AUTHORITY IN THE JAPANESE ORGANIZATION

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AUTHORITY IN THE JAPANESE ORGANIZATION

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ABSTRACT

The exercise of power and the process of decision-making in the Japanese group are characterized by three features, the sum of which constitutes a unique pattern of organizational behavior: the seepage of authority, the recession of decision, and the proliferation of faction.

Four theories of Japanese modal psychology have been advanced to explain the persistence of this pattern over time. These are the authoritarian, the dependent, and two "mixed" hypotheses: one of which sees authoritarian and dependent patterns as differing individual adaptations to the socialization process; and one of which sees authoritarianism and dependency as associated with different cultural styles conditioned by social class.

The study originally hypothesized that the "mixed--social class" theory was correct. The hypothesis is tested by the use of interviews and projective tests with a sample of middle-level administrators in large Japanese bureaucratic organizations, both public and private.

Four central psychological concerns are isolated and described in the sample: the dilemmas of inclusion-exclusion, harmony-dissension, communication and the failure to communicate, and trust--mistrust. These concerns are analyzed in their relation to the phenomena of seepage of authority, recession of decision, and proliferation of faction.

It is concluded that the initial hypothesis was untenable, and that the psycho-organizational equilibrium under study is best explained by the theory that Japanese modal personality includes both authoritarian and dependent trends, which are conditioned, not by class, but by individual modes of adaptation.

It is further shown that, although the origins of Japanese "authoritarianism" are similar to those postulated in theory, the content differs in accordance with cultural variations. The "authoritarian" strand in Japanese modal personality and culture is found to be less significant in explaining organizational behavior than the alternate pattern of "affiliative dependency."

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Foreword

This study deals--in a particular and limited context, that of the large-scale bureaucratic organization in contemporary Japan--with one of the basic problems of political life: how can men best work together in groups to take collective action and make collective decisions, and what is the distribution of authority within the group that maximizes group effectiveness and individual satisfaction?

The explanatory focus of the study is the relationship between cultural prescriptions, individual personality, and organized behavior. It is the interaction of these elements, and their balance one with another, which determines and defines a given system or a particular pattern of organizational life. Each such pattern-like the Japanese bureaucratic pattern described here--is one possible answer to the dilemma of how men can work together for common goals.

All such answers have certain aspects in common, and all are in some respects unique; but each represents a pattern that works for its participants and practitioners, given the particular cultural context and the primary psychological concerns which help to shape it.

It is relatively easy to describe behavior; one need simply observe accurately. The description and discussion of cultural patterns and psychological tendencies is more complex, and the barriers to accurate observation and interpretation are multiplied. So there are some introductory caveats which should be entered. The first has to do with how we talk about a culture. Any human culture is probably incapable of being permanently and exhaustively characterized, consisting, as it does, of the sum of the values, expectations, and attitudes of the people who share it: a sum, furthermore, which continually changes and the structure of whose components continually ramifies and develops. Japanese culture, in particular, like all the great cultural traditions, is wide, rich and deep. It stems from a long and various history, and it is self-conscious, articulate, and highly developed. Thus its variety, depth, scope and conscious quality make all generalizations subject to challenge, and all descriptive assertions pale abstractions from an infinitely rich reality.

The second has to do with observer bias. When dealing with questions of motivation, attitude, and emotional concern, the observer's interpretation must always reflect to some extent the limitations of his own position and his own personality. One of the men who gave so generously of his time in the interviews and the attitudinal survey which make up the data of this study questioned me at length to determine how I felt about Japan and the Japanese. Asked why he was so concerned on this point, he replied, "you can't understand Japan--or anything else--without liking it."

This statement expresses in summary fashion an important truth--entirely apart from its function as a rationale for a concern as to how far one ought to trust, and be frank with, an outside observer whose ultimate intentions were unclear. In fact no one can understand any social phenomenon without having some emotional concern with it. A non-

political political scientist; or a psychologist exempt from the human concerns of love, hate, fear and anger, would be an anomaly. But the picture is more complex than that. Where the observer and analyst stands outside what he is observing, as in the case of cross-cultural research, the original statement must be complemented by two more. Not only is it impossible to understand a phenomenon without liking it. But also one doesn't recognize the existence of a social phenomenon as a problem without being unlike; and one can't understand the problem without being like.

The particular mixture of these three desiderata required for accurate observation and correct analysis is no doubt a delicate one. So the reader will have to make his own evaluation of the reliability and validity of the picture of Japanese bureaucratic political culture which emerges here as filtered through my lenses. My cultural bias may not be unlike enough to make the really important problems visible; I may not like Japan enough to understand it; I may not be like enough the men who responded so helpfully to my questions to understand them.

In any case, a three-dimensional reality cannot emerge from a single two-dimensional picture. And so a multiplicity of observer angles and of observational lenses is not only inevitable but essential. The behavioral sciences can never completely grasp human reality; but their blueprints are the more informative, the greater the variety of angles from which they are drawn. Thus the inadequacy of this blueprint to convey the full depth of the phenomenon which it purports to represent needs only a conventional apology. Our understanding of both American and Japanese political culture will be greater when a Japanese observer

applies techniques and modes of analysis similar to those used here to the study of groups and their leaders in the American organizationalbureaucratic setting.

For what understanding does manage to filter through an inevitably imperfect lens, I am deeply indebted to the help, advice, and encouragement of a number of friends.

Fujimoto Atsushi, Funaoka Tadamichi, Hashimoto Tetsu, Kano Tadashi, Nambara Akira, and Tagaya Hidec--individually and collectively--provided me with friendship and instruction in a happy blend I am completely unable to analyze.

Eda Mitsutaro, Funaki Kyo, Funatani Kentaro, and Ray Kathe, during the years I lived and worked in a Japanese organization, taught me much, by example, of the proper use of authority.

The research on which this study is based would have been impossible to initiate, carry through, or complete without the generous and unselfish help of Imamura Fumio, Kumita Hideo, Nakahara Nobuyuki, Sasaki Naoto, Sasaki Tamisaburo, Shikano Shozo, Sunada Toshiko, and Tomoyasu Kazuo.

Intellectually I am deeply indebted for advice and guidance to--in Japan--Professor Kobayashi Noritake of Keio University, Professor Noda Kazuo of Rikkyo University, and Professor Takamiya Shin of Sophia University; in the United States, to Professors James W. Morley of Columbia, Abe Zaleznik of Harvard Business School, and Everett Hagen and Lucian Pye of M.I.T.

Asada Michiko first interested me in the problems of Japanese culture, for which I will always be grateful; and the Foreign Area Fellowship Program provided the funds to give that interest a concrete result.

Most of all I am indebted to the men who took the time to complete the M.I.T. Managerial Attitudes Survey, and for their thoughtful consideration of what must have seemed at times obtuse or prying questions. I wish I may know some of them yet better than by their written responses'. My debt to my wife and children for putting up with all this is beyond-words.

Whatever virtue there may be in the study is largely due to the various contributions of those listed above; the faults are of course

mine.

Part I:

The Problem of Organizational Psychology

14.

"...denn wir sehen auch in der vollkommensten Hierarchie, in der reibungslosesten Organisation keineswegs eine Maschinerie, aus toten und an sich gleichgultigen Teilen zusammengesetzt, sondern einen lebendigen Körper, aus Teilen gebildet und von Organen belebt, deren jedes seine Art und seine Freiheit besitzt und am Wunder des Lebens teilhat."1 Chapter 1: The Nature of the Study

The Japanese pattern of organization which is the subject of this study is one which has lasted for hundreds of years relatively unchanged. It has proven itself to be suited not only to the comparatively simple problems of the organization of collective effort in a feudal and agricultural society, but also to the infinitely more complex exigencies of a modern industrialized and bureaucratic state.

15.

Part of the credit for Japan's transformation over the last century must go to the system of organizational capacity--the structure of authority and decision-making--within which that transformation took place. Part, too, of the blame for the catastrophe of 1945 must be borne by this same system.

The Japanese pattern of organization has never been completely and unambiguously described, and it has never been clear where authority resides within it. It has seemed to some observers to be authoritarian and hierarchical; to others to be a form of primitive communal democracy. A more complete understanding of this particular type of bureaucratic structure is important not only theoretically as a case study in comparative political cultures, but practically as an investigation of the modes of organizational function in a nation which has demonstrated already, and can be expected to continue to demonstrate, an almost unique capacity for social, economic, and political development.

¹Hermann Hesse, <u>Das Glasperlenspie</u>l, Berlin, 1957, p. 13.

This introductory section deals with three aspects of the problem of Japanese organizational psychology: the what, the how, and the why. That is, what characteristics define the phenomenon--Japanese organizational behavior--at which we will look; how we observe, analyze, and explain it; and why we are interested--what more general significance inheres in the problem? These three aspects are taken up in reverse order: the how and the why in chapter 1 and the what in chapter 2.

a. Organizational Psychology and its Significance

The hypothesis was set forth in the foreword that organizational forms, or typical patterns of behavior within organizations, stand in a systemic relationship to the values and needs of the individuals who inhabit, develop, manipulate and work through those forms.

This hypothesis implies that the mechanisms of behavior which characterize a political sub-culture like the one which is the subject of this study make up a patterned whole where each part or aspect fits each other.

It also implies that the expectations, attitudes, values and needs of the individuals--whose collective activity forms the sum of behavior defining political structure--are equally parts of a characteristic modal pattern, a pattern into which the individual is educated or socialized by the total of his experience in group life, from the family group on to adult groups.

The hypothesis implies, finally, that the two sub-systems--that of organizational structure as defined by behavior, and that of modal

personality and values--form an equilibrium. They affect and determine each other, and a change in the one may be expected to produce a corresponding change in the other.

Why should we be interested in the shape this equilibrium takes? There are two general reasons, and one particular reason for interest in the Japanese case.

The first general reason is that organization is essential and ubiquitous in social, economic, and political life. The subordination of individual to group goals within a social structure which is effective in achieving those goals is the most powerful tool for coping with reality at our disposal. Its power makes it essential and insures that it will be used. Thus we spend our lives in organizations: the school, the firm, the army, the party, the church, the government office; and it behooves us to understand them.

The second general reason is that organizations may perform more or less well. Social life rests on the premise that organization is possible; but the quality of social, economic and political life depends on organizational performance.

One of the most important factors determining that performance is the nature of the equilibrium we called the psyche-organizational system. The fit between patterns of individual psychology and patterns of organizational structure and behavior is always necessarily present, but the character of the fit determines the capacity of the organization to achieve its goals.

The character of the fit can be defined along two scales. The first is the nature of the behaviors called forth: they may be functional or dysfunctional for the stated tasks of the group, while remaining, in both cases, a unique and necessary equilibrating pattern in the context of the culture. The second is the efficiency of the system: with how much or how little friction between individual needs and taskspecific needs does it perform? The limiting case of greatest friction is the coercive organization, which must of necessity be less efficient than the non-coercive organization because of the energy wasted on coercion.

In a perfectly equilibrated psyche-organizational system every individual would share the goals of the group; each individual task would be equally essential to the attainment of those goals; each organizational role would be exactly suited to the abilities and needs of the individual who filled it; and the forms governing the use of authority and the arrangement of the decision-making process would maximize both information available, flexibility, speed and power, and, on the other hand, the satisfaction of modal individual needs and expectations.

An example of such a perfect organizational equilibrium would be hard to find. We might seek an approximation in a baseball team; a string quartet; a mountain climbing expedition; or a team of research scientists.

If it is hard to cite examples of a perfectly friction-free and efficient organizational style which maximizes both individual satisfaction and task performance, it is not difficult to cite examples of

the other extreme. Banfield has given a paradigmatic example of a culture where organizational capability is at a minimum: the village of Montegrano, in which formal organization is non-existent except/as it is imposed from outside the culture in the forms of the church and the state.²

The particular reason why the forms of Japanese organization are of interest is stated concisely by Banfield. He adduces

> the crucial importance of culture. People live and think in very different ways, and some of the ways are radically inconsistent with the requirements of formal organization ... There seems to be only one important culture--the Japanese--which is both radically different from our own and capable of maintaining the necessary degree of organization [for a modern economy and a democratic political order].³

This case study, then, should be examined with these considerations in mind; in the hope that it may teach us something about both the inevitable constraints of organizational functioning in any culture, and certain culturally specific ways of dealing with these constraints.

b. The Study and its Methods

The research problem which is the basis of this study falls into two parts. The first is the testing of the accuracy of certain hypotheses about Japanese cultural values and personality patterns which are to be found in the literature and will be discussed in detail in Part

²Banfield, Edward C., <u>The Moral Basis of a Backward Society</u>, Glencoe, 1958.

³Op. <u>cit</u>., p. 8

III. The second is a description of the ways in which the modal valuesand needs which emerge from the data mesh with and motivate typical behavior in large-scale bureaucratic organizations.

This double goal meant that the research strategy had to be equally dual-directed. The gathering of data fell into two stages. The first stage was a series of about sixty interviews with officials, administrators, and executives in both public and private organizations in Tokyo.

The interviews were only loosely structured. They centered around the problem of the nature of leadership in the administrative or managerial context. Typical questions were, for example, What characterizes a good leader? What characterizes a bad leader? What qualities ought a good subordinate to possess, and what qualities make a subordinate unsatisfactory? What is the most efficient way to shape policy? To implement policy? What problems of personal relations typically arise between superior and subordinate? What sort of failure in leadership is most often seen? What are the strong points of Japanese organizational style, and what its weak points? What aspects of Japanese organization and administration are most commonly misunderstood by foreign observers? Is there indeed a specifically "Japanses" form of organizational capability which was in part responsible for the course of economic and political development of the country over the past century? The interviews normally lasted an hour or ninety minutes. The respondents were in no sense a random sample, but consisted of men who were both accessible to an introduction and willing to give up some of

their time to talk to an academic observer.

These interviews were useful in providing, on the one hand, a picture of normal organizational structure and prectice; and, on the other, in eliciting some of the themes of attitude and personality which the second part of the research focussed on in more detail.

21.

The second phase of the research was the formulation and administration of a survey instrument designed to yield more precise and easily manipulable data on psychological concerns as they affect organizational behavior. This instrument is the M.I.T. Managerial Attitudes Survey (Masachusettsu Koka Daigaku Keiei Ishiki ni Kan suru Anketo),⁴ English and Japanese versions of which appear in the appendix.

The survey is divided into five parts. The first part, essentially projective, consists in questions which attempt to elicit the qualities which determine the good and bad superior, subordinate, and co-worker.

The second section consists of twenty statements scaled for agreement or disagreement on a minus-three plus-three basis. The midpoint is omitted in order to exclude a response of indifference.

Items six through ten of the second part of the survey constitute a translation of the Rosenberg "Faith in People" Scale.⁵ This scale measures the dimension of basic trust or mistrust, conceived to be

⁴Japanese words are not italicized here, and throughout the study, because of the frequency with which they appear.

⁵Rosenberg, Morris, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," <u>American</u> <u>Sociological Review</u>, XXI, 1956, pp. 690-695; and Rosenberg, Morris, <u>Occupations and Value</u>s, Clencoe, 1957. twenty-four through twenty-seven). The logic underlying the use of the sentence completion test and the degree of universality it may claim as a cross-cultural investigative tool are described in detail by Phillips in his own study.¹¹

The fourth part of the survey is a set of five stories depicting hypothetical situations having to do with superior-subordinate and peer relations in the work-place. To each story a number of possible solutions or courses of action are appended, of which the respondent is to choose one. This technique, and the stories used, were developed by Hanfmann and Getzels.¹²

The final section of the questionnaire consists of a set of four TAT pictures which deal, in order, with peer relations, superiorsubordinate or senior-junior relations, the relation to authority, and peer conflict. These TATs are adapted from those developed by Solomon for research with overseas Chinese.¹³ Japanese dress and facial structure have been substituted for the original Chinese characteristics pictured, but every effort was made to alter nothing else in the series.

The survey was administered to groups of business executives or government administrators who were attending training institutes, management schools, or economic discussion groups. Completion of the questionnaire took place during regular class time (with two exceptions to

¹¹<u>Op. cit</u>., pp. 123-142.

¹²Eugenia Hanfmann and Jacob W. Getzels, "Interpersonal Attitudes of Former Soviet Citizens as Studied by a Semi-projective Method," <u>Psychological Monographs</u>, Vol. 69, no. 4, whole number 389, 1955.

¹³Solomon, Richard Harvey, <u>The Chinese Revolution and the Politics of</u> Dependency, M.I.T., Department of Political Science, Ph.D. Thesis, 1966. be noted later). The time allotted for the task was one hour, subdivided to give ten minutes for part one, seven minutes for part two, fifteen minutes for part three, five minutes for part four, twenty minutes for part five, and three minutes for the face sheet.

The number of those completing the Managerial Attitudes Survey totalled 197. Members of the sample have in common their identity as middle-level or upper-level managers in the large public and private bureaucracies of Tokyo, but otherwise their backgrounds vary across a wide range.

Certain typical features, however, can be singled out. The modal member of the sample is around forty years old. He was born in Tokyo to a family of middle- or upper-class status, his father being typically a company employee or executive (a "salary-man"). He is the oldest child in his family of origin. He attended Tokyo University (Todai) and graduated from the faculty of law and political science. His present rank in the organization in which he works is probably division chief (bucho) or section chief (kacho): but ranks in the total sample ranged from the lowest level executive positions to director, president, or bureau chief (see chart 1 on page for the positions represented).

In two cases the survey was administered under circumstances which were different from those described above. In these instances the survey was distributed, with a brief explanation of its purpose, to the groups concerned on one day and returned on the next day by only those individuals who chose to do so. The sources of bias in this procedure

Chart 1

Public bureaucracy:

Kanbocho.

Kyokucho

Kyoku-jicho

Private bureaucracy:

Shacho Torishimariyaku

Shitsucho

Common to public and private:

Bucho

Bu-jicho

Kacho

Kacho dairi, Kacho hosa

Kakaricho

Secretariat Chief Bureau Chief 25.

Vice-bureau Chief

Company President

Director

Chief of a Staff Unit

Division Chief

Vice-division Chief

Section Chief

Assistant Section Chief

Sub-section Chief

Japanese Bureaucratic Terminology of Rank and its Equivalents

(note: There may be three or four bu, or divisions, to a government ministry, and four or five in a large-scale private organization. The number of sections to a division is unspecified, but the kacho is normally in charge of up to around fifteen officials in addition to filing clerks and tea ladies.) are numerous. There was no time limit; completion of the questionnaire was done alone rather than in groups; there was nothing to prevent consultation with others as to "good" answers; and those who returned the questionnaires (about 50% in both cases) might have differed in some significant respect from those who did not.

As it-turned out, the pattern of response of these groups revealed no significant difference on any item from that of the groups who completed the survey in more formal circumstances. There was then no reason to exclude these respondents from the sample; and all the more reason to suppose that the general pattern of response which constitutes the basic data of this study is basic and invariant with respect to deviations in procedure and circumstance of the order described.

It should be noted that this sample is not a random one. It is composed of individuals who happened to be enrolled in training courses or discussion groups whose teachers were generously willing to help in the research. Because the sample is not random, no standard tests of statistical significance have been used in interpretation of the results.

There are certain limits to generalization of such data. At the one extreme, it could be argued that no inference as to the qualities of Japanese administrators in general should be made, beyond the 197 members of the sample.

But this approach may be too rigorous. The point is not to exclude all inference from imperfect data, but to get what one can out of it; always being aware that a degree of uncertainty does exist and having some idea of the magnitude of that degree.

In this case the difficulties of generalization are lessened, not increased, by the nature of the sample. The sample is biassed away from traditional modes of thought and evaluation, since it consists of men who have succeeded in advancing in formally rational, bureaucratic, .and non-traditional organizations; and whose training (including that received in the courses which provided the opportunity for administration of the questionnaire) is designed to inculcate a rational, univ-'ersalistic, and task-oriented outlook. That the physical setting of the survey was the classroom, the administrator a western researcher, and his provenance M.I.T.--all these factors reinforce the western, modern and rationalistic bias.

Thus patterns of response which run counter to this bias can be safely assumed to be more, not less, characteristic of the larger group from which the sample was drawn. And traditional, culturally-oriented modes of perception and evaulation, when they appear, we can suppose to be, with increased confidence, really there in the larger real world context.

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Chapter 2: Characteristics of the Japanese Organizational System

This chapter treats in more specific detail the "what" of the study, the Japanese psyche-organizational system. It is first defined in terms of what it is not, by contrast with the distinguishing traits of an ideal-type model of the modern western authority-structure. Its own identifying characteristics are then summarized. The chapter concludes with an outline of the systemic model which, it is argued, explains the durability, persistence, and efficacy of the characteristic Japanese organizational syndrome.

a. What the Japanese Model is not

The background against which the distinguishing traits of the Japanese organizational model stand out most clearly is that of the rational bureaucratic system given its clearest theoretical outline by Weber. This sort of bureaucratic structure is characterized by specialization of function; it is governed by appeal to general principles or universalistic rules; advancement depends strictly upon merit; personal relations are rationally rather than emotionally governed, specific rather than diffuse; authority, always limited by the rules of the organization, inheres at different levels in different degrees, but its source and principal locus is always at the top.

Two aspects of this ideal type are of particular interest for our purpose. The first has to do with the nature of personal relations

between superior and subordinate, the second with how authority is exercised.

That personal and emotional considerations have no place in an organizational structure which is rationally task-oriented is an aspect of the western image of organization whose salience is well-documented.¹ The flavor of this culturally conditioned demand is illustrated by an excerpt from an interview with an American administrator, the counterpart in age, rank, and position of the typical member of the Japanese sample:

What I want most in my subordinates is honesty, maturity, and reliability. Maturity means specifically that work doesn't get cluttered up with private emotions. I don't want to have any personal relation with my subordinates. Not, that is, with the people who are going to remain my subordinates... All I want from them is that they do their work and keep out of my hair!

The respondent here wants no relationship other than the purely official with his subordinates because he sees the personal element as a contaminant influence which might disorganize efficient routine. This attitude, effective and publicly sanctioned in one culture, is neither in the Japanese model.

A second facet of the western ideal bureaucratic type which is par-, ticularly relevant has to do with expectations about how authority will

¹Cf., e.g., Gardner, Burleigh, "What Makes Successful and Unsuccessful Executives?", <u>Advanced Management</u>, vol. 13, Septembers, 1948, pp. 116-125; and Henry, William, "The Business Executive: the Psycho-dynamics of a Social Role," <u>American Journal of Sociology</u>, vol. LIV, no. 4, January, 1949, pp. 286-291.

be handled. The content of these expectations is well exemplified in the anecdote about the sign on President Truman's desk, saying, "the buck stops here." Authority can be delegated, and responsibility for different phases of action inheres at various levels of organization; but in this cultural perspective the basic expectation is that there must be an ultimate source of authority, from the decisions of which ' there can be no appeal, and that when necessary this authority will be exercised absolutely and unilaterally.

It is also expected that, on occasion, it will be exercised in a direction counter to the expectations of those in advisory or subordinate positions. The iconography of the American presidency is rich in illustrations of such expectations, and to make more concrete the cultural sanction given to this type of use of authority we may recall the story of Lincoln's closing a cabinet meeting, at which he had gotten, one by one, from each of his advisors, vehement expressions of opposition to a proposed policy, with the words, "the ayes have it."

This western cultural matrix, which includes the archetypal images of the king, the charismatic leader, the captain of industry, and the "great man," has permeated even the concepts of social science. Freud's theoretical assertion about the nature of group leadership is without a doubt shaped in part by this cultural bias:

...many equals, who can identify themselves with one another, and a single person superior to them all--that is the situation that we find realized in groups which are capable of subsisting...man is...a horde animal, an individual creature in a horde led by a chief.²

²Freud, Sigmund, <u>Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego</u>, Standard Edition, London, 1955, vol. 18, p. 121.

It is against this background of impersonality, rationality, specificity, and the rule of law; coupled with the culturally prescribed role of the strong leader whose office is the unambiguous locus and source of authority; that we will examine the distinguishing traits of the Japanese model.

b. Defining Traits of the Japanese Syndrome

The Japanese psyche-organizational system shares with that of many other non-western cultures the "traditional" qualities of diffuse and particularistic human relations, which lend to the task-oriented bureaucratic structure a familistic atmosphere. Kawashima finds in the "familistic" nature of Japanese groups a basic explanatory principle,³ while Maruyama sees a "pre-modern emphasis on 'humanism'"⁴ as a distinguishing feature in personal and political relationships; Japanese slang labels this emotional climate as a "wet" (uetto) one, in contrastto the "dry" (dorai) attitudes of rational organizational impersonality.

The features of organizational pattern and behavior which this study attempts to explain, however, are not attitudes but those structures which are in part their consequences. From the structural aspect, the traits which particularly characterize the Japanese organizational system are three: the seepage of authority, the recession of decision,

³Kawashima Takeyoshi, <u>Nihon Shakai no Kazokuteki Kosei</u> (The Familial Structure of Japanese Society), Tokyo, Nihon Hyoronsha, 1950.

⁴Maruyama Masao, "From Carnal Literature to Carnal Politics," in Maruyama Masao (Morris, Ivan, ed.) <u>Thought and Behaviour in Modern</u> Japanese Politics, London, 1963, p. 257.

and the proliferation of faction. These three structural traits are inter-related, and the causally prior one is the first.

By the seepage of authority is meant a process by which real authority and initiative in decision-making tends to be delegated to, or taken over by, ever lower and lower-levels in the organizational structure. The formal leader becomes a figurehead who reigns but does not rule. This image of the leader has become a common part of modern Japanese folklore, and has been remarked upon by foreign observers in various contexts. Its acceptance in popular thought is illustrated by an exchange in a symposium on Japanese culture:

> Professor Kobayashi: 'A man who had returned from America told me that they had coined the term "bottom up management" there; in fact in Japan management is entirely bottom up, isn't it?'

Professor Inayama: 'It's false-bottomed.' Professor Kobayashi: 'False-bottomed, or topless, or something.' (laughter)⁵

And Lifton, as an outside observer, notes "the strong dependence" of the senior person, the 'sensei,' upon his juniors."⁶

The recession of decision denotes a process by which the processes of initiation of proposals, bargaining, and decision-making not only take place at lower levels in the organization than would be expected from the structure of the formal hierarchy, but are veiled in a series of private and informal preliminary conferences; in which explicit individual

⁵Kato Hidetoshi, ed., <u>Nihon Bunka no Tenbo</u> (The Prospects for Japanese Culture), Tokyo, Nihon Seisansei Honbu, 1968, p. 263.

⁶Lifton, Robert Jay, <u>Death in Life: Survivors of Hiroshima</u>, New York New York, 1967, p. 44 (note).

responsibility for proposals is muffled by the requirement of formal unanimity; and in which any decision or bargain in which relative power considerations play a part is shaped in accordance with "case-by-case" factors rather than by formal rules or precedents.

Finally, the proliferation of faction refers to the prevalence in Japanese organizations of cliquish mutual-aid groups, usually hierarchically structured, which have for object the maximization of their members' interests and the capture of informal power within the larger organizational framework.

In the explanation of how these three defining traits of the idealtype Japanese organization mesh with each other and with the psychological and cultural patterns which are in part their cause and to which they represent a creative adaptation--the attainment of a psychoorganizational equilibrium--we shall deal also with some central contradictions or paradoxes in the Japanese model.

The first of these is the problem of hierarchy and pseudohierarchy. The "seepage of authority" phenomenon sets the terms of this problem. Japanese organizations of the type with which we are concerned are characterized by a strict emphasis on hierarchical patterns of structure and by formal dominance of those above and formal deference of those below. But in action the true locus of power and authority tends toward invisibility, and hierarchy turns into pseudohierarchy.

The second contradiction, in the resolution of which we shall find part of the answer to the first, is that of authoritarianism and dependence. Japanese culture and modal Japanese psychological trends have often been characterized as authoritarian,⁷ and "the greater importance of subordination and respect in the Japanese"⁸ is a common finding. Yet this model of Japanese personality must somehow be reconciled with the "dependence of the senior...upon his juniors" noted by Lifton.

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The third contradiction is on the level of performance. The Japanese organization may be hierarchical or pseudo-hierarchical, and its leaders--and their subordinates--may be authoritarian or dependent. But in neither case would we expect the high degree of capability, flexibility and energy that such organizations are able to bring to bear on the political, economic and social problems of the modern world. With Banfield,⁹ we must recognize the Japanese organizational model as uniquely effective. The source of its effectiveness, and the resolution of this third contradiction, can only be understood when we have reconciled hierarchy with pseudo-hierarchy, and authoritariansim with dependence; in such a way that the structural traits of seepage of authority, recession of decision, and proliferation of faction articulate smoothly with the cultural and psychological traits which form the other side of the psyche-organizational system.

'Niyekawa, Agnes M., "Authoritarianism in an Authoritarian Culture: The Case of Japan," <u>International Journal of Social Psychiatry</u>, vol. 12, no. 4, 1966.

⁸Triandis, Henry C., Tanaka Yasumasa, and Shanmugam, Ankanahalli V., "Interpersonal Attitudes among American, Indian, and Japanese Students," International Journal of Psychology, vol. 1, no. 3, 1966, p. 202.

Vide supra, p. 19.

c. A Systemic Explanation

In order to resolve the contradictions outlined in the preceding section, and to make sense of the Japanese organizational pattern as described, we must interpret these patterns of political behavior in terms of the subjective meaning, conscious or unconscious, they have for the individual, and in terms of their value in satisfying psychological needs. A preliminary outline of that interpretation follows.

The argument of the study will be, first, that the modes of adaptation which are labelled "authoritarian" and "dependent" are not mutually exclusive, but represent alternative reactions to the strains set up by a common pattern of socialization. Of the two reactions, dependence is the prior one, and behavior which appears authoritarian is in essence a means of coping with dependency needs which would otherwise be subjectively threatening. Dependence, furthermore, when it takes shape in action, is not to be construed in unimodal fashion as simply dependence of the senior on the junior--or of the junior on the senior-but of the individual on the group.

This dependence on the group which is a distinguishing trait of the pattern of socialization in question can be further described in terms of four key psychological concerns, nuclear strains or complexes which will appear in our data. These basic concerns, expressed--as they appear in actuality--in bipolar form, are the dilemmas of trust and mistrust; communication and misunderstanding; harmony and dissension; and inclusion or exclusion.

These concerns interact in circular fashion to produce a cyclical pattern of behavior which can be satisfactory or unsatisfactory to the individual, and functional or dysfunctional for the group, depending on certain key existential choices, primary among which is the choice, whether or not to communicate.

The working of this cycle is as follows. Since dependence on the group is a salient need of the individual who is its member, the problem of inclusion or exclusion--being in or being out--becomes a key concern. This concern implies that the group itself must be preserved and maintained at all costs. The primary threat to the existence of the group, however, is internal dissension, or the open expression of aggression within it. So coupled with the individual psychological concern for inclusion or exclusion is an equally strong concern with the problem of harmony or dissension.

This concern means that the open expression of aggression must be strictly proscribed. Here, however, the dilemma of the third nuclear complex enters the cycle. Where open aggression or conflict is banned, frank communication becomes exceedingly difficult. Its difficulty is matched only by its importance for the individual, for one of the distinguishing features of "being in," as opposed to "being out," is that one can communicate frankly and freely: in the ideal case, tacitly.

Where communication is not blocked, then complete mutual trust becomes possible, and the fourth key concern is resolved favorably. But where communication is not possible, the result is endemic mutual distrust. In the one case, the cycle is a completely satisfactory one: inclusion, harmony, communication, trust. The key psychological needs inculcated by the pattern of socialization are all met, and group existence becomes unflawedly euphoric.

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In the other case, where the existential choice is made not to • communicate, the group is permeated gradually with seeds of mutual distrust. Distrust produces dissension, and dissension threatens the existence of the group. Where the group is threatened, inclusion is no longer guaranteed, and the cycle of non-satisfaction of key needs becomes a vicious one.

Why, then, should the choice be made not to communicate? This is the basic flaw--the emblem of original sin, as it were--in the psycheorganization system. The choice not to communicate is made in order to preserve harmony and suppress dissension: in the name of another key value in the set of primary social-psychological concerns.

To this picture of the circular interaction of the nuclear existential dilemmas of the Japanese group, we need add only one other point for the outline to be complete. Dependence of the individual upon the group is the leitmotif of the system; and it is the frustration of this dependence which can produce the strongest currents of aggression and threaten most basically the existence of the group itself.

It is this interlocking pattern of modal psychological needs and the dilemmas of their mutual satisfaction which works, in part, to produce the distinguishing features of the Japanese organizational equilibrium. We will argue that the process is as follows. In order for the group, whose continued existence as the guarantor of basic psychological needs is so important, to be preserved, open dissension, competition, aggression and assertion must be avoided. These factors cannot be eliminated, however, for they are basic features of • human nature. And it is in the competition for power and authority that they emerge most strongly.

The Japanese group, then, develops a characteristic safety device which muffles the drive for power. This safety device is that of pseudo-hierarchy, a formally rigid hierarchical structure which is based not on strength or merit--qualities which would require an aggressively tinged, and therefore threatening, assertion and competition for their demonstration in action--but on seniority. Seniority is arbitrary, and since it is arbitrary, it offends no one, it humiliates no one, and it calls forth no competition for rank and power. The system of promotion by age-grade (nenko-joretsu)¹⁰ is thus a functional and heuristic device to preserve group harmony in the face of threatening dissension in the competition for power.

But age-grade ranking has one serious flaw. It does not always ensure that ability or capacity is matched to authority. The two may often coincide, but there is no guarantee of this. If the organization is to function effectively in the achievement of its goals, then, provision must be made for the informal allocation of authority to levels of the group at which the requisite ability or capacity is to be found. This phenomenon is what we called the seepage of authority.

¹⁰Cf. Abegglen, James C., <u>The Japanese Factory</u>, Glencoe, 1957.

The seepage of authority implies the recession of decision to lower levels of the organization. The other features of the recession of decision syndrome are connected equally organically with the model of organizational equilibrium described: the veiling of actual decisionmaking behind a series of informal meetings with the problems of communication and trust, and the avoidance of precedent--or the insistence upon the "case-by-case" formula--with the fact that the real authority constellation, as opposed to the formal pseudo-hierarchical one, differs from issue to issue.

From the seepage of authority phenomenon follows also the proliferation of faction. The great drawback of pseudo-hierarchy in practical terms is that the actual location of power recedes into invisibility. But where authority is invisible it becomes even more important to locate and grasp it; since the existence of centers of authority, of which the individual is ignorant, is a continual threat. Cliques or factions, then, in their characteristic Japanese organizational form, are instruments to locate--or create--and wield an authority which the reliance upon pseudo-hierarchy leaves floating and unattached. They serve, in addition, as channels of communication in an environment where the possibility or advisability of communication is, as we have seen, a key dilemma.

At this structural level, just as at the individual psychological level, the Japanese organizational equilibrium maintains itself in circular fashion. For the mutual uncertainty produced by the recession of decision, and the veiled competition implicit in the workings of

the factional mechanism, tend toward a climate of hidden mistrust and covert aggressive assertion. But the solution to these problems is harmony, and the device to maintain harmony is, as we have seen, pseudo-hierarchy: which carries in its train the problems to which it represents, in part, a solution.

The following chapters will amplify and substantiate this preliminary model of the workings of the Japanese psycho-organizational equilibrium. Part II presents in greater detail the behavioral patterns of the seepage of authority, the recession of decision, and the proliferation of faction--which are the <u>explicanda</u> of the study--in a variety of historical and institutional settings. Part III sets forth the various explanatory hypotheses, ad hoc, structural, or psychocultural, which have been suggested in the literature. Part IV surveys the data of this study, and links it to the patterns of organizational behavior described. Part V summarizes the findings as to the validity of the hypotheses presented in Part III, evaluates the workings of the system as a whole, and raises the question of the direction, and the motivating factors, of change.

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Part II:

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The Structure of Behavior

"The medieval and the Lutheran traditionalistic ethics of vocation actually rested on a general presupposition ... which both share with the Confucian ethic: that power relationships in both the economic and political spheres have a purely personal character. In these spheres ... a whole organized structure of personal relations of subordination exists which is dominated by caprice and grace, indignation and love, and most of all by the mutual piety of masters and subalterns, after the fashion of the family ... Today, however, the homo politicus, as well as the homo economicus, performs his duty best when he acts without regard to the person in question, <u>sine ira et studio</u>, without hate and grace, but sheerly in accordance with the factual, material responsibility imposed by his calling, and not as a result of any concrete personal relationship."1

Chapter 3: The Seepage of Authority

In this second part of the study the linked phenomena of seepage of authority, recession of decision, and proliferation of faction are examined in more detail. The overall pattern of organizational politics, or the structuring of authority in groups, which is defined by the interplay of these three phenomena, is ubiquitous, long-lasting, and relatively invariant with respect to economic change, the scale of organization, or the nature of the group task. To emphasize this aspect of the nature of Japanese psycho-organizational structure, this chapter, like the two following, draws illustrative material from historical data as well as from the contemporary scene.

Of the three aspects of the syndrome which are our basic concern, the seepage of authority is central, and it is that with which this chapter is concerned.

a. The Historical Roots

The seepage phenomenon appears in various guises at different times and in different contexts, but it is consistently visible as a basic theme of the Japanese political process. The leader who does not wield power personally but validates the acts and decisions of others is a recurrent figure, and the charismatic leader of the classic type is correspondingly rare.

Weber, Max, The Sociology of Religion, trans. Ephraim Fischoff, London, 1965, pp. 234-235.

Since the formal leader in this system does not exercise personal authority, it descends to those who will. Japanese political history from the earliest days presents a kaleidoscopic merry-go-round of the seepage of authority, its gradual evaporation, the founding of new institutions to re-channel its course, and the obsolescence--and occasional rejuvenation--of those institutions. Ambiguity, redundancy, and obscurity are compatible with the system; but it does not tolerate the overly visible concentration of power or the naked and unambiguous ascription of it to a single center.

Hall has stated the thesis in general form thus:

At all levels of the society, power groups normally reverted to the pattern of consensus decision behind the name of a legitimizing authority ... the leader was most often assigned a passive role of merely adding his presence to the debate of policy, legitimizing by his presence the ultimate consensus.²

The prototype of this kind of leadership pattern lies in the imperial institution. From the beginning of the Yamato hegemony in the fourth and fifth centuries the role of the sovereign gradually shifts from the political to the religious, and the functions of government are delegated to subordinates, with ritual functions alone reserved for the formal ruler. This process of delegation is "carried to extraordinary lengths, so that the person who actually exercises power is usually many stages removed from the theoretical source of authority."³

²Hall, John Whitney, "A Monarch for Modern Japan," <u>Political Development</u> <u>in Modern Japan</u>, Princeton, 1968, p. 27.

³Morris, Ivan, <u>The World of the Shining Prince: Court Life in Ancient</u> Japan, New York, 1964, p. 43.

During the period from the eighth to the thirteenth century the workings of this process of delegation, coupled with a sort of historical piety and extreme conservatism of political form, which threw out no administrative furniture but relegated it to the attic for re-use when needed, created a graphic record of the seepage of authority in the central government.

As a first step the institution of the regency was established in the case of minor, female, or incompetent emperors. The office of the regent became gradually a monopoly of the powerful Fujiwara clan, which exercised covert authority through the provision of wives, fathers-inlaw, uncles, and grandfathers to the imperial family. The institution of the regency was supplemented by the office of "civil dictator" (kanpaku), which was also a Fujiwara perquisite.

As Fujiwara power waned, the imperial family recovered some of its authority by the device of the Ex-sovereign's Private Secretariat. This informal structure allowed a retired emperor to bypass, first, the originally instituted Chinese-style hierarchy of officials, which held theoretical administrative power, and second, the Fujiwara devices of the regency and the civil dictatorship. This informal mechanism "allowed the effective ruler to bypass the complex lines of authority called for in the regular structure and to make his decisions known through the intermediation of men with closer personal ties to himself."⁴

Webb, Herschel, The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period, New York, 1968, pp. 41-42.

The process of seepage of authority prevented the stable institutionalization of power in one place, however, whether emperor, regent, civil dictator, or ex-emperor. The rising military class in the provinces gradually took control of affairs which had been let go by the center, and this arrogation of authority was legitimized in the title and institution of Supreme Military Commander (shogun). But the shogun, too, delegated his authority, and in 1213 the office of regent for the shogun was created. During the centuries-long process of seepage of authority, none of the intermediary institutions had been abrogated, however; so that the Hojo family, which monopolized the office of regent for the shogun, held power as the final link in a five-fold chain of delegation.⁵

The period following the Hojo shogunal regency and before the establishment of the Tokugawa hegemony in the seventeenth century was one of internecine war and administrative chaos, as the process of formal delegation of authority could not keep pace with shifts in effective power. It was this period which saw the coining of the phrase "lower dominates upper" (gekokujo) to describe the arrogation of authority to themselves by formal subordinates without formal validation. The same process, however, albeit "legitimated" as in the cycle emperor--regent--civil dictator-- ex-emperor--shogun--shogunal regent of the preceding centuries, forms a general tendency throughout Japanese political history.

⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 44-45.

With the stabilization of the political system under Tokugawa rule, the arrogation to themselves of initiative by subordinates took less violent form, but the shogun, originally the recipient of authority delegated by the imperial court, succumbed to the same phenomenon of the seepage of authority.

The shogun was the chief titular official, but he was gradually enmeshed by a rigid framework of etiquette and forms of consultation. Designed to ensure his safety, these forms finished by restricting his effective communication to the ladies of the court and to purely official pro forma meetings with his chief advisers. Thus the advisers gradually began to monoplize power for themselves. As soon as fifty years after the establishment of the shogunate, "vassal ... officials gradually discovered that they could effectively manage affairs with de facto power located securely among themselves. They no longer assumed that only the Tokugawa lord could make major decisions for the Tokugawa house."⁶ Thus decisions were generally made at inferior levels and presented to the shogun, as he himself presented them to the emperor, only for ratification.⁷

During the Tokugawa regime the imperial court was not exempt from the same phenomenon of seepage. It might be assumed that, since the court as an institution had already delegated almost all of its powers to the shogunate, there would remain little enough real power therein to measure or contend for. This was not the case.

⁶Totman, Conrad D., <u>Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu 1600-184</u>3, Cambridge, Mass., 1967, p. 236.

Webb, op. cit., pp. 227-228.

What little authority remained in the imperial court escaped from the hands of the emperor to those of his subordinate advisers, just as the shogun's powers, "delegated" by the emperor and his court, escaped from him to his advisers. The imperial advisers, during this period, decided upon abdications and successions, the sovereigns acquiescing willingly or unwillingly. The emperor was "one of a group [the court] whose collective power was far greater than that of any single member of it,"⁸ including himself.

As the Tokugawa political system dragged out its life to its end in the turbulent decades of the 1850's and 1860's, the gekokujo phenomenon, domination of superior by subordinate, became more marked. The arrogation of initiative by formal inferiors spread deeper down within the shogunate and wider out into the vassal fiefs. The last years of the period were ones of a "striking insubordination of vassals ... who knew what was good for their lord's house and provinces, regardless of what he might think himself."⁹

After the collapse of the Tokugawa regime in the face of the threat from abroad symbolized by the American demand for commercial treaties, a new generation of men grasped the reins of government. It might be supposed that these men-the Meiji oligarchs--so recently sprung from relative obscurity themselves, would have resisted the tendency to the erosion of power in the direction of their subordinates. But this does not appear to have been the case. Their leadership was never a rule of

⁹Jansen, Marius B., "Tokugawa and Modern Japan," in Hall, J.W. and Jansen, M.B., eds., <u>Studies in the Institutional History of Early</u> Modern Japan, 1868-1900, Princeton, 1968, p. 355.

⁸<u>Ibid</u>., p. 123.

strong charismatic leaders, but was collegiate and group-oriented. The "strong-man political organization...characteristic of many of the emerging states of our time"¹⁰ never made its appearance.

The Meiji oligarchs followed the culturally determined pattern and •gathered around themselves stables of advisers on whom they could rely for advice, support and initiative. During the years of reform and innovation in the late nineteenth century it was claimed--admittedly by those in subordinate positions--that "the ministers-councillors were mere figureheads. Although they talked importantly, they were not really great. The secretaries below them were important and were arbitrarily manipulating the ministers-councillors as puppets."¹¹

With the popular unrest which followed the failure of the parliamentary governments of the early twentieth century to cope with new economic and social problems, the military and the radical nationalist groups moyed toward a seizure of power. In both sorts of group authoritarian patterns of dominance should have curbed to some extent the tendency toward the seepage of authority. The traditional patterns of leadership, however, were stronger than the authoritarian sub-cultural norms, and this did not occur.

The radical nationalist patriotic societies had no effective pattern of hierarchical authority and their leaders were unable to establish a firm dominance. "The failure of authority in Japanese patriotic

¹⁰Scalapino, R.A., "Elections and Political Modernization in Prewar Japan," in Ward, ed., <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 272.

11 Ozaki Yukio, quoted in Akita, George, <u>Foundations of Constitutional</u> <u>Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900</u>, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, p. 43.

societies, compared with their inability to band together, seems a crucial weakness,"¹² in comparison to similar groups in other cultures. In the military, too, the tendency toward subordinate manipulation of superior grew in intensity:

The Showa emperor of the 1930's ... was dismissed and ignored by young men who knew what was good for Japan, whether he himself did or did not, just as their grandfathers and great-grandfathers had ignored their daimyo in the 1860's.13

It was not only the emperor who was dismissed and ignored but also officers directly superior in the military chain of command. The outbreak of the Manchurian incident in September of 1931, in which the commanding general of the Kwantung Army yielded to the informal pressure of a group of determined officers much inferior to him in rank, and agreed to disregard orders from Tokyo not to extend the area of conflict, was only the first in a series of incidents in which the phenomenon of seepage of authority appeared to full advantage in a mostunlikely context.¹⁴

The politics of Japan's totalitarian period present the anomalous spectacle of a formally authoritarian and hierarchical structure in which, however, no single individual can be said to be the leader. Authority has seeped downwards through the administrative framework until it has become diffuse and invisible, at the disposal of whoever can grasp and focus it for any given issue.

¹²Wilson, George M., <u>Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883-1937</u>, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, p. 107.

¹³Jansen, M.B., op. cit., p. 325.

¹⁴Cf. Ogata, Sadako N., <u>Defiance in Manchuria: the Making of Japanese</u> Foreign Policy, <u>1931-1932</u>, Berkeley, 1964, pp. 63-65.

Maruyama, describing the patterns of power-use during this period, coined the concept of the "Japanese dwarfing" (washosei) of authority. This idea describes what Maruyama found to be a culturally specific pattern among Japanese leaders: they are not "free decision-making agents"¹⁵ but rather "pathetic robots, manipulated by outlaws...on whom " they looked down from the height of their position."¹⁶ They accept their role as leader but for them it does not include the imperative to rule: they are "unconscious of being oligarchs or despots."^{17.} In individual psychological terms they are "vitiated by a sort of nervous debility...and the keynote of their personalities [is] a sense of inferiority."¹⁸

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The combination of a cultural pattern pressing toward seepage of authority and a specific set of attitudes among leaders which reinforces and meshes with the cultural pattern produced, not only in totalitarian .Japan of the 1930's and 1940's, but in earlier Japanese history, a situation where authority, in Maruyama's metaphor, is like the portable shrine (omikoshi) carried down the streets at a Shinto festival. Tossing and rocking erratically on the shoulders of the dancing mob, its movement becomes the resultant of many different and anonymous forces. This pattern, rooted in Japanese cultural history, remains extant in the modern organization.

¹⁵Maruyama Masao, "Theory and Psychology of Ultra-nationalism," in Maruyama, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 16.

¹⁶Maruyama Masao, "Thought and Behavior Patterns of Japan's Wartime Leaders," in Maruyama, op. cit., p. 92.

17_{Ibid}., p. 16.

18_{Ibid}., p. 96.

b. The Seepage Phenomenon in the Modern World

The image of rational bureaucratic administration postulated by Max Weber has acquired a tremendous weight of evaluative assent in modern organization. It is seen not only as inevitable but as desirable. It is surprising to see any other pattern in modern society, and even more surprising to see another pattern work. In the various organized groups which wield power in modern Japan, however, the pattern described in the first part of this chapter remains a basic psycho-organizational theme.

Political parties, for example, seem to follow the standard pattern. Decision-making authority is delegated formally or informally by the chairman to key subordinate levels, and the chairman alone is never expected to take a unilateral action. Not only does he not take unilateral action, he does not even suggest it publicly unless and until he has obtained the unanimous consent of his immediate subordinates in the party organization.¹⁹

In private organizations the same pattern is said to hold true. In the modern business world "the leader...is not a strong individual directing and inspiring the group to achieve objectives he himself has set... Rather, his main function is to create a proper atmosphere for the group's achieving its objectives."²⁰ In a cross-cultural survey of executives and administrators of large organizations, the attitudes of

¹⁹ Thayer, Nathaniel B., <u>How the Conservatives Rule Japan</u>, Princeton, 1969, p. 218.

²⁰Yoshino, M., Japan's Managerial System: Tradition and Innovation, Cambridge, 1969, p. 205.

the Japanese respondents were found to be distinguished from those of others "almost uniformly in the direction of a more liberal position,"²¹ away from the individual assertion of the forceful leader and toward a pattern of permissive delegation of authority.

The power available to lower levels of the organization is thus informally amplified. But the formal hierarchy remains intact. The subordinate has true initiating capacity in the decision-making process, but he must "allow it to appear that the final solution was what the superior first proposed."²²

Subjective attitudes toward the problem of the continued existence of the gekokujo (lower dominates upper) phenomenon in the modern organization differ with the respondent's rank. Lower- and middle-level administrators, in our interviews, consistently referred to their superiors as figureheads: superfluous headgear (shappo, from the French chapeau) or "decoration" (kazarimono). Upper-level respondents did not share these attitudes.

One respondent, a section chief (kacho), emphasized the necessity of dealing with subordinates rather than their superiors in order to get things done:

If you want, for example, to make a technological licensing agreement, you must find out the identity of the man in the other organization who will decide on it and determine your success or failure. If you go to the head of the planning department or the technical

²¹Haire, Mason, Ghiselli, Edwin E., and Potter, Lyman W., "Cultural Patterns in the Role of the Manager," in Webber, Ross A., ed., <u>Culture</u> and <u>Management: Text and Readings in Comparative Management</u>, Homewood, 111., p. 332.

²²Dore, R. P., <u>City Life in Japan: A Study of a Tokyo Ward</u>, Berkeley, 1958, p. 209. department, as likely as not he will put the proposal in his desk and sit on it for a year. You must find the one among his five or six immediate subordinates who is capable of making a reasonable and informed decision on the problem.

Naturally this subordinate wants to cut a brilliant figure, so he will push it through even if he has to go around or over his own nominal superior.

Another respondent emphasized the feeling among the lower and middle levels of organization that it was their duty, for the good of the company, to take over functions which nominally belonged to men of higher rank:

It depends entirely on the individual in the subordinate post how far he will stretch the bounds of his authority. He can expand his turf (sono nawabari o hirogeru) just as far as he is able. I know a case where the junior executives of a big firm had developed on their own a longterm plan covering all future growth and investment policies.

They did not consult the president of the firm because, they said, he would retire soon and had no reason to be concerned with such plans. They themselves would be with the organization for the next twenty or thirty years, and so long-term planning was their proper duty and responsibility.

Formal leaders interviewed did not speak in such extreme terms. They spoke of delegation of authority, even to a very liberal extent, as an effective managerial device, but they did not see their authority as eroded thereby. Some leaders said that in fact they were not really giving carte blanche to their subordinates in the planning process, but were simply using a style of leadership in which the subordinate does not receive explicit orders or directives but must guess the leader's real intentions and desires by tiny clues. One respondent

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called this process "konseki ni shido suru," "guidance by evidence or traces." The skill that the subordinate is said to learn, that of embodying the leader's unstated wishes in his own actions, was called by others, "i o tai suru"--to give flesh and body to the superior's intent.

This process of guiding by infinitesimal and unstated clues or hints, inasmuch as it is practiced, must in actuality, whatever its intention, open the way for effective subordinate arrogation of power; since any failure in communication--and the opportunities for such failure would appear to be great--removes from the leader his initiative and transfers it to the subordinate who has failed, intentionally or unintentionally, to understand the "traces" offered.

Indeed, failure in communication appears to be one of the factors which contributes heavily to the isolation and consequent loss of authority in real terms of the formal leader. Some men in positions of organizational responsibility endeavor to circumvent the difficulties of getting accurate information by establishing one of their trusted subordinates in the role of nyobo-yaku, or "wife-figure." The most important function of the wife-figure is to serve as an information pipeline, to inform the leader of what is going on inside the organization at the lower levels where policy may be in process of originating.

The institution of the nyobo-yaku thus in part helps to redress the balance of power between top and bottom. But in the use of this device the leader who tries to shore up his power against the cultural strain toward seepage of authority has not succeeded in stopping that

seepage; he has only channeled it. He has delegated some of his authority to one or more subordinates whom he feels he can trust, while trying to avoid handing it over to his subordinates in general. In the modern organization superiors and subordinates, leaders and followers, while seeing the problem from diametrically opposed attitudes, and providing quite different rationales to explain or justify their behavior, agree with outside observers that the phenomenon we called seepage of authority is a characteristic trait of their working environment. A closely linked corollary of the seepage of authority process is the recession of decision; and this will be examined in the next chapter.

Chapter 4: The Recession of Decision

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In one sense the recession of decision is a direct consequence, and simply a re-statement in another form, of the seepage of authority. Decisions are not made at the level which is formally empowered to make them, but are effectively hammered out at lower levels first, and ratified later by higher levels. But the concept of "recession of decision" is broader, and linked in more complex ways to the psyche-organization system overall, than this one aspect suggests.

By the recession of decision phenomenon we mean a system of decision-making which includes the following characteristics. Official decisions tend to be formal, and are always preceded by a series of informal and only tacitly recognized preliminary conferences, usually at lower levels of authority. Open conflict must not appear in the process of decision-making, and all decisions must appear unanimous. There are no rules or precedents governing a given decision, but eachproblem must be settled in vacuo, according to the configuration of interest and power which defines that particular case.

These aspects of the recession of decision combine to make prediction of the outcome of any bargain or compromise very difficult. Because decisions recede from the levels formally empowered to make them, it is impossible to predict who will make them. Because decisions recede from rules or precedents, it is impossible to predict the general framework of a settlement by past performances. Because decisions recede from open conflict, in the direction of a formal unanimity, it is impossible to predict the outcome by gauging majority-minority sentiment. This chapter examines these aspects of the recession phenomenon more closely. We consider first the general phenomenon, with some background material from historical and sociological data; we then examine related phenomena in the world of the modern organization; and finally we analyze the decision-making process as it is formalized in some bureaucratic organizations, regarding this particular process, "ringi-sei," as the modern institutional crystallization of the recession of decision pattern.

a. The Historical and Sociological Roots

At the most basic level the traditional Japanese system of decisionmaking is exemplified in the village meeting, the "yoriai," Open difference of opinion does not appear at such yoriai. The formal process of decision here has been characterized as

recommendation and consensus (suisen-iginashi). After a seemingly endless and somewhat indirect discussion, a recommendation, supposedly embodying the consensus of the group, is made and in the absence of objections adopted. The raising of objections would be improper as an indication of a breakdown of group solidarity.¹

At the yoriai level no objections are raised to the "consensus"; but his does not mean the matter has not been discussed beforehand. The requirement of silence does not extend to informal preliminary meetings. These informal preliminary meetings ("shita-sodan" or "nemawashi") constitute an indispensable part of the decision-making process:

¹Steiner, Kurt, "Popular Political Participation and Political Development in Japan: the Rural Level," in Ward, ed., <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 243. Solidarity is reinforced by the ubiquitous Japanese practice of holding elaborate private discussions and negotiations before permitting a matter of any importance to reach the stage of public consideration. The intent of such informal preliminary conversations is, of course, to prearrange an attitude or solution acceptable to all or most of the parties concerned.²

Ishida³ has argued that the demand for harmonious unanimity means that minority opinion is "psychologically forced" to keep silent. This is true at the stage of final ratification, but not at the preliminary stage.

This point was clarified during the process of translation of the Managerial Attitudes Questionnaire. Question five of Part IV dealt with the members of a bureaucratic group whose new chief made unreasonable demands on the members. In the original English, "the members of the group decide to organize a slowdown; but one man feels the complaint is not justified and refuses to join."

This situation puzzled the Japanese advisers on translation. How could "the members of the group" decide if one man held out? Here the influence of cultural bias came visibly to the fore. Reading the English text one assumes that the group discussed the problem and then held some sort of an informal vote in which the majority favored a slowdown, and the minority consisted of the holdout who felt the complaint

²Beardsley, Richard K., Hall, John W., and Ward, Robert E., <u>Village</u> Japan, Chicago, 1959, p. 369.

³Ishida Takeshi, "Thé Development of Interest Groups and the Pattern of Political Modernization in Japan," in Ward, ed.,<u>op. cit</u>., p. 321 (note).

was not justified. In terms of unconsciously held non-Japanese cultural assumptions, the question was then settled: the majority rules.

But in the Japanese group these assumptions do not hold. The group does not "decide" until everyone expresses consent or at least lack of opposition. Anything else is an abuse of power, or "the tyranny of the majority," as it has sometimes been called by the minority parties in the Diet.

In the Japanese context of decision-making the unanimous vote (suisen iginashi or manjo-itchi) does not necessarily express covert compulsion or lack of free choice. The requirement of unanimity can give the holdout tremendous leverage. As long as he sticks to his position, nothing can be done. This does not mean that there is not great pressure on him to go along with an emerging consensus. When he does accede to the sense of the group, however, he can exact a quid pro quo either in the case at hand or in the next.

This balancing of individual interests and relative power in the process of arriving at a consensus which can be affirmed unanimously means that the universalistic law, the "rule" or "precedent," must be eschewed because its generalities can never be sufficiently finely attuned to the circumstances of particular cases. The "law" of such situations is not judicial but cultural, and its precept is that particular solutions must reflect particular configurations of power and interest. Only thus are they "correct." Thus the process of bargaining or negotiation consists in large part of the mutual ascertainment of the balance of power and interest, by processes of long-drawn out maneuver,

bluff, threat and counter-threat, and informal communication; all of which must be covert, since the basic rule is that conflict must not appear on the surface.

In accordance with this principle disputes in Japan are rarely entrusted to the courts, but more often to a go-between (nakodo or nakadachi), who can assist in establishing a sufficiently delicate compromise to satisfy both parties. But the go-between should not "make any clearcut decision on who is right or wrong or inquire into the existence and scope of the rights of the parties."⁴

Key features in the recession of decision phenomenon, then, are the avoidance of open conflict, the demand for unanimity, and the preference for case-by-case solutions. These factors are not restricted to the process of decision-making at the village-level yoriai, but function in the process of bureaucratic decision as well. The historical roots of this syndrome go deep; a good example of the system in action is found in the shogunate bureaucracy of the eighteenth century.

The recession phenomenon in the shogunate is linked organically with the absence of a strong central locus of authority. The seepage of authority in the Tokugawa bureaucratic machine led to an endemic but muffled competition for covert power among leading officials, and one solution to this problem was found in the elimination of a fixed identity of office and man. Most positions were not the perquisite of a

⁴ Kawashima Takeyoshi, "Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan," in von Mehren, ed., <u>Law in Japan: the Legal Order in a Changing Society</u>, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 48.

single individual but were held jointly by two or more people who rotated in office at monthly intervals. This system was instituted, according to Ogyu Sorai, the contemporary political philosopher, "because it was feared that one officer might dominate his fellows or that .each officer might hold to his own opinion and become estranged from his colleagues."⁵

Here a jealous concern that rivals might grasp the levers of decision--a concern which is a direct result of the seepage of authority phenomenon, and which we will examine in more detail in the next chapter on factionalism--led inevitably to a kind of institutionalization of the recession of decision. The "tsukiban" system of monthly rotation of office seriously restricted the use of initiative or the acceptance of responsibility at all levels... As a result there inevitably developed within the administration a tendency toward behind-the-scenes manipulation."⁶

This tendency toward "behind-the-scenes manipulation," which is one of the facets of the recession of decision, is linked causally with the seepage of authority phenomenon and with its other corollary, the proliferation of faction and the undercover competition for informal power.

So the Tokugawa bureaucratic senior officials, constrained by their mutual jealous competition for the power left floating free by the seepage of authority, instituted a system which had as one of its effects

⁵McEwen, J.R., <u>The Political Writings of Ogyu Sorai</u>, Cambridge, 1962, p. 88.

⁶Hall, J.W., <u>Tanuma Okitsugu, 1719-1788</u>: Forerunner of Modern Japan, Cambridge, Mass., 1955, p. 33.

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the seepage of their own authority away and down to their own subordinates. The function of the Japanese leader as "group representative" or "liaison officer"⁷ still remained to them in part. But this function, too, was compromised in the recession of decision syndrome, since the liaison activity essential to the pattern of preliminary informal bargaining conferences was more easily and effectively performed by the lower level officials. Official channels, given the cultural stress on secrecy and informality, were too stiff and formal, and rank and status debarred high officials from personal participation in the process. Thus it was the "immense network of informal, personal ties between han vassals, which provided the chief means of transmitting really significant political information."⁸

In this system where decisions must rest on consensus--no one may "dominate his fellows" or "hold to his own opinion"--where precedent or law is irrelevant, where open disagreement is precluded, and real bargaining takes place covertly at inferior levels of rank, routine decision-making is handled well but crisis decision-making is often impossible or erratic.

The classic case of inability to reach decision in a crisis is that of Odawara, which gives the Japanese language its name for a conference with no outcome: an "Odawara conference" (odawara-hyojo). In

⁷Beardsley, R.K., Hall, J.W., and Ward, R.E., <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 357.
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Totman, <u>op. ci</u>t., p. 108.

1590 the Hojo lords (traditional holders of the office of shogunal regent mentioned above on page 40) were faced with the problem of whether to resist or submit to Hideyoshi, whose conquests laid the groundwork for the Tokugawa hegemony. It was impossible to reach a decision: Odawara was taken and the Hojo crushed.

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In 1858, similarly, the imperial court was unable to come to any decision on the question of acceptance of the American consular and

trade treaty: ,

A common pattern of Japanese group behavior in situations such as this is to make no decision either way but to temporize, hoping that later developments will suggest a way out... When the shogunate put the American treaty in effect...the Emperor had not given his assent to it, but neither had he definitely declared it to be unacceptable.⁹

In cases such as these decision recedes into non-existence. But no decision, in some cases, is better than an ill-considered one. A crisis decision which the pattern of recession of decision made erratic and dysfunctional was the choice of the military leadership to involve the United States in the Pacific War. Hosoya stresses the unpredictability of this choice by rational criteria:

[The U.S. leaders] in predicting Japan's reactions thought chiefly in terms of the reactions of the political leadership ... They had an exceedingly inadequate understanding of the important role played by the middle

⁹Webb, <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 242-243.

echelon military officers in the course of Japanese foreign policy decision-making at this time... [They] concluded that in the light of the disparity of strength...Japanese decision-makers ...could not conceivably decide on war. In this regard they made the mistake of applying to the Japanese in unaltered form the western model of the decision-making process and the conception of rationalistic behavior.10 64.

b. Recession of Decision in the Modern World

The elements of formal unanimity, secrecy, avoidance of open conflict, avoidance of precedent, and reliance on subordinate levels for communication and bargaining, which constitute the recession of decision syndrome, are not confined to the village yoriai, the eighteenth century shogunal bureaucracy, or the military leadership of Japan's totalitarian period. Representing, as they do, a working compromise between individual psychological needs, cultural precepts, and behavioral or structural forms, all these elements are found in contemporary organizational life.

The process of decision-making in political parties, for example, is said to be characterized by these factors. In the ruling Japanese conservative party the party conference is an institution the primary function of which is ratification of decisions previously agreed upon, rather than real debate on real issues. Nothing can be placed on the agenda of such a conference unless it has been discussed previously in informal conferences and sub-conferences (shita-sodan) by all those most

^{10&}lt;sub>Hosoya Chihiro,</sub> "Miscalculations in Deterrent Policy in Japanese-U.S. Relations 1938-1941," <u>Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics</u>, vol. 6, April, 1963, pp. 45-46.

directly concerned.¹¹ If the process of "trimming the roots" (nemawashi) by which all parties are delicately sounded out in advance has been foregone, and a matter is brought up without informal advance preparation, "it will be turned down; it must be decided elsewhere and then "brought to the council."¹²

The mutual relations of modern Japanese pressure groups, and their relations with the parties and the bureaucracy, are also characterized by the difficulties in decision-making and bargaining which the recession of decision syndrome carries with it. In this case it is the contradiction between real and objective conflict of interest and the ban on the open appearance of conflict which hinders compromise. Thus Ishida points out that "conflict has been characterized by a lack of coordination through discussion," and that negotiation is carried out "without serious discussions on important issues"; a primary difficulty in the process of accommodation among pressure groups is thus "the lack of rational coordination through discussion."¹³

Among groups whose interests are not in basic conflict but are capable of being harmonized, the process of bargaining and compromise can be carried out effectively within the recession of decision syndrome. A case in point is the relationship among the large Japanese city banks and the Bank of Japan.

¹¹Thayer, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 246.
 ¹²<u>Ibid</u>., p. 295.
 ¹³Ishida Takeshi, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 298.

The Bank of Japan, in its effort to control the workings of the money market, does not rely primarily on the bank rate or the purchase and sale of government securities in the open market. It makes use, rather, of an informal strategy of control known as "window guidance," by which it rations the amount of borrowing it allows to each of the city banks. The scope allowed to each of the client banks is the result of a process of complicated and informal negotiation, without legal or statutory backing. But the process avoids open conflict and the setting of precedent, while it ensures a formal unanimity or agreement between all the partners to the informal adjustment.¹⁴ The recession of decision pattern, routinized and essentially non-crisis oriented in this particular setting at the apex of the monetary-financial world, operates functionally.

Where a governmental bureaucracy deals with its institutional clients, whose interests are essentially similar to each other's and to its own--as in the central bank case--recession of decision creates no problems. Where the interests of the bureaucratic unit and its clientele differ, the recession of decision pattern eventuates in a vagueness about authority, responsibility, and the locus of decision which can be not only frustrating to the clientele but dysfunctional for the bureaucracy. Minami sees the evasion of responsibility as deliberate:

¹⁴Cf. Patrick, Hugh, <u>Monetary Policy and Central Banking in Contemporary</u> <u>Japan</u>, Bombay, 1962; and Patrick, Hugh, "Japan's Interest Rates and the 'Grey' Financial Market," <u>Pacific Affairs</u>, vol. 38, no.3-4, pp. 326-344.

It is almost appropriate to say that an official's ability is equivalent to his ability to evade responsibility.

The superior evades responsibility by saying, 'That's up to my subordinates,' or 'I'll take it up with the people concerned'; the subordinate evades responsibility by saying, 'I'm waiting for my superior's decision,' or 'I'm only an administrative official and can't give a responsible answer.'¹⁵

But the fit of individual psychology and the decision-making form here is such that the inability to fix responsibility must be ascribed at least as much to the recession of decision syndrome itself as to the individual's willingness or unwillingness to take responsibility: which, given the system, he could not honestly even if he would.

In the modern organization as in the feudal bureaucracy of Tokugawa times the stress on the informal, tentative and covert nature of the negotiating process throws the responsibility for such negotiation on subordinate levels. A sub-section chief (kakaricho) in a government agency, when interviewed, explained the necessity for the practice in terms of relative flexibility and the requirements of prestige:

Everything must be arranged in advance at the lower levels because group prestige (taimen) will be injured if the leaders bargain openly and unsuccessfully. We are the communications specialists because, having no formal authority, we have nothing to lose. Our supervisors are not so flexible, so they have to depend on us and trust us in this area.

If they try to work out a bargain on their own they are likely to fail. In the cases where negotiations fall through, the reason is usually that the preliminary consultations were not good (nemawashi ga mazukatta).

¹⁵Minami Hiroshi, <u>Nihonjin no Shinri</u> (The Psychology of the Japanese), Tokyo, Iwanami, 1953, p. 210. In business, bureaucracy and politics the constraints of the recession of decision pattern bring about a situation in which "organization charts are of little use in showing how most important decisions are reached"¹⁶; decision-making is the resultant of "indirect and circuitous pipelines of power"¹⁷ and "extensive and complicated interpersonal relationships."¹⁸

c. The Ringi System

The related phenomena of seepage of authority and recession of decision are crystallized in institutional form in the modern administrative device of "ringi-sei," or the ringi system of decision-making. The ringi system, literally the process of humble inquiry about a superior's intentions, is found in both business and government, although it is not ubiquitous, and is probably becoming less common.

In the ringi system of decision-making a policy document is drafted for the first time at the lowest levels of the organization by the subleader at the extreme end of the chain of command (the "mattan-rida"). This document is then considered separately by the officials of all the sections of the organization which are concerned with the subject at issue. The document travels through the organization in such a fashion that it is not seen by any official at any given level of rank until all his direct subordinates have seen it first.

¹⁶Yanaga, Chitoshi, <u>Big Business in Janapese Politics</u>, New Haven, 1968, pp. 307-308.

17_{Loc. cit}.

18_{Loc. cit}.

The ringisho, or policy document, gathers the seals of approval of each official concerned as it moves through the organization. It is never, however, the subject of a formal conference of all the officials concerned.

If the policy suggested in the ringisho is approved by all the officials who have examined it, it comes to the top levels of the organization with seals of approval from each official. It then represents a consensus of opinion which the men at the top would find it difficult to veto.

If a given official disagrees with some of the provisions of the document, he may send it back to its origin with a suggestion for redrafting, or he may simply let it sit in his desk, as a form of unvoiced signal of opposition.

But this should not be necessary, as the ringi system is, in itself, merely a formality to ratify a policy decision previously taken informally. It is "cleanup work" (ato no shoku), in the words of one respondent.

The real business of making policy starts with the process of sounding out the people concerned informally, with "nemawashi." A section-chief (kacho) described this process in one interview:

What you want is to prepare the proper climate of opinion, so that when you voice a new policy openly it will receive a favorable reception. You have to talk to the people who might be concerned and ascertain very subtly how they might feel about the step, without actually committing yourself openly to it. Maybe you can get them started thinking along your own lines without giving them the feeling that you are exerting pressure on them. You go through this process of 'roottrimming' so that the tree will blossom more beautifully later.

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Next comes the process of informal planning conferences (sodan and shita-sodan). First the lower-level initiator of policy toaks to his colleagues on an equal level: "What do you think about this?" ("Kimi wa do omou ka?"). Then he talks to his immediate superior: "What's your opinion of this proposal, sir?" ("Kacho-san wa do omoimasu ka?").

Some respondents argued that conferences were only necessary across sub-groups, not within them. One respondent, a division chief, said, "We don't need conferences in my division because everyone already knows what everyone else thinks." This respondent outlined the total process as follows:

First my staff prepare a plan and present it to me. Then they check it out with the other departments concerned at the subordinate level. After they have smoothed the way, I confer with the other department heads. If there is any objection from anyone in this process, then the plan is no good. We then prepare a new plan, going through the same steps. We only prepare a <u>ringisho</u> when all this has been completed.

The primary requisite of this preliminary consultative process is that everyone who ought to be consulted is consulted. Another respondent, director of a government agency, emphasized the wide range of the category, "ought to be consulted":

> The real problem is to be sure what can be done by an individual on his own. One tends to define the scope of his authority on the basis of what one thinks others think it is. Because the formal situation is so fluid, one is never sure how far one can go and what one can get away with. So a conference is usually necessary. Who needs to participate? Almost everyone,

since you can injure your effectiveness drastically by leaving out someone who thinks he should have been brought in. If you hurt someone's feelings like this then you are in trouble.

The sensitivity to personal factors expressed in this description is a key element in the ringi process and in the recession of decision syndrome generally. The rational effectiveness of a policy must be balanced off against its workability in terms of personal relations and personal interests. Personal prides, jealousies, animosities, and sensitivities make the process of communication and successful negotiation difficult.

It is because of these sensitivities that the preliminary negotiating process veils itself in obscurity. When, however, this preliminary stage has been successfully completed, and the ringisho is finally drawn up, the policy embodied in it is one with which it is very difficult to take issue.

The ringi system by its nature produces policies which are acceptable to all and offensive to none ("atari-sawari no nai"). It is very difficult for administrators at higher levels to question an "atarisawari no nai" consensus. The ringisho embodies the best compromise available under the circumstances, and is thus an artifact with which the formal leader will be reluctant to tamper. It is quite possible, indeed, that no other policy compromise is possible at all.

In addition, the formal leader in the bureaucratic organization is relatively unfamiliar not only with the problems of implementation of policy on the operating level, but also with the other "personal"

circumstances involved. He is not helped by the fact that the ringi format militates against the consideration of clear alternatives. It presents a consensus policy not as one of a set of alternate choices but as the best course in general under the given circumstances, the circumstances being occasionally unspecified.

Thus the seal of the president, director, or bureau chief on the ringi document is a formality; just as is the ringi process itself. The real decisions have been made as the joint product of a series of informal discussions among those without the formal authority to make binding decisions.

Upper-level administrators interviewed tended to deny, however, that the system gave undue power to their subordinates. They praised it as functional, in much the same way they evaluated the system of "non-directive leadership."¹⁹

One respondent, a company president, said that the job of drafting ringi-sho and suggesting policy was given to junior people in order to give them practical experience and to give their superiors a basis for evaluation of their performance. Another praised the system on the grounds that it produced the feeling that everyone had a share in management, bringing about a beneficial effect on morale. Another, finally, argued that no policy could be implemented in which "no one who would be responsible for implementing it would have a hand in its formulation."

19 <u>Vide supra</u>, pp. 48-49. But most analysts of the system view such assertions as rationalizations. Tsuji gives an anecdotal illustration of the helplessness of the formal leader:

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A higher civil servant, a friend of mine, once told me that when he thought of a plan or policy he wanted to effect, he could only send it as a mere proposal or item for future reference to the appropriate low-ranking administrator.²⁰

Brown²¹ argues that the ringi system, while formally a centralization of authority, in actual fact "disperses it throughout the enterprise."

Yoshino,²² Noda,²³ and Glazer²⁴ support the view that the ringi system allows the middle levels of the organization to plan, initiate, coordinate, consult, and implement with only formal referral to the holders of superior positions in the Japanese organizational pseudohierarchy.

²⁰Tsuji Kiyoaki, "Decision-making in the Japanese Government: a Study of Ringisei," in Ward, ed., <u>op. cit</u>., p. 463.

²¹Brown, William, Japanese Management: the Cultural Background," in Webber, ed., <u>op. cit</u>, p. 436; quoting Yoshino Yotaro, "Soto kara Mita Nihonteki Keiei" (Japanese Management as Seen from Outside), <u>Bessatsu</u> Chuo Koron: Keiei Mondai, 1964, p. 8.

²²Yoshino, M., <u>op. cit</u>., p. 257.

²³Noda Kazuo, "Traditionalism in Japanese Management," <u>Rikkyo Daigaku</u> <u>Shakaigakubu Kenkyu Kiyo, Oyo Shakaigaku Kenkyu</u>, no. 6, special volume, Tokyo, 1963, p. 166.

²⁴Noda K., and Glazer, H., "Traditional Japanese Management: Decisionmaking," Management International Review, 1968, 2/3, p. 129.

And Nakane states flatly that

...in the so-called 'ringi-sei' ... the conceptions of the people at the top are not imposed on those below, but on the contrary the opinions of those below are submitted to the top and gotten adopted ... If this system is fully adopted ... the man at the top can be a complete fool and no harm is done.25 74:

But Noda points out in addition that although the ringi system appears extraordinary from the point of view of the rationalistic paradigm of administration which is the core of western management and organization theory, it is, given the "ancient and traditional" cultural pattern of Japan, "a virtuous and proper custom of unlimited suitability,"²⁶

It is from this point of view that we want to understand the ringi system and the recession of decision phenomenon generally: as aspects of a total psycho-organizational system which, with their corollaries, the seepage of authority and the proliferation of faction, can only be explained by their interaction with the other aspects, psychological, cultural, and structural, of the systemic equilibrium.

²⁵Nakane Chie, <u>Tate Shakai no Ningen Kankei: Tan'itsu Shakai no Riron</u> (Human Relations in the Vertical Society: the Theory of the Unitary Society), Tokyo, Kodansha, 1967, p. 146.

²⁶Noda Kazuo, <u>Nihon no Juyaku</u>, (Japan's Directors), Tokyo, Daiyamondosha, Tokyo, 1960, p. 119; "... ika ni mo fusawashii bifu na no de aru."

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Chapter 5: The Proliferation of Faction

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The third linked element in the system of behaviors which forms the structural side of the Japanese psycho-organizational syndrome is the proliferation of faction. By this is meant a tendency, deep-rooted and apparently ubiquitous in the Japanese group, toward division into competing cliques organized along vertical lines and based on strong emotional bonds between clique members. Factions are of course most readily visible in the political world, but in Japanese society they appear to play a significant role not only in politics but also in organized groups of whatever character: economic, bureaucratic, artistic, academic or criminal. The criterion for factional membership may be birth or physical relationship; common geographical origin (as in the fief-cliques or "hanbatsu" of the Meiji period or the modern birthplace-clique or "kyodobatsu"); common educational background (the "old-school-tie clique," or "gakubatsu"); or any one of a number of common life-historical circumstances. Factions are power-oriented and clash over specific issues, but they are not generally ideologically oriented.

The proliferation of faction is construed as a predominant theme in Japanese social structure in a number of theoretical formulations, of which perhaps the most general are those of Maruyama and Nakane.

¹Morris, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 59; and Scalapino, R.A., and Masumi Junnosuke, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan, Berkeley, 1962, p. 59.

Maruyama uses the images of the "whisk" and the "octopus pot" to characterize two essentially different forms of social organization.² In the whisk pattern the separate social strands are bound together firmly at the base, and separate social sub-groups are linked in such .a way that communication, interaction and mobility are easily possible. In the octopus pot pattern social sub-groupings are discrete and isolated so that communication tends to confine itself to the interior of 'each group rather than across or between groups.

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Japanese societý is of the octopus pot type, and there is a continual tendency, in whatever sphere of life, toward the formation of smaller and smaller, more and more isolated, sub-groupings; and a sharper and sharper distinction between the "ins" and the "outs." At a less extreme stage of the process the octopus pot pattern implies simply a commitment to the organization or the group such that group life swallows up the individual member in an all-embracing net of bonds of care and responsibility. The individual is "completely taken care of" (marugakae).³

At a more advanced stage of the process the organization itself is split into vertical sub-groups or faction which, like their larger, less specialized counterparts, have a strong consciousness of joint membership. This feeling of belonging, and the consequent distinction between the insiders and the outsiders, is carried to such an extent that communication eventually becomes easily possible only among "the pals at

²Maruyama Masao, <u>Nihon no Shiso</u> (Japanese Thought), Tokyo, 1961, Iwanami, p. 129.

Jibid., p. 138.

our place" who can take things for granted and understand each other "without saying anything."⁴

The corollary to this process of the formation of more and more emotionally inclusive factional sub-groups is that each group develops an abiding suspicion of the others. The group or faction that one belongs to oneself, although it may in actuality be relatively powerful, is felt to be weak and at the mercy of its, competitors. The individual and the faction come to see themselves as surrounded or entrapped; this feeling of subjective weakness and the threat from outside the group is what Maruyama calls "the consciousness of being the injured person" (higaisha-ishiki),⁵ and this psychological factor is closely bound up with the factionalization process.

Nakane's formulation, which we shall examine more closely in the next chapter, sees clique formation or "sectionalism" as a necessary consequence of the strength of vertical bonds in a hierarchical or pseudo-hierarchical society. Like Maruyama, she emphasizes the magnitude of the division between insiders and outsiders, and suggests that the element of "being completely taken care of" (marugakae) or "being wrapped up in the 'family'" (kazoku-gurumi) is an important part of the emotional significance of the factional group.⁶

The proliferation of faction, like the other elements in the behavioral syndrome described in the preceding chapters, appears to be a

6. Nakane, op. cit., pp. 45-55.

^{&#}x27;Ibid., p. 140.

^{5.} Ibid., pp. 142-143.

durable and invariant pattern which is not tied to a specific historical period or to a particular economic or technological base.

The politics of Heian period Japan, before the "feudal" period of Japanese history, centered around factional struggles within the inform-.ally ruling Fujiwara family: a "contestant must have a powerful faction at court ... [and] to undermine the rival factions he must be prepared to use almost every method except outright violence."⁷

During the Tokugawa period the faction was the principal device by which bureaucratic policy was made and through which individual careers were advanced.⁸ The faction in feudal bureaucracy, as it has remained in the modern bureaucratic group, was a mutual help society in which factional leaders gained followers on whom they could rely to bolster their own positions, and followers gained leaders who would sponsor their careers.

In the modern world this "most deeply rooted historic form of Japanese social organization"⁹ plays an important role in the life of political parties, ¹⁰ the official bureaucracy, ¹¹ and the private firms.¹²

⁹Scalapino and Masumi, <u>op. cit.</u>, p.122.

¹⁰<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 85-101; and Leiserson, Michael, "Factions and Coalitions in One-party Japan: an Interpretation based on the Theory of Games," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, vol. LXII, no. 3, September, 1968, pp. 770-787; and Totten, G.O., and Kawakami Tamio, "The Functions of Factionalism in Japanese Politics, <u>Pacific Affairs</u>, 1966, pp. 109-122.

¹¹Fujiwara Hirotatsu, <u>Kanryo: Nihon no Seiji o Ugokasu Mono</u> (The Bureaucracy: Prime Mover in Japanese Politics), Tokyo, Kodansha, 1964, pp. 60-64.

¹²Bennett, J., and Ishino I., <u>Paternalism in the Japanese Economy: Anthropological Studies of Oyabun-kobun Patterns</u>, Minneapolis, 1963; and Matsumoto, Tohru, <u>The Role of Informal Organizations In Japanese Business</u> <u>Enterprise</u>, School of Industrial Management, M.I.T., master's thesis, 1963.

^{7&}lt;sub>Morris, op. cit.</sub>, p. 55. 8_{Totman, op. cit.}, pp. 147-148.

In order to understand the functioning of the faction within the Japanese organizational syndrome, we must look at it in relation to the phenomenon of seepage of authority.

The proliferation of faction is stimulated by the unattached character of power:

> Where there is, then, no good For which to strive, no strife can grow up there From faction.13

Where authority in the organization or the group is not firmly fixed in one office, and power is to be grasped informally by whoever can capture it, the faction is a useful tool in attaining it. As Nakane points out, "sectionalism or violent factionalism is due in large part to the leader's lack of 'directorship'";¹⁴ it is a necessary response to the seepage of authority.

But the factional phenomenon is not only a response to the seepage of authority, it is, in itself, an area in which the seepage of authority can take place. The clique leader is limited in many ways by the rigidities of the pseudo-hierarchical organizational structure, just as is the formal leader. In the same way as does the man whose formal authority he wants to usurp, the clique leader becomes gradually more and more dependent on his subordinates within the faction; and thus gradually his own informal authority is compromised.¹⁵

¹³John Milton, <u>Paradise Lost</u>, Book II, lines 30-32.
¹⁴Nakane, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 138.
¹⁵Totman, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 187.

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The proliferation of faction is also organically linked to the recession of decision. It goes without saying that the clique structure, with its organizational discontinuities and the attendant difficulties in communication, contributes to the informal, secretive, and powerbalancing character of the decision-making process. But the relationship is more complex than this. Given the character of the recession of decision phenomenon, the clique or faction becomes in part an organizational device which reacts to the difficulties of communication and negotiation involved; it provides an informal network of communication nodes within the organization which makes joint action possible--on one level of analysis--while it impedes it--on another.

Thus the seepage of authority, the recession of decision, and the proliferation of faction are three aspects of organizational behavior in the Japanese context which are interwoven in a structural unity. The seepage of authority stimulates the proliferation of faction and implies the recession of decision; factionalization contributes to, and mirrors within itself, the seepage of authority, and responds, as well as contributes, to the recession of decision; while the latter is at once "cause" and "effect" of the two former factors.

It is this complex pattern of structure and behavior in which each factor is at one cause and effect, "symptom" of dysfunction and heuristic "cure" making function possible, which we want to explain. The next section of the study examines the range of explanatory hypotheses which have been suggested.

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Part III:

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Some Explanatory Hypotheses

"L'ambivalence de toute autorité, ressentie comme tutélaire et insupportable, bénéfique et oppressante, ne viendrait pas seulement de l'expérience, laquelle montre que le pouvoir est à la fois utile et génant, nécessaire et contraignant. Elle aurait aussi des sources plus profondes et plus secrètes ... Ce caractère paternaliste du pouvoir ne doit pas être exagéré. Certaines formes d'autorité semblent sans rapport avec les souvenirs inconscients de la puissance parentale: par exemple, l'autorité bureaucratique, au sens de Max Weber, fondée sur la competénce, l'efficacité, la technicité. De même, le leadership dans les petits groupes paraît assez peu lié à des images paternelles.¹"

Chapter 6: Functional, Historical and Structural Explanations

The preceding chapters argued that the phenomena of the seepage of authority, the recession of decision, and the proliferation of faction are not isolated and separate traits but exist together in a system of mutual interdependence where each implies the others. In those chapters too it was argued that this political-cultural syndrome is not of purely historical interest, but that it continues to function in modern Japanese organization and to impart to that organization its characteristic color and style.

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In this third section of the study we examine more closely the sorts of explanation which have been adduced to make sense of the parts of this pattern and of its persistence. These explanations fall into four categories. There are, first, a number of partial explanations which see the elements of the syndrome as isolated patterns particular to certain segments of society at certain periods, and give teleological or functional analyses of their appearance in the given context.

A second pattern of explanation argues that the elements of the syndrome are not isolated but linked, and explains them as the result of a kind of historical lag which brought about, in the Japanese case, a survival of "pre-modern" or "feudal" values and attitudinal patterns in an industrialized society.

The third explanatory model is the social-structural, represented most prominently by Nakane's theory of the "vertical society". The

¹Duverger, Maurice, <u>Introduction à la Politique</u>, Paris, 1964, p. 62.

explanations of the fourth category are the psycho-cultural ones. This chapter examines, in order, explanatory hypotheses of the first three categories.

a. Partial Explanations

Partial explanations, as they are defined here, consist essentially in making sense of a pattern by pointing out the special circumstances which give rise to it and/or the favorable consequences which result from it. Both circumstances and consequences are assumed to be unique, and the explanation of the pattern is confined to its appearance in the specific context at issue.

Thus, for example, Morris² suggests that the tendency toward informal devolution of power found in the Heian governmental system of the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries was a response to the closed nature of the administrative hierarchy. Since merit was never a criterion for entrance into the governing elite, able men were debarred in great numbers from government service, and informal power grew more and more separate from the formal structure: "this lack of mobility at the centre of power was bound in the long run to produce ... fossilization."

The Tokugawa bureaucratic hierarchy, too, suffered from the same rigidities. Not only was Tokugawa lordship hereditary, but the top advisory posts to the shogunate gradually became hereditary too. Totman sces the development of factionalization and the seepage of authority phenomenon as organically related to these structural limitations.

²Morris, Ivan, <u>op. cit.</u>, p.67.

The stiffness of the established structure gave rise to the development of an informal administrative structure which could accomodate "shifts in the locus of power"³ and united political and administrative functions in a way the official hierarchy could not. The informal administrative structure was the faction, and it was justified by its results, in teleological fashion: it "gave the bakufu enough flexibility to meet very adequately the political needs of the Tokugawa house."⁴

But the informal factional structure tied the hands of the informal leaders themselves. The clique leader had to have loyal men at all levels of the hierarchy in order to control affairs, and this need left the leader dependent on the cooperation of his informal followers.⁵ Given this dependence of the leader on the led, the possibility of strong action from the top was minimized because of the informal constraints on the exercise of authority. Authority was maintained by the informal leaders "only by carefully nursing their power base, in the process making compromises which almost inevitably circumscribed their field of action."⁶

Dore, too, sees the seepage of authority phenomenon in the Tokugawa system as a constructive and functional response to the rigidities

3,	Totman, <u>op. cit</u>	., P.	256.
	loc. <u>cit.</u>		
	<u>Ibid.</u> , p. 182		
41 T			
0	<u>Ibid.</u> , p. 220.		

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of the hierarchy; thus "the device of allowing able inferiors to do the real work of incompetent superiors further mitigated the possible damage of a hereditary system."⁷

Maruyama, as we have noted,⁸ saw the same tendencies at work in the politics of Japan's totalitarian period. His general explanation is a complex of the historical and the cultural-personal, and some aspects of that explanation are considered in the next chapter. But he adduces also an ad hoc historical explanation, which belongs here. He sees the seepage of authority phenomenon in Japan of the Pacific War period as being a consequence of a non-democratic form of government, since "In a true democracy, leadership, far from being weak, assumes a most powerful form."⁹ The "pluralism and irresponsibility of power" of the Japanese administration at that time, however, are not endemic to all non-democratic polities, but more specifically obey "a law of dynamics common to absolute monarchies everywhere, especially when they have reached their stage of decadence."¹⁰

The same phenomena, when found in the modern organization, tend to be described as functions of the system of lifetime hiring (shushin koyo) and promotion by seniority (nenko joretsu). The logic of the explanation is similar to that used in the case of the Tokugawa or

7 Dore, R. P., "Talent and the Social Order in Tokugawa Japan," in Hall and Jansen, eds., <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 355.

⁸Vide Supra, p. 45.

⁹Maruyama Maszo, <u>Thought and Behavior</u>..., p. 113.
¹⁰Ibid., p. 125.

Heian bureaucracies: an artificial rigidity in rank gives rise to the devolution of power in an attempt to give the system a needed flexibility. The problem then becomes that of explaining the original "rigidity," whether it be that of hereditary appointment in the historical cases or of promotion by seniority and lifetime employment in the modern ones.

Explanations for this second-level problem are themselves likely to be ad hoc or partial. Thus Noda argues that lifetime employment and promotion by seniority are not traditional or long-lasting patterns in . Japanese industry, but arose as a response to a particular shortage in the labor market in the latter part of the nineteenth century.¹¹

The teleological style of explanation is also used to clarify the persistence of factionalization in modern organizations. Matsumoto, for example, sees cliques in industry as cushioning devices to bridge the transition from the traditional world of personal loyalties to the impersonality of the industrial society.¹² And Totten and Kawakami analyze the same phenomenon in the political party in terms of its functions of providing a means for the recruitment of leaders, a ladder for advancement, channels of communication up and down, and--purely fortuitously--an added element of interest for the public in ideological

Respondents interviewed for the study confirmed the existence of all the elements that make up the Japanese organizational syndrome in

¹¹Noda Kazuo, "Traditionalism...", p. 158.

¹²Matsumoto Tohru, <u>op. cit.</u>

¹³Totten and Kawakami, op. cit., p. 122.

their own experience, but gave almost exclusively partial or ad hoc explanations. Thus the seepage of authority phenomenon was described variously as being characteristic of only a certain period (the postwar years); or of only certain rank levels; or of only certain types of organization.

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One respondent, a kacho (department chief) said that the traditional pattern of Japanese leadership was authoritarian, but that the postwar leaders in positions of authority at the present time veiled their authoritarian beliefs under a cloak of equality, kindness, and "humanism":

They have a guilty conscience (ushirometai) and this leads them to a hypocrisy of equality which gives the impression of an abrogation of authority. This hypocrisy infuriates younger people, who would much prefer an honest traditional authoritarianism.

Another respondent, also a kacho, confirmed this. Old-time bosses, he said, were arrogant (ibatte iru) but sentimental (uetto). Modern bosses were only ineffectual or dawdling (botsu-botsu).

Another informant argued not only that the seepage of authority was just a postwar phenomenon, but that it was confined to a particular rank-level; that of kacho. This was because the men now at the kacho level got their high school and college education during the war, and as a consequence of the unsettled conditions of the period their education had been markedly inferior. This made them weak and retiring:

It's odd that simply the consciousness of having had a poorer education should detract from their authority. But kacho are very subject to feelings of inferiority (retto-kan).

Those who argued that the seepage of authority was found at department chief or kacho level were generally the kacho's immediate subordinates, kakaricho or kacho dairi. A kacho felt that this phenomenon was found primarily at the level of his superiors, at the bucho (division chief) level. Here it was due to the fact that, because of the importance of maintaining the image of the group to the outside, and the time-consuming nature of the representative function, the bucho necessarily lost touch with what was going on inside the group. Because he went to so many meetings, he had to be briefed by his subordinates on what to say at them. Because he spent so much time signing letters, all his letters had to be written for him.

Respondents tended also to see the pattern in their own world but to resist expanding it into a general one. Government officials said that unfortunately the bureaucracy still tended toward traditional patterns of decision-making, but that this could not be the case in the business world because in the latter environment clearly defined goals and techniques and the sharpness of the profit indicator of performance would preclude such patterns. Businessmen in large and established organizations said that the seepage of authority and the recession of decision were found in their own companies, but that they were absent in new and rapidly growing ones.

Whether the phenomenon was seen as general or particular, and, if particular, confined to one's own sphere or to that of another, and whether it was determined by generation, by rank, or by structural peculiarity, all the respondents agreed that the elements of the syndrome were to be found in certain areas. If they were all correct then the phenomenon was close to ubiquitous.

All the partial explanations offered--in the literature and by the respondents to the survey--are valid as far as they go. This validity is confined, however, to the particular context in which the explanation is offered. These explanations, too, if they are couched in terms of structural peculiarities or of teleological logic--justification by favorable consequences--raise, but do not answer, a further set of questions. If, for example, we choose a teleological or functional explanation, seeing the seepage phenomenon and its related aspects of political style as a creative response to structural rigidities, we should explain also why this response and not another was "chosen." And we should also explain why the structural rigidities--the emphasis on heredity or seniority as determinants of rank--have been so in evidence, and have demanded the same responses, throughout Japanese history and across the range of organizational types.

Certain "partial" explanations point toward these questions unmistakably. Scalapino and Masumi see the seepage of authority as linked to the emergence of a particular type of leaders who are "chosen for their weakness, not their strength. Their tendency to be bland or neutral enables them to serve as mediators or caretakers while stronger men around them counterbalance each other without being unduly threatened by a central figure."¹⁴

Thus the seepage of authority stems from a recruitment process which brings a particular type of leader to power as a response to conditions of rivalry. But why the endemic rivalry and why this response?

¹⁴Scalapino and Masumi, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 13.

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Hall has argued too that formal leaders are not supposed to be more than symbols:

The harsh language which late Tokugawa writers heaped upon what they described as 'stupid and incompetent leadership in the shogunate and the domains' would apply chiefly to these fixtures whose very function it was to live as symbols of inflexible authority....The 'stupid men in high places' were as much a part of the system as the restive men below them.¹⁵

It is this "system" which requires explanation as a coherent 'political-cultural whole. The virtue of partial or ad hoc explanations in functional or teleological terms is that they define the limits of the system in particular cases; they set the terms of the problem but do not solve it.

b. Historical Explanations

One systemic explanation sometimes offered for the persistence of the traditional psycho-organizational equilibrium in Japanese organization consists in labelling this whole complex of behavior a "feudal" survival. Some such explanations are simply a kind of blanket condemnation, since the word "feudal" (hokenteki) has acquired pejorative connotations and can be applied to anything old-fashioned, traditional, restrictive, irksome, or undesirable from the user's own/subjective standpoint. The heavily Marxist and historicist orientation of the last generation of Japanese social scientists has made the categorization and explanation of traditional patterns as feudal an attractive theoretical alternative.

¹⁵Hall, J. W., "The Ikeda House and its Retainers in Bizen," in Hall and Jansen, eds., <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 88. This explanation is not simply a matter of putting inexplicable or distasteful phenomena in a ready-made historical pigeonhole. Many of the aspects of Japanese organization which are linked to the seepage phenomenon are strikingly similar to patterns which are also easily visible in the feudal societies of Europe.

For example, the personal character of superior-subordinate relations which Weber noted in medieval Europe and Confucian China¹⁶ is an important element in Japanese structures of authority. We may also see the reliance of superior on inferior, the seepage of authority, as in part a survival of that kind of medieval or feudal relationship--the foolish master and the clever servant--preserved for us in the images of Don Giovanni and Leporello or Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. The "pre-modern emphasis on 'humanism'"¹⁷ which Maruyama finds a characteristic trait of Japanese politics can certainly be called "feudal" with some justification.

The emphasis on the group and its exclusively defining character, together with the phenomenon of factionalization, is also characterized by Maruyama, not as feudal, but as "a paradoxical union of modern and pre-modern."¹⁸ Yet this trait deserves the feudal label_equally well;

16<u>Vide supra</u>, p. 41.

¹⁷Maruyama, "From Carnal Literature...," p. 257.
¹⁸Maruyama, <u>Nihon no Shiso</u>, p. 139.

as Tocqueville wrote, in feudal society there was no word for individualism because there was no individual who did not belong to a group, and each group thought only of itself in a kind of "collective individualism."¹⁹ Maruyama's octopus-pot pattern of society²⁰ is clearly an analogous phenomenon, which takes place, however, not in medieval France but in modern Japan.

Minami has developed a model of Japanese cultural traits and model personality, to be examined more closely in the next chapter, which includes in its consequences a dependent submission of subordinate to superior and a pattern of evasion of responsibility which contributes to what we have called the recession of decision. The latter of these traits is "a particular psychological product born of feudalistic human relations."²¹

The former trait, he writes, is paradoxically not feudal, as is often thought, but a perversion of the feudal: among the samurai of Tokugawa times loyalty and service had a contractual character, but after the Meiji restoration the dogma of "moral training" which was fabricated to preserve the emperor system emphasized only unquestioning submission and the denial of self.²² Thus these attitudes are not "feudal" but "post-feudal." Nonetheless the logic of Minami's explana-

¹⁹ de Tocqueville, Alexis, <u>L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution</u>, Paris, 1967, p. 176.

20_{Vide supra}, p. 72.

²¹Minami Hiroshi, <u>op.</u> <u>cit.</u>, p. 211.

²²Ibid., p. 189.

tion puts it firmly in the "historical survival" category.

The virtue of labelling such tendencies in Japanese organization "feudal" is in pointing economically and concisely to a general character which they share with the medieval west: personalism, emotional suffusion, and group-rather than individual-centered loyalties. The problem with this mode of explanation is that it raises more questions than it answers. If we are to explain these phenomena by historical conditions, we must amplify our explanation to say why they appear to transcend the given temporal limits.

Why, for example, do these qualities and the others described appear long before Japan's "feudal" period, as early as the Heian era? Equally, why do they persist today in a fully industrialized, bureaucratic, formally democratic and high mass-consumption society? To answer the latter question with the statement that Japan is still in some hard economic-technological sense "feudal" rather than "bourgeois" would be unconvincing.

The explanation of the seepage of authority phenomenon in terms of values or ideology specific to a given historical period could in fact be extended beyond the narrow confines of the feudal argument. Webb has suggested that the idea of the leader who rules through inaction rather than action is a Legalist or Taoist one from third century B. C. China:

When everything exercises its special qualifications, the ruler will not have to do anything. If the ruler has to exert any special skill of his own, it means that affairs are not going right, 23

23 Webb, op. cit., p. 157, quoting Liao, W. K., trans., <u>The Complete</u> Works of Han Fei Tzu, vol. I, London, 1939, p. 53.

The exercise of authority in the modern Japanese organization is certainly, in some of its aspects, "feudal." It is also Taoist, for no formula expresses more neatly a justification for the seepage of authority than

Whoever claims the right to rule over the people must submit to them...whoever claims the right to guide them must follow them.²⁴

The "feudal" historical explanation, like the Taoist, is useful primarily in description. It reminds us vividly that the complex of traits that make up the psycho-organizational syndrome under analysis includes many aspects found at other times in other cultural settings. But it does not explain the persistence of this complex, as a complex, in the Japanese organizational environment.

c. The Structural Explanation

The clearest and most systematic description and explanation of the psycho-organizational syndrome with which this study deals is Nakane's study of "the vertical society."²⁵ Nakane sums up the seepage of authority phenomenon neatly:

The Japanese-style leader, no matter how much ability he has, cannot, like the leader in other societies, tell his own group members what to do according to his own plans, or manage things his own way even to the extent of overriding the strong inclinations of the other members. Thus, not only is it difficult to act as a dictator, but, in a broad sense, it is difficult even to exhibit leadership conforming to proper goals.²⁶

²⁴Kaltenmark, Max, <u>Lao Tzu and Taoism</u>, Stanford, 1969, p. 54, quoting <u>Tao Te Ching</u>, ch. 17.

25_{Nakane, op. cit.}

²⁶Ibid., p. 138.

The recession of decision and the proliferation of faction, as we have seen, ²⁷are also integral parts of the theory of the "vertical" and "unitary" society.

Nakane's explanation of these phenomena is couched entirely in social-structural terms. The basic theoretical distinction is that between "qualificational" and "locational" societies. Qualificational societies are those in which group membership is determined by some quality of the member: birth, ability, or caste, for example. Locational societies are those in which group membership is determined by place. One is a member of a group if he is in it physically or geographically, and other distinctions are relatively less important. Thus, in the Japanese household, the daughter who is married off is no longer a member; but the new bride is automatically fully a group member and defined as such.²⁸ Similarly, in the industrial world, a man is not defined to himself and others as "an engineer" (a qualificational definition), but as "a Mitsubishi employee" (a locational definition).²⁹

The household (the "ie"), in its traditional Japanese form, is the prototype organization of the locational society. This sort of organization demands complete participation and total involvement on the part of its members. A consequence is the sharp distinction made between "insiders" and "outsiders." And a corollary characteristic is the

²⁷<u>Vide supra</u>, p. 74 and p. 77.
²⁸<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 34-35.
²⁹Ibid., p. 32.

necessity of local and tangible relationships; in this organizational structure out of sight is indeed out of mind.

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In the locational society it is difficult, if not impossible, to belong to two groups at once, because "when an individual's group membership is determined by <u>location</u>...if he leaves that location he leaves the group; and it is impossible for an individual to place himself in two or more places simultaneously."³⁰

This characteristic of the locational society means that it has also a "unitary quality" (tan'itsu-sei). The individual's relation to his group is univalent; the relation of individual to individual is also uniquely characterized by their respective group roles; and the relation of group to group within the larger society is also a unitary one.³¹ Japan is also a unitary society, in another sense, because of its high degree of cultural and political homogeneity, at least since the Tokugawa centralization.³²

The locational society is not only unitary, it is also necessarily "vertical." A vertical society is one which is characterized by a greater weight placed on relations between non-equals (boss and henchman, superior and subordinate) than on relations between equals (brothers, peers, colleagues). A society of the qualificational type must place strong emphasis on "horizontal" relationships, or relationships of equality, because group members are defined by their having certain

³⁰Ibid., p.67. 31 Loc. cit. ³²Ibid., p. 188.

characteristics in common, and inasmuch as this is true, they are, with regard to these characteristics, on a footing of equality. Conversely, "if we presuppose social groups which comprise members whose qualifications are different [locational societies], it becomes, theoretically as well as naturally, 'vertical' relationships which serve as the means of binding the members of the structure together."³³

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Given the locational, unitary, and vertical society, with its corollary emphases on particularistic relationships, local and tangible emotional bonds, and the distinction between insider and outsider, the seepage of authority phenomenon follows naturally. For the leader does not hold his position in his own right, but only as the representative of the group. His task is not to lead, but to hold together. And in this task he is hampered by emotional considerations as well as structural ones.

His freedom of action is restricted on the emotional level by the particularistic "human" bonds which tie him to his subordinates. On the structural level, the fact that relationships between group members are primarily "vertical" leads to the existence of many competing cliquelike vertical chains within the same organization; and their rivalry to control the leader subjects the leader himself to the necessity of devoting most of his energies to the task of achieving a delicate balance between them. The result is that "the leader, far from freely managing his staff, is dragged along by them."³⁴

³³<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 71.

³⁴Ibid., p. 138.

This analysis of the mechanisms governing the use of authority in the Japanese organization is logical, elegant, and precise. There are, however, two problem areas, one major and one minor, which the theory leaves unexplored.

The first--the minor one--is related to the fact that Nakane explicitly disavows the idea that the theory of the vertical society applies only to Japan: "the position of the writer is that this book ought not to be called 'Japanese characteristics', but much more 'the theory of the vertical society."³⁵

The problem with this formulation is that the universe of vertical societies from which the sample drawn is Japan is, as far as we know, exhausted by Japan. Tibetan society has a consciousness of rank-order almost as high,³⁶ but this is all we know of it in the context of "verticality" or "unitary-ness". As Nakane points out, it would be mistaken to assert that the Japanese people differ basically from any of the other peoples of the world; but to assert that Japanese political culture--like that of all other societies--is in some respects a unique equilibrium of personality and structure, is not to make that mistake; and it is a conclusion to which the evidence adduced in the theory of the vertical society may well lead us.

If this point of view is accepted, we can then deal with the more important area untouched by the theory of the vertical society. That

³⁵Ibid., p. 189. ³⁶Ibid., pp. 84-85.

problem area centers around the question of why Japan in particular has developed the characteristic forms of the exercise of authority, and of group structure, described.

The nature of the answer to this question is suggested by Nakane but not explored further. The implicit underlying explanatory variables are psychological. Thus it is "basic and hard to change styles of personal relationship"³⁷which are the raw material for the cultural anthropologist's study of social structure. These basic styles of personal relationship are linked to an "emotional"³⁸or "customary"³⁹ stratum which constitutes "a deeply rooted habit or second nature of the Japanese"⁴⁰, shaped by the conditions of history, politics, economics and culture.

A complete explanation of the pattern, then, would include notonly an analysis of the social-structural forms but of the subjective aspects of behavior which complement and motivate those forms. So Nakane points out, for example, that "the vertical consciousness of rank-order is a thing deeply embedded"⁴¹ even in individuals who live in a universalistic, individualistic, and achievement and abilityoriented social environment in Japan. Since the vertical consciousness is found even if the vertical social structure is absent, but

37. "kawari-nikui kihonteki na ningen kankei no arikata," <u>ibid.</u>, p. 24. .38<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 48.

³⁹<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 49.

40_{Ibid.}, p. 143, note.

⁴¹"joretsu-ishiki ga ne-dzuyoku aru koto de aru," ibid., pp. 80-81.

the vertical social structure is not found in the absence of the vertical "consciousness", that consciousness itself must be as essential an object of study as the structure which it animates.

Nakane, in another essay, ⁴² has suggested a clue to this other facet of the systemic problem, when the function of the leader in the group is described in terms of his "personal attraction" for the members and his contribution to the "emotional satisfaction" of their needs for dependence and security. In the following up of this clue it may be possible to come to explanations of behavior on the individual psychological level which complement, but do not replace, explanations on the structural level. Thus, in structural terms, the leader in the Japanese organization is often selected by seniority because he was the first to join the group, and is necessarily at the head of a set of vertical linkages; ⁴³ on the psychological level, the pseudo-hierarchy of the seniority system is a device, as we shall argue, to defuse an endemic but repressed aggressive competition.

For a complete "explanation" of behavior in any social context it would be necessary to the together all the types of explanation already cited. The teleological or functional explanation clarifies behavior by its results; the historical explanation demonstrates how a characteristic pattern arises; and the structural explanation shows how patterns of

⁴²Nakane Chie, "Traditional Patterns of Authority and Leadership in Japan," in Wijeyewardene, Gehan, ed., <u>Leadership and Authority: a</u> Symposium, Singapore, 1968, p. 78 and p. 82.

⁴³Nakane, <u>Tate Shakai</u>...p. 147.

behavior complement and fit established social morphologies. In addition, it is equally, but no more, essential to answer the question, "why do people do this?" with an explanation of the type, "because they think (or feel, or believe, or expect) that."

This level of explanation is the psycho-cultural, and it is to . . that class of analysis that we now turn.

Chapter 7: Psychological Explanations

The epigraph at the beginning of this section from Duverger contains two misleading implications. The first is that (the exercise of authority in the adult world tends to mirror or reproduce the relationship between parent and child. The second, which is true only if the first is accepted, is that "bureaucratic" authority, and leadership in small groups, is not amenable to understanding in psychological terms.

The psychological explanations for the pattern of Japanese organizational equilibrium surveyed in this chapter are not, for the most part, so reductionistic as to assert that the remembered image of parental authority is the basis of adult authority-systems. They do, however, assume that the vision of the world learned throughout the socialization process-in which the parents are among the most important teachers--is crucial to understanding and interpreting patterns of social action. What is learned, a complex system of needs, values, and expectations, works out in the organizational environment of adulthood in subtle ways; and does indeed affect the origin and exercise of authority, even in the bureaucratic context and that of the small group.

The principal psychological models useful for the explanation of the Japanese organizational syndrome fall into fairly distinct categories, which represent what might be described as points along the dominance-dependence continuum. In this chapter we examine, first, the model at the extreme dominance pole, the "authoritarian"; second, the model at

the other pole, the "dependent"; and third, those models which postulate a mix of dominance and dependence as explanatory variables for modal patterns of behavior.

a. The Authoritarian Model

The extreme point at the dominance end of the scale is represented by the model of the psychoanalytically oriented writers who based their judgment as to the nature of Japanese modal personality on the authoritarian and totalitarian image of the society during the years of the Pacific War. In this model passive compliance with, and submission to, a severe and rigid hierarchical authority became the most characteristic mode of power-relationship. An emphasis on ritual, tidiness, and order was seen as a manifestation of neurotic compulsiveness and as a defense against severe aggressive drives.

The main exemplars of this hypothesis as to the effect of personality structure on power-related behavior were Gorer and La Barre. Gorer saw "dominance and submission"¹ as the keynote of the Japanese organizational authority-structure. La Barre interpreted this trait as "obedience to a tyrannical super-ego."² Both saw Japanese behavior as highly compulsive (for La Barre this was "the most compulsive people in the world ethnological museum").³ Japanese personality structure, in this

¹Gorer, Geoffrey, "Themes in Japanese Culture," in Silberman, Bernard S., ed., <u>Japanese Character and Culture: a Book of Selected Readings</u>, Tucson, 1962, p. 320.

²La Barre, Weston, "Some Observations in Character Structure in the Orient," in Silberman, ed., op. cit., p. 338.

³Ibid., p. 334.

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model, was interpreted in strict conformity with the original Freudian model of a trauma at the anal level leading to a rigid and authoritarian personality.

Somewhat less extreme, but still tending to the "dominant" pole of the spectrum, is the image of Japanese psychological patterns described by Minami. His ideal type stresses the inculcation of a submissive attitude to authority in the individual⁴ such that "the faithful absolute following of great authority" becomes "the spiritual basis of life and death."⁵ Accompanying this attitude were a defensive distrust of others⁶ and a tendency to assert oneself only for selfish ends but never against authority.⁷

The roots of this pattern were sought partly in the perversion by late nineteenth century ideologues of the feudal virtues,⁸ and partly in the structure of the family environment. For Minami this personality type was formed in a society where male superiority was the accepted pattern,⁹ and in a family where the father was the prototype of authority.¹⁰ Gorer and La Barre, too, relied on the image of the Japanese

⁴Minami, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 2 and p. 12.
⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 161.
⁶<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 33.
⁷<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 40.
⁸<u>Vide Supra</u>, p. 92.
⁹<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 192.
¹⁰Ibid., p. 193.

family as ruled 'strongly by a "tyrannical father figure,"¹¹ and organized hierarchically so that "a persistent conditioning to authority figures in childhood"¹² was accompanied by the understanding that it was permissible to vent one's aggression on those below one in status.

With Minami's thesis, however, elements of dependence begin to enter the picture of Japanese character with which we are presented. Extreme submission to authority, in this model, is associated not only with the superficially "strong" authoritarian pattern: bow to those above, kick those below--but also with the superficially "weak" dependent pattern: yield to authority because it is strong and will take care of the yielder; it will substitute for what Minami calls "the undeveloped self" (hattatsu shinai jiga).¹³ Thus those below come to be dependent on those above like children on a father.¹⁴

The authoritarian models of Japanese modal personality raise certain problems. One is the inconclusive nature of later empirical studies. Niyekawa,¹⁵ for example, found that a Japanese sample scored extremely high on the F-scale measure of authoritarianism; but Arkoff <u>et al</u>. found that a Japanese sample "did not appear to be significantly different from Caucasian Americans on deference scores."¹⁶

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11La Barre, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 347. 12<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 345. 13_{Minami}, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 195.

¹⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 194.

15_{Niyekawa, op. cit.}

¹⁶Arkoff, A., Meredith, G., and Iwahara A., "Dominance-Deference Patterning in Motherland Japanese, Japanese-American, and Caucasian-American Students," <u>Journal of Social Psychology</u>, vol. 56, 1962, pp. 61-66.

Another problem is that the authoritarian model is linked to a picture of the Japanese family environment which is not corroborated by later studies.

The most serious problem is that if the authoritarian model is accepted as a temporary hypothesis, its working out in patterns of organizational behavior must be somewhat paradoxical, if it is to eventuate in phenomena like the seepage of authority which form the other half of our systemic explanation. With these points in mind we shall consider next the theories on the other end of the dominancedependence scale.

b. The Dependent Model

Just as the models at the authoritarian end of the continuum see this personality pattern as linked with a characteristic childhood environment, that of the father-dominated and hierarchical family, so those at the dependent end of the scale, which we now consider, envision a particular kind of family environment: one whose emotional center is the mother-wife figure and whose emotional significance lies in nurturance rather than dominance and submission.

Perhaps the clearest in theoretical form of the dependent hypotheses is that of Doi. Here the experience of warm and protracted intimacy with

¹⁷Cf., e. g., Vogel, Ezra and Vogel, Suzanne, "Family Security, Personal Immaturity, and Emotional Health in a Japanese Sample," <u>Marriage and</u> <u>Family Living</u>, vol. 23, 1961, pp. 161-166; Caudill, William and Weinstein, Helen, "Maternal Care and Infant Behavior in Japan and America," <u>Psychiatry</u>, vol. 32, no. 1, Feb. 1969, pp. 12-43; Caudill, William, and Plath, David, "Who Sleeps by Whom? Parent-Child Involvement in Urban Japanese Families," <u>Psychiatry</u>, vol. 29, no. 4, Nov. 1966, pp. 344-366; and Lanham, Betty, "The Psychological Orientation of the Mother-Child Relationship in Japan," Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 21, no. 3-4, 1967, pp. 332-333. the mother in childhood, and the necessity later in life of a wrenching cessation of this experience, is seen as particularly significant for the understanding of modal character-structure. A central explanatory concept in this theory is "amae," or passive object love: the desire to bask in the affection of another or others, to indulge one's need for dependence.

The Japanese, like everybody else, experience frustration of...primary love...but they never give up their basic desire to amaeru...that is why we can speak of parental dependency as being institutionalized in Japanese society. For instance, in marriage a husband does amaeru toward his wife, and <u>vice versa</u>....It is strongly present in all formal relationships.¹⁸

Doi sees this trait of Japanese personality as increasing in strength as the anomie of modern society frustrates deep dependent needs; the trend is toward "an extreme pursuit of the desire to amaeru, accompanied by...suspicion and mistrust toward others."¹⁹

The dependency hypothesis is ambiguous in its predictions as to behavior in relation to authority. Dependency, if it is a major theme of personality structure, may manifest itself in the dependence of those below on those above, as Minami and Nakane intimate;²⁰ or it may reverse polarity and result in the dependence of those above on those

¹⁸Doi, L. Takeo, "Amae: a Key Concept for Understanding Japanese Personality Structure," in Beardsley, R. K., and Smith, R. J., eds., <u>Japanese Culture: its Development and Characteristics</u>, Chicago, 1962, pp. 135-136.

¹⁹Doi, L. Takeo, "Giri-Ninjo: an Interpretation," <u>Psychologia</u>, vol. 9, 1966, pp. 7-11.

²⁰Vide supra, p.100 and p. 105.

below. Doi suggests that this latter is a more common pattern:

One of my patients...revealed to me...[that] he wanted, like the Emperor, to appear to be responsible for his acts, but to depend completely on his assistant, who would really carry the burden.²¹

Doi's concept of "amae" as the institutionalization of the desire to be loved by, and able to depend on, others, is paralleled by Sera's model of the "begging-from-above psychology" (kami-danomi shinri).²² Sera, however, sees dependence as that of those below on those above. The principal mechanism at work here is hypothesized to be the identification of oneself with the power of the superior in order to compensate for a sense of insufficiency in oneself. One "entrusts oneself to the ones above"²³ and is then freed from the oppressive awareness of one's own pettiness or insignificance ("hishosei").²⁴ He suggests also that this dependence may take the form of dependence on the group.²⁵

In this, of course, he is echoing Minami, who, as we saw in the last chapter, emphasized not only certain authoritarian elements in his model of character-structure, but also the dependence of the "undeveloped self" on the superior or the group.

And this formulation also recalls that of Maruyama, whose analysis of the "consciousness of being the injured person" (higaisha-ishiki)

²¹Doi, "Amae...", p. 137.

²²Sera Masatoshi, <u>Nihonjin no Pasonaritei</u> [The Japanese Personality], Tokyo, Kinokuniya Shincho, 1963, p. 97.

²³"onore o kami ni yudaneru," <u>ibid.</u>, p. 68.

²⁴<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 124.

²⁵<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 123.

linked this feeling of being surrounded, weak, and entrapped with the proliferation of faction and the strong insider/outsider consciousness which he labelled the octopus-pot pattern of society.²⁶ The difference is that Maruyama sees the attitude as arising out of the social-structural phenomenon,²⁷ and the psychological models would reverse the causal flow. An argument over causation would be superfluous here, however; we can simply note with interest the convergence of theory and the striking congruence of psychic mode and organizational pattern.

There is some experimental evidence for the dependency thesis and the familial environment its psychoanalytically oriented advocates postulate.

Caudill's Thematic Apperception Test data seem to indicate that the dependence theme, in the form of the image of the nurturant and supportive mother-figure, is extremely important in the family, and that, paradoxically, "it is the Japanese man who is dependent on his wife despite the culturally prescribed dominating role he plays."²⁸

Similarly, De Vos' data support the concept that the mother and wife, rather than the father-husband, is the central moral and emotional authority of the family:

²⁶Vide supra, pp. 76-77.

²⁷"Where there is no mutual communication...because of the octopus-pot pattern of society, such an attitude...arises naturally." Maruyama, Nihon no Shiso, p. 144.

²⁸Caudill, William, "Japanese-American Personality and Acculturation," Genetic Psychology Monographs, vol. 45, no. 1, Feb. 1952.

The Japanese mother...takes on the burden of responsibility for her children's behavior--and her husband's--and will often manifest self-reproach if they conduct themselves badly. Such an example cannot fail to impress.²⁹

Wendt suggests, with Doi, that dependency is linked with factors in the oral period of development,³⁰ although rejecting on theoretical grounds the application of rigid Freudian categories to non-western cultures. Lifton, too, notes "the Japanese cultural stress on the inseparability of mother and child"³¹ as a possible explanatory factor of the need for nurturance. And Caudill and Weinstein have shown through observation that the pattern of Japanese child-rearing in the earliest years is at once more nurturant and less demanding than that of some other cultures, and thus more likely to inculcate a strong need for dependence.³²

So the theorists on the dependency end of the scale argue that the family, contrary to traditional dogma, is mother-centered in terms both of overt emotion and covert authority. When the family group centers around, and is symbolized by, the figure of the mother, then, on the simplest interpretation, the mode of relationship to the figure of authority becomes the mode of dependence; since the mother-child relationship is one which has its essential defining quality in the dependence of the latter on the former. But we have seen also that this

²⁹De Vos, George, "The Relation of Guilt toward Parents to Achievement and Arranged Marriage among Japanese," <u>Psychiatry</u>, vol. 23, 1960, p. 287.
³⁰"so waren vielleicht Untersuchungen im Bereich der oralen Bedürfnisse und oralen Frustrationen in Zusammenhang mit dem sehr langen Gestilltwerden der Kinder aufschlussreich...", Wendt, Ingeborg Y., <u>Zen, Japan</u>, und der Westen, München, 1961, p. 141.

³¹Lifton, R. J., <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 38 (note).

³²Caudill, W., and Weinstein, H., <u>Op. cit.</u>, <u>passim</u>.

analysis may be an over-simplification. For if dependence is to be taken as the key psychological variable in understanding Japanese administrative political culture, its effects may appear in the leader as well as the follower; and it may be directed upward, downward, or toward the group itself.

c. The Mixed Models

At the mid-point of the authoritarian-dependent continuum of psychologically oriented explanations lies the analysis of Benedict, who adduced a pattern of character formation which is more sophisticated than most other models, since it provides for the development of several styles of life rather than postulating an unnatural and unlikely conformity.

Benedict saw the developmental problem in the life of the individual as being primarily the reconciliation of the idyllic and secure environment of early family life with the rigid social restraints which followed upon it.³³ As a consequence it was suggested that "dominant", rigid, and authoritarian individuals differed from those who were more dependent and weakly individualized as a result of the different styles of life they developed to cope with the common developmental) dilemma.

Some stake everything on ruling their lives like pedants and are deeply fearful of any spontaneous encounter with life... they remain aloof, and by adhering to the rules they have made their own, feel that they have identified themselves with all

Benedict, Ruth, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, Tokyo, 1954, pp. 290-291.

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that speaks with authority...Others, who have been more caught by their early childhood, feel a consuming anxiety in the face of all that is demanded of them as adults and try to increase their dependence when it is no longer appropriate.³⁴

The virtue of this sort of psychological explanation is that it not only fits with the data on the socialization process--both that which was available to Benedict and that which was gathered later-but it also provides an apparent explanation of the seeming contradiction between the theorists of the two extremes of the dominancedependence spectrum. Both types of character structure are seen as growing organically out of a common individual-historical ground.

There is another theoretical explanation, couched more in cultural than in psychological terms, which accomplishes the same feat of reconciliation. That explanation, the other "mixed model," is Kawashima's.

Kawashima, like Benedict, saw the coexistence in Japanese society of the two themes of authoritarian dominance and dependence, but he explained their mutual relationship in terms not of the individual's differing reaction to a common life-crisis, but in terms of the simultaneous existence of differing cultural traditions. The dominant character and the paternalistic and hierarchical familŷ which produced it were specific to the upper classes, which had been influenced much more strongly by an imported Confucian ideology; the lower classes, on the other hand, grew up in a family characterized by a cooperative atmosphere and an emphasis on the group itself

³⁴Ibid., pp. 291-292.

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rather than on the authority of its leader.

In the upper-class Confucian-style family

the relationship of parent and child and of husband and wife was a relationship of one-sided rule and of onesided submission; it was a relationship in which one party had only authority and the other side had only to bear the burden of gimu obligation; it was not a relationship in which both sides had 'rights' and 'duties'."³⁵

In the popular family structure of the mass of the population, on the other hand,

each person in the family had his fixed place, so that along with the authority of the family, the concepts of the father's right, the wife's right, and so on, are split off and come into being.36

But it is not yet a family of independent individuals; one can 'never think of opposing one's own individual judgment to the established family system of rules, roles, and statutes.³⁷

In this model of dual cultural traditions eventuating in dual family constellations, it is the Confucian-patriarchal family which stresses the role of the father and his dominance over the group. The native-cooperative family stresses the roles of the various members and their dependence on the group.

Thus, whereas Benedict explains the authoritarian and the dependent characters as differing modes of adaptation to a common developmental crisis, Kawashima explains them by pointing to the simultaneous flow of two streams of culture in Japanese history, and the differentiation by class which led to differing family structures and thus differing individual structures of value and attitude.

³⁵Kawashima, <u>Nihon Shakai...</u>, p. 10.
 ³⁶<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 12.
 ³⁷Ibid., p. 13.

In this chapter we have examined the range of "psychological" explanations which have been adduced to make sense of the behavioral patterns typically visible in the Japanese organization, and in particular those patterns which have to do with the exercise of authority.

•This examination leaves three principal questions to be answered. The first is whether the authoritarian, the dependent, or the mixed model fits the facts best. The second is whether, if the mixed model is adopted, the dominant/dependent dichotomy stems from individual psychological or class/generational differences. And the third is how the model selected fits into the syndrome of seepage of authority, recession of decision, and proliferation of faction which we labelled the Japanese psycho-organizational equilibrium.

At the beginning of the study the hypotheses adopted were 1) that the mixed model was correct; 2) that Kawashima's theory of two cultural traditions accounted more convincingly for its "mixed" quality; and that 3) while, therefore, authoritarian leadership might be found in organizations whose heads were of upper-class origin and of the older generation, the predominant pattern of leadership would be of a dependent nature; and of that dependent nature, moreover, which win the dependence of the leader on his followers the key to the organizational syndrome clustering around the phenomenon of the seepage of authority.

The next two sections of the study examine the evidence as to the correctness of these initial hypotheses.

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Part IV:

Data and Interpretation

"The efficiency of a cooperative system is its capacity to maintain itself by the individual satisfactions it affords. This may be called its capacity of equilibrium, the balancing of burdens by satisfactions which results in continuance".¹

"If we go still deeper into what is here called human relations, and think about it in terms of 'culture,' the problem gets even more complicated."²

Chapter 8: The Psychological Climate

of the Japanese Group

In this fourth section of the study we examine the subjective emotional concerns and attitudes which shape and motivate the characteristic phenomena of Japanese organizational life previously labelled seepage of authority, recession of decision, and proliferation of faction. The principal data for this examination are the responses of the sample to the projective questions of the Managerial Attitudes Survey.

Chapters nine through eleven deal directly with the nature of the superior-subordinate relationship and its consequences in informal institutional forms; chapter eight lays the groundwork for that more detailed discussion with a survey of the principal psychological themes which appear in the data, and a consideration of the ways in which they link with each other to form a mutually reinforcing network of needs, bonds, and drives.

In this chapter, then, we examine four principal themes which are ubiquitous, of great emotional intensity, and generally bipolar in nature. It is the combination of these themes, as they express themselves in action, which defines the psychological climate of the Japanese

¹Barnard, Chester I., <u>The Functions of the Executive</u>, Cambridge, Mass., 1964, pp. 56-57.

²Nakayama Ichiro, <u>Nihon no Kindaika</u> [Japan's Modernization], Tokyo, Kodansha, 1965, p. 43.

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bureaucratic organization. These nuclear concerns are 1) inclusion or exclusion, membership or isolation; 2) harmony or dissension, aggression and its management; 3) trust or mistrust, loyalty or betrayal; and 4) communication and the failure to communicate, or understanding and misunderstanding.

The relationship of these underlying areas of basic emotional tension can be summarized in this way: one needs desperately to be able to communicate frankly with others but finds this correspondingly difficult; one needs to trust and be trusted, but is haunted by the possibility of the betrayal of trust; it is felt that harmony--the condition of mutual communication and mutual trust--must be preserved at all costs, but the attempt to preserve the forms of harmony leads to the suppression of aggressive and assertive behavior, and this suppression generates smothered feelings of hostility and dissension; these emotional dilemmas can be resolved, it appears to be felt, in only one way. The tacit panacea for the tensions of communication, trust, and harmony is being in, being a member. Inclusion in the group is a condition defined by communication, trust, and harmony; exclusion is the condition which implies the failure of communication, mistrust, and dissent.

Of these nuclear emotional concerns, the most central for the individual is that of being in or being out; but the one whose consequences are most crucial for the group is that of communication and the failure to communicate. We will consider these psychological themes in order and specify their relationships in the vicissitudes of organizational politics.

a. Being In or Being Out

The centrality of the concern for being in the group, for inclusion or membership, is demonstrated in the responses to the first Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), that of the conference room. The modal response to this TAT was a story in which the standing man was seen as excluded from the group. Responses of this category were given by 25% of those responding to the question (see chart 2). The emotional weight of such a situation appears graphically in the protocol of a 38-year old assistant division chief (bucho dairi), an economist by training:

There was no sign saying 'meeting in progress' on the door of the small conference room. I entered it without thinking and found three colleagues and the kakaricho talking about something. They appeared surprised.

I said 'hello' but there was a puzzling atmosphere. What could the papers on the desk be? I tried to get a look but couldn't understand even what their subject was...

Apologizing, I left the room, but what was on the table cast a cloud over my heart. When they returned to the office, they didn't explain the subject of their conversation.

So I soon got up from my seat and said, 'I'm going to the toilet; I'll be right back. But I had the feeling of being an outcast...I even thought of asking the kacho for a transfer.

The same concern with the possibility of being excluded appears in Chart 3, the responses to the Sentence Completion Test (SCT) item, "If I were only..." Here the third ranking category of response, accounting for 16% of the replies, is, "more liked or respected by others around me."

Just as inclusion is a central desire of the sample, exclusion is a central fear. Chart 4, giving the answers to the SCT item, "What one

	ostracism	superior is worrying	he is dissatia- fied, uncoope- retive	his opinion is not accented	p1e	he is uninterested	eavesdropping	uperior inap erves to ell	iree discussion other	don't know, no answer	Totel	
Age:		1	:									
22-3 4	13	·10	11	9	.4	3	0	3	6	12	71	
35-45	17	9	4	8	7	1	4	1	3	3	57	
46-62	13	11	8	б.	1.	4	3	l	8	14	69	
Total	43	30	23	23	12	8	7	5	17	29	197	

Chart 2: Part 5, TAT 1: "The Conference Room"

is most afraid of is...," indicates that ostracism (13%) ranks with sickness and death, betrayal, and misunderstanding as a source of unease. This concern is higher among the young than the old, and it does not appear to be bound up with "traditional" attitudes in the usual sense. A typical response is that of a technical adviser at a government ministry, young and progressive in his politics (he votes Socialist): "what one is most afraid of is...becoming isolated (kodoku ni naru koto)."

Similarly, a 29-year old legal specialist who works in the labor department of a government monopoly firm writes, completing SCT 23, "What one pays most attention to in personal relations is...not to 'run alone' (dokuso shinai)."

Since being "in" is a key concern, being "out"--being ignored, excluded, or, in the picturesque Japanese phrase, "placed in the deaf box" (tsunbo-sajiki ni okareru)--leads to reactions of anger and disappointment which can have disruptive consequences for the group. How exclusion gives rise to aggressive impulses which can threaten group harmony is illustrated in the protocol of a 36-year old oil company executive to TAT 1:

The kacho has called all the members of the department to the conference room and requests their opinions on a certain policy. The young employees speak out positively, and the kacho listens to them with attention.

But one senior member doesn't ride with the wave (sono nami ni norezu) and leaves his seat; the others completely ignore him and continue the discussion. The older man feels lonely and set apart; he feels like finding fault and throwing cold water on the plans.

		en de Persona	14 			ed						
	stronger, more confident	a better person	more liked, more respected	of higher renk	smærter, a more able leeder	carefree, unworried	richer	more secure	other	DKNA	Total	
Age:												
22-34	13	6	9	14	7	5	4	lı	5	10	71	
35-45	7	8	°8	б	9	2	4	1	2	10	57	,
4 6- 62	8	12	8	5	6	2	0	3	1	24	69	•
Total	28	26	25	25	22	9	8	5	5	44	197	•
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Chart 3: Part 3, SCT 17: "If I were only ..."

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Age:	sickness, death	being misunderstoo	being ostracized	being tricked, betrayed	one's own faults	war, communism, etc (abstract)	loss of status	one's wea	other	DKNA	Total '
22-34	15	9	11	5	6	3	1	6	4	11	71
35- 45 -	11	12	4	5	6	1	5	l	2	10	57
46-62	7	8	5	10	7	7	3	0	3	19	69
Total	33	29	20	20	19	11	9	7	9	40	197

Chart 4: Part 3, SCT 24: "What one fears most is ..."

We will see later that one of the principal elements in the role of the leader is to prevent such feelings from arising in the members of his group, and to ensure a climate of inclusion, communication, and harmony.

The "consciousness of comradeship" (nakama-ishiki) and the "sense of solidarity" (ittai-kan) are very important to the respondents in the sample. If one is happy with one's work, these elements are essential parts of that happiness. If one is bored or dissatisfied, as some respondents appear to be, the human warmth, the all-embracing quality of the "wet" group atmosphere, can help to compensate for that. Thus one tries at all costs to "remain in the group to the bitter end" (aku made naka de iru); and "alienation" (jiko sogai) becomes, not an abstract sociological concept, but a real emotional threat with its own concrete horror.

The group takes on a numinous quality because it is through membership in the group that one is able to communicate, able to trust, and enfolded in harmony. In the true group, it is felt, mistrust, inability to communicate, and aggression or dissension are non-existent. They may be directed to the world outside the group, but at least the group itself is free of these endemic evils.

Not only does being "in" imply a solution to the dilemmas of communication, trust, and harmony, it appears, in extreme cases, to be a kind of ultimate guarantor of the individual's existence. A primary desire is to be recognized, to have one's personality, one's individual existence, noted and respected by others. It is as if one were continually calling to the group, "look at me! listen to me! see what I can

dol." When it is the group which must recognize one's existence, it follows that one may not fully exist without the recognition of the

For some respondents, there appears to be nothing solid to rely on but other people. Dator writes that "the small group is God for most Japanese,"³ and on the basis of our data this remark is not entirely wide of the mark. To continue the theological metaphor, in the Japanese organization's emotional life one is saved, preserved and justified not by one's own works but by faith in the form of the recognition of others (tariki hongan). This recognition is the supreme

b. Harmony and Dissension

Since the importance of the feeling of inclusion makes the group extraordinarily significant in the life of the individual, it follows that anything that threatens the group most basically is internal dissenthreatens the existence of the most deeply rooted Japanese social values that sion. So it is one of the most deeply rooted Japanese social values that harmony is to be preserved, and dissension avoided, at all costs.

Linguistically "harmony" (wa) is a talismanic word with an inherent 4 side auspicious power of its own. Uspan itself--"dai-wa" or Yamato--is

³Dator, J. A., <u>Soka Gakkai, Builders of the Third Civilization: Ameri-</u> can and Japanese Members, Seattle, 1969, p. 141. 4

"Minami, op. cit., p. 166.

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"the land of the great harmony." In the intrinsic logic of language and thought "fu-wa" (disharmony) is also inevitably "fu-wa" (un-Japanese).

The categorical imperative that the group be preserved, and, consequently, that its harmony be unimpaired, imposes severe restraints on the behavior of the group members. Open aggression is of course proscribed, but this proscription at times appears to extend to any assertion of self at all. One must never stand out.

In our survey, the answers to question 5 of part 1--"What sort of people are hardest to work with?"--as they appear in chart 5, are significantly focussed on the man who does not fit into the group, the man who might disturb smooth and harmonious relations.

The man who embodies the negative peer image, the shadow cast by all the "good" traits--and onto whom are projected all the "bad" traits--of the co-worker in the Japanese socio-cultural context, is selfish and egoistic (jiko hugi, dokuzen). He is disharmonious and uncooperative (kyochosei no nai, kyoryoku no nai). He is self-assertive, expresses his own claims too strongly, or persists in his own opinion too firmly (jiko shucho no tsuyoi). He doesn't listen to others' opinions; he doesn't make an effort to try to understand others. He is cool; insensitive; individualistic; he "runs alone."

In comparison with this overwhelming emphasis on the undesirability of standing out of the group and thus creating dissension, the other undesirable traits mentioned--dishonesty, gossip, and excessive emotionality or excessive dependence--are relatively insignificant.

	selfish, egoiștic	un cooperative, unharmonicus	self-assertive; per- sists in own way	dishonest, insincere, sly, tricky	cool, indiviourlistic; "runs alone"	doesn't litten to others, doesn't try to understend	gossipy, beckbiting	too emctional, de-	other	DKNA	Total
Age:		.*									
22-34	9	16	7	8	7	10	4	l	6	3	71
35-45	14	10	9	8.	4	2	1	2	4	.3	57
46-62	15	11	10	10	5	3	7	2	4	2	69
Total	38	37	26	26	16	15	12	5	14	8	197

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Chart 5: Part 1, question 5: "What sort of

people are hardest to work with?"

Just as words based on "wa" (harmony) are auspicious words, so--at least on the evidence of the answers to this question--all words based on compounds of "self" (jiko or ga) and "alone" (doku) are "bad" words.

The compelling force of the image of a completely "harmonious" environment, in which there is no aggression or dissension, appears in the protocol of a teacher at a governmental training institute for officials, who wrote in answer to SCT item 20,

My deepest wish is...to build a society in which no one hurts or wounds another; in which no one is blamed or blames.

And another respondent, asked about his school career in an inter-

view, said:

Kindergarten was the best time of my school life. The teachers are kind, they take care of you and look out for everyone, there are no harsh words, and no competition or disharmony with the other children. After that it's all down hill.

This nuclear emotional theme of the opposition of harmony and dissension implies that dissension, aggression, and assertion must be muffled and suppressed. But aggression is a basic human instinct, essential to the mastery of the environment, to the defense of the integrity of the self, and, in sublimated form, to the accomplishment of the tasks of the organization.⁵

Any organized social life of course requires the setting up of limits to the open expression of aggression and to undisciplined selfassertion. In the Japanese context, however, the high valuation of "harmony" appears to set even more confined limits to what is permissible.

⁵Cf. Hartmann, H., Kris, E., and Loewenstein, R., "Notes on the Theory of Aggression," <u>Psychological Issues</u>, vol. IV, no. 2, monograph 14, pp. 56-85.

The deification of harmony implies a strict repression of the aggressive drive. Aggression, however, can be expressed, channeled or sublimated in many ways; but it cannot just disappear. The more it is repressed, the more intense and complex its outlets.

The most desirable of these outlets from the standpoint of the organization is in the channeling of the aggressive drive toward mastery of the environment, the accomplishment of organizational tasks, or competition with other social groups, whether nations, rival firms, or rival bureaucracies. This alternative is sufficiently common and visible to require no discussion here.⁶

⁶But the phenomenon, in the international sphere, of what Maruyama (<u>Thought and Behavior</u>, pp. 113-114) calls "the transfer of oppression;" and, in the economic sphere, the ambivalence among businessmen and officials about competition and "excessive competition" (kato kyoso); could usefully be analyzed in these terms.

Another respondent was even more blunt: "the other guy's suffering adds savor to your soup" (aite no binbo, tsuyu no aji).

This cultural ambivalence about open assertion, ambition, and competition made itself evident in the preparation of the translation of the survey. SCT item 20 was originally in English "his greatest ambition was...," but in Japanese the literal translations of "ambition" (yashin, yabo) have a pejorative connotation, implying intrigue, social climbing, treachery, scheming, and upstartism. The word finally settled on was "nengan"--deepest wish, heart's desire.

Ambition calls forth a deep but ambivalent response. The American teacher Clark, who spent only three months in all at Sapporo University in the 1870's, left an imperishable mark in popular mythology with his famous exhortation, "Boys, be ambitious!" But what he is considered to have said in Japanese is "have great thoughts" or "have great aspirations" (taishi).

One might conclude that ambition is permissible as long as it is called by the right name. In the Japanese organization a strong competitive spirit underlies all cooperative effort; but its open expression is forbidden. The pejorative connotations of "ambition" in Japanese reflect the social fear of individual self-assertion and aggression, which must not be allowed to come out into the open lest they crack the facade of harmony and cooperation which is essential to the continued effective existence of the group.

Mastery of the environment, achievement of organizational tasks, group competition and individual competition are expressions of the aggressive drive which the Japanese demand for harmony at all costs drives underground and intensifies. All of these are functional in terms of performance, although the last is formally condemned by the explicit value system and can be dangerous to the survival of the group if unchecked.

Some other expressions of the repressed aggressive drive which appear in our data are dysfunctional both for the group and for the individual. The most common devices of this sort appear to be the turning of aggression in upon the self; its generalization and detachment from any specific object, to the point where organizational life is suffused with the atmosphere of a secret and intense game of strategy; and irrational and unplanned outbursts of anger.

The most common of these dysfunctional strategies for the management of aggression is turning aggression upon oneself. When the individual is slandered, rejected, disliked by others, annoyed, or insulted, the modal reaction in most cases, as shown in charts 6 and 7, is resignation, humiliation, or self-blame. In these circumstances, the sample appears to feel, the proper course of action is not open anger and counter-activity, but to ignore the situation.

This strategy is often coupled with the assertion that "reflection" or "self-examination" (hansei) is the solution to the difficulty. One reflects on what it was in oneself which brought about the adverse reaction from others, and drowns one's resentment by turning it inward. One does not seek the reason for the difficulty so much by open communication with others as by introspection.

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Thus "self-examination" is a function of the dilemma of communication which is another of the four nuclear emotional concerns of the Japanese psycho-organizational system. Self-examination becomes a preferred alternative mode of action to the examination of others where inter-personal communication is difficult. Since self-examination is notoriously prone to error when it comes to the ascertainment of objective fact, resort to this mode of handling aggression by internalizing it feeds and intensifies the difficulty in communication and understanding (one is spoken badly of, one is disliked, one is avoided) which prompts it.

The second dysfunctional mode of handling aggression is allowing it to float free and to attach itself to any opponent who offers. In this mode the individual comes to see life as a game of strategy in which everyone is a player and in which all the players are scheming and plotting for the ultimate triumph, which is to get one's own back again, to give as good as one gets, to take revenge for all the slights, real or imagined, which an environment of lack of trust and failure of communication may seem to offer.

So we note in charts 6 and 7 the frequency of "revenge" as a reaction to situations which arouse aggression. It might appear that revenge as a response, for example, to insult, is simply a theme which is native to any code of interpersonal ethics growing out of a feudal tradition. That this is not the case is indicated by the fact that of all the responses to all five SCTs charted here, only two gave "fighting" as a likely alternative.

	self-blame, sad- ness, don't care	0	seek the reason. Cet the facts	enfer, rage	1rritrion	try to approach	o ther	DEOVA	ТосаТ	A.
3:9 friend speaks bodly	84	21	33	- 39	0	0	5	10	197	•
3:10 one is disliked	69	39	4	10	43	15	4	8	197	,
3:11 one is avoided	62	58	31	0	8	17	5	11	197	
3:15 one is annoyed	27	7	32	34	32	0	7	31	197	•
Gross tctal	242	125	100	83	83	32	21			•
Chart 6:	SCT C	. io	. רר .	15.	Tho .	0000				

Thart 6: SCT 9, 10, 11, 15: The Occasions of Anger

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	resentment, 'anger	humiliation; icnore it; self-reflection	ssek revenge	bear a grudge; never forget	fight	seek the reason, find out why	other	DICIVA	Total
Age:									
22-34	27	20	13	2	2	2	1	4	71
35-45	23	14	11	4	0	0	0	5	57
4 6- 62	28	16	5	5	0.	0	4	11	69
Total	78	50	29	11	2	2	5	20	197
					1				

Chart 7: SCT 16: "When one is insulted ..."

Revenge is not "wiping out a dishonor" by open conflict. In the circumstances of the Japanese group, where aggression is smothered to preserve the appearance of harmony, it takes tortuous forms and it is excited by occasions which do not seem objectively to justify it.

'Consequently, as in chart 6, 16% of those answering the question give revenge, a counter-strategy, or "getting the upper hand" as a response to being annoyed. A 53-year old official of a government monopoly firm, for example, completes this item:

When someone annoys you...first think about it and then put your counter-strategy into action (mazu kangaete kara taisaku o jikko suru)."

In the same vein, a technical officer in a government ministry writes for SCT 10:

Finding out that they are disliked, most people...search out the others' weak points (aite no ketten o sagasu).

This mode of handling repressed aggression, giving rise to hidden currents of antipathy and their working out in covert strategies of generalized internecine conflict, is understandably frequent in a social group where communication is difficult and the open expression of disruptive anger and resentment is banned. That communication can be difficult, as we will see, helps to prompt such a handling of aggression; and fear of the consequences of generalized resentment, in its turn, helps to make communication more difficult: one must not be too outspoken because, in the Japanese metaphor describing a climate of generalized aggression, "cancerous nodes" of suppressed resentment (shikori) may be the result.

The third dysfunctional channel for aggressive drives exacerbated

by the cultural requirement of "harmony" is the outburst of violent, spasmodic, or convulsive anger. Several respondents used the expression, "the anger-bug arises" (shaku no mushi ga okoru). "Shaku," an ideograph coined in Japan since the Chinese vocabulary had no character for the concept, denotes convulsive, intense, or hysterical anger or resentment. Thus, when aggression does finally emerge into the open, it is more violent for having been limited and compressed; since it is stored at high pressure its escape is dangerous.

Some of the uses of aggression discussed above are functional, and some are dysfunctional; but all are touched with ambivalence or condemned outright because of the threat that aggression and dissension pose to the "harmonious" group.

The irony of the situation is that the importance of the group and the consequent apotheosis of harmony within it not only make anger, resentment, and aggression more intense, because driven underground, but also shape the occasions of anger.

The most common incitements to anger, shown in chart 8, are the failures to resolve the other nuclear dilemmas of the emotional climate of the group. "Betrayal" is the failure of trust; "being misunderstood" is the failure of communication; public failure, the insincerity of others, insult, and ostracism all carry the threat of exclusion.

The nuclear dilemma of harmony/dissension, then, grows out of the key emotional concern of inclusion/exclusion and the consequent importance of the preservation of the group. In its turn, the solu-

			•			erity				
A	betrayal	being insulted	being misunder stood	public failure	injustice	others' insincerity	ostracism	o ther	DKNA	Totel
Age :										
22-34	18	23	4	7	4	3	3	4	. 5	71
35-45	16	22	4	3.	4	2	2	1	3	57
46-62	32	16	5	3	1	3	0	0	9	69
Tota <u>l</u>	66	61	13	13	9	8	5	5	17	197
									. 1	

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Chart 8: SCT 14: "What makes one most angry is"

tion to the conflict between harmony and disharmony---the attempted repression of aggression and self-assertion--tends toward the failure of communication and the growth of a climate of mistrust, the other two key bipolar oppositions of the emotional climate of the group member.

The responses to TAT 4, that of the two opposing groups, bring out the emotional and logical centrality of the problem of aggression. Some respondents, like the 37-year old executive of a steel company, do not admit to consciousness the conflict suggested in the picture:

There is no question but that something interesting has just happened somewhere outside the area in which we see the six men...but their expressions are hard to understand.

Other respondents, of a more analytic turn of mind, make precisely and explicitly the linkage between harmony and "in-ness," on the one hand, and the exacerbation of aggressive drives, on the other, which is suggested here as characteristic of the Japanese organization:

A picture of people criticizing each other. In a society in which the consciousness of comradeship (nakamaishiki) is strong, such phenomena must inevitably be frequent.

c. Trust and Mistrust

The third central emotional dilemma in the Japanese group is that of trust and mistrust, loyalty and betrayal. This concern is linked closely to the climate of uncertainty produced by the repression of aggressive drives in the name of harmony. There appears to be, in our sample, a strong emphasis on the importance of faith, trust and loyalty, with a corresponding tacit approhension that on occasion faith will be broken, trust betrayed; and loyalty forgotten.

This apprehension is visible in the emphasis on "betrayal" as a cause of anger, shown in chart 8. 37% of the sample answering give the modal answer, "What makes one most angry is...betrayal (uragiri)." If the fear of betrayal is so significant to our sample, it is correspondingly natural that the affirmation of trust appear prominently. Chart 9 shows the distribution of answers to SCT item 19, "The most important thing in life is...." The modal answer, given by 19% of those answering the question, is loyalty, trust, good faith or the fulfillment of duty, tied with the untranslatable "ikigai" (enjoyment of life, a life worth living).

This ambivalent or bipolar simultaneous affirmation of the importance of trust and indication of a generalized distrust appears in ... high relief in the protocol of one respondent who scored as low as possible on the Rosenberg Faith in People Scale, giving "non-trusting" answers to each of the five scale items. Aside from the fact that this respondent was born in Shikoku, we know nothing else about him, because his distrust of the survey precluded his filling out the face sheet. In this protocol the bad superior is "one who doesn't trust you." People who are hard to work with are "people who don't trust yoû." In the presence of a superior, a subordinate "doesn't speak the truth." But--paradoxically and logically--the best way to treat a subordinate is "to trust him."

Other protocols exemplify the same concern with themes of deceit and mistrust, although to a somewhat lesser extent. To a 45-year old kacho--a Todai law graduate who votes Socialist--a bad superior is one

	loyalty, duty, trust	"1kiga1": 1n- terest in 11fe	love; feeling; people	religious; morel; philosophie2	effort and suc- cess	"hakki"; demon- strating sbi- lity	health	wo rk	other	DKNA	Total	
Age:									-		•	
22 - 34	11	18	9	5	6	6	2	4	2	8	71	
35-45	9	10	9	9	9	3	1	2	l	4	57	
46-62	13	5	11	12	4	0	6	0	5	13	69	
Total	. 33	33	29	26	19	9	9	6	8	25	197	•
	<i>,</i> 1				k					l I		

Chart 9: SCT 19: "The most important thing in life is"

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who "pretends not to see things which he is really aware of"; a bad subordinate is one who "doesn't tell you when he has finished a job"; and the man who is hardest to work with is the one who "hides his own knowledge."

It would be tempting to use the Rosenberg Faith in People Scale to substantiate by direct comparison the central concern with trust and mistrust postulated to exist in our sample. Scores on a translated scale, however, cannot be assumed to be directly comparable to those on the original. We may note, however, on Chart 10, that the percentage of the sample scoring "high" in trust is roughly equal to the percentage scoring high in comparable American groups,⁷ and that younger men in our sample are less "trusting" than their older counterparts.

The centrality of the theme of trust and mistrust thus cannot be substantiated by a cross-cultural comparison of scale scores. But it does emerge clearly in the responses to projective questions of our sample. Not only SCT items, as in charts eight and nine, elicited responses centering around this theme, but also TATs. The story told by a 49-year old division chief (bucho) about TAT three, the man in uniform, is a typical one:

A policeman has been called in about a case of lost property. A (the man in the suit) is the one most under suspicion right now. The weak and timid A is really completely innocent, but his colleagues and superiors avert their eyes from him (soppo o mukare) and he is driven into a tight corner (kyuchi ni tatasarete iru). No matter how much he explains and excuses himself, the suspicion doesn't clear up...

The young policeman, even though he is aware of A's innocence, can do nothing to help.

Cf. Rosenberg, Morris, Occupations and Values, Glencoe, 1957.



<u>Japanese</u> <u>Americans</u> (Age 22-34) (Age 35-45) (Age 46-61) (Law) (Business, finance) . 35 37 39 39 34

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PERCENTAGE SCORING "HIGH" ON FAITH IN PEOPLE

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The climate of mistrust, then, has its own dynamic, which has nothing to do with objective evidence. The fear that one's colleagues may not trust one (and may exclude one in consequence) does not rest on outer but on inner grounds. The free-floating mistrust in the air can be attracted and focussed on oneself simply by being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Since the genuineness and "goodness" of a Japanese group is defined partly in terms of its being that human locus within which trust is possible, the effective working of the group seems to require a high degree of explicit mutual trust, a closeness and warmth which excedes the purely functional requirements of the task. Mistrust, correspondingly, is extremely threatening to the group and to group performance.

It is a cultural imperative that one must be close to one's col-" leagues; able to rely on them; able to trust them. This imperative is linked inevitably with the corresponding apprehension that one might not be trusted, or that one's own trust will be betrayed.

d. Communication and the Failure to Communicate

The dilemma of trust and mistrust is linked closely to the dilemma of communication. Mistrust is the inevitable consequence of lack of communication, for it is impossible to know what the other "really means" where communication is hindered. In the Japanese group, a high level of trust is thought to make explicit communication unnecessary; but a low level of communication does not automatically produce high trust, but its opposite. Failures in communication make it imperative, but difficult, to "take things on trust." The key position of the communication - misunderstanding dilemma in the Japanese group is reflected vividly in our projective data.

SCT item 23, in chart 11, shows that the most important single concern of our sample in the area of personal relations is "understanding the other person's 'real intentions' (honne, shin'i)." Answers of this type are given by 23% of those responding to the question. Where knowing what the other person "really" thinks or wants or feels is felt to be sp worthy of attention and effort, it is obvious that it must be a difficult task.

Not only does the concern for communication imply the fear that one may not understand the other; one may not be understood oneself. Chart 4 demonstrates that, after "sickness and death," the respondents of this sample are "most afraid of...being misunderstood"; a category which also includes such responses as "being misjudged" or "losing the credence of others" (shinyo o ushinau koto).

When it is difficult to understand the other person's real intentions: and one is afraid that one may oneself be misunderstood (one's own good intentions may not come across--"jibun no seii ga tsujinai"); then the possibility of real communication must be highly valued.

That this is the case for our sample is indicated by the distribution of answers to SCT item 8, shown in chart 12. 30%, the largest single category, write that "a really close friend is one...to whom you can talk frankly." A further 10% see the close friend as the one who "understands."

A close friend is one who helps you; with whom you are at ease; who

	understanding the other's real in- tention	not hurting the other's feelings	loyalty; sincerity; hermony	mutual respect	fairness; imparti- elity; not to meàdle	trust	to be liked, trusted	affection, sympathy, love	other	DICINA	To tel	
Age:	ر در	2				- +J	P	a	0	н	F	
22- 34	10	14	11	9	7	5	2	0	4	9	71	
35- 45	14	7	4	12	. 4	5	2	1	1	7	57	-
46-62	14	7	11	2	8	3	1	3	2	18	69	i.
Totel	38	28	26	23	19	13	<u>5</u>	4	7	34	197	

Chart 11: SCT 23: "What one pays most attention

to in personal relations is ..."

	one ycu can telk to, reveal self to	one who helps you, cares about you	with whom you are at ease; you see often	one who understands you	rere or non-existent	loyel and trust- worthy	is similar to ycu	other	DKNA	Toțel
Age:	· ·							•		
2234	13	17	17	6	6	l	3	4	4	71
35-45	24	9	8	5	4	5	l	1	0	57
46-62	. 19	14	4	· 8	2	. 4	3	7	8	69 _
Total	56	40	29	19	15	10	7	12	12	197
						×	1	•		

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Chart 12: SCT 8: "A really close friend 1s ..."

can be trusted; or who is like you; but most of all he is defined by the fact that with him communication is possible. You can talk to him and he will understand. A rough idea of the uniqueness of this heavy stress on communication and its difficulties can be gotten by noting that in a sampling of Thai responses to this item, for example,⁸ definitions of the figure of the friend in terms of the possibility of communication and understanding appear to be so insignificant as not to merit a category of their own.

Accurate and close communication is very important to the respondents in our sample, and its importance stems in large part from its difficulty. One is never sure that the other understands oneself, and one must always be on the alert to the dangers of misunderstanding the other. Intimacy in personal relations is indeed defined for our res- " pondents, as we have seen, in terms primarily of the degree to which communication is possible.

Why should the problem of communication assume such importance for the Japanese group? Some answers are suggested by the range of answers to SCT item 22, "It is sometimes good to hide one's true feelings because...."

Chart 13 shows the modal answer to this item, given by 30% of those responding, to be "in order not to hurt others' feelings." Unfrankness or dissimulation of one's own true feelings, in order not to hurt the other, "maintains harmony" and "avoids unpleasant

⁸Cf. Phillips, op. cit., p. 160, table 10.

Åge:	in order not to hurt the other's feeling	1t avoids unpleasant consequences	1t is a velue of social propriety	it helps you get é- head, get the job done	1t maintains hermony	one's true feelings may be in error	1	DKNA	Total
22-34	24	10	10	8	. 4	3	2	10	71
35- 45	11	12	11	6	2	2	2	11	57
46-62	10	8	б	10	6	2	3	24	69
Total	45	30	27	24	12	7	7	45	197

Chart 13: SCT 22: "It is sometimes good

to hide one's true feelings because ..."

consequences." The importance of this sensitive concern for the feelings of the other is confirmed in chart 11, where we note that, after "understanding the other's real intentions," what one pays most attention to in personal relations is "not hurting the other's feelings" (17%).

But it is apparent that these two cultural imperatives--that of the desirability of real communication and that of a delicate regard for the self-esteem of the other--are unalterably opposed. The avoidance of wounding the other in his dignity, prestige, integrity, or social role (taimen, menzu) makes frank and open communication impossible. Here is a key dilemma: the maintenance of the group makes "harmony" essential; "harmony" is preserved by dissimulation; dissimulation makes true communication difficult; but true communication is the defining characteristic of the group.

This dilemma is further complicated by the fact that the "feelings" of oneself and others, which must not be injured, appear to be defined rather in terms of the group's expectations, the role it assigns, than in terms of individual emotions and expectations.

One official interviewed gave this example:

The important thing governing conduct in office is not so much the rules and regulations, nor the individual judgment of the man in office as to what is best, but the individual's idea of the requirements of the role. And the individual's idea of the requirements of the role is what he thinks others think it is.

As we saw above, in the section on the dilemma of being in or being out, it is the group which recognizes and validates one's existence; it

appears that it defines one's existence too.

The group's definition of one's social role then becomes strongly one's own, by a mechanism which De Vos has called "role narcissism"; it is

an intense identification of one's self with one's professional or social role...a lack of ego differentiation...between oneself and one's family or occupation.⁹

This definition of the individual by the group means that proper social behavior includes, on the one hand, living up to the requirements of one's public <u>persona</u> (as defined by one's own idea of what others think it should be); and, on the other, doing nothing which detracts from the social role which the other has identified with--doing nothing to "hurt his feelings" or injure his public prestige, his "taimen."

Communication can then become a matter of saying, not what one feels or wishes, but what one thinks others think one should feel or wish. And a regard for the sensitivities of the other means not for his own basic individual feelings, but for what one thinks the other thinks others expect of him. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that communication and understanding are both extremely important and extremely difficult.

A good example of how frank communication can be impeded by a narcissistic sensitivity to one's own image in the eyes of others is given

⁹De Vos, George, "Role Narcissism and the Etiology of Japanese Suicide", Berkeley, undated, mimeo., p. 12. in a story written for TAT 4 by a 33-year old sub-section chief (kakaricho) in the engineering department of a government ministry:

At lunch, in the corner of an office, a group which has been overworked by a strict kacho is thinking about a recreational trip. They designate the youngest among them to propose this to the kacho and to negotiate with him. The older ones in the group are telling him how to win the kacho over.

He finds the kacho at leisure, and sounds him out about the trip, but he is turned down flatly.

To his friends, however, he pretends that nothing has happened yet. Gradually a feeling of isolation steals over him.

The hero of this story is driven by the need to live up to the image he thinks others have of him. He wants to be "in". In order to maintain this image he adopts an attitude of pretense and lack of frankness. But the outcome is not "in-ness," but isolation. His dilemma is characteristic. If only people could talk frankly to one another! But in this cultural context frankness tends often to be precluded by the imperative that appearances, "feelings," and "harmony" be preserved.

The reaction of the Japanese group to this dilemma of communication is typically a stress on "wordless understanding" (hanasanakute wakaru koto); "tacit understanding" (ishin denshin); and "stomach to stomach communication" (hara kara hara e no denshin). Together with this goes a certain devaluation of "logic-chopping" or "rational quibbling" (rikutsu-dayori).

Skill in the art of "intuitive communication" is "haregei" (stomach-art): a facility to "by indirection find direction out" in personal relations. This sort of "communication" is essentially a subtle effort to find out what the other is thinking and feeling, without letting the process appear on the surface, and without giving

Age:	loyalty, honesty, trustworthiness	wermth, "embracing- ness", humanity	vigor, vitality, firmness, effort	cheerfulness	frankmess	gentleness, doci- lity (sunaosa)	other	DKNA	To tal.	
22-34	11	, 11	6	7	. 11	б	7	12	71	
35-45	8	13	6	8	6	8	2	6	57	-
46-62	24	б	11	8	0	1	3	16	69	•
Total	43	30	23	23	17	15	12	34	197	

Chart 14: SCT 21: "What I like best about

him is ..."

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offense or damaging "feelings." It is also the art of keeping personal relations always warm, close, intimate, secure, and trusting, without explicit or overt communication.

Wordless communication and "stomach-art" are no doubt real and valuable phenomena in a society where frank communication needs the help of intuitive understanding. But there is no doubt too that on occasion what is said without words allows each party to interpret it as he pleases: while the thrill of having "communicated" is present, the unambiguous substance may be lacking.

The stress on intuitive warmth to replace explicit understanding is visible in the range of responses of the sample to SCT 21, "What I like best about him is..." (chart 14). The modal response of those answering (29%) focusses on the related dilemma of trust and mistrust: "what I like best about him is...loyalty, sincerity, or trustworthiness." The second most common response is one which emphasizes the "wet" qualities of warmth, "human-ness" (ningen-sei), and "embracingness" (hoyoryoku): those qualities which help to create an atmosphere of trust and communication where they may be lacking in fact. Ranked fifth, with 10%, is "frankness" a quality desired, and a solution to the dilemma of communication preferred, primarily by younger respondents.

If the dilemma of being in or being out is the primary nuclear concern of the individual, in the sense that it lies behind the related problems of trust, harmony, and communication, it is the dilemma of communication whose resolution has the most important consequences.

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The four problem areas discussed are all functionally related to each other in such a way that they produce a circular and mutually reinforcing effect. Inclusion, harmony, trust and communication reinforce each other, and the circle of psychological cause and effect works positively. But exclusion, dissension, mistrust, and lack of mutual understanding reinforce each other to form a vicious circle.

Where is the key point in this system which determines whether the group environment is to be a paradise of wordless mutual loyalty and warmth or a hell of generalized antagonism, mistrust and isolation? From this standpoint it is obvious that the decisive link in the chain is the dilemma of communication. For one cannot choose whether or not to trust; nor whether or not the organizational weather will be harmonious or divisive; nor whether one will be in or out. But one can choose whether or not to speak frankly.

But there are so many good reasons why one should not communicate frankly. One doesn't want to destroy the harmony of the group, and so one tries not to hurt the self-esteem or the social <u>persona</u> of others. One's own self-esteem may demand that one be less than frank. The difficulty of communication makes intimate personal contact more highly valued and as a consequence harder to achieve because the area is so sensitive: the more one cares what others (ideally, the true friend who understands perfectly and to whom one may open one's heart) think of one, the less one dares to find out.

Being in demands communication, because the possibility of communication is a defining quality of "in-ness." But the importance

of inclusion also results in the great stress laid on harmony, and this stress makes communication more difficult. The repression of aggression and self-assertion in the name of harmony tends to block frankness, but a low level of frankness leads to mistrust and destroys harmony.

A government official of 57 wrote,

It is sometimes good to hide one's true feelings because ...this has always been considered a good thing in Japan from ancient times (Nihon de wa korai kara mo yoi koto to sarete iru)."

Another wrote that one hides one's feelings

In order somehow to get through a difficult society successfully (konnan de aru shakai o ichio umaku wataru)."

It is because hiding one's true feelings seems in so many ways a "good" thing that "society" is "difficult." Social and psychological ~ pressures tend to erect barriers against open and explicit communication. But the lack of such communication can be the most serious danger to the effective continuance of that social or organizational grouping in whose name the barriers are erected.

Culturally defined virtues and vices, and the individual psychological areas of conflict and ambivalence which reflect them, are inevitably thus dialectically intertwined, and each aspect of the dilemma is nourished by its opposite.

In this chapter we have discussed the inter-relationships of four such nuclear complexes, and their role in shaping the emotional climate of the Japanese group. It is directly as a result of this system of linked psychological concerns that, as Ishida writes,

...in traditional Japanese society the most common relationship between persons or groups is either harmony without discussion or tension without possibility of coordination.¹⁰

¹⁰Ishida, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 327.

Chapter 9: Leader and Follower: Their Mutual Images

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We have seen that the central emotional concerns of the members of the Japanese group are the dilemmas of trust, communication, harmony and inclusion. This chapter explores the consequences of these concerns in more detail, as we examine how they affect the relationship of superior and subordinate: the relationship which is at the core of the phenomenon of the seepage of authority.

The superior-subordinate relationship, as we examine it here, is a complex of mutual expectations, fears, projections and evaluations, which for analytical purposes we can separate into three strands: what the individual wants (in his opposite, be it superior or subordinate); what he fears; and what he feels he gets.

The chapter is thus divided into six parts: the vision of the "ideal" leader, the apprehension of the "evil" leader, and the perception of the "real" leader, being followed by the vision of the "ideal" subordinate, and the perception of the "real" subordinate.

We shall see that these elements--what leader and follower want from each other, what they fear from each other, and what they get from each other--stand in a symmetrical relationship; that wish, fear, and perception of reality, on both sides, are closely bound up with the nuclear dilemmas discussed in the last chapter; and that the interplay of these mutual images creates the psychological basis for the seepage of authority.

a. The Vision of the Ideal Leader

The good leader, as he appears in our data, is the man who trusts and can be trusted; who communicates well with his subordinates; who preserves harmony; and who embraces, tolerates and includes those below him in the organization. These qualities are "wet" qualities par excellence, and their salience can be seen in chart 15, "the qualities of a good superior."¹

The ideal leader has "a big heart" (hara ga okii). He understands; he listens to his subordinates; he trusts them and he delegates authority to them. He has "human-ness" (ningensei, ningenmi). The over-riding prerequisite which sums up all these qualities is "hoyoryoku." This is ability to comprehend, to include, to tolerate, to embrace, often translated as "magnanimity."

The leader is the man with the reserves of emotional strength to take care of the needs of his subordinates. He "takes them under his wing" (buka ni sewa o suru). He opens up for them, and guides them along, a pathway to advancement and reward: "buka ni michi o hiraku." He sees, and looks after, their troubles and sufferings: "buka no mendo o miru."

The ideal leader is, to his subordinates, not only the source of

¹This chart summarizes the responses to question 1 of part I. The instructions to this question, as to all those in part I, asked the respondent to suggest three traits. Here, as in the other tabulations of the questions in part I, it is the first trait suggested which is counted; except that responses like "health," "intelligence," and "ability" have been consistently ignored.

Age:	decision-making ability	"human-ness" (ningenmi)	listens well to subordinates	"embre cingness", .magnenimity	understands subordinates	delegates work	trusts subordinate	strict; rational	o ther	DKNA	Ťo t <i>e</i> l	
22-34	16	5	7	7	9	4	3	3	16	11	71	
35-45	8	12	7	8	4	5	3	0	9	1	57	•
46-62	14	15	10	8	0.	2	2	1	15	2	69	•
Total	38	32	24	23	13	11	8	4	40	4	197	-

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Chart 15: Part 1, question 1: "The qualities

of a good superior"

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material nourishment--"positions, funds, and the other necessities of a good life,"² as Scalapino and Masumi note--but of emotional sustenance. He is the "distributor of good things" to his subordinates (buka ni kubaru hito); but he also evinces a sensitive and considerate sympathy and understanding for their problems through a kind of intuitive communication: -"buka no koto o sassuru." He "protects his subordinate" even when the subordinate is at fault (shita o kabau).³

That this theme of the good leader as the man who has a warm and intimate relationship of reassurance, communication, and trust with his followers is much more central to the respondents of the sample than the idea of the leader as "fair," "dispassionate," or "strict" is evidenced further in chart 16, "the best way to treat a subordinate...." Here the "wet" qualities of trust, intimacy, and the "recognition" of the other.'s "humanity" (ningensei o mitomeru koto) are cited by 50%; while the "dry" qualities of fairness, strictness, and clear instructions are cited by only 10%.

Interview data corroborated this image of the good leader. One respondent drew a historical comparison:

The western ideal of the leader is Alexander, Caesar, or Napoleon. He is dynamic, self-assured, and charismatic. But the Japanese ideal is the first Han emperor. He was√not a brilliant man, but he knew how to attract capable men into his service. He gave munificent gifts and attracted people through his liberality. He had benevolence (jizensei). General Eisenhower was much more Japanese than General Macarthur."

²Scalapino and Masumi, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 19.
³Cf. Noda, Nihon no Juyaku, p. 121.

	warmly, intimately	bring out his ability	delegate work to him	trust him	recountze his humenity	feirly	clear instructions	strictly	other	DIGNA	Tọtal	
Age:									r			
22 34	14	12	16	11	8	1	0	2	1	6	71	
35-45	19	9	12	6	. 4	3	3	1	0	0	57	•
46-62	18	15	7	12	2	7	1	1	2	4	69	-
Total	51	36	35	29	14	11	4	4	3	10	197 ⁻	-

Chart 16: SCT 6: "The best way to treat a

subordinate ..."

Another respondent stressed the good leader's quality of understanding and communicating with others: the quality of "haragei":

The good leader has 'embracingness' (hoyoryoku); he can be trusted (shinrai sareru); also he must be most skilled in melting or softening the feelings of others (kanjo no yūwa). Without this trait the organization cannot function, as it will lack 'lubricating oil'.

How does the good leader learn these qualities of "humanity," "embracingness," and benevolence? One respondent had an interesting suggestion:

If you want to learn "ningensei," how to deal with subordinates, you ought to spend lots of time in Yanagibashi or some other geisha quarter. As Confucius said, 'women and small men are the hardest to deal with.'

If you can move at ease with women and feel free in geisha society you can be at ease with anyone, and you will gain new insight into the minds of your subordinates.

Insight into the minds of one's subordinates means to give them what they want in a leader. And what they want is the feeling of intimate inclusion, harmony, easy communication (the good leader "listens"), and trust. Trust is certified by the delegation of authority.

A 28-year old respondent, a Socialist engineer who worked as a sub-section chief (kararicho) in a government ministry, offered a story in response to TAT 2 (the old man and the young man) which depicts very well the emotional weight and significance of the themes of harmony, trust, and wordless communion:

A young employee visits his kacho's home late in the evening to talk about a matter of business. After an intimate discussion, as the young man is getting ready to leave, the kacho looks at him with an expression which seems to say indirectly:

'I'll leave the rest up to you--I ask your help and I rely on you (ato wa kimi ni makaseru zo--tanomu).' A feeling of trust wells up and overflows in both of them. The good leader is strong, protective, understanding, and capable of close emotional bonds with his subordinates. His qualities are summed up in a striking image in a phrase from a military handbook for non-commissioned officers:

Squad leaders must act like affectionate mothers and take good care of their squad members.⁴

b. The Apprehension of the Evil Leader

Just as the good leader is the one who can preserve the harmony of the group by making everyone feel included and trusted, the bad leader is seen, first of all, as cool and emotionally isolated. He "lacks a sense of solidarity with his subordinates" (buka to no ittai-kan o kaku koto); he "lacks human embracingness" (ningenteki na hoyoryoku ni kakeru). He "pretends not to notice when a subordinate is worried or " in trouble" (buka no komatte iru toki ni shiranu kao o suru).

Charts 17 and 18 demonstrate the preponderance of these faults in the image of the bad leader. 35% of the respondents in the first case, and 54% of the respondents in the second, see lack of trust, coldness, neglect and exclusion or rejection ("ignoring one's humanity"--ningensei o mushi suru) as the qualities most feared and disliked in the superior. In both cases this category forms the modal response.

The bad leader allows some of his subordinates to be isolated or excluded; he fails to keep everyone "in." The resentment this arouses

⁴"N. C. O. Handbook," Self Defence Forces, as quoted in <u>Asahi Evening</u> News, Oct. 2, 1968.

	inconsistent, evedes responsi- bility	authoriterian, overbearing	doesn't listen to subordinates	cold; doesn't trust	doesn't understand subordinates	doesn't delegate	unfeir	"sentimental"	other	DKNA -	Total
Age:		1							-		•
22-34	15	13	10	8	7	6	6	1	4	1	71
35-45	21	7	5	7	5	5	4	0	2	ŗ	57
46-62	22	11	15	5	5	1	2	3	0	5	69
Total	58 .	31	30	20	17	12	12	4	б	7	197.

Chart 17: Part 1, question 3: "The most

unpleasant qualities in a leader"

Age :	coldly; as a tool	don't delegète work	in domineering or suthoriterien styl	1Cnore his humanity	neglect him; leave him alone	don't trust him	unfeirly	coddle him	other	DIGVA	Total
22-34	13	18	7	8	5	б	4	4	1	5	71
35-45	13	7	7	7	9	5	5.	3	0	1	57
46-62	13	7	12	8	9	б	6	1	4	3	69 ~
Total	39	32	26	23	23	17	15	8	5	9	197

Chart 18: SCT 7: "The worst way to

treat a subordinate ..."

is illustrated in a story told to TAT 1 by a 40-year old kakaricho:

Three executives in an office, keeping secrets from subordinates.

They were discussing work methods. I was about to enter the room. They didn't notice me. I tried to listen to see if I could hear what the man at the desk in front was saying.

Then I thought, 'I can't go in now, it would be bad manners; I'll come back later.'

The executive facing me must have known I was there, but he pretended not to notice. It would have been better if he had acknowledged me (chotto me de aizu sureba) I realized the secret coldness of these executives.

The bad leader betrays his lack of trust and exacerbates his failure to communicate (his keeping "secrets") by not delegating authority. He "tries to do the work all by himself" (hitori de shigoto shiyo to suru). He "selfishly decides things by himself" (jibun de katte ni kimeru).

Not only does he try to "decide things by himself" without letting his subordinates in on them. He is likely to be seen as scheming to get them in his power, to gather intelligence about them which will give him a hold on them. He employs spies and talebearers to tell him what is happening in the camp of his subordinates; some juniors will always seek a spurious "trust" and "intimacy" by applepolishing, toadying, or sycophancy (gomasuri, obekka, hetsurai).

The salience of this theme among the younger and more junior in rank appears in chart 19, which details response categories to TAT 2,

⁵In this chart, as in all the others on which responses are categorized by age, it may be assumed that differences in rank are roughly parallel to differences in age except at the highest levels. Age was considered a more efficient cutting point than rank because age data for the respondents was almost entirely complete, but rank less so. the old and the young man.

13% of the total see the picture as one in which the older man is plotting or scheming with a younger helper, or in which the younger man is talebearing; 22% of the younger respondents see these themes in the picture, a category of response exceeded only by the theme of unspecific "harmony."

A²9-year old Socialist kakaricho in a government office tells a typical story:

A kacho and a member of his section whom he has invited to his house. They are having a whispered conversation. The subordinate is telling the kacho the bad things the other members of the section say about him....This is not really what is meant by a relationship of trust between superior and subordinate.

When the "evil" leader does bring his subordinates into his confidence, he does it for ulterior motives which cannot be trusted. A 32-year old government engineer explicates the motives of the same TAT:

A division chief (bucho) in a certain ministry has to make a weighty policy decision, but he is concerned about his own self-preservation. He hesitates to give a decision, so, inviting to his home a kacho who is a younger graduate of his own university, he imparts his plans and tells the young man to go full speed ahead on them.

He puts the younger man in a position where he will bear the brunt of the reaction. If everything goes well, he will take the initiative along the way. But if it goes badly, he intends to force the kacho to take the responsibility....

The two can no longer trust one another, and the kacho wants to be re-assigned.

The evil leader, then, cannot be trusted. He is emotionally cold and does not listen to his subordinates, nor does he include them in the decision-making process. His juniors feel left out. Worse than this, they feel they may be the object of a scheme or plot on the part of the superior.

Age:	conflict	harmony	young men complain seeks help	plotting; secrets; telebearing	neutral	a conflict solved	problem-solving	other	DKOVA	Totel	
22-34	8	13	8	12	7	4	5	0	17	71	
35-45	14	8	10	6	8	3	3	1	4	57	-
46-62	12	12	14	3	6	4	0	1	17	69	-
Total	34	33	32	21	21	11	5	2	38	197	-

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Chart 19: TAT 2: "The Old and the Young Man"

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These fears are the shadow cast by the hopes and wishes embodied in the image of the ideal leader.

c. The Acceptance of the "Real" Leader

If the ideal leader is strong, nurturant, reassuring, and intimate, and the "evil" leader is cold, incommunicative, and scheming, the "real" leader, as the more junior men in the sample see him, is a weak figurehead who cannot make up his own mind. This theme emerges in chart 17, where vacillation (hiyori meteki), inconsistency (chorei bokai), and inability to take responsibility are cited by 31% of those answering as typical faults.

Subordinates feel that this situation leaves the real power of planning and initiation in their hands, as long as protocol is undamaged and the formal hierarchy is respected. The good subordinate, as one respondent wrote, is the one who "gently points out what the superior doesn't see, by the device of asking for advice."

But respect for protocol does not change the image of the leader as incompetent or ignorant. A 37-year old kacho illustrates, in his story to TAT 2, the hidden and semi-tolerant scorn of the subordinate for the superior:

The reception room of a chain store; the president A and a salesman B:

B: 'I came to talk with you about our C, who wants to quit. Did you know?'

A: '(thinks: what sort of strange story is this?) 'No, I didn't know.'

B: '(thinks: calls himself the president and doesn't even know!)' (Shacho to mo aro mono ga shiranai nante...!)

Since the "real" superior cannot be trusted to be fully competent --in the minds of his subordinates--it is natural that they should see themselves as making the crucial policy decisions first and getting them accepted later. A young Socialist official illustrates this attitude in his explication of the picture of the conference room, TAT 1:

The standing man is the boss. His subordinates are having a meeting. The subordinates are developing a new. plan.

Naturally they have not yet consulted their boss. He passes casually and happens to overhear it....Convincing him will be hard, and it will be hard, too, to get it all the way up through channels to the top.

If the leader tries to resist this informal arrogation of his powers by his subordinates, he will provoke a counter-attack on the part of those subordinates who are "real power-holders," as in this story, told by a 31-year old engineer to TAT 1:

A newly appointed kacho has a somewhat strong ego and hands down very detailed orders explaining at great length just how things are to be done to suit him.

One day some of the employees who have real power (jitsuryoku ga aru kain) meet to work out a plan to make the kacho more tractable (mo sukoshi sunac), since they find it disgusting and shameful (niganigashiku) to have such a superior...

The kacho eavesdrops from a distance...he ought certainly to reflect seriously on his conduct; if all the employees get this critical mood it will not be good for the group as a whole.

Here the acceptance, by the leader, of a greater voice on the part of his subordinates, is justified by an appeal to the preservation of the group. Sticking to his formal authority is likely to be divisive. Subordinates also claim that this delegation of authority is nesessary, not only for the preservation of the group, but for it to take any action at all. One respondent put it this way in an interview: When you are hired by a Japanese firm it's not enough to say, 'let's do it the way the boss wants to do it.' You must give him the benefit of your own opinion. Otherwise he doesn't really know what he wants to do.

The "real" leader, then, is weak, uncertain, and dependent on his followers for advice and initiative. He is-- at least in the minds of his subordinates--a figurehead, and not always a very satisfactory one. But the problems he may create can usually be handled, as in this story, to TAT 4, told by a 41-year old kacho:

This is the annual outing of one of the sections of the company. As long as they were travelling on their way it was a happy trip. But now, when they arrive, the kacho, who has gotten drunk on sake in the bus, says,

'Hey! let's all go climb that mountain!'

This picture represents the employees of the section who, having neither the equipment nor the desire to go mountain-climbing, confer on how to change the kacho's mind.

Employee A: 'Say! What if we give the kacho some more sake and get him to go to sleep?'

B: 'Hmm, yeah...that's one idea, all right.'

C: 'Boy, our kacho can be a bother sometimes.'

The other three men: 'Oh hell, what'll we do? (komatta, komatta!)'

The three older men: 'Come on, we're asking you for a solution.'

The attitude of the subordinates toward the unfortunate kacho in this vignette appears to be a typical one; and the means by which they seek a solution--group discussion to work out a device by which to simultaneously get their own way, preserve harmony, and maintain the public <u>persona</u> of the leader--are also not untypical.

d. The Vision of the Ideal Follower

The subordinate, as we have seen, wants understanding, trust, and nurturance in his superior; he fears coldness, rejection, and manipulation directed against himself; and he finds, or persuades himself that

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he finds, a weakness and inconsequence which he at once tolerates and welcomes. To complete the description of the emotional aspect of the leader-follower relationship in the Japanese organization, we now examine the other side of the coin: what the leader wants, fears, and feels he gets in his subordinates.

The vision of the "ideal" subordinate appears in the response categories to question 2 or part I of the survey, "the qualities of the good subordinate," summarized in chart 20.

The nuclear emotional concerns of trust, communication and harmony, which we noted as characteristic of the members of the Japanese group, are not surprisingly in evidence here. The good subordinate is "harmonious" (19%): he is "cooperative," "has lots of friends," "is good at personal relationships," has a "rich human nature" and a "sympathetic character." In short, he is capable of "membership" (menbashippu).

The good subordinate is also "loyal" and "can be trusted" (14%). Another 10% stress that he "reports" to the superior, or keeps him informed, or is capable of intuitive communication (he "translates the superior's wishes into flesh"--i o tai suru).

But the largest single category of responses is none of these general concerns, salient though they are. The modal answer to the question concerning the qualities of a good subordinate is one stressing his energy, activity, and initiative (38%).

The good subordinate is "original"; he "states his own opinion"; he "does more than asked." He is capable of "mugen jikko"--he does what

Age:	has initiative, originality; does more than asked	1	loyalty, character	obedient (sunso)	wordless communi- cation (1 o tel suru)	reports to boss	0) 	other	DKD:A	Totel	
22 - 34	22	14	б	4	4	l	3	15	2	71	
35- 45	21	13	2	5	4	2	3	6	1	57	
46-62	20	10	10	2	2	6	1	17	1	69	
Total	73	37	18	11	10	9	7	38	4	197	

Chart 20: Part 1, question 2: "The qualities

of a good subordinate"

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has to be done without being told. As a 43-year old kacho in a heavy engineering firm wrote, he "adopts the basic attitude of complementing his superior's weak points" (uwayaku no ketten o oginau o kihonteki taido to suru).

The Japanese group, and its leaders, demand from those in subordinate positions that they have strength, initiative, and energy. One large firm, in the brochure it prepared for the 1968 graduates of Tokyo University, stated its requirements in this way:

K. Company is looking for people with fight (fuaito)! We want determined people with spiritual strength (seishinryoku) and excellent fight! Healthy and lively young men!

Similarly, a company president in his sixties said in an interview that, although some organizations were shy of hiring student political activists, his own firm would not hesitate to seek out "violent students" (boryoku-gakusei). They had given evidence of energy and initiative which the firm could use.

Thus the image of the ideal subordinate is oddly congruent with that of the ideal superior. Both sides in this relationship wish for the bonds of communication, harmony, and trust with their opposite number. But most of all, just as the subordinate seeks strength and security from his superior, the leader seeks strength and the security of capable assistance from his follower.

e. The Apprehension of the Evil Subordinate

The subordinate fears that the "bad" leader may be plotting against him; and this fear is repaid with interest in the leader's image of the "evil" subordinate. The modal answer, given by 27% in response to question 4 of part I, dealing with "the most unpleasant qualities in a subordinate," characterizes this quality as active deceit or double dealing: the bad subordinate is "not to be trusted"; he "makes a fool of his superior"; he "must be watched all the time"; he displays "outward compliance and inner resistance" (menju fukuhai). If we sum together this category and the flosely related ones of "does not state his own opinion" and "does not report, does not keep his superior informed," 47% of those answering the question stress deceit, lack of trust, and lack of communication as the most threatening in a subordinate.

If the bad leader is "selfish" in wanting to use his formal power, the bad subordinate is also the one who "selfishly" (katte ni) decides things on his own and does not inform his superior. This non-reporting, and "selfish" individual decision threatens the superior by depriving him of information and power just as it threatens the subordinate when he sees, or fears, it in his superior. When the subordinate does not report, or does not "state his own opinion," this lack of frankness is often taken by the leader as an indication of pbtting, double-dealing, and illicit ambition.

The leader's greatest fear is the deceitful and threatening)cabal of his underlings. The slightest indication that he himself is "left out" is enough to give rise to such suspicions, as in the following explication of TAT 1 by a 51-year old deputy section chief (kacho dairi) in a government monopoly enterprise:

	double-dealing; treacherous	insubordinate	unthinking cbedi- ence; does only as brdered	critical; grumbler	doesn't report	doesn't state his own opinion	1ndividualistic	too formal	other	DKNA	Total	
Age:									-		9 9 9	
22 34	14	10	7	8	7	4	7	4	8	2	71	_
35-45-	11	5	7	5	8	8	4	1	5	3	57	
46-62	27	10	8	7	4	6	1	1	2	3	69	
Total	52	25	22	20	19	18	12	6	15	8	197	-
		۱. I	1	1	L I	1	1	l,				

Chart 21: Part 1, question 4: "The most

unpleasant qualities in a subordinate"

173.

The kacho has just entered a room in the office and found four men of less than kakaricho rank having a discussion about the work of the office. The kacho doesn't like discussions among his subordinates, he likes everyone just to do his own work diligently. The subordinates know this, but they ignore his feelings and go on arguing.

The kacho resents this bitterly but he does not make them stop. He returns to his own desk. The kacho and his subordinates become more and more estranged.

This theme of the leader looking on in unhappy ignorance while his subordinates discuss plans and projects which may be threatening to him ranks as the second most common after "ostracism" in TAT 1, where it is cited by 18% of those answering (see chart 2 on p. 119).

A 47-year old government official with kacho rank gives a vivid illustration of the depth of the feelings excited by TAT 1 when it is interpreted in such a way:

Title: 'The Kacho Ignored'

A conference has just finished and three employees are still debating about some problem...

The kacho has already officially closed the meeting, so he doesn't enter the room frankly and openly. He is anxious and wishes he hadn't left his seat.

Afterwards he asks the secretary, who was taking notes, what they were talking about. The secretary gives him an ambiguous answer. The coolness between the kacho and his subordinates increases.

The leader, then, seeks strength, energy, initiative and ability to "know what to do without being told" from his subordinates. But he is, at the same time, prey to a nagging fear that this same energy and initiative, when exercised, will reduce his power, cut off his sources of information, and exclude him from the decision-making process. Wish and fear are balanced by what he perceives his subordinates to be like in reality.

f. The Acceptance of the "Real" Subordinate

The leader's vision of the "real" subordinate is parallel to the subordinate's vision of the "real" leader. Disappointment at not finding the perfectly trustworthy and loyal subordinate of the ideal image, who will "make up for his weak points" and take the burden of decision off his shoulders; and a self-reassuring insistence that the subordinate is not the scheming and insurgent "evil" follower of his fears; combine to form an image of the "real" follower as one who relies on him for strength and reassurance, who depends on him for guidance and assistance.

The centrality of this theme among older respondents appears in the stories told to TAT 2, the old man and the young man, answers to which are summarized in chart 19 on page 165. 20% of the respondents who did this TAT saw the picture as depicting a situation in which the younger man goes to an older man of higher status for advice, counsel, and reassurance. The younger man "complains" "appeals" or "accuses" about his "suffering," "distress" or "worry" (kanashimi o uttaeru, nayami-goto o uttaeru).

Among the older respondents this theme was the modal one (27%) in the stories. A 55-year old conservative division chief (bucho) in an ex-zaibtsu industrial firm sees

A subordinate complaining of some trouble to his superior. Depending on the nature of the problem, there is a good chance that he will feel better afterwards.

In the same way, a 46-year old bucho in a large city bank interprets the situation as

A junior employee who visits the home of his superior. He complains about his suffering, and asks for

guidance as to how to handle it. Some form of effective counselling will be chosen by the superior.

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Thus, the leader seeks strength and initiative in his subordinates; he fears that this initiative may be misused and threaten his own position; and he accepts, with relief, an image of his subordinatés as weak and dependent on him for help. If his wish is not to be fulfilled, at least his fear will not be embodied either.

It is apparent that the complex of mutual wishes, fears, and projections between superior and subordinate is curiously symmetrical. The leader and the follower want, and fear, the same things from each other, and in their respective visions of "reality" they project their own weaknesses on the other.

The subordinate wants a strong, reliable, and nurturant leader; the superior wants a strong and reliable follower to bolster his position.

The subordinate fears most of all the leader whose coldness and lack of intimacy or communication suggests that he may be scheming against his subordinates, or trying to "get them in his power." The leader fears a cabal of his followers to usurp his own power, to leave him cut off, alone, weak and incommunicado.

Both leader and follower resolve this system of fears and wishes by reassuring themselves that the other is the weak and dependent one, and that one is oneself playing the "ideal" role: the superior, that he is strong and nurturant, taking care of followers in need of compassion or "counselling"; the subordinate, that he is indeed the energetic mainstay of the organization with "fight" and initiative, exercising a power informally delegated by a weak but tolerated leader in the good interests of the group as a whole.

Because the leader and the follower want, fear, and project the same qualities vis-a-vis each other, each of their mutual images is reinforced by an aspect of the other's.

Thus, when the leader sees the subordinate as dependent, he reacts to, and is justified by, the subordinate's wish for a strong and nurturant leader. When the leader sees the subordinate as scheming and threatening, he reacts to, and is justified by, the subordinate's "real" vision of the leader as a weak and ineffective figurehead.

.When the subordinate sees the leader as dependent, he reacts to, and is justified by, the leader's wish for a strong and reliable subordinate. When the subordinate sees the leader as scheming, he reacts to, and is justified by, the leader's own self-reassuring vision of the "real" subordinate as weak and seeking help, while he himself is strong and in command.

And when both leader and follower see the other as strong, reliable, and ensuring their own security, they react to a wish common to both.

Chapter 10: Leader and Follower: Strategies of Defense and the Seepage of Authority

In the last chapter we examined the complex system of mutual perception and projection which defines the psychological relationship of superior and subordinate in the Japanese organization. Leader and follower both seek, in the other, strength and reassurance; they both fear, in the other, a misuse of this strength which will combine with their own need for something "to rely on," to put them at the other's mercy; and they both reassure themselves by seeing the "real" situation as one in which they play the "strong" roles of ideal superior or subordinate, and in which it is the other who is weak and dependent.

In this chapter we describe what appears to be a common psychological mechanism for dealing with this anxious and unstable balance of fears and wishes. We examine the alternate strategies it offers both superior and subordinate for coping with the tensions of authority in the organizational world. We then consider the objective differences, and the relative strength, of the emotional needs of superior and subordinate; and analyze the seepage of authority phenomenon as it arises out of the $\sqrt{2}$.

a. The Mechanism of Reaction: Defensive Assertion

The members of our sample live and work in a psychic environment in which a dominating concern is the conflict between one's own search for a strong, helpful and nurturant other, and the need to prove to oneself

that one is in fact strong and able.

The strength of this need is illustrated by the responses to the SCT item, "If I were only ...", shown on chart 3 on page 120. The modal answer (18%) among those responding is "stronger," "more capable," "more confident." An unacknowledged or denied perception of one's subjective feelings of weakness or insecurity leads to a heightened need to prove that such feelings are unjustified.

The threat of weakness can only be conquered by seeing oneself as really strong, able, and independent. Anything that threatens this vision of the self can evoke strong emotional reactions. Thus, as we note on chart 8 on page 136 "what makes one most angry" is, for 34% of the sample, being insulted--having one's worth questioned; and another considerable theme (7%) is "public failure"--being proved to oneself and, to others not to be the figure of one's compensating wishes.

We have seen, in chapter eight, that it is the group which, by its recognition, validates and seals the real worth of the individual. One must not only perform well, but one must also be seen to perform well. Accomplishment is non-existent if it is not a public thing; the recognition of others makes it a reality. The emotional certainty of one's own strength, ability and independence, then, cannot come through selfpersuasion alone; it must be the result of the recognition of others. As one sub-section chief (kakaricho) said in an interview:

I think most people work partly for money, which of course is important; partly for advancement, which is very important; and partly for the warmth of feeling that you have done a good job and that your superior approves of you, which is most important. 179.

C

	public achievement display ability; others' respect	to be a good men	content; security	world peace, etc. (abstract)	strength; health	to be of use	other	DICN'A	Totel
Age:				· · · ·				-	
22- 34	20	8	12	8	7	2	2	12	71
-35-45	11	15	6	10	2	3	3	7	57
46-62	14	8	6	3	7	7	4	20	69
Total	45	31	24	21	16	12	9	39	197

Chart 22: SCT 20: "My greatest wish is ..."

Thus the modal answer to the SCT item, "My greatest wish is...", as shown on chart 22, is "public achievement"; "the respect of others"; "to show oneself able"; "to demonstrate one's ability" (hakki suru). 28% of those responding give answers which fall into this category.

Insecure in a world which cannot entirely be trusted, uncertain of one's real ability, and dependent on the opinion of others for a recognition of one's real worth, the individual tries to act in such a way as to deny or minimize his own uncertainties and insecurities. Out of a haunting suspicion of weakness and dependency grows a burning drive to prove to himself and to others that he is "really" strong, able, and secure. Public achievement and "to display one's ability" can thus becomer psychological necessities.

This is the mechanism of "defensive assertion," and its use, by superior and subordinate, explains many of the ambiguities of authority in the Japanese organization. We can now examine the strategies of behavior it suggests, and the ways in which its use or non-use defines alternate roles, for leader and follower.

b. The Defensive Leader

When "defensive assertion" characterizes the behavior of the individual in the role of leader, it takes the form of the ostentatious--and ostensibly authoritarian--brandishing of power. It is uncertainty as to the solidity of that power which drives the defensive leader to assert it over his subordinates.

When this sort of leader does exercise his power, it usually takes the form, as Nakane points out, of "forcible measures...arbitrary decision, and the misuse of authority,"1

The defensive leader does not appear to be common in the organizations whose members comprise the modern administrative elite represented by our sample. But the defensive assertion of one's own authority appears in vivid relief in some earlier organizations, of which the old Imperial Army, as depicted by Minami, is a good example:

One way or another one implants the viewpoint of . absolute submission. If an officer asks, 'Why did you do this?', and 'an enlisted man replies, 'I did it for this or that reason', one says, 'Don't make excuses!' and beats him.

If he explains his reasons one beats him and if he remains silent one beats him too. In the long run the best thing is to say only, 'Yes sir! Yes sir! (Hai! Hai!)'²

This demand for absolute submission on the part of the subordinate stems in most cases not from the "strength" of the leader--junior officer or sergeant--but from his inner insecurity. The leader in this case knows that the superior is easily imposed upon, and feels that he may be stripped of his authority if he is at all "human." Thus he sees no alternative to maintain his position but to become "inhuman" to the men below him. Absolutist or authoritarian rule in this context is not a sign of unquestioned authority, but of an exaggerated defense of an authority one feels inwardly to be insecure.

¹Nakane, <u>Tate Shaki</u>..., p. 141. ²Minami, op. <u>cit</u>., quoted on p. 7. The defensive assertion of authority does not have the scope to operate in the bland world of modern organization which it did in the prewar military. It tends to appear particularly in cases where there is a subjective perception of a gap between the role of leader and one's own capabilities to fill it, and in which the dysfunctional aspects of this strategy of leadership are isolated from the corrective of reality.

Thus the military, isolated except in combat from reality, with young and uncertain men in positions of some authority, and a borrowed European tradition making the leader's role unfamiliar in certain aspects, was a fertile field for the operation of this mechanism.

In contemporary Japan it can be located where circumstances are similar. It appears occasionally in young men's sports clubs, where brutality and violence may be deemed to inculcate "spirit" and determination: and in the apprenticeship period in the economic organization, particularly the small one, in which a trainee may be "hazed" (ijimeru) by his immediate superior.³

But the pattern of defensive assertion on the part of the leader does not usually appear in the context we study here. The domineering "oneman leader" (wanman rida) does not appear to be desired or trusted by our respondents. And this is not surprising, because his strategy of behavior awakens all the fears of the dominating and manipulating "evil" leader which haunt his followers; and it forces them to blatantly to recognize those hidden n eds of their own for the strong, benevolent leader, which they would prefer to deny.

³See <u>e.g.</u>, the article entitled, "Resentment over Teasing: Bank Clerk Arrested for Killing Superior," <u>Japan Times</u>, July 11, 1968.

c. The Defensive Subordinate

The subordinate, perhaps more than the superior, needs the "demonstration of his ability" and the recognition of others to maintain inner equilibrium. We may expect, then, that there will be occasions when he adopts the defensive strategy.

Just as in the case of the leader, the adoption of defensive assertion by the subordinate corresponds not only to his own needs but to a certain extent to the needs and wishes of the other. The leader does indeed want helpers with energy, initiative, strength, and self-confidence (jishin). He would indeed like them to "know what to do without being told," and to "supplement his weak points."

If the subordinate is to prove his own worth and ability in his own eyes and in the eyes of others, then, it becomes very important for him to demonstrate that he does have strength and self-confidence, that he is creative, can take autonomous initiative, and can be relied on. So he is tempted to prove the point by performing above and beyond the call of duty, by rushing in where angels might well fear to tread. The prototype of the defensive subordinate is the rebellious soldier of the thirties or the rebellious samurai of the century before, who "knew what was good for Japan, whether [the Emperor] did or did not.⁴

Thus acts of wild initiative on the part of the subordinate are manifestations of an artifically heightened self-reliance, reactions designed to prove to the self and to the others that one is really the "strong" subordinate of the ideal image.

Jansen, M.B., op. cit., p. 325.

A strong theme in Japanese cultural tradition,

the absolute potency that is given only to a man who is ready at any moment to sacrifice his life -- the all-powerful virtue of concentration that a man can bring to bear upon his task when he takes the whole responsibility upon his shoulders...⁵ 185.

further pushes the individual who is uncertain of his own strength or ability into violent or dramatic action to demonstrate it. This theme grows out of the mechanism of "defensive assertion." That this psychological element is not insignificant in our sample is shown in the responses to SCT item 26, "When frightened by something, the best thing to do it ..."

The modal answer is "analyze it"; but the second most common response, given by 21% of those completing the question, is "rush in"; "grapple with it"; "have at it" (sore ni butsukaru, buttsukomu).

So if the subordinate, adopting the strategy of defensive assertion, shows wild initiative, it is in part the working out in action of a cultural value as well as the response to a psychological need. Given a problem, he will "rush in and grapple with it"; but his tactics may not be in the best interest of the group, although they bolster his selfesteem.

The danger, then, in seeking subordinates with initiative and selfconfidence is that one will get too much of what one asks for. And it is this mechanism of defensive assertion on the part of subordinates which in part reinforces and justifies the fear, on the part of the

⁵Furukawa Tesshi, "The Individual in Japanese Ethics," in Moore, ed., Japanese Culture, Honolulu, 1967, p. 232.

	enalyze the situ- ation	rush in end have a it (butsukaru)	the best you cen	seek heip	flee	contemplation; prøyer	other	DICNA	To tel
Age:									_
22-34	18	10	7	11	9	2	2	12	71
35- 45	14	11	5	3	4	5	0	15	57
46-62	12	10	15	2	2	6	1	21	69
Total	44	31	27	16	15	13	3	48	197

Chart 23: SCT 26: "When frightened by scmething,

the best thing to do is ..."

leader, of the "evil," scheming and power-hungry follower. Knowing what to do without being told, as in the confused, "lower dominates upper" politics of the thirties, can have strongly adverse consequences for the group; since the superior, in accordance with the image of the ideal leader as the one who sticks up for his subordinates whether they are right or wrong (shita o kabau), may feel he must accept responsibility for embarkation on a course of action which no one would have chosen rationally.

In practice, in the modern organization, the scope for defensive assertion on the part of the subordinate tends to be less drastic. The follower may dream that his demonstration of ability and arrogation of initiative can save the group and win recognition; but reality tempers the dream, as in the following story told to TAT 4:

> A medium-small enterprise which has gone bankrupt because of 'one-man' leadership. The young employees have held a conference on the subject of rehabilitation, and have come up with a plan. But the problem is, who will tell the president?

A takes on the responsibility. But, because he is afraid he might be fired, he never raises the subject in his meeting with the president.

His co-workers think this is disastrous. So they decide to go to the boss in a body to state their decision.

Here defensive assertion is communal, which is also entirely

appropriate to the Japanese group.

d. The Dependent Leader and the Dependent Follower

When superior and subordinate adopt the strategy of defensive assertion, they substantiate the fear of their "evil" image in the mind of the other by playing a corresponding role. Naturally this is only occasionally the case, and certainly no organization could function or survive effectively for long in which both leader and follower were tempted simultaneously to adopt these patterns of behavior.

More common is the pattern in which the leader--or the follower-strengthens the other's view of the "real" situation by surrendering to his desire to rely on the other.

When the formal leader, impelled by his need for, and concern with, trust; communication, harmony and inclusion, acts the dependent role, he seeks to ensure that he is trusted, that he can communicate, that the group remain harmonious, and that he is "in," by aligning himself with his subordinates rather than by seeking to re-align their opinions. To ensure that he remains the leader, he allows himself to be led.

We may think of this as "onbu" leadership, "onbu" expressing the mutual relationship of the Japanese mother and the baby she carries in a pouch on her back. In this situation, since the mother is regarded with opprobrium by others if the baby is not calm and passive, she may do anything she wants as long as the baby does not object. But its wants must be satisfied immediately, so she must always be on the alert for its voiced or voiceless demands. Even in this two-person group, harmony must be maintained, and it is usually maintained by the mother's yielding. Just as the mother is guided and controlled by the potential threat of disharmony from the baby, so the dependent leader in the Japanese organization has always on his back the mass of his subordinates. He must be acutely conscious of them and of the threat of disharmony and exclusion they can wield. He is guided by them, to continue the metaphor, not by "stomach-to-stomach," but by "cheek to back of the neck" communication.

In the "onbu leadership" pattern the superior is extremely reluctant to take any decision alone. When two dependent leaders are together the situation is not improved, as in this story to TAT 3 told by the 31-year old chief of the planning staff in a large firm.

> The company security officer and a kacho are conferring about the problem of a tramp who has entered the building.

'What shall we do?' they think.

They are worried because they will have to solve the problem all by themselves.

Because he does not want to have to solve any problem all by himself, the dependent leader relies explicitly on his followers for advice and information, which he gradually becomes unable to do without. This situation is depicted in the explication of TAT 2 by a 39-year old kacho:

> A bucho has invited a talented subordinate to his home and waits with anticipation for his advice...

It is true that this is an informal information route. But such conferences illumine the facts and make work livelier. Besides, he hasn't been able to discover any other way of getting the necessary information. "Onbu leadership" can appear at any level in the organizational hierarchy, and appears sometimes to have a multiplier effect, as in a 59-year old bucho's depiction of the dependent leader's dilemma in TAT 1:

> This is a picture of a bucho conferring with the group of kacho directly subordinate to him. They disagree. The kacho are uncompromising because they have the responsibility of being backed by the people who work under them...

The argument ends without any clear outcome. The bucho is about to leave. Now the kacho gather around the oldest in their group to exchange their whispered views.

The bucho is faced with a dilemma. Shall he hold fast to the views of top management and try to think of some way to get the kacho to agree with him? Or shall he respect the sincere opinion of the kacho group and alter top policy unofficially?

In either case this company will henceforth face real problems...

We note that the kacho here are "uncompromising" because they too "have the responsibility of being backed by the people under them." And it is this "responsibility" which is the self-justification of the dependent leader at whatever hierarchical level.

This responsibility, however, does not exist if the people underneath yield to the desire for security, the search for nurturance, and the desire not to be "left out," rather than trying to overcome it by defensive assertion. The dependent follower makes this choice.

He is willing to work long and hard, doing enduring, plodding, determined buy undistinguished work. His forte is "sticking to it" (gambaru), and he is willing to let others take the responsibility for decisions as long as he is taken care of by the group. He contributes stability and routine performance in exchange for "membership" and security, but in the "portable shrine" political structure, in which it is the anonymous vector of forces summed from the movements of many individual dancing carriers which determines group direction, he is content to move with the crowd.

The dependent leader, and the dependent follower, do not satisfy the needs of the opposite for nurturance, reassurance, and strength. They are consumers of, rather than contributors to, the emotional capital of the organization. On the other hand, they do not threaten the other by arousing the fears associated with the usurping subordinate or the manipulating superior. The dependent strategy, thus, can be functional as long as only one side of the authority-relationship adopts it.

But when dependent leader is teamed with dependent subordinate the organization can degenerate into a paradise of the ineffectual, as in Sakaguchi's fictional newspaper and film company:

The directors and the members ... had banded together to constitute their own private cabals ... Everything was based on group comradeship, and the individual talents of the members were used on a rotational basis with special emphasis on the traditional precepts of 'duty' and 'human feeling'. The entire organization became more bureaucratic than the bureaucracy itself. Thus they managed to protect their respective mediocrities and to form a sort of mutual-aid relief organization founded on a hopeless dearth of talent.⁶

^bSakaguchi Ango, "The Idiot," trans. George Saito, in Morris, Ivan, ed., Modern Japanese Stories, Tokyo, 1962, p. 391.

e. Leader and Follower: Objective Differences

Superior and subordinate share the same nuclear concerns; hope for, fear, and project, similar qualities in relation to the other; and adopt the same strategy of defensive assertion to cope with the complex of needs, tensions, hopes and fears which defines their shared psychological environment.

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The equivalence is not perfect, however, because leader and follower differ basically in pole, life-stage, and generation. In order to understand the actual working of their relationship and of the seepage of authority phenomenon in the Japanese organization, we must note the areas in which superior and subordinate attitudes and needs diverge, as well as those in which they are similar. Some of our data allows us to do this.

Chart 24 lists average scores on the scaled questions of Part II of the survey by item and by age group. Possible scores range from -3 ("disagree strongly") to +3 ("agree strongly").

The younger and more junior respondents are less dogmatic than their older and more senior counterparts (scoring on the average .54 as opposed to .89).

They are also less trusting of the world around them (scoring on the average .58 as opposed to .88 for the older group).

And they are less automatically acquiescent (averaging, on the first five "cliche" items, 1.78 as opposed to 2.12).⁷

This finding, as well as being intrinsically interesting, acts to reduce the significance of the spread on "dogmatism" scores to some extent; since dogmatism is measured in each item by affirmative answers. It does not, however, affect the "trust" scores to the same degree, since on two of the five items of the Rosenberg scale the "trusting" answer is in the "disagree" direction.

Mean Scores on Scale Items of Part II

Disagree -3 ----- +3 Agree

	A		-	
Question:	Age Group: 46-61	35-45		10
	(Mean Age		22-34	Total
· 始後的 가슴	(nean Age 50.88)	(Mean Age 39.10)	(Mean Age 29.78)	(Mean Age
	20.007	J3.10)	29.70)	39.87)
2-1 "too many cooks"	1.5	1.4	1.1	1.3
2-2 "two heads better"	2.1	2.1	1.6	1.9
2-3 "good leader	o / ~		o /	<u>,</u>
delegates"	2.4	2.4	2.4	2.4
2-4 "good leader loved" 2-5 "leader takes	1.9	1.6	1.4	1.6
responsibility"	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.6
responsibility	2/	2.0	2.4	2.0
. TRUST				
2-6 "most people can				
be trusted"	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.5
2-7 "inclined to help				
others"	0	.4	3	0
2-8 "don't watch out,				
others take				
advantage"	8	2	6	5 .
2-9 "fundamentally				
no one cares"	2	.3	1	0
2-10 "human nature				
fundamentally				
cooperative"	1.7	1.4	1.1	1.4
DOCUMITON				
DOGMATISM				
2-11 "worst crime"	1.5	1.1	.6	1.1
2-12 "reserve judgment"	7	8	-1.2	-1.0
2-13 "world pretty lovely"		.4	.8	.3
2-14 "great thinkers few"	1.9	1.9	1.8	1,9
2-15 "same tastes"	1.5	1.1	.8	122
2-16 "most people don't				
know"	1.2	.5	1.1	1.0
2-17 "heated discussion"	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.3
2-18 "rely on leaders		,		·
and experts"	1	.1	8	2
2-19 "beneath contempt"	1.4	1.0	5	7
2-20 "want to be great				
men"	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.3
OVERALL "ACQUIESCENCE"		•		
SCORE	2.2	2.02	1.78	1.96
OVERALL "TRUST" SCORE	.88	.64	.58	.76
OVERALL "D" SCORE	.89	.79	.54	.76
행기 철정 것이 한 것 같은 것을 알 것 같아. 집안 같은			the Report	

TRUST AND DOGMATISM SCORES BY ITEM AND BY AGE

CHART 24

The finding as to the relative strength of trust among older and younger is corroborated in interesting fashion by the high degree of agreement among the youngest age group to the Rokeach scale item, "Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonely place" (#.8 as opposed to -.3 for the oldest age group).

As well as being less dogmatic, less trusting, less automatically acquiescent, and more lonely, younger respondents are less independent and less sure of themselves, more likely to seek help from others. The modal answer to SCT item 27, "When troubled, one usually ...", reflects the Japanese cultural stress on inclusion, communication, and grouporiented strategies: 47% of all those answering suggest conferring with someone, talking it over (sodan suru). The younger and more junior respondents, however, are more likely to suggest frankly dependent modes of action. 18% of this group, as opposed to 12% of the more senior, see "seeking help" (tasuke o motomeru), or "reliance on others" (tariki hongan) as appropriate reactions to one's own problems (see chart 25). But the dependent strategy is the second-ranked (preceding, for example, answers of the type, "analyze the problem") among all age grades.

Chart 23, on page 186, confirms this tendency. 34% of the junior group, as opposed to 8% of the senior, write that "when frightened, the best thing to do is..." seek help or flee.

Not surprisingly, the younger group is more sensitive to its own image in the eyes of the other. The fear of public failure or having "one's own weaknesses pointed out" is more predominant among younger

	confer with someone	spek help from some-	evoid or flee	analyze the situation	do nothing	try things at rendom	prayer; contemplation	pther	DKUVA	Total
Age:		-								
22 - 34	32	11	7	7	2	2	0	1	9	71
35-45	22	б	6	4	4	3	l	1	10	57
46-62	·20	6	5	4`	4	4	3	2	21	69
Total	74	23	18	15	10	9	4	4	40	197
		-						-		•

Chart 25: SCT 27: "When troubled, one usually"

and subordinate people (see chart 4 on page 122); as is being seen publicly to fail as an occasion of anger (see chart 8 on page 136).

Less trusting, less certain of themselves, and more dependent, the junior respondents are more likely to yield on a point at issue. Chart 26 details the responses by age-grade to the Hanfmann-Getzels problem of the subordinate, quitting the group, who wants a letter of introduction although he does not deserve one. 22% of the-younger, and only 8% of the older respondents see themselves as yielding to the importunacy of the subordinate.⁸

Similarly, the young are more prone to passive acceptance of the misuse of authority on the part of the superior. Chart 27 lists responses by age-group to the semi-projective story of the new and arrogant boss who consistently makes unreasonable demands on those who work under him. "Doing the best one can under the circumstances" (besuto o tsukusu), is the strategy of submission. It is suggested by 19% of the junior, but only 9% of the senior, respondents.⁹

We see, then, that while superior and subordinate share the same concerns of the possibility of trust, the fear of loneliness, and the search for something or someone to depend on, these concerns are more acute in the subordinate and the young.

⁸But it is possible to interpret these results in another light, i.e., that the younger respondents identify with the man seeking the letter in the story and see the superior as giving in to them; while the older respondents see themselves as not likely to be swayed by "illegitimate" pressure from below.

⁹Here too, however, we should note that subjective distortion of the situation may be at work: the senior group is confident that those in authority (themselves) are likely to be fair and understanding; so they suggest "complaining to the kacho's superior." But the junior group does not share this confidence.

	refuse flatly	Éive work record only	yield to subordi- nate	"1t depends on <u>why</u> "	egree but write un- fevoreble letter	other	DKNA	Total
Age:			×				-	
22 34	22	18	15	5	3	4	4	71
35-45	25	15	10	3	1	3	0	57
46-62	33	13	5	5	6	2	5	69
Total	80	46	30	13	10	9	9	197
	•				•			

Chart 26: Part 4, question 2: "The

Letter of Introduction" Problem

Age:	go and tell him	do your best	complain to his superior	other	an individual problem	slowdown	DKONA	Totel
•••20••		1			i.			
22 - 34	40	13	3	8	4	l	2	71
35-45	41	12	2.	0	1	1	0	57
46-62	40	6	9	6	4	0	4	69
Total	121	31	14	14	9	2	б	197

Chart 27: Part 4, question 4: "The New and Overbearing Kacho" Problem

The older and more senior individual, after all, has already achieved something: he has a public role of respect and authority which allows him to feel that he has demonstrated his own worth in the eyes of others. Thus he does not have to struggle as violently to prove himself--to be recognized, respected, and "in"--as his younger counterpart.

This suggests that, just as dependency needs are stronger in the subordinate, so is the pressure to cope with them by the reactive mechanism of defensive assertion. The leader does not need to defend against his needs to be in, to be trusted, to communicate, and to "rely" to the same extent, because, at the top of the pseudo-hierarchy of the Japanese organization, he can relax in the certainty of his own "worth" and "strength" given by his role. When his dependent needs are satisfied in action, they are not as threatening to his self-image as in the case of the subordinate: because they can be interpreted and justified in terms of "responsibility" to one's followers, and in terms of the "nurturant" and "all-embracing" ideal leader image--where "giving in" may be really "taking care of" the subordinates, and doing one's duty to the group.

Our evidence suggests, then, that the strategy of "defensive assertion" is likely to be more common in subordinates than in superiors, $\sqrt{2}$ since dependent needs can be more easily accepted by the latter than the former. Of the alternate strategies discussed earlier in this chapter, that of defensive assertion is more tempting for the follower and that of dependence for the leader. Backhanded corroboration of this hypothesis is found in the rules of action outlined by one respondent, manager of the branch office of a large firm, in an interview:

What you have to do up to the rank of kacho is to advance in slow and orderly fashion. The important thing is simply not to make mistakes. Don't make grandstand plays! Advance soberly and unpretentiously (jimi ni). 200.

Don't be too rash and don't do what you are not told to do, which is the temptation of ambition.

But after you become a kacho, when the seniority system is no longer in strict effect -- then you should act decisively, show initiative and leadership.

What one has to do at each stage is to resist its characteristic temptation. The subordinate is tempted, by the mechanism of defensive assertion, to show "fight" and wild initiative. The superior, having less intensely to prove to himself that he is really strong, capable, and decisive, is tempted to settle back into a tempting reliance on his subordinates.

These considerations help to explain why, given the two theoretical alternate combinations of strategies which grow out of the psychological environment of the Japanese organization, the pattern of the defensively assertive leader and the dependent subordinate is relatively rare; and the pattern of the defensive subordinate and the dependent leader, which paves the way for the seepage of authority, is the more common; at least in the modern bureaucratic organizations which are the focus of our \sim ? investigation.

f. The Seepage of Authority

We have examined the nuclear emotional concerns, the mutual images, and the strategies of defense of the superior and the subordinate in the Japanese organization, and we have suggested several ways in which the interplay of these factors brings about the phenomenon of the seepage of authority.

In order to estimate the nature and the dimensions of the seepage of authority in reality, we can refer to data drawn from the hypothetical situations posed in part 4 of the survey, and compare the responses of the Japanese sample with those of the Russian and American samples of the original research.¹⁰

Chart 28 shows the responses, by national grouping, to the story of the section chief who finds that the efficiency of his department and its productivity keep falling for unknown reasons. He has four principal choices: he may try to find out, in friendly cooperation with his subordinates, where the problem is; he may discipline them more severely; he may try to manipulate them by working through a trusted subordinate; or he may try to pass the buck on up to his own superior.

1% of the Japanese sample chooses the alternative of a crackdown on discipline, as opposed to 41% of the Russian and 15% of the American group.

¹⁰<u>Cf</u>. Hanfmann, E., and Getzels, J.W., <u>op. cit</u>. It is to be noted that the Japanese data are not strictly comparable in methodological terms with those of the earlier survey. In the Hanfmann-Getzels research the situations were posed orally, and responses were categorized later; while in the Japanese survey the situations were posed in writing and responses were given in a ready-made multiple choice framework.

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	Russian	American	Japanese
Explore:	19%	48%	75%
Discipline:	, 41	15	1
Manipulate:	19	15	18
Pass the Buck:	21	22	2
Other: -	0	·	1
DKNA:	0		3

CHART 28:

Part IV, question 1: the "decline of productivity" problem in cross-cultural perspective

2% of the Japanese sample chooses to pass the responsibility upward, as opposed to 22% of the American and 21% of the Russian group.

203.

But 75% of the Japanese sample chooses intimate, friendly and cooperative exploration of the problem; as opposed to 48% of the American and 19% of the Russian group.

These results corroborate what we have expected to find: that authority, in the Japanese organizational framework, is not wielded in unambiguous, unilateral, and domineering fashion by the superior; and that it is not easily given up to one's superior; and that its proper exercise is seen to be defined by the cultural imperatives of trust, harmony, and intimacy.

Chart 29 shows the responses, by national grouping, to the "letter of introduction" problem described on pages 196 and 197.

The Japanese sample is less inclined flatly to refuse the insistent demand of the subordinate who is changing jobs (41% choose this alternative, as opposed to 49% of the Russian, and 55% of the American, sample).

The Japanese respondents see less virtue in the device of covert rejection--giving the subordinate a letter which purports to be what he wants but is actually an honest and unflattering appraisal--than the other cultural groups (5%, as opposed to 13% of the Russian and 9% of the American samples).

Our respondents are also less likely to choose the alternative of complete fulfillment of the subordinate demand; 29% of the Russian, 27% of the American, but only 16% of the Japanese sample gives in entirely.

	Russian	American	Japanese
Refuse	49%	55%	41%
Covert Rejection	13	9	5
Partial Fulfillment	9	9	20
Complete Fulfillment	29	27	16
Evade the Problem		//	5
"It Depends on Why"	11	. //	7
DKNA	11	11	5

CHART 29:

Part IV, question 2: the "letter of introduction" problem in cross-cultural perspective

Those responses favored by the Japanese group relative to the others are responses of compromise, evasion, or "it depends." They will write a letter of introduction which consists of a formal work record only (20%); or they will argue that such a situation could not arise in a properly conducted office (5%); or they will write, in the space provided for "other" answers, that the proper course of action depends not on how able the subordinate is, but on why he wants to leave his job (7%).

205.

The avoidance at all costs of superior-subordinate conflict, the evasion or postponement of difficult or divisive problems, the search for a unifying compromise, and the insistence upon particularistic given cases rather than universal and inflexible rules or precedents: these too are characteristic and necessary facets of the exercise of authority in the Japanese group.

The seepage of authority phenomenon, as described in the earlier sections of this study, and as it appears here in our data, is essentially a unique pattern of action which is limited by the nuclear emotional concerns, defined by the mutual images and projections, and shaped by the strategies of defense of leader and follower. Holding in balance, offsetting, and satisfying as much as possible the sometimes incommensurable needs of the participants, it is the particular Japanese answer? to the problem of psyche-organizational equilibrium.

For the sake of being "in," the leader defers to his subordinates; and the subordinates demand participation in the exercise of decision as a tangible proof and reassurance that they are not excluded. For the sake of harmony, the "selfish" leadership of flat assertion and unilateral decision is discouraged; and a pseudo-hierarchical compromise on promotion by seniority is evolved, which inevitably widens the discrepancy between formal and real power-holders.

For the sake of the preservation of trust, the leader must have no secrets from the follower: the demand that he be trusted motivates the subordinate's drive for power and prevents the leader's "manipulatory" exercise of it.

For the sake of obtaining the feeling of "true communication"--so difficult to get and so deceptive to exercise--the follower demands intimacy, and the leader resorts to methods of information-gathering which erode and circumscribe his freedom to act.

In a world where exclusion, aggression, mistrust and isolation are threatening possibilities, where the individual searches desperately for something to rely on and seeks, in consequence, all the more determinedly to prove himself self-reliant, able, and "recognized" by others, the mechanism of defensive assertion appeals to superior and subordinate alike. But its primary appeal is to the subordinate, whose conflict is felt more strongly, and its primary effect is to reinforce the seepage of authority rather than the pseudo-dominance of the insecure "authoritarian" leader.

The informal delegation of power by the leader, the informal arrogation of authority by the subordinate, compromise, evasion, and the "it depends" blurring of the lines of authority in the intimacy of unanimity: these elements, which make up the seepage of authority, prevent either leader or follower from being the evil opposite of the

other's fears; present both leader and follower to the eyes of the other as a reassuring projection of his own weaknesses; and give scope, to both superior and subordinate, to see themselves in the role of the "ideal" image of the other's wishes.

Chapter 11: The Recession of Decision and the Proliferation of Faction

Together with seepage of authority, recession of decision and proliferation of faction constitute the three defining characteristics of the Japanese psycho-organizational equilibrium. This chapter completes the analysis, begun in chapter eight, of the psychological basis for these three interlinked phenomena, in terms particularly of the nuclear emotional concerns of trust, harmony, inclusion, and communication.

We consider first the recession of decision, then the proliferation of faction; and suggest finally some systemic rules summarizing the relationship between individual psychological concerns and organizational behavior--in the Japanese model--which has been the focus of the study.

a. the Recession of Decision

The recession of decision phenomenon, as described in chapter four, is that syndrome of organizational decision-making and bargaining behaviors defined by a stress on 1) unanimous participation; 2) the requirement of consensus and the banning of open conflict; 3) the requirement of "arrangement in advance," by which informal decision-making devices must precede formal decisions; 4) the avoidance of rules and precedents in favor of a "case by case" approach; and 5) the recession of decision in organizations to lower levels of authority than those formally specified.

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 The demand for universal participation originates in straightforward fashion from the nuclear dilemmas of inclusion, trust, harmony and communication.

Where "being in" is so important, it is obvious that being "left out"--as in the numerous stories of ostracism stimulated by TAT 1--may have serious consequences for the individual excluded from deliberations and for the group excluding him. Exclusion stimulates mistrust and anger. Nothing is a more threatening prospect than the fear, expressed by a technical officer in the government bureaucracy, that "only certain people will examine the problem and make the decision."

Thus the exclusion of any individual who has some claim, however faint, to concern with the matter under discussion arouses fear, resentment, and animosity which will be directed against the participants in the decision and the policy which is the outcome of the "exclusive" meeting. A 32-year old government kakaricho spelled out the consequences in a story to TAT 1:

In a section conference ... one man's opinion differs, and the situation becomes complicated and begins to get out of hand.

Finally the heretic leaves his seat, but he is bewildered as to whether he ought to leave the room or not, because he still has some concern with the outcome of the conference.

The other four can do nothing but go on with their meeting. They do make a plan, but it meets passive sabotage ("shokyokuteki sabotaju") from within the section.

Afterwards dark clouds continue to hand over their record.

Q

 Not only the execution of policy, but the survival of the group itself is threatened by selective exclusion. A 55-year old administrator writes, of the same TAT,

210.

Some sort of conference to which one man is not admitted. Can't quite tell -- they might be talking about his bad conduct.

This sort of thing is not only bad for the individual in question, but it will also destroy the group (danketsu o hakai suru).

Since the survival of the group, in the minds of its members, represents a panacea against the ills of mistrust, lack of communication, the open expression of aggression, and aloneness, it cannot be threatened; and consequently, in the decision-making process, no one can seem to be excluded. Similarly, the authority of the "good" leader rests in part on his talent for making everyone feel included; and if he fails in this, not only his own authority, but the existence of the group which is the field for its exercise, will be endangered.

Just as central to the concept of the recession of decision as the requirement of consensus. Harmony must be preserved, and open conflict avoided, at all costs. And nothing excites more aggression than to be "ignored" by the majority. The self-image of the individual, based on his vision of what is due his public persona, can be unbearably wounded if he finds himself in a position where the rest of the group opposes his position: He presented a proposal at a section meeting, but the others didn't agree. His feelings hurt, he leaves his seat. The others exchange glances, and he feels this in his back.

When your opinion is crushed by numbers a spirit of antagonism arises (iken o kazu de oshitsubusu to tairitsu kanjo ga okoru).

Like his colleague quoted above, a 43-year old kacho sees, in TAT 4, open conflict between majority and minority as damaging to the feelings of the minority and hence to the stability of the group:

A threatening mood has settled over the meeting. ... The various groups which make up the anti-mainstream faction have been completely ignored by the main-stream faction in its high-handed posture of the last few days. Now they have lost patience and are trying desperately to avert the coming emergency.

At first they were dumbfounded to be so ignored. Now one can see on their faces an expression of hate for the main-stream faction.

But no good compromise plan arises. So the antimain-stream faction resorts to a mass walkout.

The mass walkout, as the physical embodiment of the group's disintegration, is the final weapon of the minority.

Thus consensus, rather than, for example, voting, must be the mechanism by which decisions are made in this context. Not only does the repression of aggression and the difficulty of communication mean that a meaningful vote would be difficult to achieve, through the absence of frank and open proliminary discussion; but also the vote, as a schematic and formal division of the group into those who get their way and those who are "ignored," can appear to the participant only as

a "crushing by numbers" leading inevitably to antagonism, and to a loss of that "harmony" which it is imperative to maintain.

Not only voting, but the threat of any open division of opinion, arouses aggression, mistrust and resentment in those on the "losing" side; as in this story to TAT 1, written by a 49-year old bucho:

After the conference is over, B and C, the men at left and right, try to persuade the kacho D, sitting with his back to the window, to override completely (massatsu suru) the dissenting opinion of A, the standing man.

A is angry, mortified, and humiliated. He begins to feel scorn and antagonism for kacho D, although he has respected him previously.

Kacho D must act more prudently and judiciously.

Thus "judicious" leadership in the Japanese context must always imply consensual decision-making. The anger and humiliation stemming from frustration of the need to be "in" on the part of any group member is too threatening to the group's stable performance for it to be otherwise.

Consensual decision-making, in which conflict or disagreement must never appear openly, helps to explain the third characteristic feature of the recession of decision syndrome, which is the reduction of the regular decision meeting or conference to a formality and the reliance upon "arrangement in advance."

Real discussion of real issues tends to be pushed farther and farther back and down into the organizational hierarchy. The issues must be thrashed out thoroughly in advance of any formal meeting at some nexus of communication at which conflict can be handled without the possibility of damage to the self-esteem of the participants and without exciting the resentments associated with the possibility of openly being "humiliated," "ignored," or "crushed by numbers."

Where this process of "nemawashi" (trimming the roots) or "shitasodan" (preliminary subordinate conference) is ignored, communication cannot be attained, conflict cannot be handled, and mistrust becomes endemic. So a 38-year old kacho saw in TAT 1 a picture of the head of one department spying on a meeting of another. A problem was being discussed in which his own department had an interest, but he had not been informed. Eavesdropping was necessary because

> ...in mutual relations with other sections, unless there is sufficient joint consideration and reflection, and unless "nemawashi" is carried out thoroughly, means of gathering information have to be distorted.

Thus formal conferences can never succeed unless the process of arrangement in advance has been meticulously adhered to first; if "trimming the roots" and arrangement in advance have been properly done, formal conferences will be successful--but they will be only formalities.

Where real decision-making recedes in this manner to the level of the informal preliminary discussion, it is understandable that there can be no reliance upon universal rule or precedent to settle an issue. Each situation, and the participants involved, constitutes a unique case. So the rules cannot be pushed too far. The importance of role or persona to the parties involved makes the crude application of an impersonal rule unsatisfactory as a formula for the "harmonization of interests" (iken-chosei). Each side is bound by what it conceives is due its own public role and by the pressures and interests of those it represents. Each side expects the other to understand its own position, even if this understanding has to be the result of the tacit communication process, with the many pitfalls inherent therein.

The necessity to attain true communication and at the same time to avoid exciting anger or conflict means that, as a kacho in an economic pressure group said when interviewed,

> You can't be too aggressive and you can't go around quoting regulations in the negotiating process. You must appear soft and flexible.

If you bite onto the problem too fiercely, you can't talk to anyone about it (kuitsuitara hanasanai).

Thus all agreements tend to be unique and transitory rather than rule- or precedent-bound; not contract, but sensitive mutual adjustment, is the key to fairness and workability. As one respondent said in an interview,

Foreigners want to have everything cut and dried. One foreign bank, for example, has even begun to draw up contracts covering the amount of compensating balances required for a loan.

This is clumsy and unskillful (umaku nai). It's much better to go to the client and say, 'I've got * to have a little more money in your account or my .prestige will suffer as a result of our deal.

 \mathbf{C}

Never put down a fixed figure, always leave it subject to negotiation. Then when circumstances change, amounts and interest rates can be adjusted according to what both sides can afford, what both sides want, and what the individuals on both sides need for a successful performance in their individual capacities.

The final element in the recession of decision syndrome is the devolution of decision to lower levels of authority than those formally specified. And it will be seen that this factor, which can, of course, be viewed as another aspect of the seepage of authority, is a necessary product of the action of the preceding four elements in the syndrome.

Everyone must seem to be included in the decision-making process, because of the fear of being "out" and the "nodes of resentment" (shikori) which exclusion may bring about. Thus the balance of power is tipped away from the upper, and toward the lower, levels of rank.

No one can be ignored; no one's opinion can be "crushed by numbers"; decisions must be consensual. Where they are not, the threat of "passive sabotage" is always present. These factors too combine to make the unilateral imposition of policy from above difficult or impossible.

The practice of "arrangement in advance" tends to put the responsibility for practical bargaining, negotiating, and decision on those whose public roles are not so rigidly demanding, and who are less visible in the organization. So "nemawashi" must generally be done by, or through, subordinates.

Q

The insistence upon the "case by case" aspect of decisions, and the rejection of the rule, intensifies the combined effect of the other aspect of the syndrome. For where the rule in general is ignored, so too will be that particular rule that fixes the responsibility for decision on those in formal positions of leadership.

Thus the recession of decision phenomenon grows organically out of the four nuclear dilemmas which define the emotional climate of the Japanese group.

The importance of "being in" means that everyone must take part in the decision-making process. The demand for trust, and the fear of mistrust, heighten the dangers of leaving, or appearing to leave, anyone out. The deification of harmony and the strict taboo on open conflict mean that all decisions must seem to be consensual. And the problem of communication puts the responsibility for arranging consensus on those who are not formally entitled--but by this very fact are informally more qualified--to do so.

b. The Proliferation of Faction

We saw in chapter 5 that the proliferation of faction was inextricably bound up with the related phenomena of seepage of authority and recession of decision. This section examines the ways in which faction, like the other two related phenomena comprising the structural side of the Japanese psyche-organization equilibrium, grows out of the abiding nuclear psychological concerns of the members of such organizations.

• The faction or clique--"the most deeply rooted historic form of Japanese social organization"¹--is a social device which satisfies the needs of the participant for trust, harmony, the feeling of communication and "in-ness"; because it is satisfying to the individual it also, to use Barnard's formulation, maintains "the efficiency of the cooperative system."

The desire for inclusion or "belonging," as we have seen, is a central need of the respondents in our survey. If, then, the formal organization taken As a whole is too impersonal and large-scale, the formation of a factional group within it satisfies needs which it cannot meet. The individual may join a faction to feel "in," to feel protected, and to enhance his sense of comradeship (nakama-ishiki). In the same way, if his formal superior does not fill the role of the "good leader," he gains, by factional membership, a benevolent substitute who has "embracingness" and "human-ness." The factional leader too, of course, gains "good subordinates," whose "self-confidence," initiative, drive, and "fight" give him the comfortable feeling of security and support which a purely formal relationship of superior and subordinate would not.

Factionalization is a device to supply "inclusion," and thus "exclusion" stimulates the process of clique-formation. This relationship is made explicit in the analysis, by a 46-year old bucho, of TAT 1:

¹Scalapino and Masumi, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 122.

Five men who work in the same department... Two employees, B and C, are having a lively discussion with kakaricho A. D, sitting with his back turned, is an outcast (nokemono). He wants to join the discussion but he can't.

Another kakaricho, E, passes by, and seeing the situation feels resentment against A, B, and C ... He sympathizes with D and expresses his resentment and sympathy openly.

Thus dissension arises and factions are formed.

The dilemma of trust and mistrust is also closely linked with the proliferation of faction. A generalized mistrust of the world around one (Maruyama's "higaisha-ishiki"), and a fear that one might be dominated by stronger others, lead to a retreat into faction as to a refuge in which "trust" is possible, and in which one is simultaneously freed from the fear of being dominated or taken over and allowed to satisfy the need to be dependent. Being "dominated" by the faction, which, in Maruyama's words, "takes care of everything" (marugakae), and, in Nakane's, "wraps one up in a 'family'" (kazoku-gurumi), saves one from the threat of being dominated by the outside world. The need is defended against by its partial satisfaction in the factional context.

The faction solves the dilemma of trust and mistrust by directing "trust" to the in-group and "mistrust" to the outgroup. Its cohesion can only be threatened by the penetration of mistrust into the inner circle, as in the story of a 35-year old banker to TAT 4:

Two mutually antagonistic groups. Two men belonging to the first group try to persuade a man from the second to join their own, by telling him that the others of his group have betrayed him.

Factions also serve an essential communications function. If an over-commitment to formal role or public persona, and the fear of exciting dissension or conflict by excessive frankness, restrict the possibilities of getting through to the other, then the faction, with its warm sense of belongingness and its pseudo-kin atmosphere, provides a facility for the swift and comparatively open exchange of information. The vertical faction provides such communications channels up and down, and the horizontal group (like the "same age circle," donenkai, or the "same year of entrance" circle) opens similar channels across and between organizations.

The faction is also, of course, a tool for capturing power where the seepage of authority phenomenon leaves power diffuse and its whereabouts uncertain. We noted in Chapter 8 that the repression of aggression in the organization which defies "harmony" can tend to intensify ambition and competition. The faction is a tool for ambition, and its effectiveness in this task is increased by the fact that the "goodness" of its comradeship disinfects, as it were, the aggressive drive for advancement with might otherwise be less acceptable. Aggressive assertions in the service of individual ambition is "unharmonious" and so illicit; but ambition in the service of the group is no vice.

All these themes are evident in this explanation of the functioning of a factional group by a respondent who filled the role of its leader:

The best way to get ahead is never to do anything yourself that you don't have to. If I have a job to do I give it to someone else whom I can trust.

First I sound out candidates for my group to see if we can get along together and if we understand each other. Then I give them a trial to test their ability.

Now I have a group of ten or twelve juniors whom I can rely upon for help. I give them credit for their work -- I say, 'this proposal is based on a memo X wrote', or something like that.

The best thing I can give them in return is information. They want more than anything else to know what's going on at higher levels.

So I show them new confidential documents, tell them what happened at meetings, and so on. As we help each other out the group gradually expands, and we all gain.

The faction, then, is a social group in which people can "trust" and "understand" each other. It serves the ambition of its members for advancement and recognition; and it works through the sharing of information, for, in a context where communication is difficult, knowledge is more than ever power. And factional members, whether leader or follower, can "rely" upon each other for 'help."

The proliferation of faction in the Japanese organization is a result of the balance of two conflicting tendencies. On the one hand, the cultural and psychological strain toward the ideals of harmony, solidarity, and inclusion tends toward ever larger and more inclusive groups. On the other hand, the image of the "ideal" leader-follower relationship, the demand for intimate and personal communication and trust, and the deflection of aggressive drives into fierce but muffled competition push toward the fragmentation of the group into cliques.

The larger the group, the more the pressure toward fragmentation; since the impersonality and complexity of the large-scale organization exacerbates the needs for intimacy and communication which the faction satisfies, and since the larger the group, the greater the power at its disposal and the more ambiguous that power's locus.

We may see Japanese organization, then, as an ever-shifting system of factional relationships, coalescing or dissolving on specific issues, organized sometimes as concentric circles of wider and wider loyalties, split sometimes and reorganized by kaleidoscopic shifts in the existential context of issues, ranks, and personalities.

This factional structure not only helps to satisfy the individual's needs for inclusion, harmony, trust, and communication, but also, and as a result, helps to perform the essential organizational functions of communication, delegation, suggestion, and promotion.

In the process, the proliferation of faction continually recreates the emotional atmosphere out of which it grows. It solves the dilemma of inclusion by selective exclusion; the dilemma of trust by the projection of mistrust; the dilemma of communication by providing channels whose exclusiveness sets barriers to general communication; and the dilemma of harmony and dissent by setting a framework in which aggressive needs, transformed into the drive for advancement and power, can be used in the service of its own harmonious group.

Maruyama, as we noted in Chapter 7, saw the proliferation of faction, the continual process of social sub-division, as the cause of the characteristic individual-psychological sense of isolation, mistrust, ~? and weakness he called "higai-sha-ishiki."² But the chain of causation is circular. The central emotional needs of the participants in the Japanese organization eventuate in a characteristic structural pattern; and this pattern of factionalization in its turn reinforces the nuclear individual dilemmas which give it birth.

Vide supra. p. 108 and note 27 to chapter 7.

One respondent, a young "management engineer" stated the consequences of this relationship bluntly in his explication of TAT 4, which he saw as the confrontation of two factional groups:

> Since it is fun (tanoshii koto de aru) to criticize others, and it is fun to have sympathetic comrades, it isn't likely that this condition of confrontation will be dissolved.

c. Some Systemic Relationships

The last four chapters have examined the principal components of the Japanese psycho-organizational equilibrium: on the one hand, the central psychological concerns of inclusion, trust, communication, and harmony; and on the other, the characteristic structural patterns of behavior of seepage of authority, recession of decision, and proliferation of faction.

These elements are linked in a system whose keynote is paradox: the tension between formal and informal, between appearance and reality. The Japanese psyche-organization equilibrium sets up elaborate formal systems to defend against the explosion of chaotic and undisciplined emotional needs, and then retreats from the use of these systems to maximize informal flexibility. It is a system which creates a climate of paradox, in which appearance and reality never coincide.

Thus the pseudo-hierarchy of the seniority system is a formal and rigid response, in the form of the repression of aggression, to what might otherwise be a continual bitter struggle for supremacy. But the imposition of this artificial device makes necessary a looser informal structure and the seepage of authority. Similarly, the formalities of "correct" (reigi-tadashii) behavior are a defensive integument within which personal intercourse may be carried on without the dangers which emotional confrontation can produce in a society whose members identify so closely with their public roles and owe so much of their personality to the recognition of others. But these formalities bring about a condition in which the only "real" communication becomes the tacit kind.

The stress on inclusion and harmony in the group produces the demand for formal consensus in the decision-making process; but it is this demand which helps to bring about the recession of decision: the requirement that everyone be included ends by making the true locus of decision invisible.

The formal demand for harmony is linked in the same way to the proliferation of faction: in which trust is achieved on a basis of mistrust, communication by non-communication, inclusion by exclusion, and harmony by aggression in the service of the informal group.

And this climate of paradox is one in which "true meanings" and real realities are always uncertain. It is a climate in which trust is uncertain; in which communication and "understanding" are difficult to achieve; in which aggression and resentment are tangible but invisible; and no one knows what is "in" and what is "out." It works, thus, to strengthen the needs which bring it about.

In the drive for inclusion, trust, harmony and communication the most elaborate and byzantine structural devices arise as safeguards against the opposites of these elements. But the working of the

structural devices in reality tends toward the perpetuation of the individual emotional concerns with which they evolved to cope.

It is this continuing balance of mutual causation between individual psychology and organizational structure which constitutes the equilibrium state of the Japanese model.

This equilibrium of institutional form and inner needs is a balanced irrationality. The system maintains itself in order, but the order does not appear on the surface.

Just as Japanese civilization, in a country where the earth itself is unstable, has created the most formal houses, gardens, and fields in the world; so institutional form--Japanese or otherwise--must be analyzed at several levels.

On the surface there is the rectilinear, rational, clearly delineated table of organization and chain of command, hanging like a print of the Acropolis on the wall of a Japanese house: a structure to which it has very little relation and to whose intricacies it offers few significant clues. Then there is the house itself, the organic blend of formal and informal within which the individual lives and works, accepting unconsciously its controlled but non-logical balance. And this structure rests on the deepest, most turbulent, and most uncontrollable drives and needs of the individuals whose interaction comprises it, as a delicate and graceful villa rests on the rank vegetation and earthquake-ridden volcanic earth of Japan.

Part V: Conclusion, Evaluation, and Prediction

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"Le Japon pourra nous emprunter nos arts, notre industrie, même notre organisation politique; il ne laissera pas d'appartenir à une autre espèce sociale que la France et l'Allemange."1

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Chapter 12: The Hypotheses and the Evidence

The preceding section explored the psychological elements and emotional concerns most in evidence in the survey and interview data of the study, and described the ways in which these nuclear concerns motivate and shape the characteristic structural patterns of Japanese organization. In this final section we examine the evidence as to the correctness of our initial psychological hypotheses, consider how well the psyche-organization system works in its own terms, and describe some factors whose effect may bring about change in the system.

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We want first to return to the question raised at the end of Chapter 7, in connection with the differing psychological hypotheses put forward to explain Japanese organizational behavior. First, whether the "authoritarian model," the "dependent model," or the "mixed model" fits our data best; and second, if the mixed model is adopted, whether differing personality orientations are most economically explicable in terms of class and cultural tradition, with Kawashima, or in terms of individual styles of adaptation to a common set of environmental factors, with Benedict.

¹Emile Durkheim, <u>Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique</u>, Paris, 1967, p. 88, note.

a. Authoritarian, Dependent, or Mixed

It is apparent that if we had to choose on the basis of our data between the authoritarian and the dependent hypotheses the dependent hypothesis would fit the facts better. The nuclear concerns of the sample are not those of strength and weakness, dominance and submission, super- and sub-ordination; nor does the strong-man, one-man leader pattern of handling authority appear to our respondents as necessary or desirable.

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It is rather inclusion, harmony, trust, and intimate communication which are the beacons lighting and mapping the mental landscape of the typical member of the modern administrative elite. Authority is consensual, tolerant, and diffuse. "Humanity" and coldness; nurturance and succorance; dependence and independence; security and "membership" as opposed to isolation and uncertainty: all these central dilemmas fit the dependence theme rather than the authoritarian.

But the authoritarian hypothesis cannot be dismissed completely. The phenomenon of "defensive assertion" in the leader; the pervading concern of the sample with the problem of whether the world around one can be trusted; and the cultural stress on the values of hierarchy, deference, and abasement to persons of higher status²; elements such as these indicate that the Japanese psycho-organizational equilibrium,

²Berrien, F.K., "Japanese versus American Values," <u>Journal of Social</u> <u>Psychology</u>, vol. 65, 1965, pp. 181-191. while it is not essentially "authoritarian," has aspects which mimic authoritarian traits.

How can the relative importance of the two themes be measured? One way is to turn to those projective questions in the survey which deal with problems of power and authority, and check the proportion of the sample who give answers indicating a concern with problems of dominance and submission.

To question 1 of part 3, "When ordered to do it, he ...", 35% of those answering complete the sentence with a response like "does it with alacrity" or "resents it." Answers of this sort can be construed to indicate an authoritarian concern, whereas the more common responses, "thinks about how best to do it," or simply "does it," cannot (see chart 30).

Similarly, to SCT 2, "In the presence of his superior...", 32% respond with "he is tense" or "he feels antipathy or deceit"; most respondents complete the sentence with "he does his best", or "he is courteous," or "there is no change in his attitude."

"When he receives an order he knows is wrong," only 25% of the respondents see the subordinate as accepting the order without question or say only that he "ought" to question it (chart 32).

We conclude, then, that authoritarian concerns are salient for only a minority of our sample. This conclusion is strengthened by a glance at our earlier data. Only 2% see the good leader as "strict" (chart 15);

	considers how best , to do it, then does it	does 1t	does it with alacrity	resents; dawdles; quelifies	DKWA	Total
Age:		× 1	-			
22 - 34	29	17	17	6	2	71
35-45 46-62	23	10	18	4	2	57
46-62	17	28	1.6	5	3	69
Total	69	55	51	15	7	197

Chart 30: SCT 1: "When ordered to do it, he"

	he is courteous	hé'is tense	he does his best	there is no change	he feels dqceit o entipathy	other	DKUNA	Total	
Age:				9 4 ,					
22-34	17	10	17	13	5	2	8	71	
35-45	19	14	9	. 8	5	2	2	57	-
46-62	14	21	13	8	2	6	8	. 69	-
Total	50	45	39	29	12	10	18	197	١

Chart 31: SCT 2: "In the presence of

his superior ..."

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	states his op1- nion openly	questions 1t tentatively	"ought" to quee-	doesn't question the order	refuses to cerry out the order	feels silent contempt	other	Digita Vital	'lotal	
Age:									-	
22-34	29	22	8	б	3	1	0	2	71	
35 45	20	14	11	5	5	1	.0	1	57	-
46-52	20	21	7	11	4	1	l	4	69	•
Total	69	57	26	22 (12	3	l	7	197	-

Chart 32: SCT 3: "When he receives an order

he knows is wrong ..."

only 2% feel that the best way to treat a subordinate is "strictly" (chart 16); only 16%, asked to name the worst qualities in a leader, suggest "domineering" or "authoritarian" (chart 17); only 14% see the worst way to treat a subordinate as in authoritarian fashion (chart 18); only 6% say that the most important quality in a good subordinate is that he be "humble" (chart 20); and only 13% of the sample sees the bad subordinates as "insubordinate" or "rebellious" (chart 21).

In each of the survey items dealing with power relationships the modal response is one which fits the dependent hypothesis more than the authoritarian. Answers indicating authoritarian concerns represent a sizable proportion of the total only in those cases where the interpretation of the response in terms of the dominance-submission complex is a generous one: for example, "In the presence of his superior ... he is nervous"; or "When ordered to do it ... he does it quickly."

We conclude, then, that some of our respondents, but only a relatively small percentage, are disposed to see the world in an authoritarian framework; that our initial hypothesis, the "mixed" model, was correct; and that we were also correct in predicting that of the two trends, the dependent would be more salient.

b. Class Tradition or Individual Style

We must now answer the second question raised in Chapter 7 about the origins of the authoritarian strain: shall we assume, with Kawashima, that paternalistic, authoritarian, and "Confucian" attitudes are a product of an upper-class or old-fashion elite upbringing, and that more

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egalitarian attitudes are the product of a native background common to the mass of the people? Or shall we assume with Benedict that authoritarian rigidity and the dependent syndrome are simply two alternate styles of coping with the strains set up in the individual by the Japanese socialization process?

In order to answer this question we have to make a distinction between the most "authoritarian" members of the sample and the others. The most convenient way to do this is to use the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale scores, if we can demonstrate that, in our Japanese sample, as well as in other cultural contexts, "dogmatism" and "authoritarianism" are measures of the same basic phenomenon.

In order to be able to make this assumption, we shall take the 20% of the sample with the highest "dogmatism" scroes, and see if their answers to the other projective questions are typically authoritarian.

The Japanese dogmatist votes conservative (see chart 33). But this may be an artificial association, for, as we have seen, the older members of the sample are more dogmatic than the younger, and they are also more likely to vote conservative. Age, rather than dogmatism, may be the causal factor.

The dogmatic person accepts orders uncritically. "When ordered to do it, he ..." is less likely to give the modal response, "consider how best to do it and then carry it out." (See chart 34).

This submissive and unquestioning attitude to authority extends even to "orders he knows are wrong." The dogmatist does not question such an order, or questions it only tentatively; the rest of the sample

	otes onservati	Other Lve	Total
High Dogmatism	24	16	40
Other	62	95	157
Total	86	111	197

Chart 33: Dogmatism and Voting

	Other	Considers, then does i	To tal t
High Dogmatism	31	9	40
Other	97	60	157
Total	128	69	197

Chart 34: Dogmatism and "Ordered to Do it"

•			
High Dogmatism 🛩	25	- 15	40
Other	54	103	157
Total	79	118	197

Other

Total

Doesn't question; or only tentative 235.

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Chart 35: Dogmatism and "an Order he Knows is Wrong"

ent ^{er} star 1997 :	Trust	Other	Total	
High Dogmatism	8	32	40	
Other	21	136	157	
Total	29	168	197	

Chart 36: Dogmatism and Trust toward Subordinates

is more likely to refuse or to question such an order openly (see chart 35).

The dogmatic is more concerned with the problems of trust than the rest of the sample. He is more likely to stress that "the best way to treat a subordinate is ... to trust him" (chart 36); and that "the worst way to treat" a subordinate is ... not to trust him" (chart 37). With this greater concern for the element of trust in the superiorsubordinate relationship, the dogmatic is also less trusting: 37.5% of the total sample, but only 30% of the highly dogmatic group, score "high" on the Rosenberg Faith-in-People Scale. Loyalty, sincerity, and trust (all cultural shibboleths) are more likely to be cited by the dogmatist as "the most important thing in life" (see chart 38); but he is less sure that he will receive them. It is understandable, then, that what he likes best in another is "loyalty" (see chart 39).

The high scorer on "dogmatism" protects himself against the realization that he cares about, or is dependent on, the opinion of others. "When he discovered that they didn't like him ... he didn't care" (see chart 40).

But that this insistence on his self-sufficiency rests on an insecure foundation we see in chart 41: "If I were only ... better liked." More even than the average member of the sample he gauges his own worth by the estimates of others.

The aggressive impulses repressed so strongly in his cultural context he feels more strongly than the average: "When someone bothers him ... he gets angry" (see chart 42).

Distrus	t Other	Total.
High Dogmatism 5	35	40
Other - 12	145	157
Total · 17	180	197

Chart 37: Dogmatism and Distrust Toward Subordinates

Loyalty, Sincerity, Trust

Other Total

High Dogmatism	8	32	40
Other	25	132	157
Total	33	164	197

Chart 38: Dogmatism and "the most Important Thing in Life"

	Loyalty	Other	Total
High .Dogmatism	. 8	32	40
Other	- 14	143 -	157
Total	• 22	175	· 197

Chart 39: Dogmatism and "What I Like

Best in Him"

	Doesn't care	Other	Total
High Dogmatism	9	31	40
Other	10	147	157
Total	19	178	197

Chart 40: Dogmatism and "They Didn't Like Him"

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angle$

	others	Other	TOTAL
High Dogmetism	11	29	40
Other	14	1 43	157
Total	25	172	197

Chart 41: Dogmatism and "If I were only"

Anger, Other rage

Total

High Dogmatism	10	30	4Q
Other	24	133	157
Total	<u>34</u>	163	197

Chart 42: Dogmatism and "When Someone Bothers Him"

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But this anger is bottled up or turned against himself: "When someone insults him ... he blames himself" or "finds it unbearable" (see chart 43).

His perception of the world as not to be trusted, and of aggressive impluses, in himself and others, as strong but concealed, finds expression in the emphasis he puts on the fear of "being tricked" (see chart 44).

When the highly dogmatic respondent is frightened, he is less likely to "analyze the situation" (chart 45) and more likely to try to deny the fear and to solve the problem by forcible and unconsidered action: he "rushes in and grapples with it" (chart 46).

His avoidance of introspection leads him to seek, then, for conventional or forcible solutions to his problems. But if these are unavailable he will try to escape or ignore the situation: "when troubled, the best thing to do is ... avoid it" or "flee" (chart 47).

The dogmatist finds an answer to the complexities of life in duty and work. He may be rigid, but his rigidity includes the values of study or diligence (benkyo), and unremitting effort (doryoku, nesshin). "What he wants most to do is ... improve his work" or "innovate at work" (chart 48).

We may safely assume, then, that the psychological dynamics which lead to a "dogmatic" view of the world are indeed those of the traditional "authoritarian personality." In the Japanese context, as elsewhere,

ilian di North	Unbearable self-blame	; Other	To tal
High Dogmatism *	12	28	40
Other	25	132	157
Total	37	160	197

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Chart 43: Dogmatism and "When Someone Insults Him"

Being tricked	Other	Total	
High Dogmetism 7	33	40	
Other 13	144	1.57	
Total 20	177	197	

Chart 44: Dogmatism and "Most Afraid of"

	Analyze	Otner	Total
High Dogmatism,	4	36	40
Other .	40	117	157
Total	44	153	197

Chart 45: Dogmatism and "When Frightened" (Analyze)

"Rush in" Other Total

High Dogmatism	11	29	40
Other	20	137	157
Total	31	166	197

Chart 46: Dogmatism and "When Frightened" (Rush in)

High Dogmetism	7	33	40	
Other	11	,146	157	`.
Total	- 18	179	197	

Other

Total

Avoid, flee

.

Chart 47: Dogmatism and "When Troubled"

Innovate, Other Total improve

High Dogmatism	8	32	40
Other	17	140	157
Total	25	172	197

Chart 48: Dogmatism and "What he Wants Most to Do"

high scores on the dogmatism scale correlate highly with authoritarian attitudes and concerns.

Our next step is to see if the "dogmatic" and "authoritarian" members of the sample can be identified with the upper-class Confucian elite of the Kawashima hypothesis, as was our original assumption.

In this case the data tend to disprove our initial hypothesis. Chart 49 classifies the dogmatic high scorers and the rest of the sample against family background. An elite background (here defined as being the son of an official, a politician, or a career military officer) is negatively rather than positively correlated with dogmatism.

Dogmatic and authoritarian attitudes, then, are not associated with the offspring of the scholar-official elite and the "Confucian" family, as we supposed. But they are class-linked to a certain extent. We note in chart 50 that the only "father's status" category among our respondents which is positively associated with high dogmatism scores is that of merchant. The authoritarian strand in contemporary Japanese culture appears to be linked not with the elite but with the small entrepreneurial class.

³It would be useful to be able to compare the overall dogmatism score of this sample with the scores of samples from other cultural backgrounds. But such a comparison would be meaningless for at least three reasons: no matter how good the translation, the instrument can never be exactly equivalent in two different languages; methods of administration and/or of scoring differ; attitudes toward test-taking (e.g., nervousness or "acquiescence") almost certainly differ from culture to culture.

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	Father official, politician, officer	Other	Total
High Dogmatism	4 -	36	40
Other	34	123	157 .
Total jj	38	159	197

Chart 49: Dogmatism and Status (Father . Official, Politician, Officer)

	Father merchant	Other	Total
High Dogmatism	8	32	40
Other	13	144	157
Total	21	176	197

Chart 50: Dogmatism and Status (Father Merchant)

Further proof that dogmatism and the associated authoritarian attitudes are not "elite" traits in contemporary Japan is visible in chart 51, which differentiates the sample by the type of university attended. Respondents who went to the former imperial universities (Tokyo, Kyoto, Tohoku and Kyushu) are less likely to be found in the dogmatic category than those who attended either a private university, or a smaller, less well-known or more specialized school, or had no university education.

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The dogmatic-authoritarian syndrome is also found more readily in individuals who are employed in small or middle-sixed organizations, and less often (see chart 52) in those belonging to the elite of the giant government or private bureaucracies.

Dogmatism is not associated, in our data, with sibling position in the family of origin, which is an hypothesis for which some arguments might be adduced. It is, however, associated in an interesting way with geographical origin. Respondents from the north (Hokkaido, Tohoku) or the mountainous mid-section of the main island (Chubu) are dramatically less likely to display the authoritarian syndrome; but those from the south (Kyushu) or the former colonies (Taiwan, Manchuria, Korea, or occupied China) are correspondingly more likely (charts 53 and 54) to display high dogmatism.

Our second hypothesis, accordingly, that authoritarian or dogmatic attitudes in the Japanese cultural context are inherited by the man of the traditional elite along with his estate and his social expectations,

	Imperial university	Other	Total
High Dogmatism	13	27	40
Other 🥜	57	-100	157
Total ·	70	127	197
	-		•

Chart 51: Dogmatism and University Training

Small or medium firm

Other

Total

High Dogmetism	13	27	40
Other	21	136	157
Totel	34	163	197

Chart 52: Dogmatism and Workplace

	Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu	Other provinces	Total
High Dogmatism	- 1	39 -	40
Other	32	125	157
Total	33	164	197

Chart 53: Dogmatism and Geographical Origin

(I)

Kyushu, colonial areas Other Total

High Dogmatism	12	38	40
Other	18	139	157
Totel 30 167			197

Chart 54: Dogmatism and Geographical Origin

(II)

Tohoku, Chubu	provinces .	
High Dogmatism _ 1	- 39 -	-40
Other . 32	125	157
Total 733	164	197

Other

Total

Total

Chart 53: Dogmatism and Geographical Origin

(I)

Other

Kyushu, colonial areas

Hokkaido,

High Dogmatism 12	38	40
Other 18	139	157
Totel 30	167	197

Chart 54: Dogmatism and Geographical Origin

(II)

must be rejected. The correlation between class, family structure, and the values which Kawashima found in traditional Japan does not seem to have survived to the present. The dogmatic-authoritarian syndrome does correlate with certain background data of family status (father a merchant), geographical origin (southern or colonial), and personal status or achievement (employed in small firm); but none of these is what we predicted.

e: Psychological Conclusions

We conclude, then, that the attitudes and concerns of our sample include both authoritarian and dependent traits; that the authoritarian are less in evidence; and that a tendency in one direction or the other is not primarily a matter of class but of individual style of adaptation. These points can be amplified as follows.

The dogmatic-authoritarian syndrome in our Japanese sample stems from the same sort of psychological pressures which produce it in other cultural contexts. It is an assertion of, and reliance on, rigid conventional values; the assertion stronger, and the reliance deeper, as the individual is less confident of the world around him and less at ease with his own inner world. The dogmatic-authoritarian sticks rigidly to "safe" values and attitudes in order to give a reassuring structure to a world which is perceived as uncertain and threatening without that structure.

But while the origin of Japanese dogmatism is similar to that of the dogmatism of other cultures, its content is different. The structure given to the world, the values whose rigidity is reassuring, differ in accordance with the content of the cultural tradition.

Thus the Japanese dogmatist stresses loyalty, sincerity, and trust; values the importance of which is acknowledged by all respondents, and a stress on which is culturally characteristic. The values themselves are not "authoritarian"; but the psychological mechanism which demands that they be rigidly affirmed is.

The Japanese authoritarian does not demand strong leadership and submissive followership but "trusting" leaders and "trustworthy" followers. The former demand, orthodox in the western authoritarian tradition, would be heterodox in the Japanese context; and the dogmatist is not heterodox.

This point can be illustrated by a comparison of the scores of our highly dogmatic respondents with those of their peers on the first two questions of part 2 of the survey. These statements, on which agreement and disagreement are measured on a plus three -- minus three scale, consist of two proverbs embodying opposing views of leadership.

To the first, the Japanese equivalent of "too many cooks spoil the broth," the sample mean is 1.33 and the dogmatic mean is 1.78. The Japanese dogmatic, then, is more likely to agree with a statement emphasizing strong unilateral leadership.

To the second, however, the Japanese equivalent of "two heads are better than one," the sample mean is 1.91 and the dogmatic mean 2.16. The dogmatic here stresses even more strongly agreement with the idea of communally oriented decision-making.

We conclude that the dogmatic agrees with all parts of the traditional proverbial wisdom, like his less dogmatic peer. It is precisely the traditional wisdom which forms the content of his dogmatism. If, as here, the traditional wisdom is one which recommends communal leadership, that is the value which the dogmatic will assert.

Thus the dogmatic-authoritarian syndrome in our sample must be distinguished from a classical western authoritarianism. The Japanese dogmatic is-authoritarian in his rigid insistence on culturally sanctioned values; but the values his culture sanctions are not authoritarian.

And the content of the dogmatic ethos is available for any individual, from whatever class or origin. The protective psychological carapace of the traditional formulae allows anyone who is tempted to think in formulae to flee into it from the complexities of the real world. Our evidence suggests that, contrary to our original hypothesis, the member of the elite is trained to need this carapace less than the man whose certainty of his own worth is not buttressed by the social badges of descent, education, and rank.

These two considerations--the non-authoritarian content of the Japanese dogmatic-authoritarian syndrome, and the lack of any positive correlation of dogmatism with eliteness--help to suggest why, although we may see occasionally a "defensive assertion" of the leadership prerogative on the part of the uncertain superior, we do not find in the Japanese context the crude western authoritarianism of unalloyed dominance and submission.

We must also qualify our view of the Japanese "dependent" syndrome. Our original hypothesis, in Chapter 7, was that the seepage of authority phenomenon was primarily a result of a one-sided dependence of the leader on the follower.

What we have found, however, is that the nuclear emotional concerns of the typical member of our sample predispose not to a simple dependence of leader on follower, or to a dependence of follower on leader, but to, rather, a mutual dependence on the social group itself and on the other as the representative of the group.

To communicate intimately, to trust and be trusted, to bask in a climate of pure interpersonal harmony, and to be "in"--these concerns indicate that the primary needs of the respondents are neither the authoritarian ones of dominance and submission, nor the dependent ones of nurturance and succorance (much in evidence as these latter are), but those of affiliation: the needs of "membership."⁴

The consequence of this situation is that, whereas in the prototypical western organizations of church and army which Freud used as examples, it can be said that the followers adopt the leader as their own ego-ideal; in the Japanese organization both leader and follower

⁴Cf. Shipley, T.E., and Veroff, J., "A Projective Measure of Need for Alliliation," <u>Journal of Experimental Psychology</u>, 1952, vol. 43, pp. 349-356.

demand of themselves and of each other that each adopt the communal ego-ideal; so that the power-struggle between leader and follower consists in the competition to define the communal ego-ideal; in which struggle each side feels itself disadvantaged and dependent on the other, and the consequence of which struggle is "the seepage of authority."

The psychological model we adopt finally as most congruent with our evidence and with the workings of the Japanese psyche-organization equilibrium is the mixed model of Benedict, which sees both dependence and authoritarian rigidity as alternate modes of dealing with the characteristic areas of strain set up by a common modal pattern of socialization.

These areas of strain grow out of the conflict between the nurturant, harmonious, and secure environment of early childhood and the rigidly structured hierarchical society of the outside world into which one grows after the first few years of life. Communication, trust, harmony and complete "in-ness" have all once been possible; but they will never be completely possible again. Thus the individual is torn between longing for the utopian world of harmony and emotional symbiosis prefigured in childhood and the need to cope with the real world where groups are not and cannot be, no matter how much their members might desire it, families.

The individual can, on the one hand, defend himself against the hardness and isolation of the adult world by a severe insistence on the traditional values: values which grow out of the necessity of dealing with

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a world in which communication, trust, harmony and inclusion are difficult. The less one trusts, the more rigidly one reiterates the shibboleths of loyalty; the less one can communicate, the more important grows the subtle and wordless "understanding" of "the guys at our place."

On the other hand, the individual may manage to carry over into the adult world the certainties of childhood that the group will indeed provide an all-embracing (marugakae) satisfaction of all needs. Like the respondent quoted on page 127, he has not given up hope for a world in which there is no hurt, no blame, no disharmony, no competition, and no aggression; the strength of his hope makes him dependent on the group which might fulfill it.

In either case it is the strain between cultural ideal and cultural actuality; between childhood and adulthood, whose contrast creates the strain; which sets the problem. The nuclear concerns of our sample are the same, but the individuals of the sample differ in the means they adopt to handle their common inner dilemmas.

Because individuals are infinitely various, and all individual solutions to the problems of cooperative life are of value, the paradigm of a modal psychological model suggested here can only be "true" or helpful in broad outline and general tendency, and then only provisionally. The limitless subtlety of reality always outruns our capacity to confine it to abstract patterns, and nowhere is this more true than in the study, as here, of what men want, and how they act, and how the two are related.

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Chapter 13: Evaluation and Prediction

The preceding chapters have described the characteristically Japanese form of psycho-organizational equilibrium: a complex system in which modal psychological needs activate structural patterns of behavior, and these patterns, in their turn, satisfy, exacerbate, or reinforce individual needs and nuclear areas of emotional concern.

We have postulated a socialization process in which the contrast between the intimate warmth and freedom of the family and the cold rigidity of the tightly structured hierarchical society outside the family is of paramount importance. This contrast, we suppose, gives rise to an abiding concern in the individual with the four nuclear dilemmas of trust or mistrust, harmony or dissension, communication or the failure to communicate, and being "in" or being "out."

These concerns can be managed in many ways, but two are particularly characteristic: a dogmatic insistence on the cultural precepts which purport to give reassuringly solid "solutions" to characteristic dilemmas (the specifically Japanese form of "authoritarianism"); and an anxious concern with one's relationship to the group, seen as the only potential agent to satisfy one's needs: the pattern of affiliative dependence.

Both these patterns of adaptation, but more particularly the second, work themselves out in organizational life in such a way as to create the unique pattern whose distinguishing features are the seepage of authority, the recession of decision, and the proliferation of faction. This pattern maintains itself in equilibrium through a circular chain

of causation. Concern with the survival of the group and the maintenance of harmony leads to the repression of aggression; the repression of aggression necessitates the arbitrary device of pseudo-hierarchy or age-grade ranking; this device brings in its train semi-institutionalized systems of the abrogation of authority. As a consequence there arise the patterns of seepage of authority, recession of decision, and the proliferation of faction. The true locus of power tends to become invisible. Authority is temporary, ambiguous, and case-by-case. The uncertainty which follows intensifies covert conflict, makes communication difficult, and engenders a climate of mistrust and dissension. The effort to control these tendencies -- the most threatening of all, given the centrality of the related emotional concerns--eventuates in a reaffirmation of the importance of the group's survival and its harmony; and this reaffirmation brings the cycle back to its beginning.

This Japanese pattern of psycho-organizational equilibrium has demonstrated that it possesses great resilience over time, high adaptive capacity, and the potential to generate a high degree of sustained collective energy. This concluding chapter deals with two questions' whose significance is a function of that resilience, capacity, and potential: how well does the system work, and in what direction is it'

a. How Does it Work?

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The question, how well does the system work? involves two related areas. The first is that of the system's performance in its own terms: how well does it satisfy the basic needs of its members? The second is that of its performance in the task of goal-achievement: what and where are its characteristic functions and dysfunctions? The answer to the second question is dependent in large part on the answer to the first.

With regard to the first problem, that of need-satisfaction, the system is quite flexible in one important respect: it provides scope for a balance of the gratifications associated with exercising, or submitting to, authority for most members regardless of formal status. Those who want to feel that they are exercising power can attain this feeling, given a modicum of ability; and those who want to rely upon the security that others are exercising it--"taking care of" things-can gratify a taste for dependency regardless of rank. The leader can suit his style of command or non-command to his needs, and the follower can match gratification with accomplishment in the exercise of his informal initiative.

The system breaks down, on the other hand, when dependent needs become too conscious or remain unsatisfied. On the one hand, the need to prove that one is "really" strong, independent, and capable can give rise to the phenomenon of defensive assertion. In the leader this strategy is dysfunctional, because it evokes in the minds of his followers the image of the evil, manipulatory superior, and it tends, as a result, to increase the strains on the organization. In the follower defensive assertion can short-circuit the normally conservative processes of decision and commit the group to irrationally chosen courses of action.

When dependence remains unsatisfied, its frustration calls forth strong feelings of hostility or resentment. Turned against the self, these aggressive impulses impair the effectiveness of one individual member of the group; directed outward, they can threaten that harmony which is the condition of the group's continued existence.

In the sphere of organizational performance or goal-attainment, the system's characteristic dysfunctions are closely linked to its virtues. We shall consider first the former.

The principal dysfunctions of the system lie in the decision-making process. Their nature is indicated in an explication of the "Conference Room" TAT by a 57-year old bucho:

A policy discussion: one man, A, can't take part because he disagrees basically.

In the future it will be difficult for A to go on working with his colleagues. The boss should quickly get A into work of his own. If he can't be assimilated in any way he should probably be re-assigned.

"The man who disagrees basically can't participate (konponteki ni ... fusansei no tame ... sanka dekinai)". This is the great weakness of the strategy of consensus. Voting, although it is obviously a device ill-suited to the Japanese context, does at least ensure that within its

mechanistic and arbitrary framework opposition will be heard. In the Japanese decision-making framework opposition must be heard at the very beginning; after a consensus has crystallized there is no place for it. Initial flexibility has been replaced by a rigidity to which the deification of harmony within the group gives an overwhelming weight.

Where there are basic differences of opinion, one solution is that the dissenter yield gracefully and "melt into the group (soshiki ni tokekomu)".

When the minority is sizable, a more likely possibility is the dissolution of the group. The pressure toward the "sense of solidarity" operates, in this case, not to preserve the larger group, but to harden divisions among the sub-groups within it. Here "sticking to one's own opinion" is no longer the bad trait it is seen as when the opinion is an individual one. It becomes evidence of loyalty to one's comrades: a virtue, but one whose consequences are dysfunctional in this case for the organization.

A third possibility is outlined in a story to TAT 2 told by a 42-year old kacho in a big ex-zaibatsu firm:

Bucho and kacho talking in a separate room. Their ideas don't agree. It looks as if they will be unable to come to any decision.

A basic opposition (kon-kurabe da). The problem will be consigned to oblivion.

This possibility of dysfunction in the strategy of consensus is perhaps the one whose consequences can be most serious. Solving urgent problems by their neglect preserves the group and maintains "harmony";

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but such "solutions" may have dangerous results.

The decision-making system, then, is flexible on the surface and inflexible below. Or, to put it another way, it can deal with minor but not major differences of opinion. The strategy of consensus works well where the possibility of consensus is pre-existent. Where consensus cannot be created, the system crushes opposition, destroys itself by splitting, or ignores the demands of reality. Where the goals of the system are clear and shared by all, as is generally the case in the economic world, sometimes the case in the bureaucratic world, and not often the case in the political world, compromise is always possible, new ideas can be accepted and modified as necessary, and the system works well, if slowly.

If the split between "us" and "them" becomes explicit, and compromise and consensus are impossible, the only solutions are unhappy ones. Harmony, communication, inclusion and trust are transformed into their opposites. Intensity of commitment becomes the only criterion by which to judge policy, and violent and chaotic fluctuations are the result, a result which confirms the worst forebodings of the traditional value system about the consequences of unrestrained aggression. Happily, such a breakdown only occurs under extraordinary conditions, and never \checkmark in the bureaucratic context with which this study deals.

Certain other dysfunctions, such as the erratic flow of communication and the fluctuating nature of responsibility (on the part of the leader it may be seen as either total or nil, both of which are unrealistic and unfortunate) may be pointed out. But, potentially at least,

the most important such dysfunctional rigidity of the Japanese psychoorganizational equilibrium, as we have described it, is that, to operate smoothly, it requires an outside object of aggression, assertion, or mastery. Aggressive drives, if they are spent in open competition within the group, or turned in upon the self, can be seriously incapacitating. Aggression is most constructively channeled in the direction of mastery of the environment or competition with other groups; and there must be, thus, some object onto which the full energy of the assertive drives stifled within the group can be directed. The equilibrium of the group in isolation must always be unstable.

The system has characteristic strong as well as weak points. When the tasks of the group are clear, so that disagreement is over means, not ends; when the outside environment provides a definite other as the object of aggressive drives; when dependent needs, if acceptable to the individual, are met, and if unacceptable, are allowed to be disguised without defensive essertion; then the psycho-organizational equilibrium is stable and functions to generate great effective energy. This energy is heightened by that aspect of the pattern which makes the group itself the ultimate source of self-validation, self-recognition, and inner security; for thus the communal goals of the group are readily internal ized in the individual and are invested with a compelling power.

If these conditions are met, the smoothly functioning Japanese organization has striking flexibility and accessibility to new ideas. The mood of its members is one of unshakable optimism, intellectual curiosity,

and an envious competitive drive. Harnessed in the organizational framework these qualities generate a radically emulative and innovative capacity, a flexibility and energy, which constitute a culturally specific form of organizational virtuosity.

In the struggle for industrialization and modernization these aspects of the Japanese system have been indispensible. The openness of the leader to suggestion from below, from the younger and more modern members of the group, meant that organizational goals and methods could change drastically while the established structural forms remained constant. If and when consensus on goals and directions was reached, the capacity of the system for quick, flexible, sustained and energetic action was unparalleled.

b. Where is it Going?

The psycho-organizational equilibrium pattern described in this study has proven itself persistent throughout centuries of Japanese history. Its flaws, which can be catastrophic, are balanced by its equally striking virtues.

In the course of the last century this pattern has lived through four revolutions in the sphere of political and social values. The revolution of 1868 shattered a static Confucian orthodoxy for the new values of the west; the revolution of the thirties discarded liberal values for the newer idea of <u>gleichgeschaltet</u> tribalism; the revolution of defeat in 1945 imposed the values of a society which could not

have been more different in all spheres of organization and ideology. Today Japan is undergoing a fourth revolution, that of second-stage automated technology, mass consumption, mass communication, and the associated changes in consciousness which seem everywhere to accompany those changes in material organization.

The system has weathered the first three of these four revolutions; but the prospects for its unaltered survival in the fourth are problematic. The evidence of pressure toward change is ubiquitous but often ambiguous.

The pressure toward change in one facet of the system appears, for example, in the explication of TAT 1 by a 43-year old kacho:

A group of five has been arguing for a long time about the new economic plan. One of them has a stubborn contrary opinion. The others have used a variety of arguments, but agreement cannot be reached.

In the past adoption of such an important plan has always been conditional upon unanimous agreement. Now, with the dissenter excluded, they are debating whether they will preserve this custom or break with it.

It is unfortunate that they can't persuade the one holdout. But, since they must get started with the new plan, they break with the custom of unanimity.

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This break with the custom of unanimity is not a mechanical change in procedure; it implies a radical reversal in values, needs, and expectations. The important question is whether the vision of change depicted in this story is one with its roots in psycho-social reality, or whether it is a reflection of a fashionable interest in the goal-rational,

dispassionate, classically "bureaucratic" forms of organizational action pictured in the textbooks.

Many respondents are strongly attracted to an exotic vision of western practice: rationalization (gorika), rationalism (gorishugi) and individualism (kojinshugi). They extol "dry" attitudes and criticize the "sentimentality" of the traditional pattern. But such respondents are not in the majority, and their true commitment to such values is put in doubt by the emphasis in their answers to projective questions on the familiar qualities of trust, sympathy, and "human-ness." Such "dryness" appears to have an element of lip-service to fashionable streams of thought, without affecting basic underlying attitudes.

This unconscious use of the verbiage of change to cloak the traditional body is a common phenomenon. One respondent, a company president, described in an interview the new system of sub-group autonomy and profit-center accounting his firm was introducing. Each task would be assigned to a team of specialists; it was the most up-to-date system in the textbooks. What were the virtues of the system, and how would the team leader exercise his authority? The leader would have to "listen" to everyone's opinion carefully; opinions would be "harmonious" and decisions satisfactory to every member; subordinates would be able

Yet beneath this ambiguity there are harbingers of a radical change in values. Where the older respondent to the survey stated simply that "loyalty" was "the most important thing in life," the younger respondent

may suggest "loyalty to oneself (jiko ni chujitsu)". Here the old value of feudal honor transmutes itself subtly into the new one of individualism. Some of the younger members of our sample appear to be giving up and outgrowing the old particularistic and group-oriented ethic; but the content of the new universalistic ethic is still uncertain.

Estimates of the pressure toward change differed among the younger and older men interviewed. Younger respondents felt change to be inevitable, and regarded the "sentimentality" and "wetness" of their superiors with a certain scorn--which had, nonetheless, a degree of ambivalence and insecurity. Older respondents tended to insist that whatever gap in attitudes existed was a product of the usual difference between youth and age rather than a secular shift in values. Younger men would learn, as they grew older, that there was only one effective model of cooperative action: the traditional one. Yet the increasing prevalence of such practices as sending young officials or trainees to Shinto temples or Self-Defense Force camps for retreats of a week or two, to learn group solidarity (ittai-kan) and mutual trust and harmony --which "the schools don't teach any more"--indicates that even those who express most confidence in the survival of the traditional pattern and its associated values feel that it will not so survive without some assistance on their part.

The most important factor favoring the continued persistence of the values and needs which shape the Japanese psycho-organizational equilibrium is that of social density. If we regard the syndrome of

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trust, harmony, communication and inclusion as an adaptive reaction to a condition of social density with which Japanese society has had to come to terms before the rest of the world, then, far from the west's exporting its impersonal and rationalistic models of organization to Japan, the trend may run the other way. The level of open aggression tolerable in a loose and open society may not be tolerable in a more densely populated and closely knit environment.

It may be that the west will have to learn to proscribe aggressive drives and to deify social harmony; and that it will come to value consensual participatory democracy over the explicit power-ranking, often with authoritarian overtones, which has been a primary strand in its socio-political tradition in the past. The Japanese device of pseudo-hierarchy could be useful in damping an intensified competition for power in a society where intimacy continually heightens frustration and the rewards and capabilities of power continually increase.

But this factor appears to be outweighed by others tending toward change. We need mention only in passing the theories of inevitable convergence among industrialized societies, implying a pattern of necessary homogenization buttressed by economic interdependence and mass communication. In one aspect, at least, the implications of such forecasts are false: for we have seen that industrial bureaucracy can function successfully in more than one cultural pattern.

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It is not the inevitable demands of rationalized organization in the Weberian sense which will bring about change in the Japanese psychoorganizational equilibrium. A pattern so well integrated in the complex of cultural tradition and individual psychological modalities can change only as a consequence of deeper-rooted modifications in the process of socialization.

Industrialization, universal education, the shortage of skilled labor, and increased social mobility do not act directly to produce their results on the psyche-organization system. Their effect is mediated through the change in family structure they bringabcut. In the Japanese case the shift from the extended to the nuclear family, the trend toward the working mother, and the idea, radical in this cultural context, of romantic personal love as the bond between parents: all these factors combine to change the childhood environment from the nurturant, permissive and overwhelmingly group-centered pattern we have postulated. When that environment changes the characteristic tension it exerts on the needs of later life will change as well. Freed from the nostalgia for the bosom of the family, the individual will no longer tend to seek the satisfaction of his most central needs in the bosom of the group.

Here is to be sought the source of change in the psycho-organizational equilibrium. When trust, harmony, communication and being "in" are no longer the most central needs of the individual, then seepage of authority, recession of decision, and proliferation of faction will no longer be the appropriate and equilibrating structural devices to handle those needs.

And indeed it appears that the process of change has already begun, and that the differences among generations in both Japanese and American society overshadow cultural differences.¹ The Japanese psyche-organization system is not static but changing. While its future shape cannot be predicted, one may hope that its best features--those elements which grow out of a sincere concern for the other's "humanity"--may be preserved; for these features can constitute a valuable lesson for other traditions of the organization of cooperative effort.

This lesson is the more easily assimilable because both the flaws and the virtues of the Japanese system are not unique, but are wellknown, to some degree, in every cultural context. The needs, motives, concerns and values which shape this particular organizational style are universal rather than idiosyncratic.

But the total pattern they form, and the subtle fashion in which they mesh with their balancing structural elements so as to maximize the potential of the system for satisfying both individual human needs and the demands of organizational performance: this system is unique, and its component parts appear in higher relief in the Japanese context.

We study the system as much to learn about ourselves as about Japan. So if the response to the total picture described is not, "how Japanese!", but "how human!", I am satisfied with, and share, that reaction.

¹Berrien, F.K., Arkoff, Abe, and Iwahara Shinkuro, "Generation Differences in Values: Americans, Japanese-Americans, and Japanese," <u>Journal of</u> <u>Social Psychology</u>, vol. 71, 1967, pp. 169-175. Appendix A: Methodological Notes

A number of interesting problems arose in connection with the preparation and processing of the survey; this methodological appendix lists the four whose consequences or implications are the most serious.

Problems of translation, of course, could not be avoided, but they become acute in the SCT items of section three of the questionnaire. English grammar is quite specific as to person and subject, where Japanese is not. In projective questions then the English forces projection: "When <u>he</u> did this, <u>he</u> ..." But ordinary Japanese sentence structure leaves the actor to be inferred, and the most likely inference would be that "I" is the subject. This inference, however, forces non-projection.

To deal with this problem a number of rather clumsy devices were adopted. In SCT 1, 2, and 3, for example, the subject, "a subordinate," is supplied. In SCT 4 the subject is "a person," "people," or "one." In SCT 5 the subject is "most people." In SCT 12, 13, 17 and 18 the inferential "I" was left alone, and in SCT 20 the "I" was supplied explicitly.

This sort of shotgun procedure is indefensible, but limitations of time and resources precluded the pretesting of different grammatical forms. The use of different forms seemed to guarantee at least that some of the questions would succeed in attaining true projective status.

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In fact there appeared no significant differences in either comprehension or apparent projective quality of the responses. But a more scrupulous care for standardization of the grammatical format would have produced a more elegant and reliable tool for research.

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The only really monumental error of translation appeared on SCT 4, "Placed in a position of power, he ..." The Japanese version decided on was "Kenryoku no za ni tsuku to ..." Unfortunately this turned out to be the beginning of a proverb; so it was infuriating but not surprising when 40% of the respondents sensibly contented themselves with completing or paraphrasing it.

Problems of scaling arose in connection with the Rosenberg Faith in People measure, which, in its original version, is a Guttman scale. The questions follow one another in ascending order of trust, so that, with a high degree of probability, any individual respondent who answered the fifth question "trustingly" will answer the preceding questions in the same direction. That this was not the case in the Japanese context can be seen from Chart 24 on page 193.

Items 7 and 10 are out of line. In the case of item 7, the discrepancy is perhaps due to the fact that the direction of the values "agree -- disagree" was switched on the printed form to check any tendency to answer automatically in the "plus" direction. This arbitrary rearrangement may have served only to confuse respondents. In the case of item 10 the difficulty is more obvious and more instructive. That "human nature is fundamentally cooperative" is a mainstay of the formal Japanese value system; but the American values in the cultural context in which the scale originated made this item the least likely to elicit agreement in the latter setting.

That the Rosenberg measure is not a Guttman scale in Japanese translation does not preclude its use as a tool to compare degrees of trust or misanthropy within the Japanese sample; but it makes crosscultural comparison, as in Chart 10 on page 140a, an endeavor the results of which must be regarded with a great deal of caution.

A third problem which must be mentioned is that of coding. The categories into which survey responses were sorted were developed ad hoc on the basis of the predominant patterns of the answers. It would have been much more desirable to have had a theoretical basis for categorization worked out in advance. But given the exploratory nature of the research this was not attempted.

A more serious drawback to the coding procedure lies in the individual responsibility of the author for the performance of that task. This procedure has a glaring flaw, which consists in the possibility of that sort of unconscious self-deception which leads in the direction of discovering what one expects to find. In answer to the legitimate reproach that this process should have been performed by a group which was disinterested in the results rather than by an individual who was interested, can only be cited, again, limitations of time and resources.

The fourth general methodological problem considered here is the most troublesome of all, and it is one to which there is no easy solution. It is the problem of the logic of interpretation in psychological terms, and it can be illustrated by an example, drawn from the survey data, which is unrelated to the principal themes of the study. SCT 24 raises the issue of "what one is most afraid of." The modal answer is in the category of "sickness or death." But the breakdown of such answers by age-grade is interesting.

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21% of the youngest group, aged 22-34, 19% of the middle group, 35-45, and only 10% of the oldest group, from age 46-62, respond that "what one is most afraid of is ... sickness" or "death".

Now, that older people are less likely than younger to express a fear of this kind is not in itself a striking phenomenon. One logic of psychological interpretation allows us immediately to explain the distribution of responses, if we wish, somewhat as follows. Older people are, of course, much more concerned with sickness and death than the young. This is a phenomenon which follows inevitably from the shape of the human life span. But, since they fear it more intensely, they must repress the fear more strongly. So it is the relative paucity of such responses among the older age group which proves the point.


But another analyst of the same pattern of response might argue differently: older people have had time to come to terms with the finiteness of life, and have had more experience of physical suffering than the young. They have lived with these things and have learned, in consequence, to accept them. So it is natural for sickness and death to excite greater concern and greater fear among the vulnerable and inexperienced young than among their elders. And the pattern of response proves this point without any necessity of twisting the results by postulating complicated psychological mechanisms like repression, projection, or reversal.

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We can take our choice among these interpretations of a simple but inscrutable fact, the distribution of response on an item of a projective test. The important criteria are that the "explanation" chosen be internally consistent, that it fit and corroborate any other evidence available on the same point, and that it be held in tentative fashion so that it can be revised if new evidence appears.

This study has made frequent use of the double-edged sword of psychological interpretation, and its conclusions are only valid insofar as they are circumscribed by those guiding criteria.



マサチューセッツ工科大学 経営意識に関するアンケート

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との調査は経営者と管理者の(a)態度、(b)期待、(c)物の考え方を調査し、国際的に比較する研究計画の一部です。

組織における人間関係と能率に寄与する諸要素の理解 を進めるためにあなたのご協力とご助力をお願いします。

このアンケートは匿名であり、その結果の利用および 分析はマサチューセッツ工科大学の経営研究グループ内 に限られます。

質問に対してはできるだけ卒直に全部答えて下さるよ うお願いします。

われわれの研究に対するど協力に感謝します。

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第一部	
1 あなたの体験から見て良い上役の条件は何ですか。思いつく	
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с.	
~ 2 あなたの体験から見て良い部下の条件は何ですか。思いつく	
ままに3つあげて下さい。	
a.	
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3 上役の部下に対する態度でもっとも好ましくないと日常感じ	
ておられることを3つあげて下さい。	
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4 部下の上役に対する態度でもっとも好ましくないと日常感じ	
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5 あなたの体験からみて、一緒に働きにくいと思われる人はど	
んな人ですか。そのような人の悪い点を3つ指摘して下さい。	
b .	
C .	- Are
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この下に書いてある文章について、あなたのご意見を下の例に ならって示して下さい。

「亀の甲より年の功」という考え方について、かなり賛成なら ば(+2)に〇印を付けて下さい。全く反対ならば(-3)に〇 印を付けて下さい。

例一

全く反対 かなり反対 やや反対 やや賛成

-3 -2 -1 +1 かなり賛成 全く賛成

+2 +3

1 「船頭多くして舟山に上る。」

-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
2 「三人寄れば文珠の知恵。」

-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3

3 「良いリーダーは部下にできるだけ仕事をまかせる。」

-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
4 「良いリーダーは恐れられるより愛される。」

-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
5 「良いリーダーは自らできるだけ責任をとる。」

-3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3
6 人によっては「世間の大多数の人間は信用できる」といい、

又、人によっては「世間の大多数の人間は信用できない」とい います。あなたのご意見はどちらですか。

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信用できない -3 -2 -1 +1 +2 +3

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	何	がぇ	起了	って	5	る	か知	Б.	方法	去は	な	5	ړ .									
			3		_	2			1		+	1		+	2		+	3				
19	I.	Г	自分	- }0)	幸	福	だけ	を	考,	える	人	は	軽へ	:っ	ĸ	もあ	た	5	した	ż Vi	<u>ل</u> ه	
			` 3		_	2		_	1	•	+	1		+	2		+	3				
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							うこ												Ý			
														+	2		+	3				

第三部

あなたが適当と思う様に次の文を完成して下さい。

例えば ― 「おひるは何がいいでしようか」と問われたら、私は…「おすし」と答えます。

279.

1 上役が部下にそれをするように命令すると、部下は…

- 2 上役がいるところでは、部下は…
- 3 部下が正しくないと知っている命令を上役から受け取ったと き、部下は…
- ▲ 一度権力の座につくと、人は…
- 5 「長(トップ)になりたいか」と問われたとき、多くの人は

-6-

6 部下の最良の扱い方は…

7. 部下の最悪の扱い方は…

~ 8 本当に親しい友達とは…

9. もっとも親しい友人が悪口をいったと分ったとき、多くの人 は…

- 10 嫌われていると分かると、多くの人は…
- 11 他の人が自分を避けていると分かると、人は…
- 12 母の事を思うと…
- 13 父の事を思うと…
- 14 人が一番怒るのは…
- 15 だれかに困らされると…
- 16 人ははずかしめられたとき…
- 17.

…の場合である。

になれたらいいんだが。

7-

18 もっともやりたいことは…

19 人生で一番重要なのは…

20 私の最大の念願は…

21. 彼の性格で一番すきなところは…

22 他人についての自分の本当の感情を隠すことは…

…の理由からときにはよいことである。

281.

⊘

23 人間関係についてもっとも気をつける点は…

24 人がもっともおそれるのは…

25 現在の多くの人達の個人的な最大の関心事は…

26 自分が何かをおそれているとき、もっともいいやり方は…

-8-

27. 困ったとき、人がふつうにすることは…

第四部

以下の文は日常の仕事の上で起る幾つかの問題を述べています。 おのおのの文を読んで、あなたがもっとも良いと思う解決法をあ げて下さい。

282.

)

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1 「自分の部下が満足のいく仕事をしてくれていないと感じた とき、上司に「どうすればよいか』と相談したとする。すると 彼は、「そんなことはほっておいても解決するから心配するな」 と答えた。しかし日が経つにつれて生産性が目に見えて低下し、 他の部門と比較するとその差は開く一方だと感ずるようになった」 このようなどき、あなたは次の中どのような行動を取りますか。

- a 部下と親しくひざをつき合わせて相談し、問題の原因を 見つけようと努力する。
- b 自分の部門の規律をさらに厳しくして部下にハッパを掛ける。
- c 一番信頼できる部下を通じて問題の原因をつきとめよう とする。

d 上司に相談し、彼に責任をもって問題を解決して貰うように頼む。

e その他 ()の中にお書き下さい。

2 部下の1人が転職したから、紹介状を書いてくれとたのんで きた。自分はその様な手紙を書く気にはなれなかったのだが、 部下はどうしてもと頼んだ。この様な場合にあなたは次のごの 様な行動を取りますか。

a ~きっぱりと断る。

b 書くことを承諾はするが、部下があまり好ましくない人物であることを手紙の中に書く。

283.

- c 職歴だけを手紙に書く。
- a 部下の押しに負けて、ありきたりの紹介状を書く。
- e その他 ()の中にお書き下さい。

3 「自分は陰口をいわれていると感じたとする。彼が部屋に入ると人々は会話をやめるか、あるいは話題を変える。ついに彼は我慢できなくなって、同僚に詰め寄り、そこで話がやみ、座が白けてしまった。」もしあなたが当人だったなら、次のどの様な行動を取りますか。

- a 問題は何かとはっきり聞き、もしそれが自分のあやまち だと分かればあやまる。
- b 同僚の1人に個人的に相談し助言を求める。
- c ひそかに自分の行動を反省し、問題と思われるものを自 分で解決するようにする。

a 事態を無視し続ける。

e その他 ()の中にお書き下さい。

- 4 「新しい課長が任命され、部下にいつも納得の行かない無理 な要求ばかりする。」もしあなたがとういう事態に直面したら、 次のどのような行動を取りますか。
 - a 自ら課長のところに出かけて行って、彼のやり方がこの 部門のやり方に合っていないとはっきり言う。
 - b 課長の言うことは一応聞くが、みんなで意識的にサポる。

-10-

c その情況下でベストをつくす。

d 課長の上司に頼む。

e 課全体の問題ではなく、むしろ個々の課員の問題だと見なし、事態を静観する。

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f その他 ()の中にお書き下さい。

5 上記の事態で、ほとんどの課員が意識的にサポることに賛成 したとする。しかしサポが効果的であるためには、全員がサポ らなければならない。あなたがこのやり方に賛同できないのに 同僚がしつこく勧めたらあなたはどうしますか。

a 同僚に対する忠誠心と友情のゆえに参加する。

b 同僚から爪はじきされることをおそれ参加する。

c 課長への忠誠心のゆえに同僚に抵抗する。

d サポは適切さと賢明さを欠くという自分の信念から賛同 しない。

-11

e その他 ()の中にお書き下さい。

5

第五部

次の絵は日常よく見られる人間関係の状況を示しています。お のおのの絵をよく見て、絵の下にその状況の簡単な説明を書いて 下さい。その際には次の諸点を必ず留意して下さい。 285.

S

1 絵の中にいる人々はだれか。


2 彼らはどこにいるが。


3 彼らは何を考えているか。


4 彼らは何をしているか。

5 この状況はどの様な結果をもたらすだろうか。

-12-









Face Sheet

290.

- イ 明治
- 1. 私は大正 年に生まれました。

昭和

2 私の出生地は です。(都道府県名のみ)

です。

3 父親の職業は

4 兄弟は 兄 人

弟 、 人

А

姉

妹 人

5 出身小学校の都道府県の名前

6 出身中学校の都道府県の名前

新制 高校 所在地の都道府県名 7. 高等学校 旧制 高校 · ·) (出身大学 大学 8 学部 卒業年度() 9 専攻は でした。 10 私は結婚 (しています) (していません)。 11. いまの勤務先は です。(会社名又は機関名) 12 そこに入ったのは 年前です。 13 いまの職名(又は所属)は です。(例えば人事 課長とか販売部員とか課長とか)

-17-

14 この前の選挙には 党に投票しました。

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Managerial Attitudes Survey

• This survey is one part of a competitive international study which is designed to investigate the attitudes, expectations, and ways of thinking of managers and executives.

We ask for your help and cooperation in this attempt to advance our understanding of the various elements which make for smooth human relations and effective performance in organizations.

The questionnaire is fully anonymous, and the analysis of the data obtained is confined to the M. I. T. management research group.

Please answer all the questions as fully and frankly as possible. We are grateful for your cooperation in this research.

Part I

1. In your own experience, what are the characteristics of a good superior? Please list three.

292.

2. In your own experience, what are the characteristics of a good subordinate? Please list three.

12

а. Ъ.

а. Ъ. с.

c.

3. Please list three of the most common faults in the attitude of superior toward subordinate.

a.

Ъ.

C.

4. Please list three of the most common faults in the attitude of of subordinate toward superior.

a.

ь.

C.,

a. b. c.

5. In your own experience, what sort of people are hardest to work with? Please list three bad characteristics of this sort of person.

Please indicate your opinion of the statements below in accordance with the example.

"The experience of age is better than tortoise shell." If you agree somewhat with this idea, circle +2. If you disagree strongly, circle -3.

Example:

disagree	disagree	disagree	agree	agree	agree
strongly	somewhat	slightly	slightly	somewhat	strongly
-3	-2	-1	. /1	/ 2	/ 3

- Too many cooks spoil the broth. [Too many helmsmen and the ship climbs the mountain.]
- Two heads are better than one. [Call on three people to get the quintessence of wisdom.]
- 3. The good leader delegates as much as possible to his subordinates.
- 4. The good leader inspires affection rather than awe.

5. The good leader takes as much responsibility as possible on himself.

- 6. Some people say that most people can be trusted. Others say you can't be too careful in your dealings with people. How do you feel about it?
- 7. Would you say that most people are more inclined to help others or to look out for themselves?

8. If you don't watch yourself people will take advantage of you.
 9. No one is going to care what happens to you when you get right down to it.

293.

- 10. Human nature is fundamentally cooperative.
- 11. The worst crime a person can commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.
- 12. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

294.

- 13. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonely place.
- 14. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.
- 15. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
- 16. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
- 17. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.
- 18. In this complicated world ofours the only way we can know what is going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
- 19. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
- 20. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, I sometimes have the ambition to become a great man.

Part III

Please complete the following sentences in the way which seems appropriate to you.

For example: When asked, "What would be good for lunch?", I ... answered "sushi".

1	•	When his superior tells him to do it, the subordinate
2	•	In his superior's presence, the subordinate
3	•	When he received from his superior an order that he knew was
		wrong, the subordinate
4	•	Placed in a position of power, one
5.	. <i>*</i>	Asked if they want to be boss, most people
6.	•	The best way to treat a subordinate
7.		The worst way to treat a subordinate
8.	•	A really close friend is
9.	•	If they found their best friend spoke against them, most people
10).	If they found they were disliked by others, most people
11	. •	When he finds out others are avoiding him, one
12	•	When (one) thinks of (one's) mother
13		When (one) thinks of (one's) father
14	•	What makes one most angry is
15	•	When (one) is bothered by somebody
16	•	When one is insulted
17	•	If (I) were only
18	. .	What (I) want most to do is
19	•	The most important thing in human life is
20	•	My deepest wish is
21	•	What (I) like most about him is
22	•	It is sometimes good to hide your true feelings about others
		because
	(4) (비행 전에 가장 물건을 알려야 한다. 그는 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것이 같이 있는 것이 없다.

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295.

23. What (one) is most careful of in (one's) relations with people is ...

24. What one is most afraid of is ...

25. The greatest individual concern of most people nowadays is ...
26. When one is frightened of something, the best thing to do is ...
27. When troubled, what one usually does is ...

Part IV

The following paragraphs describe a number of situations which arise commonly at work. Please read each paragraph and suggest the method of solution which seems best to you.

1. "The chief feels that the men under him are not doing a very satisfactory job. He asks his superior what he should do and the superior tells him not to worry, that things will take care of themselves. But still day after day the output of the group goes down while other departments seem to work at full capacity."

In this kind of situation, which of the following courses of action would you pick?

a. Have a friendly and intimate discussion with your

subordinates and try to find out what the cause of the problem is.

 Intensify departmental discipline and crack down on your subordinates. 296.

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c. Try to work through the most trusted subordinateto find the source of the problem.

297.

- d. Confer with your superior and try to get him to take the responsibility for corrective action.
- e. Other: please note within the parentheses:

2. One of the subordinates wants to leave his job and asks for a letter of recommendation. You don't want to write such a letter, but the subordinate keeps asking for it. In this sort of situation which of the following courses of action would you choose?

- a. Refuse_flatly.
- b. Agree to write the letter, but give in it a true and unfavorable opinion of the subordinate's character.
- c. Give the formal job record only.
- d. Give in to the subordinate's urging and write a standard letter of recommendation.
- e. Other.

3. "Someone gets the feeling that other people are talking about him behind his back. If he enters a room, the conversation stops or the subject is changed. Finally he can't stand it any longer, and approaches his colleagues. But the conversation stops and the atmosphere cools." If you were the person in question, which of the following would you do?

- a. Ask frankly what the problem is, and if it is your own fault, correct it.
- b. Approach one of your colleagues for a private discussion and ask for advice.
- c. Examine your own conduct privately and try to correct whatever could be the problem.

d. Continue to ignore the situation.

e. Other.

4. "A new department head is appointed who mades consistently unreasonable demands on his subordinates." If you faced this situation, which of the following courses of action would you choose?

- a. Go to the department head and tell him frankly that his way of doing things is not the way they are done here.
- Appear to accept his orders, but resist by a program
 of covert non-compliance.
- c. Do the best you can under the circumstances.

d. Complain to the department head's superior.

e. Adopt a wait and see attitude, feeling that this is not a problem for the department as a whole but for each individual.

f. Other.

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5. In the situation described above, almost all the members of the department agree on a slowdown. But for the slowdown to be effective, everyone must participate. Although you cannot agree to such a policy, your colleagues keep pushing you to join them. What would you do in such a situation?

a. Participate because of loyalty and friendship for your colleagues.

b. Participate because of the fear of ostracism.

c. Resist because of loyalty to your superior.

- d. Resist because of your own conviction that the slowdown is unjustified and unwise.
- e. Other.

Part V

The following pictures depict situations of human relations one might see every day. Please look at each picture carefully and write a short explanation of it underneath. In your explanation please include the following points:

1: Who are the people in the picture?

2. Where are they?

3. What are they thinking?

4. What are they doing? .

5. What is likely to be the outcome of the situation?

TAT 1

TAT 2

TAT 3

TAT 4

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	같은 성상 활동을 한 동안이 있는 것은 것을 할 수 있는 것이다. 이상 것은 작품이 있는 것이다. 이상 것은 것은 것은 것을 가지 않는 것이다. 이상 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것을 가지 않는 것이 같은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것을 같은 것은
an a	Face Sheet
	Meiji
1.	I was born in the year Taisho Showa
2.	I was born at (name of province, city, "metropolis"
•	or "circuit").
3.	My father's occupation was
4.	In my family there are elder brothers.
•	younger brothers.
	elder sisters.
	younger sisters.
5.	I attended primary school at
6.	I attended middle school at
7.	I attended high school (old style) at (new style)
8.	I graduated from university in the department of
	in the class of
9.	My specialty in college was
10.	I am (married) (single).
11.	I am now employed at (name of company or administrative organ).
12.	I entered this job years ago.
13.	My present title is (for example, Personnel Department
, L J •	Chief, member of Sales Division, or simply Department Head).
14.	In the last elections I voted for the Party.

300.

Appendix C: Responses Not Charted

Category

Item

III, A:

"position of power"

sticks to it	78
becomes egotistical	45
becomes blind, foolish	18
becomes corrupt, lazy	13
no change	6 /
"brandishes" power	6
fascination, ambition	4
lonely, insecure	4
other	15
don't know, no answer	8

III, 5:

"want to be boss?"

yes	114
yes, but qualifies	. 42
no, can't decide	20
yes, but don't say so	11
other	2
DKNA	8

III, 12:

"think of mother"

gratitude, linking, wishes 72 happy old age 45 beloved filial piety, obligation 22 screen, ambiguous, neutral 20 resolves to behave well 8 3 conflict 6 other 21 DKNA

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Number

III, 13:

"think of father"

gratitude, liking, happy old age 57 33 competes; compares to self screen, ambiguous, neutral 22 conflict 19 love and fear mixed: "erai", "taihen" · 11 1 4 dependence other 7 DKNA 26

III, 18:

"want most to do"

innovate or improve work	25
travel, golf, sports, what	
he feels like	23
interesting or worthwhile work	23
study; improve self	18
demonstrate his ability	
(hakki); succeed	17
just work	15
think; read; write; art	13
be morally better; attain	
religious enlightenment	11
other	4
DKNA	· 48

III, 25:

"people are converned with"

money; an abundant life	43
family happiness, peace	29
<pre>private ("selfish") ends;</pre>	
"pursuit of happiness"	26
economic stability, world	
peace, etc.	25
work; finding work worth doing	11 ,
the housing problem	. 8
sickness and death	2
other	6
DKNA	39

IV, 3:

"one is talked about"

ask openly	63
self-examination	57
approach one frined	52
continue to ignore	15
other ·	4
DKNA	6

IV, 5:

"slowdown"

resist from own conviction	133
agree group loyalty	20
agree fear of ostracism	6
resist loyalty to superior	1
evade the question	23
other	6
DKNA	. 8

303.

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TAT 3:

"man in uniform"

neutral	55
threatening, guilt	47
seeking help; uniformed man	
is helpful	21
atmosphere of general suspicion	20
protecting a subordinate from	
, the law -	. 5
a policeman is reprimanded	4
the police won't help	3
other	2
DKNA	40

TAT 4:

"opposing groups"

a threatening conflict, un-	
pleasant, must be avoided	47
conflict, tolerated as natural	33
conflict threatening the super-	
ior; plotting against or	
gossiping about boss	23
joking; a game	14
someone will be reprimanded	11
legitimate conflict, e.g.	
bargaining session	10
good news for someone	6
conflict, fun, take sides	2
other	8
DKNA	43

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Face Sheet:

"father's status"

company employee, salaryman	47
official, politician, military	38
professional or high executive	36
merchant	2,1
schoolteacher; village official	11
farmer	10
worker	6
newspaperman; engineer	5
DKNA	23

Face Sheet:

"siblings"

oldest child	55
oldest boy or only son	46
second son	36
youngest child or youngest son	
of more than two	35
only child	. 10
third, fourth, or fifth son,	
etc. but not youngest son	6
DKNA	9

Face Sheet:

"geographical origin"

Tokyo			48
Kinki			34
Kanto		•	26
Kyushu			21
Chubu			20
Chugoku	• •	۰.	13
Hokkaido, Tohokū			13
Korea, Manchuria,	China, Taiwan	÷	9
Shikoku			5
DKNA	• • • • •		8

Face Sheet:

"university"

Tokyo			42	
Other imperial	•		28	
Keio			14	
Waseda			9	
"special school"			6	
Hitotsubashi			4	
Other	▶.	٠	47	
None ,		,	3	
DKNA	•		44	

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Face Sheet:

"training"

law, political science	58
economics	46
science, engineering,	
mathematics, medicine	30
commerce, business	12
agriculture, forestry, fisheries	10
sociology, psychology, education	7
literature, history, languages,	
philosophy	- 5
DKNA	29

Face Sheet: "workplace"

hig manufacturing firms	49
government official	43
medium-small firms	34
finance, trading firms	25
government monopoly or	•••
semi-government organ	15
other	· 3
DKNA	27

Face Sheet:

"rank"

no official title ("in")	38
bucho	30
kacho or bucho dairi	30
kakaricho	JÙ
Rakarieno	19
shacho, kyokucho, torishi-	
mariyaku	18
"in charge of" (tanto, shunin)	15 ⁽
kacho dairi or "technical	
expert" (gishi)	9
"office chief" (shocho,	
shitsucho)	7
DKNA	31

Face Sheet:

:2

"politics"

Conservative	86
Socialist	~ 35
Democratic Socialist	30
Komeito	1
Communist	1
didn't vote	5
DKNA .	39

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307.

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