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REVOLUTION BY EVOLUTION: THE TANZANIAN
ROAD TO SOCIALISM.

Yale University, Ph.D., 1974
Political Science, general

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REVOLUTION BY EVOLUTION:
THE TANZANIAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of
Yale University

in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by

Samuel Stephen Mushi

December, 1974

ABSTRACT

REVOLUTION BY EVOLUTION: THE TANZANIAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM

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Yale University

1974

This is primarily a study of a road to socialism followed by one African country--Tanzania. The study aims to answer a number of questions about this particular road, but it also aims to pose just as many for future debate. The Tanzanian socialist experiment (Ujamaa) is "unique" in several ways; it is evolutionary; it is eclectic and pragmatic in methods, rather than doctrinaire, and without a rigid sociological theory of change; it is democratic and basically agrarian. It is a "revolution from above," clearly following a non-Marxist road to socialism.

In our methodology, we have deliberately tried to be as unorthodox as the experiment itself. We have combined three approaches, namely (1) historical analysis of concrete rural development policies (1920-73) to show their socio-economic concomitants and the historical roots of the current predicaments; (2) a macro-focus, analysing the changing strategies and options

of the central leadership; and (3) a micro-approach, using concrete district cases to illustrate the problems and prospects for achieving centrally defined goals in what is, in fact, a "multi-local" national community.

In chapter 1 (introduction); we place the Tanzanian Ujamaa ideology in the broad context of underdevelopment and what has been referred to as the "African Revolution," pointing out the crucial problems of choice facing Tanzania (as other African countries) during the first decade of independence. In chapter 2, we outline the main parameters of the ideology and the predicaments to which it addresses itself. The predicaments are summed up in three vital questions--(1) how to protect the national economy against foreign exploitation, (2) how to increase the national wealth, and (3) how the national wealth should be shared. Chapters 3 and 4 relate these questions to the colonial and post-independence development policies, summing up the historical roots of the current predicaments under the terms "Colonial Instrumentalism" (chapter 3), "Bureaucratic Model of Rural Change" and "Dependency Syndrome" (chapter 4).

A non-orthodox conceptual framework for interpreting the Tanzanian revolution is outlined in chapter 5, and the argument is illustrated in chapter 6 which shows how Ujamaa addressed itself to three potential counter-ideological forces--parochialism, traditional inertia and embourgeoisement--in its

various stages of evolution (1961-1972). Chapters 7, 8 and 9 contain illustrative district case studies, showing how the local/traditional communities responded to rapid ideological changes at the center (1962-1973), and the problems and prospects for a democratic socialist revolution in the context of the center's aspiration for rapid economic development.

The main conclusions are summarized in chapter 10. They include the following. First, the leadership factor (or politics and ideology) has been the independent variable in the Tanzanian experiment; the socio-economic factors classically referred to as the "substructure" have acted as intervening variables, setting a boundary to the choices available and the rate of implementation; in some cases, they can even be seen as dependent variables, being shaped by the "mode of political action." Second, and related to the first, the experiment suggests that a non-Marxist road to socialism is possible under certain conditions (elaborated in the text), and necessary for Tanzania and other African countries with similar socio-economic conditions.

PREFACE

This is a study of the Tanzanian road to socialism. Ujamaa, as the Tanzanian ideology is called, is a unique socialist experiment in several ways. First, it is a revolution by gradual evolution from traditional and colonial systems and norms. Second, it is eclectic and pragmatic in method, without a rigid sociological theory. Third, it is an experiment in democratic socialist transformation. Fourth, it is basically agrarian, having neither the strong industrial base nor the industrial proletariat considered necessary for socialism by some classical theories. What are the problems and prospects of such a road?

Methodologically, our inquiry attempts to combine three approaches. First, to reveal the evolutionary nature of Ujamaa and the nature and sources of the predicaments to which it addresses itself, we shall analyse the Tanzanian revolution in historical perspective, focusing on concrete rural development policies and their impact on the rural society from 1920 to 1973. Second, the study will also retain a macro-focus, analysing the changing strategies and options of the central leadership over a period of time, and pointing out the factors leading to the firm option for a

socialist solution in 1967. Third, this macro-focus on central policy is also combined with a micro-approach in that concrete district cases will be analysed in some detail to illustrate the problems and prospects of achieving the goals of the central leadership. Thus, at the macro-level the policies (or models of rural development) are the basic units of analysis; and at the local level, the implementing agencies and the local society (and its response to the policies of the center) are the units of analysis. In each case, the impact of previous policies or models will be noted and related to the current Ujamaa model.

Acknowledgments

This study is a product of work which has extended over several years, and my debts of gratitude are due to institutions and individuals. Space limitation makes it impossible to list all those who have assisted, morally, materially or otherwise, in this task, but my hope is that none who has facilitated the study is unaware of my deep gratitude. However, I feel obliged to mention a few in particular.

My initial research in Morogoro, mid-1970 to mid-1972, was made possible by a grant from the Council on African Studies of Yale University. A subsequent grant from the

Research and Publications Committee of the University of Dar es Salaam enabled me to extend the research to mid-1973 to observe how the reorganization initiated by Decentralization was being implemented at the local level. The University of Dar es Salaam allowed me to take a leave of absence in 1973/74 academic year to facilitate undisturbed writing, and my stay at Yale University was partly made possible by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. A large part of the typing costs was met by grants from the Graduate School of Yale University and the Hazen Foundation.

In doing research for this work I gained a great deal from discussions with colleagues at the University of Dar es Salaam who have an interest in rural development. Dr. Jon R. Morris, in particular, generously shared with me his wide East African rural research experience. Professor Antony Rweyemamu, Head of the Political Science Department, provided encouragement and opportunity to continue field work whenever departmental work made it possible.

Various comments and criticisms of an earlier outline of this study by Professors David E. Apter, William Foltz, and Alfred Stephan of Political Science Department, Yale University, contributed a great deal to the sharpening of the focus of the arguments advanced in this study.

Needless to say, however, I am alone responsible for all errors of fact or interpretation of the material presented herein.

Organization of the Study

In chapter 1 (introduction), we shall place the Tanzanian Ujamaa ideology in the broad context of underdevelopment and what has been referred to as the "African Revolution;" pointing out the crucial problems of choice facing Tanzania (as other African countries) during the first decade of independence.

In chapter 2, we shall outline the main dimensions of the ideology and the predicaments to which it addresses itself. Chapters 3 and 4 trace the historical roots of these predicaments by analysing colonial and pre-Arusha rural development policies and their impact on the Tanzanian society and economy.

In chapter 5, we point out some of the crucial differences between Tanzania's road to socialism and the roads followed in other countries, especially those claiming to follow a "scientific" (often identified with "Marxist") road. Chapter 6 advances the arguments in chapter 5 a stage further and emphasizes the normative basis of Ujamaa and its evolutionary character. In these two chapters, a 'non-

conventional' way of conceptualizing the Tanzanian "revolution from above" is suggested, and several potential counter-ideologies to Ujamaa are identified.

Chapters 7, 8 and 9 contain district (Morogoro) case studies which illustrate the problems and prospects of a democratic socialist revolution in the context of the nation's aspiration for rapid economic development. Chapter 10 sums up the main observations.

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Introduction: Chapter 1

TANZANIA'S IDEOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION

We have been oppressed a great deal, we have been exploited a great deal, and we have been disregarded a great deal. It is our weakness that has led to our being oppressed, exploited and disregarded. We now intend to bring about a revolution which will ensure that we are never again victims of these things.

--TANU, The Arusha Declaration and TANU'S Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), p. 4.

THE ISSUES IN QUESTION

While in the developed parts of the world the basic essentials of life such as proper diet, decent shelter, clean water and similar human requirements are generally taken for granted, in the underdeveloped parts the ability to provide such essentials requires a developmental revolution. Thus, when Mwalimu Myerere comments that "as Americans and Russians go to the Moon, we in Tanzania must go to the villages," he is not merely stating Tanzania's relative underdevelopment, but seriously defining an important aspect of a development strategy in Africa where over 80 percent of the population lives, works and dies in the rural areas. Whereas the developed nations now view a further development revolution in terms of "space conquest" made possible by scientific and

technological breakthrough, in a developing nation like Tanzania a revolution becomes meaningful only if it can lead to the conquest of poverty, disease and ignorance of the majority of the population. "We have to make a fundamental change in the conditions under which our people live," states Myerere, adding: "That is what revolution really means . . . in underdeveloped countries like the United Republic."¹

With a per capita income of less than U.S. \$100, Tanzania is as poor as the majority of African countries. It also shares a common heritage with the other African states which emerged from Western colonial domination a decade or two ago; a fact which makes its revolutionary measures significant beyond its borders. Like them, it inherited certain structural and normative weaknesses from the colonial regime. Among the structural weaknesses, the following are important:

(1) A skewed economy, sectorally speaking, which emphasized the production of raw materials (a few cash crops and minerals) for overseas processing and manufacturing factories; which meant an utter absence of local industrial infrastructure;²

(2) A vertical trading relationship with the West, which meant a total dependence on the West for imports and exports, with little room for diversification of trade;³

¹African Reporter, August 1964, p. 5.

²See Chapter 2 for details.

³For all the three nations of East Africa--Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda--the sale of raw materials still provided

(3) Uneven regional development in terms of cash crops, communication networks and distribution of national wealth and social services--partly a result of differences in natural resources within and between regions, but mainly a result of the colonial pattern that linked the colony with metropolitan centres;⁴

(4) A rural-urban imbalance in terms of the distribution of goods and services as well as political information; and

(5) A small emergent elite that dominated the modern organs of the state; an elite which was beginning to maintain a 'social distance' from the bulk of the population in the rural communities which are, structurally, part of more than 120 traditional (or tribal) systems.

The normative inheritance included the following:

(1) A bourgeois ideology on the part of the (educated) elite, which further reinforced the structural links with the metropolitan centres;

(2) Traditional values and norms on the part of most rural communities which, cut off as they were from the centre by communication problems, enhanced the 'social distance' that was emerging between the elite and the masses; and

20-25 percent of National Income at the time of independence. See Ann Seidman, "The Inherited Dual Economies of East Africa," in Lionel Cliffe and John S. Saul (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), p. 41.

⁴ See ibid., pp. 41-62, for an excellent description of the historical process bringing this about. See also Chapters 2 and 3.

(3) Uneven distribution of 'modernizing' values, resulting mainly from the uneven distribution of cash crops, communication networks, and especially educational facilities.

It means that the notions of 'nation-building,' 'institution-building,' 'national integration,' etc., must be viewed in structural as well as normative terms. For instance, the thing that distinguishes a government bureaucrat in Dar es Salaam from an 'ordinary' Mha in an isolated traditional village in Kigoma is not only their membership in different social organizations or their different earning capacities, but also their differing values, orientations and aspirations. In brief, there is a structural as well as an 'ideological' gap between them.

In summary, this is the situation that Tanzania⁵ inherited at independence in 1961; a situation which is not totally different from that inherited by other African countries. The Arusha Declaration (quoted at the beginning of the chapter) which was announced by Mwalimu on February 5, 1967, placed a strong emphasis on the need for a revolution in Africa generally and Tanzania particularly. In essence, the required revolution is one that ends Africa's weakness, so

⁵ Although throughout this study we shall continue to refer to the country under discussion as Tanzania, it should be understood that the present study is concerned with the mainland part, i.e. Tanganyika. Tanganyika got her independence from British rule on December 9, 1961, and Zanzibar, the Island part of Tanzania, became independent two years later. The two countries were then united on April 26, 1964, to become the United Republic of Tanzania.

that the continent is never again exploited, oppressed or humiliated. The Declaration defines the African Revolution in economic as well as psycho-cultural terms, a point to which we shall have to return later.

Mwongozo⁶ (TANU's Guidelines of February, 1971) spelled out in much greater detail the meaning of the African Revolution, and (a) identified the exploiters, oppressors and humiliators; (b) detailed their counter-revolutionary strategies, and (c) explained what the revolution would mean in Tanzania and what weapons were to be used. The main parameters of the Tanzanian Ujamaa revolution (as the Tanzanian ideology is called) and the predicaments to which it addresses itself will be discussed later. In the rest of this chapter, we shall focus primarily on two crucial factors which help to explain, at least in part, why Tanzania decided in 1967 to make a radical departure from the situation it inherited from colonial rule and to define its own ideological direction. The first factor was the failure of the 'Pan-African solution' to the continent's problem of underdevelopment. The second factor was the failure of the country's dependence on external sources of capital to meet the high development aspirations of its leaders and people. These two factors constitute the main external "determinants"; the in-

⁶ Throughout this study, we shall refer to the TANU Guidelines as Mwongozo. Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) is the ruling party in Tanzania's one-party system. Even though Tanzania is a de jure one-party system, in actual fact there are two parties, TANU in Tanganyika and Afro-Shirazi Party in Zanzibar and Pemba.

ternal determinants will be examined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.

The Pan-African Context

Apart from Ghana under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, no African country has struggled and hoped more than Tanzania for a pan-African solution to the problems of underdevelopment and low political, economic and military capabilities. The genuineness of the search for a pan-African solution is beyond question in Tanzania's case, as the country's big role in the continental liberation movements and advocacy of larger federations and unions since the early sixties clearly bear witness. Mwalimu's arguments for greater cooperation in Africa, as a strategy of solving individual country's economic and political weaknesses, predate Tanzania's independence; he even offered to delay Tanzania's own independence if the British Government would agree to give independence to its East African colonies (Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar) as one federal unit. In the course of the sixties, Tanzania made a number of economic "sacrifices" in the name of liberation or "honor" of a continental commitment to a common destiny (see Chapter 2). These sacrifices were considered "investments" valued as being good in themselves, in the first place, and as being capable of enlarging the continent's internal capabilities, in the second place.

By 1967, however, there was little hope that a pan-African approach to the continent's development was forthcoming. Instead, the "coup syndrome" that had characterized the

Latin American countries was rapidly becoming the main feature of the African scene. Nigeria, which was considered economically superior to the rest, had a coup in early 1965 followed by internal turmoil; Nkrumah, the most outspoken leader of the Pan-African movement, was overthrown a year later; the Organization for African Unity (OAU) was passing more resolutions than its members were inclined to implement, and the general dependence of the continent on its former colonial masters appeared to be increasing rather than decreasing. By the second half of the sixties, few African leaders pinned their hope on the pan-African solution. Even though Tanzania found it necessary to define its own development direction in 1967, all official policy statements have continued to view the Tanzanian revolution as an aspect of a larger 'African Revolution' and considers the liberation of the rest of the continent as being essential to the success of the Tanzanian revolution. Thus Mwongozo begins by describing the overall African situation from the early sixties:

Today our African continent is a hot-bed of the liberation struggle. This struggle is between those who have for centuries been exploiting Africa's natural resources and using the people of this continent as their tools and as their slaves, and the people of Africa who have, after realizing their weakness and exploitation, decided to engage in the struggle to liberate themselves.

It is both a bitter and continuing struggle: at times it is a silent one, occasionally it explodes like gunpowder, at times the successes and gains achieved by the people slip away.

This has been the history of Africa since 1960 when many African states obtained flag independence. Since that year, many legitimate African governments have been forcefully toppled and new governments established. . . .

This is why our Party has the duty to spell out the aims of the Tanzanian and the African revolution, and to identify the enemies of this revolution, in order to set out policies and strategies which will enable us to safeguard, consolidate and further our revolution. (Para 1)

The African revolution "whose aim is the true liberation of Africa" is defined by Mwongozo as "changes which wrest from the minority the power they exploited for their own benefit (and that of external exploiters) and put it in the hands of the majority so that they can promote their own well-being"; and this kind of revolution is seen to be "in conflict with policies of exploitation, colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism" which have been practiced by the imperialist countries of Western Europe. Any measure "with the aim of stopping the progress of the masses" is defined as a counter-revolution, and these European countries are seen as "the ones really confronting the African people on the question of liberating Africa"; for "attempts to distort the progress of the African revolution stem from the plots of European imperialists who are bent on maintaining and continuing their old exploitation" (Paras 2, 5 and 6).

The chief weapons of the African revolution are identified as continental unity and co-operation: "By strengthening our co-operation, in the knowledge that their war is our war, we shall double our strength in bringing about the total liberation of Africa"; and "we have the obligation to strengthen co-operation and solidarity with revolutionary African countries because all of us are in the same boat and our destination is one." With unity and co-operation,

Mwongozo emphasizes, "our enemies will not be able to destroy us one by one as is now their habit" (Paras 17 & 18).

The Lusaka Doctrine

It should be noted that the term 'African Revolution' has been used in three closely related senses. First, it is used to refer to the continental co-operation in the liberation of the African countries which are still under colonial rule (Mozambique, Angola, and South-West Africa or Namibia) as well as those which are governed by racial minorities (Rhodesia and South Africa). This theme has been on the agenda of virtually all Pan-African (OAU) and Regional Conferences since the first Pan-African Conference in Africa organized in Accra by Kwame Nkrumah in 1958. The Manifestos of the Conferences of the Central and East African States (especially the Lusaka and Mogadishu Manifestos of 1969 and 1970, respectively) have formulated a milder African equivalent of the American 'Monroe Doctrine.'

For instance, the Lusaka Manifesto made a clear distinction between racism within Africa and colonialism from without. Thus: "Our stand toward Southern Africa," states the thirteen-nation Lusaka Manifesto, "involves a rejection of racialism, not a reversal of the existing racial domination"; and added:

We believe that all the peoples who have made their homes in the countries of Southern Africa are Africans, regardless of the colour of their skin; and we would oppose a racist majority government which adopted a

philosophy of deliberate and permanent discrimination between its citizens on grounds of racial origin.⁷

With regard to the Portuguese colonialism and the imperialist powers assisting Portugal in her combat with liberation forces, however, the following statement is important:

In Mozambique and Angola, and in so-called Portuguese Guinea, the basic problem is not racialism but a pretence that Portugal exists in Africa. Portugal is situated in Europe; the fact that it is a dictatorship is a matter for the Portuguese to settle. But no decree of the Portuguese dictator nor legislation passed by any Parliament in Portugal, can make Africa part of Europe.

Portugal, as a European state, has naturally its own allies in the context of the ideological conflict between West and East. . . . The present Manifesto must, therefore, lay bare the fact that the inhuman commitment of Portugal in Africa and her ruthless subjugation of the people of Mozambique, Angola and the so-called Portuguese Guinea, is not only irrelevant to the ideological conflict of power-politics, but is also diametrically opposed to the politics, the philosophies and the doctrines practised by her allies in the conduct of their own affairs at home. The peoples of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea are not interested in Communism or Capitalism; they are interested in their freedom.⁸

The second use of the term 'African revolution' refers to the consolidation and defense of independence where it has already been won. In the Tanzanian case, this process is seen as involving the conversion of what Nyerere has termed 'flag independence' to 'true independence' and freedom of action as determined only by the requirements and needs of the African people. Freedom of action in this sense is at the same time an end as well as a means to the African revolu-

⁷ The Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 3.

⁸ Ibid., p. 5; emphasis added.

tion. As the Mwongozo put it, "We Tanzanians value our national independence because it is from that point that our liberation, and our aspiration for a liberation struggle in conjunction with other African people, begin"; and for this reason, "we have the duty to take all necessary steps to enable us to guard our independence in order to further our revolution" (Para 10).

The Party Guidelines continue to argue that the present situation in Africa shows that no African state has as yet achieved full liberation: "Africa is still a continent of people suffering from the weakness inherent in being exploited and humiliated," and that "is why revolutionary political parties in independent African countries, like TANU, are still in fact Liberation Movements," a decade or more after the formal transfer of political power (Para 4).

The third use of the term 'African revolution' also refers to freedom and liberation, but in a different sense from that of economic or political liberation. It refers to the process of psycho-cultural liberation (or the liberation of the mind) through programs of re-education and political re-socialization to remove the complexes and hang-overs resulting from colonial domination. Experience has shown that there is a big difference between liberation of Africa and liberation of the African. Even though participation in the former process may lead to the achievement of the latter goal, there is considerable time lag. Thus, more than a decade after independence, Tanzania is still using the concept

of Kasumba ya Ukoloni (lit. colonial opium or hang-over) to discourage colonial habits, styles and behaviors; while Mobutu in the neighbouring Zaire popularizes his concept of Authenticité Africaine to cultivate a sense of identity and self-confidence among the elites.

Indeed, the process of mental decolonization in Africa may prove to be the most difficult aspect of the African revolution; yet the very idea of an 'African revolution' presupposes a decolonized 'African mind.' It means that a development ideology--as well as the process of development itself--must be directed to the human mind before it is directed to things. Every African country has been trying in its own way to create a sense of confidence in the local elites, but it should be emphasized that there is a difference in the purposes for which this self-confidence is used by the African elites. In Zaire, for instance, Mobutu's authenticité, in addition to giving the elites confidence that they can do as well as the Belgians, it deliberately encourages 'acquisitive elitism' by converting the bureaucratic and political elites into a rural kulak or yeomen class as well as an urban business class.⁹ In sharp contrast, Tanzania's Arusha Declaration and Mwongozo emphatically taboo elitist and acquisitive tendencies. In the Tanzanian case, the very notion of 'development' is to be the absence of exploitation, oppression

⁹To the knowledge of this author, this rather vague doctrine has not been translated into a systematic program of change aside from dresses and names of individuals and places.

and humiliation, whether by foreigners or by Africans themselves. Thus Mwongozo defines 'development' as follows:

For a people who have been slaves or have been oppressed, exploited and humiliated by colonialism or capitalism, 'development' means 'liberation.' Any action that gives them more control of their own affairs is an action for development, even if it does not offer them better health or more bread. Any action that reduces their say in determining their own affairs or running their own lives is not development and retards them even if the action brings them a little better health and a little more bread. . . . Thus, in considering the development of our nation and in preparing development plans, our main emphasis at all times should be the development of people and not of things. If development is to benefit the people, the people must participate in considering, planning and implementing their development plans. (Para 28)

This notion of development through grass-root participation is further emphasized by Clause 15 which is the most popular paragraph (of the Party Guidelines) with the Tanzanian workers and peasants. The implications of this approach for the success of ujamaa is a subject for later chapters. All we need to do to conclude this section is to sum up the African development problem as it has been viewed by the Tanzanian leadership.

First, the problem of development in Africa is considered to be primarily a problem of liberation--economically, politically, and, above all, psycho-culturally. Second, liberation is seen as involving a struggle at two levels: at the inter-national level between local elites and foreign capitalists, and at the intra-national level between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' or those who believe in revolution and those defending the status quo. Third, the starting point is

considered to be a modification of the inherited politico-economic ties with the former colonial powers in a manner that does not lead to dependence on other powers or exploiters. The desire to avoid substituting one form of imperialism for another creates a dilemma of choice in deciding between possible development strategies and ideologies.

In Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration (1967) signalled the beginning of a new development direction in Africa--an important ideological departure from the inherited status quo. Immediately following the Declaration, the Government nationalized the major means of production and distribution.¹⁰ Nationalisation alone, however, could not meet the requirements of development as defined above, nor does it guarantee that a socialist revolution will take place within the nation. Hence the importance of the post-Arusha policy statements issued by the President to clarify other vital areas of the developmental ujamaa revolution. Among the important statements on implementational strategies are: (1) 'Education for Self-Reliance' (1967), (2) 'Socialism and Rural Development' (1967), (3) 'Workers Participation and Management' (1970), (4) Mwongozo (1971), (5) 'Politics is Agriculture' (1972), and (6) 'Decentralization' (1972). These documents will be analysed in other chapters. In the following few pages we intend to place the Tanzanian (and African) develop-

¹⁰See TANU, The Arusha Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), Appendix I, pp. 21-25.

ment revolution in a sharper focus by (1) examining the changing attitude towards revolution in Africa during the first development decade, and (2) analysing the 'dilemma of choice' facing African leaders as they searched for a development ideology throughout the sixties.

THE CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF REVOLUTION IN AFRICA

The term 'revolution' itself seems to have undergone a revolution in the minds of African leaders as a result of the experiences of the first decade of independence. In the early sixties, the term was generally viewed with horror and disapproval; by the late sixties and early seventies, however, it had not only acquired a positive connotation but had become a political 'watch word' considered in some quarters as the very source of legitimate leadership in Africa. But, as we shall see, the term is interpreted differently by different African leaders.

In East Africa, the visit of China's Prime Minister Chou en Lai to Somalia in February, 1964, and to Tanzania in June, 1965, served as a 'test case' for the prevailing attitude towards revolution. Chou was reported to have said in Mogadishu (Somalia) that "Revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout Africa."¹¹ Reaction to this reference within East Africa is revealing. For instance, The East African Standard commented that the suggestion by Chou en Lai that

¹¹The Tanganyika Standard, February 5, 1964.

Africa was ripe for a revolution was against the interests of the masses of Africa:

. . . Could anything be more callous or more indifferent to the suffering of the ordinary people? The whole tenor of his [i.e. Chou's] public utterances . . . has been shaped towards the same end, international communism through the Marxist methods of revolution.¹²

Sixteen months later, Chou en Lai made similar remarks at a mass rally in Dar es Salaam during his state visit to Tanzania. He declared: "An exceedingly favourable situation of revolution prevails today not only in Africa but also in Asia and Latin America."¹³ This time a sharp official statement was issued by the Kenyan Government:

The Chinese Prime Minister is reported as having said in Dar es Salaam that 'an exceedingly favourable situation for revolution prevails in Africa.' It will be remembered that Mr. Chou en Lai made a similar remark when visiting Mogadishu last year. But the Kenya Government wishes it to be known that Kenya intends to avert all revolutions, irrespective of their origin or whether they come from inside or influenced from outside.¹⁴

Needless to say, Chou en Lai did not launch an 'African revolution' by his remarks. Such change-oriented African leaders as Nyerere, Lumumba, Toure, and especially Nkrumah, had said as much long before Chou visited Africa. Chou's remarks, then, are used here only as a political thermometer to indicate the revolutionary climate in Africa during the sixties. It should also be understood that, although we have taken the Kenyan reaction as an example, in fact Kenya was

¹² The Reporter, February 14, 1965.

¹³ The Nationalist, June 6, 1965.

¹⁴ The Reporter, June 18, 1965.

not alone in viewing the notion of 'revolution' so repugnant-ly. Indeed, as René Dumont's penetrating study of the African elites during the mid-sixties clearly showed, the strategic elites in any African country--especially the Francophone West Africa--would have registered a similar reaction to any suggestion of a revolution.¹⁵

What is interesting about these reactions is that, while the African 'ruling elites' were against revolutions in general and Marxist revolutions (however understood) in particular, they reveal a certain innocence about the meaning of revolution in Africa. It was not even clearly known as against whom the revolution would be launched. Such perceptive leaders as Nkrumah, Toure, Lumumba and Nyerere were indeed an exception in that they saw very early after independence that the post-independence period would involve a work of a revolutionary nature. To most other leaders who had been thoroughly baked (or half-baked?) in Western democratic theory, all revolutions smacked of communism or Marxism which was normatively unacceptable. The Kenyan example illustrates both points--viz. the lack of a target for revolution and a normative reaction against revolutions for fear of communism. Thus, reiterating the Government's formal statement we quoted above, the Minister of Finance used the occasion of the introduction of the Foreign Exchange Bill in Parliament to

¹⁵ René Dumont, False Start in Africa (Deutsch, 1966); see also Peter Lloyd, The New Elites of Tropical Africa (Cambridge: Oxford, University Press, 1966).

remark: "There are Chinese agencies in this country and the time has come to challenge them. The other day, Mr. Chou en. Lai, who has no shame, said that the whole of Africa is ready for a revolution, but against whom may I ask?"¹⁶ It is precisely this question that Tanzania's Arusha Declaration (1967) and Mwongozo (1971) sought to answer.

Yet, quite apart from these rather irrational, normative aspects of the reaction, there were other factors as well which explain the anti-revolution posture in the sixties. First, uhuru had brought a sense of achievement, and the first generation leaders thought that what was left was the consolidation of that achievement rather than a further revolution. Indeed, many statements by African leaders in the sixties, as well as those quoted above, reflected an assumption that the independence movement was itself a revolution that ended all revolutions. As one observer has put it, the prevailing idea in the sixties was that "the various African governments had already completed their struggle after completing the process of formal transfer of power."¹⁷ Rarely was it thought, for instance, that the task of 'nation-building' which was undertaken by each independent African nation would require a revolution rather than a consolidation of the status quo inherited from the colonial rule.

¹⁶ The Reporter, June 18, 1965. Emphasis added.

¹⁷ For a further discussion of this point, see Bismark U. Mwansasu, "Commentary on Mwongozo wa TANU," The African Review, Vol. I, No. 4 (April, 1972), pp. 9-27; the quotation at p. 10, footnote 3.

The emphasis on independence as a prerequisite for any revolution that might be desired was, however, correct. It was also important that the leaders of the first independent African nations conceived independence in continental rather than just national terms. Speaking on the eve of Ghana's independence in 1957, Kwame Nkrumah declared: "The independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of Africa."¹⁸ This statement was not only included in Convention People's Party constitution and program but was also subsequently accepted by leaders in other African countries as a commitment to the liberation of Africa.¹⁹ Because of this wide interpretation of independence, it has been possible for African leaders to view liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Southern Africa as an essential part of the African revolution. All African leaders seem to agree on this. They however differ on the answer to the question, 'After independence, what?'

Second, even though most of the members of the ~~first~~ generation elite saw consolidation as the answer because they had 'misread' the world situation, others who clearly saw the need for post-independence revolution were nevertheless prone

¹⁸For a useful discussion of Ghana's politics of independence, see David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition (New York: Antheum, 1966).

¹⁹For instance, TANU's constitution lists as one of its aims, "To co-operate with all political parties in Africa which are fighting for the independence of the entire continent of Africa." See Katiba ya TANU (Dar es Salaam: National Printing Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 4; translated from Swahili.

to resist it because they had a vested interest in the status quo. Being the 'inheritors' of power, they felt that any meaningful revolution would almost certainly threaten their own fortunes--whether revolution was interpreted narrowly as a coup d'etat inspired by forces from within or from without, or more broadly as a rejection of the continuing exploitation of the new nations by the outgoing colonial powers or the centers of technology and international monopoly capital. Some observers of the East African situation have argued that, where the leaders suffered during the struggle for independence, the tendency--though not without exceptions on the Continent--was conservatism after independence, a feeling that they had to enjoy the fruits of uhuru as a compensation for the sacrifices they had made. (Such leaders tended to become what Ali Mazrui has called the 'Wabenzi tribe.') This view maintains that there is a kind of inverse relationship between suffering during the fight for independence and post-independence radicalism.²⁰ While this seems to be the general trend in East and Central Africa, it does not hold for a country like Algeria under Ben Bella's leadership.

Third, many leaders thought development would almost inevitably result from the political power they had acquired. All that was required was to urge the poverty-stricken masses to 'work harder.' Where a country did not have to wage a

²⁰For this view, see particularly Ali A. Mazrui, "The Different Concepts of Revolution in East Africa," The African Review, Vol. I, No. 4 (April, 1972), pp. 28-51.

liberation war, there was tremendous faith in the power of 'words' and 'persuasion.' If words had expelled the formidable enemy--the colonial administration--they could also expel the remaining three enemies, poverty, disease and ignorance, it was generally reasoned. In some cases, Nkrumah's famous maxim, "Seek ye first the political kingdom and the rest shall be added unto it," was completely misinterpreted by those who thought independence was the end rather than the beginning of revolution. What Nkrumah meant, as his personal reaction against the inherited status quo showed, is that the political power that had been won with independence was to be used as a means to the African revolution. He saw Ghana's independence as a beginning of a revolution not only in Ghana but in the whole of Africa, a continental vision also strongly held by the Tanzanian leadership.²¹

Finally, the first development decade was a decade of planning. There was so much faith in the developmental power of planning that the plans of the sixties were often viewed as the genuine symbols of Africa's development revolution. As it happened, however, much that was planned was not implemented, and much that was implemented had not been planned.²²

²¹All important Party documents, from its constitution to Mwongozo, have emphasized the point that Tanzania's independence will be meaningful only after the entire continent is liberated from colonial and neo-colonial control, and that this liberation required co-operation at the continental level.

²²For some examples of "planning without implementation," see Robert Chambers, "Planning for Rural Areas in Africa: Experience and Prescriptions," The African Review, Vol. I, No. 3 (January, 1972), pp. 130-145.

One problem of the first development decade was that the planning process was dominated by Western 'experts' and 'advisers'; the local elites participated only peripherally in the planning process. (Guinea is a possible exception.) The politicians, who had in many cases promised the masses a rise in their standard of living after independence, were sometimes impatient with the technocrats who questioned the over-ambitious plans of the sixties.

Moreover, these plans depended heavily on Western donors, personnel and even theorists and model-builders! Indeed, all had scrambled in to 'help out.' They tried, by way of aid, management advice, and latest theories and models of societal transformation, to convince the leaders that the inherited situation could, with an additional dose of Western liberalism--produce miracles. Thus any slight change of direction by the more perceptive elites was immediately described as 'communist-inspired,' and this could be punished by withdrawal of aid and advisory personnel, among other possible sanctions.²³ The theories and models continued to be 'consumed' ravenously by the young aspiring elites in overseas universities as well as local institutions of higher learning which were also dominated by Western scholars. The

²³Most coups d'etat in Africa, for example, have been explained in terms of 'Western Plots,' even where the causes were clearly internal in origin. The truth or falsity of such explanations are actually irrelevant to the fact that they are widely believed and therefore do act as a constraint on change.

expected miracles, however, did not occur.²⁴

Thus, by the end of the first development decade, planning within the inherited framework was beginning to be questioned, and the climate of opinion in some African countries had changed considerably in favor of revolution, even though the term was still used by most leaders in rhetorical rather than practical terms. One observer has concluded in this regard that:

. . . events in the late 1960s seem to have radically altered the climate of opinion in the African situation which was dominant in the early 1960s. Not only have the changes expected to occur during the 'development decade' not materialized, but various governments have been toppled by the army. Reference to the future are no longer expressed with the same optimism nor are the prospects viewed as rosy and bright as was common in the early 1960s.²⁵

With regard to the political climate in East Africa during the early seventies, another observer has commented: "There is a very articulate school of thought in East Africa which believes in revolutionary policies as the only adequate response to the need of these countries. The term 'revolution' has itself become a persistent theme in the rhetoric of social reformers in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. But what does this quest for revolutionary transformation really mean?"²⁶ To some East African leaders, this has meant simply

²⁴In the Tanzanian case, for instance, the recommendations of various Western Missions which were enthusiastically implemented between 1961 and 1966 made little change in the country's low rural productivity. See Chapters 3 and 4.

²⁵Mwansasu, op. cit., p. 11.

²⁶Mazrui, op. cit., p. 28.

sociopolitical change resulting from the process of modernization, but sufficiently controlled to leave the main outline of the inherited sociopolitical system intact. Others conceive of a more fundamental change in the inherited system and have less patience for gradual evolution.²⁷

Kenya and the Ivory Coast are often cited as examples of countries undergoing a revolution of this kind. Outside Africa, Japan after the Meiji Restoration has also been cited as an example of rapid industrialization within the existing framework. It is, however, important to distinguish the transformation of Japan from that of an African country such as Kenya or the Ivory Coast. Japan was not a Western colony, but was able to use the Western challenge to domesticate the Western industrial culture and its sociopolitical concomitants within the existing framework by a process of what could be termed 'innovative imitation' (or 'imitative innovation'). The African examples were Western colonies which have responded to the Western challenge not by localizing the industrial culture but rather by cultivating a taste for it through a process we could term 'consumptionist imitation' (or 'imitative consumption'). Thus, whereas in the Japanese case it is the traditional system which shows some continuity despite local industrialization, in the African case it is the Western 'colonial system' which shows continuity; the traditional system is rapidly being transformed by the Western

²⁷ Ibid., p. 29. Mazrui terms the former "structural revolution" and the latter "systemic revolution."

industrial culture which has only been artificially domesticated.²⁸

It is easy to forget this important difference, as some observers seem to have done.²⁹ Yet it is partly this difference in development 'situations' which is creating a big dilemma for the African leaders today as they search for a model of development ideology suitable for their countries. The most tempting choice has been that of the international capitalist road to development--a choice made by both Kenya and the Ivory Coast. It is tempting because it promises immediate pay-offs to the elites, but often paying little attention to the masses. Moreover, as observers of the Ivory Coast type of development have commented, the long-run danger is that of achieving "growth without development," which will be incapable of "self-sustaining transformation" as the profits flow back to France; for "indigenous sources of capital and entrepreneurial ability (public or private) which might push in a more fruitful direction, are stifled by the emergent class structure and pattern of international involve-

²⁸ Moreover, the industrial culture is expressed in consumption rather than production of industrial goods. Dumont's False Start in Africa gives interesting examples of the artificiality of the consumption pattern of African elites.

²⁹ For instance, in comparing Kenya and England, Mazrui, op. cit., ignores the fact that industry in Kenya is owned mainly by multi-national corporations in which Britain has interest. See particularly the analysis given by the National Christian Council of Kenya, Who Controls Industry in Kenya? (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), especially Chapter 2, and Seidman, op. cit., pp. 41-46.

ment."³⁰

Another important difference in development situations should be mentioned. Professor Mazrui has compared Kenya's structural revolution with the industrial revolution in England during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and concluded that in both cases there was a "revolution without revolutionaries at the helm"; so that "Major structural modifications in the society and the economy are taking place largely by the sheer momentum of unguided social change."³¹ This parallel should not be overdrawn. In the first place, the elites--indeed, the Government itself--in Kenya, as in other African countries, are consciously trying to guide social change in an ideologically-determined direction. If social change occurred in England by sheer historical momentum--which is probably true for the centuries mentioned--that is certainly not the case today in Kenya or anywhere else in Africa.

Second, the Industrial Revolution took place in England under totally different conditions from those obtaining in Africa today. Whereas in England industrial innovation came largely from internal sources, it is mainly coming from external sources in the African case--and this in turn frus-

³⁰G. Arrighi and J. S. Saul, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. VI (August, 1968); G. Hughes, "Preconditions of Socialist Development in Africa," Monthly Review (May, 1970).

³¹Mazrui, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

trating, if not 'killing in the shell,' whatever local innovative potential that might exist. Again, whereas England industrialized at a time when external pressures and competition were much less and colonial markets and sources of raw materials plentiful, African countries are presently being forced by external pressures to accelerate their development, a situation which makes them highly vulnerable to external manipulation and to a 'false start.'³²

Some East African leaders have opted for a systemic³³ revolution, involving the total transformation of the society, structurally and normatively. Tanzania's revolution is of this kind. In this type of revolution, there is more central guidance than where the leadership is merely interested in a structural revolution that does not involve significant normative or ideological shift. The problem in this type of transformation is not merely that of top leadership 'guiding' the masses. The leadership has at the same time to convert into its own image the elites who stand between it and the

³²Thus, for example, very few African leaders had the patience in the sixties to pause and ask whether "development" in their countries would be measured by the conventional per capita indices and "skyscrapers" in the cities or by some other indices; development was simply viewed as an effort to "catch up with" the developed nations.

³³Our use of this term differs from that of Professor Mazrui, "The Different Concepts of Revolution in East Africa," in that we make no distinction between structural and systemic revolutions; we see a systemic revolution as involving both structural and normative changes and, at least in the Tanzanian case, both changes are conceived and undertaken simultaneously. However, normative changes may, and often do, lag behind structural changes.

masses; just as it has to defend itself against external forces which might align themselves with the unconverted elites who are still interested in maintaining the status quo. For a systemic revolution, which is engineered from the top, attacks foreign as well as domestic exploitation; and it is the interests of the elites which are affected most whenever such a transformation is undertaken. Thus it has not been an easy choice in Africa, as the discussion in the following section will show.

THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION AND THE DILEMMA OF CHOICE

What our discussion so far suggests is that the 'African revolution' has a liberation and a development objective which cannot be achieved without adopting a suitable development ideology. The search for a development ideology, however, whether viewed in Pan-African terms or in the context of a single country such as Tanzania, involves a series of dilemmas of choice.

Experiences in Africa during the first development decade have shown that choice is neither as simple nor as rational and 'free' as it is often assumed. The main dilemma in searching for a viable development ideology resulted from the traditional ties with the West, which made it difficult to deviate from the inherited framework without risking the loss of much needed aid for 'nation-building.' The need for aid was even greater during the formative years because the

promises that the nationalist leaders had made to the masses during the mobilization for uhuru could only be fulfilled if the economy grew at a sufficiently fast rate.

The need for immediate development meant that short-term gains were often given priority over long-term strategies. There was also faith in the benevolence of the developed sections of the international community, particularly the Western industrial powers which had established financial, personnel and commercial ties with these countries. This faith is evidenced by the large "aid content" of the development plans of the sixties.³⁴ Towards the end of the first development decade, however, it had become clear beyond doubt that the responsibility for the task of nation-building lay squarely with the African states themselves, and that:

all the pious declarations by the industrial powers either collectively or individually expressing their concern and readiness to help in the process of African development have to a greater degree remained verbal declarations. Both trade and development aid to Africa have not been forthcoming in sufficient amount and regularity to assist a planned development effort to the continent. And there seems to be no evidence to suggest that things are likely to be any better in the 1970s.³⁵

As we have argued elsewhere,³⁶ the evidence that

³⁴ Most African First Development Plans relied on foreign capital to more than 60 percent of total investment envisaged. Tanzania's First Plan (1964/69) envisaged that 78 percent of the Central Government expenditure would come from external sources; the result was disappointing (see Chapter 2).

³⁵ A. H. Rweyememu, "Some Reflections on Contemporary African Political Institutions and their Capacity to Generate Socio-economic Development," The African Review, Vol. I, No. 2 (September, 1971), p. 39.

³⁶ See D. E. Apter and S. S. Mushi, "Political Theory and Development in the New Nations," International Social Science Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (1972), pp. 44-68.

exists tends to suggest that things are likely to be worse rather than better in the seventies. For even though according to the Pearson Report, Partners in Development, income flows from the non-socialist world increased from \$8,000 million in 1961 to \$12,800 million in 1968, by which time more than 100,000 experts from overseas were working in the developing countries, and even though in some cases growth rates exceeded those of the donor countries, the long-run consequences were not always developmental:

In most [developing nations], each increment of gain was likely to be offset by unanticipated difficulties. The income flows, although increasing in real terms during the decade, declined in proportion of net national product in the donor countries. The foreign experts often became transformed into enclave communities which used up resources for themselves. Although the result may appear statistically as a part of national development, it had, in substance, little or no effect on the people themselves. Other real difficulties, such as tight money, overextended payments . . . are some of the costs. . . .³⁷

Assumed Social Contract

Moreover, since much of this aid depended on bilateral agreements between a developing nation and an industrial power or a multi-national corporation, it tended to be distributed selectively to politically and ideologically 'loyal' nations. Some African leaders have argued that independence itself was granted on the assumption by the departing colonial power that this kind of 'loyalty' would continue. For instance, Nyerere has recently argued that independence was a

form of 'social contract' which was completely misunderstood by both parties. Whereas the nationalist leaders interpreted independence as "freedom to make independent decisions and choices," argues Nyerere, "the departing colonial powers assumed that uhuru would be no more than the flag and that the nationalist leaders would continue to preserve their mirija [interests]." The contract is assumed to have been made when the colonial power agreed to grant independence, even though the nationalist leaders who assumed governance did not know of it. The nationalist leaders were to become, in Nyerere's terminology, "modern chiefs" whose main preoccupation would be the preservation of the interests of their outgoing masters. In return, they would receive "certificates of approval" from their masters for all future actions which did not threaten their masters' interests.³⁸

Many other African leaders have come out with a similar theory of independence, especially after the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 which was widely interpreted in Black Africa as having been inspired by the forces of neo-colonialism which he had strongly opposed in word, letter, and action.³⁹ The theory of 'social contract,' which defines the post-independence neo-colonial situation, has been summarized as follows:

³⁸ Paraphrase of President's Swahili explanation of the Mwongozo, February, 1971.

³⁹ See particularly his Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Nelson, 1965).

The contract was that independence was being granted so long as a new state remained within the sphere of influence of the would-be departing colonial power. Trade patterns, currency convertibility, sources of 'development' aid, external communication patterns, and even the national language, were all expected to remain the monopoly of the former colonial power despite the granting of independence to the new state. Any African leadership which attempted to violate these arrangements, had to suffer severe consequences, as the experience of Sekou Toure, Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, and many others testify.⁴⁰

Apart from these politico-economic aspects of the assumed 'contracts,' there were also cultural and normative aspects which linked the African elites with the West. Most of the African leaders--and the educated elites generally--have been subjected to Western influences in three main ways. First, most of them (i.e. those who replaced colonial rulers) grew up or were adults during the colonial period; some of them had actually worked with the colonial administrators, teachers or technicians in one capacity or another. These contacts produced 'demonstration' as well as 'enculturation' effects. Second, the education they received--whether in local or overseas institutions--emphasized Western values and styles of life. As President Nyerere has often reminisced, it was in those days a matter of pride rather than insult to be called a "Black European."⁴¹ Third, in most African coun-

⁴⁰ Rweyemamu, op. cit., p. 32.

⁴¹ Speech to Parliament, December 9, 1962. The creation of a Ministry for Youths and Culture in the following year was an attempt to reassert the importance of indigenous values and the role they would play in national integration. See the relevant essays in his Freedom and Unity (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966).

tries, Western influence continued to dominate many sectors of goal-attainment after independence because of the lack of local high-level manpower and because of the old ties with the West. As we mentioned earlier, the planning scene was the domain of Western 'experts' and 'advisers' in the sixties. It was natural enough initially to rely on the West for financial aid, skills and industrial goods after independence because there were well-established ties. The West was also the natural 'market' for theories and models of development.⁴²

Institutions of Democracy

This initial--indeed, unavoidable--reliance on the West, however, had the effect of reinforcing the assumed 'social contract,' and the West generally expected the new nations to continue with the established normative and structural ties. It is interesting to note that most Western political and economic theories were also based on the assumption that the West (and the ties it had established with its former colonies) had solutions to these countries' problems of underdevelopment.⁴³ Development itself was defined

⁴² These theories and models were embodied in reports of "Missions," such as those made by the World Bank Missions for Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, or by individual scholars such as that of Arthur Lewis for Ghana, etc. In all such reports, foreign capital and private investments were emphasized, as opposed to State control of the economy.

⁴³ Thus, for example, the American "modernization" school concentrated on how roles germane to the industrial world would be transplanted in non-industrial settings, and saw the whole process of development as involving "Westernization" of roles and values.

in terms of political and economic democratization. The concept of democracy, however, was narrowly and ideologically conceived in terms of the experiences in the West. This had repercussions on 'institutional revolution' in Africa, as we shall point out briefly below.

First, those who diagnosed the emerging African polities in the fifties and sixties tended to emphasize the structures rather than the contents of democracy.⁴⁴ Thus some African leaders made a mockery of democracy as they tried to meet the Western demand of structural pluralism and democratic content (i.e. competitiveness). Taking elections as the best example, some African regimes which identified conformity with a 'pay-off' from the West maintained and publicized the visible structures of Western democracy (e.g. multi-party or two-party systems, autonomous trade unions and other associational groups) during inter-election periods, but banned them or made them somehow ineffectual during elections. These are examples of Western 'democratic' structures (artificially imposed) without democratic content.⁴⁵ In some other cases, electoral competition was both based on, and reinforced, primordial narrow identities rather than modern associational groups as is claimed to be the case in the

⁴⁴In particular, democracy was identified with the two-party or multi-party system; the one-party system was, almost by definition, considered a totalitarian system.

⁴⁵Kenya's by-elections of 1968 and general elections of 1969 are a good example of this political trick.

West.⁴⁶ In other countries, such as Nigeria before the Civil War, there was so much corruption during elections that it almost made a mockery of the democratic ideal.⁴⁷ Yet in Western circles Nigeria was considered the 'model of democracy' in Africa!

Some African leaders, however, admitted their failure to comply with the structural demand, even though they were committed to the ideal of democracy. Some of these leaders made a genuine search for some alternative structures (e.g. the dominant-party or one-party system) within which some competition was possible. Such countries are examples of democratic content without the Western 'democratic' structures.⁴⁸ However, not all regimes in the second category are 'honest' or are basically motivated by the ideal of democracy, for there are cases where single-party systems have been

⁴⁶This claim is made, for example, by James S. Coleman in Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960), pp. 532-533. Even in the West, however, such narrow identities as religion do enter electoral politics; this is as much true of the Netherlands as it is of the United States.

⁴⁷The elections of 1959, in particular, revealed that... ethnic ties were still stronger than the ties created by such modern associations as the political parties and trade unions. The political parties themselves had ethnic foundation in the Nigerian case.

⁴⁸Tanzania is a good example of a one-party structure which allows democratic elections within clearly defined rules. For details of the working of the system, see Lionel Cliffe (ed.), One-Party Democracy (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967); Election Study Committee, Socialism and Participation: Tanzania's 1970 National Elections (Dar es Salaam: Tanzanian Publishing House, 1974).

adopted for primarily selfish reasons.⁴⁹

Yet there is empirical evidence to show that many countries used the idea of democracy during the sixties as a 'window-dressing' to attract some external 'pay-off,' while others attempted to domesticate democracy by introducing structural innovation.⁵⁰ The fact that the West (governments, press and scholars alike) tended to boost the regimes in the first category as the 'model' of democracy in Africa has been a major source of disappointment for some of the African leaders who take democracy seriously but find the Western structures to be either undomesticatable or for the time being unsuitable for their manifold development tasks. Indeed, ideological reactions in the West have generally made the leaders of the developing nations less imaginative than they would have otherwise been. For the advantages of 'institutional revolution' are often assessed in the light of possible loss in Western aid or co-operation.⁵¹

⁴⁹ For instance, the Ivorian single-party system, highly elitist in its functioning, has a limited participation, even though the Ivorian elite is probably the most "Westernized" in its life style in the entire continent. The elite puts political stability before mass participation, and considers the masses incapable of participating in decision-making. See particularly Christian P. Potholm, Four African Political Systems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 248; Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 90.

⁵⁰ For a cogent statement on the need to re-examine the structure of 'democracy' inherited from Western colonial rule, see J. K. Nyerere, Democracy and the Party System (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1963).

⁵¹ This was reinforced by the fact that the position of the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, with

Second, the Western 'adviser,' like the Western theorist, did not emphasize the fact that democracy, being an ideal as well as a structural arrangement, required an ethical foundation. It was generally assumed that the particular structures which produced democracy in the West would produce and support democracy everywhere. The notions of 'competitiveness' and 'equalization of power' posited by Western democratic theory,⁵² though normatively attractive, are difficult to achieve in the present African development situation. For they assume a highly informed and highly participant citizenry. This cannot be assumed for most of the developing nations. Indeed, a strict adherence to the Western participatory structures and norms before most of the people were mobilized politically would result in the worst form of elitist politics--for there would be no control from below given the absence of modern structures of interest aggregation and articulation in most local settings. Thus one could argue a paradoxical case for democratization by stating the need to initially limit democracy (i.e. by exercising some control over the elites) in order to widen democracy (i.e. by giving it a mass base).

regard to the vague concept of "African Socialism" remained unclear. Moreover, some African leaders viewed institutional change as necessarily involving a wholesale importation of some socialist model which could be just as unworkable as the Western model under the existing African conditions.

⁵²See, for instance, Frederick W. Frey, "Political Development, Power and Communication in Turkey," in Lucian W. Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 301.

A choice between 'elitist politics' and 'mass-based politics' is an ideological choice which the African countries must make. The former has thus far been more attractive than the latter, partly because it is the elites who are making that choice, partly because the inherited situation favors that choice, and partly because the overwhelming majority of the African population is still 'politically unaware' and politically 'non-participant.'⁵³

Division of Labor

It should be emphasized that the 'contract' theory or assumption is not only applicable to the African case or where one partner has been the colonizer and the other partner the colonized, but to all situations of imperialism, whether it is carried out by nations or national (or multinational) corporations. The imperialist powers assume that the international division of labor which began in the nineteenth century following the European Industrial Revolution will remain a permanent feature. This assumption is, for instance, clearly expressed in a recent report of a U.S. Presidential Mission to the Western Hemisphere, the Rockefeller Report, which stated:

⁵³Two elections under Tanzania's mass one-party system, 1965 and 1970, have demonstrated that, given avenues of participation, the masses can exercise some control over the elite and even effect a degree of 'elite circulation.' See Cliffe, One-Party Democracy, and Election Study Committee, Socialism and Participation: Tanzania's 1970 National Elections. In both elections, more than two-thirds of the M.P.s were unseated by popular vote.

Just as the other American republics depend upon the United States for their capital equipment requirements, so the United States depend on them to provide a vast market for our manufactured goods. And as these countries look to the United States for a market for their primary products whose sale enables them to buy equipment for development at home, so the United States looks to them for raw materials for our industries, on which depend the jobs of many of our citizens.⁵⁴

What this report illustrates is the important fact that today, as a century ago, the more developed world believes strongly in the doctrine of 'division of labor' between producers of raw materials and producers of manufactured goods. The assumed 'contract' remains valid as long as one partner continues to accept a condition of perpetual weakness which results mainly from this division of labor. Thus far most African states have behaved as though they 'accepted' the permanence of the division, for industrialization is in most cases considered a very distant goal.⁵⁵

It should further be noted that the assumption of a 'social contract' is not restricted to the Western powers; it applies equally to the socialist powers as well, particularly with regard to the political, ideological and military forms of imperialism. The so-called 'Brezhnev Doctrine' illustrates the theory of 'social contract' whereby the Soviet

⁵⁴Quoted in Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," The African Review, Vol. I, No. 4 (April, 1972), p. 114, footnote 18.

⁵⁵This is a result of necessity. Most African countries could only industrialize through foreign investments; but there is no guarantee that this investment will be forthcoming. Apart from the scarcity of capital and local entrepreneurial talents, the smallness of the internal market is an additional factor.

Union is not only militarily the superior partner (and the other countries in the 'Warsaw Pact' the junior partners), but also the 'manufacturer' of ideology and 'proper' socialist policies which the junior partners must adopt or be punished. The experiences of Czechoslovakia and the dramatic overthrow of the Dubcek regime in 1968 illustrates the working of this doctrine. Speaking in Warsaw on November 12, 1968, to the V Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, Brezhnev emphasized the need for 'strict respect' for the sovereignty of other socialist countries, but added the following important qualification:

But when internal and external forces that are hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a socialist country towards the restoration of a capitalist regime, when socialism in that country and the socialist community as a whole is threatened, it becomes not only a problem of the people of the country concerned, but a common problem and concern of all socialist countries. Naturally an action such as military assistance to a fraternal country designed to avert the threat to the social system is an extraordinary step, dictated by necessity.⁵⁶

To these two examples should be added the current trend towards rapprochement between the two super-powers, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The recent visit of Brezhnev to the United States (June, 1973) will probably be an important landmark in the Soviet philosophy of 'co-existence' with the Western capitalist powers, a landmark which has lessons for the developing nations. In this visit, Brezhnev 'surprised' the American private financial magnates not because he became the first Soviet Party leader to address them and lunch with

⁵⁶Quoted in Galtung, op. cit.; p. 114, footnote 19.

them, but because of his dramatic declaration that the 'cold war' had ended and his unprecedented call for co-operation of the American 'private' capital with the Soviet 'public' capital in the development of Siberia.

What does this trend imply? Political observers have given many interpretations,⁵⁷ but we are concerned here with one point which this trend illustrates: the fact that the super-powers are themselves co-operating in various fields despite their stated ideological differences while, at the same time, trying, through various means, including military intervention, to prevent co-operation among the new nations, often under the pretenses of ideological evangelism. This new trend is part and parcel of the 'feudalization' process that the international community has been undergoing--a process whereby the richer nations (feudal lords) co-operate in demarcating their spheres of influence in the new nations (fiefdoms).⁵⁸ Experiences of the past two decades have shown that such doctrines as the 'Monroe Doctrine' (initially limiting U.S. influence to the Western Hemisphere) and the 'Brezhnev Doctrine' (theoretically limiting Soviet influence to the countries of the Warsaw Pact), can be redefined and

⁵⁷ One explanation has been that the Soviet Union intends to use U.S. interests in Siberia to eliminate Chinese claims in the area; another views the trend as a logical outcome of the existing "bipolar" politics in an age of nuclear power--i.e. the nuclear powers see their own survival in co-operation rather than in confrontation.

⁵⁸ For an excellent description of this process, see Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism."

universalized, and then used as the 'guiding rule' in the delimitation of 'spheres of influence.' The implications of the above examples for choice in the developing nations should be noted.

First, the assumption of a 'contractual' relationship with the ex-colonial powers leaves very little room for 'free choice' or long-term planning for development, since the 'commanding heights' of the economy continue to remain largely in foreign hands. The lack of economic co-operation among the poor nations has made it impossible to challenge the vertical dependency on the ex-colonial powers. Ironically, one of the active functions of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) --a body that was born of 'Pan-Africanism' which rejected colonial and neo-colonial domination through balkanization-- has been the settlement of 'border crises'! Even though the artificiality of the inherited borders is always recognized, in practice these borders are sanctified at the same time as they are denounced. The absence of strong 'Pan-Africanism' has undoubtedly made it possible for the 'feudal structure' linking each individual African country vertically with some center of capital and technology to continue without being challenged by a horizontal 'trade union' action by the new African nations which, together with other developing nations, constitute a modern equivalent of Marx's proletariat.

Second, the promises of co-operation in development made by the industrial nations cannot be relied upon; for even where aid is given lavishly, the prevailing doctrine of 'division of labor' creates situations which make local

industrialization almost impossible. Failure to industrialize perpetuates 'modernization' status which means, in effect, remaining 'derivative' and 'consumptionist.' Latin America provides examples of countries with an 'unfinished' industrial revolution--failing to make a jump from what Professor David Apter calls 'late stage modernization' to the industrial stage where innovative information is locally produced rather than imported.⁵⁹

Third, a choice of one super-power in preference to another as an ally, even where the powers in question profess ideological differences, merely amounts to a process of substituting one form of imperialism with another.⁶⁰ Fourth, with specific reference to the African situation, complete loyalty to the inherited status quo leads to a situation where most of the key decisions are made from without, making it impossible to evolve a rational development ideology from within.⁶¹

⁵⁹David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), Chapter 2.

⁶⁰The experience of Egypt provides a good illustration. Nasser's anti-West sentiments since the Suez crisis of 1956 ... gradually pushed Egypt to the Soviet Union. After the October, 1973, Arab-Israel war, President Sadat admitted that his country had made a mistake in over-relying on one super-power and initiated moves to normalize relations with the United States. President Sadat's problem is how to keep the Soviet Union at the same time as he extends friendship to the United States. A few African countries, like Tanzania, attempted to follow a 'non-alignment' road from the beginning; but this was not all smooth-sailing, as the Tanzanian experience shows.

⁶¹Malawi under the leadership of Kamuzú Banda, for instance, has been described as an 'extension of Britain.' See particularly Attati Mpakati, "Malawi: The Birth of a Neo-Colonial State," The African Review, Vol. III, No. 1 (1973), pp. 33-68.

What all this suggests is that the first step towards the African revolution is to declare nonpartisanship in any assumed 'contract,' which is precisely the message of Tanzania's Arusha Declaration and Mwongozo. To do so is to opt for a policy of national self-reliance and national independence in decision-making; it means defining new criteria by which aid, loans, gifts, old friends and new ones are to be judged. In Tanzania's case, the policy of self-reliance--as we shall discuss in more detail later--was adopted for two main reasons: (1) because of the insufficiency of money from internal and external sources; and (2) because experiences of the early sixties had taught that only a policy of self-reliance would be consistent with the principles of national sovereignty and freedom of choice which political independence was supposed to bring. Thus the Arusha Declaration denounced the increasing dependency on foreign sources and regretted the growing assumption that development is brought about by money rather than by the people:

We have made a mistake to choose money, something which we do not have, to be our major instrument of development. We are mistaken when we imagine that we shall get money from foreign countries, firstly, because to say the truth we cannot get enough money for our development and, secondly, because even if we could get it such complete dependence on outside help would have endangered our independence and the other policies of our country.⁶²

Experiences in Tanzania, Guinea, Lumumba's Congo, Nkrumah's Ghana, Obote's Uganda and, outside Africa, Allende's Chile, have shown two things with regard to a choice of this

⁶²The Arusha Declaration, pp. 11.

kind. The first is that such a 'daring' choice is not without reprisals, and that it requires courage and imagination rather than rhetoric and phrase-mongering which have preoccupied many African "revolutionaries."⁶³ The second is that, after making this initial choice which represents only the 'nationalistic' aspect of the revolution, a series of other choices will have to be made under conditions which are not entirely tranquil. For instance, the question that often follows nationalization of the means of production and distribution is whether to create local capitalism or socialism; other choices include decisions on 'organizational types,' for instance, bureaucratic or centrist types versus participatory types, etc. As we shall point out more clearly later when we examine Tanzania's 'choice situation' after the Arusha Declaration, the choice of one or the other will depend on a number of factors--e.g. the character and size of the local elite, degree of stratification, extent of national unity, etc.

The world division of labor limits choice alternatives in the new nations of Africa while at the same time creating a 'taste' for certain consumer goods which can only be obtained in the industrial nations. Why don't African leaders give priority to industrialization as one strategy for the

⁶³ Examine, for example, the writings of such "cultural revolutionaries" as President Sedar Senghor in the light of actual policies and practices. Such concepts as "Negritude," "African Socialism," etc., have remained personal philosophies rather than a guide to a psycho-cultural revolution in Africa.

African revolution? This choice is limited by a number of factors, most of them resulting from the nature of dependence already established.

First, local industrialization was deliberately discouraged by the colonial administration. Thus the body of local technicians (trained mainly after independence) is still small, with meager industrial experience and little, if any, encouragement from the politicians who have thus far given priority to non-industrial sectors.⁶⁴ In the Tanzanian case, the lack of resources and local technicians led the Arusha Declaration to de-emphasize industries. "The mistake we are making," stated the Declaration, "is to think that development begins with industries," for "we cannot get enough money and borrow enough technicians to start all the industries we need," and "even if we could get the necessary assistance, dependence on it could interfere with our policy on socialism."⁶⁵ In many cases, the African political and bureaucratic elites have continued to import most goods from traditional markets, irrespective of their development potential, largely for prestigious reasons. Indeed, consumption of certain types of goods is identified with development itself, a tendency Tanzania has been trying to discourage during the

⁶⁴The agricultural sector has received priority because (a) more than 90 percent of the population lives in the rural areas; (b) agriculture accounts for not less than 30 percent in the GNP of most African countries (Kenya 33 percent, Tanzania 41 percent, and Uganda 54 percent). See Chapter 2.

⁶⁵The Arusha Declaration, pp. 11-12.

post-Arusha era.⁶⁶ Briefly stated, then, the post-war history of most African states has been a history of acquisition of values, roles, and aspirations germane to an industrial setting while they remained internally non-industrial and without local technology and resources to make industrialization possible.

Second, the 'choice situation' in most African countries is complicated by the fact that they are nations in a hurry. For instance, the so-called 'six crises' (namely, the identity, the legitimacy, the penetration, the participation, the integration and the distribution, crisis)⁶⁷ must be met at once rather than sequentially as was the case in most European countries. In Britain, for example, political unification preceded the agrarian revolution, which preceded the industrial revolution, which preceded the provision of social services on a regular basis, democratization, etc. This sequence cannot, unfortunately, be replicated in Africa because

⁶⁶ Control over the importation of luxurious personal cars in 1971 was probably one of the biggest blows on the urban elites' "conspicuous consumption." Luxury consumption in Tanzania was much less than that described by Dumont, False Start in Africa, in regard to the elites of French-speaking West Africa, but by 1967 the ministers and higher bureaucrats were fast becoming Mazrui's "Wabenzi tribe"--the Mercedes Benz being their standard car.

⁶⁷ For a discussion of these crises, see Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 62-67; James S. Coleman, "Modernization: Political Aspects," International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Company and the Free Press, 1968), pp. 395-402.

all these things are demanded at once. An African Parliament or Party Committee will in one sitting consider the problem of integration, the need to improve agriculture, the strategies of industrialization, the need to expand social services, and the implications of all these state undertakings for grass-root participation and legitimacy of the government. None of these goals can be shelved or separated from the general idea of development or 'modernization.'⁶⁸

Thus, it is often not a question of making a simple choice, say, between agriculture and industry, but one of maintaining a correct balance between them. However, given the fact that about 90 percent of the African population lives in the rural areas and the fact of manpower and financial shortages, most leaders have tended to put agriculture before industry, often with a hope that agricultural surplus will in future assist in developing an industrial capacity.

This strategy cannot, of course, be a permanent solution. For rural modernization often leads to a premature destruction of the traditional system before the new has fully penetrated into the society. Throughout Africa, one finds a big discrepancy between the process of normative and structural detraditionalization and the creation of modern replacements. Mobilization for modernity has often led to the

⁶⁸For a useful discussion of developmental stages in the West, see A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967); W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

problems of urbanization without industrialization, on the structural side, and acquisition of bourgeois values without the resources to satisfy them, on the normative side.⁶⁹ Tanzania's Ujamaa experiment is an attempt to arrest this trend, as it will become clear later.

Third, in most African countries industrial expansion and development generally have been limited by the smallness of their internal markets. The 'federal' or 'common market' solutions have not always succeeded even where--as in East Africa--genuine efforts have been made in that direction. Communication problems within and between African nations have made it difficult to translate the 'Pan-African' ideal into concrete development programs and strategies. Furthermore, the inherited structural links and communication patterns with the former colonial metropolises continue to encourage African leaders to search for solutions to African problems from outside rather than from within the continent.⁷⁰

By the end of the first development decade, many African leaders had come to realize through a harsh experience

⁶⁹Some traditional systems, however, were able to absorb "modern" values within traditional role structures, as was the case in Buganda till the Mengo coup of 1966. See David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961); Herbert T. Spiro (ed.), Patterns of African Development (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967).

⁷⁰For an excellent examination of how "communication imperialism" is converted into other forms of imperialism such as political, economic and cultural imperialism, see Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," pp. 119-124.

that (1) nationalism has triumphed over Pan-Africanism in the sense that each nation wants to concentrate on its own national priorities rather than taking a 'trade union' action against the big giants of the world; (2) nationalism has also triumphed over internationalism in the sense that the workers in the developed countries who, had Marx been correct, would act in support of the exploited masses of the Third World, have instead been completely absorbed into the capitalist systems of their own countries;⁷¹ and (3) the dependence relationship, by making the new nations consumers, but not producers of industrial goods, has a self-perpetuating tendency, for it makes it difficult to foster local innovative power.⁷² The declarations, manifestos and charters of the late sixties and early seventies were a result of such realization.

'Nationalism' and 'Pan-Africanism' created a dilemma of choice for some African leaders who were deeply committed to both. Nyerere's experience illustrates this dilemma very well. Like Nkrumah, Nyerere viewed the African revolution in pan-African terms, but faced a number of frustrations as he attempted to translate the ideal into actuality. For instance, one question facing him in the mid-sixties was: how long would he wait for the long-talked-about East African Federation before initiating a socialist revolution in

⁷¹C. Wright Mills, The Marxists (London: Cox & Wyman Ltd., 1962), especially Chapter 1.

⁷²For a discussion of these nations as "derivative nations," see Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, pp. 42-61.

Tanzania? He had offered in 1961 to delay Tanganyika's independence if this would make it possible for the entire region of East Africa to become independent as one federal unit. He also delayed the introduction of One-Party System partly to accommodate Zanzibar which was joining into a union with Tanganyika, and partly to see if the pact signed between him, Obote of Uganda and Kenyatta of Kenya (1963) would produce an East African Federation. Eventually, Nyerere had to go it alone.⁷³

Nyerere is not the only leader who faced a dilemma between nationalism and pan-Africanism. Probably Nkrumah's efforts could illustrate this dilemma more vividly. However, there is an important difference between the two leaders in this regard. While Nyerere tried to weigh the needs of Pan-Africanism against the needs of Tanzania and concentrated on the latter when he faced frustrations and disillusionment in the former, Nkrumah concentrated on Pan-Africanism almost to the neglect of Ghana.⁷⁴ These dilemmas show that the African revolution is as 'balkanized' as the continent itself and

⁷³ Mzee Kenyatta announced after Kenya's independence that the three East African leaders had signed the federal pact in order to accelerate Kenya's independence. An official statement from Dar es Salaam stated categorically that Mwalimu was not simply engaged in a 'political trick' to accelerate Kenya's independence but was committed to an early East African Federation.

⁷⁴ As leader of the first independent nation under African leadership, Nkrumah saw himself not only as a leader of Ghana but also a leader of a larger continental movement summed up in the term "Pan-Africanism." This is clearly reflected in all his writings.

that it will take place at two levels: the pan-African (O.A.U.) level and, more immediately, at the national level. This study analyzes that revolution as it takes place in one country--Tanzania.

Chapter 2

THE SOURCES AND PARAMETERS OF UJAMAA IDEOLOGY

The question before the new nation . . . was not whether to change, but what kind of change it would have. The nation had to decide whether this change was to be deliberately chosen and implemented, or was to be merely a side effect of development elsewhere. In other words, one of the first issues . . . was whether to use the acquired decision-making power to initiate, lead and control changes in the society. The alternative was to remain fairly passive while the society absorbed changes from outside, like a sponge absorbing water.

-- J. K. Nyerere, Tanzania: Ten Years After Independence (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), p. 4.

Tanzania's Ujamaa ideology did not spring from thin air; it was a result of a complex of factors--both internal and external to the system; some historical, some socioeconomic and others politico-ideological. The general predicaments we discussed in Chapter 1--viz. the failure to achieve a Pan-African solution to the problem of underdevelopment (for which Tanzania, in particular, had struggled to achieve in the sixties), and the growing dependence on the external environment for development resources--set a boundary to the choices available to individual African nations acting singly.

Thus, for example, few African nations could individually adopt a program of rapid industrialization owing to two main factors. First, their internal markets are small and

the effort in the sixties to enlarge intra-African trade did not alter significantly the inherited links with the metropolises of ex-colonial powers, or the structure of the inherited economies which depended on export of primary commodities outside the continent. By 1966, for instance, trade between Africa and the rest of the world (mainly exchange of primary products against manufactures and semi-manufactures) accounted for about 25 percent of the continent's GNP, while intra-African trade accounted for less than 10 percent of total trade (again, mainly exchange of primary products). One analyst of the conditions of development in Africa concluded: "In African conditions, industrialization is impossible without increased trade among neighbours. . . . Progressive economic co-operation is essential, with steady progress towards economic integration."¹ Tanzania's struggle for a larger "federal" East Africa in the sixties was a realization of this fact.

Second, the capability of most African states to "bargain" with the external suppliers of capital and technical information is very low; so is the ability to service overseas borrowings. By the mid-sixties, Tanzania had seen the weaknesses of relying on the external environment and the need for a novel solution to her own underdevelopment. The crucial questions which Tanzania attempted to answer by the Arusha Declaration, and the limitations of the options avail-

¹A. F. Ewing, Industry in Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 99.

able to the regime, will be outlined briefly in the following section. These questions will be elaborated in the various chapters of this study.

THREE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

As each country struggled against its own underdevelopment, it had to answer at least three crucial questions, namely (1) how to control the economy to minimize the expatriation of surplus; (2) how to increase the wealth of the nation; and (3) how this wealth should be distributed among individuals, groups or regions of the country--the Lasswellian question of "who gets what, when, how." The first question is primarily "economic nationalism"; the second poses the problem of strategies to increase productivity and the level of investment surplus; the third is a normative (or ethical) question which has consequences for the structure as well as stability of the economy and the political system. Tanzania is one of a few African countries which have formulated a coherent ideology which attempts to answer these questions in the context of their conditions and experiences. The Arusha Declaration and subsequent policy statements provided some answers to these questions in the context of Tanzania's socioeconomic situation.

Answers to these questions depended, in part, on the development road chosen by each individual nation. Two broad alternatives existed after independence. The first was to

continue with, and further entrench, the international capitalist road whose main outlines and linkages were established during the colonial phase. The second alternative was to effect fundamental changes in the inherited system. A nation choosing the first alternative finds some aspects of the above questions already answered by the nature of the inherited socioeconomic system, and changes are likely to be procedural and technical rather than fundamental. A choice of the second alternative means building a new society, which takes a revolution.

Yet, this apparently 'simple' choice has internal as well as external constraints. The first alternative presupposes the existence of a well-developed local entrepreneurial elite and/or a high capability to attract foreign investments and to service foreign debts. Success of the second alternative depends partly on the degree of stratification and a host of other factors resulting from the existing traditional systems and colonial development policies. With regard to the first alternative, the Tanzanian leadership saw local capital and entrepreneurial talent as the major constraints; as Mwalimu has written:

The real ideological choice is between controlling the economy through domestic private enterprise or doing so through some state or other collective institutions. But although this is an ideological choice, it is extremely doubtful whether it is a practical choice for an African nationalist. The pragmatist in Africa--the man who is completely uncommitted to one doctrine or another, but claims only to deal with the situation as it is--will find that the real choice is a different one. He will find that the choice is between foreign private ownership on the one hand, and local collective ownership on the

other. For I do not think there is any free state in Africa where there is sufficient local capital, or a sufficient number of local entrepreneurs, for locally-based capitalism to dominate the economy. These are the facts of Africa's situation. The only way in which national control of the economy can be achieved is through the economic institutions of socialism.²

Thus the Tanzanian leadership considered socialist control of the economy a matter of necessity under Tanzania's conditions, and in 1967 nationalized various foreign-owned firms and the major means of production and distribution, in accordance with the Arusha Declaration. This action was seen as an economic expression of nationalism, as Mwalimu explained:

Such an economic expression of nationalism is nothing new in the world; although the manner of the action may have been particularly Tanzanian, its motivation is common enough. Every country--whether it is capitalist, communist, socialist or capitalist--wants to control its own economy. . . . Ideological differences between countries affect the method,³ not necessarily the fact, of securing national control.³

Nationalization, it must be emphasized, could only answer the question of who should control the economy; it did not guarantee increased wealth or fair distribution. Thus, since the Declaration elaborate policy statements have been issued to clarify the strategies for higher productivity and equitable distribution of wealth.⁴ The "politics of Ujamaa"

²Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 262.

³Ibid., p. 264.

⁴These include policy papers on "Education for Self-Reliance" (1967); "Socialism and Rural Development" (1967); "Worker Participation" (1970), Mwongozo (1971); "Decentralization" (1972) and "Politics is Agriculture" (1972), to be discussed later.

have therefore revolved around these three problems--control of the economy, productivity and equity. The ideology of Ujamaa is built on two related themes--viz. "self-reliance" and "national ethic"; the former defining the strategies of development and the latter defining the normative basis of a stable political community in a situation of rapid change. Both concepts emphasize democratic participation, absence of exploitation, and dependence on local, rather than external, resources.⁵ Thus the Tanzanian ideology is concerned with both economic and sociopolitical development, and it places equal emphasis on the instrumental and ethical values.⁶ The link of the two sets of values with the goals of political stability and economic development can be shown diagrammatically as in Figure 1 below.

The division of ideological norms into ethical versus instrumental; those emphasizing equity versus those emphasizing efficiency and productivity; and those emphasizing political stability versus those emphasizing economic development


⁵Both concepts will be elaborated later.

⁶Instrumental values relate to material goals; ethical values in this context refer to the values which cannot be linked directly or immediately with the achievement of empirical ends but which may be important for political and economic stability in the long run. Other distinctions have been made in the literature. For example, Frank Schurmann makes a 'pure-practical' distinction, see his Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Samuel H. Barnes, "Ideology and the Organization of Conflict," Journal of Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3 (August, 1966), pp. 513-530. David E. Apter makes a 'consummatory-instrumental' distinction, see his The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965).

(Fig. 1 below) is only an analytical device which will enable us later to locate the possible sources of conflict arising from the ideology itself and the problems and prospects of making them mutually supportive or congruent. A development ideology, such as Ujamaa, requires both sets, and in practice it is not possible--or even desirable--to make a rigid distinction between them. This is particularly true in a new nation, like Tanzania, where "nation-building" entails economic growth and productivity of inputs--both human and material--as well as the creation of a viable political system to integrate several scores of tribal communities into a modern state. Again, in the context of Tanzania's Ujamaa, the very idea of development is to be understood in terms of growth and equity (material and psychological).

Figure 1

THE LINK OF THE TANZANIAN IDEOLOGY WITH POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT



The Mobilizational Dimension

In an economy which is dependent on the productivity of millions of scattered, small-holder farms, mobilization of the peasants for greater output becomes the main variable in the development effort. The task of maintaining a good balance between the two sets of values in the mobilization process is, however, not an easy one. Several sources of conflict exist. One potential source is between those emphasizing mobilization based on ethico-moral appeals and those basing mobilization on instrumental appeals (i.e. by promising high material pay-off or lavish state subventions), which may create a division between the populist elite and the technico-professional elite. A balance between the two "appeals" needs to be a continuous process. For even if the leadership initially succeeds in controlling the tendencies towards excessive ethicism or excessive instrumentalization of the ideology, a conflict of goals may result at later stages. As the ideology becomes more clearly defined and as the growing "awareness" of the masses increases demands on the state, the need for greater efficiency is felt and the established principle of equity may have to be "redefined" if it is not to hinder further development or cause political upheaval. One of the biggest challenges to the Tanzanian Ujamaa revolution, then, seems to be how to regulate demands (and village dependence) on the meager resources of the state while, at the same time, accelerating distributive reform in a manner that does not impair productivity.

This theme of peasant mobilization and its relation to the problems of village dependence on state subventions, distributive reform (or equity) and productivity will preoccupy us in the rest of the study. All we need to do here is to specify, in broad conceptual terms, some of the negative consequences of mobilization which Tanzania's Ujamaa ought to avoid. Mobilization for "modernity" starts with communication of "politically-relevant" information,⁷ and as such, it initially represents only the "attitudinal" component of modernization. Therefore, regardless of whether it is deliberate or accidental, political mobilization of the peasantry creates problems for the regime; the commonest one being the growing gap between aspirations and availability of material goods and services, which can lead to the so-called "revolution of rising frustration." The challenge for a developing nation is to balance these aspirations with a high rate of output of goods and services, which may entail deferring gratification of some current "needs" and utilization of all available productive surplus--human labor, land and savings.

Ironically, then, one source of dilemma is how to handle the goal of modernization itself which has proved to be a two-edged sword, with positive and negative outcomes. Positively, it widens the "political market" by bringing in new

⁷This is defined by John R. Nellis, A Theory of Ideology: The Tanzanian Example (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1972), Chapter 4, as information leading to demands on the state; our use refers to information from an "authoritative" source, with the discretion of persuasion or coercion.

participants. Negatively, it threatens regime stability by creating frustrated participants. The policy challenge to the regime, therefore, is how to mobilize the peasantry for developmental tasks without bourgeoisifying them and; at the same time, without making them frustrated. As we shall elaborate in later chapters, Tanzania's Ujamaa ideology, especially with regard to the rural communities (and the problem of urban unemployment), attempts to solve this problem "ideologically"--i.e. through appeals to "higher" ethical goals.

The Main Issues Restated

Announcing the Arusha Declaration on February 5, 1967, Mwalimu told the nation that Tanzania had reached "cross-roads" and that a firm choice of direction was necessary. He later explained that Tanzania's development situation had entailed a limited choice between initiating deliberate change from within or remaining passive and willinilly absorbing change from without.⁸ What factors brought Tanzania to this "cross-roads"? Why Ujamaa and why self-reliance? Why emphasis on the rural village and agriculture? What are the problems and prospects of a democratic, agrarian socialist development in an ex-colonial country? These questions sum up our concern in this study.

Ujamaa, as a model of rural development, is one in a series of rural development models or approaches attempted

⁸J. K. Nyerere, Tanzania: Ten Years After Independence (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), p. 4.

since the colonial days. As such, its prospects and problems can best be assessed in the light of experiences with earlier rural development policies and approaches. Indeed, many of the problems facing Ujamaa transformation in the rural areas are a direct result of earlier policies and strategies. Thus Chapters 3 and 4 outline, in a "historical fashion," the main pre-Arusha rural development strategies to shed some light on the nature of the society that Ujamaa seeks to transform. As it will become clear later, Ujamaa has elements of continuity with, as well as elements of major departure from; the earlier mobilization efforts. Moreover, it will be seen that, despite rapid ideological and 'slogan' changes at the center between 1962 and 1972, the machinery for mobilization (i.e. the Party and state bureaucracy) remained virtually unchanged at the local level.

The rest of this chapter examines two aspects of the broad question we posed earlier--national control of the economy. Thus the next section looks at the economic sources of the policy of socialism and self-reliance; and the following section then examines briefly what the policy of "self-reliance" has meant in practice since the Arusha Declaration.

THE ECONOMIC SOURCES OF TANZANIA'S UJAMAA

Although Ujamaa ideology has a large ethical component and reflects Mwalimu's personal moral convictions, the timing of the Arusha Declaration was, in large part, a result of

economic necessity. By the end of 1966, it had become clear that despite much effort and apparent growth in some sectors of the economy, the inherited economic structure had in-built limitations. The two main limitations became clear in the course of implementing the First Five-Year Development Plan introduced in July, 1964.⁹ These were (1) the failure to attract foreign capital, and (2) the colonial orientation of the economy.

Economic Realism and Foreign Capital

It is probably more correct to view Ujamaa and the policy of national self-reliance as a result of failure of foreign capital and investments than as an outright rejection of them. It is true that before the Arusha Declaration Tanzania's leadership had warned against the dangers of the "Second Scramble" and against dependence on charity as the basis for nation-building¹⁰ or reason for surrendering political sovereignty.¹¹ These warnings, however, remained personal concerns of Mwalimu Nyerere; there was no systematic criterion for judging foreign aid, loans or investments before 1967.

⁹The United Republic of Tanzania, Five-Year Plan for Social and Economic Development (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1964); hereafter referred to as the First Plan.

¹⁰See particularly, J. K. Nyerere, "The Second Scramble," in Freedom and Unity (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966).

¹¹See particularly J. K. Nyerere, Principles and Development (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966).

On the contrary, between 1961 and 1967, the Government mounted a concerted effort to encourage foreign investments. Campaigns were made abroad through Tanzania's foreign missions for private investments or investments on the basis of state-private partnership. Furthermore, legal guarantees were given to protect would-be investors against uncompensated nationalization and to allow them safe margins of profit. The great "expectations" for external sources of finance during this period are evidenced by the fact that the First Plan (1964/69) was to depend on foreign assistance to the tune of 78 percent of the central Government expenditure (and 52 percent of total investment expenditure).¹²

This was the era of "mixed economy" ideology (or "African Socialism," as it was called in the sixties), defended by both politicians and bureaucrats as the "most realistic" way of achieving rapid development under the prevailing conditions. Thus, commending the First Plan to the National Assembly in July, 1964, Mwalimu concluded by entreating the House to remember that "To be truly revolutionary, we must be absolutely realistic."¹³ The planners, on their part, explained the necessity to rely on the private sector and foreign capital:

Since there is an upper limit to the investment capacity of the Government, owing on the one hand to the

¹²The First Plan.

¹³See Mwalimu's speech published as Introduction to the First Plan.

low level of domestic resources and on the other to the constraints upon its ability to service overseas borrowings, the country will have to continue to rely to an appreciable extent upon the private sector to accomplish the necessary accretion of capital. In consequence, the Plan provides that the private sector will be given all reasonable guarantees for carrying out its business in conditions sufficiently attractive to induce the reinvestment of profits in Tanganyika and an inflow of new investment from abroad.¹⁴

Unlike the Second Plan (1969/74--introduced two years after Arusha), the First Plan had very little to say about "equity"; its main concern was economic development. Rapid development would result from what was then described as "harmonious co-existence between, on the one side, the private sector and, on the other, public and semi-public institutions to the greater benefit of the country."¹⁵ The First Plan clearly demarcated the spheres of activity of each of these sectors in the industrial and commercial undertakings; and the planning bureaucracy concluded: "In the economic as well as the social field the Government, having regard to the particular circumstances prevailing in Tanganyika, has resorted to realistic means for achieving the rapid development of the country." The "best method for ensuring the equitable distribution of wealth within the country," it was suggested, "is the expansion of the co-operative movement and the promotion of Government participation in industry and commerce in the form of joint ventures."¹⁶ Thus Tanzania's First Plan

¹⁴The First Plan, p. 18.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 18-19.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 19.

shared the developmental enthusiasm of the first round of plans in Africa, emphasizing external source of finance and rapid economic development.

In the Tanzanian case, however, the optimism surrounding the launching of the First Plan lasted for only a year. Some of the reasons which made the Government rethink its development strategies in 1967 were hinted in the first year progress report on the implementation of the Plan published in 1965. The progress report revealed two main bottlenecks-- one financial, the other manpower. Whereas the Plan had envisaged an investment expenditure by the Central Government of about \$2.5 million by the end of the first year, only \$1.24 million (50.6 percent) of the projected investment expenditure was realized. Most Ministries failed to secure more than 50 percent of their expected development funds for the first year of the Plan. Finance was then identified as one of the main problems.¹⁷

The Plan had relied as much on external professional manpower as on external finance. The recruitment process itself was an expensive item, the Plan having called for centralized responsibility for recruitment and a greatly expanded recruitment program, including the establishment of a "Tanzanian overseas recruitment office" costing \$150,000.¹⁸

¹⁷ Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, First Year Progress Report on the Implementation of the Five-Year Development Plan (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965).

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

Despite this effort, only a small fraction of the required personnel had been found by mid-1965, and the situation did not improve much during the remaining four years of the Plan.¹⁹

Assessment of performance at the end of the Plan period (1969) showed the following results from which a number of lessons were learned. First, making allowances for changed prices, real investment achievement was about 75 percent. Under the existing circumstances, and considering that this was the first exercise in "comprehensive planning" within a mixed economy structure, this achievement must be considered impressive. It becomes even more so in the light of the fact that it was achieved despite the failure or delay of external finance and personnel recruitment. Thus, whereas the Plan had envisaged that 78 percent of the Central Government expenditure and 52 percent of the total investment expenditure would come from external sources, 65 percent of the former and 70 percent of the latter had to be squeezed from internal sources. As Mwalimu correctly described it in 1969, the First Plan turned out to be an exercise in self-reliance "with some warnings for the future!"²⁰ The Government had

¹⁹Ibid. At the beginning of the Plan year, there were 154 vacant posts cleared by the Civil Service Commission for overseas recruitment. By mid-1965, only 75 people had been recruited, but these were almost immediately offset by 75 new vacancies. Again, out of 324 high-level posts existing in 1966, only 135 offers were made.

²⁰J. K. Nyerere, "To Plan is to Choose," Speech to TANU Conference, May 28, 1969, in Second Five-Year Development Plan (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 2; hereafter we shall refer to this plan simply as the Second Plan.

introduced a development levy in mid-1965, and each budget after that year witnessed a dramatic rise in the prices of all luxury goods.

Second, an economic growth rate of 5 percent was achieved as against 6.7 percent forecast in the Plan. This, like many other forecasts, was based on unreliable information regarding past economic trend and population growth rate. It was assumed (on the basis of the 1957 census), for instance, that the population growth rate was 2.2 percent per annum whereas the 1967 census showed it was 2.7 percent per annum. This information bottleneck led also to problems in planning the expansion of primary education.²¹

Third, even though the value of capital goods--i.e. the machines in factories, buildings, industrial goods, etc. --doubled, industrial production grew at the rate of 10 percent per annum instead of ^{the} 14.8 percent target. This was low in view of the fact that by 1969 industry accounted for only about 7 1/2 percent of the GNP.²² Some of the shortfalls were certainly due to the country's failure to attract a high level of investment, and therefore we shall turn briefly to the reasons for such failure.

²¹Thus, whereas it was assumed 50 percent of the school-age kids would be in school by 1969, only 47 percent were attending.

²²See the Second Plan for details of results in other sectors.

Failure to Attract Foreign Capital

Tanzania's failure to attract foreign capital during the pre-Arusha era was due to a number of factors. We shall discuss them briefly in three categories--historical, economic and ideological.

The historical factors are closely linked with the history of the East African Community and the different colonial statuses of Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The British Government had chosen Kenya as the "economic headquarters" of British East Africa which consisted of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. During the days of the East African High Commission (the parent of the East African Common Services Organization and now East African Community), all common services, including industrial undertakings, were concentrated in Kenya. Two main factors account for the choice of Kenya: (1) the presence of a large white settler group mainly from Britain and South Africa; and (2) the fact that Kenya was a Crown Colony whereas Tanganyika was a Trusteeship and Uganda and Zanzibar Protectorates. These historical factors contributed to the large developmental imbalance among the member states of the East African Community, with Kenya benefiting most from the partnership, especially with regard to industrial and infrastructural development. The imbalance has remained despite two important post-independence 'agreements' geared to its eradication.²³

²³The Kampala Agreement, 1964, and the Treaty of the East African Community, 1967.

Insofar as development begets development, the economic factors are closely linked with the historical factors. Following the British lead, and owing to the cumulative advantage of Kenya, the overwhelming tendency since the colonial days was for the major foreign investors to register their main offices in Kenya, establishing headquarters in Nairobi from where they could exploit the wider East African market by extending branches to Uganda and Tanzania. Even after independence, new investors continued to prefer Kenya which had a more developed communication system and a wider internal market for modern goods.

Tanzania's internal market remained relatively small largely because the colonial administration did not extend communication to the overwhelmingly larger portion of the country under subsistence. The transport system in Tanzania (e.g. the Dar es Salaam-Ujiji-Mwanza Railway or the Tanga-Moshi-Arusha Railway) was built to facilitate colonial administration and to enable the three main cash crops--sisal, cotton, coffee--to reach metropolitan markets. Until recently, for instance, fruits and meat could literally be rotting in Mwanza at the same time as some bureaucrats posted in Lindi (Southern part of Tanzania) were seeking a transfer at the threat of resigning because these essential items could not reach there. It was much easier for these goods to get to London than to some regions of Tanzania. In a real sense, the Tanzania-Zambia road and railway development has "discovered" the southern parts of Tanzania for Tanzanians themselves.

These conditions, needless to say, were not conducive to foreign investment which prefers quick profit to investment in infrastructural development. Furthermore, Tanzania's mineral resources (e.g. diamonds, gold, mica, etc.) have been of small quantity and difficult to exploit because of communication and financial constraints. There was neither a "Katanga" nor a "Kuwait" to attract billionaires.

Yet, despite these economic limitations, it would probably have been possible to attract a little bit more foreign capital if the politico-ideological climate had remained "conductive" to foreign investment. Even though before the Arusha Declaration Tanzania advocated the "mixed economy" ideology, and actually campaigned for foreign investments, the Tanzanian regime (or, at least, Mwalimu Nyerere personally) was clearly more egalitarian-oriented than Mzee Kenyatta's regime in Kenya. Having published his treatise on Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism towards the end of 1962, Nyerere was beginning to ask a fundamental question: "Development for whom?" This question is unmistakable in all his major speeches and writings between 1963 and 1966; he was no longer talking of unqualified "development" or "three enemies."²⁴ Mwalimu's concern with the rapidly growing income inequality was expressed as early as February, 1963, in an address to the Association of Chambers of Commerce in East Africa:

²⁴Examine, for instance, the speeches in his Freedom and Unity.

We are committed to a philosophy of African Socialism and basic to it is the principle of human equality. . . . The important question is how can we deal with income inequalities given the present facts of our economic life. First, we must energetically pursue policies which will increase the amount of wealth produced in this country. . . . Second, we must not allow the present income differentials to become sacrosanct.²⁵

This personal concern, however, did not have much influence on the First Plan; indeed, the Plan showed no indication that a "declaration" as fundamental as the one made at Arusha could come only three years later. But Mwalimu's egalitarian orientation, expressed in such measures as (1) a strong stand against minority rule in Southern Africa, (2) higher minimum wages for the workers, (3) free or partially free secondary and post-secondary education, (4) a big budget for social services to benefit a wider population, etc., could hardly escape the calculating eye of a foreign investor. Profit calculations were further enhanced by the presence of Kenya, a next-door neighbor, whose policies contrasted sharply with those of Tanzania even before the Arusha Declaration.

Political stability--one criterion for investment--was undoubtedly interpreted in purely economic terms, the extent to which the regime would be likely to permit expatriation of fat profits. In this regard, Kenya was adjudged to be "stabler" than Tanzania. The Western press as well as scholarship played a role in propagating this image. Kenya was contrasted with Tanzania (and Nigeria with Ghana), and the

²⁵Quoted in the First Plan, p. 18.

former--only next to Nigeria in the sixties--was considered a "model of democracy in Africa."²⁶ Tanzania and Ghana shared a common disadvantage in this regard, and for similar reasons. Both countries had chosen a "mixed economy" ideology in an earlier phase and campaigned in vain for a higher level of foreign investment (Tanzania, 1961-66; Ghana, 1951-61) while, at the same time, their leftist ideological orientation and strong anticolonialism remained unmistakable in the speeches and writings of their top leaders. In both countries, too, a formal socialist statement or program was issued when external capital failed and the "contradiction" between ideological statements and actual policies pursued became obvious (Ghana, 1962 CPP Program; Tanzania, 1967 TANU Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance; the latter being more revolutionary in structural sense than the former which said virtually nothing about social structural changes).²⁷

Although it may be the case that Tanzania's welfare

²⁶ The late Tom Mboya himself used to brag of the fact that Kenya was the only "strong" two-party democracy in East Africa (i.e. before 1969), although, ironically, this democracy failed to yield a single "democratic" election and Mboya himself was eliminated from the political scene by the gun of an assassin rather than by the vote!

²⁷ For an excellent discussion of the contradiction between ideological statements and actual economic policies pursued in Ghana, see Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, Ghana: End of an Illusion (New York/London: Monthly Review Press, 1966); and Reginald H. Green, "Four African Development Plans: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania," Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. III, No. 2 (1965). The CPP Program can be found in David E. Apter, Ghana in Transition (New York: Antheum, 1966), Appendix B, "Program of the Convention People's Party for Work and Happiness," pp. 393-421.

measures of the sixties--especially campaigns for higher wages by NUTA (National Union of Tanzania Workers)--contributed to the low foreign investment, there is no evidence to suggest that these measures diminished the profits of foreign investments already established in the country. On the contrary, the paradox of the situation was that, as average wages increased between 1960 and 1966, the surplus of enterprises, commercial, industrial and plantation/estate, increased from 12.7 percent of national income in 1960 to 14.5 percent in 1966.²⁸

The investors played two "tricks" to retain a growing level of profit despite minimum wages laws. First, in those enterprises which faced price decline, stagnant sales and demand for higher wages (e.g. sisal estates), massive lay-offs occurred, creating a headache for the Government. Thus between 1960 and 1966 total wage employment decreased from 416,000 to 336,000. Second, the enterprises working for the internal market, and which benefited from such market regulations as high import duties, licenses and quantitative restrictions on competing imports, were at the same time able to pass on cost increases to the Tanzanian consumers because there were no regular mechanisms for price control.²⁹

The contradictions involved in the total situation

²⁸ A. Van de Laar, "Growth and Income Distribution in Tanzania Since Independence," in Lionel Clieff and John S. Saul (eds.), Socialism in Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), p. 107.

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 106-108.

should be noted: (1) higher wages reduced the number of workers in a situation of "rising expectations"; (2) "restrictionism" within the mixed economy arrangement in practice benefited the foreign partner more, with the rising costs being passed on to the ordinary consumer; (3) the leaders' incessant campaigns for "hard work," "higher productivity," etc., made little sense to the politically aware sections of the working population who knew that the fruits of their hard work would have little impact on the country; and (4) the welfare of the elite, on the other hand, was improving rapidly despite national exploitation.³⁰ The observations of one foreign analyst of the immediate pre-Arusha situation are worth quoting at some length:

It is not realistic to suppose that a policy of wage restraint is acceptable when the profits which would be enlarged thereby flee abroad, as was the case in 1963 and 1964. One cannot expect that the co-operatives can be overhauled and be admonished to frugality if the politicians and the higher bureaucrats who announce this 'happy message' drive up in a large chauffeur-driven limousine. . . . One cannot, in the context of Tanzania, expect much benefit from measures which tend to improve the investment climate even more, if in practice it appears that only a small exogenous minority reaps the fruits of this, not counting the usual negative influence on employment if capital cost for foreign investors are being further subsidized. Now just a handful of students, workers, bureaucrats and the attached politicians in fact form the power elite. They have benefited most from independence and sit in the saddle. Add to this the foreign government-to-government aid, plus foreign private investments, allow the elite to take marginal reforms. . . . The fact that foreign assistance may lead to a situation when the

³⁰For a further discussion of the last contradiction, see Issa Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle" (Paper for the Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, December, 1970), Part III.

elite can show a growth record without having to sacrifice its own privileges, creates the illusion that development can be had in a gentleman's way, without hardship. Of course, this illusion will be crudely shattered now that foreign funds are not forthcoming, largely under the impact of internal problems in the West.³¹

These observations turned out to be correct. The illusion that "harmonious co-existence" would produce developmental miracles was shattered before the end of the First Plan period. As of June, 1968, the total foreign contribution to the Plan was only 35 percent of total investment. The relative internal-external contributions between July, 1964, and June, 1968, are compared in Table 1 below. For Tanzania, then, the adoption of the policy of "self-reliance" was clearly a matter of economic necessity, the promised foreign capital having failed to come or where it was invested having opened up further channels of national exploitation, as the experience of the First Plan showed.

Even if we assume that Tanzania would 'in the long run' be better off economically if it had been able to attract more foreign investments within the mixed-economy structure, it could only attract such investments at a high political cost, as a number of "political episodes" between 1964 and 1966 showed. Three political quarrels with some Western countries, in particular, cost Tanzania a substantial amount of aid and loans for the First Plan. One was with West Germany over Tanzania's recognition of East Germany which had been allowed to establish a Consulate in Dar es

³¹Van de Laar, op. cit., p. 112.

Table 1
 EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL FINANCING OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN:
 COMPARISONS FROM JULY 1964 TO JUNE 1968

Tshs. & % Source	Planned		1964/65		1965/66		1966/67		1967/68		1964/68	
	Million Tshs.	%	Million Tshs.	%	Million Tshs.	%	Million Tshs.	%	Million Tshs.	%	Million Tshs.	%
Internal	450	22.0	125.30	61.5	154.57	64.9	167.13	56.1	261.29	75.5	708.29	65.5
External	1,590	78.0	78.55	38.5	83.50	35.1	127.27	43.9	84.62	24.5	373.94	34.4
Total	2,040	100	103.07	100	238.07	100	294.40	100	345.91	100	1082.23	100

SOURCE: Taarifa ya Uchunguzi wa Halli ya Uchumi, 1968 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), p. 92.

Salaam after the Union with Zanzibar (1964). The second involved the U.S. (and, to some extent, Britain) over what was described as the "Great Western Plot" (1964). The third major quarrel was with Britain over minority declaration of unilateral independence in Rhodesia (1965). Other quarrels involved South Africa and Portugal on questions of racism and human oppression.³²

Tanzania's leadership saw some of these quarrels (especially the one with West Germany which had bargained upon a threat to withdraw financial aid and personnel) as involving the fundamental question whether Tanzania's policies would be made in Dar es Salaam or in capitals of foreign lands. The strong commitment of Tanzania to the concept of "non-alignment" had been firmly stated in various writings and speeches of Mwalimu who continued to translate this commitment into practice throughout the sixties. That by 1966 there had been growing criticism--within the Party and outside--of Mwalimu's ethical principles in relation to development was admitted by him in an address to the National Executive Committee of TANU in which he gave a cogent examination of the delicate balance between political sovereignty and foreign assistance to a developing nation.³³ The following year saw the Arusha Declaration. Its strong emphasis on self-reliance and de-emphasis

³² See Nyerere, Principles and Development, for details of the quarrels and their possible economic consequences.

³³ Ibid.

of money as a development weapon can hardly be surprising in view of the foregoing discussion. In its third part dealing with the policy of Self-Reliance and sub-titled "We are at War," the Declaration stated:

TANU is involved in a war against poverty and oppression in our country; this struggle is aimed at moving the people of Tanzania (and the people of Africa as a whole) from a state of poverty to a state of prosperity. . . . But it is obvious that in the past we have chosen the wrong weapon for our struggle, because we chose money as our weapon. We are trying to overcome our economic weakness by using the weapon of the economically strong-- weapons which in fact we do not possess. By our thoughts, words and actions it appears as if we have come to the conclusion that without money we cannot bring about the revolution we are aiming at. It is as if we have said, 'Money is the basis of development. Without money there can be no development.'³⁴

Colonial Orientation of the Economy

The pattern of communication--roads and railways--inherited from the British administration clearly reveals the colonial orientation of the economy. Starting from an administrative town or cash crop area, all roads and railways looked "outwards" and ended at a port. Feeder roads, so important for the internal market, were ignored. Given the colonial interests, this pattern can be defended on narrow economic arguments. It facilitated a quick transport of much needed cash crops for British factories (cotton, sisal, coffee), and stimulated production of such crops in the areas which could grow them. This pattern, however, produced a number of negative consequences for Tanzania's future development.

³⁴The Arusha Declaration, pp. 4-5.

First, the emphasis on the needs of the 'mother country' condemned a large portion of Tanzania to perpetual subsistence; over 80 percent of the population lived under conditions of subsistence at the time of independence. In the few cash crop areas--e.g. Kilimanjaro, Bukoba, Tukuyu, etc.--some development occurred largely out of the initiative of the local people who, with some mission education, were able to learn from white plantations and estates. This process was partly responsible for the big inter-regional development imbalance which is now becoming a problem for Ujamaa. Failure to provide feeder roads to stimulate development in those areas without cash crops has meant (1) a diminished internal market, (2) a mobilizational problem for the Party and Government, and (3) a cycle of poverty and famine for the remote areas which remained on the fringe of the colonial tutelage. Apart from campaigns for "more cassava" (a crop with low nutrition value) as a precaution against famine, and administrative rules against soil erosion, the British formulated no policy at all with regard to the vast majority of the population in the subsistence sector. The following characterization of the plight of the Tanzanian peasants during the colonial administration is probably correct:

The net result was a life of poverty and insecurity for the masses of the people, while a small number of foreign companies or private farmers from Europe were obtaining a comfortable life--often at the expense of their exploited workers. . . . Thus, overall, the wealth produced in Tanganyika . . . provided for its people very little more than subsistence at a low level. Any surplus produced above this was mostly exported to the home ter-

ritories of the foreign companies or the agricultural estate owner.³⁵

Second, since the growth of the monetary sector had depended on the needs of the metropolitan areas, the inherited economic structure as a whole depended heavily on production of subsistence foodstuffs and primary commodities for export. Thus at the time of independence (1961), the largest single export was unprocessed sisal, followed by raw cotton and coffee, all accounting for 54 percent of the total domestic product. Sisal, the most important foreign money earner at the time, was grown solely on foreign-owned plantations. However, 80 percent of the coffee and almost all the cotton were produced by small holders; so were various types of oilseeds (e.g. cashew nuts) which by 1961 were beginning to contribute to the export revenue. The other cash crops which were growing in importance--mainly tea, pyrethrum, tobacco and sugar--were, until late sixties, being produced almost entirely on foreign-owned estates or on government-sponsored schemes.³⁶

Third, as a result of the neglect of the subsistence sector by the colonial administration, Tanzania has had to spend huge sums of money on importation of food which could

³⁵Nyerere, Tanzania: Ten Years After Independence, p. 2.

³⁶The Urambo tobacco scheme in Tabora is an example of the few successful settlement schemes including (initially) European, Asian and African farmers. Although African out-growers had participated in the production of sugar cane in Morogoro Region since early 1960s, their contribution remained very small.

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have been produced locally. Despite much campaign for increased food production during the post-independence period, the figures for food imports have been rather excessive for a poor country. For example, between 1961 and 1965 imports of dairy products were rising at 18 percent per year, although more "heads" of cattle could be counted in Tanzania than heads of people.³⁷ In 1966, the Government imported cereals worth \$8 million; dairy products worth \$4.6 million; and spent similarly high sums on the importation of margarine, fats, fruits and vegetables--all of which could have been produced locally in Tanzania.³⁸ It has jocularly been said that Tanganyika was given independence "with famine" in 1961; for Mwalimu's first task as Prime Minister was to negotiate for U.S. maize aid to alleviate the famine resulting from the droughts of that year. Another serious drought followed in 1965. These droughts brought such serious food shortages because the foundation had been very weak.

Fourth, because of the prevailing doctrines of mercantilism and division of labor, the industrial scene was even worse than the agricultural scene. Quantitatively, the industrial sector was virtually negligible at the time of inde-

³⁷ Among many pastoral communities in Tanzania, and probably in other developing countries as well, the size of the herd is considered as important as the quality of the animals in measuring the wealth and social prestige of families.

³⁸ See René Dumont, Tanzanian Agriculture After the Arusha Declaration--A Report to the Government of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1969), pp. 12-13.

pendence; even three years afterwards (1964) it accounted for only 5 percent of the monetary economy, and about 7.5 percent of the GNP by 1969. Qualitatively, it was luxury-oriented, concentrating on such things as breweries, tobacco plants, etc. In terms of ownership, it was almost exclusively in foreign hands. This de-emphasis of industry and emphasis on a few cash crops for export meant that Tanzania's economy would continue to be structurally unbalanced for a long time. This British inheritance is reflected in the economies of the other members of the East African Community as well which still show a heavy agricultural bias. For example, in 1969, out of the total GDP of the partner states (Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda) of about \$3,571 million (or shs. 25,000 million), agriculture accounted for about \$1,429 million (40 percent). What is more striking is the fact that 21 percent of this GDP constituted nonmonetary items, predominantly subsistence agriculture and its related activities (forestry, hunting and fishing), and only 19 percent constituted monetized agriculture.³⁹

For the reasons noted earlier, Kenya is less dependent on agriculture than Tanzania and Uganda, even though the contribution of agriculture to its GDP is still very high in comparison with industrial nations. For example, agriculture accounted for 33 percent of Kenya's GDP in 1969, with 20 per-

³⁹S. M. Mbilinyi, "East African Export Commodities and the Enlarged European Economic Community," The African Review, Vol. III, No. 1 (1973), p. 94.

cent being subsistence and 13 percent monetized agricultural activities. In the same year, agriculture accounted for 41 percent of Tanzania's GDP, with 22 percent being subsistence and 19 percent monetized activities. (In 1962, about 53 percent of the nation's GNP, then \$29.4 million and population of 10 million, had come from agriculture, while mining and manufacturing combined accounted for less than 5 percent; and only 41 percent of the agricultural output was in circulation, 59 percent being consumed locally by the producers themselves.) Uganda's economic structure was even more spectacular, agriculture accounting for about 54 percent of its GDP in 1969, with subsistence and monetary sectors claiming 27 percent each.⁴⁰ (Compare, for example, the heavy agricultural bias of the three East African partner-states with the small agricultural contribution to the GNP of some of the EEC partner-states in 1969: Italy 9.7 percent, Netherlands 7 percent, France 5.8 percent, Belgium 4.6 percent, and Germany 3.6 percent.)⁴¹

Since the colonial administration concentrated on the small monetized sector of agriculture (which enjoyed organized market system, credit, extension facilities, storage, communication network, etc.), a large subsistence sector has continued to co-exist side by side with the monetized sector

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 94-96.

⁴¹ EEC, European Community: The Agricultural Situation in the EEC (Brussels: Division for Agricultural Information, 1971). The figures are quoted in Mbilinyi, op. cit., p. 92.

despite much effort to correct the imbalance in the post-independence period. What this meant is that the monetized sector of agriculture depended entirely on external markets since its produce could not be consumed in the subsistence sector. The dependency relationships resulting from this situation created, in the words of one observer, "an asymmetry between the structures of production and consumption such that East African money economies generally consume what they do not produce and produce what they do not consume."⁴²

There was nothing intrinsic in the Tanzanian (or East African) situation which made industrialization impossible; rather, the colonial economy was tailored to 'complement' metropolitan economies. For example, when the British navy began a blockade of German East Africa (Tanganyika and Rwanda-Urundi states) in August, 1914, the Germans faced no technical problem in manufacturing certain essential goods in Tanganyika, including quinine, blankets, dye stuffs, cigarettes, soap, bark socks, palm wine and a kind of petrol (trebol) made from copra. The German administration converted the Amani Agricultural Research Institute into a multi-purpose industrial installation; and within eighteen months, according to one report, the factory had produced:

16 varieties of food stuffs and liquors, 11 varieties of spices, 12 varieties of medicines and medicamente, 5

⁴²J. F. Rweyemamu, "Possibilities of Regional Industrial Planning and Development in East Africa" (Paper presented to the 1972 E.A.C. Study Seminar on Integration and Regional Plan Coordination, Kampala, Uganda, June 4-16, 1972).

varieties of rubber products, 2 of soap, oils and candles and so forth. Some of these were produced in bulk, including 15,200 bottles of whisky and other spirits, 10,000 pieces of soap and other items.⁴³

Finally, the commercial sector and trading pattern had inherited three types of problems. Both the import and export trade were in the hands of private businessmen, either resident Asian traders who dominated trade in virtually all Tanzanian urban centers, or foreign entrepreneurs. Only in a few towns like Moshi, Arusha, etc., did the budding local elite challenge the Asian business monopoly to any noteworthy degree; and this has remained true even after the Arusha Declaration.⁴⁴ Second, the marketing co-operatives which had been formed by peasants as a protection against exploitation by the Asian middleman often worked against the interests of the poorer peasants and in favor of progressive farmers, as we will show later. Third, at the time of independence, Tanzanian overseas markets were restricted to the West. In actual fact, the firm adoption of a "non-alignment" policy immediately after independence was in part dictated by the need to expand transactions to include non-Western countries.

⁴³M. J. H. Gaffey, Balance of Payments Problems of a Developing Country: Tanzania (Berlin: IFO-African Studies, Germany, 1967), p. 43.

⁴⁴The bureaucratic and populist elites which were beginning to invest in trade are now prevented from doing so by the leadership code in the Arusha Declaration and the Statutory Disciplinary Committee created early 1973. However, the Asian businessmen are now dependent on the state distribution organs which control the import and export trade as well as prices of most products. But urban retail business has continued to remain in the hands of Asian communities.

This expansion was rapid, beginning with Eastern European countries, then Russia, China and other Asiatic lands.⁴⁵ The internal market has remained small however, partly because of the low earning capacity of the larger section of the population and partly due to the fact that the country's communication network is still underdeveloped.

Owing to the urgent need to develop the rural areas to meet the growing demand (both qualitative and quantitative) for food and cash crops, Tanzania has in the post-Arusha era chosen the strategy of maintaining a humble rate of industrial growth with the possibility of accelerating during the Third Plan (1974/79) and subsequent plans. The Second Plan (1969/74) allocated 56 percent of the total Central Government expenditure to projects with immediate rural impact, with a view to revolutionizing rural productivity and widening the internal market.⁴⁶ The Plan placed emphasis on

⁴⁵United Republic of Tanzania, Budget Survey, 1965-66 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966), pp. 14-17. Within ten years (1961 to 1970), Tanzanian exports rose by 73 percent to reach Shs. 1,688,733,753 in 1970, compared to Shs. 973,344,800 in 1961. On the other hand, imports rose by 143 percent or Shs. 1,145,486,754 in 1970, compared to imports worth Shs. 793,729,200 in 1961. In 1970, only 6 percent of Tanzania's exports went to socialist countries; 20 percent going to U.K.; 30 percent to other Sterling areas; 13 percent to E.E.C.; and 23 percent to other countries. In 1962, no exports were made to socialist countries; in that year U.K. alone accounted for 32 percent of Tanzania's exports and provided a source for similarly high imports into Tanzania. See Budget Surveys from 1962 onwards. Transaction with China did not occur on any noteworthy scale until mid-sixties, after Kawawa's visit to China (1964), Mwalimu's visit (1965) and Chuo en Lai's visit to Tanzania (1965).

⁴⁶United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey, 1970-71 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), pp. 52-53.

labor-intensive, small-scale industries and crafts which can be worked by the people themselves, a strategy defended as follows:

Although mass production is the best and cheapest way of meeting the needs of our people for certain types of goods, there are many others where the needs can be best met by labour-intensive, small-scale industries and craft workshops. Obvious examples of this are furniture, which can be made locally from local materials without the problem of transportation over long distances; ready-made clothes; and local food preservation. . . . Such activities have the further advantage that they require very little capital investment, and they can be carried on the villages and small towns of our country, thus improving the quality and variety of life in the rural areas.⁴⁷

The policy of self-reliance requires a wider participation at the village level in a variety of agricultural, craft, and small-scale industrial activities, rather than a concentration of inputs in urban industrialization. The problems and prospects of promoting the norms of self-reliance at a high level of productivity in the villages will be examined in Chapter 9. In the following section, we shall restrict our discussion to the broad implications of the policy of self-reliance with respect to national "interaction" with the external environment.

UNITY OF SOCIALISM AND SELF-RELIANCE

Ujamaa, as a development model, has resulted from three main sources, namely (1) a harsh development decade which taught that dependence on external finance could not be

⁴⁷The Second Plan, p. xiii

the basis for national development; (2) the lessons learned from previous development approaches; and (3) personal conviction by Mwalimu that certain traditional norms of cooperation can be reactivated to serve modern development goals, and concern about the rapidly growing inequality after independence.⁴⁸

From these various experiences (documented in the next two chapters), it is scarcely surprising that Mwalimu presents socialism and self-reliance as closely related concepts: "The truth is that it is not possible to accept socialism without self-reliance, or vice versa," he emphasizes.⁴⁹ Whereas self-reliance in development is an application of the lesson that "only Tanzanians are sufficiently interested to develop Tanzania in the interest of Tanzanians, . . . socialism is an application to economic and social life the doctrine of human equality."⁵⁰ Both the ethical and instrumental aspects of Ujamaa are thus given a developmental justification, with socialism defining a new principle of equity and socioeconomic organization, and self-reliance defining the methods as well as the development inputs to be used.

Self-reliance is conceived at two levels--viz. the national level and the village community level. As we pointed

⁴⁸ These various matters are discussed in Nyerere's Freedom and Socialism.

⁴⁹ J. K. Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration Teach-in (Dar es Salaam: The Information Services, 1967), p. 4.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

out earlier, the lesson for national self-reliance was learned mainly from the experiences of the First Plan (1964/69), and that of village self-reliance was learned mainly from the failure of the transformation approach (1963/66) to which we shall refer briefly in Chapter 4. While the former rejects state dependence on foreign sources, the latter rejects continued village dependence on the state for development inputs. However, in neither case is a degree of 'mutual interdependence' (or initial assistance) for mutual benefit denied.⁵¹

The basic requirement for both levels is that local materials and efforts of the people should as far as possible be used to generate wealth from within and that external aid --whether in the form of gifts, loans or investments--should be considered supplementary rather than basic to development. Thus the Arusha Declaration recommended a complete reorientation of the attitude prevailing in the sixties with regard to development, whether conceived nationally or locally:

Our Government and our leaders and other people keep on thinking about ways of getting money from outside. . . . But there is no country in the world which is prepared to give us gifts or loans, or establish industries, to the extent that we would be able to achieve all our development targets. . . . Even if it were possible for us to get enough money for our needs from external sources, is this what we really want? Independence means self-reliance. . . .⁵²

The Tanzanian leadership has repeatedly emphasized

⁵¹ See particularly The Arusha Declaration, pp. 8-13.

⁵² Ibid., pp. 8-9.

that the policy of self-reliance--at state or village level-- does not mean autarchy; it is rather a "recognition" that a people can only develop themselves with or without external assistance. More primarily, it is a recognition that "the development of a country is brought about by people, not by money," and that "Money, and the wealth it represents, is the result and not the basis of development."⁵³ We shall outline briefly the practical implications of this policy at the state level.

Implications: Self-Reliance and Non-Alignment

What has this meant in practice? At the national level, the concept of self-reliance agrees very well with Tanzania's policy of non-alignment. It has entailed not only relying, as far as possible, on internal resources but also interacting politically and economically with a wider external market. Thus, since the Arusha Declaration, participation in international trade has not only increased but, more significantly, changed its character. For example, with the country's greater control of the economy, it has been possible to undertake preliminary processing of some export materials as well as to promote Tanzanian products at home through tariff measures.⁵⁴

Furthermore, external assistance has increased rather

⁵³Ibid., p. 13.

⁵⁴The state controls the import and export trade since 1969.

than decreased in the post-Arusha period; but only the assistance which is consonant with the objective of socialism and self-reliance has been sought. There is no necessary contradiction between foreign assistance and national self-reliance within the post-Arusha politico-economic context. The policy is clear on this: "Gifts and loans . . . which start off or stimulate our own efforts are useful. . . . But [those] which weaken our own efforts should not be accepted without asking ourselves a number of questions."⁵⁵

In terms of loans (which are preferred to "gifts"), there was a big increase in total external debt from \$135 million in 1966 to \$349 million in 1971. During the same period, however, government borrowing from internal sources similarly rose from \$38 million to \$146 million.⁵⁶ The ratio of external to domestic debt decreased from 60 percent at the end of 1968/69 financial year to 55 percent at the close of 1969/70 financial year, rising to 57 percent by May, 1971, due to the big government loan to finance the Tanzania-Zambia road and railway development.⁵⁷ Thus, in both theory and practice, the policy of national self-reliance has not meant autarchy; it has actually meant greater efficiency in mobilizing internal and external finance for specific projects

⁵⁵See The Arusha Declaration, pp. 8-10.

⁵⁶The Economic Survey, 1970-71, pp. 30-33. The big rise in external debt is mainly due to the huge Chinese loan for the Tanzania-Zambia Railway.

⁵⁷Ibid. The Chinese loan was \$48 million by mid-1971, devoted entirely to the railway.

determined by the Government. Ironically, the Second Plan (1969/74) based on a clearly stated ideology of socialism and self-reliance was able to attract more external finance and from wider sources than the First Plan which was based on the vague pragmatic ideology of "African Socialism" or "mixed economy."⁵⁸

Self-Reliance in Technical Information

The policy is also clear on the necessity to continue relying on external technical manpower before the nation achieves self-reliance in manpower, currently estimated to be 1980. As a policy statement puts it: "It is not being self-reliant to refuse to carry out the directions of a foreign engineer, a foreign doctor, or a foreign manager; it is just being stupid. It is absolutely vital that Tanzanians should determine policy; but if the implementation of a particular policy requires someone with good educational qualifications or long experience, it is not very sensible to allow that policy to fail through pride."⁵⁹

Meanwhile, localization of manpower has proceeded very fast. Thus, whereas only about 26 percent of the occupied senior and middle-grade civil service posts in 1961 were held

⁵⁸The list of post-Arusha external sources of loans is long and varied; including IDA, USAID, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Canada, Britain, Israel, Russia, China, Federal Republic of Germany, Yugoslavia, etc. For a specific identification of the ideology of "African Socialism" and "mixed economy," see Kenya Government, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1965).

⁵⁹Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration Teach-in, p. 9.

by citizens, about 90 percent localization of these posts had been achieved ten years later, the 10 percent expatriate portion being mainly in the highly technical and professional fields.⁶⁰ To further accelerate the process of localization, an important presidential directive was issued in 1972 urging all civil service and parastatal bodies to re-examine all the posts held by expatriate personnel to ensure that (1) no unnecessary overseas recruitment is made and (2) that there is a sound program for the replacement of currently serving expatriates.⁶¹ Furthermore, the state has placed great emphasis on science subjects at the secondary school level and at the University of Dar es Salaam as well as built technical secondary schools so as to reduce the current dependence on foreign sources for technical manpower.⁶²

Tanzania's effort to achieve socialism and self-reliance will be severely weakened if the center does not acquire a reasonable degree of self-reliance in technical information. Whatever surplus is produced at the village level is ultimately handled by one or the other of the many state

⁶⁰The United Republic of Tanzania, Survey of Employment and Earnings, 1970 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1970), pp. 8-9. These percentages do not convey a true picture of the localization situation because by 1971 about 40 percent of the total posts in the civil service (5,424 as compared to 1,156 in 1961) were vacant.

⁶¹Presidential Directive No. 10 of 1972.

⁶²For a thorough examination of the high-level manpower situation, see the various "Manpower Reports to the President" prepared by the Manpower Planning Unit of the Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Dar es Salaam, from 1963 onwards.

organs concerned with development and distribution. At present, these organs depend heavily on external expertise in the form of management agreements, feasibility studies and even recommendations for such things as "trade-marks" to boost Tanzania's markets abroad.⁶³ Experience with nationalized economy since 1967 has clearly revealed the difficulties of attempting to control the economy without a high level of local technical information. Three types of problems are involved: (1) technical information from outside is always very expensive for a poor country; (2) the reliability of the data generating such information is often questionable; and (3) it is often difficult to distinguish the ideological preferences of the foreign expert from the purely technical matters in his recommendation. We shall take a few examples to illustrate these problems.

The question of who should control the economy was settled in 1967 by the Arusha Declaration which gave the state control over the major means of production and distribution. This control must be viewed in socialist as well as nationalist terms; for Tanzania's Ujamaa is at the same time a method of building an egalitarian society and a strategy of minimizing foreign exploitation. However, even though the top administrators and directors of the nationalized and re-organized industries and corporations have been local people,

⁶³For some consequences of this dependence, see Peter E. Temu, "The Employment of Foreign Consultants in Tanzania: Its Value and Limitations," The African Review, Vol. III, No. 1 (1973), pp. 69-84.

these industries have depended heavily on advisers and consultants hired from outside. Huge amounts have thus continued to flow out through management fees, consultancy fees and other contractual services supplied by foreign firms.⁶⁴ According to one assessment of the early years of nationalization:

Management contracts undertaken . . . may involve costs that are every bit as heavy as the costs to the economy would be if the Corporation in question were fully under direct foreign ownership. . . . [Tanzania's] bargaining strength is so weak that the cost of the servicing human capital may well have risen considerably.⁶⁵

As early as 1960, a World Bank mission had recommended that Tanzania should be prepared to offer attractive salaries and inducements to expatriate personnel: "It should be emphasized that overseas recruitment is not possible unless salary, tenure and other terms are competitive with those in other countries. While expatriate officials are currently well-paid by local African standards, their remuneration does not compare favourably with their market value in their own and many other countries."⁶⁶ Before nationalization, the government was only concerned with foreign expertise for the

⁶⁴ See Issa Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle" (Paper for the 1970 Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, December 27-31, 1970); Ann Seidman, "Comparative Industrial Strategies in East Africa," East African Journal, Vol. VII, No. 6 (June, 1970).

⁶⁵ J. Helleiner, "New Forms of Foreign Private Investment in Africa" (Economic Research Bureau Paper 67.12, Dar es Salaam); quoted in Seidman, "Comparative Industrial Strategies in East Africa," p. 39.

⁶⁶ World Bank, Economic Development of Tanganyika (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), p. 192; hereafter referred to simply as World Bank.

technical divisions of the civil service and a few state undertakings, but after nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy, the entire burden of foreign expertise has fallen on the government. Moreover, the need for technical expertise of various types has increased with the centralization of the economy. Thus, a part of what is gained in the control of the economy is "lost" in the purchase of technical information from outside; indeed, technical information has become a new form of foreign private investment in Tanzania since the Arusha Declaration.⁶⁷

This new form of investment is made by individual experts as well as by consultancy firms such as the McKinsey Consultancy Firm which recommended and partially supervised the decentralization of the State Trading Corporation (STC) and government administration. The "costs" do not end with the actual money paid to these experts and firms as fees (which have always been very high). In most cases, the firm which did the "feasibility studies" was given a new contract (often the contract having been implied in advance) to implement its own recommendations. This procedure benefited the firms which were free to obtain "artificially" expensive materials and personnel either from their homeland or their other companies and branches abroad.⁶⁸ The point we are

⁶⁷For a further discussion of this form of investment, see Helleiner, "New Forms of Foreign Private Investment in Africa," Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle," and Temu, "The Employment of Foreign Consultants in Tanzania."

⁶⁸This was as true of such management agreements as those of tourist hotels (e.g. the Kilimanjaro Hotel) as those

making is simply that, even though nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy has created the essential basis for socialist reconstruction in Tanzania and substantially reduced the pre-Arusha levels of national exploitation, continued dependence on external "technical inputs" may lead to new forms of exploitation, as the brief experience with socialist economy has shown.

The second problem relates to the reliability of the data on which reports and recommendations made to the Government have been based. This problem has three dimensions. First, data is not readily available to the expert entrusted with the task of making feasibility studies or recommendations; thus the importance of research and data storage cannot be overemphasized if planning is to be based on facts rather than speculation. Second, the brevity of visits by foreign experts (in many cases less than a year) meant that their reports and recommendations were based on very vague knowledge of the situation. For example, failing to examine the factors which led to the failure of the various "transformation" projects of the colonial period, the World Bank Mission to Tanzania in 1960 recommended a similar transformation endeavor which was doomed to fail from the beginning.

of the key national organs of distribution (e.g. the State Trading Corporation) and industrialization (e.g. the National Development Corporation). See Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle," and Temu, "The Employment of Foreign Consultants in Tanzania," for some examples of the influence of such firms and the economic consequences of their recommendations.

Third, experience has shown that most of the reports and recommendations have an interest in the status quo, seriously conflicting with the national ideology and goal of national self-reliance. Thus, for example, a report submitted to the Government in April, 1971 (four years after the Arusha Declaration), recommended that a minimum of seventy-five professional economists will be needed by 1980-85 for agricultural research alone and that "Pending the availability of qualified Tanzanian researchers, priority research should be staffed with expatriates."⁶⁹ Another report (June, 1970), recommended the establishment of an Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC) to supersede the existing marketing boards, and suggested minimum qualifications of its staff which would automatically eliminate local personnel.⁷⁰ These two reports reveal clearly the disutility of reports based on (a) little understanding of the situation, and (b) preferences for the status quo. They both disregarded the national goal of socialism and self-reliance and recommended the "market system" as the best alternative.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Agricultural Research Needs of Tanzania (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Agency for International Development, 1971), pp. 118-127.

⁷⁰ Herbert C. Kriesel et al., "Agricultural Marketing in Tanzania: Background Research and Policy Proposals" (Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural Economics, 1970), p. 22 (mimeographed). According to their recommendations, not a single Tanzanian would qualify for a managerial position in the AMC during the seventies. See Temu, op. cit., pp. 74-75, for an analysis of this report.

⁷¹ The full implications of these recommendations are examined by Temu, op. cit., especially pp. 71-78.

This brings us to the third problem--that of disentangling ideological preferences of the expert from the purely technical concerns. The above two reports were rejected outright because their anti-Ujamaa consequences were quite obvious; the long-term consequences of other reports and recommendations have not been as easy to determine. A related problem is that the local managerial elite is itself a product of an educational system which emphasized values of the market system and had served in that structure until the Arusha Declaration. Thus the managerial elite has in the past four years come under attack for (a) being "misoriented," (b) failing to detect the new channels of national exploitation, (c) failing to reorient the economy and working habits to the new norms of Ujamaa, etc.⁷²

The need to have a local elite which is fully aware and committed to national goals and policies is particularly great in Tanzania because until now advice and consultancy have been given by individuals and firms representing various ideologies. This is in keeping with Tanzania's non-alignment position and belief that there is no single country which could provide a "model" for her Ujamaa. There is a "realis-

⁷²These various accusations have appeared in the local papers in the past four years; see particularly the "Readers Forum" columns in The Standard, 1970-1972; Daily News, 1972-1973. For a professional analysis, see B. P. Mramba and B. U. Mwanasasu, "Management for Socialist Development in Tanzania: The Case of the National Development Corporation," The African Review, Vol. I, No. 3 (January, 1972), pp. 29-47; and Edith Penrose, "Some Problems of Policy in the Management of the Parastatal Sector in Tanzania: A Comment," The African Review, Vol. I, No. 3 (January, 1972), pp. 48-53.

tic view" that superior technology in relation to specific projects should not be rejected for dogmatic reasons; nor should technical lessons learned from the West be ignored simply because these countries are not socialist.⁷³

The great emphasis placed on "high-level manpower" (as the phrase goes in Tanzania) since 1963 when formal manpower planning started contributed to the "elitist" orientation of secondary and university students who considered themselves to be an indispensable, highly-placed group. This orientation was demonstrated by the students' unwillingness to participate in the national service program initiated in 1966. The ethical side of education which would bring the students closer to the needs of the masses had been sacrificed to the instrumental side in the rush to produce a local technocracy. Thus Mwalimu's paper on Education for Self-Reliance (1967) was partly an attempt to redress the balance between ethical and instrumental aspects of socialist education, and efforts have been made since then to recast the entire educational system.⁷⁴ Yet it will be some time before these efforts

⁷³Thus, for example, the Tanzania-Zambia Railway is being built by the Chinese while the Tanzania-Zambia Road is being built by American companies. Again, in 1972 a team led by the Speaker of the Parliament went to the United States to study the "technique" of managing absentee ballots. This was considered a purely technical matter, although the party systems in the two countries are entirely different. Similarly, there are Western as well as socialist advisers in the various state organs managing the economy, depending on the nature of the project.

⁷⁴J. K. Nyerere, Education for Self-Reliance (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967); see also the various articles in Idrian N. Resnick (ed.), Tanzania: Revolution by Edu-

produce a cadre which is well-grounded in the philosophy of Ujamaa. For example, a child who enrolled in school in 1967 --the year of the Declaration--will not graduate at the University of Dar es Salaam until around 1983; and when he graduates he will have been taught by people who were themselves a product of an entirely different educational system. Hence the importance of an on-going program of Ujamaa education for the serving elite.⁷⁵

These problems are, however, transitional, and as such they cannot be used as an argument against nationalization of the economy. Again, as we noted earlier, it would be almost impossible to "Tanzanize" the economy without placing it in the hands of the state because at the time of the Arusha Declaration local entrepreneurship was very limited. Thus the Tanzanian leadership saw a basic unity between economic nationalism and socialism, on the one hand, and between socialism and self-reliance, on the other.

Given the country's heavy reliance on agriculture, transformation of the rural villages becomes the first prior-

ation (Dar es Salaam: Longmans of Tanzania Ltd., 1968). The measures taken since 1967 include (1) a recast of primary and secondary curricula to bring them closer to the agricultural and technical needs of the country; (2) introduction of "political education" in all secondary schools; (3) greater emphasis on technical education than on liberal arts, and (4) establishment of TANU Youth league branches in secondary schools and at the University of Dar es Salaam as an organ of youth indoctrination.

⁷⁵Kivukoni College provides such a program but its enrollment is still small, and the Party has a "Political Education" section with a full-time secretary. More effort will be necessary during the seventies.

ity area, if self-reliant, socialist development is to be achieved. This entails a change from the earlier emphasis on village "self-help" within the traditional social systems to village self-reliance within new, dynamic communities based on the principles of Ujamaa to be examined later.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to show in this chapter that the Arusha Declaration was in large part a logical response to the challenges of a delicate "development situation." In particular, the challenge of the first of the three questions we posed at the beginning of the chapter, i.e. how to effect national control of the economy of an underdeveloped, ex-colonial country.

Second, we have argued that nationalization was a necessary beginning in Tanzania's case, and that the acquisition of greater "internal capabilities"--e.g. technical information and a committed, "politically aware" cadre will be necessary to minimize the effects of the new forms of foreign investments which will for some time continue to be needed. This will undoubtedly require a careful balance between the ethical/political and instrumental considerations in the educational reform initiated in 1967 and still going on in Tanzania.

Third, as the nation continues to apply the principles of self-reliance and non-alignment in its interaction with

the external environment, it has at the same time to seek ways of increasing internal productivity and equity. The main strategy adopted since Arusha is to create self-reliant ujamaa communities throughout the rural areas. The two questions--i.e. productivity and equity--will therefore preoccupy us in the rest of the study, specifically in relation to the problems and prospects of agrarian socialist development.

As defined by the Arusha Declaration and subsequent policy statements, the Tanzanian road to socialist development entails a delicate balance between (1) equality and productivity; (2) persuasion and coercion; (3) greater community self-reliance and greater national integration, etc. However, most of the existing imbalances and "misorientations," including village overdependence on the state, rural differentiation, low productivity, peasant distrust of governmental change agents, etc., have a direct link with the past colonial as well as post-independence rural development policies. Thus, in the following two chapters we shall outline the previous policies particularly in relation to three questions, namely (1) the nature and productivity of the economy; (2) the nature of society emerging from the policies, and (3) the "mobilizational" content of the strategies used. This approach will clarify the tasks facing the new nation in its effort to achieve a democratic socialist transformation.

Chapter 3

THE COLONIAL INSTRUMENTALISM AND RURAL DIFFERENTIATION

The colonial period, by and large, merely froze the situation it found. Stagnation and tribal separation were its key stones. So it was with the Germans and so it was with us [the British]. Amateur in the twenties, though better later on, our administration diligently spent what we received from local taxation and that was just about that. Any one who bothers to read the District Books of the interior will see that the great desideratum, politically above all, was that nothing should happen tomorrow except what happened today. And nothing much did happen. Nothing much, that is, until the rise of TANU.

-- Basil Davidson, "Tanganyika on its Own," New Statesman, 65:1660 (January 4, 1963).

We use the term "colonial instrumentalism" to describe the colonial development policy in Tanzania in two senses. First, in the sense that the colony was used as an "instrument" for satisfying the "home needs" of the colonial power-- whether German or British. Second, in the sense that the colonial policy concentrated on the productivity of small groups (planters or "progressive farmers"), thereby ignoring other fundamental questions such as equity or "quality" of the emerging society. We shall attempt to show that this policy orientation has created many development problems for Tanzania during the post-independence period and that the legacies inherited will for some time to come influence the

strategies adopted to correct the development imbalance between different areas of the country.

From the colonial days to the Ujamaa era, five different "models" or approaches to rural development have been tried. The colonial period produced two--the Plantation/Estate Model and the Progressive Farmer Model; the post-independence, pre-Arusha period produced two--the Transformation Model and the Improvement/Mass Extension Model; and the post-Arusha period has produced the Ujamaa Model. This latest model has learned a great deal from the preceding models, as it will become clear later.

Each of the above models had structural and normative implications built in them. The improvement/mass extension model was the least revolutionary, taking the peasants "as they are" and attempting, through extension service, to impart technological information which would gradually lead to change in peasant behavior and higher productivity. (However, the notion of "improvement" has been a common factor in all the five models; but the post-independence "Improvement Approach," as we shall see in the next chapter, deserves to be treated as a separate model.) The most revolutionary, conceptually, have been the transformation and Ujamaa models; in each case, rapid structural and normative transformations were expected, although the former leaned towards capitalism while the latter sought a socialist revolution. Both the progressive farmer and transformation models have been discredited; and now the improvement approach has been over-

shadowed by Ujamaa, while plantations and estates have been nationalized in part or in total. The present chapter examines the "colonial instrumentalism" as embodied in the plantation and progressive farmer models, with the questions we posed at the end of the previous chapter in mind; and the next chapter will examine the pre-Arusha effort to mobilize the peasantry via the transformation and improvement approaches.

POLICY EMPHASIS ON METROPOLITAN NEEDS

Colonial development policy in Tanzania can be summed up as a response to three related factors. First, it was initially a response to the needs of the mother country, as the discussion of the plantation/Estate model will show. Second, in a later stage, it was a response to the growing political pressure exerted by the colonial population; this is clearly shown by the post-war randomized planning and reclamation schemes of the fifties. Third, in the final stage, it was a response to the failure of earlier measures to foster political stability, hence the idea of "progressive farmer" as a stabilizing force. This final response could be called "political anticipation" to protect the Empire, as we shall elaborate later. Both the Germans and the British had similar initial objectives with regard to their East African holdings. In the words of one analyst:

The policies on agriculture were such that they were eventually to make the East African countries of Tanga-

nyika (German East Africa), Kenya, Uganda and Zanzibar (British East Africa) into plantations producing copra, coffee, tea, cotton, tobacco, vanilla, rubber, etc., in short, all the possible crops which would form the export commodities. At first both Governments had similar approaches towards producing these crops, and the approach was to develop large plantations and import white settlers to come and live and develop them further. In some areas this policy worked, but the Germans later changed their minds after experiencing failures and let small holders raise some crops. The British were successful with the policy in Kenya but less successful in Uganda and Zanzibar. By the end of the two World Wars many of the export crops which were originally plantation crops were grown by smallholder farmers.¹

The heavy emphasis on the internal needs of the mother country is clear from the policy statements of colonial founders and administrators. For example, the "home needs" of the German invasion of Tanganyika are evident in Carl Peters' description of the territory's economic potential for Germany in 1884:

... as a whole, the colony may be described as a good agricultural country, and it has already been found fit for all sorts of tropical plantations. . . . Taken all in all, German East Africa is perhaps not a colony of the first class, but it has splendid openings in several directions, and if properly managed, it may be developed into a wide and very important field for German enterprise.²

The Germans introduced a number of cash crops in Tanganyika, chiefly sisal, coffee, cotton and rubber, and built a few railways and roads to enable these crops to reach metropolitan markets and to make administration of the huge country possible. But these crops, as we shall see later,

¹Mbilinyi, op. cit., p. 87.

²Quoted in R. F. Eberlie, "The German Achievement in East Africa," Tanganyika Notes and Records, Vol. LV (September, 1960), p. 195.

did not stimulate growth in the vast areas of the country which could not grow them; and the pattern of communication installed could not create a wide internal market.³ The change-over from German to British rule at the end of the First World War did not change this pattern. Britain decided in the early 1900s to take over direct control of her African "spheres of influence" from the British Companies holding Royal Charters; but the British treasury was prepared to use only small grants to the colonies to stimulate the growth of the needed cash crops and to cover a part of administrative costs. An Empire Marketing Board was created in 1926 to assist the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in administering ad hoc grants and extraordinary emergency funds to meet colonial budget deficits.⁴ The smallness and "home needs" considerations of British financial assistance to her colonies can be seen in the series of Colonial Development Acts in the inter-war period, 1920-1945. We shall refer to these Acts briefly.

Between 1930 and 1940, only some £12 million were spent in the colonies under the above arrangement. In 1929, the Labor Government passed the Colonial Development Act

³For a fuller discussion of the German period, see John Illife, "Agricultural Change in Modern Tanganyika: An Outline History" (Paper for the 1970 Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, University of Dar es Salaam, December 27-30, 1970).

⁴Anthony H. Rweyemamu, "Nation-Building and Planning Processes in Tanzania" (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Syracuse University, 1966), p. 43.

which empowered the Colonial Secretary to spend up to a million pounds annually over a period of ten years for various projects in the colonies. The mercantilist or "home needs" considerations are unmistakable in the words of the Act itself. Thus, the Act stipulated, the British treasury would "advance to the government of any colony or of any territory . . . for the purposes of aiding developing agriculture and industry in the colony or territory and thereby promoting commerce with, or industry in, the United Kingdom."⁵ Colonial development was thus seen as a byproduct of metropolitan needs. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 was introduced with philanthropic appeals, calling upon the British public "to contribute directly and for its own sake, towards the development in the widest sense of the word of the colonial peoples for whose good government the taxpayers of this country are ultimately responsible."⁶ Behind these philanthropic claims, however, were the pressures from the growing violence and riots in the colonies, especially in the West Indies, following the rising prices of essential commodities.⁷ A wider Colonial Development and Welfare Act was

⁵Barbu Miculescu, Colonial Planning: A Comparative Study (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1958), p. 57.

⁶Speech by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, Minister of Health, introducing the Bill on the order of the Second Reading in the House of Commons, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 361 (May, 1940), Cols. 41-47.

⁷These riots had led to the appointment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry under Lord Mayne. The Report of the Commission led to the new legislation from which passive Tanzania (at this time) did not benefit. See Miculescu, op. cit., p. 61.

introduced in 1945, increasing the total sum to be contributed by Britain to the development of all her colonies to £120 million over a period of ten years. This period saw the rudiments of planning both at the colonial office and in the colonies.⁸ From this Act, Tanzania (or Tanganyika, as it was then) received a total of £10 million between 1948 and 1958/59.⁹

The British did not formulate a clear development policy for Tanzania during the inter-war period, for three main reasons. First, the war and the depression of the 1930s had virtually exhausted the British purse. Second, Hitler was demanding back German territories--including Tanganyika--which had been entrusted to Britain after the First World War. This created uncertainty as to the future of British rule in Tanganyika. Third, the fact of "Mandate" itself gave Britain a "pretext" or "justification" to concentrate on her crown colonies such as Kenya which had sizeable white settlements, while blaming lack of development in Tanganyika on the fact that the Trusteeship Mandate demanded protection of the rights of Africans to land. This protection, however, remained "static" rather than developmental, as one observer has neatly put it:

Corresponding to the ideas of the times and the traditions of the Colonial Office, attention was directed toward the protection of African interests, but in a

⁸Anthony Rweyemamu, op. cit., p. 45.

⁹World Bank, p. 21.

static sense rather than in the sense of accelerated economic and cultural change. This emphasis on the one hand effected a delay in economic development, but on the other made possible the development of a relatively peaceful political atmosphere. Comparatively few long-term leases were granted to Europeans and Asians.¹⁰

Colonial planning in Tanzania, a post-war phenomenon, involved identification of projects to be undertaken by the central government after being approved by the Governor and the Colonial Office. Planning had nothing to do with mobilization of the masses. Initially placed in the Secretariat, planning became the responsibility of a Development Commission created in 1946, comprising the Chief Secretary as Chairman, a Deputy Chairman, an Executive Officer and five Commissioners. The Commission produced the Ten-Year Development Plan towards the end of 1946 which was approved by the Colonial Office the following year.¹¹ The Commission admitted that the Plan was no more than "a series of objectives with an approximation of their costs"; and the pattern of allocation of the Plan funds was not geared to have immediate and wide impact on the rural population which constituted more than 96 percent of the territory's total.¹² The growing

¹⁰ Hans Ruthenberg, Agricultural Development in Tanganyika (Berlin: Gottingen-Heidelberg, 1964), p. 46.

¹¹ Tanganyika Territory, A Ten-Year Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika Territory (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1946).

¹² Ibid., p. 2, and Anthony Rweyemamu, op. cit., p. 52. The Plan envisaged expenditure of £19,186,000 from 1947-1956. Out of this amount, 11 percent was allocated to education; 36 1/2 percent to communications and transport (25 1/2 percent to roads, aerodromes and telecommunications and 11 percent to Railways and Ports); 16 percent to public health; 6

political pressures in the fifties forced the administration to effect revisions in the original allocation pattern, placing a greater emphasis on social services.¹³ Despite these revisions, however, the colonial plans, which ended a year before independence, had only minimal impact on the rural masses because they were actually geared to the creation of a colonial-oriented economy using small, responsive minority, planters and progressive farmers.

The Plantation/Estate Model

Plantation economy was introduced in Tanzania by the German administration which started shortly after the invasion (referred to as "treaty-making" with illiterate chiefs and guns) by Carl Peters in 1884. We shall restrict our discussion to the main features of this model and its impact on

percent to township development; 5 1/2 percent to water development mainly in urban areas; 5 percent to public buildings and works; and 6 1/2 percent to miscellaneous expenditure.

¹³The original Plan was recast in 1950, the new version being approved by the Legislative Council in November, 1950. This envisaged the expenditure of £24 million from 1951 to 1956. See Tanganyika Territory, Annual Report of the Development Organization, 1950 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1951); and Revised Development and Welfare Plan for Tanganyika, 1950-1956 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1951), p. 40. The new Five-Year Plan introduced in July, 1955, envisaged expenditure of £25 million, broken down into development of natural resources, £4,950,000; communications, £4,470,000; urban development, £3,215,000; electricity, £2 million; social services, £5,293,667; public buildings, £1,950,000; and African Housing, £970,000. See Tanganyika Territory, Tanganyika Development Plan, 1955-60 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1955).

the masses.¹⁴ The plantation model is distinguished from the other agricultural systems in terms of having (1) much more production inputs--land, capital and labor; (2) greater capacity to attract or cause labor migration from distant areas; (3) capacity for innovation and mechanization due to the concentration of effort in one consolidated block of land; and (4) greater capacity to attract and utilize the extension services. From economic (or purely instrumental) point of view, then, it was logical for the colonial administration to concentrate effort on this sector to accelerate production of certain key cash crops--initially sisal, coffee, tea, rubber, etc.--which were in great demand in Europe.

These crops could be obtained in three ways: (1) by establishing European-owned plantations employing African labor; (2) by encouraging Africans to grow them; or (3) by encouraging both European and African production. African colonial experience has shown that the alternative that emerged in a particular country depended mainly on the size of the white settler population. Where there were large European settlements, as in Southern Rhodesia and Kenya, the policy was to "proletarianize" the African population to ensure a regular supply of labor to the white plantations, and Africans were forbidden to grow the key cash crops. On the other extreme, the colonial administration found no alternative but to encourage African production because the climatic

¹⁴For a fuller account, see Illife, op. cit., pp. 1-10.

conditions did not permit European settlements. This was true in the case of many West African territories. Thus in Ghana, for example, large-scale cocoa-growers emerged as early as the 1890s. Tanzania stood in the middle of these two extremes, having a mixture of foreign-owned plantations and local participation in cash crop production, more due to the special circumstances of Tanzania than to any alleged 'benevolence' of British policy makers.¹⁵

Two main factors saved Tanganyika from becoming a full-blown "plantation colony." First, after the First World War, Tanganyika became a British Trusteeship Territory (becoming a U.N. Mandate after 1945) with some provisions prohibiting excessive land alienation. With the creation of the United Nations Organization in 1945, the local people were able to appeal directly to the international body where land alienation became excessive, as it was done successfully in the famous Meru Land Case.¹⁶ Second, much of the land suitable climatically for white settlements and such cash crops as coffee was effectively occupied and cultivated by sedentary local people. This denied the British a pretext they had used in Kenya to alienate Kikuyu land and Masai land which was undergoing the usual cycle of fallowing in a traditional system of shifting cultivation and pasturing. Thus in

¹⁵Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁶For an account of this case, see Kirilo Japhet and Earl Seaton, The Meru Land Case (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967).

Tanzania the biggest area under plantation was that of sisal grown largely on the less wet areas which were in many cases unoccupied.

Unlike Kenya and Rhodesia, Tanzania had a rival African sector very early, competing with (often having learned from) white settler estates. The pattern of rural "proletarianization" was also different. Whereas in Kenya white plantations proletarianized the surrounding peasants who were placed in "reserves" to supply labor, in Tanzania the plantations led to labor migration from distant regions.¹⁷ The effects of this migration will be discussed later. Although there was virtually no international restraint on the amount of land alienation that the German administration could undertake, very little land had in fact been alienated when the British took over Tanganyika on a Trusteeship Mandate at the end of the First World War.¹⁸ By the end of the German rule, sisal and coffee were the main estate or plantation crops. The other important cash crops introduced by the Germans, such as cotton, were grown mainly by small African

¹⁷ Often the surrounding people learned the art of growing the cash crops after brief periods of labor apprenticeship in the plantations or produced food crops to take advantage of the market opened by the plantations. See Filiffe, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

¹⁸ White planters had come individually, the first experiment being with tobacco and cotton near Pangani (late 1880s); then with coffee plantations around East and West Usambara and foothills of Mts. Kilimanjaro and Meru (1890s); then followed sisal plantations around Kilosa and Morogoro (1907) made possible by the central railways. Ibid., p. 7.

holders. In comparison to Kenya, the plantation sector in Tanzania grew very slowly under both German and British administrations. By the time of independence (1961), only about 1 percent of the land was under plantation/estate category, but it accounted for about 40 percent of foreign earnings accruing from agriculture.¹⁹

Three important features of the plantation model should be noted at this stage. First, with the exception of a few areas, it did not create a widespread land discontent or uprisings such as those leading to the Mau Mau movement in Kenya. Thus "land politics" was not a major mobilization factor in the struggle for independence; nor has it been a major factor in the struggle for ujamaa, as we shall elaborate later.²⁰ Second, despite its small size, the plantation sector was a crucial sector of the economy under foreign hands. Third, the colonial policies regarding labor recruit-

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 7, documents that, apart from a few settlers who took up new land in Oldeani (Arusha Region) and the Southern Highlands after British takeover from the Germans, the pattern of land alienation remained largely as established during the German period. Attempts to produce rubber on plantation scale failed. Up to 1912, rubber had been collected wild by Africans in the southern parts of the country, and was a major export in 1904. After 1912, however, rubber died away partly because it was later out-competed by sisal which grew rapidly from 25,022 tons in 1926 to 93,110 tons in 1939.

²⁰ Apart from the Meru land case, cited earlier, which the politicians used to demonstrate the wickedness of the colonial regime, and British proposals (discussed later) to convert communal ownership to individual freehold thereby making land a marketable commodity, there were very few instances of intense peasant protest against land alienation. In most areas protest originated from peasant dissatisfaction with enforced agricultural rules which we shall discuss later.

ment to the plantations produced socioeconomic consequences whose effects we shall elaborate later.

African Response

Though limited to a few areas, African response to commercial agriculture in Tanzania (mainland) grew very rapidly. By early thirties, coffee was well-established in Bukoba, Kilimanjaro, Meru, Rungwe, Mbozi, Mbinga, etc.; so was cotton in Sukumaland, and tobacco in Songea. Response was not always spontaneous; in some areas the colonial administration had used 'compulsion,' as was true of cotton in Sukumaland and to some extent tobacco in Songea. Because of the limited white plantations, both German and British administrations encouraged, as a matter of general policy, African participation in cash crop production. Exceptions occurred where production of cash crops interfered with supply of labor or food to plantations. A notable example was the government discouragement of African production of cotton in the Pangani Valley to ensure supply of food and labor to the sisal estates in that area, with the consequence that Pangani has up to now remained without an important cash crop despite its fertility.²¹

The Second World War was a turning point in British agricultural policy in Tanzania. The growing need for food to feed troops and settler communities had led to heavy cam-

²¹ Illiffe, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

paigns in the thirties for higher production. This led to excessive erosion in some areas, and thus land reclamation became the chief preoccupation till mid-fifties. The need to improve peasant agriculture was due to two other factors. First, the failure of the grand Groundnut Scheme (started in 1947 and abandoned in 1951) had taught the British that large-scale, mechanized farming was not the answer to their oil-seed needs; small-holder, peasant farming was now an attractive alternative. Second, even before the formation of TANU in 1954, political pressure had been exerted on the British administration by the Tanganyika African Association (TAA). "If African agriculture is to be advanced," stated TAA in 1945, "the Government must take immediate steps to introduce widely new methods of farming."²²

The Government reacted to this situation by adopting a policy of compulsory rehabilitation in some areas, leading to various development schemes;²³ and agricultural assistants and local authorities were used to enforce a host of legal rules such as ridging, terracing, etc. The British were rather late in this otherwise useful effort which was bound to fail because of two main factors. First, some of the rules and schemes had not been well conceived, and their implementation in the field was in many cases entrusted to

²²Quoted in ibid., p. 24.

²³Examples are the Mbulu Development Scheme, 1949; the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme, 1949; the Mlalo Rehabilitation Scheme and the Sukumaland Development Scheme, 1950s.

lowly qualified instructors. Thus, certain 'standard' rules were mechanically enforced universally without due consideration of soil requirement in each particular area. For example, under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme started in 1949, each household was required, as a matter of "government rule," to construct 300 yards of terrace each year.²⁴ Second, the reclamation exercise coincided with the rise of nationalist politics, and local politicians were quick to use agricultural grievances (especially the compulsory regulations) to mobilize peasants against colonial rule.²⁵

The Progressive Farmer Model

The failure of compulsory rehabilitation and land reclamation in many areas led to a revision of policy in the mid-fifties, the new emphasis (1955-61) being on "persuasion" and "progressive farmers." There were two main types of progressive farmers. The first included the relatively wealthy farmers who had grown cash crops in their local areas, often in response to missionary or government advice. The second group of progressive farmers was a product of government-sponsored development schemes of the fifties, such as those of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (TAC).

²⁴ For a useful discussion of the Uluguru Scheme and the politics surrounding it, see R. Young and H. A. Fosbrook, Land and Politics Among the Luguru of Tanganyika (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).

²⁵ See Lionel Cliffe, "Nationalism and Reaction to Enforced Agricultural Change in Tanganyika during the Colonial Period," in Cliffe and Saul (eds.), op. cit., pp. 17-24.

Formed in 1954, TAC replaced the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC) which had "mismanaged" the Groundnut Scheme, being responsible for African Tenant Program whose aim was to create settlements of progressive farmers. We shall not get into the failures and successes of this program here;²⁶ it suffices to say that where the schemes "succeeded," they generated rural differentiation without increasing rural productivity.²⁷ There were a few exceptions however. An example of a scheme which succeeded in both differentiation and productivity is the Mbulu Development Scheme for wheat production. For instance, in 1958, some 800 tons of wheat were sold by African farmers in the North Iraqw wheat area; by 1970 nearly all cultivation was done by about 100-150 tractor-owning African progressive farmers or partnerships for over 4,000 households in the area. Some of the large farmers cultivate 500 acres and over, with substantial income returns.²⁸

Rural differentiation was considered necessary for the stability of the country, and the colonial progressive farmer

²⁶For an assessment, see Anthony Rweyemamu, op. cit., Chapter 2 and 3.

²⁷Tobacco schemes (such as that of Urambo) were an exception with respect to the few Africans who endured the initial difficult years. In most of the other schemes (e.g. Nachingwea, Sonjo, Ichonde, etc.) loan repayment was a rare occurrence. For a further explanation, see Philip L. Raikes, "Differentiation and Progressive Farmer Policies" (unpublished Seminar Paper, Dar es Salaam, BRULUP, October 3, 1972), pp. 18-19.

²⁸Ibid., p. 20.

policies were as much political as they were economic in their objectives. The political considerations--to which we referred earlier as "anticipation"--were clearly expressed in various government policy statements. The aim was to create a "Yeoman-type" rural class (similar to the one which emerged from the Enclosure Movement in Britain in the eighteenth century) which would be a stabilizing factor in view of the rise of the nationalist movement, widespread agrarian discontent and Peasant Uprising (Mau Mau) in Kenya. As Mr. D. W. Malcolm, Principal Assistant Secretary, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, wrote in 1952:

I want to see the emergence from our hitherto undifferentiated African society of a substantial number of rich men. The 'wealthy coffee growers' (of Mbinga), if they have reached the same level as those of Kilimanjaro, will be getting a cash income of about £25 per year. That is not what I mean by riches; I would like to see men in a sufficiently strong financial position to be able to send their sons overseas for education; to afford motor cars, good houses and the like, and I believe that the emergence of such relatively wealthy individuals in the community will provide a stabilizing factor of immense importance to the future of this country.²⁹

A similar policy had been adopted more effectively in Kenya in response to the peasant stirrings which led to the outbreak of Mau Mau Terrorism in 1952; the basic ideas (which have continued to influence Kenyan rural policy even after independence) being consolidated in the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 for intensifying peasant agriculture.³⁰ The British had

²⁹Quoted in Illife, op. cit., p. 27.

³⁰Kenya Government, The Swynnerton Plan (Nairobi: Government Printer, 1954).

underestimated the strength of the nationalist movement; until mid-fifties, for example, targets for handing over some of the government-sponsored schemes to Africans were expressed in terms of "generations," with little knowledge that independence would be granted within less than a decade. Thus the Report on the ill-fated Groundnut Scheme had stated: "The project will pave the way for the eventual institution of the co-operative use of land; but when the time for this comes, which may be a generation or two ahead, it will be necessary to ensure continuance of the mechanized system of large-scale production and to avoid reversion to primitive methods of individual effort which have proved so ineffective and ruinous to the land."³¹

Progressive farmer policies were also considered a way of integrating Tanganyika into the world economy, as the Report of the Royal Commission stated in 1955: "Economic and social policies must be based on the realization that the development of East Africa basically depends on the extent to which the indigenous population can, with the help of necessarily small numbers of immigrant peoples, be integrated into the world economy." The Report recommended conversion of customary land tenure to individual freehold to facilitate progressive farming: "The tenure and disposition of land

³¹ Alan Wood, The Groundnut Affair (London: John Lane, the Bodley Head Ltd., 1950); and A. T. P. Seabrook, "The Groundnut Scheme in Retrospect," Tanganyika Notes and Records, 49 (June/September, 1957), see pp. 87-91 for the full story of the ill-fated scheme.

should aim at the individualization of land ownership and mobility in the transfer of land which, without ignoring existing property rights, will enable access to land for economic use."³² This recommendation was translated into official policy in 1958;³³ and Nyerere, as President of the nationalist movement (TANU), wrote in its condemnation:

I am . . . opposed to the proposed Government solution to this problem of shifting cultivation. . . . If we allow land to be sold like a robe, within a short period there would only be a few Africans possessing land in Tanganyika and all the others would be tenants. . . . We would be faced with a problem which has created antagonism among peoples and led to bloodshed in many countries of the world.³⁴

Apart from the advantages of good land and extension services, the progressive farmers monopolized the small amount of rural credit available during the last ten years of colonial rule.³⁵ Even when credit was later administered

³²British Government, East African Royal Commission, 1953-55 Report (London, 1955), Cmd 9475 of 1955, pp. 414-28.

³³Legislative Council of Tanganyika, "Review of Land Tenure Policy: Part 1" (Government Paper No. 6 of 1958), pp. 2-4.

³⁴Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 55-56.

³⁵Apart from the Native Authority Revolving Funds, which had been entirely under the control of powerful local notables (especially chiefs and headmen), the first credit scheme for Africans, the Local Development Loan Fund, was set up in 1947 with £50,000 derived from the retained earnings of export producers during the war. Most of the loans made were for sums over shs. 1,000, mostly for mechanization, which meant small peasants had no chance. Out of 12 loans made during the first two years, 7 were made for tractor ploughing schemes. Later, the Fund was raised to £100,000 and supplemented with the African Productivity Loan Fund worth a similar sum. Yet, the number of loans made annually by both funds was about 150 a year, average amount being more than 2,000, too high for the small peasant. See Raikes, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

through co-operative societies, the small farmers had no chance; the funds were distributed to the societies' 'Committee Members' (most of whom were, or became, progressive farmers) and local notables.³⁶

The policy of progressive farmers produced rural differentiation at two levels, (1) within individual areas, districts or regions, and (2) between regions. This process of differentiation was further enhanced by the "focal point" approach introduced around 1956. This approach "concentrated the work of Agricultural Department on the most progressive farmers, in the hope that their example would gradually spread to less responsive people and areas."³⁷ As we shall point out in the next chapter, however, this "trickle-down" (or "demonstration effect") theory, which was also entertained after independence till the Arusha Declaration, did not work in practice. The progressive farmers and planters became more "progressive" as the bulk of the peasantry became more "regressive."³⁸

SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL INSTRUMENTALISM

Apart from the emphasis on a few cash crops for export and failure to expand the internal market (noted earlier),

³⁶United Republic of Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Inquiry into the Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966).

³⁷Illiffe, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁸For a fuller discussion of this trend, see Raikes, op. cit., pp. 1-13.

the development pattern emerging from the colonial rural development policy places constraints on the current effort to build an egalitarian society. First, the areas with cash crops (which are also the areas with greatest number of progressive farmers) have been, as one would expect, the least responsive to Ujamaa (see Chapter 8). Since individualist and capitalist relations of production have remained amidst a socialist policy and socialist campaigns, policy implementers are bound to face a dilemma between encouraging productivity (of the more developed areas) and accelerated correction of the development imbalance by reorienting credit and extension services to the less developed areas which have responded to the call to form ujamaa villages. In other words, the inherited situation has made the balance between the need for uninterrupted--and increasing--rural productivity, on the one hand, and the need for rapid ujamaaization, on the other, a delicate one (see Chapter 7). Meanwhile, some socialist policies have benefited the progressive farmers. For example, the change in rural taxation, especially the abolition of produce cess in 1969, which aimed at correcting rural-urban imbalance and stimulating agricultural production, benefited the larger farmers who market a larger portion of their total output than the smaller farmers who consume much of their output themselves.³⁹

³⁹Differential pricing would probably fail because the larger farmers would sell their produce through the smaller, a trick often used by loan defaulters in the past.

Second, related to the above problem of correcting development imbalances is the fact that, as a matter of deliberate policy, certain regions--especially the Central and Western belts--were encouraged (often forced into contracts) to supply labor to the plantations and estates outside their own homeland. In some cases, as Gulliver recounted the case of the Ngoni and Ndendeule, the process of labor migration led to temporary depopulation of the youths who would have contributed to the development of their areas. These men returned home at a mature age with virtually nothing in a way of capital to invest in their abandoned farms.⁴⁰

Three methods were used to ensure regular supply of labor from these areas: namely (1) no effort was made to improve the economy of these areas beyond subsistence, thus stagnating economy led to labor migration and labor migration in turn led to further stagnation, completing the cycle; (2) the introduction of poll tax payable in cash ensured that the adults worked in a plantation for at least a few months each year since they had no other source of cash income; (3) the chiefs were instructed to mobilize and contract labor on behalf of their people. Until now some regions have not recovered from the "habit" of migration, let alone from relative as well as absolute underdevelopment. Kigoma is an example of regions in this category, especially Buha. The following excerpts from an editorial comment of the Party newspaper

⁴⁰ P. H. Gulliver, Labour Migration in Rural Economy (Nairobi: East African Literature Bureau, 1955).

justifying "Operation Kigoma" (for Ujamaa) throws some light on the developmental plight of such areas as Kigoma and also on the seriousness with which the Government views the problem:

When one talks of the Ujamaa movement in the rural areas, one generally associates the movement with the implementation of TANU's policy of transforming the rural areas into socialist communities in which the peasants, through common endeavours, shall free themselves from subsistence living and completely do away with poverty, ignorance, disease and exploitation of any kind.

But for the people of Kigoma, the Ujamaa movement is much more than this general understanding. For them, it is a matter of actually starting to live. For them, it is a matter of beginning to regard Kigoma as their permanent 'home' and not just a staging post from where to emigrate to other parts of the country.

For many years, the people of Kigoma have been on the move--a move not towards the kind of subsistence living that is experienced elsewhere but a move away from a kind of slavery that has left them in a vicious circle of utter pauperism. When they have migrated to the capitalist sisal plantations, they have found not salaried employment but a few pounds of maize flour and beans to 'keep them going' and a few shillings at the end of every year to pay poll tax!

It is for this reason that 'Operation Kigoma' must be understood differently from other 'operations.' For the success of the operation will do more than just heralding socialism in the rural areas of Kigoma. The success . . . will also rehabilitate the conscience of the 'Muha' from the quagmire of near total dehumanisation into which he has been condemned for many years. It will enable the people of Kigoma to stand upright again and say: 'We are human beings again.'⁴¹

Third, an allied economic consequence of this process was that, in the areas affected by excessive labor migration, all development work was left to women. Reporting on Ngara district in 1937, an Agricultural Assistant stated: "The large exodus of men from the district to earn money has

⁴¹ Daily News (Dar es Salaam), August 7, 1972, p. 1.

thrown the burden of coffee work on the women, and this always adds to the difficulties in the production of economic crops, since it is obviously unwise to allow such work to interfere unduly with the all-important production of adequate food crops."⁴² In some cases, this continued to be true even after the men had returned from the estates, contributing (though by no means the sole source) to the problem often reiterated by Mwalimu that it is the women who do most of the farm activities in many parts of rural Tanzania.

Fourth, there were lasting sociopsychological consequences as well. Reporting the case of the Ngoni, Gulliver observed that "the deserted wives and children of long-term absentees do often (though not always) suffer poverty and severe difficulties; and there has also been a fall in moral standards of marital and sexual relations which do not stop at the deserted wives but colours general Ngoni attitudes."⁴³ Psychologically, the "Manamba System" (the plantation workers were often known by "numbers") and the generally poor treatment accorded the workers in the plantations deprived them of the kind of self-confidence that Mwongozo is attempting to foster. Moreover, the word "manamba" itself came to be

⁴²P. H. Brett to Senior Agricultural Officer, Mwanza, July 1, 1937; TNA 197/5/3/333; quoted in Illiffe, *op. cit.*, p. 11. Illiffe notes that when economic opportunity opened in such areas, the migrants returned home and undertook production of cash crops, the net result being that no area in Tanzania mainland was completely proletarianized.

⁴³Gulliver, *op. cit.*, p. 42; but he warns that "this point should not be over-emphasized," because there could be other reasons as well.

associated with certain areas and particular tribes, increasing the ethnocentric arrogance of those in the more developed cash crop areas.⁴⁴

Fifth, the neglect of the subsistence sector by the colonial administration is partly responsible for the increasing dependence of the villages on the state. Famine was a regular feature in many rural villages in the colonial times because of the precarious balance between output and consumption, without much being left over to anticipate bad conditions. In each case of famine, the village looked to the Government for relief; and the Government, rather than revolutionizing the economy, set up relief centers, a response which increased village dependence on it rather than solving the problem of subsistence and famine per se. Thus, national dependence on metropolitan centers was paralleled by a growing village dependence on the state which continued to grow even after independence. As we shall attempt to show in other chapters, correction of this dependence syndrome is one of the greatest challenges of the policy of socialism and self-reliance which was ushered by the Arusha Declaration.

Finally, colonial rural development approaches fostered a deeply-rooted "anti-government" feeling amongst the peasantry, and a tendency to consider the Party a weapon to defend themselves against bureaucratic encroachment. This

⁴⁴ In Kilimanjaro, for instance, the term manamba was used interchangeably with the term kyasaka, a Chagga equivalent of "gentile," in referring particularly to people from the areas from where most estate workers were recruited.

feeling is a direct child of the use of coercion to induce behavioral change or compliance with rules which were often not sufficiently explained to the peasants. Some form of compulsion was undoubtedly necessary to start off a development activity, as Eberlie correctly comments in connection with the German period: "Without some form of compulsion the labour force would not be organized to play its part in the opening up of the country's economy. The work had to be done to till the settler's first plantations, to carry the crops to the waiting ships, to lay the railways and to construct the ports. It may be argued that, before the arrival of a cash economy, economic development was quite impossible without some form of compulsory labour."⁴⁵

However, what increased peasant distrust of the enforcing authority, whether local or central, was not compulsion per se, but the manner and purpose of compulsion. Indeed, where compulsion was systematic, determined, and to the benefit of the peasants, it did not take long before the peasants appreciated the significance of such "developmental compulsion," thereby making further compulsion unnecessary. Thus, for example, such colonial names as 'Major Dandus,' etc., are universally cited with great respect by Kilimanjaro coffee farmers.

In most areas, however, compulsion was not systematic even where it was for the benefit of the peasants. For exam-

⁴⁵Eberlie, op. cit., p. 193.

ple, the enforcement of useful agricultural rules was left to local authorities or Agricultural Instructors (at the bottom of the colonial salary scale) who, having received little training themselves, acted more like the colonial police (and in many rural areas equally feared) than like teachers or animators. For this reason, some peasants still fear governmental agents, a problem partly solved by 'politicization' of the bureaucracy in the post-independence period (see next chapter). Often, considerations of colonial stability received priority over local development. Thus, when in the mid-fifties the Luguru peasants protested against the Uluguru Land Use Scheme--which would have changed their traditional environment and probably improve their lives--the colonial administration gave in to protect the Empire.⁴⁶

In other cases, the purpose of compulsion was clearly not to improve the lot of the peasantry but to exploit them. Thus, it was difficult to convince those peasants forced to work for a foreign-owned plantation with less than subsistence wage that their labor would eventually lead to their development. It has not proved easy to overcome this distrust. The current attempts to balance developmental persuasion and compulsion within a democratic, participatory framework will be discussed in Chapter 8.

⁴⁶The period coincided with the rise of nationalist movements throughout the continent.

CONCLUSION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-
REVOLUTIONARY DIFFERENTIATION

The colonial rural development policy and, to some extent, that pursued by the nationalist government until 1967, accelerated the process of rural differentiation on mainland Tanzania. This differentiation was taking place between and within regions. Inter-regional differences in soil and climatic conditions, in response to the cash economy and the various progressive farmer policies, in educational, communication and health facilities, etc., contributed to the big development imbalance between regions. At the same time, monetization of the economy in some areas of the country led to the breakdown in the traditional 'leveling mechanisms' and 'mutual obligations,' giving rise to individualist attitudes and inter-familial competition rather than co-operation. Thus by 1967, Mwalimu could no longer see in many rural communities the "classless" society on which his earlier theory of "African socialism" (1962) had rested.⁴⁷ Instead, clear lines of differentiation were beginning to emerge in the cash crop areas:

In recent years this [traditional tendency to cooperate] is not what has been happening. Our society, our economy, and the dominant ambitions of our people are all very different now from what they were before the colonial era. There has been a general acceptance of the social attitudes and ideas of our colonial masters. We have got rid of the foreign government, but we have not yet rid ourselves of the individualistic social attitudes

⁴⁷ See J. K. Nyerere, Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1962).

which they represented and taught. . . . Even in the rural areas life has been changing over the past 30 years or so. Self-sufficient family farms producing just their own food with enough over to obtain cloths and pay taxes, are no longer universal.⁴⁸

Yet, taking the country as a whole, the process described by the President (which is also supported by data) had only managed to produce what could be called "non-revolutionary differentiation" by the time of the Arusha Declaration. Non-revolutionary in the sense that with the exception of such pockets of rural capitalism as that of Ismani in Iringa or feudalism as the nyarubanja system of the Bahaya in Bukoba, etc., very few areas had developed clear lines of class formation, even though the process was clearly leading in that direction.⁴⁹ Colonial policies carefully avoided the creation of a proletariat, whether rural or urban. For example, plantation workers who had completed their contracts were encouraged to return to their traditional communities partly to avoid the creation of an "aware," culturally uprooted class which would be a potential threat to the stability of the colonial system.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the smallness of the industrial sector meant that no urban proletariat could emerge. Walter Rodney's statement on the African scene as a

⁴⁸J. K. Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), pp. 4 and 6.

⁴⁹Cf. the arguments given by Raikes, op. cit., pp. 1-18; and Manuel Gottlieb, "The Process of Differentiation in Tanzanian Agriculture and Rural Society" (unpublished Seminar Paper, University of Dar es Salaam, 1972), passim.

⁵⁰Gulliver, op. cit., pp. 38-42; Illife, op. cit., p. 11.

whole applies even more particularly to the 'non-revolutionary' nature of the colonial development policy in Tanzania:

Capitalism as a system within the metropolises or epicentres had two dominant classes: firstly, the capitalists or bourgeoisies who owned the factories and banks (the major means for producing and distributing wealth); and secondly, the workers or proletariat who work in the factories of the said bourgeoisie. Colonialism did not create a capital-owning and factory-owning class among Africans or even inside Africa, nor did it create an urbanised proletariat of any significance (particularly outside of South Africa). In other words, capitalism in the form of colonialism failed to perform in Africa the tasks which it had performed in Europe in changing social relations and liberating the forces of production.⁵¹

This fact--i.e. the absence of "struggling classes"--has in part dictated both the theory and practice of Ujamaa, as we shall elaborate in Chapter 6. Land reform, which has been used by many countries attempting a socialist revolution as a mobilizational weapon to raise the revolutionary enthusiasm of the poorer peasants has, with the exception of a few areas, gone almost unnoticed by the vast majority of the Tanzanian rural population. In the absence of entrenched feudal lords, there was no "drama" and no "struggle" by the peasants. Land reform in Tanzania involved a "retraditionalization" of land by placing it under the state through a series of Parliamentary Acts. The retraditionalization process started in 1963 when all freehold titles introduced by the German and British administrations were abolished and con-

⁵¹Walter Rodney, "Colonialism as a System of Underdeveloping Africa" (Seminar Paper, University of Dar es Salaam, 1970), p. 13.

verted to leasehold.⁵² Between 1963 and 1971, at least one land Act or Amendment was introduced in Parliament every year.⁵³

Furthermore, with the exception of a few cash crop areas, the levels of labor employment and productivity of the so-called "progressive farmers" are still so low that to label these farmers "kulaks" may confuse, rather than clarify, policy options and implementational strategies.⁵⁴ In some areas, it is still difficult to distinguish paid employment (in monetary terms) from traditional forms of co-operation based on reciprocity (Ujima). This "immature class" situation creates policy dilemmas to which we shall return later.

⁵²Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act, 1963 (Cap. 523). It is estimated that the extent of such land was two million acres.

⁵³For details of land policy, see R. W. James, Land Tenure and Policy in Tanzania (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1971).

⁵⁴The term has been loosely used by such scholars as John Saul, Lionel Cliffe, Thoden van Velzen, and Rene Dumont to describe the larger farmers in Tanzania.

Chapter 4

REVOLUTION BY EVOLUTION: THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS

The . . . Arusha Declaration lays down a policy of revolution by evolution; we shall become a socialist, self-reliant society through our growth. We cannot afford the destruction of the economic instruments we now have nor a reduction in our present output. The steps by which we move forward must take account of these things. Our change will, therefore, be effected almost entirely by the emphasis of our new development and by the gradual conversion of existing institutions into others more in accordance with our philosophy.

-- J. K. Nyerere, The Arusha Declaration Teach-in
(Dar es Salaam: The Information Services,
1967), p. 11.

One important distinction between Tanzania's Ujamaa revolution and other socialist revolutions is that it is a revolution by "guided" (or accelerated) evolution. It does not make an abrupt departure from the past, but continues to modify the institutions and behaviors inherited from colonialism and traditional systems to make them congruent with the "emerging" national ideology. We refer to the national ideology as "emerging" because it was in fact emerging from the early sixties, being consolidated in the Arusha Declaration and post-Arusha policies in the late sixties and early seventies. In one sense, the ideology is still "emerging" even now because some areas--institutional and programmatic--still require definition. The present chapter examines the inter-

nal dynamics of change after independence, with a focus on (1) continuity and change in the inherited situation; (2) the factors which made this change "evolutionary" rather than "revolutionary"; and (3) the lessons learned from the process.

GRADUAL EVOLUTION: THE INTERNAL DYNAMICS OF CHANGE

The nature of the Tanzanian revolution can best be understood by examining the internal dynamics and contradictions within the Tanzanian political system before the Arusha Declaration, especially as manifested in specific programs of change. In this section, we shall examine briefly some of the internal dynamics of change and the major contradictions observed during the first development decade; and in the remaining sections we shall attempt to show the manifestations of these contradictions in actual programs of change--the transformation and improvement models.

The single most important agent of change after independence was the political Party (TANU) which, as a mass nationalist movement, had been able to out-compete smaller, sectional parties and in 1965 established itself as the de jure one-party system.¹ The socialist commitment of the central leadership of the Party had been expressed long before the Arusha Declaration. For example, an early version of

¹This, however, was done after a Presidential Commission set up in 1963 had travelled widely in the country seeking the views of the people. See United Republic of Tanzania, Report of Presidential Commission on the Establishment of Democratic One Party State (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965).

TANU Constitution listed as one of its main aims to construct a socialist society in which the state controlled the chief means of production and distribution.² Again, the entire content of the Arusha Declaration could be assembled from the various speeches and writings of President Nyerere between 1962 and 1966.³ Yet no formal socialist program was adopted until 1967. The delay was mainly due to the problem of converting a nationalist movement into a revolutionary vanguard and changing institutions and orientations inherited from colonial rule. Thus the post-independence mobilization effort was faced with three types of contradictions which often led to ineffective utilization of available resources--human and material. The contradictions involved (1) the emerging ideology versus the inherited institutions; (2) the need for rapid economic development versus the need to reallocate the national wealth along more equitable lines to correct the imbalance enhanced by the colonial instrumentalism; and (3) the intentions of the central leadership versus the response of the local systems to the various development programs.

These contradictions are not "theoretical"; they manifested themselves in actual programs of change, as we shall see in the following sections. To avoid unnecessary historical details, we shall attempt to summarize in Table 2 below

²See particularly Katiba ya TANU (Dar es Salaam: TANU Publicity Section, 1966), pp. 2-4.

³Examine, particularly, the essays included in his Freedom and Unity, which touch upon almost every aspect of the Arusha and post-Arusha policies.

the evolution of Tanzania's ideology from early sixties to mid-1974, indicating institutional changes, mobilizational concepts and programs for rural modernization. (For the sake of completeness, the table includes the British colonial period as well.) Some of the contradictions referred to above, particularly those regarding the "leads" and "lags" in the emerging ideology and inherited institutions, can be seen directly from the table. The table shows how Ujamaa evolved over time as the regime tried one option after another during the first development decade; but as the following brief comments will show, these "options" were not accompanied with the necessary institutional changes.

The most striking feature of the post-independence period (1961-74, Table 2) is the rapid output of mobilizational slogans accompanying changes in rural development approaches and emphases. These rapid changes show clearly the regime's concern that independence should make a developmental difference within a short time. As the central leadership stated in 1962, the aim was "to achieve in ten years most of the things which our colonial rulers had failed to achieve during the whole of the time they had governed our country."⁴ The development ideology adopted after independence, though strictly not socialist, aimed to go beyond the colonial approach by emphasizing higher rural productivity as well as equity. Thus in 1963 two "models"--the transformation

⁴ President's Address to the National Assembly, 10 December, 1962 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1963), p. 17.

Table 2

THE EVOLUTION OF TANZANIA'S SOCIALIST IDEOLOGY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES, MOBILIZATIONAL CONCEPTS AND PROGRAMS FOR RURAL MODERNIZATION, 1920-1974

Periods of Major Change	Ideology (Expressed or Manifest)	Dominant Mobilizational Concept	Main Rural Development Programs	Administrative Structure	The Political System
1920-45	Imperialism and Exploitation.	Native Welfare & Civilization	Plantation, Settlers & Key Crops for Overseas Markets	Colonial Bureaucracy and Indirect Rule	Unrepresentative Central Gov't and Traditional Systems
1945-61	Added: Local Capitalism	Added: Progressive Farmer & "Multiracialism"	Added: Yeoman-type Progressive Farmer and Agricultural Rules	Added: Elective Local Gov't and Nat'l Legislature (Partly)	Added: Multi-Party System and "Multiracialism"
1961-63	Undefined (Independence Honey Moon)	Self-Help & Co-operatives ("Uhuru na Kazi")	Self-Help Schemes & Social Services	Bureaucratic & Centralized	Dominant-Party System & "Non-Racialism"
1963-65	Mixed Economy (African Socialism)	Added: Nation-Building Concept	Transformation & Improvement Approaches	Added: Development and Politicization of Bureaucracy	One Party de factor, Traditional Rulers out, Union with Zanzibar
1965-67	Defining a Socialist Ideology	Nation-Building	Improvement Approach & Amending Settlement Schemes	Further Politicization	Mass One-Party de jure, Cell System
1967-69	Ujamaa and Self-Reliance	Self-Reliance	Ujamaa Villages	Yet further Politicization (Regional Development Fund Decentralized)	Ideological Party Supreme, Redefined Membership, Purged Leaders

Table 2: continued

Periods of Major Change	Ideology (Expressed or Manifest)	Dominant Mobilizational Concept	Main Rural Development Programs	Administrative Structure	The Political System
1969-71	Ujamaa and Self-Reliance	Self-Reliance	Added Emphasis: Rural Education, Water and Health	Proposals for Civil Service Reform (Partial decentralization)	Added: Office and Factory Party Branches
1971-73	Added: Mwongozo	Mwongozo and Self-Reliance	Added Emphasis: Rural Productivity ("Politics is Agriculture" Policy)	Decentralization (Administrative)	Party Role Enlarged, Leaders Re-examined, Disciplinary Committee
1973-74	SAME	SAME	"Operation Tanzania" Full Rural Collectivization Target, 1976	Decentralization Continues, Capital Shift to Dodoma Begins	SAME

SOURCE: Worked out from Reading, Analysis of Documents and Personal Experience.

approach and the improvement approach--were adopted simultaneously. While the former sought to boost productivity by modernizing selected settlements, the latter sought to improve the general welfare of the peasants through a wide mass extension service, community development action and co-operatives. This was the "African socialism" phase of the ideology (1963-1966).

However, institutional reform lagged behind ideological formulation and slogan changes, with the result that neither the expected high productivity nor correction of the inherited development imbalances was possible. The administrative bureaucracy inherited from the colonial rule remained virtually intact for a decade after independence, despite changes in ideology, rural development programs, mobilizational slogans and even the "political system" (i.e. after the adoption of one-party system in 1965). Apart from the attempts to "politicize" the civil service by (a) appointing some of its members to politico-administrative posts (e.g. Area and Regional Commissioners, 1962 onwards), (b) allowing civil servants to join the Party (1964); and the introduction of partial decentralization of (a) the Regional Development Fund (1968), and (b) the agricultural ministry (1969), the main features of the inherited civil service structure were not changed until the full decentralization of administration which began in 1972, five years after the Arusha Declaration. Apart from the sheer problem of reforming an established institution, there was the further problem that these institu-

tions had a large body of expatriates in the sixties. There was an obvious discrepancy between the unfolding ideology and the orientation of the institutions used to implement it, often resulting in wastages and decisional dilemmas. As we shall illustrate in the following sections, the attempt in 1962 to change the colonial bureaucratic (or "innovator-adopter") approaches to rural development by creating planning committees at the village, district and regional levels in practice failed to produce the desired wide participation.

Furthermore, the improvement approach did not succeed in changing the established tendency of the change agents to concentrate effort and inputs on the progressive farmers, and, as such, could not effect equitable distribution of inputs. The co-operative movement, which the nationalist government expanded to serve as a development and distributive agent, proved to be just as capitalist as the other institutions, serving the interests of the progressive farmers and local notables. Although the discrepancy between the socialist pronouncements of the regime center and the capitalist orientation of the inherited institutions became clear even before the Arusha Declaration, major changes were not attempted; reforms were introduced to gradually make them consonant with the emerging ideology. For instance, reform of the co-operative movement became necessary in 1966 to make the movement more responsive to the needs of the masses. The movement underwent further reforms after the Arusha Declaration, as we shall see later, to make it the basis for ujamaa

production and marketing.) Thus the Tanzanian revolution has been "evolutionary" in the sense that institutional reforms have gradually (and peacefully) been effected to minimize internal contradictions as the ideology acquired clarity; and continuity and change are observable at every stage.

The continuity of institutions and programs from one "model" to another necessitates a semi-historical approach to the analysis of Tanzania's revolution, particularly with regard to its agrarian aspect. For example, although the transformation approach was officially abandoned in 1966, some settlement schemes resulting from that approach have not as yet (i.e. by 1974) been fully transformed into ujamaa communities; nor has the improvement approach completely disappeared, for over 75 percent of the rural population still lives and works outside ujamaa villages. The dilemmas, problems and wastages that inevitably result from the switch from one model to another will become clearer later when we discuss district response and adjustment to the ideological and slogan changes at the center.

Four main factors have contributed to the evolutionary character of Tanzania's Ujamaa ideology, namely (1) continuity of the central leadership, (2) the history of the Party, (3) the democratic basis of the Tanzanian political system, and (4) the nature of the Tanzanian society. As these factors will be discussed again in other chapters, only brief comments will be given here. First, the continuity of a central leadership committed to a socialist goal meant that the

ideology was worked out through experience and "practice" (rather than just "theory") over a long period of time and when it was officially issued as a declaration of intent, much of its contents had already been communicated to the population. The central leadership has been able to time changes in such a way as to avoid "shocks" or abrupt disruption of the new nation's delicate political and economic institutions. Thus, for example, the Arusha Declaration (1967) was preceded by the establishment of one-party system (1965); the Declaration would probably not have survived the factional politics of the early sixties; and no major administrative changes were introduced until five years after the Declaration. In other words, the central leadership has used its good sense of timing of events as a weapon to overcome the system's institutional incapacity to effect a revolution, as it were, with one blow.

Second, the ruling Party (TANU) was a mass nationalist movement whose initial objective was to acquire independence. During the fight for independence (and some years after independence), its central leadership had talked of equality without specifying what, in programmatic and ideological terms, this would mean after independence. As Mwalimu has commented lately, it would have been impolitic to clarify the meaning of such mobilizational slogans as "Uhuru na Kazi" (freedom with work), "Uhuru na Usawa" (freedom with equality), etc., for such clarification would divide the nationalist

movement.⁵ This meant that a socialist program could emerge only gradually after independence and the Party had to find ways to explain and justify it to its supporters. Again, the Party retained its mass character even after the establishment of a one-party system, making it even more difficult to sort out the real supporters of a socialist revolution from opportunists. The full implications of this will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

Third, the Tanzanian political system has already established a unique brand of intra-party democracy, and the popular vote has since 1965 been important not only in bestowing an aura of legitimacy on the leadership but also in deciding whether particular leaders will continue in office. This has inevitably made the leaders cautious in their timing of changes. The problem of using democratic participation as a tool for effecting a rapid rural change will be discussed with some illustrations in Chapter 8. It suffices to state here that democracy is probably more attuned to evolutionary than to revolutionary socialism; and, conversely, Tanzania's democratic traditions have survived because the leadership has opted for the evolutionary path, partly as a result of necessity.

Finally, as we saw in the previous chapter, rural differentiation in Tanzania was of a "non-revolutionary" character. Colonial development policies created clear lines of

⁵See his "Introduction" in Freedom and Socialism.

class formation without creating the classes themselves. Without a rural landless class or an urban proletariat which could be mobilized by the Party as the vanguard of the revolution, it is difficult to give the Party the same "revolutionary" character as that of more orthodox socialist parties. We shall argue in Chapter 5 that, in the Tanzanian case, the Party requires as much effort to control tendencies towards bourgeoisification among the peasants (and workers) as among the members of the elite.

Thus, although the Party remained the chief agent of change at the central level throughout the sixties, other internal forces determined the rate and effectiveness of the change. The forces included (a) the wide variations in the response of the various traditional communities to progressive central initiatives which sought to transform them, and (2) the bourgeoisification of the peasants' co-operative movement (as well as the workers' unions), in direct contradiction to the emerging socialist ideology.

A further source of contradiction was the new nation's inevitable reliance on foreign experts to recommend development programs after independence. Thus, for example, the transformation approach recommended by a World Bank Mission in 1961 was clearly a continuation of the colonial policy of 'selective' development, and within three years it became clear that it conflicted with the emerging ideology. However, the brief experience with the transformation approach provided useful lessons for, as well as accelerated the

formulation of, Ujamaa ideology. The current emphasis on village self-reliance, labor-intensive techniques and peasant participation is largely a result of the lessons learned from this previous approach to rural change which we shall discuss briefly in the following section.

THE TRANSFORMATION APPROACH: A BUREAUCRATIC MODEL OF RURAL CHANGE

At independence (1961), the nationalist government inherited a number of rural development schemes and Tenant Farming Settlements, most of which had been established in the mid-fifties by the British administration in response to nationalist criticism. The schemes were an attempt to accelerate progressive farming among selected individuals under bureaucratically controlled conditions. They had been managed by the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (TAC) formed in 1955 to replace the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC) which had mismanaged the Groundnut Scheme.⁶

By 1961, TAC managed a total of 454,134 acres in its various settlements. Most of the schemes, however, had failed to produce "progressive farmers," many settlers having left the schemes or continued to produce at a lower level than the high cost incurred on them and their holdings. Success had been achieved in only a few highly-paying crop settlements which were closely supervised and managed. The

⁶The Groundnut Scheme had been started in 1948 and abandoned in 1951, having made many losses.

inherited organization (TAC) had itself been in debt every year and had little capacity to manage the schemes effectively.⁷ As institutional reform could only be undertaken gradually, the Three-Year Plan, 1961/62-1963/64, allocated some £506,800 for TAC activities pending its reorganization and the formulation of a wider program of Village Settlement Schemes which was being formulated.⁸ This new program was officially introduced early in 1963, being known as the Transformation Approach.⁹

The concept of "transformation" was seen as differing from that of "improvement" in three main ways. First, it would involve a shift of the selected settlers from their

⁷Only a few schemes had shown signs of progress. For details, see W. P. Cocking and R. P. Ford, "The T.A.C. Farming Settlement Schemes," Tropical Agriculture, Vol. XXXV, No. 2 (April, 1958), pp. 85-100; and Ruthenberg, op. cit., pp. 80-103.

⁸Tanganyika, Development Plan for Tanganyika, 1961/62-1963/64 (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1961), pp. 70-73; see also Presidential Circular No. 5 of October 28, 1964; and Tanganyika Development Corporation (Amendment) Act No. 69 of 1964. In 1963, a new body, Tanganyika Development Corporation (TDC), had been created to handle the promotion of commercial and industrial projects. A merger of TAC and TDC was effected in December, 1964, the new organization being re-named National Development Corporation (NDC), charged with the promotion of agricultural as well as commercial and industrial projects. Further changes in 1965 and 1967 restricted the NDC to industrial and a few commercial concerns.

⁹The program was based partly on (1) the schemes of TAC resulting from the ill-fated Groundnut Scheme; partly on (2) the recommendations of the World Bank; and partly on (3) recommendations of an Israeli agricultural planning advisor. See International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, The Economic Development of Tanganyika (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961); Benjamin Kaplan, "New Settlements and Agricultural Development in Tanganyika" (Beer Sheva, Israel, 1961; mimeographed report); and the First Plan.

traditional environment; second, it would require large sums of money; and third, it would involve new organizational methods and bureaucratic supervision. It was believed that the new environment and the capital and technical inputs would lead to a rapid change in the life styles of the settlers and their agricultural methods. The two approaches would be carried out simultaneously; so that as the former concentrated on achieving higher productivity under modernized conditions; the latter would spread improvement to the greater portion of the population which remained in its traditional setting. Success in the former sector would be imitated in the latter sector; and replication of the successful settlements would be undertaken gradually until all rural communities became 'modern' settlements.¹⁰

In its objectives, the Village Settlement Program was more akin to Ujamaa than to the colonial schemes which sought to achieve political stability by creating a small but financially strong class of progressive farmers. Organizationally, however, the transformation approach did not differ from the colonial bureaucratic (or "innovator-adopter") model. The objectives of the program were stated in development as well as equity terms. Emphasizing the equity side, Mwalimu saw the program as being the only way to provide social services and other amenities of life to the greatest number of the scattered rural population: "Before we can bring any of

¹⁰See the First Plan, Vol. I, p. 33.

the benefits of modern development to the farmers of Tanganyika, the very first step is to make it possible for them to start living in village communities," and therefore:

For the next few years Government will be doing all it can to enable the farmers of Tanganyika to come together in village communities. . . . Unless we do [so] we shall not be able to provide ourselves with the things we need to develop our land and to raise our standard of living. We shall not be able to use tractors; we shall not be able to provide schools . . . build hospitals or have clean drinking water; it will be quite impossible to start village small industries, and instead we shall have to go on depending on the towns for all our requirements; and even if we had a plentiful supply of electric power we would never be able to connect it up to each isolated homestead.¹¹

The development and equity considerations in the above policy statement do not differ from those of Ujamaa. As it will become clear later, however, the program could not have created rural socialism even if it had succeeded in raising rural productivity; for it was basically conceived and organized along capitalist lines. Emphasizing the development side, the settlement planners saw the program simply as a device to effect changes in the socioeconomic conditions of the rural areas so as to make rational development planning possible:

The aim in establishing these pilot settlements is to provide experience in planned resettlement and to introduce improved agricultural techniques as a basis for the eventual transformation of social and economic conditions in rural Tanganyika. As they are established and developed, settlement personnel will be trained and every aspect of rural settlement will be studied and the lessons

¹¹President's Address to the National Assembly, p. 17.

learned and experience gained in them will then gradually be applied throughout the country.¹²

As implementation started, the leaders' enthusiasm for rapid transformation led to the abandonment of the earlier idea of setting up a few pilot schemes for purposes of experimentation and learning, before expansion and replication. Instead, a full-swing resettlement program was advocated. Each settlement would bring together 250 families. Title to land would be held by individuals but farm planning, mechanical cultivation and general services would be organized on co-operative lines. The farming systems would embrace one or two cash crops and livestock together with some subsistence food production. Further, the settlers would be provided with water (pipe), education and health facilities, etc.¹³

The First Plan proposed to launch over sixty such model villages between 1964 and 1969, each costing about £150,000. The planners believed that the experience would "allow considerable acceleration of the process of modernizing Tanganyikan rural production and raising the income levels of farmers . . . to about £150 per annum (per family), as compared with present-day cash income in the traditional environment of £25."¹⁴ By mid-1965, already twenty-three set-

¹²Rural Settlement Commission, Rural Settlement Planning (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1963), p. 2.

¹³The First Plan, Vol. I, p. 33.

¹⁴Ibid.

tlement schemes were in operation.¹⁵ However, the program was facing serious problems and the government was considering ways of modifying it. The problems resulted from (1) organizational conflicts, (2) increasing village dependence on meager government resources, and (3) low settler productivity. As these problems (especially the last two) contributed to the abandonment of the program and adoption of a socialist solution, and do raise questions of crucial importance with regard to the strategies of the current Ujamaa model, we shall examine them briefly below.

Organizational Conflict

At the center, the resettlement machinery consisted of a Rural Settlement Commission and a Rural Settlement Agency, the latter being the executive arm of the former charged with the day-to-day running of the program. The structure and composition of the Commission was such that it became difficult to communicate consistent "messages" to the Agency. It consisted of five Ministers representing different ministerial priorities and emphases, under the chairmanship and coordination of the Second Vice-President. Thus interministerial priority conflicts made it difficult for the Agency to

¹⁵The Rural Settlement Commission started eight new pilot village settlement schemes in 1963, and in the course of 1964 took over seven existing settlement schemes from the former TAC and three small cotton schemes which had been started under the guidance of an Israeli Development Company known as "Agridev."

take quick decisions.¹⁶

Furthermore, the ministerial hierarchies at the center were replicated at the regional, district and sub-district levels, each departmental staff in the field emphasizing the priorities of his own ministry. (This administrative departmentalization, extended to the field while the center retained full decision-making power, was more detrimental to the improvement approach than to the transformation approach, as we shall discuss in the following section.) At the settlements themselves, the schemes were bureaucratically supervised by government managers (in a number of cases, expatriates), making the settlers feel that the projects belonged to the government and that they were hired laborers.¹⁷ Organizationally, then, there was a great deal of continuity with the colonial period.

The administrative structure made it difficult to coordinate the movement and recruitment to the proposed settlements. Thus, when in 1965 the organization of Government was reviewed to meet the requirements of the First Plan, the Government decided to place the responsibility for settlements under one Minister, instead of five. Consequently, on June 30, 1966, the Commission was dissolved and its work was taken over by the Settlement Division of the Ministry of Lands,

¹⁶For a further discussion of this point, see Anthony Rweyemamu, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-179, where organizational conflicts are examined in some detail.

¹⁷Ibid.

Settlement and Water Development. The Government further decided to replace bureaucratism with democratic participation at the settlement level: "The settlers will be encouraged to identify themselves more closely with the schemes by actually participating in making the decisions on how the settlement should be run, with the Divisional staff filling the role of advisers rather than managers."¹⁸

It is clear from the above policy shift that the current emphasis (by Mwongozo and other policy documents) on grass-roots participation is in large part a result of the failure of the bureaucratic/innovator-adopter model of rural transformation. This raises a question of tremendous importance for the Ujamaa model: the conditions under which bureaucratic and participatory approaches are likely to work. It is clear that one condition under which the transformation approach could have worked would be the use of compulsion to ensure harder work and higher productivity of the settlements. The regime was not willing, probably not even capable, to match bureaucratism with coercion. Bureaucratism and persuasion did not seem to get along very well. Thus Ujamaa is experimenting with a different formula--democratic participation with persuasion, hoping to dispense with bureaucratic management and the need for compulsion. As we shall discuss more fully with illustrations in Chapter 8, the main problem with the participatory model ushered by Ujamaa is how to

¹⁸ A. M. Babu, Minister of Lands, Settlement and Water Development, "Development Since the Declaration," The Standard, December 8, 1967.

determine where democracy ends and implementation begins. In other words, how to enforce the implementation of decisions democratically taken by the villagers themselves. The solution of this problem, as we shall argue later, may as well be the determining factor between success or failure of the Ujamaa model.

Village Dependence on State

The second problem was that the transformation model tended to increase rather than decrease the inherited village dependence on the state for subventions. Local initiative-- at the settlement level--did not seem to be coming forth. The policy itself was partly responsible for the increasing village dependence. Heavy capital expenditure had been incurred for roads, land clearing, communal buildings such as schools and hospitals, piped water supplies and housing for the settlers. In addition, each family was given a monthly allowance of thirty shillings during the initial years. The policy was that the Government would meet part of the costs of the infrastructure "free" while the rest would be repaid by the settlers over a generous period of twenty-five years. This financing policy had three main weaknesses.

First, the settlers were saddled with a heavy debt before it was possible to say with certainty that their farming would be sufficiently successful to pay off the debt. Second, the long period given for repayment of loans (twenty-five years) worked against settler productivity; for the

settlers felt no immediate pressure, and did not see the schemes as a method of making them "self-reliant." (Other countries, e.g. Hungary, Yugoslavia, etc., give shorter periods, usually five years, for such loans.) While on this point, we should mention that this government "generosity" has in practice not changed in the Ujamaa era, even though it is centrally repudiated in theory. Third, the overall effect was to increase settler demands for more state subventions and to create a consumptionist rather than a productionist orientation.

It is worth recapitulating what we said in the previous chapter that this orientation was fostered by the colonial rural development policies. Apart from the cash crop and "progressive farmer" areas, the peasants in most areas were not given development loans. They expected the government to extract resources from them--in the form of labor and taxes--and to give them aid for consumption in the frequent cases of famine. Thus peasant-state relations, though lacking legitimacy and punctuated with hostility and protests, tended to be paternalistic.¹⁹ This paternalism increased, rather than decreased, when the nationalists took over, but it was now expressed in lavish subventions for development programs rather than just emergency funds or ad hoc reallocation of wealth to meet the challenges of famine in particular areas.

After three years of operation, there was no evidence

¹⁹We do not, however, imply "benevolence" on the part of the colonial administration.

of positive correlation between the level of assistance given to a settlement and settler productivity; indeed, an inverse relationship was observed:

. . . it was found that on schemes where the settler was given an axe and jembe [hoe] and told to clear the bush and build his house himself, the response was praiseworthy, whereas on the pilot schemes where capital was used to make the lot of the settler easier, the response was disappointing.²⁰

Already in June, 1965, the pessimism of Mwalimu's address to the National Assembly had contrasted sharply with the optimism of his launching address in 1962: "Most of these new settlements are making good progress, but we have learnt a number of lessons from this early experience." In particular, "we intend to reduce the capitalization of these villages." This address seems to have been a transition in Mwalimu's thought, heralding the policy of socialism and self-reliance that was to follow two years later. He observed:

To burden the farm with very heavy debts at the outset and at the same time to make it appear that Government can provide all services is not the best way of promoting activity. In future we shall increasingly help by providing the economic services, leaving the development of the social services in the form of housing, etc., to the initiative and energies of the farmers as their work brings its return. The individual, no less than the nation, must learn the lesson of greater self-reliance.²¹

The above policy statement was reformulated and expressed in more categorical terms in the Arusha Declaration

²⁰ Babu, "Development Since the Declaration."

²¹ "Mwalimu Demands Frugality," The Standard, June 9, 1965.

which sought to modify or put an end to the "dependence syndrome"--village on the state and state on the external environment.²² Thus, whereas failure of foreign capital taught the lesson of 'national' self-reliance, the increasing dependence of the village settlements on meager government funds taught the lesson of 'village' self-reliance, both of which have received great emphasis in the post-Arusha period. As we shall point out later, however, these lessons have not in all cases provided a guide in the implementation of Ujamaa.

Low Settler Productivity

Apart from the problems of bureaucracy, systemic incapacity (or, more accurately, unwillingness) to "coerce," peasants' consumptionist orientation, etc., there was an additional factor contributing to the low productivity of most settlements. The settlements failed to attract "progressive" farmers, although this was the intention as the qualifications demanded of would-be settlers show. Each applicant was required to have, inter alia, (1) farming experience; (2) previous contact with the monetary economy; (3) a feeling for farming as a profession; (4) receptivity to new ideas and methods; and (5) capacity for hard work.²³

Most settlers did not meet the above qualifications.

²²See particularly pp. 8-13 of the Declaration where the meaning of "self-reliance" is discussed.

²³Summarized from a longer list given in John R. Nellis, A Theory of Ideology: The Tanzanian Example (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1972), Chapter 6.

Why? It is worth pursuing this problem a little further because it illustrates the interaction of a "political-choice criterion" and a "rational-choice criterion," on the one hand, and central directives and local response, on the other, in the process of planning and implementing development projects. In practice, the above qualifications (the rational-choice criteria of the managing bureaucracy) were by-passed by the local leadership which handled recruitment (the political-choice criteria). In many areas, the settlements were seen simply as a method of handling or forestalling the political consequences of the growing rural and urban unemployment. In others, recruitment was based on good "political record."²⁴ In a few extreme cases, the settlements were seen as a place to send the "trouble makers," thus negating the nobility of the entire project in the eyes of the peasants.²⁵

Furthermore, there was great uncertainty as to the "ideological" status of the settlements. We tried to show in Chapter 2 that between 1960 and 1966 Tanzania's ideology was as "mixed" as the economy--lying somewhere between capitalism and what Kwalimu Nyerere had in 1962 termed "Ujamaa--the Basis of African Socialism." We argued that the ensuing ideologico-programmatic discrepancy had created uncertainty

²⁴ Although this has been claimed by some interviewees, we lack sufficient evidence to determine its importance in the recruitment process.

²⁵ Unfortunately, in some areas of the country, ujamaa villages were initially viewed in this light.

at the national level and was partly responsible for the system's low capability to attract foreign capital. This discrepancy created uncertainty at the local level as well, and the failure of the transformation approach to attract progressive farmers is the best example.

Although the schemes had been conceived in capitalist (and commercial) terms by the World Bank, they had a "capitalist-socialist" mode of production. Thus, for example, land was individually held while most operations were communal; again, while the settlement managers appealed to the settlers' profit motive, the politicians preached the "equality" and "classlessness" of the traditional African society which Kwalimu had stressed in his 1962 treatise, etc. In other words, although the transformation approach was generally capitalist-oriented, in practice it was unable to offer the full stick and carrot of capitalism to attract progressive farmers. The "carrot" was in fact gradually reduced as it became necessary to emphasize village self-reliance (1965-66) as a result of low settler productivity and failure of external capital.

It must be stressed that the conflict between what we referred to above as political-choice criteria and rational-choice criteria was in many cases a result of genuine desire by the central leadership to achieve rapid development and to bring the "expected" benefits of uhuru to the masses. Yet, the experiences of the transformation model, improvement model (next section) and the early phase of Ujamaa model

(Chapter 7), clearly show the delicate balance between politico-ideological and economic goals in a new nation. Analyzing four African states (including Tanzania) in the mid-sixties, one eminent economist correctly questioned the utility of a strictly rational-choice model in planning for national development in Africa where economic planning is viewed as a means of simultaneously achieving socio-political ends, such as national integration, rewards to supporters, etc.:

Governments are rarely, if ever, interested in economic policy as an end. Economic policy and projects are seen as means to attaining socio-political objectives; for example, the rate of growth and the standard of living of groups to which politicians belong, or from which they derive their support, is of more intrinsic concern to them than the rate of growth of national product.²⁶

In the absence of consistent data on the number of families and size of labor force engaged in the activities of the settlements, it is not possible to assess the actual level of settler productivity or, what would be even more interesting, to compare levels of productivity before and after their transformation into ujamaa communities.²⁷ It is clear, however, that low settler productivity was one of the main

²⁶ Green, op. cit., p. 251.

²⁷ Not all schemes survived the ideological shift. The new Division of Village Settlements had taken over the twenty-three schemes from the Rural Settlement Commission on July 1, 1966. The major function of the Division was to review the economic viability of these schemes, a task which led to nine schemes being run down or handed over to the respective District Councils. Most of the rest have now been converted into ujamaa villages.

reasons for the abandonment of the transformation model.²⁸

Only a few settlements, mainly those specializing in such lucrative cash crops as tobacco, wheat, sugar cane, etc., were able to "take off" before the beginning of the Ujamaa era.²⁹ Effective ending of the transformation approach was announced by the Second Vice-President, Rashidi Kawawa, on

²⁸ That low settler productivity was the main reason for closure of some of the schemes was clearly reflected in the new policy adopted towards the end of 1966 to continue the expansion of the schemes which had done well economically, even though they did not constitute socialist communities. For example, the Urambo Tobacco Settlement Scheme in Tabora was expanded, and new tobacco schemes were started in 1967--e.g. Kaliwa (1966), Ussoke and Ulyankula (1967)--and thereafter along the old lines, despite the Arusha Declaration. The target was to increase the number of farmers in the tobacco schemes from 2,500 in 1967 to about 13,000 in 1971/72, with a corresponding estimated increase of tobacco production from 3 million lbs. in 1967 to about 25 million lbs. by 1971/72. See Babu, "Development Since the Declaration."

²⁹ For example, in the 1966/67 season, tobacco schemes sold about 3,000,000 lbs. which was worth about shs. 5,800,000, with more than 50 percent going to the farmers. In the same season, the Upper Kitete Wheat Scheme handled some 1,000,680 lbs. of wheat valued at shs. 394,000, the net accruing to the farmers being shs. 118,000. The Kilombero Settlement Scheme sold 18,600 tons of sugar cane (at shs. 40/75 per ton), with the farmers receiving about 55 percent of the total earnings. The two cattle schemes--Kongwa and Matongoro--were also doing well in comparison with many others which failed to "take off." Already by 1967 "ujamaaization" had started on these two schemes, with communal herds which included all the male stock, the female stock remaining individually owned. The only initially successful sisal settlement scheme, Kabuku (in Tanga Region), is probably the best illustration of the problem of transforming a formerly semi-capitalist settlement into a socialist community. The scheme began to disintegrate when the Government initiated its transformation into Ujamaa in 1969, leading to the expulsion of twenty-six families in 1971. These families went to Morogoro to found their own ujamaa village, Kidudwe in Turi-ani Division, complaining that the other members at Kabuku were lazy. Interview at Kidudwe, December 20, 1972.

April 4, 1966. The official reasons were explained as follows:

. . . settler-farmers on pilot schemes in general show far less enthusiasm, and [are] less hard-working, than 'settlers' in 'spontaneous' and unassisted schemes. They are also full of complaints and expect Government to give them everything. . . . In future, it has been decided that, instead of establishing highly capitalized schemes and moving people to them, emphasis will be on modernizing existing traditional villages, by injecting capital in order to raise the standard of living of the villagers.³⁰

The future of the settlement schemes already established remained unclear until Mwalimu published his blueprint on "Socialism and Rural Development" towards the end of 1967, after which rural development policy was geared to the creation of ujamaa villages. The existing settlement schemes would be encouraged to transform themselves into socialist communities at the same time as collectivization of the rest of the rural population continued.³¹ In the following section, we shall discuss the improvement model which was given greater emphasis after the abandonment of the transformation model. The improvement model illustrates even more clearly

³⁰ Ministry of Information and Tourism, Press Release, 1 T/1, 302 (Dar es Salaam, Information Services Division, 1966), pp. 3-4. This quote is part of an "Address at the Opening of the Rural Development Planning Seminar at the University College, Dar es Salaam, on Monday, 4 April, 1966."

³¹ In the meantime, however, the Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development would "concentrate on making the existing schemes successful or closing them down if they are unviable. Any new schemes will probably be in the areas where there is already an existing population, and where the people have already shown their enthusiasm for development." See Babu, "Development Since the Declaration." Local initiative was now considered the key to success.

the ineffectiveness of the inherited institutions in peasant mobilization, and the problems of achieving equitable distribution of resources and development inputs by using the bureaucratic instruments of the state or even the peasants' own organizations--such as the co-operative movement--which had been converted into political and economic tools of the progressive farmers and local notables.

THE IMPROVEMENT APPROACH: A MASS EXTENSION MODEL

The new emphasis on "modernizing the existing traditional villages" through mass extension and minimal capital assistance heralded a new direction. This shift in emphasis, however, did not represent a totally new ideology; for the improvement/mass extension approach, based on the "community development" idea, had co-existed side by side with the various transformational attempts since the colonial days. We shall restrict ourselves to the broad features of this approach, to shed some further light on the background to the current Ujamaa approach.

'Community development' in Tanzania was a post-war phenomenon, closely linked with the need to 'contain' the sociopolitical and socioeconomic effects of the Second World War on a colonial population, especially the veterans returning from the war. The British administration set up a social welfare program after the war for the needs of the veterans, leading to the creation of a social development department in

1958. The department became the Community Development Division of the Ministry of Local Government and Housing in September, 1960, after the country had acquired Responsible Government (Madaraka). The Three-Year Development Plan (1961/62-1963/64) allocated £229,195 for community development work, including community development training center; visual aids workshops; field staff; self-help schemes; community centers; field units; film units; and social development teams.³²

The main function of the community development movement was 'mobilization' of the human resource, to make the people amenable to change and innovation. As the Three-Year Plan put it, to "arouse and mobilize the dormant human resource of the nation so as to improve the economic, social and cultural life, and to co-ordinate the efforts of the people themselves with those of central and local government and voluntary agencies."³³ The Community Development Division became one of the main organs serving the "Improvement Approach" recommended by the World Bank Mission in 1961;³⁴ and from 1960 to 1972 (when it was abolished) it was switched from one ministry to another in an attempt to see where it

³²Three-Year Plan, pp. 92-95.

³³Ibid., pp. 94-95.

³⁴International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, "The Economic Development of Tanganyika." Both the transformation and improvement approaches are discussed in this report.

would best fit.³⁵ The First Plan (1964/69) explained the advantages and limitations of the Improvement Approach as follows:

The Government's policy for developing rural production . . . consists in following a two-fold approach in agriculture via the improvement approach and the transformation approach. The former aims at the progressive improvement in present methods of crop and animal husbandry by working on the peasant farmer on both psychological and technical planes to induce an increase in his productivity without any radical changes in traditional social and legal systems. The improvement approach requires continuing, widespread and co-ordinated action by community development staff and extension services to change individual behaviour and to teach technical improvements, and by co-operatives to ameliorate the methods of marketing. Experience has shown that in those regions where this approach, which does not require a massive injection of capital, has been well-organized, continuous growth in rural output has been achieved. However, this approach is not capable of assuring the maintenance of this expansion over the long-term for, by its very nature, it cannot bring about lasting solutions to the two cardinal problems of peasant farming, i.e., land tenure and agricultural under-employment.³⁶

'Self-help' and 'co-operatives' became the mobilizational slogans of the improvement approach, and community development action was to be "by adult education, exhortation and example, to enlighten both men and women on possibilities of attaining a different, higher and more satisfying standard of living."³⁷ This development strategy introduced an ele-

³⁵ Immediately after independence, the Division was removed from the Ministry of Local Government and Housing and joined with the Co-operatives to form a new Ministry of Co-operatives and Community Development. In April, 1964, the Division became part of a new Ministry of Community Development and National Culture; further changes occurred in 1969, and in 1972 it was abolished entirely following administrative decentralization.

³⁶ First Plan, p. 19.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 17.

ment of democracy in local decision-making, for in 1962 Development Committees were created at village, district and regional levels. Politically, it was argued, the committees would perform a local participatory function which was lacking in the colonial period and would make the people feel that they were masters over their own affairs. Economically, consequently, the people could, through self-help projects, be more self-reliant, which would lessen demands on the government. The development committees would draw up plans and participate in the implementation of such plans in their respective areas. A ministerial policy statement explained the new organizational structure as follows:

The essence of the plan . . . is that it is based on autonomous development committees at village level, whose task it is to plan their own village development schemes, in the form of village roads and bridges and wells; village halls, schools, dispensaries or health centres, co-operative stores, communal farms, free nurseries; in short, the immediate improvements which the people want and can undertake with the minimum of outside help.³⁸

This ambitious effort to give "more power to the people," as we shall elaborate later, was partly frustrated by the existing administrative structure which dissipated the effort of the community development movement. (Ten years later, 1972, administrative decentralization was to be introduced with the same slogan.) With the appointment of politico-administrative leaders at the district and regional levels (namely Area and Regional Commissioners) in 1962, it

³⁸Quoted in Anthony Rweyemamu, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

was hoped that there would be a good "co-operation between the Government, the political movement, the civil service and the people." The Vice-President, Mr. Rashidi Kawawa, saw the new organization as introducing a division of labor which would diminish conflict between politicians and bureaucrats: "In this programme, we politicians must provide the spirit and willingness to work and the technicians must provide the know-how."³⁹ The bureaucrats, on their part, saw community development as involving "all methods whereby progress is achieved as a co-ordinated effort of the people, on the one hand, and of the technical services and national aid of Government on the other."⁴⁰

Although at the end of the First Plan the improvement approach through community development action, widespread extension services, self-help projects, and co-operatives had more "successes" attributed to it than the transformation approach, it had revealed a number of weaknesses resulting mainly from the sociopolitical milieu in which it operated. We shall outline the main weaknesses below.

Co-operatives Exploiting Peasants

First, the co-operative movement was becoming a 'burden' on the peasants rather than an instrument for their improvement. Before independence, marketing co-operatives were

³⁹ Ministry of Information, News Review, April, 1962.

⁴⁰ Ministry of Co-operatives and Community Development, "Community Development Policy," August, 1962; mimeographed. Quoted in Anthony Rweyemamu, op. cit., pp. 127-128.

to be found mainly in the cash crop areas which needed protection against the Asian middleman.⁴¹ After independence, the Government campaigned for the establishment of co-operatives all over the country, formed a Co-operative and Development Bank, and created a Co-operative Union of Tanganyika (C.U.T., 1962). Further, the existing Co-operative Societies Ordinance was changed so that the Registrar of Co-operatives could no longer refuse to register a co-operative society. The increased credit facilities (via the Co-operative Bank, etc.) and the removal of registration delays led to the mushrooming of what some bureaucrats have termed "political co-operatives," organized from the top "without genuine local demand or even understanding."⁴²

Thus, for example, co-operative societies which had increased slowly from a mere 62 in 1948 to 857 in 1961, increased to 12,000 by 1964 and 1,933 by 1966. By 1964, co-operative societies were already handling a flow of goods and

⁴¹ A Co-operative Society Ordinance had been passed by the colonial Legislative Council on February 12, 1932. In 1933, the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCOU) was registered, followed by the Bukoba Native Co-operative Union (BNCOU) in 1950, both marketing coffee. Others followed rapidly, e.g. the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions (VFCU) marketing cotton in the Lake Victoria zone, etc. See T. R. Sadler, The Co-operative Movement in Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1961); K. P. Somani, "The Co-operative Way," Spektr, Vol. I, No. 2 (December, 1961); J. F. Moffer, Handbook of Tanganyika (2nd. ed.; Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966), pp. 117-193.

⁴² United Republic of Tanzania, Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into the Co-operatives and Marketing Boards (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1966), p. 9.

services worth more than £25 million a year, and about one full third of the country's foreign exchange earnings came from co-operatives. The aim was that by early seventies all produce which lends itself to co-operative marketing should be in the hands of the co-operative movement.⁴³

The politicians and local notables had used the co-operative movement as an instrument for channeling resources --credit, fertilizers, insecticides, tractors, etc.--to their areas; and by 1964 the Minister concerned was becoming disturbed by the growth of petty co-operatives which he saw "not only toiling in the fields, but also in the shops, the banks, the workshops and the garages," and was inclined to discourage the rate:

Plattered as I am by the constant references both inside and outside this House to the desirability of establishing new co-operatives of every sort and kind, and vastly expanding at great speed the activities of the existing societies, I must make it quite clear that as the Minister responsible I am here to encourage the establishment of successful co-operatives only, and not just a mushroom of hay-wire prestige co-operatives."

Training of personnel had not kept pace with the rate of growth of the movement; corruption had increased; the proliferation of societies and marketing boards was creating a new form of 'middleman'; progressive farmers were benefiting most; the movement was becoming undemocratic; and the peas-

⁴³Hon. J. S. Kasambala, M.P., Minister of Commerce and Co-operatives, "Policy Statement to the Budget Session of the National Assembly," June 26, 1964, p. 13.

⁴⁴Ibid.

ants were losing faith in their leaders. Mr. J. S. Kasambala, Minister of Commerce and Co-operatives, outlined the problem as he saw it in 1964:

Rapid as has been the expansion of our Co-operative Movement since independence, it is only fair to inform the House that less than half of the secretaries of our primary societies have received any co-operative training whatsoever, and quite a number of them have either seen a jail sentence or are still there cooling their castle-building ambitions!⁴⁵

It became necessary for the President to set up a committee of enquiry into the co-operative movement in 1966; and the committee's report listed a number of complaints of the peasants. The complaints included such indignant statements as: "[We are led] to believe that societies have been instituted not for the purpose of protecting us from the exploitation of the former middleman, but to place us under another worse type of middleman under the cloak of co-operative societies, unions and marketing boards" (Para 12); "We complain of the inefficiency of most of the societies' and unions' employees and committeemen . . ." (Para 16); "We further complain of the undemocratic malpractices of societies' and unions' committeemen, who scramble to retain their seats . . ." (Para 17); and finally:

We regret that after having achieved 'Uhuru' in this country we, the farmers, have been deprived of all blessings of 'Uhuru'; our incomes have been dwindling, and what is worse, we are continually being overtaxed. For example, we pay two types of Development Levy: the Local Council Cess and the National Development Levy. Under these circumstances, we feel ourselves to be forgotten.

⁴⁵Ibid.

children, and we can see nothing better than the total ruin of this country and our children in the long run.

(Para 24)

Lastly, whilst we assure the President that we appreciate the desirability of substituting co-operatives for the private traders, so far we strongly object to the way in which this is being done. (Para 25)⁴⁶

Probably the exploitation of the poorer peasants by the committeemen (often local notables and progressive farmers) was greater than government "exploitation" through taxation. However, the Government abolished the produce cess and other rural taxes in 1969. The complaints noted above simply illustrate the problem of ensuring the security of the small farmers within a capitalist setting and by using the bureaucratic instruments of the state which have strong affinity for the progressive farmers.

A number of measures have been taken since the Arusha Declaration to cleanse the co-operative movement. The main ones include (1) acceleration of personnel training, including the building of a modern Co-operative College at Moshi; (2) creation of a single Union for each region, a task completed early 1973; (3) unification of the co-operative service, i.e. by standardising the terms of service and creating a Co-operative Service Commission on similar lines as the Civil Service Commission; (4) governmental scrutiny of societies' and Unions' accounts intensified; (5) greater powers to the Registrar of societies to ensure viability of any society before registration; (6) stipulation that eventually multi-

⁴⁶ Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Enquiry into Co-operative Movement and Marketing Boards, pp. 3-4.

purpose ujamaa villages will replace primary societies; (7) encouragement of societies and unions to engage in production rather than just marketing goods which are produced by individuals or communal farmers; (8) a restructuring of the boards to handle both marketing and production problems of the peasants; and (9) deeper involvement of the Party (TANU) in guiding the affairs of the co-operative movement.⁴⁷

'Self-help'--Conservative, 'Nation-building'--Too Abstract

Second, by mid-sixties, 'self-help' was no longer an effective mobilizational slogan. Self-help schemes in the post-independence period started around 1962 when the Government propagated the idea that communities should be able to rely on their own efforts rather than expect the Government to finance every project that was needed. Economically, Tanganyika had emerged from colonialism as one of the poorest countries in Africa, lacking schools, dispensaries, community centers, and many other essential services. During the campaigns for independence, TANU had blamed these shortages on the colonial administration, and used them, along with the

⁴⁷On April 28, 1972, the Executive Committee of the Co-operative Union of Tanzania (CUT) accepted a proposal by its sub-committee to restructure the CUT to bring it in line with TANU's present policies. See "CUT to Open Gates for More Party Guidance," Sunday News, April 30, 1972, p. 16. The extent to which this reconstruction has taken place and to what effect was not known to this author at the time of writing. With regard to the marketing boards, all the important ones--e.g. those dealing with tea, cotton, tobacco, pyrethrum, etc.--have been constituted into "authorities" to engage in marketing as well as in production and research.

peasant opposition to 'imposed' agricultural regulations, as mobilizational slogans for Uhuru. After independence, TANU constituted the Government, and the people expected the nationalist government to do better than the British administration in the provision of the essential social services. Such expectations were further heightened by pronouncements--such as that of Mwalimu quoted earlier--that more would be achieved within ten years than what had been achieved in more than seventy years of colonial rule. It was in this context of 'rising expectations' that the concept of 'self-help' was elevated to a development ideology.

Although self-help (kujitolea) was officially adopted in 1962 as a strategy of community self-improvement, self-help activities had existed in both colonial and pre-colonial times. During the colonial period, however, the people had little say in the determination of projects; very often instructions came from the top in terms of 'rules.' In some areas, the sanctions for non-compliance were heavy. The colonial administration, in keeping with the prevailing idea of 'Indirect Rule,' chose to leave the mobilizational role to the local authorities and traditional community leaders who had at their disposal age-long social sanctions against non-attendance to communal undertakings. However, the fact that community self-help activities were normally done on a day set aside as "Siku ya Utawala" (or "Administration Day") meant that the activities themselves were thought to belong to the colonial government. Traditional norms of co-operation

in communal undertakings differed widely from community to community. Some communities had a well-established set of rules and sanctions while others had none; and therefore response to self-help schemes even after independence differed greatly from one area to another.⁴⁸

Enthusiasm was high during the first three years of independence, and many projects were undertaken in the urban and rural areas on the basis of self-help. The Ministry of Co-operatives and Community Development was then the chief instrument of mobilization. After the publication of the First Plan in 1964, however, the concept of 'self-help' was replaced by that of 'nation-building.' The former was considered "too narrow, inward-looking and self-centred," while the latter was considered to be "more appropriate for patriotic actions." It was argued that the term 'nation-building' implied "building for the present as well as for the future whereas self-help meant that only the present members should benefit and long-term plans, such as planting trees, would be avoided by those who thought they would not live to enjoy the fruits."⁴⁹ It has been claimed by some ex-Maendeleo (Community Development) staff that the change in mobilizational slogans led to a diminished enthusiasm among the villagers

⁴⁸ We found great variations in different wards of Morogoro. In some cases, response depended on whether the project had been initiated by the people themselves or whether it was imposed upon them by politicians or bureaucrats.

⁴⁹ Interview with Mr. Mwanga, Ujamaa and Co-operative Officer, Morogoro District, December 5, 1972.

because the campaigns for 'nation-building' remained, as one put it, "abstract and distant."⁵⁰

There has been a rapid change in mobilizational slogans in Tanzania since independence--self-help, nation-building, self-reliance, ujamaa, Mwongozo, etc. (Table 2 above). Often these changes, initiated by the central leadership, took local mobilizers unawares and, according to some ex-Maendeleo staff, created confusion because (1) they were not accompanied by the necessary institutional changes, (2) adjustments by both the mobilizers and the mobilized were slow partly because of "uncertainty as to whether a particular slogan was a lasting or a passing phenomenon"; and (3) in some areas, change of mobilizational slogans (which meant also a reorientation of resources and priorities) disappointed mobilizers as well as the mobilized "who had just started to make some progress in a particular direction and were required to undo their effort."⁵¹ The response in the districts to the changes in ideology and mobilizational symbols is illustrated by data from Morogoro District to be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. The Morogoro experience, as we shall point out, does indicate that there is some validity in the above claims.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Interview with Mr. Nsenembo, Regional Ujamaa and Co-operative Officer, Morogoro, October 28, 1972.

Failure of Co-ordination

Third, the community development effort was frustrated by the existing administrative structure. Although community development staff in the districts were supposed to coordinate the activities of all the other developmental departments, this function was often difficult because each departmental officer was directly answerable to his boss in Dar es Salaam. The creation of village (or ward after 1969), district and regional development committees in 1962 was partly an attempt to solve the problem of coordination of the mobilization effort. The committee structure provided a forum in which the officers of the development Ministries; Party officials, Area and Regional Commissioners, M.Ps., Councillors and other representatives of the people could meet together as a planning and implementation team.

In practice, however, "team spirit" was difficult to achieve under the existing administrative structure. Each ministerial official looked to Dar es Salaam for his promotion, instructions and finance for his specific assignment. Moreover, there was no district civil service head to coordinate the activities of the various ministerial officials. The Area and Regional Secretaries (administrative) who in theory were considered the civil service heads in their respective areas had little, if any, control over promotion, demotion or transfer of ministerial staff.⁵² The Area and

⁵²These were the titles of the chief administrative personnel at the district and regional levels, respectively,

Regional Commissioners, whose dual appointment as heads of administration and Party Secretaries in their respective areas could have made them effective coordinators of the development effort, lacked financial control, and consequently could not control the ministerial staff or determine district or regional priorities. Apart from the Regional Development Fund (RDF) established in 1968 and various self-help funds which were controlled locally, all development finance was, until the administrative decentralization of July, 1972, controlled centrally in Dar es Salaam by the various development ministries; and every expenditure by a district or regional ministerial official had to be requested from, and accounted to, the Principal Secretary of the Ministry concerned in Dar es Salaam. Coupled with the critical communication constraints in many Tanzanian districts, this structure made quick decision-making very difficult, and, furthermore, made it impossible to create a "district development front"⁵³ or to undertake "locational planning."⁵⁴ This is one of the

until 1972. From 1973, these titles refer to the Area and Regional Commissioners who are Party Secretaries as well as politico-administrative heads of their respective areas. Their chief administrative assistants are now called District and Regional Development Directors, respectively, following Decentralization of July, 1972.

⁵³For this concept, see "The District Development Front in Tanzania," in Iliffe and Saul, *op. cit.*, pp. 302-328.

⁵⁴For the concept of "locational planning" and its application to Tanzania, see W. L. Luttrell, "Location Planning and Regional Development in Tanzania," in Uchumi Editorial Board, *Towards Socialist Planning* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), pp. 119-148.

problems to which the administrative decentralization started in July, 1972, addressed itself:

The problem is made worse by the fact that, at present, each functional officer is responsible to his own Ministry in Dar es Salaam, so that it is extremely difficult to work out a Regional or District development or problem-solving scheme which calls for co-ordinated action. Thus, for example, if all the different functional officers in a District get together to work out the solution to a particular village problem, each one of them has then to apply to his own Ministry for any little money which may be necessary, or even sometimes for permission to devote his or her own energies to that project. Then if one Ministry refuses permission, the whole scheme can fall to the ground.⁵⁵

The Community Development staff were supposed to perform a mobilizational and coordinative function in this 'departmentalized' administrative structure so as to ensure 'integrated development.' It failed to achieve this goal, and the Community Development Department was abolished in July, 1972, following decentralization. The abandonment of the 'community development' approach is not necessarily a reflection of the inefficiency of the staff of that department, for most of them were absorbed into the new administrative structure; a few were made party functionaries and mobilizers at the regional and district levels, and the more educated ones were posted to various training centers concerned with rural development.⁵⁶

⁵⁵J. K. Nyerere, Decentralization (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1972), p. 1.

⁵⁶Most of the officers, however, assumed responsibilities as district or regional Ujamaa and Co-operative Officers, following the merger of Ujamaa and Co-operative functions into one department.

Apart from the problem created by administrative departmentalization which made it difficult to coordinate the mobilizational effort at the district and subdistrict levels, the community development approach had three other weaknesses. First, the personnel entrusted with community development programs were often young men and women who had just left school. It is these young people who were (and still are) often found 'educating' the old folk at the village level, for the older and more experienced personnel were promoted to administrative posts at the district, regional or national levels. It is rather unfortunate that the Tanzanian revolution has not been able to change the attitude that superior education and experience must qualify one 'out' of the actual scene of action 'into' some bureaucratic post, leaving the least experienced to perform the most critical job.⁵⁷ Apart from inexperience and immaturity, a young person has generally less leadership legitimacy than a maturer person of comparable qualification in most rural communities.⁵⁸

The use of immature school leavers at the village level was partly a result of the critical manpower shortage.

⁵⁷ This is partly because the symbols of prestige, including salary scales, have continued to favor the politico-administrative hierarchy.

⁵⁸ However, the findings of the 1970 election study showed that "gerontocracy" was fast giving way to education as a basis for leadership claim. See Election Study Committee, Socialism and Participation: Tanzania's 1970 National Election (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1974).

especially in the sixties when the 'Africanization' or 'localization' program was rapidly moving people from the districts to the capital. Thus, for example, out of sixty-two Districts of Mainland Tanzania in 1965, only forty-five were able to obtain Community Development Officers; and only 143 assistants could be found to cater for thousands of Tanzanian villages. Some 200 community workers were provided by Local Authorities and voluntary organizations to alleviate the problem of the subdistrict level. However, it became difficult to integrate these workers effectively into the development effort because they had a different orientation, pay, training, etc. from the ministerial assistants. Thus in the sixties it became necessary to absorb them into the government structure after retaining them. With the expansion of secondary and post-secondary education, the manpower situation has greatly improved, but the existing structure of incentive (pay, facilities, etc.) continues to militate against the rural village.⁵⁹

Second, the role of the community development field staff (indeed, that of the agricultural and other field staff as well) was not well defined. As a result, there was often not sufficient focus on any particular program or programs, as community development workers were given "a wide-ranging area of responsibility which dissipates their energies and,

⁵⁹ Apart from the better facilities in towns, officers prefer to be closer to their bosses at the district or regional capital hoping that this will make rapid promotion easier.

in most cases, seems to produce precious little in the way of real development."⁶⁰ The situation was further complicated by the fact that the community development effort was undertaken by a number of uncoordinated agencies, governmental, para-governmental and private, with varying approaches, training programs and terms of service. Thus it became difficult for any single organ to control the movement of staff from one village or district to another, as each agency had its own promotion and transfer schedules. The generally rapid transfer of personnel during the pre-decentralization period disrupted development programs which had to be carried to completion by people who played no part in their initial formulation.

Third, in many areas, it became difficult to accommodate the local initiatives resulting from the heavy campaigns for 'self-help' into the government plan. Thus one finds a number of cases where classrooms and dispensaries had been built on self-help basis while staffing had not been provided for in the plan. Other examples include roads which ended at a river because those concerned with building bridges had not been consulted and therefore had no plans to build bridges in those particular areas. In other areas, facilities built on self-help basis (e.g. the community center) were not used for the purpose for which they were built, thus weakening the initial enthusiasm of the villagers. The best example is

⁶⁰Griffiths L. Cunningham, "Education for Rural Development," in Resnick, op. cit., p. 184.

probably the community centers which in some areas were converted into bars instead of being used as 'multi-purpose' educational centers, which was the official aim.

Fourth, in most districts, targets for completion of projects (or even definition of what constituted "completion") were either not set or, where they were set, were hardly observed. Thus, for instance, community development reports for Morogoro District for the period 1962 to 1972 are full of conflicting statements with regard to the state of the various projects undertaken in the district. For example, a number of projects reported "completed" one month are again reported "uncompleted" a month or several months (in a few cases, several years) later by a different officer. Such conflicting (often late) information makes it very difficult for the center (district, regional or national) to take the necessary action at the right time.⁶¹

While being a reflection of the pre-decentralization structure and rapid transfer of personnel, unsystematic reporting is partly an inheritance from the colonial administration. For the monthly and annual reports by field personnel were geared more to the need to ensure that these often unsupervised workers did "something" than to assist in efficient monitoring of particular development programs. Thus reports became yet another technique of 'public administra-

⁶¹ Morogoro Region, Annual Reports, 1962-1972.

tion.⁶² Decentralization has introduced a new, management-oriented system of reporting, target setting and monitoring of development programs at the district level.⁶³

Finally, literacy campaigns took a very substantial part of the working time of the various agencies concerned with community development. Achievement of a mere 'literacy' by the rural population was considered an important step towards development. However, literacy as an end in itself made little sense to a poor peasant interested in improving his material well-being. It was difficult to link campaigns for literacy with the various programs geared to the achievement of empirical material needs. Writing in the year of the Arusha Declaration (1967), Griffiths Cunningham put his finger squarely on the problem, and was able to predict a policy change in favor of 'integrated mobilization' rather than inter-agency competition, a policy ushered by administrative decentralization five years later:

A programme of rural development which might produce better results would be one which appealed more to the peasants' self-interest by focusing its attention on an incomes-increasing policy, and, therefore, on economic development through agricultural change. What may be worth considering is a joint campaign method, whereby

⁶² For a useful examination of this point in the context of agricultural administration, see Jon R. Morris, "Administrative Authority and the Problem of Effective Agricultural Administration in East Africa," The African Review, Vol. II, No. 1 (June, 1972), pp. 165-178.

⁶³ Planning and management manuals were issued to all regional and district officers, and seminars have continued to be held on how to "manage" rather than just "administer" rural change.

community development workers and agricultural extension workers co-operate in the promotion of rural development, but in which the principal focus of the campaign is put in economic, rather than social, terms. This would mean that community development workers would need to learn basic agricultural techniques and agricultural extension workers would need to become more aware of social problems and perhaps more expert in extension techniques. In the long run, community development workers and agricultural extension staff might disappear as separate entities and in their place we would simply have a rural development organizer.⁶⁴

In theory, at least, decentralization of administration (see Appendices A and B) has solved the problem of dissipated energies through inter-agency competition; for at present the activities of district and regional functional officers are coordinated by a District Development Director (DDD) and Regional Development Director (RDD), respectively, and these officers are able to work as development teams as well as 'argue out' their differences within the elaborate committee structure extending from the village to the regional level. Thus a joint campaign method is now possible.

The question whether the campaigns are put in economic or socio-ideological terms, however, has been a controversial one during the Ujamaa era. On the one hand, national self-reliance depends on village self-reliance through the use of local materials rather than continued village dependence on state subventions. Thus the official policy after the Arusha Declaration has emphasized mobilization based more on ideological appeals than on the peasants' economic self-interest. On the other hand, however, the technocrats and local politi-

⁶⁴Cunningham, op. cit., p. 184.

cians have often been tempted to put more emphasis on material inputs than on ideological inputs; and, as we shall see later, response to Ujamaa so far has clearly shown that the peasants care more about campaigns which are closely related to their immediate material needs than those which promise a future of plenty and tranquility.

Assessment of Community Development Action

The precise achievements of the community development campaigns are difficult to assess because most of them had no immediate material correlates. Among the campaigns with immediate material correlates were those carried out by Bibi Maendeleo (the women Community Development field staff) regarding different and innovative ways of improving the dietary content of the villagers, making garments for the children, baskets and other simple things which make life for the rural housewife and her family more comfortable. Even this excellent effort, however, was marred by the great emphasis in the sixties placed on imported foodstuffs or such food items as eggs, fish, etc., which most peasant communities could not afford, ignoring some of the traditional dishes which could be used in innovative ways. This emphasis changed in the late sixties and the seventies have seen Swahili publications on the better use of traditional and locally available food items.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ See, for example, Mary-Catherine Materba, Mapishi ya Kikwetu (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972).

It was difficult, even for the central leadership, to appreciate the contribution of the community development movement which concentrated on the psychological level, attempting to effect attitudinal change through education, exhortation and example. Often, credit for successful projects went to the Ministries which could show evidence of performance in terms of so many dams or village roads completed or so many coffee acres sprayed with insecticide, etc. Playing the role of a post-mortem judge of his own Ministry, a former Maendeleo staff has summarized the problem of the improvement model as follows:

The success of the 'Improvement Approach' depended heavily on the ability of the Community Development Division, in co-operation with the Party and other agencies of change, to effect a significant change in the attitudes of the peasants. This meant that our role, apart from campaigns in village meetings, radio, papers, etc., was to co-ordinate the activities of the other departments concerned with development, such as Agriculture, Water, Veterinary, Education, Health, etc., so as to achieve integrated development. . . . Failure of proper co-ordination was not our mistake, but the mistake of the administrative structure in which we operated. Every officer went his own way.

Neither the Party, nor ourselves, not even the Area and Regional Commissioners could control their activities . . . so that the Water Department, for example, could start building a dam without consulting the Agricultural Department which might want to use the dam for fish or irrigation purposes, in addition to the provision of clean water to the villagers. . . . We tried our best to co-ordinate these activities with the assistance of the Party, the Area and Regional Commissioners . . . but all credit went to the ministries which could show evidence of performance. . . . For example, a successful acre of cotton, coffee or maize earned the Agricultural Department some credit; our initial role in mobilizing the peasants to use fertilizers and to accept innovation could hardly be measured, although it was, and still is, important.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Summary of interview with Mr. Nsenembo, Regional Ujamaa and Co-operative Officer, Morogoro, October 28, 1972.

Failure of Demonstration

Fourth, "demonstration" was one of the techniques used by the improvement approach. The technique involved selection of certain farmers in the villages who were encouraged (and given material assistance) to use modern methods of farming, especially in the cash crop areas. This technique had been introduced by the colonial administration in the forties and continued to be applied throughout the fifties. The theory behind it, namely that peasants were more likely to adopt innovation upon demonstration of its superior results, was probably correct,⁶⁷ but the implementation of the theory had a number of weaknesses.

First, attempts were made to use farms of community 'opinion leaders' and traditional leaders for demonstration purposes. The theoretical underpinnings of the attempt derived mainly from the stress in rural sociology on "the importance of informal channels of communication and on the importance of the use of influential persons in putting a message across."⁶⁸ These leaders were then expected to use their influence to make the rest of their communities adopt innovation. The approach failed to produce any tangible results in the areas where it was applied. In some tradition-

⁶⁷For a useful discussion of various theories advanced by the colonial administration as well as nationalist leaders and academics, see P. L. Raikes, "Differentiation and Progressive Farmer Policies" (unpublished Seminar Paper, University of Dar es Salaam, 1972), esp. pp. 5-13.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 6.

bound communities, the people did not want to 'compete' with their leaders; in others, the opinion leaders minimized campaigns in fear of such competition. A Masai example illustrates the selfish attitude of some of the so-called 'opinion leaders.'

To gain acceptance for the Komolonik Group Ranching Association under the Masailand Range Management Program, extension officers worked through the well-respected community leaders, wealthy elderly men. The approach had initial successes; but when the method of taxing the members for the resources supplied (e.g. piped water) was discussed, the opinion leaders insisted on a flat rate for every member, irrespective of herd size. They rejected graduated taxation which would demand more from them, for some of them had hundreds of cattle. Besides the unfairness of their proposal to the younger men who owned only a few animals, the proposal would in practice fail the entire program.⁶⁹ Monetization of the economy has led to the erosion and commercialization of tradition itself, so that it is hardly a coincidence that the "rain-makers" of the Luguru (Morogoro) or the Iraqw (Mbulu), etc. have amassed much personal wealth.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ See ibid. for details.

⁷⁰ The Luguru leader, Kingalu, is still respected by his people despite the fact that he has been stripped of the formal administrative and political functions. In the Mbulu case, Raikes observes that the ritually dominant clans, particularly the rain-making clans, "are by far the largest cattle owners among the Iraqw and . . . they are well represented among the large commercial wheat producers of the area" (ibid., p. 8).

Second, in many cash crop areas, demonstration plots and much of the available extension service and credit were concentrated on the farms of 'progressive farmers.' The argument was--and remained until the Arusha Declaration--that progressive farmers were more likely to adopt innovation, for they were closer to information agents (bureaucrats, radios, papers, etc.) and could financially afford the necessary inputs to carry the experiment through. Often, however, the poorer peasants either paid little attention to the demonstration plots or associated success with the wealth of the owners. After all, the farms of the progressive farmers had always been better kept than those of the poorer peasants. Moreover, the extension staff had always preferred to deal with the progressive farmers, a bias which has continued even in the post-Arusha era, according to two recent surveys.⁷¹

In other areas, the farms of Agricultural Instructors (usually local men residing within the community) were converted into demonstration plots. One negative consequence of this was that some Instructors used this as a way of becoming progressive farmers themselves, concentrating more on their farms than on "demonstration" work.⁷²

⁷¹See R. U. Saylor, "An Opinion Survey of Ewana Shambas in Tanzania" (Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, 1970, mimeographed), and H. V. E. Thoden Van Velzen, "Staff, Kulak and Peasant," in L. R. Cliffe, J. S. Coleman and M. R. Doorbos (eds.), Political Penetration in East Africa (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1974).

⁷²In Morogoro District, for example, many of the demonstration plots in the fifties belonged to Agricultural Instructors, and some interviewees attributed failure of 'demonstration' to this fact.

Third, in some areas, demonstration results disproved the experts, having produced inferior output to that attained using traditional methods. This was partly due to the fact that the demonstration work was often entrusted to the little-qualified Instructors who could not use the modern inputs in accordance with soil and climatic requirements of their areas. In some cases, for example, tractorization was used where the traditional hoe would have done less damage to the 'humus' content. In other cases, as in the Uluguru Mountains of Morogoro, new systems of ridging and terracing failed to achieve higher yields; and when they were enforced authoritatively on all peasants, a strong peasant opposition was the result.⁷³

Demonstration on private farms has been abandoned in the Ujamaa era. Besides the ministerial demonstration farms maintained by the Ministry of Agriculture in many districts, the ujamaa village itself is used as a demonstration farm. In many districts, the extension staff (agricultural assistants, ujamaa and co-operative assistants, etc.) are already residing in ujamaa villages where they can demonstrate, in a more organized framework, through participation in communal activities of the villages. They still represent an element of "bureaucracy" however, because they are government employees depending on their salary, rather than 'members' of any particular ujamaa village. The extension service faces a

⁷³For the Luguru case, see Young and Fosbrook, *op. cit.*, esp. Chapters 1 and 2.

dilemma with regard to services to the non-Ujamaa sections which constitute (by mid-1974) more than 75 percent of the rural population. Although the official policy has been, since mid-1971, to give priority to ujamaa villages and other co-operative undertakings, there has been no explicit statement as to whether or not requests from non-Ujamaa members should be entertained.⁷⁴

Further, state farms have been introduced to serve three purposes--production, cadre training and model for Ujamaa. The first objective would achieve the production targets formerly attributed to plantations, estates, progressive farmers and large-scale, mechanized settler schemes: "Certain agricultural products for which growth is required and which benefit from mechanization and/or large-scale irrigation, from organized innovation, and from centralized management of large-scale operation will be produced effectively on state farms." The Second Plan envisaged over 250,000 acres of new state farms during the Plan period (1969-1974), wheat (ten farms), rice (four farms), wine (one), dairy (two), ranches (nine), oilseeds (one), and coconut (two farms). "The farms," furthermore, "can serve as an important centre of training in two senses," namely (1) "The Government Agricultural service; in the past almost exclusively advis-

⁷⁴The situation may change if the 1976 target for full rural collectivization is achieved. In areas like Kilimanjaro and Bukoba, only a negligible portion of the population lives in ujamaa villages. In such areas, the extension is still oriented toward private individuals.

ory, will now gain direct experience in productive activity. This experience will provide an effective training for those who will in the future be responsible for providing extension and supervisory services outside the state farm system. The development of a cadre with experience in the problems of farm management is therefore one important objective of the state farm program"; (2) "The state farms will also serve as a model, introducing innovation in crops and techniques which can be taken up by Ujamaa groups in the surrounding areas, and provide certain services such as workshop and transport facilities. The state farms provide an opportunity for the support for Ujamaa activities."⁷⁵

Even though the use of community opinion leaders (as "tradition breakers") has been discontinued in the Ujamaa era, the use of specifically trained "political cadres" has not yet been constituted into a program, although training has begun at Naumbé Institute of Development Management (IDM), the Party's Ideological College at Kivukoni, and in the various Farmers Training Centres around the country. However, as we shall argue in Chapter 6, the creation of an effective mobilizational cadre under the Party--which now appears more necessary than ever before--will require the Party to transform itself in certain important ways.

⁷⁵The Second Plan, pp. 30-31.

CONCLUSION

This chapter went into considerable historical details in describing the two pre-Arusha models of rural change for two main reasons. First, we want to emphasize that Ujamaa was more a result of experience with actual programs of change than of an academic or any orthodox theory of socialist transformation. In brief, it evolved from practice under a socialistically-inclined leadership. As we shall discuss in the next chapter, this partly accounts for Mwalimu's own "anti-theory" (especially Marxist theory) stance. The two main goals of Ujamaa--rapid development and equity--were not really introduced by the Arusha Declaration; they had been affirmed by the central leadership since the early sixties. Evolution to socialism in the pre-Arusha period, however, was seen as involving what Mwalimu had called "attitude of mind"--a recapturing of the socialist or communalist sentiments of the traditional African society, without necessarily changing the organizational structures. Practice (1961-1966) showed clearly that a socialist attitude of mind could not emerge from the inherited capitalist institutions, and that the resulting contradictions would ultimately negate the regime's dual goals of rapid development and equity.

Second, we have attempted to indicate the seriousness with which the Tanzanian leadership viewed its role as the 'change agent' and the need to overcome the country's underdevelopment. This concern is clearly reflected in the rapid

succession of "options" (Table 2 above), often with little time to evaluate rejected models. In our attempt to examine why certain models were abandoned, we have tended to emphasize problems; we should therefore emphasize here that these models produced some successes in some areas. The heavy mobilization effort in the first development decade produced tangible development results, even though falling short of expectations or contradicting some of the ethical goals of the leadership. There was marked growth in agricultural output, health and educational facilities, for example. As we shall argue in Chapter 7, however, productivity per unit factor input remained very low, and this is one of the main challenges facing the Uiamaa model in the seventies. In the following chapter, we shall discuss in more theoretical terms the strategies and options available to the Uiamaa model in overcoming the problems outlined in this and the previous chapters.

Chapter 5

ECLECTIC SOCIALISM: A REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE

Most intellectuals in modernizing societies come from bourgeois groups . . . but they reject the competitive instrumentalism of the differentiated system. Hence, it is the intellectuals who become the carriers of consummatory values and represent revolutionary innovation. Their ideologies, all-embracing to be sure, are particularly designed to link them to lower groups. . . .

Embourgeoisement is a populist phenomenon associated with upward mobility. Radicalization, in contrast, is an elite phenomenon, or a "revolution from above," in which the revolutionary seeks support from below.

-- David E. Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 65, 105.

Owing to the close historical association of socialism with the complex body of theory generally known as 'Marxism,' there has been a tendency to view all leftist movements as being somehow 'Marxist.' This creates conceptual as well as practical problems when dealing with an eclectic, intellectual "revolution from above," such as Tanzania's Ujamaa. Yet a distinction must be made between Marxism as a methodology or science of social analysis and Marxism as a set of findings, conclusions or prescriptions. While the methodological aspects can be universalized--i.e. by posing the same or similar questions for every society--the conclusions cannot. Thus a strictly 'Marxist' socialist revolution would be un-

thinkable in a country like Tanzania where the forces and relations of production are still in their embryonic stage; for a Marxist revolution feeds upon "class struggle."

One of the most important differences between socialist revolutions based on orthodox Marxism and that envisaged by Mwalimu's ideology of Ujamaa is that, whereas the former depend on the revolutionary consciousness of the workers (and peasants) resulting from excessive exploitation and alienation, the latter has thus far been a result of rational planning by a ruling, intellectual elite which denounces its own class privileges.

Politically, the degree to which the elite can forego its material privileges, rather than worker/peasant consciousness, becomes the immediate problem of equity. Strategically, it is the ruling elite which must take initiative to introduce equity measures and to equip the workers and peasants with revolutionary enthusiasm; this is what we mean by "revolution from above."

Given Tanzania's situation of economic underdevelopment, which implies also underdeveloped forces and relations of production, a socialist revolution becomes as much a method of improving productivity as a method of building an egalitarian society and protecting the nation against external exploitation. The nationalization measures that started in 1967 are only a minute aspect of the task of national reconstruction that lies ahead; for Tanzania had only little to nationalize, as we have indicated in the previous chapters.

Thus, developmentally, the degree of efficacy achieved in planning, in the implementation of development programs, and the ability of the Government to devise effective incentives, are among the most urgent questions which can as well determine success or failure of Ujamaa revolution.

Methodically, Ujamaa is eclectic rather than doctrinaire.¹ This eclecticism gives the leadership a large "political space" in the choice of methods and in its interaction with external systems and ideologies. It lends the political system flexibility in dealing with the ideological blocks, thereby making it possible to maintain a kind of ideological non-alignment or ideological self-reliance. In other words, there seems to be ideological as well as practical-political reasons for maintaining flexibility.²

In Chapter 4, we identified the colonial instrumentalism, particularly as expressed in bureaucratic organization, and the traditional or local systems as the main 'conditioning' factors interacting with the national ideology which was emerging from above. In this chapter, we shall attempt to specify more clearly the internal factors to which Ujamaa has been responding in its various stages of evolution. In the

¹ Mwalimu's distaste for doctrinaire socialism is clearly expressed in his Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism; see also his arguments against the doctrinaire position taken by the Marxists in the "Introduction" to his Freedom and Socialism, especially pp. 1-30.

² As we pointed out in Chapter 2, 'Western' and 'Eastern' advisers have continued to co-exist in high government circles.

first section, we shall present a non-conventional classification of actors under Tanzania-type situation, emphasizing the ideological (or normative-behavioral) variables more than the socioeconomic variables. In the second section, we shall give a justification for such an approach under Tanzania's situation of immature stratification and poverty. The strategies used by the center at various stages of Ujamaa evolution to counter the three potential "counter-ideologies" discussed in the first section, parochialism, bourgeoisification and tradition, will be discussed with examples in the following chapter.

THREE POTENTIAL COUNTER-IDEOLOGICAL FORCES

The first problem is how to classify the actors in the system. The conventional classifications of the members of the society into broad sociopolitical categories such as "elites" and "masses" or into economic categories such as "lower," "middle," "upper" classes, or in occupational categories such as "workers" and "peasants," etc., are not very useful for our purpose. Such classifications tend to emphasize structural (in socioeconomic sense) variables, often saying little about normative and behavioral variables. Moreover, these latter variables are often assumed to result from the former.³

³Marx's idea of "substructure" and "superstructure" is an example.

We require a classification which indicates normative and behavioral attributes in addition to the structural variables. Such a classification is presented in Table 3 below. We intend to use this scheme in discussing the factors shaping the evolution of the Tanzanian ideology from the sixties to the seventies, and to indicate the implications of the resulting "compromises" for the process of modernization and pattern of resource allocation.

The classification into four "social groups," namely elites, modernists, traditionalists and parochialists, does not (1) necessarily correspond to economic ranking, or (2) necessarily imply intra-group cohesion. These are multibonded categories distinguished by structural as well as normative and behavioral variables, and without implying that one set of variables is necessarily more determinative than the others. However, for a revolution from above under circumstances such as those of Tanzania, the latter set of variables may be more important--at least initially--in influencing the rate and direction of the revolution. Our main concern here is to view these multi-bonded social categories as possible sources of "counter-ideologies," three of which are parochialism, bourgeoisification and tradition. To avoid terminological confusion, we shall give a brief explanation of these terms and the contents of Table 3.

Parochialism as a Counter-ideology

The category of "parochialists" includes all those

Table 3

DIFFERENTIATION ACCORDING TO ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATION, LEVEL OF POLITICAL INFORMATION, IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION AND BEHAVIORAL TENDENCIES--AT INDEPENDENCE AND THEREAFTER

Social Group	Structural Variables		Normative Variables		Behavioral Variables
	Affiliation	Level of Political Information	Value-Orientations (Ideology)		
Elite	Modern organizations--Party, Governmental, Associational	High (H)	Bourgeois Values (Individualist orientation; instrumental emphasis) (B)		Basic Motivation Rationalistic maximization of material income, power and social status. (Bourgeoisification)
Modernists	Modern organizations and traditional/local social systems	Medium (M)	Bourgeois and traditional values (dual orientation). (D)		Seeking income, power and status to "look like" the elite. (Bourgeoisification)
Traditionalists	Traditional social systems	Low (L)	Traditional Values (Communist/Collectivist orientation) (T)		Maximization of the security offered by the traditional systems
Parochialists	Local/factional/sectarian systems or organizations	Depends (H, M, or L)	Depends (B, D, or T)		Maximization of the security and opportunities offered by the local, sectarian or factional organizations.

groups which emphasize sectional interests--whether they are localist, factional, or sectarian in nature; and whose organizations have an exclusively defined membership. The members may have high, medium or low political information, i.e. information that leads (or is capable of leading) to demands on the state;⁴ they may have the same normative and behavioral characteristics as those attributed to any of the other categories. In political terms, such groups may represent a real problem of national integration.

Parochialism may take the form of "subnationalism" (if localist), or a counter-ideology (if factional or sectarian), and in either case claims for allocation are presented in "interest" terms because, like tradition, parochialism can be a strong force in welding its members together. The worst demand, from the central leadership's point of view, is undoubtedly that of secession.

Although the problem of parochialism--in the form of tribalism, racialism, factional political parties, etc.--has been of a much less magnitude in Tanzania than in most other African countries, it will become clear from our discussion in the next chapter that this is so partly because the central leadership feared it from the beginning, and the first phase of Ujamaa evolution addressed itself primarily to this problem. Moreover, the Party itself became a "mass" movement

⁴Here we are following a definition given by Nellis, op. cit., pp. 42-52, and Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, pp. 105-127.

by aggregating a number of local organizations which were, narrowly oriented towards their own localities. This fact makes TANU a mass movement with "confederation" characteristics, making it difficult for it to transform itself into a vanguard mobilizational organization.⁵ The implications of this will be elaborated later.

Bourgeoisification as a Counter-ideology

Bourgeoisification is a particular response to modernization among the members of the elite as well as non-elite persons in search of "modern" (as opposed to "traditional") values and styles of life. The non-elite "modernists" may include workers of various ranks as well as peasants who have come into contact with the monetary economy. Insofar as the "desire" for modern values in new nations, but especially in ex-colonial ones, precedes the actual achievement of these values, the "modernists" need not be restricted to particular economic groups. Thus, some relatively poor workers or peasants who came under the influence of the colonial instrumentalism may be just as prone to the process of bourgeoisification as the members of the urban elite who inherited governmental roles after independence. Professor Apter's definition of his concept of embourgeoisement approximates the response with which we are concerned here:

⁵For a detailed examination of this point, see Henry Bienen, Tanzania--Party Transformation and Economic Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), and Lionel Cliffe, "Tanzania--Socialist Transformation and Party Development," in Cliffe and Saul (eds.), op. cit., pp. 266-276.

The preoccupation with occupation, mobility, short-term coalitions, and consumption creates a frame for the response we call embourgeoisement.

Embourgeoisement is an important aspect of modernization for more than stylistic reasons, however. It has the effect of exaggerating the consumption function without correspondingly affecting the production function. It occurs as classes become multibonded (based on a variety of criteria), as group boundaries become increasingly fluid, and as fixed identifications or loyalties are replaced by competitive group affiliations—that is, when society is divided not by powerful antagonistic classes but by competitive interests.⁶

In an ex-colonial country, like Tanzania, embourgeoisement has an additional characteristic: it is based on values which continue to tie the country with metropolitan sources of consumption goods; often, modernization itself is associated with "Westernization," and hence the elite tendency to imitate the consumption pattern of metropolitan elites. Uncontrolled, therefore, this particular response may perpetuate indefinitely the inherited dependency. It is in this sense that bourgeoisification among local elites and other groups of modernists may act as a counter-ideology to Ujamaa which places emphasis on self-reliance. Furthermore, the response may also lead to "bureaucratism, opportunism and corruption, to efforts to provide for family, friends and associates," etc. Even if this "does not necessarily imply irresponsibility," as Apter argues,⁷ it nevertheless implies perpetuation of privilege among a few well-placed individuals who use the bureaucratic organs of the state to stifle any

⁶Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, pp. 61-62.

⁷Ibid.

revolutionary activity from below. Moreover, the response has a "demonstration effect" on the non-elite groups who come to associate modernization with the elite style of life.

In the case of Tanzania, formal education has been the main source of elite status, as it has been documented by various analysts.⁸ Given the colonial orientation of the inherited educational system, it is quite legitimate to use the level of educational attainment as a predictor of value orientation. In other words, embourgeoisement among the Tanzanian elite is in great part a product of the colonial instrumentalism as embodied in the educational system. Apart from providing education to only a few individuals, the system encouraged individualism and social inequality, emphasized white-collar jobs and induced subservient attitudes on the part of the colonial population:

. . . the educational system introduced into Tanzania by the colonialists was modelled on the British system, but with even heavier emphasis on subservient attitudes and on white-collar skills. Inevitably, too, it was based on the assumptions of a colonialist and capitalist society. It emphasized and encouraged the individualistic instincts of mankind, instead of his cooperative instincts. It led to the possession of individual material wealth being the major criterion of social merit and worth.

This meant that colonial education induced attitudes of human inequality, and in practice underpinned the domination of the weak by the strong, especially in the economic field.⁹

⁸ See particularly Helge Kjekshus, "The Elected Elite: A Social Profile of Candidates in the 1970 Parliamentary Election" (Seminar Paper, The University of Dar es Salaam, 1973, mimeographed); and R. H. Sabot, "Education, Income Distribution and Rates of Urban Migration in Tanzania" (ERB Seminar Paper, The University of Dar es Salaam, 1972).

⁹ Nyerere, Education for Self-Reliance, p. 3.

The possible outcomes of such inheritance were stated by Amilcar Cabral: "The petty bourgeoisie can either ally itself with imperialism and the reactionary strata in its own country to try and preserve itself as a petty bourgeoisie or ally itself with the workers and peasants who must themselves take power."¹⁰ Tanzania's central leadership has opted for the latter alternative. However, as we shall elaborate in the next section, the socialist consciousness of the Tanzanian workers and peasants cannot be taken for granted. Those who can be called "modernists," i.e. those who are no longer tightly held by the inertia of tradition, are still at the embourgeoisement stage, searching for upward mobility within the existing system; the radicalization stage is still far away.¹¹ It is therefore not clear when they can effectively use the power which has already been given to them from above by Mwongozo, decentralization, avenues of electoral participation, and other initiatives of the progressive central leadership.

The distribution of the modernists in the rural areas, and therefore the pattern of embourgeoisement, is in large part a product of the colonial rural development policies we examined in Chapter 3. Thus embourgeoisement should be greater in the areas which responded to the cash economy than

¹⁰ Amilcar Cabral, Revolution in Guinea (New York, 1970), see particularly the chapter on "Brief Analysis of the Social Structure in Guinea."

¹¹ For the concept of "radicalization," see Apter, Choice and the Politics of Allocation, pp. 68-71.

in those which remained outside it. Moreover, there was a big correlation between the level of monetization of the economy and the number of schools in different areas of the country during the colonial days, a gap which will take a long time to correct.¹² Furthermore, response to Ujamaa in the rural areas reveals a striking correlation between educational and cash crop indices and the number of ujamaa villages in an area, with greater response being in the poorer areas. (See statistics in Chapter 8.)

However, insofar as campaigns for modernity in the pre-Arusha period were based largely on the norms of the colonial instrumentalism, it is still possible to have poor peasants who are "bourgeois" in desire and who may respond to the opportunities opened up by Ujamaa--e.g. lavish government subventions to ujamaa villages, etc.--in a manner characteristic of the embourgeoisement response described above, emphasizing the consumption function more than the production function. As we saw in the previous chapter, this kind of emphasis was one of the factors which doomed the transformation approach; the challenge to the Ujamaa model is to change it. The importance of changing this behavioral orientation among the peasants will be clarified by the case studies which we shall present in other chapters.

Most members of the non-elite modernists have a dual

¹² Thus, for example, most of the members of the bureaucratic elite in Tanzania come from three cash crop areas, Kilimanjaro (the Chagga), Bukoba (the Bahaya) and Mbeya (the Nyakyusa).

orientation, maintaining a grounding in the traditional systems and values while at the same time seeking modern values. This is particularly true of the Tanzanian workers, for example, many of whom have retained their farms in the rural and peri-urban areas and continue, by way of regular visits to the countryside, to renew their kinship connections while working in the urban settings. This has been a necessary strategy for some workers who cannot depend solely on the security offered by their urban employment, especially those who can only find seasonal or temporary labor. The tendency to maintain a dual orientation--which was also encouraged by the colonial development policies as we saw earlier--delays the evolution of an "uprooted" urban proletariat, although it should be emphasized that the orientation itself is a result of the absence of the economic factors which create a proletariat--rural or urban.

This dual orientation, moreover, has significant, but often "hidden," counter-ideological consequences when embodied in political roles at the local level. Norman Miller has written on the political survival of traditional leadership among the Nyaswezi of Tanzania, and observed that: "This form of leadership is basically syncretistic, a leadership pattern among chiefs and headmen which is a synthesis and reconciliation of the opposing forces of traditionalism and modernism. The result is a form of leadership which is neither modern nor traditional but an incorporation of both. The process is one of accommodation and compromise. It is a reconciliation

of demands from (a) the traditional, custom-bound elements of rural society, and (b) the modernising bureaucratic groups made up of local administrative and political party leaders."¹³ Traditional chieftaincy was abolished in 1963, but partly because of manpower problems, and partly because of the "reconciliation" approach of the central leadership and respect for some aspects of tradition, traditional leaders found jobs in bureaucratic organs of the state, within the Party, and in various local organizations, such as the Cell and development committees.

By the time of independence, traditional leadership, especially in cash crop areas, had already been secularized, accepting the norms of the colonial instrumentalism, including the commercialization of land as well as the mystical "powers" such as "rain-making," etc. Thus it is possible for such leaders to make use of their dual legitimacy--from tradition and their role in modern organizations--to advance their embourgeoisement goal, as the case of the Masai elders we quoted in the previous chapter suggests. We shall have a further word on this when we discuss tradition (or traditionalism) as a possible counter-ideology to Ujamaa.

On the other hand, embourgeoisement among the members of the governing elite finds expression in bureaucratic or political roles at higher levels--regional or national. Even after the adoption of the policy of socialism and self-

¹³Norman N. Miller, "The Political Survival of Traditional Leadership," in Cliffe and Saul, op. cit., p. 145.

reliance, the bureaucratic elite has retained a high degree of discretion in deciding what projects should receive priority. Moreover, as we pointed out in Chapter 2, external influences in the form of management contracts, advisory services, etc., have increased rather than decreased after nationalization, and the Party has lacked a well-trained cadre to ensure full compliance with national priorities in the economic organs of the state. Thus the possibility of the bureaucratic elite distorting, "with impunity," the priorities of the central leadership of the Party does exist. For example, in some cases, as Malcom Segall has described the preference for grandiose health facilities in the urban centers, the local elite wanted to "compete" with metropolitan elites by siting relatively glamorous projects in the urban areas where they can easily be seen by visiting foreigners:

The urban elite also wants to feel on a par with the bourgeoisie of the capitalist world, with whom they identify. They reasonably want to demonstrate national "achievements," but these are seen in terms of prestige buildings and other material accoutrements of "modern medicine"; such interpretation is truly "bourgeois." A socialist achievement in health would be the maximum well-being of the mass of the people; this would be something to show the world. The demand of the urban elite, their bourgeois nationalism and neo-colonialism are the main determinants of the current health policy of the country.¹⁴

If embourgeoisement at the national level is sometimes hidden in 'nationalistic' explanations given by the elite

¹⁴Malcolm Segall, "The Politics of Health in Tanzania," in Uchumi Editorial Board, Towards Socialist Planning, p. 159.

which is qualified (by the modern educational criteria) to act as the intermediary between the society and external systems, in some local settings it is hidden in 'traditionalistic' claims of the local leaders, some of whom are qualified by traditional legitimacy to act as the intermediary between the bureaucratic elite and the masses in their areas. The point we are making is that both tradition and nationalism may be used to shield embourgeoisement of the elite and local "modernists" in the process of modernization. Furthermore, the economic "dependency syndrome" we described in the previous chapters--i.e. the village on the state and the state on the external systems--is replicated on the ideological plane, with the non-elite modernists imitating the local elite and the local elite imitating metropolitan elites. The ideology of Ujamaa is opposed to both "syndromes."

Tradition as a Possible Counter-ideology

Tradition, or "traditionalism," can act as a counter-ideology to Ujamaa in two ways. The first is in the manner we briefly described above and which we shall elaborate here, namely the possibility of being used by some leaders as a cloak for their bourgeois practices. Second, traditional inertia may set a constraint on the rate of development envisaged by the central leadership.

The 'traditionalists'¹⁵--as an analytical category or

¹⁵We are concerned here with those who are under the forces of traditional inertia; not with those who see some aspects of tradition as being compatible with modernization,

as a concrete social group in Tanzania's remote villages-- contrast with the 'modernists' in several important respects. First, they largely remained outside the influence of the colonial instrumentalism. Second, they have continued to remain under the inertia of tradition. Third, they are generally to be found in remote villages which are difficult to 'penetrate' because of communication problems and have remained without substantial monetary activity. Fourth, consequently, they have low level of politically-relevant information (i.e. information leading to allocation demands on the state system which remains "distant" and, in a few areas at least, almost "external" to their traditional systems).¹⁶ Furthermore, the level of embourgeoisement in such communities would be very low or absent; and maximization of the security offered by the traditional system (collectivist in organization) becomes more attractive than a venture into the modern sectors where roles are too complex and demand trained

as Mwalimu Nyerere tries to use the "spirit" or "attitude" of co-operation attributed to the traditional society to advance modern goals. See the next chapter.

¹⁶This point should not be overstated, however, because the Party, through its cell system established in 1964, has made much effort to penetrate remote villages which never saw a colonial administrator. Yet, even up to now, there are still villages which are relatively unpenetrated, politically, ideologically or administratively. In some cases, the local party leadership--e.g. the Cell Leader, etc.--has been as ignorant about what is taking place at the center as the people it leads; for the local leadership is largely untrained.

skills which cannot be acquired in these communities.¹⁷

Perpetuation of tradition in such communities may act as a powerful constraint on modernization. As we shall show in the next chapter, however, Nyerere presents ujamaa ideology in traditionalist terms partly in order to give the ideology "traditional legitimation" which will in turn abolish the dysfunctional elements in local traditions. In the meantime, implementation of central development programs in such areas will continue to be compromised by traditional inertia, and some local "modernists" may take advantage of the situation to advance their course. For it is precisely in the areas still dominated by the norms of tradition where the syncretistic political behavior described by Miller can take full effect:

A key characteristic of syncretistic political behaviour is constant change. The political system is one in which values and guides for action come from two competing sub-systems--a fluid situation, which allows a great deal of personal jousting and bargaining on the part of the traditional leaders. The individual leader can respond to a peasant in one way on a given topic and answer a bureaucratic administrator on the same topic in another manner. This phenomenon promotes the speaking to two worlds in different tongues, a duality of response. For the villager, the situation is often in flux. New syncretistic guidelines, principles, and practices are mixed and are not fully understood. The leader himself is un-

¹⁷ when it is remembered that by 1974 about 50 percent of Tanzania's school-age children can still not find a school, it will be seen that the points being made here are not theoretical procrastination. Furthermore, the distribution of the schools is still biased in favor of the cash crop areas despite much effort to correct the imbalance. For the distribution and the effort to correct the imbalance, see the Second Plan, Vols. I, II and III.

predictable; he will often vacillate between extremes of what is traditional and what is modern.¹⁸

This duality of response necessarily delays the achievement of polity-society congruence which requires effective penetration of the state system into the local systems--institutionally and normatively or ideologically. Whether this "penetration" can be achieved by the current method of persuasion, education and exhortation (which is, incidentally, the same strategy used by the improvement model), or whether the center will have to resort to coercive means, is an important question which we shall examine closely in Chapter 8.


Counter-Ideologies: A Summary

What we have described so far is a situation of competitive ideologies (or potential for them), some having a direct link with the colonial instrumentalism as it found expression in development projects, in the educational system and in continued interaction between local elites (and modernists) and the neo-colonial network after independence. The net result of these experiences was a particular response to modernization which we have referred to as bourgeoisification (or embourgeoisement, as Apter calls it). This response does act as a counter-ideology of significant consequences, as we have attempted to show, and as we shall further elaborate in the next chapter.

¹⁸ Miller, op. cit., p. 145.

The other two potential counter-ideologies are traditionalism and parochialism. Traditionalism is a kind of 'static' or inward-looking ideology; it waits to be acted upon, but its response may have a determinative effect on the rate of modernization, efficiency and productivity, especially in the rural areas. Parochialism has to a large extent been neutralized, but it influenced both the Party and Ujamaa approaches in the early stages, as we shall see; and it is still possible for it to reassert itself if the existing integrative factors--including the figure of Mwalimu Nyerere--disappear without suitable substitutes or before the norms ushered by the socialist ideology have been fully institutionalized. Hence, Ujamaa can be seen as acting on, and being acted upon by, three (potential) counter-ideological forces--enbourageisement, traditionalism and parochialism. These forces could be shown diagrammatically as in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: THE POTENTIAL COUNTER-IDEOLOGIES TO UJAMAA



Only a few remarks need be made on the relationship of the contents of Figure 2 which presents in diagrammatical form what we have been describing in long paragraphs. Under the existing circumstances, the progressive element(s) in the central leadership is faced with a number of potential challenges, some of which it must avoid while the others could be converted into advantages.

Those which must be avoided include (1) mobilization which bourgeoisifies those still under traditional inertia; (2) the tendency (already occurring) of the modernists and elites to imitate metropolitan elites or elites of neighboring countries, or to ally themselves (e.g. skilled workers with managers or bureaucrats with progressive farmers) against the interests of the broad masses of the population; (3) a possible tendency to "resurrect" the bureaucratic transformation model by over-subsidizing villages or "over-supervising" them; these tendencies may result from a genuine desire to accelerate modernization, but the result may be to encourage enbourgeoisement among the villagers as well as to perpetuate village dependency on the state. We shall give some examples in the following chapters.

On the advantage side, the progressive center can (1) attempt to use "traditional appeals" (or "traditional legitimation") to transform the majority who are still relatively uncontaminated by enbourgeoisement; (2) use existing parochial interests or organizations (e.g. various religious sects and their organizations) to further national interests; (3)

take advantage of the legitimacy that has already been established between the center (Mwalimu in particular) and the villages to establish direct links of political communication, thus weakening the influences of competitive local elites who might mislead the masses in their areas. These, and similar strategies, have already been tried in Tanzania, as we shall see in the next chapter.

INTELLECTUAL MESSIANISM AND "CLASS" COLLABORATION

We have deliberately avoided the concept of "class struggle" in examining the dynamics of the Tanzanian situation, preferring, instead, to express potential contradictions in terms of ideological (or normative-behavioral) variables appertaining to three multi-banded social categories. This does not mean absence of struggle; it is the kind and manner of that struggle which is in question. Furthermore, identification of the key participants in that struggle is itself problematic under Tanzania's present circumstances. To view this struggle as simply involving workers and peasants against some internal (and external) exploiters and oppressors would be to over-exaggerate the socialist consciousness of the Tanzanian workers and peasants. The truth is that Tanzania's struggle for socialism is much more complex than the orthodox "class struggle" model would imply; it is a situation of "multi-frontal struggle," against internal as well as external obstructions; against some members of the

elite as well as against some members of the workers and the peasantry; it is as much a struggle for development as for socialism, etc. Under such circumstances, it is not always clear as to who should struggle against whom; for the widespread poverty and multiple (often primordial) relations among actors blur the conventional lines of class confrontation.¹⁹

Immature Class Situation

Frantz Fanon, who to some extent followed a Marxist methodology, hoped that African peasants would rise against the new middle class (the "national bourgeoisie") as income differentials increased, and that this would lead to a socialist struggle.²⁰ Income differentials between the rural dwellers and the urban elites have increased substantially in Africa during the past two decades, but there is little evidence of such struggle.

The "classes" that have been emerging in Africa have been multibanded, involving educational, ethnic and familial factors, as Irright and Saul have well described them: "the general absence of population pressure on the land and the relatively unrevolutionized nature of traditional rural economic systems--family centered with many communal constraints

¹⁹ This creates a big dilemma for the progressive center, as we shall elaborate below and in the next chapter.

²⁰ Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1966).

upon the full play of individualism--mean that the range of pressures characteristic of either full-fledged feudal or capitalistic exploitation are much less in evidence," and therefore:

. . . class contradictions in independent Africa are less dramatic than in . . . many areas of the underdeveloped world. Moreover, they are blurred by racial, ethnic, and nationalist dimensions which hamper the development of subjective conditions favorable to radical change. The development of a rural proletariat and of an urban lumpenproletariat will steadily restructure this situation, but for some time to come class antagonisms are unlikely to contribute in a determined way to the internal dynamics of independent Africa. This very underdevelopment of revolutionary social forces further underscore the potentially important contribution both of intellectuals, who might play the role of generalizing protest and raising it to a level of significant revolutionary praxis, and of disciplined political movements which can over time turn discontent into a drive for radical change.²¹

Where the struggle has not been nationalistic--i.e. struggle against external exploiters or rulers--it has followed parochial or ethnic and religious lines rather than "class" lines in any Marxist sense. This point has been well stated by Benot who has commented in connection with President Sekou Toure's constant references to "class struggle":

Because of the importance of the subsistence economy and of self-sufficiency, because of the importance of social structures marked by residual communalism and parochialism, because, too, of the fact that [in Africa] the same complex of gerontocratic and familial traditions and customs encompass the exploited and the exploiters alike (who are, so to speak, often relatives), because of all these things the class struggle of which Sekou Toure

²¹ Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul, Essays on the Political Economy of Africa (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 61-84.

speaks does not manifest itself within present-day African society as an internal conflict (affrontement interne) but as a conflict with the state, which remains a far-off abstraction, unconnected with felt experience--a conflict with which everyone can eventually identify himself in some vague way.²²

These general comments apply even more concretely to the Tanzanian case, for a number of reasons. First, Tanzania is one of the world's poorest countries. Second, as a result of the selective nature of colonial projects and the unsuitability of many rural areas for the cash crops chosen by the colonial administration, Tanzania emerged into independence as one of the African countries least penetrated by the monetary or capitalist system. Third, for a variety of reasons (elaborated later), a "consensual culture" has emerged in Tanzania, making it very difficult to distinguish genuine revolutionaries from opportunists. Fourth, given these factors and the close kinship connection between the present generation of urban elites and the rural peasantry, it is quite possible to perpetuate capitalism without much "struggle" on the part of the exploited "classes." Thus, stating his wide and long experience with the Tanzanian masses, President Nyerere has expressed his personal belief that the members who did not become the immediate beneficiary of the fruits of independence could still continue to support the government for traditional and sociopolitical reasons:

The perpetuation of capitalism, and its expansion to include Africans, will be accepted by the masses who took

²²Quoted in ibid., pp. 82-83. Emphasis in original.

part in the independence struggle. They may take the new wealth of their leaders as natural and even good--for a time they may even take a reflected pride in it. This may go on for a long period if the economic circumstances of the country allow a simultaneous lightening of the general poverty--or even if the conditions of the masses remain static. This public acceptance of African capitalism will be obtained because the people have learnt to trust their nationalist leaders, and will wish to honour them. Also there will inevitably be new jobs and opportunities for a good number of the most active, vocal and intelligent of those who might have led criticism. And on top of that, there will be an end to stupidities like interference with traditional African customs by a foreign Government. But, sooner or later, the people will lose their enthusiasm and will look upon the independence Government as simply another new ruler which they should avoid as much as possible. Provided it has been possible to avoid any fundamental upset in their traditional economic and social conditions, they will then sink back into apathy--until next time someone is able to convince them that their own effort can lead to an improvement in their own lives!²³

Where, as in Tanzania, the central leadership appears to be genuinely interested in improving the lot of the masses, the traditional inertia among the rural masses becomes an exceedingly important variable, thus emphasizing mobilization as the main task of the revolution. Yet mobilization may lead to demands based on parochial tendencies. Fanon stated this problem very well: "what can be dangerous is when [the African-people] reach the stage of consciousness before the stage of nationalism. If this happens, we find in underdeveloped countries fierce demands for social justice which paradoxically are allied with often primitive tribalism."²⁴ This has not been a formidable problem in Tanzania although

²³ Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 29.

²⁴ Quoted in Arrighi and Saul, op. cit., p. 83.

the potential for it exists.

Intellectual Messianism

As we have indicated, the Tanzanian revolution can initially depend neither on "peasant messianism" nor on "proletarian messianism," but on "intellectual messianism"; it is the elite which is initially responsible for mobilizing the masses--peasants and workers. This situation creates several dilemmas and challenges for the leadership.

The first challenge is that of generating a large enough body of socialist intellectuals within the ranks of the governing elite to be able to give correct interpretation--theoretical and practical--of the Tanzanian situation and how Mwalimu's socialist ideals can be translated into action in the various social settings of the country. So far, most of Tanzania's achievements on the ideological and policy side seem to be mainly a result of the efforts of one man, Mwalimu Nyerere. This is dangerous in two ways. First, it wears out one scarce resource through overwork. Second, and even more important, it may make revolutionary continuity beyond the public life of current leadership difficult. Indeed, Tanzania has now reached a stage where commitment alone is no longer sufficient; there is an urgent need for a committed and knowledgeable elite-cadre. Probably Amilcar Cabral was correct when he commented in connection with the African Revolution:

The crisis of the African revolution . . . is not a crisis of growth, but a crisis of knowledge. In too many

cases the struggle for liberation and our own plans for the future are not only without a theoretical base, but are also more or less cut off from the concrete situation in which we are working.²⁵

Issa Shivji has stated the problem in the specific context of Tanzania. He views the Tanzanian revolution as a revolution without a comprehensive sociological theory of transformation. This situation, he argues, has meant that Ujamaa practice is inevitably based on the 'subjective' conditions of personalities rather than the 'objective' material conditions, resulting in contradictions which may be harmful to the revolution:

The present situation in Tanzania appears to be both confusing and confounding. This is made doubly so because hitherto no attempt has been made to do a scientific analysis of the socioeconomic formation in Tanzania. The vacuum resulting from the lack of a theoretical analysis of the total situation has given rise to the dangerous phenomenon of finding a substitute in platitudes, phrase-mongering or chanting of hollow slogans. Important decisions and judgements, even among progressive circles, are beginning to be founded on day to day happening of incidences and events. The psychology, attitudes and utterances of personalities are increasingly replacing concrete, objective material conditions as a yardstick for assessing particular actions. Long-time perspective has receded into the background. Instead, individual predilections and description of superficial phenomena have come to dominate the discussions of the revolutionaries. Appearances pass as reality while proper analysis of reality is met with ignorant contempt or condemned as 'doctrinaire.' Subjectivism is on the verge of triumph.²⁶

The problems raised by Shivji are in part a result of

²⁵Quoted in R. Ledia, "Social Classes and Political Struggle," International Socialist Journal, No. 4 (1967), and in Arrighi and Saul, op. cit., p. 311.

²⁶Shivji, op. cit., p. (1).

the manner in which Ujamaa ideology (as well as the Party) evolved. As we shall elaborate in the next chapter, Ujamaa was not a product of a sociological theory but a commitment to ideals which were gradually given a programmatic content as opportunity arose. And, furthermore, it did not emphasize class conflict but class collaboration. The reasons for this should be clear from our discussion so far--Tanzania's "objective" material conditions could only support an eclectic revolution from above under circumstances of mass poverty and immobilism, on the one hand, and superficial consensus among the elites, on the other.

Given this origin and the problem of determining who is genuinely committed to socialism and who is not, it is little wonder that the central leadership of the Party has clearly shown a strong "distaste" for the kind of militancy which advocates struggle based on theoretical (and "pure") classes which cannot be clearly defined in practice. Such militancy seems to have gone unrewarded, and often denied the organizational basis which could give it the opportunity to express itself.²⁷ The central leadership has preferred to be

²⁷ Such militancy has begun to come from a small group consisting mainly of students, some members of TANU Youth League and TANU Study Group and a few bureaucrats in the national media. They really do not constitute a "group" as such because they have often lacked an organizational base and an independent platform. Furthermore, the more "leftist" have not always fared too well. A few examples can be mentioned with regard to the center's effort to discredit "ultra-left-ism." First, some radical movements have been banned; examples include the banning of the University Student African Revolutionary Front and a student theoretical journal, Cheche (or Spark), in 1969. Second, some "radicals" in the mass media have either been dropped (e.g. the contro-

eclectic in method without sacrificing the principles of Ujamaa socialism, relying more on lessons learned from actual practice than on an academic theory of socialist revolution. It is therefore clear that the emerging intellectual revolutionaries can only contribute effectively if they work within the eclectic premises of Ujamaa.²⁸ These premises will be elaborated in the next chapter.

This eclectic approach, however, though necessitated by the existing circumstances, creates a number of conceptual and practical problems, as Shivji correctly points out: (1) "It fosters illusions and clouds ideological clarity"; (2) "even among progressives, moods alternate between cheerfulness and disappointment depending on what was the headline in the morning newspaper or how this or that dignitary reacted or behaved regarding particular issue"; (3) "without a clear

versial Phillip Cchieng, 1973) or given alternative assignments.

Of course, it may as well be that there were other reasons for such action. Similarly, it is not clear whether the dropping of A. M. Babu from his ministerial position in 1972 had something to do with his alleged commitment to formal Marxism or whether it was connected with the conspiracies in Sanzitar which led to the assassination of the First Vice-President Karume. It is difficult to say because several other ministers and junior ministers, some of whom were clearly "rightists," were dropped at the same time.

²⁸ Most of these revolutionary intellectuals have not analyzed the works of Marx and Engels directly, but indirectly through the growing literature on "development of underdevelopment," especially the works of such people as Andre Gunder Frank, Celso Furtado and James Petran on Latin American experience; Frantz Fanon, Samir Amin, Jean Suret-Canale, Amilcar Cabral, Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, Giovanni Arrighi, John Saul, and Walter Rodney, to mention only a few, on Black African experience; and the more Orthodox works of the founders of the "New Left," such as Baran and Sweezy.

class analysis, it is impossible to chart out a correct strategy and formulate appropriate tactics"; and, more important still, (4) "it is impossible to make correct alliances." Shivji then poses a vital question: "How can we talk about a 'Tanzanian Revolution' without even knowing the friends and the enemies of such a revolution?"²⁹

Undoubtedly, the questions raised by Shivji require immediate attention if Ujamaa is to advance to a higher stage. However, we shall argue that any answers based on a rigid, "doctrinaire" position can only mean a "revolution within a revolution." For Ujamaa has already established its own evolutionary logic from the early sixties. We argued in the previous chapter that it is the choice of this evolutionary path which made it possible to experiment, so far successfully, with democratic socialist transformation. It is the Incremental nature of Ujamaa which has stabilized the democracy-socialism equation; and the choice of this strategy was as much a matter of circumstantial necessity as it was a product of Nyerere's personal convictions. This point will be further clarified in the next chapter.

This is not to suggest the chosen path has no weaknesses or problems. In actual fact, at the present stage of Ujamaa, the questions posed above are of extreme urgency. It is clear, for example, that those foreign interests affected by the nationalization measures of 1967 could not be used as

²⁹ Shivji, op. cit., p. (1).

managers and advisers of the corporations which took over their firms without giving rise to the problems and contradictions with which Shivji is concerned. It is also important that a distinction has been made between the contradictions in this sector and the less obvious contradictions in the rural sector.³⁰

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. (ii)-(iii), states:

The fundamental contradictions in the Tanzanian society are not to be found in the rural peasantry (including the big farmers) but in the content and nature of the relationship of Tanzania's economy with the international capital. In my opinion, it is a mistaken over-emphasis (especially on the part of those who come with fixed ideas about classes and appear to see classes everywhere, so long as they can count a handful of farmers owning two landrovers or a tractor) to focus attention on rural stratification out of all proportion to its role in the context of the Tanzanian economy as a whole. It is, to say the least, misleading to begin talking about "capitalism" in Iringa and Kilimanjaro and present them as fundamental, antagonistic contradictions. . . .

The important question within this context is: "Who controls Tanzania's economy?" For it is that class which controls the economy—the nerve centre of a society—who in the final analysis will be a decisive factor against socialist struggle. . . . The farmers of Iringa and Kilimanjaro do not control Tanzania's economy as a whole. If they are important at all, it is because they may be allied with the economic bureaucracy which in turn is allied with the international bourgeoisie. We may plan victories over rural capitalism and/or take militant political decisions; but these would ultimately mean nothing if our economy remains the appendage of imperialism.

Our own view of the problem with regard to the rural sector is that the relatively wealthy farmers will present a problem (already evident in the pattern of response to the call for ujamaa villages) not only because they have "something to lose" but also because they have been more exposed to the values of the colonial instrumentalism.

THE PROBLEM OF PARTY-WORKER-PEASANT COALITION

We asserted in the first section that the non-elite "modernists," whether peasants or workers, (1) had (at least until the Arusha Declaration) accepted the norms of the colonial instrumentalism which were also embodied in the post-independence development programs and the administrative institutions which continued with only small changes, and (2) were seeking personal income, power and status to "look like" the elite. They may therefore verbally welcome the progressive initiatives of the central leadership insofar as these promise immediate material improvement in their lives--higher wages, more government credit and subsidies to farmers, etc. --but in practice they may ally themselves with the bourgeois sections of the elite in opposing a change of the system per se. This is not theoretical procrastination; there is sufficient evidence of such behavior in Tanzania's brief history of socialism as well as from experiences in other countries. We shall give a few examples to illustrate this problem.

There is an implicit assumption in Marxism that the lower classes want a socialist revolution because they "have nothing to lose but their chains." The Tanzanian workers and peasants, like the elite, had expectations, if nothing else, to lose. The awareness of these groups had been, until the Declaration, a product of the same "political information" which led to embourgeoisement among the members of the emerging local elite. As such, they had been conditioned to

aspire for the same values that set the elite apart from them, and for private property which was a symbol of dignity and respectability during the colonial days. The anticolonial movement was not a movement against colonial values, but a movement seeking to domesticate these values.

Further, the relatively smooth transfer of power in Tanzania (without "prison graduates" or violent uprisings) meant that the independence struggle, as Saul has put it, "was too easily equated with the taking over of established bureaucratic institutions, TANU's formal control in the last instance being considered sufficient guarantee of the reliability of these institutions," and "such an institutional inheritance tended to allow for a mere Africanization of the bureaucratic style of work, the conventional criteria of relevance, the elitist mentality, ingrained in colonial structures."³¹ Mwalimu has himself emphasized the point that anti-capitalism in the post-independence period will not as readily attract popular support as did the anti-colonial campaigns:

Everyone wants to be free, and the task of a nationalist is simply to rouse the people to a confidence in their own power of protest. But to build the real freedom which socialism represents is a very different thing. It demands a positive understanding and positive actions, not simply a rejection of colonialism and a willingness to cooperate in noncooperation. And the anticolonial

³¹ John S. Saul, "Socialism in One Country: Tanzania," in Arrighi and Saul, op. cit., pp. 267-268.

struggle will almost certainly have intensified the difficulties.³²

Immediately after independence, even some years before, rumors spread all over the country that the shops owned by the Asians and other migrant traders would be confiscated and distributed free to the workers and the emerging class of petty African traders. This possibility of quick personal enrichissement was also discussed by peasants in connection with Asian- and European-owned plantations and estates. Often, these interpretations of Uhuru (highly materialistic) resulted from the promises of the middle-level and local leadership of the nationalist movement during the mobilization for independence. As a matter of political prudence, as we mentioned earlier, every member of the movement was left to interpret the meaning of Uhuru in his own way.

The many strikes of the workers that followed after independence, and the demands for immediate 'Africanization' of posts (not necessarily of the institutions themselves), showed clearly the close association of independence with material pay-off. In most cases, the strikes were initiated by the elites who stood to gain most from the demand for rapid Africanization; thus there was co-operation between the workers and the elites against the "moderate" approach of the central leadership.³³

³²Nyerere, see "Introduction" to Freedom and Socialism, in particular, the section he calls "On the Problem of Building Socialism in an Ex-Colonial Country."

³³For a discussion of the clashes between the workers' movement and the Party in this period, see Lal Patel, "The

These demands appeared "radical" in nationalistic terms, but not in any socialist sense, as the post-Arusha experience has shown. In this period, it is the center which took initiative to equip the workers with Mwongozo and participation programs not only to help them to achieve their narrow economic interests but, even more important, to raise their socialist consciousness and to challenge the bureaucratic model inherited from colonial rule. One outcome of this was to weaken the pre-Arusha tendency of bureaucratic elites to use the many "voices" of the workers to entrench their own privileges; but this did not immediately lead to progressive responses from the workers. The increasing number of illegal strikes (often called "laying down tools") in the post-Mwongozo era were in many cases conceived in narrow economic interests of the workers rather than in terms of boosting the overall efficiency of a socialist economy.³⁴

Nor could the socialist consciousness of the peasantry be taken for granted either. Most of those who could be

Relationship between TANU, Government and the Workers' Movement after Independence" (Seminar Paper, Faculty of Law, The University of Dar es Salaam, 1971, mimeographed).

³⁴ Some of these strikes, however, were clearly against managers who had failed to comply with the new norms of participation, and the central leadership did not hesitate to discipline them. In a number of cases, on the other hand, the workers simply wanted to remove efficient managers who demanded too much work from them. In a few cases, although our evidence is slim here, the workers' strikes resulted from inter-elite competition, e.g. the Chairman of a Board or Corporation seeking to replace the manager, either himself or by a candidate of his choice, etc.

called 'modernists' are still on the embourgeoisement stage, rather than radicalization stage. At this stage, the colonial instrumentalism is accepted, and in the more 'modernized' rural areas commercialization of traditional values in exchange for modern goods and services is considered a positive sign. Thus, for example, the land which was traditionally communally-owned and only rarely "sold," has in such areas become a regular market commodity, and Mwalimu saw the creation of Ujamaa villages as a way of forestalling an eventual proletarianization:

. . . as land becomes scarce we shall find ourselves with a farmers' class and a labourers' class. . . . The latter will become a "rural proletariat" depending on the decisions of others for their existence, and subject in consequence to all the subservience, social and economic inequality, and insecurity, which such a position involves.

The present trend is away from extended family production and social unity, and towards the development of a class system in the rural areas. It is this kind of development which would be inconsistent with the growth of a socialist Tanzania.³⁵

It is significant to note in the last sentence of the above statement that Mwalimu views the Tanzanian revolution in terms of "forestalling" tendencies which might in future structure quite a different kind of revolution. On the other hand, however, the pattern of response to the call for ujamaa villages seems to suggest that the colonial instrumentalism had penetrated deeper into the rural society than the tabula rasa image we have described would suggest. Response in the initial stages showed that the peasants were more interested

³⁵ Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 344, 346.

in either (1) acquiring the good land formerly held by European settlers or African progressive farmers (as at Ismani) for their own individual use, or (2) acquiring the government financial, technical and social aid that was often promised them, than the basic Ujamaa idea of communal ownership and tilling of such land, or the sharing of joint production on egalitarian basis.³⁶

Such tendencies are, of course, not restricted to the Tanzanian workers and peasants alone. They can be found in all societies where enclaves of capitalism and feudalism have existed. For instance, commenting in connection with the peasants of Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Bernstein stated: "To by far the greatest number of them, the socialization of agricultural production cannot be much more than empty words. Their ideal is in the meanwhile to get their own land."³⁷ (Incidentally, it should be noted that Bernstein's idea of "evolutionary socialism," as a reaction to the Marxian idea of "revolutionary socialism," has a great deal in common with Nyerere's idea of democratic socialism represented by the Ujamaa ideology; and the southern part of Germany was at this time dominated by agriculture as much of Tanzania is today.)

The best available modern example to illustrate the

³⁶ These points will be elaborated in the Morogoro case studies presented in Chapters 7, and 8.49.

³⁷ Eduard Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1909), p. 107.

problem of creating a revolutionary regime-worker-peasant coalition in a country which has undergone some degree of mental embourgeoisement was undoubtedly Chile under the leadership of the late socialist President Allende (1970-1973). The workers and peasants who stood to gain most from the change from a highly paternalistic, neo-colonial and self-interested regime to the progressive regime of Allende were willing to join hands with the local elite and the external enemies of the regime to topple President Allende.³⁸ Commenting on the Chilean situation some months before the coup of September 11, 1973, one observer had this to say:

As the Chileans are finding out . . . the peasants who staged a land seizure are really interested more in raising their incomes than in building the new society. Embourgeoisement goes to work almost immediately among them. Similarly, workers went on strike against the new socialist owners of the copper mines because they expected much higher pay, now that foreign exploitation was at an end. Government needed to threaten to use force to keep production going. Embourgeoisement at the base was thus fed by socialism at the top.³⁹

The purpose of these observations is to illuminate two

³⁸For a further discussion of the Chilean predicament, see the special issue of Government and Opposition, Vol. VII, No. 3 (1973), "Chilean's Chile"; and Arturo Velenzuela, "Political Constraints and the Prospects for Socialism in Chile," in Douglas Chalmers (ed.), "Changing Latin America," APS, Vol. XXX, No. 4 (1972). Allende tried to rely on legalism and democratic means, using the existing laws and bureaucracy to bring about socialism--a revolution from above by 'bourgeois radicals' who believed in bargaining, debating and negotiating. The existing circumstances--the absence of 'party of solidarity,' for example--made this ill-fated strategy a matter of necessity.

³⁹David E. Apter, "Embourgeoisement and Radicalization" (Mimeographed manuscript, Political Science Department, Yale University, 1973), p. 39.

points which we have previously 'asserted' and which will recur in the following chapters. First, the process of modernization, particularly in a new country with a colonial background, tends to bourgeoisify not only the elites but also the very ranks--workers and peasants--in whose name socialist revolutions are usually carried out. Thus the consciousness of what we have called 'modernists' is itself problematic. Second, the observations do also emphasize that it is not very easy to transform a mass nationalist movement into a socialist "vanguard party."

In the Tanzanian case, TANU has been facing the problem of "self-transformation," to be able to cope with its enlarged function in the post-Arusha, and especially post-Mwongozo, era. The low socialist consciousness of the workers and peasants sets an understandable constraint on the Party's efforts to transform itself organizationally and functionally. It has also dictated in part the strategies adopted by the central leadership in the implementation of ujamaa policies. The strategies include emphasis on persuasion rather than coercion, collaboration between social groups (workers, managers, peasants, bureaucrats, politicians, etc.) rather than struggle or conflict. These matters and their political and developmental ramifications will be elaborated further in the following chapters.

Chapter 6

THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF UJAMAA MODEL

The point must be made that ultimately the safeguard of a people's right, the people's freedom and those things which they value . . . is the ethic of the nation. When the nation does not have the ethic which will enable the government to say: 'We cannot do this, that is un-Tanganyikan,' or the people to say: 'That we cannot tolerate, that is un-Tanganyikan' . . . it does not matter what kind of constitution you frame. They can always be victims of tyranny. . . . What we must continue to do all the time is to build an ethic of this nation.

-- Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 174-175.

Ujamaa ideology is a system of ideas originating from Mwalimu's personal search for a normative and ethical foundation for the Tanzanian political system; and the evolution of the ideology should correspond to the evolution of Mwalimu's own thought over a period of time. Ujamaa transformation has depended more on a careful calculation or a pragmatic methodology, taking the current "when it serves," than on a rigid theory of social transformation. Methodically, the uniqueness of the Tanzanian experiment lies in the ability of the central leadership to adopt a pragmatic (and eclectic) approach without sacrificing the main ethical principles or ideals which form the basis of Ujamaa. John Saul has referred to this ability as the "Tanzanian development equation"

which has overtime made the ideological evolution of the leadership possible and "enabled it to discern possibilities, to avail itself of permissive conditions, and to divert trends which would otherwise foreclose a progressive solution to the challenges of underdevelopment." Saul correctly emphasizes Mwalimu's role in this process:

An adequate history of Tanzania's socialist development would have to trace the skillful means by which the president placed himself at the centre of the Tanganyikan political system from an early date and managed to build his own personal links with an extremely wide popular constituency. It would also have to trace the evolution of his own convictions about the values most central to a new Tanzania and about the steps most necessary to ensure the country's development.¹

There is little doubt that the ideas (or ideology) of Mwalimu were the "independent" variable, while the objective material conditions acted as "intervening" variable limiting the range of alternatives available at each stage of Ujamaa evolution, and to a large extent heightening the problem of choice. Whereas it would be correct to say that the pragmatic methodology was in large part determined by the objective material and social conditions, it would be naive to see the ideals of Ujamaa themselves as necessarily being determined by the objective material conditions. The leadership factor has been of tremendous importance in the Tanzanian revolution; and the systemic innovations that have taken place since independence must be attributed more to ideas of men

¹Saul, "Socialism in One Country: Tanzania," in Arrighi and Saul (eds.), op. cit., p. 268.

than to any assumed "forces of historical necessity."² We should add that this interpretation of the Tanzanian experience does not necessarily reject Marx's formulation of the problem. Marx described the relationship of social transformation to economic structure and the conditions of social transformation in two well-known passages:

- (1) No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions for their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.³
- (2) Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.⁴

On the surface, the above two statements seem to contradict each other. In the context of Marx's analysis, however, they can be seen as complementing each other. The first statement--based on a thorough study of the history of various European societies--focuses on the internal dynamics of change in an "evolutionary" situation without revolutionaries at the helm. He therefore saw the maturity of the forces and relations of material production as the independent variable providing the internal dynamics of change. This provided Marx a social equivalent of the Darwinian theory of

²For there are other countries in Africa with similar material conditions and experiences but which have not adopted a socialist solution.

³Marx Marx, "Preface to the Critique of Political Economy," in Selected Works, Vol. I (Moscow, 1958), p. 363.

⁴Marx Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon," in ibid., p. 241.

the evolution of species based on "natural selection." Yet Marx realized that the evolution of human societies differed from that of species in that man could intervene and manipulate the evolution itself. Thus in the second statement he formulates the problem differently, treating (implicitly) man's ideas as the independent variable and the material conditions as intervening. It is this second formulation which has relevance for planned socialist revolutions--or for any revolution at all.⁵ As we shall point out, however, Nyerere's theory of Ujamaa revolution emphasizes the ethical and psychological factors whereas that of Marx emphasized material factors.

The present chapter examines the process by which Ujamaa ideology reacted to the three potential counter ideologies discussed in the previous chapter--parochialism, embourgeoisement and traditionalism--in its various stages of evolution. Three stages are discernible, namely (1) the unification stage (1961-1966); (2) the anti-embourgeoisement stage (from 1966 onwards); and (3) the anti-traditionalism stage (from about 1972). No rigid dates can be attached to these stages, but each stage is characterized by a concentration of attack on a particular problem, parochialism, embourgeoisement or excessive traditionalism, in that order. We shall attempt to show that this order was necessary but con-

⁵For a further discussion of this point, see David Lane, The End of Inequality? Stratification Under State Socialism (Manchester: C. Nicholls & Company Ltd., 1971), Chapter 1.

tinued to create internal contradictions which had to be resolved pragmatically as opportunity arose.

For example, concentration on national unification in the first stage gave the urban elite an opportunity to entrench its privileges, and the traditional systems were allowed to remain relatively intact so long as they acknowledged the central leadership. To challenge the privileges of the elite--and the structure that supported them--in the second stage, the center needed popular support, and therefore could not at the same time challenge the traditional inertia which was frustrating development programs. It is in the third stage that the center can act more aggressively on tradition, the extent of that aggression no doubt depending on the size of the elite-cadre at its disposal.

STAGE 1: NATIONAL UNIFICATION, 1961-1966

We have already pointed out (Chapters 2 and 4) that during this period the ideological climate was dominated by the ideas--common in Africa--of "mixed economy" and "African socialism." The two sets of ideas were often identified. Both development and equity were seen as resulting from a harmonious co-existence between private foreign capital and indigenous efforts, public and private. The worst effects of the colonial instrumentalism would be eliminated by a re-affirmation of indigenous cultures;⁶ and the inherited insti-

⁶ A Ministry of Culture and Youth was created in 1963 to accelerate the evolution of a national culture.

tutions would undergo gradual changes, dictated mainly by the need for rapid economic development. Yet it is under these very conditions that Ujamaa evolved, at first almost as a 'private' philosophy of President Nyerere.

Ujamaa was eclectic from the beginning, seeking to combine the ideals of the Western liberal tradition with what Nyerere termed "socialist attitude of mind" attributed to the traditional African society.⁷ Democracy itself was seen as being a necessary part of this traditional "attitude of mind," rather than a foreign importation or imitation of some abstract social theory. There was undoubtedly something nationalistic about this early formulation of Ujamaa. For example, the search for African "identity" is unmistakable in the following statement:

We, in Africa, have no more need of being "converted" to socialism than we have of being "taught" democracy. Both are rooted in our past--in the traditional society which produced us. Modern African socialism can draw from its traditional heritage the recognition of a "society" as an extension of the basic family unit.⁸

It should be noted further that this early formulation of Ujamaa questioned neither the existing organizational structure--modern or traditional--nor the mode of production. Socialism was conceived simply as an attitude of mind, as Kwalimu boldly asserted in 1962:

Socialism, like democracy, is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind,

⁷ See particularly his Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism.

⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare. . . . In the individual, as in the society, it is an attitude of mind which distinguishes the socialist from the non-socialist. It has nothing to do with the possession or non-possession of wealth.⁹

The emphases on "national ethic," "attitude of mind," etc., were in large part dictated by the need for national integration. Four main potential sources of parochialism existed at independence, namely (1) tribalism/localism/racialism; (2) political factions; (3) trade unions; and (4) religious organizations. There was a need to create "myths" of a glorious past to weld these various groups together. However, concrete measures were taken as well to minimize the aggregation and articulation of interests on parochial lines, as we shall outline briefly below.

With her 120 tribal groups, small in population size, non-belligerent in their history, economically poor, and politically weak, Tanzania has faced much less tension resulting from tribalism or localism than many other African countries. However, the potential for divisive tendencies based on tribal claims existed after independence. In the first place, the Party had acquired its "mass" character by aggregating tribal organizations during the fight for Uhuru. With the disappearance of the common enemy--colonialism--consensus would no longer be automatic. For example, in the 1963 Local Government elections some Independents successfully challenged official TANU candidates in Kilimanjaro and Bukoba;

⁹Ibid., emphasis added.

there were rumors of Chagga and Bahaya separatism, of "brotherization" within the civil service, etc. Moreover, modernization could stimulate, rather than silence, localist and primordial sentiments, especially among the more economically viable tribes most of which were in the border areas. This potential was partly weakened by the abolition of traditional chieftaincy in 1963, and after the formation of one-party system in 1965, all claims or recruitment based strictly on tribal affiliation have been tabooed.¹⁰

There was also potential for racism even though this had been consistently repudiated by the central leadership of the Party long before independence. The elite could defend (and actually some did) racism on the argument--quite acceptable as it goes--that the colonial period had created economic and 'power' imbalances among various racial groups. It could be pointed out that the Asian communities had dominated all internal trading, preventing Africans from developing a middle class experience or consciousness. For example, in 1960 two-thirds of the total retail business was handled by non-Africans, not one of the country's wholesalers was an African. Again, of the 390,000 African wage-earners in 1960 only 9,000 were in executive and professional positions. Furthermore, Governor Twinning's policy of "multi-racialism"

¹⁰ For an excellent and detailed analysis of the measures taken to weaken these potentially divisive tendencies, see Harvey Glickman, "Traditional Pluralism and Democratic Processes in Mainland Tanzania," Asian and African Studies, Vol. V (1969), pp. 165-202; also reprinted in Cliffe and Saul (eds.), op. cit., pp. 127-144.

(1950s) had advocated a numerical balance of racial representation in government even though the Africans constituted almost 99 percent of the total population.

In actual fact, the local elite did use these facts to appeal to the masses against the 'ethics' of racial equality advocated by Mwalimu. Immediate Africanization was demanded, the generous terms of acquiring citizenship given to the immigrant communities by the Citizenship Bill (1961) were challenged, etc. It entailed a "struggle" on the part of the central leadership to be able to maintain its moralist and non-racist approach. The following brief exchange between Mwalimu and Mr. John Kwakangale in Parliament (October, 1961) over the terms of citizenship is but one example of the kind of "ideological struggle" carried out by the central leadership in the first phase of Ujamaa evolution. Mr. Kwakangale stated:

I think 75 per cent of the non-Africans in Tanganyika still regard an African . . . as an inferior human being. Why is it so? It is because the white population has been dominating us, both economically and politically, and their neighbours, the Asians, too, have economically dominated us, we Africans. Do you think the ordinary African forming the vast majority of the population will agree to have equal rights with Europeans and the Asians? My answer is No.¹²

The fact that Mr. Kwakangale was widely applauded in the House shows that his views were held by other members as well. Apart from the question of racial equality, Mr.

Mwakangale argued that at independence (then two months away) the African political elite should immediately inherit not only the roles of the migrant and colonial personnel, but the money they had accumulated as well, thus revealing the elite preoccupation with embourgeoisement the opportunities for which independence was opening up. Mwakangale continued:

Registration of people of other races in Tanganyika who are our friends, who will have proved their loyalty to Tanganyika, should commence five years after independence. . . . All foreigners who are living in Tanganyika now and have transferred their money to their home countries or to other countries should within this period of five years bring this money back here. . . . From now on, those foreigners who are rich, who have got the means, should contribute at least fifteen per cent of their money to us, the Tanganyika National Fund. . . . And I think it is fair that as a result of all this, on the day of independence all the foreigners on the front bench [i.e. European and Asian Members of the Cabinet] must resign!¹³

These sentiments are entirely understandable when viewed in the context of colonial domination, economic monopoly by the minority communities and the nationalistic feelings of the day; yet unchallenged, they could have led to an entirely different ideological road, as the elite "acquisitiveness" of the 1960-1966 period clearly bears witness. For what was in question was not exploitation per se, but exploitation by foreigners. Articulating a different position, Kwalima replied:

There cannot be a bigger difference between the speakers and this Government here. . . . They have said they speak for the vast majority of the people of this country. We claim to do the same. . . . Discrimination against human beings because of their colour is exactly

what we have been fighting against. This is what we have formed TANU for . . . and so soon, so soon, before even 9th December, some of my friends have forgotten it. Now they are preaching discrimination, colour discrimination, as a religion to us. And they stand like Hitlers and begin to glorify the race. . . . These people are telling us to discriminate because of the special circumstances of Tanganyika. This is exactly what Verwoed says: 'The circumstances of South Africa are different.' This is the argument used by the racialists. My friend here talks as if it is perfectly alright to discriminate against the white, against the Indian, against the Arab, against the Chinaman.¹⁴ It is wrong when you discriminate against a black man.

The workers' movement was another source of parochial or sectional interests. After independence, the cordial relationship between TANU and the workers' movement, Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL), declined sharply. Strikes increased, all based on demands for higher wages and accelerated Africanization. Some ambitious trade union leaders, firmly entrenched in the workers' movement, were becoming a threat to TANU authority. At the same time, the middle-level leadership of the Party was demanding all sorts of things-- from immediate Africanization of the civil service and republican status, to expulsion of "mishbehaved" expatriates. The central leadership gave a number of concessions in this regard.¹⁵ Other sources of parochial interests after independence included weak opposition parties at the center,¹⁶ local

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ For instance, the expulsion of a few Europeans in January, 1962, was justified by vague notions such as 'mistreatment,' 'insult to Africans,' etc. These pressures also accelerated Africanization and constitutional changes from Dominion status to a Republic. Mwalima's resignation early 1962 was itself a concession as well as political calculation.

¹⁶ The African National Congress of Julius Nyerere and the Democratic Party of Kasanga Zumbo.

organizations,¹⁷ religious sects,¹⁸ and the inherited armed forces which staged a mutiny in 1964.¹⁹

It should be noted that most of the important institutional reforms in the period 1960-1966 were largely geared to the solution of the problem of parochialism and political factionalism. These included the creation of a single workers' movement in 1964, closely supervised by the Party and government;²⁰ creation of one-party system in 1965; and affiliation of all important national organizations to the single Party.²¹ All interests were to be articulated through the various organs of the Party which would be identified with the nation as a whole.²² Further, the arguments in defense of these reforms were put in 'ethical' and 'reconciliation' terms; although Kwalimu distinguished 'compromise'

¹⁷Some, like the Chagga Union, wanted the restoration of their chiefs who had been legally retired by the center at the end of 1962.

¹⁸For example, the interests of the Moslems were articulated by their national organization, the All Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT).

¹⁹The central leadership suspected that some trade union leaders had instigated the mutiny and several of them were detained.

²⁰For example, the movement, National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), was led by a General Secretary who was also the Minister for Labour, Michael Karaliza.

²¹These organizations include the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika (CUT); NUTA; TANU Youth League (TYL); Women's organization (U.W.T.); Tanganyika Parents Association (TAPA), etc.

²²See Nyerere, Democracy and the Party System, esp. pp. 23-27.

from factionalism or sectional interests:

In any human society compromise between individuals is not only necessary but desirable; for it is the only means of arriving at that common denominator without which the very idea of society would be impossible. But, if compromise is desirable, what makes it so is the common good--not sectional interests. Individualism, therefore, should be tempered with, or subjected to, the good of society as a whole, not merely to the good of a part of society. Indeed, the good of a part is too often sought only at the expense of the whole. In a society which is united, which is like a family, the only differences will be those between individuals; and that is the best starting point from which to reach the most mutually valuable compromise between the good of the individual and that of the community. Factionalism, on the other hand, is, by definition, self-interest. Therefore it is bound to be anti-social.²³

Both socialism and democracy were presented in ethical, rather than organizational, terms. Thus, for example, during the debates on the Republican Constitution (1962), Nyerere argued that democracy depended more on faith and the ethic of mutual trust than on the organizational forms stipulated in a constitutional document. If the constitution is to work, he declared: "We have got to have a little amount of faith"; for "democracy is a declaration of faith in human nature . . . a declaration of faith in mankind."²⁴ This interpretation was in part a reaction against the Western emphasis on the "structures" of democracy (e.g. the multi-party system); it was also a rejection of abstract theory as a guide to the creation of a political system: "the defence of any system must take account of its origin," Kwalimu emphasized,

²³ Ibid., pp. 21-22.

²⁴ Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 174-175.

adding: "the origin of a political system will be found either in history or in theory. That is to say, the evolution of the system must depend either on given historical circumstances without which it would not have developed, or on the practical application of some theory of government conceived as suitable to all conditions and circumstances."²⁵ Choosing the former, Mwalimu has consistently defended his position that Tanzania's democracy and socialism must evolve from the roots of the country's history and circumstances, and not from 'borrowed theory.'

In practice, however, this evolution has been eclectic since the sixties, selecting the best from the Western heritage and from local traditions. For example, in 1963 Mwalimu listed eight "ethical principles" which he claimed to "lie at the basis of the Tanganyikan nation" and which made democracy and socialism inseparable. These principles, which were to be a guide for the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of One-Party State, do reveal the eclectic nature of the Tanzanian revolution. Thus, while the formation of a one-party system was seen as a necessary departure from the inherited institutions based on Western democratic theories (though, of course, perverted by colonialism), principles one to five enumerated the conventional "freedoms" attributed to the Western liberal tradition, while principles six to eight stated the need to create a socialist society.²⁶

²⁵ Nyerere, Democracy and the Party System, pp. 15-16.

²⁶ Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, pp. 262-263.

Furthermore, although the one-party Commission succeeded in recommending an innovative and imaginative one-party democratic model, it was less successful in innovating the Parliament to suit the one-party structure, as Helge Kjekshus has convincingly demonstrated.²⁷ Emulating some aspects of the Westminster Model, the Commission assumed that the Parliament could still be "sovereign" under the new structure, while practice (1965-1970) showed that the National Executive Committee of the Party would have been the proper organ in which to vest "sovereignty."²⁸ What we are suggesting is that the changes had elements of "Western-phobia" as well as "Western-philial."²⁹

Yet much of what was achieved in the first phase in connection with national unity and laying down the ethical and organizational foundations of democracy and socialism depended on Kwalimu's personal initiative and intervention: For instance, his resignation in January, 1962, surprised even the emulators of the Westminster Model; for although opposition had been gathering, it had not acquired sufficient strength to push him out. Whatever political calculations involved in his decision, his resignation at this point was

²⁷ Helge Kjekshus, "The Second Parliament: 1965-1970," in Election Study Committee (eds.), op. cit., Chapter 3.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Probably Professor Ali Mazrui's concept of "Tanza-philial" should be considered a product of this eclecticism combined, of course, with Kwalimu's personal imagination and intuition.

important for the evolution of both democracy and socialism. Of this decision Colin Leys was to write:

Once again, and this time in the Assembly rather than within TANU itself, the democratic character of TANU had asserted itself on a policy issue and Mr. Nyerere's easy authority as the chief Party bureaucrat and charismatic head of the nationalist movement in the period before self-government was dramatically reduced.³⁰

The reduction in Nyerere's charisma, however, was doubly compensated by the faith that the people had in him when he reappeared as a Presidential candidate for the new Republic created at the end of 1962.³¹ His resignation, furthermore, had afforded him time to consolidate his political ideas and to write his two treatises on democracy and Ujamaa. More important still, he was able to travel widely in the countryside "tuning down" the expectations of the masses which were beginning to feed upon the embourgeoisement of the elite, and to revitalize the Party organization which was likely to atrophy after independence. The idea of mass participation and democracy within the Party machinery was formulated during this period. Thus the new TANU Kwalimu intended to build would "act like a two-way, all-weather road, along which purposes, plans and problems of Government travel to the people at the same time as ideas, desires and mis-

³⁰ Colin Leys, "Tanganyika: The Realities of Independence," in Cliffe and Saul (eds.), op. cit., p. 193.

³¹ In that first Presidential election, Kwalimu defeated his opponent, Zuberi Mtemvu, by a very healthy margin, marking the end of the thin "opposition" presented (outside Parliament) by the African National Congress led by Mtemvu.

understandings of the people can travel to Government."³²

STAGE 2: CHALLENGING EMBOURGEOISEMENT AND BUREAUCRATISM

The understandable preoccupation with localization of roles, correction of inter-racial imbalance, reconciliation of divergent interests, etc., gave the local elite an opportunity to consolidate its own privileges. Moreover, embourgeoisement and bureaucratism went together. Apart from Presidential attacks on "pomposity" and "officialdom," the privileges inherited from colonial personnel by the bureaucratic and populist elites remained intact during the first six years of independence. Besides the problem of the fast growing material inequality, this was leading to attitudes of social inequality as well. Moreover, high salaries within the inherited capitalist context inevitably increased the acquisitiveness of the elite, as the President has recently commented:

But the problem was not simply that a small number of educated individuals were getting great responsibilities and being paid comparatively highly for them. The real problem was that these same people were able to get access to credit facilities and technical advice, and that some of them were therefore venturing into other income-earning activities.³³

These assertions by the President were proved to the

³²Quoted in Tanganyika News Service (Tanganyika High Commission, London), January 24, 1962.

³³J. K. Nyerere, Tanzania: Ten Years After Independence (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), p. 14.

public in early 1968 when the accusations and "insults" of the self-exiled former Minister and militant Party Secretary-General, Oscar Kambona, then based in London, caused the regime to investigate his personal property. It was discovered that this ex-Minister had become rich, possessing not less than five houses (which he rented in several towns), a family printing press, and other businesses. Kambona's reply from London is interesting. He did not deny these revelations, nor the allegations by the leading East African newspapers that he had been seen at the Nairobi airport with what was described as "bags of money" on his way to London. He justified his property on the grounds that "all other leaders have acquired similar amounts of property," and urged the President to set up a Commission to inquire into the property of the other leaders, not only in order to be fair to him, but also to prove the truth of his assertion. No such Commission was set up.³⁴

Prompted by the shock of University students' demonstration against the terms of the newly introduced National Service program, the President announced (October 23, 1966) the reduction of his already relatively low salary (then

³⁴In the same meeting that Mwalimu revealed these findings, he instead thanked the leaders for complying with the Arusha Declaration and argued that it would be improper to set up a commission to disgrace the leaders simply because "one thief has been caught." Mwalimu was obviously aware that many other leaders would be "caught" had such a commission been set up, hence the problem of "who purges whom" he has often posed in response to some militants.

about \$700 per month) by 25 percent. In response to this initiative, all Ministers, senior and middle-grade civil servants, etc., accepted a salary cut varying from 10 to 15 percent.

The National Service had been introduced partly to act as a 'political re-socialization agent,' in order to counter the growing acquisitiveness of the elite and to bring the young aspiring elite into closer contact with the masses and nation-building projects. Every person who had acquired a post-secondary training was expected to participate in the two-year National Service program before or after he was assigned a job. The first six months would be spent in National Service camps learning the policies of the nation and physically helping in nation-building activities such as digging wells for rural villagers, etc. During the camp period, all participants would receive equal allowance for minor expenses. The remaining eighteen months would be spent in their appropriate jobs, but each individual would now receive 40 percent of the salary to which his qualifications entitled him. The main quarrel leading to the demonstration of October 22, 1966, and to the expulsion of some 393 students (most of them from the University of Dar es Salaam), was the 60 percent deduction. The President instructed that the students remain in the villages working with their parents for two years before being reinstated. However, most of them were re-admitted the following year after a well-supported Private Member's Motion in Parliament had requested the Pres-

ident to reduce the period to one year.

In fact, the student demonstration had acted as a catalyst, reminding the regime the need for a clear definition of the national direction. "It is ironic," stated one foreign observer of the events that followed, "that the resistance of the conservative students against their allotted share in nation-building has enabled Nyerere to bring about a political change . . . without destroying the system itself."³⁵

The following few weeks saw a challenge to the privileges of Ministers and Regional Commissioners, especially the luxurious "Benzes" which the Government had provided them immediately after independence. (Incidentally, the colonial Provincial Commissioner had used a Land Rover, rather than the luxurious Benz, in conducting official business.) These privileges were challenged in the National Assembly as well as in the press; and the National Union of Tanzania Workers (NUTA) called upon the President to set up a Commission to consolidate the ideas of socialism which had been talked about since independence. By the end of 1966, most of the Benzes had been returned to the Ministry of Communications and Works which could allocate them to any servant upon evidence of need. Without waiting for a Commission on Socialism, the National Executive Committee of TANU met in Arusha

³⁵A. Van de Laar, "Growth and Income Distribution in Tanzania Since Independence," in Cliffe and Saul (eds.), op. cit., p. 113.

towards the end of January, 1967, and its four-day deliberations produced the Arusha Declaration which was announced to the nation on February 5, 1967. The Declaration defined socialism simply as the "absence of exploitation," thus:

A true Socialist State is one in which all people are workers and in which neither Capitalism nor Feudalism exist. It does not have two classes of people: a lower class consisting of people who work for their living, and an upper class consisting of those who live on other people's labour. In a true Socialist State no person exploits another, but everybody who is able to work does so and gets a fair income for his labour, and incomes do not differ substantially.³⁶

The only people who can live on other people's labor, the Declaration stipulated, are small children, cripples, the aged, and those for whom the state at any one time cannot provide with employment. Tanzania was not yet socialist because: "It still has elements of Capitalism and Feudalism and their temptations. These elements could expand and entrench themselves." To prevent this trend, a leadership code was adopted as an important part of the Declaration. The code included six prohibitions which further reduced the privileges of the leadership:

(1) Every TANU and Government leader must be either a Peasant or a Worker, and should in no way be associated with the practices of Capitalism or Feudalism;

(2) No TANU or Government leader should hold shares in any Company;

(3) No TANU or Government leader should hold Director-

³⁶ The Arusha Declaration, p. 3.

ships in any privately-owned enterprise;

(4) No TANU or Government leader should receive two or more salaries;

(5) No TANU or Government leader should own houses which he rents to others; and

(6) For the purposes of this Resolution, the term "leader" should comprise the following: Members of the TANU National Executive Committee; Ministers, Members of Parliament, Senior Officials of Organizations affiliated to TANU, Senior Officials of Para-Statal Organization, all those appointed or elected under any clause of the TANU constitution, Councillors, and Civil Servants in high and middle cadres. (In this context "leader" means a man, or a man and his wife; a woman, or a woman and her husband.)³⁷

The relationship between the leaders and the led was well spelled out in Clause 15 of the Mwongozo: "There must be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those they lead. For a Tanzanian leader it must be forbidden to be arrogant, contemptuous and oppressive. The Tanzanian leader has to be a person who respects people, scorns ostentation and who is not a tyrant. He should epitomise heroism, bravery, and be a champion of justice and equality." In Clause 16 the Mwongozo observed: "There are presently some leaders who do not fulfill these conditions. They disregard and cleverly avoid the leadership code. The time has come

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

for the Party to supervise the conduct and the bearing of the leaders." It should be noted that the "pragmatic methodology" of the center prevailed even in this second stage. Thus, although the Party had been empowered by the Declaration--and four years later by Mwongozo--to supervise the conduct of the leadership, no machinery was provided for such supervision until 1973 when it became necessary to give the Party statutory power to form a Disciplinary Committee. Observe, for instance, the following sequence (and timing) of the main anti-embourgeoisement and anti-bureaucratic initiatives of the central leadership:

Legal-Institutional Controls

(1) 1967--Leadership Code (in the Arusha Declaration);

(2) 1969--Legislation making public servants personally accountable for errors of judgment when disposing of public funds in the course of duty;³⁸

(3) 1970--Legislation to prevent corruption among public servants, allowing the Government to check the property of any public servant who can be made to account for his accumulated riches;³⁹

(4) 1970--Workers' participation in management;

(5) 1971--Acquisition of Buildings Act;⁴⁰

³⁸It did not, however, give the Party any particular supervisory role.

³⁹Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (Amendment) Act No. 1 of 1970.

⁴⁰This was a big blow on the economic elites in the urban areas, especially the Asian traders, who had built

(6) 1971--Restrictions on importation of luxurious personal cars;

(7) 1971--Mwongozo, the slogan of "more power to the people" strengthened; party's supervisory role enlarged; people's militia; subjection of the armed forces to Party control, etc.;

(8) 1972--Administrative Decentralization, the slogan of "more power to the people" given organizational content;

(9) 1973--Disciplinary Committee, a follow-up to the 1970 anti-corruption legislation;

(10) 1973-1974--A new, more progressive Income Tax Law.

We require no extensive comments on this sequence; a fuller list of events has already been given (Chapter 4, Table 2). We should, however, note the center's timing of legal-institutional means of control to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the elite. Thus, for example, although Kambona's call for a commission to inquire into the wealth of the leadership in 1968 was rejected, no doubt for reasons of political prudence, the laws of 1970 and 1973 did exactly that. The time factor gave the members of the ruling elite a chance to dispose of their accumulated wealth, and meanwhile the center was able to use them. Furthermore, Mwalimu has chosen to deal with the elite not as a "class" or a cohesive social group but as individuals. On this basis, some leaders were purged from the Party in 1968, and the explanation given

chains of houses for renting. Some leaders had used the credit facilities available to them during the pre-Arusha period to become urban "land-lords."

was that these individuals had clearly shown, by word and action, to be against Party policy.⁴¹ In 1970, the TANU Youth League (TYL) passed a resolution advocating a more systematic "purging" policy:

Members or leaders of TANU who have capitalist connections or ideas should be expelled from the Party in order to make TANU a vanguard Party of the workers and peasants only, it was resolved this weekend by a seminar of the TANU Youth League in Dar es Salaam. . . . It was also resolved that all loopholes in the Arusha Declaration leadership code which can be used by leaders to hide away their capitalist connections should be done away with, and the Party was called upon to enforce the code more stringently.⁴²

The position advocated by the TYL in the above resolution represents an "ideological struggle" within the Party itself, between the more militant elite (often guided by some "theory" of socialist transformation) and the more 'calculating' approach of the central leadership (always maintaining a strict sense of timing). Thus Mwalimu's response is important. According to the Party newspaper:

Mwalimu said at present he could not conceive any person who had the qualifications to purge the non-socialists from the Party and added that it was necessary to recruit many socialists into the Party before "we thought of excommunicating the non-socialists."⁴³

The problem of "who purges whom" is a real one under Tanzania's circumstances, and this partly accounts for Mwalimu's reconciliational approach. This also points to

⁴¹The members affected included M.P.s, councillors and TANU functionaries. See my article, "Elections and Political Mobilization in Tanzania," in Election Study Committee (eds.), op. cit., Chapter 5.

⁴²The Nationalist (Dar es Salaam), October 22, 1970.

⁴³The Nationalist (Dar es Salaam), November 5, 1970.

another important difference between Tanzania's road to socialism and the roads followed in other countries. For example, in Russia, China and even Cuba, the revolutionary party was initially organized underground as a "conspiratorial group," and lists of "enemies" and "friends" had been prepared long before the revolution or coup. Thus purges were not only quick but systematic. TANU, on the other hand, was --and still is--a mass nationalist movement which acquired power democratically, winning popular support upon an anti-colonial argument. Its power has continued to depend, to a large extent, on the popular vote. Furthermore, given the gradual evolution of the ideology since early sixties, the elite has continued to adjust itself in such a way that it is difficult to sort out real revolutionaries from opportunists. Thus, for example, most of the leaders whom Henry Bienen (ironically, his book was published in the year of the Declaration) had singled out as the real "socialists" ("Marxist-Leninist-Maoists") were among those who refused to "declare their wealth" in compliance with the Declaration, opting out of leadership to manage their own businesses.⁴⁴

The Arusha Declaration stipulated that socialist commitment should be the new criterion for membership recruit-

⁴⁴ Bienen, *op. cit.*, see his chapter on "Ideology and Commitment." For a useful criticism of his failure to properly read the pre-Arusha situation, see Lionel Cliffe, "Tanzania--Socialist Transformation and Party Development," in Cliffe and Saul (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 266-276. Ironically, a person like Mtaki, who was jocularly called "professor of Marxism" by his fellow M.P.s, was among the early 'abdicators.'

ment: "Since the founding of the Party greater emphasis has been put on having as large a membership as possible. This was justified during the struggle for independence. Now, however, the National Executive Committee feels that the time has come for emphasis to shift away from mere size of membership on to the quality of the membership. Greater consideration must be given to a member's commitment to the beliefs and objectives of the Party, and its policy of socialism."⁴⁵ As we have indicated, however, in practice it has proved difficult to comply with this principle which has remained an artificial 'vanguard characteristic' imposed on what is through and through a mass organization. Ironically, the achievements of the first phase of Ujamaa in battling parochialism and in creating a generally 'consensual universe' is making it difficult to sort out friends and foes in the second phase.

Party Control versus Bureaucratic Control

Closely related to the question of party self-transformation is the problem of skilled manpower and a socialist cadre within the party machinery. The Party has continued to face a critical shortage of both types of cadre--the "expert" and the "committed." Furthermore, given the experiences with "fallen angels" during the past few years, it is much easier to assess the level of expertise within the

⁴⁵The Arusha Declaration, p. 19.

Party--which is certainly low⁴⁶--than the level of commitment. This situation poses the problem of Party control in two ways. First, even if the Party acquires more skills in its hierarchy as the manpower situation in the country improves, it is still possible for the Party itself to become an unwieldy bureaucracy in the absence of genuine commitment to the norms of popular participation and control, as experience elsewhere has shown.⁴⁷ Second, in the meantime, the Party will have little alternative but to rely on the best intentions of the bureaucratic elite in the various organs of the state.⁴⁸

It is an encouraging sign that these problems have received some attention in a number of articles appearing in the national press and local journals in the past five years.

⁴⁶For a useful discussion of the manpower constraints on the party see Mwansasu, "Commentary on Mwongozo wa TANU," op. cit., especially pp. 22-27.

Given the reconciliatory and pragmatic approach, however, the number of "fallen angels" has necessarily remained smaller than one might expect. Again, the general poverty of the country makes the position of the elite, even with current income restrictions, attractive in comparison with that of the general populace.

⁴⁷The unwieldy bureaucracy of the Soviet Communist Party is probably the best example. See particularly Lane, op. cit., especially Chapter 4, which deals with "Social Inequality: Hierarchy and Privilege," pp. 71-106.

⁴⁸It should be remembered, however, that "office" and "factory" party branches have existed since 1969, even though there is little evidence to show that they have been active "watch dogs" for national priorities. For example, when in 1972 the National Bank of Commerce management dished out fat bonuses to its members, in keeping with pre-Arusha practices, the local party branch did not question it in the light of the Declaration; initiative had to come from outside.

Perhaps the most articulate position is that taken by Kisenge in connection with the need for Party cadres:

In short, cadres are a sort of multi-purpose revolutionary vanguard, an inexhaustible source of party renovation, rejuvenation, and dynamism. A party backed by such a corps of dedicated individuals can rest assured that it will maintain its revolutionary militancy and be able to carry out successfully any type of program. The one that has none risks sooner or later deteriorating into an apathetic, immobile, anachronistic bureaucracy. When this stage is reached, the party becomes just another government department being led by the government rather than the reverse. In fact this has been the misfortune of many political parties in developing countries, where very good intentions of building socialism have completely failed to materialize. It is therefore important to note in this connection that TANU has not had to date any serious and systematic program for training cadres, though its intentions of building a socialist state have been known since 1962.⁴⁹

Although these comments are generally correct, they also carry a potential danger of obscuring the dilemma of choice inherent in the Tanzanian situation. In the first place, the concepts of "cadre" and "vanguard" need to be understood in 'non-classical' and 'non-doctrinaire' terms if they are to be of any utility in the mobilization for Ujamaa. In 'classical' terms, changing TANU into a cadre-based party implies a fundamental change, a structural revolution within the party itself. This raises not only a question of will-
ingness on the part of the central leadership but also the question of capability (as well as "political wisdom") to do so at this stage. Second, a related point is that under the Tanzanian system where the Party is (or ought to be) identi-

⁴⁹ Nyelwa Kisenge, "The Party in Tanzania," Majimaji (September, 1971). Similar arguments have appeared in the national press.

fied with the nation as a whole, one requires 'national' cadres rather than just 'party' cadres; and such cadres must be trained for the various organs of the state and posted at various levels. Kisenge acknowledges the magnitude of the task and the possibility of leading to further bureaucratism: "The success or failure of the socialist cadres at the grass-roots level will largely depend on our ability to provide their counterpart at various levels above. This is for the obvious reason that however good, hard-working, and dedicated the lower cadres may be, they will inevitably be frustrated by the crushing weight and immobility of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie above"; and thus:

In general terms, it might be said that the cadres require a right organizational framework within which to operate effectively. . . . Such a framework does not exist at the moment. Without it cadres will simply be absorbed into the established system, and sandwiched in various layers of bureaucratic hierarchy they will be neutralized and rendered harmless. It would follow therefore that the whole proposal presupposes also the necessity of party reorganization to provide such a framework. The overhauling of the party machinery and radical changes in methods of work could provide a basis for creating a vanguard within a mass party.⁵⁰

Furthermore, the revolution within the party to which we referred above would necessarily require the party to take on a "class" as opposed to "mass" character, a change of dubious utility under the existing circumstances, as we have attempted to show. Tanzanian policy, moreover, does not make a clear distinction between "workers" and "non-workers" (i.e. managers, etc.); the Declaration simply states: "Tanzania is

⁵⁰ Ibid. Emphasis original.

a state of Peasants and Workers." The word "worker" here is used in the sense of "non-loiterer" or "non-exploiter" performing any role of national importance, NOT in the sense of an industrial proletariat which is, at any rate, non-existent. As the state becomes the chief employer of wage labor, and assuming also the state remains progressive, the classical "worker-employer" (or worker-capitalist) distinction loses its importance as a mobilizational tool or a line of confrontation. An alternative line of confrontation has been "invented"--i.e. workers versus managers (or bureaucracy). Thus Mopulu, for example, attributes the initial weaknesses of the workers' participation program to the failure of the central leadership to mobilize the workers along "class" lines:

Tanzania's strategy has not gone as far as to identify a 'working class' that can be viewed as the chief agent of socialist development. . . . As a consequence of the absence of political strategy due to the lack of a class ideological position, there has been no conception of a bureaucracy as a structural phenomenon. The tendency has been to view workers' participation not as a structural mechanism for the control of certain strata by the class that should be the pillar of socialist construction, but principally as a wrong attitude which leads to wrong methods of work.

It follows therefore that when one reaches the factory level, participation can only be minimal in substance. Essentially, the tasks of "management" belong to the managers and the workers can come in only occasionally to "help" in certain fields and to quench their thirst for information on what is going on in the factory as a whole. This seems to be the only explanation of the preponderance of the managers in the workers' council and the council's mere advisory power.⁵¹

⁵¹ Henry Mopulu, "The Organization and Participation of Workers in Tanzania," (Economic Research Bureau, Paper 72.1 (The University of Dar es Salaam, 1972, mimeographed).

The position taken by Mopulu, Kisenge, and others who have contributed on the subject,⁵² clearly shows the unfortunate tendency among the emerging Tanzanian intellectual revolutionaries to accept unquestioningly certain classical theories of socialist revolution which really did not have the Tanzanian-type situation in mind. Hence the unwarranted identification of "political strategy" with "class ideological position"; the assertion that the workers are "the pillar of socialist construction," and that the bureaucracy must be viewed as an instrument of another "class," the elite, etc. It is our contention that such an approach fails to come into grips with the realities of the Tanzanian situation. It sounds "revolutionary" and is probably intellectually fascinating as well, but its practical significance could only be realized by "inventing" a new "society" for Tanzania! Under a situation of "revolution from above," both the workers and the elite require a resocialization to make them joint-pillars of socialist construction; neither can be written off. This seems to be the position taken by the central leadership which initiated political education programs for both management and workers, as well as for other political

⁵²For example, Shivji, "Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle," does also identify the bureaucracy with a "class," the elite, and if his arguments were taken seriously, it would mean writing off the bureaucratic elite as an agent of socialist reconstruction. Yet the contribution of this strata--we maintain that "class" is a wrong term--despite its embourgeoisement tendencies, has probably been greater than many observers would expect, given the colonial background of its training.

actors.⁵³

We are not arguing that the approach adopted by the center has been flawless to the details; we are suggesting that the alternatives offered under the rubric of "scientific socialism" are not only unscientific considering the existing society, but also miss the very essence of scientific socialism. The founders of "scientific socialism" model had in mind a situation with (1) clearly defined classes, distinguishable and opposed to each other by virtue of (a) the role they play in the productive process and, even more important, (b) ownership of property (i.e. means of production); (2) high level of industrial technology and productivity; (3) social division of labor leading to alienation under the situation; and consequently (4) capacity of the classes to "reproduce" themselves functionally as well as in terms of ownership over a period of time.

Ujamaa model did not emerge from such conditions, as we have attempted to show; it sought to anticipate them, i.e. to prevent them from occurring. It is therefore unscientific to apply the strategies of the former model to the latter model whose main preoccupation is to forestall the emergence of the very conditions which the former assumes to exist. For example, under the former, high consciousness of workers

⁵³After the introduction of the workers' participation program in 1970, political education classes were organized for all categories of public servants. Further, the Party has a political education section and an ideological college at Kivukoni; and from 1971 political education has been an examinable subject in secondary schools, etc.

and high productivity of labor are taken for granted; under the latter, their achievement is one of the main objectives, and it is the elite which must take the initiative. Criticizing Shivji's formulation, which in some areas was a bit too faithful to the classical model, Justinian Rweyemamu has made significant points along these lines:

Shivji's thesis is that for Tanzania to move toward socialism it will be necessary to establish a revolutionary party of dedicated cadres. In his own words, ". . . the state power must be in the hands of the workers and peasants led by the present revolutionary leadership and not the bureaucracy. A class, in this case workers and the peasants, cannot build a society in its interests without wielding political power." Such a formulation raises a host of questions about the concept of the party and its organizational practice. . . .

[T]here is no class of workers and peasants in Tanzania. There is a small, weak, urban industrial working class organized according to the traditions of the western type of trade unionism. There is also a class of peasant owners of land producing at a low level of productive forces. There is finally an elite substratum, which in the early period of industrialization, appears to be a privileged class, a class not far from the petty bourgeois in its social status and consciousness. This substratum "rules" not through private ownership of the means of production but through occupying the decision-making positions in the party, the state and the economy.

It is thus obvious that the weakness of the working class and the low level of consciousness of the majority of the peasantry raises the question of the proper way of establishing a mass party which is at the same time a vanguard party. . . . Yet it appears to me that such a conception of the proletarian party assumes the "classical" proletariat, i.e. a "new man," formed by the womb of capitalism and possessing the interest, the will and the ability not only to overthrow the capitalist regime but also to lead the way in the construction of a new socialist society--a conception whose usefulness is questionable at best in the context of Tanzania. The economic tasks of such a proletariat were to increase productivity, to eliminate waste and irrationality and to move as rapidly as possible from a commodity producing to a fully planned economic system. The workers and peasants of Tanzania can hardly be said to have "assimilated" the

above as their concrete tasks during the period of transition.⁵⁴

It is precisely because of these "objective" material (as well as non-material!) conditions that "the elite substratum cannot be indiscriminately written off, as Shivji apparently does," for it "will have an important role in the process of transformation."⁵⁵ It follows that the "class struggle" strategy of the classical model may even be counter-revolutionary under the Tanzanian circumstances, that is, if it is not remembered that embourgeoisement does not always correspond to the arbitrary lines drawn (for purposes of salary scales) to separate a managerial stratum from a stratum of "workers" which is itself divided into various ranks, all yearning for upward mobility. Nor is it entirely correct, terminologically, to refer to the present bureaucratic and political elite as a "class." The seeds for self-reproduction, as we saw in the previous section, were being sown during the first phase of Ujamaa (1961-66), but the process was "hi-jacked" by the Arusha Declaration.⁵⁶ Thus the status and power of the elite have a brief history, as Mwalimu has correctly commented:

⁵⁴ Justinian Rweyemamu, "The Silent Class Struggle in Retrospect" (Seminar Paper, University of Dar es Salaam, 1971, mimeographed), pp. 1-3. Emphasis is original.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 3. Emphasis is original.

⁵⁶ If the current trend in Kenya continues, the bureaucratic and political elites will soon constitute a "class" in the classical sense.

. . . almost the only way in which Africans could get the capital to become landlords or capitalists was by virtue of their office and seniority in the public service. . . . There were exceptions to this general rule, because there had been isolated instances before independence of Africans establishing themselves in business or modern farming. But in general it was the post-independence accession to power which enabled Africans to enter the capitalist system as owners or employers instead of as workers.⁵⁷

Hence, from the early phase of Ujamaa, Mwalimu saw the main problem of transition to socialism as one of overcoming a bourgeois "attitude of mind"; and his rather controversial assertion (1962) that socialism had "nothing to do with possession or non-possession of wealth" must be understood in the context of the conditions existing then. He saw the main struggle as a struggle against a "mentality" rather than against "property"--at least internally. Consequently, there has been a great emphasis on political resocialization for the population as a whole rather than just for certain "groups" which must fight among themselves in the process of socialist construction.⁵⁸ As we have seen, however, legal-

⁵⁷ Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 28-29.

⁵⁸ The need for elite resocialization arises from the colonial content of their educational experience. In 1970, about 68 percent of the parliamentary candidates, and 86 percent of elected M.P.'s, had attended some political education classes or seminars or been to the National Service. It cannot be assumed, however, that these seminars necessarily converted these people into socialists. As Kjekshus, op. cit., p. 33, correctly states:

Socialism is a recent ideology to most leaders and is intellectually embraced by them rather than resulting from an extended formal or informal socialization process growing from their relationship to material or class factors. Moreover, the socialist ideology is propounded by a group of educated leaders in a situation where education itself is an important index to socio-economic stratification.

institutional means have also been used in the second phase to control embourgeoisement and bureaucratic tendencies among the elites. The third technique being used by the central leadership is that of "control from below" which we shall discuss briefly below.

Elite Control From Below

The 'mass participation' aspect of Ujamaa ideology is both a logical outcome of the center's declared commitment to democracy as well as an additional strategy of elite control from below. It is not an outcome of political pressure from below. Any regime in Africa that inherited political power at independence could use the colonial tactic of "divide and rule" or the philosophy of 'letting the sleeping dog lie' and just concentrate on the elites and the participant sections of the modernists. This trick ensured colonial stability (for some time) in Africa and Asia, as Pye has well summarized it:

The handful Europeans who governed most of Asia and Africa could do their job because the peoples they ruled were still governed throughout the cycle of their lives by traditional systems. Habit, custom, and village relationships gave discipline and order to the lives of most of the people, and the colonial rulers had to treat only with elite relationships at the top of the societies.⁵⁹

As we pointed out in Chapter 1, Tanzania's ideology views participation (and liberation) as an essential aspect of development, and it is sometimes defended as an end in

⁵⁹ Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 10-11.

itself. Thus, for example, Nyerere defends the expansion of electoral participation in ideological and moralistic terms:

. . . only while there is this opportunity for choice can the people rest confident that they govern themselves. . . . Without free elections, the people of an independent country do not govern themselves; they are governed by masters. They may have good masters or bad; their masters may be local or foreign: but they are still masters. And if your masters are good, thank God; if they are bad, God help you!⁶⁰

This cannot be the whole story however; for the leadership does also use mass participation for political reasons --an attempt to control the behavior of the elite from below. The following statement by Mwalimu illustrates this kind of consideration:

. . . only while this opportunity [i.e. for popular participation] remains are we, their representatives, forced to overcome our indolence or selfishness and serve them [i.e. the mass] to the best of our ability.⁶¹

This represents the "benevolent" elements in the concept of mass participation--indeed, so far beyond question under Mwalimu's leadership. Yet, occasionally, wide participation has also been sought in the face of a mounting political opposition to the center. For example, when Mwalimu was faced with elite opposition to the leadership code in 1967,⁶² and resignation and self-exile of an influential Cabinet

⁶⁰ Broadcast to the Nation on the eve of the 1970 elections; see The Standard, October 30, 1970.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² See, for example, the kinds of questions asked by the elite to which the President, in his Arusha Declaration: Questions and Answers (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), gave critical answers which exposed the embourgeoisement of the elite.

Minister (who was also a former Party Secretary-General (Oscar Kambona), he called upon the masses of Tanzania "to have great confidence in themselves." As the official Party paper reported:

Mwalimu Nyerere warned the people against pinning all their hopes on the leadership, as the leaders were apt to sell the people's freedom to meet their lusts. He warned further that in running the affairs of the nation the people should not look on their leaders as saints or prophets.⁶³

What we are suggesting is that the central leadership, despite (and partly because of) its genuine ideological commitment to popular democracy, does also use vox populi to repudiate the actions of the elite or to forestall the elite which could mobilize the masses against the authority of the center. In a sense, the elite is a "shadow regime," and therefore a competitor for the support of the masses. Unlike in many developing nations, mass support in Tanzania is considered very important particularly because electoral competition within the Party is considered necessary in bestowing an aura of legitimacy on the Party and the leadership as a whole.

Nor is mass participation merely symbolic; for the realities of mass control have been duly demonstrated in two elections, 1965 and 1970. In the former election, six well-established figures in the Party and Government (with ministerial ranks) were rejected by the electorate, and only about a third of the old Parliament survived the popular verdict.

⁶³Reported in The Nationalist, September 5, 1967.

In the later election, several members with ministerial portfolios were also rejected and a full 75 percent of the 1965-1970 Parliament gave way to new incumbents.⁶⁴ This rate of "elite circulation" within the Parliament as a direct result of the voters is not only greater than that of most new nations but, surprisingly, much greater than that of many older two-party democracies of the West as well.⁶⁵ Elections within the Party itself have also been a 'terror' to the elite.⁶⁶

This popular control from below is augmented by central control of the recruitment process. For example, the National Executive committee of the Party retains the power to reject candidates with top votes in the District primaries (i.e. before popular vote); but so far the center has to a surprising degree respected the preferences of the local Party organization.⁶⁷ Thus one can see a genuine effort by

⁶⁴For details, see Cliffe (ed.), One-Party Democracy, and Election Study Committee, Socialism and Participation: Tanzania's 1970 National Elections, especially the chapter by Bismarck Mwansasu which analyzes the candidates for the 1970 elections.

⁶⁵The outcome of the two elections, moreover, does substantiate to a very large degree Mwalimu's 1962 treatise on Democracy and the Party System to which we have already referred.

⁶⁶The only position which has not been challenged is that of Mwalimu Nyerere and his Vice-President Rashidi Kawawa. For an analysis of the Presidential elections, see Antony Rweyemamu's article in the study of the 1970 elections, already cited. Unfortunately, elections within the Party have not received as much attention as the general elections, and therefore we cannot assess the rate of elite circulation with any precision.

⁶⁷In 1965, it rejected 16 candidates with top district preferences; in 1970 it rejected only 8; a small number indeed considering that this was the first election after Arusha

the central leadership to strike a balance between local participation and central control to ensure compliance with central directives and ideology. However, one 'negative' outcome of the many restrictions and taboos placed on candidates during electoral campaigns is to submerge differences which could lead to (a) important debates on policy implementation, (b) an educational experience for the voters, and (c) information to the center from the constituencies which is important not only negatively in sorting out friends and foes of the revolution but also in determining the general "mood" of the country. There has been a tendency to emphasize the "regime legitimation function" of the elections at the expense of the "educational function."⁶⁸

The generally high level of popular participation and challenge to the elite in the last two elections, however, should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that the revolution has necessarily created a mass-base; for it has meant

and also relative to the large number (1233) of candidates offering themselves at the primaries. The Party had declared in March, 1970, that it would not consider candidates who did not have Ujamaa association; in practice this did not become a major constraint on candidates. For further analysis see my article, already cited, in the 1970 election study. What is interesting is that, whereas the center rejected only 8 top preferences, the electorate rejected more than three times that number of candidates with top district preferences.

⁶⁸ These points are elaborated in my article in the 1970 election study, already cited. It should be remembered, however, that Mwalimu personally places great emphasis on the educational function; and also encourages debates on implementation strategies as long as "consensus" on the fundamentals of the national policy remains intact.

"circulation" among elites, not necessarily among workers and peasants.⁶⁹ The 1970 election data showed that 48 percent of the candidates and 69 percent of the elected M.P.'s held some form of Government or Party employment when he/she sought election. That is to say, most candidates enjoyed security of income and tenure unlike the masses. Further, since on the average the elected M.P.'s had about ten years of education, most of them would have qualified for elite status before seeking election.⁷⁰ Thus--for those who prefer to think in "class" terms--Tanzania does not as yet have a parliament of workers and peasants.⁷⁰ However, this very dependency of candidates (and other members of the elite) on the Party and Government for employment does facilitate central control. Elite dependence on the center for its livelihood has in fact increased with nationalization which reduced elite employment outside the public sector.

In summary, in the second phase of Ujamaa evolution the central leadership no longer relies on ideological appeals to change the elite's "attitude of mind." Four main methods of control have been devised: (1) legal-institutional controls; (2) popular control; (3) remunerative control (power to employ, to transfer and to dismiss); and (4) normative control through a more systematic program of political educa-

⁶⁹For a further analysis, see Kjekshus, op. cit., pp. 34-37.

⁷⁰See particularly the occupational breakdown given in Mwanasasi's chapter in the 1970 election study.

tion. Despite the remaining loopholes which we have already pointed out, the center has acquired much success in this effort. Without such success--the level of which is, admittedly, difficult to determine--it would be impossible to enter the third stage, which is probably even more delicate than the second, for it involves a challenge on tradition itself. The setting of 1976 as the target for full collectivization, for example, entails a challenge of the traditional inertia of many rural communities; a challenge which would be bootless without a high degree of elite compliance with the policies of the center. To this crucial third stage we now turn briefly.

STAGE 3: CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL INERTIA

Most of the problems presented by the traditional inertia relate to the quest for rapid modernization of the rural areas, in particular, modernization of the agricultural sector which is the back-bone of the Tanzanian economy. This particular aspect is discussed with illustrative case studies in the next chapter. A related problem is that of convincing the people to abandon their traditional habitat so as to join ujamaa villages. This is now a big challenge to the leadership since a target (1976) for full rural collectivization has been set. It will be clear from our Morogoro case studies in Chapters 7, ^{and 8} that this target cannot be achieved without a more effective mobilization effort than that carried out between 1962 and 1972.

This third stage of Ujamaa started around 1972 when several important measures relating to rural mobilization were taken. First, administrative decentralization was introduced to remove the mobilizational constraints we noted in Chapter 4.⁷¹ Second, a new agricultural policy was adopted whose aims can only be achieved by adopting a more effective style of mobilization, and by challenging the traditional "taboos" which prevent peasants from adopting modern methods of husbandry.⁷² Third, the center decided to put more emphasis on productivity and viability of ujamaa villages than on merely living together and working together which had characterized the period between 1969 ^{and} 1972. Finally, a target for full collectivization was set in 1973. The important question arising from these series of measures is whether persuasion and democratic participation can overcome the traditional inertia in the third phase. We shall deal with this question in Chapter 8. We only need to note here that Mwalimu presents Ujamaa to the peasants with traditionalist appeals, no doubt partly as a strategy for acceptability. Thus he begins his policy statement on socialism and rural development with the following:

The traditional African family lived according to the basic principles of ujamaa. Its members did this unconsciously, and without any conception of what they were doing in political terms. They lived together and worked together because that was how they understood life, and

⁷¹See Appendices A and B.

⁷²See the next chapter for details of the new policy.

how they reinforced each other against difficulties they had to contend with.⁷³

In his elaboration, Mwalimu states the need to utilize the traditional 'spirit' of co-operation to achieve modern goals; points out the inadequacies of the traditional system, such as poverty, sex discrimination, etc.; details the strategies to be used in different areas of the country according to their level of development, mode of production, and traditions; and insists that the approach must be based on voluntariness and conviction resulting from persuasion, exhortation and education.

The question that we shall take up in the following two chapters is not whether all the 'good' things attributed to the traditional society are historically true. This is a wrong question to ask of an ideology; the question is whether "it works"; for few ideologies can be effective, mobilizationally or integrationally, without a myth element. In the following chapter, we shall focus on response to agriculture by the local systems, and in the next we shall further explore the problem of mobilizational strategy in connection with specific district case studies.

⁷³Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, p. 1.

Chapter 7

AGRICULTURAL GROWTH WITHOUT INNOVATION

By bad agriculture we are reducing our ability to produce wealth. . . . We must modernise the methods by which we grow food and other crops. This is at the heart of our political policies; socialism will be regarded as having failed if in a few years, we grow insufficient food; for a failure to earn foreign exchange with agricultural exports causes other development work to stop.

-- TANU, "Politics is Agriculture," Sunday News, May 14, 1972.

In Chapter 4, we examined Tanzania's mobilization effort via the transformation and improvement approaches, and pointed out some of the internal contradictions necessitating a gradual displacement of these previous approaches and institutions.

In the present chapter, we shall examine the impact of that mobilization (1962-73) on the agricultural sector which is the backbone of Tanzania's economy, noting some of the decisional dilemmas involved in switching from one mode of production to another. The problem of maintaining a balance between productivity and equity during the transition period is more conspicuous in the agricultural than in any other sector; it involves a switch from concentration of development inputs (land, credit, extension) on a few "progressive farmers" to a wider distribution of the inputs. The main chal-

lenge in the seventies is, therefore, how to achieve this redistribution of development inputs while maintaining a growing level of agricultural productivity; and this raises the question of "mobilizational strategy" which we shall examine closely in the next chapter.

GROWTH VERSUS DEVELOPMENT: PRELIMINARY CONCEPTUAL QUESTIONS

Taking stock of the nation's achievements of the first decade of independence in September, 1971, Tanzania's central leadership was able to show an impressive "growth" record in various sectors of the economy, especially in agricultural output, health and educational facilities. At the same time, however, the leadership was beginning to doubt whether "growth" figures were a sufficient measure of "development" in the rural areas.¹ Eight months later (May, 1972), the leadership stated categorically that, although agricultural output had increased tremendously in the past decade or two, such growth resulted more from expansion of acreage in response to political campaigns than from a modernization of the peasants' attitudes towards innovation.²

The distinction between "growth" and "development" is not just an academic exercise when applied to a developing

¹See Nyerere, "Tanzania: Ten Years After Independence," pp. 37-43.

²TANU, "Politics is Agriculture," Sunday News, May 14, 1972.

country such as Tanzania. For whereas growth data often refer to aggregate material inputs and outputs within a given period, development goes beyond this to include a general acceptance by the population of innovation and self-improvement on a continuing basis; which means taking into consideration the levels of efficiency in performance and productivity per unit factor input. But quite apart from increased efficiency and productivity--which can sometimes be achieved under bureaucratic supervision or coercion--development requires attitudinal change as well, so that the people come to believe they are masters of their environment rather than a mere reflection of it. This important aspect of development requires people to "see life as alternatives, preferences and choices."³ Without such mental reorientation, the cherished goal of "self-sustaining growth," whether in the economic or political field, would probably be impossible to achieve in a new nation where the larger portion of the population is still controlled by tradition.⁴

In a country like Tanzania, a development revolution is as much material as it is attitudinal and, as we shall continue to argue, to separate the two is to frustrate the

³David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 10.

⁴For a discussion of stages of economic development, see W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960); for stages of political development, see A. F. K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967).

revolution. Tanzanian policy has come into grips with this: "We are not simply trying to organize increased production; we are trying to introduce a whole new way of life for the majority of our people," states Mwalimu.⁵ Viewed thus, the "mobilizational variable" (or the politico-ideological inputs) acquires great importance in the development effort. Probably the most important lesson to be learned from the experience with planned change in Asia--in particular, India and China--during the past three decades is that organizational and ideological inputs count as much as capital inputs in the process of national development.⁶

Tanzania's experiences with mobilization for higher rural productivity from 1962 to 1972 provide some examples of campaigns which led to agricultural growth without a significant change in the peasants' attitude towards modern methods. Much of the material presented here (as well as in the following two chapters) is based on data gathered in Morogoro District between September, 1970, and May, 1973.⁷ We shall use this data to illustrate the problem of local response and adjustment to rapid ideological and slogan changes at the

⁵Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 407.

⁶For India's experience, see Wilfred Malenbaum, Modern India's Economy: Two Decades of Planned Growth (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1971). For a comparison between India and China, see Kuan-I Chen and J. S. Uppal (eds.), Comparative Development of India and China (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

⁷The research was done in three installments: September to December, 1970; April to July, 1971; and May, 1972, to May, 1973.

center, and to assess (a) the implications of such response for Ujamaa and (b) the "developmental content" (in the above sense) of the response.

Morogoro provides several advantages in this regard. First, the presence of ample good land (taking the District or Region as a whole) eliminates land shortage as a constraint on the campaigns for greater output. Second, the more or less "coercive" strategy used by the colonial administration in an attempt to innovate the agricultural practices of the Luguru contrasts with the more or less "persuasive" mobilizational strategy of the post-independence period based on the slogans of self-help, nation-building, self-reliance, participation and Ujamaa.⁸ Third, Morogoro had a number of settlement schemes which have since 1968 been transformed (or partially transformed) into ujamaa villages; providing illustrations for the problem of transforming semi-capitalist settlements into socialist communities. Finally, Morogoro's experience with changes in the leadership's emphasis on the production of cotton, rice and sugar cane illustrates the problem of local-center adjustment we referred to earlier and the problems of resource "underutilization" and "misutilization" discussed below.

The discussion that follows leads to the conclusion that, although available statistics show tremendous "growth"

⁸ For an account of the Luguru story, see Young and Fosbrook, Land and Politics Among the Luguru of Tanganyika.

in rural material inputs and outputs in the past two decades, especially after independence, "development" in the wider sense defined above was inhibited by three main factors. First, "political-ideological inputs" (the mobilizational variable) either (a) tended to lag behind available material inputs and technical information, or (b) in some cases contradicted the latter inputs. Second, partly as a result of the existing administrative structure (i.e. before the Decentralization of July, 1972), and partly because of rapid policy and slogan changes at the center, many local settings "underutilized," "misutilized" or "failed to utilize" available resources--both material and human. Third, the net result was to weaken the mobilizational effort and to perpetuate the low productivity (i.e. output per unit factor input) inherited from the colonial rule. We shall argue that, although Tanzania--like other developing nations--has continued to face the problem of capital and manpower shortages, local implementers (at least in Morogoro) tended to exaggerate these shortages in accounting for failure of projects, and often said little about the "real" problems such as inefficiency, low productivity, conflict of goals at the local level and immobilism.

AGRICULTURAL GROWTH WITHOUT PRODUCTIVITY: NATIONAL OVERVIEW

On the agricultural front, many crops, especially cash crops, more than trebled between 1961 and 1970. Thus, for

example, cotton output rose from 30,000 metric tons to 79,000; coffee from 20,000 to 55,000; sugar from 29,000 to 90,000; cashew from 28,000 to 118,000; sunflower seed from 6,000 to 13,000; tobacco from 2,700 to 21,400; and pyrethrum from 1,300 to 3,800. Since the rate of growth achieved for many of these important cash crops was much higher than any achieved under the colonial rule, it is legitimate to claim that independence has made a "developmental difference," as Mwalimu promised in 1962. However, for most crops, there is no evidence that better husbandry played a significant part in the increased output. Response to campaigns for greater output was in terms of expansion of the land under cultivation, without innovating the existing agricultural practices. Exceptions include the areas with land shortage, especially those growing coffee, state farms and a few closely supervised schemes. For instance, the ninefold increase in tobacco output is mainly due to the success attained by the highly modernized tobacco schemes.⁹

Thus the increase in agricultural output is matched with a comparable increase in the total land under cultivation, but with a relatively small increase in the quantity of fertilizers used or modern tools purchased. Land under cultivation increased from about 29 million acres in 1961 to nearly 39 million acres in 1970. The amount of fertilizers

⁹Most of the figures quoted in the above two paragraphs are taken from Nyerere, "Tanzania: Ten Years After Independence," pp. 37-38.

used increased from 7,000 tons in 1961 to 23,000 tons in 1970. This three-fold increase is very small in comparison with the large land under cultivation, the alarming extent of soil erosion in some districts of Tanzania, and the heavy campaigns (including free distribution) for the use of fertilizers since independence. An important Party report has correctly commented in this regard: "If we had really been carrying out an agricultural revolution in Tanzania during that period, the expansion in the amount of fertilizer used would have been nearer 30 times than 3 times!"¹⁰

The use of fertilizers, moreover, was not even throughout the rural areas. Response to chemical fertilizers was greater in the progressive farmer, cash crop areas and in the areas where the farmers traditionally used organic fertilizers (e.g. animal manure in Kilimanjaro and Ukerewe). Farmers in such areas could more easily, funds being available, switch to chemical fertilizers. In most other areas, the use of fertilizers was an innovation either considered 'too expensive' where farmers were required to pay for them or surrounded with a host of traditional taboos, even where they were dished out free. Thus among the cotton growers, who have been preached on the use of fertilizers since the colonial days, only about 6 percent of them were using fertilizers by 1973. The same attitude has prevailed with regard to the use of pesticide and new seed variety in some locali-

¹⁰Ibid., p. 38.

ties.¹¹

Furthermore, with the exception of the more prosperous areas, ujamaa villages, state farms and few successful schemes, which had adopted partial mechanization (mainly tractorization), there was very little change in the use of tools. Thus, for example, while cotton was already flourishing in Sukumaland by 1907 using traditional tools, by 1972 there was only a change in acreage (and better seeds supplied by Ukiriguru Research Station situated in the cotton area) and, as one report has commented:

Our cotton is grown very much as it was grown ten years ago. A visitor to a cotton farm in Sukumaland or elsewhere, returning after an absence of ten years, will probably see nothing new in method or in tools. He will still hear the same message being broadcast--plant early, uproot and burn the plants after harvest, etc.--and he will see that these messages are still necessary because otherwise the work does n't get done.¹²

There was even less innovation adopted for food crops than for cash crops, partly because campaigns tended to concentrate on better cash crop husbandry for the country to be able to earn much needed foreign exchange, but also because in the subsistence areas food crops have a "survival value" and hence the peasants are more reluctant to accept innovation in absence of guarantees of success. Again, those who responded to the rapidly widening market opportunities expanded their farms where possible, without innovating their

¹¹The estimated figure for 1971 was 5 percent; see ibid., p. 38.

¹²ibid.

methods or tools. Thus, for example, whereas research reports have shown that an acre of maize--in most maize-growing parts of Tanzania--should under proper husbandry produce from 12 to 15 bags, only 5 to 7 bags are actually achieved in most areas, including many ujamaa villages.¹³

The implementers--politicians in particular--were partly responsible for the emphasis placed on acreage rather than 'productivity.' This was particularly true in the sixties when land was ample in many areas and the easiest way for a leader to show "evidence" of success was in terms of new land brought under cultivation in his area. Some Area and Regional Commissioners set acreage minima for some crops. In some cases, however, the minima were higher than the total family labor could manage, often resulting in yields far below those attained on smaller farms. There was nothing wrong in the expansion of land under cultivation, generally speaking, because much family labor was, and still is, underutilized in many areas of rural Tanzania. But productivity per unit factor input was ignored in the process, with the result that much sweat produced relatively little, leading to peasant discouragement in some areas. The emphasis on acreage is clearly reflected in the agricultural reports of the sixties as well as radio and newspaper reports which announced total acreage under cultivation in the districts or total agricultural output without assessing productivity per family, per

¹³One state farm, Rwankoma, has demonstrated the possibility of attaining about 20 bags per acre.

unit fertilizers used, or even per unit government inputs.¹⁴

Limitations in technical information have often been cited as a cause for the generally low productivity in the agricultural field. It is true that agricultural research was severely limited during the colonial days; it is also true, as a recent Ministerial policy statement has put it, that "Without conducting research and applying the scientific findings in the field, we can forget all about the improvement of the agricultural industry."¹⁵ Yet, despite these limitations, the question whether the little information available is disseminated beyond the confines of the research station is the more immediate one.

During the colonial period, research findings were either "locked up" in the station or in demonstration farms which the poorer peasants did not visit, or distributed to the plantations, estates and a few African progressive farmers. In 1961, only four big research centers existed--at Ukiriguru in Mwanza, Tengeru in Arusha, Nachingwea in Mtwara and Ilonga in Morogoro (Kiroša District). In addition, there were seven substations run by the government, and two others --Mlingano under the sponsorship of Tanganyika Sisal Growers Association and Lyamungu sponsored by the Tanganyika Coffee

¹⁴Examine, for instance, Morogoro agricultural reports from 1962 to 1972. In almost all the reports, low productivity is attributed to such natural factors as failure of rains, etc.

¹⁵Ministry of Agriculture, "Research Vital to Agriculture," in The Standard, December 18, 1971, p. 65.

Board. The big crop research centers have since increased to eight and the substations to seventeen. Despite continuing problems of manpower in these stations, some progress has been achieved. For example, seeds of higher yield (e.g. hybrid maize, 1969; new cotton variety--"Ilonga 66," etc.) have been developed for the Tanzanian conditions; better methods of preventing crop diseases and controlling insects have been charted out; etc.¹⁶ In addition, there is an expanding Faculty of Agriculture of the University of Dar es Salaam, strategically situated in Morogoro, where there is ample good land for experimentation. There is certainly sufficient information awaiting mobilizers and disseminators; absence of technical information can no longer be a sufficient explanation of low agricultural productivity in the seventies!

The Tanzanian leadership attempted from mid-sixties to encourage the peasants to augment their labor with draught animals and by 1971 some 21 ox-training centers had been established to train peasants in the use of animal power in the areas where tractors would be uneconomic or beyond the reach of the peasants. But response has remained low. For instance, in 1970 only some 12,000 ox-ploughs were bought by peasants, out of which 2,300 were locally made. From the low purchases, it seems that either attendance to the training centers was not enthusiastic or some of those who had attended went back to their traditional tools. Response has been

¹⁶ Ibid.

much better in the case of the Farmers' Training Centers which now take members of ujamaa villages for special causes related to the building of a self-reliant community, including training in carpentry, masonry and similar crafts. Ujamaa villages have the advantage of being 'organized' and the members have more readily taken advantage of training facilities offered by the Government.¹⁷ Thus one argument in favor of a faster pace of rural collectivization has been that it is the only way to accelerate the penetration of ideology and innovation, not only in the agricultural field but also in cottage industries and traditional crafts.¹⁸

The tractor is often preferred to the ox-plough by most Tanzanian peasants, being considered a symbol of modernity. Thus attempts to introduce an intermediate technology, short of tractorization, has often failed to attract the peasants. This is partly a reflection of the emphasis put on mechanization in the past, especially in connection with the settlement schemes. Yet, in very few areas have the peasants been able to afford the tractor or to use it economically where it has been provided (free or on credit) by the Government or Co-operatives.

¹⁷There were 17 Farmers' Training Centers by 1972, with plans to increase the number and courses taught.

¹⁸The National Development Corporation (NDC), which is responsible for the nation's industrialization, worked out in 1972 a program of establishing such industries in ujamaa villages on a nationwide basis. The program had not been finalized at the time of writing. Such industries will be particularly important in introducing co-operative undertakings in the land-hungry areas which cannot form new ujamaa villages.

In many cases, immature mechanization replaced labor which was in great supply. Thus a report on the sisal settlement at Kabuku (Tanga) observed that the settlers had "imitated too slavishly the conditions of work of the big plantations, in particular by using bulldozers for land clearing, which requires too much capital, reduces the employment of local labour, and removes a part of the surface soil, which is by far the richest in humus." It has been estimated that the settlement paid about £40 per acre instead of about £10 or less which would have been possible under labor-intensive methods. Labor-intensive methods could have probably reduced by half the huge total expenditure (about £2.5 million) on the scheme.¹⁹ Other settlements were over-equipped with tractors. For example, in 1967 the Upper Kitete Settlement had ten tractors for 1,600 acres of corn; with better organization half the number would have been sufficient. Moreover, often there were no arrangements to use these tractors for other purposes (e.g. transportation of manure, etc.) during off-season periods, most of them remaining idle (rusting) most of the time.²⁰ The question of mechanization in the ujamaa era will be discussed in another section.

The increased agricultural output, however, resulted more from longer hours of work spent on enlarged farms than from the use of tractors which is still restricted to a few

¹⁹ Dumont, Tanzanian Agriculture after the Arusha Declaration, p. 8.

²⁰ See ibid. for more examples.

areas and settlements. This meant that the peasants (at least the hard-working ones) had little time left for other development activities. After independence, campaigns for better houses, modern latrines, literacy classes, etc., went hand in hand with the campaigns for increased crop output; but often the more hard-working peasants had little time to attend to these non-farm development activities. Emphasis on greater productivity on smaller, manageable farms would result in a more 'balanced' rural/peasant development. Furthermore, concentration on productivity is now becoming absolutely necessary in the areas with land shortage as well as in ujamaa villages which have the advantage of tighter organization, planning and permanent residence. In actual fact, in absence of outright coercion, voluntary movement to ujamaa villages can only be expected to continue if the existing villages show evidence of higher productivity.

Dependence on Agriculture

For Tanzania at present--and for some time to come--development will depend on the productivity of the agricultural sector; and national policies have recognized this fact. As early as 1965, President Nyerere had stated:

Agricultural progress is the basis of Tanzanian development. This truth is said so often that people forget it. They almost don't listen; the words become part of the atmosphere, and have no impact any more. To talk of the importance of agriculture is like playing a record which has been heard too often. Yet it remains true. Agricultural progress is indeed the basis of Tanzanian

Development--and thus of a better standard of living for the people of Tanzania.²¹

It is even more urgent in the seventies than it was in the sixties to re-emphasize the importance of agriculture, and the rural areas generally where more than 90 percent of the population lives, because the nation has already adopted a development ideology, and because it is clear that the Tanzanian path to socialist development will inevitably be heavily "agrarian." A few statistics may illuminate the overriding importance of agriculture for Tanzania's future development, and hence the urgent need to concentrate on 'higher productivity' of the peasants.

First, because of low productivity, the Government has used its thin foreign exchange on food imports, especially in the years of droughts--1961, 1965, 1967 and, more recently, 1973 and 1974 (see Chapter 2). Thus each community should be encouraged to produce at least sufficient food to feed itself. Second, the more productive areas should produce a food surplus to feed more than 44 percent of the total population (14 million by 1974) which is 14 years or below; 9 percent of the population who are 50 years old and over; some 500,000 adults and their wives currently (i.e. 1974) working outside agriculture; and an extra 5.3 million people by 1980 (who will still be infants) resulting from the present rather

²¹Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, p. 104. The President made this comment in an address at the opening of the Morogoro Agricultural College, November 18, 1965. This college became the University's Faculty of Agriculture in July, 1969.

high rate of population growth (3 percent per annum). Third, to improve the low life expectation (40 years in 1972, cf. 70 in the U.S.), emphasis on the quality and variety of food produced and consumed locally is necessary. Fourth, the rate of industrialization will continue to depend on exports of cash crops. In 1972, for example, between 85 and 90 percent of the country's total exports consisted of raw or processed agricultural products.

Expansion of exports (which requires increased rural productivity) is made more necessary in the seventies by the rising prices of capital goods which Tanzania needs for her infant industry (now growing at about 15 percent per annum). For example, whereas in 1965 a tractor could be bought with about 5.3 tons of cotton or 17.3 tons of sisal, by 1972 the equivalent tractor required about 8 tons of cotton and 42 tons of sisal. The prices for these and other key cash crops experienced a downward trend from the mid-sixties, as the prices for capital goods went up in foreign markets. In "real" terms, then, the growing agricultural output did not result in a significant increase in national purchasing capacity. Tanzania's growing processing industry (e.g. the textiles) will benefit the country more if most of the raw materials are produced locally.²²

Finally, political mobilization in the post-independence, particularly in the post-Arusha, period has heightened

²²Most of the statistics are taken from the Party paper on Agriculture.

material expectations among the peasants. Two development plans (the third beginning in July, 1974) have been launched with promises of material self-improvement; what has been termed Tanzania's "Radio Revolution" has communicated these messages to the remotest villages of the country.²³ This has increased, rather than decreased, peasant dependence on the state to supply the necessary material inputs. Yet, ultimately, the state's capacity to supply the rural areas with the necessary material inputs depends on the productivity of these areas. Thus the state is faced with a dilemma: the extent to which it can pressure the peasantry not only to be self-reliant but to improve productivity beyond subsistence. We mentioned earlier that mobilization for independence took advantage of peasants' grievances against agricultural regulations enforced by the colonial administration. This "advantage" produced negative consequences after independence. Thus an entire decade (1962 to 1972) went without any systematic enforcement of such important rules as those of soil conservation (ridging, terracing, etc.). These rules were so much associated with the oppression of the colonial regime that neither the Party nor the administrative and field cadres were inclined to enforce them beyond verbal pronounce-

²³For the role of the mass media in Tanzania, see Graham Mytton, "Mass Media and TANU: Information Flow in Tanzania and its Relevance to Development" (Paper for the 1970 Universities of East Africa Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, December 27-31, 1970); and Budd Hall and Stephen Lucus, "The Election as an Exercise in Political Communication," in Election Study Committee, Socialism and Participation: Tanzania's 1970 National Elections (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1974).

ments in village meetings and resolutions in various development committees. It became difficult for the local Party functionaries to begin enforcing the same rules which they had denounced as oppressive.²⁴

The New Agriculture

The Party admitted in 1972 that this relaxation was partly responsible for the increasing deterioration of soil and the low productivity in many areas. The Party admitted also that available technical information, though scanty, had not been fully utilized. A new policy paper, suggestively titled "Politics is Agriculture," was thus issued in May, 1972, at the same time as the government administration was being decentralized. The paper emphasized productivity and soil conservation but discouraged indiscriminate use of tractors. Three essentials were listed for the new agriculture:

Modern methods are known. Many of our people have been trained, information is obtainable from books, from Ukulima wa Kisasa [i.e. modern farming program of the Ministry of Agriculture], and on Radio Tanzania. Modern methods do not demand much capital. The first essential is the use of modern seeds, early planting, proper spacing, plenty of weeding, adequate harvesting effort, and cleansing of the land afterwards. Also, soil conservation methods such as terracing, ridging or ensuring ground coverage. None of these need cost money, only intelligent work. The second essential is the use of fertiliser and, where necessary, insecticide. These should be available on credit to Ujamaa villages and members of

²⁴ Minutes of Morogoro's Regional Development Committee, 1967 to 1972, for instance, have a number of such resolutions, especially with regard to the people on the Uluguru Mountains where erosion was becoming excessive; but none of these resolutions had been implemented.

Co-operative Societies. The third essential is simple, small-scale irrigation where practicable, and the use of better tools such as ox-ploughs, ox-carts, wheelbarrows, etc. Tractors are only useful when a farm is large, properly organized and disciplined, and equipped to maintain the tractors and to run them properly. Without these things, a tractor can be a disaster, can ruin the peasant and destroy the land.²⁵

Unity of Politics and Technique

The Party paper on agriculture called upon the Party to play a greater role in mobilizing the peasants for higher productivity, thus: "Although Government employs many agricultural workers to advise the farmers, and is constantly improving their training, TANU leaders must take an active part in spreading better agricultural practices." Experience had shown that the past separation of politics (or Party role) from technique (or role of agricultural experts) had weakened the mobilization effort because (1) "Agricultural advisors can only help if the farmers are willing to learn from them," which required Party animation; and (2) "Agricultural workers cannot be at every village at the most critical times, but the better methods must be implemented everywhere now." Thus the new agriculture required unity of politics and technique.

To achieve this unity, every TANU leader in the rural areas would have four jobs relating to agriculture, namely (1) to learn the basic principles of good husbandry for the crops in his area; (2) to explain to the people in his area

²⁵"Politics in Agriculture," Part III, "What is Required."

why old agricultural practices are no longer good enough and to "make the farmers anxious to learn, and willing to practice, the new methods"; (3) to arrange for Field Assistants to come to the villages at the appropriate times or, if necessary, to teach these new methods himself; and (4) to cooperate with the distributive institutions of the state, such as the State Trading Corporation (STC) and the Co-operatives, to ensure that fertilizers and other essential equipment are available in his area at the right time.²⁶

If implemented as outlined, the new agricultural policy should go a long way in removing some of the conflicts (elaborated later) between politics and technique by ensuring that politico-ideological messages are closely related to specific technical information required by the peasants for their self-improvement. Thus, the paper emphasized: "Political education involves agricultural education, and agricultural education is part of political education." Furthermore, the role of local TANU cadres was for the first time specified in some detail. In the past, TANU cadres at the subdistrict level hardly considered themselves to have a role in the agricultural field beyond shouting such slogans as "produce more," "work hard" or "be self-reliant," slogans which remained abstract because these leaders were themselves unable to show, in practice, how these efforts would lead to higher productivity. The new policy demands more than that:

²⁶ Ibid., Part IV, "The Responsibilities of TANU."

It is a question of making everyone understand (a) that our production per acre is going down, (b) that we are destroying our land by our present agricultural methods, and (c) that urgent steps are necessary to improve productivity and to safeguard the soil. But good husbandry cannot be taught by addressing mass meetings; only by discussion and by shared work. It is action--good farming--which is required, not words at public meetings.²⁷

The new agricultural policy entails a heavy training task; it would mean giving all--or almost all--Party Cell Leaders, Branch Secretaries and Chairmen, etc., courses on the basic principles of agriculture. Agricultural seminars were held in 1972 and continued in 1973 for some of these leaders, but no specific training program had been formulated. One possibility would be to expand the existing Farmers' Training Centers and to build many more; another is to use the existing extension staff already in the field to train the Party cadre 'on the spot' using local community centers, school buildings in evenings and, of course, the Ministerial demonstration farms and ujamaa villages. Whatever method is adopted, a clear guidance from the center (i.e. Party and the Ministry of Agriculture mainly) will be necessary. At present it is not even clear whether these Party officials will be remunerated for the additional teaching responsibility or whether some of them will be placed on the ministerial list of field staff.

Unless these questions are clarified from the beginning, what appears to be a resolution of politics-technique

²⁷ Ibid., "Conclusion."

conflict may create more conflicts in the future, particularly if the Party cadres are given the illusion that a few seminars on agriculture places them at par with the ministerial Assistants who have formal training. Again, success of the program will probably depend on a more rapid collectivization which will make training of leaders (based in ujamaa villages) easier. Moreover, given that the extension service is now ujamaa-oriented, training of additional cadres will necessarily have to be ujamaa-oriented. Yet, there is a "transitional" dilemma of deciding between ujamaa and productivity, because at present the greater part of the agricultural output comes from non-ujamaa farmers. This means, therefore, campaigns for higher productivity cannot now be separated from the campaigns for more rapid collectivization, otherwise there will be two efforts contradicting each other and probably leading to mutual cancellation. The problems that are likely to face the Party in executing its enlarged role will be discussed later.

THE POLITICS OF AGRICULTURE IN MOROGORO:
A CASE OF CONFLICTING PRIORITIES

The fluctuations of agricultural output in Morogoro between 1962 and 1972 reflected the fluctuations in policies and priorities enunciated by the central or local leadership. Morogoro region has a variety of climatic and soil conditions, and most villages/wards in the region are suitable for a number of crops--cotton, paddy, maize, coffee, sunflower,

wheat, sugar cane, sisal, beans, vegetables, and many more. Even though the problem of overcrowding continues to inhibit development in such areas as the Uluguru Mountains in Morogoro District, land shortage does not exist, taking the Region or the District as a whole. Few regions are endowed with such a climatic variety capable of supporting production of almost all the crops grown in Tanzania. Yet Morogoro has remained relatively backward; and until 1972, not a single cash crop had been firmly established among the peasantry, even though a wide variety had been tried in various parts on a small scale. A report of the Regional Director of Agriculture for Morogoro expressed a concern about the failure to make firm choices from available alternatives:

Although the presence of good land for a variety of crops is a blessing for Morogoro, on the other hand this blessing is causing a problem to both peasants and leaders, a problem of determining and choosing the crops which will give the maximum benefit to the farmer and which ought to be given top priority.²⁸

The relatively low agricultural output in Morogoro, in proportion to its potential, between 1962 and 1972 was mainly due to two factors, namely (1) conflicting policies or priorities and (2) low mobilization of the peasantry. To illustrate these two aspects, we shall restrict ourselves to two cash crops, cotton and sugar cane, particularly in Morogoro District.

²⁸Regional Agricultural Director, Morogoro, "Kilimo cha Mazao ya Fedha--Mkoa wa Morogoro," March 28, 1972, p. 1. My translation from Swahili.

Cotton in Morogoro and Policy Conflict

Starting at Ilonga Research Station, Kilosa District, in the 1940s, cotton spread gradually to other parts of Morogoro Region, reaching a production of 16,500 bales in 1960. Though producing a relatively small amount in comparison with the main cotton areas of Tanzania (e.g. those around Lake Victoria), the peasantry in Morogoro had accepted cotton as a possible cash crop by the time of independence. What remained was a systematic encouragement and campaigns for the use of the right methods and expansion. Far from being systematic, the campaigns for cotton in Morogoro were so contradictory that the loss of enthusiasm in the late sixties and early seventies must be attributed more to the leadership than to the peasantry. Table 4 below shows the progress of cotton in the region between 1961 and 1965 and between 1966 and 1970. The two periods represent major policy shifts with regard to cotton in the region.²⁹

As Table 4 (a) and (b) shows, cotton failed to "take off" in Morogoro during the first decade of independence. Having reached a peak in 1965 (30,000 bales), it continued to decline and by 1970 it was at the lowest level (3,500 bales). Although the fall is partly explainable in terms of 'rational' response by the peasants to the fluctuations in prices

²⁹ Ibid.; Table 4 is extracted from Appendix A, "Mazao Yaliyokusanywa Kutoka Kwa Wakulima--Moko wa Morogoro." Morogoro Region has three Districts--Morogoro, Kilosa and Ulanga; the declining trend was experienced in all the Districts.

Table 4
 PROGRESS OF COTTON IN MOROGORO REGION

a. 1961-65									
1961		1962		1963		1964		1965	
Bales	Shs.	Bales	Shs.	Bales	Shs.	Bales	Shs.	Bales	Shs.
3,042	1,232,600	3,003	1,504,176	7,431	1,495,200	18,339	17,199,660	30,201	19,733,160

b. 1966-70									
1966		1967		1968		1969		1970	
Bales	Shs.	Bales	Shs.	Bales	Shs.	Bales	Shs.	Bales	Shs.
17,316	2,984,350	6,584	1,189,456	2,493	464,400	9,080	1,629,243	3,555	3,477,692

(and these were very wide), this factor alone cannot explain the virtual disappearance of cotton in Morogoro after an initial promise.

Another possible factor is the competition between food crops and cash crops. In many wards of Morogoro, there was certainly a conflict between cotton and paddy, as we shall discuss below; but the conflict would not have arisen if there had been careful planning at the local level to ensure a balance between the two crops; or if the center had systematically used prices as an incentive (positive or negative) through price stabilization techniques or subsidies to avoid too wide fluctuations in prices of key cash crops.³⁰

The first few years of independence saw a widespread famine in Tanzania as a whole due mainly to severe droughts and floods. This experience justified an emphasis on food crops. In Morogoro, emphasis was placed on paddy and other food crops such as maize, beans and millet; and thus cotton production went down from over 16,000 bales in 1960 to about 3,000 bales in 1962. Upon the arrival of the first Regional Commissioner in 1962, however, Morogoro saw a new emphasis on cotton. Convinced that cotton was more profitable than paddy, the Regional Commissioner campaigned heavily for it.

³⁰The Lint and Seed Marketing Board (or now, the Tanzania Cotton Authority) attempted to stabilize cotton prices by subsidizing the farmer when world prices became too low, but there does not appear to have been a coordination between this effort and that of other organs concerned with food crops. Thus, for example, a policy to encourage cotton in an area would fail if rice prices were set higher than that of cotton.

Every adult, man or woman, was compelled to grow at least one acre of cotton.

The campaigns had two main weaknesses. First, in some areas minimum acreage was enforced without consulting the technical personnel regarding suitability of soil or relative advantages of cotton and other possible cash or food crops. This failure to assess the 'opportunity cost' of each individual area led to wastages in peasants' energies and government funds. Second, between 1963 and 1965, the heavy emphasis placed on cotton ignored food production, an extreme instance being in Kilosa where some peasants were forced to uproot their paddy and maize and to plant cotton instead. Such measures increased peasants' dislike for cotton which was already proving less lucrative than paddy.³¹ In the eyes of the peasants, such measures represented not only a contradiction of an earlier emphasis but also endangered survival, and would avoid them whenever possible. However, the region was able to increase its cotton production four-fold within two years of campaigns, from 7,430 bales in 1963 to 30,000 bales in 1965, a peak for Morogoro until the seventies.

Although the manner in which the uncoordinated campaigns were launched had discouraged some peasants, by 1965 some of the larger peasants (in block farms) were beginning to like cotton because they were able to make use of the

³¹Some Kilosa peasants are said to have sent a delegation to Dar es Salaam to complain to the President about the unreasonable enforcement of cotton.

facilities put at their disposal by the Government and credit institutions. For instance, the National Development Credit Agency (NDCA) provided seventy tractors for the region, and four million shillings were made available for fertilizers, insecticides, etc., under the control of the co-operatives. Indeed, there were more facilities (capital and manpower) involved in promoting cotton in Morogoro than the output justified. In some areas, aerial spraying of block farms was used with much unnecessary wastages and alleged corruption.³²

However, as the peasants were beginning to appreciate cotton, emphasis changed again in 1967/68 when a new Regional Commissioner was appointed. Fully aware of the unpopularity of his predecessor, and the better prices of paddy (relative to its lower production cost) existing then, the new R.C. toured the Region giving the peasants an option between paddy and cotton. Most peasants opted for paddy, being food as well as cash earner, and requiring less labor and such other inputs as insecticides and fertilizers. The result was that only 2,500 bales of cotton were produced in 1968, much of it coming from the block farmers of Kilosa District.³³

The policy of national self-reliance ushered by the Arusha Declaration emphasized the importance of the rural areas and the role that agriculture would play in providing

³² Interview with agricultural personnel in Morogoro, May 25, 1972, September 5, 1972, and January 17, 1973.

³³ Morogoro District, which had no block farming tradition, produced only 350 bales of cotton in 1958.

food and cash crops for export. This required a careful balance between cash and food crops. In response to this call, leaders in Morogoro began campaigning for cotton again, but this time encouraging the peasants to ensure production of sufficient food. In 1969/70, a new variety--"Ilonga 66"--was introduced and free insecticide was given to attract the peasants. The output rose to 9,000 bales. But when in 1970/71 no free insecticide was provided, production fell again to 3,000 bales. Roughly the same number of peasants had cultivated in 1970/71 as in the previous year (and weather conditions were comparable), but very little spraying was done because most peasants were reluctant to buy insecticides. It was estimated that, had there been proper care--weeding, spraying etc.--the acreage (5,000 in total) would have produced about 10,000 bales instead of 3,000. Of the 5,000 tins of insecticide (DDT liquid) ordered for 5,000 acres (i.e. a tin per acre) for 1970/71, only 2,000 tins were bought, which means some farms were not sprayed at all, others being sprayed thinly to minimize costs.³⁴

In 1971/72, it was decided to stimulate cotton production by providing free insecticide again. Thus some 8,000 more tins were bought (making a total of 11,000 for estimated 11,000 acres) and distributed free to the peasants by the Morogoro Co-operative Union. Being free, there was now more

³⁴ The DDT liquid was rather expensive for an ordinary peasant, shs. 62 per tin (compared to shs. 30 per tin of DDT powder), a disincentive to many peasants.

demand for insecticide than the Union could afford! This graphically demonstrated the problem of instilling the new norms of self-reliance in a peasantry already used to government subventions; as a Morogoro Co-operative Union functionary neatly put it:

The peasants in Morogoro have as yet to learn that self-reliance means that they have to pay for the inputs they receive from the Government and the Co-operative Union. At present, as in the past, the peasants are reluctant to pay for these things. . . . They avoid the use of insecticide when they are asked to pay for it; they scramble for it when it is free. Some report larger acreage than they have cultivated and collect more insecticide than they need, assuming that the insecticide will do the production for them. . . . We must continue to teach the peasants the philosophy of self-reliance.³⁵

There were many instances of default in loan repayment in Morogoro, and co-operative societies had virtually given up the effort to chase peasants to pay their fertilizer and insecticide loans. The indebted peasants used their sons or neighbors to help them sell their cotton in order to avoid loan 'deductions.' (All cotton is sold through the primary societies responsible for collection in their respective areas.) The societies fear to harass the defaulting peasants lest it results in a further 'dislike' for cotton which is now given national emphasis. In the sixties, some societies decided to give loans selectively to trusted peasants, but this did not work either; much insecticide remained unused and there were accusations of favoritism, corruption, etc.,

³⁵ Interview with the Secretary of the Morogoro Co-operative Union, October 24, 1972.

leading to intervention by local populists.³⁶

Following the enunciation of the new agricultural policy in May, 1972, the Government decided to develop agriculture through "national diversification" and "regional specialization." This entailed (a) growing the 'best' crop on the 'best' soil, so that a region which is more suitable for a particular cash or food crop than others should put greater emphasis on that crop, while maintaining a good balance between food and cash crops; and (b) a greater variety of both cash and food crops is to be encouraged to increase the country's alternatives on the fluctuating world market.³⁷ "The irony of our colonial experience," stated an editorial comment on the new policy, "has been . . . serving as a source of raw materials for the metropolitan power and as a ready market for the latter's costly manufactures. As a result, our own economy has been lop-sided and increasingly reliant on a few selected cash crops whose prices are ever plummeting down"; and thus:

Implicit in the Government decision is the introduction of crop specialization at village, district and regional levels. Admittedly, there are areas in the country well endowed for the production of particular cash and/or food crops. Intensified attention to food crops will undoubtedly contribute to Tanzania's diversification

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ The policy had been outlined briefly by the Second Vice-President, Rashidi Kawawa, in March, 1972. Later in the year, the Ministry of Agriculture prepared specific programs for such crops as cotton, maize, wheat, etc., to guide local implementers.

of her economy. Such a crop specialization will facilitate the growth of an internal market that will allow a free exchange of agricultural goods and monies and the maximization of agricultural production. Furthermore, it will be easy for the people and the Government to set up associated industries in particular crop growing areas so that the industrial investment does not suffer from a lack of raw materials. "Explicit in the announcement is the use of negative incentives to peasants of an area or areas who do not readily accept crop specialization. It has to be remembered that the bulk of our population in the countryside concentrates on subsistence farming. This has been going on for generations.³⁸

Had 'negative incentives' (i.e. manipulation of price mechanisms under state control) been used earlier, cotton would have probably thrived in Morogoro; but as we shall continue to argue in the following two chapters, 'negative incentives' must be accompanied with 'positive mobilization' of the peasantry if success is to be achieved. However, following the adoption of the new policy, cotton was one of the cash crops given top national priority for rapid expansion, and Morogoro Region was specifically identified as one of the areas that will contribute to the expansion. The President himself went to Morogoro in May, 1972, to campaign for cotton, among other crops; and in July that year the Morogoro Regional Development Committee (RDC) listed cotton as the top priority cash crop.³⁹

Thus the leaders in Morogoro began a heavy campaign for cotton again. Administrative decentralization brought

³⁸ Editorial Comment, The Standard, March 8, 1972, p. 1.

³⁹ Department of Agriculture, "Mwongozo wa Kilimo Mkoa wa Morogoro, 1972/73," a guideline showing what crops grow best in what wards and the best way to plant and care for them (Morogoro, July, 1972).

optimism to Morogoro leaders that rational planning and coordinated mobilization would now be possible, as the Area Commissioner for Morogoro District stated: "Successive leaders in Morogoro, for the past few years, have variously over-emphasized food crops at the expense of cash crop production or cash crop at the expense of food crop production. All is now set to reorganize the order of emphasis with a view to balancing the situation."⁴⁰

Peasant Distrust

Yet, for three main reasons, the leaders will find it difficult to revitalize cotton in Morogoro. First, much effort will be needed to overcome the peasant distrust engendered by the contradictory policies of the past decade. This problem has been well stated by one close observer:

The cotton case in Morogoro illustrates a number of things: First, that the people respect the advice of their leaders. Thus, whereas cotton was fast becoming the main cash crop between 1950 and 1960, cultivation was later abandoned when leaders emphasized new priorities. The leaders are now considering possibilities of revitalizing cotton-growing. When this is done, the leaders in the region will have turned round a full circle in their policies. This trial-and-error method in peasant agriculture has its own disadvantages. First and foremost, it only succeeds in destroying the spirit of innovation among peasants.⁴¹

It will be necessary to convince the peasants, through attractive prices, concerted campaigns by both technocrats and politicians that this is not just another transitory

⁴⁰Quoted by Guide Magome, "Introducing Cotton to Morogoro," Daily News, July 31, 1972.

⁴¹Ibid.

emphasis but a genuine government commitment. Second, according to the list of crop priorities issued in July, 1972, by the Agricultural Department in Morogoro, each ward is allocated a number of cash and food crops, reflecting the prevailing local interpretation of "self-reliance" as meaning that every small unit must depend on its own production. This local interpretation is not altogether in line with the national idea of "specialization" which would require that certain Wards or Divisions 'specialize' in certain key crops, according to their soil conditions, and then use their earnings to acquire the things they are unable to produce from other Wards, Divisions, Districts or even Regions.⁴² As the Regional crop guidelines stand, for instance, cotton will continue to conflict with paddy because the two are listed together in most wards. There was no indication as to how compliance with the guidelines would be enforced, especially outside ujamaa villages.

Third, in the absence of "coercion" or greater Party animation, the peasants will still opt for paddy which is food as well as money earner, besides the fact that it involves less labor. The conflict between the two crops arises from the fact that they are planted and harvested roughly at the same time. Morogoro people, like most people in the

⁴²In the absence of clear guidance from the center, the present administrative decentralization can lead to the desire for each Region to be narrowly "self-reliant" and make the policy of "regional specialization" and "national diversification" inoperable.

entire coastal belt from Tanga to Kilwa, are fond of "leisure" and "feasts"; and in the absence of more effective mobilization, compliance with national crop priorities cannot be expected.⁴³ The extent to which the local politicians will be prepared to overcome this traditional inertia, which will probably need a more aggressive style of mobilization, remains unclear, as we shall elaborate in the following chapters.

The Politics of Sugar Cane Production: A Dilemma for Policy Makers

The story of sugar cane growing in Morogoro in the past decade illustrates other problems of rural development in a situation of rapid ideological and policy changes. In particular, we shall concentrate on the dilemma of deciding between wider participation in sugar cane growing (to meet the country's ideological criterion) and higher productivity by concentrating efforts and funds on a few established producers (to meet a purely economic criterion).

We should make it clear that we have no a priori assumption that either of these alternatives is necessarily more "economic" than the other. For instance, wider participation can in the long run solve the problem of low purchasing capacity of the peasants, and therefore has economic as

⁴³ For a similar view of the people in Tanga and Handeni Districts, see Clyde R. Ingle, From Village to State in Tanzania: The Politics of Rural Development (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), especially Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

well as politico-ideological implications." However, the dilemma results from the fact of "transition" from concentration of inputs in a few hands to a wider distribution of these inputs, which means not only interrupting production targets of well-established groups but also mobilizing new producers who cannot be expected to meet national targets for the coming few years. In other words, the politics of sugar cane growing in Morogoro illustrate the problem of "transition" from one development ideology to another, with some lessons for the kind and degree of mobilization still awaiting the Party.

The need to expand sugar cane production in Tangania is indisputable. First, internal consumption of sugar has risen considerably in the past decade, so that despite much effort to expand production and processing, the country has not been able to satisfy the internal market. For instance, total production of sugar in 1972 (from the country's five factories) was about 95,000 metric tons, while consumption of sugar was in the order of 135,000 tons, the extra sugar having been imported at the cost of 68.8 million shillings. Second, the growing cattle industry (as well as Tanzania's Konyagi--whisky--industry) stands to benefit from the molasses. Third, there is plenty of good land, especially in Morogoro Region (Wami and Kilombero Valleys) for cane growing, providing a good opportunity to enlarge rural employment and improve the peasants' productive capacity. Finally, despite competition on the world market, sugar can in the future

became an important cash earner for Tanzania, if production costs can be minimized. Two factories exist in Morogoro Region, one at Kilombero (Ulanga District) and the other at Mtibwa (Morogoro District). Our analysis concentrates on the politics of sugar cane around Mtibwa Estate from 1962 to 1973.

The Story of Mtibwa

The story of Mtibwa Estate from the early sixties has been a story of an "interaction" between peasants and a capitalist enclave established in their midst; the former struggling to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by the latter with the assistance of local political leaders. The relative gains of the two sides partly depended on the ideology and priorities emphasized by the center at any particular time, and therefore both sides appealed to the center for mediation, using the slogans of the prevailing ideology to justify their claims. Two phases are discernible in this struggle. Phase one extends from 1962 to about 1970, when the center (the mediator) tended to support the peasants (an "outgrower" group) against what was then seen as an "exploitation" of a foreign-owned, capitalist enclave. The second phase, 1970-1973, had a policy dilemma: the center, while encouraging higher productivity, placed emphasis elsewhere (production via Ujamaa), leaving the two sides wondering as to what their future would be. To that story we now turn.

Around 1960, a few peasants in Turiani Division (some

75 miles north of Morogoro town) began to plant sugar cane around the Mtibwa Sugar Estate owned by a certain Greek settler named Stephen Emmanuels. Partly to meet his own processing targets and partly to respond to the growing political pressures after independence, the settler encouraged the peasants around his Estate to cultivate sugar cane. For the first few years, there was a smooth interaction between the peasant outgrowers and the Estate factory, the latter supplying the necessary assistance such as husbandry techniques and transportation of cane from the scattered peasants' farms to the factory.

Trouble began when the Estate was sold to Messrs Thakabhai and Manubhai Patel of Kenya, and later (1967) resold to the Madhvani Group of Companies which had the monopoly of the sugar industry in Uganda. These latter companies belonged to well-established Asian industrialists in East Africa; and they tended to use a purely economic criterion in their dealings with the budding peasant outgrowers. The presence of two Asian Planters in the area competing with the peasants to supply cane to the Asian-owned factory heightened the peasant politics.

The peasant outgrowers accused the new company of (1) lack of co-operation, (2) favoritism (i.e. buying more cane from the Asian settlers), (3) paying them low prices on the pretext that their cane had low sugar content; (4) refusing to supply transport, etc. In these complaints, the peasants had full support of the local Party organization which as-

sisted them in securing the intervention by the Member of Parliament, the Area and Regional Commissioners.

The issue rose above the local political arena on July 28, 1968, when the Regional Commissioner appointed a high-powered, four-man committee to investigate the problems of outgrowers and their relations with the Estate.⁴⁴ The Committee acted quickly and presented its report to the R.C. on August 17, 1968.⁴⁵ Led by a powerful political figure, the Regional Chairman of TANU, the Committee was able to get the General Manager of Mtibwa to "admit mistakes of the past and to accept a new orientation" which would strengthen the position of the peasant outgrowers. The Company agreed to (1) absorb all the cane of outgrowers; (2) co-operate with them to ensure availability of transport and credit which they would repay from their earnings; (3) work out a schedule of sales for the outgrowers; (4) make proper sucrose tests in the determination of fair prices, etc.⁴⁶

⁴⁴The four included the Regional Chairman of TANU, the District Agricultural Officer, the Divisional Executive Secretary for Turiani, and TANU Branch Secretary; Turiani. Their specific mandate was to report on (1) acreage of the outgrowers; (2) annual tonnage of sugar cane; (3) how the outgrowers sold their cane; (4) the types of problems they faced; (5) Mtibwa Estate's views regarding outgrowers; and (6) capacity of the mill (Morogoro Region, File D.3/14/Vol. III/551).

⁴⁵Morogoro Regional Office, File Ref. G/SUG./59. The report gives a brief historical background to the cane growing in Mtibwa Valley.

⁴⁶Ibid. The procedure was to get a sample from the farm for the purpose of testing for sugar content, and then to determine the price for the whole yield by the outcome of the test. The price per ton ranged from shs. 37/63 to shs.

By 1968, there were 31 peasant outgrowers in the Mtibwa area, with a total of 506 acres, ranging from 95 acres per person (highest) to two acres (lowest) and farm distances from the factory between 13 miles (farthest) and 140 yards (closest). The above 'agreement' seemed to have solved some of their problems, especially that of transport of cane from distant farms. The Area Commissioner was instructed by his regional boss to enforce compliance with the agreement, with a warning that the Government would deal sternly with any attempt by the Company to act contrary to the agreement or in any way discourage the peasant outgrowers.⁴⁷

It appears that the General Manager of the Estate had accepted the terms of the agreement to avoid a political confrontation at a high level; for a few days later the Company explained (in a long letter to the Regional Commissioner and M.P. for Morogoro (North) why compliance would be difficult from practical and economic points of view. First, the factory was small and in bad condition; spare parts would take six to eight months and Mtibwa would not expand immediately; hence they had in vain advised the outgrowers not to plant more cane before these problems were solved. Second, supply of transport to distant and scattered peasant farms was expensive because roads were impassable and peasants refused to

40/73, depending on sucrose content. Because transport claimed about shs. 16 per ton, it means the farmer got about shs. 20 per ton.

⁴⁷Morogoro District Office, File ref. D.3/14/Vol. III/355, August 28, 1968.

remove stumps from the land, causing damage to Company transport. Third, the peasants were themselves competing with each other, bypassing Company sale schedules. Thus, "may we kindly request you [i.e. R.C. and M.P.] to make the farmers understand our position, and not to plant any more sugar cane until the project materializes and until we request them to do so. . . ." ⁴⁸

There was no immediate response to this complaint, and the agreement remained in force at least for the 1968/69 season. Although the outgrowers, the regional leadership and local politicians in Turiani had the feeling that the Estate was deliberately discouraging African outgrowers--and perhaps there was something to that effect--the Estate, on its side, had a legitimate complaint to make about the unpredictable production behavior of the peasant outgrowers. The key element in their complaint was the "irregularity of supply." They emphasized that the peasants had no sense of planning; therefore it became difficult to co-ordinate Company targets of sugar crushing and processing with the outgrower's "unplanned decision to enlarge or reduce his farm." ⁴⁹ The wide fluctuations in outgrower output between 1964 and 1968 (see Table 5 below) support the Estate's argument. For instance, the Estate factory had been taken almost unawares in 1968

⁴⁸ Morogoro Regional Office, File ref. GEN./A/1024/68, August 29, 1968.

⁴⁹ Mtibwa Sugar Factory, ref. A.3/12, letter to Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, August 5, 1969.

when the outgrowers supplied some 24,000 tons of cane as compared to about 3,500 tons in 1967. The fluctuations from 364 tons in 1964 to 6,504 tons in 1965 and 3,615 tons in 1966 are also noteworthy from a planning point of view. Whatever the reason for these fluctuations, by 1969 the Estate was facing a big problem of coordinating their own cane production targets (by 1968 the Estate was producing over 50 percent of the cane required by its mill) and crushing targets, for the cane must be delivered and crushed on the same day that it is cut to preserve sucrose.

Table 5

GROWTH OF OUTGROWER SUGAR CANE AROUND MTIBWA ESTATE,
1964 TO 1968

Year	Total Cane Crushed (tons)	Outgrower's Cane (tons)	% of Outgrower Cane to total crushed
1964	19,358	364	1.8%
1965	38,746	6,504	16.7%
1966	42,060	3,615	8.5%
1967	29,965	3,447	11.5%
1968	56,166	24,253	43.2%

SOURCE: Mtibwa Sugar Estate Ltd., "Farmer's Cane Supply to Mtibwa Sugar Estate Limited," a letter to Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Dar Es Salaam, Ref. A.3/12, of August 5, 1969.

These technical problems were brought to the attention of the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture in August, 1969. In a well-argued letter to the Ministry, the Estate

intimated a conference with the ministerial representatives from Dar es Salaam, Regional and District leaders concerned and local leaders "with a view to regularising the Cane Farmers or Outgrowers at Mtibwa," and complained:

In the past, various approaches have been made to the appropriate authorities, including the Regional Commissioner and Area Commissioner and the local TANU representatives of Morogoro, with a view to regularising the Cane Farmers planting and its supply. Unfortunately, our efforts have been in vain. The farmers have also been repeatedly advised not to plant cane indiscriminately but to plant it with a prior knowledge and approval from the Sugar Factory who will eventually be responsible for receiving their cane at the Factory. The supply in the past has been very irregular and it has been found difficult to co-ordinate this supply with our own plantations and keep the Factory going to its full capacity.⁵⁰

The solution to the problem, the Estate suggested, would be to encourage the outgrowers to channel their cane through co-operatives as at Kilombero. As we shall see later, however, the Estate had in mind capitalist, rather than socialist, co-operatives, for when the Government suggested ujamaa production as a solution to the many technical problems they had raised, the Estate applied for more land in order to expand its own production.

The outgrowers, on their part, aware of the new national emphasis on co-operative farming, had by August, 1969, constituted themselves into a "Wananchi Cane Outgrowers Association" and had applied for registration.⁵¹ They however

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 2.

⁵¹ Turiani Divisional Office, File ref. TUR/D.2/3/Vol. II/99, letter of August 20, 1969, from Turiani Executive Officer to the Area Commissioner, Morogoro.

continued to produce and transact with the Estate individually as before. That the Association was a "symbolic compliance" with the new national ideology to strengthen the members' bargaining capacity is clear from the fact that until now it has not undergone ujamaa transformation. However, its executive committee held an emergency meeting on August 18, 1969, to react to the charges of the Estate contained in the letter to the Ministry; and a week later petitioned the Area Commissioner about these charges, repudiating the Estate's proposal for a conference with the Ministry in very stern terms:

The attempt to initiate a conference with the Ministry should be procedurally condemned and discouraged unless and until the agenda has been dealt with unsuccessfully at divisional, district and regional level.

The allegation that Regional and District authorities have failed to promote any understanding between the company and ourselves is devoid of foundation. A delegation from the Regional/District Offices had a meeting on 18/8/69 with Company officials where it was agreed that supply of Farmers' cane should be made according to a programme to be drawn up by the local TANU branch so as to pave the way for the formation of a Cane Grower's Association. Until this system was later violated by the new General Manager from Uganda, the supply of cane to the Factory had been orderly and satisfactory to both parties. The violation of that system has brought us back to maltreatment. . . . The fact is therefore that present Factory Management is recalcitrant at the mediatory directives of both the Regional and District Authorities and commits breach of agreements, in favour of their incognito partner--the Dizungu Farm [owned by an Asian Planter].⁵²

The "breach of contract," the Association argued, arose from the fact that participation of its members in sugar cane growing had in the first place been "launched and

⁵² Turiani Divisional Office, File ref. A.13/12, letter of August 25, 1969, p. 1.

encouraged by the Factory who provided us the cane suckers . . . as well as the skill and we have to-date abided by their instruction as to the maximum tonnage." The Association accused the Estate of having cheated the Government by reporting that in 1968 the African outgrowers had produced and sold 24,253 tons, whereas the correct figure was only 12,310, "while that of their partner [i.e. Dizungu Farm] was 11,087." In phrases reflecting the prevailing anti-foreign exploitation mood of the Arusha Declaration, the Association called the attention of the Government towards what it considered exploitation of peasants, adding: "the inclusion of the Dizungu Farm in the outgrowers list is a mystery intended to victimise our output," for "Dizungu Farm is an overseas territory of the Mtibwa Sugar Estate and it is for this reason that the [Asian] farmers have been irreproachable, and have an easy twenty-four-hour access to the Factory as regards delivery and similar functions."⁵³

Following the agreement between the Estate Manager and the Regional Commissioner's committee in 1968 and various local political pressures in the following year, the Manager informed the Asian Planters on July 28, 1969, that the Factory would give priority to the cane from peasant outgrowers. On September 12, 1969, the Dizungu Farm complained, via their advocates in Dar es Salaam, that this move would be a breach of contract. Like the Wananchi Out-growers Association, they

⁵³Ibid.

argued that their endeavors (started in 1961) had been encouraged by the Estate itself. Emmanuel, the original owner of the Estate Factory, had agreed to take from them up to 100 acres' cane, Messrs Thakabhai and Manubhai Patel up to 400 acres' cane, and Madhvani up to 800 acres' cane--or a total of 20,000 tons of cane annually. They had supplied 18,000 tons during the 1968/69 season (a figure included in the total attributed to peasant production). By 1969 the Farm had 650 acres of cane and the Company had promised to continue taking all their cane. The Farm, therefore, requested the Estate to honor the agreement to avoid a possible legal confrontation, adding: "We appreciate your crushing and cane position and that of the indigenous growers in Turiani area as well."⁵⁴

Meanwhile, on August 18, 1969, a fire broke out in the Estate's cane field at Kunke location, which was described by the Manager of the Estate in a petitioning letter to the Area Commissioner as "a foul play and sabotage" by the African outgrowers. The Manager requested the Government to intervene against what could lead to "a big national loss."⁵⁵ Three more fires--on September 30, October 14 and October 15, 1969--broke out, causing damage to Estate's cane estimated at Shs. 150,000. "We firmly believe all these fires were pur-

⁵⁴ Patel & Co., Advocates, Dar es Salaam, letter to Manager of Mtibwa Estate, ref. No. DIZ/MT/AG/3661 of September 12, 1969.

⁵⁵ Mtibwa Sugar Factory, Letter ref. GOV/A/1103/69 of October 26, 1969.

posely put up by some mischief mongers," complained the Manager in a stern letter to the Divisional Secretary.⁵⁶

The Area Commissioner had to intervene with instructions to the Turiani Divisional Secretary to convene an urgent meeting and warn all farmers against causing damages by burning the Estate farms. From the address of the Divisional Secretary to the Association members on November 1, 1969, it is clear that the peasants were using the local Party organization as a weapon to fight their 'enemy.' This 'enemy,' stressed the Divisional Secretary, was creating wealth for the nation, especially because the state had acquired controlling shares in the Factory, even though the management remained unchanged. What had started as a "silent class struggle" was now beginning to be destructive.⁵⁷

Further measures were taken to bring the situation under control. At a meeting held on September 15, 1969, in Turiani, the Regional Chairman of TANU, the Area Commissioner and the M.P. for Morogoro North agreed that the Company should be instructed to negotiate with the Association's

⁵⁶ Mtibwa Sugar Factory, Letter ref. GOV/A/1388/69 of October 20, 1969. The post of Divisional Executive Officer, which had been created in 1963 to replace traditional chieftaincy, was redesignated Divisional Secretary in 1969, giving the holder a dual Party-government function as the Area and Regional Commissioners. In 1973, these latter two were redesignated Area and Regional Secretary, respectively, to emphasize their role as Party secretaries in their respective areas.

⁵⁷ Paraphrase of letter ref. TUR/A3/17/70 of November 6, 1969, from Turiani Divisional Secretary to Area Commissioner, Morogoro.

leadership rather than with individual growers, so as to avoid the allegations of individual members that the Company was taking advantage of their technical ignorance to exploit them.⁵⁸ Two weeks later, the Area Commissioner's Reconciliation Committee met with representatives of the Association and the Estate, and a new agreement was reached.⁵⁹ Despite the agreement, however, friction between the two sides continued. Thus by 1970 (end of phase one), the estate was being pressured from all sides--by peasant outgrowers, by Asian Planters, and by local politicians. As an Estate official put it: "There were manoeuvres from all sides, and our plans for expansion were made in the midst of uncertainties."⁶⁰ Before we examine the "larger issues" arising from this story, we shall first present briefly the Ujamaa phase of the struggle.

By 1970, the Government had acquired controlling shares of Mtibwa Sugar Factory in keeping with the policies of the Arusha Declaration. Moreover, expansion of the sugar industry in Morogoro was designated a 'national project.' However, the Government was now thinking in terms of communal production via ujamaa villages rather than production by

⁵⁸Turiani Divisional Office, Letter ref. A.3/12 of September 18, 1969, from Divisional Secretary to General Manager, Mtibwa Estate.

⁵⁹Morogoro Regional Office, Letter ref. A.3/12/28 of October 14, 1969, from Administrative Officer, Morogoro, to the Area Secretary, Morogoro.

⁶⁰Interview at Mtibwa Factory, December 21, 1972.

individual outgrowers. Until May, 1973, when we concluded research in the Turiani area, the changed emphasis had left both the outgrowers and Estate management in abeyance, awaiting the outcome of a prolonged debate that was going on between technocrats and politicians in the District and Regional Development Committees.

The issue of the debate concerned implementation rather than policy; the national policy to promote rural productivity via ujamaa villages is firm. The implementers were then concerned with how to switch from individual to communal production without failing national production targets. The Estate (and Government) had spent some 73 million shillings on a ten-fold expansion of the Mtibwa Factory, and the expanded mill would be ready by January, 1973. This meant that a ten-fold expansion of sugar cane production was necessary if the capacity of the mill was to be fully utilized, a real challenge to the mobilizers. Several proposals were put forward. Since these proposals do illustrate some of the decisional dilemmas facing implementers of national policy in this critical period of transition to rural socialism, we shall outline them briefly below.

The Larger Issues

Three possibilities which would meet the national criteria of higher productivity within wide participation were discussed at the regional level. First, to avoid underutilization of the enlarged mill, it was initially suggested that

the Estate should expand its own cane production so as to supply most of the cane while efforts continued to mobilize ujamaa production. The economic advantages of this were obvious; the Estate had the equipment, technique, experience and personnel. By 1971, the Estate was in control of 7,000 acres of land--3,500 developed and 3,500 undeveloped. As the new factory would process between 420,000 and 600,000 tons of cane annually instead of the existing capacity of 60,000 tons, the Estate requested an additional 7,000 acres.

The Regional Development Committee (RDC) was initially reluctant to approve allocation of more land to the Estate for two main reasons. First, while appreciating the economic argument, the Committee (mainly the 'populist' element) argued that emphasis on Estate production would ultimately make it more difficult to meet the requirement of wider peasant participation. Second, the Estate wanted its additional land consolidated around the factory, which meant that ujamaa villages would produce their cane far from the factory and face the problem of transport experienced by the outgrowers. After a prolonged discussion, with most of the technocrats in the Committee being in favor of the Estate's request, 500 additional acres were granted; but the Committee insisted that at least half of the total cane processed should come from ujamaa villages.⁶¹

Second, to meet the challenge of the increased process-

⁶¹ Interview with Regional Director of Agriculture, Morogoro, July 5, 1972.

ing capacity, it was suggested that a few, highly mechanized and modernized ujamaa villages should be established around the factory. The Estate, using their "experience of similar project elsewhere in East Africa," presented an elaborate 'Ujamaa Planters Scheme' to the RDC. Briefly, the main features of the scheme would involve the following:⁶²

1. No. of families = 1,250
2. No. of acres per family = 10 acres
3. Area to be planted = 12,500 acres
4. Area for building roads = 350 acres
5. Total area for the Scheme = 12,850 acres
6. The scheme to be fully developed in 5 years--i.e. 1972/73-1976/77
7. After the initial 5 years, the families to get up to shs. 4,800 per annum; in the meantime, every member to receive shs 5 per day subsistence allowance
8. Additionally, the families to inherit all the capital expenses after 1977 when Government loan is paid up--e.g. houses, schools, dispensaries, etc.
9. The Scheme to be under Estate Control--under a manager earning shs. 4,000 per month.
10. Productivity to rise to 22 tons per acre (cf. about 8-15 tons in existing outgrowers' farms)
11. Total Government loan 1972/73-1973/74 = Shs. 5,596,000

These proposals are interesting because they illustrate the strong tendency for the technocrats (as well as the politicians) to "resurrect" the settlement schemes of the sixties in the form of "modern" ujamaa villages, in their genuine attempts to meet the challenge of productivity.

These particular proposals, however, happened to have come from the Estate's management rather than from the RDC. The economic arguments given by the Estate in support of their

⁶²Mtibwa Sugar Estate, "Feasibility Study of Ujamaa Villages Around Mtibwa Sugar Estate for Outgrowers' Cane Plantation," Appendix A.

scheme are similar to those given a decade earlier (1962) in defense of highly capitalized, mechanized settlement schemes. As they emphasized in their feasibility report, "The entire scheme is worked out on absolute commercial consideration."⁶³ Presented to the RDC in September, 1971, the proposals had not received official approval or disapproval by mid-1973 when this research ended.⁶⁴ The long delay in giving a decision was undoubtedly a result of an understandable dilemma of choosing between possible short-term productivity and the expected long-term advantages of wider participation. However, most of the members of the RDC interviewed were against the scheme for two main reasons. First, they pointed out correctly that the net effect of the scheme would be to "undo" the ujamaa ideology itself by emphasizing dependence on the state and bureaucrats. Second, it was argued that if the equally capitalized, mechanized and bureaucratically controlled settlement schemes failed, there was no reason to expect that this new experiment would succeed in the midst of socialist campaigns.

It is worth pursuing these points a little further, particularly because the question of mechanizing ujamaa villages has been an on-going debate in Tanzania since the Arusha Declaration, but especially since 1971 when the Party directed that all rural development facilities should be concen-

⁶³Ibid., p. 1.

⁶⁴ Interview at Mtibwa Sugar Estate, December 21, 1972.

trated in ujamaa villages. Consider the above proposals as an example of a mechanized and modernized "super-village." Even if we suppose that the scheme would meet the productivity goals of the state, it would destroy the very ethical principles of "equality" on which ujamaa ideology rests. First, consider the huge amounts involved for a few villagers. The Government would spend about six million shillings in two years (1973-1974) so as to enable them to earn an average of nearly shs. 5,000 per annum by 1977. Considering that per capita income in the rural areas of Tanzania is probably less than shs. 400 per annum (certainly much less in Turiani), the Scheme's families would constitute a privileged enclave in the midst of poor peasants. Second, the scheme would fail the norms of self-reliance and the idea of opening up job opportunities using labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive methods. Third, whereas the scheme would provide incentives to the villagers around Mtibwa, it would most probably be a disincentive for other peasants whose villages depended on their sweat rather than Government subventions. Moreover, so far there is no evidence to show that the two highly modernized ujamaa villages in Tanzania--Butiama in Musoma and Chamwino in Dodoma--are serving as "models" of ujamaa living and high productivity.⁶⁵

⁶⁵ Both villages were established with much government assistance, the President himself having spent several weeks at Chamwino making bricks for the houses of the new village in mid-1971. Butiama was the first to get electricity. Plans for electrifying ujamaa villages were announced in 1972, but they have not yet been implemented.

Third, the only acceptable option was thus to widen participation in cane growing by members of ujamaa villages with minimal mechanization. This was in line with the national policy. The irony of these debates, however, was that huge cane quotas were assigned ujamaa villages which did not really exist at the time. Until mid-1973, only two cane-growing ujamaa villages existed in Turiani Division, Kidudwe and Lukenge, both within two miles from the factory. These villages were producing a very small amount of cane even for the old mill's crushing capacity. Their combined production for 1972, according to Mtibwa's leaders, would scarcely meet one day's crushing requirement of the new factory. The initial crushing capacity of the expanded mill is 1,500 tons of cane per day which should produce 40,000 tons of sugar per annum, with the possibility of increased daily intake to 2,000 tons of cane and 52,000 tons of sugar per annum. Initially, 420,000 tons of cane would be crushed annually, the Estate providing 210,000 tons and ujamaa outgrowers 210,000, instead of the 25,000 tons per year supplied by the individual outgrowers.⁶⁶ This indicates the magnitude of mobilization yet to be undertaken in connection with cane production via ujamaa villages in Morogoro.

Since 1970, campaigns for more cane-growing ujamaa villages had been undertaken by regional and district Party and Government personnel, but response had not been forth-

⁶⁶"Feasibility Study of Ujamaa Villages," pp. 1-3.

coming. In a special session of the RDC held on the subject in August, 1971, the Regional Commissioner informed the members that cane growing in Morogoro would be declared a "national project" so as to facilitate mobilization. Three strategies were adopted. First, the Party would increase its mobilizational effort "to convince the villagers on the importance of cane growing for themselves and the nation." Second, the Ministry of Agriculture would appoint one officer to be known as "Project Manager" to coordinate the cane program. Third, arrangements would be made to get money from the Regional Development Fund (RDF) and other sources to assist peasants in co-operative production of cane.⁶⁷ As we shall show more clearly in connection with other undertakings discussed in the next chapter, funds presented no problem at all in all the projects we examined, and therefore "money shortage" cannot be used to explain poor results.

By mid-1973, the situation had not changed, and the new factory remained underutilized to the extent of more than 75 percent. There is "double" loss in this kind of underutilization. First, interest continues to be paid on the 73 million shillings borrowed for the mill's expansion. Second, by 1974 the nation was spending not less than 150 million shillings (out of its meager foreign reserves) to purchase sugar from foreign markets. For the ujamaa villages (within economic distances from the factory) to be able to contribute

⁶⁷ Interview with the Project Manager, August 8, 1972.

their annual quota of 210,000 tons of cane, it will probably require a twenty-fold increase in the present number of participating villages and a real revolution in productivity.

Furthermore, with the emphasis on ujamaa, the role of the existing private outgrowers remains unclear; yet, at the present rate of ujamaa mobilization, their contribution of cane remains important. If the Party could convert these experienced growers into an ujamaa collective, their higher productivity would probably be a good example to budding villages; but there was no evidence that the local Party organization had exerted pressure on the Wananchi Cane Outgrowers Association, nor did the members of the Association have immediate plans to transform themselves into an ujamaa community. Their useful experience may, like the new factory, remain underutilized if the Party support is withdrawn.⁶⁸ Most of the problems raised in this chapter will be elaborated in the next ^{two} chapters in which we shall examine more closely the current "mobilizational strategy" and the prospects for democratic socialist transformation.

⁶⁸ These views are based on interviews with local Party leaders in Turiani Division and members of the Association carried out from December 5 to 22, 1972.

Chapter 8

MOBILIZATION FOR UJAMAA AND PEASANT RESPONSE

While investment in capital is undoubtedly necessary for economic growth, it is certainly not the controlling or predominant factor. Economists are not yet in a position to analyse this matter fully; but we can say that the principal factors in economic growth are not physical--natural resources and invested capital--but human.

--Colin Clark, Growthmanship: A Study in the Methodology of Investment (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1961), p. 13.

The "human factor" is particularly important in Tanzania's development for three main reasons. First, the country's development depends heavily on the increased output of millions of scattered small-holder peasants. Thus the task of bringing the peasants together is a prerequisite for any development work beyond subsistence in many areas of rural Tanzania. Second, some local traditions do set a constraint on agricultural development. Moreover, some aspects of tradition such as the fear of witchcraft have in some areas slowed down the rate of movement into ujamaa villages. Third, the colonial instrumentalism gave rise to the

embourgeoisement response among the peasant 'modernists' who may either (a) resist collectivization or (b) emphasize the consumption function over the production function of ujamaa villages, leading to interpretations of the national ideology in distributive (but not in productionist) terms. A vigorous mobilization of the peasantry is required to overcome these tendencies. We shall use Morogoro's experience with mobilization for ujamaa villages during the period 1968 to 1973 to illustrate these problems.

It should be emphasized that collectivization of the rural population is not just a method of achieving equitable distribution of resources; it is a prerequisite for rural development, especially in the areas where the population is scattered thinly over a large area for traditional, ecological and other reasons. The Arusha Declaration listed what it called "four prerequisites of development"--people, land, good policies and good leadership, in that order.¹ The emphasis on "people" (i.e. the human factor) in the third stage of Ujamaa evolution, and especially with regard to the rural areas, is appropriate. Taking the country as a whole, land is not a major constraint on development at present; again, Tanzania has gone further

¹The Arusha Declaration, pp. 13-18.

than many other developing nations in clarifying her development policies; and, apart from the temptations of embourgeoisement and lack of trained cadres at the local level, the country's central leadership has thus far shown imagination and commitment. It is therefore possible that the people's side of the development equation may, after the current programs of leadership training have born fruit, prove to be the main source of weakness.

We see perpetuation of the traditional inertia as the main weakness on the people's side of the development equation. This inertia has perpetuated indolence and fear of innovation in many rural communities. The Arusha Declaration recognized this fact and listed hard work and knowledge as the "conditions of development."² It stated: "Everybody wants development; but not everybody understands and accepts the basic requirements for development. The biggest requirement is hard work. Let us go to the villages and talk to our people and see whether or not it is possible for them to work harder."³ The Declaration correctly emphasized that hard work by the peasants without new information or knowledge

²Ibid., pp. 14-16.

³Ibid., p. 14.

could not bring about development.⁴ Indeed, as we saw in the, previous chapter, one of the weaknesses of the peasant response to the vigorous mobilization effort of the 1962-1972 period was that hard work was not combined with acceptance and use of new knowledge. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear whether the strategy of "talking to the people"--essentially the same strategy of "persuasion" that was used by the improvement model--will be able to overcome the traditional inertia of the peasantry during the third phase of Ujamaa. To this question we shall return after examining the Morogoro evidence.

There is no doubt that one of the crucial tests of the developmental superiority of the current Ujamaa model over the previous rural development models will be the extent to which it can overcome (1) the dysfunctional elements of tradition and (2) the established tendency of the rural villages to look to the state for all development tasks, and instead foster the idea of "self-reliance" as a development norm at the village level. In this task, however, a basic distinction must be made between self-reliance at a subsistence level which characterizes most Tanzanian villages and self-reliance at the higher level of productivity envisaged

⁴Ibid., p. 15.

by post-Arusha policies. The developmental goal of the

Ujamaa model has been formulated as follows:

If every individual is self-reliant, the ten-house cell will be self-reliant; if all the cells are self-reliant, the whole ward will be self-reliant; and if the wards are self-reliant the District will be self-reliant. If the Districts are self-reliant, then the Region is self-reliant, and if the Regions are self-reliant, then the whole Nation is self-reliant and this is our aim.⁵

This kind of self-reliance cannot be achieved without "interfering" with some traditional norms of behavior, especially what we have referred to elsewhere as "the tendency to be on the same level of progress with neighbors" largely for fear of being bewitched.⁶ For many peasants, it will entail the establishment of entirely new communities--i.e. ujamaa villages on new sites--and initial resistance will be expected. In the following section, we shall examine briefly the factors determining peasant response to Ujamaa between 1968 and 1973.

PEASANT RESPONSE TO UJAMAA, 1968 - 1973

The main feature of the revolution in rural Tanzania

⁵Ibid., p. 18.

⁶S. S. Mushi, "African Traditional Culture and the Problems of Rural Modernization," TAAMULI, Vol. 2, No. 2 (July, 1972), pp. 3-16.

has been the rapid growth of ujamaa villages since 1968. The Arusha Declaration made explicit the Party's policy of socialism and self-reliance, but did not give any detailed information on how the rural areas would be socialized, although it placed great emphasis on the need to pay much attention to rural development. This question was clarified by Mwalimu's second post-Arusha policy paper--Ujamaa Vijijini--which called for the establishment of ujamaa villages or co-operative producer communities in which people lived together and worked together for the benefit of all.⁷

The following twelve months witnessed tremendous campaigns by the Party and Government for the creation of such villages. Thus at the end of 1968 a total of 350 villages had been established. By the end of 1969 the number had almost doubled, being 650, with a combined population of about 300,000. At the beginning of 1970, some 1,100 ujamaa villages were recorded, with a population of about 500,000. The number of villages had risen to 2,668 by mid-1971, with a total population of 840,000 or about 6.3 percent of the total mainland population.⁸ Following a presidential

⁷Socialism and Rural Development, published in September, 1967, or seven months after the Declaration.

⁸This number included the "traditional" ujamaa villages such as those found in Sumbawanga.

directive in mid-1971 to place all regional resources at the disposal of ujamaa villages and the introduction of "Operation Dodoma," both the number of villages and population in them almost doubled in six months, being 4,500 villages with a combined population of about 1.6 million or about 12 percent of the mainland population by the end of 1971. By mid-1973, a little over two million people (15 percent of total population) lived in some 5,000 ujamaa villages.⁹

Main Factors

We shall make several comments on the peasant response during this period. Four main factors appear to have influenced the response, namely (1) the need for security, (2) material incentives, (3) politics and leadership, and (4) ecological and traditional factors. We require only brief comments here; more extensive analysis will be made in other sections in connection with Morogoro.

The people living in the border regions--especially in Ruvuma and Mtwara where Portuguese attacks from the south have made the people security-conscious--responded more quickly than those in more secure areas. Thus, for example,

⁹See the Economic Surveys for 1969/70, 1971/72, and 1972/73.

until 1970 more than 50 percent of the total ujamaa villages were in the border regions.

Second, the regional distribution of ujamaa villages suggests that material considerations have been an important factor in determining the pattern of response. Most ujamaa villages are to be found in the areas of sparse population and where good land is still plentiful. These areas are generally also among those with the lowest per capita income, lacking the essential facilities such as water, education and health services. By 1973, over 75 percent of the villages were in such areas. Furthermore, campaigns for ujamaa villages have generally been more successful in low-income areas without permanent cash crops than in those with cash crops; also more successful in agricultural areas than in the pastoralist areas. In the densely populated areas such as Kilimanjaro and parts of West Lake (Bukoba in particular), formation of ujamaa villages has been hampered by the acute land shortage and the presence of permanent cash crops (e.g. coffee) on individual plots which make it difficult for the people to concede to the idea of surrendering their crops to a common pool. The fact that the densely populated areas are also the high-income areas acts as a disincentive for a rapid response to the call for ujamaa villages.

However, land shortage, population density, permanent

cash crops, or the "nomadic" habits of the pastoralist people (e.g. the Masai), etc., cannot be a sufficient explanation for the low response to the ujamaa movement in such areas. Tanzania's land policy makes it possible for people from one area to settle in a different area of the country where land is still ample.¹⁰ The reluctance of the people in the cash crop areas to respond to Ujamaa cannot therefore be attributed to such factors as land shortage; three more factors are at play.

First, there is the natural attachment to one's 'traditional' environment; this attachment is further strengthened by the fact that the colonial administration had favored these areas in the provision of the basic services--schools, hospitals, water, etc. Second, an allied factor is that the colonial instrumentalism penetrated deeper into these areas than in those without cash crops. Third, the local leadership interpreted Ujamaa narrowly, emphasizing physical movement into new sites, which was not possible in the densely populated areas. Thus, for example, most delegates to the district selection meetings for the 1970 elections asked whether the candidate(s) lived in an ujamaa village rather than the broader question whether

¹⁰Thus, for example, in 1969 some Chagga joined new settlements in Mpanda, far away from Kilimanjaro.

the candidates had associated themselves with (or helped to establish) any co-operative group based on ujamaa principles.¹¹ The "frontal approach" advocated by the Second Five-Year Plan would require a wider interpretation of the ujamaa movement than simply a physical movement into new land.¹²

The importance of the material factor and government assistance in peasant response to Ujamaa is graphically demonstrated by the virtual doubling of ujamaa villages in six months (from mid-1971 to end of 1971) when the Government decided to place all resources in the regions--financial and technical--at the disposal of ujamaa villages. The response in Morogoro Region is a good example. The huge Region had lagged behind in the number of villages, having only 19 by December, 1970. The campaigns of the following six months added only three more, making a total of 22 by June, 1971 when the President issued the new directive. The next six months saw a sixfold increase, from 22 to 113 by December, 1971. There is little doubt that the placing of the Regional Development Fund (RDF) at the disposal of ujamaa activities

¹¹For elaboration, see my article in the 1970 election study to which we have already referred.

¹²The Second Plan, Vol. I. See also Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, op. cit., pp. 25-29 where he discusses the different approaches in the cash crop and pastoralist areas.

was the leading factor in this big rise.¹³

We should emphasize that during the period we are analysing (i.e. 1968-73) most ujamaa villages had ample assistance--material and technical--from the Government, co-operative societies, missions, and other sources. For the purposes of credit, supply of government funds, technical assistance and provision of social services, it became necessary in 1970 to classify ujamaa villages into three types, depending on the stage of development they had reached. First, there is the formative stage when villages require financial aid for activities of low economic viability, including clearing bush, construction of access road, purchase of equipment and building materials, provision of seeds and fertilizers, etc.¹⁴

Prior to July, 1972, when decentralization introduced a new organizational form, the responsibility for such villages lay primarily with the district and regional officials of the ministries of Rural Development and Agriculture (which included also Veterinary and Co-operatives). These officials,

¹³Leadership was an additional factor. The Region got a new and more enthusiastic Regional Commissioner in June, 1971, and his extensive campaigns in many wards did contribute to the response.

¹⁴See United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey and Annual Plan (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1971), p. 24.

in consultation with the district and regional Ujamaa Village Co-ordinators, ensured that the budding villages got at least a minimum of the necessary inputs, partly to enable them to move to a higher stage and partly as an incentive for undertaking ujamaa activities. Apart from the ministerial budgets and the self-help and educational funds (controlled by the District Councils), two other sources of assistance to the budding villages existed. The Regional Development Funds, introduced in 1968, was the major source of financial assistance; and the villages that were members of primary marketing co-operative societies continued to receive the same servicing facilities as individual members.

A village enters the second stage of development when its members have learned how to live and work together, have adopted a workable constitution, and the village has become economically viable. At this stage the village is encouraged to register as an Agricultural Association, thereby being eligible for credit from the Tanzania Rural Development Bank established in mid-1971 and other financial institutions.

The final stage comes when the village becomes a full multi-purpose co-operative society, with sufficient economic and managerial security to attract commercial forms of credit from all sorts of financial institutions. The aim is to ultimately replace the existing marketing co-operative

societies with such multi-purpose ujamaa co-operatives in all areas of rural Tanzania. At the current rate, this will certainly take a long time. For instance, of the 4,500 ujamaa villages recognized centrally by May, 1972, 4,125 were still at the formative stage, 261 at the second stage and only 160 had been registered as full multi-purpose co-operative societies.¹⁵ About 40 percent of these societies were in one Region--Iringa--which had 59. Apart from free government services, there has been ample credit facilities for such villages, particularly because they are still few. For example, in the 1972-73 season the Rural Development Bank gave some 5.5 million shillings (as loan) to 44 ujamaa villages in Iringa for the production of maize.¹⁶

It is worth noting here that the provision of huge loans to organizations of "ordinary" peasants is itself a big revolution in government trust of the so-called "common man"; and this is one area in which the Ujamaa model contrasts sharply with the colonial models which placed the small peasant outside the allocative arena and concentrated on the progressive farmers. Most regions will have to double or even treble their present mobilizational efforts to produce

¹⁵Ibid., p. 61. The others had not been properly classified.

¹⁶Daily News, (Dar es Salaam), 27 July 1972.

villages which are as credit-worthy (from economic point of view) as those of Iringa. Morogoro District, for example, did not have a single village in stage three by mid-1973, and most villages had a very low level of productivity, as we shall see later.

Regional Differences

The great ecological and demographic variety in rural Tanzania, coupled with the differences in local traditions and land tenure systems, as well as different educational levels, nature and level of economic activities, etc., have of necessity led to wide differences in the number, size and pattern of ujamaa villages in different areas. With regard to numbers, at the beginning of 1972, five regions--Dodoma, Iringa, Mara, Mtwara and Lindi--accounted for 70 percent of the total ujamaa population; the range being from 11 ujamaa villages (Kilimanjaro) to about 750 in Mtwara. In terms of size, an equally large variation existed, ranging from an average of 82 persons per village in Shinyanga Region to over 770 in Coast and Dodoma Regions. The range becomes even wider if individual ujamaa villages are considered; some having less than 50 people (less than 10 families) while others have over 2,000 people. By mid-1972, the national average was 357 people per ujamaa village (about 60

families).¹⁷

These figures do not, of course, say anything about the level of economic productivity; it all depends on the nature of activity and the composition of the population in each particular village. In most cases, about 40 percent of the village population are children under fifteen who are either in school or in their mother's arms (further reducing the working capacity of the women). About 20 percent are either too old to work or disabled in some manner. Again, it has been estimated on the basis of Morogoro's experience (1968-73) that, on the average, about 20 percent of the working labor force (i.e. the able-bodied adults) will for one reason or another fail to work in the village on any given day.¹⁸ It means that, on the average, only about 20 percent or a little bit more of the village population works on village projects on any given day.

We shall later discuss this composition in connection with specific villages in morogoro, noting the implications for the generation of surplus and eradication of poverty and famine. It suffices to state here that the low labor

¹⁷See The Economic Survey and Annual Plan, 1971/72, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁸Calculated from various statistics on Morogoro ujamaa villages, 1968-73, and interviews with villagers and agricultural field staff in Morogoro.

force in most villages is a transitional problem resulting from the fact that at present (1) many villagers maintain large private farms for security purposes; (2) others have part-time employment outside the village; (3) most villages have not been able to establish communal nurseries to free the women who spend much time looking after their kids, and (4) the traditional obligation to the parents (within and outside the village) has continued, partly because the state has not found alternative security for the rural aged population.¹⁹

Response to innovation and the level of productive work in ujamaa villages has also depended in part on the origin of the village. In some areas, there are traditional ujamaa villages such as those of Sumbawanga. Such villages have the advantage of filial bonds among their members, but this has aided the perpetuation of traditional practices, making it difficult to introduce innovation in husbandry. A few villages started spontaneously in response to the need for security long before the Arusha Declaration, such as those of the Ruruma Association. They achieved a great deal on self-help basis; some have continued to do well after

¹⁹The need to create communal nurseries in ujamaa villages was officially recognized by 1973, but no formal program had been adopted at the time of writing this study.

Arusha, but a few seem to have lost their initial enthusiasm when initiative came from the top.²⁰ In other areas, existing 'settlements' have been converted into ujamaa villages. The capitalist inheritance of such settlements, especially those resulting from the transformation model of the sixties, has been a major constraint on internal ujamaaization. We shall give illustrative cases in the next chapter.

The fourth factor in peasant response has been local leadership and politics. In a number of regions, a change of the Regional Commissioner was followed by a dramatic multiplication of ujamaa villages. Mtwara and Iringa are probably the best examples. In both cases, the personal drive of the R. C., Dr. Wilbert Klerru, was a big factor in accelerating the rate of ujamaaization. Some areas received more central attention than others either because of their internal seeds of capitalism and/or feudalism or because of their extreme poverty. For example, between 1970 and 1972 Iringa received tremendous central attention because of the capitalism and land-lordism that was developing in the maize-growing area of Ismani; and the dynamic

²⁰The Government abolished the Association after Arusha and the Party took charge of the villages. The waning enthusiasm of some villages was communicated to me by Morogoro's Regional Planning Officer who had been in Mtwara for several years. Interview on 27 August, 1972.

Dr. Klerru was transferred to Iringa from Mtwara where he had made mobilizational "successes." The number of villages in Iringa Region rose dramatically from a mere 22 in December, 1970 to 350 in June, 1971, and 651 by December, 1971, a thirty-fold increase within a year. Unfortunately, however, Dr. Klerru was assassinated by a member of the so-called "Ismani kulaks" who had been compelled to surrender his land to Wajamaa.²¹ Again, the big movement into ujamaa villages in Dodoma and Kigoma must in part be attributed to Mwalimu's personal involvement in "Operation Dodoma" (initiated in 1971) and "Operation Kigoma" (initiated in 1972).²² The role of local politics will be illustrated with Morogoro examples in the next chapter.

UJAMAA, TRADITION AND THE PARTY: THE MOROGORO EXPERIENCE

In its application to rural development, the Ujamaa model is supposed to innovate tradition and to eliminate bourgeois tendencies among the leadership and the members

²¹The assassination took place on December 25, 1971. The assassin, Juma Mwamwindi, was given a death sentence by the Iringa High Court, a sentence upheld by the East African Court of Appeal; indicating that the sentence was not necessarily based on considerations of the political importance of Ujamaa for Tanzania but strictly on proper judicial assessment.

²²In mid-1971, Mwalimu spent several weeks in

of the peasant modernists who have absorbed the individualist and enrichissez-vous norms of the colonial instrumentalism. Morogoro's experience with mobilization for ujamaa villages between 1968 and 1973 showed that there were still ambiguities as to the extent to which this goal was being achieved. These ambiguities resulted from the following observations: (1) in some areas, Ujamaa and the local Party and government cadres were absorbed into the local traditions, and thus the local mobilizers became the mobilized; and (2) the lack of a precise definition as to what constituted an ujamaa village (a) gave a chance to the local populists to use Ujamaa as a means to reward their constituents and, consequently, (b) members of ujamaa villages themselves came to view Ujamaa simply as a method of income redistribution.

Traditional Ujima versus Arusha Ujamaa

It is important, first of all, to distinguish traditional forms of co-operation such as Ujima from Ujamaa as defined by Mwalimu in the post-Arusha period. Ujima was based on the principle of reciprocity expressed in mutual assistance in construction of houses or in cultivation and harvesting, etc. Almost every tribe in Tanzania has a tribal equivalent of the

Dodoma making bricks for the now famous Chamwino ujamaa village. He has of course made innumerable visits to various ujamaa villages around the country.

Swahili word "ujima," and this form of co-operation can still be seen in many rural communities in Tanzania.²³ Whereas this traditional co-operation resulted from the need for survival at a subsistence level of production, modern Ujamaa co-operation aims at higher productivity, taking advantage of the traditional "spirit" of co-operation and the wider technological possibilities of the present century.

To see how the peasants view the relationship between traditional forms of co-operation and post-Arusha Ujamaa, we asked a straightforward and open-ended question to some 1500 peasants sampled from various rural communities around the country: "What is the meaning of Ujamaa?"²⁴ The answers are given in table 6 below which also shows separately the responses of an Ujamaa village and a "traditional" village in Morogoro District.²⁵ The responses support some of our

²³Examples include the kyando of the Chagga (Machame) and msaragambo of the Pare.

²⁴This was question number 68 of a questionnaire devised for the study of the 1970 elections in which I participated. See Political Science Department, "Uchunguzi wa Uchaguzi Mkuu wa Mwaka 1970," (The University of Dar es Salaam, 1970), p. 10, hereafter referred to simply as the 1970 Election Study Questionnaire.

²⁵In the case of Kauzeni ujamaa village, there was no sampling; we took all heads of household (and their wives) who were available on the day we administered the questionnaire. In the case of Mikese, "random" sampling methods were used to first select cell leaders who we then asked to provide lists of their members from which the respondents were randomly selected.

Table 6: PEASANTS' RESPONSE TO THE QUESTION: "WHAT IS THE MEANING OF UJAMAA?"

Answers Ujamaa Means:	(a)			(b)		(c)
	Kauzeni Ujamaa Village Morogoro (N = 100)	Mikese Traditional Village Morogoro (N = 100)	National Sample (N = 1505)			% (c)
1. DK/RA/NA	27	50	331			21.3
2. Living together & Co-operating in peace	46	33	708			47.0
3. Living and Work- ing together	23	14	322			20.7
4. Working together for Benefit of all	--	3	110			7.3
5. Self-Reliance	4	--	15			1.0
6. Sharing Joint Production	--	--	12			0.8
7. Eliminating Exploitation	--	--	5			--
8. Sharing of Gov't Aid	--	--	2			--

previous arguments and do indicate the magnitude of mobilization required to make the peasants understand what modern ujamaa entails. These responses require a number of comments.

First, about 80 percent of all respondents were willing to answer the question and gave "intelligible" answers. The 21 percent shown in the table includes those who admitted that they did not know the meaning of Ujamaa (DK) or deliberately refused to answer (RA) as well as those whose answers were considered irrelevant, ambiguous, or inapplicable to our argument (NA) and would not make a difference to the argument if listed separately.²⁶ Further, it is not surprising that the members of Kauzeni Ujamaa village were more willing to give answers (73 percent) than those of the traditional villages in Mikese Ward who had not formed Ujamaa villages (50 percent). Responding to another question: "What news have you heard about ujamaa villages?"²⁷ 77 percent of Mikese respondents either said they had heard nothing or refused to answer. This was obviously a deliberate evasion of an "embarrassing" question because most of them had said they had access to radios or read newspapers, and most of the villages are along the Dar es Salam-Morogoro main road and within only

²⁶Some answers were so vague that it was impossible to categorize them.

²⁷Question number 70 of the 1970 Election Study Questionnaire, p. 10.

about twenty miles from Morogoro town.

Second, it should be noted that the overwhelming majority of the respondents defined Ujamaa in accordance with the traditional norms of co-operation--living together and working together in harmony (see answers in categories 2 and 3), about 68 percent of the national sample, 47 percent of the Mikese respondents and 69 percent of Kauzeni ujamaa villagers. Only about 30 percent of the respondents mentioned some of the key elements in the definition of modern Ujamaa given in the Arusha Declaration and the various writings and speeches of Mwalimu. The key elements include those listed under answer categories 4 to 7, working together for the benefit of all, self-reliance, sharing joint production and elimination of exploitation. The failure to conceive Ujamaa as entailing self-reliance is particularly "conspicuous" (only 15 percent associated Ujamaa with self-reliance) because the national ideology had been formulated, published and disseminated under the title "socialism and self-reliance" (Ujamaa na Kujitegemea), and campaigns by leaders and the mass media had emphasized both elements.

Third, the smallness of the proportion associating Ujamaa with "sharing of joint production" (Mwalimu's principle 2, see below)--12 percent of the whole sample, 0 percent for Mikese and 0 percent for Kauzeni ujamaa village!--is also

very striking. This cannot be explained in terms of lack of information on the part of the respondents, for the national sample included some peasants with a good educational background and access to the mass media.²⁸ Two explanations are possible. First, it is still possible that the peasants failed to distinguish between traditional forms of co-operation (which received a high score) and post-Arusha Ujamaa. This, however, would suggest that the principle of "sharing joint production" and that of "communal ownership of the means of production" were probably not as entrenched in the traditional system(s) as it is generally believed. Mwalimu has listed three principles or what he calls "basic assumptions of traditional life," namely (1) mutual respect--i.e. "a recognition of mutual involvement in one another;" (2) communal ownership of the means of production and sharing of joint production; and (3) obligation to work. He states:

These assumptions were not questioned, or even thought about; but the whole society was both based upon them, and designed to uphold them. They permeated the customs, manners, and education of the people. And although they were not always honored by every individual, they were not challenged; rather the individual continued

²⁸Over 70 tribal groups were included in the sample, with varying ages, educational and social background, and from different economic zones of the country. Moreover, the Arusha Declaration was four years old when we administered the questionnaire.

to be judged by them.²⁹

These "assumptions of traditional life" are generally true, and anthropological work (on Africa and other countries) has shown that they are largely a product of low technology, subsistence living, and little information to control the hazards of the environment. But it must be emphasized that the assumptions are only true at a high level of generality, even in the Tanzanian case. For example, with regard to the communal ownership of the means of production (mainly land), it must be remembered that in most traditional Tanzanian communities land was communally owned by the family, clan, or tribe but individually held although (a) the individual could not sell the land to 'outsiders,' and (b) the land could be taken away from him and allocated to somebody else by the community guardians (elders, chiefs, etc.) if he did not make use of it. It remained his land and could be inherited as long as it was properly used. Furthermore, the traditional forms of co-operation (such as Ujima) were based on the principle of reciprocity rather than joint production per se, even among members of the same family.³⁰

²⁹Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

³⁰These matters are elaborated in my article "Ujamaa: Modernization by Traditionalization," TAAMULI, Vol. 2, No. 1, (January, 1972), pp. 1-18.

What we are suggesting is that there are some important differences between the Ujamaa model of Arusha and that of the traditional community; some of the differences are suggested by the responses listed in table 6 above. The mobilizational cadres must be aware of these differences which suggest that the pillars of Ujamaa must be built rather than assumed to exist.³¹ This brings us to the second, and more plausible, explanation of the low score for the principle of sharing joint production. It seems likely that the peasants were defining Ujamaa not according to what they thought--indeed, knew--it meant 'officially' but rather according to what they would like it to mean. This would suggest that the embourgeoisement phenomenon and the norms of the colonial instrumentalism penetrated deeper into the rural society than it is generally assumed (even in this study).³²

Fourth, probably the most striking feature of the responses is the failure to associate Ujamaa with elimination of exploitation. Out of the national sample, only five

³¹See ibid. for a more detailed comment.

³²The sample, however, includes groups which were already in the 'modernist' rather than 'traditionalist' category; we had no sample from the remote villages, for many of these are in areas with acute communication problems.

people (about 1/3 percent) gave answers which could be interpreted as meaning elimination of exploitation. This supports our previous argument regarding the non-revolutionary nature of the stratification in rural Tanzania. An entirely different result would have been obtained, of course, if the same question had been asked in such areas as Ismani or some parts of Bukoba where the smaller peasants and farm laborers have recently been 'struggling' against local capitalists or feudalists. Yet even the members of Kauzeni ujamaa village did not define ujamaa as a method of eliminating exploitation of man by man; nor as involving the sharing of joint production, even though the villagers had already shared two joint harvests.³³

If the responses do generally support the notion that the peasants have a low socialist consciousness and that they do not view socialism as necessarily entailing "class struggle," they do also reveal that most peasants in Tanzania still value at least the traditional "spirit" of living together, working together and co-operating for mutual benefit. This is

³³Two years later, 1972, there were problems regarding sharing of joint production at Kauzeni and Mkata and a few members were expelled for doing too little and demanding too much; a few left the villages complaining that they did not get their due share of the proceeds. The criteria of rewards had not been well established in many ujamaa villages in Morogoro.

precisely what Mwalimu intended to take advantage of in building modern forms of co-operation, and that is partly why he defined Ujamaa in traditional terms. In the Morogoro case, however, there was no evidence that this traditional spirit of co-operation, as manifested in seasonal co-operation among the peasants and in various 'mutual help' organizations, was being used as the basis for gradual transformation into ujamaa collectives in areas where traditions of co-operation still existed. This would supplement, rather than replace, the physical movement to new sites which is obviously necessary in some areas.

The heavy emphasis on the latter approach also meant that much of the initiative for forming ujamaa villages came from the District or even Regional headquarters which supplied the 'modern' inputs (e.g. tractors, etc.) and often the sub-district leadership (particularly at the ward and cell levels) was unable to take full advantage of local opportunities for various forms of ujamaa co-operation.³⁴ This interpretation

³⁴ Examination of minutes of various divisions of Morogoro district--especially Kinole, Turiani and Bwakira Chiri--1969-72, revealed the heavy dependence of the local leadership on the definitions of ujamaa supplied by the district populist-bureaucratic leadership. Apart from commercial and transport co-operatives, ujamaa was viewed simply as movement to new sites; but there was no consideration of how local traditions could be used to promote ujamaa life whether or not it entailed movement. Movement into new sites is possible in Morogoro because land is still plentiful; yet in some areas

of the ujamaa movement as being primarily a responsibility for the populist and bureaucratic elites at 'higher' levels (district, region or even State House) is not quite in line with the frontal and step-by-step approach defined by Mwalimu:

Where necessary . . . progress can be made in three stages. The first may be to persuade people to move their houses into a single village, if possible near water, and to plant their next year's food crops within easy reach of the area where the houses will be. For some peoples in Tanzania this will be quite a change in living habits, so that in certain areas this may be the second rather than the first stage in the progress. For another step is to persuade a group of people--perhaps the members of a ten-house cell--to start a communal plot (or some other communal activity) on which they work co-operatively, sharing the proceeds at harvest time according to the work they each have done . . . In either of these cases, and whether or not the people are living together in a village at this stage, the people would keep their individual plots; the community farm would be an extra effort instead of each family trying to expand its own acreage. Once these two steps had been effected, the final stage would come when the people have confidence in a community farm, so that they are willing to invest all their effort in it, simply keeping gardens around their own houses for special vegetables, etc. Then the socialist village will be really established and other productive community activities can get under way.³⁵

Although all these steps would not be followed 'mechanically' in every area, they are certainly necessary in

it is still possible to gradually transform existing communities into ujamaa collectives, as it was done in some parts of China where traditional 'mutual help' organizations and traditions existed.

³⁵Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, p. 22.

some areas. In Mikese Ward, for example, there are some traditional villages with sufficient population and good land for an ujamaa community, without entailing much physical movement or immediately pulling down their houses. Most campaigns were put in terms of 'moving out' of these villages into some other villages. On several occasions, we heard the following remarks from Mikese peasants (indeed, from the cell leaders themselves): "We have good land here; we have our houses and a few crops; we are living as a community although we do not as yet have a communal farm."³⁶ The "habit" of working together on a communal farm or other activity was unfortunately not reactivated in the areas which had not formed "formal" ujamaa villages. Yet, it is precisely in those areas where the people are more 'traditional,' for most of those who joined ujamaa villages in the first phase of collectivization in Morogoro District (1969-72) were people who fall in the 'modernist' category (minus efficiency), many of them having been former members of the settlement schemes of the sixties (Mkata, Bwakira Chini, Kidudwe, etc.); or travelled widely in search of labor in estates or towns.³⁷

³⁶Interviews in Mikese Ward, October to December, 1970.

³⁷Moreover, the villages with such 'modernists' have been notorious in their expectation of government subventions, as we shall see in the next chapter.

To be fair to the implementers, however, it must be remembered that the failure to interpret Ujamaa more widely and to fully utilize "traditional attitudes" was partly a result of the weak organizational structure before the re-organization of July, 1972; as we pointed out in chapters 4 and 7, the organizational variable did weaken the mobilization of the improvement (or community development)--approach, 1962-1972. Furthermore, the wider approach outlined by the President would require a well-trained local cadre; for, as the President realized, it would entail not merely implementation of a standard model worked out at the center (whether district, regional or national), but also a careful analysis of the traditions and customs of every locality:

It is obvious . . . that with the variations in potential, in soils and in social customs, it would be absurd to set down one pattern of progress or one plan which must be followed by everyone. What is necessary is the objective of an ujamaa community. The interim steps and the detailed organization should be adapted to the local circumstances--which include an understanding of the people's traditional attitudes as well as the degree of the people's political understanding and their acceptance of this social objective.³⁸

Such an approach would certainly require a well-trained cadre at the sub-district level. However, it is now

³⁸Nyerere, Socialism and Rural Development, pp. 22-23.

possible to attempt 'location planning' with the existing manpower because of the more rational organization introduced by decentralization. In the pre-decentralization period, the field staff at the subdistrict level, besides being largely 'unsupervised,' could not work as a team because of the existing administrative structure. As one experienced Agricultural Officer put it: "Some field workers were themselves absorbed into the local systems, enjoying local drinking parties and various ceremonies and festivities."³⁹

In actual fact, the Party cadre (cell leaders, branch secretary and chairman, etc.) was even more entrenched into the traditional systems than the government cadre which in most cases consisted of people from other parts of the country and with some education and travelling experience. This was particularly true in the more remote villages, especially in Turiani and the Uluguru Mountain areas. In a number of villages in such areas the Party cadre consisted of people who had traditional titles--mshenga, mndewa, etc.⁴⁰ In two wards of Turiani Division, Msovero and Kibati, the executive officers were also the traditional leaders of their areas.

³⁹Interview with Mr. Chombo, Director of Agriculture, Morogoro Region, 3 July, 1972.

⁴⁰These positions embodied roles which are similar to those now performed by the cell leader and ward executive officer, respectively.

In some villages of Turiani, in particular, the Party branch and cell seemed to have been "mobilized" into tradition instead of mobilizing tradition.⁴¹

But even in places like Mikese, with urban influences and accessibility, one could still notice the influence of tradition or possible conflict between the Party cell leader and mshenga, the traditional leader. For example, in several occasions we were asked by Mikese peasants whether we wanted to discuss village matters with the cell leader or mshenga. In at least one occasion, an interview session was delayed for two hours because mshenga had not arrived, even though the cell leader was present. In other words, even where the traditional leader had lost his official powers, he was still recognized and, in a few areas at least, effective. We are not suggesting that this is necessarily a bad thing; we are simply pointing out the possibility of the mobilizers being the mobilized because of the lack of an innovative cadre in many rural villages.

⁴¹Interviews in Turiani, November-December, 1972. I owe this information particularly to Community Development and Agricultural field workers in Turiani as well as the Divisional Secretary who patiently explained to me the mobilizational problems in Turiani. From what I could gather, the local Party was more absorbed into the traditional network in Turiani than in many other areas of Morogoro District, partly because of the high rate of survival of traditional leadership, partly because of communication problems, and partly because of the deeply entrenched traditions of the Nguu people in the area.

Legitimational versus Developmental Mobilization

The Party has been more effective at the local level in what we could call "ceremonial mobilization" and "legitimational mobilization" than in "developmental mobilization." Thus, for example, the local Party has been more effective in organizing mass demonstrations in support of national policies or condemnation of saboteurs, and also more effective (using the cell leadership, etc.) in mobilizing the peasants for national elections than in pressuring the peasants to form ujamaa villages, to complete outstanding self-help projects, or to accept innovation in agricultural practices.⁴² This point requires a clarification. In talking about the effectiveness of the Party, one must distinguish two levels--the strong, dynamic, revolutionary center, and the thousands of local branches whose mobilizational effectiveness depend on a host of local factors, such as communication, traditional political systems, presence or absence of a cadre aware of, and committed to, the national ideology, etc.

⁴²In the 1970 elections, for example, the party cell leaders were used in the voter registration effort and over 70 percent of the eligible population was registered. Furthermore, the Party used more than 75 percent of the campaign time in campaigning for a big "yes" vote for the President; campaign for ujamaa coming in only indirectly insofar as it was enumerated as one of the contributions of the Presidential candidate. While the "legitimational" concerns are obviously essential for national unity, more could have been said on Ujamaa during the campaigns.

There have been varying interpretations of TANU's mobilization strength, from those which see it as the best organized party in Africa to those who see it as a weak reed. Representing the first view, Friedland, for example, emphasized the reality of TANU's power which had made the Party "a focal institution, an institution which pervades and dominates all other institutions and society."⁴³ Henry Bienen, on the other hand, emphasized the implementational weaknesses of the Party: "TANU is, indeed, hierarchically organized and led by a charismatic leader. Yet Tanganyika is only partially and intermittently ruled by the national TANU elite. TANU is still a party where the relationships between the center and the organizations outside Dar es Salaam pose problems for the leaders."⁴⁴ Raymond Hopkins adds a third view. He states that the conflicting views on TANU's strength can be reconciled "if one considers that the first is based on TANU's strength relative to other national organizations, while the second relates TANU's strength to its ability to effect change, especially of a developmental or integrative

⁴³William H. Friedland, "The Evolution of Tanganyika's Political System" (Program of East African Studies, Syracuse University, Occasional Paper No. 10), p. 18.

⁴⁴Bienen, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

nature, at the local level."⁴⁵

Our interpretation of the Party's strength is a little different. The Party is strong and weak at the same time; and, paradoxically, it finds strength in its weakness and weakness in its strength, depending on whether one wants to emphasize the integration-legitimational function (i.e. political stability) or the technico-developmental function (i.e. economic development). TANU is stronger on the former than on the latter function, as we pointed out in chapter 6; and strength in the former sets a constraint on efforts to increase strength in the latter function, as we shall elaborate below.

The central leadership, however, has not only been concerned with authority legitimation. Its strength has been expressed in its ability to generate new options for the political system as opportunity arises. On the other hand, the local party organs have not generated a sufficient implementation capacity to cope with the ever growing role of the Party and various central initiatives. TANU's is not, strictly speaking, an "organizational weakness;" it is rather a weakness of internal dynamism on the part of its local organs resulting from the lack of a cadre which is at the

⁴⁵Raymond F. Hopkins, Political Roles in a New State: Tanzania's First Decade (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 31.

same time skillful and committed to the initiatives of the center.

The paradox and dilemma of the situation arises as follows. The central leadership has used its "populist strength" acquired in the last two decades to generate new development options. All these options (Arusha Declaration, Mwongozo, Iringa Agricultural policy, etc.) received popular support in the form of demonstrations, congratulatory messages, etc., all being vitally important for the integration-legitimational function. The problem has been transforming the "populist strength" into a "developmental strength." This entails a technical challenge at the local level, a replacement of one set of practices or methods with another. In some cases, the leadership has to decide between some form of 'compulsion' to overcome the inertia of the past at the "political risk" of diminishing populist support and accepting a slower rate of change. What we are suggesting is that the Party's "populist strength" can itself act as a constraint on a more aggressive style of mobilization to accelerate change within the local and traditional systems.

THE PARTY-PEASANT RELATIONSHIP

To assess the populist strength of the Party relative to other agents of change, we asked a group of Kauzeni and

Mikese peasants (100 in each case) an open-ended question with three parts: "Whom would you contact if you had a problem relating to (a) money, (b) education for your children, and (c) domestic quarrels or misunderstandings with your neighbors?"⁴⁶ The responses (table 7 below) left no doubt whatsoever as to the deep penetration of the Party into the minds of the peasants. For each of the three items--money, education and quarrels--there was, of course, a "relevant" bureaucratic agent or institution. Yet, an average of 54 percent of the respondents said they would contact TANU office, or TANU leader (cell leader, branch chairman or secretary, etc.) for such needs. Despite the smallness of the sample (200), the responses do illuminate a number of points made in this and previous chapters.

First, the responses confirm the claim by the central leadership that TANU is a party of the masses. But, second, the responses do also give an indication (by no means conclusive) of the nature of TANU-peasant relationship at the local level and the functions of the local party cadre. Thus, about 88 percent of the peasants would take their domestic quarrels or quarrels with neighbors to a TANU cell leader rather than

⁴⁶Question number 32 of the 1970 Election Study Questionnaire, p. 5.

Table 7: RESPONSES OF KAUZENI AND MIKESSE PEASANTS TO THE QUESTION: "WHOM WOULD YOU CONTACT IF YOU HAD A PROBLEM RELATING TO (a) MONEY, (b) EDUCATION FOR YOUR CHILDREN AND (c) DOMESTIC QUARRELS OR MISUNDERSTANDINGS WITH YOUR NEIGHBORS?"

Whom to Contact	Item Needed	Money		Education		Quarrels	
		Kauzeni	Mikese	Kauzeni	Mikese	Kauzeni	Mikese
1. DK/RA/NA/Nobody	Village	28	43	35	29	3	2
2. Relatives/Neighbors/Friends		17	10	3	3	0	7
3. TANU Office/TANU Leader		48	36	28	34	93	82
4. Relevant Central Gov't Officer		4	3	34	29	4	8
5. Relevant Local Gov't Officer		2	4	0	0	0	0
6. M.P./Councillor		0	3	0	3	0	0
7. Cooperative Society/other Peasant Organizations		0	1	0	0	0	0
8. Others (TYL, TAPA, A.C.)		1	0	0	1	0	1
	N =	100	100	100	100	100	100

to the formal primary courts or even traditional village elders. This finding is consistent with claims based on research done in other parts of the country on the role of the TANU cell leaders which have emphasized the semi-judicial functions of the cell leadership--or what is called Usuluhishi wa KI-TANU (i.e. "reconciliation" the TANU way).⁴⁷

Third, the low score for the "relevant" bureaucratic agents of change (Ministerial or of the local Government) is also revealing. This is not entirely surprising given the country's history. As we pointed out in chapter 2, the colonial rural development models created a deeply rooted peasant distrust for governmental change agents. In actual fact, the field officials who enforced colonial agricultural rules were themselves hated as much as the colonial administrators. As we have already pointed out, from the days of the struggle for Uhuru, the peasants used TANU as a weapon to combat colonial rules and bureaucratic "interferences" with their age-long practices. This distrust has not completely disappeared despite much effort by the Party center to discourage it. This distrust was confirmed by responses to another

⁴⁷See the various articles in J. H. Proctor, ed., The Cell System of the Tanganyika African National Union (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1971).

question: "Supposing you had a certain need, such as a license to carry out some business, etc., and you approached the relevant departmental official. Would you say your request would be considered as that of any other person?" About 52 percent said no, 28 percent said they were not sure and 20 percent answered in the affirmative. This outcome tended to confirm a claim by a number of Morogoro bureaucrats and technicians that often the peasants would not implement communications from the administration unless it was supported by some TANU official. This fact had a developmentally detrimental potential for "politics-technique" conflict. However, as we pointed out in the previous chapter, the Party National Executive Committee seemed to have been aware of this potential conflict, and the Iringa Policy Paper on Agriculture sought to achieve unity of politics and technique.

Fourth, the "populist" elite--M.P.'s and councillors--received even a lower score than the technico-bureaucratic elite. Again, this is not surprising. Studies in other districts of Tanzania have emphasized the "waning" influence of the M.P. in the eyes of the peasants in regard to the M.P.'s dwindling capability to bring material resources to his constituents.⁴⁸ The M.P. has no platform outside the Party

⁴⁸ See particularly, James R. Finucane, "Participation in Rural Tanzania: The Role of the M.P." (Paper for the 1971

Machinery; and during electoral campaigns--which are organized, supervised and to a large extent funded by the Party--the candidates are discouraged from promising material "rewards" to their constituents. The pattern was the same in all the twenty campaign meetings we attended in Morogoro during the 1970 elections. The chairman of the caravan, a TANU representative or a member of the ad hoc supervisory committee, would start by warning the audience that the candidates had neither "miracles" nor power to bring resources or development to their areas; this was the work of the people themselves in co-operation with TANU and the Government. Pre-empted thus, the candidates concentrated on their personal biographies and their Party record.⁴⁹ The same held true for the Local Government elections.⁵⁰

Fifth, the negligible score for the other institutions such as the co-operative society, the TANU Youth League (TYL), the parents' organization (TAPA), the women's organization (UWT), etc., also deserve a brief comment. The case of the co-operative movement is clear; besides being relatively new

Universities of Social Sciences Council Conference, Makerere, Kampala, December 14-17th, 1971).

⁴⁹For elaboration see my article, "Elections and Political Mobilization in Tanzania" in Election Study Committee (eds.), Socialism and Participation, op. cit., chapter 5.

⁵⁰These have now been abolished following the abolition of the Local Government structure after Decentralization of July, 1972. The new method of electing councillors had not been

and generally unpopular in Morogoro,⁵¹ it does not lend money as hard cash but in the form of inputs--fertilizers, pesticides, etc.--nor is it strictly concerned with children's education or settlement of domestic quarrels. Yet, such organizations as TYL and TAPA, which have immediate relevance with regard to education for the young were also down-graded. One possible explanation is that the peasants do not necessarily make a distinction between these organizations and the Party. If this is the case, the effort of the central leadership to identify the Party "with the nation as a whole" by giving affiliate membership to all important national organizations has achieved a measure of success. It is also possible that such key functionaries as the Area and Regional Commissioners (or Secretaries, as they are now called) were also included under TANU responses, for they are Party Secretaries as well as administrative heads in their respective areas.⁵²

finalized at the time of writing.

⁵¹Interview with the Secretary for Morogoro Region Co-operative Union, 5 October, 1972.

⁵²The main reason for changing their titles in 1973 was the observation that these functionaries had tended to emphasize their governmental role more than their Party role. Our evidence is incapable of validating or invalidating this observation.

Conclusion

Several conclusions follow from the above observations. First, the Party's "populist strength" is unquestionable. This strength has resulted from the historical relationship between the Party and the peasants as well as from the legal-rational measures taken in the post-independence period to strengthen the position of the Party relative to other institutions, agents and individuals. This populist strength is vital for political stability in the unique one-party democracy of the country which is undergoing the unique socialist transformation we have already described. Yet our argument remains that this populist strength has not been fully taken advantage of by local policy implementers; attempts must be made to transform it into developmental strength at the local level. This is, of course, not an easy task. For, as we have pointed out, in many local settings, party-peasant relationship has not been fully transformed into that of mobilizer-mobilized relationship; and in a few extreme cases, even the danger of the mobilizer being the mobilized exists. Apart from the problem of trained cadre, there is also the understandable fear that a more aggressive style of mobilization may diminish the Party's populist strength.⁵³

⁵³It is quite possible, for example, that the President has continued to receive a big "yes" vote from the cash crop areas with the so-called "Kulaks" because Ujamaa has not

Second, the Party's "technical strength" is low in two ways. It is negligible within the Party hierarchy itself, as we pointed out earlier. Further, the ability of the Party to utilize the technical capacity of the ministerial personnel was constrained by three factors in the pre-decentralization period, namely (1) peasant distrust of governmental agents, (2) conflicts between political and technical criteria, and (3) departmentalization of effort. Both Decentralization and the Iringa policy on agriculture sought to eliminate these bottlenecks, a necessary step if what we referred to as the "third stage" of ujamaa evolution--involving a challenge on the traditional inertia of the peasants--is to succeed.

Third, the populist strength of the Party may ironically constitute a constraint on its ability to change its mobilization style which has up to now depended on persuasion and accomodation of local differences in response to central directives. The dilemma of deciding between persuasion and compulsion of varying intensity will be elaborated in the next chapter.

been enforced in such areas. In the 1970 elections, the highest affirmative vote came from such areas, Kilimanjaro and Mbeya, both affirming the President with 98 percent "yes" votes.

Chapter 9

UJAMAA AND MICRO-PLANNING IN PEASANT ECONOMY: THE LOCAL POLITICS OF ALLOCATION

Today, no country can manage its national economy without long-term development plans . . . Like all aspects of social life, planning is a product of lengthy development. A plan conceived by one individual, no matter how ideal, may not coincide with the plan of another. The more active the isolated efforts of individuals to carry out their personal aspirations, the greater the resulting chaos which frequently destroys the productive forces . . . In a self-supporting economy . . . it did not matter much if the initiative of one peasant did not co-ordinate with the actions of others . . . In the conditions of developed commodity production and extensive division of labor, however, any mistakes made by one economic unit spread like a chain reaction to many others and, in the end, often cause disruption of the whole economy.

--S. Pervushin, The Plan and Initiative (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, undated), pp. 5-6.

It is worth repeating what we have already emphasized, namely that Tanzania's development depends heavily on improving the productivity of millions of peasant farmers; and the country's socialist path is of necessity strongly agrarian. Thus rural collectivization is a pre-condition for planning for rural as well as national development. Moreover, given the great diversity existing in rural Tanzania, in terms of

ecology, traditions, levels and modes of production, etc., a combination of macro-micro-planning is an absolute necessity.

The impracticability of planning each small family farm means that the concept of "micro-planning" with regard to the peasant economy can only refer to planning the development of units larger than one or a few families. In the present Tanzanian context, it means planning individual ujamaa villages and other co-operative activities of ujamaa groups, not only in relation to their own internal needs and potentialities, but also taking into account national targets and priorities as well as all complementary activities and potentialities of other areas, villages, groups or organizations within the same ward, division, district or even region. In other words, micro-planning in the rural areas must be viewed as "location planning" in a wider sense than the narrow focus on each individual ujamaa village which characterized the first phase of collectivization (1968-1972).

In section one, we shall give a brief outline of the attempts to create the organizational prerequisites of micro-location planning (1967-1972). In the second section, we shall examine the problems and prospects of micro-location planning and the local politics of allocation, taking most illustrations from Morogoro's experience. In the third section, we shall sum up the problem of mobilization strategy

to which we have made a number of references in the previous chapters. In particular, we shall examine the problems and prospects of a democratic socialist transformation in the rural areas, using the strategy of persuasion, education and exhortation¹ in the context of the local avenues of participation which have been further strengthened by Mwongozo and Decentralization.

CREATING THE PREREQUISITES OF MICRO-LOCATION PLANNING

Tanzania's effort to create the organizational prerequisites for micro-location planning (or "Regional Planning," as the phrase goes in Tanzania), pre-dates the Arusha Declaration;¹ but we shall concern ourselves here with the post-Arusha effort to give Ujamaa^{an} organizational content at the local level. What follows is a mere 'catalogue' of the main measures, which further illustrate the determination of the leadership to attempt one option after another to achieve the nation's development and equity goals. The measures do also show the evolutionary approach we discussed in the previous chapters, involving a step-by-step institutional

¹Some of these measures are examined in R. G. Saylor, and I. Livingston, "Regional Planning in Tanzania" (Economic Research Bureau Paper 69.25, The University of Dar es Salaam, 1969). See also William L. Luttrell, "Location Planning and Regional Development in Tanzania" in Uchumi Editorial Board (eds.), Toward Socialist Planning, op. cit., pp. 119-148.

changes, each entailing a partial decentralization of the development effort, to meet the "mass participation" norms of the Ujamaa model. The culmination of these changes was a full administrative decentralization started in July, 1972 or five years after the Arusha Declaration. We shall restrict ourselves to the main features of these changes.

Partial Financial Decentralization: The RDF

The Regional Development Fund (RDF) introduced in November, 1967, was the first post-Arusha step to change the colonial bureaucratic model.² The failure of the transformation approach had taught the need to encourage local initiatives, a lesson well stated in Government Paper No. 4 of 1967:

Effective rural development requires considerable emphasis on 'planning from below,' and its synthesis with planning 'from the top' at different political/administrative levels, involving people in all stages and levels, both with the planning and implementation processes.³

²See Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1968.

³United Republic of Tanzania, Wages, Incomes, Rural Development, Investment and Price Policy, (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1967), paragraph 72.

Though small,⁴ the RDF was geared to stimulate local initiative through the village, ward, district and regional development committees. The Fund could be used for any locally chosen projects under shs. 50,000 , the center only demanding that such projects be (1) of a "developmental" nature; (2) capable of stimulating high popular participation; (3) "at all times, the Fund should work for the benefit of all village people who live and work on farms, and not for the benefit of individuals."⁵ The Fund, in other words, should fulfil the developmental as well as the equity goals of Ujamaa.⁶

Ministerial Reorganization and Regional Plans

To improve regional planning, two important reorganizations were introduced between 1968 and 1969. In 1968, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning posted Regional Economic Secretaries to some selected

⁴It was originally shs. 500,000 per region a year; it was later raised to a million shillings; and in 1971 it was based on population size, two shillings per head.

⁵Presidential Circular No. 1, 1968.

⁶For a useful discussion of the distribution of the RDF in a number of regions, see Paul D. Collins, "A Preliminary Evaluation of the Working of the Regional Development Fund" (Rural Development Research Committee, Paper No. 1, The University of Dar es Salaam, 1970).

Regions.⁷ These would co-ordinate the planning process in the regions. However, partly because their role was not well defined, and partly because of the administrative departmentalization we have already^{ly} discussed, the role of Economic Secretary was as frustrating to the holder as it was ineffective.⁸

A more comprehensive ministerial reorganization was attempted in 1969, the more important changes being those relating to the Agricultural Ministry, Regional Administration and Rural Development, and Ujamaa, and Co-operatives. With regard to the agricultural development program, a Regional Agricultural Director was appointed to co-ordinate the work of the technical agricultural officers (i.e. Agriculture, Veterinary, Co-operatives, Game, Forestry, and later Water Development and Irrigation) at the regional and district levels. Further, the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development was created to act as a non-technical, co-ordinating organization, covering all rural development programs. An even more important change was the creation of the Ujamaa Village Department of this ministry on a much broader basis than the former Village Settlement Division,

⁷Initially, to 9 of the existing 17 regions, later the number was raised to 12.

⁸The post was abolished in 1972 following Decentralization. Almost all R.E.S.'s we interviewed between 1970 and

to work in close liason with the Ministry of Agriculture. Although this reorganization did not (and its limited scope could not) eliminate the problem of inter-agency competition which had led to wastages and duplications under the transformation and improvement approaches, it increased the flow of information and communication between the agencies more directly concerned with the implementation of Ujamaa and other rural development programs.⁹

Furthermore, unlike the First Plan (1964-1969) which was based on "macroeconomic models emphasizing aggregate targets and sectoral rates of growth,"¹⁰ the Second Plan (1969-74) introduced a micro-locational dimension, setting regional targets in addition to sectoral targets.¹¹ Although the regional targets were based more on speculation than on data, as both research and implementation records have

1973 expressed a sense of frustration and admitted the ineffectiveness of their role.

⁹For an elaboration of the reorganization exercise, see Saylor and Livingston, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 10.

¹¹See the Second Plan, Vol. III, "Regional Perspectives."

shown,¹² the change of the colonial and pre-Arusha planning orientation is itself important; and the Third Plan (1974-79) is likely to have a sounder regional data base.¹³ The Second Plan attempted also to 'decentralize' industry by diverting new industry away from the Capital to selected towns.¹⁴

Ujamaa Planning Teams and Training Facilities

In early 1970, six centrally initiated ujamaa planning teams were set up for work in six selected regions.¹⁵ Led by a senior TANU member, each team consisted of an agricultural officer, an economist, a co-operative officer, a land planner and a water engineer. The teams worked in selected ujamaa villages, helping the peasants to prepare their development plans. One outcome of their work was a government decision to set up similar teams in all regions using regional manpower. The local planning effort was later further decentralized by creating Ward, divisional

¹²For example, several projects allocated to Morogoro, including tourist hotels and a vegetable factory, were later allocated to other areas following feasibility studies which were made after the publication of the Plan. This alteration was made without consultation with the morogoro leadership. Minutes of RDC meeting of 6 July, 1972, Morogoro Regional Office.

¹³Mwalimu introduced a motto: "Make the Third Plan Regional Plan." Unfortunately the Plan had not been published at the time of writing.

¹⁴For criticism of this policy, see Saylor and Livingston, op. cit., pp. 10-12.

¹⁵Mtwara, Coast, Tabora, Tanga, Mbeya, and West Lake.

and district ujamaa committees.¹⁶ The attempt to combine planning by "experts" with grass-roots participation will be elaborated in connection with Morogoro in another section.

Ujamaa education for leaders and peasants was also recognized as an important input in micro-location planning; the first three years of rural collectivization had taught: "The chief bottleneck to the development of ujamaa remains the shortage of leadership and skills. The only solution to this is increased education, particularly adult education, including a large element of political education relevant to ujamaa living. This appears to be at least as important as the provision of advice and material aid."¹⁷ From 1970, agricultural training was ujamaa-oriented; institutional instructors and field officers underwent ujamaa refresher courses, and new entrants into the agricultural service were to live in ujamaa villages for several months as part of their training. Farmer training centers were increased, and priority was given to members of ujamaa villages.¹⁸ However,

¹⁶In Morogoro's case, the Ward, division and district ujamaa committees were created in March, 1972.

¹⁷United Republic of Tanzania, The Economic Survey and Annual Plan, 1970-71, op. cit., p. 25.

¹⁸There were 22 District Rural Training Centers by 1970, and more were under construction.

to-date, education for ujamaa has not been a well co-ordinated program. The Party's Ujamaa Village Division does not appear to have taken the question of cadre training seriously. The division trained a score of cadres in 1970 but it discontinued its program for a rather unconvincing reason, that it lacked funds.¹⁹

Administrative Decentralization

The culmination of the above partial decentralization measures was a comprehensive program of administrative decentralization started in July, 1972. This had been preceded by a number of district and regional studies commissioned by the central leadership.²⁰ This program may go a long way in eliminating the problem of dissipated energies at the district

¹⁹Cadre training is being undertaken by various institutions such as Kivukoni College, Farmers training centers, adult education institutions, etc., which have worked in uncoordinated manner. There has been no central conception of what cadre training for Ujamaa would entail.

²⁰Most of these studies were carried out between 1969 and 1971. Examples are (1) Surveys of Msdwa and Lower Ruembe Valleys carried out by the International Land Development consultants; (2) Rural Interdisciplinary Project in Sukumaland, sponsored by the Danish Government; (3) Arusha and Lushoto District Studies carried out by the Rural Development Research Committee of the University of Dar es Salaam; (4) Rungwe District studies carried out by a Dutch interdisciplinary team; (5) studies on Decentralization, carried out in districts and regions by a three-man Presidential Commission led by Professor Pratt (1969); and (6) the McKinsey studies and recommendations (1969-72) on which the decentralization of 1972 was based.

and subdistrict levels which we pointed out in chapter 4; but more important still, it introduced measures which make micro-location planning possible. We shall mention only the major ones.²¹

First, the program gave local implementation teams a financial and decision-making autonomy within well-defined limits. About 40 percent of Central Government development budget would be allocated to individual regions to be spent on regional projects other than those undertaken by the Central Government or national organizations. This facilitates efficiency by eliminating the necessity to request and account to a ministerial head in Dar es Salaam every cent spent on development projects. Each region would, however, account to the Parliament at the end of the financial year through its Regional Secretary (or formerly Regional Commissioner) and Regional Development Director, the regional equivalents of the minister and Principle Secretary at the Capital.

Second, the regional and district manpower was organized as "development teams" under a Regional Development Director (RDD) and District Development Director (DDD), respectively. Each development team--at the district and regional levels--consists of three staff officers and eight

²¹For details of the program, see the President's paper, Decentralization, to which we have already referred.

functional officers. The staff officers include a Planning, a Financial, and a Personnel Officer; and the functional officers include the technocratic personnel responsible for such developmental functions as health, education, agriculture, natural resources, water, land development, communications and industries, replacing the former ministerial representatives.

The Regional structure was also decentralized. For example, whereas the RDD is the accounting officer for the whole region, district allocations are controlled locally by the DDD who is the sub-accounting officer. Again, the former hierarchical links (in terms of "command" or "authoritative communication") between the district functional officers and their regional equivalents and between the latter and their ministerial bosses in Dar es Salaam were significantly modified. Official communications between these levels are now made through the DDD or RDD as they are made through the Principle Secretary at the ministerial level. Thus, instead of being a part of a ministerial organization, the functional officers are a part of a regional or district organization and their activities are co-ordinated by the RDD or DDD, as the case may be.

Third, co-ordination between and within the district and regional organizations is further facilitated by development councils and committees. With the abolition of the former

Local Government structure, the former District Councils were reorganized as District Development Councils (DDC). These Councils now consist of the elected members of the former District Councils, the M.P.'s for the District, the Area Secretary (or former Area Commissioner) and members of the District Development Team (as ex-officio members); with the TANU District Chairman at the chair and the DDD being the secretary. This rather large body is mainly concerned with policy matters. The details of planning and implementation are the responsibility of its executive arm, the District Development and Planning Committee (DD & PC). This is a smaller body consisting of the Area Secretary (i.e. former Commissioner) as Chairman, the DDD as Secretary, the M.P.'s representing the district in the National Parliament, one quarter of the elected members of the former councils (or ten such members, whichever is the larger number), and the staff and functional officers of the district development team. Thus all the development agents are well co-ordinated within the new district organization.

There is no directly "representative" body at the regional level. However, co-ordination within the region and between the regional development team and the equivalent teams in the districts is facilitated mainly by the Regional Development Committee (RDC). This is a gigantic body consisting of

between 60 and 80 members.²² The membership includes the Regional Secretary (formerly Regional Commissioner) who is its chairman, the RDD who is the secretary, TANU Regional and District Chairman, DDD, Area Secretaries (i.e. former Area Commissioners), M.P.'s for the region, and the Regional Development Team. This large body has a smaller executive arm, the Regional Development Sub-Committee.

The committee structure extends to the ward and ujamaa village level, in each case the TANU branch chairman and secretary acting as the chairman and secretary of the development committee, respectively, and the divisional secretary being an ex-officio member. This elaborate committee structure makes planning from the grass-roots level possible, and the main purpose of the reorganization exercise has been officially stated as follows:

One of the major purposes of this reorganization is to ensure that future economic planning stems from the people and serves the people directly . . . The District staff will be responsible for ensuring that ideas are sought from, and collected from, the people in the villages and Divisions before the District Development Councils discuss these ideas and decide upon the problems and priorities for that District . . . In addition, if these proposals are worked out properly, the mass of the people will find it easier for them to practice self-reliance in their own development, and to take part in decision-making which directly affects them. Further, they will find it less difficult to call to

²²The Morogoro RDC had about 70 members in 1972.

account those public servants who are responsible for local activities of Government.²³

Judging from Morogoro's experience (1970-72), the process of collecting the views of the people is easier in the areas where the people have formed ujamaa villages; for the village committee will have prepared their production targets to which the "experts" can react. These priorities and targets are then processed through the long chain of committees, as shown in Appendix C. The new planning process may be long and tedious, but if successfully implemented, it will have achieved one important goal of Ujamaa, grass-roots, participation in plan formulation and implementation.

It should be understood that what was decentralized was "administration" or "management" of the development effort, not "policy." The center is able to maintain control in the following ways. First, at every stage of the planning process a party organ scrutinizes the priorities to ensure compliance with national policy, leaving technical details to the "experts." Thus, despite the problem of low internal dynamism of the local party organs we discussed earlier, at least the party machinery is included in the planning process. This is necessary to check the tendency of the technocrats to revert to bureaucratic solutions. Second, the district

²³Myerere, Decentralization, op. cit., pp. 5, 9-10.

and regional officials are employed by the central government, the DDD and RDD being presidential appointees. Third, the Regional and Area Secretaries (formerly commissioners) are also appointed by the President, and they are heads of administration as well as the Party in their respective areas.²⁴ Fourth, the Prime Minister's Office (itself a child of Decentralization) exercises control over the regions, acting as the "clearing house" for all regional plans, and has power to put "ceilings" on regional estimates, etc. Moreover, since the reorganization entailed "deconcentration" of the center but "centralization" of all development agencies at the lower levels under people directly controlled from the center, it can be argued that Decentralization increased rather than decreased the center's power of control while at the same time creating a greater planning and management capacity at the local level.

UJAMAA PLANNING AND THE POLITICS OF ALLOCATION IN MOROGORO

The administrative decentralization and the Mwongozo that preceded it went a long way in challenging the bureaucratic, innovator-adopter model of rural development inherited

²⁴Furthermore, their statuses--in terms of emoluments--were raised to that of ministers, and they are all members of the Party National Executive Committee, the top policy-making organ, and ex-officio members of the Parliament.

from the colonial rule and perpetuated by the transformation model. An organizational basis now exists for micro-location planning as well as for popular participation at the grass-roots level. Yet, it must be remembered that often normative changes lag behind structural or organizational changes. Normative changes are still required on the two sides of the development equation, namely the leadership side and the people's side.

With regard to the leadership side of the equation, the bureaucratic model may continue to be attractive for several reasons: (1) most bureaucrats have been used to administrative solutions which were used in the previous models; (2) they have also been used to "planning things" (i.e. projects to be undertaken by the government, etc.) which is much easier than "planning people" which is demanded by the Ujamaa model; (3) moreover, as we pointed out earlier, bureaucratism has a strong affinity for embourgeoisement, and vice versa. Thus, for example, 87 percent of Agricultural extension workers interviewed in a post-Arusha survey said they would prefer to work among the progressive farmers who are more likely to accept innovation than the "common" peasant.²⁵

²⁵See Saylor, "An Opinion Survey of Bwana Shambas," op. cit., p. 8. The sample included 1,111 agricultural extension workers in 39 districts.

It is not the truth or falsity of their belief which is necessarily in question, but rather how soon they can be expected to add the "ethical dimension" demanded by Ujamaa to their purely instrumental interpretation of development. Furthermore, one direct legacy from the dual approach to rural development in the past (e.g. the "focal point approach" vs. mass rehabilitation in the colonial period, or transformation approach vs. improvement approach in the sixties) has been a tendency by the bureaucratic elite to continue to view rural development in dichotomous terms, as Cliffe has neatly put it:

A compartmentalized pattern of thinking developed (i.e. in the sixties), which has its parallel today in the planners' view that there is an ujamaa programme on the one hand, and that there is an agricultural development policy on the other; missing therefore, is a more meaningful and integrated alternative approach which sees ujamaa, socialist production relations, as a principle which underlies all rural planning. In practice, the dual strategy tended also to dictate two different planning techniques: the village settlements were conceived as separate 'projects' which could be subjected to feasibility and viability tests--i.e. only micro planning.²⁶

One of the main purposes of decentralization was, in fact, to achieve the "meaningful and integrated alternative approach" referred to by Cliffe above, so that planning for rural development would be synonymous with planning for ujamaa development. It must be remembered, however, that at times

²⁶L. R. Cliffe, "Planning Rural Development" in Uchumi Editorial Board (eds.), Towards Socialist Planning, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

some bureaucrats may resort to bureaucratic and instrumental approaches not necessarily because they want to be anti-Ujamaa, but rather because of a genuine desire to see a more rapid rate of change in the local economies. In other words, perpetuation of 'weaknesses' on the people's side of the equation which causes delays in taking advantage of the opportunities made available by Ujamaa may create temptations to revert to administrative solutions. One of the weaknesses which we shall illustrate below in connection with Morogoro's experience with planning for ujamaa (1969-72) is the very 'humble' level of productivity with which most ujamaa villages started.

Planning for Village Self-Reliance

Planning for ujamaa villages in Morogoro started in 1969/70, and this was done by a regional planning team in consultation with the villagers. In this section, we shall discuss this first attempt at grass-roots planning in Morogoro between 1970 and mid-1972 when planning modifications were introduced and the outcome of that effort, so as to shed some light on the problems which the current reorganized planning structure will have to overcome. We shall first describe the process itself.

The planning team consisted of 14 ministerial 'experts,'

seven from the regional headquarters and seven from the district headquarters. The only 'populist' element in the team was a high-ranking TANU representative, the Member of the National Executive Committee (MNE) who was the chairman of the planning team. The process was slow because this was the first experience with planning from the grass roots. In both 1969/70 and 1970/71, the team spent up to two weeks in every ujamaa village. In 1970/71, the team started consultations in April and completed its task in September (five months). The planning team had to do everything on the spot because there was very little reliable information regarding the villages and their aspirations. Every department gave its own guidelines to its representatives in the team. The guidelines included the considerations of village manpower-- total population, children, women, disabled and workers. The team proceeded with two assumptions, (1) that at least 80 percent of the able workers in the village would attend to communal activities every day, and (2) each person could cultivate, weed and harvest an average of 3 acres per year. On the basis of these assumptions, acreages for food and cash crops were determined.

After reaching agreement with the villagers with regard to the targets for cash and food crops, the plans were returned to the Director of Agriculture who forwarded them to the RDC

which usually approved them without significant modifications and proceeded to provide the necessary funds for tractors, godowns, seeds and fertilizers. Supervision of the implementation of the plans was mainly the responsibility of the Co-ordinators of Agriculture and Ujamaa Villages. Where the RDC modified a plan, the village concerned was notified and had to approve the modifications or give a new plan or suggestion. A village refusing to accept the modifications or failing to give alternative suggestions was denied funds.²⁷ The production plans and levels of fulfillment for seven ujamaa villages which were officially recognized and assisted in the 1970/71 season are given in table 8 below.

The contents of table 8 can be misleading because two key variables are not included--i.e. the size of private farms and size of the labor force which would indicate productivity per working member. This table must therefore be studied in conjunction with tables 9 and 10 which include these other variables as well as total population in each village which is necessary to assess levels of self-reliance in food. However, we shall give a few general comments on table 8 which will later be clarified by the data given in

²⁷Most villages accepted official modifications, even though none achieved the targets, as we shall see below.

Table 8: PRODUCTION PLANS AND LEVELS OF FULFILLMENT IN SEVEN SELECTED UJAMAA VILLAGES IN MOROGORO DISTRICT, 1970/71 SEASON

Village	Planned (acres)		Cultivated (acres)		Planted (acres)		Weeded (acres)		% Plan Fulfillment	
	Food	Cash	Food	Cash	Food	Cash	Food	Cash	Food	Cash
1. Lukenge	48	80	24	70	24	40	22	25	46%	31%
2. Sesenga	53½	140.	13	10	13	6	7	2½	14%	1.8%
3. Mkata	251	600	139	62	140	58	62	35	25%	6%
4. Bwakira Chini	153	125	8½	100	4	70	4	70	2.8%	56%
5. Kikundi	30	50	29½	-	29½	-	29½	-	80%	-
6. Kauzeni	529	50	36	53	36	53	4	51	0.8%	100%
7. Kizinga	-	-	31½	9	31½	9	31½	9	100%	100%

Source: Compiled from a table given in File D. 3/24/Vol. IV, "Ujamaa Villages General," a report of Co-ordinator of Agriculture of 12 August, 1971, Morogoro District Office.

the other tables.

First, the low level of plan fulfillment shows the humble beginning on the road to village self-reliance, but it is also a reflection on the planning inexperience of both the peasants and the experts who approved (in some cases, recommended) the targets. The enthusiasm of both led to over-ambitious targets which could not be fulfilled. Higher levels of plan fulfillment were achieved where the plan targets were more "realistic," considering the size of the village labor force and other factors which we shall explore below. Second, there was greater compliance with food crop targets than with cash crop targets. This must be considered a perfectly rational choice on the part of the peasants who have been used to subsistence economy and have experienced famine in the past. Whenever cash crops conflicted with the production of the basic food crops, the latter were given preference, the official plan notwithstanding. Even in such villages as Bwakira Chini and Kauzeni which produced a negligible amount of food on the communal farm (see table 8), used their private farms exclusively for food crops (see table 9).

Third, the first round of village plans inevitably led to a great deal of wastages in government funds and manpower. All cultivation costs, seeds and fertilizers were provided free, being funded largely by the Regional Development fund.

As it is clearly shown in table 8, in each case (except Kizinga which depended on its own resources) more acreage was cultivated than was planted, and more was planted than was weeded, each stage entailing a loss to the Government.²⁸ Considering that this was the first attempt at micro-location planning among a peasantry unused to the discipline imposed by plans, such initial losses can hardly be avoided. Probably the most important lesson to learn from the first round of village plans is the need to make the plans themselves more "achievable" so as to make the peasants "plan-conscious" in the future.²⁹

Another important lesson to be learned from the first round of plans is that more effort will be required to overcome the current preference for "individualism," especially in the production of food crops, which leads to divided effort between the communal farm and the private farms. This preference is clearly shown in table 9 below in which communal and private farms are compared in terms of size and the proportion of total cultivated which was planted, weeded and harvested. In each village (except the two which did not

²⁸In a few cases not shown in the table, more was weeded than was harvested, the peasants having expected the government to send in members of the National Service or TANU Youth League to assist in harvesting.

²⁹Even though total production in these seven villages increased in 1971/72, there was even much less compliance with the official plans, each village proceeded according to its own plans.

Table 9: COMPARISON OF COMMUNAL AND PRIVATE FARMS IN SEVEN SELECTED UJAMAA VILLAGES OF MOROGORO DISTRICT, 1970/71 SEASON

Village	Communal Farm (acres)		Private Farms - Food & Cash (acres)			
	Total Cultivated	% Planted & Weeded	Total Cultivated	% Planted & Weeded	Food	Cash
1. Lukenge	94	50%	DK	DK	DK	DK
2. Sesenga	23	42%	None	---	---	---
3. Mkata	201	50%	140	100%	85	55
4. Bwakira Chini	108	68%	109	100%	109	---
5. Kikundi	30	80%	49	100%	39	10
6. Kauzeni	89	61%	148	100%	148	---
7. Kizinga	41	100%	None	---	---	---

Source: Compiled from a table given in File D. 3/24/Vol. IV, "Ujamaa Villages General," a report of Co-ordinator of Agriculture of August, 1971, Morogoro District Office.

have private farms),³⁰ (1) more land was under private (i.e. individual) than communal cultivation; (2) more of the private farms cultivated were weeded and harvested (100%) than of the communal farms (62%); and (3) about 87 percent of the private farms were used for food crops, with Bwakira Chini and Kauzeni producing almost all their food crops on individual farms (compare tables 8 and 9).

The greater emphasis on individual than on communal farms in these villages is a further warning against (1) assumptions that the traditional "spirit" of co-operation which existed under situations of subsistence and insecurity can be the pillar for socialist reconstruction under a situation of modernization, and (2) interpretation of the Tanzanian struggle for socialism in terms of classical models which take the presence of peasant or worker consciousness for granted. The norms of the colonial instrumentalism created a general embourgeoisement response which was neither consonant with the traditional norms of co-operation nor capable of creating "class consciousness." Thus, initially,

³⁰We did not verify the official record in connection with Sesenga, but in the case of Kizinga, the smallness of the village (16 families) seemed to have induced greater mutual respect and trust and greater confidence in the communal farm than in those with larger populations. Moreover, the members seem to have selected themselves on the basis of real commitment to work, the work ethic having been more evident there than in most of the others.

many of these villages used the communal farm simply as a way of attracting government inputs for their individual farms.³¹ This was particularly true in the ex-settlements (e.g. Mkata and Bwakira Chini) which were being converted into ujamaa villages.³² It means that planning for ujamaa development in the rural areas is not simply a "technical" matter, it is first and foremost a normative revolution that must proceed from above. The people must first be mobilized to constitute themselves into an ujamaa community; and secondly, to accept the principles of ujamaa production.

Apart from the question of compliance with the ujamaa principles of production, there is the equally important question of productivity which is even more closely related to the quest for village and, ultimately, national self-reliance. The data given in table 10 show the low level of productivity at which ujamaa villages in Morogoro entered the road towards self-reliance. The total acreage given include

³¹In some villages, the official communal farm was secretly divided into individual farms after being cultivated by a government tractor.

³²For example, in 1972 the 48 families of Bwakira Chini ujamaa village met to decide how they were going to organize their production in view of criticism by Party and Government officials that their village was low in productivity. After a long discussion the families voted on three methods: (1) 36 families voted for private production, (2) 7 families voted for a combination of private and communal mode, and (3) 5 families supported ujamaa production.

Table 10: POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE IN SEVEN SELECTED UJAMAA VILLAGES IN MOROGORO DISTRICT, 1970/71 SEASON

Village	Total Acreage Harvested	Total Population	Total Labor Force	Acres per Worker
1. Lukege	47	96	36	1.3
2. Sesenga	10	74	20	0.5
3. Mkata	237	180	120	2.0
4. Bwakira Chini	183	203	90	2.0
5. Kikundi	74	78	43	1.8
6. Kauzeni	203	350	223	0.9
7. Kizinga	41	73	32	1.3

Source: Compiled from a table given in File D. 3/24/Vol. IV, "Ujamaa Villages General," a report of Co-ordinator of Agriculture of 12 August, 1971, Morogoro District Office.

individual and communal farms.³³ We shall make three comments in connection with table 10. First, the proportion of non-working members (children, the aged, disabled, and other dependents) is large in each village, ranging from 30 to 70 percent of the total population. The implications of this composition for village self-sufficiency will be elaborated below. Second, the average of 1.4 acres per working person is low in both absolute terms and in the ability to feed the village population. Third, it is interesting to note that Mkata and Bwakira Chini, former settlement schemes which have continued to emphasize private farms, had a higher acre/worker ratio (2 in each case) than in all the others, showing that their main problem was individualism rather than the lack of diligence. It means that micro-location planning must achieve two tasks at the same time: to stimulate rapid ujamaaization of the relations of production and to achieve a higher level of productivity. Initial conflict between the two goals can probably not be avoided, as our further discussion of the Morogoro experience will show.

³³These figures--especially those on private farms--must, however, be treated with caution; for it is possible that the acreage for private farms is actually bigger than that declared to officials. Moreover, official records have only taken notice of private farms within the ujamaa village boundaries, whereas it is known that some members have retained their farms outside the village.

Productivity, Equity and Village Self-Reliance

In planning for ujamaa villages, the planners had to maintain a balance between the need for productivity and equity. We shall look at these two needs briefly. With regard to productivity, it is clear from our discussion in the previous chapter and the data given in table 10 that a real "productivity revolution" is required if village self-reliance (let alone national self-reliance which depends on generation of surplus at the village level) is to be achieved. We shall summarize below the problems and lessons to be learned from Morogoro's experience with the first round of village plans.

First, many of the assumptions of the planners turned out to be over-optimistic. On the average, the daily turnout to communal activities in all the seven villages was found to be between 20 and 50 percent instead of the estimated 80 percent, for most villagers concentrated on their individual private farms.³⁴ Consequently, hardly any village (except Kizinga which initially depended on its own rather than government resources) reached the targets for communal production. We have already pointed out that, apart from the concentration of effort on individual farms, the plans

³⁴We wish to acknowledge the assistance of Morogoro's Director of Agriculture, Mr. Chombo, in working out these estimates. Much of what follows is also based on various interviews with him between July 3 and 6, 1972.

themselves were over-ambitious.

Second, the assumption of three acres per person also proved to be unrealistic under the existing conditions. Surveys have shown that, in absence of any mechanization of hired labor input, about 2.5 acres (or 1 hectare) per person is optimal for most Tanzanian rural communities.³⁵ It means then that some village plans would necessarily have over-taxed the villagers had they been implemented. Mkata Ujamaa Village, for example, had planned a total of 851 acres for the 1970/71 season whereas its total labor force stood at 120 persons. This would mean about seven acres per working person, indeed an unrealistic target. Both the planners and the villagers were tempted to "aim high" because cultivation was mechanized--and was "free"--but the problem of partial mechanization was realized at the weeding and harvesting stages. The planners took into account neither this problem of partial mechanization nor the fact that the central ideology did not permit ujamaa villages to hire labor even during the peak seasons. We shall elaborate this point below.

Third, related to the above observations is the whole question of village self-reliance and generation of surplus for reinvestment. We shall use the Morogoro data given in

³⁵Ibid., interview of 6 July, 1972.

tables 8, 9 and 10 for a simple calculation for the purpose of illustrating the initial problems as well as the necessity for micro-planning^a in a peasant economy. We should emphasize that this exercise is for the purpose of illustrating the argument at hand; a more comprehensive data and methodology would be necessary for more precise conclusions.

For ease of calculation, let us assume a village X with a total population of 100 people. Out of these, 50 people are able-bodied adults (i.e. 50% = labor force. This is on the high side; the Morogoro average was about 40% of total population.). If we assume 80 percent participation on communal work (which is, as we have seen, on the high side if we take Morogoro's 1970-72 experience) about 40 people will be working on communal shambas every day. For the present purpose, we can ignore the private farms because each individual is free to withdraw from the village any time he chooses and he cannot be forced to contribute the proceeds of his private endeavors to the common pool. Furthermore, the villagers do not report all their private farms and earnings to the planners. Let us also take the suggested optimal of about 2.5 acres per person. We are assuming here that the Morogoro average of 1.4 acres per person (1970/71) will continue to grow every year. But even this assumption is probably too optimistic. For the average in 1971/72 season

for the seven villages was about 1.7 or an increase of 20 percent.³⁶ At this rate, the suggested optimal of 2.5 acres per person would be reached around 1977. With decentralization which has improved the organizational variable, and assuming that the Party acquires a greater mobilizational capacity, this (still humble) target could be reached even earlier.

This village X could therefore successfully manage up to 100 acres (i.e. 2.5 x 40). In absence of mechanization or hired labor, any planning beyond 100 acres would over-tax the villagers or lead to low yield per acre. Again, since most of the villages in Morogoro--and Tanzania mainland as a whole--use ugali (made from maize flour) as their staple, let us assume the entire acreage is devoted to maize production. Taking the average for Morogoro for the past ten years (i.e. 1962-72) the yield per acre (maize) was between 5 to 6 bags;³⁷ and an average of 7 bags in the seven ujamaa

³⁶This estimate is tentative because our calculations for the 1971/72 season was based on fragmentary and conflicting reports from official records and village records. Because of rapid changes in the composition of the village population and rapid transfers of district officials in the pre-decentralization period, every official record was "tentative;" and often there were wide discrepancies between official records and the records as shown in village books.

³⁷Interview with Morogoro's Director of Agriculture, Mr. Chombo, 6 July, 1972.

villages (taking 1970/71 and 1971/72 seasons).³⁸ This means the village would harvest a maximum of 700 bags of maize. It has been estimated that each adult would require at least three bags of maize (or its equivalent) for his ugali for the year before the next harvest.³⁹ The same figure can be assumed for the children because, even though they may consume less ugali, they need other foodstuffs which can only be obtained by selling some of the maize. Again, an equivalent of three bags of maize per person would be required for mboqa (vegetables, meat, fish, etc.) which goes with ugali. It means that each villager would have a maximum of one bag of maize or monetary equivalent of about 40 shillings per year from the communal farm to cover all other expenses. At this level of productivity, the village would remain at the subsistence level and would continue to be threatened by famine every year, let alone the question of generating surplus for reinvestment in other development projects.⁴⁰

³⁸This estimate is based on interviews with the villagers and inspection of their entries in four of the seven villages, Mkata, Kauzeni, Kizinga, and Kikundi, between October, 1972 and January, 1973.

³⁹These estimates are based on interviews in the villages mentioned in footnote 38, interviews with agricultural personnel in Morogoro as well as personal experience.

⁴⁰More than 40 percent of the ujamaa villages in Morogoro region were threatened by famine in 1970/71 and had to depend on government supply of food.

The fact that in practice most villages undertake food as well as cash crop production; that they engage in all sorts of other village activities such as construction of modern houses (with Government assistance) or school buildings, and that members have other private sources of income, etc., does not alter the argument that only improved husbandry, only higher productivity per unit factor input, can ultimately break the current cycle of poverty and famine. In fact, in Morogoro's case (probably in other areas as well), village productivity was low partly because of "divided effort," the villagers being engaged in too many things at the same time. The early plans, and the numerous activities carried on at the village level, graphically reflected the departmentalized structure of administration existing then. An interesting example--indeed, an extreme case, though not unique--was given by Mkata villagers: a regional water expert (there was no district equivalent) made an appointment with the villagers to consider the expansion of their dam for purposes of raising fish. Coincidentally, district education officials went to the village on the same day (same afternoon, to be exact) to inspect an on-going school building project at the village; and, coincidentally and without notice again, a team of district agricultural experts arrived with the "happy message" that the village would receive tractor assistance from the RDF

for their cultivation, etc. In the words of one villager: "We had a holiday that day; we sat down with all our guests, and it looked like a real Bunge (Parliament)."41 Such an unco-ordinated Bunge, however, could only confuse the villagers.42 The new structure ushered by Decentralization should go a long way in removing some of these organizational problems.

To return to the question of village self-reliance, it seems that among the key variables the micro-planner must take into serious consideration (and this refers to the people's side of the development equation) are the size and composition of the village population. Full mechanization is at present out of the question for most villages because it would have the effect of undoing the Ujamaa ideology itself, for (1) it can only be done with government money which discourages village self-reliance, (2) would leave much labor idle in the rural areas, (3) since it cannot be done for all villages due to limitations in national resources, it could lead to an ironical situation where Ujamaa is used as the means of a few to exploit the many rather than a means of

41 Interviews at Mkata Ujamaa Village, November 5 to 15, 1972.

42 All the bureaucrats we interviewed in Morogoro admitted that this "confusion" was in part responsible for the low outcome of the efforts of the villagers.

preventing exploitation, and (4) for many undertakings, labor-intensive methods are still more economic than capital-intensive methods. Yet planning the village labor has been one of the most tricky aspects of micro-location planning in the past several years.

The planner (1) has no control over the composition of the village population, (2) cannot "authoritatively" enforce the fulfillment of agreed targets, and (3) cannot plan for the "idle labor" during the off-season periods. With regard to the first, for example, some villages have too many dependents who do not work and the planner can at present do nothing about it. Further, the people are free to join or leave the village when they wish,⁴³ and therefore the labor force cannot be considered a constant or a fixed factor for purposes of planning. With regard to the question of authoritative enforcement, the planners must observe the norms of Mwongozo, especially clauses 15 and 28 which require them to act as advisors and teachers but not to force the people. The peasants themselves took advantage of Mwongozo to ignore the official plan targets and to devise their own targets which bore little relation to the large inputs to which

⁴³But each village has its own rules or "qualifications" for members intending to join.

the RDC was already committed.⁴⁴ We shall return to this question of "authoritative enforcement" later.

The question of off-season idle labor is even more tricky. This requires planning on a wider basis than the single village, and the first round of village plans did not attempt it. Three problems are involved. First, there is the problem of constant changes in labor force in each village. Second, there is the technical problem of maximizing labor use in several adjoining villages with dissimilar economic activities and therefore different peak seasons. Third, there is an ideological question: until mid-1973, the center had not clarified whether an ujamaa village could hire labor from another ujamaa village or from anywhere.⁴⁵

⁴⁴This was particularly true of Mkata, Kauzeni and Bwakira Chini.

⁴⁵The fact that labor hiring is not allowed and full mechanization is not feasible, coupled with the fact of rapid population increase (3% per year nationally), has made it difficult for planners to effectively assist the villagers to produce significant surpluses. In a number of cases, the planners have not succeeded in removing the peasants from the precarious subsistence and famine levels. The truth is that in the areas of the country where peasants have risen beyond subsistence, they have been hiring labor--at least during peak seasons--as well as using the tractor for cultivation. Mechanization of cultivation in ujamaa villages encourages the villagers to expand their private farms, and this, plus the absence of external labor during the weeding stage, leads to wastages. In a number of cases, too, harvesting had to be done with the help of National Service groups or government officials, increasing the dependence attitude of the villagers. If hiring of labor is to be considered exploitation, dependence on free labor is certainly more so.

Consequently, the planners focussed rather narrowly on each individual village, without even considering how the activities of neighboring villages--ujamaa or traditional-- could complement each other. Even the traditional form of co-operation in peak seasons (ujima) was not encouraged between neighboring villages. However, to be fair to the planners, it must be remembered that the 1969-72 period was really the "political phase" of rural socialization rather than the "planning Phase" which should logically follow after Decentralization and Iringa policy on agriculture (mid-1972). During the earlier phase, there was more emphasis on the "politics of Ujamaa" than on the "economics of Ujamaa;" and the politicians tended to emphasize equity more than productivity, as we shall elaborate below.

Equity and the Politics of Allocation

The local politicians must share the blame for the poor outcome of the first round of village plans. Very often, the politicians diverted the attention of the villagers from the official plan targets which were a joint villager-technician product. The Party National Executive Committee criticized this "contradiction" at its May, 1972 Iringa meeting which produced the new agricultural policy. Following this admonition, local politicians in Morogoro admitted their past "weaknesses" freely in various RDC meetings held

on the Iringa policy in June and July; and promises of future politician-technician co-operation were made.⁴⁶ The politico-technical discrepancy resulted from a number of factors and took different forms.

First, no clear definition of what constituted an ujamaa village (apart from Mwalimu's general definition quoted earlier) existed before March, 1972, when a criterion and machinery for recognizing an ujamaa village was set up. But even the criterion established in 1972 left loopholes for local "political maneuvers," and the procedures were not always adhered to. For purposes of government assistance and allocation of the Regional Development Fund (RDF) an ujamaa village had to be recognized at four levels--Ward, Division, District and Region. Ujamaa Village Committees were established at all these levels to consider the applications of the villages seeking recognition as well as to assist in the mobilization for more villages and more productive effort.⁴⁷ The criterion for recognition included four vague demands, one being clearly politico-ideological and three technico-

⁴⁶I am grateful to the Chairman, Mr. Lyanda (the R.C.), who allowed me to attend these meetings of the committee. See particularly the Minutes of the RDC meeting of 9 June 1972. This was the first meeting after Iringa, and both the bureaucrats and politicians admitted their past weaknesses freely, since these weaknesses had already been exposed at Iringa.

⁴⁷In June, 1972, a District Ujamaa Planning Committee was set up as a sub-committee or the executive arm of the Regional Ujamaa Villages Committee.

economic. The political criterion was "commitment to ujamaa" which often depended on local interpretations, being difficult to measure "technically." The technico-economic demands included a "large enough" membership, acreage and suitable land, water facilities, etc.⁴⁸

In practice, however, the technico-economic criteria were not adhered to in the case of the villages which were formed before mid-1972. Ujamaa villages "mushroomed" without any planning and were recognized the whole way to the regional level as long as they had the support of local politicians or the District or Regional Commissioner. The emphasis was clearly on the number of villages rather than on viability. Had the technico-economic criteria been applied, probably not a single ujamaa village would have been formed or recognized on the Uluguru Mountain areas which are facing a "crisis" of land shortage and excessive erosion. Thus, for example, Kiswira, Mtamba, and Tawa ujamaa villages (all in Matombo Division) were facing serious problems of expansion. Moreover, the choice of agriculture for these villages was itself economically unsound because their (rice) communal

⁴⁸These criteria, moreover, were not consolidated in any single official document; they were expressed in various minutes of the RDC and DD & PC. The four mentioned above were given to me by Mr. Ismail, the District Ujamaa and Co-operative Officer, in an interview on 5 July, 1972 and repeated in subsequent interviews with him and other District and Regional officials.

farms (Kiswira and Mtamba in particular) were located far away from the villages themselves. These areas had defied colonial agricultural rules and rehabilitation on the lower plains, and the "persuasive" approach of Ujamaa had not made any significant change.⁴⁹ Thus ujamaa villages were formed on the mountains only for the purposes of sending resources "up there," not for economic purposes.⁵⁰

In other cases (e.g. Kidwena in Matombo and Mgongola in Turlani) most members were not residing in the village. They registered their names and acquired private plots (often "hidden" within the communal shamba) and continued to do their other businesses in town. They were therefore able to take advantage of "free cultivation" by RDF tractors and other services. There were two types of what some bureaucrats in Morogoro called Vijiji vya Wakubwa (i.e. villages of the honorable men). The first type referred to such villages as Mgongola to which some high-ranking politicians and officials

⁴⁹Efforts to convince these villagers can be seen in RDC and DD & PC minutes, but the resolutions have not been followed up seriously. In a meeting of the Matombo Divisional Ujamaa Village Committee held on 18 May 1972 which I attended, the Divisional Secretary as well as other members admitted frankly that there was no progress made beyond the colonial attempts with regard to the people on the mountains. They admitted that both the Party and the bureaucrats/technicians had not been willing to apply "enough pressure" on the peasants.

⁵⁰Ironically, however, these resources have encouraged an attack on the few remaining forests on the mountains, leading to serious erosion of the land.

belonged but did not reside there.⁵¹ The second type referred to the villages which had been formed hurriedly by local politicians who were intending to stand for the 1970 elections.⁵² The most effective way for a candidate (for Parliamentary or Conciliar elections) to attract allocations to his constituency was undoubtedly by forming an ujamaa village; and none of such villages underwent any of the technico-economic tests of the planners.

Dekedeke Ujamaa Village in Bwakira Chini Division, which was formed hurriedly in the year of elections (1970), is probably the best example to show some of the negative consequences of using Ujamaa just as a means of effecting "equity of allocation." The "patron" was the incumbent M.P. (who was also a Minister). In his electoral campaigns, he promised to provide the villagers with orange seeds among many other things. The villagers even prepared the orange gardens in anticipation. However, the promise was not fulfilled because the Minister was defeated by a little-known local politician. This failure to honor a promise by an important leader lowered the morale of the villagers

⁵¹It was even asserted that some of these politicians and officials hired labor on the villages for planting and harvesting their plots. We were unable to verify these claims.

⁵²Kikundi Ujamaa Village was sighted as an example, the patroness being Bibi Kunambi, the successful candidate for Matombo constituency in 1970.

conspicuously. There was virtually no communal activity undertaken until 1972. In a few other cases, the politicians, as well as the politico-administrative bosses (Area and Regional Commissioners), encouraged the villagers to expand their acreage, contrary to the planned targets, in the words of one technician, "so as to give the impression that development was occurring."⁵³

The race for allocation of the RDE and other resources in Morogoro (1969-72) involved four types of actors, namely (1) a politico-administrative group, (2) a group of "populists," (3) a professional group, and (4) Ujamaa groups. All of these acted as "interest" groups, even though they were not organized as such.

The Politico-administrative Group

The politico-administrative group consisted of the Area Commissioner, Regional Commissioner and, after Decentralization, the DDD and RDD who are presidential appointees. These would like to allocate resources in a manner that pleases the center. Being "aliens," they were not involved in the local politics and social nexus, and therefore they could act as the supervisors of the national "equity principle."

⁵³ Interview with the Morogoro Regional Planning Officer, 9 September, 1972.

Their influence within the Party and various allocative committees (to which they are either chairmen or secretaries--refer above) enable them to enforce compliance with the national criteria.

In actual fact in the case of Morogoro, the problem could be called "over-compliance" (elaborated below) rather than non-compliance with the national criteria of allocation. For example, analysis of the 28 main projects undertaken in Morogoro District with RDF money during the 1968/69-1970/71 period shows the following allocation:⁵⁴

1. Assistance to Ujamaa villages --- 13 projects
2. Communication --- 6 projects
3. Health Services --- 3 projects
4. Farmer training --- 2 projects
5. Construction of markets --- 1 project.

This pattern of allocation roughly corresponds to the national emphasis on ujamaa as well as communication. The question of "over-compliance" becomes evident when the actual projects are examined in the light of the local problems which would require a slightly different order of priority. For example, of the 13 ujamaa projects, 8 were construction of godowns (grain stores), and one in each case, provision of poultry, cattle, wells, seeds and tractor cultivation in ujamaa villages.

⁵⁴Morogoro District Office, File No. D3/13/Vol. II, "Regional Development Committee."

Some bureaucrats correctly pointed out that communication needed a higher priority than the building of an additional godown in a village (some had two) before the first is even filled with grain, or provision of poultry or cattle to villages in areas where transportation of the necessary feeds was difficult in the rainy season, let alone the lack of knowledge and funds among the villages to care for the exotic birds and animals. Training (which received a low priority in allocation) should have preceded the provision of poultry and cattle. The outcome of these projects proved the technicians right in their argument.⁵⁵

There was, therefore, a kind of "literal" interpretation of the national criteria, and the politico-administrative group was unable to use its power to direct allocation in accordance with local needs while maintaining compliance with the general guideline of the center. As we shall see below, however, the local populists were partly responsible for, and benefited from, this "over-compliance."

The Populist Group

The "populist" group includes the M.P.'s, the Councilors, the locally elected and locally recruited TANU

⁵⁵In all the villages provided with poultry and cattle between 1969 and 1972, a majority of the birds or animals

functionaries, etc., who are members of the allocative organs-- committees and councils. They are "populist" in the sense that (1) their positions in some ways depend on the good will of their constituents, and (2) they frame their claims in populist terms--"the people" want this and that, or this is for maslahi ya umma (i.e. popular welfare), etc. Their interests, however, are not always the same as those of "the people;" for sometimes allocation claims were made to benefit the so-called vijiji vya Wakubwa, as we have seen, although this should probably be considered an exception or an "aberration" rather than the rule.⁵⁶

In the pre-decentralization period, the populists often allied with the politico-administrative group to defend themselves against the professionalism (or the "rational choice criteria" we referred to earlier) of the group of "experts" in the committees and councils. Moreover, the two groups have certain things in common, namely (1) insecurity of tenure: one depending on the Presidential good will, the other on the people's good will (and partly on the National Executive

either died as a result of lack of proper care and feeds or were slaughtered and consumed. Examples include Kikundi (poultry) and Bwakira Chini (cattle).

⁵⁶ Judging from the contributions of this group to the debates on allocation during the period we are analysing (1968-72), there is no question that a number of the populists were genuinely interested in improving the welfare of their constituents. These views are based on examination of DD & PC

Committee), (2) both are (or were) "generalists" and generally less qualified academically than the professional group; and (3) both claim to be the guardian of the national ideology and policies as well as the interests of the masses. The populists hailed the Mwongozo partly because it strengthened their power to place their claims in the name of "the people"-- as we have indicated, "self-interest" may in some cases be synonymous with this rather vague phrase.

The Professional Group

This group includes the staff and functional managers, researchers and other "experts" who are members of the various development committees which are responsible for the allocation of funds. This group is well represented in the Regional Development Committee and its Sub-Committee, as we pointed out earlier. However, their strength results from their expertise rather than the number of external supporters claimed by the populists. This group is also more confident partly because of its professional training and partly because of its tenure.⁵⁷

minutes, former District Council minutes and RDC minutes for the period.

⁵⁷The only possible worry was the frequent transfers in the pre-decentralization period which might take one to the remote areas of the country, often--and unfortunately--considered to be a form of "punishment" for misbehavior.

Studies in other areas of the country have tended to emphasize (probably over-emphasize) the importance of this group in influencing allocation of the RDF money and other resources.⁵⁸ In Morogoro the situation was a little different. The professionals furnished the necessary technical information, in some cases, even circulated well-argued papers to the members of the Committee and defended their position in the meetings. But in every major case of conflict between them and the populists (and the latter was often supported by the politico-administrative group) they quickly gave in. The professionals presented and defended their case on the basis of facts while the populists defended their case on the basis of values, and the former yielded as soon as the debate became normatively and ideologically oriented.⁵⁹

The Ujamaa Groups

Some Ujamaa villages tended to act as an "interest group," taking full advantage of the national policy which had for the first time made the so-called "common man" an effective participant in the allocative arena beyond his

⁵⁸See particularly Colins, op. cit., who seems to over-emphasize the influence of the professionals in RDC meetings in connection with the RDF.

⁵⁹Thus most of the technocrats we interviewed on the allocation pattern during the 1968-72 period, criticized the allocation and blamed the politicians for it. The minutes,

immediate locality. A patron-client relationship based on mutualism and non-betrayal of each other's motives developed between some ujamaa villages and some members of the populist group. We shall give a few examples. First, in a few extreme cases, a group of people agreed to be mobilized by a candidate to form a "temporary" ujamaa village; or second, many established ujamaa villages agreed to grant membership to parliamentary candidates a few months before the 1970 elections.⁶⁰ In either case, there were expectations of mutual benefit. The candidate's primary aim was to fulfil a Party requirement (i.e. association with some ujamaa group). The villagers wanted to use his influence in the local (as well as national) organs of allocation to get resources to their village--RDF tractor, a team of National Service or TYL men to help in weeding and harvesting, etc.

No such mutualism existed between the villagers and the professionals, most of whom were not even local men. Their encounters were usually businesslike; and, as we pointed

particularly those of the RDC meetings, do also show initial objection (mild, but factual) by many bureaucrats to some allocations which were finally made, such as those for poultry, cattle, etc., to ujamaa villages.

⁶⁰There were no examples of the first in Morogoro but they have been reported in Tanga. There were numerous examples of the second in Morogoro as well as in other parts of the country. For elaboration, see Frances Hill, "Elections in the Local Political Context," in Election Study Committee, Socialism and Participation, op. cit., Chapter 12.

out earlier, in some cases the word of the professional had to be supported by some local populist or TANU functionary before it could be implemented.

It is worth emphasizing that this patron-client relationship was based largely on material self-interest, but in a non-developmental sense. In mid-1972, for instance, the Party center decided to launch what was called "Operation Tanzania"--essentially to correct the ill-planning (or lack of planning) in the earlier phase. This would entail a reconsideration of the vital technico-economic considerations in aiding ujamaa villages, and in some cases villages which had mushroomed within close distances from each other would be asked to amalgamate to avoid duplication of the basic services, etc. The RDC in Morogoro decided in November, 1972 to select 10 viable villages in each District which would qualify under the demands of "Operation Tanzania." Even before the technicians had completed their investigation, the populists had already spread rumors in their areas that the villages would no longer qualify for government aid, and would be amalgamated with other villages. In Morogoro District, such rumors led to a general "panic" in many villages and some members were beginning to quit, now that government aid would not be forthcoming. The District planning team had to

visit these villages to dispel the rumors.⁶¹

The allocation pattern in Morogoro in the pre-decentralization period had three main weaknesses. First, it increased village dependence on government funds--in some cases, for all stages of production, including "harvesting hands"--instead of encouraging village self-reliance. Second, too many unco-ordinated projects were started at the same time, and consequently too few were completed. For example, out of some 63 RDF projects which were started during the period 1968/69 to 1971/72, only 14 had been completed by mid-1972 when the new structure was introduced.⁶² Third, linked with the second weakness was the incapacity to utilize funds. During the same period, out of a total of shs. 968,992 allocated to Morogoro District (i.e. its share of the RDF), only shs. 648,666 had been spent by mid-1972, the remaining third being surrendered intact to the new organization.⁶³ Apart from the organization problems, this incapacity to

⁶¹Interview with Mr. Maswa, Assistant District Planning Officer, Morogoro, 22 November, 1972.

⁶²Morogoro District Office, Report of DDD of 2 August, 1972, "Matumizi ya Fedha za Mfuko wa Maendeleo wa Mkoa (RDF) hadi 30/6/72--Wilaya ya Morogoro," p. 1.

⁶³Morogoro District Council, "Taarifa ya Matumizi ya Fedha za Maendeleo Morogoro District Council--30/6/72."

utilize funds was partly a result of improper choice of priorities; communication would probably require top priority. Of all the projects we inspected, whether those of RDF (1968-72) or Self-help (1962-72), the implementer's ready explanation, "lack of funds," could not explain delay in completion of any of them.⁶⁴

GRASS-ROOTS DEMOCRACY VERSUS PLANNING DISCIPLINE

Some of the problems discussed in the previous sections are undoubtedly transitional, they will be overcome as both the planners and the people acquire more experience and commitment to national objectives. Moreover, decentralization has eliminated many of the organizational weaknesses as well as made it possible for the various actors at the local level to work closer together. It would be unrealistic, however, to assume that all the problems would disappear over-night. Traditional inertia still needs to be overcome; productivity

⁶⁴In all cases, sufficient funds had been allocated. In a few cases, however, too little had been allocated for too great a task--e.g. allocation of shs. 50,000 for a 50-mile road, etc., but even in such cases, the estimates could still be revised because funds existed. The RDF was a "revolving" fund, the unused portion was kept rather than returned to the Treasury at the end of the year. Furthermore, although Morogoro District achieved a great deal on self-help basis between 1962 and 1972, only about 40% of the projects started during that period had been completed. The problem in this case, too, was not funds, but mobilization.

and efficiency at the village level need to be "revolutionized," etc. While the necessary organization for grass-roots democracy and participation in planning and implementation of plans is in the process of being implemented, a number of policy matters remain ambiguous, particularly with regard to the machinery for ensuring "planning discipline" within the mass participatory structures. It should be clear from our previous discussion that this is not an 'academic' point, but a point on which ujamaa itself may stand or fall.

The Iringa policy on agriculture made the question of "enforcement" even more urgent. In Morogoro, this was followed by frank and detailed discussion by the Regional and District leaders on how to overcome the forces of tradition to be able (a) to achieve the goal of collectivization in the first place, and (b) to revolutionize productivity in existing villages. One of the important points emerging from these discussions was the need to make a clear distinction between democracy in decision-making (e.g. in agreeing on targets between experts and villagers) and democracy in implementation. The Regional Commissioner correctly pointed out that one cannot have both:

The peasants must be taught that they cannot have it both ways: democracy refers to decision-making, there is no democracy in implementation of projects democratically chosen with the full participation of the villagers. Once targets have been jointly agreed

upon between the leaders and the people, each side must play its part to ensure their fulfillment.⁶⁵

In various meetings of the RDC in June and July, 1972, similar observations were repeated again and again by leaders of various categories. It was noted that Mwongozo was both good and necessary in the fight against bureaucratism, but that it had flattered the peasants by declaring that they were the true "experts;" one negative outcome being that the planners did not get the necessary co-operation from them. Thus, it was argued: "Although the peasants must be encouraged to participate more and more, it must be remembered that peasants have never been planners, and that is why they have not improved for ages."⁶⁶ The traditional inertia holding the Luguru on the mountains was decried as out-dated and the need to renew enforcement of the agricultural rules was stipulated:

The colonial regulations on land conservation, etc., were not bad in themselves; what was bad was the fact that these colonialists were exploiters. They encouraged the people to work hard so that they could exploit them more.⁶⁷

The post-Iringa mood in Morogoro was clearly in favor of greater "pressure" on the peasants; but until mid-1973 no attempt had been made to translate this enthusiasm into action.

⁶⁵My notes of RDC meeting of 9 June, 1972.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

Four factors, internal to the Tanzanian political system, tend to favor "persuasion" rather than "compulsion." First, there is the historical party-peasant relationship to which we have already referred. This is particularly pertinent in the Morogoro case because the Party co-operated with the people "on the mountain" in a fierce protest against colonial agricultural rules, which is making it difficult for the local party organs to renew enforcement of the same rules, or to force the redundant population on the Hills to establish new homes on the plains. Thus many resolutions have remained on paper. Second, compulsion requires as large--if not larger--a cadre as persuasion, and probably just as much--if not more--commitment to the objectives of the center. We have already examined the problem of cadres.

Third, the fact of democratic elections is also a deterrent against the adoption of a more aggressive style of mobilization on the part of the populist elite. In actual fact, if the Iringa policy on agriculture were to be implemented to the letter, it is the politicians, rather than the technicians who would be in a "fix," because it is they who are supposed to perform the missionary task of mobilization before the technicians could follow with material and technical inputs. In this connection, and particularly with regard to the enforcement of cotton, some local politicians in Morogoro

were already (1972) assessing their 1975 electoral chances in the light of the mobilization demands of the Iringa policy.⁶⁸

Finally, the position of the central leadership with regard to enforcement has not been entirely clear. However, Mwalimu has eloquently stated the general normative case, rejecting the use of coercion on a regular basis to induce social change. The following argument, for example, makes his position very clear:

Development brings freedom, provided it is development of people. But people cannot be developed; they can only develop themselves. For while it is possible for an outsider to build a man's house, an outsider cannot give the man pride and self-confidence in himself as a human being. Those things a man has to create in himself by his own actions. He develops himself by what he does; . . . he develops himself by making his own decisions, by increasing his understanding of what he is doing, and why; by increasing his own knowledge and ability, and by his own full participation-- as an equal--in the life of the community he lives in . . . he is not being developed if he simply carries out orders from someone better educated than himself without understanding why those orders have been given. A man develops himself by joining in free discussion of a new venture, and participating in the subsequent decision; he is not being developed if he is herded like an animal into the new venture. Development to (sic) a man can, in fact, only be effected by that man; development of

⁶⁸Ibid. There were a number of speeches on this subject, and the R.C. emphasized that personal political ambitions should not be allowed to compromise the rate of mobilization demanded by the new policy on agriculture.

the people can only be effected by the people.⁶⁹

Yet, to the planner and implementer, the above statement (and Mwongozo) can only provide general guidelines to check tendencies towards bureaucratism or outright use of coercion. The problem of determining where democracy ends and implementation begins has not been resolved. Again, traditional sanctions against non-attendance to communal or self-help projects were deliberately weakened by the central leadership which forbade their use immediately after independence.⁷⁰ The central position was relaxed a bit in 1969 when Mwalimu gave authority to village communities to punish those who did not participate in community self-help projects:

Under certain conditions certain kinds of sanctions imposed by the local community will be allowed . . . Village development committees will . . . in future be allowed to impose other sanctions on those who do not take part in a self-help activity which the village development committee has itself declared to be self-help project.⁷¹

⁶⁹Nyerere, "Freedom and Development," The Standard (Dar es Salaam), 18 October, 1968.

⁷⁰For elaboration of the changing policy on this issue and the general question of compulsion, see Ingle, op. cit., chapter 4.

⁷¹The Standard (Dar es Salaam), 18 October, 1968.

This presidential directive was made law by the Ward Development Committee Bill.⁷² Yet the position has remained ambivalent, because a few months later, the President emphasized that: "We make a big mistake if we try to force the people to produce certain amounts or even to cultivate certain acreages of cash crops" and added: "Persuasion may appear slower than force, but it is more effective."⁷³ It is difficult for a village planner to reconcile this position with the necessity to maintain a balance between democracy and discipline in ujamaa villages, a case which Mwalimu has also eloquently argued:

The greater freedom which comes from working together, and achieving things by co-operation which none of us could achieve alone, is only possible if there is disciplined acceptance of joint decisions . . . once a community has democratically decided upon a particular self-help scheme, everyone must co-operate in carrying out that decision, or pay the penalty which the village agrees upon . . . The acceptance of community discipline is only a problem in Tanzania when our people do not understand the implications of the changes which we have already effected in our lives . . . We must have both freedom and discipline. For freedom without discipline is anarchy: discipline without freedom is tyranny.⁷⁴

⁷²The Bill was introduced in Parliament in January, 1969 by Mr. Kisumo who emphasized that employment of such sanctions was the essence of democracy.

⁷³See President's speech introducing, and published in, The Second Plan, p. xvi.

⁷⁴Nyerere, "Freedom and Development," The Standard (Dar es Salaam), 18 October, 1968.

It is clear then that the strategy advocated by the central leadership is that of persuasion and teaching rather than coercion:

Leadership does not mean shouting at people; it does not mean abusing individuals or groups of people you disagree with; even less does it mean ordering people to do this or that. Leadership means talking and discussing with the people, explaining and persuading. It means making constructive suggestions, and working with the people to show by actions what it is that you are urging them to do.⁷⁵

Within this framework, the village planner and the rest of the local leadership are obliged to exercise patience, but they are also faced with a dilemma between toleration of slow change and a resort to alternative solutions. The main temptations, as we have pointed out, have been bureaucratic solutions and over-subventionism, both of which have had the effect of perpetuating the village dependency syndrome.

⁷⁵Ibid.

Chapter 10

THE TANZANIAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM: CONCLUSIONS

The worst thing that can befall the leader of an extreme party is to be compelled to take over a government at a time when society is not yet ripe for the domination of the class he represents and for the measures which that domination implies. What he can do depends not upon his will but upon the degree of antagonism between the various classes, and upon the level of development of the material means of existence, of the conditions of production and commerce upon which class contradictions always repose. What he ought to do, what his party demands of him, again depends not upon him or the stage of development of the class struggle and its conditions. He is bound to the doctrines and demands hitherto propounded which, again, do not proceed from the class relations of the moment, or from the more or less accidental level of production and commerce, but from his more or less penetrating insight into the general result of the social and political movement.

-- F. Engels, The Peasant War in Germany
(Moscow, 1956), p. 115.

In this study, we have used five terms in various contexts to describe the Tanzanian road to socialism: the road is pragmatic, eclectic, evolutionary, democratic and agrarian. We have no intention of going over the large ground we have already covered. Tentative conclusions have already

been suggested in each chapter--indeed, in each section if not in each paragraph. Our primary intention here will be to further clarify this unique road to socialism and the terms we have used to describe it.

Pragmatic and Eclectic Methodology

The terms 'pragmatism' and 'eclecticism' can be misleading when used to describe the Tanzanian road to socialism. This is because they have been used (actually abused) in the past to refer to early versions of the so-called "African Socialism" which, in many African countries, turned out to be principleless opportunism of the local elites which identified their interests with those of the metropolitan elites. As it should be clear from our previous discussion, no such derogatory sense is intended in our use. In fact, one of the most unique features of the Tanzanian socialist experiment has been the ability of the central leadership to adopt a pragmatic and eclectic methodology without sacrificing the main principles of the experiment itself.

We have already suggested some of the factors making this approach possible and necessary in the Tanzanian socio-economic and sociopolitical context. We have argued that the Tanzanian revolution is a revolution 'from above,' and that mindless application of some classical theories based on

assumptions of a revolution 'from below' can even be counter-revolutionary in the Tanzanian context. It is important to note that the founders of the so-called "scientific socialism" themselves could foresee (more than a century ago) some of the problems and dilemmas that would inevitably face a leader of a socialist movement under conditions such as those currently existing in Tanzania. The statement by Engels quoted above depicts, in graphical precision, the dilemma that has faced the Tanzanian central leadership at various stages of Ujamaa evolution. Engels emphasized that, under conditions of underdeveloped forces and relations of production, progressive action depends on the "penetrating insight" of the leadership "into the general result of the social and political movement." We argued in chapters 4, 5 and 6 that the evolution of Ujamaa depended on the insight of Mwalimu and his willingness to seize every opportunity to give content to the socialist ideals of the Party. By the nature of the situation, it would be both difficult and unwise to be doctrinaire about methods. Yet the principles and ideals themselves remained unaltered throughout the past decade and a half. Engels summed up the dilemma of the leader of a socialist movement under such conditions as follows:

Thus he necessarily finds himself in an unsolvable dilemma. What he can do contradicts all his previous actions and principles, and the immediate interest of

his party, and what he ought to do cannot be done. In a word, he is compelled to represent not his party or his class, but the class for whose domination the movement is then ripe. In the interest of the movement he is compelled to advance the interests of an alien class, and to feed his own class with talk and promises, and with the asseveration that the interests of that alien class are his own interests. He who is put into this awkward position is irrevocably lost.¹

At this point, Engels' description of the dilemma would require several qualifications to apply to the Tanzanian experience. First, Mwalimu avoided the possibility of making the dilemma 'unsolvable' by refusing² to be doctrinaire about socialist transformation; by refusing to view the actors as "classes" with well-defined interests which are always opposed to those of other "classes." He rather chose to deal with the actors as "individuals" who are either committed or not committed to the socialist ideals, thereby avoiding the curious assumption that embourgeoisement ends "miraculously" with the lines drawn to separate a stratum we call managers from a stratum we call workers, or a stratum of more progressive peasants (the term "farmer" is too flattering for most of them) from less progressive peasants. Mwalimu's position would certainly have been more "awkward"--and he would probably

¹Engels, op. cit., p. 115.

²His refusal, however, is in our view based on sound judgement and his position is well defended. See his arguments in the 'Introduction' to his Freedom and Socialism, pp. 1-30.

have been "irrevocably lost" as Engels predicted--if he had assumed that a Marxist road to socialism was possible under the Tanzanian conditions. Second, it cannot be said that Mwalimu has fed "his own class" or any other class with idle "talk and promises;" he has taken every opportunity to sell the ideals of Ujamaa to all the members of the society. He acknowledges the colonial and capitalist scars which are more conspicuous in the elite substratum (to which he himself belongs), without assuming that this substratum can be written off. He emphasizes the role of the workers and peasants in the revolution, without assuming that these groups are necessarily motivated by socialism. He therefore seeks a solution in broad socialist education which will provide new experience to members of all the strata, and thereafter ^{to} deal with 'non-conformists' on the basis of individuals rather than a category called class.

Thus Mwalimu has emphasized the "power of teachers" in molding the attitudes of the people: "the truth is that it is teachers more than any other single group of people who determine these attitudes, and who shape the ideas and aspirations of the nation," and continued:

It is our teachers who have the real power to determine whether Tanzania will succeed in modernizing the attitudes which allowed every human being to maintain

his self-respect, and earn the respect of his fellows while working in harmony with them. It is they . . . who are shaping what Tanzania will become, much more than we who pass laws, make rules, and make speeches.³

This emphasis on teaching and persuasion is consistent with Mwalimu's belief that "socialism is an attitude of mind" and not just a socio-economic arrangement. We have already (chapter 6) pointed out some of the problems of interpretation arising from this formulation; we have also shown that more concrete measures have been taken in the post-Arusha period--organizational, legal-institutional, etc.--to accelerate the transition to socialism. In this effort, the role of ideology and politics has been more conspicuous than that of economics; it is the former which has been determining the latter rather than the other way around. This view is supported by C. Wright Mills who has emphasized that it is ideology and politics which determine the economics of a modern society:

Since the First World War, it has become increasingly clear that political forms may drastically modify--and even, on occasion, determine--the economics of society. Not the mode of economic production but the mode of political action may as well be decisive. As more and more areas of social life, private as well as public, become objects of political organization, a struggle for political ideals and for the political and military means of action and decision must, along with economic means, be seen as keys to man's making of history.⁴

³Ibid., p. 228.

⁴Mills, The Marxists, op. cit., p. 123.

Considering that in Tanzania the economy has depended so heavily on governmental action and initiatives, we can legitimately say, like Glenn Paige,⁵ that "the political superstructure is not a reflection of the economic base, but its creator."⁵ The importance of the ideological and the ethical dimension was also emphasized by the famous Bavarian 'Revisionist,' Eduard Bernstein, who argued that, with the progress of the society, non-economic factors tend to become increasingly important in determining future changes. "Modern society," he maintained, "is much richer than earlier societies in ideologies which are not determined by economics and by nature working as economic force;" and that "social relations are today much less dependent on economics than formerly, or in order to give no room for misconception, the point of economic development attained today leaves the ideological, and especially the ethical, factors greater space for independent activity than was formerly the case."⁶ Thus, concluded Bernstein, "A scientific basis for socialism or communism cannot be supported on the fact alone that the wage worker does not receive the full value of the product of his work."⁷

⁵Glenn D. Paige, "The Rediscovery of Politics," in Comparative Administrative Group Occasional Paper (Bloomington, Indiana, American Society of Public Administration, September, 1963), p. 7.

⁶Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

⁷Ibid., p. 39.

More primarily, we would add, socialism in Tanzania will depend (or has depended) on the mode of political action and the ideological choice made by the central leadership, with the pre-existing modes and forces of production, the structure of society, the normative content of the traditional communities, and the behavior of the elites setting a boundary to the pace of implementation. In other words, we see the so-called "Substructure" as being the intervening rather than the independent variable; it is the leadership (politics and ideology) which constitutes the latter.⁸

Ujamaa is eclectic by design, not by accident. It is eclectic in method but not in ideals, as we have already pointed out. The aim has been to utilize the traditional "spirit" of co-operation in a modern context, as well as to Tanzanize the ideals of the so-called 'Western liberal tradition' by creating non-Western structures of democratic practice, such as the one-party system and its unique intra-party democracy. We shall have a further word on the democracy-socialism equation below.

⁸The emphasis on "politics in command" in China would also appear to support this view; and Mao seems to be flexible and eclectic with classical Marxism, emphasizing the "spirit" of it rather than giving a literal interpretation.

Democratic and Evolutionary

Another unique feature of the Tanzanian experiment is the attempt to combine socialist transformation with democratic participation within a single-party framework. We have attempted to show that this combination has been possible largely because of the evolutionary character of the experiment and the continuity of a central leadership committed to both democracy and socialism.

For both democracy and socialism, initiative has thus far come from above, rather than from below. For both, too, the leadership has avoided the temptation to be 'dogmatic' about particular structures which have been identified with socialism or democracy in other countries. The starting point has been the Tanzanian society and the ideals of Ujamaa.

The President has argued that there is need for both socialists and democrats to "continue thinking," for there is no country which has achieved a universally applicable model, and there is no "Bible" for universal democracy or socialism. The ideals themselves may be universal, but the methods as well as the structures supporting them will differ from country to country.⁹

⁹Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, pp. 1-30.

The importance of such attitude, especially for a leader of a developing nation, should now be indisputable when viewed in the light of recent events in the developed nations. Probably the best example--and a warning against 'blind imitation'--is the current "Watergate Scandal" in the United States, a scandal which has exposed some of the systemic weaknesses which have been concealed for the past two centuries.¹⁰

We contended in chapter 1 that ideological reaction in the West--the enthusiasm to 'export' Western democratic "structures" to new lands--was one of the major factors inhibiting innovative thinking in Africa during the first decade of Uhuru. Even the few leaders who took "courage" to introduce significant institutional changes found it necessary to write treatises to explain at home and, particularly, abroad, why democracy would require different structures in their countries. In Mwalimu's case, as we have seen, the creation of a "democratic ethic" was more important than a wholesale transplantation of alien structures.

Probably such treatises would now be unnecessary for two reasons. First, it is now an empirical fact that genuine

¹⁰The full story has not as yet been put together; but some of the weaknesses--moral and systemic--can be seen in President Nixon's edited transcripts. See The Washington Post, The Presidential Transcripts (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 1974).

democratic practice has emerged neither in African nor in Asian countries where Western structures were artificially imposed.¹¹ Second, some of these structures are now being challenged in the West. Thus, for example, the U.S. Senate Watergate Committee has recommended a sweeping program of legislation (35 Acts) which, if implemented, will bring about significant institutional innovation in the country.¹² Some of these changes, in particular, the Federal Elections Commission and Ombudsman, are among those which Tanzania embodied in her constitution a decade ago to check electoral malpractices and the misuse of power.¹³

What we are suggesting is that, whatever is interesting and fresh in the Tanzanian experiment--and this goes for both the democratic and the socialist elements--is a result of the

¹¹India could be considered an exception; but, in our view, the big economic inequality in India inhibits participation of the majority not only in the economy but in the polity as well.

¹²See a summary of the recommendations in The New York Times, 14 July, 1974. These recommendations include the creation of an American Ombudsman (called 'Public Attorney') and a Federal Elections Commission.

¹³For the working of the Tanzanian Ombudsman, see Helge Kjekshus "The Ombudsman in the Tanzanian One-Party System," The African Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (September, 1971), pp. 13-29.

attitude that one learns from theories and experiences of other countries and then proceeds to think with the concrete society that is being transformed. This attitude makes it possible to sift what should be imitated from what should not. Indiscriminate imitation has, for example, led to a rather curious association of 'modernization' with 'Westernization'; indeed, in some extreme cases, with the development of a kind of a "Hippie Culture" in some African capital cities, whereas this culture is not only sneered at in its country of origin but considered a national "crisis of values and meaning."¹⁴ Moreover, the very idea of "catching up" with the developed nations cannot be achieved by "chasing behind," but by constant innovation.

A related point is that Tanzania could strictly make use of neither the Western classical theory of democracy nor the classical Marxist model of socialist transformation. Both bodies of theory converge on one point--the assumption of relatively high level of economic development and societal differentiation. We have no intention of engaging in a debate regarding the correctness of this association of democracy and socialism with certain levels of economic development. It suffices to state that (1) both--i.e. including classical Marxism--are a commentary on the Western

¹⁴Thus, for example, some streets of Nairobi or Abidjan would remind one of Ashbury Street in San Francisco.

tradition and experience; (2) both have elements of science (being based on concrete historical studies, etc.) as well as elements of Utopia or normative and ideological commitment to certain cherished values; and (3) even assuming that their premises and assumptions could have universal validity, neither body of theory could be applied "literally" to Tanzania which is one of the World's poorest countries--economically speaking.

Thus, for both democracy and socialism, Tanzania has depended on continued thinking and observation rather than on the application of a social science theory. Both democracy and socialism are viewed in "mass" rather than "elitist" terms, in terms of wider mass participation not only in the polity but also in the economy and society as well. The structure for such participation now exists. In summary, the center has sought to widen participation in all areas of national life--(1) within the Party by creating a cell system, 'working place' branches, and regular elections of Party and Government functionaries; (2) within factories, etc., by introducing a worker's participation program; and (3) in planning and implementation by creating an elaborate committee structure extending from the village to the regional level, etc.

We have already pointed out some of the potential sources of "counter-ideological" forces which must be overcome

if this excellent machinery for socialism and democracy is to produce the system's goals--both developmental and ethical. Traditional inertia, we have argued, may in some areas of the country conflict with both modern Ujamaa and the norms of efficiency. Unguided, it may also delay the evolution of 'modern' democratic practice (based on the principle of 'majoritarian' support for a leader) by emphasizing the traditional norms of leadership (based on the "principle of unanimity" or "universal acclamation").¹⁵

The temptation of embourgeoisement will also need to be discouraged not only among the members of the elite but also among the workers and the peasantry. We have already shown why it cannot be assumed that the members of the economically poorer stratum are necessarily yearning for socialism. Modern Ujamaa will be a new experience for members of all the strata and all must continue to learn.

Furthermore, tendencies towards bureaucratism may continue to be a problem for some time. For example, the bureaucrats have as yet to "discover" the Party branches which were introduced in all working places (offices, factories,

¹⁵For elaboration of this point, see my articles "Elections and Political Mobilization in Tanzania," and "Ujamaa: Modernization by Retraditionalization," to which we have made several references. See also A. H. Rweyemamu, "The Presidential Election," in Election Study Committee, chapter 9.

etc.) in 1969. These branches have only rarely been integrated into the day-to-day decision-making processes in these 'working places.' Yet experience has shown that suggestions made through the Party machinery stand a better chance of quick consideration by the central leadership than those made outside the Party machinery.¹⁶

It must also be noted that the foundation that has been built for socialism and democracy need to undergo a rapid process of "institutionalization" to avoid the danger of total reversal, as it has occurred in other countries of Africa and Latin America. We have already pointed out that the experiment has thus far depended (or "over-depended") on the tireless efforts of one man--Mwalimu. Up to this point, Mwalimu has been necessary for the revolution. His historical position in the Tanzanian political system has been buttressed by all the three legitimational principles classically formulated by Max Weber--tradition, charisma and legal-rational. We shall elaborate this view briefly below.

With the abolition of traditional chieftaincy, some traditional communities have tended to view the presidency

¹⁶For example, the idea of shifting the national capital from Dar es Salaam to Dodoma was suggested by a Mwanza Party branch in 1972, and it was immediately given central consideration. Of course, the center does not approve every suggestion from below, but this is beside the point.

(or, more accurately, the current incumbent) as the overall "National Father," even beyond petty electoral politics. Experience of the past three Presidential elections (1962, 1965 and 1970) tended to confirm this view. In each case, the President received a huge mass support irrespective of the electoral fate of incumbent M.P.'s or his own ministers.¹⁷ In the 1970 elections, for example, some voters even explained their failure to register in terms of support for Mwalimu; they argued (in good faith, though in ignorance of the working of modern democracy) that Mwalimu had already been elected in 1965 and therefore there was no reason to have him undergo another popular verdict in 1970.¹⁸ This "traditionalist" thinking was clearly revealed in the joint TANU-Afro electoral conference held in Dar es Salaam (September 11, 1970) for the purpose of adopting a Presidential Candidate. There was overwhelming support for the idea (suggested by the late First Vice-President Karume) of making Mwalimu Nyerere a life Government-Party President. Mwalimu's reaction is important in revealing his continuing role as the "teacher" of both socialism and democracy:

¹⁷See particularly Rweyemamu, "The Presidential Election." See also Hill's chapter in the 1970 Election Study.

¹⁸This "traditionalist" argument was heard particularly in Songea.

A national constitution is not made to fit the dimensions of any particular individual. It should be able to fit any person, whether tall or short, fat or slim. It is not like a dress which is cut to fit a particular person. The people often aspire to the idea of having a life President because they trust their leaders, but the present constitutional provision that every five years we should have a presidential election is quite convenient. Maybe after five years of office the electorate will want another leader or maybe the leader himself will want to be relieved. It should be clearly understood that people change . . . the way is, if we want him to continue, we will elect him again after five years; if not, then we say "sorry" to him. We are not electing to the Presidency a sultan but a worker.¹⁹

Mwalimu's mass support, however, is not solely a product of the traditional principle of unanimity in selecting leaders, for other well-established figures have received electoral shocks where they least expected. It is rather a combination of traditional factors, personal "charisma" (not in any mystical sense, but in the sense that he has consistently fought for the welfare of the masses and has been identified with the aspirations of the masses), as well as his constitutional powers which enable him to redistribute resources, including wide powers to appoint and dismiss or transfer all high-ranking public officials.²⁰ Unlike the M.P., the President can act as a real "benefactor" of his large national constituency. His power to reward and punish is further augmented by the fact

¹⁹The Standard (Dar es Salaam), 12 September, 1970.

²⁰For these powers, see United Republic of Tanzania, The Interim Constitution (Dar es Salaam: Government Printer, 1965).

that he is President of the Party as well as the nation.²¹ So far the President has used his legal powers with great care, and often with the aim of expanding the options of the political system. However, the degree to which the Presidency itself has been institutionalized as the source of innovation and national unity is still open to question. Certain constitutional matters still await clarification.²²

Agrarian Socialism

The Tanzanian path to socialism is agrarian in the sense that the nation depends for its development on the production of the peasants who constitute over 90 percent of the population. It is not, however, "agrarian" in the sense that it has involved any peasant uprising against their exploiters. Socialist consciousness among the peasantry, as

²¹This, however, is based on usage rather than law, and it is one area that will require clarification in the future.

²²For an assessment, see Rweyemamu, "The Presidential Election." Awaiting clarification, for example, is the whole question of Union with Zanzibar. The Union constitution is still "Interim;" and M.P.'s from the Island have continued to be appointed because there have been no elections in Zanzibar since the Revolution of January 12, 1964. Procedures for adopting the Presidential candidate are also unclear. In practice, the electoral conference has simply "acclaimed" Mwalimu in the traditional fashion. This has worked fine because an obvious candidate has existed; more refined procedures will be necessary for candidates of less "political stature."

among the workers, is itself a task to be undertaken rather than a ready pillar on which to build socialism.

Apart from the question of low consciousness, there is the problem of low productivity per unit factor input, as we have detailed in the previous three chapters. The problem of productivity is the main challenge in what we have referred to as the "third stage" of Ujamaa, involving an attack on the dysfunctional elements of tradition as well as immobilism at the local level. This is also applicable to the modern sectors. The problem of productivity and efficiency has been well summarized by Reginald Green: "For the main body of workers and peasants, a pattern of development which adds nothing to their bitterly low levels of personal consumption cannot be expected to be acceptable--let alone to generate active participation and support. 'Man does not live by bread alone' is not the same as 'man does not live by bread at all'," he states, adding:

The counterpart to consolidation of spending is concentration of attention on achieving greater efficiency--that is, more real output of recurrent services of productive capacity per shilling spent. . . . it requires rethinking 'needs' to cut out that which is useless or merely unnecessary even if desirable, and examining means and methods with a view to getting more out of a constant or slowly rising flow of resources by using them differently. An integral part of this process is the broadening of participation. Participation, including worker and farmer control, cannot be seen simply as a means to securing more self-help efforts--useful and important as that is--but as the channel through which ideas, enthusiasm,

energy and efforts of many Tanzanians can be mobilized into public sector (including parastatals and co-operatives) efforts to achieve and sustain significant productivity increases.²³

Related problems which must be avoided in connection with ujamaa production include (1) over-subvention, (2) immature mechanization (as well as partial mechanization which does not take into account the 'labor factor') and (3) the emerging tendency (at the local level) to view Ujamaa just as a method of income redistribution, thus emphasizing the consumption function more than the production function of ujamaa villages. It must be emphasized that this 'redistributive' emphasis is often a result of local politics of allocation rather than strictly a central criterion. The center acknowledges the need to maintain a good balance between the two functions. This was, for example, well stated by the Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Mr. Paul Bomani, when he was introducing the Second Plan in July, 1969:

In working on this Plan, we have found it necessary to make difficult choices; the resources available are scarce and our needs have been very great. We have tried to produce a good balance--a balance between directly productive investments which can increase our future

²³Reginald H. Green, "Resources, Demands, Investible Surpluses and Efficiency," in TAAMULI, Vol. 2, No. 1 (December, 1971), pp. 12-14.

resource and social investments which meet urgent immediate needs of our people; a balance between short-term results which can be enjoyed now, and making those long-term changes in our economy which are necessary for sustained growth; a balance between investing in those parts of the country which are already fast growing and which sometimes have the most obvious investment possibilities and those parts which have been neglected in the past and need extra push.²⁴

This problem of choice is particularly great in Tanzania because of the colonially-induced development imbalances between urban and rural areas, between regions and within regions. However, proper allocation of resources and priority-setting at the local level during the first phase of collectivization was inhibited by the fact that recognition of ujamaa villages was based more on political criteria than on technico-economic criteria. A balance of the two criteria will be necessary (and it is organizationally possible after Iringa and Decentralization) in the next phase.

Another matter requiring clarification at the local level relates to individual rights to land. In Tanzania's legal practice, no compensation can be paid for a mere claim of undeveloped land. Problems have arisen where areas demarcated for ujamaa villages have included people with some property (e.g. permanent cash crops) on the land. A purely political criterion was used in the first phase whenever there was a

²⁴Second Plan, p. xxiv.

conflict between members of an ujamaa village (or those intending to form one) and non-members. The operating norms were that in all such cases the Wajamaa must win. Although there were only a few cases of conflict over land in the first phase, more will be expected as land becomes scarce and as local implementers struggle to meet the central target of achieving full rural collectivization by 1976. Related to this problem is the broader question of "socialist legality" or "socialist justice" which has not been clearly defined in Tanzania. This fact has inevitably made the judiciary-- currently based on British practices--almost incompetent in handling the politically delicate questions of Ujamaa. Thus a legal reform and a clear definition of the land rights of the Wajamaa seem to be an urgent need if the very strong temptation towards "political solutions" (with unavoidable "arbitrariness") by the local cadre is to be minimized.²⁵


Tanzania has chosen a democratic road to socialism, and its methods have emphasized persuasion, education, exhortation and legislation, avoiding both coercion and the arbitrariness of a violent revolution. This road may be slow, but it is probably the only framework within which democracy

²⁵For a useful discussion of the need for a legal reform in post-Arusha Tanzania, see R. James, "The Role of Legislation in the Implementation of the Arusha Declaration" (Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam Seminar Paper, 1972, mimeo.).


and socialist transformation can co-exist. It is also the only framework within which the intellect can work as a systematic force, as Bernstein well stated the case: "In legislation intellect dominates over emotion in quiet times; during a [violent] revolution, emotion dominates over intellect. But if emotion is often an imperfect leader the intellect is a slow motive force. Where the revolution sins by overhaste, the every day legislator sins by procrastination. Legislation works as a systematic force, revolution as an elementary force."²⁶ Tanzania will undoubtedly need to avoid being enslaved by either of these two extremes. Legislation without mass enthusiasm can produce neither development nor socialism; the challenge for the leadership is to convert its "populist strength" into "developmental strength" at the local level.


²⁶Bernstein, op. cit., p. 218.

Appendix A: The Prime Minister's Office and its Links with the Regional Teams



Appendix B: REGIONAL AND DISTRICT ORGANIZATION.





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