followed by regionalisation. Reform of Legislative Council, with elected representation, should follow within three years of inauguration of local government institutions (para. 99).

(xli) A committee should be appointed to plan the implementation of the recommendations for the new Legislative Council, including elections (para. 100).