

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.
5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

University Microfilms International

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA
St. John's Road, Tyler's Green
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR

7900731

MUSOKE, ISSA KABOKO
IMPERIALISM, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CLASS
STRUGGLES IN TANZANIA: AN ANALYSIS OF LABOR
PROCESSES IN A DEPENDENT ECONOMY.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY, PH.D., 1976

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106

ABSTRACT

IMPERIALISM, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CLASS STRUGGLES
IN TANZANIA: AN ANALYSIS OF LABOR PROCESSES
IN A DEPENDENT ECONOMY

By

Issa Kaboko Musoke

The following piece of work aims at providing an explanation to the various developments--and especially the wave of industrial disputes that took place between 1971 and 1975--that have led to the conscription, control and clampdown on the country's labor movement by the independent Tanzania government. It is our major contention that what has been happening is a result of the class contradictions pertaining in the country and that at best reflects the objective laws of class struggle. This, we further argue, has been determined by the nature of the political economy of the country.

Thus, our major task has been to show how the nature and extent of the said class contradictions and struggles are a result of the penetration and subjugation of the Tanzanian economy by the world capitalist system which has led to the development of the major antagonistic classes.

In this piece of work, we start by dismissing the various mainstream orthodox theories that have been advanced to explain the relationship between the labor movement and the independent Tanzania government. Instead, we offer an alternative (Marxist) interpretation based on class analysis. This is followed by a critical look at the

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A lot of people and various institutions helped me write this dissertation. I would therefore like to extend my thanks to all of them.

First I would like to thank the Institute of International Education (U.S.A.), the Department of Sociology at Michigan State University and the University of Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) for having made it possible for me to pursue my doctoral studies at Michigan State University, the end product being this piece of work.

Secondly, I would also like to extend my thanks to the various people who served on my guidance and doctoral dissertation committee at one time or another for the advice and inspiration they gave me throughout my stay at Michigan State University. To Drs. Fred Buttel, Richard Hill, William Derman, David Wiley, Kevin Kelly and James McKee, I say thank you.

Special mention and thanks are extended to Professor James McKee who acted as chairperson for my committee during all this time. His advice, tolerance and endurance, sometimes during very hard and trying moments, were indeed a special inspiration to me during the time when I sometimes thought of abandoning the whole project altogether. To him, I extend my very warm and special thanks.

Thirdly, I would also like to extend my special thanks to all the secretaries in the Department of Sociology at Michigan State

University for their help and advice at one stage or another during my stay at M.S.U. Special mention and thanks also go to all those people who helped in the typing of the various drafts of this dissertation. To Judy Flositz, Alex Serunjogi, John Calhoun and others I also say thank you.

Last but by no means the least, I would like to thank my fellow graduate students in Room 318, Berkeley Hall, for having made themselves ready targets and a critical audience of most of my ideas as I developed them. To Partick Ashton, Len Berkey, Ernest Dumor, Harry Mika and all others, again thank you very much, not only for your tolerance of my probings but also for your comradely inspiration during some very trying moments. Although it bears my name, this is "our work."

	Page
1. The World Bank Report	242
Improvement	243
Transformation	243
2. Arthur D. Little, Inc. and the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.)	247
3. The Arusha Declaration	252
B. Specific Development Measures	256
1. Agricultural Development and Rural Differen- tiation: The Emergence of a Kulak Class?	260
a. The Improvement Approach	260
b. Transformation	261
1. Supervised Settlement Schemes	262
2. Cooperative Settlement Schemes	264
3. The Estate Sector	265
i) The Establishment of Ujamaa Villages	267
ii) The Estate Sector	269
2. Manufacturing and Industrial Development: The Emergence of an Industrial Working Class and the Creation of a Managerial Class	270
3. Commerce and Trade	281
a. The Marketing Boards	284
b. Agricultural Produce Marketing Coopera- tives	285
c. The Importation and Distribution of Non- Agricultural Consumer Goods	286
4. Education and Manpower	289
C. The Resulting Class Structure	292
a. The Upper Class	299
(i) The Political Leaders and Function- aries	300
(ii) Administrative Bureaucrats, Most of Them Tanzanian Citizens	300
(iii) The Managerial Class	301
b. The Commercial Bourgeoisie	302
c. The Indigenous Classes	303
II. Labor-Government Relationship: The Marriage of Convenience Dissolved	305
(a) The East African High Commission Issue	307
(b) Africanization	311
(c) Wage Demands and Subsequent Strikes	313
(i) The Mwadui Strike of December 1960	314
(ii) The Local Government-Workers Union (LGWU) vs. the Dar es Salaam Municipal Council	315
(iii) The Sisal Plantation Workers Strike of January 1963	315
(d) Government's Attempt at Control of the Unions	317

	Page
PART III. TANZANIA POLITICS AT THE CROSS-ROADS: REFLECTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 1971-1975	339
CHAPTER VI. INDUSTRIAL TURMOIL IN TANZANIA: AN ANALYSIS OF CLASS CONTRADICTIONS AND CLASS STRUGGLE 1971-1975	340
I. The Tobacco Authority of Tanzania - Tanganyika Tobacco Processing Company (T.A.T. - T.T.P.C.) Dispute: Our Major Case Study	347
A. Background	347
B. The Questionnaire Profile: A Comment	362
II. The British American Tobacco (T) Ltd. (B.A.T.) and Mount Carmel Rubber Factory Disputes: Two Other Case Studies	365
A. The B.A.T. - Kashajja Industrial Dispute No. 41 of 1973	365
B. The Mount Carmel Rubber Factory Ltd. Dispute	384
CHAPTER VII. SINGLE EVENT: VARIED INTERPRETATIONS	390
A. External Factors	390
B. Internal Factors	393
(1) Political Interference	393
(2) Workers' Implementation of TANU Policies	395
(3) Workers' Failure to Use Established Machinery for Grievance Handling and Dispute Settlement	396
(4) Attempts at De-Bureaucratization	397
(5) Quest for Decision-Making Power	397
(6) Class Struggle	399
PART IV. CONCLUSION	403
CHAPTER VIII. SOME ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION	407
A. Lessons from the Disputes	407
B. Issues Related to Production (Industrial) Relations Systems	414
CHAPTER IX. THE ANALYSIS OF CLASS AND STATE IN TANZANIA: A CRITICAL EVALUATION	425
A. The Marxian Concept of Power	427
B. The Marxian Concept of State	428
C. The State in Post-Colonial Societies	429
D. The Analysis of Class and State in Tanzania	438
BIBLIOGRAPHY	460

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. N.D.C. Investment in Tanzania in Subsidiaries and Associates - 1968 (Percent Distribution)	62
2. Response to German Control in Tanzania: 1888 to 1906	96
3. Structure of Government	104
4. Tanganyika Provinces in 1933	107
5. Administrative Structure of Government - Departmental Establishment 1958/59	109
6. Civil Service Salary Scales	114
7. Amalgamations	118
8. Education	125
9. Agricultural and Pastoral Land Alienated Under Long-Term Rights of Occupancy Since 1st January, 1946	136
10. (a) Long Term Rights of Occupancy Over Agricultural and Pastoral Land Granted During the Year 1960	139
(b) Long Term Rights of Occupancy Over Agricultural and Pastoral Lands as at 31st December, 1960	140
11. Minerals	142
12. Native Coffee Growing by 1926	150
13. Production of Principal Exports by Africans (Selected Years)	152
14. Trade in German East Africa (in Million Marks)	155
15. Historical Review of Manufacturing Industries by Industrial Activity (Establishments Employing 10 Persons or More)	159
16. Distribution of Shareholding in Manufacturing Processing Industries by Citizenship and Industrial Activity in 1965 (Establishments Employing 10 Persons or More)	160

	Page
17. Railway Transport Service by 1960	163
18. Road Transport as at 31 December 1960	165
19. Shipping, Ports and Inland Waterways	168
20. Composition of Economically Active Population According to Occupation (ii) Adult Africans in 1960	177
21. Wages Paid to Various Categories of Labour, 1935	184
22. Compulsory Labour for 1936, 1937 and 1938	191
23. Conscription of Labour for Essential Industries 1944, 1945	191
24. A Summary of the 342,000 Strong Labour Force for 1945 and 1944	192
25. Distribution of Employment of All Adult African Males by Occupations and Industries in the Territory, 1953	194
26. Distribution of Adult Male African Employees by Wage Groups Within Industry, July, 1960	197
27. Number of Persons from Whom Compulsory Labour was Ex- tracted and the Average Number of Days Per Man 1957- 1960	200
28. Cost of Living and Wage Indices: Dar es Salaam, 1928- 50 (1 Setp. 1939 = 100)	210
29. Union Membership Over Time 1952-1962	227
30. Gross Domestic Product of Tanganyika 1955-1960 in £'000	235
31. Total Domestic Exports from Tanganyika 1955-1960 in £'000	236
32. Net Imports from Overseas	238
33. Ratings of Industrial Opportunities for Tanganyika	250
34. Development Plan 1961/62-1963/64 Functional Analysis	259
35. Development Plan 1961/62-1963/64	259
36. The NDC Group of Companies, 1968	275
37. The NDC Group of Companies, 1970	278

	Page
38. Progress in Localization 1961-72 in the Civil Service: Officers Serving in the Senior and Middle Grade Posts	293
39. Progress in Localization 1961-73 in the Civil Service Staff Grade (Shs. 41,400 - 55,600)	294
40. Progress in Localization of the Civil Service 1961-73 Administrative and Professional Posts (AP.4 - AP.4)	295
41. Progress in Localization of the Civil Service 1961-73 Executive Grade Posts (Ex.2 - Ex.7)	296
42. Progress in Localization of the Civil Service 1961-73 Technical Posts (TO. 2-7)	297
43. Progress in Localization of the Civil Service 1961-73 Secretarial Posts (Ex.1 - Ex.4)	298
44. Wage and Salary Employment 1963-71	306

PART I

TOWARDS A GENERAL CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this section, attempts are made to introduce and define in details the problem under study as well as to put it into a general conceptual framework, both theoretically and methodologically. In Chapter I, an attempt is made to introduce the subject matter of our study (Labor Processes in Tanzania). This is followed by the definition of the problem under review as well as a review of the literature related to labor-government relationships in Tanzania. The chapter also addresses itself to the rationale of the method adopted for this study. It concludes by pointing out what we think are the contributions made by this study to both academia and industrial relations practices in Tanzania. Chapter II tries to put the whole study into a general theoretical framework--a Marxist analysis of the impact of imperialism on Third World countries in terms of the resulting social structure, class contradictions and struggles, as well as the development strategy that should be pursued by these countries if they are to affect an even and equal development of their people.

The concept of class as used in this study refers to a people's position in the process of production i.e., the place they occupy as against other classes both in terms of the decision-making power they have, the ability to have their decisions implemented, as well as the power to determine and decide how the surplus accrued from the

production process is to be distributed. This is because in a situation like Tanzania, where the people are said to be the owners of the major means of production through the State and the various public institutions, the juridical or legal ownership of the production forces, or lack of such, loses its preeminence in determining one's class position. So does the sale of one's labor power, because everyone, be it managing director of a public institution or shop floor worker, are all said to be employees of the people through the State and other public institutions. In such a situation, one's position, in terms of the power they possess and the ability to determine the rules of the game, become very prominent.

At this juncture, suffice it also to point out that any systematic use of established Marxist concepts of stratification becomes very difficult due to the fluidity of the situation. This is because most of the phenomena or categories referred to during the period under review were/are still in their formative stages. For instance, while it becomes possible to use concepts such as "national bourgeoisie" or the "ruling classes" to refer to that category of people who control the decision making process in the various national institutions in 1978 or thereafter, it would be wishful thinking to have used such concepts to refer to the then budding ruling class(es) in the first few years after independence. This is because the various classes were still in their formative stages, both in numerical terms and the level of consciousness. It is behind this background that any Marxist concepts of stratification used in this study ought to be followed by qualifying statements, as we shall attempt to do from stage to stage in this study. At this point it is also

important for us to define the concepts of "ruling class(es)" or "national bourgeoisie" and "State" which we shall refer to a lot in this study.

The concept "ruling class(es)" as will be used in this study refers to those people who occupy senior positions on the various political, administrative and parastatal or public corporations and other institutions. They use their senior positions to determine the political processes as well as making decisions on what and how to produce and how the surplus accrued from this production is to be distributed. In this way, they appropriate a bigger share of the surplus--in terms of higher salaries, pensions and fringe benefits--for themselves. At several stages in this study, we refer to this class(es) as the "national bourgeoisie." We shall address ourselves to class analysis in Tanzania later on in Chapter IX.

The concept of "State" as used in this study also needs some qualifications. The State here is viewed neither as merely an instrument used by the dominant class nor as an instrument determined by the social structures as they exist in Tanzania. Instead, it is viewed as both a product and determinant of the ongoing class struggles in the country with the dominant class at the respective stages of the struggle using the instruments of the State such as the National Assembly, the armed forces, the judiciary etc. to their advantage

CHAPTER I

TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM AND THE METHOD ADOPTED

1. Introduction

The following study is on "Labor Processes" and the resulting Relations of Production in independent African countries of which Tanzania* has been used as a case study. The concept "Labor Processes" as adopted in this study refers to two distinct but related dimensions--the general and the particular--of the predominantly same phenomenon. In its general dimension, "Labor Processes" refers to the process through which paid/wage labor was created and hence exploited in an international context (world capitalism) of which Tanzania is just a part. What this constitutes, therefore, is an

*Tanzania here refers to mainland Tanzania--the former British trusteeship territory of Tanganyika which got its political independence from Britain on December 9, 1961 and became a Republic a year later. On April 24, 1964 it merged with the Peoples' Republic of Zanzibar to give birth to the United Republic of Tanzania. It covers an area of 883,589 square kilometers and has a population of 15 million. On February 5, 1967 the then ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) promulgated the Arusha Declaration which charts out Tanzania's Socialist development (Ujamaa) through self-reliance. Ten years later, February 5, 1977, TANU and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) of Zanzibar merged into one party, "Chama Cha Mapinduzi" Tanzania (C.C.M.), whose English version is just the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania, thus putting the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar on a firmer ground. In the following study, the names Tanganyika and Tanzania will be used interchangeably to refer to mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) depending on the suitability of any of them to the respective and specific issues under discussion.

analysis of the impact of imperialism on Tanzania in terms of modes of production and social formations (Amin, 1974: 57-89). Of particular interest here is how imperialism, as expressed through colonial and neo-colonial exploitation led to the disintegration of the pre-capitalist modes of production and social formations and proletarianized a segment of the indigenous population which hitherto had been engaged in the so-called "primitive" or communal modes of production and organization as basis for their subsistence. In its particular dimension, "Labor Processes" refers to and explains the way labor is organized, managed, and exploited in a specific industrial setting or place of work. A typical example of the latter is the sort of process that people like Braverman (1976) or Bettelheim (1974) talk about when they explain what has been taking place at the factory level in the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China respectively, i.e., which in a way stresses the way production is organized and the resultant relations of production or what others call industrial relations systems, in the two specific industrial settings.

Thus, while the former more or less stresses the development of various social formations in general, the latter addresses itself to the concept of differentiation within each of the social formations and how this in turn is related to the particular mode of production.

My initial plan was to address myself to just the industrial disputes in Tanzania between 1971 and 1975. But it became apparent to me that one cannot grasp the dynamics of events during that particular period without an understanding of related developments and events prior to that period. Thus, it became a matter of analytical

expedience to include a historical synopsis of developments and events which were related to, and had a direct bearing on, what took place during 1971-1975. That is the rationale for Part II of this study.

This study, therefore, covers the period from the time Tanzania became a colony under the Germans in 1884/5 to 1975. However, for the purposes of this study, only issues and events related to the labor process and the resulting class formations are treated. For the period between 1884/5 and 1961 only major events and development trends are treated, thereby making the present study manageable.

2. The Problem Defined

In Tanzania, just like elsewhere in Africa, the last few years since independence, and specifically since 1971, have witnessed a bitter conflict between workers and the national bourgeoisie not only over general issues such as better wages and conditions of service, and workers' participation, but also over principle issues such as control and ownership of the means of production as well as over the question of who is to discipline whom during the transition of socialism. During the period under review, the cooperation that existed between the workers and the elite during the nationalist struggle has now turned into a bitter class struggle.

The above developments logically lead to a reassessment and re-evaluation of the theories and literature that has already been developed as regards labor-government relations in African countries since independence. This study is thus one of several others in that direction.

Though varying in form and scope, in almost all independent African countries, there existed some form of cooperation or collaboration between trade unions and nationalist parties during the period of nationalist struggle (Davis, 1966; Friedland, 1968; Mapolu, 1972). Even social scientists and observers on African politics who have attempted to show that this relationship did not exist or was minimal and/or at least informal, have also agreed that in some countries such as Algeria, Guinea (Conakry), Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Tunisia (despite the deliberate policies pursued by the respective colonial administrations in a bid to at first make it impossible for workers to organize, and later on to prevent such organizations from being used by "communist" political agitators) an element of cooperation did exist (Berge and Butler, 1964; Lofchie and Rosberg, 1968). Even in countries such as Zambia, then Northern Rhodesia, where such cooperation is said not to have existed, for a time in 1950 and 1958, the Mineworkers Union under Lawrence Katilungu formed an alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) under Harry Nkumbula. When differences between Katilungu and Nkumbula, and later on between Katilungu and other union members, prevented any meaningful cooperation, the unions were forced to form a new alliance with the newly emerged United National Independence Party (UNIP) under Kenneth Kaunda (Bates, 1971; Zelneker, 1971; Burawoy, 1972).

The awareness of the political or nationalist parties as to the importance of unions, however, differed from situation to situation, depending mainly on whether the parties were or became "mass" or "elite" parties (Davis, op. cit.: 97-98). Parties led by chiefs and religious leaders such as the Northern Peoples' Congress of

Nigeria or the Kabaka Yekka of Uganda tended to discount unions as an important source of political strength. This was because such movements drew their political support and power from the already established ethnic order, while their leaders were already secure in senior positions of authority. As such, they did not need the unions to bolster their claims to legitimacy. Given their internal organization and conservative ideology, they cared very little for unions, even as convenient recruiting grounds. Other parties, such as the United Gold Coast Convention, the Kenya African Union (KAU) or the Tunisian Destour, which were organized and led by the indigenous elite or businessmen in their infancy, also show little interest in workers' organizations, unless they aimed at transforming themselves into "mass" parties, as was to become the case with most of them. In some countries such as Guinea (Conakry), where there was no elite to engage itself into political agitation, it was the union movement under Sekou Toure that became the basis of the political movement.

Talking about the situation in his own country, Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba spoke the mind of many African leaders when he in July, 1957 said:

It is a pleasure to recall here the outstanding services rendered by the Tunisian trade union movement to the cause of the liberation of Tunisia (Beling, 1965: ix).

Senegal's President Senghor referred to unions and the nationalist party as "siamese twins," while Kwame Nkrumah referred to the nation as a "great tree" with the Convention Peoples' Party acting as the roots and trunk while the unions and other organizations formed the branches (Ghanaian Worker, August 8, 1959). In Kenya this became even more apparent during the emergency when the Kenya African Union

(KAU), for which Tom Mboya had been Director of Information and Treasurer, was banned in 1952. In the words of Mboya who had been elected General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor (KFL) in 1953, "the KFL became the voice of the African people, in the absence of any other African organization to speak for them" (Davis, op. cit.: 99).

A similar and in fact closer relationship and collaboration existed in Tanzania between the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) which was then under Rashidi Kawawa who was later to become the national vice-chairman of TANU and later on Tanzania's Prime Minister.

Referring to the above cooperation in 1960, President Nyerere said that TANU,

had an officer in the organization whose special duty was to stimulate and help the growth of trade unionism. Once firmly established, the trade union movement was, and is, part and parcel of the whole nationalist movement. In the early days, when a trade union movement went on strike, for instance, and its members were in direct need of funds to keep them going, we saw no doctrine which would be abrogated by our giving financial support from the political wing to the industrial wing of the same nationalist movement (Labour, Ghana Trade Union Congress Journal, June, 1961).

And a year later President Nyerere went on to refer not only to the "case of the right hand helping the left," but also to unions and parties as being "legs" of the same nationalist movement (Spearhead, November, 1961).

Such cooperation and collaboration between the unions and parties may be due mainly to the fact that colonial employers and government were not separable, both in appearance and essence, while political and economic demands were inseparable, both conceptually

and practically (Mapolu, 1972).

As soon as the political parties won independence, however, the "marriage of convenience" that had been forged between the trade unions and political parties (which now assumed the reigns of government and responsibilities of both ruler and employer, just as the former colonial masters had been) began to break. It soon became clear that the two legs were now moving in different directions.

Having both the political will and administrative power, especially the potential use of instruments of suppression such as the police force, the new governments conscripted or "integrated" the unions under the ruling parties or government administrative machinery, or both. Within the next few years of independence most of the unions had been brought under ruling party and government control. This differed from situation to situation and country to country and the control took the form of any of the three following themes

(Beling, 1965: 102-13):

- (a) Relative Autonomy - Referring to situations like Sierra Leone, Mauritania, Nigeria, Morocco, etc., where unions retained a high degree of associational freedom, especially as regards the right to strike, freedom to choose leaders; internal management and organization.
- (b) Semi-controlled Situation - referring to some countries where a certain amount of state supervision and control over trade unions, though established, fell just short of full integration of the trade union movement into the political or administrative system, apart from a few government regulations which were used to limit trade union autonomy. Such countries included Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, Senegal and Ivory Coast.
- (c) Controlled Unions - referring to situations like Ghana, Mali, Guinea (Conakry) and Tanzania, where efforts to control unions led to the full integration of the trade union movements into the administrative machinery, the dominant party or both--through managerial, financial and policy control over the unions.

A lot of theories have been offered to explain this control over unions. It is to such theories and literature that we shall now turn in the following section.

3. Theory and Literature

Social scientists and many African political observers have offered different theories to explain why the relationship between the unions and nationalist parties became conflictual immediately after independence and the reasons why the new governments instituted measures that have resulted in a clamp down on workers' movements.

One such theory is that of different expectations and ideology between the union members and the new governments. Protagonists of this school who include Berg and Butler, Lofchie and Rosberg, and Friedland argue that, while the unions saw in independence the first step towards more economic gains to their members, the nationalist parties saw in independence an opportunity for rapid nation-building, which included the building of viable political institutions, economic development, national unity, and, above all, bridging the income gap between the people, especially between the already "privileged" workers and peasants. In some countries, this amounted to building socialism. To the above school, it is these different expectations that are the causes of the conflict. For the purpose of this study, we shall call these theories "expectation theories."

The other school, whose validity we will be trying to prove, stresses that whatever happened and is still happening in African countries lies in the objective laws of class struggle, which are themselves a product of the political economy of the respective

countries under consideration (Zelneker, 1970; Bates, 1971; Mapolu, 1972; Mihyo, 1975). Basing their arguments on studies on Zambia and Tanzania, the above school asserts that nothing can be understood unless one traces it from the objective and subjective socio-economic conditions and history that gave rise to different and potentially conflicting social classes in the respective countries.

Similar studies have for instance been undertaken in the United States. Notable among these are the works of Aronowitz (1973), Marglin and Stone (1974), and Braverman (1974), who trace the nature of the industrial relations system in the U.S. from the internal dynamics of capitalist development. The above theories we shall call "class struggle theories."

In between the two above schools, but much more closer to the latter, is Davis (1966), who traces the emergence of the working class and the formation of trade unions in Africa from the nature, extent and scope of capitalist penetration of the African economies. However, very little is said about the labor processes after independence.

To Berg and Butler (Coleman and Rosberg, 1966: 370) the conflict between the political parties (new governments) and the trade unions is best understood as an outcome of the attempts on the part of the new governments to centralize and institutionalize their political power, which is itself dictated by the desire for rapid economic development. The independent African governments, therefore, "do not relish the existence of potential sources of opposition for they see them as threats to fragile national entities." Also important, it is further argued, is the fact that economic growth demands reform

of wage structures as well as changes in the attitudes and habits towards work, as well as restraint in personal income increases. To most political leaders this would only be achieved with the cooperation of friendly trade union organizations.

After all, it is argued, unions have never been tied to political parties nor been instrumental in making political demands, and that whether they were autonomous or not, their political significance was very slight; they did not provide money nor effective electoral machine; they undertook relatively few political activities, and when they did, they seldom were effective or successful. The following explanations are given as being the basic causes of the above state of affairs:

- (a) Timing - that in these African countries unions were the first of the two organizations to be formed and had no need of or were not organized by or on political lines.
- (b) Political Environment - that in most of these countries independence was won through the easy way (round-table negotiations) and as such there was no need for organized workers' resistance and economic sabotage or mass demonstrations. Deliberate colonial policies also discouraged union-party alliances.
- (c) Union Vulnerability - that is unions had to face and solve a lot of other problems lest they sink. They had to work hard in order to integrate the heterogeneous labor force composed of men from many ethnic groups, and they lacked finances and competent leadership.
- (d) The dilution of worker protest - i.e., these were limited

to economism and working conditions alone and were not political.

- (e) The existence of competing channels such as tribal and ethnic organizations for meeting workers' needs rather than the unions and/or political parties.

Lofchie and Rosberg (1968) come up with similar reasons and conclusions. To them, the clamp down on unions, apart from being dictated by the "Primacy of Economic Development: and the "Need to Stabilize Political Authority" was also the impact of the expected "Multifunctional Role of African Trade Unions" and the "Prevailing Elite Values" (Beling, op. cit.: 9-14).

Thus, African trade unions were expected (by the political leadership) to perform a substantially different and more varied role than their Western counterparts. They had/have to shift from "consumptionist" demands and move to a broad "productionist" role; they have to bear an important responsibility for increasing over all economic output while accepting conditions of austerity so that the entire society may benefit; they have to act as agencies of socialization by introducing traditionally agrarian populations to the rhythms, patterns and behavioral codes of industrial life; they must convey a sense of national citizenship and involvement as well as attempt to erode regional and parochial loyalties. On top of that they are also expected to work actively to support other social institutions involved in the process of nation building.

"Prevailing Elite Value" have also been pointed out (ibid.) to have an impact on the union-party (government) relationship. Some leaders have claimed they are building socialism and have a

commitment to a "dirigiste" or state-managed economy. On the other hand, others have values that allow a higher degree of economic permissiveness. All these have been reflected in their different approaches towards trade unions.

Elaborating on the last point, Friedland (1968) points out that in countries which are said to be building socialism, the unions are expected to be disciplined and on the forefront of the nation-building activities. In such countries, government's projected role for unions has been put even more emphatically by President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya when he said:

The first responsibility of the unions must be to develop a disciplined, skilled and responsible labor force. African governments like ours help trade unions become involved in economic activities such as cooperatives, housing schemes and training (African Forum, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Summer, 1965: 37).

In short, and to summarize what Friedland says, these responsibilities and obligations include disciplining for productivity, capital accumulation and administering social services. Unlike his counterparts and basing his work on Tanzania, Friedland, however, admits that there was some cooperation and indeed collaboration between unions and the nationalist movement during the struggle for independence (Friedland, 1969).

All in all, the above "expectation theories" arguments are very far from being convincing. Being based on what the official policy and limitations were supposed to be, they do not tell us what actually happened. This failure stems, among other things, from the authors' neglect of what actually happened and much more from their ignoring of the role of ideology, especially in the later disputes. They tended to base their studies and analysis on:

- (a) The Structural Relations between parties and unions in pre-independence Africa--i.e., to what extent was there formal structural relations between unions and parties, and to what extent did the parties openly dominate or influence the unions?
- (b) What concrete political acts did African trade union movement engage in and how effective were they? Did the labor movements call "political" strikes and demonstrations? Did they provide parties with man power, or with material organizational help?
- (c) What is the union position after independence? (Berge and Butler, op. cit.).

The above model, being based on the study of official and formal structural relationships, misses what actually took place. It is true that unions, in order not to be repressed and for the sake of official recognition and registration, had to show that they were not involved in "political" agitation when in actual practice they were. After all, economics and politics always go together in colonial Africa where, conceptually and in essence, employer and political ruler were practically the same thing.

The claims, therefore, that unions never played any significant political role in the nationalist struggle are erroneous and misleading. In the introductory section, an attempt was made to show the cooperation that existed between unions and parties. Even scholars on African unionism such as Friedland (1969), admit that unionism was as political as it was economic. Davis (op. cit.) has devoted a whole chapter of his small book on "Trade Unions and Political Commitment before Independence" in which he asserts that during the nationalist struggle, trade unions inevitably became involved in colonial politics and that there were three main levels at which the unions could act politically:

Initially their attempts to gain recognition through strikes were seen by colonial rulers as political, especially when the strikes were directed against the main employment agency--the government or a public corporation. It did not take much for a colonial government to jump to the conclusion that any strike of government employees was subversive. That many strikes were so categorized, indeed, led African politicians and some trade unionists themselves to see the strike as a political weapon, and, therefore, some coordinated planning of strikes became part of the nationalist campaign. This constituted a second level of political activity, though in practice its use was restricted; few strikes were political in objective, and frequently unions resisted the attempts of nationalist leaders to use industrial action for their own purposes. But at a later stage politicians and trade union leaders in some colonies created a combined trade union-party movement; in which the struggle for independence was seen as the first priority, and the trade unions adopted their tactics accordingly (ibid.: 95).

Even Berg and Butler as well as Lofchie and Rosberg admit that in some countries such as Guinea (Conakry), Ghana, Mali, Kenya and Tanzania, there was some form of close cooperation or collaboration between the political parties and unions (Coleman and Rosberg, 1966: 349-359).

The above distortions and inconsistencies can partly be explained by the practice of many scholars to use institution models developed and used in their own countries to explain what is taking place in Africa without considering the objective and subjective social, cultural, economic and historical conditions and peculiarities of these African countries. The methodological dangers (forcing data into pre-conceived theoretical models) as well as the ideological basis and implications of such practice on the part of so many social scientists, have been pointed out by Susanne Bodenheimer (1971) when she critically evaluated the foundations and usefulness of the various theories developed in the United States to explain historically Latin America's underdevelopment and dependency.

The tendency to explain everything from the official standpoint also led these authors not to make a concrete analysis of what terms such as "nation-building" and "African Socialism" mean. In Africa, where the indigenous economies had been peripherized and externally tied to the services of the metropolitan economies, could any one speak of national economic building on the morrow of political/flag independence day? Did these African countries really have national economies at the time of independence, or even today? The answer would definitely seem to be, no.

Without national economies, socialism could not be built, for socialism involves re-structuring the economy and freeing it from the colonial ties of capitalism. Furthermore, socialism presumably means equality, not only between workers and peasants, but also between the political/managerial bureaucratic class and the rest of the population.

Even in countries like Tanzania, which is supposed to be on the forefront of the movement towards socialism in Africa, no concrete measures towards that direction were forthcoming till 1967 when she promulgated the Arusha Declaration on Socialism through Self-Reliance. In fact records have it that it was the TFL's John Magongo, who in a speech announcing the initiation of a TFL economic programme to begin its own farms, schools and hospitals in July 1962, who criticized the TANU government ministers and senior officials for their ostentatious styles of life. The response given by the Publicity Secretary of TANU--that TANU ministers were the lowest paid in Africa--does not explain how these lowly paid ministers and senior officials managed to accumulate wealth, build mansiones and buy

luxurious cars for themselves, their children, relatives and even girl friends, to such an extent that some of them had to resign when the Arusha Declaration, with its inherent Leadership Code, was promulgated and announced in February, 1967. Again, it was the National Union of Tanganyika Workers--NUTA--(TFL's imposed successor) in its General Council in January, 1967 that came up with a resolution calling upon the ruling party (TANU) to take deliberate steps toward the building of an egalitarian socialist society. And when the Arusha Declaration came in February, 1967, TANU's Parliamentary members began to question the limitations that had been imposed upon them through the Leadership Code which prohibited them from engaging in any exploitative and capitalist activities. In between these clearly dichotomous explanations is another one offered by Patel (1972). According to Patel, the conflict between the unions and the TANU government was due to the lust for more economic gains for their members and political power on the part of the unions, as well as the racial discriminatory policies the unions wanted introduced by the independent government regarding recruitment and promotion to senior civil service positions. Patel, however, fails to also point out that at that particular time, both the TANU-Government and TFL leaders were in fact fighting not for any other class, but for their own interests (whatever long-term intentions they might have had), while both the ordinary peasant and worker had to toil even harder for their subsistence. Thus, if it was a power struggle, it was a struggle within one class, with the various elements in it fighting/jockeying for the control of the reigns of government which they could use to further their interests. Now that the union(s) have been integrated

or conscripted into the political-administrative system and control, how can Patel explain instances in Tanzania between 1971-1975 where and when the workers, free of leadership from both party and the union movement, have engaged in various spontaneous industrial actions including strikes, lock-outs, and taking over control of various firms and go-slows?

Patel also fails to admit or obscures the fact that in Tanzania, colonialism had structured the economy in such a way that different economic positions and activities were based and organized on racial lines, so much so that it would be impossible and mere wishful thinking to talk about economic exploitation and differences without talking about race, and especially the middleman role played by the Indians--the Patels.

4. Our Conceptual Framework: Major Hypothesis Stated

In the preceding section, an attempt was made to show the limitations and short-comings of "expectation theories" in explaining what has been taking place between the nationalist parties/governments on the one hand, and the trade unions on the other.

Using Tanzania as our case study, the purposes of this study is to give more credibility and validity to "class struggle theories." Our major hypothesis, therefore, is that what has been happening in Tanzania since independence (1961) and especially during 1971-75 when the country experienced a lot of industrial disputes in the form of workers seizing factories (the Mount Carmel Rubber factory), strikes and lock-outs, as well as the resultant use of the police force and other seemingly repressive measures on the part of the

government lies in the objective laws of class struggle (Shivji, 1972; Mapolu, 1972). This in turn has been determined by the nature of the political economy of the country. Thus, our task entails showing how the nature and extent of the capitalist penetration by, and integration of the Tanzanian economy into, the world capitalist system has led to the emergence of the antagonistic socio-economic classes so much so that one cannot understand the labor process in the country without examining the socio-economic and political history of the country.*

The specific hypotheses to be tested and analyzed as well as the underlying assumptions and prepositions will follow from stage to stage and in the following order:

(a) The first hypothesis to be tested is the proposition that the emergence and structure of the working class and the formation of trade unions in Tanzania was determined by the nature of the political economy, specifically the mode of production. Attempts will be made to show the link between the introduction of specific economic enterprises and the emergence of the related labor force, as well as how the stratification process of the working class was a result of how labor was organized, administered, paid and exploited. Thus, using

*While I have adopted the "class struggle theories" to explain what has been happening in Tanzania, this is only in terms of methodology. I do not at all accept the findings and conclusions that have been derived by the Shivji school (op. cit.) at the University of Dar es Salaam. This is basically due to the fact that Shivji and his colleagues have tended to force in conclusions in preconceived and seemingly dogmatic and doctrinaire Marxist models developed elsewhere without making any serious concrete analysis of the objective and subjective conditions and factors pertaining in Tanzania at any one particular time. I intend to address myself fully to that and other related issues in Chapter IX of this work.

data from sources 1-3 (see subsection 6), we will attempt to show how the nature of capitalist penetration and exploitation of the country led to the proletarianization and stratification of a small section of the peasantry. We will also attempt to find out whether the political orientation of the various unions varied according to the variations in the political economy. For instance, an attempt will be made to ascertain whether there was/is a dichotomy between rural/plantation workers and the urban workers who were/are in the modernized sector, and whether all those differences led to differential formations of trade unions. It is also important to establish the inter-industry propensity to industrial disputes, especially in the form of strikes. Next to put into consideration is the political orientation of the various unions and their stance on the model of independence, i.e., what did independence mean to them and in what direction did they want independent Tanzania to move. We will also attempt to look into the whole question of what happens to workers and unions in former colonies like Tanzania immediately after these countries get their political independence, especially when their post-independence role was not formulated during the nationalist struggle. Do they become redundant and anachronistic?

The underlying assumption is that the conflict between the newly created government leaders and the trade union leaders at independence was a result of the struggle for power among members of one social class--the elite. We intend to find out how wide spread the conflict was, and if there was a struggle within the union movement (TFL). Did this intra-union struggle in turn reflect the struggle between government and union leaders? Were there any coalitions formed?

What were the major issues involved? Was the conflict over the union organization and the conditions of labor? Were the issues related to the role of unions in the new government, or were there any issues facing the government which the union members and leaders thought they were in a position to contribute solutions to? What were the issues the various unions saw as defining the future of Tanzania and which groups did they think hindered progress in that direction? Also, what did both unions and the new government leaders think was their model for development, both internal and external and which group did they view as antithetical? What did they think were their respective audiences? Were all the workers in Tanzania union members, and did they form enough audience? Have the rest of Tanzanians, especially the peasant producers, been aware of what has been taking place in the country? To what extent have they taken part in the conflict? These are some of the questions we will be trying to answer.

(b) The second hypothesis to be tested is the proposition that, although different in form and direction, the differentiation of the indigenous population was in fact accelerated by the various "development" measures taken by the independent TANU government. Of specific interest to this study is the fact that the various measures taken further enforced the polarization of the indigenous population.

The underlying issue here is the extent to which the ruling class(es) on the one hand, and the working class on the other, have increased in number, united, and consolidated themselves since independence to 1971, when the second wave of industrial disputes between the worker (independent of any party or union leaders) and the

budding national bourgeoisie started. This we hope to investigate by looking into how the deliberate government industrialization and nationalization programs created more jobs for both classes. This we shall do by looking at how the various firms and labor were organized, stratified, and paid. With respect to solidarity and unity, the way they respond to the questions in the interviews, especially the direction the various people will direct their sympathies and hostilities and the measure taken to protect and defend their colleagues in times of trouble--will give us a hint as to one's class bias and position. Thus, having established the fact that the emergence and subsequent existence and consolidation of two basic different classes with different class interests to defend, it will have then become clear that whatever has been going on between them is a reflection of their consciousness as a class as against the other class. From these findings, it should then be only a matter of logical conclusion that whatever has been going on is a class struggle which has itself been determined by the nature of the country's political economy.

Colonial Tanzania was supposed to be a source of agricultural raw materials such as cotton, coffee, sisal, tobacco, etc., for the colonial manufacturing industries: The production of most of these crops was based on indigenous peasant producers. Where this was not economically and organizationally viable, such as in the production of sisal, various means of proletarianizing the peasantry were used. These included indirect means, such as the introduction of the "hut tax" or direct ones such as forced (corvee) labor. This process was in time to lead to the emergence of plantation workers. There were

also pockets of minerals, especially at Mwadui (diamonds), Kiabakari (gold) and Uvinza (salt), which also needed labor power for their extraction. This in turn led to the emergence of another group of workers (the miners) and subsequently to the formation of the African Mineworkers Union (AMU). The goods had to be transported and shipped, hence the need for a transport network system such as roads, railways, and docks. First, there was the need for workers to build and maintain the transport network. These were found amongst the native peasantry and Indian migrants who were brought in specifically to help in the construction of the railway lines. There also arose the need for people to load, transport and unload the raw materials that were being tapped from the hinterland. From this, the dock workers, railway workers, and transport workers, emerged.

It was these workers who formed the basis of early unions such as the Dockworkers Union, Tanganyika Railway African Union, the Plantation Workers Union, the Transport and General Allied Workers Union, the African Mineworkers Union, etc.

The colonial administrators also needed clerks and messengers, so there arose the need for a few semi-educated, and later on "educated" indigenous group. A few schools were built to produce this small stratum of "educated" native clerks and messengers who got relatively "higher" salaries than did ordinary wage-earners.

Side by side with the provision of raw materials, the country also served as a market for manufactured goods from the colonial mother country. Several importing and commercial houses--mainly subsidiaries of the respective big firms in the colonial mother country--opened branches and agencies in the colony. However, these firms

could not trade directly with the indigenous population which was widely dispersed over the country. This necessitated the need for a commercial middle-man group to serve as retail traders and small creditors. This task was to fall on the already economically enterprising members of the Indian community who either had come into the country to help in the construction of the railway lines or were encouraged to come in by the colonial administration specifically for that purpose. This group was to form the backbone of the commercial bourgeoisie in Tanzania. Because of their relative favourable position compared to the indigenous "natives," they also got better and higher education, especially in disciplines such as accounts, bookkeeping, medicine, law, etc., which also enabled them to get better jobs and pay than did the Africans. All this was consistent with the "divide and rule" policy deliberately pursued by the colonial administration.

Through the system of "Indirect Rule" the colonial administration also gave official recognition and in fact strengthened the position of the "tribal" or native chiefs. For instance a special school--Tabora Government Boys' School--was built to cater for the sons of the chiefs so that they could in the future carry out their administrative functions effectively. Ironically enough, this school was to produce most of the country's nationalist leaders, including President Nyerere himself.

The native chiefs on their part used their newly acquired power and colonial backing to get more land for themselves and for members of their clans or families once cash crops such as coffee were introduced.

On the eve of independence, Tanzanian society can be said to

have been roughly stratified as follows:*

- (a) The Upper Class - composed mainly of higher echelon colonial administrators and functionaries, owners of the big import/export and commercial firms or their agents and representatives and some plantation and settler farmers. All of these were mainly of European stock although a few Indians had managed to buy their position into this group, especially during the times of economic depression when the various European businessmen and planters and settlers could not get any support from the mother country.
- (b) The Commercial Bourgeoisie: composed mainly of Indian commercial middlemen and retail traders and a few trusted administrative functionaries. A few Arabs and Africans had managed to move up into this class.
- (c) The Indigenous Classes: composed mainly of the indigenous native population. Through deliberate colonial policies this group was also further differentiated and stratified in order as follows:
 - (i) The Chiefs or Traditional feudal ruling group.
 - (ii) The Educated Elite - mainly primary school teachers, clerks and messengers.
 - (iii) The Workers - mainly those working as laborers on European coffee and sisal plantations and the very few, if at all any, industries.

*The above class structure has been arbitrarily developed for the purpose of this study. Someone else with a different problem to study and coming from a different orientation might come out with a different structure.

- (iv) The Peasantry - mainly small-holding food and cash crop producers.
- (v) The Semi-Proletariat - those who were hired as casual or part time workers and as such had no permanent job.
- (vi) The Lumpen Proletariat - those landless people with no job at all.

Clear cut divisions in this class are, however, very difficult to make for some of the various differentiations were somehow inter-related and complementary. It should also be obvious that class structure in colonial Tanzania also overlapped with race lines. In Chapter III we shall offer a more detailed analysis of the social structure in Tanzania at the time of independence.

At this point, let us also note that it was from the educated elite that the leadership of both unions and nationalist movement (party) was to come. Thus, among the so-called educated Africans, there were those who led the workers on one hand and those who led the nationalist party on the other. However, any demarcation line is very difficult to draw due to the nature of cooperation and collaboration that existed between the two.

As it became clear that the country would become independent, the educated elite which had worked together during the nationalist era began to compete for positions of leadership. It is, therefore, our next task to show that what happened on the eve of and immediately after independence was a result of the above mentioned competition or struggle for power amongst the elite.

The masses (peasants, workers, semi-proletariat and the

lumpenproletariat) had nothing to do with it. They were only being invoked and manipulated by the contending parties for their own reasons. As such, one cannot call what ensured a class struggle between the workers per se and the leaders of the new TANU government. If anything, what happened was an intraclass struggle for power between the unions and TANU government elite. Nonetheless, this jockeying for political position among the educated elite led to a conscription of and clamp down on the workers' unions by the end of 1967.

Like elsewhere in Africa, the newly constituted government saw it as its responsibility to guide the country in its economic endeavors. Various economic development measures were undertaken. Notable among those was the stepping up of industrial development. Plans as well as implementing bodies were formulated and instituted respectively. Various industries, but mainly based on import substitution, sprang up, creating more jobs for Tanzanians in the manufacturing sector.

The organization and management of work in the new firms, however, remained or continued to be based on the inherited capitalist or Western managerial values and practices. Various management consultants, mainly from the U.S.A. (Arthur de Little; Mackenzies, etc.), were invited to advise the country on how to run and manage the new firms. Partnerships and management contracts were signed with various British, West German, American, French, Canadian, Japanese and Israel multi-national corporations. This process continued at even a greater extent since 1967 when the country announced it was going Socialist. Expatriates from the mother firms were hired initially to run the new and nationalized organizations and then to train

Tanzanians who were later on to take over from them. Western capitalist managerial values were thus not only introduced and maintained, but were to be passed over to the Tanzanian managerial cadres who were to take over and run the economy on socialist lines!!!

Members of the management were paid relatively high salaries, and were given big houses, company cars, and other fringe benefits. At work, hierarchy, meritocracy, elitism, commadism and red-tape were also retained and stressed. The ordinary workers were paid meager wages, which became even smaller as a consequence of high rates of inflation. These workers were to be managed, supervised, and disciplined by management. Thus, instead of there being a dictatorship of the proletariat during this transitional period to socialism, there was a dictatorship of the managerial-bureaucratic elite, despite the fact that the workers together with the rest of the population are supposed to be shareholders and controllers of these firms.

With the Arusha Declaration in 1967 and the subsequent nationalization of previously private and foreign-owned firms as well as the creation of more bodies to run the newly acquired and created enterprises, more jobs were created. While the number of wage earners increased, so did that of the managerial-bureaucratic class. Thus what had been started by the colonial system, in terms of class differentials, became more and more visible. The differences and income gaps between the managerial elite (non-productive labor) and the wage earners (productive labor) became even more pronounced. In this way, the educated ruling class managed to consolidate itself. Their number had increased. They continued to have higher salaries as well as to control the distribution of surplus. Their life styles and

consumptionist habits were also very much different from those of the common person in Tanzania. They live in secluded low density areas, mostly along the beach, and drive or are chauffeur-driven in very expensive cars, while the rest of the community depends upon an inefficient public transport system.

Thus was the situation in 1971 when "Mwongozo"--the TANU Guidelines on the consolidation and defense of the hard-won independence--was announced by President Nyerere. It was designed as a follow up on the Arusha Declaration and specifically to usher in socialist relations of production by attacking the ever increasing bureaucratic-managerial tendencies. Through clauses 15 and 28, the Party policy document throws a new light on the leadership of the various institutions, their quality and development in general. Having called for the involvement and participation of workers and peasants in running their own affairs and determining their own destinies, the document also questions the management theories and values the country inherited as well as the "capitalist industrial relations" that still linger in the country. It also gave legitimacy for any action taken by the people as a group in deciding their own affairs and how to manage their various institutions. Thus, what "Mwongozo" did was to define clearly, the relationship between workers and managers in favour of the workers. It also gave political and ideological legitimacy to their later actions.

Within a few days, the whole country was ploughed into a wave of industrial disputes, including some few strikes, seizure of privately-owned firms (the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory, Night Watch Security) as well as the locking-out of managers by the workers. In all

of this, the workers acted independently of their trade union branches, the government or the Party (TANU).

At first, government and Party were sympathetic. President Nyerere himself admitted that what the workers were doing was a result of the inequalities inherent in the country's economy. To him, what the workers were doing was the first stage towards building socialism in Tanzania (Internationalist, May, 1973).

When the workers began questioning the tenets upon which the whole system was based, and the foreign partners began to voice concern on what was happening, the ruling class came up with drastic measures against the defenseless workers, and even the trade union leadership abandoned them. This was followed by a statement from the Labor Commissioner in April, 1974 in which he said the government was viewing, with great concern the extent of industrial disputes in the country. He continued to register his belief that some of the disputes were being instigated by irresponsible workers. He also warned that stern measures would be taken against any "ring leaders" if found out.

In the next few weeks some workers at the Kilimanjaro and Tasini textiles, and Brookbond Tea Company in Dar es Salaam were dismissed for having "instigated" others to take part in industrial disputes. Immediately, potential disputes subsided, but the workers came out even more united and clear on what their immediate enemy was, as reflected in discussion we had with the Morogoro and some Dar es Salaam workers. They, however, decided to keep quiet lest they lose their jobs or be detained.

The class struggle that had begun in 1971 was somehow halted

or won by the ruling class who used all the instruments of power they had to keep the workers quiet. However, this does not mean that the relationship between the two classes has been harmonized. In fact, depending on such an artificial "quiet" situation is just like sitting on a powder keg which might erupt--and more forcefully--next time.

5. On Methodology

It is not enough to set tasks, we must also solve the problem of methods for carrying them out. If our task is to cross a river, we cannot cross it without a bridge or boat. . . . Unless the problem of method is solved, talk about the task is useless (Mao Tse Tung).

The ultimate aim of any research into a social problem should be to find a solution to the problem. This study is no exception.

It is the purpose of the present study to show the causal factors of labor processes and the resulting relations of production in Tanzania and to suggest ways to improve them rather than providing mere description.

Avoidance of a descriptive model arises from the fact that such a model has a static dimension in that it merely gives a picture of what exists at a particular time in history without throwing any light on how that particular situation developed from the past into the present and hence into the future. Research based on the assumption that social reality is static will definitely lead one to the conclusion that the same social reality is static. But that is very far from being the truth. And much more so in 'labor processes' and the resulting industrial relations, where our subject matter involves a conflict situation which is clearly dominated by movement.

Research patterned on the static premise of reality works from an assumption that the structure of 'labor processes' and the resulting relations of production, i.e., the socio-economic environment which gives rise to these relations, is also fixed. Studies and theories arising out of such a premise merely constitute a rationalization of the existing structure of relations of production. In its place, an attempt has been made to use an analytical model based on an assumption that social behavior, and indeed labor processes, has always been susceptible to change and development. In short, society is dynamic and is capable of, and indeed subject to qualitative change. In short, the choice of the dynamic model stems from two basic facts. The first is that social behavior is a dynamic phenomenon subject to social change. The second, and arising from the first, is that social behavior being that dynamic, can also change its form. In addition, in a dynamic situation, the relationships are fluid and usually causal in character and behavior is always determined by environment.

The next step then is to decide which variables or elements in environments have the highest causal significance and how they generate movement or change.

There has already been mention of several variables, including political, social, psychological, religious, physiological, historical, economic, etc., that have causal significance in an environment. But, in order to adhere to the notion that social behavior is influenced by environment and that it has causal connections, there has to be one consistently present inter-connecting element, the economic one, which is always present and always has priority over others. Thus, in every analysis one makes, one has to identify the economic variables first.

For instance, when analysing a strike action in certain industry, one has to ask questions about the economic circumstances of both employees and employers, i.e., the firm, and then proceed from there.

The next duty of a dynamic analyst is to show that movement or change in social behavior is a continuous non-ending process. This works from the basic assumption that movement is generated and perpetuated by the existence of contradictions at every level of social behavior and in all of its aspects:

A contradiction, in its process towards resolution creates further contradictions so that the stage of resolution is never reached. It is on the notion of contradiction that the possibility of model building for a dynamic analysis of reality rests (Allen, 1971: 9).

The presence of contradictions and the relationship between these contradictions in relations to contemporary action and over time, constitute the dialectical process which entails the necessity for an historical approach to all social issues. The dialectical process is an unending one, for every contradiction is a product of earlier ones and cannot be understood without reference to those preceding it. The process itself transforms "environmental determinism" which by itself is a static approach, into historical materialism, which is dynamic in conception (ibid.).

Historical Materialism

The concept of historical materialism or the materialistic conception of history was first developed by Karl Marx. The classic formulation of this doctrine is found in Marx's preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (first published in 1859). Central to this famous doctrine is the fact that material conditions

influence every aspect of social life, including historical development or social change.

The basic premise upon which Marx's proposition rests is the fact that man's basic concern is to seek means for survival or livelihood. This he does through the dialectical contact or relationship with nature. Thus, man has to subsist and survive. In order to do this he must produce the means of livelihood by appropriating nature. In the process men also enter into definite relations with other men, independent of their will. In this way, the whole exercise takes on a social form. This process which depends on the level of technology of the available tools as well as the other physical means of production such as land, industry, as well as labour, (forces of production) and the resulting social organization or relations of production is to Marx, what influences everything in society. In his introductory remarks to the above quoted work Marx puts it even more clearly:

I was led by my studies to the conclusion that legal relations as well as forms of state could neither be understood by themselves nor explained by the so called general progress of the human mind, but that they are rooted in the material conditions of life.

Elaborating on this, even further, Marx continues:

In the social production of their material life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite state of development of their material forces of production.

The sum total of these relations of production makes up the economic structure of society--the real foundation on which arises a legal and political super-structure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.

The mode of production of material life determines the social political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but rather it is their social existence that determines their consciousness.

At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production in society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or--what is but a legal expression of the same thing--with the property relations within which they have been at work before. From forms of development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation, the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed (Bear, 1955: 11-12).

The concept "determines" is here used not in its vulgar orthodox Marxist and mechanistic way, but rather in terms of the relative over-riding influence of the mode of production over other aspects of social life. The above statement should, therefore, be seen as referring to the relationship between base and superstructure, while, however, leaving room for man's ability to intervene in the course of history.

To Marx, the mortar of social change or historical development is the conflict resulting from the contradiction between the development of the forces of production and the relations of production. The superstructure always changes in line with changes in the material conditions of society.

In this study it is this historical materialism which determines the choice and interpretation of data as well as the way in which it is arranged. It works from a basic stipulation that one cannot understand the present without reference to the past and that no aspects of human life can be understood without reference to other aspects of human life or their environment. It is behind this background that the whole of Part II was included in this study.

6. Sources of Data

Due to the expanse of the subject of this study, several sources of data were explored and used. This is partly due to the fact that no one source is exhaustible enough, and partly due to the

methodological advantage of using data from the various sources to cross check each other.

(1) The first source was the already available literature on the subject, especially as regards the political, economic, social, and labor history of the country. While a substantial amount of work in that direction had already been done, most of it has tended to limit itself to only one of the said aspects, or to colonial Tanzania, or to a few years after independence (Rweyemamu, 1973; Clive Thomas, 1976; Friedland, 1968; Mapolu, 1972, etc.). Apart from Rweyemamu's work, none of the above works even touches on the specific ways in which the specific economic measures have led to the social stratification and further differentiation of the Tanzanian population, and particularly the labor force.

(2) Another source was the Labor Department reports, Economic Surveys and Plans, and Manpower plans for the whole country to provide a clear picture of the history and the state of labor in the country. The main purpose here was to find out how the specific nature of capitalist exploitation led to the partial proletarianization of the peasantry and how the emergence of specific sections in the working class correspond to the introduction of the corresponding industry or economic activity. For instance, an attempt will be made later on to show how the emergence of plantation workers or miners or dockworkers resulted from the introduction of plantation agriculture (sisal, coffee, tea, etc.), the opening up of mines and the building of port facilities, and the need to handle and transport the raw materials from the hinterland, respectively. Data from these sources not only supplemented the data from source number (1), but was also

to check the reliability and validity of the former. Data from the Manpower Plans was used to give us the size of the various sections of the working class, how they are stratified and paid.

(3) Government (official) wage structure and cost of living indices were also used to find out wage differentials and income gaps between the various sections of the labor force.

The above three sources, aimed at covering the colonial times through to independence and the present, were intended to give us a conception of the way the labor force had been stratified, differentiated, and to a lesser extent managed and paid.

(4) Labor Laws and specific Industrial Relations Acts were also explored to give us a clue as to the reasons why they were being enacted. This was intended to make clear the official and legalistic version of how things were supposed and expected to operate.

(5) Parliamentary Proceedings (Hansard) when specific labor and socialist measure and legislation were being initiated and discussed were also visited. This was also intended to cross-check the reliability and validity of data from source no. 4. The limitations and shortcomings caused by the fact that various interest groups might have either exaggerated or suppressed any meaningful discussion are of course not being ruled out. For that reason, other sources such as informal discussion with samples of the various groups of people involved, especially during the period 1970 - 1974, and even newspaper reports and readers' opinion and the like, were also used as a supplementary source.

(6) Attention was also paid to specific government and union (workers') statements and of any such other bodies involved, as regards

the state of industrial relations at any one given time.

(7) As regards the causes of industrial disputes since 1967 when the country declared it was going socialist, and especially since 1971,

- (a) A sample of workers, union leaders and management at the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania/Tanzania Tobacco Processing Company (TAT/TTPC) at Morogoro, 124 miles from Dar es Salaam, were interviewed. However, the limitations of such sources of data were quite clear, especially when one puts into consideration that each group is likely to give reasons and responses that cover up for actions of members of its class.
- (b) To supplement the above, Labour Department, TANU and NUTA files, as well as the Permanent Labour Tribunal proceedings on the disputes were also explored.
- (c) This was followed by informal discussion with a sample of non-wage earners, union and government officials and University of Dar es Salaam students. Of specific significance, however, were some comments made in and outside Parliament between unionists and some Party and government leaders especially on the Mount Carmel Rubber factory dispute which happened to have taken place at a time when the Tanzanian National Assembly was in session.
- (d) On-the-spot journalistic impressions and reports--by various reporters, and especially my own notes when covering some of the disputes for "the Daily News" from 1970 to 1973, also provided some insight and enabled me to come

up with a general pattern. Also useful as a source here, were letters to the editor (People's Forum) in which the general public and concerned workers made some statements and comments which they would not have otherwise made when confronted by various officials or an interviewer.

7. Contribution of the Dissertation

The main task of the study is to add new dimensions to the various theories on labour processes and industrial relation systems especially in former colonial or dependent economies with reference to Africa and Tanzania in particular.

Should my findings prove my hypothesis right, then a new variable in the understanding of labor processes--especially government labor relations--will have been added. It will become clear that government-labor conflict in these countries is due to the nature of the political economy, i.e., the mode of production, which has led to the emergence of the various antagonistic classes.*

Methodologically, it now becomes clear that any student of labour processes or industrial relations has to go beyond the official statements and exchanges and look at other existential factors that determine and influence the emergence of specific labour processes.

In our case however, specific attention ought to be paid to the political economy, i.e., the specific mode of production, and how labour is in turn organized, exploited, and rewarded by capital. One

*Elsewhere, Bates (1971) and Cherry Gartzel (1974) have demonstrated how the nature of political economy has led to a similar show of strength between unions and government in Zambia.

has also got to look at the particular class position, interests as well as the motives of his/her sources.

To those involved in the administration of industrial relations, they will from then on begin to look beyond the legislation or any such other official statements. It will have become apparent that unless there is equitable distribution of the surplus and that unless want on the part of the majority is eradicated, the conflict between labour and the national managerial-bureaucratic class is likely to go on unresolved.

But more than that, any theoretical-conceptual models built up in the study of one country might not necessarily be useful tools with which to study and analyze what is happening in other countries. Each society with its peculiar circumstances necessitates a different model to suit the respective specific features of that country.

Since Tanzania is one of the few former colonial states to come up with a development program with a socialist orientation, this study will have added some new dimension on the study of socialist production relations. The uniqueness of this country lies in the fact that she is attempting to build socialist production relations, at the same time she is trying to build a socialist economic base. This is in contrast to other countries, such as the Peoples' Republic of China, which did this (Cultural Revolution) after she had built the basis of a socialist economy.

The fact that my conclusions might provide both positive and negative reactions from both scholars and practitioners is yet another important contribution. Should this result in further research and academic as well as constructive debate, then this study will have made its contribution to scholarship.

CHAPTER II

CAPITALIST PENETRATION, SOCIAL FORMATIONS AND CLASS STRUGGLE: THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

In this chapter an attempt will be made to show the economic and social implications of capitalist penetration for the Third World countries, in short, their underdevelopment. Basic to our contention is the hypothesis that the underdevelopment of the Third World countries did not only lead to the peripherization* of the economies of these countries but also to the development of specific class structures typical of these countries. Behind the above proposition is also the hypothesis that in order for the underdeveloped countries to have any meaningful economic development it has to be based on socialist planning and reconstruction. Equally important to stress is the fact that such a strategy implies an inevitable class struggle. All this works, first from a basic presupposition that while underdevelopment should be partially seen as an "externally" imposed phenomenon, it is also partially an "internally" generated phenomenon. Externally, through economic, political, social, cultural, communications and military structural linkages with the metropolis of the world

*"Peripherization" here refers to the process through which Third World economies have been integrated into the world capitalist system, made complementary, secondary and subordinate to the economies of the metropolitan countries.

capitalist system (Galtung, 1971), and internally through the acceptance of such a situation by the nascent home or local bourgeoisie who benefit from such a situation and as such are not willing to reverse the exploitative trend lest they lose their dominance and privileges (Gantzel, 1973). True economic development in these countries must involve disengagement from international monopoly capitalism, which has also introduced into these Third World countries type a dependence and class structure characteristic of the metropolis.

In one of his works (Cockroft, Frank and Johnson, 1972: 19).

Frank clearly demonstrates how:

- 1) The historical development of the world capitalist system has subjected the whole of Latin America (as well as Asia and Africa) to an increased degree of colonial or neo-colonial economic subordination;
- 2) . . . This colonial relationship with the capitalist metropolis has created, and transformed over time, the domestic economic and class structure of Latin American Society;
- 3) . . . This economic and class structure has occasioned political, economic, social and cultural policies which in the past, present, and foreseeable future result in the development of underdevelopment in general and the underdevelopment of development in particular instances in Latin America and;
- 4) . . . That this historical process of underdevelopment for the majority of the peoples of Latin America cannot be reversed and turned into economic and social development until they replace capitalism with socialism.

And using a similar method of analysis on Tanzania-type

economics, Clive Thomas (1972: 14-15) demonstrates how the whole system of economic relationships with the colonial and monopolistic capitalist system has led to the introduction of industrialization strategies that perpetuate the present unfair system or what Professor Rweyemamu (1973) calls "perverse capitalist industrial development." Talking of a similar process in West Africa, Samir Amin (1970) talks of the resulting peripherization of these economies as well as the marginalization of the peasants and workers in those countries. Elsewhere (1972) he talks of development in such economies as "growth accompanied by structural change."

It is thus the basic aim of this study to look at the characteristics of the economies of these countries, as well as the resulting class structure which in turn has had an impact on economic development strategies adopted by the governments in these countries. In my conclusion, I intend to point out what I think should be done--economic disengagement and the introduction of a socialist planned economy, with the inevitable class struggle that is likely to result from such a strategy. Our starting point will be a look at the socio-economic trends in the Third World countries, but only after making the following assumptions which I think are basic to our study:

- 1) The present state of underdevelopment in the "Third World" has a history which dates back to the first contacts made between the now 'developed capitalist countries' (DCC) and the underdeveloped ones. Also this contact was between societies at different levels of development and between two qualitatively different modes of production (Rodney, 1972; Baran, 1968; Amin, 1972).

- 2) This contact more or less arrested and disrupted the self-contained development--based on their internal dynamics--of the societies of the 'Third World' and put them on a new trajectory, the trajectory of underdevelopment.
- 3) The relations so established between the DCC and the 'Third World' have undergone many historical changes and passed through various phases; formal colonialism was only one of them.
- 4) The development of the DCC and the underdevelopment of the 'Third World' are two inter-linked opposites of the same historical process. They form two parts of a single system at the present time (the world capitalist system) each part as much the cause as the effect of the other (Amin, op. cit.; Hveem, 1973; Wallerstein, 1974).
- 5) That the relationship between the DCC and the underdeveloped countries is one of structural-social, economic and political-dependency (Galtung, 1971; Gantzel, 1973).

That the nature and forms of these structures are specific to each country and society and should be analyzed specifically. That formal political 'independence' does not necessarily end these relations.

- 6) The system of underdevelopment has its own laws of motion responsible for its reproduction.
- 7) The social and economic development of the 'Third World' countries requires a complete reorganization of the socio-economic and political structures of these societies which in turn means the overthrow of the existing socio-economic

and political structures which characterize underdevelopment. In economic terms this means reorganization (disengagement) of the externally-oriented economic structures towards nationally-integrated economic structures.

Having said that we now proceed to point out why and how the above structures were developed overtime.

In an attempt to avoid crisis at home, Capitalism had to find a safety-valve. It is therefore no wonder that it had to expand abroad in search of cheap raw materials for her industries and markets for her finished goods. As Marx and Engels succinctly point out in the Communist Manifesto,

the need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere. (Beer, ed. 1955: 13).

Once it had accumulated more capital and became monopolistic, capitalism was further forced to look for new investment grounds for its enormous finance capital. The above argument explains the need, on the part of the capitalist countries, of colonies and spheres of influence.

In order to be successful in these countries that had different social, economic, political and cultural systems, capitalism introduced in these countries with amazing rapidity, all the economic and social tensions inherent in the capitalist system. As Baran points out (Rhodes ed., 1970: 268).

It effectively disrupted whatever was left of the feudal coherence of the backward societies. . . . It substituted market contracts for such paternalistic relationship as still survived from century to century . . . oriented the partly or wholly self-sufficient economies of agricultural countries towards the production of marketable commodities . . . linked their economic

"fate with the vagaries of the world market and connected it with the fever curve of international price movement."

Economically, one society was subjected to the new function of producing raw materials for the highly industrialized society and became a dependent of the former.

Such countries lost their traditional, precapitalist systems and began to supply cheap labor and raw materials for capitalism. According to Samir Amin (1970) an export economy was created. There was also no linkage between the export sector and the rest of the economy. The whole system led to the marginalization and peripherization of the economies of these countries. Elaborating on the above situation, Amin makes a distinction between the economies of such countries and those of the capitalist (self-centered) systems. To him, the determining relationship in self-centered economies was the linkage between the production of "mass" consumption and capital goods in those systems (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. In the above model external relations are left out indicating that the main relations within the system can be understood without them, for after all, the external relations of the developed regions as a whole with the periphery of the world system remain quantitatively marginal, as opposed to the internal flows of the center.

In these advanced economies, there was during the industrialization era; forward and backward linkages between the various sectors of the economy. At the early stages of industrialization, the need for food to feed the industrial workers stimulated agriculture. Equally, agricultural raw materials, such as cotton, stimulated the textile industry which in turn, and due to the need of mechanizing agriculture so as to have enough food for the industrial workers, stimulated the rapid development of the iron and steel industry. Addressing himself specifically on the industrialization process in Britain, Clive Thomas (op. cit.: 6) demonstrates how there was

an organic link rooted in an indigenous science and technology, between the pattern and growth of domestic resource use and the pattern and growth of domestic demand.

People had to be clothed and therefore had to buy the manufactured textiles, thus stimulating the textile industry. Likewise, workers in the new industrial centers had to eat and therefore stimulated agricultural development.

The structure of demand in the early system speeded the agricultural revolution by providing a market for food products intended for internal consumption. (ibid)

On the other hand, and under the impulse from the center, an export sector was created in the Peripheral countries. The reason lies in the need of obtaining from these countries, cheap raw materials for use in the home industries at the Center. Using the Amin model, the main relationship was between exports and consumption of luxury goods instead of being between "mass" consumption and capital goods, a process which leads to the marginalization of Third World economies. Even when the chance for industrialization presents itself, there is usually an inclination, on the part of the "national"

bourgeoisie, towards the production of luxury consumer goods through import substitution. The economies of such countries thus become outward-oriented and structurally linked to the world capitalist metropolis.

Thus from the above facts and developments, it becomes clear that what we know of as underdevelopment today

has its origin in Western Colonialism and the integration of Latin America, Asia and Africa into a world society dominated by industrialized Europe and North America. . . . It is a consequence of systematic historical events and forces, particularly in the sphere of colonization and international economics (Johnson, 1973: 4 and 5).

At this juncture, it thus becomes clear how the historical development of the world capitalist system has really subjected these countries to an ever increasing degree of colonial or neo-colonial economic subordination. And as Frank succinctly points out (Rhodes op. cit.: 19).

This colonial relationship with the capitalist metropolis has created and transformed over time, the domestic economic and class structure

of these dependent countries. The above process has, however, differed from region to region and from country to country depending on two basic factors as follows (Bodenheimer, 1971: 37-38).

1. Characteristics of the international system:

- a. the prevalent form of capitalism (mercantile or industrial, corporate or financial);
- b. the principal needs of the dominant nation(s) in the international system (agricultural commodities, minerals, cheap labor, commodity markets, capital markets and so forth);
- c. the degree of concentration of capital in the dominant

- nation(s) (competitive or monopolistic capitalism);
- d. the degree of concentration internationally (one hegemonic power or rival powers and if one hegemonic power, which nation (Spain, England or the United States).
2. Degree and nature of the . . . country's ties to and functions within the system:
- a. integration into the international system under conditions of mercantilism, "free trade," protectionism (tariffs, quotas, and the like imposed by the dominant nations) or trade within the structure of multi-national corporations;
- b. nature of political tie to hegemonic power(s) (Colonial or nominally independent);
- c. function primarily as a supplier of raw materials or agricultural products, as a market for manufactured goods, as a supplier of certain manufactured commodities, as an arena for direct foreign investment, or any combination of the preceding;
- d. degree of foreign control in the principal economic sectors and more generally, degree or relative autonomy (e.g., periods of world war or depressions versus "normal" periods).

All in all, the colonial system established relationships of inequality, dependence and exploitation between the colonies and the colonial metropolis and created within the former the so-called structural aspects of underdevelopment which are their main characteristics today (Stavenhagen, op. cit.: 5):

- 1) sectoral inequalities in productivity;
- 2) disarticulation of the economic system, or what is sometimes referred to as the "dualism" of underdeveloped countries; and
- 3) external domination.

Equally important to our analysis, is the fact that, "the establishment of colonial systems and the expansion of capitalism in underdeveloped countries led to certain processes of social change which accelerated the disintegration of traditional structures and gave birth to new social categories and social classes" (Stavenhagen, 1975: 53). While the said processes of social change and acculturation are varied and complex, six of them have however been essential in the transformation of class structure and stratification processes in the Third World countries. These include the following (ibid: 53-62):

- 1) The Introduction of a Money Economy whose main elements included the establishment of monetary taxes, the introduction of wage labor and the development of commercial monetary exchange. These developments were to lead to the rise of new social categories and the transformation of traditional social structures. Amongst these was the rise of a wage laboring class and a commercial stratum, while in Black Africa, the English and French colonial administrators placed the traditional chiefs in charge of tax collection;
- 2) The Introduction of Private Landownership and Commercial Monoculture: Wherever capitalism developed, it stimulated individual appropriation of land. In Africa, the process of disintegration of tribal land tenure and the formation of private landholdings among Africans has been underway now for many years. At the same time and as a result of

colonization, land belonging to the native population was systematically expropriated and occupied by European colonists (e.g. Kenya, Southern Africa, North Africa) or by foreign companies in the form of "concessions."

The establishment of private land tenure has also resulted in the concentration of land in the hands of small minorities. This was also followed by the widespread establishment of large-scale commercial monoculture (sugarcane, cocoa, cotton, coffee, sisal, etc.). The above said process which altered traditional social structures wherever it took place, has also given rise to new social categories and represents an essential aspect of the formation of new social classes (55-56);

- 3) Migration of Workers and Rural Exodus: The two earlier mentioned developments i.e. the expropriation of land, the destruction of traditional subsistence agriculture, the improvement of the peasant masses, the demands of the monetary economy, and economic development in underdeveloped countries have all contributed to the creation of a democratic movement which became very significant in the twentieth century. The seasonal migration of workers in African and Latin America is an indication of these radical changes in traditional economic structures as well as a powerful factor in the formation of new social classes (ibid: 56). These demographic movements are either within or across national borders. In African countries for instance, a lot of young and able bodied males leave their rural homes to work in

the mines, the farms, the plantations and the industrial and urban centers. This movement is also both geographical and occupational. A lot of people migrate into South Africa, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Uganda, Zaire, Liberia, Ghana and others as migrant labourers. Countries such as Mozambique, Botswana, Malawi, Burundi, and Ruanda are usually the sources of this exported labor. Jack Woddis (1960) has succinctly pointed out the six basic characteristics of these migrations as follows (Stavenhagen, op. cit.: 57):

- a) They are made up almost exclusively of adult men;
 - b) The workers are generally contracted for a strictly limited period of time;
 - c) The migration is repeated several times during the life of the rural worker;
 - d) The workers generally travel enormous distances, often on foot;
 - e) These migrations are tied to various kinds of recruitment, many of which are nothing more than disguised forms of forced labor;
 - f) These migrations are of such large scale that they create a complete disequilibrium between the populations of the cities and the countryside, which aggravates the already acute agrarian crisis, and totally destroys the economic harmony of the African countries and territories most directly affected. In addition, the instability of the labor force and the occupational mobility inherent in the migration system make it difficult for workers to upgrade their skills, make union organization virtually impossible, and logically tend to reduce wage levels. It is these migrations that have led to the emergence and development of a working class, and subsequently the trade union movements in Africa.
- 4) Urbanization and deliberate colonial policies which led the colonizers to encourage the formation of cities and urban centers to serve as commercial, administrative or mining centers. These have for a long time also maintained closer

economic relations with Europe than with their African hinterlands. Urbanization should also be seen as a social and economic process which significantly affects traditional socio-economic systems and provide the context within which the new social structures appear. Thus while many people have been forced to leave the hinterland and their original occupations (agriculture) the new urban centers have not been able to provide all of them with jobs. Even those who secured jobs for themselves have usually been mainly in the tertiary sector, that is, the trades and services, which are characterized by low productivity, low incomes, and a high degree of underemployment and unemployment. Thus, while it is true that the development of capitalism has been able to uproot millions of rural people, it has been unable to provide for them adequately in new, integrated, economic and social structures. Rural migrants and urban marginals do not turn automatically (except for a small proportion) into an industrial proletariat or a "rising middle class" as is so often argued (Ibid: 59). Instead we tend to have a marginalized lumpen or semi-proletariat class. Thus new classes emerge and new stratification systems develop.

- 5) Industrialization: This is a recent phenomena. It is however one of the most salient factors in the emergence and development of a new social class in Africa--the industrial proletariat. At first, industrialization in the colonies was prevented by the manufacturing interests of the colonial powers. Later on, however, and as a result of crisis in the

capitalist system, some marginal industrialization was allowed especially since World War II. This process has however been introduced under the leadership of multinational corporations (MNC/s) which have set up plants in Third World countries to take advantage of tax exemptions, cheap labor costs, and raw materials. In most cases, the finished or semi-finished goods are re-exported back home. This kind of industrialization increases the underdeveloped country's dependence upon the industrialized nation, does not contribute to strengthening the internal market in the country in which it takes place, and due to modern capital intensive technologies, hardly contributes to an expansion of the industrial labor force (Ibid: 60-61). Thus while industrialization can be said to be one of the significant processes that change the traditional class formation and leads to the development of new social classes, it does so within the general context of dependent and uneven capitalist development.

- 6) National Integration of Underdeveloped Countries: This was later to lead to some social problems. Thus while it is still possible to talk of the economy of East Africa, one must however distinguish between the economic development of Tanzania and of Kenya or Uganda. As a result, social class structure, which can only be understood in the context of specific socio-economic systems would differ considerably between the two or three countries. From the above basic propositions, and as Frank (1972 : 1) points out, it becomes

more important to define and understand underdevelopment in terms of classes. Underdevelopment in a dependent region such as Latin America cannot be understood except as the product of a bourgeoisie policy formulated in response to class interests and class structure which are in turn determined by the dependence of the Latin American satellite on the colonialist imperialist metropolis.

What Frank said of Latin America is also true of Asia and Africa. Thus, today, the anti-imperialist struggle in these regions must be carried out through class struggle. Elsewhere Amin (1972) has also pointed out not only how the mode of production pertaining at a particular time and place influences the social formations but also how this capitalist penetration and the resultant social formations were brought about and effected in some parts of Africa.

Thus socially and economically, we see how the above mentioned development has equally created a middle class of local bourgeoisie who have also assimilated the political, economic, social, and cultural values of the foreign dominant class. At the time of independence, these have tended to seek nothing more than accommodation to the prevailing order, striving for a share in the existing sinecures.

They made political and economic deals with their dominant overlords or with powerful foreign investors. They combined the worst features of both worlds--feudalism and capitalism--blocking effectively all possibilities of economic growth (Baran in Rhodes, ed., *ibid*: 287-288).

To them, independence meant that they would now have a chance of stepping into the bootstraps of their colonial mentors and masters thus getting all the favours and privileges enjoyed by the former. During the nationalist struggle, they tended to identify themselves with the common man. But immediately after gaining "independence," the interests

of the two groups began to conflict. The local bourgeoisie began to turn a deaf ear towards popular demands from radical and seemingly leftist elements in their respective countries. Afraid that any radical leftist reforms might antagonise their domestic and foreign masters and hence deprive them of their foreign support, the local bourgeoisie have in most cases tended to desert their anti-imperialist and nationalistic platforms. This has, now and again, tended to push the masses into the camp of socialism which in turn lead to an even more and greater alliance between the "national" or local bourgeoisie with the aristocratic and monopolistic sector. Being very much dependent on the foreign metropolitan power, the native elite have tended to throw away their historical chance of assuming effective control over the destinies of their nations, and of directing and gathering popular storm against the fortresses of feudalism, capitalism, reaction and foreign exploitation.

Thus, while one would have expected that such a situation would or was going to be reversed immediately these countries got their "independence," this dependence situation has been enhanced and consolidated even more by the so-called "national" governments of these countries. To which our next question is, why has such an unequal arrangement not been challenged by the national governments?

The answer to the above question lies in the fact that imperialism did not only link the economic systems of the Third World countries to the world capitalist system; on top of that it introduced or imposed upon them the capitalist class structure, social values, and cultural norms. Through its education system it turned out a small number of an educated elite which was nothing but a replica of the elite in the

mother country. This local elite, whom Fanon (1967: 37) calls "spoilt children of yesterday's colonialism and of today's nationalist government," tried to assimilate the cultural and consumption patterns of their mentors to whom they were also linked. In most countries, the process also gave rise to a residential commercial and "productive" petty bourgeoisie who acted as commercial "bridgeheads" or middlemen between the natives and the foreign exploiters. In the case of most African countries, and especially East Africa, these were also alien--the Asians or Indian dukawallas who directed the exploitation process and shared its benefits in economic and political alliance with the metropolis. Internally, the commercial and educated elite formed an alliance into what is popularly known as the "national" bourgeoisie. At independence, political power fell in the hands of the native elite. Through their control, they were to direct the use and distribution of the little that was left over on the national surplus after the metropolitan powers and firms had expropriated much of it in terms of profits. On their part, the local bourgeoisie mis-appropriated the left-over surplus to their use by importing luxury consumer goods or embarking on an industrial strategy that stressed the production of the same goods through import substitution.

This they did through partnership with Multi-National Corporations with which they signed various partnership and management contracts. While these partnerships and contracts had certain advantages to the Multi-National Corporation (MNC) they have tended to lead to certain detrimental consequences to the economies of the 'Third World' economies or the host-countries (Shivji, 1972; Coulson, 1972).

Using experiences from Tanzania, Shivji (op. cit.) points out

the advantages of such arrangements to the MNCs and disadvantages to the 'Third World' countries. Since this issue is not the subject of our study I will briefly outline them (ibid: 11-32):

a) Benefits of Partnership to MNCs include:

- (i) Mobilization followed by denationalization of local capital: With a relatively small equity capital and a management contract, a MNC can mobilize and use substantial amounts of local capital. By associating with local private or public capital and retaining day-to-day control through a management-service agreement, it is able to effectively denationalize local capital.
- (ii) Retaining of old and capturing of new markets.
- (iii) Tariff protection, duty and tax concessions.
- (iv) Priority in government contracts, etc.
- (v) Outlet for the products of the group, i.e. the foreign partner who is a managing agent is in a very good position to encourage the sale of the products of the parent company; to hire out patents, trade marks, etc; to make use of the Research and Development (R & D), program already developed by the Group, at a fee--even to push obsolete machinery onto the local subsidiary; . . . and the manipulation of intercorporate prices thereby enhancing the profits and/or reducing the costs and taxes of the parent company or the Group as a whole.
- (vi) Pressuring the government so as to make it develop all the necessary infrastructure needed by the MNC in its

various activities.

- (vii) Political security, security against high wage demands, Strikes, etc.

b) Losses of Partnership to the Public Corporation and host economy in general:

- (i) Siphoning off of surplus, i.e. the drain of the large portion of economic surplus generated in the 'Third World' to the metropolitan countries.

- (ii) Pattern of Investment: The main criterion by which private investors make their investment decisions is, of course, profit; if not in the short-run, definitely in the long-run. Thus, instead of investing into sectors that would serve the whole peoples' needs and create a basis for a national productive capacity which is basis for further development, the MNC advise and encourage their partners to invest into the Export Sector and the production of luxurious consumption goods for a very small proportion of the population--the elite. This can be illustrated by looking at the pattern of investment of the National Development Corporation (NDC) of Tanzania (Table 1). The above investment trend is usually possible through a variety of ways ranging from (ibid: 24)

- (a) the control of the enterprise by the managing agents to

- (b) initiation of projects i.e. in many cases the original ideas for a particular project in fact

Table 1. N.D.C. Investment in Tanzania in Subsidiaries and Associates - 1968 (Percent Distribution)

Sectors	Issued Capital	No. of Employees	Wages Salaries	Dividends Paid to N.D.C.	N.D.C. Investment	N.D.C. Loans
Raw Materials for Export	25.2	43.7	40.9	93.32	44.6	NA
Producer Goods	12.7	16.4	19.4	0.2	10.6	31.9
Domestic Consumption:						
Necessities	1.9	6.1	3.5	-	10.0	-
Luxuries	38.0	8.0	17.7	1.9	33.0	-
Export Processing	20.5	23.0	16.2	4.4	7.3	64.1
Tourism	1.41	0.2	1.9	-	3.1	3.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Adapted from Seidman Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa, Table 5-6c, p. 120.

Source: Shivji, I. "Capitalism Unlimited: Public Corporations in Partnership with Multinational Corporations," (op cit.) p. 22).

come from a potential foreign partner to

(c) Leverage of the home state.

(iii) Technological Underdevelopment i.e. the type of the technology to be used and the people to man it are usually determined by the foreign partner and they are usually themselves foreign. For instance, a foreign partner might prefer the employment of so many expatriates, a technology that is either labor or capital intensive in outlook depending not on the realities and policies of the host country but the foreign partner's outlook and orientation. There have also been instances where foreign partners have been cited to have brought into the country, old and outdated machinery and equipment.

(iv) Industrial Relations: Multinational Corporations are a product of the capitalist system (Baran and Sweezy, 1966) and as such their managerial values and orientation are basically capitalist. In their operations they definitely have a tendency to transmit and define everything according to their own cultural outlook and orientation (Sauvant, 1976). Sometimes this has been in conflict with the Industrial relations and political objectives being pursued in certain countries. This has been more so in Tanzania where the official political policy and objective is building a just, equal, and socialist society, while most of the country's public corporations have business partnership

and management/consultancy agreements with the capitalist MNCs. In 'Blood sucking Contracts' Andrew Coulson (op. cit.) has clearly demonstrated how in Tanzania, the managerial practices practiced by the Israel firm (Mlonot) running and managing the Killimanjaro Hotel led to an industrial dispute at the hotel.

All in all, partnership with MNC's has been very detrimental to the economies of the 'Third World' countries while their behavior leaves much to be desired. It is, therefore, no wonder that even liberal scholars such as Louis-Turner (1973, 1975) have dared to castigate the MNCs for their behavior/activities:

Some of their number behaved abominably, even by the lax standards of the by-gone era of the robber barons. Even the better-behaved firms involved with the Third World acted callously, if we judge them by today's business standards. They bribed officials, they failed to train local nationals with any urgency, they "fiddled" their accounts so that poverty-stricken countries were further weakened by massive outflows of precious foreign exchange, and when there were disputes with local interests, they would get as much diplomatic help from their home country as possible. Even today many of the complaints against the activities of genuinely well-meaning companies have considerable justification, and no company should do business in the Third World without at least being aware of the types of activities that cause resentment (ibid, 1975: 15).

Whatever is the case, partnership with MNCs have had very adverse consequences for 'Third World' countries. It is, therefore, not surprising that even in countries like Tanzania today, eleven years after the Arusha Declaration and nationalization measures, the economy, and especially the industrial strategy is still foreign-oriented. The so-called "majority" share holding system, the management/consultancy agreements and such other things like aid and loans, as well as "those blood-sucking contracts" have not changed the country's dependency

structures.

The economic and social implications for Tanzania of such an industrial strategy, which depends on foreign firms, have been more clearly put by Rweyamamu (1973: xii-xiii):

Specifically it is shown that dependency relationship created by the colonial division of labor, dependency on foreign markets for the sale of their output and the provision of basic inputs, technological dependency on the advanced countries and dependency on foreign entrepreneurs, all these work in such a way as to produce perverse capitalist industrial growth. Such growth is characterized by the establishment of a productive structure that (a) is biased against the capital goods industries, thus limiting industry's contribution to the production of farm equipment and transport facilities, (b) utilizes relatively more capital-intensive techniques of production, thus compounding the problem of urban unemployment and the widening of urban-rural differentials, (c) has limited linkage effects, especially with respect to the traditional sector, (d) fosters lopsided development both in terms of geographical location within the country, and sectoral distribution of consumer goods output favouring luxuries, and (e) sets up uncompetitive oligopolistic structures.

And elaborating on the above even more, Rweyamamu comes up with a number of hypotheses (ibid: 105-110):

The hypotheses presented below are derivable from the above model and deal with such issues as market structure, sectoral distribution of output, capital intensity, location, inter-industry relations, etc. Since the general argument has been sketched above, a summary of it is presented below in each particular case.

Hypothesis I

A part of the profits of large oligopolistic foreign firms in the ex-colonial countries are not shown as profits in the accounting records of the ex-colonial countries but instead are realized through over-invoicing of equipment, parts, raw materials, etc.

Hypothesis II

Foreign-owned firms tend to be more capital-intensive than locally-owned enterprises.

Hypothesis III

Foreign-owned firms, though capital-intensive (and therefore relatively more labour-productive) are not necessarily more efficient in terms of total factor productivity than locally owned enterprises.

Hypothesis IV

Linkage effects of the industrial structure of the ex-colonial countries are limited and there is a high dependence on imports.

Hypothesis V

Modern industries of ex-colonial economies are located in the export enclaves.

Hypothesis VI

The system of industrial production of the ex-colonial countries is characterized by (a) a low percentage share of capital goods, and (b) a high percentage share of luxury consumer goods relative to the world average, for given income and population.

The next logical question then is, how is it that such a situation of one sided development has not been challenged?

As Gantzel (op. cit., p. 207) puts it,

the foreign capital owners and investors and their allies, the native economic oligarchy, are not interested in the long-term development of a well balanced economic, infra--and social structure: they are interested in the greatest possible profit. Moreover, in many cases profit returns several times the amount invested to the donor nations. The result is a one-sided development of high profit production. The tremendous private and public poverty, the unequal access to income, is thus accentuated and not alleviated. The vicious circles accelerated by crises of inflation, growth and monetary matters ensures the integration of the country more and more into imperialist dependency.

The main reason behind this dependence and marginalization is that the local or national bourgeoisie who are benefiting from such an arrangement dare not restructure the economy. To this class, nationalization measures and such other policies like "decentralization" as was the case in Tanzania recently, have meant more jobs and control to the members of the class, which has tended to accept dependence

consciously and willingly.

Against this group or class are the vast masses of peasants and workers who have been marginalized:

. . . the pre-requisites for life, work, social-political articulations, and social integration are confiscated from, or denied, these groups because they are of no direct 'use' to realizing profits, accumulating capital or supporting oppositional elite etc. Rather, they present an obstacle to these goals; in fact, the exclusion of these groups secures the advantages of the 'center' (or the periphery near the center). No interaction exists with these segments of the population: they are ignored, expelled to the illegitimacy, condemned to apathy, treated by the integrated lower and middle classes with enmity etc (ibid: 204).

These have the legitimacy of challenging such a system. They have nothing to lose save their being exploited.

In my concluding remarks, I shall try to answer the question, "What is to be done and who is likely to do it?" In the preceding sections, an attempt was made to show how the historical development of capitalism has led to the polarization of society in the underdeveloped countries.

Many suggestions on how these countries would get away from this unfortunate economic and hence social and political plight have been made. To Western establishment scholars, the remedy lies in adopting Western institutions through diffusion (Hoselitz, 1960) and through following the stages of growth that the advanced capitalist countries went through (Rostow, 1952). To them, underdevelopment has been due to the predominance of archaic local institutions. What this amounts to is for the 'Third World' countries to invite resources (both human and material) from the now advanced capitalist countries and let the personnel from these countries 'develop' the now underdeveloped countries.

In concrete terms this amounts to saying that the now advanced capitalist countries feel it their 'moral' responsibility to develop the underdeveloped. Some of the suggested ways through which this process would 'successfully' take place are business and investment partnership between the underdeveloped and Multinational Corporations (MNCs), "aid" and "loans" from the advanced capitalist countries.

It would, however, be naive for any serious scholar worth the name to suggest that such partnership and handouts from the now advanced capitalist countries would lead to the development of the 'Third World' countries. Several studies, for instance, have clearly demonstrated how partnership with MNCs leads to even more underdevelopment (Shivji, 1972a; Coulson, 1972; Arrighi, 1973). This is mainly due to the fact that MNCs are an overgrowth of capitalism and as such their interests and hence investment rationale are of necessity contradictory to the needs of the peoples of the 'Third World.' While the latter wants investments and a development strategy geared to the needs of their people, the MNCs are basically oriented towards the maximization of profits from their investments, and this implies even more exploitation and outward-oriented 'Third World' economies--in short, continued underdevelopment. The ways through which this is done have been pointed out elsewhere in this chapter (Shivji, *ibid*; Coulson, *ibid*). It is therefore not surprising that even bourgeois apologues like Turner (*op. cit.*: 44) have agreed that:

. . . even in the short term, the multinationals are abusing their dominant positions by devices that benefit the company first, their parent economy second (i.e. the United States and Europe), and only then their host economy in the Third World.

It would therefore, be wishful thinking to hope, as Turner does, that

some of these MNCs are 'genuine' and 'well-intentioned.' Indeed they are, but in their own interests and those of the parent economies. Even when they have tended to 'cooperate' with the host governments of the 'Third World,' this has only been in so far as it serves their interests and usually as a matter of strategy, while elsewhere they have tended to undermine the nationally-oriented policies of their host countries and in most cases through the leverage of their parent governments. A typical example would be the case of the U.S. oil companies operating in the Arab world. When the Arab oil producers at the instigation of Libya and later on all Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members decided to raise the price of gasoline, the companies did give in only to a certain extent. The six United States firms, for instance, were allowed to contravene the anti-trust laws and team up together against the oil producing governments, especially Libya. Meanwhile, the U.S. government used all its diplomatic services to make the producing governments rescind their further-intended and seemingly more extreme demands; at least not to take the very drastic measures suggested and even undertaken by Libya, which not only nationalized the oil producing industry but also terminated the presence of American military bases on Libyan soil. Attempts were then made by the Western democracies especially the U.S. to isolate Libya from the rest of the Arab world, while then U.S. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Henry Kissinger did not hesitate to point out that should the Arab oil producing countries go further, the U.S. would be duty-bound to secure oil for the 'free world' even by the use of arms.

This is because further concessions to the oil producing

made sure the policy got bogged down in the Chilean Congress, and when ratified were only partially successful. While Kennecott agreed to the scheme and sold 51 percent of its principal mine to the government, Anaconda did its best to permit the government only 25 percent of its third and smallest mine keeping full 100 percent control over the mines that mattered (ibid: 11). It was public resentment of such a sell-out that partly cost Frei the 1970 general election in which Marxist Dr. Salvador Allende was elected President. Allende then went on to nationalize the copper companies and other businesses.

Similar trends were happening in Peru where the populist military government of General Juan Valasco Alvarado expropriated various foreign firms (e.g. International Petroleum Corporation (IPC)) a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey, nationalized the sugar industry, expropriated ranches owned by Cerro (U.S. firm), and the telephone system run by International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT), and instigated stringent foreign exchange regulations. Meanwhile, a regional economic organization, the Andean Pact had been formed by Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Colombia in 1969.

The big MNCs were not very much concerned with nationalizations. They knew and know the advantages of such arrangements:

The nationalization of the Chilean copper might not have greatly affected the supporters of free enterprise, but the Andean Pact went further, drawing up a charter on foreign investment to which all five member countries subscribed. This surprised outside observers, who felt that Colombia and Ecuador would be unwilling to join any pact that might frighten off new investment. Certain sectors, like the steel industry and banks, would be totally forbidden to foreign investors, while in all others foreigners could take only a minority shareholding. In particular, existing firms would have fifteen years at the most to come up with the necessary local participation, while Peru wanted it to be found much faster. The impact of the nationalizations in Peru and Chile was traumatic. Other

countries followed suite, like Bolivia; which nationalized Gulf Oil's assets. But the companies were most disturbed by the realization that a country like Chile could democratically elect a Marxist president, who would then work with other countries to formulate terms seriously affecting private investment--by imposing limits on equity participation and repatriation--and get away with it (ibid: 13).

From then on, the MNCs and U.S. government worked hard to pacify or neutralize Chilean influence, especially at a time when the military regime of Argentina was also flirting with the Andean Group and that even Cuba was likely to be allowed into the mainstream of Latin American official life. It is behind this background that the brutal assassination of Dr. Salvador Allende and the overthrow of his Marxist government in the 1973 CIA planned and partially executed coup, as well as the overthrow of Argentina's Isabella Peron in 1976, should be looked at.

That then is the extent to which the MNCs backed by the military might of their parent governments can "genuinely" and "well-intentionally" cooperate with 'Third World' countries.

Foreign aid and loans also will not help 'Third World' countries from their economic and hence political plight; for after all, all aid and loans are usually tied. As U.S.'s great statesman, George Washington, once put it (Frank, 1969: 162): "It is madness for one nation to expect disinterested help from another." The idea was carried out even further by one time Kennedy and Johnsons's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, John Foster Dulles, who, when referring to U.S. aid to the rest of the world, said:

The United States does not have friends; it has interests (ibid). And it so happens that the interests of the Center and Periphery nations are contradictory, so much so that it becomes absurd for one to

talk of a moral responsibility and commitment on the part of the Center countries to help the Peripheral ones. It is also now common experience that for every single dollar 'given' out as a loan or aid to 'Third World' countries, e.g. by the U.S., it takes out another five or even more. Former and late President John F. Kennedy put it even more succinctly when he said that . . . the capital inflow to the United States from the underdeveloped countries in 1960 was \$1,300 million and the capital outflow from the United States to the said countries was only \$200 million (Frank, 1969: 163). And U.S. News and World Report of December 25, 1961 found the same trend for the period 1956-61: a ratio of inflow to and outflows from the United States of 147 percent for Latin American, 164 percent for the 'Third World' countries as a whole and 43 percent for Western Europe. Continued aid and loans, therefore, leads to even further underdevelopment. Drawing his conclusions from U.S. loans and aid to Brazil, for instance, Frank (ibid: 160) asserts that:

Far from contributing capital to, and improving the structure of, the Brazilian economy, the United States draws capital out of Brazil and with what remains gains control of Brazillian capital and channels it into directions that increase Brazil's dependence on the United States and hinder Brazil's economic growth.

What actually happens is that due to superior technical and economic position, U.S. firms are able to mobilize Brazilian money and channel it into investments which they think are more profitable to them. And again through economic favors they are allowed to carry out some of it in forms of profits, overinvoicing etc., lest they pull out of the country all together. And over time, this economic control becomes translated into political and military control to the extent that

peripheral countries' governments become impotent and incapacitated to make any decisions of their own.

It would seem that all the suggestions given to 'Third World' countries by Western establishment scholars imply continued dependence and underdevelopment. None of them, for instance, dare to suggest that the development of the now advanced countries has been due to their exploitation of 'Third World' countries. It has thus mainly been scholars from these countries, or those really sympathetic to them who have been able to establish the fact that underdevelopment in 'Third World' countries is a result of imperialism which first subordinated and then oriented the economies of these countries to international monopoly capitalism (Frank, op. cit.; Jallee, 1968; etc.). To such scholars, the only way out of this continued dependence and underdevelopment is through disengagement from world monopoly capitalism and, subsequently, socialist planning and reconstruction of these economies. Talking about the rationale for such a strategy in Africa in general and Tanzania in particular President Nyerere (1968: 264) asserts:

The question is not whether nations control their economy, but how they do so. The real ideological choice is between controlling the economy through domestic private enterprise, or doing so through some state or other collective institution.

But although this is an ideological choice, it is extremely doubtful whether it is practical choice for an African nationalist. The pragmatist in Africa . . . will find that the real choice is between foreign private ownership on the one hand, and local collective ownership on the other. For I do not think there is a free state in Africa where there is sufficient local capital or a sufficient number of local entrepreneurs, for locally based capitalism to dominate the economy. A capitalist economy means a foreign-dominated economy. These are the facts of Africa's situation. The only way in which national control of the economy can be achieved is through the economic institutions of Socialism. . . . To Tanzanians this inevitable choice

is not unwelcome. We are all socialists as well as nationalists. We are committed to the creation of a classless society in which every able-bodied citizen is contributing to the economy through work, and we believe that this can only be obtained when the major means of production are publically owned and controlled. But the fact remains that our recent socialist measures were not taken out of a blind adherence to dogma. They are intended to serve our society.

Thus it becomes clear that the above strategy calls not only for the disengagement of the 'Third World' economies from the world capitalist system, but also making them serve the interests of the masses of the people in these countries. It calls for, among other things, the intervention and control by the state in all basic economic activities. Rapid economic development in these countries, therefore, calls for central planning and the observation of two basic "iron laws" of development (Thomas, op. cit.) as follows:

- 1) The Convergence of Resource Use and Demand, and
- 2) The Convergence of Needs and Demands.

According to the above model, there should also be a backward and forward linkages between the various sectors of the economy. The model also calls for rapid basic industrialization because once industrial production is established, the country will not only stop the importation of manufactured goods at very high prices, but will also have the option of gaining foreign exchange through exporting some of the locally manufactured goods. Like Amin's earlier model (Figure 1) the process of industrialization should also be based on the production of capital and "mass" consumption goods. Industry must thus meet the needs of all the people instead of producing luxury goods for the "national" bourgeoisie. The need for food to feed the industrial workers will obviously stimulate agricultural production, including

enough raw materials for industry, thus forging the backward and forward linkages which Amin talks about. Accordingly, rapid industrial growth in 'Third World' countries can only take place if it is unimpeded by the exploitative arrangements and capitalist contacts which have for a long time made it impossible. This involves total disengagement by using the country's own resources, central state planning whereby the people through their government can set priorities, gearing all sections of the economy so as to assist in the new policy and investment. It also implies the observance of five facts as follows (Coulson, op. cit.):

- 1) Breaking with international companies by cutting the internal links which enable these companies to operate. The basic question here is whether the so-called "national" bourgeoisie who benefit from the present arrangement will be willing to do such a job which impliedly amounts to class suicide;
- 2) Rural transformation to increase food production and consumption;
- 3) Release of sufficient financial surplus to finance basic industrialization, including a cut in conspicuous consumption so as to earn more foreign exchange, and re-allocation of local resources from unproductive uses into productive ones;
- 4) Commitment to planning so that the industries can be properly inter-related; and
- 5) Exposure by the workers and peasants of corruption, waste, inefficiency and misuse of resources wherever it may be found.

The problem however is that the "national" bourgeoisie in these countries stand to lose if such a strategy is to be followed. It, therefore, follows that they will oppose such a strategy. Opposed to this privileged class are workers and peasants in these countries. Basically the interests of workers and peasants are opposed to and

contradict those of the "national" bourgeoisie. In this way, economic nationalism and the struggle against imperialism takes another turn; it becomes a class struggle. Writing on the same situation and the coincidence of the two struggles in countries like Latin America Frank (1969: 372) notes:

The strategic coincidence of class struggle and the anti-imperialist struggle, and the tactical dependence of class struggle in Latin America over the anti-imperialist struggle against the metropolitan bourgeoisie, is obviously valid for guerrilla warfare, which must begin against the national bourgeoisie of the country; and it is also valid for the ideological and political struggle that must be directed not only against the imperialist and colonial enemy but against the native class

Frank then goes on to tell us how this also applies to the "neo-colonial" countries of Asia and Africa and perhaps to some colonial countries, unless they are already militarily occupied by imperialism (ibid: 372). What this implies and which I would like to stress is the fact that in countries like Tanzania where you had no strong settler community and where exploitation was direct i.e., predominantly between small-holding peasant producers through a few middlemen who were also alien, and the metropolitan mother country, the anti-imperialist struggle definitely takes precedent over class struggle. What is quite clear in the Tanzanian case is that the economic and class structure during the colonial era was such that the middle position was held by Asians (Indians) and a few Europeans (mainly Greeks and a handful of Britains who dominated the sisal plantation and a few coffee farms in the Kilimanjaro area, respectively). The indigenous population was relegated to the position of small-holding producers or plantation and farm labourers. Of course, there were a few indigenous Africans who had been handpicked and educated to

help to facilitate the process of exploitation. It was this group that was to lead the nationalist movement and later on handed over political power by the British at the time of independence. At independence, therefore, the problem is not to combat this group but to prevent them from using their newly acquired political power to acquire wealth and consolidate themselves as a class against the rest of the population. This in turn entails the conscientization of the masses of the peoples in such countries to make them aware of their class interests. This implies the presence of a political movement with a clear mass ideology. Also important in this connection is a process in which the educated elite should also, be educated and made aware of their position as 'bridgeheads' as well as the fact that together with the masses they are being exploited. Efforts should also be made to make them aware of their potential as revolutionaries ready to lead the rest of the country out of the dependence situation. Thus instead of isolating and fighting them, which would be a wrong target strategically, these people should be incorporated into the over-all struggle against economic imperialism.

At this juncture, suffice it also to point out that the struggle does not necessarily need to be an armed one. The new indigeneous rulers can use their newly acquired political power to dispossess or pacify the alien economic middleman, thus breaking the link between the exploiting class in the metropolises and the indigenous producers. And putting into consideration the way colonialism transforms itself into neo-colonialism, the economic and/or trade links between the newly independent countries and the outside world should be diversified thus ruling out the possibilities whereby any metropolitan

country could use its monopoly to strangle the economy of the new countries. Again this is no easy task. It calls for the stepping up of nationalist and revolutionary vigilance and militance against any form of a come-back by the former colonial powers or their allies. Thus all the people in the newly independent countries should be made aware of the fact that they are one class versus imperialism.

PART II

COLONIALISM, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND LABOR

In this section attempts will be made to delineate the impact of European contact with, and systematic integration of, the African economy into the World Capitalist System which began at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Important to our study is the fact that Europe and Africa confronted each other in respective stages of development and undevelopment;* and whether one likes it or not, there is no doubt that in their contact, the apparatus of European culture was infinitely superior to that of Africa which it was able to subjugate and subordinate to its will (Brett, 1973).

Its control over the scientific revolution and its products in the field of warfare, administration, and economic production enabled it to "discover" the world beyond its own, to conquer this and divide it up between the leading European nations (ibid.: vii).

Thus through its superiority, Europe was able to subjugate Africa, establish and dictate the terms and conditions of the unequal relationship between the two. The above process was quickly regularized through the creation of the colonial system, "which rapidly transformed the undevelopment of African society into the underdevelopment of

*Undevelopment here and as defined by Europeans refers to the lack of African progress in the techniques required to sustain an advanced materialistic culture (Brett, 1973: vii).

colonial society" (ibid.). This process led to certain developments and implications, among them:

- (i) The creation of export oriented and foreign dominated economies and systems,
- (ii) The destruction or modification of existing traditional social structures and replacing them with those that were neither purely European nor African,
- (iii) The emergence of new social forces in traditional society whose interests could be expected to conflict on many levels with those of both the colonial and traditional elites--the basis of conflict and change in African society, and
- (iv) The modification or replacement of existing political authorities with those that would accept their subordination and service to the foreign occupying power.

Of particular interest to us is an examination of the relationship between Center and Periphery, especially the total process of change in the structure of production in Africa and how these were dictated upon by the dominant institutions of the metropolis.

This study uses the Tanzanian historical case as the empirical basis for the examination of the said connection between Center and Colony from the latter half of the nineteenth century and the impact of such development. Of crucial significance here will be the examination of the impact of capitalist penetration and integration of the Tanzanian economy and society and specifically the resulting social formations--and especially the emergence, differentiation, and organization of the labouring class(es) and the resulting relations of

production and how these were to lead to the various class conflicts. Special attention will be paid to the class struggle that erupted with the promulgation of "Mwougozo" in 1971 which we shall deal with exhaustively in Part III.

CHAPTER III

COLONIALISM, SOCIAL FORMATIONS AND CLASS STRUCTURE: THE TANZANIAN EXPERIENCE

I. PRE-COLONIAL MODES OF PRODUCTION

In order to clearly demonstrate the impact of imperialism in the form of colonial and neo-colonial penetration and integration of the Tanzanian economy and society into the World Capitalist System, one has first to cast a glance at the socio-economic and political structure of pre-colonial Tanzania. Several studies to this effect have been done ranging from purely anthropological works contained in the British Colonial Archives (Notes and Records), to oral descriptions such as those edited by Roberts (1968), to liberal ones (Kimambo and Temu, 1970) and to radical and seemingly Marxist ones such as those by Rweyemamu (1973) and Nyerere (1966). It is Rweyemamu's work, based on Marx's Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations' (Cohen J., 1965) however, which is of direct interest to us and which we intend to quote at great length.

In his work, Rweyemamu (op. cit.: 4-8) clearly points out that pre-colonial Tanzania was composed of predominantly scattered communities of independent producers clustered in social-cultural groupings known as tribes, of which the dominant productive system was the village. Village organization was based on mutual relationships which were in turn based on the right and obligation to work on land. Land

was the only productive asset and "ownership" was based on its use or development. The system of land tenure was thus composed of "clusters" of rights over land and its production and was universally characterized by (ibid.: 4-5):

- (a) The right of every individual to the productive use of some land in virtue of his citizenship in a given social-cultural group,
- (b) The overlapping of right in land and its products among individuals and groups which manifest itself in
- (c) Rigid prohibition against individual alienations of land over which a person had specific but never absolute rights.

All independent peasant producers were equal, there were no classes. The peasants were self-sustaining and there was no wage labor which is the basis for exploitation and misery on one hand, and capital accumulation on the other. Technology was very low and rudimentary and this accounted for the low level of surplus which also sustained a weak political system. The purpose of work was not the creation of value but the maintenance of the owner and his family as well as his immediate community as a whole. As such, there was no market for labor. Production was based on the principles of use-value and not exchange-value. Market exchanges, if at all any, were peripheral and as such, exchange was not the basis upon which individuals got the bulk of their means of subsistence. Land was organized and distributed on kinship relationships based on certain cultural values and norms. The material level of life was very low due to the low level of technology and social organization which failed to inspire creativity and technical change.

Also co-existing side by side with the dominant village community mode of production were other forms as follows (ibid.: 7-8):

1. Pastoralism - found in the drier areas of the country, which also necessitated constant movements in search for grass and water.
2. Banana* cultures of present day West Lak, Kilimanjaro and Usambara regions where a more settled, perennial culture emerged, leading to social differentiation based on land holding. In areas like Bukoba this had developed into a systematic feudal organization of land and mode of production known as the "Nyarubanja"* system. Intensive and often irrigated settlements in areas with population pressures such as Ukerewe, an island on Lake Victoria, also existed under the above mode of production.
3. Artisans and traders engaged in regional trade in grains, fish, livestock, axes, spears, knives, etc. Amongst some tribes such as the Yao and Wanyamwezi, there had developed some long distance trade in iron products (hoe blades, knife blades, axeheads, spearheads, anklets, bracelets) salt, and later in the nineteenth century, ivory (Gray and Birmingham, 1970).

II. EARLY CONTACTS - THE ARABS

Like any other part of East Africa, Tanzania's contacts with the outside world were first with Southern Arabia, which are said to have started as early as the first century A.D. (Ingham, 1965: 1).

*See Footnote on page 101.

The first account of these contacts are given in the Periplus of the Erythrean Sea (a guide to the commerce of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean) written in the second half of the first century A.D. probably by a Greek trader of the Roman Empire living in Egypt. Similar accounts are contained in Al Masud's book, "The Meadows of Gold and Mines of Gems" finished in A.D. 947, and the works of a twentieth-century Arab geographer under the name of Al Idrisi (ibid.: 1). All these talk of the establishment of trading links and posts on the Eastern coast of Africa as far south as Kilwa in Tanzania which were visited by Arab sailors and traders interested in the slave and ivory trade in the Eastern African hinterland.

These contacts were however scanty, mainly on individual basis and depending on seasonal variations. Friedland (Diamond and Burke, 1966: 244) notes that it was only after Mohammed's death that the desire to spread Islam led to the introduction of significant establishments along the coast. The establishment of Shiraz state, stemming from Persia is said to have been founded in the tenth century A.D. with its headquarters at Kilwa (Ingham, op. cit.: 2). The early establishments were mainly coastal trading settlements whose impact on the interior was very slight.

Apart from the Arabs and Persians, other people said to have visited the area include the Portuguese, following Vasco da Gama's voyage to India after 1497, and earlier on the Chinese who made two expeditions--one between 1414 and 1419 and the other between 1421 and 1422--which visited Malindi and Mogadishu and later on some parts of the coast of Tanzania notably Zanzibar and Kilwa (ibid.: 5).

Although control of the coast was claimed by the Sheikhs of

Oman, this was on very small scale and based on individual houses or families who held certain towns or trading posts. It was not until the nineteenth century that Arab domination of the Eastern coast of Africa became increasingly significant. In 1840, the court of Seyyid Said, ruler of Oman, was moved to Zanzibar mainly due to anticipated and partly calculated economic potential of the African mainland.

Said was concerned with controlling the trade between East Africa and the rest of the world by collecting duties through control of the ports and entrepots along the coast and by trading into the interior as an entrepreneur in his own right (Diamond and Burke, op. cit.: 244).

According to Friedland (ibid) Said proceeded to develop the economy of the area through the following three policies:

1. Increasing the volume of exports from the East African mainland--ivory, slaves, copra, palm oil etc.;
2. Exploiting Zanzibar itself through the large-scale planting of cloves; finally
3. Opening new markets for the products of his territories by welcoming European and American traders who were beginning to enter the area.

To tap the trade in the interior, trading caravan routes were established from the coast to the hinterland. There was one between Bagamoyo and Tabora. Another one was established via Mpwapwa, Tabora to Ujiji and was to be the source of ivory beyond Lake Tanganyika. Yet another one was established via Kilwa to sources of slaves in the Lake Nyasa area. Caravans paid tribute (hongo) to chiefs/ headmen for their goodwill and protection. Arab trading posts and settlements were also established along the caravan routes, notable at Tabora, Mpwapwa, Ujiji, Bagamoyo and Kilwa (ibid.: 245).

While Zanzibar's control of the coastal ports was clear (although the degree of this control varied from place to place), control inland was very thin and tenuous and very much depended upon the good will of the local rulers. This was partly due to the lack of personnel and other resources to enable the Sultan of Zanzibar to effectively occupy and control the vast hinterland, and partly due to resistance meted to his authority by militarily able African leaders such as Mirambo in Tabora. As such, Zanzibar's suzerainty was restricted to trading posts in the interior and coastal settlements.

Such then was the situation until the second half of the nineteenth century when European powers began to have an interest in, and which was to lead to European acquisition and subsequent colonization of the area.

III. EUROPEAN COLONIZATION - THE GERMANS AND BRITISH

Any study on Tanzania's colonial history has to start with a consideration of the following basic facts which definitely influenced the policies pursued by both the German (1884-1918) and the British (1919-1961) colonial administrations:

1. Apart from a brief period (1884-1918) when Germany was the occupying power, the country was under British Colonial administration (1919-1961) throughout her history.
2. Tanzania's colonial history should always be studied in its British East African context of which Kenya was meant to be the center and Tanganyika and Uganda the internal colonies or peripheries in the Periphery.
3. Unlike Kenya, and to a lesser extent Uganda, Tanganyika

was not endowed with the good climatic conditions which could attract European planter farming and settlement. The good highlands that were there were scattered around the country in areas too remote from Dar es Salaam, the capital, while the infrastructure was also poorly developed.

4. Apart from sisal, most of the cash crops (coffee, cotton, maize, etc.) grown in the country could be cheaply produced on small holder peasant basis.
5. Much more important however is the fact that Britain assumed administrative responsibility of this country from the League of Nations at a time when her economic and military might were precariously declining and as such could afford neither the money nor the men for any expensive colonial administrative apparatus and military subjugation of the indigenous political authorities at will. She had to woo them into accepting foreign subordination through extending and accepting their political control and suzerainty.
6. Tied to the last three points is also the fact that the first two British governors, Sir Horace Byatt and Sir Donald Cameron both came with experiences of areas dominated by African peasant production (Somaliland and Nigeria respectively). Cameron had also been influenced by the Indirect Rule paternalism of Lugard and Clifford.

All the above factors definitely influenced the choice of the colonial strategy to be adopted for Tanzania. It is to this process that we shall now turn.

At this point, suffice it also to point out that to both the

Germans and the British, the colonies were seen as suppliers of raw materials and markets for their manufactured goods. This necessitated certain policy measures to facilitate the whole process. First was the establishment or imposition of a political administrative machinery to oversee the exploitation of the country. Secondly was the introduction of cash crop production (both peasant and plantation) to supply the industries of the colonial "mother" country. Third was the establishment of Import and Export houses to conduct and regulate commerce and trade. Fourth was the institution of communication and transport networks to tap the resources from the producing interior of the country. All the above developments led to a fifth development, and that was the need for a labor supply to help in extracting or manning the transportation and shipping of the various goods. All in all, one could rightly point out that systematic European colonization of Tanzania was characterized by the following elements (Rweyemamu, op. cit.: 12):

- (a) the establishment of the plantation system,
- (b) the introduction of the metropolitan-oriented cash crops to the African peasantry, with the consequent class formations resulting there from,
- (c) the institution of the financial and other infrastructure which was to serve the production structure thus introduced, and
- (d) the establishment of the basic institutions of foreign trade with the metropolis.

All these had certain social, political and economic impact on the traditional pre-colonial socio-economic and political structures-- i.e. the peripherization and external orientation of these economies and the destruction and replacement or substitution of the social-political fabric upon which these societies were formed and organized.

The impact of, and reaction to, colonialism, however, varied

from area to area and individual to individual. Some societies that were naturally endowed, for instance, advanced in terms of wealth, and western education much more quickly than others. As a result, Tanzanian societies were differentiated. And on this, John Iliffe (Kimambo and Temu, 1970: 125) continues to point out that:

Further within a single society some individuals had better opportunities and more ambition than others. They lived closer to a school or their parents were already educated and could teach them. Their relations held political power as chiefs or headmen, and could use this power to obtain further privileges. They cultivated the most fertile land or could acquire it.

This tended to widen and deepen the pre-colonial social divisions, a thing that was however always obscured by the fact that everyone was under colonial rule.

That much said, we now turn to the specific policies and measures taken by both the Germans and British colonial administrations to find out their impact on the pre-colonial social formations and class structure. Specific areas singled out for our study include the fields of Administration, Education, Agriculture and Mining, Commerce and Industry, and Communications and Transport.

We shall however start with a brief history on the acquisition and occupancy of the country by the Germans and the subsequent British take over. On this we shall very much depend on historical works done in that direction, notable amongst them those by Townsend (1921); Harlow, Chilver and Smith (1965); Ingham (1965); Iliffe (1969); Kimambo and Temu (eds.) (1970); and Brett (1973).

A. German Acquisition and British Takeover: A Historical Note

By the middle of the nineteenth century certain European countries were becoming highly industrialized. They all needed additional

raw materials for their industries and new markets for their manufactured goods.

In Germany, Bismarck's early reluctance to found colonies was giving way to active participation in the scramble and subsequent partition of Africa. Germany had to have a share in the spoils of the European scramble of the "Dark Continent." Within Germany itself, certain specific developments were taking place. Notable among them was the formation of the German Colonial Union (Deutscher Kolonialverein) and the Society for German Colonization (Gesellschaft für deutsche Kolonialisatiön) in the 1880's (Harlow, Chilver and Smith op. cit.: 124). The former was mainly a propaganda society while the latter aimed at founding a colony; and for that purpose it in September 1884 sent an expedition under Carl Peters to East Africa. Once in Tanganyika, Peters signed several treaties with African chiefs--notable among them Chief Mhngungo of Msowero in Kilosa.

When Carl Peters went back to Germany in February 1885, the Society for Germany Colonization received a charter from Bismarck in respect to its acquired possession--an area estimated at some 60,000 square miles. The charter declared that certain areas lying west of the possession of the Sultan of Zanzibar and not under the authority of any other state were placed under the German Imperial protection. To Bismarck, imperial protection was defined as follows:

The German Empire cannot carry on a system of colonization like France's. It cannot send out warships to conquer overseas lands, that is, it will not take the initiative; but it will protect the German merchant even in the land which he acquires. Germany will do what England has always done--establish chartered companies so that responsibility rests with them (Townsend, 1921: 180).

The Society for German Colonization was thus granted sovereign

rights in the territory which it had acquired as well as the actual ownership of land and authority to dispense justice. The only condition imposed upon the society was the obligation to remain a German organization (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 126).

In February 1885, the Society appointed five "directors" to supervise the acquired territory. Immediately these directors formed the German East African Company which was incorporated in 1887-8. The Company was joined by a German banker, Karl von der Heydt in the summer of 1885 and the industrialist Friedrich Kurpp--both becoming shareholders. Others included the Overseas Trading Corporation (Sechandlung), a public corporation.

The Sultan of Zanzibar protested that the acquired lands belonged to him. He sent troops to enforce his claims, but German naval demonstration off the coast of Zanzibar in August 1885 forced him to recognize the rights acquired by the Germans. On December 20, 1885 the Sultan signed a treaty with the Society through which Germany secured privileges at Dar es Salaam and Pangani ports, and also the right to send certain goods duty free through the coastal strip to the interior.

Such was the situation till 1886 when the area was partitioned between Britain and Germany. A line was drawn from the mouth of the "River Umba'or Wanga" to Lake Jipe and from there round the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro to the Victoria Nyanza dividing their spheres of influence (ibid.: 127). In December 1886, Germany and Portugal agreed that the River Ruvuma should demarcate their respective territories.

In the acquired possessions, the Company was acting swiftly and with amazing rapidity. By the end of 1887, it had established ten stations which were both trading posts and plantations. In 1887, the

Company also signed a treaty with Seyyid Bargash who had succeeded Seyyid Said as Sultan of Zanzibar for the recognition of his territories in return for more trading concessions. But since the treaty was not ratified, Bargash soon severed his connection with the Company.

In 1888 however, the German Consul-General at Zanzibar and Seyyid Khalifa (Bargash's successor) agreed that the Company should collect customs dues on the coast, mine minerals, regulate commerce and improve communications.

Some coastal Arabs led by Abushiri in Pangani and some natives led by the Swahili Bwapa Heri "revolted" against German encroachment. The "revolt" was however crushed by the German Captain Herman Wissman in 1889 after Abushiri was betrayed to the Germans. He was publicly hanged in December 1889.

On August 1, 1890 Emin Pasha signed a treaty with local Arabs in Tabora and later on his lieutenant Langheld established stations at Mwanza and Bukoba both on Lake Victoria.

The acquisition of the coast, the settlement of spheres of influence and the suppression of the Arab revolt paved way for an agreement between the Reich and the Company on the future organization of the colony. Throughout all these years, it was also becoming apparent that the attempts to rule the colony through the Company were doomed to failure. The Reich now accepted the responsibility for the future administration of the colony, and on November 20, 1890 the Company relinquished its administrative functions and passed them to the Reich thereby becoming a purely commercial institution (ibid.: 131-132). The Company soon paid compensation to the Sultan of Zanzibar for renouncing his sovereignty over the coast and it agreed to maintain

the colony's harbors. The Company was in turn authorized to raise loans and to receive at least 600,000 marks a year from the customs revenue to provide for interest and amortization (ibid.: 312).

B. Specific Policy Measures and Their Impact on Pre-Colonial Social Formations and Class Structure

1. Administration

On taking over the administration of the German East Africa (Tanganyika) in 1890 the Imperial government was already declining economically and as such could afford neither the military nor an experienced administrative personnel to rule the country. Secondly, the Germans had to deal with the already predominant Arab influence and established administrative structures, especially on the coast. Thirdly, the Germans had also to deal with African resistance to their occupation of the country. Elsewhere Gwassa, has clearly pointed out and demonstrated that European Colonization was not always as easy as has often been believed, (Kimambo and Temu, op. cit.: 85-122). Between 1888 and 1906 for instance, the Germans had to fight at least six major battles or resistances as Table 2 indicates. All of these factors influenced the administrative structures adopted by the German government for her East African protectorate.

Central Administration:

1. The German Imperial Chancellor was originally responsible for the administration of all German Protectorates, but in 1907 the Colonial office was separated from the Foreign office and made an independent department or ministry.

2. The Head of the local Government was the Governor who was assisted by a council which met twice a year at Dar es Salaam. It's

Table 2. Response to German Control in Tanzania: 1888 to 1906

Year	Event
1888	Arab revolt at Pangani against German East African Company. Ignites Bushiri rebellion from Pangani to Kilwa. Revolt put down by Imperial German force led by von Wissman October, 1889.
1889-94	Siki, Chief of Unyamwezi, expresses hostility to Germans in 1889. Closes caravan routes at Tabora in 1892. His son attacks German forces. Defeated by Germans and Tabora occupied in 1894.
1890	Gogo raid in Tabora area. Punitive expeditions sent out to put an end to raids.
1890	Kalembera, Chief of Usambara, attacks Stilmann's passage in 1890. German troops destroy two homes and 163 Africans killed and wounded.
1890-8.	Ngoni rebellion at Unyanyembe and Urambo. Not subdued until 1897-8.
1891	Sinna of Kibosho tears down German flag. Subdued by Wissman.
1891-8	Mkwawa rebellion destroyed Zelweski's column in 1891. Seriously defeated in 1894 but harassed by Germans until he committed suicide in 1898.
1892	Meli, successor of Mandara as paramount chief of Chagga collides with Germans and kills Baron von Bulow. Punitive expeditions sent to re-establish slave trade. Captured in a punitive expedition.
1895	Machembo, Yao chief southwest of Lindi, refuses to pay hut tax. Persists until 1899 when a punitive expedition imprisons his followers and he flees to Portuguese territory.
1905-6	Maji Maji resistance war. Begins on cotton plantation and spreads throughout south-east region. Suppressed at an estimated cost of 120,000 lives.

Source: J.P. Moffet (ed.), Handbook of Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam, Government Printer, 1958), pp. 56-9, 63, 65, 66; Richard Reusch, History of East Africa (New York, Frederick Ungar, 1961), pp. 310, 315, 316, 332-6; Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew (eds.), History of East Africa op cit., pp. 442, 443, 446.

Adopted from Rweyemamu, J.F., Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania, Oxford University Press 1973, p. 13.

function was advisory. The first Governor was Julius von Soden who was appointed in 1891. He was succeeded by Schele in 1893 who was in turn succeeded by General von Wismann in January 1895. He left the country a year later and his place was taken over by Colonel Edward von Liebert (1896-1901) who was himself succeeded by Count Adolf von Gotzen (1901-1906).

The Governor's duties included the enforcement of laws (Gasetze), imperial edicts (verordungen). The Governor was also in charge of defence forces and had powers to make local decrees. If the post of Governor and Commander in Chief of the Defence forces were held by two different persons it was the Governor who decided to deploy or use the troops.

3. The Civil Administration at Dar es Salaam was divided into different departments including Finance, Surveying and Agriculture, Justice, Medical, Public Works, Railways, Defence, Postal and Telegraph, etc. Apart from the Postal and Telegraph department, which did not fall under his direct jurisdiction, the Governor was the supreme civil and military authority, although from 1906 onwards, the Protectorate troops were placed under a separate commander, Major (later on Major-General) von Lettow-Vorbeck. Each of the above mentioned departments was under a Departmental head directly responsible to the Governor. The various departmental heads were also assisted by a few technical and professional experts, almost all of them Germans.

4. For the purposes of Administration, the Protectorate was divided into 24 districts. Of these 19 were civil districts, 2 (Mahenge and Iringa) military districts and 3 (Ruanda, Burundi and Bukoba) residencies. The District Commissioners (Bezirksamtmaner)

were responsible for the collection of taxes, appointed and dismissed local chiefs and German agents and were also in charge of district police and a military detachment. Since they were also responsible for the maintenance of peace and good order in their districts, they also administered justice and punishment; though only colored people could be dealt with in their courts* (Gwassa, op. cit.: 103).

In 1914, the Germans had an administrative staff of 79 Europeans to fill in the senior departmental and district administrative positions. Few Africans and Asians (mainly of Indian origin) assisted them as clerks, bookkeepers, messengers, interpreters, nursing orderlies and combat soldiers.

In the interior, German authority was generally established in these stages (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 134-135) as follows:

- (1) In a number of areas treaties had been signed with local chiefs and German influence depended upon the extent to which the chiefs fulfilled their obligation. Punitive expeditions were sent against recalcitrant chiefs.
- (2) The establishment of military posts on caravan routes, at centers of maritime trade, at places from which European merchants and missionaries already exercised some influence and at the headquarters of agents of the Sultan of Zanzibar or of local chiefs.
- (3) The third stage in the evolution of colonial administration was for the military government to be replaced by that of civilian district officers who exercised both executive and judicial functions. A number of senior civilian officials had formerly served in the Defense Forces.

Native Administration:

The system of Native Administration adopted by the Germans differed from area to area as shown below (ibid.: 174-179):

*For the maintenance of justice among Europeans, there were five High Courts at Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Moshi, Mwanza and, Tabora with a Supreme Court at Dar es Salaam. The Judges on hearing cases were assisted by four European assessors.

1. On the Coast: On taking over the country, the Germans adopted the existing system of administration introduced by the Sultan of Zanzibar in the 1840's and 1850's. The system was based on Walis (governors or magistrates) who helped the Sultan in administering the coastal towns and Akidas in the countryside. Besides the Walis and Akidas the outlines of an indigenous administration centering around Jumbes can be made out.

The Akidas were paid (usually Arab or Swahili) officials, each of whom had magisterial jurisdiction over the indigenous residents including powers to inflict corporal punishments; they were responsible for the collection of taxes in his area of jurisdiction, perhaps 100 villages (Great Britain, Colonial Office 1921: 31).

Below the Akidas were village headmen known as Jumbes. These were in most cases hereditary and unpaid. Several jumbes were placed under the supervision of one Akida. If the Jumbe was an influential man, he was directly responsible to the District Commissioner and was given the same magisterial jurisdiction over his village as an Akida: otherwise he was subordinate to the Akida. The Jumbe's duties consisted mainly in recruiting labor for the Government or European travellers (ibid). The Jumbes proved their worth by rendering valuable services to the administration. From 1895 onwards, for instance, they assisted in the distribution of seeds for the various cash crops and in instructing their subjects to plant a required portion of their fields with cash crops. In return, the German authorities confirmed the Jumbes in their positions (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 175).

However, the Jumbes were subject to dignitaries called "muini" or "pazi" or "diwani" who claimed wider powers than the Jumbes and

flaunted more conspicuous signs of office.

In the coastal towns were also Liwalis or Arab governors who as a rule were nothing more than superior Akidas.

2. The Coastal Hinterland: Originally, this area did not possess Akidas. Following the economic development of the area instigated by both the Arabs and later the Germans, a lot of people from other tribes went into the area. However, the local chiefs were not powerful enough to control the influx and to handle the local labor supply. Due to the above reasons, in Tanga District, as well as in Usambara, Morogoro - Kilosa and later on other coastal districts (with the exception of Pangani and some parts of Bagamoyo) Akidas were appointed. In some areas such as Uzigua, the hereditary chiefs however continued to hold sway.

At this point it is imperative to also point out that Akidas were usually imposed on a people. They were not hereditary and had no local kinship ties. At first Arabs were appointed, and later on Swahili school leavers trained as clerks. Being alien and only versed in Moslem traditions and values, they often overlooked the peoples' traditional values, beliefs and norms. This was often the basis of conflict and antagonisms from the grass roots. Akidas were also often accused of the extortion and the embezzlement of tax money which they also collected through very ruthless means.

3. Large Tribal Interior and Lake Bantu Kingdoms: In the region of large tribes of the interior (Sukuma, Nyamwezi, Hehe, Ngoni, Chagga, Gogo, Nyaturu) and around the plateau between Lake Victoria and Tanganyika (Haya, Ha, Subi) traditional tribal chiefs functions were accepted by the Germans or formally recognized. Akida appointments

were exceptional and temporary. Chiefs were placed in a position to call on tribal labor regularly on their own behalf and were also given powers to call statutory labor for government work. Like Jumbes, the chiefs were also employed to collect taxes, and to make their cooperation more palatable were given a share amounting to five percent of the amount collected. This in a way made them ruthless in collecting the taxes, a thing that tended to more or less undermine the people's confidence and trust in them as their legitimate and paternalistic traditional leaders. Chiefs also supported the Government in the introduction of cash crops, and in this way reflected excellent calculations. In the process they used their position to get more lands. Supported by tradition and by the Germans for instance, the Haya chiefs obtained most of the profits from coffee production by using the quasi-feudal system of Nyarubanja* (similar to the Mailo system in Buganda) to their advantage as well as that of their relatives or favorites. In Moshi, the Germans had also permitted the Chagga chiefs to distribute Clan lands (vihamba) a process they also used to their advantage. Chief Marealle for instance is said to have grown as many as 1,000 coffee trees in 1909 (Rweyemamu, op. cit.: 29-30).

*A "Nyarubanja" was a manor, and the conditions on which it was held bore the remarkable resemblance to those of manorial tenure in Medieval Europe. A Nyarubanja was granted by the chief either to his relative, or other persons for services rendered. It usually formed an entire village by itself, and consisted of the demesne of the landlord and the holding of tenants, who paid the landlord as rent a fixed proportion of their produce. Formerly the resemblance to manorial tenure was even closer, as the tenants were obliged to work without pay on the landlord's demesne, and were forbidden to leave their holdings. Those extra oppressive conditions were abolished by the British government in the 1920's. The system was abolished altogether by the Tanu government in 1969.

In the middle of the 1890's some military commanders had also placed considerable heads of cattle (obtained as taxes or looted during punitive expeditions) with friendly chiefs.

The chiefs also made use of the Pax-Germanica to build up their ritual functions; they were for instance encouraged by the administration to lead their tribes in the rites marking the phases of the agricultural calendar, a process they used to bolster their claims and privileges.

All these developments made it possible for the chiefs as well as their relatives and favorites to constitute themselves into a privileged class exploiting their peasant subjects.

Such then was the situation till the British took over the administration of the country after World War I. The British administration started with the occupancy of some areas at the start of the war, notably in 1916 placing them under Political Officers. Following the signing of the Treaty of Peace with Germany at Versailles on June 28, 1919 with Principle Allied and Associated powers, Tanganyika became a mandate territory under the League of Nations and Britain assumed de jure control of the mandate, which it continued to do even after World War II when the country became a Trusteeship territory under the United Nations.

On July 22, 1920, the British monarch issued an Order-in-Council known as the Tanganyika Order-in-Council which was read and proclaimed in Dar es Salaam on September 25, 1920. It constituted the Office of the Governor and Commander-in-Chief for the territory. Sir Horace Byatt took over as the first Governor immediately after that.

Central Administration

On taking over the country, the British decided not to effect any radical change in the administration of the country. They opted for the modification of the German system to make it more efficient.

1. At the Head of the local government was the Governor who administered the territory assisted by an Executive Council consisting of a specified number of official and unofficial members. Together with the Legislative Council, established in 1926, the Governor made the country's laws, the Legislative Council's functions being mere advisory.

2. The Civil Administration at Dar es Salaam was divided into various departments each under a Departmental Director and later on a Minister who coordinated and supervised departmental activities. The various directors or ministers were directly responsible to the Governor who was in turn responsible to the Colonial Office in London. The structure of Government was as shown in Table 3.

3. For the purposes of administration the British on taking over, adopted the 22 districts from the Germans. By 1925 however, they had grouped these into 11 Provinces and later on (1933) only 8 as shown on the following Table 4.

4. Each Province was under the coordination and supervision of an Administrative Officer styled Provincial Commissioner, who was responsible to the Governor for the administration of his Province. These officers had a staff of assistants, and provinces were usually divided into districts under the coordination and supervision of an administrative officer styled District Commissioner who was responsible directly to the Provincial Commissioner.

Table 3. Structure of Government

The Governor

I. Chief Justice

Administration of Justice (in other than Local Courts)

II. Members of the Council of Ministers

Chief Secretary

Leader for Government in Legislative Council
 Constitutional Affairs
 Trusteeship Council Affairs
 Other External Affairs
 General control of Civil Service (including Provincial
 Administration)
 Public Relations
 Broadcasting
 Printing and Stationery
 Ceremonial

Attorney General

Legislation
 Legal matters
 Administrator-General

Minister for Finance

Financial Policy
 Economic Policy
 Statistics
 Economic Research
 Accounting
 Financial Control
 Estimates
 Taxation and other Revenue
 Income Tax
 Customs and Excise (H.C.)*
 Land Bank
 Development Planning
 C.D. & W. Loans
 Exchange Control
 Post Office Savings Bank
 Economic Relations
 Foreign Aid
 E.A.H.C. Finance

Table 3. (Continued)

 Minister for Natural Resources

Agriculture
 Fisheries
 Veterinary Services
 Tsetse Control
 Forests
 Water Development and Irrigation
 Game
 National Parks

Minister for Education and Labour

Education
 Labour
 Antiquities
 Cinematography
 Film Censorship
 Missions
 Religious Affairs
 Museums
 Languages Board
 British Council
 I.L.O.
 E.A. Literature Bureau
 U.N.E.S.C.O.

Minister for Security and Immigration

Police
 Defence
 Prisons
 Immigration
 Registrar of Societies
 Nationality and Naturalization matters
 Refugees

Minister for Provincial Affairs

Provincial Administration
 District Councils
 Native Authorities
 Local Courts
 Sociology
 Maintenance of Distressed and Destitute Persons

Minister for Health

Health
 Hospital Services

Table 3. (Continued)

Government Chemist W.H.O.
Minister for Lands and Surveys
Lands
Surveys
Land Tenure
Minister for Mines and Commerce
Commerce and Industry.
Mines
Geological Survey
Trade Licensing
Development of Secondary Industries
Tourism and Hotels
Weights and Measures
Price Control
African Productivity and Local Development Funds
Transport Licensing
E.A. Office
E.A. House
E.A. Industrial Council
Civil Aviation (H.C.)*
Posts and Telecommunications (H.C.)*
Railways (H.C.)*
External Trade Relations
Minister for Social and Co-operative Development
Social Development
Co-operative Development
Approved Schools
Probation Service
Minister for Urban Local Government and Works
Public Works
Town Planning
Urban Local Government
African Housing
Buildings
Urban Water Supplies
Sewerage and Drainage
Electricity
Ferries
Aerodromes
Traffic
Township and Aerodrome Fire Services

-Table 3. (Continued)

III. Executive Council

Source: Greta Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1959, Appendix II.

*H.C. indicates an East African High Commission service.

Table 4. Tanganyika Provinces in 1933

Province	Constituting Districts	Area in Sq. Mile	Population	Provincial Headquarters
Lake	Mwanza, Maswa, Musoma, Kwimba, Biharamulo Bukoba and Shinyanga	40,040	1,390,609	Mwanza
Western	Tabora, Kahama, Nzega, Kigoma, Ufipa	85,075	679,692	Tabora
Iringa	Iringa, Njombe, Rungwe and Mbeya	41,450	491,911	Iringa
Lindi	Lindi, Mikindani, Kilwa Masasi, Tunduru, Newala Songea	55,308	543,413	Lindi
Eastern	Dar es Salaam, Rufiji, Bagamoyo, Morogoro, Kilosa, Mahenge	42,890	619,191	Dar es Salaam
Central	Dondoma, Singida, Kondoa, Mayoni, Mkalama	38,770	579,712	Dodoma
Tanga	Tanga, Usambara, Pangani, Handeni, Pare	13,863	355,914	Tanga
Northern	Arusha, Masai, Mbulu, Moshi	33,770	344,198	Arusha

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report for Tanganyika for 1933, p. 10.

All the above positions required an establishment staff to fill them and by 1958, the total establishment of the civil service had grown to 32,212 compared with 27,846 in 1957 and 26,962 in 1956 (Grt. Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika, 1958: 32). Of the 32,212 civil servants, 24,606 were locally domiciled persons, mostly Africans, while 3,356 were overseas officers (Europeans--mainly from the United Kingdom and British Dominions; Asians from India, Pakistan and Gao; also a small number of Seychellor's, Mauritians and Camorians and a few handful of Africans from South Africa). It was mainly the Europeans who occupied the top positions and hence the highest salaries in the administrative structure. They were followed by Asjans and other colored peoples while the Africans usually occupied the lowest positions and hence the lowest pay in the structure as Tables 5 and 6 on the following pages indicate respectively.

By 1958/1959 recruitment to junior levels of the civil service was from young people completing their education at local schools with the Cambridge Overseas Certificate or with Territorial Standard Ten Certificate. Candidates with lower qualifications obtained entry into the Civil Service in the non-pensionable grades on gratuity terms; and would by application to their duties and success in prescribed examinations be promoted to the permanent and pensionable services. Upon entry, these were usually expected to go through departmental training courses. Higher posts were filled by those who had taken courses abroad notably the United Kingdom. The University College at Makerere, the Royal Technical College Nairobi, and the Engineering School at Kampala, were aimed at providing a number of candidates for higher levels and professional and technical personnel.

Table 5. Administrative Structure of Government - Departmental Establishment 1958/59

Table showing by Departments of the Territorial Administration the positions (both principal and subordinate but exclusive of employees on temporary and Works Staff terms and on daily rates of pay) for which provision was made for the financial year 1958/59 and the number of such positions held as at 31st December, 1958, showing the domicile, race and sex of the officers concerned.

Notes:

(1) In most cases the salaries of the posts shown below are on incremental scales, particulars of which are given in Appendix II C. Fixed salaries and the super-scales are quoted in £ per annum.

(2) Staff is not normally allocated to a specific administrative region and is liable to transfer to any station in the territory.

(3) Column (h) in the table represents the total of all overseas officers (i.e. the total of columns (e), (f) and (g)). "Others" in column (g) include Seychellois, Mauritians, Comorians, Africans from South Africa, etc., who retain their overseas domicile.

(4) Column (l) represents the total of all locally domiciled officers (i.e. the total of columns (i), (j), and (k)). "Others" in column (k) include locally domiciled Arabs, Seychellois, Mauritians, Comorians, Somalis, persons of mixed race, etc.

(5) Column (m) gives the total number of officers serving as at 31st December, 1958 (i.e. the total of columns (h) and (l)).

- (6) Column (e) = Asian
 Column (f) = European
 Column (g) = Other
 Column (i) = African
 Column (j) = European
 Column (k) = Asian and other

Table 5. Administrative Structure of Government - Departmental Establishment 1958/59

Department	Designation	Salary or Salary Scale	Establishment 1958/59	Officers in Post as at 31st December, 1958										
				Overseas Officers				Locally Domiciled Officers						
				(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)		
Governor	Governor	5,500 plus 2,500 duty allowance fixed	1		1		1							1
	Private Secretary (Sec. from Prov. Adm.)	"A"	1		1		1							1
	Asst. Secretary and Aid de Camp	850	1		1		1							1
	Housekeeper	C(W)5	1		1		1							1
	Personal Secretary	C(W) 6-5	1		1		1							1
	Clerk U.D.	E2-1	1					1				1		1
	Driver/Mechanic	E3	1					1				1		1
	Motor Drivers	E6-4	5					5				5		5
	Head Gardener	E4-3	1											1
	Sub. Staff		63					61				61		63
Judiciary	Chief Justice	3,500	1		1		1							1
	Judges	2,900	5		4		4							4
	Registrar	2,300	1		1		1							1
	Deputy Registrar	"A"	1		1		1							1
	Senior Resident Magistrates	2,000 x 70--												
	Resident Magistrate	2,140	4		4		4							4
	Reporters	"A"	28		25		25							25
	Section Officers	C(W)5-4	5		4		4							4
	Personal Secretaries	C6-4	3		3		3							3
	Chief Clerks	C6-5	3		2		2							2
	Clerks U.D.	E2-1	7		7		7							7
	Clerks G.D./S.S.	E6-3/S2-1	29		24		24		2		1	3	3	27
	Caretaker	E2-1	75		4		4		59			59		63
	High Court Interpreter	E4-3	1											1
	Telephone Operator	E6-5	3					3				3		3
	Sub. Staff		1					1				1		1
			58					58				38		58
Legislative Council	Speaker	1,500	1		1		1							1
	Clerk of Legco.	1,656	1		1		1							1
	Clerk-Assistant of Council	B5-3	1		1		1							1
	Personal Secretary	C(W)6-5	1		1		1							1
	Clerk U.D.	E2-1	1					1				1		1
	Sub. Staff		2					2				2		2
Audit	Director	2,700	1		1		1							1
	Deputy Director	2,300	1		1		1							1
	Principal Auditors	2,000 x 70--												
	Senior Auditors	2,410	3		2		2							2
	Auditors and Asst. Auditors	"B1"	5		5		5							5
	Sten. Personal Secretary	B5-2	10		1		6		7					7
	Chief Examiner of Accounts	C(W)6-5	1		1		1		1					1
	Senior Examiner of Accounts	C5-3	1		1		1		1					1
	Examiner of Accounts	C5-4	2		2		2		2					2
	Clerk U.D.	C6-5	8		8		8		8					8
	Clerk G.D./S.S.	E2-1	11		10		10		10		1			11
	Sub. Staff	E6-3/S2-1	27		11		11		11		6	1		18
			7					7				7		7

Table 5. (Continued)

Department	Designation	Salary or Salary Scale	Establishment 1958/59	Officers in Post as at 31st December, 1958										
				Overseas Officers					Locally Domiciled Officers					
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)		
Public Service Commission	Chairman	3,100	1		1							1		
	Secretary	BS-1	1		1							1		
	Personal Secretary	C(W)6-5	1		1							1		
	Clerk U.D.	E2-1	1					1				1		
	Sub. Staff		1					1				1		
Transport Licensing Authority	Chairman	2,300	1		1							1		
	Deputy Chairman	2,000	1						1			1		
	Member/Secretary	2,000	1		1							1		
	Personal Secretary	C(W)6-5	1		1							1		
	Clerk U.D.	E2-1	1		1							1		
	Clerks G.D./S.S.	E6-3/S2-1	2									1		
	Sub Staff		1						1			1		
Office of the Chief Secretary	Chief Secretary	3,400	1		1							1		
	Minister for Constitutional Affairs	3,100	1		1							1		
	Ministerial Secretary (Adm. Officer Class I)	2,500	1		1							1		
	Principal Asst. Secretaries													
	Adm. Officers Class II A or B	2,300												
	Sec. from Prov. Adm.	2,000 x 70-- 2,140	2		2			2				2		
	Asst. Secretaries (Sec. from Prov. Adm.)	"A" or B(W) 5-2												
	Personal Secretaries	C(W)6-5	4		2		2					2		
	Clerks U.D.	E2-1	2		1		1					1		
	Clerks G.D./S.S.	E6-2/S2-1	1						1			1		
	Telephone Operator	E2-1	1									1		
	Sub. Staff	E4-3	1						1			1		
			69					67			67	67		
Establishment Division	Director of Establishments	2,900												
	Principal Asst. Secretary	2,300												
	Adm. Officer Class II A or B	2,000 x 70-- 2,140	1		1							1		
	Senior Organization Officer	2,000 x 70-- 2,140	1		1		1					1		
	Establishment Officers	B2-1	3		1		2		3			3		
	Organization Officer	B3-1	1		1		1					1		
	Government Employees													
	Welfare Officer	"C2"	1		1		1					1		
	Assistant Establishment Officers	B5-3	4		4		4					4		
	Establishment Assistants	C6-4	9		8		4		8	1		9		
	Stenographers/Personal Secretaries	C6-5/E3-1	7		3		1		4			4		
	Registry Assistant	C6-5	1		1		1		1			1		
	Clerks U.D.	E2-1	10		5		5		5	1		6		
	Clerks G.D./S.S.	E6-3/S2-1	9		2		2		9			9		

Table 5. (Continued)

Department	Designation	Salary or Salary Scale	Establishment 1958/59	Officers in Post as at 31st December, 1958									
				Overseas Officers:			Locally Domiciled Officers						
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	
Passages, Division	Government Passages Agent	C3-2	1		1		1					1	
	Asst. Govt. Passages Agent	C4-3	1	1			1					1	
	Office Assistant	C6-5	1	1			1					1	
	Clerks U.D.	E2-1	9	4			4					4	
	Clerks G.D./S.S.	E6-3/S2-1	7						3		1	4	4
Common Services	Chief Office Superintendent	"C2"	1		1		1					1	
	Office Superintendent (Sec. from Prov. Adm.)	C4-3	1		1		1					1	
	Cypher Officer	C4-3	1										
	Reporters	C(W)5-4	2		1		1					1	
	Junior Accounts Officer	C5-4	1	1			1					1	
	Cypher Assistant	C6-5	1									1	
	Registry Assistant	C6-5	1	1			1					1	
	Office Assistant	C6-5	1	1			1					1	
	Personal Secretaries and Stenographers	C(W)6-5/E3-1	5	1	3		4					4	
	Clerks U.D.	E2-1	9	7			7					7	
Clerks G.D./S.S.	E6-3/S2-1	16	2			2		8			8	10	
Immigration	Prin. Immigration Officer	2,300	1		1		1					1	
	Asst. Immigration Officer	"B1"	1		1		1					1	
	Immigration Officers	B5-2	10		9		9					9	
	Office Superintendent	C4-3	1		1		1					1	
	Stenographer/Personal Secretaries	C(W)6-5	2		2		2					2	
	Clerks U.D.	E2-1	9	7			7					7	
	Clerks G.D./S.S.	E6-3/S2-1	18	5			5		4			4	9
Sub. Staff		10						9			9	9	
Police (including Motorized Companies)	Commissioner	2,900	1		1		1					1	
	Deputy Commissioner	2,500	1		1		1					1	
	Asst. Commissioners	2,000 x 70--											
		2,140	6		6		6					6	
	Civil Secretary												
	Adm. Officer Class II A or B (Sec. from Prov. Adm.)	2,300 or 2,300 x 70--	1		1		1					1	
		2,140											
	Adm. Officer Class III (Sec. from Prov. Adm.)	"A"	1		1		1					1	
	Pathologists (Sec. from Medical)	"A"											
	Sr. Superintendents	"B1"	10		10		10					10	
	Superintendents	"B2"	29	1	28		29					29	
	Treasury Acc. (from Acgen's Dept.)	B5-2	1		1		1					1	
	Registry Suptd.	B(W)5-3	1										
	Asst. Suptd.	B5-3	135	13	114		127		5	1		6	133
	Asst. Suptd. Band Master	B5-3	1		1		1					1	
	Sr. Asst. Engineers	"C2"	2		1		1					1	
	Asst. Engineers, Grade I & II	C4-3 and C5-4		11	3	5		8			1	1	9

Table 5. (Continued)

Department	Designation	Salary or Salary Scale	Establishment 1958/59	Officers in Post as at 31st December, 1958										
				Overseas Officers				Locally Domiciled Officers						
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)		
Police (continued)	Storekeeper	C4-3	1	1		1						1		
	Traffic Officers	C5-3	6	5	5							5		
	Stock Theft Preventive Officers	"p1"	5		2		2					2		
	Stenographers/Personal Secretaries	E3-1 or C6-5	15		9		9					9		
	Office Supervisor	C5-4	1	1			1					1		
	Stores Officer, Grade II	C5-4	1	1			1					1		
	Jr. Acc. Officer	C5-4	1	1			1					1		
	Office Assistant	C6-5	1	1			1					1		
	Accounts Assistant	C6-5	1	1			1					1		
	Arms Registry Asst.	C6-5	1	1			1					1		
	Senior Armourer	C6-5	1							1	1	1		
	Clerks U.D.	E2-1	46	17			17	3				3	20	
	Clerks G.D./S.S.	E6-3/S2-1	77	6			6	31		3	34	40		
	Inspectors	"p3"	65	28			28	37				37	65	
	Sub. Inspectors	"p4"	136	18			18	87		13	100	118		
	Armourer	E4-1	1	1			1						1	
	Asst. Armourers	E6-5	2					2				2	2	
	Sergeant Major	"p5"	31					15				15	15	
	Station Sergeants	"p6"	54					52				52	52	
	Sergeants	"p7"	210					208				208	208	
	Corporals	"p8"	466					439				439	439	
	Constables and other ranks	"p9"	3,752					3,641				3,641	3,641	
	Sub. Staff		279					265				265	265	

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1958 Appendix II.

Table 6. Civil Service Salary Scales

(Note: Where there are separate special scales for women officers these are indicated by the prefix (W).)

Super Scale I 2,300 x 50-- 2,400

Super Scale II 2,000 x 70-- 2,140

A. Scale

A.3. 726 x 36-- 870

A.2. 945 x 39--1,023 x 45--1,068 x 48-- 1,308

A.1. 1,359 x 51--1,410 x 54-- 1,518

A.(W)3. 726 x 36-- 870

A.(W)2. 906 x 39--1,023 x 45--1,068 x 48-- 1,308

A.(W)1. 1,359 x 51--1,410 x 54-- 1,518

Medical/Scientific Extension

1,581 x 63-- 1,770

(W) 1,581 x 63-- 1,770

B. Scale

B.6. 534 x 21--597 x 27-- 624

B.5. 678 x 27--759 x 30-- 789

B.4. 879 x 33--912 x 36-- 984

B.3. 1,020 x 36--1,056 x 39--1,095 x 42-- 1,137

B.2. 1,179 x 42--1,263 x 45-- 1,308

B.1. 1,359 x 51--1,140 x 54-- 1,518

B(W)6. 534 x 21--597 x 27-- 624

B.(W)5. 678 x 27--759 x 30-- 789

B.(W)4. 819 x 30--879 x 33-- 912

B.(W)3. 948 x 36-- 1,056

B.(W)2. 1,095 x 42--1,263 x 45-- 1,308

B.(W)1. 1,359 x 51--1,410 x 54-- 1,518

C. Scale

C.6. 576 x 21-- 597

C.5. 624 x 27-- 732

C.4. 825 x 33-- 924

C.3. 960 x 36-- 1,068

C.2. 1,104 x 36--1,140 x 39--1,179 x 42-- 1,263

C.1. 1,308 x 51--1,410 x 54-- 1,518

C.(W).6. 576 x 21-- 597

C.(W)5. 624 x 27-- 732

C.(W)4. 762 x 30--792 x 33-- 858

C.(W)3. 891 x 33--924 x 36-- 996

C.(W)2. 1,032 x 36--1,140 x 39--1,179 x 42-- 1,263

C.(W)1. 1,308 x 51--1,410 x 54-- 1,518

D. Scale (Men and Women) 471 x 21-- 555

Table 6. (Continued)

E. Scale

E.6. 104.5 x 6.15-- 138
 E.5. 152.5 x 6.15--172.10 x 7.10-- 180
 E.4. 187.10 x 10.10--208.10 x 13.10-- 262.10
 E.3. 290.5 x 13.10--330.15 x 14.5--345 x 21-- 366
 E.2. 387 x 21-- 450
 E.1. 471 x 21-- 555
 E.(W)6. 104.5 x 6.15-- 138
 E.(W)5. 145.10 x 6.15--172.10 x 7.10-- 180
 E.(W)4. 187.10 x 10.10--208.10 x 13.10 x 14.5-- 345
 E.(W)3. 276.15 x 13.10--330.15 x 14.5-- 345
 E.(W)2. 366 x 21--450
 E.(W)1. 471 x 21-- 555

N. Scale

N.5. 624 x 27--732 x 30--792 x 33-- 924
 N.4. 678 x 27--732 x 30--792 x 33--924 x 36-- 996
 N.3. 996
 N.2. 1,104
 N.1. 1,308

Police Scale

P.9. 83.8 x 2.14--105 x 3--111 x 3(Biennial--114 x 3.6(Biennial)--
 117.6 x 3.12(Biennial)-- 124.10
 P.8. 111 x 5.8-- 138
 P.7. 152.5 x 6.15--172.10 x 7.10-- 195
 P.6. 198
 P.5. 201.15 x 6.15-- 235.10
 P.4. 208.10 x 13.10--262.10 x 27.15--290.5 x 13.10--330.15 x 14.5--
 345 x 15-- 360
 P.3. 372.15 x 14.5--387 x 21-- 555
 P.2. 576 x 21--597 x 27--732 x 30-- 792
 P.1. 825 x 33--924 x 36-- 1,032

Prisons Scale

PR.7. 83.8 x 2.14--105 x 3--111 x 3(Biennial)-- 114
 PR.6. 116.8 x 5.8-- 138
 PR.5. 152.5 x 6.15--172.10 x 7.10-- 202.10
 PR.4. 208.10 x 13.10-- 262.10
 PR.3. 290.5 x 13.10--330.15 x 14.5-- x 15- 360
 PR.2. 372.15 x 14.5--387 x 21-- 555
 PR.1. 576 x 21--597 x 27--732 x 30-- 792

Table 6. (Continued)

 Subordinate Service Scales

S.4.	Shs. 107/50 x 5/-	--Shs. 112/50 per month.
S.3.	Shs. 118/- x 5/-	--Shs. 138/ per month.
S.2.	Shs. 145/- x 7/-	--166/- x 10/0 --Shs. 176/- per month.
S.1.	Shs. 188/- x 10/-	--Shs. 228/- per month.

Source: Great Britain Colonial Office, Annual Report for Tanganyika, 1960, Part II, p. 16-17.

Native Administration:

On taking over as Governor, Sir Horace Byatt who had earlier served in Somali was much more inclined towards exploiting and ruling the country through locally and traditional established institutions. In the administrative field, the policy was to develop people to an extent where they could rule themselves through their own established institutions. The reasons for British disapproval of, and hostility towards the German system of Administration was clearly pointed out in a report by Captain G. St. J. Ordé-Brown O.B.E. when Britain first occupied the territory:

The German system consisted of the election and vigorous support of a few powerful Akidas, who were assisted by numerous Jumbes. The Akidas are in almost all cases Arabs or Swahili, who are usually quite oblivious of native ideas and customs, and regard Islamic culture as the only and obvious road for any advance. They appear to consider themselves in most cases the lieutenants of a blind and ponderous Administration, which has certain concrete demands in the form of labor and tax that must be met. Beyond those, the Akida seems to regard himself as not expected to go; he is to be allowed a fairly free hand to exploit the people as he pleases, and expects a wide measure of power--supported if necessary by Government bayonets--to enable him to carry out his share of the bargain. The Jumbes model themselves on him, and naturally follow the lines likely to please him, though in some cases they spring from the people whom they rule, and can therefore honestly claim to represent them when the truth is likely to be accepted. After a

careful consideration, I must express myself as a decided opponent of the Akida system (Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika, Annual Report for 1920, 32).

He then expressed the need to modify the system with the curtailment of the excessive powers of the Akidas.

Byatt and later on Cameron who succeeded him in 1925 held similar strong views on the need to evolve a Native Administrative system based on Indirect Rule and which was reflected in the various Native Authority Ordinances they issued in 1921, 1923 and notably the 1926 one.

The system of administration evolving out of the above said ordinances was to support and supervise, with the least possible interference, the native authorities as existing or established. Where they did not exist due to lack of tribal cohesion and where chiefs had scant control over their subjects, attempts were made to reinstate them in the proper and just regard of their people. In areas where the chiefs were alienated from their subjects or abused their power, attempts were made to remedy the situation. In established areas such as Bukoba where each chiefdom (county) was under a hereditary chief who administered his chiefdom through sub-county (Gombolola) chiefs, chosen and appointed by him with Government approval, the system was not only upheld but also improved. In such areas, together with others like Sukumaland (Mwanza), Moshi, Tabora, and Uzigua, the Administrative Officers acted rather in an advisory and supervisory capacity.

To make the system work, chiefs no longer depended on a share of the taxes collected as their pay. They were now paid out of a Civil List while in areas like Bukoba they were paid through Native Administration funds. By 1929, 134 Native Administrations had been

established, some from Amalgamations as indicated in Table 7 below:

Table 7. Amalgamations

Province	Number of Units After First Introduction of Indirect Administration	Present Number of Native Administration Units 12/31/29	Remarks
Bukoba	6	6	
Central	15	8	
Eastern	18	18	Does not included Dar es Salaam.
Iringa	15	13	
Kigoma	16	13	
Lindi	21	17	
Mahenge	11	9	
Mwanza	32	23	
Northern	10	9	
Toborá	33	13	
Tanga	15	5	Does not included Tanga District

Source: British Colonial Office Annual Report for Tanganyika for 1929, p. 11.

The encouragement and development of Native Administration through the system of Indirect Rule did not definitely come out of the good intentions of the British nor was it a result of the paternalistic attitude on the part of the first two British governors. Like the Germans, the British had as their basic motive, the maximum exploitation of the country at minimum costs. Their motive was simple: first belief in the British Empire and a pride in being Imperialists. It so happened that that was the cheapest way of pursuing their objectives.

Through the system of Indirect-Rule, the British made the positions of chiefs even more stronger than the Germans had done. They

were expected to keep law and order in their areas of jurisdiction and as such had both administrative and magisterial powers. They presided over Native Courts, decided cases and meted out punishment. They also collected taxes, conscripted labor for government public works, and in the process could still call on labor on their own behalf. They also continued to distribute land and performed ritual ceremonies. And more than that, they used the Pax-Britannica to enhance their positions and power. They were paid salaries, had cars, were treated more favorably by agricultural extension officers, had better credit facilities while their children got better education at schools built specifically for them.

2. Education

Both the German and British colonial administrations saw the need for what Listowel (1965: 85-104) calls "A Due Supply of Persons Well Qualified to Serve." They realized the need for trained native personnel to help in the administration and exploitation of the country.

The German Administration for instance realized that some Africans would have to become proficient in both Swahili (in Latin characters) and in Arithmetic so that they could become clerks in local government offices, on the railways and plantations (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 145). Missionary societies were encouraged to expand their educational work and the government itself opened up a new school at Tanga in 1893 under the charge of Herr Barth, and three years later had 94 pupils. The school which served as a model for others had three sections--one for children, one for training of

clerks, and one for training of personal servants. It soon became very popular with the Jubmes of the district who sent their sons to a boarding establishment associated with the school.

In a bid to raise the standards of achievement at the Tanga school, Barth established new feeder schools in charge of African teachers. A training department and crafts department were established. School was made compulsory for boys in Tanga in 1899 (*ibid.*: 205). Schools were also opened up in other areas in the country, and by 1900, Protestant missionary schools accounted for 900 pupils and Roman Catholic missionary schools 5,000 pupils. The three government schools at Tanga, Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo catered for 1,600 pupils during the same year, making a total of 7,500. In 1903 there were 8 government schools (5 white and 16 native teachers and 1,142 pupils), 12 schools run by the local authorities (1 white master, 18 native teachers and 417 pupils) and 15 missionary schools. In 1911 the Catholic and Protestant missions were each responsible for the elementary education of 30,000 pupils, and the Administration had 3,500 pupils in its elementary schools. Two thousand five hundred more pupils were receiving a more advanced education in Senior and grade schools.

Progress in education was encouraging, so that by 1914 the German administration was able to conduct much of its correspondence with village headmen in Swahili, and during that same year 6,200 pupils were said to have been enrolled in Government schools. Of these, 2,500 pupils were in the German Principle Schools while the rest 3,700 were in Government elementary schools, all employing 16 European and 159 native teachers. The mission schools (1,800 of them) accounted for another 110,000 on their registers (Listowel, *op.*

cīt.: 86).

The Germans had definitely done a better job in the field of Education than the British were doing in their colonies. A British official stated in 1921 after Britain took over the country, that owing to education received from the Germans,

the degree of usefulness to the administration of the natives of Tanganyika Territory is in advance of that which we have been accustomed to associate with British African protectorates (Buell, 1929, vol. 1: 478).

Like any other developments and institutions by the Germans, education progress was also affected by the outbreak of W.W.I. School teachers left their jobs while some school buildings were also demolished. By the end of the War, everything was in shambles.

On taking over the country, the British realized the need to reconstruct a new education system from scratch. A training class for teachers was started in Dar es Salaam and 50 other Government schools with an attendance of 3,800 were reopened by the end of 1922. All education in government schools was also free (Great Britain Colonial Office, 1921: 27).

Pupils were expected to go through an elementary three years course after which they were expected to be proficient in reading, writing and simple arithmetic and elementary geography. Instruction was given in Swahili, and attached to all schools were plantations where some instruction in plant and animal husbandry were given. The government also opened Primary schools offering a three year course in Dar es Salaam and Bukoba to which pupils who completed elementary courses could elect to go. Certain government departments, notably Posts and Telegraph, Railways, Public Works, Veterinary, Medical and

Agriculture gave some specialized training and certain instruction. All the above schools were intended for Africans.

Side by side with Schools for Africans, there were also special schools for other communities. There was for instance a school for the children of the Dutch settlers at Arusha under the control of a local committee to which the government contributed a subsidy of £100/year. The Indian communities in Dar es Salaam and Tanga also had their own elementary schools.

Although efforts were made to build more schools, they were just not enough. By 1939 for instance, there were only 72,000 children in attendance at registered schools out of approximately 1,000,000 children of school age. Ninety-four percent of the 72,000 were in Primary Vernacular Schools which provided a four year course in Swahili (Standards I - IV). There were also 1,800 boys and girls enrolled in Standards V and VI.

Many of the boys who completed the six year course were recruited for training as teachers or artisans while a few obtained local employment under their Native Administrations as junior clerks. The girls usually returned home for marriage, though a few of them were trained as teachers and nurses.

Special education for Indians continued to be provided. In 1939 for instance, the Government Indian Secondary School at Dar es Salaam was the most advanced in the territory and provided full Secondary School courses leading to the Cambridge School Certificate Examinations.

As for Europeans, a correspondence course (covering British Secondary School materials) for the children of Public employees and

those of big commercial undertakings was established. For younger children facilities were available at the European Government Union School Dar es Salaam, the German School Dar es Salaam and the European Kindergarten schools at Tanga and Moshi. There was also the St. Joseph Convent School in Dar es Salaam which was a boarding and day school which also admitted Goanese and children of mixed races. There were also Grant-aided schools for the German Community at Olddeani, Mbulu district; Lushoto and Lwandai in Korogwe district and at Mbeya respectively; for the Greek community at Kibosho and Kiluti in the Northern Province; and for South African Dutch Communities at Oldonyo-Sambu and Ngare-Nanyuki in Arusha district, and at Oldeani in Mbulu district. There were also other schools for the European community at Sadani near Iringa and the Chunya European school which served the Lupa Goldfields and was attended by almost entirely South African Dutch children.

No Secondary School Education was however provided for European children at this time, but by inter-territorial arrangements, European pupils from Tanganyika were admitted at the European Government School in Kenya Colony. For such pupils and those who chose to go to South Africa, assistance was granted by the government if the need arose.

The above racial divisions in the education system coincided with similar divisions in the Civil Service as pointed out earlier (Table 5).

The British government also introduced educational policies which continued to perpetuate existing hierarchies in traditional or pre-colonial African life by providing sons of chiefs with a superior education so that they might take their proper places as leaders of

thought, morals, society and government (Brett, op. cit.: 77).

For the sons and heirs of chiefs, Tabora Government School, modelled on English Public Schools, was built and by 1925 had its first intake of 30 pupils. Ironically enough this school is reputed for having produced most of Tanzania's revolutionary leaders including Julius Nyerere himself a son of a Zanaki chief in Musoma. Within the next five years, another school for the daughters and future wives of the aristocracy was open just facing the Boys school.

By the 1960's some progress in Education had been made. On the eve of independence in 1960 there were 434,572 African children attending schools ranging from Primary to Middle and to Secondary Schools. There were also Technical, Vocational and Teacher Training Schools. Some successful students could also go to the East African college at Makerere and the Engineering School in Kampala, Uganda, and the Royal Technical College, Nairobi, Kenya. There were also several European and Indian schools as clearly demonstrated in Table 8.

As Iliffe clearly points out (Kimambo and Temu, op. cit.: 126) the reactions and responses to education varied from area to area and individual to individual. In most areas, the mood of the chief determined the popularity of the schools.

Some chiefs such as Kimweri are said (ibid) to have urged European explorers such as Krapf to settle in Usambara as a teacher. Bukoba chiefs for instance urged their people to send their children to school. They were the first to send their children to the first schools opened in the district.

Some areas, especially those where Moslem influence was strong, were not hospitable to education which was also somehow tied to

Table 8(a). African Education: Number of Schools by Type, Number of Streams and Enrolment (At 1st November, 1960)

	Primary Standards I-IV				
	Schools	Streams	Enrolment		
			Male	Female	Total
Government Schools	58	100	8,621	5,504	14,125
Local Authority Schools i.e., N.A. Schools	695	724	69,621	30,764	100,385
Total Government and Local Authority	753	824	78,242	36,268	114,510
Aided Schools not included above: R.C. Schools	1,003	1,055	90,923	53,466	144,389
Other Christian Schools	885	898	74,019	42,760	116,779
Muslim Schools	37	40	3,567	1,993	5,560
Others	4	4	280	187	467
Total Aided	1,929	1,997	168,789	98,406	267,195
Unaided Schools: R.C. Schools	--	--	--	--	--
Other Christian Schools	48	41	2,043	1,282	4,225
Muslim Schools	1	1	76	31	107
Others	2	2	106	124	230
Total Unaided	51	44	3,125	1,437	4,562
Grand Total	2,733	2,865	250,156	136,111	386,267

Table 8(a). (Continued)

	Middle Standards V-VIII				
	Schools	Streams	Enrolment		
			Male	Female	Total
Government Schools	31	36	2,375	1,387	3,762
Local Authority Schools, i.e. N.A. Schools	118	119	13,380	338	13,718
Total Government and local Auth- ority	149	155	15,755	1,725	17,480
Aided Schools not included above:					
R.C. Schools	119 9D	120 9D	11,212 449	2,921 176	14,133 625
Other Christian Schools	92 3D	92 3D	8,945 94	2,595 83	11,540 177
Muslim Schools	1	1	77	--	77
Others	--	--	--	--	--
Total aided	212 12D	213 12D	20,777	5,775	26,552
Unaided Schools:					
R.C. Schools	1	1	--	25	25
Other Christian Schools	6	6	434	221	655
Muslim Schools	-- 1D	-- 1D	-- 36	-- 2	-- 38
Others	1	1	39	--	39
Total Unaided	8 1D	8 1D	509	248	757
Grand Total	360 13D	376 13D	13,041	7,748	44,789

D - District School Standards V-VI (disappearing).

Table 8(a). (Continued).

	Secondary Standards IX-XII, Forms V-VI				
	Schools	Streams	Enrolment		
			Male	Female	Total
Government Schools	12	27	1,773	307	2,080
Local Authority Schools i.e., N.A. Schools	--	--	--	--	--
Total Government and Local Author- ity	12	27	1,773	307	2,080
Aided Schools not included above: R.C. Schools	9	18	1,357	307	1,531
Other Christian Schools	7	12	1,000	--	1,006
Muslim Schools	--	--	--	--	--
Others	--	--	--	--	--
Total Aided	16	30	2,363	147	2,537
Unaided Schools:					
R.C. Schools	--	--	--	--	--
Other Christian Schools	1	1	27	1	28
Muslim Schools	--	--	--	--	--
Others	--	--	--	--	--
Total Unaided	1	1	27	1	28
Grand Total	29	58	4,163	482	4,645

Table 8(a). (Continued)

	Technical and Vocational Training				
	Centers	Courses	Enrolment		
			Male	Female	Total
Government Institutions	3	18	1,370*	257*	1,627*
Local Authority Institutions	--	--	--	--	--
Aided, not included above:					
R.C. Institutions	4	4	--	133	133
Other Christian Institutions	--	--	--	--	--
Unaided:					
R.C. Institutions	7	11	99	69	168
Other Christian Institutions	2	2	77	--	77
Other Institutions	1	1	65	5	70
Total	17	36	1,611*	464*	2,075*
	Teacher Training				
Government Institutions	5	11	336	134	470
Local Authority Institutions	--	--	--	--	--
Aided, not included above:					
R.C. Institutions	13	14	325	188	513
Other Christian Institutions	11	10	333	99	432
Unaided:					
R.C. Institutions	--	--	--	--	--
Other Christian Institutions	1	1	23	3	26
Other Institutions	--	--	--	--	--
Total	30	36	1,017	424	1,441

*Includes part-time students

Table 8(b). Indian Education: Number of Schools by Type and Enrolment (At 1st November, 1960)

	Primary			
	Schools	Enrolment		
		Male	Female	Total
Government Schools	5	2,269	995	3,264
Aided Schools	106	6,193	6,694	12,887
Unaided Schools	2	51	51	166
Total	113	7,740	7,740	16,317
	Secondary			
Government Schools	7	2,801	1,379	4,180
Aided Schools	24	2,226	2,308	4,534
Unaided Schools	--	--	--	--
Total	31	5,027	3,687	8,714
	Collèges	Teacher Training		
Government Schools	1	13	30	43
Aided Schools	--	--	--	--
Unaided Schools	--	--	--	--
Total	1	13	30	43
	Institutions - Technical and Vocational			
Government Schools	1	740	539	1,279
Aided Schools	--	--	--	--
Unaided Schools	1	6	8	14
Total	2	746	547	1,293

Note: The enrolment shown under Technical and Vocational includes Indian students, mostly part-time, attending inter-racial institutions.

Table 8(c). European Education: Number of Schools by Type and Enrolment (At 1st November, 1960)

	Primary			
	Schools	Enrolment		
		Male	Female	Total
Government Schools	11	580	568	1,148
Aided Schools	14	349	304	653
Unaided Schools	10	187	109	296
Total	35	1,116	2,097	2,097
	Secondary			
Government Schools	2	44	59	103
Aided Schools	6	303	269	572
Unaided Schools	7	46	19	65
Total	15	393	347	740
	Colleges	Teacher Training		
Government Schools	--	--	--	--
Aided Schools	--	--	--	--
Unaided Schools	--	--	--	--
Total	--	--	--	--
	Institutions - Technical and Vocational			
Government Schools	1	25	80	105
Aided Schools	--	--	--	--
Unaided Schools	--	--	--	--
Total	1	25	80	105

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1960, pp. 118-120.

Note: The enrolment shown under Technical and Vocational education is of European students, mostly part-time, attending the Technical Institute, Dar es Salaam, which is an inter-racial institution.

Christianity. The Coast for instance was not only resistant but hostile to education.

At the individual level, things were not different. Some parents at first did not want education. They were distrustful of the institution and resorted to rumors to discredit it. School going was compared to slavery and children had to be bribed to go to school and attendance was therefore very low causing the closure of some classrooms in some areas. Girls were also discouraged from going to school lest they make bad wives.

As a result of all the above factors, we had a differential access to education both at the regional and individual levels, a process that tended to perpetuate the existing class hierarchies and inequalities.

The education system as provided by the colonial administration in Tanzania suffered three basic deficiencies. It was elitist, racist and inadequate as we shall see later on in Chapter V.

3. Agriculture and Mining

Like any other colony, Tanganyika was supposed to be a supplier of raw materials for the industries of the "mother" country, whether Germany or (later on) Britain. This function definitely influenced the policies pursued by the two colonial countries in relation to Tanganyika.

To the Germans, the colony was seen as a main supplier of strategic raw materials such as cotton, rubber, sisal and gold (Rweyemamu, *op. cit.*: 14). In order to tap these resources, the Germans encouraged settler plantations and mining, and where they could,

African peasant production.

Plantation Agriculture:

All in all, the Germans were basically inclined to plantation agriculture and settler farming. Despite large areas where settled agriculture was not possible, Tanganyika has a great deal of suitable land around the Kilimanjaro and Usambara highlands in the North-East, and in the South-Western highlands around Iringa and Tukuyu close to the Zambian border.

Between 1885 and 1887 for instance, the German East African Company established ten stations which were both plantations and trading posts. Another few plantations started in the 1880's included the East African Planting Company, the Mrima Company and the German East African Seehandlung. By 1904 exports from sisal which was the main plantation crop had risen to 571,739 marks, those from coffee to 523,618 marks, while timber and rubber together were valued at 2,308,000 marks.

Despite labor difficulties, there was a considerable development of European plantations in the colony. In 1905 there were already 180 white planters and farmers and by 1910 there were 54 sisal plantations in the colony. The larger producers included the Sisal-Agaven-Gesellschaft of Dusseldorf and the Deutsch-Agaven-Gesellschaft of Berlin. The year 1912 saw the arrival of another 758 German settlers.

The introduction of plantation and settler farming however had far reaching repercussions on the indigenous populations. A lot of Africans were evicted from their best agricultural lands which were given to the settlers. The Germans for instance are said to have alienated 2 million acres of land from the Africans (Chidzero, 1961:

357-362) who were in turn placed in reserves. In Kilimanjaro area the settlers pushed the displaced Africans further up to the mountains. And in a bid to get labor for its settler community and its various Public Works, the government also barred Africans from growing certain cash crops.

The above process destroyed the traditional precolonial mode of communal production and social organization and partially proletarianized a segment of the hitherto peasant population. An army of landless peasants was created. This was to be the reserve from which labor for plantations and other government projects was to come from.

Juxtaposed to the traditional economy, where a proletarian class did not exist, the institution of the plantation system required the creation of conditions for the emergence of free labor that was alienated from the means of production, facing the capitalist who owned and controlled the means of production (Rweyemamu, op. cit.: 17).

The problem of labor however, continued to plague both the Germans and British planters and settlers. This can be explained partly by the poor working conditions on the plantations and partly by the fact that Africans could get most of their basic needs met by working on their individual small plots. We shall come to this problem later on in Chapter IV.

Apart from sisal and to a lesser extent coffee however, the first attempts to grow other crops such as tobacco, cotton and rubber on plantations failed. Take rubber for example: A short rise in the prices for rubber after 1905 encouraged white settlers to open up plantations of Manihot rubber in the Tanga and Morogoro districts. By 1910, about 250 rubber estates had been established. In 1911 rubber exports were valued at 4,700,000 marks of which 75 percent

came from four plantations while the remaining 25 percent was collected by native peasant producers. When the world prices of rubber reached their climax, the German planters sold their estates, at very higher prices, to various English companies including--East African Rubber Plantations Company Ltd. (1909); Manihot Rubber Plantation Ltd.; Muhesa Rubber Plantations Ltd.; Lew Rubber Estates Ltd.; Kamna Rubber Estates Ltd.; and Kigulu Rubber Estates Ltd.; (Harlow, Chilver and Smith op. cit.: 152). Overproduction of rubber in South East Asia however, led to the collapse of the world price of rubber and by 1913 the plantations were a mere historical reference. They had doomed to failure.

On taking over the country, the British stressed the need to exploit the country through peasant production with the exception of one crop--sisal.

Sisal required heavy capital investment and infrastructure. It was grown in dry areas not generally regarded as suitable for permanent settlement by Europeans, and was therefore conducted on plantations rather than small scale peasant agriculture. A lot of capital was involved and only Europeans could afford it. In the 1930's however when sisal prices went down and a lot of Europeans began to leave or sell their estates, local Asians took over as entrepreneurs in this industry. This was mainly due to the fact that compared to Africans, Asians had made more money to purchase such estates while banks and other credit giving institutions were more willing to give them loans than they were willing to give them to Africans.

There were also other crops that were grown on settler farms or plantations. These included coffee, tobacco, pyrethrum, wheat and

tea.

Thus despite the policies pursued by the British, especially the first two British governors (Byatt, 1920-25; Cameron, 1925-30) to discourage the development of plantation and settler-farm agriculture more lands continued to be alienated from the indigenous Africans for the large-scale production of certain crops which counted for the bulk of the agricultural exports from the country. By 1938, British settlers controlled 788,000 acres of land, Germans 476,000 and Asians (against whom no Kenya-style discrimination was practiced) 280,000 acres (Brett, op. cit.: 221). The practice continued at an even much faster pace after the Second World War and by the end of 1957 a total of 2,488,469 acres under 1,618 holdings had been alienated from the peasants for foreign owned and dominated large-scale Agriculture and Pastoralism under long term rights of occupancy since January 1, 1946 as clearly demonstrated in Table 9.

Even on the eve of independence in 1960, the trend still continued. During that year alone for instance, 73,055 acres were alienated and given to various nationalities under 25 holdings as Table 10(a) below indicates.

Most of these lands as mentioned above were given to European nationalities and a few Asians of Indian and Pakistan origin. Africans accounted for a very insignificant proportion of the land given, as clearly indicated in Table 10(b).

Mining:

The trends that we have talked about as regards plantation agriculture in terms of ownership were more or less duplicated in the mining sector. On this, the information obtained from the British

Table 9. Agricultural and Pastoral Land Alienated Under Long-Term Rights of Occupancy Since 1st January, 1946

Year	Alienation of Agricultural Land up to 1,500 Acres and Pastoral Land up to 2,500 Acres				Alienation of Agricultural Land Over 1,500 Acres and Pastoral Land Over 2,500 Acres			
	Agricultural up to 1,500 Acres		Pastoral up to 2,500 Acres		Agricultural over 1,500 Acres		Pastoral over 2,500 Acres	
	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1946	3	3,673	-	-	2	5,171	-	-
1947	3	1,140	-	-	4	8,320	-	-
1948	11	8,575	-	-	3	32,960	-	-
1949	101	65,353	1	500	30	130,082	-	-
1950	186	102,583	-	-	22	71,804	-	-
1951	91	44,888	2	693	43	189,063	-	-
1952	128	68,559	4	3,678	33	188,398	10	135,698
1953	76	44,669	2	4,403	16	95,514	4	42,080
1954	40	20,888	2	2,545	14	54,339	2	13,900
1955	78	21,681	-	-	10	23,497	1	18,647
1956	51	27,443	9	12,969	12	31,433	4	152,275
1957	50	30,785	8	6,284	7	26,152	5	85,874
Totals	818	440,237	28	31,072	196	856,733	26	448,474

Notes: (a) Includes minor adjustments not reflected in preceding columns. (b) The total land area of the Territory is estimated to be 219,331,840 acres or 342,706 square miles. (c) This total takes into account 1,043 holdings comprising approximately 789,676 acres previously subsisting. (d) This total is held in 1,618 holdings.

Table 9. (Continued)

Year	Total of Columns (2) to (5) (Smaller Acreage Group)		Total of Columns (6) to (9) (Longer Acreage Group)		Total of Smaller and Larger Acreage Groups Columns (10) to (13)		Alienation to Public or Semi-Public Groups	
	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres
(1)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
1946	3	3,673	2	5,171	5	8,844	-	-
1947	3	1,140	4	8,320	7	9,460	1	363
1948	11	8,575	3	32,960	14	41,535	1	1,000
1949	102	65,853	30	130,082	132	195,935	-	-
1950	186	102,583	22	71,804	208	174,387	3	195,629
1951	93	45,581	43	189,063	136	234,644	-	-
1952	132	72,237	43	324,096	175	396,333	4	335,299
1953	78	49,072	20	137,594	98	186,666	1	25
1954	42	23,433	16	68,239	58	91,672	-	-
1955	78	21,681	11	42,144	89	63,825	3	69,404
1956	60	40,412	16	183,708	76	224,120	5	2,280
1957	58	37,069	12	112,026	70	149,095	4	5,913
Total	846	471,309	222	1,305,207	1,068	1,776,516	22	609,913

Table 9. (Continued)

Year	Total Alienations During Year		Surrenders Revocations, etc. During Year		Net-Increase In Alienated Land. During Year		Total Area of Long-Term Rights of Occupancy at End of Year	
	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	No.	Acres	Acres See Note (a)	% of Territory (b)
1946	5	8,844	6	10,482	-1	-1,638	788,038 ^c	0.4%
1947	8	9,823	4	1,707	4	8,116	795,683	0.4%
1948	15	42,535	251	175,836	-236	-133,301	663,102	0.3%
1949	132	195,935	23	72,541	109	123,394	786,248	0.4%
1950	211	370,016	40	33,139	171	336,877	1,122,017	0.5%
1951	136	234,644	16	14,797	120	219,847	1,341,151	0.6%
1952	179	731,632	21	132,411	158	599,221	1,938,941	0.9%
1953	99	186,691	23	15,916	76	170,775	2,109,985	1.0%
1954	58	91,672	25	21,627	33	70,045	2,180,166	1.0%
1955	92	133,229	45	60,239	47	72,990	2,248,366	1.0%
1956	81	226,400	33	98,967	48	127,433	2,376,125	1.1%
1957	74	155,008	28	43,291	46	111,717	2,488,469 ^d	1.1%
Total	1,090	2,386,429	515	680,953	575	1,705,476		

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1957.

Table 10(a). Long Term Rights of Occupancy Over Agricultural and Pastoral Land Granted during the Year 1960

Nationality	Holdings	Average
British of South African Origin	3	28,105
British (other than of South African origin)	6	8,536
Greek	5	6,245
Indian or Pakistani	4	2,224
African	3	252
German	1	129
Others	3	27,564
Total	25	73,055

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for the year 1960, Part II, p. 52.

Note: The total land area of the Territory is estimated to be 219,331,840 acres.

Table 10(b). Long Term Rights of Occupancy Over Agricultural and Pastoral Lands as at 31st December, 1960

Nationality	Holdings	Acerage	Percentage of Total Land Area*
British (other than British of South African Origin)	470	1,315,966	0-6000
Greek	279	355,351	0-1620
Indian and Pakistani	287	256,192	0-1168
British of South African Origin	107	192,399	0-0877
Dutch	14	32,654	0-0149
German	45	32,021	0-0146
Swiss	24	31,189	0-0142
Danish	11	30,555	0-0139
African	35	17,226	0-0079 ⁺
Missions	265	16,710	0-0076
Arab	34	9,502	0-0043
Goan	11	5,517	0-0025
Italian	7	4,852	0-0022
Syrian	4	2,897	0-0013
French	4	2,695	0-0012
American	3	548	0-0003
Others	66	182,469	0-0832
Total	1,666	2,488,743	1.135

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1960 Part II, p. 51.

*The total land area of the Territory is estimated to be 219,331,743 acres.

⁺This figure does not include land held by Africans otherwise than on long-term Rights of Occupancy.

Colonial Office Annual Report on Tanganyika for the year ending December 1960 (Table 11) speaks for itself.

At this juncture suffice it to also point out that mineral extraction took place in a rural sectoral context that was also part and parcel of an economic strategy and structure designed to facilitate the maximum exploitation of the country's resources and the development and perpetuation of dependent economic relations between Tanganyika (the satellite) and Britain and other European powers (the metropolis).

In most cases mines were also located in areas suitable for agriculture and mining operations meant some jobs for the peasants whose lands had been taken away. The wages they received were also used in the purchasing of manufactured goods imported into the country from the metropolis.

Ownership of the mines and therefore the biggest profits went to Europeans while a few Asians also got some share from the spoils. Africans on the other hand were relegated to the position of mere workers (Table 11(d)). Even here the good lucrative jobs went to the European and Asians with the Africans doing all the menial and back-breaking underground jobs.

Peasant Cash Crop Production and Rural Stratification:

Where they could not exploit the country through plantation and settler-farming, both the Germans and (later on) the British encouraged peasant cash crop production. This was in fact contrary to the wishes of the settlers who wanted all the good and productive lands alienated and distributed to them. This would in turn force the landless peasants to sell their labor cheaply to the plantation owners. In fact one of the issues between the German Governor Rechenberg

Table 11. Minerals

A. Areas held under mining titles by sections of population on 31st December, 1960

Section of Population	Claims (Acres)	Mining Leases (Acres)	Total (Acres)	Percentage of Total
Indigenous	2,669	87,040	89,709	65.33
Asian	3,132	2,176	5,308	3.87
Non-British European	5,125	870	5,995	4.36
British	10,909	25,391	36,300	26.44

Notes:

- (i) The above figures are approximate.
- (ii) Missions hold no Mining titles.
- (iii) The Government has a majority share-holding in the largest salt-producing concern and a 50 percent interest in the largest diamond-producing mine.
- (iv) Several Government departments work quarries for public purposes which are not included in the above figures.
- (v) Of the 620 prospecting rights held on 31st December, 1960, 247 were held by Africans, 115 by Asians and 258 by persons of European extraction.

B. Mineral Reserves

There are no exact figures of the total workable reserves of various minerals but it is known that there are useful reserves of gold, silver, diamonds, coal, iron ore, kaolin, phosphate, rock salt, gypsum, tin and niobium-bearing pyrochlore. It is expected that the production of mica will continue unless the price for this mineral falls very considerably. Copper and some silver and gold were produced from lead concentrates during the year.

Table 11. (Continued)

C. Mines

With the exception of one diamond mine and perhaps two gold mines there are few in Tanganyika that fall within the usually accepted sense of the word "mine" but there are a large number of small worker operations besides several potentially larger producers.

The following is a list of the companies which produced minerals to the value of £50,000 or more during 1960. The share holding in these companies is believed to be predominantly British:

Williamson Diamonds, Ltd	Diamonds
AJamasi, Ltd.	Diamonds
Uruwira Minerals, Ltd.	Lead
Geita Gold Mining Co. Ltd.	Gold
Buhemba Mines, Ltd.	Gold
Nyanza Salt Mines (Tanganyika) Ltd.	Salt
Tangold Mining Co. Ltd.	Gold
Kyetwa Syndicate, Ltd.	Tin

The above concerns produced about nine-tenths of the minerals produced in Tanganyika during 1960.

A large number of smaller concerns, especially quarrying, are companies owned and operated by Asians.

Table 11. (Continued) D. Distribution of Mining Titles by Sections of the Population on 31st December, 1960.

	Gold			Diamonds		
	Persons or Concerns	Mining Leases	Claims	Persons or Concerns	Mining Leases	Claims
Indigenous	8	-	22	-	-	-
Asian	4	1	10	-	-	-
Non-British European	7	1	27	-	-	-
British	16	16	170	2	2	1
Total	35	18	229	2	2	1
	Lead			Tin		
Indigenous	-	-	-	6	-	13
Asian	-	-	-	7	-	27
Non-British European	-	-	-	7	-	56
British	1	3	-	10	3	7
Total	1	3	-	30	3	103
	Mica			Salt		
Indigenous	14	2	24	-	-	-
Asian	-	-	1	8	8	3
Non-British European	7	-	24	2	-	2
British	7	-	40	3	5	-
Total	28	2	89	13	13	5
	Building Minerals			Lime		
Indigenous	69	-	247	7	-	9
Asian	109	1	1,182	12	-	21
Non-British European	27	1	156	4	-	12
British	13	-	162	3	-	12
Total	218	1	1,747	26	-	54

Table 11. - (Continued)

	Miscellaneous		
	Persons or Concerns	Mining Leases	Claims
Indigenous	19	-	36
Asian	9	-	28
Non-British European	12	-	34
British	16	1	87
Total	56	1	185

There is a considerable unrecorded production of salt by Africans under native rights from various salt springs and salt pans. No mining rights are granted over such sites.

Table 11. (Continued)

E. Details of the grant or refusal of prospecting licenses and mining titles to various sections of the population during 1960.

	Prospecting Rights	Exclusive Prospecting Licenses	Mining Claims	Mining Leases
Granted:				
Africans	151	-	129	Nil
Asians	64	-	179	Nil
Europeans	151	1	77	1
Total	366	1	385	1
Refused:				
Africans	7	-	32	Nil
Asians	1	-	36	Nil
Europeans	1	-	5	Nil
Total	9	-	73	Nil

Note: A large proportion of the claim applications which are refused are on account of the failure of the applicants to submit proper applications or to take possession of the ground in the prescribed manner. In such instances the mistakes made are pointed out and the applicant is normally given an opportunity to submit a fresh application. Applications made in the proper manner may not be refused.

Table 11. (Continued)

F. Labour employed in Mining (Average during 1960)

Mine	European		Asian		African		Total
	S	UG	S	UG	S	UG	
Geita Gold Mine	33	18	62	1	604	439	1,157
Williamson Diamonds	286	6	57	2	1,913	182	2,446
Mpanda Mine	24	6	-	-	625	255	910
Buhemba Mine	9	2	5	3	245	172	436
Alamasi Mine	37	-	11	-	338	-	386
Uvinza Salt Works	3	-	2	-	384	-	389
Kiabakari Gold Mine	47	9	22	-	407	242	727
Remaining Mines and Quarries	109	6	86	3	6,531	1,778	8,513
Total 1960	548	47	245	9	11,047	3,068	14,964
1959	629	55	266	8	11,870	2,767	15,595
1958	666	59	286	10	12,688	2,730	16,439
1957	643	74	258	13	13,687	2,665	17,340
1956	586	76	255	13	13,909	2,884	17,723

S = Surface UG = Underground

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1960, op cit.: 56, 57, 61.

(1906-1912) and the settlers was whether the country should develop as a "commercial or plantation" colony. He believed that the "natives" and also the old established German trading and shipping firms would benefit more from a "commercial" than a "plantation" economy:

Rechenberg proposed to raise the standard of living of the Africans, to maintain their economic independence and to preserve their tribal structures by encouraging them to grow on their own lands products suitable for the European market and as they became prosperous they would purchase more goods made in and by German firms (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 147).

Similar views were held by the first two British governors when Britain took over the administration and exploitation of Tanganyika under the League of Nations mandates system. Both Byatt and Cameron came with experiences of areas dominated by African production. Byatt had been in Somaliland and Cameron in Nigeria where he had also been influenced by the Indirect Rule paternalism of Lord Lugard and Clifford. To them, therefore the first duty of the government was to the "natives."

It would however be a gross mistake to assume that the seemingly sympathetic attitude towards Africans shown by these men came from their commitment to help and raise the standards of living of the Africans as against those of their kith and kin. It only so happened that at the time things were such that the exploitation of the country through peasant production was far easier and more "natural" than the creation of a settler community.

The latter required massive administrative and economic injections on behalf of an economic structure which found it very difficult to compete effectively on the world market. . . . The African peasantry on the other hand, requiring very little in the way of capital and being prepared to work long hours for small returns, provided a valid base on which to establish and maintain the modest administrative and commercial superstructure which British colonialism imposed (Brett, op. cit.: 218).

Also important to put into consideration is the fact that some crops were already being grown much more efficiently by the African peasant producers. Take the case of coffee for instance. This crop had long been grown in Bukoba where coffee berries were being used by the chiefs for ritual and ceremonial purposes. By 1898 the people of Bukoba were already exporting the crop. By 1904 Africans were growing other crops such as Copra (856,409 marks), sesame (374,026 marks) and cotton (123,892 marks) for exports. Basically the Africans preferred to grow cash crops to meet their financial obligations rather than work on settler plantations and farms.

The major African crops were cotton and coffee. Others included sesame, copra, groundnuts, maize and rice.

Coffee: As pointed out earlier, this crop had been grown in Bukoba before the Germans arrived in Tanganyika. With the encouragement of the production of cash crops by the colonial governments, the Haya chiefs began to grow it in large quantities. Using their traditional basis of legitimacy and the support of pax-Germanica they invented a quasi-feudal form of land ownership (Nyarubanja) to get the best productive lands for themselves, their relatives and courtiers. In this way their peasant subjects were turned into tenants, if not serfs, with the chiefs taking some proportion of their crop. The Haya chiefs also urged their subjects to grow the crop in even larger quantities. By 1913, three quarters of the coffee crop exported from Tanganyika was grown by Africans in Bukoba (Iliffe, in Kimambo and Temu, op. cit.: 135). And again as far as 1930, Bukoba still contributed 70 percent of the coffee exports from Tanganyika.

In Kilimanjaro too, coffee had been introduced by missionaries

in the 1890's. They encouraged the Chagga to grow Arabica coffee on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro unlike in Kenya where Africans were barred from growing coffee. Seedlings were usually distributed to friendly chiefs. Like in Bukoba it was also the Chagga chiefs, their relatives and courtiers who benefitted from the innovation. This they did by distributing good "clan lands" (vihamba) to themselves, their relatives and courtiers. By 1909 for instance, Chief Marealle I is said to have had 15,000 coffee shrubs in Marangu (ibid.: 136).

And again when the British introduced coffee growing in Bugufi in the late 1920's, they distributed the seedlings in the following order: 1,500 to the chief; 1,000 to a leading headman and 75 to each lesser headman.

All in all African response to the production of coffee as a cash crop for export was good. By 1926 native production of coffee was as follows (Table 12).

Table 12. Native Coffee Growing by 1926

District	Acres-Native	Acres Non-Native
Bukoba	50,000	500
Moshi	5,000	30,000
Arusha	60	9,000
Usambara	5	5,500
Tanga	-	2,500

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1926, p. 44.

Cotton: The Germans first made attempts to grow cotton on a plantation basis in Morogoro and on the valley of the Rufiji river, but only a modest success was made. Soon they abandoned the idea altogether and encouraged African peasants to grow the crop. When the British took over the country, they put even more emphasis on the production of the crop by the "natives": 150 tons of seeds were distributed. By 1926, non-natives produced only 25 percent of the country's cotton exports.

The most dominant and promising cotton growing region was Mwanza. The production of cotton in Mwanza started in the early 1900's when a settler in Nera chiefdom began growing the crop. He made a share-cropping scheme with the local headmen: young Sukuma men settled on "his" land, received free seed, sold to him (at a cheaper price) the cotton which he in turn exported to Europe along the Uganda railway (ibid.: 135). By 1906, the Sukuma were however tired of being exploited by this individual and instead turned to the government for support and encouragement. The first chiefdom to respond to government encouragement of the production of cotton and hence to get benefits from the whole exercise was Nasa Chiefdom. Soon others followed suit and by 1911, 163,334 pounds of raw cotton from Mwanza were exported to Europe. By the 1925-26 season, Mwanza was already producing 8,750 bales out of 21,675 bales of cotton produced by the whole country (one bale of cotton was between 300-400 lbs).

All in all, peasant production of the various crops was encouraging and did show some good results year after year (Table 13). The introduction of cash crop production, however, had far reaching repercussions, both across and within regions.

Table 13. Production of Principal Exports by Africans (Selected Years)

Kilimanjaro	Coffee (in tons)
1923-24	32
1926-27	80
1929-30	416
1934-35	1,275
1940-41	3,250
1944-45	3,275
1950-51	5,670
1955-56	6,577
1960-61	8,739

Mwanza	Cotton (in Kilos)
1905	9,975
1908	21,496
1911	164,402
1913	676,000

Bukoba	Coffee (in tons)
1904	---
1905	234
1909	280
1911	554
1912	681

Source: Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union Limited (annual report); Ralph A. Austen, Northwest Tanzania Under German and British Rule, pp. 270-1. Adopted from Rweyemamu op cit.: 18.

- First is the fact that it was only those regions that had good climatic conditions and arable land suitable for the production of the respective crops that benefited most from this innovation. Areas like Bukoba, Kilimanjaro, Mbeya and Mwanza regions benefited more than other regions in the country. In this way one can rightly assert that the introduction of cash crops led to the differential development typical of the country today:

Secondly, is the fact that within regions and districts, the move also had some impact especially on the pre-colonial communal modes of production and social formations. It led to the stratification of rural communities (Rweyemamu, op. cit.: 25-32).

(1) Traditional rulers used their position to get more land for themselves, their relatives and courtiers as against the rest of the population. They instituted new or modified old forms of land tenure to the advantage of the group.

(2) Profitable production of cash crops such as coffee meant bigger plots, a development which resulted into the emergence of non-communal forms of land tenure.

(3) The profitable production of cash crops by African peasants was also based not on changed and improved techniques of production, but on the use of more lands. This resulted into land pressure and scarcity, a development that in some cases, such as the Nyakyusa, changed the traditional inheritance laws and practices (Guliver, 1958).

(4) From then on, production for market exchange rather than for use began to dominate the village economy and all other social relationships became commercialized.

(5) The commercialization of agriculture also led to the embryonic formation of an African merchant (low turn-over retailers) class who acted as middlemen between the peasant producers and Asian and European representatives of foreign import and export houses and agencies.

4. Commerce and Industry

German and British ideas and policies on colonial development were very much dictated by their needs as major manufacturing and capital exporting countries. They needed cheap sources of raw materials for their industries and markets for their manufactured goods: while the respective governments needed funds to beat their ever-deteriorating economic problems, their business enterprises also needed areas of operations. As such there was a complementality of interests between the two. Tanganyika like any other colony, therefore, was supposed to be a supplier of raw materials for their industries and a market for their industrial manufactures. Her economic activities were therefore expected to supplement and complement the economic and industrial activities of the respective "mother" country rather than compete with them.

The above factors then, necessitated a situation where the nationals of Germany or Britain respectively had to control every economic activity in Tanganyika.

Commerce and Trade:

When the Germans occupied the country, Tanganyika's commerce and trade was still undeveloped. Internal trade was limited by inadequate communications while external trade was limited by both the above factor and the lack of suitable exports.

Internal trade was confined to barter while external trade consisted in the exchange of European goods for ivory and a few other local products (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 144).

This trade was largely controlled by well established Indian traders such as Sewa Hadji and a few Arabs on the coast operating mainly from Zanzibar. There were also few European established traders such as the Irish merchant Stokes.

On occupying the country, the Germans stimulated the growth of agricultural crops for exports and introduced money as a medium of exchange instead of barter. They also brought in new manufactured goods. By 1904 Africans were already growing various crops for exports. These included copra, sesame and cotton all valued at 1,357,327 marks. There was also sisal grown on plantations (571,739 marks), coffee (513,618 marks) and timber and rubber both valued at 2,308,000 marks. Within a few years trade improved tremendously as indicated in the Table below.

Table 14. Trade in German East Africa (in Million Marks)

	1906	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1912
Imports	25.2	23.8	25.8	33.9	38.7	45.9	50.3
Exports	11.0	12.5	10.9	13.1	20.8	22.4	31.4
Total	36.2	36.3	36.7	47.0	59.5	68.3	81.7

Source: Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 153

All the above import and export trade was dominated by a German trading monopoly, the Deutsche O Strafrika Gessellschaft which also

had the widest trading networks within the country. The company also used the services of Indians and a few Arabs to carry out trade in the remotest parts of the country.

When Britain took over the country after the end of World War I, British and a few other European, Japanese and Indian firms took over businesses that had hitherto been controlled by Germans. A network of trading oligopolies was established. These included Smith Mackenzies and Company Ltd.; Dalgety (East Africa Ltd.; International Trading and Credit Company of Tanganyika; Co-operative Supply Association of Tanganyika Ltd.; A. Baumann and Company (Tanganyika) Ltd.; Twentsche Overseas Trading Company Ltd.; and African Mercantile Company (Overseas) Ltd. Other companies included Wigglesworth and Company (Africa) Ltd.; British-American Tobacco (Tanganyika); Bata Shoe Company; Tanganyika Metal Box Company; Tanganyika Portland Cement and so many others.

Most of the above companies were subsidiaries of Multinational corporations (MNC's), most of them with their main East African offices in Nairobi rather than Dar es Salaam.

Agricultural crops such as sisal were handled by Kenyan based firms such as Ralli Brothers of Kenya which was a subsidiary of Ralli Brothers of London. Coffee, Tea and Cotton were sold to agents of foreign buyers such as Tanganyika Cotton (Tancot) Ltd. which was a subsidiary of the Lonrho (London Rhodesia) group and Brook Bond. Meat products were also the monopoly of foreign firms such as Liebig Extract of Meat Company and Mitchell Cotts of London (Rweyemamu, op. cit.: 29).

It was basically these same firms which handled the imports

into the colony.

In all their operations, these foreign firms-used Indian and few Arab middlemen. Africans were not to be trusted and as such were discriminated against by the Colonial Administrators. Rweyemamu (ibid.) points out how for instance wholesalers were forbidden to advance merchandise in excess of Tanzanian shillings (shs) 600/= to Africans while in schools commercial courses were reserved for Asians.

However, and mainly as a result of the introduction of cash crops, an embryonic formation of a small class of African merchants, mainly low turn-over retailers, took place. According to the 1961 Survey by Hawkins (1965: 34), there were 34,381 licensed African retail traders out of a total of 48,535 traders. These traders however accounted for less than one third of the total business turn-over.

It is also imperative for us to point out that most of the import and export trade was done with the Western world, mainly Britain and her dominions and colonies.

Industry

The needs of the colonial mother countries for raw materials for their industries and markets for their manufactured goods necessitated a policy of non-industrialization. When it took place (only during British colonization),* it was dictated by other needs such as preserving the fertility of the land by destocking and hence a beef packing industry, or the primary processing of agricultural materials so that they could be handled for export easily and cheaply.

*The Germans never encouraged any industrialization at all. They supplied the indigenous market with goods imported into the country from Germany and made by German manufacturers.

Basically Tanganyika's industrial needs were to be met by European imports, and when this was not economically feasible, by imports from Kenya which was being "developed" as a center for the British East African Periphery comprising of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar. Industrialization in the country was thus inhibited, mainly because of the pressure from British manufacturers.

The economic ideology of the period required both that colonial development be confined to forms of production which would not compete with British manufacturers and that colonial consumers prefer British commodities however uncompetitive. . . . This precluded any serious attempt to promote the secondary and tertiary economic activities which a long-term process of structural change towards full Industrialization would have required (Brett, op. cit.: 75).

The British administration looked at colonial economies as units to complement her own and as such had no desire to stimulate industrialization. Very few industries, therefore, were established in Tanganyika and this only after World War II due to the need to complement and supplement British manufactures rather than compete with them. Most of these were in the primary processing of raw materials and a few consumer goods as indicated in Table 15.

Even when established, most of these industries were owned and managed by foreign firms and individuals. Where this was not the case especially at the time of independence most owners were Tanzanians of Asian descent as has been clearly pointed out in Table 16.

5. Transport and Communications

In order to tap the resources in the interior and to facilitate the movement of goods and people from and within the country, a communications and transport network became a necessity. A railway network, road system and port facilities had to be initiated and built.

Table 15. Historical Review of Manufacturing Industries by Industrial Activity (Establishments Employing 10 Persons or More)

Code	Industrial Activity	Number of Establishments	Year of Commencement of Production		
			Pre-1946	1946-1960	1961-1965
ISIC		1965			
20	Food manufacture	125	15	71	39
21	Beverage industries	11	4	3	4
22	Tobacco manufacture	3	1	2	-
23	Textiles	158	50	66	42
24	Footwear and clothing	10	-	3	7
25	Wood except furniture	73	10	33	3
26	Furniture and fixtures	17	1	13	3
27-	Paper, printing, publishing	22	-	13	9
28					
29	Leather products	8	4	3	1
30	Rubber products	5	-	2	3
31	Chemicals and products	18	-	11	7
33	Non-metallic mineral products	9	1	5	3
34-	Metals and products	19	1	5	14
35					
36-	Repair of machinery	12	1	6	5
37					
38	Repair of transport equipment	73	11	43	19
39	Miscellaneous manufacture	6	2	-	4
	Total	569	101	279	189
	Percent	100	18	48	34

Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Survey of Industries (Dar es Salaam, Central Statistical Bureau, 1967), Table 5.

Adopted from Rweyemamu, op cit.: 112.

*Textiles include sisal decortication (110 establishments) and cotton ginning and cleaning (30 establishments). There was no textile establishment other than these two activities prior to 1961.

Table 16. Distribution of Share-holding in Manufacturing Processing Industries by Citizenship and Industrial Activity in 1965 (Establishments Employing 10 Persons or More)

Code, ISIC	Industrial Activity	No. of Est.	% 0*	Shares of noncitizens by No. of Est.		
				1-50	51-99	100
20	Food manufacturing	125	46	14	19	46
21	Beverage	11	5	1	--	5
22	Tobacco	3	1	--	1	1
23	Textiles	158	37	26	34	61
24	Footwear and clothing	10	4	2	--	4
25	Wood except furniture	73	27	7	11	28
26	Furniture and fixtures	17	6	--	--	11
27-28	Paper, printing, publishing	22	10	4	1	7
29	Leather products	8	3	--	--	5
30	Rubber products	5	--	1	3	1
31	Chemicals and products	18	4	1	5	8
33	Non-metallic minerals and products	9	1	--	2	6
34-35	Metals and products	19	6	3	1	9
36-37	Repair of machinery	12	2	1	1	2
38	Repair and assembly of transport	73	27	6	1	2
38	Miscellaneous manufacturing	6	2	1	1	2
	Total	569	181	67	95	226

Source: United Republic of Tanzania, Survey of Industries, 1965 (Dar es Salaam, Central Statistical Bureau, 1967). Adopted from Rwsyemamu (ibid.,: 115).

*Although all 181 establishments listed in this category are owned by Tanzanian citizens, it is only fair to state that the majority of these businessmen are of Asian descent who have acquired citizenship during the last few years.

Railways:

The Germans realized the need to open up the interior. This would facilitate the movement of the imported manufactured goods into, and agricultural and other raw materials from, the interior. The German government therefore undertook to build a Railway network.

Construction of the Usambara Railway from Tanga to Korogwe and to Mombo started in June 1893 and ended in 1905. This line was later extended to Buiko (1909) and by February 1912 had been extended to new Moshi at the foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. It was 352 Km. long in all.

Another company was also formed in 1904 to build the Dar es Salaam-Morogoro line which was completed by, and opened in, June 1907. An extension to Tabora from Morogoro was completed and opened by the Governor on July 27, 1912, while the final section of this line (the Central Railway) to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika was completed in March 1914 a few days before the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914.

On taking over the country after the First World War, the British continued to invest in the transport network which was also inclined towards African producing areas rather than European plantations. Extensions were built on the Central line: one from Tabora to Mwanza on Lake Victoria and another from Manyoni to Kinyangiri. The Usambara line was extended to Arusha. All these were intended to stimulate peasant production and to facilitate the movement of goods and potential laborers from place to place. During the later years of British administration, an extension from the Central Railway at Ruvu to Mnyusi on the Usambara railway was also initiated and built.

The operation of the Railway system was first under the colonial government and in 1932 an Advisory Board was set up to consider and deliberate on all matters relating to railway transportation in the country. In 1946 when the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) was formed under the East African High Commission, Railways, like Posts and Telegraph, Harbors and all other facilities, became common service department under the E.A.C.S.O. The East African Railways also operated some road (bus) services. On the eve of independence in 1960, the situation as regards Railway transport in Tanganyika was as indicated in Table 17.

Road Transport:

To complement, support and feed the railway system, roads had to be built. Road construction did in fact dominate the Public Works program under both German and British Colonial Administrations. Again roads were built towards the agricultural productive areas. By the end of 1960 the situation as regards Road Transport was as indicated in Table 18.

Apart from services operated by the Railway administration as indicated in Table 17 and the Dar es Salaam Motor Transport Company (DMT) which was a subsidiary of the Kenya Bus Services Company based in Nairobi, most of the road transport business was in the hands of Asians (Indians and Sikhs) and Arabs. These include the transport magnates like Singh of Mwanza who operates the Tanganyika Bus Service up to this moment, Hirji Shariff and later on his son Abdullah in Bukoba--whose business was the basis of the West Lake Bus Services, Rahemtulla Banji of Muleba, the Nanjis in Morogoro, Hashim in Tanga, Ali Said of Ngara and so many other small operators. Taxis in cities

Table 17. Railway Transport Services by 1960

(i) Railways	
(a) Length of Railway lines at 31st December, 1960:	
Total Mileage (including Sidings)	1,825
For details see the E.A. Railways and Harbours Annual Report for 1960.	
(b) Number of locomotives at 31st December, 1960 (excluding Tanga Line)*	
	112
(c) Number of goods wagon units at 31st December, 1960 (excluding Tangá line)*	
	3,147
(d) Number of coaching stock vehicles at 31st December, 1960 (excluding Tanga line)*	
	265
(e) Number of rail passengers conveyed in 1960 (including Tanga line)	
	1,451,134
(f) Originating tonnage of goods traffic during 1960 (rail only):	
	tons
Public tonnage originating from Central Line and Southern Province stations, including traffic booked through to Kenya and Uganda	610,099
(g) Total freight ton miles operated during 1960 (excluding Tanga line)	
	298,421,993

*Locomotives and rolling stock on the Tanga Line are interchangeable with Kenya and Uganda and can be supplemented as necessary.

Table 17. (Continued)

(ii) Railway Road Services	
(a) Route mileage at 31st December, 1960	2,611
(b) Total mileage of services operated at 31st December, 1959	2,945
(c) Number of goods service vehicles at 31st December, 1960:	
5 ton capacity	9
6 " "	32
8 " "	16
10 " "	19
	76
Trailers--Goods	17
Tankers	13
Tank Trailers	--
(d) Number of passenger vehicles at 31st December, 1960	60
(e) Number of domestic vehicles at 31st December, 1960	12
(f) Number of passengers carried during 1960	375,601
(g) Number of passenger miles operated during 1960	Not Available
(h) Tonnage of freight carried during 1960	42,537
(i) Freight ton mileage operated during 1960	9,884,069

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1960, pp. 67-68.

Table 18. Road Transport As at 31st December, 1960

(a) Mileage of roads classified according to type:	
Territorial Main Roads	3,774
Local Main Roads	5,176
District Roads	10,833
Village Roads	8,500
Roads in Municipalities and Townships	495
Roads in Other Settlements	186
Total	28,964
(b) Number of public and private cars licensed (including vans, pick-ups, boxbodies, Jeeps and Landrovers)	
	23,443
(c) Number of buses, lorries, etc., licensed (whether publicly or privately owned)	
	8,862
(d) Length of Motor Bus lines as at 31st December, 1960:	
Dar es Salaam Motor Transport Co. Ltd:	miles
Town Services	707
Country Services	2,240
E.A. Railways and Harbours Road Services	2,611
Services of other private bus companies not available.	
(e) Number of passengers conveyed by buses in 1960:	
Dar es Salaam Motor Transport Co. Ltd:	
Town Services	8,871,000
Country Services	94,000
E.A. Railways and Harbours Road Services	375,601
Services of other private bus companies not available.	

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report for 1960, op cit.: 67.

and towns were also owned by Indians such as Valji and Alibhai and Purshotams in Dar es Salaam.

The commercialization of agriculture had however led to the creation of a nucleus of African transporters which was to become very important after independence. Otherwise Africans were relegated to the position of drivers, mechanics, bus conductors and turn-boys.

Ports and Harbors:

The imports into and exports out of Tanganyika also led to the need for ports and harbor facilities through which they could be handled. Fortunately for this East African colony, there were several coastal points which were also good "natural" harbors. These included Dar es Salaam, Tanga, Lindi, Pangani, Mikindani, Bagamoyo and Kilwa. On inland waterways there was Mwanza, Musoma and Bukoba on Lake Victoria and Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika.

Both German and British administrations improved these ports. As early back as 1926, the following steamship lines are said to have called regularly at the above principal ports (Great Britain, Colonial Office, 1926: 67):

- (a) British India Steamship Company Ltd.
- (b) Union-Castle Mail Steamship Company Ltd.
- (c) Messageries Martime
- (d) Clam Ellerman Harrison Line
- (e) Holland East Africa Line
- (f) Deutsche ost-Afrika Linie
- (g) Italia Societa di Navigazione
- (h) Osaka Shosen Kaisha
- (i) Hall Line Ltd., and
- (j) Compagnia Italiana Transatlantica

Ports on Lake Victoria (Mwanza, Musoma and Bukoba) were visited by steamers of the Kenya-Uganda Railway Marine which after 1946 became under the East African Railways and Harbors Corporation of the

E.A.C.S.O. Steamers of the Grand Lacs Company operated trade on Lake Tanganyika while the S.S. Mwanza of the Tanganyika Railways carried passengers between Kigoma and the ports of Ufipa.

According to Table 19 which gives us a clear picture of the Shipping, Ports and Inland Waterways services as they existed at the end of 1960, all the vessels were owned by foreign firms and lines. Even the docks at Dar es Salaam, though owned by the Railway administration, were operated by three different shipping lines including Union-Castle, British India and the Tanganyika Boating Company which was owned by Holland Afrika Lijn.

The above policy measures pursued and effected by the respective colonial administrations had specific impacts and implications for the various numerous pre-colonial modes of production and social formations.

First was the grouping of various small nation states--based on ethnic groups known as tribes--into one bigger nation-state (which did cut across ethnic national boundaries and regions) first referred to as German East Africa and later on as Tanganyika.

Secondly was the integration of this nation-state into the World Capitalist system. This process resulted into the peripherization of the economy and the marginalization of the vast masses of the people of Tanganyika.

Thirdly, and much more important for our present study is the class structure resulting from the various colonial policies--which is the subject of our discussion in the next section of this chapter--and the proletarianization of a segment of the hitherto peasant population which we shall address ourselves to in the next chapter.

Table 19. Shipping, Ports and Inland Waterways

A. Maritime vessels registered in Tanganyika as at 31st December, 1959		
B. Tonnage discharged from and loaded at maritime ports in all ships during 1960:		
Discharged		552,000 tons
Loaded		588,000 tons
C. Number and net Registered Tonnage of Ships entered in Internal and External Trade from 1st October, 1959, to 30th September, 1960, at Maritime Ports		
<u>Nationality</u>	<u>No. of Ships</u>	<u>Net Registered Tonnage</u>
British	2,004	2,632,376
Dutch	456	1,237,271
American	112	510,101
French	101	480,300
German	73	201,240
Italian	76	343,881
Norwegian	72	229,609
Belgian	23	111,878
Japanese	112	447,436
Indian	19	49,107
Swedish	18	45,979
Zanzibarain	158	39,570
Panamanian	3	18,903
Greek	-	-
Israel	23	26,176
Danish	41	14,626
South African	-	-
Arabian	9	827
Costa Rican	-	-
Ethiopian	8	6,000
Liberian	2	14,190
Spanish	2	8,292
Portuguese	1	5
Total	3,313	6,417,767
D. Number of passengers embarked and disembarked during 1960 (maritime ports):		
Embarked		24,708
Disembarked		29,608
E. Length of navigable inland waterways:		
Lake Tanganyika		343 miles
Lake Victoria		830 miles

Table 19. (Continued)

F. Vessels used on inland waterways at 31st December, 1960:

Lake Tanganyika

- 1 Steamer of 1,200 tons displacement.
- 1 Diesel tug of 40 tons displacement.
- 3 Lighters each of a capacity of 100 tons of cargo.
- 1 bulk oil lighter of a capacity of 150 tons.
- Large number of native vessels not registered.

Lake Victoria*

- 3 Steamers each of approximately 1,300 tons displacement.
- 3 Motor vessels of 800 tons, 320 tons and 190 tons displacement.
- 1 Motor vessel (tanker) of 600 tons displacement.
- 4 Steam tugs, 3 of 200 tons and 1 of 160 tons displacement.
- 2 Motor tugs of 90 and 20 tons displacement.
- 3 Motor launches and motor vessels of various displacements less than 100 tons.
- 1 Motor ferry of 40 tons displacement.
- 8 Small motor boats and launches.
- 42 Lighters of different capacities.
- 58 Native vessels (sail) of a total of 960 tons displacement.

G. Number of fishing vessels in inland waterways registered and unregistered as at 31st December, 1960:

No craft are registered as fishing vessels only, but many of the native vessels registered undertake fishing, together with large numbers of unregistered canoes.

H. Tonnage loaded on inland waterways during the year 1960:

Lake Tanganyika	7,858 tons
Lake Victoria**	245,262 tons

I. Number of passengers carried on inland waterways during 1960:

	I	II	III
Lake Tanganyika	566	1,075	22,895
Lake Victoria**	9,474	18,551	336,413

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report for 1960, op cit.: 71, 72.

*Operating in all three East African Territories except in the case of native vessels the number of which is for Tanganyika Territory only.

**For the whole lake (i.e. not only for places in Tanganyika).

C. The Resulting Class Structure*

At the time of Independence, Tanzania society can be said to have been roughly stratified as follows:

(a). The Upper Class: This group was basically the representatives of the metropolitan bourgeoisie which was resident outside Tanzania and was mainly of European stock. It was composed mainly of higher echelon colonial administrators and functionaries, agents and representatives of the big import/export houses and commercial firms and the numerous plantation and settler farmers. In the 1957 census, this European population amounted to 20,598 persons of which about 70 per cent were of British nationality, 1,300 Greeks and 1,174 Italians. Out of that total European population 3,356 were senior government administrators, functionaries, technicians and professionals. At this point let us also point out that while all of these members of the upper class were mainly of European stock, a few Asians (Indians and Pakistanis) had managed to buy their position into this group, especially during the times of economic depression when the European businessmen, planters and settlers could not get any financial support from the mother country. Thus this group can be said to have been stratified or differentiated as follows:

- (i) The colonial administrators and functionaries all of them citizens of Great Britain and her Dominions.
- (ii) Representatives and agents of the big foreign import/export houses and other commercial and shipping firms. While the

*As pointed out earlier in Chapter I, the above class structure has been arbitrarily developed for the purpose of this study. Someone else with a different problem to study and coming from a different orientation might come out with a different structure.

majority of these were British citizens, others came from other European countries.

- (iii) Plantation owners and settler farmers. Again this group was composed of the various nationalities including British, Italians, Greeks, Germans, South African Dutch and many others.

Depending on their various positions and functions, their outlooks should definitely have been different. For instance, the representatives of the British Colonial Administration were much more concerned with the smooth administration and exploitation of the country through "native" institutions ranging from Native Administration to peasant production. The plantation owners and settler farmers on the other hand were interested in measures that would ensure a steady supply of labor for their plantations and farms irrespective of whether they disrupted the native institutions which colonial administrators such as Governors Byatt and Cameron were interested in preserving. Representatives of the various imports/export houses and commercial firms were definitely interested in the smooth flow of trade and as such were more interested in things like communication and transport systems as well as the establishment of the commercial infrastructure to facilitate trade and commerce.

And again there were differences in terms of nationalities with the British citizens for instance being hostile to German settlers whom they feared had come back to facilitate the re-taking over of the Colony by their Government, suspicions that climaxed into actual hostilities during the Second World War.

- (b) The Commercial Bourgeoisie: This was composed of mainly Asian

(Indian, Pakistan, Arabs, Goanese) Somali and other colored commercial middlemen and retail traders. According to the 1957 Census, there were 65,461 Indian, 6,299 Pakistani, 4,776 Goan, 19,100 Arabs, 3,114 Somalis, 2,257 colored and 1,525 other nationalities in Tanganyika. The predominant group amongst them however were the Indian and Pakistani nationals who dominated in the field of commerce and trade.

Some of these were descendants of Indian mariners who ventured to East Africa before the European arrival. Otherwise, most of them came to East Africa in the nineteenth century, specifically from about 1840 when Sultan Seyyid Said moved his court from Muscat to Zanzibar. He brought with him many Indian traders to help him organize his commercial business. These included Moslems from Bombay and a number of Hindus from the west coast of India. By 1866, the Indian community, many of whom had made fortunes numbered 6,000 in the Sultan's East African empire (MacDonald, 1966: 218). One of those who had made it was the Sultan's collector under the name of Jariam Shivji who left behind a sum of \$2 million when he died in 1866. As time went by, the Indian community monopolized almost everything in commerce. A much more succinct position of the Indian monopolization of commerce has been clearly put up by MacDonald when he asserts:

The Indian community had gradually taken over all small business in Tanganyika. Each village had at least one duka run by a Hindu or Moslem trader. When the Germans evacuated during World War I, the Asians had the means to buy their property, so they acquired most of the real estate in Dar es Salaam, and many of the German sisal plantations. By 1924, Asians owned more than a quarter of a million acres of land in the territory. When World War II broke out in 1939, it was estimated that Asians controlled more than \$10 million in property including 80 percent of the sisal and cotton industries, 90 percent of all town property, 55 percent of the import and export trade and 80 percent of the transport services (ibid.: 221).

Unlike in-Kenya, there was no discrimination against Asians in Tanganyika. Though within certain limits, the Asians were politically active. Under the 1945 Constitution for instance, three of the fourteen non-official members of the Legislative Council represented the Asian community, a trend that was made even better in 1955 when the thirty nominated members of the Legislative Council represented European, Asian, and African communities equally. The Independence Constitution gave nine seats in the National Assembly to the Asians, eleven to the Europeans and fifty to the Africans. The first speaker of the first elected Legislative Council in March 1959 was the Hon. A.Y.A. Karimjee, a well known Moslem Indian whose family had been in East Africa for five generations (ibid.: 219).

It would however be very misleading to assume that all Indians were a single hegemonious group and therefore with similar outlooks and interest. This is far from being true due to the fact that the various groupings and castes as existed in 'mother' India were also duplicated in Tanganyika. At the time of Independence, the Asian community, estimated at about 100,000 was divided into various castes or groups as follows:

- (i) Hindus - These were the majority and most of them belonged to the ancient Bhattia trading caste.
- (ii) Moslems - about 25,000 of them for whom the Aga Khan was spiritual leader.
- (iii) Sikhs - although the majority of the 20,000 East African Sikhs lived in Kenya, there were a few thousand living in Tanganyika. These are mainly an artisan class composed of several mechanics, carpenters, masons and railwaumen

(ibid.: 218).

(iv) Goans - there were about 10,000 of them in East Africa.

These are mainly Roman Catholics and filled clerical posts.

They preferred to be linked with Portuguese rather than Indians.

A much more detailed and sophisticated differential analysis of the Asian "commercial bourgeoisie" has been made by Shivji (1976: 45-48) as follows:

The Asian community could be divided into four strata according to wealth and property, income and status. The upper stratum consisted of the large estate and plantation owners, big wholesalers and produce merchants, and a few really "successful" professionals such as lawyers, doctors, and accountants. These were the richest of the community, living in expensive bungalows, with chauffeur-driven cars, and their sons and daughters studying in the UK. It was essentially a narrow stratum largely because of the relatively low level of the economy itself but also because an important segment of the industrial enterprises in the country was controlled by the Kenya--and Uganda--based Asians.

The second much broader stratum, consisted of prosperous businessmen, well-to-do professionals, highly paid civil servants and managers and executives, etc., employed by foreign companies. The last, strictly speaking, formed the comprador class. It is important to note that it was mainly the Asians and not the Africans who comprised this comprador class for this would help to explain why there was hardly any opposition from the African petty bourgeoisie against the 1967 nationalization measures affecting the foreign and Asian interests.

The third stratum was composed of the small retailers, self-employed people supplying various services like tailors, shoemakers, etc., middle-level public employees, and the skilled craftsmen.

The fourth level, narrower than the second and third, consisted of mainly "manual" workers--mostly carpenters, masons, poor retailers in the countryside areas, and self-employed people like pot-makers, repairers, and so on (ibid.: 45).

(c) The Indigenous Classes: This was composed of the native population who according to the 1957 census numbered 8,665,336.

Through deliberate colonial policies this group was also further differentiated and stratified in order as follows:

- (i) The chiefs or traditional feudal ruling group. Elsewhere in this chapter we demonstrated how this sub-group used its traditional base of legitimacy and both pax-Germannica and pax-Britannica to enrich itself as against the rest of the population. When the production of cash crops was introduced, they used their positions to get the best lands for themselves, their relatives and courtiers. They were paid a good salary and got preferential treatment from government functionaries and agricultural extension workers as well as credit facilities.
- (ii) The Educated Elite - these were mainly primary school teachers, clerks and messengers. At the time of independence, few others had managed to climb up into the middle income group of the Civil Service. This group constituted the backbone of the leadership in the nationalist (political and working-class) movement. This group can however also be said to have been divided into two groups accordingly: First were those members of the educated class who had been groomed to take over the various positions once the colonial administrators left. They had been taught similar bureaucratic values as those of their mentors. They were not allowed to join the nationalist movement led by "communist agitators" and the like. They were supposed to be the "good boys" of their colonial masters whether consciously or otherwise. Then there were some few members

of the educated elite who joined and in most cases provided leadership to the nationalist movement (political party and trade unions). They grew up in the struggle of the peoples of Tanzania and their outlook was in turn shaped by the pressing needs and demands of their people which they saw being met only after the total overhauling of the colonial system and replacing it with better people's institutions. This group was also further differentiated between leaders of the working-class movement and those of the nationalist political movement; each group with different outlook of the future society as we shall see later on in the next two chapters. They however united to fight their immediate and common enemy--colonialism.

- (iii) The Workers - mainly those working as laborers on European sisal, coffee and other plantations plus a very few of them in industries and administration and office hands. Most of these were unskilled workmen working mainly on plantations. By 1960 this group totaled 315,252 and was stratified and differentiated accordingly as clearly demonstrated in Table 20.
- (iv) The Peasantry - these were (are) mainly small-holding food and cash crop producers and form the bulk of the indigenous population. Since most of the crops were based on small-holding production units, it would be very unfair to talk of the emergence of the Kulak class as some people (Shivji, op. cit.: 50-52) would like us to believe. It is true a few individuals had plots big enough to make more money

Table 20. Composition of Economically Active Population According to Occupation (ii) Adult Africans in 1960

Occupation	Employees
Administrative and executive workers	3,190
Professional workers	6,740
Clerical	10,616
Office and store	9,151
Mechanics and fitters	5,869
Drivers	9,083
Carpenters and joiners	4,687
Masons and bricklayers	5,068
Other skilled workmen	23,336
Domestics (butlers and stewards, waiters in clubs, schools, etc.)	4,275
Headmen/Foremen	12,261
Unskilled workmen	215,055
Unclassified	5,981
Total	315,252 ¹

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Tanganyika under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Report for 1960: 10.

¹In addition to the above there were approximately 35,000 domestic servants in private households.

than others, but these were very few and did not make that much. After all the plantations were owned by European settlers and a few Indian plantation owners.

Amongst better to do peasants were also some who emerged as small traders and merchants and some owned one lorry or a tractor. These however did all these other activities while remaining tied to the land. It was only in towns and other urban centers that a section of them looked at their activities as the basis of their livelihood. But even these still retained their plots in the rural areas where they continued to make some small investments hoping to retire there once they were spent out. At least this was the case with most people coming from the well to do regions such as Bukoba, Kilimanjaro and Mbeya. This group however was to become very enterprising after independence as they began to move into areas that had hitherto been the monopoly of Indians through the "Africanization" of the economy.

- (v) The Semi Proletariat - those who were hired as casual or part-time workers and as such had no permanent jobs. A lot of peasants had their lands alienated, evicted and placed in reserves. Some managed to get some jobs while others could not. As such they began to move from place to place looking for jobs that were in most cases not permanent. Plantation agriculture for instance required seasonal labor. So were the ports and docks which after the shipping of cash crop season became dormant and as

such could not support all the busy season work force.

- (vi) The Lumpen-Proletariat - these were composed of those landless peasants who could not get any jobs at all. Their lands had been alienated while the system could not provide an alternative occupation to them. These roamed the villages and urban centers looking for jobs that were not there.

Clear cut divisions in the above class are, however, very difficult to make for some of the various differentiations were somehow interrelated and complementary.

It should also be obvious that class structure in Tanzania coincided and overlapped with ethnic and race lines, a fact that some people (Patel) have tended to obscure. Also important to stress is the fact that the above class divisions were reinforced by various deliberate economic, social, and political discrimination and segregationist measures such as separate residential areas, different schools, hospitals, clubs etc. as well as a racial salary structure in the public and imitatively in the private sector (Rweyemamu, op. cit.: 30). The 1947-48 Holmes Commission which was called upon to inquire into the "Civil Service Structure and Salaries in East Africa" for instance recommended different salary structures for different racial groups on the pretext that:

the European surpasses the Asian in such matters as sense of public service, judgment and readiness to take responsibility, and subject to individual exception the African is at the present time markedly inferior to the Asian in the same educational qualifications in such matters as sense of responsibility, judgment, application to duty and output of work (ibid.: 30).

Such then was the class structure as it existed in pre-Independence Tanganyika.

CHAPTER IV

THE EMERGENCE OF THE WORKING CLASS AND THE FORMATION OF TRADE UNIONS IN TANZANIA

In this chapter an attempt will be made to look into the process through which a segment of the hitherto peasant population of the Tanganyika was proletarianized, thus resulting in the embryonic formation of a working class. Of specific interest to us will be the resulting working class actions and the formation of trade unions. Before going into that, we must however make a few points clear.

In the last chapter we (at least impliedly) demonstrated that colonial exploitation of the country was based on agriculture, of which the plantation sector played a very important role by contributing to exports and by providing wage employment to many landless peasants.

This had far reaching impacts and implications. Of crucial importance is the fact that plantation agriculture attracted migrant labour only. People came to work for a few shillings with which to meet their pressing monetary needs--taxes, dowry, bride-price, school fees for their children, etc.--and went back to their rural communities where they usually grew their food and, sometimes, cash crops. This meant that only a few--mostly needy--peasants came to work in the plantations, and this only for a specified time. After all this was in the interest of the plantation industry whose activities were also seasonal. This in turn had far reaching influence on the Tanzanian

labour force. As Rweyemamu (op. cit.: 22) rightly asserts: "the plantation system failed to bring about the (total) proletarianization of the African peasantry." All this, coupled with poor working conditions and very low wages, the fact that some "natives" (e.g., in Kilimanjaro, Masai, Pare and Usambara) were not suitable material for plantation work, as well as the alternative of growing cash crops on the part of the majority of the peasantry, reduced the potential source of labor for the plantations and settler farms.

All in all, the plantation system led to (ibid.: 22-23):

- (i) The excessive introduction of capital intensive techniques of production. Thus, when the unions and the independent TANU government pressed and negotiated for more wages, the planters and settler farm owners were able to lay off many workers without jeopardizing their ever-increasing output.
- (ii) The policy of paying very low wages pursued by the plantation owners was to lead to the continuation of the unskilled character of the Tanzanian labor force which was also characterized by lack of initiative, absenteeism, and low productivity.
- (iii) The major cause of absenteeism, lack of initiative and low output of the Tanzanian labour force was thus the nature of the plantation system rather than traditional social values.
- (iv) The system of migrant labour prevented initiative and inventiveness in the traditional sector so that "a vicious circle was built upon with poverty compelling migration and migration in turn hindering the alleviation of poverty."

A. The Emergence of the Tanzanian Working Class

Like elsewhere in Africa, the working class in Tanzania did not develop spontaneously, but was a result of a deliberate colonial policy and capitalist penetration of the pre-colonial modes of production and social formations pertaining in the country before European contact and subsequent colonization.

Both Germany and (later on) Britain needed a labour force to help them in the exploitation of the country. On coming to Tanganyika, the Germans for instance needed potters, carriers, junior clerks, attendants, combat soldiers (askaris) and several other types of workers to help them administer and exploit their newly-acquired possession. Of major concern to them was the need for plantation labour.

With the introduction of public works and the inauguration of building the railway system in 1905, the need for manual and unskilled cheap labour arose. At first they depended on Indian labour but soon found it insufficient. This prompted them to take specific measures aimed at making the peasant dependent on the sale of their labour for subsistence rather than growing their own food, and later on, cash crops, so as to ensure a sufficient supply of labour. And this they did through many devices as follows (Rweyemamu, op. cit.; Iliffe, op. cit.; Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.; Chidzero, op. cit.; and Brett, op. cit.):

1. First was the alienation of hitherto community lands and the eviction of the former owners who were clustered in reserves with the hope that they would begin looking for wage employment at the labour market. The Germans alone are said to have alienated about 2 million acres of land. The British on their part also alienated large

agricultural and livestock development and mining lands as indicated in the last chapter (Table 9).

The response from the indigenous population was very little and in most cases negative due to the following factors:

- (a) First is the fact that most Africans continued to grow their food crops. They also had the alternative of producing cash crops to meet their monetary needs rather than work on plantations which would destroy their traditional social organization and relations of production at the village community.
- (b) Secondly is the fact that wages given by the plantation owners and settler farmers were very low and most people ran to Kenya where wages were better.

Wage income promised by the plantation interests not only fell short of what an African would need to support his family but were also unreliable as well (Rweyemamu, op. cit.: 19).

Even by the end of 1935, the wages given were not higher than they had been at the beginning of the century as indicated in Table 21.

- (c) Thirdly is that terms and conditions of work on plantations were also very poor and unsatisfactory. On the sisal plantations for instance, workers were subjected to severe bruises and scratches from the spikes of sisal. And due to their illiteracy, the Africans were wooed into entering labour contracts whose contents they did not understand, and once they had entered these contracts were subjected to harsh punishment for breaking them.

Table 21. Wages Paid to Various Categories of Labour, 1935

PROVINCE	Prevailing Rates of Wages Per Month		Porter Rate Per Day	Ration Rate Per Day	
	Skilled Labour	Unskilled Labour			
	-Shs-	-Shs-	-Cts-	-Cts-	
Central	20-60	10-45	5-15	20-50	10-20
Eastern	15-100	10-45	6-15	30-60	10-20
Iringa	25-200	12-30	6-12	30-50	20
Lake	20-150	7-30	5-15	20-50	05-20
Northern	25-60	12-30	6-15	30-50	10-20
Southern	15-80	12-30	6-15	30	10-20
Tanga	20-80	13-20	4-15	30-40	20
Western	12-70	9-30	4-12	20-50	05-20

Source: Labour Department (Tanganyika) Annual Report for 1935: 87.

Reporting on the conditions of work in the plantations after the British took over Tanganyika, a British Annual Medical Report for 1924 has it that:

On arrival at the plantations, the labourers were turned on to build any sort of shelter, and within a day or two were put to work. The diet issued was deficient in quality and variety, and there was no adequate arrangement for hospital accomodation, medical attention, water supplies, kitchens, latrines, etc. As a consequence, dysentery, bowel troubles and deaths ensued, and the proportion rendered unfit was large (Rweyemamu, op. cit.: 19).

The settlers were interested in quick large profits and as such were unwilling to increase wages or improve working conditions.

The above factors led to negative response, and to some instances resistance, from the indigenous populations towards plantation labour. The Germans therefore, had to look for other means to force Africans into accepting wage employment.

2. The introduction of a hut and poll tax: This was issued under the 1897 taxation ordinance and was also re-enacted by the British in 1922. The purpose of the taxation measures was to: "oblige Africans to accept paid labour and accustom themselves to European administration" (Iliffe, op. cit.: 160). The move also failed in that Africans preferred to get money for their taxes from the sale of their cash crops. As the African saying goes, they preferred to "grow" their tax rather than work for it on plantations or elsewhere. The Germans responded to this by introducing two other measures as indicated below.

3. Specific measures were taken to bar Africans from growing certain cash crops (especially coffee in the Northern Province) so as to limit the Africans' source of money thereby forcing them to look

for employment. This measure was as indicated elsewhere, due to pressure from plantation owners:

settler pressure against the development of market crops by Africans is strong in Kenya and Rhodesia, and although their influence is less in Tanganyika, settlers here spoke bitterly to us of the right of Africans to produce coffee which they felt should be a monopoly of Europeans (Wilson and Wilson, 1945: 137).

The above move was followed by another and somehow related one.

4. The Introduction of Preferential tariff for the benefit of European planters and against African producers by subjecting their cash crops to export duties. As clearly demonstrated by Michael Yaffey (1967: 6) the 1911-12 German Annual Report has it that,

the incidence of the export duties falls almost exclusively upon the indigenous population, as the produce of European planters is exempt from duty. Also among the import commodities, most of the duty is borne by necessities imported for the coloured population, especially textiles.

All the above measures however proved ineffective and the Colonial governments resorted to another measure.

5. Forced Labour: In order to alleviate the labour shortage, the Germans introduced the "WILHEMSTAL SYSTEM" under which Africans had to work for one month in every four either on a plantation of their own choice or on public works (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 144). In Western Usambara each person was issued a labour card (Kipande) which required him to spend 30 days on a plantation. In Morogoro, Iliffe (op. cit.: 160) talks of a system under which village headmen were instructed:

to produce a certain number of workers for a specified plantation in proportion to the number of inhabitants of their village. . . . These regulations . . . (were) carried out with energy, if necessary by an askari . . . (and) . . . are based on agreement between planters and district officers.

Certain areas were however exempted from the forced labour system.

All in all, the Germans were very ruthless in implementing all the measures, a process that was to step up African resistance, as explained by the number of Africans who fled to Kenya where wages were comparatively higher as well as the Maji Maji rising (Gwassa, op. cit.).

The above moves however managed to have an impact on the number of "native" wage earners. By 1909-10, there were already 70,000 wage earners and by 1912-13 this had increased to 172,000. The largest group was plantation workers (80,000), porters (20,000), employees of railway contractors and railway companies (21,000), employees of commercial firms (10,000), domestic servants (9,000) and askaris serving in the Defense Force and Police (6,000) (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 152).

Such then was the situation when the First World War broke out in 1914. On taking over from the Germans after World War I, the British Colonial administration was much more concerned with the revival of the economic life of the colony which had been disrupted by the War.

The British retained the labour laws left by the Germans, though with a desire to repeal or modify them at a later time.

It was the British colonial government, however, which was to take the lead in improving conditions of work. Compulsory labour for private purposes was restricted while natives could pay their tax obligations through a period of labour on roads and necessary works of advantages to the community. The government also immediately appointed a Commission to look into wage rates of its unskilled employees. Following the results of this Commission, the Administration announced fixed rates of pay for its own unskilled employees effective from

January 1, 1922. This was followed by the appointment of a Permanent Labour Board to deal with matters related to rates of pay for government unskilled employees throughout the country.

The following year, November, 1923, the Administration enacted a Masters and Native Servants Ordinance with certain provisions similar to those of the British Workmen's Compensation Act.

The Act was designed to safeguard the interests of the native employee and, on the other hand, to ensure that the workman shall carry out the services which he has agreed to perform. It bonds the employer to provide food, cooking utensils, water supply and proper housing accommodations where the native is not resident of his home . . . to supply medicine and where necessary medical attendance when sick . . . to make compensation for bodily injuries received by the servant in the course of his employment unless they are caused by the servants' negligence . . . to pay wages monthly and pay for the servants fare home at the end of the contract (Colonial Office, (Tanganyika) Annual Report for 1923: 19).

Under the Act, the period of contract was limited to six months, but an employee could, if he wished, renew it for a further period provided the renewal was attested by a magistrate just as if a new contract was being signed.

But the Africans were illiterate and as such could not understand the terms of the contract, while on claiming compensation for damages inflicted upon them in their duties, it was always easily proven that was caused by their negligence, to wit they were punished for bringing up "unfounded" accusations against their "considerate" and "clean" employers.

In 1924, the Administration appointed Maj. G. St. J. Orde Brown, O.B.E., a special Labour Commissioner to investigate labour conditions in plantations and in districts where labour was recruited, as well as consulting with the several Planters' Associations as to their needs and difficulties, and generally of collecting information and

submitting recommendations that would serve as a basis for a Permanent Labour Commission.

Despite the above measures, the various private employers and government continued to experience a labour shortage. Something had to be done, and in 1926, two specific measures were taken.

First was the formation of a Permanent Labour Department under a Labour Commissioner (Maj. Orde Brown), an Assistant Labour Commissioner and three Labour Officers. Its headquarters were in Morogoro and other offices were opened at Muheza (to serve the sisal plantation Province of Tanga) and Kilosa where a labour camp to accommodate natives going for recruitment or returning from plantations was also opened.

The functions of the new department included:

- (i) Collection of information and compilation of statistics concerning labour requirements and the supply of labour.
- (ii) Examine labour conditions and advise employers on all aspects of the supply and care of labourers.
- (iii) Supervise and consider the effects of existing and proposed labour legislation.
- (iv) Make recommendations on the care of labourers both during their employment and while travelling to and from their work (Harlow, Chilver and Smith, op. cit.: 584).

The second measure taken to alleviate the shortage of labour during 1926 was the enactment of a new Masters and Native Servant's Ordinance. The new ordinance made the payment of wages in cash compulsory and required employers to report serious injuries sustained by their employees to the Labour Department. It also redefined the contract from a defined time to performance based on a certain number of days

work within a certain reasonable time.

During the year (1926) Governor Cameron while calling upon administrative officers to urge their people to work in their fields, went further to say that where this was not possible the people could offer their services first to government when work was available, and when it was not, to private employers.

Within the next three years or so, the labour supply condition improved, and in 1931 the Labour Department was abolished. The increase in plantation agriculture and gold mining in the 1930's however, led to further need for labour and once again the question of working conditions became a matter of great concern for the government.

Thousands of Africans were involved in the alluvial gold mining in the Lupa gold mines, often as employees of men with very limited capital and as such not in a good position to give better wages and guarantee reasonable working conditions.

The resulting labour supply shortage forced the government to resort to compulsory labour for its various projects and outlays as indicated in Table 22

In 1937 the government appointed a Committee to look into the questions of the supply and welfare of labourers, and its work resulted into the establishment of a standing Labour Advisory Board in 1933 under the Chief Inspector of Labour. Its activities were however, disrupted by the beginning of the Second World War in 1939-1945 during which labour was displaced and the source of supply disrupted. And again in 1944 and 1945 the government had to resort to forced conscription of labour for industries engaged in essential production as indicated in Table 23.

Table 22. Compulsory Labour for 1936, 1937 and 1938

Year	Type of Work	Number Employed	Total Number Of Man-Days Worked
1936	1. Porters	6,809	42,317
	2. Others	957	8,754
1937	1. Porters	2,622	9,168
	2. Others	32,056	340,533
1938	All (Porters and others)	12,475	365,934

Source: Labour Department (Tanganyika) Annual Reports for 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1938.

N.B. In addition to the above figures there were those people employed on various essential works and services for periods equivalent to amount of taxes due. In 1935 a total of 36,144 in 1936 a total of 28,307 men were such employed.

Table 23. Conscription of Labour for Essential Industries 1944, 1945

	1944	1945
Production of Sisal	12,054	7,171
Production of Rubber	7,502	7,428
Production of Essential Foodstuffs and Pyrethrum	11,206	6,572
Essential Public Services	839	1,708
TOTAL	31,601	22,879

Source: Labour Department, Annual Report for 1945, Government Printers, Dar es Salaam.

All in all however, the number of workers continued to rise, and according to the second census on "natives in employment" held on February 15, 1945 there were a total of 342,000 natives, including 11,472 women and 21,924 juveniles in wage employment. The labour force still reflected a bias towards plantation and settler agriculture as Table 24 indicates.

Table 24. A Summary of the 342,000 Strong Labour Force for 1945 and 1944

Industry or Occupation	YEAR	
	1945	1944
1. Sisal	102,478	97,375
2. Rubber	21,235	17,344
3. Essential Foodstuffs	23,364	24,879
4. Agriculture and stock farming (Other than 1, 2 and 3)	40,144	30,884
5. Trade, transport and industrial Establishment	14,087	14,618
6. Timber production, fuel and saw milling	14,982	11,578
7. Mining	17,560	20,884
8. Miscellaneous (including wharf)	18,584	21,895
9. Public Service	64,766	56,685
10. Domestic Servants (estimated)	25,000	24,300
TOTAL	342,200	320,442

Source: Department of Labour, Annual Report for 1945: 7.

One of the interesting developments in the 1940's however, was the Kongwa Groundnuts scheme undertaken by the British Overseas Development Corporation. The succession of cargo steamers bringing men and machines for the whole project which led to the crowding into Dar es Salaam harbour in 1947 was the basis of an army of dockworkers, teamsters, and truckmen (Macdonald, op. cit.: 138).

The workers were also differentiated, categorized and paid

according to industry and skills as indicated in Table 25 and Table 26.

Even at this time however, there was still a labour shortage especially as regards portorage and the government still conscripted compulsory labor to meet its needs (see Table 27).

At this stage it must be quite apparent that:

- (i) The creation of a wage labour force in Tanganyika, just like elsewhere in Africa is basically a product of European economic activity and the institution of colonial administration.
- (ii) That while many Africans aspired to jobs in the colonial civil service, other forms of wage labour were, not surprisingly, less popular as reflected in the unwillingness of, and sometimes resistance by, Africans to engage in wage labour.
- (iii) That this in turn led to the introduction and instigation of certain measures to force the Africans to engage in wage labour, and
- (iv) That through a combination, then of the disruption of the pre-colonial economies, the introduction of taxes, as well as the opening up of other economic alternatives, and later on the changed conditions in the labour market, a relatively stable wage and salary earning class emerged in Tanganyika, and
- (v) That this labouring class emerged in conditions that were definitely very different from those pertaining in Europe and later on the United States during the emergence of the proletariat classes in these countries (Sandbrook and Cohen, op. cit.: 13-15).

Table 25. Distribution of Employment of All Adult African Males by Occupations and Industries in the Territory, 1953.

INDUSTRY	OCCUPATION										TOTAL	
	Clerical	Office and Store	Mechanics and Fitters	Drivers	Carpenters and Joiners	Masons and Bricklayers	School Teachers	Headmen	Other Skilled Workers	Unskilled		Domestics
A. AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY, HUNTING AND FISHING DIVISION												
A. Agricultural and Livestock Production Group:												
(i) Coffee	127	115	46	202	133	130	4	507	179	10,756	--	12,199
(ii) Cocoa	12	8	4	25	9	15	--	55	16	1,345	--	1,489
(iii) Cotton (including ginning)	37	29	111	68	29	31	--	62	95	2,648	--	3,110
(iv) Peanuts	19	21	14	35	26	30	6	124	23	2,219	--	2,517
(v) Pyrethrum	16	14	3	23	28	25	3	65	9	1,197	--	1,283
(vi) Rubber	--	--	--	--	2	1	--	3	--	83	--	91
(vii) Sisal	1,166	759	2,256	1,578	774	1,812	45	5,592	2,262	110,422	--	126,666
(viii) Staple Foodstuffs	210	151	179	568	154	190	7	638	653	13,632	--	16,362
(ix) Stock and dairy farming	40	17	18	108	52	70	--	92	99	2,610	--	3,106
(x) Sugar (including Jaggery)	42	49	98	83	23	27	7	235	11	3,450	--	4,025
(xi) Tea	81	66	52	36	117	127	12	373	40	5,304	--	6,210
(xii) Tobacco	47	21	24	95	49	162	11	157	87	2,264	--	2,917
(xiii) Hatfle	15	3	15	25	22	21	--	34	16	773	--	924
(xiv) Other	43	19	24	48	14	27	--	52	118	1,092	--	1,437
TOTAL OF GROUP	1,856	1,273	2,844	2,896	1,432	2,668	95	7,989	3,608	157,695	--	182,356
B. Forestry and Logging Group:												
(i) Fuel	19	4	2	21	--	--	--	9	10	858	--	931
(ii) Mangrove	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
(iii) Other	--	6	--	1	--	--	--	--	6	35	--	48
TOTAL OF GROUP	19	10	2	22	--	--	--	9	24	893	--	979

C. Hunting, Trepping, Game Protection and Fishing Group

	1,875	1,284	2,847	2,921	1,433	2,668	95	8,000	3,638	198,011	2	6	223	237
TOTAL OF DIVISION	1,875	1,284	2,847	2,921	1,433	2,668	95	8,000	3,638	198,011	2	6	223	237
1. Mining and Quarrying														
Division:														
(i) Diamond	52	53	12	92	154	235	2	78	203	3,019				3,900
(ii) Gold	108	86	141	64	50	96	2	177	791	3,769				5,284
(iii) Lead	71	50	75	27	44	40		115	390	1,273				2,085
(iv) Hica	23	22	23	19	24	4		74	332	900				1,428
(v) Tin	9	3	3	7	5			9	50	543				629
(vi) Quarrying	23	22	20	32	3	3	2	45	159	1,202				1,511
(vii) Other	14	11	12	28	11	20		99	28	1,504				1,807
TOTAL OF DIVISION	300	247	286	268	291	298	6	597	1,953	12,209				16,444
2-3 Manufacturing Division:														
(i) Brick, Block and the making	6	8	4	12	4	12		16	97	526				685
(ii) Clothing and footwear	--	29	5	2	4	--		--	160	14				214
(iii) Food, drink and tobacco	108	196	125	106	29	15		93	313	2,636				3,621
(iv) Motor Vehicle repairing and general engineering	44	97	515	71	33	14		4	227	361				1,366
(v) Carpentry/furniture	6	36	13	43	314	51		19	131	326				939
(vi) Sawmills	209	96	167	335	171	28		201	1,239	5,114				7,560
(vii) Other	34	87	43	27	27	20		21	438	705				1,402
TOTAL OF DIVISION	407	549	872	596	582	140		354	2,605	9,682				15,787
4. Construction Division: Building and CIVI Engineering	183	189	305	461	743	1,788		253	768	9,281				13,971
5. Electricity, Gas, Water and Sanitary Services Division: (Other than those provided by local authorities)	45	66	79	29	9	11		8	195	589				1,031
6. Commerce Division: (i) Hotels, Clubs, Cafes and Restaurants	17	35	17	15	18	20		12	41	161				1,716
(ii) Wholesale and Retail Trades	538	2,566	206	535	165	140		119	823	4,034				9,206
(iii) Other	15	140	1	2	--	--		4	1	74				177
TOTAL OF DIVISION	570	2,741	304	552	183	160		135	865	4,209				11,099

Table 26. Distribution of Adult Male African Employees by Wage Groups Within Industry, July, 1960

	SHILLINGS PER MONTH*											
	Shs. 39/- or less		Shs. 40/- to 59/				Shs. 60/- 70/-					
	Skilled	Clerical	Unskilled	%	Skilled	Clerical	Unskilled	%	Skilled	Clerical	Unskilled	%
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing	341	79	24,942	15.48	1,284	582	16,021	10.92	2,113	531	20,296	14.00
Mining and Quarrying	14	25	1,220	11.75	269	23	3,213	32.71	176	61	1,525	16.44
Manufacturing	102	48	1,085	7.94	343	217	3,129	23.72	915	211	2,271	21.84
Construction	6	4	193	2.31	40	17	1,721	20.12	199	67	1,267	17.35
Electricity, Gas, Water and Sanitation	1	--	4	0.36	1	35	127	11.73	16	11	243	19.42
Commerce	259	173	484	7.78	594	274	1,145	17.10	894	485	1,264	22.44
Transport (excluding E. A. Railways and Communications)	13	6	67	1.42	33	27	311	6.13	100	41	573	11.79
Services (excluding Domestic and Government)	170	416	1,745	17.48	608	402	1,368	17.83	581	361	1,316	16.93
Government, E. A. High Commission and Local Authorities	846	187	3,261	5.13	1,915	295	19,447	25.86	2,512	675	9,317	14.93
TOTAL	1,752	938	33,001	11.32	5,087	1,872	46,482	16.95	7,506	2,443	38,072	14.93

*Inclusive of any bonuses, cost of living allowances or other cash remuneration where these are part of agreed wage rates.

Source: Gt. Britain Colonial Office Annual Report, 1960 (Ibid: 80, 81)

SHILLINGS PER MONTH*

	Shs. 80/- to 99/-			Shs. 100/- to 149/-			Shs. 150/- to 199/-			Shs. 200/- and over					
	Skilled	Clerical	% Unskilled	Skilled	Clerical	% Unskilled	Skilled	Clerical	% Unskilled	Skilled	Clerical	% Unskilled			
3,777	906	46,174	31.04	6,641	1,599	29,752	23.19	3,767	1,100	1,830	4.08	1,194	879	41	1.29
222	87	556	8.07	271	234	1,196	15.87	412	86	43	5.05	888	196	--	10.11
611	311	961	12.11	1,406	315	1,227	18.95	904	204	268	8.85	734	275	16	6.59
330	106	1,627	23.34	1,027	150	385	17.67	1,015	118	11	12.94	477	77	1	6.27
36	20	286	24.61	151	71	104	23.45	134	25	6	11.87	76	43	--	8.56
874	570	647	17.75	900	957	608	21.61	418	253	154	7.00	347	376	23	6.32
83	139	239	7.61	275	238	288	13.23	509	126	1,765	40.96	962	165	15	18.06
516	241	178	7.08	1,207	396	304	14.30	739	393	25	8.67	1,409	940	23	17.78
3,325	1,144	2,387	8.17	9,212	3,325	5,212	21.20	6,028	2,425	788	11.04	6,424	4,746	280	13.67
9,758	3,524	53,055	21.04	21,090	7,285	39,156	21.42	14,006	4,730	4,890	7.50	12,511	7,695	399	6.54

NOTE: The above does not include unclassified workers and domestic servants in private households unclassified by age or sex.
The groups percentages are based on the total adult males employed in each industrial division.

TOTAL			
Skilled	Clerical	Unskilled	Total
19,117	5,676	139,056	163,849
2,252	712	7,753	10,717
5,015	1,581	8,957	15,553
3,097	539	5,205	8,838
415	265	770	1,390
4,286	3,086	4,405	11,777
2,055	742	3,258	6,055
5,230	3,149	4,959	13,338
30,246	12,797	40,692	83,735
71,710	28,487	215,055	315,252

Table 27. Number of Persons From Whom Compulsory Labour was Extracted and the Average Number of Days Worked Per Man* 1957-1960

TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT	NUMBER EMPLOYED				AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS WORKED			
	1957-58	1958-59	1959-60	1957-58	1958-59	1957-58	1958-59	1959-60
A. Portrage (Article 10)	1,718	2,565	1,425	3-25	2-91	4-77		
B. Tax Defaulters (Article 10)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil		
C. Minor Public Works (Article 10)	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil		
D. For Native Authority	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil		

*The Periods Covered are the 12-Monthly Periods Ended 30th June Each Year.

Source: Great Britain, Colonial Office, Annual Report, 1960 (ibid.: 79)

Having said that, we now turn to a look at how this working class that was basically amorphous, heterogenous; illiterate, unskilled and still tied to the land (which they saw as their only source of security and which they always retired to) was to organize itself.

B. Early Working Class Action and the Formation of Trade Unions

Any discussion on the labour history and the formation of trade unions in Tanzania in particular has to put the following facts (Sandbrook and Cohen, *ibid.*: 49-72) into consideration:

- (i) That the history of labour in Tanzania makes little sense unless it is taken back far beyond the semi-political unionism of the 1950's, back indeed to the attempts of the earliest groups of workers to act in solidarity (*ibid.*: 49).
- (ii) That a labour movement has its roots not in politics but in work. It grows out of the nature of that work, the economic and social position of the worker, and his response to that position. To view it solely "from the top" is to miss the dynamic which powers the movement. The history of a labour movement must therefore be based on a history of work, and the most profound source of change within it is the changing character of work in which the men are engaged (*ibid.*: 49).
- (iii) That . . . organization and group consciousness among workers are created by the workers themselves (*ibid.*: 49-50). Thus while a specific mode of production such as industrialization or the colonial mode of economy created the

embryonic formation of a working class, it is the workers themselves who create their group consciousness and solidarity. Talking about the development of capitalism and the emergence of the proletariat in Europe, Britain in particular, in his The Poverty of Philosophy (Moscow edition, n.d.: 195) Marx puts it even more succinctly as follows:

Economic conditions had first transformed the mass of the people of the country into workers. . . . This mass is thus already a class as against capital but not yet for itself. In the struggle . . . this mass becomes united, and constitutes itself as a class for itself.

Thus, working class action and organization in Tanzania was initiated by the various affected workers themselves and was not imposed upon them from above by a conscious and educated elite as others (Tandau, n.d., and Friedland, 1969) would like us to believe. At least not so till the 1950's.

Also, at this stage, while most workers were employed by plantation and farm owners, early effective working class action and organization did not emanate from there. It was from the urban centers, notably Dar es Salaam and to a lesser extent Tanga and Lindi, that the first working class action and organization were to begin and spread to the rest of the country. Also important to note is the fact that from the late 1930's to 1950, the history of the labour movement in Tanzania was dominated by the actions and activities of the dockworkers at Dar es Salaam and at one instance or so, Tanga and Lindi.

1. The Initial Spurt: The Need for Security

On coming to towns, early African workmen were faced with the problem of finding employment, accomodation, social security and a sense of belonging and identity. They also had to adjust themselves

to a new, hostile and robust environment as well as to the other demands and discipline dictated by their new job. This was even much more so in the 1920's and early 1930's when social conditions in towns like Dar es Salaam were threatening, and especially to new labour migrants.

To meet these new challenges, and as Iliffe (Kimambo and Temu, op. cit.: 145) points out; the new workers in towns created a multitude of organizations--tribal associations, clubs, voluntary organizations and later on unions--organizations intended to offer security in times of hardships such as sickness, unemployment, solitude, etc.

The first such organizations were tribal ones. In Dar es Salaam for instance, we had the Pogoro Association formed in 1912 and the New Nyamwezi Association formed in 1936. According to the Rules of the New Nyamwezi Association--Dar es Salaam (contained in a letter from D.O. Northcote to P.C. Eastern, May 8, 1936, TNA 61/450/40) the main purpose of the Association was the need for all Nyamwezi people,

to join together and concern ourselves with every sort of human problem for the whole Nyamwezi nation.

Iliffe (Kimambo and Temu, op. cit.: 146) has very well summarized the practical function of the Association as,

to locate and visit Nyamwezi in hospital and to arrange their funeral when necessary. Every member was required to pay ten cents whenever a Nyamwezi was found to be sick, 30 cents in case of death and a 50 cents monthly subscription.

There was also the elitist Tanga Young Comrades Club formed to preserve the elitist position of its members. This attitude was very much criticised by many other Africans especially the retailers in the African Commercial Association which was formed in 1934 under the leadership of Erica Fiah, a radical Ganda shopkeeper who had been

influenced by the works of the American black leader Marcus Garvey and the British Independent Labour Party. Although formed to cater for African retail traders in their competition with Asians, the Association was soon transformed into a Welfare Association catering for all Africans regardless of tribe, religion, status or nationality. Soon it began to agitate for African political rights and representation (ibid.: 148). In this sense it was a nationalist organization in opposition to colonial government.

The first African working class organization in Dar es Salaam were welfare associations. These included the Tanganyika African Government Servant's Association, the Railway African Association and the Tanganyika African Postal Union (Labour Department, 1959: 86). These were basically staff Associations catering for the interests of the educated African elite. There were no association or organizations for the unskilled and illiterate manual workmen.

Side by side with these, there were also Employers Associations such as the Dar es Salaam Port Employer's Association (The African Wharfage Company, Ltd.; the East African Lighterage and Stevedoring Company, Ltd.; the Tanganyika Boating Company, Ltd.; the Tanganyika Landing and Shipping Company, Ltd.); the Tanga Port Employers' Association (3 companies) and the Sisal Growers' Association and later on the Planters' Association.

At this stage however, suffice it to point out that the British colonial policy on workers organizations was very ambivalent, in fact hostile. Where and when they could, they did not only discourage but did suppress any grassroots working class movements. They argued that the African working class--amorphous, migratory and illiterate

as they were--were not ready for any working class organizations. By imposing foreign (British) standards to be met by Tanzanian workers before they could be allowed to form unions or the like, the British were in fact paying tribute to themselves for having educated and trained the Tanzanian working class to meet those standards!! They also assumed, and of course very wrongly, that capitalist development and its accompanying process of proletarianization took the same direction in the Periphery as it did in the Center. All this is definitely not true and at best reflects the problem of institutional model transfers discussed exhaustively in Chapter I.

Despite British ambivalence and hostility towards working class movements and organization, conditions of work were such that these were inevitable. The nature and organization of work, the poor working conditions as well as the very low wages (as against ever increasing costs of living as we shall see later on in Table 28) made such actions and development an inevitable and logical conclusion.

2. Towards Working Class Action and Trade Union Organization

The above facts and developments definitely forced the Colonial Administration to reconsider their attitude towards working class action and organization. From a situation of ambivalence and hostility towards such actions and organizations, they moved swiftly towards a policy of short-circuiting, and later on, controlling them through legislation and otherwise.

The first such legislation was the Trade Unions Ordinance enacted on November 3, 1932. This Act accepted the legitimacy of any registered trade union. It also set procedures to govern their conduct and operations. The Act stipulated that workmen were free to join

and form trade unions which could in turn take action on their behalf, provided that the actions could not have been punishable if they had been taken independently by any person and did

not affect the law relating to riot, unlawful assembly, breach of peace or sedition or any offence against the sovereign authority.

Section 23 of the Act stipulates that;

An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable on the ground only that it induces some other person to break a contract of employment or that it is an interference with the trade, business, or employment of some other person, or with the right of some other person to dispose of his capital or his labour as he wills.

In sub-section 4 of Section 22, the Act goes further to point out areas where peaceful picketing is allowed or disallowed:

It shall be lawful for one or more persons acting on their behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of any individual employer or firm in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries business or happens to be if they so attend merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working.

The act however, strikes a very different and contradictory tone when it further stipulates (section 5, sub-section 2) that;

It shall not be lawful for one person or more persons . . . to attend at or near a house or place where a person resides or works or carries on business or happens to be . . . if they so attend in such numbers or otherwise in such a manner as to be calculated to intimidate any person in that house or place, or to obstruct the approach there to or egress there from, or to lead to a breach of the peace . . . and (any) person who acts in contravention of this subsection shall be guilty of an offence punishable with a fine not exceeding four hundred shillings or with imprisonment with or without hard labour for a period not exceeding three months.

But the said "numbers" and "manner" were not defined. It definitely remained the discretion of the colonial courts to determine

whether the "manner" in which picketing was done, and the "number" of people involved were such that could be seen as intimidating. Secondly, the operational standards such as good accounting and book-keeping imposed on the unions if they were to be and remain registered were far beyond the capabilities of the unskilled and illiterate African workers. This was made even worse by the colonial policy barring educated Africans in the Civil Service and elsewhere from joining and hence providing leadership to such organizations or else they lost their jobs. There was also the fine of four hundred shillings which an African worker could not afford, as indicated earlier in Table 21.

Due to the above impediments, it is therefore not surprising that no effective working class organization and action was forthcoming till the latter half of the 1930's. In fact it was not until 1945 that the first trade union was registered.

There had definitely been some sporadic local strikes on sisal estates and elsewhere before the 1930's. Iliffe (Kimambo and Temu, op. cit.: 149) talks of a recorded strike of joiners at Kwirow mission in 1924. There was also a major strike in Tanga in 1937 when 250 wharf labourers downed their tools for two days demanding higher wages and better working conditions.

The first effective working class organization and action however, took place on July 17, 1939 when casual workers at the port of Dar es Salaam went on strike demanding:

- (i) Daily wages of shs. 2.00 instead of shs. 1.50,
- (ii) A mid-day rest,
- (iii) A rate of shs. 3.50 for night work,
- (iv) Compensation for sickness and accident such as permanent

workers received, and

(v) Better treatment on the job.

In their petition to the District officer, from "All Coolies, Dar es Salaam" on July 19, 1939, in which they clearly pointed out their grievances, they went on to say:

we do not like to be kicked and to be pushed during working time . . . If our masters will accept the above statements we shall be ready to do their work, provided that they will agree with what we have written above and sign the agreement before you; Sir (TNA 61/679/5).

The European companies operating the docks and port facilities acting in unison, however, refused the workers' demands and threatened to recruit a new labour force on the existing terms if the strike continued. After all there was a large reserve army of unemployed people in Dar es Salaam estimated at 6,000 by the "Report on Native Affairs in Dar es Salaam Township," (June 5, 1939, TNA 61/207/220). Having met with the Provincial Commissioner for Eastern Province on July 21, 1939, four workers' representatives consulted the strikers on the issue and the next day the strikers started going back to work. By July 25, 1939 all had resumed work thus ending the strike. The workers had lost the day.

Though it failed, the strike however, made a few things clear.

- (1) First is that the workers' demands were spontaneously worked out by the workers themselves from the grassroots.
- (2) The demands for some of the privileges such as sickness and accident compensation which were reserved for permanent workers might partly explain the refusal on the part of the latter to join the strikers. There was no element of solidarity among the various groups and categories of

workers.

- (3) Demands for a shs. 2.00 daily wage resulted from workers' realization that their employers had economically recovered from the doldrums of the Great Depression (Kimambo and Temu, op. cit.: 57). To the above three points, I would like to add a fourth one, and that is that the failure of the strike can be partly explained by lack of leadership to articulate the casual workers' grievances and present them well. This strike was followed by another one by dockers in 1943.

That strike began on August 23, 1943, when some 800 dockers came out for higher wages and better conditions of service. It included all registered casual workers, 300 unregistered casuals and about 170 of the 250 permanent workers. Apart from 4 senior headmen who signed the letter stating the workers' demands, other headmen did not join the strike. Even the four who signed, however, continued to report for work each morning, while acting as the workers' representatives throughout the strike (ibid.: 50).

* The strike had been basically prompted by the need to raise the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) due to the impact of the wartime inflation on the standard of living as demonstrated in Table 28.

As demonstrated in Table 28, the cost of living for a family of two had rocketed by 55% between September 1939 and January 1943. In September 1942 a "Report of Enquiry into Wages and Cost of Living of Low Grade African Government Employees in Dar es Salaam" had also found that,

Table 28. Cost of Living and Wage Indices: Dar es Salaam, 1928-50.
(1 Sept. 1939 = 100)

Date	Cost of living index	Government daily rate, casual labour	Dock daily rate, casual labour	Est. dock take-home pay, casual labor
Jan. 1928	146 ^a		133 ^a	
1 Sept. 1939	100	100	100	100 ^d
Feb.-Apr. 1940				154
June 1940			120	
Oct. 1940		160		
Sept. 1942	122 ^b			
1 Jan. 1943	155	200		
1 Jan. 1944	167	220		
1 Jan. 1945	177			
1 Jan. 1946	184	260		
1 Mar. 1947	187	260	153 ^c	
10 Sept. 1948	247	320	260 ^c	
Sept. 1949	287	320	260	
25 Oct. 1950	299	350	260	

Sources:

- a. D.O., Dar es Salaam, to P.C. Eastern, 10 Jan. 1928, TNA 61/295/27.
- b. "Report of Enquiry into Wages and Cost of Living of Low Grade African Government Employees in Dar es Salaam" (Sept., 1942), TNA SMP 30598/15.
- c. Tabulation of Hatchell award, Sept. 1947, TNA SMP 16756/18.
- d. Molohan, "Report on Conditions of Employment of Dock Labour in Dar es Salaam," 3 Jan. 1940, TNA SMP 25912/6A.
- e. Dickson (Labour Officer, Dar es Salaam) to Labour Commissioner, June 1940, TNA 61/14/22/1/2.

All other Annual Reports of the Labour Department 1942-50, *passim*.
Adopted from Iliffe (Sandbrook and Cohen, *op. cit.*: 52).

some 87 percent of Government employees in Dar es Salaam are in receipt of a wage on which they cannot possibly subsist without getting into debt and remaining in debt (ibid.: 59).

The 1943 strike however, was important in another way. For the first time, the demands presented did not only include but in fact emphasized demands by the permanent employees. Their demands included:

- (i) Wage increase of around 25 percent for most grades--wages of shs. 40-45 a month)
- (ii) a cost of living bonus
- (iii) fourteen days paid leave a year
- (iv) retirement gratuities
- (v) free mid-day meal
- (vi) improved sick pay and medical benefits

The casual workers surprisingly and ironically made more modest demands:

- (i) sick pay and medical treatment
- (ii) a free mid-day meal
- (iii) an increase in the basic casual daily rate from shs. 1.80 to shs. 3.00 (Molohan, TNA 61/679/16; Labour Department Report 1943: 8).

The employers on the other hand continued to refuse the worker's demands. They knew the colonial administration would, in case of confrontation with the workers, support them. On August 25, 1943 for instance, the District Commissioner advised the Provincial Commissioner to invoke Defense regulations making work in the dock an essential service requiring all trade disputes to be referred to a tribunal before workers can go on strike. On August 28, 1943 the port was declared an essential service and the dispute was referred to a

tribunal under Mr. Justice Wilson. Workers were then urged to return to work but to no avail, to wit the Governor ordered their arrest.

From August 29, to September 3, 1943 at least 143 strikers were arrested and charged. Most of them (103) were however, given suspended sentences by the Dar es Salaam Resident Magistrate. At least five "trouble makers" were dismissed and the rest went back to work.

On September 5, the Tribunal made its award public. It recommended a considerable increase in wages for the skilled workers while casual labourers gained very little, less in real value than the 1939 levels (Sandbrook and Cohen, op. cit.: 61).

One interesting fact as regards the development of working class consciousness and solidarity however, happened during the turbulent days. While the dockers were on strike, some domestic servants also threatened to go on strike unless a union controlled agency was provided for them. This action resulted into the formation of "the Union of European Boys" in January 1944. The Union was to press for fixed standard wages and working hours, weekend rest, severance payments and a union controlled employment agency for them (Iliffe, in Kimambo and Temu, op. cit.: 150).

Although it was not that much successful in terms of satisfying the workers' demands, the 1943 strike had certain far reaching implications as regards the future development and direction of the working class movement.

First is that for the first time an element of solidarity between the permanent and casual workers had been achieved. This partly explains why the employers could not threaten to recruit another labour force during the strike as had happened during the 1939 one.

Secondly, is the role played by the State in putting down the workers. The state apparatus was used in favour of capital in its confrontation with labour and for the first time the dockers not only opposed but also felt the full weight of colonial authority (Sandbrook and Cohen, *op. cit.*: 59).

Thirdly, and most important for future action and organization, is the fact that the workers realized that any successful working class action needed a trade union organization to coordinate and further it through the right established channels. However, it took the dockers another four years before forming a Union. The Union, which was short lived came out of the 1947 strike whose cause and direction we now turn to.

On August 22, 1947, the dockworkers and stevedores at Dar es Salaam came up with demands for higher wages and better conditions of service. They warned their employers that unless these were met, they would down their tools at the end of the month. The employers made an offer on September 5, but this did not satisfy the workers who had vowed to demonstrate their strength. For the first time all sections of the labour force including the headmen and other skilled and permanent employees had joined in the organization of the strike. The Labour Department on the other hand hastily repealed the emergency regulations in force since 1943 and replaced them with another one, making compulsory arbitration a necessary precondition before the said workers could go on strike.

On September 6, the workers met and decided to go on strike and the next day, September 7, 1947 the strike started.

According to Iliffe (*ibid.*: 61-65) and whom we intend to quote

at great length, the workers' demands were as follows:

- (i) a rise from shs. 2.30 to shs. 5.00 for the daily casual labourers, and
- (ii) a general rate of shs. 100.00 per month for skilled permanent employees.

The employers however, had offered a few shillings/monthly increase for permanent workers and a 20 cents daily increase for the casual labourers. The workers refused the offer and the strike went on.

On the next day, September 8, 1947, came another important development in the history of labour in Tanzania. The strike, initiated by the dockworkers and stevedores, spread to some other casual workers in the town. More important still is the fact that the towns' unemployed from where the employers might have recruited scabs as had been the case before, joined in the strike. Soon the strike spread like bushfire to other groups of workers in Dar es Salaam and across the country. On September 10, 1947, railway workers in Dar es Salaam became the first organized group to join the strike. The next day, they were joined by their colleagues in Morogoro, Dodoma and Tabora. On September 12, they were joined by their colleagues at Kilosa and by sisal plantation workers in Morogoro.

By September 11, Dar es Salaam was already in a very precarious situation and the government moved swiftly in reprimanding the strikers and urging them to go back to work. On that same day, 45 men were arrested while in the evening the town was patrolled by 300 special constables. On September 13, lorries with police escorts moved into the African town to ferry those workers who were willing to go back

to work. Meanwhile, the government also issued a warning to African Civil Servants who had also joined their kith and kin, that dismissal orders awaited anyone who did not go back to work by Monday, September 15. By mid-day Monday, September 15, most workers had gone back to work and on that same day the government appointed a special tribunal under the chairmanship of G.W. Hatchell to look into the causes of the dispute and adjudicate accordingly.

While Dar es Salaam was returning to normal life, the strike up-country was just beginning. Railway workers in Kigoma and Mwanza went on strike on September 15, 1947. In Mwanza the initiative came from the dockers but was joined by others in town and even spread to some rural areas such as Bukumbi and Misungwe. Workers on the Kongwa Groundnuts Scheme also went on strike on the same day. Arusha and Uvinza salt workers took their turn on September 17. The last group to join in were workers at the Uruwira Lead mines in Mpanda who went on strike on October 6, a month later after the Dar es Salaam dockworkers decided to go on strike.

What had started as a Dar es Salaam dockworkers strike had indeed turned into a national general strike. For the first time the workers had forged an element of solidarity and unity within and across industries and regions.

Meanwhile, the tribunal appointed to look into the initial causes of the dispute continued to search for a solution. No agreement was however reached between workers' and employers' representatives, and as such the Chairman imposed his own award.

The Hatchell award, (contained in the Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1947: 447) was published on September 26, 1947. Its

contents have been clearly summarized by Iliffe (op. cit.: 64) as follows:

His award . . . was designed to stimulate the conversion of port employment from irregular casual labour to a regular profession. He urged the introduction of a shift system to end excessive overtime and create 'a professional class of waterfront workmen.' He introduced a five-shilling bonus for attendance on twenty days in any month, regular free meals and free hospital treatment for workers. Perhaps more important to the dockers, he awarded wage increases variously estimated at 40-50 percent of existing pay, raising the casual daily wage from shs. 2.30 to shs. 3.90 and finally pushing the dockers' wages well above the price increase since 1939.

Iliffe then goes on to inform us that within a few months, other private employers and the government brought their pay rates into line with the Hatchell award and how in so doing, "the dockers had won a substantial economic advance for Tanganyika workers as a whole" (ibid.): On that we would like to argue further, that, the dockers victory was definitely facilitated by the unity and solidarity extended to the dockworkers by all their fellow workmen in the country, and especially the unemployed who refused to play the role of scabs and cross picket lines.

Meanwhile, between the 1943 and 1947 strikes, some advances were being made in the direction of working class organization in the form of employees' associations and trade unions. The Labour Department's Annual Report for 1945 talks of increasing working class activity and organization. The Report, for instance, reports one strike at Kikwetu Sisal Estate in Lindi District on February 20, 1945. The strike, regarding tasks to be performed by Labourers on the estate involved 42 workers. According to the Report:

The proceedings degenerated into something of a riot, the General Manager of the Estate being threatened with violence, but owing to the prompt intervention of the Labour Officer,

who caused the ringleaders to be arrested single-handed and who was subsequently commended by the Magistrate for his action, no injuries resulted and the ringleaders were committed to terms of imprisonment. It was established that the rioters had no just cause for striking (Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1945: 9).

There had also been rapid growth of African employees associations--the Motor Drivers' Association in the Southern Highlands and Western Provinces, the African Railways Association, the Tanganyika Government Servants' Association--and attempts by various associations to register as trade unions. During the year (1945) the "African Cooks, Washermen and House Servants' Association" became the first African trade union to be registered (ibid.: 11).

Following the 1947 General strike, the colonial government was forced to accept the fact that African working class organizations were there to stay. The Hatchell award had made provisions for the formation of a union by the dockworkers, and immediately after the publication of the award in September 1947, the Dockworkers and Stevedores Union was formed and registered. The government moved swiftly to circumvent the labour movement, especially the new union, from falling under the influence of "communists" and political agitators by trying to direct it into "constructive" channels. The Labour Department tried to shape the Union by imposing standards similar to those governing the operation of British unions. They wanted it to promote efficiency and discipline among the workers and hence more production and profits to the employers. It had to have a well-equipped office, buy the necessary registers and stationary, print a rule book and have a paid full-time general secretary. It also had to have an annual income of shs. 40,000 and its accounts checked and audited by the

Department of Labour.

Putting into consideration the level of illiteracy and the low wages of most of the workers one wonders where the dockworkers could get the necessary expertise and funds. But all the same, the Union managed to survive its formative months under its first General Secretary Abdul Wahid Sykes, a semi-educated Tanzanian who had also served in the Kings African Rifles (KAR) during the Second World War. When Sykes resigned his post in July over "indiscipline of leaders and the short-sightedness of the rank and file," Erica Fiah, then editor of the Swahili nationalist paper "Kwetu" became General Secretary--and this against colonial government wishes. Under Fiah's leadership, membership of the Union grew from 1,000 to 2,259 paid-up members by 1949, built a one-story building at a cost of shs. 15,000 while its property was estimated at shs. 65,000 (Iliffe, op. cit.: 67). More workers solidarity and militancy among union members is also reported at this time, and this did not definitely please the colonial government which in turn made a lot of allegations of corruption and extortion against the Union leadership. Through government intrigue however, Erica Fiah was ousted from the post of General Secretary.

At this stage suffice it to stress the fact that the colonial government and the employers were not happy with the Union's vigilance and militancy, especially the unity amongst the various sections of the workers and the Dar es Salaam unemployed which had hitherto been the source of scabs during the various previous disputes. They did all they could to discredit the leadership by accusing it of corruption and extortion. The union officers were accused of paying

themselves high salaries as well as the fact that every worker on going off shift had to pay 50 cents from his wage to make sure he would be re-hired. The government was also of the opinion that the Union was very much dominated by a leadership with left-wing leanings (ibid.). They did all they could to break this working class organization, a process that was facilitated by the February 1950 strike over the introduction of a new gate and call-on stance.

According to Iliffe (ibid.: 67-69) a new gate and call-on stance was introduced for the first time at the port by the employers. It was to be operational from February 1, 1950. The Union members opposed this and on January 31, the Union executive, after a heated debate which almost split it, advised its members not to enter the port through the new gate. On February 1, 1950, all but a few permanent workers heeded the union's call and peacefully started the strike.

The employers, with the support of the Labour Department started hiring blackleg labour immediately the strike started. The dockers tried to persuade others not to take over their jobs but to no avail. This infuriated the dockers who at 7:00 a.m. on February 3, decided to picket the dock gate. In the process they clashed with police who had been brought to guard the docks. A skirmish ensued and one police officer was injured. Immediately the government arrested 16 dockers, and attempting to free their 16 colleagues from the police station, another 41 dockers were arrested. During the day, another and much more serious clash between the police and dockers and their supporters and sympathizers took place in the "open space" separating the African section for the commercial zone of the town, most probably Jangwani or Mnazi Mmoja or Kiungani area. A crowd of an estimated

600 people surrounded and cut off a police riot squad. The police reacted by opening fire into the crowd killing one African, fatally wounding another and seriously injuring six more (ibid.). The crowd retaliated and rushed the police. In the process one Asian and one European police officer were seriously injured. The government called in reinforcements from the KAR, made several arrests including the entire Union executive, and in the afternoon armed police patrolled the town (Labour Department, Annual Report, 1950: 20). What followed immediately after this has been clearly put up by Iliffe (ibid.: 68).

Altogether 145 men were charged with offenses arising from the strike and the ensuing violence. Eight members of the union executive charged with unlawful assembly and conspiring to prevent casual labourers from exercising their occupation were released for lack of evidence. Of those charged with offenses arising from the riot, one was sentenced to ten years for attempted murder and nine others--including one described as a union official--were imprisoned for lesser crimes. Another 77 were convicted of offenses in other incidents.

Meanwhile life at the port began to return to normal as many of the casual workers began to go back to work. Most of the skilled and permanent workers however, never went back. On June 2, 1950, the High Court officially dissolved the strike. Under the same order the union property--its building and shs. 24,000 in cash--was transferred to the public trustee.

The 1950 strike had two far reaching implications as regards working class movements and organization in Tanzania;

- (1) First the strike ended the attempts of dockers to organize.
 - (2) Secondly is that the 1950 events provided justification for Government's hostility and indifference towards Unionism.
- Addressing employers in Tanga on April 28, 1950, Hamilton, a Senior Labour Officer spoke the mind and attitude of

the government when he said:

Government were of the opinion that the African was at the present time quite unable to accept responsibility in a Trades Union sense,--and we are doing absolutely nothing to encourage Unionism at this time (Labour Department 126/4/3).

This attitude was to contribute to the slow development of unionism in Tanzania thereafter.

Some significant gains in union organization however, continued to be made and by 1956 a substantial number of African employees' associations had been registered as trade unions. These included:

- (1) The African Cooks, Washermen and House Servants Association
- (2) The African Tailors Association
- (3) The Morogoro African Personal Servants Association
- (4) The Dar es Salaam African Motor Drivers Union
- (5) The African Commercial Employees Association
- (6) The Tanga and District Clerical Workers' Union
- (7) The Tabora Tailors Association
- (8) The Kigoma--Ujiji Tailors Association
- (9) The Kilimanjaro Drivers' Association
- (10) The Dar es Salaam Asian Commercial Employees' Association
- (11) The Tanganyika African Civil Servant's Association
- (12) The Tanganyika African Postal Union
- (13) The East African Railways African Union (Tanganyika)
(Labour Department, Annual Report for 1947, 1948, 1953, 1957).
- (14) The Hotel Worker's Union (MacDonald, op. cit.: 139).

Side by side with these African unions were European and Asian employees' associations and unions as well as employers' associations.

The European employees' associations or organizations included the Tanganyika European Civil Servants' Association, the European Staff Association (of the East African Posts and Telecommunications Administration, Dar es Salaam Branch), the European Staff Association of the Landing and Shipping Company of East Africa Ltd. (Dar es Salaam Branch) and the European Railway Servants' Staff Association. Similar organizations and associations with the same names were duplicated for Asians (Labour Department, Annual Report, 1953: 86).

The Employers' associations included the Dar es Salaam Port Employers' Association, the Tanga Port Employers' Association, the Dar es Salaam Employers' Association formed in 1950 upon the initiative of the Dar es Salaam Chamber of Commerce, the Tanganyika Planter's Association and later on the Federation of Tanganyika Employers formed in 1960 to cater for the interest of all employers.

The growth of unionism which had slowed down after the 1950 dockers' strike however, was stimulated from 1954 onwards when a number of small localized unions were formed partly at the instigation and support of the newly created nationalist party--TANU--which wanted to tie the union and political struggles together because the colonialist was at the same time the employer. After all that is the essence of imperialism as manifested in both colonialism and neo-colonialism.

As the number of unions grew, so did the need to forge working class solidarity and unity. The above desire was climaxed by Tom Mboya's brief visit to Dar es Salaam in 1955. Mboya, who was recognized as a highly experienced unionist by his Tanzanian counterparts, had been elected General Secretary of the Kenya Federation of

Registered Trade Unions in 1953. During his visit, which also marked the height of coordination of Pan-Africanist activities, Mboya suggested then that "the existing structures of Unions--localized, craft-based, and without any central organization--was inadequate (Friedland, op. cit., n.d.: 2). He suggested the formation of a central union organization. The idea was taken up by Tanganyika unionists, notably Rashidi Kawawa who was then President of the Tanganyika African Civil Servants' Association. Kawawa, then a young robust and militant unionist, interested leaders of other unions in forming a united labour movement. Thus was born the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) in 1955. Rashidi Kawawa agreed to resign from the Civil Service and work full time as General Secretary of the TFL. The first TFL President was a Kenyan under the name of Arthur Ohanga who returned to Kenya later on.

Definitely the idea of a united labour movement was not welcome by the colonial government.

Its labor officials had encouraged unions so long as they were run by Westernized, clerical types who would cooperate with (Labour) department, but they frowned upon the new central organization. They claimed the budding unions did not authentically represent the workers since only a small proportion of the workers were due-paying members (MacDonald, op. cit.: 139).

The new central union organization was put to test in the general strike of 1956. The strike was started by the Hotel Workers' Union demanding higher wages and better conditions of work. In this they were joined by others and the strike became a general one led and coordinated by the TFL. Several employers on their part resorted to locking out their striking workers. Meanwhile, international labour organizations began to show an interest in the Tanganyika labour

movement. Kawawa flew to London to consult with the top brass of the British Trades Union Congress (TUC). The TUC, and later on, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions each sent one person to help the TFL negotiate a settlement for its workers. A negotiated settlement including a minimum wage and improved working conditions was reached.

During all this time, the Colonial Administration was trying to find out means of diffusing union activities and organizations which in most cases also tended to be political. A new Trade Unions Ordinance (No. 48) was enacted in 1956. It called for compulsory registration of any employees' associations as trade unions before they could operate, with a hope that some would have their applications rejected in the process. The government also wanted to "protect" the unions from being manipulated by "communist" inspired political agitators. The next move on the part of the government was in the regulation and control of trade disputes. This it did through the enactment of the Trade Disputes (Arbitration and Settlement) (Prescription of Notice) Rules Act of 1957.

The Act (section one) starts by defining a trade dispute. It then goes on to elaborate the machinery to be followed in dealing with any trade dispute which includes reference to a tribunal (sections 2 and 3). Having also singled out various industries and activities and designated them "Essential Services" (section 4), it goes on to state that no one can take part in a lock-out or strike in any essential service,

Unless a trade dispute exists and has been reported in writing to the Labour Commissioner in accordance with paragraph 5, and a period of twenty one days, or such further period as may have

been allowed by the Minister of Social Services, has elapsed since the date the dispute was referred to a tribunal. Any employer or workman who takes part in a lock-out or strike in any essential services otherwise than as permitted by this paragraph is guilty of an offense and may be punished by a court (ibid., section 7).

The Act then goes to define terms of appointments and procedures of the tribunals. Section 5 discusses the role of the Labour Commissioner in conciliating the parties to any disputes arising in the essential services. One salient feature in this Act is that the tools of both employer and workman are clearly defined. The employer can use a "lock-out" while the workman can use a "strike."

The Act however, was biased towards the employers. Definitely no employer would resort to a lock-out unless threatened by a strike or the like. Since the Act set up the procedures to be followed before workers can go on strike, it follows there was no way the employer could use his "lock-out" weapon, for the dispute would have been settled before the workers decided to go on strike, thus provoking the employer. Only workers who went on strike before the dispute was adjudicated upon by the tribunal could be prosecuted under the Act.

Another crucial point to note is that the Minister concerned or the Governor could designate any activity or industry an "Essential Service" thereby forestalling or stopping the possibilities of a strike in the respective industry or service.

While all this was happening however, the number and strength of unions grew. Most of the new unions were also affiliated to the Tanganyika Federation of Labour. Another important landmark in the history of unionism in Tanganyika, however, was still to come. This was the organization of Plantation workers who in 1958 formed the

Tanganyika Plantation Workers Union with Victor A. Mkello as its first General Secretary. Other national unions were to spring up at that time. These included the Tanganyika Railway African Union (TRAU), the National Union of Post Office and Telecommunications Employees, The Tanganyika Mine Workers Union, and Tanganyika Union of Public Employees, the Transport and General Workers Union, the Tanganyika Africa Local Government Workers Union, the Tanganyika Union of African Teachers, the Building Construction and Industrial Union.

By 1960, several unions had emerged as powerful entities. Most of these were congregated in towns and sisal and other settler plantation and farm areas. Most of them were also affiliated to the Tanganyika Federation of Labour of which Rashidi Kawawa had just been made president. During that year the TFL had 27 affiliates with a total union membership of 95,000. The single largest union was the Tanganyika Plantation Workers Union with 25,000 members. It was followed by the Tanganyika Railway African Union, 16,250 members; Tanganyika Union of Public Employees, 14,000; Transport and General Workers Union, 10,000 and the Tanganyika African Local Government Workers Union, 8,000. The Dock Workers and Stevedores Union had also been revived and registered. Its General Secretary then was L.L. Ngahyoma.

The growth of union membership over the period has been summarized in Table 29.

C. The Relationship Between the Union and Political Movement

The above developments lead us to a discussion of the relationship between TANU and the Labour movement during the nationalist

Table 29. Union Membership Over Time 1952-1962

Year	Estimated Membership
1952	301
1953	687
1954	291
1955	2,349
1956	12,912
1957	33,986
1958	44,600
1959	78,100
1960	91,770
1961	199,915
1962	182,153

Source: Calculated from Tanganyika, Annual Report of the Labour Department, 1952-1962.

Adopted from: Friedland, W. "Cooperation, Conflict and Conscription TANU-TFL Relations 1955-65: University of Dar es Salaam (memo), (n.d.): 2.

struggle. At this point suffice it also to point out that in Tanganyika, trade unionism preceeded the formation or the emergence of TANU which was officially launched in 1954. The unions had been formed by the workers so as to further their interests in terms of demands and agitation for higher wages and better working conditions. TANU was formed basically as a nationalist political movement agitating for the political independence of the whole country. Thus from the beginning, it follows that although conceptually and in essence employer and colonialist were the same (Mapolu, op. cit.) the nature and scope of the struggles of the two movements though similar, were not the same. Strategically however, they soon realized that they were fighting the same enemy, hence the need for a concerted united action.

Also of crucial importance is the colonial government's attitude towards the two movements. While the British were at least indifferent to trade unionism, they were definitely hostile to the nationalist movement. When for instance, they realized that working class action and movement were inevitable, they moved with swiftness and vigour to "protect" it from "communist" inspired political agitators. Through various pieces of legislation, they categorically indicated that any working class organization or union that would engage itself into political action would not be allowed to register as a union or would have its registration cancelled. They also dispatched British unionists to Tanganyika to help set up the organizational and operational basis of unions in the country--modelled on the principle of trade union economism as was the case with British trade unions. The government also went further and made it impossible for any civil servants to join TANU lest they lose their jobs. The idea

of course was to deprive TANU of the source of educated and enlightened leadership. It is therefore, not surprising that, although sympathetic to TANU, leading trade unionists like Rashidi Kawawa did not become TANU members until the end of 1958.

Thus between 1954 and 1958, both the TFL and TANU were very cautious in their relationship for fear of government intervention and repression. The above considerations, then, help to explain the formal organizational separation between the two movements up to 1958.

At this juncture, we would like to carry the issue further by suggesting that, despite the above restrictions, the relations between TANU and the unions were very close. First of all we see that over the material years--1954-1960--there was an ever-increasing TFL support of TANU programs and activities (after all, a lot of TFL members were also TANU members). For instance, and as we shall see later, in the E.N.N. Kanyama affair in 1959, the TFL made it clear that any anti-TANU forces within its ranks and leadership would not be tolerated.

Secondly, TANU always gave effective support including organizational expertise and financial aid during the several union boycotts (Friedland, op. cit., n.d.: 3). It is to the nature of this relationship that we shall now turn to:

TANU-TFL Cooperation: A Marriage of Convenience?

According to Friedland (ibid.) and whom we intend to quote at great length, the first time that TANU-TFL relationship was discussed by the concerned parties was during the TFL's first annual conference held in Dar es Salaam in October 1956. In a resolution "Trade Unions and Politics" which charted out the "official" TFL policy as regards its relationship with TANU, it was categorically stated that,

- (i) At the moment trade union leaders should not accept positions of leadership in political organizations;
- (ii) The Trade Union movements should be represented in the Legislative Council and the Emergency (Executive) Committee of the TFL should study the means of making this possible (TFL, 1956).

Although it was the opinion of most of the delegates that unions should avoid politics, they, however, felt that they should be represented, and in this way TFL demands became political and in most cases similar to those being made by TANU at that time. They however had to tread their way very carefully lest they provoke the government into taking actions against them.

By 1957 however, the tone had changed and this time towards TANU's aspirations. During their General Council meeting in July 1957, the TFL came with the following resolution:

Africans must be left to govern themselves. . . . To be ruled is absolutely unjustifiable today. A date for independence of Tanganyika must be fixed without delay. . . . We want all citizens of this country to be given the right to vote so that there can be government by the majority. . . . Workers and unions cannot keep away from government affairs because they are citizens like other people. Our unions are not political but we must be given the opportunity to express our views and be heard on all issues concerning our lives and the progress of the country. Our unions must have representatives in the legislature of the country to speak on our behalf and defend the rights of workers (TFL, July, 1957).

This definitely angered the government and TANU's opposition party, the United Tanganyika Party (UTP) which was settler-dominated. The Unions on their part continued to claim they were not structurally linked to TANU.

By 1958, however, things began to change. TANU's activities and popularity in the country had increased tremendously. The period between 1957-60 were indeed TANU's hey-days. It had become apparent

that the Party was at least the de facto representative of the wishes of the majority of Tanzanians. All this facilitated the TFL-TANU relationship even more. The TFL began to realize it could now openly support TANU without any fear of repression. The mood and trend of events during the year have been clearly summarized by Friedland (op. cit., n.d.: 4).

In June, the TFL agreed to provide financial support to a proposed TANU college. Later in the year, Rashidi Kawawa, TFL general secretary, became a TANU candidate for the legislature. TFL leaders became increasingly prominent within TANU, and, late in the year, as the country moved to the first general elections, TFL encouraged the registration of the workers as voters. By the end of the year TFL was formerly represented, at the invitation of TANU, at TANU provincial Committee meetings.

By this time it had also become apparent that many trade unionists were both militant TANU members and leaders. This TANU-TFL relationship was to culminate into the offering of two TANU National Executive Committee seats to the TFL in 1961.

Another development which reflects this TANU-TFL closer relationship is the Kanyama affair of 1959. E.N.N. Kanyama was general secretary of the Tanganyika Railway African Union (TRAU). Just before the 1959 February elections for the Legislative Council, he signed a petition in support of Dr. Daya, an Asian candidate. When TANU met later it endorsed another candidate. This spurred off rage and anger against Kanyama from both the TFL and TRAU. TFL called for his expulsion from TRAU. TRAU acted swiftly against him and ousted him from his position and expelled from TRAU altogether. He was replaced by a young and militant trade unionist Christopher S. Kasanga Tumbo as General Secretary to TRAU. Friedland (ibid.: 5) asserts that in an interview with Rashidi Kawawa, the latter agreed to have "played a (leading)

role in organizing the opposition to him, (Kanyama) within the TRAU."

The above mentioned TFL support for TANU programs was usually followed or complemented by joint TFL-TANU actions as clearly summarized by Friedland (ibid.: 5).

While TANU played no direct role in the general strike which developed in Dar es Salaam in late 1956 and early 1957, TANU support of a trade-union boycott of the Dar es Salaam municipal bus system represented its first instance of public support of the unions. In this strike, the Transport and Allied Workers Unions, unable to stop the movement of busses manned by Asians and European supervisors, called for a boycott of the busses by Africans, who constituted almost the entire clientele. TANU effectively supported the strike and helped the unions to achieve a partial victory.

A similar situation developed during the bitter strike of brewery workers in April 1958; strikers were removed from their homes and Kawawa was arrested for threatening non-strikers. Again, because of the racial division of labor, it was feasible for production and distribution to be maintained during the strike. The boycott called by the unions was supported publicly by TANU. A subsequent conference of the TFL formally resolved "that a letter be written to the Honorable J.K. Nyerere . . . thanking him and TANU for the assistance offered during the brewery strike and asking that he notify all TANU branches of our gratitude. This conference also asks that the present relationship between this organization and TANU be maintained for the benefit of our country. (TFL, 1958)

Again we would like to add that during Rashidi Kawawa's trial in which he was facing charges of intimidating non-strikers at the Tanganyika brewery, the presence of Julius K. Nyerere at the trial pulled so many people to the court and the whole issue took a significant political turn. Kawawa was convicted and fined sh. 101.

Friedland, (op. cit.: 5-6) also goes on to point out:

Another instance of close cooperation occurred in late 1958 when the first major strike of plantation workers was held against the Mazinde estate owned by David Lead who had been one of the major supporters of the UTP, and the strike had strong political implications. When it appeared that Lead was seeking to recruit strikebreakers from the Washambala tribe, a mission consisting of Kawawa and S.S. Chamshama, a local TANU leader with no connection with the unions, was

sent to meet the chief to request his cooperation in keeping his people from being scabs. (TFL, 1959).

Cooperation in such instances benefited both organizations. For TFL wide public support for its boycotts and economic actions provided necessary assistance for its activities because European and Asian supervisors were able to sustain production and services during strikes. For TANU any series of actions which would mobilize its followers and permit them to express some legitimate hostility to European domination was useful to the party in developing mass support; and union boycott activities offered the party another access to the grass roots level.

Such then was the relationship between TANU and the TFL up to May 1, 1960 when self-government was granted to Tanganyika under the leadership of TANU.

CHAPTER V

POST-INDEPENDENCE DEVELOPMENTS (1961-1970):

FROM COLONY TO NEO-COLONY?

In the last two chapters, an attempt was made to show how specific measures taken by the colonial governments led to the integration of the Tanzanian economy into the world economic system (which is predominantly capitalist), as well as to the emergence of a social structure and labour process typical of this East African Colony.

All in all, the independent TANU government which came into power in 1961 inherited a dual, underdeveloped and dependent economy stressing agriculture as the basis for the economic exploitation of this peripheral country by international capital. In sectoral terms, the agricultural sector accounted for 45 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product while the manufacturing industry for instance accounted for only 4 percent of the total GDP as the Table 30 indicates.

There is no doubt that the colony's economic performance during these colonial days was predominantly based on the growth of exports of primary agricultural products with sisal as the dominant export item (see Table 31). As might be seen from this table,

Forty percent of money incomes is derived from exports and 80 percent of export earnings comes from agricultural and livestock products as against 13 percent for minerals. Manufacturing industry's contribution is very small. (Tanganyika Government, 1962: 2)

Table 30. Gross Domestic Product of Tanganyika 1955-1960 in E ' 000

SECTOR	1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1960*	
	Total	Money	Total	Money	Total	Money	Total	Money	Total	Money	Total	Money
Agriculture	72,455	29,703	74,363	31,014	76,478	32,591	75,008	32,236	79,964	36,915	32,289	40,789
Livestock Products	12,651	3,576	12,915	3,698	14,625	3,736	15,027	3,502	16,706	4,365	18,394	4,093
Forest Products	5,259	3,131	5,605	3,544	5,965	3,825	5,295	3,135	5,106	2,889	5,191	2,911
Hunting and Fishing	1,514	159	1,739	159	2,144	147	2,928	347	3,423	374	3,578	505
Mining and Quarrying	5,060	5,060	5,024	5,024	4,984	4,984	6,186	6,186	6,572	6,572	6,984	6,984
Manufacturing	4,085	4,085	4,016	4,016	5,727	6,727	6,750	6,750	7,100	7,100	7,343	7,343
Craft Industries	5,269	--	5,319	--	5,617	--	5,698	--	5,834	--	5,916	--
Construction	8,140	43,735	9,305	4,826	10,326	5,442	10,470	6,089	16,028	5,637	10,787	6,306
Public Utilities	763	763	903	903	641	641	955	955	1,074	1,074	1,130	1,130
Transport, Storage and Communi- cations	8,510	8,510	9,041	9,041	10,181	10,181	11,437	11,437	12,273	12,273	12,798	12,798
Distribution	7,641	7,641	7,580	7,580	7,662	7,662	7,814	7,814	8,590	8,590	8,600	8,600
Ownership of Dwellings	2,724	2,724	2,889	2,889	3,065	3,065	3,334	3,334	3,542	3,542	3,797	3,797
Public Administration and Defence	8,712	8,712	9,335	9,335	10,405	10,405	11,326	11,326	11,752	11,752	13,223	13,223
Miscellaneous Services	3,961	3,961	4,306	4,306	4,535	4,535	4,834	4,834	5,148	5,148	5,381	5,381
TOTAL	146,744	81,760	152,420	89,335	162,335	92,941	157,092	97,945	177,112	106,231	185,411	113,860

SOURCE: Tanganyika Government, Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961/2-1963/4, Government Printers, Dar es Salaam 1962, p. 3.

Table 31. Total Domestic Exports from Tanganyika 1955-1960 in £ '000

ITEM	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Sisal	10,902	9,956	10,823	9,482	10,349	13,057	15,442
Coffee (not roasted)	10,003	6,905	9,237	7,142	7,576	5,745	7,326
Cotton	3,357	5,534	7,486	6,578	7,249	6,657	8,827
Tea	504	535	543	601	632	771	1,151
Meat and Meat Preparations	800	492	346	515	907	1,512	1,942
Hides, Skins and Furs	1,531	1,235	1,199	1,223	1,200	1,919	1,836
Cashew nuts	554	869	881	1,514	1,087	1,562	2,126
Groundnuts	182	346	1,017	1,073	779	785	1,053
Other Oilseeds, Nuts and Kernels	172	1,376	2,246	2,329	2,035	2,014	2,178
Wood and Timber	364	399	456	603	472	405	598
Diamonds	3,107	3,199	2,865	3,242	4,415	4,548	4,653
Gold	901	864	742	678	705	1,067	1,231
Lead Ore and Concentrates	371	623	1,352	1,129	895	829	1,077
Tobacco	66	89	26	74	44	60	90
Other	2,406	3,777	5,665	3,248	3,385	4,356	5,324
TOTAL DOMESTIC EXPORTS	36,229	36,199	44,884	39,431	41,730	45,287	54,854

Source: Tanganyika Government, Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961/2 - 1963/4 p. 6

The country's import bill on the other hand was dominated by manufactured goods, machinery and equipment and, ironically enough for a country exporting agricultural primary products, and food (see Table 32).

The facts as presented in Table 32, together with the desire on the part of international (in most cases British) capital to maintain the status quo through neo-colonial arrangements on one hand, and the needs and desires by the new sovereign state to provide its people with various services and outlays (some of which might not be economic in the short term range) on the other, definitely influenced the various development measures taken by the independent government. Also to consider in this respect is the plain fact--though seemingly unpalatable to many Tanzanian ultra-nationalists at the time of independence--that the country did not have an indigeneous trained technical and professional manpower to implement the new government's development measures. The government was therefore forced to depend on expatriate officers (most of them former colonial functionaries) who formed the backbone of all technical services to implement the various measures. Some of these were political decision and in most cases contradictory to the orientations, outlook and even immediate and long-term interests of the same expatriate officers who were expected to implement them effectively and efficiently.

It is our purpose in this chapter to look at the various development measures taken by the TANU government from 1961 to 1970 with the aim of finding their impact on the emerging social structure (section I) as well as the resulting labour processes in general and production relations in particular (section II).

Table 32. Net Imports from Overseas

SECTION	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Food	2,326	2,358	2,366	2,550	2,108	2,343	2,306
Beverages and Tobacco	418	452	286	291	288	274	268
Crude Materials inedible, except Fuels	119	142	145	128	108	113	129
Mineral Fuels, Lubricants and Related Materials	2,669	3,061	3,434	4,076	4,125	3,670	3,934
Animal and Vegetable Oils and Fats	72	196	224	257	154	143	194
Chemicals	1,278	1,782	1,782	1,711	1,871	2,050	2,251
Manufactured Goods	13,698	18,684	13,138	16,545	12,491	13,182	13,911
Machinery and Transport Equipment	7,438	12,285	10,396	9,558	8,629	9,065	10,881
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles	2,636	3,081	2,765	2,850	2,530	2,575	2,865
Miscellaneous Transactions and Commodities	1,307	1,371	1,351	1,308	1,264	1,042	1,078
TOTAL NET IMPORTS	31,962	43,531	35,885	39,275	33,568	34,456	37,817

Source: Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961/2 - 1963/4 *ibid.* p. 6.

At this stage, however, suffice it to point out that post-independence developments in the socio-economic field were based on four major recommendations and policy documents, namely:

- (a) The World Bank Mission Report on the Economic Development of Tanganyika (1961).
- (b) An industrial development strategy plan compiled by M/s Arthur D. Little Inc. an American business firm under contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development (1961).
- (c) The Tanganyika Five Year Industrial Plan compiled by the U.S. Agency for International Development (1964) and
- (d) The Arusha Declaration issued by TANU (1967) which charts out the country's socialist development through self-reliance.

Developments in the field of labour on the other hand were based on four pieces of legislation, one policy recommendation report and one Presidential Circular as follows:

- (a) The Trades Dispute (Settlement) Act - No. 43 of 1962.
- (b) The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act - No. 18 of 1964.
- (c) The Security of Employment Act - No. 62 of 1964.
- (d) The Permanent Labour Tribunal Act - No 41 of 1967.
- (e) Report to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on Wages, Incomes and Prices Policy, compiled for the government by Professor H.A. Turner of the International Labour Organizations, hence the common usage of the term "Turner Report" (1967), and

- (f) The Presidential Circular, No. 1 of 1970 calling for encouragement and institution of workers' participation in the day-to-day affairs of their industries and factories.

I. SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TANZANIA 1961-1970

In what follows, attempts will be made to point out the basis upon which the general development trends pursued by the country during the period under review were built and their impact on the social structure that was to emerge during the period under review. Particular development measures in the areas of Agriculture, Manufacturing and Industry, Commerce and Trade, and Manpower and Education will be singled out for special scrutiny in that regard.

A. General Considerations

We start this section by restating what is commonly understood but often neglected about the development strategy to be pursued by any new independent (African) country. Any new country, African or otherwise, usually has a choice between two major approaches to socio-economic development, depending on the value judgments and ideological direction held by the particular country: the capitalist-oriented or the socialist-oriented approach. Neither of these is pure and uniform, for both include a diverse spectrum of alternative approaches to specific issues related to development. In some instances, they may even overlap (Seidman, 1972: 56-57).

The Capitalist-Oriented Approach: This mainly assumes that private ownership of the means of production and distribution will lead to the best possible allocation of resources through the efforts to

maximize profits through competition (ibid: 56). The above approach calls for African countries like Tanzania to create the appropriate atmosphere for private investors (tax rebates, trade protectionist tariffs and other inducements to private businesses) to invest in the desired areas of the economy, thereby contributing to the overall economic development of the country through the multiplier effect.

Under the above model, the State is expected to intervene where private entrepreneurship has failed, as well as to provide and expand the necessary social and economic infrastructure to attract investment. Its involvement however, is expected to be minimal.

Also important is the fact that since there are usually no national capitalist entrepreneurs in these countries, it also becomes the duty of the State to attract foreign private investors and of course the inherent exploitation, underdevelopment, and dependency that goes with such a strategy.

The Socialist-Oriented Approach: This is mainly a critical alternative to the capitalist-oriented form of development which is here seen as being based on the accumulation of profits by those who own the means of the production through the exploitation of the actual producers' labour, a contradiction which inevitably leads to a class struggle with the State acting in favour or being used by those who own the means of production.

The socialist model of development, on the other hand, argues that the State should be used or should intervene on behalf of the masses in planning and coordinating production processes and especially the resulting relations of production which very much depend on

the way the surplus accruing from the process of production is distributed. This calls for the reorganization of the country's economic structure to make sure that the State, on behalf of workers and peasants, controls the major means of production and distribution.

There were several specific policy recommendations for the socio-economic development of Tanzania during the period under review. We now turn to these.

1. The World Bank Report

On the eve of independence, the British Colonial government invited the international Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to send a mission to Tanganyika and make recommendations as to the country's future economic development. The Mission was directed,

to assess the resources available for future development, to consider how these might best contribute to a balanced program of social and economic development, to make recommendations for practical measures to further such development and to indicate the financial implications of such recommendations (IBRD, op. cit.: vii).

In its findings and deliberations, the Mission was of the opinion that for a country like Tanganyika which was dominated by peasant agriculture, any other aspects of development were (through the multiplier effect) to be based on agricultural development: The main development task in

Tanganyika is to improve the methods of peasant agriculture and cattle keeping or to transform present methods and organization into systems making more productive use of the land (ibid.: 5).

All other aspects of development were, according to the Mission, closely related to the improvement and transformation of agriculture and animal husbandry. The key words in the Mission's recommendations

were "IMPROVEMENT" and "TRANSFORMATION."

Improvement: According to the Mission, within the first few years no radical changes would have to be made in agricultural organization and production. The main increase in production would have to come from piece-by-piece improved agricultural production methods within the general framework of the existing methods. This was to be done through the stepping up of agricultural extension work and the adoption of the "Community Development" approach. According to the Mission's fifth recommendation:

The agricultural "improvement" effort should be continued by means of: extension work (with some changes of organization and methods); a revitalized program of agricultural credit; and measures to improve the market outlets for African crops and to increase cash crop incentives (ibid: 492).

Of specific interest to this study are two facts. First, that improvement efforts were to be concentrated on specific areas which were already endowed with favourable climatic conditions and as such could ensure higher yields of specific crops. Secondly, that within these respective areas, efforts were to be concentrated on particular individuals who were thought of as being receptive and ready to adopt the new innovations in agriculture. This was, as we shall see later, the basis of differentiation across the country and within specific regions.

Transformation: Side by side with the improvement approach, the Mission also made recommendations for the adoption of "transformation" programs.

The joint aims of these transformation programs should be: to make more productive use of the land of Tanganyika, while at the same time protecting or even building up the fertility of the soil; and to institute types of farming which

justify the injection of capital. This involves the creation of farming systems based on more intensive and permanent use of the land by efficiently run, planned farms of economic size (ibid.: 6).

The World Bank group went further to point out that these transformation programs would have to rely "on securing quicker and higher returns on investment and efforts by using selected, sparsely populated areas for planned settlement schemes and cattle ranches" (ibid.: 7), adding that most of the larger schemes would be best organized on a partnership basis, in which individual Africans farm the land, but a public body or authority provides capital works, productive services and input of skilled management. Again, only specific areas and a few people were to be involved. In fact it was estimated that only about one million people would have been covered by these programs by 1980.

The Mission also considered that estates run by non-Africans still made a very significant contribution to the country's economy. It recommended that they receive assistance from the government on a similar basis as those applied to the rest of the agricultural sector (ibid.: 493).

The Bank then specified crops that would have to be grown (cotton, coffee, cocoa, pyrethrum, beans, tobacco, rice, wheat) as well as the physical and social infrastructure such as irrigation schemes, transport network, marketing institutions, and extension staff needed to facilitate the various agricultural development programs.

As regards manufacturing and industrial development, the IBRD recommended and outlined a program of limited import substitution and export processing. Specifically, the Mission urged the export processing of canned meat, wattle extracts, cashew nuts, sisal, coffee,

desicated coconuts and starch products based on cassava (Seidman, op. cit.: 109). It then went further to suggest small scale labour intensive projects to produce furniture, building materials, soap, soft drinks, dairy industry and bakery products.

Realizing the lack and inadequacy of investment resources in the country (partly as a result of colonial exploitation and partly as a result of the country's underdevelopment), the Mission recommended specific measures to attract foreign private capital as follows (ibid.: 109):

- (i) a low income tax rate--which was low enough at that time;
- (ii) a 20 percent initial deduction for industrial plant and machinery;
- (iii) that industrial estates be established in Dar es Salaam, Moshi, Tanga, Morogoro, and Mwanza with the government supplying all the necessary infrastructure.

As an integral part of the above industrial development programme, the Mission envisioned the apparent emergence of an African entrepreneurial class involved in small to medium scale enterprises.

The emergence of an African business community will necessarily be a gradual process, though it may be aided by a training scheme. As the participation of Africans in commerce and service trades develops, this should provide a nucleus of a business class which can shift to small and medium sized industrial activity as opportunities arise. . . . [T]he expansion of industry, particularly the capital intensive type, must rely heavily on enterprise, technicians and, to a substantial degree capital from outside the territory (IBRD, op. cit.: 129).

The IBRD Mission also proposed setting up a small Tanganyika Development Company, "provided that it could draw on the assistance of the Colonial Development Corporation or some suitably qualified outside body" (ibid.: 494). The Tanganyika government was expected

to contribute £500,000 which would then be topped by some funds from external sources; initially the Colonial Development Company of Britain and later on the Commonwealth Development Company. The functions of this company would be to investigate and publicize future and potential industrial and commercial ventures. As a follow up and second step, a development company with funds to invest in manufacturing projects would then be created.

On top of the above recommendations, the government was also called upon to invest in the social infrastructure by providing education--especially secondary, technical and higher education so as to meet the manpower needs of the country. According to the recommendations on education, first priority in that direction was to be given to increasing the annual number of African school certificate candidates from 2,000 to 2,500 (*ibid.*: 305-306). Special efforts were also to be made in the improvement and increase of the education for girls by:

- (i) expanding facilities at all levels;
- (ii) introducing more practical courses for girls in the middle schools;
- (iii) increasing the number and quality of women teachers, and heads of girls' middle schools (*ibid.*: 311).

To facilitate this, the Mission called for "a case for remission of school fees for African girls until a tradition of female education has been more firmly established" (*ibid.*: 519).

High priority in education was also to be given to the expansion of technical training facilities and other professional education facilities as well as adult literacy training.

Furthermore, the Mission recommended that all future developments in education be carried on within the intended racial integration of the educational system. To that effect, the Indian (Asian) community was advised to "abandon its exclusively academic concept of secondary education" (ibid.: 520).

The Mission further made recommendations as regards institutional structures that would be needed to facilitate development in general. This included the reorganization of certain existing institutions as well as the creation of new ones to run and manage the various projects, as we shall see later on.

2. Arthur D. Little, Inc. and the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.)

Immediately after the World Bank Mission issued its report, an American private firm Arthur D. Little, Inc., under contract with the United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.) was asked to make a study as regards the industrial potential and exploitation of the country. Since its findings and recommendations are the basis upon which the Tanganyika Five Year Industrial Plan (compiled by the U.S.A.I.D. in 1964) was based, we shall combine the findings and recommendations of these two documents and deal with both of them under this section.

Both of these documents stressed the need on the part of the Tanganyika government to provide incentives to attract private investors. In this, special emphasis was also placed on the need and role to be played by foreign private entrepreneurs, but only when they had been assured of 'a favourable political climate' (U.S.A.I.D., 1964: i). In most cases, they came up with similar ideas and suggestions

as those made by the World Bank Mission as regards industrial development.

Arthur D. Little Inc. was however skeptical and less enthusiastic about Tanganyika's industrial potential when it said that there was "little reason to believe that Tanganyika can become a manufacturing center, processing imported materials for re-export" (Little, op. cit.: 18), when compared to Nairobi (Kenya) which was already at an advantageous position within the East African Common Market. According to Little, therefore, Tanganyika's industrial development program would be in the directions of (Seidman, op. cit.: 109-110):

- (i) partial or complete processing for export of raw materials originating in the country or
- (ii) manufacturing for local market.

Like the World Bank Mission however, Little, too

urged that the Government utilize its limited resources to produce a "maximum multiplier effect" by encouraging private investment. This, it emphasized, required enhancement of "the presently favourable climate for private investment," taking into consideration that "Tanganyika must sell its labour and resources, and buy its risk-taking capital and management in the world market in competition with many other countries (ibid.: 109).

Like the World Bank Mission, the two bodies called for the establishment of an Industrial Development Corporation. According to Little, the Corporation's capital would be drawn from three possible sources and divided into three parts as follows (Smith, 1966: 275):

1. Income from dividends or possible sale of some of the present industrial holdings of the government;
2. New capital appropriations by the Government of Tanganyika; and
3. Intergovernmental loans for industrial development purposes.

The capital available to the development corporation may appropriately be divided into three parts:

1. Fund A, to be used for loans to small business firms, both commercial and industrial, with special attention given to the needs of 'African' entrepreneurs;
2. Fund B, to provide 'high risk' or 'soft term' financing to projects of critical importance to the economy, but which cannot be adequately financed through other sources; and
3. Participation with capital from private sources or other governments, in a Joint Development Company to provide financing for commercially sound ventures.

According to the U.S.A.I.D. Five Year Industrial Plan for Tanganyika, the government had to take the following steps in order to stimulate industrial development (op. cit.: ii-iii):

1. Renegotiation of the (East African) Common Market agreements to eliminate vestiges of discrimination, such as "industrial licensing;"
2. Provision of more technical and financial assistance in Tanganyika, so as to break out the Nairobi "old boy net;"
3. Making available more suitable land for industrial development;
4. Reducing electric power rates for industry; and
5. Improving and expanding selling efforts, and establishing better relations with existing industries.

Having made those general recommendations to the government of Tanganyika the two bodies went on to point out specific industrial opportunities for the country as indicated in Table 33 on the next page.

Of special interest to this study is the fact that, like the World Bank Mission, the two above-mentioned institutions called for

Table 33. Ratings of Industrial Opportunities for Tanganyika

Probability of Being Feasible	Importance if Feasible	Probable Time of Feasible Development
<u>High:</u>	<u>High:</u>	<u>Early:</u>
Cashew Nuts Vegetable-Oil Products Animal Feed Canning Fruits and Vegetables Multipurpose Food Honey and Beeswax Cassava Starch Fish Canning Grain Milling Mahogany Plywoods Quality Soaps Boats Furniture Glass Bottles Carbon Dioxide Cottage Weaving Cement (Limestone) Clay Products Cement Products	Cashew Nuts Vegetable-Oil Products Canning Fruits and Vegetables Pulp and Paper Animal Feed Multipurpose Food Cassava Starch Tanning Fish Canning Grain Milling Mahogany Plywoods Fertilizer Burlap and Sacks Cement Cement Products Clay Products	Cashew Nuts Vegetable-Oil Products Canning Fruits and Vegetables Multipurpose Food Honey and Beeswax Cassava Starch Tanning Fish canning Mahogany Plywoods Boats Furniture Flooring Paper Converting Quality Soaps Burlap and Sacks Cottage Weaving Cement (Limestone) Cement Products Clay Products
<u>Medium</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Medium</u>
Desiccated Coconuts Chemical Treated Wood Composition Hardboard Tanning Fertilizer Sodium Silicate Paper Converting Burlap and Sacks	Furniture Flooring Paper Converting Cottage Weaving Boats Chemical Treated Wood Composition Hardboard Glass Bottles Chlorine Sulfuric Acid	Glass Bottles Fertilizers Sulfuric Acid Animal Feed Chemical Treated Wood Composition Hardboard Grain Milling Carbon Dioxide
<u>Lower</u>	<u>Lower</u>	<u>Lower</u>
Coir Fiber Coconut Shell Flour Pulp and Paper Caustic Soda Soda Ash Chlorine Sulfuric Acid	Quality Soaps Honey and Beeswax Carbon Dioxide Coir Fiber Coconut Shell Flour Desiccated Coconuts Caustic Soda Sodium Silicate	Coir Fiber Coconut Shell Flour Desiccated Coconuts Pulp and Paper Caustic Soda Chlorine Sodium Silicate Soda Ash

*NOTE: Other new industries based on Import Substitution and in 'Core' and Service categories are not yet adequately identified to allow classification.

SOURCE: Smith, Hadley E. Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania, Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam (1966) pp. 282-283.

government spending in the exploration and provision of industrial investment opportunities to private, and in most cases foreign, capital. Even more important however, is the use of these public funds in creating or promoting an African entrepreneurial class.

These suggestions and recommendations of the three above institutions were incorporated in the first two Development Plans for the country (1961/2-1963/4 and 1964/5-1969). All in all, the above recommendations led to policies which had significant effects on the overall socio-economic development of the country.

First and most important is the fact that they led to further integration of the Tanzanian economy into the world capitalist system with its inherent trends towards the exploitation and underdevelopment of the country.

Secondly, and as a result of the first development this integration of the Tanzanian economy into the World Capitalist system led to a situation of dependence on the part of the former. From then on, any development within the country was dictated by and depended on external developments and situations.

Thirdly, and even more important to this study, is that the policies pursued following the recommendations of the above three bodies, led to the differential economic development of the country. Certain areas which were endowed with favourable climatic conditions developed more than others. Furthermore, within the various regions or areas, certain segments of the population benefited more from the pursued policies than others. These developments were thus the basis of an emergent class structure and inequalities (as we shall see later on in section II of this chapter).

However, it did not take very long before the political leadership in the country recognized inadequacies and contradictions arising out of the above charted line of development. On top of the above-mentioned three consequences in the pursued policies, the amount of external aid and investment as envisioned in the first two development plans was not forthcoming. The little that came had certain political strings tied to it, while a lot of surplus that would have otherwise been re-invested in new development ventures was repatriated abroad in the form of dividends, commissions, and other tricks such as overcharging or overinvoicing of certain imported machinery and equipment. Tanzania was also remaining underdeveloped in trained manpower and dependent on external donors:

It was behind such a background that in 1967, the then ruling party (TANU) came up with a new policy document--The Arusha Declaration--charting the country's future development of Socialism and Self-reliance.

3. The Arush Declaration:

It should now be apparent that the first few years after independence did not involve any far-reaching and radical socio-economic changes in the country. A few "evolutionary" steps were however effected by the independent TANU government:

Among the most important evolutionary measures taken was to bring the Party into direct administrative control at all levels of Government. Thus TANU politicians, and not the civil servants, took over from the British colonial administrators. The TANU Regional Commissioners took over from the British Provincial Commissioners at the regional level. Likewise, the District Commissioners were replaced by TANU Area Commissioners (Ruhumbika, ed., 1974: 71).

Otherwise, and as Mbilinyi, Mabele and Kyomo continue to point out

(ibid.: 75).

the general characteristics and features of Tanzania's economy during the colonial era were carried over into the post-independence years. It was not until 1967 that Tanzania confronted the problems of economic imbalances, the ownership of means of production and some problems of distortion. The Arusha Declaration was proclaimed that year by TANU and immediate steps were taken to implement it.

The Arusha Declaration did not only reflect a revolutionary watershed, but also marked a radical turning point in the socio-economic history of the century. From then on, the country embarked on the building of a socialist country through self-reliance.

In its economic aspects, the Declaration emphasized the following salient features, as clearly pointed out by Mbilinyi, Mabele and Kyomo whom I intend to quote at great length (Ruhumbika, op. cit.: 75-76):

- a. With respect to the balance of social and economic growth between urban-rural, the emphasis on development was to shift from urban to rural areas. The strategy for rural development stressed the need for communal living--Vijiji Vya Ujamaa. Vijiji Vya Ujamaa were to form the units of production and centers or nuclei of rural development or transformation.
- b. The ownership and control of the major means of production and exchange were transferred to the people through their Government or public institutions. The first step thus in the implementation of the Arusha Declaration was the nationalization of major industries, import/export firms, wholesale trade, the real estate sector, and part of the estate sector. Further, areas of investment were demarcated and guidelines for investment were drawn out. Thus, some sectors of the

economy (major grain milling and arms industry) could be 100 percent Government owned, or Government and private sectors could enter into partnership (with Government having controlling shares of what were called "the commanding heights" of the economy), while others could remain 100 percent privately owned.*

- c. Knowing the realities of Tanzania's economies, self-reliance was made the cornerstone of the strategy for development. While foreign investment was to be welcomed, this would be encouraged only if it supplemented local efforts and not as a substitute for it.
- d. The emphasis on production was to take cognizance of local demand. In other words, local resources were to be channelled into production first to meet national demand and only second for exports. The emphasis shifted from encouraging the production of export crops to increasing the production of food crops. Industries were to produce more farm inputs and

*The above said categorization of industry was as follows and was taken to reassure potential private investors as to their future in Tanzania (Seidman, op. cit.: 115):

1. Industries restricted to Government ownership: major grain milling establishments and arms industry (not yet established);
2. State-controlled industries: major means of production including land, forests, mineral resources, water, oil, electricity, communications, transport, steel, machine tool, motor car, cement, fertilizers, textile and "any other big industry upon which a large section of the population depends for its living or which provides essential components for other industries," and large plantations, "especially those which produce essential raw materials."
3. Other enterprises--all those not covered by (1) and (2): private firms may invest with or without Government cooperative participation, depending on their own desire, as long as they abide by the laws relating to employment conditions, and so forth.

necessities and less luxury goods. These attempts are aimed at transforming the economic structure so that production is geared to the needs of the people and economic imbalances and distortions which give rise to dependence are minimized.

- e. Local technology is to be revived and encouraged, through the expansion and increased investment in the small scale industries.

Thus, from 1967 onwards specific development measures and all government's efforts were taken and directed towards the implementation of the policy objectives set in the Arusha Declaration with the basic aim of transforming the characteristics of the country's economies.

The various measures taken to that effect include (Ruhumbika, op. cit.: 78):

1. A change in the pattern of ownership of the means of production and distribution from the previous foreign private domination of the economy to public ownership through the various institutions of the state.
2. Production of raw materials first for national needs and only after that, for export.
3. A shift in industrial production from the emphasis on luxury goods for a few, and in most cases, urban people to the production of the basic needs for the majority of Tanzanians.
4. The development of the infrastructure and the provision of other social services to the rural areas where more than 90 percent of Tanzanians live rather than continued concentration on urban areas as was previously the case.
5. Emphasis on the development of small scale industries which

would use both traditional indigeneous technology and modern technology appropriate to the country's level of technological development.

6. The provision and development of the country's own manpower through expanded educational and technical training programs so as to cut down the dependence on the so often expensive and irrelevant foreign technical manpower aid.
7. Stress on development based on locally available resources (the land and the people) rather than putting emphasis on capital resources which are, ~~after~~ all, very meagre in a country like Tanzania.

We now turn to the specific development measures in the various sectors of the economy with the aim of pointing out their impact and implications as regards the social structure that was to emerge by 1970.

B. Specific Development Measures

During the first few years after independence, Tanganyika's socio-economic development was based on the recommendations of the World Bank, Little Inc., and the U.S.A.I.D. Both the first (Three Year) Development Plan (1961/62 - 1963/4) and the First Five Year Plan for Economic and Social Development (1964-1969) incorporated and were indeed guided by these recommendation as regards development strategies in the various sectors of the economy.

According to the Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961/2 - 1963/4, the country had two development alternatives to follow at the time of independence:

The first choice implied a concentration on economic projects which would yield the quickest and highest returns in the near future, whereas the second choice meant distribution of scarce resources over all competing sectors alike. The Government's view and also the view of the World Bank Mission was that at this stage of Tanganyika's development the first choice is the right one (ibid.: 7).

It was also further and succinctly stipulated in the plan that:

The main economic objective in Tanganyika is to ensure a rapid and progressive increase in cash income per head of population and to secure a steady improvement in the people's standard of living. This in turn requires increased production and the widening of the internal market from individual family or village to the whole territory. Seen from a different angle the same problem can be described as giving the economy a sufficiently strong stimulus to ensure a more rapid and continuous growth and development (ibid.: 7).

All of the above was, according to the plan, to be based on the expansion of the production of agricultural cash crops and livestock. This also called for the development of the necessary economic and social infrastructure to stimulate growth or production. The economic infrastructure needed included water supplies and irrigation schemes as well as improved communication networks. The social infrastructure mostly needed was technical manpower (ibid.: 8):

Tanganyika's most urgent need in this sphere is to increase the number of secondary school places and to expand technical training facilities. In other words, at this stage of the territory's development there is a most pressing need to provide cadres of trained people necessary for technical, clerical and skilled work both in the Government and in the private sector.

To sum up the country's most urgent objective at that time were seen as being the,

- (i) Development of agriculture and livestock industry with its subsidiary task of development of water supplies and irrigation.
- (ii) Improvement and development of communications.

(iii) Development of secondary and technical education.

The above considerations definitely influenced the sectoral budgetary allocations during the plan period as indicated in Tables 34 and 35.

The First Five-Year Plan (1964-1969) struck a similar tone. Unlike the preceding one however, there was specific attention given to Manufacturing/Industrial development in which recommendations made by Little Inc. and the U.S.A.I.D. featured prominently. All in all, the Plan stressed four major areas of development as follows (op. cit.: 3-4):

- (i) Fostering agricultural production through the improvement and transformation approaches. Altogether £37 million or 14.5 percent of the total capital expenditure was reserved for agricultural development.
- (ii) The introduction and expansion of manufacturing and mining activities as well as the purchase of construction. A sum of £59 million (24 percent of the total capital expenditure) was set aside for this purpose--three quarters of this being expected to come from the private and predominantly foreign sector. The Plan projected production for 1970 was expected to be three times the 1963/64 level.
- (iii) Expansion of the commercial network to cope with the likely increase in the volume of production. A sum of £33 million or 13 percent of the total capital expenditure was set aside for investment in this sector.
- (iv) Social infrastructure--emphasizing the expansion of secondary and higher education in view of the marked increase in demand for high level manpower during the period of the

Table 34. Development Plan 1961/62-1963/64 Functional Analysis

No.	Group	'000	Percent
1.	Agriculture	2,355	9.8
2.	Veterinary	319	1.3
3.	Forestry	533	2.2
4.	Water Supplies and Irrigation	2,291	9.6
5.	Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation	507	2.1
6.	Trunk Roads	3,217	13.5
7.	Feeder Roads	950	4.0
8.	Aerodromes	193	0.8
9.	Power	1,800	7.5
10.	Development Corporation	500	2.6
11.	Industrial Credit	80	0.3
12.	Geological	147	0.6
13.	Mineral Surveys	125	0.5
14.	Education	3,270	13.8
15.	Health	954	4.0
16.	Co-operative Development	265	1.1
17.	Community Development	229	1.0
18.	Township Development	1,154	4.8
19.	Lands and Surveys	170	0.7
20.	Game and Preservation of Wildlife	354	1.4
21.	Police and Prisons	2,180	9.1
22.	Army	200	0.8
23.	Government Buildings	1,027	4.3
24.	Housing	694	2.9
25.	Information Services and Broadcasting	152	0.6
26.	Miscellaneous	164	0.7
TOTAL		23,930	100.0

Table 35. Development Plan 1961/62-1963/64

Summary			
No.	Ministry	'000	Percent
1.	Prime Minister	1,252	5.2
2.	Agriculture	5,737	24.0
3.	Communications, Power and Works	6,900	28.8
4.	Education	3,270	13.7
5.	Commerce and Industry	1,095	4.6
6.	Local Government	1,244	5.2
7.	Home Affairs	2,180	9.1
8.	Health and Labour	954	4.0
9.	Lands and Surveys	1,298	5.4
TOTAL		23,930	100.0

SOURCE: (Both Tables 33 and 34) Tanganyika, Development Plan 1961/62-1963/64, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam (1961) Pp. 14 and 13 respectively.

Plan and in subsequent years.

Specific development measures and strategies in the various sectors of the economy were as follows:

1. Agricultural Development and Rural Differentiation: The Emergence of a Kulak Class?

Agricultural development immediately after independence was based on the advice given by the World Bank Mission and was also in line with the colonial policy. It was based on the need by the government to help able and fewer people increase agricultural output through the following approaches:

a. The Improvement Approach:

This was based on the need to improve and increase agricultural production and output through the expansion of the then existing policy of assistance and guidance to the fewer "receptive" farmers who were ready to adopt any new innovations and agricultural technical advice. This was carried out through agricultural extension workers and Community Development Officers. It was to be the basis of small-holder individual peasant production. Under the above program, "progressive" individuals within the various agricultural production areas were singled out and given all government aid in terms of extension advice, short term credit to purchase fertilizers and insecticides, as well as instruction in better crop husbandry. As a result of this, a few peasants in their respective areas not only improved their agricultural performance and output, but also reaped all the economic benefits accruing therefrom. The majority of the

rural dwellers, on the other hand, continued to live marginal lives. Certain areas that had also been singled out for the production of certain crops also advanced more at the expense of the rest of the country.

b. Transformation

This was the basis of the "villagization" or settlement schemes that were to mushroom in the country immediately after independence. The approach was aimed at grouping hitherto scattered peasants into selected villages or settlements from where they could carry on agricultural production based on "modern" agricultural and capital intensive techniques. These new ventures were directly under the Ministry of Lands and Settlement and Water Development which provided tractors, improved houses, and rural water supplies. Government was also expected to provide these settlements or villages with all the necessary social facilities including schools, hospitals, community centers, etc.

These settlements can be divided into two basic categories

(Seidman, op. cit.: 177-178):

First were supervised settlement schemes--these were new settlements started and run by government agencies and usually on newly opened up land. Production activity was carried out through a direct form of control over individual settlers or farmers.

Secondly were cooperative agricultural settlements started "voluntarily" by people coming together. In most cases these were based on existing communities on new or already occupied land to share production functions.

1. Supervised Settlement Schemes: These can be divided into two groups or categories depending on who initiated and was running them as well as the way they were organized as follows:

- (i) Settlements organized and being run by the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation: These included the Nachingwea groundnuts scheme, the Kongwa Cattle scheme and the Urambo flue-cured tobacco scheme. These were formerly sites for the ill-fated groundnuts scheme which had been started by the U.K. Overseas Food Corporation after World War II. The Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (TAC) had been established in 1955 to run these schemes. On top of that, the TAC had also opened up a few other new schemes. These included the cattle ranches at Ruvu, Mkata, Lupa Tingatinga and Matengero, as well as tobacco schemes in Chunya and Iringa districts, and the Mbarali irrigation scheme in Mbeya. In 1962, the TAC was also asked to assume responsibility of running three other schemes which had sprung up in the Kilombero valley at the initiative of T.A.N.U. In 1965, all TAC schemes were turned over to the Village Settlement Agency.
- (ii) The village settlement schemes initiated and run by the Village Settlement Agency (VSA) which was established in 1962 to implement the policy of transformation: These were designed to settle 250 families each at an investment of £150,000. Each family was to be under the supervision of a qualified manager. Each family was expected

to earn £150 a year. During the First Five-Year Plan, over £12 million (13.5 percent of the central government development budget) was set aside for the various projects under this scheme. By the end of the plan period (1969) however, only 70 settlements involving less than 5 percent of the population were expected to have been established.

- (iii) Three irrigation (cotton) schemes started by an Israel Company, AGRIDEV, in Mwanza district aimed at two crops a year.
- (iv) The "Assisted" World Food Program schemes started by the government in collaboration with the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization numbering five in 1963. All were however closed down in 1966.
- (v) Block farms which were started in 1964 with the purpose of mechanizing cotton production in the Lake regions. By 1965, there were about 37 of them, all of which, however, had died out in 1968.
- (vi) Licenced Producer Schemes in Tabora, Mpanda, Bukoba, Rungwe and Usambaras: Under these schemes, peasants were given all the necessary advice and financial aid while cultivating their own individual plots in their home areas. By 1964, there were an estimated 1,000 such licenced growers all working under the supervision of appointed managers.

The impact of all these schemes was that a few individual African producers made it. For instance, under the tobacco "Master Grower"

schemes in Urambo where the Government provided supervision, credit for fertilizers, spray and hired labour, a small number of Africans managed to put as much as 40 acres of land under cultivation, thus managing to make as much as Tanzania shs. 80,000 annually.

As Cliffe and Cunningham (1968) put it, the idea behind all these schemes was to create a

healthy, prosperous, yeoman farmer class, firmly established on the land, appreciative of its fruits, jealous of its inherited wealth and dedicated to maintaining the family unit.

2. Cooperatives Settlement Schemes: These can be divided into five categories as follows (Seidman, op. cit.: 184):

- (i) Cattle and coconut schemes in Tanga and the Coast regions.
- (ii) Sisal cooperatives initiated by TANU and the government so as to involve Africans in the production of sisal. There were 416 of these by 1964.
- (iii) Voluntary settlement schemes mostly started by TANU and the TANU Youth League (TYL) since 1959.
- (iv) Spontaneous settlements: these were new communities which mushroomed up on ad hoc basis. In such communities, mostly as a result of some migration into new areas, most of the production activities were carried out on individualistic basis. However, when it was necessary for the villagers to share some facility, such as new water supply or an irrigation project, the people came together into some form of cooperative.
- (v) Ruvuma "Ujamaa" Settlement Schemes: These were started under the TANU and TYL leadership in Ruvuma region in the early 1960's and joined together into the Ruvuma

Development Association. Unlike the other cooperative settlements, which had for all practical purposes died out by 1966 due to unsystematic planning and lack of political and administrative inputs, the Ruvuma Ujamaa experience succeeded very well. This was mainly due to the high level of ideological commitment coupled with careful attention to concrete techniques required to increase labour efficiency and productivity (ibid.: 182).

3. The Estate Sector:

On top of the small and medium sized holding peasant units and villagization, or settlement schemes developed through the "improvement" and "transformation" approaches, there was also the estate sector. Addressing the National Assembly on the First Five-Year Development Plan on May 5, 1964, President Nyerere categorically stated that privately-- and in most cases alien--owned estates and plantations, though occupying less than 1 percent of the land, accounted for 40 percent of the value of the nation's agricultural exports. The government therefore would continue to encourage increases in production and output from these estates by granting them new land concessions so long as the beneficiaries were willing to cooperate in helping some Africans also establish their own estates. Like the two previous mentioned strategies, very few people were expected to benefit from this arrangement.

Thus, from the time of independence to 1967, the country pursued a pattern of agricultural development not different from that pursued by the colonial government. The government's policy was aimed at the expansion of cash crops (mainly for exports) through the institutional support of individual peasants. The vast amount of government

investment was, however, devoted to the "transformation" schemes.

However, suffice it also to point out that the agricultural development strategy appeared to benefit a relatively small number of well-to-do farmers. The majority of peasants remained poor because they were unable to escape the poverty inherent in their subsistence sector. Unable to compete with the various transformation schemes, they found themselves confined to the less fertile and desirable land. As such they were unable to earn enough from their own small holdings to support their own families, especially as producer prices fell (in relative terms) on the world market. A substantial number of them began to join the ever-increasing number of hired labourers working for those who had 'benefited from historical accident and/or government assistance' in their production of larger areas of good land. Others began to flow into urban centers looking for "better" jobs.

All in all, one can rightly conclude that these policies led to the emergence of an entrenched group of well-to-do individual African farmers. These definitely saw their future as being well served by the status quo rather than through any fundamental changes in the then existing institutional structures. These Africans were, however, confined to small and sometimes medium sized farms. The large estates and plantations remained in the hands of European settler farmers and a few Indian agricultural entrepreneurs who had managed to buy their way into the lucrative agricultural commercial activities. It also became clear that this approach was not capable of leading to the restructuring of the inherited lop-sided agricultural economy dominated by the alien privately owned estate sector.

Such then was the situation till 1967 when the TANU government

began to pursue agricultural policies in line with the country's strategy of socialism and self-reliance. From then on, specific policies for agricultural development were instituted to combat some of the flaws and inadequacies resulting from the previous policies pursued by the country from 1961 to 1967.

While agricultural development was still seen as an essential basis for structural change in the economy, it was also realized that agricultural development based on the creation of an entrenched group of well to do farmers, existing side by side with an ever increasing number of landless hired peasants would not lead to the promotion of an integrated economy capable of leading to higher standards of living for all the people in the country. From then on, agricultural development was to be based on the creation of producer communal farms based on increased internal specialization and exchange, thus promoting productivity on one hand and higher incomes for all peasants in the framework of an integrated economy on the other.

Specific measures were then taken in three directions as follows:

(i) The establishment of Ujamaa villages:

As pointed out earlier, the agricultural development strategy pursued immediately after independence had led to the emergence of a small entrenched group of African 'progressive farmers' who received more government credit, extension services and advice as well as employing other landless peasants as agricultural labourers. This in turn led to some form of rural social differentiation typical of the Tanzanian rural land. Commenting on this in his pamphlet, Socialism and Rural Development (1967: 8) President

Nyerere pointed out that if progressive farmers continued to reap all the benefits and profits from these policies and through hired labour, the country would soon find itself with

a farmers' class and a labourers' class, with the latter being unable either to work for themselves or to receive a full return for the contribution they are making to the total output. . . . They will become a "rural proletariat" depending on the decisions of other men for their existence, and subject in consequences to all subservience, social and economic inequality, and insecurity which such a position involves.

To remedy such a situation agricultural development was, henceforth, to be based on socialist communities (ujamaa villages) where a group of individuals or families would voluntarily live and work together for the benefit of all. All institutional support was to be given to the ujamaa villages rather than "progressive farmers." The Community Development and Agricultural Extension Officers were all directed to spend all their time advising and working with ujamaa villagers. Special political campaigns were taken by the Party to educate the peasants on the importance of living and working together for the good of all rather than working for a few people as agricultural labourers.

All these measures definitely turned the tables against the emerging "progressive farmers" class. With no government institutional support, credit facilities and extension services, as well as political agitation discouraging peasants from selling their labour to them, these so-called "progressive farmers" were badly hit. The process through which more of them would emerge was also halted.

(ii) The Estate Sector:

With the Arusha Declaration, a new approach was also developed for the estate sector. While aware of the need to grow certain crops on large scale mechanized and capital intensive farms, the government was also bent on full ownership and control of the estate sector. To do this, the government took over a major share of the ownership of about 60 percent of sisal estates and amalgamated them into the Tanzania Sisal Corporation (TSC). The TSC acquired a 60 percent interest in about 30 subsidiaries. In 1969, it also took over the 51 percent of the shares in the Ralli Estates which had formerly been owned by the National Development Corporation (NDD). Interesting enough, however, is the fact that these firms continued to be run by German, English and Dutch managers as before. Eventually, however, the government assumed full ownership and control of the various estates.

The Government also saw the need to produce certain crops on large scale mechanized farms. In the second Five-Year Plan, it denoted a substantial share of public investment in agriculture. About £4 million was to be used to plant 250,000 acres of various crops under state farms. These included wheat (which was to take half of the proposed cultivated area), nine ranches, four partially irrigated state farms for rice and four state owned dairy farms.

The government's nationalization of the estate sector and the introduction of state farms, all undermined the basis upon which private large scale commercial agriculture, of a Kulak type, would be operated.

In their place however, it created institutions which were to become the basis of the managerial/bureaucratic control of large scale agricultural production.

2. Manufacturing and Industrial Development: The Emergence of an Industrial Working Class and the Creation of a Managerial Class:

Following the recommendations of the World Bank Mission and later on M/s Arthur D. Little Inc., and the U.S.A.I.D., specific measures were taken to promote manufacturing and other industrial ventures and activities.

The first step towards that direction was the establishment of the Tanganyika Development Corporation (TDC) in July 1962. According to the Tanganyika Development Corporation Act of July 1962, the TDC was to function as the Government's organ to 'facilitate and promote the economic development of Tanganyika. Its major aim was to explore and advertise the country's investment potential as well as securing government control in some of the industrial ventures. The TDC was provided with an initial capital of £500,000 and immediately took over Government holdings in Williamson Diamond Mines, the Tanganyika Packers and the Nyanza Salt Mines. In December 1964, the TDC was, by an Act of Parliament, renamed the National Development Corporation (NDC) which came into effect on January 1, 1965. It also took over assets and liabilities of the Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation which was henceforth dissolved.

The NDC came into existence with Government assets valued at nearly £5 million, including investments and loans in 11 subsidiaries and 10 associated companies most of which were still in their infancy.

By the end of 1965, the NDC had also committed a further £1.3 million in another 14 new projects. It also had further plans to invest another £185,000 in five other new projects in 1966. The NDC operations and future projects included textiles, hotels, ranching, publishing, agriculture and a wide selection of import substitutes and agricultural and mineral processing industries (NDC, 1965: 1-2). In most of its ventures, NDC entered partnership with Multinational Corporations (MNC's) to whom it also gave all decision-making power as regards day to day operations and activities of the various undertakings. This it did through entering into various management contracts with the partner MNC's which also provided the senior managerial and technical manpower, at least in the first few years of operations. As such, the managerial values and modes of operation were dictated by the senior partners who were usually western owned and oriented companies. Being capitalist firms, their guiding motive was the maximization of profits at the minimum possible costs. In this respect one should expect a conflict between their interests and those of the government of Tanzania. In other words, their major aim and interest was the subjugation of the Tanzanian economy to serving their own national economic interests rather than helping in the creation and promotion of a viable national integrated economy.

It is therefore, not surprising that the 1965 Survey of Industry in Tanzania found that the structure of industry still reflected the inherited lop-sided and dependent dual economy (Central Statistical Bureau, 1965). At this time, there were 569 firms employing ten or more workers (Seidman, op. cit.: 111-112):

They were mainly located in the export enclave: Dar es Salaam (31 percent); Tanga (20 percent), Coast and Morogoro (11 percent); Arusha and Kilimanjaro (13 percent) and Mwanza, Mara, Shinyanga and West Lake (14 percent). About two-thirds had been established before 1960. The remainder had been established since then contributing to a rate of growth of industry of 6-7 percent a year. About 40 percent were entirely foreign-owned, 32 percent were entirely Tanzanian owned, and the remainder were owned by foreign and Tanzanian owners in partnership. Of the gross output of all manufacturing industries of about £778 million (excluding sisal decortication establishments) food processing produced 28 percent and textile manufactures produced 42 percent. The remaining industries each produced only 1 to 4 percent of gross manufacturing output. Total employment in all the plants was (only) about 41 thousand workers.

All in all, industrial development in the country still faced the following problems:

- (i) What limited investment did take place in the country tended to be limited to the existing export enclave. Regional imbalances and differentiation continued to exist.
- (ii) A significant share of it was directed to the limited luxury market for higher income groups.
- (iii) Much of it continued to depend on imported materials and supplies, thereby continuing the dependency and underdevelopment pattern inherited from the colonial era.
- (iv) Most of it tended to be capital intensive. As such there was no correlation between industrial development and the provision of employment opportunities.
- (v) Managerial values continued to be based on western typology, as was the industrial relation systems.
- (vi) A lot of surplus was taken from the country in the form of dividends to foreign investors and partners, compensation payments, etc. Little money was left for further investment and distribution.

Such then was the situation till 1967 when the ruling party promulgated the Arusha Declaration stressing the development of Socialism and Self-reliance.

After the Arusha Declaration was promulgated, the government made clear its intention to step up its share of ownership and control of the major commanding heights of the economy in a bid to accelerate economic development. The government took over a lot of enterprises involved in food processing, normally purchased from or through the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB). Through the NDC, the government also acquired majority shares in seven large foreign-owned enterprises. These included the Tanzania Breweries Ltd., the Kilimanjaro Breweries Co. Ltd., the British American Tobacco Co. (Tanzania), the Tanganyika Portland Cement, Metal Box and Co., Tanzania Bata Shoe Co., and the Tanzania Extract Company. The management of these firms however, continued to be the responsibility of the foreign partners (Seidman, *ibid.*: 114). While foreign and private investors were still welcome into the country, this was, with certain qualifications, as President Nyerere puts it in the number one issue of *Jenga* (NDC, 1968: 62-63):

We have firmly rejected the proposition that without foreign aid we cannot develop. We shall not depend upon overseas aid to the extent of bending over political, economic or social policies in the hope of getting it. But we shall try to get it in order that we may hasten our economic progress, and that it may act as a catalyst to our own efforts. Similarly, . . . we have rejected the domination of private investment in all those areas not reserved for Government in the Arusha Declaration.

Thus, while pursuing the policy stipulated under the Arusha Declaration, the NDC continued to attract foreign partners. Its areas of operations continued to expand. By 1968, the NDC had interest in

66 ventures including 24 subsidiaries, 20 Associate Companies, 17 new companies and projects in the process of development and 5 other NDC investments as indicated in Table 36. These firms employed a total of 17,459 workers whose wages and salaries bill in 1976 was Tanzanian shs. 89,320,606, relatively too much in a country such as Tanzania.

Such then was the situation till 1969, when a major reorganization of parastatals took place. At this time, the initial role of NDC as the central national agency to promote Government investment was no longer appropriate and had led to too diverse a range of responsibilities to be in line with quick and efficient group development. In March 1969, the government, therefore, announced a major reorganization. Henceforth, government participation in agriculture and the tourist sectors which had up to this time been under NDC were transferred to the National Agricultural and Food Corporation (NAFCO) and the Tanzania Tourist Corporation (TTC) respectively (The Annual Economic Survey, 1968: 79). The NDC became responsible for manufacturing, processing and mining. NDC shares in the Ralli Estates and the State Trading Corporation (STC) were transferred to the STC while her interests in Dalgety Travel Service were transferred to TTC. NDC's interests in Mwananchi Trading Company were transferred to the STC while her interest in film and hotels were also transferred to the TTC. The National Property and Development Management Company were transferred to the National Housing Corporation (NHC).

NDC operations on the other hand, continued to expand and by the end of December 1970, it had interests in numerous companies employing 18,037 people (see Table 37). Its wages and salaries bill in 1970 was Tanzanian shs. 99,742,772 most of it going to senior managerial cadres

Table 36. The NDC Group of Companies, 1968

I. NDC SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES	COMPANY	* ADDRESS AND/OR REGISTERED OFFICE	BUSINESS	DATE OF INCORPORATIONS	NDC HOLDINGS %
	BAT Tanzania Ltd.	P. O. Box 9114, Dar	Cigarette manufacture	Jan. 65	60
	Bukoba Tea Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Tea production	Nov. 64	90
	Friendship Textile Mill Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Textile manufacture	Apr. 66	100
	Kilimanjaro Breweries Ltd.	P. O. Box 2924, Dar	Brewing	Sep. 60	60
	Kilimanjaro Hotels Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	The Kilimanjaro Hotel	Jan. 66	100
	Lake Manyara Hotels Ltd.	P. O. Box 348, Dar	Lake Manyara Hotel	Feb. 60	100
	Lime Products Development Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Lime (fruit) production	Jan. 66	74
	Mwananchi Engineering & Contracting Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2720, Dar	Construction	Feb. 64	60
	Mwananchi Trading Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2720, Dar	Commerce	Jul. 63	60
	NDC Agricultural Department	P. O. Box 9113, Dar	Ranching	May 68X	100
	National Printing Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2320, Dar	Printing	May 65	100
	National Small Industries Corp. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Home industries	Nov. 65	80
	New Africa Hotels Ltd.	P. O. Box 348, Dar	New Africa Hotel	Aug. 65	100
	Northern Dairies Ltd.	P. O. Box 456, Dar	Milk processing	Apr. 64	66½
	Nyanza Salt Mines Ltd.	P. O. Box 45, Dar	Salt mining	Jul. 37	817
	Tanganyika Instant Coffee Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 410, Bukoba	Coffee processing	Nov. 55	56T
	Tanganyika Meerschbaum Corporation Ltd.	P. O. Box 3151, Arusha	Meat processing	Dec. 63	20
	Tanganyika Packers Ltd.	P. O. Box 452, Dar	Brewing	Aug. 47	51T
	Tanzania Breweries Ltd.	P. O. Box 9013, Dar	Diamond cutting	Apr. 66	51½
	Tanzania Diamond Cutting Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Educational distribution	Apr. 67	75
	Tanzania Elims Supplies Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Finance	Mar. 67	60
	Tanzania Finance Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 45, Dar	Finance	Dec. 62	68½
	Tanzania Shoe Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 68, Dar	Shoe manufacture	Oct. 65	60
	Tanzania Wildlife Safaris Ltd.	P. O. Box 602, Dar	Big game hunting	Sep. 63	100

II. NDC ASSOCIATE COMPANIES

COMPANY	ADDRESS AND/OR REGISTERED OFFICE	BUSINESS	DATE OF INCORPORATION	NDC HOLDINGS
Furaha ya Visiwani Hotels Ltd.	P. O. Box 348, Dar	Hotel development	Jan. 66 *	49
Kwamfili Estate Ltd.	P. O. Box 120, Tanga	Cocoa production	Jan. 67	30
Hallmark Hotels Ltd.	P. O. Box 348, Dar	Hotel management	Jan. 67	30
Industrial Promotion Services Ltd.	P. O. Box 9241, Dar	Finance	Mar. 62	23
Metal Box Co. of Tanzania Ltd.	P. O. Box 618, Dar	Container manufacture	Jul. 48	50
Mwananchi Tractor and Vehicle Assemblers Ltd.	P. O. Box 402, Dar	Vehicle assembling	Oct. 65	24½
Ralli Estates Ltd.	P. O. Box 409, Tanga	Sisal growing	Dec. 60	50
Dindira Tea Estates Ltd.	P. O. Box 112, Korogwe	Tea production	Aug. 55	50
Sikh Sammlis Ltd.	P. O. Box 581, Tanga	Sisal growing	Aug. 55	50
Sisi Enterprises Ltd.	P. O. Box 1525, Dar	Drive-in cinema	Apr. 65	271
Tanika Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 9280, Dar	Cashew processing	Nov. 63	401
Tanganyika Creameries Ltd.	P. O. Box 21164, Dar	Dairy products	Apr. 62	33½
Tanganyika Development Finance Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2478, Dar	Finance	Dec. 62	25
Tanganyika Extract Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 3154, Arusha	Pyrethrum processing	Nov. 62	49
Tanganyika Portland Cement Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 1960, Dar	Cement production	Jan. 59	50
Tanganyika Terry Plastics Ltd.	P. O. Box 45, Dar	Plastics manufacture	Dec. 62	49½
Tanganyika Cashew Machines Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Invention	Jan. 66	501
Tanzania Publishing House Ltd.	P. O. Box 2138, Dar	Printing	Apr. 66	501
Tanzania Tobacco Processing Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Tobacco processing	Oct. 66	50
Williamson Diamonds Ltd.	P. O. Mwandui	Diamond mining	Mar. 42	50

III. NDC COMPANIES AND PROJECTS IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT	ADDRESS AND/OR REGISTERED OFFICE	BUSINESS	DATE OF INCORPORATION	NDC HOLDING %
Arusha Plantations Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Agriculture	Mar. 68	100
Coastal Dairy Industries Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Agriculture	Jul. 66	66 2/3
Mkonazi Mining Ltd.	P. O. Box 105, Tanga	Gemstone mining	Sep. 66	25
Mwara Cashew Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 103, Mtwara	Cashewnut processing	Jan. 68	50
Mwanza Textiles Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Textile manufacture	May 66	40
National Property Development & Management Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Real estate	Mar. 68	75
National Steel Corporation Ltd.	P. O. Box 348, Dar	Industry	-----	50
Serengeti Safari Lodges Ltd.	P. O. Box 348, Dar	Tourism	Aug. 67	100
Sisal Pulp	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Sisal processing	-----	--
Tabora Msitu Products Ltd.	P. O. Box 504, Moshi	Timber manufacture	Mar. 68	75
Tanzania Bag Corporation Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Sisal processing	Aug. 66	40
Tanzania Film Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Film distribution	Mar. 68	100
Tanzania Hotels Investments Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Finance	Aug. 68	100
Tanzania Industrial Centres Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Industry	Feb. 66	100
Tembo Tanneries Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Leads and skins	Feb. 66	75
Ubungo Farm Implements Manufacturing Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Timber manufacture	May 67	80
		Industry	Jun. 68	100

IV. OTHER IDC INVESTMENTS

Development House
International Trading & Credit Co. Ltd.
Kahama-Mzega Co-operative Union Ltd.
Kilosa District Development Board
Tanzania Assia Pharmaceuticals
Mwananchi Ocean Products Ltd.

NDC head office building: capital value, Shs. 4,640,000
NDC shareholding sold to the State Trading Corporation.

SOURCE: National Development Corporation, Fourth Annual Report 1968, pp. 21, 20.

Table 37. NDC Group of Companies 1970

I. NDC SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES	ADDRESS AND/OR	BUSINESS	DATE OF INCORPORATIONS	NDC HOLDINGS %
BAT Tanzania Friendship Textile Mills Ltd. Kilimanjaro Breweries Ltd. National Printing Co. Ltd. National Textile Industries Ltd. National Textile Corporation National Salt Mines (T) Ltd. SIKU Sewing Mills Ltd. Tabora Hotel Products Ltd. Tanganyika Inst. Coffee Co. Ltd. Tanganyika Meerschlam Corp. Ltd.	Box 9114, Dar Box 20842, Dar Box 3104, Arusha Box 2320, Dar Box 2476, Dar Box 20842, Dar Box 42, Uvinza Box 501, Tanga Box 395, Tabora Box 45, Dar Box 3151, Arusha	Cigarette Manufacturè Manufacturers of Textiles Beer Manufacturing Printers Cottage Industries Textile Marketing Salt Mining Plywood, Tea Timber Timber Sleepers Coffee Manufacturers Manufacturing of smoking pipes	Jan. 65 Apr. 66 Sep. 61 Jul. 67 Nov. 65 May 70 Jul. 37 Oct. 49 Mar. 68 Dec. 63	60 100 60 100 80 100 100 81.3 100 75 80 80
Tanganyika Packers Ltd. Tanganyika Tegyri Plastics Ltd. Tanzania Breweries Ltd. Tanzania Diamond Cutting Co. Ltd. Tanzania Finance Co. Ltd. Tanzania Shoe Co. Ltd.	Box 452, Dar Box 2219, Dar Box 9013, Dar Box 97, Iringa Box 2669, Dar Box 42, Dar	Meat processing Plastic Manufacturing Brewing bottling and Distrib. beer Diamond Polishing Investment Footwear Manufacturing Imports & retailing	Aug. 55 Nov. 47 Dec. 62 Mar. 60 Apr. 66 Dec. 63 Oct. 65	56 51 100 51 75 98 60
Tanzania Tanneries Co. Ltd. Tanzania Publishing House Ltd. Tanganyika Standard (W.) Ltd. Tembo Chipboards Ltd. Ubungo Farm Imp. Mfg. Co. Ltd.	Box 3063, Moshi Box 2138, Dar Box 9033, Dar Box 2669, Dar Box 20126, Dar	Tanning Publishing Publishers & Distributors Timber Manufacture of Agricult. Implements	Feb. 68 Apr. 66 Jan. 61 May 67 Jun. 68	75 60 -100 80 100

II. NDC ASSOCIATE COMPANIES

COMPANY	ADDRESS AND/OR REGISTERED OFFICE	BUSINESS	DATE OF INCORPORATIONS	NDC HOLDINGS %
Blanket Manufacturers Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 26472, Dar	Manufacturers-of Blankets	Mar. 61	30
I. P. S. (Tanzania) Ltd.	P. O. Box 9241, Dar	Industrial Development	Mar. 62	23.77
Metal Box Co. of Tanzania Ltd.	P. O. Box 616, Dar	Mfg. of Metal Prod.	Nov. 47	50
MTAVA Ltd.	P. O. Box 405, Dar	Venical Assembly	Oct. 65	24.5
Mwara Cashew Company Ltd.	P. O. Box 103, Mwara	Cashewnut Processing	May 66	40
Mwara Textiles Ltd.	P. O. Box 134, Mwara	Cotton Manufacturers	Nov. 63	40
Tanita Company Ltd.	P. O. Box 9200 Dar	Cashewnuts Processing	Nov. 63	40
Tanganyika Dev. Finance Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2478, Dar	Finance	Dec. 62	25
Tanganyika Extract Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 3194, Arusha	Pyrethrum Flowers Processing	Jan. 62	49
Tanzania Bag Corporation Ltd.	P. O. Box 504, Moshi	Manufacture of sisal bags	Aug. 66.	40
Tanzania Portland Cement Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 1950, Dar	Cement Manufacturers	Jan. 59	50
Hillier Diamond Ltd.	P. O. Mwandui	Diamond Mining	Mar. 42	50
Tanzania Cashew Machines Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Invention	Jan. 66	50

NOTE: The Corporation is at present responsible for the management of Tanganyika Standard (N.) Ltd. Shares in the company held by the Treasury Registrar have yet to be transferred to the Corporations

III. NDC COMPANIES AND PROJECTS IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT	ADDRESS AND/OR REGISTERED OFFICE	BUSINESS	DATE OF INCORPORATION	NDC HOLDINGS %
General Tyre E. A. Ltd.	P. O. Box 3065, Dar	Importation & Distribution of Tyres & Tubes	Feb. 69	74
National Cashew Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2919, Dar	Cashewnuts processing	May 70	100
Steel Rolling Mills Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Steel Rolling	Oct. 66	60
Tanzania Fertilizer Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Fertilizers	Jul. 68	60
E. A. Kenaf Industries Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Kenaf farming & Manufacturing of Kenaf Bags	Apr. 70	100
Raleigh Bicycle, Mfg. Co. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Manufacture of Bicycle and Accessories thereof	Sep. 70	50
Mkata Saw Mill Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Timber	May 70	51
Fibre Board E. A. Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Manufacture of Fibre Board	Jul. 70	100
Kilbo Paper Industries Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Manufacture of Paper	Taken over in 70	100
Tanzania Distillers Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Cartons	Apr. 70	37½
National Steel Corporation	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Manufacture of Dry gin	Oct. 66	100
National Steel Corporation	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Steel Rolling	Jun. 69	100
Tanzania Gemstone Industries Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Mining	Feb. 66	100
Tanzania Industrial Centre Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Building	Sep. 66	100
Mkomazi Mining Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Gemstone Mining	Sep. 66	100
Mwananchi Ocean Products Ltd.	P. O. Box 2669, Dar	Fishing	Apr. 64	100

IV. OTHER NDC INVESTMENTS

Kahama Kzega Igembasabo Co-op. Union Ltd.
National Co-op. and Dev. Bank

SOURCE: National Development Corporation, Sixth Annual Report, 1970, Pp. 25, 24.

and technical experts who were predominantly foreign (NDC, 1970: 26). Thus, by 1970, a few salient facts were quite clear.

First, through its participation (direct or indirect) in industrial development, the Tanzanian government had managed to create institutions through which full ownership and control of the economy could be effected. This is very important especially as regards the creation of a nationally-oriented, inward-looking and integrated economy.

Secondly, and important to this study, is the fact that the creation of so many new manufacturing and other industrial projects meant more job opportunities. This was the basis upon which the Tanzanian industrial working class came into being. Also important to us is the fact that side by side with this industrial working class, there also emerged a national managerial class.

Thirdly, the industrial development strategy pursued, especially after the Arusha Declaration, mitigated against the emergence of a national or African industrial entrepreneur class.

3. Commerce and Trade

By the time of independence the whole field of commerce and trade, especially import-export and wholesale trade was dominated by private, foreign-owned import-export houses and the Asian commercial bourgeoisie who acted as middlemen between the Africans in the colony and capitalism abroad. Africans were excluded from this sector. Operations in this sector also tended to be dictated by the needs of the external metropolitan economy rather than contributing to the building of a viable and integrated national economy. To sum it up, the inherited pattern of trade suffered from the following inadequacies (Seidman,

op. cit.: 197-198):

- (i) Export-import trade tended to be dominated by foreign owned oligopolies linked with buyers and sellers in their home countries; these had every reason to limit foreign trade to old channels rather than to find new buyers or cheaper sources of supply.
- (ii) Both the infrastructure and the institutions for internal trade tended to be concentrated in the export enclave.
- (iii) Africans had been excluded from the higher echelons of trade, partly by official regulations as to licensing and discrimination by dominant trading firms and financial institutions, and partly by lack of know-how and capital. This is not to deny that by the time of independence there were not many African traders. In Tanzania, the number of licensed African traders was about 35,000 out of a total of 45,000. For most part, however, Africans engaged in trade were the smaller traders, peddlers, and duka owners. The wholesale trade and most of the more prosperous shops remained in the hands of Asians or British firms.
- (iv) The supplies of spare parts sold through regular trade channels was inadequate. This caused delays in getting repairs completed while expensive imported machinery and equipment lay idle for long periods.
- (v) As elsewhere in East Africa, consumer goods prices appeared to be rising. This may have partly been the result of the inflationary pressures caused by increased government development expenditures; it was also undoubtedly a result,

especially in periods of shortage, of inherent features of the marketing system. According to the Economic Survey, 1968 (op. cit., Tables 23, 25: 29. 30) the price index of retail goods consumed by minimum wage earners in Dar es Salaam fluctuated seasonally but by 1968 had risen over all from the 1961 base year by about 14 points for all items and 10 points for food. Most of this increase occurred at a rate of 3-4 percent annually after 1964; both indexes declined initially from 1961 to 1964. The cost of living index of goods and services consumed by middle grade civil servants in Dar es Salaam, on the other hand, showed a 26.3 points rise by December, 1967, with 1963 as a base.

Thus at the time of independence, and thereafter, it became imperative to institute the appropriate structures of reshaping foreign trade as well as expanding internal trade. This was a necessary condition if the country was to build an inward-looking economy.

The inherited foreign trade institutions need to be reshaped to achieve two aims: First, to increase export earning by broadening external markets and selling exports in an increasingly processed form; and second to direct export earnings to the import of capital goods and equipment to implement industrial and agricultural development strategy. The institutions of internal trade also need to be reoriented and expanded to facilitate the growth of a two way exchange between rural areas and expanding urban centers (Seidman, op. cit.: 196).

Of course, there was also the need to involve Africans in the trade and commercial sector. All in all, the aim was to nationally own and control all operations in this sector so as to be able to institute certain structural reforms which would, in the long run, contribute towards the attainment of a higher standard of living for all the

people.

To that effect, the government created and encouraged the creation of various marketing and distribution institutions to handle the export of agricultural cash crops, the importation and distribution of both capital and consumer goods as well as institutions to act as primary marketing institutions for other agricultural produce. This definitely undermined the foundation upon which the import-export houses, the whole sale and Asian "middlemen" commercial bourgeoisie were based.

Institutions to handle the marketing, distribution and export of agricultural produce included the various Marketing Boards and Agricultural Produce Marketing Cooperatives.

- a. The Marketing Boards: Immediately after independence the government established a number of 'statutory marketing boards' to handle both export and domestic produce. Apart from the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) most of the marketing boards had been created to deal with export crops. Among the marketing boards established by the government during the period under review were:

- (i) The Tanzania Coffee Board established in 1961. This was instituted to handle coffee actions after an International Coffee Agreement was arrived at. The bulk of its coffee was provided by Coffee growers and marketing cooperatives.
- (ii) The Tanzania Lint and Seed Marketing Board. This was established in 1962 to handle the export of cotton. It represented the cotton-growers cooperatives.

- (iii) The Tanzania Tobacco Board established in 1963 to handle all tobacco produce. It also had the power to license tobacco growers.
- (iv) The National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) established in 1962. It was established to handle internally marketed food crops. Later on, it began to deal with some exports such as castor, simsim, cashew nuts, sunflower, soyabeans, etc. The board had the sole monopoly in the internal distribution of crops such as maize and rice. When in 1967 (Arusha Declaration) the Government nationalized and secured full control of the major milling business through the National Milling Corporation (NMC), the NMC was instructed to buy its grains directly from the NAPB, thus eliminating altogether the possibility of the appearance of new private middlemen between agricultural producer cooperatives and large mills.

b. Agricultural Produce Marketing Cooperatives:

At the time of independence, the government embarked on a crash program to organize producer and marketing cooperatives in the whole country. These were basically to serve as the primary marketing agencies for agricultural products. To make the whole process work quickly and better, the Cooperative Ordinance was changed in 1963 giving the powers to register cooperatives to the Minister responsible for cooperatives rather than the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. As a result of all this, the number of cooperatives increased tremendously. By the end of April 1966, there were about 1,533 registered

cooperatives (ibid.: 244). The amount of agricultural produce handled by these institutions tripled from 145,000 in 1960 to 496,000 tons in 1965. Organizationally, about 20 primary cooperatives were grouped into Unions. These were usually at District level, although in some cases such as the Victoria Federation of Cooperative Unions and the Bukoba Cooperative Union, these covered more than one district. At the national level, the various Unions were joined into the Cooperative Union of Tanzania.

As time passed, the cooperatives diversified their operations and activities. Some, like the Bukoba Cooperative Union and the Victoria Federation of Cooperatives also invested in education, hotels, processing, transport and distribution. By 1970, almost all cooperatives in the country helped in the distribution of consumer goods and food crops to and from peasants.

All this undermined the position of individual traders, especially the Asians who had hitherto acted as middlemen or brokers between the primary producers and the various institutions dealing in these products. These commercial bourgeoisie were hurt. Some who had dealt in this buying and selling of agricultural produce had to abandon their business. A few of them left the country altogether.

- c. The importation and distribution of non-agricultural consumer goods:

The independent government was also interested in the diversification of the control of distribution of consumer goods from Asian to African hands. The government also wanted to control and restructure the import-export business so that it could lead to the overall economic development of the country. A lot of steps were taken

immediately after independence to that effect (ibid.: 217-221).

The first step was taken in 1961 when the Government established the Cooperative Supply Association of Tanganyika (COSATA). Its major function was to set up wholesale and retail consumer cooperatives. It was also given the mandate to encourage African traders. The management of COSATA was given to Israeli managers whose commissions and share of profits amounted to nearly £429,000 a year.

Following this move, a number of consumer cooperatives were started in almost every urban center in the country. In some cases, COSATA opened retail shops and collected share capital for them. In instances where the consumer cooperative societies were started without COSATA involvement, the former supported them by making credit facilities available. Unfortunately, however, most of these cooperative societies died out, due to poor management and financial problems. This happened at a time when COSATA was itself facing its own management and financial problems and as such could not advance any more credit and financial support to these consumer shops. By 1965, only 10 of the larger urban centers still operated consumer cooperative shops. The reasons for the poor performance and subsequent closure of these ventures were succinctly summarized in the 1966 Report of the Presidential Special Committee of Inquiry into the Cooperative Movement. These included lack of enough local interest and enough capital to finance the shops as well as the fact that most of these shops were undercapitalized and lacked a genuine strong demand on the part of prospective customers.

To secure a direct foothold and control in the export trade, the government in partnership with Dutch and British interests established

INTRATA in 1964 with 60 percent of the capital coming from the Tanzanian government and her partners, Von Feghen and Maclain, contributing the remaining 40 percent. With the formation of INTRATA, Tanzania began to diversify her trade with the outside world. INTRATA, for instance, sold such exports as coffee, sisal and wattle extracts to Eastern Europe without the involvement of brokers. It also sold other crops such as maize, germ meal, kapok, oil seeds, and cotton to Belgium, West Germany and the United Kingdom through brokers. As regards imports, it also diversified its sources.

Such, then, was the situation till February 11, 1967, when the government, in line with the Arusha Declaration, decided to put import-export and wholesale business under state control. To that effect, all the existing export-import distributing firms including COSATA and INTRATA were nationalized. Their businesses were all placed under the newly formed State Trading Corporation (STC). The STC established six divisions dealing with groceries, general merchandise, technical matters, exports, textiles and shipping. It had an initial staff of 1,500-1,600 including 85 Europeans, mostly managers and technicians in the former nationalized firms, and few other expatriates.

In its operations, which included export, import, shipping, wholesale and retail distribution, the STC used the old channels. In some instances, however, it was able to diversify.

Under the Second Five-Year Plan the STC was earmarked to play a very important role in the promotion of external sales, especially to Socialist and other Third World countries. Already the STC had started consultations with the marketing boards in finding out the

possibilities of channelling the bulk of their produce through it.

The advantages accrued from the STC operations have been well put up by Ann Seidman, whom we intend to quote at great length (ibid.: 220).

STC was able to reduce the costs of importing to Tanzania significantly. In the first year of operation, STC had a 60 percent owned buying/or confirming office in Holland and an agent in London which facilitated efforts to find the lowest cost sources of supply in these areas. Whereas the individual importing companies had previously imported through their parent company in Europe or England, paying a confirming house commission of 2 1/2 percent plus a fairly high interest rent on credit, the STC paid its own agent only one percent and could negotiate for credit for the lowest rate obtainable. Where possible it bought directly from the manufacturer to eliminate all intermediary profits.

The STC was also able to eliminate hidden rebates made by the importing houses to the manufacturers. It has been suggested that at least five to ten percent of the 17 point rise in Tanzania's import price index from 1962 to 1967 may be attributed to private trading company measures to raise import prices paid to firms with which they are associated overseas in order to ship profits out of the country undetected. A five percent across-the-board increase in import prices of this kind would have cost Tanzania about £4 million in 1966 alone, a considerable loss in both investible surpluses and foreign exchange earnings: it would have been equal to about seven percent of Tanzania's total 1967 capital formation.

Definitely this hit both international capital and the budding local African entrepreneurs. But the most hit were the Asian commercial bourgeoisie who had not only monopolized wholesale trade in all rural and several urban centers but also hoped to move into the more lucrative import-export business when the European firms would be kicked out. Instead, however, the moves created a commercial managerial class which controlled and run the various newly created institutions.

4. Education and Manpower

The independent TANU government inherited a situation where

qualified and skilled manpower was lacking. In order to have enough manpower to implement the various development programs, a crash program on education and training of the required personnel had to be undertaken.

Introducing the First Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development to the National Assembly in Dar es Salaam on May 5, 1964, for instance, President Nyerere pointed out not only the need, but also the dangers of depending on outside help to implement the various development programs outlined in the Plan. He pointed out how the country would still depend on external aid for qualified and skilled people to implement the outlined plan objectives and targets. In the field of education for instance, Mwalimu pointed out that the country needed between 500-12,00 graduate teachers to teach in our schools. He also expressed hope that once in the country, Tanzanians would seek every available opportunity to learn and take-over from such expatriates.

From the time of independence, we therefore see that specific measures had to be taken to meet the manpower needs and requirements of the country. The 1961/62-1963/64 Development Plan for Tanganyika, for instance, called for the need for a well planned and coordinate crash program for the provision and expansion of formal education within the framework of a single integrated education system for all pupils and students irrespective of racial origin, which was to come into effect from January 1, 1962 (p. 78). The Plan stressed the need for the expansion of secondary education through deliberate plans which would, within four years, increase the number of school certificate candidates nearly three times (from 1,202 in 1960 to 3,276 in

1964). School fees remissions were also made to ensure that no pupil or student with all the necessary qualifications would be forced to drop out of school due to lack of funds on the part of his/her parents or guardians. The First Five-Year Plan, for instance, stressed, an expansion of higher education and technical training facilities so that the country would be self-sufficient in manpower by 1980. Stress, however, was put on the need to educate and train Tanzanian adults who were already on the job and who had an immediate direct impact on the economic performance of the country.

Side by side with that, however, was the expansion of formal educational facilities. Development in this area have well been summarized by Ibrahim Kaduma in his article, Twenty Years of TANU Education (Ruhumbika, op. cit.: 22--222). According to Kaduma, between the years 1961 and 1964 there was about 50 percent increase in places for primary schools from 486,470 to 633,678 respectively. During the same period junior secondary school places (forms I-IV) increased by nearly 65 percent while Higher School Certificate places increased from 412 in 1961 to 1,097 in 1964.

The total pupil population in secondary schools from form I-IV increased from 11,832 in 1961 to 19,897 in 1964. By 1971 this figure had been almost trebled and the pupil population stood at 31,600. Of these, there were 3,076 in Senior Secondary Schools, i.e., in forms, V and VI (ibid.: 221).

It should also be emphasized that the expansion in education was not only in number but also in direction. In Secondary Education, science subjects also received priority so that by 1969, 1,509 (57.7 percent) out of 2,563 pupils in forms V and VI were studying science subjects.

The government also saw the need for higher education. During internal self-government in 1961, TANU decided to launch the nucleus of a national University. The Party gave its headquarters to that

effect and in 1961/62 the first batch of students began their studies in made-shift premises at Lumumba Street. The building now houses the Institute of Adult Education (ibid.: 222). Meanwhile, deliberate efforts were made to build the University College of Dar es Salaam at a hilly site eight miles from the capital which opened in 1963. The first enrollment at the University College (Lumumba Street) had been only 14 law students. By 1967, the University student enrollment had risen to 711. At this stage, the number of Tanzanian students taking studies in the now defunct University of East Africa increased from 178 in 1961 to 337 and by 1970/71 the figure was 1821. There were also several other students taking their studies abroad, notably in the U.K. and the U.S.A., West Germany, the Eastern European Socialist block countries, and other African universities.

This helped to alleviate the manpower problem and by December 1970 the number of citizens occupying Senior and Middle Grade Posts in the Civil Service had increased from 1,170 (26.1 percent) in 1961 to 8,042 (85.6 percent) as Tables 38-43 indicate.

These deliberate educational programs and measures, especially as regards higher and professional training programs, coupled with the deliberate localization programs of the Civil Service, were the basis upon which senior and middle grade Tanzanian administrative and technical cadre class was built. These took over from the colonial senior and middle grade administrators and technical functionaries.

C. The Resulting Class Structure

One of the most far reaching consequences of economic development in Tanzania during the period under review was the creation of several

Table 38. Progress in Localization 1961-72 in the Civil Service: Officers Serving in the Senior and Middle Grade Posts

Year Ending	Total Establishment	Total Filled	Citizens	Non-Citizens	Vacant	% of Total Filled by Citizens	% of Citizens of Total Establishment	Temporary Officers
December, 1961	6,003	4,877	1,170	3,282	1,156	32.70	26.57	425
December, 1962	6,409	5,007	1,821	2,902	1,403	42.02	32.82	283
December, 1963	6,727	4,007	2,469	2,580	1,427	67.88	40.43	251
December, 1964	7,276	5,671	3,083	2,306	1,605	59.33	46.24	282
December, 1965	3,010	6,229	3,951	2,011	1,790	67.71	52.60	267
December, 1966	9,006	6,573	4,364	1,898	2,433	71.12	51.90	311
December, 1967	9,911	7,031	4,937	1,817	2,880	74.15	52.60	277
December, 1968	11,021	8,193	6,208	1,619	2,828	80.22	59.64	266
December, 1969	11,024	7,738	6,123	1,351	3,286	82.54	57.93	264
December 1970	14,300	9,719	8,042	1,377	4,581	85.83	58.33	300
December 1971	16,393	10,723	9,708	1,015	5,424	90.00	60.00	246
December, 1972	20,200	12,733	11,988	745	7,467	94.10	59.34	131
December, 1973	19,877	13,400	12,600	800	6,477	94.00	63.38	n.s.

Source: Annual Manpower Report to the President, Central Establishment Division (1973), p. 100.

Table 39. Progress in Localization 1961-73 in the Civil Service Staff Grade (Sns. 41,400 - 55,600)

Year Ending	Total Establishment	Total Filled	Citizens	Non-Citizens	Vacant ¹	% of Total Filled by Citizens	% of Citizens of Total Establishment	Temporary Officers
December, 1961	176	162	6	156	14	3.7	3.4	-
December, 1962	137	121	32	89	16	26.44	23.35	-
December, 1963	160	134	48	86	26	35.80	30	-
December, 1964	198	158	75	83	40	47.46	37.87	-
December, 1965	218	170	101	69	48	59.4	46.3	-
December, 1966	225	225	102	66	57	44.66	44.66	-
December, 1967	234	180	122	57	54	68.33	52.56	1
December, 1968	232	172	130	40	60	76.74	56.89	2
December, 1969	227	149	116	33	78	77.85	51.5	-
December, 1970	257	162	134	28	95	82.73	52.14	-
December, 1971	283	180	140	40	103	77.00	49.00	-
December, 1972	482	337	299	38	145	88.7	62.03	1
December, 1973	456	342	321	21	114	94.0	70.39	n.s.

¹ Assuming that all temporary officers are citizens, add the columns "temporary officers" to "citizens," in calculating the percentages.

Source: Annual Manpower Report to the President, Central Establishment Division (1973), p. 101.

Table 40. Progress in Localization of the Civil Service 1961-73 Administrative and Professional Posts (AP.1 - AP.4)

Year Ending	Total Establishment	Total Filled	Citizens	Non-Citizens	Vacant	% of Total Filled by Citizens	% of Citizens of Total Establishment	Temporary Officers
December, 1961	1,138	870	194	684	268	24.82	18.98	22
December, 1962	867	667	96	553	200	17.09	13.14	18
December, 1963	996	798	260	513	198	35.71	28.61	25
December, 1964	1,208	894	415	451	314	49.55	36.67	28
December, 1965	1,421	994	573	379	427	61.87	43.27	42
December, 1966	1,530	1,039	595	395	491	61.58	42.09	49
December, 1967	1,758	1,162	684	442	596	63.68	42.09	56
December, 1968	1,718	1,272	800	405	446	97.95	92.52	446
December, 1969	1,688	1,083	726	284	605	73.77	47.33	73
December, 1970	2,162	1,346	881	403	816	70.05	43.61	63
December, 1971	2,509	1,504	1,084	375	1,005	75.00	44.00	45
December, 1972	2,123	1,971	1,636	335	1,152	83.00	52.36	45
December, 1973	3,765	2,264	1,969	295	1,501	87.00	52.30	n.s.

Source: Annual Manpower Report to the President, Central Establishment Division (1973), p. 102.

Table 41. Progress in Localization of the Civil Service 1961-73 Executive Grade Posts (EX.2 - EX.7)

Year Ending	Total Establishment	Total Filled	Citizens	Non-Citizens	Vacant	% of Total Filled by Citizens ¹	% of Citizens of Total Establishment	Temporary Officers
December, 1961	1,382	1,103	289	738	279	33.09	26.41	76
December, 1962	1,797	1,460	702	710	337	51.36	41.36	48
December, 1963	1,761	1,430	803	581	331	59.37	48.21	46
December, 1964	1,837	1,464	955	457	373	68.78	54.81	52
December, 1965	2,081	1,752	1,264	421	329	75.97	63.95	67
December, 1966	2,439	1,930	1,501	344	509	82.17	65.02	85
December, 1967	2,657	1,884	1,528	311	773	83.49	59.20	45
December, 1968	3,172	2,516	2,150	276	656	89.03	70.61	90
December, 1969	3,383	2,284	1,987	228	1,099	90.01	60.77	69
December, 1970	4,120	2,508	2,254	205	1,612	91.82	55.89	49
December, 1971	4,462	2,819	2,602	177	1,645	92.00	59.00	40
December, 1972	6,891	4,400	4,343	57	2,491	98.00	63.02	23
December, 1973	4,361	2,296	2,234	62	2,665	98.2	51.23	n.s.

¹ Assuming that all temporary officers are citizens, add the last column to that of "Citizens" in calculating the percentage.

² The figures were obtained from establishment circulars for respective months from 1961-1973.

Source: Annual Manpower Report to the President, Central Establishment Division (1973) p. 103.

Table 42. Progress in Localization of the Civil Service 1961-73 Technical Posts (T.O. 2 - 7)

Year Ending	Total Establishment	Total Filled	Citizens	Non-Citizens	Vacant	% of Total Filled by Citizens	% of Citizens of Total Establishment	Temporary Officers
December, 1961	1,629	1,260	254	876	369	30.47	23.57	130
December, 1962	1,845	1,303	471	747	542	42.67	30.13	85
December, 1963	1,956	1,420	672	656	536	53.80	39.05	92
December, 1964	2,127	1,526	830	603	601	60.48	43.39	93
December, 1965	2,141	1,566	1,079	428	585	72.66	52.15	59
December, 1966	2,513	1,711	1,221	411	802	75.97	51.73	79
December, 1967	2,769	2,010	1,521	365	759	81.84	59.40	124
December, 1968	3,269	2,323	1,890	292	973	87.43	61.69	141
December, 1969	3,103	2,171	1,842	143	1,032	93.09	62.13	86
December, 1970	4,268	2,792	2,413	216	1,476	92.26	60.35	163
December, 1971	5,151	3,365	3,067	139	1,790	95.00	62.00	159
December, 1972	5,364	2,902	2,788	144	2,462	96.1	51.97	57
December, 1973	5,847	3,894	3,858	36	95	89.3	65.98	n.s.

¹ Assuming that all temporary officers are citizens, add the last column to that of "Citizens" in calculating the percentages.

² The figures were obtained from establishment circulars for respective months from 1961-73.

Source: Annual Manpower Report to the President, Central Establishment Division (1973), p. 104.

Table 43. Progress in Localization of the Civil Service 1961-73 Secretarial Posts (EX.1 - EX.4)

Year Ending	Total Establishment	Total Filled	Citizens	Non-Citizens	Vacant	% of Total Filled by Citizens	% of Citizens of Total Establishment	Temporary Officers
December, 1961	289	256	27	118	33	53.90	47.75	111
December, 1962	312	274	94	102	38	62.77	55.12	78
December, 1963	331	305	175	91	26	70.16	64.65	39
December, 1964	358	308	206	66	50	78.57	67.57	36
December, 1965	418	298	212	50	120	83.22	59.33	36
December, 1966	445	279	197	43	166	84.58	53.03	39
December, 1967	436	249	182	23	187	86.34	49.31	33
December, 1968	440	230	182	23	210	90.00	47.04	25
December, 1969	394	231	184	11	163	95.23	55.83	36
December, 1970	454	269	232	12	185	95.53	56.60	25
December, 1971	448	285	275	8	163	97.00	61.00	2
December, 1972	628	314	308	6	314	98.1	49.04	5
December, 1973	764	443	436	7	321	98.4	57.07	n.s. ¹

¹ Assuming that all temporary officers are citizens add the last column to that of "Citizens" in calculating the percentage.

² The figures were obtained from establishments circulars for respective months from 1961-73.

Source: Annual Manpower Report to the President, Central Establishment Division (1973), p. 105.

public institutions to run and operate various programs, industries, businesses, etc., on behalf of the public. These institutions, popularly known as parastatal organizations, became the institutions through which public control and ownership of the "commanding heights" of the economy was secured.

While controlled by the state through various "parent ministries," they were given a room of flexibility to carry on their various functions and operations in a "business-like" manner. Their management was thus given almost equal freedom to run them just as the former private alien owners and managers had run them. They were also in most cases given the same conditions of work remuneration, and other fringe benefits. In this way their styles of life and outlook definitely differed from that of the purely administrative bureaucrats in the Civil Service from whom these same managers, especially the first ones, did actually spring.

All this, together with various developments which have been outlined in Part B of this chapter had far reaching implications as regards the social class structure that was to emerge during the period under review. Using the same broad categorization as the one used in section C of Chapter Three, the emerging class structure can be said to have developed as follows:

a. The Upper Class: This was composed of what one would call the ruling class in Tanzania. Unlike the colonial upper or ruling class which was alien and mostly of British stock, the new upper or ruling class was of Tanzanian origin and in most cases Tanzanians of African descent. It controlled and directed trends in the socio-economic and political development of the country. The group was,

however, not that homogeneous as some people (Shivji, op. cit.) claim. It was stratified and differentiated accordingly. This differentiation or stratification was not a mere historical coincidence or accident. It resulted from the specific socio-economic and political developments characteristic of the country. Of specific importance is the fact that this differentiation actually reflected the different origins, backgrounds and orientations of the members who form the particular sub-groups to which we now turn:

- (i) The Political leaders and functionaries: These form the basis of the ruling class in Tanzania. At the time of independence these were basically drawn from the TANU leadership and took over from the colonial ruling class as Ministers, Regional Commissioners, and Area Commissioners. Having been involved in the nationalist struggle where they were in constant contact with the masses at the grass roots level, they were expected to reflect the wishes and aspirations of these same people in their day to day activities. Of course there were some who saw in independence a room for mobility and a chance to just step into the same positions as those occupied by the colonists.
- (ii) Administrative bureaucrats, most of them Tanzanian citizens: These were senior administrators, technicians, and experts. The first ones grew up in the colonial administrative structure and were promoted at the time of independence to the various senior administrative positions in the Civil Service. They were soon joined by several others, products of the country's educational crash program. As administrators,

in most cases brought up in the same old bureaucratic tradition, they were/are more concerned with the smooth functioning of the administrative process. In most cases they tended to support the maintenance of the status quo rather than create "disequilibrium" through any structural changes. Anything that was to bring about change was/is termed as "politically" motivated and "interference" in the smooth functioning of the administrative system which is supposed to be technical and scientific.

- (iii) The Managerial class: These are basically the product of the country's post-independence economic development measures and specifically the creation of various parastatal organizations through which the country could control the "commanding heights of the economy." While the first group of these managerial functionaries was drawn from the senior Civil Service core, most of them are young men who graduated from the various universities after independence. Some of them (the old guards) are byproducts of the special training programs designed by the country immediately after the parastatals came into being, so that they could take-over from the foreign managers who formerly ran these institutions, or were hired by the government to do so immediately after such institutions were created. In their day to day activities and operations, these managers have been guided by the same Western managerial values they either inherited from their expatriate predecessors or picked up in the various training programs. (After all,

these training programs have always been designed and carried out by the same people whom these Tanzanian managers are supposed to take over from.)

b. The Commercial Bourgeoisie: This group, formerly predominantly composed by the Asian commercial bourgeoisie has been the most affected since independence. Through deliberate economic measures such as the nationalization of wholesale trade and the creation of several parastatals to run the various industries, import-export trade and the internal distribution of consumer goods, the economic base of the Asian commercial bourgeoisie has been eroded. As Walter Rodney points out (1975: 22), the Asians in East Africa are almost finished as a class and

there is no longer any future for them in the old roles which they had in East Africa and Tanzania. In Tanzania this has been done through the instrumentality of the state.

In the process however, a few Tanzanian Africans have moved into some of the businesses that were predominantly Asian monopolies. Thus, while the Asians have been disintegrating, rather being disintegrated, as a comprador class, their position, though to a lesser degree, has been taken over by native Tanzanians. Of course, with the post-Arusha limitations, the extent to which they can advance themselves has always been limited and circumscribed.

This class has always seen further government intervention in commerce and trade as a very unfortunate development. This is of course in contrast to the managerial class which sees such development as not only expanding their base but also opening up new ventures for mobility.

Despite all the moves against them, a few Asians have managed

to adjust and accommodate themselves to the new changes. Due to the liquid funds they still have, they have continued to exercise some influence, especially when their money has been used 'to increase the amount of bribery and corruption that is present in the system' (ibid.: 22). But whatever they do, their days as an influential class are indeed numbered.

c. The Indigenous Classes: Apart from a few changes to be pointed out shortly, the composition of this class has remained intact over time as outlined in subsection (c) of Section C in Chapter III. The few changes that have taken place include the following:

- (i) First, the position of the chiefs and traditional ruling group has been eroded. With the 1962 Act abolishing chieftainship and the 1969 Act abolishing the feudal basis upon which this group was based, their advantageous position as against the rest of indigenous Africans has been undermined.
- (ii) Second, with the coming of independence, the educated natives moved into the Upper Class. Most of them were promoted to Senior and middle grade positions in the Civil Service. Some of them were also to join the managerial class when a lot of parastatals and other public institutions were created. To this group therefore, independence and the subsequent economic measures meant chances for mobility. They are the ones who can be said to have benefited from or eaten "the fruits of independence" as the common Swahili saying goes.
- (iii) Third, the agricultural development policies and strategies pursued immediately after independence led to the creation

of an entrenched "progressive farmers" class. A substantial number of them have managed to survive the reversed development trends pursued since the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration. These are Tanzanians who have managed to cultivate medium sized farms. They did or have not managed to go into plantation and large settler type of agricultural business as operated by the predominantly European and few Asian planters and settler farmers. As such, it would not be fair for us to talk of the existence of a Kulak class (to use the familiar Russian concept) as some people (Shivji, op. cit.: Awiti, etc.) do. It might be true that if one was to look around carefully in specific areas of Tanzania one might find out one or two real well-to-do farmers. But one or two "Kulak" type individuals do not form a Kulak class. And as Rodney (op. cit.: 18) clearly puts it:

One Kulak doesn't make a Kulak class. What one would discern in Tanzania is that when you take the size of the country, and the development of cash crop farming in certain isolated pockets of the country, you could go into a given community and you could find one or two Kulaks, but it can't be said they begin to operate in a way comparable to say, Ghana, or the Ivory Coast, or Western Nigeria or Senegal. There wasn't that cohesion. The numbers, the social content was different, because quantitatively and qualitatively it was a different phenomenon. There was no real Kulak class in Tanzania, no landed class comparable to either Uganda or Kenya in the East African countries.

More important however is the fact that the concept of class presupposes not only people being in the same objective and subjective economic position, but also that they also forge or develop a class consciousness. This has definitely not been the case with Tanzania's

so-called "progressive farmers."

Apart from these few changes and developments one can rightly assert that most indigeneous Tanzanians have continued to occupy the same position though in a slightly and relatively different and seemingly better context.

II. LABOR-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP: THE MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE DISSOLVED

One of the most important developments to this study during the period under review however, was the progressive increase in the number of workers after a small clamp down during the first two years after independence. While the number of non-agricultural workers continued to increase, however, there was a decline in the number of agricultural workers (Table 44). This was partly a result of the opening up of new industries and institutions outlined in the preceding section of this chapter and partly as a result of the decline of the price of sisal on the World market which forced plantation owners to cut down the number of their workers.

While all this was happening, however, the good relationship that had existed between the nationalist movement (TANU) and the Labor movement (TFL) began to turn sour. Four issues which resulted into this conflict were the East African High Commission, Africanization of the Civil Service, wage demands and the right to strike on the part of workers, and Government's attempts to conscript and control the union movement.

Table 44. Wage and Salary Employment 1963-1971

YEAR	TOTAL N/S		NON-AGRICULTURE N/S		AGRICULTURE W/S	
	EMPLOYMENT	EMPLOYMENT	EMPLOYMENT	EMPLOYMENT	EMPLOYMENT	EMPLOYMENT
1963	340,344		174,812		165,532	
1964	351,257		187,668		163,589	
1965	333,755		194,593		139,162	
1966	336,497		210,274		126,223	
1967	346,741		222,854		123,887	
1968	351,711		242,498		109,213	
1969	367,926		255,038		112,888	
1970	374,635		286,267		107,368	
1971	401,912		292,220		109,692	

SOURCE: Annual Manpower Report to the President; Central Establishment Division (1971) Table I.

(a) The East African High Commission Issue

The whole issue began with two strikes initiated and conducted by two Tanganyika based unions against the High Commission (Friedland op. cit.: 6). The first, which started in December 1959 and lasted 55 days, was by post office workers against the East African Postal and Telecommunications Administration. It had been called by the Tanganyika African Postal Union (TAPU) whose major leader was the late Jacob Namfua. The second one, which started in February 1960 and lasted eighty-two days, was a strike by African railway workers against the East African Railways and Harbours Administration. It had been called by the Tanganyika African Railway Union (TRAU), which was under the leadership of the young dynamic and militant Christopher Kasanga Tumbo. All the two strikes had been a result of workers demands for higher wages and better conditions for service. Unfortunately for the two unions, however, was the fact that the European and Asian employees in the two administrations managed to keep the essential services going on. From then on, members of the two unions became very hostile to the East Africa High Commission and called for its dismantling or Tanganyika's withdrawal from the Commission immediately she became independent.

The tone was set by TAPU's General Secretary Jacob Namfua in his address to the TAPU Annual Conference held in Dar es Salaam between July 3 - 6, 1960 when he said:

Our view is that the High Commission--a creation of London--should be destroyed. We shall be ready to cooperate with other territories in East Africa in the economic field however . . . We think that there can be a working committee in which ministers having full ministerial responsibilities can meet and settle problems instead of through the Central Legislative Assembly (of the High Commission). It is unacceptable

to us that we risk our freedom and progress in some other federation of East African territories before breaking up the High Commission (Friedland, op. cit.: 7).

Mr. Namfua's suggestion was approved and given even more steam by the delegates to the conference who at the end of their meeting resolved that:

As Tanganyika achieves responsible government, the High Commission should be dissolved immediately. A minister, responsible and answerable to the electorate of this country, should be appointed to handle posts and railways . . . if these proposals are not accepted, we shall request the cooperation of other unions in High Commission agencies to join together and strike to show their objections to the High Commission (ibid.: 7).

The TAPU conference was immediately followed by the TRAU annual conference held at the end of July, 1960. In his opening speech to the Conference, TRAU's General Secretary Christopher Tumbo issued an even sharper statement against the High Commission. Having stated that his union favoured the formation of an East African Federation, Tumbo went on to say, "We are opposed to the present High Commission. We are opposed, opposed, opposed" (ibid.: 7).

This second criticism and hostility towards the High Commission by Tumbo prompted negative responses from TANU's Organizing Secretary Oscar Kambona who had attended both Conferences. Responding to Tumbo's statement Kambona had this to say:

If you want to tell the government, you have to tell it to Mr. Nyerere. But tell the government what? That the High Commission is no good? I agree to that . . . no colonial rule is good and TANU does not want the High Commission.

But let's consider the matter. Why is the High Commission bad? Is it the spirit of the people ruling it who have the spirit of ruling other people? It is not that the house is bad; it is the people inside the house that are bad. But if you live in a house and there are vermin in the house, does that mean that you burn it down? The house has to be rid of vermin, but that does not mean that the house itself is bad. The High

Commission is bad because the people that run it think of themselves as small gods; we have to rid ourselves of them (ibid.: 7).

TANU, which was expected to form the Internal Self-Government from September 1, 1960, saw the then East Africa High Commission as the basis of a future East African Federation composed of Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and Tanganyika, once these countries became independent. During a visit to Addis Ababa in June 1960, Chief-Minister Julius Nyerere even went to the extent of saying that TANU was prepared to delay Tanganyika's independence if that meant the four countries becoming independent simultaneously and joining into the proposed East African Federation. This however was not accepted by the two unions.

Interesting enough, however, is the fact (which has always been neglected by so many people when writing about the issue) that the Unionists were not alone. During the debate on the Governor's address to the Tanganyika Legislative Council, on October 14, 1960, Dereck N. Bryceson then Minister for Health and Labour also cautioned the Government on the plight, fears and desires of High Commission employees by saying that:

These people want that the people whom they have elected to have a say in their own affairs, in their affairs, and as far as I am aware, this government cannot effectively pave way for the future of the High Commission workers.

Mr. Speaker, I beg to draw attention to what has been going on in the past. You will notice that there have been two major strikes of High Commission workers, in which Government has not effectively and immediately intervened. There has been a strike by postal workers; at the same time or shortly after that there has been a strike of railway workers. What happened was that the bosses could direct, in fact influence the actions of the Government here. When I say Government, I mean to say the Labour Department, which is a government department. The Labour Department has failed completely to settle the

disputes in the High Commission services. The Labour Department to this end, has not done anything in disputes that the workers in the railways have declared, and if the Labour Department cannot solve these problems, who will solve these problems, and if the problems of the workers cannot be solved where is the workman driving to? . . . I would beg that the Government should now make a clear and unmistakable statement with regard to the future of High Commission servants in this territory, because it will be unthinkable in an independent territory to be controlled from an external headquarters. Mr. Speaker, these are the omissions that I wanted to reflect on the House (Hansard, Thirty-Sixth Session, October, 1960: 171-172).

All in all however, one can rightly assert that it was the High Commission issue that triggered off the future conflict between TANU and the FTL. The whole issue, however, tended to split the Unions within the TFL. First there were the anti-government unions. These were mainly those unions whose members were employed by government agencies. They included TRAU, TAPU, the Tanganyika Union of Public Employees (TUPE) and the Tanganyika African Local Government Workers Union (TALGWU). Second were those unions which supported TANU policies. These included the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) led by Michael Kamaliza and the Domestic and Hotel Workers Union. Their membership was composed of employees in the private sector and as such dealt with 'relatively minor employers.' (ibid.: 9). They did not deal with large employers or with the government. In between these groups were the Plantation Workers Union (PWU) led by Victor Mkello, the African Mine Workers Union (AMU), and the two dockworkers unions. These formed what one could call the "swing" group and their stance varied according to the relevance of any given issue to their own needs. In most cases these unions tended to take a neutral stance between the two antagonistic groups of unions.

The conflict between the pro-TANU and anti-TANU unions within

the TFL between September 1960 and March 1962 became centered on the persons of Michael Kamaliza (TGWUP) and Christopher K. Tumbo. The clashes reflected by, and the differences between these two people first came into the open in October 1960 during a TFL meeting called to elect new officers. TFL President Rashidi Kawawa had just accepted the position of Minister without Portfolio in Nyerere's Internal Self-Government. Of the two people (Kamaliza and Tumbo) Kawawa had had good working relations with Kamaliza whom he preferred to be President of the TFL. Although Kawawa still had much influence within the TFL, the delegates to the meeting were much more concerned with preserving unity within the TFL. Thus, while they elected Kamaliza President, they also elected Jacob Namfua (a Tumbo ally) Secretary-treasurer.

(b) Africanization:

The second issue that led to the conflict between Unions and the new TANU government was the question of promoting Africans into the upper positions in the Civil Service and other sectors of the economy. Due to deliberate colonial racial policies, Africans had been restricted to the bottom echelons of the administrative structure and the economy. With a new African government they expected rapid promotion of Africans into the upper echelons of the administrative structure.

The new TANU government, however, was cautious over the issue of Africanization. While it agreed with the Unions in principle, it also was of the opinion that this would not be done at either the cost of non-indigenous Tanganyika communities or at the cost of having

mediocre people fill in the vacancies simply because they were black. Addressing the Thirty Sixth session of the Tanganyika Legislative Council on October 19, 1960 on the subject, Chief Minister Julius K. Nyerere did not hesitate to make his government's position clear when he categorically stated:

I should like to make it clear to this house that we are not going to Africanize at the cost of unfairness to anybody else (Hansard, 1960, op. cit.: 377).

The Government's policy, therefore, was that while priority would be given to Africans when making new appointments or filling in the existing vacancies, this would only be made if they were qualified. If no qualified African was available, the positions would go to Tanganyikans of any race and on failing to get any qualified Tanganyikan, the government would seek qualified people from outside the country. This position of "localization" was very much opposed by the Unions because it meant that local Europeans and Asians, (due to their long-historical advantaged position mentioned in Chapter Three) could continue to fill the senior positions.

The government's stand was very much attacked by unionists, especially the Tanganyika Union of Public Employees (TUPE); who did not want any jobs to go to Europeans whether local or not. TUPE went to the extent of even saying that it was ready to name up to 20 Africans who were qualified to take up senior administrative positions. The government's response to that was contained in Nyerere's concluding remarks of his address to the Legislative Council on the whole issue:

Before I leave the subject which has taken me one hour I want to suggest to my Hon. Friends who have been pushing us to Africanize in six weeks, that in fact they have been paying an unnecessary and undeserved compliment to the colonial administration of this country. They don't realize what they have

been telling us is that they have come here, they have found that the colonial administration had trained all the people that we needed and all we needed to do as a Government was merely to fix them in their proper jobs. This is not true (ibid.: 382).

All this was not accepted by unionists. Unionists who were members of the Legislative Council, notable among them Christopher Kasanga Tumbo, continued with their barrages of criticisms against the government's Africanization program. Later on, the unions (TUPE) were even to point out that the government's policy of Africanization was in fact leading to "brotherization," a process through which brothers or relatives of African officials were being promoted into the various lucrative positions (MacDonald, op. cit.: 148). TUPE also accused some Africans in top government positions of becoming "black colonialist" who preferred to have Europeans and Asians rather than natives working under them (ibid.: 148). This irritated Nyerere very much, and he named a committee including TUPE and TFL to look into the whole issue.

(c) Wage Demands and Subsequent Strikes:

A third issue that sharpened the conflict between the unions and the TANU government even further was the demand for higher wages by unionists for their members. During the nationalist struggle period, the unionists had definitely promised their members of the benefits that would come with the coming into power of an African government. TANU, now occupying the position of government, and therefore main employer, was however not expected to support their demands. Nor was it prepared to accept, or even tolerate the strikes by unions in enforcing their demands. This sharpened the conflict between the

labour movement and the TANU government as we shall soon see.

(i) The Mwadui Strike of December 1960: This was a result of a disagreement between the African Mine Workers Union (AMU) and the mines management over a fifteen-month contract which they had signed earlier on in the year. The mine was jointly owned by the government of Tanganyika and DeBeers Mining Company of South Africa who were also managing it. AMU wanted some pay raise for its members above the amount agreed in the contract. The management on the other hand was not willing to make any concessions to AMU. The Union then called a strike. Immediately the strike began, the Minister for Commerce and Industry flew to Mwadui. During the trip, TFL Secretary-treasurer Jacob Namfua who was on the same plane with the Minister realized that the Minister was taking a tough position and was in support of the management for refusing to arbitrate. While at Mwadui, however, Namfua found that the Unions and mine officials were willing to talk and negotiate. The Minister, on the other hand, issued an ultimatum to the workers saying that unless they went back to work within 48 hours they would all be dismissed. This very much angered the Unionists who had expected their TANU government to support them rather than the management. After consultations between Nyerere and Unionists however, the strike was settled but on management terms. From then on, the Unionists began to direct criticisms against the government. At a press conference after the dispute, Namfua did not hesitate to attack certain government ministers (Friedland, op. cit.: 10).

I must equally say that some certain Government Ministers are mainly responsible for the serious situation that existed at the mine. The situation could have turned to complete chaos and possible bloodshed.

Some Government Ministers have completely ignored the Government policy of encouraging trade unions in collective bargaining. In the Williamson dispute, the Government has absolutely ignored the laid down machinery of negotiations.

Namfua then went on to sound an even harsher and serious warning to the Government when he added that;

I must warn the government that trade unionism was put on trial at Mwadui. Trade unionism has sustained that trial and trade unionism is here to stay. We do not and shall not take orders from anybody other than from the members we represent.

Certain Government Ministers are ill-advised by their so-called expatriate civil servants (ibid.: 10).

Meanwhile, relationships between TANU and the unions continued to be bitter and became public at a Pan-African Movement of East, Central and South Africa (PAFMECA) meeting called to demand freedom for Jomo Kenyatta on December 20, 1960. Addressing the conference which was held in Dar es Salaam, TANU's coordinator Mbuta Milando accused the unions of complicity in the Mwadui strike. This angered the unionists present, including Namfua and Tumbo. Tumbo reacted by walking out of the meeting and within the following few weeks there were reports of workers fleeing TANU and joining the opposition African National Congress and that the TFL was in fact thinking of breaking relations with TANU.

(ii) The Local Government-Workers Union (LGWU) vs. the Dar es Salaam Municipal Council: Through the most part of 1961, the LGWU had been involved in a lot of disputes with the Dar es Salaam Municipal Council whose mayor was Sheikh Amri Abedi over demands for higher wages for the Council's employees which were opposed by the mayor as being excessive. The union called a strike in November, 1961, but the intervention of the Minister responsible for labour averted it.

(iii) The Sisal plantation workers strike of January 1963: This

involved more than 10,000 workers on fifteen estates demanding higher wages and better conditions of service. To avert the situation, the Minister of Labour had set up a Central Joint Council through which the parties to the disputes in the sisal industry could discuss the problems without going on strike. The Tanganyika Plantation Workers Union (TPWU) on the other hand refused to cooperate with the Council. To wit, President Nyerere invoked section II of the Deportation Ordinance and ordered that TPWU President Victor Mkello and Organizing Secretary Sheha Amira to be put into detention in Sumbawanga. They were charged for having incited workers to go on strike and organizing opposition to labour legislation (MacDonald, op. cit.: 146-147). The government also placed restrictions on union activities in the sisal-growing areas around Tanga while union officials were barred from the sisal estates. This action led to more bitter antagonisms against the government by the TFL of which Mkello had just been elected President. Together with the Zanzibar and Pemba Federation of Labour they appealed, but to no avail, to President Nyerere to release Mkello. And talking on the need for restraint in wage demands by the workers, the Minister responsible for Labour had warned that:

It would be easy for an employer of a particular industry to concede to a demand for higher wages. For example, let us say in the milling industry. He could concede to demands for higher wages and he could put up the price of his finished product. He will then get the same profit that he got before. He will pay higher wages to his workers and they will be happy because of that, but the bulk of the population of this country will have to pay more for the flour which they buy from this particular enterprise. In this way we can see that high wages does not necessarily mean higher standard of living and therefore I would appeal to both sides of industry to bear this very much in mind (Bryceson, Hansard, 1960, op. cit.: 334).

Those then are some of the considerations that prompted government's

opposition to what they saw as "excessive" demands for wages. To the unionists on the other hand, the demands were justifiable.

At this point, suffice it also to point out that having failed to convince most of the unionists to drop their "excessive" demands for higher wages for their members, the government accused them for being selfish and representing and advancing the special interests of the already privileged minority of the population at the cost of the overall economic development of the nation.

(d) Government's Attempt at Control of the Unions:

A fourth issue that led to further conflict between the Unions and the TANU government was the proposal to reorganize and centralize the Unions and bring them under the control of the Ministry responsible for Labour. The idea was given to the Minister of Health and Labour Dereck Bryceson and the TFL President Michael Kamaliza by John Tettegah, General Secretary of the Ghana Trades Unions Congress (GTUC) during a visit to Tanzania. The proposals were based on the centralization of the financial organization of all unions under the TFL thus giving the TFL control over strike funds. Tettegah's long term ideas to integrate the labour movement into the political system were even put clearer in an article he published in the Spearhead issue number 1 of January 1962. In the article, titled "The African Proletariat," the author called for an "African Labour Personality" suggesting that unions in Africa should abandon their economism and get themselves politically involved by cooperating with their governments (Friedland, op. cit.: 12-14). Kamaliza, then President of the TFL made the above proposals and suggestions public. This further inflamed the anti-TANU government

wing within the TFL. Protesting against this proposed government encroachment on union freedom and movement, Tumbo led a walkout of four unions--Railways, Government, Local Government and Postal Workers--from a TFL conference held on April 18, 1961 (Tanganyika Standard, April 19, 1961). At the same time, John Magongo, then General Secretary of TUPE and one of Tumbo's supporters and protege wrote a reply to Tettegah's article. In his article titled "Cooperation Not Domination" (Spearhead, op.cit.) while agreeing to the idea that unions should exercise constraint in making their wage demands, Magongo further asserted that that should be voluntary. He then went on to state that;

There is a tendency on the part of political leaders to exercise authority over trade unions and make them part and parcel of Government. Self restraint is demanded with threats forgetting that such things have to be carried out by cooperation. . . . Sometimes such actions are taken by the political leaders because of their ignorance of the principles of free labour movement. But in most cases integration of trade unions and political parties is carried out under the banner of Pan-Africanism and nationalism and on the pretext that trade unions have to be molded on local conditions.

Such then was the state of affairs between the labour movement and the new independent TANU government at least during the first few years of independence.

Having failed to discipline and control the unions through persuasion, the government decided to take other means. For instance, having realized that the conflict between the TANU Government and the anti-TANU unions was partly a result of the personality clashes between Tumbo and Kamaliza, the government decided to remove all of them from the union scene. Following a ministerial shake up in the first TANU government after Julius Nyerere surprised the world by resigning as Prime Minister in order to spend most of his time strengthening

the party in January 1962 (just a month after independence) Kawawa, who then became Prime Minister, appointed Michael Kamaliza Minister of Labour. Christopher Kasanga Tumbo was appointed Tanganyika's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom. Earlier on, Jacob Namfua had resigned his position as TFL Secretary-Treasurer to become Union Minister for Finance. His TFL post had been taken over by Joseph Clemence Rwegasira, the shrewd Bukoba unionist. Rwegasira had earlier represented the Tanganyika Railways Union at the Moscow congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions. On taking office, Rwegasira told newsmen:

It is my intention to use my influence to make the TFL as independent as possible from political control (MacDonald, op. cit.: 144).

The government and TANU had hoped to influence the results of the elections of the new TFL officers following the removal of Kamaliza and Tumbo from the union scene. They hoped that the new TFL officers would at least be more united and cooperative than the previous leadership. In this they were proved wrong, for the delegates to the TFL special congress called to elect new officers on March 15-16, 1962, showed some concern in maintaining an internal balance and harmony within the TFL.

The delegates elected a member of the "swing" group of Unions, Victor Mkello of the Plantation Workers Union, President of the TFL. His election definitely reflected an attempt on the part of the delegates to find someone who was "neutral" and had not been involved in the major disputes within the TFL. The position of General Secretary went to J.R. Magongo of the militant Tanganyika Union of Public Employees (TUPE). Magongo was a major Tumbo supporter. His assistant

however, was Alfred Tandau from the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) and a Kamaliza protege. For the first Vice-President position, the delegates elected another "neutral" person, N. Kazimoto, while that of second Vice President went to another Tumbo supporter, Hassan Khupe of the African Mine Workers Union. Joseph Clemence Rwegasira was retained as director of the TFL.

Meanwhile, the TANU Government was getting concerned about the increasing number of strikes in the country as well as pressure on it to Africanize. It was also getting concerned about the extent to which unionists would publicly criticize it with impunity and get away with it. Its strategy to integrate the unions through persuasion had also failed. Much more important still is the fact that the state of industrial relations at that time also scared off the already existing and potential foreign, private investors whom the government was trying to woo into the country. Of crucial significance was also the fact that, in their public criticisms of the TANU government, the Unionists did not only tend to come with an alternative strategy of development but also criticized top Government officials for having abandoned their people. For instance, it was S.J. Katungutu, then General Secretary of the Tanganyika Railway African Union, who in 1962 after his return from Moscow called for the nationalization of all major industries. This was definitely unpalatable to the TANU government which, following the recommendations of the World Bank Mission was doing all it could to attract foreign private investment into the country (MacDonald, op. cit.: 144). Again, it was J.R. Magongo who, in a speech announcing the beginning of several TFL economic projects in July 1962, publicly castigated TANU government ministers and senior

officials for their ostentatious styles of life. And the response, from TANU's Publicity Secretary Edward M. Barongo, was that TANU's ministers were the lowest paid in Africa (Friedland, op. cit.: 18). The Publicity Secretary did not attempt to compare the salaries of his ministers with the low wages of workers in Tanzania.

It was behind this background that the government came up with a new formula for labour policy. During the second meeting of the First session of the National Assembly June 5 - July 3, 1962, Michael Kamaliza, then Minister of Labour, introduced three bills.

The first bill, the Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Act brought the trade unions and their finances under substantial measure of government control. It empowered the Minister responsible for Labour to appoint a "designated" federation of labour to which all unions would have to belong in order to secure legal recognition. This meant that the designated federation, by then the TFL, could be "undesigned" by the same Minister. Indeed, and as we shall see later, it did not take long before the TFL was undesigned in 1964. As a result of this law, the registration of 19 trade unions was cancelled. They were then regrouped into affiliates of the TFL. The second bill, the Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act was aimed at making strikes and lock-outs almost impossible by making them illegal unless a very long and complex procedure leading to conciliation and arbitration had been followed. In actual reality, the right to strike was abolished by this Act. The third one, the Civil Service (Negotiating Machinery) Bill removed Civil Servants whose pay was more than £702 a year from being union members. These were from then on represented in the Staff Advisory System. This last move definitely robbed the Unions of a

source of potential leaders.

The response from all unionists (TFL) was very critical and hostile. The move was seen as undermining the freedom and autonomy of the Labour movement. In the National Assembly, Victor Mkello (then TFL President) who was a nominated member found himself in an awkward situation, especially when substantial pressure was brought to bear on him to vote for the bills, which he did after some amendments were made softening the amount of financial control of the unions to be held by the Minister of Labour.

Mkello's vote for the bills did not mean union support for them. Outraged unionists, one after another, attacked the bills. The attack was led by Luke Ngahyoma, then Secretary General of the Dar es Salaam Dockworkers Union. In July 1962, Ngahyoma accused Julius Nyerere for having "misrepresented the facts" while explaining the bills at a TANU sponsored rally. This statement drew reactions from TANU's Organizing Secretary Oscar Kambona and other TANU members and officers. They attacked Ngahyoma's statement and were in turn subjected to a barrage of criticism and ridicule from the unions.

Ngahyoma's statement was followed by other statements from other unionists. Commenting on the bills, Abdullah Mwamba, Chairman of the Tanganyika Railway African Union said the measures would retard union autonomy and freedom. He went on to call for the resignation of the Minister of Labour. The Tanganyika Plantation Workers Union on the other hand had envisaged that the new laws would lead to a perpetual war between government and labour, while TFL Director Rwegasira said that, that "abominable policy cannot suit the aspirations of the working class" (MacDonald, op. cit.: 145). The TFL President, Victor

Mkello was however more cautious and moderate in his remarks when he said:

I appeal to my fellow President of TANU to see that the country is not divided into two by passage of these bills (ibid.: 145-146).

The most bitter and harsh criticism of the bills was still to come. And it did come through TFL's General Secretary J.R. Magongo who while commenting on the bills had this to say (ibid.: 144):

This will hold the labour movement back because both sides, labour and management, recognize that it forces agreement on them.

Magongo then went on to say that the TFL would from then on support any anti-Nyerere charge and that anyone who did not, and especially those supporting the legislation were "stooges" or "Tshombes" (MacDonald, ibid.: 145; Friedland, op. cit.: 18). This latter part of the statement, however, proved Magongo's undoing in the union movement. Immediately after that, on September 15, 1962, Mkello suspended Magongo from office. He accused him for complicity in a conspiracy to embezzle a sum of £200 from the TFL in what has come to be popularly known as "the Makota Affair" (Friedland, op. cit.:). Friedland has clearly demonstrated how Magongo did not steal from the TFL but gave the money to Davision Makota for TFL related projects (Friedland, ibid.: 19).

The expulsion of Magongo was unconstitutional and therefore a meeting of the Emergency Committee had to be called on September 28, 1962 to validate Mkello's action. It is believed he had been pressured to do so by the Government. This meeting took place without Magongo's presence. He had been arrested and imprisoned on the previous day and charged for stealing from the TFL. As a result, he was not able

to present his case. During the meeting however, TFL Vice President Hassan Khupe and S.J. Katungutu of TRAU denounced Mkello and protested over Magongo's suspension. They were in turn, together with their unions, (the African Mine Workers Union and the Tanganyika Railway African Union) suspended. The National Union of Post Office and Telecommunications Employees protested the suspension of the two unions despite the fact it was approved by an Emergency Committee meeting held in November and was approved by a special conference of the TFL held in January 1963. On February 5, 1963 however, the Minister of Labour Michael KamaTiza rejected the expulsion of the TRAU from the TFL on the pretext that the expulsion vote had been without a secret ballot. The African Mineworkers Union had been reinstated earlier on.

Mkello had cooperated with the government to oppose his fellow unionists, but eventually he too was attacked by the same government. This came in January 1963 when a series of wildcat strikes occurred in the plantations. The government was of the opinion that Mkello as President of the Plantation Workers Union and its Organizing Secretary Sheha Amiri were involved in inciting the workers to go on strike. The two men, as pointed out earlier (section C, subsection iii), were rounded up and detained in Sumbawanga.

At this point let it be noted that following Magongo's expulsion from the TFL, a new General Secretary, Alfred C.A. Tandau, who was more sympathetic to government intensions, had been elected. He was former Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union. The duties of acting deputy General Secretary fell under Joseph Rwegasira.

Meanwhile, the relationship between government and labour remained calm for a while. Mkello and Amiri were released on March 8,

1963 and issued statements that they would from then on cooperate with the Government. Mkello was reinstated to all his positions at TFL and the Plantation Workers Union. This did not, however, prevent Mkello from joining other unionists to block Kamaliza's proposals to integrate the trade unions into the Ministry of Labour on October 27, 1963.

The calm in the relationship between unions and government that had existed during the greater part of 1963 was disrupted in January, 1964. This followed President Nyerere's new policy of nondiscrimination in the selection and promotion of candidates to the various civil service positions. This was contradictory and in contrast to the unions' position of rapid Africanization. It definitely outraged the unions and the TFL sent a special six-man delegation to President Nyerere protesting the new policy. At this point, however, time was running out for the unionists.

On January 20, 1964, a small number of soldiers mutinied. The mutiny brought about the total collapse of the central government. It was quickly put down through the help of British and Nigerian troops. Once the mutiny was suppressed, the government moved very swiftly against all elements whom they thought were the cause or had contributed to the whole affair. Included amongst the people arrested and detained for their complicity in the mutiny was an estimated 200 trade unionists (Tanganyika Standard, January 27, 28, 29, February 1, 1964). Within a few days however, unionists belonging to the pro-TANU faction within the TFL were released. Most of the union leaders however remained in detention. Following pressures from the Minister for Labour Michael Kamaliza, the few TFL leaders who were around (of course these

were the pro-TANU elements) met in executive session on January 27, 1964 and voted for the dissolution of the TFL. On February 8, 1964, Alfred Cyril Tandau led a procession of the remaining unionists to the State House where they assured President Nyerere, who was flanked by Vice President Kawawa and Labour Minister Michael Kamaliza, that they had faith and confidence in his leadership and government (MadDonald, op. cit.: 149). Thanking the unionists for their statement of loyalty, President Nyerere told them that it was only the "bad ones" who had been rounded up and detained after the mutiny. He told his attentive audience that there had been only 200 people who had been detained, including trade unionists, police and military personnel, some members of the general public, and even TANU officials. He called on the rest to rejoin together in the process of nation building.

The Government also used this occasion to settle, once and for all, the union problem. With all the critical unionists in detention and the country still in the shock of the mutiny, the Minister of Labour introduced into the National Assembly on February 21, 1964, a bill that more or less nationalized labour in Tanzania. Introducing the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Bill in the National Assembly, Kamaliza claimed that the leadership in the various unions had hitherto been irresponsible, financially lax, and self-seeking. He went on to point out how, through a review of union expenditures, it was detected that 93.8 percent of total union incomes was being spent on administrative expenses, including the purchase and running of several fleets of cars. The Tanganyika Plantation Workers Union, whose President was Victor Mkello, was singled out as an example. The TPWU's income he said was 1,499,000 Tanzanian shillings or about \$200,000 (at

that time) and that 95 percent of that had been spent on administration with very little going back to the workers as benefits (ibid.: 149).

The Minister then told the National Assembly that such a situation called for a radical re-organization of the labour movement:

in a manner which would unite all wage earners within a single workers' movement which would be an additional instrument of national unity (ibid.: 150).

Kamaliza then asked the members of the National Assembly to approve his bill. The bill was then passed without debate. Under the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment) Act No. 48 of 1964, the TFL and its affiliates were abolished and NUTA established as the only national workers' organization. It consists of a single structure to which workers individually belong directly by joining one of the nine sections of NUTA: Docks, Agriculture, Domestics, Transport, Central Government Civil Servants, Local Government Civil Servants, Teachers, Miners and East African Common Services Workers--including railway, postal, customs and harbours employees.

The General Secretary and his deputy were both to be appointed by the President every five years. The General Secretary would then appoint assistant secretaries to run each of the nine departments. Politically, NUTA also became one of the five affiliates of TANU, including the TANU Youth League, the national women movement (U.W.T.), the Tanganyika Parents Association (TAPA), and the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika. The union uses a check-off system authorized by the government.

The following day after the NUTA Act was passed, President Nyerere appointed Minister of Labour Michael Kamaliza as the first NUTA General

Secretary and Alfred C. Tandau his deputy secretary. Kamaliza immediately appointed nine people to run the nine sections. Apart from Sheha Amiri who had a long history of opposition to the government's policy on labour, most of the other men included Kamaliza's and Tandau's supporters and fellow ex-officers in the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). These included Assistant Secretary for Agriculture Herier Naftal (formerly General Secretary of TGWU), Director Mustafa M. Songambele (former President of TGWU and then Regional Commissioner of the Government and TANU Regional Secretary in Dar es Salaam) and Director Michael Juma (former regional Secretary of TGWU).

From what happened during the first few days after NUTA was established, it became very clear that the Government and TANU were seriously bent on conscripting and controlling the labour movement. The dissolution of the TFL and the imposition of NUTA onto the workers from above dealt a heavy death blow to free working-class movements and trade unionism in Tanzania.

One other area in which the independent TANU government was also concerned is the area of industrial relations and especially the settlement of industrial disputes. From the eve of independence, TANU became more concerned with workers "excessive" demands for higher wages and better conditions of service as well as the resulting industrial disputes especially in the form of strikes by workers. Immediately, the country got independence, the TANU government also began to be concerned about some obstinate employers who refused any workers' demands even when the workers were justified, as well as those employers who tended to dismiss employees at will. It was also concerned about the low wages the workers received. Specific measures therefore, had to be taken to

remedy the situation.

The first move in that direction was to establish an elaborate machinery for the settlement of disputes and making it almost illegal for employers or employees to take part in a lock-out or strike without exhausting the established machinery. This was done through the enactment of the Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act No. 43 of 1962. The Act established a compulsory and elaborate procedure for the settlement of industrial disputes. This included the reporting of the dispute to the Commissioner for Labour who would then appoint a labour officer or any other person to act as conciliator. In case no settlement was reached, the Labour Commissioner was required to report the dispute to the Minister responsible for labour, who would then direct the appointment of a Board of Inquiry to inquire into the causes and circumstances of the dispute. The Minister, after considering the report from the Board, would then refer the dispute to a tribunal within twenty-one days from the date it was reported to him.

During that same year, the government also enacted the Civil Service Negotiating Machinery Act No. 52 of 1962. The Act provided for a Joint Staff Council for the Civil Service to settle disputes and regulate relations between the government and civil servants earning less than £702 a year, who alone were eligible for trade union membership.

The government was, as pointed out earlier, also concerned about the low wages workers, especially the unskilled and semi-skilled labourers, received. To remedy the situation in 1962 it established a Territorial Minimum Wages Board to "enquire into and recommend on the establishment of a basic minimum wage" for all workers in the country (Report of the Territorial Minimum Wages Board, 1962: 2). Following

recommendations of the Board, statutory minimum wage rates were prescribed for the various areas of the country (ibid.: part v: 24-28). The statutory minimum wages which came effective from January 1, 1962, definitely benefited the workers. In some cases they meant an increase of more than eighty percent, and for this the TANU government needs some credit.

The above 1962 measures were followed by the Security of Employment Act No. 62 of 1964. Having established a Disciplinary Code and the mode of punishment to be received by any worker who contravened any of its provisions, the Act also provided for the establishment of Workers' Committees in certain businesses and undertakings where ten or more union members were employed.

According to sub-section (i) of Section 6 of the Act, the functions of the said Committees were:

- a. To consult with employer on matters relating to the maintenance of discipline and the application of the Disciplinary Code;
- b. To discuss with the employer, at regular intervals and at least once every three months, means of promoting efficiency and productivity;
- c. To consider and advise the employer on safety and welfare agreements for persons employed in the business;
- d. To attend . . . all statutory inspections at the place of work by any authority charged by law with the duty to make inspections and report on working conditions;
- e. To make sure that wages are in line with the Regulation of wages and Terms of Employment ordinance or any law;

- f. To consider and advise the employer on any of the employer's rules for the place of work.
- g. To consult with the employer concerning any impending redundancies and the application of any joint agreement on redundancies.
- h. Generally to assist in the furtherance of good relations between the employer and persons employed by the business and to exercise such other functions as are conferred on a Committee by this Act.

Sub-section (2) of the same section also empowered the Committees to "consult, consider, advise or make recommendations in relation to any matter concerning" the termination of probationary employment within a period of one month from the day of employment and the termination of seasonal, temporary, or casual employment for reasons other than the Disciplinary Code, as well as the engagement of new staff, promotions, and transfers.

Thus, the functions of the Committees were merely consultative and advisory. More than that most of their functions related to areas beneficial to the employers. Their advice on matters related to discipline, the promotion of sound industrial relations as well as on matters relating to efficiency and the increase in productivity, are matters that any employer would be happy to discuss with the workers. The central question of the equitable distribution of the surplus accrued from the business or undertaking was never touched upon.

The only new feature beneficial to workers by the Act was that it also restricted the powers of the employers, whether private or public, to summarily dismiss their employees at will. It also

restricted their powers in the administration of the Disciplinary Code. According to Part III of the Act, no employer could,

- a. Summarily dismiss any employee, or
- b. by way of punishment make any deductions from wages due to any employee, save for the contravention of any provisions under the Discipline Code.

The Security of Employment Act also provided for the establishment of conciliation boards in each area with representatives of government, union, and employer. The conciliation boards were to hear appeals submitted to them by workers who were aggrieved in respect to a fine imposed on them as a penalty prescribed by the Disciplinary Code or in respect of the intention or the act of summary dismissal.

It is worth noting that the Disciplinary Code established under the above act affected workmen only, i.e. employees. The employers had no Disciplinary Code by which to abide. There was no mention of this even after 1967 when the country declared it was going Socialist and nationalized all the major means of production and created public-owned institutions. Up to this time, therefore, we see how Tanzanian laws continued to distinguish two classes or groups of people in factories and industries. One group is the workmen, who are affected by the Disciplinary Code and who can be punished by the employers or our own managers after Arusha. The other group is that of employees (managers) who "are fallible," very clean to the extent of being given a right to punish others. Indeed, this is a contradiction in a country trying to build a classless society. Under the system the country is purporting to build, it is the people, through the state, who are employers and that everybody--be it managers/bureaucrat--is

to be treated as a worker and subject of the same Disciplinary Code and same treatment.

Despite all the above inadequacies, however, one can argue that the enactment of the Act reflected a progressive step towards the right direction (the establishment of workers' committees and limiting employers' powers to dismiss workers). Its limitations definitely reflected the class structure and class struggles going on in the country.

Just as it had centralized and controlled the union movement, the government was also interested in establishing a uniform and centralized machinery through which to conduct industrial relations and especially the settlement of industrial disputes. After the Turner Report (1966), it also developed an interest in the restriction or limitation of wage demands and increments by workers. Something to that effect had to be done, and indeed it was in 1967 when the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act (No. 41) of 1967 was enacted.

The Act was basically intended to provide only one Permanent Labour Tribunal to settle all industrial disputes in the country. According to the introduction to the Act, the whole move was intended to:

make further and better provision for the settlement of trade disputes by negotiation, conciliation and reference to the Permanent Labour Tribunal.

The Act thus established a compulsory machinery through which all aspect relating to industrial relations (ranging from collective bargaining, negotiations, wage settlement, etc.) had to be conducted. Under the Act the disputes no longer need to be referred to a Board of Inquiry. Instead of a dispute being referred to the Board of Inquiry before going to the respective tribunal, the 1967 Act provides that

the dispute be referred to the Permanent Labour Tribunal directly once a conciliator appointed by the Labour Commissioner has failed to conciliate the parties.

The Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine any trade dispute referred to it under the provisions of the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act. Its awards and decisions are final and binding to both parties and may not be questioned or reviewed in any Court of Law, unless the issue is a matter relating to a point of law.

The greatest loss to the workers, however, is that it deprived them of their strike weapon. Apart from establishing a compulsory long and tedious machinery through which all disputes had to be settled before workers could go on strike, it also increased the penalty on those taking part in a strike or lock-out without exhausting the established machinery or those inciting others to go on strike or take part in a lockout. Sub-section (3) of Section II of the Act has it that any individual taking part in a strike or lock-out without exhausting the established machinery would be:

liable upon conviction to a fine not exceeding one thousand shillings or imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or both such fine and imprisonment.

Section 12 on the other hand has it that those inciting others to take part in a strike or lock-out,

shall be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding three thousand shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fifteen months or both.

The established machinery on the other hand was so long and tedious so that by the time a dispute was referred to and settled by the Tribunal, the issue involved may no longer be of importance and relevance to the parties involved. After all the award and decision of the Tribunal

was final and binding to all parties whether satisfied with it or not.

One other issue covered by the Act is the question of wages. Provisions in this area are based on recommendations contained in the Turner Report, compiled by an "expert" from the International Labour Organization under the name of Professor H.A. Turner (Government of Tanzania, 1967). The main argument advanced by Professor Turner is that the rising wages in the country had resulted in unemployment. He went on to say that in order to prevent further unemployment, wage increases would have to be linked to productivity. The inadequacies and flaws contained in the Turner Report have been dealt with elsewhere (Green R., 1966; Rweyemamu, J.F., 1969; and Seidman, op. cit.: 130-142) to merit no further treatment here. Let me therefore go on to point out that following the Turner Report wage increments were limited to only 5 percent a year and this only after productivity in the respective enterprise during the previous year had been good and profits recorded.

The Act definitely dealt what one would call the final blow to the labour movement. Whatever freedom that had been left to the union movement after 1964 was taken away. It is therefore no wonder that some labour leaders criticized the whole idea.

Participating in the debate on the bill after it was introduced in the National Assembly on October 24, 1967 by Mr. Mponji, then Junior Minister for Transport, Labour and Works, Mr. Saidi Mtaki, member of the National Assembly from Dodoma said the whole move was wrong, especially for a country building Socialism (Hansard, Tenth Session, 1967: 19-23). Mr. Mtaki pointed out the fact that the Labour Advisory

Council, of which he was member, had not been consulted before the bill was drafted. Secondly, he said the bill gave too much powers to the Minister responsible for labour. Thirdly, he added, was the fact that the move limited the power and freedom of both employees and employers to negotiate their terms and conditions of service at will without government interference.

Next to speak, and indeed to reflect the fears of many unionists and workers, was Mr. Kida (ibid.: 23-31). According to Mr. Kida, the bill if passed would repeal or replace the 1962 Trades Disputes Settlement Act, which to him had been functioning very properly. Secondly, if passed, the new law would make the right to strike illegal. This was to him very unfortunate in that the strike was/is the weapon of weak people. "It is the weak who go on strike," he asserted (ibid.: 24). Talking on the limitations on wage increments to only five percent a year, Mr. Kida said that was irrational in that the move would benefit only the employers (the capitalist owners of the means of production). Amid wild cheers and deafening applause, Mr. Kida asked,

How can you justify limiting workers wage increments while other people are getting very fat salaries? How do you allow a situation where one worker earns shs. 80 and another one shs. 5,000; shs. 6,000; or shs. 12,000 per month. This is a sin in the eyes of God (ibid.: 30).

He then went on to say that the salary structure as it existed was unfair in that it was unequal. He called on the government to look in to the whole issue, or else it would be very difficult for the leadership to ask the workers to put down their demands for higher wages when they knew and saw other people get too fat salaries.

The third member to categorically oppose the bill was Mr. Masha (ibid.: 45-54) who said that if passed, the bill would benefit

employers only. It was no wonder, he added, that the employers were very happy:

If you tell me that I should not give my employee more than a 5 percent salary/wage increment without also telling me not to increase the prices of products, why shouldn't I be happy? (ibid.: 46).

He then went on to question the rationale of limiting wage increments to only five percent even when employer and employee had agreed on a higher increment. Like Kida, before him, Masha questioned the rationality of putting a "ceiling" on wage increments for workers while other people continued to receive very fat salaries. He expressed doubt as to whether the move was in line with the government and Party policy of building equality through socialism (ibid.: 50). Despite some criticisms by some members of the National Assembly, the bill was voted into law on the next day (October 25, 1967) without any further debate.

With the passage of the Permanent Labour Tribunal Act, the process through which government attempted to control labour which started on the eve of independence was now over. Labour had been subdued, at least for the time being. For the next three years that followed nothing very much happened. It was only in 1970, through Presidential Circular No. 1 that anything significant happened.

The Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 created structural changes in the formal organization of the various public institutions and working places. The Circular called for the participation of workers in the day-to-day affairs of their industries and factories. This altered the relationship between workers and their employers. They were all expected to work together as equals. All had to take part in the

decision-making process pertaining to the day-to-day running of their industries. Thus, the balance of power between workers and managers began to change in favour of the workers. This was then followed by the President's call for Workers' Political Education.

Under the program, workers were educated on their rights and obligations in a country like Tanzania trying to build Socialism. They were also told how, in a country like Tanzania, all people are supposed to be equal and that each worker, be he manager or messenger, must get an equal share of the surplus they produce. But more than that, the workers were told how for a long time this had not been the case and that it was the managerial/bureaucratic class that had so far benefited from the system and enjoyed the "fruits of independence." In some instances, they were also told that they were the only force or class, in alliance with the peasants, that could really bring about Socialism in Tanzania. The educators also touched on the unsocialist behavior and practices of the managerial/bureaucratic class, saying that such behavior must cease immediately.

This created some ideological consciousness and change among the workers. But putting into consideration the short duration of the seminars (2 weeks) as well as the class background and orientation of most of the educators, the impact was definitely minimal. All the same however, it had some impact.

It was behind such a background that the then ruling party TANU promulgated a new policy document "Mwongozo" in 1971.

PART III

TANZANIA POLITICS AT THE CROSS-ROADS: REFLECTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 1971-1975

In the whole of Part II, an attempt was made to point out some of the salient features and developments determining the labor processes and the resulting Industrial Relations System in Tanzania up to the end of 1970. Important to our analysis is the emergence of certain social formations in general and the polarization of the labor force or wage earning group during that period.

All in all, Part II was meant as a backgrounder for the events that were to take place during the period under review in this section of our study (1971-1975). It is to these events that particular attention should now be paid.

CHAPTER VI

INDUSTRIAL TURMOIL IN TANZANIA: AN ANALYSIS OF CLASS CONTRADICTIONS AND CLASS STRUGGLE 1971-1975

The year 1971 witnessed an important landmark in the history of Tanzania, not only as regards relations of production (Industrial Relations) but also as regards future strategy for building Socialism in this African country.

The crucial event was the promulgation of "Mwongozo"* by the then ruling party (TANU) early in 1971 following the Amin coup in Uganda. Unlike the previous Acts, this is not a law passed by Parliament. It is a policy statement issued by TANU--the then ruling party in the country. And since the Party is supposed to be supreme, it follows that its provisions are unquestionable and binding. It is above the other Acts passed by Parliament.

Through Clauses 15 and 28, the Party policy document throws a new light on the leadership of the various institutions, their quality and development in general. Clause 15 states:

Together with the issue of involving the people in solving their problems, there is also the question of the habits of leaders in their work and in day-to-day life. There must

*"Mwongozo" is the Swahili word for the "TANU Guidelines on Guarding, Consolidating and Advancing the Revolution of Tanzania and Africa," issued by TANU, Dar es Salaam, 1971.

be a deliberate effort to build equality between the leaders and those they lead. For a Tanzania leader, to be arrogant, extravagant, contemptuous and oppressive must be taboo. A Tanzanian leader has to be a person who respects people, scorns ostentation and who is not a tyrant. He should epitomize heroism, bravery and be a champion of justice and equality.

And Clause 28 has it that:

For a people who have been slaves or have been oppressed, exploited and humiliated by Colonialism or Capitalism, 'development' means 'liberation.' Any action that gives them more control of their own affairs is an act of development, even if it does not offer them a little more bread. Any action that reduces their say in determining their own affairs or running their own lives is not development but retards them, even if the action brings them a little better health, a little more bread.

Thus having defined the qualities of a Tanzanian leader and pointed out the things he should not do, the document calls for the involvement of the people in running their own affairs and determining their own destinies.

The document also questioned the management values and theories we inherited, and the capitalist and Colonial industrial relations that still linger on with us. It also gave legitimacy for any action taken by the people as a group in deciding their own affairs. Thus when "Mwongozo" came, it defined, clearly, the relationship between workers and managers. This was, however, in favor of the workers, for it also gave political and ideological legitimacy to their later actions.

It is important that this radical change came from the Party and not from the Government because (apart from the fact that the laws so far enacted were against the workers) the managers, Parliamentarians and Government Senior Officials were constituting themselves into a privileged class and therefore wanted to maintain the

status quo. Thus, the workers could not change their position by making Government put into law the statements of "Mwongozo."

The workers, therefore, had to take extra-Parliamentary actions to enforce the ideas and ideals stipulated and contained in "Mwongozo." Having thus been enlightened and having ideological and political legitimacy, the workers began to demand that any leader who did not live up to the qualities expected of a Tanzania socialist leader should be sacked. Clause 15 of "Mwongozo" can therefore be seen as providing a Disciplinary Code for the managerial-bureaucratic class. And the workers made sure it was being followed.

To exert their position they started wild-cat strikes in order to force those in power to conform to their demands. But being aware of what the strikes and stoppages would cost their young and poor nation in terms of economic loss, and partly as an attempt to avoid persecutions from the powers that be, the workers looked for another strategy to deal with the stubborn managers who had failed to correct themselves. This they found in the application of "Lock-out" which prior to that time and under law is the employer's tool in dealing with stubborn workmen.

The picture of what followed was clearly put up by Hadji Konde (Sunday News, March 5, 1972). In an apologetic tone for the system and lamenting on what was happening, Hadji Konde summarizes some of the strikes and the economic loss to the country as follows:

In 1971, the National Milling Corporation lost 169,350/= (Tanzania shillings*) when its workers laid down their tools. A total of 5,103 man-hours were paid for, although no work was done. The strike also cost the country 33,215/= in unpaid taxes.

The strike at the Tanzania Shoe Company Ltd. cost the firm Shs. 94,500/= in unpaid taxes. During the 7,812 man-hours lost, 10,000 new shoes would have been produced.

The dispute at the Aluminum Africa Ltd. cost the country Shs. 11,000/= in lost tax revenue and the Company Shs. 1,600/= in expenses.

The worst examples are the Tanganyika Dyeing and Weaving Mills Ltd., and Tasini Textiles, both at Gongolamboto, Kisarawe district. When the 1,650 workers at the weaving mill stopped work, the nation lost Shs. 277,928/= in unreceived taxes.

The company itself lost Shs. 899,765/=. A total of 231,630 unproductive hours were paid for. In that time, 233,700 meters of cloth would have been produced.

At Tasini, the 1,260 workers on strike caused a loss to the nation of Shs. 139,000/= in tax revenue. The company itself spent Shs. 150,000/=. A total of 136,080 hours were lost, an equivalent of 189,000 meters of cloth.

There was also the Calico Textiles Industries' strike when 12,968 hours were lost. An equivalent of 17,825 meters of textiles would have been produced. The country lost Shs. 12,900/= in terms of unpaid taxes while the company lost Shs. 27,200/=.

The list could have gone on and on even longer. Konde definitely just picked up those strikes that suited his mission and left out some which were also important. For instance he left out the events on December 27, 1972 when the whole of Dar es Salaam had to walk to work after the Dar es Salaam Motor Transport (DMT) Company workers went on strike. Though not exhaustive the above figures for 1971 and 1972 give some idea of the extent of events and the economic loss incurred during the strikes.

But it would be naive and absurd to only look at the short-run economic losses as against the long-term political and ideological benefits the country is likely to gain through such actions.

*One American dollar is presently equivalent to 8.18 Tanzanian Shillings.

Unfortunately, the government, and much more so, its own-controlled English Newspapers--the Daily and Sunday Newspapers--have tended to blame the workers for the industrial disputes and hence the losses. They have failed to even put into consideration the many cases when the management has been the cause, not even those instances where the Permanent Labour Tribunal has found some managers responsible for the strikes and hence the losses.

The most crucial development, however, is that for the first time in the history of Tanzania, the workers had affected change in, and indeed a break from, the colonial labor laws the country had inherited. It has indeed been a revolutionary act taken by the more conscious workers and not through the reformist Parliament that has for a long time been dominated by the country's bourgeoisie that has always been sympathetic and in favor of the managerial elite.

And in most of the first such actions, the workers did not wait to go through the long and tedious set machinery or TANU and NUTA branches. At times, as was the case with City Council sanitary and refuse collection workers, they even refused to be represented by their workers' committee members. Instead, they elected their own representatives on the spot or sometimes demanded that whoever wanted to talk to them should do it directly to them.

Day in and day out, the workers used this strategy to air their grievances and discipline the budding managerial class. And since what they were doing was in line with the Party policy and ideology, it became difficult to prevent them from doing so, even when the workers had acted in a manner contrary to the established machinery. And in an interview with me for the Sunday News, the Chairman of the

Permanent Labour Tribunal, Mr. Francis Nyalali, agreed that at first the Government and Party were indeed sympathetic to the workers (Sunday News, March 18, 1973: 7).

Those then are the effects of "Mwongozo" on industrial relations, strikes and lock-out in Tanzania after 1971. Of course, the strikes and especially the lock-outs had unforeseen effects. In some instances, ambitious people or warring factions in a certain industry used them so as to further their own interests. One other effect was that some managers began to shun their responsibilities in fear that workers might lock them out.

But much more important was the fact that seeing that their interest and positions were being shaken by the conscious and revolutionary workers, the government began to take repressive measures against the workers, including arrest, dismissal and detention. In some cases, as with some workers of the Dar es Salaam Motor Transport Company, and the Tanganyika Planting Company in Arusha, etc., workers were charged for having incited others to take part in lock-outs or strikes. This is not surprising, for everywhere where the ruling class is not so sure of its position and where it has been challenged, it has always taken refuge in using fascist repressive measures and oppressive instruments such as the police. This is itself an indication of the fact that communications between the two classes have broken down. And in order to maintain the status quo, the powerful class has to use its instruments of terror and repression.

The Government issued a statement condemning the acts of workers locking-out their managers without going through the established

machinery and procedure regarding the settlement of trade disputes (Government Statement, April 22, 1973). The statement also pointed out that there were some workers who were inciting their fellow workers to take part in such activities and warned that stern measures would be taken against such elements. The statement also urged the Board of Directors, which were not happy with the workers' stand relating to management in their companies, to take up the matter with higher authorities, NUTA, TANU and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare (see paragraph No. 6 of the said statement). The statement added that this was necessary to protect managers by their employers, the "Board of Directors" and that this would decrease the uncertainties that had befallen managers alone during various disputes.

Earlier (Part I, Chapter I) we pointed out that while there have so far been many interpretations of the Post-Mwongozo industrial disputes (see Chapter Seven) it is the aim of this study to show that only one of them, i.e., that these disputes reflect the ever-growing working-class consciousness and solidarity, can be put to test in almost all the industrial disputes that took place since 1971-1975. However, this does not mean that we should apply it to any dispute without reservations.

For our purpose and to render more credibility to the above hypothesis, three specific industrial disputes have been picked and will be examined in detail. These are the Tobacco Authority of Tanzania--Tanganyika Tobacco Processing Company (T.A.T.-T.T.P.C.) dispute, which is our major case study; the British American Tobacco (T) Ltd. (BAT); and the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory disputes.

I. The Tobacco Authority of Tanzania--Tanganyika Tobacco Processing Company (T.A.T.--T.T.P.C.) Dispute: Our Major Case Study

A. Background

When the T.T.P.C. - T.A.T. Industrial Dispute No. 41 of 1972 was first brought before the Permanent Labour Tribunal on October 5, 1972, NUTA, on behalf of the workers of the T.T.P.C. - T.A.T. instituted 16 counts-charges against the former General Manager Mr. G. Mandara. Three more charges were discovered or arose during the proceedings of the Tribunal thus making the number of issues total 19.

The charges were as follows (Ministry of Labor, 1972; Tandau, February 22, 1974):

- (1) That he usurped the powers of the General Manager of T.T.P.C.;
- (2) That he broke the T.T.P.C. workers' - management agreement by transferring some workers outside Morogoro;
- (3) That by transferring or dismissing Workers' Committee members he had implicitly dissolved the T.T.P.C. Workers' Committee; that he had also blocked the activities of the T.T.P.C. Workers' Council as well as failing to form a new one; and that he had also stopped all workers' sports and social activities;
- (4) Practicing favoritism and tribalism in recruiting new workers at the factory;
- (5) Making salary scales that were contrary to SCOPO* directive number 3 by favoring his own tribesmen and friends;

*That is the abbreviated form for "Standing Committee on Parastatal Organizations."

- (6) Misusing the firm's funds relating to the transportation of tobacco from Morogoro to Dar es Salaam; misusing the company's cars for personal and his friends' purposes; misusing the firm's funds by chartering planes when it was not necessary;
- (7) Misusing the firm's money by purchasing very expensive vehicles and other implements without the permission of the various responsible bodies;
- (8) Usurpation of all powers as regards: recruitment of workers; transferring workers; establishing salary scales, promotion and demotion of workers as well as terms of service;
- (9) Acting contrary to SCOPO directives Numbers 2, 3, 6, and 9.
- (10) Acted contrary to the 1972 Minimum Wages as regards payment of "Overtime";
- (11) He repressed the workers;
- (12) That he dismissed workers contrary to the set laws;
- (13) That he dissolved and blocked the activities of the workers' committee at the Iringa branch; that he also repressed workers' committee members at the Company's Morogoro-based headquarters by transferring them to jobs they did not know so that on failing to perform their duties they would be dismissed from work;
- (14) Failed to cooperate with and understanding his fellow top-level officers in the firm.
- (15) He carried out the activities of the Board contrary to our policy of Socialism and Self-reliance:

- (a) by buying luxurious vehicles;
 - (b) by buying equipment from private individuals or companies instead of buying the same from public institutions;
 - (c) by hiring private companies to transport tobacco instead of public institutions and corporations.
- (16) Opposing Ujamaa villages while strengthening capitalists by:
- (a) directing that tobacco from Ujamaa villages be given lower price than tobacco from capitalist farmers;
 - (b) directing that the Shs. 330,000/= loan given to Ujamaa villages be used in buying implements for the Ujamaa villages from a capitalist company;
 - (c) going contrary to the wishes of the Iringa Regional TANU Secretary regarding the selling of individuals' tobacco to Ujamaa villages.
- (17) He seized the responsibilities of the General Manager of Tobacco Authority of Tanzania (T.A.T.);
- (18) Together with the Board of Directors, he usurped the powers of the Appointments Committee by taking disciplinary measures against workers which the committee would not have done;
- (19) He concealed all necessary information concerning the activities of the Board from the Executive Chairman.

The first time these grievances came into the open was during the various meetings of the Worker's Committee and TANU branch between January 27, and March 7, 1972. But the issues had been reported to

NUTA as far back as November 1, 1971. When the issues reached the Morogoro TANU Regional Secretary, he called for an enquiry into some of the grievances (TANU, Morogoro, 1972).

On February 28, 1972 two workers wrote a letter to the Executive Chairman, Mr. Edward Barongo, in which they accused Mr. Mandara of three things:

- (a) Practicing tribalism
- (b) Using a private firm, M/S Freight Express Co., to transport tobacco from Morogoro to Dar es Salaam and
- (c) Threatening to dismiss them from work following their stand against him using M/S Freight Express Co.

On March 6, 1972 the Executive Chairman of the Tobacco Board, Mr. Barongo wrote a letter to the Minister of Agriculture, Hon. J. Mungai in which he touched on seven points relating to his position as Executive Chairman and the conduct of Mr. Mandara in discharging his duties as General Manager of the T.T.P.C. These were as follows:

- (i) that his (Barongo's) duties and responsibilities as Executive Chairman were not clearly defined (as per count No. 19).
- (ii) that as Executive Chairman he was not being briefed by the General Manager on what was going on (as per count No. 18).
- (iii) on Mr. Mandara hiring M/S Freight Express in transporting tobacco from Morogoro to Dar es Salaam (as per counts Nos. 2(a) and 14(c)).
- (iv) on the practice of Tribalism by Mr. Mandara (as per count No. 4).

- (v) that Mr. Mandara was acting contrary to the various SCOPO directives (as per charge No. 9).
- (vi) that Mandara was suppressing the workers (as per count No. 11) and
- (vii) that Mandara was not cooperating with his fellow top-officials (as per count No. 14).

Some of these grievances or complaints had come into the open during the TANU branch and Workers' Committee meetings held in January, 1972.

This was then followed by various meetings between the workers and the management and the exchange of various "memos" especially between the Executive Chairman and his General Manager. For instance, on March 17, 1972, the Executive Chairman wrote a "memo" to Mr. Mandara warning him on the extravagance and misuse of public money and property.

Earlier on March 14, 1972 the TANU branch and Workers' Committee at their meeting had recommended that Mr. Mandara be removed after they found him guilty of 11 counts as per charges Nos. 2, 4, 6(c), 7 9(c) and 10 of the Dispute. Their recommendations were sent to the TANU District Office. And on March 16, 1972 the recommendations appeared in that day's issue of the Nationalist (TANU's English daily newspaper). On the next day Barongo wrote him a warning "memo."

This state of affairs led to an extraordinary Board of Directors' meeting held on March 23, 1972 to discuss the unhealthy state of affairs developing within the institution as had been recommended by Mr. Barongo in his letter to Minister Mungai on 6/3/1973. In the last but one paragraph of the letter, Mr. Barongo admits Mr. Mandara

was good at his work but lacked good public relations with workers (Barongo, March 6, 1972). Apart from discussing the workers' claims that Mr. Mandara was practicing tribalism and why he was using M/S Freight Express Co., a private firm, for transporting the tobacco from Morogoro, no other listed workers' grievances were discussed, such as his use of a T.A.T. watch-man and "air-conditioners"; repressing, commanding, and disregarding workers, stopping their salary increases, and other issues such as misuse of chartered planes which had been raised by Mr. Barongo.

However, during this extraordinary meeting, the dispute took a dramatic turn and the issue of personalities between Mandara and Barongo came up. Answering charges by Barongo that Mr. Mandara was believed to be having interests in M/S Freight Express Co. which he used at higher rates instead of using the East African Railways or CORETCO whose charges were said to be lower, the General Manager, (Mr. Mandara), told the Board meeting that he and the Executive Chairman had worked like great friends until September 1971 while on a business tour in Europe. While in Stockholm the Executive Chairman suggested to the General Manager that they recommend a second payment to farmers on the tobacco bought from farmers for their crop of 1969/70 season, in return for which, certain farmers had promised to pay the Executive Chairman (Barongo) Shs. 120,000/=, who wanted the money very much because of his pending marriage ceremony in December 1971. At that the General Manager (Mandara) refused, despite the fact that he also had similar offers, the latest of which was a promise to get Shs. 60,000/=. He declined it because, besides making secret profit (the matter contrary to his principles) there was danger to ruin one's

career, as he had worked with the B.A.T. for the last eleven years and had never fallen to such temptations before (Tanganyika Tobacco Board, March 23, 1972, Minute 11/72). Mr. Mandara further said that from that time the Executive Chairman began to undermine his efforts as General Manager. He also sensed various indifferences from the Executive Chairman (ibid.).

On March 27, 1972 the TANU branch committee wrote to the Minister of Agriculture complaining that they had not been involved in an Enquiry Committee set up by the Board and that the Board never heeded the workers' opinions. They also pointed out that they had no confidence in some of the Directors. They also accused the General Manager of buying, at very high prices, equipment from Southern Highlands Tobacco Growers (Iringa) instead of the State Trading Corporation (as per count No. 16(b)).

On March 30, 1972 the Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Mungai, held two meetings in Morogoro, one with the Regional TANU Executive Committee at the T.T.P.C. during which he briefed them on the findings of the Board meeting; and the other with the TANU branch and Workers' Committee on the same subject. According to the minutes of the second meeting, the Presidential Directive No. 1 of 1970 had not been implemented, (as per claim no. 3(b)). It was also found out that some of Mandara's activities were anti-socialist (as per claim No. 15).

On April 6, 1972 the TANU and Workers' Committees wrote a letter to the Prime Minister, with copies to the Minister of Agriculture, the General Secretary of NUTA, the Minister of Labour, the District TANU Secretary Morogoro, the Executive Chairman and the General Manager TTPC/TTB in which they explained what happened at their place

of work as well as the General Manager's self-styled fringe-benefits. They reiterated some of the accusations and grievances the workers had raised against Mr. Mandara during their March 30, 1972 meeting. They also asserted that Mandara was anti-socialist, that as leader he behaved in a manner not expected of a socialist leader (Clause 15 of Mwongozo), that he was practicing tribalism, had weakened the Accounts department, established a fake Appointments Committee, and was not consulting others in his day-to-day activities.

On April 7, 1972 the Morogoro Regional TANU Executive Committee set up an inquiry Committee to look into the dispute in which the workers were involved. On April 12, 1972 the Inquiry Committee gave its findings. Some of the issues as put in the letter to the Prime Minister were not deliberated upon, for up to that time claim nos. 1, 3, 7, 9, (i), (b), (ii), 11, 12, 15, and 16 had not come into the open.

On April 15, 1972 another development took place: Tobacco classificatiors at Tabora wrote a letter to the Executive Chairman in which they accused Mr. Mandara of:

- (i) threatening to dismiss them (as per claim No. 10);
- (ii) blocking their chances to advance themselves (as per claim No. 3(a);
- (iii) practicing tribalism and favoritism (as per claim No. 14) and
- (iv) lack of clear, well-defined line of command.

At the end of April, Mr. L. Kintu, who was Acting Regional Manager of the T.T.B. in Iringa, got a letter of demotion and transfer to Songea from Mr. Mandara.

On June 5, 1972, Kintu wrote a letter to the Executive Chairman, with a copy to the General Manager, in which he said his transfer and demotion were due to his favoring buying tobacco from Ujamaa villages instead of from a certain Greek, Mr. Mitchalakis (as per count No. 15(a), (b), (c)). The Iringa Regional TANU Secretary and Regional Commissioner was opposed to Mr. Kintu being transferred. To that effect, he wrote a letter to the General Manager dated May 8, 1972. Mr. Barongo, the Executive Chairman, also opposed the move, as per his letter to the General Manager dated May 24, 1972.

On June 27, 1972 two Iringa classifiers, Ikanga and Mwakyoma, got letters from Mr. Mandara terminating their services. On July 18, 1972 they appealed to the Minister of Labour saying they had been victimized due to their refusal to down-grade tobacco from Ujamaa villages so that it could fetch lower prices. The two had their services terminated by the Board of Directors on Mr. Mandara's advice, despite the fact that under the Disciplinary Code, as per second schedule of the Security of Employment Act of 1964, such an action would have been taken by the Appointment Committee. Furthermore, these two workers were not given a chance to defend themselves.

From July to October, nothing of interest actually happened. On October 13, 1972, however, Mr. Mwita, the then Public and Industrial Relations Officer wrote to the General Manager, Mr. Mandara complaining that activities and duties which were supposed to have been done by, or involved him, were being done without him (Mwita) being consulted.

On October 30, 1972, Mwita wrote to the Minister of Labour complaining of Mr. Mandara's behavior, poor leadership and his interference in Mwita's duties. Meanwhile, on October 5, 1972, the dispute

had been brought before the Permanent Labour Tribunal for solution.

The hearing of the dispute went on till June 1973. And summing up his case for the workers on May 28, a NUTA Assistant General Secretary, Mr. S. Kaindoah, on behalf of NUTA called for the sacking of Mr. Mandara and reinstating workers he had dismissed unjustifiably.

At the end of the deliberations, the Tribunal was of the opinion that most of the charges against Mr. Mandara were true and that in only three, i.e., numbers 1, 5, and 8, was Mr. Mandara not responsible. In charge or count number (1) the Tribunal found that Mr. Mandara had not usurped the powers of T.T.P.C. General Manager for he had been given the post by the Board of Directors as per minute No. 52/72 of the T.T.P.C. annual meeting of April 23, 1971. On claim no. (5) the Tribunal, though agreed there was an element of favoritism, was of the opinion that there was not enough evidence to make Mr. Mandara guilty of all the charges. The Tribunal also failed to find enough evidence to convict Mr. Mandara of charge no. 5.

So, from the findings of the Tribunal, Mr. Mandara can be said to have been found guilty of most of the politically serious offenses. However, the Tribunal was also of the opinion that some other people and circumstances were also, together with Mr. Mandara, responsible for the disputes and grievances as follows:

- (1) The T.T.P.C. Workers' Council had died and that it was not possible to form the T.A.T. counterpart due to personal clashes between Barongo and Mandara;
- (2) Social activities and sports had come to a halt due to poor financial position and the stress by both Barongo and Mandara on hard work alone;

- (3) That the Board of Directors meeting which dismissed Ikanga and Mwakyoma usurped the powers of the Appointments Committee contrary to SCOPO directive no. 6, while it did not give the two chance to put their case or defend themselves contrary to natural justice;
- (4) That the management was divided into two hostile camps due to the ignorance of the responsibilities of some of the leaders;
- (5) Most of the workers' grievances were not solved at the various sittings held in 1972.

Thus from the above Tribunal findings, it is quite obvious that for one reason or another others must share the responsibility.

After the Tribunal findings and recommendations, the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare wrote a letter, dated 27/6/73 to his Minister, advising his Minister to ask the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Mungai, to find another General Manager in the place of Mr. Mandara as well as to implement the Permanent Labour Tribunal recommendations.

On July 20, 1973, Mr. Tandau as Minister of Labour wrote a letter to the Minister of Agriculture, copied to the General Secretary of NUTA, in which he pointed out the nature and scope of the disputes and recommended that due to Mr. Mandara's unbecoming behavior as General Manager:

- (a) Mr. Mandara should not return to work in the factory as General Manager for 14 of the charges instituted against him were serious, while returning him to the factory would be dangerous not only to the factory but to Mr. Mandara's

person as well. (Mr. Tandau, therefore, recommended that Mr. Mandara be transferred from the factory.)

- (b) Where he will be transferred, he should not deal directly with the workers or matters relating to their terms and conditions of services for that would be a false-start; and that he should not return to the factory as that would plant seeds of discord for some people would like to pay vengeance; that
- (c) There was need for Mr. Mandara to correct himself;
- (d) Mr. Tandau also recommended the split of the T.T.P.C./ T.A.T.

This was followed by another letter dated July 23, 1972 from Mr. Tandau and copied to Mr. Mungai, the General Secretary of NUTA, the Labour Office, Morogoro, and the Chairman of the Workers' Committee at the T.T.P.C. urging the T.T.P.C./ T.A.T. authorities to implement the findings and recommendations of the Permanent Labour Tribunal (LAB/724/468/4).

Meanwhile, there was a letter from NUTA signed by Mr. S.K.L. Kaindoah on behalf of the General Secretary of NUTA to the Minister of Labour complaining that Mr. Mandara never heeded the P.L.T.'s call not to transfer any worker until the dispute was over. Attached to this letter was a letter from a certain Victoria John to the NUTA General Secretary, dated, July 5, 1973, complaining she had been transferred. Other people who were transferred included a certain Mr. Makani and Mr. Mohammed - Hussein Hassan. Meanwhile, there was another letter dated July 26, 1973 from the Minister of Labour to the TANU Executive Secretary stating that as some of the accusations

against Mr. Mandara had political implications, there was need for the Party to take action. This letter, Ref. No. LAB 724/468/5 was also copied to the Minister of Agriculture, the Hon. J. Mungai.

During this time, the Board of Directors, following Minister Tandau's recommendation, at least on paper, split the T.T.P.C./T.A.T. and appointed Mr. Mandara General Manager of the T.A.T.

On August 2, 1973, the Workers' Committee in a letter to Hon. Mungai and Tandau, signed by the Committee's Secretary Mr. Bambo, on behalf of his Chairman, indicated surprise as to the reason Mr. Mandara had been named General Manager after he had been found guilty of 14 basic counts. On top of that, they argued, it had been workers of both the T.T.P.C. and the T.A.T. who had brought up the charges against Mr. Mandara. They also expressed fear of vengeance and victimization.

This was followed by a letter dated September 14, 1973, from the Chairman of the Workers' Committee to Mr. Mungai complaining that although the General Manager of the T.A.T., Mr. Mandara was still directly involved in the day-to-day activities of T.T.P.C.; he called upon the Minister to name new officials as soon as possible and recommended that Mr. Mandara should not be included in the Board of Directors of the T.T.P.C. so as to make sure the T.T.P.C. was independent of the T.A.T. Copies of the letter were sent to the Minister of Labour, the General Secretary of NUTA, the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Labour, the Morogoro NUTA Regional Secretary, the Morogoro Regional Commissioner, the TANU Chairman Morogoro region, the Executive Chairman T.A.T. and T.T.P.C. On the same day, a letter signed by the TANU Chairman and with similar contents to those of the above

and copied to the same people was sent to Mungai.

This was followed by another letter from the Chairman of the Workers' Committee, dated 17/9/73, to the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare pointing out that Mandara and Mungai were working in league to see to it that the Permanent Labor Tribunal recommendations did not materialize. He pointed out that they were threatening to introduce a Bill in Parliament which would ensure that the T.T.P.C. remained under the ambit of T.A.T. In that letter, Mandara is quoted to have said that he would "draft a Bill and introduce it in Parliament so that the T.T.P.C. is dissolved." In the letter, it was also pointed out that Mandara was still involved or was interfering in the activities of the T.T.P.C. The letter concluded by urging the Minister of Labour to intervene.

On the same day, another letter from the Workers' Committee was sent to Mungai informing him that what had been recommended to him in a letter (REF.: No. LAB/724/468/4 of July 23, 1972) from the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare had not been implemented. The letter further urged him to effectively separate the T.T.P.C. from the T.A.T. as these were supposed to be different organizations. Throughout the rest of the year, nothing very much took place. The workers continued with their protests while Mr. Mandara persisted in being stubborn.

On October 10, 1973 the Board of Directors of the T.A.T. held an extraordinary meeting to resolve the issue. The meeting was attended by both Mungai and Tandau. At this meeting, the Board resolved to transfer the office of the General Manager of the T.A.T. (Mr. Mandara) from Morogoro to Dar es Salaam. They also resolved

that Mandara should not be a Director in the T.T.P.C. On top of that, the meeting agreed to transfer the offices of the T.T.P.C. where they were formerly housed to some other place in Morogoro. They are now housed in the TANU Regional Office.

All the same, the workers still persisted that Mr. Mandara should go. And this state of affairs went on till April, 1974 when President Nyerere appointed Mr. G. Rutabanzibwa as new General Manager for the T.A.T. At this point, it should also be born in mind that it is usually the President who, at least formally, appoints senior officials in this country. It is also clear that he is usually advised by the respective Ministers, his Principal Secretary, Personal Assistants and the like. But on this it is more likely that he merely informed them of his decision after he had made his choice in his attempt to put an end to what was heppening.

Earlier on, Chief Humbi Ziota had succeeded Mr. Edward Barongo as Executive Chairman of the T.A.T. Thus, with the appointment of Mr. Rutabanzibwa, the T.A.T. came into the hands of completely new men who had no stake in the dispute. The Board of Directors of the Tanganyika Tobacco Processing Company (T.T.P.C.) appointed Mr. S. Kacholi as the firm's General Manager. The post of Personnel and Administrative Manager went to Mr. Mapezi. Thus, both firms, i.e., the T.A.T. and T.T.P.C., were in the hands of new men.

Thus, it became clear that Mr. Mandara was now "unemployed." Attempts were made to transfer him to the British American Tobacco Company (B.A.T.) in Dar es Salaam from where he had been seconded to the T.T.P.C. in 1971. But on hearing this, workers at the B.A.T. refused and said they would close their gates to Mr. Mandara if he

attempted to enter their premises. Those in authority began to realize that Mr. Mandara would not be accepted by any group of workers anywhere in the country. So he was given a job in one of the B.A.T. agencies in Khartoum, Sudan. But soon Mr. Mandara was back in Dar es Salaam where he has taken up a "new" job (Director) with M/S Freight Express Company.

At this point, the question to ask yourself is what did the B.A.T. workers' refusal to admit Mr. Mandara into their premises mean? The question of his having done them any wrong does not hold. So the only logical alternative, unless otherwise stated, is that their action reflected their solidarity with Morogoro workers. And do not forget that these B.A.T. workers had locked-out their former Personnel Manager, Mr. F. Kashaija on almost similar grounds.

So, briefly that is the background, and indeed history of T.A.T. - T.T.P.C. dispute.

In concluding the background and history of the dispute, let me pose one question. Why was the Minister of Agriculture and the Board of Directors so sympathetic to Mr. Mandara? Whether this is a reflection of his infallibility or indispensability as against the rest of the workers and national economic and political interests is still another subject of conjecture. Can't this be attributed to their class position and interests with Mr. Mandara as against those of the workers?

B. The Questionnaire Profile: A Comment

What follows below is a profile of the questionnaire administered to the workers of the T.T.P.C. - T.A.T. in order to get their

opinions and measure their attitudes not only on what had happened at their place of work, but on other national issues; the answers of which have been used as my measuring instrument for their consciousness and solidarity. As some of the workers had been transferred to other places, a few of the questionnaires were submitted to them through friends who managed to make them fill them. But this was mostly for workers in columns (a) and (d) of the profile. The questionnaire was administered to 87 workers at the T.A.T. - T.T.P.C. factories.

As you might see, the profile begins with answers to question number 5 onwards. This is due to the fact that as regards question number 1, the workers come from almost all tribes in Tanzania and as such to have a list of all the tribes was not necessary. However, since one of the accusations against Mr. Mandara was tribalism, I made sure that I included members of his tribal group--the Chagga--in my sample.

Seventy four percent of all the workers interviewed completed Primary School, 13% did not complete Primary School and in most cases these were old people above 35 years of age, 11% had completed form IV and 2%, mostly old people had not had any formal education.

All workers interviewed were TANU members and NUTA members while all female workers were U.W.T.* members. All the young men were also TANU Youth League members. The age groups for the interviewed workers were as follows:

*U.W.T. stands for "Umoja Wa Wanawake Wa Tanzania" which refers to the women's organization in the country affiliated to TANU.

- (a) Among the (lower) workers who were interviewed, seven were between 20-25; 27 between 25-30; 7 between 30-35 and 9 between 35-45 years old.
- (b) Among the workers' leaders, one was between 25-30 years; 4 between 30-35 years, and one between 40-45 years old.
- (c) Among the middle-grade workers, one was between 20-25 years; 14 were between 25-30; 6 were between 30-35 years and only one was above 35 years of age.
- (d) Among the top-level employees, one was between 25-30 years; 2 were between 30-35 years; and 3 were between 35-40 years of age.

The replies given to the various questions, suggest a few salient features. Replies given to questions 6-11 suggest the workers support the charges against Mr. Mandara brought before the Permanent Labour Tribunal, and the findings and recommendations of the Tribunal, etc. There was, however, the tendency for people with higher formal education, and much more so if they were Chaggas--Mandara's tribesmen--to give moderate replies, which might suggest some tribal connection. Otherwise, tribe alone was not an important variable.

On question number 12 asking for the workers' opinion of the disputes elsewhere in the country, all the lower and middle grade workers including their leaders said these were inevitable and hence justifiable.

On question 13 and 16 all on the government's action against the involved workers, all workers interviewed, save the top-level employees, while supporting the government's actions and statement said that some of the measures were just too harsh and taken without any

serious considerations as regards their implications.

The more educated a worker is, the more aware one is, but not necessarily radical. However, the younger, more educated and middle-class grade, the more conscious and rebellious one is. This may be due to the fact that it is those who are near the top who feel the weight of the system and hence, the need to change it. However, it is these less educated workers who have been providing the backing force in the struggle against "anti-socialist" managers. The replies give clear indication that the workers are aware of the issues involved in such incidents. Their replies given to the general questions indicate their consciousness not only regarding their rights and duty as a group, but as workers of and for Tanzania. For more credibility of the above conclusions, let us now visit the questionnaire and the replied given to the various questions. (See next 12 pages.)

II. The British American Tobacco (T) Ltd. (B.A.T.) and Mount Carmel Rubber Factory Disputes: Two Other Case Studies

A. The B.A.T. - Kashija Industrial Dispute No. 41 of 1973

Another interesting and almost similar situation to that of the T.T.P.C. one is the B.A.T. - Kashija dispute. Almost all the charges against this former Personnel Manager are similar to those instituted against Mr. Mandara. But more interesting is the fact that while at the end of its deliberations in the Mandara case, the Tribunal recommended that he should continue to work for the firm(s) in the new recommended structure, the Tribunal recommended the removal from the B.A.T. of Mr. Kashija because "his pompous and repressive behavior and stubbornness had angered and undermined the confidence of the

QUESTION	(a) REPLY FROM WORKERS (LOWER)	(b) REPLY FROM WORKERS LEADERS	(c) REPLY FROM MIDDLE GRD. WORKERS	(d) REPLY FROM TOP-LEVEL WORKERS
	(50)*	(8)*	(20)*	(9)*
5. Did you take part in the recent struggle between the workers and your former General Manager?	All agreed to have taken part.	All 8 agreed to have not only taken part but to have led the workers in the struggle.	All agreed to have taken part.	Although they all agreed to have taken part, 3 of them tended to give mild replies which indicate some took part due to fear of also being locked out.
6. 8, 9. On reasons which prompted them to take part in the struggle.	(i) Mandara was pompous (50). (ii) Mandara was extravagant and misused public money for his personal reason (50). (iii) He was anti-Ujamaa and carried out policies which were sub-versive to our socialist policy. (iv) He practiced favouritism, tribalism (42). (v) He usurped powers of the Board of Directors and those of the General Manager of T. T. P. C. (31).	All (8) agreed or gave the same reasons as listed in column (a).	As listed in column (a) (all 20).	As listed in column (a) though somehow mildly. Two of them said in some of the charges even the former Executive Chairman Mr. E. Barongo and the Board of Directors were also responsible.
7. Do you think the charges against Mr. Mandara were justified? Yes/No Why?	All agreed in the affirmative. The only reason given was that even the Permanent Labour Tribunal found him guilty of most of the charges and that even the higher authorities were convinced and hence "dismissed" him from work.	While giving the same replies as those given in column (a), five also added that they thought such a person was detrimental to "our" socialist policies and good	Same replies as those given in column (a) and some of those given in column (b).	While giving almost the same reasons as those given in column (a) and (b) two of these people felt a little bit sympathetic with Mandara.

*The numbers in brackets indicate the number of people interviewed as well as the number of people in a certain category who gave a particular reply or answer.

10. On the level of consciousness of workers and management.	All said that of the workers was higher than the management.	Industrial relations and hence productivity for by practicing favouritism and tribalism he undermined the morale of some of the workers.	As in columns (a) and (b) (all 20).	All admitted the workers were more politically conscious than the management.
11. Has the situation changed? If Yes, towards which direction?	<p>(a) 37 of the workers agreed that the situation was beginning to change and that even the members of the management were beginning to be politically aware. *</p> <p>(b) 13 said the situation had not really changed.</p>	<p>(a) All agreed the situation was changing and that the management was beginning to pick up politically.</p>	All agreed the situation was changing that even the management was beginning to be politically aware.	As in column (c) (all of them 9).
12. What are your opinions of any other such incidents elsewhere in the country.	<p>(a) All of them gave a positive reply i. e. it was justified.</p> <p>(b) However, 35 of them said this should be done only after other means had failed.</p> <p>(c) 15 said it was the only way to make managers behave.</p>	Tended to give a negative reply saying that if the machinery was being followed these incidents would have been avoided.	All of them gave similar replies as those given in column (b).	<p>(a) 6 of them gave negative answer saying such disputes should be solved through the set procedure.</p> <p>(b) Only one gave a positive reply and said that was the only way to carry out the socialist revolution and good industrial relations when all other means had failed.</p>

<p>13. On the government's directive stating that in future all such disputes will have to be solved through the set procedure and that it will not tolerate such lock-outs.</p>	<p>32 supported the move but also warned that unless the set procedures were really followed very quickly the directive would have one-sided effects in that it would only benefit the stubborn managers. 18 opposed the move saying it was anti-workers and pro-managers in that in most of these incidents, the set procedures had been followed without any meaningful results.</p>	<p>All supported the move so long as the set procedures can be followed effectively.</p>	<p>All gave similar reply as column (b) and 6 added that communications have to be improved.</p>	<p>All vehemently supported the move saying it would prevent the "anarchist" behavior on the part of the workers.</p>
<p>14. On the country's ideological, economic and social development.</p>	<p>35 said it was merely "satisfactory" saying this was due to the fact that our economy was not good otherwise we would not have been hit by so many shortages, while politically not all people, especially the managers were politically articulate and conscious. 12 of them said it was alright. The rest (3) said they did not know.</p>	<p>All of them said it was merely satisfactory and gave similar reasons as those given in column (a).</p>	<p>As in column (b) (All of them).</p>	<p>All of them said it was "satisfactory" saying economically we had still a long distance to go, while politically we still had conflicts and contradictions, and that socially the country still had elements of "cultural imperialism" especially youngmen.</p>

<p>15. Of what significance to you was the Dar-based BAT workers' move to reject the admission into their factory of Mr. Mandara after you had locked him out.</p>	<p>All hailed the BAT workers for their 'conradely' support and said the action reflected the political maturity and working class consciousness and solidarity on the part of the BAT workers' action should serve as a warning to other managerial cadres who had failed to correct themselves.</p>	<p>All eight gave similar replies as those given by the workers in column (a).</p>	<p>17 of them tended to agree with their lower grade counterparts. -Three of them, however, thought Mr. Mandara should have been given another chance to "correct" himself.</p>	<p>7 felt that the BAT workers should have allowed Mr. Mandara in and that that would have given him a chance to correct himself. 2 felt the workers at the BAT were right and especially putting into consideration the fact that they also had a similar case with their former Personnel Manager, Mr. Francis Kashaija. -All, however, agreed and some were in fact amazed by the growing working class consciousness and solidarity.</p>
<p>16. On the government's action to arrest and deport the workers at the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory in Dar-es-Salaam.</p>	<p>Eleven said the government was right--but added that such a punishment was too harsh as it also affected their innocent wives and children. 18 said the government was right saying government leaders knew what they were doing!!</p>	<p>All said the government was wrong in that the workers had in fact tried to put into practice what the Arusha Declaration said on the question of the ownership and control of the instruments of production. Three, however, said that even if the workers might have been wrong, that was not a question of principle but of details and strategy and blamed it on NUTA and TANU for having failed to educate the workers</p>	<p>-14 said that while the government might have been right, its action was too harsh. -Six said the government was wrong for after all, the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory workers were in fact implementing the Arusha Declaration.</p>	<p>6. said the government was right and added that, that would serve as a warning to all potential trouble-shooters!! 3. however, felt the government's action was too harsh on the workers and that in a way the workers at the Mount Carmel were right as their action was in line with the Arusha Declaration.</p>

<p>17. As a worker, what do you think should be your role in the overall development of the</p>	<p>-29 opposed the government saying what the workers had done was in line with the Arusha Declaration which calls for public ownership of the major means of production.</p> <p>-The rest said the government was wrong but gave no reason.</p>	<p>On their rights, duties and responsibilities as well as the right procedures to follow.</p>	<p>-work hard in line with national policies and ideology (50). -Be responsible at work (50). -Cooperative with others at work (50).</p>	<p>-work had in line with national policies and ideology (9). -Be responsible at work (6). -Cooperative and teach others (7).</p>
<p>18. What do you think are the stumbling blocks in your duty?</p>	<p>-work hard in line with national policies and ideology (50). -Be responsible at work (50). -Cooperative with others at work (50).</p>	<p>All gave replies as in column (a) + -make sure good industrial relations are promoted (6). -expose the enemies of the country (6).</p>	<p>-work hard (20). -be responsible and cooperative at work (20).</p>	<p>(i) Lack of enough technical qualifications (14). (ii) Poor leadership (17). (iii) Poor industrial relation and conscious leadership (13).</p>
<p>19. What steps do you think should be taken in order to solve these problems?</p>	<p>(i) Lack of technical qualification (50). (ii) Lack of enough formal education (17). (iii) Poor-leadership (37). (iv) Irresponsible workers (19). (v) Our work not recognized by the management (27).</p>	<p>All eight replied as in column (a) (i) (ii) plus (v) Bad and irresponsible managers and irresponsible workers (6).</p>	<p>All replied as in column (a).</p>	<p>(i) Educate workers on the importance of hard work (6). (ii) Give more political education to all of us including the work-men (3).</p>

<p>20. What group of people do you think were an impediment towards this? What steps do you think should be taken?</p>	<p>(ii) Give us more political education (48). (iii) Educate the management on the importance of good industrial relations (27). (iv) A few of the said bad leaders should be dismissed (33).</p>	<p>(i) Bad leaders/managers and irresponsible workers (50). (ii) On the steps to be taken 39 said the Party should step up its political education campaign while 27 also called for the dismissal of the irresponsible and non-committed managers.</p>	<p>As in column (all 20).</p>	<p>(i) Bad and irresponsible workers (2). (ii) Few irresponsible and non-committed leaders (4). (iii) On steps to be taken all called for more political education and the importance of good work.</p>
<p>21. In general, what are your suggestions on the steps to be taken in order to increase, (a) industrial production and reduce (b) industrial disputes.</p>	<p>(a) steps to be taken increase industrial production include:- -Educate all of us on the importance of good work (47). -Arm the workers with technical and professional know how (44).</p>	<p>All gave replies as in column (a) + call to reduce industrial disputes (3).</p>	<p>As in column (a) (all 20) i.e. called for more education on the importance of good work as well as arming workers with technical and professional know how.</p>	<p>(a) Steps include: -Educate workers on the importance of good work (7). -reduce the number industrial disputes by urging and educating workers on the procedures to be taken rather than laying down tools (6). -Arm workers with technical know how (8).</p>

	<p>(b) steps to be taken in order to reduce industrial disputes include: -Educate managers on the importance of good industrial relations (47). -set up a proper and quicker machinery to solve worker's grievances (50).</p>	<p>(b) All called for the education of managers on good industrial relations as well as the setting up of machinery to solve industrial grievances.</p>	<p>(b) All replied as in column (a) plus need to educate the managers on good industrial relations.</p>	<p>(b) -Workers should follow laid down machinery for solving disputes instead of laying down tools or locking out their managers (6). -Workers' grievances should always be dealt with immediately (3).</p>
<p>22. Have you attended political education seminars?</p>	<p>All answered in the affirmative.</p>	<p>All said yes.</p>	<p>All said yes.</p>	<p>All said yes.</p>
<p>23. What are your assessment of the seminars?</p>	<p>(i) They were very good in that they made us aware of our duty and rights (50) but (ii) They were not enough (19). (iii) They must be continuous (19).</p>	<p>All said they were good but complained that they had not been enough and continuous.</p>	<p>(i) They were good and made us aware of our duties and rights (20). (ii) Ought to have been longer and continuous (17). (iii) Should not be anti-one group in content (6). (iv) Should have more (13).</p>	<p>(i) They were very good in that they made us aware of our duties (9). (ii) Ought to have been longer and continuous (7). (iii) Content should not only include workers rights but also their duty and responsibility (6). (iv) should have more (6). (v) Should not be anti-one group i.e. managers (6). (vi) Should tend to unite all workers rather than divide them into "good" work men and "bad" managers (7).</p>

<p>24. Are you a member of the Peoples' Militia? If "Yes" do you think it is justified in your being taught and armed to defend the motherland? Why?</p>	<p>-Over half said they were members (31). Those who were not said their turn to be trained had not come (19). All, however, agreed it was justified saying to defend the motherland was the duty of all citizens and added that the training made it possible for them to defend themselves if need be.</p>	<p>All said they were members and agreed it was justified to prepare them for the defense of their country.</p>	<p>All gave same replies as in column (b).</p>	<p>Seven said they were members and agreed it was justified for both self-defense and in defending the mother country.</p>
<p>25. What do you think should be the qualifications of a leader, manager-bureaucrat in this country? NB. The confusion in the wording of the question as regards identification of the top-level employees in this country reflects the same confusion in the workers' perception. For instance, there are now current terms as "Idugu" (comrade) "Mananchi" (Citizens') "Mzee" (elder) and "Bwana" (Master). To the common man in the streets, "Idugu" is a NUTA term, "Mananchi" a TANU term, "Mzee" a term being used in Govt. Ministries and "Bwana" in Parastatals.</p>	<p>(i) As put in clause 15 of "Mwongozo" (50). (ii) Should be cooperative with others especially those he leads (41). (iii) Must be responsible (39). (iv) Must be human (43).</p>	<p>All gave same replies as in column (a) (i) - (vi) plus (v) should be socialist-oriented (4). (vi) Must understand the problems of fellow workers (3).</p>	<p>As in column (a) (i) - (iv) (20) plus (v). Good industrial relations (13).</p>	<p>All gave same replies as in column (c) (i) - (v) plus (vi). Must have higher education, (9), (vii). Must have technical know how in his field and (3) (viii). Good or better administrative abilities (6).</p>

<p>However, the workers clearly know which one uses what term in referring to them.</p>	<p>26. (a) Do most leaders in this country meet the above qualifications? (b) If No, what steps should be taken to rectify the situation.</p>	<p>(a) No, most of the leaders in the country do not meet with the above qualifications (50). (b) All agreed that managers lacking in such qualifications should be more politically educated as to their role and duties.</p>	<p>(a) As in column (a) (8). (b) As in column (a) (8).</p>	<p>(a) As in column (a) - (20). (b) As in column (a) and (b) - (20).</p>	<p>(a) Only a few of the leaders in the country don't meet with the above qualifications. They should be educated on the importance of good public relations, on what a responsible worker should be (9).</p>
<p>27. What do you think should be your role in the process.</p>	<p>17 tended not to know their role in the process. 33 said they would cooperate with their fellow worker.</p>	<p>(i) Cooperate with my fellow workers and educate them through various Party sittings (8).</p>	<p>(i) As in column (b) - (20).</p>	<p>(i) To cooperate with other people especially in the Party and help them correct themselves by educating them (9).</p>	
<p>28. What do you think should be the qualifications of a good worker in this country?</p>	<p>All gave the following replies: -Hard work. -Responsible. -Understand country's ideology and policy.</p>	<p>As in column (a) plus readiness to expose enemies of the country. -should be ready to defend country (5).</p>	<p>-As in columns (a) and (b) - (20).</p>	<p>All gave same replies as in column (b) + -he should follow instructions from above (6). -Should follow country's laws and procedures affecting him in his work (3). -Should be socialist (4).</p>	
<p>29. Have most workers in</p>	<p>(a) 36 said most workers had</p>	<p>(b) Most of them</p>	<p>(a) 12 said most</p>	<p>(a) All of them said</p>	

<p>Tanzania/at the I. A. T. attained the same qualifications. Yes/No.</p>	<p>attained the above qualifications. (b) 14 said very few workers had attained the above qualifications.</p>	<p>said most of the workers in Tanzania were far away from attaining the said qualifications (6). (b) Two of them replied in the affirmative</p>	<p>workers had attained the qualifications. (b) 8 said most workers in Tanzania had not attained the qualifications.</p>	<p>only few workers in Tanzania had attained the above qualifications.</p>
<p>If no, what do you think has been the reason.</p>	<p>-Lack of education, both professional and technical (47). -Lack of political awareness as to the importance of good work (37).</p>	<p>-lack of education (6). -lack of political awareness as to the importance of good work and their responsibility (4).</p>	<p>-lack of education as in column (a) (18). -lack of political awareness as to their duties and responsibilities (11). -poor leadership (14). -Bad industrial relations (11).</p>	<p>-lack of education and awareness as in (a) (b) and (c) (9). -lack of initiative (3). -irresponsibility (2). -laziness (2).</p>
<p>30. What then should be done to rectify the situation?</p>	<p>-Educate them technically and politically (50).</p>	<p>-Educate them (8).</p>	<p>-Educate them (20). -Promote good industrial relations (13).</p>	<p>-Educate them (9). -Give them chance to show their initiative (4).</p>
<p>31. What is your assessment of workers' solidarity and consciousness in this country?</p>	<p>(i) 41 said it was very high (ii) 9 said it was beginning to come up and was encouraging.</p>	<p>(i) Only two said it was very high. (ii) Most of them (6) said it was beginning to come up and was encouraging.</p>	<p>(i) 12 said it was very high. (ii) 8 said it was just beginning.</p>	<p>(i) Most of them said it was just beginning (7). (ii) Two said it was encouraging and reasonably high.</p>

<p>32. Whether the struggle was still on or had just ended once the Mandara issue was closed, if on, what form.</p>	<p>(i) 32 said it had ended. (ii) 18 said it was still on and that it had only calmed down for a short while due to fear of government repression.</p>	<p>(i) Two said it had. (ii) Most of them said it was still on and that the workers were still studying the situation and afraid of the govt. repressive measure (6).</p>	<p>(i) 14% said it still on. (ii) 6% said it had ended. -Workers had cooled down-unless things change will definitely erupt again in "cold" way.</p>	<p>(i) All said it was over.</p>
<p>33. What groups of people should be counted upon in this struggle? Workers/peasants/elite or leaders?</p>	<p>(i) 34 said the workers. (ii) 14 said both workers and peasants. (iii) 2 said every responsible and committed Tanzanian.</p>	<p>(i) All said both workers and peasants and committed TANU leaders.</p>	<p>(i) As in column (b) plus revolutionary intellectuals (7)</p>	<p>(i) All said workers and peasants led by revolutionary intellectuals.</p>
<p>34. Assessment of Workers' Committees and Council.</p>	<p>(i) 23 said the/Committee was doing well. (ii) 20 said the W/C Committee had been poached. (iii) 7 said it was still early to comment. -Said workers' Council not impressive still new (39).</p>	<p>(i) All said workers' Committee was doing well. (ii) Workers' Council still premature to judge (2).</p>	<p>(i) 13 said their Committee had not been given chance to function-still premature to judge. (ii) 7 said the W/C Committee was very much afraid.</p>	<p>All agreed the Committees and Council had not been given a chance to function... still premature to judge.</p>
<p>35. What is your opinion of the TANU leadership since Independence.</p>	<p>ALL ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE - POSITIVE i.e., The leadership was good and committed to building a socialist Tanzania. President Nyerere was singled out as a typical example of a committed "son of Tanzania."</p>			
<p>36. Any suggestions for a better future?</p>	<p>-Hard work (50). -Vigilant and militancy (38). -Expell all bad managers Am us with technical education (38).</p>	<p>-Hard work (8). -Implement Party policies (5). -Dismiss bad managers. and managers who cannot correct themselves (6).</p>	<p>-Hard work (20). -Take hard action on those who evade the leadership code (13). -Improve industrial relations (8).</p>	<p>-Hard work (9). -Implement Party policies (6). -Step up good working relationship and</p>

-Stress should be on Ujamaa village development (3).
-More political education (6).

coordination (6).
-Improve the network of communication (3).
-involve people in all levels of decision-making and implementation (3).
-More integrated political education for all (3).

FOOTNOTE:

1. N. B. of all the people interviewed only 6 said had other qualifications. These included 3 teachers on of whom had also been a Minister of religion, one stenographer and two trained assistant accountants.

workers in him that they could no longer tolerate him." The accusations against him were as follows (Tandau, op. cit.):

- (1) Misusing the Company's money, property and car for personal purposes.
- (2) Spending the Company's money extravagantly in making a very big party.
- (3) Encouraging canteens on class lines.
- (4) Tribalism and favoritism in
 - (a) deciding cases on absenteeism;
 - (b) in employing people who had left their jobs with the company contrary to the set procedure at the industry;
 - (c) by meeting the training costs of a temporary employee.
- (5) Making the Company pay airport fees on behalf of his wife who is not an employee of the Company.
- (6) Unfairly stopping the salary increment of a certain worker.
- (7) Pomposity, disregard for others, and arrogance in discharging his duties and responsibilities.

Having listed the charges against Mr. F. Kashaija, we should now look at the background and history of this dispute.

During a Seminar held at the factory in 1970 workers complained of tribalism. They said there were too many Wahaya--Kashaija's tribesmen--in the B.A.T. After that there had not been any official complaints until November 2, 1972 in a letter from the Deputy Chairman of the Workers' Committee on Bi. Felista Mwambene, when tribalism was also mentioned. On November 10, 1973, the TANU branch Committee at the B.A.T. met and discussed the issues.

On January 12, 1973, the Prime Minister and Second

Vice-President, Rashidi Kawawa visited the B.A.T. to open the Workers' Co-operative shop. During the ceremony, the TANU branch Chairman, Mr. G.S. Raji and his Secretary, Mr. Abdulrahman, read their messages in which they told the Prime Minister of the good industrial relations at the B.A.T. and specifically mentioned Mr. Kashaija as the main architect behind that.

On April 27, 1973, during the TANU branch Executive Committee Meeting, the Secretary accused Mr. Kashaija of misusing public vehicles on personal matters as per claim No. 1. They then decided to call the General Manager so that he could give them an explanation of that allegation. They also touched on Mr. Kashaija's behavior and conduct. This was followed by the May 3, 1973 meeting at which the General Manager gave an explanation of Mr. Kashaija's use of the vehicle to Bukoba. During the meeting, the Chairman and Secretary cited an example of one worker, a certain Mr. Zephryne Rutashobya, having been promoted on tribalist grounds and his salary increased from 740/= to 1100/=. They cited a certain Sarah Nderingo, a Chagga, for having been promoted on favoritism. They also quoted a certain Mrs. Bwogi whose training costs had been met by the factory despite the fact that she was on temporary terms. On claim No. 4(b) they cited a certain Mr. John Mkono. They also claimed Mr. Kashaija was administering the factory "federalistically and like a Sultan" and that his personal behavior and conduct as a leader was contrary of what was expected from a leader in this country and especially as per clause 15 of "Mwongozo."

This was followed by another meeting on the next day during which they discussed the above issues as well as the difficulties

encountered by messrs.: Mohamed, Sengo Ndali and Yusuf Salum on being recruited to work in the factory, as well as Kashaija's discriminating himself from the general canteen contrary to SCOPO directive No. 8 as per claim No. 3. Also discussed was his personal behavior and conduct. At the end of the meeting, it was resolved that another meeting be held to deliberate on, and resolve the issues:

At a general meeting of all the workers on May 10, 1973, a new issue as per claim No. 4, that Kashaija favored Mrs. Mutafulungwa in deciding her case on extending her leave for eight days more, was also introduced.

A public meeting was held on May 11, 1973, and was attended by all workers. The workers' grievances were read and the meeting resolved that Mr. Kashaija be transferred with effect from May 16, 1973. However, the Tribunal was not sure of whether the issues were discussed exhaustively and democratically. On May 12, 1973, the TANU branch Secretary wrote to the General Manager informing him of the decisions of the previous day's meeting.

On this same day, the District TANU Political Sub-committee wrote to NUTA on the issue.

From May 14 to 20th, NUTA local leaders (district and regional level) carried out investigations of the dispute upon recommendations from the TANU District Committee. They also carried out investigations on Mr. Kashaija's trip to Zanzibar with his wife as per claim No. 5.

On May 22, NUTA wrote to the General Manager saying they agreed with workers' claims and recommended the transfer of Mr. Kashaija. On the same day, the General Manager told the Committee of Enquiry

that he had no power to transfer Mr. Kashaija and that it was only the Board of Directors that could do so. Later the same day, the Board of Directors met at its Chairman, Mr. G. Kahama's house. They then directed the General Manager to write to NUTA telling them that the Kashaija issue would be discussed at the May 29, 1973 Board meeting. The General Manager complied with this and wrote the said letter on May 23.

Immediately after this letter was handed to NUTA, Mr. Kashaija entered the factory. This led the protesting workers to ring the alarm bell, and so began the strike. One NUTA official said that Mr. Kashaija had been warned not to enter the premises until the dispute had been resolved, but that Kashaija refused to heed the advice. He was of the opinion that had Kashaija heeded the warning, the strike may have been avoided.

Another view, however, is that this was due to the failure of the General Manager to prevent or warn the workers that that was not the right thing to do. Still other people argue that the General Manager had a stake in the whole issue due to the fact that he had learned of the President's directive calling for immediate localization of all posts in our various Ministries and Public Corporations; and that he used the incident to discredit all local staff, especially Mr. Kashaija, who it is said, was being groomed for the post of General Manager. This school of thought argues that it is for that reason that all the expatriate staff in the B.A.T. in fact left the country or were transferred to some other countries.

That then, is the background to, and history of, the B.A.T.--Kashaija dispute. At the end of the proceedings, the Tribunal found

him guilty of (ibid.):

- (1) Extravagant use of the Company's funds in making a very long "grand party."
- (2) Having his meals in the "top-class" canteen contrary to SCOPO directive No. 8.
- (3) Practicing tribalism and favoritism.
- (4) Making the Company pay "airport fees" for his wife who had accompanied him on a business trip to Zanzibar while she was not an employee of the Company.
- (5) Again practicing tribalism as regards recruitment.
- (6) Unfairness to one worker by stopping his wage increment.
- (7) Self-conceit, commandism, stubbornness as regards his relations with workers, and their various organizations at the factory. (On this, the Chairman of the Permanent Labour Tribunal in his report, also noted that Kashaija was self-conceited and arrogant as contrary to Clause 15 of "Mwongozo." Even in the Tribunal proceedings they had to now and again, warn him on that.)

The Tribunal also found Kashaija responsible for the May, 1973 events or work stoppage. The Tribunal also recommended that due to his unbecoming behavior, Mr. Kashaija be transferred from the B.A.T. and that as the transfer was enough punishment, he be forgiven and exempted from paying back the airport fees as regards his wife and the amount of money he spent on the "grand-party."

The Tribunal, however, noted that the B.A.T. workers should not discriminate and victimize their fellow workers simply because they were Kashaija's tribesmen, for they were not responsible for what had

happened. It also urged that a political education seminar be held at the B.A.T. for all the workers and their leaders as regards their duties and responsibilities, SCOPO directives and the functions of the workers' Council.

However, regarding the misuse of the Company's car and authorizing funds to be spent on the "grand-party," the Tribunal found the General Manager responsible and recommended that he pay back the costs involved.

On October 8, 1973, the Minister for Labour and Social Welfare wrote to Mr. Kahama, who was then Chairman of the B.A.T. Board of Directors, that he had agreed with the findings and recommendations of the Tribunal. He, therefore, recommended that Kashaija be transferred from the B.A.T. He also directed that all toher recommendations from the Tribunal be implemented forth-with. (Labor, October 8, 1973).

Mr. Kahama then complied forthwith and instructed the then B.A.T. General Manager, Mr. H.P. McDonald, to implement the Minister's recommendation. Part of the letter read:

I wish to notify you formally that we have been informed by the Government that Mr. Francis Kashaija, your Personnel Manager, will not be allowed to return to the B.A.T. Tanzania Ltd. . . . By copy of this letter, I am requesting our Group Personnel Manager, Mr. Makota, to meet with you to discuss the finalization of Mr. Kashaija's outstanding personal matters, if any, including his personal account with the Company (Kahama, 1973).

From the contents and wording of this letter, Mr. Kashaija's services with the B.A.T. had been terminated . . . and on government instructions.

B. The Mount Carmel Rubber Factory Ltd. Dispute

The way to build and maintain Socialism is to ensure that the major means of production are under the control and ownership of the peasants and the workers themselves through their Government and their Cooperatives. (The Arusha Declaration, TANU Dar es Salaam, 1967: 3).

Another dispute is that which took place between the workers of the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory in Dar es Salaam and their employer, and owner of the factory, Mr. Yazdani. It is interesting in that the workers did not only lose their case but their jobs too. But much more so is the fact that the police were used to put the workers under control.

In this dispute the workers did not only lock out their Managing Director, but also took over the firm as well. The first question that one has to ask here, is why did the same government and Party that had given a green light to the workers at the Tanganyika Rubber Industry and later on those at the Night Watch Security to take over the firms, refuse the same to the workers of the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory?

The workers' grievances at the factory go as far back as February 1972 when they, in a letter to NUTA dated 25/2/1972 asked the concerned authorities to investigate and solve their grievances. The workers' grievances were as follows:

- (1) That since the establishment of the Workers' Council at the factory, it had failed to function properly due to problems emanating from the proprietor;
- (2) That there was no workers/management agreement; that they had only 18 days annual leave with a 30/= flat rate fare;

that some workers were working as casual laborers for a year without being registered as permanent workers; that wage increments were being given on favoritism; that no leave was given when one was sick or had personal family calamities.

On March 10, 1972, Mr. Makalwe, a Labour Officer in the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare wrote to the Coast Regional Labour Officer asking him to make investigations on the matter.

On May 16, 1973, feeling they had waited long enough, the workers decided to lock-out their employer. In fact the workers had consulted the Coast Regional Commissioner, Mr. Peter Abdullah Kisumo, and NUTA on the issue and that they had been given green light.

When the then Coast Regional Commissioner went to the premises on that day, the workers in their speech brought up their grievances again and told the Regional Commissioner that in order to end their grievances they had decided to take over the firm and run it on a cooperative basis.

Various meetings and consultations between the NUTA, TANU and workers' leaders followed, in which they tried to convince the workers to drop their plan of taking over the firm. But the workers persisted.

Their bid to take over and run the firm by themselves was, however, rejected by the Coast Region TANU Executive Committee. On this, the then Coast Regional TANU Secretary, is quoted to have said that the workers did not follow the set procedure and that the whole question called for a disciplined procedure.

On being further advised to allow their employer into the factory and resume work while their claims were being investigated, the

workers on June 19, 1973, said they would rather go and form their own Ujamaa village(s) if provided with all facilities, rather than work with Mr. Yazdani.

The workers knew what to say to convince the country's political leaders. In their speeches, they not only quoted Clause 15 of the TANU Guidelines but also went as far as quoting the Arusha Declaration and other Party policy documents and statements. But all the same, their fate was predetermined. The Government wanted to show them who was powerful.

The decisive moment was yet to come. The next day, June 20, 1973, having refused to heed the Government's advice to resume work, the 67 workers were whisked away from the factory premises by members of the Field Force Unit, bundled into the waiting police vehicles and driven to the Dar es Salaam Central Police Station, where they were interrogated and had their pictures taken. They were then told that they had been summarily dismissed and that they would be repatriated to their respective homes.

The Government's harsh action was openly opposed by some people. In his next Friday letter in the Daily News, (the government paper) Generali Ulimwengu a columnist for the paper supported the workers and pointed out the inherent political implications in their action. NUTA's Director of Publicity, Ndugu David Zimbihile, argued (Daily News, June 23, 1973) that the Government's action in dismissing the workers was "too rash and too harsh." He also added that the Union had not been consulted. Zimbihile also went on to say that by dismissing the 67 workers, the Government had in fact deprived the means of livelihood not only to the 67 workers, but all their dependents.

He also charged that, "the dismissal of the workers was a direct result of lack of revolutionary wisdom on the part of those individuals who were charged with finding a solution to the issues the workers had raised" (ibid.).

Mr. Kisumo on the other hand threatened Ndugu Zimbihile by saying that if he (Zimbihile) was not careful, he would also lose his job. Coming from a person with the rank of Regional Commissioner and Chairman of the ruling party's Political Affairs Sub-Committee, such a statement could not be taken lightly. In fact, NUTA's higher officers seemed to be disassociating themselves from the statements made by Zimbihile.

But the whole affair between Zimbihile and Kisumo on the dispute took a dramatic turn when President Nyerere appointed Ndugu Joseph Rwegasira new Regional Commissioner for the Coast Region in place of Mr. Kismo, who was transferred to Kilimanjaro. Ndugu Rwegasira was sworn in by the Prime Minister on June 26, 1973.

According to some political observers, Mr. Kisumo's transfer was due to the fact that his ideological clarity and certainty was dubious. Earlier, he had dismissed two butchery workers at Temeke, Dar es Salaam. Later on, Mwalimu Nyerere is quoted to have said that dismissing workers was unsocialist. It is, therefore, no wonder that some observers think that his transfer was due to the fact that he had messed up with the workers.

The new Regional Commissioner on the other hand is a long time trade Unionist of high standing with much more experience in matters relating to workers. He had been General Manager of the Friendship Textile Mill whose workers are said to have protested his transfer

from the Mill.

Later on, however, the punishment imposed on the workers was "reduced" from dismissal to termination of services. Their employer was then advised to give them their terminal benefits and certificates of competence. This was followed by a letter from NUTA to the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare asking him to inform all employers in the country to give the workers consideration when they applied for work (NUTA, November 2, 1973).

It is also understood that their former employer had refused to give them their terminal benefits saying he had no money. It is understood the Government made arrangements for him to get the money.

Meanwhile, the Commissioner for Labour, Mr. Makutika wrote to the General Secretary of NUTA as per letter ref. No. LAB/4/29/682/86 dated 8/11/73 saying his office was not keen in publicizing the Mount Carmel Rubber factory dismissed-workers issue again. He advised him to help the workers by possibly writing to the Regional Labour Officer.

And working as the TANU headquarters on November 9, 1973 Tandau wrote to the Labour Commissioner, as per letter ref. Malalamiko/TANU headquarters/22, instructing him that the affected workers be given letters indicating they had been "forgiven" and that he should also write to the police on this and ask them that they should no longer be harassed.

The Labour Commissioner was then forced to comply as per letter ref.: LAB/4/29/682/88 dated November 16, 1973. The Regional Police Commander also complied and on November 26, 1973 he wrote to his District subordinates at Chang'mbe and Central Police Stations (Police, November 26, 1973). That then was the end of the Mount Carmel Rubber

Factory dispute.

What did we learn from this experience? First and foremost was the inconsistency in policy of the then Regional Commissioner, NUTA and the Commissioner of Labour. Whatever the reason behind this is something yet to be determined.

Also important is that this was the first direct clash between those in power and the workers. Also stemming from that is the fact that those in power and benefitting from the system would use whatever means to uphold their positions and ideas.

CHAPTER VII

SINGLE EVENT: VARIED INTERPRETATIONS

No event in Tanzania has had so many varied and sometimes distorted interpretations as have the wave of industrial disputes that took place between the years 1971 and 1975. Part of this state of affairs can be attributed to deliberate attempts by those who are not interested in, and in fact hostile to what is happening in Tanzania; to the stage the country has reached in its attempts at socialist construction; and partly to the lack of understanding and comprehension of the internal dynamics as to the real objective and subjective causes of the disputes--strikes, lock-outs--and the subsequent dismissal of some of the workers and, in the long-run, a clampdown on the independent and spontaneous working-class activities.

Like all major events elsewhere, what has been happening has indeed produced a lot of interpretations from many scholars and political observers as follows:

A. External Factors

Some scholars and observers have, for instance come up with the idea that the real cause which ushered in "Mwongozo" and hence the subsequent increase in the downing of tools, strikes, lock-outs and dismissals was the fear of the rumored threat of an "external"

invasion by "imperialist" forces who have never been happy with Tanzania's apparent successes in combating international monopoly capitalism, thus providing an example to the rest of Africa, especially the liberation movements in the South where the capitalist world has a stake. There is also her stern stand and commitment to the African Liberation Movement.

Such people argue that "Mwongozo," which through clauses 15 and 28 has given the workers the political legitimacy needed as a base from which to question the behavior of their "bosses," was President Nyerere and the Party's attempt to put one's own house in order in preparation for the said invasion. Protagonists of this school quote those parts of "Mwongozo" which point out that the whole of the African continent is a "battleground" (clause 1 of "Mwongozo," TANU, 1971) and other sections introducing and stressing the importance of arming all able-bodied Tanzanians through the Peoples' Militia so that they are able to defend their country.

Already in 1970, the Portuguese had invaded Guinea (Konakry). Moreover, the Portuguese, using Oscar Kambona, (one-time Tanzania's Foreign and Defense Minister and Secretary General of TANU and now living in self-exile in Europe) in collaboration with other imperialist powers were planning an invasion of the country from the South. There were also, (especially within the active journalist community to which I then belonged) stories of U.S. warships in the Indian Ocean. But more importantly, and what can be rightly said to have hastened the Party Guidelines was the Uganda coup d'etat by General Iddi Amin (in collaboration with the Zionists and their western allies), which toppled the mildly socialist regime of the Uganda

Peoples' Congress (U.P.C.) led by Dr. Milton Obote. Reference is made of the Uganda coup and Amin "the stooge" (Kibaraká Amin) and the Revolutionary Government of the U.P.C. led by President Obote in clauses 1, 9, and 20 of "Mwongozo." Immediately after the Amin coup, the Tanzania government sent troops to its borders with Uganda. This was followed by hostilities and border skirmishes between the two sister partner states of the now defunct East African Community which reached its climax in the second half of 1972 with Uganda bombing the two Tanzania lake towns of Bukoba and Mwanza. Attempts to normalize relations between the two countries were made by several African leaders at the initiation of Somali's President Mohammed Siad Barre. This resulted into the signing of the Mogadishu Peace Accord at the end of 1972 between Uganda and Tanzania. Even after that the relationship between the two countries has never been that normal. Uganda has made several threats of invasion to Tanzania simply because she granted political asylum to Uganda's deposed President Obote and several Ugandans hostile to the Amin regime or those fearing to "disappear" or to be killed. Following the massacre of Archbishop Luwum and two of his ministers, Lieut. Col. Erinayo Oryema and Charles Oboth-Ofumbi, whom Amin claims to have died in a motor accident (collision) when they were being taken to be interrogated about their complicity in an alleged plot to overthrow his regime in February 1977, Amin went on to accuse Tanzania of allowing Chinese arms destined for liberation movements be made available to the said "plotters" (Kaufman, 1977). Amin then went on to say that if Tanzania did not stop such activities aimed at his overthrow he would go to war with her.

B. Internal Factors

Most scholars and observers, however, have tried to trace the real causes of the industrial disputes since 1971 from the "internal" factors in Tanzania. But even here, there are several interpretations as follows:

(1) Political Interference:

One such interpretation is held by those, especially managers in affected industries, who see President Nyerere as the main architect of all that happened during the period under review. They accuse him of disturbing the "natural trend of events" through his encouragement of what was happening in order to quickly lead the country towards a socialist revolution. They say he had subsequently encouraged "anarchism" and "irresponsibility" on the part of the workers. They also accuse him for having led the country to economic chaos and stagnation. This view was/is also shared by some Party and Government bureaucrats. Mwäpachu (1974) argues, these managers and bureaucrats even go to the extent of arguing that the strikes and lock-outs by workers were a reflection of a clear and deep understanding of clause 15 of "Mwongozo."

But President Nyerere himself, has categorically denied this when he said:

Strikes for instance; they say Mwongozo makes the worker strike, but we are in an unequal society, how can you expect that workers will not go on strike. They will sit down and we will say do you understand what going on strike means, and the workers will reply and say do you understand what inequality means? We must have a society where this is accepted, where if you like we experience the birth of socialism. We accept this because we do not pretend that we have a socialist society (New Internationalist, May, 1973: 8).

This does not, however, mean that President Nyerere supports the strikes. What he has done is only to state what is and what we are in Tanzania, and from that premise demonstrate how such incidents are not only inevitable but a prerequisite condition of building socialism. They are the result of our inequalities.

At this stage, let me therefore point out that whatever is the case, "Mwongozo" is not the origin of the said industrial disputes. Their origin can, as President Nyerere implies, be traced as far back as the time when the country was incorporated into the world capitalist system, and specifically since 1967 (the Arusha Declaration) and the subsequent nationalization measures; the rapid industrialization process which was to give birth to a large army of the working class, and especially the industrial workers, who by 1971 numbered 300,000, i.e., 58 percent of the total number of wage and salary earners (Wienhold, 1972: 6-7). But much more so, Wienhold continues, is the Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 which called for the establishment of Workers' Councils, Executive Boards and Board of Directors and the subsequent workers' political education program.

Thus what "Mwongozo" did was to provide the workers with political legitimacy upon which to base their actions.

Also writing on the issue, Mapolu (1973: 31-43) points out that what took place during the period under review was/is a reflection of working-class consciousness and solidarity and that the workers in Tanzania are much more politically conscious and aware than the managers and bureaucrats. He further asserts that in most enterprises the workers' refusal to identify themselves with the local NUTA and TANU branches was due to a number of reasons including: failure of

TANU branches to act as leading political forces; loss of confidence in NUTA on the part of workers due to its anachronistic position; our industrial organization which though calling for harmonization amongst workers still differentiates and separates certain groups of workers from the rest and rewards them better; the long delay before workers' grievances and disputes could be solved through the right and normal procedures; and the failure to identify the working class as a leading force and agent for socialist development which itself stems from TANU's failure to make a dialectical class analysis of Tanzania society. Elsewhere, Mapolu (1972: 36) points out that:

there is no attempt to relate the factory level participation to the more general forms of democratic control in the socio-political life of the country which determines the relations that can prevail at the macro-level.

But, and unfortunately enough, Mapolu fails to give us a more elaborate and concrete idea or suggestion as to how to make the workers "a more consciously organized driving force for implementing TANU policies" (Wienhold, op.cit.: 15). Despite all this, Mapolu's contribution to the on-going debate on the issue should not be overlooked for it was indeed the first dialectical analysis of what was happening in Tanzania at the time he was writing. One could, however, rightly argue that Mapolu's works by depending on press reports alone, lack empirical data and insight that would have made his study more exhaustive and scientifically analytical.

(2) Workers' Implementation of TANU Policies:

Another interpretation of the post-"Mwongozo" industrial disputes is that they reflect the workers' attempt at implementing the Party policy on take-overs. The Arusha Declaration clearly points

out that the Government alone cannot take over all private economic instruments, but that the people themselves, in cooperative groups, can do so. It is, therefore, no wonder that the Party and Government supported the workers' initiative in taking over the Tanganyika Rubber Factory and the Night Watch Security Force companies. The disturbing question, however, is why did this same Party and Government refuse a similar workers' bid to take-over the Mount Carmel Rubber Industry? Why the harsh and seemingly unsocialist measures against the workers, especially considering the fact that a few months back, President Nyerere, commenting on the dismissal of two butchery workers by the then Coast Regional Commissioner Mr. Peter Abdallah Kisumo, said that dismissing workers as a punishment was unsocialist.

(3) Workers' Failure to Use Established Machinery for Grievance Handling and Dispute Settlement:

The third interpretation, one that has in most cases been advanced by the Government and the Government-owned newspaper, has it that the said disputes have been caused by failure on the part of workers to use the established set machinery for settling such industrial disputes, i.e., through the Workers' Committees, NUTA and party branches, etc. Protagonists for this position accuse the striking workers of having affected the national economy. They see strikes as acts of non-commitment, rebellion and irresponsible behavior on the part of workers. Interesting enough, however, is that none of these people has ever come into the open against the various senior government and public corporation leaders who have shown the same non-commitment, irresponsibility and sometimes even rebellion such as not abiding by the Leadership Code under the Arusha Declaration or even signing partnership and management contracts with certain Multinational

Corporations and which have led to the crippling of our economy. The case of the Tanzania Fertilizer Company, the Mwananchi Electric and Construction Company (MECCO) and the contract with an Israel firm (MLONOT) to run the Kilimanjaro Hotel mentioned in part two of this study are just a few examples of the said contracts.

(4) Attempts at De-Bureaucratization:

Another interpretation is that the industrial disputes during the period under review are a reflection of TANU and Nyerere's attempt at de-bureaucratization. Elsewhere, Sheldon Weeks (1973), drawing most of his material from a similar interpretation on the Chinese Proletariat Cultural Revolution has explored this issue. This school of thought starts by making a distinction between the two dimensions of bureaucracy, i.e., bureaucracy as a group of people and bureaucracy as a way of doing things. They then point out that what is at stake here is not the bureaucrats, i.e., their numbers, but their way of doing things--its red-tape, over-lordism, privileges, status, etc. (Musoke, 1974: 11-15).

(5) Quest for Decision-Making Power:

Nearer to the above school are those, especially liberal managers and bureaucrats, who argue that the workers' action reflect their quest to participate in the decision-making process which in itself is a reflection of working-class consciousness and solidarity. Most of them, however, come to see this growing consciousness and solidarity and the subsequent quest for decision-making power as an end in itself. It is, therefore, not surprising that Mwapachu, who was then Manpower Manager of the National Bank of Commerce was to say that: at the center of the whole problem of industrial strike today is the

unequal distribution, not of material resources like wages or other material benefits, but decision-making power.

Office power seems to be the key variable in determining class structure in the Tanzania industrial setting (Mwapachu, op. cit.: 390).

According to this trend of thought, the workers are fighting for their share of decision-making and nothing more. To them power is seen as an end in itself. However, Mwapachu detaches the factor of power from the material base while the two in fact are interrelated. Mwapachu tends to argue that in Tanzania what everyone gets in terms of remuneration has already been "equitably" determined by our seemingly socialist state. It is, of course, true, on the face of it that:

The traditional form of labor protest in form of strikes by workers claiming increase in payment; improvement of working conditions, provision of health and welfare and fringe benefits has gradually disappeared with the implementation of collective agreements which act as truces or armistices in the class war between the workers and their employers. . . . The new form of protest that has arisen . . . has not been the laying down of tools at all. It has been the rejection and attempted eviction of the employer and his vassals. Instead of laying down the tools, the workers have picked them up and made them sharper, continued working even at an even increased rate while at the entrance they install a red light for the employer, lock him out and refuse him entry forever (Mihyo, 1974).

Thus on the face of it one can be misled by the fact that having been more conscious through workers' education seminars, speeches from various leaders, "Mwongozo," etc., Tanzania workers began to question the behavior of their managers as well as the bureaucratic way of doing things. It is also true that through policy documents such as the Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 and "Mwongozo," they began to demand more equal power in making decisions pertaining to the well-working of "their" industries and factories. It is, therefore, not surprising that we have been made to believe that the industrial

disputes during the period under review, on the face of it have no element of economism* that was so apparent in such incidents before nationalization.

(6) Class Struggle:

Another and more convincing interpretation and to which I belong, is the one which sees these disputes as a reflection of the inherent class contradictions and hence struggle in our system. The above school stresses the fact that through our present satellite-metropolis economic dependence system and the inherent policy of partnership with Multinational Corporations, the various economic enterprises and factories do not belong to the workers that much. Clive Thomas (1972) has clearly pointed out the implications of such an economic set up. The economic, political, and social dependence that result from such a system has also led to the formation of a domestic bourgeoisie which it also nourishes. Unlike its mentors this group of people has no investment acumen but consumes the little surplus that is left over by the metropolis bourgeoisie. This state of affairs is only possible because these people control the state and its instruments of persuasion, coercion and suppression. They thus as a group make decisions and policies that will ensure their position. Of course there are a few of them, especially within the Party, notably President Nyerere who would like this trend reversed, but they are very few and cannot do it single-handedly.

Against this group are the mass of peasants and workers who

*"Economism" here refers to the process or situation whereby the activities of any working class organizations or movements are only centered around the economic demands such as wage increases and better working conditions for their members.

have been exploited, oppressed and repressed by the system. Accordingly, these masses have been "marginalized" (Amin, 1970). This marginalization, we would like to add, is not only in terms of economic but in political power as well and hence power to make decisions pertaining to their well-being and destiny.

It is thus not true that the workers are only challenging and questioning the behavior of the managers as well as their monopoly of power for the sake of it as Mwapachu (op. cit.) would like us believe.

It is because this control of power carries with it economic advantages. The workers have definitely invoked policy statements such as clause 15 of "Mwongozo" or the Arusha Declaration only to have a legitimate basis. Behind all these terms they have invoked there lies deeper economic reason.

So what the workers are actually fighting for is not power to make decisions for their sake, but to make decisions that will improve their material being. It is not power as an end in itself.

Look at the Dar es Salaam Motor Transport (D.M.T.) workers (drivers, conductors) case for example. When the D.M.T. workers first downed their tools, they said they were doing so in protest over their being abused, bullied and beaten by the passengers. They were then given police escort. Seeing this, they said the truth and that is that they wanted more pay.

The Tanganyika Planting Company (T.P.C.) workers also first said they were seeking clarification as to whether they were horticultural workers or factory workers. But this is because as horticultural workers they would have received higher wages. The dispute at the Dar es Salaam Harbours, again the workers wanted more pay and

better material conditions and terms of service. The same applies to the dispute at the Railways Regional head office. The issue was more pay.

And looking at the T.A.T. - T.T.P.C. and B.A.T. disputes again, an element of economism is quite visible. When the workers invoke such terms as tribalism, favoritism, etc., they always relate them to recruitment, promotions, wage increments, and such other material benefits. For instance, when the B.A.T. workers accused Mr. Kashaija of holding a marathon grand-party, what they were actually saying is that the money would have been used in improving their lot. Instead, Kashaija had used it to entertain members of his class. Again there are the accusations made by some workers at the T.T.P.C. that their Workers' Committee was no longer effective because it had been "pocketed" either through promotions or trips and attendance of seminars where those committee members are actually paid subsistence money on top of their salaries.

Again we see that having grasped the real cause of their problems, the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory workers decided to take over the firm. In fact they accused Wazdani of exploiting them and the country. Even in their complaints, they complained of poor working conditions and terms of service.

So any explanation lacking in class-analysis of the problem is indeed very misleading. It is basically for this reason that Mapolu's works on the disputes and the state of industrial relations in general (op. cit.) should be ranked among the very few pieces that have really grasped the nature and extent of the problem.

All in all, it should be quite clear by now that workers in

Tanzania are not challenging their managers or seeking decision-making power for its own sake. They are doing so because as a class they feel exploited by those who have the power. Therefore, their attempt at control is only a means to an end. This is indeed a class struggle.

In conclusion, suffice it to point out that what has been happening in Tanzania since 1971 lies in the objective laws of class struggle. This has been due to the fact that the type of (dependent) economy Tanzania inherited and seems to perpetuate has led to the polarization of the Tanzanian population into two main classes, each with its own interests which it is ready to fight for and protect. There are the masses of the workers and peasants who have been marginalized on one hand and a few managerial-bureaucratic elite who benefit from this satellite-metropolis relationship. While the workers fight for a fair share of the surplus, the managerial-bureaucratic class on the other hand wants to keep the workers in perpetual exploitation and under managerial control. This is mainly due to the fact that with dependent economies such as the Tanzanian one, a significant portion of the surplus is being exported to the Center leaving very little to share in the Periphery. The little surplus left is usually consumed by the national compradores at the expense of the rest of the population. And that is the center of contradictions between the two classes and hence the class struggle between them. This has indeed been the central feature behind the industrial disputes in Tanzania during the period under review.

PART IV

CONCLUSION

Introduction

Throughout parts two and three, attempts were made to show the impact of capitalist penetration on Tanzania. Of specific significance to our study are a few facts as follows:

- (a) That capitalist penetration of Tanzania led to the total integration of the country's economy into the world economic system which is predominantly capitalist.
- (b) That this integration led to uneven development of Tanzania with some parts of regions of the country that are endowed with favorable climatic conditions being "developed" more than others.
- (c) That this process also led to the differential development of the peoples of Tanzania and that specific class structures emerged from the process within and across regions.
- (d) That the process was also accompanied by a partial proletarianization of a segment of the indigenous population, a process that was to be the basis of the emergence of the working class and therefore the resulting relations of production, or if you like it, industrial relations system.
- (e) That there have always been attempts on the part of both

the colonial and independent African governments to control the labor process, especially the industrial relations system through government laws and otherwise.

(f) That like elsewhere in Africa, preoccupation with, and interest in the study and promotion of sound and healthy industrial relations, or what some of us preferably call relations of production, by the independent African government has been the result of three major factors (Onyemelukwe, 1973: 189):

- (i) The activities of the International Labour Organization (ILO) which have concentrated mainly on pushing for the establishment of minimum conditions of work through the promotion of the rights of workers to join unions and promote the principle of collective bargaining.
- (ii) Government's interest in good industrial relations in that the type of industrial relations pertaining in a country also have ideological implications which in turn have effects on the country's foreign policy and internal security.
- (iii) That when these relations are strained and come to the open through a strike or stoppage of work, such an action takes public import.

Like elsewhere in Africa, the government got involved due to the fears that unhealthy industrial relations may hamper the nation-building and development activities and strategies which it had set itself to, as well as the fear

that employers, who were in most cases foreigners, would not give just wages to the indigenous Tanzanian workers. Also is the fear that industrial unrest is sometimes marked by violence and real threats to the security of the government.

It is behind this background that in fact all East African states, irrespective of which development approach they favor, have continued to institute elaborate laws and procedures for the registration of unions and employers' associations, on negotiation, arbitration and the rights and procedures to strikes and lock-outs. Such moves have definitely dominated government strategy for dealing with worker-management relationships in the area.

And like all others, Tanzania uses the ILO-initiated tripartite partnership which is based on the fundamental premise that war against want calls for a concerted effort, national and international:

in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status with those of governments, join with them in the free discussion and democratic decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare (ILO, 1973, No. 42: 5).

The above ILO proposition is above all based on:

the effective recognition of rights of collective bargaining, the cooperation of management and labor in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures (ibid.).

It has been behind the above principles so cherished in the ILO constitution that the ILO and its affiliates are committed to the promotion and maintenance of:

free, independent, strong and responsible organizations of workers capable of playing an effective and dynamic role in partnership with governments, in ensuring greater prosperity and equitable distribution of the fruits of greater prosperity (ibid.).

As a logical conclusion from that, Tanzania, like her East African counterparts, has not hesitated to make provisions for a machinery where the two "equal partners" (capital and labor!) can voluntarily bargain, negotiate and agree collectively on certain issues related to the process of production.

All the above developments and processes, however, have led some of us to raise some issues related to the industrial relations system so far forged and the various explanatory theories so far advanced to explain what has been taking place in the country since independence. For our purposes, however, we shall start with a look at the lessons that can be learnt from the 1971 - 1975 industrial disputes. An understanding of these lessons is very necessary if one is to chart out a meaningful strategy for labor and building socialism in Tanzania.

CHAPTER VIII

SOME ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

A. Lessons from the Disputes

In what follows, attempts will be made to point out some of the lessons that can be learned from the disputes.

First and foremost is that the disputes cited indicate a clear cut conflict between the workers and the managerial-bureaucratic clique. In this, the workers have tended to unite, as reflected by the Dar es Salaam BAT workers' refusal to admit Mr. Mandara at their factory after the TAT-TTPC workers in Morogoro had locked him out. So have the national managerial-bureaucratic ruling class. I have in mind here the sympathy and support given to Mr. Mandara by the Board of Directors, the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Mungai, and many other sympathizers especially those in similar positions elsewhere. Even at the factory, and within the T.A.T. itself, we had three senior officials supporting him. It was, therefore, no wonder that after sensing this, the workers at the T.T.P.C. locked out two other people including the Factory Manager.

Secondly, and tied to the first one, is the fact that while there are obvious divisions amongst the managers and bureaucrats, on basis of personality, it is very difficult to remove any of them without resistance from the others. For instance, despite the fact that Mr. Mandara had been found guilty by the Permanent Labour Tribunal (some of the

offenses being political), the Board of Directors and the then Minister of Agriculture (who as elected Member of Parliament is supposed to be politically articulate, conscious and aware) still tried to sympathize with him. They attempted to keep him in his position by going to the extent of deciding to transfer his office from Morogoro to Dar es Salaam. Having failed to do that, they tried to transfer him to the B.A.T. in Dar es Salaam; but even here the workers rejected him. It is, therefore, not surprising that the managerial-bureaucratic class, having learned from the above solidarity of the workers did not attempt to find a job for Mr. Kashaija, former Personnel Manager at the B.A.T. after he was found guilty of almost similar offenses by the Permanent Labour Tribunal.

In the case of the Mandara issue, the President appointed another General Manager. Even here, it is not clear whether this was because of the workers' complaints (although this is the most probable reason) or the Tribunal findings or the President's own wish.

Third and linked to the preceding two lessons, is the fact that even when they have been found guilty, Manager-Bureaucrats do not get punished. They simply get transferred. This indicates considerable class consciousness and solidarity among members of the national ruling class.

On the other hand, any worker who breaches the Disciplinary Code is usually punished. Having, however, seen that the present system is against them, the workers have tended to show solidarity within the factories and across their industries.

Fourth and important to put into consideration is the fact that in all the disputes the workers had used the proper channels and

machinery to solve their problems. This had, however, taken them a very long time. In all the three disputes cited above, it is clear that the workers had lodged their grievances at least a year before they locked-out their managers.

The fifth and vital lesson to be drawn from the disputes is the fact that during any struggle whoever has the control of the state apparatus will always have an advantage over his adversaries. Throughout the disputes we were able to see how the ruling class was able to subjugate the workers by using government statements and instruments of coercion. The use of the Field Force Unit of the police-department against workers at the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory is clear example of this. Thus whatever happens, unless the workers are able to seize control of state power they are not likely to make any meaningful gains in whatever struggle they are involved in against the national ruling class.

Lastly and very relevant for future developments, however, is the fact that the extent to which the national bureaucratic/managerial class can keep the workers down is beginning to be limited. The workers' consciousness and resistance have already gone up. So is their ideological understanding and solidarity. All of these are well reflected by their triumph over both Kashiya and Mandara, as well as the debate that followed the government's premature decision to stop public corporations and institutions from buying buses to transport their workers to and from work.

According to the Sunday News issue of August 11, 1974, the "government" through Hon. Job Lusinde, then Minister for Communications and Works had directed those institutions with such buses to

start charging fares for their use as with effect from September 1, 1974.

According to the Minister the move had been taken in order:

- (a) To strengthen UDA (the Dar es Salaam City Transport Corporation) and public transport for all in the city;
- (b) To preserve our foreign reserves, for allowing public bodies to buy such buses was a burden on our foreign reserves;
- (c) That corporations and public institution buses were used only during specific hours and that at all other times they were left idle. As such the nation did not get any profit as it would if that money was spent in buying UDA buses, and
- (d) That the buses benefited only a section of the workers in Dar es Salaam.

The Hon. Minister then went on to add that:

In order to iron out such differences, it is necessary to abolish the whole system. After all most of the buses are being misused (Sunday News, August 11, 1974).

We must also remember that this decision came up under a background where UDA had also announced an increase in bus fares ranging from up to one hundred percent for some areas to slight increases in others which were to be operational effective from September 1, 1974. And don't forget this was the second time the UDA bus fares had been increased. Early in the year, there was an increase by the Dar es Salaam Motor Transport Company (DMT)--UDA's forerunners, of ten cents (Daily News, August 2, 1974).

And defending the "government's" decision was the Hon. Minister who invoked TANU--the sole ruling party--adding that the move was in

line with the country's socialist policies.

The workers, however, refused to give in easily. Through their TANU branches at their respective working places, they called special meetings to discuss the issue. And this was in line with the Arusha Declaration and "Mwongozo."

The pace was set by members of TANU at the Bank of Tanzania in Dar es Salaam. During a meeting they held on August 23, 1974, the members, while supporting the government's ban on buses for public institutions in order to save the meagre foreign reserves, questioned whether that ban should not also apply to senior government officers and managers who were using state and corporation-owned cars. They urged the government to charge such officers according to the use and maintenance of the vehicles they used, adding that:

It would be useless to ban the purchase of a bus worth about shs. 40,000/=* for 300 workers and continue to buy a 'Volvo' for shs. 71,000/= just for one person (Daily News, August 24, 1974: 1).

The TANU members also urged the government to review the UDA fares in the light of the ever-rising costs of living in the city.

The debate reached its climax on August 29, 1974 when workers at the National Bank of Commerce in Dar es Salaam resolved that the TANU Vice-President and Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa be called to explain the government's stand on the buses owned by public corporations as well as the decision to make workers pay bus fares. One worker is quoted to have said that when the Prime Minister visited

*The figure quoted by the workers as the price for the bus however seems to be unusually low. However, this does not obscure their argument.

/the National Bank of Commerce on May 1, 1973 he had called upon the management to offer transport to the workers so as to increase productivity at the corporation (Daily News, August 1, 1974: 1). The workers also warned that the ban would retard productivity. They also maintained that the decision was wrong and went on to say that it was the duty of TANU and its organs (an implied reference to NUTA which had so far been quiet) to intervene on behalf of the workers and come up with a right decision. They also resolved that the buses should not be sold until a solution was found.

Worker after worker stressed the point that the corporations had decided to buy buses for their employees in order to increase efficiency and promote the country's economy.

Buses are not bought for luxury, it is not our privilege, but our right and for the sake of the country's economy these buses should continue to operate (ibid.: 1).

The workers' rage, and indeed their tone, was well put by the NBC-TANU branch chairman, Ndugu Msomi who implicitly warned that:

One Bank employee produces an average of 23/70 an hour and is paid 4/93 an hour. If 1055 workers came to work half an hour late, they would still be paid an average of 2,605/85 while they would have produced an average of 12,501/85. The Bank would, therefore, get a loss of 15,107/70 per day, 362,584/80 per month and 4,351,017/60 per year (ibid.: 1).

This meeting was followed by several other meetings at various working places including the TANU headquarters, the University of Dar es Salaam, BAT, etc. And at all of these meetings the members persisted in their argument that it was a good thing to provide transport to the workers, saying:

It is hard to justify cars provided for officers in government and parastatals service free while denying other workers the facility or asking them to pay for it (Daily News, September 5, 1974).

They also questioned what brand of "equality" the Hon. Minister was talking about. Was it equality amongst "us" or equality between "us" and "them"? In short was it horizontal or vertical equality that the Hon. Minister was talking about? They also expressed their doubt if at all he was speaking for TANU, and much more so after "Mwongozo" which called for the involvement and participation of the people when making important decisions.

But despite all these workers' presentations and protests, the "government" persisted in its stand. On August 30, 1974, the Minister for Communication and Works is quoted to have said that the "government" would not change its decision and that officers entitled to use cars, of course including himself and his likes, due to the importance of their work would continue to do so long as it was according to the Standing Committee on Parastatal Organizations (SCOPO) regulations (Daily News, August 31, 1974). And the question here is what is the class nature and orientation of those who make such directives? Are their interests compatible with those of the mass of the workers and peasants of this country? That is yet another question meriting its own separate study.

But the Minister's persistence was short lived. On September 6, 1974 at a Press conference he called, he announced that the government had now suspended the bus ban as well as the fare order and that those who had already charged their employees should refund them.

He said the decision had been taken to give time to the public to discuss the issue through their various party branches and that the government would give its ruling after all the parties concerned had given their views on the issue to the government. But which

TANU government worth its name would have forgotten this basic principle after "Mwongozo."

In such a situation, it becomes very difficult to rule out the possibility put up by some people that it was President Nyerere who had directed that the decision be reserved when he came back from his Congo State visit where he had been during the ideologically controversial debate.

Thus, what has been happening in Tanzania is enough indication of the fact that the silent class-struggle continues unabated and is about to come to the open.

Indeed events in Tanzania today, the contradictions between the workers and the managerial-bureaucratic class, are clear indication that Tanzania politics are at the cross-roads.

B. Issues Related to Production (Industrial) Relations Systems

In the preceding parts of this work, it has been demonstrated how the government has attempted to introduce, foster and regulate relations of production in the country. A vigorous machinery through which all matters relating to these relations has been instigated and set up through law. It is also important to remember that apart from the Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970 and "Mwongozo" in 1971 (which are after all not pieces of legislation passed by the Tanzanian National Assembly), all the labor laws so far enacted have tended just to evolve around the colonial laws. No serious shift from that pattern has ever been attempted.

One other notable fact is that all legislation has tended to lean in one direction--to control and subordinate the labor movement

to government policy. This has been done through the control of finances by appointing accounting officers, by appointment of top union officials, by the creation of a central union under the Ministry responsible for Labor, and more important, by depriving the workers of their strike weapon. This leads us to pose a few questions as regards the strategy that is being followed, especially in a country that has declared to go socialist, as follows:

(i) Can industrial relations be administered through legislation alone? This question becomes even much more intricate when the laws so far enacted have evolved around or are mere amendments to the colonial laws inherited by the country. More still is the fact that the country has, at least on paper and platforms, declared it is building socialism. But these laws cannot bring about socialist relations of production. As far back as May 1973, President Nyerere also pointed out the limitations and capitalist-orientation of the existing laws for countries that were building socialism when he said:

Our system of law is irrelevant. It is aimed at defending private property--capitalist property. . . . Tanzania lawyers will therefore have to make new relevant laws if they are to provide room for a more effective implementation of Ujamaa (Daily News, May 25, 1973: 1).

At the end of a judges and magistrates' conference held in Dar es Salaam some three days earlier, Justice Biron, speaking almost on behalf of every lawyer present, called upon the government of Tanzania to erect laws that were in line with Ujamaa in place of the existing outdated and colonial ones (Daily News, May 23, 1973).

Indeed no legislation on industrial relations will succeed if it does not look at the socio-economic characteristics. This lesson

is evident all around:

No country has done so much to regulate industrial relations and in no other has the process of union-management relations been given so much attention as in the United Kingdom.

Yet today that country is embroiled in serious industrial strife and tension because the system has outlived the changing socio-economic situation (Onyemelukwe, 1973: 153).

It thus takes more than laws, directives, statutes and government statements to create industrial harmony, for industrial harmony is itself part and parcel of the socio-economic structure existing at a particular time and place.

(ii) Should the industrial relations regulating machinery be imposed on both employees and employers from the top? All legislation governing industrial relations in Tanzania has been enacted by the government and passed on to the employees and employers to implement. Even in instances where the same laws provide for the participation of employees and employers in making labor laws, this, as well as the manner and extent to which they can participate, has always been predetermined by the government. As a consequence, in some instances union leaders and workers have criticized such legislation. The effects of such a situation were clearly demonstrated during the 1971 to 1975 industrial disputes when the workers evaded the set up machinery and took extra-parliamentary actions. In fact they even dramatized the whole issue by grabbing from the employers their "lock-out" weapon.

It follows therefore that government intervention should be as minimum as possible. Unfortunately, this has not been the case in Tanzania. The government has gone farther than that. In some instances, workers have been threatened, dismissed, detained and even

persecuted. Depending on such methods, however, does not solve the problem. You can suppress and quiet them for a while but not always.

(iii) Is there any direct relations between harmonious industrial relations and the creation of more job opportunities in Tanzania? Protagonists of the above school, notably the ILO and MNC's, have always argued that with industrial harmony, enterprises are likely to do well and make more profits. They go on to say that this surplus is then re-invested in terms of expansion or opening up new ventures, thus creating more employment opportunities. But in countries like Tanzania, the firms apart from being private, have also always been foreign-owned. Thus part of the surplus is usually exported outside the country in terms of dividends and through such practices as over-invoicing of equipment bought by the branches in Tanzania from their parent companies. It follows therefore that little surplus is left in the country and even that has been conspicuously consumed by the managerial-bureaucratic stratum.

One other thing to note here is that only between 5-10 percent of the population in the country are employed in the wage and salary sectors. Most people are self-employed through such activities as crafts, petty businesses and mainly peasant agriculture. They may be underemployed, but they are not unemployed

(iv) Can we have effective workers' participation as provided by the various labor laws and Presidential Circulars and directives in Tanzania? Most of the enterprises in the country are partially foreign-owned or at least managed through business partnerships with MNC's and management contracts, respectively. These MNC's and management consultancies and agencies have their policies of operations decided

by the board of directors outside Tanzania. Their managerial values and practices tend to be foreign, and in most cases western (capitalist) oriented. This complicates the matters for a country like Tanzania which has also tried to institute its own managerial and industrial relations values and practices according to its own aspirations and environment. This becomes even more intricate when we put into consideration the fact that Tanzania has declared to build a socialist society.

The question here is whether the concept of workers' participation, short of workers' control, is compatible with socialism. The situation in the country has always been that workers' participation applies only to such seemingly minor issues as recruitment of middle and junior grade workers, enforcing the disciplinary code, consulting with and advising the management on how to promote efficiency and hence step up production. The question of distributing the surplus and deciding who is to get how much has never been touched. After all, most of the workers presumably do not have enough academic and technical qualifications to understand the intricacies and technicalities involved in such things as planning and making balance sheets. More still is the fact that even the management agreed on certain issues with the workers, should not be in line with the wishes of the foreign senior partners and owners, one doubts if such an agreement would be implemented.

(v) To what extent should the government be involved in the setting up and regulation of wages? Should not the government merely set up the statutory minimum wages and conditions of service and let employers and employees battle it amongst themselves for the rest?

The tendency, however, has been for the government to go as far as setting up the maximum increments. The reason given is that government did not want to have too much income differentials amongst workers in various firms. Another reason is to prevent a situation where workers would constitute themselves into a privileged class as against the peasants.

The question is, in a situation like that pertaining in Tanzania where most of the major firms are partially foreign-owned or managed, does not the government protect the owners as against the workers? If both employees and employers felt there was a need for adjustments, is it not unfair for the government to prevent such a deal? More than that, however, is the question as to whether the union (NUTA) is competent enough to bargain for wages for their members in a situation where the owners--the real employers--are outside the country. After all, very little surplus is left in the country. Even this is lavishly and conspicuously consumed by the local managerial compradores at home. How then can the union bargain to share something that is not there? And this is the problem with dependent economies.

(vi) What should be the method of handling grievances? Does not the idea of compulsory settlement and binding decision negate the whole basis upon which the tripartite system is based, namely:

- (a) freedom of association;
 - (b) the right to bargain collectively and in certain circumstances to withdraw labor; and
 - (c) minimum participation and interference by the government
- (Musoke, 1975: 11).

What has actually been happening is that the procedures and

machinery for handling grievances rules out the possibilities of withdrawing labor. On the other hand, government interference has been maximum.

In some instances striking workers have been dismissed or threatened with dismissals, detained, and even sent to courts even if they were not disrupting the "essential services" or were not working in public corporations. What happened to workers at the Mount Carmel Rubber Factory in Dar es Salaam, and later on the National Textiles (NATEX) and Kilimanjaro Textiles (KILTÉX) industries in the same city, as pointed out in Part Three, bears enough evidence as to what happens to "rebellious" workers.

The Permanent Labor Tribunal, on the other hand, deals with only disputes that have been reported to them. There are, however, so many others that end up at the factory level or are merely not referred to the Tribunal. Even in disputes that have been reported to the Tribunal, this institution usually bases its decision mainly on what each party says in the court room. Very little is usually said as to background and real circumstances leading to the disputes.

(vii) Should workers not go on strike? This question is too central in countries where the economic systems are capitalist-oriented, despite pledges to go socialist. So long as inequalities and deprivation still linger on the workers, it will become difficult to prevent strikes. In fact Tanzania's President Nyerere put it even more succinctly when he said:

Strikes for instance; they say Mwongozo makes the worker strike, but we are in an unequal society. How can you expect that the workers will not go on strike. They will sit down and we will say do you understand what going on strike means, and the workers will reply and say do you understand what inequality means?

We must have a society where this is accepted, where if you like we experience the birth of socialism. We accept this, because we do not pretend that we have a socialist society (New Internationalist, May, 1973: 8).

Thus what President Nyerere is actually saying is that in a non-equal society, the workers are justified to go on strike. More than that, Nyerere sees such strikes by the working class as a prerequisite step towards "the birth of socialism."

Therefore, a clampdown on strike rights and action is likely to fail or undermine the workers' morale which will definitely hamper, not only their output, but also the continued struggle to build socialism in the country.

(viii) What is the role of trade unions in the over-all economic development of the country? Immediately after coming to power, the TANU government began to urge the labor movements to stop their economic and "consumptionist" demands that were typical and had TANU's support during the nationalist struggle. The government exhorted the workers to channel all their efforts and creativity towards nation-building and that all other benefits would follow under their TANU government.

But the question is whether mere change of the people holding the reigns of political power without radically changing the economic pattern that has always exploited the same workers makes it possible for the workers to get any benefits. It is true trade union members just like anybody else in the country must join hands in developing the economic lot of their people, but with a non-changed economic pattern, are the workers in fact not being urged to develop foreign-owned capitalist economies?

(ix) Should there be international cooperation among trade unions? An important element in trade union principles and activity is the concept of the universality among trade union organizations. Even though national boundaries necessitate a structure of operational units on a national basis, it is maintained that the interest of solidarity of workers is international and not affected by such boundaries. In line with this concept, trade unions have organized themselves in international organizations such as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), believing that this will increase their strength and power, permit an exchange of experiences and enable stronger and better developed parts of the organizations to support and give aid to weaker and less developed ones.

But much more so is the fact that capitalism, which exploits and suppresses the workers, is itself an international hegemonic phenomenon. It follows, therefore, that if the workers are to have any meaningful bargaining power they also have to unite.

In some cases, this international cooperation has not been looked upon favorably. Some governments, notably Tanzania, have argued that international connections, rather than helping in the development of national trade unions in the new countries, have contributed to a state of dependency on outside financial support, have increased disunity because of the existence of international organizations with differing political views (the cold war), and in some cases have even tended to strengthen unions to the disadvantages of other sectors of society. This argument, while true to some extent, has sometimes been used by government to rationalize the measures they have taken

to control and subordinate the working class organization.

(x) Can we study industrial relations in isolation from the whole socio-economic, political and cultural environment which in fact give rise and indeed shape these relations? A serious weakness in the attempts by various governments to regulate and administer industrial relations in some countries like Tanzania stems from the inconsistencies of their poor and dependent or dual economies. Tanzania, like some other countries has adopted a policy to eradicate the income differentials among its people, yet the economic strategies it has adopted depend on income inequality in order to work. They depend on western managerial values which stress qualifications based on merit, higher wages or salaries for management, formal education, bonuses, bureaucratic hierarchy, prestige, status and the like. Attempts to level incomes are, therefore, likely to upset the very machine from which the income itself flows.

This being the case, is not all talk about promoting harmonious industrial relations in its present form likely to turn out a farce in the long run?

To some of us, unless this East African State finds solutions to its present economic situation, present efforts at industrial relations are merely attempts to bring calm before the storm. In Part III, we have suggested that for a long time now, Tanzania, like most of the other underdeveloped and dependent countries, has adopted economic strategies that are inconsistent with the social and economic problems facing it.

Capital and foreign investment do not constitute the sine qua non of economic development. This is in fact the root of the economic

and industrial ills that have besieged all dependent economies of Africa.

CHAPTER IX

THE ANALYSIS OF CLASS AND STATE IN TANZANIA:

A CRITICAL EVALUATION

A crucial but central issue to our present discussion, are the various theories advanced to explain what has been taking place in Tanzania since independence in 1961.

In Chapter I, we discarded "expectation theories" and said we were adopting instead the "class struggle theories" or Marxist analysis for the purposes of this study. However, we went on to say that, while we were adopting the latter theories as a methodology for the purpose of this study, we did not agree with the findings and conclusions derived from the method by Shivji (op. cit.) and his associates at the University of Dar es Salaam. This is due partly to the fact that the above Dar es Salaam school, which we shall come to later, has tended to force conclusions into preconceived and seemingly dogmatic and doctrinaire Marxist models developed elsewhere without giving consideration to the objective and subjective conditions and factors pertaining in Tanzania at any particular moment, thus obscuring reality. That such a situation of wholesale adoption of theories is a manifestation of intellectual dependence has been pointed out by Mahleka (Review of African Political Economy No. 6, 1976: 81) when he asserts:

Our dependence often manifests itself in the wholesale application to contemporary African conditions of certain conceptual frameworks, propositions and prognoses which were developed in certain concrete historical contexts, and in certain particular social structural contexts, to which our own subject of investigation may not be exactly identical.

He then goes on to advise Tanzanian "revolutionary intellectuals" and potential Marxist analysts elsewhere that:

if we are to use Marxism as a living science, we have to regard it as a method rather than a series of dogmatic statements. In other words, we should avoid all age-old slogans which do not derive from concrete analyses of concrete situations. Of course slogans are revolutionary when appropriately formulated to suit particular revolutionary situations. If not, we render them sterile and our science irrelevant.

A second reason for the flaws in the theories developed by the Shivji group stems from the lack of familiarity, on their part, with Marxist literature on various issues. This fact is clearly reflected in Haroub Othman's statement (1974) when he categorically states that since Lenin, apart from the works of Gramsci and Miliband, no other Marxist analysis on the state had been made. Such a statement reflects unfamiliarity with the literature on the state (cf. Monthly Review, October and November, 1975).

We now turn to the "class struggle theories" and the control of the Tanzanian state as advanced particularly by Shivji and Othman.

However, before we go into any discussion of the theories of the state and class analysis in Tanzania we should first visit the basic Marxist literature on the subject from which both Othman and Shivji seem to have based their works. At this stage, it is also imperative to point out that Marx's concept of the state is related and indeed tied to his concept of power to the extent that one cannot understand the former without first understanding the latter.

A. The Marxian Concept of Power

The Marxian conception of "Power" was first developed by both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The basic assumption and contention behind their work on power is that "power," i.e., the ability to act effectively, to make things go one's way, or keep them so, is most simply held by those who control what is valued in their society; what has been valued; what is coming to be valued. Thus,

control over the means of material survival places its possessors at the center of power in any society, although the forms and functions associated with such control have differed quite substantially in history. . . . Control over productive wealth in a capitalist society as a source of power comes closest to being the source of power (Dowd, 1974: 246).

Thus throughout history it is quite clear that those who control the means and therefore the process of production also have the power and control over those who do not, and that changes in the control over production leads to changes in the locus of power. What this means, in simple Marxian terms, is that a change in the mode of production will also lead to a change in the locus of power. The sources of power are of course diverse, with control over the means of production the most vital. The framework through which power is used is the framework of politics: the political system. The forms or institutions of politics, like the source of power are diverse: power is applied through pressure--in and through political parties, directly and indirectly on (or in) the agencies of the state through lobbies in order to influence government. Thus, related to the Marxian concept of "power" is also the Marxian conception of the state.

B. The Marxian Concept of the State

The Marxist conception of the state in bourgeoisie society was first developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (The Communist Manifesto, 1840) who saw the state as an instrument of exploitation and suppression of the proletariat by the capitalist class--the bourgeoisie. Accordingly,

The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie (The Communist Manifesto, edited by S.H. Beer, 1955: 11-12).

To both Marx and Engels, the state was merely the organized political power of one class for oppressing (an)other class(es). Marx, however, goes further to point out that in the process the state also acquires an independent form superior to all social classes and becomes the dominant force in society rather than being merely the instrument of the dominant class. This is what Alavi (1972: 60) calls their secondary view of the state.

In contemporary bourgeoisie society, the modern capitalist state system has many components: government, administration and bureaucracy; military, para-military and security forces; the judiciary; lesser (local and state) governments; legislative bodies (federal and other). The state system elaborated above is the system through which power flows; within it power grows, for use within and outside the state system:

The state system, like the larger social system which it represents, is oligarchic and pyramidal in structure: there is an elite at the top and people of some but not much power in the middle; the mass of participants in the state system (like those in the economy) are mere hirelings (249).

It is behind the above assumptions that Marxists, old and new, have developed their theories on the role of the state in capitalist

societies.

C. The State in Post-Colonial Societies

While a lot has been written on the role of the state in capitalist societies, literature on the role of the state in post-colonial societies such as Tanzania has tended to lag behind. It is only recently that scholars have bothered themselves with the subject. In our case, the initial spurt comes with the works of Hamza Alavi (1972). Here the author presents us with a provocative assertion in the form of a new theory of the state stressing its relative autonomy in post-colonial societies.

Central to Alavi's arguments are two basic contentions:

- (a) The state apparatus in post-colonial societies is overdeveloped: it was intended by the colonial regime to secure dominion over all other indigenous social classes in the colony;

The colonial state (was) therefore equipped with a powerful bureaucratic-military apparatus and mechanisms of government which enable them through its routine operations to subordinate the native social classes. The post-colonial society inherits that overdeveloped apparatus of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of the indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled (61).

- (b) The apparatus of the state further takes on a new and relatively autonomous economic role, which is not comparable in the classical bourgeoisie state:

The state in the post-colonial society directly appropriates a very large part of the economic surplus and deploys it in bureaucratically directed economic activity in the name of promoting economic development (62).

Alavi then goes on to point out his central reposition: that in the post-colonial society the state is not an instrument of one single

class:

It is relatively autonomous and it mediates between the competing interests of the three propertied classes, namely the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous bourgeoisie and the landed classes, while at the same time acting on behalf of them all to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded, namely the institution of private property and the capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production (62).

To the above two conditions which to Alavi are supposed to "differentiate the post-colonial state fundamentally from the state as analyzed in classical Marxist theory," John-Saul (1974: 351) adds yet a third one as follows:

In advanced capitalist countries the state is the "dominant classes' political power centre" and, in this respect, comes to have an important ideological function. For in fact it symbolizes the unity of the social formation, seeming to transcend any narrow class or sectional interest and thus helping legitimize the status quo. It is for this reason that Poulantzas has conceived the state as being "not a class construct but rather the state of society divided into classes." But the state's function of providing an ideological cement for the capitalist system which has evolved slowly and surely in the imperial centres, in step with the latter's economic transformation. In post-colonial societies, on the other hand, and particularly in Africa, this hegemonic position must be created, and created within the territorial boundaries which often appear as quite artificial entities once the powerful force of direct colonial fiat has been removed. Peripheral capitalism, like advanced capitalism, requires, territorial unity and legitimacy and the post-colonial states' centrality to the process of creating these conditions (like its centrality in "promoting economic development") further reinforced Alavi's point about the state's importance.

According to Alavi, all this myriad of functions is performed by those who staff the state apparatus--the military-bureaucratic oligarchy--which acts on behalf of the upper class composed of "the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie, and the landed classes" who compete for the control of the state's military-bureaucratic apparatus but whose competition is not antagonistic, but instead reflect an unequal and hierarchial collaboration:

The concept of collaboration implies and describes the fact that their separateness, and hierarchy implies a degree of conflict between their interests and a tension which underlies their relationship. Convergence of their interests does not dissolve into an identity of interests. It is this element of mutual competition which makes it possible and necessary, for the bureaucratic-military oligarchies to play a mediatory role (Alavi, op. cit.: 75).

Girling (1973: 49-51) however, suggests that Alavi's schema raises a few theoretical and empirical issues.

In his post-colonial society, Alavi explains the lack of antagonistic contradictions between the landowners and the national bourgeoisie, and between the national and metropolitan bourgeoisie as follows:

1. The feudal landowner class is integrated into the capitalist economy. Describing the growth of capitalist farming within the context of the Green Revolution, Alavi goes on to demonstrate how large scale farming resulted in an agricultural surplus needed to sustain industrialization and urbanization as well as expanding the domestic market for manufactured goods (74). He also points out how many large landowners are engaged in the process of diversifying their assets by investing in the industrial sector. Lastly, due to their control of political parties whose grass root support is basically rural, the landowners are needed by the military-bureaucratic state for local control and legitimation.
2. The relationship between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and the indigenous bourgeoisie expands its activities from industries of relatively low technology to those requiring high technology for which they must turn to the metropolitan

bourgeoisie in a process of collaboration (75).

The crucial issue here is whether there are really three separate propertied classes competing within the post-colonial state. By saying that there is no antagonistic relationship between the landowners and the bourgeoisie because the former was never feudal, Alavi confuses the concrete historical formation of a particular society and a higher theoretical level of abstraction:

Theoretically, the antagonisms which exist between social classes within a given mode of production are not reversible. They are derived from the structural opposition of groups within the relations of production. Until those relations of production are changed, the antagonistic contradictions between social classes will not be eliminated. In other words, a social class is defined theoretically and practically by its opposition to another social class--the negation of this opposition--or antagonistic contradiction--implies the negation of the classes opposed. The same concept applies to the relationship between classes of two historically and structurally different modes of production, capitalism and feudalism for example. The negation of the theoretical and historical opposition between the nascent European bourgeoisie and feudal landowners was actualized by the defeat of feudalism and the establishment of the bourgeoisie capitalist state (50).

On the second point, Girling goes on to say:

The lack of antagonism between the national bourgeoisie and the metropolitan bourgeoisie which is supposed to contradict classical Marxist theory also contradicts Alavi's "new" concept of the state's relative autonomy in pos. His analysis misses the fact that the indigenous bourgeoisie in most colonial and post-colonial societies began originally as an arm of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and developed a limited local class autonomy only during the brief inter-war period of import substitution. Following World War II, local capital was and continues to be increasingly absorbed or displaced by the multinational corporation. Those brief populist inter class alliances of the 40's and 50's which dominated colonial and post-colonial politics not only gave way to the emergent military-bureaucratic state as local and foreign capital were re-integrated in a new productive system, but they were instrumental in sponsoring, strengthening and legitimating a new military-bureaucratic state dependent on the international capitalist class in the post-colonial society.

The next question is: To what extent is the mediatory role of the state in post-colonial society among the supposedly three propertied classes different from its mediatory role between elements of a single propertied class in the metropolitan society so as to warrant changes in its relative autonomy?

Alavi also neglects the fact that (especially in Africa, where the military and bureaucracy have just come into power without prior seizing of wealth) the military-bureaucratic oligarchy may have its own interests opposed to those of the other propertied indigenous classes. Amin's Uganda should serve as an example of this.

Alavi's model of analysis may also fail to explain events in African countries and Tanzania in particular. In Tanzania, as elsewhere in Africa, there was no well-entrenched landed aristocracy or indigenous bourgeoisie. The commercial middleman role was occupied by the predominantly Asian (Indian) community which was/is alien. There was no indigenous bourgeoisie which had developed to the extent described by Alavi for Pakistan and Bangladesh, so much so that:

Under East African circumstances (with weak indigenous classes), the oligarchy falls much more directly under the thumb of the "Metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisie"--the transnational corporations--whose influence may now seem even more imbalanced and unalloyed there than in the case of Alavi (Saul: 353).

Despite its deficiencies and flaws, Alavi's model and piece of work has been the basis and source of the initial spurt for studies on the role of the state in Africa. Commenting on the various models developed for Africa, John Saul (354-359) (whom we intend to quote at great length) starts his work by first distinguishing the two aspects of the "benign" interpretations on the role of the state in contemporary Africa.

The first one stresses the process of modernization. The central proposition is that those who inherited the state apparatus at the time of independence are "benign elites"--the "new middle class" or "the modernizers":

Their role within the trickle-down process of enlightenment from advanced countries to backward countries, is naturally to facilitate the "development," the modernization of their "new nation" (Saul, op. cit.: 354).

This approach stresses the autonomy of the state and those who control it as being in a position to effect "development." According to Saul, there is also a second and left variant of the essentially benign interpretation--"an interpretation which quite uncritically, sees this new stratum as a force for socialism."

The above version is exemplified by the works of Reginald H. Green (1973: 85) who, while admitting the existence of ruling elites in Africa who abuse power and the trust of the masses, goes on to overestimate the progressive attributes of the Tanzanian ruling elite:

in the case of Tanzania, it would be fair to say that virtually every general and specific issue raised by university critics had been posed (sometimes in even harsher terms) at least six months (and in certain cases up to two years) earlier by members of the 'neo-bourgeois bureaucratic elite' and that almost all were under active study aimed at evaluating alternative operational solutions both at official and political level. There is no reason to suppose this is a totally unique record even if it may well be atypical in degree. Further, the public sector elite has accepted material rewards substantially lower than those in neighboring states, and then those prevailing in Tanzania five years ago, with no evident general loss of morale or loyalty. To say that shortcomings can be cited and that the elite is still far above average material standards is fair comment; to argue that it has on any broad scale deliberately obstructed or been unable because unwilling to move ahead on the implementation of the Arusha Declaration is much more dubious. There is no logical reason to assume that because technical competence need not be positively related to political commitment it must always be negatively related (ibid.).

Green assumes that the ruling class in Tanzania is a homogeneous entity. He fails to make a distinction between the bureaucratic-managerial elite on one hand, and the party elite on the other. What has actually been happening in Tanzania is that it has been from within the party that progressive (though seemingly mild) measures have usually come, such as the Leadership Code, which was hostilely received by some senior government and public enterprise officials as well, as by some members of the National Assembly, when they realized it barred them from accumulating wealth. In fact some members of TANU, such as Saidi Mtaki, who was a Junior Minister, resigned from public office when the Leadership Code was introduced. Later the evasion of the provisions of the Leadership Code prompted political leadership within TANU to set up a Leadership Code enforcement committee.

The bureaucratic-managerial elite could not show active resistance and hostility towards such measures undertaken by TANU, especially given the grass root support and popularity they generated for President Nyerere. There was, however, passive resistance.

It is against such a background that a radically opposite model has been developed. It starts with the works of Claude Meillassoux (1970). Meillassoux attempts to show the emergence of a fully developed class--the bureaucrats--with interests quite different from and antagonistic to those of the rest of the population.

In the style of Frantz Fanon (1963) Meillassoux defines the bureaucrats as "a body generated by the colonizers to carry out the tasks which could not (or would not) be undertaken by the European themselves" (195). To the above author, the basis of their position is the education they received from their colonial mentors and the

control of political power. At the time of independence these bureaucrats replaced the colonial personnel and used the acquired power to exploit, control and repress the vast mass of the population:

. . . having been the instrument of the colonial power, and having turned against it to become the mouth piece of the exploited Malian peasantry, the bureaucracy was gaining (with its access to power) some of the characteristics of a social class: control of the economic infrastructure and use of it as a means of exploitation, control of the means of repression, involving a resort to various devices to maintain dominance. Some of its features are original: its opposite class is not yet socially well defined; it does not own the means of production on a private judicial basis, but controls them on a constitutional basis. There is no room here for a parliamentary system, regulating conflicts between a great number of private owners or corporations. The situation is better controlled through the single-party machine, within which open conflicts can be reduced to inner struggles between hidden factions. Appropriation of the economic bases of power cannot come from individual endeavor or entrepreneurship, nor from inheritance. It can come through cooperation by the people in position, or as the bargain lot of a coup d'etat (107-108).

Meillassoux then goes on to point out how these bureaucrats infiltrated the economy, and hence assured themselves an economic base through the nationalization of the economic sector:

This was done under the label of 'socialism' which provided them with a convenient ideology to bring the economy under their control, supposedly of course on behalf of the entire population. 'Socialism' permitted them to put the bureaucracy into the position of a managerial board of a kind of state corporation (ibid.: 106).

Like Alavi, Meillassoux also points out the subordinate position occupied by this "class" in its relationship with the metropolitan bourgeoisie.

However, Meillassoux seems to contradict himself when he says that the opposite of the bureaucratic "class" is "not yet socially defined." Yet, theoretically, classes exist in opposition to and

relationship with other classes. The author confuses us even more when he attempts to define the working of the Malian socio-economic and political system by using defining characteristics typical of any advanced capitalist country, such as a western parliamentary system, to regulate conflicts between a great number of private owners or corporations. He obscures the fact that the African systems were basically communal and that Mali under Modibo Keita had in fact chosen to go socialist. As such one should not expect to find the predominance of private property and entrepreneurship. As to changes of governments through coup d'etats, Meillassoux does not attempt to show us the extent to which most of these coup d'etats in Africa have been foreign instigated, supposed to serve the imperialist interests which are, according to him, also supposed to have been served by the overthrown ruling bureaucratic class in countries such as Mali. Why should imperialism hatch up coup d'etats against classes that are supposed to serve it. Nor does Meillassoux tell us if things are usually better under military regimes.

Like Green, Meillassoux also assumes the homogenic character of members of the ruling classes. He does not make a distinction between party and government or administrative bureaucratic classes. And to him everything that the ruling class did in Mali was aimed at manipulating the masses and did not stem from any commitment to socialism.

It is the above model that Issa Shivji and his proteges at the University of Dar es Salaam tend to duplicate when making their analysis of what has been taking place in Tanzania.

D. The Analysis of Class and State in Tanzania

In his first work, Shivji (1971) clearly demonstrates how the country has continued to be embedded into the world capitalist system as a neocolony. He clearly demonstrates how the various economic measures taken after independence, and much more the nationalization measures embarked upon when the Arusha Declaration was promulgated in 1967, have continued the entanglement of Tanzania's economy in the web of neocolonialism:*

What changes then did the Arusha Declaration bring about? The country, of course as the President said, did not become socialist. The important step was the nationalization of the "commanding heights" of the economy. The National Development Corporation acquired majority ownership of some seven large foreign-owned companies. The Government also took over outright a majority of the firms processing foods. Thus the large sector of the economy came under state ownership. Nationalization was a step forward in so far as it is a prerequisite for building socialism. But by nationalization, as we shall try to show, the country did not cease to be a neo-colony. Neither did it become a workers' state (ibid.: 25).

The Arusha Declaration, however, and as Shivji rightly points out, made certain issues clear:

- (1) Through the creation of public corporations such as the State Trading Corporation (STC) and the National Development Corporation (NDC), the measures "paved the way for the eventual elimination of the Asian sub-capitalist class as a social stratum" (ibid.).

*Defining neocolonialism, Shivji adopts Nkrumah's (1965: IX) definition:

The essence of neocolonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.

(2) Through the managerial jobs created in the above public institutions, the nationalizations also paved the way for the rise of what Shivji calls an "economic bureaucracy":

The "new stratum" of managers, directors and administrators of parastatals already constitute a formidable bureaucratic stratum (ibid.: 26).

Shivji then goes on to point out how the ruling class (his petty-bourgeoisie) in Tanzania is nothing but a transmitting belt or bridgeheads between the exploited masses (peasants and workers) and the international or metropolitan bourgeoisie.

In his second work in which he attempts at an analysis of the class formation in Tanzania, Shivji (1976) continues to stress the point of the petty-bourgeoisie in Tanzania as being mere agents of the international bourgeoisie. This time, however, he goes further to develop a much more sophisticated analysis of their own stake in the system (Saul, 359).

Shivji distinguished six class formations: the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the commercial bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie, Kulaks, workers and the peasantry. He then continues to stress the assertion that what took place after independence and particularly in 1967 was a reflection of an attempt on the part of the petty-bourgeoisie, which after consolidating itself politically was trying to build an economic basis for itself. Accordingly, the Arusha Declaration is said to have ushered in a new stage in the class struggle:

Up until the Arusha Declaration, the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' cannot be said to have really become a bourgeoisie. Rather it was a politico-administrative bureaucracy. Although the state played an important role in the economy, it was mostly a regulatory one. With the Arusha Declaration the state and state institutions (including the parastatals) became the dominant factor in the economy. Thus a new and the most important wing

of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' was created. Political power and control over property had now come to rest in the same class (Shivji, 1976: 85).

This group, Shivji goes on to remind us, used state power to further the interests of their metropolitan mentors, and in the process, their own as against the interests of the masses of Tanzanian workers and peasants.

Similar claims have been made by Haroub Othman (1974) and Said Salum (1977). In his article in which he was attempting to answer the question "who controls the state of Tanzania, and whose interests does it serve?" (op. cit.) Othman asserts that the nature and structure of the state in independent Tanzania was just the same as it was during the colonial area:

Ten years after Uhuru, the Tanzania state, its institutions and structure, remains the same as it was when the colonial regime left the country. While attempts are being made to disengage the country from international finance capital, the state which is to be an instrument of this disengagement still remains interlocked with that system (ibid.: 50-51).

Othman then goes on to express his wish that the government at independence ought to have dismantled the colonial state and its apparatus and replace them with new ones. He sees the state in terms of the 18 ministries, the President's office, and six extra-ministerial departments. This to him is the core and basis of the bureaucratic class which uses the state apparatus to further its own interests and those of the metropolitan bourgeoisie.

To defeat these budding bureaucratic class tendencies, Othman calls for a national democratic phase as a prerequisite stage for building socialism, which can only be achieved through the existence of a well-organized disciplined party with a clear ideology at the

head of the national front. Having pointed out that the then ruling party (TANU) was not capable of that task, Othman calls for the same party to purge itself and become a vanguard party and cleanse itself of anti-socialist elements (55). But he contradicts himself when he says that this same vanguard party, "must retain its mass character."

The flaws in Othman's article, which was much more on strategy of building socialism rather than on class analysis and the role of the state, are the subject of Said Salum's article (January, 1977).

To Said Salum, Othman's analysis of the state in Tanzania is both superficial and misleading:

In fact, it is a classic case of an "analysis" which begins from Marxist principles but, as a result of political somersault ends up in reformist and revisionist conclusions (51-52).

Salum then goes on to point out that Othman's fundamental error lies in his consideration and analysis of the economic structures as separate from the social relations which they bring about. In this way, he lacks a sense of totality in his analysis which should in fact be the essence of any Marxian analysis. As George Lukacs once pointed out (1968: 27):

it is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitute the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeoisie thought, but the point of view of totality.

Accordingly, Othman overlooks three points which are in fact Salum's contribution to this ideological debate going on amongst the left in Tanzania:-

- (a) That the 1967 declaration and nationalization were the culmination of class struggle--through which the upper stratum of the petty-bourgeoisie which had taken over state

power dealt a heavy blow to the Asian commercial bourgeoisie, replacing them as intermediaries vis-a-vis-imperialism. In this way Salum is no different from Shivji;

- (b) That with nationalization the monopolistic economic dominance of the British bourgeoisie, a colonial legacy was weakened. This enabled the bureaucratic bourgeoisie to consolidate its territorial hegemony as well as securing a greater freedom of maneuver within the international capitalist system;
- (c) That the state in Tanzania is controlled by an indigenous bureaucratic bourgeoisie with relative autonomy from the international bourgeoisie (Salum: 52-54).

In the style of Shivji, Salum sees the Arusha Declaration and the process of statization that followed as leading to new forms of neocolonial exploitation and dependence, as well as the accelerated growth of the ruling bureaucratic bourgeoisie (53). But unlike Othman, Salum asserts that the present-day state in Tanzania cannot be said to be the same as the colonial state as Othman would like us to believe:

The fundamental feature which the colonial state and the present-day state have in common is that both are dictatorships against the working class and the peasantry which is different from saying that both states are one and the same thing (54).

It is the above assertion, based on the fundamental acceptance by Salum that the class structures and resulting institutions in colonial and post-colonial societies are a result of dynamic processes different from those that took place in advanced metropolitan countries, that is our basis of viewing Salum as separate from the

seemingly doctrinaire and dogmatic Marxist analysts as the University of Dar es Salaam. His work, however, shares the other deficiencies inherent in the works of Shivji and his cohorts to which we shall now turn.

The model presented by the University of Dar es Salaam group of Shivji, Othman and others is to some of us incomplete. The Arusha Declaration and the subsequent statization of the "commanding heights" of the economy had other and seemingly positive implications for the socialist revolution supposed to be taking place in Tanzania:

- (1) First is that the above measures did not only create and nourish a managerial bureaucracy, they also laid the basis for more jobs for an impoverished industrial working class, which though still small and in its infancy, was to play an important role in the proletarian struggle that started with the promulgation of "Mwongozo" in 1971. Their impoverishment as well as the political education seminars given to them were to be the basis of their radicalism, which even President Nyerere in an interview with David Martin (May, 1973) cited earlier, agreed to as being the basis of the birth of socialism in Tanzania. A more succinct and positive evaluation of this process was made by Henry Mapolu (1972), another member of the Shivji group. He asserts:

By any standards the progress made by the working population in Tanzania in the last few years as far as political consciousness is concerned is astounding. To begin with, at no other time in the whole history of this country have strikes and industrial disputes generally been so much a day-to-day affair as has become since 1970. But more important, at no other time have such strikes and disputes

been of such a political nature! . . . It has indeed been a veritable revolution for the Tanzania workers; within a period of three years they have moved from a state of docility, timidity, and above all disunity to one of tremendous bravery, initiative and class solidarity.

- (2) Secondly, the establishment of various public corporations or parastatals such as NDC and the now defunct STC also provided a basis upon which the government on behalf of the people can take over full control and administration of all economic activities in the country. That these may have been misused is a different issue to be discussed later on in this chapter.

Shivji's class analysis also has serious shortcomings. First is his use of the term "petty bourgeoisie." The word "petty" comes from the French word "petit" which means small. "Petty-bourgeoisie" then would refer to those elements in society who owned some income producing property, though very little or small, i.e., small capitalists. In the case of Tanzania, however, one wonders whether, some of the people included in Shivji's petty-bourgeoisie own any income accruing property apart from their meagre salaries, which are in fact mere minimum wages. To what extent can we really say that members of the middle layer (middle government salariat, junior clerks, soldiers, etc.) and lower layer (shopkeepers, lower salariat in the service sector and generally lowest grades of the salariat) can be said to be in the same objective socio-economic position and hence similar or identical class interests to those of the top echelons in this class, i.e., the "petty-bourgeoisie" proper? How can we include taxi drivers, shoemakers, tailors and primary school teachers, who subsist on meagre incomes, in the same boat with the administrative

and managerial-bureaucrats who derive large salaries and other fringe benefits from their positions and who make and enforce decisions to be implemented and followed by lower ranks?

Shivji himself admits to the above statement of fact when he says:

The position of the ex-secondary school student is rather different. An ex-Form IV student finds himself in the lower sector of the petty-bourgeoisie with a salary not very different from that of a minimum wage-earner. On top of such 'bleak' future prospect he is also a victim of a very authoritarian and inefficient school system (92).

It would seem more convincing to place such people in the same position with the ordinary wage earners, the working class proper, with whom they share the same objective and subjective socio-economic position. In fact it has been this group of semi-educated salarials who have tended to give leadership to the working class proper during the proletarian struggles which started in 1971.

It also seems inadequate to talk about the existence of a "Kulaks" class in Tanzania. Hereditary chieftainship and its inherent feudal arrangements, which were the basis of large land ownership in some areas such as Bukoba, was abolished long ago. Such measures, together with the establishment of ujamaa villages, giving loans and agricultural extension expertise advice to ujamaa cooperatives instead of individual large scale private "Kulaks," mitigate against the formation of a Kulak class in Tanzania.

Sisal growing, which was once the basis of a Kulak type of agriculture, is now under state farms run and managed by the Tanzania Sisal Corporation. The former European coffee farms in the Kilimanjaro and Usambara areas have more or less been transformed into

Ujamaa villages or have died out following their abandonment by their former foreign absentee-owners. In Bukoba and Mbeya, the cash crops which include coffee, eta, etc., have always been cultivated on small peasant-holding basis. So has been cotton in the Lake Victoria and Morogoro regions.

What has actually happened is that the indigenous "prosperous" farmers have now entered into petty-commercial activities, thus squeezing out the Asian middlemen even more. This is what has taken place in the rich agricultural areas such as Bukoba, Kilimanjaro and Mbeya. It is people from these areas, especially Kilimanjaro and Bukoba, who carry out commercial activities in all major towns in the country, notably Dar es Salaam, Mwanza, Tanga, Arusha and Morogoro.

At this juncture, there is also the need to make a distinction between the administrative managerial-bureaucratic stratum and party leaders or functionaries, instead of putting the two distinct groups into one class. While the former got higher formal education and went through an orientation system stressing western values, most members of the latter group have had little formal education at all. The former were, for instance, prevented from taking part in the nationalist politics by the colonial administration, while the latter, including those with high formal education, such as Nyerere and a few others, grew up in the nationalist movement with the peasants and workers. Their outlooks are, therefore, more mass oriented than those of the purely administrative managerial-bureaucratic group.

It is, therefore, not surprising that all progressive measures*

*By progressive measures here is meant any action taken by the ruling class in Tanzania to improve the common lot of the people as a whole.

in Tanzania have always come from the party leadership, notably President Nyerere. On the other hand, the former group has always been reluctant to implement such party decisions and resolutions, always terming them technically impossible or merely political and non-economic and as holding back the country's economic development. Such an outlook was clearly demonstrated by their reactions towards "Mwongozo" and the industrial disputes that followed (see Part III).

That the two groups have tended to co-exist is explained partly by the fact that the country is still lacking in indigenous manpower, let alone committed socialist administrative cadres, and partly by the hope on the part of the top party leadership that their government and parastatal counterparts would in the process be committed to Tanzania's socialist aspirations. The latter explanation can in fact be enlisted as one of President Nyerere's weaknesses, who assumes that everybody ought to see things the way he (Nyerere) does and, therefore, be committed to the Tanzanian socialist course. It is also true that within the party leadership there have been those with interests and aspirations identical to those of the administrative managerial-bureaucratic stratum. These have definitely provided a basis and political leverage upon which the latter have been able to operate and have their ideas infiltrate the political process.

Even within the party, one needs to make a distinction between those who understand and are committed to socialism and those (left-wing opportunists) who act only to further or protect their own individual and/or group interests, or even those who, while chanting political revolutionary slogans, have not hesitated to sabotage the socialist revolution in a way or another. There are struggles waged

within the party between those who have been called (by their adversaries within the Party) "Communist" or "Marxist" and the non-Marxist or Communist socialists.

Another comment we would like to make on Shivji's class analysis is his failure to tell us the basis of the distinction he makes between his "petty-bourgeoisie" and the working class proper. In the case of Tanzania, both are said to serve the same international capitalist system and both derive their income and hence means of livelihood from the sale of their labor (regardless of whether one gets a comfortable salary and fringe benefits for his/her non-productive labor or whether one gets mere subsistence wages for the sale of their tangibly productive labor). Their different positions and outlooks therefore, arise out of the process of differentiation and structuration taking place within one alienated and proletarianized section of the Tanzanian population which has resulted from the development of the peripheral mode of capitalist production and expansion. This also led to false class consciousness on the part of the managerial-bureaucratic class.

Specific studies to this effect have been undertaken elsewhere. Notable among these are the works of Marglin (1974), Stone (1974), Aronowitz (1973) and Braverman (1974). These authors, among many others, have taken pains to show how capitalist development and expansion did not only lead to the alienation and proletarianization of hitherto independent producers, but how it also led to their differential development and structuration.

All in all, the Shivji model has not gone unchallenged. Reacting to Shivji's conclusions and assertions, Saul (1974) suggests another way of interpreting events in Tanzania. To him, there has existed a

group amongst the leadership, notably President Nyerere, who have consciously pushed progressive measure, notably the Arusha Declaration and its Leadership Code. Central to his argument is the proposition that;

It is difficult, in fact, to avoid the conclusion that the Arusha Declaration package of policies--the opting for collective solution to the Tanzanian development problem--represented, first and foremost, an initial victory for a progressive wing of the petty bourgeoisie (and the announcement of its continuing commitment to the interests of the workers and peasants), rather than some cold-blooded fulfillment of the class interests of that stratum's bureaucratic core (362).

The Arusha Declaration was in fact not the "first and foremost" victory for the "progressive wing" of the party. Even before 1967, the progressive leadership had managed to pass other measures that were in the interests of the workers and peasants. Still more have also been announced in recent years. For the purposes of clarity we shall enlist a few such measures as follows:

- (1) Establishment of minimum wages and conditions of service for all workers in Tanzania. In some instances there was an almost one hundred percent gain on the part of workers. Under the Act which came into operation in 1963, some hitherto casual laborers acquired the status of permanent wage earners.
- (2) Abolition of the racially segregated school system and the abolition of school fees. This provided equal opportunities of education for the sons and daughters of all Tanzanians regardless of income, race or status.
- (3) Abolition of the universal head tax which hitherto had been the source of bureaucratic embarrassment and

humiliation of some peasants and workers who could not afford it.

- (4) Abolition of chieftainship and later on the feudal system whereby peasants had been exploited by the traditional ruling class, especially in areas like Bukoba where the "Nyarubanja" feudal system was predominant.
- (5) Provision of free and desegregated medical and other welfare services.
- (6) Reduction on the importation of luxury consumer goods such as personal private cars which hitherto had drained the country's foreign exchange. The money is now being used for the importation of goods that are needed for the development projects and other goods that benefit or are being used by all the people.
- (7) Provision of channels of mass participation in the various spheres of life.

These and many others have not been "mere manipulations" by the petty bourgeoisie as Shivji and his friends would like us to believe. And stressing the progressive nature of the Arusha Declaration, Saul points out:

there is some difficulty in reconciling this with the Arusha Declaration Leadership Code--a code designed to prevent leaders from involving themselves, profitably, in the private sector (261).

What all this suggests, therefore, is the existence of committed and revolutionary leadership, especially within the party, which has deliberately and consciously effected these progressive measures.

These are not, therefore, mere manipulations on the part of the "petty

bourgeoisie." In the case of Tanzania one needs only to cast a glance at the TANU cards which categorically state the aims and principles of the party as building a just, equal and humane society and the cooperation with fellow human beings in the eradication of disease, poverty and ignorance. Also from the beginning TANU vowed to fight hard in the elimination of all colonial vestiges, racism and apartheid from the African continent. During the constitutional talks before Tanganyika got her political independence, Julius Nyerere as TANU chairman and spokesman said he was prepared to delay Tanganyika's independence for a year or so if that would accelerate Kenya and Uganda's so that the three East African countries could get their independence together.

The Arusha Declaration and other measures have therefore been taken to make the above commitments and pledges a reality and are not mere manipulations on the part of the leadership.

As to the claims that Tanzania is a neocolony and as such does not make her own decisions, one needs to consider the following few decisions and actions she has taken despite disapproval from her claimed and so-called "neocolonial masters":

- (1) In 1964 she went to the extent of forfeiting aid from West Germany which tied her aid with a condition of diplomatic non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic (East Germany).
- (2) In 1965 she was the first African country to sever diplomatic relationship with Great Britain over the principle of "No Independence Before Majority Rule" (NIBMAR) for Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).
- (3) She has also continued with her unconditional support for

African Liberation Movements. Dar es Salaam has always been the headquarters of all African Liberation Movements and military training ground for their patriotic nationalists.

- (4) In 1975-76 during the Angolan crisis, President Nyerere did not hesitate to sternly warn Tanzania's Chinese friends of the implications of their support of the reactionary imperialist instigated FNL/UNITA/South Africa alliance against the progressive MPLA. Nyerere in fact went on to warn both the Peoples' Republic of China and the Soviet Union not to transplant the Sino-Soviet conflict on African soil.
- (5) Again there is the 1967 nationalizations which did not definitely please her purported "masters," especially British business. Commenting on this, Saul (362-363) points out:

International capitalism was stung and the conventional wisdom of most civil servants visibly affronted. In other words, these and other initiatives represented real achievements in a transition towards socialism.

These measures, therefore, suggest some relative independence and initiative on the part of some members of Shivji's "petty bourgeoisie," although not all of them.

On our part this implies the development of a differential class analysis which takes note of individual's different developments, training, orientations and outlook before putting them into any one imaginary class. Recognition of this point has in fact already been made by some scholars on social formations and class structure in Africa and Tanzania. Notable among these are the works of Cabral (1969), Rodney (1971) and Freyhold (1973).

Addressing himself to the question of the petty bourgeoisie in Guinea Bissau and the role it can play especially after liberation, Cabral (op. cit.: 59) makes a distinction between the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie and the rest of the petty bourgeoisie and argues that the former is honest and committed to the people's course. In his own words, Cabral has this to offer:

To return to the question of the nature of the petty bourgeoisie and the role it can play after the liberation, I should like to put a question to you. What would you have thought if Fidel Castro had come to terms with the Americans? Is this possible or not? Is it possible or impossible that the Cuban petty bourgeoisie, which set the Cuban people marching towards revolution, might have come to terms with the Americans? I think this helps to clarify the character of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie. If I may put it this way, I think one thing that can be said is this: the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie is honest; i.e., in spite of all the hostile conditions, it remains identified with the fundamental interests of the popular masses. To do this it may have to commit suicide, but it will not lose; by sacrificing itself it can reincarnate itself, but in the condition of workers or peasants. In speaking of honesty I am not trying to establish moral criteria of judging the role of the petty bourgeoisie when it is in power; what I mean by honesty, in a political context, is total commitment and total identification with the toiling masses (ibid.: 59).

The implications of the above model for Tanzanian Marxists and other scholars were made by Rodney (50-51) who in his comment on Shivji's "Tanzania: The Salient Class Struggle," had this to say:

He (Cabral) considers the petty-bourgeoisie not as a decadent stereotype but as a stratum with various possibilities, and he includes himself. Cabral was concerned with evaluating the "nationalist capacity" of the petty-bourgeoisie as well as their "revolutionary capacity" for the post-independence phase. He speaks about a "revolutionary petty-bourgeoisie," meaning that section which has joined the Liberation Struggle and is already carrying it forward in the direction of socialist reconstruction in the liberated zones. In other words, the African petty-bourgeoisie stratum includes Shivji, the other T.Y.L. comrades at the University and most of the national leadership--irrespective of the political convictions. Sections of the petty-bourgeoisie have broken with their mentors, and individuals within the group have at various times wholly or partially opposed the external and local capitalist.

Rodney then goes to say that while a "significant section of the petty-bourgeoisie together with the workers and peasants from whom they sprang constituted a revolutionary force represented by TANU" during the struggle for national independence;

for the Socialist Revolution a much smaller proportion of the petty-bourgeoisie are initially prepared to join the workers and peasants than was the case with the national revolution for political independence. One must take this rift inside the petty-bourgeoisie as a point of departure for political action. It is not a question of revolutionary forces against the petty-bourgeoisie, but of a struggle within the social stratum which is called the petty-bourgeoisie and which includes the economic and political bureaucracy, whose actions are most relevant to the question of disengagement from the imperialist economy (ibid.: 51).

Striking the note even further, Rodney adds:

There are undoubtedly a few elements who are ideologically hostile to socialism and who are still the direct spokesmen of external interests. There are many more who are indifferent and intellectually lazy, and since they are not committed firmly to change, they too are unwitting allies of anti-Tanzanian forces. The silent class struggle involves exposing the difference between revolutionary and non-revolutionary ideas. It involves scrutinizing the overall implications of the policies pursued by the economic bureaucracy at every stage. Because those ideas and policies are associated with individuals, it means drawing the line between those who are prepared to come over to the side of the masses and those who are interested in preserving personal privileges incompatible with socialism. In that respect, Shivji's paper is itself a contribution to the Silent Class Struggle (ibid.: 51-52).

It was behind that background that Freyhold (op. cit.) adopted the term "Mizers" or "nizations" (from Africanization) frequently used by Tanzanians to refer to that stratum or class which other social scientists have called "educated elite," "labor aristocracy" or "petty-bourgeoisie"--those who took over important administrative and economic positions when colonialism was defeated. And defending her choice, Freyhold has this to say:

'Educated elite' is an ideological term bound up with the elitist theories of dubious origin. 'Labor aristocracy' suggests a link between workers and 'nizers' which--does not exist. 'Petty-bourgeoisie' has a double meaning: it refers to small capitalists on the one hand and all those who look to the bourgeoisie as their model on the other. As long as the educated stratum to which we refer is directly employed by colonialists or a national bourgeoisie it is necessarily a petty bourgeoisie in the second sense. In the absence of such direct employers the educated stratum can choose whether it wants to remain subservient to those by whom it has been created. Since the stratum in question may decide to become a petit bourgeoisie in both senses we would prefer to reserve the term for that particular situation (Quoted in Sauls 365).

Defending her choice of the term "Nizers," she goes on to tell us that:

'Nizers' is a precise and dialectical term. It refers firstly to the progressive aspect of Africanization, to the promise that those who take over the power would return this power to the people on whose behalf they took it away from colonialists.

It refers secondly to the fact that the 'nizers' have not created the existing economic and social structure but have taken it over, either adopting to it or changing the built in dependency on imperialism.

It refers thirdly to the negative possibility that the original promises are not held, that the structure is not changed, that those who have taken the power will usurp it for themselves.

Which of the connotations of the term 'nizers' will emerge as the decisive one is subject to the still on-going struggle among the nizers and the kind of support the different factions can mobilize among other classes--the workers and peasants.

For our purposes this implies a careful analysis of the various development projects and measures taken by the dominant section of the "petty-bourgeoisie" to ascertain whether these have aimed at preserving the capitalist development model with its inherent exploitation and marginalization of the vast masses of the country or whether they are aimed at effecting a people-oriented (socialist) and autonomous development which I have just demonstrated in the earlier pages of

this chapter.

And in doing this one needs also to make a distinction between the actions of the 'petty-bourgeoisie' once in power (which can be partly determined and explained by other considerations, such as the fact of the material country having been embedded in the world capitalist system through colonialism long before that particular class came to power), and the long term ideological commitment by the leadership, which in our case is contained in the aims and principles of the then ruling party-TANU-which were worked out long before the country got her political independence. Definitely Nyerere and a few of his supporters have tried to implement the Party's ideological commitments and goals. And in this process they have always gathered their inspiration and strength from the support given to them by the masses of Tanzanian workers and peasants.

Commenting on the 1967 measures, Freyhold goes on to remind us that:

In 1967 an enlightened political leadership had decided that Tanzania should not turn into a neocolonial society. The Leadership Code was to cut the links between public-office holders and petty capitalism and nationalizations were to bring foreign capital under control. . . . Both measures were . . . a vital first step . . .

The author then goes on;

While the transformation of the nizers is an obvious prerequisite for the promised creation of a socialist society it is obvious that it will not proceed without a protracted struggle within that educated stratum itself. What the progressive parts of Tanzania's nizers envisage as their future is not yet reality. As long as the future is undecided there are still two ways in which one can look at the present educated stratum: as a nascent petty bourgeoisie which will not only be a faithful agent of international capital but which will eventually solidify into a class with petty capitalist connections and orientations or as the precursors of a socialist avant-garde (ibid.).

In conclusion we would like to point out the fact that all the above models on class structure and the role of the state in post-colonial Africa suffer from one common weakness: the fact that all this happens in an international system which is predominantly capitalist, and therefore impinges upon any measures aimed at building just and equal socialist economies. Several studies to the effect of this global dominant capitalist system have been made by various scholars such as Wallerstein (1974; 1976), Pierre Jalee (1973), Amin (1972) and several others including all the quoted Marxist works on Tanzania (Shivji, Mapolu, Thomas, Coulson, etc.).

Wallerstein (1974) demonstrates how the world capitalist system developed and concludes by saying that all present national states are part and parcel of this world capitalist system which has, inherent within it the existence of a

division of labor, such that the various sectors or areas within are dependent upon economic exchange with others for the smooth and continuous provisioning of the needs of the area. Such economic exchange can clearly exist without a common political structure and even more obviously without sharing the same culture (ibid.: 390).

And in his later work (1976) he calls upon social scientists to,

. . . abandon the idea altogether of taking either the sovereign state or that vaguer concept, the national society, as the unit of analysis. I decided that neither one was a social system and that one could only speak of social change in social systems. The only social system in this scheme was the world-system (ibid.: 7).

He then goes on to tell us the need to,

explain changes in sovereign states as consequent upon the evolution and interaction of the world system (ibid.).

In a similar work, Pierre Jalee (1973) demonstrates how Third World economies have been integrated into the World Economy. The

integration of African economies into this world Capitalist System is the subject of Samir Amin's work (1972)*

All this raises the question as to what extent can socialism be built in any peripheral part of this world capitalist system without first effecting this change in the system's center. This, together with other issues related to the strategies for labor and building socialism in dependent economies, will be the subject of our concluding chapter.

To conclude this chapter, let us note that any Marxist class analysis and the role of the state in post-colonial societies must put the following points into consideration:

- (1) It must demonstrate the development and existence of certain social formations or class structures each with different, contradictory, hostile and conflictual interests with those of other formations or classes. There is also need to go further and show the existence of further contradictions and different orientations of particular individuals or groups within the larger social formations. This calls for the development or adoption of a differential class analysis model--similar to that developed by Shivji (1976: 45-58) in his analysis of the commercial bourgeoisie in Tanzania but which he fails to apply to other social formations.
- (2) It must also demonstrate the use of state power on the part of the dominant class or faction thereof, to further

*The African experience is also the subject of Wallerstein's other work (1973).

their specific interests and which are different and hostile to the interests of the other classes, especially the majority of the population.

- (3) It must also include an analysis of specific measures taken by the dominant class or faction thereof, to see and demonstrate a deliberate attempt on the part of that particular class or faction to further its interests or the long term ideological commitments and development measures in the interest of all the people.
- (4) Arising from the above statement, such an analysis must in the case of Tanzania, make a distinction between seemingly revolutionary leaders such as Nyerere on one hand and the non-progressive elements on the other hand.
- (5) The above process implies a need to make a distinction between what dominant classes or factions do when in positions of power, and their long term ideological commitments and objectives.
- (6) There should also be a recognition of the fact that all this takes place within a global or world capitalist system which has an impact and determines the extent to which men, as agents of social change, can act freely.

In conclusion, let me point out that, due to organization complexities--in terms of time and space--a chapter on the strategy for labor and building socialism in Tanzania has been left out.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Alavi, Hamza. "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," New Left Review, No. 74, July-August 1972, pp. 59-81.
- "All Coolies, Dar es Salaam" to D.O. Dar es Salaam, July, 19, 1939. TNA 61/679/5.
- Allen, V. I. The Sociology of Industrial Relations, Longman, London (1971).
- Amin, Samir. "The Theoretical Model of Capital Accumulation and of the Economic and Social Development of the World Today," (Mimeo), University of Dar es Salaam (1970).
- _____. "Development and Structural Change: The African Experience 1950-1970," Journal of International Affairs, XXIV (Autumn, 1970) pp. 203-223.
- _____. "Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black-Africa: Historical Origin," Journal of Peace Research, No. 2 (1972), pp. 105-119.
- _____. "Modes of Production and Social Formations," Ufahamu, Kivukoni College, Dar es Salaam (1974), pp. 57-89.
- _____. "In Praise of Socialism," Monthly Review, Vol. 26 (September, 1974), pp. 1-16.
- Aronowitz, Stanley. False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1973.
- Arrighi, Giovanni. "International Corporations, Labor Aristocracies and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," in Arrighi, G. and Saul John S. Essays on the Political Economy of Africa, Monthly Review Press, New York (1973), pp. 105-151.
- Awiti, Adhu. "The Development of Ujamaa Villages and the Peasant Question in Iringa District: A Study Outline," Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam paper no. 3 (1973).
- Baran, Paul and Sweezy, Paul. Monopoly Capital; An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, Monthly Review Press, New York (1966).

- Baran, Paul. The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Press, New York, (1968).
- _____. "On the Political Economy of Backwardness" in Rhodes (ed.) Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader, Monthly Review Press, New York (1970).
- Barongo, Edward Munyagi. Letter from Mr. Barongo who was then Executive Chairman of the Tanganyika Tobacco Board of Directors to the Minister of Agriculture which was tended as exhibit during the Permanent Labour Tribunal Proceedings. It appears as Appendix 15 in the T.T.P.C.-T.A.T. Industrial Dispute File at the Ministry of Labour.
- Bates, Robert. Unions, Parties and Political Development, Yale, (1971).
- Becker, Howard S. "Whose Side Are We On?" Quoted in Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Sociologist As Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State," The American Sociologist, May 1968.
- Beling, Willard. The Role of Labor in African Nation-Building, Praeger, New York, (1968).
- Bell, Daniel. The End of Ideology, Glencoe, Illinois (1960).
- Berge, E. and Butler. "Trade Unions" in Coleman and Rosberg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, University of California Press, Los Angeles, (1966), pp. 340-389.
- Bettelheim, Charles. Cultural Revolution and Industrial Organization in China: Changes in Management and the Division of Labor, Monthly Review Press, New York (1974).
- _____. Class Struggles in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1923, Monthly Review Press, New York (1976).
- Biron, (Justice). The Daily News, May 23, 1973.
- Bodenheimer, Susanne. The Ideology of Developmentalism: The American Paradigm--Surrogate for Latin American Studies, Comparative Politics Series, No. 01-015, Vol. 2, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, California, (1971).
- Braverman, Harry. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, Monthly Review Press, (1974).
- Brett, E.A. Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa: The Politics and Economic Change, 1919-1939, NOK Publishers Ltd., New York (1973).
- Buel, R.L. The Native Problem in Africa, (2 Vol.) London (1929).
- Burawoy, Michael. "The Colour of Class on the Copper Mines Institute for African Studies," University of Zambia (Lusaka), Zambian Papers, No. 7.

- Cabral, Amilcar. Revolution in Guinea; An African People's Struggle, Stage 1 Publishers, London (1971).
- Calverton, V.F. (ed.). The Making of Man: An Outline of Anthropology, Modern Library, Random House, New York (1931).
- Carter, F.V. Education in Uganda, Ph.D. London (1967).
- Central Statistical Bureau, Survey of Industries, 1965, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam (1967).
- Chidzero, B.T. Tanganyika and International Trusteeship, Oxford University Press, London (1961).
- Cliffe, L. and Cunningham, G. "Ideology, Organization and Settlement Experience in Tanzania," Rural Development Research Committee, Paper No. 3 University College, Dar es Salaam (1968).
- Colfax, J.D. and Roach, J. Radical Sociology, Basic Books (1971).
- Coleman, J. and Rosberg C. Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa, University of California Press, Los Angeles, (1966).
- Coulson, Andrew. "A Simplified Political Economy of Tanzania," Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, (1974).
- _____. "Blood-Sucking Contracts" (Mimeo), University of Dar es Salaam (1972).
- Daily News. The Daily News, Dar es Salaam, May 25, 1973, p. 1.
- _____. The Daily News, Dar es Salaam, March 30, 1974, p. 1.
- _____. (The) "UDA Increases Bus Fares," The Daily News, Dar es Salaam, August 2, 1974.
- _____. "Query on Bus Ban: Review New UDA Fares," The Daily News, August 24, 1974.
- _____. "Clarify Ban on Busses-Call," The Daily News, Dar es Salaam, August 30, 1974.
- _____. "Buss Ban: The Debate Goes On," The Daily News, Dar es Salaam, September 5, 1974.
- Davis, Ioan. African Trade Unions, Penguin, (1966).
- Deutscher, Irvan. "Words and Deeds: Social Science and Social Policy," Social Problems, Vol. 3 (1969), pp. 235-259.
- Diamonds and Burke, F.G. (eds.). The Transformation of East Africa, Basic Books, New York (1966).

- Dowd, Douglas. The Twisted Dream, Winthrop Publishers, Cambridge Mass. (1974).
- Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth, Grove Press, Inc., New York, (1968).
- Fimbo, G.M. "Land, Socialism and the Law in Tanzania," Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam (1974), (mimeo). This paper forms a Chapter in Ruhumbika (ed.) Towards Socialism: Twenty Years of TANU Leadership, East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi (1974).
- Frank, Ander Gunder. Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Monthly Review Press, New York (1969).
- _____. Lumpen-Bourgeoisie; Lumpen Development: Dependence, Class and Politics in Latin America; Monthly Review Press, New York, (1970).
- _____. "Economic Dependence, Class Structure and Underdevelopment Theory" in Cockcroft J., Frank, A.G. and Johnson D., Dependancy and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy, Anchor Books, New York, (1972).
- Friedland, William. Vuta Kambas: A History of Trade Unionism in Tanganyika, Hoover Publication Press, Stanford, California (1969).
- _____. "Cooperation, Conflict and Conscription: TANU-TFL Relations 1955-64," University of Dar es Salaam, (mimeo), (n.d.).
- _____. "The Evolution of Tanganyika's Political System, in Diamonds and Burke, F.G. (eds.) The Transformation of East Africa, Basic Books, Inc., New York (1966): 241-311.
- Feeyhold, M. Von. "The Workers and Nizers," (mimeo), University of Dar es Salaam, (1973).
- Galtung, Johan. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research, (1971).
- Gantzel, Klans. "Dependence Structure as the Dominant Pattern in World Society," Journal of Peace Research (1973).
- Gertzel, Cherry. Labor and the State in Zambia: A Research Note, University of Zambia (mimeo) Lusaka, (1975).
- Girling, Sherry. "Comments on Hamza Alavi (New Left Review No. 74, July-August 1972, pp. 59-81) in Kapitalistate No. 2 (1973), pp. 49-51.
- Gouldner, Irving. "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State," The American Sociologist, May 1968, pp. 103-116.

- Goundner, Irving. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Basic Books, New York (1970).
- Gray, R. and Birmingham (eds.) Pre-Colonial African Trade, Oxford University Press, London, (1970).
- Great Britain, Colonial Office. Tanganyika Under United Kingdom Administration, Annual Reports for the years 1920, 1921, 1922, 1929, 1933, 1939, 1957, 1958, 1959, and 1960.
- _____. Annual Labour Report, 1943, Government Printers, Dar es Salaam (1974):
- _____. Annual Labour Development Reports (1922, 1923, 1924, 1926, 1931, 1944, 1947, 1948, 1950, 1953 and 1960) Government Printers, Dar es Salaam.
- _____. Annual Medical Report (Tanganyika) 1924, Government Printers, Dar es Salaam, (1925).
- _____. "Commission On Higher Education in East Africa," Colonial Office 142, (1937).
- Green, R. "Wage Levels, Employment Productivity and Consumption: Some Issues in Social Policy." EDRP No. 109, October 14, 1966.
- Guliver, P.H. Land Tenure and Social Changes Among the Nyakyusa, East African Institutes of Social Research; Kampala, (1958).
- Gwassa, G.C.K. "The German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania, in Kimambo and Temu (eds.). A History of Tanzania, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, (1970).
- Harlow, V. Chilver, E.M. and Smith, A. (eds.) A History of East Africa, Oxford University Press, London, (1965).
- Hawkins, H.C.C. Whole Sale and Retail Trade in Tanganyika: A Study of Distribution in East Africa, Praeger, New York, (1965).
- Hinton, William. Turning Point in China, Monthly Review Press, New York, (1972).
- Horowitz, I.L. Professing Sociology, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, (1968).
- Hoselitz, Bert F. Sociological Factors in Economic Development, Glencoe: The Free Press, (1960).
- Hveem, Helge. "The Global Dominance System: Notes on a Theory of Global Political Economy," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 4, (1973).
- Iliffe, John. Tanzania Under German Rule, Cambridge University Press, London, (1969).

- Iliffe, John. "The Age of Improvement and Differentiation (1907-45) on Kimambo and Temu (eds.). A History of Tanzania, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, (1970).
- _____. "The Creation of Group Consciousness Among the Dockworkers of Dar es Salaam 1929-50" in Sandbrook, R. and Cohen R., The Development of An African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action, University of Toronto Press, Toronto and Buffalo, (1975).
- Ingham, K. A History of East Africa, Praeger, New York, (1965).
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), The Economic Development of Tanganyika, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, (1961).
- International Labour Office, (United Nations Development Programme, Technical Assistance Sector). Report to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on Wages, Incomes and Price Policy, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam (Government Paper No. 3) - Commonly cited as the Turner Report, (1967).
- ILO. Labour-Management Relations Series, ILO, Geneva, 1973 No. 42.
- Jahoda, Seltiz, Cook and Deutsch. Research Methods in Social Sciences, Dryden Press, New York, (1951).
- Jalee, Pierre. The Pillage of the Thrid World, Monthly Review Press, New York, (1968).
- _____. "The Third World in World Economy," Warner Modular Publication, (1973), pp. 1-13.
- Johnson, Dale L. The Sociology of Change and Reaction in Latin America, the Bobbs-Merril Company, Inc., (1973).
- Kahama, George Clement. Letter Ref. OP7314032 from Mr. Kahama, then Chairman of the BAT Board of Directors to the General Manager of the B.A.T. Mr. H.P. McDonald, October 1973 informing him of the decision to terminate Mr. Kashaaja's services with the B.A.T. as directed by the Ministry for Labour and Social Welfare.
- Kaufman, Michael. "Death of Archbishop Held by Amin Brings Demands for Investigations," New York Times, February 19, (1977), pp. A1 and A4.
- Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science, Chandler Publication Company, San Fransisco, (1964).
- Kimambo, I. and Temu, A. (eds.) A History of Tanzania, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, (1970).

Konde, Hadji. "The Price of Workers' Awakening," The Sunday News, Dar es Salaam, March 5, 1972.

Labour Department, 126/4/3.

Labour, Ministry of. Letter Ref. No. LAB/724/426/9 from the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare to Mr. Kahama, then Chairman of the BAT Board of Directors, October 8, 1973.

Letter Ref. No. LAB/724/468/4 from the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare to the Minister of Agriculture, July 23, 1973.

TAT-T.T.P.C. Industrial Dispute No. 41 of 1972, dispute file, Labour Division, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, Dar es Salaam, 1972.

Lenin, Vladimir I. "The Immediate Task of the Soviet Government (1918)" Collected Works Vol. 27, Moscow, (1965).

"Imperialism; the Highest Stage of Capitalism" in Henry M. Christian (ed.) Essential Works of Lenin, Bantam Books, New York, (1966).

Listowel, Judith. The Making of Tanganyika, Chatto and Windus, London, (1965).

Little, Arthur D. Inc. Tanganyika Industrial Development, A Preliminary Study of Bases for Expansion of Industrial Processing Activities, (1961).

Lukacs, George. History and Class Consciousness, Merlin Press, London, (1968).

McKee, James B. "Some Observations on the Self-Consciousness of Sociology," Ohio Valley Sociologists, Vol. xxxii, No. 4 (Summer 1967).

"The Radical Challenge to Sociology," Sociological Focus: Sociology and Social Issues, The Ohio Valley Sociological Society, Vol. 4, No. 2, winter, 1970/71.

MacDonald, Alexander. TANZANIA: Young Nation in A Hurry, Hawthorne Books, Inc., New York, (1966).

Magdoff, Harry. The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy, Monthly Review Press, New York, (1966, 1963, 1969).

Mahleka, A. "Some Comments on K. Nsari's 'Tanzania: Neo-Colonialism and the Struggle for National Liberation,' R.A.P.E. No. 4" in Review of African Political Economy (R.A.P.E.) No. 6, May-August, 1976 - Debate: 81-84.

- Mandel, Ernest. Marxist Economics Theory, New York, (1969).
- Mannheim, Karl. Ideology and Utopia, Harvest Books, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., New York, (1936).
- Mapolu, Henry. "Labour Unrest: Irresponsibility or worker revolution," Jenga, NDC Dar es Salaam, 12(1972).
- _____. "The Workers' Movement in Tanzania," TANU Youth League, University of Dar es Salaam, Maji Maji No. 12 (1973), pp. 21-22.
- _____. "Underdevelopment and the Working Class in Tanzania," (mimeo) University of Dar es Salaam (1972).
- Marglin, Stephen A. "What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production," The Review of Radical Political Economics, (Union of Radical Political Economics) Vol. 6, No. 2nd Summer, (1974).
- Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. "The Communist Manifesto" in Samuel H. Beer (ed.) The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels, AHM Publishing Corporation, Northbrook, Illinois (1955):
- _____. The Poverty of Philosophy, International Publishers, New York, n.d. (1963).
- _____. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations, translated by Jack Cohen, with an Introduction by E.J. Hobsbawm, International Publishers, New York, (1965).
- Meillassoux, Claude. "A Class Analysis of the Bureaucratic Process in Mali," The Journal of Development Studies (January, 1970).
- Merton, Robert. Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe: Illinois Free Press, (1957).
- Mihyo, Pascal B. "Labour Unrest and the Quest for Workers' Control: Three Case Studies," TANU Youth League, University of Dar es Salaam, Maji Maji, (1974).
- _____. "The Law, Workers and Class Struggle in Tanzania," (mimeo) Faculty of Law, University of Dar es Salaam, (1975).
- Mills, C.W. The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, New York, (1957).
- _____. The Sociological Imagination, Oxford University Press, New York, (1959).
- Molohan (D.C., Uzaramo) to P.C. Eastern, August 25, 1943, TNA 61/679/16.
- Musoke, Kaboko I. "Weber's Bureaucracy: A Re-Appraisal" unpublished M.A. Semester paper, Department of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam, January, (1974).

Musoke, Kaboko I. "Industrial Relations in Eastern Africa: A review of Important Variables," Department of Sociology, University of Dar es Salaam (1975), (mimeo).

Mwapachu, Juma V. "Industrial Labour Protest in Tanzania: An analysis of Influential Variables," African Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1974).

Myrdal, Gunnar. Objectivity in Social Research, London, (1970).

National Development Corporation (NDC). First Annual Report and Accounts, (1965).

_____. Fourth Annual Report and Accounts, (1968).

National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA). Letter Ref. SY1/102/1/20 from NUTA Headquarters in Dar es Salaam to the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, November 2, 1973.

_____. Resolutions of the Fourth Annual Congress, held in Dar es Salaam, September 16th-19th, 1972.

New Internationalist. Interview with President Julius Nyerere by David Martin, New Internationalist, May, 1973: 8.

Nkrumah, Kwame. Ghanian Worker, August 8, 1959.

_____. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, International Publishers, New York, (1965).

Nyalali, Francis. "Face The People" interview with Kaboko Issa Musoke, The Sunday News, March 18, 1973.

Northcote, to P.C. Eastern May 8, 1936, TNA 61/450/40.

Nyerere, Julius K. "Azimio Stopped Class Formation," The Daily News, February 5, 1977.

_____. "Party Must Belong to Workers, Peasants," The Daily News, October 4, 1976.

_____. Socialism and Rural Development (TANU), Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1967).

_____. "Ujamaa-basis for African Socialism," in J.K. Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, Oxford University Press, (1966).

_____. The Rational Choice, Dar es Salaam, (1972).

_____. The Arusha Declaration, TANU, Dar es Salaam, (1967).

_____. "Economic Nationalism" in Nyerere J.K. Freedom and Socialism, Oxford University Press, London, New York and Nairobi, (1968).

- Nyerere, Julius K. Labor, Ghana Trade Union Congress Journal, June, 1961.
- _____. Spearheard, November, 1961.
- _____. Interview with David Martin on the State of Industrial Disputes in Tanzania, New Internationalist, May, (1973).
- _____. "The Task Ahead for Our African Trade Unions," Labour (Ghana Trade Union Congress) June, 1961.
- Onyemelukwe, C.C. Men and Management in Contemporary Africa, Longman, London, (1973).
- Othman, Haroub. "The Tanzanian State: Who Controls It, Whose Interests Does It Serve," Monthly Review, Vol. 26, December, 1974, pp. 46-57.
- Orlans, Harold. Contracting for Atoms: A Study of Public issues posed by the Atomic Energy Commission's contracting for research, development and managerial services, Brookings Institution, Washington, (1967).
- _____. Science and the University, Brookings Institution, Washington, (1968).
- _____. Contracting for Knowledge, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, (1973).
- Parsons, Talcot. The Social System, Glencoe, Illinois Free-Press, (1951).
- Patel, L. "Trade Unions, State and Party-Conflict between TFL and TANU," (mimeo), University of Dar es Salaam, (1973).
- Pike, A.H. "Report on Native Affairs in Dar es Salaam Township," June 5, 1939, TNA 61/207/2/220.
- Police. Letter Ref. D. 168/E/177 from the Coast Regional Police Commander to his District Subordinates at Chang'ombe and the Central Police Station in Dar es Salaam, November 26, 1973.
- "Report of Enquiry into Wages and Cost of Living of Low Grade African Employees in Dar es Salaam, September 1942," TNA SMP 30598/15.
- Rhodes, Robert (ed.). Imperialism and Underdevelopment, Monthly Review Press, New York, (1970).
- Roberts, Andrew (ed.). Tanzania Before 1900, Historical Association of Tanzania, East African Publishing House, (1968).
- Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam, (1972).

Rodney, Walter. "Class Contradictions in Tanzania," The Pan-Africanist No. 6, June 1975, pp. 15-29, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, (1975).

_____. "Some Implications of the Question of Disengagement from Imperialism" in Shivji, Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle, Zenit Reprint 6, Lund Sweden, (1971).

Rostow, Walt W. The Process of Economic Growth, Norton, New York, (1952).

Ruhumbika, Gabriel (ed.). Towards Ujamaa, Twenty Years of TANU Leadership: A Contribution of the University of Dar es Salaam to the 20th Anniversary of TANU, East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi, (1974).

Rweyemamu, Justinian F. Underdevelopment, and Industrialization in Tanzania: A Study of Perverse Capitalist Industrial Development, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, (1973).

_____. "Some Aspects of the Turner Report," Economic Research Bureau, University College, Dar es Salaam (mimeo), (1969).

Salum, Said. "The Tanzania State: A Critique," Monthly Review, Vol. 28, January, 1977, pp. 51-57.

Sandbrook, Richard and Cohen, Robin. The Development of An African Working Class: Studies in Class Formation and Action, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, (1965).

Saul, John. "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania," The Socialist Register, 1974, pp. 349-372.

Sauvant, Karl P. "Multinational Enterprises and the Transmission of Culture: The International Supply of Advertising Services and Business Education," Journal of Peace Research, No. 1, Vol. XIII (1976), pp. 49-65.

Schuler, E.A. "Toward A Code of Professional Ethics for Sociologists as A Historical Note," The American Sociologist, (May, 1969).

Seidman, Ann. Comparative Development Strategies in East Africa, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, (1972).

Shivji, Issa G. Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle, Zenit Reprint, Lund Sweden, 1971.

_____. Tanzania: The Silent Class Struggle, Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam, (1972).

_____. "Capitalism Unlimited: Public Corporations in Partnership with Multinational Corporations," (mimeo) University of Dar es Salaam, (1972), also published in The African Review, Vol. 3, No. 3, (1973).

- Shivji, Issa G. Class Struggles in Tanzania, Heinemann, London, (1976).
- Sjoberg, G. and Nett, R. A Methodology for Social Research, Harper and Row, New York, (1968).
- Sjoberg, G. (ed.). Ethics, Politics and Social Research, Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts, (1967).
- Smith, Hadley E. Readings on Economic Development and Administration in Tanzania, Institute of Public Administration, University College, Dar es Salaam, (1966).
- Stone, Katherine. "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry," The Review of Radical Political Economics, (URPE), Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer, (1974).
- Ståvenhagen, Rodolf. Social Classes in Agrarian Societies, translated by Juddy Alder Hellman, Doubleday, Anchor Free Press, New York, (1975).
- Sunday News, (The Sunday News, Dar es Salaam, August 11, 1974, p. 1.
- Tandau, Alfred. "The Question of Locking-Out Managers" speech by Mr. Alfred Tandau, General Secretary of NUTA who was also Minister for Labour and Social Welfare, delivered at the Institute of Development Management at Mzumbe, Morogoro, February 22, 1974.
- _____. Historia ya Kuundwa Kwa T.F.L. (1955-1962) na Kuanzishwa kwa NUTA (1964), National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA) Dar es Salaam (n.d.).
- Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). Letter Ref. TRO/MOR/CONF/156 from the Morogoro TANU Regional Secretary to the TAT-TTPC dispute concerned parties, January 19, 1972.
- _____. Mwongozo, Dar es Salaam, (1971).
- _____. The Arusha Declaration: Socialism and Self-Reliance. Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1967).
- Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL), Minutes of the TFL Annual Conference held in Dar es Salaam, October 5-6, 1956.
- _____. Minutes of TFL General Council, July 4-6, 1957.
- _____. Minutes of TFL Annual Conference, November 23-26, 1958.
- _____. Minutes of TFL Emergency Committee, February 6, 1959.
- Tanganyika Government, Tanganyika Legislative Council, Official Report (Hansard), Thirty-Six Session (First Meeting) Sitting from October 11, - October 20, 1960, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1960).

Tanganyika Government, Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961/62 - 1963/64, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1962).

_____. The Trades Dispute (Settlement) Act-No. 43 of 1962, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1962).

_____. Report of the Territorial Minimum Wages Board, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1962).

Tanganyika Standard, January 27, 28, 29, 1964.

_____. February 1, 1964.

_____. April 19, 1961.

Tanganyika Tobacco Board (T.T.B.). Proceedings of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Board of Directors of TTB, held in the Boardroom at Morogoro on March 23, 1972.

Thomas, Clive. "The Transition to Socialism: Issues of Economic Strategy in Tanzanian-Type Economies" Economic Research Bureau University of Dar es Salaam, (1972) (mimeo)

_____. Dependence and Transformation: The Economics of the Transition to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, New York, (1976).

Townsend, M.S. Origins of Modern German Colonization, 1871-1885, New York, (1921).

Turner, Louis. Multinational Corporations and the Third World, Hill and Wang, New York, (1973, 1975).

United Republic of Tanzania. The Security of Employment Act-No. 62 of 1964, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1964).

_____. The National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Establishment), Act-No. 18 of 1964, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1964).

_____. The Presidential Committee of Inquiry into the Cooperative Movement, 1965, (Report, 1966).

_____. The Permanent Labour Tribunal Act-No. 41 of 1967, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1967).

_____. The Annual Economic Survey, 1968 (A Background to the 1969-70 Budget), Ministry of Economic Affairs and Development Planning, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1969).

_____. The Presidential Circular No. 1 of 1970, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1970).

_____. Annual Manpower Report to the President, Central Establishment Division, Government Printer, Dar es Salaam, (1973).

- United States Agency for International Development. Tanganyika Five Year Industrial Plan, Report Under Contract, AID/afe-160, 2 Vol. (1964).
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. "Africa in A Capitalist World," Issue, No. 33 (1973), pp. 1-14.
- _____. "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis" Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 16, No. 4, (September, 1974).
- _____. The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, Academic Press, Inc., New York, (1976).
- Weeks, Sheldon. "De-Bureaucratization: What is It?" Paper presented at the East African Social Science Conference, Dar es Salaam, December, (1973).
- Whyte, Martin King. "Bureaucracy and Modernization in China: The Marxist Critique," American Sociological Review, Vol. 30, No. 2, (1973), pp. 149-163.
- Wienhold, H.J. "Problems of Workers' Participation in Tanzania," University of Dar es Salaam, (1972), (mimeo).
- Wilson, G. and Wilson, A. Social Change, Cambridge University Press, London, (1945).
- Woddis, Jack. Africa: The Roots of Revolt, Lawrence and Wishart, London, (1960).
- Writh, L. "Preface" to Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, Routlage and Kegan Paul Ltd. London, (1963); Harcourt Brace Harvest Books edition, New York, (1955).
- Yaffey, M. "International Transactions Before and During the German Period," Economic Research Bureau, University of Dar es Salaam, (1967) (mimeo).
- Zelneker, S. Changing Patterns of Trade Unionism: The Zambian Case, 1948-1964, Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, (1970).