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1971



# INFLUENCE OF TRIBALISM, LINGUA FRANCA, AND MASS COMMUNICATION ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EAST AFRICAN STATES OF KENYA, UGANDA, AND TANZANIA

bу

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ON NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF EAST AFRICAN STATES OF
KENYA, UGANDA, AND TANZANIA

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# CHAPTER T

### TNTRODUCTION

This brief chapter presents the general purpose of the study, the main objectives, the key postulates from which the hypotheses proceed, statement of the four central hypotheses, and the plan of the study.

The countries of East Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, have achieved a closer economic and cultural integration than most other regions of the world, encompassing a group of sovereign nations. During the colonial era the three countries were under a coordinated British administrative structure, and an informal customs union dating back forty years. Despite currency problems and disputes over trade restrictions—e.g., the common currency was broken when Tanzania four years ago issued its own currency—and despite the absence of any move toward political federation, the cooperation at economic and cultural levels has been considerable. Common textbooks are becoming a fact, exemplified in the project known as Zamani: A Survey of East African History. The East African Institute of Social and Cultural

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Some authorities broaden the concept of East Africa to include also the Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. This is useful for certain cultural and geographical analyses. (See <u>The Transformation of East Africa</u>, New York: 1966, Basic Books, by Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke.)

Affairs sponsors network broadcasting from all three capitals, and is in itself a symbol of interregional cooperation.


In addition to cultural integration, the internal problems of the three countries, which include tribal loyalties and the question of a national language, have peculiar affinities; thus, for the purposes of this study, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are worth considering as an entity. The geographical unity of these nations is delineated on the accompanying maps. (See Figures 1-1 and 1-2.)

While there is no denying the interdependence of all the major variables on which the analysis focuses, the approach of the study is to treat tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communications as independent variables, and to view national development as the main dependent variable.

Before dealing with the principal hypotheses the study advances a set of eight postulates, which provide a background for understanding and appreciating the significance of the study, and on which the reasoning is built. These eight postulates are developed and supported with information from a variety of resource materials, including current books and articles by outside authorities on East Africa, as well as those by national leaders of the three countries.

Of the four hypotheses proposed, the first two embody the main thesis of the study, that is: Tribalism in new African nations tends to be negative to national development, while lingua franca and mass communications tend to support

See Chapters II and III for further development of the idea of entity.



Africa




Fig. 1-2. East Africa

national development and to offset some of the negative effects of tribalism. Mass communications and lingua franca are mutually supportive, and thus are important accelerators of national development in emerging nations.

The purpose of the third and fourth hypotheses is to focus attention on two related conditions in new African nations, which seem to call for education of their leaders about mass communications and the importance of the mass media in the development of their countries.

The predictions stated imply the presence and force of two of many intervening factors which more or less influence the major variables under study. These two intervening factors are (1) national policy and the effort to widen the use of a lingua franca, and (2) the foreign media experiences of leaders and potential leaders of new African nations.

The survey of East African students in the United States has several purposes. It takes advantage of a valuable information source relevant to the study. Most likely these students will be national and community leaders in their nations, and they represent the thinking of a substantial proportion of the future leaders. The opinions of potential leaders, who will shortly bear the responsibility for leading their nations into the modern world, are of prime importance in the better understanding of that development. For example, the student survey helps to determine how these young people view the recent explosions of tribal loyalties and the management of lingualism in their respective countries. The position of present leaders can be studied from their public pronouncements and execution of government policy; the opinions

of the political leaders can only be discovered by systematic questioning.

A word of explanation is in order. This study does not purport to give comprehensive answers to any problems to be found in developing countries in general, or of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in particular. Many such problems and their backgrounds are not even discussed. Much of the history, geography, and anthropological data about East Africa were omitted if they did not pertain directly to the main purposes of this study. The two Overview Chapters attempt to give an authoritative exposition pertinent to the postulates and hypotheses of the study and to provide a background that will make more intelligible the student survey and its findings.

Hopefully, the synthesis of the findings of the study will indicate the importance of the variables under study and will reveal some part of the shape of tomorrow's national development in the nations of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.

### CHAPTER II

OVERVIEW: PART 1--POSTULATES AND RATIONALE

### Postulate 1.

East Africa, as represented by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, is in a transitional state of national development and modernization; thus it is a fruitful area of inquiry into the special set of interrelated factors that affect national development of new African states.

At the outset, it is important to delineate the meaning of "modernization," and a "transitional state of national development," with particular reference to systems of communication.

Cyril Black (1966) seems to equate modernization with westernization, although he broadens the concept a bit. He says that modernization is really the dynamic form that the old process of innovation has assumed due to the explosion of knowledge. "It stems initially from an attitude, a belief that society can and should be transformed, that change is desirable."

Marion Levy (1966) says modernization "hinges on the uses of inanimate sources of power and the use of tools to

<sup>1</sup> Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, New York: 1966, Harper and Row, p. 7.

multiply the effect of effort . . . a society will be considered more or less modernized to the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power and/or use tools to multiply the effects of their efforts." Levy's concept of "particularistic ethics" and lack of specialization found in nonmodern societies agrees substantially with Daniel Lerner's thesis that traditional society is nonparticipant.

Daniel Lerner (1963) says that modern living is a style of life. The components are interactive and behavioral, as they operate only through the activity of human beings. Empathy is the key to the modernizing process. In his definitive study of the Middle East (1958), Lerner pointed out:

That high empathic capacity is the predominant personal style only in modern society, which is distinctively industrial, urban, literate and participant. Traditional society is nonparticipant—it deploys people by kinship into communities isolated from each other and from a center . . . people's horizons are limited by locale and their decisions involve only other known people in known situations. 4

One of Lerner's chief theses is that mass media can function effectively only in modern or modernizing society.

Indices to modernization include urbanization, literacy and

Marion Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Society, Princeton: 1966, Princeton Univ. Press, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup>Daniel Lerner, "Towards a Communication Theory of Modernization," in Communications and Political Development, Princeton: 1963, Princeton Univ. Press, edited by Lucian W. Pye, p. 329.

Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society, New York: 1958, The Free Press (Paperback Edition, 1966, p. 50).

media participation. <sup>5</sup> In his 1958 study Lerner had discovered that there is a clear relationship between media growth and such factors as schools, industry, literacy, per capita income and urbanization. Only after ten percent urbanization occurs is there a significant increase in literacy. Later research reported in 1967 does not find that basic relationship of urbanization to the other aspects of growth which Lerner had noted previously. This new data show little evidence of a single pattern of mass media growth in relation to literacy, urbanization and per capita income. <sup>6</sup> There were thirty-two countries included in the 1967 research report; none was in East Africa, but it is reasonable to believe that there is carry-over value in the light of other factors in the countries of Kenyá, Uganda, and Tanzania.

Lerner concludes:

The mass media are clearly the primary resource for developing societies—in—a—hurry. They reach the most people fastest and cheapest with their message . . . this requires high initial investment, which is repaid only as the mass media succeed in doing their job. 7

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup><u>Ibid</u>., pp. 55-57.

See Wilbur Schramm and W. Lee Ruggels, "How Mass Media Systems Grow," in Daniel Lerner and Wilbur Schramm, Communication and Change in the Developing Countries, Honolulu: 1967, East-West Center Press.

<sup>7&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 316.

Everett Rogers in a recent study (1969)<sup>8</sup> analyzes the modernization process among peasants in Colombia, using the variables of literacy, innovativeness, interpersonal and mass communication, empathy, achievement motivation, cosmopoliteness, and fatalism. Rogers closely parallels Lerner in saying that communication processes are integral elements of modernization at the individual level ". . . The process by which individuals change from a traditional way of life to a more complex technologically advanced, and rapidly changing style of life." He is careful to differentiate modernization from westernization. Thus "modernization . . is a multidimensional concept which is not to be equated with Europeanization or westernization, and which implies no value judgment as to desirability."

From a different viewpoint Inayattulah, a Pakistani contributor to the Lerner and Schramm book (1967), castigates the western world for assuming that the developing world has the same values as the West:

. . . It presupposes that because the "traditional" societies have not risen to the higher level of technological development (since the Industrial Revolution) in comparison to the Western society, therefore they are sterile, unproductive, uncreative, and hence worth liquidating. It measures the creativity of the "traditional" world with a few limited standards such as urbanization, and

<sup>8</sup> Everett M. Rogers, Modernization Among Peasants: The Impact of Communication, New York: 1969, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>10 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>. p. 15.



industrialization, like the person who measures the competence of everybody in terms of his own special competence. It ignores (because it cannot measure it with its available instrument) the possibility of existence of (at least the potentiality) of non-material areas of creativity. 11

But, as Lerner remarks, the people of developing areas do in fact want material modern improvements.

Even when expressed in more moderate forms, the ethnocentrism of the new nations in the East seriously complicates their modernizing process. Wanted are modern institutions, but not modern ideologies, modern power, but not modern purposes, modern wealth but not modern wisdom, modern commodities but not modern cant. It is not clear, however, that modern ways and words can be so easily and so totally sundered. 12

In another aspect of the problem, Ruth Benedict in 1934 noted that the ethnocentrism of the west precludes real anthropological study because western people set their own "beliefs" over against their neighbors' superstitution:

. . . Western civilization because of fortuitous historical circumstances, has spread itself more widely than any other local group . . . we have been led, therefore, to accept a belief in the uniformity of human behavior that under other circumstances would not have arisen. 13

Benedict pioneered the belief that all cultures are patterned and integrated. They ". . . are more than the sum

<sup>11</sup> Lerner and Schramm, op. cit., p. 100.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 115-116.

<sup>13</sup>Ruth Benedict, <u>Patterns of Culture</u>, Boston: 1934, Houghton, Mifflin Co. pp. 3-4, 5.

of their traits." If this be true, then a process of modernization has to be more than a simple addition of selected items to an existing culture, an idea than Lerner has substantiated.

Stanislav Andreski (1969) has presented a penetrating analysis of the situation in Africa in reference to modernization, some of which he applies to East Africa. Andreski proposes to "analyze the obstacles facing the new African states on the road to prosperity, internal peace and elementary freedom." He says it is difficult for us to get an accurate picture of Africa from indigenous writers on sociology and politics, who lack self-assurance, due to the humiliations they have suffered. The educated class is too new and too small. "Truly realistic pictures of the African social and political scene can be found only in the novels of certain African authors."

Andreski has scathing criticism of the mass media in Africa:

. . . The popular press, the trashy books, the shoddy films, records . . . television, are doing enough harm in the industrial societies, but in the poorer countries they smash the very foundations of the social order by

<sup>14&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 47.

<sup>15</sup> Stanislav Andreski, <u>The African Predicament</u>, New York: 1969, Atherton Press, p. 11.

<sup>16 &</sup>lt;u>Tbid.</u>, p. 13. Most of the important writers portraying the African scene come from south or west Africa. Few have yet arisen in East Africa. Two outstanding examples of African writers with wide influence are Chinua Achebe (Nigeria) and Lenrie Peters (Gambia).

undermining the traditional values without putting into their place anything except anti-social hedonism and the worship of money.  $^{17}$ 

Referring specifically to East Africa, Andreski declares:

On the East coast, especially in Tanzania, Africa socialism furnishes the justification for the attempts to despoil and drive out the Indian traders, and to replace them with a bureaucratically controlled distribution under the guise of co-operatives; just as national socialism provided a perfect formula for anti-semitism in Central Europe, because the Jews (like the Indians in East Africa) could be condemned from a nationalistic point of view as aliens and from a socialist standpoint as capitalists. 18

Thus Andreski feels that the process of modernization as it is proceeding in Africa, and as he defines it, is more negative than positive in its effects on society. Nevertheless, the process of modernization is inevitable as new nations reach out for the desired technology of the western world.

To summarize, we can define modernization as a life style dependent on an urban, industrialized, literate society, which has in its nature the factor of empathy, participation and backed up by, and interlaced with, effective means of mass communication.

Regarding the "transitional state of national development," East Africa appears to fit into this category from an economic, as well as political point of view. Schramm reminds

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 83.

<sup>18 &</sup>lt;u>Tbid</u>., p. 202.

us that <sup>19</sup> two thirds of the world's people live under conditions that give a family of five under fifteen hundred dollars annual income; many have much less.

The more highly developed states have experienced the Industrial Revolution or their version of it; the underdeveloped ones have not, or have experienced it in a limited way, or only in limited sectors of their population.<sup>20</sup>

The countries of East Africa are experiencing this change in a limited way as yet, but the way is opening up for greater change, as government leaders put into operation Five Year Plans, and seek to implement them through foreign aid and the education of the people.

Schramm points out how important an adequate flow of information and its efficient use can be to national economic and social development ". . . The presence of mass media makes a significant difference in the level of information even among people who are unable to read the printed media and do not have access to the electronic media."

Schramm further discusses the need for interpersonal communication to parallel the development of mass media. The feedback idea is most essential to the success of any communication system, whatever its stage of development. People in any society must be informed, persuaded, and instructed through

<sup>19</sup> Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development, Stanford: 1964, Stanford Univ. Press, p. 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 90.

the operation of the communication system. The degree to which the mass media are developed is an index to the extent of modernization in a country. The presence of some amount of mass communication in an area is one important indication that the nation is in the midst of a transition stage of national development. 22

Lucian Pye has set forth certain useful models of traditional, transitional and modern communication systems. He says that there needs to be a fusion between technical, professional and informal face-to-face types of communication within a modern system, and that "the real test of modernization is the extent to which there is effective 'feedback' between the mass media systems and the informal face-to-face systems." 23

The transitional stage is "bifurcated" and con tains two systems: one based on modern technology is urbancentered, reaching the westernized sectors of the population; and another system largely conforming to traditional processes is based on face-to-face relationships. This system is also characterized by isolated subsystems, because many villages have less communication with each other than with an urban center. "The pattern is like the spokes of a wheel all connecting to a hub, but without any outer rim or any direct connections among any of the spokes." Furthermore,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 246.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>Pye, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 43.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 27.



The mass media sector of the communications process of the transitional societies generally relies heavily upon foreign and international systems of communication for the information it disseminates . . . there are not ready criteria for selecting what should be retransmitted, and consequently there is a random element as to the relevance and appropriateness of what is communicated. 26

The transitional model of communications systems thus described appears to fit the situation of the three countries of East Africa very well. The modernizing processes so well analyzed by Schramm and Lerner lend credence to the postulate that in all respects—economic, social, political—Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are in the midst of a transitional stage in their development, and the factors of tribalism and lingua franca constitute concomitant aspects of the situation.

## Postulate 2

Modernization is a recognized need on the part of the prevailing leaders in the area under study. While recognizing the need for modernization, national leaders in the area under study strive toward retaining and developing African ideals and culture.

Leaders in many parts of African have often written and spoken on the necessity for the introduction of western technology into their nations, but usually with reservations.

K. A. Busia, a noted sociologist and the present prime

<sup>26 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 28-29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>See Overview, Part 2.

<sup>28</sup> Lerner and Schramm, op. cit.

minister of Ghana, reflected on the philosophy of African leaders when he wrote ". . . Behind Africa's search for modernization and new political and social institutions lies an interpretation of the universe which is intensely and pervasively religious. It influences the decisions and choices Africa is making." Thus much of western technology will be adapted to African ideals, not just adopted wholesale, a process which is clearly in line with Benedict's pattern of culture theory.

The top leaders in East Africa, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Milton Obote 30 of Uganda and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania are all products of western education. It is thus not surprising that these men reflect in their actions and statements a desire for the benefits of modernization. Yet Nyerere and Kenyatta, especially, also show a strong determination to preserve African culture, and intend to lead their nations in that political and philosophical context. 32

Kenyatta (1962), in his anthropological study of the Kikuyu people (written after his studies in London),

<sup>29</sup>K. A. Busia, Africa in Search of Democracy, New York: 1967, Frederick A. Praeger, p. 16.

 $<sup>^{30}</sup>$ For the current status of Obote, see page 100.

<sup>31</sup> Kenyatta and Nyerere studied at the London School of Economics and Edinburgh University, respectively, while Obote never attended a university, although he was educated in Christian schools in East Africa and has received foreign honorary degrees.

 $<sup>$^{32}\</sup>mbox{For further details}$  see Chapters IV and VI of this study.

reflects his deep attachment to his tribal antecedents, and he relates modernization of Africa to that attachment. 33 Kenyatta admits the value of western technology, which he implicitly equates with modernization when he says,

There certainly are some progressive ideas among the Europeans. They include the ideas of material prosperity, of medicine, and hygiene, and literacy which enables people to take part in the world culture. But so far the Europeans who visit Africa have not been conspicuously zealous in imparting these parts of their inheritance to the Africans, and seem to think that the only way to do it is by police discipline—and armed force. 34

This bitter cry growing out of the colonial era in Africa has many echoes even today. The leaders who experienced such a system are likely to remember it well and are inclined to idealize their own tribal societies in sheer defense. Kenyatta thinks that Africans should choose the parts of European culture that are beneficial and that can be successfully transplanted and cultivated. Much should be rejected, according to his philosophy.

African Socialism as proclaimed by Kenyatta, and to a much greater extent by Nyerere, treads gingerly on the road to modernization, carefully choosing and adapting what is fit for Africa and always idealizing African concepts. The phrase "Harambee" (Let's Pull Together) has been made famous by Kenyatta in his public utterances; it is simply a manifestation



<sup>33</sup> Jomo Kenyatta, <u>Facing Mt. Kenya</u>, New York: 1962, Vintage Books. Kenyatta took his degree under Branislav Malinowski in anthropology.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 305.

of the belief that concerted action is an ancient African ideal and one to be used in nation-building.

Kenyatta has demonstrated his determination to unify his nation by restricting political dissent and proclaiming policy in speeches and interviews concerning national development. In a speech before the International Press Institute in Nairobi, in 1968, Kenyatta notes the importance of the mass media in national development, yet clearly reflects the prevailing official policy of restrictions on political dissent, believed to be in the best interests of his nation. "Newspapers in the Republic of Kenya are free to criticize the members or the policies of my government." Yet Kenyatta also states that:

No government with a mandate from the people could permit such criticism or campaigning as might undermine the security of the state. No government with a rational sense of duty could allow the people to be consistently misinformed. 35

Perhaps no other leader has seized upon African cultural concepts to use as building blocks in a national development program as has Julius Nyerere. A system of self-reliance, based on rural ideals and joint endeavor, is the heart of his African Socialism.

The ideal society is based on human equality and on a combination of the freedom and unity of its members. there must be equality, because only on that basis will men work co-operatively. There must be freedom, because the individual is not served by society unless it is his.

<sup>35</sup> Africa Today, 16:3, p. 5 (June-July, 1969).



And there must be unity, because only when society is united can its members live and work in peace, security, and well-being.  $^{36}$ 

Nyerere emphasizes basic African ideals:

The principles of the traditional African family all the time encourages men to think themselves as members of a society. In contrast, the capitalist and money economy, as introduced into Africa by the trading and colonial powers, operates on the basis of individualism; it encourages individual acquisitiveness and economic competition. A wage-earning member of the family is therefore exposed to luxuries like radio, and wrist watches, and in the wider society his status depends on possession of these things. Yet his responsibilities to the other members of his family remain and increase with every increase of his wages, because they are the responsibilities of sharing. 37

Nyerere has instituted an austerity program in Tanzania as the nation proceeds along the lines he advocates. In his Arusha Declaration, February, 1967, <sup>38</sup> Nyerere says that his government is committed to policies of socialism and self-reliance. He stipulates qualifications for the leaders of TANU. <sup>39</sup> Each leader should be a worker or peasant. He cannot own shares in companies, nor own a house in which he does not

Julius Nyerere, <u>Freedom and Unity (Uhuru na Umoja.)</u>, London: 1967. Selections from Writings and Speeches, 1952-1965. Oxford Univ. Press, p. 8.

<sup>37 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 10.

 $<sup>^{38}</sup>$  This Declaration is more widely discussed in this study under African Socialism.

<sup>39</sup> Tanganyika African National Union, which is the ruling political party in Tanzania. It will be further discussed in Chapter VI.

live. Nyerere set the example by cutting his own salary by 20 percent in October, 1966, and that of other top government officials. Nyerere's theory states that political responsibility should not lead to economic enrichment.

"Charter of the Common Man," which proclaims the tenets of socialism. It calls for a national service program in which all citizens will participate. Obote seeks to remedy some problems in Uganda that are very great. One of these problems is the need for political integration. Dr. Ali Mazrui, head of the Political Science Department of Makerere College in Kampala, comments that the service camps proposed would provide "institutionalized opportunities for ethnic intermingling." The camps would stress the values of manual labor and show all citizens the tremendous importance of land use. Hunter says,

Although the national service proposals evoke some smiles, they represent an effort to realize more of Uganda's economic potential and to foster political integration at the same time. There is little doubt that the government intends to implement them . . . money may well be the factor which determines how far and how fast it can go in translating them into action. 42

On May 1, 1970, Obote announced nationalization of oil companies, banks, insurance, mines, all transport, manufacturing, and large plantations. The Uganda constitution was amended to change "prompt and adequate" compensation for

<sup>40</sup> Frederic Hunter, "Uganda's Blueprint for Change," The Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1969.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

expropriation to "reasonable." Obote said such action was not hasty and has been put before the public in discussion over his Common Man's Charter or blueprint for change issued in October, 1969. He said,

We are trying to prevent a development of a violent conflict between the masses who produce coffee and cotton and the managers and directors of big companies who really are engaged in a line of activities to which the people find themselves as spectators. [See article on Uganda in Africa Digest, Vol. XVII: 4, August, 1970, pp. 73-74.]

# Postulate 3

Regarding tribal loyalties, the more intense these loyalties are, the more they hinder national development and progress. But enlightened leaders, intent on modernization can and do use tribal followings in support of national development.

Most African leaders recognize the elements of "tribe" and "tribalism" in their countries, but some tend to sweep them under the rug. Nyerere, who proclaims often that Tanzania must bury tribal differences in order to build a nation could say in 1964 that:

The conflicts resulting from contact between members of different tribes have not completely stopped, but the sovereign authority which had previously been transferred from the individual to the tribal unit has now been transferred to the larger group . . . the nation. 43

What is a tribe? Not even anthropologists can agree on a precise and empirical definition. Their various concepts

<sup>43</sup> Nyerere, op. cit., p. 270.

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encompass aspects of togetherness, culture consciousness and the like. It seems clear, however, that tribe as used in East Africa is fairly neutral emotionally.

It refers to certain more or less accepted divisions of a country's population. Only in connection with the implied contrast with the western world does it carry the overtone of "primitive." "Tribal," however, carries the clearer imputation of reference to tradition, and hence to conservatism. 45

Tribalism clearly carries more emotional overtones to leaders and peoples of East Africa. "To belong to a tribe is a fact of life, but to engage in tribalism is reprehensible in others and to be denied in oneself."

In a 1968 debate in the Kenya National Assembly, members of the opposition party--KPU (Kenya People's Union)--put forth charges of tribalism in allocation of government jobs. These charges were hotly denied by members of the government, but no one denied the existence of tribes as such. 47

Gulliver says that "a tribe is a named group of people distinguished from neighbouring groups in a number of ways; the group occupies and exploits a more or less defined territory, usually to the exclusion of other groups; the people are recognized, and recognize themselves, as being different from others by virtue of their common possessions of and adherence to a particular way of life or culture."

(P. H. Gulliver, p. 65, in The African World, edited by Robert A. Lystad. New York: 1965, Frederick A. Praeger.)

<sup>45</sup> P. H. Gulliver, (ed.) <u>Tradition and Transition in East Africa</u>. Berkeley: 1969, Univ. of Calif. Press, p. 11.

<sup>46 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 11.

<sup>47 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 11.

Since there is no empirical delineation of tribe, at least in East Africa, patterns of cultural affiliation change, and groups reshuffle for various reasons. Gulliver shows that the Kikuyu had no definite unity in precolonial times—they were composed of overlapping communities, who affiliated for defense against encroachments of the British and continued their tribal consciousness in their fight for independence for all of Kenya.

Perhaps the best description for the concepts of tribe and tribalism is that they are:

. . . primarily a product of the interaction of cultural-regional groups within the state; their competition with each other, their apprehensions of each other, fears of deprivation of interests and rights, attempts to dominate, stimulated awareness of differences, and so on. That is to say, unlike European nations, tribes are mainly in opposition to one another, rather than to the overarching authority of the new encompassing state. 49

Herein lies the essential difference between European nationalism and tribalism, according to Gulliver.

Gulliver further says that tribalism is "... one form of a different and general sociological category—par—ticularism ... tribalism can be most fruitfully compared with other kinds of particularism: regionalism, sectionalism, communalism, casteism, etc." Tribalism remains a very present factor in the life of East Africa.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 22.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 30

James Coleman (1960) discussed the effect of urbanization upon tribal loyalties in African nations emerging into independence and the transitional stage of development. He reminds us of the fallacy of assuming that new cities in Africa are aggregations of "detribalized" individuals:

Kinship associations and tribal unions have emerged as instruments for maintaining lineage and tribal attachments and also of creating a sense of belonging and relatedness in the city . . . Thus, most urban African aggregations have some form of structure; they are not globs of humanity. And it is upon these structures—the network of tribal and urban associations—that nationalist movements and political parties have been based. 51

We cannot assume that once an African leaves his home village to seek work in the distant city that his ties with tribe and family are cut, or in some cases, even weakened.

Coleman continues:

Most Africans in urban centers belong to a kinship or tribal association. Organized initially as mutual—aid and self—help societies, some have assumed a variety of significant political functions, including the representation and protection of interests of the village or tribal community concerned . . . at the level of local government in both the urban center and tribal homeland these associations have acted as pressure groups agitating for political reform, greater representation, and other measures to protect or enhance their group interests. 52

<sup>51</sup> Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton: 1960, Princeton Univ. Press, pp. 272-273.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 319.

Many of these tribal associations were tools of national independence movements and have been used since to promote political stability by independent governments. 53 These groups may remain as pressure groups that influence choice of government officials and many newly elected governments are forced to parcel out positions according to the strength of various tribal groups which are the most articulate, if not always the most numerous.

Andreski insists that moral horizons in Africa are still tribal, not universal.

Whereas in Europe or Asia the processes of widening the moral horizon beyond the confines of the tribe stretched over many centuries, in Africa, the supratribal economic and administrative structures have emerged so suddenly that the change in attitudes could not keep the pace. Urban living seems to have produced a rootless and amoral society. 54

Nonkinsmen are not really trusted, and tribal clashes are merely perpetuated in cities. Although a tiny fraction of people in East Africa live in cities, yet these are the political forces that count, despite the fact that leaders constantly stress the importance of the rural masses. 55

 $<sup>$^{53}\</sup>mathrm{This}$  situation prevails more clearly in Kenya and Uganda than in Tanzania.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup>Andreski, op. cit., p. 43.

 $<sup>$^{55}\</sup>mathrm{This}$  kind of speech-making is particularly typical of Julius Nyerere.

# According to Andreski:



Many of the most painful aspects of African development stem from the fact that the dissolution of the old ethics of the tribal and clan solidarity goes on faster than the emergence of new norms and ideals . . . the educated elite are almost everywhere morally disoriented: torn between the traditional values which they have imbibed in childhood and the so-called civilising influences from abroad, many of them are completely unsure about what is right and what is wrong, and oscillate between incompatible patterns of behavior. 56

The basis for a modern nation-state is political unity that transcends ties of kinship and clan, and the East African leaders all accept this. Yet,

On the whole Africans have not yet evolved any moral bonds beyond the confines of the clan and tribe, and for this reason usually act in urban settings as "perfect economic man" whose attitudes are purely mercenary, because most of the people with whom they come into contact in shops, offices and streets are not their kinsmen but strangers in the primeval sense of the word. 57

It is hardly surprising that East Africa has yet to overcome factionalism among its disparate tribes. Time is an important factor here, as Andreski points out. Karl Deutsch observes that <sup>58</sup> the urbanization of Africa dates back at most one hundred years. There has been only partial literacy for barely thirty years, and most languages have been written only for fifty years or so. "It took centuries to make Englishmen

<sup>56</sup> Andreski, op. cit., p. 55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 81.

<sup>58</sup> Karl W. Deutsch, <u>Nationalism and Its Alternatives</u>, New York: 1969, Alfred Knopf, p. 72.

and Frenchmen. How are variegated groups to become Tanzanians, Zambians, or Malavians in one generation?"59

In the colonial era, as African peoples were slowly absorbing western ideas, often tribal conflicts were enhanced and even openly encouraged for the purposes of "divide and rule." Despite this fact, alien European rule did provide one of the few truly unifying factors among tribes -- they could all agree to oppose it, as Fred Burke reminds us. 60 That unifying force is now removed in the independent countries. While it is clearly the aim of some African leaders to reconcile tribal differences, others seem to use them to support personal power. Julius Nyerere is certainly among the former. A member of a minor tribe himself, 61 Nyerere has astutely used the multiple tribal situation in Tanzania, where something like one hundred twenty tribes exist, as a base of operations to encourage amalgamation into a nation. Only one tribe in Tanzania, the Sukuma, number as many as one million members in a total population of about twelve million; thus no one tribe can wield the deciding political power. writings and speeches Nyerere stresses his determination to deny even the existence of tribalism by proclaiming that the people of Tanzania are citizens of one nation. This is donethrough education as well as by other means.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 73.

<sup>60</sup> Fred G. Burke, Africa's Quest for Order, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1964, Prentice-Hall, Inc., p. 29.

61 Zanaki tribe.

In a penetrating article in 1969, 62 B. Magubane, lecturer in sociology at Zambia University, Lusaka, insists that tribal loyalty has nothing inherent in it to conflict with loyalty to the nation. He defines tribalism as ". . . a consciousness of belonging to a primary group whose language, customs, and myths are your own and with whose members you feel a certain solidarity." Magubane feels that where intense tribal loyalties exist they are aggravated by dependence on western capital. The study of ethnic conflict must be in the context of means of production, since such conflict is essentially an economic question. 64

There can be little argument that whatever their root cause recent tribal conflicts in Kenya and Uganda have hindered rather than helped national progress. The assassination of Tom Mboya, Minister of Economic Planning, in 1969, was followed by violent tribal clashes. Members of the Luo tribe, of which Mboya was a leader, accused the Kikuyus of instigating the murder. The result was suppression of the opposition party and ouster of its chief protagonist, Oginga Odinga. President Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, is clearly afraid of tribal

B. Magubane, "Pluralism and Conflict Situations in Africa: a New Look," in <u>African Social Research</u>, Lusaka, Univ. of Zambia Institute for Social Research, no. 7, June, 1969. (Distributed by Humanities Press, Inc., 303 Park Ave. South, New York, 10010, p. 535.)

<sup>63</sup>By this definition we all belong to a tribe. When I was teaching in a college in Mwanza, Tanzania, students often pressed me to tell them which tribe I belonged to, I finally said "Texan." This seemed to satisfy them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup>Magubane, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 541.

dissension, and has moved to suppress articulate opposition to his government.

The dominant position of the Baganda in Uganda has created a knotty tribal problem in that country. Traditionally, the Baganda have held a superior position, enhanced by the British policy of colonial rule. President Obote has reflected his own tribal leanings as a member of the Lango tribe in many of his actions. The exile of the Kabaka and the assumption of his presidential powers by Obote in 1966 is evidence of this. (See Chapter V.)

Despite tribal dissensions, many authorities agree that pluralism in African societies, while often deep-seated, need not necessarily be a stumbling block to national progress. Coleman states that:

Although the racial and tribal pluralism of the new political communities tends to retard the process of national unification, it is not a barrier to their survival, nor is it necessarily unhealthy in terms of the development of competitive societies. The multiplicity of tribes within a state is not everywhere an obstacle to the creation of a broader political nationality . .

The crucial question is not whether tribal loyalties exist-they clearly do-but how they can be used to further, rather than block, real progress toward a modern nation-state.

<sup>65</sup> Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 368.

In the midst of numerous tribal languages and intense tribal loyalties, the present national leaders in East Africa recognize the need of a lingua franca as essential to national development.

The history of the area resulted in the establishment of the trade language Swahili as a working lingua franca.

Swahili does not have the tribal connotations of other languages native to the area.

Wilfred Whiteley in a recent study of the development of Swahili notes that:

It must be clearly stated that Swahili is a Bantu language, one of several hundreds of such spoken across the southern half of Africa. Over centuries its coastal habitat had brought it into contact with Arab, Portuguese, Indian, British and German traders and colonizers, so that its lexicon, like that of English, has been enriched by many hundreds of loan words.

Swahili probably developed out of the situation in which peoples with broadly similar languages engaged in trade. Zanzibar, off-shore from Tanganyika, 67 was the focal point of this trade, which gradually spread inland, taken by such Swahili

<sup>66</sup> Wilfred Whiteley, Swahili: The Rise of a National Language, London: 1969, EC4 Methuen and Co., Ltd., p. 8. (See also Edgar C. Polomé, Swahili Language Handbook, Washington, D.C.: 1967, Center for Applied Linguistics. Also M. Guthrie, "Some Developments in the Pre-History of the Bantu Languages," Journal of African History, III: 2, pp. 273-82 (1962). Guthrie is now engaged in writing a comprehensive work on the origins of the Bantu languages.)

<sup>67</sup> The former name for Tanzania; in 1964 Tanganyika joined with Zanzibar to form the nation of Tanzania.

traders as Tibbu Tip. The Swahili language as it is today owes a great deal to those who have carried out standardization in the twentieth century. In the last one hundred years Swahili has developed over a wide area in East Africa; it can be understood as far west as Congo and from Somalia to Mozambique.

Standard Swahili has not wiped out the various dialects.

The picture at the present time is thus one of a "standard" form of the language being acquired as a second or third language by a large majority of speakers over a wide area of eastern Africa. Simultaneously there exist pockets of dialects spoken along the littoral and on the off-shore islands mainly as a first language. Finally, there are a number of up-country dialects acquired as a second, third, or even fourth language and used as a means of communication between African and Asian or European, or between African and African, particularly in the towns where speakers of dozens of Bantu and Nilotic languages all seek a common means of communication. 68

The chief literary tradition in Swahili has had its impetus from Islam, which was early established on the East Coast by Arabic traders. Whiteley says that <sup>69</sup> there is evidence to argue for a proto-Swahili prior to the tenth century. Until 1969 the earliest written evidence of Swahili was a manuscript written in the northern dialect of the eighteenth century-entitled Utenzi wa Tambuka. In 1969 E. A. Alpers found

<sup>68</sup>Whiteley, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>69&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 31.

fourteen letters in Swahili written in Arabic script. These letters were in the Portuguese archives at Goa and were dated between 1711-1728; they were written in the northern dialect of Swahili known as Ki-mvita.

Although space does not permit a detailed historical analysis of Swahili, a few words should be said concerning its development. Between 1800 and 1850, trading caravans took Swahili far inland into East Africa; after 1850 European missionaries began the first systematic study of the language. The Germans used Swahili as the administrative language in Tanganyika—a policy continued by the British. However, English became more prestigious in higher echelons of government and in higher education. TANU early saw the advantage of Swahili and promoted its use in nationalist movements in Tanganyika. Many missionaries preferred to use the local languages, saying Swahili was not well understood by villagers, while the church in Uganda took a definite stand against Swahili. This work is the stand against swahili. The Whiteley observes,

It is interesting to note the support for Swahili among the Nilotes in Uganda, in contrast to the opposition from them in Kenya, which does something to dispel

<sup>70</sup> The earliest written form of Swahili was in Arabic orthography. Only after missionary scholars of the midnineteenth century began their work did Swahili have a Roman alphabet, which was not standardized until the 1940's.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup>Despite the early opposition by many missionaries to Swahili, today one of the best pieces of Swahili literature is the Swahili version of the Holy Bible, <u>Biblia Katika</u> Lugha ya Kiswahili, London: 1950, The British and Foreign Bible Society.

the myth that there are linguistic reasons why Nilotes  $^{72}\,$  find Swahili difficult to learn.  $^{73}\,$ 

Nevertheless, Swahili was promoted as a lingua franca as early as the 1930's when an interterritorial committee was appointed to decide what language would be the medium of instruction in the schools of East Africa. Originally, non-African members were chosen from Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar to serve on this committee, which did not have a single African member until 1939. In 1964 this committee, having already selected Swahili as the medium of instruction, continued its work as the Institute of Swahili Research at the University College in Dar Es Salaam. Meanwhile, with the coming of independence in the three East African countries, different policies on language gradually changed original decisions of the committee.

English is still the language of social status in East Africa, but in Tanzania Nyerere has mounted a crusade to get Swahili accepted as a national language—in fact, it is so designated. In the first general election held in 1965, all candidates had to speak in Swahili. Nyerere himself often insists he can speak anywhere in Tanzania, using Swahili, and be understood. But official designation of a language as official does not produce a monolingual nation. Hundreds of tribal languages are used in East Africa, and much of the

<sup>72</sup> As represented by such tribes as the Lango and Acholi. (My own observation.) See also Overview, Part 2.

 $<sup>^{73}</sup>$ Whiteley, op. cit., p. 71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 82.

area's interterritorial affairs in higher education, the high court, and secondary education are conducted in English. In Tanzania the national assembly, TANU, trade unions, lower courts, primary education and certain portions of the civil service are carried on in Swahili. Despite the intense promotion of the use of Swahili, as Whitely notes, there is an inherent difficulty in relating Swahili to the national cultural revival, which is sweeping over Tanzania. The Islamic tradition originally associated with Swahili on the coast is not characteristic of the whole country. Nevertheless, the Education Department is directing the teaching of Swahili at all levels, and it has been taught at the University College in Dar Es Salaam since 1964, although English remains the medium of instruction at higher education levels.

Mazrui (1967) says that <sup>78</sup> Swahili is nontribal and is politically neutral in most areas of East Africa, but it is basically Bantu, and thus associated with certain tribes. In Uganda the British took care to develop English as a lingua franca, because of the tribal feelings over Luganda, a Bantu language. The Nilotes <sup>79</sup> are friends of Swahili because their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 114.

<sup>76&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 101.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

<sup>78</sup> Ali Mazrui, "Language and Politics in East Africa," Africa Report, 12:6, (June, 1967).

 $<sup>^{79}</sup>$ Tribal problems are further dealt with in the Overview, Part 2.

rivals, the Baganda, are Bantu and push their language, Luganda. Although English is widespread among the educated in Uganda, Swahili has risen in status since the revolution of 1966 in which Obote forced the Kabaka out of office and clipped the wings of Baganda political power. Today Swahili is used in trade unions, common services with Kenya and Tanzania, the army, and the police.

Tanzania is committed to Swahili and English is becoming less important, but is by no means out of use. Most government publications are published in both English and Swahili. In Kenya there is still the classical poetry of Swahili so highly developed in the past on the island of Lamu (a part of Kenya); yet Kenya is less interested in pushing Swahili at the moment. It may, in the future, become a national language for Kenya.

East African leaders probably feel the greatest need for a lingua franca in the areas of education and the news media, including radio broadcasting and newspapers. As already mentioned, East African school texts are being prepared, shared broadcasts in both English and Swahili are regularly arranged, and there is the cooperation among the three colleges of the University of East Africa, located respectively at Kampala (Makerere), Nairobi, and Dar Es Salaam. The magazine, Transition, as well as the East African Journal are cooperative projects. Also launched recently are two new

<sup>80</sup> Mazrui, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 60.

Swahili journals--Mawazo (Reflection), from Makerere College, and Zuka (Emerge). 81

The promotion of Swahili as an intellectual force is illustrated in Nyerere's excellent translation of <u>Julius Caesar</u> into Swahili. According to Mazrui, this translation "... has contributed more to the potential of Swahili as a dramatic medium than any original work in Swahili which has so far emerged." In addition to encouraging the wider use of Swahili in education, drama and the news media, Nyerere has often used popular Swahili proverbs in connection with exhortations about the value of work and service in the building of Tanzania. One proverb Nyerere often quotes is: "Mgeni siku mbili, ya tatu mpe jembe." (Treat your guest as a guest for two-days; on the third day give him a hoe.)

## Postulate 5

The communication systems, particularly the mass media, affect every major facet of national development--political, economic and cultural.

Development of mass media tends to facilitate national development.

In new African nations--with the problems of literacy and distribution--radio is the mass medium that will tend to develop the fastest, and is thereby the medium that will probably contribute most to national development in the early stage.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>82</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 61.

Most analyses of the problems of developing countries neglect communications systems. S. C. Dube says that:

There is very little scientific knowledge regarding the communication situation in the underdeveloped countries . . . nor is there much scientific information on the opinion leaders who have a seminal role in the dissemination of ideas and adoption of new practices. 83

Later studies, however, have recognized the importance of opinion leaders. Rogers says that "modernization is essentially a communication process. Therefore, concepts and methods utilized in communication research can provide insights and instruments for a scientific dissection of the modernization process." Rogers further points out how the interrelatedness of traditional forms of communication involves the role of opinion leaders as well as the mass media, and that the Lazarfeld two-step flow of information theory needs modification in the light of additional data from his Colombia studies and elsewhere.

Mass media in underdeveloped areas reach relatively small audiences compared to the mass media in modern nations.

However, certain elite audiences (such as university students or middle class urbanites) in less developed

<sup>83</sup>S. C. Dube, "A note on Communication in Economic Development," in Lerner and Schramm, op. cit., p. 95.

<sup>84</sup> Rogers, op. cit., pp. 42, 43.

<sup>85 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, Chapter 10. The two-step flow model, developed by Paul F. Lazarfeld et al., as a result of the Erie County, Ohio, study of the 1940 presidential election is simply stated: "Ideas often flow from radio and print to opinion leaders and from them to the less active sections of the population" (Lazarfeld et al., <u>The People's Choice</u>, New York: 1944, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Meredith Press, p. 151.



countries have mass media exposure levels that are just as high as those for similar elites in more developed countries. Audiences for the electronic mass media, especially radio and film, are larger than for the print mass media, such as newspapers and magazines, in less developed countries. The messages carried by the mass media in less developed nations are of low interest and relevancy to villagers because of the strong urban orientation of the media. Government control over the mass media, especially the electronic media, is greater in less developed countries.86

Rogers overstates his case in some respects, but he tends to shed light on the variations in mass media reach for different classes of people in underdeveloped countries.

Rogers further observes that "Mass media communication is more important in changing cognition (that is, in increasing knowledge of ideas), whereas interpersonal communication is more likely to cause attitude change."87 Many aid programs for underdeveloped countries founder on the rock of ignorance of the peasant subculture. Change, particularly in attitudes, can be very slow, and processes of communication make only a slight impression on the great majority of the population. 88 Schramm holds that attitude changes proceed at

<sup>86</sup> Rogers, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 115.
87 <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 116.

<sup>88</sup> However, Rogers shows how fast certain events can be spread by word-of-mouth in the instance of news of President Kennedy's death in 1963. The word was received by radio in a remote Colombian village and then disseminated by wordof-mouth so that several thousand villagers knew of it within a couple of hours of its\_occurrence in Dallas. In contrast, other types of messages concerning technological change have met with little success, using the same communication system.

the pace of stalagmite formation, even in modern nations. 89



The chief role of the mass media is to achieve "a climate for modernization rather than to provide specific details needed for adoption of innovation." The data used by Rogers include some cross-cultural findings on mass media exposure in India, Kenya, and Brazil. The Kenya study in 1965 involved 624 respondents from three villages about three hundred miles from Nairobi, and revealed the same pattern as Rogers had found in Colombia.

Both Lerner and Schramm, in studies already cited, give essentially the same conclusion—that communication systems are a part of national development and in fact are indispensible to it. Lerner's major hypothesis is that "highempathic capacity is the predominant personal style in modern society." Traditional society is neither participant nor highly mobile. But mass media can start the ball rolling to increase psychological mobility and multiply its effect. Lerner further shows how economic and political developments are interrelated with the development of mass communications.

Modern media systems have flourished only in societies that are modern by other tests . . . the media spread psychic mobility most efficiently among peoples who have

<sup>89</sup> Wilbur Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Communication, Urbana: 1955 (Seventh Printing 1965), Univ. of Illinois Press, p. 16.

<sup>90</sup> Rogers, op. cit., pp. 65-116.

<sup>91</sup> Lerner, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 50.

achieved in some measure the antecedent conditions of geographic and social mobility. 92

Abundant evidence shows that African leaders and educated elites understand well the importance of mass media systems in the modernizing process. Kenyatta, as already noted,  $^{93}$  recognizes the educational possibilities as well as the dangers to political stability of an unregulated press.

The press should positively promote national development and growing self respect . . . the press in Africa can have a tremendous influence in nation building. It may constantly inspire, or could set out to frustrate, the spirit of  $\underline{\text{Harambee}}$  or national unity which every young country needs as the fundamental of its progress.  $9^4$ 

John Merrill notes that "In Africa no press system can be considered very free, but Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania and Uganda probably have fewer controls than other nations on that continent." Regulations do exist; in a 1966 PICA survey of the world's press, a scale of freedom was established, ranging from one to nine, using such factors as legal controls, extralegal controls (threats and imprisonment), government licensing, amount of press criticism of government and its officials, libel and privacy laws, government control of circulation and distribution, and government control over domestic news agencies. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania rated in the

<sup>92&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 55.

<sup>93</sup> See footnote 35, p. 19.

<sup>94&</sup>quot;President Kenyatta Answers Ownership Question," IPI Report, 17:3-4, (1968), p. 3.

<sup>95</sup> John C. Merrill, Carter R. Bryan and Marvin Alisky, <u>The Foreign Press</u>, Baton Rouge: 1970, J.SU Press, p. 14.

the third category from the top--that is, "free--many controls." 96

There are specific instances illustrating the fear on the part of East African leaders that a free mass media can impede development of their countries. Merrill observes that:

At the present level of African culture, tribal loyalties transcend all other ties and have a bearing on every decision and influence all public reaction. Criticism is seen as opposition and opposition as disloyalty; disloyalty is seen as treason, and the penalty for treason is death. 97

The 1969 detention of <u>Transition</u> editor, Rajat Neogy and Abu Mayanja, an opposition party member of Parliament, is a case in point. Mayanja had criticized Prime Minister Obote in <u>Transition</u>. The academic community exerted pressure for a trial, which resulted in acquittal for Neogy and Mayanja. Both Neogy and Mayanja were again arrested, Neogy being finally released, but Mayanja remained in custody.

Some Africans in the area share Merrill's view that government officials regard the press as a subversive influence and a possible danger to their country's development. Hilary B. Ng'weno, journalist, notes that although there is no official censorhip in Kenya, Uganda or Tanzania, those countries do have restrictive sedition laws inherited from British rule, as well as preventive detention laws which means the government "can detain without trial those responsible for acts and statements, including newspaper reports,

<sup>96</sup> Ibid., pp. 32 and 33.

<sup>97&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid</sub>., p. 273.

considered by government to be prejudicial to the national pinterest."98

The foreign ownership of most of the press of East Africa makes defense of press freedom difficult. There are two chief groups of papers under foreign control, the <u>Standard</u> and the <u>Nation</u>. These two groups represent 80 percent of newspaper readership in East Africa. According to Ng'weno, economic threats to freedom of the press are the chief concern. There are shortages of skills and resources, and circulations are small. Newspaper circulations are further discussed in Chapter VII.

Like all other freedoms, the freedom that newspapers should enjoy in their treatment of newsworthy events and comments should be subject to limitation dictated by the national interest. The trouble is that in most new countries, governments tend to treat themselves as the sole judges of what constitutes the national interest. 100

Many authorities think that government officials in Africa certainly recognize the importance of mass media in nation-building, particularly such media that might affect the power base of the leaders. This point will be further explored in the Overview in connection with the ideology of the one-party state, but one pertinent observation can be made here. Pye points out that:

<sup>98</sup> Hilary B. Ng'weno, "The Nature of the Threat to Press Freedom in East Africa," Africa Today, 16:3, (June-July, 1969) p. 1.

<sup>99</sup> See Overview, Part 2.

<sup>100</sup> Ng'weno, op. cit., p. 4.

In most transitional societies there is an imbalance of power in favor of established governments, and the suspicion must always be entertained that when officials argue that criticism is dangerous, because it may threaten the unity of the state, they are in fact worrying more about the security of their own personal power. The sad fact is that in most countries where we find the press being denied its role of inspector general, the danger is not one of national unity but an understandable urge of particular leaders to make their own lives easier. 101

There appears little doubt that in new nations of East Africa, with the problems of literacy and distribution, radio is the mass medium that will probably contribute most to national development in the early stages. Both Lerner and Rogers show the trend is generally toward emphasis by government on use of radio to hasten the political and economic education of their nations. The fact that government owns and operates all broadcasting media emphasizes the desire to control and use for national purposes these means of communication. It is not enough to say that this is a British colonial legacy, for other phases of colonialism are being abolished, or drastically modified to suit the new nations; it is obvious that low levels of literacy limit the extensive use of print media for mass education and political indoctrination, so there are broadcasts in more than one languages in all three East Africa countries. The Voice of Kenya has three language services -- Swahili, English and various tribal languages. Regular Swahili broadcasts are beamed to classrooms

<sup>101</sup> Lucian W. Pye, in Lerner and Schramm, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

in many parts of these nations. 102

Some studies have shown that there is a strong positive correlation between literacy and mass media exposure, both in the aggregate level of analysis, and also where individuals were used as units of analysis. Rogers' Colombia data show a high correlation between literacy and newspaper exposure, more than that between literacy and nonprint media. Literacy is also related to radio exposure . . . which suggests the presence of the centripetal effect. Uhu Much specific research is needed on the question of literacy versus mass media exposure and the results of it. Other factors can enter in besides the level of individual literacy. Many illiterates have occasional printed media read to them, for example. Rogers suggests that the significant factor may

<sup>102</sup>While teaching in Tanzania in a Teachers' College, I noted regularly scheduled Swahili broadcasts mainly in the realm of citizenship instruction. All teachers were required to use these programs.

<sup>103</sup> Lerner, 1966, op. cit., Deutschmann, op. cit., and UNESCO, Mass Media in Developing Countries, Paris: 1961.

Rogers, op. cit., p. 83. The centripetal effect, according to Lerner, is defined as the tendency for a person exposed to one mass medium to be exposed also to other media. See Footnote 3, p. 8.

<sup>105</sup> It was my experience in ten years of village work in India that many village homes had a book or newspaper, often quite ancient, but proudly displayed. Most Christian homes had a Hindi Bible, even where no resident member of the household could read. It was there to be read aloud to gathered family and friends when a literate visitor appeared.

well be family literacy, rather than individual literacy, since the Colombia data show only a small percentage of households that contain not a single literate member. 106 If substantial numbers of illiterates have newspapers read to them, probably many more people listen to the radio placed in the village area, and thus are at least exposed to that medium, whether greatly changed by it or not. Radio has the additional advantage of being less expensive to operate and possess than television, and radio does not suffer from the sparse and uneven distribution of sets, such as is found in the case of television set distribution in many developing countries. 107

## Postulate 6

The colonial legacy of British rule in East Africa has left a basis for economic cooperation and interchange of social and educational facilities, leading toward a united effort to deal with certain common problems.

The English language as a colonial legacy is still a potent force and serves in varying degrees as a lingua franca.

The most outstanding of the British influences concerns economic cooperation, which goes back to the beginning

<sup>106</sup> Rogers, op. cit., p. 84.

<sup>107</sup> In Tanzania, during my residence there--19641966--daily newspapers and other periodicals were flown upcountry to the main towns; thus their distribution was fairly
quick, but was limited to the relatively small number of people in and around those towns. However, even in distant villages, a visitor could regularly observe the ubiquitous
transistor radio, in homes and shops, or being carried on the
dusty roads, along with the loads of produce.

of British rule; a <u>de facto</u> common market dates to 1917, when Kenya and Uganda had free trade. In 1927, Tanganyika entered the free trade area, having come under British control as a result of World War I. In 1940, customs services were joined together, and there was a common external tariff in all three countries, aided by a common currency until mid-1966. Economic unity was further strengthened by EACSO (East African Common Services Organization) in a common administration of railroads, harbors, telegraphy, posts and aviation.

The 1960's saw a heated debate over EACSO, due to Kenya's advantage in the greater development of industry. Although a new treaty greatly altered the cooperation pattern in 1967, the earlier basis for cooperation has not been cast aside. However, attempts at political federation have failed. Besides the form of mutual activity already mentioned, log the University of East Africa has been a symbol of unity in higher education. Each college has specialized in one or two professional areas and students from all three countries go to the college where they can best get the work they need. There are numerous mutual research projects, chiefly in the areas of public health, fisheries, and the like.

British policy in the 1920's was geared toward a political and economic union among Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, although the actual cooperation accomplished was limited to the economic area. Yet East Africa has had much

<sup>108</sup> See Overview, Part 2.

<sup>109</sup> See Introduction.



more cooperative effort between sovereign nations than most other areas of Africa, and in many respects, more than other parts of the world--there being few examples of a common market until the coming of the European common market following World War II.

The common use of English served as a potent force under British rule to unite the elites of the three countries, and survives as an important factor at present. Precise statistics are unavailable as to the number of East Africans who use English, and to what degree they do so. Kenyatta and Obote both make frequent use of English in their speeches; and Nyerere, while emphasizing Swahili as the national language, has recognized the utility of English in secondary and higher education, in newspapers and in other areas of national life. 110

## Postulate 7

Young Africans who go abroad for a higher education and then return to their native land, will usually become community or national leaders.

The development of western education at any level is relatively recent in East Africa. It really got under way only after 1900, and its greatest development took place in the 1920's. Studies show that relatively few East Africans reach Grade 12; thus the small number going abroad for college will naturally be a substantial part of the educated elite and almost certainly among those qualified for national

<sup>110</sup> See Part 2 of the Overview.



leadership. Goldthorpe shows lll the enrollment in the school system--including both Christian mission and government schools--for as late as 1958; these data reveal the phenomenal attrition rate in the secondary education in East Africa. The data in Table 2-1 illustrate this high rate of attrition in the student population from primary to Grades 10 and 12:

TABLE 2-1
ATTRITION RATE OF EAST AFRICAN STUDENTS

| Ma Ma      | ·         | Boys    | Girls  |
|------------|-----------|---------|--------|
| Kenya      | Primary 1 | 113,380 | 55,760 |
|            | Grade 10  | 984     | 149    |
|            | Grade 12  | 614     | 42     |
| Uganda     | Primary 1 | 48,196  | 28,244 |
|            | Grade 10  | 800     | 89     |
|            | Grade 12  | 581     | 41     |
| Tanganyika | Primary 1 | 67,903  | 39,358 |
|            | Grade 10  | 1,276   | 102    |
|            | Grade 12  | 163     | 11     |
|            |           |         | •      |

These data are adapted from Goldthorpe, p. 6.

Source: Reports of the Departments of Education of Kenya,

Uganda and Tanganyika for 1958.

It is difficult to place these figures in their demographic setting, as the nearest over-all population figures are for 1961, three years later; however, for sake of

<sup>111</sup> J. E. Goldthorpe, An African Elite: Makerere College Students, 1922-1960, East African Studies Series No. 17. Nairobi: 1965, Oxford Univ. Press for East African Institute of Social Research.

comparison, the census figures for 1961, rounded off, may serve this purpose:  $^{112}$ 

Kenya: 7,287,000
Uganda: 6,845,000
Tanganyika: 9,404,000

Africans comprise 97.5 percent of the total population of these countries. 113

As Goldthorpe notes, the policy of the colonial government in East Africa was to send European and Indian sudents abroad. Until the 1940's, East Africans going abroad to study were very few. Jomo Kenyatta was one of the first; he went to England under a private scholarship in the twenties. The first three Africans to be financed by the colonial government went to England in 1946; in 1954 Kenya had one hundred and ten students studying abroad, mostly in England and India; as for Tanganyika, in 1953-54, the number of students abroad were so few that biographies of each were compiled. By the end of the fifties, the number of East African students studying abroad had greatly increased, as the following figures for 1960 will show:

Data taken from East African Services Organization, The East African Statistical Review, No. 3, (June, 1962).

<sup>113</sup> For later demographic data see Chapter III, Part 2.

Adapted from Goldthorpe, op. cit., p. 18. (See also pp. 16 and 18).

|             | Country of                    | Studying in      |                            |  |
|-------------|-------------------------------|------------------|----------------------------|--|
|             | Origin                        | United States    | England                    |  |
|             | Kenya<br>Uganda<br>Tanganyika | 73 .<br>29<br>22 | 40<br>80 <b>-</b> 90<br>26 |  |
| * . <b></b> |                               | · •              |                            |  |

Evidence gathered in 1969-70 from the embassies of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in Washington, D.C. shows that several hundred students were studying in the United States from each of these countries in that school year.

Goldthorpe comments that in East Africa:

Study abroad, rather like the grand tour of renaissance Europe, came to be regarded as an indispensable part of the education of a fully educated man. Scholarships abroad tended to become part of the stock in trade of African political patronage, and cases were not unknown of men and women being sent abroad to train for careers which they had no intention of pursuing, or for courses equally available locally, apparently in recognition of political or other services rendered to a chief or other persons of importance. 115

Thus, those having studied abroad constituted a privileged elite, who with their knowledge of English could and did engage effectively in the politics of independence. In the last two decades the larger tribes of Kenya and Uganda, such as the Kikuyu, Luo, and Baganda have dominated student groups going abroad, while Tanzania, having numerous small tribes, has wider distribution across many tribes in its student group studying abroad.

Although Goldthorpe's study deals with the preindependence era of East Africa, the general trends in the

<sup>115 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 20.

attrition rate in education have continued; however, greatly increased enrollments in all schools exist today. (See Table 2-2.)

TABLE 2-2

SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN EAST AFRICA
(Figures are for 1968 unless otherwise noted)

| Kenya   | a                                | Uganda ('66) <sup>b</sup>                 | Tanzania <sup>c</sup>           |
|---|----------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| First level:<br>Second level:<br>General<br>Vocational<br>Teacher |                                  | 564,190<br>98,129<br>(90,904)<br>( 3,128) | 855,000<br>28,300               |
| Training Third level: Overseas                                    | ( 6,634)<br>5,967<br>2,800 ('65) | ( 4,097)<br>1,593 ('67)<br>2,500 ('67)    | 3,220<br>912 ('66)<br>807 ('66) |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>United Nations Statistical Yearbook, for 1969, p. 726.

b<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 736. Another source, Allison Butler Herrick, Area Handbook for Uganda, 1969, gives the total for 1966 for primary and junior secondary schools as 633,546, (p. 122). Also <u>Statesman's Yearbook</u>, 1970-71, p. 463, gives 633,546. In 1968 the Minister of Defense stated that over one million children were enrolled in Uganda's primary schools.

Callison Butler Herrick, et al., Area Handbook for Tanzania, Washington, D.C.: 1968, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, p. 160.

Part of the high drop-out rate in the schools of East Africa is due to the practice, especially in Tanzania, of providing terminal courses in primary grades for large numbers of pupils--that is, not preparing them for secondary

schools but expecting that they will enter the labor force immediately. However, most of the sharp drop in enrollments after primary level is due to the lack of schools and teachers. For example, in Tanzania in 1967, only 50 percent of the school-age children could be accommodated in primary schools to begin with, and only 10 percent of these could be admitted into secondary schools.

The general trends in the development of this student elite have continued to the present time in East Africa. Practically all of the top leaders have had a foreign-bassed education, and as more students have gone abroad, even the lower echelons in national and community affairs have been filled with such graduates. 117 Foreign-educated Africans have recently filled many positions as principals and teachers in secondary schools and colleges. Such posts carry with them prestige in the community and mean that the incumbents can influence local politics and other areas of economic and social life. One notable feature of this situation is the youth of high officials. Tom Mboya became a cabinet official in Kenya after extensive study in the United States while still in his twenties; Nyerere became Prime Minister of Tanganyika in his thirties, and President at the age of forty.

<sup>116&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 148.

<sup>117</sup> Evidence shows that the stream of African students has peaked in the United States and may now be on the decline. Many sources of foreign aid to finance such study have dwindled. There is also an attitude on the part of African leaders that more higher education should be provided in their own countries.

Thus the great need of leadership, coupled with the relatively few highly educated people in East Africa, result in an unusually great importance being attached to the understanding of African students who study abroad, since they inevitably become leaders in one way or another upon their return to their countries.

#### Postulate 8

The prevailing political philosophy in East Africa is African Socialism.

Much has been written about the concept of African Socialism; many western authorities appear to question its validity, saying it is vague and theoretical. But within the last three or four years, Nyerere, at least, has spent much time and effort not only proclaiming the idea of African Socialism, but endeavoring to put its theory into practice through various self-help projects, using the concept of "people-centredness" as opposed to "profit-centredness." 18

Friedland and Rosberg, 119 writing in 1964, called African Socialism "unanalyzed abstractions." They felt at that time these concepts were vague and generalized.

Ndabaningi Sithole, African Nationalism, New York: 1969, Second Edition, Oxford Univ. Press, p. 189.

William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr., African Socialism, Stanford: 1964, Stanford Univ. Press, pp. 2-3.



Though African Socialism is neither a precise ideology nor a specific guide to action, it is nonetheless a set of dimensions to which Africans will give specific content as they work out their problems on a day-to-day basis.

Since the work of Friedland and Rosberg, much has transpired in East Africa to implement these "abstractions." Eloquent talk by Nyerere continues unabated, but certain schemes have also come into effect. 120 In Nyerere's words,

We want to create a socialist society which is based on three principles: equality and respect for human dignity; sharing of the resources which are produced by our efforts; work by everyone and exploitation by none.121

The revamping of the educational system in Tanzania so as to produce students geared to socialist ideals is a major goal and has been started. Nyerere states,

The educational system of Tanzania must emphasize cooperative endeavor, not individual advancement; it must stress concepts of equality and the responsibility to give service which goes with any special ability, whether it be in carpentry, in animal husbandry, or in academic pursuits . . . our education must counteract the temptation to intellectual arrogance. 122

Nyerere has often reiterated his belief that the exploitation of western capitalism must be phased out in

<sup>120</sup> See Chapter VI.

Julius K. Nyerere, Education for Self-Reliance, Dar Es Salaam: 1967, Govt. Printer. (Reproduced in Wilfred Cartey and Martin Kilson, The African Reader: Independent Africa, New York: 1970, Vintage Books, p. 237.

<sup>122&</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 239.

Tanzania, and he points to factors in African culture for his ideas:

The foundation and objective of African Socialism is the extended family. The true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethern and another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the 'brethern' for the extermination of the 'non-brethern'. He regards all men as his brethern-as members of his ever extending family . . .

Ujamaa, or 'family-hood,' describes our socialism. It is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a happy society on the basis of the exploitation of man by man; and it is equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism, which seeks to build its happy society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man. 123

The official aims of TANU in Tanzania involve ideals of African Socialism, just as do those of the ruling parties in Uganda and Kenya. Tanzania has gone further in implementation of these ideals. Since 1964 when Tanganyika joined with Zanzibar to form Tanzania, Ujamaa has been heavily stressed:

President Nyerere, local and national party leaders and the press and radio constantly remind the people that development is the duty and responsibility of all. Simple slogans such as "Uhuru na Umoja" (Freedom and Unity), and "Uhuru na Kazi" (Freedom and Work) are promoted to unite the nation into a common endeavor . . . Nyerere's socialism is a synthesis of the African Socialism of Kenya, Ghana, Mali and others; it is a moderate philosophy that retains traditional patterns of political behavior insofar as they do not conflict with economic development. 124

Nyerere has done more than talk. He has taken sharp measures against dissenters. In 1966 university students

Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, 1967, op. cit., p. 170.

<sup>124</sup> Herrick (Tanzania) et al., p. 264.

University College at Dar Es Salaam for two years. This involved more than three hundred students, two-thirds of the student body. The Arusha Declaration of 1967, besides forbidding officials to enrich themselves while in office, also nationalized banks and some businesses. Schools were directed to implement the rules of self-sufficiency by growing food as well as instituting changes in curriculum geared toward rural life styles. 126

Tom Mboya's writings also reflect the concepts of African Socialism based on the importance of good human relationships. He proposed a common brotherhood based on a rural life style, which involves communal land ownership. 127

Kenyatta does little talking in detail about African Socialism, but he clearly favors it. Kenyatta stands for nationalism of foreign-held interests, including the lands of white settlers, with fair compensation and by gradual means. This is actually being done. Kenyatta brooks little opposition, especially from abroad. He sent Communist agents out

 $<sup>^{125}\</sup>mathrm{Tanzania}$ , as well as Uganda subsidizes college students for their education. The students are expected to give service to the nation.

<sup>126</sup> See William P. Lineberry, <u>East Africa</u>, Vol. 40, Reference Shelf, New York: 1968, Foreign Policy Association, H. W. Wilson Co.

<sup>127</sup> See Tom Mboya, <u>Freedom and After</u>, London: 1963. André Deutsch, p. 163.

<sup>128</sup> See Jomo Kenyatta, "African Socialism and African Unity," in African Forum, Summer, 1965, American Society of African Culture, New York: Vol 1:1.

of the country in 1965 when they appeared to threaten political stability in connection with Russian support of the Lumumba Institute in Nairobi. Kenyatta also batted down Chou En-lai when the Chinese leader visited East Africa in 1965 and remarked that Africa is ripe for revolution. Kenyatta said that "Kenya intends to avert all revolutions irrespective of their origins."

Some non-Africans scoff at the ideals of African Socialism, insisting they do not face up to reality. When Nyerere announced his nationalization policy in 1967, one authority wrote: "There is little money in Dar Es Salaam to pay those whose companies have been nationalized, whatever the president may in all sincerity say about intending compensation to be 'full and fair.'"

<sup>129</sup> See "Atlantic Report: Tanzania," in Atlantic: 219:34 (June, 1967).

#### CHAPTER III

OVERVIEW: PART 2

For the three-nation region under study, this chapter is concerned with geography and people, with recent national developments, and with three interrelated problems affecting national development on which the investigation focuses; namely, tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communication.

## Geography and People

To the uninitiated, one surprising feature of Africa is the large size of some countries. East Africa, including Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania (incorporating Zanzibar) is one-fifth the size of the United States, comprising 683,020 square miles. Tanzania without Zanizibar is four times the size of Great Britain, and is larger than Texas plus all of New England. Kenya equals France and Belgium together, while Uganda is about the size of the United Kingdom. Another surprise is the climate and to some extent the terrain. Both are at variance with the usual stereotype which depicts an Africa of dense tropical forests, hot humid climate, and one kind of people—black. Actually, much of Africa is a gigantic elevated plateau tilted to the southeast and having scant rainfall—which is

William A. Hance, <u>The Geography of Modern Africa</u>, New York: 1964, Columbia Univ. Press, pp. 376.

also unreliable. Many of the various racial types of mankind are found in Africa--by no means are all of them black. This description fits much of East Africa. Except for a coastal strip and certain portions of the northern shore of Lake Victoria mainly in Uganda, rainfall is generally less than sufficient for good agriculture, but temperatures are greatly moderated by the elevation. Thus Nairobi at 5000 feet above sea level enjoys a year-round temperature comparable to that of Denver in late spring. The Great Rift Valley, one of the truly magnificant geological features of the world, slashes southward across the area, producing many long, deep lakes, such as Lake Tanganyika and Lake Nyasa, while the high central plateau including Lake Victoria and Mt. Kilimanjaro, and the lush coastal area illustrate the varied features of the land-scape of East Africa.

It is apparent that the basic geography of the three nations is generally advantageous for economic development and support of populations many times larger than those presently occupying the area. If, then, other conditions are favorable, these nations have the opportunity for modernization and full-fledged national development.

The varied landscape mentioned above is matched by the diversity of the people. There are four main groups in East Africa, the first of which are Africans, comprising 97.5

percent of the population. 2 Great variety exists among the numerous tribes. Some had well organized political kingdoms, such as the Baganda and Banyoro, prior to the European conquest; others were acephalous groups with little apparent cohesion. Some by tradition have been farmers; others exhibit a highly developed cattle culture. Clashes between these diverse societies were often frequent and prolonged in precolonial times.

The second major population group is usually termed Indian or Asian. They include Hindus, Pakistanis, and Goans, and are often descended from people brought into Africa by the British as railway workers and soldiers, although quite a few have come temporarily in the years following World War II to be teachers. Those Asians became the entrepeneurs of large areas of Africa, often amassing wealth as shopkeepers and traders; many hold clerical and professional jobs. They are envied and resented by Africans.

Kenya: 10,506,000 Uganda: 9,500,000

Tanzania

Mainland: 12,557,000 Zanzibar: 369,000

Source: <u>United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1969</u>, pp. 136-137.

<sup>3</sup>The position of Asians is precarious in the independent countries of East Africa. In 1968 thousands tried to flee to Britain from Kenya, since they held British passports. Britain has turned many away. The Africanization programs in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are aimed partly at loosening the economic hold Asians have had in those countries. Asians usually do not participate in African life; they often speak their own languages and start their own schools and bring brides from their ancestral lands.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>The latest population figures (for 1969).

The third population group are the Europeans, most numerous in Kenya, where early in the twentieth century large groups of white settlers were granted land. One third of all Europeans in East Africa live in and around Nairobi and thus are highly concentrated. Since independence there has been a steady migration out. Most Europeans are British, although there is a sizable Greek population in Tanzania, and a scattering of Americans and United Nations personnel.

Arabs constitute a fourth population group—a small minority concentrated along the coast and in Zanzibar, where their presence predates the Portuguese explorers by many centuries. The Arabs brought Islam into East Africa, where it flourishes today.

The distribution of population reflects the availability of good land and sufficient rainfall; thus the area around Lake Victoria and the highlands area are the most densely populated. Besides low rainfall and poor soil, one of the main causes for large areas being uninhabited is the prevalence of the tsetse fly. Other than the three capitals of Nairobi, Kampala, and Dar Es Salaam, only Mombasa constitutes a large urban area in East Africa. Distances are tremendous and the logistics of communication whether by road, railroad, telegraphy, telephone, or airways present very difficult problems at this stage of East Africa's development.

The town of Mwanza with a population of 34,559 is the third largest city in Tanzania, and is a center for education as well as up-country political activity. Yet it is 700 miles from the capital city of Dar Es Salaam on the coast. Just one road, stretches of which are unpaved, one railroad and one airline go to Mwanza from Dar Es Salaam. In the interior one

# Recent National Development

Despite the problems of sparse population, few urban centers, great distances, inadequate transportation systems, lack of capital and technical skills, and a great majority of the people still illiterate and unsophisticated, the three countries of East Africa have made definite progress in their development since gaining independence in ways often not discernible from afar.<sup>5</sup>

Lineberry writes:

In Kenya the legacy of colonialism is being overcome; no one can doubt that the white man in Kenya today fares far better than the black man under apartheid in South Africa—a tribute both to the native tolerance of Kenyan Africans and to their willingness to forgive. In Tanzania a new austere and distinctly African brand of socialism is emerging which stresses self—help, co—operation, and an end to privilege for the "new class" of bureaucracy that has come to power in so many newly independent African states. Uganda, though saddled with one—man rule and sluggish economy, is evincing a co—operative spirit toward its neighbors and has thus far avoided the threat of a military takeover.

Undeniably, East Africa has its problems. One-party rule, widespread poverty, and political scandal are as

can travel for hours by car and not meet a single person, either afoot or in a vehicle. Some of this country is unfit for habitation due to poor soil, lack of water or tsetse fly infestation. Much progress has been made in the eradication of the tsetse fly, which causes sleeping sickness; however, the tsetse fly remains a problem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Tanganyika received her independence in 1961, having been under British mandate control since World War I. Uganda became independent in 1962, and Kenya in 1963; both of these countries had been British colonies since the late nineteenth century.

<sup>6</sup>Lineberry, op. cit., pp. 3-4.



rife there as in much of tropical Africa as a whole. Surrounded by troubled or trouble-making neighbors-Sudan in the north, the Congo in the west, white-ruled Rhodesia, South Africa, Mozambique in the south--Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda share a precarious stability in a setting fraught with dangers.

Concomitant to these changes in political economy and ideology, there was the "revolution of rising expectations" developing in most newly independent countries after World War II; this wave of hope was followed closely by the "revolution of rising frustrations," according to Lerner. People in developing areas of East Africa who, via the mass media and otherwise, have some knowledge of the technology of the west have experienced both of these "revolutions." They have seen hope for change and progress but over a period of years many have become disillusioned because they themselves have received little real benefit.

<sup>7</sup> Interesting economic comparisons can be made between Tanzania and Kenya and their aims and methods in economic development. Both countries compare closely in population and area. In 1968 their economic growth rates were estimated at 6.5 percent for Tanzania and 6.7 percent for Kenya. The latter country has more industrial capacity, and it is significant to note that Kenya projects a 57 percent capital investment to come from private and foreign sources, while Tanzania aims at 66 percent from state-owned or controlled sources. (See Africa Digest, Vol. XVII, No. 4, August, 1970, p. 79.)

<sup>8</sup>Lerner and Schramm, op. cit., pp. 316-317.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Leaders of some nations are becoming uneasily aware that GNP and other indices of economic development are too narrow as gauges for over-all national progress. The expectations of stages of economic growth have not materialized. Social problems must be integrated more fully into development planning for the seventies. (See Itzhak Galnoor, "Social Information for What," in <a href="The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science">The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</a>, Vol. 393, (January, 1971).

While the decade of the sixties began with an increased interest in aid to Africa, especially from the United States, the war in Indo-China soon lessened the American aid program elsewhere. As American aid declined in Africa, and as Russia's earlier interest there also was on the wane, the interest and foreign aid of Communist China was steadily growing. Nyerere visited China, entertained Chou En-lai in Tanzania, and accepted various types of aid from the Chinese. Today China is engaged in constructing a twelve-hundred-mile railroad from the copper mines of Zambia across Tanzania to Dar Es Salaam, giving a new outlet to world markets, unfettered by white-ruled Rhodesia. Yet there is also in East Africa a note of caution developing on the part of leaders in dealing with China, and the Chinese call to revolution for Africa's masses has not been received with enthusiasm.

Economic cooperation among the three East African nations is considerable, although political federation is lacking. Following meetings among the top leaders, the East African Community was inagurated December, 1967, at Arusha, Tanzania. The former EASCO was used as a basis and head-quarters were placed at Arusha, thus removing Kenya's usual advantage of dominance. A special minister of cabinet rank from each of the three countries and the heads of state make up a political policy body, while a legislative assembly composed of an equal number of representatives from each country can legislate on common matters. This organization is open

<sup>10</sup> See reference to Kenyatta and Chou-En-lai p. 58.

<sup>11</sup> Herrick, (Uganda) op. cit., pp. 203 ff.

to other interested countries, and Zambia as well as Ethiopia have made overtures toward joining.

A development bank and posts and telegraph administration are located in Uganda, while the harbors authority is in Tanzania; Kenya remains the headquarters for airways and railroads. Thus a type of decentralization has been effected, which is more satisfactory to the less developed countries of Uganda and Tanzania. A mutual arrangement whereby transfer taxes are employed to promote industrial development is also in effect. If one of the member countries has a deficit in the manufacturing of a certain product, that country can tax imports from the other members to make up the deficit. There are no other internal tariffs within East Africa, and a common customs and income tax service also operate. 12

# Three Interrelated Problems

While the three East African countries have individually and cooperatively made progress toward modern national development, they are still emerging and have far to go before becoming modernized and mature nations. Among the many problems their national leaders face are three peculiarly interrelated ones that are of special concern to this study. These are the problems of tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communications. In various ways, these same or analogous problems are found in many emerging or underdeveloped nations. This

<sup>12</sup>A detailed analysis of the East Africa common market is found in Philip Ndegwa, The Common Market Development in East Africa, Nairobi: 1968, Second Edition, East African Studies 22, East African Publishing House.

study is undertaken with the belief and on the premise that the interrelationships between these problems—or variables—found in this study will tend to exist to greater or lesser degree between the same or analogous problems in other like countries. Further, it is believed and postulated that the successes and failures of coping with these three interrelated variables by the leaders of East Africa will have useful lessons for leaders of other emerging or underdeveloped nations.

#### Tribalism

Tribalism is a canker sore eating out the heart of Africa as in no other part of the world. Witness the recent Nigerian civil war. The murder of Tom Mboya in 1969 set off a spate of violence in Kenya, resulting in the demise of the country's only opposition party. His murder was undoubtedly tribally related, if not inspired. The ancient bonds of tribesmen, who experience the cohesion of common ancestry, language and rituals, often overcome an African's allegiance to a nation-state composed of diverse tribes. This feeling is by no means confined to the illiterate villager. 13 Tribalism is a way of life for many. Since so much of Africa abounds in small tribes, no viable African nation-state could be established consisting of one tribe. A way to bind tribes together must be found.

<sup>13</sup> I asked my college students in Tanzania what country they came from. (Students come from all over East Africa to colleges.) Some students replied, "Sukumaland"—this is an area within Tanzania but is not even an official province. To the Sukuma, this response reveals his instinctive tribal loyalty.

There are peculiar facets of the problem of tribal loyalties existing in each of the three East African nations; these facets will be explored in more detail later in this study. In general, it is patently clear that in the entire area of East Africa forces of tribal tensions have increased in recent months, particularly in Kenya in the aftermath of Mboya's murder, (see page 29), and in the recent overthrow of Obote in Uganda. African intellectuals and political leaders are strongly aware of the tensions. B. A. Ogot, head of the History Department at Nairobi University College, thinks that these tensions do not necessarily have to be disruptive.

Tribalism could be positive if people were proud of it and used it to create something bigger from diverse backgrounds. We must start with tribal cultures . . . Dawn can only fall after midnight. This looks like midnight. We were too unrealistic and expected too much (of independence) too soon. 14

Some constructive steps are being taken in the countries of East Africa to overcome tribal problems. In Uganda, the army commander, General Idi Amin, who overthrew the Obote regime in January, 1971, has not established a strictly military rule but has appointed 16 civilians to cabinet posts, out of 18 positions; these selections reflect a wide cross-tribal representation, thus alleviating many fears of tribal favoritism. Nyerere, who has made great strides in overcoming the manifestations of tribalism in Tanzania, curiously enough was the first African leader to recognize the new state of Biafra, now defunct, which was the result of

<sup>14</sup> As quoted by C. C. Miniclier, "Tribalism: African Resource," The Houston Post, February 21, 1971, p. 12.a.

bitter tribal warfare in Nigeria. Nyerere, by promoting Swahili as the national language hopes to reduce tribal tensions. There is a stern Puritan streak running throughout many of the national policies in Tanzania, exemplified in the recent order that the proud Masai tribesmen must henceforth wear trousers instead of the scanty shuka, which exposes most of the buttucks. It may be that Nyerere is striving for a respectable society in the eyes of the world, instead of enhancing the stereotype of the "naked African tribesmen."

Thus, while leaders and the educated elite continue to deplore tribalism, and attempt ways to defuse its power, the tensions remain and pervade East Africa. Tom Mboya shows that 16 the independence struggle brought with it the first real effort to introduce a national movement to replace various tribal loyalties. Seven years after Mboya's analysis, 'the process continues, with varying success. Traditional ideas of land tenure are being used in cooperative schemes with some The introduction of money economy, the removal of many people from rural areas to towns for work, have surely had effect on tribal loyalties. But as Mboya notes, despite all the effort thus far in overcoming tribal tensions and attempting to bring all the citizens of the East African area. into modern nation-states ". . . planning in all three countries has been largely a central exercise which has yet to be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 12.a.

Tom Mboya, "The Impact of Modern Institutions on the East African," in P. H. Gulliver, op. cit., p. 93.

appreciated by the man in the rural area."17



Lingua Franca

A second problem of great importance, and of special interest to this study, is the question of a lingua franca. This question is closely tied to tribal loyalties and the very multiplicity of languages enhances the difficulty. Whiteley notes that 18 there are about one hundred sixty languages in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania—among a total population of twenty—six million. The great majority of the languages are of the Bantu family, with about the same degree of relationship as exists within the Romance languages. But Nilotic and Cushitic languages also exist in the area, and they are totally different. Only a very few languages are spoken by as many as one million people—the Kikuyu or Sukuma, for example. Many languages are known by only a few hundred or a few thousand people. At most, ten million speak Swahili as a second language, mostly in Tanzania and Kenya.

In the realm of education the near-futility of coping with the language problem becomes apparent. For example, Uganda 19 recognizes seven languages in primary education, but only one, Luganda, is used as a subject for the Cambridge School Certificate. Imagine the educational loss to thousands of children who do not speak one of the seven languages.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 97.

<sup>18</sup> W. H. Whiteley, "Language Choice and Language Planning in East Africa," in P. H. Gulliver, op. cit., pp. 195 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Ib<u>id.</u>, p. 106.

Religious factors also enter in, since the Christian missions have used certain tribal languages and thus developed them highly. In much of East Africa Swahili is the language of trade and football, among other things; English remains the language only of the educated elite. Whiteley further observes:

Efficient government requires efficient means of communication both within the State and outside it; and while all three countries recognize that indispensability of English as a means of communication with the rest of Africa and the world, there is less than unanimity with regard to the linguistic pattern of internal communica-Uganda's problem is that she is a relatively small country and has a small number of languages which are y held in more or less esteem . . . In Tanzania, where the number of languages is large, where none of these has pre-eminent status, and where there is a conveniently long-established lingua franca, the choice may be simple but the implementation rather more difficult, despite repeated exhortation. This is the situation now that Swahili has been chosen as the national language. In Kenya, the number of languages is relatively small, but it includes a number of large linguistically diverse groups, and furthermore a convenient lingua franca is available. 20

Thus, unlike some other African countries, where the language of the former colonial power seems to be the only feasible instrument for overcoming the tribal-based lingualism --Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania have a choice between the use of English and Swahili as a lingua franca. Neither language is known to the majority of the people, but at least they do not have overtones of tribal loyalties to the same extent that



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 107.

their other languages possess, 21 and Swahili of course avoids the stigma of colonialism.

### Mass Communication

The third major problem affecting national development in East Africa which is of special interest in this study is that of mass media. Not only the leaders of East Africa, but some African journalists are quite aware of the part government plays in the development of a truly African press. Titus Mukupo of the Zambia information service notes that:

There are three important ways in which government can contribute to the development of an African press: by financing the establishment of genuinely African newspapers, the training of journalists, and the maintenance of a healthy political climate in which newspapers can thrive to the full advantage of the nations.<sup>22</sup>

The facts show that the East African press, in keeping with most of the rest of Africa, is beset with knotty probems, which are often intensified, not alleviated, by the suspicious attitude of government. Hachten observes that <sup>23</sup>

The whole question of tribal lingualism is discussed in detail in Heinz Klass, "Bilingualism and Nationalism," in the <u>Journal of Social Issues</u>, Vol. XXIII No. 2, (April, 1967) pp. 39-47.

Titus Mukupo, "The Government and the Press," in "Notes on the Symposium on the Press," Africa Report, Vol. 11:1, (January, 1966), p. 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>William A. Hachten, "The Training of African Journalists," in <u>Gazette</u>, Deventer, The Netherlands, Vol. XIV, No. 2, (1968) p. 102-103.



The new African political leaders are hypersensitive to criticism from expatriate or foreign journalists. There is an understandable desire to have a nation's own nationals man its media. Hence, the push for Africanization of news media exacerbates the urgency of training African journalists. 24

Considering the colonial legacy of the area, the prevailing attitude of leaders is not surprising. Ainslie shows that newspapers in East Africa "from the beginning were vehicles for the culture and concepts of the rulers, with considerable resources of white capital at their command." So for more than sixty years the East African Standard was the voice of white settlers in East Africa, particularly in Kenya; the Tanganyika Standard established in Dar Es Salaam (1930) and the Uganda Argus (1953) served the same purpose, in their respective areas. Clearly today, newspapers are an important source of information for the educated elite; most leaders recognize the influence of the press, which accounts for their wary attitude towards it.

In addition to the problem of a scarcity of trained journalists and the continuing foreign economic control, the recent increase in the number of government and party publications has hurt the privately owned papers. Lack of

Many schemes have been tried to train African journalists, the most effective of which is probably the African Training Scheme of the International Press Institute. Since 1963 it has given several six months courses in Nairobi, financed by the Ford Foundation. Two hundred journalists had been trained by mid-1967. Tanzania has a permanent training program. (See Chapter VI.)

Rosalynde Ainslie, <u>The Press in Africa</u>, London: 1966, Gallancz, p. 99.

indigenous capital, together with the high cost of raw materials such as newsprint, that must be imported across 5000 miles of ocean, add to the obstacles facing the press. Naturally, the lack of economic development results in extremely low levels of advertising expenditure, which restricts financial success and weakens freedom from special interest groups and from government influence. The high level of illiteracy hampers circulation, and the multiplicity of languages present the need for many editions. As Sommerlad notes,

Apart form a few mission periodicals, almost all papers are published from the three capitals of Nairobi, Dar Es Salaam, and Kampala. Distribution facilities are inadequate and expensive, and only one or two of the major newspapers in each city achieve anything like a national distribution. The rural population, therefore, are poorly served. 26

No one has mustered the capital or skill to attempt competition with the long-established foreign-owned Groups.

Merrill observes:

The long-established East African Standard group has its <u>East African Standard</u> in Kenya, <u>Uganda Argua</u> in Kampala, and <u>Standard Tanzania</u> in Dar Es Salaam. All three are broadsheet mornings with separate editors; there is a Sunday sister paper, the <u>Sunday News</u>, published in Tanzania.

The East African newspapers (Nation Series) are owned by the Aga Khan. Established in 1959-60, the East African newspapers started with four newspapers. First, in February, 1959, came the Swahili weekly <u>Taifa Kenya</u> followed a year later by the Swahili daily <u>Taifa Leo</u>.

<sup>26</sup> E. Lloyd Sommerlad, "Problems in Developing a Free Enterprise Press in East Africa," in Gazette Deventer, The Netherlands, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1968), p. 74. The whole issue is devoted to the press in East Africa.

In March, 1960, the <u>Sunday Nation</u> was launched and in October of that year, the <u>Daily Nation</u> started in Nairobi, Kenya. The <u>Daily Nation</u> is the main paper in the series today and there are now three weekly <u>Taifas</u>, one each for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, all in <u>Swahili</u>...

These . . . compete with the Standard's Swahili weekly <u>Baraza</u> . . . The Nation Series also publishes <u>Tayfa Empya</u> in Uganda. This is the vernacular (Luganda) version of the <u>Daily Nation</u> published in Kenya. Also competing for the readership in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are government-owned and/or independent newspapers as well as church publications and others. 27

Although occasionally harassed, most newspapers in East Africa do not have to fear for their existence, <sup>28</sup> despite the climate of wariness they live in, provided they "write from a basic sympathy with the national effort." <sup>29</sup>

As to other means of mass communication in East Africa, radio has been the most important medium, since it requires no literacy nor expensive imported equipment. 30 Donald Browne says that Africa as a whole has witnessed an increased emphasis on mass media due to three main factors:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Merrill, et al., op. cit., p. 282.

Nyerere nationalized the <u>Standard Tanzania</u> early in 1970, saying it had South Africa interests, but he vowed its new editor would have "day to day" freedom subject only to Nyerere's personal directives. (See also Chapter VI.)

The words of Tom Mboya, as quoted by Rosalynde Ainslie, op. cit., pp. 222-23.

 $<sup>$^{30}\</sup>mathrm{Most}$  technical personnel in radio broadcasting are still foreign.

- 1. The desire to imitate advanced nations.
- 2. The desire of the one-party states to increase their power.
- 3. The desire to use the media as a tool of modernization. 31

On the continent of Africa each independent nation has a radio service and twelve have television. 32 Africa the national radio service of each country produces various language programs, details of which are found in the discussion of the separate countries. All use music, often up to two thirds of broadcast time. The music varies in its cultural origin, and not all is African, by any means. and duties of citizens are stressed, together with news broadcasts. Various experiments with television in some African countries have demonstrated the problems with visual semantics, especially in village areas. Black and white images may not be regarded as real; enlarged mosquitoes used in teaching about the causes of malaria are sources of amusement, not learning. But these are minor problems compared to the economic problems of television, such as the large capital investment needed for broadcast facilities and the relatively high costs of receiving sets. In contrast, radio is the underdeveloped country's ideal medium. Despite the polyglot language problem in East Africa, radio prospers in these countries.



<sup>31</sup> Donald R. Browne, in Walter Emery, <u>National and International Systems of Broadcasting</u>, East Lansing: 1969, Michigan State Univ. Press, p. 438.

Jbid., p. 446. There is a very limited experiment with television in Kenya and Uganda; plans are underway for educational television at the University College in Dar Es Salaam for Tanzania.



Browne says that "Africa is perhaps the last great testing ground of the thesis that broadcasting can be used purposefully to uplift society." 33

In subsequent chapters on the three separate countries, other media will be mentioned. They are of less importance than newspapers and radio, but some, like imported films which are shown in many towns in the whole East African area, have an influence on the modernization and development of these emerging nations.

In the three countries under study, evidence is clear that the leaders are aware of the problems of tribal friction, the need for a lingua franca and the possible use of the mass media to overcome these problems and to further national progress and development. The very fact that much is said and written about the evils of tribal rather than national loyalties and the official attempts to further the use of Swahili or/English in the educational systems, government circles and in other areas of national life is proof enough of the reality of the problems themselves. An African's loyalty to his tribe is usually bound up with loyalty to his language, and the educated elite have often found themselves torn between two worlds--the sophisticated world of the twentieth century in which English is the true lingua franca, and the world of the traditional village from whence he or his parents came--usually a small world that has little need for a lingua franca.

<sup>33&</sup>lt;sub>Ibid., p. 447</sub>.



#### CHAPTER IV

# KENYA

This chapter presents the state of national development, tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communications in Kenya. Special attention will be given to the interrelation—ships of these variables.

Kenya in many respects has progressed the most among the three countries under consideration in its national development; yet it shares the plight of Africa as a whole in some René Dumont says that problems found in of its problems. other developing regions of the world are compounded in Africa --poor soil, scanty rainfall, prevalence of disease and malnutrition, and illiteracy--to name but a few. A false start has been made, according to Dumont, because rates of mechanization and industrialization do not allow African countries to go beyond a certain point of progress; the incipient population explosion, due partly to improved medical care and raising of standards of nutrition, are fomenting disaster. "Africa must simultaneously learn to use writing and money, the plow and the centralized state (which Asia has known for a long time) while striving to grapple effectively with the Industrial

René Dumont, <u>False Start in Africa</u>, New York: 1969, Trans. by Phyllis Nauts Ott, Second Edition Revised, Frederick A. Praeger, Chapter I.

Revolution."<sup>2</sup> Dumont feels that improvement in agriculture should be an indispensable corollary to industrialization. The situation is not hopeless.

Men alone are responsible for the economic backwardness of Africa. The question is which ones, Africans or Europeans—we forget too easily that the white man exploited the African shamelessly for centuries, through slavery, colonialism and economic exploitation. 3

Hope, therefore, lies in the African leaders who are now in control of these emerging nations.

A number of important indicators of national development reveal the economic and social conditions in Kenya. In 1966 Kenya had a gross domestic produce of 5.8 billion (Kenya shillings). Computed in 1960 constant prices, this results in a per capita figure of 610 shillings, with a 5.2 percent average annual growth rate over a five-year period. Kenya, with an area of 224,960 square miles has a total of 26,000 miles of roads, and 2144 miles of railroads. This mileage in both cases is concentrated in the more densely populated regions, leaving vast areas unserved with any adequate means of transportation. In 1964 Kenya had 6.4 percent of its population engaged in wage labor. (The estimated population

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 32.

Europa Yearbook, Vol. II, 1970, p. 799. 17.17 shilings are equal to 1£ sterling. The shilling is worth 14¢.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Statesman's Yearbook, 1970-71, p. 470.

Figured from tables in Irving Kaplan, et al., Area Handbook from Kenya, Washington D.C.: 1967, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, p. 91.

of Kenya in 1964 was 9,200,000.) In the area of government budget expenditure, Kenya for 1967-68 spent a total of \$153 million, which amounted to \$15 per capita.

The latest population estimates (1969) for Kenya show a total of 10.5 million people, with an average density of 21 persons per square mile. This density figure is very deceiving, however, inasmuch as Kenya's people are concentrated in the Nairobi, Mombasa and highlands areas. About 10 percent of the population is urbanized, based on towns of 2000 or more. Kenya has four cities of 25,000 or more population. These include: Nairobi (capital) 478,000; Mombasa 246,000; Nakuru, 47,800 and Kisumu 30,700. (Figures are for 1969.) Thus about 7.5 percent of the population live in cities over 25,000.

In 1968 Kenya had a primary school enrollment of 1,209,680 and a total of 109,867 in various types of secondary education; there were 4,967 students engaged in higher education in 1965 with an additional 2,800 studying overseas. (See also Table 2-2 page 52.) The literacy rate of Kenya is barely 30 percent, despite the fact that enrollment in schools is steadily increasing and a number of books, newspapers and magazines are available.

For a clear understanding of the situation in Kenya today, a brief glimpse of its history is necessary. Although the early history and prehistory of Kenya is only now being

Figured from data in <u>Statesman's Yearbook</u>, 1970-71, p. 468.

United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1969, p. 136.

<sup>9</sup> Statesman's Yearbook, p. 466.

thoroughly studied, evidence at hand shows that by the third century A.D. iron-using cultures were already in the area, and that by 1500, there were present most of the direct ancestors of the modern ethnic groups found today. The Masai--cattle-raising people--along with many other tribes such as the Luo and Turkana began a gradual infiltration into Kenya after 1500. The Kikuyu, who were farmers, and generally acephalous in their organization also spread over the area of Kenya. Tribal clashes were frequent and the trend was towards concentration of power into the hands of chiefs, in many tribes, a condition which existed when Europeans arrived on the scene in the late nineteenth century. 10

amount interest of Europeans in East Africa was religion, and Christian missionaries were the pioneers in exploration of the area. By 1885 a partition of East Africa between Germany (which got clear title to Tanganyika) and Britain (which received Kenya and Uganda) was effected. It was not until 1895 that Britain formally established her colonies in Kenya and Uganda. Early rule was through a chartered company and was gradually replaced by direct government rule from Britain. Kenya was not heavily populated at the time of the British take-over. According to Colin Legum, 11 a combination of

For the early history of East Africa, including Kenya, see Basil Davidson, <u>A History of East and Central Africa</u>, New York: 1969, Anchor Books. Other definitive works include, Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew, <u>History of East Africa</u>, Vol. I, Oxford, 1963. The Clarendon Press.

ll Colin Legum, (ed) Africa: A Handbook to the Continent. Revised, New York: 1966, Frederick A. Praeger, p. 111.

tribal clashes, drought, disease and the Arab slave trade had kept an effective check on the population; with the coming of British rule, tribal warfare was reduced and a fourfold increase in population occurred, resulting in great pressure on the available land.

White settlers preempted the best highland areas, aided by a colonial government largely sympathetic to them. The African took little part in government, and thus were sown the seeds of the Mau Mau uprising, a half century later. Attacks on European farms caused the government to declare a state of emergency, which lasted eight years from 1952.

Mau Mau was to tear up the whole country and radically re-shape the whole thinking on Kenya's future. While its oathing ceremonies and its savage attacks, not least on fellow Kikuyus, are not to be excused, at the same time it is fair to record that Mau Mau broke the Government's complacency of the time. 12

After the emergency Africans were given more representation, and Kenyatta emerged from prison, the leader for independence. Political parties arose--KANU (Kenya African National Union), formed by Kenyatta after his release from prison in 1961, and KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union). These two parties agreed to form a coalition after independence was granted December 12, 1963. An independent Republic was declared with Kenyatta as President and Oginga Odinga as Vice President. 13

Kenya has gradually gone towards a one-party state. The leader of the opposition party, Oginga Odinga, resigned

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 113.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 115.



his position as Vice President in 1966, setting up the Kenya People's Union party, which found its position precarious and finally dissolved in November, 1969, in the turmoil following Tom Mboya's assassination. As a public meeting was in progress, Kenyatta, furious at taunts from Odinga's supporters, ordered Odinga's arrest, and KPU was outlawed. The violence has subsided, but the threat of further outbreaks is not dismissed, as the question of the succession to the aging Kenyatta becomes more and more urgent.

Stanley Meisler shows that 15 despite denial of tribal partiality in appointments, "Kikuyu dominance can be documented easily. The President and six of his twenty-two cabinet members are Kikuyu; and the six ministries include the two most prestigious--Finance and Foreign Affairs . . ." There has been recently much resentful criticism of Kikuyu dominance by members of Parliament. But as Meisler points out such critics do not face facts. "The Kikuyus are the most modern tribe in Kenya. If all promotions and appointments could be controlled strictly by an objective computerized test of merit, the Kikuyus probably would still hold almost all the positions they have today." 16

Yet Kenyatta makes a concerted effort to minimize the actual effects on tribalism in Kenya and attributes its worst manifestation to fanatics.

<sup>14</sup> See Newsweek, November 10, 1969.

<sup>15</sup> Stanley Meisler, "Tribal Politics Harass Kenya," in <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, October, 1970: Vol. 49:1, pp. 116.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 117.



Such men are human residue—refugees perhaps—bewildered and unbalanced by the sheer vigour of the progress going on around them. They cling to tribalism not as a tactic, but because they are in need of refuge. Nationhood is too great a concept for them to picture or pursue, and they are driven to reach back into the womb of the past, seeking the protection of the old tribal associations in a misplaced and frantic effort to keep the modern world at bay. 17

Concentration of population on good lands has created an alarming situation in Kenya, where three-fourths of the people live on one-eighth of the land, largely in the south-western section of the country. Land is the main natural resource; "tribal affiliation is still of some importance, and most Kenyans feel more comfortable with people who speak their own tongue and share the same traditional values and symbols." This becomes complicated when the multiplicity of tribes is spelled out. 19 Four tribes clearly have the majority of the population:

<sup>17</sup> Jomo Kenyatta, "The Emergence of Kenya," in Encyclopedia Britannica Book of the Year, 1970, p. 25.

<sup>18</sup> Kaplan, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> From Census of Kenya, 1962.



|       | - ,       |
|-------|-----------|
|       | 1,642,065 |
|       | 1,148,335 |
|       | 1,086,409 |
|       | 933,219   |
|       | 538,343   |
|       | 439,921   |
|       | 414,887   |
|       | 341,771   |
|       | 181,387   |
|       | · 170,085 |
|       | 154,079   |
|       | 121,645   |
|       | 109,691   |
|       | 100,871   |
|       | 983,234   |
| Total | 8,365,942 |
|       | Total     |

To further complicate the matter, less than one fourth of the area of Kenya is actually or potentially agriculturally productive. This land shortage accentuated the trend to tight economic planning and the universal appeal of "Harambee." The population is young, ethnically heterogeneous and growing at the high rate of 3 percent annually. 20

Although Swahili is less well-known in Kenya than in Tanzania, still it is the language most used as a second language.

Because Swahili is the indigenous language of few and the second language of many, it is also apolitical and thereby of enhanced usefulness. Speaking Swahili is in no way an indication of an attachment to a single society, region or political party, a problem faced in many other African countries where the language of a dominant indigenous group comes to have political significance when it is a second language elsewhere.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> Kaplan, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 144.

Swahili is used in trade, in news reports, in communication between different tribes, in the courts and schools at the primary level. However, English remains the official language of the Kenya government and the constitution requires English fluency for members of the national assembly.

Although the vast majority of Kenyans are rural dwellers, they are also engaged in the money economy, for the most part; and many who hold down jobs in the city retain their ties to the land. The single largest employer in Kenya is the East African Railways and Harbors Agency which has headquarters in Nairobi; it supplies vocational training, schools, medical facilities, adult classes, retail stores and recreation for its employees. Nairobi is the urban center for all of eastern Africa. Thus Kenya as a whole has more sophistication in western ways than her neighbors—Uganda and Tanzania.

Nevertheless, Kenya still has a high rate of illiteracy, and tribal loyalties persist.

Many of the values associated with tribalism—are the very ones desired for all the citizens of the new nation . . . a sense of adventure, a willingness to accept hard—ship in training for adult life, fidelity of the young to their peers and responsibility, patience and wise counsel of the older people.<sup>22</sup>

Tribalism is constantly denounced by the government, yet officials continue to appoint their own tribal brothers to positions of public office.

Kenyatta has proceeded with Africanization of his country with some caution, saying that anyone is welcome in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Ib<u>id</u>., pp. 288-289, 383.

Kenya who will be loyal to its principles and government, and insisting that the acquisition of the lands of the white settlers must be done by gradual means, with compensation. This attitude does not appear to extend to Asians who, as noted previously, have had to leave Kenya as they lost their jobs and businesses. Yet application of the ideas of African Socialism with its emphasis on egalitarianism is at least the official aim of the government.<sup>23</sup>

Christian missions have greatly affected the history of Kenya, including beliefs, education and the level of social services such as medical care; missions have been deeply involved in the development of the press, in all of East Africa, but especially in Kenya. 24 The two leading Christian papers are The Target, in English, and Lengo in Swahili, both monthlies; the Roman Catholics publish two monthlies in Kikuyu and the Kimeru languages. The monthly, The Catholic Times of East Africa folded in 1964, but in 1966 a new bilinugual weekly was started by the Catholic Church in English and Swahili, The The Protestant papers are ecumenical in out-Catholic Mirror. look and are influential with general readers, while the Catholic papers are published in the heart of the former Mau Mau region, where it happens that numerous secondary schools exist.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>As set forth in Sessional Paper No. 10 of the first Parliament of Kenya, "African Socialism and Its Application to Planning in Kenya," 1965.

Kaplan, op. cit., quotes 1962 Census as showing 60 percent Kenya Africans said they were either Moslem or Christian. This was divided into 20 percent Roman Catholic, 34 percent Protestant and 6 percent Moslem (p. 262).

Many students read the newspapers to their illiterate parents, thus multiplying circulations of these papers. 25

Since the Voice of Kenya, the government-owned and operated broadcasting service, broadcasts in many regional languages as well as in Swahili and English, the influence of radio is increasing. Gallay notes that:

Transitor receiving sets have enormously stimulated the influence of broadcasting all over the country. Since broadcasting stations cover the entire state . . . radio has become the medium supplying large groups of the people with information, and this is especially true of the rolder people who cannot read.<sup>26</sup>

Meanwhile it is significant that the circulation of newspapers in Kenya, where Nairobi is the news-gathering center of most of black Africa, has declined. Merrill observes that <sup>27</sup> in the years since the 1964 UNESCO survey of the world press, the number of dailies in Kenya have decreased from six to three and total circulation from 103,000 to the present 85,000. This declining trend is also found in other types of publications such as weeklies. A notable publication still flourishing is the illustrated fortnightly Reporter, that circulates throughout East Africa.

The Kenya news agency found in 1963, supported by the government, provides English language news; but Reuters

Pierre Gallay, "The English Missionary Press of East and Central Africa," in <u>Gazette</u>, Deventer, The Netherlands, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 130. (See also Roland Oliver, <u>The Missionary Factor in East Africa</u>, London: 1952, Longmans, Green.)

<sup>26 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 129.

<sup>27</sup> Merrill, <u>et al.</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 284.



still brings international news, which is carefully screened before distribution. This tendency to "manage the press" is in line with government action in deporting foreign correspondents whenever they criticize government policies to any appreciable extent. In recent years the editor of The Target, John Schofield, a Britisher, was forced to resign after his outspoken editorials on Kenya's one-party system. Some Communist newsmen have also been deported. The Kenya Union of Journalists, beginning in 1962, is an attempt to organize journalists on a professional basis and has a major aim to further extend freedom of the press in Kenya.

Clearly, problems of tribal loyalties among Kenya's people, the need for a widely accepted lingua franca for the business of government, education and national life as a whole, together with an efficient and effective system of mass communications are factors which must be accommodated and made to complement, not impede, each other on the road to national development.



# CHAPTER V

#### UGANDA

This chapter presents the state of national development, tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communications in Uganda, with special attention given to the interrelationships of these variables.

Uganda, the smallest of the three East African countries, has a higher proportion of good productive land, since the northern shore of Lake Victoria has an annual rainfall of more than 40 inches; Uganda's equatorial situation is tempered by altitudes of over 4,500 feet in many areas, rising much higher in the Ruwenzori mountains on the western border. It is a land of great contrasts and physical attractiveness, containing the fabled source of the Nile.

The important indicators of national development largely reflect this physical and geographical situation. In 1966 Uganda had a gross domestic product of 3.9 billion Uganda shillings in 1960 constant prices. In per capita terms this is 502 shillings, with a 5.5 percent average annual growth rate over a five-year period. Uganda, with an area of 91,134

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Legum, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 141.

Herrick, (Uganda) op. cit., p. 222. 17.14 shillings = 1f sterling; the Uganda shilling =  $14\phi$ .

square miles, has 15,000 miles of roads<sup>3</sup> and 528 miles of railroads. Both roads and railways reflect the importance of Uganda's one urban area—in and around Kampala, near the shores of Lake Victoria. In 1966 Uganda had 3.2 percent of its population engaged in wage labor.<sup>4</sup> (The estimated population of Uganda in 1966 was 7,765,000). In the area of government budget expenditure, Uganda spent a total of \$101 million in 1967-68, which amounted to \$12.4 per capita.<sup>5</sup>

The latest population estimates (1969) for Uganda show a total of 9.5 million people, with an average density of 40 persons per square miles. This density figure must be interpreted in the light of population concentrations in Uganda, which center around the Kampala area, leaving the northern and eastern regions much more sparsely populated. Densities are largely determined by sufficient rainfall, fertile soil, and absence of the tsetse fly. Between 4 and 5 percent of the population are urbanized, almost entirely in and around Kampala and Jinja near the shores of Lake Victoria. Uganda has only two cities with more than 25,000

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. viii.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 330.

Statesman's Yearbook, 1970-71, p. 464.

<sup>6</sup> United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1969, p. 137.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Herrick, (Uganda) op. cit., p. 67.

<sup>8</sup>See page 90 of this study; also <u>Encyclopaedia</u> <u>Britannica</u>, 1968, Vol. 22, p. 464. No basis for defining urbanization is given.

inhabitants. These are Kampala (capital), whose metropolitan area includes Entebbe, with a population of 331,889, estimated for 1969 and Jinja with 47,298 people. Thus about 4 percent of the population of Uganda live in cities of 25,000 or more.

In 1966 there were 564,000 pupils enrolled in primary schools in Uganda, with 98,129 studying in various types of secondary education. There were 1,593 students in higher education in East Africa, with 25000 students overseas in 1967. (See also Table 2-2, page 52.) The literacy rate of Uganda is hard to determine with any accuracy since the government does not issue official statistics in this area. Multiplicity of languages used in education further complicate this factor. Literacy among Ugandans has been variously estimated at 25 and 40 percent, while one authority calls it "the highest in Africa." (See page 88, footnote 25.) The relatively high literacy is probably due to the prevalence of Christian mission schools in the population centers around Kampala, where a very high percentage of the Baganda people have become literate as well as Christian.

The present situation in Uganda clearly reflects the history of the area, and a discussion of national development without a knowledge of this background would not be intelligible.

For at least 2000 years numerous tribes have roamed over the area of modern Uganda: the Bantu kingdoms of

<sup>9</sup>Statesman's Yearbook, 1970-71 says "greater Kampala" has a 1969 population of 170,000, p. 462.

<sup>10</sup> Herrick, (Uganda) op. cit., p. 114.

Buganda, 11 Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole, in the south and west; to the north are the Nilotic tribes such as Acholi and Alur, as well as such Nilo-Hamites as the Lango and Teso; the primitive nomads known as the Karamojong inhabit the northern border. All told, there are about twenty sizable ethnic groups in modern Uganda, the largest being the Baganda, numbering over a million.

The Baganda had the strongest of the early organized kingdoms, and controlled a sizable trade with the coastal Arabs in ivory and slaves prior to the arrival of the Europeans. When J. H. Speke, English missionary and the first European to reach the northern shores of Lake Victoria, arrived there in 1862, he found a highly organized political structure among the Baganda, ruled by the Kabaka Mutesa. This was no mean kingdom. 12

ll "Ganda" is a generic form, referring to a certain tribe; "Ba" prefix denotes the collective personal name for the tribe, "Baganda." "U" indicates the place of the Ganda--Uganda, an entity created by the British; "Buganda" means the traditional kingdom of the Ganda.

The capital of the Buganda kingdom (located on the site of the present-day Kampala) had an estimated population of 10,000, as reported by Apolo Kagwa in Ekitabo kye Mpisa za Baganda, Kampala: 1905, Uganda Society 1952, pp. 292-97. Abject homage was paid to the Kabaka by his subjects; he controlled an elaborate network of appointive officials in many districts and had a "fleet" of more than 100 canoes on Lake Victoria; he also controlled the Arab dhow trade. The absolute authority of the Kabaka is illustrated in 1865 when he ordered the summary execution of about 50 African Christians; they had displeased the Kabaka by allegedly refusing his homosexual advances. Pope Paul declared the 22 Catholic martyrs saints in 1964. (See "A Sacred Safari for the Pope," in Time, August 8, 1969.) See also Audrey I. Richards, The Multicultural

Britain had great interest in the area, since it contained the source of the Nile, and she hoped to effect a link with Egypt and the Sudan via the river. Thus Britain acquired the area of Uganda in the partition agreement in 1885. 13 Various Christian missions were established, and British rule was established under the aegis of an imperial company headed by Frederick Lugard. Following violence resulting from religious wars around the court of the Kabaka, Britain formally declared a protectorate with direct rule from England after 1894. Special treaties were made with the kingdoms of Buganda, Toro and Ankole, and they retained a privileged place in the protectorate until independence came in 1962.

The British began building the Uganda railway in 1896 from Mombasa across Kenya, traversing the difficult terrain of the Rift Valley; the line finally reached Kampala in 1931. While the British considered Uganda the prize colony,

States of East Africa, Montreal: 1969, McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, pp. 42-43.

For further readings in Uganda history see Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., David Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda, Oxford Univ. Press, 1961; Kenneth Ingham, The Making of Modern Uganda, London: Allen and Unwin, 1958; John Beattie, Bunyoro: An African Kingdom, New York: 1960, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

<sup>13</sup> See page \$1.

Kenya was at first regarded as an impediment to be crossed, since the Kikuyu and Masai tribes resisted colonial rule; only later the Kenyan highlands became attractive to white settlers. Tribesmen regularly cut the telegraph wires to make copper bracelets, and lions on the track constituted one of the chief obstacles to railroad traffic in the early days of the railway.

white settlers never came into the area to take up farming as occurred in Kenya; thus agriculture remained in the hands of the small African farmer, who today produces the food crop of Uganda and prospers to a certain extent.

The Baganda continued their special position in independent Uganda, the Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa, becoming the first President in 1963, with Milton Obote as Prime Minister. However, the uneasy relations between the Baganda and other tribes in Uganda continued to be a major problem in the new country; in 1966 Obote acted to suppress the power of the Baganda, and the Kabaka fled to Britain; 15 Obote became President under a new constitution adopted in 1967. It is ostensibly a parliamentary type of government with fundamental rights guaranteed to all citizens, but this is largely theoretical. political coalition is possible; thus the one-party state with a strong central executive rules the country, and there are many political prisoners in Uganda. Political awareness among the rural people is very low. "Despite the government's use of radio and Uganda television as channels of civic education, the political horizons of most Ugandans remained restricted to their tribal and ethnic groups."16

Only about 5 percent of Uganda's people are urban; two thirds are not reached by formal means of communciation, and agriculture, while productive in comparison to many other areas of the underdeveloped world, suffers from lack of

<sup>15</sup> The Kabaka died in England in 1969, apparently a victim of alcoholism.

<sup>16</sup> Herrick, (Uganda) op. cit., p. 199.



diversity; the cash crops are almost entirely coffee and cotton. However, Uganda is largely self-sufficient in food; the second Five Year Plan is in operation and ends in 1971. Among other aims of Uganda is the attempt to reorient the educational system more toward Africa, reducing the influence of the British system, and to increase the percentage of university students obtaining their education in East Africa, rather than abroad.

Christian missions have played a very important role in the modern history of Uganda, providing school and hospitals as well as other services. Today Uganda is about 50 percent Christian, Catholics being more numerous than Protestants. Many of the important national leaders are of the Christian faith, while the number of Moslems and Hindus constitute a small minority in addition to those of tribal religious attachments.

The tribal situation in Uganda is dominated by the historical position of power held by the Baganda, who are the largest and most advanced group in Uganda. The removal of the Kabaka as President of the country in 1966, and a new constitution has not solved the problem of resentment that is neld against the Baganda because of their privileged position of power. And it has certainly not made the Baganda satisfied. Not only are the Baganda the most developed politically, but they hold the most highly productive area of Uganda, around Kampala. Although they have lost their privileged position under the constitution, they continue to be an important political force to reckon with in the development of Uganda.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 223.

Forty tribes cover 99 percent of all Ugandans, although, as noted previously, about twenty are numerically significant. 18 Two-thirds are speakers of Bantu languages, but the Nilotic and Sudanic groups constitute an important minority, who not only resent Luganda because it is the language of the highly developed and powerful Baganda tribe, but also resist the use of Swahili since it is Bantu-based. Thus the language problem is compounded in Uganda. Herrick notes that in 1968 ". . . A majority of African language newspapers were in Luganda and a considerable body of literature existed in that language."19 Swahili is used by the army and also taught as a subject in the schools; however, English is the medium of instruction, and is used almost entirely in the government. The Baganda are 30 percent literate in English, and most have been educated in Christian schools (75 percent are Christians), and have thus been in contact with the western world for a relatively long time.

The dominance of the Baganda traditionally was enhanced by the British colonial system and the language problem was thus more complicated. English was made the goal of any educated person, and the effect of this policy is being carried over, despite some tribal feelings against it. President Obote had indicated his preference for its use, in spite of the objections raised by many that it is associated with colonial rule and the educated elite, not the common people. English is firmly established in Uganda for the present; Swahili is

<sup>18</sup> See page 93.

<sup>19</sup> Herrick, (Uganda) op. cit., p. 78.

less important in Uganda than in Kenya or Tanzania.

Regarding mass communications in Uganda, the government owns and operates radio broadcasting, as well as some newspapers and periodicals. It was estimated that there were two million radio listeners and 200,000 readers of newspapers and periodicals in 1968. 20 Radio is used for civic and social educational programs and in classrooms. In 1968 there were 230 broadcast hours a week in English, 14 in African languages and Hindustani. About 500,000 radio sets were in operation; and the second five-year plan aims to install several hundred public receivers in village centers. The African language programs include those on health, sanitation and agriculture. In 1966, the school broadcasting system went into 1000 schools; one purpose was to teach English, since it is the medium of instruction. The Uganda television service began in October, 1963; it is limited to the area around Kampala, but the plan is to install television receivers in all community centers where electricity is available. In 1967, of 7,500 sets known to be in use, over half were owned by Asians and Europeans. 21

Besides the <u>Uganda Argus</u> and <u>Tayfa Empya</u> already, mentioned, <sup>22</sup> <u>Munno</u>, published in Luganda is the only Catholic-owned daily in Africa. <sup>23</sup> Kampala, the capital city of Uganda

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 211.

<sup>21&</sup>lt;u>Ibid</u>., p. 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>See pp. 73-74.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>The Christian press is rather well-developed in Uganda, at least as to circulation. Catholics predominate, having three printing works in Uganda and a large library in Kampala, periodicals in English and Luganda, as well as other tribal languages—including children's magazines are published.

has seven dailies in contrast to the three that are produced in Nairobi. Gallay states that 24 Uganda enjoys the highest rate of literacy in Africa, thanks to Christian mission schools. As long ago as 1959, the Baganda people had achieved a 75 percent literacy. Thus with a high rate of literacy together with a large percentage of Christians, a ready market for printed material is at hand. The government publishes a number of periodicals and newspapers, including the influential party organ, The People—the voice of the Uganda People's Congress.

Printed matter from several sources may thus be available, but quality is another matter. Of the three East African countries, it is possibly true that the state of freedom of the press is most precarious in Uganda. There is frequent government interference, an example of which was mentioned. Obote was very critical of the press after the storming of the Kabaka's palace by a mob in the 1966 crisis. Obote declared that "pressmen will not be allowed to place obstacles in our path. We cannot have a Government and a press enjoying the same responsibility." It is evident that outspoken editors or newsmen will not be allowed to operate for long unless they are in fundamental agreement with government policy, even though, officially, a censorship system is not in existence in Uganda.

<sup>24</sup> Gallay, op. cit., p. 131.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>The case of <u>Transition</u> editor, page 42.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> <u>IPI Report</u>, July, 1966, p. 3.

Uganda appears to have high potential for the early and effective development of the mass media into an important tool in national development, with the existing facilities and the added advantage of a relatively high literacy among her people. The stumbling blocks are many,—including the uneasy political situation, persistence of tribal loyalties and jeal-ousies, and the vexing problem of languages. 27

A military coup occurred in Uganda on January 26, 1971, while President Obote was attending the Commonwealth meeting in Singapore. The chief of military staff, General Idi Amin, a long and close associate of Obote, took control; some violence occurred. At this writing the situation appears quiet, and there were reports of the release of many political prisoners. Civilians have been appointed to most cabinet posts, as mentioned. Meanwhile, Obote has gone to Tanzania, where Nyerere has publicly defended him and deplored the events in Uganda. Reports from Kenya indicate a cautious acceptance of the new situation, but some authorities feel this event casts a shadow on the East African Common Community. Only time will tell.



#### CHAPTER VI

#### TANZANIA

This chapter presents the state of national development, tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communication in Tanzania, with special attention given to the interrelationships of these variables.

In many respects, Tanzania is the least developed of the three countries under consideration. Her estimated per capita annual income is less than \$80, which is low even for Africa; her natural resources are somewhat limited. Over 90 percent of Tanzania's people are engaged in agriculture, and 80 percent are illiterate. However, concerted efforts are being made to improve the level of life for the average Tanzanian. President Nyerere has said that "while other nations try to reach the moon, we are trying to reach the village."

The various indicators of national development show that Tanzania is facing great economic challenges. In 1966
Tanzania had a gross domestic product of 4.6 million Tanzania

Gold and diamonds are found in Tanzania, but their production accounts for only about 3 percent of the gross domestic product.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Leon E. Clark (ed) <u>Through African Eyes</u>, (A Series) <u>Nation Building: Tanzania and the World</u>, Vol. VI, New York: 1970, Frederick A. Praeger, pp. 11-12.

shillings in 1960 constant prices. In per capita terms this is 447 shillings, with a 4.7 percent average annual growth rate over a five-year period. Tanzania, with an area of 362,844 square miles (including 1044 square miles in Zanzibar and Pemba), has 25,000 miles of roads and 1600 miles of rail-roads. This transportation system reflects the concentrations of population around Dar Es Salaam and Tanga on the coast, Kilimanjaro region near Arusha and the Mwanza region on the shores of Lake Victoria. In 1966 Tanzania had 2.9 percent of its population engaged in wage labor. (The estimated population of Tanzania in 1966 was 11,760,000.) In the area of the government budget expenditure, Tanzania in 1967-68 spent a total of \$149 million which amounted to \$12.1 per capita.

The latest population estimates (1969) for Tanzania show a total of 12,926,000, with an average density of 34 persons per square mile. Population densities are concentrated as already indicated and there is the additional factor that density on the island of Zanzibar is very much higher--over 340 per square mile. By the 1967 census Tanzania is 4.8 percent urbanized--that is, using a base of towns with 8000 or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Herrick, (Tanzania) op. cit., 1968, p. 274. (17.17 shillings = lf sterling. The shilling is worth  $14\phi$ .)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. x.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup><u>Ibid.</u>, p. 380.

<sup>6</sup> Statesman's Yearbook, 1970-71, p. 447.

<sup>7</sup>United Nations Demographic Yearbook, p. 137.

more inhabitants. 8 Tanzania, including Zanzibar has six cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants (1969 estimates). These include the following:

| Dar Es Salaam (d | eñital)      | 272,821              |
|------------------|--------------|----------------------|
|                  | capidai,     |                      |
| Tanga            |              | 61,061               |
| Mwanza           |              | 559 <b>،</b> 34      |
| Arusha           | ٠            | 32 <b>,</b> 452      |
| Moshi            |              | 26 <b>,</b> 853      |
| Morogoro         | v <b>a</b> 4 | 25 <b>,</b> 262      |
| Zanzibar City    |              | 68,490               |
|                  | Total        | 521,498 <sup>9</sup> |

Therefore about 4 percent of the population of Tanzania lives in cities of 25,000 or more.

In 1968 Tanzania had primary school enrollment of 855,000, with a total 31,520 studying in various types of secondary education. There were 912 students in higher education in East Africa in 1966 and 807 students abroad in that year. As noted, (page 101) literacy in Tanzania is 20 percent.

The largest of the three East African nations, both in population and geographical area, Tanzania has a

... homogeneous population. More than 99 per cent of mainland Tanzanians are African. The remainder include 80,000 Asians from India, 25,000 Arabs and 15,000 Europeans. The religious composition of the mainland is roughly 25 per cent Christian, 31 per cent Muslim, and 44 per cent traditional African religious. 10

This percentage of urbanization refers to mainland Tanzania. See Herrick, (Tanzania) op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>9&</sup>lt;u>United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1969</u>, p. 192 gives the figure on Dar Es Salaam; <u>Whitaker's Almanack</u>, 1971, p. 769 is the source for data on the other five cities.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp. 13-14.

There are more than 120 tribes in Tanzania, the majority of which are Bantu, but some are of Nilotic and Hamitic origins.

No one tribe is in a position to dominate the rest; the largest is the Sukuma, being 13 per cent of the total population. In some cases the tribes are split by international boundaries—for example, the Masai, who live in both Kenya and Tanganyika. 11

The multiplicity of tribes, together with the widespread use of Swahili, have been the factors that lessen the dangers of tribal separatism in Tanzania, despite the continuing intermittant conflict at local levels over cattle and land.

Much of inland Tanzania is a high and dry plateau, with rugged highlands in the south, a lush green coastal strip, and Africa'a highest mountain, Mt. Kilimanjaro, rising to over 19,000 feet. Rich volcanic soil on the slopes of Kilimanjaro supports a thriving coffee production, while the shore of Lake Victoria has the largest concentration of population. There have been few white settlers on the land in Tanzania, chiefly because of the hardships of long distances, lack of water, the prevalence of the tsetse fly, and dearth of interest in this vast land, largely unknown to the outside world for so many years.

The history of Tanganyika is unique in one respect; recent fossil-finds indicate that man may have originated in

Legum, op. cit., p. 129. The partition of East Africa in 1885 cut across tribal lines in a very arbitrary fashion partly out of ignorance on the part of the European powers, and partly for their convenience.

the area of Olduvai Gorge in northern Tanzania. 12 The discovery in 1959 by Dr. Louis Leakey and his wife of a human skull fragment, subsequently dated at 1,750,000 years has aroused the interest and excitement of scientists everywhere. Later discoveries in East Africa have reinforced these early findings. 13

For at least 2000 years, Arab and Chinese traders have been in touch with East Africa, and the ancient African-Arab city of Kilwa on the Tanzania coast flourished long before Europeans reached the scene. The Islamic faith was brought by the Arabs in the eighth century, and a Swahili culture began to develop in the coastal region. Arab slave traders went inland in search of ivory and slaves, carrying the trade language with them. The Portuguese at the close of the fifteenth century in route to India found this culture, and set up their own trading posts, thus effectively putting the Arab civilization into a decline. The Portuguese controlled the coast for two hundred years, making little attempt to go inland. was not until 1857 that Richard Burton and John Speke went inland in search of the source of the Nile. Thus the coast of Tanzania has been known to outsiders for 2000 years, the interior little more than a century. 14

<sup>12</sup> See Sonia Cole, The Pre-History of East Africa, London: 1963, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, for a comprehensive account of this subject.

<sup>13</sup> For further discussion on this see L. S. B. Leakey, Olduvai Gorge, 1951-1961, Cambridge: 1965, Cambridge Univ. Press, Vol. I.

For further historical studies, see Basil Davidson, op. cit., Oliver and Mathew, op. cit., Vol. I; V. Harlow, E. M. Chilver, and A. Smith (eds) History of East Africa,

The Germans were the first to colonize the interior of Tanganyika. <sup>15</sup> In 1884, a German society for colonization signed treaties with six African chiefs, and by 1890 the German East Africa Company had control of the whole area which included Tanganyika, Burundi and Rwanda. Following World War I, Britain got Tanganyika as a mandate from the League of Nations. There was a gradual movement toward independence in the fifties, led by Julius Nyerere. He became the first Prime \*\* Minister at independence, December, 1961, and later President, heading the political party which he insired--TANU. <sup>16</sup>

Tanzania has become a one-party state by the deliberate action and promotion of TANU and the ideas of African Socialism. (See Chapter III, Part 2.) In January of 1964, updated when Zanzibar joined with Tanganyika, Nyerere appointed a presidential commission to study recommended changes in the constitution, making a "democratic one-party state" a reality. Many of the recommendations made by this commission under the guidance of Nyerere are in fact in operation in Tanzania.

Vol. II, 1965; R. Coupland, <u>East Africa and Its Invaders</u>, London: 1961, Oxford Univ. Press; and Fawn W. Brodie, <u>The Devil Drives</u>, New York: 1967, W. W. Norton and Company (A Life of Sir Richard Burton).

<sup>15</sup> As noted earlier, Tanganyika joined with Zanzibar to form the country of Tanzania in 1964. Our study is concerned only with mainland Tanzania or the former Tanganyika, since Zanzibar has not been integrated into the larger area in more than a very superficial manner, and since the people and problems of Zanzibar constitute a different milieu. (A recent informative work on Zanzibar is S. G. Ayany, A History of Zanzibar, 1934-1964, Dar Es Salaam: 1970, East African Literature Bureau).

<sup>16</sup> See page 20.

Work and equality for all citizens were emphasized in the guiding principles.

The nation of Tanganyika is unalterably opposed to the exploitation of one man by another, of one nation by another, or one group by another. It is the responsibility of the State therefore to take an active role in the fight against colonialism wherever it may exist, and to work for African unity, and for world peace and international co-operation on the basis of human equality and freedom. 17

The principles of <u>Ujamaa</u> are basic to the elaborate and detailed Tanganyika Five Year Plan established in 1964. <sup>18</sup> In the crucible of experience the attempt to increase agricultural production by bringing farmers together and teaching them modern methods failed in the first plan. The cry began for self-reliance and the taking of knowledge to the people where they are. An even larger slice of the 1970-1975 Five Year Plan is given to agriculture (21 percent of total expenditure), <sup>19</sup> but the approach has shifted to voluntary villages established on a self-reliance basis. Some are in operation today. <sup>20</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Report of the Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One-Party State, Dar Es Salaam: 1965, Govt. Printer, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> Tanganyika Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, Dar Es Salaam: 1964, Govt. Printer.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Clark, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 60.

Communally-worked land is the basis for such villages; about 600 are in existence throughout Tanzania. See Frederic Hunter, "Tanzania Daily Seizes Watchdog Role," in The Christian Science Monitor, February 7, 1970.

Bienen (1967) has made a definitive study of Tanzania's one-party system and the operation of TANU. 21 states that the organization was strong prior to independence, and that by 1961 Nyerere would no longer tolerate the power of various tribal chiefs. They had been used by the British to control local government. Bienen notes that many studies of one-party systems begin and stay at the top level, and thus neglect the local organizations. This is unfortunate for a thorough and realistic analysis of the political situation. "Pressures for change are common from below. There is real evidënce that a rising level of expectations is forcing leaders to formulate economic and social policies to meet grievances. 22 There is also indication that these grievances are being met, at least to some extent. The 1970 general election in Tanzania resulted in overwhelming support for Nyerere and his govern-Two candidates, both of TANU, ran for each parliamentary seat; President Nyerere was the only candidate for the Presidency, but the voters could vote him out. The system forbids candidates from running who own shares in private companies or own rent-houses; no appeals may be made to race, religion or tribe in campaign speeches. 23

While tribal loyalties in Tanzania are not as disruptive as those of Kenya and Uganda, they are not entirely

Henry Bienen, <u>Tanzania Party Transformation and</u>
<u>Economic Development</u>, Princeton: 1967, Center of International Studies.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup><u>Ibid</u>., p. 266.

<sup>23</sup>Frederic Hunter, "Tanzania Elections Strengthen Nyerere," in The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 4, 1970.

eliminated. Geography plays a part in the situation. For example, the Sukuma, the largest tribe in Tanzania, are located on the shores of Lake Victoria, hundreds of miles inland from the capital at Dar Es Salaam. The Sukuma do not dominate national politics; in fact they supply relatively few members of the government. The Chagga tribe whose home is in the area surrounding Mt. Kilimanjaro are the fifth in size, but are the wealthiest tribe, and have the highest standard of education. They do hold many important government positions. Nevertheless, Tanzania does not face the bitter tribal tensions that plague other African states in their struggle to achieve national unity.

Tanzania does experience tension between Asians and Africans. Less than 2 percent of the population are Arabs or Asians, but, they still effectively control much of the economy. In Dar Es Salaam, virtually all the shops are owned by Asian merchants; Asians are deeply resented by Africans, who do not mix with them. The seeds of violence exist in this uneasy social and political milieu. 24

There is little tribal lingualism in Tanzania, partly because of the multiplicity of tribes and tribal languages. None is in a dominant position to cause trouble. Swahili is readily accepted by most of the population as a working lingua franca. Whiteley notes that 25 the establishment of a national

See James B. Alexander, "Tanzania Restive Astride Social Rift Between Asians, Africans," in <u>The Christian Science</u> Monitor, August 8, 1969.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Whiteley, op. cit., p. 116.

language by a nation involves two aspects—ideological and technological. To implement the ideological aspect, the image of the language must be kept before the public eye. This is being done in Tanzania. In the technological phase, courses in the education system must be provided. Tanzania faces the practical problem of an acute shortage of teachers, as well as proper Swahili reading materials. Specialized words for modern education are scarce in Swahili and must be invented and integrated into the language. Native speakers with the technical education and ability for this task are in very short supply. <sup>27</sup>

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As late as 1967, mass communications in Tanzania, actually affected only the educated elite and about 5 percent of the rural population. The <u>baraza</u>, or village meeting, is an important word-of-mouth type of rural communication, and it is being used to get support for government programs. Of the mass media, evidence shows that radio far outweighs other types of communication. Listenership in 1967 was estimated at one third of the total population; the press was second in terms of effect. Recent surveys indicate that literates

In addition to the constant use of Swahili, Nyerere has ordered government publications, once issued only in English, to be published also in Swahili, while government—owned newspapers and periodicals are in Swahili. Frequent visits by education officials to regional schools and colleges always involve elaborate speeches and programs in Swahili.

<sup>27 &</sup>lt;u>Ibid.</u>, p. 117. One of the most talented writers in Swahili was Shaaban Roberts, who died in 1962.

regard the press as the best news source, while radio is second best.

A Ministry of Information supervises radio and disseminates its own information to publicize government policy and actions. Radio Tanzania operates four separate services for domestic listeners, all involving much popular music and many newscasts. English and Swahili are the mediums used—Swahili being the language for educational broadcasting to the schools. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, Tanzania does not broadcast tribal—language programs, a reflection of the determination to promote national unity. Television has had no chance to show its influence in Tanzania as yet, although plans are being made, as indicated, for educational television from the University College in Dar Es Salaam. Other programs in radio education are also being expanded.

In all three countries of East Africa foreign radio broadcasts are received. The British Broadcasting Corporation

<sup>28</sup> Herrick, (Tanzania) 1968, op. cit., p. 247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Tanzania Information Services publishes a succinct annual report on the number and extent of public information services that are provided; it is printed in both English and Swahili: Taarifa ya Mwaka (Annual Report).

<sup>30</sup> See B. W. W. Welsh, "Educational Broadcasting in Tanzania," for details on all the types of educational broadcasting. (Gazette, Deventer, The Netherlands, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1968).

Recent programs in adult education have been greatly expanded by the employment of radio tutors by Radio Tanzania; they operate from four main centers in Tanzania and conduct training for local radio forum leaders in villages.

(Jane and Idrian Resnick, "Tanzania Educates for a New Society," Africa Report, Vol. 16, January, 1971, pp. 26-29.)

has the largest audience, with the Voice of America, and Russian and Chinese broadcasts also operating. Tanzania, because of the wider knowledge of Swahili, probably has more listeners to the Communist Swahili broadcasts than do Kenya or Uganda.

The press in Tanzania plays an important role also in the communications field, greatly affecting the ideas and life of the educated. "In 1967, the mainland (of Tanzania) had four dailies, four weeklies, three fortnightlies and about twenty monthlies, quarterlies and other periodicals. Total circulation of all publications was estimated at over 300,000." The government-owned Nationalist competes with the Tanzania Standard. Uhuru is the Swahili version of the Nationalist. One of the most influential papers in Tanzania is the Catholic fortnightly in Swahili--Kiongizi; it provides good news coverage and is read by many leaders.

On February 7, 1970, the <u>Tanzania Standard</u> was taken over by the government of Tanzania. In an editorial of that date appearing in the <u>Standard</u>, Nyerere outlined the purpose of the take-over.

In accordance with the Arusha Declaration, it is clearly impossible for the largest daily newspaper in independent Tanzania to be left indefinitely in the hands of a foreign company . . . the new <u>Standard</u> will give general support to the policies of the Tanzania government, but will be free to join in the debate for and against any particular proposals put forward for the consideration of the people, whether by government, TANU, or by other bodies . . . The <u>Standard</u> editor will be appointed by the president

<sup>32</sup> Herrick, (Tanzania) op. cit., p. 251.

<sup>33</sup> See page 75.



and will have full autonomy in the day to day operation of the newspaper . . . the new <u>Standard</u> will endeavour to spread an understanding about socialism in Tanzania among its readers.  $3^{4}$ 

seeks to prevent any criticism by the press that would undermine the political power of the ruling party. Tanzania has acted more than once to prevent such criticism; the nationalization of the newspaper with the highest circulation is but a step to solidify over-all supervision of the mass media. To further this policy, Tanzania runs its own journalism training center near Mwanza at Nygezi. The eighteen-month course provides high school graduates with a practical course in the arts of writing as well as background knowledge of related social sciences; it is actually the only comprehensive journalism training course in East Africa. Tanzanian students have also attended the IPI program in Nairobi from time to time. 35

Tanzanian leaders have made a determined beginning in using the mass media that are at hand and can be readily provided, such as the print media and radio. The national government seeks to use the press and broadcasting to further not only the education of Tanzanian youth, but the proclaiming of the nation's one-party principle of government, and to further national development.

<sup>34</sup> See "Implementing Arusha," Africa Report, Vol. XVII, No. 2, April, 1970.

<sup>35</sup> See page 73, footnote 24.



# CHAPTER VII

# TRIBALISM, LINGUA FRANCA, AND MASS MEDIA RELATED TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BY COUNTRIES

This chapter presents first a basic typology of national development and then applies it to the three countries of East Africa, establishing a rank order of national development for Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. This rank order is based on indicators other than the three independent variables—tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communication—which are the focus of this study. The three independent variables are then examined for their relationship to the rank order of the three countries in national development. The analysis comes to a focus on the four hypotheses posed for the study. The interrelationships between tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communication are dealt with in the interpretations of the results.

# Typology of National Development

In working towards a typology of national development of the three countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, three stages of analysis are useful for clarity. The first stage encompasses a basic typology as illustrated in the following paradigm (Figure 7-1):



| Country |      | licators | Relative    |
|---------|------|----------|-------------|
| Country | a b  | c d      | Development |
| A       | High | High     | High        |
| B       |      |          | <b>^</b>    |
| C .     | Low  |          | Low         |

Fig. 7-1. Paradigm of National Development

(Adapted from Daniel Lerner, <u>The Passing of Traditional Society</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, Third Printing, 1966, p. 90.)

The second stage in the development of the typology includes the data concerning the four indicators used in the analysis of national development in Kenya, Uganda, and Tan-These four indices are literacy, education, urbanization and industry. These statistical data are presented in To compare industrial development, the four indicators selected are employment as an index of human resources, roads as an index of transportation, government expenditures budget as an index of financial resources, and gross domestic product (GDP) as the overall index of production of all goods and services annually. The employment statistic used in Table 7-1 shows the relationship of total employed to total population for each country, and on this index Kenya ranks first, Uganda second, and Tanzania third. To be comparative, roads need to be related to total square miles (size) of the country; the ratios put Uganda first with a ratio at .166, Kenya second at .116, and Tanzania third at .070. Government budget figures and GDP need to be related to population for comparative purposes.



TABLE 7-1
INDICATORS OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

#### **Data on Statistical Indicators** Urbanization<sup>C</sup> industry Population of **Employment**d Percent of GDP<sup>9</sup> Govt, Budget<sup>T</sup> Education<sup>h</sup> Country Literacv<sup>8</sup> Cities > 25,000 Total Pop. (percent of Roads<sup>e</sup> (millions of (billions of (percent) (1969)population) (miles) dollars) shillings) (1968)(1964)Kenya 30± Primary: 1,209,000 802,000 7.5 6.4 26,000 153 5,8 Secondary: 109,000 Other: 4,967 (1966)(1966)Uganda 25-40 379,187<sup>b</sup> Primary 564,000 3.2 15,000 101 3.9 Secondary: 98,129 (217, 298)Other: 1.593 (1967)(1968)(1966)Tanzania 20± Primary: 855,000 521,498 2.9 25,000 149 4.6 Secondary: 28,300 Other: 912 (1966)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Sources: Kenya: Kaplan, op. cit., (see p. 80 of this study); Uganda: (see p. 92 of this study); Tanzania: (see p. 101 of this study); Herrick (Tanzania) op. cit., p. viii of Herrick gives a lower literacy figure: 10-15%.

bDiscrepancy occurs over conflicting figures for population of greater Kampala.

CSource: United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1969, p. 192. Whitaker's Almanack, p. 769. Statesman's Yearbook 1970-71, pp. 462 & 466.

dSources: Kaplan, op. cit., p. 91; Herrick (Uganda), op. cit., p. 330; Herrick (Tanzania), p. 380.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>e</sup>Statesman's Yearbook, 1970-71, p. 470; Herrick (Uganda), p. viii; Herrick (Tanzania), p. x.

Calculated from data in the three area handbooks and other sources given on this page. Conversion from local currency to U.S. dollars according to official exchange rate.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Europa Yearbook, Vol. II, p. 799; Herrick (Uganda), p. 222; Herrick (Tanzania), p. 274.

hThis figure includes higher education of various kinds in the countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, not overseas. The overseas student figures include many levels. (See Table 2-2, p. 52.)

Kenya has the highest budget on a per capita basis and Uganda and Tanzania are about equal. On GDP, the per capita index ranks Kenya first, Uganda second, and Tanzania third. Combining these four relative indices, the resultant industrial index ranks Kenya first, Uganda second, and Tanzania third.

The final stage in determining the typology consists of an ordinal ranking of the three countries with reference to national development according to the statistical indicators presented in stage two. The following table shows these rankings:

TABLE 7-2

RANK ORDER IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

|          | Ordinal Ranking by<br>Statistical Indicators |                |                   |               |                                    |
|----------|--|----------------|-------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|
| Country  | Liter-<br>acy                                | Educa-<br>tion | Urbani-<br>zation | Indus-<br>try | Overall<br>Relative<br>Development |
| Kenya    | ,2   | 1              | 1 ·               | 1             | 1                                  |
| Uganda   | 1  | 2              | 3*                | 2             | 2                                  |
| Tanzania | 3 .  | a · 3          | 2*                | 3             | 3                                  |

<sup>\*</sup>Doubtful order.

On the whole there is a consistency in the rank order. The most notable exception is the ranking of Kenya second and Uganda first in the factor of literacy. This situation may be due to the high concentration of urbanization within one area in Uganda, around Kampala. Since this region

was the site of the densely populated kingdom of Buganda of earlier centuries, the missionary efforts from Europe and America were focused in the area for the development of mission schools, along with the teaching of Christianity. This effort was highly successful in that a very high percentage of the Baganda people today are both literate and of the Christian faith. (See chapter on Uganda.) Newspapers and other publications have been developed in various tribal languages, especially by the churches, and these periodicals also appear to have encouraged a higher rate of literacy. While important in the whole picture of national development in Uganda, this instance of Uganda's advantage over Kenya does not affect the overall rank order of the three countries regarding national development.

The relative rank order for urbanization concerning Uganda and Tanzania is another factor that needs explanation. The urbanization figures for Uganda are somewhat confused, as indicated in Table 7-1, and the situation is hard to assess with accuracy. Other evidence seems to support the judgment that Uganda should be ranked slightly behind Tanzania in urbanization. As it stands in the table, the order is doubtful.

There is evidence from the history of the East African region to show that the level of national development within the three countries has been affected by their various experiences under colonial rule. Certainly the presence of a large colony of European settlers in the highland areas of Kenya--a situation not existing in Uganda nor Tanzania--has meant that Kenya even before independence had such socio-economic amenities as roads, railroads, schools, newspapers.

as well as other means of communication, to a greater degree than either Uganda or Tanzania; these facilities were there primarily to serve the white settlers. Many of these same amenities are now useful to Kenya as an independent nation. This factor should not be over-emphasized but probably it does play a part in the picture of national development in East Africa, particularly helpful to Kenya.

Tribalism, Lingua Franca, and Mass Communication in Relation to the Rank Order of National Development

### Tribalism

In the earlier discussion of the effects of tribalism in East Africa it was pointed out that tribes are mainly in opposition to each other over land, language and other matters of personal interest, rather than being in opposition to the state itself. (See p. 24 ff.) Data show the different levels of this competition within the separate countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, and how it affects national development in various ways, both negatively and positively. (See Table 7-3.)

"tribal tendencies negative to national development" with respect to the effects of mass media and of lingua franca in overcoming these hindrances, the final ranking of the three countries will be in the direction of the weight of the overall evidence. In this sense, the factor dealt with goes beyond tribalism and includes other effects caused by the existence of many or few tribes. The key question is: In which

TABLE 7~3
TRIBALISM AND OTHER TRIBAL EFFECTS

| Countries  | Negative Effects                         | Positive Effects                       |
|------------|--|--|
| Konya      | One hadre deadnesses                     | Government is officially b             |
| Kenya .    | One-tribe dominance, educationally and   | against tribal favoritism              |
|            | politically (Kikuyu)                     | against tribar lavoritism              |
|            | Creates a jealousy <sup>a</sup>          | The dominant Kikuyu <sup>b</sup> are   |
|            | creates a jearousy                       | responsible for much of                |
| •          | Tribal favoritism in                     | nation's progress                      |
|            | government appointments                  | Hation's progress                      |
| •          | Rosetiment appointments                  |  |
| •          | "Gradually gone to one-<br>party state"a |  |
| . **       |  |  |
| Uganda     | One tribe dominant: c                    | Baganda with high <sup>d</sup> literac |
| برز 800000 | Baganda; they have the                   | rate have increased the                |
|            | most political and eco-                  | strength of nation                     |
|            | nomic power                              | J                                      |
| ě          |  |  |
|            | One-party state reflects <sup>c</sup>    | Tribalism partly respon-               |
|            | dominant tribe                           | sible for overthrow of                 |
|            |  | Obote; result is an                    |
|            | Second in number of dif-                 | apparent lessening of                  |
|            | ferent tribes and lan-                   | Baganda dominance                      |
|            | guages to cope with                      |  |
| Tanzania   | No dominant tribe to <sup>e</sup>        | Many tribes so that <sup>e</sup> none  |
| ramanna    | assume strong leadership                 | can dominate and create                |
|            | assume sorong readersuit                 | dissensions                            |
|            | Has by far the largest                   | #=2000F400                             |
|            | number of tribes and                     | One party state reflects               |
| •          | different tribal languages               | effort to reject negative              |
| •          | to cope with                             | effects of tribalism                   |

aPage 83 of this study.

bPage 83 of this study.

<sup>c</sup>Page 95 of this study.

dPage 96 of this study.

ePage 104 of this study.

NOTE: Data on dominant positions of tribes are as follows:

Kenya:

14 tribes having at least 100,000; 4 have one half of total population; Kikuyu largest (see page 85 of this study).

Uganda:

40 tribes constitute 99 percent of population; 20 sizeable tribes; Baganda largest (see page 97 of this study).

Tanzania:

120 tribes, none dominant; Sukuma constitute 13 percent of the

total population (see page 104 of this study).



country does mass media (also lingua franca) have the most work to overcome tribal tendencies hindering national development? Tanzania has the most work insofar as hindrances to education, to communication, to national commerce and industry, to travel, and other aspects of national development. In this sense, it is rated 3. Similarly, Uganda is rated 2, and Kenya 1.

# Lingua Franca

The nature of the language problem is clearly reflected in the multiplicity of native languages in East Africa. Both English and Swahili have support as a lingua franca. Leaders recognize the necessity of some common means of communication as was pointed out earlier in this study. (See p. 36 ff.) In the realm of newspapers and education this need is most urgently felt. It is recognized that without a common language little progress in nation-building can be made.

#### Mass Communication

There is a consensus of opinion on the part of African leaders as well as other authorities that radio is the prime medium for the building of national unity and progress in East Africa. However, the print media, especially newspapers and magazines, are clearly an important factor as well.

The following tables sum up the factors of tribalism, lingua franca and mass communication in their effects on national development in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.



TABLE 7-4 LINGUA FRANCA AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

|                 |   | Lingua Franca  | •   |  |
|-----------------|---|--|---|--|
| Countries       | Swahili   | English  | Other                                       |  |
| Kenya           | Used in government <sup>a</sup> and primary education as medium of instruction    | Official lang. <sup>a</sup> of govt.; mem-<br>bers of Parliament must be<br>fluent in it | `   |  |
| •               | A second language for b the majority of people                                    | Important in print $^{\mathbf{C}}$ media and radio                                       | •   |  |
|                 | Used in newspapers <sup>b</sup> and mag-<br>azines to some extent                 | Language of prestige and the educated  | •   |  |
| Uganda<br>:     | Used in police, army <sup>d</sup> and as subject in secondary schools             | Official lang. e of govt.  | •   |  |
|                 |   | Language of the educated   | Tribal lang. in primary education           |  |
|                 |   | Important in print media   | Luganda language<br>in radio,<br>newspapers |  |
| <b>Fanzania</b> | Official national language  Medium in primary schools and as a subject throughout | Medium of instruction in middle, secondary schools, and the university                   |   |  |
| વુ જ            |   | Prestigious among educated   | ·   |  |
|                 | Important in newspapers, magazines  |  |   |  |

ap. 86 of this study.

Note: About 10,000,000 Swahili speakers use the language well; possibly 90% of the population of East Africa know it to some extent, mostly in Tanzania and Kenya. (See p. 70.)

bp. 85 of this study. cp. 86 of this study.

dp. 97 of this study.

ep. 97 of this study.

fp. 110 of this study. gp. 109-110 of this study.

#### TABLE 7-5

#### MASS MEDIA AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

| Countries | Medium  |   |
|-----------|---|---|
|           | Radio   | Newspapers  |
| Kenya     | Some tribal languages used in broad-<br>casts; mostly Swahili and English | Total circulation of dai<br>ies and weeklies: c<br>214,760 (1969) |
|           | 500,000 radio sets in 1968 (L)  | Dailies:<br>10 per 100 persons <sup>d</sup><br>Weeklies:          |

Uganda

Uses many tribal languages in broadcasts; also English and Swahili

2 million listeners f

509.000 radio sets (R)b (1969)

Tanzania

280,000 radio sets inh (1969) (L)

500,000 to 600,000 (R) sets in

1967

English and Swahili; no tribal language

Large Christian presse

Total circulationg of dailies and weeklies: 129,450 monthlies: 66,000 46% in English Dailies: 7.5 per 100 persons k

Weeklies: 8.5 per 100 persons

Largest English daily nationalized in 1970

Journalism training Circulation of news-

papers: 130,000 Magazines and newspapers: 315,000 4.3 per 100 persons for daily newspapers 6.5 per 100 persons for weeklies

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Page 88 of this study.

bunited Nations Statistical Yearbook for 1969, p. 756. (L) are licensed sets; (R) those not licensed. A radio purchaser is supposed to get a license.

cInternational Yearbook and Statesman's Who's Who, 1970, p. 316.

dFigured using 1967 population of Kenya at 10 million.

fPage 98 of this study. ePage 87 of this study. gHerrick (Uganda), p. 214.

hHerrick (Tanzania), p. 248. <sup>1</sup>Page 112 of this study. JPage 111 of this study. Based on Uganda's 1967 population of 8 million.

Herrick (Tanzania), pp. 255-56; based on 1967 census of 12 million.

It is difficult not to overestimate the effect of mass media in the countries under study. Evidence abounds in statistics about increased hours of broadcasts, higher circulations in newspapers, and the appearance of hundreds of transitor radios in rural areas. Yet some surveys have shown that while many of the people in Kenya's urbanized areas are reached by radio and/or newspapers, most in rural areas are not; as for Uganda, estimates show that two thirds of the population is not reached by any means of mass communication. (See p. 95 of this study.) In Tanzania mass communication affected about 5 percent of the rural population in 1967, but one third of the population did have some access to radio. (See p. 110.) A rough judgmental rating of the three countries on separate media use is given in Table 7-6.

TABLE 7-6

COMPARATIVE RATING IN DEVELOPMENT OF MASS MEDIA

|           |        | Medium     |            |  |
|-----------|--------|------------|------------|--|
| Country . | Radio  | Newspapers | Television |  |
| Kenya     | medium | low        | barely     |  |
| Uganda    | medium | lower      | barely     |  |
| Tanzania  | medium | lowest     | none       |  |

On newspapers, the circulation figures available are somewhat harder evidence than the estimates of radio sets and radio listeners. The combined number of dailies per 100 persons and weeklies per 100 persons is selected as the best

index of newspaper use in each country. Taken from Table 7-5, the tabulation below reveals a distinction between the three countries on newspaper use:

Newspaper Circulation per 100 Persons (Dailies and Weeklies Country Combined)

Kenya 25.5

Uganda 16

Tanzania 10.8

Assuming that the three countries have less of a difference in use of radio than in use of newspapers, and taking into account that Kenya and Uganda have at least the beginnings of a television industry while Tanzania has none, the ordinal rankings on the variable of mass media for the three countries is therefore Kenya first, Uganda second, and Tanzania third.

# Ordinal Ranking

The relative ratings and ordinal ranks for the three countries with regard to the factors of tribalism, lingua franca and mass media and their relation to national development are presented in the following table:

RATINGS AND ORDINAL RANKINGS ON THREE VARIABLES
OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

TABLE 7-7

| Country  | Tribal Tendencies<br>Negative to Nat'l<br>Development | Lingua Franca | Mass Media<br>Use |
|----------|---|---------------|-------------------|
| Kenya    | 1*  | high-medium   | first             |
| Uganda   | 2   | medium        | second            |
| Tanzania | 3   | high          | third             |
|          |   |               |                   |

\*"1" = least

# Four Hypotheses

In this section, the four hypotheses posed as the focus for this study are presented in turn; a discussion follows on the results of the data assembled thus far in relation to each hypothesis. An attempt is made to show the interrelationships existing among the factors of tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communication as found in the data.

Hypothesis 1: The more developed mass media are in the countries of East Africa, the greater the development of a lingua franca.

Conversely, the existence of a lingua franca aids development of mass media in these countries roughly in proportion to the prevalence of the lingua franca.

If we first compare Kenya and Uganda with regard to mass media and lingua franca, the data in the foregoing section tends to support the hypothesis. In concentration of

lingua franca, Kenya surpasses Uganda. In use of newspapers Kenya also surpasses Uganda. Kenya has 25.5 subscribers per 100 people for newspapers (dailies and weeklies), to Uganda's 16 per 100 persons. This difference may be due in part to Kenya's practice of publishing newspapers in lingua franca -- English and Swahili -- whereas Uganda's newspapers are published in one lingua franca--English--and six tribal languages, with Luganda as the most important tribal language. has fewer newspapers and larger circulations than the Uganda newspapers, therefore economizing on newspaper production in the industrial sense as well as in the professional sense. Regarding the latter factor, one organization of trained journalists can communicate to larger audiences when a lingua franca also increases understanding and exchange of information between tribes and across national boundaries in East Africa. Certainly Kenya newspapers have considerable readership both in Uganda and Tanzania; this is partly because Kenya's large daily, The East African Standard, is the oldest of East Africa's newspapers, and is read by a large proportion of the English-speaking population of all three countries. spread readership across boundaries in East Africa is also due to the ease of obtaining Nairobi newspapers in the urbanized area of Uganda and in northern Tanzania. Communication by air and lake steamer (on Lake Victoria) is better between northern and eastern Tanzania and Nairobi, than between that area of Tanzania and its own capital, Dar Es Salaam. comparatively highly developed English language newspapers in Kenya have had a substantial influence on the spread of English as a lingua franca in all three East African countries, especially among educated people.

p

Thus, the data and related circumstances in Kenya and Uganda give support to the hypothesis linking mass media and lingua franca. But what happens when Tanzania is added to the total picture? It presents a result contrary to the hypothesis., Tanzania is lowest in media use, particularly newspapers, but it is rated highest of the three countries in lingua franca concentration. Does this outcome negate the hypothesis? It raises a doubt, but does not necessarily cause abandonment of the hypothesis. A number of other factors enter in to help explain why Tanzania has the least development in media use and the highest rating in lingua franca concentration. It is more a case of "all other factors not being equal," rather than the lack of any relationship such as postulated in Hypothesis 1. For example, the prevalence of a lingua franca in Tanzania is partly due to historical reasons. the colonial period Swahili was used much more extensively in Tanzania in official government administration than it was in either Uganda or Kenya. Under Tanzanian independence, Swahili has been made the official national language, but none has been so sanctioned in Uganda or Kenya. The present campaign by the Tanzania government through education, radio and print media to encourage use of Swahili has resulted in its spread and use, even in the rise of newspapers and periodicals in Swahili with substantial circulation, as far as estimates tell us.

More hours of broadcast time are being devoted to Swahili programs than to English programs in Tanzania, thus materially contributing to the spread of Swahili as the national language in Tanzania—and also increasing the use of the mass media, as people are exhorted to listen to Swahili broadcasts.

When independence came to these three East African countries, had Tanzania been up to the level of Kenya or Uganda in literacy, education, and other factors important to modernization of the nation, it is quite possible that Tanzania's recent zealous efforts to spread Swahili would have by now produced a degree of media use equal to or surpassing its neighboring countries.

Hypothesis 2: The greater the development of mass communications in the countries of East Africa, the more it reduces tribal tendencies that are negative to national development.

The greater the prevalence of a lingua franca in these countries, the greater the opportunity for overcoming tribal tendencies that are negative to national development.

Certainly tribal conflicts have negative effects on Kenya's progress, as noted in the chapter on Kenya, and also acknowledged by its leaders. However, Table 7-3 shows the dominance of the Kikuyu tribe contributes both positive and negative effects to Kenya. The Kikuyu have shown much initiative and effort to develop Kenya as a unified nation, ever since the days of the struggle for independence. The government, dominated by Kikuyu, uses only limited tribal language broadcasts, concentrating on Swahili and English programs. Tribal loyalties are usually closely connected with language loyalty, since each tribe has its own particular language as a basic feature of its culture. By means of this policy of limiting tribal language programs, as well as discouraging tribal language publications (only the Christian periodicals publish much in tribal languages), the government of Kenya is developing its mass media in a direction away from tribal

loyalties that could be negative to national development. Since the data indicate that Kenya ranks <a href="https://www.high-medium">high-medium</a> in the prevalence of a lingua franca (see Table 7-7), Kenya has a good opportunity for using this advantage plus her relatively superior development in use of the mass media (see Table 7-6) to overcome tribal tendencies negative to national development.

In Uganda, use of radio is medium, although data on radio use are uncertain, and this factor is difficult to assess with any accuracy. Tribal loyalties are strengthened rather than lessened by the practice of broadcasting in many tribal languages, in addition to Swahili and English. While these tribal language programs are in the minority in number of hours of broadcast time, their effect is one of decreasing, not increasing national unity. Thus, while both Uganda and Kenya are rated medium in radio use, Kenya clearly makes better use of radio to help reduce tribal tensions by the wider use of a lingua franca in programming. The different policies of the two countries in this matter can be partly explained by the attitudes of the dominant tribes in Kenya and Uganda. is, in Kenya--as mentioned -- the powerful Kikuyu tribe apparently desires a reduction in tribal conflict, while the Baganda, with their historical elite position, encouraged and entrenched by British colonial policy, tend to remain fiercely determined to maintain their power and prestige in present-day independent Uganda. The situation in Uganda may change at any time, since the recent overthrow of Obote leaves that country in the midst of uncertainty.

Tanzania also has a medium rating comparable to that of Kenya in the development of mass media, but is ranked third in use of mass media. (See Table 7-7.) Tanzania has seized the opportunity to overcome tribal tendencies by a determined effort to promote Swahili as a lingua franca; this policy is being implemented largely by use of radio and the print media, as well as in educational policies. Tanzania ranks high in the use of a lingua franca as well as third in the negative effects of tribalism. (See Table 7-7.) This comparison is probably significant in the relationship between a lingua franca and the use of mass media to defuse tribal conflicts. Another policy of Tanzania that reinforces this effort to use a lingua franca to dispel tribal frictions is the journalists' training program at Nygezi. (See p. 113.) There the students are instructed how to write in the medium of Swahili.

Hypothesis 3: The recognition of the importance of mass media's influence on national development is not widespread among leaders and potential leaders in the countries under study.

At this point in the study, the ideas of present leaders of East Africa will be mentioned in relation to this hypothesis. Opinions of potential leaders will be analyzed in Chapter IX.

This is the hypothesis that receives the least support in the data that has been gathered for the study. What is evident from the findings is a great concern on the part of East Africa's leaders that the mass media do not obstruct national programs of development through adverse criticism.

(See separate chapters on Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania for details.)

It seems significant that Tanzania ranks the lowest of the three countries in most of the indicators of national development, and the factor of literacy is a case in point, with relationship to the mass media. Tanzania with only 20 percent literacy (Table 7-1) is mounting the most comprehensive educational program in East Africa via radio to reach school children as well as adults with organized educational programs. This important fact illustrates clearly that the leaders of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania are beginning to see the important role of mass media in national progress. The Tanzanian radio programs in education are quite realistically facing the issue of illiteracy and recognizing that radio is the best medium available to overcome this barrier to development.

On the whole, the chief findings in relation to this hypothesis in all three countries are of two main types. First, the leaders do recognize the potential of mass media in national development as shown through their statements and policies, and secondly, these leaders also feel great concern that the people of their countries are not misled or persuaded out of the path of socialism.

Hypothesis 4: The prevailing political concepts in East Africa--African Socialism--greatly affect the attitude of leaders and potential leaders towards the use and control of mass media in national development, e.g., limitation on freedom of the press by government officials, and legal and constitutional provisions.

In this discussion we will deal with the findings as they pertain to attitudes of present leaders of the countries of East Africa. Opinions of potential leaders with reference to this hypothesis will be dealt with in Chapter IX.

Although all three countries under consideration, to some degree, show adherence to the ideals of African Socialism, Tanzania under Nyerere has developed this political philosophy to the highest degree in East Africa. An extensive economic and social development program based on the ideals of African life as outlined in the writings of Nyerere is in operation in Tanzania, the details of which are discussed earlier in this study (see p. 55 ff). These essential ideals include: equality, human dignity, sharing of resources, and hard work by all people.

Clearly, in Tanzania, certain actions of the government as implied in the data analyzed in this chapter, demonstrate the fact that use and control of mass media will be in line with the ideas of African Socialism mentioned. the print media nor radio is free to criticize openly the policies of the government or its leaders. Nyerere, in his action nationalizing the most important English language daily in Tanzania, The Tanzania Standard, has a clear intent to make the newspaper a more effective instrument of national develop-Its editorial policies as well as the news it prints definitely reflect support for government policy. nalism training program, already mentioned, has as its goal to train journalists in the concepts of African Socialism news reporting. In Table 7-5 totals of newspaper circulation in the three countries are shown, as well as the number of

we find that government publications in Tanzania, particularly in the Swahili language, occupy an increasing part of the print media. Such publications reflect in their content Nyerere's program for national development along the lines of the one-party state which will enforce the ideas of hard work, sharing of resources and the other facets of African Socialism. The goal is that no person will be exploited, but that also no one shall be allowed to escape hard work.

In the area of radio broadcasts, since they are entirely controlled by the government, there is an easy opportunity to proclaim the tenets of the one-party state and this is done consistently in Tanzania. There are constitutional provisions allowing free speech, but events have proved that persons who freely criticize the leaders or their policies are effectively silenced.

Uganda, under Obote, followed a course of even more rigid restrictions on correspondents who dared to criticize government leaders or policy. (See chapter on Uganda.) While there is a larger Christian press in Uganda than in Tanzania —which is not directly controlled by the government—evidence does show that the Christian press is not entirely free either. Radio in Uganda, as in Tanzania, is a government monopoly; its programming, while reflecting to some extent the wishes of the numerous tribal groups in Uganda, does to a large extent exhort the people to get in line with official government policy with regard to the development of the country. African Socialism is a less well-organized system in Uganda, and with Obote's removal, may become even more nebulous than before.

Kenya has followed a course of mild restriction on the press with fewer direct attempts made to use either the print media or radio to espouse the ideals of African Socialism than has been the case in Uganda or Tanzania. Yet Kenyatta makes frequent appeals in his public statements to the ideals of "togetherness" and the necessity of hard work to develop Kenya along lines of African culture, taking only what is useful from western technology. Recent incidents of explusion of foreign correspondents from Kenya have occurred, when these journalists criticized government policies or leaders. chapter on Kenya.) Therefore, while the organized activity of African Socialism, including the nationalization of industry and banks, as has occurred in both Uganda and Tanzania, has not occurred in Kenya, a controlled press in a moderate degree prevails in Kenya. Probably the wider use of English in Kenya has limited the intensity of African Socialism in Kenya. In Tanzania, Swahili is the true vehicle for the proclamation of African ideals. Uganda also makes more use of English as a lingua franca than of Swahili, which may account for the milder effect of African Socialism in some of its aspects in Uganda.



#### CHAPTER VIII

#### STUDENT SURVEY

This chapter deals with the survey of East African students in the United States and Canada. It explains the importance of this elite group and how the attitudes of these individuals give some indications of what we may expect in the future regarding the influences of tribalism, lingua franca, and mass communication on national development in East Africa. The organization of this chapter is divided into three main sections. First, the background of the survey is treated -explaining the rationale, the questionnaire, and the method-The second section gives the size of the returns and their distribution by countries, and it elaborates on the demographic data of the respondents. In the third section a general overview of the findings is given in order to focus attention on the principal factors under study and their influence on national development in East Africa. The following chapter deals specifically with findings related to the four hypotheses of the investigation.

# Background of the Survey

Importance of Group Surveyed

independence era, very few East Africans went abroad for higher education. Many who did go became leaders in the independence movements in their countries, and now occupy important positions in the new nations. The present student group who go overseas for study constitute a small but influential elite whose opinions and actions upon their return affect nation-building. Evidence indicates that the number of students from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania studying in America probably reached a peak in the late sixties, and now appears to be leveling off. But the fact remains that most newly independent countries in Africa are headed by leaders who have studied abroad, and it seems likely that this will continue for some time to come.

Most East African students return to good positions in their countries where the need for skilled leaders is still great. This situation is in marked contrast to students from India and some other Asian countries; these young people often stay in America where there are more opportunities for their knowledge and skills.

The importance of this student group in America in the eyes of their countries is illustrated in the policy of

<sup>1</sup> See page 48 ff.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>See page 53, footnote 117.

Uganda, and Tanzania attempt to maintain a current list of their students studying in the United States and Canada. These lists were the main source of names and addresses used in the present study; data were also secured from about two hundred sixty colleges and universities. The publication of the Institute of International Education, Open Doors, lists foreign students studying in the United States and Canada by country and the geographical concentration in American colleges; it was found that the majority of East Africans were in colleges in the midwest and far west. Other sources included the USAID scholarship program. Much valuable help was given by all these agencies.

#### The Questionnaire

A three-page questionnaire was devised, consisting of both open-ended and multiple choice questions. Personal data items were followed by a sheet of questions concerning use of mass media and the place of a lingua franca, together with the problems of national unity and modernization within the students' respective countries. Three different third pages were prepared, each version being sent to approximately one-third of the respondents, so that wider spread of questions could be asked, without using an excessively long questionnaire. The third-page questions concerned mainly tribal loyalties and the mass media. (See Appendix for the questionnaire.) representativeness of the data gathered from different versions of page 3, which of course is supported by smaller numbers than from pages 1 and 2, is discussed in the Appendix. general, it can be inferred that data from page 3 is as

representative as data from pages 1 and 2.

Great care was taken in the preparation of the questions, making use of extensive experience with the English-language ability of East African college students. "Americanisms" were hopefully avoided. Experiences with the pilot testing of African students revealed the need for some changes in the questionnaire, which were made in the final form.

## Methodology of the Survey

Questionnaires were mailed in March, 1970, to college students from Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania studying in the United States and Canada with a short covering letter, explaining the purpose and procedures of the survey. (See Appendix.) No attempt was made to divide the number of students equally among the three countries; but, as expected, Kenya provided the largest group on the mailing list, with Uganda second and Tanzania last. Statistics show that the proportions on the mailing list approximate the proportions of students in America from the three countries. The breakdown of the mailing list was as follows:

| Country                     | <u>Students</u>  | Percentage of Total |
|-----------------------------|------------------|---------------------|
| Kenya<br>Uganda<br>Tanzania | 236<br>140<br>94 | 50<br>30<br>20      |
| Total                       | 470              | 100%                |

Reminder cards were sent after one month to those failing to respond. These cards were written in Swahili with

the hope of engendering interest in reluctant respondents, and the results from this effort were quite good. In the end, 201 completed questionnaires were returned, a gratifying response considering the fact that the respondents were foreign students engaging in a strange procedure and having to use English—which for most was a second or even third language.

Regarding the return, evidence shows that Kenya is the most highly developed of the three countries of East Africa in education and economic progress, yet Tanzanian students produced the highest percentage of answers to the question-naire—a return of 50 percent—and often the most articulate, detailed answers. Uganda showed 43 percent and Kenya 35 percent return of questionnaires.

Compared to the proportions to whom questionnaires were mailed by countries, the figures below indicate a response that was influenced by some factor other than chance, although this result had no unusually disturbing significance as far as this study is concerned.

| Country  | Percentage of Total Mailed | Percentage Returned by Country | Number<br>Received |
|----------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|
| Kenya    | 50                         | 35                             | 93                 |
| Uganda   | 30                         | 43                             | 60                 |
| Tanzania | 20                         | 50                             | . 48               |
|          |                            | <b>\</b>                       | 201                |

Concerning nonrespondents to the questionnaire it was not feasible to seek further information on them. Many of the students had probably returned to their countries without

leaving forwarding addresses. Taking the number of envelopes returned unopened--35--and subtracting this figure from the total of questionnaires mailed out--470--we get a total of 435 respondents who actually received the questionnaires; thus a total of 43 percent of the respondents returned completed questionnaires. Of the 57 percent who failed to return the questionnaires, there is evidence to suggest that many of them may have been newly arrived students in the United States and Canada since only a small percentage--10 percent--of the students responding indicated that they have been in the United States or Canada for less than one year. (See Table 8-1 for this demographic data.)

### General Demography of Respondents

The student respondents represent a relatively homogeneous group with regard to such demographic data as sex, age, marital status, social class and occupation of father. Of the total respondents, 86 percent are male, and 79 percent are in the 21 to 30 age bracket—14 percent are above, and 7 percent below that age bracket. A total of 70 percent are single. While 60 percent state that they are of the middle class, 12 percent give no class or insist that no classes exist in their country; of the remainder 23 percent consider themselves from a very poor class, and 5 percent say they are wealthy. Although 42 percent state that their fathers are farmers, there appears to be no relationship between that occupation and the class category; 28 percent say that their fathers are professional or in business, while 10 percent say government service; about 20 percent give no answer at all.

An interesting feature of the data is that 57 percent of the respondents say they have been in America more than two years, indicating perhaps less contact with current events in their countries than recent arrivals would have; yet many answers reflect an awareness of happenings abroad. a total of 33 percent who have been in America from one to two years, 1 percent under six months and 9 percent from 7 to 12 months. Since 65 percent have completed only secondary level of education prior to arrival in America, it is not surprising to find that 56 percent are seeking bachelor's degrees; but a good number -- 16 percent -- are working for the doctoral degree; and 23 percent for the master's degree. Approximately 5 percent of the respondents give no indication of what degree they seek, if any. Perhaps a significant fact here is that of 32 students seeking the doctorate, 13 are from Tanzania, the country with the lowest literacy rate and the least economic. development.

The major fields of study show a wide distribution, with the social sciences encompassing 19 percent, physical sciences 18 percent, business and economics 11 percent and mass communication only 2 percent. The last figure seems significant in that many answers by the respondents reflect a decided opinion on the place of mass communication in national development. The other 50 percent of the answers on major fields of study reflect a very wide distribution. In a related question on what type of work the student expects to do upon return to his country, a significantly large proportion—47 percent—show education as their intended occupation. Politics or civil service is indicated by 18 percent, scientific or engineering fields by 11 percent, and 16 percent

give other scattered fields; 8 percent are undecided. About  $_{\lambda}$ 30 percent receive financial aid, mostly from their governments.


The small group of female respondents display some striking features in their answers. A total of 16 out of 27 respondents have education as an occupational goal, and 5 have some type of medical practice in mind. These two categories constitute 77 percent of the whole group. Possibly some feminist rebellion against the status quo is reflected in that of the 8 respondents out of 201 in the survey who refused to indicate their tribe, 4 of them are women. They each make a point of suggesting that tribes are obsolete. Only 5 women have scholarships. Table 8-1 summarizes these demographic data.

# Overview of the Findings

To get a better sense of the main directions and interrelations of the data gathered in the survey relative to tribalism, lingua franca, and mass media as <u>influences on</u> and as <u>affected by</u> national development, this overview is selective in presenting the findings. It also gives separate data for different countries only when deemed significant. Chapter IX takes up the four hypotheses of the study and relates pertinent survey findings as well as other available information to each hypothesis.

Tribalism, Lingua Franca, and National Unity

Although many of the students gave comments to various questions that reflect their devotion to the ideals of



| 7 | Category                  | · Percentage |
|---|---------------------------|--------------|
|   | Sexmale                   | 86           |
|   | Age                       |              |
|   | 21 to 30 years            | 79           |
|   | 31 and over               | 14           |
|   | 20 and under              | 7            |
|   | Marital statussingle      | 70           |
|   | Class status described    |              |
|   | Middle class              | 60           |
|   | Very poor                 | 23           |
|   | Wealthy                   | 5            |
|   | No class                  | 12           |
|   | Occupation of father      |              |
|   | Farmer                    | 42           |
|   | Profession or business    | 28           |
| : | Government service        | 10           |
|   | No indication             | 20           |
|   | Length of time in America |              |
|   | More than two years       | 57           |
|   | One to two years          | 33           |
|   | 7-12 months               | 9            |
|   | Under six months          | 1            |
|   | Degree sought             |              |
|   | B.A. or equivalent        | 56           |
|   | M.A. or equivalent        | 23           |
|   | Ph.D. or equivalent       | 16           |
|   | Other                     | 5 .          |
|   | Major field of study      |              |
|   | Social sciences           | 19           |
|   | Physical sciences         | ī́8          |
|   | Business and economics    | 11           |
|   | Mass media                | 2            |
|   | Varied other fields       | 50           |
|   | Occupation goal           |              |
|   | Education                 | 47           |
|   | Politics/civil service    | 18           |
|   | Science/engineering       | 11           |
|   | Other                     | 16           |
|   | Undecided                 | 8            |
|   |                           |              |

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African Socialism and the denial of the presence of tribalism in their country, all but eight of the African students gave the names of their tribes. Dozens of tribes were represented in the group of respondents, but predictably, in Kenya three tribes were named with much greater frequency, and one tribe was the most frequently mentioned in Uganda; Tanzania had widely distributed answers, reflecting that country's numerous tribes. East Indians represented about 10 percent of the total, being 21 out of 201 respondents.

Eighty percent of the students gave a tribal language as their mother tongue, many being represented. Only Luganda with 18 percent and Kikuyu with 13 percent were above the 10 percent level in frequency of mother tongues mentioned, corresponding with the numerical importance of these two tribes in Uganda and Kenya respectively. Over half the respondents said Swahili was their second language, and more than 40 percent gave English as a second language, with better than 90 percent claiming good or excellent fluency in their second language. (See Table 8-2.)

Swahili should be the national language, in their country, according to 64 percent of the students, with many from Tanzania insisting that in fact it is already a national language. Only in Uganda was English preferred over Swahili as a national language. (See Table 8-3.) The most widely given reasons for selecting either English or Swahili as the national language were (1) that it is widely understood or easily learned and (2) that it promotes unity and avoids tribal conflicts. Eighty-eight percent of the students believed that a national language would promote unity; and



TABLE 8-2 ...
LANGUAGES SPOKEN BY STUDENTS (N = 201)

|                 |        | F       | ercentage S | peaking        |       |       |
|-----------------|--------|---------|-------------|----------------|-------|-------|
| Classification  | Tribal | Swahili | English     | East<br>Indian | Other | Total |
| Mother Tongue   | 80     | 6       |             | 9              | 5     | 100   |
| Second Language |        | 92      | 84*         | <b></b>        | 14    | * * * |

<sup>\*</sup>While all of these students were studying in the U.S.A. or Canada and therefore using English to some considerable degree, about 65 percent regarded some other language as their second language equal to English.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Total percentage greater than 100 because of large number of multiple answers for the second language.

70 percent thought the mass media could help develop a national language. (See Tables 8-3 and 8-4.)



TABLE 8-3
PREFERENCE FOR NATIONAL LANGUAGE

|               | Perce     | Percentage by Countries |          |          |      |  |  |
|---------------|-----------|-------------------------|----------|----------|------|--|--|
| T             | · ·       | II                      | Manania  | Tot<br>N | al % |  |  |
| Language      | Kenya<br> | Uganda<br>——————        | Tanzania |          | /0   |  |  |
| Swahili       | 71        | 27                      | 96       | 123      | 64   |  |  |
| Énglish       | 20        | 44                      | 0        | 42       | 22   |  |  |
| Luganda       | 0         | 22                      | 0        | 12       | 6    |  |  |
| Multiple      | . 8       | 6                       | 2        | 11       | 6    |  |  |
| Other         | 1         | 2                       | 2        | 3        | 2    |  |  |
| Total number  | 91:       | 55                      | 45       | 191      |      |  |  |
| Total percent | 100       | 101                     | 100      |          | 100  |  |  |

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TABLE 8-4



# QUESTION: CAN MASS MEDIA HELP DEVELOP ONE NATIONAL LANGUAGE?

| Response                         | Percentage |
|----------------------------------|------------|
| Yes .                            | 70         |
| No                               | 12         |
| Don't know                       | 14         |
| Already have a national language | Total 100  |

Lingua Franca, Mass Media and National Development

While 88 percent of the students believe a national language will promote national unity, 75 percent believe that increased access to radio for the people "will help to reduce difference and create greater national unity." (See Table 8-5.)

TABLE 8-5
INFLUENCES FOR NATIONAL UNITY

|                                     | Perce | entage |
|-------------------------------------|-------|--------|
| Type of Influence                   | Уes   | No     |
| National language (N = 108)         | 88.   | 12     |
| Increased access to radio (N = 184) | 75    | 25     |

English was far the most popular language for newspapers read by the students, although Swahili was more important in radio listening. Even in Uganda, where the tribal language Luganda is widespread, Swahili outweighed Luganda in popularity for radio programs. The significance of this finding is reinforced by the fact that Swahili is the most important language used in broadcasts in East Africa, according to the respondents. The importance of English as the medium used in films reflects the lack of a film-producing industry in East Africa—most movies being imported from England or America, and a few from India in the Hindi language. (See Table 8-6.)

While newspapers, in the opinion of the students, have less influence than radio with the people, they believe newspapers tend to have good availability; 46 percent say many newspapers are available in their hometowns, and 52 percent say some are. A total of 83 percent believe newspapers do influence their readers regarding national problems.



TABLE 8-6
LANGUAGE USED IN MASS MEDIA

|   | Language Used (Percentage) |         |         |             |       |                  |  |
|---|----------------------------|---------|---------|-------------|-------|------------------|--|
| Mass<br>Medium                              | English                    | Swahili | Luganda | Multiple    | Other | Total            |  |
| Newspaper<br>(most read<br>by students)     | 54                         | 18      |         | 24*         | 2     | 100<br>(N = 199) |  |
| Radio (listened to most by students)        | . 24                       | 45      |         | 16*         |       | 100<br>(N = 199) |  |
| Radio (most used in respon- dents' country) | 16                         | 56      | 5       | 22 <b>*</b> | 1     | 100<br>(N = 197) |  |
| Films (most often used)                     | . 84                       | 6       | 2       | 8*          |       | 100<br>(N = 195) |  |

\*Mentions of more than one language in answering a question were not distributed. They tend to reflect the same degree of differences found in single mentions.

Note: Wording differences in questions regarding data above are indicated with the classifications in the stub of the table.

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In rating types of mass media for aiding national development, the respondents put radio first with 72 percent, followed by newspapers with 19 percent. In influence on national leaders, they think newspapers lead, and rate radio second, the percentages being 36 and 24 percent respectively. But radio, in the opinion of 46 percent, is more influential with "ordinary citizens" than is the newspaper; and they believe the next best means of influencing the citizenry is by word-of-mouth. (See Table 8-7.)

A total of 77 percent of the students thought that the mass media in America did give them ideas as to how such media might be used in developing their own countries, but a large number had negative reactions to the kinds of ideas gained. Some of these ideas are mentioned later in this study.

In the matter of government control of the mass media in their own countries, 55 percent said newspapers were both privately and government-owned, and a convincing 96 percent declared that government owns and operates all broadcasting service. The answers were more evenly divided on the question of whether government owns and operates the film industry; 56 percent said it did, and 44 percent said it did not.

In response to the question asking if there should be regulation of speech and press in the students' countries, the pro-con dichotomy was nearly equal: 54 percent said "Yes," 46 percent, "No." There was no equivocation on this question. Of those saying there should be such regulation, 24 percent believed that anything detrimental to the people or the leaders should be forbidden. Other types of regulations suggested were widely distributed.

TABLE 8-7
INFLUENCE BY TYPE OF COMMUNICATION

|                        |       |                 | Percent           | age      |       | -                |
|------------------------|-------|-----------------|-------------------|----------|-------|------------------|
| Object of<br>Influence | Radio | Newspaper       | Word-of-<br>Mouth | Multiple | Other | Total            |
| National               |       | ,               |                   |          |       |                  |
| Development            | 72    | 19              | -                 | 6        | . 3   | 100 (N = 93)     |
| Leaders of<br>Country  | 24    | <sub>.</sub> 36 | 27                | 6        | 7     | 100<br>(N = 186) |
| Ordinary<br>Citizen    | 46    |                 | 41                |          | 13    | 100<br>(N = 72)  |

Importance of Mass Media Relative to Education

Notwithstanding the widespread usage and influence of mass media indicated by survey results, the respondents overwhelmingly put education ahead of mass media as to importance in modernization of the country. In fact, they also rated transportation more important than mass media in this regard. Table 8-8 gives their answers to the question asking: Which of three factors are most important to modernization of your country?

TABLE 8-8

IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION, TRANSPORTATION, AND MASS MEDIA

| Factor                            | Percentage | Number |
|-----------------------------------|------------|--------|
| Education                         | . 88       | 169    |
| Transportation                    | 6          | 12     |
| Mass Media                        | 4          | 8      |
| (Multiple answers, undistributed) |            | 193    |

According to 80 percent of the respondents, tribal loyalties of pupils in secondary schools in their countries are now weaker than those of their elders; only 8 percent felt that such loyalties were strong and 12 percent saw no difference. Since most school children go away from home to boarding schools in central locations, this question has some significance. In another aspect of the tribal problem, 75 percent of the respondents thought tribal loyalties are weakened

when people are urbanized. These two results reinforce each other.

Interpretation

Certain important factors stand out in these data. Most respondents are single, young males from the lower middle class, with serious intentions concerning their higher education and what they may do with it upon their return to their countries. Less than a third receive scholarship help, and yet the majority have been in America since completing secondary school, and intend to obtain at least a B.A. degree, with a considerable number aiming higher.

A larger number of the respondents recognize the need of a lingua franca in East Africa; they are somewhat divided between Swahili and English for this purpose, with the former having the edge for the near future. clearly the medium very often mentioned as the most important for the modernization of the country, while newspapers strongly influence the literate and especially national leaders. loyalties exist but are minmized in importance by the respondents, this being most striking in the case of the Tanzanians and less so in Uganda and Kenya. Education is an important theme running throughout the answers--being important both in modernization and as a subject for the mass media to emphasize in developing national unity. There is a measure of admiration for the technological progress seen in America, but also much antagonism to the content and technique of the mass media in the United states. Most respondents show an attitude of determination to further development of their countries along

African culture patterns, taking what is useful from the west, and discarding the rest.

The findings which deal with interrelationships of lingua franca, mass media, and national development all tend to be supportive of one another. Reflecting attitudes of future leaders of the three nations of East Africa as they do, the results constitute a positive sign for future progress in national development and modernization of East Africa.



#### CHAPTER IX

# STUDENT SURVEY FINDINGS RELATED TO FOUR HYPOTHESES

The questions of the survey were not designed to provide direct tests of the hypotheses posed in the study, but more to see if the East African students' knowledge and attitudes in these matters reflect understanding and support of the relationships expressed in the hypotheses. What these future national leaders think in these regards will surely help shape national development in their countries to some appreciable degree.

Each hypothesis will be taken up one at a time, and related findings of significance will be introduced and cross-related to other of the hypotheses where important.

Hypothesis 1: The more developed mass media are in the countries of East Africa, the greater the development of a lingua franca.

Conversely, the existence of a lingua franca aids development of mass media in these countries, roughly in proportion to the prevalence of the lingua franca.

Can Mass Media Help Develop a National Language

Perhaps more significance will be attached to the data presented in this section if first a clear picture of

the need for a lingua franca is drawn from the survey data.

Asked what was their mother tongue, 199 students gave forty different languages. These were as follows with the frequency of response:

| Luganda    | 35  | Maragoli    | 2   | Igukuria    | 1    |
|------------|-----|-------------|-----|-------------|------|
| Kikuyu     | 25  | Runyarwanda | 2   | Pare        | 1    |
| Luhyia     | 14  | Lusoga      | 2   | Kiporogo 🐦  | 1    |
| Luo        | 13  | Kihehe      | 2.  | Kinyaturu   | 1    |
| Swahili    | 12  | Zanaki      | 2   | Kirewe      | 1    |
| Kikamba    | 6   | Jita        | 2   | Kingoni     | 1    |
| Haya -     | 6   | Ateso       | 1   | Kinyiramba  | 1    |
| Kipsigi    | 5   | Kiembu      | 1   | Iraqw       | 1    |
| Runyankole | 5   | Nandi       | 1   | Zaramo      | 1    |
| Lutoro     | 4   | Elmolo      | 1   | Portuguese  | 1    |
| Lango      | - 4 | Lugbara     | 1   | East Indian | 17   |
| Śukuma     | 4   | Acholi      | . 1 | Other       | 5    |
| Kichagga   | 4   | Lunyole     | 1   | Multiple    | 5_   |
| Kisii      | 3   | Lugisu      | 1   | Motol       | 3.00 |
| Taita      | 2   | Samia       | 1   | Total       | .199 |
| Meru       | 2   | Nyamwezi    | 1   |             |      |

Question 5 asked: Do you think that broadcasting and widespread use of newspapers and magazines in your country could help develop one national language?

The distribution of answers show an overall strong affirmative appreciation of the relationship between mass media and development of a national language or lingua franca. (See Table 9-1.)

'TABLE 9-1'
MEDIA HELP DEVELOP NATIONAL LANGUAGE

|          |      |     | e             |                            |      |     |
|----------|------|-----|---------------|----------------------------|------|-----|
| Country  | Yes  | No  | Don't<br>Know | 'Is National*<br>Language' | N    | Nat |
| Kenya    | 74   | 13  | 13            | 1                          | % 88 | 4   |
| Uganda   | 58   | 20  | 22            | . 0                        | 59   | 1   |
| Tanzania | . 78 | . 0 | 4             | 18                         | 45   | 3   |
| Total N  | 134  | 23  | 26            | 9 .                        | 192  |     |
| Total %  | 70   | 12  | 14            | 5                          | 101  |     |

\*Instead of answering  $\underline{Yes}$  or  $\underline{No}$ , nine students wrote in that their country had a national language.

tNa = no answer.

The one large difference in the distribution pattern of the "Yes" answers is the relatively lower figure for Uganda than for the other two countries. While mass media development in Uganda almost equals that in Kenya and surpasses that in Tanzania, the Ugandan students view mass media as somewhat less help to the development of a national language. This result may be explained by their weaker consensus as to what their national language should be (see Table 9-2) and by the less concentration of the mass media in Uganda on one or not more than two linguas franca.

TABLE 9-2
WHAT SHOULD BE THE NATIONAL LANGUAGE

|          | Percentage |               |         |          |       |     |
|----------|------------|---------------|---------|----------|-------|-----|
| Country  | English    | Swahili       | Luganda | Multiple | Other | Ņ   |
| Kenya    | 20         | <b>√</b> 71 . | 0       | 8        | 1     | 91  |
| Uganda   | 44         | 27            | 22      | 6        | 2     | 55  |
| Tanzania | 0          | 96            | 0 .     | 2        | 2     | 45  |
| Total N  | 42         | 123           | 12      | 11       | 3     | 191 |
| Total %  | 22         | 64            | 6       | 6        | 2     | 100 |

Table 9-2 shows that Swahili was the preferred national language of 96 percent of Tanzanian students and 71 percent of Kenyan students. Among Ugandan students, there was not even a majority agreed on one language, English receiving the largest percentage--44 percent, with the remainder spread over more than four other languages. A part of the explanation for their lack of consensus on a lingua franca is undoubtedly due to the use of a larger variety of languages in radio broadcasts and printed periodicals in Uganda as detailed in Chapter VII.

This same picture of Uganda's lingua franca problem is reflected by student answers to the question:

Which language is used most in radio broadcasts in your country?

The distribution of the answers in Table 9-3 shows that radio

listening, in the opinion of the students, is spread across more than five languages with none getting a majority of the listeners. In Tanzania, 98 percent of the students say Swahili is used most in radio broadcasts, and 97 percent of Kenya students say Swahili is used most in radio broadcasts in Kenya.

TABLE 9-3

LANGUAGE MOST USED ON RADIO BROADCASTS

|                | -       | Percen  | Number of |       |     |  |
|----------------|---------|---------|-----------|-------|-----|--|
| Country        | English | Swahili | Luganda   | Other |     |  |
| Kenya          | 30      | 97      | 0         | 2     | 117 |  |
| Uganda         | 78      | 1       | 35        | 20†   | 76  |  |
| Tanzania       | 2.      | 98      | 0         | 0     | 47  |  |
| Total Mentions | 74      | 136     | 20        | 10    | 240 |  |
| Percentage     | 31      | 57      | . 8       | 4     | 100 |  |

Total number = 195.

\*Number used in the table is based on number of mentions, which reflects numerous multiple answers. Number of students for each country were Kenya 91, Uganda 57, and Tanzania 47.

tMost of the "other" are probably "Luganda." However, the phrase "tribal language" was used by the students; since 7 out of 10 respondents giving this designation "tribal language" are of the Baganda tribe, the probability is great that the phrase indicates Luganda.

Uganda students felt that radio broadcasts were actually working against the firm establishment of a national language, since the broadcasts were so fragmented linguistically. In this respect, the respondents thus imply that, with the multiplicity of languages used in broadcasts in Uganda, the effectiveness of the mass media as a unifying factor in developing a national language and in other respects is at present slight. The following are some of the comments of Ugandan students:

. . . tribes listen to their own tribal broadcasts or programmes.

People tend to stick to their own languages since each tribe has a radio station.

Broadcasts are made in most languages and each group of people listen to their own.

. . . There are 12 tribal languages used on Uganda radio. Each tribal language gets 15 minutes on radio in the time of national news . . . there is no language which is common in Uganda, so communication is very hard . . .

One of the questions asked of all students surveyed was:

Do most people in your home town or village listen to radio?

Eighty-six percent said  $\underline{\text{Yes}}$  and 14 percent said  $\underline{\text{No}}$  (N = 189). When data on this question are related to replies to the question asking what language the home town people listened to most, the results show they think Swahili is preferred by a majority percentage and English the second choice.

The large degree to which the total subjects see Swahili as the preferred national language and the relationship of this strong consensus to whether mass media helps develop a national language are revealed in Table 9-4.

In summary, the evidence from the student survey relating to Hypothesis 1 indicates the great majority have some appreciation of the mutual relationship between lingua franca and mass media, and they understand that in the context of national development each tends to support the other. In this regard, it could be inferred from the findings that student awareness of the lingua franca function of Swahili and English, particularly, influenced their thinking.

Hypothesis 2A: The greater the development of mass communications in the countries of East Africa, the more it reduces tribal tendencies that are negative to national development.

Hypothesis 2B: The greater the prevalence of a lingua franca in these countries, the greater the opportunity for overcoming tribal tendencies that are negative to national development.

Tribal Tendencies Negative to National Development

mass media and lingua franca as forces which help overcome tribal tendencies negative to national development. To bring the data from the survey to bear on the hypothesis as a whole and more specifically on each part, the first step is to elaborate on the meaning of "tribal tendencies negative to national development." The most obvious and probably most far-reaching negative tendency in a tribe is for members to hold on to their tribal languages and their peculiar culture. The consequences of clinging to tribal language and culture tends to be a barrier to communication with tribes in a nation with

TABLE 9-4 \
NATIONAL LANGUAGE CHOICE AND MASS MEDIA HELP

|         | Can mass media  National language should be  National language should be |                             |                                     |  |   |  |  |  |
|---------|--|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|--|---|--|--|--|
| English | Swahili  | Luganda                     | Multiple                            | Other  | N   | %  |  |  |
| 29      | 88   | 6                           | 10                                  | . 0  | 133   | 71   |  |  |
| 8       | 7  | 5                           | 1                                   | · 2  | 23  | 12   |  |  |
| 5       | 17   | 1                           | 0                                   | 0  | 23  | 12   |  |  |
| 0       | 7  | . 0                         | 0                                   | , 1  | 8   | 1  |  |  |
| 42      | 119  | 12                          | 11                                  | 3  | 187   |  |  |  |
| 22      | 64   | 6                           | 6                                   | 2  |   | 100  |  |  |
|         | 29<br>8<br>5<br>0  | 29 88<br>8 7<br>5 17<br>0 7 | 29 88 6<br>8 7 5<br>5 17 1<br>0 7 0 | 29     88     6     10       8     7     5     1       5     17     1     0       0     7     0     0       42     119     12     11 | 29 88 6 10 0 8 7 5 1 2 5 17 1 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 | 29 88 6 10 0 133<br>8 7 5 1 2 23<br>5 17 1 0 0 23<br>0 7 0 0 1 8 |  |  |

other languages and cultures. Other negative tendencies are actually specifics of the barrier to general communication. They include the fragmenting of educational effort and consequently the great reduction of general education, more especially at higher levels. Another negative tendency would be prejudice against other tribes, and an important example of prejudice that can hurt development of national unity is the favoritism often shown by a dominant tribe influencing the selection of local and national leaders from its tribal members. A more general symptom of prejudice would be failure of different tribes to understand and appreciate the needs, problems and rights of one another. This attitude comes very humanly from thinking more in terms of one's own immediate social group than in terms of the nation's interest at large.

More specific facets of the lack of communication which are barriers to national development are the difficulties in administering national government, of developing national commerce and industry, of facilitating travel, and many other functions of a national society. A part of this, too, would be the difficulty of accommodating the inward flow of rural people to urban centers; that is, the language barriers in polyglot nations, such as make up East Africa, would slow the development of urbanization.

#### Radio Helps National Unity

To obtain opinion directly on Hypothesis 2A, the students were asked:

As more people get access to radio broadcasts in your country, do you think this will help reduce differences and create greater national unity?

The question focused on radio for the obvious reason that it is the only mass medium which comes even close to reaching half the population of each country. The total response was a strong affirmative, 75 percent <u>Yes</u>, to 25 percent <u>No</u>, with 184 students responding. On an individual country basis, substantial differences showed up in percentages of affirmative replies, ranking Tanzania first, with 91 percent; Kenya second, with 78 percent, and Uganda third, with 57 percent. (See Table 9-5.) This order cannot be definitely correlated with

TABLE 9-5
RADIO AND NATIONAL UNITY

| ,        | Percen | tage | Total. |     |  |
|----------|--------|------|--------|-----|--|
| Country  | Yes    | No   | N      | . % |  |
| Kenya    | 78     | 22   | 88     | 48  |  |
| Uganda   | 57     | 43   | 54     | 29  |  |
| Tanzania | 91     | 9    | 42     | 23  |  |
| Total N  | 138    | 46   | 184    |     |  |
| Total %  | 75     | 25   |        | 100 |  |

development of radio listening by countries, as indicated in Chapter VII. On the basis of the latest estimates of totals of radio sets to population, the countries seem almost even. But when the concentration of broadcasts by languages for each country, as judged by the students (see Table 9-3), is compared to student appraisal of the radio medium's effect on

national unity in Table 9-5, the correlation is very high. In radio concentration by language, Tanzania uses Swahili most, 98 percent of the students said, with 2 percent indicating English. In Kenya, it is Swahili, said 97 percent, with 30 percent also indicating English on par with Swahili. In Uganda, counting multiple answers, 78 percent of the students said English, 35 percent, said Luganda, and 20 percent said "tribal language." Thus, on language concentration for radio broadcasts, the order is Tanzania first, Kenya second, and Uganda third. This is the same order found in the results to the question about the effect of radio on national unity. (See Table 9-6.)

TABLE 9-6

RADIO: LANGUAGE CONCENTRATION AND NATIONAL UNITY

|          | Rank Ord                  | ler                            |  |  |
|----------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|--|--|
| Country  | Language<br>Concentration | Influence on<br>National Unity |  |  |
| Tanzania | . 1                       | 1                              |  |  |
| Kenya    | 2                         | 2                              |  |  |
| Uganda   | 3                         | 3                              |  |  |
| Total N  | 195                       | 184                            |  |  |

Asked Why, students who saw radio as a unifying force explained it more on an educational basis than any other reason. Many felt radio programs can be used to further adult

education in the areas of better methods of agriculture, in increased literacy, and to inform people of plans and programs of the government. This latter factor was often expressed in the answers, the majority of which expressed the need and desirability of government continuing to control the contents of radio broadcasts for the important purpose of fostering and increasing a feeling of national unity and pride among diverse tribes which make up each of the three countries of East Africa.

To another question, many students responded in a similar-vein. They were asked:

In what important ways could any of the means of mass communication help in the modernization of your country?

Out of 124 who received the question, 107 responded and 79 of these-said education, in some variation or other. Another 35 answers were closely related, keying on the idea of <u>information dissemination</u>. Next in frequency of response was <u>fostering of national unity</u>, offered by 25 students, and fourth in line was <u>giving people political awareness</u>.

As stated earlier in this chapter (page 165), radio was presumed to be the most important mass medium at the present stage of the national development of East Africa. In this regard, the students were asked:

Which is the most important means of mass communication in national development of new African states?

Their answers leave no doubt that they favor radio, as shown in Table 9-7. Newspapers are definitely second, and other media are scarcely mentioned.

TABLE 9-7
MEDIA IMPORTANCE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

|          | Percentage saying most important |                 |                |      |               |      |     |
|----------|----------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|------|---------------|------|-----|
| Country  | Radio                            | News-<br>papers | Maga-<br>zines | Film | Mul-<br>tiple | N    | %.  |
| Kenya    | 66                               | 21              | . 2            | 2    | 8             | - 89 | 46  |
| Uganda   | 71                               | 24              | <del></del>    |      | 5             | 59   | 31  |
| Tanzania | 84                               | - 7             |                | 4    | 4             | 45   | 23  |
| Total N  | 139                              | 36              | 2              | 4    | 12            | 193  | .•  |
| Total %  | 72                               | 19              | 1              | 2    | 6             |      | 100 |

<sup>\*</sup>Multiple answers of more than one medium.

Some light on newspaper's role and degree of influence in national development is given by the student response to the question:

Do you think newspapers have any influence on their readers as to what to think about national affairs in your country?

Table 9-8 gives the frequency distribution of their replies, according to degree of influence attributed to the newspaper medium.

TABLE 9-8
NEWSPAPERS AND NATIONAL AFFAIRS

| Three countries |            | Degree o | f Influence |      |       |
|-----------------|------------|----------|-------------|------|-------|
| Combined        | None       | Little   | Moderate    | Much | Total |
| Number          | <b>2</b> - | 3        | 34          | 36   | 75    |
| Percent         | 3          | 4        | 45          | 48   | 100   |

In answers to other questions, it becomes clear that the students see the newspapers as a medium of influence on leaders of the country more so than on the people. This view is understandable in the light of the limited circulation relative to the size of the population. (See Table 7-5.)

Returning to the matter of using mass media to help educate the people, and referring to an assumption made in the beginning of this section, that the more varied and diffused the tribal languages in a country, the greater would be the hindrance to development of education, we can examine the answers to a question about the use of radio by type of program that should be emphasized and see if it reflects student awareness of the degree of educational needs in their countries. The question asked was:

Below are four types of radio programs. If you were the manager of home broadcasts in your country, indicate the type of program you would emphasize most by ranking it "first." Then rank the other second, third

| and four | th, according | to 1 | the | emphasis | you | would | give |
|----------|---------------|------|-----|----------|-----|-------|------|
|          | ADVERTISEMENT | rs   |     |          |     |       |      |
|          | EDUCATION     |      |     |          |     |       |      |
|          | NEWS          |      |     |          |     |       |      |
|          | ENTERTAINMENT |      |     |          |     |       |      |

Used on one of the alternate page 3's in the questionnaire, 57 students responded. Lumping together students from all three countries, and analyzing the data by weighting each first place four points, second place three points, and so on, the "if-then" picture as a whole shows the following resultant weight for each type of program:

| Type of Program | Weight |
|-----------------|--------|
| Education       | 194    |
| News            | 155    |
| Entertainment   | 99     |
| Advertisements  | -66    |

These results show that students put educational type programs definitely ahead of the other types. By inference, therefore, we can say that as a whole the East African students are aware of the needs for educational programs, and it is reasonable to believe that the multiplicity of tribal languages is one of the factors contributing to their awareness of the need. More will be said about this point later.

The same rank order is found for each country separately. While the number in each subsample for separate countries is too small to support strong reliability in the analysis of data by countries, the weighted index for separate countries is shown anyway in Table 9-9. A weighted index is used in order to adjust for different size samples in each of the three countries.

TABLE 9-9
WEIGHTED INDEX BY TYPES OF PROGRAMS\*

| Country  | Education | News          | Entertainment | Advertisements |
|----------|-----------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| Kenya _  | 38        | 31            | 18            | 13             |
| Uganda   | . 43      | 27            | 24            | 9              |
| Tanzania | 38        | <sup>28</sup> | 23            | 13             |

\*To derive the index value, for each country the weighted score was divided by the total of its four scores and the result multiplied by 100.

It has been assumed that if mass media are used to educate, the effects help reduce tribal tendencies negative to national development. In support of the validity of this assumption, the student answers to the following question give strong supporting evidence:

Do you think tribal loyalties of pupils now in secondary schools are stronger or weaker than those of the older generation?

The results shown in Table 9-10 make it clear that the students believe education weakens tribal loyalties.

TABLE 9-10
EDUCATION AND TRIBAL LOYALTIES

| •        | •        |                  |        |    |    |
|----------|----------|------------------|--------|----|----|
| Country  | Stronger | No<br>Difference | Weaker | N  | %  |
| Kenya    | 12       | . 8              | 80     | 25 | 38 |
| Uganda   | 7        | 20               | 73     | 30 | 45 |
| Tanzania | · 0      | 0                | 100    | 11 | 17 |

Of course, no one can attribute all the presumed difference to be due to education alone, but the question made education central in importance, and it can be inferred that it was probably the strongest factor influencing student answers.

In this regard, the following question recognizes that education leads to other factors that further reduce tribal tendencies negative to national development, i.e., mobility and the movement from tribal villages to urban centers:

As more people get education and go to towns and cities to seek work, do you think tribal connections, or loyalty to one's tribe, will be weakened?

The answers show that Tanzanian students are more acutely aware of the difference such changes in education and mobility will make. (See Table 9-11.) Since Tanzania is the least developed in education and a doubtful second or third in urbanization, their appraisal of the degree of change expected is logical.

TABLE 9-11
WEAKENING EFFECTS OF EDUCATION AND MOBILITY
ON TRIBAL RELATIONS

| •. •     | Percentage |    |    |     |
|----------|------------|----|----|-----|
| Country  | Yes        | No | N  | %   |
| Kenya    | 60         | 31 | 29 | 49  |
| Uganda   | 75         | 25 | 20 | 34  |
| Tanzania | 90         | 10 | 10 | 17  |
| Total N  | 44         | 15 | 75 |     |
| Total %  | 75         | 25 |    | 100 |

Hypothesis 2B: The greater the prevalence of a lingua franca in the countries of East Africa, the more it reduces tribal tendencies that are negative to national development.

The close relation between lingua franca and mass media has been treated in several previous parts of the study, and it was the primary focus of this chapter's first section dealing with Hypothesis 1. Student opinion strongly supports the supposed relationship between lingua franca and mass media. In the first part of this chapter's second section dealing with Hypothesis 2A—that mass media tend to reduce tribal tendencies negative to national development—student opinion also was found to strongly support that relationship. Therefore, it is to be expected that student opinion will strongly support Hypothesis 2B. Such is the case in the student response to the question:

As more people learn a national language, do you think that a stronger feeling of national pride and unity will develop?


The results, given in Table 9-12, are as expected, and they show an even stronger support for the relationship between the development of a national language and development of national unity than was found in response to a similar question relating increasing availability of radio and effects on national unity. (See Table 9-5.)

TABLE 9-12
EFFECT OF NATIONAL LANGUAGE ON NATIONAL PRIDE AND UNITY

|          | Percentage |            |      |     |  |
|----------|------------|------------|------|-----|--|
| Country  | Yes        | No         | N    | %   |  |
| Kenya    | 86         | <b>1</b> 4 | 56   | ~   |  |
| Uganda   | 86         | 14         | 29   |     |  |
| Tanzania | . 96       | 4          | 22   |     |  |
| Total N  | 94         | 13         | 107* |     |  |
| Total %  | 88         | 12         |      | 100 |  |

<sup>\*</sup>Question was on two of the alternate pages, with total number responding = 107.

The results in Table 9-12 are not differentiated in degree, and therefore there is no way to analyze the data to test for the concomitant variation hypothesized in 2A. On one point, however, it can be argued that since Tanzania has



#### Student Comment

Taking Hypothesis 2 as a whole, it is enlightening to examine pertinent comments of the students, some of which came in response to Why questions, and some were voluntary.

Clearly, a large majority of the respondents--75 percent--thought that radio broadcasts have a unifying effect on the people of their country. But 25 percent definitely said radio broadcasts will not help this problem. There was no equivocation on this question, which illustrates the emotional overtones involved. The comments on why radio broadcasts do or do not affect the tendencies towards tribalism are quite interesting. Here first are representative comments on the positive side of the question:

Properly designed programs will instill a national spirit and bridge the gap between ethnic differences.

A lot of disunity is based on ignorance and fear which needs good informative media to dispel.

Because they will have understanding of government policy at national level and think themselves as a nation.

If they draw ideas and information from the same source, chances of distrust are minimized, common trend of thought and idealism emerges.

Radio broadcasts help people to understand what government does and plans. They show or tell what is good for the people. It is part of education to those who do not get into classes.

Of those saying that radio broadcasts will not enhance national unity, the following comments seemed significant:

National unity Will depend largely on the attitude of the government toward its subjects (i.e. without discriminating)

There is no interaction or physical contacts.

People have very strong tribal loyalties; they always want their tribe to win.

Because people react to news differently . . .

Since 88 percent of the respondents stated that as people learn a national language greater unity will result in the nation, it is interesting to note some of the reasons for this opinion. The following are typical of comments upholding this position:

I think tribalism is due to a great extent on lack of understanding; a common language would break this barrier.

A good example is my experience. I identified more with the Baganda when I was young and had not been exposed to English. But now I look down on people who cannot raise their outlook beyond their tribal experiences and customs. I think I represent quite a large group in my thinking.

Simply, a Tanzanian speaks Swahili in the same way that a true Tanzanian is a socialist.

Various ethical [sic] groups will be able to communicate with each other and perhaps be able to share their feelings. Lack of communication is one of the stumbling blocks towards our national as well as African unity.

The minority view held that learning a national language does not aid unity and in fact may destroy it. For example the following unusual remark was made by one respondent:

For Kenya English is fast becoming the 'national' language. From my observation a frightening normlessness and utter lack of pride is exhibited by the English speaking Kenyan. When speaking a vernacular, the same Kenyans speak very emotionally about national pride and unity. Is it possible the new medium (English) is responsible for the change?

Two other negative comments on the relationship between learning a national language and the development of national pride and unity are:

It is very hard to shake the tribal loyalty. What we probably need is to educate the people to think of themselves as Kenyans rather than Kikuyus or Luos.

The principal problem is not language but the need for emergence of honest public figures respected and accepted by all various tribes within the country. At present most of the political leaders present believe (themselves) to be nationalists but actually they use their offices as means of earning a living and fame.

The implication of these data is that tribal tendencies are a fact of life in East Africa; they are affected and sometimes lessened by effort of the government operating through radio broadcasts and educational programs. A common language is generally thought to be encouraged by the available means of mass communication, although almost nothing is said concerning the effect of newspapers, periodicals, or films on the question of tribalism. Clearly the implication is that radio is the most practical means of reaching the ordinary citizen of the countries of East Africa, due to

illiteracy and other inhibiting factors.

Hypothesis 3: The recognition of the importance of mass media's influence on national development is not widespread among leaders and potential leaders in the countries under study.

Previously Presented Data

Some data gathered in the student survey can be applied directly to potential leaders' recognition of mass media's influence. As for present national leaders' appreciation of mass media, a few inferences can be drawn from student opinion on the matter. In Chapter VII some evidence on attitudes of national leaders toward the importance of mass media was discussed in connection with Hypothesis 3 (see p. 131).

Much data has been presented in the two previous sections of this chapter which reveal that student appreciation of mass media is widespread. All but two students said they read newspapers in their own country, and at least one fourth read newspapers in two languages equally well. As to use of radio, 88 percent listen daily and another 5 percent listen often, the remaining 7 percent being occasional users. Most of the students—86 percent—think most people in their hometown or village listen to radio. While these data do not speak to the point of whether the students regard mass media as being important to national development, the data provide evidence in the right direction. If the students were not newspaper readers and radio listeners, such evidence would be very negative.

We have previously shown that a large majority of the students believe mass media help develop elements of great importance to national development, such as national language or lingua franca, national pride and unity, and public education. By inference, therefore, we can assume their recognition of mass media's importance to national development is widespread. As far as it goes, this evidence runs contrary to the hypothesis.

Mass Media Compared to Education and Transportation

The response to two questions in the survey puts the importance of mass media in the eyes of the students in better perspective. They were asked which is most important to modernization of their country: transportation, mass media, or education. Also, which is second in importance? Approximately 90 percent designated education most important, with 6 percent for transportation and 4 percent for mass media. In second rank, they designated transportation over mass media by 58 to 42 percent. All things considered, with regard to national development of emerging nations, the students' values appear to be in the proper order, that is, as a man of western civilization would see it. In modern nations, both education and transportation are larger endeavors than mass media by practically every socioeconomic measure.

Among the questions in the survey which pertain to Hypothesis 3 one was: Which of the following means of communication do you feel is the most important influence on the leaders of your country? The results are tabulated below:

|    | . ` |
|----|-----|
| 7. |     |

| Number | Percent                        |
|--------|--------------------------------|
| 67     | 36                             |
| 49     | 27                             |
| 45     | 24                             |
| 10     | . 5                            |
| 1      | 1                              |
| 1      | 1                              |
| 11     | 6                              |
| 184    | 100                            |
|        | 67<br>49<br>45<br>10<br>1<br>1 |

Given the state of development of the different media in East Africa and the purposes they serve at present, the order of importance in influence on the leaders is not surprising. The rating of word-of-mouth communication as second in importance only to newspapers in influencing leaders might be interpreted as demeaning to mass media, particularly radio, and somewhat to newspapers, other mass media admittedly being at a low state of development.

With the question of influence focused on the ordinary citizen—the people, as opposed to the leaders—the students placed radio first, word—of—mouth second, newspapers third, magazines fourth, television fifth, and films last. This order is consistent for each of the three countries, but television was a close rival to magazines for fourth place with Kenya and Uganda students, although not with Tanzania students. This difference reflects the fact that both Kenya and Uganda have established the beginnings of a television industry in their largest cities. Tanzania has not yet started television operations.

Regarding the students' rating of word-of-mouth communication as second to radio in influence with the people,



the interpretation is not the same as in the case of the leaders of the country. The two-step flow theory of mass communication holds that interpersonal communication assumes a larger influence on the people than on the leaders of a country. The influence flows downward from leaders to people by interpersonal communication.

Interpretation of Comments

Answers to open-ended questions and voluntary comments add more understanding to how students view the importance of mass media.

The matter of whether use of the mass media in the United States or Canada gave the respondents ideas as to how such media could be used in the development of their countries, of 167 respondents answering this question, 77 percent thought it did. Many of the comments were sharply critical of the mass media in the United States, although the majority of the answers were clearly positive in their tone. Of the students responding, 52 percent said that the mass media could be used for educational purposes, both in the schools and for adult education in such fields as literacy, sanitation, agriculture and political awareness. Some negative ideas indicated disenchantment with the mass media in the United States. The scarcity of media facilities in their own countries for good mass communication was frequently brought out by the respondents. These are some typical comments:

lazarfeld, et al., op. cit.



The use of TV for instance in giving instructions to the farmers about how they may be able to cultivate in a better way, or how to look after their cattle properly in addition to school programmes, would make it possible for the few experts we have to reach the many who need their advice.

I have always been impressed by the use of TV in U.S.A. and how effective it could be in national development. In East Africa where over 75 percent of the population is illiterate the visual images shown on the screen could be more effective than the printed words which are read by a small section of the population.

TV and radio broadcasting are the most important mass communication. Newspapers and magazines are also very useful. But I'm afraid to say that my country is not ready for TV due to some corrupted pictures they show, especially moral deterioration.

It would help if leaders try to pass on their ideas by means of advertising and persuasion rather than dictatorial methods.

Small towns should have their own radio stations where news and programs from that community are broadcast. People would develop pride in what they are.

The media could be used very effectively. . . to create a sense of a national culture rather than tribal cultures (in the traditional sense). . . . to create an atmosphere conducive to modern development.

Here it seems as if people are free to express their ideas freely whether it be good or bad. People can even criticize leaders.

The American mass communication is not a good example to be used in our country because it is best for a material oriented society.

. . . The U.S. takes the degree of freedom of mass communication only because of its size. Any issue cannot be serious enough to disrupt the whole of the U.S. A San Francisco type campus riot is enough to completely disrupt small countries.



In the national development of my country I would use very limited mass communication, because from what I've seen in the States, mass communication is a weapon to bring confusion and used as just a commercial thing-instead of the intended so-called "educational concept."

Commercials make me sick.

. . . I deplore the presentation of violence on TV which unknowingly a nation may lead itself to self-destruction . . .

Mass communication in this country is class oriented and highly censored to that effect. Ours should also be censored but not to support institutional corruption as is the case here, but to guard and promote the revolution.

. . . Too much of this mass communication has made citizens of the U.S. too much ignorant about other places; nobody argues logically here—a lot of quoting newspapers and TV—newsweek or Walter Cornkite [sic] says something and the public absorbs it like catechism.

It can lead to a whole world of error and chaos if journalists are allowed to report their feelings and not the objective news. American journalists should be banned in Africa--completely.

It appears that most of the respondents do in fact have very decided opinions on the place of the mass media in national development. Besides the instances discussed here, throughout the responses to other questions a tone of seriousness is evident in the necessity for using radio and other forms of mass communication in education and for increasing economic and social development of new nations. The awareness of the importance of mass media in national development by present leaders has already been discussed. In both cases while naiveté is evidenced in the proposed uses of the mass media, the recognition of their potential usefulness on

the part of both present leaders and potential leaders is clear. Thus the assumptions made in Hypothesis 3 have been largely refuted by the findings of this study, that is, the evidence indicates the recognition of importance of mass media's influence on national development is widespread among leaders and potential leaders of East Africa.

Hypothesis 4: The prevailing political concepts in East Africa--African Socialism--greatly affect the attitude of leaders and potential leaders towards the use and control of mass media, e.g., limitation on freedom of the press by goverment officials, and legal and constitutional provisions.

There is a considerable amount of material relevant to this hypothesis on African Socialism by way of background, some of which was discussed in the earlier part of this study (see p. 54 ff). Despite its theoretical nature in the eyes of some western observers, this system of political, social and economic development has great significance in East Africa. The student respondents in their answers clearly reflect an involvment with the system and its basic aim of maintaining the integrity and stability of existing African governments. This aim certainly envisages limitations on free speech and press.

We have mentioned some of the attitudes of East African leaders in connection with the last section of Chapter VII, which deals with supporting data on national development in relation to the four hypotheses. Students in their replies clearly reinforce most of the ideas of such men as Tom Mboya of Kenya and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania which concern Ujamaa (togetherness), opposition to "capitalistic"

exploitation" of the people, and a basic mistrust of private industrial enterprise, particularly as developed in the west. The extended family is both a foundation and an objective of African Socialism; all men are brothers and hence equal.<sup>2</sup>


Thus African Socialism as established in East Africa is a system of values closely involving political, economic and social ideals, and one in which "people-centredness" is a fundamental concept. There is also a conscious rejection of the exploitation of capitalism, as well as of doctrinaire socialism, which is based on inevitable class conflict.

There are many echoes of these ideas in respondents' answers. One of the key questions involved in this data is:

Do you think that there are proper regulations that need to be placed on private persons in what they publish or say in your country?

of the 182 persons who answered, 54 percent said Yes, 46 percent said No. (See Table 9-13.) Two additional questions asked whether their government controlled radio and films. The strong comments from respondents are significant. Whereas American respondents would likely interpret "proper regulations" to include mainly restrictions on libel and matters related to fairness and to rights of individuals, these African students, immersed in a socialistic system, interpreted "proper regulations" in a political as well as social and economic context. There was no discernible pattern of difference among the three countries in respondents' answers on any of the questions posed in Table 9-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Nyerere, <u>op. cit</u>., p. 170.



| •  | Percentage |    |     |  |
|--|------------|----|-----|--|
| Question   | Yes        | No | N   |  |
| Are there proper regulations needed on speech and press? | 54         | 46 | 182 |  |
| Does government control radio broadcasting?              | 96         | 4  | 54  |  |
| Does government control films?                           | 56         | 44 | 48  |  |

The following comments are relevant to this general picture of the influences of African Socialism on the thinking of the students regarding purposes and freedom of the press. Four trends are discernible in these comments, which will be described following the comments. Each passage is from a different respondent:

Material that is relevant to the people and not what the western world decides is important. We should not have material that provokes discontent and causes different political factions at this stage in the development of the nation.

No capitalism indoctrination to my people (socialism--yes).

Criticism of the government publicly confuses the peasants [sic] masses.

An average Tanzanian could be misled easily, if the publisher would remember our goal now developing and take it as a guide the rest would be easy.

الثت



Democracy as practiced in the U. S. is a luxury in the technologically developing countries; all must sacrifice part of their personal freedom in the initial stage.

Statements that encourage divisive sentiments among the citizens should not be published.

Newspapers should be censored due to the fact that not many people can differentiate between fact and opinion.

Limit interviews to foreign press who only pick out our weaknesses and ignore the good in us.

Since these parts have become ideological battlegrounds for the big powers the government should ensure that masses are not distracted from the purposeful plans of development.

Stooges of foreign powers. [Refers to one type of needed regulation.]

Censorship of 'news' as reported by foreign press.

They can be used as weapons to misinform and misinterprate [sic] the government's intention, causing instability among the people. [Refers to newspapers.]

The public is relatively uninformed and conflicting ideologies would only tend to confuse them . . . Contridiction [sic] in public is unhealthy to harmony necessary for growth.

No private person or foreigner should publish something unless double-checked and approved by the ministry concerned. This is because some foreigners publish only things that let the country down, overlooking the good side of the the country. [Apparently the first sentence quotes some regulation actually existing.])

Interpretation of Kenyan culture to Kenyans should not be done by foreigners whatever the reasons may be.

Because my country is young and need  $[\underline{sic}]$  to stabilize before freedom of anything is allowed. [Refers to need for regulation.]



Regulation of publishers of foreign propaganda. I think that for newly growing nations, these publications only create more confusion and misunderstanding, particularly on the part of the public.

Against cold war and immorality . . . Kenya is a non-aligned country and should not encourage pre-judiced publications.

These comments reflect several trends:

In the first place, there appears a desperate desire to see their countries remain politically stable and "socialist-minded." Therefore, complete freedom of expression is impossible and would be unwise. This is an echo of some statements of certain East African leaders. (See pp. 19 and 41-42.)

Secondly, the comments reveal a definite and strong antagonism to the "foreign press," which represents a remnant of colonialism to the young states of Africa. Most of the press is still financed abroad, and this fact is highly resented by the African students; they feel that this press should conform to African ideas and not disrupt their countries' fragile unity by "unwise" publications.

A third trend is found in the protectiveness displayed with regard to the masses of people, who are believed to be easily fooled by conflicting viewpoints. Among these respondents there is the feeling that due to their ignorance, the "peasants" should be protected against wrong ideas.

Lastly, the element in African Socialism which established and maintains a one-party state is clearly reflected in the comments quoted. New countries of Africa are considered too weak to withstand numerous conflicting parties. The press must not be allowed to cause disunity.

Although the respondents are rather well-informed on the status of the press in their countries, they do not seem to be aware of the low level of literacy, which ranges from 20 percent to perhaps 40 percent in the three countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. (See Table 7-1.) As far as the print media is concerned, we might ask whether the effect of "disruptive" statements in a free press would actually reach many of these illiterates.

There appears also in the data some noteworthy ideas against press regulation—but they are very much in the minority. Thus African Socialism has not completely stifled other viewpoints. Nonetheless it should be noted that two of the three comments given here display a desire for voluntary restraint on the part of publishers against "disruptive ideas." The following is a meaningful observation of a Ugandan respondent:

There is now no freedom of press and expression. Therefore, all the newspapers are working under fear. People cannot say really what they feel is right. Constructive editorials are not found in newspapers because editors fear to have troubles with the government, because the government cannot suffer any fair comment about the policies of the government and criticism . . . the newspapers in Uganda cannot in fact do their job . . . any fair comment on policies of the government means nothing else in the eyes of the leaders of Uganda [sic] "trying to overthrew the government."

The foregoing statement is all the more significant because it was made by a member of the dominant tribe in Uganda. It reflects conditions under the Obote regime, which has since been ended, but as yet there is little information about present status of freedom in Uganda. Other replies to the

question on whether there should be regulation of the pressinclude these:

I deeply regret saying 'Yes' because this implies I condone censorship. I believe that private persons who specialize in sheer political progaganda can be very disruptive. Surely constructive criticism should be very welcome and I believe it is.

I don't mean any explicit list of things that people may not write about but at this point of our development I think it would be extremely irresponsible for people to publish things that would disrupt whatever orderliness we have achieved . . . So I suggest personal restraint on the part of publishers.

In another answer the above respondent explains that he knows of no explicit law regulating the press in Kenya, but that tacitly newspaper editors are careful, and tend to relay, rather than "make" news.

In four of the open-ended questions, regarding press and speech regulations and control, a simple content analysis was used to classify the direction of answers relevant to this hypothesis. Below are the questions asked and categorization of the answers:

## Question

Mention one type of regulation on press and speech needed.

N = 93

# Direction of Answers

- 24 percent said things detrimental to leaders or people should not be published.
- 22 percent said that complete freedom of expression is dangerous to a young, unstable socialist country.
- 54 percent widely distributed 100 % total

Concerning ownership of the press the students were asked this question:

#### Question

Are newspapers privately owned or are they controlled by the government?

N = 54

### Direction of Answers

- 33 percent said they were privately owned
- 11 percent said they were government owned
- 56 percent said they were both

The answers here reflect only a partial awareness of the actual situation in the countries of East Africa regarding the ownership and operation of the press. In fact both privately owned and government owned newspapers and periodicals exist in all three countries under consideration in this study. Until recently the greater number were privately operated, particularly the large dailies and weeklies. Presently, government-run publications are fast becoming important.

In a question concerning the influence of newspapers upon their readers, students were asked to choose among four gradations of the amount of influence: moderate, much, little and none:

#### Question

Do you think that newspapers have any influences on their readers as to what they think about national affairs?

N = .75

## Direction of Answers

- 45 percent said moderate influence
- 48 percent said much influence
  - 4 percent said little influence
  - 3 percent no influence

100 % total

The answers here reflect positive relationship with similar questions concerning the importance of newspapers on the leaders of East Africa. In the question just presented a total of 93 percent of the respondents thought that newspapers had moderate or much influence on readers' opinions about national affairs; in a related question 54 percent of the students ranked newspapers third out of five categories as to influence on ordinary citizens. Newspapers where ranked first by 36 percent of the respondents in their influence on leaders. Clearly the students considered newspapers important influence on leaders, and only partly influential (in the realm of national affairs) on the public in general.

It is a fact that both private and government-owned newspapers exist in East Africa, but even privately owned, papers have the heavy hand of government laid on them if they criticize either government officials or their policies. (This condition is fully discussed elsewhere in the study.) The nationalization of the <u>Tanzania Standard</u> in 1970 may be the start of a gradual swallowing up of the newspapers by government; the respondents seem well aware of the trend, as sevveral mentioned the nationalization event. The majority of the students reflect a keen awareness of the status of the press in their countries.

In conclusion, the hypothesis regarding African Socialism is largely substantiated in the respondents' answers; this was particularly evident in their strong desire to see control of speech and press to prevent instability and disunity in their countries. There is a clear reflection of an

authoritarian theory of the press, although we cannot draw any definitive conclusions from such limited data.  $^{3}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The chief purpose of an authoritarian press is to support and advance policies of the government in power; ownership is private or public; the press cannot criticize politican machinery or officials in power. It is an instrument for effecting government policy. Licenses are necessary and sometimes there is censorship. (See Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Petersen and Wilbur Schramm, Four Theories of the Press, Urbana: 1963, University of Illinois Press, p. 7.)



#### CHAPTER X

# INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The skeins of ethnocentric ideas are tightly interwoven in the minds of most people, and thus in the assessment of research findings in another culture great care is needed. In the conclusions of this study we can only attempt an honest objectivity based on experience in East Africa, being aware of our built-in bias to the western world.

Probably African Socialism is the most powerful force in shaping national development of the three East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania; therefore, the findings concerning the last hypothesis will be considered first in these conclusions.

First, some general comments seem important. With respect to national development, one important dichotomy is evident between the positions of western authorities on East Africa and the leaders of that area. Most of the western authorities cited in this study emphasized the economic phase of development in the countries they discuss, as was the custom following World War II, when massive programs of foreign aid were being formulated and bases for these programs needed to be devised. Usually implicit in foreign aid plans was a desire for a democratic political system in the image of the western world. In contrast, most East African leaders included the social and political factors as well as economic considerations

in their plans and policies for development of their countries. Many of the ideas of these leaders are loudly echoed in data and comments from the student respondents. As the 1970's begin, some western experts are also beginning to move toward a fuller consideration of all social and political factors, as well as economics, in their analyses of the needs and problems of developing countries; this trend is but a glimmer so far. (See footnote 9, page 64.)

A related consideration in the findings is that the social and political changes wanted by the East African leaders are somewhat alien to western views. This desire is by no means confined to Africa; many other developing countries have desired the fruits of western technology without adopting the value system of the west. The data at hand illustrate the desire of leaders of newly independent countries to adopt certain features of modern life without accepting the entire social and political system of the western world. This policy can be termed selective modernization.

Hypothesis 4 postulates that African Socialism greatly affects the attitudes of leaders and potential leaders towards the use and control of mass media, e.g., limitation on freedom of the press by government officials, and legal constitutional provisions. Several important recurring ideas in the findings relate to the importance of African Socialism in the thinking of both leaders and student respondents. First of all, modernization is a goal to be desired, and both leaders and students agree essentially on its format—the best of western technology, including education, scientific knowledge, economic development, and the judicious use of the mass media.

Most of the leaders and students reject some parts of the value system of the west, including "capitalistic exploita-"tīon." The desire is for modernization in African dress only. The chief exponent of African Socialism, Nyerere, does not seem to accept urbanization as a part of the modernizing formula. The self-help schemes to raise the levels of living in rural Tanzania emphasize ideals of rural African life. This reflects the idea of selection in determining what is needed from western modern living and what is not. Such a viewpoint is hardly surprising in the light of the colonial history of East Africa.

Both leaders and students express the need for industry, higher standards of living, better education and
similar important goals, while at the same time they reject a
predominantly capitalistic system, along with much of the
freedom of speech and press so cherished in the western world.
This selective process in devising a new social order for
émerging nations may prove to be a chimera—as Lerner reminds
us. (See page 11.)

A second important factor in the findings relating to the concepts of African Socialism is the idea of the nation-state. Implicit in the attitudes of East African leaders, as well as those of the students, is the assumption that a unified country, transcending the bonds of tribalism, is desirable, and in fact a necessity. The idea of the nation-state is basically western European in origin. It appears that Africans desire the benefits accruing in a strong centralized nation-state, but wish to retain at the same time basic African ideals that may actually weaken such a nation. There is a failure to

consider the generations of almalgamation and development from tribal societies that Europe had to experience before arriving at the modern nation-state. The leaders and students in East Africa possess a sense of urgency--they want to do in one generation what other nations managed to accomplish only through trial and error and centuries of accretion. urgency is earnestly expressed. Consider the ideals of a Nyerere, who endeavors through better education to instill in the youth of Tanzania the concept that Tanzanians must work ' their own way out of poverty, realizing that all citizens are members of one society, depending upon each other. Such ideals can only inspire admiration for the people who strive for Thus the idea of a nation-state cast in the image of African culture is a desired goal of African Socialism and it is clearly indicated in the thinking of both leaders and . students.

A third factor reflecting African Socialism in the findings is the tendency on the part of both leaders and students to over-estimate the achievements thus far in national development. The deep sense of urgency already mentioned probably helps to generate this situation. Both leaders and students tend to over-emphasize the absence of strong tribal loyalties in Tanzania, for example, and insist that all citizens are fluent speakers of Swahili. The students are greatly concerned about the effect of a completely free press on the "peasants" who are illiterate and thus easily swayed and confused by conflicting views. Exaggeration is implicit at this point, since none of the East African countries under study have a literacy rate above 40 percent, more likely 20 to 25 percent in most parts. The data in this study also show a



low level of newspaper distribution. Thus the print media do not reach most of the population. Despite their paternalistic view, many of the students insisted that no class system existed in their country. Leaders likewise assume that the people need protection from the disruptive ideas that an unfettered press could generate.

Here it is all too easy to say, from the western viewpoint, that the leaders are over-reacting and this simply means a desire on the part of the leaders to retain their power and prestige by restricting the press. This judgment may be so in some cases; but the western view may also be myopic and distorted by naiveté. For example, statistics on increased number of radio sets among the people of East Africa show that the radio medium is developing very well, if not quite in the spirit of freedom that a western observer might deem desirable. Thus, self-serving interpretations are hardly unique to East African leaders and students, but are more likely a universal trait of mankind.

The legal and political bases for restrictions on the press in the countries of East Africa rest clearly within the ethic of the one-party state. This is well demonstrated in the case of Tanzania. Nyerere has reiterated his stand that the moral basis for socialism must be emphasized and the people instructed in it. Hence, unlimited freedom of the press or other media must be curtailed in order to protect the people from misinformation. There is a clear basis for this policy in the current constitution of Tanzania. This implicit restriction on the press is also found in Kenya, where Kenyatta has affirmed his stand, on the basis of one-party rule, that persons who publish "misinformation" about

government policies must be restricted in their activities. Likewise similiar provisions were imposed by Obote in Uganda, where there have been several arrests of persons who were too free with criticisms of the government. It is hardly remarkable that many students, who have been imbued with these ideas in their education, are influenced to echo the ideas of their leaders. In all of the three countries, the ruling party is effectively one with the government, so as the party thinks, so does the government act. The mass media are regarded as an instrument to further national development.

Thus, the evidence from the study clearly shows strong support for the hypothesis that African Socialism greatly affects attitudes of leaders and students towards the use and control of the mass media in their countries.

In Hypothesis 1, a mutually supportive relationship was posited between lingua franca and mass media regarding the development of each in transitional societies such as the East African countries. The original statement of the hypothesis was probably too precise in postulating a matching ordinal relationship, i.e., the more developed mass media are in the countries of East Africa, the greater the development of a lingua franca. With only three countries in the test of this hypothesis, it was expecting too much. But in the general study of each country, qualified support was found for the hypothesis. Kenya surpassed Uganda in the development of mass media and in concentration on one lingua franca—Swahili. Uganda has a problem of too many linguas franca. A considerable proportion of its population have capabilities in one or more of three linguas franca besides their tribal language;

namely, English, Luganda, and Swahili. Luganda is a tribal language but also known widely enough to serve as a lingua franca. When Tanzania is brought into the total picture, we have a country that ranks somewhat below Kenya and Uganda in mass media development but which has surpassed both countries in concentration on Swahili, even adopting it as the national language and conducting an intensive campaign to increase its use. This finding does not negate the positive relationship hypothesized between mass media and lingua franca, but it gives no support to the too precise degree of relationship in

the original proposition.

Several important facts emerge from the findings in Chapter VII. The first is that radio is the mass medium most highly developed and in actual use in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, with the three countries not widely divergent in the reported number of radio sets in operation. Radio broadcasts in the three countries seem to affect use of linguas franca--. Kenya and Tanzania using mainly English and Swahili with Uganda also broadcasting in various tribal languages. The students show strong support for the use of mass media to help develop a national language, with the Uganda respondents reflecting the least support for this idea. This clearly supports the fact that Uganda broadcasts in many languages, thus lending weaker support to the concentration on one lingua franca in that country.

Secondly, the findings on newspaper circulation in the three countries reveal distinct differences between the countries. Kenya has by far the highest subscriber ratio relative to population size and has the custom of using English

and Swahili in newspapers and periodicals. Uganda, with various languages used in publications, ranks, much lower than Kenya in newspaper circulation relative to population size, other factors having a larger influence in this country. Tanzania ranks the lowest of the three countries in newspaper development relative to population.

Students from the three countries appear to support the mass media policies of their countries, by their answers to the question of what should be the national language. Swahili was preferred as the national language by 96 percent of the Tanzania students, and by 71 percent of those from Kenya. There was no majority agreement among Uganda students—44 percent thought English should be the national language. Lingua franca was regarded by the students as being strongly supportive of national development, and there was a strong awareness of the function of Swahili and English as linguas franca. The multiplicity of mother tongues reported by the students helps explain the need for a lingua franca as well as helps one understand why the students would sense the importance of a common language for their countries.

Hypothesis 2 viewed the tribal aspects of East Africa as mainly negative to national development of the East African states and treated these negative tribal tendencies as amenable to the influence of mass communications and of lingua franca.

Findings presented in Chapter VII illustrate both the negative and positive effects of tribalism. It was found that tribal loyalties naturally tend to be negative to national development, while lingua franca tends to be strongly

supportive of it. Clinging to one's own language is an integral part of maintaining a particular tribal culture, and Thus has a negative effect in a nation-state where a multiplicity of tribes and languages exist. Fragmentation of education -- especially in Uganda -- and prejudice against other tribes, resulting in favoritism in the selection of national leaders are also important factors. Lack of communication is a real barrier to national progress. The facts show that both Kenya and Tanzania have developed mass media in directions away from tribal diversity by using linguas franca almost exclusively in radio broadcasts, and by discouraging tribal language publications. Uganda's policy of employing many tribal languages in radio programs and allowing tribal publications naturally brings about less general use of one lingua Adherence to tribal languages tends to heighten intertribal tensions in Uganda, although other factors enter into this situation. Tanzania, having decreed the policy of developing Swahili as a national language, is using radio and the print media to help achieve this goal of one national language.

The students say that education, mass media and lingua franca all tend to reduce tribal friction. At home they are mostly daily users of newspapers and radio and thus are aware of the media. They think radio is the best medium for use in national development, but feel that education and transportation are more important to their countries' progress than mass media. National leaders are most influenced by newspapers; the ordinary citizen is most affected by radio, say the students. For leaders or for the people, the second most important means of communication is word-of-mouth, they believe.

Thus, the government policy of using radio broadcasts in one or two linguas franca is encouraging national unity, especially in Kenya and Tanzania. Uganda allows the use of many tribal languages on radio programs. The students strongly support the implication that radio is the most practical means of reaching the ordinary citizen to educate him against negative tribal tendencies and promote national unity by increasing use of lingua franca.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that the recognition of the importance of mass media's influence on national development is not widespread among leaders and potential leaders in the countries under study. Contrary to this prediction, evidence from both the findings in Chapter VII and the student survey results in Chapter IX shows clearly that both leaders and students do appreciate the potential use of mass media in national development of their countries.

Findings regarding the status of national development with regard to the three factors of tribalism, lingua franca, and mass media reflect concern on the part of leaders of East Africa over the possible misuse of mass media to obstruct implementation of government policy, by arousing discontent. The firm hand of control is seen in the matter of expulsion of foreign correspondents from all three countries whenever they are found to be critical of the government; the continuing tight control of radio operation—a policy inherited from the colonial era—and the nationalization by Tanzania of the leading English—language daily. Tanzania, with the lowest rank in overall national development, has undertaken, as noted, an extensive campaign to use radio in

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educational programs for both adults and children.

Abundant evidence is produced from student answers to show that they, too, are quite aware of the importance of mass media in national development. Perhaps no other category of questions produced stronger expression in voluntary comments, much of it related to the students' experience with mass media in America. When in their homeland, 88 percent of the students listen regularly to radio, and 86 percent of them said that most people in their hometowns listen to radio also. Most of the students feel that Swahili-language broadcasts are most often heard. This opinion may be an example of the tendency to exaggerate the effects of mass media, already referred to at the beginning of this chapter. There are too few surveys available on the facts of language broadcasts and who listens to what programs in what languages. The student popinion on this factor of the prevalence of the use of Swahili broadcasts is interesting in the face of the apparent wide effect of tribal language broadcasts in Uganda.

Like the leaders, students place education in the highest place in importance for modernization, and put transportation second. Mass media comes third. This order seems logical in the measure of values in modernization, at least to the western mind.

The students often express a negative attitude towards the kinds of mass media they have seen in the United States. Many students talk of using "proper" kinds of programs in their countries, an echo of the tenets of African Socialism. But despite the students' negative criticism of mass media in the United States, the overall findings from the general study

and from the survey strongly refutes the hypothesis that generally the national leaders and the students did not appreciate mass media's influence in national development.

Several important general conclusions can be stated as follows:

- 1. The study produced an ordinal ranking of the countries in overall national development on the basis of four socioeconomic indicators—literacy, education, urbanization, and industry. The results showed Kenya first, Uganda second and Tanzania third.
- 2. There was found to be clear interrelationship among the three independent variables—tribalism, lingua franca, and mass media—in their influence on national development. Lingua franca and mass media were supportive of national development, and tribalism tended to be negative, except where offset or turned to advantage by enlightened leadership.
- 3. Both leaders and students are clearly aware of the importance of mass media in promoting national development, according radio the highest place in usefulness, newspapers next.
- 4. In relative importance to national development, the students--future leaders of their country--viewed education and transportation well ahead of mass media.
- 5. The great need and desirability of a lingua franca was clearly proved by basic data on the countries and by opinions of both leaders and students.
- 6. Tribal loyalties were generally deplored by leaders and students alike.

7. National leaders and future leaders—the students—are committed to achieving moderni—zation for their countries in the context of African culture.

This study has pointed out some areas of research where little has yet been done on an empirical basis. In the field of communication, for example, only limited surveys of the press and radio in East Africa are available, mostly done by people coming in from the outside, who perhaps are not too familiar with African culture and languages. The need is for African scholars to take up the task of delving deeply into the study of interpersonal communication systems in the rural areas of Africa with a view to discovering how mass media can better reach and have desired effects on the masses of illiterate people.

The present study attempts to break ground for further work not only in the area of communications but also to show that a study in communications becomes more meaningful when related to the fields of anthropology and linguistics. Certainly the complex tribal organization and multiplicity of languages that exist in Africa have large influences on the nature and effects of mass communication there.

Findings from such studies as this one might serve the purpose of giving leaders of Africa some new insights as to what the problems are that they face in the development of their countries. Simply to expose and analyze a problem can mean the first step toward finding solutions. Westerners can bring objectivity to the issues and carry research in these areas forward, but probably always short of discovering solutions. The solutions to their problems must come from Africans themselves.

APPENDIX



# THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN AUSTIN, TEXAS 78712

Department of Journalism Box 7818/Phone 512—471-1845

March 3, 1970

Dear

Your country in East Africa is the subject of this brief questionnaire. Your answers will be part of a Ph.D. research project. In no way will your name be attached to your answers.

Your opinions and answers are important because you are future leaders of your people and your country. The results of the study will help predict future developments in your country. Only through your help can we obtain such information as needed in this research project.

Be assured all information will remain confidential. Each and every answer is important to get the truest picture of present and future trends in your country. Please help us do the best study possible by taking a few minutes to answer the questions and return the questionnaire in the enclosed envelope. No stamp is needed. Just put the envelope in the mail box.

Sincerely.

Martha J. Shelly
Graduate Student

Approved:

Supervising Professor

# The state of the s

### PERSONAL DATA SHEET

| 1.  | What is your home country?   |
|-----|--|
| 2.  | What is the name of your tribe?  |
|     | What is your age? Sex? Marital Status If you have children, please say how many.   |
| 4.  | Place of birth(town, province, country)  |
| 5.  | What is your mother tongue? e.g., your first language?   |
| 6.  | If you know any other language, please specify  How fluent are you in the second language? (Circle one) Excellent Good Fair. |
| 7.  | Did you grow up in the country of your birth?  If the answer is "no", please indicate in which country you grew up           |
| 8.  | How many months have you been in the United States?  |
| 9.  | Are you studying on a scholarship from your home government?   |
| 10. | What college or university are you now attending?  |
| 11. | What level of education did you finish before coming to the United States? (Circle one)                                      |
|     | ELEMENTARY SECONDARY COLLEGE   |
| 12. | Are you seeking a degree now?  If the answer is "yes", please specify what degree  |
| 13. | What is your major field of study here in the United States?   |
| 14. | When do you expect to finish your studies in the United States?  |
| 15. | What type of work do you expect to do when you return to your own country?   |
| 16. | Which of the following groups do you feel you belong to in your country? (Circle one)  |
|     | VERY POOR MIDDLE CLASS WEALTHY OTHER (Specify)   |
| 17. | What is the occupation of your father?   |
|     |  |

### Questionnaire

| 业 | 1.       | In your country what language newspaper did you MOSTLY read?  (Circle one) ENGLISH SWAHILI OTHER (specify)  |
|---|----------|---|
| Ą | 2.       | Which language is used MOST in radio broadcasts in your country? . (Specify one)  |
|   | 3.       | What language-radio broadcast did <u>you</u> listen to MOST often?  (Circle one) ENGLISH SWAHILI OTHER (specify)  |
|   | 4.       | Which language is used most often in films? (Specify)   |
|   | 5.       | Do you think that broadcasting and widespread use of newspapers and magazines in your country could help to develop one national language?  (Circle one) YES NO DO NOT KNOW   |
| - | 6.       | What language do you think should be the national language of your country?   |
|   |          | Why?  |
|   | 7·<br>~. | As more people get access to radio broadcasts in your country, do you think this will help reduce differences and create greater national unity?  (Circle one) YES NO Why?  |
|   | 8.       | Which is the most important means of mass communication in national development of new African states?  (Circle one) MAGAZINES FILMS NEWSPAPERS RADIO   |
|   | 9.       | Which is most important to the modernization of your country?  (Circle one) TRANSPORTATION MASS MEDIA EDUCATION  Which of the above is second in importance? (Specify)  |
|   | 10. ^    | Which of the following means of communication do you feel is the most important influence on the leaders of your country? (Circle one) RADIO TV NEWSPAPERS MAGAZINES FILMS WORD-OF-MOUTH  |
| : | 11.      | Do you think that there are proper regulations that need to be placed on private persons in what they publish or say in your country?  (Circle one) YES NO  If the answer is "Yes," mention one type of regulation you think is proper: |
| : | 12.      | Does the widespread use of mass communication in the United States or Canada give you any ideas on how such media could be used in the national development of your country? (If so, mention one idea.)                                 |
|   |          | •   |
|   |          |   |
|   |          |   |

| . ILL s  | \   |
|----------|---|
| American | in-your country which is the MOST important purpose for newspapers? (Circle one) a. To try to educate the people and tell them what the official                                  |
| ٨        | policies of the nation are.   |
|          | <ul> <li>b. To provide news and entertainment.</li> <li>c. To discuss all sides of questions about national policy.</li> </ul>  |
|          | c. 10 diseas all sides of questions about national policy.  |
| 14.      | What are two of the most important factors that are present in a modern highly developed nation:  |
|          | #1  |
|          | #2  |
|          | To what degree are each of these factors you named present in your country?   |
|          | For #1 (Circle one) HIGH MEDIUM LOW   |
|          | For #2 (Circle one) HIGH MEDIUM LOW   |
| 15.      | In your country did you listen often to the radio? (Circle one)   |
|          | EVERY DAY 2 OR 3 TIMES A WEEK OCCASIONALLY NEVER  |
| 16.      | Do most people in your town or village listen to the radio? (Circle one) YES NO   |
|          | What language-broadcasts do they usually listen to? (Specify)   |
| 17.      | Are films shown in your home town or village? (Circle one) YES NO   |
| 18.      | What is the size of your home town? (Circle one) VILLAGE SMALL TOWN LARGE TOWN CITY   |
| 19.      | Ape newspapers easily available in your home: town? (Circle one) MANY SOME NONE   |
| 20.      | As more people in your country get some education and go to towns and cities to seek work, do you think that tribal connections, or loyalty to one's own tribe, will be weakened? |
|          | (Circle one) YES NO   |
|          | Why do you think so?  |
|          |   |
|          |   |
|          |   |
|          |   |
|          |   |
| 21.      | In what important ways could any of the means of mass communication help in the modernization of your country? (Name the first three ways you can think of.)                      |
|          |   |
|          |   |
|          |   |
|          |   |

| A M |   |
|-----|---|
| ,   | To you think, as more people learn a national language, that a stronger feeling of national pride and unity will develop?  (Circle one) YES NO  Why do you think so?  |
|     |   |
|     | \rightarrow .   |
| 14. | Below are four types of radio programs. If you were the manager of home broadcasts in your country, indicate the type of programs you would emphasize most by ranking it "lst." Then rank the others 2nd, 3rd, and 4th, according to the emphasis you would give each type. |
|     | ADVERTISEMENTSEDUCATIONNEWSENTERTAINMENT  |
| 15. | In what important ways could any of the means of mass communication help in the modernization of your country? (Name the first three ways you can think of.)  |
|     | c   |
|     | T   |
| 16. | Does the government own and operate, or in any way control, the radio broadcasting or showing of films in your country?   |
|     | In radio? (Circle one) YES NO   |
|     | In films? (Circle one) YES NO   |
| 17. | Are newspapers privately owned and operated, or are they controlled by the government in your country?  |
|     | (Circle one) PRIVATELY GOVERNMENT BOTH OWNED CONTROLLED   |
| 18. | Do most people in your town or village listen to the radio? (Circle one) YES NO   |
| 19. | Are films shown in your home town or village? (Circle one) YES NO   |
| 20. | Are newspapers easily available in your home town? (Circle one) MANY SOME NONE  |
| 21. | What is the size of your home town? (Circle one) VILLAGE SMALL TOWN LARGE TOWN CITY   |
| 22. | What are two of the most important factors that are present in a modern highly developed nation:  |
|     | #2  |
|     | To what degree are each of these factors you named present in your country?   |
|     | For #1 (Circle one) HIGH MEDIUM LOW   |
| -2  | For #2 (Circle one) HIGH MEDIUM LOW   |

| ٨   | (Circle one) STRONGER WEAKER NO DIFFERENCE   |
|-----|--|
|     | Why do you think so?   |
|     |  |
|     |  |
| 14. | Do you think that newspapers have any influence on their readers as to what they think about national affairs in your country? (Circle one) GREAT MODERATE LITTLE NO INFLUENCE INFLUENCE INFLUENCE INFLUENCE |
| 15. | Which of the following means of communication do you think is the most important in influencing the ordinary citizen of your country? Which 2nd? Which 3rd? 4th  |
|     | (Rank these below 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th)  |
| ٠   | RADIOFILMSMAGAZINESTVWORD-OF-MOUTHNEWSPAPER  |
| 16. | Are there in your country any regulations on the freedom of newspapers and radio (Circle one) YES NO   |
|     | If the answer is "Yes," mention two types of regulation that exist:  |
| Þ   |  |
|     | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  |
|     |  |
|     |  |
| 17. | Do most people in your town or village listen to the radio? (Circle one) YES N   |
| 18. | Are films shown in your home town or village? (Circle one) YES NO  |
| 19. | Are newspapers easily available in your home town or village? (Circle one) MANY SOME NON   |
| 20. | What is the size of your home town? (Circle one) VILLAGE SMALL TOWN LARGE TOWN CITY  |
| 21; | Do you think, as more people learn a national language, that a stronger feeling of national pride and unity will develop?  (Circle one) YES NO   |
|     | (Official office) Ind.   |

#### TEST FOR REPRESENTATIVENESS



#### OF SUBSAMPLES

As explained in Chapter VIII, three alternate page 3's were used in the survey. To test for the representative-ness of the subsamples, data gathered on questions 5, 7, and 8 were used. The chi square test was applied to see if there was no significant difference between the distribution of answers for each subsample and the distribution of answers for the total sample. Each country's students were treated separately, making a total of 27 tests for representativeness. At the end of each series of tests for a particular question, the results of the tests are summarized and interpreted with regard to the representativeness of the subsamples. The final results of the three series of tests and their interpretation are given at the end.

### Question No. 5

The question asked: Do you think that broadcasting and widespread use of newspapers and magazines in your country could help to develop one national language?

From the total sample of 88 Kenya students answering the question, the observed distribution, together with the expected frequency of answers for the subsamples pertaining to alternate third pages, and the chi square tests of these data are shown below. Percentage of total sample becomes the expected frequency for subsamples.

### Total Sample

|        | <br>Distri |      |      |       |
|--------|------------|------|------|-------|
| Keny-a | Уes        | No   | DK   | Total |
| N      | <br>\66    | , 11 | 11   | 88    |
| %      | 75         | 12.5 | 12.5 | .100  |

Note: One person answering "Is National Language" was placed in "Yes" column.

# Question No. 5, Alternate Page 1

|                     | Distribution of Answers |      |      |    |
|---------------------|-------------------------|------|------|----|
| Kenya               | Yes                     | No   | DK   | N  |
| Observed            | 23                      | * 4  | 2    | 29 |
| Expected            | 21.8                    | 3.6  | 3.6  | 29 |
| Percentage Expected | 75                      | 12.5 | 12.5 |    |

 $\chi^2 = .82$  At 2 df, p > .50

# Question No. 5, Alternate Page 2

| and the second s | Distribution of Answers |      |      |      |
|--|-------------------------|------|------|------|
| Kenya  | Yes                     | No   | DK   | N    |
| Observed   | 19                      | 2    | . 8  | . 29 |
| Expected   | 21.8                    | 3.6  | 3.6  | 29   |
| Percentage Expected  | 75                      | 12.5 | 12.5 |      |

 $\chi^2 = 6.45$  At 2 df, p < .05

## Question No. 5 Alternate Page 3

|                     | Distribution of Answers |      |      |    |
|---------------------|-------------------------|------|------|----|
| - Kenya             | Yes                     | No   | DK   | N  |
| Observed            | 26                      | 4    | 1    | 31 |
| Expected            | 23.25                   | 3.88 | 3.88 |    |
| Percentage Expected | 75                      | 12.5 | 12.5 |    |

 $\chi^2 = 2.48$ 

At 2 df, p > .30

From the total sample of 59 Uganda students answering the question, the observed distribution, together with the expected frequency of answers for the subsamples pertaining to alternate third pages, and the chi square tests of these data are shown below.

# (otal Sample

| Distribution of Answers |      |      |      |       |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|-------|
| Uganda                  | ¥es  | No   | DK   | Total |
| N                       | 34   | 12   | 13   | 59    |
| * %                     | 57.6 | 20.3 | 22.0 | 100   |

# Question No. 5, Alternate Page 1

|                     | Distribution of Answers |      |      | -     |
|---------------------|-------------------------|------|------|-------|
| Uganda              | Yes                     | No   | · DK | N     |
| Observed            | 6                       | 1    | 1    | ,8    |
| Expected            | 4.61                    | 1.62 | 1.76 |       |
| Percentage Expected | 57.6                    | 20.3 | 22.0 | 1.2.1 |

$$\chi^2 = .99$$

 $\chi^2 = .99$  At 2 df, p > .50

# Question Nó. 5, Alternate Page 2

|                     | Distribution of Answers |      |      |    |
|---------------------|-------------------------|------|------|----|
| Uganda              | Yes                     | No   | DK   | N  |
| Observed            | 10 -                    | 4    | 7    | 21 |
| Expected            | 12.16                   | 4.26 | 4.62 |    |
| Pércentage Expected | 57.6                    | 20.3 | 22.0 |    |

$$x^2 = 1.63$$

 $\chi^2 = 1.63$  At 2 df, p > .30

# Question No. 5, Alternate Page 3

|                     | Distrib |      |      |          |
|---------------------|---------|------|------|----------|
| Uganda              | Yes     | No   | DK   | N        |
| Observed            | 18      | 7    | 6    | 31.      |
| Expected            | 17.86   | 6.29 | 6.82 |          |
| Percentage Expected | 57.6    | 20.3 | 22.0 | <i>:</i> |

$$\chi^2 = .18$$

At 2 df, p > .90

From the total sample of 45 Tanzania students answering the question, the observed distribution, together with the expected frequency of answers for the subsamples pertaining to alternate third pages, and chi square tests of these data are shown as follows:

Total Sample

|            | Distribution of Answers |    |     |       |
|------------|-------------------------|----|-----|-------|
| Tanzania   | Yes                     | No | DK  | Total |
| N          | 42                      | 0  | 3   | 45    |
| % .        | 93.3                    | 0  | 6.7 |       |
| Adjusted % | 94.8                    |    | 5.2 |       |

Note: Eight persons answering "Yes," were divided roughly according to proportion of "Yes and "DK" answers, and further adjusted so that "percentage expected" reflected proper proportion.

# Question No. 5, Alternate Page 1

|                     | Distribution of Answers |    |      |    |  |
|---------------------|-------------------------|----|------|----|--|
| Tanzania            | Yes ·                   | No | DK ' | N  |  |
| Observed            | 19                      | 0  | 0    | 19 |  |
| Expected            | 18.01                   | 0  | 99   | -  |  |
| Percentage Expected | 94.8                    | 0  | 5.2  |    |  |

$$\chi^2 = 1.04$$
 At 2 df, p > .50

### Question No. 5, Alternate Page 2

| And the second s | Distribution of Answers |    |     |    |
|--|-------------------------|----|-----|----|
| ्रुः. Tanzania   | Yes                     | No | DK  | N  |
| Observed \   | 11                      | 0  | 1   | 12 |
| Expected   | 11.38                   |    | .62 |    |
| Percentage Expected  | 94.8                    | 0  | 5.2 |    |

 $\chi^2 = .24$ 

At 2 df, p > .80

## Question No. 5, Alternate Page 3

| ,                   | Distrib |    |      |     |
|---------------------|---------|----|------|-----|
| Tanzania            | Yes     | No | DK . | N ' |
| Observed            | 14      | 0  | 1    | 15  |
| Expected            | 14.22   |    | .78  |     |
| Percentage Expected | 94.5    | 0  | 5.2  | •   |

 $\chi^2 = .07$  At 2 df, p > .95

### Results on Question 5

The nine chi square tests yielded probability values as follows: > .50, < .05, > .30, > .50, > .30, > .90, > .50, > .80, and > .95. All but one test indicate that there is no significant difference between distributions of answers for the total samples for each country and the subsamples for each country.

### Question No. 7

The question asked: As more people get access to radio broadcasts in your country, do you think this will help reduce differences and create greater national unity?

From the total sample of 88 Kenya students answering the question, the expected frequency for subsamples pertaining to alternate third pages is as follows: Yes--78.4 percent; No--21.6 percent. The observed distribution of answers for the three subsamples of Kenya students is given below together with results of the chi square test for each subsample, using 1 degree of freedom.

|                | Answers |    |    |                |       |
|----------------|---------|----|----|----------------|-------|
| Alternate Page | Yes     | No | N  | x <sup>2</sup> | P     |
| lst            | 23      | 6  | 29 | .015           | > .90 |
| , 2nd          | 24      | 6  | 30 | .045           | > .70 |
| 3rd ·          | 23      | 7  | 30 | .053           | > .80 |

For Uganda students, the expected frequency for subsamples is as follows: Yes--57.4 percent; No--42.6 percent. The observed distribution of answers for the three subsamples of Uganda students is given below, with test results.

|                | Answers |      |    |                |       |
|----------------|---------|------|----|----------------|-------|
| Alternate Page | Yes     | No   | N  | x <sup>2</sup> | P     |
| lst            | 4       | 4    | ,8 | .179           | > .50 |
| 2nd            | 12      | 9    | 21 | .0006          | > .98 |
| 3rd            | 14      | . 11 | 25 | .020           | > .80 |

For Tanzania students, the expected frequency for subsamples is as follows:  $\underline{\text{Yes--90.5}}$  percent;  $\underline{\text{No--9.5}}$  percent. The observed distribution of answers for the three subsamples of Tanzania students is given below with test results.

| •              | Ansv | vers |    |                |       |
|----------------|------|------|----|----------------|-------|
| Alternate Page | Yes  | No   | N  | x <sup>2</sup> | P     |
| lst            | 15   | · 3  | 18 | 1.052          | > .30 |
| · 2nd          | 11   | 1    | 12 | .019           | > .80 |
| 3rd            | 12   | 0 ,  | 12 | 1.260          | > .20 |

The results of the nine tests in this series for the data gathered on Question 7 show probability values greater than .90, .70, .80, .50, .98, .80, .30, .80, and .20. The interpretation of the results is that there are no significant differences between distribution of answers given in the subsamples and the distribution of answers given in the total sample.

### Question No. 8

The question asked: Which is the most important means of mass communication in national development of new African states?

From the total sample of 89 Kenya students answering the question, the expected frequency for subsamples pertaining to alternate pages is as follows:

| Medium    | Percentage |
|-----------|------------|
| Radio '   | 66.3       |
| Newspaper | 21.3       |
| Magazine  | 2.2        |
| Film      | 2.2        |
| Multiple  | 7.9        |

The observed distribution of answers for the three subsamples of Kenya students is given below together with the results of the chi square test for each subsample, using 4 degrees of freedom.

| •  | Alte              | Alternate Page    |                        |  |  |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|--|--|
| Medium   | 1                 | 2                 | 3                      |  |  |
| Radio<br>Newspaper<br>Magazine<br>Film<br>Multiple | 19<br>9<br>0<br>0 | 18<br>5<br>2<br>2 | 23<br>6<br>0<br>0<br>3 |  |  |
| Number   | 29                | 29                | 32                     |  |  |
| chi square .                                       | 3.296             | 6.155             | 1.744                  |  |  |
| p value  | > .50             | > .10             | > .70                  |  |  |

From the total sample of 59 Uganda students answering the question, the expected frequency for subsamples pertaining to alternate pages is given below:

| Medium    | Percentage |
|-----------|------------|
| Radio     | 71.2 ≈     |
| Newspaper | . 23.7     |
| Magazine  | 0.0        |
| Film      | 0.0        |
| Multiple  | 5.1        |

The observed distribution of answers for the three subsamples of Uganda students is given below together with the results of the chi square test for each subsample, using 4 degrees of freedom.

|  | Alternate Page    |                        |                   |  |  |
|--|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|--|--|
| Medium   | 1                 | 2                      | 3                 |  |  |
| Radio<br>Newspaper<br>Magazine<br>Film<br>Multiple | 5.<br>3<br>0<br>0 | 17<br>4<br>0<br>0<br>0 | 21<br>9<br>0<br>0 |  |  |
| Number   | 8                 | 21                     | 31                |  |  |
| chi square   | 1.136             | 1.543                  | .637              |  |  |
| p value  | > .20             | > .90                  | > .95             |  |  |

From the total sample of 45 Tanzania students answering the question, the expected frequency for subsamples

pertaining to alternate pages is as follows:

|     | Medium    | Percentage |
|-----|-----------|------------|
|     | Radio     | 84.4       |
| • • | Newspaper | 6.7        |
|     | Magazine  | 0.0        |
|     | Film      | 4.4        |
|     | Multiple  | 4.4        |

The observed distribution of answers for the three subsamples of Tanzania students is given below together with the results of the chi square test for each subsample, using 4 degrees of freedom.

|  | Alternate 1            |   | 'age              |
|--|------------------------|---|-------------------|
| Medium   | 1                      | John State of the | 3                 |
| Radio<br>Newspaper<br>Magazine<br>Film<br>Múltiple | 15<br>3<br>0<br>2<br>0 | 10<br>1<br>0<br>0<br>0  | 11<br>2<br>0<br>0 |
| Number   | 20                     | 11  | 13                |
| chi square   | 4.571                  | 1.117   | 3.893             |
| p value  | > .30                  | > .80   | > .30             |

The results of the nine tests in this series for data gathered on Question 8 show probability values greater than .50, .10, .70, .20, .90, .95, .30, .80, and .30. The interpretation of the results is that there are no significant

differences between distribution of answers given in the subsamples and the distribution of answers given in the total sample.

### Conclusion

In the findings for the preceding 27 chi square tests, only one test indicated results in a subsample were significantly different from the total sample at the .05 level of probability. The other 26 tests indicated no significant differences, and the majority of probability values were 7.50 or higher. It is reasonable to infer from these results that each of the subsamples determined by the three alternate page 3's of the questionaire were sufficiently like the total sample to be accepted as representative of the whole group of respondents.

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